

VOLUME I
A-L

ENCYCLOPEDIA *of the*
**AMERICAN
REVOLUTION** SECOND
EDITION
LIBRARY of MILITARY HISTORY



HAROLD E. SELESKY, *Editor in Chief*

*Encyclopedia of the
American Revolution*

SECOND EDITION

Library of Military History

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Preface

More than forty years ago, Mark Mayo Boatner, III, then a forty-four-year-old lieutenant colonel in the United States Army, saw the need for an encyclopedia that focused on the military aspects of the American Revolution. He completed and published the fruits of his labor in 1966; it was an impressive achievement for one man, who distilled nearly two centuries of scholarship on the war into a single wide-ranging yet manageable volume of almost 1900 entries. The book immediately earned a respected place in the reference literature on the war, and came to be so well regarded that historians of the period referred to it simply as “Boatner.” Amid the many noteworthy books on the complex conflict that gave birth to the American nation, “Boatner” was the premier place to go for concise, accurate information on how the war was waged and won. Historians, of course, continued to investigate and write about the war, often with “Boatner” serving as an important reference and guide. Their efforts were spurred in part by the bicentennial events of 1975–1983, but they were also responding to evolving priorities and changing interests in the discipline of history. As more information on war making in colonial and revolutionary America was uncovered, and new questions were asked of familiar material, historians began to put together a more complete picture of what happened during the war, and understood more about why it happened, than had previously been the case. Because the literature on the American Revolution has burgeoned in the years since the original edition of “Boatner” was published, it is time to incorporate the information and new perspectives of that scholarship into an updated work that satisfies the needs and interests of the twenty-first-century reader.

The present volumes are a comprehensive revision of the original edition of Mark Boatner’s 1966 encyclopedia. All 1700 entries in the 2006 edition have been reviewed, and all but a small percentage have been comprehensively revised and augmented. Recent scholarship has been incorporated into the revised entries, as well as used to produce entirely new entries on subjects that had not been explored or contemplated forty years ago. These new subjects include “African Americans in the Revolution,” “Historiography,” “Iconography,” “Religion and the American Revolution,” “Continental Army, Social History” and “Violence,” among others. A new cluster of entries on mobilization in the colonies is also an original contribution to this edition. All entries are combined in a single alphabetical sequence, the plan Boatner employed in his original encyclopedia. This second edition is further enhanced by the addition of a thematic outline of entries, and a comprehensive updated bibliography. The purpose of the present volumes remains what it was in

1966: to provide a handy source for concise, accurate information on the military aspects of the American Revolution.

In addition to incorporating recent scholarship in revised and new entries, the present volumes differ from the original “Boatner” in another significant way. Where the 1966 encyclopedia was the product of the perspective and hard work of one person, these volumes are works of collective scholarship. Many historians have contributed their expertise to the present volumes, and their passion for and knowledge of their subjects is evident throughout, even as they write within the necessarily limited space of an encyclopedia entry. Every new entry ends with the name of its author, and every revised entry of substantial length ends with the name of the person who reviewed and revised it. (Shorter entries, typically definitions of military terms, mentions of physical locations, and alternate names for things and events known better by another name, as well as all cross references, do not carry an attribution, although all of them have been reviewed and revised where necessary.) The revisions undertaken to update the longer entries range widely in scope and substance. Many of these entries, including the biographical sketches on the most important leaders and all of the accounts of major battles and campaigns, have been rewritten in light of modern scholarship, and thus bear little resemblance to the original entry in the 1965 volume. All entries, of course, reflect the perspective of their authors or revisers; every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the factual information contained in each entry, but the interpretations and opinions are those of its author or reviser. Scholarship in history works that way: from the voices of many investigators, each with its own emphasis and point of view, come, eventually, a synthesis that allows us all to understand a bit more clearly what it was like to have lived and fought in a war that began more than 230 years ago.

It should be noted that the two volumes of the encyclopedia are part of a trilogy with the revised edition of Boatner’s *Landmarks of the American Revolution: A Guide to Locating and Knowing What Happened at the Sites of Independence*, originally published in 1973. The *Landmarks* book has been thoroughly updated in a process similar to that whereby the encyclopedia has been revised, and provides a comprehensive companion for the reader interested in the current state and accessibility of many of the sites mentioned in the encyclopedia.

As in all works of collective scholarship, the person whose name is on the masthead owes an incalculable debt to the many authors who have contributed their time and expertise to making this final product worthy of its pedigree and able to stand the test of time. Rather than single out a few, and thereby relegate the rest, I invite readers to thumb through the encyclopedia, to read with purpose or at leisure, and to note the name of the person whose words they have digested and from which they have learned a bit more about the conflict that defined the American nation. The names of all contributors are listed alphabetically in one group elsewhere in this front matter.

At the risk of seeming invidious, I would, however, wish to thank two individuals by name. Stephen Wasserstein is the editor at Thomson Gale in New York who contacted me about the possibility of updating Mark Boatner’s singular achievement. Stephen cheerfully put up with me, offered his counsel and assistance at every turn, and fully deserves the heartfelt thanks and appreciation I now offer him. These volumes owe their existence to him as much, or more, than anyone else.

The actual production of the volumes was in the capable hands of the Thomson Gale team at the company’s headquarters in Farmington Hills, Michigan. Stephen Cusack, project editor on the history team for the Macmillan and Scribner’s imprints, was the leader of the craftspeople who created the handsome volumes you now hold. In an age when cost-consciousness can be taken to extremes, he orchestrated a demonstration of how high quality can still be achieved on a tight budget.

Every author—and editor, too—owes a debt of gratitude to the family members who, in words that are as true as they are conventional, made it possible for me to undertake and

complete this project. In my case, those long-suffering—and endlessly supportive—individuals were my wife Joyce, our daughters Margaret and Caroline, and our canines Spenser, Emily and Daphne. It is also conventional, and accurate, for the editor to accept responsibility for whatever flaws might remain in the work. This I do so gladly, believing that it is more important to get scholarship that stimulates thinking into the hands of the reader, even if a few flaws remain.

OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

War remains the most complex task that any society can undertake. The decision to resort to politically sanctioned, purposeful armed violence generally arrives when a critical mass of a society's leaders wins the approval of enough of its politically active members so that war can be initiated and sustained with some prospect that the society will thereby earn a favorable outcome to whatever problem could not be resolved short of war. The decision that war is the only, or at least the best available, means to resolve a political problem is powerfully shaped by the character of the society. The makeup of that society, in turn, profoundly shapes how the war is imagined and waged. The course of the war—and no war ever resembles exactly what either side thought it would look like—exerts pressures and strains that can come to determine the structure and development of the societies involved. It therefore behooves us to investigate and understand how wars begin, are waged, and become part of the fabric and memory of our society. No war can be comprehended in isolation from the host of political, social, economic, geographic, and racial factors—to name but a few—that form the totality of a society. But it is possible to begin one's inquiry with the aspects of a conflict that involve the understanding and manipulation of armed violence, what might be called “military history.” As long as one remains mindful that war making is connected in a web with everything else in society, it is intellectually possible to focus on the armed struggle itself.

The term “American Revolution” encompasses far more than the military conflict between Great Britain and its continental North American colonies between 1775 and 1783. The full story of the American Revolution begins roughly in the middle of the eighteenth century, when the assumptions about the character and stability of the British Empire in North America, as we can see in retrospect, were more or less shared by British citizens living on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Over the next twenty-five years, circumstances, decisions, and events shredded those assumptions, to the point that open war broke out between the colonies and Britain in April 1775 and the colonies declared their political independence in July 1776. For eight years—the longest war in the history of the American nation until the Vietnam conflict—the men and women we know as “Patriots” created and used military and naval forces to defeat British attempts to re-establish the authority of the Crown over the colonies. The military aspects of that struggle, more accurately known as the War for American Independence, remain the focus of these volumes. The Revolution itself continued after the end of the war, as the victors continued their efforts to create new forms of governance that would be as widely accepted, and therefore as stable, as the ones they had once known under the British Empire. That process included the writing of a new federal constitution and the establishment of a working federal government, and culminated in the peaceful transition of power from one political party to another following the election of 1800.

Winning the War for American Independence was the indispensable prerequisite for the creation of an American nation. Had the British government managed to suppress the rebels in its North American colonies, the men we revere as the founding fathers would be known today as nothing more than the leaders of a failed insurrection, not the architects of a still-thriving experiment in republican government. Given the anger and antipathy eighteenth-century monarchies felt towards rebels, it is surely possible that some of the more prominent American rebels would have paid with their lives for challenging the established authority of the king-in-Parliament.

The outcome of the military conflict was, of course, not predestined. Each side faced a task of daunting, and in many ways unprecedented, complexity, but each side, too, had significant assets. The activists in the colonies, those who had concluded that British attempts to reform the empire amounted to unendurable intrusions on the rights and liberties of their societies, had to organize armed resistance to the most daunting array of military and naval power in their generation. The British government had to use its military and naval power judiciously in the trickiest of circumstances, using armed violence to restore political allegiance without completely alienating their subjects. At numerous points during the conflict, politicians and military commanders faced what we might call points of contingency, where the choices they made significantly shaped the options available thereafter.

Five crossroads stand out, battles that a traditional military historian might single out because the outcomes were unexpected, against the odds, and contributed significantly in shaping the conflict. The skirmishes outside Boston at Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775 demonstrated to both the British and the Americans that the colonists, militarily unsophisticated by European standards, could and would fight effectively against well-trained British regular troops. Less than two months later, on 17 June, at the clash on the Charlestown peninsula that came to be called the battle of Bunker Hill, the British fumbled their best chance of demonstrating to the colonists the imbecility of their armed rebellion against the Crown. A year and a half later, at Trenton, New Jersey, on Christmas Day 1776, the rebellion that seemed to be in its last throes was plucked from the dustbin of history by America's greatest soldier, the aristocratic Virginia planter George Washington.

Having demonstrated that their rebellion would not crumble quickly, the Americans had to find a way to convert their resilience—their ability not to lose—into a way to win political independence. It appeared that the only solution lay overseas, in the hands of Britain's ancient enemy, France, and especially in its resurgent navy. The French king had already decided to turn covert French aid into open assistance, and thus to declare war on a Britain weakened by colonial rebellion, when the Americans captured a British army at Saratoga, in upstate New York, on 19 October 1777. Success in this subsidiary theater ratified the French decision to intervene, boosted American morale, and seemed to open the door to final victory. But it was four long years before the new partners could find the right opportunity to work together effectively. Forced by French intervention to find a new strategy to defeat the rebellion, the British tried to detach the Deep South from the rebel alliance. Meeting fierce local resistance, they turned their attention to Virginia in 1781. French naval assistance was the critical element in allowing the Americans to force the surrender of another British army at Yorktown on 21 October 1781. The war ended when Parliament accepted the fact that further efforts to recover the political allegiance of the colonies were a waste of time and money, especially since they were certain that Britain could readily maintain America in a continued state of economic dependency.

In the years since the original "Boatner" was published, historians have clarified this traditional military analysis and, more importantly, added to it a dimension not fully evident in 1966. Because we have come to recognize that "military history" includes so much more than just battles and leaders, our understanding of the war now begins with the mobilization of political support in the thirteen separate and distinct colonial societies of mainland British North America to resist British imperial intrusions and exactions, efforts the resisters demonized as British "tyranny." Once a sufficient number of resisters came to understand that their movement might one day have to field armed men capable of organizing a sustained and violent resistance, the colonial activists began to make preparations for that eventuality. They began to accumulate the physical means of resistance, including firearms and gunpowder, without adequate amounts of which no sustained or effective resistance would be possible.

More importantly, the leaders of the resistance had to sustain and expand popular support for their cause. They had to present an analysis of public events and proposals for a

course of action that would motivate a sufficiently large number of the politically aware adult white men in their societies to subscribe to a point of view that demanded action—violent if necessary—to reverse the erosion of their rights, liberties, and potential to capitalize on economic and social opportunities in the future. Some contemporaries—principally those who supported, or at least acquiesced in, the expansion of British authority—thought that men like Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry were nothing more than rabble-rousing demagogues who sought to lead the people away from their true allegiance, for reasons having more to do with personal profit and prestige than principled support for liberty. Some historians have agreed. Other historians have countered by suggesting that even men motivated by self-interest had to shape a message that would resonate with the widest possible audience, for without widespread support no resistance movement could hope to succeed, or, one day, field the number and quality of soldiers needed to oppose the well-trained army and well-manned ships that Britain could command. We now realize that the opponents of increased imperial control—the men and women often revered as “Patriots” and “founding fathers”—were not above using threats and intimidation to expand popular support and suppress pro-British dissenters. Our present understanding of how these societies mobilized for war combines an awareness of the mix of physical, social, economic, political, and emotional factors that motivate people, with an appreciation of the enormous complexity of the process of war making in an agricultural society, where the problems included the constant drain on society’s productive resources, the breathtaking expenses and financial expedients involved in raising and maintaining soldiers and sailors, and the debilitating uncertainty of not knowing how or when the conflict and the burden would end.

All of the complexity of this sort of war must be understood, moreover, in a premodern context. George Washington was a prominent member of the ruling Virginia oligarchy, a slave-holding plantation owner who believed he had a right to help direct the future of his society; he was not the precursor of the modern American general officer. Although he had more military (and combat) experience than any other American, he was not a professional soldier who had been trained to manipulate well-constructed armed forces along the lines suggested by the study of history and the principles of war. Nor was the Continental Army the direct ancestor of the modern United States Army (or the militia of the modern National Guard). Both forms of military organization were based, at least theoretically, on the model of a locally rooted, largely voluntary organization in which citizens undertook military service as part of their civic responsibilities, as it had been modified to suit local circumstances during the long series of imperial wars against French and Native American competitors since 1689. As the burden of service became increasingly difficult for men of some affluence to bear—meaning those who had a political stake in the outcome—societies willingly relegated more military service to younger, less affluent men, many of whom had fewer family ties to particular localities and could be induced to see the value of shouldering the burden of military service by the payment of financial incentives. The colonies had raised soldiers in this fashion during the Seven Years’ War that ended in 1763. In the same way, the rebels raised Continental forces that were able, ultimately, to meet the British on the field of battle on more or less equal terms. Together with much larger numbers of militiamen serving for brief periods, the rebels managed to field potent enough military organizations so that the British never managed to find a way to suppress the armed rebellion. By adapting and modifying their colonial military experience in a manner that remained more effective than efficient and in which the need to maintain popular support nearly always trumped the more strictly military demands of fighting the war, the American people won the chance to determine their own political destiny.

What is most remarkable about that process—what sets it apart from other examples of “people’s war” before and since, and makes it vital to study and understand—is that the leaders of the “people” managed to incorporate and sustain ideas of freedom, equality, and opportunity for an unprecedented number of adult white men in their societies; in the broadest sense, it does not make any practical difference if they did so because they felt

compelled to win popular support or because they believed fervently in the principles they espoused. That their idea of who was entitled to freedom, equality, and opportunity seems to us to be restricted and narrow ought not to earn them our disapprobation or lack of respect. It matters more that they imbedded in our language and our culture a set of ideals and principles, however imperfectly they implemented them, that have endured, and distinguish our society from much of the rest of the world. The essential account of how they got that chance, of how they won the war that enabled them to chart their own political and social future, is the story told in this encyclopedia.

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Thematic Outline

This outline organizes the encyclopedia's 800 longest entries into twenty broad categories. All subsections are in alphabetical order except for the battles, which are organized chronologically.

To avoid repetition and for purposes of clarity, precedence is given to the area in which the biographical subject attained prominence during the Revolution; thus, George Clinton, who served as a soldier during the war, was most notable as governor of New York and is listed under political leaders. Foreign-born volunteers who fought with Continental forces are listed under "Continental Soldiers." No subject is listed more than once.

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- Association
- Background and Origins of the Revolution
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- Boston Tea Party
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- Continental Congress
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- Declaratory Act
- Factionalism in America during the Revolution
- Gaspée* Affair
- Independence
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- Loyalists in the American Revolution
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- Nonimportation
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- Prime Ministers of Britain
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- Quebec Act
- Regulators
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- Salem, Massachusetts
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- Shays's Rebellion
- Signers
- Sons of Liberty
- Stamp Act
- Taxation Without Representation is Tyranny
- Tea Act
- Townshend Revenue Act
- United States of America
- Whigs and Tories

2. BRITISH POLITICAL LEADERS

- Barré, Isaac
- Burke, Edmund
- Bute, John Stuart, Third Earl of
- Campbell, Lord William
- Chatham, William Pitt, First Earl of
- Eden, Robert
- Fox, Charles James
- George III
- Grenville, George
- Johnson, Sir William
- Martin, Josiah

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Murray, John
North, Sir Frederick
Pownall, Thomas
Rockingham, Charles Watson-
Wentworth, Second Marquess of
Sackville, George
Sandwich, John Montagu, Fourth
Earl of
Shelburne, William Petty Fitzmaurice,
Earl of
Shirley, William
Townshend, Charles
Tryon, William
Wilkes, John
Wright, Governor Sir James

3. PATRIOT POLITICAL LEADERS

Adams, John
Adams, Samuel
Bartlett, Josiah
Belcher, Jonathan
Boone, Daniel
Boudinot, Elias
Burke, Thomas
Carroll, Charles
Chase, Samuel
Clay, Joseph
Clinton, George
Clymer, George
Dickinson, John
Drayton, William Henry
Duane, James
Duer, William
Dulany, Daniel
Franklin, Benjamin
Gadsden, Christopher
Gerry, Elbridge
Gwinnett, Button
Habersham, Joseph
Hall, Lyman
Hancock, John
Henry, Patrick
Hopkins, Stephen
Houstoun, John
Jefferson, Thomas
Laurens, Henry
Lee, Richard Henry
Livingston, William
Lovell, James
Lynch, Thomas, Jr.
Madison, James
Martin, John
Mason, George
McKean, Thomas
Middleton, Arthur
Middleton, Henry
Moore, Maurice
Morris, Gouverneur
Morris, Lewis
Nelson, Thomas
Otis, James

Paine, Robert Treat
Paine, Thomas
Penn, John
Pinckney, Charles
Randolph, Edmund Jenings
Randolph, Peyton
Read, George
Revere, Paul
Rodney, Caesar
Ross, George
Rutledge, Edward
Rutledge, John
Sears, Isaac
Sherman, Roger
Smith, James
Stockton, Richard
Taylor, George
Trumbull, Jonathan, Sr.
Warren, James
Warren, Joseph
Wilson, James
Witherspoon, John
Wolcott, Oliver
Wythe, George

4. BRITISH OFFICERS, ARMY

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Cathcart, Sir William Schaw
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Clinton, Henry
Cornwallis, Charles
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Dalrymple, William
Debbieg, Hugh
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Erskine, William
Ferguson, Patrick
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Howe, William
Jackson, Robert
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MacLean, Allan
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Montresor, John

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Percy, Hugh
Phillips, William
Pitcairn, John
Prescott, Richard
Prévost, Augustine
Rawdon-Hastings, Francis
St. Luc de la Corne, Pierre (or Louis)
Simcoe, John Graves
Tarleton, Banastre
Vaughan, John
Watson, John Watson Tadwell
Webster, James
Wolfe, James

5. BRITISH OFFICERS, NAVY

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Graves, Thomas
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6. CONTINENTAL NAVAL OFFICERS

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Hopkins, Esek
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Read, James
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Whipple, Abraham

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Butler, Zebulon
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Carrington, Edward
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Champe, John
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Cleveland, Benjamin

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 Davidson, William Lee
 Davie, William Richardson
 Dayton, Elias
 Dearborn, Henry
 De Haas, John Philip
 De Kalb, Johann
 Dickinson, Philemon
 Dooly, John
 Elbert, Samuel
 Febiger, Christian
 Fermoy, Matthias Alexis de Roche
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 Franks, David Salisbury
 Frye, Joseph
 Gansevoort, Peter
 Gates, Horatio
 Gibson, John
 Gimat de Soubadère, Jean-Joseph
 Gist, Mordecai
 Glover, John
 Graham, Joseph
 Green, John
 Greene, Christopher
 Greene, Nathanael
 Gridley, Richard
 Hall, Prince
 Hamilton, Alexander
 Hampton, Wade
 Hand, Edward
 Harmar, Josiah
 Hayne, Isaac
 Hazen, Moses
 Heath, William
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 Hogun, James
 Howard, John Eager
 Howe, Robert
 Hull, William
 Humphreys, David
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 Irvine, William
 Jackson, James
 Kirkwood, Robert
 Knox, Henry
 Kosciuszko, Thaddeus Andrzej
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 Lafayette, Marquis de
 Lamb, John
 Laumoy, Jean-Baptiste-Joseph,
 Chevalier de
 Laurance, John
 Learned, Ebenezer
 Le Bègue de Presle Duportail, Louis
 Lee, Charles (1731–1782)
 Lee, Henry
 Lewis, Andrew
 Lincoln, Benjamin
 Livingston, Henry Brockholst

Lynch, Charles
 Marion, Francis
 Marshall, John
 Mathews, George
 Maxwell, William
 McDougall, Alexander
 McIntosh, John
 McIntosh, Lachlan
 McLane, Allen
 Meigs, Return Jonathan
 Mercer, Hugh
 Mifflin, Thomas
 Monroe, James
 Montgomery, Richard
 Moore, James
 Morgan, Daniel
 Mottin de La Balme, Augustin
 Moultrie, William
 Moylan, Stephen
 Muhlenberg, John Peter Gabriel
 Murphy, Timothy
 Nicola, Lewis
 Nixon, John (1727–1815)
 Ogden, Aaron
 Ogden, Matthias
 Oswald, Eleazer
 Parsons, Samuel Holden
 Paterson, John
 Penot Lombart, Louis-Pierre
 Pickens, Andrew
 Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth
 Pinckney, Thomas
 Pomeroy, Seth
 Poor, Enoch
 Preudhomme de Borre, Philippe
 Hubert, Chevalier de
 Pulaski, Casimir
 Putnam, Israel
 Putnam, Rufus
 Ramsay, Nathaniel
 Reed, James
 Reed, Joseph
 Rosenthal, Gustave Henrich
 Wetter von
 St. Clair, Arthur
 Sampson, Deborah
 Scammell, Alexander
 Schaffner, George
 Schuyler, Philip John
 Scott, Charles
 Sevier, John
 Shelby, Isaac
 Smallwood, William
 Spencer, Joseph
 Stark, John
 Stephen, Adam
 Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von
 Stewart, Walter
 Sullivan, John
 Sumner, Jethro
 Sumter, Thomas
 Teissèdree de Fleury, François Louis

Thomas, John
 Thompson, William
 Tilghman, Tench
 Tousard, Ann-Louis
 Tronson du Coudray, Philippe
 Charles Jean Baptiste
 Trumbull, Jonathan, Jr.
 Trumbull, Joseph
 Tuffin, Armand Charles, Marquis
 de La Rouërie
 Tupper, Benjamin
 Van Cortlandt, Philip
 Varick, Richard
 Varnum, James Mitchell
 Ward, Artemas
 Warner, Seth
 Washington, George
 Washington, William
 Wayne, Anthony
 Weedon, George
 Wilkinson, James
 Willett, Marinus
 Williams, Otho Holland
 Woodford, William
 Wooster, David

8. LOYALIST LEADERS

Brown, Thomas
 Butler, John
 Butler, Walter
 Coffin, John
 Connolly, John
 Cruger, John Harris
 De Lancey, Oliver (1718–1785)
 De Lancey, Oliver (1749–1822)
 Duché, Jacob
 Fanning, David
 Fanning, Edmund
 Franklin, William
 Galloway, Joseph
 Girty, Simon
 Grierson, James
 Hutchinson, Thomas
 Johnson, Guy
 Johnson, Sir John
 Kemble, Stephen
 Lovell, John
 McKee, Alexander
 Rankin, William
 Rivington, James
 Robinson, Beverley
 Rogers, Robert
 Ruggles, Timothy
 Skene, Philip
 Sower, Christopher

9. FRENCH OFFICERS

Barras de Saint-Laurent,
 Jacques-Melchior, Comte de

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Chastellux, François-Jean de Beauvoir,
Chevalier de
Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat,
Comte d'
Grasse, François Joseph Paul, Comte de
Guichen, Luc Urbain de Bouëxic,
Comte de
Landais, Pierre de
Rochambeau, Jean-Baptiste Donatien
de Vimeur, Comte de
Suffren de Saint Tropez,
Pierre André de
Ternay, Charles Louis d'Arsac,
Chevalier de
Vence, Jean Gaspard

10. GERMAN OFFICERS

Donop, Carl Emil Kurt von
Ewald, Johann von
Knyphausen, Wilhelm, Baron von
Riedesel, Baron Friedrich Adolphus

11. BATTLES (IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

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Ticonderoga, New York, American
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St. John's, Canada (14–18 May 1775)
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Norfolk, Virginia
Moores Creek Bridge
Cedars, The
Trois Rivières
Gwynn Island, Virginia
Long Island, New York, Battle of
Kips Bay, New York
Harlem Heights, New York
Pell's Point, New York
White Plains, New York
Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia
Fort Washington, New York
Fort Lee, New Jersey
Basking Ridge, New Jersey
Trenton, New Jersey
Princeton, New Jersey
Fort Independence Fiasco,
New York
Bound Brook, New Jersey
Brunswick, New Jersey
Ticonderoga, New York, British
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Hubbardton, Vermont
Fort Anne, New York
McCrea Atrocity
Oriskany, New York
Bennington Raid
Brandywine, Pennsylvania

Warren or White Horse Tavern,
Pennsylvania
Ticonderoga Raid
Saratoga, First Battle of
Paoli, Pennsylvania
Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of
Saratoga, Second Battle of
Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania
Saratoga Surrender
Fort Mercer, New Jersey
Quinton's Bridge, New Jersey
Wyoming Valley Massacre,
Pennsylvania
Barren Hill, Pennsylvania
Monmouth, New Jersey
German Flats (Herkimer), New York
Unadilla, New York
Cherry Valley Massacre, New York
St. Lucia, Captured by the British
Savannah, Georgia (29 December
1778)
Kettle Creek, Georgia
Briar Creek, Georgia
Stono Ferry, South Carolina
Stony Point, New York
Minisink, New York (19–22 July,
1779)
Paulus Hook, New Jersey
Newtown, New York
Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779)
Lenud's Ferry, South Carolina
Waxhaws, South Carolina
Ramseur's Mill, North Carolina
Williamson's Plantation, South
Carolina
Bull's Ferry, New Jersey
Rocky Mount, South Carolina
Hanging Rock, South Carolina
Fishing Creek, North Carolina
Great Savannah, South Carolina
Augusta, Georgia (14–18 September
1780)
Wahab's Plantation, North Carolina
Charlotte, North Carolina
Black Mingo Creek, South Carolina
Kings Mountain, South Carolina
Schoharie Valley, New York
Klock's Field, New York
Fish Dam Ford, South Carolina
Blackstocks, South Carolina
Halfway Swamp–Singleton's, South
Carolina
Hammond's Store Raid of William
Washington
Cowpens, South Carolina
Cowans Ford, North Carolina
Haw River, North Carolina
Wetzells Mills (or Mill), North
Carolina
Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina
Fort Watson, South Carolina
(15–23 April 1781)

Hobkirk's Hill, South Carolina
Petersburg, Virginia
Pensacola, Florida
Fort Motte, South Carolina
Fort Granby, South Carolina
Charlottesville Raid, Virginia
Green Spring (Jamestown Ford,
Virginia)
Quinby Bridge, South Carolina
New London Raid, Connecticut
Eutaw Springs, South Carolina
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13. WARS, CAMPAIGNS, AND OPERATIONS

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Burgoyne's Offensive
Camden Campaign
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Charleston Expedition of Clinton in
1780
Charleston Raid of Prevost
Charleston Siege of 1780
Clinton's Expedition
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Connecticut Coast Raid
Danbury Raid, Connecticut
Dorchester Heights, Massachusetts
Dunmore's War
Forbes's Expedition to Fort
Duquesne
Georgia Expedition of Wayne
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Jamaica (West Indies)
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New Jersey Campaign
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New York
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 Nicaragua
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 (22 May–19 June 1781)
 Penobscot Expedition, Maine
 Philadelphia Campaign
 Pontiac's War
 St. John's, Canada
 St. Leger's Expedition
 Southern Campaigns of Nathanael
 Greene
 Southern Theater, Military
 Operations in
 Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of
 Knyphausen
 Sullivan's Expedition against the
 Iroquois
 Virginia, Military Operations in
 Western Operations
 West Indies in the Revolution
 Wilmington, North Carolina
 Yorktown Campaign

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Achard de Bonvouloir et Loyauté,
 Julien Alexandre
 Andre, John
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 Bailey, Ann Hennis Trotter
 Bancroft, Edward
 Billy (Will the Traitor)
 Church, Benjamin
 Conway Cabal
 Huddy–Asgill Affair
 Intelligence, American
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 Wallis, Samuel
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 Williamson, Andrew

**15. MILITARY POSTS, CAMPS, AND
 FORTIFICATIONS**

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 Crown Point, New York
 Fort Laurens, Ohio
 Fort Stanwix, New York
 Fort William Henry (Fort George),
 New York
 Hudson River and the Highlands
 Morristown Winter Quarters,
 New Jersey
 No-man's Land around New York City
 Pittsburgh

Valley Forge Winter Quarters,
 Pennsylvania
 West Point, New York

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 ORGANIZATION**

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 Admirals, Rank of
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 Artillery of the Eighteenth Century
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 Battalion
 Bayonets and Bayonet Attacks
 Board of War
 British Legion
 Brown Bess
 Camp Followers
 Cartridge Boxes
 Champlain Squadrons
 Cheval de Frise
 Communication Time
 Connecticut, Mobilization in
 Continental Army, Draft
 Continental Army, Organization
 Continental Army, Social History
 Convention Army
 Corporal Punishment
 Council of War
 Delaware Continentals
 Engineers
 Flying Camp
 Fraser Highlanders
 Georgia, Mobilization in
 German Auxiliaries
 Gunpowder
 Interior Lines
 Knapsacks and the Soldiers' Burden
 Light Infantry
 Line
 Marines
 Marksmanship
 Maryland, Mobilization in
 Massachusetts, Mobilization in
 Military Justice
 Military Manuals
 Militia in the North
 Minutemen
 Music, Military
 Muskets and Musketry
 New Hampshire, Mobilization in
 New Jersey, Mobilization in
 New York, Mobilization in
 North Carolina, Mobilization in
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 Soldiers' Shelter
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 Vermont, Mobilization in
 Virginia, Mobilization in
 Volunteers of Ireland

17. AMERICAN INDIANS

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 Cornplanter
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 Gnadenhutzen Massacre, Ohio
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 Langlade, Charles Michel de
 Montour Family
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 Shawnee
 Stuart, John

18. FOREIGN RELATIONS

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 Stainville
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 Deane, Silas
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 Dutch Participation in the American
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 Izard, Ralph
 Jay, John
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 Lee, Arthur
 Lee, William
 Livingston, Robert R.
 Paris, Treaty of (10 February 1763)
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 Peace Commission of the Howes
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Spanish Participation in the American Revolution
Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Comte de

19. CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXTS

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Copley, John Singleton
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Freneau, Philip Morin
Gordon, William
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Hopkinson, Francis
Iconography
Jones, Thomas

L'enfant, Pierre-Charles
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Moravian Settlements
Myths and Misconceptions
Peale, Charles Willson
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Presbyterians
Quakers
Ramsay, David
Religion and the American Revolution
Roman Catholics
Smith, William (II)
Trumbull, John
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20. ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND SCIENTIFIC CONTEXTS

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Cochran, John
Erskine, Robert
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French Covert Aid
Hortalez & Cie
Manufacturing in America
Medical Practice During the Revolution
Mercantilism
Money of the Eighteenth Century
Morgan, John
Morris, Robert (1734–1806)
Nixon, John (1733–1808)
Ohio Company of Virginia
Privateers and Privateering
Prizes and Prize Money
Resources of America and Great Britain Compared
Rush, Benjamin
Shippen Family of Philadelphia
Thacher, James
Thompson, Benjamin Count Rumford
Trade, The Board of
Transport
Watercraft

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A

AACHEN, TREATY OF. 18 October 1748. Aachen is the German name for Aix-la-Chapelle.

SEE ALSO *Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of.*

ABATIS. An obstacle formed of trees felled toward the enemy.

ABENAKI. The Abenaki were a loose confederacy of Algonquin tribes located in what is now northern New England and the Canadian Maritime provinces. European contact brought a number of devastating plagues that reduced the population of the confederacy by an estimated three-fourths. After King Philip's War in 1676, the Abenaki absorbed most of the fleeing natives of southern New England. Allied with the French, who had a mission at Norridgewock on the Kennebec, the Abenaki resisted English expansion into northern New England, launching a number of preemptive raids against settlements. In 1722 Massachusetts declared war on the Abenaki. What is known as Dummer's War reached a climax when the New Englanders destroyed Norridgewock in 1724. The Kennebec, part of the Abenaki confederation, were dispersed, mainly into Canada, and their new capital was located on the St. Francis River near its junction with the St. Lawrence. A peace treaty was signed in 1727. The Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and Malecite did not migrate, however, and in 1749 the former nation made peace with

the English. Some other Indians returned to Norridgewock, but this place was raided again in 1749; in 1754 its inhabitants returned to St. Francis. There they were attacked in 1759 by Robert Rogers, who burned their town and ended their participation in the Seven Years' War. The American Revolution divided the Abenaki. Most sided with the British, but the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy served with the rebels while the St. Francis and Micmac split between the two contenders. Massachusetts acknowledged the services of the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy by granting them reservations in northern Maine; the remaining Abenaki lost all claim to their lands within the new United States and sought refuge in Canada. The Abenaki are no longer even recognized by the U.S. government as existing.

SEE ALSO *Rogers, Robert.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ABERCROMBIE, JAMES. (?–1775). British officer. Brother of Ralph and Robert Abercrombie, he served with the Royal Highlanders in America, where he became experienced in forest warfare. He was aide-de-camp to his uncle, James Abercromby, and was later on Jeffery Amherst's staff. He reached the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1770. Abercrombie died on 28 June 1775 of wounds received in leading the grenadiers' assaults on Breed's Hill.

revised by John Oliphant

ABERCROMBY, JAMES. (1706–1781). British general. A laird's son from Banffshire in Scotland, he rose to colonel in the army in 1746. Through Newcastle's patronage, in 1756 he became Loudoun's second in command with the local rank of major general. He proved a solid subordinate. Becoming commander in chief himself in 1758, he unwisely attacked Ticonderoga without waiting for his artillery. Although removed from his command, he was promoted to lieutenant general in 1759 and general in 1772. In Parliament he supported the coercion of the American colonies. He died on 23 April 1781.

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revised by John Oliphant

ABERCROMBY, SIR RALPH. (1734–1801). British army officer. Born in Clackmannanshire, Scotland, in October 1734, Ralph was the elder brother of Sir Robert Abercromby and of James Abercromby, who died of wounds received at Bunker Hill. He served in Germany in the Seven Years' War and was elected to Parliament in 1774. His insistence on voting according to his conscience and his opposition to the war in America seriously damaged his career prospects until 1793. An able commander with strong humanitarian principles, Abercromby was mortally wounded at Abu Qir Bay in Egypt in March 1801. His heroic death caught the public imagination, and his victory over the French army of occupation restored the reputation of the British army.

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ABERCROMBY, SIR ROBERT. (c. 1740–1827). British army officer. Robert Abercromby was baptized at his family's Clackmannanshire estate in Scotland on 13 October 1740. He won a commission by his gallantry at Ticonderoga on 8 July 1758 and rose to captain in 1761. Promoted to major in 1772, he became lieutenant colonel of the Thirty-seventh Foot in 1773. Not sharing his brother Ralph's doubts about the American war, he served with distinction at Long Island in August 1776 and

at Brandywine and Germantown in September and October 1777, respectively. In 1778 he made an expedition to destroy shipping in the Delaware, took part in the action at Crooked Billet in May, and was wounded at Monmouth on 28 June. He sailed south with the Charleston expedition of 1780 and stayed to serve under Cornwallis, whom he impressed. In the early hours of 16 October 1781, he led a sortie from Yorktown that temporarily silenced six enemy guns.

After the war he followed his new patron, Cornwallis, to India, where he rose to major general in 1790 and was knighted in 1792. Despite Cornwallis's warning that the post was beyond Abercromby's competence, the latter was appointed commander in chief in 1793. Four years later, plagued by failing eyesight and his authority compromised by an officers' conspiracy, he was forced to return home. Promoted to lieutenant general later in the year and to full general in 1802, he died in Scotland in November 1827.

SEE ALSO *Long Island, New York, Battle of; Yorktown Campaign.*

revised by John Oliphant

ABOVILLE, FRANÇOIS MARIE, COMTE D'. (1730–1817). French officer. Aboville began his military career in 1744 under an uncle who was an artillery officer. Distinguishing himself in the Seven Years' War, he was promoted to captain *en second* in 1759 and was made a chevalier in the Order of St. Louis in 1763. He became *chef de brigade* in 1776 and lieutenant general in 1778. Commander of French artillery in Rochambeau's force, his efforts at Yorktown led to a personal acknowledgment from Washington, which earned him the rank of brigadier of infantry on 5 December 1781. Promoted to brigadier general in 1788, he commanded artillery of the French army in the north under Rochambeau in 1792 and became lieutenant colonel that year. Retired in 1802, he was named grand officer of the Legion of Honor in 1804 and a hereditary peer four years later. He was confirmed a peer during the Bourbon restoration.

SEE ALSO *Yorktown Campaign; Yorktown, Siege of.*

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ABRAHAM, PLAINS OF (QUEBEC)

SEE *Plains of Abraham*, 13 September 1759, 15 November 1775, and 6 May 1776.

ACHARD DE BONVOULOIR ET LOYAUTÉ, JULIEN ALEXANDRE.

(1749–1783). French secret agent. Bonvouloir, a cadet of a noble Norman family, had settled in Saint Domingue in the early 1770s. Traveling in North America for the climate, he toured the colonies before the outbreak of war and met in Philadelphia with members of the first Continental Congress. Claiming to have gained valuable information about the Americans while there, he went to London and met French ambassador comte de Guines. On 8 September 1775 he returned to America with instructions from Guines to observe and to inform the Americans that the French had no intentions on Canada, wished them well, and would be glad if circumstances permitted their ships in French ports.

Masquerading as a merchant of Antwerp and instructed by Guines never to say the word “French,” he had three meetings with Benjamin Franklin and other members of the Congress’s Committee of Secret Correspondence. Although he denied any official connections and claimed that he was there only to explore the possibilities of making private deals to supply the Americans with munitions, the committee members sensed his real mission. This is apparent from the questions they submitted to him in writing: Could the gentleman inform them of the official French attitude toward the colonists, and if they were favorable, how could this be authenticated? How could they go about getting two qualified engineers? Would it be possible to get arms and other war supplies directly from France, paid for in American products, and would French ports be open for such an exchange?

Bonvouloir reported to his superiors on 28 December 1775 that he had maintained his pose as a private citizen and promised only that he would present their requests where they might be satisfied. Yet his meeting with the committee was complicated by the arrival of two actual French merchants, Pierre Penet and Emmanuel de Pliarne. They also offered arms to the Americans and implied they were acting on behalf of the French government. Penet reached France about the same time as Bonvouloir’s report. On 3 March 1776 Congress decided to act directly by naming Silas Deane its emissary to find out what he could do in France to obtain aid. This led to the establishment of Hortalez & Cie. The French feared that Bonvouloir was so transparent that he might embarrass the court officially. On 13 June 1776 Vergennes wrote to Guines: “I strongly hope M. de Bonvouloir has been sufficiently wise in undertaking his return voyage.” Not pleased

with Bonvouloir, Vergennes sent Guines the money the agent needed to get home, having exhausted his advance.

Bonvouloir returned to France in June 1777. Hoping to become an actual merchant, he returned to America, where the British captured him and imprisoned him at St. Augustine. He was released and returned to France in July 1778. There he received a commission as *lieutenant de frégate* on 10 July 1779, became a *lieutenant d’artillerie*, and on 30 September 1781 was made *aide-major* in the expeditionary corps in India. He died near Pondichéry.

SEE ALSO *Hortalez & Cie.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

ACLAND, JOHN DYKE. (1747–1778).

British army officer and politician. Acland, the elder son of Sir Thomas Acland, seventh baronet, was born in Somerset on 18 February 1747. He was educated at Eton (1763–1764) and University College Oxford (1765–1766) before embarking on the Grand Tour of Europe with Thomas Vivien. Another friend was Thomas Townshend, later Viscount Sydney, with whom he was painted by Sir Joshua Reynolds in *Young Archers*. He married Lady Christian Henrietta Caroline Fox-Strangways (1750–1815), known as Harriet, a daughter of Stephen Fox, first earl of Ilchester, on 7 January 1771. She too was painted by Reynolds, once with her mother as a little girl and again as a young married woman in 1771–1772. Her dowry included Pixton Park in Devon and Tetton, making Acland a very considerable landed gentleman.

In March 1774 he bought an ensign’s commission in the Thirty-third Foot and in October was elected member of Parliament for Callington in Cornwall. In Parliament he took a tough line on American questions, arguing against relinquishing the right to tax and declaring on 26 October that the choice was between ceding independence and war. This may have had as much to do with military ambitions as political opinions: an expanded army would

provide better chances of rapid promotion. Already a regular captain and a colonel of militia, he bought a major's commission in the Twentieth Foot and sailed for Canada with his wife in April 1776.

Acland, who served under both Sir Guy Carleton and General John Burgoyne, turned out a courageous soldier and his wife an extraordinary camp follower. She nursed him through a serious illness at Chambly and at Skenesboro and through his recovery from wounds sustained at Hubbardton, where on 7 July 1777 Burgoyne's advance guard surprised the American rear. As the British force prepared to cross the Hudson, the couple barely escaped from their burning tent after a pet dog knocked over a candle. On 2 October at Bemis Heights during the second battle of Saratoga, Acland was shot through both legs while leading a bayonet charge and left on the ground when his grenadiers had to retire. He would have been killed on the spot but for the young James Wilkinson, who had him removed to Poor's headquarters as a prisoner. When the news reached the British camp, Harriet immediately obtained Burgoyne's permission to join him. At sunset on 9 October, armed with a safe conduct addressed to General Horatio Gates, and accompanied by her maid, Acland's valet, and a chaplain, she set off downriver by boat. Crossing the Hudson after dark, she was challenged by two startled American sentries who refused to let her land until an officer, Henry Dearborn, appeared. She may have waited as long as eight or nine hours (according to Burgoyne) or as little as a few minutes. Harriet quickly persuaded Dearborn to take her to Gates, who in turn allowed her to nurse Acland. The couple were reunited in the early hours of 10 October.

Early in 1778 Acland gave his parole, and the couple returned to England. He was given a private audience (and warm praise) by George III before retiring to Pixton Park. At a dinner party in Devon he quarreled with a Lieutenant Lloyd, who may have sneered at the army's performance against the American rebels. Neither was wounded in the duel that followed on Bampton Down, but Acland caught a serious chill which led to a fever. Already in a weak condition, he failed to recover and died at Pixton Park on 22 November 1778.

SEE ALSO *Bemis Heights, New York; Burgoyne, John; Carleton, Guy; Gates, Horatio; Hubbardton, Vermont; Saratoga, Second Battle of.*

revised by John Oliphant

ACTIVE CASE. Four captured Americans were among the crew of the sloop *Active* sailing from Jamaica to New York in August 1778. Unwilling to remain

prisoners in New York, the four, led by Gideon Olmstead of Connecticut, took over the sloop on the night of 6 September off the New Jersey coast. A Pennsylvania state navy brig and a privateer escorted the *Active* to Egg Harbor and claimed a share of her cargo as capture. At a trial before the Pennsylvania court of admiralty (George Ross presiding), the four sailors were awarded only one-fourth of the prize. Seeing an opportunity to make money, Benedict Arnold, Continental Army commander in Philadelphia, made a secret agreement with the four sailors that, in return for one-half interest in the cargo, he would advance funds for the appeal and would use his influence with Congress on their behalf. On 15 December 1778 the Committee of Appeals in the Continental Congress annulled the verdict of the admiralty court and ruled that the *Active* was the prize of Olmstead and his associates. It ordered the marshal of Philadelphia to sell the prize, pay \$280 in costs and charges, and turn the rest of the money over to Olmstead and the other three. But Judge Ross refused to yield, claiming that a court of appeals could not reverse a judge's ruling in a question of facts decided by a jury, and took possession of the £47,981 for which the cargo (not including the sloop) had been sold. Congress never challenged the order of the Pennsylvania admiralty court. Olmstead and his associates received their quarter share on 21 October 1779. The case dragged on for thirty years until in 1809 the United States Supreme Court ordered the state of Pennsylvania to pay the four sailors all that the Continental Congress had awarded them.


SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Ross, George.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

ADAMS, JOHN. (1735–1826). Lawyer, U.S. congressman, diplomat, signer of the Declaration of Independence, vice-president under Washington and second U.S. president. Massachusetts. John Adams was born in Braintree (now Quincy), Massachusetts, on 19 October 1735, and graduated from Harvard in 1755. Admitted to the Boston bar three years later, Adams slowly built up a law practice. In October 1764 he married Abigail Smith, daughter of Reverend William and Elizabeth Quincy Smith, which not only brought him a wife who proved a



John Adams. *The first vice president and second president of the United States in a painting by Charles Wilson Peale (c. 1791–94).*
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION.

lively and worthy partner but also gave him wide connections with prominent Massachusetts families.

Soon after graduating from Harvard, Adams took an interest in local politics and started writing for the newspapers. The Stamp Act crisis brought him into prominence as the author of the resolutions of protest that were sent by his hometown to its representatives in the legislature and upon which other towns modelled their own protests. Adams joined with Jeremiah Gridley and James Otis in presenting Boston's memorial on the closing of the courts and started a long contest with Massachusetts' lieutenant governor, Thomas Hutchinson.

EARLY PROFESSIONAL LIFE

Early in 1768 Adams moved to Boston, where his enlarged legal practice promoted his rise to political prominence. In that same year he defended John Hancock on charges of smuggling. Given Hancock's guilt, Adams wisely based his defense on constitutional grounds, rejecting the validity of the law under which Hancock was charged because Massachusetts lacked representation in the English Parliament. Following the Boston "Massacre," of 5 March 1770, Adams joined Josiah Quincy in

successfully defending the British guard commander and his men against homicide charges. The patriot leadership supported Adams's actions not only because they demonstrated his commitment to equal justice, but also because Adams carefully steered inquiry away from the crowd's incitement of the soldiers. Unlike his radical cousin, Samuel Adams, John disapproved of the Stamp Act riots and other violence. Rather, he based his opposition to the mother country's coercive policy on strictly legal grounds.

In gratitude for his defense of British soldiers, the government offered Adams the post of advocate general in the Court of Admiralty, but Adams saw this offer as an attempt to break his association with the Patriot leaders and declined. Adams heartily approved of the Boston Tea Party, but continued to oppose mob violence. Although he saw that independence was a possibility, he dreaded its potential consequences. On 14 June 1774 he was chosen as a delegate to the first Continental Congress, and sat with each succeeding Congress through the election of 4 December 1777. In the First Congress he helped draft the declaration to the English king, as well as a declaration of rights.

In the Second Congress Adams unsuccessfully opposed further petitions to the king, and was largely responsible for George Washington's selection as commander in chief, a move calculated to draw Virginia into closer support of the revolution. Having come around to the conviction that independence was desirable, Adams seconded the independence resolution of Richard Henry Lee on 7 June 1776. Appointed to the committee that drafted the Declaration of Independence, Adams, who played a lesser role in the drafting of the document, was credited by Thomas Jefferson with getting the document approved by Congress. On 13 June Adams was placed on the newly created Board of War, where his duties were onerous but essential to the functioning of the Continental army: seeing to its provisioning, arming, and pay. Over the following year Adams served on ninety committees, more than any other member of Congress. He also devoted a great deal of time to the constant squabbling of officers for primacy in rank and promotion; worked assiduously to establish an American currency, secure foreign loans, and regulate prices; and took part in the putative Peace Conference on Staten Island, which convened on 11 September 1776.

DIPLOMATIC ENDEAVORS

Adams left Congress on 26 October 1777, never, as it turned out, to return. On 28 November he was elected to succeed Silas Deane as commissioner to France, and on 13 February 1778 he sailed for Bordeaux with his ten-year-old son, John Quincy Adams (who would become the sixth U.S. President). Adams did not like France, the French, or his fellow commissioners. In May he drafted a plan for reducing the squabbling commission to a single representative, eventually winning the approval of his

fellow commissioner and roommate, Benjamin Franklin, and he won the support of Congress as well. Adams's return to the United States was delayed until June 1779 so that he might accompany the French minister, Conrad Alexandre Gérard, across the Atlantic. Immediately upon his return to Massachusetts, Adams was named to represent Braintree in the convention called to draw up the state constitution. Adams played a vital role in the writing of this document, which reflected his doubts regarding unfettered democracy, and he institutionalized a powerful executive branch of the state's government.

In September 1779 Congress named Adams a minister plenipotentiary, charged with drawing up a treaty of peace and of commerce with Great Britain. Adams found himself on a very difficult mission, because the English initially would not negotiate and the French foreign minister, Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes, loathed him. Benjamin Franklin wanted him removed from his diplomatic post, and Congress ignored Adams's communications. Frustrated, Adams spent much of the next two years in the Netherlands, where he gained Dutch recognition of American independence and a desperately needed loan that kept the American war effort alive.

Adams returned to Paris in October 1782 as part of a five-man commission that negotiated a peace treaty with Britain. This commission ignored Congress's instructions to follow the French lead, and as a result, on 30 November 1782, the peace negotiations produced a peace treaty that proved very favorable to the United States. The treaty was finally ratified by Congress on 3 September 1783.

As a fitting capstone to Adams's numerous and significant efforts on behalf of American independence, he was appointed the first U.S. minister to Great Britain in 1785. He was reluctantly received by George III. Adams returned to the United States in 1788, becoming the nation's first vice president. In March 1797, he was elected the nation's second president. Adams died on the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, in 1826.


SEE ALSO *Boston Massacre; George III; Peace Negotiations; Peace Treaty of 3 September 1783.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

ADAMS, SAMUEL. (1722–1803). Radical patriot, political agitator, master propagandist, Signer. Massachusetts. Born in Boston on 27 September 1722 to a wealthy real estate speculator and brewery owner, Adams



Samuel Adams. *The radical patriot, political agitator, and master propagandist Samuel Adams, shown here in a painting by John Singleton Copley (c. 1772), was described by Thomas Jefferson as "truly the Man of the Revolution."* NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION.

rose from relative obscurity in 1765 with the Stamp Act crisis, and fell from eminence as one of the chief figures of the Revolution when Congress got down to the business of constructive statesmanship after the Declaration of Independence in 1776. But during the decade that intervened, Samuel Adams was "truly the Man of the Revolution," as Thomas Jefferson called him.

Adams graduated from Harvard in 1740, and almost immediately went bankrupt on his first business venture. He then joined his father in the family brewery, which he inherited on his father's death in 1748. A short time later Samuel's mother died, and he found himself in possession of a considerable estate. Within ten years, however, he had dissipated this inheritance. Fortunately, his political activism earned him an appointment as Boston's tax collector, which position he held from 1756 to 1764. Adams proved as inept at tax collecting as at business, ending his tenure in office with £8,000 in arrears. With this record of failure in managing his own affairs, the 42-year-old Samuel Adams stepped onto the stage of history to manage the American Revolution.

Adams's failures did not hinder his political career, and he became the leading opponent of the elite running the Massachusetts government. In 1764 and 1765 Adams was selected to draft instructions to Boston's representatives, who were protesting British tax policies. In September 1765 he was elected to the State House and almost immediately wrote the legislature's response to a speech by Governor Francis Bernard. In this response, Adams formulated one of the key Patriot doctrines by insisting that only the people's representatives have a right to pass taxes.

Between 1766 and 1774 Adams became the leader of the State House in its ever increasing opposition to British rule. Adams led the successful effort to recall Governor Francis Bernard, and then aimed his political artillery at Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson. Adams organized the opposition against the Townshend Acts, helped form the Non-Importation Association of 1768, and drafted two famous "Circular Letters," one sent to the assemblies of other provinces and one which the "Convention" of the Patriot party held in Boston in 1768. Previously he had sparked the formation of the Sons of Liberty. As Thomas Hutchinson, the Royal Governor of Massachusetts, wrote: "I doubt whether there is a greater incendiary in the King's dominion."

Adams worked during the early 1770s to set up a Revolutionary organization. On 2 November 1772, the Boston Town Meeting, on his motion, appointed "a committee of correspondence . . . to state the rights of the Colonists and of this Province in particular, as men, as Christians, and as Subjects; and to communicate the same to the several towns and to the world." Adams had already written to the towns about this project; now he urged them to follow Boston's lead. In this matter he may be credited with initiating revolutionary government in Massachusetts and sowing the seed in the other colonies. His next triumph was the Boston Tea Party, 16 December 1773. Though Adams opposed the use of violence, he encouraged and may have helped organize the crowd that expressed their political frustration in an inventive act of violence against property. He took the lead in opposing the Intolerable Acts (1774). Learning that other colonies were unwilling to adopt nonintercourse measures independently, Adams concluded that an intercolonial congress was an "absolute necessity." On 17 June 1774 he moved that the Massachusetts House of Representatives appoint delegates to such a congress. This resolution was adopted, and he was chosen one of the five representatives. Unlike most members of the Continental Congress, Adams favored immediate independence. He proposed a confederation of colonies, supported the resolution that independent state governments be formed, and supported adoption of the Declaration of Independence.

Though Adams fell from a leadership position once independence was declared, he continued his active

involvement in the revolutionary cause. Most notably, he served on the overworked Board of War, chaired by his second cousin John Adams, from 1775 until he left Congress in 1781. Along the way, Adams became involved in a number of intrigues, often disrupting the work of Congress.

Adams left Congress concerned that the United States was on a path toward founding its own empire. His lifelong fear of centralized power led him to oppose the Constitution and kept him active in Massachusetts politics until 1797. After losing an election to serve in the new Congress in 1788, Adams became lieutenant governor in 1789, and governor upon John Hancock's death in 1793, serving until his retirement in 1797. Adams did not extend his support of radicalism to those who opposed the state government, calling for the execution of those who took part in Shays's Rebellion. Adams died in 1803.

SEE ALSO *Boston Tea Party; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; Sons of Liberty.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

ADDITIONAL CONTINENTAL REGIMENTS. The congressional resolution of 27 December 1776 authorized the raising of sixteen regiments "at large." These were not numbered but, except for the "German" Regiment, were known by the names of their colonels. The following information is from Heitman's *Historical Register* (1914).

Colonel David Forman assumed command of his regiment on 12 January 1777. The unit was never fully recruited, and on 1 July 1778 it was disbanded, its personnel going mainly to the New Jersey Line.

Colonel Nathaniel Gist commanded his regiment from 11 January 1777 to 1 January 1781, absorbing Grayson's regiment and Thruston's on 22 April 1779. (See below.)

Colonel William Grayson's regiment existed 11 January 1777–22 April 1779. (See Gist's regiment, above.)

Colonel Thomas Hartley commanded his regiment 1 January 1777–16 December 1778, at which time it became the Eleventh Pennsylvania.

Addressers

Colonel David Henley's regiment was formed 1 January 1777 and on 22 April 1779 was consolidated with Henry Jackson's regiment. (See below.)

Colonel Henry Jackson's regiment, 12 January 1777–23 July 1780, became the Sixteenth Massachusetts on the latter date.

Colonel William R. Lee's regiment, 1 January 1777–24 January 1778, was consolidated with Henry Jackson's regiment on the latter date.

Colonel William Malcolm's Regiment, 30 April 1777–22 April 1779, was consolidated with Spencer's regiment on 22 April 1779. (See below.)

Colonel John Patton's regiment, 11 January 1777–13 January 1779, was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Park after 3 February 1778 and (presumably) by Major Joseph Prowell to 13 January 1779. It then was broken up, part of its personnel going to the Eleventh Pennsylvania and the rest to the Delaware regiment.

Colonel Moses Rawlings' regiment was commanded by Rawlings from 12 January 1777 to 2 June 1779. Its lieutenant colonel has not been identified, if the regiment had one. Major Alexander Smith served with it from 11 September 1777 to 6 September 1780. No unit records have been found, and Heitman believes it never was fully organized. Originally raised in 1776 in Virginia and Maryland as Stephenson's Maryland and Virginia rifle regiment, it was reorganized in 1777 to become one of the "additional regiments."

Colonel Henry Sherburne's regiment was in existence 12 January 1777–1 January 1781.

Colonel Oliver Spencer's regiment was under his command during its existence, 15 January 1777–1 January 1781.

Colonel Charles M. Thruston's regiment appears not to have been fully organized. Thruston commanded it 15 January 1777–1 January 1778. Its other regimental officers are not known. On 22 April 1779 the unit was merged with Gist's regiment.

Colonel Seth Warner's regiment was organized under the 5 July 1776 resolve of Congress; not being attached to any state, it was regarded in 1777 as one of the sixteen "additional regiments." Warner commanded until 1 January 1781.

Colonel Samuel B. Webb commanded his regiment 1 January 1777–1 January 1781, on which date it was transferred to the Connecticut Line and designated the Third Connecticut.

The German Regiment or Battalion was organized under the congressional resolution of 25 May 1776. Raised in Maryland and Pennsylvania but having no state identity, it was considered one of the sixteen "additional regiments." It was commanded by Colonel Nicholas Haussegger from 17 July 1776 to 19 March 1777 and by Colonel (Baron) DeArendt from the latter date to 1 January 1781.

Unless otherwise noted, it has been assumed that the regiments ceased to exist on the date Heitman shows their colonel no longer in command. Only the German Battalion (or Regiment) was commanded by two colonels in succession.

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Mark M. Boatner

ADDRESSERS. In May 1774 twenty-three citizens of Marblehead, Massachusetts, signed an address thanking Governor Thomas Hutchinson, who was retiring, for his services to the colony. Another one hundred subscribed to an address welcoming his replacement, General Thomas Gage, to Boston. Opponents of increased imperial control published the names of these "Addressers" in an effort to subject them to public scorn and ridicule. The radicals also singled out by name others, called "Protesters" and "Mandamus Councillors," as people they believed were lukewarm in the defense of the liberties of Massachusetts. This effort to isolate and intimidate potential supporters of royal authority was largely successful.

SEE ALSO *Mandamus Councillors; Protesters.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

ADJUTANTS. From the time of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), the adjutants in the British army began to assume more important duties at both the regimental level and higher up the chain of command. The regimental adjutant was an all-purpose staff officer who managed the unit's paperwork and served in the field as a principal assistant to the regimental major, who was the operations officer. On higher staffs the adjutant stayed at the general's elbow and saw that orders were properly recorded and transmitted through the aides de camp; he was also charged with the supervision of outposts and with security. The adjutants "not only controlled the personnel administration of the units, but much of their prestige was attributable to the fact that they were the staff officers through whom most of the general orders were issued" (Hittle, p. 138). Armies had only one adjutant-general at a time; the officer holding the comparable post in other major field commands was known as a deputy

adjutant-general, and his immediate subordinate would be an assistant deputy adjutant-general.

As part of his preparations for the 1776 campaign, Sir William Howe appointed Lieutenant Colonel James Paterson of the Sixty-third Regiment as the first full adjutant general of British forces in North America, at Halifax on 18 April 1776. Paterson superceded, in rank and scope of authority, Major Stephen Kemble, who had acted as deputy adjutant-general of British forces in North America since 7 August 1772. But Kemble continued to superintend the paperwork of the army massing for the expedition against New York City (including for a time its German mercenaries). Sir Henry Clinton named his aide, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Rawdon-Hastings, as adjutant-general of the British army at New York on 15 June 1778. Kemble, whose only sister, Margaret, married Major General Thomas Gage, had served with the army at Boston and remained as deputy adjutant-general under Howe and his successor, Sir Henry Clinton, until 23 October 1779. Kemble was succeeded as deputy adjutant-general by Captain John André, Clinton's aide, now promoted to major, who had been running the British spy networks around New York City. André performed so well during the Charleston Campaign in the summer of 1780 that Clinton promoted him after returning to New York. Clinton also left in André's hands the responsibility of continuing to negotiate with Benedict Arnold. Adjutant General Baurmeister of the Hessian forces left the valuable *Journals* so often cited in accounts of the Revolution.

The Continental Army adopted the British staff system. Washington appointed Horatio Gates, the army's senior brigadier general, as its first adjutant-general on 17 June 1775, an indication of the importance the commander-in-chief attached to the post. Gates had experience in the British army as a staff officer, and he began the herculean task of bringing order to the army's paperwork, including gathering vital information about how many soldiers were present with the main army, how many were absent on other military or support missions, and how many were sick or otherwise unable to perform any military duty. When Gates stepped down in March 1776, he was succeeded by Colonel Joseph Reed, Washington's former military secretary and an important Patriot leader in Pennsylvania in his own right, who served through the 1776 campaign. Colonel Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts was adjutant-general for most of the 1777 campaign, and was followed by Alexander Scammell, colonel of the Third New Hampshire Regiment. Brigadier General Edward Hand of Pennsylvania was adjutant-general for the last three years of the war.

SEE ALSO *André, John; Gates, Horatio; Hand, Edward; Pickering, Timothy; Rawdon-Hastings, Francis; Reed, Joseph; Scammell, Alexander.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

ADMIRALS, RANK OF. In the seventeenth century the British Royal Navy was divided into operating squadrons known as the Red, White, and Blue. These squadron names subsequently became formal terms for designating the seniority of flag officers, in the following order: admiral of the fleet (there was no admiral of the Red), admiral of the White, admiral of the Blue, vice-admiral of the Red, vice-admiral of the White, and so on, down to rear-admiral of the Blue. When a captain was promoted to flag rank for active service, he became a rear-admiral of the Blue; on promotion, he would rise to be a rear-admiral of the White, and so on up the list. Promotion to, and within, flag rank was almost always by seniority.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

ADMIRALTY COURTS **SEE** *Vice-Admiralty Courts.*

ADMIRAL WARREN, THE **SEE** *Warren or White Horse Tavern, Pennsylvania.*

AFFLECK, SIR EDMUND. (1725–1788). Naval officer and baronet. Born into a Suffolk gentry family on 19 April 1725, Affleck served throughout the Seven Years' War though without opportunity for distinction. In the navy continuously after 1763, in 1778 he was promoted to captain of HMS *Bedford* with orders to join John Byron's squadron in its pursuit of the Toulon fleet to New York. Heavily damaged in a gale, the *Bedford* turned back, and Affleck next found himself in the Channel with Sir Charles Hardy during the invasion crisis of 1779. On 16 January 1780 he took a prominent part in George Brydges Rodney's "moonlight battle" off Cape St. Vincent during the relief of Gibraltar. In 1781 the *Bedford* was sent to reinforce Marriot Arbuthnot's squadron and was present, although without opportunity to become engaged, at the battle off Chesapeake Bay (16 March 1781). That summer he was a peace

commissioner at New York before rejoining the *Bedford* and sailing with Samuel Hood for the West Indies where, appointed commodore, he played a leading role in the defense of St. Kitts (26 January 1782). After Hood's squadron joined Rodney's fleet, Affleck distinguished himself at the battle of the Saints (Saints Passage), where he pierced the French line just as Rodney did elsewhere (12 April 1782). Affleck was rewarded with a baronetcy on 10 July and, on his return home in 1784, with promotion to rear-admiral of the Blue. Subsequently unemployed, he married twice and sat in the Commons for Colchester, where he had been elected in March 1782. He died on 19 November 1788.

Affleck's younger brother Philip (1725?–1799) was also a naval officer and served under Rodney in several West Indies actions, including the Saints. He rose to admiral of the White before his death on 21 December 1799.

SEE ALSO *Arbuthnot, Marriot; Byron, John; Chesapeake Bay; Hood, Samuel; Rodney, George Bridges.*

revised by John Oliphant

AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE REVOLUTION. Political and social turmoil in the decade before the American Revolution presented African Americans with opportunities and frustrations. As did their white counterparts, African Americans in the decade before the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775 prepared for the conflict in disparate ways. In New England, where slavery was least common among the colonies, blacks prepared petitions seeking to take part in the Patriot cause against the British and later a significant proportion of them enrolled in state militias. In the mid-Atlantic, where legal restrictions in the system of small farm and urban slavery negated any chances for freedom, some blacks substituted for their masters in the state militias but more sided with the British. In the Upper and Lower South, African Americans seized upon the military and political splits within colonial society to gain freedom through self-emancipation and by siding with the British army. Blacks took part in the Revolutionary struggle throughout the war and played many different roles. Their eventual fate depended upon their location and on the final results of the war.

EMANCIPATION IN THE NORTH

Initial sightings of black Revolutionary activities occurred in New England. African Americans there took part in the riots against the Stamp Act, the tax on tea, and the street

clashes with British soldiers from 1765 into the mid-1770s. The first person killed at the Boston Massacre in 1770 was Crispus Attucks, a black man. But mob actions were not the only way by which blacks demonstrated their growing awareness of the political conflict between colony and crown. There were hopeful signs for African Americans in New England. Many felt heartened by the Somerset Decision of 1772, which barred taking enslaved blacks out of England and in effect gave enslaved people civil rights, and blacks were also inspired by the poetry of Phillis Wheatley. Reminding the Patriots and the royal governor of Massachusetts that blacks too expected greater liberty, a committee of slaves sent a number of petitions to Governor Hutchinson and the colonial legislature. The petitions compared the status of blacks with that of whites who had clamored about royal designs to enslave the colonists. Accordingly, the petitioners, calling themselves Free Africans, informed the governor that they aligned themselves with Patriot discontent and asked that slaves be given a free day each week to earn money to purchase themselves. Upon gaining freedom, the petitioners opined, blacks would be eager to return to Africa to enjoy their liberty.

Although Hutchinson refused to act upon these requests, blacks in the Northeast continued to send forth petitions seeking general emancipation, even during the war. These petitions, combined with Patriot comprehension that enslavement of blacks contradicted white demands for liberty, produced results in the northern states. During the American Revolution, the breakaway Vermont territory abolished slavery by constitutional amendment in 1777. Massachusetts and New Hampshire extinguished slavery by gradual emancipation. New England's black population contributed mightily to the Patriot cause. Militias and Continental army quotas were filled with black soldiers. The Connecticut line in particular included many black soldiers, while various militia units in Massachusetts had sizable black participation. Some had notable careers. The Belknap family of Brookline, Massachusetts, freed Peter Salem so that he might enlist in the Massachusetts militia. He joined Pompey of Braintree, Prince of Brookline, and Cato Wood of Arlington in the state militia. Peter Salem and Salem Poor saw action at the Battle of Bunker Hill. In Connecticut, black soldiers proclaimed their new status by forsaking derisive titles such as Caesar, Charity, and Cato and taking names such as Pomp Liberty, Cuff Freedom, and Primus Freeman.

MIDDLE-STATE UNREST

Patriot officers in New York and New Jersey were less open to black enlistments, although both allowed blacks to replace their masters in the military. In pre-Revolutionary years in Monmouth County, New Jersey, for example, masters worried about blacks roving about the countryside

at night. Members of the Society of Friends (Quakers) made other masters uneasy with their antislavery rhetoric. Blacks in Long Island and in New York City openly defied their masters and spoke freely of alliances with the British. As white society descended into open conflict, an upsurge of self-emancipated blacks simply left their masters. Added to the usual number of young men who ran away from bondage were women, some with children and at times entire extended families. They took with them clothing, tools, food, and money to help start their new lives. Using the rhetoric of the whites, one black man left his former master in Philadelphia, demanding “that freedom, justice, and protection to which I am entitled to by the laws of the state, although I am a Negro.” If whites regarded him as wrong, this man and other blacks were determined that the war prove him right.

DISCONTENT IN THE SOUTH

Tensions between masters and slaves rippled further south as the crisis between Britain and America unfolded. A young James Madison reported in 1775 that a number of blacks in Virginia had gathered together and elected a leader “should the British troops arrive.” His correspondent, the printer William Bradford of Philadelphia, responded by saying, “Your fear of insurrection being excited among the slaves seems too well founded,” and he told of his own fears about Pennsylvania. Around Charleston, South Carolina, blacks ran away with increasing frequency and began to form bands that patrolled the roads.

BLACK LOYALISTS

Two events in 1775 determined black participation in the Revolutionary conflict. In July 1775 General George Washington ended black enlistments in the American forces, though he did allow those already in service to remain. Washington was in part reacting to a plan by Edward Rutledge of South Carolina to expel all blacks from the armed forces. The American strategy in dealing with African Americans proved disastrous after 7 November 1775, when Lord Dunmore, the royal governor of Virginia, announced that he would guarantee freedom to any enslaved black or indentured servant willing to take up arms to put down “the present horrid rebellion.” Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation opened the floodgates, and thousands of enslaved blacks left their masters for freedom “inside the British lines.”

New York City was the destination of thousands of former slaves and self-proclaimed free people. Black Loyalists, as such people were known, comprised men, women, and children. Living in occupied New York City, they created the first true free black community in British North America. Enlivened by freedom, blacks formed significant parts of Anglican congregations, took

part in marriage and baptismal rituals, worked for wages at local breweries and factories, and held joyous Ethiopian balls where mixed race dancing was common. Black Loyalists felt so comfortable in their roles that they sent General Henry Clinton New Year’s greetings in 1780. A dream experienced by one Black Loyalist that year encapsulated their hopes. Murphy Stiel, a black Loyalist from North Carolina who relocated to New York, had a dream in which God told him to take a message to General Clinton, asking him to warn George Washington that the Patriots should lay down their arms and surrender. Patriots should then, according to this message, offer freedom to blacks or face a vengeful God.

Few blacks left such public pronouncements, but their numbers spoke loudly. Estimates of how many enslaved blacks left their southern masters in the wake of Dunmore’s Proclamation range from fifteen thousand to over one hundred thousand. Thomas Jefferson spoke of thirty thousand slaves leaving masters in Virginia, though he may have simply added zeroes to the thirty who abandoned him. Whatever the actual number, the responses by African Americans to Dunmore’s Proclamation and to those made by British commanders later in the war sustained the most sizable slave flight before the Civil War. Dunmore’s Proclamation insured black loyalties to the British as the most likely side to give them their liberty.

Joining the British and siding with the Americans were not the only fates for African Americans. Some lived in areas where conflict raged only briefly. Masters in a number of southern colonies and a few in the North sought to avoid problems by retreating far into the interior. For such whites and blacks, the war was avoidable and real choices waited until later. But for those who joined the British, Dunmore’s Proclamation was a clarion call of freedom.

Fighting for Britain. Following Dunmore’s Proclamation, insurgent blacks formed regiments under the leadership of British officers. The first was the Ethiopian Regiment that coalesced around Dunmore and saw action in various battles around Virginia in early 1776. Hampered by poor leadership and devastated by disease, the Ethiopian Regiment suffered sharp losses before about eight hundred members left by ship with Dunmore north to Staten Island to become incorporated into the British forces there. They joined several regiments of black guides and pioneers who served as pilots, spies, wagon masters, foragers, and infantrymen. The most elite groups, called the Black Brigade, consisted of active duty soldiers for the British. More loosely aligned were freelance marauders such as Colonel Tye of New Jersey.

Captain Tye. Tye, formerly Titus Corlies, left his master in Shrewsbury, New Jersey, right after Dunmore’s Proclamation. Vanishing from history for a short while,

Titus returned to his home area in 1777, fighting as Captain Tye in the Battle of Monmouth the following year. It was, however, in 1780 that he made his biggest impact. Starting in late March 1780, Tye commanded a “motley crew” of blacks and whites that raided Patriot homesteads in Monmouth, taking off cattle, silver plate, and significant numbers of prisoners to the British in New York City. He headed three such actions in June, in one of them capturing Barnes Smock, a leader of the county militia. Terrified, other Patriots in the county petitioned Governor William Livingston to declare martial law to help fend off Tye’s incursions.

After several more attacks over the summer, Tye attempted his greatest feat in September. Then he captured Josiah Huddy, a Patriot notorious for his summary executions of known Loyalists. After a gun battle lasting several hours, Tye and his men captured Huddy and began their return to New York. While crossing from Monmouth County and Staten Island, New York, Huddy jumped overboard and swam toward a nearby Patriot vessel. In the battle that followed Huddy escaped, though he was recaptured later, and Tye suffered a wound in his wrist that later worsened to lockjaw. He died several days later. Tye’s memory lived on for generations among white New Jerseyans, who viewed him with great respect, and into the twenty-first century among black residents of the state, some of who claim direct descent from him.

Not all blacks became as well known as Tye, but their contributions to the war effort were substantial. Following his treason, Benedict Arnold employed over three hundred black men to fortify Portsmouth, Virginia, in order to repulse Patriot efforts to retake the city. Others worked out of the Dismal Swamp between Virginia and North Carolina as freelancers who plundered the countryside. Their examples made enslaved people more assertive in dealing with masters, who at one point on the eastern shore of Maryland confiscated guns, swords, and bayonets from local slaves.

Gradually, Patriot militias had to disregard George Washington’s edict and enlist slaves and free blacks. The state of Maryland subjected free blacks to a draft and enlisted slaves. Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia permitted slave masters to send their bondmen as replacements. During invasions, Patriots and British commonly impressed slaves to serve as laborers digging entrenchments or as personal servants to officers and common soldiers. Black women followed both camps as laundry workers and domestic servants.

LIMITS OF BRITISH ASSISTANCE

Royal proclamations offering freedom to enslaved blacks did not mean the British were abolitionists. No attempt was made to enlist the slaves of Loyalists, and runaways

from Loyalist masters were routinely returned. In occupied New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston, British officers and colonial Loyalists maintained a brisk internal slave trade. Moreover, British commanders could be slippery about their promises. Lord Dunmore took a number of black Loyalists with him to Bermuda and then promptly sold them back into slavery. Lord Cornwallis abruptly abandoned thousands of blacks when he surrendered at Yorktown in 1781.

SERVING IN THE SOUTH

Despite the uncertainty of their British alliances, black Loyalists continued to join the army of the king. As the war moved south, blacks became important actors in a nasty civil war around Charleston, South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia. Hearing rumors that they would “be all sett free on the arrival of the New Governor,” blacks began to leave their masters in mid-1775 with increasing frequency and assertiveness. One slave told his astonished master that he “will serve No Man and that he will be conquered or governed by no Man.” After that, the slave departed. Whites soon organized patrols around the streets of Charleston and established curfews. Violators were whipped and even hung for minor infractions.

Right after Dunmore’s Proclamation, several hundred runaways who had gathered on Sullivan’s Island in Charleston Harbor began raiding coastal plantations. Even after Patriots were able to defeat them, they attracted more recruits. More than in the North and Upper South, self-emancipated blacks in South Carolina and Georgia moved in sizable groups, often based upon kinship and friendship. David George, later a prominent black minister, recalled leaving his master with “fifty or more of my master’s people” who marched into freedom behind the king’s lines. Many then entered the British army either as guerillas, laborers, or domestics. Others seized insecure residences in the coastal cities and hired themselves out. Life there was dangerous, as kidnappers were ubiquitous and smallpox and malaria swept through Charleston several times in 1779 and 1780. As in New York, blacks enjoyed a new freedom, donning fashionable attire and holding Ethiopian balls, to which prominent white officers were invited. Former enslaved women in particular were noted for their freedom attire. Entrepreneurial blacks took control of deliveries of food and supplies to the British commissary in Charleston. Eventually, blacks controlled access to a number of waterways into Charleston and proved very difficult for Patriots to dislodge, even several years after the conflict had ended. After the British abandoned the Lower South, many black Loyalists decamped into Spanish Florida to join with Seminole Indians.

BLACKS IN THE SOUTHWEST

The Revolutionary War enhanced white conquest of Native American lands along the Gulf of Mexico and up the Mississippi River. Plantation masters along the coast and inland took their enslaved people to remote areas as far north as western Virginia and to what would become the Mississippi Territory. Nearly four hundred slaves from South Carolina arrived in the future Mississippi Territory in 1778 and were followed by others from the nascent free states whose masters sought more hospitable locales and from the West Indies, where some of the plantations were being downsized. The Revolutionary War spread west as Americans, British, and Spanish armies battled for power along the Mississippi River and the coastal region known as West Florida. The immediate winners were the Spanish, who controlled all of the Gulf Coast from Florida to New Orleans. Quickly, African Americans evacuated American plantations for freedom in the coastal region. They established a maroon colony at Gaillardville, north of New Orleans, that was led by James Malo, a fierce warrior and shrewd commander. Blacks also fought in units for the Spanish for a brief time, maroons and black Spanish soldiers, gaining their freedom by doing so, and thereby opening a tiny crack in the edifice of slavery. The booming economy of New Orleans offered enslaved blacks an opportunity to buy their own freedom under hiring agreements with their masters. Whites generally strove to control the conditions of self-purchase with a bias toward wives, mistresses, and the children of mixed love. But as freedom descended through the mother, this practice assured the liberty of future generations. Political changes put an end to many of these methods for gaining freedom. By the early 1800s, as white American society moved west and Spanish rule gave way to French and then to American, free blacks gave way to enslaved peoples.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

The black Loyalists were on the side of the war's losers. From the British surrender at Yorktown in 1781 until the Treaty of Paris ended the war two years later, black Loyalists continued to battle for their freedom. In General Guy Carleton they had an important ally. Blacks who left their masters along the Atlantic coast served the British army with valor and sacrifice. Eventually, thousands of them were rewarded when Carleton declared, during peace negotiations in 1783 with General George Washington, that he could not return blacks who had come into the British lines in response to royal proclamations. Washington, who viewed the blacks as stolen property, was astonished and angered. Carleton replied that to return them would dishonor the king's intentions. To

push the negotiations along, Carleton agreed to compile a list of blacks who had left New York, primarily for Nova Scotia and in lesser numbers to England and Germany. Carleton also agreed to a requirement that blacks prove that they had entered the British lines during or before 1782.

THE "BOOK OF NEGROES"

The list, the so-called Book of Negroes, contained three thousand names, including about fourteen hundred men, eight hundred women, and eight hundred children. They came from all over the colonies, with the greatest numbers coming from Virginia, South Carolina, and New York. Many had been at large fighting for the British since 1775. Some children were freeborn within the British lines of parents from different regions who had met during the conflict. There were women in far greater numbers than had ever been reported escaping from slavery during the colonial period. By the end of November 1783, the three thousand black Loyalists had left New York for Nova Scotia. About four thousand left from Savannah, Georgia, for uncertain fates in the British West Indies.

Their departure did not end the controversy over them. American slave masters felt cheated by the British, whom they regarded as slave thieves. For example, Thomas Jefferson, in his perennial negotiations with the London merchants to whom he owed money, exclaimed in 1786 that the slaves taken from him by Lord Cornwallis were worth far more than the debts he owed. The issue remained a sticking point in Anglo-American economic relations until after the War of 1812, during which several thousand more blacks fled their masters for freedom in Nova Scotia.

BLACKS IN POSTWAR CANADA

The black Loyalists in Nova Scotia found freedom but little prosperity. They attempted to establish a free black community composed of religious denominations and militia groups. They strove to work as farmers, fishermen, and town workers. In Nova Scotia, a black clergy emerged like a phoenix. Boston King, John Marrant, David George, Moses Wilkinson, and others made alliances with Methodist groups, while Stephen Bluke even owned a pew in the white Anglican Church in Halifax. Overall, black Loyalists were discontented in Nova Scotia. Encouraged by the migration of the so-called Black Poor from London to Sierra Leone in 1789, over one thousand Black Loyalists departed from Nova Scotia two years later to help create the nation of Sierra Leone. Their nation-building work was inspired by their experiences in the American Revolution.

POSTWAR NORTHERN BLACKS

If the black Loyalists had to travel the Atlantic Ocean to find freedom, they at least attained it within a lifetime. For those who stayed in North America, liberty came slowly. The tiny black populations of New England benefited from the extinction of slavery during the 1770s and 1780s. Pennsylvania abolished slavery in 1780. But New York and New Jersey, with the largest slave populations in the North, did not legislate gradual emancipation until 1799 and 1804, respectively. In both cases, black men born after 4 July of the year of enactment had to labor for their masters until they were twenty-five years of age, while black women were not freed until reaching the age of twenty-one. Facing such long terms, blacks in those states bargained with masters for shorter terms on the basis of good behavior and for cash payments based on work performance. Liberal whites joined blacks in freedom suits against masters who had reneged on promises of liberty, for example, after military service. Many more blacks simply left their masters for freedom in the cities. In the countryside, masters held tightly to slaves. A few years after the adoption of gradual emancipation there, masters from Bergen County petitioned the state legislature to repeal the act because it deprived them of property rights won in the American Revolution.

Whether legally or self-proclaimed free people, African Americans created genuine communities in northern cities. Centered on black churches that gradually created a black clerical leadership, the black communities featured burial and fraternal associations, vibrant neighborhoods of small entrepreneurs and artisans, and boardinghouse keepers. They created a new interpretation of history. In the early nineteenth century, black intellectuals such as Peter Williams, Jr. hailed the closure of the international slave trade. Sea captain Paul Cuffe owned his own vessel. Sail maker James Forten employed about thirty workmen and became the wealthiest black in Philadelphia. In each of the northern cities, a tiny but robust black middle class emerged and combined religion, work, opposition to slavery, and reverence for the meaning of the American Revolution as central components of their ideology. While middle-class blacks sought improved social and political conditions, northern cities were becoming the homes of a more hedonistic, apolitical, poorer class of blacks who, to the disdain of educated blacks, spent most of their money on clothing, drink, and gambling. Rising racist attitudes in the North focused on the latter group and lampooned the hopes of blacks intent upon self-improvement. In the rural areas around the cities, freedom meant little more than a change in the local registry. Free blacks there had difficulty obtaining loans for land, received low subsistence wages, and were oppressed by a white society that soon forgot the shared work of the past by assuming racist postures toward free

blacks. The latter often had to labor on white farms as cottagers, an early form of sharecropping.

POSTWAR SOUTHERN BLACKS

In the Upper South, a period of egalitarianism after the American Revolution sparked new feelings of liberty among many whites. Robert Carter III, the largest slave master in Virginia, felt the contradictions of revolution and servitude and freed several hundred bonded people. George Washington, the father of the nation, went through a number of personal crises before, in his will of September 1799, freeing his more than one hundred slaves at his death, which came two months later. Thomas Jefferson, on the other hand, though conflicted about the meaning of slavery, wrote in his *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1785) that blacks were inferior intellectually to whites and would be best served if they were returned to Africa. Gradually, Jefferson became more conservative on the issue of slavery and black capabilities. Despite his misgivings, the number of free blacks in Maryland and Virginia rose sharply in the years after the war, only to fall after the resurgence of slavery as an institution in the early nineteenth century.

The lives of free blacks in the cities of the Lower South were akin to those of their northern counterparts in many ways. Charleston's free people of color worked as artisans, peddlers, and domestics and formed independent churches. Lighter-skinned people of color formed a Brown Society to act as a social and political force. Similar groups operated in Savannah. The significant difference from the North was that free blacks in the South lived and worked in a slave society where little dissent was tolerated and in which servitude was the dynamic economic force. Whereas in the North, slavery was a declining system and the slave trade had been legally forbidden by the 1780s, South Carolina imported over one hundred thousand new slaves directly from Africa between 1788 and 1807, when a national ban on human trafficking took place. Quickly, Southerners learned to profit from an internal slave trade that moved enslaved blacks from the Upper South and regions along the Atlantic coast to the booming new white settlements from Georgia through Mississippi to Louisiana and Texas.

By 1810, then, blacks, abetted by white allies, had pushed through gradual abolition of slavery in the northern states. In the Upper South, revolutionary egalitarianism had cooled and Virginia, for example, demanded that free blacks leave the state. While converting much of their farmlands from tobacco to cereal production, the Chesapeake societies learned to profit by selling enslaved people to the expanding Lower South. As cotton plantations spread from South Carolina to Texas, slavery became entrenched in the region. Free blacks became more beleaguered and white southerners viewed slavery as a property

right protected by the American Revolution and the federal Constitution of 1787.

SEE ALSO *Loyalists in the American Revolution*.

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Graham Russell Gao Hodges

AFRICAN ARROWS. Flaming arrows were used to set fire to a defended place when it was too strong to be taken by assault. The term “African arrows” became current probably because a Indian bow, presumably of African origin or design, was used against Fort Motte, South Carolina, on 12 May 1781. The technique was employed then with well-publicized success by Francis Marion and Harry Lee. Flaming arrows were sometimes fired from muskets, as at the siege of Ninety Six from 22 May to 19 June 1781.

SEE ALSO *Fort Motte, South Carolina; Ninety Six, South Carolina*.

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AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, TREATY OF.

18 October 1748. This treaty ended the War of the Austrian Succession. It represented a suspension of hostilities between rival European coalitions rather than a stable solution of serious problems. French victories on land in Europe balanced British successes at sea. Britain agreed to restore Louisbourg, captured by its New England colonies, for French withdrawal from the Low Countries. Maria Theresa was confirmed as empress of Austria, but British pressure forced Austria to concede Silesia to Prussia, souring Anglo-Austrian relations. French stature was enhanced, and Prussia was

enlarged, by Frederick II’s successful aggression against Austria. No solutions were found for Anglo-French imperial rivalries in India and North America, which continued to fester. The German name for the city is Aachen; thus this document is also called the Treaty of Aachen.

SEE ALSO *Austrian Succession, War of the; Louisburg, Canada*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

ALAMANCE, BATTLE OF THE.

16 May 1771. In an effort to use military force to suppress what he believed was a spreading insurrection by Regulators against law, order, and legal government in the Piedmont of North Carolina, Governor William Tryon raised over 1,000 militiamen, mostly in the Tidewater counties, and marched at their head from New Bern west toward Hillsborough, where he intended to link up with Hugh Waddell, who was leading a second column of 250 reluctant militiamen northeast from Salisbury. Tryon reached Hillsborough without opposition, but learned that Waddell had been confronted by large numbers of Regulators and had not advanced. On 11 May, Tryon’s force started toward Salisbury, and on 14 May it reached the Alamance River. The Regulators were camped five miles away. Although they numbered 2,000 men to Tryon’s 1,100 men, the Regulators had no single leader and no artillery, and many were unarmed. On 16 May Tryon formed his militiamen in two lines outside the Regulators’ encampment and demanded their submission. Still without proper leadership and divided among themselves as to whether they would do battle or merely make a show of resistance to gain concessions from the royal governor, the Regulators formed a crude line of defense. Tryon opened fire with his artillery (two brass cannon sent by General Thomas Gage from New York), ordered his infantry to advance, and after more than an hour of sporadic and uneven resistance drove the insurgents from the field in disorder. At least nine militiamen were killed, and a further sixty-one were wounded. The Regulators may have lost as many as twenty men killed; an unknown number were wounded.

SEE ALSO *Regulators*.

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ALBANY CONVENTION AND PLAN.

At the request of British authorities, delegates from seven colonies (New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire) convened at Albany, New York, from 19 June to 10 July 1754, to concert measures to defend the northern frontier, and especially to make a show of unity to counter French pressure on the Iroquois. The delegates agreed on a plan of union based on a model drawn up by Benjamin Franklin in 1751 and subsequently modified by Thomas Hutchinson. All colonies except Georgia and Nova Scotia were to be united under a president-general appointed and paid by the crown. Each colony would elect between two and seven representatives to a grand council, depending on how much each contributed to the general treasury. The grand council would act as a unicameral assembly, but its power to legislate was subject to the approval of both the president-general and the crown. The president-general and grand council were to have jurisdiction over Indian affairs, including new land purchases outside existing colonial boundaries. Neither the British government nor any individual colony found this plan of union acceptable. The rejection of the plan reinforced the idea that the colonies were incapable of acting together against a common enemy, but the convention did establish a precedent for later extra-institutional gatherings like the Stamp Act Congress and the first Continental Congress. The plan itself was a point of departure for later schemes for confederation.

SEE ALSO *Franklin, Benjamin; Hutchinson, Thomas*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

ALEXANDER, MR SEE *Rankin, William*.

ALEXANDER, WILLIAM. (1726–1783). Continental officer and claimant to the title of Lord Stirling. William was the son of James Alexander (1691–1756), a prominent New York lawyer, and Mary Sprat Provoost, a merchant. Growing up in privileged circumstances, he received a good education from his father and private tutors and became a proficient mathematician and astronomer. He was associated with his mother in her mercantile business. In 1748, he married Sarah Livingston, daughter of Philip Livingston, thus securing a close connection with the wealthy and powerful Livingston family of New Jersey. At the start of the Seven Years' War, he joined the military staff of Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts as his secretary. In addition, he and some business partners were hired as army contractors during the Niagara campaign of 1755 and 1756. His connections with Shirley proved to be a liability when the governor failed as a military leader, for Alexander and his partners were accused of profiteering. In 1756 he accompanied Shirley to London, where he defended his mentor's reputation and fought successfully to clear his own name.

Alexander lived in Britain from 1757 to 1761, hobnobbing with land-owning gentlemen and spending money in pursuit of the lapsed Scots earldom of Stirling. He got the Scots lords to accept his claim to the title, but not their English counterparts. Undeterred by this rebuff, he assumed the title, and his American contemporaries thereafter called him lord Stirling. Upon his return to America, he gave up his previous occupation of merchant. Building an elegant country house near Basking Ridge, New Jersey, he lived there with his family in emulation of the English landed gentry. He dabbled in science, invested in iron mining, speculated in land, drank to excess, and squandered a fortune of more than £100,000. He served on the councils of New York and New Jersey and the Board of Proprietors of East Jersey. He also held the post of governor of King's College (later Columbia University). As tensions grew between America and Britain in the 1760s and 1770s, Alexander expressed pro-parliamentary views. On one occasion he even urged the Board of Trade to tighten its enforcement of navigation and tax laws in the colonies.

When the war with Britain began in 1775, however, Lord Stirling quickly declared for America and never wavered thereafter. The royal governors of New York (William Tryon) and New Jersey (William Franklin) removed him from their councils. He was appointed a member of the extralegal Council of Safety in New Jersey, and on 1 November 1775 was commissioned as a colonel of the First New Jersey Regiment. He assisted in the seizure of an armed British transport, the *Blue Mountain Valley*, on 25 January 1776, and was rewarded with promotion to brigadier general on 1 March.

Assuming command at New York City, he directed the construction of defensive works in preparation for a threatened British invasion. In April he welcomed General George Washington to the city, and soon developed a congenial association with the commander in chief. He confronted his first big test as a military leader on 27 August 1776, when Washington gave him command of the American right wing in the battle of Long Island. Through no fault of his own, his brigade was overwhelmed and he was captured.

Stirling was included in a prisoner exchange on 6 October 1776. Rejoining Washington's army on Manhattan, he was given command of another brigade. He operated in a semi-independent command over the next two weeks, retreating with the rest of the American army to White Plains, New York. There, on 28 October, he participated in a pitched battle before joining in a fighting withdrawal across New Jersey in November and December. At Trenton on 26 December he played a major role in the defeat of a Hessian garrison commanded by Colonel Johann Röll. On 19 February 1777 he was one of five American officers promoted to major general. He took up his post with his division near Metuchen, New Jersey, on 24 June. Two days later he was assaulted by a superior enemy force commanded by Lord Charles Cornwallis and was given a severe mauling before he extricated himself from his dangerously exposed position. Retaining Washington's confidence, he served in the Hudson Highlands for a short time before rejoining the main army and marching into Pennsylvania. He commanded well in the battle of Brandywine on 11 September, rushing his division to the support of John Sullivan when Sullivan was attacked near the Birmingham Meeting House. In the battle of Germantown on 4 October, Stirling's division was in the thick of the fight.

After spending the winter of 1777 and 1778 at Valley Forge, Stirling accompanied the American army in mid-June 1778 as it followed the British forces withdrawing from Philadelphia across New Jersey. In the battle of Monmouth on 28 June he played a key role in the American victory by deploying cannon to good effect in the third and final line of defense. For almost two hours, he cannonaded the enemy, with the British reciprocating in kind. Breaking up a British infantry advance, he then ordered his own men to assault the enemy's right flank. As the redcoats broke into flight, he wisely ordered his soldiers not to press the pursuit. From 4 July to 12 August he presided over the court martial of Charles Lee, who was subsequently suspended from the army for one year. In the summer of 1779 he assisted Major Henry Lee in the latter's brilliant assault on Paulus Hook, New Jersey. On January 14 and 15, 1780, he led a mismanaged, abortive raid on Staten Island during a period of cruelly cold weather. Later

that year he served on a board of general officers that inquired into the activities of John André.

Given an independent command at Albany in 1781, Stirling prepared to defend Fort Ticonderoga from a possible British attack. No attack materialized, and his duties were easy. He died of a virulent and painful attack of gout on 15 January 1783. Although not a brilliant soldier, he was loyal, trustworthy, reliable, and brave. His loss was mourned by Washington, his fellow officers, and his family.

SEE ALSO *Lee, Henry* ("Light-Horse Harry"); *Monmouth, New Jersey*.

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revised by Paul David Nelson

ALFRED–GLASGOW ENCOUNTER.

6 April 1776. A five-ship Continental navy squadron under Esek Hopkins, returning from its successful Nassau raid with several prizes, was on its way to New London, Connecticut. Meanwhile, H.M. Frigate *Glasgow* (twenty-four guns) had recently become separated from a small British squadron operating in Rhode Island. She stumbled into the midst of the Continental squadron near Block Island between midnight and 1 A.M. In a remarkable action lasting all night, Captain Tyringham Howe handled the old *Glasgow* with great skill and great luck. Hopkins failed to coordinate the actions of the American squadron of converted merchantmen, whose crews were debilitated by disease. Instead of massing and overpowering the frigate, Hopkins let Howe fight a single-ship action against his flagship, the *Alfred* (twenty-four guns), which despite having the same number of guns was much lighter in construction. A lucky shot knocked out the *Alfred's* steering, letting the badly mauled *Glasgow* escape to Halifax.

Casualties were relatively light (the Americans lost twenty-four killed or wounded, the British admitted suffering only four), but both vessels needed major repairs. The fledgling Continental navy correctly interpreted the engagement as a failure and held a major

investigation to affix blame, effectively destroying Hopkins's reputation.

SEE ALSO *Hopkins, Esek; Nassau.*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

ALLEN, ETHAN. (1738–1789). American officer. New Hampshire (Vermont). Born on 10 January 1738 in Litchfield, Connecticut, Allen moved to the New Hampshire Grants in 1770. The next year he was named “colonel commandant” of the Green Mountain Boys, the volunteer militia that fought a largely bloodless conflict with New York for control of the region that became Vermont. In 1771 Governor Tryon of New York declared Allen an outlaw, placing a twenty-pound reward on his head, raised to one hundred pounds in March 1774. With the events at Lexington, Allen immediately linked the cause of the New Hampshire Grants with the American Revolutionary struggle, leading the force that took Ticonderoga on 10 May 1775. Within two days, Allen's forces captured control of Lake Champlain without loss of life. He was voted out of command of the Green Mountain Boys by the region's elders, who thought he operated too precipitously. Allen then joined the staff of General Richard Montgomery as a recruiter, enlisting Indians and Québécois to join the forces invading Canada. Operating ahead of Montgomery's invading army, he was captured after his premature attack on Montreal on 25 September 1775. Identified as the captor of Ticonderoga, Allen was sent in irons to England and lodged in Pendennis Castle. The government, fearing reprisals if it hung Allen, returned him to America, where he suffered notoriously harsh treatment at the hands of the British in Halifax and New York City. On 6 May 1778 he was exchanged for Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell and reported to Washington at Valley Forge. On 14 May he was brevetted colonel in the Continental army.

Back in Vermont, Allen led the efforts to gain congressional recognition for the new state of Vermont. But Congress avoided getting involved in a dispute between New York and New Hampshire, especially as New York's Governor Clinton threatened to abandon the war effort should Vermont be admitted to the Union. Appointed major general of Vermont's militia in 1779, Allen launched a long and crafty political and diplomatic campaign to insure Vermont's independence, playing New York against New Hampshire and Congress against the British. The British recognized their opportunities for capitalizing on the situation in Vermont, and in July 1780 Allen received a letter from Beverley Robinson that

led to a correspondence between Allen and Canada's governor, General Frederick Haldimand.

By not hiding his negotiations with the British from Congress, Allen set himself up for charges of treason, but he maintained the autonomy of his state. As New York's passion for holding onto the region died down in 1784, Allen dropped his negotiations with the British. He used the upheaval of Shays's Rebellion in 1786 to persuade the New York elite of Vermont's reliability, rejecting offers to lead the Massachusetts uprising. Pushed by Alexander Hamilton, New York's legislature dropped its claims to Vermont, though Governor Clinton stalled its entry into the Union until 1791.

Allen's book about his captivity, *Narrative of Colonel Ethan Allen's Captivity* (1779), was a major success, apparently selling more copies than any book of the period with the exception of Paine's *Common Sense* (1776). Less successful, but more controversial, was Allen's *Reason the Only Oracle of Man* (1785), the first deistic work published by an American. Allen died while returning to his home in Colchester, Vermont, on 12 February 1789.

SEE ALSO *Green Mountain Boys; Haldimand, Sir Frederick; Hamilton, Alexander; Montgomery, Richard; Montreal (25 September 1775); Robinson, Beverley; Shays's Rebellion; Ticonderoga, New York, American Capture of.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

ALLEN, IRA. (1751–1814). Frontier leader. Born in Cornwall, Connecticut, on 1 May 1751, Allen joined his older brothers in settling in the New Hampshire Grants, a region contested by several provinces. With the crown recognizing New York's claim, New Hampshire's land grants appeared worthless. In 1773 Allen formed the Onion River Land Company to buy up the deeds to the Grants, relying on his brother and partner, Ethan Allen, to secure their value. Ira Allen was present at the capture of Fort Ticonderoga on 11 May 1775 and served as a lieutenant in the invasion of Canada. Returning to the Grants the following year, Allen played a leading role in the creation of the state of Vermont. With Ethan Allen a prisoner of the British until May 1778, Ira Allen organized the conventions that led to Vermont's declaration of

independence in January 1777; drafted the state's constitution with Thomas Chittenden, who became Vermont's first governor; and served as treasurer, surveyor general, member of the governor's council, and secretary to the governor, as well as Vermont's chief negotiator with the other states and the British in Canada. The power of the Allens declined with the success of their revolution as thousands of new settlers poured into Vermont. Ira Allen left the government in 1787 and devoted the rest of his life to personal finances. In 1791 his pledge of four thousand pounds persuaded the state legislature to charter the University of Vermont in Burlington. In succeeding years Allen fell progressively deeper in debt, and he fled the state in 1803, dying a pauper in Philadelphia on 15 January 1814.

SEE ALSO *Allen, Ethan.*

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ALLIANCE–SIBYL ENGAGEMENT.

10 March 1783. Captain John Barry sailed from Havana in the thirty-two-gun frigate *Alliance* accompanied by another Continental ship, the *Duc de Lauzun* (twenty guns) to deliver \$100,000 in specie to Congress. Several days later at dawn on 10 March they were sighted off the coast of Florida. Three British warships took up the pursuit: the frigates *Alarm* (thirty-two guns) and *Sibyl* (sometimes spelled *Sybil* in American accounts; twenty-eight guns), and the sixteen-gun sloop of war *Tobago*. The *Alliance*, the only Continental Navy vessel with copper sheathing, had great speed and was easily getting away when Barry saw that the British were overtaking the *Lauzun*. He turned to assist his smaller, slower, and clumsier consort. While Barry was instructing the *Lauzun* to jettison her guns and run for it, a fifty-gun French ship from Havana bore down on the scene. Four of the six vessels separated, leaving *Alliance* to engage in a frigate duel with the smaller *Sibyl*. After forty-five minutes the heavier guns of the *Alliance* reduced the *Sibyl* to a wreck barely able to break contact, and Barry resumed course for Philadelphia. This was the last naval action fought by the Continental navy.

SEE ALSO *Barry, John.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

ALSOP, JOHN. (1724–1794). Congressman. Connecticut and New York. Born in Middletown, Connecticut, Alsop moved to New York City with his brother and business partner, Richard, becoming a successful merchant. In 1770 he helped establish the New York Hospital Association, serving as its first governor until 1784. A member of the New York assembly and then the Provisional Congress, Alsop was selected as a representative to the Continental Congress (1774–1776). In addition to serving on the Committee of Safety that ran New York City before British occupation, Alsop made enormous efforts to acquire arms and ammunition for the Continental Congress. Despite his many contributions to the war effort, he opposed independence as cutting off any chance of reconciliation with the British. He resigned from Congress rather than opposing the movement toward independence. When the British occupied New York City he withdrew to Middletown until the war was over. He died in Newton, Long Island, on 22 November 1794. One son, Richard (1761–1815), was a member of the “Hartford Wits,” a group of poets centered in that city, and another, John (1776–1841), was also a poet. His daughter Mary married the politician Rufus King.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ALTAMAHAW FORD. The action generally known as Haw River (or Pyle's Defeat) occurred in North Carolina on 25 February 1781. It is referred to by Kenneth Roberts in his *Oliver Wiswell* (1940) as Altamahaw Ford in the text and as Attamahaw Ford on the endpaper map. The former is accurate and is now the location of a NASCAR racetrack.

SEE ALSO *Haw River, North Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

AMBOY, NEW JERSEY. Eighteenth-century British and American writers did not show any consistent usage of the names Amboy, Perth Amboy, and South Amboy. It is safe to assume that any of the three forms refers to the area of modern Raritan Bay, New Jersey.

AMERICAN LEGION SEE *Legion*.

AMERICAN VOLUNTEERS. This was the name given to Major Patrick Ferguson's corps of 150 loyalists, drafted from various Provincial regiments in New York City in late 1779. It accompanied Sir Henry Clinton's Charleston expedition in 1780, saw much service thereafter in the southern backcountry, and formed the core of the force that was virtually wiped out by the over-mountain men at King's Mountain on 7 October 1780.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Ferguson, Patrick; Kings Mountain, South Carolina*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

AMHERST, JEFFREY. (1717–1797). British general. Amherst was born on 29 January 1717 in Kent, England, one of four brothers. The Amherst family's neighbor at Knole, the duke of Dorset, gave young Jeffrey a place as a page and in 1731, through Sir John Ligonier, an ensigncy in the First Foot Guards. Thereafter, Ligonier continued to be Amherst's military patron. He was Ligonier's aide-de-camp during the war of the Austrian succession and saw action in Germany at Dettingen (1743), in Belgium at Fontenoy (1745) and in Holland at Rocoux (1746). He then became staff intelligence officer to the duke of Cumberland, with whom he served at Laffeld, in Germany, in 1747. He continued as Cumberland's protégé into the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). In 1756 he was promoted colonel of the Fifteenth Foot, was at Hastenbeck (Germany) with Cumberland the following year, and survived the disgrace of Cumberland's forced surrender in the Convention of Kloster Zeven. Afterward, Amherst stayed on in Europe as commissary to the German troops serving in the British army.

In 1758, this middle-ranking staff officer—who had never directed a battle—was chosen by William Pitt, then secretary of state for Britain, to be major general commanding an expedition against the French at Fort

Louisburg, in Canada. He had the advantage over James Abercromby and John Forbes, fellow British officers leading troops in the region, because Amherst was delivered by sea to a place where he could direct a conventional military operation, rather than having to slog through endless forest to a distant and far less glamorous objective. He made the most of his advantages. Supported by Admiral Edward Boscawen's naval squadron, and ably seconded by James Wolfe, Amherst safely landed his 14,000 men and opened a formal siege. Louisburg fell in seven weeks, a triumph that contrasted dramatically with Abercromby's blundering at Fort Ticonderoga, in New York. Pitt promptly sacked Abercromby and made Amherst commander in chief in his place. At the end of the year, as he settled into his new job, Amherst heard of Forbes's success at Fort Duquesne (near present day Pittsburg).

A tall thin man with a cold manner and formidable organizational powers, Amherst soothed the feelings of colonial officials and officers and carefully assembled the men and materials for a new campaign. In 1759 he personally led the force that took Fort Ticonderoga, while Wolfe attacked Quebec and John Prideaux's expedition took Fort Niagara. Amherst, the soul of caution, decided not to press on to Montreal that season, but on 8 September 1760 his converging columns forced Governor Phillippe de Rigaud Vaudreuil to surrender New France. Amherst's Achilles heel was his dislike and ignorance of Native Americans, many of whom were former allies of France. His insistence upon slashing spending on trade goods and presents to them convinced many of these groups that the British meant to exterminate them. The result was the outbreak of Pontiac's War in 1763, during which Amherst proposed to use biological warfare, and his recall to Britain before the end of the year. Nonetheless, he was named (absentee) governor of Virginia at the end of the war.

Amherst became a lieutenant general in 1765. In 1768 he was angered by being asked to resign his absentee governorship of Virginia so that the sinecure could be given to Lord Botecourt. At first the British government's opposition championed Amherst's cause, using his complaint in order to attack Pitt's ministry. The affair was ended by George III, who offered Amherst a peerage and a pension equivalent to his income as governor. Amherst rejected the pension but was promised other posts with adequate remuneration: in 1770 he became governor of Guernsey; in 1772 he was made lieutenant general of the ordnance; and in 1776 he was granted the title of baron.

In the early 1770s the new prime minister, Frederick North called on Amherst for advice as the American situation worsened. Although he fully supported the government's policies, Amherst declined an offer of the American military command in 1774 and another after the battle of Saratoga in 1777. Early in 1778 he was

appointed to the cabinet office of commander in chief, but was uncomfortable in the company of politicians. He had little to say, and could only with difficulty be induced to give reasons for his opinions. Consequently, although on the whole he opposed sending more troops across the Atlantic, he had little influence on the direction of the war. He was far more at home in the other dimension of his job, as commander of the home forces. He made careful plans to meet a Bourbon invasion, a real possibility by the summer of 1779, and acted firmly and properly in suppressing the anti-Catholic riots led by Lord George Gordon in 1780.

A political innocent, Amherst was surprised when the fall of the North ministry in 1782 was quickly followed by his own dismissal and replacement by Seymour Conway. In the House of Lords he voted against the peace proposals offered by William Petty, second earl of Shelburne, who was then Prime Minister of Britain. He also opposed the India Bill proposed by Charles James Fox, which was intended to give the Crown greater control over the administration of The East India company's administration of Bengal. Amherst eventually supported William Pitt the younger, after he became prime minister in December 1783.

Amherst was given a second peerage in 1788, and was recalled to be commander-in-chief at the outbreak of war in 1793. His age and taciturn nature worked against him, however, and two years later Pitt reluctantly replaced him with Prince Frederick, duke of York. Amherst became a field marshal in 1796 and died on 3 August 1797.

SEE ALSO *Abercromby, James (1706–1781); Forbes's Expedition to Fort Duquesne; Louisburg, Canada; Pontiac's War.*

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revised by John Oliphant

AMHERST, JEFFREY. (1752?–1815). British officer. Probably born in Warwickshire around 1752, this Jeffrey Amherst is no relation to the British commander in chief, Lord Jeffery Amherst. Amherst became an ensign in the Sixtieth Foot on 3 June 1771. With the local rank of major in 1781, he was aide de camp to General James Robertson and is mentioned in Henry Clinton's memoirs as the officer sent on the *Jupiter* from New York City (20 March 1781) with dispatches for Cornwallis. He was promoted to the regular rank of major in the Sixtieth Foot on 1 October 1782, transferred to the Tenth Foot on 8 August 1783, and reached the grade of major general on 1 January 1798. He died in 1815.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

AMUSE. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the usual sense of this word was "to divert the attention of" or "to mislead" (*Oxford Universal Dictionary on Historical Principles*, 1955). When a tactician of the period sent out a force to amuse the enemy his intentions were no more humorous than those of today's commander who plans a diversion.

Mark M. Boatner

AMUSETTE. A light field cannon invented by Marshal Maurice de Saxe (1696–1750). The word passed into the English language in 1761 (*Oxford Universal Dictionary*, 1955).

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ANDERSON, ENOCH. (1753?–1824). A member of the Delaware regiment of the Continental Army and author of *Personal Recollections of Captain Enoch Anderson* (Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware, 1896).

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ANDERSON, JOHN. John André's pseudonym in Arnold's Treason.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason*.

Mark M. Boatner

ANDRÉ, JOHN. (1750–1780). British army officer and spymaster. Son of a Genoese merchant settled in London, André was born on 2 May 1750 and educated at home, at St. Paul's School, and in Geneva before joining the family business. In December 1770 his fiancée suddenly ended their engagement, which may explain why early in 1771 he bought a lieutenant's commission in the Twenty-third Regiment. In 1772 he was granted leave to study mathematics in Göttingen but rejoined the army (as lieutenant in the Seventh Foot) in Quebec in 1774. André was captured when St. John's fort surrendered to the invading Americans on 2 November 1775, and he spent a year on parole in Pennsylvania before being released. In 1776 he was promoted to captain in the Twenty-sixth Foot and returned to Pennsylvania with Howe's invasion force the following year. He was at the Battles of Brandywine (11 September 1777), Paoli (21 September), and Germantown (4 October) and became aide-de-camp to Major General Sir Charles Grey in Philadelphia. There he proved himself both able and diligent. He took part in the overland withdrawal from the city in 1778 and fought at Monmouth (28 June). On Grey's recommendation he then became aide-de-camp to Sir Henry Clinton in New York. He participated in the Connecticut coast raid in September 1779 and on 23 October became a major and Clinton's deputy adjutant general. In both Philadelphia

and New York he took a leading part in putting on plays, wrote poetry, revealed a marked artistic talent, and was popular among Loyalist women. In Philadelphia he courted young Peggy Shippen, who afterwards married Benedict Arnold, only weeks before Arnold's first approach to the British.

As deputy adjutant general, André corresponded with Clinton's informers, spies, and potential defectors, the most important of whom was Arnold. This task was punctuated only by Clinton's Charleston expedition of 1780, in which André acted as full adjutant general. Back in New York, André judged it time to meet Arnold, and at a secret rendezvous on the night of 21 September, Arnold handed over the details of West Point's defenses. Unfortunately, André's transport, the sloop *Vulture*, was fired on and driven back down the Hudson. André, determined to get his prize home, took the enormous risk of disguising himself in civilian clothes, knowing that he could be executed as a spy. The gamble almost came off. André was in sight of British lines when he was arrested by three American militiamen. Taking them for Loyalists he did not show them Arnold's pass, whereupon they searched him and found the crucial papers hidden in his boots. Arnold heard the news just in time to flee to the British army, but his unfortunate handler was tried by court-martial as a spy. On 29 September he was sentenced to death by hanging. Despite Clinton's intervention, Washington would neither pardon André nor grant his petition to be shot as a soldier. André spent his last days sketching a portrait of Peggy Shippen and engaging the admiration of his captors. He died calmly on the gallows on 2 October 1780.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason*.

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revised by John Oliphant

ANDRUSTOWN, NEW YORK. 18 July 1778. This settlement of seven families, six miles southeast of German Flats, was plundered and burned by Indians under Joseph Brant. An unknown number of persons were killed and captured (Lossing, vol. 1, p. 255; Swiggett, *War out of Niagara*, p. 136).

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York*.

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Mark M. Boatner

ANGELL, ISRAEL. (1740–1832). Continental officer. Born in Providence, Rhode Island, on 24 August 1740, Angell was a cooper living in Johnston, Rhode Island, at the beginning of the Revolution. Rushing to the siege of Boston, Angell became a major in Colonel Daniel Hitchcock's Rhode Island regiment and of the Eleventh Continental Regiment in January 1776. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Second Rhode Island Regiment on 1 January 1777, and two weeks later was made colonel, seeing action at the Battles of Brandywine and Monmouth. His regiment won praise for its service at Red Bank, New Jersey, in October 1777.

Angell's reputation, though, rests largely on his performance at the Battle of Springfield, New Jersey, on 23 June 1780. General Nathanael Greene ordered Angell and Major Henry Lee to hold the bridges over the Rahway River against General Wilhelm Knyphausen's far superior force of five thousand British and German troops as long as possible. Angell took the brunt of the attack, and his regiment fought a notable holding action. Though forced to withdraw, the Americans inflicted such heavy losses on the enemy forces that they retreated after burning Springfield. General George Washington, who was present, and many military historians have held Angell's leadership during the Springfield battle to be one of the classic military actions of the Revolution. Angell retired in January 1781 when the two Rhode Island regiments were merged, returning to Johnston and his career as a cooper. He died on 4 May 1832 in Smithfield, Rhode Island, his service during the Revolution encompassing the only notable events in an otherwise routine life.

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ANNA. Part of the Charleston Expedition in 1780, the British transport *Anna* (or *Ann*) was crippled by storms that began when the convoy was two days out of New York. She was taken in tow by the *Renown* (50 guns), but the cable broke and the *Anna* eventually drifted clear across the Atlantic to Cornwall. She was carrying Captain George Hanger's company of 120 Hessian and Anspach jägers, Captain John Althouse's sharpshooter company of the New York Volunteers, and (possibly) some thirty of Captain Johann Ewald's Hessian jägers who had been distributed among other ships when their transport, the *Pan*, was damaged before leaving New York.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Hanger, George*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

ARBUTHNOT, MARRIOT. (1711–1794). British admiral. Arbuthnot, son of John Arbuthnot, was born in Weymouth. He entered the navy around 1727, passed for lieutenant in August 1739, and reached post rank in 1747. After service in the Seven Years' War, he became resident commissioner of the Halifax careening yards in 1775 and lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia on 20 April 1776. On 23 January 1778 he was promoted rear admiral and recalled to Britain, where he was made commander in chief of the North American squadron. On 25 August he reached New York.

His squadron had been much reduced following French entry into the war, and the choices Arbuthnot had to make were even more difficult than those confronted by Howe. In 1779, aware of the approach of comte d'Estaing from the West Indies but unsure of his target, he rightly stayed in the north to cover New York, Newport, and Halifax. In fact Estaing attacked Georgia, taking four British ships and supporting the unsuccessful American attempt on Savannah. Early in 1780 Arbuthnot successfully cooperated with Henry Clinton in the Charleston expedition. Afterward he concentrated his forces at Gardiners Bay at the northern tip of Long Island to bottle up Rochambeau's squadron in Newport, seized by the French in July. There was little else a purely naval force could do, and he rejected Clinton's vague plan for a combined offensive. At about

this time his relations with Clinton deteriorated to the point where they could hardly work together. In September, George Rodney—probably wisely—took it upon himself to come to Arbuthnot's support against an expected French onslaught from the West Indies. He then took the extraordinary step of insisting, as the senior admiral, on assuming command on Arbuthnot's station. He proceeded to interfere with Arbuthnot's patronage and dispositions, giving rise to the latter's complaint that Rodney's real interest was in prize money. Rodney was reprimanded by the earl of Sandwich, but the quarrel has too often been attributed to Arbuthnot's selfish pride. Worse still, when Rodney left in November he took with him all of Arbuthnot's frigates and most of his naval stores. Arbuthnot thus had caution thrust on him when he caught the escaped Newport squadron off Chesapeake Bay on 16 March. The action was disappointing; but by afterward entering the bay Arbuthnot effectively protected Benedict Arnold's force in Virginia. Plagued by ill health and fading eyesight, Arbuthnot resigned and sailed for Britain on 4 July. Retired on half-pay, he rose to rear admiral of the Blue by seniority before his death in London on 31 January 1794.

Arbuthnot may have been, as some contemporaries alleged, over-cautious, rude, quarrelsome, and too old for his job. On the other hand, he was zealous, strategically sensible, capable of energetic action, and generous to his captains. He had too few ships, and Clinton and Rodney were difficult colleagues. Although he was probably not the best choice for the North American command, his abysmal reputation is largely undeserved.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Chesapeake Bay; Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, comte d'; Rochambeau, Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de; Rodney, George Bridges; Sandwich, John Montagu, fourth earl of.*

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revised by John Oliphant

ARMAND, CHARLES *SEE* *Tuffin, Marquis de La Rouerie Armand-Charles.*

ARMED NEUTRALITY. Conceived and phrased by the Danes, proclaimed by Catherine the Great of Russia on 29 February 1780, and also subscribed to by Sweden and several other European nations, Armed Neutrality began as a response to specific British naval actions but became a long-lived principle of neutral rights. In order to enforce a blockade of its rebellious colonies, England claimed the right to inspect neutral ships at sea and seize contraband goods bound for America. In practice, this policy focused primarily on ships from the Netherlands. The Dutch island of St. Eustatius in the Caribbean was the center of their trade with the Americans. Goods from the American states bound for Europe were exchanged at St. Eustatius for Dutch and French military supplies, which were essential to the American war effort. Further alienating the British, Dutch ports offered a safe haven to American privateers and ships of the U.S. Navy. While the Americans, Spanish, and French had no problem with the Dutch trading with both sides in the war, the British found it an intolerable betrayal of the Treaty of Alliance of 1678. The British government was willing to allow the Dutch to carry non-military goods, but insisted that they cease supplying arms and ammunition to the Americans. In 1779 the Netherlands informed the British that they refused to limit their trade in any way. In response, the British announced their intention to put a stop to the shipment of military stores in Dutch ships through the English Channel, issuing what they thought was a fair warning. Again, the Dutch ignored the British and in January 1780, Commodore Fielding encountered a small Dutch fleet off Weymouth, England, and demanded to search the Dutch ships. When the Dutch commander, Count Byland, refused, Fielding fired upon the outgunned Dutch, who surrendered. In response, the Netherlands filed diplomatic protests. Catherine, seeing a major diplomatic opportunity to increase Russian influence, took a more proactive approach, announcing that her ships would resist all search efforts at sea. She then entered into a defensive treaty for the protection of neutral shipping in wartime with Denmark and Sweden and called upon the belligerents to accept the treaty's terms.

The principles of the treaty were: (1) that neutral vessels may navigate freely from port to port and along the coasts of the nations at war; (2) that the effects belonging to subjects of the said powers at war shall be free on board neutral vessels, with the exception of contraband merchandise (that is, "free ships make free goods"); (3) that as to the specification of contraband, the Empress Catherine holds to what is enumerated in the tenth and eleventh articles of her treaty of commerce (1766) with Great Britain, extending her obligations to all the powers at war (that treaty did not include naval stores or ships' timbers as contraband); (4) that to determine what constitutes a blockaded port, this

designation shall apply only to a port where the attacking power has stationed its vessels sufficiently near and in such a way as to render access thereto clearly dangerous; (5) and that these principles shall serve as a rule for proceedings and judgments as to the legality of prizes.

Spain and France immediately accepted these principles. Great Britain, which received the declaration of neutral rights from the Russian ambassador on 1 April 1780, could accept the first and third principles as a matter of policy but would not recognize them as "rights." To do so, the British ministers determined, would be to undermine their most effective military weapon, the blockade. They therefore decided on the course of publicly disregarding the Armed Neutrality while actually being very fearful of its consequences.

Since it was supposed to be the League of *Armed Neutrality*, Catherine announced the creation of an armed fleet to enforce the principles of neutrality and called on other nations to join. This fleet consisted of 84 Russian, Danish, and Swedish warships. Most of the nations of Europe eventually signed on, and even the United States attempted to join, despite being one of the belligerents in the war. When the Netherlands indicated a willingness to join the League, the British government decided that it was better to declare war on the Dutch than to have them enter into an alliance with the Russians. In November 1780 the States-General of the Netherlands voted to join the League. The British government felt they had to act before the Dutch officially joined the League, and so declared war on the Netherlands in December, hoping thereby to avoid dragging the rest of the League into the war. The British ministers, fearing that Russia might seize upon the pretext of the Dutch voting to join the League and enter the war as a Dutch ally, voted to offer Catherine the Mediterranean island of Minorca if she would side with them in the war. George III refused, however, to approve this deal, which ended up not mattering. The Dutch went ahead and signed onto the League at the beginning of 1781, but Catherine voided this treaty when she learned of the English declaration of war on the Dutch, nullifying their neutral status.

The British government acted quickly to take advantage of its war on the Dutch, directing Admiral George Rodney to attack St. Eustatius. Rodney's fleet seized the island, but in doing so, he became bogged down in the Caribbean and was unable to join the British fleet in the encounter with the French off the Chesapeake Capes, which led in turn to French victory and Cornwallis' surrender.

Catherine attempted in December 1780 to use the leverage of the League of Armed Neutrality to mediate an end to the Revolutionary War. France was initially interested in the offer and Britain agreed so long as Joseph II of Austria participated, but the tangle of negotiations soon broke down and events at Yorktown decisively terminated the effort at a mediated peace. Other than the unintended

consequence of Britain declaring war on the Netherlands, however, the League of Armed Neutrality accomplished so little that Tsarina Catherine called it an "Armed Nullity."

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

ARMSTRONG, JAMES (CAPTAIN).

Continental officer. North Carolina. Armstrong was a captain in the Second North Carolina on 1 September 1775, and colonel of the Eighth North Carolina on 26 November 1776. His unit was part of Lachlan McIntosh's brigade at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777–1778. He retired 1 June 1778. He later became colonel of a militia regiment and was wounded at Stono Ferry, South Carolina, on 20 June 1779.

Another James Armstrong was lieutenant of North Carolina Dragoons from October 1777 to January 1781. A third James Armstrong was from Pennsylvania and served in Lee's Legion.

SEE ALSO *McIntosh, Lachlan; Stono Ferry, South Carolina*.

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ARMSTRONG, JAMES (QUARTER-

MASTER). (1748–1828). Continental officer. Pennsylvania. Born in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on 29 August 1748, Armstrong was the son of John Armstrong, a member of the Continental Congress, and brother of John Armstrong, Jr., a future secretary of war. Armstrong attended the College of New Jersey (now Princeton) before studying medicine in Philadelphia. In 1769 he set up practice in Winchester, Virginia. Armstrong served as a medical officer and quartermaster of the Second Pennsylvania Battalion, starting on 20 February 1776. He was promoted to captain on 1 January 1779. The record is unclear, but he may have been captured at Dorchester, South Carolina, on 13 December 1781, remaining a

prisoner until the end of the war. It is certain that, after the war, Armstrong spent three years in England before returning to Carlisle in 1788. In addition to his medical practice, Armstrong served as a judge and represented his district in Congress from 1793 to 1795. In 1808 he accepted an appointment to the Cumberland County Court, holding that position until his death 6 May 1828.

SEE ALSO *Armstrong, John, Jr.*; *Armstrong, John, Sr.*

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ARMSTRONG, JOHN, JR. (1758–1843). American officer; prominent postwar politician. Pennsylvania. Armstrong was born in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on 25 November 1758, the son of John Armstrong and brother of James Armstrong. He was in his second year at Princeton in 1776 when he volunteered for the Continental army. As aide-de-camp to General Hugh Mercer, he was present when that officer was mortally wounded (3 January 1777) at Princeton. He then served Gates in the same capacity until the end of the war. Gates sent Armstrong to recall Benedict Arnold during the Second Battle of Saratoga (7 October 1777).

Major Armstrong composed the Newburgh Addresses (1783) calling upon Congress to issue the back pay owed to the army. The Newburgh Addresses were seen by many as a threat of mutiny, and political enemies used Armstrong's authorship against him throughout the remainder of his life. After the Revolution he had a long political career. He served as adjutant general of the Pennsylvania militia and as a U. S. senator from 1800 to 1804, as well as a minister to France from 1804 to 1810. His career culminated in his becoming secretary of war under President Madison in January 1813. Blamed for the failure of the expedition against Montreal and for the British capture of Washington, he was forced to resign. He married Alida Livingston, the sister of Robert R. Livingston in 1789. He died 1 April 1843.

SEE ALSO *Armstrong, John, Sr.*; *Saratoga, Second Battle of.*

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ARMSTRONG, JOHN, SR. (1717–1795). Continental brigadier general; major general. Ireland and Pennsylvania. Born in County Fermanagh, Ireland, on

13 October 1717, Armstrong crossed the Atlantic to Pennsylvania in the 1740s, becoming surveyor for the powerful Penn family. Elected to the Assembly in 1749, he became a key figure in the development of western Pennsylvania. During the Seven Years' War Armstrong persuaded the Assembly to establish its first forts in the west, which he commanded. He also led the 300-man force that destroyed the Delaware settlement at Kittanning, in Pennsylvania, on 8 September 1756, driving that nation out of the war. He was the senior Pennsylvania officer in Brigadier General John Forbes' expedition to Fort Duquesne in 1758. Colonel Armstrong also served in Pontiac's War (1763), fighting no battles but burning many Indian villages.

Although an elderly man and suffering from chronic rheumatism, he was named a Continental brigadier general on 1 March 1776. General Armstrong took part in the successful defense of Charleston in June 1776, but as a troop commander at Haddrell's Point, in South Carolina, he did not engage the enemy. During the New Jersey campaign he was useful to Washington in trying to "stir up the people" in his part of Pennsylvania (around Carlisle) and in establishing magazines. Dissatisfied with the promotion of junior officers over his head, Armstrong resigned on 4 April 1777 and the next day was appointed general of the state militia. At Brandywine (11 September 1777) he commanded the Pennsylvania militia posted at Pyle's Ford, a point where no enemy threat was expected and where none materialized. At Germantown (4 October 1777) he led the militia that constituted the right flank of George Washington's complicated attack and, although he made contact with the enemy, the battle was lost before his command became seriously engaged. He was named major general on 9 January 1778, and held this militia rank the rest of the war. After the Wyoming "massacre" (July 1778) he led part of the relief forces sent to the scene but again saw no action. A member of Congress from 1778 through 1789 and from 1787 through 1788, he also held many local public offices. He was the father of John and James Armstrong. He died 9 March 1795.

SEE ALSO *Armstrong, James (quartermaster)*; *Armstrong, John, Jr.*; *Forbes's Expedition to Fort Duquesne.*

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ARNOLD, BENEDICT. (1741–1801). General in the Continental and British armies, traitor. Connecticut. Great-grandson of a Rhode Island governor, Benedict Arnold was born in Norwich, Connecticut, on



Benedict Arnold. *The American general who became one of the most notorious traitors in American history, in an etching by H. B. Hall.* THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

14 January 1741. He had to abandon his education after his father, an alcoholic merchant, went bankrupt. In March 1758, Arnold ran off to enlist in a New York company. He deserted the following year, but through his mother's efforts was not prosecuted. In March 1760 he enlisted again, served briefly in upper New York, and again deserted. He made his way home alone through the wilderness and completed his apprenticeship as a druggist. After the death of his parents, the twenty-one-year-old Arnold sold the family property and went with his sister, Hannah, to New Haven, Connecticut, where he opened a shop to sell drugs and books. He became a successful merchant and started sailing his own ships to the West Indies and Canada. One of his activities was horse-trading, a business which took him to Montreal and Quebec. Like others who had the opportunity, Arnold undoubtedly engaged in smuggling as well. In 1767 he married Margaret Mansfield and fathered three sons in five years.

CONTINENTAL ARMY CAMPAIGNS

In 1766 Arnold became leader of the New Haven Sons of Liberty and was active in local Patriot politics, though his violent personality colored his reputation. He fought at least two duels and gained a reputation as a spendthrift and

philanderer. Having been elected a captain of militia in December 1774, Arnold reacted quickly to the "Lexington alarm." When New Haven's town leaders refused to issue arms and munitions to Arnold's company, he led his men in a raid on the armory, then marched his newly armed men to Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Almost immediately upon his arrival in the Boston lines, Arnold talked the authorities into letting him lead a bold enterprise to capture Fort Ticonderoga. The Massachusetts authorities appointed him a militia colonel on 3 May, and he traveled north ahead of his troops. He arrived at the fort just in time to find another group, the Green Mountain Boys under Ethan Allen, about to launch their own attack. Arnold attempted to bully his way into command, but was rebuffed, although Allen did allow Arnold to participate in the capture of Ticonderoga, on 10 May 1775.

Using captured boats, Arnold raided St. Johns, Canada, on 17 May, and on 1 June he was instructed by Massachusetts authorities to take temporary command of all American forces on Lake Champlain. On 14 May, Massachusetts sent a committee with instructions to put all American troops in Arnold's area under the command of a leader from Connecticut. Arnold took violent exception to being superseded and, after withdrawing with a body of supporters to the captured vessels off Crown Point, he defied the order and threatened to arrest the committee. Insulted by a fellow officer, Arnold "took the liberty of breaking his head." Arnold was finally persuaded to abandon his mutiny, and on 5 July he returned to Cambridge to face accusations of mishandling the funds that had been entrusted to him for the expedition. The Massachusetts legislature eventually paid the official expenses Arnold had incurred. Meanwhile, Arnold's wife had died on 19 June.

Arnold next marched to Quebec through the Maine wilderness with 1,000 men, from 13 September to 9 November 1775, and this contributed to his reputation as the "whirlwind hero." Joining with General Richard Montgomery's army, which had come up the St. Lawrence River, Arnold acted bravely in the attack on Quebec, 31 December 1775, in which he was seriously wounded in the knee and Montgomery was killed. Arnold was appointed brigadier general on 10 January. After spending a terrible winter laying siege to Quebec, Arnold surrendered command of his pathetic little army to David Wooster in April 1776. With the arrival of British reinforcements, the Americans retreated to Montreal, ravaged by hunger and smallpox the whole way. In May, Arnold led an effort to release the prisoners taken in the actions at the Cedars shortly before the Americans retreated from Canada.

Over the next few months, Arnold built a small navy on Lake Champlain, even while facing a court martial for plundering. At Valcour Island, he led his small navy in a remarkable action of great strategic importance against a larger British force. Though defeated, Arnold delayed

the British advance sufficiently to prevent their moving further south to Ticonderoga.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

During this period Arnold maintained good relations with his superiors, Phillip John Schuyler and Horatio Gates, but he clashed with three junior officers. Captain Jacobus Wynkoop of the navy had been sent by Schuyler to take charge of the fleet on Lake Champlain. When Wynkoop challenged Arnold's authority as senior commander, Arnold had him arrested and, with the backing of Gates, removed. Arnold charged Captain Moses Hazen with negligence in handling the stores evacuated from Montreal, but Arnold made himself so offensive to the court-martial that the latter acquitted Hazen and ordered Arnold arrested. Major John Brown proved to be a more tenacious enemy than either Wynkoop or Hazen, and embroiled Arnold in a series of inquiries that were never resolved.

Arnold, meanwhile, had joined George Washington in New Jersey. On 23 December 1776 he was sent to Providence, Rhode Island, to help Joseph Spencer plan an operation to oust the British from Newport, a place they had just occupied. While in New England he was outraged to learn that, on 19 February 1777, Congress had promoted five officers to major general, but had neglected to include Arnold's name on the promotion list. He wrote Washington that Congress must have intended this as "a very civil way of requesting my resignation." Washington, who had not been consulted on this list and who had the highest opinion of Arnold, urged him to remain in the service while he attempted to have the injustice righted. Arnold was frustrated in his efforts to raise troops and supplies for the Newport operation, incensed by the failure of federal authorities to recognize his military accomplishments to date, and worried about the neglected state of his personal affairs at New Haven.

During this period, Arnold has been described as "sulking in his tent like some rustic Achilles," but an opportunity suddenly arose for him to display his daring leadership. On 23 April 1777, the British launched the Danbury Raid, aimed at a key American supply depot in Connecticut. Arnold did not arrive in time to prevent the British from burning Danbury, but his 400-man militia inflicted heavy losses on the enemy as they retreated to the coast. Again a popular hero, Arnold was promoted to major general on 2 May, but this did not remove his principal grievance: he was still junior in rank to the five officers who had been promoted over him on 19 February.

John Brown, also a good man at pressing a grievance, had meanwhile renewed his offensive against Arnold. On 12 May he published a personal attack on Arnold that ended with the prophetic words: "Money is this man's god, and to get enough of it he would sacrifice his country."

Exactly a month later, after Arnold had reached Morristown, Washington wrote Congress asking that a committee investigate the matters Arnold wanted settled: his public accounts, Brown's charges, and his seniority. In Philadelphia on 20 May Arnold sent Congress Brown's handbill of 12 May and reiterated the request for an inquiry. The Board of War was given the latter duty and on 23 May, reported that Brown's charges were groundless. Some delegates still wanted an accounting for \$55,000 of the \$67,000 Congress had advanced him for operations in Canada, but Arnold was unavailable to respond; he was sent on 14 June to take charge of militia forces on the Delaware, where the enemy started their perplexing maneuvers that preceded the Philadelphia Campaign.

Arnold returned to resume his arguments with Congress, but the same day that he finally submitted his resignation—11 July 1777—Congress received Washington's request that he be assigned to command the militia of the Northern Department in opposing Burgoyne's Offensive. Arnold asked that his resignation be suspended and headed north. On 8 August a motion to backdate Arnold's commission to 19 February was defeated in Congress by sixteen votes to six.

Arnold's first assignment in the north was to lead the relief forces that ended British general Barry St. Leger's expedition. He sided with Schuyler in the factionalism that rent the northern army, and was almost immediately at odds with Gates when that general succeeded Schuyler. In the first and second battles of Saratoga, 19 September and 7 October, he played a prominent and controversial part in the American victories.

Seriously wounded in the second battle of Saratoga, Arnold was incapacitated for many months. But Congress again was forced to acknowledge his contribution to the cause: they officially thanked him, along with fellow officers Gates and Benjamin Lincoln for the defeat of Burgoyne, and on 29 November they resolved that Washington should adjust Arnold's date of rank. A new commission made him a major general as of 17 February 1777, which finally gave him seniority over the five officers whose promotions on 19 February had so rankled him. The slate of his grievances now virtually erased, Benedict Arnold entered a new phase of his career. Because his leg had not healed sufficiently for him to lead troops in the field, he was directed on 28 May 1778 to take command in Philadelphia when the expected British evacuation took place. On 19 June he was in the city.

DESCENT INTO DISGRACE

Since Philadelphia was the seat of the state as well as the federal government, Arnold had two sets of civil authorities over him. Furthermore, the city was divided into factions: returning Patriots, Loyalists and collaborators,

and neutralists. Any military commander in such a situation would have trouble, but few could have gotten into it any faster than Arnold. Almost from the start he was suspected of using his official position for personal speculation. He heightened suspicion and alienated townspeople in all walks of life by ostentatious living that exceeded his known means of legitimate income. Joseph Reed, president of the Pennsylvania Council and of the state, presented Congress with eight charges of misconduct against Arnold in February 1779. Arnold immediately demanded an investigation, which cleared him of most charges and referred the rest to a military court. The prosecution was handled by Colonel John Laurance, and Arnold took charge of his own defense.

Although documents brought to light long after the trial prove that Arnold's dishonesty as the military commander of Philadelphia was far worse than the state authorities suspected, the prosecution was unable to assemble adequate evidence to support its case. Hence, Colonel Laurance had to resort to such charges as "imposing menial offices upon the sons of freemen of this state." There was more substance to the other three charges that were presented at the trial, although proof was lacking.

After hearing Arnold argue his case with admirable skill, on 26 January 1780 the court came as close as possible to exonerating him without insulting his accusers. Two of the charges were dismissed entirely. These were the allegation of imposing "menial offices" and the charge that he had purchased goods for personal speculation during a period in which he ordered all shops in Philadelphia to be closed. However, the court found Arnold guilty of improperly issuing a pass for his ship, the *Charming Nancy*, to leave the city while other vessels were temporarily quarantined, and he was also convicted of using public wagons for private purposes. The sentence for these offenses, however, was merely a reprimand from the commander in chief. Still positively disposed to Arnold, Washington's reprimand was written almost as a commendation, but Arnold was nonetheless furious that he did not receive a complete acquittal.

TURNING TRAITOR

Arnold did not wait to finish his protracted battle with the Pennsylvania authorities before making the decision that launched him into the adventure for which he is known to history. On 8 April 1779 he had married 19-year-old Peggy Shippen, daughter of a prominent Philadelphia merchant and suspected Loyalist. The next month Arnold took the first step in turning traitor to the Continental cause.

Using his influence to gain command of West Point in August 1779, Arnold conspired to hand the post over to the British the following month. The plot was soon discovered, however, and Arnold fled West Point aboard the British ship, the *Vulture*, on 25 September 1780. The British made

good their promise to reward Arnold for his efforts in their behalf, despite his failure to deliver West Point. He was commissioned as a brigadier general of the British Army and given the perquisites (including a pension) associated with that rank. He was also awarded £6,315 in compensation for the property losses he incurred in coming over to the Loyalist side. In the spring of 1782, Peggy Arnold was additionally awarded a yearly pension of £500, and £100 per year was eventually given to each of her children.

The British authorities assigned Arnold a military command, and he started raising a legion comprised of Loyalists and American deserters. After escaping an attempt by Sergeant John Champe to kidnap him in New York, Arnold led raids against New London, Connecticut, and in Virginia. Nonetheless, the British officers in America did not welcome this provincial traitor as a companion in arms, and the high command did not trust him. Furthermore, his recruitment efforts proved unimpressive. Deserters and Loyalists were plentiful, but even though Arnold offered a bounty of three guineas gold and the same food, clothing, and pay as British regulars, by the end of a year he had attracted only 212 of the 900 men his legion required. Although he enjoyed some success as a British commander, Arnold found his reception in London, where he arrived in early 1782, frosty at best. While the king and his ministers consulted Arnold on American affairs, they did not offer him the field command to which he felt entitled, and even other Loyalists in exile scorned the famous traitor.

LATTER YEARS IN EXILE

In the following years, Arnold entered into a number of commercial schemes. In 1785 he established himself as a merchant-shipper at St. John, New Brunswick, and re-entered the West Indies trade. After some initial success and the birth of an illegitimate son, John Sage, Arnold's fortunes soon faltered: his business was destroyed by a fire in 1788 and he returned to London in 1791 to try his hand at other ventures. On 1 July 1792 he fought a duel with the Earl of Lauderdale, who had accurately impugned Arnold's character during a debate in the House of Lords. Arnold shot and missed; Lauderdale held his fire and agreed to apologize. During the war with France, Arnold served as a privateer. Captured, he spent some time in a French prison, but eventually escaped. Later he helped to put down the Martinique slave uprising, but he again found himself returning to London on the verge of bankruptcy. He spent the last few years of his life seeking further preferment from the British government.

Arnold remains a highly controversial figure. Most military historians find him one of the finest field commanders in the Revolution, a leader capable of inspiring his men to truly heroic actions. Yet his lack of discretion, reckless leadership, and aggressive personal behavior undermined his effectiveness and destroyed a promising career.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's March to Quebec; Arnold's Treason; Canada Invasion; Champe, John; Danbury Raid, Connecticut; St. Leger's Expedition; Valcour Island.*

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ARNOLD'S MARCH TO QUEBEC.

13 September–9 November 1775. The forces Congress had ordered to invade Canada were already advancing north along the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River corridor when General Washington took steps in late August 1775 to increase the invasion's chances for success by launching a second expedition against Canada from his army at Cambridge. The proposed route up the Kennebec River and down the Chaudière to Quebec was well known. British engineer John Montresor had mapped and described it in 1761, making it seem a feasible avenue of approach, and Colonel Jonathan Brewer of Massachusetts had proposed using it in May 1775 to threaten Quebec. Washington and Benedict Arnold were aware of its difficulties, especially in winter, but agreed that the risks were worth taking. With winter approaching, it was essential to organize the expedition quickly. On 21 August, Arnold spoke with Reuben Colburn, a Kennebec boatbuilder who happened to be in Cambridge, about furnishing two hundred light bateaux that could be carried across the many portages that turned the series of lakes and rivers into an invasion route. Having carefully weighed the risks, on 3 September, Washington gave Colburn orders to build the bateaux, and two days later he issued in his general orders a call for volunteers.

ORGANIZATION OF ARNOLD'S COMMAND

Arnold's force of about 1,100 men consisted of three components. Captain Daniel Morgan led three companies of riflemen, his own Virginians and the Pennsylvania companies of William Hendricks and Matthew Smith. Ten New England companies were divided into two battalions, the first led by Lieutenant Colonel Roger Enos and Major Return Jonathan Meigs, both from Connecticut, and including the companies of Thomas Williams, Henry Dearborn, Oliver Hanchet, William Goodrich, and a man

known only as Scott. The second battalion was led by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Greene from Rhode Island and Major Timothy Bigelow from Massachusetts, with the companies of Samuel Ward Jr., Simeon Thayer, John Topham, Jonas Hubbard, and Samuel McCobb. A detachment of fifty artificers, led by Captain Colburn, joined the expedition on the Kennebec. The staff included surgeon Isaac Senter, a surgeon's mate and two assistants, two adjutants, brigade major Christian Febiger, two quartermasters, and chaplain Samuel Spring. Five men accompanied the expedition as volunteers: Aaron Burr, Matthias Ogden, Eleazer Oswald, Charles Porterfield, and John McGuire.

Although Washington's general orders specified that the volunteers should be "active woodsmen and well acquainted with batteaus," only the riflemen had experience in extended outdoor living; the New Englanders were mostly farmers with little knowledge of the wilderness or of boats. While all the riflemen were eager volunteers, Washington had taken the precaution to order a draft if a sufficient number of New Englanders did not volunteer; in the event, compulsion did not have to be invoked. Just before the expedition was to leave Cambridge, however, some men refused to march until Washington gave them a month's advance pay. And in a not uncommon display of intercolonial rivalries, the captains of the riflemen refused to serve under Greene, a Rhode Islander, forcing Arnold to keep the riflemen together in a single division.

THE DEPARTURE

The riflemen led the march from Cambridge on 11 September, with the last companies of the force departing two days later. At Newburyport on 19 September the men boarded eleven coastal sloops and schooners and reached Gardinerstown, on the Kennebec below Fort Western, three days later, where Arnold found two hundred bateaux waiting. For Colburn, who had had eighteen days to build the bateaux after receiving Washington's order on the 3rd, it was a remarkable achievement, but the boats suffered from the speed of their construction. Made of green lumber (the only material available), many were poorly constructed and smaller than specified. Arnold accepted the boats, having no alternative, and ordered another twenty to be built. Colburn had also assembled flour and meat for the expedition and was able to furnish information about the route. His two scouts, Getchell and Berry, had gone as far as the Dead River and returned with ominous news that the British appeared to expect an invasion from this direction.

On 24 September, two reconnaissance parties left Fort Western (later Augusta, Maine) and started up the Kennebec, followed on succeeding days by the riflemen, Greene with three companies, and Meigs with four companies. Arnold set out with two companies on the 29th,

followed by Enos with one company. The column took two days to cover the first eighteen miles to Fort Halifax. The first significant portage was at Ticonic Falls, where the four-hundred-pound bateaux and about sixty-five tons of matériel were carried half a mile. Then came Five Mile Ripples (or Falls), the dangerous half-mile approach to Skowhegan Falls, the falls themselves, the Bombazee Rips, and the three Norridgewock Falls. To this point, the expedition had passed through a region dotted with settlements where some supplies and assistance could be procured; thereafter, the route was through the wilderness until they were well down the Chaudière into Canada. Having spent three days passing Norridgewock Falls, repairing their badly battered boats, and finding many provisions already spoiled by water, on 9 October the column pushed on to Curritunk Falls, the next major portage. On 11 October, Arnold and an advance element reached the Great Carrying Place, where eight miles of portage and four miles of rowing across three ponds took the expedition to the Dead River (the west branch of the Kennebec). Thirty miles of rowing up the Dead River took the men to the four-mile carry across the Height of Land that separated the watersheds of the Kennebec and the Chaudière, and then to a treacherous stream that meandered through swamps to Lake Megantic.

For many days before reaching the Great Carrying Place, it was apparent that the expedition faced hazards that had not been foreseen. First, no experienced woodsman would have considered the route passable for bateaux, particularly in winter. Second, Arnold had miscalculated the length of his march and food was running out. Finally, the weather was against them: at the outset it had been cold enough to take a toll on men who spent days struggling in the water to manhandle the boats past obstacles in the rivers, but the temperature dropped further, and continuous, heavy rains started falling. On Dead River on 21 October they were struck by a hurricane of historic proportions that swelled the river from sixty to two hundred yards in width.

THE DEFECTION OF ENOS

Morgan's riflemen were continuously in the van, except for 16–17 October, when they allowed Greene's three companies to take the lead, perhaps in order to pilfer flour from the New Englanders; Arnold ordered Morgan to stay at the head of the column thereafter. Greene's men had to camp and await resupply from the provisions supposed to be with Enos's three companies, which were bringing up the rear. The four companies of Meigs's third division followed Morgan, but when Enos caught up with Greene on 25 October, Arnold ordered these two commanders to send on only those men who could be given fifteen days' provisions and to send back the sick. After a council of war on the 26th, Greene's men staggered on

toward Quebec with a meager two and a half barrels of flour from Enos's stocks, whereas Enos started to the rear with about three hundred men from his own division plus stragglers and the sick from the other divisions. They reached the settlement at Brunswick fifteen days later. On 1 December 1775 a court-martial acquitted Enos of the charge of "quitting his commanding officer without leave." In April 1776 Major General John Sullivan defended Enos on the grounds that Arnold and his seven hundred men could not have gone on without the provisions sent forward from the last division, and Brigadier General William Heath joined twenty-four other field officers in a testimonial that Enos deserved "applause rather than censure" (Freeman, vol. 3, p. 574n). But many of Enos's contemporaries judged his defection "cowardly." He left the Continental service in January 1776 and served thereafter in the Connecticut and Vermont militias.

ARNOLD STRUGGLES ON

Up the flooded Dead River, over four and a half miles of portage to Seven Mile Stream, the gaunt survivors then floundered through icy swamps to find Lake Megantic. When Arnold's main body assembled on the Chaudière on 31 October, they had only a few bateaux left, several having been wrecked in the dangerous rapids and falls of this last river. "Our greatest luxuries now consisted of a little water, stiffened with flour," wrote Senter on 1 November. They killed and ate Captain Dearborn's pet Newfoundland dog that had hitherto survived the hazards of the wilderness. "Nor did the shaving soap, pomatum, and even the lip salve, leather of their shoes, cartridge boxes, etc., share any better fate." Arnold forged ahead with an advance party to the Canadian settlements and sent back provisions that reached his men on 2 November.

At St. Mary's the expedition left the river and marched north to reach the St. Lawrence at Point Levis, opposite Quebec, on 9 November 1775. Within a day, the aggressive Arnold had found Indian canoes and dugouts, acquired supplies of flour, and had the men prepare scaling ladders. He was ready to cross the mile-wide St. Lawrence, which was full of British naval craft, but the attempt was delayed by a gale that lasted until the 13th. Owing to the shortage of boats, only three-quarters of the small force got across the first night. The rest crossed the second night, bringing the scaling ladders. Arnold led them onto the Plains of Abraham, but since the British were alert to the American presence, he wisely decided against attempting an assault on Quebec. In a truly remarkable operation, Arnold had started from Fort Western with 1,100 men and led them in 45 days across 350 miles of wilderness to arrive at the gates of Quebec in midwinter. There was enough fight left in the 675 survivors to push across the St. Lawrence and throw Quebec's 1,200 defenders into considerable consternation. But Arnold's force could

do no more than blockade Quebec from the land side until 2 December, when Brigadier General Richard Montgomery arrived from upriver with 300 better-supplied American troops, the remnant of the force that had invaded Canada via the Champlain-Richelieu route.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Justin Smith says 1,050 men left Cambridge, about 50 men (Colburn's carpenters) joined on the Kennebec, and Arnold drew clothing for 675 survivors on 5 December. Ward found it "incredible that no more than 55 were lost." (The original 1,100 men minus the 675 survivors, minus the 300 men with Enos, minus the 70 men evacuated from Dead River, would leave 55 men dead, deserted, or turned back as escorts with the invalids.) "It seems probable that the arrivals were not much more than half of the original party," according to Christopher Ward (p. 450n). The surviving journals, twenty of which were edited by Kenneth Roberts, give ample testimony to the hardships endured by the expedition, but historians have noted with some skepticism the ability of men to keep a record of their suffering. Ward has written: "Probably no other expedition of similar length made by so few men has produced so many contemporary records" (p. 448).

SEE ALSO *Bateau; Burr, Aaron; Canada Invasion; Council of War; Febiger, Christian ("Old Denmark"); Montresor, John; Quebec (Canada Invasion); Senter, Isaac.*

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ARNOLD'S RAID IN VIRGINIA SEE *Virginia, Military Operations in.*

ARNOLD'S TREASON. May 1779–25 September 1780. Early in May 1779 Major General Benedict Arnold, then military commander at Philadelphia, decided to offer his services to the British. He sent for Joseph Stansbury, a Loyalist whose mild nature and cautious conduct had enabled him to continue living in the city, and said he was ready either to join the British outright or to undertake secret dealings. With the help of a New York City Loyalist, the Reverend Jonathan Odell, Stansbury met on 10 May with Captain (later Major) John André, an aide to General Sir Henry Clinton. The British accepted Arnold's offer and decided it would be best for him to remain in his post in the Continental army; meanwhile, secret channels were established for correspondence between Arnold and André through Stansbury. Arnold started sending information almost immediately. He used the code name "Moore" during most of the sixteen-month conspiracy.

The nineteen-year-old Peggy Shippen, whom the thirty-eight-year-old Arnold had married on 8 April 1779, was a partner in his treason from the beginning. There is no reason to believe, however, that she instigated it or that Arnold was won over by British agents. Arnold's defection came after a long series of perceived grievances coupled with a need for money.

Arnold initially demanded ten thousand pounds regardless of his specific service to the British. Clinton rejected this proposal, instead suggesting that Arnold accept a command in the British army. Negotiations broke down at this point but were revived in May 1780, when Arnold was involved in the drawn-out court-martial for his corruption in Philadelphia. Meanwhile, he had been working to get command of West Point, which Clinton had indicated the previous year was of particular interest to the British. On 15 June, Arnold opened communication with General Wilhelm Knyphausen, who was in temporary command at New York City. Though he had not yet received any promises from the British, Arnold began sending valuable information, including that French General Jean Rochambeau's expeditionary force was expected soon, this intelligence persuading Knyphausen to launch the Springfield, N.J., raid of June 1780. Upon Clinton's return, Arnold pressed him for an agreement on the price: he wanted ten thousand pounds and another ten thousand pounds should he successfully hand over West Point to the British, plus an annual pension of five hundred pounds. Clinton agreed to pay Arnold twenty thousand pounds if the British got possession of West Point, its garrison of three thousand men, its artillery, and its stores. He would not agree to Arnold's demand for ten thousand pounds "whether services are performed or not," nor to an annual pension, but he did promise that if the plot failed, he would not be "left a victim."

ARNOLD AT WEST POINT

Meanwhile, however, Arnold sent the British bits and pieces of information, including “innocent confidences” to his wife in Philadelphia, who relayed them through Stansbury to Odell to André. Since George Washington and Rochambeau were working out plans for an attack on New York City, this intelligence was extremely valuable. As late as 1 August, Arnold was slated to command a wing of the allied army in this campaign, but he pleaded physical disability (his three-year-old wound), and on 3 August, he received command of West Point. On 5 August, Arnold wrote the British from West Point that the departure of Continental troops had reduced the garrison to fifteen hundred Massachusetts militia and that these were “in want of tents, provisions and almost everything.”

Arnold's new command comprised not only West Point proper but also Stony Point and Verplanck's Point some ten miles to the south; the outpost at Fishkill somewhat less than the same distance to the north; and the infantry-cavalry force at North Castle, which was roughly the same distance east of Verplanck's. Even while setting out plans to strengthen these posts, Arnold began preparations for handing them over to the British. Instead of establishing headquarters at West Point, he selected the house of a Loyalist, Colonel Beverley Robinson, across the river. Over the objections of Colonel John Lamb, who commanded the West Point garrison, Arnold detached two hundred men from that place to cut wood under the direction of Colonel Udny Hay, who commanded at Fishkill; Lamb was particularly critical of this weakening of his force because he had already sent Hay two hundred militia for guard duty. Although Arnold did not take up or partially dismantle the chain across the Hudson that had been laid to block enemy ships, he accomplished this end merely by neglecting necessary repairs.

Arnold also set up a net of secret agents. He promptly established contact with Joshua Hett Smith, who lived a short distance below Kings Ferry in the country house of his brother, William, the royal chief justice of New York who was a refugee in New York City. Joshua was known as an active Whig, and while Robert Howe commanded at West Point, he had handled the latter's secret agents. Arnold met Smith in Philadelphia, and Howe may have suggested that Arnold use him for intelligence work. Smith offered the use of his home as an overnight stop for Peggy Arnold on her trips to visit her husband.

Arnold's intimacy with Smith was one of several factors that created a tense atmosphere in his military household. Colonel Richard Varick and Major David Franks did not conceal their disapproval of their chief's dealing with a man whose brother was a famous Loyalist; yet until the end they never suspected that Arnold was up to anything more dishonorable than profiteering. In fact,

Arnold was using profiteering as a cover plan for his business of treason.

In late August the conspirators worked out the following scheme: Colonel Robinson would request a meeting with Arnold ostensibly to discuss arrangements about the Loyalist's household property; John André would come along, and an opportunity would be found for him to discuss with Arnold plans for the surrender of West Point. Clinton's emissaries would use the armed sloop *Vulture*, which was regularly stationed at Spuyten Duyvil and occasionally sent boats up the Hudson on reconnaissance. After unsuccessful attempts to meet on 11 and 20 September, Smith was rowed to the *Vulture* before midnight on 21 September and returned with a certain “John Anderson” for a clandestine meeting between that person and Arnold. “Anderson,” of course, was John André. As far as Joshua Smith knew, however, he was a merchant who wore a British army officer's blouse under his blue topcoat as a pretense.

By the time Arnold and André had completed their conference in the woods (at about 4 A.M.), the men who had rowed André and Smith ashore had become suspicious and refused to make the return journey. André therefore went to Smith's house, about four miles away, to wait until the following night. At around dawn, however, Colonel James Livingston, who commanded American forces in this area, on his own initiative attacked the *Vulture* with two cannon he had moved to Tellers Point on the east shore. Arnold and André watched the shelling from a window of Smith's house, and after the battered *Vulture* finally managed to escape downstream, they decided that André would have to make his escape overland.

ANDRÉ'S ESCAPE ATTEMPT

André was getting in deeper and deeper. Although his going ashore under an assumed name was a risk he had accepted from the start, Clinton had prescribed that he would neither go in disguise nor enter the enemy lines, so that he not be deemed a spy if caught. Clinton also later insisted that he had ordered André not to carry any papers. But at Arnold's insistence, André was to travel through American lines carrying plans of the fortifications of West Point. According to André, Arnold made him put the papers between his stockings and his feet. Arnold prescribed that Smith act as guide, and he made out passes that would serve either for a boat trip to Dobbs Ferry—the route André expected to be followed—or to get “John Anderson” through the American guards at White Plains.

Arnold left in his barge to return to Robinson's house. Smith accompanied him to Stony Point and then returned to inform André that the overland route would be used. Whether this decision was on Smith's own initiative or on instructions from Arnold, the young British officer was surprised and alarmed, but he had no choice. Had Smith



Benedict Arnold. A two-faced figure representing Benedict Arnold is paraded through the streets of Philadelphia in this broadside published in 1780. THE GRANGER COLLECTION, NEW YORK.

known who “John Anderson” really was, he might have decided differently, for although the water route was actually no safer than the one overland, it had the essential advantage of not requiring that André remove his uniform. Smith and “Anderson” stopped for a drink with some officers at Stony Point, crossed Kings Ferry, visited Colonel Livingston at Verplanck’s, and stopped for the night near Crompond (about eight miles from the river). André had intended to ride straight on to White Plains, but a suspicious militia captain pointed out the dangers of meeting Loyalist partisans.

Before dawn on 23 September, André and Smith moved on. When they reached the vicinity of Pine’s Bridge over the Croton River, André was left to cover the remaining fifteen miles alone; he was now beyond the normal range of Patriot patrols (but had Arnold’s pass in case he did meet with any such patrols), and Smith did not want to run the risk of meeting a Loyalist patrol. At Pleasantville, André learned that rebel patrols were on the road ahead, so he turned toward Tarrytown. At about 9 or 10 A.M., he was stopped by three men at the bridge just outside the latter place. When he was challenged by John Paulding, Isaac Van Wart, and David Williams, André made the mistake of assuming they were Loyalists. He did not produce his pass until after they had decided to search him. These three men were volunteer militiamen operating under a recent New York law permitting them to claim property found on a captured enemy. While the loftiest of patriotic motives were subsequently attributed to their actions, their real interest probably was loot.

The prisoner was taken to North Castle, where Lieutenant Colonel John Jameson commanded American troops. Arnold had previously issued instructions that a

“John Anderson” might come into the lines from New York City and had ordered that this person be sent to his headquarters on the Hudson. Jameson was puzzled by the fact that “Anderson” had been brought to him from behind the lines, and also by the papers, which he subsequently characterized as being “of a very dangerous tendency.” The American outpost commander devised an interesting compromise decision: he sent the prisoner to Arnold, as called for by his instructions, but sent the papers to Washington, who was believed to be around Danbury en route to Peekskill.

Major Benjamin Tallmadge, head of Washington’s intelligence service, reached North Castle shortly after André’s departure. After speaking with Jameson, Tallmadge immediately suspected the truth. Although he could not talk Jameson out of reporting the capture to Arnold, Tallmadge did succeed in having “John Anderson” called back. When the latter returned to North Castle and learned that the incriminating papers had been sent to Washington, he revealed his true identity. André did not mention his connection with Arnold but wrote Washington that he had come between the lines to “meet a person who was to give me intelligence” and had subsequently been “betrayed . . . into the vile condition of an enemy in disguise within your posts.”

But Jameson’s messenger had not found Washington and returned to North Castle, only to be sent on to Robinson’s house, to which Washington was known to be traveling. Earlier in the day the other messenger, having returned with André, departed with Jameson’s report to Arnold. It was a race to see whether Washington or Arnold would get the word first, but for some reason neither messenger reached Robinson’s house until Monday morning, 25 September.

ARNOLD ESCAPES

On 25 September things happened fast. At about 9 A.M. two officers from Washington's party reached the Robinson house to say he would be late. Arnold received Jameson's first message while at breakfast. Arnold told the militia lieutenant who brought it not to say anything to the others and, without showing his alarm, went upstairs to give Peggy the bad news before he made his own escape. He was coming back downstairs when Franks informed him that Washington was about to arrive. Arnold ordered a horse, left word for Washington that he had urgent business at West Point, hurried to his barge, and started down the Hudson to the *Vulture*.

Washington arrived at about 10:30 A.M. with a party that included Lafayette, Henry Knox, and Alexander Hamilton. After eating breakfast, they were rowed over to West Point to inspect the works and meet Arnold. Franks then learned about the message from Jameson and the fact that the bearer had been ordered to keep quiet about it. Varick and Franks became suspicious but agreed that doubting their commander was "uncharitable and unwarranted," as Varick later explained. Even when they heard that Arnold had headed down the river and not across to West Point, they were not alarmed.

Peggy Arnold distracted the household's attention with a bizarre performance. She sent for Varick and hysterically accused him of ordering her child killed. Varick reported that she behaved like an insane woman, "her hair dishevelled and flowing about her neck" and too scantily dressed "to be seen even by gentlemen of the family." She fell on her knees, he said, "with prayers and entreaties to spare her innocent babe."

Washington returned to the Robinson house at 4 P.M., already beginning to have vague misgivings about Arnold's long absence, and saw the first set of papers forwarded by Jameson with a note that these had been found on a man called John Anderson. The documents included a summary of the army's strength, a report of the troops at West Point and vicinity, an estimate of the forces needed to garrison the defenses properly, a return of the ordnance on hand, the plan of artillery deployment in the event of an alarm, a copy of the minutes Washington had sent Arnold on an important council of war held 6 September, and a report by Arnold on the defects of the West Point defenses. Washington was then handed the letter identifying "Anderson" as John André. Told that Arnold had received a message at the breakfast table just before his sudden departure, Washington knew the worst. Although Arnold had more than six hours' head start, Washington sent a detachment under Hamilton's command down the Hudson in an effort to intercept the traitor. Before Hamilton could return from Verplanck's Point to confirm the traitor's escape, Washington was given a letter written by Arnold aboard the ship and sent

ashore under a flag. "Love to my country actuates my present conduct," said this astounding communication, which was the start of a long apologia. Peggy was "good and innocent as an angel," he lied, but added a truthful footnote saying that Varick, Franks, and Smith "are totally ignorant of any transactions of mine that they had reason to believe were injurious to the public."

Meanwhile, Washington had to see immediately to the defense of West Point, which was dangerously exposed to a possible British attack. He recalled all the detachments Arnold had sent from the post and ordered General Anthony Wayne to march as quickly as possible to reinforce West Point. Wayne acted with typical alacrity, rushing his veterans sixteen miles through the night in just four hours.

ANDRÉ'S FATE

With West Point secured, Washington ordered André brought under heavy guard to Robinson's house. He then ordered Colonel Livingston, commandant at Kings Ferry, brought to him for questioning, and Colonel Lamb was sent to command Livingston's important post. Livingston's innocence was quickly established. Meanwhile, Washington had no alternative but to tell Varick and Franks to consider themselves under house arrest, a precaution they accepted without resentment. Lieutenant Gouvion was sent to Fishkill to arrest Smith, who was found and hurried on to Robinson's house, where he arrived before 8 P.M. on 25 September. From this glib and voluble individual, Washington finally was able to get details from which he could see Arnold's conspiracy with some perspective. He realized that but for "a most providential interposition" that led to André's capture, Arnold would have delivered a vital American citadel to the enemy.

Major John André reached Robinson's house the morning of the 26th after a long night ride in the rain with a strong escort of dragoons commanded by Tallmadge. Washington declined to see André, but he did get the details of his capture and of the disagreement between Jameson and Tallmadge as to how this should be reported. André was then sent to West Point, taken by barge to Stony Point on the 28th, and imprisoned at Mabie's Tavern in Tappan. Smith accompanied him, but the two were not allowed to communicate.


On Friday, 29 September, a board of officers met to examine André as speedily as possible and consider the appropriate punishment. Nathanael Greene was president of the board that included Major Generals Alexander, Lafayette, Steuben, St. Clair, and Robert Howe and Brigadier Generals James Clinton, John Glover, Edward Hand, John Stark, Samuel Parsons, Henry Knox, and Jedediah Huntington. The only record of the trial is the abstract made by John Laurance. The board interrogated André and then examined letters from Beverley Robinson,

Arnold, and Sir Henry Clinton. The most damning testimony was André's honest admission that he could not pretend that he came ashore under a flag.

The letters, on the other hand, insisted that André had come ashore under a flag, had acted on Arnold's orders while within the American lines, and therefore could not be considered a spy subject to the usual penalty. "The unhappy prisoner gave us no trouble in calling witnesses," commented Steuben to an aide, "he confessed everything." After the single day's hearing, the board concluded that André's coming ashore "in a private and secret manner" and his subsequent movements behind the American lines "under a feigned name and in a disguised habit" made him a spy and that he should be executed. Washington ordered that André be hanged at 5 p.m. on 1 October. At about 1 p.m. of 1 October, Washington received Sir Henry Clinton's request for a delay until Major General James Robertson and two others could arrive "to give you a true state of facts." Although Washington suspected that Clinton had nothing to add to the case, he postponed the execution until noon of the next day. André appealed to Washington to be shot as a soldier and not hanged. But Washington could not grant this request, for as Washington told Congress, André was either a spy to be hanged or a prisoner of war who could not be executed. Any lessening of the sentence, Washington felt, would call the justice of his conviction into question. Washington, who not surprisingly felt personally betrayed by Arnold, an officer he had long favored, hoped to exchange André for Arnold. General Robertson, Clinton's emissary, met with General Greene but offered no extenuating facts, presenting instead what, in effect, was a plea that André be released as a personal favor to Clinton. He also dismissed out of hand the possible exchange of Arnold for André. He did hint, however, at retaliation if André was hanged.

John André was hanged before noon on 2 October. He was allowed to wear his full dress uniform and strode bravely to the scaffold. Major Tallmadge, who had become friendly with André, stood at his side "entirely overwhelmed with grief," he wrote, "that so gallant an officer and so accomplished a gentleman should come to such an ignominious end." Tallmadge, like most officers on either side of the conflict, blamed Arnold for André's death. André's last words were, "I pray you to bear me witness that I meet my fate like a brave man."

Arnold's treason had an immediate and dramatic impact on American public opinion. A patriotic revival competed with fears of further conspiracies and betrayal. Crowds dragged effigies of Arnold through the streets of nearly every American city and town. His name became, and remained, a byword for corruption and treason as well as a negative standard by which every other officer could measure his commitment to the cause. At the same time, suspicious rumors circulated about the reliability of any



The Unfortunate Death of Major André. John André, a young British officer and aid to General Henry Clinton, was hanged as a spy by the Americans in 1780. André's execution is depicted here in a 1783 engraving by John Goldar. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

officer with a connection to the Loyalists. The British, meanwhile, hoped that these rumors were accurate, trusting that Arnold was just the first of many American officers and officials who would regain their reason and return to obedience to the crown. Arnold, however, had few imitators.

Colonel Varick demanded a court of inquiry and on 2 November was unanimously cleared of any suspicion. Franks testified but was not himself suspected of any complicity. Although Philip Schuyler and Robert R. Livingston had used their influence to help Arnold get the assignment to West Point, neither was suspected of treason. Joshua Smith was acquitted by a court-martial but was subsequently imprisoned by state authorities. Those three dubious patriots, Paulding, Van Wart, and Williams, were each given the thanks of Congress, a silver medal, and an

annual pension of two hundred dollars in specie. When Paulding applied to Congress in 1817 for an increase, former Major Benjamin Tallmadge, then a member of the House of Representatives, presented evidence (based on his interrogation of André after the capture) that the heroes had been motivated by greed and not patriotism and had been more than compensated for their accidental contribution to the American cause.

SEE ALSO *Alexander, William; André, John; Arnold, Benedict; Clinton, Henry; Clinton, James; Glover, John; Hamilton, Alexander; Hand, Edward; Howe, Robert; Huntington, Jedediah; Knox, Henry; Knyphausen, Wilhelm; Lafayette, Marquis de; Lamb, John; Livingston, James; Livingston, Robert R.; Odell, Jonathan; Parsons, Samuel Holden; Paulding, John; Robinson, Beverley; Rochambeau, Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de; Schuyler, Philip John; Smith, Joshua Hett; Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of Knyphausen; St. Clair, Arthur; Stansbury, Joseph; Stark, John; Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von; Stony Point, New York; Tallmadge, Benjamin, Jr.; Van Wart, Isaac; Varick, Richard; Verplanck's Point; West Point, New York; Williams, David.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION.

Adopted by Congress 15 November 1777; ratified 1 March 1781. Proposed by Richard Henry Lee on 7 June 1776 when he offered his resolution for independence, the idea of confederation was then studied by a thirteen-member committee. A month later, on 12 July 1776, it presented the “Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union” to Congress. Principally the work of John Dickinson, the articles proposed a loose union, in which the principal powers granted to Congress were exclusive authority to declare war and make peace, to conduct foreign relations, to provide central direction of the war effort, to resolve disputes among the states, and to provide for the disposal of western lands. After more than a year of intermittent debate, the thirteen articles were formally

adopted on 15 November 1777 and sent two days later to the states for ratification. Congress adopted the articles on the basis that states would pay their share of governmental expenses, especially for wartime expenditures, in proportion to their land area. Ratification was delayed by Maryland because it refused to act until states with western land claims (the so-called “three-sided states”) ceded those claims to the United States. Those lands would later be sold to pay off the national debt. Virginia yielded on 2 January 1781, Maryland signed on 27 February, and final ratification took place 1 March 1781. Ratification formally dissolved the Second Continental Congress, and on 2 March the delegates sat for the first time as “The United States in Congress Assembled.” By then, the extraordinary strain of the war effort had shown the need for a more powerful central government, especially in the matter of the power to levy taxes. The articles were obsolescent before they were ratified.

The United States were governed under the Articles of Confederation until the ratification of the Federal Constitution on 21 November 1788. On 10 October 1788 the last Congress under the Articles transacted its last business, and on 4 March 1789 the first Congress under the Constitution met in New York City.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress; Dickinson, John; Lee, Richard Henry.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

ARTIFICERS. Artificers provided important logistical support for the field armies. There were two principal types of these soldier-craftsmen. Artillery artificers performed many of the functions of a modern ordnance department. These skilled artillery technicians and

laborers operated military depots and even accompanied troops in the field, performing vital services as gunsmiths, wheelwrights, and blacksmiths, among other crafts. Quartermaster artificers constructed fortifications and barracks when the army was stationary, and worked as wagonmasters and bateauxmen to make it mobile. Companies were scattered among the field armies and in depots across the states.

Separate companies and smaller detachments of artificers existed from the earliest days of the Revolution. No entire regiment ever took the field, although several schemes were put in place to organize the companies into regiments for administrative purposes. On 16 January 1777, Washington ordered Colonel Benjamin Flower to raise an artillery shop company (at York, Pennsylvania), a field support company, several depot companies, and a laboratory company to manufacture ammunition. The companies raised later that year by Colonel Jeduthan Baldwin were quartermaster artificers, eleven companies of which (mostly from Connecticut) were in service by 1779. Plans to “regiment” these units were never carried out, and an effort to form a regiment of both artillery and quartermaster artificers in 1781 also failed.

SEE ALSO *Baldwin, Jeduthan; Flower, Benjamin.*

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ARTILLERY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. Gunpowder was invented in China and in widespread use in Europe by the end of the fourteenth century. It was used almost exclusively to provide the explosive force that enabled large, heavy, and cumbersome artillery pieces to propel large projectiles—initially stone, later cast iron—over relatively short distances. It took many improvements in the strength of metals and the explosive force of gunpowder to make it practical to field smaller and more mobile projectile weapons, the most important of which were crew-served small artillery pieces and the personal firearms of the foot and horse soldiers. A notable advance in artillery occurred in the first decade of the seventeenth century, when gun founders working for the Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus (1594–1632), cast artillery tubes that were both sufficiently strong and

lightweight to be effective and mobile. Where artillery had once been limited to the slow rhythms of the attack and defense of fortifications, now it could be brought to the battlefield with often devastating effect. At Breitenfeld, in 1631, Gustavus proved the soundness of his ideas and marked the birth of true field artillery by using light guns to smash the Spanish infantry squares. Gunners remained civilian technicians until 1671, when Louis XIV of France raised the first artillery unit and established schools to teach his troops how best to use the weapons in the field. But French artillery officers did not receive military rank until 1732, and in some countries drivers were “contract civilians” as late as the 1790s.

In North America, where distances were enormous by European standards, there was no road network over which artillery pieces could be transported. Consequently, most artillery used during the Colonial Wars was waterborne, with its use concentrated in defensive fortifications and on warships at sea. Americans, for whom using artillery was a technical challenge and an almost unsupportable expense, displayed initiative and ingenuity when they turned French cannon captured in an outlying fortification against Louisburg in the siege of May–June 1745. True field artillery was used on only a handful of American battlefields down to 1775, and even then it amounted only to small artillery pieces being used mainly as antipersonnel weapons.

Americans began their war for independence with only the motley assortment of cannon (some thirteen different calibers), projectiles, and gunpowder that was in the hands of the colonial militia, plus the prospect of what they could capture from British forts and ships. The British sought to confiscate what little artillery the Americans had, because even the smallest artillery pieces could wreak havoc on soldiers standing shoulder-to-shoulder several ranks deep in the formations required by the linear tactics of the period. General Thomas Gage, for instance, ordered raids to Salem, Massachusetts, on 26 February 1775, and to Lexington and Concord on 19 April, to capture ordnance reported to be in the possession of the rebels. At the start of the war, Americans had no tubes of a sufficiently large size to be useful as siege guns, a significant handicap for the New England army facing off against the British in Boston. The ordnance stored at Fort Ticonderoga was thus of vital importance. In an isolated interior location and guarded by only a few British soldiers, it was relatively easy to take possession of. Once Henry Knox solved the problem of how to transport those heavy guns overland from Ticonderoga to the coast, Washington could begin to formulate the plan that drove the British from Boston. At Philadelphia as early as 1775 Americans tried to remedy their lack of artillery by casting cannon and making gun carriages, but their industrial infrastructure was insufficiently developed to make possible the rapid production of large numbers

of tubes. Some French field pieces—made surplus to French requirements by the development of the Gribeauval system—were brought to America during the war.

Britain's ability to supply its armies with artillery far outstripped the poor American efforts, and, moreover, the guns were delivered into the hands of officers and men who drew on a wellspring of experience and tradition in using these weapons. The Royal Regiment of Artillery provided trained gunners, whose officers were schooled in the science of their profession at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. Sir William Howe, for example, entered the battle of Long Island in August 1776 with three battalions of gunners and seventy-two guns, completely overmatching the inexperienced American artillerists. The British artillery hero of Minden, William Phillips, made effective use of his guns during Burgoyne's Offensive, particularly at Ticonderoga in July 1777, and at the first battle of Saratoga on 19 September 1777, proving that artillery could be moved by inland waterways well into the interior. The motto of British artillery was "Ubique" (Ubiquitous); British gunners lived up to it by bringing their guns into action at nearly every important battle of the war.

American gunners had to develop their own traditions from scratch. Richard Gridley, an American veteran of the last colonial wars who had made his reputation by laying the guns at the siege of Louisburg in 1745, was the first commander of American artillery, at the siege of Boston (19 May 1775). He was replaced on 17 November by portly, twenty-five-year-old Henry Knox, who had acquired his basic knowledge of artillery from the books he sold at his Boston bookstore and who gained practical experience by watching Gridley for six months. Knox made his reputation bringing the cannon from Ticonderoga to Boston and, during the next eight years, eventually as chief of artillery, did a remarkable job of turning the artillery from the slenderest beginnings into the most proficient American combat arm. American gunners generally well-served their pieces up to the limits of their sometimes shoddy equipment. Their success in keeping their powder dry and bringing their guns into action made a notable contribution to the crucial American victory at Trenton (26 December 1776). There was only one regiment of Continental artillery during 1775 and 1776, although several states raised artillery companies for local service. John Lamb and Alexander Hamilton, for example, began their military service in companies of artillery raised by New York State. The four numbered regiments of Continental artillery raised in the three-year army of 1777 folded together gunners from both of these sources. Colonel Charles Harrison (1st Regiment) had commanded the Virginia state artillery regiment. Colonel John Lamb (Second Regiment) had led a New York artillery company on the Canada invasion. Colonel John Crane (Third Regiment) had served under Gridley

and Knox at the siege of Boston. Colonel Thomas Proctor (4th Regiment) had been a major of the Pennsylvania Artillery Battalion during 1776. Colonel Benjamin Flower supervised a regiment of artillery artificers, operating as companies and smaller detachments, that provided vital technical support for the field artillery. As hostilities wound down, the four field regiments were consolidated into a "Corps of Artillery" under Colonel John Crane (17 June 1783 to 3 November 1783), and with Major Sebastian Bauman, the second in command, in charge until 20 June 1784. By its resolution of 4 June 1784 Congress reduced the army to eight privates guarding military stores, including the surviving artillery pieces, twenty-five at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five at West Point under a captain.

The guns themselves varied widely in size, weight of tube, weight of projectile, and purpose. There were three broad categories: guns, howitzers, and mortars. Guns were usually designated by weight of projectile, howitzers and mortars by width of bore. Almost all cannon used on the battlefield were made of brass, an expensive alloy but one that could be cast with greater reliability than iron. Guns threw solid, round shot (a kinetic energy projectile) over a relatively flat trajectory, with weight of projectiles ranging from three pounds to twenty-four pounds, although twelve-pounders were normally the heaviest in field service. Solid shot could knock down masonry walls, penetrate the sides of wooden ships, and mow down men standing in rank and file. In the early 1770s the British had developed sturdy, lightweight, three-pounder gun tubes, called grasshoppers, that could be broken down and transported on packhorses to increase their already extreme mobility. Howitzers and mortars generally threw hollow, explosive (chemical energy) projectiles at a higher arc and thus shorter range; they were developed for use in siege warfare, where the projectiles—"bombs" and "carcasses"—would go over the fortification wall and explode among the gunners sheltering behind the parapet. Howitzers, too, were field artillery, up to a bore diameter of about five and one-half inches. Both guns and howitzers could fire antipersonnel ammunition at close range, typically grape shot (a set of subcaliber solid shot stacked around a center pintle and held together with a rope net) and case shot (subcaliber scrap, musket balls, or slugs stacked in a tin cylinder). On the axle of the two-wheel gun carriage flanking the gun tube were "side boxes" holding several rounds of ready ammunition. Each tube was attached by the trail of its carriage to a limber, drawn by a team of horses, six or eight if available. (Oxen could haul heavier loads—Knox used oxen to bring the cannon from Ticonderoga to Boston—but they were too slow and vulnerable for battlefield service.)

On the battlefield itself, a crew of eight to ten cannoners manned drag ropes and trail spikes to

maneuver the guns into position, accomplished the intricate dance of loading gunpowder (mostly in bags of cloth or paper, but sometimes ladled loose down the barrel) and projectile down the muzzle of the piece, and set it in position to fire at the target. All artillery was muzzle-loading and smooth-bore. Aiming was an art, accomplished by peering down the length of the tube and quickly making a rough calculation that combined distance to the target, weather conditions, quality of powder, and weight of projectile. Traverse was accomplished by manually shifting the entire carriage; changes in elevation were done by inserting a triangular wooden block, called a quoin, under the rear of the barrel. The piece had to be re-aimed after each shot, since there were no recoil mechanisms to return it to its original position after firing. The maximum effective range of artillery—even large-caliber guns firing solid shot—was about 1,200 yards (a mile and a half), and with untrained gunners using imperfect weapons and ammunition the range was about 400 yards. Because aiming was so imprecise, gunners invariably tried to minimize range before opening fire. Rates of fire varied with the pace of operations and, of course, the skill of the gun crew. The maximum rate of about eight rounds an hour could not be long sustained, both because of crew fatigue and overheating of the barrel.

The impact of artillery on the outcome of the war is sometimes difficult to assess. Probably the greatest service was rendered by heavy guns during siege operations. British gunners scored a notable success in destroying the American defensive lines at Charleston, South Carolina, in May 1780, and American gunners demonstrated a high level of skill in siege operations at Yorktown in October 1781. The mere presence of heavy artillery could be as important as the actual operation of the guns: Washington forced the British to evacuate Boston in March 1776 without firing a shot from Dorchester Heights. Artillery could keep an enemy at bay, but inaccuracy at long range limited its impact. During the siege of Boston, the British delivered one cannonade at short range that inflicted only one slight casualty in the American lines. British gunners did succeed in damaging Roxbury, at a range of about a mile from their positions at Boston Neck. When they lobbed mortar shells into Cambridge, more than two miles away they did little damage owing to faulty ammunition and extreme range. Field artillery was almost always used for infantry support, and again its effectiveness depended on the skill and audacity of the gunners, the suitability of their pieces, and the quality of their supplies. Sometimes artillery pieces played an important direct role (as at Trenton); as often, the sound of one's own artillery must have been an enormous fillip for the infantrymen, regardless of the actual damage the guns inflicted on the enemy.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Siege of 1780; Grasshopper; Gridley, Richard; Hamilton, Alexander; Knox, Henry; Lamb, John; Lexington and Concord; Louisburg, Canada; Muskets and Musketry; Phillips, William; Salem, Massachusetts; Saratoga, First Battle of; Ticonderoga Raid.*

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ASGILL, CHARLES. (1763–1823). British officer in the Huddy-Asgill affair. The only son of Sir Charles Asgill, first baronet and self-made banker, he became an ensign in the First Foot Guards on 27 February 1778. He became a lieutenant in the same regiment with the army rank of captain on 3 February 1781. Subsequently sent to America, Asgill was taken prisoner at Yorktown in October. On 3 May 1782 Washington ordered Moses Hazen to choose by lot a British captain for execution if Richard Lippincott, Captain Joshua Huddy's executioner, was not put to death. A British court-martial acquitted Lippincott on the ground that he was obeying the orders of the Board of Associated Loyalists; but when Clinton sent Washington the proceedings and his strongly worded disavowal of the execution of Huddy, Washington was partly mollified. However, Asgill was not finally released until his mother appealed to the French foreign minister, the comte de Vergennes, who—at the request of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette—approached Washington. Washington then passed the French request to Congress, which on 7 November 1782 passed an act authorizing Asgill's release. He was then returned to Britain on parole.

Asgill succeeded to his father's baronetcy on 15 September 1788. After the outbreak of war in 1793,

he served in Flanders and Ireland and in staff posts before reaching the rank of full general on 4 June 1814.

SEE ALSO *Huddy–Asgill Affair*.

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ASHE, JOHN. (1720–1781). Politician and brigadier general in the militia. North Carolina. Born in North Carolina, perhaps in 1720, John Ashe served as an officer during the Seven Years' War. A member of the legislature from 1752 to 1775, Ashe was speaker of the house from 1762 to 1765. He played a conspicuous part in the Stamp Act crisis, twice leading mobs that prevented the distribution of the royal stamps. Siding with the government against the Regulator movement in North Carolina in 1771, he was an officer in Governor Tryon's army that defeated the Regulators at Alamance on 16 May 1771.

At the start of the civil war in the Carolinas that characterized the Revolution in the South, Ashe became a leader of the Sons of Liberty. He organized and drilled the Patriot militia of New Hanover County, and led a mob to enforce the boycott of British goods. On 17 July 1775, Ashe, Robert Howe, and Cornelius Harnett led the militia into Fort Johnston in a futile attempt to seize the royal Governor, Josiah Martin.

In Sept. 1775, the legislature selected Ashe's brother-in-law, James Moore, as colonel of the state militia by a single vote. Ashe, who had desired the post, raised his own company of troops and moved on the Loyalists of Cape Fear, North Carolina. His independent unit then joined the force that defeated the Loyalists at Moore's Creek Bridge on 9 February 1776. In consequence of these actions, the North Carolina Assembly appointed Ashe brigadier general on 23 April 1776, in command of the Wilmington district. At the beginning of 1779 he was ordered to Charleston to reinforce General Benjamin Lincoln. His militia was poorly armed, and when it was attacked at Briar Creek on 3 March 1779, his troops broke and ran, most without firing a shot. A court-martial severely censured Ashe for "want of sufficient vigilance," and North Carolina relieved him of his command. When the British overran his part of the Carolinas he went into hiding in the swamps. There, one of his slaves betrayed him to the enemy in 1781. Paroled by the British, Ashe

died on 24 October 1781 of smallpox while on his way home to rejoin his family.

SEE ALSO *Briar Creek, Georgia; Regulators*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ASSOCIATED LOYALISTS. The term "associated" or "association" was used by various Loyalist military organizations active during the war. During the siege of Boston, Timothy Ruggles, a major political figure in colonial Massachusetts and a veteran senior commander of Massachusetts' troops during the French and Indian War, called the several armed companies of Loyalist refugees he organized to help maintain order in the town the Loyal American Association. During the British occupation of Rhode Island, Colonel Edward Winslow Jr. formed the Loyal Associated Refugees to avenge losses and indignities suffered at the hands of the Patriots. The Refugees made several raids to Long Island and Nantucket, capturing vessels, cattle, and people, and they even tried to acquire the *Oliver Cromwell*, a Connecticut state navy ship captured by the Royal Navy, to promote their activities.

A better-known organization grew out of a meeting held in London on 29 May 1780, with Sir William Pepperrell as chairman and Joseph Galloway on the committee to draw up an address to the king. William Franklin, son of Benjamin Franklin, became the head of this organization in New York City, whose purpose, apart from revenge and plunder, was to give the Loyalists some sort of legitimate status in dealing with the British and American governments. On 30 June, Major General William Tryon, the commander of Provincial forces in America, supported the idea of tapping the military potential of Loyalists "who for various reasons will not enlist themselves soldiers, . . . many of whom are nevertheless willing to take up arms and contribute their aid for the suppression of the rebellion" (Van Doren, p. 236). In November 1780, Sir Henry Clinton, the British commander in chief in North America, authorized the Associated Loyalists to make war under their own officers, but he was unenthusiastic about the value of the group's activities and withheld some of the powers requested by its board. When Lord Cornwallis surrendered his army at Yorktown (19 October 1781), the Board of Associated Loyalists informed Clinton in great alarm that it considered that Loyalists had been "abandoned to the power of an inveterate, implacable enemy" (Clinton's words) by the tenth article of the capitulation, in which the Americans refused to promise that the Loyalist prisoners at Yorktown would not be punished for joining the British. Clinton was unable to give the board any satisfaction on this particular

matter, but its influence was sufficiently strong for him to feel obliged to direct that British commanders in the future would “pay the same attention . . . to the interests and security of the loyalists within their respective districts that they did to those of the King’s troops” (Clinton, p. 353). The involvement of the Associated Loyalists in the retaliatory murder of New Jersey militia captain Joshua Huddy (12 April 1782) led Clinton to deprive the group of all its powers, and in August 1782 Franklin left for England.

SEE ALSO *Franklin, William; Huddy–Asgill Affair; Tryon, William.*

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ASSOCIATED REFUGEES SEE *Fanning’s Regiment.*

ASSOCIATION. Various “associations” were created after 1763 as a means of organizing and testing political strength. These groups were particularly important in helping the resistance movement expand and endure. American activists who opposed the imperial government’s attempt to increase its control over the colonies used associations to bring together like-minded citizens and to concert opposition within and among the colonies, as well as to intimidate those who might otherwise have supported the new British measures. People who subscribed to the goals of an association were known as “associators.”

Members of the recently dissolved Virginia House of Burgesses, led by George Washington, adopted on 18 May 1769 a voluntary nonimportation agreement banning British goods on which a duty was charged (except paper), slaves (after 1 November), and many European luxuries. A month later, on 22 June, the reconvened burgesses agreed that local committees would publish the names of those who had violated the agreement. On the same day, a Maryland provisional convention drew up an association that already had a provision for boycotting

those who would not make a similar compact. Other colonies and individual port towns followed suit.

The first Continental Congress adopted the Continental Association on 20 October 1774 as a response to the Coercive (Intolerable) Acts; it was modeled after the Virginia Association. After expressing loyalty and enumerating grievances, the document set out a framework the delegates hoped would pressure the imperial government to abandon the “ruinous system of colony administration” it had followed since 1763: “To obtain redress of these grievances which threaten destruction to the lives, liberty, and property of his Majesty’s subjects, in North America, we are of opinion, that a non-importation, non-consumption, and non-exportation agreement, faithfully adhered to, will prove the most speedy, effectual, and peaceable measure” (Jensen, *Documents*, p. 813). The nonimportation of “any goods, wares, or merchandise whatsoever” from Great Britain or Ireland was to take effect on 1 December 1774. The nonexportation of American products was delayed until 10 September 1775 to allow merchants in Britain and the West Indies time to exert pressure on Parliament. Congress threatened to discontinue the slave trade, more as an economic lever than as a moral stance, and urged Americans to practice “frugality, economy, and industry, and promote agriculture, arts, and the manufactures of this country, especially that of wool.” To promote a reformation of values and assert the virtuousness of its resistance, Congress also asked Americans to “discountenance and discourage every species of extravagance and dissipation, especially all horse-racing and all kinds of gaming,” and it recommended that mourning dress be scaled back to demonstrate both frugality and virtue. Congress wanted committees “chosen in every county, city, and town by those who are qualified to vote for representatives to the legislature . . . attentively to observe the conduct of all persons touching this Association” and expected the committees of correspondence in each colony to “inspect the entries of their custom houses” and inform each other of those who violated the agreement. By April 1775 some form of the Association was operating in twelve colonies; Georgia had adopted a modified version on 23 January 1775.

The Continental Association had an immediate and important impact. It has been estimated that the value of British goods imported into the colonies dropped by over 90 percent between 1774 and 1775. Desperate English merchants put pressure on Parliament to promote reconciliation with the colonies; they were worried not only by the decline in business, but also by the fact that if war broke out they would never collect the large sums owed them by American planters. Parliament did not comply because, in its opinion, the dispute with the colonies had gone beyond economic considerations to questions of authority and obedience. For Americans, the Association was “a major step in the development of revolutionary

political organizations.” Opponents of the imperial government generally controlled “the committees created in every community to enforce the Association” and used the Association to force Americans “to choose between support of the proposals of Congress and obedience to the laws of Parliament” (*ibid.*, p. 813).

Other associations of a different nature began to be organized in early 1775. Unlike those created for commercial retaliation, these promoted armed opposition to Britain.

SEE ALSO *Nonimportation*.

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ASSOCIATORS. Certain associations were military rather than political. The most famous was the volunteer military group called The Associators, founded on 21 November 1747 at Philadelphia by, among others, Benjamin Franklin. Created because the pacifist Quakers who controlled Pennsylvania’s government would not sanction a compulsory militia, the organization was as much an assertion of the rising political fortunes of non-Quakers as it was a military unit. The prominence of its founders, rather than any military necessity, won government recognition for the organization on 7 December. Officially organized on 29 December 1747 as the Associated Regiment of Foot of Philadelphia, the unit grew to five battalions in 1775 and was renamed the Associators of the City and Liberties of Philadelphia. These Philadelphia Associators were among the militia forces that reinforced Washington in the dark days of December 1776. The Associators were reorganized in 1777 as the Philadelphia Brigade of Militia under the command of John Cadwalader. On 11 April 1793 they were again reorganized, this time as volunteer infantry in the Pennsylvania militia.

SEE ALSO *New Jersey Campaign*.

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ASSUMPTION. “Assumption” was the term applied to the economic policy proposed by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton in his First Report on the

Public Credit, which he presented to Congress on 14 January 1790. Under this policy the new federal government would “assume” about \$25 million of debt that states had contracted during the War of Independence. State debts, along with about \$40 million owed by the former central government, would be converted into new federal government securities to be redeemed over the long term. Representatives from states that had undertaken often painful financial measures to retire their own debt had no interest in assuming part of the burden of their less fiscally responsible neighbors. At the same time, there was a controversy over the site for the national capital. Thomas Jefferson, then secretary of state, engineered a dinner meeting, probably on 20 June 1790, at which Hamilton and James Madison of Virginia, a state that had retired much of its war debt, agreed to a compromise. In return for Hamilton’s help in getting the federal capital moved to a site on the Potomac River (what is now Washington, D.C.), Madison, a leader in the House of Representatives, endorsed the assumption of debts the states could prove were contracted to prosecute the war. The entire plan was passed into law on 4 August 1790.

SEE ALSO *Hamilton, Alexander; Jefferson, Thomas; Madison, James*.

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ATLANTIC CROSSING. Allowing for calms and storms, it normally took an eighteenth-century sailing vessel a month to cross from America to England and twice that time to return. (Westerly winds prevailed.) Four months would be a reasonable time for a British official to wait for a reply to a dispatch sent to America. Instances of faster communication can be cited, but on the other hand the last dispatches from Britain that General William Howe received in Boston before evacuating that place on 17 March 1776 were dated 22 October 1775. In the autumn of 1775, thirty-six unarmed supply ships were sent from Britain for Boston, but only thirteen arrived. The rest were either captured by American naval vessels and privateers or driven to the West Indies by the exceptionally bad weather that winter.

Arming the victuallers (provision ships) reduced losses from privateers to negligible amounts during the years 1776 to 1778. Gathering supply ships into convoys guarded by Royal Navy warships began in 1779 as a response to the threat posed by the French navy, and

very few major ships were lost thereafter, either to American privateers or French squadrons. But convoying increased the time of passage, since the convoy traveled at the speed of the slowest ship ("convoy speed"). A convoy that left Britain on 19 July 1779, for example, arrived at New York on 22 September. A second convoy left Ireland on 24 December and arrived at Charleston, South Carolina, only in early March 1780.

While the British army in America was victualled largely from Britain and Ireland, commanders of captured American ports, especially New York City, did all they could to obtain supplies from the surrounding countryside, an illicit trade (from the rebel point of view) that was never extinguished.

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ATTAINDER, ACTS OF. Acts of attainder extinguished all of an individual's civil rights (and could encompass a death sentence) without a judicial trial, usually for the most heinous of behavior, especially treason. All of the American states passed laws that, to varying degrees, restricted the rights of Loyalists, abused or confiscated their property, and sent them into internal exile to reduce their military threat. Acts of attainder were used by states to confiscate Loyalist property and prevent Loyalists from receiving or transmitting property by inheritance. In some case, individual Loyalists were outlawed, which meant that not only could they not sue or testify in court but also that their lives were ipso facto forfeited. Article 1, section 9, of the federal Constitution provides that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." Article 3, section 3, defines treason as "levying war" against the United States "or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort," and, by implication, allows acts of attainder as punishment, with the caveat that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted."

SEE ALSO *Loyalists*.

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ATTUCKS, CRISPUS. (1723?–1770). Rebel leader. Massachusetts. Of mixed ancestry, Attucks may have been raised in the Natick Indian town of Mashpee. It is possible that he may have been a slave prior to 1770, by which time he was a free man and a sailor. A leader of the crowd that precipitated the so-called Boston Massacre, 5 March 1770, and the first killed, Attucks became a martyr to freedom in the eyes of most Bostonians and would become a symbol of African American heroism and participation in the Revolutionary struggle.

SEE ALSO *Boston Massacre*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

AUGUSTA, GEORGIA. 29 January–13 February 1779. Occupied by the British under Colonel Archibald Campbell.

SEE ALSO *Southern Theater, Military Operations in*.

Mark M. Boatner

AUGUSTA, GEORGIA. 14–18 September 1780. Clarke's abortive attack. While Patrick Ferguson led Loyalist operations that culminated in his annihilation at Kings Mountain, Colonel Elijah Clarke and Lieutenant Colonel James McCall undertook to wipe out the important Loyalist stronghold at Augusta. McCall recruited only eighty of the five hundred men he hoped to get in the neighborhood of Ninety Six. In his home territory of Wilkes County, Georgia, Clarke assembled 350 men, and McCall joined forces with him at Soap Creek, forty miles northwest of Augusta. McCall received information that provided an added inducement for the poorly armed Patriots: a shipment of arms, ammunition, and other supplies had just arrived in Augusta intended for distribution to the Indians. Colonel Thomas Brown and British Lieutenant Colonel James Grierson commanded a Loyalist garrison of 150 men and some 50 Indian allies at Augusta.

In three columns the rebels approached their objective undetected on 14 September. The left column, under Major Samuel Taylor, surprised an Indian camp near Hawk's Creek and chased the Indians into the White House, a strongly fortified trading post a mile and one-half west of Augusta, where a company of King's Rangers was stationed. When Colonels Brown and Grierson left the town to join the battle at the White House, Clarke and McCall captured Forts Cornwallis and Grierson in Augusta. Leaving detachments to hold these forts, the

rebels concentrated their fire on the White House from 11 A.M. until darkness. The next day, 15 September, two guns from Fort Grierson were brought into action, but the only qualified artilleryman among the Patriots had been killed early in the day. Clarke's men cut off the enemy's water supply early on the 15th when they drove an Indian outpost from the river bank, and that night they stopped an attempt by fifty Indians to reinforce the garrison. But the rebels ran out of ammunition and could not hope to take the position by assault and Brown, although wounded early in the action and suffering severely from thirst, was not a man to give up—he even persuaded his men to save their urine to drink. On the morning of 18 September, Colonel John Harris Cruger appeared on the South Carolina side of the river with a Loyalist relief column from Ninety-Six. Clarke abandoned the siege at about 10 A.M. and headed west for the safety of the mountains.

The Patriots lost about sixty killed and wounded; many others deserted during the siege with plunder from the forts. The Loyalists hanged Captain Anthony Ashby of the South Carolina militia and twelve other prisoners on the stairway of the White House. Aside from twenty Indians killed, Loyalist losses are not known.

The failure of Clarke's force to accomplish its purpose caused an outburst of Loyalist vindictiveness in the region, and four hundred women and children were forced to flee with the three hundred survivors of Clarke's expedition toward North Carolina. Attempts by Ferguson to intercept this column figured prominently in the events preceding Kings Mountain on 7 October 1780.

SEE ALSO *Kings Mountain, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

AUGUSTA, GEORGIA. 22 May–5 June 1781. As the main rebel army moved against Ninety-Six, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee was detached with his Legion and the newly raised North Carolina militia of Major Pinketham Eaton to support the thirteen hundred militia of General Andrew Pickens and Colonel Elijah Clarke besieging Augusta since 16 April. Colonel Thomas Brown, with 330 Loyalist militia and 300 Creek Indians, were holding Fort Cornwallis on the northwest side of the town, 150 yards from the Savannah River, and the smaller post about half a mile west that was called Fort Grierson. In about the middle of May, Clarke had resumed command of the Georgia militia around Augusta, and a detachment of mountaineers under Isaac Shelby and Georgia troops under Patrick Carr had been sent by him to block a Loyalist relief column; at Walker's Bridge, on Briar Creek, Shelby and Carr stopped and

drove back a Loyalist relief force. This and other little successes encouraged Clarke to believe that Augusta could be taken by assault, and it was at this stage that General Nathanael Greene ordered Pickens and Lee to undertake this operation. Lee's capture of Fort Galphin on 21 May was an important preliminary action that deprived Brown of a considerable body of reserves (two Loyalist companies) and supplies.

Lee's cavalry, under Major Egleston, were the first to join the militia around Augusta. Egleston informed Brown that strong reinforcements were on the way from Greene's army and summoned the Loyalist commander to surrender; Brown refused. Lee's main body arrived on the morning of 23 May, and the rebels immediately surrounded Lieutenant Colonel James Grierson's fort, attacked from three sides, and captured it with little difficulty. When the eighty defenders tried to fight their way half a mile east to Fort Cornwallis, they were overwhelmed and brutally chopped up: thirty were killed and almost all the others wounded and captured. Captain Samuel Alexander of the Georgia militia murdered Grierson after he surrendered. Among the few rebel casualties at Fort Grierson was Major Eaton. An attempt by Brown to make a sortie in support of Grierson was checked by Lee.

Fort Cornwallis was a harder nut to crack. The only available artillery was a little three-pounder from Lee's Legion and an old iron five-pounder that Clarke had picked up. One of the two guns captured from Fort Grierson was later brought into action. Meanwhile, Lee and Pickens had to undertake regular approaches. On Lee's suggestion a Maham Tower was started. Brown tried to drive the builders off with fire from his two heaviest guns, and he launched two determined but unsuccessful sorties. He then secretly moved powder into a frame house that stood between the fort and the tower. But the house was prematurely blown up by the defenders without damage either to the tower or to the rebel troops.

On 31 May, Brown refused a second summons to surrender. That night a captured six-pounder from Fort Grierson was mounted in the tower, and the next morning the rebels started an effective cannon and small arms fire from it, the six-pounder knocking the two Loyalist cannon out of commission.

On 4 June the attackers were formed for the final assault when Brown agreed to consider a conditional surrender. After a day of negotiations the Loyalists laid down their arms and were marched off under Continental guard to be paroled in Savannah. A strong guard of regulars had to protect Brown from Grierson's fate. Lee marched with the prisoners to Ninety Six. Pickens followed later, but was then sent with Lee's cavalry to oppose the relief column led by General Francis Rawdon to Ninety Six.

The rebels lost about forty men during the siege. Fifty-two Loyalists were killed and 334 captured.

SEE ALSO *Fort Galphin, South Carolina; Ninety-Six, South Carolina; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION, WAR OF

THE. 1740–1748. Frederick II (the Great), king of Prussia, rejected the Pragmatic Sanction, by which the Habsburg Emperor Charles VI of Austria decreed in 1713 that his territories should pass to his daughter Maria Theresa if he should have no male heir. When in fact Charles died in October 1740 without a male heir, Frederick laid claim to and invaded the Austrian province of Silesia in December 1740. A coalition of France, Spain, Saxony, and Sardinia, each coveting a portion of the Habsburg dominions, supported the Bavarian candidate for election as Holy Roman Emperor in 1741. Maria Theresa looked to Britain, Austria's traditional ally against France, for support. Britain managed to arrange a temporary peace between Austria and Prussia in July 1742, but Britain was drawn into the war because King George II was simultaneously elector of Hanover. Acting nominally in support of his Habsburg ally (but fully aware that France was the principal threat to both Britain and Hanover), George II led an Anglo-Dutch-Hanoverian force (the "Pragmatic Army") to victory over the French at Dettingen, 27 June 1743, the last time a British king personally led his troops in battle.

The French withdrew from German soil, and Britain formed an alliance with Austria and Sardinia to drive France and Spain from Italy. France, Spain, and Prussia formed a countervailing alliance. The French declaration of war against Britain on 31 March 1744 ended the absurd situation in which hostilities on land and at sea had taken place between powers nominally at peace. France supported the Stuart claimant to the British throne, which touched off the second Jacobite Rebellion ("the '45"), led by the Young Pretender. Although distracted at home, Britain continued to support an Anglo-Dutch-Austrian army in Flanders, led by the king's son, the duke of Cumberland. When Maurice de Saxe, marshal of France, defeated this army at Fontenoy on 11 May 1745, the French gained control of Flanders. By October,

Cumberland and his British troops were on their way to Scotland, where on 16 April 1746 they crushed the Jacobites at Culloden. Prussia withdrew from the alliance on 25 December 1745, when Maria Theresa agreed to let Frederick retain Silesia, a bargain that allowed Austria to drive the French and Spanish from northern Italy in 1746.

The European war evolved into a struggle for maritime and colonial supremacy and became interwoven with conflict in India and North America, where it was called King George's War. The so-called War of Jenkins' Ear had already erupted in 1739 over British commercial penetration of Spain's American empire, and the conflict continued in the Caribbean and on the mainland until 1742. Britain's New England colonies captured Louisburg in June 1745, the French took Madras in 1746, and Britain gained control of the seas.

The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 18 October 1748, restored all conquests, including Louisburg, much to the disgust of colonial Americans. Prussia retained Silesia, the Dutch Republic regained its frontier fortresses in Flanders, the Pragmatic Sanction was guaranteed, Francis I (Maria Theresa's consort and coregent) was elected emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and France agreed to expel the Young Pretender.

The war left an unstable situation in its wake and demonstrated how conflict in Europe could expand overseas. The next war involving these European powers would begin in North America and ignite the tinder the war of the Austrian succession had left strewn across Europe. The war is of interest also because many British and American officers who later served in the Revolution underwent their baptism of fire in this conflict.

SEE ALSO *Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of; Colonial Wars; Culloden Moor, Scotland; Fontenoy, Battle of; Jenkin's Ear, The War of; King George's War.*

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B

BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS OF THE REVOLUTION.

The War of American Independence, waged between 1775 and 1783 by the inhabitants of thirteen of Britain's North American colonies to secure their political independence from the mother country, was the military phase of a larger movement called the American Revolution. The origins of the beliefs, attitudes, and values that eventually coalesced into resistance, rebellion, and revolution are found in three general areas: (1) the circumstances in which the colonies were founded, from 1607 (Virginia) through 1734 (Georgia); (2) the initial diversity and subsequent growth of those settlements into established societies; and (3) the ways in which Britain attempted to exercise control over its colonies, which alternated between neglect and scrutiny, and culminated in an attempt to assert its supremacy over what were, by the middle of the eighteenth century, mature and self-possessed societies.

Although the first colonies were intended to be money-making ventures for investors back in England, the lack of readily exploitable mineral or agricultural resources ensured that the men and women who immigrated to North America had to scramble to wrest a livelihood from an always daunting and often dangerous natural environment. Only in the Chesapeake (tobacco), and later in low-country South Carolina (indigo and rice), did the North American colonies produce commodities that could even approach the significance to the British economy of the sugar grown on islands in the Caribbean. But the exploitation of natural resources (forests, offshore fisheries, animals, and even members of its resident human population), held the promise of greater wealth for the

average person than he or she could hope to obtain elsewhere. This quest for individual aggrandizement in a land where resources were abundant and labor was scarce was a fundamental part of an emerging American identity.

The diversity of human inhabitants in the colonies far surpassed anything in Britain. The most numerous newcomers were English in culture, language, and political ideas, but the colonies also incorporated others of European heritage, including Dutch (in what became New York), Swedes (in the Delaware), Germans (mostly in Quaker Pennsylvania), and Scots-Irish (mostly in the frontier backcountry from Pennsylvania south). The native Americans who encountered these Europeans pressing inland from the coast were pushed aside or conquered; but the clash of cultures added new dimensions to American identity, as did the presence of enormous numbers of enslaved Africans, imported by the Europeans largely to meet the demand for agricultural labor in the Chesapeake and lower South.

Englishmen and -women dominated this unique mixing of cultures an ocean away from the mother country. The colonies were places of religious refuge and economic opportunity that, in large part because of their geographic isolation from England, developed their own ways of organizing their social and political relations and of governing themselves. The fact that colonization began during decades when ideas about the role and power of central government were in flux in England helped to make the colonists wary of strict supervision by the imperial government, and more receptive to seeing sinister motives in every attempt to bind the colonies more closely to the mother country.

Englishmen in England believed they had a right to regulate economic activity in the colonies for the benefit

of the mother country—a view known as mercantilism. Their primary goal was to make sure that the products of the colonial economies were carried to England in English ships, even if those products were intended for re-export to other places in Europe. Doing so would provide employment for English sailors, profits for English merchants, and customs revenue for the English king, all the while keeping these benefits out of the hands of England's European competitors. Beginning in 1651 various acts of Parliament, known as the Navigation Acts, sought to keep trade flowing in these channels, an effort that did not unduly restrict the natural currents of trade in the nascent colonial economies. The Board of Trade and the vice-admiralty courts were created in 1696, between two colonial wars, to ensure the supervision of trade, but their regulatory intrusiveness was minimal. Although there were some sharp differences about particular acts, and especially how they were being enforced, the period from 1721 to the middle of the eighteenth century has been called a period of "salutary neglect" in relations between the colonies and the mother country. By 1750 imperial officials began to lay plans for a stronger central administration of colonial affairs, a reasonable course of action for those who believed that the increasingly prosperous colonies existed for the benefit of the mother country, but one that ignored the growing awareness among the colonists that being English now meant something different for them than it did for Englishmen in England. The final two colonial wars dampened centripetal pressure, but the extent and scope of the victory over France in North America, evident by 1763, opened the gates for a flood of postponed ideas and mutual misperceptions.

In the short span of five years (1760–1765), relations soured between the imperial government and many members of the colonial oligarchy. The euphoria over the fall of New France (1760) and the capture of Havana (1762) gave way to colonial astonishment and perplexity at the imperial government's seemingly comprehensive and sinister tightening of the rules of empire. The Treaty of Paris (1763) left Britain the undisputed victor over a humiliated France and an impotent Spain, but British leaders were left to face several serious problems. They had to manage a national debt that had doubled owing to war-time expenditures (interest payments had increased tenfold) and integrate a new set of far-flung colonies into the existing empire. They lacked allies, since other nations resented Britain's ascendancy and were waiting for the opportunity to restore a balance of power in Europe and overseas. At home, government leaders were so consumed by local and parliamentary politics that formulating a consistent imperial policy proved to be difficult to achieve. George III, who had acceded to the throne in 1760 with the determination to "be a King," was a thoroughgoing Englishman who wanted

to make Britain's mixed government of king, lords, and commons work more effectively for the benefit of the nation. He played a more active role in parliamentary politics than had either his grandfather or great-grandfather, a circumstance that contributed to sharpening the contest for interest and influence. Far from being a well-organized conspiracy against the rights of the colonists, British colonial policy after 1763 was whipsawed among the more urgent needs of domestic political competition with an unpredictability that fatally decreased the ability of British politicians and American oligarchs to understand and appreciate each other's points of view.

The deterioration of relations was precipitated by a convergence of several factors. The downturn in the British economy in 1763 made critical the need to raise a revenue to pay the cost of running the expanded and more closely regulated empire. The Americans, however, were in a particularly unsympathetic mood. Economically, they had their own troubles in the form of a postwar depression. Militarily, elimination of the traditional French and Indian threat made them feel less dependent on British troops for protection, a dependence that had been one of the firmest ties between the colonies and the mother country. Politically, the colonial assemblies had expanded their authority and self-importance at the expense of royal government and imperial officials during the final French and Indian War (1755–1763). Most royal governors were political appointees, dominated by the colonial assemblies. Even if the governor was a capable politician, he faced the impossible task of trying to execute royal instructions through an elected colonial assembly that appointed many of the administrative officers, initiated all laws, made appropriations, and controlled the colonial purse strings, including payment of his own salary. The existence of these representative assemblies in all the colonies by 1775 was the institutional prerequisite for the formulation and concerted expression of political resistance to increased imperial control. Even if opposition was originally organized outside the assembly, the assembly was the recognized forum for the expression of the popular will.

Opponents of imperial regulation argued that the king's corrupt ministers were conspiring against colonial rights, in an effort to increase their power and profit. All the colonists had to do was to alert the king to the problem, the king would dismiss the evil ministers, and the system of mixed government would right itself. A significant number of colonists clung to the belief that, even if the ministers were corrupt and Parliament would not redress their complaints, the king would help them. When their cries fell on deaf ears, and the king supported his ministers and the notion of parliamentary supremacy, Americans realized that they had exhausted the resources of accepted legal and political arguments in their quarrel with the British government. They invoked "natural law"

to sustain their resistance and developed new political theories, the most important of which was to shift the locus of sovereignty in a state from the monarch to the people. The Declaration of Independence was the end product of that process, a statement of a revolution that had already taken place in the hearts and minds of a significant number of politically active Americans.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; Mercantilism; Paris, Treaty of (10 February 1763); Royal Government in America; Salutory Neglect; Trade, The Board of; Vice-Admiralty Courts.*

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BAHAMAS. New Providence (later Nassau) was twice captured by American naval forces. Spanish forces captured the defenseless islands in the summer of 1782

SEE ALSO *Nassau; Nassau Raid of Rathbun.*

Mark M. Boatner

BAILEY, ANN HENNIS TROTTER. (1742–1825). Scout. Born in Liverpool, England, in 1742, Ann Hennis immigrated to Staunton, Virginia, in 1761, marrying Richard Trotter in 1765. In 1774 Trotter volunteered for service in Dunmore's War and was killed in the battle of Point Pleasant on 10 October 1774. Hennis then stepped into her husband's place, gaining a reputation as a tough scout. She served during the Revolution as a spy on the frontier, primarily in the Shenandoah Valley, reporting on the activities of Indians allied with or suspected of being sympathetic to the British. She also gained praise for recruiting men living on the frontier to join the American side of the conflict, if only by forming together in local militia companies. With the war's end, Hennis continued her service as a frontier scout. In 1785 she married John Bailey, who served at Fort Lee (later Charleston, West Virginia). They both continued to serve as scouts from that base. Ann Bailey, as she was now called, became widely known during the Indian siege of Fort Lee in 1791, when she rode through the Indian lines on her horse Liverpool and traveled one hundred miles to Fort Union for gunpowder, returning with the powder just three days after she left. Credited

with saving the fort, Bailey became a legendary figure on the frontier. Her services to the military ended with General Anthony Wayne's Treaty of Greenville in 1795. In 1817 she moved with her son to Gallipolis, Ohio, where she died on 22 November 1825.

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Michael Bellesiles

BALDWIN, JEDUTHAN. (1732–1788). Continental officer. Massachusetts. Born in Woburn, Massachusetts, on 13 January 1732, Jeduthan Baldwin commanded a company in the Seven Years' War and served in the Massachusetts Provincial Congress from 1774 to 1775. He entered the Continental army on 16 March 1776 as an assistant engineer, holding the rank of captain. He was charged with constructing fortifications for the Boston Siege. His *Revolutionary Journal*, published in 1906, is a valuable source of details on that campaign. On 3 September 1776 he was promoted to colonel of the Engineers after having been active in constructing the defenses of New York City. The next year he worked with General Thaddeus Kosciuszko, under Brigadier General Arthur St. Clair's command, in the fortification of Ticonderoga, and in 1780 was associated with the same two men in constructing the works at West Point. In what presumably was a concurrent assignment, Baldwin raised several companies of quartermaster artificers. He died in Brookfield, Massachusetts, on 4 June 1788.

SEE ALSO *Artificers; Engineers*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BALDWIN, LOAMMI. (1740–1807). Civil engineer, Continental officer. Massachusetts. Born in Woburn, Massachusetts on 21 January 1745, Baldwin worked as a cabinetmaker, walking to Cambridge with his friend Benjamin Thompson to attend lectures on mathematics and physics at Harvard. Progressing from surveyor, he had become a civil engineer by the time the war started. He became a major in the militia and was at Concord on 19 April 1775. Enlisting in the Continental army, Baldwin was promoted to lieutenant colonel in Samuel Gerrish's Massachusetts Regiment on 19 May,

becoming commander when Gerrish was cashiered 19 August. When the regiment was redesignated the Twenty-sixth Continental on 1 January 1776 and increased from eight to ten companies, Baldwin was promoted to the rank of colonel. He served through the siege of Boston, then went to New York with the main army. He saw action at Pell's Point, took part in the retreat to the Delaware, and led his regiment at Trenton on 26 December 1776. Because of continued ill health, he resigned on 31 December 1776.

After holding a number of political posts, including a position on the General Court from 1778 to 1779, Baldwin returned to a full-time pursuit of engineering. He was chief engineer of the Middlesex Canal, which joined the Charles and Merrimac Rivers, and served as director of this project from 1794 to 1804. The Middlesex was one of the first major canals in America, and Baldwin's work influenced future canal projects. A life-long autodidact, Baldwin received an honorary degree from Harvard in 1785. His interest in horticulture led him to develop the Baldwin apple. He died 20 October 1807. His son, Loammi Baldwin, Jr. (1780–1838), followed in his footsteps, becoming known as the "father of civil engineering in America."

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege; Pell's Point, New York; Thompson, Benjamin Count Rumford*.

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BALFOUR, NISBET. (1743–1823). British army officer. Balfour was one of five sons of the laird of Dunbog, Fife, all of whom followed their father into the army. Nisbet became an ensign in the Fourth Regiment, called "The King's Own Foot" on 27 January 1761. By 1770 he was a captain, but he had never been in action when the war of American Independence broke out in 1775.

Balfour was badly wounded at Bunker Hill on 27 June 1775, but he recovered in time to fight in the New York campaign in the summer and autumn of 1776. Promoted to the rank of major, he was sent home with General William Howe's dispatches and his own gloomy appreciation of the progress of the war. His views were, however, ignored, and he was sent back to New York with orders to encourage greater energy on the part of the British generals. He took part in the Philadelphia campaign and became a lieutenant colonel in the Twenty-third Regiment in 1778. By October he was appreciably more optimistic about the war, arguing that a modest reinforcement would guarantee victory. At the end of the year he went home on sick leave

but returned in time to take part in Sir Henry Clinton's expedition against Charleston in 1780.

It was in the south that Balfour achieved prominence. When the British pushed inland to secure the South Carolina hinterland, he was given command of the key isolated post at Ninety-six, together with three battalions of Royal Provincials and some light infantry. From here he supported Patrick Ferguson's recruitment of 4,000 Loyalist militia. However, Balfour was acutely aware of the political dimension of what was a bitter civil war. He was sensitive to the need to conciliate as well as the need to secure territory, and like General Charles Cornwallis, he was highly critical of the behavior of some of the Loyalist troops. When in August Cornwallis prepared to move up country to join Francis Lord Rawdon for the Camden campaign, he summoned Balfour—technically Rawdon's senior—to take command in Charleston. It was Balfour who put down a rising in Rawdon's rear in the summer of 1781 and brought one of the rebel officers, Isaac Hayne, before a court of enquiry. Hayne, who had been released in 1780 on condition that he would no longer serve against the British, was condemned to death for breaking his parole.

After the war Balfour was promoted colonel, made aide de camp to George III, and served as a commissioner to adjudicate Loyalist compensation claims. In 1790 he was elected as the member for the Scottish seat of Wigton Burghs, which he held until 1796. From 1797 to 1802 he sat for Arundel, in Sussex. A loyal supporter of the younger William Pitt (prime minister of Britain from 1783 to 1801 and from 1804 to 1806), Balfour was promoted to major general in February 1793 and in 1794 he served in Flanders. He rose to lieutenant general in 1798 and general in 1803. He died on 10 October 1823.

SEE ALSO *Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Philadelphia Campaign; Rawdon-Hastings, Francis.*

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BALME **SEE** *Mottin de La Balme, Augustin.*

BANCROFT, EDWARD. (1744–1820). Double agent, writer, inventor. Born at Westfield, Massachusetts on 9 January 1744, Bancroft led an

adventurous life as a sailor and colonist in Dutch Guiana before settling in London. Here he wrote on American subjects for the *Monthly Review* and published his *Essay on the Natural History of Guiana* (1769), which gained him a solid reputation as a naturalist. He also wrote the pro-American *Remarks on the Review of the Controversy between Great Britain and Her Colonies* (1769), and *Charles Wentworth* (1770), a novel attacking Christianity. Becoming acquainted with Benjamin Franklin in London, he served as Franklin's spy and later performed in the same role for another American diplomat, Silas Deane, whom he had known as a young man. He also gained the confidence of John Paul Jones. In December 1776 he began spying for the British, as well, assuming the name Edwards. His American friends never suspected Bancroft of his duplicity.

Paid £200, eventually increased to £1000 a year, and promised the post of Regius professor of divinity at King's (Columbia) College when New York was returned to British control, Bancroft was given the mission of spying on the American commissioners in Paris. His reports were sent to Paul Wentworth, another double agent, in London. Using his secret information, he also speculated financially based on war news such as General John Burgoyne's defeat and the start of the peace negotiations. The British government terminated Bancroft's services as a spy in 1784, ignoring his pleas that he could still be useful.

Bancroft lived a complicated double life. A successful doctor and scientist, he was elected to the Royal Society on Franklin's recommendation in 1773. As an inventor he made important discoveries in the field of textile dyes. His *Experimental Researches Concerning the Philosophy of Permanent Colours* was published in 1794. Yet, despite these accomplishments, Bancroft seemed compelled to intrigue. His treachery did not come to light until seventy years after his death on 8 September 1821. When a descendant, the British general William C. Bancroft, learned the truth, he burned all his grandfather's papers.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BARBÉ-MARBOIS, FRANÇOIS, MARQUIS DE. (1745–1837). French diplomat and politician. Son of a spice merchant, he became tutor to the children of the marshal de Castries. He was employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1768 and served at Ratisbonne, Dresden, and Munich. He accompanied Luzerne to Philadelphia in 1779 as chargé d'affaires and secretary of legation. He was soon authorized to organize consulates throughout the American states. In an effort to gather information about each state, he sent questionnaires to prominent Americans. Jefferson later revised and

published his responses as his *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1785). Barbé-Marbois accompanied Lafayette during the latter's negotiations in 1784 with the Iroquois at Fort Stanwix to reconcile them with the Americans. During his stay in America, Marbois married Elizabeth Moore, the daughter of the president of Pennsylvania.

After his return to France, he was named intendant general of the French Leeward Islands in 1786. He served in several diplomatic positions under the revolutionary government. He was arrested after the coup d'état of 4 September 1797 and transported to French Guiana, but was freed in 1799 by Napoleon, under whom he advanced quickly in the bureaucracy. In 1803 he negotiated the Louisiana Purchase. During the Bourbon restoration, he was created a peer (4 June 1814) and accorded the rank of marquis in 1816. Noted for his malleability, he survived the vicissitudes of French politics under six governments.

SEE ALSO *Fort Stanwix, New York.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

BARBER, FRANCIS. (1750–1783). Continental officer. Born in Princeton, New Jersey, on 26 November 1750, Barber graduated from the College of New Jersey in 1767. Becoming a teacher, he numbered Alexander Hamilton among his students at the Elizabethtown Academy. Named a lieutenant in the militia on 22 January 1776, Barber immediately took part in the capture of the British supply ship *Blue Mountain Valley*. For his heroism, he was made major of the Third New Jersey Regiment on 26 January 1776 and was sent with his regiment to the Mohawk Valley. Promoted to lieutenant colonel on 26 November 1776, Barber led his regiment in harassing British forces during the winter and spring of 1777 and at the Battles of Brandywine (11 September 1777) and Germantown (4 October 1777). During the winter at Valley Forge, he served under General Friedrich von Steuben as one of

four subinspector generals responsible for training the troops. Wounded by a musket ball at the Battle of Monmouth in June 1778, Barber returned to duty by the end of the year, again harassing enemy positions in New Jersey. The following year his regiment took part in General John Sullivan's attack on the Iroquois. Barber was named deputy adjutant general of General Sullivan's Western Army on 26 May 1779 and was wounded at the Battle of Newton on 29 August 1779. Back in New Jersey, he took part in the battles at Connecticut Farms on 7 June 1780 and Springfield on 23 June 1780 before being named deputy adjutant general at West Point. In January 1781 he was placed in charge of the force that suppressed the mutiny of the New Jersey Brigade. Barber served under General Anthony Wayne at the Battle of Green Spring, near Williamsburg, Virginia, on 6 July 1781 and was aide-de-camp to Lafayette at Yorktown, where he was wounded with a bayonet in the attack of 14 October. Barber was made colonel of the Second New Jersey Regiment on 7 January 1783. On 11 February 1783 he died in a freak accident when a tree fell on him.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BARCLAY, THOMAS. (1753–1830). Loyalist and British officer. Born in New York City on 12 October 1753, Barclay graduated from King's College in 1772 and studied law with John Jay before passing the bar in 1775. Driven from his home as a Loyalist, Barclay was commissioned a captain of the Loyal American Regiment in 1776. He was promoted to major the following year for his bravery in the capture of Forts Clinton and Montgomery. In 1779 the New York legislature found him guilty of treason and ordered the confiscation of his property. An officer in the Provincial Corps of Light Infantry, he served under General Alexander Leslie in Virginia in 1780 and under Lord Rawdon in South Carolina the following year. Volunteering to take dispatches to General Cornwallis later that year, he was captured by the French.

Paroled to New York City, Barclay joined the British evacuation in 1783, helping to resettle many Loyalists in Nova Scotia, where his regiment disbanded. Barclay was elected to the Nova Scotia assembly in 1785, serving as its speaker from 1789 to 1799. In 1793 he was made lieutenant colonel of the Royal Nova Scotia Regiment. Between 1796 and 1798 he served as the British member of the arbitration commission established by Jay's Treaty to determine the Maine-Canada border. In 1799 he received two thousand pounds for his losses during the Revolution from the Loyalist claims commission and was named British consul general in New York City. He remained in his home city the rest of his life, being occasionally

threatened by angry crowds in the long period of tension that led to the War of 1812, during which conflict he worked to effect prisoner exchanges. He resigned as consul in 1815 and devoted the next seven years to trying to settle the northeastern boundary between the United States and Canada. He died in New York City on 21 April 1830.

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Michael Bellesiles

BARLOW, JOEL. (1754–1812). Diplomat and poet. Born in Redding, Connecticut, on 24 March 1754, Barlow studied at Moor's Indian School. He graduated in 1758 from Yale, where he had demonstrated his interest in poetry with his first publication, on the dreadful quality of college food. His commencement poem, *The Prospect of Peace*, earned considerable praise. Barlow served during the Revolution as chaplain of the Third Massachusetts Brigade. Throughout the war he persisted in writing poetry, most of which sounds stilted to modern ears.

At the war's end, Barlow opened a printing shop in Hartford and set about seeking patrons to support his writing. In 1787 he published his first epic poem, *The Vision of Columbus*, which made the entire history of the Americas a lead-up to the American Revolution, a perspective which continues to find great favor. Barlow's poem exerted enormous influence on the culture of the early Republic, if only in his elevation of Columbus to a central role in world history. His concluding prediction of the future greatness of the United States in every branch of human endeavor appealed enormously to the public's ego and guaranteed the poem's popularity.

Taking advantage of Barlow's sudden fame, the Scioto Associates, a company seeking to sell lands in the Ohio territory, named him its European agent and paid his expenses to Paris. Barlow proved less interested in selling land than in befriending the leading intellectuals there, from Thomas Paine and William Blake to Mary Wollstonecraft and Brissot de Warville (whom he translated). When the Scioto group collapsed in scandal the next year, Barlow was held blameless and stayed on in Europe as a journalist, reporting on the fall of the Bastille.

Meanwhile, his poetry crafted an interpretive vision of the past; *The Conspiracy of Kings* (1792), for instance, blaming the French Revolution on aristocratic corruption. In a series of pamphlets, Barlow defended the French Revolution against British accusations of approaching anarchy. Made an honorary citizen of France, Barlow

thought to run for public office in 1793. But with the execution of the king and the arrest of his friend Tom Paine (whose *Age of Reason* he saved from the police), Barlow abandoned politics for shipping, moving to Hamburg, where he became a wealthy merchant.

In 1796 the United States appointed him minister to Algiers, where he successfully arranged the release of more than one hundred American prisoners. Barlow returned to the United States in 1804, settling in Washington and returning to poetry. With his friend Robert Fulton he wrote an epic poem, *The Canal: A Poem on the Application of Physical Science to Political Economy*, which foresaw more greatness for America through the use of Fulton's steamships. In 1807 Barlow published his most famous poem, *The Columbiad*, an expanded version of his *Vision of Columbus* that devoted more attention to the American Revolution and the new nation's scientific promise, and that rejected Christianity as an outdated concept. Barlow returned to Europe in 1812 as special emissary from his friend President James Madison to Napoleon, whom he found fleeing Russia. Repulsed by what he saw, Barlow wrote his greatest poem, *Advice to a Raven in Russia*, which graphically described the frozen corpses, the hunger, the senseless destruction, and the death of revolutionary ideals. Barlow caught pneumonia and died on 26 December 1812 in Poland.

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Michael Bellesiles

BARNEY, JOSHUA. (1759–1818). Naval officer. Born in Baltimore on 6 July 1759, Barney went to sea at the age of eleven, taking command of his first ship at fifteen. In October 1775 he enlisted in the Continental navy, serving on the *Hornet* and the *Wasp*. Serving with distinction in a number of engagements, he was commissioned a lieutenant and executive officer of the *Sachem* in June 1776. After again displaying heroism in battle, he was transferred to the *Andrea Doria*, which captured two British privateers in December; one of them was put under Barney's command. The British seized this ship and put Barney ashore at Charleston. By March he was back aboard the *Andrea Doria*, which took part in the defense of Philadelphia and was burned by the Americans to prevent its capture by General Howe's troops. Returning to Baltimore, Barney was given command of the new frigate *Virginia*, which ran aground as it attempted to elude the British blockade. After a brief period as a prisoner of war in

New York City, Barney became a privateer, making several successful voyages over the next three years. In October 1780, at the age of twenty-one, he returned to the navy as lieutenant of the *Saratoga*. The same month he was given command of a captured British privateer, which was quickly retaken by the British; Barney was then confined to Mill Prison in England. Escaping, Barney crossed the Atlantic and made his way to Philadelphia in March 1782. Given command of the Pennsylvania ship the *Hyder Ally*, Barney won a notable victory over the *General Monk* on 8 April 1782, the latter being renamed *General Washington*, with Barney in command until the war's end.

After the Revolution, Barney became a successful businessman and a supporter of the Constitution. In 1794 President Washington nominated him one of the six captains of the new navy, but Barney declined after learning he was ranked third on the list. After a few more years in trade, he took a position as commodore in the navy of revolutionary France, serving until 1802, when he returned to Baltimore. At the beginning of the War of 1812, he put to sea as captain of the privateer *Rossie*, capturing eighteen prizes valued at \$1.5 million in just three months. He spent the rest of the war commanding a small fleet charged with defending the Chesapeake from the British. When the British finally attacked in August 1814, Barney had to burn his ships, marching his men to meet the British at Bladensburg. In the ensuing battle, only Barney's 500 sailors and marines held their positions, the militia fleeing in panic all around them. In 1818 he decided to move to Kentucky but became sick on the way and died at Pittsburgh on 1 December.

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BARRAS DE SAINT-LAURENT, JACQUES-MELCHIOR, COMTE DE.

(1719–1792?). French naval officer. Entering the Coast Guard in 1734, he later served in the Mediterranean and the Antilles. Barras was promoted to ensign (1742), ship's lieutenant (1754), and ship's captain (1762). Commander of the *Zélé* in Estaing's squadron in Rhode Island (1778) and Savannah (1779), he escorted the convoys between Saint Domingue and France. He returned to America in May 1781 to command the French squadron at Newport. Rochambeau and Barras were to meet Washington at Wethersfield, Connecticut, to discuss what might be done before François Grasse's arrival, but Arbuthnot

took up a station off Rhode Island, and Barras was unable to leave. He eventually cooperated with the allied armies, however, and safely entered the harbor of Yorktown on 10 September 1781, after the battle off the Chesapeake Capes on 5 September 1781, carrying the siege artillery of the French army. After Yorktown, Barras's squadron followed Grasse to the West Indies, ending the possibility that they might be used in a southern campaign. In 1782 he was promoted to lieutenant general and distinguished himself by capturing Montserrat. He returned to France ill in April 1782 and was awarded the Grand Cross of the Order of Saint-Louis in 1784. He was promoted to vice admiral in January 1792 but resigned shortly thereafter.

SEE ALSO *Chesapeake Capes*.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

BARRÉ, ISAAC. (1726–1802). British officer and politician. Born in Dublin in 1726, Barré graduated from Trinity College in Dublin in 1745 and immediately entered the army as an ensign. During the unsuccessful attack on Rochefort in 1757 he won the high regard of James Wolfe as well as that of the colonel of his regiment, William Petty Fitzmaurice, Lord Shelburne. He was with Wolfe when the latter was killed at Quebec, Barré himself receiving a disfiguring wound when a bullet struck his cheek and remained lodged there. William Pitt turned down Barré's application for advancement in 1760, but later named him lieutenant colonel and placed him in command of the 106th Foot (infantry) from 1761 to 1763.

Through Shelburne's influence, Barré entered Parliament on 5 December 1761. Five days later he delivered a vehement speech against Pitt. On 7 February 1765 he blasted the proposal to tax the American colonists and referred to them as "sons of liberty." The Patriots adopted this name for the groups opposing the Stamp Act. Almost without rival as an opposition orator, he was a hero in America, a terror to the British government, and second only to John Wilkes in the unpopularity he incurred with George III. Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, was named after these two. Barré continued his rhetorical barrage on the

government for the next ten years, becoming a close ally of Pitt's in the process. When news of Bunker Hill reached England, Barré accused the troops of misbehavior. When Shelburne became prime minister briefly in 1782, he made Barré treasurer of the navy, a very lucrative post. Barré went blind in about 1783, but remained in Parliament until forced out in 1790 after a disagreement with Shelburne. He died on 20 July 1802.

SEE ALSO *Wilkes, John*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BARREN HILL, PENNSYLVANIA.

For a foreign volunteer, Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch Gilbert du Motier, the Marquis de Lafayette, enjoyed extraordinarily rapid advancement in the American military establishment after arriving in America in June 1777. In mid-August the commander in chief, George Washington, could neither spell nor correctly pronounce his aristocratic name. Barely more than a month later, after Lafayette had performed bravely and resourcefully at Brandywine, an admiring Washington began drawing him into his inner circle of aides. The wounded Lafayette rehabilitated his leg in a hospital at Bethlehem and rejoined the Continental army in December. During the early part of the winter at Valley Forge in 1777–1778, Lafayette remained staunchly loyal to Washington through the weeks of institutional intrigue and personal recrimination within the Continental establishment that some historians have mislabeled the Conway Cabal.

What Lafayette did not receive from his commander and now his mentor—and which he wanted very badly both for reasons of personal honor and to gratify the yearnings of youth—was a field command leading troops in circumstances of combat or at least the potential for combat. The limited types of operational assignments available in the late fall and early winter, after Lafayette returned to camp and later at Valley Forge, involved small-unit patrolling and skirmishing of a nature poorly suited to whatever military skills the marquis may have possessed. Washington preferred Lafayette's presence at headquarters, and for the sake of his diplomatic value, he could not have afforded to have him killed or captured performing minor patrol duties.

In January 1778 the new Board of War, an administrative agency headed by Washington's rival, General Horatio Gates, pushed through the Congress a plan for a Continental invasion of Canada. Perhaps seeking to buffer the plan politically with a nomination from Washington's own suite, it recommended Lafayette to lead the expedition. Despite Lafayette's hearty distrust of Washington's

adversaries, he could not resist this opportunity for action and glory, nor could Washington refuse his protégé the opportunity. To Lafayette's great credit, when he reached Albany—the expedition's departure point—in mid-February, he recognized the folly of the very idea of a midwinter invasion, and he was gratified when the project was abandoned. Then he returned to Valley Forge, where he continued to champion Washington's interests and agenda.

DEFENDING THE PHILADELPHIA COUNTRYSIDE

Washington, meanwhile, found his tactical and strategic intentions for the winter increasingly pressured by events. Despite a preference of his generals to place the army in inland urban quarters for the winter, he had personally brokered the compromise decision for the army to remain in the field, in deference to the political sensibilities of the Revolutionary political bodies, especially the beleaguered state government of Pennsylvania. He arranged a division of responsibility for securing the Philadelphia countryside by which the Continental army assumed control of the territory west of the Schuylkill River to the Delaware River near Wilmington. The state government, meanwhile, promised to keep enough militia in the field to patrol the area east of the Schuylkill to the Delaware at Trenton, New Jersey. Even when the state's ability to meet this manpower commitment faltered, Washington resisted pressures to fill the territorial gap by expanding the sphere of army responsibility. Only when bold British and partisan guerilla raiding east of the Schuylkill in February threatened the army's supply line to the northern states during a severe provisions crisis did Washington reluctantly agree to make even modest increases in the small Continental security patrols already working east of the Schuylkill.

By the late spring, the complete collapse of American militia resistance and modest improvements in Continental strength and proficiency levels caused Washington to rethink this approach and to gradually increase the army's involvement in Philadelphia and Bucks Counties. General Howe, meanwhile, took advantage of American tactical disabilities in the field to send increasingly aggressive patrols of British and partisan raiders into the area to attack both military and civilian targets. In mid-May 1778, after the announcement and celebration of the new American alliance with France and during the transition in command in Philadelphia from the retiring William Howe to his successor, Henry Clinton, the British sent a party up the Delaware to attack rebel nautical facilities at Bordentown, New Jersey, and Bristol, Pennsylvania. Extensive damage was done to civilian property and morale in that area, and predictable demands emerged from the Pennsylvania government for the army to respond to the crisis.

LAFAYETTE'S COMMAND

Washington ordered Continental troops patrolling near the Schuylkill under the command of Brigadier General William Maxwell to move north toward Trenton to respond to the incursion. This mission expansion tore the Continental grip loose from the Schuylkill River, leaving a gap in the army's immediate security system near Valley Forge that could not be tolerated. On 18 May, Washington was finally able to gratify the thirst of the loyal and generally uncomplaining Lafayette for a field command. He ordered his protégé to lead an expedition of about twenty-two hundred troops across the Schuylkill to cover Maxwell's previous positions. He reminded Lafayette of the large size and importance of his detachment and warned him to move warily and to avoid being engaged by a major enemy force or being cut off from a retreat to the west side of the river.

The British quickly discovered the inexperienced Lafayette's presence in the area. They increased their routine patrols and intelligence activity to protect the *meschianza*, an elaborate festival that the officers planned to bid farewell to their departing commander, Howe. Late on the evening of 19 May, Clinton learned that Lafayette had taken a stationary post at Barren Hill, an elevated plateau just beyond Chestnut Hill, northwest of Germantown. Clinton sent a party of between five thousand and six thousand British regulars and Hessians under General James Grant to try to get beyond Lafayette's position and between it and Valley Forge. Early the next morning, the superseded Howe was given the honor of leading the main body of the army up the Germantown Road with the intention of trapping Lafayette between Howe's and Grant's forces. General Charles Gray was sent with a party of troops to intercept any retreat to alternate Schuylkill fords.

Lafayette, who had with him a group of Indian scouts, was alerted to the maneuver. He notified Washington and quickly made arrangements to withdraw across the Schuylkill by the one still-unobstructed road to Matson's Ford. Washington, mortified that his young aide had put him into this compromised position, prepared to lead most of the army to his rescue, risking the general action that he had carefully avoided for most of the previous year. Lafayette was accused by British sources of having "sacrific[ed] his rear guard" in his haste to retreat, and several soldiers were indeed drowned, otherwise killed, or captured in or near the river. Most British and Hessian memoirists blamed Grant for moving too slowly and for hesitating to spring the trap that they believed he had it in his hands to close. For Howe, the event—supplemented with whispered criticisms for the excesses of the *meschianza*—punctuated the overall failure of his strategy to that point. From a strictly military point of view, Barren Hill was not an important or even a very memorable event. One would not be able to say that, however, if Lafayette,

with nearly one-fifth of the Continental army, had been cut off and captured or if Washington had fought and lost an inadvisable general battle that day to rescue his spirited but headstrong aide.

Official American casualties were six men killed and about twelve captured. British losses in this action are not reliably known.

SEE ALSO *Clinton, Henry; Gates, Horatio; Howe, William; Lafayette, Marquis de; Maxwell, William.*

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revised by Wayne K. Bodle

BARRY, JOHN. (1745?–1803). Continental naval officer. Ireland. Born in County Wexford, Ireland, perhaps in 1745, John Barry went to sea at an early age, settling in Philadelphia around 1760. Over the next decade he became a prosperous shipmaster and owner. Congress gave Barry command of the brig *Lexington* on 14 March 1776. After a brisk fight on 17 April 1776, Barry captured the British sloop *Edward*, winning the U.S. navy's first battle. Barry won further victories in 1776, seizing two more British ships in separate encounters and driving off a British attack off Cape May. Congress then awarded him command of the freshly built, thirty-two gun *Effingham*. While his ship was confined to the dock by a lack of supplies, Barry volunteered his services to General George Washington, taking cannon off of the *Effingham* for use as an artillery company in the battles of Trenton and Princeton. He then used smaller boats in a series of heroic actions against the British on the Delaware. However, the *Effingham* never saw action, because Barry burned it to prevent its capture when the British took Philadelphia in September 1777.

Barry next took command of the 32-gun *Raleigh*, which he had to run aground near Penobscot Bay after a gallant fight against two British frigates in September 1778. Two years later Barry gained command of the thirty-two gun *Alliance*, which was accounted the finest ship in the navy. He took many prizes with this ship before his epic battle with the *Atalanta* and *Trepassy*. Despite being outgunned, wounded, and lacking a wind upon which to escape, Barry refused to surrender. Instead, he battled back to take both British ships captive. Later in the year he took the Marquis

de Lafayette back to France. In the indecisive but well-conducted Alliance-Sybilie Engagement of January 1783, he fought the last important naval action of the war.

After the war, Barry fought for seamen's rights, made a significant voyage to China in 1789, and in 1794 was named senior captain of the U.S. navy. He had command of the forty-four gun *United States*, which served as his flagship during the so-called quasi-war with France from 1798 to 1799. He was in command when the *United States* fought and captured a notorious privateer, the *L'Amour de La Patrie*, near Martinique. He died in Philadelphia on 13 September 1803. Though not as dramatic as John Paul Jones, John Barry is accounted by many scholars to be the most important figure in the development of the U.S. navy.

SEE ALSO Alliance-Sybilie *Engagement*.

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BARTLETT, JOSIAH. (1729–1795). Signer, Massachusetts. Josiah Bartlett was born in Amesbury, Massachusetts, on 21 November 1729. After a classical education, he studied medicine at the age of sixteen, and in 1750 he began a medical practice in Kingston, New Hampshire. A successful doctor who introduced several medical reforms, he won election to the provincial assembly in 1765 and served as a member continuously. He held a civil commission as justice of the peace (1767) and a militia commission commanding a regiment (1770), but the royal government rescinded these appointments in 1775 in response to his open opposition to the Crown. In 1774 he served on the Committee of Correspondence and as a member of the first extralegal provincial congress, which selected him as a delegate to the Continental Congress. He was unable to accept this appointment, however, because he was occupied with the rebuilding of his house, which had recently been destroyed by a chimney fire. In 1775 he was again elected, and he served in Congress until 1777, when he resigned owing to poor health. He signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776. In August 1777 he was with General John Stark at Bennington, where he attended the sick and wounded. He held the rank of militia colonel from 1777 to 1779. He was re-elected to Congress in March 1778, where he signed the Articles of Confederation. He was the only medical practitioner to sign both the Declaration and the Articles. Worn out by work in Congress, Bartlett returned

home in late 1778. In 1782, he was named as an associate justice of the superior court, serving until his appointment as chief justice in January 1790. In February 1788 he served as delegate and president pro tem of New Hampshire's federal constitution ratification convention. In the spring of 1790 New Hampshire voters elected Bartlett to the office of chief executive (then called president), a position he won annually. In 1792 the amended state constitution changed the title to governor and Bartlett won another annual term. He retired in June 1794. He organized and was first president of the New Hampshire Medical Society in 1791, the year before he was given an honorary medical degree by Dartmouth College. Bartlett and his wife Mary (nee Bartlett), a cousin, had ten children, eight of whom lived into adulthood. Bartlett died of apoplexy in Kingston, New Hampshire, on 15 May 1795.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress*.

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revised by Frank C. Mevers

BARTON, WILLIAM. (1748–1831). Militia officer, captor of General Richard Prescott. Rhode Island. Born 26 May 1748, in Warren, Rhode Island, Barton was a hatter by trade. He became adjutant of William Richmond's Rhode Island Regiment on 3 August 1775. He was promoted to captain on 1 November, brigade major of the Rhode Island troops on 19 August 1776, and major of Joseph Stanton's Rhode Island State troops on 12 December 1776. Barton conceived the idea of capturing General Richard Prescott in order to exchange him for Charles Lee, who at this time was considered to be an asset to the American cause. Barton carefully and secretly planned the daring raid that accomplished this mission the night of 9 July, 1777. With forty volunteers from his regiment, he landed on the western shore of Rhode Island, then moved a mile inland. After silencing the guard on Prescott's billet, he captured the general and his aide-de-camp, Major William Barrington, and escaped with his prisoners. (This was the second time Prescott was captured, having been exchanged for General John Sullivan the previous year.)

Barton was commended by the Continental Congress by the passage of an act on 25 July 1777, in which he was extolled as “an elegant sword.” On 10 November 1777 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel, and on 24 December 1777 he was named a colonel in Stanton’s Regiment. In 1778 he was wounded while pursuing the British in their retreat from Warren, Rhode Island.

Although his state declined to appoint delegates to the Federal convention of 1787, Barton joined others in sending the convention a letter pledging their support of the Constitution, and in 1790 he was a member of Rhode Island’s state convention, which adopted Constitution. He was detained as a prisoner at an inn in Danville, Vermont, for fourteen years after refusing on principle to pay a judgment on a piece of land in Vermont, that he had bought or been granted by Congress. Word of the old hero’s plight came to the attention of the Marquis de Lafayette during a visit during 1824 and 1825. Lafayette personally paid the claim, and Barton returned to Rhode Island. He died in Providence on 22 October 1831.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

BASKING RIDGE, NEW JERSEY.

13 December 1776. Charles Lee’s capture. Having finally decided to comply with Washington’s repeated orders to march south and join him, Major General Charles Lee had crossed the Hudson and had reached a point a few miles south of Morristown, New Jersey, by late afternoon on 12 December. The troops went into bivouac, but Lee chose to spend the night three miles from camp at the tavern of Widow White near Basking Ridge with a small group (including guards) of about twenty men. That same afternoon Charles Lord Cornwallis, thirty miles south at Pennington, New Jersey, sent Lieutenant Colonel William Harcourt with thirty of his light horse to locate the rebel force in his rear. Early on the 13th, after a halt at Hillsborough, Harcourt headed for Morristown. Four or five miles from Basking Ridge, a Loyalist gave them the location of Lee’s main body, and within a mile of Lee’s billet they captured two sentinels who, under threat, informed them that Lee was at the tavern with a small guard. Uncertain whether to credit this intelligence, Harcourt ordered Cornet Banastre Tarleton and two men to observe from a small hill; Tarleton soon sent back a prisoner who confirmed the information.

On the morning of the 13th, Lee had ordered his troops forward at about 8 o’clock but had delayed his own departure to do some paperwork. He had scarcely finished his famous “entre nous” (just between us) letter to Gates when, about 10 A.M., Harcourt’s patrol attacked from two sides. Lee’s surprised guard was routed with a loss of two killed and two wounded. After about fifteen minutes’ resistance, Lee came out to surrender to Harcourt, who had been his subordinate in Portugal, and was allowed to wait for a coat to be sent out. He then was carried off with one of his officers, the Sieur de Boisbertrand, who had received a sword wound on the head while trying to escape out the back door. Another French volunteer, Captain de Vernejoux, along with James Wilkinson, who had come with dispatches from Gates to Washington, and Lee’s aide Major William Bradford, escaped because the British did not search the house. Although Sullivan sent out a rescue party, Harcourt got his prisoner safely to Brunswick.

Except for the propaganda value of capturing one of the ranking Continental generals, the incident had little practical significance. Sullivan led the troops south in time to participate in the Battles of Trenton and Princeton, and it could be argued that keeping Lee out of everyone’s hair until the spring of 1778 actually improved the Continental army.

SEE ALSO *Cornwallis, Charles; Tarleton, Banastre; Wilkinson, James.*

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BASTION. A projection of a fortification that permits the defender to fire along the front of the main wall (or “curtain”).

SEE ALSO *Enfilade.*

Mark M. Boatner

BATEAU. A flat-bottomed boat with tapering ends, the bateau was a common type of vessel well adapted for American lakes and rivers. Bateaux could be built quickly from sawed boards and moved by oars, poles, or square sails. They were invaluable in moving men and equipment over inland rivers and lakes. The decision to use this type of craft for Arnold’s march to Quebec caused significant problems

not only because it was very cumbersome to guide through rapids and carry across portages, but also because the boats were poorly constructed of green lumber.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's March to Quebec.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

BATTALION. During the second half of the eighteenth century, the term “battalion” meant the basic active-service maneuver unit in the linear tactical system that dominated European land warfare. The standard battalion in the British army contained ten sub-units called companies which acted as coordinated fire units within the battalion command structure. The terms “battalion” and “regiment” were nearly synonymous in the British and American armies because most infantry “regiments” contained only one active-service “battalion.” Although the umbrella administrative structure of the “regiment” could manage two or more active-service battalions, that form of organization was not common. In the British army in 1775, there were 71 infantry battalions in 69 regiments; only the First (Royal Scots) Regiment of Foot (the Royal Regiment) and the Sixtieth (Royal American) Regiment of Foot had 2 battalions. During the war 34 regiments of foot were added, 3 of which, the Seventy-First (Fraser’s Highlanders), the Seventy-Third (MacLeod’s Highlanders), and the Eighty-Fourth (Royal Highland Emigrants), had a second battalion. Two more battalions of the Sixtieth were raised in 1775, and a second battalion of the Forty-Second (Royal Highlanders) in 1781, so that by 1783 the army had 111 infantry battalions in 103 regiments. (In the American army, the Second Canadian Regiment was the only multi-battalion regiment; its four battalions each had four companies.) Active-service horsed cavalry units were almost always called regiments and contained three, sometimes four, sub-units called troops that could maneuver independently if necessary.

In the standard infantry battalion/regiment in the British army, eight of the ten companies, called battalion companies, were uniform in structure, training, and purpose. The two remaining companies, one of grenadiers, the other of light infantry, were called flank companies because, in the standard linear battle formation of the period, they took station on either flank of the battalion companies. Both flank companies were elite formations, composed of men chosen for specific physical characteristics and trained to perform battle functions over and above what could be expected from a standard battalion company. The grenadier company was the senior flank company, and as such took its place of honor on the right of the battalion line. Grenadier companies had originally been formed, in the late

seventeenth century, of tall, strong soldiers who were trained to throw gunpowder-filled cast-iron spheres called grenades over fortifications. The light infantry company was composed of smaller, more agile men whose purpose was to skirmish ahead of the battalion line so as to break up advancing enemy formations and cushion their impact on the battalion line. Formed at the middle of the eighteenth century in response to both European and North American conditions, the light infantry companies, when in line, took station on the left of the battalion. It was common practice from midcentury to detach the flank companies and gather them into provisional elite battalions for special purposes, usually as the spearhead of the army.

The regiment in the British army was commanded by its colonel, usually a senior general officer who retained some of the perquisites and responsibilities of the prior age when the colonel owned the regiment and did not normally lead the regiment on active service. A battalion usually went to war under the command of the lieutenant colonel (literally “in place of the colonel”), but the demands placed on senior field officers was often so great that the major, the third-ranking field officer, was left in charge of the battalion. In the American army, which generally followed British organizational patterns, the colonel would be expected to lead the battalion himself. In 1781 the Continental Army abolished the rank of colonel and created in its place the rank of lieutenant colonel commandant (i.e., commanding) for battalion or regimental commanders. Prisoners were exchanged on the basis of actual rank; few or no colonels were in service in the British army in America.

Authorized strengths of battalions varied widely in the British and American armies. Companies in the prewar British army were set at 38 private soldiers each, which totaled, with officers, noncommissioned officers, and musicians, about 490 men in a battalion. In August 1775 company strength was raised to 56 privates, or about 680 men per battalion, and again in 1779 to 70 privates, or about 820 men per battalion. The strength of the Continental Army regiments for 1776 authorized by Congress on 4 November 1775 was about 720 men (76 privates in each of eight companies, plus officers, noncommissioned officers, and musicians), a structure reauthorized on 16 September 1776 for the 88-battalion army of 1777. Authorized strength dropped to about 580 men on 27 May 1778 (53 privates in each of ten companies), and rose to about 700 men on 3 October 1780 (64 privates in each of nine companies). The battalions in both armies were almost never recruited to full strength, and replacements were rare. For example, many of the American and British regiments at Yorktown numbered around 200 rank and file, and few had more than 600.

SEE ALSO *Exchange of Prisoners; Flank Companies; Light Infantry; Muskets and Musketry; Regiment.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

BATTLE OF THE KEGS. The British won control of the Delaware River in November 1777 and opened a water line of communications to the recently occupied city of Philadelphia. David Bushnell applied his inventive genius to creating floating mines (suspended below kegs and tied together with rope) that were designed to drift downriver into the British fleet, snag a vessel, and explode on contact. A daybreak attack with “a score of kegs or more” on 5 January 1778 was a failure (the British used cannon and small arms fire to detonate the mines), but it inspired Francis Hopkinson’s poem *The Battle of the Kegs*, in which the poet says the kegs looked like barrels used to transport “pickled herring.”

SEE ALSO *Bushnell, David; Philadelphia Campaign.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

BAYLOR, GEORGE. (1752–1784). Aide-de-camp to Washington, Continental officer. Virginia. Coming from a prominent family of the Virginia gentry,

he was selected as aide-de-camp by Washington on 15 August 1775 and commissioned lieutenant colonel. Washington had been a close friend of Baylor’s father. Commended by Washington in a letter of 27 December 1776 to President Hancock, he carried the news of the victory at Trenton and a captured flag to Congress and was thanked by that body. Hancock wrote Washington recommending that he be promoted and given a horse. The gift horse came on 1 January 1777, the promotion on the 9th, and with the latter he assumed command of the Third Continental Dragoons. He was bayoneted through the lungs and captured in the Tappan massacre of 28 September 1778. After being exchanged he returned to duty, assuming command of the First Continental Dragoons on 9 November 1782 when the Third was merged with that unit. His cavalry troops served with the southern army from 1779 until the end of the war, although for a good part of that time, because of his wound, he was unable to resume his field command. He was breveted brigadier general on 30 September 1783 and died the next March at Bridgetown, Barbados, where he had gone in hopes of recovering from the wound received at Tappan.

SEE ALSO *Tappan Massacre, New Jersey.*

revised by Harry M. Ward

BAYONETS AND BAYONET ATTACKS. The bayonet was the most common as well as the most important edged weapon in all armies during the War of Independence. Developed in France in the mid-seventeenth century to give infantrymen armed with muzzle-loading muskets an edged weapon to replace the pikes they had previously wielded, the first bayonet resembled a short knife or dagger. (The term reflects the bayonet’s apparent origins in the French cutlery center of Bayonne.) Because it was inserted in the muzzle of the firearm, it was called a plug bayonet and effectively turned musketeers into spearmen by preventing them from reloading. A modified bayonet was developed, again in France, and came into widespread use by the end of the seventeenth century. This weapon featured a four-inch socket that fitted over the muzzle of the firearm and carried a blade more than a foot in length that was offset about two inches out of the path of the projectile. Reloading a muzzle-loading firearm with a socket bayonet in place was still a cumbersome task, but it was a vast improvement over being disarmed by the plug bayonet. Several systems were developed to secure the socket bayonet, most of which used a lug attached at the front of the barrel to guide the socket into place. Most bayonets used a slotted socket and locking ring, or a socket in which two slots were

cut at right angles. The blades of most bayonets were triangular in cross section and designed for thrusting rather than cutting.

The bayonet played a vital role in the linear tactics of the period. The standard infantry firearm was a smooth-bore musket, with which a well-trained infantryman could average an initial rate of fire of about three or four rounds per minute—a rate that dropped rapidly thereafter. Thus there was an increasing amount of time between volleys during which he would not be ready to fire his weapon. On top of the problem of rate of fire, a musket could not deliver aimed fire at much more than fifty yards, meaning an enemy could close for hand-to-hand combat before the infantryman could load and fire to stop him. The bayonet made both attack and defense in close combat more effective, and provided a weapon that could still be used if one's musket misfired or gunpowder was damp. If one side had bayonets and the other did not, the impact of a charge by bayonet could be devastating. British infantrymen, armed with seventeen-inch bayonets, were said to pray for rain so they could close with the enemy without receiving any volley fire, confident that their proficiency with the bayonet would overwhelm the opponent. Americans initially suffered a severe shortage of bayonets, and the states scrambled to fill the void with various patterns, from the eighteen-inch bayonets of Massachusetts and Virginia to the fourteen-inch bayonets of Connecticut.

Bayonets were especially important in night attacks, when they were used to retain surprise and reduce the risk of firing into friendly units by mistake. Soldiers would load their muskets but were not permitted to prime them, to prevent the loss of surprise by premature firing; then, if necessary, the commander could order his troops to complete this last step and open fire. Another technique was to load the musket, put in the priming charge, close the firing pan, and remove the flint. Major General Charles ("No-flint") Grey used it in his surprise attacks on Continental units at Paoli, Pennsylvania, on 21 September 1777, and at Tappan, New Jersey, on 28 September 1778. On both occasions Grey was accused of allowing atrocities—largely, it seems, because his attacks succeeded.

SEE ALSO *Grey, Charles; Muskets and Musketry; Paoli, Pennsylvania; Tappan Massacre, New Jersey.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

BEATTY, JOHN. (1749–1826). Continental officer. Born in Warwick, Pennsylvania, on 19 December 1749, Beatty graduated from the College of New Jersey in 1769 and studied medicine with Dr. Benjamin Rush in Philadelphia, setting up his practice in Princeton in 1774. At the beginning of the Revolution, he and his three brothers enlisted in the Continental army. Commissioned a captain in the Fifth Pennsylvania Battalion in January 1776, Beatty led his troops to New York, where they built fortifications. Promoted to major and commander of the battalion, he and most of his troops were taken prisoner in the debacle at Fort Mifflin on 26 September 1776. After six months aboard one of the horrendous British prison ships at New York City, he spent a year paroled on Long Island, being exchanged in May 1778. Promoted to colonel and named commissary general for prisoners of war, Beatty found himself frustrated by a lack of support at every turn and worked informally with the British to improve the care of POWs. General Washington was outraged by these arrangements and ordered Beatty court-martialed in February 1780. Reprimanded by the court and by Washington, Beatty resigned his position in March and returned to Princeton.

His state had a different opinion of his services, and he was a member of the New Jersey state council from 1781 until the legislature elected him to the Continental Congress in November 1783, where he served until 1785. As a delegate to New Jersey's constitutional ratifying convention, Beatty supported the Constitution. He went on to serve as speaker of the state assembly in 1789–1790, as a member of Congress from 1792 to 1795, and as New Jersey's secretary of state from 1795 to 1805. He died at his home in Trenton on 30 April 1826.

Michael Bellesiles

BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA.

3 February 1779. When Generals Augustine Prevost and Benjamin Lincoln faced each other across the Savannah River at Purysburg, the British commander took advantage of his naval supremacy to direct a turning movement against Beaufort, on Port Royal Island in South Carolina. It lay thirty miles to Lincoln's rear and sixty miles south of Charleston.

Lincoln ordered General William Moultrie to turn out the militia to oppose this threat, and when Major William Gardiner approached with two hundred British troops, Moultrie was waiting at Beaufort with three hundred Charleston militia, twenty Continentals, and three cannon. Moultrie moved his forces out from the town to attack the British, who retreated to the cover of trees.

Beckwith, George

Moultrie ordered his own men into the cover of some other trees and the two sides fired on each other for a little over half an hour. Gardiner was handicapped by having his one cannon disabled early in the fight, but the rebels' ammunition ran out and Moultrie then ordered a withdrawal. When Moultrie realized that the British were also retreating, he ordered pursuit by his few mounted troops. The British escaped by boat to Savannah, and Moultrie moved south to join Lincoln.

American losses were eight killed and twenty-two wounded. British losses are unknown but assumed to have been heavy, given Gardiner's hasty retreat.

This little action discouraged the British from any further operations into South Carolina until the spring of 1779. Then, Prevost moved against Charleston on 11–12 May.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Raid of Prevost; Southern Theater, Military Operations in.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BEAUMARCHAIS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION SEE *French Alliance; French Covert Aid; Hortalez & Cie.*

BEAUSEJOUR, NOVA SCOTIA SEE *Fort Beausejour, Acadia; Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia.*

BECKWITH, GEORGE. (1753–1823). British army officer and colonial governor. George Beckwith was the second of four sons of John Beckwith, an officer in the Twentieth Foot Regiment, all of whom followed him into the army. George became an ensign in the Thirty-seventh Foot on 20 July 1771. He rose to lieutenant on 7 July 1775 and in October embarked for the war in America. He fought with distinction in the New York and New Jersey campaigns in 1776, leading the British advance into Elizabethtown and Brunswick. Promoted to the rank of captain on 4 December 1778, he became aide de camp to Wilhelm Knyphausen. During John André's absence with Sir Henry Clinton's 1780 Charleston expedition, Beckwith took over André's intelligence work, including his exploratory contacts with Benedict Arnold. When André returned, and after his capture and death in October 1780, Beckwith continued to assist with intelligence matters. Early in 1781 Beckwith helped the younger Oliver de Lancey to reorganize the

military service. He took part in Arnold's New London raid and was breveted major for his part in the storm of Fort Griswold on 6 September 1781. However, he continued to work in military intelligence until the end of the war, in this way attracting the attention of Sir Guy Carleton.

After the war Beckwith's regiment was stationed in Nova Scotia, and he became Carleton's aide-de-camp at a time when Britain had no ambassador in the United States. In 1787 Carleton, now Lord Dorchester, appointed Beckwith as his agent charged with supplementing the reports of the consuls, a post he held until 1791. Through Alexander Hamilton, Beckwith learned that many Americans favored conciliation with Britain, and for his services he was breveted lieutenant colonel on 10 November 1790. The Thirty-seventh Regiment had gone home in 1789, but Beckwith stayed on with Dorchester, being breveted colonel in 1795. In 1797 he became governor of Bermuda, moving to St. Vincent in 1804 and to Barbados in 1808. He was promoted to major general in 1798 and lieutenant general in 1805. In 1809 he took Martinique (for which he was knighted) and in 1810 captured Guadeloupe. He returned home in 1814, where he was made a full general and was commander in chief in Ireland from 1816 to 1820. He died in London on 20 March 1823.

SEE ALSO *André, John; Carleton, Guy; New London Raid, Connecticut.*

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BEDFORD, GUNNING. (1742–1797). Continental officer, governor of Delaware. Often confused with his cousin (see next article), he was a deputy quartermaster general, became lieutenant colonel of the Delaware Continentals, and was muster master general in 1776–1777. Wounded at the Battle of White Plains, he turned down higher command but continued to serve until 1781; he then returned to Delaware and entered politics, holding many offices. Elected governor in 1795, he died in office in September 1797.

SEE ALSO *Delaware Continentals; White Plains, New York.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BEDFORD, GUNNING. (1747–1812). Revolutionary statesman. Delaware. Calling himself Gunning Bedford Jr., perhaps to avoid being confused with his cousin (see preceding article), he was born in Philadelphia, was a classmate of James Madison at Princeton, studied law under Joseph Reed, and was admitted to the bar in 1774. He settled in Wilmington in 1783, becoming attorney general of Delaware the following year and holding that office until 1789. He was a delegate to Congress from 1783 to 1786, though he attended few sessions. In 1787 he attended the Constitutional Convention, signed the Constitution, and worked for its ratification at the Delaware convention in December. In 1789 Washington appointed him a judge for the Delaware district, an office he held until his death, 30 March 1812.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BEDFORD–FAIR HAVEN RAID, MASSACHUSETTS. 5–6 September 1778. Sir Henry Clinton's relief force—some five thousand troops on board seventy vessels—reached Newport on 1 September, but found that the Americans had escaped thirty-six hours earlier. The British sailed on to Boston, but saw no possibility of attacking the French fleet there. Clinton then headed back for New York, but detached Major General Charles ('No-flint') Grey to raid the Massachusetts coast. After capturing Fort Phoenix at the mouth of the Acushnet River, in a space of about eighteen hours Grey destroyed property in Bedford and Fair Haven. His men burned between seventy and a hundred vessels (including privateers and their prizes), almost forty warehouses, and many important naval supplies. The raiders then sailed on to Martha's Vineyard.

SEE ALSO *Martha's Vineyard Raid; Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778).*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

BELCHER, JONATHAN. (1682–1757). Merchant, colonial governor of Massachusetts and New Jersey. Born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on 8 January 1682, Jonathan Belcher was raised in a prosperous family

that had important political and commercial connections. Graduating from Harvard in 1699, Belcher traveled in Europe before becoming a wealthy merchant in Boston. In 1705 he married Mary Partridge, daughter of New Hampshire Lieutenant Governor William Partridge.

After being elected to the Massachusetts Council eight times during the twelve years from 1718 to 1729, Belcher happened to be in England when Governor William Burnet died, and he was able to secure the governorship of Massachusetts and New Hampshire for himself. On 10 August 1730 he landed in Boston to take up his commission. His position was one that called for real genius, which Belcher lacked. He tried to walk the fence between royal and colonial interests, but repeatedly found himself embroiled in controversy. Among the conflicts that troubled his time in office was the Broad Arrow policy, which brought him into conflict with royal authority; the Land Bank, in which he supported his friends and family, who opposed the popular scheme; and the boundary dispute between Massachusetts and New Hampshire, in which he was accused of accepting a bribe. On 7 May 1741 the Board of Trade dismissed Belcher as governor of both provinces.

In 1744 Belcher went to England to argue his case, meeting with the Board of Trade, members of Parliament, and King George II. In 1747, perhaps just to get rid of him, the Crown appointed Belcher governor of New Jersey. He reached his new post in August 1747 and had a relatively tranquil tenure until his death on 31 August 1757, in Elizabethtown, New Jersey. He took a great interest in the founding of the College of New Jersey (Princeton) and left the college his library.

SEE ALSO *Broad Arrow.*

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BELKNAP, JEREMY. (1744–1798). Congregational clergyman and historian. Author of the three-volume *History of New Hampshire*, which was published from 1784 through 1792. Jeremy Belknap had the advantage of firsthand knowledge of many events and personalities of the Revolution through his ministry in Dover, New Hampshire, from 1767 to 1786. He wrote that the Boston Port Bill gave sufficient cause for military action against the British. The Committee of Safety in 1775 appointed him military chaplain, but he declined owing to poor

health. He later appealed to former military leaders John Sullivan and Josiah Bartlett for financial aid to publish his historical volumes. His work shows thorough research and considerable literary skill. Belknap had a leading part in establishment of the Massachusetts Historical Society in 1791.

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revised by Frank C. Mevers

BEMIS HEIGHTS, NEW YORK. The bluff on the west side of the Hudson River, three miles north of the village of Stillwater, was named for Jotham Bemis, a local farmer and tavern keeper. The American Northern Army under Horatio Gates created field fortifications on its broad, thickly wooded plateau to block the advance of John Burgoyne's army. As Richard M. Ketchum notes, from the top of the bluff the Americans had "an unobstructed view for miles in almost every direction. Below it, the bottomland, cleared of trees, narrowed down into a defile no more than five or six hundred feet wide between the string of bluffs and the Hudson. Through this defile passed the only road to Albany on the west bank of the river" (*Saratoga*, pp. 337–348). The name of the bluff was attached to the second battle of Saratoga (9 October 1777), Burgoyne's failed final attempt to break through the barrier.

SEE ALSO *Saratoga, Second Battle of*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

BENNINGTON FLAG SEE *Flag, American*.

BENNINGTON RAID. 6–16 August 1777. When Burgoyne's forces reached Fort Edward and Fort George on 29 July, two British weaknesses were already

apparent. The most obvious problem was logistical—it would be impossible to sustain the offensive with just the supplies that came from Canadian bases. Lines of communications were already 185 miles long and would grow as the army marched south. And, as they kept discovering without ever learning the lesson, the popular support promised by Loyalist leaders in exile did not materialize.

German General Baron Friedrich Riedesel proposed on 22 July that an expedition be sent by way of Castleton and Clarendon into the Connecticut Valley, where horses were reported to be available. Although other foraging was important, Burgoyne needed mounts for the 250 Brunswick dragoons then serving on foot and (more importantly) draft horses and oxen to help haul the wagons and artillery overland, since boats could no longer be used. On 31 July, Burgoyne gave Riedesel preliminary instructions to plan the raid, but in fact he ordered a much more ambitious expedition. Burgoyne's concept of the operation was based on the erroneous belief that Seth Warner had fallen back from Manchester to Bennington. He wanted the raid to push further south so that it would end closer to the main body as it moved toward Albany. The easy capture of Ticonderoga left Burgoyne confident in his regulars' invincibility. Riedesel, who had personally experienced the tough fighting at Hubbardton, was more cautious but was overruled.

Final instructions came on 10 August, when Riedesel briefed Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum on the mission—proceed to Bennington, destroy the American magazine there, and collect horses and oxen. The move would also rally Loyalists and produce recruits to fill Lieutenant Colonel John Peters's Queen's Loyal Rangers. Because Baum spoke neither English nor French, several bilingual British officers accompanied the expedition as translators. The expedition was to start from the Hudson opposite Saratoga (the mouth of Batten Kill), move east to Arlington, follow the Batten Kill upstream to Manchester, and cross the mountains to Rockingham on the Connecticut River. After remaining there "as long as necessary," the foragers were to descend the river to Brattleboro and march west to Albany. Burgoyne expected the operation to take about two weeks.

Baum was field commander of Brunswick's Dragoon Regiment Prinz Ludwig. (Riedesel himself was its colonel, while the honorary chief was Prinz Ludwig Ernst of Braunschweig.) The regiment's four troops formed the nucleus of the expedition. Total strength assigned to the task force was about 800, of whom 374 were Germans (all Brunswickers except for about 30 Hesse Hanau artillerymen). The German strength can be further broken down as follows: 170 rank and file from the dragoons (70 were left behind); 100 infantrymen, most of them elite jägers or Breyman's grenadiers; and the gunners with two three-pounders. The only British regulars were Captain Alexander Fraser's company of about 50 marksmen.

Loyalists, Canadians, and Indians—about 100 of each—completed the force. Flaws in Burgoyne’s planning included the language barrier (and the related inability to “read” a situation by noticing subtle cultural points), overconfidence, and the use of the slow-moving dismounted dragoons and grenadiers on an operation that should have valued speed.

AMERICAN DISPOSITIONS

The fall of Ticonderoga and the Jane McCrea atrocity became sources for propaganda that aroused New England and New York. Furthermore, for nearly a century the people of southern New England had understood that their safety could best be insured by stopping attacks from Canada well to the north of Albany, especially since an invasion like Burgoyne’s could either go south along the Hudson or turn east to the Connecticut Valley. So they mobilized in strength.

New Hampshire turned to John Stark to lead its contingent. He was available, having angrily resigned his Continental commission in March and accepted a state brigadier general appointment (17 July) on the provision that his command remain independent of orders from Congress. Stark took only a week to raise about fifteen hundred men, and by the 30th he had started moving toward Manchester. Seth Warner’s Vermonters, in accordance with their last order at Hubbardton, “Scatter and meet me at Manchester,” were already there. Also on hand was Continental Major General Benjamin Lincoln, sparking a new crisis.

STARK’S INSUBORDINATION

Lincoln was sent to command the American forces being raised by New England in this region, and he had orders from General Philip Schuyler to have Stark’s brigade join the main body on the Hudson. Stark, who had resigned in part because Lincoln’s appointment came at the expense of his own seniority, objected. Lincoln handled the problem with remarkable skill. If Stark could not be commanded as a subordinate, some use might still be made of him and his independent brigade by treating him as an ally. Finding that Stark wished to cut in on Burgoyne’s left rear, Lincoln agreed to this plan and persuaded Schuyler to go along.

BAUM’S APPROACH

Fraser’s Advance Corps had moved eight miles from Fort Edward to Fort Miller on 9 August to give Baum a more advanced jumping-off point. On 11 August, Baum advanced from Fort Miller to the mouth of the Batten Kill, a march of only four miles. He wasted the 12th, but on the 13th pushed fifteen miles southeast to camp at New Cambridge. He also suffered his first casualty when a Loyalist was wounded in a small skirmish. On this same day Burgoyne started crossing the Hudson with his main body and headed for the battlefields of Saratoga.


When Stark learned that Indians were in Cambridge, he sent two hundred men from Bennington, about eighteen road miles away, to check them. By evening Stark had learned that enemy regulars were approaching in strength behind the Indians, and he prepared to move with his brigade the next morning, the 14th. Simultaneously, he sent Warner word to move immediately from Manchester to Bennington, a distance of about twenty miles. The local militia also mobilized. Baum’s own scouts learned that Bennington was occupied by eighteen hundred militia, not four hundred, and he sent word back to Burgoyne, along with a promise to advance cautiously.

THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON

Baum resumed his march about dawn on the 14th and after about two hours reached a mill known as Sancoick’s (at what was later North Hoosick), where the Little White Creek flows into the Walloomsac River. Colonel William Gregg, at the head of Stark’s two-hundred-man advance party, had spent the night there. As Baum approached, the men fired one volley and fell back. After detailing a small guard of Loyalists to guard the mill and its supplies and repairing a damaged bridge, Baum pushed on several more miles, following the course of the Walloomsac. About four miles from Bennington he found Stark waiting with his brigade. Stark had occupied commanding high ground overlooking the river; Baum could not maneuver around that blocking position, so he took up a defensive posture and sent another messenger back to Burgoyne requesting reinforcements. The rest of the 14th saw minor skirmishing between patrols. While no Germans fell, the Canadians, Loyalists, and Indians started losing men, and their morale began to drop.

Before darkness fell on the 14th, Baum committed three crucial errors. First, by asking for reinforcements to reach Bennington, he used wording that Burgoyne reasonably interpreted as good news (see below). Second, although he knew that he was outnumbered by more than two to one and was 25 miles from friendly forces, Baum did not withdraw. Finally, the way he occupied the ground invited defeat in detail. Because he still assumed that he would keep moving along the road towards Bennington, he placed 150 men (mostly Loyalists) on the American side of the river to protect a bridge. They erected a hasty breastwork later referred to as the Tory Redoubt on a small rise about 250 yards southeast of the crossing. Other men occupied cabins on both sides of the river, while the west side of the bridge was covered by 50 German infantrymen, about 25 British marksmen, and one three-pounder in hasty entrenchments.

Baum’s main position was on the hill overlooking the river crossing from further back on the west bank. In what became known as the Dragoon Redoubt were the dragoons, the other half of Captain Fraser’s British marksmen, and the second three-pounder; the two hundred rank and file at this



THE GALE GROUP.

position represented Baum's largest cohesive unit. Three other posts supported the two redoubts. To keep the Americans from infiltrating through an area on the right bank, which could not be seen from the Dagoon Redoubt, fifty jägers set up a strongpoint. A fifth position was located back along the road to Sancoick's Mill, about one thousand yards from the vital river crossing; here, fifty German infantrymen and some Tories were deployed in a field with the mission of guarding to the rear. The Indians were grouped on a plateau northwest of the dragoons.

REINFORCEMENTS

Burgoyne was awakened before dawn of the 15th with Baum's request for reinforcements. He saw nothing alarming in this and dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Christoph Breymann with most of the rest of the Brunswick Advance Corps, probably about 650 officers and men. This included another contingent of Breymann's grenadier battalion, most of Major Ferdinand Albrecht Bärner's Chasseur Battalion, and another detachment of the Hesse-Hanau Artillery Company under Lieutenant Spangenburg with two English six-pounders. They covered about half the distance to Baum that day and stopped for the night in the woods.

Warner had gotten Stark's request for reinforcement on the 14th, but a considerable number of his men were off on

patrol, and he did not start for Bennington until the morning of the 15th. He had 350 men; although their speed was considerably better than Breymann's, and the distance about the same, they also were slowed by the rain. Warner joined Stark the evening of the 15th, and around midnight his troops camped about six miles (two hours' march) behind him. Other militia from Berkshire County, Massachusetts, followed. Neither side's reinforcements arrived in time to take part in the first phase of the battle of 16 August.

BAUM'S DEFEAT

The same rain that slowed the advance of the reinforcements also kept Stark from attacking on Friday, 15 August, since it would have neutralized his one tactical asset, musketry. But American reconnaissance patrols probed every part of Baum's perimeter and came back with accurate knowledge of his positions. They also picked off about thirty men, including two Indian leaders.

By daybreak on the 16th, Stark realized he now held a three to one advantage and decided to attack. Dividing his force into three columns, one to fix the center and the others to execute a double envelopment, he started forward about noon. Colonel Benjamin Nichols led two hundred men in the right arm of the pincers, marching four miles along the wooded high ground and taking up a position to hit the Dagoon Redoubt from the north. The

other enveloping force, three hundred strong under Colonel Samuel Herrick, forded the Walloomsac, swung south around the bridgehead by masking themselves behind a ridgeline, and then crossed back over to come up on Baum from the west. The third column advanced down the road using two hundred men to double envelop the Tory Redoubt (with Colonel David Hobart on the left and Colonel Thomas Stickney on the right). Another one hundred demonstrated against Baum's front.

Baum had been sending out small mounted patrols during the morning, and when the rain stopped around noon he could see parties of Americans leave Stark's bivouac from his exceptionally fine observation post in the Dragoon Redoubt. Tradition says that he had drawn the unfortunate conclusion that they were retreating, and that when small bodies of armed men later approached, he mistook them for Tories seeking protection. Surviving German sources do not support that assumption. What is certain is that somewhere around 1 P.M., portions of Baum's perimeter started taking heavy firing. The Indians and some of the Canadians and Loyalists broke and started to flee. One of the cannon fell silent as American snipers eliminated its crew. About 3 P.M. the fighting became general. Nichols and Herrick overran the main position from the north and west, while Hobart's and Stickney's men, having disposed of the Tory Redoubt, came in from the south and east. Stark moved out of the bivouac area with another twelve hundred or thirteen hundred troops to make the main effort down the Bennington Road. At this time or somewhat earlier he shouted to his men, "We'll beat them before night, or Molly Stark will be a widow." Baum's own redoubt held out until about 5 P.M., when ammunition started running out and he fell mortally wounded. Without his leadership, resistance collapsed. Those survivors who could escape started racing west for the safety of the relief column.

BREYMANN'S DEFEAT

The slow-moving German relief column had not started moving (due to the rain) until 9 A.M., and when it reached Sancoick's Mill about 4 in the afternoon, it found refugees from Baum's command, who gave widely disparate accounts of the situation. Although the Dragoon Redoubt was only four miles on a beeline from the mill, Breymann later reported that he heard no sound of firing; this was apparently a case of "acoustic shadow." The tired Germans resumed their march from the mill on the assumption that Baum was still holding out, and their flank patrols on the high ground left of the road drove off the small militia bands that attempted to stop their progress.

Stark's command was in a poor situation to meet this new threat: his men had scattered to chase fugitives or guard prisoners. But Warner's column (about three hundred men) took up pursuit as it came onto the battlefield

and made contact with Breymann about a mile beyond the ford, near the village later known as Walloomsac. He fell back at contact in order to occupy a better position on high ground. One of the Germans later talked of the opening of this phase of the fight as being a situation in which the relief column "ran into the fire at full speed." The Americans quickly realized that they outnumbered Breymann by four or five to one and began trying to work around his flanks and rear.

Although they might be called "fresh troops" in the sense that they had not yet done any serious fighting, the reinforcements of Breymann and Warner had experienced an exhausting march in oppressively hot, muggy weather. They nevertheless engaged with vigor, and Breymann actually advanced almost a mile. But then the tide turned as he started running low on ammunition and casualties started mounting. About sunset Breymann started a fighting withdrawal. He had to abandon both of his artillery pieces when all the horses fell but did bring off a large number of his wounded.


Wounded in the leg and with five bullet holes in his clothes, Breymann personally commanded the rear guard action that permitted two-thirds of his command to escape after dark. The ubiquitous Philip Skene also conducted himself bravely in this action. Stark wisely ordered his men to break contact and not attempt a pursuit after dark, when it would have been impossible to maintain any control and Americans would have been shooting each other.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Historians disagree on the American casualties in this running engagement, generally citing somewhere between 40 and 70 killed and wounded. The most reliable numbers, however, are the ones contained in Stark's official after-action report: 14 killed and 42 wounded. The raiders left 207 dead on the field, and about 700 prisoners (including 32 officers and staff) were taken. The dragoons bore the brunt of the fighting, but the Loyalists also paid a heavy price; the Indians had taken off early in the action and it appears that most of the British marksmen got away as well. Stark captured all four of the Germans' cannon plus a large array of other weapons and equipment.

SIGNIFICANCE

Tradition tends to magnify the remarkable American victory at Bennington. Clearly, the mission assigned by Burgoyne was too optimistic, and the composition of the task force in retrospect seems flawed. But it is a bit misleading to condemn Burgoyne and his subordinates for underestimating the size of the American forces massing at Bennington, since that judgment assumes that invading armies of that era had greater ability than they actually did to carry out effective military intelligence operations. Both columns of Germans



Bennington Battle Flag. *This American Revolutionary flag was reputedly flown at the Battle of Bennington on 16 August 1777.* THE GRANGER COLLECTION, NEW YORK.

fought quite well—they just erred in standing and fighting while they still had a chance to withdraw. The problem with criticism of that error is that had they known to do so, Burgoyne would have had to know that his own mission was impossible and that he should have begun retreating to Ticonderoga. The other traditional charge leveled against the German commanders is that Baum and Breymann failed to adapt their military thinking to the new military problem of fighting American irregulars. For example, historians often charge that Breymann did not really have to stop his column and dress ranks every fifteen minutes during their approach march. Unfortunately, given the nature of the Brunswick tables of organization, such a system preserved the order needed to be effective on the battlefield—it was a tactical decision that actually made great sense.

On the American side, most attention normally falls on Stark and Warner, both of whom tend to be identified as militia leaders. Actually, both were Continentals (Stark merely spending a few months in the militia out of the entire war) who happened to be charismatic leaders. Historians conditioned by Emory Upton's negative views of militia forces, views that influenced interpretations after the Civil War, have charged that Stark's plan of attack violated many principles of war and that he was lucky in finding an opponent who blundered more. Actually, he took advantage of his numbers and the terrain and (like Morgan at Cowpens) plotted tactics tailored to the abilities and personalities of his men. Congress recognized these

features when, on 7 October, it appointed him as a brigadier general as a reward for this victory. Lincoln earned a solid reputation as a general who could successfully work with militia based in large part on his handling of Stark, and that reputation would lead to his later appointment as commander of the Southern Department.

Bennington was a great boost to American morale at a time when one was needed, and it encouraged further militia mobilizations. On a more practical level, the losses significantly weakened Burgoyne's combatant strength in pure numbers, and qualitatively they did even more damage by stripping away the best of his German units. Coupled with the failure of St. Leger's expedition, Bennington helped set the stage for Saratoga.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne's Offensive; Hubbardton, Vermont; Lincoln, Benjamin; McCrea Atrocity; Rank and File; Riedesel, Baron Friedrich Adolphus; Schuyler, Philip John; Skene, Philip; St. Leger's Expedition; Stark, John; Warner, Seth.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

BERKELEY, NORBORNE. (1717?–1770).

Royal governor of Virginia. Born in England, perhaps in 1717, Norborne Berkeley (who claimed the title of Baron de Botetourt) was a member of Parliament who requested a lucrative appointment from the Crown in order to make good his gambling debts. In 1768 he was appointed governor of Virginia. His tenure was notable for its ceremonial aspects. Determined to impress the colonists into submission, Botetourt arrived to take up his post in resplendent costume, borne in a magnificent coach pulled by a team of cream-white Hanoverian horses. When the House of Burgesses condemned Parliament's tax policies, Botetourt dissolved the assembly. The assembly responded by meeting in a tavern the next day and resolving to boycott English goods. At the election for a new assembly, Botetourt was frustrated to find that only those who supported him had failed to be re-elected. Switching to a policy of appeasement, Botetourt called on the colonial secretary, Willis Hill, the first lord of Hillsborough, to allow the colonies to tax themselves for Britain's benefit. He received the colonial secretary's promise that this would be permitted, but soon learned that Lord Hillsborough was lying to him. Outraged, Botetourt requested his own recall. Before he could be relieved of duty, Botetourt died in Williamsburg, Virginia, on 15 October 1770.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BERM. Coming from a word meaning "brim," this was a term in fortification for the ledge between the ditch and the base of the parapet. If the defender had time he would fraise it.

SEE ALSO *Fort Mercer, New Jersey; Fraise.*

Mark M. Boatner

BERMUDA. A group of 20 inhabited islands totaling 21 square miles of land, Bermuda lies in the North Atlantic, midway between Nova Scotia and the West Indies, about 580 miles east of the North Carolina coast. Because Bermudans had little land on which to raise food, they were heavily dependent on provisions shipped from the North American colonies. They were particularly anxious when the Continental Congress enacted a program of nonexportation, to begin on 10 September 1775. A delegation of Bermudans arrived at Philadelphia in early July to see if a deal could be worked out. Recognizing that they could not openly defy the imperial government, the Bermudans were willing to curtail their trade in return for continued access to North American provisions. Recognizing, too, that many islanders sympathized with the mainlanders' struggle (only an estimated one-third of Bermudans were actively loyal to the crown), the delegation agreed in mid-July to allow the covert exportation of their local stock of gunpowder in return for food. The Bermudans returned home and, on 14 August, a group of islanders seized 112 barrels of gunpowder from the royal arsenal near St. George, on the main island. The gunpowder made its way to Philadelphia and Charleston, and in the autumn Congress approved the exportation of specified amounts of provisions.

Royal Governor James Bruere urgently asked for protection, and several detachments of troops were sent, but given the demands for manpower elsewhere, Bermuda was garrisoned in strength only from 1778, with companies of the Fifth-fifth Regiment of Foot and the Royal Garrison Battalion, a Loyalist unit. Bermuda served as a base for the Royal Navy and for Loyalist privateers, but the islands' continued economic dependence on the mainland nearly led to sanctions on the mercantile community.

SEE ALSO *West Indies in the Revolution.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

BERNARD, SIR FRANCIS. (1712–1779).

Royal governor of New Jersey and Massachusetts. Born in Brightwell, England, on July 1712, Bernard studied law

and was admitted to the bar in 1737. His good friend, Viscount Barrington secured him an appointment as governor of New Jersey in 1758. Accounted a great success as governor, he was promoted in 1760 to governor of Massachusetts, which proved a less happy posting. His first error was to appoint Thomas Hutchinson, who was not a lawyer, to the office of chief justice in preference to James Otis. The Stamp Act crisis brought him into conflict with the province he governed, while the refusal of the colonial assembly to revoke its circular letter calling on the other colonies to join in resistance to the Townshend duties led to his dissolving the assembly and calling for British troops to restore order. After a number of his letters to the Colonial Secretary Lord Hillsborough containing unflattering characterizations of the people of Massachusetts were published by the *Boston Gazette* in April 1769, Bernard's legitimacy plummeted to the point that his own council called for his removal from office. The Crown agreed with the council's action, and on 1 August 1769, Bernard left Boston amid cheers from the crowd. The government consoled Bernard by making him a baronet. He died in Aylesbury on 16 June 1779.

SEE ALSO *Stamp Act; Townshend Acts.*

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BERTHIER, LOUIS ALEXANDRE. (1753–1815). French lieutenant in America, later marshal of France and chief of staff (actually used more as an adjutant general) to Napoleon. From childhood he worked with his father as a topographical engineer at French army headquarters. He served successively as a lieutenant (1770), as a captain in the Flanders Legion, then dragoons of Lorraine (1777). Attached to the Soissonais regiment, he arrived in Rhode Island in 1780, became a *sous-aide maréchal des logis*, and assisted in the siege of Yorktown. Upon his return to France he was attached to the general staff. He was later appointed adjutant general with the rank of colonel (1787). In the first days of the French Revolution, he was second in command of the Versailles National Guard and protected the royal family in the October days. He was suspended from his functions in 1792 but fought in the Vendée in 1793 and became general of division (1795); head of the general staff of the Army of the Alps, where he began his long association with Napoleon (1795); commanding general of that army (1798); minister of war

(1799); general of the reserve army (1800); minister of war again (1800); marshal of the empire and later vice constable of France (1804); and major general of the Grand Army (1814). He is remembered in American history for his journal and maps of the American campaign.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

BIDDLE, CLEMENT. (1740–1814). Continental officer. Born in Philadelphia on 10 May 1740, Biddle entered his father's successful business as a young man and remained a merchant for his entire life except during the Revolution. In 1764 he organized a militia company to protect friendly Indians from the Paxton Boys. The following year he played a key role in promoting the nonimportation agreement, becoming a leader of the Patriot cause. He helped create the volunteer militia companies known as the Quaker Blues at the beginning of the Revolution. Congress appointed him lieutenant colonel of the volunteer Flying Camp on 8 July 1776. In November he became aide-de-camp to General Nathanael Greene, seeing action at several battles from Trenton—where he received the German officers' swords—to Monmouth. Congress appointed Biddle commissary general of forage in July 1777, a position he held until June 1780. During this period, Biddle and Greene entered into a business partnership that continued for many years after the war. Biddle resigned from the Continental army in October 1780. In November he was named marshal of the court of admiralty by the Pennsylvania Executive Council. In his new post, Biddle was responsible for selling captured enemy property. He was also named quartermaster and colonel of the Pennsylvania militia on 11 September 1781, holding that position until the war's end. Except for occasional duty as a judge on the court of common pleas and as U.S. marshal for Pennsylvania from 1789 to 1793, Biddle devoted the rest of his life to business. He died in Philadelphia on 14 July 1814.

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Michael Bellesiles

BIDDLE, NICHOLAS. (1750–1778). Continental naval officer. Pennsylvania. Born in Philadelphia on 10 September 1750, Nicholas Biddle went to sea at the age of 13, was shipwrecked on one voyage, and joined the Royal Navy in 1770. Failing to get an assignment aboard a ship bound for polar exploration in 1773, Biddle gave up his naval commission and joined the expedition as a common seaman. On the subsequent exploration of the Arctic he made the acquaintance of Horatio Nelson, who also had sacrificed rank in the navy for this adventure.

Returning to America after this voyage, Biddle took the Patriot side and volunteered for duty. On 1 August 1775 he took charge of the Pennsylvania galley *Franklin* in the Delaware River defenses, but in December he became one of the first four captains of the Continental navy. Commanding the 14-gun *Andrea Doria*, which had a crew of 130, he took part in the naval operations led by Esek Hopkins in early 1776 that captured Forts Montague and Nassau in the Bahamas. After this, Biddle cruised in the North Atlantic, taking many supply ships whose cargoes were sent to General George Washington during the siege of Boston. In addition, he captured two armed transports carrying 400 Highlanders to Boston. He returned to Philadelphia with only five of his original crewmen, all the rest having been detached to man the captured ships. He replaced his original crew with volunteers taken from among his prisoners. Rewarded with command of the recently launched, 32-gun *Randolph*, Biddle was sent to the West Indies. There his prizes included the 20-gun *True Briton* and its convoy of three merchantmen, which he took into Charleston. He was held in that port for a time by the British blockade, but in February 1778 he sailed out with four small warships that had been fitted out by South Carolina and attached to him for operations.

Sighting a sail at 3 P.M. on 7 March 1778, Biddle made for it. Unfortunately it turned out to be the 64-gun British vessel, the *Yarmouth*, which destroyed the *Randolph* after a fierce twenty-minute action at close quarters. Biddle was wounded and so directed the battle from a chair on the quarterdeck. The *Randolph* blew up, and all but four of its 315 officers and men were lost.

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege; Naval Operations, Strategic Overview.*

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BILLETING ACTS **SEE** *Quartering Acts.*

BILLINGSPOORT, NEW JERSEY. 30 September–1 October 1777. In 1776 the Continental Congress and the government of Pennsylvania selected Billingsport for the outermost belt of Philadelphia's Delaware River defenses. They emplaced a double line of chevaux-de-frise twelve miles below Cooper's Ferry (later Camden, New Jersey), protected by a large redoubt on the Gloucester County, New Jersey, side of the river. Thaddeus Kosciuszko had made the original plans, but Congress expanded on them in the early summer of 1777 on the advice of Major General Philippe Tronson du Coudray. Before construction could be finished, Washington reviewed the river defenses and decided to make Fort Mifflin, upstream, the focal point, leaving Billingsport to be manned by the New Jersey militia. On 26 September the British captured Philadelphia from the land side and turned their attention to clearing the Delaware River so that the city could be supplied; three days later Sir William Howe sent Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Stirling at the head of a task force (the Tenth and Forty-second Foot) to start the process. Stirling crossed from Chester to Raccoon Creek (later Swedesboro) on the New Jersey side and then swung north to attack the redoubt. Faced with a major attack supported by the Royal Navy, Colonel William Bradford's garrison of four hundred New Jersey and Pennsylvania militia spiked its guns and withdrew. On 1 October the British occupied the position and covered Captain Andrew Snape Hamond's naval element, which cut through the chevaux-de-frise.

SEE ALSO *Howe, William; Kosciuszko, Thaddeus Andrzej Bonawentura; Philadelphia Campaign.*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

BILLY (WILL THE TRAITOR). Slave and possible rebel. As is generally the case with American slaves, little is known of the life of Billy, also known as Will or William, except for a brief moment when he entered the

historical record on a charge of treason. Colonel John Tayloe of Richmond County, Virginia, claimed Billy as his property. On 2 April 1781, Billy, anxious to escape service to Tayloe, and several other slaves were arrested for planning to capture an armed ship in order to “wage war” on the state of Virginia. Billy’s actual plans are unknown, but they may have involved sailing to join the British in hopes of attaining freedom. At his trial he argued that he had been forced against his will onto the ship, and no evidence was produced at the trial to indicate that he had gone willingly. The court of Prince William County, however, rejected his defense and condemned him to death on 8 May. Justices Henry Lee and William Carr dissented from this three to two decision, pointing out that since Billy enjoyed none of the rights of citizenship, and thus did not owe allegiance to Virginia, he could not be guilty of treason. In May 1781 Governor Thomas Jefferson accepted the dissenting judges’ reasoning and granted a temporary reprieve, but he refused to make a final determination and asked the legislature to decide Billy’s fate. A joint resolution of Virginia’s house and senate on 14 June 1781 reprieved Billy from death and returned him to slavery. Nothing more is known of him.

Michael Bellesisles

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. The history of warfare provides many examples of commanders who deliberately attempted to spread infectious disease in the camps of their enemies. The sophistication and effectiveness of the biological component of warfare has ranged from the relatively simple act of polluting water sources with the carcasses of dead animals and humans to the malicious distribution of smallpox-laden clothing into a susceptible population. Because it can be spread only through human-to-human contact and produces a horrifying set of symptoms with a high mortality rate, smallpox has the potential to be both manipulated by humans and highly destructive when introduced. Long before modern science was able to explain why smallpox spread so quickly and proved so deadly, humans knew enough about the disease to be able both to protect themselves and to facilitate its spread. Early in the eighteenth century, colonial Americans became aware of the practice of inoculation, a procedure whereby a small amount of infectious agent was deliberately introduced under the skin, producing a case of the disease that, for reasons that still cannot be fully explained, was significantly less deadly than if the individual had been infected via person-to-person contact. While it cannot be conclusively proven that outbreaks of smallpox during wartime in eighteenth-century North America were caused by human agency—the infection could have traveled via trade routes

and contacts that were a regular and normal part of the environment—it is possible to demonstrate that humans did intentionally want to spread smallpox among their enemies during this time.

THE CASE OF AMHERST

The best documented case of intent occurred during Pontiac’s War, when Major General Sir Jeffery Amherst, the British commander in chief in North America, wrote to Colonel Henry Bouquet on 7 July 1763 to ask: “Could it not be contrived to Send the *Small Pox* among those Disaffected Tribes of Indians [then laying siege to Fort Pitt]? We must, on this occasion, Use Every Stratagem in our power to Reduce them.” Bouquet agreed with Amherst’s suggestion in his reply of 13 July: “I will try to inoculate [sic] the Indians by means of [smallpox-infected] Blankets that may fall in their hands, taking care however not to get the disease myself.” Neither senior officer knew that Captain Simon Ecuver, the commander of Fort Pitt, and William Trent, a trader and land speculator then resident at the fort, had already put in motion the very plan that Amherst proposed. Elizabeth A. Fenn has written, “The eruption of epidemic smallpox in the Ohio country coincided closely with the distribution of infected articles by individuals at Fort Pitt. While blame for this outbreak cannot be placed squarely in the British camp, the circumstantial evidence is nevertheless suggestive” (*Biological Warfare*, p. 6).

WASHINGTON AND INOCULATION

Whether or not the British were guilty of spreading smallpox in 1763, senior American commanders were alive to the reality that American-born soldiers, living their lives in a disease environment where encounters with smallpox were episodic and deadly, were at significantly greater risk of falling prey to the disease than were their European-born opponents, who—besides having more exposure to the disease—were also regularly inoculated when recruited into military service. George Washington, who had survived his own encounter with smallpox on a voyage to Barbados in 1751, wrestled with the problem from the moment he arrived at Cambridge, Massachusetts, on 2 July 1775 to take command of the New England army besieging Boston. Rumors were rampant that Major General Thomas Gage, the British commander in chief in Boston, was trying to promote outbreaks of the disease in the American camps. Washington instituted measures to try to quarantine the disease but worried that, given the state of indiscipline in the army, his orders might not be followed. He considered inoculating the troops, but shrank from it because the army’s medical facilities were still too primitive to manage the procedure effectively and because it would put too many men out of combat for too long in the face of an active and opportunistic enemy. He made sure that the first American

troops entering Boston on 17 March 1776, after the British evacuation, were survivors of smallpox and thus had immunity against the disease.

The impact smallpox could have on an army was demonstrated vividly by the way it destroyed the American invasion of Canada in 1775–1776. American forces arrived outside the walls of Quebec in November 1775 and managed loosely to besiege the city over the ensuing winter and even to mount an unsuccessful assault on New Year’s Eve, despite being at the end of a tenuous supply line that stretched all the way back to Albany, New York. But when smallpox broke out among the troops in the spring—deliberately introduced, it was rumored, by Major General Sir Guy Carleton, the British commander in Canada—American morale crumbled. Abandoning dead and dying comrades along the roadside, the survivors fled up the St. Lawrence and then south toward Lake Champlain. Major General John Thomas, himself a medical doctor, eventually authorized inoculation, but it was too late; Thomas himself succumbed to smallpox at Fort Chambly on 2 June 1776.

Washington still vacillated about inoculating the army. In a letter to Horatio Gates of 5 February 1777 he admitted, “I am much at a loss what Step to take to prevent the spreading of the smallpox; should We Inoculate generally, the Enemy, knowing it, will certainly take advantage of our situation.” Literally overnight, he came to a decision. In the postscript he added the next morning, he told Gates: “Since writing the above, I have come to the Resoluto. of Inoculatg the Troops, and have given Orders to that purpose as well at Philada [Philadelphia] as here [Morristown, New Jersey]. This is the only effectual Method of putting a Period to the Disorder.” Inoculation became standard practice in the army for the remainder of the war. It was one of Washington’s most important decisions.

THE BRITISH AND SMALLPOX

Smallpox was epidemic across the North American continent from 1775 through 1782, so it is impossible to prove that the British deliberately used smallpox as a weapon. That some British senior officers saw smallpox as an added way to injure the rebels is beyond dispute, however. During the campaign in Virginia in 1781, thousands of African American slaves liberated themselves by joining the tail of the various British expeditions that crisscrossed the state that summer. African Americans were as likely to contract smallpox as any Americans, and soon the freedmen and freedwomen were being ravaged by disease. The British in truth did not have the resources to help them, but instead of trying, senior commanders turned them out, knowing full well that they might carry smallpox back to the rebels. From Portsmouth on 13 July, Major General Alexander Leslie told Charles Earl Cornwallis that “Above 700 Negroes are come down the

River in the Small Pox; I shall distribute them about the Rebell Plantations.” Cornwallis himself, as he sat his army down at Yorktown to await the relief that never came, expelled perhaps several thousand former slaves. American soldiers, at least, thought he did so to spread smallpox in the besieging army. According to the memoirs of Joseph Plumb Martin, “During the siege, we saw in the woods herds of Negroes which Lord Cornwallis (after he had inveigled them from their proprietors), in love and pity to them, had turned adrift, with no other recompense for their confidence in his humanity than the smallpox for their bounty and starvation and death for their wages.”

SMALLPOX’S IMPACT

While smallpox did influence the outcome of some campaigns, most notably the invasion of Canada in 1775–1776, it did not determine the outcome of the war. What it did do was increase human suffering, not just among the soldiers and camp followers, but in the communities to which the passage of armies and the return of veterans communicated the disease. Specific evidence is lacking, but it all probability smallpox killed more people during the war than died as a result of direct military action.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

BIRD, HENRY SEE *Kentucky Raid of Bird*.

BIRON, ARMAND LOUIS DE GONTAUT, DUC DE SEE *Lauzun, Armand Louis de Gontaut, duc de Biron*.

BISSELL, ISRAEL. (1742–1823). Bissell, from East Windsor, Connecticut, was the post rider chosen to carry the news of the British attack at Lexington and Concord to Philadelphia, covering the 350 miles from Watertown, Massachusetts, to Philadelphia's City Hall in five days.

SEE ALSO *Lexington and Concord*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BLACK MINGO CREEK, SOUTH CAROLINA. 29 September 1780. To overawe rebels around Williamsburg, South Carolina, and to serve as an advance outpost for the recently completed British base at Georgetown, Colonel John Coming Ball and his forty-six Loyalists took a position near Shepherd's Ferry, about twenty miles north northwest of Georgetown. (This spot is near where South Carolina Highway 41 later crossed Black Mingo Creek.) Learning of this movement, Colonel Francis Marion (the "Swamp Fox") led his partisans south from Port's Ferry, hoping to make a surprise attack. A Loyalist sentinel heard horses crossing Willtown Bridge, a mile above Shepherd's, at about midnight, and Ball deployed for action, firing a volley that halted the Patriot advance. Though he had lost the element of surprise, Marion attacked with the dismounted troops on the right (west) flank under Major Hugh Horry, a small body of supernumerary officers under Captain Thomas Waites in the center to assault Dollard's Tavern (the "red house"), and a small mounted detachment to move east of Dollard's. Marion followed with a small reserve.

Ball had formed in the field through which Horry advanced rather than fight from the house as Marion expected, and the British colonel calmly held his fire until the rebels were within thirty yards. When his men did open up, they killed Captain George Logan, badly wounded Captain Henry Mouzon and Lieutenant John Scott, and started a disorderly retreat among Horry's troops. Captain John James kept his men under control, however, rallied those of Mouzon, and started a cautious advance. When Waites skirted the tavern and turned against the Loyalist right flank, the defenders began to lose heart and soon retreated. Although only fifty men were engaged on each side in an action that lasted but fifteen minutes, two rebels were killed and eight wounded, the Loyalists losing three dead and thirteen wounded, captured, or both. Along with a number of much needed firearms, Marion's booty included the fine sorrel gelding of the enemy commander, a horse the

Swamp Fox renamed Ball and rode for the remainder of the war.

SEE ALSO *Marion, Francis; Port's Ferry, Pee Dee River, South Carolina*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BLACK RIVER SETTLEMENT SEE *Honduras*.

BLACKSTOCK'S, SOUTH CAROLINA. 20 November 1780. In the wake of rebel victories at King's Mountain, 7 October, and Fishdam Ford, 9 November, General Charles Cornwallis was determined to regain the initiative by securing the middle and upper regions of South Carolina. Certainly this step was essential to his plans for carrying out a second invasion of North Carolina. His first move was to call Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton back from the lower Peedee and to send Major Archibald MacArthur to secure Brierly's Ford on the Broad River. Campbell, with his First Battalion of the Seventy-first Regiment of Foot (Fraser's Highlanders) and the remaining men of James Wemyss' Sixty-third Foot, was to hold the ford until Tarleton could come up with his British Legion. When so combined, this force would then act against the body of rebel partisan militia said to be operating in the area under Brigadier General Thomas Sumter. Cornwallis was particularly concerned that rebel forces might try to take Ninety Six, a town that was the Loyalists' key backcountry stronghold, and his orders to Tarleton were to find and break up Sumter's band of partisans before they could do this or any other harm to the British cause.

It was this situation that led to the series of events that preceded the battle at Blackstock's Plantation. First, in accordance with his orders, Tarleton and his legion duly reached their objective of Brierly's Ford by forced marches the morning of 18 November. At that point they drew fire from a 150-man mounted force of rebels apparently sent to scout out just this sort of British move. Tarleton immediately crossed the river and set out in pursuit with his legion and the infantrymen of the Sixty-third, these last having been mounted on horses rounded up along the way.

The British pursuit changed things for Sumter. Reinforced by Georgia troops under Colonels Elijah Clarke and John Twiggs, he had until this moment intended to attack not Ninety-Six but a Tory post some

fifteen miles away on Little River and commanded by Colonel James Kirkland. But on the night of 19 November a British deserter entered Sumter's camp with the news that Tarleton had returned from the Peedee and was at that moment coming after the Americans with all speed. Sumter ordered a retreat toward the Tyger River. The British continued their pursuit through the morning and into the afternoon of 20 November. But their progress was too slow for the hard-riding Tarleton. Realizing that he could not, with his entire force of slow-moving foot soldiers, move swiftly enough to catch Sumter, Tarleton decided to push ahead with his fastest troops: the nearly two hundred legion dragoons and the eighty mounted infantrymen of the Sixty-third. The remaining infantry troops and the three-pounder gun and its crew were ordered to follow as quickly as they could.

Tarleton's idea of pushing ahead with the mounted elements paid off, with the British advanced guard soon catching up to the rebels' rear elements. But Sumter's main body had already reached Blackstock's Plantation and the ford on the Tyger River. Escape from Tarleton beckoned. The light was already failing, and, with the onset of darkness, Sumter would have every chance of getting his command safely across to the far side of the river. At this juncture a woman of the neighborhood who had observed the passage of Tarleton's column rode up with important news: Tarleton's, she told Sumter, was only a partial force. The British main body of infantry and artillery was still well to the rear of the mounted elements. Encouraged by this information and knowing that it was sure death to be caught by Bloody Tarleton, as he was known, while astride a river, Sumter decided to make a stand at Blackstock's.

He was favored by good defensive terrain. Although the river was to his rear, on Sumter's left, as he faced the oncoming British, was a hill on which five log houses of the plantation were located in an open field. There Sumter posted Colonel Henry Hampton and his riflemen, and the Georgia sharpshooters of Colonel John Twiggs were positioned along a rail fence extending from the houses to the woods on the left flank. On a wooded hill that rose to his right from the main road he deployed the troops of Colonels William Bratton, William Hill, James McCall, and Edward Taylor. Colonel Edward Lacey's mounted infantry screened the right flank, and Colonel Richard Winn was posted to the rear, along the Tyger, as a reserve.

When Tarleton closed up to this position with the legion cavalry and mounted infantry of the Sixty-third Regiment, he realized the Americans were too strong to attack with just his small numbers. He would have to wait until the rest of his force could come up. He therefore dismounted the Sixty-third and formed them on his right overlooking the creek that ran in front of Sumter's position. To the left of the road he formed his dragoons. "Gamecock" Sumter, though, had little intention of

standing idle with his far more numerous force while Tarleton's much smaller one gained its reinforcements. He moved to start the fight. Ordering Colonel Elijah Clarke to turn the enemy right with a hundred men and block the reinforcements that would be coming up the road, Sumter led Twiggs and four hundred men in an attack on the Sixty-third. The Americans crossed the creek and started up the hill against the redcoats, but delivered their fire too early. The British counterattacked and drove them back toward the houses of Blackstock's Plantation. As these eighty British regulars were engaged in the remarkable feat of pushing back a force five times their size, Sumter ordered Lacey to hit the British left flank and the legion dragoons posted there.

So busy were these in watching the infantry action on the other flank that Lacey was able to get within seventy-five yards of them undetected. His riflemen delivered a sudden fire that instantly dropped twenty enemy troopers out of the saddle. But just as quickly the British reacted, charging to drive Lacey back into the trees. Tarleton himself next led the dragoons in a wild, second charge. This one was in the direction of the log buildings of the plantation, from which Hampton's riflemen continued to pour forth a fire that had already mortally wounded the Sixty-third's battalion commander and stopped the redcoats cold. Tarleton's was less the unpromising tactic of a cavalry charge against riflemen firing from cover than a way of keeping Twiggs's men, who had rallied and reformed, from overrunning the remnants of the Sixty-third. The redcoats fell back in good order. Sumter, previously on the rebels' right flank with Lacey, at this point was riding back to the center of the line. A lucky shot from one of the Sixty-third's muskets struck him, penetrating his right shoulder, ripping along the shoulder blade, and chipping his backbone. Unable to speak and bleeding badly, Sumter had to be evacuated from the field on a makeshift litter carried between two horses. With Sumter down wounded, Twiggs assumed command.

Darkness had now fallen and both sides withdrew. Both sides claimed the victory. On the British side Tarleton had succeeded in his purpose of deflecting—for the moment—the threat of a rebel attack against Ninety six. His forces had dispersed the rebels and also inflicted wounds that were serious enough to keep Sumter out of action in the critical time ahead. On the other hand, Tarleton had taken losses the British could not afford. He had let the Americans pick the ground and circumstances of a fight. On the American side, Sumter's militiamen-partisans had repulsed a British attack and then, under cover of darkness, slipped away before the main body of Tarleton's column could come up to finish them off.

The Gamecock was indeed badly hurt, but within two and a half months he was back in the field (and lived to be ninety-eight, the last surviving general officer of the

American Revolutionary War). The arrival of the remainder of Tarleton's force permitted him to occupy the field and claim the victory. He pursued for two days after the fight at Blackstock's, eventually reaching the Pacolet River and picking up rebel stragglers and British fugitives from such recent clashes as Patrick Ferguson's defeat at King's Mountain and Wemyss' defeat at Fishdam Ford. Tarleton persisted in believing reports that Sumter was mortally wounded and that his force, disheartened from the intensity of the British pursuit, had given up and dispersed into small units. Tarleton returned to Brierly's Ford about 1 December. The next time he pushed a rebel force so hard that they turned at bay with their backs to a river would be at Cowpens, 17 January 1781.

CONCLUSIONS

The events both leading up to and following this action showed the ability of the rebels, who fought in the mounted infantry style of riding to the battle but fighting dismounted, to get away before their British pursuers could catch them. What made Blackstock's Plantation significant was that Sumter chose to turn and fight. The action there was arguably the Gamecock's greatest fight as a partisan leader. For the first time in the campaign in the South, rebel partisan militiamen—fighting alone, with no help from the Continental regulars of their own side—managed to repulse British redcoat regulars. The battle was also emblematic of what some historians have identified as the Americans' "strategy of erosion"—a strategy of wearing down the British by inflicting losses and inducing them to engage in exhausting, fruitless marches. The Sixty-third Foot, for example, a veteran regiment that had fought engagements from Long Island to Monmouth Court House and had been sent south, at the end of 1779, for the fighting in South Carolina, had steadily lost men through just such weary marching and fighting. It lost two promising junior officers to the rebels' rifles at Blackstock's, as well as Major John Money, the Sixty-third's energetic and highly regarded commander. These were losses that the British could not replace. The fight at Blackstock's was also a significant learning experience for American commanders in another key matter: how best to combat the ever-aggressive Tarleton. Blackstock's confirmed the view that Tarleton would pursue at any cost in order to cut off retreating rebel forces, especially when these might try to cross a river to safety. At Cowpens two months later, Brigadier General Daniel Morgan would make the British and Tarleton in particular pay for just such aggressiveness.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

The British troops engaged at Blackstock's comprised the 80 regulars of the Sixty-third Foot and the 190 Loyalist provincial troops of Tarleton's British Legion. The total

number of British troops engaged in the battle thus amounted to 270 men. On the American side, Sumter's force comprised some 800 to 900 South Carolina militiamen plus an additional 100 Georgia militiamen. British losses amounted to 92 killed and 100 wounded (some accounts put the number of killed and wounded much lower), or somewhere between one-third and two-thirds of the force that Tarleton committed to the battle. Sumter's losses amounted to 3 killed and 5 wounded (one of them himself).

SEE ALSO *Clarke, Elijah; Cowpens, South Carolina; Fishdam Ford, South Carolina; Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Ninety Six, South Carolina; Sumter, Thomas; Tarleton, Banastre; Wemyss, James.*

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revised by John Gordon

BLAINE, EPHRAIM. (?–1804). Continental commissary officer. Pennsylvania. According to Heitman's *Historical Register*, (1914), Blaine was commissary of the Eighth Pennsylvania, 17 October 1776; commissary of supplies, Continental Army, 1 April 1777; deputy commissary general of purchases, 6 August 1777; and commissary general of purchases, 1 January 1780–24 July 1782. Johnston's order of battle for the Yorktown campaign shows Colonel Blaine as commissary general. Heitman shows no military rank.

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Mark M. Boatner

BLAINVILLE **SEE** *Celoron de Blainville, Paul Louis.*

BLANCHARD, CLAUDE. (1742–1803). Chief commissary to Rochambeau. Blanchard's career began in 1761, when he served in the Ministry of War. Named commissary of wars in 1768, he was sent to Corsica for ten years. Rochambeau appointed him in March 1780 to his general staff as chief commissary. He arrived in Rhode Island in July 1781 and assisted in the Battle of Chesapeake Bay. Blanchard returned to France in January 1783. He was made a chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis (1788), elected commander of the National Guard of Arras (1789), and elected deputy for Pas-de-Calais to the Legislative Assembly (1791). He lost all posts as an "aristocrat" in 1794 but was appointed to the Army of Batavia after the Reign of Terror. His *Journal* of the French campaigns provides colorful details on the participants not found elsewhere.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

BLAND, THEODORICK. (1742–1790). Continental officer. Virginia. Born in Prince George County, Virginia, to a wealthy plantation family, he was schooled in England between 1753 and 1763, where he graduated from the University of Edinburgh as a doctor of medicine and practiced in Virginia from 1764 until 1771, when bad health forced him to retire and become a planter. He was active in Patriot politics and was one of the twenty-four who removed the arms from the governor's palace in Williamsburg to the powder magazine on 24 June 1775. On 13 June 1776 he became captain of the First Troop of Light Dragoons, and on 4 December he was promoted to major of Light Dragoons. He subsequently became colonel of the First Continental Dragoons on 31 March 1777.

Bland commanded mounted troops in the New Jersey campaign and in the Philadelphia campaign. In the Battle of the Brandywine on 11 September 1777, he commanded light cavalry troops at Washington's disposal and was posted on the right (north) flank. Since he failed to gain timely knowledge of the enemy's main attack around this flank, he is largely to blame for the faulty intelligence that caused the American defeat. The main criticism of Bland

was not so much that the information was several hours too late, but that he had not properly reconnoitered the creek on Washington's right flank to inform the commander in chief that the enemy could ford it to make a tactical envelopment. "Light-Horse Harry" Lee was wrong in putting the entire blame on Bland, but he probably was justified in the judgment that "Colonel Bland was noble, sensible, honorable, and amiable; but never intended for the department of military intelligence."

On 5 November 1778, Washington gave Bland the mission of escorting the Convention Army from Connecticut to Virginia, and on 1 May 1779 Bland took command of the guard detail at Charlottesville, Virginia. In November 1779 he received permission to leave this post, where he had earned from the captive Major General William Phillips the nickname "Alexander the Great." Elected to the Continental Congress, he served for three years (1780–1783). Although an anti-nationalist, he supported both the incorporation of a national bank and an impost levy by Congress. Bland is credited with persuading the French minister to the United States, Chevalier de la Luzerne, to send a French naval squadron to the Chesapeake Bay region during Benedict Arnold's invasions of Virginia from December 1780 to the spring of 1781. Bland retired to his plantation, Farmingdale or Kippax, in Prince George County, which had been plundered during his absence by British raiders. In 1786 he was an unsuccessful candidate for governor against Edmund Randolph. He served in the House of Delegates from 1786 to 1788, voted against adoption of the federal Constitution in the Virginia Convention of 1788, and in that year was elected to the first U.S. House of Representatives. There he served until his death on 1 June 1790. He has been described as tall, handsome, suave, strictly honest, and of meager intellect.

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revised by Harry M. Ward

BLANKETS. Blankets (including bed rugs and coverlets) comprised part of the allotment issued to Continental army, British, and German forces. Blankets were often troops' only covering in inclement weather and served as substitutes for coats in cold weather. They were also sometimes used in lieu of knapsacks for carrying extra clothing and other necessities. Seldom were sufficient

Bloody Backs

supplies of blankets on hand, despite efforts to obtain them via donations, impressments, and imports. Blankets were again scarce during the hard winter of 1779–1780, when the Board of War instigated a secret mission to purchase quantities from British-held New York. General George Washington was brought into the matter when New Jersey authorities discovered the plan and threatened to confiscate the shipment. As a result, Washington's troops were not issued the much-needed British blankets until late spring of 1780.

Made of wool, linen, or the mixed cloth linsey-woolsey, they came in a variety of colors and patterns. Most were white or off-white; striped and checked blankets were also common. Less frequently seen were black, yellow, blue, red, brown, orange, and green. A surviving example carried by an American private soldier in the war is a white 3-point blanket, 53 inches by 72 inches, with two and three-quarter-inch stripes of indigo blue (one at either end) and points of the same color. American-made blankets of the period were constructed from two pieces of material, domestic looms producing only narrow cloth, from 20 to 40 inches wide. British military blankets often were marked with a broad arrow or crown device and the initials 'G.R.'

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John U. Rees

BLOCK ISLAND, NEW YORK SEE
Alfred–Glasgow *Encounter*.

BLOODY BACKS. Derisive American term for British regulars, alluding to their severe discipline, which included lashing. Presumably the term lost its vogue after Washington got authority to increase lashing in the Continental Army to five hundred strokes.

Mark M. Boatner

BLOODY BILL SEE *Cunningham, Bloody Bill*.

BLOODY TARLETON. Nickname of Banastre Tarleton, who also was called "Bloody Ban" or, by such as Dan Morgan, who was hazy about orthography, "Bloody Ben."

SEE ALSO *Tarleton, Banastre*.

Mark M. Boatner

BLUE LICKS, KENTUCKY. 19 August 1782. The British in Detroit sent out two expeditions in the summer of 1782 to press on the Virginia frontier. One group moved against Wheeling in July. The second force of Indians and Loyalists, under Captain William Caldwell and Simon Girty, collected at Chillicothe in early August to invade the Kentucky settlements; they planned to eliminate Bryan's Station and then move on to the Lexington settlements about five miles further southwest. They reached the vicinity undetected on the evening of the 14th and the next morning approached Bryan's Station. The defenders had been alerted the previous day by news of an ambush at Upper Blue Licks and were making military preparations to start a pursuit when the raiders attacked. The first assault failed, as did an attempted siege, and on the morning of the 18th, the raiders started a slow, deliberate withdrawal. A large party of frontiersmen assembled at Bryan's a few hours later and set off in pursuit. The next morning the leading party of 182 men caught up with an estimated 240 raiders near the Lower Blue Lick Springs on the Middle Fork of Licking River. Daniel Boone and other leaders advised waiting for a large reinforcement known to be on its way under General Benjamin Logan, but Major Hugh McGary foolishly touched off a disorganized charge. The Americans were caught in the deep ford by a superior force and in a few minutes were crushed. The Kentucky men fled after losing sixty-four killed and five captured.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

BLUE MOUNTAIN VALLEY OFF SANDY HOOK, NEW JERSEY. 22–23 January 1776. When the Elizabethtown, New Jersey, Committee of Safety learned that a British transport had

been sighted off the coast, the committee ordered its capture. Elias Dayton and Colonel William Alexander (Lord Stirling) assembled a body of eighty volunteers from the town and a thirty-man detachment of Stirling's First New Jersey Regiment, which put off from the shore in four small boats (three shallops and a pilot boat). They came up with the British vessel about forty miles from Sandy Hook and approached it while all but a few men stayed hidden. The ship was the *Blue Mountain Valley*, a victualler that was one of a group of twenty-one merchantmen under a contract let in the fall of 1775 to the firm of Mure, Son and Atkinson to transport an emergency shipment of food and coal to the Boston garrison. The master, James Hamilton Dempster, mistook the approaching Americans for fishing vessels and allowed them to come alongside. The boarding party then poured through the hatches and easily took the surprised vessel on the 23rd.

Two months later, on 27 March, the Royal Navy got its revenge. Lieutenant Robertson set off at 10 P.M. from a point off Bedlow's Island with the ship's boats of the ship of the line *Asia* and frigate *Phoenix* and under cover of darkness rowed to Elizabethtown Point, where the *Blue Mountain Valley* and another captured vessel were moored. They burned the *Blue Mountain Valley* but recaptured the *Lady Gage*.

This otherwise minor occurrence took on great importance in propelling not only New Jersey but also New York City into active participation in the war. It also caused considerable consternation in British command circles and back in London and led to major policy changes prohibiting the use of transports sailing without naval escorts. That policy change helped to limit losses of vessels, but it also greatly complicated the Royal Navy's burden. Secondary sources disagree on the details, reflecting a squabble over credit among the participants.

Robert K. Wright Jr.

BLUE SAVANNAH, SOUTH CAROLINA. 4 September 1780. After his successful coup at Great Savannah, on 20 August, Colonel Francis Marion led his fifty-two mounted men swiftly east to escape pursuit and camped sixty miles away, at Ports Ferry on the Peedee River. Although he now was safe from attack from the west, where the British forces were located, danger developed to the northeast when Major Micajah Ganey called out his Loyalist militia and started down the Little Peedee early on 4 September. Although outnumbered nearly five to one, Marion marched to meet this threat. His advance guard under Major John James located and routed a forty-five-man advance guard under Ganey's personal leadership.

When Marion saw the remaining two hundred Loyalist militia under Captain Jesse Barefield, who had defected from the South Carolina Continentals, he retreated to the Blue Savannah swamp, circled to set up an ambush, and routed Barefield's men by a sudden charge. The Loyalists delivered one volley, wounding three men and killing two horses, before heading for the swamps. This success broke the spirit of the Loyalists east of the Peedee and brought sixty volunteers in to double Marion's strength.

Blue Savannah is about sixty miles east northeast of Great Savannah. This put it near Galivant's Ferry, established later.

SEE ALSO *Marion, Francis; Port's Ferry, Pee Dee River, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BOARD OF WAR. 13 June 1776–7 February 1781. Congress spent much of the war trying to create an effective and efficient system to manage military affairs. Because the colonies did not quickly or easily relinquish control over their military resources, it was something of a miracle that Congress fielded credible, centrally directed armed forces, a success that was attributable largely to the urgent need to coordinate the military activity of what was, in effect, a coalition of thirteen separate states. It took Congress nearly two months, from 17 April to 15 June 1775, to take the obvious step of creating the office of commander in chief of its field forces and selecting George Washington for that responsibility. Although the delegates understood the weaknesses and delays inherent in the committee system, it took them even longer to work out how to allocate the executive authority for managing and overseeing an increasingly complex military system in wartime.

CREATING THE BOARD

Dissatisfied with the course of the war, particularly the problems plaguing the invasion of Canada, Congress began to consider alternatives to appointing ad hoc committees in January 1776, but it was not until 12 June 1776, while waiting for delegates from South Carolina and the middle colonies to get instructions on whether to support independence, that it resolved to establish "a board of war and ordnance, to consist of five members." It created the board the next day and elected as its members John Adams of Massachusetts (chairman), Edward Rutledge of South Carolina, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, and James Wilson of Pennsylvania. The geographical distribution of the members reflected the need to give voice to the interests and agendas of the

principal states, the only feasible way of running a military alliance of sovereign states.

The care with which the board's duties were spelled out demonstrated Congress's wariness about delegating authority to an executive agent. It was authorized

to obtain and keep an alphabetical and accurate register of the names of all officers of the land forces in the service of the United Colonies; . . . [to] keep exact accounts of all the artillery, arms, ammunition, and warlike stores, belonging to the United Colonies, . . . [and] have the immediate care of all such . . . stores, as shall not be employed in actual service; [to] have the care of forwarding all dispatches from Congress to the colonies and armies, and all monies to be transmitted for the public service by order of Congress; [to] superintend the raising, fitting out, and dispatching of all such land forces as may be ordered for the service . . . ; [to] have the care and direction of all prisoners of war"; (Ford, ed., *Journals*, 5, pp. 434–435)

and to maintain all paperwork. Important extra duties also devolved on what was called the "war office," including "controlling troop movements and detaining suspected spies" (Ward, p. 2). And, in hope of remedying the indiscipline contributing to American military defeats, the Board drew up a revised set of articles of war for the next iteration of the Continental Army that was to be enlisted for three years from 1 January 1777. Congress adopted the revised articles on 20 September 1776.

The crush of detailed work almost overwhelmed the members. According to John Adams,

The duties of this board kept me in continual employment, not to say drudgery from this 12 of June 1776 till the eleventh of November 1777 when I left Congress forever. Not only my mornings and evenings were filled up with the crowd of business before the board, but a great part of my time in Congress was engaged in making, explaining, and justifying our reports and proceedings. . . . I don't believe there is one of them [lawyers in the United States] who goes through so much business . . . as I did for a year and a half nearly, that I was loaded with that office. Other gentlemen attended as they pleased, but as I was chairman . . . I must never be absent. (Adams, *Papers*, 3, p. 342.)

A NEW BOARD

By the end of 1776, Congress recognized the need to shift the day-to-day burden of managing the war effort from its members. On 26 December 1776, Congress—in a rump session at Baltimore, to which it had fled from the British army advancing on Philadelphia—advocated the creation of a new five-member board of war for "better conducting the executive business of Congress by boards composed of

persons, not members of Congress" (Ford, 6, pp. 1041–1042). Congress did not act on this idea until 18 July 1777, when it created a three-member Board of War, and did not elect the members until 7 November, in the midst of a disastrous campaign that again forced it to flee from Philadelphia (19 September), first to Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and on to York, Pennsylvania, by 30 September. Within ten days after electing the new board, Congress approved the Articles of Confederation and sent them to the states for the start of a ratification process that would take almost three years to complete (1 March 1781).

The members of the new board were experienced, capable individuals, but their ability to work in harness with Congress and General Washington was open to question. Thomas Mifflin was an important political leader in Pennsylvania, a former delegate to Congress, and a major general in the Continental army, but he had just resigned as quartermaster general (also on 7 November 1777) after a contentious tenure. Colonel Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts was then the adjutant general (and would continue in that post until 13 January 1778), and Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Harrison of Maryland was Washington's headquarters secretary.

Because all three men were already engaged in important business, the new board was slow in organizing. On 21 November, Congress authorized "any two members" of the old board to act with "any one or more" of the new members until the new board could take up the reins of business (Ford, 9, p. 946). Although, on Mifflin's recommendation, Congress added two more members to the new Board on 24 November, the next day it continued the old Board "till such time as a quorum of the commissioners of the War Office shall attend" (Ford, 9, p. 960). On 27 November, Congress completed the membership of the new board. Again on Mifflin's recommendation, it elected Major General Horatio Gates, the victor of Saratoga who was then at the zenith of his reputation, as president of the board. It chose Joseph Trumbull of Connecticut, the former commissary general who had resigned in August 1777 under a cloud of controversy, to replace Harrison, who had declined the original appointment. Finally, it decided to continue in office the secretary of the old board, Richard Peters of Pennsylvania, who had "discharged the duties of an arduous and complicated department in its infant stage with honour to himself and much disinterestedness, and with fidelity and advantage to the public" (Ford, 9, p. 959).

THE CONWAY CABAL

All of this reorganization took place as Washington was coping with the problems of defending the Delaware River forts while trying to recruit, clothe, and feed his army. The reorganization was part of Congress's desire to exert closer control over the army and was fed in part by some dissatisfaction with Washington's performance. The Board of

War has been seen by some historians as the center of the so-called Conway Cabal, an effort to replace Washington with Gates, because Gates was its president and Mifflin, who had temporarily fallen out with the commander in chief, was its most important member.

Thomas Conway, a French soldier of Irish descent who had been openly contemptuous of Washington's leadership, submitted his resignation as the army's junior brigadier general to Congress on 14 November 1777, and the delegates referred it to the Board of War. The board did not act on Conway's resignation, but some delegates about this time advocated that Conway be appointed the army's inspector general. Support for Conway was a direct challenge to Washington, and it prompted the commander in chief to ask Congress to choose between them. Faced with this choice, few delegates were willing to back the erratic and arrogant Frenchman against Washington. Washington's sharp reminder of the central role he played in holding the army together resulted in the collapse of congressional criticism of his handling of the war. Gates curbed his ambition, and the Board of War's efforts to exercise greater control over strategy and operations were slowed. The board's advocacy of another invasion of Canada further proved that it was not the instrument to succeed Washington in overall direction of military operations.

REPLACING THE BOARD

Congress reorganized the board a final time on 29 October 1778, when it mandated a membership of three nondelegates and two delegates and set the quorum at three members. Thereafter, most of the Board's work involved ensuring that the armies were properly following the regulations of Congress. The work was undertaken by Pickering and Peters, who increasingly involved themselves in the minutiae of management and whose efforts were undercut in any event by the disastrous decline in the value of Continental currency, a failure wholly outside their control. Over the course of 1780, a year of stalemate and treason in the North and disaster in the South, Congress concluded that it had no choice but to create executive departments in which a single individual would be trusted with the power to manage a portion of the nation's business. Prompted by the same factors that induced Virginia and Maryland to acquiesce to the Articles of Confederation, Congress on 7 February 1781 created the office of the secretary of war to try to save the war effort from spiraling stagnation and ultimate defeat. Even then, Congress moved at a snail's pace and allowed events to shape its actions. It elected Major General Benjamin Lincoln as the first secretary of war only on 30 October 1781. The board continued to function until Lincoln accepted his appointment on 26 November.

While Congress ultimately streamlined and thereby improved the structure of its oversight of military affairs,

the choice of Lincoln to fill the office still reflected Congress's hesitancy about delegating too much authority to a single individual whose ambitions might exceed his respect for congressional control. Lincoln's primary qualification, beyond Washington's recommendation and his own experience in the field (culminating with his service as Washington's chief subordinate at Yorktown), was his willingness to obey Congress's orders to defend Charleston, South Carolina, in the spring of 1780, a decision that had led to the capture of the principal American army in the South.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion; Canada Invasion (Planned); Conway Cabal.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

BOISBERTRAND, RENÉ ETIENNE-HENRI DE VIC GAYAULT DE **SEE** *Gayault de Boisbertrand, René Etienne-Henri de Vic.*

BOMB. Albert Manucy explains that “the word ‘bomb’ comes to us from the French, who derived it from the Latin. . . . Today bomb is pronounced ‘balm,’ but in the early days it was commonly pronounced ‘bum.’” The modern equivalent of an eighteenth-century bomb is a high explosive (chemical energy) shell. “A bombshell was simply a hollow, cast-iron sphere. It had a single hole where the powder was funneled in, full, but not enough to pack too tightly when the fuse was driven in. . . . Bombs were not filled with powder very long before use, and fuses were not put into the projectile until the time of firing” (Manucy, pp. 65–67).

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BONHOMME RICHARD–SERAPIS ENGAGEMENT.

23 Sept. 1779. At 2 p.m. P.M. on this day John Paul Jones sighted British merchantmen rounding Flamborough Head on the North Sea coast of Yorkshire. When Jones ordered his ship, the *Bonhomme Richard*, and the others in his squadron, *Alliance* (36 guns), *Pallas* (32 guns), and *Vengeance* (12 guns), to give chase, the British merchantmen fled and the convoy commander, Captain Richard Pearson, positioned his ship, the *Serapis* (40 guns) and her escort, the *Countess of Scarborough* (20 guns), between the attackers and their prey. At around 6:30 P.M., the *Serapis* and *Bonhomme Richard*, both flying British colors, came within hailing distance, and Pearson demanded that Jones identify his ship. Jones responded “The *Princess Royal*” but, seeing that Pearson was not fooled by his ruse, Jones ran up an American flag, and the two ships exchanged virtually simultaneous broadsides. For an hour the ships exchanged fire as each maneuvered to rake the other.

During the first or second broadside, two of Jones’s eighteen-pound cannons burst, putting the rest of the guns on the *Bonhomme Richard*’s lower deck out of commission. After the initial exchange of broadsides the *Serapis* moved ahead of her adversary and on the leeward side. Not being able to gain enough distance to cross in front of the *Bonhomme* and rake her with cannon fire, the *Serapis* lost headway in executing a turn and was rammed near the stern. Jones ordered his men to lash the ships together, and personally tied a loose forestay from the *Serapis* to the *Bonhomme Richard*’s foremast.

A desperate battle raged more than two hours longer. At one point, when the American ensign was shot away, British Captain Pearson is alleged to have hailed Jones asking, “Do you ask for quarter?” to which Jones is reputed to have replied with the immortal, “I have not yet begun to fight.” The fighting continued as the grapeshot from two nine-pound cannon and small arms fire from marines and sailors in the tops of the *Bonhomme Richard* swept clear the upper deck of the *Serapis*. Meanwhile, cannon fire from the *Serapis* blew huge holes through the *Bonhomme Richard* and turned its lower decks into a death house for American seamen. Neither side gained an overall advantage until an American grenade fell through a hatchway on the *Serapis* and ignited powder charges on the deck below, killing dozens of British sailors. Moments later the *Serapis*’s mainmast began to quiver, and Pearson, fearing destruction of his ship, finally struck his colors. Two days later it was the *Bonhomme Richard* that could not be saved, so Jones transferred his flag, surviving crewmen, and British prisoners to the *Serapis*. During the engagement the treacherous, if not yet mad, Pierre Landais had ordered his ship, the *Alliance*, to fire into the *Bonhomme Richard*, inflicting nearly as many casualties as did the British.

On October 3 1779, Jones sailed the jury-rigged *Serapis* into The Texel, in neutral Holland, accompanied by the *Alliance*, the *Pallas*, and the *Countess of Scarborough*, which the *Pallas* had taken while the *Bonhomme Richard* engaged the *Serapis*. During one of the hottest single-ship actions of the age of sail, each side suffered seventy to eighty men killed and an equal number of wounded. Years later, Midshipman Nathaniel Fanning recalled seeing “the dead lying in heaps [on the *Serapis*], the entrails of the dead scattered promiscuously around, [and] the blood over ones shoes.”

Hoping to use Jones’s victory to distract public opinion from the failed attempt to invade England, French officials lionized Jones. King Louis XVI knighted Jones and gave him a gold-hilted sword, and Benjamin Franklin capitalized on Jones’s fame to help mend strained Franco-American relations.

SEE ALSO *Jones, John Paul*; *Landais, Pierre de*.

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BONVOULOIR SEE *Achard de Bonvouloir, Julien*.

BOONE, DANIEL. (1734–1820). Frontiersman. Born in Berks County, Pennsylvania, on 2 November 1734, Daniel Boone moved with his family to Buffalo Lick, North Carolina, on the north fork of the Yadkin River, in 1751. Like Daniel Morgan, he accompanied Edward Braddock’s expedition as a teamster; escaping from the disaster of 9 July 1755. On this expedition he met John Findley, a hunter whose stories of the Kentucky wilderness fired him with a desire to visit this country. After failing to persuade his wife, Rebecca Bryan, to move to Florida, Boone undertook an extensive exploration through the Cumberland Gap into

the Kentucky territory starting in 1767. In 1773 he led a group of settlers west, but reluctantly turned back after two of his party, including his son James, were tortured and killed by Indians. In 1775, as an agent of the Transylvania Company, he led about thirty men to the site of what became Boonesborough, Kentucky, cutting the Wilderness Road as they went. After building a fort, Boone returned to North Carolina to get his family and twenty more men. This activity was in defiance of the Proclamation of 1763, and in their efforts to stop and drive back this invasion of settlers, the Cherokees and Shawnees started raids into what became known as the “dark and bloody ground.”

On 14 July 1776, Boone’s daughter, Jemima, and two other girls were captured by Indians. Boone led a group in pursuit, and three days later launched a surprise attack that killed an Indian and rescued the girls. Boone immediately became a famous figure on the frontier, and even drew attention in the east. When Kentucky became a county of Virginia in the fall of 1776, Boone was made a captain of the militia and was later promoted to major. In February 1778, he and thirty others were captured by Shawnees. The Shawnees needed new warriors to replace those lost in battle, and adopted Boone and sixteen other men, selling the remaining prisoners to the British in Detroit. When Boone learned of a planned attack on Boonesborough, he escaped, traveling the 150 miles back to Boonesborough in just four days.

One Indian leader, Blackfish, led 400 men against Boonesborough on 7 September 1778. With only forty men, Boone held the Indians off for eleven days, after which Blackfish finally gave up and retreated. Blackfish spent the first two days attempting to persuade Boone to negotiate the fort’s surrender. After failing to trick Boone into leaving the fort when the Indians could seize him, Blackfish tried burning and tunneling into the settlement before giving up and leaving the area. The next month Boone went east for a stay that was to last a year, but in October 1779 he returned with a new party of settlers. The following spring he started back east with \$20,000 collected from settlers for the purchase of land warrants, necessary because the state had repudiated the land titles that had been issued by the Transylvania Company, but he was robbed of the entire amount. He then moved to Boone’s Station. The same year, 1780, Kentucky was divided into three counties, and he was made lieutenant colonel of the Fayette County militia. In August 1782 his son Israel was killed during the American defeat at Blue Licks.

After holding a number of public offices, including representative in the Virginia assembly, Boone became embroiled in a series of ejectment suits by which he was to lose his large land holdings of nearly 100,000 acres. All his titles had been improperly filed, and in around 1798 he lost his last holding in the region he had done so much to develop. Meanwhile he had moved from Boone’s Station to Maysville in 1786, to Point Pleasant (in modern West

Virginia) in 1788, and to what now is Missouri in 1798 or 1799. His son Daniel had preceded him to Missouri, and Boone was given a large Spanish land grant of nearly 10,000 acres at the mouth of Femme Osage Creek. When the United States assumed title to this region, Boone’s land claims were declared void but, after many delays, Congress awarded him 850 acres for services rendered. Boone sold this land to pay off his debts. He died in Missouri on 26 September 1820.

Exaggeration of his exploits by early historians started with John Filson’s *The Discovery, Settlement, and Present State of Kentucke* (1784). The seven stanzas that Lord Byron devoted to him in *Don Juan* (1823) further helped to create a legend that made Boone one of the most famous pioneers in U.S. history.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; Proclamation of 1763.*

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BORDER WARFARE IN NEW YORK.

When the rebels declared independence in 1776, their new nation had to cope with a long British Canadian frontier to the north and several Indian nations to the west. This porous frontier was vulnerable to raids by British regulars, Loyalists, and Indians. After the failure of Burgoyne’s offensive from June to October 1777 and the supporting St. Leger’s expedition, military operations were reduced to raids and punitive expeditions. Detroit was the British base for attacks against the frontier settlements along the Ohio River and territory to the south, modern Kentucky bearing the brunt. Niagara and, to a lesser extent, Oswego were headquarters for British operations farther north, and from these locations numerous operations were conducted against the New York frontier.

War out of Niagara was directed toward Tryon County, New York, a vast territory whose western boundary was, in effect, the Iroquois frontier. The spine of Tryon County was the Mohawk Valley, and it was against the

settlements of this valley that Loyalist exiles directed their efforts. Guy and Sir John Johnson, John and Walter Butler, and the Mohawk Joseph Brant led the most effective and bloody of the Loyalist-Indian raids against the United States.

Burgoyne's surrender and St. Leger's retreat instilled a sense of security among the settlers along the northern frontier. The French alliance, which soon followed, furthered the illusion, as did the presence of Lafayette in Albany to organize a second Patriot invasion of Canada.

The Wyoming Massacre in Pennsylvania on 3–4 July 1778, south of the Mohawk River, was the first thunderbolt from Niagara. At the same time Joseph Brant was mobilizing an army in the vicinity of Unadilla, an Indian town on the Susquehanna about fifty miles from the main settlements of the Mohawk Valley, that would figure prominently in future operations. Despite the excellent intelligence furnished by James Deane, Philip Schuyler's secret agent, the Patriots were taken by surprise. Brant sacked Andrustown on 18 July, raided Minisink on 19–22 July, and returned to destroy German Flats on 13 September 1778. The Patriots retaliated by destroying Unadilla on 6–8 October. These were relatively minor actions in which much property was lost with no casualties being inflicted, but they led to the serious Patriot disaster at Cherry Valley on 11 November.

Sullivan's expedition from May to November 1779 was a savage American attempt to eliminate the Iroquois. After innumerable delays and having sacrificed all surprise, 4,000 Continental troops crashed into the wilderness, routed a Loyalist-Indian force at Newtown (also known as Chemung) on 29 August, burned 40 towns, and destroyed the Indian's crops—an estimated 160,000 bushels of corn—before they could be harvested. The winter of 1779–1780 was of record-breaking severity, and the Iroquois suffered greatly from a lack of shelter and food, as General John Sullivan had hoped. Nonetheless, far from achieving its real purpose, this punitive expedition brought on a furious reprisal in its turn.

OPERATIONS IN 1780

General Sullivan and New York's Governor George Clinton expected the Iroquois to sue for peace after the demonstration of U.S. power and the harsh winter. But the opposite proved to be the case. Supported by British regulars and Loyalists, the Iroquois attacked the Oneidas, who had tried to remain neutral; destroyed their settlements; and forced them back into the Mohawk Valley. Most of the Oneidas sought shelter around Schenectady, where they no longer served as a protective screen for New York against attacks from Oswegos and Niagaras. Indians captured the militia garrison at Skenesboro in March and Brant raided Harpersfield, a small town south of the Cherry Valley, on 2 April. He would also have attacked the Upper Fort of

Schoharie Valley but for the false information of a prisoner, Captain Alexander Harper, that this place was defended by three hundred Continentals. With nineteen prisoners, Brant's Indians and the Loyalists moved south to finish off Minisink around 4 April. Seven Indians attacked the blockhouse at Sacandaga on 3 April but were all killed. Several whites were killed and captured when seventy-nine Indians attacked Cherry Valley on 24 April. Though the Indians undertaking these raids were desperately hungry and poorly organized, they met little resistance.

JOHN JOHNSON'S FIRST RAID

With four hundred Loyalists and two hundred Indians, Sir John Johnson entered the Johnstown settlements undetected on the evening of 21 May. He had taken the Lake Champlain route to Crown Point and marched from there to the Sacandaga River. He detached Brant, who burned Caughnawaga, on the Mohawk River, at dawn of the 22nd, and other detachments killed, burned, and took prisoners in the valley. On 23 May, Johnson burned Johnstown and withdrew slowly to Mayfield, about eight miles to the northeast, with forty prisoners. Having given the Patriots every opportunity to attack him there, he withdrew on the 27th and continued slowly toward Crown Point with his booty, prisoners, and a number of "liberated" Loyalist families. Governor Clinton made a feeble attempt to cut him off at Ticonderoga.

With five hundred Loyalists and Indians, Joseph Brant sacked Canajoharie on 1–2 August 1780. Brant then moved with amazing swiftness into another theater of operations for the coup on the Ohio River known as Lochry's Defeat, and he subsequently returned to participate in Johnson's second raid into Tryon County in September. This operation aimed, as Governor Sir Frederick Haldimand explained to Lord George Germain, to divert Patriot forces away from any campaign planned by General James Clinton out of New York City as well as to evacuate Loyalist families suffering from Patriot outrages.

Leaving Oswego in September, Johnson moved toward Unadilla and picked up reinforcements under Brant and Cornplanter to bring his strength to between eight hundred and fifteen hundred. He also had artillery: two small mortars and a brass three-pounder. Johnson's approach was undetected, and he ravaged the Schoharie Valley during 15–17 October; destroyed all rebel property in the vicinity of Fort Hunter on 17 October; started up the Mohawk the next day, laying waste to everything on both sides of the river as far as Canajoharie; and camped that night near Palatine. Along the way Johnson recovered the family silver and papers hidden at Johnson Hall. The next morning he crossed the Mohawk at Keder's Rifts.

General Robert Van Rensselaer assembled between four hundred and five hundred militia in the lower

Mohawk and started in pursuit, while Governor George Clinton left Albany with a small force to catch up with him. While a detachment of fifty raiders headed for Fort Paris in Stone Arabia, Colonel John Brown sallied forth from that place to attack Johnson's main body on orders from Van Rensselaer, with the promise that the latter would arrive in time to support him. Near the ruined Fort Keyser, on 19 October Brown and about forty of his 130 men were killed and the rest routed after making a gallant attack against a superior force. Johnson ordered the burning of Stone Arabia after liberating any moveable goods. Van Rensselaer was too late to prevent the annihilation of Brown's force, but he was reinforced by 300 or 400 militia and sixty Oneidas under Colonel Lewis DuBois and brought Johnson to bay at Klock's Field on 19 October. The raiders made their escape via Lake Onondaga to Oswego.

Meanwhile, a second raiding party, which consisted of a detachment of the Fifty-third Regiment under an officer named Houghton, struck the upper Connecticut Valley and destroyed some houses at Royalton, Vermont. Another force, under Major Carleton, moved through Fort Anne, Fort Edward, and Fort George; attacked Ballston (a mere twelve miles from Schenectady); and threatened other settlements north of Albany.

In just five days, Johnson had inflicted as much damage as had General Sullivan in a month the previous year. The northern frontier was demoralized. Governor Clinton wrote Washington on 30 October:

The losses we have sustained by these different incursions of the enemy will be most severely felt; they have destroyed, on a moderate computation, 200 dwellings and 150,000 bushels of wheat. . . . The enemy to the northward continue in the neighborhood of Crown Point, and the inhabitants, in consequence of their apprehensions of danger, are removing from the northern parts of the state.

RAIDS OF 1781

The worst news Governor Clinton had to report in this same letter was that Sir John Johnson, Brant, and Walter Butler had escaped. In 1781 they returned. Brant, who had been wounded in the heel at Klock's Field, ranged the upper Mohawk Valley almost at will during the early months of the year. The Oneidas were no longer in their settlements to furnish a screen of protection, or at least of warning, and militia resistance had collapsed. War parties revisited German Flats, Cherry Valley was attacked in April, and two parties of the Second New York Continentals were captured while trying to take supplies to Fort Stanwix. The latter post was abandoned in May after being critically damaged by floods and fire. It might be said that a housing shortage existed, but life in the valley went on, and spirits soared when Colonel Marinus Willett

arrived late in June to assume command of the scattered frontier posts. With 400 men, Willett had the seemingly impossible mission of protecting some 5,000 settlers in an area of about 2,000 square miles—his posts at Ballston, Catskill, and Fort Herkimer (German Flats) forming a triangle of roughly that area. His "main body," if it can be dignified by that term, comprised 120 men at Canajoharie, where he established his headquarters. The rest of his puny force was parceled out among the far-flung settlements, though Willett had the creative idea of rotating his men between his four main posts to keep them alert and give the settlers an impression of action.

Willett did not have to wait much more than a week before the first challenge came. About 350 Indians led by John Doxtader surprised Currytown on 9 July, but the remarkable Willett annihilated this force the next day at Sharon Springs Swamp. Donald McDonald was defeated and killed by the heroic stand of a single family at Shell's Bush on 6 August. The British suffered further losses when the Indian and Loyalist force under Captain William Caldwell was defeated at Wawarsing on 22 August, and Lieutenant Solomon Woodworth was killed near Fort Plain on 7 September, when his party was ambushed.

FINAL OPERATIONS

In the fall of 1781, the U.S. Northern Department had alarming and confusing reports that one enemy column was approaching along Lake Champlain and another along Lake Oneida from Oswego. Although General William Heath had only 2,500 men to guard the Highlands against the threat from Sir Henry Clinton's force of 17,000 in New York City while Washington and Rochambeau marched south, he sent the New Hampshire Continentals and some artillery north on 13 October. The threat from Lake Champlain proved illusory on 24 October, when the smoke of burning buildings started rising in the Mohawk Valley. Major John Ross had left Oswego on the 16th with 700 men, 130 of whom were Indians. He struck the valley near Warrenbush (later Florida) and burned a seven-mile stretch to come within twelve miles of Schenectady on the 25th. Although he had not met any real resistance, Ross then started withdrawing. Failure of the Indians to turn out in the numbers expected, muddy roads, and certainty that the militia was gathering all around him persuaded Ross to return to Oswego. What Ross did not know was that Willett was in rapid pursuit with his small force. After joining up with militia units at Fort Hunter, Ross had 400 men. He caught up with the raiders and attacked at Johnstown on 25 October.

Darkness called a halt to this action, which had begun late in the day. Ross claimed to have gotten the better of it, and Willett's failure to start pursuit until the 28th tends to support that contention. But the British leader lost most of his head start when his guides were slow in finding a trail

north to the St. Lawrence, a route Ross had to choose because of the possibility that Willett might cut off a retreat to the boats left on Lake Oneida. After waiting for provisions, the rebels started pursuit on the evening of the 28th, marched twenty miles in a snowstorm on the 29th, and caught up at 8 o'clock the next morning. Ross kept up a running fight as his tired and famished Loyalists, British regulars, and Indians headed for West Canada Creek, where they hoped to make a stand. Walter Butler's rear guard had just crossed this sizable stream when Willett's vanguard arrived at 2 P.M. The action at Jerseyfield on 30 October was little more than a firefight across the ford, but when the enemy forces resumed their retreat, they left behind the dead body of Walter Butler, one of the most effective Loyalist soldiers on the northern frontier. After a pursuit of another twenty miles Willett called a halt, as his forces were exhausted and running low of provisions.

This was the last Loyalist attack on Tryon County. Indian raids continued in 1782, and a few prominent Patriots were abducted by Loyalists. The border warfare, however, had basically ended.

SEE ALSO *Andrustown, New York; Brant, Joseph; Brown, John; Burgoyne's Offensive; Butler, John; Butler, Walter; Canajoharie Settlements, New York; Chemung, New York; Cherry Valley Massacre, New York; Clinton, George; Clinton, James; Colonial Wars; Cornplanter; Currytown, New York; Fort Hunter, New York; Fort Keyser, New York; Fort Stanwix, New York; Germain, George Sackville; German Flats, New York; Grasshopper; Haldimand, Sir Frederick; Harpersfield, New York; Heath, William; Jerseyfield, New York; Johnson, Guy; Johnson, Sir John; Johnstown, New York; Klock's Field, New York; Lochry's Defeat, Ohio River; Minisink, New York (19–22 July, 1779); Schoharie Valley, New York; Schuyler, Philip John; Sharon Springs Swamp, New York; Shell's Bush, New York; St. Leger's Expedition; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois; Tryon County, New York; Unadilla, New York; Wawarsing, New York; Western Operations; Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.*

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BOSTON CAMPAIGN. 19 April 1775–17 March 1776. Military actions in Massachusetts from the battles at Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775 until the evacuation of Boston by the British Garrison on 17 March 1776 are sometimes grouped under the heading "the Boston Campaign." Operations during this period are covered in the entry on the Boston Siege.

SEE ALSO *Boston Garrison; Boston Siege; Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Dorchester Heights, Massachusetts; Knox's "Noble Train of Artillery"; Lexington and Concord.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

BOSTON GARRISON. 1 October 1768–17 March 1776. The British imperial government had sent troops to Anglo-America on prior occasions to suppress disorder and support royal authority, but the dispatch of regular soldiers to Boston in the wake of the Townshend Acts raised an unprecedented set of thorny issues involving civil-military relations and the utility of using soldiers to enforce political obedience. The royal governor of Massachusetts, Francis Bernard, had long wanted regulars in Boston to counter the threats and intimidation the radicals were using to resist imperial control. He was reluctant to make a formal request for troops because he was unwilling to accept responsibility for a decision that was certain to exacerbate an already incendiary situation. He wanted Major General Thomas Gage, the British commander in chief in North America, to send troops on his own initiative, but Gage refused to act without orders from Britain or a request from the governor.

TROOPS SENT TO BOSTON

Five days after a Boston mob attacked the customs commissioners in the Liberty affair (10 June 1768), the terrified commissioners wrote to Gage, who was headquartered at New York City, and asked for protection. They also appealed directly to Colonel William Dalrymple, commander of the garrison at Halifax, the closest troops to Boston, and to Commodore Samuel Hood, the local Royal Navy commander. Gage ordered Dalrymple to alert two regiments, and asked Hood to ready transports, but he cautioned them not to act until Governor Bernard requested their aid. Bernard attempted to get Gage to send the troops on the pretext of a routine administrative movement to get better quarters for the regulars. Gage, quite properly, refused to comply with this subterfuge. In late August 1768 Gage received orders from London (dated 8 June) to send at least one regiment to Boston. News of the Liberty affair had reinforced the resolve of imperial leaders to use force. In a letter of 30 July, Gage was told that the 64th and 65th Regiments were to be sent from Ireland to Boston.



The British Landing in Boston. The arrival of British troops in Boston in the autumn of 1768 is depicted in this colored engraving, produced in 1770 by Paul Revere. HULTON ARCHIVE/GETTY IMAGES.

Transports carrying Dalrymple's force of 800 men (most of the Fourteenth and Twenty-ninth Regiments and an artillery company with five guns) sailed from Halifax on 19 September 1768, convoyed by a powerful Royal Navy squadron under Commodore Hood (a ship-of-the-line, seven frigates, and two tenders). This armada reached Boston Harbor on 28 September, and found a tense situation awaiting it. Some Boston radicals wanted to mobilize the town mob and forcibly resist the landing of the regulars from Halifax. The leaders in surrounding towns refused to support the radicals, and James Otis, Jr., who opposed mob violence, reminded them that the other colonies would probably condemn them if their actions started a war. Otis's views prevailed. On 1 October, when the regulars landed under the guns of the Royal Navy to establish a garrison that would be in Boston for seven and a half years, "they were greeted with cold silence rather than hot lead" (Alden, p. 163). The contingent from Ireland started arriving in mid-November, but a large portion of the Sixty-fifth Regiment, with its commander, Colonel Alexander Mackay, was driven off the coast by a storm. After taking refuge on Nevis, in the West Indies, it reached Boston on 30 April 1769.

The British had trouble procuring quarters and provisions for four regiments in Boston. Gage had sent an engineer, Captain John Montresor by land from New York City to assess the availability of quarters and to repair

the barracks at Castle William, the fort on an offshore island that guarded the harbor. Dalrymple and Bernard wanted to billet the Halifax regiments in town and quarter the regiments from Ireland at Castle William. But, in outright defiance of the requirements of the Quartering Act, Boston's leaders refused to provide quarters in town as long as the barracks on Castle Island were empty, and turned down all requests to furnish provisions. Gage reached Boston on 15 October, and in the next six weeks (before he returned to New York City on 24 November) he managed to arrange makeshift billets and find supplies.

The town permitted some of the troops to use Faneuil Hall temporarily, but the rest of the British troops had to camp on the Common. Gage and Bernard got reluctant authority from the provincial council to use the Manufactory Building, which belonged to the province, but this, too, caused unrest. Other persons had been authorized to use the building, and they sued to stop Gage and Bernard from evicting them. Gage then decided to rent property at the crown's expense. A Tory named James Murray had already made several buildings available (4 October). An adaptable patriot named William Molineux rented the army several warehouses on Wheelwright's Wharf (28 October) and a week later made available another building, as well. Part of the Irish contingent went to Castle Island and the rest was billeted in Boston.

Gage understood the seriousness of the problem he faced in Boston. He told Hillsborough on 26 September 1768 that the people of Boston had displayed “mutinous behavior” and that their actions had been “treasonable and desperate” (Carter, p. 196). His remedy was intelligent and, had it been implemented, was probably the best way Britain had of using military force as part of an integrated plan to quash the incipient rebellion in Boston:

I know of nothing that can so effectually quell the spirit of sedition, which has so long and so greatly prevailed here, and bring the people back to a sense of their duty, as speedy, vigorous, and unanimous measures taken in England to suppress it. Whereby the Americans shall plainly perceive, that it is the general and determined sense of the British nation, resolutely to support and maintain their rights, and to reduce them to their constitutional dependence, on the Mother Country. (Carter, p. 197)

In the event, imperial leaders did not follow Gage’s advice.

INCREASING TENSIONS

Colonel Dalrymple commanded the Boston garrison from its establishment on 1 October 1768 until Colonel John Pomeroy arrived in November with his Sixty-fourth Regiment. Mackay, who had the local rank of major general, succeeded to the garrison command when he arrived on 30 April 1769 with the portion of his Sixty-fifth Regiment that had taken refuge at Nevis. Pomeroy then went on leave. Mackay left Boston on 18 August 1769 for leave in Britain, and Dalrymple resumed command of the garrison. Before the end of July 1769, the Sixty-fourth and Sixty-fifth Regiments were transferred to Halifax, leaving only the Fourteenth and Twenty-ninth Regiments in Boston.

Reducing the garrison left enough troops in Boston to remind the town of its grievances, but too few to cow the radicals. Renewed agitation, some of which was directed by radical leaders like Samuel Adams, led to confrontation, the most serious of which was the Boston “Massacre” on 5 March 1770. Responding to threats from the radicals that the continued presence of British troops in Boston would lead to large-scale conflict, Governor Hutchinson and his council wanted Dalrymple to withdraw the Twenty-ninth Regiment to Castle William and keep the soldiers of the Fourteenth Regiment in their barracks. “Dalrymple, although he had only six hundred men fit for duty, suggested that a threatened insurrection was a powerful argument for keeping the troops in the town” (Alden, p. 176). But Dalrymple allowed himself to be persuaded by the civilian authorities, and thereby gave the radicals another demonstration of how threats and intimidation could trump the rule of law. The 29th

Regiment was ordered to New Jersey in April 1770, leaving only Dalrymple’s 14th Regiment at Boston. Two years later the 14th was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Leslie’s 64th Regiment.

Gage returned to Boston on 17 May 1774 to implement the British government’s punitive policies against the city. What had heretofore been a “garrison” soon was built up to the largest British troop concentration in America. By early July 1774 Gage had brought in four regiments from Britain, one from New York, and a few artillerymen. In October, the 10th and 52nd Regiments arrived from Quebec, part of the 18th and the 47th arrived from New York, and two companies of the 65th came from Newfoundland. Excluding the 64th Regiment on Castle Island, this gave the British commander almost 3,000 troops stationed in Boston. On 12 December the warships *Asia* and *Boyne* arrived from Britain with about 400 Royal Marines that could also be used in land action.

MORE TROOPS ARRIVE

At the start of 1775 Gage had about 4,500 combat troops, including five artillery companies and 460 marines from ships that now included the *Scarborough* and *Somerset*, plus frigates, sloops, and many transports. By the middle of June his strength in rank and file (not including officers) has been estimated as between 6,340 and 6,716 troops. By the end of June 1775 the following foot regiments were in Boston or on the way: 4th, 5th, 10th, 23rd, 35th, 38th, 43rd, 47th, 49th, 52nd, 59th, 63rd, 64th (at Castle William), and 67th. An “incorporated corps,” consisting of three companies of the 18th Regiment, had come from New York in October 1774, along with two companies of the 65th Regiment from Newfoundland. Four more companies of the 65th arrived in the spring of 1774, at about the same time the contingent of marines was increased to 600 men. The 17th Light Dragoons, numbering fewer than 300 troopers and counting on picking up their horses in America, reached Boston late in May.

Even as the number of troops under his command increased, Gage grew more despondent about his ability to enforce imperial edicts in Massachusetts or even to keep the peace. When he sent 250 regulars on 1 September 1774 to bring 125 barrels of gunpowder belonging to the colony from Cambridge to Boston, he sparked an enormous outpouring of American minutemen and militia ready to resist by force of arms. Two days later, he began fortifying Boston Neck and building more barracks. On 26 February 1775, he sent Leslie with his 64th Regiment to confiscate cannon at Salem, but this display of armed force did not cow the increasingly self-confident and well-organized radicals. When he sent 900 men to seize military stores at Concord on 19 April 1775, the resistance of the countryside demonstrated the final failure of Britain’s attempt to use troops to secure the political obedience of

the colonies. The British garrison's principal attempt to break the American encirclement of Boston failed at Bunker Hill on 17 June 1775, and although reinforcements arrived during the remainder of the siege of Boston, no further major combat took place. When the British evacuated the city on 17 March 1776, their total strength in army and navy personnel was about 11,000 men.

SEE ALSO *Boston Massacre; Boston Siege; Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Lexington and Concord; Liberty Affair; Montresor, John; Otis, James; Powder Alarm; Quartering Acts; Salem, Massachusetts.*

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BOSTON MASSACRE. 5 March 1770. Increasing friction between British soldiers of the Boston Garrison and local citizens created conditions ripe for confrontation. On Friday, 2 March 1770, an exchange of insults between workmen and an off-duty soldier seeking employment at Grey's ropewalk led to a small riot. Tempers did not cool over the weekend, and by Monday evening, 5 March, bands of soldiers and civilians roamed the moonlit streets looking for trouble. About 9 P.M. a sentry of the Twenty-ninth Regiment at the Customs House in King Street was so taunted and menaced by a crowd of about sixty young men and boys that, fearing for his life, he loaded his musket and called for help from the nearby Main Guard. Captain Thomas Preston, the officer of the day, led a corporal and seven soldiers to rescue the sentry. Although the soldiers had fixed bayonets and eventually also loaded their muskets, the crowd continued to taunt and press in on them, apparently led by Crispus Attucks, a sailor of African and native American descent. Finally, one nervous soldier pulled his trigger and the rest followed. The British gunshots killed three men, including Attucks, and wounded eight others, two mortally. With the crowd stunned and the soldiers reloading and preparing to fire again, Preston ordered his men back to the Main Guard. No one in the crowd made any attempt to retaliate or to follow the soldiers.

The incident created an uproar in Boston, and it was only with great difficulty that imperial officials, including Governor Thomas Hutchinson, managed to quiet the town. Preston and his men were arrested and charged with murder, the Twenty-ninth Regiment was withdrawn to Castle William, and the Fourteenth Regiment was confined to barracks. The radicals claimed that the "massacre" was the inevitable result of having British troops garrisoned in a town of peace-loving citizens, and used the incident to demonstrate to other colonies the evils of increased imperial control. They turned the incident into a propaganda victory, greatly aided by Paul Revere's engraving, which depicted the soldiers as a group of leering, blood-thirsty killers firing into an innocent gathering of Boston citizens. Allegations that Samuel Adams provoked the entire incident to inflame the people and animate the resistance cannot be proven.

Because of fears that Captain Preston and his men could not get a fair trial in Boston, King George III expressed his willingness to pardon the men if they were convicted. But the trial (in late October 1770) turned into a shrewdly orchestrated demonstration of the rectitude of the radical cause. With the approbation of the radical leaders, three leading Boston attorneys (Robert Auchmuty, John Adams, and Josiah Quincy, Jr.) carefully picked a jury, emphasized the uncertainties in eyewitness testimony, and claimed the soldiers had fired in self-defense. They managed to get Preston and six soldiers acquitted of all charges. Two soldiers whom everyone agreed had fired their muskets were convicted of manslaughter, but they were released after pleading the benefit of clergy and being branded on the hand.

Patriot propaganda in 1770 viewed the five men killed in the "massacre" as martyrs to the cause of American liberty. Opinions in subsequent years have varied. When the Massachusetts General Assembly voted in 1887 to erect a memorial to the victims, members of the Massachusetts Historical Society protested, resolving that "nothing but a misapprehension of the event styled the 'Boston massacre' can lead to classifying these persons with those entitled to grateful recognition at the public expense" (Alden, p. 184). Whether the members objected more to memorializing riotous behavior or to the social standing of the victims is not known.

SEE ALSO *Adams, John; Adams, Samuel; Attucks, Crispus; Boston Garrison.*

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Boston Port Act

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BOSTON PORT ACT. 1 June 1774. Parliament passed the Boston Port Act, one of the so-called Intolerable Acts, to shut down the port of Boston until restitution had been made to the British East India Company for the cost of the tea destroyed in the Boston Tea Party on 16 December 1773. With effect from 1 June 1774, the customs office in Massachusetts was moved to Salem, allowing commerce to continue but bypassing Boston. The act had the effect of rallying other colonies, notably Virginia, to the support of Massachusetts, and resulted indirectly in the call for the first Continental Congress to consider united measures of resistance.

SEE ALSO *Boston Tea Party; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts.*

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BOSTON SIEGE. 19 April 1775–17 March 1776. By the evening of 19 April 1775, several thousand well-armed militiamen from Massachusetts had driven the British regulars sent to raid Lexington and Concord back into Boston and had invested the city. The opposing sides were in direct contact only at Boston Neck; Charlestown peninsula to the northeast and Dorchester peninsula to the southeast were occupied by neither side.


THE AMERICAN BUILDUP

The Massachusetts Provincial Congress had already taken steps to create and direct armed forces to resist the British. On 26 October 1774, the first Provincial Congress had urged the towns to take control of their militia companies, authorized the enlisting of minuteman companies, and established the Committee of Safety as its executive agent during recesses. The next day it appointed three general officers (Jedediah Preble, Artemas Ward, and Seth Pomeroy) to command the militia should it be called into active service. On 9 February 1775, the second

Congress had confirmed these arrangements and added two more general officers (John Thomas and William Heath). On 8 April “it resolved in general terms to raise and establish an army,” and in response to inquiries from Connecticut and Rhode Island, sent delegations to the assemblies in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire to acquaint them with its intention to raise an army and to ask them to contribute men and material to the projected army. Thus it was that Massachusetts was prepared both to respond effectively to the British raid on 19 April and thereafter rapidly to form an army to besiege Boston.

Starting on the evening of 19 April, the Committee of Safety, under the chairmanship of Dr. Joseph Warren, took the lead in bringing order out of the chaos left by the day’s events. The Provincial Congress reconvened on 22 April at Concord and immediately adjourned to Watertown, from where it formally put into motion on the 23rd the plans it had earlier laid for a provincial army. It recommended that 30,000 men be called to arms in New England, 13,600 of them to be raised immediately in Massachusetts. It confirmed Artemas Ward as commander in chief of the Massachusetts troops, headquartered at Cambridge, and named John Thomas to organize a force at Roxbury, facing the British earthworks on Boston Neck. The Massachusetts army took shape slowly, as the militiamen who had turned out on short notice on 19 April decided whether or not to enlist immediately, return home temporarily before enlisting, or return home permanently. More than half of the new army was composed of veterans of 19 April, led in most cases by the officers under whom they had turned out; the remainder were newly enlisted. Arranging companies into regiments also took time, and it was not until the third week of May that commissions were issued to confirm arrangements that had been in place, in some cases, for nearly a month. Ultimately, twenty-seven regiments formed, some as late as mid-July, with strengths varying from 475 to 700 men each.

The Rhode Island Assembly voted on 25 April to send a brigade of three regiments, fifteen hundred men under Nathanael Greene, to reinforce the siege. The Rhode Islanders arrived in late May and took station with Thomas in the camp at Jamaica Plains. The leaders of the New Hampshiremen who had turned out on 19 April and remained at Cambridge met on 26 April to advise the men to stay in service and place themselves under Colonel John Stark. The New Hampshire Congress voted on 20 May to set a quota of two thousand men and place Nathaniel Folsom in command, but he did not arrive in camp until 20 June. The two regiments under Stark were stationed at Medford and Charlestown Neck. The Connecticut General Assembly voted on 26 April to enlist six thousand men in six regiments and appointed David Wooster as its major general and Joseph Spencer



The Attack on Bunker's Hill and the Burning of Charlestown. *The June 1775 attack on Boston's Bunker Hill and the burning of nearby Charlestown is depicted in this engraving, first published around 1790 in Edward Barnard's History of England. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.*

and Israel Putnam as brigadier generals. The regiments of Spencer and Putnam arrived in early May, joining Thomas and Ward respectively; eventually, four Connecticut regiments served at Boston.

By early June 1775, the "grand American army" in the camps around Boston numbered about 16,000 men, 11,500 from Massachusetts, 2,300 from Connecticut, 1,200 from New Hampshire, and 1,000 from Rhode Island. About one-third were stationed at Roxbury and Jamaica Plains under Thomas; the right wing included four thousand men from Massachusetts, Greene's Rhode Island regiments, most of Spencer's Connecticut regiment, and three or four artillery companies. The center, at Cambridge under Ward, comprised nine thousand men in fifteen Massachusetts regiments, four Massachusetts artillery companies under Major Samuel Gridley, Putnam's Connecticut regiment, and the rest of Spencer's. On the left were three companies of Samuel Gerrish's Massachusetts regiment at Chelsea, John Stark's New Hampshire Regiment (the largest in the army) at Medford, and James Reed's smaller New Hampshire Regiment near Charlestown Neck.

Although nearly all men carried a personal firearm, either their own or one supplied by their town or colony, this improvised army was short of all other matériel, particularly gunpowder. Ward was in direct command of all Massachusetts troops, who constituted the bulk of the "Boston army," and of the New Hampshire contingent, which had been directed to take orders from him. The Rhode Island and Connecticut contingents took formal orders only from their own officers at this time, but they cooperated effectively with Ward. After the Battle of Bunker Hill on 17 June, Connecticut put its troops under Ward's direct command.

For two and a half weeks after the British raid on Lexington and Concord, the Americans worked feverishly to organize their army and the British, stunned by the militia's spirit and prowess, wondered what to do next, especially how to keep themselves fed now that traditional sources of supply had been cut off. As early as 27 April, Warren advocated an attack on Boston, an impossibility given the disorganization of the American army at that time, but all of the New England commanders recognized the need to keep the men enthusiastic and focused on the

task at hand. Putnam was the first to help the American army shake off its lethargy. On 13 May he led his regiment on a grand excursion around Charlestown peninsula, in full view of the British army in Boston and the Royal Navy's warships floating offshore, in an effort to taunt the enemy and embolden his own army. Major General Thomas Gage, the British commander in chief in North America, launched his first foraging expedition, to Grape Island in Boston Harbor the next day, inaugurating a series of skirmishes and raids that soon encompassed all of the important islands in the harbor: Noodle's, Hog's, Pettick's and Deer's. Skirmishing also occurred at Boston Neck, where the lines were in contact.

THE BRITISH RESPONSE

A new phase in the Boston siege began on 25 May 1775, when British Major Generals William Howe, Henry Clinton, and John Burgoyne arrived in Boston with reinforcements for the Boston garrison. By mid-June the British had about sixty-five hundred rank and file stationed in a city of less than seventeen thousand people, Gage having allowed some civilians (mainly women and children) to flee to the American lines. Although Howe carried a dormant commission to replace Gage, all four senior British officers seem to have worked together on a plan to suppress the rebellion by force of arms. They decided, first, to strengthen their defenses by taking unoccupied Dorchester Heights, the key to the British position in Boston; should American artillery be placed on the heights, it could force the Royal Navy from the harbor. That accomplished, they planned to march out across Boston Neck and make for the American headquarters and supply depot at Cambridge, keeping their right flank close to water and confident that well-trained British regulars could brush aside any opposition the Americans might muster. Destruction of the laboriously accumulated supplies at Cambridge, especially the gunpowder, might not deal a death blow to the rebellion, but it would certainly cripple the rebels' ability to mount significant military resistance for the foreseeable future.

Before putting the plan in motion Gage, who had been ordered by London to proclaim martial law in Massachusetts but who also wanted to make a last effort to avoid an escalation of hostilities, issued on 12 June a manifesto that he had asked Burgoyne to draft. "Gentleman Johnny," as the Americans had derisively nicknamed him, thought he had a flair for literary expression. Addressing "the infatuated multitude, who have long suffered themselves to be conducted by certain well known incendiaries and traitors," Gage's proclamation (in Burgoyne's words) offered the king's pardon to all who would lay down their arms, except Samuel Adams and John Hancock. The document was met with derision on both sides of the Atlantic.


The Massachusetts Committee of Safety learned of the British plan on 13 June, five days before the operation was to take place, possibly because Burgoyne had boasted of the thrashing the Americans were about to receive, although information security was so extremely lax on both sides that the information might have come from multiple sources. The Americans ordered a countermove to fortify Charlestown peninsula, hoping to deflect British attention from the occupation of Dorchester Heights. The result was the Battle of Bunker Hill on 17 June, which left the British in possession of Charlestown peninsula, but at an unacceptable cost in both their own casualties and the enhancement of American morale.

A CONTINENTAL ARMY

Unknown to the combatants on Bunker Hill, the Continental Congress in Philadelphia had, three days earlier, voted to adopt the New England army besieging Boston as a "continental army" and had elected George Washington, one of the Virginia delegates, as its commander in chief. He took command at Cambridge on 2 July and did not like what he found. In his letter to John Hancock, the president of Congress, on 10 July, Washington made clear the army's deficiencies. Although he made sure to praise the efforts of the New Englanders, especially the Massachusetts Provincial Congress and the Connecticut commissary, Joseph Trumbull (the son of the Connecticut governor), he noted the too-great extent of the siege lines, the absence of engineers, the lack of adequate returns (making it impossible to know the true size of the army), the inadequate number of tents, the great deficiency in "necessary clothing" (especially among the Massachusetts troops), and the problems caused when Congress disregarded local seniority in appointing Continental general officers.

Two problems were of even greater concern. "Upon finding the Number of Men to fall so far short of the Establishment, and below all Expectations," Washington wrote, "I immediately called a Council of the general Officers whose opinion as to the Mode of filling up the regiments, and providing for the present Exigency, I have the Honour of inclosing." At the council of 9 July, the generals had recommended sending an officer from each of the Massachusetts companies to recruit in their home areas and "to apply to the provincial Congress of this Province for their assistance in procuring a temporary reinforcement." Washington was not sanguine about the outcome:

From the Number of Boys, [British] Deserters, and Negroes which have been listed in the Troops of this Province, I entertain some Doubts whether the Number required [the council had recommended a total of 22,000 men] can be raised here; and all the General Officers agree that no Dependance can be put on the Militia for a



THE GALE GROUP.

Continuance in Camp, or Regularity and Discipline during the short Time they may stay.

Congress had already (on 14 and 22 June) agreed to pay for a dozen companies of riflemen, to be raised on the Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia frontiers and to be sent to reinforce the army around Boston as soon as possible. The first company arrived in late July and the remainder in August, the only reinforcements Washington received from outside New England.

Concern about the discipline of the militia led Washington to describe his greatest problem, the solution for which, he recognized, he bore principal responsibility:

It requires no Military Skill to judge of the Difficulty of introducing proper Discipline and Subordination into an Army while we have the Enemy in view, and are in daily Expectation of an Attack, but it is of so much Importance that every Effort will be made which Time and Circumstance will admit. In the mean Time, I have a sincere Pleasure in observing that there are Materials for a good Army, a great Number of

able-bodied Men, active [and] zealous in the Cause and of unquestionable Courage.

The problems Washington enumerated in July 1775 were to remain with him in one form or another throughout the war, along with a whole slew not yet as apparent. It was to the great credit of the commander in chief and his principal subordinates that the new Continental army remained an effective force through early December 1775.

Like Putnam, Washington had served as a senior officer during the French and Indian War, and he, too, understood the need to keep the men active and focused to keep discipline from deteriorating even further. Throughout the summer and fall, Washington worked on numerous plans to attack the British garrison in Boston. On 21 September, for example, he told Hancock that "The State of Inactivity, in which this Army has lain for some Time, by no Means corresponds with my Wishes[;] by some decisive stroke [I propose] to relieve my Country from the heavy Expence, its Subsistence must create." He thought a surprise attack

not “wholly impracticable, though hazardous.” When his generals rejected his idea, he assured Hancock by writing that “I cannot say that I have wholly laid it aside.”

Even though no attack ever materialized, each side was active in skirmishing against the other. Among the more noteworthy were the following encounters. On 21 July, Major Joseph Vose led Massachusetts troops on a raid to destroy the lighthouse on Great Brewster Island; Major Benjamin Tupper led another raid on 31 July to prevent the British from rebuilding it. Gage sent three men-of-war and six transports from Boston on 25 July to raid small islands in Long Island Sound (Block, Fisher’s, Gardiner’s, and Plumb); on 20 August he reported the capture of eighteen hundred sheep and more than one hundred oxen. Vice Admiral Samuel Graves, who had reached Boston on 1 July to enforce the blockade, sent a force to attack Falmouth, Maine, on 16–17 October. Pennsylvania riflemen and two Massachusetts regiments repulsed a foraging party sent to Lechmere’s Point on 9 November.

RAISING A NEW ARMY

By November 1775, Washington had seventeen thousand men, all of them reasonably well fed, housed, and healthy. But that was about to change. Because the enlistments of the Connecticut regiments expired on 10 December and those of the rest of the army were about to expire on 31 December, he faced the problem of raising another army in the midst of an ongoing siege. In this critical period, as Congress in Philadelphia debated about how to raise money and place-hunters sought personal advantage from the reorganization of the army, Washington “had to struggle with himself to keep his patience and his faith” (Freeman, p. 570).

Writing to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Reed from Cambridge on 28 November 1775, Washington reported that:

We have been till this time Enlisting about 3500 men. To engage these I have been obliged to allow Furloughs as far as 50 Men a Regiment, and the Officers, I am perswaded, indulge as many more. The Connecticut Troops will not be prevail’d upon to stay longer than their term (saving those who have enlisted for the next Campaign, and mostly on Furlough), and such a dirty, mercenary Spirit pervades the whole, that I should not be at all surpris’d at any disaster that may happen. In short, after the last of this month our lines will be so weakened that the Minute Men and Militia must be call’d in for their defence; these being under no kind of Government themselves, will destroy the little subordination I have been labouring to establish[;] . . . could I have foreseen what I have, and am likely to experience, no consideration upon Earth should have induced me to accept this Command.

Five weeks later, he again unburdened himself to Reed:

Search the vast volumes of history through, and I much question whether a case similar to ours is to be found; to wit, to maintain a post against the flower of the British Troops for Six Months together, without [gunpowder], and at the end of them to have one Army disbanded and another to raise within the same distance of a Reinforced Enemy. . . . The same desire of retiring into a Chimney Corner siez’d the Troops of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts (so soon as their time expired) as had Work’d upon those of Connecticut. . . . We are now left with a good deal less than half rais’d Regiments, and about 5000 militia who only stand Ingaged to the middle of this Month, when, according to custom, they will depart, let the necessity of their stay be never so urgent. Thus it is that for more than two Months past I have scarcely immerged from one difficulty before I have been plunged into another.

By 14 January 1776, only 8,212 of the 20,370 men authorized by Congress the preceding October had been enlisted, and only 5,582 men were present and fit for duty. Meanwhile, the five thousand Massachusetts militiamen called in to serve from 10 December would end their term on 15 January 1776. Over two thousand of Washington’s men lacked muskets, the rest had no more than ten rounds of ammunition each, and the Boston garrison was being reinforced. On 16 January, Washington prevailed on a council of war to accept his view that the British must be attacked before their further reinforcement in the spring made this completely impossible. A call was then made for thirteen militia regiments to serve during February and March to make such an operation possible. The next day Washington learned of the failure at Quebec, and Congress later detached three of the thirteen new militia regiments for service in Philip Schuyler’s Northern Department.

On 16 February, before all the new militia units had arrived, Washington proposed, again, to a council of war that the army launch a surprise attack against Boston over the ice of Back Bay; he estimated that the enemy now numbered only five thousand foot troops and believed his own sixteen thousand militia and Continentals had a rare opportunity for success. His generals opposed this plan on various grounds, principally that Washington had underestimated enemy strength and overestimated the offensive power of his own troops. They also insisted that no assault could be undertaken without an artillery preparation of several days; although Henry Knox’s “Noble Train of Artillery” had begun arriving at Framingham from Fort Ticonderoga, gunpowder was still in short supply. A less ambitious plan did, however, emerge from this meeting. The generals proposed that while an adequate supply of

gunpowder was being assembled, they should, meanwhile, seize some position that would draw the British out of Boston and into an attack on an objective the Americans would have had time to fortify. Although disappointed by the failure of his generals to endorse his assault plan (they were right; the ice lasted only a few days), Washington turned his attention to the plan they proposed. Thus was borne the operation that secured Dorchester Heights for the Americans on the night of 4–5 March 1776.

THE BRITISH EVACUATE

Since the summer of 1775, the British had considered moving their forces from Boston to the more central, and, they hoped, more loyal, area around New York City. After calling off an attack on American-held Dorchester Heights ordered for the night of 5–6 March, Howe decided on 7 March to evacuate Boston. The transports were loaded by 9 A.M. on 17 March. At 9 P.M. the Sixty-fourth Regiment blew up Castle William as it departed, the last group—out of a total of about eleven thousand British army and navy personnel and nearly one thousand Loyalists (including one hundred civil officials)—to leave Boston. The convoy remained in Nantasket Roads, five miles south of the city, until 27 March, when it sailed for Halifax rather than New York, as the Americans expected. By tacit agreement, the British, in return for being allowed to depart unmolested, did not burn Boston. There was a great deal of looting by departing soldiers and Loyalists, however. A New York Irish adventurer named Crean Bush was authorized by Howe to seize clothing and other supplies that might benefit the Americans, but his loot-laden brigantine *Elizabeth* was recaptured. The Loyalists were given vessels but were required to raise their own crews.

General Ward entered Boston on 17 March with five hundred men who had immunity to smallpox. Washington visited the town the next day, and the American main body entered on 20 March. The British had left sixty-nine cannon that could be salvaged by the American artillery, and thirty-one that were useless. Miscellaneous ordnance matériel, almost all the enemy's medical supplies, and—most surprisingly and welcome—three thousand blankets and much equipment were found on the wharves, a windfall resulting from Howe's lack of shipping capacity and the failure of subordinates to follow his orders to destroy matériel that could not be evacuated.

The eight-month siege had cost the Americans fewer than twenty men killed in action. Boston and the province of Massachusetts were free of British troops for the remainder of the war.

SEE ALSO *Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Continental Army, Social History; Dorchester Heights, Massachusetts; Falmouth, Maine; Great Brewster Island,*

Massachusetts; Knox's "Noble Train of Artillery"; Lechmere Point, Massachusetts; Lexington and Concord; Massachusetts Provincial Congress; New York Campaign; Reed, Joseph; Thomas, John; Ward, Artemas; Warren, Joseph.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

BOSTON TEA PARTY. 16 December 1773. The *Dartmouth*, the first of three ships carrying East India Company tea, arrived in Boston Harbor on 28 November 1773, and docked at Griffin's Wharf three days later. It was followed shortly thereafter by the *Eleanor* and the *Bruce*. While the agents to whom the tea had been consigned waited to see if the cargo could be landed safely, the Boston Committee of Correspondence organized several mass meetings to prevent any unloading. Governor Thomas Hutchinson refused to allow the ships to leave Boston. He seems to have assumed that, after twenty days when the law allowed customs officers to seize goods to pay the required duties (in this case, three pence per pound of tea as required by the Tea Act of 1773), the tea would be impounded, the agents would be able to pay the duty, and the principle of Parliament's right to collect revenue in the colonies would be upheld.

Hutchinson did not think that local Patriot leaders would destroy the East India Company's property. He was, therefore, surprised when, after a meeting at the Old South Meeting House on the evening of 16 December over which Samuel Adams presided, a crowd surrounded the wharf while a boarding party of

between 40 and 50 men, “dressed and whooping like Indians,” emptied 340 chests of tea into Boston harbor. In a notable display of controlled violence, the “Indians” destroyed nothing other than the tea and the chests in which it was contained. Although some people believed at the time that John Hancock had led the boarding party, the people who destroyed the tea have never been reliably identified. The East India Company never received restitution for its loss, valued at £9,000.

The “tea party” ratcheted up the level of confrontation between Britain and the colonies, and began a sequence of events that convinced activists across British North America that they had to cooperate more closely to resist what they believed to be imperial tyranny. In March 1774 Parliament retaliated for the “tea party” by passing the Boston Port Act, the first of the Intolerable Acts, which prohibited any ship from entering or leaving the port of Boston until restitution had been made for the cost of the tea and assurances had been given for payment of duties in the future. The activists reacted by calling the first Continental Congress to consider collective resistance.

SEE ALSO *Adams, Samuel; Continental Congress; Hutchinson, Thomas; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; Tea Act.*

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BOUDINOT, ELIAS. (1740–1821). Jurist, commissary general of prisoners, president of the Continental Congress, director of the U.S. Mint, author. His Huguenot great-grandfather came to New York in 1687. The fourth Elias in a line, he studied law with Richard Stockton, his future brother-in-law and signer of the Declaration of Independence. Licensed to practice law in 1760, he moved to Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and became a prominent attorney (receiving an honorary LL.D. from Yale in 1790); he mentored young Alexander Hamilton. Conservative in his politics, he supported the colonial cause mainly by opposing the royal New Jersey government. When, on 11 June 1774, Boudinot became a member of the Committee of Correspondence for Essex County, he believed that some ties with England were necessary. But in March 1775 he urged the General Assembly’s approbation of delegates to the Continental Congress. He was in the Provincial Congress in 1775 and

sent gunpowder to Washington at Cambridge when the general’s supplies ran low.

On 1 April 1777 Washington asked him to be the first commissary general of prisoners and also to procure intelligence. Boudinot declined the job, but Washington “objected to the conduct of Gentlemen of the Country refusing to join him in his Arduous Struggle... That if Men of Character & influence would not come forward & join him in his Exertions, all would be lost. Affected by this address . . . I consented to accept” (Elias Boudinot, *Journal*, p. 9). On 6 June 1777, Congress approved him as commissary general of prisoners with the pay and rations of a colonel, backdated to 15 April, and two deputies. He was answerable to General Washington.

At that time some five thousand American prisoners were in British hands and had to be fed and clothed by the Americans. On a visit to New York in February 1778, Boudinot borrowed nearly twenty-seven thousand dollars on his own credit to clothe and feed fourteen hundred men. He overcame great difficulties to organize the care of prisoners, becoming particularly close to Washington during this time. Boudinot regarded the general with reverence and aided him in a number of ways, such as by resolving conflicts between Steuben and other officers. In the area of intelligence, on 4 December 1777 he procured information “that Genl Howe was coming out the Next Morning with 5000 Men” and passed it on in time for Washington to prepare for the enemy’s movement against the commander in chief’s position at Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania (*ibid.*, p. 50).

On 20 November 1777 he was elected to the Continental Congress but did not attend until July 1778. He also served terms from 1781 to 1783 and was named president on 4 November 1782. He was described by Eliphalet Dyer as “a Gentn of good Carracter, virtuous, & decent behavior.” On 15 April 1783 he signed the proclamation of the cessation of hostilities. On 24 June 1783 he ordered the removal of Congress to Princeton in order to avoid mutinous soldiers that the state of Pennsylvania refused to control. As president he signed resolutions of thanks to the departing French army, treaties with Sweden and France, and proclamations disbanding the Continental army and calling for public thanksgiving. He was also acting secretary of foreign affairs in 1783–1784. He presided over Congress at Princeton and on 26 August 1783 read a congratulatory address in which Washington was praised: “Your services have been essential in acquiring and establishing the freedom and independence of your country. They deserve the grateful acknowledgements of a free and independent Nation.”

Under the new Constitution, Boudinot served in the House of Representatives from 1789 to 1795 as a strong Federalist. After his retirement from Congress, he became the third director of the U.S. Mint in October 1795. He

resigned in July 1805. In 1790 he became the first counselor named by the U.S. Supreme Court. An extremely rich man, he retired to study biblical literature and, as a trustee of Princeton University (1772–1821), helped the school through financial troubles; in 1805 he spent three thousand dollars to found its cabinet of natural history. He authored four religious texts from 1801 to 1815 and helped found the American Bible Society, an institution he endowed and of which he served as president.

His sister married Richard Stockton, who was the father-in-law of Benjamin Rush. Elias married Stockton's sister Hannah in 1762, and his many letters to her are a wonderful testament to love and devotion. Described as "elegant . . . tall, handsome every way prepossessing," he combined good sense with benevolence (J. J. Boudinot, ed., vol. 1, pp. 23–24). His home in Elizabeth, New Jersey, is a National Historic Landmark. He is buried at St. Mary's Episcopal Churchyard in Burlington, New Jersey.

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revised by Joseph Lee Boyle

BOUGAINVILLE, LOUIS-ANTOINE

DE. (1729–1811). French explorer, Admiral. Born in Paris as the son of a notary, Bougainville early entered the Black Musketeers, published a book on integral calculus (1752), and became secretary of the French embassy in London (1756). During the Seven Years' War he was captain of dragoons and served as Montcalm's aide in Canada, where he assisted in the capture of Fort Oswego and Fort William Henry. He was promoted to colonel in 1759. In 1760 he defended Île-de-Noix at the mouth of Lake Champlain. After 1763 he was named a ship's captain in the navy; established a colony in the Falkland Islands for Acadians (1763–1765); and made the famous, two-year voyage of discovery around the world (1767–1769) that resulted in his book, *Voyage autour du monde* (Voyage around the world) (1771).

When France declared war against England in 1778, he commanded the *Guerrier* and later the *Languedoc* in d'Estaing's squadron at Rhode Island and Savannah. In 1779 he was promoted to commander of the squadron. He participated in the September 1781 action off the Virginia Capes. In January 1782, Bougainville captured Montserrat. At the Battle of the Saints in August 1782, aboard the *Auguste*, he rescued eight ships of his division but was accused by Grasse of misconduct and banished from the royal court. He was a member of the Royal Academy of Sciences, the Royal Naval Academy, and the London Royal Society and a knight of the Order of Saint Louis. During the French Revolution, he refused the post of minister of the navy but accepted in June 1792 the rank of vice admiral. He retired in 1793 to his estate in Brie. He became a member of the Institut de France in 1795. Napoleon appointed him senator, conferred upon him the title of count, and named him grand officer in the Legion of Honor.

SEE ALSO *Grasse, François Joseph Paul.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

BOUND BROOK, NEW JERSEY.

13 April 1777. While Sir William Howe's and George Washington's armies were still in winter quarters, much of northern New Jersey became a no-man's-land. Each side sent patrols and foraging parties into the area and sought to ambush the other side's parties. On one such occasion a British foraging expedition (built up to nearly eight thousand men) swept the area around Brunswick. While there it also attempted to cut off the American outpost at Bound

Bounties (Commercial)

Brook, seven miles up the Raritan. Charles Lord Cornwallis led a task force estimated at two thousand British and Germans that moved at night against Major General Benjamin Lincoln's camp. Total American strength was probably about five hundred men, mostly from the Eighth Pennsylvania and supported by three three-pounders from Proctor's artillery regiment (a state unit until becoming Continental in June) and some militia. Although surprised, Lincoln extricated most of his force, but enemy light horse captured the guns. Cornwallis withdrew before Greene arrived with reinforcements.

Knox estimated that the Americans lost six killed and twenty or thirty captured. The British do not appear to have lost anyone. While some suspected that a neighborhood farmer learned the password and gave it to the British, the primary blame for the surprise was put on the militia, which were supposed to be guarding the Raritan, which was fordable at almost every point. Lincoln and his men were considered to have acquitted themselves well. The incident prompted Washington to reduce the number and size of his outposts. Not only was this an effort to prevent further surprise attacks, but it also contributed to Washington's massing of forces to better counter the anticipated British offensive.

SEE ALSO *Cornwallis, Charles; Howe, William; Philadelphia Campaign; Washington, George.*

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BOUNTIES (COMMERCIAL). As part of its policy of mercantilism, the British government paid premiums or bounties to encourage certain industries or production. The Act of 1705, for example, provided bounties on certain naval stores that were listed as enumerated articles. These bounties, except for that on hemp, which lapsed during the Seven Years' War, continued until 1774. Bounty payments on naval stores during these years totaled £1,438,702. Indigo bounties, paid chiefly to planters in Georgia and the Carolinas, amounted to more than £185,000 from 1748 to 1776.

SEE ALSO *Enumerated Articles; Mercantilism; Naval Stores.*

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BOUNTIES (MILITARY) SEE *Pay, Bounties, and Rations.*

BOUQUET, HENRY. (1719–1765). Swiss-born British army officer and military theorist. After a careful education Bouquet entered the Dutch service in 1736, and during the War of the Austrian Succession he fought for the Sardinians, probably learning something of light infantry tactics in the process. In 1748 he became captain commandant and lieutenant colonel of a Swiss Guards regiment being formed by the Prince of Orange to occupy fortresses being given up by the French. This brought him into pleasant contact with the British, and in 1756 to a lieutenant colonelcy in the new Royal American (60th) regiment being formed for service in North America. Bouquet, who seems already to have devoured numerous modern works on military theory, was particularly impressed by Count Turpin de Crisse's *Essai sur l'art de la Guerre* (1754) and went to America determined to apply its maxims to American conditions. After a brief period in South Carolina, where a French attack was expected, his battalion joined Forbes's expedition in Pennsylvania. Bouquet quickly realised Native Americans were far more dangerous than any European light infantry and analysed the principles behind their methods: attempt to surround the enemy, always adopt an open deployment, and always yield ground when attacked in force. Soon he was systematically training his battalion in counter-tactics devised by himself and enthusiastically pressing de Crisse's book upon his colleagues. He allowed the ambitious and plausible Grant to bounce him into authorising a reconnaissance in force, but was not responsible for the unauthorised attack which led to Grant's defeat and capture at Fort Duquesne. In Pontiac's War he relieved Fort Pitt after a hard-fought victory at Bush Run (5–6 August 1763) and went on to lead an expedition that forced the Shawnees and Delawares to make peace in 1764. He was then made brigadier general and given the command of all British troops in the southern colonies, but died in an epidemic at Pensacola in the autumn of 1765.

Bouquet's personal attitude to Native Americans is controversial: while he seems to have removed settlers from the upper Ohio in anticipation of the Proclamation of 1763, he did not dissent from Amherst's proposal to distribute smallpox-infected blankets at the start of Pontiac's War. However, his status as an important innovator and theorist of light infantry methods in closed country is beyond dispute. William Smith's account of Bouquet's Ohio campaigns was prepared with papers given to him by Bouquet and the second edition (1766) included a reflective appendix almost certainly by

Bouquet's pen. The light infantry methods pioneered by Bouquet and others, though neglected in the 1760s, were quickly revived and adapted in the War of American Independence, and had a permanent effect upon the tactics of the British army.

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BOUQUET'S EXPEDITION OF 1764.

After relieving Fort Pitt in 1763 during Pontiac's War, Henry Bouquet's force of regulars was too small to subjugate the tribes in the Ohio Valley and to free their numerous white prisoners. Not until 1764 did the Pennsylvania Assembly vote an adequate force of provincials for the expedition. Virginia and Maryland flatly refused to contribute. On 5 August Bouquet reached Carlisle with the 1,000 Pennsylvania troops and a detachment of regulars from the Forty-third and Sixtieth Regiments. Within a week 200 provincials had deserted. On 17 September he reached Fort Pitt, having lost another 100 Pennsylvania troops, but Virginia had responded to his appeal and sent a body of woodsmen. After many delays, in early October he was able to leave Pittsburgh with 1,500 men. His cautious advance west some 100 miles to the Muskingum River, the heart of the Delaware and Shawnee country, was unopposed, and he was met by chiefs bringing eighteen white captives and suing for peace. Demanding that all prisoners be surrendered, he took hostages and moved south to the forks of the Muskingum and waited until another 200 prisoners were brought in. Making peace, he directed the Indians to go to Sir William Johnson to conclude treaty arrangements and returned to Pittsburgh with additional hostages to assure that the Indians delivered another 100 Shawnee captives and that they honored their obligation to make treaties with Johnson. The

Indians did both, and their threat to the frontier was temporarily ended. Bouquet's well-managed and successful campaign was in marked contrast to the failure of Bradstreet's Expedition of 1764.

SEE ALSO *Bouquet, Henry; Bradstreet's Expedition of 1764; Pontiac's War.*

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BOURG SEE *Cromot du Bourg, Baron de.*

BOWLER, METCALF. (1726–1789). Informer. Rhode Island. A London-born merchant and speculator, Bowler was a successful businessman during the years of Newport's commercial supremacy. A Patriot who served in the Stamp Act Congress, Continental Congress, and as Speaker of the Rhode Island assembly, Bowler was in fact one of General Henry Clinton's secret informers. This was not discovered until scholars gained access to Clinton's papers in the 1920s.

SEE ALSO *Clinton, Henry.*

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BOYD, THOMAS. (?–1779). Continental officer. Pennsylvania. First sergeant of Thompson's Pennsylvania Rifles on 25 June 1775, he was captured at Quebec on 31 December 1775 and exchanged in November 1777. Commissioned first lieutenant of the

First Pennsylvania on 14 January 1778, he was captured with Sergeant Michael Parker on 13 September 1779 while leading the advance guard of John Sullivan's expedition. Taken to Genesee, he and Parker were questioned by Joseph Brant and John Butler. After the latter two left, Boyd and Parker were horribly tortured and killed.

SEE ALSO *Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois.*

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BRADDOCK, EDWARD. (c. 1695–1755). British general. Edward Braddock, son of an officer of the same name, was baptised in London on 2 February 1695. In October 1710 he became an ensign in his father's regiment, the Coldstream Guards, and then rose slowly by the purchase of higher rank. By 1745 he was a lieutenant colonel, but almost certainly did not see action during the war of the Austrian Succession. In 1753 he became colonel of the Fourteenth Foot and was a popular acting governor of Gibraltar in 1753 and 1754. In April he was made major general. This was the man—solid, aging, inexperienced in action—who in the autumn was ordered to take two weak regiments to roll back the French in North America.

Braddock's tasks were to get the colonies to organize their own armed forces, co-ordinate a three-pronged offensive against recent French advances, and lead the thrust against Fort Duquesne himself. He arrived with the Forty-fourth and Forty-eighth Foot in Hampton, Virginia, on 20 February 1755 and immediately ran into difficulties. The colonies resisted cooperation, and he found it difficult to get provisions, transportation, and recruits for his own expedition. He attempted to recruit hundreds of Cherokees, only for Governor James Glen of South Carolina to step in and induce the warriors to stay at home. When Braddock's force finally assembled, it amounted to no more than 2,000 effective troops, many of them of indifferent quality. The army finally marched on 10 June, hacking its own road through the wilderness, but Braddock rapidly became alarmed at their slow progress. On 16 June he left about a third of his force under Thomas Dunbar, colonel of the Forty-eighth Foot, to follow with the baggage while Braddock himself pushed ahead with the main body.

Braddock's precautions against surprise were effective: the enemy was unable to harass his advance and decided not to attack him as he crossed the Monongahela River. The next day, however, a fateful slip in vigilance left a key hillock and adjacent ravines unsecured. While a French frontal attack was repulsed, hundreds of Indians were able to

stream down both flanks and pour deadly fire into the British column. The lack of light infantry training told as Braddock's orders to reform and advance against the foe in the woods were ignored. After three hours of vainly trying to stem the tide, Braddock was shot in the chest and the army fell back in disarray. On 13 July at Great Meadows, some sixty miles back, Braddock died.

The battle stimulated the development of new light infantry tactics for forest conditions which had a permanent, if uneven, effect on training of the British army. Braddock himself was awarded an undeserved share of the blame, and was caricatured as the archetypal, arrogant British martinet who refused to listen to American advice and had no idea of how to fight under American conditions. This travesty of the truth became widespread in America and had long-term effects upon the relations between colonists and the regular British army.

SEE ALSO *Forbes's Expedition to Fort Duquesne.*

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BRADSTREET'S CAPTURE OF FORT FRONTENAC. 27 August 1758. Seeking a victory in the aftermath of the disastrous British attack on Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga) on 7 July 1758, Major General James Abercromby ordered Lieutenant Colonel John Bradstreet to lead 3,100 provincial troops and bateaumen (armed transporters of military supplies who are also capable of offensive and defensive action) in a lightning raid to destroy Fort Frontenac (at Cataragui, now Kingston, Ontario). Located at the point where Lake Ontario flows into the St. Lawrence River, the fort controlled the French line of communications to their western posts, including Fort Duquesne (against which the expedition led by Brigadier General John Forbes was then advancing) and Fort Niagara. Bradstreet, who had been planning such a raid for two years, overcame significant logistical obstacles

to demonstrate that an Anglo-American force could move rapidly across long distances in the backcountry, even when encumbered with a small train of artillery. The force reached Oswego in mid-August and departed on the 22nd, rowing in bateaux and whaleboats along the shore of Lake Ontario before crossing to Cataract on the 25th. A few small cannon, placed in impromptu siege lines, compelled the garrison of perhaps 150 men to surrender on 27 August the key to French influence in the interior. After destroying the fort and its stock of supplies intended for posts farther west, Bradstreet's force was back at its starting point, the Oneida Carrying Place, by 13 September.

SEE ALSO *Forbes's Expedition to Fort Duquesne.*

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BRADSTREET'S EXPEDITION OF 1764.

As part of the delayed punitive action the British directed against participants in Pontiac's War, Colonel John Bradstreet left Niagara with 1,400 sickly British regulars and untrained American provincials in early August with orders from Major General Thomas Gage, British commander in chief in North America, to attack the Shawnees and Delawares. This was to be done in conjunction with Colonel Henry Bouquet's expedition from Fort Pitt and to continue on to Detroit. Near Presque Isle (later Erie, Pennsylvania), Bradstreet met ten Indians who claimed to be emissaries from the two tribes he was supposed to attack, and they duped him into concluding a peace treaty (12 August). He proceeded to Detroit, where he was only partially successful in his dealings with the Indians. The return voyage to Niagara, via Sandusky, Ohio, was badly managed. Bradstreet seriously overestimated the willingness of native Americans to submit to British control. Gage finally lost confidence in his leadership when Bradstreet disobeyed a direct order to attack the villages on the Scioto River, something Bradstreet knew to be logistically impossible. It was left to Bouquet's expedition to restore British prestige.

SEE ALSO *Bouquet's Expedition of 1764; Gage, Thomas; Pontiac's War.*

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BRANDYWINE, PENNSYLVANIA.


The Battle of Brandywine, on 11 September 1777, opened the British army's Philadelphia campaign with a major defeat for the American rebels. Nevertheless, some revolutionaries—both within, and to a lesser extent without, the Continental Army—saw in the character of the engagement limited signs of progress toward military parity with the enemy. The battle demonstrated the challenges soldiers on both sides faced trying to execute traditional strategic or tactical operations while surrounded by civilians of divided loyalties and diverse cultural characteristics in a charged revolutionary polity. It also shows us civilians beginning to teach themselves how to survive during warfare.

SIGNIFICANCE OF BRANDYWINE

The British commander in chief, William Howe, launched his effort to occupy and pacify Pennsylvania relatively late in 1777. On 25 August, about fourteen thousand British troops left warships at the navigable head of the Chesapeake Bay, near the modern town of Elkton, Maryland. After they were refreshed from five harrowing weeks at sea, they began cautiously probing toward Philadelphia, and more immediately, toward the positions of George Washington's main Continental army at Wilmington, Delaware. A sharp skirmish at Cooch's Bridge in Delaware on 3 September suggested Howe's intention to fight aggressively in 1777 after a tentative and ultimately costly end to the campaign the year before. Washington withdrew his force of about eleven thousand Continentals and some Pennsylvania militiamen into southern Chester County, Pennsylvania. He was determined not to let the Continental Congress be driven from Philadelphia for a second year in a row, but he also needed to protect critical fabrication and storage areas for Continental war materials and weapons in the upper Schuylkill River valley, above the town of Reading. The lower reaches of the Brandywine Creek represented a tactical and metaphorical fork in the road for that objective. If Howe's troops passed that obstacle unharmed, they would be able to campaign against either the American capital or against the Reading supply bases with relative ease.

DISPOSITIONS AND STRATEGIES

While the Brandywine was not a major, and certainly not a navigable, waterway, its flow was considerable enough to



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power a number of large “merchant” gristmills at Wilmington that ground fine flours for sale throughout the Caribbean and Mediterranean worlds. This trade had during the previous three generations turned southeastern Pennsylvania’s farmland into the “best poor man’s country in the world.” The Brandywine was fordable at a series of named sites between Wilmington and its division into eastern and western branches just southeast of the modern town of West Chester. On 10 September, Washington placed the main part of his army behind the Brandywine at Chads Ford. All outward appearances suggested that Howe—whose troops were camped six miles away at Kennett Square—would cross the Brandywine at Chads Ford. Washington attempted to reconnoitre the terrain in the Brandywine Valley, but he was later criticized for having an inadequate knowledge of its geographical complexities. His army was composed largely of new recruits, and services like intelligence—which required agents well-known to the commanders—were being belatedly rebuilt. Local civilians, especially the pacifist or neutral Quakers who dominated Chester County, were distrusted in American military camps. Pennsylvania’s own revolutionary government was in turmoil. It had been created in June and July of 1776, following the forcible overthrow of that colony’s provincial government. A year later its inexperienced leaders were still

struggling among themselves over power and constitutional authority. This made it a challenge for the state to fill its regular army quotas or even to keep its militia in the field. The same cultural factors that had tempted Howe to come to Pennsylvania to try to end the rebellion, therefore, confounded efforts by revolutionary civil and military leaders to fight an effective war on that terrain.

Washington established his headquarters in a farmhouse near Chads Ford. Behind the ford itself he installed the division commanded by his trusted subordinate, Nathaniel Greene of Rhode Island. Greene was joined there by General Benjamin Lincoln’s division, temporarily commanded in Lincoln’s absence by general Anthony Wayne. Wayne, a Pennsylvanian, lived in nearby Paoli. The inexperienced Pennsylvania militia guarded the left wing of Washington’s line at Pyle’s Ford, just south of Chads, a place not considered to be vulnerable to attack. The right wing was commanded by troops under general John Sullivan of New Hampshire. They concentrated at Brinton’s Ford; Jones’s Ford; Wistar’s Ford; and Buffington’s Ford, six miles to the north, which lay in the forks of the Brandywine. Washington’s informants the previous night had told him that there were no fordable places on the creek for twelve miles above the forks. To secure the right wing, Washington deployed small

mounted parties of regulars and militia who crossed the Brandywine to watch the countryside for British movements. These forces reported to Washington through Sullivan. Behind Greene and Sullivan, as reserve forces, respectively, were the divisions commanded by Adam Stephen of Virginia and by William Alexander, also known as Lord Stirling, of New Jersey. Washington kept an artillery corps at Chads Ford, and finally he sent skirmishing parties under General William Maxwell across the Brandywine to make contact with and report on the activities of approaching British forces there.

General Howe, at Kennett Square, hoped to execute a reversed version of the flanking maneuver he had employed to overwhelm the American forces at Brooklyn Heights on Long Island just over a year before. September mornings were often foggy in the region. Before dawn on 11 September, Howe sent between five thousand and seven thousand of his troops directly forward to Chads Ford under the command of the Hessian general, Wilhelm von Knyphausen. Knyphausen was instructed to make the appearance of preparations for a charge across the Brandywine to hold Washington's troops there. Meanwhile, Howe and his subordinate, general Charles Lord Cornwallis, with between seven thousand and nine thousand troops, marched to their left and headed upstream behind the creek, guided by local Loyalists and seeking unguarded fords. Howe had been informed that there were a pair of fords just above the forks of the creek.

Many later accounts of the battle suggested that Washington was again caught flatfooted by this maneuver, as he had been the previous year, and beaten for that reason. Actually, he both anticipated a possible flanking maneuver and even devised a plan to try to exploit it to his own advantage. If, as he thought, the nearest fords above Sullivan's positions were fifteen or more miles away, he could cross the Brandywine after Howe and Cornwallis departed and overwhelm Knyphausen's detachment before Howe could relieve him. At 8 A.M. Maxwell's troops engaged the forward elements of Knyphausen's force, and sharp clashes developed in obscured terrain. Maxwell was gradually driven back across the stream, but he reported, inaccurately, that his men had inflicted significant casualties on their opponent. After Knyphausen reached the Brandywine, artillery on both sides duelled noisily across the water for several hours, but the British made no concerted move to attack across the stream. The fog still lingered, and Washington could not tell whether he was facing all or just a part of the enemy's force.

WHERE WOULD HOWE ATTACK?

As the morning went on, the sun burned through and the day became very hot. Late in the morning, scouts began to report evidence of Howe's and Cornwallis's flanking maneuver through Sullivan, but the evidence was at best fragmentary

and contradictory. First Washington learned that a large body of redcoats had been observed marching north along the Brandywine toward the forks. His knowledge of particular fords and distances was partial and flawed, but Washington knew that if the British did cross the creek anywhere above Sullivan they would march against his right wing along a road that ran past the Birmingham Friends Meetinghouse. He ordered Stephen's and Stirling's reserve divisions to fall back and move toward that position to be ready to block such an attack. Then he ordered Greene's and Sullivan's divisions to cross the Brandywine to attack the diminished force that had presumably been left there by Howe.

The next intelligence reports confirmed the first ones, that at least five thousand British troops were marching toward the forks. This account named two fords immediately above that point, much closer than the twelve to fifteen miles previously believed. Almost immediately, however, Sullivan forwarded another report from Pennsylvania militia troops who said that they had scouted all morning but had seen no enemy troops above the forks. If this news was true, Washington realized, he risked sending a part of his army into battle with the whole of Howe's, with a treacherous watercourse at their rear. Confused by these contradictions, he countermanded his orders to Greene and Sullivan and ordered Stephen and Stirling to halt their march to Birmingham. Early in the afternoon, as Washington tried to reconcile his intelligence, the Howe and Cornwallis column crossed Jefferis' Ford over the east branch of the Brandywine and then rested for an hour, with only empty and hilly farmland between it and the American flank.

At about this time, a local farmer who called himself Thomas Cheney argued his way into Washington's presence with the news that Howe's column, in motion once again, was closing in on the unprepared Americans. Washington questioned the report, but confirmations of its basic tenor began to arrive quickly, and the commander in chief resumed preparations to defend his army on its right flank. Stephen and Stirling were ordered to resume their march toward Birmingham, and Sullivan—having been withdrawn from crossing the creek—was told to wheel around and join Stephen and Stirling. When he had formed a solid connection with them, Sullivan would assume command of the battlefield on the right flank. Washington decided to remain near Chads Ford, where he continued trying to piece together a coherent picture of the action as a whole.

THE BATTLE INTENSIFIES

Howe's and Cornwallis's troops had marched for seventeen miles since daybreak, and they took some time on Osborne's Hill to organize for the coming assault on the American wing. This delay gave Stephen and Stirling time to reach the area of the Birmingham Meetinghouse, where



Battle of the Brandywine. This 1898 illustration by Frederick Coffay Yohn shows a line of American infantry attempting to repel charging British troops during the Battle of Brandywine in Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania, in September 1777. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

they formed a strong line across the top of a hill facing Osborne's Hill, using the Quaker Meetinghouse itself as a strong point. Sullivan's march to the same place was more problematic. As his regiments appeared in the vale between Osborne's Hill and the hill behind Birmingham, Sullivan had difficulty locating the left wing of Stirling's impromptu line. He had to order the Americans to shift out of the way so that he could try to move his troops into the gap. While he was groping at this task, the British assault on the combined American position, which had begun at about 4:30 in the afternoon, intensified. Washington tried to assess the significance of the increasingly sharp small arms and artillery fire that he heard from the Birmingham area. At five o'clock he drafted a brief—and somewhat matter-of-fact and noncommittal, though vaguely hopeful—report on the action to Congress in Philadelphia.

As Sullivan's forces crumbled and Stephen's and Stirling's troops came under heavier pressure, Washington concluded that the attack on his army's right wing represented the main action of the day, and he decided to leave the skirmishing across Chads Ford to supervise the battle. Accompanied by a civilian guide, he rode as quickly as he could toward Birmingham. Before he could reach the meetinghouse,

Stephen's and Stirling's divisions began to break and retire toward yet another piece of high ground in their rear. Washington had also directed General Greene's division to abandon the front on the Brandywine and rush to reinforce the right wing. Those troops came at a dead run just behind the commander in chief. The hastily formed front carried out a surprisingly effective delaying action, and shadows were beginning to gather on the battlefield. Washington left Sullivan in operational command on this front and personally attended to calming and rallying the inexperienced American troops. He was accompanied by his young French volunteer aide, the Marquis de Lafayette, who this day earned the commander's ungrudging respect. Lafayette rode back and forth close to the front until he received a musket ball in the thigh. A concerned Washington ordered that he be escorted to a field hospital, anxiously proclaiming—as Lafayette later insisted in a memoir—that the young Frenchman was like his own son.

A FIGHTING RETREAT

The first elements of Greene's reinforcing units arrived near Dilworthtown, a village behind Birmingham

Meeting, just as the battered elements of the American line gave way. They had covered a distance of about four miles in nearly three-quarters of an hour. General George Weedon's brigade opened their line to allow the retreating Americans through and then closed ranks to receive the British attack. Greene's troops fought valiantly as darkness gathered, exhausting their ammunition and retiring repeatedly to seek new defensible positions. The American retreat was jeopardized by renewed action on the Brandywine itself. As predetermined with his commander in chief, General Knyphausen prepared to fall on the American front at Chads Ford as soon as it was weakened by the withdrawal of forces to sustain the flank defense. At about four P.M., the British artillery bombardment across the creek suddenly intensified. With Greene's troops away toward Birmingham, the responsibility for the creek front fell to Anthony Wayne, commanding General Lincoln's division in his absence. Knyphausen sent his forces across the ford, where they used their bayonets to intimidating effect to drive the Americans away from the creek. The rebels abandoned their valuable and hard-to-replace artillery pieces that had been used effectively since daybreak. Wayne's lines disintegrated, although individual pockets of men kept up a hot fire, slowing the advance and giving Washington time to organize the retreat of both the broken units from the Birmingham clash and those from the ford.

WHY AMERICANS ESCAPED DECIMATION

Darkness brought the engagement to a conclusion. If Washington was later criticized for his imprecise reconnaissance of the ground and for his troubled intelligence system early in the day, William Howe was predictably chastened for a lack of aggression in following up on a successful battle plan. The complaint was trite, and probably unjustified. Howe's conduct of the war since 1775 had long made it clear that he did not have a killer instinct or an ingrained disposition to crush a soundly defeated foe. There was as yet no developed mid-eighteenth-century doctrine about pursuing a broken foe and running him into the ground in conventional combat. It was also evident that Howe—and probably the vast majority of the British military establishment—did not really view American revolutionaries as being on the same moral plane as Scottish Jacobite rebels in 1715 or 1745 or as Irish warriors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—that is, the Americans were not seen as savages to be exterminated if possible. Gaining solid footing beyond the Brandywine had probably guaranteed Howe the possession of Philadelphia whenever he wanted it. Beyond that objective, his plan was to break the rebellion and its military instruments piece by piece.

Howe's troops—especially those from Cornwallis's column—were exhausted by nightfall. In addition to the length of their march, many of the cavalymen were operating dismounted, as the loss of horses during the five-week sea voyage to the Chesapeake continued to take its toll. Also, Howe's commissary general, Daniel Weir, was obliged to begin feeding the army from the countryside after it entered Pennsylvania. His brother, Richard Lord Howe, was bringing the British fleet around into the Delaware River with its cargoes of provisions, expecting to meet the army at Philadelphia. Eighteenth-century doctrines of warfare also made the victors who controlled battlefields responsible for the immediate care of the wounded and the decent interment of the dead of both sides, as well as for the humane treatment of prisoners of war. On each of these fronts there was much work to be done. Casualties were heavy on both sides, and Americans were captured in growing bunches in the confusion of the day's end.

Washington's immediate duties were lightened by the realization that Howe could, and would, attend to the previous responsibilities. As soon as Knyphausen broke off his advance, Washington was able to shepherd the troops from the Brandywine front, together with those who had retreated from Birmingham and Dilworthtown, and to begin arranging for their retreat. The river port village of Chester, on the Delaware below Philadelphia, was designated as the initial rendezvous point for the stricken survivors of the battle. Washington himself reached that town at about midnight on the heels of most of his troops. His two previous messages of the day to Congress, from about noon and just after 5 P.M., respectively, had been either plainly optimistic or at least cautiously hopeful. By now it was clear that news of the late reverses would reach Philadelphia with stragglers and civilians, and in good conscience as well as self-interest, Washington owed his civilian superiors a candid official report. He felt too exhausted to draft one, however, and his aides-de-camp understandably wrangled over the disagreeable assignment.

At length, Adjutant General Timothy Pickering agreed to compose the message. That dour New Englander did not try to sugarcoat the bad news. The Americans had been "obliged to leave the enemy masters of the field," he acknowledged, before speculating that the British had paid a high price for this benefit in casualties. Washington read over the draft before he retired, and he insisted that the candor be leavened with at least an abstract expression of optimism. The American troops, Washington appended—probably accurately—were still "in good spirits," and he still hoped that "another time we shall compensate for the losses now sustained."

American casualties consisted of about 300 men killed, the same number wounded, and about 315 missing in action. The British lost 90 men killed, 448 wounded, and only a handful of missing.

CIVILIANS LEARN TO SURVIVE

The action of 11 September 1777 has other insights to disclose to modern observers. External constraints like terrain, heat, and sunlight had been critical to its outcome, but it should be remembered that Howe had chosen to campaign in Pennsylvania—at the risk, it turns out, of the entire British strategy for the year—on the hope of exploiting the good will of its population. Howe's far superior intelligence to that which Washington received suggested that his adviser, Joseph Galloway, was not completely wrong to promote that hope. But the civilian experience of the events of Brandywine was much more complex and subtle than any of the military professionals present that day would have acknowledged. Southeastern Pennsylvanians were as innocent as any late-colonial Americans of the costs and horrors of war, because Quaker political control of their colony had, until the late 1750s, kept it out of most imperial wars. Even the panic of late 1776 prior to Washington's Trenton reprisal had not changed that fact. Beginning with the red-coat and Hessian push into Chester County, however, and continuing for most of the following year, that innocence ended, and civilians had to accommodate themselves to calamity.

The day before the battle, Hessian Captain Johann von Ewald observed that local Quakers came to British camps "in crowds, and asked for protection." After the British victory, other civilians warned the British that the rebels were retreating toward Chester and effectively chided Howe for not pursuing them with more vigor. Other country people, less favorably disposed to the restoration of royal authority, abandoned their plantations, but foraging soldiers, especially Hessians, occasionally paid for their plunder with their lives at the hands of vindictive farmers. Most civilians neither fawned before nor ambushed soldiers, but rather scurried around trying to avoid getting caught between large groups of them. To their astonishment, many discovered that there were pockets within campaigns, and even on battlefields, where they could observe military actions in situations of remarkable intimacy with some degree of safety.

SEE ALSO *Alexander, William; Cooch's Bridge; Cornwallis, Charles; Ewald, Johann von; Galloway, Joseph; Greene, Nathanael; Howe, William; Knyphausen, Wilhelm; Lafayette, Marquis de; Lincoln, Benjamin; Maxwell, William; Philadelphia Campaign; Pickering, Timothy; Stephen, Adam; Sullivan, John; Wayne, Anthony; Weedon, George.*

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revised by Wayne K. Bodle

BRANT, JOSEPH. (1743–1807). Mohawk leader. Brant was born as Thayendanega at Cuyhoga to undistinguished Mohawk parents early in 1743. His father died when he was young, and his widowed mother took him back to her native Canajoharie in the Mohawk Valley, where he was baptized into the Church of England. After Catawbas killed her second husband, his mother married the hereditary chief, Brant Canagaraduncka (whose own father had visited London in 1710), from whom Joseph took his surname. His elder sister Molly became Sir William Johnson's mistress and Joseph consequently became Johnson's protégé.

During the Seven Years' War, young Brant fought against the French and their native allies, beginning at the tender age of thirteen at Lake George. In 1761, with the American war virtually over, Johnson sent Joseph and two other Mohawks to Moor's Indian Charity School in Lebanon, Connecticut, where he learned to speak, read, and write fluent English and studied Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and agriculture. He was supposed to complete his education and become a missionary but, for reasons that are still obscure, he returned to Canajoharie after only two years. In 1765 he married Neggen Aoghyatonghsera (Margaret) from a prominent Oneida family, a connection that significantly enhanced Joseph's own status.

RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS

Despite his exposure at Lebanon to Wheelock's nonconformist influences, Brant clung to a devout Anglicanism blended with traditional Iroquois beliefs. He appears to have been a missionary's interpreter in 1763, and later he helped to translate several religious works, including parts of the Book of Common Prayer, into Mohawk. In 1768 Joseph and Molly gave land for the building of the Indian Castle mission church at the Mohawk Upper Castle. In 1773, two years after Margaret's death, Brant followed Mohawk custom by marrying her half sister. This was too much for the local Anglican priest, so the ceremony was performed by a German minister. The incident seems to have had no effect on Joseph's attachment to the Church of England, which appears to have been of political as well as religious importance. As the revolutionary crisis deepened and the New England Calvinist missionary, Samuel Kirkland, seduced the Oneidas and Tuscaroras to the American cause by offering an alternative belief system, so Anglicanism became all the more inseparable from the Mohawk alliance with the British.

SECURING BRITISH SUPPORT

Like some other Native leaders, Brant judged that unswerving loyalty to the crown might bring the Mohawks protection against unscrupulous land jobbers and intrusive settlers. He therefore joined the Mohawks who fought on the British side in Pontiac's War and worked as a guide and translator for the northern Indian department. In 1774, when Guy Johnson succeeded Sir William Johnson as Indian superintendent, Brant became his secretary. Joseph was not, however, above using violence when appeals to officialdom failed, as when he led twenty warriors against the notorious speculator, George Klock.

As the revolutionary conflict developed, most of the land speculators came to support the American cause, thus deepening Brant's conviction that the Six Nations must cleave to the British. In 1775 he went north with a Loyalist and Mohawk force to oppose the American advance on Montreal and was the Mohawk spokesman at a conference with Guy Carleton. Here Brant's principal concerns were partly met by Carleton's assurances that the Mohawks' lands would be safe and that Britain would compensate them for any losses during the war. He was even given a captain's commission. But experience had made Brant cautious, and late in 1775 he traveled to London to get Carleton's promises confirmed and to ask for redress for earlier illegal encroachments. In London, like earlier Native visitors, he was received at court, feted and entertained by members of the educated public (including James Boswell), painted (by George Romney), and made a kind of popular public spectacle. More importantly, he was given the guarantees he sought in return for Mohawk loyalty during the rebellion. Thus armed, Brant sailed for home in June 1776, used his musket in an encounter with an American privateer, and landed on Staten Island. He joined in military operations in New Jersey before returning home through American lines.

THE NEW YORK FRONTIER

Subsequently Brant, in conjunction with the Butlers at Fort Niagara, led many Loyalist-Indian raids upon the New York frontier. These operations had three objectives: to rescue the families of fled Iroquois and Loyalists; to defend the Iroquois country; and to prevent the rebel forces drawing supplies from the frontier farms of New York. No doubt Brant also saw the opportunity for personal distinction, but despite black propaganda to the contrary, he was not interested in slaughter and scalping for their own sake. He led the Indian contingent with St. Leger's expedition at the siege of Fort Stanwix and took part in John Butler's ambush of Herkimer's relief column at Oriskany on 6 August 1777. During the next year, while Butler was raiding the Wyoming Valley, Brant gathered a force of Indians and Loyalists at Unadilla on the Susquehanna. From there

he hit Andrustown on 18 July and German Flats on 13 September. Finally, after rebel forces destroyed Unadilla (6–8 October), he joined forces with Walter Butler to inflict a serious reverse upon the rebels at Cherry Valley on 11 November 1778. These actions attracted the admiration of the distant Lord George Germain, who sent Brant the king's commission as colonel.

Brant's raids provoked Sullivan's invasion of the Iroquois country in 1779. While this expedition was being prepared, Brant raided Minisink, a settlement on the Delaware, on the night of 19–20 July, perhaps to secure supplies for Butler or to draw off some of Sullivan's men. Two days later he cut off and destroyed a pursuing rebel force before retiring to help Butler resist Sullivan. On 12 August he inflicted some casualties in a minor skirmish with the rebels. At Newtown (29 August 1779), where an ambush similar to that at Oriskany failed and the rebel artillery panicked the Indians, Brant held enough of his warriors together to offer a desperate resistance against odds of five to one. He launched a counter-attack that almost destroyed a New Hampshire regiment before the Loyalists and Indians were forced to retreat. Sullivan's army then marched through the Iroquois country, burning towns and forcing most of the people to flee to Fort Niagara. Here they had to live in refugee camps, dependent upon British handouts.

But the Iroquois were not knocked out of the war: on the contrary, they struck back harder than ever. Brant himself raided Harpersfield and Minisink (2–4 April 1780) and destroyed the Canajoharie settlements (1–2 August). About 25 August he destroyed a one-hundred-strong rebel force on the Ohio before moving north again to join Sir John Johnson's raid on the Schoharie Valley. In early 1781 he repeatedly raided the upper Mohawk Valley until rebel resistance stiffened and British will to fight on withered away. By now the strain had caused a marked deterioration in Brant's character, and he had begun to take to drinking and brawling. The Treaty of Paris of 1783 seemed to him a cynical betrayal of the Iroquois. Nevertheless, he led a movement to resettle the Iroquois on the Grand River in British territory on the northern side of Lake Erie. By 1785 about one-third of the New York Iroquois were there and Brant had risen from being a predominantly Mohawk leader to being a leading figure in the Six Nations.

POST-REVOLUTIONARY EFFORTS

Brant now tried to construct a pan-Indian alliance while also attempting to obtain for the Iroquois full title to their Canadian lands and the compensation promised to the Mohawks in 1775 and 1776. He also hoped for promises of British military support for the nations of the northwest and Great Lakes against the United States. However, this support, without which Brant and other leaders felt unable

to act, was not forthcoming when the Americans attacked the northwestern nations in the years from 1787 to 1794. Consequently, the idea of a pan-Indian alliance collapsed and with it the aim of reuniting the Six Nations. Within the Canadian Iroquois, his political opponents may have tried to have him assassinated by his son Isaac, who died after a brawl with his father in 1795. Joseph himself, much weakened by drink and malaria, died in his bed at Burlington on Lake Ontario on 24 November 1807.

OF THE “MIDDLE GROUND”

Joseph Brant was an outstanding product of the “middle ground,” a term Richard White originally applied to the Great Lakes region but which some writers have used even when its relevance is limited. However, there is no doubt of its validity in connection with the Mohawks, and with Brant in particular. He lived in a world where he could be simultaneously hunter, trader, civil servant, and assistant missionary and in which both sides borrowed from the other in order to establish a mutually acceptable meeting place. His extraordinary intelligence and energy thrived in such an environment. If Brant was only temporarily successful in sustaining this middle ground, it was because the odds were stacked against him from the beginning.

SEE ALSO *Andrustown, New York; Butler Brothers of Pennsylvania; Canajoharie Settlements, New York; Cherry Valley Massacre, New York; Germain, George Sackville; German Flats, New York; Harpersfield, New York; Lochry's Defeat, Ohio River; Minisink, New York (19–22 July, 1779); Newtown, New York; Oriskany, New York; Schoharie Valley, New York; St. Leger's Expedition; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois; Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.*

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BRANT, MOLLY. (c. 1736–1796). Loyalist. New York. The sister of the Mohawk leader Joseph Brant, she met Sir William Johnson, superintendent of Indian affairs, in 1759 and lived with him until his death in 1774. They had eight children together. Hers was an influential voice in persuading many in the Iroquois confederation to side with the British in the Revolution. Her message to Barry St. Leger of Nicholas Herkimer's expedition to Fort Stanwix made possible Brant's successful

ambush at Oriskany, 6 August 1777. Receiving an annual pension from the British government for her wartime services, Molly Brant settled with many other Loyalists in Kingston, Ontario, where she died 16 April 1796.

SEE ALSO *Brant, Joseph; Oriskany, New York.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BRAXTON, CARTER. (1736–1797). Signer of the Declaration of Independence. Virginia. Son of a wealthy planter, Carter Braxton was born on 10 September 1736, on the family's plantation. He graduated from the College of William and Mary in 1756 and, after the death of his first wife in December 1757, he spent the next three years in England. In May 1761 he married Elizabeth Corbin, daughter of a British official, and started a fourteen-year tour as representative from King William County in the House of Burgesses (1761–1775) that was interrupted only by a short period when he served as county sheriff.

In the controversies that led to the break with England, Braxton wavered between his conservative instincts and political survival. He opposed the Virginia Resolves of 1765, but supported the non-importation agreements. He is credited with preventing bloodshed in the dispute between Governor Dunmore and Patrick Henry's militia over the seizure of colonial powder in the spring of 1775, and was appointed to the Committee of Safety after the governor fled. The following year the assembly selected him as a delegate to the Continental Congress, where he supported the resolution for independence and signed the Declaration of Independence, but there are few references to him in the *Journals of the Continental Congress*. Probably because of his conservative views and his wife's loyalism, he was not re-elected. His county, however, returned him to the House of Burgesses, where he served from 1776 to 1785. In 1785 he suffered a stroke and retired from public affairs. Braxton lost most of his wealth during the Revolution, dying in a rented Richmond house, 10 October 1797.

SEE ALSO *Virginia Resolves of 1765; Virginia, Military Operations in.*

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BREED'S HILL SEE *Bunker Hill, Massachusetts.*

BREWSTER, GREAT, ISLAND SEE *Great Brewster Island, Massachusetts.*

BRIAR CREEK, GEORGIA. 3 March 1779. As recruits flocked to General Benjamin Lincoln's camp at Purysburg, South Carolina, he made preparations to recover Georgia. Having already posted General Andrew Williamson across the Savannah River from Augusta with one thousand men, he ordered General John Ashe to join him with his fourteen hundred North Carolina militia and Colonel Samuel Elbert's one hundred Georgia Continentals. Ashe reached Williamson's post on the evening of 13 February, and the British evacuated Augusta that night. Crossing into Georgia on the 25th, Ashe descended the Savannah. At Briar Creek, on the morning of Saturday, 27 February, he found the bridge demolished; the creek in this area, close to its junction with the Savannah, ran through a deep swamp about three miles wide.

Ashe ordered the bridge rebuilt and also started work on a road to the Savannah so that General Griffith Rutherford and his North Carolina militia could reinforce him from Mathew's Bluff, South Carolina, about five miles to the east. However, his troops moved very slowly on these preparations.

Colonel Archibald Campbell interrupted his retreat at Hudson's Ferry, a fortified British outpost fifteen miles south of Briar Creek. General Augustine Prevost received intelligence that Ashe was stalled at Briar Creek and sent reinforcements to Hudson's Ferry with orders for a counterstroke to check the rebel advance. The plan was for Major William Macpherson's First Battalion of the Seventy-first Regiment, with a reinforcement of Loyalist militia and two cannon, to occupy the south bank of Briar Creek as a diversion. The general's younger brother, Lieutenant Mark Prevost, would execute a wide circuit westward and attack the American rear with his Second Battalion of the Seventy-first, Captain Sir James Baird's light infantry, three companies from the Sixtieth Regiment, a troop of mounted Loyalists, and 150 militia infantry—about 900 in all.

The American force against whom this surprise attack was directed comprised the brigade of General David Bryant, the light infantry of Lieutenant William Lytle, Colonel Elbert's Georgia Continentals, three small cannon, and two hundred mounted Georgia militia under Colonel Leonard Marbury. The latter unit was on Briar Creek when Ashe's troops arrived from the north.

In a remarkable fifty-mile march, Lieutenant Colonel Prevost crossed Briar Creek fifteen miles above the enemy

camp and was only eight miles to its rear when detected. Marbury's horsemen had picked up the enemy movement on the afternoon of 1 March, but the messenger was intercepted before he reached the American commander. Backed up against the swamp and with the bridge not yet finished, Ashe was faced with annihilation; yet he took no steps to meet the attack other than to form his troops in column with the Continentals out front.

The British deployed at a range of 150 yards. Elbert's regulars advanced on the British and fired two or three volleys before shifting left to mask the fire of the advancing New Bern Regiment. The Edenton Regiment also got off course and moved right so that a gap was created in the North Carolina militia line of battle. When the British capitalized on this error and rushed into the gap with fixed bayonets, the Halifax Regiment, on the left, broke without firing a shot, most throwing down their guns, and panic quickly spread through the other militia units. The Continentals held for some time but were finally surrounded by the British; Elbert and many of his men were captured. Ashe tried to rally his fleeing men, but they were too fast for him. The militia headed for the swamps and the Savannah River where many drowned, though large numbers escaped by swimming or crossing on crowded rafts.

In a brilliant little operation that restored their hold on Georgia, the British suffered only five killed and eleven wounded, despite the claims of Ebert and Perkins to having many marksmen in their ranks and having fired several volleys. The Americans lost between 150 and 200 killed or drowned and over 200 captured. Most of the surviving militia, who abandoned their guns and other military stores for the British to claim, did not stop running until they reached their homes. After the battle the British counted more than five hundred captured muskets.

The Patriots howled for Ashe's hide. He demanded a court-martial, which cleared him of cowardice but censured him for failing to take proper military precautions. Briar Creek was a staggering defeat that cost the Patriots heavily, setting the stage for the even greater catastrophe at Charleston the following year. As Page Smith has written, "The simple moral to be drawn from the Briar Creek disaster was that there is no real substitute for military training and experience" (*A New Age*, vol. 2, p. 1316).

SEE ALSO *Southern Theater, Military Operations in.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

BRIGADE. A military formation of two or more regiments, generally temporary, and commanded by a brigadier in the British army or a brigadier general in the American army. (During the Revolution the terms “regiment” and “battalion” were virtually synonymous.)

Mark M. Boatner

BRISTOL, RHODE ISLAND. 7 October 1775. A small British fleet of four warships, commanded by Captain James Wallace, was operating in Newport harbor. It appeared off Bristol on the afternoon of 7 October. Wallace sent an officer ashore to state that if a delegation did not come out to his ship the *Rose* within an hour to hear his demands he would open fire. William Bradford told Wallace’s emissary that it would be more fitting for Wallace to come ashore and make known his demands. About 8:00 P.M., in a pouring rain, the British started a bombardment that lasted an hour and a half and stopped only after Captain Simeon Potter had gone to the end of the wharf and hailed Wallace’s ship, asking that the town be given time to select a delegation to meet him. The British commander first asked for two hundred sheep and thirty cattle, but finally settled for forty sheep. A number of houses had been destroyed by the bombardment, mostly as a result of fire.

SEE ALSO *Wallace, Sir James.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BRITISH GUIANA. The Dutch West India Company established settlements at Essequibo, Demerara, and Berbice between 1621 and 1657. British privateers took the first two of these in 1781, which were then captured by the French the following year and restored to the Netherlands in the peace treaty of 1783. The British again seized the colony that became British Guiana in 1803, holding it until its independence in 1966. Demerara is now Georgetown, capital of Guyana. Essequibo was located about fifty miles northwest, at the mouth of the Essequibo River.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BRITISH LEGION. Before Sir Henry Clinton left Philadelphia in June 1778, he laid the foundation for “a legionary corps” of provincials, “the command of which

I gave to a Scottish nobleman, Lord [William] Cathcart,” then a captain in the Seventeenth Light Dragoons. Captain Richard Hovenden’s troop of Philadelphia Light Dragoons was the first unit subsumed in Cathcart’s Legion, also called the British Legion, followed by Captain Jacob James’s troop of Chester County Light Dragoons and then by Captain Charles Stewart’s Caledonian Volunteers and Captain David Kinloch’s Troop of Light Dragoons, both then recruiting in New York City. Thereafter, the legion recruited to its establishment of five companies of infantry and three troops of cavalry. Cathcart remained colonel of the legion throughout its existence, but the regiment won its enduring reputation under Banastre Tarleton, its lieutenant colonel from 1 August 1778.

The British Legion was one of the units of light troops, including the Queen’s Rangers and Emmerich’s Chasseurs, that skirmished with the Americans around New York City from late August 1778 until late December 1779, when it embarked for Charleston, South Carolina, as part of Sir Henry Clinton’s expedition. Despite having lost its horses on the passage from New York (Tarleton secured remounts on Port Royal Island), in the nine months between 12 April 1780 (at Monck’s Corner) and 17 January 1781 (at Cowpens), Tarleton’s Legion became the scourge of the Americans. Wearing a distinctive green uniform similar to that worn by other legions like John Graves Simcoe’s Queen’s Rangers and Henry (Light-Horse Harry) Lee’s Legion, the legionnaires won renown for the speed of their pursuit and their alleged bloodthirstiness in battle, an undeserved reputation that nonetheless contributed to the fear they aroused in their opponents. Although the legion performed with less success when Tarleton was not personally in command, as at Williamson’s Plantation (12 July), Wahab’s Plantation (21 September), and Charlotte, North Carolina (26 September), Tarleton’s own carelessness contributed significantly to his defeat at Cowpens. The legion was placed on the American Establishment on 7 March 1781 as the Fifth American Regiment; by that time, however, thanks to Cowpens, it consisted only of cavalry. The bulk of the legion’s horsemen continued to serve with Lord Cornwallis’s army in North Carolina (at Guilford Court House on 15 March 1781) and Virginia (Green Spring on 6 July 1781) before surrendering at Yorktown on 19 October. Survivors stationed at Charleston and New York were consolidated into the King’s American Dragoons, but the legion cavalry, as a formation, was placed nominally on the British Establishment on Christmas Day 1782. The last vestiges of the legion evacuated New York City for Nova Scotia about 15 September 1783 and were disbanded there on 10 October 1783.

SEE ALSO *Charlotte, North Carolina; Cowpens, South Carolina; Queen’s Rangers; Tarleton, Banastre; Volunteers of Ireland; Wahab’s Plantation, North Carolina; Williamson’s Plantation, South Carolina.*

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BROAD ARROW. All royal property was marked with a figure in the shape of an arrowhead to signify that it belonged to the king. The broad arrow was inscribed on military materiel like cannon, muskets, kegs of gunpowder, and various accoutrements. It was also carved into white pine trees of twenty-four or more inches in diameter, found mostly in the forests of New Hampshire, because these tall, straight-grown, strong trees were needed for naval masts, as an alternative to obtaining them from the Baltic. The "Broad Arrow Policy" in the Naval Stores Act of 1729 reserved for the crown all such white pines growing on lands granted after 7 October 1692, when the restriction had been included in the regranted Massachusetts charter. A masting trade grew up around this resource, benefiting New Hampshire oligarchs and the Royal Navy but antagonizing settlers on the land.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

BROAD RIVER, SOUTH CAROLINA.

9 November 1780. Alternate name for the action at Fishdam Ford.

SEE ALSO *Fishdam Ford, South Carolina*.

BRODHEAD, DANIEL. (1736–1809).

Continental officer. Pennsylvania. Born in Albany, New York, on 17 September 1736, Brodhead served as deputy surveyor-general of Pennsylvania from 1773 to 1776. With news of the battle at Lexington, Brodhead led a company of volunteers to Boston, where he enlisted in the Continental Army. On 13 March 1776 he became a lieutenant colonel,

commanding the Second Battalion of Miles's Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion. At Long Island on 27 August 1776, his unit barely escaped annihilation. Transferred to the Third Pennsylvania Battalion on 25 September 1776, he was promoted to colonel and he was given command of the Eighth Pennsylvania Battalion on 12 March 1777. His regiment saw heavy action at Brunswick, Brandywine, Paoli, Germantown, and Whitemarsh. Early in 1778, George Washington ordered Brodhead's regiment to move from Valley Forge to Fort Pitt, where General Lachlan McIntosh sent them down the Ohio to build Fort McIntosh. After a dreadful winter at this base, Brodhead wrote to Washington, accusing McIntosh of gross incompetence. Washington agreed, and on 5 March 1779 he made Brodhead commander of the Western Department.

Brodhead's expedition against the Seneca and Delaware, which took place from 11 August to 14 September 1779, led to a treaty with the Delaware and won the thanks of Congress and Washington. Although he showed more energy than his predecessors, Brodhead was considered a martinet with a jealous, irascible temperament. His inability to cooperate with other commanders led Washington to remove him from his post. In the reorganization of 17 January 1781, Brodhead became commander of the Second Pennsylvania, which he led until 3 November 1783. He was breveted as a brigadier general in the Continental army on 30 September 1783 and returned to his farm in Pike County, Pennsylvania. In 1790 he was made surveyor-general of Pennsylvania, a position he held until his death in Milford, on 15 November 1809.

SEE ALSO *Brodhead's Expedition*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

BRODHEAD'S EXPEDITION. 11 August–

14 September 1779. In conjunction with Sullivan's Expedition, Colonel Daniel Brodhead marched up the Allegheny valley from Pittsburgh with a force of six hundred men drawn primarily from his own Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment and attacked Seneca villages. During this operation he covered about four hundred miles, pushing to within fifty miles of the British outpost at Niagara, and destroyed ten villages and their crops. On 15 August, in the only military engagement of the expedition, his advance guard beat back a larger force of Indians.

SEE ALSO *Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois*.

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BROOKLYN, BROOKLAND, BREUCKELEN, NEW YORK.

A Dutch settlement on the western tip of Long Island, organized into a town in 1646, four years after the settlement had become known as The Ferry. Its name evolved from the Dutch word meaning marshland. (There were numerous variations of the Dutch spelling.) The modern spelling, "Brooklyn," was not standardized until the end of the eighteenth century. "Brooklyn Heights" refers to the high ground close to the ferry where Washington established defensive lines on 27 August 1775 after the disaster of the Battle of Long Island. John Glover's Marbleheaders ferried Washington's army to safety from Brooklyn on the night of 29 August.

SEE ALSO *Long Island, New York, Battle of*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BROOKS, JOHN. (1752–1825). Continental officer. Born in Medford, Massachusetts, on 4 May 1752, Brooks studied medicine and set up his practice in Reading, Massachusetts. Elected captain in the militia in 1775, he led his forces in harassing the British on their retreat from Concord on 19 April 1775. Joining the troops gathered around Boston, he was promoted to major in May. His regiment was stationed alongside General Alexander McDougall's brigade on Chatterton's Hill during the Battle of White Plains on 28 October 1776, standing up before the main British attack. After the battle he was named lieutenant colonel of the Eighth Massachusetts Regiment. The following year his force was part of Benedict Arnold's relief effort to Fort Stanwix, and Brooks is credited with sending the mad Hon Yost Schuyler to give false information to the Indians that led to their retreat. He arrived with Arnold in time to see action at Freeman's Farm on 19 September 1777 and commanded the advance unit at Bemis Heights that on 7 October captured Breymann's redoubt, ensuring victory. His regiment was at Valley Forge in 1778, and he served as adjutant to General Charles Lee at Monmouth, testifying on Lee's behalf at the latter's court-martial. After serving on General Friedrich von Steuben's staff, Brooks became commander of the Seventh Massachusetts Regiment from November

1778 until June 1783. After the war, Brooks returned to Medford, serving in the assembly in 1785–1786, as major general in the militia during Shays's Rebellion, as delegate to the Massachusetts constitutional ratifying convention, as brigadier general in the U.S. Army from 1792 to 1796, as adjutant general of Massachusetts from 1812 to 1816, and as the nation's last Federalist governor from 1816 to 1823. He died at Medford on 1 March 1825.

Michael Bellesiles

BROTHER JONATHAN. As early as March 1776 the British used this term to designate Americans. Governor Jonathan Trumbull (the elder) of Connecticut was a key man in the support of Washington's army. Once, when coping with a particularly tough problem, Washington is alleged to have said, "We must consult Brother Jonathan." Legend has it that the expression spread as a generic term for Americans. The *Oxford English Dictionary* accepts this derivation of the term, which stood as the widely used generic name for the United States through the nineteenth century until replaced by "Uncle Sam."

SEE ALSO *Trumbull, Jonathan, Sr.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BROWN, JOHN. (1744–1780). Patriot leader. Massachusetts. Born 19 October 1744 in Haverhill, Massachusetts, John Brown graduated from Yale in 1771 and was admitted to the bar in Tryon County, New York, the next year. In 1773 he settled in Pittsfield and became a prominent Patriot and member of the Committee of Correspondence. In February 1775 he volunteered for a mission to Montreal on behalf of the Boston Committee of Correspondence, with the dual purpose of evaluating Canadian sentiment toward the Revolution and of setting up a network of informers. He is one of several credited with the rather obvious thought that the Patriots should seize Ticonderoga. While traveling across New Hampshire on his way to Montreal, he had been struck by the strategic importance of the place, and, probably, its defenselessness at the time. On 29 March he reported to Adams and Warren in Boston, and he participated in the capture of Ticonderoga on 10 May 1775. Ethan Allen selected Brown to take the news of the victory to Congress.

Commissioned a major in Colonel James Easton's Regiment on 6 July, he conducted a reconnaissance into Canada during the period 24 July to 10 August and reported his findings to General Philip Schuyler at

Crown Point, New York. The degree to which Brown's scouting contributed to the advance of General Richard Montgomery's wing of the invasion of Canada is uncertain, but Brown figures prominently in all accounts of the operation. In September he notoriously abandoned Allen during the attack on Montreal, leading to the capture of Allen's entire force. The following month he played a significant part in the capture of Chambly, Quebec, on 19 October. Brown and Easton drove Allen McLean's Royal Highland Emigrants down the Sorel River to the St. Lawrence, and took over works that their foes had started at this strategic spot, capturing several tons of gunpowder.

During the Quebec siege, Brown's insubordination to Benedict Arnold would have resulted in his removal from the scene if General Montgomery had not intervened. Brown and Arnold clashed repeatedly over the next year, exchanging charges and calls for courts martial. Having been appointed lieutenant colonel of Colonel James Elmore's Connecticut Regiment on 1 August 1776, Brown took part in the fighting around Lake Champlain. He resigned in February 1777, citing his disagreements with Arnold as the cause. During General John Burgoyne's offensive, Brown returned to the field and took part in the Ticonderoga raid of 18 September 1777, surprising a British force and taking nearly 300 prisoners while freeing 100 Americans. After service at Bemis Heights, New York, Brown again returned to his law practice. Elected to the General Court in 1778, Brown became judge of the county court in February 1779. In the summer of 1780 he marched to the Mohawk Valley with the Massachusetts levies that were called out to oppose the Loyalist-Indian raids in the region. In an ambush near Fort Keyser on 19 October 1780, Brown and 45 of his men were killed.

SEE ALSO *Fort Keyser, New York; Ticonderoga Raid.*

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BROWN, THOMAS. Southern Tory partisan leader. As a young man he reached Georgia after 1773 to take up five thousand acres near the confluence of the Broad and Savannah Rivers as an investment for his family of wealthy Yorkshire merchants. Rather than use black slaves, the Browns brought in about eighty-five indentured servants, most of them Orkney Islanders.

As a recent British immigrant in Georgia, he was naturally opposed to revolutionary agitation. Young

Brown made himself conspicuous by cleverly ridiculing the Whigs and their cause. For this he was tarred and feathered, publicly exposed on a cart, and forced to profess support of the Whigs. At the first opportunity he fled. In British East Florida, Brown started partisan operations and raised a body known variously as the East Florida or King's Rangers. He took part in the capture of Fort McIntosh, Georgia, in February 1777 and with the rank of lieutenant colonel led his regiment on raids in Georgia. In 1779 he was defeated by inferior forces near Waynesboro on two occasions. He took part in the defense of Savannah in October 1779. In 1780 he established himself at Augusta, ran the Whigs out of town, sequestered their property, and successfully defended this strategic town against the abortive attack of Elijah Clarke and James McCall in September 1780. The next year he repulsed a night attack by Colonel Harden but was forced to surrender after a heroic defense of Augusta from 22 May to 5 June 1781.

Popular hatred of this successful Tory leader was so great that a special guard had to be assigned to guarantee his rights as a prisoner of war. That he was not hanged as an outlaw was probably the result of the British threat to retaliate by hanging six Whigs. After his release he was colonel of the Queen's South Carolina Rangers and superintendent of Indian Affairs for the South. In the final defense of Savannah, his attempted sortie was defeated by Wayne's night bayonet attack.

Brown's forces then were dispersed, his South Carolina and Georgia properties were confiscated, and he took refuge in the Bahamas. He was given a land grant on St. Vincent in 1809 and died there in 1825.

His biographer, Edward J. Cashin, has observed that "in 1775, when . . . most Loyalists were inclined to maintain a prudent silence, Brown plunged boldly into the fray. . . . Whig spokesmen William Henry Drayton and William Tennent recognized Brown as their most implacable and dangerous opponent" (Cashin, p. 223). Though not the only advocate of the reconquest of Georgia in 1778, he was an early and vigorous advocate for it in the early stage of the southern campaign.

SEE ALSO *Augusta, Georgia (14–18 September 1780); Augusta, Georgia (22 May–5 June 1781); Fort McIntosh, Georgia; Georgia Expedition of Wayne; Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779).*

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BROWN BESS. The term “brown bess” refers to various models of smooth-bore, muzzle-loading, flintlock muskets of .75 caliber (their diameter in inches) first issued to British troops in 1730. Before 1722, the colonels of each regiment contracted individually for the firearms issued to their soldiers. In an effort to remedy this lack of standardization, the Board of Ordnance established specifications to which all colonels were directed to adhere. The Board also established a new system of manufacture whereby lock mechanisms, barrels, and other metal parts were manufactured (generally in Birmingham), inspected, stored in the royal armory in the Tower of London, and issued as needed to London gunsmiths to assemble into complete muskets. Full production of muskets to the new pattern began in 1728, and the first Long Land Service Pattern 1730 muskets were issued two years later. The firearm had a forty-six-inch long-rounded barrel attached to the walnut stock by four pins and a screw through the tang, a wooden ramrod held beneath the barrel by four short brass cylinders called pipes, a lug at the muzzle of the barrel to hold a four-inch socket that carried a seventeen-inch bayonet; a flintlock firing mechanism with a lock plate shaped like a banana, and assorted furniture also made of brass.

The origin of the nickname “brown bess” for this firearm and successive models, first used in print in 1785, is obscure. “Brown” may derive from the acid-pickling process that gave the barrel a brown color. Or it may come from the natural dark brown color of the walnut stock; previously, the stocks of English muskets were painted black. “Bess” may refer to a different form of firearm previously used, or be the feminine counterpart of a pole arm called the “brownbill.” Or soldiers may have coined this term of affection to honor the only companion a fighting man ought, or could expect, to have.

Various modifications were made in successive models of the Land Service musket in 1742 and 1756, the most important of which was the introduction of the steel ramrod in 1756. Following the successful introduction of the Sea Service Pattern 1757 muskets that were manufactured with shorter barrels (thirty-seven inches and forty-two inches), the Board approved a new forty-two-inch-long barrel for the Short Land Service Pattern 1768 musket, first issued as the standard British infantry arm in 1769. Long land service muskets, which continued in limited production until 1790, were the principal firearms used by the British army in North America through 1777 and in Loyalist units until the end of the war. Without the one-pound, fourteen-inch bayonet, the land service musket weighed ten or eleven pounds. The round lead projectile remained standardized at .75 caliber throughout the life of the long land design. The bullet weighed about one ounce, or so that there were fourteen and one-half bullets to the pound. (The Land Service Pattern was copied by the East India Company for muskets to arm its troops in

India, with a barrel shortened to thirty-nine inches, but this weapon was not a true brown bess.)

A total of 218,000 land service muskets were manufactured in Britain over the course of the war. At least 100,000 more were made by contractors in Liège and various German cities after 1778, when Britain went to war against France and the demand for firearms increased dramatically.

SEE ALSO *Muskets and Musketry*.

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BROWNE, MONTFORT. Governor of New Providence, the Bahamas, (1774–1780), he surrendered Fort Nassau to Commodore Esek Hopkins of the Continental navy on 3 March 1776 and was taken prisoner. Six months later he and Major Cortlandt Skinner were exchanged for General William Alexander. Made a brigadier general, Browne subsequently raised Browne’s Corps, known officially as the Prince of Wales Loyal American Volunteers. It saw action in the raid on Danbury and in Rhode Island.

SEE ALSO *Nassau; Prince of Wales American Volunteers*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BRUNSWICK, NEW JERSEY. 22 June 1777. Washington’s Main Army had passed through Brunswick (or more properly New Brunswick) during the retreat to the Delaware River the previous winter. General William Howe had turned it into one of his major garrison locations, with up to 7,800 troops occupying it. At the start of the Philadelphia Campaign, Howe determined to move to Philadelphia by sea rather than try a second time to advance through New Jersey. Accordingly he began falling back through Amboy to New York City and Staten Island. On 21 June Washington moved forward to harass the British and exploit any weakness. Initially he sought to have Major General John Sullivan with the Maryland Division make a feint toward Brunswick, while Brigadier General William

Maxwell worked his way onto the British western flank. On the morning of 22 June, he modified these orders and sent Major General Nathanael Greene with the First Virginia Division (two brigades) and a third brigade to push against Howe's rear elements while holding the bulk of the army in reserve. He also had Brigadier General Anthony Wayne's First Pennsylvania Brigade and Colonel Daniel Morgan's provisional Rifle Corps try to maneuver around the flank. Morgan made the first contact and drove the British across the bridge over the Raritan. The British and Hessian jägers promptly evacuated the two redoubts covering the bridge and headed down the road to Amboy. The Americans pursued as far as Piscataway before realizing that they were closing in on a major part of Howe's army. At this point they realized that they had gotten too far in front and fell back to Brunswick. The British continued on to Amboy, burning buildings along the way.

SEE ALSO *Philadelphia Campaign*.

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BUCK AND BALL. Three or more buckshot loaded behind a regular musket ball.

SEE ALSO *Swan Shot*.

Mark M. Boatner

BULL, WILLIAM, II. (1710–1791). Acting royal governor of South Carolina and son of South Carolina's lieutenant governor, William Bull (1683–1755). William Bull II was born on 24 September 1710 on the family plantation outside of Charleston. He was the first native-born American to receive the Doctor of Medicine degree at the University of Leyden, in 1734. On his return to South Carolina he turned to agriculture and politics, serving many years in the legislature, including several as speaker, and gaining appointment as brigadier general of the militia in 1751. Becoming lieutenant governor in 1759, he was acting governor for a total of eight years, during the period from 1760 to 1775. He particularly distinguished himself in Indian affairs. Governor William Henry Lyttleton's refusal to follow Bull's counsel of moderation led in part to the Cherokee uprising in 1759.

While acting governor in 1761, Bull secured the outside support that led to the Cherokee expedition, led by James Grant, that temporarily subdued the Indians. He handled the Regulator crisis, from 1769 to 1771, with diplomacy and intelligence, avoiding the violence that disrupted North Carolina. During the critical years just before the Revolution, his sympathy for his fellow Carolinians came into conflict with his loyalty to Britain. In 1775 he was succeeded by Lord William Campbell, and although his extensive estates were not confiscated by the Patriots—whose respect and affection he had retained—Bull left Charleston with the British troops in 1782 and spent the remaining nine years of his life in London. He died there on 4 July 1791.

SEE ALSO *Cherokee Expedition of James Grant; Regulators*.

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BULL'S FERRY, NEW JERSEY. 20–21 July 1780. On 20 July, General Washington detached Anthony Wayne with the First and Second Pennsylvania Brigade, four guns, and Stephen Moylan's Fourth Continental Light dragoons to destroy a stockaded blockhouse erected at Bull's Ferry, about four miles north of Hoboken. Although Sir Henry Clinton minimized its significance, arguing that only seventy Loyalists under Thomas Ward held "this trifling work" and used it as a base for woodcutting and for protection against "straggling parties of militia," it served as an important base for British logistical efforts to keep New York City. Washington hoped that Wayne's attack would provoke Clinton into sending a relief force from Manhattan which would then be ambushed. Wayne opened fire on the blockhouse the morning of 21 July, but it easily withstood the light field pieces. After an hour two regiments bravely tried to charge the stockade and were driven off with losses of fifteen men and three officers killed.

Clinton says that the bombardment inflicted twenty-one casualties and that the blockhouse was "perforated by at least 50 cannon shot." Without recognizing that they had avoided a trap, the British celebrated the incident as a stirring victory. John André composed a long, burlesque epic-ballad, "The Cow Chace," the last part of which appeared in *Rivington's Royal Gazette* the day André was captured. It begins:

To drive the kine one summer's morn,
The tanner took his way,

The calf shall rue that is unborn
The jumbling of that day.

And it ends:

And now I've closed my epic strain,
I Tremble as I show it,
Lest this same warrior-drover, Wayne,
Should ever catch the poet.

SEE ALSO *Moylan, Stephen; Wayne, Anthony.*

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BUNKER HILL, MASSACHUSETTS.

17 June 1775. The Battle of Bunker Hill holds a special place in the history and mythology of the American Revolution. Along with Lexington, Valley Forge, and Yorktown, it epitomizes how Americans think about the War for American Independence. The victory by American citizen-soldiers over British professionals in this first set-piece battle of the war encouraged Americans to believe that military resistance to increased British imperial control (what the British called rebellion) was possible. It showed the British that they were in for a real fight.

For nearly two months after American militiamen had hounded the British back into Boston on 18 April 1775, neither side escalated the conflict. While each side postured and watched each other (and skirmished on islands in the harbor), neither the British nor the Americans occupied Charlestown Peninsula or Dorchester Peninsula, two projections of land that flanked Boston to the north and south. Both peninsulas were crowned with hills that overlooked the town, but Dorchester was the more important because artillery on Dorchester Heights could potentially command the harbor and make continued British possession of Boston untenable.


Within two weeks of the arrival of reinforcements on 25 May, Thomas Gage and his subordinates (Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne) had devised a plan to secure Dorchester Heights (doing so would make it nearly impossible for the Americans to oust the British from Boston), raise the siege, and strike a heavy, perhaps fatal blow at the rebellion. The Massachusetts Committee of Safety, chaired by Dr. Joseph Warren, seems to have learned of the British plan on 13 June, apparently through careless talk by John Burgoyne, although intelligence security was so poor that the British could not have kept the preparation of the expedition hidden for long. To forestall the British plan,

which would begin with the occupation of Dorchester Heights on 18 June, the committee decided on 15 June to send troops to erect fortifications on Charlestown Peninsula. The committee may not have intended the occupation of the peninsula to be permanent—the first contingent was to be relieved after erecting the fortifications—but under Warren's aggressive leadership, it was willing to send troops into a cul-de-sac and offer battle to draw British attention away from Dorchester.

At 6 o'clock on the evening of 16 June, a motley group of New England provincial soldiers assembled on Cambridge Common to begin the operation. The force of fewer than twelve hundred men was composed of the Massachusetts regiments of William Prescott, James Frye (under Lieutenant Colonel James Brickett), and Ebenezer Bridge; a two-hundred-man party from Israel Putnam's Connecticut regiment (under Captain Thomas Knowlton); and Captain Samuel Gridley's Massachusetts artillery company of two guns and forty-nine men. The force, under the command of forty-nine-year-old Colonel Prescott, a veteran of the final French and Indian War, moved out at 9 P.M. under the cover of darkness.

At Charlestown Neck, Putnam met the column with wagons loaded with entrenching tools and fortification materials. After crossing the neck, Prescott sent Captain John Nutting's company of his own regiment and ten of Knowlton's men off to outpost Charlestown, which had been deserted by its inhabitants shortly after the siege began. Prescott and the main body climbed the gentle slope of Bunker Hill, and either on its summit or a few hundred yards across a saddle on an elevation closer to Boston that came to be called Breed's Hill, Prescott assembled his officers and, for the first time, told them of his orders to fortify the peninsula. While there may have been some grumbling among the officers and men about not being consulted before embarking on so risky a mission, the principal question before Prescott, Putnam, and Colonel Richard Gridley (the army's chief engineer on the basis of his experience during the colonial wars) was where to begin the fortifications. The lateness of the hour, the purpose of the mission, and the limited number of entrenching tools dictated that the work begin on Breed's Hill, with the intention, it seems, to dig in on Bunker Hill if and when time permitted.

The decision to begin fortifications on the forward elevation of Breed's Hill has been criticized for over two hundred years. It has been alleged, among other things, that the three commanders lost their way in the dark, that Breed's Hill was too vulnerable because it could be outflanked, and that Bunker Hill could have been made impregnable and offered at least equal strategic value. But the likelihood is that it was no mistake. All three men were experienced soldiers occupying ground with which they were familiar: Putnam had led his Connecticut regiment



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around the peninsula on 6 May; Prescott had traveled to Boston many times before the war as a delegate to the Massachusetts Assembly; and Gridley lived in Boston. When and if the captured cannon from Fort Ticonderoga

arrived (Knox would bring his "Noble Train of Artillery" into Cambridge only in mid-February 1776), they would be less effective on Charlestown Peninsula because it was further from the harbor, than on Dorchester Heights. To

draw British attention away from those vital heights, which they might also use as a springboard to advance on the storage depot at Cambridge to seize the supplies (especially gunpowder) without which the Americans could not have continued the fight, the Committee of Safety decided to dangle Prescott's force on the Charlestown Peninsula in a show of defiance and bravado.

It should be noted that no one exercised overall command of the American forces on 17 June. Prescott led the fight on Breed's Hill. Commanders of units that arrived later in the day inserted themselves along the slope of Breed's Hill that led toward the Mystic River, sometimes coordinated by Putnam, who seems to have spent much of his time on Bunker Hill urging American units forward. Artemas Ward, the commander of the New England army and a member of the Committee of Safety that had planned the operation, remained in Cambridge, trying to balance reinforcing the Charlestown position with the need to guard against any British attack on the American supply depot.

After Colonel Gridley traced out the shape of a redoubt on the summit of Breed's Hill, about forty-five-yards square, the soldiers started digging, using the excavated earth to create a parapet behind which they could shelter. It was a few minutes after midnight. Although British sentinels on ships in the Charles River and in Boston itself heard this pick and shovel work, reports of activity on the Charlestown Peninsula did not reach Gage until about 4 A.M. Shortly thereafter, when daybreak revealed the outlines of the redoubt, the British sloop *Lively* opened fire. In four hours of arduous work, the Americans had dug into the summit of Breed's Hill a well-designed earth fortification that was practically invulnerable to British artillery fire. In a foolhardy but effective show of bravery, Prescott walked the parapet to inspire his exhausted men to continue to dig as fast as they could.

BRITISH STRATEGY

Gage called a council of war to decide what to do about the unexpected American activity on the Charlestown Peninsula. Controversy has swirled around this meeting for almost as long as it has around the American decision to fortify Breed's Hill first. Clinton, who may have been the first senior British commander to learn that the rebels were digging in on Breed's Hill, urged Gage to attack the new rebel post quickly, before its defenses could be completed. Clinton advocated a two-pronged attack, Howe to lead a force against the front of the redoubt to hold the rebels in place while he led an amphibious force of five hundred men up the Mystic River and landed behind the Americans to cut off their retreat. Howe sensibly opposed this plan. A veteran of amphibious assaults at Louisbourg and Quebec during the final French and Indian War, he understood better than did Clinton the risks entailed in landing from the sea against enemy opposition. Besides, the original plan

(largely of his making) had encompassed more important objectives than snapping up a rebel force foolishly exposed on Charlestown Peninsula. He was willing to modify the plan to take advantage of rebel stupidity, but his ultimate objective was Cambridge. The troops would be in the field for several days—even now they were finishing the preparation of three days of rations—and hasty action might compromise efforts to achieve the larger goal.

Howe proposed a thoroughly intelligent course of action, which Gage adopted. Longboats from the Royal Navy ships in the harbor would land Howe with the main British force near Moulton's (or Morton's) Point, on the tip of Charlestown Peninsula. From Boston, Gage could see that the point was undefended, out of range of musket fire from the redoubt, and well placed to be supported by artillery fire from Royal Navy ships and the Copp's Hill battery at Boston. Although the troops would have to wade ashore, wet feet were preferable to landing dry-shod at the wharfs of Charlestown, where American troops might be waiting to play havoc with the debarkation. From there, Howe would seek to envelop the American left between Breed's Hill and the Mystic River (no earthworks yet extended toward the Mystic to guard that flank), while Brigadier General Robert Pigot, his second-in-command, feinted a frontal assault against the redoubt to fix its defenders in position. Since high water was needed for the landing, and high tide was not until 2 P.M., the debarkation was set to start at 1 P.M. This schedule gave Howe barely enough time to finish preparations for an extended expedition toward Cambridge; he later reported that it was "just possible" to accomplish, even "with the greatest exertion." It also gave the Americans several additional hours to improve their defenses and send up reinforcements.

The British commanders were seasoned professional soldiers, and their plan was basically sound; it would earn them high marks even by modern military standards. Strategically, the objective had not changed: get to Cambridge; destroy the rebels' military supplies; and deal the rebellion the hardest blow that arms could deliver. Operationally, the new plan scrapped the central feature of the old plan, taking Dorchester Heights to secure the fleet's anchorage, in favor of a gamble to shorten the distance to Cambridge while snapping up a badly positioned rebel force. The choice was not foolhardy; only in retrospect was it evident that they should have stuck to the original idea. Tactically, the British had every reason to expect overwhelming success. They would pin the defenders of the redoubt in place and envelop their open left flank. Even when American reinforcements arrived to defend that gap, there was every reason for Howe to remain confident in his plan, although the Americans had contrived to reduce the options he would have if anything went wrong with the initial assault. But what could go wrong? Speed in the assault would ensure that Howe's heavy right hook would

incur the fewest possible casualties while punching through hastily constructed field works defended by raw American troops liable to run like lightning at the sight of British bayonets bearing down on them. Given the poor marksmanship the Americans had displayed during the British retreat from Concord two months earlier, Howe had no reason to expect that a few experienced American officers would be able to make this rabble in arms wait until the British were in range and then deliver a disciplined, accurate, and sustained fire into his troops.

THE BRITISH LANDING

Part of the significance of the battle on Charlestown Peninsula derives from the fact that it played out so close to Boston. Tens of thousands of people saw or heard the action on that clear, hot June day, almost as though it was occurring in some vast amphitheater. Movement began around noon, when the British stepped up their bombardment of the American position. Firing at the redoubt were the sixty-eight gun ship of the line *Somerset*; two floating batteries; and the battery atop Copp's Hill in Boston, reinforced with four twenty-four-pounders. Firing on Charlestown Neck from the Charles River (to discourage reinforcement) were the frigate *Glasgow*; the armed transport *Symmetry*; and two floating batteries, each with one twelve-pounder. In direct support of the landing beaches were the sloops *Falcon* and *Lively* (which later moved to a position off Charlestown). Sailors from the fleet rowed the twenty-eight longboats that moved out from Boston's wharfs carrying fifteen hundred troops and twelve field guns (four light twelve-pounders, four five-and-one-half-inch howitzers, and four light six-pounders) (French, *First Year*, p. 232 n.). Howe's strike force comprised two ten-company composite battalions (one of light infantry, the other of grenadiers, composed of the elite flank companies detached from regiments in the Boston garrison) and the remaining battalion companies (eight each) of four infantry regiments (the Fifth, Thirty-eighth, Forty-third, and Fifty-second). The troops landed unopposed at about 1 P.M. and formed in three lines on Moulton's Hill.


The moment Howe landed he saw that the Americans had used the preceding six hours to strengthen their left wing. He decided to delay his attack until the boats could return to Boston for additional troops. He pushed four light infantry companies forward off Moulton's Hill into a depression where they were protected from fire from the redoubt but where they could provide security for his beachhead. Pigot moved left to the base of Breed's Hill with the sixteen battalion companies of the Thirty-eighth and Forty-third Regiments. Before the reinforcements reached Howe, probably before 2 P.M., the battery on Copp's Hill fired "hot shot" and carcass into Charlestown to set fire to the abandoned buildings and drive out the snipers who had been harassing the British left. With the

arrival of six more flank companies, the eight battalion companies of the Forty-seventh Regiment and the ten companies of the First Marine Battalion (which landed between Moulton's Point and Charlestown, near where Pigot was already in position with the Thirty-eighth and Forty-third Regiments), Howe had almost twenty-three hundred men, almost all the operational troops that could be spared from Boston's garrison of sixty-four hundred men.

AMERICAN DISPOSITIONS

Recognizing the vulnerability of the redoubt, the Americans had constructed one hundred yards of breastwork that extended down the slope of Breed's Hill toward the Mystic River. The redoubt and breastwork were manned by Prescott's regiment and parts of the Massachusetts regiments of David Brewer, John Nixon, Benjamin Ruggles Woodbridge, Moses Little, and Ephraim Doolittle. When Prescott saw the British landing he ordered Knowlton to take his exhausted working party and "oppose them." Seeing the risks of advancing against the beachhead, Putnam ordered Knowlton's Connecticut men to take position along the line of a "rail fence" that lay to rear on the left flank of the redoubt. There, by dismantling one rail fence, placing it in front of a second made half of stone and the rest of rails, and filling the interval with earth, bushes, and newly cut hay that lay about in abundance, they gave the position a deceptively strong appearance. To cover the gap between the parallel lines of the breastwork and the rail fence, Colonel Gridley had some Massachusetts men hastily throw together, possibly also from fence rails, three small v-shaped outposts known as *flèches*. Finally, to the right of the redoubt, three companies (from the regiments of Doolittle, Joseph Reed, and Woodbridge) were retreating from the conflagration of Charlestown, while Nutting's company of Prescott's regiment and a few other troops waited in a cartway and in the shelter of a barn and a stone wall.

Although Prescott and Putnam repeatedly asked for reinforcements, Ward at Cambridge would not weaken his center until he knew that Howe's force was the only British threat of the day. Believing his left wing to be secure, he finally agreed to send forward the New Hampshire regiments of John Stark and James Reed from Medford. At the Neck, forty-seven-year-old Colonel Stark, a ranger captain in the final French and Indian War, found the way blocked by men of two Massachusetts regiments who were afraid to cross through the artillery fire laid down by the *Symmetry* and the floating batteries. He asked them to stand aside, and when they did, he led his and Reed's regiments across the Neck, walking through the barrage at a very deliberate pace. When one of his captains, Henry Dearborn, suggested "quickening the march of the regiment, that it might sooner be relieved of the galling crossfire," Stark "observed with great composure" that "one fresh man in action is worth ten fatigued ones." From the summit of



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
Bunker Hill, Stark saw that Knowlton's defenses at the rail fence were critically thin and led the two New Hampshire regiments to reinforce him. Once there, he spotted the remaining danger point and moved quickly to cover it: the rail fence extended only to a bluff on the riverbank, where the ground dropped off eight or nine feet to a narrow strip of beach, wide enough so that a British column could march along it in relative safety. Stark had his men build a breastwork with stones from adjacent walls and posted them three ranks deep to defend it. He remained to command the position and sent the rest of his regiment to reinforce Knowlton and Reed at the rail fence.

While Prescott, Knowlton, and Stark worked to organize the defenses around Breed's Hill, Israel Putnam was trying to put on the summit of Bunker Hill the men who had trickled up from the Neck or who had straggled back from the front lines to work constructing fortifications. Just before the first British attack, he was joined by two senior American leaders. Although both had been elected to the rank of major general in the Massachusetts army, neither had been officially commissioned, so both offered their services as volunteers. Sixty-nine-year-old Seth Pomeroy carried the musket he had made and carried to war at Louisbourg forty years earlier; he eventually joined Stark on the Mystic beach. Thirty-four-year-old Dr. Joseph Warren was president of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, chairman of the Committee of Safety, and the

principal architect of both the Massachusetts army and the operation on Charlestown Peninsula. He joined Prescott in the redoubt on Breed's Hill.

FIRST ATTACK

According to the British plan, Pigot's left wing was to advance against the redoubt to hold its defenders in place while Howe's right wing enveloped the American left. With the grenadier companies in the front rank and the battalion companies of the Fifth and Fifty-second in the second rank, the bulk of Howe's force was to move toward the rail fence to engage the defenders' attention. (He ordered his six-pounders to advance ahead of the infantry, but this part of the plan failed when the gunners discovered that all the extra ammunition their negligent senior officer had sent over from Boston was for twelve-pounders. Boggy ground kept the guns from getting close enough to fire grapeshot effectively.) Everything depended on the eleven light infantry companies attacking in column along the narrow strip of beach that had caught Stark's eye. Howe was confident that their unstoppable charge would penetrate the American left, whereupon they would climb the bluff to hit the defenders of the rail fence from the rear and lead Howe's entire wing in an envelopment of the redoubt. Depending on how long it took to dispose of the rebels on the peninsula, the force would then regroup and head for Cambridge that evening or the next day.



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In the oppressive heat of early afternoon, the British light infantry moved rapidly in a column four abreast along the unobstructed beach toward Stark's line of nervous New Hampshiremen. The leading company (Royal Welch Fusiliers) had gotten to within fifty yards and had begun to charge with bayonets leveled and ready when Stark gave the order to fire. The men had been instructed to shoot low and to look for the gorgets that marked the officers. Their initial volley tore apart the head of the British column. Without hesitation the survivors of the leading company pressed forward, only to be cut down. The next two companies, the Fourth (King's Own) and Tenth (those of Lexington Common), charged in turn with incredible valor over the bodies of their dead and wounded comrades and with the reasonable expectation that they could come to grips with these farmers as they reloaded between volleys. But Stark had organized his men into three ranks, one of which was always ready to fire, so there was no lull between volleys. The men of the Fifty-second Regiment came forward, but their officers could not make them attack. When the light infantry was finally ordered to retire, ninety-six men lay dead on the beach.


As his main effort collapsed in bloody failure, Howe was busy leading the attack on the rail fence. The grenadiers in the front rank came under heavy and accurate fire as they

moved across fences and walls on ground they had not reconnoitered. Again, the Americans held their fire until the enemy was within about fifty yards; here also they had been told to shoot low and to look for the officers. Aware of what was happening to the light infantry, the grenadiers paused to return the American fire instead of charging with the bayonet. This violation of their instructions not only was ineffective, but it caused the second line to mingle with the first. As fire from the fence continued to pour into the confused regulars, they finally dropped back to reorganize. Pigot's feint on the British left, which was never intended to develop into a frontal assault on the redoubt, also encountered effective musket fire and dropped back.

Putnam, who had been at the rail fence during this first attack, now rode back to Bunker Hill and to the Neck in a vain attempt to get volunteers to reinforce the front line. When he later explained to Prescott, "I could not drive the dogs," Prescott is alleged to have retorted that he "might have led them up."

SECOND ATTACK

Within fifteen minutes of the failure of the first attack, Howe launched a second attack. While Pigot again moved toward the redoubt and the surviving light infantrymen demonstrated against the rail fence, Howe sent a column



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into the gap between the redoubt and the rail fence, seeking now to envelop a smaller portion of the American position. Again the defenders held their fire until the British were a hundred feet away. The continuous crossfire from the redoubt, the breastwork, the three flèches, and the rail fence was even more murderous than before. When the men in the column spontaneously deployed into line, trading momentum and speed for a chance to fire back at their tormentors, the second attack collapsed in a failure as dismal as the first.

Although the Americans had suffered few casualties in defeating these two assaults, they were now running critically short of ammunition. Putnam continued his efforts to get reinforcements and resupply forward to Prescott, Knowlton, and Stark. Although he had frequently ridden across the Neck that day, many troops refused to brave the crossfire from the guns of the Royal Navy. When Colonel James Scammons was ordered from Lechmere Point to "the hill," he marched his regiment to Cobble Hill! When he finally crossed the Neck, he ordered a retreat before reaching the top of Bunker Hill. Colonel Samuel Gerrish and his Massachusetts regiment refused to leave the reverse slope of Bunker Hill, but Christian Febiger, his Danish-born adjutant, did lead some volunteers of the regiment into the battle. (Gerrish was later cashiered; Scammons was acquitted by a court-martial on the grounds that he had misunderstood his orders.) American field artillery was particularly ineffective. Six small field pieces, in three companies led by Captains Samuel Gridley (son of the engineer), Samuel Trevett, and John Callender, may have gotten into action, but the officers and men were too poorly drilled and insufficiently aggressive to make much of an impact. Both Gridley and Callender were dismissed from the service after the battle, although Callender later

redeemed himself as a volunteer in the ranks and had his commission restored. Trevett lost one gun on Bunker Hill but got the other forward to the fence and managed to bring it off during the retreat; his was the only gun the British did not capture (Ward, *War of the Revolution*, pp. 96–97).

FINAL ATTACK

Reinforced with four hundred fresh troops (the Sixty-third Regiment and the flank companies of the Second Marine Battalion), Howe organized a third assault. His men had made their first two assaults carrying between 100 and 125 pounds of equipment, including three days' rations, ammunition, and a blanket; musket and bayonet alone weighed fifteen pounds. Those attacks had been shattered. When Howe ordered his men to drop their knapsacks and other accoutrements, he abandoned all remnants of his original plan. He was now fighting to retain some honor for the British army and at least to oust the rebels from the peninsula. He would never get to Cambridge. Pigot and his relatively unhurt left wing would have to bear the brunt of the fight, assisted by Clinton, who had come across from Boston to rally the dazed survivors of earlier assaults that he had seen milling on the beach near Moulton's Point without discipline or orders.

The plan this time was to demonstrate against the rail fence while Pigot and Clinton tried to encircle the redoubt. The gunners, now with the proper ammunition, moved their fieldpieces forward to enfilade the breastwork from the left. They routed the defenders, some of whom retreated to the rear while others withdrew into the redoubt. The British infantry advanced in column until they were close enough to charge with the bayonet, suffering more devastating musket fire until they were within ten yards of the redoubt. The marines on the extreme left



The Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker Hill (1786). John Trumbull's painting dramatizes the death in June 1775 of Joseph Warren, a leading Massachusetts citizen and the principal architect of both the Massachusetts army and the operation on Charlestown Peninsula. © FRANCIS G. MAYER/CORBIS.

(toward Charlestown) were stopped by musket fire and, in violation of their instructions, stopped to shoot back. The Forty-seventh came up to steady the marines and resume the attack, but not before Major John Pitcairn of the marines was mortally wounded. As the rebels expended the last of their gunpowder and their musket fire petered out, the regulars swarmed into the redoubt from two sides, and for a few moments there was desperate hand-to-hand combat. Having few bayonets, the Americans met their assailants with rocks and clubbed muskets. Only thirty Americans were killed in the redoubt, but among them was Joseph Warren. Prescott fought his way out, parrying bayonets with his sword. Why Prescott, an experienced soldier, chose to keep his men in the redoubt to await the final assault remains a mystery. He knew they were almost out of ammunition and could not withstand a bayonet attack. It may be that Prescott effectively abdicated command to Warren, whose aggressiveness and inexperience led him to misjudge the situation. If so, he paid for that mistake with his life.

"The retreat was no rout," Burgoyne reported, having watched the battle from Boston. Lord Rawdon, who

commanded the grenadier company of the Fifth Regiment after Captain (later Lord) Harris was wounded, wrote home that the rebels "continued a running fight from one fence, or wall, to another, till we entirely drove them off the peninsula." As is commonly the case, the defenders sustained most of their casualties in the retreat. The exhausted regulars pursued only to Bunker Hill, where they stopped to organize a defense against any American counterattack.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

American strength on the peninsula during the battle was probably in excess of three thousand men. Not more than half this number was in action at any one time, and perhaps a third took little or no part in the fighting. Total American casualties were said to number 441 men, of whom 140 were killed and 301 wounded; 30 of the latter were captured.

British strength was about twenty-five hundred men, including the four hundred who only took part in the final assault. Gage reported that the army suffered 1,054

casualties, about 40 percent of its strength. Returns totaled 19 officers and 207 men killed and 70 officers and 758 men wounded. Officer casualties were particularly heavy; of the British officer casualties in the twenty largest battles of the Revolution, one-eighth were killed and about one-sixth were wounded at Bunker Hill.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Battle of Bunker Hill rallied the colonies and banished any real hope of conciliation with Britain. Although many Americans at first thought the battle had been unnecessary and discreditable (they had been driven from the field), they soon realized that they had behaved well and that the British regulars were not invincible. They later came to regard the battle with pride. The British were forced to revise their opinions about the fighting abilities of the American rebels. According to Gage,

These people show a spirit and conduct against us they never showed against the French, and every body has judged of them from their former appearances and behavior when joined with the King's forces in the last war, which has lead many into great mistakes. They are now spirited up by a rage and enthusiasm as great as ever people were possessed of, and you must proceed in earnest or give the business up. . . . The loss we have sustained is greater than we can bear (*ibid.*, p. 134).

The secret of the defense of Breed's Hill, little realized even today, was the presence of American officers who had acquired military experience in the final French and Indian War. Gridley knew how to lay out and direct the construction of field fortifications. Prescott, Stark, Putnam, and Knowlton—to name them in approximate order of their importance in the battle—displayed the highest of leadership skills. Putnam knew the psychological value of breastworks. He is supposed to have commented that Americans were afraid of being shot in the legs but did not worry about their heads; protect their legs and they would fight forever. Prescott at the redoubt, Knowlton at the rail fence, and Stark along the beach also understood how to motivate and command American citizen-soldiers. These veteran officers exuded an air of confidence and calm control that kept the men from panicking when facing British artillery fire and then held them in position as the renowned and redoubtable British infantry advanced to point-blank range. Inspiring citizen-soldiers to behave in these ways was a remarkable feat of leadership.

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege; Carcass; Charlestown, Massachusetts (17 June 1775); Dearborn, Henry; Dorchester Heights, Massachusetts; Febiger, Christian ("Old Denmark"); Gridley, Richard; Pitcairn, John; Pomeroy, Seth; Warren, Joseph.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

BURGOYNE, JOHN. (1723–1792). British general, politician, and playwright. Born at Westminster on 4 February 1723, Burgoyne was educated at Westminster School and was commissioned into the third troop of Horse Guards in 1737. He sold out in 1741 but finally became a cornet in the First Dragoons in 1747. He became a lieutenant in 1745 and a captain in 1747. In 1751 he eloped with his friend's sister, Lady Charlotte Stanley, daughter of the earl of Derby. Burgoyne again sold his commission and traveled in France and Italy with his wife until 1755. The following year, reconciled with Lord Derby, he bought a commission in the Eleventh Dragoons. After distinguished service at St. Malo in 1758, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and ordered to recruit the new Sixteenth Dragoons, one of the two light horse formations whose creation he had championed. In 1762, as a local brigadier general, he demonstrated exceptional light cavalry skills with a fifty-mile march culminating in a dawn charge at Valencia d'Alcantara. The city fell, a Spanish regiment was annihilated, and booty and numerous of prisoners were taken. More importantly, he secured the Tagus Valley, thus saving Lisbon from Spanish attack. Burgoyne ended the Seven Years' War as a full colonel and with recognition as a capable commander. "Gentleman Johnny" was also very popular among his men and wrote a manual for officers. In the late 1760s he made a tour of inspection of European armies and argued strongly for the creation of a superior British cavalry arm. In 1769 he became governor of Fort William in Scotland and a major general in 1772.

He was also active in politics. In 1761 he had been returned for Midhurst in Sussex. With a deep respect for parliamentary supremacy and convinced that basic

liberties were not at stake, he supported both the Stamp Act and the Declaratory Act. With the death of his patron in 1768, he lost Midhurst but contested Preston in Lord Derby's interest. The seat had generally returned Tories, not administration Whigs like Burgoyne, and the election was a violent one. Burgoyne went canvassing with a pair of pistols, the Tory mayor rejected over 600 of his votes on the grounds that they were not cast by freemen, and Burgoyne was only seated after appealing to Parliament itself. He was also fined one thousand pounds for his armed campaigning. In 1772 he chaired a committee that investigated Robert Clive's Indian fortune and two years later supported the Coercive Acts. Appealing for a military role in America, in 1775 he became the junior of the three major generals appointed to support Thomas Gage at Boston.

The characteristics Burgoyne would exhibit in America were already evident when he left London. He was essentially a cavalry man, addicted to danger, drama, and dash. His runaway marriage, his addiction to reckless gambling, amateur acting, and efforts as a playwright—his debut, *The Maid of the Oaks*, had appeared in 1774—all pointed in the same direction. When he reached Boston with the others in May 1775, Gage asked him to compose a last appeal to the rebellious colonists: the result was a florid, overwritten epistle to “the deluded multitude,” which probably did no good at all. Here was an officer for dramatic postures, not to mention bold schemes and risks, on a scale that only Charles Lord Cornwallis could rival. He was not a man in tune with William Howe and Henry Clinton's penchant for method and caution.

BURGOYNE'S PLAN FAILS

Boston meant an uncongenially passive role for Burgoyne: even at Bunker Hill, his participation was limited to providing artillery fire from across the water at Copp's Hill. He filled in the time by writing numerous letters home criticizing Gage and writing a farce, *The Siege of Boston*. At last he successfully applied for home leave and on reaching London in November presented Lord George Germain, the new secretary of state, with a memorandum entitled “Reflections on the War in America.” In this document he urged the seizure of New York City and an advance overland to Albany from Quebec via Lake Champlain. The idea was to isolate New England, still supposed to be the real seat of the rebellion, and to interrupt the American movement of supplies and men to and from the middle colonies. The underlying agenda was, of course, to provide Burgoyne with a glamorous independent command.

The New York City part of the idea was sound and appealed to Germain's own thinking. The city was centrally placed, had a good harbor, and gave access to a major inland waterway, the Hudson River. The Canada–Lake

Champlain end of the scheme, however, had just a spurious plausibility that could have convinced only someone who had never been there. Canada had to have serious reinforcements in any case to see off the American siege of Quebec. From there they might as well be used to invade New York along the line used, in reverse, by Abercromby and Amherst during the Seven Years' War. Looked at on a large-scale map, it appeared simple. Such an analysis, however, took insufficient account of the physical difficulties of the route or of the ease with which it could be blocked, at least temporarily, by enemy forts, troops, and flotillas. Finally, it failed to appreciate the fact that the main American communications could be more easily severed by securing the Hudson through a modest advance from New York City.

The immediate need was to reinforce Sir Guy Carleton against the American invasion that had confined him to Quebec. Germain, unaware that the real danger had passed, sent Burgoyne with ten thousand troops embarked in fifteen ships. They arrived in the St. Lawrence opposite Quebec in fifteen ships on 5 May 1776, enabling Carleton to lead a reconnaissance in force that routed the few remaining besiegers. Burgoyne served under Carleton in the expulsion of American forces from Canada, culminating in the destruction of the American flotilla at Valcour Island on Lake Champlain on 11–13 October. Carleton now judged it too late in the season to attack Ticonderoga and prudently withdrew from Crown Point. Disappointed, Burgoyne again returned to Britain to press his ideas on the ministry.

His memorandum to Lord North, “Thoughts for Conducting the War on the Side of Canada,” called for no less than eight thousand regulars and German mercenaries, two thousand Canadian laborers, and at least one thousand Indians. His own objective was to be either Albany or, preferably, Rhode Island via the Connecticut River. He also wanted St. Leger to provide a diversion on the Mohawk River. The orders actually sent out to both Howe and Burgoyne, however, made it perfectly clear that Burgoyne was to expect no direct help from Howe unless Washington himself moved against Burgoyne and that his objective was to be Albany, not Rhode Island or the Connecticut River. He was not given as many troops as he wanted—7,251 British and German regulars—and he was allowed to recruit only 150 Canadian workmen and 500 Indians. None of this caused Burgoyne, or anyone else, the least anxiety before he left London in March 1777. Everyone on the British side underestimated the numbers and effectiveness of the rebel militia that could be brought to bear in the upper Hudson wilderness. In Canada he found that Carleton had assembled a powerful flotilla on Lake Champlain but had not found adequate numbers of horses and wagons, a critical shortcoming for an army needing to draw almost all its supplies from



The Surrender at Saratoga. Burgoyne's surrender to General Horatio Gates at Saratoga on 17 October 1777, depicted here in a French engraving (1784), effectively ended any further effort by the British to conduct major offensive operations from Canada. © CORBIS.

Canada. Recruitment of Indians, Canadians, and Loyalists had been disappointing. Even now it did not occur to Burgoyne that he might have bitten off more than he could chew.

At Saratoga on 7 October 1777 he found himself engulfed by American forces totaling over thirteen thousand and compelled to surrender. His opponent, Horatio Gates, agreed that the British army should be repatriated on condition that it did not serve again in North America.

ASSESSING BLAME

Although the Continental Congress failed to honor this convention, Burgoyne was allowed to go home on parole, where he met a barrage of criticism. When he arrived on 13 May 1778, the king refused either to see him or give him a court-martial. He lost his colonelcy of the Sixteenth Dragoons and the Fort William governorship; in Parliament, questions were raised about the surrendered army, and it was suggested that Burgoyne should be sent

back as a prisoner of war. His only supporters were the handful of Foxites, with their near-paranoid suspicion of executive power and urgent wish to embarrass the ministry.

Only now did Burgoyne begin to argue that he had absolutely inflexible instructions to reach Albany—so that the decision to persist rather than to retreat in good time had not been his to make—and had been given only half the troops he asked for. He also blamed Carleton for not supporting him properly and Howe for inattention to orders. He put this case quite ably to a parliamentary inquiry in 1779 and published it in *State of the Expedition from Canada* in 1780.

There is no doubt that Burgoyne was to some extent the author of his own misfortunes. There was something of the dashing cavalryman and gambler about his handling of the enterprise from beginning to end. A cautious, methodical general might have waited for more horses and better wagons, whereas Burgoyne was in the field within six weeks

of arriving in Canada. Where a prudent commander might have withdrawn, Burgoyne crossed the Hudson. His attempts to shift the blame onto others are deeply unappealing. Yet the basic strategic decision belonged to Germain and the ministry and would probably have been taken even without Burgoyne's lobbying. He was certainly not the only candidate for the command. Carleton was slow to find land transport and resigned out of pique at not being given the command in June 1777. Howe's decision not to push up the Hudson was his alone. The actual balance of blame is unclear, and pursuit of it is probably futile. More important was the near-universal underestimate of the scale of the rebellion and the decision to fight a backwoods campaign far from British naval support.

A MORE LIBERAL POLITICS

The experience drove Burgoyne's politics in a liberal direction. The soldier who had championed the Coercive Acts and itched to draw his sword against the rebels now joined Fox and Sheridan in opposition to the war. In 1782 the former champion of Westminster's supremacy voted for the Rockingham ministry's grant of legislative independence to the Irish Parliament. His reward was to be made commander in chief and privy councillor in Ireland (as well as a colonelcy), a post he kept under the Fox-North coalition but resigned after the younger Pitt came to power in December 1783. He used his pen to satirize the Pitt administration and, in keeping with his earlier attack on Clive and the East India Company corruption, in 1788 he took part in the prosecution of Warren Hastings. Later still he was to welcome the French Revolution.

LITERARY WORK

Burgoyne also resumed his literary career. *The Maid of the Oaks* had already been taken up and expanded by David Garrick; and turned into a modest Drury Lane success. He wrote a libretto for an opera and translated another, *Richard Coeur de Lion*, from the French. Neither was a popular triumph, but a comedy, *The Heiress*, was received as an incisive representation of contemporary upper-class society. It opened with thirty performances at Drury Lane, ran through ten editions in a year, and remained popular in Britain and Europe for fifty years.

His wife died in February 1776, and he never remarried. However, he began a long affair with a married actress, Susan Caulfield, by whom he had four children between 1782 and 1788. The four were brought up in Lord Derby's household, and the eldest became Field Marshal Sir John Fox Burgoyne (1782–1871).

John Burgoyne died suddenly on 4 June 1792, probably from the effects of gout, and was buried in Westminster Abbey on 13 August.

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege; Burgoyne's Offensive; Carleton, Guy; Champlain, Lake; Clinton, Henry; Cornwallis, Charles; Gage, Thomas; Gates, Horatio; Germain, George Sackville; Howe, William; Saratoga Surrender; St. Leger's Expedition.*

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revised by John Oliphant

BURGOYNE'S OFFENSIVE. June–October 1777. The notion of a British invasion from Canada along the traditional Champlain-Hudson route was certainly not a novel idea. In 1775 fear of such a course of action prompted the American efforts to control Lake Champlain, and both General Thomas Gage and Lieutenant General Richard Howe mentioned it that year. In 1776 Sir Guy Carleton, commander of British forces in Quebec, attempted the move but ran out of time. On 13 December 1776 the king himself urged the ministry to undertake another offensive in 1777, and to have Lieutenant General John Burgoyne lead it instead of Carleton because he was more “energetic.” In February the government toyed with having Lieutenant General Henry Clinton and Burgoyne exchange places (both men were in England on leave for the winter), but in the end left matters as they had stood in 1776. Keeping in mind that Carleton exercised a completely separate command in Canada from Howe, and thus carried out independent operations, the ministry maintained overall coordination because no military action could be exercised without approval from one of the three secretaries of state. George Germain, the American Secretary and himself a former general, watched over both commanders but knew that the transatlantic communication problem mandated leaving the men on the ground the maximum amount of flexibility to adjust to changing conditions. The specifics of the northern part of the 1777 campaign that he finally approved came from Burgoyne's “Thoughts for

Conducting the War on the Side of Canada," submitted on 28 February.

After various meetings on 18 March Germain informed the king that instructions would be prepared for the various commanders to explain the objectives of the campaign, beginning with Burgoyne so that he could depart for Canada as soon as possible. He arrived in Quebec on 6 May on a frigate carrying Germain's orders to Carleton, followed by convoys bringing some reinforcements. Germain told Carleton to stay in Canada with a garrison of 3,770 troops, while Burgoyne led a two-pronged offensive southward. The main effort by some 7,000 men under Burgoyne himself would move south across Lake Champlain, capture the fortified complex at Ticonderoga, and push on to Albany. As a diversion, Barry St. Leger's offensive would move east along the Mohawk River with about 2,000 more. At Albany the two forces would unite, and at that point Burgoyne would come under Howe's orders. Howe's responsibilities were to conduct operations to facilitate Burgoyne's movement, not to make physical contact.

Controversy erupted the following winter as various generals tried to blame each other for the failure of the campaign, and their charges and countercharges have confused historians ever since. Older interpretations followed allegations made by Burgoyne's defense and concluded that the campaign was doomed when Howe opted to attack Philadelphia instead of moving up the Hudson River to Albany. Others blamed Germain for not giving specific orders to the various commanders directing step-by-step moves, and even alleged that bureaucratic sloppiness "lost" just such a memo. Both lines of reasoning were discredited by William Willcox in a 1962 *Journal of British Studies* article, "Too Many Cooks: British Planning Before Saratoga." In point of fact, none of the British military or civilian leaders felt that Burgoyne had any danger in moving as far as Albany; they also knew that Howe had ample forces in New York and Rhode Island to hold those bases and that he intended to try to bring Washington to decisive battle, and that he would probably need to attack Philadelphia to make that happen. What they all expected was that Howe would use part of his forces to pin down American troops near his own bases so that they could not move north to assist in opposing Burgoyne. Actions after Burgoyne arrived in Albany remained deliberately flexible because no one in the winter could predict how things would stand in the fall. Germain, Carleton, Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne all knew that Burgoyne could either push southeast and coordinate with troops moving up from Rhode Island in a strike to break the heart of resistance in New England, or push south to meet an advance up the Hudson by New York-City based troops, severing New England from the other colonies, which London believed had substantial Loyalist sympathies and

would rally to the Crown in the aftermath of a string of victories.

PREPARATIONS IN CANADA

Carleton's excellent preparations during the winter of 1776–1777 and subsequent cooperation with his former subordinate enabled Burgoyne to start operations within six weeks of his arrival in Canada. Unlike the previous fall, Schuyler could not challenge the British for naval control of the lake. Carleton's British and German regulars came out of their winter quarters rested and well-equipped; most of the American regiments had been sent home to reorganize, and needed to undergo smallpox inoculation, draw uniforms and weapons, and then march back to the front. Major General Philip Schuyler had much greater difficulty moving his forces to their forward positions than Carleton did in assembling Burgoyne's army at St. Johns and then linking up with the squadron at Cumberland Head (now Plattsburgh, N.Y.). On 20 June a "splendid regatta" started south, reached Crown Point on 27 June, and approached Fort Ticonderoga on 30 June.

Burgoyne had well over 10,000 troops, seamen, and Indians under his command, and up to 1,000 noncombatant laborers or authorized camp followers complicating his logistics. Some 3,700 of the troops were British regulars and another 3,000 the contingents from Brunswick-Lunenburg and Hesse-Hanau. The flotilla included the larger armed craft as escorts and for gunfire support, over 20 gunboats, and about 800 bateaux needed to move troops and supplies. He also brought forward an extensive array of artillery with their gunners, including light and medium pieces as a field train to take on to Albany and heavier weapons to pound Ticonderoga into submission.

BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE

Brigadier Simon Fraser led the Advance Corps, which had British and German components. Fraser himself led his own Twenty-fourth Foot and composite battalions of grenadier and light infantry battalions composed of the flank companies of the British regiments. Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Breymann's comparable German force contained Chasseur Battalion von Barner (the four Brunswick light infantry companies and the single Brunswick jäger company) and his own battalion formed from the four Brunswick grenadier companies. Assorted Indians, Loyalists, and Canadian militia formations loosely operated with the Advance Corps.

Burgoyne's main body had a British ("Right") Wing and a German ("Left") Wing, each divided into two brigades. Major General William Phillips, an artillery officer, was made second in command so that he could command troops of the line (infantry and cavalry). Major General Friedrich von Riedesel led the wings. Henry Powell led the

First Brigade, James Hamilton the Second. On the German side, Colonel Johann Specht and Colonel Wilhelm von Gall led brigades of Germans.

The guns were manned by 250 British artillery regulars augmented by 150 men attached from the British infantry; direct support guns for the Germans came from the Hesse-Hanau artillery company. Unlike his other forces, the irregulars fell short of the numbers Burgoyne had expected. About 400 Indians followed some of the same French Canadian leaders who had led in the previous war. Only 100 or so Loyalist and 150 Canadian militia started with the expedition. More ominously, Burgoyne's forces had excellent transportation as long as they stuck to major waterways but came woefully underequipped with the wagons, carts, and horses necessary to move on land.

AMERICAN DISPOSITIONS

When the British began their advance Schuyler was still in the process of assembling his new forces and releasing the formations that had held the posts over the winter. Under the strategic dispositions designed by Washington at the start of the spring, Schuyler's Northern Department had half of the Massachusetts regiments (eight), all three of the New Hampshire regiments, and three of the five from New York, plus several miscellaneous units and a provisional battalion of artillery. Schuyler pushed the bulk of the men forward to the Ticonderoga complex under Major General Arthur St. Clair (probably 2,500–3,000 Continentals), where roughly 900 militia also assembled. Smaller detachments at Skenesboro, Fort Anne, Fort Edward, and Albany kept open the lines of communications. Schuyler also allocated several Continental regiments to defend the Mohawk Valley, basing most of them at Fort Stanwix but still counting on the militia from the upstate New York counties to carry the bulk of the burden in defending his flanks.

INITIAL OPERATIONS

After issuing Burgoyne's Proclamation and delivering a flamboyant speech to his Indians, "Gentleman Johnny" moved south and captured Ticonderoga on 2–5 July, with a speed and ease that badly shook American morale. Senior American officers knew that "the Gibraltar of America" really depended on control of Lake Champlain for its defense. They also understood that the original French fortifications sat on terrain that could not withstand an attack by any large force with the proper artillery; they had been working for over a year to try to turn the position into a complex (including Mount Independence on the opposite shore) but did not have anywhere near enough men to hold such long lines. Schuyler and St. Clair had been running a bluff,

and when Major General William Phillips found a dominating position for the British guns, St. Clair conducted a well-conceived night evacuation that saved the garrison and thereby gave Schuyler an army that could continue to fight another day. The detachment left to cover the departure, however, bungled their mission, and Burgoyne's seamen cut through the boom obstructing access to Lake George in far less time than the Americans thought. These factors cost St. Clair the head start time he needed to escape unmolested. There being no short road from Ticonderoga to Skenesboro, St. Clair led the largest part of his command on a forty-five-mile, roundabout route through Castleton; the rest with the guns, stores, and sick took the water route over Lake George. American mistakes and British vigor allowed the lead elements of the pursuit to catch up with the rear element on each line of retreat. The overland rearguard engaged at Hubbardton on 7 July; the other force at Skenesboro on 6 July and at Fort Anne on 7 July. St. Clair finally reached Fort Edward on 12 July.

OTHER FRONTS

By the time Howe sailed for Philadelphia on 23 July he knew that Burgoyne had captured Ticonderoga, which everyone had assumed would be the hardest part of the northern campaign. Howe therefore left Sir Henry Clinton in and around New York City with about 8,500 troops. Back in the spring Washington had designated two other concentration points for the American forces in addition to Schuyler's Northern Department. The bulk of the army gathered in northern New Jersey under Washington's direct command and formed the Main Army. A somewhat smaller element occupied the vital strategic position in the mountains astride the Hudson River and were designated as the Highlands Department. Howe's slow pace in starting the 1777 campaign puzzled the American leaders, in part because the British actions made no military sense. As time elapsed Burgoyne's movements and Howe's inaction led Washington to reinforce Schuyler. The remaining Massachusetts regiments (Nixon's and Glover's brigades) shifted up from Major General Israel Putnam's Highlands command; Colonel Daniel Morgan's riflemen were detached from the main army (then near Ramapo, N.J.); and the fiery Major General Benedict Arnold, just recovering from wounds, got orders to join Schuyler. At Washington's suggestion, Major General Benjamin Lincoln was ordered to the Vermont area to organize and command New England militia being assembled there. Governors of the New England colonies and New York were urged to fill their quotas of Continentals and to turn out their militia.

In St. Leger's Expedition, an unsuccessful diversion, St. Leger left Oswego, New York, on 26 July, reached Fort Stanwix with his main body on 3 August, and repulsed a

militia relief column at Oriskany on 6 August. But he started withdrawing on 22 August when Arnold led a Continental column from Schuyler's army into the Mohawk Valley. That column returned to Schuyler before any decisive battle occurred, making St. Leger's entire expedition ineffectual in furthering the British campaign plan.

BURGOYNE'S FIRST MISTAKE

In his "Thoughts," Burgoyne had stated an assumption that the Americans would have a sizable flotilla on Lake George that might bar use of this "most expeditious and most commodious route to Albany." In the same paper he also foresaw that along the alternate route overland from Skenesboro "considerable difficulties may be expected, as the narrow parts of the river [Wood Creek] may be easily choked up and rendered impassable, and at best there will be necessity for a great deal of land carriage for the artillery, provisions, etc., which can only be supplied from Canada." Despite inadequate transport and the lack of opposition on Lake George, however, Burgoyne still elected to take the alternate route, using Lake George only for the movement of supplies and heavy artillery. He later justified this decision on two grounds: since he needed all his boats to move supplies, he could not have reached Fort Edward with his army any faster via Lake George than by the route along Wood Creek; and, he said, falling back from Fort Anne after the skirmishes might have been construed as weakness by "enemies and friends." There is no substance to the legend that Loyalist Philip Skene talked him into the shorter land route with the personal motive of getting a road built between Skene's property and the Hudson.

As soon as Burgoyne stopped to regroup, Schuyler immediately launched a brilliant tactical operation. Schuyler correctly recognized that time was his ally in 1777, just as it had been in 1776. The British had to achieve victory before winter froze the lakes and cut their lines of communications, so he set about enhancing the obstructions nature had placed in Burgoyne's path to Fort Edward (on the Hudson). Schuyler sent 1,000 axmen to fell trees across Wood Creek and across the trails. They dug ditches to create additional quagmires in a region that was boggy to start with; they rolled boulders into the creek to obstruct boats and to cause overflows. It took the British twenty days to cover the twenty-two miles. They had to bridge at least forty deep ravines, and in one place constructed a two-mile causeway. On 29 July Burgoyne reached Fort Edward, and his supply column, commanded by General Phillips, took Fort George, fifteen miles to the northwest at the tip of Lake George. The murder of Jane McCrea had taken place on 27 July and was to have an unexpectedly great effect on subsequent operations.

It now became apparent that "the fatal defect in Burgoyne's plan was the inability to supply his army" (Greene, p. 109). From Fort Edward the British line of communications stretched 185 miles back to Montreal. The only other option for procuring food and fodder for the horses would have been to employ foragers. But the area north of Stillwater had very few inhabitants or farms, and Schuyler's men had made sure nothing of value remained to fall into British hands. The Bennington Raid, 6–16 August, prompted by Burgoyne's need for supplies, turned into a disaster that hastened his doom.

GATES SUCCEEDS SCHUYLER

Despite his shortcomings as a commander, Schuyler had scored successes that left Burgoyne no sound alternative but retreat. The virus of sectional factionalism finally led to Schuyler's being relieved, however, and Major General Horatio Gates arrived on 19 August to command the Northern Department. When he took over the department's main combat forces (about 4,000 men), they were camped at the junction of the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers, where supply was easiest. In addition to the detachments still working on the obstruction program, Gates inherited the large force under Arnold relieving Fort Stanwix to the west and the slightly smaller Bennington veterans thirty miles to the east. He also benefited from earlier calls to mobilize New York and New England militia; the need to assemble and organize those forces had taken time, but units were now starting to arrive, and more Continentals were on their way from the Highlands. Burgoyne probably could have saved his army by a prompt retreat. Oblivious of the growing danger, he continued on toward Albany. (Burgoyne would later claim that he had positive orders from Germain to march to that location, but no such orders had been issued.) Because Albany lay on the west side of the Hudson, and the river got wider as it flowed south, Burgoyne opted to cross to the west side near Saratoga. The problem of numbers and losses dogging the invaders since mid-July finally became critical here. If he kept heading south he would not have enough spare troops to guard the crossing site. So in order to keep going, Burgoyne chose to cut his own lines of communications with the lakes, built up thirty days' supplies to take with him, and counted on drawing supplies from Clinton in New York City after he reached Albany.

On 13 September, with about 6,000 rank and file, he started crossing to Saratoga, and two days later he dismantled his bridge of boats. All but fifty of his Indians had deserted by now, and Burgoyne was in the dark as to the enemy situation; Gates, on the other hand, was well informed. On 12 September the Americans had advanced north a short distance from Stillwater to occupy strong defensive terrain at Bemis Heights, where Arnold and

Thaddeus Kosciuszko, colonel of engineers in the Continental Army, had laid out the lines.

The First Battle of Saratoga, 19 September 1777, was fought around Freeman's Farm. The next day Burgoyne considered attacking Gates in full force. Simon Fraser argued that his grenadiers and light infantrymen, who would spearhead the attack, needed a day's rest, and Burgoyne decided to wait. The British were ready to attack on the twenty-first when Burgoyne received Clinton's letter of 12 September. Burgoyne had sent numbers of messengers in civilian clothing overland to New York, and since he had left Fort Miller had been calling on Clinton to come north in support. Clinton's letter was the first to reach Burgoyne, and in it Clinton offered to make a diversion against the Highlands. Burgoyne's misunderstanding of what Clinton proposed (and his own instructions from London stated) led him to conclude that he did not need to attack, but instead should await the outcome of Clinton's move. The same day, 21 September, the British heard sounds of rejoicing from the unseen American positions on Bemis Heights. A few days later they learned the noise was occasioned by news of John Brown's Ticonderoga Raid.

BURGOYNE DIGS IN

The invaders now entrenched the positions they had taken up on 20 September in preparation for the canceled attack. Facing south along the plateau between the Hudson and the North Branch (of Mill Creek) were the Germans of Riedesel's column (on the east) and Hamilton with four regiments. Outposts sat a few hundred yards in front of these positions. Continuing west, the line was manned by Fraser's Advance Corps. The British light infantry, under Alexander Balcarres, occupied the key terrain feature of Burgoyne's entire position: the salient at Freeman's Farm, where they built the fortification known as the Balcarres Redoubt. The Breyman's remnants of the German flank troops held another redoubt about 500 yards farther north, in effect creating as a refused flank (a tactical disposition in which the end of a line is bent backwards to prevent an enemy from taking the position from the side or rear). A handful of Canadians in stockaded cabins screened the intervening gap. Bateaux and stores were collected at the mouth of the Great Ravine (Wilbur's Basin) and a bridge of boats was constructed across the Hudson at this point. Three redoubts, one known as the Great Redoubt, were started on the high ground overlooking this area and about 600 yards west of the river's edge.

Burgoyne's strength had dwindled to about 5,000, and desertions were mounting. The troops had been on a diet of salt pork and flour for some time, and on 3 October their rations were reduced by one third. Horses were starving to death. To add to the misery, the Americans

harassed the invading forces continually. "I do not believe that either officer or soldier ever slept during that interval [20 September–7 October] without his cloaths, or that any general officer, or commander of a regiment, passed a single night without being upon his legs occasionally at different hours and constantly an hour before daylight," Burgoyne wrote.

THE AMERICAN SITUATION

The only change in the defenses of Bemis Heights was the fortification of the high ground half a mile west of the Neilson House, which Burgoyne had selected as his objective on 19 September. But in contrast to Burgoyne's, Gates's numbers had been growing at a steady rate. With Burgoyne no longer a threat to move east, Gates pulled Lincoln's militia from the Bennington area, and other militia arrived from New England and New York. By 4 October Gates had more than 7,000 troops; three days later he had 11,000. Thanks to Schuyler, Gates's ammunition had been replenished. Gates held all of his Continentals (about 3,000) and much of the militia in the fortified lines, but took advantage of the huge numbers of militia to send out combat patrols to attack British outposts all the way north to Ticonderoga and to maintain a counter-reconnaissance screen that left Burgoyne completely in the dark. Patriot morale soared.

BURGOYNE'S LAST EFFORT

On 4 October Burgoyne proposed a turning movement around the American west flank while 800 men remained behind to guard the supplies. His senior officers talked him out of this foolhardy plan. Riedesel then proposed a retreat to the vicinity of Fort Miller, where they could reestablish communications with Canada and await help from Clinton, but Burgoyne insisted on making one more attempt to accomplish his mission. This took the form of a reconnaissance in force to try to find out the actual strength of Gates's position and led to the Battle of Bemis Heights, or Second Battle of Saratoga, on 7 October.

His defeat in this action included the loss of Breyman's Redoubt. Without that bastion Burgoyne's entrenched position became untenable, and he withdrew, in good order, to the Great Redoubt and vicinity. The Americans occupied his former positions on 8 October, and Gates sent Brigadier General John Fellows with 1,300 militia to get astride the enemy's line of retreat to Saratoga. Fellows moved up the east side of the Hudson, forded the river to Saratoga, and encamped west of there. Brigadier General Jacob Bayley already had 2,000 more militia near Fort Edward. Gates's own need to resupply and feed his Continentals, the troops who had borne the brunt of the fight on 4 October, kept him from putting direct pressure on Burgoyne.

On the evening of 8 October, leaving campfires burning to deceive the enemy, Burgoyne started north. Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Sutherland had moved out earlier with the Ninth and Forty-seventh Foot to reconnoiter the route, and he reported back that Fellows's camp was unguarded. Burgoyne refused to let Sutherland attack it, and at 2 a.m. the main body of Burgoyne's army stopped to rest three miles short of Fellows's; it did not reach Saratoga until late evening of 9 October. Its movements had been slowed by heavy rain and the need to keep abreast of the bateaux being rowed laboriously up the river. Burgoyne left his hospital behind with more than 300 sick and wounded. Tents and much of the remaining baggage had to be abandoned on the march when wagons could no longer be manhandled through the deepening mud. And to complete his misery, aggressive American patrols hanging on the rear and flanks snapped up all stragglers and many of the bateaux. Exhausted, the British dug in once again.

Gates finally started serious pursuit in the afternoon of 10 October, sometime near 4 p.m. His van watched the British rear guard withdraw across a creek after burning the Schuyler Mansion. Sutherland had started for Fort Edward from Saratoga on 10 October with the two regiments mentioned earlier, some Canadians, and a party of artificers to build a bridge across the Hudson for Burgoyne's retreat. When this movement was reported to Gates, he assumed that it was Burgoyne's main body. The morning of 11 October had a heavy fog. Hurrying up to crush what he thought was merely a rear guard north of the Fishkill, Gates called off the attack when John Glover picked up a British deserter who revealed the true situation. But that day the Americans captured most of the enemy's remaining bateaux, which deprived Burgoyne of his bridging equipment while simultaneously increasing Gates's capability for moving troops across the Hudson.

As Gates tightened the noose on 12 October, taking up positions on all sides except the north, Burgoyne

presented a council of war with five proposals: (1) Stand fast and await events (he still hoped Clinton's expedition would help him); (2) Attack; (3) Fight northward to Fort Edward, taking all guns and baggage; (4) Abandon the latter and slip away under cover of darkness; or, (5) Should Gates shift more strength westward (perhaps to cut them off), to strike south for Albany. Burgoyne, Phillips, and Hamilton inclined toward the fifth proposal, but Riedesel convinced them that only the fourth made sense. The way north was still open when this plan was adopted, but by 10 p.m., when Riedesel was ready to move, word came back that the operation was canceled. It turned out that the gap had been closed on the north by the arrival of John Stark's command. The Saratoga surrender, on 17 October 1777, was inevitable.

SIGNIFICANCE

For many years historians called this campaign the turning point of the Revolution because it led to the French Alliance. Although we now know that Louis XVI decided to enter the war before news of Burgoyne's capture reached him, Saratoga did bolster American morale at a time when the Philadelphia Campaign was giving it a beating. The losses effectively ended any further effort by the British to conduct major offensive operations from Canada (they even abandoned Ticonderoga). But perhaps the campaign's most important effects were political. Charges of blame and heated replies plagued London for years. The apparent contrast between a "militia" victory in the north and the failure of Washington's army of Continentals in the south led to the political machinations known as the Conway cabal.

SEE ALSO *Bennington Raid; Burgoyne's Proclamation at Bouquet River; Canada Invasion; Carleton-Germain Feud; Champlain Squadrons; Clinton's Expedition; Conway Cabal; Factionalism in America during the Revolution; Flank Companies; Fort Anne, New York; French Alliance; Hubbardton, Vermont; Kosciuszko, Thaddeus Andrzej Bonawentura; McCrea Atrocity; Oriskany, New York; Philadelphia Campaign; Saratoga Surrender; Saratoga, First Battle of; Saratoga, Second Battle of; Skene, Philip; Skenesboro, New York; St. Leger's Expedition; Ticonderoga Raid; Ticonderoga, New York, British Capture of.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

BURGOYNE'S PROCLAMATION AT BOUQUET RIVER. 23–24 June 1777.

While camped at Bouquet River, forty miles north of Fort Ticonderoga (now Willsboro, New York), General John Burgoyne issued a bombastic proclamation intended to rally loyal Americans to his support and dishearten the rebels with threats of attack by his native American allies. The document was filled with the rhetorical excess for which Burgoyne was already well known and exposed him to ridicule from both sides of the Atlantic. At about the same time he was threatening to unleash native American warriors against the rebels, he spoke to those allies in an attempt to persuade them to fight humanely. Burgoyne's two efforts at military rhetoric display a set of unrealistic assumptions about the character of the struggle, the nature of war on the frontier, and the motives of native Americans that help to explain why his campaign ended in surrender at Saratoga.

After an introductory enumeration of his titles and a general comment on the justice of his cause, his political proclamation read:

To the eyes and ears of the temperate part of the public, and to the breasts of the suffering thousands [of Loyalists] in the Provinces, be the melancholy appeal, whether the present unnatural Rebellion has not been made a foundation for the compleatest system of tyranny that ever God, in his displeasure, suffered, for a time, to be exercised over a froward and stubborn generation. . . . Animated by these considerations, at the head of troops in the full power of health, discipline and valour, determined to strike where necessary, and anxious to spare where possible, I, by these presents, invite and exhort all persons, in all places where the progress of this army may point, and by the blessing of God I will extend it far, to maintain such a conduct as may justify me in protecting their lands, habitations and families. The intention of this address is to hold forth security,

not depredation to the country. To those whom spirit and principle may induce to partake [of] the glorious task of redeeming their countrymen from dungeons, and reestablishing the blessings of legal government I offer encouragement and employment. . . . The domestick, the industrious, the infirm and even the timid inhabitants I am desirous to protect, provided they remain quietly in their houses . . . , [and do not] directly or indirectly endeavour to obstruct the operations of the King's troops, or supply or assist those of the enemy. [Concluding with threats against those who continued in rebellion, he went on to say that] I have but to give stretch to the Indian forces under my direction, and they amount to thousands [400, actually], to overtake the hardened enemies of Great Britain and America . . . whenever they may lurk. (Quoted in Commager and Morris, *Spirit of 'Seventy-Six*, pp. 547–548)

Burgoyne addressed an assembly of chiefs and warriors by means of an interpreter on 24 June. Beginning with a why-we-fight exhortation, he then tried to lay down a few simple rules:

Persuaded that your magnanimity of character, joined to your principles of affection to the King, will give me fuller control over your minds than the military rank with which I am invested, I enjoin your most serious attention to the rules which I hereby proclaim for your invariable observation during the campaign. . . . I positively forbid bloodshed, when you are not opposed in arms. Aged men, women, children and prisoners must be held sacred from the knife or hatchet, even in the time of actual conflict. . . . In conformity and indulgence of your customs, which have affixed an idea of honor to such badges of victory, you shall be allowed to take the scalps of the dead when killed by your fire and in fair opposition; but on no account . . . are they to be taken from the wounded or even dying, and still less pardonable . . . will it be held to kill men in that condition on purpose. . . . Base, lurking assassins, incendiaries ravagers and plunderers of the country, to whatever army they may belong, shall be treated with less reserve. (Commager and Morris, pp. 545–547)

THE REACTIONS

After an initial flush of rage, Americans started laughing, and the more literate reached for their goose quills and foolscap. One of the most widely publicized of the many satirical retorts, attributed to Francis Hopkinson, included these lines:

I will let loose the dogs of Hell,
Ten thousand Indians who shall yell
They'll scalp your heads, and kick your shins,

And rip your —, and flay your skins,
And of your ears be nimble croppers,
And make your thumbs tobacco-stoppers.
If after all these loving warnings,
My wishes and my bowels' yearnings,
You shall remain as deaf as adder
Or grow with hostile rage the madder,
I swear by George and by St. Paul
I will exterminate you all.
(Quoted in Commager and Morris, *Spirit of 'Seventy-Six*, p. 550)

Another anonymous American commented, "General Burgoyne shone forth in all the tinsel splendour of enlightened absurdity" (Montross, p. 198). In England, Horace Walpole suggested that "the vaporing Burgoyne," "might compose a good liturgy for the use of the King's friends, who . . . have the same consciousness of Christianity, and . . . like him can reconcile the scalping knife with the Gospel" (quoted in Nickerson, *Turning Point*, p. 122). In the House of Commons, Edmund Burke evoked a picture of the keeper of the royal menagerie turning loose his charges with this admonition: "My gentle lions, my humane bears, my tenderhearted hyenas, go forth! But I exhort you as you are Christians and members of civil society, to take care not to hurt any man, woman or child" (Commager and Morris, p. 544).

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne, John; Burgoyne's Offensive; Burke, Edmund; Hopkinson, Francis; Walpole, Horatio (or Horace)*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

BURKE, EDMUND. (1729/30–1797). Edmund Burke was born in Dublin, the son of a Catholic mother and a Protestant lawyer. He received a thorough intellectual training at a Quaker school in Baltimore (Ireland) from 1741 to 1744, and at Trinity College, Dublin, where he read law and graduated in 1748. In 1750 went on to the Middle Temple in London, intending to qualify for the Irish bar, but he became disenchanted with

the law and began instead to write. *A Vindication of Natural Society* (1756) was his first widely noticed work, and his *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* also commanded admiration. With his friend William Burke, he contributed to *An Account of the European Settlements in America* (1757). From 1758 he was the editor of the new *Annual Register*, for which he was paid a handsome £100 per volume. In 1759, having a wife and young son to support, he became private secretary to the new chief secretary in Ireland and, in 1765, to the new prime minister, Lord Rockingham (Charles Watson-Wentworth). At the end of the year he was elected to Parliament and took his seat on 14 January 1766.

Burke entered parliament as an adherent of the Rockingham Whigs, and shared their belief that a secret court influence was subverting Parliament. In colonial matters he repeatedly made a distinction between Britain's undoubted right to tax and the expediency of letting the colonies look after themselves and create wealth for the empire. His speeches in support of the repeal of the Stamp Act and of the Declaratory Act were intelligent and much admired. He also coordinated the lobbying of merchants and manufacturers who stood to lose from a retaliatory American embargo on imports. This experience both confirmed his belief in extra-parliamentary politics and gave him experience in its organization. In 1767, having evaded an offer of office from William Pitt, the earl of Chatham, whom he thought intellectually bankrupt, he opposed the Townshend duties and the subsequent deployment of troops in Boston.

Up to 1773 these arguments carried some weight. However, the Boston Tea Party convinced almost all British politicians that it was time to stop giving way in the face of violent American blackmail. In these circumstances, even Burke found it difficult to oppose a carefully graded incremental process of coercion. The Coercive Acts of 1774, however, were sufficiently draconian to allow Burke and Rockingham to appear as champions of a saner, more generous course of conciliation. His two key speeches, "Taxation" (1774) and "Conciliation" (1775), argued powerfully for the repeal of the Acts and the abandonment in practice of parliament's constitutional right to tax. In Burke's view, both sides should focus less on rights and more upon mutual responsibilities and cooperation. These views did not go down well in Parliament, although their published versions (1775) earned him admirers among the wider public. The promulgation of the Declaration of Independence made it even more difficult to oppose the war in the American colonies, but Burke's preferred solution, secession from parliament, was only patchily observed by his colleagues, and the justification Burke offered to his electors, published as *A Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol*, was rather lame.

When he returned to parliament, Burke lashed out at the employment of German mercenaries and Native irregulars by Englishmen against Englishmen. When the war began to go badly, and men blamed it on corruption and inefficiency, he sought reform in the shape of a public accounts committee. However, the government's position under the prime ministry of Lord North was almost unassailable until the battle of Yorktown, and it did not collapse until 1782.

Burke was paymaster to the forces in Rockingham's second ministry and, later, that of the duke of Portland. His continuing zeal for hunting out injustice and corruption in imperial affairs was evident in his contributions to Henry Fox's India Bill in 1783 and to the prosecution of Warren Hastings (1785–1794) for corruption. However, he was still no revolutionary and was steadily becoming more conservative. In 1790 he published his famous denunciation, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, which was aimed at English radicals advocating sweeping reforms at home. This, along with other factors, caused a final rift with Fox and the publication of his *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs* in 1791. By 1794 Burke was equating the prosecution of Hastings with the war on Jacobinism, and when Hastings was acquitted, Burke resigned his parliamentary seat. He died on 9 July 1797.

SEE ALSO *Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts*; *Stamp Act*.

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revised by John Oliphant

BURKE, THOMAS. (1747?–1783). Physician, lawyer, congressman, governor of North Carolina. Ireland, Virginia, and North Carolina. Born in County Galway, Ireland, sometime around 1747, Thomas Burke may have attended the University of Dublin. In about 1764 Burke immigrated to America, settling in Norfolk, Virginia, where he practiced medicine and gained a modest reputation as a poet and deist, having abandoned Catholicism. Switching to law, Burke became the attorney for the Transylvania Land Company. In 1772 he moved to Hillsboro, North Carolina, playing a prominent part in local politics of his region. He served in the provincial Congress from 1775 through 1776, where he was a key figure in persuading the legislature to support independence. A delegate to the Continental Congress from February 1777 to June 1781, Burke championed civil rights whenever they appeared menaced by military

power, and he was responsible for assuring that states be guaranteed any powers not specifically delegated by the Articles of Confederation to Congress.

Burke is famous in the history of the Continental Congress for his performance in April 1778. Disapproving of a proposed message of censure to George Washington, and seeing that his presence was necessary to make a quorum, he simply walked out of the hall in which the delegates were meeting, maintaining that he had no duty to attend an unreasonable assembly. When Congress attempted the next day to discipline him, Burke replied that he was responsible to his state and would not be tyrannized by a majority of Congress. Returning to North Carolina, he was exonerated by his constituents and re-elected. The irony is that even as he was defying the authority of Congress, he was defeated for re-election because he had favored the appointment of a Pennsylvania officer, Edward Hand, to take command of North Carolina's troops. The legislature changed its mind after he stood up to Congress.

Burke returned to Hillsboro at about the time that the southern region became the major theater of military operations. When the regulars under Generals Johann De Kalb and Horatio Gates moved through North Carolina, Burke led resistance to what many people considered to be the unwarranted demands of Continental officers for supplies. Meanwhile the well-fed North Carolina militia of Major General Richard Caswell marched uselessly around the state and refused to join the regulars until just before the Camden Campaign. In June 1781 Burke was elected Governor of North Carolina and vigorously undertook to stiffen the spine of his people; Burke had won on the political point of the primacy of civil authority over military, but the British regulars were chasing the ragged Continental troops across his state and the performance of the North Carolina militia had been sorry indeed.

David Fanning captured Governor Burke and his council in his raid on Hillsboro, on 12 September 1781. After being closely confined at Wilmington and then on Sullivan's Island in Charleston Harbor, Burke was paroled to James Island in November 1781. When told that he was being held hostage to guarantee the life of Fanning (should the latter be captured), Burke argued that his parole was no longer binding. He also claimed that he had been fired upon by Loyalists while at James Island. On the night of 16 January 1782, Burke escaped to Nathanael Greene's headquarters, and on the latter's advice informed British general Alexander Leslie that he would return if they guaranteed the terms of his parole, or that he would arrange a prisoner exchange. Receiving no reply from General Leslie, Burke returned to North Carolina and completed his term as governor. He refused to stand for re-election in the spring of 1782, and died on 2 December 1783 at his estate, "Tyaquin."

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign; Hillsboro Raid, North Carolina; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

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BURR, AARON. (1756–1836). Continental Army officer. Third vice president. New Jersey. Son of Aaron Burr, second president of the College of New Jersey (later Princeton) and grandson of Jonathan Edwards, the eminent theologian. Young Aaron was a bright, unruly child who was raised by his maternal uncle after the death of his parents. He graduated with distinction from the College of New Jersey at the age of sixteen, studied theology until 1774, and then undertook the study of the law.

As a captain on Arnold's march to Quebec, he proved himself to be an able soldier, and he survived the blast that killed Montgomery at the assault on Quebec. In the spring of 1776 Congress promoted him to major and appointed him to George Washington's staff, but he left headquarters at New York City after a few weeks because he and Washington had developed a mutual dislike and distrust. On 22 June, Burr became aide-de-camp to Israel Putnam, at which post he conducted himself admirably in the battle of Long Island and in the evacuation of New York City. On 4 January 1777 he was commissioned lieutenant colonel of Malcolm's additional Continental regiment. Stationed in Orange County, New York, the twenty-one-year-old Burr established a reputation for courage and good discipline. He commanded an outpost that protected the Continental Army's winter quarters at Valley Forge in 1777–1778, and although he may have sympathized with Washington's critics, he took no active role in the so-called Conway Cabal that winter. He led his regiment in the battle at Monmouth on 28 June 1778, where his regiment was mauled and both commander and men suffered from the extreme heat and humidity. He openly sided with Charles Lee in the subsequent controversy about the conduct of the battle. After Monmouth, Washington sent the regiment to Westchester County, New York, where Burr maintained his reputation for discipline and alert soldiering in the field. On 3 March 1779 he resigned his commission on grounds of ill health, a condition that had been exacerbated by his experience at Monmouth. It was not until the fall of the next year that he was well enough to resume the study of law.

Burr was admitted to the New York bar in 1782 and the next year moved to New York City, where he and Alexander Hamilton competed for preeminence. He was elected to the state assembly in 1784; appointed attorney general by Governor George Clinton in September 1789; and elected U.S. senator in 1791 over Philip Schuyler, Hamilton's father-in-law. He failed to win reelection in 1797, but won a seat in the state senate for the next two years. Thereafter, he built a strong Democratic-Republican Party organization in New York City that helped the party capture control of the state legislature in 1800, a success that secured him the second slot on the party ticket headed by Jefferson in the presidential election. Because presidential electors at that time did not vote separately for president and vice president, both Burr and Jefferson ended up with seventy-three electoral votes each. Hamilton threw his support to Jefferson, ensuring his election as president in the House of Representatives. As vice president, Burr presided over the Senate in a manner that won praise from both parties, but he was dropped from the ticket in 1804 and failed later that year to win election as New York governor, a defeat he again attributed to Hamilton's political enmity. Angry at the failure of his political career, Burr sought satisfaction by challenging Hamilton to a duel. The antagonists met at ten paces the morning of 11 July 1804 at Weehawken, New Jersey. Each man fired, and Hamilton fell mortally wounded. For the next three years, Burr pursued a quixotic—and treasonous—effort to separate the western states from the Union. Acquitted of treason on 1 September 1807, Burr fled to England. After returning in May 1812 he pursued the practice of law in New York City for the rest of his life.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's March to Quebec; Hamilton, Alexander.*

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BUSHNELL, DAVID. (1742–1826?). Inventor of the submarine. Connecticut. Born on 30 August 1740 in Saybrook, Connecticut, Bushnell attended Yale University from 1771 to 1775. While at college he demonstrated to skeptical instructors that gunpowder could be detonated under water. He subsequently built a

man-propelled submarine that he called the American Turtle, so named because the top-shaped craft of heavy oak beams was said to look like two turtle shells joined together, with the tail end pointed downward. The submarine was unsuccessfully tried in the waters around Boston, New York, New London, and Philadelphia during the years 1776 to 1778, but the American Turtle eventually proved that it could dive, travel and navigate under water, plant a large time-charge of powder against the hull of a ship, and surface.

The submarine never sank a warship, however, primarily because no adequately skillful operator was ever found. With Sergeant Ezra Lee of the Connecticut Line at the helm, the submarine unsuccessfully attacked Admiral Richard Howe's flagship, the *Eagle*, in New York Harbor in 1776. Two other attacks also failed. Giving up on his submarine, Bushnell switched to developing undersea mines, attempting to blow up the British vessel *Cerberus* off New London in the following year. The ship's captain saw the device, however, and cut the line that tethered it in place. The mine floated to a nearby schooner, where it exploded, killing three men. Bushnell contrived various other devices to harry British shipping, and his unsuccessful floating-mine attack on the British in Philadelphia in December 1777 inspired Francis Hopkinson's poem, "Battle of the Kegs."

Although the public mocked Bushnell's efforts, his inventions showed more promise than anyone realized. His technical qualifications were recognized by the army, and on 2 August 1779 he was commissioned as a captain-lieutenant of the newly organized Corps of Sappers and Miners. On 8 June 1781 he was promoted to captain of the Engineers, and on 4 June 1783 he was given command of the Corps of Engineers at West Point. When that body was disbanded, Bushnell was mustered out in November 1783. He sank into obscurity after the Revolution, taking on assumed names, teaching, and practicing medicine. His place of death is unknown, but it is thought that he died in 1826.

SEE ALSO *Hopkinson, Francis.*

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BUSHY RUN, PENNSYLVANIA. 5–6 August 1763. In this remarkable action, fought on a ridge dominated by higher ground twenty-six miles southeast of Fort Pitt, four hundred Highlanders, Royal Americans,

and rangers went against an unknown, but larger, number of native Americans, most of whom had participated in the siege of Fort Pitt. Colonel Henry Bouquet, the able Swiss officer, commanded the British force, and, although ambushed on 5 August, devised overnight a ruse whereby the next morning two of his companies seemed to abandon a portion of the defensive perimeter. Native American warriors rushed in to take advantage of the gap and were caught in a crossfire by the British. When Bouquet advanced with two more companies, the Indians fled in disorder and broke off the engagement.

SEE ALSO *Bouquet, Henry; Pontiac's War.*

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BUSKIRK, ABRAHAM VAN. A doctor in Bergen County, New Jersey, Buskirk sided with the crown in the Revolution. He was lieutenant colonel of the New Jersey Volunteers in the Loyalist brigade of Cortlandt Skinner. His son was Lieutenant Jacob Van Buskirk, whose capture on Staten Island in November 1777 created a short-lived crisis for Washington as local Patriots attempted to try Van Buskirk for treason.

SEE ALSO *Paulus Hook, New Jersey.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BUTE, JOHN STUART, THIRD EARL OF. (1713–1792). British prime minister. John Stuart was born in Edinburgh on 25 May 1713 and inherited his father's earldom on 23 January 1723. He was educated at Eton (1724–1728) and at Leiden, where he graduated in 1732. For some years he lived quietly on his estates, raising a family and studying botany.

When the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 began, Bute moved to London and two years later met Frederick, prince of Wales, father of the future George III. Bute was appointed tutor to young George, in whom he encouraged an abhorrence of "party." He became George's indispensable mentor, friend, and adviser.

On George III's accession to the throne in 1760, Bute became a privy councillor and, on 25 March 1761, secretary of state for the northern department. After Pitt's intemperate resignation on 5 October, Bute presided over the war effort. As first lord of the Treasury from 27 May 1762, he directed the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Unlike Pitt, he was alarmed by the size of the national debt, recognized the futility of trying to permanently cripple French sea power, and disliked subsidizing European allies. Consequently, although the French Empire in North America was destroyed, he restored Manila and some key West Indian conquests and gradually withdrew from the Prussian alliance. Again recognizing financial realities, to say nothing of known Bourbon plans for revenge, he also decided in principle to tax the American colonies in part payment for their own defense, a policy Grenville later put into practice.

Bute, whom historians used to deride, has become recognized as an able, idealistic, and patriotic prime minister. However, he had no following in the Commons, depending wholly upon favor at court. This provoked the established Whig elite to attack him as a corrupt apostle of royal absolutism and maker of a soft peace with the Bourbon powers, who favored only Scots aspirants to office. He was also falsely accused of owing his influence to an affair with Princess Augusta, the king's mother; demonstrators against the peace often carried a boot and petticoat on a gibbet. All this made him extremely unpopular, and Bute was insufficiently thick-skinned to ride out the storm. He resigned on 8 April 1763, but in August, Grenville refused to remain in office should the king continue to consult Bute in private. Bute withdrew from the court in September though he continued writing to the king until 1766, when his influence ended.

SEE ALSO *George III; Wilkes, John.*

revised by John Oliphant

BUTLER, EDWARD. (?–1803). Youngest of the five Butler Brothers of Pennsylvania, he became captain in Gibson's regiment of Pennsylvania levies in 1791 and was present at St. Clair's defeat. He became Wayne's adjutant general in 1796 and was a major in the permanent

reorganization of 1802. He died at Fort Wilkinson, Georgia, on 6 May 1803.

SEE ALSO *Butler Brothers of Pennsylvania*.

Mark M. Boatner

BUTLER, JOHN. (1728–1796). Loyalist leader. New York. Born in New London, Connecticut, he moved with his parents in 1742 to the Mohawk Valley, where his father, Captain Walter Butler, commanded at Fort Hunter and at Oswego. John Butler served as a captain in Sir William Johnson's expedition against Crown Point in 1755, under Abercromby at Ticonderoga, and under Bradstreet in the expedition against Fort Frontenac. He was Johnson's second in command in the capture of Fort Niagara, where he led the Indian forces. After the war, Butler settled in the Mohawk Valley, where he owned more than twenty-five thousand acres, making him the largest landowner in the region after Sir Guy Johnson. In 1772 he was made lieutenant colonel of militia.

He sided with the British at the beginning of the Revolution and was forced to flee his home in the Mohawk Valley with his son, Walter, the rest of his family being taken hostage by the Patriots and held until an exchange in 1780. Dispatched by the British to Niagara in November 1775, Butler managed Indian affairs in Canada as the deputy of Guy Johnson. Initially, Butler followed Governor Guy Carleton's orders to keep the Indians neutral, but by 1777 the British government had switched to a more aggressive policy of recruiting Indian warriors. By that time, Butler had established a network of agents throughout western New York and the Ohio Valley. In August he and Joseph Brant led the Indian and Loyalist forces at the Battle of Oriskany. After the failure of St. Leger's expedition, Butler, now a major, organized a Corps of Rangers from among the Loyalist refugees that became known as Butler's Rangers. He led these and additional forces in the remarkable raid to the Wyoming Valley. The Patriots responded to this and other raids with Sullivan's expedition, and in the only pitched battle of this campaign, Butler was defeated at Newtown on 29 August 1779. Early the next year Haldimand promoted him to lieutenant colonel and Butler's forces continued their operations on the frontier, which achieved Butler's goal of drawing Continental forces away from the major theaters of operation.

The state of New York confiscated Butler's property by the Act of Attainder of 22 October 1779. At the same time, Butler established a settlement of Loyalists on the Niagara Peninsula to grow food for the garrison. When Butler's Rangers were disbanded in 1784, the British

government gave him a pension and a five-hundred-acre land grant but refused to reimburse him for the loss of his thousands of acres in New York. Butler settled near Niagara and continued to serve as deputy superintendent of the Indian Department, also holding a number of local offices and commanding the area's militia. However, the enmity of Sir John Johnson prevented Butler from attaining office beyond his community. He died at Newark, Ontario, on 13 May 1796.

SEE ALSO *Johnson, Guy; Newtown, New York; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois; Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania*.

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BUTLER, PERCIVAL. (1760–1821). Continental officer. Pennsylvania. Next to youngest of the Butler Brothers, he became second lieutenant of the Third Pennsylvania on 1 September 1777, was promoted to second lieutenant on 23 November 1777 and on 1 January 1783 transferred to the Second Pennsylvania. He fought with Morgan at Saratoga and with Wayne against Simcoe at Spencer's Tavern and took part in the siege of Yorktown. Serving to the end of the war, he moved to Kentucky and was adjutant general in the War of 1812.

SEE ALSO *Butler Brothers of Pennsylvania*.

Mark M. Boatner

BUTLER, RICHARD. (1743–1791). Continental officer. Ireland and Pennsylvania. One of the four Butler brothers of Pennsylvania who all served in the Revolutionary War. Richard Butler was born in Dublin on 1 April 1743. He was an ensign on Henry Bouquet's expedition of 1764. With his brother William, he subsequently became an Indian trader at Chillicothe, Ohio, and at Pittsburgh. He led a Pennsylvania company against Pittsburg during the dispute between Pennsylvania and Virginia that preceded Dunmore's War.

In 1775, Congress appointed him an Indian agent, in which capacity he was charged with securing the neutrality of a number of Native American nations. Commissioned a captain in the Second Pennsylvania Battalion on 5 June 1776, Butler was swiftly promoted to major of the Eighth

Pennsylvania Continental Regiment on 20 July. On 12 March 1777 he became lieutenant colonel of this regiment. He commanded the regiment at Bound Brook, New Jersey, on 13 April 1777. Joining Daniel Morgan's Riflemen in the spring, he took part in the battles around Saratoga, New York.

After Burgoyne's surrender, in October 1777, Butler returned to General George Washington's army as colonel of the Ninth Pennsylvania Battalion, leading this unit at the battle of Monmouth, 28 June 1778. Taking action against the British during the Tappan massacre, Butler's men got the better of a skirmish above Kings Bridge (Manhattan) on 30 September 1778. At Stony Point, 16 July 1779, Butler distinguished himself leading the Second Regiment of Anthony Wayne's Light Infantry Brigade.

During the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line (January 1781), Richard and his brother William accompanied Wayne, who had become a close friend, to Princeton to negotiate with the mutineers; the latter insisting that they would only deal with the Butler brothers. In the reorganization of 17 January 1781, Butler took command of the Fifth Pennsylvania Battalion, which became part of Wayne's Light Infantry, and joined General Lafayette (Gilbert du Montier) in June 1781. He led the attack on John Graves Simcoe's troops at Spencer's Tavern, Virginia, on 26 June, and took part in the engagement at Green Spring, Virginia, on 6 July. In the siege of Yorktown he led the Second Pennsylvania Battalion of Wayne's Brigade in General Friedrich Wilhelm Augustus von Steuben's Division. After the surrender of General Charles Cornwallis, Richard Butler marched with Wayne to the Carolinas and subsequently into Georgia. Butler commanded the Third Pennsylvania Battalion from 1 July to 3 November 1783 and on 30 September of that year was brevetted with the rank of brigadier general.

After the war, Congress again appointed Butler an Indian commissioner. This time, Butler acted far more aggressively in negotiating a series of important boundary treaties during the years from 1784 to 1786. In the latter year he was made Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Northern District. After Harmer's expedition of 1791 failed so disastrously to enforce these treaties, Butler, who had sat on the inquiry vindicating Harmer's conduct, was named Major General of U.S. Levies. Commanding the right wing of Arthur St. Clair's expedition against the Miami Indians, Butler was mortally wounded in the battle of 4 November 1791.

SEE ALSO *Butler Brothers of Pennsylvania; Girty, Simon; Green Spring (Jamestown Ford, Virginia); Monmouth, New Jersey; Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line; Pontiac's War; Spencer's Tavern, Virginia; Tappan Massacre, New Jersey; Wayne's Light Infantry.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

BUTLER, THOMAS, JR. (1754–1805).

Continental officer. Pennsylvania. One of the five sons of Thomas Butler, and the first to be born on American soil, he was studying law with Judge Wilson in Philadelphia when he joined the Continental army on 5 January 1776 as a first lieutenant in the Second Pennsylvania Battalion. On 4 October 1776 he was promoted to captain in the Third Pennsylvania Battalion. Butler fought in most of the major engagements of General George Washington's main army over the next four years, being congratulated by the commander in chief for rallying retreating soldiers after the battle at Brandywine, and winning thanks from General Anthony Wayne for covering the retreat of Richard Butler's regiment at Monmouth. Retiring from the army on 17 January 1781, he became a farmer in western Pennsylvania. In 1791 he rejoined the army as a major, commanding the Carlisle Battalion of Gibson's Regiment. He was twice wounded in the action of 4 November. The following year he was assigned to the Fourth Sub-Legion. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 1 July 1794 and took part in Wayne's western campaigns. He rose to the rank of colonel of the Second Infantry on 1 April 1802. He died on 7 September 1805 in New Orleans.

SEE ALSO *Butler Brothers of Pennsylvania.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BUTLER, WALTER. (c. 1752–1781). Tory leader. New York. In his *War out of Niagara: Walter Butler and the Tory Rangers* (1933), the definitive work on Butler, author Harold Swiggett remarks:

There is an absorbing mystery about his life and character. The date of his birth is unknown [but almost certainly 1752, Swiggett says]. There is a legend of his marriage to a daughter of Catharine Montour, and another with a daughter of Sir William Johnson. . . . There is no physical description of him except in fiction. Letters about him in catalogues even of the Schuyler Papers, the Gates Papers, . . . and many other papers, are mysteriously

marked missing. . . . The histories have contented themselves with denouncing him as a bloody monster, but back of the histories in the primary material of the Revolution there is an amazing figure" (pp. 4–5).

A son of John Butler, he was raised in the Mohawk Valley. On 18 February 1768 he was commissioned an ensign in the militia regiment of which his father was lieutenant colonel. In 1770 Walter, whom Swiggett calls "the most brilliant young man in the Valley," went to study law in the office of Peter Silvester in Albany. When news of Bunker Hill reached the Mohawk Valley, the Butlers, Guy Johnson, and Joseph Brant left for Oswego, where they arrived 17 July 1775. Walter led a force of thirty Indians and rangers in an envelopment that defeated Ethan Allen at Montreal on 25 September 1775, and he took part in the action at the Cedars in May 1776.

As an ensign in the Eighth (King's) Regiment, he accompanied St. Leger's expedition, and after taking part in the Oriskany ambush, he volunteered for "one of the bravest and most audacious enterprises of the war" (Swiggett, p. 90). With about fifteen men he left the British camp around Fort Stanwix on 10 or 11 August and headed for German Flats with St. Leger's proclamation and the appeals of Sir John Johnson and John Butler for the inhabitants of the Mohawk Valley to join the Loyal cause. He was holding a midnight meeting at Shoemaker's House when militia troops of Colonel Weston, informed of his presence, surrounded the place and took him prisoner. On 21 August he was convicted of espionage and sentenced to hang. Marinus Willett signed the minutes as J. A., and Benedict Arnold, who was on his way to relieve Fort Stanwix, approved the sentence. Upon the intercession of various Continental officers, including Schuyler, Butler was reprieved and imprisoned in Albany. On 21 April 1778 he escaped from the house in which he apparently was living on parole. Down Lake Champlain to the St. Lawrence, Butler went first to Quebec and then to Niagara. His commission as captain had been signed on 20 December, while he was imprisoned at Albany.

The Cherry Valley massacre, on 11 November 1778, was Captain Butler's most notorious operation. In October 1781 he accompanied Ross's raid to the Mohawk and was killed at Jerseyfield (Canada Creek) on 30 October 1781. Swiggett, commenting on the various myths surrounding Butler's death, says that "there is a legend that Tories brought his body secretly to St. George's Church, Schenectady, and that he is buried there. It seems unlikely: wolves were closing in on the armies" (ibid., p. 243). That Butler begged for quarter and that an Oneida shouted "Sherry Valley quarter" just before killing him with a tomahawk has been shown by Swiggett to be "myth-making at its worst" (ibid., p. 251). Another fabrication, which even the *Dictionary of*

American Biography has perpetuated, was to give Butler a middle initial. He had no middle name, but Swiggett has theorized that "the infamous Walter N. Butler" sounded more villainous than "the infamous Walter Butler."

Was Butler a violent man whose pathological anger found outlet in frontier Revolutionary conflict? Cautiously, historians stress several structural considerations. One was generational. Butler's father, John, a veteran of the Seven Years' War, understood white-Native American politics, and in 1777 he mended his relations with the Mohawk leaders Joseph and Mary Brant. Butler saw Indian warriors as useful in controlling a chaotic situation, but could not grasp the idea of Indian allies fighting along side white Loyalists. For another, the Mohawks paid close attention to the style and authenticity of white Loyalist military leadership. "What young Butler lacked in experience," Graymont has observed, "he made up for in hauteur. The Indians were not impressed" (*Iroquois*, p. 190). What most magnified Butler's brutality was his refusal to share command of Indian fighters with Brant in the Cherry Valley massacre in 1778; terrorized white Patriot families credited Joseph Brant and thirty of his Mohawk braves with saving their lives.

SEE ALSO *Butler, John; Cherry Valley Massacre, New York; Jerseyfield, New York; Montour Family.*

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revised by Robert M. Calboon

BUTLER, WILLIAM. (?–1789). Continental officer. Ireland–Pennsylvania. William Butler and his brother Richard were born in Dublin before their family emigrated to Lancaster, Pennsylvania, where their other three brothers were born. After Henry Bouquet's expedition of 1764, the two elder Butler brothers were partners at Chillicothe and Pittsburgh in the Indian trade. On 5 January 1776 William was made captain in the Second Pennsylvania Battalion, and he advanced to major on 7 September 1776. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Fourth Pennsylvania Battallion on 30 September 1776, and became aide-de-camp to General William Alexander on 7 May 1778. Five months later he led the raid that wiped out Indian settlements around Unadilla,

Butler, Zebulon

New York, and he published an account of that operation. When Sullivan's expedition withdrew toward Wyoming, Butler was detached (on 20 September 1779) to destroy Indian villages east of Cayuga Lake. He narrowly escaped death during the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line in January 1781. In the military reorganization that followed the mutiny, Butler became commander of the new Fourth Pennsylvania Battalion. He retired on 1 January 1783 and died six years later.

SEE ALSO *Butler Brothers of Pennsylvania; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BUTLER, ZEBULON. (1731–1795). Continental officer. Connecticut. Grandson of Lieutenant William Butler of Ipswich, Massachusetts, and son of John and Hannah Perkins Butler, he was born at Ipswich but moved with his parents to their new home in Lyme, Connecticut, in 1736. After owning one or more sloops engaged in the West Indian trade, he saw service in the French and Indian War, rising from ensign in 1757 to captain in 1760. He survived a shipwreck to arrive in time to participate in the siege of Havana in 1762. In 1769 he led the Connecticut settlers to the Wyoming Valley and continued as their leader in the Pennamite Wars. In July 1771 he forced the surrender of Pennsylvania troops in Fort Wyoming, and in December 1775 he drove back the Pennsylvania troops under Colonel William Plunkett sent by Governor John Penn to establish a military government in the valley. Meanwhile he had served as director of the Susquehanna Company, represented Westmoreland in the Connecticut assembly (1774–1776), and served (with Nathan Denison) as a justice of the peace.

When the war started he was commissioned colonel of militia and Denison became lieutenant colonel. On 1 January 1777 Butler became lieutenant colonel of the Third Connecticut Continental Regiment, and on 13 March 1778 he was promoted to colonel of the Second Connecticut. Home on leave, he participated in the defense of the valley, but his part in what became known as the Wyoming Valley Massacre was not particularly creditable. He returned as commander in the valley and remained there during Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois in 1779. At the request of the Continental Congress, on 29 December 1780 Washington recalled Butler from Wyoming to reduce the friction there between the Connecticut and Pennsylvania elements. On 1 January 1781 he was transferred to the Fourth Connecticut. Assigned to West Point, he became colonel of the First Connecticut on 1 January 1783 and resigned on 3 June

1783. He died at Wilkes-Barre and was survived by his third wife.

SEE ALSO *Penn, John; Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.*

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BUTLER BROTHERS OF PENNSYLVANIA. The four eldest of the five sons of Thomas Butler served together as Continental officers in the Revolution, and three of the surviving four were together under General Arthur St. Clair in the Indian expedition of 1791. The two elder Butler brothers, William and Richard, were born in Dublin. In 1748 the family immigrated to America, settling in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Here, Thomas Jr. was born in 1754, Percival in 1760, and then Edward. All but the latter, who presumably was too young, became officers in the Continental Army, and much of the time they served in the same unit or adjacent ones. At Monmouth, Thomas commanded a company whose rearguard action saved the regiment commanded by his brother, Richard. William Butler died in 1789, but three of the four remaining brothers served together in the disastrous operations led by General St. Clair that ended in defeat on 4 November 1791. Richard, who commanded a wing of the army in which Thomas served as a major and Edward as a captain, was mortally wounded and evacuated to the center of St. Clair's camp, where he was soon joined by the seriously wounded Thomas. Before the retreat started, Edward arrived to remove his brothers, but could take only one. Richard insisted that the other brother be saved, and Edward succeeded in carrying Thomas to safety.

SEE ALSO *Butler, Edward; Butler, Percival; Butler, Richard; Butler, Thomas; Monmouth, New Jersey; St. Clair, Arthur.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

BUTLER–JOHNSON, ENMITY SEE *Johnson, Guy.*

BUTLER'S RANGERS. John Butler's success in leading a mixed force of Native American warriors and Loyalists at the Battle of Oriskany on 6 August 1777 so impressed Major General Sir Guy Carleton, the British commander in Canada, that on 15 September he authorized Butler to raise a corps of rangers. Initially only a single company, the corps had grown in strength to ten companies by 1781. Butler's Rangers launched many significant raids from their principal headquarters at Fort Niagara and kept a large part of the frontier in turmoil. Butler led two hundred rangers and three hundred Indians that devastated the Wyoming Valley in Pennsylvania on 3 July 1778. His son, Captain Walter Butler, led a similar raid that on 11 November dealt a heavy blow to Cherry Valley, New York. Responding to the calls for help from the frontier, Washington sent Major General John Sullivan in the summer of 1779 to destroy Fort Niagara, but his supply line became overextended before he could reach his objective. The rangers participated in retaliatory raids across the New York and Pennsylvania frontiers in 1780 and 1781; both years culminated in a major raid through the Mohawk Valley. In 1782 companies stationed at Detroit raided Sandusky in Ohio; Blue Licks in Kentucky (defeating Daniel Boone); and Wheeling, later in West Virginia. The corps was reduced to one company at Detroit on 24 June 1784, and that company was disbanded when it reached Fort Niagara on 16 July. Veteran rangers and their descendants served in the Canadian militia during the War of 1812.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Butler, John; Cherry Valley Massacre, New York; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois; Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

BYNG, JOHN. (1704–1757). British admiral. The son of Viscount Torrington, a distinguished admiral and first lord of the admiralty, Byng went to sea in 1718

and took part in the battle of Cape Passaro. For almost forty years thereafter, despite war service from 1739 to 1748, he saw no serious action. Personally brave and a good seaman, but lacking battle experience, strategically timid, and prone to shift responsibility, Byng was undoubtedly the wrong man to be sent to relieve the Mediterranean island of Minorca in the spring of 1756. He was also unfortunate. The Admiralty sent him too late and with too few ships, and the governor of Gibraltar deliberately misled him. Although an indecisive battle on 20 May left Byng free to reach Fort St. Phillip, he induced a council of war to advise retreat to Gibraltar. Minorca fell soon after, and Byng was court-martialled. Acquitted of cowardice, he was convicted of negligence and shot on 14 March 1757. Contemporaries thought the verdict justified but the sentence excessive and probably politically motivated. The shadow of Byng therefore hung over the decisions of British admirals for some time.

revised by John Oliphant

BYRON, JOHN. (1723–1786). British admiral. Second son of the fourth baron Byron, and later father of the poet, George Gordon Byron, John Byron was born on 8 November 1723. He entered the navy in 1737 and later took part in Captain George Anson's voyage to the Pacific. Surviving shipwreck on the Chilean coast, he returned to Britain in 1746 to become a post-captain by the end of the year. In 1760 he demolished the fortifications at Louisburg (Nova Scotia) and destroyed nearby French shipping and stores. From 1764 to 1766 he circumnavigated of the globe. Governor of Newfoundland from 1769 to 1772, and a rear admiral from March 1775, he was promoted vice admiral on 29 January 1778. Almost at once he was confronted with an emergency: Charles Hector Theodat D'Estaing's naval squadron was preparing to sail from Toulon (France).

D'Estaing's destination might have been anywhere: Minorca, the English Channel (in conjunction with the Brest fleet), North America, the West Indies, or even India. It was impossible for the British fleet to cover all these destinations without being weak everywhere and taking serious risks in the Channel. Byron was therefore given a squadron with orders to pursue D'Estaing wherever he might go. In June, once it became clear that D'Estaing was heading for North America, Byron took his ships into the Atlantic, where they were scattered by gales. By the time he reached New York, D'Estaing had moved north to Rhode Island. After repairs, Byron set out to find him and was once again beset by storms. In December Byron heard that D'Estaing was in the West

Byron, John

Indies, but on the way south in pursuit, Byron ran into foul weather yet again.

On 6 January 1779 Byron reached St. Lucia, in the Caribbean, which recently had been taken by Rear Admiral Samuel Barrington and Major General James Grant for the British. With their support, Byron ably kept D'Estaing's counter-attack at bay. Afterwards, he and Grant wisely kept their ships and troops concentrated at St. Lucia, ready to respond in force to any move D'Estaing might make from Martinique. At last, in June 1779, Byron used his whole fleet to cover a homeward-bound convoy, probably in hopes of tempting D'Estaing out to attack exposed islands. If so, the plan went badly wrong: when Byron returned, the islands of St. Vincent and Grenada had fallen and De'Estaing had been substantially reinforced. After an indecisive action off Grenada on 6 July, a now ailing Byron left the fleet and sailed for

home. He was not employed again and died on 10 April 1786.

Nicknamed "Foul Weather Jack," Byron was the unluckiest of admirals. His failures in 1778 and 1779 illustrate not personal incompetence but the acute dilemmas facing an unprepared navy that was unable to be strong everywhere and not daring to seriously weaken its squadrons in home waters.

SEE ALSO *Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'.*

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revised by John Oliphant

C

CABBAGE PLANTING EXPEDITION.

Derisive name, possibly coined by Charles Lee, for Loudoun's unsuccessful attempt against Louisburg in 1757. Loudoun ordered his men to plant cabbages at Halifax to provide themselves with fresh vegetables.

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CADWALADER, JOHN. (1742–1786).

Militia general. Pennsylvania. Born on 10 January 1742 in Philadelphia, John Cadwalader was active in public affairs, a member of the Committee of Safety, captain of the city's "silk stocking" militia company, commanding officer of a city battalion and, in 1776, colonel of a Pennsylvania militia regiment. His militia figured in George Washington's plan for the attack on Trenton on 26 December 1776, but his troops were unable to cross the Delaware River south of Trenton until the battle was over.

Cadwalader's military intelligence materially contributed to Washington's success at Princeton. Although Washington offered him an appointment as a Continental brigadier general, Cadwalader declined in order to serve as a brigadier general of the Pennsylvania state militia from 5 April 1777 to the war's end. In the fall of 1777, at Washington's request, he organized militia on the eastern shore of Maryland. In 1778 he served as a volunteer at Brandywine and Germantown, and led a number of guerilla

operations against the British. On 4 July 1778 he fought a duel with General Thomas Conway, over the latter's insults to Washington, and shot Conway in the mouth. On 10 September 1778 Cadwalader was again offered a commission as Continental brigadier general, and again declined. After the war he moved to Maryland and became a state legislator. He died 10 February 1786 at the age of 43, leaving a large fortune to his heirs.

SEE ALSO *Conway, Thomas.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CALEDONIAN VOLUNTEERS **SEE**
British Legion.

CALENDARS, OLD AND NEW STYLE.

The Julian (Old Style) Calendar was used in Great Britain and her colonies until 1752, when the Gregorian (New Style) finally was adopted. To adjust for overestimation of the solar year by eleven minutes and fourteen seconds, the Gregorian Calendar had added ten days to each year from 1582 through 1699, added eleven days to the succeeding years through 1751, and left eleven days out of 1752. Great Britain's decree made 14 September 1752 follow 2 September. Under the "O.S."—which is the customary abbreviation—the year usually began 25 March (vernal equinox).

Washington's birthday is 22 February 1732 N.S. but 11 February 1731 O.S.; the latter year sometimes is expressed as 1731–32 or 1731/1732. Unless otherwise stated, dates spanning the year 1752 are assumed to be New Style (see Appendix VI).

Mark M. Boatner

CALTROPS. Caltrops were known by the less sophisticated name of "Crowsfeet" during the Revolution.

SEE ALSO *Crowsfeet*.

Mark M. Boatner

CAMBRAY-DIGNY, LOUIS ANTOINE JEAN BAPTISTE, CHEVALIER DE.

(1751–1822). Continental officer. France. From a Picardy family, he was born in Florence, Italy. An officer candidate in the French artillery in 1770, he was discharged (*réformé*) four years later for lack of a vacancy. Franklin wrote a strong letter on his behalf to Washington on 10 September 1777. Cambray-Digny arrived in North Carolina in February 1778 to improve coastal fortifications there. Governor Caswell recommended him to Congress for a commission, and Lafayette also endorsed him. On 13 June he was commissioned lieutenant colonel in Duportail's corps of engineers. During the Monmouth campaign he served with the main army. On 20 October 1778 Congress ordered him to Charleston but then sent him on temporary duty to Pittsburgh where, as Lachlan McIntosh's chief engineer, he directed construction of Fort McIntosh. On 2 February 1779 Congress ordered him to Maryland and North Carolina to gather military stores for the South. He reported to Lincoln on these activities and then took part in the defense of Charleston. In September the South Carolina legislature commended him for emergency constructions that thwarted Augustin-Prevost's May 1779 attack. Captured 12 May 1780 with Lincoln's army, he failed repeatedly to obtain Washington's intervention for an early parole in the summer of 1781 and again in the summer of 1782. He was finally exchanged on 26 November 1782.

On 30 October 1782 he was granted a year's leave in France and reached Brest in June 1783. He was breveted colonel in the Continental army on 2 May 1783 and honorably discharged on 15 November 1783. He served as a major of provincial troops and voted in 1789 for the bailliage of Montdidier. He retired to his chateau of Villers-aux-Érables in the Somme.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

SEE *Powder Alarm*.

CAMDEN, SOUTH CAROLINA

SEE *Hobkirk's Hill, South Carolina*.

CAMDEN CAMPAIGN.

July–August 1780. On 12 May 1780, a force of about 1,400 Continentals under General Johann De Kalb was moving toward Charleston when that place surrendered. On 13 June Congress commissioned General Horatio Gates to command the Southern Department. With the collapse of American military resistance in the South, and with little prospect of assistance from the French Alliance, Congress hoped that Gates, the victor of Saratoga, would rally militia to stop the British in the South, as he was credited with having rallied them to defeat British General John Burgoyne. The commander in chief of the Continental army, General George Washington, did not approve of Gates's appointment. He considered Nathanael Greene better qualified, but Congress did not consult him on the matter. Charles Lee warned his friend Gates to "take care lest your Northern laurels turn to Southern willows."

THE FORCES ASSEMBLE

When Gates reached De Kalb's headquarters at Coxe's Mill, North Carolina, to take command on 25 July, he found a half-starved force of about 1,200 regulars. These were the remnants of the Delaware and Maryland Continentals and three small artillery companies who had survived the march southward, along with 120 survivors of Casimir Pulaski's Legion, now commanded by Charles Armand, who had recently joined De Kalb. Leaving the infantry under De Kalb's command and designating the entire body of troops "the grand army," Gates ordered that they prepare to march on a moment's notice. According to one participant, Colonel Otho Williams, whose contemporaneous narrative

appears as an appendix in William Johnson's *Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene*. "the latter order was a matter of great astonishment to those who knew the real situation of the troops. But all difficulties were removed by the general's assurances, that plentiful supplies of rum and rations were on the route."

A number of other American units were in the field, but two notable contingents did not appear. These were the cavalry units that Colonels William Washington and Anthony White were trying to build around the survivors of the engagements at Lenud's Ferry (May 5), and Monck's Corner (April 14), both in South Carolina. They had asked Gates's support in recruiting horsemen and offered to join him, but Gates refused to help and let it be known that he did not consider the Southern Theater good cavalry country.

Although British forces controlled Georgia and South Carolina, the situation of General Charles Cornwallis was far from rosy. Many of his 8,300 troops were sick, and he had twelve scattered posts to maintain in an area of about 10,000 square miles. He believed that an offensive into North Carolina was the only alternative to abandoning all this territory and concentrating at Charleston. To undertake this offensive, he had established a forward base at Camden with outposts at Hanging Rock, Rocky Mount, and Cheraw. However, he had not yet secured the necessary provisions, and when Gates advanced there were 800 hospital cases in Camden—men who would have to be abandoned if the place were not defended.

Partisan General Thomas Sumter, who had been operating in the region for only a short time, sent Kalb a report of Cornwallis's scattered dispositions shortly before Gates arrived. According to historians George F. Scheer and Hugh F. Ranking, it was "[p]robably on the strength of this letter, which set at seven hundred the total enemy strength in 'Camden and vicinity,' and encouraged by dreams of manna for his men and 'shoals of militia' gathering in North Carolina, Gates resolved to attack Camden" (p. 405).

Subordinates who knew the country recommended that "the grand army" circle westward through Salisbury, Charlotte, and the Catawba region, a route that would take them through fertile country where the natives were sympathetic. Gates insisted on taking a more direct route, fifty miles shorter but through an impoverished and Tory-infested region of pine barrens, sand hills, and swamps. The march started on 27 July, only two days after Gates took command. The sick and underfed troops took two weeks to cover 120 miles, although some days they marched eighteen miles. When the promised rum and rations did not appear, Gates assured them they would find abundant corn on the Pee Dee River. He was right, but the corn was still green, and soldiers who had been getting sick on green peaches now got sick on green corn instead. They were so desperate that some tried using hair powder to thicken the stew they concocted from lean woods cattle and green corn. Ironically, their route took them through the area where the

modern health resorts of Pinehurst and Southern Pines are located. Historian Sydney George Fisher comments that "the air. . . is dry and invigorating, but the troops of Gates needed more than air to sustain them" (vol. 2, p. 296).

After crossing the Pee Dee River at Mask's Ferry on 3 August, the Continentals were joined by 100 Virginia state troops, whom Lieutenant Colonel Charles Porterfield had managed to keep in the field after the surrender of Charleston, two and a half months earlier. Francis Marion, who had joined De Kalb earlier and had been detached to Cole's Bridge, rejoined the army with about twenty miserable-looking followers. As for these "men and boys, some white, some black," Colonel Otho Williams says "their appearance was in fact so burlesque, that it was with much difficulty the diversion of the regular soldiery was restrained by the officers."


One reason why Gates may have chosen his much criticized line of operations was to increase his opportunities for drawing militia reinforcements to him. The designation of his force as "the grand army" tends to support this supposition. In any event, former Governor Richard Caswell was known to be hunting Tories with a body of 1,200 well-provisioned North Carolina militia, whom he commanded as a major general. De Kalb had called on Caswell to join him—with the ulterior motive of alleviating his own problems of subsistence—but the militia leader "offered excuses and held aloof" (Ward, p. 715).

On 5 August, however, Gates received a message from Caswell that he was about to attack a British outpost on Lynches Creek, and on the next day, Caswell's urgent appeal for help arrived. Gates was already headed for Caswell's camp when the second message arrived, but the episode brought the North Carolina militia into "the grand army." Although strength of the militia had been estimated originally at 1,200, it had now been reinforced to 2,100. The combined forces moved to Lynches Creek.

According to historian Christopher Ward:

What to do next might have puzzled an abler general than Horatio Gates. He could not stay where he was; there was no food there. If he turned to the left, Camden would be to his rear, cutting off any help from the north. If he turned to the right, to the flourishing settlements of the Waxhaws, a two or three days' march, he would seem to be retreating and the North Carolina militia would desert him. So, without any plan or purpose, he went blindly straight ahead. (p. 720-721)

He ordered his heavy baggage and camp followers back to Charlotte, but he lacked transportation to move the former, and the women and children refused to leave their "sponsors." Meanwhile, some edible corn and beef had been found to provide temporary relief of the famine of his troops.



THE GALE GROUP.

BRITISH REACTION

Young Lord Francis Rawdon, who co-commanded at Camden, had sent a series of messages to Cornwallis in Charleston warning him that 7,000 Americans were approaching his advance base. Although Rawdon saw the necessity for concentrating at Camden, “he dared not remove the garrisons from Hanging Rock and Rocky Mountain, lest Sumter should slip past him and either cut his communications with Charleston, or move rapidly westward and overwhelm his posts on the Broad River” (Fortescue, p. 316). Sumter attacked Rocky Mount on 1 August and Hanging Rock on 6 August with precisely this strategy in mind, and the British held the two outposts only after serious fighting.

About the time Gates’s Continentals crossed the Peedee River, at a point some twenty-five miles north of the post held by the Seventy-first Highlanders at Cheraw, Rawdon moved forward to delay the American advance. When Caswell’s North Carolina militia started acting as if they were going to attack his outpost on Lynches Creek, Rawdon threw them into disorder by feigning an attack, and then withdrew.

On 10 August Gates found Rawdon barring his advance across the bridge at Little Lynches Creek, 15 miles northeast of Camden. Although the British were badly outnumbered, they had a strong position overlooking a broad marsh through which the enemy would have to attack. British Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton commented that “by a forced march up the creek, [Gates] could have passed Lord Rawdon’s flank and reached Camden which would have been an easy conquest and a fatal blow to the British” (Ward, p. 913n). De Kalb is said to have suggested this maneuver. According to Robert Duncan Bass, “Gates wheeled his army to the right, forded the creek, and began a flanking movement” (p. 97). Gates may, therefore, have had a decisive action in mind, but he spoiled his chance by starting it in broad daylight and eliminating the essential element of surprise. Covered by Tarleton’s dragoons, Rawdon withdrew to Camden.

The last British troops had now been pulled back from Hanging Rock and Rocky Mount. Sumter followed and seized all crossings across the Wateree River as far down as Whitaker’s Ferry, five miles below Camden. Bass describes Sumter’s intentions as follows:

Trying to coordinate his movements with those of the main army, on August 12 he wrote General Gates. He suggested that a powerful corps be thrown behind Camden. For the second time he urged that a strong detachment be sent to the High Hills of Santee or to Nelson’s Ferry to cut the British supply route and to prevent their expected retreat toward Charleston. (p. 97)

Although Gates consistently exhibited a complete immunity to good advice during this campaign, this time he acted on Sumter’s suggestion. On 14 August, therefore, when his army had reached Rugeley’s Mill (Clermont, about twelve miles from Camden), Gates detached Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Woolford with 100 Maryland Continentals, a company of artillery with two guns, and 300 North Carolina militia to reinforce Sumter. The latter scored a bright little success at Wateree Ferry on 15 August, but contributed nothing to the campaign. Also about this time, Francis Marion was detached to take command of the Williamsburg militia at Witherspoon’s Ferry.

FROM BAD STRATEGY TO WORSE TACTICS

The American army at Rugeley’s Mill was reinforced on 14 August by 700 Virginia militia who had come south under General Edward Stevens. With 900 rank and file of De Kalb’s Delaware and Maryland Continentals, 120 mounted and foot troops of Armand’s Legion, Porterfield’s 100 Virginia light infantry, about 100 men and six guns in Colonel Charles Harrison’s Virginia artillery, the 1,800 North Carolina militia, and about 70 volunteer horsemen, Gates now had about 4,100 rank and file troops. Cornwallis thought he had 7,000, an understandable error inasmuch as Gates himself was under the same misapprehension. When Deputy Adjutant General Otho Williams showed Gates figures to prove that only 3,052 were present and fit for duty, Gates waved this information aside with the comment that “there are enough for our purpose.” De Kalb’s strength takes into account the detachment of 100 Maryland Continental troops. Six guns remained with Gates after two were sent to Sumter. De Kalb had started south with nineteen guns, but nine had been abandoned before he reached Coxe’s Mill, on Deep River in North Carolina, and two more had been left behind at Coxe’s Mill for want of horses to pull them.

Cornwallis reached Camden on the night of 13 August. By this time Rawdon had been reinforced by four light infantry companies from Ninety Six. According to Nathanael Greene, the morning report showed 122 officers and 2,117 men fit for duty. Many of his troops were well-seasoned regulars: three companies of the Twenty-third Regiment (282 rank and file), the Thirty-third (283 men), five companies of the Seventy-first (237 men). Others were high-quality Tory units brought from New York with Sir Henry Clinton: the Volunteers of Ireland (287) and Tarleton’s British Legion (289). There was a 17-man detachment of the Royal Artillery, a 26-man pioneer unit, and two North Carolina Tory regiments with a total strength of over 550. Although Cornwallis still believed himself outnumbered more than three to one, he decided to fight. Retreat would have meant the abandonment of 800 sick or injured men, a quantity of stores, and the surrender of all of South Carolina and Georgia

except for Charleston and Savannah. The decision to remain reveals the element of greatness in Cornwallis.

In a meeting on 15 August Gates announced that the army would make a night march to Saunders Creek, only five and one half miles from Camden, where a strong position could be prepared. This, he hoped, would pressure the British to abandon Camden or to attack Gates's position behind the creek on a high hill. His officers, who included eight generals, were too stunned by the prospect of maneuvering their columns of famished troops through the woods at night to voice their objections at this meeting; but the positive terms in which Gates read his orders to them clearly implied that he was not interested in their views. Colonel Williams did point out later that Gates was more than 100 percent wrong in his strength calculations, but Gates treated this observation dismissively, as a minor detail. When Armand learned that his mounted troops were to lead the column, he pointed out that cavalry was the wrong type of force for such a mission. But perhaps Gates was finally learning the value of cavalry, for Otho Williams noted that his orders were for Armand's horse to "not only . . . support the shock of the enemy's charge, but finally to rout them." Indeed, Cornwallis would likewise place Tarleton's cavalry out front of the British.

The true history of this battle has a touch that would be unacceptable in fiction. Some rations had been gathered to feed the troops a full meal before the attack, but there was still no rum. There was a supply of molasses, however, and Gates conceived the happy idea of issuing each man a gill of this delicacy as a substitute. The half-cooked meat and half-baked bread, followed by a mixture of molasses and cornmeal mush, had a gastrointestinal effect on the half-starved troops that would be funny if the tactical results had not been so serious. Again according to Otho Williams, the men were "breaking the ranks all night and were certainly much debilitated before the action commenced in the morning."

The Americans started down the road from Rugeley's Mill toward Camden at 10 P.M., with Armand in the lead. The night was sultry, the moon full, and the road showed up well in the dark. Flanking Armand at a distance of 200 yards, Porterfield's Virginia and John Armstrong's North Carolina militia advanced through the dark woods and swamps in single file on each side of the cavalry "point." Further back down the road came an infantry advance guard, followed by the Continentals, Caswell's North Carolina militia, Stevens's Virginia militia, and the baggage train under the escort of the volunteer horsemen.

By an uncanny coincidence, Cornwallis had left Camden at 10 P.M., and was marching along the same road toward Gates with a view to attacking him at Rugeley's Mill at daybreak. At about 2:30 on the morning

of 16 August the two forces met at a place called Parker's Old Field in Gum Swamp. The "point" of the British column, twenty mounted and twenty dismounted dragoons of the British Legion, charged and drove Armand's troops back in confusion, but the flank patrols closed in and drove back the British point. After a quarter of an hour the firing stopped on both sides.


THE BATTLE OF CAMDEN, 16 AUGUST 1780

Gates called his officers together for a council of war. This time he appeared anxious to have their recommendations, for Otho Williams reports that he asked: "Gentlemen, what is best to be done?" There was a painful silence, from which historians have assumed that most of the officers favored a retreat but were unwilling to suggest it. It is also reasonable to assume that Gates hoped the council would recommend this course of action.

Williams notes that it was General Stevens who finally broke the silence, asking "Gentlemen, is it not too late *now* to do any thing but fight?" There are other versions that put Stevens' comment in more positive terms, but all agree generally that he was the only subordinate to say anything at the meeting. As a result, the officers got their men ready to fight.

The "meeting engagement" took place in a sandy area of widely spaced tall pines. Dense swamps narrowed the battlefield to 1,200 yards at the point where the columns collided, but this defile widened toward the north. Gates was favored by slightly higher ground, but his flanks would be "in the air" if he had to withdraw from the narrowest part of the defile. Cornwallis had the disadvantage of being less than a mile forward of Gum Swamp Creek. Despite the narrow front (which gave him no real opportunity for maneuver initially) and lack of depth to his position (which limited deployment of his reserves), believing himself to be outnumbered three to one, and knowing that the obstacle to his rear would make tactical defeat tantamount to annihilation, Cornwallis nonetheless calmly prepared to attack at dawn.

The British deployed in a line perpendicular to the road. On the extreme right, against the swamp, four companies of light infantry went into position. The Twenty-third (Royal Welch) and Lieutenant Colonel James Webster's Thirty-third Regiment extended this wing to the road. Webster commanded the entire wing. The Volunteers of Ireland were west of the road, then came the infantry of the British Legion, and the Royal North Carolina Tories extended to the swamp. Colonel Morgan Bryan's North Carolina Tory volunteers were in echelon to the left rear of this flank. Lord Rawdon commanded the left wing. The two small battalions (totaling five companies) of the Seventy-first Highlanders were to the rear, one battalion on each side of the road.



THE GALE GROUP.

Tarleton's cavalry was posted to the right of the road behind the Highlanders. The woods were so thick in this area that this cavalry reserve had to remain in column.

The American line was parallel to the enemy's. Unfortunately, Gates put his militia on his left, opposite the British regulars, and kept half his regulars in reserve. From east to west the American units were as follows: Stevens's Virginia militia was on the flank, with Armand's Legion to their rear; Caswell's North Carolina militia was toward the center of the line; and General Mordecai Gist's Second Maryland Brigade was west of the road, constituting the right wing. Gist's Brigade comprised the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Maryland Regiments, as well as the Delaware Regiment. The latter was closest to the road, and the militia unit to its east was Colonel Henry Dixon's North Carolina troops. De Kalb commanded the American right wing. The American line was so narrow that William Smallwood's First Maryland Brigade was placed astride the road to the rear as the reserve. The regiments of this brigade present were the First, Third, and Seventh Maryland Regiments. Thomas Woolford's Fifth Maryland Regiment was the Continental unit sent to reinforce Sumter. According to Otho Williams, the six guns of the First Virginia Artillery were posted in front of the American center, near the road. Other accounts and maps indicate they were not massed in the center, but rather that four were dispersed along the front and two on the road, with the First Maryland Brigade in the second line.

Although some skirmishing took place during the two hours between the time of contact and dawn, all this time must have been needed to form the opposing lines. Gates established his command post behind the First Maryland Brigade, and apparently had no plan other than to wait for Cornwallis to make the opening move. Colonel Williams had apparently come from Stevens's Brigade toward the artillery in front of the center when the British were reported advancing in line of columns. Artillery Captain Anthony Singleton told Williams he could see the British 200 yards away. Ordering Singleton to open fire, the adjutant general rode back behind the reserve brigade to inform Gates. Cannon were now firing on both sides, and smoke settled over the battlefield in a heavy fog. Williams suggested to Gates that Stevens move forward and attempt to hit the enemy while they were deploying from column into line of battle. Since the Virginians were already formed, Williams pointed out that "the effect might be fortunate, and first impressions were important." Gates agreed and ordered it done. Then he ordered the First Maryland Brigade forward in support of the militia. The American right also was ordered to advance.

Meanwhile, the enterprising adjutant general hurried to the left flank and Stevens led his brigade forward, but it was too late to hit the enemy right wing before they

deployed. Williams then went ahead with forty or fifty volunteers to disrupt the enemy's advance and weaken their impact on the V militia. The desired effect of this expedient, according to Williams, was not gained:

General Stevens, observing the enemy to rush on, put his men in mind of their bayonets; but the impetuosity with which they advanced, firing and huzzaing, threw the whole body of the militia into such a panic that they generally threw down their loaded arms and fled in the utmost consternation. The unworthy example of the Virginians was almost instantly followed by the North Carolinians; only a small part of the brigade commanded by Brigadier General Gregory made a short pause. A part of Dixon's regiment of that brigade, next in the line of the Second Maryland Brigade, fired two or three rounds of cartridge. But a great majority of the militia (at least two thirds of the army) fled without firing a shot. The writer avers it of his own knowledge, having seen and observed every part of the army, from left to right, during the action.

In his narrative of these events, Williams went on to describe the chaotic scene in greater detail:

He who has never seen the effect of a panic upon a multitude can have but an imperfect idea of such a thing. The best disciplined troops have been enervated and made cowards by it. Armies have been routed by it, even where no enemy appeared to furnish an excuse. Like electricity, it operates instantaneously—like sympathy, it is irresistible where it touches. But, in the present instance, its action was not universal. The regular troops, who had the keen edge of sensibility rubbed off by strict discipline and hard service, saw the confusion with but little emotion. They engaged seriously in the affair; and, notwithstanding some irregularity, which was created by the militia breaking pell mell through the second line, order was restored there—time enough to give the enemy a severe check, which abated the fury of their assault and obliged them to assume a more deliberate manner of acting.

The attack of the British right wing had been commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James Webster who, instead of pursuing the militia, had wheeled to roll up the exposed flank of the American right. Lord Rawdon had led the British left and forward when Webster's wing advanced, but the Continentals held their ground against repeated attacks, and even succeeded in pushing back the British right. Fog, dust, and smoke hung over the battlefield from the start of this action. The reduced visibility undoubtedly contributed to the panic of the militia, and it isolated the American right from the knowledge that they were now standing alone against the entire enemy army.

De Kalb was sufficiently hard pressed, however, to call for the reserve when his flank came under attack. Although the First Maryland Brigade had re-formed after the militia passed through them, General Smallwood had been swept away with the fugitives, so the (apparently omnipresent) Otho Williams assisted the regimental commanders to lead the First Brigade forward. They tried to bring the brigade up on the exposed flank of the Second Brigade, but the enemy held open a 200-yard gap between them. Cornwallis then turned Webster's regulars against the front of the reserve brigade.

Attempting to refuse their exposed left flank, the First Brigade ended up at a right angle to the Second Brigade. After being driven back twice and rallying twice, the Marylanders were driven from the field. Williams had meanwhile returned to the Second Brigade, where the British were closing in for hand-to-hand combat. Kalb had been unhorsed and was bleeding from several wounds, including a saber cut on the head, but the old Bavarian refused to quit or to retreat without orders from Gates. After leading a counterattack, which achieved a momentary success, the 58-year-old warrior fell mortally wounded, dying a prisoner in Camden three days later. Major George Hanger had led part of the Legion cavalry against the exposed flank of the American right, and Tarleton returned from his pursuit of the left wing to hit from the rear. The Battle of Camden was over and the pursuit began.

PURSUIT AND ITS PROBLEMS

Major Archibald Anderson, Colonel John Gunby, Lieutenant Colonel John Howard, and Captain Henry Dobson, all of Maryland, and Captain Robert Kirkwood of Delaware rallied about sixty men, who retreated as a unit. Other survivors, whether individually or in small groups, scattered in all directions. Tarleton's cavalry met some resistance at Rugeley's Mill from Armand and a few other officers who were trying to save the baggage train from American looters and send it north to safety. The British pushed on to Hanging Rock before the horses and men succumbed to exhaustion. Tarleton returned to Rugeley's late in the afternoon, and left the next morning to destroy Sumter's command at Fishing Creek on 18 August.

Gates, Caswell, and Smallwood were swept from the field with the first wave of fugitives. After abandoning hope of rallying at Rugeley's, Gates covered the remaining sixty miles to Charlotte, North Carolina, on the day of his defeat. A few troops assembled at Charlotte—the remains of Armand's Legion (whose unit had done no fighting at Camden but had momentarily stalled Tarleton at Rugeley's Mill), Smallwood with a handful of men, and Gist with two or three. Believing Charlotte

untenable, the wretched remnant of the army, accompanied by patriot refugees, 300 friendly Catawba Indians, and survivors of the battle at Waxhaws started the arduous trek through Salisbury to Hillsboro. Gates arrived there on 19 August, having covered 200 miles in three and a half days.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Casualty estimates for the American army vary tremendously. Christopher Ward states that of the 4,000 that had constituted "the grand army," only 700 reached Hillsboro. General Cornwallis, writing at the time, claimed that 800 to 900 Americans were killed and that 1,000 were captured. But Lieutenant Colonel H. L. Landers noted that these "numbers are so far from correct that they are valueless as a guide. The militia broke early in the day and scattered in so many directions upon their retreat that very few were made prisoners" (Landers, p. 62). According to Ward, the answer lies somewhere in between. He says:

It has been estimated that 650 of the Continentals were killed or captured, [all of ?] the wounded falling into the hands of the enemy. About 100 of the North Carolina militia were killed or wounded, and [an additional?] 300 were captured. Only 3 of the Virginians were wounded [and none captured?]. (p. 732)

Ward's numbers are valuable primarily in showing which units did the fighting. Only 1,000 Continental troops were on the field, and one battalion, Mordecai Gist's Second Maryland, was far more heavily engaged than the other. In addition, the Delawares on the east flank were under the heaviest pressure. Of the North Carolina militia, Dixon's regiment, which was deployed adjacent to the Delawares, was the only unit to put up any real resistance. Most of the North Carolina casualties must therefore have been in this unit.

Although the British had won a resounding victory, they paid dearly for it. The British lost 324 men: two officers and 66 men killed, eighteen officers and 238 men wounded, according to Fortescue. Most American writers accept the figures of Tarleton, which differ from Fortescue only in that he shows eleven fewer wounded—he puts these eleven in the category of "missing." While these figures sound low, they must be put into perspective. The Volunteers of Ireland suffered a 28 percent casualty rate, and the crack Thirty-third suffered an amazing 42 percent. Replacing these men would prove difficult.

Writing at the time, Captain John Marshall noted that "[n]ever was a victory more complete, or a defeat more total," and, as late as 1900, it was called "the most

disastrous defeat ever inflicted on an American army.” In England the victory appeared even greater, because Cornwallis repeated his mistaken assessment of American troop strength, putting the ratio of American to British forces at 5,000 to 2,000. (At times he portrayed the ratio as being even more skewed, claiming that his 2,000 troops were confronted by 7,000 American foes. Since Gates himself on the eve of battle thought he had 7,000, Cornwallis’s errors are excusable; they detract little from the magnitude of the triumph. In concept and execution the strategy and tactics of Cornwallis were first class. The performance of his troops and subordinate commanders, particularly Rawdon (before the battle), Webster (during the battle), and Tarleton (in the pursuit), was outstanding.

Gates, on the other hand, has been accused with considerable justice of making nearly every error possible. Scheer and Rankin summarize his defense neatly:

Civilians were quick to censure Gates, but few soldiers did; the harshest criticism leveled at him was not that he lost a battle but that he fought at all. Not many generals would have placed reliance on militia in the circumstances. (p. 411)

Nathanael Greene, successor to Gates in the Southern Department, wrote him that, after seeing the battlefield and reviewing Gates’s dispositions, attributed the Camden debacle to misfortune, rather than to blameable actions. However, Greene did consider the abandonment of Charlotte to have been entirely unnecessary and, in his opinion, the thing that alienated the Patriot public more than the defeat at Camden. A committee of Congress fully exonerated Gates of misconduct.

Following so closely after the American reverses at Savannah, Charleston, and Waxhaws, the engagements at Camden and Fishing Creek left the Patriots in what historian George Otto Trevelyan calls “a morass of trouble which seemed to have neither shore nor bottom” (vol. 5, p. 298). Cornwallis prepared for an invasion of North Carolina that promised to meet no resistance. Now that its own choices for leadership in the Southern Department (Benjamin Lincoln and Gates) had been eliminated, Congress let Washington pick the general who would be charged with salvaging what was left of the situation. Washington selected Nathanael Greene, but even before Greene’s southern campaign got under way, the tide was turned in favor of the American cause at Kings Mountain.

SEE ALSO *Cornwallis, Charles; Delaware Continentals; Gates, Horatio; Gist, Mordecai; Marshall, John; Rawdon-Hastings, Francis; Sumter, Thomas; Tarleton, Banastre; Williams, Otho Holland.*

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revised by Steven D. Smith

CAMPAIGN. A campaign is “a connected series of military operations forming a distinct stage in a war; originally, the time during which an army kept the field [*campagne*]” (*Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary*).

CAMPBELL, SIR ARCHIBALD. (1739–1791). British army officer and colonial governor. Born at Inverary, Campbell was educated at Glasgow University and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. He received a commission in the corps of engineers in 1758 and subsequently served with distinction in the West Indies. From 1768 to 1773 he was chief military engineer in Bengal, where he made a fortune from private ventures. The following year he was elected Member of Parliament for Stirling Boroughs, a seat he held until 1780.

In November 1775, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, he raised the Twenty-first Highlanders (Fraser Highlanders) and in May sailed with them to Boston for

his first service on the American mainland. Arriving in June, after the Americans had occupied the city, he was captured and held captive at Concord until exchanged for Ethan Allen and six other American prisoners in May 1778. Resuming command of his regiment, he was given eight battalions to reconquer Georgia, a task in which he displayed impressive talents as a commander. He took Savannah on 29 December and occupied Augusta on 29 January 1779 before handing over command of British troops in the southern colonies to major general Augustin Prevost. Returning home a popular hero and a newly promoted colonel, on 7 July he married Amelia Ramsay, daughter of the portraitist Allan Ramsay.

The following year he was made brigadier general with command of the royal troops in Jamaica. After a dispute with the governor about the use of his soldiers, Campbell was appointed governor as well as commander in chief for troops in Jamaica in 1782. In the face of probable Bourbon attack he reorganized the island's defenses, daring to use black militia for the purpose. He returned home in August 1784 and was knighted for his outstanding services on 30 September 1785.

His friendship with Henry Dundas led to his appointment as governor of Madras, where he arrived in April 1786. He was an energetic and conscientious administrator and earned Cornwallis's praise (and the East India Company's censure) for a treaty that settled the Nawab of Arcot's debts. He resigned in 1789 and returned home to be re-elected for Stirling Boroughs. He died in London on 31 March 1791 and was buried in Westminster Abbey.

SEE ALSO *Allen, Ethan; Savannah, Georgia (29 December 1778).*

revised by John Oliphant

CAMPBELL, JOHN SEE *Loudoun, John Campbell, fourth earl of.*

CAMPBELL, JOHN. (c. 1725–1806). British general. Born in Strachur, Scotland, Campbell entered the army in June 1745 as a lieutenant in Loudoun's Highlanders, then commanded by John Campbell, earl of Loudoun (the two men were not related). He served through the Second Jacobite Rebellion and took part in the Flanders campaign in 1747, after which he was promoted to captain. Appointed to the Forty-second Highlanders on 9 April 1756, Campbell was wounded

at Ticonderoga in 1758. On 11 July 1759 he became a major of the Seventeenth Foot, and was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 1 February 1762.; He commanded that regiment in the operations against Martinico and Havana in 1762. On 1 May 1773 he became lieutenant colonel of the Thirty-seventh Foot, and in 1776 he went to America with this regiment. During the Philadelphia campaign he was part of Sir Henry Clinton's force left in New York, and served as commander on Staten Island from 1777 to 1778. On 11 September 1777 he led a force that landed at Elizabethtown, New Jersey, with a dual mission. First, he hoped to create a diversion in favor of General William Howe's main army, which that day fought the Battle of Brandywine. He also planned to conduct a large-scale foraging operation through Newark. The raid netted some horses and livestock, which, according to General Clinton, "afforded a seasonable refreshment to the squadron and the army," but accomplished little more.

Around the end of November 1778, Clinton detached Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell to take Savannah, Georgia, and General John Campbell to take command in West Florida. The latter was sent, at the suggestion of George Sackville (Lord Germain, then the British colonial secretary), with orders to capture New Orleans if Spain entered the war. On 19 February 1779 he was given the local rank of major general. Far from being able to execute the ambitious strategy proposed by Germain, who neglected the detail of sending him adequate means, Campbell was forced to surrender Pensacola to Spanish General Bernardo de Galvez on 9 May 1781. Exchanged almost immediately, Campbell was promoted to lieutenant general, and the rank was made permanent on 28 September 1787. Ten years later he was made a full general. He died in 1806.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; Culloden Moor, Scotland; Loudoun, John Campbell; Pensacola, Florida; Staten Island, New York.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CAMPBELL, JOHN. (1753–1784). British officer. Born on 7 December 1753 near Dumbarton, Scotland, Campbell was the son of Lord Stonefield and lady Grace Stuart, the daughter of John Stuart, the third earl of Bute. In 1771 he entered the army as an ensign in the Thirty-seventh Regiment. In 1774 he became a lieutenant in the Seventh Foot (also known as the Fusiliers). At the start of the Revolution, this regiment and the Twenty-sixth Foot, both of them under strength, were the only British regulars at the disposal of General Guy Carleton

for the defense of Canada. Campbell was captured at St. Jean early in the war. Soon exchanged, he was promoted to captain in the Seventy-first Highlanders on 2 December 1775, and on 30 December 1777 he became a major in the Seventy-first Highlanders. In 1780 he returned to England, and on 7 February 1781 was promoted to lieutenant colonel. He distinguished himself in India, where he commanded the famous defense of Mangalore from 23 May 1783 to 23 January 1784. At the conclusion of the battle, he surrendered his 856 survivors with the Honors of War. He died 23 March 1784 in Bombay.

SEE ALSO *Honors of War*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CAMPBELL, LORD WILLIAM. (?–1778). Naval officer and last royal governor of South Carolina. The fourth son of the fourth duke of Argyll, William entered the navy, rising to post captain by 1762. In command of the *Nightingale* in 1763, he visited South Carolina and there married Sarah Izard, daughter of the wealthy Ralph Izard. The marriage, in a colony where Scots were already resented as condescending imperial agents and interlopers and which was preceded by Sarah's rejection of a local suitor, offended an already touchy colonial elite. Elected to Parliament in 1764, Campbell resigned in 1766 to accept the governorship of Nova Scotia. In 1773 he became governor of South Carolina, taking over the government from the long-serving lieutenant governor, William Bull, arriving in Charleston on 17 June 1775. Here he found royal authority in a state of collapse and attempted to enlist the help of frontier settlers and the Cherokee and Catawba nations. This policy was understandable but had to overcome conflicting grievances: the dissatisfaction of the settlers was based upon the virtual exclusion of the backcountry from local politics, while the Indians' dissatisfaction was based on their resentment of the expansion of frontier settlements. John Stuart, whom Campbell asked to conduct his Indian negotiations, saw the problem at once and offered to promote Native cooperation with Loyalists and to discourage indiscriminate Indian attacks.

When Campbell's plans were discovered, only the restraining hand of the moderates prevented the Charleston radicals from seizing him, and he was able to take refuge in HMS *Tamar* on 15 September 1775. He refused an invitation to return and threatened Charleston with the *Tamar's* guns until the battery at Fort Johnson forced the ship to leave. He retired to Jamaica before joining Sir Henry Clinton's expedition

against Charleston in June 1776, where he was wounded while commanding the lower gun deck in the *Bristol* during the bombardment of Sullivan's Island. He returned to Britain and died in Southampton, apparently of the long-term effects of his injury on 5 September 1778.

SEE ALSO *Bull, William II; Stuart, John*.

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revised by John Oliphant

CAMPBELL, WILLIAM. (1745–1781). Patriot leader at Kings Mountain, Virginia. Born in Augusta County, Virginia in August 1745, Campbell led the local militia during Dunmore's War in 1774. At the start of the Revolution, Campbell raised a militia company. A few months later he was made a captain of the Continental First Virginia Regiment. In April 1776 he married Elizabeth Henry, the sister of Patrick Henry. He resigned his commission in October 1776. Thereafter he served as boundary commissioner in dealings with the Cherokees, rose to the rank of colonel in the militia, and was a delegate to the Virginia legislature. In 1779 and 1780 he led a partisan campaign against Loyalists, becoming known for his brutality as the "bloody tyrant of Washington County."

At the urging of Isaac Shelby, Campbell led 400 Virginia militia in the attack on Major Patrick Ferguson's Loyalists. Unable to agree upon a commander, the assembled volunteers elected Campbell "officer of the day," and he became the nominal leader of the composite force that won the important victory at Kings Mountain, South Carolina, on 7 October 1780. Campbell took part in the killing of Loyalists attempting to surrender.

A few weeks later Campbell marched his militia to join General Nathanael Greene, demonstrating courage and skill as a commander during the battles at Wetzell's Mill on 6 March 1781, and Guilford, North Carolina, on 15 March of that year. Rewarded with the rank of brigadier general by the Virginia assembly on 14 June 1781, Campbell next led his militia to reinforce General Lafayette's forces in Virginia. Campbell fell sick shortly thereafter and died at Rocky Mills, in Hanover County, Virginia, on 22 August 1781.

SEE ALSO *Dunmore's (or Cresap's) War; Kings Mountain, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CAMP FEVER. Any epidemic fever occurring in camps, chiefly typhus.

Mark M. Boatner

CAMP FOLLOWERS. As American revolutionaries in 1775–1776 created the forces they needed to ensure success against British arms, they had to grapple with their hostility to regular armies. One part of their antagonism, other than the ideological, was a distaste for some of the baggage that accompanied established militaries. They did not disdain the matériel, that is, the arms, ammunition, food, shoes, and other supplies and equipment. Rather, it was the personnel they tended to despise. There were a number of reasons for that. One was the cultural baggage of British officers and soldiers: their mental maps of who were superiors and inferiors. Their conceptions of colonists as backward provincials and imperial servants infuriated the Americans. The Revolutionaries, in turn, perceived Britain's regular soldiers as myrmidons accompanied by nasty minions. The Americans were determined that the same could not be said of their own forces. This led them to tout reliance on militias rather than on an army and then, when that proved untenable, to celebrate their servicemen as citizen-soldiers. It also led them to discount their own camp followers even after they proved useful.

While American revolutionaries may have contemplated creating their own new model army, they actually—guided by General George Washington—consciously modeled the Continental Army upon European, and specifically British, forces. Those armies utilized civilian adjuncts—job-related followers who were employed by or engaged in sanctioned trade with the forces—for essential supplies and services. They also had family followers. Eighteenth-century militaries had such followers because of the kind of men who served, how long they served, and the nature of the service itself. At times they also had them because of refugee issues. The American army accumulated followers for the same reasons. It tried to minimize the numbers, impact, and dependency (both of the followers on the army and the army on followers) at various times, but ultimately the Continental army maintained its followers because the institution and its men, like the British army, needed them.

WIVES AND OTHER CAMP FOLLOWERS

British army officers generally came from the gentry while the soldiers came from the lower orders. While many young gentlemen bought a commission, served a short while, and then sold out, many others made the army a career. When those who did so married, their wives became the ladies of the regiment. Soldiers usually enlisted for life (although special circumstances could limit the term) and found that the military then exercised command over their choice and support of a spouse. A soldier had to have permission to marry if he wanted his wife to be recognized, that is, rationed and billeted, by the regiment. Permission was generally predicated upon a soldier's seniority and good service and the woman's behavior. When the army had to expand rapidly for war, it accepted wives in order to recruit their spouses. Rank and regulation thus affected the number and treatment of family followers.

Deployment determined whether spouses, children, and servants were true camp followers. While many British officers' wives maintained households in garrison towns, fewer actually accompanied their husbands when they shipped out for war. More soldiers' spouses would have probably embarked than actually did had it not been for regimental quotas determining how many wives could travel with the troops. The quotas varied, but they generally allowed up to six women per company (about one woman to every ten men in a typical company) and came with the caveat that such women would receive rations only in return for such services as nursing, washing, and cooking for the soldiers. Even so, once the army was on the move it picked up more followers, thus making a determination of the average ratio of followers to soldiers difficult (but apparently greater than one to ten). Some wives, concubines, and children remained with the regiments as officers' servants or simply snuck by. Others in the actual theaters of war, as in America, attached themselves to soldiers who encamped near their homes. Some of those American women followed the British drum for love, others for money.

Still other Americans accompanied the British army for security or opportunity or in loyalty. During the War for Independence refugees flocked to and then followed the British army starting with its evacuation of Boston in 1776. As American Revolutionaries tightened their control of communities through the use of patrolling militias, loyalty oaths, and confiscation of enemy property, more Loyalists fled to British lines. Some of those men either joined that army or Tory extramilitary organizations. Others served the British army in civilian capacities, as supply contractors or servants or the like. Such followers included African Americans. Most were fugitive slaves responding to words and actions (from Lord Dunmore's

Proclamation in November 1775 to the tactics used by British and Loyalist forces in Georgia and South Carolina from late 1779 onward), offering independence to those who would run away from rebellious masters and serve with the British forces. Others were “contraband” or were impressed into military labor. Whether black or white, acting as soldiers or servants, if their families followed, they had the task of trying to reestablish households within the limitations of camps and garrisons. Other women, some of those who had flirted and more with British officers and soldiers in Philadelphia and elsewhere, also ended up following the British army.

REGULATING CAMP FOLLOWERS

The British forces regulated their camp followers, whether they had been brought from England or acquired in America, so that they would be useful to the troops and not undermine health or discipline. Commanding officers issued numerous orders stating where accompanying women could go and what they were to do. They threatened punishment to those who stole, sold illegal liquor, or engaged in licentious activities (especially if they passed on sexually transmitted diseases). Noncompliance could result in the revocation of rationing or licenses for trade or in whipping and banishment.

The hired German forces did the same with the many women and children who accompanied them. In return for rations and permission to bunk with their men, the women were expected to obey orders and work and forage for their keep. Observers tended to describe them as dirty beasts of burden. The Baroness Frederika von Riedesel, who followed her husband, General Friedrich Riedesel, to America, was anything but that. She was an aristocrat who distinguished between ladies and women of the army.

The Continental Army also maintained distinctions among its female adjuncts. Premier among its ladies was Martha Washington. In the late months of 1775 she made the first of many treks to join her husband over the course of the war. She and other generals’ wives, such as Catharine Greene and Lucy Knox, generally stayed only so long as the troops remained in camp and their spouses had some time for socializing. Once the campaign commenced, these consorts generally, though not always immediately, returned home. Wives of more junior officers, if they came to camp at all, appear to have followed that example. There were, of course, exceptions, as some officers’ wives, like many soldiers’ spouses, stayed with the army throughout a campaign. If a man left a farm or business, the likelihood was that the family remained to carry on. Only those who had others to see to things had the time and resources to make visits to camp. On the other hand, those with nothing had little to lose in choosing to follow the army, and those who had already lost everything saw military encampments as refuges.

Some Canadians who fought at Quebec and formed the cores of the Continental Army’s First and Second Canadian regiments marched into exile in 1776. The wives and children of many of these men trudged south with them and stayed with the American army for the rest of the war. When the British took and held areas, such as New York City and later Charleston, families of men in or joining the Continental service with nowhere else to go set out for camp as well.

The Continental Army could not limit followers by enlisting only single men, forbidding soldiers to marry, or barring families from camp. Doing so would have resulted in even fewer men in the service. It did, however, try to manage the escalating numbers of followers. There appear to have been fewer of them in the early years of the war than later. That may have been due to the reliance on militia in the first year, the short-term enlistments of the men in the next, and other priorities in the army’s organization. By 1777 there were more mentions of women in regulations and ration lists. As the war widened and the Continental army became more of a regular army, it accumulated more of the baggage common to such forces. By 1781 such administrators as the adjutant general, secretary at war, and superintendent of finance wanted to regularize rationing of women, suggesting a ratio of one to every fifteen men. Washington disagreed, for—as he explained in 1783—that could actually have increased the number of women rationed. He thought it better to accept a surplus of women with some regiments rather than impose a uniform policy throughout the army. He had a point. Some regiments, especially those with men and families from British-occupied areas, did have more followers, but others had far fewer. Overall, based on limited returns and keeping in mind that numbers changed given the time, place, and unit, it appears that the number of adult women followers averaged out to approximately three percent, or one to every thirty men.

Accepting rations meant accepting regulations. As retainers (meaning those maintained or employed by the army), followers were subject to orders under the Articles of War. Continental army officers commonly directed when, where, and how followers were to travel with and work for the troops. Some orders directed followers to stay with the baggage and off the wagons. Others stipulated what washerwomen could charge for laundry and what male and female sutlers could charge for the liquor and other goods they sold. Such orders promised punishment for noncompliance. The same held true if a follower was found pilfering or plundering. Serious offenses could result in court-martial and banishment.

Although some followers were troublemakers, most proved useful to their respective armies in numerous ways. Peddlers provided both necessities and luxuries. Family

members and servants (black and white) cooked and cleaned for officers as well as soldiers. Some women volunteered for nursing duty, while others who were already followers found themselves essentially drafted for the task. Through all of these services, followers contributed to the cohesion and continuing operation of their forces. That proved especially important to the establishment of the army of the United States.

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CANADA, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO. March–June 1776. Realizing that the Canada invasion was failing politically as well as militarily, Congress decided early in 1776 to send a special committee to do what it could to win over the people. Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Chase, and Charles Carroll of Carrollton (not then a member of Congress) were selected. Carroll, a Catholic who had been educated in France, persuaded his cousin John Carroll, a priest, to accompany them. The group left Philadelphia on 25 March and, after a rigorous trip, reached Montreal on 29 April. Their mission a failure, they returned in early June with firsthand accounts of the "shocking mismanagement" of military operations.

SEE ALSO *Canada in the Revolution; Canada Invasion.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CANADA CREEK, NEW YORK, ACTION AT **SEE** *Jerseyfield, New York.*

CANADA IN THE REVOLUTION.

"Canada," as known in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, did not exist as a nation at the time of the American Revolution. Its creation in the modern sense came in 1867, when the various colonies of British North America gradually came together to form the Canadian Confederation, the latest province to join being Newfoundland in 1949. During the American Revolution, the British possessions north of the so-called thirteen colonies were extensive in territory and sparsely populated. Each was a quite different entity from the others and each had its own government and laws. On the Atlantic seaboard were the colonies of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and the Island of St. John (later Prince Edward Island). On the continent, from the Gulf of St. Lawrence westward to past the Great Lakes, was Canada. North and west of Canada was Rupert's Land, the vast wilderness that was the Hudson's Bay Company's fur trade domain.

The largest and most important of these in 1775 was Canada, officially called the Province of Quebec after 1763. It was a province like no other in the British Empire because it had been the former northern part of New France and nearly all of its population of about eight-five thousand was of French ancestry except for two or three thousand newly arrived Britons and Americans. Nearly all were settled along the shores of the St. Lawrence and Richelieu Rivers. The fortress city of Quebec was the capital and port of entry. Montreal was the main business city and key to the fur trade that was so important to Canada's economy. Trois-Rivières (Three Rivers) was the next town of importance in the St. Lawrence Valley. There were no substantial settlements further west except for the town of Detroit, between Lakes Erie and Huron.

BRITISH RULE IN CANADA

Following the surrender of the last French troops to British forces at Montreal in September 1760 and the Treaty of Paris three years later, when France abandoned its North American colony, Britain found itself having to rule a rapidly expanding French population. A worse problem concerned the conciliation of the civil and religious rights of the Roman Catholic French Canadian population, guaranteed by the Treaty of Paris (1763), with those of the small Protestant British and American community that had just arrived. The latter claimed that only they should rule the country, with their own elected legislature reserved to Protestants, which was utterly unacceptable to the French Canadians who formed the overwhelming

majority of the population. As there was no likelihood of massive immigration from the British Isles, it was obvious that a satisfactory result, agreeable to the French Canadians, had to be found if the colony was to thrive. It was further understood that pushing French Canadians to revolt could be disastrous. Half of them were veterans of the late conflict and a rebellion would require a considerable British military effort to defeat.

The solution found was the Quebec Act of 1774, which basically satisfied no one. Unfortunately, the British-appointed governor, Guy Carleton, had misread French Canadians' social organization and fostered, through an appointed legislative council, a feudal-style society based on the powers of the gentry, or seigneurs, over farmers. The law was for the most part badly received by the British and Americans as it restored Canada's vast wilderness frontier and seemed more favorable to the French Canadians than to them. For their part, most ordinary French Canadians resented the extensive powers it gave to the church and the seigneurs, powers they had never enjoyed under the French royal government. Furthermore, although British subjects, they were still excluded from the public service or from obtaining military commissions in the regular forces because they were Catholics. However, it was a worthy effort and most in Canada looked to see how it would actually work and would adapt accordingly. The social climate was calm and there was no great discernable resentment against British authority, a very different situation than found in the thirteen American colonies.

Another concern for the British authorities in Canada was the vast expanse of the Great Lakes region and relations with aborigine nations there. Chief Pontiac's uprising during 1763–1764, while overrunning most of the western forts, had been defeated. This, however, left the new British overlords rather unsure about their future prospects in dealing with aborigines in the Great Lakes area. They wisely continued the policies of the French by maintaining garrisons in western forts such as Frontenac (later Kingston, Ontario), Niagara, and Michilimackinac while the British Indian Department, a political as well as a military organization, fostered good relations by diplomacy, gifts to the various nations, and a certain degree of protection from American settlers encroaching on native lands.

The military situation in Canada was quite stable at the eve of the American Revolution. In 1774 the 7th, 10th, 26th, and 52nd regiments, with Royal Artillery detachments, were in garrison in the St. Lawrence and Richelieu Valleys and the 8th was stationed at the Great Lakes. All were understrength and totaled about 1,700 officers and men. At this time, General Gage in Boston had overall military command in North America and, given the tense political climate in that city, instructed Governor Carleton to immediately send the 10th and 52nd there, which was

accordingly done. Excluding the garrisons on the Great Lakes, there were only about 800 regulars left in Canada by the spring of 1775. The Canadian militia, which was to be reorganized, listed about 18,000 men who on paper were able to bear arms. But this organization, excellent during the French regime, had been very neglected by suspicious British authorities so that it had become totally inefficient and was practically unarmed.

AMERICAN ATTACK

Unbeknown to Canada, tensions in Massachusetts had broken out into fighting between American Patriots and British troops in April 1775. On 10 May a bemused detachment of the Twenty-sixth Foot was captured at Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point in New York by a party of Patriots led by Ethan Allen. The Americans had decided to invade Canada and, during the summer of 1775, General Richard Montgomery led an American army of some two thousand men up the Richelieu River valley. In September he laid siege to the fort at Saint-Jean (St. John), defended by a garrison of five hundred British troops and Canadian volunteers. Nearby Fort Chambly was easily captured on 20 October. The siege of Saint-Jean dragged on until 2 November, when its garrison surrendered after a resistance of fifty-five days. It was a disaster for Carleton, who was left with perhaps one hundred regulars to defend Canada. Montreal obviously could not be held, and the Americans entered the city on 12 November, just as Carleton was leaving it.

Carleton reached Quebec on 19 November and quickly organized its defenses to withstand a siege. He now knew that a second American army of about 700 men under the command of General Benedict Arnold had come up through Maine and was at Lévis, facing Quebec. On 3 December, Montgomery's army linked with Arnold's outside the city. Within its ramparts, Carleton only had about 110 regulars, mostly from the Seventh Foot and the Royal Marines, some 200 recruits of the newly raised Royal Highland Emigrants, 80 artificers, and 460 sailors. All able-bodied men in the city were organized into companies numbering about 320 British and 580 French Canadian militiamen. In all, the city had a garrison of about 1,700 men. The Americans staged a disastrous assault in a snowstorm on 31 December in which General Montgomery was killed, Arnold wounded, and some 400 Americans captured. The siege, now more like a blockade, dragged on until May 1776, when reinforcements arrived at Quebec from England. West of Montreal, a mixed party of the Eighth Foot, Indians, and Canadian militiamen beat an American force at Cedars. After a repressive occupation and, as a final act, trying unsuccessfully to set fire to the city on 15 June, the American army retired to the state of New York.

An important decision made by the British government back in July 1775 was to split North America in two commands. Thenceforth, the Canada command under Governor Carleton was a separate, independent command from that of General Gage's, the latter comprising the thirteen colonies, Nova Scotia, and the Island of St. John. One result was that Carleton now had the power to raise units without first asking General Gage. With hundreds of persecuted Americans who remained loyal to the crown now seeking refuge in Canada from their Patriot neighbors, a number of Loyalist units were raised, the most famous being the King's Royal Regiment of New York and Butler's Rangers. Together with the aborigines, most of whom took up arms with the British, these Loyalist units raided the Americans' frontiers from Canada until the end of the war.

FRENCH CANADIAN NEUTRALITY

While some French Canadians joined the Americans or fought for the British, the vast majority remained neutral during the Revolution. They saw the conflict as a fight between their old enemies, the British and Americans, who only fifteen years earlier had invaded and ravaged parts of their homeland. And they knew better than to believe the promises made by the American Continental Congress and the kings of Britain or France. Three companies of French Canadian militia were embodied under some duress in 1777; two were part of General Burgoyne's disastrous Saratoga campaign, and the other was at the unsuccessful siege of Fort Stanwix. A new and, to the French Canadians, generally positive element was the arrival of German regiments in British pay beginning in 1776. Their officers often spoke French, they had blue or white uniforms rather than the scorned red coats, and the German soldiers were generally seen as more open and friendly than the dour British. The British government certainly noted this, and the regular garrisons in the St. Lawrence and Richelieu Valleys were eventually largely German, some five thousand being on guard by 1782. In 1778 Carleton was replaced by Sir Frederick Haldiman, a Swiss soldier fluent in French. By then, the British knew they would never enlist the French Canadians, so they did all they could to keep them neutral, and in this they succeeded.

RESISTANCE IN NOVA SCOTIA

Nova Scotia was a small colony of seventeen thousand souls in 1775. With Halifax as the main base for the Royal Navy in the North Atlantic as well as an important staging point for the army and the colony's most important city, American autonomist ideas were not entertained for long. The most serious event was an attempt by about five hundred American patriots to capture Fort Cumberland (the former French Fort Beauséjour near

latter-day Aulac, New Brunswick) in November 1776. Some two hundred Loyalists of the Royal Fencible Americans Regiment garrisoned the fort with their families, many having been among the eleven hundred refugees recently evacuated from Boston. They resisted until relief arrived on 28 December and then chased back the Americans. Otherwise, American privateers, more intent on looting than the spread of liberty, would occasionally raid small coastal towns such as Charlottetown (Island of St. John) in 1775 or Liverpool (Nova Scotia) in 1778. Local provincial troops were consequently raised in Nova Scotia, the Island of St. John, and Newfoundland to assist the British regular garrisons.

FRENCH NAVAL ATTACK

One of the most spectacular, if least written about, events in Canada during the Revolution occurred in faraway Hudson's Bay during 1782. On 8 August, the employees of the Hudson's Bay Company at Fort Prince of Wales saw three sails on the horizon that, to their utter surprise and dismay, turned out to be a French 74-gun battleship with two frigates. A 250-man-strong detachment from the Armagnac and Auxerrois regiments landed and demanded the immediate surrender of the bastioned stone fort. They were commanded by count La Pérouse, a daring sailor who was to become one of the great explorers of the Pacific. The fort surrendered, as later did those of York Factory and Severn, and all were blown up. Although the British later made light of the raid, it must have been a painful loss, as no dividends were paid to the company's shareholders for the next two years.

As a whole, the American Revolution's effect on Canada was, except for the invasion of 1775–1776, relatively minor during the course of the conflict. The real impact came at war's end, when some forty thousand Loyalists arrived in the country and forever transformed it.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Carleton, Guy; Montgomery, Richard; Paris, Treaty of (10 February 1763).*

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René Chartrand

CANADA INVASION. August 1775–October 1776. Although Ticonderoga’s capture on 10 May 1775 opened the way for an American advance into Canada and Benedict Arnold warned the Continental Congress that the British were massing their forces at St. Johns, Congress did not respond with a decision to take offensive action until 27 June. Congress believed that the inhabitants of the “fourteenth colony” would join the resistance to the London authorities if only the occupying British garrison could be neutralized. Execution of the operation fell to Major General Philip Schuyler, who commanded the Continental army’s forces in the province of New York. Unfortunately, they consisted only of four infantry regiments and one company of artillery that New York was in the process of raising, two regiments on their way from Connecticut in response, and a handful of miscellaneous units. One of the latter was the regiment to be raised from the Green Mountain Boys in modern Vermont, and Congress had only authorized it four days earlier. When all of the units assembled, Congress thought that Schuyler would have about five thousand men. But he also had to protect New York City and create from scratch the support structure to sustain an army.

Fortunately, Schuyler’s considerable experience in the French and Indian War had been in the logistics of wilderness operations. So he set about creating the New York territorial department while dispatching his second in command, Brigadier General Richard Montgomery, to take charge at Lake Champlain. This decision, which would be repeated several times during 1775, played to the two men’s strength. Montgomery had retired from the British army a few years earlier and was an experienced combat veteran. After several false starts, he occupied Ile-aux-Noix on 4 September with twelve hundred raw troops and a small, heterogeneous fleet. Schuyler joined him there, but he had to go to the rear on the 16th when his health failed. Operations against strategic St. Johns from 5 September to 2 November 1775 dragged on much longer than the Americans expected. The fall of nearby Chambly on 18 October boosted morale. During this period Ethan Allen made his abortive attack on Montreal on 25 September. Although plagued with disciplinary problems, Montgomery pushed on to take Montreal on 13 November with only token resistance. Meanwhile, the start of Arnold’s march to Quebec on 13 September opened a second front in the campaign.

CARLETON’S DEFENSIVE PLAN

Lieutenant General Guy Carleton’s command in Canada reported directly to London and remained separate from that of Gage. He was also the civil governor of Canada, which had been transferred to Britain by the Treaty of

Paris in 1763. His policies leading up to the Quebec Act of 1774 had won support from wealthy French Canadians and from the Roman Catholic bishop; the eighty thousand or so other inhabitants remained skeptical. Since his “army” had only eight hundred or so regulars, and one-third of them were in the isolated fort on the Great Lakes, Carleton looked to the militia for assistance.


On 9 June 1775 Carleton had declared martial law, and on 6 September he issued an order to mobilize one-tenth of the militia in each parish. The farmers in most districts simply refused to obey the orders or follow the officers he had appointed. While the Americans struggled to organize an invasion, Carleton decided that his only hope of success would come if he concentrated as much strength as possible in the forward forts to give his deputy time to get the walled city of Quebec ready. He gambled that this strategy would string things out until the harsh Canadian winter stopped the Americans. Come spring, he knew, fresh troops would arrive from Britain. The stand at St. Johns cost him half of his regulars but won precious weeks. Carleton might have been more active in calling for support from the Indians, but like many other experienced officials, he knew that unleashing them would also harden American resolve.

SIEGE OF QUEBEC

The fall of Montreal (13 November) shifted the battlefield to Quebec. Arnold’s expedition reached the St. Lawrence opposite the city on 9 November; storms prevented him from crossing for several more days. During the interval, one last convoy made it upriver with about eighty Highland veterans to assist Lieutenant Governor Hector Cramahé. Carleton would arrive from the west on the 19th aboard an armed schooner with news that Montgomery’s American army was on the way.

Lieutenant Colonel Allen McLean, the commander of the newly arrived Royal Highland Emigrants, took over the day-to-day organization of the city’s defense. On paper, about 1,200 men were available, but that included 200 English-speaking and 300 French Canadian militia of dubious reliability, 37 marines, and 345 sailors brought ashore from the ships in the harbor. The advent of winter froze the St. Lawrence and enabled the British to leave skeleton crews on the frigate *Lizard* (twenty-eight guns), the sloop-of-war *Hunter* (sixteen guns), four smaller armed vessels, and two transports.

Arnold’s seven hundred men outside the walls could only set up a blockade on the land side; they lacked artillery and ammunition to do anything more. Arnold tried to bluff MacLean into surrender, but MacLean did not bite; instead, he burned houses near the walls that might provide the Americans cover and lobbed eighteen-pound shot out. Early on 19 November, Arnold fell back



to avoid an expected sortie. He stopped and camped at Pointe aux Trembles (modern Neuville), twenty miles up the river. Two weeks later, on 2 December, Montgomery arrived and assumed command. He brought only three

hundred more infantry, raising the American strength to about one thousand. But he had artillery and a good supply of ammunition, food, and—of much more immediate interest to Arnold's threadbare survivors of

the wilderness—a year's supply of British clothing captured from the Seventh and Twenty-sixth Foot.

On 5 December the Americans reoccupied positions outside the gates of Quebec. Although the defenders outnumbered him and had the further advantage of fortifications, Montgomery had to risk taking Quebec by assault before he lost many of his men upon expiration of their enlistments. This operation, on 31 December 1775 and 1 January 1776, resulted in a brave but costly defeat in which Montgomery was killed and Arnold badly wounded.

THE RETREAT

With about six hundred men—including Canadians and friendly Caughnawaga Indians—Arnold kept up the blockade and called for a veteran general and fresh troops to renew the attack. Brigadier General David Wooster was holding Montreal, Chambly, and St. Johns with fewer than six hundred men and had no troops to spare. (A British regiment was still in the Great Lakes region, and the Indian threat was ever present.) General Schuyler could offer no assistance from Albany, being occupied with Loyalist uprisings in the Mohawk Valley. Arnold's emissary, Edward Antil, continued on to Philadelphia, where Congress voted on 19 January 1776 to send reinforcements to Canada. Washington had only learned of the disaster two days earlier. Despite his own problems of holding together enough troops for the Boston siege, he proposed that seven hundred of the militia ordered to augment him be diverted to Canada. But he refused requests from Congress and Schuyler to detach Continentals until April, when the British had evacuated Boston and he shifted his own operations to New York City. Then he sent four of his regiments north.

Wooster joined Arnold at Quebec on 2 April and took command of a force that now numbered two thousand. Arnold, who had been promoted to brigadier general on 10 January but was still hobbled by his wound, went to take command at Montreal. When Major General John Thomas reached Quebec on 1 May, he assumed command of an army that had been built up to twenty-five hundred, only to be reduced by death, discharges, and desertions to nineteen hundred; more ominously, smallpox had appeared and not enough time remained to try inoculation, a preventive measure still feared by most Americans. During May, more units started flowing in from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York and Brigadier General William Thompson had reached Fort George with the regiments from Washington (two thousand strong, including a company of riflemen and another of artificers). By the time they all assembled, almost seven thousand American troops would be in Canada. In addition, Congress sent a special committee, composed of Benjamin Franklin, Charles Carroll, and Samuel Chase,

that reached Montreal 29 April to try and persuade the Canadians to form a government and send delegates to Philadelphia.

Despite the apparent absurdity of their posture—500 effectives, on the end of a long line of communications, besieging a walled city of 5,000 inhabitants garrisoned by 1,600 armed men supported by 148 cannon and several ships—the Americans lasted through the winter. But when the spring thaw opened up the St. Lawrence, the inevitable British relief convoy arrived. Thomas got word that it was coming on 2 May but could do nothing about it and started moving forces upriver. Carleton had only a few of them land and on the 6th led nine hundred troops and four guns out of the city. Thomas's rear guard fell back but had to leave behind two hundred sick, cannon, supplies, and even headquarters records. Carleton did not pursue, but waited for the rest of the ships to work their way to Quebec. The reinforcements under Major General John Burgoyne brought Carleton's total to about thirteen thousand men, including forty-three hundred Germans from Brunswick and Hesse-Hanau.

The American retreat halted at Deschambault, forty miles up the St. Lawrence, to regroup. Thomas then fell back to Sorel (arriving on 17 May), having been harassed on the way by British marines and naval gunfire. To further complicate matters, smallpox reached epidemic proportions. Thomas died of the disease on 2 June, and Congress recalled Wooster four days later. Command passed to Major General John Sullivan on 1 June, when he reached St. Johns and found Thompson's column.

Although the Americans had suffered a humiliating setback at The Cedars, the arrival of fresh troops and adequate supplies raised expectations. But the dream of Canada joining the United Colonies ended in the defeat of this last field force at Trois Rivières on 8 June.

CARLETON'S COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Sullivan had no alternative but to order a retreat to Lake Champlain. He and the bulk of his troops (about twenty-five hundred) evacuated Sorel on 14 June; lead elements of the British convoy arrived an hour after his last bateau left. Arnold and the small Montreal garrison escaped across the river to Longueuil on 9 June and withdrew to St. Johns. He then took charge of the rear guard while crowded bateaux evacuated the rest of the troops and as much matériel as possible. The last of Sullivan's men reached Ile aux Noix on 19 June and were further crippled by an outbreak of what was probably dysentery. The last of the Americans straggled into Crown Point on 2 July, ten months after Montgomery had set out to liberate Canada. They left five thousand casualties in Canada; another three thousand were hospital cases, and the remaining five thousand were in bad shape. On 17 June,

Congress had ordered Major General Horatio Gates to take command of the troops in Canada. Since Schuyler was still at his headquarters in Albany and Sullivan was with the troops at Crown Point, there was a question as to which of these officers Gates was succeeding. On 8 July, Congress clarified its instructions, and Gates—who was junior in seniority—became Schuyler's second in command. Despite the objection of many subordinate officers, Schuyler, Gates, and Sullivan decided in a council of war at Crown Point on 5 July to abandon the extensive works at Crown Point and concentrate their defense at Ticonderoga, where logistical problems were easier to solve. More Continentals and a force of mobilized militia came up to bolster the defenses.

Carleton paused at St. Johns until 4 October in order to build a fleet. Despite his numerical advantage over Schuyler, he could not advance until he had built a fleet capable of winning control of Lake Champlain. The Americans understood that same vital point and raced to augment their own squadron. Arnold took command of the American vessels, which were manned by army troops, not by Continental navy seamen, and took up patrolling the north end of the lake. The squadrons clashed in the Battle of Valcour Island on 11 October 1776. Arnold and his men put up a game fight against a superior force and then slipped away under the cover of darkness. A running fight consumed the next two days as the British caught up with the American vessels one by one. Most beached before they could be captured, and the crews got away. The Americans lost control of the lake, but the decimated fleet had bought the same precious time that the defenders of St. Johns had won the previous fall. Carleton took a look at Fort Ticonderoga but withdrew when he realized that winter would come before he could break through.

SIGNIFICANCE

Time turned out to be the critical commodity in the Canadian campaign. In 1775 it ran out for the Americans; in 1776 it ran out for the British. In each case the defenders benefited from the fact that winter snow and ice trumped the transportation of the era.

It is interesting that many historians, including Lynn Montross in *Reluctant Rebels* (1950), tend to consider the Canada invasion as a useless frittering away of men, money, and supplies that could have been better used for defense. Others, including John Fortescue, see the seeds of Burgoyne's disaster at Saratoga in London's overconfidence brought about by Carleton's easy victories in 1776. Both are probably too harsh. Carleton received a knighthood for the defense of Quebec. And while Canada did not become the fourteenth state, the First and Second Canadian Regiments did become the equivalent of a fourteenth state line, and

after consolidation on 1 January 1781 they served until the end of the war, including participation at Yorktown.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Arnold's March to Quebec; Boston Siege; Burgoyne, John; Canada in the Revolution; Canada, Congressional Committee to; Carleton, Guy; Cedars, The; Chambly, Canada; Gates, Horatio; Montgomery, Richard; Montreal (25 September 1775); Paris, Treaty of (10 February 1763); Quebec (Canada Invasion); Quebec Act; Saratoga Surrender; Saratoga, First Battle of; Saratoga, Second Battle of; Schuyler, Philip John; St. Johns, Canada (5 September–2 November 1775); Sullivan, John; Trois Rivières; Valcour Island.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

CANADA INVASION (PLANNED).

1778. During the struggle for control of the Continental Army known as the Conway Cabal, the new Board of War planned to follow up on General John Burgoyne's defeat by launching an "irruption" (invasion) into Canada. The Board deliberately ignored Washington when making its decision and did not even tell him until late January 1778. On 22 January Congress approved the Board's decision and named Major General the marquis de Lafayette as the commander, with Brigadier General Thomas Conway as second-in-command. The Board felt that using both a Frenchman and an Irish veteran of the French army would attract support from the French Canadians, but it also assumed that Lafayette would be a mere figurehead and that Conway, its ally, would pull the strings. That assumption was a fatal mistake. Although Lafayette was young and had been only a captain in the French army, he came from the court nobility, unparalleled masters of intrigue and power politics. He promptly informed Congress that he would accept the command only if the orders were to come from Washington and General Johann De Kalb replace Conway, implying dire consequences if Congress did not comply. Not only would he go home, he would take all the other French volunteers with him, and inform his father-in-law (the duc d'Ayen) that the king should be urged to send no more aid. While the cabal quickly collapsed, Lafayette went to Albany to take charge

Canadian Regiment, First

of the operation. There he found that neither the supplies nor the troops had been assembled and that the invasion could not work because the British were prepared. On his recommendation, Congress canceled the operation.

SEE ALSO *Conway Cabal; Lafayette, Marquis de.*

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CANADIAN REGIMENT, FIRST. On 20 November 1775, Brigadier General Richard Montgomery authorized James Livingston, a New-York-born merchant then living near Chambly, Quebec, to raise a force of Canadians for the Continental service. The unit was to consist of eight companies, but probably was never recruited to full strength. The Canadians participated in the assault on Quebec (31 December 1775, at St. John's Gate) but they did not distinguish themselves. Livingston led his remaining troops in the retreat from Canada, after which Congress gave him permission to recruit in New York, in part among pro-American refugees from Quebec. The regiment remained with the Northern army in 1776 and through 1777, participating in the battles of Saratoga in September and October of that year. Reorganized into five small companies in 1778, it served in the Hudson Highlands for two years, until 1 January 1781, when its remaining personnel were absorbed into Moses Hazen's Second Canadian Regiment and Livingston retired.

SEE ALSO *Canadian Regiment (Second); Saratoga, First Battle of.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

CANADIAN REGIMENT, SECOND. Massachusetts-born Moses Hazen was an effective and brutal captain of rangers during the final French and Indian war (1759–1760), after which he settled in Montreal. Not immediately pro-American at the outset of the Canada invasion, he soon chose the American side and, after serving at the siege of Quebec city, was sent to Philadelphia to persuade Congress to reinforce the

American army in Canada. Congress commissioned him as a colonel of the Second Canadian Regiment on 22 January 1776, and sent him back to Canada to recruit his regiment. The regiment, recruited first in Quebec and, after the American retreat, among Canadian refugees at Albany and Fishkill, New York, was organized on a unique scheme of four-battalions with five-companies-per-battalion scheme that echoed French practice. It fought at Staten Island, Brandywine, Germantown, and Yorktown, and earned a reputation for its staunch fighting qualities. Created by Congress independent of any state regimental line, and thereby deprived of any state's support, the regiment was nicknamed "Congress's Own" and "Hazen's Own." It absorbed James Livingston's small First Canadian Regiment in early 1781 and remained in service until the men were furloughed in June 1783. The regiment was formally disbanded in November 1783.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion; Canadian Regiment (First); Hazen, Moses.*

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CANAJOHARIE SETTLEMENTS, NEW YORK. 1–2 August 1780. The principal fortification in this part of the Mohawk Valley was Fort Plank, a three-story blockhouse of heavy timbers surrounded by earthworks and located on a plain overlooking the village that became Fort Plain. On 6 June Colonel Peter Gansevoort occupied Fort Plank with his regiment in preparation for escorting supplies from there to Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler). Joseph Brant, whose presence in the area caused patriot authorities to prescribe special precautions, spread rumors that he intended not only to attack the convoy but also to attack Fort Stanwix. As a result, strength was drawn from the settlements and Fort Plank to reinforce Stanwix and protect the westbound convoy. Brant then entered Canajoharie unopposed from the east and destroyed fifty-three dwellings, an equal number of barns, a church, and a mill. His forces killed sixteen inhabitants who had not fled with the rest to Fort Plank, Fort Clyde, and other strong points, and captured fifty. An estimated three hundred head of livestock were killed or carried away. Because his object was pillage and destruction—after the model of John Sullivan's expedition—Brant did not waste his strength in attacking the forts. Canajoharie had been the home of Brant's mother when the Mohawk leader

controlled the region. It was also at this site, on June 30 1779, that the Patriots hanged Lieutenant Rolf Hare and Sergeant Gilbert Newbury of Butler's Rangers for their roles in the Cherry Valley massacre.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Brant, Joseph; Cherry Valley Massacre, New York; Fort Stanwix, New York; Mohawk Valley, New York; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

CANE CREEK, NORTH CAROLINA.

12 September 1780. In the Loyalist invasion of western North Carolina that preceded the Battle of Kings Mountain, Major Patrick Ferguson pushed some twenty-two miles north of Gilbert Town (later Rutherfordton), North Carolina. A skirmish with rebel militia at Cane Creek, near the home of Colonel John Walker, produced a few casualties before the rebels withdrew. Ferguson took about a dozen prisoners, whom he released on parole before he started the movements that led to his annihilation at Kings Mountain. By a strange coincidence another action took place almost exactly a year later at another Cane Creek in North Carolina (also known as Lindley's Mill) on 13 September 1781.

SEE ALSO *Kings Mountain, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CANE CREEK, NORTH CAROLINA

SEE *Hillsboro Raid, North Carolina.*

CANISTER. An artillery projectile consisting of a can (canister) packed with small round shot that scatter—shotgun fashion—when the projectile leaves the muzzle. It was used at close range against personnel. It should not be confused with grape or with shrapnel, a type of projectile in which the shot is scattered by a time fuse after the projectile leaves the gun.

SEE ALSO *Grape or Grapeshot.*

Mark M. Boatner

CAPE ST. VINCENT, PORTUGAL.

16 January 1781. Naval victory of Admiral George Brydges Rodney over the Spanish squadron of Admiral Don Juan de Langara.

SEE ALSO *Rodney, George Bridges.*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

CARCASS. An incendiary projectile used for setting fire to buildings or ships. Of doubtful etymology.

Mark M. Boatner

CARLETON, CHRISTOPHER.

(c. 1743–1787). British officer. Nephew and brother-in-law of Sir Guy Carleton and the latter's aide-de-camp, Christopher Carleton became a lieutenant in the Thirty-first Foot on 29 July 1763. In 1771 he married Anne, daughter of the earl of Effingham, and sister of Sir Guy's wife.

Carleton was promoted to captain on 25 May 1772. After leading the initial movement of General John Burgoyne's offensive up Lake Champlain, Carleton was promoted to major of the Twenty-ninth Foot on 14 September 1777. The next year he was operating as a spy in the Mohawk Valley and led "Carleton's Raid," as it is known, down Lake Champlain. The raid was accounted a success for its destruction of some 100 structures. In addition, his men carried out the burning of crops and the slaughter of livestock that could have been used to support an American invasion of Canada. Carleton accomplished these ends in just three weeks.

Carleton led a raid that captured Fort George on 11 October 1780, then went on to attack Ballston, 12 miles north of Albany. These latter actions were carried out as a part of the so-called "border warfare" then being carried out. On 19 February 1783 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. He died at Quebec in 1787.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Burgoyne's Offensive; Carleton, Guy.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CARLETON, GUY. (1724–1808). British general, governor of Canada, commander in chief at New York (May 1782 to December 1783). Born in Strabane, Ireland, Guy Carleton was a member of an old Anglo-Irish



Guy Carleton. *The British general and governor of Canada, in an engraving by Alexander Hays Ritchie. © CORBIS.*

family in the Protestant ascendancy. He is best remembered for his abilities as a general and statesman, and for his cold and aloof personality. Through family connections, he and his brothers, William and Thomas, gained valuable early political patronage from William Conolly, a member of the Irish parliament.

EARLY MILITARY CAREER

On 21 May 1741, Carleton enrolled as an ensign in the Twenty-fifth Regiment, known as Lord Rothes' regiment in honor of its colonel, Major General John Leslie, Earl of Rothes. He was promoted lieutenant in the same regiment on 1 May 1745. In 1747, during the War of the Austrian Succession, he served on the European continent as aide-de-camp to the duke of Cumberland and was involved in the fighting for Bergen op Zoom, in the Netherlands. He was commissioned a lieutenant in the First Foot Guards on 22 July 1751. In early 1753, upon the recommendation of his friend James Wolfe, he became military tutor of Charles Lennox, third duke of Richmond. He used the Duke's patronage to secure promotion to lieutenant colonel of the First Foot Guards on 18 June 1757.

In early 1758, Carleton was chosen by General Jeffery Amherst to join a military expedition against Louisbourg, on Cape Breton Island in New France. King George II

refused to confirm this appointment, however, because Carleton had made disparaging remarks about Hanoverian troops. Instead, Carleton spent the summer of 1758 as an aide-de-camp to Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel in central Europe. Also in 1758 he was chosen lieutenant colonel of the Seventy-second Regiment by its colonel, the duke of Richmond. In early 1759, when Wolfe organized his campaign against Quebec, Carleton was commissioned quartermaster general of the army, with the local rank of colonel. The king once again protested, but Wolfe finally prevailed upon the stubborn monarch to relent.

In the campaign, Carleton distinguished himself as quartermaster, military engineer, and commander of an elite corps of grenadiers. Fighting bravely in the battle of the Plains of Abraham on 14 September while leading his grenadiers, he was wounded in the head, and his friend Wolfe was killed. Carleton returned to England in November 1759. In March 1761 he served as local brigadier general in an expedition against Belle Isle, off the French coast, and was again wounded. Promoted to colonel on 19 February 1762, he joined the earl of Albemarle as quartermaster general in the conquest of Havana with the local rank of brigadier general. On 22 July he was wounded for the third time while leading a successful assault upon a Spanish fortification.

GOVERNOR OF QUEBEC

By the age of 38, Carleton had made an impressive military record, through shrewd use of patronage and because of his own martial abilities. He had served in three theaters of war, been wounded three times, held important ranks, and secured a permanent colonelcy. On 7 April 1766 he was appointed lieutenant governor of Quebec, although effectively he acted as governor from the outset, replacing the nominal governor, James Murray, who had been called home. Carleton was officially appointed governor on 12 April 1768. On 21 August 1766 he sailed into New York, where he consulted with General Thomas Gage, commander in chief of North America. He then traveled to Quebec, arriving on 22 September and taking the oath of office two days later. On 3 October he was appointed brigadier general in America. Immediately, Carleton asserted control over the members of his council and began governing more or less independently. When challenged in these actions, he was supported by his superiors in London: Henry Seymour Conway, secretary of state for the Southern Department; Charles Lennox, duke of Richmond, who succeeded Conway; and Lords Wills Hill, Viscount Hillsborough and William Legge, earl of Dartmouth.

As governor, Carleton paid particular attention to the fur trade, which was a staple of the Canadian economy. He battled without success to eliminate the fee system that was used to pay government officials, and he worked to improve

the defenses of Quebec. From the outset he befriended the French Canadians, protecting them, he declared, against English “commercial adventurers,” who had descended upon Quebec like a cloud of locusts. In 1767, when Parliament began studying plans for the reorganization of Quebec’s government, Carleton advocated retention of the French cultural and legal heritage in the St. Lawrence River valley. He returned to England in 1770 to present his views on these and other matters. On 12 April 1772 he was appointed colonel of the Forty-seventh Regiment, and on 12 May he was promoted to major general. He married Lady Mary Howard on 22 May 1772 and together they had eleven children. In 1774, Parliament enacted the Quebec Act, which incorporated most of Carleton’s recommendations. On 18 September 1774 he returned to Quebec, where he was greeted warmly by the populace.

THE AMERICAN WAR

Immediately, Carleton was confronted with growing discontents against Britain by the lower thirteen colonies, and had to face the possibility of an American invasion of his own province. Part of the discontent was due to the Americans’ hatred of the Quebec Act. Asked by General Gage to dispatch the Tenth and Fifty-second Regiments to Boston, he acquiesced, although he was left with only two regiments to defend Canada. He would rue his haste in the following year. He attempted to organize the old French citizens into militia units, but most of the *habitants* remained neutral. He refused to use Indian allies, considering native warriors to be unreliable in civilized warfare. In the fall of 1775, the anticipated American invasion came, with General Richard Montgomery seizing Montreal on 13 November. Carleton, who had established his headquarters in that city, was driven down the St. Lawrence River toward Quebec. In the meantime Benedict Arnold approached Quebec through Maine.

Carleton reached Quebec on 19 November, just before Arnold surrounded the city, and he prepared the citizens for a winter siege while awaiting reinforcements from Britain. On the evening of 31 December, he repulsed an American attempt to capture the city under cover of a blowing snowstorm from the northeast. Montgomery was killed, along with 51 of his fellow rebels; Arnold and 36 Americans were wounded; and 387 Americans fell into Carleton’s hands as prisoners.

Although the rebel army was reinforced and maintained the siege until spring, Carleton and his garrison were rescued on 6 May 1776 by the arrival of the expected troops from England. Carleton learned at that time that he had been promoted general in America on 1 January 1776. He began a campaign to drive the Americans from Canada, culminating in the successful battle of Trois Rivières on 8 June. His strategy was to allow the rebels to escape, and even to release prisoners of war, in hopes that

he might induce them to renew their loyalty to the Crown. Some of his officers thought this policy delusional. On 6 July 1776 he was given the Red Ribbon of a Knight of the Bath for his successful defense of Quebec.

After the Americans had escaped from Canada, Carleton lacked the necessary shipping to pursue them up Lake Champlain toward Fort Ticonderoga. Therefore, he paused for three months in the summer of 1776 to prepare a fleet for operations on Lake Champlain. He moved a number of small warships up the St. Lawrence and Richelieu Rivers, dismantled them, and then rebuilt them at St. Johns. He was promoted lieutenant general on 29 August 1776. On 5 October he sailed southward to engage an American flotilla commanded by Arnold. He attacked and destroyed the enemy vessels on 11 and 12 October at Valcour Bay, then pushed on toward Fort Ticonderoga. After reconnoitering that post on 27 October he decided that it was too strong to assault, and that the season was too far advanced to continue the campaign. Hence, he withdrew his army into Canada and began preparations for operations in the following summer.

Lord George Germain, who had been appointed colonial secretary on 10 November 1775, was dismayed when he heard of Carleton’s decision. Germain already believed that Carleton had mishandled the defense of Quebec and had been too lackadaisical in his pursuit of the rebels to Fort Ticonderoga. Hence, in early 1777, Germain appointed General John Burgoyne to replace Carleton as commander of British forces in Canada during the following year’s campaign. On 6 May 1777 Carleton welcomed the first ship of the year from England to Quebec, and learned of Burgoyne’s appointment. Hurt and angry, Carleton wrote Germain on 27 June, resigning as governor of Canada and asking to be relieved. His replacement, Lieutenant General Frederick Haldimand, did not arrive until 28 June 1778, so Carleton remained in Canada during Burgoyne’s operations in the summer of 1777. Following the instructions he received from the government, Carleton supported Burgoyne, and was not blamed by officials in London when Burgoyne was defeated at Saratoga on 17 October. Carleton returned home in July 1778.

On 18 February 1782 Carleton was appointed commander in chief in America, replacing Sir Henry Clinton. Lord Charles Cornwallis had surrendered at Yorktown on 19 October 1781, and the war against America was coming to an end. Because of his administrative experience, Carleton was selected by King George III to handle sensitive matters relating to the evacuation of British troops and Loyalists from the United States. Along with Admiral Robert Digby, he was appointed a peace commissioner. He accepted these commissions with the understanding that the government supported his intention to persuade

the Americans, even at this late date, to remain within the empire. He landed at New York on 6 May 1782, and immediately was embroiled in financial matters and acrimony between Loyalist and Patriot militias. He was dismayed in August to learn that Britain was granting independence to the United States. Angrily he attempted to resign his commission, but was persuaded to remain and effect the Loyalist and troop withdrawals. In the next few months, he dispatched 30,000 troops and 27,000 refugees from America. Many of the refugees went to Canada. He departed New York on 5 December 1783.

GOVERNOR OF QUEBEC AGAIN

In London, Carleton was feted by the king and politicians, and his advice was sought on how to accommodate the large influx of Loyalists into Canada. Following his suggestions, new provinces were created and a new office of governor-general was established. Baron Sydney, secretary of state for home affairs, wanted to appoint Carleton to the new post, but Carleton agreed to accept only if he were given a barony in return. After months of resistance, Sydney relented in September 1785. On 21 April 1786 Carleton was created first baron of Dorchester, and on 23 October he arrived in Quebec.

Carleton's second administration was not as successful as his first, for he was burdened with problems beyond his, or perhaps anyone's, ability to master. He continued to advocate the interests of the old French inhabitants, but he also sympathized with the new Loyalist community. Finally in 1791 he supported Parliament's division of Quebec into Lower Canada, largely French-speaking, and Upper Canada, mostly English-speaking. On leave in England from 1791 to 1793, he was promoted general on 12 October 1793.

Back in Quebec, Dorchester (as Carleton was now called) dealt successfully with problems caused by the French Revolution. He was less successful in his relations with John Graves Simcoe, lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada. He seemed to go out of his way to frustrate and anger Simcoe, his able subordinate, during the next few years. He also aggravated diplomatic and military tensions between Britain and the United States. Adopting a condescending and truculent tone toward the United States in 1794, he appeared to be trying to provoke an incident between Americans and Britain's Indian allies in the Northwest Territory. When the American government complained to London, Dorchester was mildly scolded by Thomas Dundas, the home secretary. Angrily, Dorchester requested permission to resign, and in May 1796 Robert Prescott replaced him. Dorchester sailed for England on 9 July, but was shipwrecked on Île de Anticosti, near the mouth of the St. Lawrence River. No one was killed or injured. Resuming his voyage, he reached home on 19 September.

A PROUD LEGACY

In his final years, Dorchester lived the life of a country gentleman, keeping up his interest in things military. In 1790 he had been appointed colonel of the Fifteenth Dragoons. On 18 March 1801 he became colonel of the Seventeenth Light Dragoons, and on 14 August 1803 colonel of the Fourth Dragoons. Upon his death on 10 November 1808, his wife carried out his wish to destroy all his personal papers.

A man of stern rectitude, Dorchester was intensely loyal to King and country. He vindicated the trust of his many supporters by performing bravely and excellently as a soldier. He also was a capable administrator, and as governor of Canada he laid the groundwork for a New French Canadian–Loyalist immigrant polity in British North America. Although he seemed to lose his grip on government in the 1780s, nevertheless his policies became a model for other British imperial governors. He was one of the great soldier-statesmen of early British Canada.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict.*

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revised by Paul David Nelson

CARLETON, THOMAS. (1735?–1815). British army officer and colonial governor. Thomas Carleton, youngest brother to Sir Guy Carleton, was born

in Ireland. He became an ensign in the Twentieth Foot in 1753, lieutenant by 1756, and captain in 1759. He fought in Europe during the Seven Years' War and afterwards toured to watch other armies in action. By November 1775, during the war of American Independence, when he became quartermaster general to his brother Guy in Canada, he had been made a lieutenant colonel in the Nineteenth Foot.

Thomas was wounded at Valcour Island (in Lake Champlain) and led the Indian canoe-borne advance up Lake Champlain in September 1776. He remained in Canada after his brother's departure and became increasingly critical of the British government's handling of the war. In 1782 he was promoted to the rank of colonel and in 1784, after two others had declined it, he was appointed governor of New Brunswick, Ontario. He served there for nineteen years. He was made major general in 1793 and lieutenant general in 1803. He died in England on 2 February 1817.

SEE ALSO *Valcour Island*.

revised by John Oliphant

CARLETON–GERMAIN FEUD. The personal animosity between Guy Carleton, governor of Canada, and George Sackville Germain, Britain's secretary of American affairs, began with Carleton's hostile testimony against Germain during the inquiry of the latter's conduct at the Battle of Minden of 1 August 1759. Their feud mattered, as Carleton and Germain held their posts for most of the Revolution. Carleton's failure to take Ticonderoga in the fall of 1776 turned the king against Carleton and led to John Burgoyne's appointment as commander of the expedition from Canada in 1777. Germain seized the opportunity to kill whatever chances Carleton might have had for further advancement, going so far as to attribute the Trenton disaster to Carleton's "supineness" in not attacking Ticonderoga. Carleton was so disgusted by the lack of support from the London government owing, as he saw it, to Germain's interference, that he resigned his position in 1778 and returned to England, where he could more effectively snipe at Germain. Despite constant derision from members of Parliament, Germain held on to his office until 1782. As Germain's reputation collapsed, Carleton's rose, being named commander-in-chief of British forces in North America on 2 March 1782. He acquitted himself well in directing the withdrawal of British troops from the United States and upon his return home in late 1783 received a very handsome annual pension of £1000.

SEE ALSO *Carleton, Guy; Germain, George Sackville; Ticonderoga Raid*.

revised by Michael Bellesisles

CAROLINA GAMECOCK. Nickname of Thomas Sumter.

SEE ALSO *Sumter, Thomas*.

CARPENTER'S HOUSE, NEW YORK
SEE *Jamaica (Brookland), New York*.

CARRINGTON, EDWARD. (1748–1810). Continental officer, General Nathanael Greene's quartermaster general. Virginia. A man who deserves to be better remembered for his varied services in the Continental army, Edward Carrington was born in Goochland County, Virginia, on 11 February 1748, and served on its Patriot County Committee in 1775 and 1776. He was commissioned as a lieutenant colonel of artillery in Colonel Charles Harrison's First Continental Artillery Regiment when this unit was activated on 30 November 1776. Carrington distinguished himself at the battle of Monmouth, in May 1778, where his guns were posted with the left wing of General William Alexander (Lord Stirling), playing a crucial role in preventing an American defeat. In March 1780 he served with General Arthur St. Clair and Alexander Hamilton as commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. Carrington commanded the three batteries that marched south with de Kalb, along with other Virginia artillery units that had been sent earlier to reinforce Lincoln. When Colonel Harrison unexpectedly joined De Kalb in North Carolina he superseded Carrington.

When General Horatio Gates reached de Kalb's headquarters (25 July 1780), or soon thereafter, he sent Carrington on a reconnaissance mission along the Roanoke and Dan Rivers that proved of great value in General Nathanael Greene's ingenious campaign of maneuver against General Charles Cornwallis' army. General Henry Lee praised Carrington for performing his "duty with much intelligence."

Carrington rejoined the army just two days before its concentration at Guilford Court-House, 7 Feb. 1781, where he served both as an artillery commander and as Greene's quartermaster general. Lee again praised Carrington for a brilliant job: "[W]ithout a single dollar in the military chest . . . he contrived, by his method, his zeal, and his

indefatigable industry, to give promptitude to our movements, as well as accuracy and punctuality” (Lee, p. 250).

Carrington repeatedly served double duty as an active officer, joining Colonel Otho Williams’s rearguard action in delaying Cornwallis’s pursuit of Greene’s army, and personally supervising the crossing of the Dan River. Soon thereafter, Carrington brought forward the artillery and some much-needed provisions just in time for the battle of Hobkirk’s Hill, which took place on 25 April 1781. When Greene’s army withdrew into an area of prominent ridges known as the High Hills of Santee (South Carolina) in July 1781, he granted Carrington’s request to return to General George Washington’s army to succeed Colonel Thomas Proctor as commander of the Fourth Continental Artillery Regiment. Carrington commanded this artillery regiment during the Yorktown Campaign.

After the surrender of Cornwallis, Carrington reverted to his post of quartermaster general, having been passed over for promotion in the artillery. On Greene’s instructions, he went to Philadelphia to see Robert Morris about getting supplies for the southern army. In this assignment he was successful, and Morris made funds available to Greene for the purchase of food and clothing. Carrington rejoined Greene in the summer of 1782, and served as his quartermaster general until the end of the war.

The Virginia legislature selected Carrington as one of its representatives to the last Continental Congress, which met from 1786 to 1788, whereupon Washington appointed him to the post of federal marshal for the state of Virginia. Carrington was foreman of the jury that acquitted Aaron Burr of treason in 1807. He died almost exactly three years later, at the age of 61. Carrington’s organizational skills and his ability to acquire and move supplies and munitions kept Greene’s hard-pressed army in the field throughout the vital Southern campaign. Perhaps his epitaph should be the words of Nathanael Greene: “Nobody ever heard of a quartermaster, in history.”

SEE ALSO *Burr, Aaron; Williams, Otho Holland.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

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Jesuits. Afterwards he studied law at Bourges, in France, and at London’s Middle Temple, returning to Maryland in 1765. He lived on his 10,000-acre estate, which he called Carrollton. A Catholic, he was prohibited by British law from professional participation in public life on account of his religion, but that prohibition did not keep Carroll quiet. His first disagreements with the Crown came over the tax that supported the Church of England and the laws which forbade Catholics their own schools and denied them the vote in Maryland. Carroll wrote a series of refutations of the government’s stand on the Established Church between January and July of 1773. He became known and respected in the colony as a result of this. In December 1774 he joined the committee of correspondence, and in 1775 he became a member of the committee of safety. He attended the revolutionary convention at Annapolis from December 1775 to January 1776, and was one of the commissioners to Canada. He sat in the Maryland convention in 1776 and was sent to the Continental Congress, where he was the only Catholic to sign the Declaration of Independence. A member of the Board of War, he continued in Congress until 1778. He was one of the writers of the conservative Maryland constitution of 1776, and was a member of its first senate. He was an ardent Federalist, although he did not accept election to the Constitutional Convention. He was elected as the first U.S. senator under the new Constitution (1789–1792) while serving continuously in the state senate until he resigned in 1800. Owning hundreds of slaves and between seventy and eighty thousand acres in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, Carroll was considered the wealthiest man in the United States when he died on 14 November 1832, the last surviving signer of the Declaration of Independence.

SEE ALSO *Canada, Congressional Committee to.*

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
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CARS, GEORGIA SEE *Kettle Creek, Georgia.*

CARTER, JOHN CHAMPE. (1758–1826). Continental officer. Virginia. John Champe Carter held the rank of ensign of the Seventh Virginia



Carter Family of Virginia. THE GALE GROUP.

Regiment from 18 March 1776 until he resigned on 13 January 1777. On 30 October 1777 he became a captain of the First Continental Artillery. After the British took Charleston, Carter was part of the hasty retreat of those who were not included in the surrender of General Benjamin Lincoln. Carter was charged with not bringing his guns into action at Waxhaws, North Carolina, on 29 May 1780, when Colonel Banastre Tarleton caught up with and defeated the fleeing Americans. Taken prisoner at Waxhaws, Carter remained a prisoner until the end of the war. He became brevet major on 30 September 1783.

SEE ALSO *Waxhaws, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CARTER FAMILY OF VIRGINIA. The sons of Robert "King" Carter were not distinguished, but the descendants of his five daughters included three Signers, two governors, and two presidents.

SEE ALSO *Braxton, Carter; Harrison, Benjamin; Nelson, Thomas.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

CARTRIDGE BOXES. Military smoothbore muskets were loaded using pre-packaged paper cartridges containing a powder charge and lead ball, or a ball with several smaller shot, known as "Buck Shott and Ball." To carry these cartridges, soldiers were issued a leather cartridge (cartouche) box or pouch, enclosing a wooden block pierced with holes in which ammunition was inserted. The terms "box" and "pouch" signified two different items. A box referred to a cartridge container worn on a waist belt, often only a wooden block with a simple leather covering. Cartridge pouches were carried on a belt worn over the left shoulder, hanging on the soldier's right hip. Pouches were usually more substantial than cartridge boxes and held more rounds. Tin cartridge canisters, watertight with a thirty-six-round capacity, were first issued to American troops in 1777 as a reserve container. From 1778 onwards, American tin canisters were often issued when leather pouches were unavailable.

The common campaign allotment was forty rounds of ammunition for Continental troops and sixty for British soldiers, with extra rounds carried in knapsacks or coat pockets. The several variants of cartridge box and pouch carried as few as nine rounds and as many as thirty-six. Beginning in 1778 the Continental army began making a "new model," also known as "new Constructed," pouch, a copy of the better-designed British twenty-nine-hole pouch.

Early war American cartridge pouches were notorious for their poor construction. The Battle of the Clouds

(White Horse Tavern) on 16 September 1777 was cut short by a severe storm: “the Violence of the Rain was so lasting that . . . the Rebels had not a single Cartridge in their Pouches but was Wet, the [British] Light Inf[antr]y Accoutrements being mostly Rebel were in the same Situation” (Journal, p. 37).

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John U. Rees

CASTLE WILLIAM. Castle William, named for King William III, was the fortification on Castle Island that was the principal inner defense of Boston Harbor. Garrisoned by a small company of provincial soldiers before the arrival of British troops in September 1768, it was demolished when the British evacuated Boston in March 1776. The site is no longer an island, having been connected to the town of Dorchester with landfill in the nineteenth century.

SEE ALSO *Boston Garrison; Boston Siege*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

CASUALTY FIGURES. In land warfare of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the ratio of wounded to killed in battle was about three or four to one. Figures that vary appreciably from this ratio are to be considered suspect: they stem either from deliberate falsification or from incomplete reporting. Bennington, Stony Point, and Monmouth are examples. Among those classified as “wounded” in most battle reports of the Revolutionary War were men who subsequently died of their wounds. Those reported “missing” included prisoners, deserters, unrecovered dead, and men—wounded and otherwise—who subsequently rejoined their unit.

SEE ALSO *Bennington Raid; Monmouth, New Jersey; Stony Point, New York*.

Mark M. Boatner

CASWELL, RICHARD. (1729–1789). Congressman, governor of North Carolina, militia general. North Carolina. Born near Baltimore, Maryland, on 3 August 1729, Richard Caswell moved to Wake (which became Raleigh), North Carolina, when he was 17 and was, in turn, a surveyor and lawyer. Prior to the Revolution he held important political offices, including colonel of the New Bern militia, in which capacity he commanded a wing of William Tryon’s army in the defeat of the Regulators at the Alamance River in 1771. He also served as speaker of the North Carolina Assembly in 1770 and 1771. He led the force that defeated the Loyalists at Moores Creek Bridge on 27 February 1776. After this victory, the assembly appointed him to brigadier general. A delegate to the Continental Congress from 1774 to 1776, Caswell presided over the Provincial Congress, which drafted the state constitution in 1776, and was elected the first governor of the state, serving from 1777 to 1780 and 1785 to 1787. In between he was in the state senate, generally as the presiding officer. In 1780 he became the major general of the North Carolina militia. In this capacity he led his troops to a humiliating defeat at Camden, where they broke and ran. He also served without distinction during the Southern Campaigns of Greene. He gave better service as chairman of the Council Extraordinary, North Carolina’s board of war during Greene’s campaign. Suffering a stroke while presiding over the senate, he died on 10 November 1789.

SEE ALSO *Moores Creek Bridge*.

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CATAWBA FORD, SOUTH CAROLINA SEE *Fishing Creek, North Carolina*.

CATHCART, SIR WILLIAM SCHAW. (1755–1843). British army officer and politician. Cathcart, son of a distinguished diplomat, was born at Petersham in Surrey on 17 September 1755. He entered Eton College in 1766 and moved to St. Petersburg in 1768 when his father became ambassador to Russia. There he learned Russian and was tutored in classics by William Richardson, later a professor of humanities at the University of Glasgow. Returning to Scotland in 1773, he spent three years training for the bar privately and at

university in Dresden and Glasgow. He was admitted to the Faculty of Advocates in 1776 and in August succeeded his father as the tenth baron Cathcart. In June 1777, having been powerfully attracted to a military career, he rejected law and bought a cornetcy in the Seventh Dragoons. After initial training he obtained leave to serve with the Sixteenth Light Dragoons in America.

There he served as aide de camp first to Major General Sir Thomas Spencer Wilson, baronet, and then to Sir Henry Clinton. He accompanied Clinton's Hudson Highlands offensive and took part in the storming of Forts Clinton and Montgomery on 6 October 1777. In November he became a lieutenant and in December was made captain in the Seventeenth Light Dragoons. He served in Pennsylvania, where he was instructed to form the Caledonian Volunteers, and fought at Monmouth Court House on 28 June 1778. In 1778, as major commandant, he was ordered to expand the Caledonian Volunteers into a large provincial legion of six troops of cavalry and six infantry companies, known at first as Cathcart's Legion and then as the British Legion. After marrying Elizabeth Elliot, daughter of the lieutenant governor of New York, on 10 April 1779, he was additionally made major in the Thirty-eighth Foot, quartermaster general in America, and finally local lieutenant colonel. After recruiting in Savannah from December 1779 he joined Clinton's 1780 expedition against Charleston; he was very ill, and command of the legion seems in fact to have been exercised by Banastre Tarleton. Invalided back to New York in April, and asked to choose between his commands, he finally relinquished the legion and took up his duties with the Thirty-eighth. He commanded his regiment in Knyphausen's Springfield raid in June; by October his health had so deteriorated that he was sent home to Britain. He was warmly welcomed by George III, who made him captain and lieutenant colonel in the Coldstream Guards.

In 1788 he was elected as a Scottish representative peer to the House of Lords, where he became lord president of committees. In 1789 he became lieutenant colonel in the Twenty-ninth foot, succeeded to the colonelcy in 1792, and became a brigadier general in 1793, major general in 1794, and lieutenant general in 1801. He served on the continent under Lord Moira in 1794 and 1795, was commander in chief in Ireland from 1803, took over the northern European command in 1805, and became commander in chief in Scotland in 1806. In 1807 he commanded the land forces at the siege of Copenhagen and became a British peer. He spent the next five years on duty in Scotland. On 1 January 1812 he was made a full general and in July became ambassador to St. Petersburg, a post he held until 1820. After returning home as earl Cathcart in the British peerage, a title he had been awarded in 1814, he

occupied himself with family and estate matters as his interest in politics gradually waned. He died at Cartside, Renfrewshire, on 16 June 1843.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Fort Clinton, New York; Fort Montgomery, New York; Monmouth, New Jersey; Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of Knyphausen; Tarleton, Banastre.*

revised by John Oliphant

CATHCART'S LEGION SEE *British Legion.*

CAUCUS CLUB OF BOSTON. Boston politics was dominated after 1719 by a group of local leaders whose economic and social interests often conflicted with the royally appointed officials who led the province. The Caucus was led by Elisha Cook Jr. and included among its active members Deacon Samuel Adams, father of the politician Samuel Adams. Drawing its support from the artisans, small shopkeepers, mechanics (tradesmen), and shipyard workers of Boston's North End, the Caucus was America's first political machine. (The name "caucus" may be a corruption of "caulkers," the shipyard workers who lent their meeting place to Cooke's faction.) The younger Adams, already fascinated by politics, in 1747 helped found a group to debate and write about public affairs that its opponents nicknamed the Whipping Post Club. By 1763 he was a leader of the Caucus. Believing that the imperial government's restructuring of the empire after the final French and Indian war posed a mortal danger to the divinely sanctioned local government of Massachusetts, Adams rapidly became a significant figure in the resistance. As the imperial dispute merged with local politics, several groups grew out of the Caucus, including the Loyal Nine and the Boston Sons of Liberty. The Caucus met at the Green Dragon Tavern on Union Street, Boston, a building that has been called "Headquarters of the Revolution."

SEE ALSO *Adams, Samuel; Loyal Nine; Sons of Liberty.*

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CAUGHNAWAGA. The Caughnawaga (Kahnawake) Indians are those Iroquois Indians who converted to Roman Catholicism, removed from the Iroquois homeland in upstate New York, and resettled in Canada during the seventeenth century. Caughnawaga was the name of the easternmost town of the Mohawks and a source of many of the original Canadian Iroquois. One of the first settlements of relocated Iroquois was at a Jesuit mission near Montreal, at a place the French called La Prairie. The Iroquois called it Caughnawaga (the more modern rendering is Kahnawake). The term “Caughnawaga Indians” can refer to the Iroquois community at Caughnawaga/Kahnawake or to the Canadian Iroquois generally. The Iroquois of Caughnawaga/Kahnawake proper were the Canadian Iroquois most directly affected by the American Revolution. They struggled to maintain neutrality during the Revolutionary War and were lobbied by both the British and Americans to join their respective sides.

Many captives taken during the colonial wars of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries had been settled in Kahnawake by the French governing authorities. Thus the town of Kahnawake was home not only to Catholic Iroquois who had migrated to Canada in the seventeenth century but also many people of mixed English and Iroquois ancestry. The people of Kahnawake maintained ties with the Indians and Europeans of New England. Several Caughnawaga/Kahnawake Indians were attending Dartmouth College when war began in 1775. The Caughnawaga Indians rejected Canadian governor Guy Carleton’s offer to attack the Americans in 1775 and likewise refused to join Benedict Arnold’s assault on Quebec in the winter of 1775–1776. However, in 1776, at the urging of Ethan Allen, they successfully petitioned to British commanders at Montreal to release a group of Stockbridge Indians in the American service who had been captured and sentenced to death. Interestingly, in 1780 a delegation from Kahnawake visited the French Expeditionary Force of General Rochambeau in Rhode Island. The Caughnawaga/Kahnawake Indians did not join either side in the war, remaining both neutral and advocates for peace. The Kahnawake community has maintained itself through the modern era; the Mohawks of Kahnawake are a First Nation of Canada, making their home in the First Nations Reserve Kahnawake 14 on the St. Lawrence River south of Montreal.

SEE ALSO *Carleton, Guy; Indians in the Colonial Wars and the American Revolution.*

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revised by Leonard J. Sadosky

CAUGHNAWAGA, NEW YORK. 22 May and 18 October 1780. A small settlement located in what is now the eastern part of Fonda in Montgomery County was one of several locations with this name. It had been established by Douw Fonda, whose home was probably the so-called Fort Caughnawaga. It was raided twice during 1780 by Loyalist and Indian forces controlled by Sir John Johnson. Fonda was killed when Joseph Brant surprised the settlement on the morning of 22 May and burned it to the ground. On 18 October Johnson passed through again and destroyed everything that had been built since the earlier visit. The more important Caughnawaga was the Christianized Mohawk settlement nine miles from Montreal.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Brant, Joseph; Johnson, Sir John.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

CEDARS, THE. A small post called The Cedars was the Americans’ westernmost position on the St. Lawrence River, established in March 1776, forty-three miles upstream from Montreal. The garrison came from Bedel’s Regiment, a New Hampshire unit that began life in 1775 as a corps of rangers. Colonel Timothy Bedel commanded the post. By early May Captain George Forster, commanding Oswegatchie, had assembled several hundred western Indians and a contingent of the Eighth Foot and set out downriver. On 12 May Bedel learned in general terms about the British intentions, and set out to get reinforcements from Benedict Arnold, who commanded Montreal. Major Isaac Butterfield assumed command of the 300 Americans and 100 Canadians in the garrison. On 16 May, Major Henry Sherburne led a 140-

man relief column from Montreal; Arnold continued assembling additional forces. Two days later Butterfield surrendered without any real attempt at resistance. Sherburne did not learn of the surrender when he landed at Quinze Chiens, nine miles from The Cedars, on 20 May, and marched into an ambush about four miles from Butterfield's post. The relief column tried to fall back but got pinned down. They held out for forty minutes before surrendering. Two prisoners were executed that evening, and four or five were later tortured and killed by the Indians. Forster continued his advance to Quinze Chiens. On 26 May he skirmished with Arnold's second relief column (700 men). The next day he exchanged prisoners with Arnold, who had to honor an agreement made by Butterfield and started back to Oswegatchie. Arnold returned to Montreal.

Only a handful of men were killed or wounded on either side, and Forster's withdrawal left little permanent impact on the course of the campaign. But it did ruin reputations and lead to a series of inquiries and courts-marshal.

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CELORON DE BLAINVILLE, PAUL-LOUIS. (1753–?). Canadian volunteer. Son of the celebrated French officer and explorer, Pierre-Joseph Celoron de Blainville (1693–1759), he was born at Detroit while his father commanded the garrison of Fort Pontchartrain. He became a gentleman cadet in the Rochefort regiment in 1774 and a *sous-lieutenant* in the Martinique regiment in 1775. On 16 October 1776 he volunteered for service in the American army and on 18 December became a lieutenant in James Livingston's First Canadian Regiment. At Schoharie, New York, until Burgoyne's offensive started, he marched under Arnold to the relief of Fort Stanwix and fought in Learned's brigade at Saratoga. In the second battle of Burgoyne's campaign on 7 October 1777, he received a bayonet wound in the leg and was hospitalized at Albany. Rejoining the regiment, he was with Varnum's brigade at Valley Forge and as part of this command was at Monmouth and Newport. On

29 July 1778 he became a chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis.

In 1779 Celoron became a captain in Pulaski's legion, a promotion that was the subject of complaint by Baron de Frey. He was engaged in combat at Charleston on 11 May 1779 and at Savannah, receiving a bullet wound to the head during the latter action on 9 October 1779. On 12 May 1780 he became a prisoner at Charleston and was exchanged on 26 November 1782. Congress retained him in the American service on 21 January 1782, but his resignation was accepted on 1 July 1782. Named *capitaine aide-major* in the French army, he served at Saint-Christophe and Guadeloupe until 1791. He emigrated to Trinidad in 1793. He became civil *sous-commissaire* of the National Guard of Abymes, Guadeloupe, on 20 June 1803 and *commissaire commandant* two years later. In 1807 he was *capitaine adjoint* on the general staff at Guadeloupe. His name was sometimes spelled "Seleron" or "Celoron."

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

CERBERUS. British Frigate. Reaching Boston on 25 May 1775, this British frigate was immortalized in the pasquinade posted soon thereafter in the town:

Behold the Cerberus the Atlantic plough,
Her precious cargo, Burgoyne, Clinton, Howe.
Bow, wow, wow!

The three gentlemen, it might be noted, were members of Parliament in addition to being general officers. The *Cerberus* was destroyed at Newport on 5 August 1778, in Suffren's attack. A year earlier it had been unsuccessfully attacked by the submarine of David Bushnell.

SEE ALSO *Bushnell, David; Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778)*.

CHADD'S FORD, PENNSYLVANIA
SEE *Brandywine, Pennsylvania*.

CHAISE MARINE. A light, covered, two-wheeled wagon. During the critical shortage of transportation in 1776–1777, Quartermaster General Mifflin proposed that these be manufactured to carry artillery and ammunition.

Mark M. Boatner

CHAMADE. A drum or trumpet signal by which one opponent requests a parley.

SEE ALSO *Parley*.

Mark M. Boatner

CHAMBLY, CANADA. 18 October 1775. During the siege of St. Johns, Major Joseph Stopford with eighty-eight officers and men of the Seventh Foot held Chambly, ten miles farther north. Although the place was of great strategic importance, Guy Carleton, governor of Quebec and commander of British forces in Canada, lacked the manpower to give it a larger garrison and felt that St. Johns would screen it. A large combat patrol led by Major John Brown had ambushed a supply train two miles from the fort on 17 September and then (after being reinforced) had driven an attempted sortie back into Chambly. There matters rested, with neither side able to amass enough strength to attempt anything. But on the night of 17 October, at the suggestion of pro-rebel Canadians, two American bateaux slipped past the defenses of St. Johns. They brought nine-pound guns, which altered the balance of power. Brown with fifty Americans and three hundred Canadians led by James Livingston surrounded the impressive-looking but thin-walled stone fort. The guns fired a few rounds that knocked holes, and Stopford promptly surrendered. In addition to the prisoners, the Americans captured 6 tons of gunpowder, 6,500 musket cartridges, 3 mortars, and 125 stand of arms, along with a large stock of food. Neither side had anyone killed or seriously injured. The fall of this garrison helped to seal St. Johns's fate, and the Seventh Foot's captured colors appear in the background of John Trumbull's painting of the signing of the Declaration of Independence.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion; St. Johns, Canada (5 September–2 November 1775)*.

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

CHAMPE, JOHN. (c. 1756–1798). Continental soldier who attempted to kidnap Benedict Arnold. Virginia. On 20 October, 1780, Washington directed Henry Lee to select volunteers from his legion to capture Benedict Arnold and also to check on intelligence that other high ranking American officers were dealing with the enemy. Lee picked John Champe, who was then serving as sergeant major in Lee's cavalry. Lee describes Champe as being of a "saturnine countenance, grave, thoughtful, and taciturn, of tried courage and inflexible perseverance." (Lee, p. 272.) Champe "deserted" at about 11 P.M. on the same day, and on 23 October he was accepted by the British as a bona fide deserter. He then joined the legion of Loyalists and deserters being raised by Arnold and learned enough about the latter's habits to make a plan to capture him. Meanwhile, he established communications with Lee, sending back word that he had found no evidence that other American officers were dealing with the enemy and informing Lee when the attempted abduction would take place.

Champe had learned that every night at about midnight, Arnold walked in the garden of his quarters, which were near the Hudson River. Having secretly loosened some fence pickets between this garden and an alley, Champe and one accomplice planned to grab and gag Arnold and hustle him to the river. A boat would be waiting there to take Arnold to Hoboken, New Jersey. Before the attempt could be made, however, Champe was ordered to embark with Arnold's legion for operations in Virginia. Sergeant Champe was unable to escape safely from the legion until Arnold had completed his raids in Virginia. Eventually effecting his escape, Champe rejoined Henry Lee in the Carolinas. Champe's comrades did not know until his return that his desertion to the Loyalist cause had been faked. Champe was rewarded and discharged from the service to protect him from British retaliation if he were captured. When Washington again became commander in chief in 1798 he proposed to commission Champe a captain, but he learned that Champe had recently died along the Monongahela River.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

CHAMPLAIN, LAKE. Stretching 125 miles from north to south and varying in width between four hundred yards and fourteen miles, Lake Champlain was a

vital link in the strategic waterway between the Hudson and St. Lawrence River valleys. Ten miles of rapids in the Richelieu (or Sorel) River between St. Johns and Chambly bar navigation to the St. Lawrence, and five miles of swift, narrow channel bar navigation between Ticonderoga and Lake George. Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga were scenes of battle during the colonial wars and the Revolution. St. Johns and Chambly also were military objectives during the Revolution. Valcour Island saw the important conflict between Champlain squadrons in 1776. Note that “up Lake Champlain” should be used in the sense of “upstream,” or south.

SEE ALSO *Chambly, Canada; Champlain Squadrons; Colonial Wars; Crown Point, New York; Lake George, New York; St. Johns, Canada (5 September–2 November 1775); Ticonderoga, New York, American Capture of; Valcour Island.*

Mark M. Boatner

CHAMPLAIN SQUADRONS. 1775–1776. Control of the waters of Lake Champlain was key to the invasion of Canada from the south or of New York from the north. In 1775 all travel was on foot or waterborne. The only feasible route for a road between New York City and Montreal hugged the western shore of the lake so closely that it could be dominated by guns aboard lake vessels or cut by troops landed behind an army’s line of march from boats on the lake. There were few vessels of any size on the lake in 1775, and most that did exist were of the small, rowing type, with sails that could be used only when wind was from the rear. A flotilla of these craft would be at the mercy of a single armed sailing vessel. This explains the importance of the 10 May 1775 capture of a schooner belonging to the Loyalist Major, Philip Skene—renamed *Liberty* by the Americans—at Skenesboro at the southern end of the lake, and the use of the *Liberty* and two bateaux to capture a sloop renamed the *Enterprise* from the British at St. Johns at the northern end of the lake a week later.

After capturing the *Enterprise* the American commander, Benedict Arnold, returned to Fort Ticonderoga and devoted the summer of 1775 to building additional vessels. Meanwhile, the British dispatched four hundred troops to St. Johns and began construction of two large warships, each to mount from twelve to fourteen guns. Philip Schuyler, who had succeeded Arnold in command of U.S. forces in northern New York, returned to besiege St. Johns that fall. On 2 November, the British garrison surrendered and turned over to the Americans a large supply of naval stores, the newly completed schooner *Royal Savage*, and a sloop nearly ready for launching.

THE AMERICAN FLOTILLA

In the Canada invasion of 1775–1776, the Americans lost their entire St. Lawrence squadron. However, when they evacuated St. Johns on 18 June 1776, they still had the *Liberty*, *Enterprise*, and *Royal Savage*, which they had captured in 1775. The schooner *Revenge* was being built at Fort Ticonderoga, and from St. Johns the Americans evacuated frame timber to build the cutter *Lee* at Skenesboro. During the previous winter Schuyler had ordered that trees be felled; that abandoned sawmills at Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and Skenesboro be reopened; and that bateaux be constructed for the transport of men and supplies. At Skenesboro he ordered work begun on gundalows (vessels of from fifty to sixty feet in length, flat-bottomed with shallow drafts that mounted a single sail and carried a bow gun and two guns amidships) and galleys (larger vessels from 80 to 120 feet in length, with two lateen-rigged masts, and able to carry from ten to twelve guns).

The improvised boatyard at Skenesboro was worked by men from the ranks until thirty craftsmen were sent from Albany and another two hundred started arriving from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Philadelphia. To lure skilled craftsmen to Lake Champlain, each was promised a month’s pay in advance, one and one-half rations per day, and a day’s pay for every twenty miles traveled to reach Skenesboro. This was more than anyone in the Continental navy, save Commodore Esek Hopkins, earned. In July 1776, Schuyler named Benedict Arnold to replace Jacobus Wynkoop as commander of the American squadron on Lake Champlain. When Arnold reached Skenesboro on 23 July, he found as many as five hundred men at work, three gundalows finished, and two others nearing completion. Arnold delegated supervision of construction to Brigadier General David Waterbury and devoted his energies to obtaining critical naval supplies—spikes, nails, hawsers, anchors, canvas, paint, and caulking. He was aided in this endeavor, ironically, by the British blockade of New York and Philadelphia, which helped divert supplies to Lake Champlain because it cut off the frigates being built at those cities. Arnold’s driving leadership caused his fleet to be ready more than a month before the British.

When added to the schooners *Liberty*, *Revenge*, and *Royal Savage*, the sloop *Enterprise* and the cutter *Lee* that had been captured from the British, the newly constructed vessels—the row galleys *Congress*, *Trumbull*, and *Washington*, eight gundalows (*Boston*, *Connecticut*, *Jersey*, *New Haven*, *New York*, *Philadelphia*, *Providence*, and *Spitfires*), and numerous bateaux—gave Arnold a force the British could not ignore. Typical of the row galleys that would prove to be the most important American vessels, the *Washington* was seventy-two feet four inches on deck, twenty-foot beam, and six feet two inches in the hold, according to the Admiralty draught made after the British capture. The *Washington* mounted two

Chandelier

eighteen-pounders, two twelve-pounders, two nine-pounders, and four four-pounders in her broadside, with a two-pounder and eight swivel guns on the quarterdeck.

One of the Gundalows, the *Philadelphia*, was recovered in 1935 by T. F. Hagglund in a remarkably good state of preservation, and a description has been assembled. It was an open boat measuring fifty-three feet four inches, fifteen feet six inches beam, and three feet ten inches depth amidships; flat-bottomed; and rigged with two square sails on a single mast. The gundalows were all armed with a twelve-pounder in the bow and two nine-pounders amidships; they carried forty-five men and were equipped with oars (as were the galleys). Having no outside keels, although this was called for in Arnold's specifications, the gundalows could not sail into the wind; however, "with their relatively powerful rig [they] were very fast off the wind," says the historian Howard L. Chapelle (p. 113).

On 24 August, Arnold sailed from Crown Point with the eleven vessels that were ready. He was joined later by the galleys *Congress*, *Trumbull*, and *Washington* and the gundalows *New Jersey* and *Philadelphia* as they were completed. The *Gates* was not completed in time for the battle. The existence of another gundalow, the *Success*, has been referred to by some authors, but it is not named as a participant in the Battle of Valcour Island by any eyewitness.

THE BRITISH FLEET

Meanwhile, at St. Johns, the British assembled a squadron of similarly disparate vessels. A large gundalow, the *Convert*, was captured from the Americans as they withdrew southward in June 1776, renamed the *Loyal Convert*, moved around the rapids on the Richelieu River, and reassembled at St. Johns, as were the schooners *Maria*, also captured from the Americans; the *Carleton*, which had been brought in pieces from a dockyard in England; and last of all, the three-masted ship sloop *Inflexible*, which was not ready for service until 4 October. The most remarkable vessel in Carleton's fleet was the 422-ton "radeau," or sailing scow, built at St. Johns and named *Thunderer*. Carrying a three-hundred-man complement and two large howitzers, six twenty-four-pounders, and six twelve-pounders (manned during the battle of Valcour Island by the gunners of the Hanau Regiment), it was almost ninety-two feet long and over thirty-three feet in beam. The *Thunderer* had two masts (leading a contemporary British officer to call her a ketch), but being flat-bottomed, it could not work to windward and did not participate in the battle.

The British also moved several smaller boats past the rapids from the St. Lawrence: twenty gunboats each having one gun; four long boats with a field gun each; and twenty-four provision boats or bateaux—many received in frame from England. The *Maria*, with fourteen six-pounder guns, the *Loyal Convert*, with seven nine-pounders,

and the *Thunderer* did not get within effective range during the battle of Valcour Island. The *Inflexible* delivered a long-range fire with her eighteen twelve-pounders initially, then was finally able to get within point-blank range and discharge five broadsides, which completely silenced Arnold's guns and probably did most of the damage suffered by the American flotilla. Cannon in the fifteen to twenty gunboats that participated in the fight (Arnold estimated their number in those terms) varied in caliber from nine-pounders to twenty-four pounders.

At the start of Burgoyne's offensive in 1777, the British flotilla consisted of the British gunboats and sailing vessels of their 1776 squadron; the captured *Lee*, *New Jersey*, and *Washington*; a newly built sailing vessel, the *Royal George*; five provision ships (*Commissary*, *Receipt*, *Delivery*, *Ration*, and *Camel*); and ten transport bateaux. At Skenesboro on 6 July 1777, the last of the American squadron was burned by the departing rebels (*Revenge*, *Enterprise*, and *Gates*) or captured (*Trumbull* and *Liberty*).

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Burgoyne's Offensive; Gundalow; Hopkins, Esek; Schuyler, Philip John; Skenesboro, New York.*

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revised by James C. Bradford

CHANDELIER. A heavy timber frame filled with fascines and other materials to form a field fortification. Chandeliers are particularly useful in rocky, frozen, or boggy ground where digging is difficult.

SEE ALSO *Dorchester Heights, Massachusetts; Fascine.*

Mark M. Boatner

CHARLES CITY COURT HOUSE, VIRGINIA. 8 January 1781. From Westover, where he had withdrawn after his raid on Richmond from 5–7 January, Benedict Arnold sent John Simcoe with forty mounted men on a reconnaissance toward Long Bridge on the Chickahominy. Simcoe learned from prisoners that General Thomas Nelson was near Charles

City Court House with a body of militia. An escaped slave guided the Rangers by a back route to the courthouse, where they surprised the guards in the dark and scattered some 150 militia. Two Americans were killed and a number captured; the rest fled to Nelson's camp a few miles away. Simcoe's losses, three wounded, were insignificant. Simcoe returned to Westover before dawn with his prisoners and a dozen captured horses.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Nelson, Thomas; Simcoe, John Graves; Virginia, Military Operations in.*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA.

The first English settlement in South Carolina was established at Albemarle Point on the west bank of the Ashley River in 1670 and named Charles Town, in honor of King Charles II. The location proving to be undesirable, a new Charles Town was begun on the site of the present Charleston about 1672, and the seat of government was moved there in 1680. The name was changed to Charlestown about 1719 and Charleston in 1783. Hence, pedants are correct in calling the town "Charlestown" for the period of the American Revolution.

Mark M. Boatner

CHARLESTON EXPEDITION OF CLINTON IN 1776.

During the fall of 1775, even as the British situation in Massachusetts deteriorated, the Ministry started developing plans for a military expedition to the South, initially thinking only of sending arms. Rebel elements in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia drove all four governors to seek shelter on board warships, but their correspondence and the pleas of London merchants and others convinced the government by mid-October that Loyalists could restore authority with the assistance of a respectable force of regulars. The planning started by William Legge Dartmouth was continued by George Sackville Germain when he became American Secretary on 9 November.

The plan gradually evolved as London attempted to take advantage of changing circumstances and adjust to a wide array of mobilization and deployment problems. In final form the expedition consisted of seven infantry regiments from Ireland plus supporting artillery embarked in chartered transports sent from London and escorted by a Royal Navy squadron. All of the troops selected had already

been earmarked to reinforce either William Howe or Guy Carleton. Once the force restored order it would turn the southern colonies over to their governors and move on to join Howe. Charles Cornwallis led the troops, Commodore Sir Peter Parker the squadron. As London wanted, on 6 January Howe ordered Henry Clinton to meet the expedition at Cape Fear, North Carolina, and take command.

Clinton left Boston on 20 January with two light companies (from the Fourth and Forty-fourth), and a few officers who were to raise a body of Highland emigrants in North Carolina. His ships included the frigate *Mercury*, two transports, and a supply vessel. Stopping to confer with Governors Tryon (New York) and Dunmore (Virginia) along the way, he reached Cape Fear on 12 March where Governors William Campbell of South Carolina and Josiah Martin of North Carolina soon joined a growing flotilla.

Parker and Cornwallis should have left Cork in December but did not actually set out until 12 February, and then immediately ran into a storm that drove the convoy back to port. The second try at crossing the Atlantic ran into still more trouble from storms. The badly scattered vessels began trickling into the rendezvous on 19 April; the whole force was not collected at Cape Fear until 15 May. By that point premature Loyalist uprisings in both Carolinas had already gone down to defeat, most visibly at Moores Creek Bridge, North Carolina, 27 February.

Clinton saw no possibility of accomplishing his original mission in time to rejoin Howe for a spring offensive as originally planned. Wanting to do something, however, he favored operations in the Chesapeake, where small, easily maintained outposts might serve as bases for raids and as havens for Loyalists. But when Parker arrived he sent a naval reconnaissance toward Charleston, and on 26 May he talked Clinton into a more ambitious plan. Parker wanted to capture unfinished Fort Sullivan in Charleston harbor and use it as a base for a small garrison supported by a frigate or two before letting the main task force go north. As William Willcox comments, "Clinton surrendered his own scheme, apparently without protest, and fell in with this idea" (*Portrait of a General*, pp. 84–87). On 30 May the British task force crossed back over the bar and the next day sailed for Charleston.

AMERICAN PREPARATIONS

The defense of Charleston began with a wrangle over authority. The colony's Provincial Congress had raised four full-time regiments of state troops in 1775 and added two more in February 1776, but remained adamant that they were under the exclusive control of the colony. In early January the Continental Congress anticipated that the British might attack Charleston, among other potential targets in the south, and on 27 February it created a

separate Southern Department for Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Major General Charles Lee received the command on 1 March and left New York City two days later. On 3 May Brigadier General John Armstrong arrived in Charleston, the first Continental officer to appear. He immediately learned of South Carolina's insistence on its independent status. It took Lee's negotiating skills (he and Brigadier General Robert Howe arrived 9 June) and the presence of the British expedition offshore to persuade them to accept a unified defense. This decision gave Lee their six regiments, plus the Eighth Virginia Regiment, Third North Carolina Regiment, and part of the Second North Carolina Regiment. Including mobilized militia the American total on the day of battle was more than 6,500 rank and file, although only a small percentage were actually engaged.

Charleston's colonial-era defenses had been refurbished and expanded, but the key element was a large bar that lay along on the low, sandy islands—Sullivan's Island on the north and James Island on the south—that formed the shore of the harbor. Once vessels worked their way over the bar, a difficult feat of seamanship, they had to pass one of the forts along the channels of the six-mile passage to the city proper. Fort Johnson, the older work on James Island, mounted twenty heavy guns, with a new twelve-gun battery as an outwork.

South Carolina had not begun building Fort Sullivan on the northern island of the same name until January 1776 as a square redoubt with bastions on each corner. It remained only half-done when the British attacked. A proper seacoast fort of the period should have had stone walls to withstand naval bombardment, but Colonel William Moultrie built with the only materials at hand: parallel walls of palmetto logs were put up, and the sixteen-foot space between them was filled with sand. Only the south and east walls and the two southernmost bastions were finished. They held emplacements for twenty-five guns that ranged in caliber from nine- to twenty-five-pound. The remaining half of the redoubt had been built to a height of only seven feet, so breastworks were erected and six twelve-pounders provided some protection to the rear. The northern tip of the island was three miles from the fort and separated from undefended Long Island (now Isle of Palms) by a narrow gap of water known as the Breach.

Although Moultrie spoke highly in his memoirs of the value of Lee's presence, it would appear that Lee did not have much confidence in the new fort. Moultrie wrote in his *Memoirs* that, "when he came to Sullivan's Island, he did not like that post at all; he said there was no way to retreat, that the garrison would be sacrificed: nay, he called it a 'slaughter pen,' and wished to withdraw the garrison and give up the post, but President Rutledge insisted it


should not be given up." Lee then ordered construction of a floating bridge to permit the garrison's escape across the mile-wide cove, but this improvised affair of planks and hogsheads would not support troops.

Moultrie himself was never "uneasy on not having a retreat because I never imagined that the enemy could force me to that necessity; I always considered myself as able to defend that post against the enemy. I had upwards of 300 riflemen, under Colonel Thompson, of his regiment, Colonel Clark, with 200 North-Carolina regulars, Colonel Horry, with 200 South-Carolina, and the Raccoon Company of riflemen, [plus] 50 militia at the point of the island behind the sand hills and myrtle bushes; I had also a small battery with one 18-pounder, and one brass field-piece, 6-pounder, at the same place, which entirely commanded the landing and could begin to fire upon them at 7 or 800 yards before they could attempt to land. Colonel Thompson had orders that if they could not stand the enemy they were to throw themselves into the fort, by which [time] I should have had upwards of 1000 men in a large strong fort, and General Armstrong in my rear with 1500 men, not more than one mile and a half off, with a small arm of the sea between us, that he could have crossed a body of men in boats to my assistance. This was exactly my situation. I therefore felt myself perfectly easy because I never calculated upon Sir Henry Clinton's numbers to be more than 3000 men." Moultrie notes that, in answer to Lee's question as to whether he could maintain the post, he replied, "Yes, I think I can," upon which they discussed it no further.

BRITISH PRELIMINARIES

The Clinton-Parker task force left Cape Fear on 31 May and reached the islands off Charleston the next day. Parker took his time and conducted a careful reconnaissance of the harbor mouth; much more time would be required to get the warships and transports across the bar. The British originally intended to overwhelm Charleston by immediate attack but now realized they would have to conduct more systematic operations. Parker agreed to commit his full force of warships to a bombardment of the fort; Clinton (with the concurrence of Cornwallis) agreed to land on Long Island (Isle of Palms). The troops would then support the naval force by crossing over to Sullivan's Island and hitting the fort from the rear.

Parker finished the naval part of the attack plan on 15 June, and Clinton landed most of his troops on undefended Long Island on 16–18 June. Much to his chagrin, Clinton discovered that his intelligence had made a huge error about the Breach and that it was too deep to be forded. He had only fifteen flatboats to attempt a ferrying operation, making that option unworkable. On 18 June Clinton sent Brigadier General Vaughan to Parker to suggest that the commodore take two regiments on board his ships to use in a direct landing at the end of the bombardment.



Plan for the British Attack on Fort Sullivan. This map, drawn by a British officer, details the British plan for the attack on Fort Sullivan in Charleston Harbor on 28 June 1776. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GEOGRAPHY AND MAP DIVISION.


Parker planned to attack on 23 June, but adverse winds made him delay for five days. During this period the Americans continued to improve the defenses on Sullivan’s Island.

THE ATTACK

On 28 June at 11 A.M. the British ships went into action. The bomb ketch *Thunder* opened fire at a range of a mile and a half with two mortars (a 13-inch and a 10-inch); she was supported by the *Friendship* (16 gun). The *Active* (28), *Bristol* (50), *Experiment* (50), and *Solebay* (28) anchored 400 to 800 yards south of the fort and opened fire. The *Actaeon* (28), *Sphynx* (20), and *Syren* (28) then formed a second line and started blasting away. After an hour the ships of the second line started moving to new positions west of the fort from which to enfilade its southern face

and also to threaten its access to the city. All three ran onto a shoal known as the Middle Ground and became sitting ducks for the American gunners at about the same time that the *Thunder’s* mortars broke down. After several hours the *Syren* and *Sphynx* got free but had to withdraw for repairs; the *Actaeon* could not be moved. Parker’s flag-ship, the *Bristol*, also suffered enormous damage when a cable was shot away and her stern swung toward the fort.

Moultrie had been visiting Thompson’s position on the northern end of Sullivan’s Island the morning of 28 June, and across the Breach he could see Clinton’s force manning boats as if for an assault. But when he saw Parker’s ships preparing to get under way he galloped the three miles back to Fort Sullivan and “ordered the long roll to beat.” That day the garrison consisted of about 425 men of Moultrie’s Second South Carolina Regiment and



Sergeant Jasper's Heroism. When the American flag fell during the attack on Fort Moultrie in 1776, Sergeant William Jasper went out through an embrasure to retrieve it, a heroic act depicted in this nineteenth-century engraving after a painting by J. A. Oertel.

© BETTMANN/CORBIS.

twenty-two gunners. Although nervous at first, the defenders settled down and worked the fort's cannon with skill. Moultrie's only problem was insufficient powder.

As it turned out, the construction materials of Fort Sullivan had certain surprisingly good qualities: the spongy palmetto logs did not shatter and splinter like ordinary wood, and the sandy earth of the walls further cushioned the impact of cannon balls and mortar shells. Most of the American casualties resulted from the few shots that came through the embrasures. Despite the punishment the British naval gunners were taking, however, they manned their pieces well. "At one time, 3 or 4 of the men-of-war's broadsides struck the fort at the same instant," wrote Moultrie, and the merlons were given "such a tremor that I was apprehensive that a few more such would tumble them down." Despite the long range, the *Thunder* "threw her shells in a very good direction; most of them fell within the fort, but we had a morass in the middle that swallowed them up instantly, and those that fell in the sand and in and

about the fort were immediately buried so that very few of them burst amongst us."

Moultrie noted that Lee visited the fort during the action, pointed a few guns, and departed with the words, "Colonel, I see you are doing very well here. You have no occasion for me." He later wrote, as quoted by Moultrie: "The behaviour of the garrison, both men and officers, with Colonel Moultrie at their head, I confess astonished me. It was brave to the last degree. I had no idea that so much coolness and intrepidity could be displayed by a collection of raw recruits."

When a shot struck the flagstaff and the flag fell outside the fort, Sergeant William Jasper went out through an embrasure to retrieve it and put it back into view on an improvised staff. This was more than bravado, because disappearance of the flag could have signaled to the enemy as well as to the thousands of American civilian and soldier spectators that the fort had surrendered.



Presentation of Colors. *The wife of Colonel Barnard Elliott was reported to have presented in 1776 a set of embroidered flags to Colonel Moultrie and the soldiers who defended the fort on Sullivan's Island, a scene depicted in this nineteenth-century painting.* **PRESENTATION OF THE COLORS TO COL. W. MOULTRIE.** (OIL ON CANVAS) BY AMERICAN SCHOOL (19TH CENTURY); CHICAGO HISTORICAL SOCIETY, CHICAGO, IL / BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY.

The firing tapered off at sunset, and with the tide ebbing and his ammunition starting to run out, Parker told his ships to fall back at 9:00 P.M.—all but the marooned *Actaeon*, which was set on fire by her crew the next morning and abandoned.

As for Clinton's part in the action, he had ended up as a spectator, and with a rather poor seat at that. He had demonstrated toward the island and toward the mainland but could not risk crossing without naval covering fire. When he discovered the next morning what a beating the navy had taken, he could do nothing but make plans for a strategic retreat. His troops remained on Long Island three weeks before embarking (21 July) for New York. Only the *Solebay* accompanied the transports; Parker's other ships had to remain some time longer for repairs. Clinton's

troops reached Sandy Hook on 31 July and joined Howe on Staten Island for the New York Campaign.

LOSSES

Lee reported 10 Americans killed and 22 wounded in Fort Sullivan; Ward's figures are 12 killed, 5 died of wounds, and 20 wounded. Moultrie, the one person in a position to know for sure, gives no figures in his memoirs.

Only the Royal Navy lost men in the attack. According to Parker's official report (*Naval Documents*, 5:997–1002), British casualties amounted to 64 killed and 141 wounded, but he curiously omitted the *Actaeon's* losses from his accounting. *Experiment* and *Bristol* took most of the casualties and both ships' captains died from their wounds. Parker himself was slightly but painfully wounded.

SIGNIFICANCE

Until the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, this campaign attracted relatively little scholarly attention. Yet the battle was a humiliating defeat to the British that gave a critical boost to rebel morale. "Britain had worse defeats in the course of the war, but no more egregious fiasco," says Willcox. The southern colonies (which became states on 4 July) remained in rebel hands for three years before the British sent regulars again. During those three years Loyalists in Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia had to either leave the country or hide their feelings.

Although the entire British operation rested on a false belief in Loyalist strength, the king's military forces might have had some modest accomplishments if they had been able to get there sooner. The relatively small force Clinton took from Boston was incapable of doing much alone, but in combination with the 2,500 troops of Cornwallis and Parker's fleet it should have been possible to accomplish part of Clinton's mission. Most accounts blame one component or another for being dilatory. The truth was that the technical difficulties of mounting the expedition overwhelmed the British government's cumbersome administrative structure. The British fatally misjudged the harbor and fort conditions, and the Loyalists themselves displayed no common sense and rose prematurely. Their biggest defeat, at Moores Creek Bridge, had lingering effects during the second invasion.

Lord North, Germain, and the king found no fault with Clinton's conduct of the Charleston expedition and gave him private assurances to this effect. A controversy developed, however, when Sir Peter Parker's public letter to the Admiralty charged Clinton with failure to support the naval attack. The published version of Clinton's letter to the secretary of state was so abridged as to omit the portions that would have refuted Parker's contentions. The supersensitive Clinton was embittered by the government's unwillingness to make public their private assurances of his exoneration for the Charleston failure. In the autumn of 1776 his friends in the House of Commons vigorously attacked the government on this matter; upon his return to England in the spring of 1777 he was given the Order of the Bath to reestablish his prestige.

In a sense the Americans damaged themselves by winning such a lopsided victory. Political leaders in the Carolinas and Georgia misread the technicality that few "Continental" troops participated, and assumed that their militia resources and fortifications would be ample for their defense. Although they did raise (or turn over) Continentals, they never furnished them with adequate support or replacements. And they paid the price.

SEE ALSO *Jasper, William; Merlon; Moores Creek Bridge; New York Campaign; South Carolina Line; Southern Theater, Military Operations in.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

CHARLESTON EXPEDITION OF CLINTON IN 1780. Charleston (called Charles Town in 1780), South Carolina, the most significant port in the southern colonies and one of the wealthiest cities in America, played a role in British strategy throughout the war. Although the 1776 attempt on Sullivan's Island failed, Howe considered an expedition against Charleston in the winter of 1777–1778, and Prevost's feint in the spring of 1779 conceivably could have taken the city. Recognizing its economic and strategic significance, Clinton determined by August 1779 to make another attempt on Charleston.

Delayed by the French move north for operations against Savannah, preparations began in earnest in November 1779. The expeditionary force, numbering eighty-seven-hundred men, embarked from New York on 26 December 1779. The force was conveyed by a fleet of over one hundred transports and warships, commanded by Arbuthnot. Cooperation between the army and the Royal Navy would be critical to reducing Charleston, but the relationship between Clinton and Arbuthnot threatened its success from the start. Receiving word that French ships were wintering in Chesapeake Bay, Arbuthnot suggested attacking them before moving south. Clinton, aware of the Chesapeake region's importance to the rebel war effort, wished to take Charleston first and return to the mid-Atlantic theater later. Arbuthnot abandoned the idea of moving against

the French, but this difference of opinion foreshadowed future disagreements between the two commanders.

The winter of 1779–1780 was one of the worst of the eighteenth century, and severe storms buffeted the British fleet as it sailed toward the rendezvous point at Savannah. The weather damaged and sank ships; caused the loss of provisions, horses, and ordnance; and lengthened the voyage. A journey that normally lasted ten days took some vessels five weeks to complete.

THE LANDING IN SOUTH CAROLINA

Off Savannah, Clinton sent Brigadier General James Paterson ashore to make a feint toward Augusta, while Tarleton was sent to Beaufort to replace cavalry horses lost at sea. Clinton and Arbuthnot haggled over where to land the army, but the question was settled when the admiral sent Captain George Keith Elphinstone to handle the disembarkation. Elphinstone performed to Clinton's satisfaction throughout the Charleston operations.

Sailing into the North Edisto River on 11 February 1780, Elphinstone put ashore Clinton's grenadiers and light infantry that night on Simons (now Seabrook) Island, and the remaining troops landed the following day. Over the next several weeks, Clinton's army encamped on Johns Island, seizing Stono Ferry, and then crossed to James Island on 24 February 1780, where they established positions at Wappoo Bridge on Wappoo Cut and at Fort Johnson.

With the 1776 attempt on Sullivan's Island on his mind, Clinton moved cautiously against Charleston. He preferred the landing in the North Edisto River region because it put an appropriate distance between his army and the rebels in Charleston. The American general Benjamin Lincoln, who had learned of British intentions against the city from captured Royal Navy sailors, declined to sortie against the British, however, deciding instead to mass his force within Charleston's defenses. Rumors of a smallpox epidemic kept South Carolina militia from joining Lincoln, and he believed he lacked adequate numbers to attack the British on their march. He feared that if he sallied forth from the town, the British would attack it in his absence. Instead, he sent Brigadier General William Moultrie and Lieutenant Colonel Francis Marion to hold Bacon's Bridge on the Ashley River, while his cavalry harassed the British as they moved toward Charleston.

THE CROSSING OF CHARLESTON BAR

Clinton could advance no further until Arbuthnot crossed Charleston Bar, a large sandbank that ran from Sullivan's Island, above the harbor entrance, to Lighthouse Island several miles below it. The Bar represented a strong natural defensive obstacle to enemy warships since vessels could only cross it via a few shallow channels; the primary avenue


for larger ships, the Ship Channel, was only twenty feet deep at high tide. The British men of war drafted too deeply to clear this channel, and even the forty-four-gun ships would have to have stores and guns removed before they could sail through it.

Lincoln, recognizing the Bar's strategic importance, urged Commodore Abraham Whipple, who commanded American naval forces in Charleston, to take up a position to defend it. Lincoln argued for a station inside the Bar blocking the Ship Channel. By keeping the Royal Navy outside the harbor, he was confident that the Americans could limit the British to a landside assault on the town. The cautious Whipple, outclassed by Arbuthnot in number and size of warships and uncertain of the tricky currents in the waters surrounding the Bar, was reluctant to do so. Backed by his captains, he argued that his ships would be more effective acting in concert with Fort Moultrie on the southern end of Sullivan's Island. Lincoln was displeased, but he consented to a station near the fort.

Arbuthnot took advantage of this opportunity on 20 March 1780, crossing the Bar uncontested with the *Renown* (fifty guns), the *Roebuck* (forty-four guns), the *Romulus* (forty-four guns), four frigates, a sloop of war, and several smaller vessels. When Whipple recognized that the *Renown* was inside the Bar, he insisted to Lincoln that his vessels could not maintain their current station and asked that he be allowed to moor them in the Cooper River instead. Frustrated, Lincoln again consented to the change in position, and Whipple's forces were effectively removed from action for the remainder of the campaign. The *Renown's* ability to clear the Bar should not have surprised Whipple, since the British had sailed a fifty-gun ship over it for operations against Sullivan's Island in 1776. In any event, this failure to properly defend the Bar and harbor was a critical error in the American defense of Charleston. Whipple not only surrendered Charleston's key natural defensive obstacle without a fight, but he freed the Royal Navy to send more direct assistance to Clinton.

CLINTON MOVES TO CHARLESTON NECK

The crossing of the Bar enabled Arbuthnot to send boats and sailors to Clinton's army for the advance to Charleston. Clinton, meanwhile, ordered Paterson to join him from Georgia so they would have sufficient men to maintain the line of communication with James Island and the Royal Navy when the move was made to the Charleston Peninsula. As with the initial landing, Clinton wished to cross the Ashley River, where his troops would be least vulnerable to attack by the rebels. He chose Drayton Hall, thirteen miles from the city. There, on 29 March 1780, Royal Navy flatboats under Elphinstone carried them over the river. On the opposite



THE GALE GROUP.

bank, they met only a few scattered shots from American horsemen.

The following day, the British army advanced toward Charleston; in the vanguard were the light infantry and jägers, who would play a crucial role in the siege. Lincoln sent his own light troops, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, to reconnoiter and prevent the British from approaching the city too quickly. The two sides skirmished throughout the day before Laurens withdrew to the American lines, each side suffering a few casualties. Encamping two miles from the city, Clinton's army opened its siegeworks on Charleston Neck on the night of 1 April 1780, from eight hundred to one thousand yards from the American defenses.

On 8 April 1780, Arbuthnot in the *Roebuck* led the *Romulus*, the *Renown*, his frigates, the sloop of war *Sandwich*, and two transports past Fort Moultrie. Although a third transport was lost when it ran aground and some vessels received damage from the fort's guns, in ninety minutes Arbuthnot sailed his flotilla safely to the waters off Fort Johnson on James Island. There, they had an anchorage out of range of American guns in the city and on Sullivan's Island. The Royal Navy had now cut off Charleston by sea, and the British were in position to surround the garrison.

Clinton and Arbuthnot summoned the garrison on 10 April 1780. When Lincoln immediately rejected their demand for surrender, they pressed on with the siege, and their batteries on the neck opened on 13 April.

OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN LINE OF COMMUNICATION

Clinton wished to completely invest Charleston. Securing the Cooper River and the region east of it would box in the Americans. Clinton sent a corps under Lieutenant Colonel James Webster across the Cooper while Arbuthnot, he hoped, would push ships into that river.

Reaching Goose Creek by 13 April, Webster detached Tarleton to attack the rebel cavalry. Lincoln had posted his cavalry, under Brigadier General Isaac Huger, outside Charleston to harass the British and keep open the line of communication with the South Carolina backcountry. Huger's force consisted of several regiments of horse, all commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William Washington, and a detachment of North Carolina militia. The cavalry arm was one of the few advantages that Lincoln held over Clinton at the outset of the campaign. Not only did the American cavalry outnumber the British, but many of the British dragoon horses had been lost on the stormy voyage from New York, and the mounts collected since were

inferior to those of the rebels. Tarleton ambushed the Americans at Biggin's Bridge near Moncks Corner on 14 April and inflicted a severe defeat on them. The British success opened the door to the region east of the Cooper River, providing the opportunity to cut off the garrison.

Reinforcements from New York arrived on 18 April, allowing Clinton to send additional troops east of the Cooper. He also appointed Cornwallis to command this strengthened corps. He anticipated that Cornwallis would block routes in and out of Charleston and cooperate with the Royal Navy when Arbuthnot brought vessels into the Cooper River. Arbuthnot, despite promises to Clinton, did not act vigorously to make such an attempt. Clinton became increasingly frustrated as no action was taken despite his pleas to the admiral. Arbuthnot was reluctant to risk ships for the endeavor. The Americans sank hulks in the main channel leading into the Cooper River to prevent British access, while the Hog Island Channel on the Mount Pleasant side, though open, was narrow and difficult to navigate. Lincoln's men, meanwhile, constructed a battery at Haddrell's Point specifically to cover the entrance to Hog Island Channel.

In addition to the Haddrell's Point battery, the Americans held Fort Moultrie and a strong redoubt at Lempriere's Point. Fort Moultrie's significance had lessened when the Royal Navy pushed into the harbor on 8 April, but Lempriere's, located near the confluence of the Wando and Cooper Rivers, kept open the door to the South Carolina backcountry, providing an avenue of escape for the American army. Although the British had a substantial force east of the Cooper, Cornwallis admitted that it would be relatively easy for an evacuating American force without cannon or baggage to slip by them.

Clinton feared that the garrison could escape via Lempriere's Point, but he believed it too formidable for Cornwallis to assault. Arbuthnot's foot-dragging made assistance from the Royal Navy doubtful. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Francois Malmedy, the position consisted of a redoubt with six eighteen-pounders and a number of smaller fieldpieces. With Malmedy were one hundred Continentals and two hundred North Carolina militia. Lincoln at one point sent Laurens and the light infantry to Lempriere's but withdrew them as the British pushed their siegeworks closer to the American defenses on the neck.

On 27 April, information reached Malmedy that Cornwallis was approaching his position at Lempriere's Point in force, and the French officer hastily spiked his guns and evacuated the garrison to Charleston. Ironically, Cornwallis was making no such move, having contented himself with patrolling the region east of the Cooper River to forestall an American escape. The Royal Navy took possession of the fort the next day.

Encouraged by Lincoln to leave Charleston to ensure the continuance of "civil authority" and to raise the backcountry militia, Governor John Rutledge had departed on 13 April. Although the loss of Lempriere's Point made it more difficult to approach the city, Lincoln still hoped that reinforcements could reach the garrison. Rutledge met with little success in South Carolina, but a detachment of Virginia Continentals under Colonel Abraham Buford was marching to assist the garrison. Moreover, the American cavalry, now commanded by Colonel Anthony Walton White, who arrived in the state with a few additional dragoons, had regrouped after the disaster at Moncks Corner.

White crossed the Santee River on 5 May; four miles north of Awendaw Bridge on the road leading to Charleston, they captured eighteen men from a British foraging party. Falling back toward the Santee the following day, White's cavalymen were ambushed by Tarleton at Lenud's Ferry. As Cornwallis accurately pointed out, "this stroke will have totally demolished their cavalry." The British now faced little threat outside the American siegeworks.

Despite close investment by the British, Lincoln and his officers resolved to continue the defense. Clinton rejected their request for much too generous terms on 21 April, and he now anxiously believed his troops would be forced to storm the rebel works. Arbuthnot, who had repeatedly ignored Clinton's requests to push vessels into the Cooper River, moved against Fort Moultrie, which he captured on 7 May. This success and the victory over the American cavalry at Lenud's Ferry gave the British commanders another opportunity to summon the garrison.

Making note of these defeats, Clinton and Arbuthnot again offered Lincoln an opportunity to surrender on 8 May. Virtually surrounded and with no hope of reinforcement, Lincoln acceded to negotiations. Talks broke down over the prisoner-of-war status of the American militia and the siege continued until 11 May, when Lincoln capitulated. The garrison marched out on 12 May.

ASSESSMENTS

The victory at Charleston was the greatest of the war for the British. They took possession of the most important city in the southern colonies and captured six thousand men, four hundred cannon, and over five thousand muskets with minimal losses. That is not to say the campaign had been easy. Vicious winter weather upset the expedition at the outset, the relationship between army and Royal Navy commanders was tenuous, and the British faced a determined enemy.

Much could have gone wrong. Had the American navy stopped Arbuthnot at Charleston Bar as Lincoln

hoped, it is doubtful that operations would have continued. The cautious Arbuthnot, who had lost a man of war to a sandbar off Savannah early in the expedition, might have balked at further attempts had he lost additional vessels or faced greater enemy resistance. Cooperation between land and sea forces was critical for success. One branch of service could not have succeeded at Charleston without the other. Likewise, had Lincoln taken the initiative and escaped into the backcountry, his army would have provided a rallying point for the state's numerous militia, who would soon have harassed Cornwallis when his troops pushed inland. More skillful handling of the American cavalry and the retention of Lempriere's Point, meanwhile, could have prevented the British from cutting off the city east of the Cooper River and kept open communication with the South Carolina backcountry.

The British avoided these calamities, however, and celebrated the victory. Clinton believed that he had conquered both Carolinas with the capture of the city, but as Cornwallis found, the provinces were far from conquered. Although a tremendous victory for the British, the Charleston expedition, in kicking off major operations in the South (those in Georgia notwithstanding), set them on a road that led to Yorktown just seventeen months later.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Clinton departed New York with 8,700 men. A small contingent of these were blown so far off course that they never reached Savannah, and others remained in Georgia. Clinton utilized the remainder in operations against Charleston. The 18 April reinforcement from New York City added 2,600 troops. By the end of the campaign the British army operating against Charleston numbered 10,100 men. Returns showed 76 men killed and 189 wounded from the landing in the North Edisto to the close of the siege.

American strength is more difficult to gauge, since the makeup of Lincoln's army fluctuated throughout the campaign. On the eve of the British landing in South Carolina, Lincoln reported 1,400 Continental infantry and cavalry fit for duty plus 2,250 militia. Many of the North Carolina militia returned home prior to the commencement of the siege, however. Washington sent Lincoln the North Carolina brigade and Virginia line from the main army, but each numbered only just over 700 men by the time they reached Charleston. Clinton reported to Germain that they captured 6,618 men (including 1,000 sailors who had come ashore from rebel ships), but Lincoln's total force was probably closer to 6,000. A July 1780 return of prisoners, which makes allowances for soldiers who joined the British ranks, shows far fewer Continentals accounted for than noted at the end of the siege. Lincoln reported 89 men killed and 138 wounded during the siege. These figures do not include 15 killed and 18 wounded at

Moncks Corner and 41 killed and wounded at Lenud's Ferry.

With regard to naval forces, Arbuthnot initially commanded five ships of the line, a fifty-gun ship, two forty-fours, four frigates, and two sloops of war. One ship of the line, the *Defiance*, was destroyed in a storm off Savannah. British naval personnel numbered forty-five hundred men. Operations against Charleston cost the Royal Navy twenty-three killed and twenty-eight wounded.

Whipple brought with him to Charleston three frigates of the Continental Navy and a sloop of war. Of the frigates, the *Queen of France* was in such poor shape that she was sunk to block the channel between Charleston and Shutes Folly. The South Carolina state navy contributed a frigate, two French transports that had been converted into warships, two brigs, and several smaller vessels. A number of these shared the same fate as the *Queen of France*. The Royal Navy captured those not sunk.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Siege of 1780; Fort Moultrie, South Carolina (7 May 1780); Lenud's Ferry, South Carolina; Monck's Corner, South Carolina.*

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CHARLESTON RAID OF PREVOST.

11–12 May 1779. Shortly after he replaced Robert Howe as commander of the Southern Department in December 1778, Major General Benjamin Lincoln resolved to drive the British from Georgia. Reinforced by militia in spring 1779, he devised a plan to march up the Savannah River, cross to Augusta, and move into the Georgia backcountry. Leaving twelve hundred men under Brigadier General William Moultrie at Black Swamp and Purisburgh, Lincoln arrived at Augusta on 29 April 1779 with four thousand men, including the bulk of his Continentals.

Rather than chase Lincoln, Major General Augustine Prevost determined to move into South Carolina to compel the American commander to abandon the Georgia enterprise and to collect supplies for his army. He crossed the Savannah River with a force of three thousand men. Outnumbered, Moultrie retreated toward Charleston, destroying bridges over the numerous rivers on his route. As the Americans fell back, Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens skirmished with the British briefly, and—unwisely in Moultrie’s opinion—at Coosawhatchie on 3 May, but Moultrie successfully reached Charleston on 7 May. He was joined there by a force of militia brought into the city by Governor John Rutledge and Pulaski’s Legion, which had arrived from Washington’s army.

The ease with which his army advanced and the persuasions of South Carolina Loyalists convinced Prevost to move against Charleston. His vanguard, commanded by his brother, Lieutenant Colonel Marc Prevost, crossed the Ashley River on 11 May and marched toward the city. Brigadier General Pulaski, who had arrived only days before, sallied out to meet them with his Legion cavalry and infantry and a few militia. Pulaski intended to draw the British into an ambush, but this stratagem failed when some of his troops, hiding behind a breastwork, showed themselves too soon. Prevost’s men drove off Pulaski, inflicting severe casualties on his detachment.

The arrival of the British force outside Charleston threw the inhabitants into a panic. The mistaken belief that enemy troops were immediately outside the gates the night of 11 May caused a general fire of musketry and artillery all along the lines and resulted in the killing or wounding of thirteen Americans who were attempting to fill a gap in the abatis. Among those killed was Major Benjamin Huger. Despite the apprehensions of many in

the garrison, Moultrie was confident that they could hold out against the British. He had at least thirty-two hundred men protected by earthworks against Prevost’s three thousand. Moreover, Moultrie had written Lincoln repeatedly since the British crossed the Savannah, and he expected the latter’s return at any moment. Others in the town were not so sanguine, however. Reports had reached Charleston that put British numbers at from seven thousand to eight thousand; Governor Rutledge was among those who accepted these greatly exaggerated figures.

Rutledge and the South Carolina Privy Council urged Moultrie to send a letter to the enemy asking what terms would be granted if the Americans capitulated. Prevost had given his brother, Lieutenant Colonel Prevost, the authority to summon the town. The latter responded to the Americans that any of the garrison who did not accept the king’s peace and protection would be considered prisoners of war.

Despite the concerns of Rutledge and the Privy Council, Moultrie and his officers argued vehemently that they should hold out. The civilian officials prevailed, however, and they had Moultrie send a proposal to Prevost that offered South Carolina’s neutrality in exchange for the security of Charleston. The question of whether the state would belong to the United States or Great Britain at the end of the war would be determined by the peace treaty.

When the message was sent to Lieutenant Colonel Prevost on 12 May, he replied that he had not come in a legislative capacity and that his business was with General Moultrie as military commander and not with Governor Rutledge. The receipt of these words in Charleston spurred Moultrie to take charge. Meeting with his officers, the governor, and the Privy Council, he asserted that they would “fight it out.” The truce at an end, he immediately issued orders to the men on the lines to prepare to defend the city.

On the following morning, 13 May, the garrison discovered, with great surprise, that the British had withdrawn. Pulaski attempted to pursue the retreating force, but he found that it had safely reached James Island southwest of Charleston.

By 6 May, Lincoln was rushing back down the Savannah River to relieve Charleston. The British intercepted a letter indicating his return, which influenced Prevost’s decision to withdraw. His lack of siege artillery and a cooperating naval force also swayed him. Prevost probably could not have taken Charleston with the means he had available, but he gambled in summoning the town in the same way he gambled in moving into South Carolina rather than opposing Lincoln in the Georgia backcountry. The roll of the dice of crossing the Savannah into South Carolina paid off in that Lincoln was compelled to abandon the expedition against Georgia.

Given this success, Prevost's failure to take Charleston mattered little.

Some South Carolinians, meanwhile, harshly criticized Lincoln for going into Georgia and leaving the state undefended. Lincoln was sensitive to these comments and requested permission to resign. The Continental Congress accepted his request, but Moultrie and Rutledge convinced him to stay. With the controversy fresh in his mind, Lincoln, for better or for worse, would keep his troops in the city when the British returned in 1780.

After remaining on James Island several days, Prevost moved his army to Johns Island and fell back to the Beaufort area beginning 16 June. Lincoln attacked his rear guard at Stono Ferry on 20 June in a bloody defeat for the Americans that brought a close to the campaign.

SEE ALSO *Moultrie, William; Prevost, Augustine; Rutledge, John; Stono Ferry, South Carolina.*

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CHARLESTON SIEGE OF 1780. The six-week British siege of Charleston represented the longest formal siege of the war. It was also the largest military operation in South Carolina.

AMERICAN DEFENSES

Charleston lies on a peninsula at the confluence of the Ashley and Cooper Rivers, which meet to form its harbor. With fewer soldiers than the British, Major General Benjamin Lincoln elected to concentrate the bulk of his troops in defense works just outside the town. The focal point of the American fortifications was a tabby and masonry hornwork that lay astride the main road into the city. Late in the siege, Lincoln's engineers enclosed this hornwork to form a "citadel" and constructed two covering redoubts, one on each flank.

In front of the hornwork, the main defense line, a parapet interspersed with redans and batteries ran across Charleston Neck from the Ashley River on the left to the Cooper River on the right. Before the parapet was a double-picketed ditch and, beyond that, two rows of abatis. The outer defense consisted of a canal, or wet ditch, eighteen feet across and from six to eight feet deep, fed by a tidal creek on the Cooper River. The canal extended across the peninsula stopping short of the Ashley. The Americans could control the depth of the canal by means of a dam with sluices on the Cooper. The main line

inclined forward on the American right to protect the dam, and an advanced redoubt covered the canal on the left. Chevaux de frise were sunk in the tidal creeks, which cut into the neck, and filled gaps in the line. Wolf traps, holes with stakes in their floors, lay between the canal and main defense line.

The Americans had constructed an effective defense in depth. To take Charleston, the British would have to force the city's surrender, or alternatively they would have to clear the canal, fight through lines of abatis and chevaux de frise, avoid falling into the wolf traps, struggle through the double-picketed ditch, and then scramble up the parapet, all under fire from rebel soldiers. Even then the Americans would be in possession of the hornwork and supporting redoubts.

THE FORCES ENGAGED

Manning his fortifications, Lincoln had twenty-seven hundred Continentals and two thousand militia. The Continentals included those of South Carolina, North Carolina, and a detachment of Virginians. Shortly after the siege began, an additional seven hundred Virginia Continentals arrived in Charleston, and one thousand sailors from the Continental and South Carolina navies came ashore to serve in the lines.

At the outset of the siege, Clinton's army of 7,500 men consisted of two battalions of light infantry; two battalions of British grenadiers; four battalions of Hessian grenadiers; the 7th, 23rd, 33rd, 63rd, 64th, and 71st Regiments of Foot; a detachment of the Royal Artillery; Regiment von Huyn; a detachment of jägers; and the British Legion (Cathcart's), American Volunteers (Ferguson's Corps), New York Volunteers, North Carolina Volunteers, and South Carolina Royalists. Most had embarked at New York, but a number of the provincial units had marched from Savannah with Paterson. On 18 April a reinforcement arrived from New York, consisting of the 42nd Regiment (Black Watch), Regiment von Dittfurth, the Queen's Rangers, the Prince of Wales Regiment (Brown's Corps), and the Volunteers of Ireland. This gave Clinton another 2,600 men.

THE FIRST PARALLEL

On the night of 1 April 1780, Clinton sent out fifteen hundred laborers and an equivalent number as a covering party to begin the first parallel. By the following morning, the British had constructed three redoubts, connected by a trench, from eight hundred to a thousand yards from the Charleston defenses. The Americans were shocked that the British had moved so quickly. Still hauling guns into position, they fired from thirty to forty cannon shots at the new earthworks throughout the day.

Major James Moncrief planned six fortifications for the first parallel, anchored on the left by a battery to be constructed on Hampstead Hill, a small rise overlooking the otherwise flat terrain before the city. British troops seized this high ground on the Cooper River on the night of 3 April and established the battery. Recognizing the position's significance, Clinton expected a sortie against it. Lincoln sent the Continental sloop of war *Ranger* up the Cooper to bombard the work. *Ranger* scored a number of hits on it, but British artillerymen further upriver used a howitzer and twenty-four-pounder to drive the vessel off. Lincoln planned an assault against the fortification but demurred when he realized the British had enclosed it.

American artillery harassed British working parties daily as they pressed on with the first parallel. From 4–5 April alone, rebel cannon threw 573 shots at the besiegers. Although causing little damage and few casualties, the bombardment unnerved British laborers. To relieve the pressure, Clinton had a battery west of the Ashley River and galleys posted in the Ashley fired into the town. This action terrorized civilians but did little to check the American guns. On 7 April an expected reinforcement of seven hundred Virginia Continentals arrived to further bolster the garrison.

While the army had successfully blockaded Charleston on the neck, Clinton wished to invest Charleston completely. Arbuthnot's ships had lain anchor in Five Fathom Hole since crossing the bar on 20 March. On 8 April 1780, Arbuthnot in the *Roebuck* (forty-four guns) led the *Romulus* (forty-four guns), the *Renown* (fifty guns), four frigates, the sloop of war *Sandwich*, and two transports past Fort Moultrie. Although a third transport ran aground and had to be abandoned, the other vessels received only minor damage and anchored safely near British-held Fort Johnson on James Island. The Royal Navy now controlled the harbor.

Arbuthnot went ashore to consult with Clinton, and the two commanders agreed to summon the garrison even though batteries in the first parallel were incomplete. Major Crosby delivered the message on 10 April. Without consulting his officers, Lincoln responded that sixty days had passed since British intentions were known, which had given him time to abandon the city, but that he intended to hold it to the last extremity.

THE AMERICAN SITUATION

Lincoln called a council of war on the morning of 13 April to discuss the critical situation of the garrison. He outlined to his senior officers the unfavorable state of their troops, provisions, stores, and artillery. His engineers, meanwhile, had little faith in their defensive works. Brigadier General Lachlan McIntosh argued that they should at least evacuate the Continentals from Charleston. The meeting was

interrupted, however, by the opening of the British batteries in the first parallel.

Throughout the day and into the night, British guns bombarded the American lines and the city. Lincoln's artillerymen returned the favor, and the two sides dueled until midnight. Never before had Charleston seen such a cannonade. The battery on Hampstead Hill propelled hot shot into the town, starting several fires, and there were a number civilian casualties. Artillery firing continued almost daily for the next four weeks.

Before the first parallel was completed, British working parties commenced an approach toward a second parallel. They had constructed a battery 150 yards in front of the left of the first parallel on 9 April, connected to the parallel by a trench. From this position, they pushed forward to a second parallel just 750 feet from the American canal. When American batteries and riflemen directed their fire against laborers in this vicinity, the British began a new approach from the right of the first parallel. They excavated another section of the second parallel at the head of this sap and connected the two sections on 17 April. Ignoring the method espoused by Vauban, Moncrief had his men dig the approaches directly at the enemy lines, rather than in a zigzag fashion, which allowed the Americans to fire down the length of the saps.

Tarleton's victory at Moncks Corner on 14 April and the subsequent British advance into the region east of the Cooper threatened the garrison's access to the South Carolina backcountry. The besieging army's progress on the neck, meanwhile, was evident. On 20 April, Lincoln convened another council of war to weigh options. Once again describing the gloomy state of affairs, he asked the officers what measures they should pursue under the circumstances. With a British force east of the Cooper, evacuation through that region was still possible but now more difficult. Still, General McIntosh thought it the best course of action. Others, led by Colonel Laumoy, a French engineer, argued for offering terms of capitulation.

When Lieutenant Governor Christopher Gadsden, chief civilian official in Charleston, entered, Lincoln allowed him to participate in the council. Gadsden insisted they postpone further discussion until he consulted the Privy Council. When they reconvened, Gadsden returned with Benjamin Cattell, Thomas Ferguson, Richard Hutson, and David Ramsay of the Privy Council. Gadsden browbeat the officers, insisting that "the militia were willing to live on rice alone" rather than surrender and even "old women . . . traveled the streets without fear or dread" of British shot. Ferguson was more direct. He noticed that the army had collected boats, ostensibly for the purpose of evacuating the city. Ferguson asserted that if the Continentals attempted to withdraw from the town, he would open the gates for the British and assist them in attacking Lincoln's soldiers as

they boarded the boats. Under this pressure, Lincoln and his officers abandoned the idea of escaping the city.

The following day, 21 April, the council of war determined to offer honorable terms of capitulation. The terms Lincoln put forth were unrealistic, however, including articles allowing all American troops and ships to withdraw unmolested from the city. After a brief truce, Clinton and Arbuthnot rejected the proposal.

CLOSING IN ON CHARLESTON

While strengthening and constructing batteries in the second parallel, British working parties pressed on toward a third. The third parallel, when completed, consisted of two unconnected sections. On the British left, engineers extended the parallel toward the dam that allowed the defenders to control the water depth in the canal.

As the British advanced their approaches and parallels, the garrison offered stiff resistance, and American solid shot, grapeshot, and small arms took their toll. Work slowed after completion of the second parallel because of the increasing proximity to the Charleston lines. Still, the Americans had thus far failed to sortie against the besieging army. This inactivity may have caught the British off guard when two hundred South Carolina and Virginia Continentals, led by Lieutenant Colonel William Henderson, attacked the third parallel shortly before daybreak on 24 April. A heavy fire from the second parallel eventually compelled Henderson to retreat, but not before his detachment had killed or wounded eight men and captured twelve. American losses were Captain Thomas Moultrie killed and two wounded.

The sortie's impact extended to the next evening. When nervous American sentries fired muskets into the darkness, artillery and small arms erupted from the garrison. Assuming another sortie was under way, British and Hessian soldiers in the third parallel bolted for the rear. Troops posted in the second parallel mistook the retreating soldiers for advancing rebels and opened up on them. Before the officers discovered what had happened, at least twenty men had been killed or wounded. Beginning on 27 April, the Americans placed burning barrels of turpentine before their lines each night, illuminating the space between the armies and ensuring there would be no further sorties or false alarms.

When Brigadier General Duportail arrived in Charleston on 24 April, he offered a grim assessment of the American defenses. He asserted that the works were untenable and advised an evacuation. Duportail had missed the council of war on 20 April and was unfamiliar with the prevailing political considerations. Hence, Lincoln called another council on 26 April. The officers concluded unanimously that the British force east of the Cooper River and the civil authority's opposition made

such a move impracticable. Any possibility of escape ended the next evening when Colonel Malmedy abandoned Lempriere's Point, gateway to the backcountry.

By 1 May, British working parties had pushed a sap to the canal and opened a trench to begin draining it. The wet ditch was emptied by 6 May, and the British had thereby breached the first layer of the American defenses. The primary battery in the third parallel, meanwhile, played on the hornwork. The area between the lines became a no-man's-land, and both sides reported increased casualties as the siege dragged on. Artillery pounded fortifications, and riflemen on both sides targeted individual soldiers. The Hessian jägers were particularly effective in this duel, directing their fire at the American embrasures and preventing artillerymen from manning their guns in daylight. On 24 April, a jäger shot and killed Colonel Richard Parker, the highest-ranking officer to die in the siege, when he peered over the parapet.

As his men toiled in the trenches, Clinton worried that the rebels would not capitulate and that his men would have to storm their fortifications. The American situation was becoming more precarious, however. The presence of Cornwallis's force east of the Cooper and the loss of Lempriere's Point made it nearly impossible to transport large quantities of supplies into the town. The garrison possessed sufficient rice stores to last several weeks, but meat was becoming scarce. On 4 May the meat ration was reduced to six ounces per man, and four days later an officer reported that no meat was being issued. Another officer noted that the British taunted them by firing into the town shells charged with rice and sugar. Parties of soldiers sent among the civilians to locate surplus food turned up little.

NEGOTIATIONS

The loss of Fort Moultrie to the Royal Navy on 7 May was a serious blow to morale in the city. This success and Tarleton's victory at Lenud's Ferry once again gave Clinton the opportunity to summon the garrison. On the morning of 8 May, Clinton sent a message to Lincoln suggesting that he capitulate. A truce extended into the next day as councils of war were called, options discussed, and messages sent back and forth.

Negotiations broke down over the status of the militia in the event of surrender. Clinton easily accepted Lincoln's offer of the Continentals as prisoners of war, but the American commander also proposed that the militia be allowed to return to their homes. Clinton acknowledged that they could do so but only as prisoners of war on parole. He also objected to other issues involving the citizens of Charleston, and he did not believe the Americans worthy of the honors of war. He rejected Lincoln's stipulation that the defenders march out of their works with shouldered arms, drums beating, and

colors flying. He maintained that when the rebel army delivered up its arms, their colors were to be cased and their drums were not to beat a British march.

Lincoln would not accept Clinton's changes and talks ended. Shortly after nine P.M. on 9 May, American soldiers gave three cheers and their batteries commenced firing. The two sides furiously cannonaded each other throughout the night and into the next day. British artillerymen sent 469 rounds of solid shot and 345 shells into the rebel works and the city, the largest twenty-four-hour total during the siege.

American defiance proved short-lived, however. Lincoln received several petitions from the militia in garrison which indicated that they understood that negotiations with Clinton and Arbuthnot had broken down over their status as prisoners of war on parole. The militiamen now informed Lincoln that terms proposed by the British commanders were acceptable to them. Moreover, Lieutenant Governor Gadsden wrote him on 11 May advising the same. Lincoln called a final council of war; with the exception of General Duportail, the council voted to accede to British terms.

At two P.M. on 12 May, two companies of British grenadiers took possession of the hornwork, while the remainder of the army lined the canal and second parallel. The Continentals marched out through the gate of the hornwork with colors cased and drums playing the *Turk's March*. A detachment of light infantry and jägers met them midway between the gate and the canal to receive their arms. The militia paraded later in the day within the works. Once the Continentals had grounded arms, grenadiers hoisted the British flag above the works, and the Royal Artillery fired a twenty-one-gun salute. The British had achieved their greatest victory of the war.

CONCLUSIONS

Clinton had conducted a classic eighteenth-century siege, proceeding cautiously and methodically against Charleston. He would have done it no other way. Interestingly, Lincoln's engineers, including Duportail, had little faith in the American fortifications; the British, on the other hand, considered them formidable. Consequently, Clinton took no chances. This strategy may not have succeeded had he faced a commander willing to risk an escape.

Lincoln received harsh criticism from some for not withdrawing from Charleston. As can be seen from his deference to civilian officials during the siege, Lincoln very much understood that the success of the Revolution depended upon the support of the people. He was sensitive to criticism that he had left Charleston undefended when Prevost marched on the city. He would not let that happen again. In explaining his actions during the campaign to Washington, he noted that prior to the defeat at Moncks

Corner, his army could not have retreated "with honor" or the city been abandoned "with propriety." Both phrases suggest Lincoln was concerned with public opinion. He determined very early in the campaign to defend Charleston and keep the bulk of his force in the city. Unfortunately, Commodore Whipple's inept use of the sea arm, the cavalry's defeat at Moncks Corner, and the abandonment of Lempriere's Point meant that the British could encircle his army. With no real reinforcement reaching the city following the Virginians, Lincoln was doomed.

The nature of operations in South Carolina would have changed dramatically had Lincoln escaped. Eager to return to New York and move forward with operations in the Chesapeake, was Clinton prepared to pursue the Americans into the backcountry? Would the South Carolina militia who had not come in to Charleston have rallied to support Lincoln? Although Lincoln was not Greene, it seems safe to say that British forces would have faced a hornet's nest in the South. With Royal Navy support, the British army could capture coastal cities such as Newport, New York, Savannah, and Charleston fairly easily. It was in the interior that they could not prevail.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Fort Moultrie, South Carolina (7 May 1780); Lenud's Ferry, South Carolina; Monck's Corner, South Carolina.*

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revised by Carl P. Borick

CHARLESTOWN, MASSACHUSETTS. 17 June 1775. Located on the peninsula opposite Boston, Charlestown was settled in 1630 and in 1775 had a population of 2,700 people. All but about 200 had evacuated the town when the siege of Boston started, and those remaining seem to have fled before the battle of Bunker Hill on 17 June 1775. Parties of American soldiers, including detachments sent by Colonel William Prescott from his regiment at the redoubt on top of Breed's Hill, used the abandoned dwellings of Charlestown as cover from which to fire on the British left wing commanded by Brigadier General Robert Pigot. Samuel Graves, the vice admiral in command of the Royal Navy's North American squadron, commented:

The General [William Howe] observing the mischief his left wing sustained by the fire from Charles Town, the Admiral [Samuel Graves] asked him if he wished the place burned, and being answered yes, he immediately sent to the ships to fire red hot balls (which had been prepared with that view), and also to [the Royal Navy-manned] Cope [Copp's] Hill battery [at Boston] to desire they would throw carcasses into the town, and thereby it was instantly set on fire in many places, and the enemy quickly forced from that station. (French, p. 231)

Americans called this justifiable action an atrocity and pilloried Howe for burning the town. Charlestown was rebuilt after the British evacuated Boston in March 1776.

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege; Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Carcass; Graves, Samuel; Howe, William; Pigot, Robert.*

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CHARLESTOWN, MASSACHUSETTS. 8 January 1776. Successfully raided during Boston Siege by Thomas Knowlton during a performance of General John Burgoyne's play, "The Blockade of Boston."

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne, John; Knowlton, Thomas.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA. 26 September 1780. Cornwallis moved the largest of his three columns toward this village of twenty homes and a courthouse. Colonel William Davie was waiting to challenge him with twenty dragoons posted behind a stone wall near the courthouse and the rest of his command along Steel Creek road, in front of the stone wall. Major George Davidson commanded two companies of mounted riflemen, about seventy men, and Major Joseph Graham had a small body of Mecklenburg militia.

After being surprised by Davie at Wahab's Plantation on 21 September, Major George Hanger led the reinforced British Legion as an advance guard. When the rebel position was discovered at Charlotte, Hanger—eager for revenge—sent his infantry forward to clear the rebels from the fences along the road, and he himself led the cavalry charge against the twenty dismounted dragoons. Both elements of this ill-conceived attack were stopped by fire and driven back. At this point the British light infantry under Lieutenant Colonel James Webster arrived and forced the rebels to leave their fences along the road and fall back to defensive positions to the east of the town. Hanger and Webster renewed the attack and Davie ordered a retreat to Salisbury. The Legion cavalry pursued vigorously for several miles, a task more to its taste.

Each side lost about five killed and a dozen wounded. Davie did an excellent job of holding up Cornwallis's advance and withdrawing his forces under fire.

Davie, his small force of some 150 men augmented by nearly 1,000 militia under General Jethro Sumner, harassed the British at every turn, picking off foraging parties, attacking convoys from Camden, and—by intercepting messengers—keeping Cornwallis virtually without news of Ferguson's operations. Learning of the latter's defeat at Kings Mountain, Cornwallis abandoned his plans for a winter offensive into North Carolina and left Charlotte on the evening of 14 October to start his retreat to Winnsboro, South Carolina.

SEE ALSO *Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Wahab's Plantation, North Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CHARLOTTE RIVER, NEW YORK.

Alternate name for the east branch of the Susquehanna River.

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CHARLOTTESVILLE RAID, VIR-

GINIA. 4 June 1781. Learning from a dispatch captured on 1 June that Governor Thomas Jefferson and the legislature were meeting at this place, 60 miles west of his camp on the North Anna, Charles Lord Cornwallis sent Banastre Tarleton with a picked raiding force to scatter the legislators and capture the author of the Declaration of Independence, while John Simcoe led a second raid against the supply depot at Point of Fork. Cornwallis hoped that the two blows would land simultaneously. Departing before dawn on 3 June, Tarleton took with him 180 troopers of his Legion and the Seventeenth Light Dragoons plus a reinforcement of 70 mounted infantrymen from the Twenty-third (Royal Welch Fusiliers) under Captain Forbes Champaigne. His raiding party had a greater distance to traverse, so it was entirely mounted on horseback. However, Captain John Jouett of the Virginia militia spotted Tarleton's column the afternoon of the 3rd and got ahead of the raiders that night to spread the alarm. Having reached Louisa Court House at 11 P.M., Tarleton resumed his march at 2 A.M. on the 4th. Before dawn he captured and destroyed 12 wagons loaded with weapons and clothing for Greene's army. Six miles from his objective he split his force in two. One column rode to Belvoir, the home of John Walker, where Captain David Kinlock captured his cousin, Francis Kinlock, a member of Congress. Tarleton led the other column to Castle Hill, the home of Dr. Thomas Walker, where he captured a number of prominent Patriots.

While Tarleton was at Castle Hill, where he let his men rest an hour and have breakfast, Jouett reached Monticello. Jefferson's guests that morning included the speaker and other members of the assembly, who promptly departed for Staunton in the Shenandoah Valley on the other side of the mountains. A detachment of dragoons under Captain Kenneth McLeod entered the house less than ten minutes after Jefferson left it. Monticello was not damaged. Meanwhile, the other raiders had routed a militia guard at the ford of the Rivanna and charged into Charlottesville. It would appear that the three or four members of the legislature captured on this raid were those taken at Belvoir and Castle Hill, and that

none were bagged in town. Tarleton destroyed one thousand new muskets, four hundred barrels of powder, some military clothing, and several hogsheads of tobacco before moving with his prisoners to join Cornwallis about 9 June at Elk Hill, some thirty miles southeast of Charlottesville.

SEE ALSO *Cornwallis, Charles; Greene, Nathanael; Jefferson, Thomas; Point of Fork, Virginia; Simcoe, John Graves; Tarleton, Banastre; Virginia, Military Operations in.*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

CHASE, SAMUEL. (1741–1811). Signer.

Maryland. Born 17 April 1741, in Somerset County, Maryland, Samuel Chase was admitted to the bar in 1761. He became a prominent lawyer and sat in the colonial and then state legislature from 1764 to 1788, where he earned a reputation for extreme independence. He even supported the regulation of ministerial salaries, which reduced his father's income by half. Chase resisted the Stamp Act and, as a member of the Sons of Liberty, publicly affirmed his own participation in the looting of public offices, destroying stamps and burning the collector in effigy. In the Continental Congress of 1774 to 1778, he was also a member of the Maryland committee of safety, the first Maryland convention, and the Committee of Correspondence. He advocated a total trade embargo of England, favored confederation, and supported George Washington in the face of congressional intrigues. Chase was sent on the unsuccessful Canadian mission. In 1778 he attempted, with others, to corner the flour market, using congressional information about the arrival of the French fleet. Alexander Hamilton exposed this corruption, temporarily ending Chase's political career. In 1783 the governor of Maryland sent Chase to England to recover state funds invested in the Bank of England before the war. He failed in this mission. In 1786 he moved from Annapolis to Baltimore and, in 1788, he became chief judge of the new criminal court. A member of the state convention that adopted the Federal Constitution in 1788, he opposed its ratification. After serving as chief of the Maryland general court, he was named to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1796. In 1804, he was impeached by the House of Representatives but was acquitted by the Senate. He continued on the bench until his death on 19 June 1811.

SEE ALSO *Canada, Congressional Committee to.*

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CHASSEURS. Certain light infantry troops were known as Jägers in the German army and as chasseurs in the French and British army. Even the Germans, however, used the term “chasseurs” for those Jägers who were part of a regiment, as opposed to those who were in von Wurmb’s Jäger Corps.

SEE ALSO *Jägers*.

Mark M. Boatner

CHASTELLUX, FRANÇOIS-JEAN DE BEAUVOIR, CHEVALIER DE. (1734–1788). (Later marquis de.) French officer and writer. The grandson of Chancellor Aguesseau, Chastellux entered the army as *lieutenant en second* in the Auvergne Regiment on 23 March 1747, was promoted to captain on 20 May 1754, and became a colonel of the Chastellux Regiment at the age of twenty-one. Aide-major general of the Army of the Lower Rhine (1757), he became colonel of the Regiment of La Marche (1759) and then the Regiment of Guyenne (1761). Brigadier in 1769, he served in 1778 in the Army of Broglie on the coast and was promoted to *maréchal de camp* on 1 March 1780. Sent to America as major general under Rochambeau, he was helpful as an English translator. He remained in Newport until the start of the Yorktown campaign, stayed in Virginia until the summer of 1782, marched back with the French army to New England, relinquished his post as *maréchal de camp*, went to Philadelphia, and sailed from Annapolis early in January 1783. Named inspector general in 1782, he took the title of marquis upon the death of his brother in 1784. He became divisional inspector in Normandy on 1 April 1788 but died suddenly of a fever.

Chastellux’s larger reputation lies in his work as a literary and philosophical figure. In 1772 he wrote his famous essay *On Public Happiness*. He also wrote for the *Encyclopédie*. Chastellux was elected to the French Academy in 1775. His visit across several states provided material for a book, *Travels in North America*. Howard C. Rice Jr., translator of an English edition of *Travels*, wrote of Chastellux: “He was equally at ease in staff conferences,

in the drawing rooms of Philadelphia or Boston, and in roadside taverns” (vol. 1, pg. 16).

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

CHATHAM, WILLIAM PITT, FIRST EARL OF. (1708–1778). Prime minister. Pitt was born in Westminster on 15 November 1708, grandson of a wealthy merchant and ex-governor of Madras who had acquired the family fortune. He was educated at Eton (1719–1726), Trinity College Oxford (1727), and Utrecht (from 1728). As a younger son he had to make his own career, and in 1731 he was bought a £1,000 commission in Cobham’s regiment of horse. In 1733–1734 he took an attenuated grand tour of France and Switzerland, and in February 1735 he was elected to the House of Commons for the family pocket borough of Old Sarum, becoming one of “Cobham’s Cubs.” This group was closely associated with Frederick, Prince of Wales, who was at odds with his father George II, and whose home at Leicester House was a focus for opposition politics. The connection cost Pitt his cornetcy in May 1736. But he did not regularly take part in debates in the Commons and in 1742 failed to obtain a place in the ministry of John Carteret (Earl Granville). From about this time, however, he argued vehemently against financial and military support for the Hapsburg monarchy and Hanover, contending that vital British interests were being sacrificed for “a despicable electorate.” Although he moderated his language in 1744, it is hardly surprising that George II’s opposition kept him out of office until he became paymaster general in May 1746.

In the autumn of 1755 Pitt was dismissed from the paymastership for attacking the King’s new treaties with Prussia and Hesse-Cassel. In opposition, Pitt continued to argue that Britain should concentrate on naval and colonial objectives, rather than waste resources on alliances meant to defend Hanover. The loss of Minorca to a French invasion in 1756, followed by further disasters in India and North America gravely weakened the duke of Newcastle’s ministry and seemed to justify Pitt’s

criticisms. The king had to accept Pitt as secretary of state for the southern department (an office which gave him effective control of the war) with the duke of Devonshire as nominal prime minister. However, George II's confidence came at a price: once in office Pitt promised new support for Prussia in addition to a greater effort in America. Although dismissed in April 1757, he was able to forge a new alliance with Newcastle (who replaced Devonshire as prime minister) and resumed office on 29 June. The spectacular military successes of 1759–1760 were followed by plans for a pre-emptive strike against Spain. The last alarmed his cabinet colleagues, and in October 1761 Pitt resigned rather than give way.

Pitt attacked the Peace of Paris as far too moderate, given the scale of his own military successes. But his opposition to the Stamp Act seems to have been genuine. Unlike most contemporaries, Pitt argued that, because America was not represented in the Commons, Parliament had no right to levy internal taxes. Unlike George Grenville, who was far more prescient on this issue, he thought that Americans could raise no fundamental objection to external duties intended to regulate trade within the navigation system. Like almost everyone else, he thought that such powers were fundamental to Britain's prosperity and, even more important, to her naval power and security. The enthusiasm with which Americans greeted news of his speeches was therefore partly misplaced. Pitt never really resolved the paradox of standing up for American liberties on one hand while insisting on parliamentary supremacy on the other.

On 6 July 1766 Pitt was asked to form a new administration, but by accepting a peerage as earl of Chatham he seriously weakened his influence over his old power base, the Commons. The cabinet, distracted by the affairs of the East India Company and Chatham's ill health, was slow to work out specific policies toward America. Then, in January 1767, with Pitt ill at Bath, Charles Townshend denounced the distinction between internal and external taxes, effectively rebelling against the prime minister. The government's following in the Commons disintegrated, and Chatham returned to London only in time to hand over the leadership to Augustus Grafton.

Ill and isolated for two years, he returned to politics in 1769 to form an opposition alliance with the followers of Rockingham (Charles Watson-Wentworth). Rockingham opposed confrontation in America (in 1766 his short-lived ministry had carried the repeal of the Stamp Act with Pitt's support) which he associated with an imaginary court plot to subvert the constitution. However, age and infirmity had made Chatham both inflexible and autocratic, and he had nothing constructive to say about the fast-changing position in America. His speech on the Coercive (or Intolerable) Acts was muddled, and not until January

and February 1775 did he put forward coherent proposals. By now he was prepared to offer "concessions" to the Americans (his old talk of rights had vanished) in return for acknowledgment of ultimate parliamentary sovereignty. His position differed from Lord North's only in the scale of the concessions he was prepared to offer. Again disabled by illness, he took little part in politics during the first part of the War of Independence. In May and November 1777, alarmed by the likely Franco-American alliance, he argued strongly for an early and generous peace and for the futility of a war conquest. At the same time he set himself firmly against independence as a natural right and broke with the Rockinghamites in 1778. On 7 April he made a rambling speech on the issue of independence, then collapsed and was carried out of the House of Lords. It was his last exit: he died at Hayes on 11 May.

Pitt had little effect on American affairs after his resignation in 1761. His second administration did little to grapple with the problems of American resistance, and his insistence on the distinction between internal and external taxes was myopic at best. His initial apparent sympathy with the Stamp Act rioters concealed a conviction, which hardened as time went on, that Britain's great-power status depended on the subordination of her colonies. His reputation depends more on the legend generated by his unmatched oratory and by the sheer scale of his accomplishments during the Seven Years' War.

SEE ALSO *Grafton, Augustus Henry Fitzroy; Grenville, George; Independence; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; North, Sir Frederick; Rockingham, Charles Watson-Wentworth, Second Marquess of; Townshend, Charles.*

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revised by John Oliphant

CHATTERTON'S HILL. Scene of decisive action in the Battle of White Plains in New York on 28 October 1776.

SEE ALSO *White Plains, New York.*

CHEHAW POINT. Chehaw Point, twelve miles below Combahee Ferry, should not be confused with Cheraw on the Peedee River, near the North Carolina-South Carolina border.

SEE ALSO *Combahee Ferry, South Carolina.*

CHEMUNG, NEW YORK. 29 August 1779. Another name for action at Newtown.

SEE ALSO *Newtown, New York; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois.*

CHEROKEE. The Cherokee Indians were one the largest and most powerful Indian nations in eighteenth-century eastern North America. They inhabited a strategically important region in the southern part of the Appalachian Mountains, within the boundaries of the modern states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee. During the American Revolution, most of the Cherokee initially fought against the United States.

The Cherokee inhabited the southern Appalachian Mountains since before the period of European contact. The Cherokee entered into sustained interaction with the British in the late seventeenth century, after the founding of the colony of South Carolina in the 1670s. The Cherokees' political relations with the British were formalized in 1730, with the intervention of adventurer Sir Alexander Cuming, who anointed chief Moitoi of Tellico (a region in present-day Tennessee) as the "Emperor of the Cherokees." While Cherokee politics had no institution of emperor, Cuming did escort a number of Cherokee leaders, including a respected warrior named Attakullakulla, to London. From this point forward, the bulk of the Cherokees' commercial and diplomatic interactions would be conducted with the British, through South Carolina. Relations between the British and the Cherokee were generally cordial, although a brief Anglo-Cherokee War (1759–1761) arose during the Seven Years War after Cherokee warriors returning from service against the French killed some Virginia farmers' livestock. Tensions between the settlers and the Cherokees erupted into a full-scale conflict. After Cherokee warriors captured the British post of Fort Loudon, British regulars invaded the Cherokee country. Order was reestablished in large part due to the diplomacy of Attakullakulla.

After the Seven Years War, Cherokee-British relations were shepherded by the British Indian Superintendent for the Southern Department, John Stuart. In 1763, at Augusta, Stuart brought representatives of all of the southeastern tribes

together to reestablish commercial and diplomatic relations. The South Carolinian settlers' desire for land cessions from the Cherokee increased during the 1760s and 1770s. Cherokee leaders Oconostota and Attakullakulla supported land sales to British settlers, but with the outbreak of the American Revolution, they turned away from the colonists and supported the British side. John Stuart cautioned the Cherokees against openly challenging the American Revolutionaries, and older leaders like Attakullakulla agreed. However, tensions between frontier white settlers and the eastern Cherokees continued to increase. Younger Cherokee men, led by Attakullakulla's son, Dragging Canoe, seized on the opportunity offered by the Revolution to defend their lands, and joined with the Shawnee in attacks on American settlements that had been erected inside traditional Cherokee lands. In retaliation for these attacks, expeditions from all of the southern states—Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia—invaded the Cherokee country in the summer of 1776. The Americans destroyed many Cherokee towns, and large numbers of Cherokees became refugees, fleeing to the western side of the Appalachians and into the Creek nation. After the Cherokee homelands had been devastated, the older chiefs made peace agreements with each of the American states in early 1777. The price of peace was, as always, land.

The remainder of the American Revolution saw the Cherokees divided. The peacemaking faction remained neutral, while other Cherokees hoped for more robust British support. With his trade connections to Britain largely cut, there was little material aid that agent John Stuart could provide the Cherokees. By the end of the Revolutionary War, the Cherokee were dealing with the Americans. Under the leadership of Old Tassel, and with the advice of war-woman Nancy Ward, in November 1785 the Cherokee signed the Treaty of Hopewell with commissioners who had been appointed by the Continental Congress. This was the Cherokees' first treaty with the new United States. The Treaty of Hopewell established a boundary line between the Cherokees and Anglo-American settlers that was a compromise of sorts—it confirmed the large land cession the Cherokee had made in 1776–1777, but it did not give white land speculators and settlers everything they wanted. The treaty did acknowledge American victory in the Revolution and American sovereignty over eastern North America, and it committed the Cherokee to exclusive trading relations with the American government. Of course, Hopewell was not the last word in Cherokee-American relations. Pressure by American settlers and land speculators would continue into the early 1830s when, in the aftermath of the Cherokee Nation's landmark Supreme Court cases and the (what most consider) fraudulent Treaty of New Echota (1835) forced on the Cherokee by the Andrew Jackson administration, the Cherokee were forcibly removed to Oklahoma.

SEE ALSO *Indians in the Colonial Wars and the American Revolution; Stuart, John.*

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CHEROKEE EXPEDITION OF JAMES GRANT.

1761. In 1759 the long-standing friendship between the Cherokee nation and South Carolina deteriorated badly as the result of friction during John Forbes's 1758 campaign and a number of murders by frontiersmen of Indians as they returned home. Governor William Lyttleton averted trouble for a time, but individual acts of violence finally led to an eruption of open hostilities in January 1760. Before being promoted to governor of Jamaica, Lyttleton began raising troops and asked neighboring colonies as well as Jeffery Amherst, governor general of British North America, to send forces. Colonel Archibald Montgomery arrived in April with over 1,300 regulars (from the First Foot and Highlanders of his own Seventy-seventh Foot) and pushed up to the town of Ninety Six. Montgomery scored early successes in June by burning the so-called Lower Towns, but when he tried to penetrate into the wilderness the Cherokee dealt him a stinging defeat at Echoe on 27 June. As a result the regulars headed back to New York, leaving the isolated outpost of Fort Loudon to its fate.

In 1761 Amherst sent the competent Lieutenant Colonel James Grant back to Charleston with regulars from the First, Seventeenth, and Twenty-second Foot and some Mohawk and Stockbridge scouts. South Carolina contributed a provincial regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Laurens, rangers, allied Catawbas and Chickasaws, and a well-organized logistical train. On 18 May this force, about 2,800 strong, reached Ninety-Six prepared for a lengthy wilderness campaign. On 10 June the Cherokee again ambushed the column near Echoe and tried to repeat their successful tactics of concentrating on the pack train. But Grant was a much tougher opponent than Montgomery, and the action turned into a hard-fought battle lasting six hours. The British and colonials held their ground, suffering a dozen killed and fifty-two wounded; the Cherokee may have had

as many as twice the casualties, but more importantly they expended nearly all of their ammunition. As a result they were unable to offer further resistance as Grant spent nearly a month systematically burning the fifteen Middle Towns and destroying 1,500 acres of crops. With a Virginia column in the Holston Valley and threatening the Overhill Towns, Chief Attakullakulla ("Little Carpenter") opened peace negotiations.

The Cherokee never really recovered from this blow. The campaign also had an influence on the Revolutionary War by providing important military experience to many of the men who would become South Carolina's military and political leaders: Henry Laurens, Francis Marion, William Moultrie, Andrew Williamson, Isaac Huger, and Andrew Pickens.

SEE ALSO *Amherst, Jeffery (1717–1797); Cherokee; Grant, James; Huger, Isaac; Laurens, Henry; Marion, Francis; Moultrie, William; Ninety Six, South Carolina; Pickens, Andrew; Williamson, Andrew.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

CHEROKEE FORD, SOUTH CAROLINA.

14 February 1779. Skirmish preceding the action at Kettle Creek, Georgia, on the same date.

SEE ALSO *Kettle Creek, Georgia.*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

CHEROKEE WAR OF 1776.

As the Revolutionary War began, the British attempted to restrain the Cherokee from attacking the backcountry settlements while keeping them loyal to England. In June, however, combined Cherokee and Loyalist forces attacked settlements in South Carolina and Tennessee. Quickly, the colonial governments of South Carolina, Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia organized retaliatory expeditions. Colonel Samuel Jack was in the field by July, burning Cherokee villages in northern Georgia. In August, Colonel Andrew Williamson, with 1,800 troops and some Catawba scouts, marched into northwestern South Carolina, burning

more Cherokee villages as they went. From South Carolina, Williamson pushed into western North Carolina to rendezvous with General Griffith Rutherford.

Rutherford left Davidson's Fort (present day Old Fort, North Carolina) on 1 September with some 2,500 North Carolina militia and drove west through rugged Appalachian country to the Middle Cherokee villages along the Little Tennessee River. Not finding Williamson, Rutherford split his force, leaving 800 at Nuquassee (now Franklin, North Carolina). With the rest he marched further west to attack the Valley towns. Williamson eventually found Rutherford's reserve and, taking a different route west, rendezvoused with Rutherford at Hiwassee (now Murphy, North Carolina). Having burned all the villages along their routes, they returned home. A third column of 2,000 Virginia and North Carolina militia, under Colonel William Christian came down the Holston River from the north (Over Mountain Men territory) and burned out the Overhill Cherokee. Dispirited, and realizing the British would provide little assistance, the Indians started suing for peace. In the treaties of Dewitt's Corner, South Carolina, signed on 20 May 1777 with South Carolina and Georgia, and of the Long Island of Holston, in modern Tennessee, signed on 20 July 1777, the Cherokee ceded all their lands east of the Blue Ridge and dropped their claims to land north of the Nolachucky River. Some moved west to continue the struggle against white settlement and expansion.

SEE ALSO *Indians in the Colonial Wars and the American Revolution.*

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revised by Steven D. Smith

CHERRY VALLEY MASSACRE, NEW YORK. 11 November 1778. In the spring of 1778 Major John Butler, who directed Loyalist activities from Niagara, planned to disrupt the northern frontier as a strategic diversion from General Sir Henry Clinton's plans to move up the Hudson River valley. Toward this end, Butler led an expedition that ended in the Wyoming Valley Massacre in Pennsylvania on 3–4 July. His son, Walter Butler, was given command of

another Loyalist force that joined Joseph Brant's Indians for an attack in Cherry Valley.

In addition to distracting the Patriots, this campaign sought to secure British bases in the west. The Mohawk Valley settlements formed a salient that stretched toward Loyalist-held Fort Oswego and along the northern boundary of Iroquois territory. (See map "Mohawk Valley,") From his base at Unadilla, Joseph Brant raided settlements including German Flats on 13 September 1778. Patriots retaliated by destroying Unadilla on 8 October. A successful counterstroke now against Cherry Valley would relieve the pressure on Unadilla while setting the stage for operations against the Schoharie Valley and Canajoharie. The Loyalists might then move against Fort Stanwix (later Fort Schuyler) and regain the homes from which they had been forced to flee.

By the time Walter Butler and his Rangers reached the theater of operations, however, Patriot forces had returned to ravaged Wyoming and moved up the Susquehanna. In October, therefore, young Butler waited in his camp at Chemung, near Tioga, for this threat to subside, with plans to join forces with Brant at Oquago (later Windsor). While it is not clear why Butler delayed his attack so long, knowing that the Patriots would have more time to prepare their defenses, one reason might be that he had to make sure of his line of retreat through Tioga. It was also the case that it took time to persuade his Indian allies that it was in their interest to join the campaign.

CHERRY VALLEY'S DEFENSES

In the summer of 1740 a John Lindsay left New York City and established the first farm in the isolated valley to which he subsequently gave the name Cherry Valley. During the next ten years not more than four families joined Lindsay, but cordial relations were established with the Mohawks and, since this nation remained generally loyal to the British, the settlement survived the Seven Years' War unscathed. Early in 1775 they associated themselves with the Patriot faction and the next summer raised a company of rangers under the command of Captain Robert M'Kean. When this unit was ordered away, the Cherry Valley settlers started petitioning for troops. The New York Provincial Congress responded to their appeal of 1 July 1776 by sending a company of rangers under Captain Richard Winn. The house of Colonel Samuel Campbell was fortified and enclosed to form a place where the inhabitants could gather for safety. Since Joseph Brant assembled a considerable number of warriors around Oquago (sixty miles southwest) and appeared in Unadilla during the summer of 1777, military law was established in the Cherry Valley and most of the inhabitants gathered around Campbell's house. They responded to General Nicholas Herkimer's call to meet St. Leger's expedition but arrived too late for the Battle of Oriskany.

In the spring of 1778 Colonel Campbell joined Lafayette at Johnstown, explained the exposed position of the valley, and convinced him of the need for a fort there.

Meanwhile, the inhabitants of Cherry Valley returned to their stockade at Campbell's while waiting for the new fort to be built. Refugees came in from Unadilla and other settlements. Brant's forces remained active in the vicinity, snapping up a few prisoners and forcing the inhabitants to form armed parties to work their farms. Colonel Ichabod Alden arrived in July with his Seventh Massachusetts, numbering about 250 men, to take command. Alden has been much criticized as a poor officer, and his men had no experience of frontier warfare. Ironically, Colonel Peter Gansevoort had sought the assignment of garrisoning Cherry Valley with his regiment, the defenders of Fort Stanwix, but Alden was given the post.

James Deane, Schuyler's chief spy, had been sending in accurate intelligence of Loyalist-Indian activities and intentions. It was hoped that a Seneca chief called Great Tree, who returned to his people after spending some time in Washington's headquarters, would prevail on the Iroquois to cancel their plans for war against the frontier, but Deane reported in October that Great Tree had changed heart after hearing rumors of a planned invasion of Iroquois territory by Patriot forces. On 6 November a warning was sent to Alden from Stanwix: information had been received from friendly Indians of a "great meeting of Indians and Tories" on the Chemung (Tioga) River, at which Walter Butler was present and where the decision had been made to attack Cherry Valley. Alden sent his thanks, but made no further defensive arrangements.

THE LOYALIST-INDIAN ATTACK

The settlers got wind of this recent advisory from Fort Stanwix and asked to move into the new fort, or at least to store their valuables there. But Alden refused, assuring them that the intelligence was probably wrong and that the presence of their property in Fort Alden would tempt his soldiers to pilfer it. He did, however, send out reconnaissance parties. The members of the one that scouted down the Susquehanna were captured the morning of 10 November as they slept around their fire. Based on information from the prisoners that the rebel officers were billeted outside the fort, Butler and Brant planned their attack. On the night of 10–11 November, several inches of snow fell, and the next morning a thick haze and rain concealed the raiders' approach on the sleeping settlement.

The plan was first to hit the houses in which the officers were known to be billeted and then to attack the fort. At 11 A.M. the Loyalists and Indians were approaching their objective when a farmer rode by on his way to the fort. The Indians fired and wounded him but he escaped to spread the alarm. While the Rangers stopped to check

their firearms, an advance party of Senecas raced ahead to attack the Wells house, four hundred yards from the fort, where Alden was billeted with Lieutenant Colonel William Stacey and a headquarters company of 20 or 40 men. Alden ran for the fort but was killed well short of reaching it. Stacey was captured and several other officers and men were killed. The fort closed its gates and held out for the next several hours, Brant and Butler withdrawing at 3:30 P.M.

Turning from the fort to the homes scattered nearby, the raiders found six of the forty homes occupied. The Patriot prisoners held Butler responsible for the murder of some two dozen civilians while crediting Brant with preventing the killing of women and children.

Captain John McDonnell led a sortie from the fort that saved many settlers who had taken refuge in the woods. The raiders withdrew with seventy-one prisoners, most of whom were released the next day. On the morning of the 12th, having camped near Cherry Valley, Butler started his long retreat to Niagara. Since his mother and wife, as well as the wives of several Loyalist officers, were prisoners in Albany, Butler kept two women and their seven children as hostages. (Colonel Campbell's wife and four children as well as Mrs. James Moore and three daughters.) He also took with him just over twenty slaves, who certainly welcomed their liberation.

COMMENT

From a military viewpoint the Cherry Valley raid was a brilliant coup executed in the face of great difficulties. Its success was due largely to incompetent rebel leadership, which largely explains why American accounts prefer to dwell on the horrific aspects of the battle.

The Cherry Valley Massacre became another symbol of Loyalist-Indian barbarity, further feeding the cycle of violence against noncombatants. Just as the Mohawks were responding to the attack on Unadilla in moving against Cherry Valley, so the Patriots now retaliated by launching Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois from May to November 1779. It was supported by Brodhead's expedition and Clark's western operations.

SEE ALSO *Brant, Joseph; Butler, John; Butler, Walter; Clinton, Henry; German Flats, New York; Herkimer, Nicholas; Oriskany, New York; St. Leger's Expedition; Tryon County, New York; Unadilla, New York; Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.*

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revised by Micheal Bellesiles

CHESAPEAKE BAY. By 1780, the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries, lancing deep into the American countryside, seemed to fix the attention of Sir Henry Clinton, commander of the army that was attempting to subjugate Britain's thirteen rebellious colonies. Immediately following the conflict's eruption, skirmishes ashore and afloat had dotted the region, while a major British amphibious force raided the bay for two weeks with near impunity in 1779. As Clinton's southern campaign developed, especially following the capture of Charleston, South Carolina, the need for a deepwater port midway between the northern bastion of New York and the newly captured city seemed obvious. If such a port could serve as an enclave for recruiting local Tories, raiding rebel farms and plantations, or even regaining control of the colony, so much the better.

In late October 1780, the Royal Navy landed Major General Alexander Leslie and 2,500 men on the Elizabeth River with orders to establish a fortified harbor after raiding as far inland as Petersburg and Richmond, sites of major rebel supply depots. Leslie, finding virtually no support from local Loyalists, opted to seize the harbor at Portsmouth, Virginia, and to begin raiding only after fortifying it as his base. Before his entrenchments could be completed, General Charles Cornwallis, directly commanding British operations in the south, ordered Leslie to the Cape Fear region of North Carolina and then to Charleston to serve as a garrison force. By late November, the British presence in the Chesapeake Bay evaporated. Somewhat frustrated by Cornwallis's decision, Clinton immediately began planning another expedition to the region, issuing orders which would lead to the first of two major naval engagements and, eventually, to a world turned upside down.

PRELUDE TO BATTLE

On 11 July 1780, a French squadron of seven ships of the line, transports carrying around five thousand French soldiers, and supporting vessels anchored at Newport, Rhode Island. It posed little immediate threat to Clinton's strongly defended base at New York. Vice Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, commanding the British fleet, did not fear to engage the French at sea, especially after reinforcements under Rear Admiral Thomas Graves arrived hard on the heels of the enemy force. The inherent strength of the British defensive positions at New York and the numerical superiority of Arbuthnot's ships of the line eliminated an immediate tactical threat, but the strategic location of Newport, with its difficult-to-blockade approaches, threatened to allow French interference with other British operations, especially in the south.

In truth, a quick amphibious assault against the French position may well have resulted in the utter

destruction of the French forces, but their arrival found Clinton and Arbuthnot in the midst of an ongoing dispute over prize money dating to the capture of Charleston. Bitter feeling plagued their relationship, and neither was willing to give ground or full support to the other. In September, Admiral Sir George Rodney brought in the bulk of his fleet from the West Indies to avoid the hurricane season in the Caribbean. This worsened the rivalry, because Rodney refused to support either man and further alienated Arbuthnot by claiming overall naval command while in New York. Despite the tremendous naval superiority in American waters gained by Rodney's arrival, nothing had been accomplished by the time his fleet sailed back to the West Indies in mid-November except the stripping of spars, cables, and naval stores from New York.

With the departure of Rodney and the apparent return of Georgia and South Carolina to British control, Clinton determined to establish a permanent presence in Virginia. Brigadier General Benedict Arnold, late of the Continental army, landed at Westover, on the Chesapeake, on 4 January 1781. Within a matter of days, his forces had burned most of Richmond, Virginia, along with cannon foundries, supply depots, and anything else of value in the region. He then moved to Portsmouth, settling into the lines begun by Leslie the previous year. In late January, Arnold requested an additional 2,000 men, bringing his detachment to more than 3,500, for defense against the numerous rebels gathering around Portsmouth and to keep a raiding force active in the region. If he could not be reinforced, he suggested withdrawal to New York.

The danger posed by the French lodgment at Newport became evident in late January, when the 64-gun *Eveille* and two frigates escaped British blockaders. Graves, commanding the squadron on blockade, dispatched three ships of the line in pursuit. Caught by a harsh winter storm, the seventy-four gun HMS *Bedford* lost its masts, while HMS *Culloden*, another seventy-four gun ship, drove ashore on Long Island. Through heroic efforts its masts and rigging were saved to refit *Bedford*. The sixty-four gun HMS *America* was damaged in spars and hull and eventually returned to its anchorage. Meanwhile, the French raiders reached the Chesapeake, capturing a few merchantmen and the fourth-rate, 44-gun HMS *Romulus*. Without troops, however, the French could accomplish little against Arnold before returning to Newport.

Yet, the raid set forces in motion. The loss of *Culloden* and the addition of *Romulus* to the French squadron gave its commander, Captain Charles-Rene-Dominique Gochet Destouches (serving as commodore of the squadron since the loss of his admiral to fever), equality in hulls, if not in armament. It also encouraged General George Washington to dispatch Major General Marquis de Lafayette to the Chesapeake with 1,200 Continentals.

Major ships engaged at Chesapeake Bay					
British Ships	Guns	Captains	French Ships	Guns	Captains
<i>Robust</i>	74	Phillips Cosby	<i>Neptune</i>	74	De Medine Com. Des Touches
<i>Europe</i>	64	Smith Child	<i>Duc de Bourgogne</i>	84	Baron de Durfort
<i>Prudent</i>	64	Thomas Burnett	<i>Conquerant</i>	74	De la Grandiere
<i>Royal Oak</i>	74	William Swiney	<i>Provence</i>	64	Lambart
<i>London</i>	98	Vice-Adm. Arbuthnot	<i>Ardent</i>	64	De Marigny
<i>Adamant</i>	50	David Graves	<i>Jason</i>	64	De la Clocceterie
<i>Bedford</i>	74	Rear-Adm. Graves	<i>Eveille</i>	64	De Tilly
<i>America</i>	64	Gideon Johnstone	<i>Romulus</i>	44	De Villebrune
		Edmund Affleck			
		Samuel Thompson			

THE GALE GROUP.

By 3 March Lafayette's force rested on the Elk River, waiting hopefully for French naval transport to arrive. Meanwhile, as Arbuthnot worked feverishly to repair his ships from the same dockyard that had been stripped a few months previously by Rodney's vessels, Clinton organized men and transports to reinforce Arnold. Captain Destouches worked just as feverishly, cramming 1,120 soldiers with their equipment and supplies aboard his warships.

Destouches and his squadron—seven ships of the line, the fourth-rate *Romulus*, the sixty-four gun *Fantasque* armed en flute and two frigates—sailed on 8 March. Their disappearance was discovered by the British the following day. Arbuthnot's squadron—seven ships of the line, the fourth-rate *Adamant*, and three frigates—completed its repairs and upped anchor on 12 March. Clinton's transports, filled with over 2,000 men and their supplies and escorted by eight warships, followed on 20 March.

THE ENGAGEMENT

Heavy seas, strong wind, and variable visibility marked 16 March 1781 in the Atlantic waters off the entrance to Chesapeake Bay. Around 0600 hours, the frigate *Iris*, covering the rear of the British squadron, signaled the presence of the French force astern. The coppered bottoms of the British ships, which retarded the growth of weed and other sea life that could reduce ship speed, had allowed them to outpace the French ships, many of which lacked this maritime innovation. With the wind from the west, Arbuthnot immediately maneuvered to seek the weather gauge (a ship standing between the wind and an enemy ship is said to have the weather gauge, because it can determine the pace of the subsequent engagement). By 7 A.M., both squadrons had moved from their loose sailing formations to lines of battle (see table).

In each squadron's case, the line of battle would stretch for a mile on a day when visibility often fell

below that distance. As to the lesser ships in the action, *Iris* maintained watch over the French, while Arbuthnot stationed his remaining frigates as repeaters (flag officers often stationed ships too small to stand in the line of battle on the side of the squadron away from the enemy in order to repeat flag hoists to the squadron). The French frigates apparently covered the *Fantasque* during the action. As usual in such affairs, all stood clear of enemy broadsides that could shatter or sink them in an instant.

Initially, Destouches, his ability to work or fight his ships impaired by the soldiers crowding their decks, sought to avoid action by fleeing northeastward. As the faster British fleet steadily reduced his lead and the wind began to veer to the north then to the northeast, Destouches surrendered to the inevitable and wore his ships to face the British. By noon both fleets bore southeastward, with the French holding the weather gauge and *Robust* rapidly drawing abreast of *Romulus*.

Usually, holding the weather gauge provided a strong advantage. However, with heavy seas and strong winds, as on 16 March, a ship heeling to the wind buried its lower-deck gunports on the leeward side (the side away from the wind) in the waves, rendering those guns unusable. Destouches, realizing that the weather gauge merely increased British superiority in guns, decided to surrender it to the enemy. At 1:30 P.M. hours he ordered his ships to wear in succession around the head of the British line to a roughly westerly course. Arbuthnot, his line already extended from the morning's maneuvers, wore his ships as well and gained the weather gauge at the price of losing his advantage in number of guns. By 1400 hours, both fleets sailed a parallel course toward the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay. Arbuthnot kept his signal for "Line Ahead" flying, (a flag hoist instructing all ships to sail in a single column) apparently waiting for the ships at the rear of his line to resume station and intervals before hoisting "Engage the Enemy Closely."

But shortly after 2. P.M., and for reasons unknown, Captain Phillips Cosby steered his *Robust* directly toward the *Neptune*. As French fire concentrated on the *Robust*, the *Europe* and *Prudent* turned out of line to support it. Very quickly, the British flagship and the *London* entered the fray as well, clouds of smoke obscuring ships and signals. Unfortunately, Arbuthnot neglected to change his signal flag, and the remaining three British vessels, unaware of his desires, maintained their current course rather than closing in on the French rear.

Five British and eight French ships fought a chaotic battle inside the great cloud of smoke arising from their broadsides. British ships tended to fire at an enemy's hull, reducing their foe's firepower and weakening the ship's crew for eventual boarding. French doctrine called for the destruction of an enemy's rigging and masts, allowing French captains to eventually achieve a raking position, thus forcing the surrender of a drifting hulk. In this engagement, the upper-deck guns of Arbuthnot's ships fired with telling effect, as evidenced by the steady flow of blood from the scuppers of *Conquerant*, but French practice triumphed as the *Robust*, *Europe*, and *Prudent* soon drifted from the action with their rigging, spars, and even masts shot away.

Less than an hour after the first shot, Destouches decided to preserve his squadron and broke off southward. Arbuthnot, with damage to spars and sails on the *Royal Oak* and *London* almost as severe as that of his three lead ships, could not pursue. Instead he limped into Chesapeake Bay, securing it for the reinforcement convoy's eventual arrival.

CONCLUSIONS

Although Destouches clearly outperformed Arbuthnot in what came to be known as the battle of Cape Henry, he failed to secure the Chesapeake Bay for the Franco-American cause. Yet, Destouches's decision to abandon the action even after his maneuvers and British confusion provided a decided advantage is understandable. His ships, though in no danger of foundering, had been roughly handled by British broadsides. A continuation of the action may have resulted in a major victory, but the French navy lacked a dockyard in North America to repair damage to the squadron, much less any prizes captured. A Pyrrhic victory would have left the reduced and damaged French squadron blockaded, whether at an anchorage in the Chesapeake or at Newport. The soldiers packed between the decks of the French ships also weighed heavily on Destouches's mind. A protracted battle would have seen even more of them dead, perhaps in their hundreds, when delivering those same troops actually formed the core of his mission.

By denying the Chesapeake to the French, Arbuthnot won a tactical victory despite his poor performance in the battle. An admiral exists to control squadron and fleet

operations. By failing to engage his entire fleet against the French line, Arbuthnot came very close to defeat. Even so, his tactical victory contributed to a strategic fallacy. By securing the Chesapeake, Arbuthnot validated Clinton's enclave strategy. That validation ultimately led directly to the British defeat at Yorktown, wherein another British fleet failed to gain control of the bay. In the final analysis, neither side lost ships during the engagement. The British suffered 30 killed and 73 wounded. The French, because of crowded conditions and the British concentration on hull damage, lost 72 killed and 112 wounded.

SEE ALSO *Arbuthnot, Marriot; Destouches, Charles René Dominique Sochet; Graves, Thomas; Naval Operations, British; Naval Operations, French; Rodney, George Bridges.*

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revised by Wade G. Dudley

CHESAPEAKE CAPES. 5 September 1781. On 4 January 1781 Brigadier General Benedict Arnold, awarded his position in the British Army for betraying the American cause at West Point, landed with some 1,500 troops at Westover, Virginia, on the shores of Chesapeake Bay. After raiding rebel depots and towns, he established control of Portsmouth as a deep-water port for the Royal

Major ships engaged at the battle of the Chesapeake, listed in order of initial engagement					
British Ships	Guns	Captains	French Ships	Guns	Captains
<i>Shrewsbury</i>	74	Robinson	<i>Le Pluton</i>	74	de Rions
<i>Intrepid</i>	64	Molloy	<i>La Bourgogne</i>	74	de Charitte
<i>Alcide</i>	74	Thompson	<i>Le Marseillais</i>	74	de Masjastre
<i>Princessa</i>	70	Admiral Drake	<i>Le Diadème</i>	74	de Montecierc
		Knatchbull			
<i>Ajax</i>	74	Charrington	<i>Le Reflechi</i>	64	de Boades
<i>Terrible</i>	74	Finch	<i>L'Auguste</i>	80	Admiral de Bougainville
					de Castellan
<i>Europe</i>	64	Child	<i>Le St. Esprit</i>	80	de Chabert
<i>Montagu</i>	74	Bowen	<i>Le Caton</i>	64	de Framond
<i>Royal Oak</i>	74	Ardesoif	<i>Le César</i>	74	d'Espinouse
<i>London</i>	98	Admiral Graves	<i>Le Destin</i>	74	de Goimpy
		David Graves			
<i>Bedford</i>	74	Thomas Graves	<i>La Ville de Paris</i>	98	Admiral de Grasse
					Admiral de Latouche-Tréville
<i>Resolution</i>	74	Manners	<i>La Victoire</i>	74	de Saint Cezair
<i>America</i>	64	Thompson	<i>Le Sceptre</i>	74	Saint-Hyppolyte
<i>Centaur</i>	74	Inglefield	<i>Le Northumberland</i>	74	de Vaudreuil
<i>Monarch</i>	74	Reynolds	<i>Le Palmier</i>	74	de Briqueville
<i>Barfleur</i>	90	Admiral Hood	<i>Le Solitaire</i>	64	D'Argelos
		Alexander Hood			de Cicé Champion
<i>Invincible</i>	74	Saxton	<i>Le Citoyen</i>	74	d'Ethy
<i>Belliqueux</i>	64	Brine	<i>Le Scipion</i>	74	de Clavel
<i>Alfred</i>	74	Bayne	<i>Le Magnanime</i>	74	le Bègue
			<i>L'Hercule</i>	74	de Turpin
			<i>Le Languedoc</i>	80	de Parscau
			<i>Le Zélé</i>	74	de Gras-Préville
			<i>L'Hector</i>	74	d'Aleins
			<i>Le Souverain</i>	74	de Glandevès

Table 1. THE GALE GROUP.

Navy in furtherance of British commander in chief Sir Henry Clinton's southern campaign. On 16 March 1781 a British squadron under Vice Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot met a French squadron of similar size under Commodore Sochet des Touches off Cape Henry. Hours of maneuvering led to a brief though violent exchange of broadsides in which the French achieved an apparent tactical advantage. Des Touches, however, chose to withdraw rather than further risk his ships and men, leaving Arbuthnot in control of the entrance to the Chesapeake.

Meanwhile, General Charles Cornwallis, commanding the British field army in the Carolinas, won a Pyrrhic victory against the American army of Major General Nathanael Greene at Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina. Cornwallis, with supplies depleted and hundreds of wounded in tow, made for the British enclave at Wilmington, North Carolina. Once supplied and reinforced with the few men that could be spared from that garrison, Cornwallis opted to abandon the attritional campaign in the Carolinas for Virginia. Exactly what he hoped to accomplish in Virginia is unclear, though his absence did allow Patriot forces to reestablish control of the interior of the Carolinas.

By the end of May, over seven thousand regular and Loyalist forces worked to build new fortifications at the deep-water port of Yorktown, Cornwallis having abandoned Portsmouth as indefensible. For the British army in North America, ports meant safe havens: time and again the Royal Navy protected communications and logistics as well as evacuating troops from losing positions. Arbuthnot's apparent victory over des Touches in March merely strengthened that belief. Yet General George Washington, commanding the Continental Army investing New York, studied his maps and envisioned the British position at Yorktown as a vast trap, awaiting only a concentration of American and French troops and a brief period of naval superiority to cinch a war-ending victory.

PRELUDE TO BATTLE

In truth, the threads leading to the Battle of the Capes are as complex a weave as any of the massive cables used by ships of that era. At their core rests the British southern campaign, beginning with the successful siege and capture of Charleston, South Carolina, in 1780. This opened the door for Clinton's subordinate, Cornwallis, to begin the pacification of the Carolinas, an effort that seemed to yield

initial success, thus encouraging the establishment of an enclave at Portsmouth, Virginia. Meanwhile, French entry into the war saw a French squadron sheltering at Newport, Rhode Island. Inferior in both guns and hulls to the British squadron based in New York, it elicited little respect from the Royal Navy. Then, Washington's plan to eliminate the Virginia enclave together with a brief parity in hulls between French and British squadrons led to the near-run battle off Cape Henry. Had des Touches persevered, the British position at Portsmouth may have been forced to surrender, ending the Virginia campaign and penning Cornwallis in the Carolinas. But he did not, and both battered naval squadrons eventually returned to their respective home bases, more than willing to play a waiting game while repairing. In July Arbuthnot, complaining of his health, returned to England, relieved by Rear Admiral Thomas Graves, his second-in-command at Cape Henry. About the same time, des Touches resumed his role as ship's captain, replaced as commodore by a new arrival from France, the comte de Barras. Both sides awaited reinforcements, knowing that the upcoming hurricane season would bring the fleets operating in the West Indies northward; but only Barras knew with certainty that the coming campaign would center on the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay.

Strangely enough, two of the key threads leading to this battle originated far from Yorktown and Chesapeake Bay, at St. Eustatius in the Leeward Islands and in the French port of Brest. Since 1632 St. Eustatius had been a thorn in the British side whenever war visited the New World. Claimed in that year by the Dutch, the port became a commercial center of the West Indies, especially for smugglers seeking to avoid British maritime law and duties. Since the outbreak of the American rebellion, ship after ship from the wayward colonies had unloaded tobacco, rice, indigo, lumber, and other products, returning to their home ports with weapons, ammunition, specie, or other cargoes necessary to continue resistance against the British.

On 2 February 1781 Admiral Sir George Rodney took advantage of Great Britain's recent declaration of war on Holland to lead a fleet of fourteen ships of the line, five lesser warships, and three thousand troops against the harbor. The defenders, one ship of the line, and a gaggle of smaller vessels supported by less than one hundred troops, immediately surrendered, and into the hands of the commander of all British naval forces in the region fell quite possibly the single richest prize in the Indies. Rodney, sick of body and with his mind burdened by mounting debt at home, could not resist the loot of easy wealth. Over the next months, he focused almost exclusively on securing his share of the prize money, even to the point of shifting the dispositions of ships to protect the convoy bearing this wealth to England, a convoy that Rodney soon followed home.

Rodney's fixation on personal gain came at a very bad time for the British efforts in America. On 22 March Rear Admiral de Grasse, the comte de Grasse, sailed from Brest, France, with a large fleet of warships escorting 150 merchantmen to the West Indies. Rodney, with some intelligence of expected French reinforcement to the theater even before de Grasse left port, ordered his chief subordinate, the newly minted Rear Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, into a defensive posture in mid-February. In company with Rear Admiral Francis S. Drake, Hood cruised with eighteen ships of the line to windward of French-held Martinique, site of Front Royal, the largest French base in the Leeward Islands and the obvious landfall for the expected enemy fleet. By mid-March, they had nothing to show for their efforts other than some two thousand men suffering from scurvy.

Rodney, believing that the French had sought another destination, then shifted Hood's squadrons to the leeward side of Martinique to serve as a covering force for a weakly escorted convoy of over a hundred prizes and transports loaded with the loot of St. Eustatius and bound for England. Hood obeyed under protest, fearing that he would be unable to bring the expected French fleet to a decisive action before it could reach Front Royal. On 29 April, de Grasse and twenty ships of the line escorted the merchantmen from Brest into Front Royal after a sharp skirmish with Hood and Drake. Having abandoned the windward position at Rodney's orders, the British admirals could not close the range in time to prevent de Grasse from reaching safe haven.

Over the next weeks, de Grasse led or dispatched detachments to threaten British holdings in the West Indies. Thwarted at St. Lucia, de Grasse managed to capture Tobago. In early July the French admiral and his entire fleet sailed from Martinique, escorting the annual convoy of merchantmen bound for France on the first stage of its journey. With the convoy safely on its way, de Grasse anchored in the harbor of Cap François on Hispaniola. There he received a packet from General comte de Rochambeau, commanding the French army supporting Washington and the rebellion. Because the admiral would need to leave the West Indies during the hurricane season, the general urged de Grasse to find men, artillery, and money, then make his first landfall at the Chesapeake Capes. There he would join a Franco-American land force to isolate and destroy the British army under Cornwallis. Moving expeditiously, de Grasse gathered over three thousand men, artillery and siege artillery, and a large sum of money from local resources. His fleet, over twenty ships strong, then sailed for the Chesapeake on 3 August 1781.

Two days earlier, Rodney, seeking healthier climes and no doubt desirous to put his financial affairs in order, had sailed for England with three ships of the line

and a large convoy of merchantmen. Before leaving, Rodney ordered Hood to sail for New York, looking into both the Chesapeake and the Delaware Bays on the way. Hood, with Drake joining at the last moment, sailed from Antigua on 10 August. His fleet, however, had dwindled to a mere fourteen ships of the line because of detachments and worn vessels. On 25 August Hood arrived at the Chesapeake. Thanks to their coppered bottoms, the British had outsailed the French. Failing to find de Grasse in either of the American bays, Hood arrived at New York on 28 August and anchored off Sandy Hook.

Refusing to waste time on getting his ships over the bar and into New York harbor, Hood had himself rowed ashore to meet with Rear Admiral Graves, freshly returned from a three-week cruise to intercept a rumored French squadron off Boston. Graves, senior in rank to both Hood and Drake by over a year, automatically inherited command of the combined squadrons. Pressured by the aggressive Hood and the recently garnered knowledge that de Barras had sailed from Newport with all of his warships and a large convoy carrying men and siege equipment on 25 August, Graves moved his ships across the bar to join the West Indies squadrons as quickly as adverse winds allowed. On 31 August the combined squadrons set course of the Chesapeake, arriving on 5 September only to discover de Grasse at anchor inside the capes.

De Grasse had reached the Chesapeake Bay on 30 August, surprising and capturing one British frigate while another frigate and smaller craft fled up the York River. Anchoring his main fleet in Lynnhaven Roads, de Grasse dispatched his lighter vessels to interdict both the York and James Rivers while three ships of the line directly blockaded Yorktown, effectively isolating Cornwallis in his entrenchments as de Grasse's ships' boats began landing their contingents of infantry and artillery. Then, around 8:00 A.M. on 5 September, a French frigate signaled that a fleet had appeared outside the bay—a fleet with far too many warships to be the expected Barras.

THE ENGAGEMENT

The nineteen ships of the line, a fifty-gun ship too small to stand in the line of battle, seven frigates, and a single fireship composing Graves's fleet were in less than tiptop condition as it closed the Virginia Capes at 9:30 A.M. on 5 September. Though all were fully crewed and coppered, many badly needed refits, none more so than HMS *Terrible*, already pumping to stay afloat before the first cannon fired. A certain degree of rot also appeared at the command level where the aggressive Hood, having led most of the ships in the fleet from the West Indies, seemed to resent Graves's command of the combined squadrons. Graves, apparently seeking to reconcile his admirals, relied on command councils for decision making rather than firmly taking control of the fleet himself. And, in the

haste to leave New York, Graves failed to issue standing orders for signaling. This meant that, though using similar signals, the officers in the West Indies squadrons and those in Graves's New York squadron may well have interpreted them differently.

De Grasse's twenty-four available ships may have been in better overall physical condition than those of their enemy, but de Grasse had problems of his own. His ships, anchored in the best positions to unload their human cargoes, did not hold the best positions for a stationary defense. Furthermore, around fifteen hundred crewmen, including some ninety officers, were away in small craft or on detached duty supporting the landing force; thus virtually every ship would enter battle short-handed. Finally, the combination of fouled bottoms from their months at sea and an incoming tide meant it would be some hours before he could leave the bay to challenge his attackers.

Fortunately, the British approached slowly. Graves ordered the line of battle to form not until 11:00 A.M. At almost the same time, the tide having turned, de Grasse ordered his captains to slip their cables, leaving them attached to buoys for later recovery, and exit the Chesapeake at best speed while forming the line of battle on the fly. By 2:00 P.M., Graves, pushed by a north-northeast wind and thus possessing the weather gauge, could clearly see the disordered line of the French some three miles clear of the capes. He also made an accurate count of de Grasse's fleet. Although at that time there was a possibility of isolating and destroying the French van, the five-ship superiority of the enemy may well have nullified the loss of the van ships and allowed the French to still defeat Graves's fleet. Rather than risk a devastating loss that would guarantee the eventual fall of all British positions in the rebellious colonies, Graves opted for the strict linear engagement mandated by the *Fighting Instructions*, near sacred to Britain's Admiralty for many years. At 2:15 P.M., he ordered the fleet to wear to an easterly course that would parallel the French line.

The major ships engaged at the Battle of the Chesapeake are listed in order of initial engagement in table on page 207.

At 2:30 P.M. Graves ordered his van to steer more to starboard, thus edging closer to the French line. Several signals followed urging the rear squadron to make more sail and close the remainder of the fleet. At 3:46 P.M., Graves flew two signals, one to maintain the line ahead and the other to close and engage their opposite number in the enemy line. At 4:05 P.M., the second ship in the British line, HMS *Intrepid*, opened fire. Within minutes the van and centers of both fleets were hotly engaged. For almost two hours, these ships exchanged fire. Yet Hood, commanding the rear of the British force, never closed the enemy, justifying his failure to support Graves's center

with a misunderstanding of the signals. Graves, himself, felt that Hood's hanging back stopped the French from using their numeric advantage to penetrate and overwhelm the rear of the British fleet. In truth, a close engagement by Hood would most likely have simply increased damage and casualties without reaching a decision for either side.

By 1630, the fighting ended. Both sides had suffered heavy damage aloft, but the five leading ships of the British line had taken the worst of the damage, the *Terrible* barely managing to remain afloat. Over the next four days the two fleets, in roughly parallel columns, continued to sail eastward into the Atlantic. De Grasse saw no need to renew the action and was more than happy to keep Graves at sea while Barras and his transports entered the Chesapeake. Even after that, de Grasse had merely to keep the British out of the bay with his superior force to enable a strategic victory ashore against Cornwallis. Finally, late on 9 September de Grasse decided to end the game and turned his fleet for the Chesapeake, returning on the morning of 11 September to find Barras safely at anchor.

Graves declined to interfere with de Grasse's maneuvers. On 10 September he ordered the scuttling of the waterlogged *Terrible*, and three days later he received word from a frigate that de Grasse had joined Barras in the Chesapeake. With no hope of defeating that combined fleet, he ordered the British squadrons to return to New York. Heroic efforts saw the fleet repaired and reinforced to twenty-five ships of the line by 19 October. Yet Graves's new fleet sailed too late. Cornwallis surrendered on that same day, making any return engagement at the Chesapeake pointless.

CONCLUSIONS

The failure of Graves to secure any form of victory at the Battle of the Chesapeake Capes can be directly and immediately traced to Admiral Rodney. His fixation on personal wealth led to Hood's failure to engage de Grasse closely with a relatively equal force when the French fleet first appeared at Martinique in April—the best, perhaps only, chance to disrupt French naval activities in the Americas. Rodney compounded the problem by dissipating his ships to convoys (especially those of personal interest) throughout the West Indies, leaving a vastly inferior squadron to pursue de Grasse to the Chesapeake. Had de Grasse engaged Hood before reinforcement by Graves, say at the mouth of the Chesapeake or in Delaware Bay, it is difficult to see Hood escaping without severe losses. Nor could Hood have secured the Chesapeake by anchoring there on 25 August. The French could simply have blockaded his forces, then used fireships, cutting out expeditions, or even quickly established shore batteries to further weaken the outnumbered British before an overwhelming final assault. This is a moot point, however, as Rodney's orders prevented Hood from lingering in the Chesapeake.

Once Graves assumed control of the fleet, he had very little chance to free the Chesapeake of French shipping. An immediate attack on the French van certainly offered little guarantee of victory, and reengagement on any day between 5 and 10 September would only have increased the cumulative damage to both fleets—a game of attrition that the outnumbered British could not win. The same goes for Hood's failure to engage on 5 September. Commitment of the rear squadron offered little chance of victory and much chance of increased losses.

The Royal Navy's failure at the Chesapeake Capes, no matter the reason, sealed the doom of Cornwallis and his army. This second surrender of a major British army in the colonies destroyed the Grenville Ministry, and led directly to freedom for the rebellious colonies.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Nineteen British ships of the line engaged twenty-four French ships of the line at the Battle of the Chesapeake Capes. Smaller ships supported both sides. The British lost one ship, HMS *Terrible*, which was scuttled, and a frigate, HMS *Iris*, captured after the action of 5 September. British casualties numbered 90 killed and 246 wounded, as well as the crew of the *Iris* captured. The French lost no ships and reported total losses of slightly over 200 men (some estimates place this as high as 400 men).

SEE ALSO *Arbuthnot, Marriot; Charleston Siege of 1780; Clinton, Henry; Cornwallis, Charles; Dutch Participation in the American Revolution; Grasse, François Joseph Paul, Comte de; Grenville, George; Hood, Samuel; Rochambeau, Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de; Rodney, George Bridges; Weather Gauge.*

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revised by Wade G. Dudley

CHEVAL DE FRISE. A portable obstacle used to stop cavalry, form road blocks, close gaps in fortifications, and so on, it was formed of large beams traversed by pointed spikes. A submarine version, whose invention was attributed to Benjamin Franklin and which differed considerably in design, consisted of a heavy timber frame bristling with iron-tipped spikes; sunk on the bottom of a river, it could rip the hull of a vessel. Franklin's obstacles were used in the Delaware below Philadelphia and in the Hudson below West Point. Usually employed in the plural, the term "chevaux de frise" means "horses of Friesland," the province in North Holland where they first were employed, apparently during the Dutch War for Independence of 1568–1648.

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CHEVALIER. Many French volunteers came to America with this title, or were later awarded it, by virtue of being decorated with the Order of St. Louis. John Paul Jones was given the French Cross of the Institution of Military Merit in 1781, which entitled its holder to be addressed as "chevalier."

Mark M. Boatner

CHICKASAW. The Chickasaw Indians were an important eighteenth-century Indian nation that inhabited the lower Mississippi Valley, on the borderlands between British North America (later the United States) and Spanish Louisiana. In the eighteenth century, Chickasaw settlement was concentrated in the northern part of modern-day state of Mississippi, although their settlements also ranged into modern-day Tennessee and Alabama and some Chickasaw located villages among other Indian nations, such as the Creeks. The Chickasaw sided with the British and against both the Spanish and the United States during the War of the American Revolution.

The Chickasaw spoke a Muskogean language and lived in the region from the period before European contact. The people subsisted on an economy that combined agriculture and hunting and lived in established, named towns. European observers recorded eighteen different Chickasaw towns in the early eighteenth century, but by the middle of that century only ten named towns were recorded. English traders made contact with the Chickasaw in the 1680s, and the Chickasaw generally remained allied with the British throughout the years of the American Revolution.

The Chickasaw often attacked their French-allied neighbors, the Illinois and the Choctaw, and, with the Creeks, openly attacked the French garrison at Mobile during Queen Anne's War (1702–1712). The Chickasaw continued hostilities toward other French-allied Indians throughout the 1740s. The Chickasaw fought alongside the British forces in the Seven Years War. Their alliance with the British was reaffirmed by the negotiations of Indian Agent John Stuart at the Augusta Conference of 1763. Stuart sent a succession of deputies to the Chickasaw villages, which helped keep them loyal to the British during Pontiac's rebellion (1763–1766), and this same policy preserved the Chickasaw-British alliance during the Revolutionary war, albeit on their own terms.

The Chickasaw directed their hostility primarily against the Spanish government in Louisiana, which was under the command of Governor Bernardo de Galvez. As the Revolutionary War drew to a close, the Spanish and American governments competed for access to trade with the Chickasaw, with the Americans finally winning out. Chickasaw leaders signed the Treaty of Hopewell (1786) with the United States. In the early national period, the Chickasaw pursued a variety of strategies to cope with the expansion of American power, most often signing treaties that ceded progressively greater amounts of the lands they had claimed in the eighteenth century. The Chickasaw were removed west of the Mississippi River in accordance with the Treaty of Pontotoc (1832), which was signed after the passage of the Indian Removal Act (1830).

SEE ALSO *Pontiac's War*.

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CHILLICOTHE, OHIO. The Chillicothe division of the Shawnee always called their principal town (capital) Chillicothe. In the eighteenth century three separate places were known at various times as Chillicothe, and all were destroyed by whites. In 1774 Chillicothe on Paint Creek near its junction with the Scioto River, close to the site of today's Chillicothe, Ohio, was attacked by the forces of Virginia's royal governor, John Murray, the earl of Dunmore, during Dunmore's War. This town lasted until 1787, when it was destroyed by Kentuckians. Chillicothe on the Little Miami River was where Daniel Boone was held prisoner in 1778. George Rogers Clark destroyed this town on 6 August 1780. Chillicothe on the (Great) Miami River was originally called Piqua and was burned by Clark on 8 August 1780. Renamed Chillicothe, it was again destroyed by Clark on 10 November 1782. The modern city on this site was named Piqua in 1823.

SEE ALSO *Dunmore's (or Cresap's) War*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CHOISEUL, ETIENNE-FRANÇOIS, COMTE DE STAINVILLE. (1719–1785). (Later duc de Choiseul [pronounced shwa zearl].) French soldier and diplomat. Son of the marshal generally known as Plessis-Praslin, he entered the army and rose to the grade of lieutenant general. Choiseul entered the diplomatic service and advanced rapidly through ability and the sponsorship of the royal mistress, madame de Pompadour. As ambassador at Vienna in 1757, he started negotiations that led to the marriage of Marie Antoinette to the future Louis XVI. In 1758 he was awarded the title of duc de Choiseul. As minister of foreign affairs from 1758 to 1770, minister of war from 1761 to 1770, and minister of the navy from 1761 to 1766, he brought about the Family Compact (1761) and conducted a covert diplomatic system known as the Secret du Roi. Although he came to power too late to save France from humiliation in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), he started rebuilding the army and navy. Foreseeing the opportunity for France to profit from inflaming differences between England and its American colonies, he sent secret observers (including De Kalb) to

America after 1764 and expanded the spy service in England. As the result of conflicting reports from his agents, he had concluded by 1770 that open disruption was not imminent. Another major Bourbon power, Spain, was also struggling at this time. Choiseul undertook to support it in its conflict with England over the Falkland Islands, hoping for a war in which it could defeat England. His failure to promote this policy to Louis XV and the other ministers brought about his political downfall on 24 December 1770.

In disgrace at his estate Chanteloup from 1770 to 1774, he finally obtained the intervention of Marie Antoinette with Louis XVI to return to court, but the king received him coldly, and he returned to his estate. Financial difficulties plagued him in his final years, and he died near ruin.

SEE ALSO *De Kalb, Johann*.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

CHRISTOPHE, HENRY, KING OF HAITI. (c. 1757–1767–1820). Christophe, king of Haiti (1811–1820), supposedly took part in the attack against Savannah on 9 October 1779. Frances Heitman claims he was in the legion commanded by Fontanges. Hubert Cole, however, suggests that he may have fought either as a free infantryman or as an enslaved orderly for a French officer.

SEE ALSO *Fontanges, Vicomte de*.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

CHURCH, BENJAMIN. (1734–1778?). Informer. Massachusetts. Born at Newport, Rhode Island, on 24 August 1734, Church graduated from

Harvard College in 1754. After studying medicine under Dr. Joseph Pynchon, he went to the London Medical College, returning in 1759 with an English wife, Sarah Hill.

A talented man, Church quickly became one of Boston's leading doctors and was also well-known for his speaking and writing abilities as a member of the Patriots' Committee of Correspondence. On 6 March 1770 he accompanied those who officially protested the Boston Massacre, and the deposition he made after examining the body of Crispus Attucks was printed with other Patriot propaganda. In 1773 the town meeting selected Church to deliver the commemoration on the anniversary of the Massacre, in which he attacked British rule.

At the time of his election to the Provincial Congress in 1774, Paul Revere began to suspect Church of feeding information to Governor Thomas Hutchinson. On 22 April 1775, three days after the fighting at Lexington and Concord, he went to Boston on the pretext of getting medicines and claimed to have been captured and taken before General Gage. Most Patriot leaders accepted his story, and on 25 July 1775 Congress appointed Dr. Church chief physician to the Continental army at Cambridge. Meanwhile, Church had given Gage more than a month's advance notice that the Americans intended to fortify the Charlestown and Dorchester peninsulas, and he informed the British of business being conducted by the Provincial Congress.

Church proved a poor administrator. An investigation into his performance cleared him of misconduct, but he sought to resign on 20 September only to be dissuaded by Washington, who was desperate for capable doctors. The treason of Church came to light just a few days later, when Nathanael Greene brought Washington a coded letter that had been picked up in Newport when Church's mistress attempted to deliver it to a British officer there. Church was arrested on 29 September and his papers seized. Joseph Reed's search of his papers revealed nothing except that somebody—possibly Benjamin Thompson—had culled them just before Reed's arrival. The mysterious letter of 22 July was deciphered by two amateur cryptologists working independently, the Reverend West and Colonel Elisha Porter, and proved to be an intelligence report. In it Church told of his activities, described the strength and strategic plans of American forces, and mentioned the Patriot plan for commissioning privateers. After giving elaborate instructions for sending a reply, Church's letter ended: "Make use of every precaution or I perish."

Washington presided over a council of war on 3–4 October. Church insisted that he was just attempting to confuse the enemy, correctly stating that much of his information was false. The inquiry concluded that Church was guilty of communicating with the enemy,

but Washington and his generals found that the articles of war did not provide for any sentence more severe than cashiering, forfeiture of two months' pay, or thirty-nine lashes. Church was confined at Cambridge while Washington awaited instructions from Congress. On 27 October the Massachusetts legislature heard his case, and on 2 November expelled him from that body. On congressional orders he was then transferred under guard to the jail in Norwich, Connecticut. Church petitioned Congress in January 1776 for mitigation of his close confinement, which had brought on severe asthma. The delegates directed Governor Trumbull to move the prisoner to a more healthful place, but on 13 May they received another petition from the Norwich jail that showed he was still there and, according to the certificate of three doctors, in dangerously bad health. Since the British had by then evacuated Boston, Congress gave him permission to return to his home, where he was to remain under house arrest. However, after a mob attacked his home, he was moved to the Boston jail. In June 1777, General William Howe attempted to arrange an exchange for Church, but Congress refused. On 9 January 1778, the Massachusetts legislature finally decided to allow Church to leave, ordering him placed aboard the sloop *Welcome*, which was bound for the island of Martinique. The ship vanished in a violent storm.

SEE ALSO *Thompson, Benjamin Count Rumford*.

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CINCINNATI, SOCIETY OF THE.

In May 1783, when the Continental army was about to be disbanded, General Henry Knox obtained Washington's approval for a plan to form a society of officers. At a meeting on 10 May in Newburgh, New York, with General Friedrich von Steuben presiding, Knox, Edward Hand, Jedediah Huntington, and Samuel Shaw were selected to draw up final plans for the organization, and three days later their constitution was adopted at a meeting of officers held at Steuben's headquarters. "To perpetuate . . . as well the remembrance of this vast event [the Revolution], as the mutual friendships . . . formed," read the second paragraph:

the officers of the American army do hereby, in the most solemn manner, associate, constitute and combine themselves into one Society of Friends, to endure so long as they shall endure, or any of

their eldest male posterity, and in failure thereof, the collateral branches, who may be judged worthy of becoming its supporters and members.

Initially, the organization was limited to army officers, though naval officers were soon included. The founders named themselves after "that illustrious Roman, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus," who twice was called from his farm to save Rome (in 458 and 439 B.C.) and who twice returned to his plow when the crisis was past. The society's stated purposes were "to preserve . . . those exalted rights and liberties of human nature," to promote national unity and honor, to perpetuate the brotherhood of American officers, to help those officers and their families who might need assistance, and to seek pensions from Congress. Other paragraphs of the constitution dealt with the establishment of state societies, election of officers, and frequency of meetings and prescribed that each officer would contribute one month's pay for a welfare fund.

The constitution also dealt with the creation of a badge. The "order" of the Cincinnati, designed by Pierre L'Enfant, was the size of a silver dollar, emblazoned with a bald eagle, suspended by a dark blue ribbon edged with white to symbolize the alliance with France.

Washington was not an organizer of the society, but on 19 June 1783 he agreed to become its president. He was succeeded on his death by Alexander Hamilton, after whom the following original members held the office until their death: Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Thomas Pinckney, Aaron Ogden, Morgan Lewis, and William Popham. The latter was followed by Henry Alexander Scammell Dearborn, son of Henry Dearborn, who served from 1848 until his death in 1851. Hamilton Fish, son of Nicholas Fish, was president from 1854 to 1893. At about this time most of the state societies died out for lack of heirs, but the general organization was revived in 1902. In 1960 there were about 2,000 members in the United States and 150 in France.

There was a good deal of opposition to the society's formation, particularly to the wearing of a distinctive badge. Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Sam Adams, and many other Patriot leaders charged the Cincinnati with attempting to create an aristocratic order that would eventually threaten republican values. They believed that by excluding enlisted men, the officers perpetuated class antagonism in the ranks of the Revolutionary veterans. Although the Cincinnati turned out to be a fairly innocuous fraternal organization, hostility to it increased over the next twenty years. Rhode Island disfranchised its members, a committee of the Massachusetts legislature investigated it, and Supreme Court justice Aedanus Burke of South Carolina attacked the order in a pamphlet that was translated and published by Count Mirabeau under his own name. The Tammany societies of New York City,

Philadelphia, and other major urban centers were founded partly in opposition to the Cincinnati.

The French branch was extremely vigorous, Mirabeau's pirated pamphlet in no way slowing the rush of army and naval applicants. The eagle and blue ribbon are said to have been the only "foreign decoration" permitted to be worn by French subjects in the court of Louis XVI. But the republicanism of the French Revolution led to the disbanding of the French Cincinnati in 1792.

SEE ALSO *Adams, John; Adams, Samuel; Dearborn, Henry; Franklin, Benjamin; Hamilton, Alexander; Hand, Edward; Huntington, Jedediah; Jefferson, Thomas; Knox, Henry; L'Enfant, Pierre Charles; Lewis, Morgan; Ogden, Aaron; Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth; Pinckney, Thomas; Shaw, Samuel; Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von.*

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CLAPP'S MILLS, NORTH CAROLINA.

2 March 1781. During the period of maneuvering that preceded the Battle of Guilford Court House, British and American patrols collided on 2 March near Clapp's Mills on the Haw River. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee does not mention this brisk skirmish in his memoirs, but both Nathanael Greene and Charles Cornwallis mentioned it in their reports. The American force consisted of Lee's Second Partisan Corps reinforced by elements of Colonel Otho Holland Williams's light corps and some North Carolina and Virginia militia. Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton led the British light troops with Colonel James Webster's brigade in support. Lee used the militia as a screening force; when they started taking casualties they became convinced that they were being "sacrificed" to protect the Continentals and fell back. Tarleton did not pursue because he feared running into Greene's main body. Casualties were light on both sides, and the skirmish had little tactical significance. It and a second skirmish at Wetzell's Mills on 6 March did, however, lead to deteriorating morale among the North Carolina militia, which had a real impact on the rest of the spring campaign.

SEE ALSO *Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene; Wetzell's Mills, North Carolina.*

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CLARK, ABRAHAM. (1726–1794). Signer. New Jersey. After a general education he became a surveyor, a lawyer, and—informally—a settler of land disputes. He was known variously as "Congress Abraham" and "The Poor Man's Lawyer." He was high sheriff of Essex County and clerk of the colonial assembly under the crown. In December 1774 he was a member of the Committee of Safety and sat in the New Jersey Provincial Congress in May 1775 before going to the Continental Congress on 22 June 1776. He signed the Declaration of Independence and served in the Congress continuously until 1789, except for the single year in between the three-year term limits. In 1786 he attended the Annapolis Convention and in 1782–1787 sat in the New Jersey legislature. He was chosen a delegate to the Constitutional Convention in 1787, but poor health prevented his attendance. He opposed the Constitution until the Bill of Rights was added and favored legislation on behalf of the poor, including support for paper money and debtor relief. He became a Jeffersonian Republican. He was a member of the 1789 commission to settle the states' accounts with the United States and sat in Congress from 1791 until his death in 1794 from sunstroke.

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revised by Harry M. Ward

CLARK, GEORGE ROGERS. (1752–1818). Officer in the Virginia militia. Born near Charlottesville, Virginia, on 19 November 1752, George Rogers Clark had little formal education when he started studying surveying at the age of 19. He read widely in history and geography, however, and his letters indicate a sharp intellectual curiosity. Starting in June 1772, Clark made several journeys by flatboat from Pittsburgh, traveling down the Ohio River and finally staking claim to some

land at the new community of Fish Creek, 130 miles below Pittsburgh. Clark took part in Dunmore's War in 1774 as a militia captain, and then surveyed land on the Kentucky River for the Ohio Company.

With the beginning of the Revolution, Clark returned to Virginia to raise arms and ammunition for the western settlers. He anticipated a war against the Indians, whose land the settlers were in the process of stealing. It took Clark a year to acquire the munitions and to transport them west. During that time several Indian nations, including the Miami, Wyandot, and Shawnee, were themselves negotiating with the British for military support in an effort to reclaim their lands from the white settlers. Governor Patrick Henry commissioned Clark as a major and placed him in charge of the defense of the Kentucky settlements. Clark developed a bold plan of attack against the British military bases in the region. In 1777, Clark again traveled to Virginia to request aid. Governor Henry enthusiastically supported Clark's plan, covering its expenses and promoting Clark to lieutenant colonel.

In 1778 Clark recruited 175 men in the Pittsburgh area, without bothering to inform them of their mission. In June this small force took flatboats down the Ohio River to the mouth of the Tennessee River and then struck overland for Vincennes, where he planned to capture a British outpost. The surprise was complete, for both parties. When Clark roused the astonished outpost's commander from his bed, he discovered, to his chagrin, that his prisoner was French, and that there were no British at the outpost. Though the French were allies to the Patriot cause, Clark left a company under the command of Captain Leonard Helm at Vincennes and headed for Kaskaskia, on the Mississippi River. Clark found no British troops there, either.

Meanwhile, in the fall of 1778, the lieutenant governor of Canada, Henry Hamilton, led a small group of Canadian militia, British regular army forces, and Indians against Vincennes, taking the post by surprise and without loss of life. Hamilton sent his regular army troops back to Detroit and settled in for the winter. In January 1779, Clark recruited the French militia at Kaskaskia to join him at Vincennes. He attacked on the night of 25 February, opening fire on the garrison as they came running out of the blockhouse. Hamilton surrendered and was sent as a prisoner to Virginia. With this quick victory, Clark claimed control of the northwest territory for the United States.

In 1781 Clark went to Richmond, Virginia, to garner Governor Thomas Jefferson's support for an attack on Detroit. Their conversations were interrupted by General Benedict Arnold's raid, which sent them both fleeing for safety. Arnold burned several buildings, one of which contained Clark's vouchers for his military campaigns. Virginia never made good on these debts.

After the war, Clark served for a number of years on the board that supervised the allocation of the 150,000 acres north of the Ohio River across from Louisville that Virginia had granted for Clark's veterans. He also served with Richard Butler and Samuel Holden Parsons on the commission that concluded the treaty at Fort McIntosh in January 1786. In this treaty, the Indians acknowledged U.S. sovereignty over some of the western territory ceded by Great Britain. In 1786 Virginia and Kentucky charged the Indians living along the Wabash (Piankashaw, Shawnee, and others) with breaking various treaty promises and asked Clark to lead a punitive expedition. This mission failed when the Kentucky troops mutinied, charging Clark with ineptness. Clark returned to Vincennes with his Virginia troops and established a garrison there. Back in Kentucky he found it necessary to defend himself from both creditors and political enemies intent on ruining his public standing. Clark then entered onto a number of ambitious schemes, including a plan to establish a colony in Spain's Louisiana Territory and an expedition to take possession of disputed lands between the Yazoo River and Natchez, which President George Washington stopped.

More or less desperate, Clark accepted a commission as general in the French army, and set out to attack the Spanish territories west of the Mississippi River. The United States government demanded that he surrender this commission, and he was forced to take refuge in St. Louis, Missouri. In 1803 he built a cabin at Clarksville, on the Indiana side of the Ohio River, near the falls. Here he ran a grist mill until a stroke and the amputation of his right leg forced him to move to his sister's home near Louisville in 1809. He died and was buried there nine years later. His younger brother, William Clark, would gain fame as one of the leaders of the Lewis and Clark Expedition.

SEE ALSO *Dunmore's (or Cresap's) War; Indians in the Colonial Wars and the American Revolution.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

CLARK, THOMAS. (?–1792). Continental officer. North Carolina. Elected to the office of major of the First North Carolina Regiment on 1 September 1775, Thomas Clark became lieutenant colonel of the First North Carolina Continental Regiment on 10 April

1776. He commanded this unit on Sullivan's Island during the defense of Charleston in 1776. He became colonel of the regiment on 5 February 1777. Given the commonness of the surname, it is occasionally difficult to distinguish one Colonel Clark from another in accounts of the Revolutionary War. It is likely that this Thomas Clark led the North Carolina Continentals at Monmouth on 28 June 1778, and that he took his regiment to reinforce General Benjamin Lincoln at Charleston, arriving 3 March 1780, just in time to surrender to the British on 12 May. An officer called Lieutenant Colonel Clark is also identified as having been at Kettle Creek, Georgia, on 14 February 1779. Clark was brevetted brigadier general on 30 September 1783 and died on 25 December 1792.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Siege of 1780; Monmouth, New Jersey.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CLARKE, ALURED. (1744–1832). British officer. Born on 24 November 1744, Alured Clarke became an ensign in the 50th Foot in 1759. After seeing service in Germany, he was promoted to lieutenant on 10 May 1760, and then became captain of the Fifty-second Foot on 30 December 1763. In 1767 he transferred to the Fifth Foot, stationed in Ireland. He was made major of the Fifty-fifth Foot in 1771, and then colonel in 1775. He and his regiment sailed from Ireland to America the following year. In March 1777 he took command of the Seventh Fusiliers, which had recently been sent to New York from Canada, and held this commission until he succeeded General John Burgoyne as muster master-general of the German forces. He commanded British forces in Georgia from May 1780 until their withdrawal in July 1782.

Clarke was lieutenant governor of Jamaica from 1783 until 1791, when King George III made him lieutenant-governor of the new province of Lower Canada and commander of British forces in North America. In 1795, Clarke, now a major general, commanded a reinforcement that was sent to India with orders to rendezvous with General James Craig for an attack on the Dutch colony at the Cape of Good Hope. After the Dutch surrendered, on 14 September, he continued on to Bengal, where he was promoted to lieutenant-general and made commander in chief until his return to England in 1801. In 1830 Clarke and Sir Samuel Hulse, the two oldest generals in the army, were made field marshals. Clarke died on 16 September 1832.

SEE ALSO *Craig, James Henry.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CLARKE, ELIJAH. (c. 1733–1742–1799). Patriot militia commander, adventurer. North Carolina and Georgia. Born in Edgecombe County, North Carolina, probably of Scottish-Irish stock, Elijah Clarke moved with his family to Wilkes County (to the so-called “ceded lands”), Georgia, by 1773. Initially opposed to anti-British activities, he soon joined the militia and eventually became an important partisan leader during the war.

Modern authorities spell his name “Clark,” the style in which he signed it, at least in later life, but he is “Clarke” in traditional accounts. A militia captain, Clarke fought Cherokee and Creek war parties along Georgia’s frontier during 1776–1777. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in the state troops in early 1778 and wounded at Alligator Creek, Florida on 30 June 1778, Clarke had his finest hour at Kettle Creek, Georgia, on 14 February 1779. After leading his troops in three skirmishes in South Carolina in August 1780, (at Green Spring, Wofford’s Iron Works, and Musgrove’s Mill), and having been wounded in the last two, Elijah Clarke made his foolish attack on Augusta, Georgia, between 14 and 18 September 1780. Some authorities also credit him with action at Fishdam Ford. He was at Blackstocks, South Carolina, on 20 November 1780, and back at Augusta from 22 May to 5 June 1781. In early 1782 he led the Georgia militia as they assisted Continental General Anthony Wayne in pushing the British back to Savannah.

In recognition of his war services Clarke was granted an estate, and he fraudulently acquired several thousand additional acres from bounty certificates. Clarke led state militia during numerous Indian crises but when the U.S. government reduced military aid to the frontier and cancelled an invasion of the Creek nation, he resigned his post. In an effort to bring security to the frontier himself, Clarke formed and led several volunteer armies on various missions of his own design. Governor Mathews and President Washington stopped his 1794 attempt to invade East Florida. Clarke then led his volunteers and their families into the disputed Oconee territory where they established the short lived Trans-Oconee Republic before returning to Georgia. In 1795 Clarke attempted to organize a revolt along the Florida border but dispersed his men when faced with U.S. and Spanish forces. His proposal to organize a defense of East Florida from a possible British invasion was turned down by French and Spanish officials. He lost much of his property to debts incurred by these schemes. Despite all, he died a popular hero in 1799.

SEE ALSO *Georgia Expedition of Wayne; Green (or Greene’s) Spring, South Carolina; Kettle Creek, Georgia; Mathews, George; Musgrove’s Mill, South Carolina; Southern Theater, Military Operations in.*

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revised by Leslie Hall

CLAY, JOSEPH. (1741–1804). Merchant, politician. Born in Beverly, Yorkshire, England, Clay moved to Savannah in 1760 to join his uncle, James Habersham. A respected and successful merchant and planter, Clay served his state in a number of capacities throughout the war and afterwards.

Clay became involved in the revolutionary movement in 1774. He participated in Georgia’s first two provincial congresses and served on the council of safety in 1775. At the council’s direction he appraised and took an inventory of Savannah property in March 1776, prior to the defense of the capital against British ships seeking rice. He opposed the state constitution of 1777 as too radical and expressed his concern that people of little experience were assuming positions of authority in the state for economic gain alone. Henry Laurens, a friend of Clay’s and a member of the Continental Congress for South Carolina, relied on him for information regarding Georgia, which often went unrepresented in the Congress. He asked Clay to become deputy paymaster general for the Continental army in Georgia. Clay reluctantly agreed and eventually held this position for South Carolina as well.

Clay worked in this capacity until the end of the war. His job was difficult, for there was often no Continental money available either to pay the soldiers or purchase supplies. He felt his reputation as a trustworthy gentleman was in danger of being destroyed through nonpayment of debt accrued by the army under his name and so borrowed money to keep the army’s credit, and thus his own, sound. Although his position disqualified him from public office, he served as a member of the short-lived supreme executive council formed in Augusta during July 1779. He became well-known to Continental Generals Benjamin Lincoln and Nathanael Greene, among other prominent individuals in the war effort. His contact with these men served to bolster Georgia’s reputation and make the state’s many difficulties better understood. In June 1781 Greene sent him to Augusta to assist in the formation of the institutions of state government, which settlers in the

backcountry had been without for over a year. While never in a combat role, Clay traveled with the troops and earned the respect of militia Colonel James Jackson for his ability to share in their danger and hardship.

It took Clay a long time to close his government books after the war, and this delay hurt his business activities. Additionally, many could not pay him the debts they owed, and he in turn found it hard to pay off British creditors. He had moved his family out of state in 1779, abandoning his holdings when the British reoccupied Georgia. As the British evacuated the state in 1782, he purchased nearly four thousand acres of land from confiscated estates. The income from these and other holdings carried him through the next few years. He served the state as treasurer (1782), justice of his county (1783), and member of the assembly. He also participated in the successful campaign to modify Georgia's constitution of 1777.

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Leslie Hall

CLERKE, SIR FRANCIS CARR. (1748–1777). British officer. Clerke (the surname is pronounced “Clark”) became an ensign in the Third Foot Guards on 3 January 1770 and was promoted to captain on 26 July 1775. As General John Burgoyne’s aide-de-camp, he was mortally wounded by Timothy Murphy in battle at Bemis Heights on 7 October 1777 while delivering the orders to withdraw. He died that same night in the tent of General Horatio Gates. His orders were not received, leading to further losses by the British. His letters home from the campaign are notably well written and useful to scholars of the Revolutionary War.

SEE ALSO *Murphy, Timothy; Saratoga Surrender.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CLEVELAND, BENJAMIN. (1738–1806). Patriot, militia leader. North Carolina. Born near Bull Run, Virginia, he moved with relatives to the portion of the North Carolina frontier that became Wilkes County.

About twenty-one years old at this time, uneducated and with a fondness for gambling and horse racing, he developed into a frontiersman. On 1 September 1775 he became ensign in the Second North Carolina Line. He participated in the rout of Scottish Loyalists at Moores Creek Bridge in February 1776. The next summer he was a scout on the western frontier, and that fall he served under General Griffith Rutherford in the Cherokee War of 1776. He was promoted to captain after this campaign (23 November 1776) and saw the country where he was later to settle. In 1777 he served at Carter’s Fort and the Long Island of Holston. The next year he retired from the Second North Carolina on 1 June and in August was made colonel of the militia; he also became justice of the Wilkes County court when the county was organized, having been chairman of the Surry County Committee of Safety. In 1778 he was elected to the North Carolina House of Commons.

In 1780 he turned out to crush the Tories at Ramseur’s Mill on 20 June but apparently was with the force led by his old commander, General Rutherford, and therefore saw no actual fighting. Four months later, however, he led 350 men south to take part in the battle of Kings Mountain on 7 October 1780. Cleveland is said to have been the man most responsible for the decision to hang nine prisoners after the battle.

“Cleveland’s Bull Dogs” had a reputation along the Upper Yadkin for brutality and inhumanity as Tory hunters that was unmatched by David Fanning on the other side. As a “justice” he was a fast man with the rope. Prisoners were convicted and executed by order of drum-head court-martials. In 1781 he was captured by Tories but soon rescued.

After a title dispute Cleveland lost his plantation, so he moved to what is now Oconee County at the western tip of South Carolina. He became a justice of the region. General Andrew Pickens is among those who have testified that the uneducated, grossly fat Patriot hero normally slept through the court proceedings—he became highly annoyed at legal arguments and technicalities. Having reached the incredible weight of 450 pounds, he died at the breakfast table when in his sixty-ninth year.

SEE ALSO *Cherokee War of 1776; Fanning, David; Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Moores Creek Bridge; Ramseur’s Mill, North Carolina.*

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revised by Harry M. Ward

CLINTON, GEORGE. (1739–1812). First governor of the state of New York; Continental general. New York. Born in Little Britain, New York, on 26 July 1739, Clinton left home in 1757 to serve on a privateer. Returning home in 1760, he joined the militia company commanded by his brother, James Clinton, and took part in the capture of Montreal. After studying and practicing law for a few years, he entered the New York provincial assembly in 1768, where he became the rival of Philip Schuyler as a leader of the radical minority. In 1775 he was sent to the Second Continental Congress, but lost the opportunity of signing the Declaration of Independence because Washington ordered him to take charge of the defenses of the Hudson Highlands in July 1776. After being commissioned as a brigadier general of militia on 25 March 1777, he was also appointed a brigadier general of the Continental Army. The British threat to the Highlands did not develop until October 1777, but his defenses failed to stop Sir Henry Clinton's expedition or avert the burning of Kingston. On 20 April 1777, Clinton became the first governor of New York under the new state constitution, winning election to six consecutive terms. After General John Burgoyne's surrender in October 1777, fighting in New York state was restricted to border warfare, which forced Clinton to devote most of his energies to repelling the raids mounted by Loyalist and Indian forces from Canada. Clinton's firm opposition to Vermont's independence, which extended to twice threatening to take New York out of the war if Congress recognized Vermont, prevented coordinated defensive actions. Clinton insisted that the state of Vermont was in fact the northeastern counties of New York and he would not compromise or budge on the state's sovereign rights to these lands. On 30 September 1783 he was given the brevet rank of major general in the Continental army.

Clinton strongly opposed the federal Constitution, fearing that it would undermine New York's economic authority and his personal power within the state. Clinton published his anti-federalist views in seven "Cato" letters (so called because he signed them using the name of that Roman statesman). His reasoning made use of the French philosopher, Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu's insistence that republics survive only if they are geographically small in scope. Alexander Hamilton responded to Clinton with a series of letters signed "Caesar," and, more significantly, by completely out-maneuvering the governor at the state ratifying convention in June 1788. Clinton's opposition to the Constitution almost cost him the election in 1789. In 1792 he stole the election by having his agents throw out the results from three counties. Clinton refused to run for office again in 1795 because he recognized that his defeat at the hands of John Jay was inevitable, but he allied himself with the powerful and rich Livingston family and

Aaron Burr to win the governorship in 1800, moving on to serve two terms as vice president of the United States from 1805 to 1812, under Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. He died in office on 20 April 1812.

SEE ALSO *Clinton, James; Schuyler, Philip John.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

CLINTON, HENRY. (1730–1795). British commander in chief, 1778–1782. Clinton was born on 16 April 1730 to a naval officer who was related by marriage to the first duke of Newcastle. In 1741 Newcastle obtained for Clinton's father promotion to admiral and the governorship of New York, where the family lived from 1743. Young Clinton became a lieutenant in an independent company at New York in 1745, served at Louisburg the same year, and eventually rose to captain lieutenant. In 1748 he requested leave to go to France and probably traveled there (perhaps studying military science) from 1749 to 1751, when he returned to Britain. Through Newcastle's patronage he became a lieutenant in the Coldstream Guards (Second Foot Guards) on 1 November 1751, later rising to captain and aide de camp to Sir John Ligonier. On 6 April 1758 he became lieutenant colonel in the First Foot Guards and two years later saw his first actions at Korlach and Kloster Kamp. He became a colonel on 24 June 1762. Wounded at Johannsburg in Hesse on 30 August, he was invalided home. He was now established as a capable and experienced officer and a student of his profession. In 1766 he became colonel of the Twelfth Foot. Next year he married Harriet Carter (d. 1772) and went with his new regiment for a tour of duty at Gibraltar. In 1772 he was promoted to major general and began a political career as a member of Parliament in the Newcastle interest. In 1774 he was an observer of the Russo-Turkish war and on 1 February accepted the post of Gage's third in command in North America.

AT BOSTON AND CHARLESTON

On 25 May he reached Boston equipped with considerable and varied military experience, theoretical knowledge, and a generally sound tactical and strategic sense. Unfortunately, he combined these qualities with two



Henry Clinton. *The commander of the British Army in North America during the American Revolution, in a portrait (c. 1758) attributed to M. L. Saunders. COURTESY OF THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL ARMY MUSEUM, LONDON/BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY.*

paradoxical characteristics: a deeply ingrained diffidence (particularly when in command) and a tendency to press his ideas on his superiors with tactless assertiveness. He presented Thomas Gage with a workable plan for taking Dorchester Heights but failed to get it adopted, perhaps because he failed to advocate it firmly, perhaps because he tried too hard. At Bunker Hill he disobeyed William Howe's orders in order to join one of the attacking columns and play a significant part in the eventual victory, but he worried for months afterwards that he might be reprimanded.

The Charleston expedition of 1776, his first experience of high independent command, was hamstrung by the ministry's overestimate of the strength of the southern Loyalists and by the logistical problems that beset all other British generals in North America. By the time his convoy reached the Cape Fear River on 12 March, the North Carolina Loyalists had already been defeated at Moores Creek Bridge. His promised reinforcements under Sir Peter Parker and Charles Lord Cornwallis were late in arriving from Cork, so that Clinton's force was not wholly assembled until the end of May. By then Clinton had decided that it was too late to do more than set up a

raiding base in the Chesapeake before rejoining Howe for the attack on New York. However, he let Parker talk him into a combined assault on Fort Sullivan in Charleston Harbor, an attack that went fatally wrong when three of Parker's frigates ran aground and Clinton was unable to get his boats into the harbor at all. The results were a heavy boost to rebel morale, a three-week pause before re-embarkation was possible, and failure to reach Howe until perilously late in the season. None of that failure can fairly be attributed to Clinton's leadership, although Parker found it convenient to blame the army afterwards.

NEW YORK

Now a local full general, Clinton probably planned as well as executed Howe's brilliant turning movement at Long Island on 27 August 1776. Clinton was later very critical of Howe's slowness and caution in his New York and New Jersey operations, especially the failure to cut off Washington inside New York City. At the time, however, he was full of the need to avoid even the mildest reverse that might encourage the rebels and undermine the red-coats' qualitative and moral advantage. After capturing Newport, Rhode Island, he asked to go home on a winter's leave, but this may not have been provoked wholly or even predominantly by his disapproval of Howe. His request, and his intention to resign, was perhaps motivated more by the way Germain seemed to have absorbed Parker's version of the Charleston fiasco.

Germain, unwilling to lose an able commander, was conciliatory, arranged for him to be knighted for Rhode Island (even though the Order of the Bath was full), and obtained for him the rank of lieutenant general on the regular establishment. He was even considered for the command of the Canadian expedition eventually given to Burgoyne.

Clinton's feelings about the Howe brothers' 1777 strategy were certainly not those of a bold, imaginative subordinate chaffing at the slowness of an overcautious commander in chief. If anything, the roles were reversed. Clinton, left behind to protect New York and, if possible, cooperate with Burgoyne, feared that Washington might evade Howe and descend upon his garrison in overwhelming force. Throughout August he sat still, making no attempt to press up the Hudson. By early September it was clear that Washington had swallowed Howe's bait and would be busy in Pennsylvania; Burgoyne, on the other hand, was asking for help, and Clinton himself was expecting substantial reinforcements from Britain. The reinforcements did not arrive until 24 September and Clinton did not begin to push upstream until 3 October. By 7 October he had forced his way through the American fortifications. However, although Burgoyne's senior, and

although Burgoyne specifically asked him for instructions, Clinton would not accept the responsibility of coordinating the two armies. By 8 October he had nearly overcome the American fortifications in the Highlands but did not press on in force to Albany. Whether he could have reached there is doubtful: the Second Battle of Saratoga had been fought the day before and a small probing force under Vaughan and Wallace was still forty-five miles from Albany when it found the way blocked by around sixty-five hundred Americans. That was on 16 October, the day before Burgoyne finally surrendered. Howe's order to withdraw from the Highlands and send reinforcements to Pennsylvania came too late to affect the outcome. However, as Clinton was acutely aware, it did entail abandoning control of the lower Hudson, and with it the prospect of a base large enough to furnish adequate essential supplies.

CLINTON'S FRUSTRATIONS AS COMMANDER

By the end of the 1777 campaign, Clinton was again ready to resign, but the home government responded by making him commander in chief in place of Howe. Like Howe, he had to carry out a strategy devised in London while trying to keep his regulars intact for the final, decisive battle. With French entry into the war in 1778, his long transatlantic communications were all the more fragile, with the added danger that the French might at any time secure local superiority at sea. That certainly made him cautious, but as we have seen, he had been wary even in 1776. He was appalled when in May—just as he took over from Howe—he received orders to detach five thousand of his precious soldiers to the unhealthy West Indies for an attack on St. Lucia. Worse, to free these men he was to give up hard-won Philadelphia and with it the confidence of the Pennsylvania Loyalists. Worse, he was to send an expedition to Georgia to exploit the supposed great numbers of southern Loyalists. In short, he was asked to carry out a plan at least as ambitious as that of 1777 with far fewer and even more dangerously dispersed troops.

At first he was thrown onto the defensive. After failing to trap Lafayette at Barren Hill, Pennsylvania (20 May 1778), he had to evacuate Philadelphia by land (fighting the Battle of Monmouth on the way) to avoid a reported approaching French squadron. When he reached New York he found Estaing already threatening the harbor. It was November before the French fleet had gone and the St. Lucia detachment was safely away. Once the coast was literally clear, Clinton carried out the next part of his orders by sending three thousand men to Georgia. When Savannah fell in December 1778, Clinton wanted to exploit his success by attacking Charleston. But like Howe, he had to wait for the reinforcements that would

allow him to do so without dangerously weakening New York. Meanwhile, he sent a raid to the Chesapeake and tried to lure Washington into a decisive battle by again thrusting up the Hudson to take Stony Point and Verplanck's Point on 1 June 1779. This move severed the Americans' most important east-west communications and promised to establish that vital supply base. In July, while he waited for Washington to react, Clinton launched the Connecticut coast raid.

To his frustration, he then received orders to send two thousand men to Canada. The reinforcements from Britain came in August—too late and riddled with sickness—just as Clinton heard of another French squadron about to descend on New York. He prudently concentrated his forces in New York, calling in his advanced Hudson posts as well as the Rhode Island garrison. As it turned out, the French and the Americans combined against Savannah, not New York. These events have been used to represent Clinton as a hopelessly indecisive commander, but in truth he was the victim of lack of numbers, French intervention, the intractable problem of transatlantic logistics, and a flawed strategy devised by a ministry three thousand miles away.

CLINTON AND CORNWALLIS

February 1780 found him before Charleston, where he had unexpectedly trapped Lincoln's army. Prudently preserving his troops by conducting a slow, regular siege, he finally took the city's surrender on 10 May and left Cornwallis behind to complete the conquest of South Carolina. Above all, Cornwallis was not to attempt anything against North Carolina or Virginia that might imperil South Carolina and Georgia. Clinton had no intention of risking anything more until he had at least ten thousand additional troops and a certainty that the French would not once again seize local naval supremacy. There is evidence that the cautious Clinton already found it hard to work with his more dashing subordinate and with the touchy Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot. With Cornwallis now too far away to control easily and with little influence at home, Clinton suddenly found his cautious strategy undermined by the ministry's enthusiasm for Cornwallis's bold aggression.

Now Clinton's natural diffidence let him down. When Cornwallis invaded North Carolina and demanded reinforcements, Clinton sent detachment after detachment to the Chesapeake. By May 1781 around three-fifths of his regulars were in the South. Worse, when in the same month he found that Cornwallis had invaded Virginia without his consent, Clinton allowed him to stay where he was instead of ordering him back to South Carolina by sea. Knowing that a powerful French fleet could soon threaten British troops in the Chesapeake, Clinton decided to withdraw most of the forces there to New York. Yet when Cornwallis challenged these

orders, and in the face of Germain's order (soon to be countermanded) to make no withdrawals, Clinton backed down and allowed Cornwallis to establish himself a base at Yorktown. Germain had already thought better of his decision, but by the time his countermanding instruction arrived, it was too late: as Clinton had feared, the French had taken control of the Chesapeake and Cornwallis had been forced to surrender. While Clinton's hesitation and lack of confidence was a contributory factor, the fault lay with the faulty strategy imposed from London three years before, Cornwallis's reckless insubordination, and Germain's endorsement of that insubordination.

However, Clinton, not Cornwallis, became the scapegoat for Yorktown. He resigned and stayed in America only long enough to hand over his command to Guy Carleton on 5 May 1782. He then returned to Britain to find that the king would not reward his service as commander in chief and that he was widely held responsible for Yorktown—and, indeed, for the entire British failure in North America. In the general election of 1784, having quarrelled with his patron, the second duke of Newcastle, he even lost his seat in Parliament. He spent most of his remaining years trying to rescue some shreds of reputation. He was returned to Parliament in 1790 and promoted to full general in October 1793. In July 1794 he was appointed governor of Gibraltar but died before taking up this post on 23 December 1795.

ASSESSMENT

Clinton may have had a complicated personality, and he may at times have failed to assert his authority. Above all, however, he was placed in an impossible situation. The ministry insisted on directing a war from thousands of miles away when it would have been better to leave the commander in chief to get on with his job. Orders arrived late and caused confusion. Above all, the war was conducted from beginning to end on false premises: that there were huge numbers of would-be active Loyalists and that their greatest concentration was in the South. That led ministers to weaken gravely Clinton's army and to order its fatal dispersal in the face of enemies now powerful at sea. Much of his apparent dithering, like Howe's, was due to the late arrival of men and supplies that could only come from across the Atlantic. Clinton was an intelligent and able commander, and it is difficult to see how anyone in his position could have done more. Those who accuse Clinton of excessive caution as commander in chief should reflect upon where recklessness led Burgoyne and Cornwallis.

SEE ALSO *Arbuthnot, Marriot; Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Cornwallis, Charles; Estaing, Charles Hector*

Théodat, Comte d'; Gage, Thomas; Howe, William; Lafayette, Marquis de; Monmouth, New Jersey; Moores Creek Bridge; Parker, Sir Peter; St. Lucia, Captured by the British; Stony Point, New York.

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revised by John Oliphant

CLINTON, JAMES. (1736–1812). Continental general. New York. Born on 9 August 1736 in Little Britain, New York, James Clinton served as a militia captain in the expedition under John Bradstreet that took Fort Frontenac on 27 August 1758. He remained in the provincial army on frontier duty until 1763. At the beginning of the Revolution, Clinton was a lieutenant colonel with the Ulster County militia regiment. A delegate to the New York provincial congress of May 1775, he was named a colonel of the Third New York Continental Regiment on 30 June, and accompanied General Richard Montgomery's column of the Canada invasion to Quebec, taking part in the Battle of Quebec. On 8 March 1776 he was named colonel in the Second New York Regiment, and on 9 August Congress made him a brigadier general. In this capacity he joined his brother, George Clinton, in supervising the construction of defenses along the Hudson River.

Serving under his brother in the Highlands, James escaped from Fort Montgomery with a bayonet wound when it and Fort Clinton were captured by Sir Henry Clinton's expedition in October 1777. James Clinton was placed in command of the northern department, with headquarters in Albany, on 20 November 1778, holding that post until 25 June 1781. Upon taking command he launched a series of attacks against the Loyalists in Tryon County, and then led one of the two forces that constituted General John Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois from May to November 1779. After burning more than forty Indian towns and winning its only battle against the Indians, at Newton, this expedition pushed westward to the Genesee River but ultimately returned without having dealt the decisive defeat

to the Indians that General George Washington had desired. In 1781 Clinton and his brigade participated in the Yorktown campaign. He was brevetted major general on 30 September 1783.

A member of New York's ratifying convention, Clinton opposed the federal Constitution because it lacked a bill of rights. His son, De Witt Clinton, (1769–1828), would later be governor of New York and the Federalist Party candidate for President in 1812. James Clinton spent most of his last years overseeing his farm, and died in Little Britain on 22 December 1812.

SEE ALSO *Clinton, George; Clinton's Expedition; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois.*

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CLINTON–CORNWALLIS CONTROVERSY. Whether Sir Henry Clinton, as British commander in chief in North America, or Charles Earl Cornwallis, as commander of the British army in the South, was more responsible for the British defeat at Yorktown, and thus in America, led to a controversy that began in 1781 and ended only with Clinton's death in 1795. Cornwallis claimed that he had received from Clinton positive orders to entrench at Yorktown and await relief by sea. The energy and enterprise that Cornwallis had shown throughout the war in the South was not in evidence at that critical point. Clinton in late 1779 had made the decision to divide the British army in North America between New York and Charleston, South Carolina, and thus staked the survival of the army on the ability of the Royal Navy to maintain control of the sea lanes along the North American littoral. But he had not ordered Cornwallis to move north from South Carolina, first to North Carolina, and then to Virginia. And he had not positively ordered Cornwallis to sit down at Yorktown and await rescue. In truth, the Royal Navy had let down both army commanders. Its central administration at London had not put enough ships in commission, so that it was reduced to sending squadrons to follow the French across the Atlantic instead of blockading the French fleet in its harbors. Thomas Graves, its commander in North America, did not act aggressively with the ships he did have, and so he forfeited the only possible way he had to make up the deficiency. Clinton and Cornwallis could have, together, fixed the blame where it belonged, on the navy, but long-standing personal animosities led them to accuse each other of negligence.

Clinton opened the controversy while still at New York, publishing a pamphlet of his correspondence with Cornwallis before the end of 1781. He published a longer narrative shortly after he arrived home in 1782. Cornwallis responded with an answer to Clinton's narrative, and Clinton shot back with observations on the answer. An anonymous Cornwallis supporter then replied by pointing out alleged errors in Clinton's narrative. The controversy continued to simmer for another dozen years, but Cornwallis, the more astute politician, was already the victor where it counted, in the corridors of power. He went on to reap further glory and enhance his reputation as governor-general in India; Clinton never held another command.

SEE ALSO *Clinton, Henry; Cornwallis, Charles; Yorktown Campaign.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

CLINTON'S EXPEDITION. Clinton's expedition to the Highlands during 3–22 October 1777 (in support of Burgoyne's offensive). Sir Henry Clinton was left to defend the New York City area with about four thousand regulars and three thousand Loyalists when Howe sailed south on 23 July 1777. Clinton objected strongly to Howe's strategy, arguing that he was leaving all strategic decisions in George Washington's hands. Howe did not specifically direct that Clinton do anything to assist Burgoyne, and his letter of 17 July to Burgoyne said merely that Clinton was in command around New York City and should "act as occurrences direct." Howe's letters to Clinton spoke vaguely about his "acting offensively," and on 30 July he wrote Clinton, "If you can make any diversion in favor of General Burgoyne's approaching Albany, I need not point out the utility of such a measure."

During August, with Clinton convinced that Washington would attack New York City and Burgoyne confident of his own self-sufficiency, there was no question of military cooperation between them. In September, however, Burgoyne began calling on Clinton for help. By this time Clinton felt capable of giving some assistance as he expected sizable reinforcements from England and Washington appeared intent on battling Howe

in Pennsylvania. On 12 September, Clinton proposed attacking Fort Montgomery on the Hudson just north of Peekskill in hopes of drawing U.S. troops away from Burgoyne's army. Burgoyne got this letter on 21 September, two days after the First Battle of Saratoga, causing him to delay an attack that might well have succeeded in opening the road to Albany. Burgoyne wrote Clinton that "an attack or even the menace of an attack upon Fort Montgomery must be of great use, as it will draw away great part of their force. . . . Do it, my dear friend, directly." On 28 September, Burgoyne asked Clinton to instruct him whether to attack or retreat and said he would not have given up his line of communications to the lakes had he not been counting on finding British forces in Albany. Clinton responded in the third person that "Sir H. Clinton cannot presume to give any orders to General Burgoyne," thus further confounding the nearly paralyzed Burgoyne.

AMERICAN DISPOSITIONS

Major General Israel Putnam commanded the strategic region known as the Highlands of the Hudson River starting in May 1777. His strength had been reduced by the detachment of troops to other fronts, and at the time of Clinton's offensive he had only twelve hundred Continentals, most of whom were at Fort Independence, and four hundred militia around Peekskill; one hundred of the latter were unarmed and, "what is worse," wrote Putnam on 16 September, "it would be damned unsafe to trust them." On the west shore of the Hudson, four miles northwest of Fort Independence as the crow flies, about six hundred poorly equipped militia and a few Continentals held the two forts that were Clinton's objective.


Fort Montgomery, under the command of Colonel John Lamb, was well situated but uncompleted. Fort Clinton, named for New York's governor, George Clinton, was commanded by his brother, Brigadier General James Clinton. The mouth of Popolopen Creek was about 120 feet below Clinton and the two forts were separated by its deep gorge.

Clinton was the stronger fort, although smaller, and had to be taken if the British wished to hold Fort Montgomery. Approaches to the forts from the land side were through rugged defiles that could be easily defended. A system of obstructions, including so-called chevaux de frise, were strengthened by a log boom and a great iron chain that blocked the river below Fort Montgomery. Upstream from the boom was a flotilla comprising the frigates *Congress* and *Montgomery*, a sloop, and two galleys. West Point, about five miles north, was not fortified at this time, and the unfinished Fort Constitution, opposite West Point, did not figure significantly in this operation.

THE BRITISH STRATEGY

About 24 September, Clinton received reinforcements from England that brought his strength in regulars to 2,700 British and 4,200 Germans. On 3 October he moved north with 3,000 troops organized into three divisions. The evening of the 5th he landed troops at Verplanck's Point, on the east shore across the Hudson from Stony Point, and routed a small rebel outpost. Putnam hastily withdrew four miles from Peekskill into the hills and ordered reinforcements from Forts Montgomery and Clinton to join him, which was precisely what Sir Henry had intended to achieve by this initial diversion. Leaving 1,000 troops at Verplanck's to deceive Putnam further, the British commander landed near Stony Point the next morning under cover of a thick fog. Despite cumbersome uniforms and equipment that weighed 60 pounds and more, the troops followed their Loyalist guide, Brom Springster, quickly up a steep trail, through an 850-foot-high pass called The Timp, and down to a trail junction at Doodletown, within two and a half miles of Fort Clinton. Here, at about 10 A.M., they made contact with an American patrol and drove it back. Henry Clinton then sent 900 men around Bear Mountain to cross the creek and attack Fort Montgomery from the rear (west); the rest waited to give the encircling column time to make its difficult seven-mile circuit before attacking Fort Clinton from the south.

The forts were now commanded by Governor George Clinton, who hurried south from a meeting of the New York legislature at Esopus (later Kingston). He established his headquarters in Fort Montgomery. Washington had recommended outposting The Timp, but others—including Greene and Knox—argued that rough terrain ruled out the possibility of an enemy's using this route; the strategic point was therefore undefended. Scouts posted south of the Dunderberg informed Governor Clinton of the British landing at Stony Point, and he dispatched the thirty-man patrol that the enemy met at Doodletown. A second delaying force was driven back from the same area, although the fifty Continentals under Lieutenant Colonel Jacobus Bruyn and fifty militia under Lieutenant Colonel James McLarey conducted themselves creditably. Captain John Fenno left Fort Montgomery with sixty men to meet the column coming around Bear Mountain. Reinforced with a gun and forty more men, he took up a strong delaying position along the rugged side of the creek, about a mile from the fort, and forced the enemy to deploy. When threatened with being outflanked, the Americans spiked their gun and dropped back to another gun that Captain Lamb had run forward. Fenno was captured. When the second delaying position was threatened with envelopment, the defenders spiked the second gun and retreated to the fort.



Plan for the Attacks on Forts Clinton and Montgomery. This map, published in London in 1784, outlines the British plan for the storming in October 1777 of Fort Clinton and Fort Montgomery in New York. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GEOGRAPHY AND MAP DIVISION.

THE ASSAULT

After landing early and moving rapidly across difficult terrain, the British were not ready for a simultaneous attack by both columns until 4:30 p.m. After the customary summons to surrender and the heroic refusal, the action started. Opposite Fort Montgomery was the advance guard of Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell that had led the advance from Stony Point and had then made a difficult seven-mile march to get into position. From left (north) to right were the Fifty-second Regiment, a group of New York Volunteers, Colonel Beverley Robinson's Loyal Americans (four hundred strong), Emmerich's Hessian jägers, and the Fifty-seventh Regiment. Campbell was killed in the attack, and his men, enraged by his death, the rigors of their march, and the intense heat of the day, at first refused to give quarter. Some of the defenders were, however, spared, and others escaped north or east across the river. Governor Clinton was among the latter.

Fort Clinton's main defenses were oriented southward to cover a 400-yard-wide strip of relatively flat ground between what is now called Hessian Lake and the drop-off to the river. An abatis and 10 cannon covered this approach. Since there was little opportunity to maneuver and no artillery support, the British commander committed the bulk of his forces to a frontal attack from the south. In the first wave were the 7th and 26th Regiments and a company of Anspach grenadiers. They were followed by the battalion companies of the 26th, a dismounted troop of the 17th Light Dragoons, and some Hessian chasseurs. The battalion companies of the 7th and a German battalion followed in support. The 63rd Regiment circled west of Hessian Lake to attack from the northwest. In the best tradition of European regulars, Clinton's troops pushed forward through the abatis and the enemy's fire to claw their way into Fort Clinton. The British and Germans lost some 40 killed with 150 wounded, while American casualties numbered near 300, with 260 taken prisoner. The Americans also lost 67 guns and a significant quantity of stores and had to burn their flotilla when it could not escape north against the wind.

On 7 October the British broke through the boom and routed the small garrison at Fort Constitution. Putnam then abandoned his position at Fort Independence. The royal governor of New York, William Tryon, wanted to move on to Albany, but Clinton felt he would be walking into a trap. On 8 October, Clinton wrote Burgoyne, "I sincerely hope this little success of ours may facilitate your operations."

In fact, however, these little victories made no difference to Burgoyne, who lost the Second Battle of Saratoga on 7 October. In response to repeated appeals from Burgoyne, Clinton sent General Sir John Vaughan with seventeen hundred men, supported by a flotilla under Sir

James Wallace, with orders to render what assistance he could. Vaughan and Wallace picked their way through the chevaux de frise on 15 October and anchored that night near Esopus. The next day they burned the town and moved upstream to Livingston's Manor, about forty-five miles from Albany. Putnam now commanded some sixty-five hundred men blocking Vaughan's progress, and the latter's pilots refused to take his forces further upriver between the guns the Americans had placed on either side of the Hudson. Clinton received orders from Howe to abandon his gains in the Highlands and send reinforcements to Pennsylvania. On 22 October, Clinton wrote Vaughan to withdraw and the British returned to New York City.

This operation of Clinton's, although skillfully conducted, was no direct threat to the Americans around Saratoga. Nonetheless, it caused Gates considerable anxiety and raised Burgoyne's hopes, the former helping to explain the American generosity regarding the terms of the Saratoga Convention. Although exonerated at a court-martial for his conduct, Putnam never again received a field command. After Clinton's withdrawal, the Americans began construction of Fortress West Point to defend the Hudson River.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne, John; Burgoyne's Offensive; Cheval de Frise; Clinton, George; Clinton, James; Hudson River and the Highlands; Kingston, New York; Lamb, John; Philadelphia Campaign; Putnam, Israel; Saratoga Surrender; Saratoga, First Battle of; Saratoga, Second Battle of.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

CLUBBED MUSKET. Musket used as a club (in close fighting).

Mark M. Boatner

CLYMER, GEORGE. (1739–1813). Signer. Pennsylvania. Born in Philadelphia on 16 March 1739,

George Clymer was orphaned in 1746. He nonetheless grew up to be very well connected. He was reared by his uncle, a friend of Benjamin Franklin, who left him his business and fortune. Clymer further extended his social connections by marrying Elizabeth Meredith, the daughter of a wealthy Quaker merchant.

By the outbreak of the Revolution, Clymer was one of the three richest men in Philadelphia. He was an early Patriot and captain of a volunteer company in General John Cadwalader's brigade. In 1773 he was chairman of the "Philadelphia Tea Party," forcing the resignation of all merchants named by the British to sell tea, and he went on to serve on the city's Committee of Safety. On 29 July 1775 Congress appointed Clymer and Michael Hillegas to serve as U.S. treasurers. Clymer put his personal fortune behind independence, converting all his specie to Continental currency and subscribing to a loan, both of which proved to be costly decisions. On 20 July 1776 Clymer became one of five congressional delegates named by his state to replace those who would not sign the Declaration of Independence, adding his signature to that document on behalf of Pennsylvania. In Congress he served on the critical Board of War, giving special attention to reforming the army's medical and commissary departments. On 26 September 1776 he was named to inspect the northern army at Ticonderoga and advocated increasing General George Washington's powers. He was re-elected to Congress on 12 March 1777, but was defeated for re-election on 14 September. After the British took Philadelphia, they sacked his house. In 1777 he was named a commissioner to treat with the Indians near Fort Pitt. In 1780 he was one of the founders of the Philadelphia Bank, which was formed to supply the army. He was also re-elected to the Continental Congress (1780–1782). A member of the federal Constitutional Convention and a firm supporter of the Constitution, Clymer was elected to the first Congress but declined to stand for re-election in 1791. Shortly thereafter, Washington, then serving as president, named Clymer collector of the duty on spirits, where his heavy-handed methods helped spark the Whiskey Rebellion. In 1796 he helped negotiate the Treaty of Coleraine with the Creek Indians. He was vice-president of the Pennsylvania Agricultural Society and president of the Academy of Fine Arts and the Philadelphia Bank until his death on 23 January 1813.

SEE ALSO *Philadelphia*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

COCHRAN, JOHN. (1730–1807). Last medical director of the Continental Army. Pennsylvania. Born on 1 September 1730 in Sadsbury, Pennsylvania, John Cochran entered British service as a surgeon's mate during the Seven Years' War. Cochran saw a great deal of action, taking part in the battle of Fort Oswego in 1756, Colonel John Bradstreet's capture of Fort Frontenac in 1758, the British defeat at Fort Ticonderoga in 1758, and General Jeffrey Amherst's campaign up Lake Champlain in 1760. By war's end Cochran was a specialist not only in the treatment of wounds, but also in inoculation. Having made friends with Philip Schuyler during the war, Cochran settled in and married Philip's sister, Gertrude Schuyler. In 1762 he moved to New Brunswick, New Jersey, and helped found the New Jersey Medical Society in 1766, becoming its president in 1769. With the outbreak of the Revolution, Cochran volunteered. He was present with General George Washington during the crossing of the Delaware and at winter quarters in Morristown. He also collaborated with William Shippen, Jr. in preparing the plans that were used to reorganize the army medical department after 14 February 1777. On 11 April 1777 he was named physician and surgeon general of the Middle Department, and on 6 October 1780 he became chief physician and surgeon for the army. Among the hundreds of serious wounds he treated were those of General Lafayette (Joseph Paul Yves Roche Gilbert du Motier) at the Battle of Brandywine and Benedict Arnold at Saratoga. Following the traitor Benjamin Church and the Philadelphia doctors John Morgan and William Shippen, on 17 January 1781 he ascended to the top position in the army's medical department and served to the end of the war. In this position he was able to correct many of the inefficiencies he so vehemently deplored.

After the war Cochran settled in New York City, and in 1790 President George Washington had him appointed commissioner of loans. After suffering a paralytic stroke in 1795 he retired to Palatine, New York, where he died on 6 April 1807.

SEE ALSO *Shippen Family of Philadelphia*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

COCK OR COX HILL, NEW YORK

SEE *Fort Cockhill, New York*.

COERCIVE ACTS SEE *Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts*.

COFFIN, ISAAC. (1759–1839). British admiral. Massachusetts. Born in Boston on 16 May 1759, Coffin entered the Royal Navy at the age of fourteen. With the outbreak of the Revolution, Coffin remained in the British navy, being promoted to lieutenant in 1778 and placed in command of the cutter *Placentia*. He was court-martialed the following year for wrecking a ship under his command but was acquitted. After taking part in Rodney's victory off Saints Passage in April 1782, Coffin was promoted to captain and given command of the *Shrewsbury* (seventy-four guns). He was court-martialed for disobedience and contempt after refusing to accept three young officers appointed by Rodney to his ship, but once again he was acquitted. After having his naval rank suspended for listing nonexistent sailors, he joined the Brabant patriots of Flanders in their fight against Austria. His naval rank was restored in 1790, but he was removed from active duty in 1794 after being incapacitated by injuries incurred while rescuing a sailor who had fallen overboard. For the next decade he held a number of land-based posts, regularly getting in disputes with his superiors but earning promotion nonetheless. In 1804 he was knighted and made rear admiral, retiring with his promotion to vice admiral in 1808. By 1814 he had become full admiral. He served in Parliament from 1818 to 1826. Coffin maintained a deep and public interest in the country of his birth, repeatedly crossing the Atlantic to visit the United States, sending English racehorses to improve the breed, and importing plants and commercial fish (the turbot) to the United States. In May 1827 he established the Coffin School at Nantucket. Coffin died in Cheltenham on 23 July 1839.

SEE ALSO *West Indies in the Revolution*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

COFFIN, JOHN. (1756–1838). Loyalist officer. Massachusetts. Elder brother of Sir Isaac, he went to sea as a small boy and at the age of eighteen had been given command of a ship. On 15 June 1775 he reached Boston with a shipload of British troops. Two days later he ferried these soldiers over for the Battle of Bunker Hill, took part in the fighting on land, and for his gallant conduct was given a battlefield commission. After serving successively as ensign and lieutenant, he was

promised command of four hundred Loyalists on the condition that he recruit them in New York. Going to New York City after the evacuation of Boston (15 March 1776), he raised and assumed command of the mounted rifle force known as the Orange Rangers and led them in the Battle of Long Island. In 1778 he transferred into the New York Volunteers. The same year he went to the South, where he raised a corps of mounted troops in Georgia. Coffin took part in the action at St. Lucia (December 1778) and Briar Creek (3 March 1779). He is said to have distinguished himself in the action at Savannah (presumably in October 1779). He is also said to have been in the Battle of Camden on 16 August 1780. At Hobkirk's Hill on 25 April 1781, his gallant attempt to capture the American guns was beaten off, and he subsequently was routed by the cavalry of William Washington.

Captain Coffin particularly distinguished himself at Eutaw Springs on 8 September 1781. The Patriots are said to have offered a reward of ten thousand dollars for his head. Whether or not the story is true, Coffin appears to have believed it: after the battle of 8 September 1781, he left the main British army and fought his way to Charleston. He subsequently served under Cornwallis at Yorktown but escaped the surrender there and returned to Charleston, the home of his fiancée, Ann Mathews of St. Johns Island. When the British evacuated Charleston he went to New York City. On 25 December 1782, Carleton promoted him to major in the King's American Regiment, and at about this time Cornwallis presented him with a sword for his services.

Before the British evacuation of New York City, Major Coffin went to New Brunswick (Canada), where he was joined by his young wife and four slaves. Only twenty-seven years old, he started clearing his lands and eventually developed a valuable estate of six thousand acres about twelve miles from St. John. He remained in the British army on half pay, rose steadily in rank, and became a full general on 12 August 1819. Meanwhile, he was a successful member of the assembly and raised three sons, who had active military careers in various parts of the empire and helped establish a century-long pattern of United Empire Loyalist military professionalism. When Coffin died on 12 June 1838, he was the oldest general in the British service.

Another John Coffin, an uncle of the above, constructed the defenses that stopped Montgomery's column in the assault on Quebec on 31 December 1775.

SEE ALSO *Briar Creek, Georgia; Eutaw Springs, South Carolina; Hobkirk's Hill (Camden), South Carolina; Quebec (Canada Invasion); St. Lucia, Captured by the British*.

revised by Robert M. Calhoon

COLERAINE, FOURTH BARONSEE *Hanger, George; Tarleton, Banastre.***COLLIER, SIR GEORGE.** (1738–1795).

British naval officer. Born in London on 11 May 1738, Collier entered the navy in 1751 and became a lieutenant on 3 July 1754. After service at home and in the East Indies, he rose to post-captain. On 3 September 1763 he married Christina Gwyn only to divorce her nine years later. In the years prior to the War of American Independence this sensitive, cultured, short, muscular dynamo of a man not only held a series of naval commands but also successfully adapted a version of “Beauty and the Beast” for the Drury Lane stage.

In 1775 he was sent to America on a special mission, the nature of which is still unknown, but for which he was knighted on 27 January 1776. On 20 May he sailed in the frigate *Rainbow* (forty-four guns) for the American station, where Richard Lord Howe appointed him senior naval officer at Halifax. On 8 July he captured the large, newly built American frigate *Hancock*, which was taken into the Royal Navy as *Isis*. In August he preempted a planned rebel strike at Nova Scotia by destroying the stores the rebels had accumulated at Machias, and went on to burn about thirty of their ships.

In February 1779 he was ordered to New York to succeed Rear Admiral James Gambier in command of the North American station. On 4 April he was appointed commodore and hoisted his broad pennant in *Raisonné* (sixty-four guns). Despite the depletion of his squadron to reinforce the West Indies, Collier at once persuaded Henry Clinton to mount a combined operation in the Chesapeake. Sailing with two thousand soldiers under Major General Edward Mathew, Collier reached Hampton Roads on 9 May, took Fort Nelson, and subsequently burned or captured vast quantities of naval stores and at least 137 ships. On 30 May, having returned to New York, Collier took ships up the Hudson River to support Clinton’s operations against Stony Point and Verplancks. Not content with all this activity, he agreed to personally accompany the Connecticut coast raid in July. From the coast of Connecticut he moved north to bottle up and destroy the rebel flotilla attacking Francis MacLean’s Penobscot base in Maine. On returning to New York, Collier found that the inevitable had happened: Vice Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot had arrived to be a permanent replacement for Gambier. Put out, but most certainly not surprised, Collier sailed for home in the frigate *Daphne*, reaching Portsmouth on 27 November. Shortly afterward he vented his dissatisfaction by claiming

that the war in America could not be won with the methods and men currently employed.

He was not long ashore. Early in 1780 he was given *Canada* (seventy-four guns) in the Channel Fleet. In her he took part in Darby’s timely relief of Gibraltar, and on the return voyage captured the Spanish forty-four-gun frigate *Leocadia*. But on his return home he resigned his command. There is no evidence that he was personally at odds with the earl of Sandwich but there seems to have been some incident, perhaps a failed application for patronage, which gave him a grievance against government.

On 19 July 1781 he married Elizabeth Fryer, by whom he had six children. In 1784 he was elected to Parliament for Honiton and in 1786 aroused the Pitt ministry’s ire by opposing its attempt to give the Prince of Wales only limited powers should a Regency become necessary. Rightly or wrongly, Collier later maintained that this stance delayed his advancement to flag rank. He was certainly unemployed until the Nootka Sound crisis in 1790, when he was given *St. George* and ordered to prepare her for a flag officer. Angered by being again passed over, Collier, with the approval of fellow officers, complained to the Admiralty and the order was revoked. However, Collier still did not get his flag, and when the crisis passed *St. George* was paid off. (When a ship reached the end of its commission the ship’s company was paid off; they were no longer employed.) He had to wait until a new war loomed before becoming rear admiral of the *White* on 1 February 1793, followed by promotion to vice admiral of the *Blue* on 4 July 1794. In January 1795 he was made commander in chief at the Nore, only for his health to compel resignation within weeks. He died in London on 6 April 1795, still embittered by his belief that his brilliant few months of independent command in America had not received due recognition.

SEE ALSO *Arbuthnot, Marriot; Clinton, Henry; Connecticut Coast Raid; Howe, Richard; MacLean, Francis; Sandwich, John Montagu, fourth earl of; Stony Point, New York; Verplanck’s Point.*

revised by John Oliphant

COLOMB, PIERRE. (1754–?). French volunteer. Born at Nîmes, the son of a silk merchant, he entered the *gendarmes de la garde* on 8 December 1766 and served until 15 December 1775. He traveled from Cádiz, Spain, to Charleston, South Carolina, in 1777. He then moved to Georgia, where he was appointed a lieutenant in the Continental Dragoons in 1778. He served in the expedition against Florida and was later promoted to captain.

His father sought Henry Laurens's intervention to encourage him to return to France or become a merchant in America. Colomb was captured on 29 December 1778 in the defense of Savannah and mistreated both by his captor, Colonel Archibald Campbell, and during his imprisonment aboard the *Whitby* on the Georgia coast. In March 1779 Prevost ordered his parole. Though he was authorized to return to France to be exchanged, this did not occur immediately. Instead he applied to the Congress's Board of War for promotion to the rank of major, which Congress rejected on 7 August 1779. He returned to France in the autumn of 1779 and began a series of failed appeals to Franklin for preferment, claiming to have been promoted to major the last day of his American service.

Serving in the French army during the French Revolution as colonel of the Second Dragoons (July 1792), Colomb was named brigadier general for the Army of the North in April 1793. He ceased his functions in April 1794 and retired in 1795. In 1817 he was still alive at Lyon. Colomb is often confused with Lafayette's aide-de-camp, Louis Saint Ange, Chevalier Morel La Colombe.

SEE ALSO *Prevost, Augustine.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

COLONIAL WARS. 1565–1760. Competition among European imperial powers increased the scale and scope of conflict in North America. Since the outcomes of the European conflicts created the circumstances within which the American Revolution and the War of American Independence occurred, it is useful to summarize the wars in eastern North America before 1775 as part of the background of the events that occurred thereafter. Many of the people, places, events, and issues that were prominent during the last stages of the colonial wars also played important roles in the Revolution.

EARLY CONFLICTS

All European imperial powers—Spain, France, England (Britain after 1701), and the Netherlands (until 1664)—sought or were compelled to insinuate themselves into the relationships that had existed among Native American tribes before their arrival. As they worked to impose their own agenda on the land, the Europeans courted Native allies who could help them learn how to survive in the new environment and perhaps even provide support against hostile tribes.

The Spanish founded the first enduring European settlement on the eastern shore of North America at St. Augustine in Florida in 1565, and they exterminated their local French competitors at Fort Caroline the next year. The French established their first enduring settlements in the St. Lawrence Valley, at Quebec in 1609 and Montreal in 1611. The English were latecomers in the race for settlements on the mainland, establishing an evanescent presence on the Outer Banks of what would become North Carolina in 1585 before managing (barely) to survive at Jamestown in Virginia after 1607. Nearly every European who came to the New World did so to make money. Even the English men and women who emigrated to New England beginning in 1620 to create religiously based communities also searched for economic opportunity.

For the Spanish, St. Augustine was the northeastern outpost of their larger colonies in Central and South America, important principally to prevent competitors from establishing themselves too close to the routes that the treasure fleets took home to Spain. To create a hinterland to supply and support their relatively small coastal communities, they had founded by 1655 about forty missions in the interior and were making considerable progress in converting some twenty-five thousand Indians.

Frenchmen going to the New World were interested primarily in developing commercial outposts from which they could exploit the fur trade. From their initial settlements in the St. Lawrence Valley, they pushed inland through the Great Lakes, where they excelled in exploration and in establishing relations with Native Americans.



Champlain Fights the Iroquois. The French explorer Samuel de Champlain and his Algonquin and Huron allies clashed with Iroquois in upstate New York. The French, who were armed with muskets, promptly overpowered the Iroquois in this nineteenth-century engraving. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA.

Their most important competitor was a league of five tribes, known most commonly as the Iroquois, whose core towns stretched from the Hudson Valley in the east almost to the Niagara River in the west. To counter this league, the most powerful military force in eastern North America, the French allied with the Algonquins, Montaignais, and Hurons. The Iroquois drove back French outposts during 1642–1653, but the French had responded in sufficient strength by 1666 to make the league sue for peace. After the sieur de la Salle reached the mouth of the Mississippi in 1683, the French claimed the entire region west of the Alleghenies to the Mississippi River. They called it Louisiana.

France and England also clashed in other areas of eastern North America. The French established a colony in Acadia, beginning at Port Royal in 1610, but it was destroyed by the English in 1613. In 1621 England granted Acadia to Sir William Alexander, which led to open hostilities with the French in 1627. The English privateers Alexander and David Kirke captured Quebec in 1629, but that key post, along with Acadia, was returned to the French by treaty in 1632. Competition for fish and furs led New Englanders to capture Acadia in 1654; they held the region until it was returned to France

in 1670. The English also established trading posts on the shore of James Bay in 1668 to divert the fur trade from the St. Lawrence, but the French captured three of the five posts in 1686, severely impeding the operations of the Hudson's Bay Company.

IMPERIAL WAR

The ambitions of Louis XIV brought Roman Catholic France into conflict with a Protestant coalition led by England's king and queen, William III and Mary II. In Europe, the war to curb French expansionism was known as the War of the League of Augsburg (1689–1697); its American extension was called King William's War. Hostilities started on Hudson Bay and in the Mohawk Valley. In the winter of 1690, the governor of New France, Louis de Buade, comte de Frontenac, launched three raids by the French and their Abenaki and Caughnawaga allies on New England and New York border settlements and attacked the Iroquois on the western frontier. The continued French alliance with Native American tribes was bitterly resented by British Americans, which contributed to their willingness to overextend their resources to destroy New France in one blow.

After William Phips led a New England force to capture Port Royal in the early spring of 1690, the northern British colonies collaborated on a two-pronged attack on Quebec. Phips led a Massachusetts expedition up the St. Lawrence to besiege the key to New France, while a combined Connecticut–New York expedition struggled north along the Lake Champlain corridor to Montreal. Time and logistics, along with desperate French resistance, eventually stopped both expeditions. In subsequent years the French recaptured Port Royal and the remaining English posts on Hudson Bay, while the English recaptured their James Bay posts. The Treaty of Ryswick (1697) restored all conquests, leaving the French free to continue their expansion in Louisiana. They established a series of posts, beginning with Cahokia (near modern East St. Louis) and Fort Maurepas on Biloxi Bay in 1699, and followed up with Mackinac in 1700, Detroit in 1701, Fort Louis on the Mobile River in 1702, and Kaskaskia in 1703.

Louis XIV's ambition to win the Spanish throne for his nephew led to the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) in Europe. The American extension was called Queen Anne's War (1702–1713), after Mary's sister and William's successor. After years of exhausting war, the Iroquois in 1701 concluded a truce with New France that left the French and their Native American allies free to raid British settlements in Maine and Massachusetts. Benjamin Church retaliated by leading a New England expedition that destroyed two French villages in Acadia. In Newfoundland, the French and Indians took St. John in 1708 and established control of the eastern coast. After two failures, New England colonists, with British naval support, captured Port Royal in 1710. Then, in 1711, as the war wound down in Europe, Britain uncharacteristically invested heavily in a colonial campaign. It sent ten ships of the line under Rear Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker with six thousand regular troops in thirty transports under Brigadier General John Hill to Boston, carrying a total of eleven thousand soldiers and sailors. It was the largest British expedition to North America before the French and Indian War and was intended to ascend the St. Lawrence to Quebec while an expedition of colonial troops marched overland against Montreal. The entire campaign fell apart when, on 22 August, part of Walker's fleet was caught on a dead lee shore in the Gulf of St. Lawrence; nearly nine hundred men drowned.

Spanish threats to Carolina's southern frontier led the Carolinians to mount an overly ambitious attack on St. Augustine in 1702. Lacking the artillery to reduce Castillo de San Marcos, the force of Carolinians and Indians sacked the surrounding town and withdrew. Seeking to reestablish their credibility with their own Native allies, the Carolinians sent a force into the

Appalachee in 1704 that destroyed all but one of the fourteen Spanish missions there. The unwillingness of the Choctaws to allow the Carolinians to pass through their territory ensured that Carolina's schemes to attack French settlements along the Gulf of Mexico never got off the ground. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 gave Britain the Hudson Bay area; Newfoundland; Acadia; St. Christopher in the West Indies; and with typical European ethnocentrism, the Iroquois country. France retained Cape Breton Island and islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. An agreement with Spain, called the *asiento*, allowed the British South Sea Company to ship forty-eight hundred Negro slaves a year to the Spanish colonies for thirty years, along with one trading vessel a year.

BETWEEN WARS

For twenty-five years after the end of Queen Anne's War, the French tried to rebuild and consolidate their position in North America. They began building the powerful fortress of Louisburg on Cape Breton Island in 1720 to protect their fishing interests and to provide a naval harbor on the Atlantic. They began Fort Niagara in 1726 to help protect the trade route across Lakes Ontario and Erie and to promote their influence among the Iroquois. Between 1715 and 1731 they built Forts Miami, Ouiatenon (or Ouiataon), and Vincennes, in modern-day Indiana, to cover the route from Lake Erie via the Maumee and Wabash Rivers to the Mississippi. And, finally, they built a fort at Crown Point on Lake Champlain in 1731 to push south the outer defenses of Montreal. The British colonies were growing rapidly, but they were less aggressive in shrinking and fortifying the zone of Native American influence that still separated them in most places from the French. The British built Fort Oswego on the south shore of Lake Ontario in 1725, to which Niagara, about 125 miles due west, was the counterweight, but the age of relentless expansion into Indian lands was only just beginning.

On the Carolina frontier, the expansion of settlements along the coast south of Charleston brought on a war in which the Yamassee and Lower Creeks regained control of all the area west of the Savannah River. The Carolinians managed, with the aid of the Cherokees, to defeat the Yamasseees in 1716 and thereby also to reduce the Creek threat to their frontier. They built forts at Port Royal and the present site of Columbia, on the Santee River, for protection against the Indians, and despite Spanish protests, more forts on the Altamaha, Savannah, and Santee Rivers between 1716 and 1721. Thirteen months of hostilities between Britain and Spain in 1727–1728 gave the Carolinians a pretext to invade Spanish Florida and destroy a Yamassee refugee village near St. Augustine. The British position was significantly strengthened in 1732, when James Oglethorpe founded

Georgia, with its southern boundary on the Savannah and Altamaha Rivers, one of the primary purposes of which was to serve as a buffer against the Spanish. To defend his southern frontier, Oglethorpe by 1739 had established forts on the islands of St. Simons, St. Andrew, Cumberland, and Amelia and inland at Augusta and Okfuskee on the Talapoosa River, in what is now Alabama.

RENEWED CONFLICT

British violations of the trade agreements with the Spanish in the Caribbean led to seizures of British ships and the rough handling of her seamen. In 1739, a Captain Robert Jenkins claimed that the Spanish had cut off his ear eight years earlier as punishment for what he assured Parliament was nothing but legal trading, and he publicly displayed the severed part to “prove” Spanish brutality. Vice Admiral Edward Vernon, a former commander of the Jamaica station who advocated armed aggression against the Spanish colonies, sailed again for the West Indies in July 1739, three months before a reluctant Parliament declared war against Spain on 19 October in the so-called War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739–1742). Vernon attacked Spanish possessions in the Caribbean, winning acclaim at home for his capture of Porto Bello on 22 November 1739, but he was recalled after the failure of combined land and sea attacks on Cartagena on the Spanish Main (April 1741) and on Santiago, on the southern coast of Cuba (by December). Roughly thirty-six hundred men recruited in the North American colonies served as part of the eighty-five-hundred man army under Major General Thomas Wentworth. George Washington’s half-brother, Lawrence, served as a captain in the colonial regiment and named his estate Mount Vernon in the admiral’s honor. In North America, Oglethorpe—with Virginia, Georgia, and Carolina troops—invaded Florida in 1740. The expedition captured two Spanish forts on the St. Johns River, besieged St. Augustine for more than a month, and withdrew only when the Spanish threatened its rear. The British crushed a Spanish counterattack at the Battle of Bloody Swamp on St. Simon’s Island, Georgia, in 1742, and Oglethorpe’s second attack on St. Augustine, in 1743, also failed.


Frederick II of Prussia began a new round of European wars in December 1740, when he invaded Silesia to begin the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748); the war pitted Britain and Austria against France and Prussia. The North American extension of this conflict, called King George’s War (1744–1748) after George II, overlapped the War of Jenkins’s Ear. Operations in the northern British colonies were not pressed vigorously at the outset. In 1744 the French and their Native American allies raided along the Maine frontier and attacked, but failed to capture, Annapolis

(formerly Port Royal) in Nova Scotia. William Johnson instigated Iroquois attacks on the French, who retaliated by burning Saratoga (1744) and raiding Albany (1745). Thanks to the initiative and energy of William Shirley, the governor of Massachusetts, a New England army led by William Pepperrell and supported by a British squadron under Sir Peter Warren, captured Louisburg on 16 June 1745 after a six-week siege. It was New England’s greatest military success. A follow-up expedition against Quebec and Montreal planned for 1746, modeled on the attacks in 1690 and 1711, was cancelled when the British government diverted the essential Royal Navy squadron to attack more important targets in European waters. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 restored all conquests to all parties, including Louisburg to the French, a display of the British government’s disregard for colonial achievements and interests that greatly embittered many New Englanders. In 1749 the British sent twenty-five hundred soldiers and settlers to found Halifax as a counterweight to the restored French fortress.

THE OHIO VALLEY

Creation of the Ohio Company and the increased penetration of Pennsylvania traders into the upper Ohio Valley in the late 1740s led the French to take a series of steps to protect their route to the Ohio and assert their claims in the area. They established a mission on the St. Lawrence near modern Ogdensburg, New York, to woo the Iroquois from the British, and they founded Fort Rouille (later York, afterward Toronto, Ontario) on the north shore of Lake Ontario to siphon trade from the British post at Oswego. Further west, they built another post at the Niagara portage to augment Fort Niagara and also strengthened Detroit. In 1749 the governor of Canada sent Céloron de Blainville (1693–1759) with 215 Frenchmen and some Indians to remind Native Americans in the Ohio Valley of their allegiance to the French. In 1752 Charles de Langlade captured the colonial trading post of Pickawillany on the Miami River (modern Piqua, Ohio) and killed all its defenders. In 1753 Ange de Menneville, marquis de Duquesne, the new governor of Canada, sent expeditions to build Fort Presque Isle (near Erie, Pennsylvania) and Fort Le Boeuf (modern Waterford, Pennsylvania) and to capture and expel the garrison of John Frazier’s trading post at Venango (modern Franklin, Pennsylvania). The French line of operations from Canada into the Ohio Valley extended from Fort Presque Isle on Lake Erie across a fifteen-mile portage to Fort Le Boeuf on French Creek, and thence by water to the Allegheny River at Venango and so on to the Ohio River.

Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia was alarmed by the increase in French activity in the Ohio Valley, both



THE GALE GROUP.

because it seemed to threaten the Virginia frontier and because its success would foreclose lucrative speculation in Ohio lands. The governor sent twenty-one-year-old George Washington to warn the French to withdraw from the Ohio Valley because Britain claimed it as part of the Virginia colony. When Washington reached Fort Le Boeuf, he was told politely but clearly that the French were in the area to stay.

In January 1754 Dinwiddie sent a militia company to build a fort at the Forks of the Ohio (modern Pittsburgh). On 17 April, a five-hundred-man French force captured the half-completed fort, allowed the Virginians to withdraw, and then built Fort Duquesne on the site. Anticipating the need for military force, the Virginia House of Burgesses had already authorized a small regiment of thirteen hundred frontiersmen under Colonel Joshua Fry, with Washington as lieutenant colonel and second-in-command. Washington, on the way to the Forks with sixty men, met the fort builders on their way home. After sending for reinforcements, Washington pushed his force forward; on 7 May it reached a clearing on the Cumberland Road known as Great Meadows, about ten miles east of what is modern Uniontown, Pennsylvania. While camped there, Washington learned that a small French force was approaching. In a controversial

surprise attack on the morning of 27 May, Washington's men killed the enemy commander (Ensign Joseph Coulon de Villiers Jumonville) along with nine others and took twenty-one prisoners.

Returning to their camp, the Virginians strengthened it, named it Fort Necessity, and waited for the rest of the regiment to come up. Washington, who had assumed command of the regiment on the death of Colonel Fry on 31 May 1754, was joined in early June by the rest of the Virginians and Captain James Mackay's Independent Company of South Carolina, a unit of about one hundred regulars. On 3 July, Fort Necessity was attacked by about five hundred French and four hundred Indians. Washington was compelled to surrender after a long-range exchange of musketry that caused few casualties but which exposed the fact that his position was untenable. The next day, the French allowed Washington's force to withdraw with the honors of war to its base at Wills Creek (later Cumberland, Maryland), fifty miles away.

THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR

Washington's encounter with the French in the Ohio Valley was the spark that ignited the fourth (and final)

imperial war in North America. The British government were increasingly concerned about so-called French encroachments on lands its colonies claimed along the frontier, and it had already asked the seven northern colonies (from New Hampshire to Maryland) to appoint delegates to meet at Albany, New York, to concert measures to defend the frontier. The request was an extension of a traditional idea: with the exception of the Walker expedition in 1711, the British had always tried to defend the colonies on the cheap by tapping colonial resources, especially manpower, to do the job. When the Albany Convention (19 June–10 July 1754) failed to create a workable model for intercolonial cooperation, the British decided by the end of October 1754 to up the ante in order to repair the damage done by the disaster at Fort Necessity. The government agreed to send Major General Edward Braddock to Virginia as commander in chief in America and gave him two understrength regiments from the Irish establishment, Colonel Peter Halkett's Forty-fourth Regiment and Colonel Thomas Dunbar's Forty-eighth Regiment, both of which were to be recruited to full strength in Maryland and Virginia. Braddock was ordered to execute the central part of a four-part strategy designed to push back the French. He would lead the expedition that would oust the French from Fort Duquesne; Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts would lead provincial soldiers against Fort Niagara; William Johnson of New York, appointed as Britain's superintendent of the Iroquois, would lead his new charges and some provincials against Crown Point; and Colonels Robert Monckton and John Winslow would lead a largely provincial force against Fort Beauséjour on the Chignecto Isthmus in Nova Scotia. Braddock, capable but overconfident, marched his fourteen hundred British regulars and eleven hundred provincials out of Fort Cumberland on 29 May. George Washington was one of his three aides. Horatio Gates commanded a New York independent company that guarded the pioneers, and Adam Stephen led the rearguard of Virginia provincials.

Having achieved the not inconsiderable accomplishment of getting his army over the Appalachian Mountains into the Ohio Valley, Braddock was about eight miles from Fort Duquesne when, on 9 July 1755, a force of 250 French and 650 Indians surprised, stopped, and surrounded his advance guard of 400 regulars under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage, driving it back in confusion onto the main body of the army. Firing from behind trees, the French and Indians cut down the British regulars as they tried to restore their formations and move forward into open country. The regulars, bewildered and frightened by the unorthodox forest fighting, even shot down some of their colonial allies, who—like the enemy—were fighting from the cover of trees. Braddock, trying to rally his troops, had five horses shot from under

him before he fell mortally wounded. In the three-hour fight, 63 out of 86 British officers were killed or wounded and 914 out of 1,373 soldiers were hit. The French lost only 43 men in all.

The Battle of the Monongahela (also known as Braddock's Defeat), together with the abandonment of the Niagara expedition for logistical reasons, ruined British strategy for 1755. Only in Nova Scotia, where Monckton and Winslow captured Fort Beauséjour on 19 June 1755 with a force of two thousand New Englanders and a few British, did things go according to plan.

The remaining expedition, against Crown Point, was late in getting started and in addition faced logistical difficulties. William Johnson managed to get his force of thirty-five hundred New England provincials and four hundred Indians to the southern tip of Lake George by early September, where the troops constructed Fort William Henry to secure their communications. When Johnson learned on 8 September that a body of French and Indians under Jean-Armand, baron de Dieskau, was behind him, he sent a one-thousand-man reconnaissance-in-force under Colonel Ephraim Williams of Massachusetts to reestablish contact with Fort Edward on the Hudson. The French and Indians ambushed and decimated Williams's force but botched the pursuit. The remaining provincials in the hastily fortified Lake George camp were able to beat off fierce attacks by Dieskau's two hundred French regulars. When several hundred French and Indians returned to the scene of the earlier ambush, they were surprised and routed by a scouting party from Fort Edward that threw the enemy dead into what was thereafter known as Bloody Pond. The shock of combat, the losses incurred, the shortage of provisions, and the lateness of the season produced dissension among the ill-disciplined provincial troops, the reasons a reluctant Johnson gave for being unable to advance on Crown Point. The French constructed Fort Carillon at Ticonderoga, the point where Lake George flowed into Lake Champlain.

Britain formally declared war on France on 15 May 1756; a rapprochement between France and Austria meant that Britain was now compelled to ally with Prussia, a fact of significant European consequence but one which had little impact on the war in North America. Louis Joseph, marquis de Montcalm, (1712–1759), reached Canada with reinforcements on 11 May to take command of the French forces, and John Campbell, the earl of Loudoun, reached New York on 23 July to command the British and provincials. Montcalm used his head start to strike first, at Oswego, which he took after a short siege on 14 August. Loudoun spent the rest of the campaigning season shoring up the defense of the New York frontier.

into a means of stalemating France in Europe while leaving Britain free to use its naval superiority to ship thousands of regulars to North America and strip France of its colonies. While this strategy was highly successful, it was also enormously expensive, especially when Pitt decided to subsidize the raising of provincial soldiers to give British armies an even greater numerical edge over their opponents. Pitt's decision to spare no expense created a huge debt that was a crucial element in prompting British politicians to reorganize the empire after the war to make its administration self-supporting. Proposals to reorganize the empire, in turn, prompted colonial Americans to begin rethinking the value of remaining in the empire.

Pitt expanded the resources Britain was willing to devote to making war in North America, but he did not change the basic strategy of rolling up the appendages of French power before striking at its heart. He recalled Loudoun and replaced him with Major General James Abercromby, who was also named to lead the expedition against Fort Carillon on Lake Champlain. Against the objections of George II, Pitt forced the promotion to major general of Colonel Jeffery Amherst—over the heads of what Pitt considered to be Amherst's mediocre superiors—to command the expedition against Louisburg. Brigadier General John Forbes was given command of the third expedition of 1758, which sought to avenge Braddock by taking Fort Duquesne.

Two of the three expeditions achieved their objectives. Amherst's fourteen thousand regulars, supported by a slightly larger naval force under Admiral Edward Boscawen, forced the strategic fortress to surrender on 26 July 1758. Brigadier General James Wolfe distinguished himself in establishing a beachhead in the difficult amphibious operation that preceded the seven-week siege. Forbes's expedition was a logistical masterpiece. The two thousand regulars and five thousand provincials cut a new road across the mountains and forced the French to evacuate Fort Duquesne on 25 November. Then they immediately set out to create the much larger Fort Pitt. Abercromby himself was less fortunate. Pitt had assigned the highly regarded Lord George Howe, the eldest brother of Richard and William Howe, as his second-in-command, but when Howe was killed in a skirmish on 6 July, Abercromby could find no better alternative than to shatter his sixteen-thousand-man expedition in a hopeless frontal attack on 8 July against the breastworks Montcalm had erected about a mile to the west of Fort Carillon. Colonel John Bradstreet's capture on 27 August of Fort Frontenac, on the north shore of Lake Ontario near where the lake flows into the St. Lawrence, crippled the ability of the French to supply their western forts and native allies and did a great deal to restore the morale of Abercromby's army. Bradstreet's success also demonstrated how vulnerable New France was to fast-moving raiders who could

sever supply lines at a fraction of the cost of a full-scale expedition. But this success could not save Abercromby, who was recalled on 9 November.

Pitt planned a three-pronged offensive against Canada in 1759 that was designed to capitalize on success and redeem failure. He sent an amphibious expedition under Rear Admiral Charles Saunders and Major General James Wolfe to ascend the St. Lawrence and take Quebec. He had Amherst promoted to commander in chief and named him personally to lead the most difficult operation, the capture of Ticonderoga and Crown Point. Out west, Pitt sent Brigadier General John Prideaux to split Canada from Louisiana by taking Fort Niagara and then, retracing his steps, returning to Oswego and on down the St. Lawrence at least as far as La Galette (modern Ogdensburg, New York).

With fewer than seven thousand men, Amherst started north up Lake George on 22 July 1759. When he approached Ticonderoga, the French withdrew their main body of twenty-five-hundred men and two days later, on 26 July, the four-hundred-man rear guard withdrew after blowing up the fort. The French then destroyed Fort Frederick at Crown Point before the British could reach it. Amherst spent August reconstructing the works at Crown Point, establishing control of Lake Champlain, and putting through a road to the Connecticut River. Although Prideaux was killed on 20 July when he stepped in front of a mortar as it was being fired, his successor, Sir William Johnson, brought the siege to a successful conclusion on 24 July. Amherst sent Gage to take command of this column of two thousand British regulars and Johnson's one hundred Indians, but through an excess of caution, Gage did not leave Oswego.

THE FALL OF CANADA

Saunders's fleet, with Wolfe's nine thousand soldiers on board, left Louisburg on 4 June 1759 and began ascending the St. Lawrence on 16 June. In a remarkable feat of navigation on an often treacherous river from which the French had removed all markers and buoys, the fleet reached Île d'Orléans, downstream from Quebec, on 28 June and began disembarking the troops. The British established two additional camps by mid-July, on the north shore of the river east of where the Montmorenci River cascaded into the St. Lawrence, and at Point Levis, across the river from the city. Wolfe had great difficulty in finding a way to crack the French defenses: his camps did not encircle the city, and the bombardment of Quebec's lower town was showy but ineffective. Montcalm, in charge of the French defenses, easily repulsed Wolfe's principal attack, a frontal assault across the tidal flat beneath Montmorenci Falls, six miles northeast of the city, on 31 July, inflicting significant casualties on the British attackers. By early August, Wolfe was reduced to having his light troops ravage

everything that stood on both banks of the river for miles downstream, but even this cruelty did not draw the French out of their trenches. As the days of August passed, Saunders became increasingly worried about his ships becoming locked in place when winter froze the river.

Out of alternatives and against the advice of his three senior subordinates, Wolfe chose to gamble on having Saunders float the bulk of his army upstream on the tide and seek to land at some point above Quebec. He learned from Captain Robert Stobo, a Virginian whom Washington had surrendered as a hostage at Fort Mifflin in 1754 and who had been a prisoner in Quebec before escaping in the spring of 1759, that a path led from the river at L'Anse au Foulon up the face of the cliff to the Plains of Abraham. Starting at dark on 12 September, Colonel William Howe led his light infantry up the path from what would soon be renamed Wolfe's Cove. By dawn, forty-five hundred British troops were on the plateau, a mile and a half from the western walls of Quebec. Wolfe had placed his troops in an untenable position, without artillery to batter down the walls, between the walls and French forces rapidly approaching from their rear and without sufficient supplies to sustain themselves for more than a day.

Montcalm should have left Wolfe to twist in the wind, watching as his troops were gradually but inexorably ground down and facing the unenviable choice of assaulting the French positions or trying to withdraw to the river. Instead, in one of the worst decisions ever made by a military commander, Montcalm gave Wolfe exactly what the British commander wanted: a stand-up, open field fight using traditional European linear tactics (for the first time in North America) between Wolfe's superbly disciplined regulars and his own ragtag combination of French regulars and Canadian militia. Without waiting for three thousand reinforcements to arrive from Cap Rouge, on the eastern side of the city, Montcalm sallied forth with forty-five hundred men. His gallant but foolhardy attack, unsupported by artillery, was repulsed with a loss of two hundred French killed and twelve hundred wounded; the British lost only sixty killed and six hundred wounded. Both Wolfe and Montcalm were mortally wounded, the British commander dying in a blaze of glory at the very moment that his ridiculous gamble succeeded and the French commander living long enough to know that he had lost Quebec. The city surrendered on 18 September 1759.

The final conquest of Canada required one further campaign to complete. In the spring of 1760, Amherst personally took command of Gage's eleven-thousand-man force that had bogged down at Oswego and sent Colonel William Haviland with thirty-five-hundred men to reduce French defenses on Île aux Noix at the northern end of Lake Champlain and to push into the St. Lawrence Valley

from the south. Brigadier General James Murray, Wolfe's successor at Quebec, had narrowly escaped losing Wolfe's great prize to a resurgent French force of seven thousand men under François-Gaston, chevalier de Levis, at Ste. Foy, six miles from the walls of the city, on 28 April. Badly beaten, Murray retreated to Quebec and was saved from disaster only because the first ship to reach the city up the still partly frozen St. Lawrence that spring (12 May) wore the Union Jack, not the fleurs-de-lis. Murray thereupon began organizing an advance up the St. Lawrence toward Montreal, where he arrived with twenty-five hundred men in late August. In a rare example of a successful "strategic concentration," the three widely separated British columns massed at Montreal almost simultaneously, Haviland arriving on the evening of 6 September and Amherst the next morning.

With no hope of succor from France, Pierre de Rigaud, marquis de Vaudreuil, the governor of New France, surrendered Montreal unconditionally on 8 September 1760; it was crowded with refugees, the militia had deserted, and the twenty-four hundred French regulars had no chance of holding off the British. In the wake of his surrender, all of Canada passed into British hands. Major Robert Rogers, the famous ranger captain, led the principal force that traveled west, accepting the capitulation of Detroit and the other surviving French posts on the Great Lakes in 1760–1761. British attempts to replace French influence in the vast area west and southwest of Niagara helped to create a situation that many Native Americans found intolerable and which led to the outbreak of Pontiac's War in the summer of 1763.

Spain entered the war belatedly as an ally of France, fearing that a British victory would jeopardize its New World possessions. Anticipating this move, Britain declared war on Spain on 2 January 1762 and quickly moved to take advantage of Spanish weaknesses. A British amphibious expedition had already taken the French sugar island of Guadeloupe, in the West Indies, in the spring of 1759; another expedition had taken the rest of the French islands (Martinique, St. Lucia, Grenada, and St. Vincent) by early March 1762. Britain followed up these successes by sending George Keppel, earl of Albemarle, with a strong force to attack Havana, Spain's most important city in the Caribbean. On 7 June 1762, twelve thousand regular troops from Britain and elsewhere in the West Indies began landing in Cuba and invested the city. Another four thousand regulars and provincials arrived from North America in late July. Havana capitulated on 13 August after a siege of two months, but disease ruined the invading army. At least half of the British and colonial troops sent to Havana died during and immediately after the siege, a tragic loss that Amherst had to keep in mind when planning the redeployment of forces to control the newly expanded North American empire. The two-

thousand-man expedition, led by Brigadier General William Draper, that captured Manila on 5 October was, by contrast, relatively disease free. The British retained neither Havana nor Manila after the war. Both were returned to Spain, and by the treaty of San Ildefonso of 3 November 1762, France compensated Spain for its losses in the war by ceding all territory west of the Mississippi River and New Orleans itself to Spanish control. The preliminaries of the Treaty of Paris were also signed on 3 November, effectively ending a conflict that had reached around the globe; the Definitive Treaty was implemented on 10 February 1763.

CONSEQUENCES OF VICTORY

Thanks to the unparalleled worldwide reach of its naval, military, and economic power, Britain emerged from the war in 1763 in an unprecedented position of dominance among its traditional competitors. But success brought new problems and exacerbated some old ones. Nearly everyone recognized that the perturbation in the European balance of power was only a temporary condition. France, especially, was left angry and humiliated, brimming with a new determination to rebuild its army and navy and find a way to exact revenge on its ancient enemy. Pitt's willingness to spare no expense in waging and winning the war had doubled the British national debt, a hard reality that made his successors extremely sensitive to the costs of running the enlarged empire. In some ways, Britain's reach had exceeded its grasp; the return of Havana and Manila to Spanish control reflected an understanding that the nation had neither the desire nor the resources to control Cuba and the Philippines.

Britain won its greatest territorial and psychological advantages in North America, which appeared to be the culmination of a long-sought goal. The conquest of Canada united the colonists with the mother country as never before in an exuberant celebration of the elimination of the French threat. But the way in which the war had been conducted also widened important fissures that would quickly turn jubilation into contention. Friction among the colonies, and between the colonies and Britain, had been common throughout the entire span of imperial wars. The colonies were always reluctant to lose control over their internal affairs by cooperating too closely with their neighbors, even when military necessity seemed to mandate a joint effort. They continually claimed they did not have the financial resources to participate more fully in military action, close to the truth in an agricultural economy with little ability to generate large amounts of liquid capital rapidly. In the early years of the French and Indian War, several colonies even continued to trade with the French West Indies because that was, they claimed, the only way they could acquire the money to prosecute the war against Canada. The imperial government had a

different perspective on the behavior of the colonies, becoming increasingly frustrated by their lack of intercolonial cooperation; their failure to meet demands for men, money, and supplies as promptly or as fully as British generals required; and especially, their persistence in trading with the enemy.

Confrontations over most of these problems had been muted or postponed by the pressing need to defeat the French and, especially, by Pitt's liberality with Parliament's gold. Pitt had treated the colonies more as allies than as subordinates, and the victories of Wolfe and Amherst in 1759 and 1760 were seen in America more as capstones on a alliance than as the prelude to a more closely regulated empire. The disappointment and bewilderment felt by many colonists when Parliament tightened the screws, started raising taxes, and began putting them in their place were enhanced because expectations had been so different. Resistance to these measures found fertile ground in part because large numbers of colonists had been exposed to British attitudes and practices for the first time when they enlisted in the provincial regiments raised to reinforce the regulars. Many were offended by the supercilious attitude of regular officers; the brutality of regular discipline (compared with their own far less rigid version); and in particular, the vast social gulf that separated officers from the men. Memories of how British commanders had scorned and mismanaged colonial volunteers in various campaigns—for example, Walker and Hill at Boston in 1711, Vernon and Wentworth at Cartagena in 1742, Braddock on his way to the Monongahela in 1755, Loudoun in 1756 and 1757, Abercromby at Ticonderoga in 1758, and Amherst thereafter—contributed to making it apparent to many colonists that the British were now, by 1765, a different people than they were, with different attitudes, behaviors, and aspirations. A rethinking of the imperial relationship was inevitable, although independence was perhaps not.

SEE ALSO *Abenaki; Albany Convention and Plan; Amherst, Jeffery (1717–1797); Background and Origins of the Revolution; Bradstreet's Capture of Fort Frontenac; Cabbage Planting Expedition; Caughnawaga; Chatham, William Pitt, First Earl of; Forbes's Expedition to Fort Duquesne; Fort William Henry (Fort George), New York; Gage, Thomas; Gates, Horatio; Howe, William; Johnson, Sir William; Langlade, Charles Michel de; Loudoun, John Campbell; Monckton, Robert; Ohio Company of Virginia; Paris, Treaty of (10 February 1763); Pontiac's War; Rogers, Robert; Stephen, Adam.*

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COLUMN, COLUMN OF FILES SEE Formations.

COMBAHEE FERRY, SOUTH CAROLINA. 27 August 1782. Also known as the battle at Chehaw Point. During the final stage of operations, the light brigade of General Mordecai Gist, which had been organized to oppose British attempts to forage for their besieged garrison of Charleston, was ordered from Stono Ferry to attack the enemy force on the south side of the Combahee (about forty miles southwest of Charleston). Around Combahee Ferry the British had about eighteen sailing craft of various sizes, three hundred regulars, and two hundred Loyalists. Gist placed a howitzer at Chehaw Point, twelve miles below the ferry, to cut off any retreat downriver. When Gist learned that the enemy planned to move down the river under cover of darkness, he ordered Colonel

John Laurens to march quickly to Chehaw Point with his infantry element of the light brigade (comprising Lee's infantry, the two remaining companies of Delaware Continentals, one hundred men from other Continental units, and the dismounted dragoons of the Third Virginia). The British in their turn learned of Laurens's advance; they then landed three hundred men on the north bank above Chehaw Point and formed an ambush in the tall grass. Marching straight into this trap, Laurens was killed and twenty of his men wounded. The American advance guard fell back on the rest of Gist's advancing column, and the British followed. Gist was unable to drive the enemy from the line it then formed in the woods, since his cavalry could not operate in the rough, wooded terrain and the American infantry lacked the strength for a successful attack without cavalry support. (The cavalry element of Gist's light brigade, which was commanded by Colonel George Baylor, was drawn from Lee's Legion and the Third and Fourth Virginia.) The enemy withdrew without loss and continued its foraging. Gist later attacked two armed galleys at Port Royal Ferry, capturing one and driving off the other. His corps then rejoined the main army.

SEE ALSO *Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF'S GUARD.

Officially The Commander-in-Chief's Guard but commonly called The Life Guard, it was organized in 1776 at the beginning of the New York Campaign. With a strength of 180 men, it was first commanded by Captain Caleb Gibbs of Rhode Island, whose appointment to this post was 12 March 1776. Other officers of the bodyguard were Henry P. Livingston, William Colfax (who succeeded Gibbs as commanding officer toward the end of 1779) and Benjamin Goymes. During the winter of 1779–80 the strength of the unit was increased to 250, the next spring it dropped back to 180, and in 1783 it numbered 64 enlisted men. Despite its impressive unit designation and its important mission, "Washington's Life Guard" appears to have been nothing more than what today would be called a headquarters security detachment.

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COMMAND ON SEE On Command.

COMMISSARIES OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY *SEE* *Supply of the Continental Army*.

COMMITTEE OF SECRET CORRESPONDENCE. In anticipation of foreign contacts, if not alliances, on 29 November 1775 the Continental Congress appointed a five-man Committee of Correspondence—soon renamed the Committee of Secret Correspondence—“for the sole purpose of Corresponding with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland and other parts of the world.” The original members were John Dickinson, Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Harrison, John Jay, and Thomas Johnson. James Lovell joined later, becoming an influential and hardworking member, and on 30 January 1776 Robert Morris, chairman of another panel called the Secret Committee, was made a member. The new committee marked the beginning of the United States diplomatic relations with other nations.

Arthur Lee was the committee’s first correspondent in Europe, followed by Charles Frederic William Dumas, a student of international law residing in The Hague, Netherlands. After meetings with Achard de Bonvouloir, the committee decided on 3 March 1776 to send an agent to France, in the guise of a merchant, to investigate the possibilities of French aid and political support. Silas Deane was selected by the Continental Congress for the assignment. A diplomatic commission to France consisting of Franklin, Deane, and Arthur Lee was appointed by Congress in September 1776.

Since the functions of the two congressional committees soon become entangled, the Committee of Secret Correspondence was renamed the Committee on Foreign Affairs (17 April 1777), and the Secret Committee became the Committee of Commerce (5 July 1777). Thomas Paine became paid secretary of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in April 1777, and this body thereafter directed American diplomacy. In the furor surrounding the recall of Deane and the investigation of Hortalez & Cie, a company that funneled French aid to the United States, Paine made public use of confidential documents whose revelation embarrassed the French government, and on 8 January 1779 he resigned under pressure. As with most congressional committees, the work undertaken usually depended on the energy of a single member. By 1779 it was James Lovell who fulfilled this role for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as he well knew, writing Arthur Lee to complain about his crushing administrative load: “there really is no such Thing as a Com’ttee of foreign affairs existing—no Secretary or Clerk—further than that I persevere to be the one and the other.”

The following year Congress appointed Lovell, James Duane, and William C. Houston to investigate the problems of the committee. Their report was made in the summer of 1780 but not considered by Congress until December, and on 6 January 1781 that body agreed to replace the Committee on Foreign Affairs with a secretary of foreign affairs. The first man to hold this office was Robert R. Livingston, who was elected on 10 August. Livingston resigned in June 1783, and the office remained vacant until John Jay returned from Europe in July 1784. Jay was succeeded on 22 March 1790 by Thomas Jefferson, who became the first secretary of state under the new Constitution.

SEE ALSO *Bonvouloir; Deane, Silas; Dickinson, John; Duane, James; Franklin, Benjamin; Harrison, Benjamin; Hortalez & Cie; Jay, John; Lee, Arthur; Livingston, Robert R.; Lovell, James; Morris, Robert (1734–1806); Paine, Thomas.*

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COMMITTEES OF CORRESPONDENCE. It was common for colonial legislatures to create a standing committee to correspond with the colony’s agent in London when the legislature was not in session. In response to rumors about the court of inquiry convened to investigate the *Gaspee* affair of 1772 (in which rebellious American colonists set fire to a British revenue cutter off the Rhode Island coast), the Virginia House of Burgesses voted on 12 March 1773 to establish a standing committee of correspondence “to keep up and maintain a correspondence and communication with our sister colonies” and “to obtain the most early and authentic intelligence of all such acts and resolutions of the British Parliament, or proceedings of administration, as many relate to or affect the British colonies in America.” On 28 May, the Massachusetts House of Representatives endorsed the Virginia proposal, established its own committee, and sent a circular letter to the other colonies recommending that they, too, establish such committees. All complied.

SEE ALSO *Gaspée Affair; Sons of Liberty.*

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COMMON SENSE SEE *Paine, Thomas.*

COMMUNICATION TIME. One month was the normal sailing time from North America to England and two months was normal for the westward voyage. News of the Boston Port Bill, which passed the House of Commons on 25 March 1774 and received the royal assent on 31 March, reached Boston by a fast ship on 10 May. Paul Revere, with frequent changes of horses, rode 350 miles to Philadelphia in six days with the news. Six to nine days were required for a letter from Boston to reach New York City by ordinary postal service, and it took almost a month for a letter to go from New Hampshire to Georgia. General Thomas Gage's report on the fighting at Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775 was placed aboard ship (the *Sukey*) on 22 April and reached London on 10 June, a passage of fifty days. The American version left four days after Gage's, in the *Quero*, and arrived twelve days earlier because the Massachusetts leaders sent the ship in ballast. In late 1781 Congress did not learn of the battle of Eutaw Springs for five weeks. During the Yorktown Campaign, waterborne communications between Sir Henry Clinton at New York City and Charles Lord Cornwallis on the Peninsula in Virginia, not much more than 300 straight-line miles, took eight days. The time involved in communicating decisions could cause problems. For example, a letter from George Germain, dated at London on 2 May 1781, reached Clinton at New York City with instructions that made it necessary for Clinton to countermand the orders he had sent to Cornwallis and that had been received on 26 June. In a fast-moving strategic situation, the British commander in chief in North America might receive counter orders from London before he received their original orders.

SEE ALSO *Atlantic Crossing; Yorktown Campaign.*

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COMPO HILL SEE *Danbury Raid, Connecticut.*

CONCORD, MASSACHUSETTS SEE *Lexington and Concord.*

CONFEDERATION SEE *Articles of Confederation.*

CONGRESS. The term "congress" was used in colonial America to denote an intercolonial gathering at which colonial leaders discussed significant issues of mutual interest. Some were sanctioned by the imperial government (the Albany Congress in 1754 was called to restructure colonial resources for the defense of the New York frontier against the French), but most were extralegal meetings called to discuss how to achieve a coordinated response to imperial intrusions and exactions. The term helped to legitimize the gatherings as a genuine expression of the desires and interests of the politically active men in each colony. The most important congress in this period was called to determine how to respond to the Stamp Act (the Stamp Act Congress of October 1765); it provided the model for the Continental Congress of September 1774. The principal value of a congress was to provide a forum in which colonial leaders met each other, lived and ate together, and took each other's measure as they discussed the issues at hand. That these politically savvy delegates were able to debate critical and divisive issues, with the like-minded building consensus and agreeing on a course of action, was akin to a political miracle and a major reason why the resistance coalesced, evolved, won the war, and erected a workable federal government under the Constitution.

SEE ALSO *Albany Convention and Plan; Continental Congress; Stamp Act.*

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CONGRESS–SAVAGE ENGAGEMENT. 6 September 1781. In 1781 the privateer *Congress*, an especially large thirty-two-gun frigate, was completed in Philadelphia for a group of merchants. On 6 September of that year the Royal Navy's fourteen-gun sloop *Savage* was cruising off Charleston. Captain Charles Stirling, encountering the *Congress*, made a fatal error of identification and engaged, only to discover that he was badly outgunned by the American ship. A four-hour running battle ensued before Captain George Geddes battered

the sloop into submission. The *Congress* then headed home for repairs. The *Savage* was recaptured later in the year by the twenty-eight-gun British frigate *Solebay*.

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CONNECTICUT, MOBILIZATION

IN. Connecticut had several reasons for enthusiastically embracing the revolutionary movement that led to independence from Great Britain. The unrestrained fertility of the colony's women and the extensive agriculture practiced by its men had exhausted Connecticut's usable lands by 1750. After midcentury the colony had begun exporting people. The formation of the Susquehanna Company to settle disputed territory in north-central Pennsylvania reflected the problem, although many Connecticut migrants preferred eastern New York and Vermont to the Upper Susquehanna River valley. Establishing families in an unsettled wilderness required capital. Parliamentary subsidies during the Seven Years' War filled the gap created by interruptions in Connecticut's overseas commerce. The mother country offered to pay for colonial manpower and supplies, and Connecticut's government passed this windfall along in the form of the bounties it offered volunteers. The colony's young men eagerly joined the expeditionary forces marching against Canada in expectation of acquiring enough capital to establish families of their own in lands secured from the French.

Connecticut was not alone in being militarized by the Seven Years' War, but it was the only colony with overlapping claims to northern Pennsylvania. That made it especially reluctant to obey British restrictions on westward settlement at the conclusion of the conflict. Pennsylvania's Quaker leadership had failed to support the war effort the way Connecticut's had, fostering the assumption that Pennsylvania would be at a disadvantage in defending its title. Even if Britain declined to recognize Connecticut's superior military value, the colony expected to be more than a match for Pennsylvania on the ground, especially if and when the imperial connection dissolved.

Connecticut's religious identity reinforced its economic interest in revolution. The colony had begun as part of the Puritan migration that also settled Massachusetts. By the end of the seventeenth century, both colonies had made provision for the public support of their Congregational clergy. Connecticut reacted to the turmoil accompanying the rapid expansion of settlement

within its eastern half after King Philip's War (1675–1676) by developing a Presbyterian version of Congregationalism known as the Saybrook Platform (1708). But she joined Massachusetts in regarding the Church of England as a threat after the English church began using its missionaries to subvert New England's Congregational establishments. The Congregational clergy feared the next step would be the appointment of an American bishop, since some Anglican clergy in the colonies publicly favored such a measure. The Baptists, together with other dissenters from the Congregational establishment, shared this fear, ensuring that most of Connecticut's people would heed their religious leaders in opposing any expansion of British authority over them. The Church of England's clergy and communicants felt differently, but the only area of Connecticut where they constituted a significant presence was along the western border shared with New York.

After 1763 fewer anxieties about independence clouded Connecticut's response to Parliament's efforts to regulate the colonies' trade and raise a revenue from them than elsewhere in British North America. Connecticut's peripheral relationship to its more strategically located neighbors reinforced its rebellious disposition. The colony had won access to the larger Atlantic economy as an exporter of meat and timber to the West Indies. But it lacked any of the gateway ports that had emerged during the colonial period to facilitate the exchange of American surpluses for European imports. Initially, Boston had served as the central gateway for the rest of the continent; around 1750, however, Philadelphia replaced Boston. Those with an eye to the future could see that New York possessed assets that eventually would allow it to rival Philadelphia. And even Rhode Island had Newport, favored by the Royal Navy because it was largely ice-free. Connecticut's only deepwater port, New London, had a limited hinterland. Though New Haven, Hartford, and Middletown emerged as local commercial centers, the colony remained dependent on New York, Boston, and Newport for its European imports.

Occupying the economic and strategic periphery seemed advantageous as the imperial crisis developed. Responsibility for the nonimportation movement of 1768–1770 that resisted the Townshend duties fell on the gateway ports. When Britain replied with measures designed to subvert the solidarity of local merchants' associations, Connecticut's leaders observed from the sidelines, drawing two conclusions from the spectacle. They construed the lengths to which Britain was prepared to go in combating nonimportation as a symptom of weakness. And they assumed that any showdown with the mother country would take place around the continent's principal ports rather than in Connecticut. In 1769 the colony's government quietly extended its jurisdiction over the

disputed Susquehannah lands. The action reflected a determination on the part of the leadership to press the colony's claim and the confident expectation that should independence materialize, possession would constitute nine-tenths of the law.

THE INITIAL MOBILIZATION

Connecticut responded almost as vigorously as Massachusetts to the Lexington and Concord alarms that initiated the Revolutionary War. Israel Putnam dropped everything upon hearing the news and hastened to Cambridge, Massachusetts, where a makeshift army was assembling. Several thousand of his fellow colonists were not far behind, though most soon turned back because of the lack of supplies. But Connecticut subsequently complied with the Continental Congress's call for six regiments totaling six thousand men to serve until the end of 1775, embodying its full complement of men in less than a month.

News of the fighting in Massachusetts caught few by surprise. The Boston Port Act, followed by the Medford powder raid of 1 September 1774 had sent the message that Britain preferred coercion to conciliation. The British government had also replaced the Massachusetts charter of 1692 with a more centralized form of government headed by General Thomas Gage. Massachusetts responded with a Provincial Congress that began assuming the functions of government. The first Continental Congress's sponsorship of a continental nonimportation agreement persuaded no one close to Boston that an armed showdown could be avoided. Connecticut's farmers planted a bumper crop of winter wheat in September 1774. Since they had long before abandoned exporting wheat, we can infer they were anticipating an army's demand for bread during the following year. Their foresight paid off when Washington chose Joseph Trumbull as the first commissary general of the Continental army.

Most of Connecticut's population saw only economic advantage in a struggle they expected would be decided quickly somewhere else. The British force in Boston clearly was too weak to subdue New England, let alone the entire continent. Once Britain understood the realities on the ground, many expected her to offer acceptable terms. If, instead, Britain chose to pursue a military contest, the mother country would be limited to one major offensive now that it was deprived of the economic support formerly derived from its American colonies.

After the British had been driven from Boston early in 1776, however, Connecticut learned that the largest expeditionary force ever mounted from Europe was on its way to America. Some must have had second thoughts about their initial commitment to the contest. But they still expected the coming campaign would decide the issue, and Connecticut immediately doubled the number of

regiments it placed under Continental command. Later it committed most of its western militia to the defense of New York. The results proved to be far from reassuring, and not just because the British experienced little difficulty in pushing Washington's forces off Long Island and Manhattan and chasing them through Westchester County. Washington's refusal after the Battle of White Plains to deploy troops in Connecticut's defense proved as disturbing as the visible superiority of British arms. Instead, he withdrew his dwindling army to New Jersey to cover Philadelphia, which was the seat of Congress, and to get access to grain surpluses that Connecticut had failed to produce in 1776. Left to defend itself, the newly independent state began to understand that being on the periphery could also be disadvantageous.

The Danbury raid in April 1777 increased Connecticut's misgivings. The British marched a force of eighteen hundred men twenty-three miles inland to destroy a Continental depot and escaped with minimal casualties after spending three full days in the state. By then it was too late to turn back. When the Congress asked Connecticut to raise eight regiments for three-years service or the duration of the war, the legislature turned to the towns. Local civil authorities cooperated with the local militia to raise the quotas of men assigned them through a combination of arm-twisting and enhanced incentives. Though the state did produce over four thousand men for the "permanent" army, compliance was incomplete and the regiments assembled much more slowly than in 1775 or 1776.

Nonetheless, Connecticut still behaved as if it was part of the revolutionary vanguard despite having to raise additional state regiments to provide for the defense of its coastline. In the early autumn of 1777, the northwestern militia responded vigorously to Horatio Gates's summons to assist in forcing Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga. The government also sponsored several military expeditions against Long Island and British-held Newport. None proved successful, but news that France had recognized the independence of the United States and entered into an alliance with the new nation offered hope that the next campaign would be the last.

TRANSITIONING TO A WAR OF ATTRITION

Rather than heralding victory, the campaign of 1778 demonstrated two unpleasant truths: the continent was in for a long war, and those who had stood on the periphery were no longer immune to the vicissitudes hitherto visited on the strategic centers. Connecticut had received a foretaste of its changing circumstances early in 1777 when the commissary general, Joseph Trumbull, was replaced by a prominent Maryland merchant, William Buchanan. Buchanan seemed better positioned to provide the army with bread until British General William Howe disrupted

Maryland and Delaware's grain region by striking at Philadelphia through the Chesapeake. Congress then turned back to Jeremiah Wadsworth, a Trumbull lieutenant during 1775–1776 from Hartford. Wadsworth managed to provide for the army during the campaign of 1778, but at the cost of bankrupting the continent.

Wadsworth's appointment has mistakenly led some to conclude that Connecticut was the "provision state." During the late colonial period, New England had specialized in producing livestock surpluses, and many of the cattle sustaining the army were procured by a network of Wadsworth's Connecticut agents, if not directly from it. But barreled salt pork rather than cattle had been the state's prewar specialty and would have better suited the army's needs had salt been available. Cattle had to substitute for pork because pigs could not be walked to camp. When it came to bread, providing for the limited mobilization of 1775 had left the state exhausted. Connecticut's principal contribution to the revolutionary movement was political commitment, though even that eroded as a prolonged war of attrition converted the state's peripheral position into a military liability.

While Connecticut lacked sufficient strategic significance to have the continent contribute to its defense, it remained an attractive prey for British commanders contemplating diversionary operations, as with Benedict Arnold's assault in 1781 on New London, and for ruffian Loyalists seeking plunder. After the Danbury raid, regular British forces did not return to the state until 1779, when Commodore George Collier attacked New Haven, Fairfield, and Norwalk between 5 July and 12 July and burned the latter two towns. However, Connecticut suffered as much from an abortive effort to dislodge the British from Newport during 1778 as it subsequently did from direct enemy action.

Cooperating with the French taxed the continent's resources to a point where an irreversible, downward spiral in the value of the continental currency ensued. The collapse of the currency affected Connecticut more than other states because it had contributed disproportionately to the early phase of the struggle and would now be repaid in devaluated coin, if at all. Provisioning the army raised for the Newport operation, together with Burgoyne's surrendered army near Boston, and the refit of a French expeditionary force, exhausted New England's grain supplies. Wheat bread became a luxury few could afford; most of the population was forced to subsist on grains they fed their stock. An extraordinarily harsh winter in 1779–1780 then substantially reduced the region's supply of animals.

LIVING WITH A WAR OF ATTRITION

Repeated adverse turns of fortune depressed the morale of the civilian population, producing widespread war

weariness that had adverse political and military repercussions. At the end of 1779, Connecticut faced the task of replacing its three-year recruits for the army who had enlisted during 1777. By then the currency had lost almost all value as an inducement while frontier violence, together with the title dispute, prevented Connecticut from offering land bounties in the Susquehanna region. That left the state with no option but to divide the militia into as many units as men to be raised and to require each class to produce a recruit. The classes usually did so by raising a purse large enough to attract a volunteer. Though a class could also use force, coercion made bad soldiers. Eventually the legislature defined classes by the amount of property they possessed rather than the number of adult males they contained. But buying volunteers invited bounty jumping and the sellers' market that recruits enjoyed made it difficult to get them for more than one year. Connecticut was not alone in the obstacles it encountered in maintaining its Continental regiments. But by contributing to the progressive shrinkage of the army, the state surrendered its former vanguard identity.

Connecticut was unique in another, unenviable respect. The state had a 120-mile shoreline, most of which fronted on the protected waters of Long Island Sound. After the fall of New York City in 1776, Long Island fell under Britain's sway. That meant the island, never more than eighteen miles away, provided an ideal base for raiding Connecticut's coast. Though there had been some partisan raiding during 1777 and 1778, it was confined to refugees trying to survive. That began to change with the May 1779 kidnap of Gold Selleck Silliman from his home outside Fairfield. Silliman commanded the state's southwestern militia, and his abduction could be seen as preparation for Collier's incursions two months later. In 1780 Britain formally embodied a paramilitary organization known as the Associated Loyalists to raid the shoreline. An orgy of kidnapping and plundering ensued. Those living in the no-man's lands of New York and New Jersey suffered similar depredations from Loyalist ruffians. But Connecticut's extensive coastline made its exposure more widespread than theirs. Trying to defend the state against this threat competed directly with efforts to maintain Connecticut's Continental regiments. There were insufficient resources to go around, in part because the state's Continental regiments were being used by Washington to defend New York and New Jersey. Connecticut's small navy proved better at sponsoring retaliatory strikes than at intercepting Loyalist raiders on the Sound.

Long Island also provided a base from which the British launched an illicit trade with Connecticut's coastal population. Trade proved to be a more productive way of extracting provisions than plundering, because after five years of being cut off from European and West Indian

commodities, Connecticut's people craved overseas imports. British textiles and hardware now commanded a barter price in provisions unthinkable in peacetime. The state had no choice but to oppose this trade, since unhindered, it might have won the people's allegiance back to the crown. But Connecticut's political system proved as inadequate to the task as its military system was in defending the state against the Associated Loyalists. This time the legislature devolved principal responsibility for resisting the illicit trade onto individuals. Those making a citizen's arrest of an illicit trader were entitled to half the value of the goods seized. But that hardly solved the problem, because the enemy retaliated by plundering anyone who apprehended Loyalist partisans. The legislature authorized coastal communities to compile lists of the disaffected in their midst from whose property Patriot victims could be compensated. But this remedy proved more effective in dividing coastal communities among themselves than in halting the raiding and illicit trade.

The pressures that the illicit trade exerted on the state's coastal communities reverberated throughout Connecticut's political structure in debilitating ways. Most dramatically the state's governor, Jonathan Trumbull, began to be whispered out of office by rumors that he was trading with the British. The rumors originated with kidnap victims who were shown trunks of British goods—allegedly consigned to Trumbull—by their captors in New York. Though Trumbull was the only state governor to serve throughout the entire Revolutionary War, during the last three years of the conflict he was elected by the legislature rather than the people. At a less obvious level, the inability of the state to defend its coastline and secure itself against illicit traders created tensions within the legislature between the representatives of towns near the coast and the interior towns.

ADJUSTING TO PEACE

At the end of the war Connecticut was demoralized and exhausted. One measure of that exhaustion was the state's decreasing ability to raise money. Connecticut's revenue derived from direct taxes laid on male polls over eighteen years of age and the assessed value of lands and improvements. In the course of the war, the state's grand list declined dramatically because of enemy depredations along the coast and the migration of polls elsewhere. During the last years of the conflict, the state's tax collections fell hopelessly into arrears, precluding any reduction in taxes with the peace. Instead, Connecticut found itself having to service the substantial state debt it had contracted during the initial phase of the Revolution, quite independently of the demands Congress continued to make on it.

Connecticut's situation contrasted dramatically with neighboring New York's. Though New York had been less

forward in joining the Revolution and had spent most of the war with three-fifths of its population under enemy occupation, it had emerged from the conflict with a much smaller state debt because the Continental army had defended the Hudson River. With peace, most of the foreign imports desired by Connecticut came through New York burdened by its impost. New York could tax Connecticut without fear of retaliation. A continental impost, such as the one Congress had been asking the states for since 1781, provided the obvious remedy. It would bear less perceptibly on a war-weary people, since only those who chose to purchase the dutied goods would pay. A continental impost would also preclude the states from competing against each other for this preferred resource, thus maximizing its yield. Connecticut's true interest lay in a stronger central government empowered to impose such a tax, but persuading its traumatized people of the wisdom of such a course posed a major challenge for its less than triumphant leadership.

At the end of the war, Jonathan Trumbull retired as governor. His replacement, Matthew Griswold, could do little to check the hostility a long war had built up against Connecticut's Revolutionary leaders. Popular dissatisfaction took many forms, from resisting the resettlement of Loyalists, entitled to return under the terms of the peace treaty, to opposing Congress's commutation of the Continental officers' half pay for life to full pay for five years. The latter issue provided the pretense for the Middletown Convention of 1783, which met twice in an effort to challenge the leadership's hold on the council, or upper house of the legislature, that had veto power over the lower house. The effort failed, but just barely. The state's leadership was less successful in persuading the lower house to adopt realistic fiscal policies that would reestablish the state's credit or in preventing the popular branch from favoring state creditors over federal creditors. It did not help that Congress had pronounced judgment against Connecticut's Susquehannah claims in 1782.

Eventually, those who possessed a continental vision of the state's problems triumphed. At the last minute the Connecticut legislature appointed three delegates to attend the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which framed the federal Constitution. The compromise proposed by Connecticut's delegates then proved critical in securing the agreement of the Convention to the new form of government. And Connecticut's ratifying convention endorsed the Convention's handiwork without significant opposition. But none of these developments would have occurred had it not been for the specter of anarchy raised by Shays's Rebellion in nearby Massachusetts.

The traumatic memory of the Revolution bred reservations about republicanism among Connecticut's Federalist leaders. It shaped their orientation to the wars of the French Revolution, predisposing them to favor

good relations with Britain at the expense of bad relations with republican France, even to the point of waging a limited war against France. After the turn of the century, these leaders helped subvert the national government's attempt to parry pressure from the belligerent powers through commercial measures. When their actions left their domestic opponents with no alternative to war with Britain besides capitulation, Connecticut's government was so bent on avoiding a repetition of the revolutionary debacle that it withheld the state's militia from federal command. In 1814–1815 it even hosted a New England Convention in Hartford that concerted quasi-treasonable measures. Though Connecticut's people eventually repudiated those responsible for these actions, the state abandoned its former revolutionary identity, preferring instead to settle for being a land of "steady habits."

SEE ALSO *Associated Loyalists; Collier, George; Connecticut Coast Raid; Danbury Raid, Connecticut; Silliman, Gold Selleck; Trumbull, Jonathan, Sr.; Trumbull, Joseph; Wadsworth, Jeremiah.*

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CONNECTICUT COAST RAID. July 1779. George Germain's 8 March 1778 instructions to Sir Henry Clinton establishing the "southern strategy" also directed him to use the forces remaining in the north to carry out amphibious raids on American ports in order to disrupt commerce. The following year, after the expedition that set up Stony Point as a forward outpost returned to New York City, Clinton turned his attention to Long Island Sound. In addition to the goal of destroying merchant ships and docks, Clinton hoped to stop raiders using small craft from harassing Long Island and to increase the political pressure placed on Washington by states seeking more Continental troops to defend their coasts. Major General William Tryon, the royal governor of New York, received command of a task force which he assembled at the end of June. Part of the force came from the garrison just withdrawn from Rhode Island and were still on their transports. Embarkation of the rest began on 29 June and lasted until 3 July, with the task force sailing the next morning. Commodore Collier used a frigate as his flagship and picked the three other escorts because they could operate close inshore: a sloop, a brig, and a galley. The expedition arrived off New Haven the night of 4 July and landed without opposition the next morning.

Tryon assigned the task of capturing the town of New Haven to Brigadier General George Garth and gave him two infantry regiments (Seventh and Fifty-fourth Foot), the four flank companies of the Guards Brigade, a jäger detachment, and four guns. About 150 militia, and some Yale students who volunteered, skirmished briefly and then removed the planks from a bridge across West River. Garth detoured along Milford Hill to the Derby Road. Although the British suffered some casualties—their adjutant, Major Campbell, was mortally wounded—they entered New Haven shortly after noon.

East Haven was the initial objective of the second column led personally by Tryon. His units were the Twenty-third Foot (Royal Welch Fusiliers), the Landgrave Regiment (Hesse-Cassel), the King's American Regiment

(Loyalists), and two guns. Tryon had to wait for the boats that landed Garth's division, but he met only token resistance. Carrying out the destruction of shipping and public facilities took all of 6 June, but on the next day the two columns united at East Haven and re-embarked.

Fairfield, some twenty miles southwest of New Haven, formed the next target, and was occupied on 8 June. Outmatched, the local militia could only fall back and content themselves with random sniping. The civilian inhabitants had fled, and the invaders got out of control in the empty village. Heavy looting took place, and then fires burned 83 homes, 54 barns, 47 storehouses, 2 schools, 2 churches, the jail, and the courthouse. The landing force then camped for the night before returning to the transports.

Green's Farms suffered the same fate on 9 July, Norwalk on 11 July. About 30 buildings went up in smoke at the former; 130 homes, 87 barns, 22 stores, and 17 shops at the latter. In between Tryon regrouped on the far side of Long Island Sound at Huntington, on Long Island, and was back there preparing to hit another town when Clinton ordered him back to New York.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Tryon's force consisted of about 2,600 troops, British, German and Loyalist, and all of them were experienced. They suffered over 100 casualties, about half of which were in the four companies of the Guards. Tryon officially reported 26 killed, 90 wounded, and 32 missing. American militia losses were insignificant, but property damage was enormous.

SIGNIFICANCE

Because Washington refused to swallow the bait and detach forces from the Highlands, the raid had no immediate military importance. On the other hand the sheer destruction and targeting of homes and other structures that could not be considered military objectives raised a firestorm of indignation. Instead of terrorizing the inhabitants, the raid strengthened resolve, and not just in Connecticut. It also marked the practical end to Tryon's combat service. The raid has attracted very little attention from historians.

SEE ALSO *Western Reserve*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

CONNECTICUT FARMS, NEW JERSEY. 7 June 1780. Burned during Springfield Raid.

SEE ALSO *Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of Knyphausen*.

CONNECTICUT LINE. Connecticut's Line benefited from the fact that alone of all the colonies, Connecticut did not have to change its existing government—it retained its Assembly rather than having to form a provincial congress, and its elected governor had been one of the leaders of the Revolutionary movement. Furthermore, because its own borders had been secure for a hundred years, Connecticut's military role throughout the eighteenth century had been to mobilize troops for distant service. This tradition and experience served Connecticut well in 1775, when it swiftly raised eight regiments and dispatched five of them to the siege at Boston and three to help in the invasion of Canada. The first six regiments were authorized on 27 April and became part of the Continental Army on 14 June. Two more were added in July and recruited as Continentals.

On 1 January 1776 the five Connecticut regiments at Boston reenlisted as the 10th, 17th, 19th, 20th and 22d Continental Regiments, with minor reshuffling of some of the companies. The 10th, 17th, and 22d disbanded on 31 December 1776 at Peekskill, New York; the 19th and 20th participated in the Trenton and Princeton campaign and extended their service until 15 February 1777 before disbanding at Morristown, New Jersey. The troops in Canada followed a different path—hardly a surprise given the confused state of the invasion. Two (the 4th and 5th Connecticut Regiments) disbanded in December 1775, whereas the 1st extended its enlistments until 1 April 1776 before disbanding. However, the veterans played an important role in forming two new regiments: Elmore's Regiment assembled in Canada on 15 April, and Burrall's Regiment assembled in Connecticut on 18 January, then moved north. Elmore's unit disbanded on 10 May 1777, while in garrison at Fort Schuyler in the Mohawk Valley. Burrall's disbanded at Ticonderoga on 19 January 1777. One other regiment, led by Andrew Ward, was formed in the summer of 1776 and deployed for the defense of New York City. It disbanded at Morristown on 14 May 1777.

The “88-Battalion Resolve” of 16 September 1776 gave Connecticut a quota of eight infantry regiments for 1777, and all were newly-organized in the winter and spring, but each included a majority of veterans. The state also raised (Samuel B.) Webb’s Additional Continental Regiment, and it was formally taken into the line on 24 July 1780 as the Ninth Connecticut Regiment. Because Webb’s troops had been issued captured British uniforms when they were assembled, the regiment had a great deal of success intercepting messengers and Loyalist recruiters in the Hudson Highlands, and was known as the “Decoy Regiment.” The quota dropped on 1 January 1781 to five regiments through consolidations and renumbering, and then, on 1 January 1783, it was reduced to three. Two of those were furloughed on 15 June 1783 when the men serving duration enlistments went home. The remaining men became the Connecticut Regiment and remained in service until 15 November, when the line officially ceased to exist.

Connecticut also furnished other units to the Continental army that were never part of the line. These included the Second Continental Light Dragoons; half of Sherburne’s Additional Continental Regiment; part of the Second Continental Artillery. In addition, Connecticut raised two Westmoreland Independent Companies, named for a county in the Wyoming Valley, which was part of Connecticut until 1783.

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CONNOLLY, JOHN. (c. 1745–c. 1798). Loyalist conspirator. Born in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, about 1745, Connolly became a doctor and settled in Pittsburgh, where he made the acquaintance of George Washington. Connolly had been granted land by Virginia, and with a view to making a fortune in land speculation, he sided against his native province to become the agent of Lord Dunmore, the royal governor of Virginia. In this capacity he had a large part in instigating Dunmore’s War in 1774. In April 1775 he was captain and commandant of the Virginia militia at Pittsburgh, but at the outbreak of the Revolution he was, because of his unconcealed Loyalist convictions, forced by the local Patriots to leave. In August he joined Dunmore aboard a British warship off Portsmouth, Virginia. Two weeks later he carried Dunmore’s dispatches to General Thomas Gage in Boston, and after ten days at the latter place, he returned with Gage’s approval for an ambitious plan to reclaim Virginia for the king. Dr. Connolly’s scheme was for him to return to the frontier, raise a regiment of Loyalists, equip an expedition at Detroit, and launch an offensive that would capture Pittsburgh and Alexandria before joining up with Dunmore for the reconquest of Virginia.

For this mission Connolly was made lieutenant colonel on 5 November. With eighteen sheets of instructions from Dunmore cleverly concealed in hollow sticks used to carry his baggage, Connolly and two fellow conspirators—Allan Cameron and J. F. D. Smyth—were taken prisoner in Frederick County, Maryland, after a servant informed on them. The hidden papers were not found, but another document compromised part of their plan. To save themselves from mob justice, they acknowledged their British commissions. Before they could be sent to Philadelphia, Smyth escaped from their Maryland prison with letters from Connolly. He was recaptured and imprisoned in Philadelphia on 18 January 1776, fifteen days after the other two had reached that city.

Congress rejected Connolly’s plea to be treated as a prisoner of war and kept him in prison in Philadelphia until the end of 1776, when he was moved to Baltimore. Finally exchanged in October 1780, he went to New York and then returned to Pittsburgh in a failed effort to organize a Loyalist uprising. In June 1781 General Henry Clinton sent him to serve under Cornwallis in Virginia. Three months later Connolly was recaptured and again imprisoned in Philadelphia. He was released in March 1782 on the promise that he would go to England. Connolly appears to have gone to Nova Scotia instead and moved around the frontier region for the next several years.

SEE ALSO *Dunmore’s (or Cresap’s) War*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT. 1774.

An updated version of a pamphlet John Wilson had originally written in 1768, *Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament* was a publication that advocated the central tenet of Wilson's political philosophy: "All power is derived from the people." The pamphlet affirmed Wilson's support for the idea of direct representation, and thereby rejected the notion that the interests of the colonies could be represented in Parliament by non-residents. Wilson believed that Parliament had no legislative authority over the colonies, who were united with Britain only through the person of the monarch. Even then, Wilson argued, the king's prerogative power could be vetoed by the colonial assemblies. While his ideas were an important step in the rejection of parliamentary authority, Wilson shied away from dissolving the connection with the king and clung to a hope of reconciliation well into 1776. Yet, as a delegate to the Second Continental Congress, when the die was cast, he voted for independence and signed the Declaration of Independence.

SEE ALSO *Wilson, James.*

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CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROPRIETY OF IMPOSING TAXES IN THE BRITISH COLONIES, FOR THE PURPOSE OF RASING A REVENUE, BY ACT OF PARLIAMENT.

Pamphlet by Daniel Dulany.

SEE ALSO *Dulany, Daniel.*

CONTINENTAL ARMY, DRAFT.

Revolutionary American military forces drafted men throughout the conflict. At the most elementary level, state militias divided their contingent into classes of from fifteen to twenty men, then called out (drafted) one or several of a county's classes for service ranging from weeks to months. Having served the allotted time, the men

returned to their homes. Similarly, Continental regiments were occasionally augmented with state militia drafts, usually each county class providing a draftee, volunteer, or substitute in place of a drafted man.

In 1777 Connecticut passed a statute that set recruiting quotas for selected towns, met by "detaching" (drafting) men from the local militia to serve ten months as Continental soldiers. That October a Virginia measure called for counties to provide an allotment of one-year militia levies to augment Continental regiments. A draft lottery was to be held in February 1778, and the chosen men were to travel north by 31 March.

Congress authorized the first comprehensive Continental army draft in a February 1778 recruiting act. Covering eleven of thirteen states (excepting South Carolina and Georgia), the legislation called for the enactment of a nine-month levy, or an effective alternative, to fill recruiting quotas. Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and North Carolina instituted a levy, and as a result they garnered substantial numbers of men for the 1778–1779 campaigns.

In February 1780 the Board of War reiterated General George Washington's 1778 recommendation of a long-term draft. The result was a one-time, six-month levy that produced lackluster results in all but a few states. (Massachusetts was the sole exception, garnering substantial numbers of levies each year from 1780 through 1782.) In consequence, beginning in 1779 and continuing to 1783, army strength steadily diminished. A limited draft was also instituted in Virginia and North Carolina in 1781, adding numbers of troops to those states' efforts to counter invading British forces.

American militia and Continental conscription mirrored the reality of the Civil War system (1863–1865), when volunteers and substitutes outnumbered draftees. Large numbers of serving Revolutionary militia were (paid) volunteers substituting for men whose class had been called up, and predominant numbers of men gleaned through the 1778 and 1780 Continental army drafts were in fact also volunteers or substitutes who stepped forward because of monetary inducement.

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CONTINENTAL ARMY, ORGANIZATION. The military forces of revolutionaries during the War of American Independence fell into three categories. Each of the thirteen states maintained a militia organized for local defense. These militias provided basic military training to the adult male population and formed a pool from which mobilizations could be drawn. Longer-serving regulars, called state troops, also remained under the control of the state governments. The third force, the full-time soldiers of the Continental army, served exclusively at the national level under the authority of the Continental Congress. It was this latter group which carried the main battlefield burden of the war.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL ARMY

The Continental Congress created its national army on 14 June 1775 when, in an action deliberately glossed over in its journals for security reasons, it transferred to its own control the four existing colony armies of New England and a similar force that was being created by New York. The same action also directed the recruitment of companies of riflemen in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia to provide for broader participation. With this step Congress accepted the responsibility to pay and feed the men, commission the officers, and establish a disciplinary framework. On 15 June it named George Washington as the “General and Commander in Chief” of this army, and thereafter created other general officers, as well as logistical and other administrative support structures, a process which would continue to be refined and improved throughout the war.

The original military forces assembled in 1775 were intended to maintain the siege of Boston to neutralize occupying British troops, to protect New York City from possible naval attack, and to occupy the traditional Lake Champlain route to prevent an invasion by the British garrison in Canada. Following the precedent set by the provincials of the French and Indian Wars, these first soldiers were recruited only to serve for a single year.

At the end of 1775 Congress, in coordination with the army’s leaders, set about reenlisting the regiments for a second year. Washington’s main forces around Boston completed the task with reasonable smoothness, and he sought to foster a sense of nationalism by having the regiments stop using the names of their colonies; for example, the Third Connecticut Regiment of 1775 reorganized under the new designation of Twentieth Continental Regiment. Reorganization on the northern front followed a more chaotic path, because of the difficulties associated with active involvement in an invasion of Canada. During the course of 1775 and 1776, all of the other colonies raised regiments which became part of the Continental Army, as did the rebellious inhabitants of

Canada, which was to have been the fourteenth member of the Continental Congress. Some of those units started as state troops and then transferred to Congressional control; others were formed explicitly at the request of Congress.

Serious battlefield reverses came during 1776, in the face of the British attempt to crush the rebellion by deploying huge forces of regulars (including Germans) from Europe. This reality led the American political leaders to declare independence and then to reconsider their policy of relying solely upon a relatively small Continental Army whose troops enlisted for a single year and which was supported by large militia mobilizations. On 16 September 1776 Congress passed legislation known as the “88-Battalion Resolve” which endorsed a new strategy. Hereafter the Continentals would enlist for the duration of the war (or at least three years) and would be numerous enough to carry the burden of formal battle with minimal assistance. The December 1776 crisis led to supplemental legislation that increased the authorized force to the equivalent of about 120 regiments. Five were to be artillery, four to be light dragoons, and the rest infantry; Washington’s 1776 experiment with dropping state names from regimental titles ended, because it had proved to be unpopular with the men.

BASIC ARMY ORGANIZATION

The 1777 Continental Army represented the largest American regular force at every point in the war. The infantry quota consisted of the thirteen states’ contingents, which were called the “State Lines,” and the two-regiment Canadian force, which was also treated as if it were a state line. The primary purpose of the ‘line’ arrangement was to provide a fair mechanism for officer promotions. Up to the grade of captain, an officer rose by seniority within his regiment, whereas field-grade officers (majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels) had seniority within the entire state line. General officer promotions were handled independently, by Congress, which considered seniority on a national basis.

The light dragoons and the artillery (except for the regiment in South Carolina) were also managed as if they were lines. Some other units remained outside the basic system, however. A few of the older infantry regiments, which were not tied to a specific state, were called Extra Continental Regiments and had a complex administrative structure. Sixteen other infantry regiments authorized in the December 1776 resolve were called Additional Continental Regiments and were managed by Washington himself. These were allocated recruiting areas in an effort to adjust the initial act’s quotas to a more realistic apportionment. Only fourteen of them ever actually formed, and several of them failed to achieve full strength. Washington also treated the Additional as a line.

Congress continued to approve some specialist units after the spring of 1777—for example, two maintenance regiments, a regiment to guard prisoner-of-war facilities, several mixed infantry-cavalry units called legions or partisan corps, and some company-sized formations. But as the 1777 campaign came to a close, the main focus was to keep up the existing troop strength. This problem was never solved, and thereafter the army reluctantly carried out periodic consolidations of regiments in order to sustain combat formations that were capable of fighting.

Major reorganizations took place on 1 January 1781 and 1 January 1783. Once peace negotiations reached a preliminary treaty, Congress directed Washington to begin releasing as many men as possible, granting them furloughs instead of discharges in the event that the regiments had to reassemble if fighting erupted again. On 23 December 1783 Washington returned his commission to Congress, marking the end of the basic demobilization process. The last regiment of the Continental Army mustered out at West Point, New York, in June 1784, to be replaced by a peacetime United States Army.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE REGIMENTS

The fundamental organization in the Continental Army was the regiment. It consisted of a command and staff element and a number of companies. Regiments were normally commanded by a colonel, who was assisted by a lieutenant colonel and a major. Companies were commanded by a captain and his subordinate lieutenants, ensigns or cornets (for mounted units). Regimental staffs usually had: an adjutant, who was assisted by a sergeant major for administration; a quartermaster and a quartermaster sergeant for logistics; a paymaster; a surgeon and his deputy, the surgeon's mate; a drum major and fife major, who were responsible for communications and did not function as a musical band. Early in the war, each regiment also had a chaplain. The typical regiment contained eight companies in the first half of the war and nine in the second half, although numbers could range as high as ten or as low as six.

At full strength, an eight-company infantry regiment would contain about 728 officers and men, and a company would have 90 officers and men. In combat, the regiment would normally be tactically organized as a battalion, with the eight companies that formed the line of battle each being called a platoon. Later in the war, larger units might fight as two battalions, with companies fighting as two platoons. This formation was a reflection of the tactical limitations of the smooth-bore musket. Unlike modern warfare, the private did not fire and move with freedom—inaccuracy, a slow rate of fire, and short range mandated that the platoon all fire at one time, as if it were a giant shotgun. By the time a platoon had completed the

reloading process, seven other platoons would have fired. Therefore, using eight platoons allowed a battalion to maintain continuous combat.

Having a regiment act as a single battalion and a company act as a single platoon eliminated confusion during an engagement. The Continentals differed from contemporary Europeans by putting more emphasis on gunfire than on bayonet charges, and had their soldiers stand in formations only two men deep. Europeans used three ranks to achieve more stability, but since the men in the back rank couldn't shoot effectively, they wasted a third of their manpower. When Congress added the ninth company in 1778, it specified that the new addition would be a light infantry force that was to be employed as skirmishers or detached to form elite attack battalions with the light companies of other regiments.

From the beginning, the Continental Army grouped several regiments together as a brigade, commanded by a brigadier general. Several brigades formed a division under a major general. Starting in the Trenton-Princeton campaign, however, Washington started treating the brigade as a combined-arms team that was held together on a long-term basis to improve teamwork. These new brigades usually contained four infantry regiments, one artillery company, and a small support staff. Washington felt that such an organization could fight independently when dispersed to protect larger portions of the countryside and yet it still could concentrate rapidly when needed for major battles. In a set-piece battle, the army would move into position by marching in columns, and then it would deploy into lines. The northern armies under Washington and his subordinates normally used two lines of brigades and a smaller third line as a reserve. In the southern campaign, Nathaniel Greene and Daniel Morgan had much smaller forces of Continentals and employed them only as the third line, placing militia in the first two lines but using them more to wear down the British than to stand and fight at close quarters.

TACTICAL DOCTRINE

The remaining piece of the Continental Army's system consisted of its tactical doctrine, and took shape slowly. When the original units formed in each state, they tended to rely on British practice, since most of the leaders had gained their combat experience in the French and Indian Wars. Like the British, the early Continentals left decisions about which specific drill manual to use to the regimental commanders or to the state governments. By 1777 this decision rested with the brigade commanders. While most chose to use the then-current British manual, which was issued in 1764, enough variations in application existed to make it hard to maneuver the army—different units moved at different speeds and with different commands.

Washington knew that this variation was a problem, but he could not address it until the winter of 1777–1778, the first time when he did not have to concentrate his attention on issues of reorganization. He turned to a foreign volunteer, Friedrich Steuben from Prussia, to put together a standard system. Steuben created a simple yet highly efficient set of drills and maneuvers based on new ideas circulating in the French army and drawing inspiration from the flexibility of the ancient Roman legions. This was the set of concepts that Washington had learned during the French and Indian War from the innovative British general, John Forbes. Steuben personally taught his ideas at Valley Forge, where he became the Inspector General, and then a team of subordinates spread out to disseminate them to the other parts of the army. In the fall of 1778, a board of generals reviewed that year's campaign and decided that the program had been successful. Washington then had Steuben prepare a written version, which was published in 1779 as *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Army, Part I*. Called the Blue Book because of the color of its cover, this slender volume became the Army's first field manual, and dealt with battlefield tactics, not drill and ceremonies.

SEE ALSO *Continental Army Draft; Continental Army, Social History; Line; Regiment; Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von.*

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Robert K. Wright Jr.

CONTINENTAL ARMY, SOCIAL HISTORY. "Continental Army" were the "regulars" of the American army, as distinguished from the state militias. The Continental army was created in June 1775 when Congress raised companies of riflemen, made George Washington commander in chief, took over the Boston "army," and started naming generals for Continental commissions.

EARLY CONGRESSIONAL ORGANIZING EFFORTS

When Washington assumed command at Boston on 3 July, he found 17,000 militiamen whose enlistments would expire before the end of the year. A congressional committee visited Boston and consulted Washington and the colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire on the best way of maintaining a regular army; the committee concluded that this force should number at least 20,370 men organized into 26 battalions of 8 companies each, exclusive of artillery and riflemen. (Cavalry was out of the question.) Congress apportioned these battalions among the colonies as follows: Massachusetts, 16; Connecticut, 5; Rhode Island, 2; and New Hampshire, 3. By mid-November fewer than 1,000 had enlisted, and a month later there were only



Private Field Dress. A private from the First Georgia Continental Infantry, circa 1777, in a nineteenth-century illustration by Charles MacKubin Lefferts. © NEW-YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY, NEW YORK/BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY.

about 6,000. Washington therefore had to call for militia to serve from 10 December to 15 January.

During this first year Congress authorized the raising of Continental troops in other colonies, and about 27,500 men were reported as being in its pay in 1775. An additional 10,000 militia were put in the field by Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.

On 1 January 1776, 27 Continental regiments of infantry were raised for the year. The 1st Continental Infantry was from Pennsylvania (and was merely a reorganization, under the same commander, of Thompson's Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion). The 2nd, 5th, and 8th Continental Infantry were from New Hampshire. The 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 12th through 16th, 18th, 21st, and 23rd through 27th were from Massachusetts. The 9th and 11th were from Rhode Island, and the 10th, 17th, 19th, 20th, and 22nd Continental Infantry were from Connecticut. It would be more precise

to say these regiments were "designated" rather than "raised": they were militia units that had existed in 1775 but that were now given Continental numbers; in almost all instances they retained the same organization and the same commander. On 15 July, Congress authorized Georgia to raise two infantry regiments and two artillery companies in Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina to serve until the end of 1777.

On 16 September the delegates resolved that 88 battalions (regiments) be enlisted as soon as possible to serve "during the present war," and they asked states to furnish the following numbers of battalions: New Hampshire, 3; Massachusetts, 15; Rhode Island, 2; Connecticut, 8; New York, 4; New Jersey, 4; Pennsylvania, 12; Delaware, 1; Maryland, 8; Virginia, 15; North Carolina, 9; South Carolina, 6; and Georgia, 1. The Boston phase of the war had ended and the delegates were now faced with British threats against Charleston and New York. Furthermore, they had recently received a letter in which Washington gave his considered opinion that the militia had done the cause more harm than good. Congress now was trying to raise a serious army to which states would contribute in accordance with their populations. A \$20 bounty was offered to every enlisted man who would engage for the duration, and land bounties were offered, varying from 500 acres for a colonel to 100 acres for a noncommissioned officer or private.

The 16 Additional Continental Regiments were authorized on 27 December 1776, on which date the delegates also resolved that 2,040 artillery (in three battalions) and 3,000 cavalry (or dragoons) be raised. Fewer than half the Continentals actually were raised, and the overall strength of regulars and militia in 1777 was 68,720, a drop of 20,931 from the strength in 1776. In 1778 the Continental figures dropped another 2,000 and the militia decreased 15,000 (due to lack of enemy activity).

RECRUITMENT OF SOLDIERS

Despite the enticements of a bounty and land warrants, recruitment was slow. Additionally, although there was some regional variation, the evidence indicates that those men who did answer the recruiter's call came from lower social and economic backgrounds. Many of the soldiers who were property owners or sons of property owners returned home after the first enthusiasm for war passed. They were replaced first by laboring men from the same communities and then by transient poor. By 1777 a number of states had instituted a draft in order to meet their troop quotas. Some, such as Maryland, offered an additional bounty payment of clothes and shoes over and above the Continental bounty, and these bounties together provided a considerable inducement for society's poorest men. Draft legislation of the states also reached out to those who lived on the edges of society. Maryland wanted "such disaffected persons that were arrested or hereafter

shall be arrested” to be signed up. South Carolina, in 1779, wanted “vagrants and idle disorderly persons” to be recruited. In 1778 North Carolina decided that a term in the Continental army was to be the punishment if a man failed to turn out for militia service, and it was also the punishment for those who harbored Continental deserters.

Those with financial resources who wanted to avoid service could hire a substitute. There was no disgrace in either hiring one or serving as one. The price was privately negotiated between the draftee and the substitute. Details about how much was paid to substitutes is largely anecdotal, but some substitutes reported being paid a small amount of money, perhaps equal to a few weeks pay, while others, perhaps facing a desperate or prosperous draftee, were able to exploit the situation and bargain for land. However, substitution did not always involve a financial transaction. It was also a mechanism used by families to shift the burden of service among themselves. For example, a younger son might go to allow a drafted father or older brother to stay at home, and in those cases it is unlikely any money would change hands.

Some of the men recruited either directly or as substitutes were African Americans. Perhaps as many as five thousand black men served in the Continental army. Initially, George Washington had been reluctant to allow black men to serve, although a significant number were already part of the forces around Boston when he arrived there in June 1775. The commander in chief and other military leaders were afraid that the presence in the army of black men would discourage white enlistment. However, later that year, with enlistments sluggish from all regions, free blacks already in the army were invited to reenlist. In 1777, when the Continental Congress fixed new troop quotas, most northern states allowed blacks to serve, and Connecticut and Rhode Island offered freedom to slaves in exchange for service. In fact, the following year Rhode Island organized two separate African American battalions, but everywhere else African American servicemen were integrated into existing units from places as far south as North Carolina. Outside New England, some slaves gained their freedom by serving as substitutes for their masters or others.

Additionally, a significant number of soldiers were foreign born. Data on this are hard to come by but towards the end of the war, 40 percent of one Maryland regiment was foreign born. However, it is possible that this was a distortion. Following the defeat of the British at Yorktown in 1781, perhaps citizens had felt free not to renew their enlistments, so that percentage of foreigners may not have been so high earlier in the war. However, even in 1776, one South Carolina regiment recognized its significant cohort of Irish soldiers by giving them a day off for St. Patrick’s Day.

RECRUITMENT OF OFFICERS

Officers were somewhat easier to find; in fact, more men wanted to be officers than could be accommodated, although many lacked the necessary skills. Following the British tradition, an officer was a gentleman, and plenty of colonial young men aspired to be both. Washington was not impressed by the quality of men he met who wanted to become officers. In a letter to Congress in September 1776, he argued that only “Gentlemen of Character” should be engaged. He felt officers should be the social superiors of the men they led to solidify and enforce military discipline. Wealthy or prominent men found it easy to secure commissions. Men of less obvious social worth spent a lot of time jockeying for position and recognition both in trying to get their commissions and in trying to get promoted once they were in the army.

In contrast to the British army, in which young gentlemen could buy a junior officer’s commission from a regimental commander, an officer leaving a regiment, or a commission broker, Continental commissions were given out by Congress and state legislatures. Congress appointed

men to the rank of general, but field grade officers, colonels and below, were appointed by the state assemblies in the state in which a regiment was raised. A commission at any level, then, could only be obtained by having influential friends who might recommend a man for a particular commission. One study of a sample of the New Jersey officer corps shows that 84 percent of them came from the wealthiest third of the community and 32 percent from the richest tenth.

With a lot at stake in terms of any possible promotion, many officers were consumed with their own advancement. A particularly difficult issue for all to deal with was seniority. Matters such as whether earlier service as a militia officer or as an officer with state troops counted toward Continental service when being considered for promotion led to much wrangling and politicking. Still, despite the anxieties thus aroused, the army provided literate men of modest means an opportunity to expand their horizons. It exposed them to a larger community and provided them with opportunities for leadership, and officers therefore jealously guarded all their privileges of rank.

CONGRESS'S LATER ORGANIZING EFFORTS

The reorganization of 29 March 1779 called for a regular force of 80 Continental regiments, the 1776 quotas (see above) being changed as follows: New York was to furnish 5, an increase of 1; New Jersey to furnish 1, a decrease of 1; Pennsylvania to furnish 11, one fewer than previously; Virginia, 11, four less than before; and North Carolina, 6, 3 fewer than before. All other states retained their old quotas.

In the last years of the war, from 1781 to 1783, the authorized strength of the Continental army was reduced to 58 battalions. Massachusetts and Virginia were assigned 11 each; Pennsylvania 9; Connecticut, 6; Maryland, 5; North Carolina, 4; New York, 3; New Hampshire, New Jersey, and South Carolina, 2 each; and Rhode Island, Delaware, and Georgia, 1 each. These were supposed to be 576-man battalions, as compared with the 522-man battalions for the previous years, but fewer than half of the required 33,408 Continentals actually showed up during these last years of the war.

TROOPS FURNISHED

Without allowance for the fact that many men served two, three, and even four terms in the American army and were therefore counted several times, the following figures are a basis for estimating how many men fought for American independence. The numbers for the Continental army were estimated by Colonel John Pierce of Connecticut, the army's paymaster general, and the Treasury accountants; the numbers for the militia were estimated by

Militia Estimates

State	Continental Army	Militia	Total
New Hampshire	12,497	4,000	16,497
Massachusetts	67,907	20,000	87,907
Rhode Island	5,908	4,000	9,908
Connecticut	31,939	9,000	40,939
New York	17,781	10,000	27,781
New Jersey	10,726	7,000	17,726
Pennsylvania	25,678	10,000	35,678
Delaware	2,386	1,000	3,386
Maryland	13,912	9,000	22,912
Virginia	26,678	30,000	56,678
North Carolina	7,263	13,000	20,263
South Carolina	6,417	20,000	26,417
Georgia	2,679	8,000	10,679
Totals	231,771	145,000	376,771

THE GALE GROUP.

Francis B. Heitman (see table). Heitman estimates that this total, 376,771, should be reduced to not more than 250,000 in view of the multiple enlistments (Heitman, p. 691).

The largest number of troops raised by Congress during any year of the war was 89,600 men in 1776; 42,700 of these were militia. The largest force Washington ever commanded in the field was under 17,000 regulars and militia, and in his finest campaign, that of Trenton and Princeton, he had only 4,000 regulars and militia. The greatest strength of the Continental army, in November 1778, was about 35,000.

BECOMING A PROFESSIONAL ARMY

By the end of the war, both officers and men had developed a degree of professionalism that Washington could only have dreamt about in 1775. Soldiers serving for longer terms were better trained and some were seasoned veterans. Officers, too, who were not bound to a particular length of service and who could resign their commissions at will were also gaining experience. Some of the improvement came from military manuals borrowed from the British army and quickly reprinted in the colonies when the fighting started. Some was a result of the training by the Prussian officer Baron Friedrich von Steuben, who had arrived at Valley Forge in 1778. He produced his own military manual, *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States*, which was widely available by 1779. He is most famous for having taught soldiers how to drill and maneuver, thus improving battlefield performance, but he also taught officers what might later be called managerial skills. His own and the other military manuals taught officers how to organize a camp, how to conduct an inspection, and how to deal with insubordination; Steuben even offered a sample worksheet for

organizing guard duty rotations. With these instructions, years of practice, and the example of veteran officers, the army gained in confidence and skill.

Paradoxically, another factor that helped create esprit de corps was the increasing isolation that many in the army felt from the civilian community. Continuing supply problems, interruptions in pay, and payment in depreciating currency were grievances that united officers and enlisted men and made both feel forgotten by the civilian world around them. Whether men served for political reasons, for the money, or for adventure or from a desire to get away from an unhappy home, a bad apprenticeship, indentured servitude, or even slavery, army life offered camaraderie, community, and the chance to be part of something larger than oneself. All these factors helped make the men an effective fighting force.

THE POSTWAR REGULAR ARMY

The British evacuated New York on 17 November 1783, Washington resigned as commander in chief on 22 December 1783, and at the start of the next year the American nation of four million people had an army of seven hundred rank and file. They constituted Colonel Henry Jackson's Continental or First American Regiment. On 2 June 1784 Congress abolished the Continental army except for eighty privates, "with a proportionable number of officers, no officers . . . above the grade of captain," to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, West Point, and other magazines. What was left, under the command of Captain John Doughty at West Point, was the vestige of Alexander Hamilton's Provincial Company of New York Artillery. Hence, only one unit of the modern American army, the one whose lineage can be traced to Hamilton's Battery, dates from the American Revolution.

On 3 June 1784, the day after abolishing Jackson's regiment, Congress recreated a force of seven hundred rank and file. This force was successively increased and decreased as crises arose and were met: these included British refusal to abandon their military posts in the Old Northwest; Shays's Rebellion; Indian troubles with the Miamis; and the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.

THE VETERANS

In 1783, as the Continental army disbanded, its officers organized the Society of the Cincinnati. The organization celebrated the officers' accomplishments and the value of an orderly society. It also lobbied for the interests of its members, making sure that they received the pensions they had been promised and appropriate national recognition. Soldiers, in contrast, did not form any associations but simply drifted back into civilian life. Workingmen's clubs or associations were a phenomenon of a later era. This generation of veterans scattered and some, many years

later, did not know anyone who had served with them. They were also largely forgotten by the public until after the war of 1812. Then, in a spirit of national celebration and an era of budget surpluses, they were awarded pensions, at first need-based and then service-based, and the appreciation of a grateful nation.

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments; African Americans in the Revolution; Boston Siege; Cincinnati, Society of the; Continental Congress; Militia in the North; Pay Bounties and Rations; Populations of Great Britain and America; Riflemen; St. Clair, Arthur; Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von; Thompson's Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion.*

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revised by Caroline Cox

CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. One of the most serious weaknesses the colonists faced at the outset of their war with Britain was the lack of a central government. Individual colonies (soon to become states) were fortunate in having a long tradition of local government rooted in the supremacy of the locally elected legislature. Although there was no lack of savvy politicians, the relations among the thirteen colonies were marked by a long history of jealousy. One of the surprises of the Revolution was Americans' ability to unite politically. The Albany Congress of 1754 and the Stamp Act

Location	Timeframe
1st Continental Congress Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	5 September 1774–26 October 1774 10 May 1775–12 December 1776
2nd Continental Congress Baltimore, Maryland	20 December 1776–4 March 1777 End of New Jersey Campaign
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	5 March 1777–18 September 1777
Lancaster, Pennsylvania	27 September 1777 British occupy Philadelphia
York, Pennsylvania	30 September 1777–27 June 1778 British occupy Philadelphia
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	2 July 1778–21 June 1783

THE GALE GROUP.

Congress of 1765 gave politically active colonists a foretaste of how to work together and of how to achieve the consensus that made “congressional” action possible.

As protest mounted against the Intolerable Acts of 1774, the first of many calls for an intercolonial congress came from Providence (17 May), Philadelphia (21 May), and New York City (23 May). Radicals in Boston had asked the other colonies to join in an immediate nonimportation agreement, but when they saw this hope was not to be achieved they fell in with the movement for a meeting. The Boston leaders framed a Solemn League and Covenant, which was a form of nonimportation agreement, and twelve days later, on 17 June, the Massachusetts House of Representatives proposed that a congress be held in Philadelphia in September. By 25 August twelve colonies (all except Georgia) had named delegates.

FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

Fifty-six delegates from twelve colonies met for the first time at Carpenter’s Hall, Philadelphia, on 5 September 1774. Peyton Randolph of Virginia was elected president and Charles Thomson of Pennsylvania, although not a delegate, was named secretary. (The congress was never really “continental,” since the other British North American colonies—Canada, Nova Scotia, and the two Floridas—did not join the rebellion.)

According to the notes of James Duane of New York, “the first question debated was whether the Congress should vote by colonies and what weight each colony should have in the determination.” Patrick Henry of Virginia, who said “he conceived himself not a Virginian but an American,” thought that “one of the greatest mischiefs to society was an unequal representation,” and advocated “such a system as would give each colony a just weight in our deliberations in proportion to its

opulence and number of inhabitants, [and] its exports and imports.” Because such a system would favor larger, more populous colonies, Samuel Ward of Rhode Island “insisted that every colony should have an equal vote” and argued “that we came if necessary to make a sacrifice of our all and that the weakest colony by such a sacrifice would suffer as much as the greatest.” The matter was resolved in favor of giving each colony a single vote when it was realized that “the delegates from the several colonies were unprepared with materials to settle that equality”—that is, no one had an objective count of any colony’s population or wealth (Smith, vol. 1, p. 31).

Word of the British seizure of colonial powder stored at Charlestown, Massachusetts (the Powder Alarm), arrived on 6 September. This news helped the radicals build a consensus in favor of resolute action that led Congress to endorse the Suffolk Resolves (17 September) and defeat Galloway’s Plan of Union (28 September 1774). In a set of declarations, the First Congress subsequently denounced the Intolerable Acts, the Quebec Act, all of the revenue measures imposed since 1763, the extension of vice-admiralty courts in the colonies, the dissolution of colonial assemblies, and the peacetime stationing of regular soldiers in colonial towns. Thirteen parliamentary acts since 1763 were declared unconstitutional, and the delegates pledged to support economic sanctions until these acts were repealed. Ten resolutions set forth the rights of the colonists as they saw them. They signed the Continental Association (a complete suspension of trade) on 20 October, prepared addresses to the king and to the British and American people, and agreed to reconvene on 10 May 1775 if their grievances had not been redressed. They adjourned on 26 October.

SECOND CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

On 10 May 1775 the delegates met at the State House (later Independence Hall) in Philadelphia and reelected the same president and secretary. On 24 May Randolph withdrew, and John Hancock was elected president of Congress. Still without an official representative from Georgia, the delegates took a score of actions that amounted to the de facto assumption of the rights and responsibilities of an independent state. They resolved that the colonies be put in a state of military readiness (15 May); adopted an address to the Canadians asking them to join the resistance (29 May); resolved to raise ten companies of riflemen in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia to support the New England army besieging Boston; agreed to pay for the New England army (thus adopting it as a “continental army”); named a committee to draft rules for the administration of the army (all on 14 June); elected George Washington, a delegate from Virginia, as commander in chief of the Continental Army (15 June); elected four major generals (Artemas

Ward, Charles Lee, Philip Schuyler, and Israel Putnam); elected eight brigadier generals (Seth Pomeroy, William Heath, John Thomas, David Wooster, Joseph Spencer, John Sullivan, Richard Montgomery, and Nathanael Greene); elected Gates to be adjutant general and voted \$2 million in bills of credit to finance the war (all on 22 June); and adopted articles of war on 30 June.

As events continued to cascade toward full-scale war (the New England army fought its only battle, at Bunker Hill on 17 June, not knowing it had become a “continental army” three days earlier), Congress assumed more powers that made it look like a government. The delegates made a last-ditch effort to patch up the quarrel by approving the Olive Branch Petition on 5 July, one of several important papers drafted by the conservative John Dickinson, and the next day promulgated a “Declaration of the Causes and Necessities of Taking Up Arms,” the joint work of Dickinson and Thomas Jefferson, to explain to the people of Britain and America why armed resistance was now necessary. On 15 July they voted to waive those provisions of the Continental Association that might slow the importation of war supplies, and on 31 July they rejected Lord North’s plan for reconciliation as too little, too late. They appointed commissioners to treat with the Indians (19 July) and established a postal department (26 July) with Benjamin Franklin as head. On 2 August 1775 the Second Congress adjourned.

The Second Continental Congress reconvened on 12 September 1775, this time with delegations from all thirteen colonies present. Learning on 9 November that George III had on 23 August proclaimed the colonies to be in revolt (thereby rejecting the Olive Branch Petition), on 6 December Congress replied with a statement of continued allegiance to the king but not to Parliament. A continental navy was authorized on 13 October, and on 14 December a Marine Committee to oversee it was appointed. On 29 November the delegates appointed the Committee of Secret Correspondence to conduct relations with foreign governments (a precursor of the modern State Department). The movement toward independence was spurred by Thomas Paine, who published his pamphlet *Common Sense* on 10 January 1776. Across the late winter and spring of 1776, leaders in the various colonies took actions that made them, in all but name, independent states. On 15 May 1776 the de facto Virginia state government authorized its delegate, Richard Henry Lee, to take the initiative in acknowledging what was already the reality on the ground in the states and in Congress. On 7 June Lee introduced the resolution that led to the Declaration of Independence. The delegates voted to declare independence on 2 July, and on 4 July promulgated their final bill of indictment against the imperial government and George III, in which they explained to the world why independence was their only possible course of action.

MANAGEMENT OF THE WAR AND OTHER BUSINESS

Managing all aspects of a war of unprecedented complexity always absorbed the bulk of the delegates’ time and attention. Sometimes action was delayed or deferred by the need to build consensus. Particularly difficult issues might have to be addressed by the entire Congress, which resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, but the delegates did a remarkable amount of business through an evolving sequence of committees and boards. Although the system was not particularly efficient, it was effective in keeping the war effort up and running. Many of the congressional initiatives were ambitious. In late March 1776 the delegates sent a special committee to Canada to explain the political purpose behind the invasion and to salvage support for a campaign that was rapidly failing. On 12 June they appointed a Committee to Prepare Treaties with European countries. On 17 September they adopted the report of this committee and on 23 December authorized its three commissioners (Silas Deane, Benjamin Franklin, and Arthur Lee) to borrow money for their operations.

Congress could do little to influence active military operations, and during 1776 it watched as its armies triumphed at Charleston and Boston, failed in Canada and at Long Island, saw New York City fall into British hands, received increasingly discouraging reports in connection with the New York campaign, fought the overtures resulting from the Peace Commission of the Howes, were cheered by the delay Benedict Arnold bought by his victory at Valcour Island, and on 12 December ran for the safety of Baltimore as the British success in the New Jersey campaign threatened Philadelphia. It granted Washington extraordinary authority (“dictatorial” powers) during this crisis; some joked nervously that 1777 promised to be the “Year of the Hangman.” Robert Morris remained in Philadelphia, and on 21 December 1776 Congress formally appointed him, George Clymer, and George Walton as its “executive committee.”

At Baltimore the three-story brick house of Henry Fite was the meeting place of the twenty to twenty-five members of Congress who showed up for business, fewer than half the number that had decided the great issues in 1775 and 1776. The members continued to plan for the future. They resolved on 30 December 1776 to send commissioners to Austria, Prussia, Spain, and Tuscany. (William Lee of Virginia was assigned the first two posts on 9 May; Franklin covered the Spanish post, in addition to France, from 1 January 1777 until Arthur Lee of Virginia was named to succeed him at Madrid on 1 May; Ralph Izard of South Carolina was assigned to Tuscany on 7 May.)

Back at Philadelphia on 4 March 1777, Congress reconstituted the Committee of Secret Correspondence as the Committee on Foreign Affairs (17 April 1777),



Assembly Room in Independence Hall. In 1776 the delegates of the Continental Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence in this room at the Pennsylvania State House (later Independence Hall) in Philadelphia. © DAVE BARTRUFF/CORBIS.

passed the Flag Resolution creating the Stars and Stripes (14 June), and on 19 September fled the city again. Howe's threat to Philadelphia was more effective this time, and Congress was forced to flee, first to Lancaster and then to York, Pennsylvania (30 September). The so-called Conway Cabal that challenged Washington's leadership, the problems of Burgoyne's Convention Army, and Lafayette's abortive "irruption into Canada" were among the important military matters that occupied the talents of the delegates during the winter of Valley Forge. Congress also sent a committee to confer with Washington about reorganizing the army, an effort that complemented the efforts of Steuben to complete the transformation of the Continental Army into an effective, professional military force. Congress adopted, finally, the Articles of Confederation on 15 November 1777, and with the French alliance a reality on 8 January 1778, it ratified the implementing treaties on 4 May. With some hope on the horizon, Congress was better able to fend off the peace commission of the earl of Carlisle after June 1778.

During the last years of the war, Congress coped with a wide range of problems. Perhaps the most serious was the

collapse of the economy, caused in part by trying to pay for a protracted war with too much continental currency and not enough taxing authority. The military situation continued to raise more immediate issues. British success in the south after May 1780 seemed to herald the reestablishment of royal government in the former southern colonies. The American effort slowly recovered over the summer of 1780, with Congressional approval of Washington's pick to command the theater (Nathanael Greene, on 14 October 1780) one of the milestones along the way. British raids in Virginia (most seriously after December 1780) were damaging, but marked the beginning of the end of Britain's strategy to recover the South. Washington, with the indispensable aid of French soldiers and sailors, managed to capture Britain's last field army at Yorktown in October 1781, but that crucial victory was not easily achieved. The American military effort had seemed to be crumbling from within following the revelation of Benedict Arnold's treason (25 September 1780) and the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line (early January 1781), but Washington's leadership helped to hold the army together.

Presidents of the Continental Congress

President	Elected
Peyton Randolph of Virginia	5 September 1774
Henry Middleton of South Carolina	22 October 1774
Peyton Randolph of Virginia	10 May 1775
John Hancock of Massachusetts	24 May 1775
Henry Laurens of South Carolina	1 November 1777
John Jay of New York	10 December 1778
Samuel Huntington of Connecticut	28 September 1779
Thomas McKean of Delaware	10 July 1781
John Hanson of Maryland	5 November 1781
Elias Boudinot of New Jersey	4 November 1782
Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania	3 November 1783
Richard Henry Lee of Virginia	30 November 1784
John Hancock of Massachusetts	23 November 1785 (did not serve)
Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts	6 June 1786
Arthur St. Clair of Pennsylvania	2 February 1787
Cyrus Griffin of Virginia	22 January 1788

As noted in the article on the Continental Congress, the so-called *Continental Congress* ceased to exist on 2 March 1781, at which time it became "The United States in Congress Assembled."

THE GALE GROUP.

The way Congress did business also matured and changed during these years, most notably in 1781. Under the crushing pressure of events, Congress authorized the creation of four executive departments, foreign affairs on 10 January and finance, war, and marine on 7 February. This essential step helped to streamline the daily working of government by lifting a great deal of the burden of clerical and routine duties from Congress as a whole. On 1 March 1781 Congress acknowledged that Maryland had ratified the Articles of Confederation, the last state to do so. Strictly speaking, the Second Continental Congress ceased to exist on that day; the delegates met the next day as "the United States in Congress Assembled." Congress also began the tortuous negotiations for a final peace settlement. It began by setting minimum conditions as early as February 1780, appointed peace commissioners in June 1781, and ratified the proposed text of the Treaty of Paris on 15 April 1783.

On 24 June 1783 Congress again demonstrated its strategic mobility by fleeing to Princeton when some three hundred Continental soldiers marched in to demand their rights. Remaining at Princeton until 3 November, it reconvened at Annapolis on 26 November under a plan calling for alternate sessions there and at Trenton. The day before, the British had evacuated New York City, thereby implementing some of the final provisions of the peace treaty. At the end of December the Continental Army ceased to exist, and Congress, and the nation, faced for the first time the challenges of the postwar era of reconstruction and recovery.

The first federal Congress met on 4 March 1789 in New York City and began regular sessions on 6 April. The new federal city of Washington, District of Columbia, became the seat of Congress when the second session of the sixth U.S. Congress met there on 17 November 1800.

SUMMING UP

Over the course of fifteen years (5 September 1774 to 3 March 1789), 435 delegates to Congress were elected by the states. Only 80 percent of those elected (342) actually served in Congress, some for only a few weeks or months. The number of delegates that served during the nine years of military mobilization and actual fighting (5 September 1774 to 31 December 1783) was smaller still: only 245 men, or 70 percent of the total of 342 who served. Turnover in membership was rapid and continuity in office (and thus the amount of experience members could accumulate in running the business of the new nation) was limited to a handful of delegates who were willing and able to make the personal and financial sacrifice needed to attend Congress on a regular basis. In *Reluctant Rebels*, the military historian Lynn Montross notes that, "before the war ended, more than half of the members were fated to have their property looted or destroyed. Others were to be imprisoned or driven into hiding by man hunts, and even their families would not escape persecution" (p. 131). The record of military service compiled by the members of Congress "has probably never been bettered by any other parliament of history. Of the 342 men elected during the fifteen years, 134 bore arms in either the militia or the Continental army. One was killed in action, twelve seriously wounded, and twenty-three taken prisoners in combat." Given that a majority of the delegates were in their forties or older, "the valor of Congress needs no apologies" (*Reluctant Rebels*, pp. 190–191).

ASSESSMENT

Congress received some harsh criticisms from contemporaries, including from some of its own members, and subsequent historians have echoed this assessment. It certainly displayed inefficiency and dithered over decisions that might have been more palatable if made more quickly. It saw its share of badly run committees, ill-conceived experiments in organization and oversight, and poorly timed meddling in the responsibilities of its field commanders, most notably Washington himself. Petty political infighting and rivalries were all too common, based as much on personal dislikes as on principled differences about policy. Behavior that can only be called corrupt was also in evidence. In all of these things, the Continental Congress was similar to American legislative bodies before and since.

Against these criticisms, a slew of achievements can be entered on the positive side of the ledger. The mere fact that Congress existed and functioned at all was a significant milestone. All of the men who served in this new experiment in political organization had knowledge of or had served in the legislative assemblies of their individual colonies and states. Overcoming the provincialism and parochialism of those assemblies, legislative bodies that jealously guarded their prerogatives and power not only from the imperial government but also from each other, was no small achievement. Few men as yet agreed with Patrick Henry's assertion that they owed their primary allegiance to "America" (in Henry's case, too, rhetoric exceeded reality). In everything Congress did, consensus had to be built before unanimity could be achieved, and, without unanimity on all major issues, the British might readily break the rebellion into fragments. Because the nature of their resistance to imperial authority had schooled them to be extremely suspicious of power in all its forms, the delegates undertook management of continental affairs as a collective exercise, unwilling to concentrate power in the hands of one man or a few under all but the worst circumstances. Only in the blackest days of the war did the rump Congress give Washington, himself a member of the Virginia oligarchy and a former delegate to Congress, the authority to act without congressional approval of major decisions. When the crisis passed (due largely to Washington's leadership), Congress was a bit more solicitous of the realities of field command; but it never relinquished its desire to oversee the minutia of military organization, appointments, movements, and operations that would today be left in the hands of the military professionals. Washington continually chafed at the conflicting tugs of congressional oversight, indecision, misunderstandings, and downright meddling. But because he was one of them he never disavowed the fundamental principle of civilian control of the military, vested in the hands of the delegates to Congress.

Gradually, the delegates' understanding of the nature of government began to evolve, as they realized, under the intense and unrelenting pressure of running a war far longer than anyone had anticipated, that, if declaring independence had been an act of unprecedented courage that required genius and faith, erecting a working government required the talent, integrity, and energy to slog through the unrelenting demands of daily business. The erection of four executive departments in early 1781 was an important milestone on the road to rebuilding the sort of faith in extralocal government that the imperial crisis had shattered.

Given the circumstances in which it was created, Congress, although inefficient, was also remarkably effective. As the historian John Richard Alden, in *The American Revolution*, observes:

The Congress declared the independence of the United States; appointed the commander in chief and higher officers of the Continental army; established the American navy and the marine corps; formed a diplomatic service; negotiated treaties with European nations and Indian tribes; organized a postal service; issued currency; and borrowed money. It even gave advice to the colony-states with respect to the making of their constitutions; and it drew up the Articles of Confederation. . . . It was created in emergency, endowed with uncertain authority, and plagued by rapid changes in personnel. Hence it exhibited obvious defects lacking or less conspicuous in long- and well-established legislatures. . . . [But Congress's] record, when the difficulties to be faced are taken into account, is splendid rather than dismal. (pp. 166–169)

SEE ALSO *Admiralty Courts; Albany Convention and Plan; Articles of Confederation; Association; Boston Siege; Canada Invasion; Canada Invasion (Planned); Canada, Congressional Committee to; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Committee of Secret Correspondence; Continental Currency; Convention Army; Conway Cabal; Declaration of Independence; Declaration of the Causes and Necessities of Taking Up Arms; Dickinson, John; French Alliance; Galloway's Plan of Union; Hangman, Year of the; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; Long Island, New York, Battle of; New Jersey Campaign; New York Campaign; North's Plan for Reconciliation; Olive Branch Petition; Peace Commission of Carlisle; Peace Commission of the Howes; Peace Negotiations; Philadelphia Campaign; Powder Alarm; Quebec Act; Riflemen; Solemn League and Covenant; Stamp Act; Suffolk Resolves; Valcour Island; Valley Forge, Pennsylvania; Washington's "Dictatorial Powers."*

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CONTINENTAL CURRENCY. The colonies had no choice but to fund their armed resistance to increased British imperial control by issuing large amounts of paper money. They had had extensive, and largely successful, experience with this form of currency finance during the French and Indian War and chose to ignore the fact that a large part of that success was due to imperial restrictions on their currencies and Parliament's reimbursement (in specie) of much of their wartime expenditures. On 22 June 1775, the Continental Congress voted to issue two million dollars in bills of credit, an amount that turned out to be merely a down payment on the spiraling costs of a war that lasted longer than anyone could have imagined in 1775. For five years, Congress authorized ever-increasing amounts of paper money to meet the urgent demands of American forces for sustenance, clothing, pay, transportation, and every sort of military equipment, until the total, near the end of 1779, reached the unprecedented sum of \$241,500,000.

The delegates were fully aware that unsecured paper money would inflate rapidly, but they were also aware that, until all states approved the Articles of Confederation (adopted by Congress on 15 November 1777 but not ratified until 1 March 1781), they were members of what was, legally, nothing more than a forum for consultation among sovereign allies. Because

Congress had no source of revenue apart from recommending that the states provide the means for redeeming Continental currency, this paper money in effect had little or no real backing. The states themselves had issued over fifty-four million dollars in their own paper money by the end of 1779, and there was little money remaining to support the supposedly common currency. Add to these circumstances the fact that the British were engaged in a large-scale effort to counterfeit Continental currency (the full dimensions of which are unknown), it was inevitable that the value of paper money would decline.

While the value of Continental currency varied considerably from place to place, by the end of 1777 in Philadelphia, it took nearly four dollars in paper money to buy one dollar in specie. Despite a burst of optimism about the French alliance in the summer of 1778, by the end of that year it took nearly eight dollars in Continental currency to buy one dollar in specie. Despite limited efforts to redeem and retire Continental currency after 1778 (including the heavily counterfeited 20 May 1777 and 11 April 1778 emissions) and some attempts to enforce laws mandating the acceptance of the currency at par value, Continental currency collapsed in 1781. By the start of the year, depreciation had reached 75 to 1 in most states, 100 to 1 in Philadelphia, 110 to 1 in Maryland, and 210 to 1 in North Carolina. In May the currency collapsed, and the phrase “not worth a Continental” became synonymous with worthless. Two months later only hard money was used in the marketplace.

Depreciation wiped out roughly \$226 million in Continental currency, worth \$40 million in specie. The noted economic historian E. James Ferguson has stated:

The loss was carried by the people of the nation as money depreciated in their hands—a process sometimes considered as a form of taxation in rough proportion to ability to pay. Eventually the dead mass of currency was drawn in by the states. A good part of it was scattered or destroyed, and in 1790 only about \$6,000,000 remained in the hands of individuals. (*Power of the Purse*, p. 67)

Under the funding act of 1790, the old Continental emissions were exchanged for bonds at the rate of 100 to 1.

Ferguson summarized the importance of paper money for the success of the war in these words:

Paper money provided the sinews of war in the first five years of the Revolution. . . . The burden was borne at home; indeed, currency finance sustained the war and survived in an attenuated form until the moment of victory. Only after the French and American forces captured Cornwallis at Yorktown did foreign loans and state payments become important. (*Ibid.*, p. 44).

Currency required to purchase \$1 in specie		
Year	Month	Amount
1777	January	1.25
	April	2.00
	July	3.00
	October	3.00
1778	January	4.00
	April	6.00
	July	4.00
	October	5.00
1779	January	8.00
	April	16.00
	July	19.00
	October	30.00
1780	January	42.50
	April	60.00
	July	62.50
	October	77.50
1781	January	100.00
	April	167.50

SOURCE: Ferguson, *Power of the Purse*, p. 32

THE GALE GROUP.

SEE ALSO *Finances of the Revolution; Money of the Eighteenth Century; Morris, Robert (1734–1806)*.

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CONTINENTAL VILLAGE. 9 October 1777. About three miles north of Peekskill, New York, and at the main entrance to the Highlands on the east bank of the Hudson, the rebels in 1777 constructed a camp for two thousand men and established a supply center. On

Currency emissions by year		
Year	Continental	States
1775	\$6,000,000	\$4,739,667
1776	\$18,947,220	\$13,327,523
1777	\$13,000,000	\$9,572,500
1778	\$63,500,300	\$9,118,333
1779	\$140,052,480	\$17,613,400
1780	0	\$66,813,093
1781	0	\$123,376,667
1782	0	\$172,400
1783	0	\$1,633,357
Total	\$241,500,000	\$246,366,940

SOURCE: Michener, *Backing Theories*, p. 690

THE GALE GROUP.

9 October 1777 Governor Tryon with Emerick’s chasseurs, other German troops, and a three-pounder routed the small guard detachment commanded by a Major Campbell and destroyed the settlement. A few days later General S. H. Parsons marched south from Fishkill with two thousand men and occupied Peekskill.

Mark M. Boatner

CONTINGENT MEN. Like warrant men, each British foot regiment had several “noneffectives” whose subsistence was paid to the colonel for repair of regimental weapons and other contingent expenses.

SEE ALSO *Warrant Men*.

Mark M. Boatner

CONVENTION ARMY. The surrender of Major General John Burgoyne’s army at Saratoga on 17 October 1777 was by a convention negotiated with Burgoyne by Major General Horatio Gates. Hence the prisoners became known as the Convention Army. According to a return (a classified listing of men present across several categories) prepared by Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkinson, the deputy adjutant general of the Northern Department, they totaled 4,991 people (2,139 British, 2,022 Germans, and 830 Canadians). The agreement was that they would lay down their arms, march to Boston, and take ship to Britain with the promise to serve no more in North America during the war. Almost immediately, a controversy broke out that kept the convention

from being honored as well as the Convention Army from being returned to Britain. Each side charged the other with perfidy. Congress wanted to evade the terms of the convention because, although the prisoners would be shipped back to Europe, they would free an equal number of soldiers from other duties for service in North America or the Caribbean.

The prisoners were marched under armed escort to Cambridge, Massachusetts, where the first delay was caused by Sir William Howe's attempt to have them shipped home from a port in British hands, meaning either Newport or New York. The Americans seized on this demand as evidence that Howe intended to keep them to reinforce his own army. While waiting for the British transports to arrive at Boston, Burgoyne gave Congress additional grounds for delaying implementing the convention. In a letter to Gates complaining that his officers had not been furnished with the quarters they had a right to expect, he used the unfortunate phrase, "the public faith is broke." Congress had already appointed a committee to furnish reasons to justify a delay in ratifying and implementing the convention. The first reason it offered was that, because Burgoyne's 5,000 troops had turned in only 648 cartridge boxes, they had not surrendered all their arms. Now, if Burgoyne charged that "the public faith is broke," he might be building a case for invalidating the convention. Congress therefore suspended the embarkation until it got "a distinct and explicit ratification of the convention. . . by the court of Great Britain."

When the transports arrived off Boston late in December 1777, they were not permitted to enter. Finally, when the king sent orders to Sir Henry Clinton (Howe's successor as commander-in-chief) to ratify the convention, Congress took the position that the orders might be a forgery; it wanted a witness to swear he had seen the king sign them. Burgoyne and two of his staff officers were permitted to leave for England on 5 April 1778, but the rest of the Convention Army finished the war as prisoners. After a year in Massachusetts, first in the towns around Boston and then at Rutland, in January and February 1779 the troops were marched through Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland to Charlottesville, Virginia. This twelve-week trek was made in the dead of winter and on starvation rations, an ordeal Baroness Riedesel, wife of Major General Friedrich von Riedesel, endured with her three daughters. Many Germans deserted as the column passed through German-speaking parts of Pennsylvania, an action their guards did little to inhibit.

After another year, the remaining Convention troops were moved to Winchester, Virginia, and then to Frederick, Maryland. In the summer of 1781 they were moved north on the approach of Cornwallis to prevent their rescue by Banastre Tarleton and John Graves Simcoe; some went to Easton, Pennsylvania, and others back to

Rutland. By the end of the war their numbers had been reduced by death, desertion, paroles, and exchange to about half the original 5,000. Although the majority returned home, a few stayed in America.

American historians generally agree that Congress did not live up to the bargain Gates had struck, and some believe that its behavior impugned the honor of the new nation. But the stain was not exclusively on the escutcheon of Congress. Among the papers of Henry Clinton at the William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan, which were not generally available to historians until the 1930s, is a letter of 16 November 1777 from Howe to Burgoyne in which "Howe revealed his intention of diverting to New York the homeward-bound transports and exchanging the Convention troops for American prisoners" (Wallace, p. 168).

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne, John; Continental Congress; Gates, Horatio; Howe, William; Saratoga Surrender; Virginia, Military Operations in.*

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CONWAY, THOMAS. (1733–1795). Continental general. Son and grandson of Irish officers in the French service, he was born in County Kerry, Ireland, taken to France at the age of six, and educated there. He became *lieutenant en second* in the Irish regiment of Clare on 16 December 1747 and was promoted to captain on 25 March 1765. On 9 July 1769 he was promoted to major in the regiment of Aquitaine. On 9 November 1772 he was promoted to colonel.

He left France on 14 December 1776 with a letter of introduction dated 30 November from Silas Deane and reached Morristown on 8 May 1777. Washington was favorably impressed and sent Conway to Congress with an unusually commendatory letter. On 13 May he was elected brigadier general and was assigned to Sullivan's division. In the operations from the Brandywine to Germantown, he greatly impressed Sullivan. The group associated with the "Conway Cabal" was most usually accused of trying to undercut Washington's reputation,

especially among members of Congress, in favor of General Gates. On 14 December 1777, despite Washington's assertion that Conway's "merit . . . exists more in his own imagination than in reality," he was promoted over the heads of twenty-three other brigadiers to major general and inspector general. After the "cabal" collapsed, Lafayette refused to accept Conway as second in command for his projected expedition into Canada. Conway nevertheless joined Lafayette in a subordinate position to de Kalb, who had been appointed Lafayette's second in command, and continued his intrigues to get a separate command. On 23 March 1778 Congress directed Conway to put himself under McDougall's orders at Peekskill. On 22 April he wrote Congress a critical letter about its failure to give him a command, and he again raised the threat of resignation. Congress had by this time turned against him, and his resignation was accepted on 28 April. Conway, having heard that offensive words were said about him by Pennsylvania militia General John Cadwalader, challenged him to a duel on 4 July that resulted in an injury to Conway's cheekbone.

Conway returned to the French army and on 1 March 1780 he was named brigadier general of infantry; on 3 March 1781 he became colonel of the Pondichéry Regiment, and on 1 January 1784 was named *maréchal de camp*. Governor general of French forces in India as of 9 March 1787, he was elevated to governor general of all French forces beyond Cape of Good Hope on 14 April 1789. On 29 July 1790 he left the French service. In March 1792 the émigré princes gave him command of a projected army for southern France, which never developed. He became commander of the Sixth Regiment of the Irish brigade in the service of England in October 1794 but died shortly thereafter.

SEE ALSO *Conway Cabal*.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

CONWAY CABAL. Winter 1777–1778. The name of Major General Thomas Conway has improperly been given to a secret movement by which the New England faction of Congress was trying to regain their lost leadership of the Revolution. The disasters suffered by the army under George Washington left many Patriots with reason to suspect that the Virginian was not up to the task assigned him, particularly when his failures were contrasted with the success of Major General Horatio Gates at Saratoga. Although there were many individual expressions of dissatisfaction, as in Conway's private letters to a number of other officers, certain politicians apparently got together to organize what could properly be called a cabal. The best-known leaders of this shadowy movement were Samuel Adams, Richard Henry Lee, Thomas Mifflin, and Dr. Benjamin Rush. Their cautious approach was to drop hints and suggestions in influential circles and to circulate an anonymous paper called "Thoughts of a Freeman." The latter was not only a formal attack on Washington's ability but also on his popularity. "The people of America have been guilty of idolatry in making a man their God," it said, borrowing a phrase from a letter of John Adams (quoted in Page Smith, *A New Age Now Begins*, vol. 2, p. 1020). But the leaders of the cabal wanted to find out how deeply rooted this popularity of Washington really was before they made a serious move to effect his ouster. What they did not know was that the President of Congress, Henry Laurens, was reporting on these machinations to his son John, a member of Washington's staff. It is probable that the elder Laurens knew that his son would pass on the substance of these letters to Washington, as he did.

Into this situation rushed Thomas Conway, a French officer of Irish birth who was one of Silas Deane's recruits to the American cause. After participating in the battles of Brandywine and Germantown as a brigadier general, Conway became critical of Washington's leadership. Conway also began pestering Congress with requests that he be promoted, even though Conway was the most junior of twenty-four brigadier generals in the American service at this time.

The sequence of events culminating in the controversy known as "Conway's cabal" may be said to have started the night of 28 October when the ever-conniving James Wilkinson, aide-de-camp to General Gates, passed on to Major William McWilliams, aide-de-camp to General Lord Stirling (William Alexander), a certain tidbit of headquarters gossip. General Conway, Wilkinson said, had written General Gates: "Heaven has been determined to save your country; or a weak General and bad Councillors would have ruined it" (Smith, vol. 2, p. 1022). Stirling immediately sent this information on to Washington.

What shocked Washington most was not the disparaging remark but the evidence that two of his subordinates

were in collusion to discredit him. Washington assumed that Gates had charged Wilkinson with passing on this information, which is unlikely. Washington's only action was to send Conway a brief note reporting what he had heard.

Conway immediately wrote back to protest that there was nothing improper in his conduct. Apparently sensing Washington's suspicion of collusion, he said he had written Gates on 9 or 10 October to congratulate him on his Saratoga victory; he admitted that his previously voiced criticisms of American military methods may have been in this letter but denied using the expression "weak general." Conway added that he was willing to have his original letter shown to Washington.

The affair might have ended on 14 November, when Conway sent Congress his resignation. As reasons he mentioned the criticism he had received in requesting promotion, but he particularly cited the promotion to major general of Johann de Kalb, who was Conway's junior in the French army. Congress did not act on the resignation but sent it to the Board of War. The latter was in the process of reorganization, but Thomas Mifflin was already its most powerful member and Gates soon became its president. During the delay in acting on Conway's resignation, some congressmen began to support a proposal that an inspector general be appointed for the army. On 13 December Congress adopted this proposal, and shortly thereafter Conway was given the post with the grade of major general. Washington viewed this development with disgust, and he knew that Conway's promotion would be strongly resented by the twenty-three brigadier generals who were senior to him. (Conway's promotion, incidentally, was "on the staff," so he had no command authority over the brigadiers who held their rank "in the line"; but this mollified the latter little if at all.) The new inspector general visited Valley Forge winter quarters and was received with icy civility. When Washington sent an officer to ask Conway how he intended to go about his new duties, the latter answered on 29 December with a general outline of his plans and then volunteered that, if Washington preferred, Conway would be delighted to return to France, where he had some business that needed his attention.

An interchange of letters followed in which Washington calmly and formally told Conway that, although the brigadiers were determined to protest his promotion, he (Washington) would always respect the decisions of Congress. The French officer then proceeded to impale himself on his own pen. Conway wrote:

The general and universal merit which you wish every promoted officer might be endowed with is a rare gift. We know but the great Frederick in Europe and the great Washington in this continent. I certainly never was so rash as to pretend to such a prodigious height. However, sir, by the

complexion of your letter and by the reception you have honored me with since my arrival, I perceive that I have not the happiness of being agreeable to your Excellency and that I can expect no support in fulfilling the laborious duty of an Inspector General. (Smith, vol. 2, pp. 1023–1024).

Quite apart from his anger at the Frenchman's hypocrisy in pretending a sincere parallel between him and Frederick, Washington was infuriated by Conway's accusation that Washington would not support him in the execution of his inspector general duties and by Conway's charge that he had not been properly received. On 2 January Washington forwarded this correspondence to Congress with a straightforward statement of his position that, though "my feelings will not permit me to make professions of friendship to a man I deem my enemy," he had every intention of working with Conway in the fulfillment of his duties (Smith, vol. 2, p. 1024).

Meanwhile there were developments resulting from Wilkinson's report of Conway's remark about "a weak General." Conway had seen Wilkinson and gotten a denial that the aide had uttered the exact words relayed to Washington. When Conway reported the occurrence to Mifflin, the latter was aghast at this breach of secrecy and wrote Gates to be more careful about his papers. Gates, in turn, was much disturbed, but he thought he saw a way of capitalizing on the blunder. He decided that Alexander Hamilton, Washington's aide, had taken advantage of being left alone in Gates's room during a recent visit and had secretly copied a letter; Gates believed he could use this to disgrace Washington and Hamilton. On 8 December, therefore, Gates wrote to Washington in feigned alarm: Conway's letters to him had been "stealingly copied"; having no reason to suspect any member of his own headquarters, he thought Washington could render "a very important service, by detecting a wretch who may betray me, and capially injure the very operations" that Washington himself was directing (Smith, vol. 2, p. 1024). Since he did not know whether Washington's note to Conway was based on information from an army source or from a congressman, Gates said he was reporting the matter to Washington and Congress simultaneously.

Gates had hoisted himself on his own petard. He learned from Washington that the information had come from Gates's own aide, and he got this news in a letter sent through Congress. Wilkinson had succeeded up to this point in shifting suspicion to Lieutenant Colonel Robert Troup, another aide to Gates and the officer who had carried the trouble-making letter from Conway. When Gates learned the truth about the leak and dressed Wilkinson down, Wilkinson challenged his commander to a duel, but the two men were reconciled before it took place.

Congressmen who had championed Gates as a possible successor to Washington were now faced with the two sets of correspondence Washington had sent them to review, which discredited both Gates and Conway while demonstrating Washington's professional conduct. At the same time, nine brigadier generals joined in a "memorial" to Congress protesting the promotion of Conway, and several colonels were preparing a similar paper objecting to Wilkinson's brevet promotion to brigadier for bringing Congress the news of Saratoga. Congress was in a difficult position for having promoted a pair of scoundrels.

On 19 January Gates reached York with the original of the famous letter, and Conway thought his position had been strengthened by this proof that he had not written the sentence Wilkinson had passed on to Stirling's aide. Conway put up a show of wanting to have the letter published, yet neither he nor Gates offered to let Washington see it. President Henry Laurens was not offered a look either; but after reading a copy secured from another source he wrote a friend that, although Wilkinson's quote was not verbatim, Conway's original was "ten times worse in every way" (Smith, vol. 2, p. 1025). Both Gates and Conway maintained in subsequent correspondence with Washington that the letter was harmless, but neither offered to send him a copy.

The attack on Washington had failed completely. Congress sent Gates, Conway, and Mifflin back to the army, and those rival authorities, the Board of War and the office of inspector general, ceased to represent any significant threat to Washington's position as commander in chief. Washington was able to establish a harmonious working relationship with Gates. Mifflin and Conway soon were taken completely off his hands.

COMMENTS

Historians disagree as to whether any real cabal actually existed. The consensus is that the ambitions of Gates and Conway matched dissatisfactions and concerns within Congress. Many members of Congress, even such supporters of Washington as John Adams, had their confidence shaken by the repeated British victories in the Pennsylvania campaign of 1777. They also feared the growing public adoration of Washington, despite these defeats, and hoped to protect civilian control of the military against what they saw as an incipient Caesarism and possible military dictatorship. They had no real cause for these latter fears, as Washington always adhered to a strict respect for civilian authorities, no matter how ineffectual and inept. After Conway was thoroughly discredited by his own clownishness, these rumblings that Washington should be replaced were calmed, though misunderstandings and disputes would certainly persist.

Much of this controversy must hinge on the question of when the normal opposition to any leader reaches the state of organization necessary to qualify it as a "cabal." It should be borne in mind, however, that Washington undoubtedly thought there was a cabal, regardless of what subsequent scholarship has concluded, and his reactions must be judged accordingly. One thing certain—and ironic—is that Thomas Conway's main contribution to the affair remembered as "Conway's cabal" was to wreck it.

SEE ALSO *Alexander, William; Conway, Thomas; Laurens, Henry; Laurens, John; Mifflin, Thomas; Washington's "Dictatorial Powers."*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

CONYNGHAM, GUSTAVUS. (1747–1819). American naval officer known as the "Dunkirk Pirate." Ireland. Born in County Donegal, Ireland, in 1747, Gustavus Conyngham emigrated to Philadelphia in 1763 and entered the service of his cousin, Redmond Conyngham, who had founded a shipping house there in 1745. In September 1775 Gustavus sailed for Europe as master of the brig *Charming Peggy*. This was intended as a "powder cruise." Picking up a cargo of flax seed at Londonderry, along with Irish registration, he intended to return with a load of war supplies critically needed in the American colonies. At Dunkirk he took on a load of powder and, having been warned by French friends, unloaded it just in time to frustrate a search demanded by the local British consul, Andrew Frazer. He managed to pick up more war supplies off the Dutch island of Texel, but Frazer got word of this through a deserter while Conyngham was becalmed in Nieuport Canal. The British got permission from the Dutch to put a guard aboard the *Charming Nancy* and Conyngham was stranded in Europe.

On 1 March 1777 the American commissioners in Paris appointed Conyngham to command the lugger *Surprise*, which was owned partly by Congress and partly by William Hodge, a Philadelphia merchant responsible for finding ships and officers for the American navy. On 3 May Conyngham captured the British packet *Prince of Orange*. On his way back to Dunkirk he snapped up the

brig *Joseph* as well, and returned to Dunkirk just one week after his original departure with two valuable ships as prizes. The British ambassador in Paris, Lord Stormont (David Murray, second Earl of Mansfield), raised an uproar over this raid, which he called piracy, by an American ship fitted out in a French port. The red-faced comte de Vergennes (Charles Gravier) had no alternative but to order the arrest of Conyngham and his crew. Soon released, Conyngham was commissioned a captain in the Continental navy and given command of the *Revenge*. On 16 July 1777 he sailed on the first of the cruises into British waters that were to earn him the epithet "The Dunkirk Pirate." In a period of two months he raided the North Sea and the Baltic, circumnavigated the British Isles, and went safely into the Spanish port at Cap Ferrol. In this audacious venture into British home waters he took many prizes, terrified the coastal towns, and sent maritime insurance rates soaring. After destroying or capturing nearly twenty ships in just two months, Conyngham had become, in the words of Silas Deane, "the terror of all the eastern coast of England and Scotland."

In 1778 Conyngham used Spanish ports with great success, claiming another forty ships, until British pressure caused the Spanish to become less hospitable. Conyngham moved to the West Indies, took two valuable British privateers off St. Eustatius, and reached Philadelphia on 21 February 1779 with a cargo of military supplies. In eighteen months he had taken sixty prizes. On 27 April 1779 he was captured off New York City by the British naval vessel *Galatea* while sailing as a privateer aboard the *Revenge*, which had been bought by some Philadelphia merchants and converted to this new role. In view of his odious reputation, the British subjected him to unusually severe treatment, first in Pendennis Castle, Falmouth, and later in Mill Prison, Plymouth. On his third attempt, on 3 November 1779, he escaped with fifty other prisoners by digging out. He reached Texel and joined John Paul Jones aboard the *Alliance*, transferring shortly thereafter to the *Experiment*. On 17 March 1780 Conyngham was again captured by the British and sent back to Mill Prison. Here he remained a year before he was included in a prisoner exchange.

After the war Conyngham returned to the merchant service. He failed in his efforts to re-enter the navy and to get compensation from the government for his war services. He died in Philadelphia on 27 November 1819.

SEE ALSO *Naval Operations, Strategic Overview*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

COOCH'S BRIDGE. 3 September 1777. To harass the advance of General William Howe from Head of Elk, Maryland, Maxwell's light infantry took up a position near Cooch's Bridge, Delaware, (sometimes called Iron Hill) on Christiana Creek about five miles northeast of Elkton, Maryland. On 2 September, Washington warned William Maxwell that the enemy would move in his direction the next day. About 9 o'clock the morning of the 3rd, Maxwell's pickets opened fire on the advance guard of Cornwallis's "grand division." Lieutenant Ludwig von Wurmb, commanding the leading element of jägers, brought his amusettes into action and then drove the Americans back by an envelopment and bayonet attack against their right. Maxwell was forced out of several delaying positions. The British light infantry came forward to support the Germans, and although the Americans delivered several close, well-directed fires, the running fight degenerated into flight. The Americans fell back on Washington's main body on White Clay Creek, some four miles north of Cooch's Bridge.

Carl Leopold Baurmeister, a Hessian officer, said the Americans left thirty dead, including five officers, but evacuated their wounded. The historian Christopher Ward accepts this figure, but he also mentions that other contemporary estimates ranged from Montresor's figure of twenty American dead left on the field to Marshall's estimate of forty American killed and wounded. Enemy losses were three killed and twenty wounded according to Montresor, or thirty killed and wounded according to Robertson.

The relatively minor skirmish gained notoriety from being the largest fight of the war to take place in Delaware, and because it is claimed to be one of the first places where the recently adopted Stars and Stripes flew in battle.

SEE ALSO *Amusette; Howe, William; Maxwell's Light Infantry; Philadelphia Campaign*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

COPLEY, JOHN SINGLETON. (1738–1815). American painter. Massachusetts. Born in Boston on 3 July 1738, John Singleton Copley established himself as a professional portrait and pastel painter as a teenager. An exhibition of his painting “Boy with the Squirrel” in England in 1766 made him known in that country, gained him election to the Society of Artists, and earned him the support of fellow artists, including Benjamin West and Joshua Reynolds. Copley seems to have been in sympathy with the Patriot cause but was too engrossed in his art to let himself be diverted by politics. His father-in-law, Richard Clarke (1711–1795), was the merchant to whom was consigned the merchandise that figured in the Boston Tea Party, and Copley’s in-laws were all Loyalists, so in June 1774 the artist yielded to a long-standing desire to further his training in Europe and went to London. Here he met Sir Joshua Reynolds, visited the Royal Academy, was received by Governor Thomas Hutchinson and other Bostonians-in-exile, and then undertook a tour through Italy. On his return to London he was joined by his wife and children, and they soon established what was to be their permanent home on Hanover Square.

In the fashion of the times he painted historical scenes as well as portraits, and his “Death of the Earl of Chatham” was his most successful venture into that field. Copley presented it in the first-ever London exhibition of a single painting. During the Revolution he painted portraits of Loyalists, British officers and politicians, English gentry, and the children of King George III. Copley did not return to the United States, dying in London on 9 September 1815.

SEE ALSO *Boston Tea Party*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

CORAM, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK SEE *Fort George, Long Island, New York*.

CORBIN, MARGARET COCHRAN. (1752–1800?). American heroine. Pennsylvania. Born on

12 November 1752 in western Pennsylvania, Cochran (birth name) was four years old when her father was killed by Indians and her mother taken captive. Raised by an uncle, she married John Corbin, a Virginian, in 1772. Her husband, serving in the First Company of the Pennsylvania Artillery, was mortally wounded at Fort Washington on 16 November 1776. In the midst of the battle, Margaret Corbin stepped forward to take over his duties as matross on a small cannon, assisting the gunner with loading, firing, and sponging down the gun. While helping to keep the cannon in action she was severely wounded. One arm was nearly severed and a breast was mangled by grapeshot. Taken prisoner, Corbin was moved with other casualties to Philadelphia, where she was paroled and later assigned to the Invalid Corps. On 29 June 1779 the Executive Council of Pennsylvania granted her \$30 for immediate needs, which was the extent of their generosity. On 6 July 1779 Congress voted her a suit of clothes and allotted her half-pay for as long as she remained disabled. In 1781 the Invalid Regiment was moved to West Point, where Corbin stayed until she was mustered out in April 1783. Staying in the area, Corbin became a subject of steady complaint from the officers at West Point, who found her obnoxious as a hard-drinking, impoverished, and demanding veteran. She died around 1800 and is buried at West Point.

SEE ALSO *Artillery of the Eighteenth Century*.

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CORNPLANTER. (1732?–1836). Seneca chief. New York. Born at Conewaugus (now Avon, New York) in about 1732, Cornplanter was the son of John Abeel, an Albany trader, and a Seneca woman named Gahhononeh. Raised by his mother, Cornplanter may have been present at General Edward Braddock’s defeat in the French and Indian War in 1755. He and his uncle Guyasuta argued for the neutrality of the Iroquois Confederation, but by 1777 he seems to have come around to siding with the British in the war. As the war chief of the Seneca, Cornplanter played a key role in the siege of Fort Stanwix in 1777, defeating the New York militia at Oriskany, although he suffered heavy losses and the siege ultimately failed. Cornplanter led the Seneca in joining with the Loyalists in their devastating attacks on the Wyoming and Cherry Valleys in 1778, as well as helping

to defeat the American invasion of the Delaware country at Wyalusing. The following year he joined the British in another successful attack on the Susquehanna Valley. He and his allies were finally defeated by General John Sullivan's force at the battle of Newtown, on 28 August 1779. His participation in Indian treaties between 1784 and 1802, in which large areas were conveyed to the United States, made him so unpopular with his tribe that, for a time, his life was in danger. In 1790 he visited General George Washington to present Indian grievances. The following year he moved to a farm on the banks of the Allegheny, given to him by Pennsylvania in gratitude for his help in negotiating peace treaties. Cornplanter died there on 18 February 1836.

SEE ALSO *Indians in the Colonial Wars and the American Revolution.*

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
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CORNSTALK. (1720?–1777). Shawnee chief. Hokolesskwa, as he was named, was a friend of the Moravians and played a role in the 1764 peace talks with Colonel Henry Bouquet. He commanded the Indians in their bold attack on Point Pleasant in Dunmore's War, 1774. An advocate of Indian neutrality in the Revolution, Cornstalk went to Point Pleasant in October 1777 to determine if U.S. troops intended to attack the Shawnee. Captain Matthew Arbuckle took him hostage, and the militia in the fort murdered Cornstalk, his son, and two other Indians, touching off a wave of warfare by the Shawnee that did not cease until 1794.

SEE ALSO *Bouquet's Expedition of 1764; Dunmore's (or Cresap's) War; Moravian Settlements.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CORNWALLIS, CHARLES. (1738–1805). First marquess Cornwallis, British general and governor general of India. Charles Cornwallis was born in London on 31 December 1738. He was at Eton in 1753 and matriculated at Clare College, Cambridge, at Easter 1756. However, he chose the army over the university. On 8 December 1756 he obtained an ensign's commission in the First Foot Guards and in 1757 took leave to travel in



Charles Cornwallis. *The British general and nobleman, in a portrait (c. 1792) by John Smart.* © FITZWILLIAM MUSEUM, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, UK/BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY.

Europe with a Prussian officer companion and study at the Turin military academy. He broke off his tour to join Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, to whose army his regiment had been assigned. He was aide-de-camp to the marquess of Granby, served at Minden in 1759, and in August became a captain in the Eighty-fifth Foot. In June 1761 he became lieutenant colonel of the Twelfth Foot, and he distinguished himself at Kirch Denkern on 15 July. In 1762 he was at Wilhelmstadt and Lutterberg. By the end of the Seven Years' War he was known as an experienced and able soldier, albeit one who had never held high command.

He had been member of Parliament for the family pocket borough of Eye in Suffolk since 1760 and moved to the House of Lords on the death of his father, the first earl Cornwallis, in 1762. Ever wary of executive power, he allied with the Rockingham Whigs and supported John Wilkes. In 1765 he voted against the Stamp Act and, when Rockingham came to power later that year, he was rewarded by being made aide-de-camp to the king and a lord of the bedchamber. He supported the repeal of the Stamp Act and a bill banning general warrants in 1766 but voted against the Declaratory Act. A close friend and former comrade in arms of Shelburne, in 1766 he

obtained from the Chatham ministry the post of chief justice in eyre south of the Trent. In 1769 he exchanged this post for the vice treasurership of Ireland; in 1770 he joined the Privy Council, and in 1771 he became constable of the Tower of London. In short, while he was too principled to be a successful politician, his integrity had the respect of the king and of others who disliked his views on America.

He was also beginning to find domesticity more attractive than active political life or high military command. On 14 July 1768 he married Jemima Tulkiens (1747–1779). They had two children, Mary (1769–1857) and Charles (1774–1823). Thus, when war broke out in America, his sense of duty to the crown had to be weighed against his family life as well as his objections to the way the American question had been handled.

ARRIVAL IN AMERICA

However, his views did not extend to sanctioning rebellion, and in the end, duty came before family. When war broke out in 1775, he at once sought military employment and was promoted to major general. He sailed from Cork in charge of ten regiments on 12 February 1776 under the escort of a squadron commanded by Sir Peter Parker. Their orders were to meet Henry Clinton at the Cape Fear River and from there to take action against the southern colonies, which the ministry wrongly supposed to harbor sufficient Loyalists to make the restoration of royal authority relatively easy. They were then to move north to reinforce Howe in New York. On top of the misconception about the southern Loyalists, the plan assumed that there would be time to reach Howe early in the campaigning season and made no allowance for Cornwallis's and Parker's late arrival. In fact, their last ship did not anchor at Cape Fear until 31 May. By then the southern Loyalists had been defeated and were unable to make contact with the expedition. After a failed attempt on Charleston, the combined force rejoined Howe on Staten Island in August, having succeeded only in delaying the assault on New York until dangerously late in the season.

NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY

Before the month was out, Cornwallis was in action. He and Clinton led the troops that landed on Long Island on 22 August, and during the battle of the 27th he commanded the reserve division that swept through Jamaica Pass in the wake of Clinton's men. Later he blocked the retreat of the Americans' right wing and repelled their successive attempts to break through. He led the Kips Bay assault on 15 September, took part in the attack on Fort Washington, and on 18 November narrowly missed capturing the fleeing garrison of Fort Lee. He then led the

pursuit of Washington across New Jersey, through pouring rain along roads deep in mud. Forced to rest his exhausted troops at New Brunswick on the Raritan, he reached the Delaware to find Washington safely across, no boats on the British side, and winter closing in. Even Cornwallis, ever a bold and aggressive commander, could not contemplate a winter campaign in such conditions.

Cornwallis had supported Howe's slowness and caution throughout the 1776 campaign and approved of Howe's decision on 13 December to go into winter quarters. But he did not want to draw right back to the Raritan as Howe wanted. Now Cornwallis's bold streak came to the fore as he persuaded his chief to leave outposts along the Delaware with a supporting base twenty-five miles back at New Brunswick. His argument had some merit in it. Politically, the presence of British troops would encourage New Jersey Loyalists to commit themselves openly. Militarily, the risk of a major American counter-offensive was miniscule, and logistically the wider area of occupation could furnish supplies that would otherwise have to come from Britain.

Where Cornwallis and Howe went wrong was in supposing that Washington would not launch winter raids against one or more of the Delaware posts and destroy them in detail—as he soon did at Trenton and Princeton. Cornwallis's embarrassment was compounded by his failure on 22 January 1777 to trap Washington after he had pinned him against the river at Trenton, a rare tactical failure that may have obscured his partial responsibility for the strategic error. The consequences were grave. The rebel army had been encouraged at the very moment it seemed about to disintegrate. The British army retired to the safer line of the Raritan, abandoning the local Loyalists, encouraging the rebels, and losing much of the supply base Howe and Cornwallis had hoped to establish. The royal army at New York was to be dependent on transatlantic convoys for everything from flints to firewood for the remainder of the war.

For the rest of the winter and into the spring, Cornwallis was engaged in minor skirmishes around New Brunswick. After a short period of home leave he returned to take part in the abortive attempt to lure Washington into battle at Short Hills (26 June 1777). Having witnessed the failure to engage the American army in New Jersey, Cornwallis approved of Howe's plan to attack Philadelphia, and on 27 September he distinguished himself in leading the enveloping movement at Brandywine. He occupied Philadelphia, brought three battalions to reinforce Howe at Germantown on 4 October, forced the evacuation of Fort Mercer on 21 November, and had a brush with Washington's van at Matson's Ford on 11 December. With the end of



Surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown (1820). British troops under General Cornwallis surrendered to American forces on 19 October 1781, in Yorktown, Virginia, an event dramatized in this painting by John Trumbull. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION.

the campaigning season he was allowed to go home on leave.

SOUTH CAROLINA AND GEORGIA

He returned to Philadelphia in the spring of 1778 as a lieutenant general and Clinton's second in command and prospective successor. On 28 June he took a leading role in repelling the American army at Monmouth, personally leading the counterattack on Nathanael Greene's men. In December 1778 he again went on leave, this time to attend his dying wife. He returned at the end of 1779 in time to take part in the planning and execution of the expedition against Charleston. With the surrender of the city on 12 May 1780, he was left behind to secure Georgia and South Carolina. He was not to launch any northward offensive that might imperil this primary task. Cornwallis's subsequent operations, culminating in the overwhelming victory over Gates's superior numbers at Camden on 16 August, wrecked almost all American resistance. Cornwallis raised thousands of Loyalist militia

and began to reorganize South Carolina into the American supply base the British army had lacked since 1775.

He had not, however, removed the danger of partisan action, as illustrated by Patrick Ferguson's disaster at King's Mountain on 7 October, nor the possibility of renewed invasion from North Carolina. The Loyalist militia seemed more intent on settling old scores than on providing security, and its soldiers struck Cornwallis as little more than disorderly "banditti." He argued that the answer was to keep up the momentum of success by overrunning both North Carolina and Virginia. He could then link up with Clinton on the Chesapeake and launch a joint attack on the middle colonies. By contrast, sitting still would allow the enemy to recover, expose his South Carolina posts and logistical base to attrition, and hand the initiative to the Americans. Pleading that Clinton was too distant to direct his operations, he obtained permission to correspond directly with London and used that consent to persuade the ministry to back his strategy.

SURRENDER IN VIRGINIA

King's Mountain temporarily deflected him from his expedition to secure his rear, and a sober consideration of his resources might have led him to do the same after Cowpens on 17 January 1781. Instead he invaded North Carolina, chased Greene all the way to the Dan without catching him, and scored an indecisive victory at Guilford Courthouse on 15 March. He then retired to Wilmington on the Cape Fear River, where he could be supplied by sea. But instead of staying there, or—better still—retreating to South Carolina, he struck into Virginia. When Clinton found out, he was displeased but accepted the *fait accompli*; subsequently, however, he demanded three thousand men to help defend New York. Cornwallis, who thought that success in Virginia was worth even the loss of New York, was dismayed. Deciding that he could not sustain himself in the Yorktown Peninsula with a depleted force, Cornwallis retired across the James River, inflicting a defeat on Lafayette at Green Spring on 6 July. At the last moment Clinton, under direct orders from Germain, allowed him to keep all his men and ordered him to set up a base at Old Point Comfort, incorporating Yorktown if it would strengthen the main position. Thus Clinton's weakness and Germain's interference bought Cornwallis back into the Yorktown Peninsula, where he would be trapped.

Cornwallis, deciding that Old Point Comfort would be hard to defend, confined himself to Yorktown and Gloucester, just across the York River. By 22 August he was in position and looking for reinforcement by sea. Thanks to De Grasse's occupation of Chesapeake Bay, it never came. When Graves approached the Bay in September, he found the French fleet and decided to fight De Grasse on the open sea. When Barras arrived, De Grasse became so strong that Graves could not hope to dislodge him. Washington and Lafayette joined hands on 14 October and proceeded to batter their way into Cornwallis's defenses. On 19 October 1781, seeing his position no longer defensible and with no hope of rescue by sea, Cornwallis surrendered.

THE IMPACT OF YORKTOWN

Yorktown did not end Britain's capacity to carry on the war. Only around five thousand men were lost there, and the main British army in America was still intact at New York. The French navy's local superiority was only temporary. The real blow was struck at London's willingness to carry on. The North ministry was forced out of office in 1782 and the new Rockingham administration began peace talks in Paris. Not all the responsibility belonged to Cornwallis: Yorktown followed from the ministry's dispersal of force in the face of a potentially more numerous enemy and its faulty assumption about the strength of

Loyalist support in the South. However, the Americans were at the end of their tether in 1781 and a more cautious commander might not only have saved his army but witnessed a British triumph. Cornwallis took great care of his men and was popular amongst them; on the battlefield he was formidable. Unfortunately, he combined these qualities with a bold, imaginative, and fatally flawed strategic sense.

GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA

Yet Cornwallis, unlike Burgoyne after Saratoga, was hardly blamed at all. Allowed home on parole, he was offered (and refused) the governor generalship of India in May 1782. Shortly afterwards he was formally exchanged for Henry Laurens. He resigned as constable of the Tower after his friend Shelburne lost office in December 1783 but soon resumed the post's purely military duties. He rejected Pitt's and Dundas's renewed offer of India in 1784, but they approached him yet again when a vacancy occurred in 1785. Cornwallis was attracted, but mindful of the problems brought by divided command in America and probably aware of where weak central control had left Warren Hastings, he insisted on being empowered to override his council and being commander in chief. These requests being granted, Cornwallis accepted in February 1786.

In his seven years' tenure, Cornwallis attacked widespread corruption (though at the cost of weakening Indian participation in administration), separated the administrative and commercial wings of the company's service, and began to Anglicize the Bengal law courts and legal system. In 1791–1792 he demonstrated his logistical and tactical skills in the war against Tipu Sultan of Mysore but wisely avoided totally destroying his principality.

LORD LIEUTENANT OF IRELAND

After his Indian term expired in 1793, Cornwallis became master of the ordnance with a seat in the cabinet (1795) and lord lieutenant of Ireland (1797). Arriving in the wake of the great rebellion, he was determined to create peace within Ireland and encourage Irish acceptance of British rule. The key, as he saw it, was Catholic emancipation, and the great obstacle was the implacable opposition of the Protestant establishment to Catholic domination of the Irish Parliament. He therefore wanted to abolish the Irish Parliament and replace it with representation at Westminster—a solution acceptable to Catholics only if it came with emancipation. Consequently, he was very unhappy with Pitt's refusal explicitly to include emancipation in the Act of Union (1800) and also with the corrupt practices needed to

persuade the Irish assembly to vote itself out of existence. In 1805 he returned to India as governor general and died there on 5 October 1805.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Camden Campaign; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Chesapeake Capes; Clinton, Henry; Cowpens, South Carolina; Ferguson, Patrick; Fort Lee, New Jersey; Fort Washington, New York; Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of; Green Spring (Jamestown Ford, Virginia); Greene, Nathanael; Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Kip's Bay, New York; Long Island, New York, Battle of; Matson's Ford, Pennsylvania; Parker, Sir Peter; Princeton, New Jersey; Short Hills (Metuchen), New Jersey; Trenton, New Jersey; Yorktown Campaign; Yorktown, Siege of.*

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revised by John Oliphant

CORNY **SEE** *Ethis de Corny, Louis Dominique.*

CORNY, DOMINIQUE-LOUIS ETHIS

DE **SEE** *Ethis de Corny, Louis Dominique.*

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT. Like their civilian counterparts, military authorities feared the spread of insubordination and resistance from persons at the lower levels of society. The infliction of punishment preserved order. Enlisted men in the Continental Army not only suffered deprivations and hardships, but they also were subject to brutal corporal punishment. Officers, like the gentleman class in civilian society, did not receive corporal punishment; instead they were liable to correction by means of reprimand, fines, imprisonment, or dismissal from the army.

Americans became inured to physically brutal penalties under military authority during the French and Indian

War. Provincials serving with British regulars were put under all the severities of the British Articles of War, which sanctioned various forms of physical correction and floggings up to as many as one thousand stripes. At the beginning of the American Revolution, however, the military codes governing the colony and then state militias, and also the initial Articles of War invoked by the Continental Congress, were lenient in comparison to their British counterpart. The Congressional Articles of War of 30 June 1775 replicated the Massachusetts military code of April 1775; no death penalty was provided for desertion, mutiny, sedition, and treason, and flogging could not exceed the amount stated in the Bible—thirty-nine lashes. George Washington, as commander in chief, successfully prodded Congress to enact a sterner Articles of War, and on 20 September 1776 a new such document expanded the number of offenses meriting the death penalty to sixteen and set the limit of lashes per offense to one hundred. Washington tried in vain to persuade Congress to increase the number of lashes; he argued that there was too wide a gap in the maximum penalty of either a hundred lashes or death. Of course, there was a way to go beyond the restriction: for especially nefarious culprits, courts-martial ordered a hundred lashes for each count charged against a soldier.

Although corporal punishment of soldiers in the Continental Army did not reflect substantially the widespread use of torture by the British, various odd forms of physical correction were employed by the Americans, mostly in regard to crimes of less than maximum severity. For drunkenness, soldiers wore the “clog” (or log): they were shackled to a segment of wood weighing twenty to thirty pounds, which was dragged around wherever they went. A variation was to wear a three pound clog around one’s neck. Also reserved for minor offenses was “the cage,” a wooden structure in which a culprit, fed only bread and water, remained standing for up to thirty-six hours. This punishment seems to have been similar to the British army’s whirligig, in which a person stood and was whirled around.

Other than simple flogging, three means of correction induced great injury and pain. For the wooden horse, carried over from British practice, two boards were nailed together to form an inverted V. This device was given four wooden legs, and pieces of wood designating a horse’s head and a tail were attached to either end. The culprit was straddled over the sharp ridge, with hands tied behind and feet weighted down. The wooden horse was moved along, with vibrations causing pain and ruptures. Some persons undergoing this penalty were emasculated. Because of bodily injury, the use of the wooden horse was discontinued after the beginning phase of the war.

Corporal Punishment

Picketing, a punishment that appears to have been confined to cavalry and artillery units, often accompanied a flogging. The victim had his wrist tied to the top of an upright pole, and a heel rested on a sharp peg driven into the ground. The prisoner had to shift his weight to either his wrist or his heel, which in some instances was penetrated entirely by the peg. Because of the possibility of causing the permanent disability of a soldier, this punishment was seldom used by the Continental Army.

Running the gauntlet, a punishment chiefly for desertion, was used throughout the war, though infrequently. Eventually Washington refused to approve such punishment because it exceeded the number of lashes allowed by Congress and also left a prisoner disabled or even dead. However, American commanders outside the main army were apt to permit courts-martial to inflict running the gauntlet. A soldier running the gauntlet might have to pass through all of a brigade or even, in the rarest of situations, through the whole army. The victim was stripped to the waist and then compelled to proceed through parallel lines of soldiers, his progress being impeded by a sergeant going on ahead, moving backward, pointing a bayonet at the culprit's chest, thereby allowing soldiers, yielding hickory sticks, to make blows well laid on. A sufferer of this punishment was soon, in the words of a contemporary, "in one general gore of blood."

Flogging was the preferred correction, for trivial as well as major offenses. Although sentences for the same crimes varied, usually because of extenuating circumstances, patterns did emerge. For example, repeatedly being drunk brought twenty lashes; not cleaning arms, twenty-five; stealing the shirt of a soldier, fifty; and one hundred or death for desertion, plundering, or sleeping on duty. A man accused of the plundering of civilians might be summarily whipped. Stragglers could be whipped on the spot if they could not explain their absence from their unit. Flogging was a frequent occurrence at camp, sometimes occurring as many as ten times a day. Most of the punishments were inflicted at the regimental level, during morning or evening roll calls, or at guard mounting on the parade ground. The victim, stripped to the waist, was tied to a tree or post, called the "adjutant's daughter." Troops of his regiment (or, rarely, his brigade) witnessed the ordeal from a hollow square or parallel line formation. The punishment was under the direction of the regimental adjutant or, sometimes, the provost marshal. Regimental drummers and fifers—in cavalry units, the trumpeter—performed the whipping.

The preferred instrument for flogging, the cat-o'-nine-tails, consisted of nine knotted cords attached to a handle. Before fifty lashes could be delivered, the back of the victim "would be all out and like jell." Frequently

punishment was stretched over several days, "in which case the wounds are in a state of inflammation and the terror of the punishment is greatly aggravated." Usually the victim was given a lead bullet to chew on. A former drummer in the American army, Samuel Dewees, recalled that upon completion of a whipping, the victim was untied and laid down with his face to the ground, and then pack salt was strewed over his back. His comrades then took a small paddle-board and "patted" it down, beating it thus into the gashes, and then laid him by for awhile until he recovered a little. Cruel as it seems, the salt was actually a form of mercy, as it cleansed the wounds and enabled them to heal (Hanna, *Dewees*, p. 203).

Corporal punishment in the American Revolutionary army did not have the desired effect of making for a more disciplined body of troops. It did not reduce the rate of desertion; in fact, camp brutality undoubtedly was one of the factors that impelled men to desert. Moreover, the cruelty affected recruitment. As Lieutenant Colonel David Cobb of a Massachusetts regiment said, "the Continental officers are so cruel and severe" that "men can never be got to serve under 'em."

In the officer corps no protest mounted against corporal punishment. General Daniel Morgan, who did not resort to it, was close to being a lone exception; Dr. James Thacher, an army surgeon, spoke out against it; and Dr. Benjamin Rush, for a while Physician General of the middle department of the army, after the war, stated that corporal punishment "increased propensities to crimes" and that "a man who has lost his character at a whipping post, had nothing valuable to lose in society." The civilian population voiced little demand for army correctional reform. This lack of concern is attributable to the existence of physical punishment in civilian life for persons deemed to be of a lower class; a realization that a large number of soldiers were riffraff and therefore needed stringent discipline; and the belief that only a well-ordered army could win the war. Only toward the end of the war did Washington express any qualms about the use of corporal punishment. He had never shown any sympathy for soldiers being punished, being concerned only that the punishment fit the crime. In general orders of 12 November 1782, Washington noted that to "reclaim" soldiers "who are not lost to all sense of virtue and military Pride," different "modes of punishment may be introduced which by awakening the feelings of honor will have a better influence than corporal."

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Harry M. Ward

CORPS OF INVALIDS. The British army had long organized companies of men who were unfit for active service into garrison companies to guard fortifications and stores. On 21 April 1777 the Board of War recommended the creation of an eight-company Corps of Invalids, with a view to making use of veterans who were unfit for further field duty but still capable of limited service. Congress approved the recommendation on 20 June and named Colonel Lewis Nicola as commander of the Corps. Congress also directed the Corps to provide a "school for young gentlemen previous to their being appointed to the marching regiments," but this role was never actually performed. Nicola began recruiting in Philadelphia during the summer of 1777, and eventually established detachments at Boston and West Point, where the Corps performed the valuable service of manning the fortifications and guarding the stores at those locations. The Corps was disbanded between April 1783 and December 1784 at West Point. The states retained partial control over their men in the Corps, but never gave them a high priority.

SEE ALSO *Nicola, Lewis*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

COUDRAY SEE *Tronson du Coudray, Philippe Charles Jean Baptiste*.

COUNCIL OF WAR. During wartime a commander might call together a formal assembly of senior subordinates to advise him about significant issues facing the army, usually in some sort of operational emergency. The members of such a council of war would be asked to express their opinions, sometimes in writing, about several proposed courses of action. No commander was obliged to accept a majority opinion of his subordinates. However, he would disregard their opinion only for what he thought were good and sufficient reasons, as he assumed that the subordinates knew in greater detail whether the soldiers in their commands would obey any orders he cared to give. The fact that a commander called a council of war was not considered evidence of indecision on his part. In fact, it would normally be seen as a prudent management style by both the highly stratified British army as well as by the less hierarchical American army. A commander might be accused of contempt for the judgment of his subordinates if he did not make them party to major decisions; it was to his benefit both to solicit subordinates' ideas and to instruct officers in the rationale for a particular course of action.

Sometimes decisions weighed in council involved cultural norms as well as strictly military matters, as when repeated councils of war convinced John Burgoyne that he could not renege on his decision to surrender once he had made the offer to Horatio Gates at Saratoga. Washington used councils to sound out his principal subordinates about the state of the army, and more than once at the start of his tenure at the siege of Boston was told that his proposals were too bold and would not be carried out by the soldiers. Always reluctant to admit defeat, Washington could allow himself to be persuaded by a council of war that it was more prudent to retreat and live to fight another day, as when his subordinates voted ten to three on 12 September 1776 to evacuate Manhattan Island south of Fort Washington. A commander could also use a council of war like a modern "committee solution" to dilute his own responsibility for decisions that events might prove incorrect or hasty, as when Burgoyne canvassed his subordinates about how to escape the American trap at Saratoga. Like most modern well-run committee meetings, a council of war could be used to ratify decisions a commander had already made or, less honorably, to give retrospective cover for decisions for which a commander wanted to evade responsibility. When a council of war met to consider whether the column commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Roger Enos in Benedict Arnold's march to Quebec should turn back, Enos is said to have covered his own reputation by voting against the retreat after first assuring himself that the majority would vote the other way.

Coup de Main

SEE ALSO *Arnold's March to Quebec; New York Campaign; Saratoga Surrender.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

COUP DE MAIN. A sudden attack that captures a position.

SEE ALSO *Stony Point, New York; Paulus Hook, New Jersey.*

Mark M. Boatner

COWANS FORD, NORTH CAROLINA. 1 February 1781. Cowans was a private ford a few miles downstream from Beattie's on the Catawba River, which was almost five hundred yards wide at this point with a swift current. About midstream the ford split. The wagon ford continued straight ahead while the shallower horse ford turned south at a forty-five-degree angle, passed over the corner of a small island, and hit the shore several hundred yards below the exit from the wagon ford. General Nathanael Greene sent General William L. Davidson and more than six hundred North Carolina militia to prevent Cornwallis from crossing the Catawba at this point from the west to the east. (Greene was as yet unaware that General James Webster and Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton had already crossed the river at Beattie's Ford.) Davidson posted the largest portion of his force to cover the exit of the horse ford, with just a small outpost at the wagon ford, and stationed his mounted troops on a small hill a few hundred yards behind the river.

Cornwallis's advance unit, the Light Infantry of the Guards, commanded by General Charles O'Hara, attempted to force the crossing on 1 February. Their guide, a supposed Loyalist named Dick Beal, led the British into midstream and then deserted without telling them about the two exits. The Guards pushed straight ahead on the wagon ford, although they were under fire and men were being swept away by the current. O'Hara himself was thrown into the water when his horses fell. But the error turned out to be fortunate, for the bulk of Davidson's men could not fire on the British from their position at the horse ford. The Guards established a firm bridgehead on the eastern shore before Davidson could bring reinforcements from the position downstream. Davidson was attempting to rally his men to a new defensive position when he was killed. The militia scattered, and the action ended in American defeat. Tarleton pushed on later that day to rout other militia forces that were assembling at Tarrant's Tavern.

SEE ALSO *Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene; Tarrant's Tavern, North Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

COWBOYS AND SKINNERS. The names "cowboys" and "skinnners" were applied to marauders operating in the Neutral Ground around New York City from 1776 until the end of the war. Although the names were loosely applied to all lawless bands and individuals, including those of no political affiliation, the cowboys were generally considered to be Loyalists and the skinnners rebels. The cowboys' main occupation was stealing cattle and selling them to the British garrison in New York City. The skinnners tried to stop the cowboys. Both groups also provided intelligence information about the activities of the other side.

SEE ALSO *Neutral Ground of New York.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

COWPENS, SOUTH CAROLINA. 17 January 1781. Earl Cornwallis learned in late December 1780 that Brigadier General Daniel Morgan was operating against Ninety Six with a force of dragoons and light infantry. In response, he dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton to protect Ninety Six and then drive Morgan from South Carolina. Morgan already had a well-deserved reputation for his audacity at Quebec and for leading riflemen at Saratoga. His presence in the main British force's rear with sizeable force presented a very real threat to British plans for a winter advance into North Carolina. Cornwallis could not start north until Morgan's threat was eliminated.

Cornwallis knew that the Continental Southern Army, under Major General Nathanael Greene, was at least one hundred miles away from Morgan, and that his own British force lay between them. With a numerical

superiority of two to one located between Greene and Morgan, Cornwallis saw an opportunity to destroy Morgan. Tarleton proposed moving toward Ninety Six with his legion and other troops. He would protect the post and either destroy Morgan or drive him toward Kings Mountain. At the same time, Cornwallis was to move from Winnsboro and cut off Morgan's escape route in case he eluded Tarleton.

After five days' rapid march, Tarleton made a surprise river crossing that caused Morgan to evacuate his temporary Burr's Mill camp early on 16 January. Morgan had already ordered South Carolina militia under Colonel Andrew Pickens to withdraw to the northwest toward a road junction called the Cowpens. As they did so, they cleared readily available supplies from the route that Tarleton's pursuing British had to follow.

Morgan had officers with him who lived nearby and knew the country intimately. The Cowpens road junction was utilized repeatedly by both sides during the last seven months' campaigning because it provided access to river fords and a good campsite and was well-known to any arriving reinforcements.

By midafternoon on 16 January 1781, Morgan reached the crossroads and conducted a reconnaissance. He first planned for a battle in case he was attacked, but later opted to force a fight on Tarleton. The Cowpens had the obvious advantages of forage and of being easy for the militia reinforcements to find. Morgan sent word to Pickens and other militia leaders to meet at the Cowpens. Morgan also ordered an available cattle herd slaughtered to feed his men.

THE BATTLEFIELD

Approaching the crossroads from the south, the British would follow the Green River Road through a tree-dotted flat area clear of underbrush that rose gradually for about five hundred yards to a "military crest." About seventy yards farther north was a geographical (or true) crest some seventy feet in total elevation. About five hundred yards behind this, across a grassy swale, was another crest just south of the intersecting road leading southwest toward the Pacolet River and northeast toward the Broad River. As the British proceeded up the road, tree cover increased slightly, but there was very little underbrush, the result of innumerable campfires since the preceding August. There were at least three springs on each side of the road. These fed into boggy ground where thick stands of cane grew; these constricted the battlefields and, later, protected American flanks.

Morgan's troops included three hundred Continental infantry from Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia under Lieutenant Colonel John Eager Howard of Maryland. Lieutenant Colonel William Washington of Virginia led


some seventy-two Continental light dragoons. There were state troops from South Carolina and Virginia, some of whom arrived just before the fighting began. There were also Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia militia, many of whom were riflemen.

Over the night of 16–17 January, Morgan spent a great deal of time telling his officers what was expected of them. As more troops came in, he decided he would fight and went through the process again. Morgan carefully instructed the officers where to position their men when final deployments were made. A forward skirmish line with over 150 picked riflemen from both Carolinas and Georgia would take position on the southernmost rising ground. On the American right, the terrain was steeper and faced low, boggy ground. Major Charles McDowell of North Carolina commanded at least five militia companies from that state on this (western) side. On the left, Captain Samuel Hammond commanded South Carolina state troops and three small companies of Georgia militia. All these skirmishers were to fire and withdraw after forcing the British to deploy. Hopefully, they would then take up positions in the main militia line.

The second line, comprising most of the South Carolina militia and reinforced by the skirmishers, was commanded by Colonel Andrew Pickens of South Carolina. His men were placed north of the military crest and slightly below it, some 150 yards behind the skirmish line. This reverse slope defense offered some concealment. Pickens's militia brigade contained four battalions and numbered well over eight hundred men; Tarleton later claimed some one thousand men were positioned here. The militiamen were told to fire twice at close range, aiming for British officers and sergeants. When the enemy got close enough for a bayonet charge, the second line was to withdraw through the third line. Here they could reassemble behind the third line's bayonets.

The third, or main, battle line was 125 yards forward of the northern geographical crest and 150 yards down the slight grade behind the second line. Commanded by Howard, about 300 Continental infantrymen formed the main opposition for Tarleton. Four Delaware and Maryland Continental companies were in the center. Three companies of Virginia militiamen formed a battalion to their left under Major Francis Triplett. On the right, another Virginia battalion was posted under Major Edmund Tate. This battalion was an odd composition because, from right to left, there was a Virginia Continental company, a Virginia state troops company, and an Augusta County militia. Attached to each flank were small companies (about twenty-five men in each) of North Carolina militiamen. The third line had approximately 550 to 600 men covering a front of 220 yards.

The reserve consisted of Washington's 72 Continental light dragoons, Georgia major James McCall's 45 mounted



THE GALE GROUP.

South Carolina state troops dragoons, another 45 horsemen armed only with sabers, and some volunteer dragoons. The mounted men were posted about 150 yards behind the third line slightly behind the high ground.

Long after the battle, many men related that Morgan had challenged his militiamen to fire two shots. He reminded them of what the British and Tories had done

to their property and their kinfolk. He may have shown the scars of the famous flogging he had taken from the British years ago, but no one mentioned him doing so. Less dramatic, but probably more important, Morgan sent his men into battle fed and rested. Long before the British completed their exhausting twelve-mile march to the battlefield, the Americans were in position and waiting.

TARLETON'S APPROACH

Giving his men little sleep, Tarleton beat reveille at 2 A.M. and left camp at 3 A.M. The British marched northward led by three light infantry companies. Behind them came the British Legion infantry, the Seventh Regiment of Foot, the Seventy-first Regiment (Fraser's Highlanders), a Royal Artillery detachment with two 3-pounder cannon, 50 troopers of the Seventeenth Light Dragoons, and the British Legion cavalry. A company of about 25 men under a local Tory, Captain John Chesney, was also present, serving as guides. Total strength was over 1,150. The 250 infantry and over 250 dragoons of his British Legion, the 50 men of the Seventeenth Light Dragoons, 25 artillerymen, and over 249 Highlanders of the Seventy-first Regiment's First Battalion, and a light infantry battalion of over 135 men were veteran troops. The Seventh Regiment's 177 enlisted men were recruits originally destined to garrison Ninety Six. The guarded baggage wagons followed as rapidly as they could.

Many authors have accepted uncritically Morgan's figure of eight hundred men, claiming that Tarleton had numerical superiority. To explain the victory, these partisans have suggested that Morgan's men were better than the British forces because the militiamen were veterans of partisan, backcountry warfare and superb shots. More recent research, using pension records, suggests that Tarleton's statement that the Americans had more men than he is supported.

Feeling their way cautiously for over two hours, the advance guard still reached Thicketty Creek an hour before dawn, sunrise on 17 January coming at about 7:36 A.M. Tarleton sent forward a cavalry that soon made contact with an American patrol commanded by Captain Joshua Inman. At least one prisoner was taken, a Continental dragoon sergeant whose horse had been shot down. Learning Morgan's camp was within three miles, Tarleton sent Captain David Ogilvie forward with two troops to reinforce the advance guard and feel out the American position. At about 6:45 A.M., Ogilvie rode out of the woods bordering the southern extremity of the Cowpens. The noise of moving men trying to be quiet alerted the troopers that a sizeable force was immediately ahead. Meanwhile, Tarleton interviewed the prisoner and learned in no uncertain terms that Morgan was intending to fight. Ogilvie's report, coupled with the new intelligence, forced a dilemma on Tarleton. Was the force ahead only a rear guard covering a retreat or was it Morgan's whole force? The situation was critical for Tarleton because he knew American reinforcements were coming to Morgan while his own force would get no larger.

Although his troops had just marched some twelve miles over difficult, wet terrain in darkness, Tarleton wasted no time getting ready to attack. Chesney's guides

briefed him accurately on this well-known spot. He shifted his leading troops into a line east of the road about four hundred yards in front of the first American position. Then, with orders to drive in the skirmishers, the men advanced about three hundred yards and began forcing the riflemen back. After passing the boggy ground in front of McDowell's position, he deployed for a frontal assault.

From left to right he placed the Seventh Regiment west of the road. East of the road, he posted the Legion infantry and the light infantry. One three-pounder went into action in the road, the other in the middle of the Seventh Regiment. On each flank, Tarleton posted fifty horsemen, the Seventeenth Light Dragoons troop was on the right, Ogilvie's Troop on the left. A scattering fire among the Seventh Regiment broke out, probably because its commander, Major Timothy Newmarsh, was wounded, but with this exception the line moved forward with good discipline. Waiting as a reserve in the left rear of the Seventh Regiment were Fraser's Highlanders. The British Legion dragoons took a position on the road to take advantage of any opportunities.

As the British advanced and then deployed, the first-line skirmishers drifted rearward, taking positions on Pickens's flanks. They continued firing as the British advanced at a trot. When the range closed within fifty yards, ten-man groups of sharpshooters slightly in advance opened fire on the British leaders and then ran back to the ranks. This was not just an attempt at attrition; these men were tempting the British to fire while still beyond effective range. After the British advanced another ten yards, the militia battalions began firing volleys. Reinforced by the riflemen from the first line, the aimed rifle fire was devastating. Over half the British casualties occurred during this phase of the action, and about 40 percent of the officers went down. The four militia battalions got off five volleys but only one had time to fire twice. The disciplined British infantry kept coming because they had been trained to assault militia riflemen immediately rather than engage in a gun fight. The militia broke ranks and ran back, passing through the main line where openings had been left for their passage; then the main line closed up to present a solid front.

After driving back the militia line, Tarleton reformed his infantry and resumed the attack. Howard's line opened up with steady volley fire once the British infantry was in range. The British were checked but not stopped. Firing volleys at a distance well under forty yards, Tarleton commented that "the fire on both sides was well supported and produced much slaughter." This firefight lasted less than ten minutes.

Trying to break the stalemate after only a minute or two of volley firing, Tarleton ordered up the Seventy-first and sent the flanking dragoons to envelop the Americans. The Seventeenth Light Dragoons charged past the American left, passing through the flankers and falling upon the reforming militia. The surprise was so total



Cowpens National Battlefield. A restored cabin dating from the 1830s sits on the grounds of Cowpens National Battlefield in South Carolina. © WILLIAM A. BAKE/CORBIS.

that one man later reported the fifty or so men as four hundred. They were counterattacked by Washington and McCall, who outnumbered them four to one at the point of contact. The British dragoons fled after one-third were struck down.

Major Arthur McArthur was already moving the Seventy-first Regiment forward to envelop the American right, following behind Ogilvie's dragoons. They were delayed by McDowell's North Carolina militia, who slowed them for perhaps three minutes. As the Highlanders overran the militia, Howard ordered his right company, Captain Andrew Wallace's Virginia Continentals, to change front to meet the new threat—a tactic known as "refusing a flank." Wallace's company started the maneuver but did not complete the evolution. They were ordered rearward to sort themselves out. Further confusion ensued because the Highlanders fired a volley at precisely the right time, killing the commander of the next company on the third line. His replacement did not know what had been ordered and so ordered the company off the line. Each adjacent unit then withdrew, and the entire Continental line started rearwards, but in good order, reloading as it

went. To make the best of a movement that could not be stopped, and seeing that it might be a good idea, after all, to extricate his entire line from a bad situation, Howard decided to continue withdrawing to a new position.

Morgan rode up in alarm but Howard reassured him, and Morgan went off to mark a spot where the Continentals would halt, turn about, and fire. The Scots rushed forward in a loose formation, followed by the other British units. As the American infantry moved back, Washington, reforming after dispatching the Seventeenth Light Dragoons, now ordered his men against Ogilvie on the American right. Wheeling about, he rode back through the British, scattering the legion dragoons. Washington sent word to Morgan that the British had lost unit cohesion and that they were running like a mob.

As the first Continental companies reached their new position; Howard ordered them to face about and fire. The British, charging in pursuit, were within fifteen yards when the Continentals turned, fired from the hip, and charged with the bayonet. At about the same time, Washington and McCall hit the Highlanders' left flank and rear. The surprise fire and bayonet charge proved too

much for troops who had lived the last week on low rations and little sleep, had then completed a four hour march over wet roads, had attacked a good half mile, and now supposed victory was at hand. Suddenly hit by the surprise volley of buck and ball at less than fifteen yards, those men still on their feet were splattered with blood and gore. The Scots were seized with an “unaccountable panic” and fled. The Highlanders tried to rally after a short distance but Pickens’s militia appeared on their flank and rear, firing at long range. With most officers killed or wounded, the Highlanders gave up. The Americans continued the pursuit and those infantrymen who tried to stand were overwhelmed. The American leadership acted quickly to keep their men from exacting “Tarleton’s Quarter.”

Tarleton did not quit. He rode back and ordered the British Legion dragoons forward in a counterattack he thought might win the day, or at least save the artillery. The dragoons rode off and left a frustrated Tarleton behind. The handful of British artillerymen went down fighting as they were overwhelmed by Howard’s infantrymen. All were killed or wounded defending the guns.

Some forty men of the Seventeenth Dragoons and fourteen officers rallied around Tarleton as he rushed to save the guns. Tarleton and his small force were driven back as Washington followed in hot pursuit. Washington was well in advance when three British officers turned back for a dramatic finale. In the first exchange, Washington’s saber was broken. His opponent was shot by a “little waiter” (or orderly). An American sergeant major then wounded the third officer. This celebrated encounter was later romanticized by a fanciful painting; Howard summed it up by saying that one British officer was thought to be Tarleton. In retrospect, it is most likely the three officers were subordinates, including at least one from the Seventeenth Light Dragoons.

Retreating, Tarleton came upon his wagon train and found the guards had fled. American militia dragoons were already looting the wagons. Tarleton’s men drove off the Americans, burned what little they could, and rode for the main British camp. After rounding up some two hundred dragoons, Tarleton crossed the Broad River and reached Cornwallis on 18 January.

Morgan wasted no time. Leaving local militia behind to take care of the dead and wounded, he gathered what booty he could use and marched the prisoners off the battlefield before noon. Reaching the north side of the Broad River six miles away, he crossed and then camped to allow his detachments and stragglers to catch up.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Less than an hour’s fighting cost the British over 100 killed and 200 wounded. All those reported wounded were captured, and at least an additional 600 unwounded

were taken prisoner. Officer casualties are confusing, but at least ten were killed and another 29 captured. Sixty african americans accompanying the baggage were also captured; they were distributed under receipt to various militia officers, including two to Morgan. The booty included 100 dragoon horses, 800 muskets, 35 wagons, the colors of the Seventh Regiment, a traveling forge, and the British music (the fifes, drums, and trumpets of the British were kept as trophies). American losses were 24 killed and 104 wounded.

COMMENTS AND CONTROVERSIES

The Battle of Cowpens destroyed Cornwallis’s light infantry. To recapture them, he embarked on a pursuit of Morgan, and then Greene, that almost destroyed his main force. Another consequence was that it raised patriot morale, just as Greene had ordered when he sent Morgan west to “spirit up the people.”

Tarleton’s reputation did not suffer greatly. He was still a feared opponent until captured at Yorktown. Until then, he continued to conduct slashing raids against the Americans. Cornwallis officially exonerated Tarleton, but the Seventy-first refused to serve with him again.

Morgan’s Cowpens victory is a classic, the best American tactical demonstration of the war. Morgan combined his own charismatic leadership skills with superb junior officers (Howard and Washington, in particular, but the captains under them were also outstanding, especially Delaware’s Robert Kirkwood). He got the most out of a potentially disastrous mix of Continentals, state troops, and militia who had all suffered at British hands.

Morgan certainly used an unusual deployment to maximize his own men’s weapons while taking advantage of a British tendency to fire high. By utilizing a reverse slope defense, Morgan placed the British against a lightning skyline and firing downhill, leaving them to overshoot. The reverse slope also concealed many Americans from Tarleton. The progressively stronger American lines depleted British morale and stamina as the Americans forced their opponents to attack them head-on, because each line was covered by springs, boggy ground, and canebrakes. Even with more men than Tarleton and with all his other advantages, Morgan was lucky, but winners tend to make their own breaks and take advantage of situations as they develop.

While Howard’s infantrymen stood fast, exchanging volleys with the British, Washington obeyed his orders to take advantage of opportunities. The American dragoons achieved mass against each British flank attack in succession. They simply overwhelmed their opponents. Using shorter interior lines, the American dragoons were able to defeat both British mounted thrusts in detail, then attack down the battlefield to ensure the rout.

Like many other backcountry battles during 1780 and 1781, Cowpens was over fairly quickly. In some accounts, it could be interpreted as lasting less than thirty-five minutes. The rapidity of troop movements and the sudden collapse are reflected in the casualty totals. As with other short, vicious fights, the loser suffered greatly compared to the winner. While the Americans could replace most of their losses, the British could not. In order to retake his men, Cornwallis overstretched his supply lines and marched his army into the ground. As events played out, Cowpens was one step on the road to Yorktown.

SEE ALSO *British Legion; Morgan, Daniel; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene; Tarleton's Quarter.*

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revised by Lawrence E. Babits

CRAIG, JAMES HENRY. (1748–1812). British officer and colonial governor. James Craig was born in Gibraltar in 1748, the son of Hew Craig, a Scots judge in the fortress. Gazetted ensign in the Thirtieth Foot in 1763 when he was fifteen, he was allowed to attend military schools in Europe before joining his regiment. Promoted lieutenant in the Forty-seventh Foot in 1769, Craig returned to Gibraltar where in 1770 he became aide de camp to the governor, Colonel Robert Boyd. He was promoted captain on 14 March 1771. In 1774 he accompanied his regiment to America, where in 1775 he became involved in the War of American Independence.

Seriously wounded at the taking of Bunker Hill in June 1775, he was moved to Canada. Here he took a significant part in turning back the last American attempt to sustain a foothold on the St. Lawrence at Trois Rivières on 8 June 1776. Afterward he participated in Guy Carleton's advance to Ticonderoga. In 1777 he was with Burgoyne when he took Ticonderoga and was wounded during the discomfiture of the American rearguard at Hubbardton on 7 July. At Freeman's Farm (the first battle of Saratoga), he so distinguished himself that he was sent home with General John Burgoyne's dispatches and in December 1777 was rewarded with a majority in the

new Eight-second Foot under Colonel Francis MacLean. He returned with his new regiment to America, where he served at first in Nova Scotia. In June and July 1779 he took part in MacLean's Penobscot expedition to Maine and in the defeat of the American force sent to dislodge him. In 1780 he commanded four companies of the Eight-second sent from New York on 16 October with Alexander Leslie's diversionary expedition to the Chesapeake. The force reached Charleston, South Carolina, in December.

As General Cornwallis prepared to strike deep into North Carolina, Craig was sent to seize Wilmington, which offered a convenient supply port closer to his line of operations than was Charleston. With about 450 regulars Craig took the place, almost without resistance, on 1 February 1781 and held it for two weeks. During this time he generated so much Loyalist support that the rebels afterward found it impossible to raise troops or supplies in the area. After the battle at Guilford Courthouse, Cornwallis retired on Wilmington and marched thence to Virginia, leaving Craig to hold the town and conduct raids against American targets. In July he commissioned the formidable partisan David Fanning to raise and lead local Loyalist forces, while Craig conducted a number of skillful hit-and-run operations of his own, including that on New Bern in early August. He evacuated the town on 18 November to avoid being cut off by the American regulars Arthur St. Clair was taking south to reinforce Nathanael Greene. Reaching Charleston, he was posted on Johns Island, which he held until the end of hostilities. He was promoted lieutenant colonel in the Sixteenth Regiment before he left America.

After the war he was sent with the Sixteenth to Ireland, where in 1790 he was promoted colonel. He traveled in Europe to study Prussian military methods and became the first regimental commander to adopt David Dundas's new drill method. In 1794 he served with the duke of York in the Netherlands, first as adjutant general and from 3 October as a major general. In 1795 he commanded the first landing against the Dutch at the Cape of Good Hope and held out until the main army arrived. After the Dutch surrender on 14 September he was appointed military governor and remained at the Cape until 1797. In that year he was recalled and knighted prior to taking up a divisional command in Bengal, where he prevented a mutiny. He was promoted lieutenant general on 1 January 1801, and returned to England in 1802 to command in the eastern district. In March 1805, though ailing, he was promoted a local full general and sent with seven thousand troops to cooperate with Russian and local forces in the Kingdom of Naples. After Austerlitz he sensibly retired to Sicily, where in March 1806 bad health obliged him to hand over to general John Stuart. On 29 August 1807 he became captain general and governor in chief of British North America, an office beset by factional rivalry within the Canadas and by a

growing American threat without. He improved the defenses of Upper and Lower Canada and, while his political activities met with mixed success, he laid the foundations for the French Canadian loyalty that helped to defeat the American invasion of 1812. Compelled to resign by his deteriorating health, he left North America in June 1811. Promoted full general on New Year's Day, he died in London on 12 January 1812.

SEE ALSO *Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Charleston Siege of 1780; Fanning, David; Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Leslie, Alexander; New Bern, North Carolina; Penobscot Expedition, Maine; Saratoga, First Battle of; St. Clair, Arthur; Ticonderoga Raid; Trois Rivières.*

revised by John Oliphant

CRAIK, JAMES. (1730–1814). Chief physician and surgeon of the Continental army. Scotland. Born near Dumfries, Scotland, James Craik was the illegitimate son of a member of the British Parliament. The family's gardener was the father of John Paul Jones. Craik studied medicine at Edinburgh and then joined the British Army, serving in the West Indies. In 1751 he quit the army and moved first to Norfolk and then Winchester, Virginia. He was physician at the fort of Winchester, and on 7 March 1754 he became the surgeon of Colonel John Fry's Regiment. The next year he was with General George Washington at Great Meadows, tended the mortally wounded Edward Braddock after the latter's defeat, and he became Washington's chief medical officer when the latter became commander in chief of the Virginia forces on 14 August 1755. Thereafter Craik was closely associated with Washington, accompanying him on a trip to the interior in 1770 and becoming senior medical officer in 1777 of the military district bounded by the Hudson and Potomac Rivers. He organized the hospitals for the comte de Rochambeau's expeditionary force, became chief hospital physician of the Continental Army on 6 October 1780, and chief physician and surgeon of the army on 3 March 1781. He warned Washington of the "Conway Cabal," naming Thomas Mifflin as a conspirator. Craik was present at the surrender at Yorktown and served in the army until 23 December 1783. That same year he helped to create the Society of the Cincinnati. He then moved to Alexandria, Virginia, to be near his friend Washington, accompanying him on his western journey in 1784. He returned to the army briefly as its physician-general on 19 July 1798 during the French war crisis. He attended Washington in the

latter's final illness, and is often blamed with hastening Washington's death. He died in Alexandria on 6 February 1814.

SEE ALSO *Conway Cabal; Washington, George.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

CRANE, JOHN. (1744–1805). Continental officer. Massachusetts. Born in Braintree, Massachusetts, on 7 December 1744, John Crane served in the Seven Years' War, enlisting to fill his father's place at the age of 15. After the war he became a housewright. He was one of Boston's Sons of Liberty and took part in the Boston Tea Party. During that action, a tea chest fell on Crane as he was working in the hold, knocking him unconscious. Believing he was dead, his companions nearly buried him, but he revived before they could complete the task and later recovered. The next year, 1774, he moved to Providence because business in Boston was at a standstill. As a captain in Richard Gridley's regiment of Massachusetts artillery he took part in the siege of Boston (3 May 1775). Meanwhile, he was active in skirmishes at the Neck (near Marblehead), and on 8 July he led a successful attack against an advance post. On 10 December 1775 he was named the first major in Henry Knox's Continental regiment. He was wounded in the foot on 14 September 1776 while shelling a man-of-war in the East River. On 1 January 1777 he was named a colonel in the Third Artillery. After raising this regiment he was mentioned for his service in John Sullivan's operations at Newport and in the defense of Fort Mifflin (Red Bank), New Jersey. On 17 June 1783 he took over from General Knox as the commander of the Continental artillery. On 30 September he was brevetted brigadier general, resigning on 3 November 1783. After the war he went into the lumber business, but failed at this enterprise. He moved to a 200-acre land grant at Whiting, Maine, which he had received in recognition of his war service. In 1790 he became a judge in the court of common pleas, holding that position until his death on 21 August 1805.

SEE ALSO *Knox, Henry.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CRAWFORD, WILLIAM. (1732–1782). Continental officer. Virginia and Pennsylvania. Born in what became Berkeley County, West Virginia, in the northern part of the Shenandoah Valley, William Crawford's long association with George Washington started when the latter came to the frontier in 1749 to survey the vast holdings of Lord Fairfax. Washington and Crawford, both surveyors and land speculators, became friends during their exploration of Virginia's western claims. They both volunteered to serve during General Edward Braddock's expedition against Fort Duquesne in 1755, Crawford being commissioned an ensign. He was promoted to captain of the Virginia volunteers, serving under Washington in the 1758 campaign led by General John Forbes.

BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

After the Seven Years' War ended, Crawford and Washington continued their land speculation in the western area claimed by Virginia and Pennsylvania. Following brief service in Pontiac's War, Crawford and his slaves built a cabin in 1765 at Stewart's Crossing (near modern Connellsville, Pennsylvania), about 35 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, and cleared nearly 400 acres. Joined by his wife and three children in the spring of 1766, Crawford established himself as an Indian trader, surveyor, and farmer. In 1770 Washington again visited Crawford, and from 13 October to 25 November the two men traveled extensively through the Ohio Valley, claiming prime tracts of land for their families. Washington referred to his lands, which totalled more than 40,000 acres as "the first choice" and "the cream of the country."

In May 1774, during Dunmore's War, Crawford was commissioned captain. On 8 May 1774 he wrote Washington that he was starting for Fort Pitt with 100 men, and on 20 September, having meanwhile been promoted to major and given command of 500 men, he wrote Washington that he was leaving that day from Fort Pitt with the first division of Virginia troops for a rendezvous with Dunmore's second division near the mouth of the Hocking River, where he had previously selected some fine bottom land for Washington. During the operations that followed, Crawford destroyed two of the three Mingo villages near the site of Steubenville. He built Fort Fincastle at Wheeling, rescued several white captives, and took fourteen Indians prisoner.

Crawford took both sides in the boundary dispute between Pennsylvania and Virginia. In 1770 he was appointed justice for what then was Cumberland County, Virginia, where his home was located. When Governor John Penn designated this region part of Bedford County, Pennsylvania, on 9 March 1771,

Crawford and Arthur St. Clair were among the local leaders who were appointed justices of the peace. Regarding Crawford, St. Clair wrote Governor Penn on 22 July 1774:

Captain Crawford, the president of our court, seems to be the most active Virginia officer in their service. He is now down the river at the head of a number of men, which is his second expedition. How is it possible for a man to serve two colonies in direct antagonism to each other at the same time? (Anderson, citing Washington–Irvine Corresp., p. 114)

THE REVOLUTION AND BEYOND

This border dispute was temporarily put aside with the advent of the Revolution, and Crawford became a prominent member of the Committee of Defense organized at Pittsburgh after a meeting on 16 May 1775. When Crawford offered his services to the Council of Safety in Philadelphia they were not accepted, but Virginia authorities welcomed his offer. He was appointed lieutenant colonel of the Fifth Virginia Regiment in early 1776. He quickly recruited troops, and on 11 October 1776 the Continental Congress appointed him colonel of the Seventh Virginia Regiment, backdating this commission to 14 August 1776.

Colonel Crawford, now in his mid-40s, led his regiment in the battles of Long Island, Trenton, and Princeton. During the Philadelphia campaign, Crawford commanded a detached company of scouts that saw action at the battles of Brandywine and Germantown, receiving praise from his fellow officers for his bravery. In November 1777 the Continental Congress asked that Washington send Crawford to serve under General Edward Hand at Pittsburgh as commander of regulars and militia in the Western Department. Crawford visited New York briefly to get instructions from Congress, then returned to the frontier. In the spring of 1778 he built Fort Crawford (so named by General Hand), and in May he took command of the new Virginia regiment that General Lachlan McIntosh had raised. McIntosh succeeded Hand in August 1778, and the next month Crawford's command included the troops at Fort Pitt, the militia raised on the frontier, and those from other parts of Virginia. Crawford was present at Fort Pitt when several Delaware leaders, including Captain Pipe (Hopocan, a Delaware chief), signed a peace treaty with the United States.

Meanwhile, Crawford had an important part in the establishment of Forts McIntosh and Laurens, and he commanded Fort Crawford. George Rogers Clark invited him to take part in his western operations of

1778, but Crawford did not feel he could leave his other duties and declined. When Forts Laurens and McIntosh were abandoned in August 1779, the Indians pushed their raids deeper into the white settlements of the Ohio country. Crawford led a number of small punitive expeditions in retaliation. In 1779 he also took part in Colonel Daniel Brodhead's expedition. The next year he visited Congress and succeeded in getting badly needed increases in appropriations for further western operations.

Crawford had long advocated an offensive against the Sandusky region, but it was not until 1782 that renewed Loyalist and Indian actions stirred the settlers and Congress into organizing such an expedition. Now 50 years old and the veteran of many battles with the Indians, Colonel Crawford quickly volunteered to serve, accepting command of a group of volunteers.

When the assembled U.S. forces met on the Ohio, Crawford was elected to command the expedition. Crawford's force of 468 men found only deserted villages as they moved through Indian country. Running short of supplies, Crawford had already decided to turn back when the Indians attacked. In what is known as Crawford's Defeat, 4–5 June 1782, the Americans were roundly defeated and retreated in a disorganized fashion under cover of night. Crawford and the expedition's surgeon, Dr. John Knight, became separated, eventually joining up with a few other stragglers. On 7 June the party was surprised by a body of Delawares. Crawford, for some reason, ordered his party not to fire. The others escaped, but Crawford and Knight were captured and taken about half a mile to the Indian camp, where they found John McKinley, formerly an officer of the 13th Virginia Regiment, and eight other prisoners. On 10 June the captives and their 17 guards started marching toward the town of the Wyandot chief Dunquat (also known as the Half-King), on the Upper Sandusky, 33 miles away. On the morning of 11 June, Captain William Caldwell, who had commanded in the action of 4–5 June, reached Half King's Town with the Delaware chiefs, Captain Pipe and Wingenund. The Christian Delawares of Gnadenhutten had been the victims of a brutal massacre at the hands of the Pennsylvania militia under Colonel David Williamson in March 1782. Many Delawares demanded retribution. Captain Pipe, who knew Crawford well, personally painted the prisoners black as a sign of his condemnation. On their way to the Delaware village on the Tymochtee Creek, the Indians killed all the prisoners except Crawford and Knight.

CRAWFORD'S DEATH

Crawford was tortured to death on 11 June 1782. Dr. Knight later published an eyewitness account of the

torture. According to Dr. Knight, Crawford was stripped and the two prisoners were beaten with sticks and fists. The colonel's hands were bound behind him and a rope was run from his wrists to the foot of a post, leaving enough slack for him to circle the post once or twice and return. Dr. Knight was bound and held a few yards away. Captain Pipe then made an inflammatory speech, referring to the Gnadenhutten massacre, after which the Indians fired at least 70 charges of powder into the naked prisoner's body. They then closed in on him and apparently cut off his ears, since Knight saw blood running down both sides of Crawford's head after the Indians cleared away. Three or four Indians at a time then ringed the post and prodded the captive with the burning ends of hickory poles, forcing him to move back and forth at the end of his rope. Indian women scooped up live coals and threw them in Crawford's path until the post was ringed with embers and bits of burning wood. At this point Crawford begged to be shot but was refused. Knight estimated that this phase of the torture lasted almost two hours before the victim fell face down in the embers. According to Knight, Crawford was then scalped, and the trophy was held to the doctor's face with the shout "Here is your great captain."

Knight either escaped or was allowed to escape a few days later. He wandered for three weeks before stumbling into Fort Pitt on 4 July. His story of Crawford's torture quickly became famous through the United States, arousing outrage and further hatred of the Indians.

SEE ALSO *Crawford's Defeat; Fort Laurens, Ohio; Fort McIntosh, Georgia; Western Operations.*

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CRAWFORD'S DEFEAT. 4–5 June 1782. William Crawford had long advocated an expedition to the Upper Sandusky region, where Loyalists and Indians

rallied for their raids against the Pennsylvania-Virginia frontier. After reluctantly agreeing to accept the leadership of this expedition—which he felt was about three years too late insofar as his personal participation was concerned—Colonel Crawford left his home on 18 May and rode to Fort Pitt for final instructions from General William Irvine. Irvine ordered Crawford to destroy the Wyandot and Shawnee towns “with fire and sword” in order to “give ease and safety to the inhabitants of this country.” At Mingo Bottom, about three miles below modern Steubenville, Ohio, Crawford assembled his forces. In the election of officers Crawford received 235 votes to become commander of the 480 volunteers. Major David Williamson, who received 230 votes, became second in command. Other field majors, in order of rank, were Thomas Gaddis, John McClelland, and a Major Brinton. The brigadier major was Daniel Leet. In addition to the guides—Thomas Nicholson, John Slover, and Jonathan Zane—Crawford recruited Dr. John Knight as surgeon, who left a valuable narrative of the expedition, as well as General Irvine’s aide-de-camp, Lieutenant John Rose (actually the Baron von Rosenthal, the only Russian to fight with the Americans during the Revolution); John Crawford, the colonel’s only son; Major William Harrison of the famous Virginia Harrisons, who was the colonel’s son-in-law; and William Crawford, his nephew.

Although Crawford planned his expedition well, he could not maintain its secrecy, because his men persisted in firing off their muskets without cause and contrary to repeated orders. They also tended to skip guard duty. Lieutenant Rose called this little army an “undaunted party of Clodhoppers,” and was confident that they were marching to disaster, shadowed by the Indians.

Crawford’s force moved quickly, covering the first 60 miles in four days, and they arrived at the abandoned Moravian settlements where the Gnadenhutzen Massacre had taken place less than a month earlier. By 3 June, when they camped near the site of modern Wyandot, Ohio, Crawford’s army was running short of supplies and morale plummeted. The next day they reached Sandusky Old Town, about three miles southeast of modern Upper Sandusky, and found that the Indian village was deserted. About three and a half miles northeast of Upper Sandusky, in a grove situated on high ground rising from the Sandusky Plain (a place later called Battle Island) the American scouts under the command of Lieutenant Rose made contact with a sizable enemy force.

The enemy was commanded by Captain William Caldwell of Butler’s Rangers, who had about 100 Rangers from Detroit and, initially, 200 Indians. The

Indian forces were led by Captain Pipe and Wingeneund of the Delawares, the Wyandot chief Zhaus-sho-toh, and Simon Girty, Alexander McKee, and Mathew Elliott.

A two-day skirmish took place, both sides keeping their distance and firing at long range. Crawford lost five killed and 19 wounded on the first day. Caldwell reported one Ranger, the interpreter Francis Le Vellier, and four Indians killed; and three Rangers (including himself, shot through both legs) and eight Indians wounded in the two-day action. On the afternoon of the second day the Americans realized why Caldwell had been holding back from a general engagement: he had been waiting for reinforcements. A detachment of Rangers arrived from Detroit with two field pieces (probably the light-weight, brass, three-pounders known as grasshoppers) and a mortar. About 140 Shawnees and several other Indians had also arrived and were working around the flanks and rear of Crawford’s forces. At about 9 P.M. the Indians started withdrawing, but this movement turned into a panic as small arms and artillery fire cut into them. Discipline collapsed as small units and individuals took off in several directions. Most of the Americans got through the encircling Indians, but some were cut off and annihilated. Major McClelland, leading the advance guard, was fatally wounded.

At about 2 P.M. the next day, 6 June, Crawford turned and made a stand about five miles from the site of modern Bucyrus, near Olentangy Creek. Lieutenant Rose reported a loss of three Americans killed and eight wounded in a one-hour action. Major Williamson led most of the volunteers safely to Mingo Bottom, where they arrived on 13 June. Crawford’s capture and horrible death were widely reported at the time. Dr. Knight, Major William Harrison, and young William Crawford were also captured and tortured to death.

SEE ALSO *Crawford, William; Gnadenhutzen Massacre, Ohio; Grasshopper; Irvine, William.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

CREEKS. The Creek, or Muscogee, Indians were one of the largest and most powerful Indian nations in eighteenth-century eastern North America, inhabiting an expansive region within the modern borders of the states of Georgia and Alabama. The majority of the Creeks either allied with Great Britain or tried to remain neutral during the American Revolution.

The Creeks were a confederation of various Native American communities that came together in the seventeenth century following the post-contact collapse of the Mississippian chiefdoms—notably the Coosa and the Alabama—that had dominated the North American southeast through the last phase of the prehistoric period. The villages of the Creek Confederacy retained a measure of ethnic diversity from the Mississippian period, but Creek communities had become increasingly united by the mid-eighteenth century. Still, individual Creek towns retained a good deal of political autonomy, and it was for this reason that Creek loyalties during the American Revolution were generally divided.

Geographically, the Creek Confederacy was divided between the Upper Creeks and Lower Creeks. The towns of the Upper Creeks lay inside modern Alabama along the Alabama River and its forks, the Coosa and Tallapoosa. The Lower Creeks existed primarily along the Chattahoochee River, within both modern Georgia and Alabama.

Like many Native peoples of the Eastern Woodlands, the Creeks subsisted through a combination of agriculture, hunting, and fishing. Generally, Creek subsistence labor was divided along gendered lines, with men hunting and fishing and women engaged in agriculture. The Creeks traded deerskins with various European agents for a variety of trade goods, including textiles, firearms, metal goods, and liquor. From the midpoint of the Seven Years' War, the Creeks' trading relationships were directed by John Stuart, the British Indian Superintendent for the southern colonies. Stuart brought the Creeks—and all of the Indian peoples of the Southeast—into formal alliance with Britain at the Treaty of Augusta (1763). Under Stuart's direction, an increasing number of British traders came to reside in the Creek country. Many British traders intermarried with the Creeks, producing a generation of mixed Creek-British offspring. Among the most famous of these traders was Scot Lachlan McGillivray, whose son, Alexander McGillivray, became wealthy from his father's position in the Creek-British trade and garnered prestige through his mother's clan status to become one of the Creeks' most powerful leaders. By the early 1780s, McGillivray had succeeded Emistesigo as the principal war chief of the Creek nation. Both Emistesigo and McGillivray persuaded most Creek

villages to remain allied with British during the American Revolution.

However, the American Revolution weakened the monopoly of political and commercial power the British had built within the Creek nation under John Stuart's direction. From New Orleans, Spanish forces under Bernardo de Gálvez invaded the Floridas and took the ports of Mobile (1780) and Pensacola (1781). Many Creek towns began to trade with the Spanish rather than the British. At the end of the American Revolution, the Floridas passed back into Spanish control. The majority of the Creeks now traded with British mercantile firms that were granted licenses by the Spanish government. At the same time, Revolutionary leaders in Georgia and South Carolina cultivated relations with several Creek towns. The leaders of two Creek towns, Hoboithle Micco and Neha Micco, signed land cession treaties with the state of Georgia in 1783, 1785, and 1786. In 1790 Alexander McGillivray himself signed the Treaty of New York with the United States. The Creek nation's leadership looked to the new federal government to help it resist encroachments by settlers from Georgia.

Although tied by trading relationships to the British exclusively before the American Revolution, the Creek nation adapted to the changing geopolitical realities brought about by the war and its aftermath. In subsequent years, though, the Creeks fared less well under the United States. Creek warriors known as the Red Sticks were defeated by General Andrew Jackson during the War of 1812 (at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend in 1814). And although many Creeks continued to live within Alabama and Georgia after the War of 1812, they lost more and more lands to the U.S. government and were forcibly removed to Oklahoma in 1836. The sovereign Muscogee (Creek) Nation has continued to exist into the twenty-first century within the state of Oklahoma, spanning eleven counties, with its Council House in the town of Okmulgee.

SEE ALSO *McGillivray, Alexander; Stuart, John.*

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Leonard J. Sadosky

CRESAP, MICHAEL. (1742–1775). Border leader and Continental officer. Maryland. Born in Old Town, Maryland, on 29 June 1742, Michael Cresap was the son of the famous pioneer, Thomas Cresap (c. 1702–c. 1790). Michael failed as a merchant, and in early 1774 moved west to Wheeling. Almost as soon as he arrived, in April 1774, he heard rumors of Indian wars breaking out to the north. Panicking, Cresap and his neighbors attacked, killed, and scalped two Indians who were working for a local merchant. They then killed some passing Shawnee. Logan, a Mingo chief, blamed this group for massacring his family, leading many to hold Cresap responsible for starting Dunmore's War. Although Logan's accusation has been discredited, it has nonetheless given Cresap a place in history. The actual murderer of Logan's family was a man named Jacob Greathouse.

After his two attacks on unsuspecting Indians, Cresap fled back to Old Town, returning with a large group of settlers after Dunmore had restored peace to the frontier. With the beginning of the Revolution, Cresap was named captain of the First Company of the Maryland Rifles. He marched his company 550 miles in 22 days to become the first southern unit to join General George Washington's forces surrounding Boston. Two months later (about 15 October) he was forced by illness to give up his command, and on 17 October 1775 he died in New York City.

SEE ALSO *Dunmore's (or Cresap's) War*; *Logan*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

CRESAP'S WAR. Alternate name for Dunmore's War, 1774.

SEE ALSO *Dunmore's (or Cresap's) War*.

CRITICAL TERRAIN. An esoteric term used by modern students of tactics and strategy, it is applied to

any natural or man-made feature whose control would give either opponent a marked advantage. In many instances, critical terrain is immediately apparent, as at Kings Bridge, New York. Less obvious features, however, were Dorchester Heights in Boston, Mount Defiance at Ticonderoga in July 1777, and the ford (or bridge) at Bennington.

SEE ALSO *Dorchester Heights, Massachusetts*; *Kings Bridge, New York*; *Ticonderoga, New York, American Capture of*.

Mark M. Boatner

CROMOT DU BOURG, MARIE FRANÇOIS JOSEPH MAXIME, BARON DE. (1756–1836). French officer. Born at Versailles, he volunteered in 1768 for the Regiment of Dragoons of La Rochefoucauld. He received the rank of Second Lieutenant in the dragoons of the comte de Provence (later Louis XVIII) in 1770. He received command of a company in 1774. He was Rochambeau's aide from 26 March to 18 November 1781 and left a valuable journal of the campaign.

In 1783 Bourg was promoted to major on the general staff of the army and later to lieutenant colonel (1787) and colonel (1788). He resigned his command on 18 October 1790 and joined the emigré army, serving as aide-de-camp to the comte de Provence from 1792 to 1796. In 1815 the former comte, now King Louis XVIII, gave him the honorary rank of *maréchal de camp* with a pension.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

CROMPO HILL SEE *Compo Hill*.

CROOKED BILLET, PENNSYLVANIA. 1 May 1778. When the British occupied winter quarters in Philadelphia, Washington set up a cordon of detachments around the city in an attempt to restrict the flow of supplies to the enemy. One of those outposts was at Crooked Billet

in the central part of Bucks County, north-northeast of Philadelphia. Brigadier General John Lacey (a former Continental Army captain) had responsibility for the sector in the spring of 1778 with a military force that fluctuated wildly from week to week but that in late April probably amounted to less than a hundred men. Major John Graves Simcoe worked with Lieutenant Colonel Nisbet Balfour (General Howe's aide charged with intelligence activities) to develop a plan to hit the militia while they were vulnerable as a new rotation of men came into camp. On 30 April Simcoe set out on a twenty-five-mile march with the Queen's Rangers to take Crooked Billet from the rear while a large light infantry force (partly mounted) under Lieutenant Colonel Robert Abercromby set up near Horsham Meeting House. They intended to push any survivors of Simcoe's dawn attack into Abercromby's ambush. Fortunately for Lacey, the two British elements failed to time the attack properly, and an alert militia sentry gave the warning before the trap was sprung. Lacey withdrew through some woods, and his men broke into small parties, most getting away although losing their baggage. Simcoe claimed that he killed fifty or sixty at the cost of a few wounded; Lacey reported about half as many casualties.

SEE ALSO *Abercromby, Sir Robert; Balfour, Nisbet; Simcoe, John Graves.*

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CROSSWICKS, NEW JERSEY. Eight miles southeast of Trenton and three and a half miles east of Bordentown, this town figured slightly in the Battle of Trenton in December 1776 and the Monmouth campaign of June 1777, as opposing forces moved through the town. An action took place on 23 June 1778 at a point on Crosswicks Creek, four miles from Trenton, where the British encountered difficulty in rebuilding a drawbridge. The horse of Elias Dayton of the Third New Jersey was killed there.

SEE ALSO *Dayton, Elias; Trenton, New Jersey.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CROTON RIVER, NEW YORK. 14 May 1781. Advancing through the "Neutral Ground" from

their base in southern Westchester County under cover of darkness, the Third Battalion of James De Lancey's Brigade of Loyalists crossed the Croton River. Near sunrise, they surprised an outpost of the Rhode Island Regiment just after the night sentries had come back to quarters. Washington's standing instructions to the forces manning these forward lines stressed that they were never to remain in the same camp two nights in a row because Loyalist sympathizers could pass detailed information to the British very quickly. Colonel Christopher Greene, a brave and otherwise competent officer, ignored the rules and paid for it with his life. Major Ebenezer Flagg and about a dozen others were killed and about thirty captured. The Loyalists appear to have suffered insignificant losses. The fight's military significance is minor, but public opinion was inflamed by allegations that Greene's body was mutilated.

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CROWN POINT, NEW YORK. About a dozen miles north of Ticonderoga on the west shore of Lake Champlain, Crown Point was the scene of a battle between the French explorer Samuel de Champlain and the Iroquois in 1609 that marked the beginning of a century and a half of hostility. In 1735 the French began constructing Fort St. Frédéric as a permanent stone fortification and completed the main works about 1740. It replaced a temporary post established four years earlier on the east shore at Pointe de la Chevelure (later called Chimney Point). A colonial expedition in 1755 was stopped short of the point, and in response the French constructed the much larger Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga), which blocked other English expeditions until 1759. That year General Jeffery Amherst forced the French to evacuate both positions and blow up the works. He then set about building a new fort two hundred yards south of the site of Fort Frédéric that was three times the size of Ticonderoga; but with the peace of 1763 it had only a caretaker garrison. During a fire in April 1773 the magazine exploded, causing extensive damage, and the British moved most of the men and guns to Ticonderoga.

On 12 May 1775 Ethan Allen sent an expedition under Seth Warner, his second-in-command, to capture Crown Point. The nine enlisted soldiers (and their ten dependents) promptly surrendered. It became a logistical staging point during the American invasion of Canada and a forward base for Guy Carleton's counteroffensive in October and November of 1776.

In late June 1777 the forces of Burgoyne's offensive moved through Crown Point on their way south but never made it a significant base. In October, after Burgoyne's surrender, the detachment fell back to St. John's as part of the evacuation of the entire Lake Champlain–Lake George lines of communications. For the rest of the war it was visited only by patrols.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne's Offensive; Canada Invasion; Ticonderoga, New York, British Capture of.*

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CROWSFEET. Properly known as caltrops, crowsfeet are small metal spikes cast so that their four points form a tetrahedron. According to Captain George Smith's *Military Dictionary*, a caltrop is "a piece of iron having four points, all disposed in a triangular form, so that three of them always rest upon the ground and the fourth stands upwards in a perpendicular direction. Each point is three or four inches long." Dropped at random, their shape ensures that they will always have one point straight up. They are of ancient origin, developed to be scattered in the path of cavalry. In modern war, they can still be used as a passive device to puncture pneumatic tires. When the British evacuated Boston by sea in 1776 they sprinkled caltrops of a different design on the last mile of the road from Roxbury into the city to slow the American advance. According to James Thacher, "the implement consists of an iron ball armed with four sharp points about one inch in length, so formed that which way soever it may fall one point still lies upwards to pierce the feet of horses or men."

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

CRUGER, JOHN HARRIS. (1738–1807). Tory officer. New York scion of the Cruger family. Like his father before him, he was a member of the New York

city council. He later became its mayor and by the start of the Revolution was its chamberlain. A son-in-law of Oliver De Lancey (the elder), he was given command of one of the Loyalist battalions raised by him and went south with the expedition of Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell that captured Savannah, 29 December 1778. It was the First Battalion that Cruger commanded. Posted at Fort Sunbury, he was recalled to take part in the defense of Savannah on 9 October 1779, where he held a redoubt on the southern side of the perimeter against the poorly managed secondary attack of General Isaac Huger. He is mentioned several times in this article on Savannah and is quoted on the low caliber of American troops engaged. Captured at Belfast, Georgia, in June 1780, he was soon exchanged for John ("Come and Take It") McIntosh. He then succeeded Nisbet Balfour around mid-August as commander of the Tory stronghold at Ninety-Six, and led the relief column from this place that relieved the siege of Augusta, 14–18 Sept. 1780.

He then distinguished himself in commanding the defense of Ninety Six, 22 May–19 June 1781, the operation for which he was justly praised for his vigilance and gallantry by Clinton. Joining the main British army in the South, he was commended for his conduct and gallantry at Eutaw Springs, 8 September 1781. Speaking of the defenses of Charleston as organized the end of 1781, Baurmeister reported that "Colonel Cruger and 350 men are posted at the Stono; Colonel Stewart is in command of six battalions of British and provincials posted . . . across the narrowest part of the Neck." This assignment of Cruger, a Provincial officer, to one of the two defensive sectors is evidence of the high regard the British commander had for him and his troops.

Cruger's property having been confiscated, he went to England after the war and died in London.

SEE ALSO *Augusta, Georgia (14–18 September 1780); Eutaw Springs, South Carolina; Ninety Six, South Carolina (22 May–19 June 1781); Savannah, Georgia (29 December 1778); Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779).*

Robert M. Calhoon

CULLODEN MOOR, SCOTLAND.

16 April 1746. In a bloody defeat at the hands of William, duke of Cumberland, the forces of the Young Pretender (Charles Edward) were destroyed. This ended The 1745, or the Second Jacobite Rebellion. Hundreds of Highlanders sought refuge in North Carolina, and many established themselves around Cross Creek (later

Fayetteville). There is reason to believe that the oath to the crown taken after Culloden is what kept so many of these refugees loyal during the American Revolution. Culloden was repeated on a minor scale at Moores Creek Bridge in North Carolina on 27 February 1776 and at Kettle Creek, Georgia, on 14 February 1779.

SEE ALSO *Kettle Creek, Georgia; Moores Creek Bridge.*

Mark M. Boatner

CUNNINGHAM, "BLOODY BILL."

(c. 1748–c. 1787). Loyalist partisan. Born in South Carolina, Cunningham enlisted in the Patriot militia in 1775 but was court-martialed and whipped. Changing sides, he raised a company of Loyalist cavalry that became known as the Bloody Scout, operating in Georgia and the Carolinas. He gained notoriety for his personal ferocity in a number of skirmishes, although his unit did not take part in any major military encounters. It is thought that he settled in Charleston after the war, where he apparently died in 1787.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CUNNINGHAM, GUSTAVUS SEE *Conyngham Gustavus.*

CUNNINGHAM, ROBERT. (1739–1813). Loyalist leader. Ireland. Settling near Ninety Six, South Carolina, in 1769, Robert Cunningham became a judge. He opposed the Revolutionary movement, and in 1775 he was imprisoned in Charleston. After his release he raised Loyalist militias and joined the British forces in 1780. Made a brigadier general of Loyalist forces and given command of the garrison at Charleston, Cunningham took part in Hammond's Store Raid, but saw little other action. The South Carolina legislature confiscated his estate in 1782 and refused him permission to remain in the state. Given a generous allowance by the British government, Cunningham settled at Nassau, where he died on 9 February 1813.

SEE ALSO *Hammonds Store Raid of William Washington.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM. (1738?–1799?). British provost marshal. Ireland. Little is known of Cunningham prior to his arrival in New York City in 1774. For a while, he was engaged in breaking horses and giving riding lessons. On 6 March 1775 he was beaten at a public meeting for offering a blessing in the name of King George III. Forced to take refuge in Boston, he was made provost marshal with the rank of captain by General Thomas Gage. Responsible for disciplining troops and taking care of prisoners of war, Cunningham became notorious on both sides in the Revolution for his cruelty and brutality. In 1778 he had charge of the prisons in Philadelphia, and later those in New York City. Cunningham was accused of withholding food from prisoners to the point of starvation, and of beating prisoners to death. It is certain that hundreds of American prisoners of war died because of their ill treatment at his hands. The publication of Ethan Allen's popular *Narrative of Colonel Ethan Allen's Captivity* in 1779 made Cunningham notorious throughout America. Little is known of his later life, but there was a long-standing rumor (no longer believed to be credible) that he was hanged in London on 10 August 1791 for a charge of forgery. There is some evidence that he was still alive in 1799 and running a prison in Gloucester.

SEE ALSO *Allen, Ethan.*

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CURRENCY SEE *Continental Currency; Currency Act; Money in the Eighteenth Century.*

CURRENCY ACT OF 1764. 19 April 1764. One of a set of measures designed by George Grenville to tighten Britain's control over the empire, the Currency Act prohibited all colonies from issuing any paper money as legal tender and from extending the time period over which their outstanding paper money would be paid off and retired. Intended primarily to prevent the colonies from paying debts in Britain with depreciated paper money, the act also created a shortage of paper money, which had been the principal form of circulating currency in the colonies, at a time when the Sugar Act, another of Grenville's measures, cut off the supply of specie formerly

acquired in trade with the West Indies. Parliament later tried to ameliorate some of these negative consequences by allowing colonies south of New England to issue a limited amount of paper money. This compromise was too late to assuage colonial anger against the imperial government.

SEE ALSO *Grenville Acts; Grenville, George; Stamp Act; Sugar Act.*

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revised by *Harold E. Selesky*

CURRYTOWN, NEW YORK. 9 July 1781. About noon several hundred Tories and Indians under John Doxtader surprised this small settlement eleven miles southeast of Fort Plain (part of Canajoharie). Although he burned a dozen houses, most of the inhabitants successfully took refuge in a fortified house (“Fort Lewis”) and repulsed the attack. Colonel Marinus Willett reacted promptly and defeated Doxtader the next day at Sharon Springs Swamp.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Sharon Springs Swamp, New York; Willett, Marinus.*

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CUSTOMS COMMISSIONERS. The Navigation Act of 1673 established customs commissioners in the American colonies. Under the jurisdiction of the Treasury Board (not the Board of Trade), they supervised the activities of collectors, searchers, and surveyors of customs. The chief customs commissioners held their posts as sinecures, living in England and delegating the collection of customs to poorly paid agents in the colonies, who made mutually beneficial arrangements with local merchants. The imperial government did not closely monitor the customs system before the final French and Indian war (1759–1760), preferring to accommodate

interests and promote trade rather than strictly enforce the Navigation Acts. This policy came to be known informally as “salutary neglect.”

Anger at the extent of colonial evasion of customs duties, which was highlighted during the war, and the post-war need to raise revenue in North America led to a re-invigoration of the system by means of the Townshend Acts of 1767. It has been estimated that, before 1767, goods worth £700,000 a year were smuggled into the colonies. In contrast, about £2,000 worth of duties were collected on the goods that were legally imported, at a cost of collection amounting to more than £8,000 a year. The Townshend Acts did result in greater revenue—between 1768 and 1774 the American customs brought in an average of £30,000 a year at an annual cost of £13,000—but in addition to generating resentment among merchants, this policy exposed the entire arrangement of colonial dependency on the mother country to charges of corruption.

The central element in the revised system was a new, five-man American Board of Commissioners of the Customs, established at Boston in November 1767. The board was directly responsible to the Treasury Board, but had authority to rule without consulting it. Oliver M. Dickerson called the activities of the commissioners “customs racketeering,” and Edmund S. Morgan agreed that “they richly deserve the epithet.” Morgan described the corrupt practices thus:

[The commissioners] were a rapacious band of bureaucrats who brought to their task an irrepressible greed and a vindictive malice that could not fail to aggravate the antagonism not only against themselves but also against the Parliament that sent them. . . . In the complicated provisions of the Sugar Act it was easy to find technicalities on the basis of which a ship could be seized. The commissioners used these technicalities in a deliberately capricious manner to trap colonial merchants. Their favorite method was to follow a lax procedure for a time and then, suddenly shifting to a strict one, seize all vessels that were following the practice hitherto had been allowed. By playing fast and loose with the law in this way, they could catch the merchants unawares and bring in fabulous sums. (Morgan, pp. 37–38)

The offending vessel and cargo were sold. One third of the proceeds went to the British treasury, a third to the governor of the colony, and a third to the customs officers who made the seizure. The practice of the customs commissioners provoked the *Liberty* Affair on 10 June 1768, in which a sloop owned by John Hancock, presuming the lax procedures were in effect, attempted to land at Boston without declaring the totality of its cargo. When the customs agent refused, violence erupted, and the ship was ultimately seized. One of the warships sent to support

them was involved in the *Gaspée* Affair, in which the armed revenue schooner *Gaspée* was burned to the waterline by angry American colonists. The actions of the customs commissioners contributed significantly to the colonists' sense that the imperial government was engaged in a conspiracy against their liberty.

SEE ALSO *Gaspée Affair; Liberty Affair; Townshend Acts; Trade, The Board of.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

D

DALLING, JOHN. (c. 1731–1798). British general and governor of Jamaica. John Dalling was born in Suffolk around 1731 and entered the army in 1747. A major in the Twenty-eighth Foot by 1757, he served under John Campbell Loudoun at Louisburg in 1758 and Quebec in 1759. Taking command of the Forty-third Regiment in 1761, he fought in the West Indies and at the capture of Havana in 1762. He was then posted to Jamaica, where he was made lieutenant governor in about 1768. Upon Sir Basil Keith's death in August 1777, Dalling was promoted major general and confirmed as governor. In 1779 a successful expedition to the Bay of Honduras tempted him to conquer a route to the Pacific via Lake Nicaragua in 1780. Although this expedition was ruined by disease, Dalling persisted in feeding in reinforcements, most of whom died. He was unable to save Mobile in March 1780 and Pensacola in May 1781, partly for lack of transports. Dismissed by the end of the year, he never held another independent command, though he rose to general in 1796. He died at Clifton, near Bristol, on 16 January 1798.

SEE ALSO *Honduras; Jamaica (West Indies); Mobile; Pensacola, Florida.*

revised by John Oliphant

DALRYMPLE, JOHN. (1749–1821). British officer. Born in Edinburgh on 24 September 1749, John Dalrymple was the eldest son of the fifth Earl of Stair.

Made a captain in the 87th Regiment, which was raised in July 1779, Dalrymple served with distinction under Benedict Arnold in the New London raid of 6 September 1781. He was sent to London with dispatches by General Henry Clinton shortly thereafter. On 5 January 1782 he was appointed minister plenipotentiary to Poland. During the period 5 August 1785 to 1788 he held the same post in Berlin. In 1789 he succeeded his father to the peerage as the sixth earl of Stair and died in London on 1 June 1821.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

DALRYMPLE, WILLIAM. (?–1807). British general. Garrison commander at Halifax with the Fourteenth Foot, Lieutenant Colonel Dalrymple was ordered south to occupy Boston in 1768. Arriving on 1 October with the Fourteenth and Twenty-ninth Foot, he remained in command in the city until 1772, when he was relieved by Alexander Leslie and the Sixty-fourth. His task was a thankless one, the soldiers having no police powers without the consent of the local magistrates, consent that was not forthcoming. The tension reached a climax in the incident on 5 March 1770 that was quickly inflated into the so-called Boston Massacre. Though the “massacre” was followed by a shocked reaction against the radical mob, Boston remained an unpleasant posting long after Dalrymple's departure.

During the New York campaign he was in command of Howe's fortified base on Staten Island. At the end of the

year, his regiment was broken up and used as drafts for other units, while Dalrymple himself left with Cornwallis for Britain. He may have commanded the Seventy-ninth when it was raised in Liverpool and sent to Jamaica in 1778. Later in the year he took Germain's dispatches from London to Clinton in Charleston, arriving as a brigadier general on 10 May 1780. Clinton promptly made him quartermaster general with the local rank of major general in succession to Cathcart, Erskine's temporary replacement. In the autumn, Clinton sent him back to Germain with an oral ultimatum: unless Arbuthnot was recalled, he (Clinton) would resign. Dalrymple returned to Clinton in New York in 1781 without clear answer from Germain, and he took part in the councils of war during the Yorktown campaign. He became a major general on the regular establishment in November 1782 and later rose to full general. Despite his high rank, his role in the war was minor.

SEE ALSO *Leslie, Alexander*.

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revised by John Oliphant

DANBURY RAID, CONNECTICUT.

23–28 April 1777. After the successful Peekskill raid, in New York on 23 March 1777, General Howe sent Major General William Tryon (the royal governor of New York) to destroy the more important rebel depot at Danbury. The 2,000-man force was composed of the 4th, 5th, 23d, 27th, 44th, and 64th Foot; 300 men of the newly formed Prince of Wales's Volunteers (Loyalists); a dozen light dragoons; and six artillery pieces. Generals James Agnew and William Erskine accompanied Tryon. Escorted by two sloops of war, the expedition left New York on 23 April and landed near Norwalk, Connecticut, on the evening of the 25th. The next day they marched 23 miles unopposed and started burning Danbury at 3 P.M. The 150 Continentals stationed in the area had removed a small quantity of stores, but by the next morning the British had destroyed 19 dwellings and 22 barns and storehouses, together with provisions, clothing, and almost 1,700 tents.

Militia meanwhile assembled under Brigadier General Gold S. Silliman and started forward to harass the British as they withdrew. Continental Generals Benedict Arnold and David Wooster joined the pursuit

with still more men at Redding, and the hunt was on. About 11 A.M. on the 27th, serious attacks began as the retreating column started slowing down because of rain. As in the retreat from Concord, the return trip to the safety of the ships in Long Island Sound became a living hell. Arnold maneuvered around to try blocking Tryon's van, while Wooster pressed against the rear until falling mortally wounded on the 28th. Wisely observing the principle of returning by a different route, the British withdrew through Ridgefield, where they halted for a few hours' rest around midnight.

Arnold and Silliman, meanwhile, had established a barricade astride the narrow road at Saugatuck Bridge. By the time Tryon approached in the rain in midmorning, the blocking force of five hundred men included three field pieces from Lamb's Second Continental Artillery Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Eleazer Oswald, while five hundred more men, now under Colonel Huntington, pressed against the rear guard. When his column drew fire, Tryon sent detachments out to envelop both enemy flanks, and Agnew brought enfilade fire to bear on the barricade from the American left. The fighting became general about 11 A.M. It took nearly an hour before the sheer weight of numbers pushed the Americans back. Arnold ordered a withdrawal, and he himself was fired on at a range of thirty yards by an enemy platoon that cut the road behind him. When his horse was killed under him, Arnold managed to escape after shooting a Tory who rushed forward demanding his surrender.

The Americans tried a second time to block the retreat, but a Loyalist guided Tryon's column to Compo Hill, where it could set up a secure perimeter. Erskine led four hundred men in a successful "spoiling attack" that enabled the raiders to embark in safety. Alexander McDougall was actually on the way from Peekskill with a strong Continental force to complete Tryon's destruction when he learned of the embarkation.

Although the Connecticut militia failed to prevent the raid, no one except later historians expected them to be able to stop such a strong column. More to the point, the citizen-soldiers, stiffened by some Continentals and under charismatic leaders, came close to annihilating the raiders after the damage to Danbury had been done.

The British in fact learned their lesson. While the raid was annoying, the material destroyed did not justify their losses nor was it worth the risk. This raid was the last the British attempted during the war against a target so far inland. As long as Washington kept his depots out of the reach of amphibious raids, he knew that the militia and the states' local defense troops could provide adequate security. Danbury provided him with convincing proof to cite to politicians when arguing that he needed to keep the Continentals concentrated.

Tryon and his officers deserve great credit for avoiding another Lexington and Concord. Arnold and Wooster showed splendid leadership, as did Colonel John Lamb, whose three guns made a valiant attempt to break up Erskine's bayonet attack. Congress finally recognized Arnold's service and made him a major general within a week (later predating his commission to give him seniority over the five officers promoted over his head; on 20 May, Congress gave him a horse, "properly caparisoned . . . as a token of their approbation of his gallant conduct . . . in which General Arnold had one horse killed under him and another wounded" (Heitman, *Historical Register of Officers* . . .).

American casualties were probably about 80 (not the 400 claimed by the British). Wooster died; this was the second (of three) times that Arnold would be shot in the same leg. Howe officially reported losses of 26 killed, 116 wounded, and 29 missing—about a 10 percent loss rate.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Peekskill Raid, New York; Tryon, William; Wooster, David.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

"DARK AND BLOODY GROUND."

The region that became the states of Kentucky, West Virginia, and Ohio was known by this lugubrious name even before the Indians started fighting back the encroachment of white settlers. Called "dark" probably because of its heavy forests, it was a favorite hunting territory of several native peoples, including the Delawares, Shawnees, Hurons, and Miamis. This region became bloodier when British-American settlers and U.S. forces invaded the Indians' territory.

SEE ALSO *Western Operations.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

DARTMOUTH, WILLIAM LEGGE, EARL OF.

(1731–1801). William Legge, second earl of Dartmouth, was a politician who served as president of the Board of Trade and secretary of state for the colonies. His father having died soon after he was born, he succeeded to the earldom in 1750; consequently he never sat in the House of Commons. Legge grew up with his stepbrother Frederick North, the future prime minister, and they remained lifelong friends. But for a long time Legge seemed more interested in evangelical religion than in politics. By 1757 he and his wife were committed supporters of the Methodists John and Charles Wesley, George Whitefield, and the Countess of Huntingdon (Selina Hastings). Only in 1765 did he accept office as president of the Board of Trade under Rockingham. Confronted with the consequences of the Stamp Act (of which he disapproved), he quickly decided that although Parliament was supreme, colonial grievances could and should be accommodated. Thus he strongly approved of both the repeal of the Stamp Act and of coupling it with the Declaratory Act affirming Parliament's right to tax.

Legge resigned after the Rockingham ministry collapsed in 1766 and returned to his religious preoccupations. During this time he was a supporter of Moor's Charity School, founded by Eleazar Wheelock around 1750 in Connecticut mainly for the education of Indians; the school relocated to New Hampshire and was renamed Dartmouth College in his honor in 1769. He used his patronage to secure ordination and preferment for John Newton and to support other evangelicals. In 1767, when a politician would have been preoccupied with the Townshend Duties, Dartmouth was more concerned with whether he should succeed the ailing Countess of Huntingdon in her religious role.

In January 1771 he refused North's first offer of a cabinet post, but by the following year the prime minister was looking around for a secretary of state who would cause less division in the cabinet than did the incumbent, the earl of Hillsborough. He also wanted someone whom the Americans would find acceptable. With Benjamin Franklin's recommendation in hand, North at last persuaded Dartmouth to accept the post in the summer of 1772.

Dartmouth inherited three problems from his predecessor: resolution of the *Gaspée* affair; the extent and rate of western expansion; and the issue of representative government in Quebec. He never really came to grips with the first two, and he did not bring the Quebec Bill before parliament until 2 May 1774, almost five months after news of the Boston Tea Party had reached London.

Dartmouth's reaction was predictable: the colonists must pay the legally imposed tea duty. He supported the four coercive laws of 2 June 1774, although he did not initiate them. By an unfortunate association of timing, the Quebec Act (22 June) became associated with these laws as the Intolerable Acts. Yet he did not believe that the underlying differences were beyond reconciliation. He forwarded Franklin's idea of a commission to negotiate with American delegates but was humiliated when George III proved to be downright hostile; within the cabinet even North was lukewarm at best. Fighting began in April 1775, and in November he resigned to become Lord Privy Seal. Although he remained in office until 1782, he took no part in policy making. He died at Blackheath on 15 July 1801 and was buried in Holy Trinity Minorities on 3 August.

Dartmouth was universally admired for his integrity and lack of personal ambition. But, as contemporaries on both sides of the Atlantic observed, he was ill-suited to practical policy making and to the rough and tumble of professional politics. His very virtues prevented him from seeing when compromise had become impossible. He was certainly not the man to direct operations in the War of American Independence.

SEE ALSO *Gaspée Affair; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; North, Sir Frederick; Rockingham, Charles Watson-Wentworth, Second Marquess of; Townshend Acts.*

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revised by John Oliphant

DATES BEFORE 1752 *SEE Calendars, Old and New Style.*

DAVIDSON, GEORGE. (c. 1748–1815). Continental and militia officer. North Carolina. A captain in the First North Carolina Regiment starting 1 September 1775, he resigned on 5 February 1777 and became a major of militia, seeing action at Ramseur's Mill and Wahab's Plantation in 1780.

SEE ALSO *Wahab's Plantation, North Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

DAVIDSON, WILLIAM LEE. (1746?–1781). Militia general. North Carolina. Born in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, probably in 1746, Davidson's family moved to Rowan County, North Carolina, in 1748. After serving on the county Committee of Safety from 1774 to 1776, he served with the militia in the operations against Loyalists in South Carolina. Appointed major of the Fourth North Carolina Regiment on 15 April 1776, he went north under Colonel Francis Nash to take part in the New Jersey campaign. For gallant conduct in the battle of Germantown on 4 October 1777, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Fifth North Carolina Regiment, with which he endured the winter at Valley Forge. On 1 June 1778 he was transferred to the Third North Carolina Regiment, and on 9 June 1779 to the First North Carolina Regiment. In November 1779 the North Carolina Continentals were sent to the Southern theater of war. Having stopped to visit his family, he arrived too late to join his regiment in the Charleston defenses and therefore avoided becoming a prisoner of war when General Benjamin Lincoln surrendered.

Having lost his regiment, Davidson was given command of a battalion of 300 light infantry in the Patriot force rallied by Governor (General) Griffith Rutherford for the operation that ended with the Loyalist defeat at Ramseur's Mill, North Carolina, 20 June 1780. Davidson proved effective in harassing British forces. In the summer of 1780 he was severely wounded in an engagement with Loyalists near Colson's Mill, on the Yadkin River; a musket ball passed through his body and he was out of action for eight weeks. With the capture of General Rutherford at Camden in August, Davidson was promoted to brigadier general of the state troops and given command of the Salisbury district.

Two weeks after arriving to take command of the Southern theater of operations, General Nathanael Greene ordered Daniel Morgan to march south from Charlotte and join the North Carolina militia led by Davidson for operations between the Broad and Pacolet Rivers. Around 25 December 1780, Davidson joined Morgan in his camp on the Pacolet, bringing with him 150 men. Two weeks later, on 31 January 1781, he was directed by Greene to rally the unenthusiastic North Carolina militia for service in guarding the fords of the Catawba after the withdrawal of the main army. He went off on a recruiting drive and thus did not see action at the battle of Cowpens (17 January 1781). Davidson was killed at Cowans Ford on 1 February 1781, while engaged on his recruiting mission, and with him died Greene's hope of militia assistance.

SEE ALSO *Cowans Ford, North Carolina; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

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DAVIE, WILLIAM RICHARDSON.

(1756–1820). Patriot officer, commissary general of the Southern army under General Nathanael Greene, governor of North Carolina. Born in Egremont, England, on 20 June 1756, Davie was taken by his father to the Waxhaws settlement in South Carolina in 1763 to be adopted by his maternal uncle, William Richardson, a Presbyterian clergyman. In 1776 Davie graduated from Princeton with first honors, and settled in Salisbury, North Carolina, to study law. He served in the militia for three months under General Allen Jones in 1777 and 1778. In 1779, as a captain of militia, he led operations against the Loyalists in North Carolina. Promoted to major, he raised a troop of cavalry and joined General Casimir Pulaski's division. He was seriously wounded at Stono Ferry, South Carolina, on 20 June 1779. Early the next year, after a slow recovery, he raised another troop of cavalry and operated north of Waxhaws Creek, sometimes with Thomas Sumter, in the bloody partisan warfare that followed the surrender of Charleston. He particularly distinguished himself at Hanging Rock during the engagement there on 6 August 1780. After this he received a promotion to colonel. After the Patriot defeat at Camden he is credited with using his little command, in contradiction to the orders of General Horatio Gates, to save valuable supplies. He scored a bold success at Wahab's Plantation on 21 September, and then, with only 20 men, brought General Charles Cornwallis and his entire army to a temporary halt at Charlotte, North Carolina, on 26 September 1780. When the British withdrew into South Carolina, Davie harassed their flanks and rear.

Having proved himself to be an exceptional commander, Davie was bitterly disappointed when Greene singled him out to be his commissary general. When Davie protested that he knew nothing of money and accounts, Greene said, "Don't concern yourself. There is no money and hence no accounts." Despite overwhelming difficulties and an acute distaste for the work, Davie measured up to Greene's expectations. In 1782 he settled at Halifax, North Carolina, and married Sarah Jones, the wealthy daughter of his former commander and the niece of Willie Jones. He had been licensed to practice law in 1780, and became a prominent lawyer. He represented Halifax in the legislature

from 1786 to 1798, was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention in 1787, was an ardent Federalist, and was largely responsible for the establishment and organization of the University of North Carolina. He became commander of the state's troops in 1797 and brigadier general in the U.S. army during the crisis of 1798–1800. He became governor of North Carolina in 1798, and was peace commissioner to France the next year. Defeated for election to Congress in 1803, Davie left politics and retired to his plantation, "Tivoli," in Lancaster County, South Carolina, where he died on 5 November 1820.

SEE ALSO *Charlotte, North Carolina; Hanging Rock, South Carolina; Jones, Allen; Jones, Willie; Wahab's Plantation, North Carolina.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

DAWES, WILLIAM. (?–?). Fellow courier of Paul Revere. On the night of 18 April 1775, he set off earlier than Revere, taking the longer route via Boston Neck, Cambridge, and Menotomy to Lexington, where he joined him. While Revere was caught shortly afterwards, Dawes escaped.

SEE ALSO *Revere, Paul.*

revised by John Oliphant

DAYTON, ELIAS. (1737–1807). Continental general. New Jersey. A native of Elizabethtown, apprenticed as a mechanic, he joined the Jersey Blues, became a lieutenant on 19 March 1756, and served at various stations on the New York frontier. He rose to the rank of captain. In Elizabethtown he established a general store, became a member of the committee of safety (6 December 1774), and was named one of four Essex County muster-masters on 26 October 1775. In January 1776 (on the 10th or 18th) he became colonel of the Third New Jersey Continentals, and that month he took part in the capture of the British supply ship, *Blue Mountain Valley*. Leading his regiment to Albany in May 1776, he rebuilt Fort Stanwix and constructed Fort Dayton at Herkimer. He

saw some action against the Indians before rejoining the main army at Morristown in March 1777. He took part in the skirmishes at Bound Brook and Staten Island (presumably those of 13 April and 22 August) before engaging in the Battles of Brandywine (11 September) and Germantown (4 October). After spending the winter at Valley Forge (in William Maxwell's brigade), he led his regiment in the Monmouth campaign (June 1778) and then performed coastal outpost duty in New Jersey. He joined Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois in Maxwell's Brigade in 1779 and was credited with the destruction of Runonvea, near Big Flats, on 31 August 1779. Dayton and his son Jonathan refused to sign the semipolitical endorsement that Sullivan secured from his officers.

Back in his home state to rejoin the main army under Washington, Dayton figured prominently in delaying and stopping General William Knyphausen's Springfield Raid (7–23 June 1780). During this and previous operations he served close to his home, Elizabethtown, and in marked contrast to such Patriots as John Cadwalader and Philemon Dickinson, he not only remained with the Continental army rather than resign to become a militia general, but also declined election to Congress. After General Maxwell's resignation in July 1780, Dayton became the acting commander of the New Jersey Brigade for the remainder of the war. During the mutiny of the New Jersey Line in January 1781, Dayton showed skill in handling disgruntled troops under his command. In the reorganization of 1 January 1781, Dayton left the Third New Jersey to become commander of the Second New Jersey. Dayton led the New Jersey troops in the Yorktown campaign. On Washington's insistence he was appointed brigadier general on 7 January 1783.

After returning to his business in Elizabethtown he became a leading citizen, state legislator, and major general of militia; he was also in the Continental Congress in 1787–1788. A personal friend of Washington, he is said to have borne him a physical resemblance.

SEE ALSO *Blue Mountain Valley off Sandy Hook, New Jersey; Cadwalader, John; Dayton, Jonathan; Dickinson, Philemon; Fort Stanwix, New York; Mutiny of the New Jersey Line; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois; Yorktown Campaign; Yorktown, Siege of.*

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revised by Harry M. Ward

DAYTON, JONATHAN. (1760–1824). Continental officer. New Jersey. The son of Elias Dayton, he graduated from the college at Princeton in 1776; joined his father's regiment, the Third New Jersey, as an ensign on 7 February; and became regimental paymaster on 26 August 1776 and lieutenant on 1 January 1777. Captain-lieutenant beginning 7 April 1779, he became aide-de-camp to General John Sullivan on 1 May (during Sullivan's Expedition) and captain on 30 March 1780. Captured by a British raiding party at Elizabethtown (his home) on 5 October, he was exchanged at an unknown date. In the reorganization of 1 January 1781, he became a member of his father's Second New Jersey. At Yorktown, his regiment was in his father's brigade of Lincoln's division. Leaving the Continental Army on 3 November 1783, he served as a New Jersey legislator, was chosen a delegate to the federal Constitutional Convention in 1787, and became speaker of the New Jersey assembly in 1790. He was a U.S. representative for three terms ending on 3 March 1799 and a U.S. senator from then until 1805. He was arrested on charges of being involved in the conspiracy of Aaron Burr (1805) but not brought to trial.

SEE ALSO *Burr, Aaron; Dayton, Elias; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois.*

revised by Harry M. Ward

DEANE, SILAS. (1737–1789). Continental congressman, first American diplomat abroad. Connecticut. The son of a blacksmith, Silas Deane was born in Groton, Connecticut, on 24 December 1737 and graduated from Yale in 1758. Moving to Wethersfield, Deane taught school and studied law, gaining admission to the bar in 1763. Deane rose quickly to prominence, aided by a pair of advantageous marriages. In 1763 he wed a well-to-do widow, Mehitabel Webb, in 1763. She died in 1767, and two years later Deane married Elizabeth Ebbets, the granddaughter of former Governor Gordon Saltonstall. Deane became active in the Susquehannah Company, which sought the expansion of Connecticut into the western territories through energetic land speculation. First elected to the General Assembly in 1768, Deane became a leader of the Patriot movement in Connecticut, serving as secretary of the colony's Committee of Correspondence, and was selected to serve in the first Continental Congress in 1774. The following year, Congress appointed Deane to the committee organizing the American navy. Deane gained added renown for his support of Ethan Allen's capture of Fort Ticonderoga.

Deane proved less popular in his home state. According to Deane's friend, Governor Jonathan Trumbull, the

assembly did not trust Deane, and so refused to re-elect him to Congress. Deane, who had aligned himself with the commercial interests of New York and Philadelphia, had entered into a number of deals with a wily financier, Robert Morris, and so he stayed on in Philadelphia. The visit of Achard de Bonvouloir to Philadelphia late in 1775 led Congress's Secret Committee, charged with acquiring munitions from abroad, to decide that an agent should be sent to France to explore the possibilities of military assistance. They awarded this assignment to Deane, even though he did not speak French, and offered him a five percent commission on all goods he acquired during the assignment. Seeing his opportunity, Deane entered into a number of secret partnerships with various merchants and political leaders hoping to profit from supplying the new Continental Army. As Deane said, he was "involved in one scheme and adventure after another, so as to keep my mind in constant agitation."

As luck would have it, Congress instructed him to arrange a meeting in Paris with his old friend, Edward Bancroft. Deane did so, passing American and French secrets to Bancroft with a view to making their fortune in trade, purchasing supplies for Congress, and engaging in land speculation and many other forms of profiteering and double dealing. What Deane did not know, and what the world did not learn until sixty years after Bancroft's death, was that Bancroft was a double agent serving the British.

Deane sailed for Europe in April 1776 with instructions from two separate Congressional committees, both of them secret. For the Commercial Committee, he was one of five merchants authorized to buy American produce with Congressional funds, to ship this merchandise abroad, and to bring back supplies needed by the colonies; Deane was the European agent for this traffic. The second committee, called the Secret Committee, instructed Deane to buy clothing and equipment for 25,000 men and to purchase artillery and munitions. He was to do this on credit, if possible. He also was to explore the possibilities of French recognition and an alliance.

Hortalez & Cie was the first fruit of Deane's efforts. French Foreign Minister Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes, acting through his agent Pierre Beaumarchais, created Roderigue Hortalez and Company to secretly funnel munitions and other supplies to the Americans. Although details of this secret operation were passed promptly to Lord Stormont (David Murray) in Paris and to the British authorities in London, Deane and Bancroft withheld critical information about shipments in which they had a stake. Thus, vital supplies continued to flow to America. Congress had directed Deane to take Arthur Lee into his confidence, but Deane did not do so, turning Lee into a bitter enemy of Deane's. Lee

also, accurately as it turned out, accused Bancroft of being a spy.

The matter of foreigners in the American army brings up the name of Silas Deane most frequently in the pages of military history. As early as 2 December 1775, Congress had asked the Secret Committee to find four "able and skillful engineers" for the Continental army, but Deane went far beyond his authority in making contracts with foreign officers who wanted Continental commissions. He had no qualifications for sorting out the real soldiers from the mere opportunists, but went right ahead and sent a stream of ambitious European officers to Philadelphia. Some of these officers were extremely competent, most notably the self-proclaimed Baron Johann de Kalb and the Marquis de Lafayette (Gilbert du Montier), but most barely rose above the level of blowhards. Henry Laurens was to write later that Deane apparently "would not say nay to any Frenchman who called himself Count or Chevalier" and solicited a high commission in the American army.

In September 1776 Congress appointed Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee to form a committee with Deane to continue the mission originally entrusted to Deane alone. This led to the French Alliance, which Congress ratified on 4 May 1778, and ended Deane's diplomatic mission. Recalled ostensibly to report to Congress on affairs in Europe, but actually to answer charges raised by Lee, he stirred up a lively controversy that is an important part of the story of Hortalez & Cie. Deane also was attacked at this time for showing poor judgment in letting so many foreign adventurers come to America.

After two years in America, Deane returned to Europe as a private citizen to pursue a series of nefarious affairs with Bancroft. In 1781, he wrote to friends in America of his failing confidence in the cause of Independence and advocated an accommodation with Britain. He sent these through Bancroft, who showed them to the British authorities. With a view to giving these letters more credence, and helping their own cause, the British pretended that Deane's letters had been intercepted, and they were published in *Rivington's Gazette* at about the time General Charles Cornwallis surrendered. Now accused of treason in addition to the older charges of profiteering, dishonest financial methods, and incompetence, Deane became an exile. Bankrupt, sick in spirit and in body, he lived for a short time in Ghent and for a few years in England. He died at the start of a voyage to Canada, on 23 September 1789. His reputation was cleared to some degree when Congress voted his heirs \$37,000 in 1842 as partial restitution for his war expenses. At this time the audit of his accounts that had been made under Arthur Lee's direction was called "a gross injustice to Silas Deane." Despite his

personal corruption, Deane had done an invaluable service to the American cause by helping to transport thousands of firearms and tons of powder for use by U.S. forces.

SEE ALSO *Bancroft, Edward; Bonvouloir; Hortalez & Cie.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

DEARBORN, HENRY. (1751–1829). Continental officer, later secretary of war. New Hampshire. Descended from a native of Exeter, England, who came to America in 1639, Henry was born on 23 February 1751 in North Hampton, New Hampshire. He studied medicine with Dr. Hall Jackson in Portsmouth and started practicing at Nottingham in 1772 before he organized and was elected captain of a militia company. After learning of the fighting at Lexington and Concord, he led sixty of his men to Cambridge, Massachusetts, where his company became part of Colonel John Stark's Regiment. Dearborn distinguished himself as part of the latter's command at Bunker Hill. Commanding a company of musketeers in Arnold's march to Quebec, he became sick and had to be left behind on the Chaudière River. He rejoined in time, however, to be captured at Quebec on 31 December 1775. Held for a while in the city, he was paroled in May 1776 but not exchanged until 10 March 1777. On 19 March he was appointed major of Alexander Scammell's Third New Hampshire Regiment (with rank from 8 November 1776), and he fought at Ticonderoga and the First Battle of Saratoga on 19 September 1777. On the latter date he was promoted to lieutenant colonel.

After spending the winter of 1777–1778 at Valley Forge in Enoch Poor's brigade, Dearborn took part in the Battle of Monmouth in June. The next summer found him in Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois setting out from Easton, Pennsylvania. On 19 June 1781, Quartermaster General Timothy Pickering requested that Washington appoint Dearborn to be his (Pickering's) assistant, and the request was granted. While serving in this capacity during the Yorktown campaign, he had the sad duty of writing home that his former commander, Colonel Scammell, had been killed.

Serving in the Continental army until 21 March 1783, he settled in Kennebec County, in the Maine district of Massachusetts, where he rose to major general of militia and, in 1790, U.S. marshal for the district. He was a Republican congressman from 1793 to 1797. Dearborn

was secretary of war during Jefferson's eight years as president (1801–1809). On 27 January 1812 President Madison made him the senior major general with command of what was expected to be the critical theater, the sector between the Niagara River and the New England coast.

History has generally judged Dearborn and his successor, William Eustis, to be incompetent secretaries of war. As a field commander, Dearborn was more conspicuously incompetent, and the American defeats of 1812 and 1813 in the War of 1812 were largely due to his lack of strategic sense and vigor. Morgan Lewis succeeded him in the summer of 1813 as field commander, but further evidence of Dearborn's incompetence being revealed by subsequent American defeats, he was relieved of command on 6 July 1813. His request for a court of inquiry being unheeded because officials were busy trying to salvage the mess he had created, Dearborn was given command of New York City. He was later made president of the court-martial that tried and condemned General William Hull for his defeat at Detroit, which was ironic, since it was Dearborn's inept strategy that had enabled the British to concentrate their entire force against Hull at Detroit.

In March 1815 James Madison surprisingly nominated Dearborn for secretary of war. In the ensuing uproar Madison withdrew his name, but not before the Senate rejected him. He was honorably discharged from the army on 15 June 1815.

During Monroe's administration, Dearborn was minister to Portugal from 1822 to 1824. He returned at his own request and retired to Roxbury, where he died on 6 June 1829.

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revised by Frank C. Mevers

DEBBIEG, HUGH. (1732–1810). British officer. Born in 1732. Debbieg's birthplace is unknown. After graduating from Woolwich Royal Military

Academy in 1746, he entered the Royal Artillery, serving in the unsuccessful Point L'Orient campaign that same year as part of the War of the Austrian Succession. He won the attention of the duke of Cumberland for his gallantry at the Battle of Val on 2 July 1747 and gained promotion. After the end of the war, he served as an engineer in Britain, purchasing a lieutenancy in the Thirty-seventh Foot on 1 September 1756. He served in America during the Seven Years' War starting in May 1758, becoming General James Wolfe's assistant quartermaster general at the siege of Louisbourg and continuing in that position through the Battle of Quebec, where he was at Wolfe's side at his death. He was promoted to captain in the Royal Engineers on 17 March 1759. He spent the next two years overseeing the construction of Halifax's defenses and taking part in the campaign against the French in Newfoundland in 1762.

Over the next several years Debbieg undertook a number of important assignments, including a secret mission for Admiral Richard Howe to examine French and Spanish coastal defenses, for which he received a lifetime pension and was brevetted major on 23 July 1772. But he accused Howe of renegeing on a promise to hold open the position of senior engineer in North America for him. As a consequence, Debbieg refused to serve in America in 1775, even when offered the position of chief engineer in Canada. He finally received the preferment he believed he deserved in 1777, being brevetted lieutenant colonel and then, in May 1778, becoming chief engineer on Jeffrey Amherst's staff. As such, he oversaw operations of the Royal Engineers for the rest of the war. Along the way he designed military bridges, an improved pontoon, and machinery for defending a breach. During the Gordon Riots of June 1780 in England, Debbieg organized the defense of public buildings, personally leading the defense of the Bank of England. On 20 November 1782 he was promoted to colonel of the Royal Engineers. With the exception of Amherst, Debbieg got along better with his subordinates than his superiors, leading the latter often to ignore his advice during the American Revolution. He came into almost immediate contention with the duke of Richmond when the latter took control of the ordnance office in March 1782. Debbieg was reprimanded and punished by courts-martial for insubordination in 1784 and 1789. Despite his many quarrels with Prime Minister Pitt, Debbieg was promoted to major general on 12 October 1793, lieutenant general on 1 January 1798, and general on 25 September 1803. Debbieg died at his home in London on 27 May 1810.

Michael Bellesiles

DE BORRE SEE *Preudhomme de Borre, Philippe Hubert.*

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. 4 July 1776. Momentum in favor of the idea of independence was building during the winter and spring of 1776. Thomas Paine's pamphlet *Common Sense*, published on 10 January 1776 and widely read, increased popular acceptance of severing political ties to Britain. Several states had already expressed sentiments that amounted to independence, but Congress was more cautious. The Virginia convention forced the issue on 15 May 1776 by instructing its delegates to offer in Congress a resolution declaring the colonies to be independent. The Virginia delegates laid the resolution before Congress on 27 May, at the same time that the North Carolina delegates indicated that they had instructions to vote for independence. The next eleven days were spent in building a consensus in Congress. Then, on 7 June, Richard Henry Lee, a delegate from Virginia, offered the following resolution: "Resolved, that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states, that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved."

Following two days of debate, on 11 June 1776 Congress postponed consideration of the resolution for three weeks (to allow wavering delegates to get instructions from home) and simultaneously appointed a "Committee of Five" to draft a statement that would present to the world the case for independence. Four committee members—Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania, John Adams of Massachusetts, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, and Robert R. Livingston of New York—delegated the fifth, Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, to prepare a draft declaration. Although only thirty-three years old, Jefferson had a reputation for political writing that made him a logical candidate to be the drafter. Perhaps more to the point, of the five delegates he was the one least busy with other congressional business. The document about which so much historical fuss has been made was regarded as nothing more than routine work at the time.

Congress reconvened on 1 July to consider Lee's resolution. Voting by colonies, the resolution received nine affirmative votes. Pennsylvania and South Carolina voted in the negative, New York abstained, and Delaware's two delegates deadlocked. Taking advantage of Edward Rutledge's intimation that South Carolina might change sides, the advocates of independence, who dearly desired unanimity on such an important measure, agreed to retake the vote the next day.



The Declaration of Independence, 4 July 1776. John Trumbull's painting (c. 1817) of the Assembly Room in Pennsylvania's State House (now Independence Hall) in Philadelphia on 4 July 1776, shows Thomas Jefferson standing at the center, surrounded by (left to right) John Adams, Roger Sherman, Robert Livingston, and Benjamin Franklin. They face John Hancock, who sits at the right. © FRANCIS G. MAYER/CORBIS.

The events of 2 July demonstrated the lengths to which advocates of independence would go to achieve unanimity. John Adams worked tirelessly to sway his colleagues, leading the difficult battle for greater consensus. Under the influence of Rutledge, South Carolina now joined the majority. Two conservative Pennsylvania delegates—Robert Morris and John Dickinson—deliberately absented themselves, allowing the remaining delegates to vote three-two in favor. And, most dramatically, Caesar Rodney, alerted by Thomas McKean that his vote would be needed to break Delaware's deadlock, rode eighty miles through the night in a thunderstorm from Dover, Delaware, to cast his tie-breaking vote for independence. The final tally was twelve votes for independence, with the New York delegates still awaiting instructions from their newly elected assembly back home.

With Lee's resolution approved, Congress now turned to Jefferson's draft Declaration, which Franklin and Adams had changed slightly. Jefferson drew on many sources in constructing his draft; as James Madison later commented, "The object was to assert, not to discover

truths." In general, his words reflected the influence of political philosophers beginning with the English revolution of the mid-seventeenth century, including most notably ideas found in John Locke's writings from the late seventeenth century. That cache of notions about the proper role of government, and especially what to do when an established government became abusive or tyrannical, had become a common element in American political discourse since the start of the imperial crisis, and would have made ready sense to politically aware people who were active in government at the local and colony level. Jefferson's phraseology suggests that he had before him on his drafting table a copy of the preamble he had written for the recently adopted Virginia state constitution of 1776 and copies of the first three sections of George Mason's Declaration of Rights. The introductory sections of his draft of the Declaration asserted that independence was now an unavoidable step, an action based on principles that his readers would readily understand as "self-evident." When the established government had engaged in "a long train of abuses and usurpations," it

was the right of a people “to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.” The bulk of the Declaration provided the particulars needed to indict and convict George III of tyranny, and asserted that all means of redress short of independence had been denied. In words that echoed Lee’s resolution of 7 June, the Declaration concluded that “these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states.” Modern scholarship has demonstrated that, although the Declaration retained much of Jefferson’s literary style, linguistic cadence, and political thinking, because the draft was edited by Congress as a committee of the whole the Declaration deserves to be regarded as the product of the collective wisdom of delegates from all the colonies, who labored into the late afternoon of 4 July to produce and approve the final document.

The committee had the Declaration printed at the shop of John Dunlap, Congress’s official printer, on the night of 4–5 July, for distribution to the army, state assemblies, conventions, and committees of safety. The printed document was headed, “In Congress, July 4, 1776. A Declaration by the representatives of the United States of America in General Congress assembled,” and entered into the journal of Congress under the date 4 July, a circumstance that gave rise to the legend that the Declaration was signed on 4 July. (John Trumbull’s painting in the Capitol rotunda, *The Signing of the Declaration of Independence*, also propagates this error.) Its first public reading occurred on 8 July, when Colonel John Nixon was appointed by the sheriff of Philadelphia to read the Declaration on the steps of the Statehouse. Congress received news on 11 July that the New York convention had voted for independence two days earlier. On 19 July it ordered the Declaration to be engrossed (written out on parchment in a large, clear hand, by Timothy Matlock, an assistant to Charles Thomson, the secretary of Congress) as “The unanimous declaration of the thirteen United States of America.” The engrossed copy was ready on 2 August, when it was signed by all fifty delegates present (six delegates signed later). After John Hancock had signed as president of Congress, the New Hampshire delegates began the list of signatures below and to the right of the text. The other delegates followed in geographical order from north to south, in six columns that went from right to left across the parchment. The Georgia delegates signed last.

The significance of the Declaration, which merely gave official notice of the course on which the states and Congress had already embarked, was to destroy any lingering possibility of conciliation and to make it possible for foreign powers to ally themselves with the new nation.

SEE ALSO *Independence; Jefferson, Thomas; Signers.*

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DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES SEE *Stamp Act.*

DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITIES OF TAKING UP ARMS.

6 July 1775. The Declaration was one of several addresses issued by Congress to justify the necessity of armed resistance. On 23 June Congress appointed a committee consisting of John Rutledge, William Livingston, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and Thomas Johnson to draw up an address for George Washington to read to the Continental Army besieging Boston. The draft was debated on 24 June and postponed on 26 June. Congress then added John Dickinson and Thomas Jefferson to the committee. The second draft was the joint work of Dickinson and Jefferson. Congress adopted that draft on 6 July, the day after accepting Dickinson’s Olive Branch Petition.

The heart of the document is in these lines:

We are reduced to the alternative of choosing an unconditional submission to the tyranny of irritated ministers, or resistance by force. The latter is our choice. We have counted the cost of

this contest, and find nothing so dreadful as voluntary slavery. . . . Our cause is just. Our union is perfect. Our internal resources are great, and, if necessary, foreign assistance is undoubtedly attainable. . . . With hearts fortified with these animating reflections, we most solemnly, before God and the world, declare, that, exerting the utmost energy of those powers, which our beneficent Creator hath graciously bestowed upon us, the arms we have been compelled by our enemies to assume, we will, in defiance of every hazard, with unabating firmness and perseverance, employ them for the preservation of our liberties; being with one mind resolved to die freemen rather than to live slaves.

SEE ALSO *Dickinson, John; Franklin, Benjamin; Jay, John; Jefferson, Thomas; Livingston, William; Olive Branch Petition; Rutledge, John.*

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DECLARATORY ACT. 18 March 1766. On the day it repealed the Stamp Act of 1765, Britain’s Parliament asserted its authority to make laws binding the American colonies “in all cases whatsoever,” using the same general language as in the Irish Declaratory Act of 1719. One of the most important influences in persuading Parliament to repeal the Stamp Act had been the masterful performance of Benjamin Franklin in his testimony before the House of Commons on 13 February 1766, the thrust of which had been that Americans objected only to “internal” taxes, but not to taxes on trade. Franklin’s testimony was disingenuous at best (historian Edmund S. Morgan calls it “a dangerous piece of deception with unfortunate aftereffects”), since Franklin knew that most colonists drew no such distinction.

The prime minister, the Marquis of Rockingham, who favored repeal of the Stamp Act because he believed it was unsound policy, knew that repeal would have to be accompanied by some declaration that would assuage Parliament’s anger at American defiance of its authority. William Pitt had already introduced a resolution that, in demanding repeal of the Stamp Act, simultaneously “proposed that Parliament assert its sovereignty over the colonies in ‘every point of legislation whatsoever.’” Rockingham made use of the distinction introduced by Franklin and supported by Pitt that Americans objected only to internal taxes. In the Declaratory Act, he asserted

Parliament’s right to make laws and statutes binding the colonists “in all cases whatsoever” without specifically stating whether or not those cases included the right to tax. Members of Parliament were persuaded that Americans objected only to internal taxes and believed that the Declaratory Act included the right of Parliament to tax the colonists. The misunderstandings embodied in the Declaratory Act were an important element in eroding an accurate understanding of the imperial crisis on both sides of the Atlantic.

SEE ALSO *Franklin, Benjamin; Stamp Act.*

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DE COUDRAY SEE *Tronson du Coudray, Philippe Charles Jean Baptiste.*

DEFEAT IN DETAIL. In the correct military sense—in the twenty-first as well as in the eighteenth century—this term means “the defeat in turn of the separated parts of a force.” To avoid “defeat in detail,” a commander keeps all his units within “supporting distance” of each other.

Mark M. Boatner

DE FERMOY SEE *Fermoy, Matthias Alexis de Roche.*

DEFILADE. A person or thing protected by a natural or man-made barrier—a rise in the ground, or mounded earth—is said to be in defilade. In modern military parlance, this is “cover,” as opposed to “concealment.”

Mark M. Boatner

DE HAAS, JOHN PHILIP. (1735–1786). Continental general. Pennsylvania. Born in Holland, John Philip De Haas came to America with his parents around 1737 and settled in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. De Haas was an ensign in the Provincial Battalion of Pennsylvania in December 1757 and was stationed on the Susquehanna River. He accompanied General John Forbes's expedition to Fort Duquesne the next year, served throughout the rest of the Seven Years' War, and during Pontiac's War took part in Colonel Henry Bouquet's victory at Bushy Run in August 1763. During the period from 1765 to 1779, he was a local magistrate and engaged in the iron industry of Lancaster County. In 1775 he raised a militia company, was named major of the Pennsylvania Provincials, and on 25 October 1776 was appointed a colonel of the First Pennsylvania Battalion. He led this unit to Canada and is credited with saving Benedict Arnold from possible capture at Lachine by arriving with four companies to drive off an enemy column. During the retreat from Canada he operated between Montreal and Sorel during the month of June 1776, before joining the final withdrawal to Ticonderoga.

De Haas's First Pennsylvania Battalion formed the nucleus of the Second Pennsylvania Continentals, of which he was named colonel on 25 October 1776. He was appointed brigadier general on 21 February 1777, but hesitated so long in acknowledging his promotion that General George Washington wrote in June to ask if he was still in the army. It appears that he was not, for De Haas does not appear in the service records from 1777 until his official retirement on 3 November 1783, except for being brevetted as a major general on 30 September 1780. It is possible that, during the intervening years, he was in unofficial retirement because no brigade could be found for him to command. In 1779 he moved to Philadelphia, where he died in 1786.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict.*

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DE KALB, JOHANN. (1721–1780). Continental general. Born in Hüttendorf, Bavaria, on 19 June 1721, de Kalb, the son of Bavarian peasants, became known in America as "Baron de Kalb." He appeared as a lieutenant (1 September 1743) in a French infantry regiment under the name of Jean de Kalb. He subsequently fought in the army of the great Marshal Saxe (Hermann Maurice, comte

de Saxe), served through the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), was promoted to major in 1756, and distinguished himself in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). Meanwhile he had become an assiduous student of languages and mathematics in addition to strictly military subjects. In 1764 he married a wealthy heiress whose fortune enabled him to retire from the army and settle near Paris. During the first four months of 1768 he traveled in America as a secret agent for the French Secretary of State (Etienne François, Duke of Choiseul) to report on the colonists' feelings toward Great Britain. Upon his return, de Kalb found that Choiseul no longer cared about America, and his mission proved useless.

The accession of Louis XVI brought the comte de Broglie (Charles François) back into influence and de Kalb, who had served in the latter's corps, returned to the army. He served under Broglie in the Metz garrison, and on 6 November 1776 was commissioned brigadier general. By this time he had decided to seek his military fortune in America, and he received permission to go as a volunteer. Silas Deane drew up one of his contracts, and de Kalb sailed on 20 April 1777 with the Marquis de Lafayette (Marie-Joseph-Paul-Roche-Yves-Gilbert-du-Motier). Although Congress made satisfactory arrangements for the wealthy and influential young marquis, they saw no way of accommodating the bogus baron. De Kalb threatened a civil suit for breach of contract and was about to return to France when, on 15 September, he was voted a commission as major general. After some hesitation about accepting it, he joined General George Washington early in November and spent the winter at Valley Forge. In the spring of 1778 he was named as Lafayette's second in command for the proposed invasion of Canada.

Not until two years later did de Kalb finally receive an assignment commensurate with his rank. On 3 April 1780 he was ordered to the relief of Charleston with the Maryland and Delaware Continentals. On 25 July he surrendered command to General Horatio Gates, but remained with the southern army at the head of his division. Gates ignored the professionally sound advice of de Kalb, leading the army to annihilation in the Camden campaign. In the battle of 16 August, de Kalb fell bleeding from 11 wounds, dying three days later.

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign; Canada Invasion; Southern Theater, Military Operations in.*

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DE LA BALME SEE *Mottin de La Balme, Augustin.*

DE LANCEY, JAMES. (1747–1802). Loyalist. Born in West Farms, New York, on 6 September 1747, De Lancey was appointed to the family's traditional position of sheriff of Westchester County in 1770, holding it until 1775, when he took the Loyalist side in the Revolution. Confined to his home, De Lancey fled to the British on Long Island in the summer 1776. When the royalist governor, William Tryon, appointed De Lancey commander of the Loyalist Westchester County militia in March 1777, the latter seized the initiative and formed the Westchester Refugees, popularly known as "De Lancey's Cowboys" for their seizure of Patriot cattle. Though he did not officially become commander until 1780 when he was promoted to colonel, De Lancey led the Refugees on a long guerrilla campaign out of their base at King's Bridge, which is credited with keeping the British in New York City supplied with food. De Lancey was captured by a Patriot unit in December 1777, being held on parole in Hartford until exchanged in 1778. He claimed to have taken five hundred Patriots used in exchange for Loyalist captives. Westchester County was contested ground, with a number of atrocities committed by each side, most famously the Loyalists' shooting of Colonel Christopher Greene on 14 May 1781 after he had surrendered. New York confiscated De Lancey's property in October 1779, and he left the state shortly after resigning his commission on 3 April 1783. He settled in Annapolis County, Nova Scotia, where he was elected to the assembly in 1790 and served on the council from 1794 to 1801. He died at home on 2 May 1804.

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DE LANCEY, OLIVER. (1718–1785). (The elder.) Senior Loyalist officer in America. New York. Born 16 September 1718 in New York, De Lancey was the youngest son of Etienne De Lancey, who came to New York in 1686 after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and of Anne van Cortlandt. In 1742 De Lancey married Phila Franks, a Jew from New York City. A successful merchant and landowner, he and his brother James (1703–1760) built the family party into a position of

power in New York provincial politics, constantly finding themselves in conflict with the royal governor. Despite his aristocratic status, De Lancey became popular among the working class of New York City and campaigned easily among its members. He served during the Seven Years' War as one of New York's paymasters and raised and led volunteers to Fort Ticonderoga in 1758. When his brother James died in 1760, De Lancey became head of the family's political faction, serving on the governor's council for the next fifteen years. In 1769 he formed an alliance with the Sons of Liberty, leading his party to victory over the Livingston faction in an election marked by demonstrations and the intimidation of voters. In 1773 De Lancey reached the apex of his power, being named commanding colonel of the Southern Military District. Almost immediately thereafter his relationship with the Sons of Liberty soured as the latter's demands turned more radical. Over the next year New York's political factions traded places, with the Livingstons allying with the Patriots while the De Lancey faction became identified with Governor William Tryon.

De Lancey fled New York City on 20 June 1776, joining the British forces. General William Howe promoted De Lancey to brigadier general, making him the highest-ranking officer in the British forces. Oliver raised a brigade of fifteen hundred Loyalists who were generally known as De Lancey's New York Volunteers. Two of these battalions served in the South with distinction and the third remained throughout the war on Long Island, as did De Lancey himself. On 26 November 1777 a Patriot raiding party destroyed De Lancey's mansion on the Hudson River near Greenwich Village. He was included in New York's Act of Attainder of 1779, and his property was confiscated. Leaving New York City with the British in 1783, De Lancey received a pension and £23,446 from the crown to cover his claimed losses of £78,016. He and his wife settled in Beverley, England, where he died on 27 October 1785.

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DE LANCEY, OLIVER. (1749–1822). (The younger.) British officer, Clinton's adjutant general. Of the powerful New York family led by his father (see preceding entry), young Oliver was born in New York City, educated in England, and in 1766 he entered the British army as cornet of the Fourteenth Dragoons. In

May 1773 he became captain in the Seventeenth Dragoons, in which he remained for forty-nine years and succeeded the first duke of Newcastle as its colonel in 1795. Preceding his regiment to America in 1774 to secure remounts and arrange accommodations, he joined them on their arrival in Boston on 24 May 1775. His mounted detachment led the British turning movement at Long Island and assured its success by capturing the American patrol at Jamaica Pass. He took part in the action at Jamaica, Long Island, on 28 August 1776 and in an affidavit of Lieutenant Robert Troup, not made public until 1846, was accused of striking the wounded Brigadier General Nathaniel Woodhull after his surrender. More valid testimony indicates that De Lancey saved the general—who was a kinsman—after a trooper had inflicted the wounds from which he eventually died. After serving with his regiment in Pennsylvania and New Jersey on 3 June 1778, De Lancey was promoted to major and given the post of deputy quartermaster general in the Charleston expedition of Clinton. He succeeded John André as Clinton's adjunct general in 1780 and, in this capacity, reorganized the secret service in the North. During the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line, in January 1781, he initiated various schemes to exploit the situation, but he had no success. In May 1781 he became the adjunct general of the British army in America and was promoted to lieutenant colonel. After the fighting ended he was head of a commission to settle accounts of the war.

De Lancey became barrackmaster general of the British army, an office he held for ten years. In 1794 he was promoted to major general, and in 1812 he became a full general. For many years he represented Maidstone in Parliament. He died a bachelor at the home of his sister Charlotte, who had married Sir David Dundas, commander in chief of the British army after the duke of York.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Jamaica (Brookland), New York; Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line.?*

John Oliphant

DE LANCEY'S BRIGADE. Oliver De Lancey (the elder) was authorized in September 1776 to raise a Provincial brigade of three battalions to fight alongside the British. The Third Battalion, under Gabriel Ludlow, remained in the New York garrison throughout the war. The two others, commanded by John Harris Cruger and George Brewerton, were sent south in late November 1778 as part of Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell's expedition against Savannah, Georgia, and

helped defend the city from the Franco-American counter-attack in September–October 1779. Both battalions remained at Savannah when Sir Henry Clinton took Charleston, South Carolina, in May 1780. Thereafter, the First Battalion participated in the long campaign to help pacify the interior of South Carolina, notably in the defense of the post at Ninety Six from 22 May to 18 June 1781. Withdrawn into the defensive perimeter around Charleston, it helped defeat the Americans at the Battle of Eutaw Springs on 8 September 1781. Consolidated with the Second Battalion, the First Battalion evacuated Charleston in December 1782. Back in New York, it joined the Third Battalion in garrison on the western end of Long Island. The bulk of the brigade evacuated New York for New Brunswick in early September 1783 and was discharged on 19 October.

SEE ALSO *Campbell, Archibald; Cruger, John Harris; De Lancey, Oliver (1718–1785); Eutaw Springs, South Carolina; Ninety Six, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia (29 December 1778); Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779).*

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DELAPLACE, WILLIAM. British officer who surrendered Ticonderoga on 10 May 1775.

SEE ALSO *Ticonderoga, New York, American Capture of.*

DELAWARE. The Delaware, or Lenape, Indians were a strategically significant Indian nation that, during the middle of the eighteenth century, inhabited a region constituting the western part of modern-day Pennsylvania and most of modern-day Ohio. Many communities of Delawares allied with the United States during the American Revolution, while others maintained neutrality, and some sided with the British. The Delaware were signatories to the first Indian treaty signed under the Continental Congress (1778), and also were victims of

one of the bloodiest massacres of American Indian civilians by American troops, at Gnadenhutten, Ohio (1782).

At the time of significant and sustained European contact in the seventeenth century, the Delaware inhabited the entire Delaware River Valley, in the modern-day states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. The Delaware inhabited villages of a few hundred people each, and their population at contact has been estimated to be between 8,000 and 12,000 people. While having a shared culture, the Delaware spoke two different languages, Munsee and Unami.

As white settlement in the Jerseys and Pennsylvania expanded, the Delaware were pushed westward in the Susquehanna Valley, and eventually settled west of the Alleghenies. Cordial relations between the Delaware and the government of Pennsylvania soured during the eighteenth century, beginning with the controversial Walking Purchase of 1737, which ceded Indian lands along the Delaware River to white settlers, with the extent of the land ceded to be measured as the distance a man could walk in a day and a half. Relations further deteriorated with the anti-Indian violence of the Paxton Boys Riots (1764), which resulted in the massacre of a Conestoga Indian village. Pennsylvania was also the base of operations of the Church of the United Brethren, or Moravian Church, a German pietist sect. The Moravians were active in proselytizing among the Delawares, and took in hundreds of converts during the middle decades of the eighteenth century. The Moravian Delawares, also often known as the Moravian Indians, adopted European modes of subsistence and culture, and lived in separate villages, apart from other Delawares and Anglo-Americans.

By the start of the American Revolution, most Delawares, both Moravian and non-Moravian, had relocated into the trans-Allegheny region, living in modern-day western Pennsylvania and Ohio. It was in this region and this time period that the Delawares came together in new villages, increasing their political power. Four important chiefs guided the Delawares—Captain Pipe, the head of the Wolf clan; Captain Johnny, head of the Turkey clan; and Netawatwees, or Newcomer, head of the Turtle clan. Newcomer died in 1776, and his grandson Gelelemend, or Killbuck, became head of the Turtle clan in his place. Another leader, named White Eyes held the position of war chief in the Turtle clan. Like many other Indian nations of the eastern woodlands, Delaware political organization was diffuse, with chiefs exerting power through persuasion rather than through command.

As was the case with the Iroquois, both the Americans and the British initially pushed for the Delaware to remain neutral during the early phases of the American Revolution. The Continental Congress created three Indian departments on 12 July 1775, and the Delaware fell under the control of the Middle Department. Indian

trader and land speculator George Morgan was appointed chief Indian commissioner of the Middle Department. Morgan organized several treaty conferences at Pittsburgh (1776, 1777, 1778), in which the Delaware were participants. Morgan's diplomacy, in concert with the efforts of Moravian missionaries David Zeisberger and John Heckewelder, kept most Delawares sympathetic with the American cause, in contrast with most of the Indians of the Great Lakes basin and Ohio Valley, who sided with the British. The Delaware signed a formal treaty of alliance with the United States at Fort Pitt on 17 September 1778. The treaty was the first formal treaty the United States government made with an Indian nation. Article VI of the Treaty held out the possibility of the Delaware eventually forming a state and being admitted as an equal member to American union, with membership in the Continental Congress. This provision, obviously, was never acted on by Congress.

The alliance between the United States and the Delawares proved fragile, and eventually collapsed. While Killbuck and White Eyes were strongly devoted to the American cause, the other Delaware leaders were not. Most Delawares wanted to remain neutral and disapproved of the Fort Pitt treaty, because they felt it tied them too strongly to the United States. Worried that too many Delawares were leaning toward the British side, Colonel Daniel Brodhead, then the commander at Fort Pitt, led an attack against the main Delaware neutralist settlement at Coshocton in 1780. Complicating matters was the fact that, while the American military leadership in the Middle Department was committed to maintaining some sort of alliance with the Delawares, the American settlers in the region were not.

Settler communities consistently initiated violence against their (mostly Delaware) Indian neighbors. White Eyes was murdered by American settlers. In the spring of 1782, Pennsylvania settlers attacked Killbuck's settlement near Pittsburgh, and also attacked and destroyed the Moravian Delaware village of Gnadenhutten, murdering almost a hundred of the villagers. Like many other Indians during the American Revolution, the Delawares emerged from the war divided, weakened, and generally suspicious of the new United States. The Delaware participated in the pan-Indian resistance movement of the 1790s, which culminated in the Treaty of Greenville. Between the 1810s and 1830s, most Delawares were removed to reservations west of the Mississippi River.

SEE ALSO *Gnadenhutten Massacre, Ohio; Indians in the Colonial Wars and the American Revolution.*

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DELAWARE CONTINENTALS. On 9 December 1775, Congress assigned Delaware a quota of one regiment to raise for the Continental army in 1776. Organized on 19 January 1776 under Colonel John Haslet, an Ulster-born physician from Kent County, this was the only regiment furnished by Delaware during the war. The regiment was well trained by its adjutant, a former British captain, and well uniformed in blue coats faced and lined with red, white waistcoats, buckskin breeches, white woolen stockings, black gaiters, and peaked black hats that were smaller versions of British grenadier hats. After obtaining "lately imported" English muskets from Philadelphia in July, it marched in August to join Washington's army at New York City. Among "the best uniformed and equipped [regiments] in the army of 1776," it was also one of the few armed with bayonets (Lefferts, p. 26).

The regiment fought for the first time at Long Island on 27 August 1776 and saw hard service with the main army over the next two years in brigades with Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia regiments. Major Thomas McDonough was wounded at Long Island and did not return. Lieutenant Colonel Gunning Bedford was wounded at White Plains on 28 October 1776 and left the regiment in January 1777. Haslet himself was killed at Princeton on 3 January 1777. David Hall, a lawyer from Lewes, succeeded Haslet and was seriously wounded at Germantown on 4 October 1777. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Pope, who had been wounded at Mamaroneck on 21 October 1776, led the regiment until he resigned on 13 December 1779. Having recouped some of its strength by recruiting, especially at Wilmington over the winter of 1777–1778, the regiment was transferred on 5 April 1780 to the Southern Department along with the Maryland Line. It marched south under Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Vaughan and Major John Patten and suffered heavily at Camden under Horatio Gates on 16 August 1780. There both field officers were taken prisoner; they remained on parole to the end of the war.

Camden reduced the regiment to two ninety-six-man companies under Captains Robert Kirkwood and Peter

Jaquett. Both units fought with distinction during the remainder of Nathanael Greene's southern campaign, usually with the remnants of the Maryland Line. Back in Delaware by early 1783, the companies were furloughed at Christiana Bridge on 17 January. The regiment was formally disbanded on 15 November.

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign; Haslet, John; Jaquett, Peter; Kirkwood, Robert H.; Long Island, New York, Battle of; Princeton, New Jersey.*

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DELAWARE LINE. The smallest of the state lines (military forces) belonged to Delaware, the smallest state. On 9 December 1775 the Continental Congress authorized a single regiment to serve for a year, and the state government recruited it in early 1776, with John Haslett as colonel. Some of the companies saw their first action on the shores of Delaware Bay by capturing a boat from the Royal navy frigate, the HMS *Roebuck*. The regiment achieved a higher level of training than many other units because its adjutant was a former British captain. It went to New York City and gained fame during the defensive battles in that campaign.

The regiment reenlisted for the duration of the war in 1777, now under the command of Colonel David Hall. The regiment continued to perform well in the main army, initially serving in the Maryland Division and then, in 1778, in a Virginia division. It rejoined the Marylanders in 1779 and accompanied them south in the spring of 1780. It was shattered in the battle of Camden, with only enough men remaining to form two companies. Those companies stayed in action through Nathanael Greene's campaign, with the other officers returning home. New recruiting enabled two more companies to join General George Washington for the siege of Yorktown, and then went to Greene to relieve the two veteran companies. The last of the regiment went on furlough in early 1783, and formally disbanded on 15 November of that year.

Demilune

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene; Yorktown, Siege of.*

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Robert K. Wright Jr.

DELAWARE RIVER FORTS SEE *Philadelphia Campaign.*

DEMILUNE. Meaning “half moon,” this was a standard fortification term for a crescent-shaped outwork.

Mark M. Boatner

DEMONT, WILLIAM. American traitor. Pennsylvania. Born in England, Demont settled in Pennsylvania before the Revolution. Commissioned ensign in the Fifth Pennsylvania Battalion on 6 January 1776, he became regimental adjunct to Colonel Robert Magaw, commander of Fort Washington, on 29 September. He deserted on the night of 2–3 November 1776 to the camp of Earl Percy at McGown’s Pass in Manhattan, taking with him complete information on Fort Washington’s defenses. Shortly after the fall of fort to the British, Magaw and other American officers learned of Demont’s treason; Washington, however, kept the incident quiet for fear of

its impact on morale. Dement traveled with General William Howe’s army until 1780, when he went to England to press his claims for some sort of reward. Though he had done the British great service in turning over the plans to Fort Washington, as late as 1792 Dement was still attempting to gain recompense for his losses during the Revolution. The government awarded him sixty pounds.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

DENISON, NATHAN. (1740–1809). Militia officer. Connecticut. A native of New London, he was a well-educated man who became one of the early Connecticut settlers of the Wyoming Valley and was active in its affairs. In 1774 he and Zebulon Butler became justices of the peace of the newly established town of Westmoreland. In 1777 Denison was made lieutenant colonel of the Connecticut militia, and later in the year he was promoted to colonel, a grade he held until 1780. He commanded troops in the Wyoming Valley Massacre in July 1778 and figured prominently in that action. After the war he held several important posts under the authority of Pennsylvania. He died on 25 January 1809 at the age of sixty-eight.

SEE ALSO *Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.*

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Mark M. Boatner

DENTAL RECORDS. Dental records as a means of identifying a corpse were probably used for the first time on record by Paul Revere in identifying the body of Joseph Warren.

SEE ALSO *Warren, Joseph.*

Mark M. Boatner

DE PEYSTER, ABRAHAM. (1753–1799). Loyalist officer. New York. Member of a wealthy New York family and nephew of Arent Schuyler De Peyster, Abraham De Peyster was born in New York City. Siding with the British, in December 1776 he was commissioned captain in the Fourth (King’s) American Regiment, also called the King’s American Rangers, serving through the

rest of the war. Second in command of Loyalist forces at the Battle of Kings Mountain, South Carolina, on 7 October 1780, De Peyster succeeded Patrick Ferguson as commander after the latter's death and was forced by the hopelessness of the situation to surrender his force. Wounded and taken prisoner, he was exchanged the following year and returned to New York City, though he saw no further action. In 1783 he was retired at half pay as a captain and settled at St. John, New Brunswick, where he became treasurer of the province. He died there on 19 February 1798.

His brothers Frederick and James also were Loyalist officers. The former distinguished himself during Clinton's expedition to the Highlands in the attack on Fort Montgomery.

SEE ALSO *Clinton's Expedition; De Peyster, Arent Schuyler.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

DE PEYSTER, ARENT SCHUYLER.

(1736–1832). Loyalist officer. New York. Born to a powerful family on 27 June 1736 in New York City, De Peyster went to England in 1751. He enlisted on 13 April 1755 with an ensign's commission in Major General William Shirley's Fiftieth Foot, becoming a lieutenant in Sir William Pepperrell's Fifty-first Foot on 10 June. During the Seven Years' War he served under his uncle, Peter Schuyler (1710–1762), along the northern frontier, being taken prisoner at Oswego on 14 August 1756. Exchanged the following year, he transferred to the Eighth Foot and saw duty in Germany. Promoted to captain, De Peyster was stationed in Montreal from 1768 until 1774, when he was made commandant of Michilimackinac. There he played a key role in negotiating a peace between the Sioux and Ojibwas.

With the start of the Revolution, De Peyster successfully won the support of several Indian nations, sending volunteers to serve with Generals Guy Carleton and John Burgoyne. He was promoted to major on 6 May 1777. In 1779 he was put in command at Detroit, where he again won many Indians over to the British side and organized attacks on the Kentucky settlements. In 1783 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Eighth Foot and given command at Niagara. In 1785 he returned to England as commander at Plymouth. In 1793 he sold his commission and retired to Dumfries, Scotland, where in 1795 he commanded the Dumfries Volunteers. An original member of his command was Robert Burns, who wrote a poem titled *Epistle to Colonel De Peyster*. The following year De

Peyster again retired, devoting himself to poetry. He died in Dumfries on 26 November 1832. He was an uncle of Abraham De Peyster.

SEE ALSO *De Peyster, Abraham.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

DESPARD, EDWARD MARCUS.

(1751–1803). British army officer and revolutionary. Edward Marcus Despard, a younger brother of John Despard, was born in Ireland on 6 March 1751. He entered the army with an ensign's commission in 1766. He was later stationed at Jamaica where he was promoted to lieutenant in 1772 and proved to have considerable ability as a military engineer. With Horatio Nelson, he survived the disastrous San Juan expedition in 1779 and was promoted captain the following year. In 1781 he became the governor of British possessions in the Gulf of Honduras and in 1782 was involved in the Black River expedition. In 1786 he became the British superintendent in Honduras, where he proved a clumsy and authoritarian administrator and was removed in 1790.

Angry at not receiving compensation, he drifted towards the revolutionary United Irishmen and United Britons. By 1798, when he was arrested, he was working with a French agent to coordinate risings throughout Britain with a French invasion. Released in March 1801, he retired to the family estate in Ireland; a year later, however, he was back in London organizing a rising by Irish laborers and disaffected guardsmen and liaising with French spies. Arrested in November, he was tried and—despite Nelson's character evidence—condemned to death. With six fellow conspirators, he was hanged at the Surrey county gaol, Newington, on 21 February 1803, and his corpse was decapitated.

SEE ALSO *Despard, John.*

revised by John Oliphant

DESPARD, JOHN. (1743/4–1829). British army officer and colonial governor. The elder brother of Edward Marcus Despard, he entered the Twelfth Foot as an ensign in 1760. He saw action in Germany, and was promoted to lieutenant on 12 July 1762. Placed on half pay in 1763, he accepted a lieutenantancy in the Seventh Foot (Royal Fusiliers) in 1767 and went with his regiment to Quebec in 1773. Taken prisoner at the surrender of

St. Johns (on the Richelieu River) on 2 November 1775, he was exchanged in December 1776 and joined William Howe's army at New York. Promoted to captain on 25 March, Despard took part in the capture of Fort Montgomery in New York during October. Subsequently promoted to major, in 1778 he organized Rawdon's new corps, the Volunteers of Ireland. He then served as deputy adjutant general on Clinton's Charleston expedition of 1780 and with Cornwallis's army until Yorktown in 1781. Promoted to colonel in August 1795 and major general in 1798, he was governor of Cape Breton from 1800 to 1807 and rose to full general in 1814. Altogether he served in twenty-four engagements and suffered three shipwrecks.

SEE ALSO *Volunteers of Ireland*.

revised by John Oliphant

DESTOUCHES, CHARLES-RENÉ-DOMINIQUE SOCHET, CHEVALIER. (1727–1794). French admiral. Born in Luçon, he joined the navy in 1743, becoming lieutenant in 1756, commander in 1765, and ship's captain in 1767. On 27 July 1779 he participated in the Battle of Ouessant. Succeeding Admiral Ternay as commander of the French squadron at Newport after the admiral's death in December 1780, he quickly dispatched a cutter to protect coastal traffic in the New London area. He also sent a force southward to support Lafayette in Virginia. After the action off Chesapeake Bay on 16 March 1781, he returned to Newport, carrying back the British frigate *Romulus*. Governor Hancock of Massachusetts asked him to undertake a combined operation against Fort Penobscot, but it was cancelled in April when Washington expressed misgivings. Destouches was succeeded by Admiral Barras in May 1781. The former served on the *Neptune* during the Yorktown siege and participated in the capture of Saint-Christophe (February 1782) but was taken prisoner with his superiors by Rodney on 12 April 1782. He was awarded the rank of squadron commander in 1784 and promoted to rear admiral January 1792, but he soon retired. He was arrested in 1793 but was freed by the royalist army at the point of his trial.

SEE ALSO *Chesapeake Bay*.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

DE WOEDTKE SEE *Woedtke, Frederick William*.

DIAMOND ISLAND SEE *Ticonderoga Raid*.

DICKERT RIFLE. Many writers have referred to a "Deckhard rifle" carried by the "Over Mountain Men" at Kings Mountain. The weapon was actually a long rifle made by Jacob Dickert of Lancaster, Pennsylvania. The non-existent "Deckhard" may be a phonetic rendering of "Dickert" or "Deckert." Many weapons, not just the Dickert rifle, are mistakenly identified by the name of the lockmaker; another well-known example is the Golcher (or Goulcher) rifle, named for G. Golcher of Kentucky.

SEE ALSO *Murphy, Timothy*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

DICKINSON, JOHN. (1732–1808). American political theorist. Born on 8 November 1732 in Talbot County, Maryland, John Dickinson studied law for three years before going to London for another three years of study at the Temple (1753–1757). Returning to Philadelphia, he was admitted to the bar and quickly became a prominent lawyer. In October 1760 he was elected to the assembly of the lower counties of Delaware, where his family owned property, becoming speaker of that body. In 1762, after losing re-election in Delaware, he was elected representative from Philadelphia to the Pennsylvania legislature. Here his conservative views threw him into the role of leading the unpopular Proprietary Party in opposition to Benjamin Franklin,

who wanted a royal government. Dickinson won this battle and Franklin lost his bid for re-election. A vigorous opponent of the Stamp Act, Dickinson attended the congress of 1765 and is credited with doing most of the work on the "Declaration of Rights and Grievances." In an essay published in 1765 entitled "The Late Regulations Respecting the British Colonies . . . Considered," Dickinson advocated enlisting the aid of British merchants to secure the repeal of the Sugar and Stamp Acts. His *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania* (1768), which called for peaceful resistance to the arbitrary government of the British Parliament, had a major impact on political thought in England as well as America.

In 1771 Dickinson drew up the first "Petition to the King," which won unanimous acceptance from the assembly, but he fell in popular estimation by condemning the often violent approach of the New England radicals. In 1774 he disapproved of any more assistance to Boston beyond sending an expression of sympathy. He epitomized the conservative Patriot viewpoint in his "Essay on the Constitutional Power of Great Britain over the Colonies in America," which urged caution in America's resistance to British authority. The Pennsylvania assembly selected Dickinson as a delegate to the first Continental Congress, drafting their "Petition to the King" and "Address to the People of Quebec," in which they sought Canadian support.

Made chairman of a Committee of Safety and Defense on 23 June 1775, Dickinson held this position a year. He also became a colonel of the first battalion raised in Philadelphia. In the Second Continental Congress he continued to advocate peaceful methods. He wrote the "Olive Branch Petition," adopted 5 July 1775 over the furious objections of New England delegates, and crafted the final version of the "Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of taking up Arms." He voted against the Declaration of Independence, insisting that a peaceful settlement was still possible and believing that the colonies lacked the central government and the support of allies needed for a successful war. Nonetheless, he headed the committee that drafted the Articles of Confederation, and led his regiment to Elizabethtown to combat the British. Dissatisfied by the direction events were taking, he quit both the assembly and Congress and moved to Delaware. He served as a private in the Delaware militia during the Philadelphia campaign, and in October 1777 he was made a brigadier general of militia.

Dickinson returned to Congress in February 1779 as a delegate from Delaware, but he resigned in the fall. In 1781 he became president of the Supreme Executive Council of Delaware, and when he returned to live in Philadelphia he held the same office in Pennsylvania from 1782 to 1785. In 1787 he was a delegate from

Delaware to the convention that framed the federal Constitution, and the next year he published nine letters, signed "Fabius," urging its adoption. In 1791, Dickinson was a delegate to and president of the Delaware constitutional convention. He then served in the assembly until he resigned because of ill health in 1793. During his last 15 years he held no public office, but in 1797 he published fourteen letters advocating friendship with France. He died on 14 February 1808.

SEE ALSO *Articles of Confederation; Stamp Act.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

DICKINSON, PHILEMON. (1739–1809). Militia general. Born on 5 April 1739 in Talbot County, Maryland, Philemon Dickinson moved to Philadelphia in 1757 to attend the College of Philadelphia. He then studied law with his brother John, but quit to oversee the family estate in Trenton, New Jersey. In July 1775 he was named a colonel of the Hunterdon County militia, and on 19 October became brigadier general of the New Jersey militia. In 1776 he was elected to the New Jersey provincial congress. Present at the Battle of Trenton on 26 December 1776, he ordered the artillery to shell his own house, which the British were using as a command post. A great deal of his personal property was destroyed in the battle. That same month, Dickinson became embroiled in a political controversy when a letter from his brother John advising him to refuse Continental currency and resign his commission became public.

While General George Washington occupied winter quarters at Morristown, Dickinson led one of the raids that seriously jeopardized British attempts to get provisions. He marched 400 untrained troops through a waist-deep river to surprise and defeat a large foraging party near Somerset Courthouse, New Jersey (20–22 January 1777). On 15 February 1777 he resigned his commission as militia brigadier general, but on 6 June he was named major general and commander in chief of the New Jersey militia, a post he retained until the end of the war. During the Philadelphia campaign (June to December 1777), he and David Forman were in the field with militia detachments, but Washington was unable to draw Dickinson's

command to the main army for the battle of Germantown (4 October). On 27 November he took part in an attack on Staten Island. On 9 May 1778 he led the militia in repulsing Major John Maitland's attack on Trenton. During the Monmouth campaign (June–July 1778) Dickinson's militia performed usefully in destroying roads and bridges to retard the British retreat across New Jersey and provided important intelligence. On 4 July 1778 he stood as second for his cousin, John Cadwalader, in the latter's duel with Thomas Conway. When General Wilhelm Knyphausen undertook his raid on Springfield, (7–23 June 1780), Dickinson and his militia performed a valuable service by acting as a delaying force, and they fought well at the battle of Springfield, New Jersey.

Starting in 1778, Dickinson ran for governor of New Jersey against William Livingston three times, losing each election. From 1782 to 1783, while his brother John was president of Delaware, Philemon served as a delegate to Congress from that state. In 1783 and 1784 he was vice president of the New Jersey State Council. In 1785 he, Robert Morris, and Philip Schuyler constituted a commission to select the site for the national capital. He was defeated by William Paterson as a candidate for U.S. senator in 1789, but served the unexpired term, 1790 to 1793, when Paterson left the Senate to become governor. Though raised a Quaker and married to one, Dickinson owned slaves and defended the institution, getting into an extended and heated debate with his brother when the latter insisted that he free his slaves. Dickinson died at his Trenton estate on 4 February 1809.

SEE ALSO *Monmouth, New Jersey; Philadelphia; Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of Knyphausen.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

DIGBY, ROBERT. (1732–1814). British naval officer. Digby went to sea in 1744 and became a lieutenant in 1752, a captain in 1755. During the Seven Years' War he served at Rochefort (1757), the capture of Gorée (1758) and Quiberon Bay (1759), and in the Mediterranean. On 27 July 1778 he commanded *Ramillies* (seventy-four guns) at the battle of Ushant,

and on 19 March 1779 he was promoted rear admiral of the *Blue*. During the critical summer of 1779 he was second in command to Sir Charles Hardy in the Channel Fleet, and he performed the same role under George B. Rodney during his relief of Gibraltar. It was at this time that he became governor of the king's son, Prince William Henry, who first went to sea in Digby's *Royal George*. Digby continued as second in the Channel Fleet in 1780–1781 and took part in Darby's relief of Gibraltar. In 1781 he relieved Thomas Graves as commander in chief in North America and generously allowed Samuel Hood to take most of his ships of the line to the West Indies. Hereafter the North American station was quiet until the end of the war; Digby returned home in 1783. In 1784 he married Mrs. Jauncy, Andrew Elliot's daughter. In 1787 he rose to vice admiral and in 1794 to admiral. He died on 25 February 1814.

SEE ALSO *Graves, Thomas; Hood, Samuel.*

revised by John Oliphant

DIPLOMACY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

European exploration and colonization of the New World led to the Colonial Wars, and the political settlements that followed these conflicts must be considered the background of the diplomacy during and after the American Revolution. In simplest terms, British diplomacy during the Revolution amounted to little more than the attempt to maintain European neutrality while the "revolting colonists" were brought back into line. The Americans, on the other hand, needed European support to win. France and Spain, the major powers on the Continent, looked on England's misfortune in America as their opportunity to reshape the balance of power in Europe and in the world.

In the period following the Seven Years' War, two French foreign ministers, Choiseul and later Vergennes, anticipated conflicts between the American colonists and the British and sought to exploit them for French advantage. As the war of words between the colonies and England escalated into actions, George III issued a proclamation in October 1774 forbidding the sale of munitions to the colonies. In the spring of 1775 Parliament passed a series of acts that prohibited altogether foreign trade with the colonies except for those considered safe—Georgia, North Carolina, Delaware, and New York. In August George III declared the colonies to be in rebellion and those participating as traitors. The colonies under restraint (especially Rhode Island, Connecticut, Maryland, and

Virginia) began the search for arms and ammunition from foreign sources such as the West Indies. Working through local merchants, they identified and established contacts with sympathetic foreign officials in the Caribbean and in Europe.

Congress on 18 September 1775 established a committee, similar to the state organizations, called the Secret Committee of Trade (later known as the Secret Committee) to negotiate contracts for imports of gunpowder and munitions. Original members of the committee included, among others, Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, Robert R. Livingston, and Robert Morris. When Morris's business firm received contracts through the committee, congressional factions led by the Adamses and Lees complained. Divisions between the Adams-Lee Junto and the Morris faction, two small but powerful minorities in the Continental Congress, continued to fragment congressional policy on foreign relations. As Neil Storch has concluded, this strife increased until 1779 when it included numerically only fifteen to forty percent of the delegates, but those small groups constituted a significant portion of the divided leadership. The Adams-Lee Junto included among others: Samuel Adams, John Adams, William Whipple, James Lovell, Arthur Lee, Francis Lightfoot Lee, Richard Henry Lee, Henry Laurens, and James Searle. The Morris faction included among others: Robert Morris, John Dickinson, James Duane, John Jay, Robert R. Livingston, Gouverneur Morris, Meriwether Smith, Thomas Burke, William Henry Drayton, and William Paca. Thus the factionalism present in Congress became a fundamental element of American foreign policy. Another secret committee, the Committee of Secret Correspondence, was established on 29 November 1775 "for corresponding with our friends in . . . other parts of the world." Its members included, among others, Franklin, John Jay, and later Robert Morris. The two secret committees combined their efforts and objectives to send Deane to France.

Deane had been an active Connecticut merchant, and as a member of the Continental Congress he had spoken out in the debate over trade policy for America in favor of seeking it actively abroad. From July to December 1776, he alone represented Congress in France. There he assumed the role of a merchant openly buying goods, while privately seeking the favor of the French government. In a secret meeting with Vergennes, Deane was given assurance that as a private merchant he could conduct business in France and that the French government was in possession of older model weapons (see the article on Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval) that were still serviceable. Vergennes recommended him to Pierre-Augustin Beaumarchais, the author of comedies who was also engaged in commerce. Soon the two had made arrangements for significant arms shipments to America. Early in December many French officers began to approach

Deane for service in the American army. Perhaps seeking to play to public opinion in France as well as to provide experienced officers for the American army, Deane provided commissions for many highly placed officers.

In September 1776 the Continental Congress appointed Franklin and Arthur Lee to join Deane as a committee (or, as they became known, the "commissioners") to perform the mission originally entrusted to Deane alone. Though not "trained" diplomats, Franklin and Lee had served earlier as colonial agents in England and had become accomplished negotiators and propagandists. Their skills strengthened the American presence in France. Franklin, as the more colorful and charming figure, of course became the topic of greatest public interest. Lee, without set duties and accused of English associations, dissociated himself from the others. Ironically it was Franklin and Deane who were unwittingly providing information for covert English agents such as Edward Bancroft. By early February 1777, Franklin, Deane, and Lee became concerned at their lack of timely news and further instructions from the Congress. So in February they agreed to exceed their earlier instructions. Given that little was happening in France, the three decided that Lee should venture off to Spain and Deane to the Netherlands. In February 1777 Lee went to Spain, where the embarrassment of his presence forced the officially neutral government to offer him private assurances of money and supplies through Diego de Gardoqui.

William Carmichael, an affluent student in London, had been recruited by Lee to carry dispatches for him. When he appeared in Paris, he shifted loyalties to Deane to establish business and diplomatic contacts with the Netherlands and Prussia. Congress meanwhile in May 1777, under the influence of the John Adams-Arthur Lee junto, had appointed Lee commissioner to Spain as well as renewed him as a commissioner to France; William Lee commissioner to Prussia and the Holy Roman Empire (Austria); and Ralph Izard commissioner to Tuscany (Italy). Before news of these Congressional appointments reached France, Arthur Lee proposed in April 1777 that Carmichael accompany him to Prussia. Carmichael—now associated with Deane—refused unless awarded official status, which the commissioners declined to grant. This magnified the growing rift among Deane, Franklin, and the Lees. In addition, Deane and Franklin refused to inform Lee of negotiations during his absence or to provide him with access to their files. Complaining to the French of his treatment, Arthur Lee set off for Berlin and Vienna on 15 May. Contrary to his experiences in Spain, Lee found his advances stymied in both capitals. When he returned to Paris to find his brother William arrived from London, Lee also discovered that his fellow commissioners were not keeping systematic financial accounts and were indiscreet in the security of sensitive documents. The acrimony increased. In October and November, Arthur

Lee wrote to his congressional allies calling for an overhaul of America's agency in Europe and a separation of diplomats from commercial agents; he also suggested that the commercial activities of Beaumarchais were in fact gifts of the French government.

On 27 November Deane suggested to Franklin and Lee that they threaten France with an ultimatum. If it would not agree to a commercial treaty, they would open negotiations with the British. The two rejected Deane's proposal. Shortly thereafter news arrived in France that General John Burgoyne had surrendered his army to the Americans at Saratoga. One prominent American historian, Jonathan Dull, suggests that news of Saratoga had little to do with the French decision to negotiate treaties with the Americans. He suggests that French planners had already projected that spring 1778 would be the date to begin hostilities against the British. On the other hand, noted English historians John Hardman and Munro Price suggest that changes in Bavarian politics may have opened the way for the redirection of French attention (and resources) to America. Serious negotiations on a treaty began on 8 January 1778. The French representative agreed to American proposals and responded with a counteroffer of a commercial treaty and a military alliance treaty. The texts of both were approved and signed on 6 February, and Louis XVI formally received the American commissioners at Versailles on 20 March. Although the British ambassador quickly withdrew from France, there was no major combat between England and France until 16 June, when a naval encounter served as the formal cause for mutual proclamations of war between the two major powers.

As a last effort to trump the alliance in America, Lord North pressed two bills through Parliament. One offered the Americans repeal of the Coercive Acts and freedom from taxation; the other established a commission to negotiate peace with the Americans under the nominal leadership of the earl of Carlisle. Congress dismissed the proposals. The French minister to the newly recognized United States, Conrad-Alexandre Gérard, arrived near Philadelphia on 11 July 1778 with the recently recalled American commissioner Deane and a French fleet commanded by comte d'Estaing. To equalize diplomatic representation, the Congress dissolved the commission in September and appointed Franklin as its minister plenipotentiary.

France now turned to Spain to secure its commitment to the war and thereby achieve clear naval superiority over England. Spain's price for such a commitment was a series of objectives crowned by a combined invasion of England. The treaty of Aranjuez, establishing a Franco-Spanish alliance, was signed on 12 April 1779. By its terms Spain promised not to undertake a separate peace with England and to acknowledge that France would conclude no peace short of American independence. As a result of disease and

bad weather, the projected invasions in 1779 and 1781 failed, but they distracted critical English naval forces from American waters. An English attempt to negotiate with the Spanish through envoy Richard Cumberland also failed.

Congress's next step was to balance its diplomatic representation overseas. Congress kept Franklin as minister to France, selected from the "radicals" John Adams as peace commissioner, chose from the "moderates" John Jay as minister to Spain, and the nonaligned former president of Congress Henry Laurens as minister to the Netherlands. Arthur Lee and William Lee were recalled to America. During 1781 Congress appointed a peace commission composed of Franklin, Jay, Adams, Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson (who declined) and instructed them to undertake no treaty without consulting with the French government. With the success of the Yorktown campaign, American prospects for a serious English negotiation blossomed.

When the British government under Lord North fell in March 1782 and was replaced by the Opposition under Lord Rockingham, there were deep divisions within the new government about how to handle the Americans. The English negotiators Richard Oswald and Thomas Grenville took different approaches with Franklin, the remaining American representative in Paris. Adams had gone to the Netherlands to work out the terms of a treaty of amity and commerce. John Jay did not return to Paris until late June. Henry Laurens had been captured on the Atlantic and upon his release from English imprisonment declined to serve. Separate English negotiations with Franklin and with Vergennes were both stalemated. With the death of Rockingham in June 1782, George III named the earl of Shelburne as head of the cabinet. By the end of July Shelburne offered the Americans independence. However, Franklin, owing to illness, had been forced to withdraw from the negotiations. Jay, having entered the negotiations late, hesitated to agree until the British negotiator's instructions included the offer of independence. He was also suspicious of a separate French-British deal. He sent Benjamin Vaughan to England with an offer for America to withdraw from the French alliance.

In October Franklin, Adams, and Laurens joined the negotiations, and all reached an agreement with the British diplomats on 30 November. The British would acknowledge American independence and withdraw all their troops, and accept America's boundary demands, its fishing rights off Newfoundland, and its right to navigation on the Mississippi River. In turn, the Americans would honor their British debts and Congress would urge the states to treat the Loyalists fairly. Yet ambiguities in these terms would lead the British to delay a full troop withdrawal from the frontier until 1794 by the terms of Jay's Treaty. Although the French were somewhat surprised by the British concessions the Americans had obtained, they

were pleased that this achievement would put additional pressure on the Spanish to comply without having reached their primary goal of retaking Gibraltar. On 20 January 1783 a preliminary peace treaty was signed by the Americans, French, and Spanish and on behalf of the Netherlands. However, by February a new problem had arisen. The House of Commons rejected the proposal.

With the rejection of the preliminaries, Shelburne resigned as chief minister and was replaced by a coalition government led by Lord North and Charles James Fox. A wave of anti-American feeling swept through England, resulting in the passage of an act excluding Americans from trade with the British West Indies. Despite this, the new government held on to the old treaty concessions, and a final treaty along the same terms was signed at Paris on 3 September 1783, the same day as the French and Spanish treaties were signed. A final British treaty with the Dutch followed on 20 May 1784. For all its military, political, and economic weaknesses, America had emerged at the end of the war victorious in its major objective: political and diplomatic independence. In time, with a new constitution it would move to overcome those weaknesses.

The standard general authority on the diplomacy of the American Revolution is Jonathan R. Dull. The best authority on French relations with the Continental Congress is William C. Stinchcombe.

SEE ALSO *Adams, John; Bancroft, Edward; Choiseul, Etienne François, comte de Stainville; Colonial Wars; Committee of Secret Correspondence; Deane, Silas; Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, comte d'; Fox, Charles James; Franklin, Benjamin; George III; Gérard, Conrad Alexandre; Gribeauval, Jean Baptiste Vaquette de; Hortalez & Cie; Izard, Ralph; Jay, John; Jay's Treaty; Laurens, Henry; Lee, Arthur; Lee, William; Livingston, Robert R.; Morris, Robert (1734–1806); North, Sir Frederick; Oswald, Richard; Rockingham, Charles Watson-Wentworth, second Marquess of; Saratoga, Second Battle of; Secret Committee of Congress; Shelburne, William Petty Fitzmaurice, earl of; Spanish Participation in the American Revolution; Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Comte de; Yorktown Campaign.*

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DIRECTION. When a military writer speaks of going down a body of water, he means in the direction of flow. Burgoyne's offensive, for example, advanced up Lake Champlain from Canada to New York. No difficulty is encountered in the case of streams that run from north to south, as does the Hudson, but frequent errors are made as a result of thinking that north always means up, as it does on the conventional map. The left bank of a stream is the one on an observer's left as he or she faces downstream. The left flank of a formation is the left side as its members face the enemy; unless the enemy is retreating, his left flank is on the side of your right flank.

Mark M. Boatner

DISALLOWANCE. There were many steps involved in the formal process of enacting legislation in the royal colonies of British North America. The popularly elected assemblies initiated laws, which the royal governor could veto. Laws passed by the assembly that received the governor's assent were sent to the Board of Trade for review. The Board then recommended to the Privy Council the "allowance" of the legislation if, in its opinion, it did not deviate from imperial policy, and recommended "disallowance" in other cases. The Privy Council submitted final recommendations to the king.

While perhaps as many as 95 percent of all laws eventually received royal assent, a process which could take up to a dozen years, the governor initially and the Board of Trade at the center of the empire always were alert to disallow laws that adversely affected the interests of British merchants. Laws that enhanced the stature and authority of local assemblies were more favorably received during the time of "salutary neglect" (when enforcement of trade policy was left intentionally lax), on the theory that the delegation of power and responsibility promoted an accommodation of interests whereby everyone would benefit. Wartime brought increasing strains in relations between governors and assemblies, especially about raising money and men for military purposes; local elites were not above using emergencies to extract concessions from the governors that would have been unthinkable in peacetime. The assemblies could evade some measure of disallowance by passing these laws as temporary acts.

SEE ALSO *Salutary Neglect; Trade, The Board of.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

DISPLAY. The modern tactical term is "deploy," which dates from 1796.

DOBBS FERRY. About fifteen miles below Kings Ferry and less than ten miles north of Kings Bridge, this was an important crossing site on the Hudson. During most of the war this ferry was too close to the British defenses of New York City for the Americans to use, so Kings Ferry—covered by Stony Point and the works at Verplancks Point—became the crossing that both sides sought to control.

Mark M. Boatner

DOLLAR SEE *Money of the Eighteenth Century.*

DONOP, CARL EMIL KURT VON. (1740–1777). Hessian officer. At Long Island he commanded the body of Hessian grenadiers and jäegers (light infantrymen, from the German word meaning "hunter") engaged in the center of the line. After the pursuit of General George Washington's army to the Delaware, Colonel von Donop was relieved by Colonel Johann Gottlieb Rall as commander of the Trenton garrison on 14 December 1776 and was given overall responsibility for the chain of outposts along the Delaware. He was overruled by General William Howe when he advocated a concentration of his forces at Trenton. Howe directed him to occupy Bordentown and Burlington, both in New Jersey, to protect Loyalists of the region, but Donop withdrew from the latter place when its mayor informed him it would be shelled by American naval vessels from the river if the Hessians remained. He stationed the Forty-second Foot ("Black Watch") and one of his grenadier battalions at Black Horse (now Columbus), and moved the rest of his command to the vicinity of Bordentown.

After the annihilation of Rall's force at Trenton on 26 December, Donop wisely withdrew to Princeton, where he ordered the construction of two small redoubts to cover the approach from Stony Brook. He was mortally wounded in the attack on Fort Mercer (Red Bank), New Jersey, on 22 October 1777, and died three days later.

SEE ALSO *Fort Mercer, New Jersey; Trenton, New Jersey.*

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DOOLY, JOHN. (1735 or 1740–1780). Militia officer and partisan leader. Born in Wilkes County, North Carolina, he was in the Ninety Six district of South Carolina with extended family by 1765 and moved his family to Wilkes County, Georgia, in 1773. There, he acquired land where he maintained a mill, fort, ferry, and plantation and became a deputy surveyor. Initially opposed to anti-British activities, Dooly soon joined the militia and served in a variety of leadership positions.

Commissioned captain of his local militia company in December 1775, in 1776 he became captain of the Twelfth Troop of the Georgia Continental Regiment of Horse.

During the fall of 1777 he resigned his commission under threat of court-martial because he had taken an Indian peace delegation hostage in retaliation for his brother Thomas's death by a Creek war party. He served Wilkes County in the assembly and as its first sheriff during 1777–1778, assumed command of the county militia battalion in 1778, and was elected to that position the following winter.

The British reoccupied Georgia in late 1778, and when troops led by Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell came into the backcountry in January 1779, Dooly, his subordinate, Lieutenant Elijah Clarke and one hundred volunteers fled to South Carolina. Bolstered by South Carolina militia under Colonel Andrew Pickens, they returned to Georgia and on 14 February 1779 defeated Loyalist forces at Kettle Creek. In March, Pickens and Dooly and their militias defeated a large number of Indians attempting to reach the British, but they arrived too late to assist General John Ashe at Briar Creek.

With the British now out of the backcountry, rebel leaders formed a temporary government. Dooly served not only as a member of but also as attorney for this government and as colonel-commandant of the militia. Writing to Colonel Samuel Elbert, captured by the British at Briar Creek, he explained that trying to recruit in the backcountry was difficult because rebel plundering raids turned the settlers from the rebel cause toward the British. Dooly and his militia joined General Benjamin Lincoln's army at the unsuccessful siege of Savannah in the fall of 1779. This defeat eliminated any hope of external support for Georgia's rebel government.

John Dooly and others now formed partisan bands to fight the British in Georgia. A strong leader, he attracted men on both a political and military level, and they rode without pay, supplies, or a specified term of service. After the British captured Charleston in May 1780, they allowed rebel militiamen to return to their homes as prisoners of war on parole. Dooly and four hundred of his men returned to the backcountry and surrendered to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brown on 5 June 1780. That summer Dooly was assassinated, probably by Loyalist militia Captain William Corker and several others, an incident that has figured in folk legend. Dooly's two sons were each awarded five hundred acres by the state government at the end of the war.

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Leslie Hall

DORCHESTER, BARON. (1724–1808). The title of Sir Guy Carleton, governor general of British North America, from 21 August 1786.

SEE ALSO *Carleton, Guy*.

DORCHESTER, SOUTH CAROLINA.

1 December 1781. After recuperating from the hard-fought Battle of Eutaw Springs of 8 September, General Nathanael Greene left the High Hills on 8 November. Major John Doyle (often confused with his brother, Lieutenant Colonel Welbore Doyle, of the Irish Volunteers), in temporary command of British forces while Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Stewart recovered from a wound, had resumed operations, and a Loyalist uprising had been inspired by David Fanning's daring Hillsboro raid on 13 September. Doyle withdrew to Goose Creek Bridge as Greene approached. Greene then decided to try to cut off the post of Dorchester on the Ashley River, fifteen miles northwest of Charleston. This place was held by 850 men, and Greene moved against them with 200 Maryland and Virginia Continentals and 200 cavalry. The rest of the American army, under Colonel Otho Williams, marched to the Round O plantation, but when the British identified Greene in the column approaching Dorchester, they assumed that his entire army was following. There were cavalry skirmishes and a clash between the American advance guard and a reconnaissance force from Dorchester, but the enemy did not attempt to defend the post. Destroying their stores and throwing their guns into the river, they withdrew to within five miles of Charleston. Stewart returned to take command, and he recruited and armed African American troops in anticipation of an attack on Charleston. The Americans went into camp at Round O. Another indecisive skirmish occurred at Dorchester on 29 December 1781.

SEE ALSO *Hillsboro Raid, North Carolina*.

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DORCHESTER HEIGHTS, MASSACHUSETTS.

2–27 March 1776. As American soldiers began the siege of Boston in the days after the first clashes at Lexington and Concord (19 April 1775), they did not establish positions on either the Charlestown peninsula, across the Charles River from Boston, or the Dorchester peninsula, which extended into Boston Harbor from the southeast. Both areas remained in the



Dorchester Heights Monument. *A white marble tower, dedicated in 1902, stands on the site where American forces built fortifications from which they drove the British from Boston in March 1776.* © JOSEPH SOHM; CHROMOSOHM INC./CORBIS.

no-man's-land between the opposing armies until early June, when, to forestall a British expedition against Cambridge, the Massachusetts Committee of Safety directed its forces to occupy both locations. Massachusetts Major General John Thomas was reluctant to comply, knowing the weakness of the troops under his command at Roxbury, and in the event, only Charlestown peninsula was fortified, action that led directly to the Battle of Bunker Hill.

The Dorchester peninsula remained unoccupied for the rest of the year, but it continued to play a significant role in the calculations of both sides. Indeed, the Committee of Safety understood that artillery placed on the heights near the end of the peninsula would make Boston Harbor untenable for the British as early as May 1775, when it endorsed Benedict Arnold's idea to acquire the requisite cannon from Fort Ticonderoga. The British generals in Boston also understood the importance of the heights, but after Bunker Hill they thought their army would be spread too thinly if they tried to hold it.

The stalemate began to dissolve as Colonel Henry Knox's "Noble Train of Artillery" wended its way from Fort Ticonderoga to Cambridge. General Washington had arrived at Cambridge on 2 July 1775, and ever since he had been building up the American army's stocks of gunpowder, without which the cannon would be useless. Now, with the arrival of the artillery at Cambridge in late January, and the pressing need to take some offensive action before the arrival of British reinforcements in the spring, Washington held a council of war on 16 February 1776 to discuss the matter with his generals. Although he believed the army capable of assaulting Boston, his generals did not share that opinion, and they proposed instead that the Americans seize some position and force the enemy to attack. Dorchester Heights was the obvious choice. As finally worked out, the plan was for this high ground to be fortified in the course of a single night, as had been done at Bunker Hill. Because the frozen ground made quick pick-and-shovel work impossible, Rufus Putnam proposed that the army construct fortifications aboveground by the use of prefabricated parts. Heavy timber frames (called chandeliers) were assembled, and gabions, fascines, and bales of hay were made up to fit into them. Barrels to be filled with earth were prepared to be placed around the works, where they would give the fortification an appearance of strength and also could be rolled down the steep, bare slopes into the ranks of attacking forces. Abatis would be constructed from orchards adjoining the heights.

A secondary attack across Back Bay to turn the defenses of Boston Neck was also planned should the British attack the fortifications on Dorchester Heights. For this operation, Major General Israel Putnam would lead the division of John Sullivan and Nathanael Greene: four thousand men in forty-five bateaux, supported by two floating batteries. As a diversion, American guns would start a heavy bombardment on 2 March and continue nightly through 4–5 March, when the fortifications were to be built.

The main operation was commanded by John Thomas (then a Continental brigadier general), who moved out the night of 4 March with a work detail of 1,200 men, a covering force of 800 men, and a train of 360 ox carts to move the heavy fortification materials. Conditions were ideal: the air was mild, a bright moon gave light by which to work, and a ground haze obstructed enemy observation from Boston and Castle William. Although the artillery drowned out much of the noise of shovels, picks, and axes on the hill, a British officer detected the work at 10 P.M. and reported it to Brigadier General Francis Smith. That venerable regular officer, who had shown himself to be mentally and physically slow at Lexington and Concord, did nothing. By daylight the Americans had completed their work unmolested:

a fresh fatigue party had reported at 3 A.M.; the ox carts had made two trips; and reinforcements, including five rifle companies, had arrived to man the two small forts.

The American movement took Major General William Howe, the British commander in chief in Boston, by surprise. He had sent troops to raid and reconnoiter Dorchester Heights on 14 February, and when they found no American activity, he seems to have let his attention lapse. Now he may have overestimated the American accomplishment. After the works became visible, he reported to London that the Americans must have employed at least twelve thousand men to raise them. A British engineer estimated that up to twenty thousand men were involved. Still, Howe needed to act quickly, since the Royal Navy would have to pull its ships out of the harbor if the American positions were not soon eliminated. Because a bombardment was unlikely to dislodge the rebels (British gunners would have difficulty hitting men firing from behind fortifications on heights above them), Howe planned a night attack with twenty-two hundred men under Major General Valentine Jones to take Dorchester Heights with the bayonet and push on into the American lines at Roxbury, if possible. At a council of war around 7 P.M., shortly before Jones's troops were to move out, Howe and his generals agreed that the attack should be called off. Howe had already decided that Boston was a cul-de-sac and that his best chance of suppressing the rebellion required him to change his base to New York. He refused to sacrifice troops he would soon need elsewhere on what amounted to a rear-guard action. A few hours later, over the night of 5–6 March, a severe storm struck, and Howe informed his troops in general orders the next day that he had canceled the operation due to adverse weather conditions. On 7 March he began issuing orders for the evacuation of Boston.

The Americans attempted to extend their Dorchester Heights position by occupying and fortifying Nook's Hill on the night of 9 March, but they were driven off with the loss of five men dead by artillery fire. Washington and his army had demonstrated (to themselves as well as to the British) that they could strike quickly, with stealth and cleverness, but in the end the principal operational result was to speed up the British timetable for withdrawal.

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege; Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Howe, William; Knox's "Noble Train of Artillery"; Thomas, John.*

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DORMANT COMMISSION. One that became effective in a certain contingency. German generals in America were senior to the second-ranking British generals, and one would have become commander in chief had anything incapacitated General Howe or his successor, Clinton, in the spring of 1776. Therefore, Clinton was given a dormant commission as a full general in America to take effect if Howe could no longer command (thus blocking Heister); when Clinton succeeded Howe, Cornwallis was given a dormant commission that would make him senior to Knyphausen if Clinton were incapacitated. When Clinton sent Benedict Arnold to conduct his Virginia raid (December 1780), he secretly furnished Dundas and Simcoe with dormant commissions authorizing one of these trusted British officers to take command "in case of the death or incapacity" of Arnold.

Mark M. Boatner

DRAGOON. A mounted infantryman who, strictly speaking, rode his horse into battle but dismounted to fight, as opposed to a cavalryman, who was supposed to fight on horseback. He got this name from the primitive firearm, called a "dragon" because flame came from its mouth, with which the original dragoons were armed. Since dragoons could fight on horseback and cavalry could fight dismounted, the two names generally were used synonymously.

Mark M. Boatner

DRAYTON, WILLIAM HENRY. (1742–1779). Patriot leader. Born in St. Andrew Parish, South Carolina, in September 1742, Drayton was born to privilege and married great wealth. Educated in England from 1753 to 1763, he was ordered home by his father before he finished his Oxford degree. Elected to the assembly in 1765, he supported Parliament's power to pass the Stamp Act and was defeated for reelection. In 1769 he wrote a notorious article in the *South Carolina Gazette* opposing the nonimportation agreement and found himself ostracized and unable to sell his crops. He went to England, where he promoted himself as a loyal supporter of the crown. Drayton published *The Letters of Freeman* in 1771, which earned him appointment to the South Carolina council with his father and brought him back to Charleston. But Drayton had further ambitions that were consistently foiled by the crown, which appointed Englishmen to the posts he desired. His efforts to steal

144,000 acres from the Catawbas were halted by John Stuart, the superintendent of Indian affairs. Abruptly, Drayton began to see the flaws in the English political system, and in August 1774 he published *A Letter from Freeman*, asserting American rights and castigating the Coercive Acts as despotic. He recommended that the first Continental Congress set up an independent American legislature subject only to the king. In response, the governor suspended Drayton from the council in March 1775.

Suddenly one of the most radical men in Charleston, Drayton quickly became an important Patriot leader. Elected to the Provincial Congress in 1775, he served on a number of important committees and on the Council of Safety, led the crowd that seized the armory and other government offices that same year, negotiated a truce with Loyalist leaders on 16 September 1775, and was elected president of the Provincial Congress. In the latter position he worked to develop a South Carolina navy and personally orchestrated the attacks against the British ships in Charleston Harbor. On 6 February 1776 he called on the Provincial Congress to declare independence from Britain. When the South Carolina Congress passed a constitution the following month, Drayton was named a member of the state council and the assembly and also became chief justice, thus holding a leadership position in all three branches of government. In 1778 he became president of South Carolina; played a prominent role in drafting a new constitution; and was elected to Congress, where he served on more than eighty committees in the next seventeen months. Drayton's primary goals in Congress were protecting southern interests, which is to say slavery, and resisting efforts at reconciliation with Britain. He also began work on a history of the Revolution, which was cut short by his death of typhus in Philadelphia 3 September 1779.

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Michael Bellesiles

DUANE, JAMES. (1733–1797). Patriot statesman, jurist. New York. Born on 6 February 1733 in New York City, James Duane was admitted to the bar in August 1754, and soon had a large, highly successful practice. In Revolutionary politics he was conservative, and after his election to the Continental Congress (4 July 1774) he worked for conciliation with Britain. As a member of the

committee to draft a statement of the rights of Americans, he did much to moderate its tone. He seconded Joseph Galloway's Plan of Union on the grounds that the British Parliament did have the right to regulate colonial trade, but he signed the non-importation agreement (20 October 1774) even though he felt it went too far. Re-elected to the Continental Congress, he was one of the strongest opponents of the movement toward Independence.

Serving as a delegate from 1774 to 1779, and again from 1781 to 1783, Duane was on a large number of committees, and his most important work was done in the fields of finance and Indian affairs. He assisted in making the final draft of the Articles of Confederation (adopted 15 November 1777 by the delegates). Inevitably, his loyalty to the Revolution was challenged and, in the summer of 1781, the press raised charges of which he was cleared only after John Jay and other influential colleagues stepped forth to defend him. When New York City was evacuated by the British, Duane entered the city as a member of Governor George Clinton's council. On 4 February 1784 he was appointed mayor, an office he held until September 1789, when President George Washington appointed him the first federal judge of the New York district. In March 1794 he retired from public life because of bad health, but continued to be active in land development. As a lawyer he had represented New Yorkers in private suits involving the boundary dispute with Vermont. Prior to 1765 he had carried out colonizing projects on his large Mohawk Valley holdings, and his interest in this undertaking continued. Duane attended the Poughkeepsie ratification convention of 1788 as a supporter of the Constitution. He died in Schenectady, New York, on 1 February 1797.

SEE ALSO *Independence*.

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DUBUYSSON DES HAYS, CHARLES-FRANÇOIS, VICOMTE. (1752–1786). Continental officer. Of noble French birth, he became an artillery officer candidate (*aspirant*) in 1768 and *sous lieutenant* in the Noailles cavalry regiment in 1772 and was discharged (*reformé*) in 1776. He accompanied Lafayette to America and then from Charleston to Philadelphia in 1777. On 4 October 1777 he was appointed major in the Continental army and assigned as aide-de-camp to De Kalb.

On 11 February 1778 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel, subject to his having command only over Canadian troops raised in Canada. Because of his abrasiveness with members of Congress in his application, Laurens advised De Kalb to tell him that “hurry & urgency . . . are exceedingly disgusting to a deliberative body.” On 16 August 1780 he suffered serious wounds at Camden and was captured. North Carolina awarded him an honorary rank of brigadier general by virtue of his conduct. As a prisoner on parole in Philadelphia, he repeatedly sought Washington’s intervention in advancing his exchange to return to France, but Washington repeatedly declined, claiming his release out of proper order would interfere with the public good. On 4 September 1781 Congress commended him and authorized his return to France. He was honorably discharged on 1 January 1782. He became a chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis in 1785.

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DUCHÉ, JACOB. (1738–1798). Chaplain of Congress. Pennsylvania. Son and namesake of a former mayor of Philadelphia, Duché was born in that city on 31 January 1738. He graduated from the first class of the College of Philadelphia in 1757, spent the next year at Cambridge, and returned with the orders of an Anglican minister. Rector of two churches, he became a popular preacher and respected essayist. In 1759 he had married Elizabeth, sister of his friend and classmate Francis Hopkinson. In 1774 the first Continental Congress named Duché its chaplain after his sermon at its first session moved many members to tears. Though he had initially supported independence, he came to believe it was a grave error and resigned his position in October 1776, asking that his \$150 salary be used for the relief of widows and children of Pennsylvania officers. A year later he wrote Washington a long letter urging him to give up the hopeless struggle and to use force if necessary to see that Congress revoked the Declaration of Independence. Washington promptly forwarded the astounding letter to the delegates at York.

The letter, which damned the Continental Congress as a collection of “Bankrupts, attorneys, men of desperate fortunes” and the Continental army as made up of “undisciplined men and officers, many of whom have been taken from the lowest of the people, without principle, without courage,” was widely circulated and published in Rivington’s *Royal Gazette* on 29 November 1777 (Van Doren, *Secret History*, pp. 40–41). Duché found himself cursed by Patriots as a traitor and sailed in December 1777 for England, where he became a popular preacher, published two volumes of sermons, and in 1782 was named secretary and chaplain of the Asylum for Female Orphans in Lambeth Parish. The state of Pennsylvania confiscated his property but left his family enough money to join him. In 1783 Duché read the Swedish philosopher Emanuel Swedenborg and almost immediately became his leading English exponent. In 1792 Pennsylvania repealed its exclusion law that had denied Loyalists the right to return to the state. Duché and his family immediately sailed to Philadelphia, where he lived until his death on 3 January 1798.

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DU COUDRAY SEE *Tronson du Coudray, Philippe Charles Jean Baptiste*.

DUER, WILLIAM. (1743–1799). Congressman, speculator, militia officer. England and New York. Born in Devonshire, England, on 18 March 1743, William Duer was the third son of a wealthy owner of large plantations in Antigua and Dominica. He was educated at Eton, commissioned in the army, and went to India as aide-de-camp to (Robert) Lord Clive in 1764. Unable to stand the climate, Duer returned to England, and in 1768 visited New York to buy timber on contract for the navy. In this connection he met Philip Schuyler, and on the latter’s advice bought large timber tracts above Saratoga. In 1773 he settled his affairs in England and established himself in New York. Aligning himself with the moderate Patriots at the start of the Revolution, Duer was elected to the Provincial Congress, which offered him a commission as a militia colonel. He turned down the offer but became more active in politics, serving as a delegate to the state Constitutional Convention, where he helped draft New York’s constitution. He also sat on the Committee of

Duke of Cumberland's Regiment

Safety and Committee on Conspiracies that targeted Loyalists. In 1777 he was appointed a judge on the court of common pleas, which post he held for ten years, and was selected a delegate to the Continental Congress from 1777 to 1778, where he sat on numerous committees and gained the respect of Congressional leaders.

Duer became wealthy from varied financial and commercial ventures, mostly involving the trade in military supplies, and he never hesitated to make use of inside information and political connections. In March 1786 he was appointed secretary to the Board of the Treasury. The next year he was the principal organizer of the Scioto Company, which became connected with the Ohio Company of Associates. In September 1789 Duer became assistant secretary of the new Treasury Department under his friend, Alexander Hamilton, but six months later he resigned, after he was discovered to be taking advantage of his situation to speculate in stocks and bonds. After engaging in large-scale speculations in New England lands and in other business ventures, he attempted to corner the government bonds market. When Duer could not meet his creditors' demands, he was arrested for debt on 23 March 1792 and imprisoned, setting off the first financial panic in the new nation's history. Except for a short period in 1797 he remained in jail until his death on 7 May 1799.

SEE ALSO *Ohio Company of Associates*.

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DUKE OF CUMBERLAND'S REGIMENT. On 17 November 1780, John Dalling, the governor of Jamaica, wrote to Charles, Earl Cornwallis, at Charleston, South Carolina, proposing to raise a regiment from among the Continental army prisoners captured at the siege of Charleston (12 May 1780) and the Battle of Camden (16 August 1780). The bearer of the letter was Lord Charles Montagu, who, Dalling proposed, would command the regiment of five one-hundred-man companies as its lieutenant colonel commandant. The effort was successful, and the regiment was sent to Jamaica in August 1781. The Loyal American Rangers were absorbed into the regiment after the death of their commander in January 1783. As late as 27 May 1783, British and Provincial soldiers convicted of crimes like desertion, robbery, and even murder were sent from New York City to Jamaica

for service in the regiment. It was disbanded on 24 August 1783, and the men allowed to settle in Nova Scotia.

SEE ALSO *Loyal American Rangers*.

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DULANY, DANIEL. (1722–1797). Lawyer, political leader. Maryland. Born in Annapolis, Maryland, on 28 June 1722, Dulany was schooled at Eton, Cambridge, and Middle Temple, and in 1747 was admitted to the Maryland bar. On the eve of the Revolution he was recognized by his political enemy, Charles Carroll, as "indisputably the best lawyer on this continent," but Carroll's son, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, found him simply "bizarre." Dulany entered the legislature in 1751, became a member of the Governor's Council in 1757, was commissary general from 1759 to 1761, and was secretary of the province from 1761 to 1774. After passage of the Stamp Act, he wrote a pamphlet entitled *Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies, for the Purpose of Raising a Revenue, by Act of Parliament* (1765). Dulany argued that the theory of virtual representation did not apply to the colonies because members of the British Parliament were not affected by measures that might hurt America. He went on to say that, since the colonies were not represented and could not be, they could not be taxed. This thesis was more subtle than the mere charge that "taxation without representation is tyranny," for Dulany based his position on English law rather than a flat assertion of right. He also advocated that the colonists manufacture their own goods as a means of achieving economic independence and ending England's exploitation of the Americans. Dulany was no radical, however, and at the outbreak of the Revolution, fearing anarchy, he retired to Hunting Ridge, near Baltimore, remaining loyal to Britain but proclaiming his neutrality. His family divided over the Revolution, one son becoming a Loyalist, the other a Patriot. Half of his property was confiscated in 1781, while he was on a brief visit to England. He lived the rest of his life in Baltimore, where he died 17 March 1797.

SEE ALSO *Taxation without Representation Is Tyranny*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

DUNBAR, MOSES. (1746–1777). Loyalist. Born in Wallingford, Connecticut, on 14 June 1746, Dunbar was the son of a Congregationalist minister. In 1764 he married Phebe Jerome and broke with his family and church, joining the Church of England in Bristol, Connecticut. This congregation was primarily Loyalist, and Dunbar—influenced by the ministers James Scovil and James Nicholas—sided with the crown in the accelerating political crisis. With the start of the Revolution, both his and his wife’s families divided politically. Two of her brothers died fighting on the Patriot side, while two other brothers were arrested for Loyalist activities. Dunbar based his loyalty to the crown on his religious faith, insisting that since George III was head of the church, he owed a sacred allegiance to the king. Dunbar found himself regularly harassed for his religious and political views, being set upon by a mob in 1776 and imprisoned in New Haven. Upon his release from jail, he went to Long Island and enlisted as a captain in the British army. In 1777 he began recruiting men for the army in New York and Connecticut. Arrested by Patriot authorities, he was jailed in Hartford and tried as a traitor under Connecticut’s Treason Act of 1776. The state’s supreme court found him guilty of illegal recruiting and sentenced him to death. Aided by Elisha Wadsworth, Dunbar escaped on 19 March 1777 but was recaptured the same day and immediately hanged, becoming the first person executed by the state of Connecticut for the crime of treason.

Michael Bellesiles

DUNDAS, THOMAS. (1750–1794). British army officer and politician. Dundas was born on 30 June 1750 into an old family of minor Scottish gentry. His father was a businessman and the member of Parliament for Orkney and Shetland. Educated at Edinburgh high school, Dundas obtained a cornetcy in the First Dragoon Guards on 25 April 1766. On 26 May 1769 he bought a captaincy in the Sixty-third Foot and

in 1771, in absentia, succeeded to his father’s parliamentary constituency. He continued to serve in Ireland with the Sixty-third until it sailed from Cork in April 1775 as part of the first reinforcement for the army in Boston.

On 20 January 1776 Dundas purchased a majority in the Sixty-fifth Foot in Halifax. Soon after, part of the regiment was drafted to other units, and the remainder, including Dundas, was sent home to recruit. On 27 December 1777 his influential uncle obtained for him the lieutenant colonelcy of a new regiment, the Eightieth, being raised by the corporation of Edinburgh. He sailed for America with the Eightieth in March 1779, in a convoy escorted by Marriot Arbuthnot’s squadron, and won praise for undertaking menial tasks when typhus swept through his ship, decimating the troops and crew. Dundas himself was taken ashore desperately ill in New York on 25 August. Recovering, he embarked on Clinton’s 1780 Charleston expedition. He was at Charleston when the city surrendered in May 1780 and subsequently served under General Charles Cornwallis. At the beginning of 1781 he joined John Simcoe on Benedict Arnold’s Chesapeake expedition, both officers carrying secret dormant commissions empowering them to take command should Arnold fall. On 6 July, at Green Spring, South Carolina, where Cornwallis narrowly failed to trap Anthony Wayne and Marquis de Lafayette, Dundas led the brigade that formed the British left wing. At Yorktown he commanded the detachment at Gloucester, across the river, and was one of the two commissioners who arranged the terms of surrender.

On 20 November 1782 he was breveted colonel and on 5 April 1784, when the Eightieth was disbanded at Edinburgh, Dundas went on half-pay. On 9 May he married. He was in Canada dealing with Loyalist compensation claims from 1785 to 1788. He lost his seat in Parliament in 1790, and in 1793, promoted major general, he sailed with Charles Grey’s expedition to the West Indies. In Barbados he trained six elite battalions in the light infantry tactics he had learned in America. He played a key role in Grey’s operations in the French Windward Islands in from February to April 1794 and was appointed governor of Guadeloupe. He died there of yellow fever on 3 June, not knowing that he had already been awarded his long-coveted colonelcy of the Sixty-eighth foot.

SEE ALSO *Arbuthnot, Marriot; Arnold, Benedict; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Cornwallis, Charles; Green (or Greene’s) Spring, South Carolina; Simcoe, John Graves; Yorktown, Siege of.*

revised by John Oliphant

DUNKIRK PIRATE. British epithet for Conyngham.

SEE ALSO *Conyngham, Gustavus.*

DUNMORE'S (OR CRESAP'S) WAR.

1774. The spread of white settlement into the Ohio Valley after the end of the final French and Indian War led in 1774 to the outbreak of a full-scale war. Chronic tensions were inflamed by a series of atrocities committed by white settlers. On 27 April, Captain Michael Cresap's party killed one Indian and captured another at Logan's Camp, also known as Baker's Cabin, thirty-five miles west of Pittsburgh near the junction of Yellow Creek and the Ohio River. Three days later, Daniel Greathouse lured a group of Indians into an "entertainment" and then murdered six of them. The Mingo chief Logan, heretofore a friend of the whites, lost a brother and a sister in what came to be known as the Baker's Cabin Massacre. He and two dozen warriors raided western Pennsylvania and took thirteen white scalps in retaliation. Although this revenge satisfied him, the Shawnees went to war. Captain John Connolly, commander of Fort Pitt (as well as the agent of Virginia's royal governor, John Murray, the earl of Dunmore), began retaliating against Indians in the vicinity in response to their recent attacks against settlers.

On 10 June Dunmore called out the militia of south-west Virginia. He seemed to welcome hostilities between whites and Indians as a diversion from the long-standing conflict between Pennsylvania and Virginia interests in this disputed territory. Early in August, Major Angus McDonald raided Shawnee villages on the Muskingum River (100 miles from Pittsburgh). The next month Dunmore started down the Ohio River with almost two thousand militia and ordered Colonel Andrew Lewis to lead another column of over a thousand militia down the Kanawha River to join forces with him deep in Indian territory. The Shawnee chief Cornstalk mobilized a thousand Shawnee, Miami, Wyandot (Huron), and Ottawa to attack Lewis before Dunmore was within supporting distance. The Indians were defeated after several hours of intense fighting in a major engagement on 10 October at the mouth of the Kanawha near Point Pleasant. Indian resistance collapsed, and the two columns linked up near the site of modern Chillicothe, Ohio. Despite Logan's refusal to join in the peace talks, Cornstalk met with Dunmore and hostilities ended. The tribes agreed to give up all lands east and south of the Ohio, the first time Indians in the Ohio Valley relinquished some of their land.

SEE ALSO *Chillicothe, Ohio; Cornstalk; Cresap, Michael; Logan; Murray, John.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

DUPORTAIL SEE *Le Bègue de Presle Duportail, Louis.*

DURHAM BOATS. Developed to carry iron ore, grain, whiskey, and other bulk freight between Philadelphia and the northern counties of New Jersey, they ranged between forty and sixty feet in length, were eight feet wide, and drew only twenty inches of water when fully loaded. The largest could carry fifteen tons. They could be sailed or poled. William S. Stryker describes them as being "like large canoes, . . . usually painted black, pointed at each end, and manned by four or five men" (*Battles of Trenton and Princeton*, p. 129). Washington used them in his attack on Trenton on 26 December 1776.

SEE ALSO *Trenton, New Jersey.*

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Mark M. Boatner

DU SIMITIÈRE SEE *Simitière, Pierre-Eugene du.*

DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. Born of a long struggle against Hapsburg Spain, the Dutch Republic began its independent life as the world's premier commercial nation. Wielding a vast colonial empire and maintaining maritime connections with virtually the

entire world, the seven United Provinces also manifested themselves as a political power in the seventeenth century. After a decline—mostly relative rather than absolute—during the last quarter of the century, the country gradually reduced its participation in the international political arena. This disengagement was accentuated by the decision to opt for neutrality in the Seven Years' War, a measure that paid dividends in international commerce without undermining the longstanding and mutually beneficial relationship with Great Britain.

Dutch involvement in the American War of Independence effectively ended the comfortable position into which the republic had maneuvered itself. Building on close contacts with American colleagues that had developed in previous decades, Dutch merchants began sending war material to ports and out-of-the-way anchorages in North America as early as 1774. In August of that year, an Amsterdam firm shipped gunpowder to the revolutionaries, and two months later three American ships were reportedly moored in Amsterdam harbor, their holds filled with gunpowder, cannonballs, and firearms. Such shipments provoked English enmity and led the Dutch Estates General in turn to placate their neighbors by formally forbidding consignments of materials of war from both metropolitan Dutch ports and the Dutch Caribbean islands. London's wrath, however, grew stronger as the 1770s advanced, in particular following the outbreak of the Anglo-French war in the summer of 1778, a few months after King Louis XVI had recognized the American rebels. What disturbed London was that the Dutch persevered in their neutrality. Fearing that Dutch merchants would use their neutrality to ship naval stores from the Baltic to France, the British government put pressure on the Dutch Estates General to voluntarily give up the right to transport naval stores, even though that right had been explicitly recognized by an Anglo-Dutch treaty. When it did not receive a satisfactory reply, Britain responded to what it perceived as Dutch aid to the French enemy by launching attacks on Dutch shipping.

At this juncture, Britain started complaining about alleged subversive transactions organized from Dutch islands in the Caribbean. Although the Dutch presence in the Americas in the eighteenth century bore little resemblance to the short-lived empire encompassing New Netherland and northern Brazil that flourished a century earlier, the Dutch colonies mirrored the mother country in that they were small but commercially significant. Cash crop production did not count for much in the insular Dutch Caribbean, but trade all the more. Two colonies stood out in activities that were more often than not illegal: St. Eustatius in the Leeward Islands and Curaçao off the coast of Venezuela. St. Eustatius's location was the better of the two. This tiny Caribbean island (twenty-one square kilometers, or one-quarter the size of

Manhattan), nicknamed the "Golden Rock," benefited from official Dutch neutrality in the fight between the thirteen colonies and their mother country, absorbing cash crops from Britain's mainland and island possessions, and sending large amounts of military stores to the North American rebels.

At least four thousand barrels of gunpowder left St. Eustatius in the first half of 1775 alone, and by the end of the year, daily shipments of Dutch and French gunpowder arrived in North America from St. Eustatius's Orange Bay. Many more were to follow in the years ahead. Adding insult to injury, the Dutch saluted the Grand Union flag in November 1776, when the brigantine *Andrew Doria* arrived in Orange Bay, which in British eyes was tantamount to recognizing the rebel states's independence. Even before that incident became a bone of contention, the British government had taken measures to stop Dutch supplies to St. Eustatius. In 1775 two warships were sent to cruise off the Dutch island of Texel, the home port from which dozens of ships left for the Golden Rock every year. Meanwhile St. Eustatius's governor, Johannes de Graaff, steadfastly denied any wrongdoing on the part of the colonists, producing falsified documents showing that ships had not been fitted out on the island but in Boston or Philadelphia, or that the ammunition seized by British privateers was not consigned to the rebels. In reality, de Graaff did not deny entry to any American vessel. The scale of supplies (military stores and consumables) from St. Eustatius to the rebels is suggested by the punitive expedition carried out by Britain in the summer of 1777. Fifty-four ships were seized on the outward or return voyage between the Netherlands and St. Eustatius.

In the fall of 1780, the British government exploited a document that fell in its lap, seemingly exposing the full extent of Dutch metropolitan collaboration with the North Americans. Although the copy of the treaty signed between the American diplomat Henry Laurens—the first United States envoy to the United Provinces, a Dutch banker, and one of Amsterdam's burgomasters—was merely a draft, England raised a hue and cry over Amsterdam's apparent collaboration with the colonies. Another complaint concerned the refusal of the Estates of Holland and the Dutch Estates General to turn over to Britain John Paul Jones, who had arrived in the Netherlands in late 1779, shortly after defeating a British naval force. War between the two neighbors now became a distinct possibility, a war that would hit two birds with one stone, so the British reasoning went. Joseph Yorke, the British ambassador to The Hague, convinced his superiors in London that war would restore to power the House of Orange, as it had on previous occasions. Hostilities became inevitable after the Dutch Estates General joined Russia, Denmark, and Sweden in the League of Armed

Dutch Participation in the American Revolution

Neutrality on 10 December 1780. Ten days later Britain declared war. The war, to which the Dutch at the time referred as the American war, was an entirely maritime affair. It went off miserably for the Dutch. In a show of strength, British cruisers and privateers seized scores of Dutch ships in European waters and the Indian Ocean, paralyzing Dutch overseas trade. Several fortified Dutch ports in India and Ceylon, three Dutch colonies in Guiana, and almost all Dutch forts and lodges in West Africa also fell into British hands, and scores of Dutch East Indiamen were seized, but nowhere was British reprisal so ruthless and detrimental as in St. Eustatius. After the island surrendered to a British naval force led by Admiral George Rodney in February 1781, the invaders settled old scores by confiscating cash, ships, and other property. Rodney's timing was bad. It has been speculated that the expedition to St. Eustatius played into the hands of the American Revolution by allowing the French fleet under squadron commander comte de Grasse to sail to Virginia. That fleet would soon contribute to the victory at Yorktown.

SEE ALSO *Grasse, François Joseph Paul, comte de; Rodney, George Bridges; St. Eustatius.*

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revised by Willem Klooster

E

EAST HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

SEE *Connecticut Coast Raid*.

EASTON, TREATY OF. (October 1758).

Pennsylvania agreed with the western Indians to make no settlements west of the Alleghenies.

SEE ALSO *Proclamation of 1763*.

EDEN, ROBERT. (1741–1784). Royal governor of Maryland. Born in Durham, in England, on 14 September 1741, Eden married Caroline Calvert, the sister of Lord Baltimore, in 1765. Three years later he was commissioned to serve as governor of Maryland. With his wife and two sons he reached Annapolis on 5 June 1769 and immediately proved himself to be admirably suited for his difficult post. His first important official act was to prorogue the General Assembly before it could protest passage of the Townshend Acts. He skillfully attempted to steer a middle course between the demands of the colonists and what they saw as the coercive policies of the government. His authority effectively ended with the convening of the Maryland Convention in June 1774, yet incredibly Eden remained governor even after the Revolution started. Although his reports went to great pains to explain the viewpoint of the colonists, in April 1776 a letter from Eden to George Sackville Germain was intercepted and interpreted to mean that the governor was an enemy of the people. The Maryland Council of Safety considered the charges

groundless and refused to act on a resolution of the Continental Congress that Eden be arrested. However, the Convention ordered him out of the country in May 1776 after learning that the government had ordered Eden to support the British armed forces in America. He left Annapolis on 26 June 1776 and returned to England. On 10 September 1776 he was made a baronet for his service. When the war ended he returned to Maryland to recover some property, and died at Annapolis on 2 September 1784.

SEE ALSO *Townshend Acts*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

EDEN, WILLIAM. (1744–1814). British diplomat, penal reformer, and politician. Educated at Durham School, Eton College, and Christ Church, Oxford, he was called to the bar in 1768. His *Principles of Penal Law* (1771) argued for fewer capital offenses and for the reform of offenders as against punishment. He became undersecretary in the Northern Department in 1772, and in 1774 he was elected to Parliament. The interruption of transportation to America in 1775 allowed him to introduce bills for the reform of the prison hulks and the creation of penitentiaries. He was appointed to the Board of Trade in 1776, and in 1778 North chose him for the peace commission led by Eden's Oxford friend, lord Carlisle. Although for

Eden it was a professional blind alley, his *Four Letters to the Earl of Carlisle* (1779) strongly defended the principle of negotiation. He was chief secretary of Ireland when Carlisle was lord lieutenant (1780–1782) and went on to be a distinguished diplomat. Created baron Auckland on his retirement in 1793, he continued to be a force in British politics until 1807. He died on 28 May 1814.

SEE ALSO *Carlisle Peace Commission*.

revised by John Oliphant

EGG HARBOR, NEW JERSEY SEE *Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey*

EGGLESTON, JOSEPH. (1754–1811). Continental officer. Virginia. Born in Virginia, Joseph Eggleston joined the Continental army soon after graduating from William and Mary, becoming paymaster in the Continental Dragoons in March 1777, and resigning this post 18 November 1777. On 21 April 1778 he became lieutenant and paymaster of Henry Lee's Dragoons, and on 5 September 1779 he advanced to the rank of captain. Captured at Elizabethtown, New Jersey, on 25 January 1780, he was included in a prisoner exchange and joined Lee's Legion for operations in the South. His performance was outstanding at Guilford, Augusta (May–June 1781), and Eutaw Springs. Having been promoted to major in 1781, he served in this grade until the end of the war. He then was a member of the Virginia legislature for several years and a congressman from 3 December 1798 to 3 March 1801. He died in Virginia in 1811.

SEE ALSO *Augusta, Georgia (22 May–5 June 1781); Eutaw Springs, South Carolina; Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ELBERT, SAMUEL. (c. 1740–1788). Continental general. Born in either Savannah, Georgia or Prince William Parish, South Carolina to a Baptist clergyman, Samuel Elbert was orphaned as a young child. He became a very prosperous merchant and West Indies trader, and made his home in Georgia. He served in the colonial militia, forming the Georgia Grenadiers in 1772. Having been a Son of Liberty and member of the first local Council of Safety (June 1775), he was commissioned a lieutenant

colonel of the First Georgia Continentals on 7 January 1776. After serving under Lachlan McIntosh he was made a colonel of the Second Georgia Continentals on 5 July 1776 and in May of the following year he commanded the Continental troops on the abortive expedition against eastern Florida. He made a successful landing on Amelia Island, but the heat, lack of supplies, and loss of surprise led him to abandon plans to attack the mainland. Elbert succeeded McIntosh as commander of Continental troops in Georgia and was accepted by Georgia's factionalized leadership. He attempted to train his forces, who found him approachable and concerned with their morale. After General Robert Howe arrived to take command in Georgia and undertook an invasion of eastern Florida, Elbert led 300 men and three galleys to capture Fort Oglethorpe in Frederica, near the mouth of the Altamaha River. Recalled to Georgia to help in the defense of Savannah in December 1778, he unsuccessfully urged that the main defense be made on Brewton's Hill. At Briar Creek, Georgia, on 3 March 1779, his 100 regulars put up about the only real resistance before the American force was routed. Elbert was wounded and captured. Some historians claim that he was wounded and captured a second time, on 12 May 1780, but this is incorrect. Included in a prisoner exchange in June 1781, he commanded a brigade at Yorktown. He was breveted as a brigadier general in the Continental army on 3 November 1783. After the war he became Governor of Georgia and a major general in the militia.

SEE ALSO *Briar Creek, Georgia; McIntosh, Lachlan*.

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revised by Leslie Hall

ELIZABETHTOWN, NEW JERSEY.

On 6 January 1777, at the end of the New Jersey campaign, General Sir William Howe ordered the British garrison of the outpost at what is now Elizabethtown, New Jersey, to fall back to Amboy. American combat patrols pressured the retreat and had an engagement with a detachment of the Waldeck Regiment (a unit serving the British). Due to its strategic location, the town was the site of a number of other skirmishes during the war, especially in early 1777, in what came to be known as the "Forage War," during which

American forces harassed British and Hessian troops as they scoured the countryside for crops and other supplies.

SEE ALSO *New Jersey Campaign*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

ELIZABETHTOWN–NEWARK–

PASSAIC RAID. 12–21 September 1777. General Henry Clinton sent two thousand British, German, and Loyalist troops into New Jersey at three different places on 12 September to conduct foraging operations. Brigadier John Campbell landed at Elizabethtown and swept north; Major General John Vaughan landed at Fort Lee and headed west toward Slotterdam; and a much smaller element came ashore below Tappan and swept south. On 13 September they linked up and engaged in day-long skirmishing along the Passaic River. American forces from the Hudson Highlands came south in reaction under the command of Brigadier General Alexander McDougall, and in a series of small clashes between patrols they established that Clinton was merely on a raid. The British returned to New York on 21 September with only a small amount of livestock.

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Robert K. Wright Jr.

ELLERY, WILLIAM. (1727–1820). Signer. Rhode Island. Born in Newport, Rhode Island, on 22 December 1727, William Ellery graduated from Harvard in 1747 and went to work for his father, a wealthy merchant. With his father's death in 1764, Ellery turned to politics and law. He joined the Sons of Liberty that year and entered the bar in 1769. An early advocate of colonial rights, he was sent to the Continental Congress in May 1776. Ellery sat in Congress continuously until 1786, with the exceptions of 1780 and 1782. He served on many committees and specialized in naval and commercial matters. During the British occupation of Rhode Island, his house was burned and his

property sacked. He was named chief justice of the Rhode Island superior court but never took his seat, feeling himself more valuable in Congress. He was commissioner of the Continental Loan Office for Rhode Island (18 April 1786–1 January 1790) and, from 1790 until his death on 15 February 1820, collector of the port of Newport.

SEE ALSO *Sons of Liberty*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

ELLIOT, JOHN. (1732–1808). British naval officer. Son of the Lord Chief Justice of Scotland, John Eliot was born in April 1732. Eliot entered the British navy in 1740. In April 1777, Commodore Elliot was given command of the *Trident* (sixty-four guns) with orders to carry the Peace Commission of Carlisle to New York. Arriving early in June, he served during the next two months as second-in-command to Admiral (Lord) William Howe, and he was one of the naval officers later named by General Henry Clinton as an acceptable successor to Howe. Returning to England and given command of the *Edgar* (seventy-four guns), he sailed with Admiral George Rodney on 29 December 1779 for the relief of Gibraltar and played a distinguished part in the action off Cape Vincent (on the Saint Lawrence River) on 16 January 1780. During the next two years, he commanded the *Edgar* in the Channel Fleet. During the period from 1786 to 1789 he was governor of Newfoundland. On 16 April 1795 he was promoted to admiral, but because of ill health had no further naval service. He died in Roxburghshire, England, on 20 September 1808.

SEE ALSO *Peace Commission of Carlisle*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ELLIOTT, MATHEW. (1739–1814). Loyalist Indian Agent. Born in County Donegal, Ireland, Mathew Elliott moved to America in 1761 and came to western Pennsylvania, where he established himself in the Indian trade. During the French and Indian War (1754–1763), he enlisted in the military and served as a scout and messenger for Henry Bouquet in 1763. In 1764 he accompanied Bouquet's expedition to the Muskingum River, in what is now eastern Ohio.

In 1765 Elliott returned to the fur trade. Using Pittsburgh as his base, he spent the next ten years trading with the Ohio Country Indian nations living in the Muskingum, Tuscarawas, and Scioto River Valleys.

When the Revolutionary War began, Elliott seemingly supported the Patriot cause. In July 1775 he supplied information concerning the British garrison at Detroit to Continental authorities, and in 1776 he conducted several councils with the Ohio Country Indians at the request of Pittsburgh officials, urging them to remain neutral during the war. But his close affiliation with Alexander McKee, the British Indian Department commissary at Fort Pitt, with whom Elliott shared a long and abiding friendship, caused local Patriots to question his true sympathies. After Patriot officials threatened McKee with arrest in March 1778, Elliott, McKee, Simon Girty, and several others fled Pittsburgh for Detroit.

Henry Hamilton, the British lieutenant governor of Detroit, did not trust Elliott, and Hamilton relegated him to menial tasks until his loyalties could be ascertained. Elliott served as a scout during Hamilton's 1778 expedition to Vincennes. The distrustful Hamilton's capture by George Rogers Clark in February 1779 removed a significant obstacle to Elliott's advancement, and thereafter he served the Crown ably in a number of raids throughout the Ohio Valley.

In 1779, Elliott and a party of Native American allies ambushed a party of Americans escorting gunpowder to Fort Pitt. In 1780 he accompanied Alexander McKee and Captain Henry Bird on an expedition against (Isaac) Ruddell's and (Joseph) Martin's Stations in Kentucky. In 1781, he evicted Moravian missionaries and their Delaware congregations who were suspected of aiding the Americans from Ohio. In 1782, he assisted in defeating an American army led by William Crawford near Upper Sandusky, Ohio, led an expedition with William Caldwell against (William) Bryant's Station in Kentucky, and helped defeat Kentucky irregulars at the Battle of Blue Licks.

Elliott remained with the Indian Department following the war. In 1796, he was appointed superintendent of Indian affairs. During the War of 1812, he participated in numerous actions along the Detroit frontier.

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Larry L. Nelson

ELLIS, WELBORE. (1713–1802). British statesman. Son of the noted Bishop of Meath, he graduated from Oxford in 1736. He entered Parliament in 1741, holding a seat until 1794, making him the longest-serving member of the House in the eighteenth century. He was appointed a lord of the Admiralty in 1747 and served until 1755. On 17 December 1762 he succeeded Charles Townshend as secretary at war, opposed sending more troops to America, and resigned in 1765. In 1776 he spoke out against receiving any papers from Congress. The following year he became treasurer of the Royal Navy. On 11 February 1782 he succeeded George Sackville Germain as secretary of state, but the next month he resigned when the Rockingham ministry came in. He was created first Baron Mendip on 13 August 1794.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ELMIRA, NEW YORK. Modern name of Newtown or Chemung.

SEE ALSO *Newtown, New York; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois.*

ELPHINSTONE, GEORGE KEITH. (1746–1823). Viscount Keith, British naval officer and politician. George Keith Elphinstone, fourth son of the tenth Lord Elphinstone, was born near Stirling in Scotland, on 7 January 1746. He entered the navy in November 1761 and saw action in North American waters before moving to the Mediterranean in 1763. A voyage to China in 1767–1768 in his brother's Indiaman may have given him a modest financial independence. He was made lieutenant in 1770, commander in 1772, and post-captain in 1775.

In 1775 Elphinstone escorted a convoy to Newfoundland, and in 1776 he sailed in *Perseus* (twenty guns) with a convoy bound for New York. For three years, apart from four months in the West Indies, he harassed privateers and blockade runners, and assisted operations in support of the army. In September 1779 he took the French *Therèse* (twenty guns) off Charleston. In 1780 he was responsible for the transports on Clinton's Charleston expedition, winning Clinton's enthusiastic praise. When the city fell on 7 May, Elphinstone was sent home with Marriot Arbuthnot's despatches. Given *Warwick* (fifty guns), in January 1781 he took the Dutch *Rotterdam* (fifty guns) without losing a single man. In February he was returned to Parliament as a Whig, and on 27 March

he again sailed for North America with a convoy. In September his ship was with the squadron that caught a French convoy off the Delaware. In November 1782, in poor health, he sailed for home.

Elphinstone returned to active service in 1793. He took part in Hood's occupation of Toulon and later supervised the evacuation. Knighted and promoted rear admiral in 1794, he served with distinction until 1815, rising to admiral of the *Red*, becoming Baron Keith in 1803 and Viscount Keith in 1814, and supervising Bonaparte's initial captivity in 1815. He died on 10 March 1823.

SEE ALSO *Arbuthnot, Marriot; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780.*

revised by John Oliphant

EMMERICK'S CHASSEURS. In August 1777, Sir Henry Clinton authorized Captain Andreas Emmerick, an experienced jäger officer from Hesse-Hanau who had briefly led the Guides and Pioneers in December 1776, to raise a company of one hundred rifle-armed marksmen from the Provincial regiments in New York City. Operating with a company of bayonet-armed infantrymen in support, the Chasseurs distinguished themselves in Clinton's campaign in the Hudson Highlands in October 1777. Having proved its effectiveness, the corps was expanded in 1778 to a small legion of riflemen, light infantrymen, and light dragoons, with Emmerick as its lieutenant colonel. By 1779 the corps was on the verge of mutiny, and Clinton disbanded it. The rifle company under Captain John Althouse became part of the New York Volunteers, and with other light troops aboard the transport *Anna*, was blown across the Atlantic while on the way to Charleston in 1780.

SEE ALSO *Anna; Bayonets and Bayonet Attacks; Guides and Pioneers; Hudson River and the Highlands; Jägers; Riflemen.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

ENFILADE. A fire from small arms or artillery that sweeps a line of men or defensive works from end to end, as opposed to "frontal fire." Rake is the naval equivalent.

SEE ALSO *Rake.*

Mark M. Boatner

ENGINEERS. In western Europe, military engineering had been raised to a high art by Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban (1633–1707), a marshal of France who, along with his disciples and competitors, was involved in endless rounds of digging siege lines to capture important fortresses and building ground-hugging protective walls to prevent their own creations from being seized. (Military engineering in eighteenth-century armies often combined the skills of the artilleryman and the engineer.) In North America, where distances were greater and resources far less, there were far fewer examples of the engineer's art. Louisburg and Quebec (both French-built) were the only true fortresses (towns surrounded by defensive walls) on the continent, and permanent works of stone or brick of any sort were uncommon. In 1773, a questionnaire from the secretary of state for the American colonies, the earl of Dartmouth, to all colonial governors revealed the lack of fortifications: "Not one fort now," answered Virginia and New Jersey. A "quite ruinous" stone castle was reported by New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania had a half-finished fort in the Delaware to ward off pirates. Boston's Castle William was in ill repair, and only a few batteries at other Massachusetts ports were in existence. Georgia had four forts. New York had a fort and batteries at the mouth of the Hudson and forts at Albany and Schenectady, but none was properly equipped with cannon or adequately supplied.

LIMITATIONS OF AMERICAN FORTIFICATIONS

Military engineering in North America normally involved erecting small, temporary defensive structures—earthwork batteries at vulnerable points along the Atlantic coast as well as palisaded outposts along the interior frontier—and creating even less permanent field fortifications to give some advantage on the battlefield. Americans placed a largely unwarranted faith in the ability of batteries made of earth and timber to control coastal waterways. For example, Fort Washington, on the north end of Manhattan Island, and its companion, Fort Lee, on the New Jersey Palisades, were constructed to prevent British warships from ascending the Hudson River, a function they were unable to perform. On the other hand, Fort Moultrie—a palmetto-log battery on Sullivan's Island at the mouth of Charleston Harbor in

South Carolina—was able to resist heavy artillery fire from British warships on 28 June 1776, a key factor in the American success there. The redoubt on the summit of Breed's Hill, on the Charlestown peninsula, was laid out and erected over the night of 16–17 June 1775 and played an important role, along with even flimsier field fortifications at the rail fence and along the Mystic River beach, in helping the Americans resist British assault. All of these positions were designed by men who had limited experience as military engineers and the bulk of whose knowledge came from books.

The first chief engineers of the Continental army were self-taught Americans. Colonel Richard Gridley had had a principal role in the siege of Louisbourg in 1745 and was responsible for laying out the siege works around Boston in 1775, but his advanced age limited his active service thereafter. Colonel Rufus Putnam eventually received the post on 5 August 1776, in part as a recognition of his efforts to help lay out the defenses on Manhattan Island and Long Island that summer.

EUROPEAN ENGINEERS AID AMERICA

Congress, recognizing the lack of engineering competence in the American forces, requested Benjamin Franklin, the American envoy to France, to recruit engineers formally trained in European methods. In December 1776 Franklin conveyed the request to the French minister of war, who allowed four French engineers—Louis le Begue de Presle Duportail, Louis de Shaix La Radière, Jean Baptiste de Gouvion, and Jean Baptiste Joseph de Laumoy—to volunteer for service in America. Duportail became chief of engineers on 22 July 1777 and continued in that post until 10 October 1783. He was Washington's chief engineer at the siege of Yorktown, where he worked closely and effectively with his artillery counterpart, Henry Knox, and his former colleagues in the French expeditionary force.

A good example of the variety of tasks undertaken by American engineers is found in the career of another foreigner whose engineering ability contributed greatly to American victory. Thaddeus Kosciuszko, who had also been trained at the French school of artillery and military engineering at Mézières, arrived at Philadelphia on 30 August 1776, where he worked on the forts guarding the Delaware River. Congress sent him to the Northern Department in early May 1777, where his advice on the vulnerability of Fort Mifflin went unheeded. Thereafter, he directed the efforts that impeded the southward march of Major General John Burgoyne's invading army, selected the bluffs on the west side of the Hudson south of Saratoga (Bemis Heights) as the best place to stop Burgoyne, and laid out the field fortifications that made the American position well-nigh

invulnerable. From March 1778 to June 1780, he superintended the continuing construction of the defenses at West Point in the Hudson Highlands, the so-called "key of the continent" that was perhaps the greatest achievement of American engineers during the war. Arriving in the South after the disaster at Camden, he served as Nathanael Greene's chief engineer for the rest of the war. He was successful in managing the army's transport but was criticized for his conduct of the unsuccessful siege of Ninety Six, South Carolina, from 22 May to 19 June 1781.

BRITISH DEFENSES

The British army was generally well served by its engineers. Captain John Montresor helped to fortify Boston after 19 April 1775 and served as chief engineer in the 1776 campaign against New York. During Parliament's inquiry into the conduct of Sir William Howe in America, Montresor testified that the fortification on the main American line at Brooklyn "could not be taken by assault, but by approaches, as they were rather fortresses than redoubts." Since Montresor undoubtedly knew better—he had examined the works after the American evacuation—his opinion seems to reflect loyalty to his former chief rather than objective field engineering. Lieutenant William Twiss, Burgoyne's chief engineer, saw that Fort Mifflin was overlooked by Sugar Loaf Hill and directed the placement of artillery on the summit of the latter that forced the Americans to evacuate. Captain Lieutenant James Moncrieff, Sir Henry Clinton's favorite engineer, directed the successful defense of Savannah, Georgia, in October 1779 and managed the successful siege of Charleston, South Carolina, from March to May 1780. A day after Charleston fell on 12 May, Clinton wrote to George Germain, the secretary of state for the American colonies, that Moncrieff "conducted the siege with so much judgment, intrepidity, and laborious attention, I wish to render a tribute of the highest applause and most permanent gratitude" (Curtis, *Organization*, p. 9). British defenses at New York City were so strong in August 1781 that Washington had to abandon all thought of an assault and instead turned his attention to the Chesapeake, where Charles Earl Cornwallis's engineers were less successful in preparing defenses at Yorktown.

Cartographers in military service are known as topographical engineers. On 19 July 1777, Washington recommended that Congress appoint Robert Erskine to direct mapmaking services for the main army.

SEE ALSO *Artillery of the Eighteenth Century; Erskine, Robert; Gridley, Richard; Le Begue de Presle Duportail, Louis; Moncrieff, James; Montresor, John; Putnam, Rufus; West Point, New York.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

"ENGLAND" AND "ENGLISH." Strictly speaking, England is that part of the British Isles excluding Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, the inhabitants of which cannot properly be called "Englishmen." The modern meaning of Britain derives from the union of England (and Wales) with Scotland in 1701. "British" forces in the War of American Independence were an amalgam of English, Scottish, Irish, Loyalists (Tories), Native Americans (Indians), and Germans (Hessians).

SEE ALSO *German Auxiliaries*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

ENOS, ROGER. (1729–1808). Continental officer. Connecticut. Born in Simsbury, Connecticut, Roger Enos served with colonial troops in 1759, and in 1764 had become a captain in Israel Putnam's regiment. He took part in the Havana campaign of 1762, and ten years later went on the commission sent by Connecticut to look at land in the Mississippi Valley that had been granted to veterans. Promoted to major of the Second Connecticut Regiment on 1 May 1775, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 1 July of that year. He commanded a battalion in Arnold's March to Quebec, and on 1 December was court-martialed for "quitting without

leave," because he had turned back from that march with his 300 men and their supplies. Although honorably acquitted, he left the Continental service on 10 December 1775. He subsequently became colonel of the Sixteenth Connecticut Militia, resigned 18 January 1776, but was colonel of another regiment from 1777 through 1779. In March 1781 he settled in Enosburg, Vermont, and that year he was appointed brigadier general in command of all Vermont militia. He was promoted to state major general in 1787, and held this post until his resignation in 1791.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's March to Quebec; Putnam, Israel*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ENUMERATED ARTICLES. As part of British mercantilism reflected in the Navigation Acts and Trade Acts, certain colonial products that were allowed to be exported from the place of origin only to England or one of her colonies were "enumerated." The Navigation Act of 1660 put sugar, tobacco, indigo, cotton, ginger, and certain dyewoods on the list. In 1705 the list was expanded to include rice, molasses, and naval stores; furthermore, the colonists were given bounties for production of these articles. In 1721 the enumerated list included beaver skins, furs, and copper. The Sugar Act of 1764 enumerated hides and skins, pot and pearl ashes, iron, lumber, whale fins, and raw silk. In 1767 it was decreed that all nonenumerated goods destined for any part of Europe north of Cape Finisterre be shipped through England, but only a small percentage of colonial exports were affected.

SEE ALSO *Mercantilism; Naval Stores*.

Mark M. Boatner

ENVELOPMENT. An attack directed against the enemy's flank—or flanks, in the case of a double envelopment. It should not be confused with the "turning movement," although the latter is commonly known also as a "strategic envelopment."

SEE ALSO *Turning Movement*.

Mark M. Boatner

EPAULEMENT. Coming from the French word for “shoulder” (*épaule*), this was the shoulder of a bastion, or in another sense, an outwork for flank protection.

SEE ALSO *Bastion*.

Mark M. Boatner

EPINE OR DES EPINIERS SEE *L'Épine*, *Augustin François*.

ERSKINE, ROBERT. (1735–1780). Map-maker of the Continental army. A native of Scotland, after studying at the University of Edinburgh he went to London, where the treachery of a business partner got him seriously in debt. Escaping a jail sentence because of his excellent character and innocence in the affair, he continued his studies, and for his work in the field of hydraulic engineering he became a fellow of the Royal Society (F.R.S.) in 1771. He reached New York City on 5 June 1771 as the representative of a British capitalist who had invested in the American Iron Company, which was mining and manufacturing at Ringwood in the upper part of Passaic County, New Jersey. He soon became a supporter of the Patriot cause and in the summer of 1775 organized his employees into a military company. Erskine was made a captain in the Bergen County militia, and his men were exempted from compulsory service in other units.

Washington met Erskine early in the war and, learning that this able engineer and F.R.S. was well acquainted with the region west of the Hudson, offered him the position of “geographer and surveyor-general to the Continental Army.” On 27 July 1777 Erskine was commissioned “Geographer and Surveyor to the Army of the United States.”

In three years of zealous work, Erskine produced maps that contributed significantly to Washington’s operations, despite their numerous inconsistencies in scale and errors in distance and orientation. Among the prized possessions of the Pierpont Morgan Library in New York City is an engraved copy, with annotations believed to be in Washington’s hand, of “A Map of part of the States of New-York and New-Jersey: Laid down, chiefly from Actual Surveys, received from the Right Honble Ld Stirling and others, and Deliniated for the use of His Excely Genl. Washington, by Robt. Erskine F.R.S. 1777.”

During the war, Erskine’s iron works factory at Ringwood manufactured items used by the American army. He also designed and produced the *chevaux-de-frise*

(chains) that were placed in the Hudson River to deter passage of British ships.

Erskine died on 2 October 1780 of a respiratory illness contracted during his fieldwork. In his military journal entry for 25 January 1781, Dr. James Thacher, who was accompanying General Robert Howe’s force from the Hudson Highlands to put down the mutiny of the New Jersey Line, wrote of the excellent accommodations given to Howe and his field officers in Pompton “at the house of Mrs. Erskine, the amiable widow of the late respectable geographer of our army.”

Erskine’s papers are held by the New Jersey Historical Society. Records of the quartermaster general contain numerous references to Erskine and his works. His original maps are in the possession of the New York Historical Society Library.

SEE ALSO *Howe, Robert*; *Mutiny of the New Jersey Line*.

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revised by Harry M. Ward

ERSKINE, WILLIAM. (1728–1795). British general. Born in England 1728, William Erskine entered the Scots Greys in 1743, became a cornet at Fontenoy (1745) and, later, a major in the Fifteenth Light Dragoons in March 1759. He served with great credit in Germany. In 1762 he became a lieutenant colonel, and the next year, after presenting George III with 16 stands of colors captured by his regiment at Emsdorf, Germany, he was made a knight banneret. As a brigadier general he commanded a brigade in the battle of Long Island on 27 August 1776, and the next night surprised an American detachment at Jamaica. In April 1777 he was William Tryon’s second in command during the Connecticut coast raid. Sir Henry Clinton made Erskine his quartermaster general, in which capacity he also led troops during the Monmouth campaign, and during the winter of 1778–1779, Erskine commanded the eastern district of Long Island. When Clinton moved up the Hudson River in November 1778 in an attempt to intercept the Convention Army, which was reported to be moving to Virginia, Erskine commanded five infantry battalions and a cavalry squadron, but the expedition returned to New York City after getting as far as Kings Ferry. In summer, 1779 he turned over his duties as quartermaster general to Major Duncan Drummond and sailed for London.

He had been made colonel of the Eightieth Regiment in 1777, was promoted to major general in 1779, lieutenant general in 1787, and became a baronet in June 1791. During the Flanders campaign of 1793 to 1795, he was second in command to the Duke of York. He died on 9 March 1795.

SEE ALSO *Connecticut Coast Raid; Jamaica (Brookland), New York.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

ESOPUS, NEW YORK **SEE** *Kingston, New York.*

ESTABLISHMENT **SEE** *Regular Establishment.*

ESTAING, CHARLES HECTOR THÉODAT, COMTE D'. (1729–1794).

French admiral. Estaing's given names on his birth certificate were Charles-Henri, those on his marriage certificate were Jean-Baptiste Charles, those recorded by the French navy were Charles-Henri Théodat, and those of the French National Library were Charles-Hector. Born in the château of Ruvel in Auvergne, he entered the second company of the king's Musketeers of the royal household. In that capacity he served in the Flanders campaign of 1744–1745 in the War of Austrian Succession. In 1746 he married the daughter of the Maréchal de Chateaurenault. Later that year upon his father's death, he succeeded to the title of comte and the family fortune. In 1748 he was commissioned a colonel by the king and fought at the siege of Maastricht. He was sent to England in 1755 to assist French ambassador de Mirepoix. In that capacity he prepared memoranda promoting the causes of a strong navy and colonial defense.

In 1755 Estaing's request for service with Montcalm in Canada was denied. Instead, he was promoted the following year to brigadier. In 1757 he was awarded the Croix de Saint-Louis and left for India. At the siege of Madras in 1758, he was captured and later paroled. He conceived several operations against the English in south-east Asia that brought him to the king's attention, and he

was promoted to maréchal de Camp in February 1761. On his return to France he was captured by the English, who considered him as having violated his parole. Estaing was taken to Plymouth, badly treated, and released in 1762 with a letter from Lord Egremont, the English secretary of state for the Southern Department, to the duc de Choiseul complaining of his conduct. He was promoted to lieutenant general of the army after his return to France and appointed to head a squadron against Brazil three months later. However, the signing of peace preliminaries halted the project. Estaing's career now turned to colonial administration.

In late 1763 Estaing was appointed governor of the French Leeward Islands. There he found the colonial rule lax and incurred the hostility of locals when he sought to reestablish royal control. He wrote, "I would rather fight some enemy a hundred years than these contemptible people for a quarter of an hour." In 1766 he requested his recall on the grounds of ill health and left Saint Domingue. In 1767, having reached the minimum required age, the king conferred on Estaing the Order of the Holy Spirit. He was appointed naval commandant at the important port of Brest in 1772 and vice admiral of French naval operations in Asia and America in February 1777. Estaing sailed from Toulon with a squadron on 13 April 1778, arriving in American waters by July.

Following Howe's fleet near New York from 11–22 July, he was forced to break off pursuit for lack of water. A landing at Newport was stymied first by delays of American forces and later by the bad state of French vessels. Estaing's offer to debark troops at Boston was rebuffed by Congress, though it passed a motion on 18 October endorsing his actions.

On 4 November he sailed for the West Indies after abandoning plans for an amphibious Franco-American expedition against Halifax and Newfoundland. Admiral Barrington frustrated Estaing's attempt to retake Santa Lucia, but the French admiral succeeded in capturing St. Vincent and Grenada. He also forced Admiral Byron to withdraw from an effort to relieve Grenada. On 6 July 1779 Estaing and Byron fought a drawn battle, but when the latter retired to St. Christopher, the Frenchman would not use his superior forces to attack him in the roadstead. Estaing was not sure whether to attack Jamaica or sail for North America. Unsure of English strength on the island and with Spain now in the war, Estaing received a series of appeals from South Carolinians fearing an assault from the British General Prevost in Savannah. He decided to attack the latter and set sail on 16 August. The squadron dropped anchor off the Georgia coast on 1 September, encountering a violent and damaging storm.

At Savannah on 9 October 1779, Estaing attempted a surprise assault on the western fortifications, but deserters had alerted the English, who repelled the combined

American-French force with heavy casualties. Estaing was wounded in an arm and leg. The French vessels divided up, and d'Estaing sailed to France. He arrived there in December just in time to enjoy the celebrations for his victory at Grenada. In July 1780 Estaing was sent to Cadiz to command a joint French-Spanish amphibious expedition. Its object was set in October 1782 as Jamaica, but the signing of the Peace Preliminaries on 20 January 1783 ended the project for him and his second-in-command, Lafayette.

Estaing suffered from the ill will of the new naval minister, Castries, who denied him further rewards. Yet he was rewarded by the state of Georgia in 1785 with citizenship and twenty thousand acres near the Oconee River and granted special privileges by the king of Spain. In 1784 he was named president of the French section of the Society of the Cincinnati. In 1785 he became governor of the province of Touraine, and in 1787 was appointed to the Assembly of Notables. In September 1789 the officers elected him commandant of the Versailles National Guard, which post he held until his resignation in favor of Lafayette in October. In May 1792 the National Assembly issued a decree naming Estaing admiral. Although in favor of national reforms, he remained loyal to the royal family. Estaing was arrested by the Committee of General Safety of the French Convention on 22 November 1793, interrogated on 29 March 1794, and condemned and executed on 28 April 1794.

Estaing, a sometime poet and litterateur, wrote in 1790 an "Aperçu hasardé sur les colonies." He followed it in 1791 by a play he styled a tragedy of circumstances titled *Les Thermopyles*, which prophetically contained the line: "Go tell Sparta that we are dead here for obeying his laws."

SEE ALSO *New York; Savannah, Georgia* (9 October 1779).

revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

ETHIOPIAN REGIMENT. John Murray, the fourth earl of Dunmore, the royal governor of Virginia in 1775, gave this name to the unit of runaway slaves he created to help him fight the armed forces of the Virginia Convention. Perhaps three hundred of these former slaves accompanied Dunmore's little army when it was evacuated to New York from Gwynn's Island in the Chesapeake in July 1776. The unit was disbanded shortly thereafter.

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ETHIS DE CORNY, LOUIS DOMINIQUE. (1736–1790). French commissary officer.

After completing his law studies, he returned in 1754 to his birthplace, Metz, as an attorney. Under the name of Ethis de Novéant, he served from 1757 to 1762 as a cadet in the corps of war commissaries. He became secretary to the intendant of Franche-Comté in 1762 and later commissary of provincial war in Brittany and Normandy. He corresponded with Voltaire in the 1760s. In 1772 he purchased a position with the war commissary and served in that post from 1779 to 1780 under marshal de Vaux. As commissary of war he was sent to America with Lafayette when the latter returned in the spring of 1780, his assignment being to make preparations for Rochambeau's expeditionary force. On 5 June he received the rank of lieutenant colonel (later colonel) of American cavalry without command to facilitate his mission. He briefly returned to France in February 1781, supposedly because of bad health. Louis XVI named him principal commissary of war in June 1781. Washington commended him for his conduct at Yorktown. He left American service on 1 January 1782, became commissary of war of the Regiment of Swiss Guards (1784), and was appointed royal *procureur général* for the city of Paris in 1785. In 1787 he became a chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis. Corny supported Jefferson's efforts as minister to France, including the purchase of American flour and wheat by the City of Paris in 1788. He was an active supporter of the French Revolution in its early days yet eventually lost his fortune in it. William Short claimed that a resulting mental and emotional crisis led to his death.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

EUTAW SPRINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA.

8 September 1781. After Ninety Six, Major General Nathanael Greene spent over a month in the High Hills of the Santee resting his army while drilling Continental and militia infantry in battalion-level firing. His cavalry augmented partisan activity as the British were kept off balance and denied current knowledge of American movement and intentions. As September arrived, Greene began to move toward the main British force protecting Charleston by slow, easy marches to allow more men to join him and deceive the British. Sufficiently reinforced, he surprised the British army under Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Stewart at Eutaw Springs near Nelson's Ferry on the Santee River.

Leaving his overnight camp at Burdell's Tavern at 4 A.M. on 8 August, Greene moved toward Eutaw Springs, only seven miles away. The marching column was arranged to allow immediate deployment in planned battle lines, so there was a surprising number of militia near the front. Lieutenant Colonel John Henderson led the column with his detachment of seventy-three South Carolina state troops, its subunits commanded by Lieutenant Colonels Ezekiel Polk and Hugh Middleton, and Lieutenant Colonel Henry "Light-Horse Harry" Lee's Partisan Legion. Colonel Francis Marion, who joined Greene on 7 September after a four-hundred-mile march, followed with his partisans, Colonel Francis Malmédy's militia, the Marquis de Malmédy's two North Carolina militia regiments, and General Andrew Pickens's two South Carolina militia regiments. Each Carolina brigade had an eastern and a western regiment. Local companies were raised, largely by respected leaders in the vicinity, then consolidated and marched to the main army. The western troops were led by western officers, the eastern troops by officers from their region. They followed very different routes to join Greene.

Next in the column came General Jethro Sumner with three small North Carolina Continental battalions under Lieutenant Colonel John Baptiste Ashe and Majors John Armstrong and Reading Blount. An understrength Virginia Continental brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Richard Campbell followed. Its two battalions were led by Major Smith Snead and Captain Thomas Edmonds. Colonel Otho Holland Williams's Maryland Continental Brigade, with two battalions commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Eager Howard and Major Henry Hardman, were further to the rear. Lieutenant Colonel William Washington's Third Continental Light Dragoons and Captain Robert Kirkwood's Delaware infantry company brought up the rear. The American artillery had two three-pounders under Captain-Lieutenant William Gaines and two six-pounders commanded by Maryland captain William Browne in the column. After the initial contact,

Gaines would be sent to the advanced party with a guard of North Carolina Continentals. Greene had about twenty-two-hundred men in this force.


Stewart had between eighteen hundred and twenty-two hundred effectives. Flank companies of the Third, Nineteenth, and Thirtieth Regiments constituted Major John Marjoribanks's "flank battalion," with some three hundred men. The line regiments included the recently arrived Third Foot, the "Buffs," as well as the understrength Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth Foot, Colonel John Harris Cruger's New York and New Jersey Provincials, and Major John Coffin's South Carolina horsemen. Stewart's artillery included two six-pounders, one four-pounder, a three-pounder, and at least one swivel gun.

THE PRELIMINARY BOUTS

Stewart had been sending out foraging parties around dawn to dig sweet potatoes. On 8 September the detail was drawn from Marjoribanks's battalion and the Buffs. Unarmed, and with a small guard, the foragers left camp about 5 A.M. An hour later, two North Carolina deserters were brought to Stewart with a story that Greene was approaching with 4,000 men. Stewart reported that Major John Coffin was already reconnoitering in the direction from which Greene would approach with 140 infantrymen and 50 cavalry, but other accounts suggest Coffin went out after the deserters were interrogated. Coffin made contact about four miles from Stewart's camp around 8 A.M.

Major John Armstrong, commanding a party of North Carolina vedettes, reported Coffin's approach to Henderson, who promptly set up a hasty ambush. When Coffin's dragoons incautiously pursued Armstrong, they came under small arms fire from both flanks and then were enveloped by the legion cavalry under Major Joseph Egleston as Captain Michael Rudolph led the legion infantry in a bayonet charge. Coffin escaped with his cavalry to warn Stewart, but four or five of his infantry were killed and about forty, including their captain, were captured. In the follow-up to this encounter, many of the foraging party were also taken prisoner. Numbers vary from one hundred to as many as four hundred, but whatever the total, this loss was an attrition of British strength at a crucial time.

The initial contact caused Greene to deploy into his planned fighting formations well over three miles from the actual battlefield. Since Stewart sent out a delaying force, this was not necessarily wrong. The delaying party actually executed an ambush on the American advance some two miles from the British camp, slowing the approach. Although the British advance party was driven off by the South Carolina state troops, Greene's men were forced to move cautiously through the woods, creating difficulties in maintaining their linear formations.



THE GALE GROUP.

After sending out the force to delay Greene, Stewart deployed on even ground west of his camp. Major John Marjoribanks's light infantry and grenadiers were posted in a blackjack thicket some distance beyond the British right flank. Cruger commanded the main line. The infantry was arranged with the Third Foot on the right; then Cruger's New Jersey and New York Provincials; and the Sixty-fourth, Eighty-fourth, and Sixty-third Foot spread south across the River Road. The Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth Provincials were worn down by the summer's hard campaigning and were much reduced in strength. Coffin's horse and foot troops were posted as a reserve. Major Henry Sheridan of Cruger's Provincials was ordered to occupy Roche's brick

house and hold it should the Americans break through. While there was a ravine beyond the British left and the Santee River beyond its right, both flanks were largely unprotected. The two armies are shown as the main battle commenced just west of Roche's Plantation.

PHASE I: GREENE'S MILITIA ATTACK

Shortly after 9 A.M., heavy firing began as the militia advanced against the British line. The first American attack line, under General Francis Marion, was Carolina militia with Malmedy's North Carolina Brigade flanked by the two South Carolina regiments. In generalized terms, Marion commanded the left, Malmedy the center, and General

Andrew Pickens the right segments of the first line. Gaines's guns went out of action, one disabled, the other damaged by enemy fire, after a short exchange that silenced one British gun. The militia performed admirably, firing seventeen volleys before retiring. Lee tried to turn the enemy left but was fought off by the Sixty-third Foot.

**PHASE II: BRITISH COUNTERATTACK
ROUTES THE MILITIA**

With both flanks in the air, unprotected by terrain features, and concerned that American dragoons would turn his flanks, Stewart held back, in part because he saw that Greene's line was largely militia. For some reason, the British left advanced and was followed by the remainder of the line. As the militia infantry gave way, Lee's legion stood its ground against the Sixty-third, and the South Carolina state troops held off the Third Regiment. Greene responded adroitly to the new situation by ordering General Jethro Sumner's North Carolina Continentals forward to take over from the militia.

The North Carolina Continentals were composed of voluntary enlistees, plus men forcibly drafted because they had allegedly fled at Guilford Courthouse. Some of these men had been in continuous service since March. Most had been subjected to intense training in the last month but about one hundred additional men had arrived only the night before. The North Carolina Continentals were led by outstanding officers with considerable combat experience. Although the men were relatively inexperienced, Sumner drove the British back to their original positions and began forcing them rearward.

PHASE III: SUMNER IS DRIVEN BACK

Stewart now committed his reserve. Coffin's cavalymen took position to protect the left flank against the threat posed by Lee's dragoons; his infantry reinforced the faltering front line. Heavy fighting continued on both flanks as the opposing commanders were occupied with restoring their centers. The American left faltered momentarily when Henderson was wounded, but

Hampton rallied them to push back the Buffs and take one hundred prisoners. Lee's legion held the right without undue pressure.

After fighting so well, Sumner's Continental infantry—weakened because all of its field grade officers and many of its captains were wounded—were finally forced back by the reinforced British center. A shortage of ammunition also contributed to their giving way.

When the British advanced to create a new breakthrough, Greene sent the Maryland and Virginia Continentals of Colonel Otho Williams and Lieutenant Colonel Richard Campbell forward. The Continentals advanced with muskets at the trail and delivered their first volley at forty yards, then followed up with a bayonet charge. Almost simultaneously, Captain Michael Rudolph led the infantry of Lee's legion against the vulnerable British left flank. The left half of Stewart's line collapsed and retreated in confusion through their camp. The Buffs obstinately held a short time against Lieutenant Colonel John Eager Howard's Second Maryland Regiment, but they were driven back after a bayonet fight that left the dead "transfixed by each other's bayonets."

PHASE IV: STEWART'S STRONGPOINTS HOLD

Despite the collapse, Marjoribanks's flank battalion still held the blackjack thicket on the British right. Washington's cavalymen could not penetrate the thicket, and when they wheeled to bypass it by going nearer the river, nearly all the officers were shot down by a volley from Marjoribanks's position. Washington was bayoneted and captured when his horse was shot. Colonel Wade Hampton rallied the Continental dragoons and then charged together with his South Carolina horse. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses.

Even with the British right holding off the American horsemen, Greene's men were doing well until they found food and liquor in Stewart's camp. Both Continentals and militiamen took advantage of the opportunity and the attack broke down except for Howard's Second Maryland.

Greene's loss of effective control can now be seen in the unsuccessful attempt to drive Coffin from the field. Greene was personally directing the fighting on the left, while Lee was directing his legion infantry on the right. When Lee realized that defeating Coffin's cavalry would eliminate Stewart's mobile reserve, he wanted to send his legion cavalry against the British left. When he sent for Egleston and prepared to lead the legion cavalry forward, Lee found Egleston had already been committed on the left flank. Hampton finally attacked Coffin and drove the Loyalist horsemen back, but when Hampton pursued up the road, he was exposed to fire from Marjoribanks's second position in the palisaded garden next to the brick house and driven back.

PHASE V: MARJORIBANKS'S COUNTERATTACKS

With the British infantry line collapsing, Sheridan had moved his men into the Roche Plantation's house. This brick structure was a natural fortification that could not be taken if resolutely defended. Kirkwood's Delaware and some legion infantry nearly got through the door before Sheridan's Loyalists could secure it. Captain Lawrence Manning, who commanded Lee's infantry at this point, used a British officer as a shield while withdrawing from the yard. Others did likewise since many British soldiers had been unable to get inside the house because the American pursuit was so rapid.

Four six-pounders, two American and two just-captured British guns, were brought up to break down the door but were placed too near the house. The gunners were shot down by British musket and swivel gun fire. The British began rallying around Sheridan's strong point. Some entered the house from the rear while others took position behind the garden palisades. Marjoribanks now led his flank battalion in a gallant sally that captured the American artillery. Continuing their counterattack, his men engaged Second Maryland elements as Howard, personally leading Captain Edward Oldham's company, attempted to slow the advance but was wounded. Marjoribanks was mortally wounded as the sortie fought its way through the British camp, but his counterattack changed the fortunes of the day. Other British troops reinforced his battalion and the battle was soon over as Greene opted to retire rather than risk destruction of his command.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

As for detailed estimates of numbers, Greene had some 1,256 Continental infantrymen, and another 300 Continental dragoons and light infantry under Lee, Washington, and Kirkwood. At the very least, there were over 200 North Carolina and 300 South Carolina militia, plus Marion's 200 militia and 73 South Carolina state troops, serving as infantry. Marion brought 40 horsemen, who augmented the South Carolina state troops cavalry, numbering seventy-two. Of this approximate total of 2,400, some 200 were detached as baggage guards at Howell's Ferry on the Congaree. Component strengths of the British force included some 280 men in Marjoriebanks's flank battalion and 300 in the Third Foot, while the Sixty-third (96), Sixty-fourth (180) and Eighty-fourth (82) were well understrength. Cruger's three battalions of Provincials numbered approximately 180 men. The South Carolina Royalists numbered approximately 70 cavalry and 100 infantry. Most of Stewart's troops were British regulars. Cruger's Tories were veterans and of the caliber of regulars. Only Coffin's troops were relatively inexperienced militia, and they had seen hard duty since early April.

Approximately 2,200 Americans were engaged and suffered over 500 casualties (139 killed, 375 wounded, and 8 missing, a total of 522). Officers took heavy losses as 60 were killed or wounded. Of the seven Continental officers commanding infantry regiments, only two emerged unscathed. Richard Campbell was among the dead. Militia leaders Pickens and Henderson were wounded. In the enlisted ranks, at least two North Carolina Continental companies reported over 90 percent of their men as casualties.

The British suffered very high proportionate losses. Starting with approximately 1,900 effectives, they lost 693, according to official returns. Stewart, wounded himself, reported 85 officers and men were killed, 351 wounded, and 257 missing. There is some question about British prisoner numbers; much of it centers on the foraging party losses.

COMMENTS

Eutaw Springs, the last major engagement in the Deep South, was one of the hardest-fought actions of the Revolution. Troops on both sides fought exceptionally well, and there is little fault to be found with the tactical performance of either commander. Greene scored a fine tactical surprise and followed through well to exploit it. Stewart recovered promptly and made an excellent deployment, particularly in assigning Marjoriebanks's flank battalion and preparing to defend the brick house. An even fight until the Americans reached the British camp and were distracted by plunder, the British outfought the Americans after that, rallying repeatedly to retake their position and drive them off. On a day marked by gallantry, John Marjoriebanks was conspicuous and, as with other field grade officers on both sides, he paid the price.

For the fourth time, Greene failed to win a battle in the South, but he won the campaign. The British army was so weakened by losses at Eutaw Springs that it withdrew toward Charleston. With the British holding only Charleston and Savannah, the South was nearly regained after sixteen months of occupation. Confined to a narrow coastal belt, it could not adequately supply itself and would evacuate the South in 1782.

Part of Greene's success in this campaign was due to his interdiction of virtually all British intelligence prior to the battle. Camped only seven miles from the Continentals, Stewart did not know their proximity until two deserters informed him on the morning of the engagement. These men may have been deserters, or they may have been sent ahead to frighten Stewart by reporting an excessively large American force. In either case, Greene's approach was a surprise.

SEE ALSO *Parker's Ferry, South Carolina; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

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revised by Lawrence E. Babits

EVACUATION DAY. 25 November 1783. The departure of British troops from New York City on this date was coordinated with the city's reoccupation by the remnants of the Continental Army. Major General Henry Knox directed the operation. Colonel Henry Jackson, the senior infantry officer still in service, was in immediate command of the two infantry regiments (Colonel Joseph Vose and Lieutenant Colonel William Hull), two artillery companies (Major Sebastian Bauman), and militia troop of horse (Captain John Stakes) that composed the 800-man force. The last British ships sailed from the harbor on 4 December. The term applies uniquely to New York City because it was the last city to be evacuated by the British under the terms of the Treaty of Paris (3 September 1783).

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

EWALD, JOHANN VON. (1744–1813). Hessian officer. Germany. Born in Kassel, Germany, in 1744, Ewald, the son of a bookseller, entered the Hessian army at the age of 16, taking part in the closing campaigns of the Seven Years' War. He lost his left eye in a duel in 1770. Having studied military engineering in Kassel, he published a book on military tactics in 1774 and was made captain of the Leibjäger, an unusual promotion for a commoner. As commander of the Second (jäger) Company, a unit rented by the British for service in the Revolution, he reached New Rochelle, New York, on 22 October 1776, and was in action the next day against a force of American riflemen. His unit constituted the advance guard at Monmouth and Brandywine, Ewald earning special commendation from Sir William

Exchange of Prisoners

Howe. He was conspicuous in the Charleston expedition of Henry Clinton in 1780 and, in his diary, left a valuable record of this operation. He surrendered at Yorktown, and almost died of dysentery while on parole on Long Island. He returned to Kassel in May 1784, waited four years in vain for a promotion he would not receive because of his "lowly birth," and then became a lieutenant colonel commanding a jäger corps in Denmark. He reorganized the corps, was elevated to the Danish nobility, and was a major general in 1802. Commanding forces in Holstein, again in Germany, he skirmished with French forces under Marshalls Joachim Murat and Nicholas Soult in an effort to maintain the neutrality of Denmark against the wishes of Napoleon Bonaparte. He was made a lieutenant general in 1807 after taking part in the assault on Stralsund, Germany. He died six years later, after a brief illness.

SEE ALSO *Jungkenn, Friedrich Christian Arnold.*

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EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS. At the time of the Revolution (and for another century), it was normal to parole prisoners of war and then arrange for their exchange. As a rule only officers could be exchanged. Exchange of "other ranks" was not favored by American civil or military authorities because the emaciated American prisoner often did not live long after his release from a British jail; this meant that the enemy stood to gain from the practice. Little is known about how many prisoners were taken during the war and even less about how many were exchanged, but the following "tariff" was worked out in December 1779 on the basis of how many privates were equivalent to various ranks. A sergeant could be exchanged for 2 privates; a second sergeant or ensign, 4; a first lieutenant, 6; a captain, 16; a major, 28; a lieutenant colonel, 72; a colonel, 100; a brigadier general, 200; a major general, 372; a lieutenant general, 1,044.

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FACTIONALISM IN AMERICA DURING THE REVOLUTION.

Throughout the Revolution, America was split into hostile factions on the grounds of race, religion, social and economic interests, and politics, making it impossible to speak in sweeping generalities about “Americans.” In many instances factionalism amounted to regionalism— New Englanders opposing New Yorkers, northerners finding little cause for compatibility with southerners, Tidewater elites competing with those living inland, and nearly everyone looking askance at Rhode Islanders as a home to all sorts of to all sorts of wild and fuzzy ideas about tolerance. Boundary disputes were at the base of animosities between colonies, particularly New York and New Hampshire (and much of the rest of New England) over the region that became Vermont. The Wyoming Valley was the scene of conflict before and after the Revolution, and Pennsylvania struggled with Virginia for control of what became western Pennsylvania, particularly Pittsburgh. There were also specific regional animosities; for instance, people living on New England’s northern frontier despised the merchants of Albany for selling guns and ammunition to the Indians.

The white population of the colonies was predominantly Anglo-Saxon, the New Englanders being particularly proud to trace their ancestry in America back more than one hundred years. Considering themselves members of founding families, they often held newer immigrant groups, such as the Scots-Irish, Germans, and Huguenots, in contempt. Many of these newer arrivals gravitated toward the frontier, where they soon had economic as well as ethnic and religious differences with the older settlements. Settlers in western Pennsylvania came to feel ignored by the province’s

Quaker oligarchy, and they were denied proportional representation in the legislature. The same held for the western counties of all the southern states, even after the drafting of constitutions during the Revolution. Class divisions also became evident during the war, as many farmers and artisans favored paper currency and schemes such as the land bank, only to be frustrated by the wealthy oligarchs who preferred specie or hard money. Such class divisions often had deeper roots, the memory of the Regulator troubles in the Carolinas and the rent riots in New York and New Jersey often determining political allegiances during the Revolution. Just because these factions often shared a commitment to American independence did not mean that they united in concerted opposition to a common foe. Often they were looking beyond the victory over Great Britain, recognizing that the structuring of government and society during the Revolution could have significant long-term consequences.

Complicating these divisions further were the sharp political divisions aroused by the Revolution. Though historians have been unable to determine with great precision the number of those committed to independence and of those who sought to retain British rule, it seems fair to say that at least one-fifth of the colonies’ white population remained loyal to the crown. Even Patriots were keenly divided between those with a more conservative vision who feared that the Revolution might unleash an excess of democracy and radicals who hoped to attain precisely that end. What the former particularly feared was that the rhetoric of revolution might extend to the enslaved people of America, who accounted for between one-fourth and one-third of the new nation’s total population. For slaves, it was the British and not the Patriots who offered freedom. Similarly, the other often-forgotten

portion of America's population, the Indians, understood that a British victory would help to preserve their lands.

While most of these problems persisted after the war against Britain had been won, some of these divisions especially plagued the efforts of Patriot leaders to attain unity during the Revolution. New England leaders, who dominated the period of resistance to British measures from 1763 to 1775, realized that they needed the support of other colonies, particularly Virginia, if the Revolution were to succeed. Hence, they went to considerable lengths to avoid giving the impression that they wanted to dominate either Congress or the Continental army.

Although the necessity of appointing generals with an eye to equitable state representation resulted in the elevation of many incompetents to positions of military leadership, these were often pushed into assignments where they could not do too much harm to the cause. Only in the Northern Department did factionalism seriously jeopardize military operations. There, the New England–New York antagonisms soon became evident. As commander in chief of this department, General Philip Schuyler did not receive the wholehearted support of the New England colonies during the Canada invasion. He encountered a lack of cooperation that verged on treason in his opposition to Burgoyne's offensive, and it was pressure from the New England delegates in Congress that led to his replacement by Horatio Gates. Regionalism loomed large in the American effort against the Bennington raid and in several other frontier battles. It also figured in the so-called Conway Cabal. Class conflict underlay much of the animosity of the common soldier for Congress in the last years of the war, fueling mutinies, resistance to orders, and declining morale. In this context, Washington deserved special credit for balancing many of these factions and holding his army together until 1783.

SEE ALSO *Bennington Raid*; *Burgoyne's Offensive*; *Conway Cabal*.

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FAIRFIELD, CONNECTICUT. Occupied and burned by the British on 8 July 1779 during a Connecticut coast raid.

SEE ALSO *Connecticut Coast Raid*; *Western Reserve*.

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FAIR LAWN, SOUTH CAROLINA.

29 August 1782. The Fair Lawn Plantation was Francis Marion's last engagement of the war. He surprised two hundred men from the South Carolina Royal Dragoons and Black Dragoons commanded by Major Thomas Fraser. After initial success, Marion was forced to retreat by Fraser's stiff defense.

SEE ALSO *Marion, Francis*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

FALMOUTH, MASSACHUSETTS.

(now Portland, Maine), 18 October 1775. The increasing effectiveness of American privateers was a source of frustration for the British vice admiral Samuel Graves. Within army circles, moreover, criticism of the Royal Navy's inactivity was mounting. As a result, the navy decided to carry out punitive raids on New England seaports. One such expedition was led by Lieutenant Henry Mowat against the coastline north of Boston all the way to what is now Maine. On 6 October Graves ordered Mowat to take command of a small squadron to "lay waste burn and destroy such Seaport Towns as are accessible to his Majesty's Ships," with specific instructions stating that "My Design is to chastize Marblehead, Salem, Newbury, Port Cape Anne Harbour, Portsmouth, Ipswich, Saco, Falmouth in Casco Bay, and particularly Mechias." Mowat had been employed prior to the start of hostilities in cruising along that coastline with the party of Royal Engineers carrying out the first full survey of the region, and so was an ideal selection. His task force consisted of his own armed vessel *Canceaux* (schooner-rigged and armed with six guns), which had been his "survey sloop"; Lieutenant John De la Touche's smaller but better-armed schooner *Halifax* (sixteen guns), which had just been purchased in Nova Scotia to replace a wrecked schooner of the same name; the armed transport *Symetry* (eighteen guns, with a crew primarily transferred from warships); the sloop *Spitfire* (a vessel under army control); and a 100-man detachment of marines and artillerymen under Captain-Lieutenant Forster of the Royal Marines embarked on the *Symetry* and *Spitfire*. Preparations were completed that same day, and the force stood out to sea on 8 October. Forster had first explored the possibility of attacking settlements on Cape Ann but decided that it was too strong for the force at his disposal.

On 16 October Mowat reached the area of Falmouth and moved into the harbor the following afternoon. The next morning the squadron opened fire on the port at 9:40 and kept on firing until 5:00 P.M. At 3:00 P.M. Mowat sent a landing party ashore to set fire to some buildings that had

escaped the bombardment, and it returned an hour later after skirmishing with the Cumberland County militia; by 8:00 that evening the entire task force had moved back to a safe distance offshore. Mowat claimed to have destroyed the entire town (the Americans said 139 homes and 278 other structures burned) and to have burned eleven vessels and removed two others as prizes. But because he had warned the inhabitants on 16 October, the civilians had evacuated the town and none were injured.

Mowat arrived back at Boston on November with his squadron and four prizes. He reported suffering two wounded—a marine and Midshipman Larkin of the *Canceaux*. Other than infuriating the Americans, the expedition accomplished nothing of military significance. The uproar led Lord George Germain to order General William Howe to conduct an official court of inquiry in May 1776, which, unsurprisingly, found no misconduct.

SEE ALSO *Graves, Samuel*; *Naval Operations, British*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

FANNING, DAVID. (1755–1825). Tory partisan. Virginia and South Carolina. Although details of his origin are obscure, David Fanning was probably born at Beech Swamp, Amelia County, Virginia, and was the son of David Fanning. Having run away from a harsh master to whom he was apprenticed, the younger David was an Indian trader among the Catawba in South Carolina in the years just before the Revolution. Although he said he was only nineteen years old in 1775, he also claims to have owned one thousand acres in Virginia and two slaves. Another detail of his prewar life that may have influenced his character was a disfiguring scalp disease known as scald head; this was so offensive during his childhood that he was not allowed to eat with other people, and when he outgrew this childhood disease it left his scalp so disfigured that he always wore a silk cap. In the early stages of the split with England, he sided with the Patriots but changed sides when he was robbed of his Indian trade and a considerable quantity of goods by a gang whose members called themselves Whigs.

A sympathetic picture of Fanning is presented by Robert O. DeMond in his *Loyalists of North Carolina during the Revolution* (1940). According to DeMond, Fanning resided in South Carolina when the war started and was

a sergeant in the same militia company as Thomas Brown when it split into Whig and Tory factions in May 1775. Having signed a paper in favor of the king at that time, he returned to his home on Reburn Creek and for the next six years—during which time he apparently received his “training” under “Bloody Bill” Cunningham, a notorious Tory partisan—he was in and out of Patriot prisons. Captured and paroled in January 1776, recaptured and imprisoned on 25 June, he escaped, was recaptured, tried for treason, and acquitted but charged three hundred pounds for court expenses. This life continued, according to his own account, for another five years. The place of his confinement usually was at Ninety Six.

On 5 July 1781 he was commissioned colonel by Major James Craig, British commandant at Wilmington, North Carolina, and for the next ten months he led his guerrillas in a number of remarkable actions. It is of this brief and final phase of his career that DeMond writes: “Probably no friend of the [British] government during the entire war accomplished more for the British, and certainly none received less credit.” While Colonel Benjamin Cleveland, one of the Kings Mountain heroes, led his vigilante Patriot bands along the Upper Yadkin, Fanning undertook the same role on Deep River, some thirty miles northeast. His most impressive operation was the Hillsboro raid on 12 September 1781. Bloody retaliatory warfare continued after regular military operations had ended in the South. Fanning apparently outclassed his opposition, but when he met rebel peace overtures with the request that his followers not be required to oppose the king during the remainder of the war, the civil authorities became arrogant. “There is no resting place for a Tory’s foot upon the earth,” said a Colonel Balfour (*ibid.*). Fanning subsequently sacked Balfour’s plantation and killed him. The Tory leader got the upper hand in the region and continued to raid, but he also continued efforts to arrange an armistice. He was married in the spring of 1782 and on 7 May entered a truce area on the lower Peedee. He settled in East Florida when Charleston was evacuated and went to Halifax in September 1784 after Britain ceded East Florida to Spain. He was elected to the provincial parliament of New Brunswick and served from 1791 until January 1801, when he was expelled for some unknown crime. For the latter he was condemned to death but pardoned. Fanning moved to Digby, Nova Scotia, and became colonel of militia. He died at Digby in 1825. His tombstone says he was seventy years old at that time.

In requesting compensation from the crown, Fanning claimed to have led thirty-six skirmishes in North Carolina and four in South Carolina, commanding bands that varied in strength between 100 and 950 men. For all this, he was allowed the grand sum of sixty pounds. Colonel Fanning’s *Narrative* was written in 1790 and first published (in Richmond, with an introduction by J. H. Wheeler) in

1861. The fifty-page manuscript was subsequently reprinted several times. DeMond calls the *Narrative* “the best contemporary account of the Loyalists for the latter period of the war.”

Craig’s appointment of Fanning as commander of the North Carolina Loyal Militia came at a historic juncture in British operations in the Carolinas. For the first time, the British had learned how to wage irregular warfare against the Americans. According to the historian John S. Watterson, Fanning employed new tactics and discipline to use in a war of “quickness, mobility, deception, and improvisation” that Governor Burke and General Greene found, in the short run, impossible to counter. Had the French fleet not cut Cornwallis’s supply lines to New York in September 1781, the Craig-Fanning offensive in North Carolina in 1781 might well have helped to shift the strategic balance in the southern campaign in 1782.

SEE ALSO *Brown, Thomas; Craig, James Henry; Cunningham, William; Hillsboro Raid, North Carolina; Kings Mountain, South Carolina.*

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revised by Robert M. Calhoon

FANNING, EDMUND. (1739–1818). Loyalist leader. New York. Born on Long Island on 24 April 1739 and graduated with honors from Yale in 1757, he moved to Hillsboro, North Carolina, and was admitted to the local bar in 1762. He rose quickly to local prominence, serving in the assembly and becoming a colonel of militia and a favorite of Governor William Tryon, as well as the storm center of the subsequent Regulator movement. Among the frontier settlements of western North Carolina, Fanning emerged as the symbol of the corruption and political dominance of the eastern elite.

On 8 April 1768 the Regulators fired shots into Fanning’s house. In May he arrested two of their leaders but prudently released them when the mob threatened to raid the jail. A show of force by Tryon restored order temporarily, but violence again flared up, and in the

election of 1769 Fanning lost his seat in the assembly. Tryon then created the borough of Hillsboro to give Fanning a safe seat. On 24 September 1770 a mob of Regulators broke up the session of the superior court at Hillsboro, dragged Fanning from the courthouse, and whipped him. The next day they ran him out of town and destroyed the fine house they maintained he had built from money extorted in official fees.

After the Battle of Alamance put a finish to the Regulator movement, Fanning followed Tryon to his new post as governor of New York in 1771 and became his private secretary. Although unable to get compensation from the North Carolina legislature for the loss of his property, Fanning received a number of large land grants in the Mohawk Valley and the Green Mountains, as well as several lucrative offices in New York before the war, among them the post of surveyor general in 1774. That same year Oxford University awarded him an honorary law doctorate. An ardent Loyalist when the Revolution broke out, he raised Fanning’s Regiment, officially known as the King’s American Regiment but also called the Associated Refugees. He was given the rank of colonel in 1776. Fanning’s Regiment earned a reputation for fierce fighting and the cruel treatment of prisoners as they conducted a series of coastal raids against New England. In 1779 he captured New Haven but ordered his men not to burn the town for fear of damaging Yale.

Twice wounded during the war and all of his property confiscated, Fanning moved to Nova Scotia in 1783. Fanning placed the worth of his land at more than £17,000 and requested full compensation; he received £4,447. In September 1783 he became councillor and lieutenant governor of that province, and in 1786 he assumed the office of lieutenant governor of Prince Edward Island (at that time called St. John’s Island). However, his predecessor, Walter Patterson, who was to return to London to answer charges of corruption, refused to give up his office and leave the island until 1788, creating a political controversy that lasted the rest of his term in office. Meanwhile, Fanning had been made a colonel in the British army in December 1782, and in April 1808 he was promoted to full general. His resignation as lieutenant governor was effective in July 1805. In 1813 he moved to London, where he died on 28 February 1818.

SEE ALSO *King’s American Regiment of Foot: Regulators.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

FANNING, NATHANIEL. (1755–1805). American privateer. Little is known of Fanning’s early years, except that he went to sea at a young age. In 1778

he was on his third voyage aboard the *Angelica*, a privateer, when he was captured and held for 13 months in Forton Prison near Portsmouth, England. After being exchanged he became midshipman and private secretary to John Paul Jones on the *Bonhomme Richard*. Highly commended by Jones for promotion, Fanning served with him on the *Ariel* until December 1780, when he and most of the ship's other officers refused to remain under Jones's command, rejecting what they saw as his excess cruelty toward his crew. In 1781 he was captured aboard a French privateer and spent another six weeks in prison. Early the next year he became a French citizen, commanded French privateers, was twice held prisoner by the British for short periods, and briefly accepted a commission in the French navy. At the war's end he gave up this commission, however, and returned to America. Having married in 1784, he apparently was a merchant seaman until he accepted a lieutenant's commission in the U.S. Navy on 5 December 1804. Ten months later he died of yellow fever while commanding the naval station at Charleston.

SEE ALSO *Jones, John Paul*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

FANNING'S REGIMENT SEE *King's American Regiment of Foot*.

FARMER GEORGE. The nickname of George III, from his interest in agricultural improvements, especially stock breeding. He established model farms at Windsor and, as "Mr. Robinson," wrote articles for agricultural journals.

SEE ALSO *George III*.

revised by John Oliphant

FARMER'S LETTERS. Constitutional objections to the Townshend Acts were presented in fourteen essays by John Dickinson that appeared from 5 November 1767 to January 1768 in the *Pennsylvania Chronicle*. Collectively, they were entitled *Letters from a Farmer in*

Pennsylvania to Inhabitants of the British Colonies. Dickinson argued that Parliament had no right to tax the colonies solely for revenue but had authority only to regulate trade, even if this resulted incidentally in revenue. He also called suspension of the New York Assembly a blow to colonial liberties. In pamphlet form the letters circulated widely in England and America.

SEE ALSO *Dickinson, John; New York Assembly Suspended*.

Mark M. Boatner

FASCINE. A long bundle of brushwood firmly bound together and used to fill ditches (in the assault of a fortified position) or in other military engineering tasks.

SEE ALSO *Gabion*.

Mark M. Boatner

FAWCETT, SIR WILLIAM. (1727–1804). British officer. Born in Halifax, England, on 30 April 1727, Fawcett enlisted in the army in 1748, serving first as an ensign in the Thirty-third Foot before joining the Third Foot Guards on 26 January 1751, a regiment with which he remained until 1779. Fluent in French and German, he began in 1754 to translate foreign military manuals for use by the British army. Fawcett's editions became the essential works studied by most British officers at the time. In 1757 he purchased the rank of lieutenant and the following year went to Germany as aid-de-camp to General Granville Elliot and then the marquess of Granby. Fawcett brought the news of the 1760 victory at Warburg to George II, receiving the rank of lieutenant colonel as a reward on 25 November 1760. Granby named Fawcett adjutant general in 1766, leading to a number of additional positions, including lieutenant governor of Pendennis Castle in 1770, brevet colonel on 25 May 1772, and governor of Gravesend in 1776. In 1775 he traveled through Germany negotiating the treaties that rented troops for use in America. His son William, also of the Third Guards, was made aide-de-camp to the Hessian contingent. Fawcett was promoted to major general on 29 August 1777 and to lieutenant general on 20 November 1782. He then set about completely restructuring the training methods of the British army in response to the harsh lessons learned during the American Revolution and is generally credited with preparing the military for the challenges of the long war with

France. He was made a knight of the Bath in 1786 and full general on 14 May 1796, retiring in 1799. He died at his home in Westminster on 22 March 1804.

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Michael Bellesiles

FEBIGER, CHRISTIAN ("OLD DENMARK"). (1746–1796). Continental officer. Denmark and Virginia. Born at Fåborg, Denmark, in 1746, Febiger had a military education before joining the staff of his uncle, the governor of the Danish island of Santa Cruz, in the West Indies. In 1772 Febiger visited the American colonies, traveling from Cape Fear, North Carolina, to the Penobscot River, and the next year entered the lumber, fish, and horse business in Boston. When the Revolution began he joined Colonel Jacob Gerrish's Massachusetts Regiment on 28 April 1775, becoming adjutant on 19 May, and rendering valuable service at Bunker Hill on 17 June 1775. He was brigadier major during Arnold's March to Quebec, which occurred from September to November 1775, and was captured in the attack on Quebec from 31 December to 1 January. In September 1776 he went to New York with the other prisoners and was exchanged in January 1777.

Joining Daniel Morgan's Eleventh Virginia on 13 November 1776 as lieutenant colonel, Febiger fought at the Brandywine on 11 September 1777, and was promoted to colonel immediately thereafter. He was on Greene's right at Germantown on 4 October, and on 9 October 1777 took command of the Second Virginia Regiment. After he demonstrated skill in provisioning the troops at Valley Forge, General George Washington placed Febiger in charge of a brigade, which Febiger then led at Monmouth. Afterwards, Febiger commanded a regiment in General Anthony Wayne's daring night-time storming of Stony Point on 16 July 1779. Leading the attack, he was among the first over the ramparts and personally captured the British commander, taking charge after Wayne was wounded.

In August 1780 Febiger was stationed in Philadelphia with the mission of forwarding arms and supplies to the south, a duty at which he proved highly effective. He went to Virginia the next spring, assisted Morgan in quelling a Loyalist uprising in Hampshire County, served as a recruiting officer, commanded a body of newly raised Virginia Continentals under the Marquis de Lafayette, and was present at Yorktown when the British surrendered. Febiger was an effective advocate for the use of

martial music to improve morale, and is often given credit for persuading Washington of its value. He retired on 1 January 1783, was brevetted brigadier general on 30 September 1783, settled in Philadelphia, went into business, was treasurer of Pennsylvania from 1789 until his death on 20 September 1796.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's March to Quebec; Bunker Hill, Massachusetts.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

FELTMAN, WILLIAM. Continental officer, diarist. Pennsylvania. Of interest for his diary, which Freeman calls a "most useful source," he became an ensign in the Tenth Pennsylvania on 4 December 1776 and on 13 January 1777 was promoted to second lieutenant of Captain Jacob Weaver's Independent Company guarding prisoners at Lancaster. On 30 October 1777 he advanced to first lieutenant. Weaver's company was transferred to the Tenth Pennsylvania on 17 January 1777 and to the First Pennsylvania on 1 January 1781. Feltman was captured at Green Spring, Virginia, on 6 July 1781 and resigned on 21 April 1782. Feltman's military journal is an immensely valuable source, describing army life while he was serving with General Anthony Wayne's Pennsylvanians during the Virginia campaign.

SEE ALSO *Wayne, Anthony.*

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revised by Harry M. Ward

FENCIBLES. Short for "defensibles," the term was applied to regular troops enlisted for service in Great Britain only, with special exemption from being drafted. There were "fencible infantry" as well as land, river, and sea fencibles in 1796 and perhaps earlier.

Mark M. Boatner

FERGUSON, PATRICK. (1744–1780). British army officer. Born of Scots parents, Ferguson was educated at a private military academy in London before taking up a cornetcy in the Royal North British Dragoons (the Scots Greys) on 12 July 1759. He served in one German campaign before being struck down by an illness that kept him out of the service until he became a captain in the Seventieth Foot on 1 September 1768. His career in the 1770s is still obscure, although he is said to have served in the West Indies in 1772–1773. In March 1776 he submitted to the adjutant general a design for a breech-loading rifle that he was allowed to patent on 2 December, even though his proposal contained nothing new and his particular mechanism had been patented in England as early as 1721. One hundred breech-loaders were made in Birmingham for a trial corps of picked men under Ferguson's command.

The new unit reached New York on 24 May 1777 and on 26 June fought in its first action at Short Hills (later Metuchen), New Jersey. Having adopted the green uniform usual for rifle companies, they took part in the Philadelphia campaign, landing at Turkey Point, Maryland, on 24 August. Working alongside British and Hessian light infantry, Ferguson's men ejected Maxwell's light infantry from its delaying position at Cooch's Bridge (later Iron Hill) on 3 September. Other skirmishes and hard marching followed, so that by the time Ferguson reached the Brandywine Creek he had only twenty-eight effectives. At about this time, according to his own account, he declined to shoot an American officer in the back and expressed no regrets when the officer turned out to be Washington. Ferguson's men then took part in the secondary British assault at Chadd's Ford late in the afternoon of 11 September. During this action a ball shattered his right elbow and permanently crippled his arm.

On the next day, Howe judged the Ferguson rifle to have failed and disbanded the corps. Despite its initial accuracy and high rate of fire and dependability in wet weather, the weapon could rarely get away ten shots before fouling jammed its breech mechanism. Fouling also quickly and progressively affected the weapon's accuracy, and the positioning of the mechanism made the wooden stock hopelessly fragile. All the known surviving Fergusons have crudely repaired stocks, suggesting that most broke before they were withdrawn and stored in New York in the summer of 1778. Howe could hardly have been jealous of such an invention, as is sometimes alleged. While he may have been piqued by the way Ferguson's unit was foisted upon him in the first place, his decision had irrefutable military justification.

While his arm healed, Ferguson was switched to military intelligence, a role in which Clinton valued him as highly as John André. From time to time Ferguson led raiding parties against isolated rebel targets,

the best known of which was at Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey, on 4–5 October 1778. From July to November 1779 he was governor of Stony Point, and his appointment as major in the Seventy-first was officially announced on 25 October. While at Stony Point he began to recruit his own unit of 150 Loyalist rangers known as Ferguson's Scottish Corps or the American Volunteers. On 1 December he was made lieutenant colonel in America, but news of this promotion reached the colonies only after his death.

His new corps, brigaded with other light infantry units, went on the Carolina campaign of 1780, joining the army outside Charleston on 11 January. Sent with Banastre Tarleton to cut the rebel communications with the city, Ferguson took part in the successful action at Monck's Corner on 14 April. Thereafter, he operated independently on the north bank of the Cooper River until Charleston fell on 12 May. On 22 May, Ferguson was made inspector of militia for both Carolinas, raised over four thousand men near Ninety Six, and formed his own southern militia corps of about three hundred out of them. These men fought a series of skirmishes with rebel militia, with some success.

When Cornwallis began his northern march in September 1780, Ferguson—perhaps overconfident, perhaps wrongly thinking that support was at hand—allowed his force of Loyalist militia to become dangerously isolated. He seems to have underestimated, or simply not known, the size of the rebel forces in the vicinity. Cornwallis, ill and resentful of Clinton's favoritism towards Ferguson, had only Tarleton's force available, and Tarleton was down with malaria and unable to move for days. Whatever the exact truth, Ferguson decided to fight on an open hilltop at Kings Mountain, South Carolina, on 5 October 1780. It was a curious and fatal choice for the master of irregular warfare. The sides of the mountain were steep and tree-clad, giving excellent cover to the attackers, and Ferguson failed to build field fortifications. Despite three heroic bayonet charges, his 1,018 Loyalists were rapidly shot to pieces and Ferguson himself was killed. He was just thirty-six years old.

Patrick Ferguson was an intelligent, humane, and dedicated officer. Although his famous rifle turned out to have fatal defects, his interest in new weapons was at one with his keen and inventive use of light infantry and irregular tactics. He was one of the most able officers on either side in the War of American Independence.

SEE ALSO *Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Monck's Corner, South Carolina.*

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revised by John Oliphant

FERGUSON RIFLE *SEE* *Ferguson, Patrick*.

FERMOY, MATTHIAS ALEXIS DE ROCHE. Continental general. Born in Martinique about 1737, he reached America in 1776 claiming to be a French colonel of engineers and wearing the Croix de St. Louis (and the title of chevalier). Commissioned brigadier general on 5 November 1776, he commanded a brigade in the attack on Trenton on 26 December 1776. Starting out at the head of General John Sullivan's division as part of the right wing, he subsequently was moved behind Nathanael Greene's division and sent with Adam Stephen to block the enemy's retreat toward Princeton, New Jersey. He and Stephen met the Hessians with small arms fire while other American forces completed the encirclement and forced the enemy's surrender.

In the next phase of the New Jersey campaign, Fermoy unaccountably left his post as commander of a large force whose mission was to delay the expected enemy advance on Trenton from Princeton. Sent north in March 1777 to oppose General John Burgoyne's offensive, Fermoy was given command of Fort Independence over General George Washington's protest. Contrary to General Arthur St. Clair's orders, Fermoy set fire to the fort when he abandoned it on the morning of 6 July 1777, alerting the British of the American retreat.

After persistent efforts to win promotion from Congress were rebuffed, Fermoy resigned on 31 January 1778 and was awarded \$800 to go back to the West Indies. Nothing further is known of Fermoy.

SEE ALSO *New Jersey Campaign; Ticonderoga, New York, British Capture of.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

FERSEN, HANS AXEL. (1755–1810). (Count von.) Swedish nobleman, French officer in America. Son of a famous Swedish soldier who had served in France before becoming a field marshal in Sweden, Fersen had been a captain in the Swedish service. He became *mestre de camp* in the French army on 20 January

1780. He was an aide-de-camp with Rochambeau in America, but at the siege of Yorktown he served as second colonel of the Deux-Ponts Regiment. He participated in the Swedish army's 1788 campaign against Russia. In 1791, Fersen organized the French royal family's flight to Varennes. He returned to Paris in February 1782 but was unable to organize another escape attempt. In the Swedish army he became a major general (1792), lieutenant general (1800), and grand marshal (1801). Accused by unfounded popular suspicion of having poisoned Prince Christian August in 1810, he was killed by an angry mob on the day of the funeral. Fersen's letters on the French expedition in America provide a variable barometer of the changing staff opinion on many things, including their commander.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

FEU DE JOIE. Literally, a "fire of joy"—William Heath spelled it "feu-de-joy"—this was a form of public, military celebration in which musket fire was timed so as to progress from one man to another, producing a continuous roar. According to the *Oxford Universal Dictionary on Historical Principles*, this was the sense of the term in 1801, but as early as 1771 "feu de joie" meant a bonfire in the literal as well as the figurative sense.

Mark M. Boatner

FEVER SEE *Camp Fever; Jail Fever; Swamp Fever.*

FIELD OFFICER. Dating back as far as 1656 in English, the term was defined in that year as being an officer above the rank of captain, and under the rank of general.

“FIELDS,” MEETING IN THE. 6 July 1774. Presided over by Alexander McDougall, a mass meeting of radicals heard Alexander Hamilton speak against British measures and ended by deciding to send New York delegates to the first Continental Congress. The site of the meeting is now City Hall Park in New York City.

Harold E. Selesky

FILE SEE *Formations.*

FILMS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. Whether set in the ancient Mediterranean or a galaxy far away, war has provided one of the great themes of feature films. In American history the Civil War, the two twentieth-century world wars, and Vietnam all have inspired films of the highest level of achievement, both in terms of cinema and the popular reconstruction of the American past. The Revolutionary War is at least a partial exception. It has generated perhaps ten feature films of note, from D. W. Griffith’s *America* (1924) to Robert Emmerich’s *The Patriot* (2000). Most have serious flaws, whether artistic, historical, or both. Like virtually all historical fiction, they are as much concerned with issues current at the time of their own making as with recreating the verifiable past.

America has not attracted as much attention as Griffith’s first great feature, *The Birth of a Nation* (1915), or his attempt to make up for that film’s vicious racism, *Intolerance* (1916). That is unfortunate, because it deserves wider attention within his body of work. Its budget was enormous for the day (\$950,000), and its production values were high. Griffith never balked at large themes, and the film includes recreations of Lexington and Concord, the Declaration of Independence, and the Continental Army’s bleak winter at Valley Forge. It employs the spectacular sets, battalions of extras, and color-washed film stock that

were Griffith’s hallmarks. But, setting a precedent that subsequent productions would follow, the film centers its treatment of the whole Revolution on a family melodrama, involving an ordinary Patriot man and an aristocratic woman. Here, as in films to come, the interplay of class and sex is complicated by the Loyalist leanings of the woman’s father.

John Ford considered the process and the meaning of American history throughout a career that stretched from the silents to the sixties. He turned to the Revolution in 1939 with *Drums Along the Mohawk*, starring Henry Fonda and Claudette Colbert, based on Walter D. Edmonds’s novel of the same name (1936). Edmonds had researched the revolutionary Mohawk Valley carefully, and his long tale depicted a biracial society tearing itself apart. Ford had high production values, including expensive Technicolor and location work in Idaho, but *Drums* was no *Gone with the Wind*. His best meditations on American history (*Stagecoach* [1939], *My Darling Clementine* [1946], *The Searchers* [1956]) emerged as he expanded skimpy stories. With *Drums* his problem was to condense a very large text to normal feature length.

The result is a film framed in terms of a “natural” conflict between Indians and settlers. Britain is hardly mentioned. The Indians are manipulated by a villainous Loyalist (John Carradine), whose place as the only significant white on their side is balanced by the one Indian among the whites (Chief Big Tree). In an echo of the Griffith film, Gil Martin (Fonda) is an ordinary man who has married a rich woman, Lana (Colbert). She has followed him to the frontier and must learn the frontier’s ways; in the process, they experience a profound exchange of roles. The film deals with battle twice. The first time, Gil describes its horrors to Lana as she tends his wounds. His tale is loosely based on the Patriots’ ambush by a force of British, Loyalists, and natives at Oriskany in 1777. The second battle is a siege of a fort. Ford realized it in starkly sexual terms of white women threatened with rape, and it ends as Continental troops “literally run” to the rescue.

A year later Frank Lloyd directed Cary Grant in *The Howards of Virginia*. Critic Pauline Kael described the urbane, English-born Grant’s performance as Matt Howard, a buckskin-clad surveyor who marries an aristocratic woman, as “really bad.” Matt Howard joins the revolutionary struggle, which, as in *Drums*, is shown in terms of frontier conflict—though Lloyd puts more stress than does Ford on the clash of Loyalists and Patriots among whites. Footage from *Drums Along the Mohawk*, including battle sequences, was used in 1956 in *Mohawk*, directed by Kurt Neumann. That film’s one merit is that it renders its native characters as complex and divided, rather than as faceless forest horrors.

Walt Disney’s production of *Johnny Tremain* (1957), based on the novel by Esther Forbes, was made for Disney’s

mid-twentieth-century family audience. Director Robert Stevenson clearly had a low budget, and most of the film was shot on the Disney lot under warm Southern California skies. But allowing for those constraints and for a certain degree of melodrama, the film does a remarkably thorough, if pedestrian, job of showing the revolutionary crisis in Boston. In this it holds true to Forbes's intention to provide an introduction to the Revolution for young readers.

Like Walter Edmonds, Forbes had done her historical homework. The film does give a good sense of tiny, crowded eighteenth-century Boston, of the events leading up to the destruction of the East India Company's tea in December 1773, of Paul Revere's ride to warn that the regulars were marching to Concord the following April, and of the battle that followed. It also gives windy speeches to some Patriot leaders and renders British General Thomas Gage (Ralph Clanton) as more a victim of bureaucracy than a villain in his own right. The villain, instead, is a pompous Loyalist merchant, an uncle of the title character. Johnny (Hal Stalmaster) rejects his uncle along with his family's inherited wealth and reactionary politics. As the Patriot army's campfires ring besieged Boston, Gage has almost the last word, admitting that an idea, not mere rebelliousness, has driven his opponents to war.

Hugh Hudson's *Revolution* (1986) is *Johnny Tremain*'s direct opposite in almost all respects. Hudson had established himself as a major director with *Chariots of Fire* (1981). Working with a huge budget, he chose to do location work in Britain, reasoning that the hungry look of ordinary English people under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would show something of the suffering of Americans under George III. The idea was intriguing, but it failed. One reason is the locations. The English sky and trees and fields simply do not look at all like America. A major battle sequence shows a British armada invading New York City in 1776. Much of the battle takes place in a field yellow with ripe rape (canola), a sight familiar to any summer traveler in England but unknown on the American east coast. The sequence completely misses the near-entrapment of the American troops on Brooklyn Heights and Washington's brilliant nighttime withdrawal to Manhattan. The film closes with the siege of Lord Cornwallis's emplacement at Yorktown, which it presents as simply a melee. Once again, there are problems of location, with the final shots taking place at the bottom of a steep, rocky cliff. Nothing of the sort exists on the shores of Chesapeake Bay. In between there is a long sequence at Valley Forge, which the film shows as a fort defending itself against British raiders rather than as the winter encampment that it actually was.

Revolution also uses the device of a rich young woman (Nastassja Kinski) falling in love with a poor man (Al Pacino). Her father is a double-dealing business

man, looking for profit on both sides, but she emerges as a fiery Patriot. The film reprises several devices from *Drums Along the Mohawk*. One is to have her listen to his tale of combat when she finds him wounded after the first battle. Another is to dress her in a soldier's blue coat and make her an active participant in the action at Valley Forge, where she appears to be killed by British troops as she is driving a wagon laden with wounded soldiers. Several coincidences later, Pacino's character finds her alive.

Hudson's own Labor Party sympathies are apparent. At worst, this leads to a caricature of the British forces. Soldiers in the ranks, represented by a loutish sergeant major (Donald Sutherland), are brutal. Officers are not just aristocratic but effete, to the point of outright camp. Pacino's male lead enters the film completely without knowledge or motivation. That could be forgiven for the youthful Johnny Tremain in the Disney production, whose function is to introduce issues to young, naïve viewers. But for an adult in 1776, such ignorance is unbelievable. But despite these flaws, Hudson's approach has merits. The happy, totally unlikely union of the Kinski and Pacino characters takes place not in the midst of sunshine-soaked triumph but under a cloud of bitter realization of the price of revolution and the problems to come. Patriot soldiers realize that speculators have cheated them out of what they had been promised. Emergent racism is evident among the victorious white Americans against both native peoples and African-Americans. Pacino's final voice-over is optimistic, but the final images and sounds give reason to doubt.

Emmerich's *The Patriot* is equally lavish and equally flawed. Unlike *Revolution*, the location work is right. The film is set in South Carolina and was shot there as well. The two major sequences of formal battle, based on the conflicts at Camden (1781) and Guilford Court House (1782), are very well done, though the film is no better than *Johnny Tremain* at showing massed musket fire and bayonet charges. We learn under the opening credits that it is autumn of 1776 and shortly afterward that independence has not been declared. Like Pacino's Tom Dodd in *Revolution*, Mel Gibson's Benjamin Martin is given no motivation for joining the Revolution, until his own son is killed when he encounters British wrath. Then Martin turns into a fury, modeled loosely on the "Swamp Fox" guerrilla leader, Francis Marion.

In another predictably antiphonal pairing, Gibson's Ben Martin finds his opposite number in Colonel William Tavington (Jason Isaacs), who is based on the historic cavalry commander Banastre Tarleton. The film perfectly captures Tavington's image, derived from Sir Joshua Reynolds's portrait of Tarleton. But Tavington is pure villain, and British reviewers were rightly outraged that



The Patriot. In Roland Emmerich's 2000 film about the American Revolution, Mel Gibson's Benjamin Martin (center) is not motivated to join to the war effort until his own son has a fatal encounter with the British. THE KOBAL COLLECTION.

in the film he perpetrates an atrocity against civilians that Tarleton never committed.

All of these films at least touch on the issue of race, but *The Patriot* makes a great deal of it. Unfortunately, it simply denies historical fact. Martin is a member of the South Carolina elite, but he owns no slaves. The partisan fighters who gather around Martin later in the film welcome and respect Occam (Jay Arlen Jones), a black man who joins them and wins his freedom. They find refuge in a slave maroon community, which never would have welcomed whites. At the end Occam leads the rebuilding of Martin's ravaged house. The film ignores the historical record: that revolutionary white Carolinians stoutly resisted the Revolution's opening to black freedom, that they kept the slave trade going into the nineteenth century, and that their progeny would lead the secession movement in 1861 so as to protect slavery.

Mary Silliman's War, made for PBS in 1994, is worlds apart from Hollywood films like *The Patriot*. Based on a scholarly biography, by Joy Day Buel and Richard V. Buel Jr., of an elite Connecticut woman whose husband, Brigadier General Gold Selleck Silliman, was kidnapped

by Loyalists, it shows how war came to one Revolutionary community. Without grand, heroic charges or powerful sound effects, the film gives a strong sense of a community at odds with itself, of how British regular soldiers dealt with civilians, and of how living through the war changed one woman and her world.

Both dramatically and historically, the small-scale, small-screen film depicts the Revolution well. But the subject still awaits a good, mass-viewer treatment that does not do violence to the Revolution's history.

SEE ALSO *Marion, Francis; Tarleton, Banastre.*

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Edward Countryman

FINANCES OF THE REVOLUTION.

Since hatred of imperial taxes was one of the main reasons why the colonists undertook to defend their rights by force of arms in the first place, Congress and the states had had to be wary of taxing the people to pay for the war effort. Yet war making was ruinously expensive, and some method of sustaining the armed struggle had to be found. On 22 June 1775, eight days after adopting the New England army around Boston as a continental army, Congress voted to issue \$2 million in bills of credit, the beginning of a stream of currency finance that reached \$241.5 million by the end of 1779. The colonies had issued paper money to help pay their expenses during the French and Indian War, but the money had been backed by taxation and the reimbursement of expenditures by Parliament, neither of which was now possible. Congress was reduced to asking the states for contributions, but with the states issuing their own unbacked paper money, there were few funds left to support the continental emissions. Everyone knew the currency would depreciate. With expenses estimated as high as \$20 million in specie annually, the longer the war lasted, the faster the value would bleed from paper money. The British initiated a significant counterfeiting program to help cheapen the currency, but it was the continuing stalemate, even after the French entered the war in February 1778, that accelerated the devaluation. Although currency finance carried the war through its critical early years, when the currency began to collapse in 1779, it seemed to many that the Revolution was running out of time.

As the central financing of the war stalled, Congress stepped up reliance on borrowing money from wealthier Americans (about \$60 million in Loan Office Certificates) and allowing agents of the quartermaster and commissary departments to impress needed supplies, giving in return Certificates of Indebtedness (a minimum of \$95 million in ten states). It also shifted a significant burden to the states, who were not themselves in very good financial shape. Nine states agreed to be responsible for paying the wages of their Continental troops in 1781 and 1782, but the soldiers themselves received virtually nothing, a dangerous way to deal with troops, some of whom, in the New Jersey and Pennsylvania Lines, had already mutinied over arrears in pay in January 1781. A plan floated on 18 March 1780 to revalue Continental currency at 40 to 1 by declaring forty dollars of old Continental currency worth one dollar in specie had failed by the end of the year.

In May 1781 the Continental currency collapsed, taking with it, via depreciation, \$226 million in debts, in effect a tax levied on those who had held on to the paper. Foreseeing this collapse, Congress had reorganized and rationalized its executive departments in late 1780 and early 1781, steps it had not had the political will, or the

financial pressure, to take earlier. On 20 February 1781, Robert Morris—perhaps the wealthiest, and certainly one of the most astute, merchants in America—accepted the job of superintendent of finance.

Morris's principal goal was to establish a sound financial footing for the central government. He streamlined the administration of army supply by relying on, and promptly paying, private contractors, rather than operating through layers of government agents who paid for goods with promissory notes. He created two new series of paper money—the so-called Morris's notes, backed by his own assets, and notes issued by the Bank of North America that he persuaded Congress to charter—to restore confidence in bills of credit. He consolidated the existing debts into a single central debt and wanted Congress to fund it with taxes imposed by the central government. All of his measures were made possible by the fact that the war was winding down, American political independence was assured, the size of the Continental army was shrinking, and no large-scale military operations were necessary after the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown in October 1781.

The history of American war finance is the story of the leaders of a coalition's constituent partners learning to work together to pay for a war of unprecedented scope and complexity—and therefore, cost—in a society where the instruments of financial manipulation were underdeveloped and the aversion of the people to taxation was enormous. Given these circumstances, it is probably more appropriate to emphasize their successes rather than their failures and to remember that they did manage to establish the political independence of their confederation.

SEE ALSO *Continental Currency; Morris, Robert (1734–1806).*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

FINCASTLE. One of the titles of Lord Dunmore, the name of the fort at Wheeling, and the name of a village on the James River that previously had been called Botetourt Court House. Fincastle County included what became the southern part of West Virginia and the adjacent portion of Virginia.

SEE ALSO *Murray, John; Wheeling, West Virginia.*

Mark M. Boatner

FIRE CAKE. Flour and water baked in thin cakes on hot stones.

FISH DAM FORD, SOUTH CAROLINA. 9 November 1780. Hearing that newly promoted General Thomas Sumter was camped with three hundred men at Moore's Mill, only thirty miles northwest of the main British army at Winnsboro, General Charles Cornwallis gave Major James Wemyss authority to go after him with his one hundred mounted infantry of the Sixty-third Regiment and forty horsemen from Tarleton's British Legion. The plan was to surprise the rebels in a night attack at Moore's Mill, but Sumter had unexpectedly moved five miles south to Fish Dam Ford. Finding the first camp empty, Wemyss pushed on, reaching the new encampment at dawn. The British dragoons charged into the camp with Wemyss at their head. The rebels responded quickly, opening fire. Wemyss was shot and fell from his saddle with a broken arm and a wounded knee. At this point the Sixty-third

arrived in the camp, dismounted, and fired upon the Patriots, who fled into the nearby woods from where they returned fire on the British. Not knowing that Cornwallis had given Wemyss specific instructions not to misuse Tarleton's cavalry by employing them at night, young Lieutenant John Stark led a mounted charge down the road and into Sumter's bivouac, where they were silhouetted against the campfires and badly shot up. With the battle becoming ever more chaotic, both sides withdrew.

Meanwhile, five dragoons who had been given the mission of getting Sumter dead or alive were led to Sumter's tent by a Loyalist named Sealy. As two dragoons entered the front of his tent, Sumter slipped out the back and spent the night hiding under a bank of the nearby Broad River. Stark left Wemyss and the other twenty-two wounded British soldiers at the plantation's farmhouse under a flag of truce and returned to Winnsboro. When Sumter ventured back to his camp about noon—the British sergeant in charge of the wounded said no rebels were seen until two hours after sunrise—he took the paroles of the wounded. Major Wemyss had in his pocket a list of the men he had hanged and the houses he had burned in the punitive raid up the Peedee to Cheraw, but Sumter threw the list in the fire after glancing at it.

Although Cornwallis says Sumter had about three hundred militia and "banditti" (that is to say, noble partisans) at Moore's Mill, it is likely that the number at Fish Dam Ford was more like two hundred men. The unit commanders who rallied the Patriot militia in the absence of Sumter were Colonel Thomas Taylor and Colonel Richard Winn. The British attacked with 150 men, losing from ten to fifteen men killed and twenty-three wounded while the rebels lost five or six dead and a dozen wounded.

The rebels counted Fish Dam Ford a great success and morale soared. As Cornwallis reported to Sir Henry Clinton, "The enemy on this event cried 'Victory,' and the whole country came in fast to join Sumter." Alarmed for the safety of Ninety Six, the British commander recalled Tarleton and sent Major Archibald McArthur with his First Battalion of the Seventy-first Highlanders and the Sixty-third Regiment to guard Brierly's Ford on the Broad River. Tarleton reached this place on 18 November, and his efforts to trap Sumter led to the action at Blackstocks, South Carolina on 20 November 1780.

SEE ALSO *Blackstock's, South Carolina.*

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FISHING CREEK, NORTH CAROLINA. 18 August 1780. After the defeat of General Horatio Gates at Camden on 16 August, Captain Nathaniel Martin and two dragoons rode to warn Colonel Thomas Sumter of the disaster and to arrange a rendezvous near Charlotte. Loaded down with the booty and prisoners taken around Wateree Ferry on 15 August, Sumter and Captain Stevens Woolford's detachment marched day and night in an effort to escape. Cornwallis, meanwhile, had moved with his main body to Rugeley's Mill (Clermont). By the time Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton returned to this place late on the 16th from his pursuit to Hanging Rock, Cornwallis had picked up information of Sumter's location and ordered Tarleton to pursue him the next morning.

With 350 men and one cannon, Tarleton started up the east side of the Wateree early on 17 August. By late afternoon he had learned that his quarry was across the river on a parallel course. Reaching the ferry at Rocky Mount around dusk, Tarleton saw enemy campfires about a mile west of the river, and he bivouacked without fires in the hope that Sumter intended to cross the river and could be attacked while in this vulnerable position. When his scouts reported the next morning that the Americans were continuing up the west side, Tarleton crossed the Wateree and followed Sumter, undetected, to Fishing Creek. Reaching this point, some forty miles from Camden, at about noon, Tarleton's foot troops said they were unable to continue. Tarleton pushed forward with one hundred dragoons and sixty infantry, the latter riding double with the horsemen. After another five miles, two of Sumter's scouts were cut down after they had fired and killed one man of the enemy advance guard. Pressing forward, Tarleton found Sumter's troops resting with their arms stacked, unaware they were being pursued. Tarleton reported that some of the rebel militia were bathing in the creek and that many were drunk from alcohol they had seized from the British. Tarleton made a hasty deployment and charged. When Sumter, who had been sleeping, woke up in the scene of general confusion, he indulged in no heroics but, rather, saved his own skin by leaping coatless astride an unsaddled horse; two days later he rode into Major Davie's camp. Some of his men rallied to defend themselves from behind the wagons, killing Captain Charles Campbell, who had burned Sumter's house and launched the latter on his not always glorious career.

With a loss of 16 killed and wounded, Tarleton killed or wounded 150 Americans, captured 300, released 200 British and Loyalist prisoners, and recaptured 44 wagons full of supplies. Tarleton's reputation soared with reports of this coup. Only 350 of Sumter's 800 troops escaped. In writing of this battle, Colonel Henry Lee thought that it again proved that no reliance could be placed on the militia, which demonstrated a "fatal neglect of duty. . . .

The pursuance of that system [militia] must weaken the best resources of the state, by throwing away the lives of its citizens" (Smith, vol. 2, p. 1420).

SEE ALSO *Wateree Ferry, South Carolina.*

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FLAG, AMERICAN. Until the outbreak of the Revolution, when Americans flew a flag, they used the British Union Flag, which was proclaimed by King James I in 1606 (and was superseded by the Union Jack in 1801). A number of flags were flown in the first two years of the Revolution, including the green flag of the Green Mountain Boys with its fourteen oddly shaped stars on a blue background and the Cambridge Flag flown at Washington's headquarters at Cambridge, Massachusetts, with thirteen red and white stripes and the united crosses of St. George and St. Andrew, which was a modification of the British Meteor Flag. Other early flags include the Bunker Hill flag, the Gadsden or South Carolina Rattlesnake flag ("Don't Tread on Me"), the New England Pine Tree Flag ("An Appeal to Heaven"), and the Crescent Flag of South Carolina.

On 14 June 1777 Congress passed the Flag Resolution, which specified that there be thirteen stripes, red and white alternately, with thirteen white stars in a blue field "representing a new constellation." This left considerable latitude to flag makers as to the type of stars, their arrangement, and the arrangement of the stripes.

The Bennington Flag is believed by many authorities to be the first Stars and Stripes-style flag flown by ground forces. Said to have been carried or present at the Battle of Bennington in Vermont during August 1777, its field—nine stripes wide—had an arch of eleven seven-pointed stars over the numerals "76" and had two more stars in the top corners of the field. The top and bottom stripes were white rather than red. Another early use of the Stars and Stripes came at Cooch's Bridge, Delaware, on 3 September 1777.

The famous story about the first Stars and Stripes flag being made by Betsy Ross at the request of George Washington, Robert Morris, and George Ross is based on a family tradition first made public by her grandson, William Canby, in March 1870. Although Betsy Ross is known to have made flags, there is no evidence from her time that she made one along the pattern of the Stars and Stripes.

SEE ALSO *Bennington Flag; Cooch's Bridge; Jasper, William; South Carolina, Flag of.*

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FLANK COMPANIES. Each battalion of the British army included a light infantry company and a grenadier company; they were known as “flank companies” and were made up of the best soldiers in the battalion. During field operations they normally were pooled to form special corps of light infantry and grenadiers. The remaining eight companies were called the “battalion companies.” The American army never formed grenadier companies but did have light infantry.

SEE ALSO *Light Infantry*.

Mark M. Boatner

FLANKING POSITION. A form of defense in which the defender takes up a position so located that the enemy will expose his flanks or line of communications if he continues his advance. Rarely found in combat, a good flanking position must have these characteristics: strong defensive terrain; protection for one’s own line of communication; and the possibility of sallying forth to attack the enemy should he try to ignore the position and continue his advance. The defender also must have sufficient strength so that the attacker cannot contain him with part of his force and continue on to his original objective.

Mark M. Boatner

FLÈCHE. A small earthwork shaped like an arrowhead or V and open to the rear.

Mark M. Boatner

FLEURY SEE *Teissèdre de Fleury, François Louis*.

FLORA, WILLIAM. Continental soldier. The son of Virginia free blacks, Flora’s birth and early life

remain unknown. In 1775 he joined the Second Virginia Regiment under the command of Colonel William Woodford. At the Battle of Great Bridge in December 1775 the regiment confronted Lord Dunmore’s Loyalist, British, and “Ethiopian” troops, the latter being slaves who won their freedom by joining Dunmore’s forces. On the morning of 9 December, Flora was on guard duty on the bridge over the Elizabeth River when the British attacked. The other sentinels fled in panic, but Flora stood his ground, firing, it was reported, eight times on the advancing enemy before he retreated to the Patriot breastworks. After Dunmore’s retreat, Flora won praise for his heroism and then vanished from the records until 1781, when he was present at the Battle of Yorktown. Following the British surrender, Flora returned to Portsmouth, Virginia, where he ran a cartage business and livery stable. In 1784 he became the first black person known to own land in Portsmouth. He married a slave woman and purchased her freedom after Virginia altered its manumission laws in 1782. During the war scare following the attack of the British warship *Leopard* upon the U.S. ship *Chesapeake* in 1807, Flora volunteered for duty but his services were not required. In 1818 he and other Virginia veterans of the Revolution received a land grant of one hundred acres each in Ohio, which is the last historical reference to this hero of the Revolution.

SEE ALSO *African Americans in the Revolution; Dunmore’s (or Cresap’s) War*.

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Michael Bellesiles

FLOWER, BENJAMIN. (1748–1781). Continental officer, Pennsylvania. Commissary of military stores for the flying camp from 16 July to December 1776, he was directed by Washington on 16 January 1777 to raise the unit that became known as the Regiment of Artillery Artificers. He died young (28 April 1781) and is buried at Philadelphia’s Christ Church. A portrait, believed to be by Charles Willson Peale, is in the Star-Spangled Banner House in Baltimore.

SEE ALSO *Artificers; Flying Camp*.

Mark M. Boatner

FLOWER, SAMUEL. Continental officer. Massachusetts. Commissioned second lieutenant of

Danielson's Massachusetts regiment, May 1775 to December 1775, became captain in Third Massachusetts on 1 January 1777, resigned on 9 February 1780, and was major of the Massachusetts militia in 1782 .

Mark M. Boatner

FLOYD, WILLIAM. (1734–1821). Signer. New York. Born in Brookhaven, New York, on 17 December 1734, William Floyd was active in local politics prior to the Revolution. Elected to the Continental Congress, in which he served until 1783, he became colonel of the Suffolk County militia on 5 September 1775. He and his family fled before the British in 1776, and his farm was seized as rebel property. From 1777 to 1783, he was New York state senator by appointment rather than election, for his district was occupied by the British. Though he spent most of the war living with his wife's family in Connecticut, he served on the New York Council of Safety and continued to represent New York in Congress. His most notable service in that body was on the Committee of Secret Correspondence. He was elected to state senate, where he served from 1784 to 1788 and in 1787 and 1789 was a member of the council of appointment. He sat in the first U.S. Congress (1789 to 1791), but lost his re-election bid. In 1801 he attended the New York constitutional convention. Two years later he moved his family to the town of Western, New York, on the Mohawk River, where he died 4 August 1821.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

FLYING CAMP. July–November 1776. When the British evacuated Boston in March 1776, the Americans were faced with the need to defend widely scattered areas where the enemy might strike next. Part of their solution was the establishment of a “flying camp,” the term being a literal translation of the French *camp volant*, which, in the military terminology of the day, meant a mobile, strategic reserve. Washington met with Congress and with specially appointed committees between 24 May and 4 June 1776 to discuss plans for future military action. One decision was that Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would furnish until December 1776 a total of ten thousand men from their militias to constitute a flying camp that, unlike the militia, could be ordered to go where it was needed. Congressional

authorization came on 3 June, Hugh Mercer was designated commander, and the newly appointed brigadier general reported to New York City on 3 July to assume his duties with much energy. Men arrived slowly, however, and they all lacked training; by 25 July, Mercer had only three thousand men in eastern New Jersey, mostly at Perth Amboy. When Washington called for two thousand men to assist in the fortification of New York City, Mercer was hard put to find this number of reliable soldiers.

Units of the Flying Camp were stationed from Amboy to Long Island before and after the British attacked there on 27 August 1776. Elements of five battalions of the Pennsylvania Flying Camp fought well at Long Island, as did several companies of the Maryland Flying Camp at Harlem Heights (16 September). The Flying Camp's most notable exploit was participating in the gallant defense of Fort Washington on 16 November, where four Pennsylvania battalions were overwhelmed and captured by the British and Hessian assault. Most of the two to three thousand men who followed Washington and Greene out of Fort Lee on 18 November were from the Flying Camp. On 30 November the Flying Camp came to an end when its final two thousand enlistments expired, although few soldiers actually remained in the field by that point. Washington was disappointed by the small number that had reported to Mercer's camp at Amboy in late November.

The Flying Camp was plagued throughout its short existence by the same lack of organization, supply, and training that afflicted Continental army and other state units. Nevertheless, it was a worthwhile attempt to tap the militia to create a ready source of reinforcements for the field army. The pace of operations in the second half of 1776 around New York City was too rapid to allow it time to prepare adequately for active service.

SEE ALSO *Fort Lee, New Jersey; Fort Washington, New York; Harlem Heights, New York; Long Island, New York, Battle of; Mercer, Hugh*.

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FLYING SAP SEE Sap.

FONTANGES, FRANÇOIS, VICOMTE

DE. (1740–1826). French major general. Born at the Château de la Fauconnière at Gannat, he became a lieutenant in the Poitou Regiment in 1756. He fought in Germany and was promoted to captain in 1758. In 1775 he transferred to the Regiment of Cap Français in Saint Domingue, where he was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1778. In 1777 he became a chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis. In July 1779 he was named major general of the troops of debarkation for Estaing's assault on Savannah, where he was seriously wounded in October 1779. He returned to Saint Domingue as major general of militia in 1780, was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the Regiment of Cap Français in October 1780, and subsequently was elevated to colonel in 1784 and *maréchal de camp* in 1789. He resigned on 18 April 1790 because of differences with the colonial assembly. He arrived in England in 1795. In 1811 he returned to France and became a lieutenant general on 13 August 1814. During the Restoration in France, he was made commander in the Order of Saint Louis.

SEE ALSO *Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

FONTENOY, BATTLE OF. 11 May 1745.

Fontenoy was a small village on a narrow plain two miles southeast of the fortress of Tournai on the banks of the Scheldt in Flanders. It gave its name to a decisive action in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), when a French army under Maurice de Saxe, marshal of France, defeated an Anglo-Dutch-Hanoverian army under the duke of Cumberland, son of George II. Although funneled into a restricted battleground, Cumberland sent forward a compact mass of some 15,000 infantry to break the French center. The column, eventually one huge square, was built around six battalions of superbly disciplined British infantry that advanced at a deliberate cadence to ensure their battle lines remained properly aligned. As the British

moved through the French crossfire and came within musket range (thirty paces) of the enemy's lines, Lord Charles Hay, captain of the First Company of the First Battalion of the First Foot Guards, stepped forward and, it is reported, in effect invited the French to fire first. Hay was not being excessively gallant or merely quixotic. In the world of linear tactics, the side that fired first exposed itself to an enemy riposte while it desperately tried to reload. The surviving soldiers on the side that received the fire had a few precious seconds to launch a bayonet charge against their temporarily defenseless foe, or to advance closer and deliver their own volley fire. According to all the British accounts, the less-well-disciplined French did fire first, and the famously well-disciplined British struck back with a series of volleys by companies, a rain of fire that brought down between 600 and 800 Frenchmen. Although the episode is one of the most famous and dramatic in this period (equaled, perhaps, only by a similar display of British discipline under fire at Minden fourteen years later), the allied infantry was later forced to retreat under intense pressure, leaving Saxe victorious and in possession of Flanders. Among those who saw action at Fontenoy were Thomas Gage, George Sackville (later George Germain, who distinguished himself as a regimental commander), James Grant, Robert Monckton, and Philip Skene, all of whom figured in the American Revolution.

SEE ALSO *Austrian Succession, War of the; Gage, Thomas; Germain, George Sackville; Grant, James; Minden, Battle of; Monckton, Robert; Muskets and Musketry; Skene, Philip.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

FOOL, KNAVE, AND HONEST, OBSTINATE MAN.

Alexander McDougall's characterization of Joseph Spencer, George Clinton, and William Heath, respectively, in connection with their recommendation that New York City be defended during the New York campaign.

SEE ALSO *New York Campaign.*

Mark M. Boatner

FORBES'S EXPEDITION TO FORT DUQUESNE.

1758. A major operation of the French and Indian War, the American phase of the Seven Years' War. As part of the Pitt ministry's new approach to the global struggle for supremacy against Britain's traditional Franco-Spanish Bourbon enemies, the crown had committed major assets to North America. The strategic river junction later named Pittsburgh (in his honor) became a critical objective. The second expedition—Braddock's was the first—is of interest here primarily because of the many participants who went on to play key roles in the Revolutionary War. General John Forbes gathered a force of over sixty-five hundred British regulars and Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland colonials to eliminate Fort Duquesne and end French penetration of the Ohio Valley. Regulars of Lieutenant Colonel Henry Bouquet's Sixtieth (Royal American) Foot and of the newly raised Seventy-seventh (Montgomery) Foot formed the heart of the strike force—the former consisting mostly of Germans and German-speaking Swiss, the latter of Scottish Highlanders. While British policy relegated many of the provincials to support and labor roles, others were given combat assignments. Future Continental army generals serving under Forbes included John Armstrong, Hugh Mercer, Adam Stephen, Andrew Lewis, and George Weedon. Colonel George Washington served as one of the four brigade commanders, the highest rank attained by any American in the war.

Both Pennsylvania and Virginia claimed the lands around the Forks of the Ohio (modern Pittsburgh) and colonial politicians expended considerable energy competing against each other to convince the imperial authorities to pursue policies that would further their ambitions. Much to the chagrin of the Virginians, Forbes chose not to follow the old Braddock Road but instead pushed west from Bedford, Pennsylvania, along a path thereafter known as the Forbes Road.

While this decision would have long-term impact on territorial jurisdiction, Forbes's greater impact came from his unique contributions to American military theory. A student of the classics (he had originally trained to be a doctor), the Scot carefully studied Roman success against the Gauls for lessons in how to operate in wilderness conditions. Forbes, like the French theoreticians Turpin de Crisse and the comte de Saxe, found inspiration in the writings of Julius Caesar. Forbes and his second in command, Bouquet, realized that regular troops' discipline would overwhelm the Indians if they could be brought into close combat, and that the regulars could accomplish that task by replicating the flexibility of the Roman legions. They especially saw careful logistical preparations and moving in 360-degree defensive formations as keys to success. Washington took this lesson to heart, and in 1779 John Sullivan replicated the tactics in his campaign against the Iroquois in the Mohawk Valley.

After spending the summer of 1758 laying that groundwork and finding Indian allies, the expedition started forward. Forbes refused to quit when the advance party under Major James Grant made a tactical error and was defeated on 21 September. The main body fought off a furious attack by French and Indians on 12 October at Loyal Hannon (Ligonier). Forbes paused here during a period of bad weather to improve the road and bring up supplies. On 12 November, however, Bouquet learned from three prisoners that the French garrison was in desperate straits—Bradstreet's capture of Fort Frontenac had isolated Duquesne, and the Indians were deserting—and resumed the advance. Faced with inevitable defeat, the French garrison destroyed Fort Duquesne and Bouquet took possession on 25 November 1758.

Forbes Road, constructed at tremendous effort between Bedford and Pittsburgh for this expedition, was used for the next thirty years not only as a military line of communications, but also for a stream of settlers. In later centuries, U.S. Route 30 has followed roughly the same trace.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; Grant, James; Sullivan, John.*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

FORLORN HOPE. A small body of picked troops that precedes the main body in an attack. Dutch in origin, the term originally meant "lost troop," but both words became corrupted in English to give the sense of "suicide mission."

Mark M. Boatner

FORMAN'S REGIMENT. Forman's Regiment was one of sixteen additional Continental regiments.

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments.*

Mark M. Boatner

FORMATIONS. When soldiers stand shoulder to shoulder facing the front, they are formed in a rank or a line; when they stand one behind the other they constitute a file. Two or more files make a column; two or more ranks (or single lines) are also called a line. (The term "column" is most commonly used in the sense just defined, although men can also be in a "column of (single) files" or "Indian file.")

Linear tactics—as opposed to the massed formations of the Greek Phalanx of ancient times and the Spanish Square that was doomed by field artillery—evolved with the advent of effective muskets. A “line of columns,” was used in the Franco-American attack on Savannah on 9 October 1779.

SEE ALSO *Artillery of the Eighteenth Century; Muskets and Musketry; Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779).*

Mark M. Boatner

FORT ANDERSON, SOUTH CAROLINA.

Also called Thicketty Fort.

SEE ALSO *Thicketty Fort, South Carolina.*

FORT ANNE, NEW YORK. 8 July 1777. Although General John Burgoyne captured Skenesboro, New York, on 6 July, he failed to trap the defenders. On 7 July, Lieutenant John Hill led his Ninth Foot in pursuit while two other regiments consolidated their hold on the former naval base. The British traversed the 12 miles of rugged road towards Fort Anne and camped a mile from it. Hill had failed to catch Colonel Pierce Long’s 150-man rear guard, but he did pick off several boats of invalids, camp followers, and others straggling in Wood Creek. His pickets also had an intense 4-hour skirmish with strong American patrols as evening fell. Shortly after dawn on the 8th an American spy posing as a deserter appeared in Hill’s camp with the story that 1,000 troops held Fort Anne. Since Hill’s force only numbered 190, and he did not feel able to either attack or safely retreat in the face of such odds, he decided to stand fast and call for reinforcement. The “deserter” then escaped to Fort Anne and reported on the British weakness. Meanwhile, heavy rains slowed the movement of the relief column and reduced visibility to almost nothing.

Colonel Henry van Rensselaer had, in fact, reached the fort with four hundred New York militia, and at 10:30 he sallied forth with Long’s New Hampshire Continentals to annihilate Hill. The detachment abandoned its camp along Wood Creek and took refuge atop a steep, five-hundred-foot ridge, where it set up an all-around defense. Hill and his men fought off their adversaries for two hours. When their ammunition was running low and they were being attacked from all sides, an Indian war whoop was heard from the north. The Americans—who also were low on ammunition—assumed that it signaled the arrival of Burgoyne’s reinforcements from Skenesboro, broke off the engagement, burned Fort Anne, and retreated to Fort Edward. It turned out that the “reinforcements” consisted of one deputy

quartermaster general, Captain John Money; when his Indians had refused to follow him into the action, he had advanced alone with a borrowed war whoop. In this confusing little action the British lost twenty-two casualties, including three officers; the Americans probably suffered less. While both sides claimed victory, the edge went to Long, since the check ended effective British pursuit of his column.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne’s Offensive; Skenesboro, New York.*

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FORT BEAUSEJOUR, ACADIA. (Later Nova Scotia.) Fort Beausejour was built by the French in 1751 at the head of the Bay of Fundy (on the border between modern Nova Scotia and New Brunswick) to counterbalance Fort Lawrence, built a few miles away by the British the previous year. During the final French and Indian war, Fort Beausejour was captured after a two-week siege (19 June 1755) by troops from Fort Lawrence.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

FORT BLAIR. Fort Blair was erected on the site of the Battle of Point Pleasant (10 October 1774).

FORT BUTE, LOUISIANA (MANCHAC). Fort at Manchac named for Lord Bute.

SEE ALSO *Manchac Post (Fort Bute).*

FORT CARS SEE *Kettle Creek, Georgia*

FORT CLINTON, NEW YORK. 6 October 1777. Captured along with Fort Montgomery by Clinton’s expedition.

SEE ALSO *Clinton’s Expedition.*

FORT COCKHILL, NEW YORK. 16 November 1776. At the mouth of Spuyten Duyvil, the little fort at Cock or Cox Hill was an outpost of Fort Tryon, which was in turn an outpost of Fort Washington.

SEE ALSO *Fort Washington, New York; Spuyten Duyvil, New York.*

Mark M. Boatner

FORT CORNWALLIS SEE *Augusta, Georgia (14–18 September 1780).*

FORT CUMBERLAND, NOVA SCOTIA. 7–29 November 1776. With from 14,000 to 15,000 New Englanders living in Nova Scotia at the beginning of the Revolution, there was much talk in that province of joining the insurrection of the other colonies. However, the British garrison at Halifax and the presence of warships served as a powerful deterrent. Early in 1776 a Scot named John Allen and an emigrant from Massachusetts named Jonathan Eddy (a veteran of the French and Indian War) led a movement to secure control of the province from the British. Although Washington and Congress could not promise support, Massachusetts agreed to supply whatever force the rebels could muster. Allen visited Massachusetts to make plans for the insurrection and returned to Sackville with a small body of men, including Indians, who captured the small outpost at Shepody. Although only 180 men assembled at Machias, the rebel leaders decided to attempt the capture of Fort Cumberland (formerly Beauséjour and near modern Amherst). On 7 November they got possession of a sloop anchored near the fort, gaining much-needed supplies, and on the 10th, Eddy sent the enemy commander a summons to surrender.

Fort Cumberland was held by the Royal Fencible Americans under the command of Colonel Joseph Goreham. The besiegers realized that Goreham could expect prompt support from Halifax and that their time was therefore limited. The summons having been refused, Eddy launched attacks on 13 and 22 November, but both failed. A company of the Royal Highland Emigrants and two companies of marines then arrived from Halifax. A British sortie on 29 November broke the siege, but bad weather and lack of proper clothing prevented Goreham from pursuing the insurgents. Instead, the British commander decided on a policy of reconciliation, offering a conditional pardon to the rebels. More than one hundred men surrendered their weapons and expressed regret for

having participated in the operation. Although Eddy and Allen continued their efforts, the British established Fort Howe at the mouth of the St. John, checking further rebel action in the Maritimes.

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FORT DAYTON, NEW YORK. The site of Fort Dayton, built in 1776 by New Jersey troops of Colonel Elias Dayton, is marked in the present-day village of Herkimer, New York. The Palatines settled the area, calling it German Flats, in 1722, about two miles west of Fort Herkimer Church. Presumably on the site of the dilapidated blockhouse left from the Seven Years' War, the fortified stone house was the point of departure for the ill-fated march to Oriskany in August 1777. Fort Dayton figured in the action at nearby Shell's Bush exactly four years later. The site is marked by a heroic bronze statue in Myers Park depicting the desperate defense of this position at Oriskany.

SEE ALSO *Dayton, Elias; German Flats, New York; Oriskany, New York; Schell's Bush, New York.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

FORT DREADNOUGHT, SOUTH CAROLINA SEE *Fort Galphin, South Carolina.*

FORT FINCASTLE, VIRGINIA SEE *Wheeling, West Virginia.*

FORT GAGE. Two small forts were called Fort Gage in this period, both named after Major General Thomas Gage. In 1758 the British built Fort George at the head of Lake George to replace Fort William Henry, which the French had besieged and burned in August 1757. Fort Gage was a small earthwork built in 1759 a half-mile south of Fort George. A second Fort Gage was located in Kaskaskia, Illinois, and was captured 4 July 1778 by Virginia state forces under the command of George Rogers Clark.

SEE ALSO *Clark, George Rogers; Colonial Wars; Fort William Henry (Fort George), New York; Gage, Thomas.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

FORT GALPHIN, SOUTH CAROLINA. 21 May 1781. When Colonel Henry Lee moved from Fort Granby to link up with the militia forces of General Andrew Pickens besieging Augusta, he learned that a quantity of British supplies were temporarily stored at Fort Galphin, a small stockade twelve miles below Augusta that was the home of George Galphin, the deputy superintendent of Indian affairs, and garrisoned by two companies of infantry. These supplies were the annual king's present to his loyal Indians. Mounting some of his Legion infantry double behind a select group of cavalymen, Lee made a forced march and reached his objective on the afternoon of the 21st. Lee had part of his force make a feint against the position from one direction, and when the defenders sallied forth, Major John Rudolph rushed in from the other side with a detachment of Legion infantry. The nearly two hundred Loyalist defenders surrendered without a fight, and Lee captured the fort and its supplies, which included blankets, clothing, small arms, ammunition, medical stores, and provisions, all of which the rebels needed. Having lost only one man to heat prostration in this coup de main against a strong point, Lee withdrew.

SEE ALSO *Augusta, Georgia (22 May–5 June 1781); Fort Granby, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

FORT GEORGE, FLORIDA SEE *Pensacola, Florida.*

FORT GEORGE, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK. 21–23 November 1780. During the period of British occupation of New York City, western Long Island Sound was the scene of a unique form of raiding known as "whaleboat warfare." Patriot and Loyalist parties both used large rowboats, easily hidden in the rocky coves lining the coast, to carry out such attacks. In the afternoon of 21 November, Major Benjamin Tallmadge put eighty dismounted troopers of the Second Continental Light Dragoons in eight boats. Crossing from Fairfield, Connecticut, they landed on Long Island at 9 P.M. at Old

Man's Harbor (later Mt. Sinai Harbor). Tallmadge's objective was Fort St. George at Mastic on Long Island's south shore. Loyalist refugees from Rhode Island had recently occupied the manor house of General John Smith on Smith's Point in Great South Bay, erecting a triangular stockade as a base for wood-cutting operations and as a depot for Suffolk County. Bad weather forced Tallmadge to remain hidden for twenty-four hours, but he surprised and easily captured Fort St. George at dawn on the 23rd. He not only eliminated that objective, but on the return trip to his hidden boats, he personally led twelve men to Coram, where they destroyed three hundred tons of hay collected for the British army. Tallmadge reached Fairfield in the early evening with fifty-four prisoners. The raid also cost the Loyalists seven killed or wounded; only one of Tallmadge's dragoons was wounded. Tallmadge's coup drew official recognition from both Washington and Congress.

Robert K. Wright Jr.

FORT GEORGE (MANHATTAN). Fort George, in Manhattan, was the position defended by Colonel William Baxter at the northern end of Laurel Hill. It consisted merely of field fortifications (a pair of fleches) during the battle for Fort Washington on 17 November 1776. In this vicinity, the British subsequently built Fort George as part of their Fort Knyphausen (formerly Fort Washington) defenses. Similarly, Moses Rawlings's redoubt, at the northern end of Mount Washington, was replaced by the British with Fort Tryon.

SEE ALSO *Fort Washington, New York.*

revised by Barnet Schecter

FORT GEORGE, NEW YORK SEE *Fort William Henry (Fort George), New York.*

FORT GEORGE (NEW YORK CITY). On the site of Fort Amsterdam, this was the principal fortification in New York City on the eve of the Revolution and was not garrisoned at the start of the Stamp Act Crisis. Fort George and the nearby Grand Battery were located near what is now known in New York City as "The Battery."

Mark M. Boatner

FORT GRANBY, SOUTH CAROLINA.

15 May 1781. This British post, on the southern bank of the Congaree River near modern Columbia, was held by 340 men under Maryland Loyalist Major Andrew Maxwell. The garrison included sixty German dragoons, the rest being Loyalists primarily of Maxwell's Prince of Wales Regiment. Although this was a strong post protected by abatis, earthworks, and palisades, Colonel Henry Lee knew Maxwell and thought him a coward more interested in plunder than in the military arts. Lee therefore planned a quick attack, leaving Fort Motte on 13 May and reaching the woods west of the fort the following night, where he emplaced a six-pound gun. When the fog cleared the next morning, Lee fired the cannon and his Legion infantry moved forward to deliver a musket fire on Maxwell's pickets. When summoned to surrender, Maxwell agreed to do so if he and his men could keep their plunder and if the garrison could withdraw to Charleston as prisoners of war until exchanged. Knowing that Colonel Francis Rawdon might arrive at any minute to save the fort, Lee agreed, with the condition that all horses fit for public service be surrendered. The Germans objected, and negotiations were suspended.

When Lee received word from Captain James Armstrong, who had been screening in the direction of Camden with a small cavalry force, that Rawdon was across the Santee at Nelson's Ferry and was approaching Fort Motte, Lee agreed to Maxwell's terms. The capitulation was signed before noon of the 15th, and Maxwell moved off with two wagons full of his personal plunder. Without the loss of a man—on either side—the rebels gained possession of an important post along with a considerable supply of ammunition, some salt and liquor, two cannon, and the garrison's weapons. Lee's good sense in handling this situation is expressed in Napoleon's Maxim 46: "The keys of a fortress are well worth the freedom of the garrison..."

SEE ALSO *Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

FORT GRIERSON, GEORGIA **SEE**

Augusta, Georgia (22 May–5 June 1781).

FORT GRISWOLD, CONNECTICUT.

6 September 1781. Major action of Arnold's New London raid in Connecticut.

SEE ALSO *New London Raid, Connecticut.*

Mark M. Boatner

FORT HENRY **SEE** *Wheeling, West Virginia.*

FORT HUNTER, NEW YORK. In the Mohawk Valley at the mouth of Schoharie Creek, the old Fort Hunter of the French and Indian War was torn down at the start of the Revolution but was rebuilt and often garrisoned.

Mark M. Boatner

FORT INDEPENDENCE FIASCO, NEW YORK.

17–25 January 1777. On 5 January, immediately following the rebel victories at Trenton and Princeton, Washington wrote to William Heath in the Hudson Highlands:

The enemy are in great Consternation; and as the Pannick affords us a favorable oppertunity to drive them out of the Jerseys . . . you Should move down towards New york with a Considerable force as if you had a design upon the city—that being an object of great importance, the enemy will be reduced to the necessity of withdrawing a Considerable part of their force from the Jerseys if not the whole to Secure the city.

After spending ten days mobilizing militia forces to augment his Continental garrison in the Hudson Highlands, Heath took up an arc of positions across Westchester County. On the night of 17–18 January he launched three columns toward Kings Bridge, intending to converge simultaneously on the enemy's outposts at dawn. Lincoln's command moved from Tarrytown on the Albany road; the forces of Wooster and Parsons advanced from New Rochelle and East Chester; and the center column, comprising the militia of John Scott, marched from a point below White Plains. At first the plan worked smoothly, all columns arriving on schedule, and Heath's troops overran the outposts at Valentine's Hill, Van Courtland's, Williams's, and the Negro Fort. The rebels closed up to Fort Independence (in the Valentine's Hill area just north of Spuyten Duyvil), and Heath summoned the German commander to surrender. The enemy opened fire with artillery that Heath had not suspected the other side possessed. Instead of driving in to take the fort, Heath took a more cautious approach consistent with his mission of conducting a feint. Several days of ineffective cannonading and maneuvering followed. On the 19th, Heath ordered an attempted envelopment across the frozen creek to cut off the Hessian battalion at Kings

Bridge the next morning. On the 20th, he canceled it when warming weather melted the ice. The British sallied forth early on the 25th in the direction of Delancey's Mills and routed the rebel screening force, then pushed on to Valentine's. On 29 January the signs of an approaching blizzard convinced Heath and his generals to end the campaign.

The British crowed about the affair and historians ever since have accepted their viewpoint, one of them calling the operation a "seriocomical affair" (Freeman IV, p. 384). In point of fact, Heath performed his assigned task, distracting Howe from Washington's activity in New Jersey.

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FORT JOHNSON, SOUTH CAROLINA. Located on James Island, it guarded the entrance to Charleston Harbor. It was captured by the rebels in September 1775, and its twenty large guns were ineffectually employed in the action of 1776. Allowed to fall into ruin, it was retaken (from the land side) by the British in their Charleston expedition of 1780.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780.*

revised by Carl P. Borick

FORT JOHNSTON, NORTH CAROLINA. Guarding the mouth of the Cape Fear River and located some ten miles below Brunswick, North Carolina, Fort Johnston was built by the British between 1748 and 1764 primarily as a defense against privateers. Named for Governor Gabriel Johnston, it figured in the Stamp Act Crisis, when British naval Captain Jacob Lobb spiked its guns to keep them from being used by the aroused patriots. Governor William Tryon was unable to prevent the citizens from occupying the fort in February 1766, after Lobb had refused to give him armed support. The post became badly deteriorated. Governor Josiah Martin fled to it on 2 June 1775, and on 18 July he escaped to a British warship when the patriots occupied the fort in an attempt to capture him. The fort was burned at this time in the first

overt act of defiance of the American Revolution in North Carolina. A new Fort Johnston was built by the United States from 1794 to 1809. This fort was seized by the Confederates in 1862 and used during the Civil War.

SEE ALSO *Martin, Josiah; Stamp Act; Tryon, William.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

FORT KEYSER, NEW YORK. 18 October 1780. Johannes Keyse built a stone house in Stone Arabia in 1750. The house was fortified by local militia in 1776. Colonel John Brown held Fort Paris in Stone Arabia, in New York's Mohawk River Valley, with 130 Massachusetts militia when Sir John Johnson approached. On news of the destruction of Schoharie, 15–17 October, General Robert Van Rensselaer assembled militia and moved up the Mohawk Valley behind Johnson. In obedience to Van Rensselaer's order and with the assurance that Van Rensselaer would arrive in time to strike the enemy's rear, Brown sallied forth to attack a force ten times the size of his own. Near the ruins of Fort Keyser, he was killed with a third of his men; the rest were routed before the promised support arrived. Johnson destroyed Stone Arabia before he was brought to bay at Klock's Field late in the afternoon of 19 October. The building was abandoned after the war and torn down in the 1840s.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Brown, John; Klock's Field, New York; Schoharie Valley, New York.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

FORT KNYPHAUSEN, NEW YORK. The former Fort Washington.

SEE ALSO *Fort Washington, New York.*

FORT LAFAYETTE, NEW YORK. Located on the highest ground on Verplancks Point, the eastern end of Kings Ferry, it was begun in the spring of 1778 and finished in May 1779 as a modest four-gun earthwork. The British captured it on 1 June 1779 in operations conducted at Stony Point, 16 July 1779, and substantially increased its size.

SEE ALSO *Stony Point, New York.*

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FORT LAURENS, OHIO. November 1778–August 1779. Located near modern Bolivar and subsequently a state historical site, this was the first U.S. fort established in what became the state of Ohio. Work was started after the twelve-hundred-man expedition under General Lachlan McIntosh reached the spot on 21 November 1778. Their march having taken far longer than expected and with no supplies having yet reached Fort McIntosh, seventy miles to the east, the proposed invasion of Indian territory in the direction of Detroit was abandoned. Instead, McIntosh decided to establish the isolated post of Fort Laurens on the west bank of the Tuscarawas River and hold it with a small garrison through the winter, using it as a jumping-off place for an offensive in the spring of 1779.

Fort Laurens was planned by a regular army engineer—possibly Louis Cambray-Digny—and garrisoned by 150 men of the Thirteenth Virginia under John Gibson. McIntosh's troops withdrew on 9 December, before work was completed, and it was not until late December that Gibson was able to report that his post was tenable, though it was far from secure. Short of provisions, Gibson negotiated with friendly Delawares at Coshocton to buy cattle. A detachment under Samuel Sample, an assistant quartermaster, was attacked on its way to get these cattle, losing one man. At the end of January 1779, Captain John Clark of the Eighth Pennsylvania was returning from Fort Laurens to Fort McIntosh with a sergeant and fourteen men when they were attacked three miles from Fort Laurens by seventeen Mingo Indians led by the renegade Simon Girty; there was a loss of two killed, four wounded, and one man captured. Further attempts to supply the garrison were unsuccessful, and by the middle of February the food situation was critical. On 23 February, nineteen men sent to cut wood were attacked, with two captured and the rest killed within sight of the fort.

Shortly thereafter, the fort was besieged by a force composed primarily of Wyandots and Mingo. Their numbers were variously reported as being from 180 to almost 300, though Gibson thought he faced more than 800 warriors. After 15 days, with his garrison nearly out of food, the Indians, who also lacked food, proposed to lift the siege in exchange for a barrel of flour and some meat. Assuring the Indians that he had rations to spare, Gibson promptly agreed, and the siege was soon lifted.

On 3 March 1779, General McIntosh received a message from Gibson informing him of the situation. On 19 March a force of some two hundred militia and over three hundred Continentals left Fort McIntosh and covered the seventy miles to Fort Laurens in four days to find the siege lifted. A celebratory volley fired by the garrison stampeded the pack train, causing the loss of some horses and supplies and ending the epic on a note of comic opera. The defenders had been living for almost a week on raw hides and such roots as they could find in the area. A council of war decided against McIntosh's plan for continuing the advance toward the Sandusky region. Major Frederick Vernon was left to hold Fort Laurens with 106 rank and file of the Eighth Pennsylvania and was given less than sixty days' supply of food. On 28 March 1779, soon after the departure of McIntosh's column, Indians reappeared and attacked a forty-man woodcutting party, killing two men. By the middle of May, Vernon had to order most of his garrison to return to the east because of a lack of provisions. By the end of the month, with its twenty-five-man garrison on the verge of starvation, Captain Robert Beall of the Ninth Virginia reached Fort Laurens with supplies. In late June, Lieutenant Colonel John Campbell reinforced the garrison with seventy-five well-supplied men and assumed command.

Colonel Daniel Brodhead succeeded McIntosh as commander of the Western Department in March 1779. He soon realized that Fort Laurens was untenable, and on 16 July he informed Campbell that the post would be abandoned as soon as horses could be sent to evacuate the stores. The fort was vacated early in August 1779, but not before two more Americans had been killed in the immediate vicinity. Planning to return at some point, Campbell did not destroy Fort Laurens, which remained intact until demolished after the war.

SEE ALSO *Cambray-Digny, Louis Antoine Jean Baptiste, chevalier de; Gibson, John; Girty, Simon; McIntosh, Lachlan.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY. 20 November 1776. Captured by the British. Fort Lee, originally Fort Constitution, was renamed for Washington's second-in-command, Major General Charles Lee. Along with Fort Washington it was built in August 1776 to cover a line of

sunken obstructions in the Hudson River (underneath today's George Washington Bridge) and thus bar the movement of British ships. The British ran their ships up the Hudson on several occasions and proved that these forts were not up to the task. The British captured Fort Washington on 16 November 1776, after which Fort Lee became their next target.

Moving with uncharacteristic speed, General William Howe sent Charles Cornwallis across the Hudson the morning of 20 November to take Fort Lee. (Some accounts give 18 November as the date). Crossing in the rain, with between 4,000 and 6,000 troops, Cornwallis landed at Closter (modern Alpine), New Jersey, six miles (by road) above Fort Lee. Cornwallis marched his troops south to capture the fort and the troops garrisoned there. It was not known until 1963 who had led Cornwallis up the hazardous trail at Closter, in his attempt to trap the Americans. Then Richard P. McCormick, professor of history at Rutgers University found a memorandum in the British Public Records Office stating that Major John Aldington was the man. McCormick's findings were published in the 21 November 1963 edition of the *New York Times*.

Surprise and the opportunity to capture the garrison of Fort Lee were lost when news of the British landing at Closter was brought to the Americans. Scholars disagree about who provided the warning. Some claim it was the work of a British deserter, others say it was an American civilian. The latter position is supported by hearsay evidence provided in a manuscript currently archived in the Princeton University library citing a British ensign, Thomas Glyn, on the subject. Still other sources claim that the British movement was reported by "an American officer on patrol."

Warned of this movement, the Americans evacuated their troops but left a considerable amount of valuable equipment. The British found 200 or 300 tents still standing and pots still boiling. Twelve drunken Americans were captured in the fort, and about 150 other prisoners were taken in the vicinity. Nathanael Greene had returned to the fort about two hours after the main body's departure and had rounded up several hundred stragglers, many of whom were drunk on the abandoned stocks of a sutler (merchant) who had fled with the garrison troops. Although the Americans managed to evacuate stocks of gunpowder, they left behind 1,000 barrels of flour, all their entrenching tools, about 50 cannon, and their baggage. By sacrificing this matériel, however, Washington succeeded in leading 2,000 troops from the fort to safety before the British could seize the only bridge across the Hackensack River.

SEE ALSO *Fort Washington, New York.*

revised by Barnet Schecter

FORT MCINTOSH, GEORGIA. 2–4 February 1777. As the rebels got the upper hand in Georgia at the end of 1776, Loyalist refugees gathered in East Florida, where Governor Patrick Tonyn was actively organizing militia and fitting out privateers. Here Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brown assembled his Florida Rangers and led them on raids from a base on the St. Marys River (the boundary between Florida and Georgia). The Loyalists attacked Fort McIntosh, a small, bastioned stockade about one hundred feet square on the left bank of the Satilla River in southeastern Georgia. The fifty-man garrison of Captain Richard Winn surrendered after two days, and all of them were paroled except for two officers who were taken to St. Augustine as hostages.

SEE ALSO *Brown, Thomas.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

FORT MERCER, NEW JERSEY. (Red Bank, Gloucester Co.) 22 October–21 November 1777. As part of the system of Delaware River forts, a triple row of chevaux de frise extended between and was covered by Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania, and Fort Mercer, New Jersey. Fort Mercer was a large earthwork with most of its cannon aimed at the river, but it was nevertheless protected on the land side by a substantial ditch and abatis. Colonel Christopher Greene commanded a garrison of about six hundred from his own First and Colonel Israel Angell's Second Rhode Island Regiments and Captain Jotham Drury's company of Crane's Continental artillery regiment. New Jersey militia reinforced the garrison, but not in the numbers expected. When Major Thomas-Antoine du Plessis, chevalier de Mauduit, arrived, Greene listened to the expert and made a very significant change: the fort was too extensive for the size of the garrison, so a new, interior wall was built that cut off the northern wing but which could not be seen from the outside.

On 21 October 1777 Howe sent Colonel Karl Emil Ulrich Donop from Philadelphia with two thousand Hessians to capture the fort, correctly assuming that it was far more vulnerable to attack from the rear than to ships trying to force their way north. Donop was not a member of the nobility, but he was a very experienced soldier who commanded the brigade made up of the Hesse-Cassel grenadiers and served as the colonel in chief of the Jäger Corps. For this mission he had three of his grenadier battalions (named for their commanders, Lieutenant Colonels Otto von Linsingen, Georg von Lengerke and Friedrich von Minnigerode); four foot companies of jägers plus a dozen more from the corps' mounted troop; an infantry regiment (Musketeer Regiment von Mirbach commanded by

Colonel Justus Block); and an artillery detachment with two British medium guns and eight three-pounders. All three of the grenadier battalions, however, were worn out by the campaign and probably were down to only about three hundred effectives each. Mirbach was better off but considered to be a lower quality unit than the elite grenadiers; also, its intelligence on the state of the fort and garrison was several weeks out of date.

After crossing the river and camping at Haddonfield, New Jersey, Donop started about 4 o'clock on the morning of the 22nd, and after being delayed by a destroyed bridge, approached the fort about one o'clock that afternoon. Deploying to cut the fort off and moving up the last two miles consumed three more hours, but at 4 P.M. an officer was sent to demand surrender, threatening "no quarter" if Greene did not surrender. The Americans refused to capitulate.

The Germans had both of their flanks anchored on the Delaware River, with Lengerke and the artillery as the right flank, Mirbach in the center (east), and Linsing as the left (south) flank. Minnigerode and bulk of the jägers acted as a reserve and then moved forward to hit the north face. Each assault unit carried bundles of fascines to throw in the ditch. Donop's columns advanced at double time in an effort to minimize the casualties from the Americans' artillery and three supporting galleys firing from the river. Minnigerode on the right, Mirbach in the center, and Linsing on the left all made it into the ditch. Minnigerode also got into the fort, where the Germans later said American resistance stiffened. In reality, that column had only pushed aside a screening force on the abandoned outer works and then ran head-on into du Plessis's unsuspected new wall; the other two columns failed to clear the ditch because their sections of wall were fully manned.

The first assault stopped cold in the face of heavy, accurate fire that cut down many of the officers. A second try ended almost immediately as more officers fell. Forty minutes after it started the survivors retreated, with Lengercke's relatively unscathed battalion covering the retreat route. Greene lacked the manpower to pursue. Lieutenant Colonel Von Linsingen late on the 23rd led the remnants into Philadelphia, where the three assault units went into barracks "for they could not possibly do service very soon" because of their losses (Muenchhausen, p. 41).

EVACUATION

The defenders of Fort Mifflin were forced to abandon their post on the night of 15–16 November, which made Fort Mercer untenable. As Cornwallis approached with two thousand men for another assault, Greene pulled out of Fort Mercer the night of 20–21 November. The Howe brothers finally had a line of supply open so that they could hold on to Philadelphia.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

The attack on Fort Mercer left Donop mortally wounded (hit in the hip by a musket ball, he died on 25 October); 22 other officers were killed or wounded, including all four battalion or regimental commanders. The official Hessian report gave total Hessian losses as 371, but that is probably understated a bit; the true numbers of killed, wounded, or captured should be about 400, which would be about one-third of the men engaged. The Americans lost only 32 killed or wounded.

SIGNIFICANCE

While Greene and the other defenders greatly respected the heroism displayed by Donop and his men, the fight had very little impact on the outcome or pace of the campaign. But it did have a huge impact on the role of the Germans for the rest of the war. The historian Rodney Atwood has written, "Redbank marks a turning point for the Hessian corps in America. If Trenton destroyed the myth of Hessian invincibility, Redbank shattered the physical reality. Their best troops had suffered devastating losses . . . Redbank, not Trenton, killed Hessian enthusiasm for the American War" (pp. 128–129).

SEE ALSO *Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania; Philadelphia Campaign.*

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FORT MIFFLIN, PENNSYLVANIA.

23 September–16 November 1777. Located opposite Fort Mercer (Red Bank, Gloucester County, New Jersey) on Mud Island, Fort Mifflin anchored the American defenses of the Delaware River and protected the final band of obstructions (chevaux de frise) and

the anchorage of the Continental-state naval squadron. In concert with Fort Mercer and the squadron, Washington hoped the forts could keep the river sealed and thus force the British to evacuate Philadelphia by choking off the flow of supplies. Continental regulars took over the responsibility for the fort from Pennsylvania on 23 September. A 450-man garrison consisted of detachments rotated in and out during the course of the siege. The first commandant, Colonel Henry baron d'Arendt of the army's German Battalion, fell ill from overwork and passed command to Maryland's Lieutenant Colonel Samuel S. Smith. Both men worked feverishly with two French volunteers, Major Thomas-Antoine du Plessis, chevalier de Mauduit, and Major François Teisseydre, marquis de Fleury, to augment the fortifications as the British began clearing the river.

Americans assumed that nearby Province and Carpenter's Islands, which had been flooded earlier in the summer, were too marshy for enemy artillery use, and concentrated their efforts on the threat posed by warships approaching upstream. On 23 October, the day after Donop's unsuccessful attack on Fort Mercer, the guns of Fort Mifflin, a mobile battery on the riverbank, and the American squadron achieved the war's greatest triumph over the Royal Navy when they pummeled six men-of-war trying to work upstream. The sixty-four-gun ship of the line *Augusta* and the sixteen-gun sloop of war *Merlin* ran aground and were destroyed, the former by accident and the latter by its own crew to prevent capture. But that was the last bright moment for the Americans.

Loyalists headed by Joseph Galloway told Howe where to find suitable sites on Province and Carpenter's for siege batteries, and on 5 October a detachment crossed to Province to begin construction. Despite a number of American nighttime raids, the British were able to open fire from four of them on 15 October; more batteries followed over the following weeks, and at about 7:30 on the morning of 10 November, the full complement started reducing the earth and timber fort to rubble. On 15 November, Admiral Howe brought up HM Armed Ship *Vigilant*, a specialized shore bombardment vessel mounting fourteen heavy twenty-four-pounders but with a shallow draft, to take up a position raking the defenders. A wounded Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Smith was evacuated and Major Simeon Thayer succeeded in command of Fort Mifflin. By nightfall the fort had no guns left in working order and no walls capable of defense, so Thayer evacuated the survivors to Fort Mercer. Showing remarkable tenacity, the Americans had stuck to their guns despite 250 casualties. It is highly significant that Smith would reprise these same tactics in 1814 as a militia major general when he successfully defended Baltimore.

SEE ALSO *Philadelphia Campaign*.

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FORT MONTAGU, BAHAMAS SEE *Nassau; Nassau Raid of Rathbun*.

FORT MONTGOMERY, NEW YORK. 6 October 1777. Captured along with Fort Clinton by Clinton's Expedition.

SEE ALSO *Clinton's Expedition*.

Mark M. Boatner

FORT MORRIS, GEORGIA SEE *Sunbury (Fort Morris, Georgia)*.

FORT MOTTE, SOUTH CAROLINA. 12 May 1781. Fort Mott was a key British outpost in South Carolina that was captured through the cooperative efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Henry "Light Horse Harry" Lee's legion of cavalry and infantry and Colonel Francis Marion's band of South Carolina partisans. Recognizing the importance of the back-country guerrilla war to American hopes for victory, the commander in the South, Major General Nathanael Greene, had sent Lee—father of Civil War Confederate general Robert E. Lee—to reinforce Marion. Fort Motte was a strategic point because it was located where the Congaree and Wateree Rivers join to form the Santee River. The fort served as the principal depot on the British line of communications between Charleston and the interior. The position comprised the large mansion of a widow, Mrs. Rebecca Brewton Motte, which had been commandeered by the British against her will. The mansion's defenses were strengthened by the addition of a stockade, ditch, and abatis (a fortification made of felled brush and trees). It was held by British Lieutenant Donald McPherson with 150 British and Hessian infantry and a small detachment of dragoons who had been passing through from Charleston with dispatches destined for Camden.

Lee and Marion had just successfully completed their maneuvers against Fort Watson and, on 8 May, started regular approaches against Fort Motte. Lee's forces numbered 100 cavalry and nearly the same number of infantry. Marion's partisan force amounted to just over 100 men. A surrender summons sent to the fort's commander on 10 May was refused. That evening the rebels received information that Colonel Francis, Lord Rawdon was retreating toward Fort Motte from Camden. British beacon fires spotted during the morning and evening of 11 May encouraged the defenders and told the attackers they would have to take the place quickly or abandon the operation.

Lee conceived the idea of setting fire to the Motte mansion by firing flaming arrows onto the shingle roof, which was dry after a period of sunny weather. Mrs. Motte, who had been displaced by the British when they took over her home, was now living in the nearby farmhouse from which Lee and Marion were directing their siege. When she was informed that this decision had reluctantly been made, she not only accepted the fact but produced a fine Indian bow and bundle of arrows. The morning of 12 May, Dr. Irvine of Lee's Legion advanced with a flag to inform McPherson that Rawdon was not yet across the Santee River and to request his surrender. The British commander again refused. By noon the rebel trench was within range and Private Nathan Savage of Marion's Brigade dropped two flaming arrows onto the roof of the mansion. When enemy soldiers tried to extinguish the flames, they were driven off the roof by the Americans' artillery and rifle fire. The British showed a white flag, the fire was put out, and the garrison surrendered at 1 P.M. Only Marion's partisan forces suffered losses during the siege: a Lieutenant Cruger and a Sergeant McDonald. No others were killed on either side of the confrontation.

Mrs. Motte, ever the lady of the plantation, provided a splendid dinner for the officers of both sides. Greene arrived on the evening of the surrender, having been worried about completing this operation before Rawdon could intervene. He returned to his camp after ordering Lee to go on to take Fort Granby and sending Marion to take Georgetown.

The capture of Fort Motte showed the ability of the rebels to capture British outposts or any key point along the lines of communications. It also showed the wisdom of Greene's strategy of combining conventional forces (the Continental troopers of Lee's Legion) with irregular forces (Marion's partisans) in order to achieve an effect greater than either kind of force by itself could have achieved.

SEE ALSO *African Arrows; Greene, Nathanael; Lee, Henry ("Light-Horse Harry"); Marion, Francis.*

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FORT MOULTRIE, SOUTH CAROLINA. 28 June 1776. Formerly known as Fort Sullivan, this installation was successfully defended by Colonel William Moultrie's against the fleet of Sir Peter Parker.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776.*

Mark M. Boatner

FORT MOULTRIE, SOUTH CAROLINA. During General Clinton's Charleston expedition, in 1780 Fort Moultrie surrendered without a fight; although most of the garrison had been evacuated, British sailors and marines took 200 prisoners.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776.*

revised by Carl P. Borick

FORT NELSON (VIRGINIA). 10 May 1779. The Matthews-Collier raid started offensive operations against Portsmouth by landing about a thousand men at the mouth of the Elizabeth River and moving on the town and its defensive Fort Nelson. The Virginians could not resist because they had only a hundred men from the State Artillery Regiment under Major Thomas Matthews in garrison. Matthews spiked his guns and withdrew up the South Branch of the river with his stock of ammunition, but left his colors flying on the fort as a gesture of defiance. The British pursued him until the garrison reached the safety of the Dismal Swamp. A court of inquiry held at Williamsburg on 4 June exonerated Matthews of any charges of misconduct.

SEE ALSO *Virginia, Military Operations in.*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

FORT PARIS, NEW YORK. Colonel John Brown marched from this place to his defeat at Fort Keyser, New York, on 19 October 1780.

SEE ALSO *Fort Keyser, New York.*

Mark M. Boatner

FORT PLEASANT, SOUTH CAROLINA. Located at Haddrel's Point.

SEE ALSO *Haddrel's Point.*

Mark M. Boatner

FORT SACKVILLE, INDIANA. 25 February 1779. Located at Vincennes, Indiana, it was surrendered to George Rogers Clark during western operations.

SEE ALSO *Western Operations.*

FORT SAINT GEORGE, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK SEE *Fort George, Long Island, New York.*

FORT SAINT JOHNS SEE *St. Johns, Canada (5 September–2 November 1775).*

FORT SAINT JOSEPH, MICHIGAN.

January 1781. The French built this fort in 1697, turning it over to the British in 1763. That same year Pontiac captured the post, which was returned to the British at the end of that war. The British did not garrison it again until the Revolution. After the British offensive against St. Louis, 26 May 1780, the Spanish sent a force against Detroit. With about sixty militia and sixty Indians, Captain Eugenio Pourré surprised Fort St. Joseph in January 1781, and the British garrison surrendered immediately. Holding the place only twenty-four hours, the Spaniards subsequently claimed the valleys of the St. Joseph and Illinois Rivers "by right of conquest" (Ward, p. 862).

SEE ALSO *St. Louis, Missouri.*

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FORT SCHUYLER, NEW YORK SEE *Fort Stanwix, New York.*

FORT SLOGO, NEW YORK SEE *Treadwell's Neck, Long Island, New York.*

FORT STANWIX, NEW YORK.

Located at the head of navigation of the Mohawk and at the portage between that river and Wood Creek, which led to Oswego, this place was astride the main route between Canada and the Mohawk Valley. Here, on the site of present-day Rome, New York, the French had built a fort to protect their trade with the Indians. The British had built Fort Stanwix in the same area in 1758. This fort fell into disrepair after 1763, but in June 1776 a detachment of Continental troops under Elias Dayton started rebuilding it. For a time it was called Fort Schuyler, in honor of General Philip Schuyler, and is therefore occasionally confused with an older Fort Schuyler built during the Seven Years' War and named for one of Schuyler's uncles. The new Fort Schuyler, which most people persisted in calling Fort Stanwix, figured prominently in Barry St. Leger's expedition.

SEE ALSO *Dayton, Elias; St. Leger's Expedition.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

FORT STANWIX, TREATY OF.

5 November 1768. At a council attended by over two thousand Indians and presided over by Sir William Johnson, the Iroquois gave up their claims to lands southeast of a line running from Fort Stanwix (later Rome, New York) to Fort Pitt (later Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), and thence along the southern bank of the Ohio River to the mouth of the Tennessee (Cherokee) River. The treaty replaced the temporary proclamation line of 1763 with a "permanent" boundary between white settlements and Indian hunting grounds,

and opened vast tracts along the frontiers of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia to white land speculators and settlers. Because Iroquois claims to these lands were specious, and no one thought it important to consult the actual inhabitants of the lands in question, the treaty amounted to a huge land grab to feed the rapacious appetite of whites for western lands.

SEE ALSO *Johnson, Sir William; Proclamation of 1763.*

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FORT SULLIVAN, SOUTH CAROLINA. 28 June 1776. For Colonel Moultrie's successful defense of this place, subsequently known as Fort Moultrie.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776.*

Mark M. Boatner

FORT TRYON, NEW YORK. Here, on the highest ground in Manhattan, the British improved rebel earthworks captured in the operation against Fort Washington and renamed their fort in honor of Governor Tryon.

SEE ALSO *Fort Washington, New York; Tryon, William.*

Mark M. Boatner

FORT WASHINGTON, NEW YORK. Captured by the British on 16 November 1776. After Washington's forces slipped away into the hills north of White Plains at the end of October, Major General William Howe gave up the chase and turned south to complete his conquest of Manhattan. Howe had pried Washington out of northern Manhattan by landing behind him in Westchester; Washington, against his better judgment, had left behind twelve hundred men at Fort Washington.

WASHINGTON AND GREENE'S INDECISION


To retain Fort Washington, now isolated in enemy territory, the Americans needed to control the adjacent areas of northern Manhattan. They had to hold both Mount Washington, on which the fort was built—a long, narrow elevation running north-south along the Hudson—and Laurel Hill, parallel to it, along the Harlem River. To the south, the defensive lines on Harlem Heights were also critical, as was the Kings Bridge at the northern tip of the island. Defending the five-mile perimeter around this entire area would require from eight thousand to ten thousand troops. Major General Nathanael Greene was in charge of Fort Lee and its garrison of thirty-five hundred men as well as Fort Washington, where he gradually increased the garrison from twelve hundred to twenty-eight hundred men. He wrote to Washington on 31 October that twenty-eight hundred was far too many if they intended to hold only the fort itself—which could accommodate only half that number—and far too few if they hoped to defend the entire northern end of Manhattan.

Greene believed the fort alone could be defended successfully, but he continued to enlarge the garrison, apparently hoping that Washington would choose to contest the whole area and send more troops. However, since the crossfire from Fort Lee and Fort Washington and the sunken obstructions that Major General Israel Putnam had arranged to be placed in the river between them had failed to stop British ships from sailing upriver, Washington was inclined to abandon Fort Washington altogether. On 8 November he wrote to Greene that Fort Washington was not worth the risk involved in holding it since it did not serve its intended purpose. Nonetheless, he deferred to Greene about evacuating the fort since he was “on the spot” and therefore the best judge of the situation.

Greene conceded that the sunken obstructions had not worked but insisted that the fort was still an asset and that the men could be evacuated across the Hudson if need be. The fort's large supply of war matériel would be a more difficult matter, Greene admitted, but even that, he felt confident, could be removed expeditiously. The commander of the garrison, Colonel Robert Magaw of the Fifth Pennsylvania Battalion, believed he could fend off the British until the end of December.

AMERICAN DISPOSITIONS

The final result of the indecisive exchange between Washington and Greene during the first week of November was Magaw's deployment of twenty-nine hundred men to defend a perimeter nearly five miles long—a job for which Greene knew he needed ten thousand troops. Facing south, Lieutenant Colonel Lambert Cadwalader—



Plan of Fort Washington. This map shows a part of New York Island with the plan of Fort Washington, “now Call’d Ft. Kniphausen,” and the positions from which the “rebels” were driven on 16 November 1776, by troops commanded by Lord Percy. It was surveyed by Claude Joseph Sauthier on the same day as the attack. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GEOGRAPHY AND MAP DIVISION.

with his own Third Pennsylvania Battalion, Magaw's Fifth Pennsylvania Battalion, some broken companies of Colonel Samuel Miles's Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment, and other battalions, mostly from Pennsylvania—defended the three lines of trenches and redoubts on Harlem Heights. Meanwhile, Colonel William Baxter's Pennsylvania regiment along with those of Colonels Michael Swope, Frederick Watts, and William Montgomery, all from the Pennsylvania Flying Camp, were stationed at the northern end of Laurel Hill, overlooking the Harlem River. Most of Laurel Hill—the mile and one-half below Baxter's position—was left undefended. Half a mile north of Fort Washington, a redoubt at the northern end of Mount Washington held a battalion of Maryland and Virginia riflemen led by Colonel Moses Rawlings. Magaw, at Fort Washington, commanded all of the outlying units, which had orders to retreat within the walls of the fort if necessary.

Washington and his generals expected an attack on Fort Washington but remained distracted by Howe's other strategic options. They worried that he might seize the Hudson Highlands or cross the river and march through New Jersey to capture Philadelphia. Meanwhile, on 5 November, Howe moved his forces west from White Plains toward Dobbs Ferry on the Hudson and then slowly headed south to besiege Fort Washington with eight thousand men. Howe was also armed with the plans for the fort, along with information about the works and the garrison provided by Magaw's adjutant, Ensign William Demont, who had deserted on 1 November.

WEAKNESSES OF FORT WASHINGTON

While Fort Washington occupied a naturally commanding position, the structure itself had many weaknesses that made it unfit for withstanding a concerted attack, much less a prolonged siege. It was easily accessible only from the gradual southern slope of the hill, the other three slopes being steep and rugged. However, the pentagonal fort, enclosing four acres of ground, was a simple earthwork, the interior exposed to the sky and without proper barracks or magazines for ammunition; water had to be drawn from the Hudson, 230 feet below, because the fort had no well. The ground in back of the fort was high enough that the enemy could fire over the walls. Aside from the small redoubt that Rawlings occupied, the fort had neither outworks nor an adequate ditch around it to fend off attacks.

HOWE DEMANDS SURRENDER

On 15 November the adjutant general of Howe's army, James Paterson, and several other mounted officers approached Fort Washington with a white flag and a drummer "beating a parley" to demand its surrender

within two hours, threatening death to all those captured if Magaw refused. Magaw sent a note to Greene at Fort Lee and, without waiting for a reply, answered the British that, "actuated by the most glorious cause that mankind ever fought in," he was "determined to defend this post to the last extremity." Greene instructed Magaw not to surrender, and he alerted Washington at his new headquarters at Hackensack, New Jersey. Greene then crossed the Hudson to Fort Washington.

Arriving at Fort Lee at 9 P.M., Washington set out to join Greene on the New York side. Generals Putnam and Greene were on their way back and met Washington halfway across the river, where they assured him that morale was high at the fort and that the troops would put up a good fight. The generals convinced Washington to return to New Jersey. Howe had given the Americans a day and a night from the ultimatum to evacuate the fort; early the next morning, on 16 November, his forces closed in.

THE BATTLE BEGINS

General Knyphausen had received an affirmative answer when he asked Howe for the privilege of making the main attack with only Hessian troops. Knyphausen's two columns were each led by twenty jägers and forty grenadiers and included a grenadier battalion (Kohler), Hessian regiments (under Rall, Lossberg, Wutgenau, Knyphausen, Hunyn, and Bunau), and the Waldeck regiment. In the predawn darkness, they marched southward across the Kings Bridge towards Mount Washington. The Hessians assaulted Rawlings's redoubt and drove his men back to Fort Washington. Meanwhile, to the east, another three thousand troops under Brigadier General Edward Mathew and Major General Charles Earl Cornwallis were to come down the Harlem River on flatboats, land at the foot of Laurel Hill, and storm Baxter's position. Mathew, commander of the brigade of Guards in America, led two battalions of light infantry and two battalions of his guards, while Cornwallis led two battalions of guards and the Thirty-third Regiment as reinforcement. From the south, Lord Percy's two thousand troops, including some Hessians, were to overrun the Harlem lines. To confuse and possibly trap Cadwalader's men in the Harlem lines, Howe planned a fourth prong: the Forty-second Highlander regiment under Colonel Thomas Sterling was to cross the Harlem River and land at the southern end of Laurel Hill, just above the American lines.

The battle began at 7 A.M. with a massive two-hour cannonade from British guns on the east side of the Harlem River, across from Laurel Hill, and from the frigate *Pearl* in the Hudson to confuse the Americans as to where the main attack on the fort would be made. In order to synchronize the attacks on three fronts, Howe had Knyphausen withdraw the Hessians when they were nearly

halfway up Mount Washington, because Mathew and Cornwallis were not yet in position at Laurel Hill, having been delayed by the tides. To the south, Percy's units had begun driving the Americans out of their trenches on Harlem Heights when he too was ordered to stop and wait in the woods until Mathew and Cornwallis landed.

Generals Washington, Putnam, Greene, and Hugh Mercer came over from Fort Lee and examined the battlefield. Despite the danger, they proceeded all the way across to the grounds of the Morris house. Washington declined when each general offered to remain on the battlefield and insisted that they all return with him to Fort Lee. Fifteen minutes later, the British captured the ground where they had stood.

ATTACKS FROM EAST AND NORTH

Flatboats carrying the two brigades of British troops finally came down the Harlem River at 11 A.M. and deposited Generals Mathew and Cornwallis with their men on the Manhattan shore at the northern end of Laurel Hill. With artillery support from the other side of the river, the British scrambled up the steep, wooded slope and overwhelmed the Americans. A British officer killed Colonel Baxter, and the militia fled westward to Fort Washington.

The Hessians, with ten field pieces in tow, resumed their assault on the northern end of Mount Washington. Unable to stand in many places because the slopes were so steep, they had to pull themselves up by grabbing onto bushes. America's first battlefield heroine, Margaret Corbin, took her husband's place at his cannon when he was killed and aimed so accurately that the Hessians focused their fire on her. A severe wound from grapeshot in her shoulder finally took her out of the action.

Pressing forward under the hail of grapeshot and bullets from above, the Hessians climbed over logs with sharpened branches that the Americans had placed in their path. Colonel Johann Rall's regiment attacked from the west, while Knyphausen attacked the east side of the hill, placing himself in the thick of the battle to urge his men forward. After two hours the Americans—their rifles clogged with gunpowder residue—retreated to Fort Washington. Rall's troops, close on their heels, positioned themselves behind a storehouse one hundred yards from the fort.

PERCY'S AND STERLING'S ATTACKS

On Harlem Heights, Percy had resumed his attack, and General Howe ordered the fourth prong, under Colonel Sterling, to cross the Harlem River and block Cadwalader's retreat. When Sterling's Highlanders landed on the Manhattan shore just below the Morris mansion, Magaw sent a warning to Cadwalader, and together they sent 250 men to oppose the landing. The Americans inflicted scores of casualties, but the 800 Highlanders,

backed up by cannon fire from the opposite side of the river, climbed the steep slope up from the water's edge and took 170 prisoners. Nonetheless, Cadwalader's main force reached a wooded area just south of Mount Washington, where it was able to fend off the Highlanders. Following a narrow road along the Hudson, Cadwalader then brought his men up the gentle southern slope to the fort.

SURRENDER OF FORT WASHINGTON

When the Americans crossed the open ground on the flat crest of Mount Washington and approached the fort's entrance, Rall ordered his grenadiers forward to attack them. The Hessians sprang from behind the storehouse just to the north and, in the ensuing melee, trapped some Americans against the wall of the fort while driving the others inside. Rall sent an English-speaking captain to demand the surrender of the fort, giving Magaw just thirty minutes but promising that every man would be able to keep his personal possessions. With about 2,800 men crowded into a fort designed for half that number, a British bombardment would have meant the slaughter of everyone inside, but Magaw, encouraged by a note from Washington, tried to rally the men to defend the walls.

Rall, however, refused to be kept waiting. After Knyphausen came up with the other Hessian column soon after Rall, Magaw surrendered his sword to him; 230 American officers and 2,600 soldiers were marched out of the fort and brought down to the city, where they began their long ordeal of captivity in the city's jails and churches and on prison ships. The Americans lost 59 killed and 96 wounded, while the loss of matériel at Fort Washington, combined with that at Fort Lee four days later, amounted to 146 cannon, 12,000 shot and shell, 2,800 muskets, and 400,000 cartridges, along with tents and entrenching tools. On 16 November the British lost 77 killed and 374 wounded—mostly Hessians.

SEE ALSO *Fort Lee, New Jersey; New York Campaign; White Plains, New York.*

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FORT WATSON, SOUTH CAROLINA. 28 February 1781. Thomas Sumter surrounded a British foraging party within a mile of Fort Watson, but his troops were repulsed by reinforcements from the fort.

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revised by Steven D. Smith

FORT WATSON, SOUTH CAROLINA.

15–23 April 1781. The taking of Fort Watson marked the first step in Major General Nathanael Greene’s plan to retake a string of British outposts in South Carolina. The successful capture of the fort on 23 April was made possible by Major General Charles Lord Cornwallis’s decision not to return to South Carolina following his Pyrrhic victory at Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina. Greene initially chose to pursue Cornwallis as the British commander moved toward Wilmington, North Carolina. At length, however, Greene turned from his pursuit of Cornwallis to march instead toward Camden, South Carolina. As he did so, he detached Lieutenant Colonel Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee and his infantry-cavalry forces to screen against a possible movement of Cornwallis from the direction of Wilmington. Should this threat not materialize, Lee was to join forces with Colonel Francis Marion and capture Fort Watson. With Captain Oldham’s company of Maryland regulars, and a small piece of artillery, Lee and his “Legion” joined Marion on 14 April. The next evening they invested Fort Watson. Total forces under Lee’s overall leadership numbered approximately 300 men.

Fort Watson was a key link in the British line of communications from Charleston, 60 miles to the southeast. It was named after British Lieutenant Colonel John Watson, of the Third Regiment of Foot (The Buffs), who was somewhere in the area with a large Tory force, chasing after Marion. Fort Watson was a small but strong stockade, surrounded by three rings of abatis (fortifications made of felled trees), and located atop an ancient Indian mound. The mound and its British fort were on the edge of Scott’s Lake, part of the Santee River, and effectively in command of the surrounding bare plain. It was between 30 and 50 feet high. In Lieutenant Colonel Watson’s absence, Lieutenant James McKay commanded its small garrison of 80 regulars and 40 Loyalists.

Lee and Marion opened their effort against Fort Watson with the customary demand for surrender. When this was refused, the rebels seized the fort’s water supply point on the lake. The defenders next dug a well and ran a trench that filled it from the lake. The score was then even. Without siege artillery, however, and with the danger that Lieutenant Colonel Watson might return at any moment to relieve McKay, the situation looked bad

for the attackers. Major Hezekiah Maham of Marion’s partisans then suggested building a type of tower that was thereafter known by his name and used in other sieges. This was a prefabricated log crib, rectangular in plan, on which a protected platform was built from which riflemen could deliver plunging fire into the fort. It took five days to cut, trim, and notch the logs, but on the dark night of 22 April Maham’s tower was carried to within range of the fort. By dawn a company of riflemen started delivering a deadly drizzle of aimed shots into the stockade. At the same time two assault parties attacked the abatis, one composed of militia under Ensign Johnson and another of Lee’s Legion infantry. Unable to defend the stockade without exposing themselves to fire from Maham’s tower, the garrison had to surrender. The rebels were thus able to take the fort before Lieutenant Colonel Watson could arrive with a British relief force. Total rebel losses amounted to two killed and six wounded.

Fort Watson was the first British fort to be captured in South Carolina, and showed the pattern of Greene’s plans to take outposts or any other key point along the British lines of communication. The specific advantage gained was that its capture had the effect of isolating Greene’s target, Camden. It showed as well the effectiveness of Greene’s practice of combining conventional forces (the troopers of Lee’s Legion) with irregular forces (the partisans of Marion’s band) in order to achieve an effect greater than either kind of force by itself could have achieved. Finally the Americans demonstrated no little ingenuity in the manner of devising and employing a “Maham’s tower” as a tactical expedient.

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revised by John Gordon

FORT WILLIAM AND MARY, NEW HAMPSHIRE.

14–15 December 1774. Fort William and Mary guarded the mouth of the harbor at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Alerted by a message from the Boston Committee of Correspondence (carried by Paul Revere on 13 December 1774) that Major General Thomas Gage was planning to reinforce the fort and secure its munitions, Samuel Cutts and his colleagues on

the Portsmouth Committee of Correspondence decided to forestall Gage and remove the gunpowder from the custody of the single officer and five men who guarded it. On the afternoon of Wednesday, 14 December 1774, four hundred men carted away about one hundred barrels of gunpowder and shipped it up the Piscataqua River to safety in Durham. The next day a party of men from Durham led by John Sullivan marched to Portsmouth and with local help again took control of the fort, removed the lighter cannon and all the small arms, and sequestered them with the gunpowder in Durham. The munitions proved invaluable in arming New Hampshiremen in 1775.

SEE ALSO *New Hampshire, Mobilization in; Sullivan, John.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

FORT WILLIAM HENRY (FORT GEORGE), NEW YORK. 1755–1780.

William Johnson started construction of Fort William Henry, at the southern tip of Lake George, after his victory over the French on 8 September 1755. Montcalm, the commander of French troops in North America, besieged the place on 4 August 1757, and on 9 August its garrison of about 2,200 men was surrendered by Lieutenant Colonel George Munro. The French-allied Indians violated the surrender terms and started taking trophies and murdering prisoners. Munro reached Fort Edward, on the Hudson River, with 1,400 survivors. For the overall strategic situation at this time, see the entry “Colonial Wars.”

Fort George was built about a mile southeast of the ruins of Fort William Henry (which Montcalm destroyed). It served as the northern link of the overland route from Lake George to Fort Edward thirteen miles to the south on the Hudson River. Though by 1777 it was little more than a ruin, Fort George became an important British base during Burgoyne’s offensive. General William Phillips occupied the place on 29 July 1777, and the British abandoned it after the Saratoga surrender. It was recaptured by the British on 11 October 1780 but not held.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Colonial Wars; Johnson, Sir William.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

FORTY FORT, PENNSYLVANIA SEE

Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.

FOSTER’S HILL. Alternate name for Nook’s Hill, which figured in final phase of the Boston siege.

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege.*

Mark M. Boatner

FOUQUET. Nicholas Fouquet and his son Marc (or Mark) accompanied Coudray from France in 1777 as bearers of commissions from Silas Deane. Nicholas held a commission as a captain-bombier and Marc as a lieutenant. Congress begrudgingly approved their commissions on 7 November 1777 but offered to facilitate their return to France by covering their expenses. As experts in the production of gunpowder, they offered a counterproposal, and so the Board of War employed them in 1778 to make powder and inspect powder magazines.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

FOUR CORNERS, NEW YORK SEE

Young’s House.

FOURTEENTH COLONY. Term hopefully applied to Canada by the American Patriots early in the Revolution.

Mark M. Boatner

FOX, CHARLES JAMES. (1749–1806).

British politician. Fox was born in London on 24 January 1749, the second son of the politician Henry



Charles James Fox. *The British statesman and supporter of the American cause, in a 1781 engraving.* THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

Fox (later first baron Holland) and Caroline Lennox, daughter of the second duke of Richmond. Closely attached to his father and two brothers, Fox was brought up virtually without restraints, a background that is said to explain his later colorful lifestyle and his inability to provide firm leadership to others. Fox was educated, by his own choice, at a school in Wandsworth and (from June 1758) at Eton, where he began long friendships with a circle he called “the Gang” and that included Lord Carlisle. He also established a reputation as an able classical scholar. In 1763 he left school for a sojourn in Paris, where Henry Fox encouraged his fourteen-year-old son to gamble heavily and arranged for him to lose his virginity. It is hardly surprising that soon after his return to Eton in the autumn of 1764 young Fox was asked to leave. He went straight on to Oxford, where he enjoyed mathematics and classics, but was too ill disciplined to stay for a degree. His learning was then continued by another visit to Paris in the spring of 1765 and by a long grand tour through France, Switzerland, and Italy. On this journey he encountered numerous women, as well as Edward Gibbon, Voltaire, the duc d’Orleans, and Lafayette.

He began his political life as his beloved father’s ally and protégé and therefore no friend of the Whigs, who had

never forgiven Henry for accepting office under Lord Bute. In 1768, when he was nineteen and legally too young to be elected, Charles James entered Parliament as member for Midhurst in Sussex, a seat purchased by his father. Predictably he took up against the Rockinghamites and supported the ministries of Grafton and North. He supported the attempts to punish John Wilkes for defying Parliament over the Middlesex election and had no particular objection to either ministry’s American policies until 1774. He got on well with North and in February 1770 became a lord of Admiralty at the age of twenty-one. His move toward a more radical stance came out of family considerations, not political principle.

The first problem was the Royal Marriages Act of 1772, which required the immediate descendants of royalty to obtain the sovereign’s consent before marrying. As Fox’s mother was a direct descendant of Charles II, and especially as hers had been a runaway marriage, Fox may have felt it reflected on his own legitimacy. In 1753 Henry, for rather similar reasons, had opposed the earl of Hardwicke’s marriage act against clandestine marriages. Now, on 15 February Charles James resigned from the Admiralty in protest. In December he was found a place on the Treasury board, only to resign that office in February 1774 after the North ministry failed to raise the Holland barony to an earldom. These flimsy, even capricious, grounds for the laying down of public office marked him down as a man who could not, for the moment at least, be taken very seriously.

Excluded from office by his own actions, from 1774 Fox drifted into the orbit of the Rockingham Whigs. This drift was not purely political opportunism; and it was very slow. One reason was a growing mutual dislike between himself and George III, who disapproved of Fox’s libertine habits. Under the tutelage of Edmund Burke, Fox gradually came to share the Whig delusion that George was deliberately moving toward a royal absolutism. Fox now saw his friend North as the weak, possibly unwitting or unwilling, instrument of George’s designs. Though still looking over his shoulder at fresh opportunities for office, Fox found himself publicly advocating more frequent elections and a wider franchise, ideas that in private he found only mildly appealing.

What really swung Fox into opposition was the approach of the War of American Independence, which from the first he feared would be a long and probably unsuccessful contest. In April 1774 he spoke and voted against the Coercive Acts and was not surprised when violence followed. As early as 1776 Fox began to think American independence better than a costly and humiliating war. He attacked the earl of Sandwich and Lord George Germain for incompetence and gradually began to associate the Americans with himself as fellow victims of George III: from there it was only a short step to perceiving

a trans-Atlantic royal plot against liberty. As ever, Fox's changing opinions were shaped by personal contacts. He exchanged letters with Thomas Jefferson and met Benjamin Franklin in Paris in the winter of 1776–1777. General John Burgoyne, one of his high-living gambling cronies, wrote to him from America between 1775 and 1777. His brilliant speeches marked him as the leader of opposition to the war in the Commons, and in 1782 he concerted the moves that brought down North's government.

Fox now became foreign secretary in the short-lived Rockingham administration. It was not a happy experience. Fox found it nigh impossible to work with the earl of Shelburne, the home secretary, and, predictably, suspected George III of using the Lord Chancellor and Shelburne to frustrate the Paris peace negotiations. Fox's chief negotiator in Paris, Thomas Grenville, certainly met with obstruction from Shelburne's man Richard Oswald. Fox had already decided to resign when Rockingham's death on 1 July 1782 put an end to the ministry. The new Shelburne ministry negotiated separate treaties with France and the United States, but at a price, which allowed Fox and North to combine forces to bring Shelburne down in February 1783. The Fox-North coalition (March–December 1783) was later vilified as a cynical union of convenience between sworn enemies, but at the time it was accepted as a partnership of men who had worked well together in the past and still held each other in high regard. They had no choice but to accept the peace terms they had just censured; the alternative was to restart the fighting, a political if not a military impossibility. They fell when George III intervened to have Fox's India bill defeated in the Lords, thus providing him with an excuse to sack his ministers and bring in the younger William Pitt.

Fox, already paranoid about royal plotting, was appalled at the king's behavior and blocked every ministerial measure he could until the election of 1784 gave Pitt a comfortable majority. Thereafter British politics resolved into a duel between the two. In 1788 Fox opened the prosecution of Warren Hastings as a means of protest against the king's destruction of his own India bill. He supported the prince regent's claims during the Regency crisis of 1788–1789 because he was at odds with George III. He opposed the war against revolutionary and Napoleonic France on the grounds that even a perverted liberty was preferable to a coalition of despots—particularly a coalition joined by George III and Pitt. His illusion that he could patch up a peace by chatting with his friend Talleyrand was rudely shattered when he became foreign secretary in the “ministry of all the talents” in January 1806, and only his death on 13 September saved him from total humiliation.

Fox's politics were always conditioned by family considerations, friendships, and his overwhelming distrust of

George III, and his support for the American Revolution was based on expediency rather than principle. He was never a radical or convinced parliamentary reformer, and whatever political ideals he possessed did not run deep. His great oratory, unlike the younger Pitt's, was of an essentially destructive kind. These were hardly the qualifications of a great minister, but perhaps Fox's greatest talent lay elsewhere: as the supreme opposition spokesman of his age.

SEE ALSO *Diplomacy of the American Revolution; Franklin, Benjamin; George III; Germain, George Sackville; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; Jefferson, Thomas; Lafayette, Marquis de; Rockingham, Charles Watson-Wentworth, second Marquess of; Sandwich, John Montagu, fourth earl of; Shelburne, William Petty Fitzmaurice, earl of.*

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revised by John Oliphant

FOX'S MILLS, NEW YORK. Alternate name for the action at Klock's Field on 19 October 1780.

SEE ALSO *Klock's Field, New York.*

FRAISE. A palisade around a fortification between the main wall and the ditch that is, the berm). Its timbers were either pointed horizontally toward the direction of attack or slanted either up or down. The fraising normally was pointed, and the purpose was to hinder an enemy in its final assault without giving it the protection that an abatis might offer.

SEE ALSO *Abatis.*

Mark M. Boatner

FRANCISCO, PETER. (1760?–1832). War hero. Possibly Portugal and Virginia. Put ashore from a strange ship and abandoned near the present Hopewell,

Virginia, when he was about four years old, Peter was reared by Judge Anthony Winston, an uncle of Patrick Henry. The boy's true name and origin are not known. He grew into a 6-foot, 6-inch giant and joined the 10th Virginia Regiment at the age of 15. He was wounded at the Brandywine (September 1777) and met the Marquis de Lafayette when they were both receiving medical treatment. After fighting at Germantown and Fort Mifflin, he re-enlisted and was seriously wounded by a musketball at Monmouth on 28 June 1778. He was one of the twenty-man, forlorn hope of a troop led by Lieutenant James Gibbons at Stony Point on 16 July 1779, and one of the four who reached the final objective. Despite a bayonet slash across the abdomen received in this action, he also took part in the assault on Paulus Hook, slightly more than a month later, and is credited with splitting the skulls of two grenadiers. At the expiration of his second enlistment he joined the militia regiment of Colonel William Mayo. In the rout at Camden, South Carolina, on 16 August 1780, he is said to have carried off a 1,000-pound cannon to prevent its capture, and to have rescued Colonel Mayo after he was taken prisoner. Francisco then joined the mounted troop of Captain (Thomas?) Watkins and took part in the subsequent guerrilla operations of Colonel William Washington's dragoons. At Guilford, North Carolina, on 15 March 1781, he was twice wounded by bayonet while charging at the head of Nathanael Greene's counterattack.

Found lying among the dead at Guilford, Francisco was rescued by a Quaker. He recovered and volunteered as a scout in the operations against British raiders in Virginia. At a place called Ward's Tavern he was surrounded by nine of General Banastre Tarleton's dragoons, but managed by ruse and by single combat to fight his way out, leaving at least two of the enemy dead. He took part in the siege of Yorktown.

After the war he served for many years as sergeant at arms in the Virginia House of Delegates. In 1824 he accompanied Lafayette on a tour of the state. He died in Richmond in 1832.


SEE ALSO *Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN. (1706–1790). American statesman. Signer. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. At the start of the Revolution, Franklin



Benjamin Franklin. *The American statesman, scientist, inventor, and writer in a 1778 portrait by Joseph-Siffred Duplessis.* THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

was almost 70 years old. He had an international reputation as a scientist, inventor, writer, and editor, to mention but some of his achievements. Yet in the last fifteen years of his life, Franklin played as prominent a role in attaining and securing American independence as anyone.

Born in Boston on 6 January 1706, Franklin attended school only a short time before going to work, first in his father's tallow shop and then in his brother's printshop. After breaking with his brother in 1723, Franklin quit his indenture and fled to Philadelphia. Within six years he owned the *Pennsylvania Gazette*. In 1730 he moved in with, but did not marry, Deborah Read, with whom he had several children.

Poor Richard's Almanack began appearing in 1732, and was edited by Franklin until 1757. He edited the *Gazette* until 1748. The Junto, a debating club he founded in 1727, became the American Philosophical Society in 1743. He established a circulating library (1731), Philadelphia's first fire company (1736), and an academy (1751) that was the nucleus of what eventually became the University of Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania having no militia, Franklin led a group of citizens in creating the

“Philadelphia Associators.” Turning down an officer’s rank in this militia, Franklin insisted on serving as a private soldier, which only enhanced his reputation with the anti-Quaker party. In the scientific field, which gained him fame abroad, he invented the woodstove that still bears his name (1742) and conducted a series of significant experiments into the nature of electricity.

Franklin served as clerk of the Pennsylvania Assembly from 1736 to 1751, was a member of that body from 1751 to 1764, deputy postmaster at Philadelphia from 1737 to 1753, and, with William Hunter, was postmaster general of the colonies from 1753 to 1774. He attended the Albany Convention of 1754 and submitted his famous plan of union. He served as agent for Pennsylvania from 1757 to 1762, and renewed his service from 1764 to 1775. He served in the same capacity for Georgia from 1768 to 1774, and for Massachusetts from 1770 to 1774.

Preceded by his scientific reputation, Franklin enjoyed a warm welcome in England and on the Continent. He was accompanied to London by his son, William. William became a Loyalist who would earn appointment as New Jersey’s last royal governor. Benjamin Franklin moved in the opposite political direction from his son, becoming the prime representative in Britain for the Patriot position. Instrumental in securing repeal of the Stamp Act (1766), Franklin met regularly with sympathetic British politicians to argue the American cause, wrote dozens of pamphlets and newspaper articles, and endured a highly unusual grilling before the entire House of Commons in 1766. When it was suggested by a Member of Parliament that troops might be needed to deal with the American uprising, Franklin replied, “They will not find a rebellion; they may indeed make one.” He was publicly censured in England in 1774 for his part in the Hutchinson letters affair and dismissed shortly thereafter as postmaster general by the British government.

Franklin returned to Philadelphia in May 1775, just in time for the start of the military conflict with Britain. He was immediately chosen as a member of the Second Continental Congress, was appointed the first Postmaster General (1775–1776), and was one of the three men sent to Canada by Congress in 1776. He helped draft the Declaration of Independence, and was a signer of that document. In September 1776, Congress appointed Franklin, along with Arthur Lee and Silas Deane, to negotiate a treaty with the French.

Already known for his scientific works, Franklin arrived in Paris in December 1776 and was lionized by the public. Although the government could not openly receive him as an official American representative, the foreign minister, the comte de Vergennes, singled Franklin out as the only one of the three with whom he would deal, so the chief burden of negotiations with the French government fell on him. His popularity did much

to expedite secret aid and to bring about the French alliance. The former went a long way toward arming the Continental army and bringing about the American victory at Saratoga, which in turn effected the goal of alliance. Franklin worked tirelessly for the American cause, securing munitions and arranging vital loans for the American states; acquiring ships for the new U.S. navy and securing them safe harbors in European ports; issuing letters of marque for American privateers; negotiating for humane treatment of American prisoners of war and effecting prisoner exchanges; and heading up an extensive, though not always effective intelligence network, while pouring forth a stream of propaganda. All the while, he was charming his way through the European elite. Meanwhile he suffered the “magisterial snubbings and rebukes” of the psychotic Arthur Lee, but got along well enough with the third commissioner, Silas Deane.

By September 1778, Congress realized its mistake in having appointed three commissioners to France. It made Franklin the sole plenipotentiary. On 8 June 1781 Franklin was named one of three American commissioners for peace negotiations, in which he played the major role. Probably no American has ever been as successful in the conduct of diplomatic affairs.

On 26 December 1783, Franklin reminded Congress of their promise to recall him after the peace was made (the treaty had been signed 3 September), but he did not get his authority to leave until 2 May 1785. Finally reaching Philadelphia in September 1785, Franklin was elected president of the Pennsylvania Executive Council, which office he held until 1788. He was a member of the Constitutional Convention that met in Philadelphia in May 1787; and although none of his cardinal ideas was adopted—for instance, he favored a single chamber and an executive board—he made a considerable contribution in bringing about the necessary compromises among the delegates. He did not like the way the Constitution was finally worded, but urged its unanimous adoption. “The older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment,” he said with the whimsy that had ironed out other controversies of the convention. He asked the others to join him in doubting a little of their own infallibility and “to make manifest our unanimity, put his name to the instrument.” Unlike most people, Franklin became more radical as he grew older. By the time of the Constitutional Convention, he was calling for the establishment of a humane American criminal justice system and urging the extension of the logic of the Revolution to women and blacks, calling for an end of slavery and legal rights for women. Though often ignored at home, he inspired reformers in Europe and South America. After his death on 17 April 1790, the French Assembly

voted a three-day mourning period. The U.S. Senate rejected a similar proposal.

SEE ALSO *Albany Convention and Plan; Associators; Canada, Congressional Committee to; Declaratory Act; French Alliance; Hortalez & Cie; Hutchinson Letters Affair; Peace Negotiations.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

FRANKLIN, WILLIAM. (1731–1813). Royal governor of New Jersey, Tory leader. Pennsylvania-New Jersey. An illegitimate son of Benjamin Franklin, probably by his common-law wife, Deborah Read, he joined the company of Virginia troops raised by Beverley Robinson in 1746 for the expedition against Canada and at the age of about fifteen he rose to the grade of captain. For almost thirty years afterward, he was closely associated with his father as comptroller of the general post office from 1754 to 1756, clerk of the Pennsylvania provincial assembly, and as his father's companion in 1757 when the latter went to England as colonial agent for Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Will, as his father called him, was "a tall proper Youth, and much of a Beau." He studied at the Middle Temple, was admitted to the bar, traveled with his father, and aided him with his scientific investigations. Having become acquainted with the earl of Bute, he was appointed governor of New Jersey in 1763 through the latter's influence. This unsolicited honor may have been given with a view to winning Benjamin Franklin over to the British side.

William Franklin's tenure in the governorship started successfully. His adherence to the royal cause at the start of the Revolution appears to have been prompted by nothing more complicated than a sense of duty to the government that appointed him. In this he was estranged from his father, who after failing in all arguments to win him over, characterized William as "a thorough government man." On 15 June 1776 the Provincial Congress of New Jersey declared him an enemy and ordered his arrest. After severe treatment as a prisoner at East Windsor, Connecticut, he went to New York City in October 1778 after being exchanged for John McKinley, the Patriot president of Delaware. Franklin became president

of the Associated Loyalists, which was deprived by Clinton of its powers after the Huddy–Asgill Affair in 1782. After Captain Lippincott was acquitted, blame for the killing of Huddy was transferred to William Franklin and some of the other directors of the Associated Loyalists. Franklin left for England in August 1782. He was allowed a relatively paltry eighteen hundred pounds for the loss of his estate and was given a life pension of eight hundred pounds a year. His first wife, whom he had married in England in 1762, died while he was a prisoner in Connecticut, having never been allowed to visit him there. In the family tradition, William sired an illegitimate son, William Temple Franklin, who became his grandfather Benjamin's secretary in Paris and later edited the works of the great man.

Franklin's career was a tragic paradox. As royal governor he was flexible, moderate, and resourceful, but as president of the Board of Associated Loyalists in the New York garrison town from 1778 and 1782, he tried without much success to smooth relations between Loyalist exiles trapped in the city and British commanders, first Clinton and then Carleton. To have been a stabilizing influence in the New York garrison town as the British military effort moved inexorably toward defeat would have required his father's guile.

SEE ALSO *Associated Loyalists; Franklin, Benjamin; Huddy–Asgill Affair.*

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revised by Robert M. Calhoon

FRANKS, DAVID SALISBURY. (1742–1793). Major and aide-de-camp to Benedict Arnold. Canada and Pennsylvania. Born in Philadelphia on 27 March 1742, David Salisbury Franks was the son of a Jewish merchant who moved to Quebec after the end of the Seven Years' War, settling in Montreal in 1774. At the start of the Revolution, he had risen to the position of president of the Montreal Shearith Israel Congregation. He denounced King George III over the Quebec Act, which failed to recognize the civic rights of Jews. For expressing these views, Franks was imprisoned in May 1775, although he was released after two weeks. When the Americans captured Montreal on 13 November 1775, Franks supported their cause with loans and denounced his father as a Loyalist. The following year, General David

Wooster made Franks the paymaster of the American garrison. When the Americans retreated from Montreal, Franks went with them.

Franks joined the Continental army in Albany, seeing action at Saratoga. Because he could speak French, he was made liaison to Admiral Valerie d'Estaing in 1778. In July he was promoted to major and became a member of Benedict Arnold's staff in Philadelphia. Franks testified on Arnold's behalf at his court-martial for corruption in May 1779, afterwards transferring to General Benjamin Lincoln's staff in Charleston. In July 1780 he returned to Arnold's staff at West Point. When Arnold defected in September, Franks was suspected of complicity and subjected to two courts of inquiry, both of which attested to his innocence. General George Washington issued a personal commendation after the second verdict in November 1780. In 1781 Franks resigned as a lieutenant colonel and devoted the next six years to serving the United States as a diplomat, making numerous trips to Europe. Congress sent him to Paris in 1784 with the ratification of the peace treaty, and the next year he acted for a short time as vice consul at Marseilles before returning to the United States. In 1786 Franks played an important role in drafting the Morocco trade agreement. In 1789 he failed in an attempt to be made consul general in France and returned to business, becoming assistant cashier of the Bank of North America in 1791. He died in the Philadelphia yellow fever epidemic on 7 October 1793.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict*.

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FRASER, SIMON. (1726–1782). Colonel of the Fraser Highlanders. In 1745 Fraser's father, the eleventh Lord Lovat, recalled him from his legal studies at St. Andrews University to lead clan Fraser in the Jacobite rebellion. His distinct reluctance—he ran away at Falkirk and missed the battle of Culloden—may explain his release from military service in 1747 and his pardon in 1750.

Fraser completed his studies and practised law in Scotland and, later, in London. In 1757 he was permitted to raise a battalion, the Sixty-third Foot (which was renumbered as the Seventy-eighth in 1759). This battalion was the first to be known as Fraser's Highlanders, which Fraser led in the action at Louisburg (1758). Wounded in a skirmish near Beaumont (Canada) on 26 July 1759,

Fraser missed both the failed attack at the Montmorency River and the battle on the Plains of Abraham, both of which were part of the attack on Quebec. In 1760 he led a brigade, was wounded again at St. Foy on 28 April, and took part in the advance on Montreal later that year.

In 1761 Fraser was elected to Parliament, for Invernessshire. Next year he took an expedition to Portugal, where he became a temporary major general in the Portuguese service and may have risen to lieutenant general by 1768. Meanwhile, in 1763, his regiment had been disbanded. In 1772 he became a major general in the British army, and on 25 October 1775 he was authorized to raise a new two-battalion Highland regiment, the Seventy-first, which became known as Fraser's Highlanders. This regiment later served with distinction in the War of American Independence. Fraser, though promoted lieutenant general on 29 August 1777, was not offered an active command and spent the war in parliament. He died in London on 8 February 1782.

SEE ALSO *Fraser Highlanders*.

revised by John Oliphant

FRASER, SIMON. (1729–1777). British general. The youngest son of Hugh Fraser of Balnain, Scotland, Fraser seems to have begun his military career in the Dutch service. In 1747 he was wounded while with the Scots brigade at Bergen-op-Zoom, in the Netherlands. However, on 31 January 1755 he was commissioned as a lieutenant in the new British Sixty-second Regiment (later the Sixtieth Regiment), also known as the Royal Americans. Two years later Fraser moved as captain-lieutenant to the Seventy-eighth Foot, which came to be known as Fraser's Highlanders. After service at Louisburg in 1758, he was commissioned captain (22 April 1759) and fought at the capture of Quebec.

Fraser then served in Germany, being made brevet major on Ferdinand of Brunswick's staff on 15 March 1761, and later leading a light infantry unit known as Fraser's Chasseurs in a number of actions. He became a major in the Twenty-fourth Foot on 8 April 1762, afterwards serving in Gibraltar and Ireland and being promoted lieutenant colonel in 1768. In 1770 he was made Irish quartermaster general. During these years Fraser introduced his regiment to new infantry tactics pioneered by General James Wolfe, and made friends with John Burgoyne and William Phillips.

On 28 May 1776 Fraser and his regiment arrived in Canada with Burgoyne's reinforcements for Sir Guy Carleton, and was at once given a brigade on the south bank of the St. Lawrence River. He successfully

defended Trois Rivières on 8 June and pursued the fleeing enemy until ordered to halt. Two days later Carleton made him a local brigadier general with orders to take command of the British advance guard and, if possible, cut off the fleeing Americans. During the summer he protected the flotilla Carleton was building at the fort on Lake Champlain, and after Valcour Island (11–13 October 1776) his force was advanced to Chimney Rock, twelve miles from Ticonderoga (New York). In June 1777 he took command of Burgoyne's advance guard and helped to capture Fort Ticonderoga, and on 7 July his troops defeated the American rear-guard at Hubbardton, Vermont, albeit with heavy losses. At Freeman's Farm (New York) on 19 September, during the first battle of Saratoga, he led one assault on Daniel Morgan's riflemen. On 7 October he was leading another attack when he was shot, possibly by the rebel sniper Timothy Murphy. Though nursed through the night by Baroness Riedesel (wife of Baron Friedrich Adolphus Riedesel), Fraser died at eight the following morning.

SEE ALSO *Freeman's Farm, Battle of; Saratoga, First Battle of; Valcour Island.*

revised by John Oliphant

FRASER, SIMON. (1737/8–1813). British army officer. Simon Fraser was born in 1737 or 1738 in the Scottish Highlands. He was the son of a tacksman, which is a Scottish term designating an individual who has been granted the use of a plot of land (called a tack), usually in return for services to the clan leader. Fraser became an ensign in Fraser's Highlanders, the Seventy-eighth Foot, on 21 July 1757, and was promoted lieutenant on 21 September 1759. During the Seven Years' War, Fraser served in Canada at Louisburg (1758), Quebec (1759), St. Foy, and at the surrender of Montreal (1760). In 1765 he joined his patron, General Simon Fraser, in the Portuguese army, and in 1775 became senior captain in the new Fraser's Highlanders, the Seventy-first Foot. During the War of American Independence, Fraser lost an eye during the well-executed British raid on Danbury, Connecticut (23–28 April 1777) and fought at Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth. Promoted major in October 1778, he was deputy quartermaster general to the Georgia expedition, to both Charles Cornwallis and Francis Rawdon-Hastings in South Carolina and, in 1782 and 1783, in Jamaica. He served as a major general in Portugal (1796–1801) and as a lieutenant general in home postings from 1803. He died on 21 May 1813.

SEE ALSO *Danbury Raid, Connecticut; Rawdon-Hastings, Francis.*

revised by John Oliphant

FRASER'S HIGHLANDERS. Two regiments known by this name, both raised by Simon Fraser (1726–1782), were conspicuous in America during the French and Indian War and during the Revolution. The first was raised in 1757, numbered as the Seventy-eighth Regiment of Foot on 1 June 1758, and was disbanded in December 1763 at Quebec.

Recognizing that the British army in America would need reinforcements following the slaughter at Bunker Hill, Simon Fraser raised at Inverness, Stirling, and Glasgow a regiment of two battalions. Officially the Seventy-first Regiment of Foot (Fraser Highlanders) from 25 October 1775, the unit sailed from Scotland for Boston at the end of April 1776, not knowing that Boston had fallen into Patriot hands on 17 March 1776. Two transports were captured at sea, one of them carrying a company of the Seventy-first and the other a company of the Forty-second Regiment of Foot (Royal Highland Regiment). Four more transports were captured off the Massachusetts coast in mid-June. Among the prisoners was Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell, whose transport was taken in Boston Harbor; he was exchanged two years later for Ethan Allen. Replacement companies were raised in Scotland by September 1779 and arrived safely in America.

The First Battalion and the remainder of the Second Battalion arrived at Staten Island in July 1776 and took part in the Battle of Long Island on 27 August, being the first ashore on the 24th. They were with the force that cut off the retreat of rebel Major General William Alexander (Lord Stirling) in the final phase of the battle. The Highlanders fought at Fort Washington, New York (16 November 1776), Brandywine, Pennsylvania (11 September 1777), and Billingsport, New Jersey (9 October 1777). The Third Battalion of the Seventy-first was created in May 1777 and was sent in 1779 to garrison Newfoundland.

The two original battalions were the core of the expedition sent south under Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell in December 1778. The Highlanders helped to capture Savannah on 29 December 1778; occupied Augusta from 29 January to 13 February 1779; fought at Briar Creek, Georgia, on 3 March; and helped defend Savannah against the Franco-American counterattack in September. After receiving 150 replacements, they joined Sir Henry Clinton's expedition against Charleston, South Carolina. They took part in the final siege operations and remained with the field army under Lord Cornwallis. Under Major

Archibald McArthur, the First Battalion distinguished itself before most of it was captured at the Battle of Cowpens on 17 January 1781; the Second Battalion was with Cornwallis until the final surrender at Yorktown. The remainder of the First Battalion went from Charleston to Halifax, Nova Scotia, in November 1782, and then returned to Scotland, where it was disbanded in 1786. The members of the Second Battalion were among the prisoners exchanged in 1783; the Highlanders returned to Scotland and were disbanded at Stirling on 3 October.

SEE ALSO *Briar Creek, Georgia; Campbell, Archibald; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Cowpens, South Carolina; Fraser, Simon (1726–1782); Long Island, New York, Battle of; Maitland, John; Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779).*

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FRAUNCES TAVERN, NEW YORK CITY. Site of Washington's farewell to his officers, 4 December 1783. In 1762 Samuel Fraunces purchased this private residence, built in 1719, and opened a popular tavern. Preserved in the restored Fraunces Tavern at Pearl and Broad Streets is the historic Long Room that was the scene of Washington's farewell to his officers on Thursday, 4 December 1783, the day the British fleet sailed from New York Harbor.

Soon after noon Washington arrived to find the small group of officers who had entered the city on 25 November and all others who had been assembled on short notice for the occasion. Washington took a wine glass, as if to toast his fellow officers. "With a heart full of love and gratitude, I now take leave of you," Washington said. "I most devotedly wish that your later days may be as prosperous and happy as your former ones have been glorious and honorable." Gripped with an emotion that threatened to overwhelm the small assemblage, they mumbled a confused answer and drank their wine before Washington, blind with tears, continued:

"I cannot come to each of you, but shall be obliged if each of you will come and take me by the hand." Henry Knox stepped forward as the senior officer present. Impulsively, Washington put his arms around his chief of artillery and, now weeping openly, kissed him. This description comes from a letter by Benjamin Tallmadge, who reported that "tears of deep sensibility filled every eye" as "every officer in the room marched up, kissed, and parted with his general in chief." For Tallmadge, the notion "that we should see this face no more in this world seemed to me utterly insupportable." After he had embraced the last officer, Washington raised his arm in silent farewell and left the tavern. Joined by New York governor George Clinton and the city council, Washington, in his finest blue and buff uniform, passed through ranks of light infantry and walked to Whitehall. The wharf was crowded as Washington approached, climbed into a barge, and headed for Paulus Hook, accompanied by General Friedrich von Steuben. From there he proceeded by way of Philadelphia to Annapolis to surrender his commission to Congress (23 December 1783).

When Washington was president, the government rented the tavern to house the offices of the Departments of War, Treasury, and Foreign Affairs. In 1904 the Sons of the Revolution in the state of New York bought and restored the tavern, which is now a museum.

SEE ALSO *Tallmadge, Benjamin, Jr.*

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FREEMAN'S FARM, BATTLE OF.

The Battle of Freeman's Farm is an alternate name for the first Battle of Saratoga, 19 September 1777, which opened in the roughly twelve-acre clearing that had once been the farm of John Freeman. Freeman had sold the farm to Isaac Leggett and gone north to join Burgoyne's invasion force. Leggett, also a Loyalist, was not present on the day of the battle.

SEE ALSO *Saratoga, First Battle of.*

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FREEMASONS SEE *Masonry in America*.

FRENCH ALLIANCE. (Ratified by Congress 4 May 1778.) The origins of the Americans' relationship with France had long before the Revolution been established as a part of the English mind-set, based on the traditional rivalry of the two great nations. The English and Americans had been taught to despise the government, religion, and culture of France. France was the object of colonial hatred and suspicion in the years preceding the Revolution, when the French and Indian War was remembered for the outrages against frontier settlements of the English colonies. The French in turn saw the English as arrogant, heretical, and money driven and as having upset the world balance of power, relative peace, and stability set by the Peace of Utrecht (1713) through their power grab in the Treaty of Paris (1763). Yet despite a continuing rhetoric of hostility, the Americans had continued to conduct clandestine, illegal trade with continental France and the French West Indies.

Believing that much of English power derived from the commercial advantages of its colonial possessions in North America, the French government sent observers to study conditions in these colonies after 1763. Among these were Kalb and later Achard de Bonvouloir.

SECRET FRENCH AID

When open combat started in America, the French could not risk a formal alliance with the colonists until they were certain the latter were really seeking independence and were capable of gaining military victories to achieve it. Otherwise, the French feared, they might find themselves at war with a British army and navy no longer engaged in or scattered across North America. The advisers of young Louis XVI believed that he would do best by first delaying war until the French army and navy were ready for combat and then forcing England to overextend itself in a transatlantic war; meanwhile, France would send the rebels secret aid.

In March 1776 the Continental Congress sent Silas Deane as its agent to France, and two months later Hortalez & Cie was in business. Soon Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee arrived in France to complete the "Commission" (as the American delegation was known) that would pursue a formal French Alliance. Once there, they busily engaged themselves in securing experienced French officers to serve in America, negotiating contracts for the purchase of munitions and other needed war supplies from French merchants, supporting American privateers in the eastern Atlantic, and seeking to establish formal ties with the French government. At the same time, that government

found itself in the quandary of trying to encourage the Americans informally without overly alarming the British.

FORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE

On 17 December 1777, having learned of the Saratoga victory and impressed by the spirit shown by Washington at Germantown, French authorities told the American commissioners in Paris that France had decided to recognize American independence. On 8 January 1778 Vergennes informed the envoys that France was ready to make an alliance. The treaties were signed on 6 February, and Louis formally received the commissioners on 20 March. On 4 May, Congress ratified the two treaties: a treaty of amity and commerce (recognizing independence) and a treaty of alliance to become effective in the event of war between France and England. On 13 March, the French ambassador at London informed the British of these treaties and the British ambassador was immediately recalled from France. Spain offered to mediate, but the war started on 17 June when Admiral Keppel, leading twenty ships on a cruise out of Portsmouth, fell in with two French frigates and fired his guns to bring them to.

The Peace Commission of Carlisle was prompted by an urgent desire on the part of the British to settle the dispute in America before France could throw her tremendous potential into the conflict. French entry into the war, followed by the Spanish Alliance a year later, meant that the decisive international theater now was the sea.

MILITARY VICTORY FOLLOWS DEFEATS

News of the French Alliance inspired such overconfidence among Americans in the beginning that it may eventually have resulted in a negative effect. A large fleet under Admiral d'Estaing left Toulon on 13 April 1778 and made an incredibly slow crossing of eighty-seven days that enabled the British fleet to withdraw from the Chesapeake. D'Estaing failed successively at New York during 11–22 July and Newport during 29 July–31 August 1778, abandoned plans for an amphibious offensive against Halifax and Newfoundland, and headed for the West Indies. The disastrous Franco-American attack on Savannah on 9 October 1779 was another setback. Early in 1780 the French government warned the Americans that they must do more for themselves, and in April, Congress responded by ordering Kalb south with a small force of regulars around whom, it was hoped, the militia would rally. This led indirectly to the loss at Camden on 16 August 1780. The French, who had been planning a direct assault against the British Isles until the autumn of 1779, decided soon thereafter to send a French army to North America.

The arrival of Rochambeau's expeditionary force at Newport on 11 July 1780 marked the beginning of a new and decisive phase of Franco-American military cooperation. A series of British strategic blunders, the decision of Admiral de Grasse to move his large French fleet north from the West Indies to support the allied armies of Rochambeau and Washington, and the skillful operations of Lafayette in Virginia contributed to the victorious Yorktown campaign and the end of British military power in America.

FRENCH CONSULS AND TRADE

The treaty of alliance of 1778 had given the United States a free hand to conquer Canada and Bermuda; France was at liberty to take the British West Indies. Both countries agreed to respect the other's territorial gains in these areas, and neither was to conclude a treaty with Britain without the other's consent. France's motive in the war, therefore, was to regain its former preeminence by reducing English power through American independence; it was not in the war for any significant increase of its overseas possessions. Yet in addition to helping the Americans gain their independence, France had also hoped to make significant commercial inroads into American markets, and it began by establishing a series of consular agents throughout the states. These appointments included a consul at Philadelphia (1778); a consul at Boston (1779); a consul for New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut (1783); a vice-consul at Savannah (1783); a vice-consul for Virginia (1784); a consul at Charleston (1784); and a vice-consul at Portsmouth, New Hampshire (1785). However, the efforts to completely supplant British trade largely failed in the postwar years.

The best study on the impact of the French alliance on American domestic politics during the war is William C. Stinchcombe's *The American Revolution and the French Alliance* (1969). He discusses the relationships between the French minister Conrad Alexandre Gérard and his successor, Anne César de La Luzerne, with the American military command, the members of the Continental Congress, and various state officials. Of special interest are the chapters dealing with French propaganda efforts among the American media to promote the alliance.

SEE ALSO *Achard de Bonvouloir et Loyauté, Julien Alexandre; De Kalb, Johann; Deane, Silas; Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, comte d'; Franklin, Benjamin; Gérard, Conrad-Alexandre; Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of; Grasse, François Joseph Paul, comte de; Hortalez & Cie; Independence; La Luzerne, Anne-César de; Lee, Arthur; Monmouth, New Jersey; Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778); Peace Commission of Carlisle; Rochambeau, Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de; Saratoga*

Surrender; Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779); Yorktown Campaign.

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FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR.

Although this term can be used literally to mean all four of the conflicts between the British and French colonists in North America between 1689 and 1763 (King William's War, Queen Anne's War, King George's War, and the final French and Indian war), the term applies more precisely to the last of the colonial wars (1756–1763), which in Europe is called the Seven Years' War. The historian Lawrence Henry Gipson rechristened the final French and Indian war "the Great War for the Empire," but that name is not in common usage.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars.*

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FRENCH COVERT AID. As the dispute between England and its colonies escalated into actions, French officials anticipated conflicts between the American colonists and the British, and they sought to exploit the situation to their own advantage. The French

provided informal and, to some extent, covert support for the American cause in several ways. First, through opening up their West Indian islands to American vessels, they provided an immediate market for American wheat, tobacco, salted fish, and indigo. This, in turn, provided money with which the colonists were able to purchase munitions. Second, in both the Caribbean and off the French coast, they unofficially offered safe harbors for American privateers that were marauding British shipping and capturing British cargoes. Finally, the French provided loans and subsidies to assist the Americans in sustaining their war-making ability. France's major concern was that, should their support become publicly known, it would serve as a justifiable cause for the English to declare war on France at a time when the French were still unprepared for combat. The result was that the French were required to maintain a delicate balance between 1775 and 1778, providing enough supplies to keep the Americans in the field without provoking the English government to declare war.

In October 1774 conflict between England and its colonies had led George III to forbid the sale of munitions to the colonies. By spring 1775 the British Parliament prohibited the colonies from foreign trade altogether, except for those colonies that the government considered safe: Georgia, North Carolina, Delaware, and New York. In August George III declared the colonies to be in a state of rebellion and charged that those who participated in the rebellion were traitors.

INITIAL FRENCH OVERTURES

To assess the level of discontent in America, the French foreign minister, Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes had dispatched Achard de Bonvouloir to visit the colonies. While in Philadelphia in December 1775, Bonvouloir met with members of the Committee of Secret Correspondence, who inquired whether France would sell munitions to the Americans. His conversations convinced him that French support of the American cause would be worthwhile. When Vergennes received Bonvouloir's report, he presented Louis XVI with a memorandum titled "Considerations," proposing that France provide the Americans with secret aid to sustain their efforts.

In May 1776 Louis XVI approved an investment of one million livres to enable the Americans to purchase arms. To provide cover for the investment, Pierre Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais was selected to set up a company, Roderique Hortalez & Cie, which would use the money to purchase obsolete arms from government arsenals to sell to the American Congress on credit. Congressional representative Silas Deane arrived in Paris in July 1776 and quickly became involved with Beaumarchais in the enterprise. The two agreed to a contract for the exchange of American tobacco and other goods in return for munitions.

Beaumarchais had worked hard to convince Deane of his close relationship with the French government, and this later led many in Congress to conclude that he was merely a conduit for French gifts, a situation that would have tragic financial results for Beaumarchais and his descendants. Soon another French financier, Jacques Donatien Leray de Chaumont, also came forward to offer Deane one million livres credit for the purchase of supplies, which Deane immediately accepted.

By December, Beaumarchais's initial cargo of war supplies in the *Amphitrite* was exposed in the *London Chronicle*, and the "secret" became public knowledge. The English ambassador to France, David Murray, the seventh Viscount of Stormont, complained about French involvement in the colonies, and Vergennes was forced to issue orders halting the ship. However, it had already set sail before the orders arrived.

Having received instructions to enlist engineers, Deane also recruited experienced French officers for the Continental army, signing so many commissions that he soon created a crisis for the Congress as to which commissions to honor. In December 1776, Deane was joined by Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee, who also pressed the French government for further concessions.

THE SCRAMBLE FOR MUNITIONS

Despite the actions of the Continental Congress, the states began to fear that they would not be able to defend themselves from British military and naval force. A number of states, especially Rhode Island, Connecticut, Maryland, and Virginia, decided to act individually in the search for arms and ammunition from foreign sources such as the West Indies. Often using the contacts of American shippers and merchants, they identified and established covert relations with sympathetic foreign merchants and officials in the Caribbean and in Europe.

On 15 July the Continental Congress passed a resolution suggested by Benjamin Franklin that allowed a nine-month period during which ships returning to America with cargoes of military supplies would be exempt from the prohibitions on foreign trade. During the summer of 1775, Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island sent ships to the West Indies to obtain munitions. On 18 September 1775 Congress created a the Secret Committee of Trade (later simply known as the Secret Committee) to negotiate contracts for the importation of gunpowder and munitions. During the winter of 1775–1776, New York and Rhode Island planned and executed voyages to the Dutch and the French West Indies to obtain war supplies. In August 1776 Georgia sent Oliver Bowen and Pierre Emmanuel de la Plaigne to Saint Domingue, and in the following November Virginia appointed Raleigh Colston as its agent

in Saint Domingue, all in order to secure the material needed for the war.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND FINANCE

On 18 May 1776, the Continental Congress instructed the Committee of Secret Correspondence to send a representative to the French West Indies to purchase munitions. They selected as the committee's secretary Philadelphian William Bingham, whose father had been a merchant in the West Indian trade and who had undertaken a business tour of Europe in 1773. Under the cover of a private merchant he went to Martinique, met its governor-general, comte Robert d'Argout, and began to purchase muskets and bayonets. He was also given the informal duty of promoting the American cause and keeping Americans in France informed of events back home.

Upon his arrival in Martinique, Bingham met Richard Harrison, the agent for Virginia and Maryland. In the autumn of 1776, while awaiting the appearance in the islands of arms shipments from the Hortalez & Cie, Bingham began loading vessels with molasses and shipping them to America to generate income for the committee's benefit. By the spring of 1777, vessels began to reach Martinique from France. Bingham split the cargoes for transport to America among several smaller ships. Throughout 1777 he received shipments of arms, powder, tents, cloth, and medicines from Nantes and Bordeaux. Yet he received no return cargoes from the Committee to pay for these supplies. Finally, on 16 April 1778, Congress authorized him to draw funds from the Paris-based commissioners (Deane, Franklin, and Lee) to cover his bills. In May Bingham received news of the signing of the treaties with France neither through the commissioners in France nor from Congress but from reading a newspaper from the island of Dominica.

THE ROLE OF PRIVATEERING

The second field of covert French continental and West Indian assistance was through their support for American privateers. The purpose of these privateers was twofold. First, their capture of English merchant vessels provided cargoes with which to fund the purchase of much-needed munitions. Second, they created a disruption of English commerce.

The capture of British merchant vessels by privateers began as soon as Franklin arrived in France. On the Atlantic crossing, Franklin's ship, *The Reprisal*, captured two merchant vessels. The Americans sold them in French ports by falsifying their papers. Vergennes complained, but the Americans continued their privateering activities. When Captain Lambert Wickes captured eighteen prizes in June 1777 and brought them into French ports, he brought the situation to a crisis.

In August 1777 and with the support of King George III, Lord North, who was then Britain's prime minister, sent a special envoy to Versailles to threaten war if Wickes's squadron was not expelled from French ports. A few weeks later, the American squadron set sail for America. Facing French anger and a lack of resources, the American commissioners to France found that their financial situation was deteriorating rapidly. By November, however, Vergennes came to the commissioners' aid by advising them not to worry about paying for the supplies they had purchased from Hortalez & Cie. Thus began Arthur Lee's belief that the loans from Beaumarchais were, in fact, gifts. In early November Vergennes informed the commissioners that France would provide an additional three million livres to sustain them. Shortly afterward, news arrived of the American successes in the battle of Saratoga. The new year brought with it an alliance and further aid, but this time the French were willing to cement their formal alliance with the Americans.

American use of privateers in the West Indies was also significant, but it was not as threatening to peace as it was with the ships that were marauding the shipping lanes that lay directly off the French and English coasts. Early during the Revolution, Bingham and Harrison had jointly financed privateers that were working in the West Indies. Lord Stormont complained to Vergennes in autumn 1776: "At Martinico in particular the Privateers of the Rebels had been furnished with everything they wanted . . ., with as much willingness, and alacrity, as if they had been subjects of France." The American commissioners to France reported by 6 February 1777 that insurance rates for English vessels sailing in the West Indies were higher than at any time during the Seven Years' War. "This mode of exerting our force against them should be pushed with vigour. It is that in which we can most sensibly hurt them." (Stevens, *Facsimiles* 14, no. 1392; Franklin, *Papers*, 23: p. 287)

Stormont's complaints to Vergennes continued into the middle of 1777; now he added that the privateering vessels had crews who spoke French and had French papers. In response to Stormont's complaints, Vergennes finally announced that the governor of Martinique, d'Argout, would be replaced by François Claude Amour du Chariol, Marquis de Bouillé, and the minister of the navy and colonies, Antoine Gabriel de Sartine, decreed that the sale of prizes in French colonial territories was forbidden. Despite these actions the new governor of Martinique continued to allow American privateers to enter French continental and colonial ports on the flimsiest excuse. By December 1777, the French were in fact providing the protection of French warships until American vessels were safely out of harbor. In response, Stormont claimed that Martinique was engaging in war-like acts.

The efforts of the French government to sustain the American cause were never truly unknown to the English government, which maintained an extensive spy system in France. Whenever French support became especially obvious or painful to the British, they issued diplomatic complaints and threats which the French were obliged to address, even if only to issue formal orders that were informally ignored. The French sought to maintain a delicate balance, whereas the Americans were pressing for every advantage. As a result of the aid channelled to the Americans through the French West Indies, through their often contradictory but generally supportive treatment of American privateers, and finally through their financial assistance by way of supposedly private commercial ventures such as Hortalez & Cie, the French were able to keep American forces supplied until 1778, by which time the French military and naval forces were prepared for the possibility of combat with the British and a formal alliance could at last be concluded.

SEE ALSO *Committee of Secret Correspondence*; *Deane, Silas*; *Franklin, Benjamin*; *Hortalez & Cie*; *Louis XVI in the American Revolution*; *Vergennes, Charles Gravier, comte de*.

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FRENEAU, PHILIP MORIN. (1752–1832). Poet, mariner, journalist. New Jersey. Born on 2 January 1752 in New York City, Freneau graduated from Princeton in 1771. His first major poem, "The Rising Glory of America," was read at the graduation ceremony. At the outbreak of the Revolution he penned several pamphlets and patriotic poems, as well as eight political satires within a period of a few months, among them "General Gage's Soliloquy" and "General Gage's Confession." After teaching school, studying law, and some excursions into journalism, he became secretary to a prominent planter on Santa Cruz in the Danish West Indies. During his two years there, Freneau became an opponent of slavery and wrote what are considered his most significant poems: "Santa Cruz," "The Jamaica Funeral," and "The House of Night." These poems placed Freneau among the pioneers of the romantic movement in poetry.

Returning to America in July 1778, Freneau enlisted as a private in the New Jersey militia's first regiment, gaining promotion to sergeant. He built and commanded the privateer *Aurora* in 1779. After several escapes from British cruisers, he was captured on 25 May 1780 and imprisoned aboard the *Scorpion* in the Hudson. After six weeks of horrendous ill treatment, he was released. His experiences inspired two poems, "The Hessian Doctor" and "The British Prison-Ship: A Poem, in Four Cantos." During the three years after his release in 1781 he was employed in the Philadelphia Post Office, where he had the leisure to turn out a steady stream of poetry for the *Freeman's Journal*, which he occasionally co-edited. In nearly a hundred poems he blasted the Loyalists, satirized the British, and glorified the Patriots.

In 1784 Freneau returned to sea as the captain of a brig, surviving shipwrecks and hurricanes, and writing magnificent poems about these experiences. In 1790 he married and became editor of the New York *Daily Advertiser*. The following year, at the insistence of his college roommate, James Madison, he became editor of the *National Gazette* in Philadelphia. In both efforts he was highly successful; his passionately democratic journalism was lauded by Thomas Jefferson, who credited him with saving the country from monarchy, but bitterly criticized by George Washington, who called him “that rascal Freneau.” On 26 October 1793 the *National Gazette* was suspended for lack of funds and because of the yellow fever epidemic. Freneau edited three more papers over the next three years before quitting journalism and returning to the sea as captain of the *John*. Like most poets, Freneau spent most of his life on the border of poverty. On 19 December 1832 he died in a snowstorm while trying to find his way home from the country store.

SEE ALSO *Naval Operations, Strategic Overview*.

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FRONTAL ATTACK. Although often used in the literal sense of an attack on the enemy's front (as opposed to an envelopment or turning movement), in the precise meaning used by military writers it is an attack wherein the available forces are equally distributed and strike the enemy all along its front.

SEE ALSO *Envelopment; Turning Movement*.

Mark M. Boatner

FRYE, JOSEPH. (1712–1794). Colonial Wars veteran, Continental general. Massachusetts (Maine). Born on 19 March 1712 in Andover, Massachusetts, Fraye served as an ensign in Hale's Fifth Massachusetts

Regiment, took part in the capture of Louisburg in February 1745, and was a lieutenant colonel in John Winslow's Kennebec expedition in 1754. He spent the following year burning the houses of the dispossessed people of Acadia. He served under Lieutenant Colonel George Munroe when this officer was surrounded near Fort William Henry and forced to surrender on 9 August 1757 to General Marquis de Montcalm. Frye escaped after killing his Indian guard, making his way to Fort Edward. Under the terms of the British surrender of Fort William Henry, he was placed on parole for 18 months. After this, from March 1759 to the end of 1760, he was commander at Fort Cumberland (near modern Amherst, Nova Scotia).

On 3 March 1762, in response to his petitioning, he was granted a township in Maine, and in 1770 he moved there and opened a store in Fryeburg. On 21 June 1775 he was named to the post of major general of the Massachusetts militia and served in this capacity for about three months, before being appointed a brigadier general of the Continental army on 10 January 1776. On 23 April of that year he resigned for ill health, to use the popular euphemism. In fact, the aged warrior was useless to General George Washington, who wrote Joseph Reed that Frye “has not, and I doubt will not, do much service to the cause; at present he keeps his room and talks learnedly of emetics, cathartics, &c. For my own part, I see nothing but a declining life that matters [to?] him.” (Freeman, vol. 4, p. 41). He returned to Fryeburg, where he died on 25 July 1794.

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FUSILS AND FUSILIERS. During the seventeenth century a light flintlock musket or fusil was developed for artillery guards, and a special type of light infantry called fusiliers was created. Like the grenadiers, they continued to exist as elite units after their original mission had disappeared. Until a few years before the American Revolution, the spontoon was carried by infantry officers; it then was replaced by the fusil, although some were carried during the Revolution (for example, at Trenton).

SEE ALSO *Grenadiers; Spontoon*.

Mark M. Boatner

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GABION. A wicker basket of cylindrical form, usually open at both ends and filled with earth. It was used for field fortifications and other works of military engineering.

SEE ALSO *Dorchester Heights, Massachusetts.*

Mark M. Boatner

GADSDEN, CHRISTOPHER. (1724–1805). Merchant, Revolutionary statesman, Continental general. South Carolina. Born in Charleston, South Carolina, on 16 February 1724, Christopher Gadsden inherited a considerable estate in 1741, and spent the next 25 years making himself richer. With the Stamp Act of 1765, he became the acknowledged leader of the South Carolina radicals, organizing the Sons of Liberty and attending the Stamp Act Congress. He sat in the first Continental Congress (1774). Colonel of the First South Carolina Regiment at the beginning of the Revolution, Gadsden returned to Congress in June 1775, where he served on the Navy Committee and designed the famous “Don’t Tread On Me” flag for Commodore Esek Hopkins. He returned to South Carolina in January 1776 to lead his regiment in the defense of Charleston. In February he startled friend and foe by proposing to the provincial congress that they move for independence. Commanding Fort Johnson in June, he had a good view of the British attack on William Moultrie’s palmetto fort, but was not otherwise engaged in defeating Sir Henry Clinton’s Charleston expedition (1776). Congress made him a brigadier general in the Continental army on 16 September 1776.

Over the next three years, Gadsden was involved mostly in state politics. In debates over the state’s new constitution in 1778, Gadsden and William Henry Drayton demanded the disestablishment of the church and the election of senators by popular vote. John Rutledge led the conservatives in a political counterattack that eliminated Gadsden’s political influence, even though he was elected the first vice president of South Carolina. Dispute over the command of Continental troops in the state led Gadsden to resign his commission and resulted in a duel with Robert Howe that injured neither party.


Taken prisoner by the British at Charleston on 12 May 1780, he was closely confined for 10 months in St. Augustine before being exchanged. Elected governor in 1782, he declined the post on grounds of age and ill health, but sat for two more years in the assembly. Here he was one of the few who opposed the confiscation of Loyalist property. He supported adoption of the Constitution and became a Federalist. He died in Charleston on 28 August 1805.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Howe, Robert.*

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Thomas Gage. *The Massachusetts governor and British general, in a portrait (c. 1768) by John Singleton Copley.* © YALE CENTER FOR BRITISH ART, PAUL MELLON COLLECTION/ BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY.

GAGE, THOMAS. (1719 or 1720–1787). British general and colonial governor. The second son of an Irish peer and Sussex gentleman, Thomas Gage was born late in 1719 or early in 1720, probably in Wye, Gloucestershire. Although the family had long been Roman Catholic, his father had converted to Anglicanism in 1715 (which allowed him to become member of Parliament for Tewkesbury in 1721) and his sons were brought up in that faith. Lord Hervey described young Thomas's father as "a petulant, silly, busy, meddling, profligate fellow," while Lord Wharton promised to pay his debts "when Lady Gage grows chaste." With such parents Thomas did well to develop a character noted for honesty, generosity, and decency.

From 1728 to 1736 he was at Westminster School, where he became acquainted with Francis Bernard, John Burgoyne, William Legge (Lord Dartmouth), George and Richard Howe, and George Sackville, later Lord George Germain. In 1741 he obtained a lieutenancy in the Forty-eighth Foot (Cholmondeley's) and by 1743 was a captain. He was aide-de-camp to William Anne Keppel, Lord Albemarle, at Fontenoy in 1745 and fought at Culloden in 1746 before returning to the Netherlands for the

campaigns of 1747 and 1748. After the War of the Austrian Succession ended, having purchased the rank of major in 1748, he served in Ireland with the Fifty-fifth Foot (soon renumbered the Forty-fourth) and became its lieutenant colonel on 2 March 1751.

In late 1754 the Forty-fourth was ordered to America as part of Edward Braddock's expedition against Fort Duquesne at the forks of the Ohio River. Braddock's soldiers were unused to forest warfare, he had few native scouts and he was short of time. Nevertheless he took effective measures to screen his front and flanks, and Gage, in charge of the advance guard, was careful and systematic. Yet Gage's one slip was fatal: his failure on 9 July 1755 to secure a commanding hillock led to the humiliating defeat at the Monongahela River. Braddock and Gage's colonel, Peter Hackett, were killed, and Gage, who displayed great courage, stubbornness, and coolness under fire, was slightly wounded. Gage took command of the regiment when Hackett fell, but afterward was not allowed to succeed to the colonelcy. He was second in command of an unsuccessful expedition to the Mohawk River in 1756 and in 1757 served with Lord Loudoun's abortive attempt on Louisburg.

Braddock's defeat had demonstrated the need for infantry properly trained in light infantry tactics, and in this need Gage saw his chance to achieve his long-coveted colonelcy. In December 1757 he was allowed to form a light infantry regiment, the Eightieth Foot, the first specifically light infantry battalion in the British army. Although even John Forbes, who commanded the successful 1758 expedition to capture Fort Duquesne, thought it a "most flagrant jobb," designed more to advance Gage's career than the army's efficiency, this was a mould-breaking move. From the first the Eightieth was intended to provide a better-disciplined and more reliable alternative to North American rangers; at least five of the Eightieth's first ensigns had learned their business under Robert Rogers. Woodland-trained infantry rapidly became a major arm of the British army in North America.

Unfortunately for Gage, his new command did not produce the expected opportunities for distinction. He was wounded again at Ticonderoga in 1758 while leading James Abercromby's advance guard. The following year, promoted brigadier general, he was sent to replace brigadier general John Prideaux in command of the British forces on Lake Ontario. Ordered to advance down the St. Lawrence toward Montreal, and so relieve the pressure on James Wolfe at Quebec, Gage decided that the French forces in his path were too strong for him to challenge. Jeffery Amherst was displeased, and in the final advance on Montreal Gage found himself in charge of the rearguard. Gage, however, was unlucky rather than incompetent: he was a popular officer and widely regarded as able, conscientious, and brave.

Promoted major general in 1761, he was the military governor of Montreal from 1760 until 1763. Here he proved himself as an administrator, becoming popular for his sensitive dealings with the French inhabitants and British settlers, while keeping his soldiery under strict control. When the outbreak of Pontiac's War discredited Amherst's Indian policy and sent him home in disgrace, Gage became the acting British commander in chief throughout North America. He took up his new duties in New York on 16 November and in November 1764 his tenure was confirmed.

In many ways he was an excellent choice. His attitude to Indians was ambivalent rather than (as in Amherst's case) contemptuous. It is true that on the ground his frontier policy was curiously passive, allowing provincial and local interests to nibble away at the principle of a fixed boundary line and a regulated adequate supply of trade goods; yet he never forgot the lessons of Pontiac's War, and much of his correspondence concerned questions of Indian policy. He was honest and tactful with colonists and managed his army effectively. Through his marriage in 1758 to Margaret Kemble of Brunswick, New Jersey, he had access to an important, if limited, circle of American contacts. More clearly than anyone else, he recognized the deteriorating, possibly hopeless, political situation in America. He also saw the utter inadequacy of the small garrisons he was able to put into New York and Philadelphia to deal with revolt; even the withdrawal from all but three of the western posts in 1768, and the garrisoning of Boston, would make little difference. On the other hand, he was curiously reticent about his insights in his official correspondence, although his private letters to his friend Lord Barrington, the secretary at war, reveal a deep disquiet. Though privately angry at American affronts to royal authority from 1765 onward, his principal aim was to stay out of the conflict.

He let his habitual caution drop after he went home on leave in 1773. In February 1774 George III consulted him about the proper response to the Boston Tea Party. The king understood him to recommend resolute action, though later Gage claimed he had been misunderstood. Perhaps he was misled by ministerial promises of adequate troops. Whatever really happened, Gage soon found himself with the governorship of Massachusetts and orders to enforce the Coercive Acts. In fact he quickly discovered that his writ did not run farther than Boston itself and that in the countryside thousands of militia were preparing to resist. Now at last he informed the home government that military action was out of the question, only to be overruled. On 14 April he received an unequivocal order from Dartmouth, the colonial secretary, to seize the principal leaders of the rebellion.

Gage knew perfectly well that any such attempt outside Boston was beyond his powers, but he could not

completely ignore his instructions. However, a swift strike against a strictly limited military objective might succeed and even satisfy London. He chose as his target Concord, a town only twenty miles away, where the militia were known to be collecting arms and stores. At the same time he wanted to keep most of his soldiers in reserve in Boston. He employed sixteen companies of grenadiers and light infantry—probably enough for safety but only a small proportion of his total force—and equipped them lightly for rapid movement. He tried (unsuccessfully) to keep the movement secret and gave the command to an officer unlikely to do anything rash. The expedition got under way at dusk on 18 April, but its purpose had already leaked out, perhaps betrayed by Gage's own wife. Next day Gage's forces skirmished with local militia at Lexington and marched on to Concord to destroy the stores. After a sharp battle with militia the column marched back, harassed all the way and suffering 30 percent casualties, until it met a relief column led by Lord Percy. No significant American leaders had been taken, and the long-feared general revolt was now a reality. By 19 April Gage found himself besieged in Boston.

On 25 May three major generals—William Howe, Henry Clinton, and John Burgoyne—arrived with reinforcements, which brought Gage's force to 6,500 men. This, however, was little more than a third of the force assembled outside the city. All Gage could do was to couple his declaration of martial law—again, in obedience to orders—with a last-ditch effort at conciliation. His proclamation, drawn up for him in extravagant language by the literary Burgoyne, offered a royal pardon to all who would lay down their arms, Samuel Adams and John Hancock excepted. When this failed Gage planned to seize Dorchester Heights, from which point artillery could command the outer harbor, making the city untenable to a garrison dependent on seaborne supplies and succor. However, he was forestalled. On 13 June, five days before the operation was to begin, the Americans learned of the British plan, and on the night of 16–17 June they moved to fortify the Charlestown peninsula on the other side of the harbor. The position was too far away to threaten the main anchorage, and in retrospect Gage might have been better off ignoring it and occupying Dorchester Heights as planned.

At the time, however, the Americans' move seemed to demand a response. Perhaps, too, Gage sensed from the arrival of the three major generals that the ministry meant to replace him: he needed to demonstrate speed and aggression and to score a dramatic success. Gage and his subordinate generals considered a landing on Charlestown Neck, behind the enemy position, but rejected it because of the state of the tides. That, combined with Gage's limited knowledge of his opponents' dispositions and powers of resistance, dictated a landing by Howe and

2,500 men at undefended Moulton's Point. From there Howe could combine a frontal attack with an envelopment between Breed's Hill and the Mystic River. Neither Gage nor Howe could have known that the ragged Americans, once behind their field fortifications on the hilltops, would fight with as much determination as they did. It cost the regulars three assaults and well over 1,000 casualties before they carried the American works. Between the losses and the need to garrison the captured hills, Dorchester Heights were effectively forgotten until March, when their occupation by George Washington forced Howe to evacuate the city.

Gage, being the man on the spot, was about to suffer for the truth of his own predictions. At the very time he was attacking Bunker Hill, Germain was beginning the process of dislodging him for showing insufficient energy and enthusiasm. On 25 September he was ordered home, although he was not formally deprived of the post of commander in chief until 18 April 1776. He handed over to William Howe on 10 October 1775 and arrived in London on 14 November. Thereafter he was punished by neglect. Although he remained the official governor of Massachusetts and kept his military rank, his income was sharply reduced. He was finally appointed to Amherst's staff in April 1781 and briefly given the task of organizing the Kent militia to resist French invasion. Only the fall of the North ministry allowed his promotion to full general on 20 November 1782. By then his health was in serious decline, and he died at his home at Portland Place, London, on 2 April 1787. He was buried at Firlie Place, Sussex, the family home.

Gage has never quite shaken off his reputation as the slow, blundering commander in chief responsible for the military humiliations of 1775. The truth, of course, is that the North ministry consistently failed to recognize the scale of the American rebellion, and saw Massachusetts as the heart of the trouble whereas in fact resistance infected every colony from Georgia to New Hampshire. Within Massachusetts, the trouble appeared to be primarily in Boston, not throughout the countryside. Consequently, the North administration ignored Gage's pleas to the contrary, gave him far too few troops, and ordered him to do too much with them. Gage must be partly to blame for not speaking up clearly and persistently long before 1774. Although he may have relied too much on a small, unrepresentative, lofty circle of American contacts—mainly his wife's wider family who, unlike that good lady, had little sympathy for the rebellion—he was well aware of the dangers. It is true that he did not keep up early friendly contacts with men such as Benjamin Franklin and Washington, whom he met on Braddock's expedition, but given the length of time concerned and the subsequent lack of contact, a cooling was perhaps inevitable. In any case, his principal task was military, not political, and the fundamental error was not his.

Although he had little or no opportunity to prove himself a brilliant field commander, his military decisions in 1775 were fundamentally sound, with the sole and serious exception of the failure to occupy Dorchester Heights. From first to last Gage was the unluckiest of officers.

SEE ALSO *Amberst, Jeffery (1717–1797); Braddock, Edward; Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Burgoyne, John; Clinton, Henry; Dartmouth, William Legge, second earl of; Dorchester Heights, Massachusetts; Germain, George Sackville; Howe, Richard; Howe, William; Pontiac's War; Ticonderoga, New York (1755–1759).*

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GIAULT OR GAYAULT **SEE** *Boisbertrand, Rene Etienne Henri de Vic Gayout de.*

GALLOWAY, JOSEPH. (1731–1803). Prominent Loyalist. Maryland. A leading Philadelphia lawyer and vice president of the American Philosophical Society (1769–1775), he was a close friend of Franklin, who left his papers and letter books with him for protection when he went to England in 1764. Galloway sat in the Pennsylvania assembly from 1757 to 1774 and was speaker from 1766 to 1774. Galloway was an able colonial politician, and he never failed to advance the interests of his province and his class, that of the aristocratic merchants. He was in favor of changing the colonial government from the proprietary to the royal form and was an active Tory in the early part of the war. While in the first Continental Congress in 1774, he wrote a *Plan of a Proposed Union between Great Britain and the Colonies*. It was first accepted but later rejected. Galloway refused to be a delegate for the second Congress in 1775. That year he wrote *A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great Britain and the Colonies: With a Plan of Accommodation on Constitutional Principles*, in which he castigated the Continental Congress. His essentially conservative stand coupled with a rather cold and unsympathetic nature

made him extremely unpopular and, fearful of the Philadelphia mob, he retired to his country home, where Franklin tried unsuccessfully to change his Loyalist views.

Galloway joined Howe in the British advance through New Jersey in December 1776. Subsequently, he served with consummate skill as overlord of civil government in Philadelphia and southeastern Pennsylvania during the British occupation from the autumn of 1777 to the early summer of 1778. He withdrew with the British and the next year went to England, where he remained for the rest of his life. In 1779 he was examined by the House of Commons on the British conduct of the war, and he charged Lord Howe with incompetence. He also published pamphlets on this subject. He continued to explore the possibilities of a reconciliation of the colonies with the crown based on a written constitution and believed that America would be better off with a continued connection with the mother country. The Pennsylvania assembly in 1788 charged Galloway with high treason and ordered the sale of his estates. His petition to return in 1793 was rejected. He wrote a number of books and pamphlets, among them *Letters to a Nobleman, on the Conduct of the War in the Middle Colonies, 1779* (1779), *Historical and Political Reflections on the American Rebellion* (1780), and *Cool Thoughts on the Consequences to Great Britain of American Independence*. (1780).

As an exile in London, he brought all of his vengeful pettiness to the campaign to saddle Sir William Howe with blame for the British failure to crush the Revolution. Galloway thereby help ensconce in power a North ministry increasingly dependent on a false appraisal of the conflict in North America.

SEE ALSO *Galloway's Plan of Union*.

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GALLOWAY'S PLAN OF UNION.

28 September 1774. Joseph Galloway, a Pennsylvania delegate to the first Continental Congress, proposed solving the imperial crisis by asking Parliament to give the American colonies more control over their internal affairs, an arrangement akin to the dominion status Britain would grant to Canada in the nineteenth century. Galloway

wanted to create an intercolonial legislature, called a grand council, whose members would be chosen by each colony for a three-year term. The council would have authority to regulate commercial, civil, criminal, and police affairs when more than one colony was involved. The council would be chaired by a royally appointed president-general, who would serve at the king's pleasure and who could veto its acts. Although Galloway would allow either the council or Parliament to initiate legislation affecting the colonies, and required that both bodies approve such measures before they took effect, he clearly intended for the council to be "an inferior and distinct branch of the British legislature" (Jensen, p. 812). He argued that "in every government . . . there must be a supreme legislature" (p. 810); for him, it was Parliament. The plan drew the support of conservative delegates who saw it as a means of offsetting Congress's vote on 17 September to endorse the more militant Suffolk Resolves. The plan was defeated by a single vote, six colonies to five. Had it been adopted, the course of the resistance to imperial authority would have been significantly altered.

SEE ALSO *Galloway, Joseph; Suffolk Resolves*.

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GALVAN, WILLIAM. Volunteer from Dominica. He arrived in South Carolina with munitions from Beaumarchais, for which the state was held liable. He served as a lieutenant in the Second South Carolina Regiment in 1777 but resigned when he was not allowed to furlough northward for military action. On 19 March, Congress rejected his request to raise an independent corps. It also rejected on 3 April his request to be sub-inspector of a battalion of blacks to be raised in the South and on 28 December turned down his application for lieutenant colonel. Congress finally relented in January 1780 to commission him as major and employ him as an inspector. Luzerne intervened with Washington on his behalf and the latter ordered him to Cape Henry in May to await the possible arrival of the French fleet. He returned to serve in Lafayette's light infantry in September 1780. Lafayette was initially satisfied with Galvan but soon found him "very unpopular among officers" (Lafayette, *Papers*, 3:27). Washington removed him for "bad health" and Lafayette sent him to obtain artillery for the Virginia campaign of the spring of 1781.

Galvan received a commendation from Lafayette for his actions at the Battle of Green Spring on 6 July 1781. On 14 July, Lafayette gave Galvan permission, for reasons of ill health, to return to the main army. He later served as a member of the court-martial trying Major General Robert Howe in December 1781, and Washington signed a certificate of service for him on 31 December 1781. He committed suicide on 24 July 1782 because of a romantic rejection by an American widow.

SEE ALSO *Green Spring (Jamestown Ford, Virginia); Howe, Robert; La Luzerne, Anne-César de.*

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GÁLVEZ, BERNARDO DE. (1746–1786). (Visconde de.) Governor of Spanish Louisiana and Florida. Born in Macharaviaya, Spain, of a prominent family at the royal court, he served as a lieutenant against the Portuguese (1762); was promoted to captain and served in New Spain against the Apaches (1769–1770) before being stationed in Algiers (1775); and was promoted to lieutenant colonel, serving at the military school at Ávila. He became acting governor and intendant of Louisiana in January 1777. During the next two years, before Spain's entry into the war, he attempted to weaken the British in his area. He supported the Patriot supply agent Oliver Pollock by providing sanctuary for James Willing in his raids on British West Florida and by seizing British ships that had been engaged in a profitable

contraband trade. When Spain entered the war, Gálvez took military action. In 1779 he captured the British river posts of Manchac, Baton Rouge, and Natchez. He took Mobile on 14 March 1780 and forced the surrender of Pensacola during 8–10 May 1781.

He returned to Spain in 1783–1784 to consult on future Spanish policy in the Floridas and the Louisiana territory. Promoted to major general, given his title of nobility, and appointed captain-general of Louisiana and the Floridas, he returned to America and had a prominent part in subsequent diplomatic negotiations with the United States. He became captain-general of Cuba and in 1786 he succeeded his father as viceroy of New Spain while retaining his previous posts. Only a few months after his fortieth birthday, he became ill of a fever and died in Tacubaya, Mexico.

SEE ALSO *Manchac Post (Fort Bute); Mobile; Pensacola, Florida; Pollock, Oliver.*

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GAMBIER, JAMES. (1723–1789). British admiral. Gambier, the grandson of a Huguenot refugee, became a naval lieutenant in 1743, a captain in 1747, and served at Louisburg (1758), Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Quiberon Bay (1759). In 1770 he was the commodore commanding the North American station, after which he held administrative posts. Rising to rear admiral in 1778, he was Richard Lord Howe's second in command at New York, where he supervised refitting and repairs. He was commander in chief from Howe's departure until John Byron arrived on 1 October, and from Byron's departure until Thomas Graves took over in 1779. Before he sailed for home on 6 April, Gambier had shown his inability to cope with a senior wartime command. He rose to vice admiral in 1782 and was commander in chief at Jamaica in 1783–1784. He died at Bath on 8 January 1789. Admiral Lord Gambier was his nephew.

SEE ALSO *Byron, John; Graves, Thomas; Howe, Richard.*

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GAMBIER, JAMES, BARON. (1756–1833). British admiral and evangelist. Nephew of James Gambier and son of the lieutenant governor of the Bahamas, Gambier was born in New Providence (modern Nassau) on 13 October 1756. He went to sea at an early age and on 12 February 1777 became a lieutenant on the American station. In 1778 he was in command of the bomb ketch *Thunder* when it was captured by Estaing. Promptly exchanged, on 9 October he was made post in the *Raleigh* (thirty-two guns). In her he took several prizes, participated in the May 1779 expedition to relieve Jersey, and in May 1780 was present at the fall of Charleston. He served in the French wars of 1793–1815, being awarded a peerage in 1807 and rising to admiral of the fleet in 1830. A devout Anglican evangelical, he zealously cared for the spiritual needs of his crews and in retirement became first president of the Church Missionary Society.

SEE ALSO *Gambier, James.*

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GAMECOCK SEE *Sumter, Thomas.*

GANSEVOORT, PETER. (1749–1812). Continental officer. New York. Born in Albany, New York, in 1749, Gansevoort became major of the Second New York Regiment on 30 June 1775 and was with Montgomery’s wing of the Canada invasion; he was present at the victory at St. Jean and the defeat at Quebec. On 19 March 1776 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and placed in command of Fort George. He became colonel of the Third New York on 21 November 1776 and subsequently distinguished himself in the defense of Fort Stanwix (or Fort Schuyler) against St. Leger’s expedition in June–September 1777. For this he not only received the thanks of Congress but most thoroughly deserved them.

Temporarily in command at Albany in October 1777, Gansevoort returned to Fort Stanwix, which he

commanded until November 1778. From there, Washington ordered him on to Schenectady. The following year, Gansevoort conducted a number of small expeditions against pro-British Indians.

He was the commander of the Saratoga garrison from the fall of 1780 into the following year. On 26 March 1781 he was appointed brigadier general of militia and retired from service, being promoted to major general of militia the following year. In the ensuing twenty years he devoted himself to the lumber business in Saratoga County, New York. In 1790 he became sheriff of Albany. In 1802 Jefferson appointed him military agent for the Northern Department, which mostly involved the movement of supplies. On 15 February 1809 he was commissioned brigadier general in the U.S. Army with responsibility for reviewing courts-martial sentences. In 1811 he presided at the court-martial that found General James Wilkinson innocent of treason. He died at home on 2 July 1812.

SEE ALSO *Ritzema, Rudolph; St. Leger’s Expedition.*

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GARTH, GEORGE. (1738?–1819). British general. The son of John Garth, a member of Parliament, he entered the First Regiment of Footguards in September 1755 and was made colonel in February 1779. As a “local” brigadier general he commanded a division in the Connecticut Coast Raid, July 1779, and was second-in-command to Governor William Tryon. Sailing from New York to take command in Georgia, he was captured by the French in October 1779. After being exchanged he was promoted to major general in 1782 and served in the West Indies. He became a full general in 1801.

SEE ALSO *Connecticut Coast Raid; Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779).*

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GASPÉE AFFAIR. 9 June 1772. The armed revenue schooner *Gaspée*, stationed in Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island, to support the customs commissioners, was attacked and burned on the night of 9 June 1772 after having run aground on what is now called Gaspée Point,

seven miles below Providence, while chasing another vessel. Despite a £500 reward offered for information, the British were never able to uncover sufficient evidence to try the culprits. The sixty-four attackers had been organized by John Brown and led by Abraham Whipple.

Another British vessel named the *Gaspée* was an armed brigantine. Isaac Coffin served aboard her, under Lieutenant William Hunter, in 1773. An ensign and twelve marines of her complement took part in the unsuccessful defense of St. Johns, Quebec, in September–November 1775, and became prisoners there. The ship was seized by the Americans after the fall of Montreal on 13 November.

SEE ALSO *Coffin, Isaac; Customs Commissioners; Montreal (13 November 1775); St. Johns, Canada (5 September–2 November 1775).*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

GATES, HORATIO. (1728–1806). Continental general. England. Horatio Gates was the son of Robert Gates, a Thames waterman, and Dorothy Reeve, housekeeper of Peregrine Osborne, second Duke of Leeds. Gates' godfather, Horace Walpole, was only eleven years old when he assumed this responsibility. Following the duke's death, Robert and Dorothy Gates entered the service of Charles Powlett, third Duke of Bolton, at Greenwich. Through Bolton's patronage, Robert Gates was appointed tidesman in the customs service, and later became surveyor of customs at Greenwich. In 1745, Bolton purchased for young Horatio Gates a commission as ensign in the Twentieth Regiment. In the same year, Gates was appointed a lieutenant in a regiment that Bolton was privately raising. Although he lost this position when Bolton's regiment was reduced in 1746, he was able to return to his ensigncy in the Twentieth Regiment. During the War of the Austrian Succession, he served as regimental adjutant in Germany. In November 1748, following the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, he was placed on half pay. Seeking new employment, he volunteered in 1749 to serve as an aide-de-camp to Colonel Edward Cornwallis, governor of Nova Scotia. He helped establish the naval base at Halifax and secured appointment as captain-lieutenant in Colonel Hugh Warburton's Forty-fifth Regiment. In the summer of 1750, he was promoted to the rank of captain.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Facing slight prospects for further advancement at Halifax, Gates returned to England in January 1754. On 13 September, with the assistance of Cornwallis, he sold his captaincy in the Forty-fifth Regiment and purchased a captain's commission in the Fourth Independent



Horatio Gates. Continental General Horatio Gates was outspokenly in favor of a decentralized republican government for his new country. He is depicted here in a portrait (c. 1782) by James Peale, after a painting by Charles Willson Peale. NATIONAL PORTRAIT GALLERY, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION/ART RESOURCE, NY.

Company of Foot, doing duty in New York. He returned to Nova Scotia, where, on 20 October 1754, he married Elizabeth Phillips. They had one child, a son named Robert. Upon the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1755, Gates and his company joined Major General Edward Braddock's army in Pennsylvania. Gates was with Braddock on 9 July 1755, when Braddock's army was ambushed near Fort Duquesne. Badly wounded, Gates spent a few months recuperating at Lancaster, and then Philadelphia. In December he sailed with his company to New York, and in the summer of 1756 took the field in the Mohawk Valley. For the next two years he did garrison duty on the New York frontier.

In 1759, with the assistance of his mentor, Edward Cornwallis, Gates was appointed brigade major to Brigadier General John Stanwix, commandant at Fort Pitt (formerly Fort Duquesne). When Brigadier General Robert Monckton replaced Stanwix in May 1760, Gates was appointed Monckton's brigade major. On 20 May 1761 Monckton was appointed governor of New York, and Gates accompanied him to his new post. During the summer and fall, Gates assisted Monckton in organizing an expedition

against the French West Indian island of Martinique. In February 1762 the island's key bastion of Fort Royal capitulated, and although Gates had not taken part in the fighting, Monckton gave him the honor of carrying the news to England. On 24 April Gates was promoted major in his old regiment, the 45th, now commanded by Edward Boscawen and still posted in Nova Scotia. He attempted without success to become adjutant general or quartermaster general under Sir Jeffery Amherst in New York.

When the Seven Years' War ended in 1763, Gates began a frustrating decade of thwarted ambition and declining morale. Losing his patrons, he had difficulty advancing in the peacetime army. On 8 November 1764 he was promoted major of the Sixtieth, or Royal American, Regiment, stationed in Quebec. After maneuvering without success to secure promotion to lieutenant colonel, he exchanged his major's commission in the Royal Americans for a majority on half pay in the Seventy-fourth Regiment. In despair, he resigned from the army on 10 March 1769, and sought consolation in drinking and gambling. Overcoming these vices, he flirted with Methodism and embraced radical politics. While in New York, he was befriended by liberal young men of the Whig Club, and he now socialized with "friends of America" in England such as Monckton, Benjamin Franklin, and Charles Lee. Soon he was being called a "red hot Republican." Although this characterization was not entirely accurate, he soon was contemplating a move to America. In August 1772 he brought his family to Virginia, and in March 1773 bought a plantation of 659 acres in the lower Shenandoah Valley, near Shepherdstown. Naming his new home "Traveller's Rest," he settled into a life of substantial middle-class comfort. His only public duties were justice of the peace and lieutenant colonel of Virginia militia.

THE WAR FOR AMERICA

Over the next two years, Gates took no active part in the escalating quarrel between Britain and her colonies. However, he grandiosely asserted in public that he was willing to risk his life to preserve the liberty of the Western world. The Continental Congress, desperate for officers to command its army at Boston in 1775, was aware of Gates's politics and reputation in military administration. Hence, on 17 June, the legislators appointed him adjutant general with the rank of brigadier general. He joined General George Washington at Cambridge on 9 July, and in the following months worked diligently to bring order and discipline to the fledgling Continental Army. While at Boston, he became a vocal advocate of militia armies, believing that America's citizen-soldiers would overcome martial deficiencies through high political motivation. He argued in favor of a cautious, defensive strategy, which he believed was adapted to the militiamen's willingness to

fight so long as they were ensconced behind fortifications. He also was outspokenly in favor of independence from Britain and adoption of a decentralized republican government for his new country. An ambitious man, he cultivated friendships with influential New England congressmen such as John Adams, who agreed with his politics and might advance his military career. After the British evacuated Boston in March 1776, he accompanied Washington to New York.

On 16 May 1776, with the assistance of his friends in Congress, Gates was promoted major general, and a month later was given command of an American army that had invaded Canada the year before. Upon his arrival at Albany to assume his new command, he was dismayed to learn that his army had retreated from Canada into New York, where Major General Philip Schuyler was in charge. Since both generals asserted control over these troops, they agreed that Congress must clarify the command problem—which it did in favor of Schuyler on 8 July. Gates accepted this decision with scant grace, but was somewhat mollified when Schuyler appointed him commander of American troops at Fort Ticonderoga. During the summer and fall of 1776, Gates worked in close harmony with Schuyler and Benedict Arnold to repel a thrust from Canada by Major General Guy Carleton up Lake Champlain toward Fort Ticonderoga. On 2 December he led six hundred Continentals to Washington's assistance on the Delaware River. Falling ill, he left the army and traveled to Philadelphia, where he took command of American troops for the winter.

While in Philadelphia, Gates lobbied his friends in Congress to supersede Schuyler as commander of the Northern Department. Achieving his purpose on 25 March 1777, he arrived at Fort Ticonderoga, only to learn that Schuyler had gone to Philadelphia to demand that he be restored to command. This continual bickering between Gates, Schuyler, and congressional proponents of the two generals profited no one except Major General John Burgoyne, who threatened to invade New York from Canada in the spring of 1777. But the matter was not easily resolved, for it reflected deep political divisions in America between proponents of a strong central government, who supported Schuyler, and "small government" men, who favored Gates. The quarrel still had one more round to go before it ceased. On 15 May, Congress restored Schuyler to office, only to have Gates rush southward to lobby against him once more. On 5 July, Burgoyne captured Fort Ticonderoga and impelled Schuyler to order an American retreat toward the Hudson River. The British general seemed poised to capture Albany and seize control of the upper Hudson River. Taking advantage of Schuyler's reversal, congressional supporters of Gates succeeded on 4 August in having their favorite restored to command of the Northern Department.

THE NORTHERN COMMAND

With the command situation at last clarified, Gates devoted his full attention to stopping Burgoyne's advance toward Albany. Putting into action his views on defensive warfare, he ordered Colonel Thaddeus Kosciuszko, a Polish engineer, to construct impressive fortifications on the west bank of the Hudson River at Bemis Heights. He then posted his troops behind these works, which Burgoyne must capture if he would make further progress southward toward Albany. In the battle of Freeman's Farm on 19 September, Gates stymied an attempt by Burgoyne to turn the Americans left by sending the riflemen of Colonel Daniel Morgan and Major Henry Dearborn to stop him. Benedict Arnold, who was quarreling with Gates, also likely was involved in the fighting, although without orders. Encamping near the American lines, Burgoyne contemplated the military situation for the next few days. On 7 October, in the battle of Bemis Heights, he attempted once more to bypass the enemy's formidable works by flanking them on their left, and once again was stopped by Gates's forces.

On 9 October Gates learned that Burgoyne was withdrawing toward Fort Ticonderoga, and cautiously followed him. Four days later, Burgoyne's line of retreat was severed when John Stark's militiamen took up positions on the east bank of the Hudson River. On 17 October Burgoyne capitulated to Gates, with the stipulation that his army return to England and no longer serve in America. Gates was severely criticized for the liberality of this provision, but correctly noted that during negotiations with Burgoyne, his supply base at Albany was threatened by a British army under Sir Henry Clinton. Thus, he was compelled to direct his attention to that problem. He was also charged with deliberately delaying the report of his victory to Washington, but he explained that his messenger, James Wilkinson, through no fault of his own, had dallied on his way southward with the news. Finally, he was accused of withholding troops from Washington's hard-pressed main army in Pennsylvania in late 1777. But Gates correctly pointed out that he had in fact sent more than was prudent for his own safety.

These criticisms of Gates, and many others besides, were leveled against him in the winter of 1777–1778 by adulators of Washington who believed that Gates was complicit in a scheme against the commander in chief. Generally called the Conway Cabal, this conspiracy supposedly was intended to remove Washington as commander in chief of the Continental army and put Gates in his place. The plotters were thought to include the army officers Gates (although in a secondary role), Thomas Mifflin, and Thomas Conway, and politicians John Adams, Samuel Adams, Richard Henry Lee, and James Lovell. Gates himself was not believed to be the prime mover of the cabal, only the willing recipient of its fruits.

The plotters, all "small government" men, putatively feared that army officers around Washington were not evincing due deference to civilian authority. Washington and his admirers were particularly sensitive about these matters, for the triumphant Gates had prevailed over his enemies in the military campaigns of 1777 while Washington had lost the city of Philadelphia, as well as a number of battles against William Howe.

In defending his position as commander in chief, Washington publicly treated Gates and his supposed plotters with scorn. Gates, serving as chairman of the Board of War during the winter of 1777–1778, was attempting to implement a number of useful army reforms. Any success he might have had was destroyed by Washington's attitude. Innocent of the charges laid against him by Washington and his friends, Gates was hurt and angry, and although he managed to weather the storm of invective, he developed a profound and lasting dislike of Washington. Without trial, he declared, he had been found guilty of dissuading true believers from divine worship of Alexander's statue. On 15 April 1778, he was ordered by Congress to take command in the Hudson Highlands, where on 4 September he fought a ludicrous duel with James Wilkinson. He commanded at Boston and Hartford in the winter of 1778–1779. After spurning Washington's offer to lead an expedition against the Mohawk Indians in 1779, he served instead at Providence.

THE SOUTHERN COMMAND

In the summer of 1780, Gates was ordered by Congress to take command of the Southern Department, after Benjamin Lincoln had surrendered Charleston to the enemy on 12 May. Although he was not optimistic about his chances against surging British military power in the south, he assumed command of a small army at Coxe's Mill on 25 July. Marching immediately against an enemy garrison at Camden, he directed his army through country barren of provisions, instead of taking a more distant line of advance through country abounding with supplies. Gates's haste seemed to violate his own precepts about careful, defensive warfare, but he had his reasons. He wanted to maneuver his army into a defensive position just north of Camden, which he would fortify, and compel the British army, led by General Lord Charles Cornwallis, to assault at a disadvantage. Unfortunately for him, as he marched his army southward on the night of 15 August toward Camden, he encountered Cornwallis's army marching northward toward him. Forced to deploy his soldiers in the open, Gates hoped that his army of 3,050 men would overwhelm Cornwallis's force of 2,100 soldiers.

In the battle of Camden, on 16 August, Gates commenced the battle by ordering untrained militiamen on his left to charge against veteran British regulars. Soon that entire part of his battle line collapsed, leaving the Continental

regulars on his right, commanded by Johann de Kalb, facing most of Cornwallis's army. Gates was forced off the field by his panicky militiamen, and even though his regulars were still fighting, he rode toward Hillsborough, North Carolina, to rally his forces and reorganize. Meanwhile, de Kalb was killed and the Continentals also disintegrated into a retreating mob. Gates's defeat at Camden and his unfortunate gallop northward destroyed his military reputation, and his political foes never allowed him to forget his poor performance at Camden. In the next three months, as he worked diligently to get his army back into fighting form, Congress debated his future. During that time he learned the devastating news that his son, Robert, was dead at the age of twenty-two. On 5 October Congress voted to order a court of inquiry into the general's conduct at Camden, and to allow Washington to appoint another officer to take his place. Washington immediately appointed Nathanael Greene, who superseded Gates on 2 December. The American army then numbered 1,804 men, and according to Banastre Tarleton, a British cavalryman, presented a tolerable appearance.

For almost two years after his defeat in the south, Gates labored to restore his military reputation, while his political enemies allowed him to languish in forced retirement at Traveller's Rest. The court of inquiry was never convened, and it was not until 14 August 1782, months after the War for America had begun to wind down, that Congress finally voted unanimously to rescind its resolution and invite Gates to rejoin the army. On 5 October he reached the army's final cantonment at Newburg, New York, where he was greeted by his nemesis, Washington. According to observers, their meeting passed with perfect propriety on the part of both men. Gates was placed in command of the right wing of the army, composed of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut troops. During the winter of 1782–1783, he played an important role in mobilizing officer discontents against Congress, sometimes called the Newburgh Conspiracy. He was particularly disgusted that the officers had not received their pay. Nationalists in Congress apparently tried to use these discontents to increase the authority of the national government. Gates refused to be their tool; his only aim was to secure justice for his fellow officers. When Washington suppressed the discontents, for fear that they might lead to an army mutiny, Gates acquiesced.

LAST YEARS

In late March 1783 Gates rode away from the army for the last time, to be by the bedside of his dying wife, Elizabeth. On 1 June she died, leaving her husband a lonely and embittered man. As the Continental army went through final shudders of demobilization, he reflected upon the ungratefulness of a country that would send its loyal soldiers home to an uncertain future without even paying them. His own economic future seemed uncertain, and he

completely lost interest in politics. In 1786, his future began to look rosier, for on 31 July of that year he married Mary Vallance, a rich widow. Once again politically engaged, he expressed concern that Congress was making inadequate provision for the peacetime military. Also he expressed concern that the government as defined by the Articles of Confederation was too weak, even though he had earlier been a proponent of decentralized power.

In 1787, Gates supported the Constitutional Convention, but made no effort to attend the deliberations in Philadelphia or the ratifying convention held later in Virginia. When the Constitution went into effect in early 1789, he seemed happy about the new system of government, despite concerns about Washington's election as the first president and his appointments to the cabinet and Supreme Court. But Gates had no reservations about the nomination of Thomas Jefferson, his fellow Virginian, to be secretary of state. In 1790, Gates and his wife moved to Manhattan and bought an estate named "Rose Hill Farm." Reverting to his earlier Whiggish principles, he became a Jeffersonian republican and supported the French Revolution. In 1800 he was elected to one term in the New York legislature, but then fell into unmerited neglect by the public. Nevertheless, he spent his last years recollecting with pleasure his part in the creation of the American republic, and died fulfilled.

Gates was a controversial man during the American Revolution, and he made a number of powerful enemies. His politics were too radical for some, and he had a habit of meddling in military politics. But his reputation was most sullied by unwarranted accusations that he was plotting to supersede Washington as commander in chief. At best, he was only a modestly gifted military man, although his conduct of the campaign against Burgoyne was hard to fault. His uncharacteristic lack of caution in the Camden campaign led him to disaster. Clearly his strongest military gifts lay in the areas of army organization and administration. On balance, he has been too severely criticized for his errors and too little credited for his successes. His contributions to the cause of American independence outweigh his failures and deficiencies.

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign*; *Conway Cabal*; *Gates's Flight from Camden*; *Washington, George*.

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revised by Paul David Nelson

GATES–SCHUYLER CONTROVER-

SY. The antipathy between New Englanders and New Yorkers—an aspect of the factionalism in revolutionary America—forced Generals Horatio Gates and Philip Schuyler into the roles of contending champions. It was not that either had any particular animosity toward the other, but the New Englanders felt their interests would be served if Gates commanded the Northern Department whereas the New Yorkers wanted Schuyler to hold this position. In March 1777 the New England faction prevailed in Congress, and Gates succeeded Schuyler. The latter managed to have himself reinstated the next month. On 4 August 1777 Congress, dissatisfied with the abandonment of Fort Ticonderoga before Burgoyne's offensive, ordered Schuyler superseded by Gates. The northern army remained split into partisans of the two generals; the Schuyler supporters could not make a hero out of their general during the Revolution, but they conducted a successful postwar campaign to make a villain out of Gates.

SEE ALSO *Factionalism in America during the Revolution; Gates, Horatio; Schuyler, Philip John.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

GATES'S FLIGHT FROM CAMDEN.

16–19 August 1780. After retreating to Rugeley's Mill with the routed militia of his left wing from Camden, and after failing to rally them to stand, General Horatio Gates covered 60 miles on a horse famous for its speed and reached Charlotte the evening of the battle (16 August). During the next two days, mounted on a relay of horses, he covered 120 miles to reach Hillsboro, North Carolina, on 19 August. Alexander Hamilton, whom one scholar (Lynn Montross) has called Gates's "leading character assassin," commented:

Was there ever an instance of a general running away as Gates has done from his whole army? And was there ever so precipitous a flight? One hundred and eighty miles in three days and a half! It does admirable credit to the activity of a man at his time of life. But it disgraces the general and the soldier.

Gates explained in a letter of 22 August to Governor Richard Caswell his reasons for going so precipitously to Hillsboro:

I therefore resolved to proceed directly thither, to give orders for assembling the Continental Troops on the March from Virginia, to direct the Three Corps of Horse at C[ross] Creek to cover the stores . . . and to urge the Resources of Virginia to be drawn forth for our support.

Henry Lee praised Gates for seeing that Hillsboro was the best place to rebuild his army and for going immediately there despite "the calumny with which he was sure to be assailed."

Although Congress replaced Gates with Nathanael Greene, a congressional committee would exonerate Gates's conduct at Camden. Overall, historians would be harder on Gates than most of his contemporaries. Perhaps, Nathanael Greene, his successor, should have the last word on Gates's performance. In January 1781 Greene wrote Alexander Hamilton:

The battle of Camden is represented widely different from what is to the Northward. Col[onel] Williams thinks that none of the General Officers were entitled to any extraordinary merit. . . . The Col also says that General Gates would have shared little more disgrace than is common lot of the unfortunate notwithstanding he was early off, if he had only halted at the Waxhaws or Charlotte.

Later, in October 1781, Greene would personally write to Gates:

I had the opportunity of viewing the ground where you fought, as well as the disposition and Order of Battle, from all which I was more fully confirmed in my former sentiments, that you were unfortunate, but not blameable; and I am confident, from

all the inquiries I have since made, you will acquit yourself with honor.

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign; Gates, Horatio; Greene, Nathanael; Lee, Henry* (“Light-Horse Harry”).

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revised by Steven D. Smith

GAYAULT DE BOISBERTRAND, RENÉ ETIENNE-HENRI DE VIC. (1746–1823). French officer captured with Lee at Basking Ridge, New Jersey. He was born at Bourges and entered the Hainault Regiment on 10 July 1763 as *sous-lieutenant*. Named lieutenant on 20 April 1768, he became provost general of the mounted constabulary of Berry with the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1772. He was granted two years leave on 23 June 1776 to carry correspondence from Dubourg to Franklin in America but did not sail from Nantes until 10 September.

Seriously wounded and captured at Basking Ridge on 16 December 1776, the French volunteer received two years of successive imprisonments by the British at New York, Rhode Island, and eventually Forton in England. Escaping from Forton on 23 July 1778, he reached France to find that his hereditary post had been given to another. He made two requests for reinstatement in the army at the rank of brigadier general but both were denied, presumably because of his poor physical condition. In 1788 he was awarded the chevalier of the Order of Saint Louis and retired at the rank of *maréchal de camp* on 1 March 1791. In 1820 he applied for and received admission as colonel to the Invalides, the military pensioners’ hospital.

SEE ALSO *Basking Ridge, New Jersey*.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

GENTLEMAN JOHNNY. Nickname of John Burgoyne.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne, John*.

GENTLE SHEPHERD. Nickname of George Grenville.

SEE ALSO *Grenville, George*.

GEORGE III. (1738–1820). King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and elector of Hanover. George was born the eldest son of Frederick, Prince of Wales, and his wife, Augusta of Saxe Gotha, in the Duke of Norfolk’s house in St. James’s Square, London, on 24 May 1738. Baptised George William Frederick, he was far from being the backward unbalanced child of legend. Although shy and of only average intellect, he could read and write English and German at eight, and in later life was drawn to astronomy, clocks, chess, drawing and painting, art and book collecting and—above all—music. Although he travelled little and read fewer books than he collected, he could hold a cultivated conversation with the likes of Dr. Johnson and the astronomer William Herschel. Early tendencies to melancholy and anxiety stayed with him, but although he was plagued by porphyria—a genetically inherited physical malady—as early as 1762, there was nothing wrong with his mind. The young king was an idealist with an almost unbearable sense of duty, borne up by a narrow but deep religious faith and a desire to see the rule of virtue. His misfortune was that no one had taught him to deal with the realities of the political world.

EARLY YEARS

George’s alleged early slowness may have had more to do with a shy disposition and uninspiring tutors than with any intellectual inadequacies. From 1756, when he was given



King George III. *The king of England during the American Revolution, in a painting (1781) by Thomas Gainsborough.*
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his own establishment, his tutor and close adviser was John Stuart, Earl of Bute, with whom he formed a close, at times pathetically dependent, relationship. Bute, as scores of George's marked essays testify, worked the adolescent prince hard and his rebukes cut deep. Indeed, Bute's schoolmasterly comments on his pupil's diligence were excessive, distressing, and—for later historians—misleading. While his influence tended to reinforce George's leanings to priggish puritanism, suspicion, and histrionics, Bute also inculcated a sense of patriotism and duty. George became the first Hanoverian to publicly “glory in the name of Briton.”

There is no substance in the old accusation that Bute, whose politics were theoretical rather than practical, led George towards autocracy and the subversion of the constitution. On the contrary, both George and Bute saw the monarch as the proper defender of the constitution as established after 1688: a partnership between parliament's law making and fiscal powers and the king's rights to choose ministers and (when absolutely necessary) veto legislation. They were particularly anxious to guard against a possible coup by George's uncle, the Duke of Cumberland. Both, like George's late father Frederick, despised “party” (that is, political partisanship) not because they wished to undermine parliament but

because—like many others—they disapproved of self-interested factionalism. George, with the extremism of idealistic youth, moved from this position to contempt for all politicians except for Bute. To him, the Duke of Newcastle (Thomas Pelham-Holles), William Pitt (the elder), Henry Fox, and their cronies were all obnoxious. Unfortunately for George, this phase in his development coincided with the moment when, as the new king, he was forced to work with these very villains.

PRE-WAR MINISTRIES: BUTE TO GRAFTON

George succeeded his grandfather, George II, on 25 October 1760. Bute at once assumed the office of secretary of state for the north, replacing Robert Darcy, the Earl of Holderness, in this position. The young king saw that this protected Bute against talk that he was a court favorite who gave ministerial advice in secret. George's immediate aim was not to create a party of “king's friends” but to encourage consensus by offering household posts to opposition Tories. Ironically, far from eliminating partisanship, the policy contributed to the political instability in the 1760s.

While royal patronage could be, and was, deployed to cement majorities and influence elections, eighteenth century political parties were kaleidoscopic and constantly shifting alliances of personal followings and interest groups. George's determination to have Bute as his prime minister contributed further to the uncertainty. Finally, the king's wish to end the Seven Years' War, and especially to withdraw from the German conflict, put him at odds with Pitt, then secretary of state for the south, and Newcastle, the prime minister. He was not sorry when Pitt fell in October 1761 after his cabinet colleagues refused to countenance a pre-emptive strike against Spain. However, it was not until July 1762 that he was rid of Newcastle and able to appoint Bute.

Although from this point on ministries rose and fell with bewildering rapidity, George behaved with impeccable constitutional propriety. In 1763 he had to reluctantly accept Bute's resignation and accept George Grenville, who could command a parliamentary majority. There was no disagreement on policy. He agreed with Grenville that John Wilkes had to be punished for attacking the king and his court in print, and accepted the new prime minister's insistence that the colonies must be taxed in order to spread the financial burden of the war and of keeping a garrison in North America. Nevertheless, Grenville's tediousness and his tendency to harangue the king at length, not to mention his hostility to Bute, soon made him unbearable.

When Charles Watson Wentworth, the Earl of Rockingham, succeeded Grenville, and ran into severe opposition to repeal the Stamp Act, George gave the repeal

bill his personal backing, incidentally demonstrating his willingness to compromise on colonial questions. When William Pitt, the Earl of Chatham, succeeded Rockingham as prime minister, George overcame his earlier distaste for the man and gave the new administration his unstinting support. (At this time, Bute had withdrawn from public life.) Even when it became apparent that Chatham's body and mind were giving way, George continued to encourage him to stay on in office. It was Chatham himself who finally insisted on resigning. This left George with the stop-gap ministry of Augustus Henry Fitzroy, the third Earl of Grafton, which was brought down, not by the king, but by Chatham's unexpected attack on Grafton in the House of Lords in January 1770. Only then, almost in desperation, did George turn to the only politician capable of keeping a parliamentary majority together: Lord Frederick North. At no point was there any possibility of the king imposing a ministry upon an unwilling Parliament, nor did George III think in such terms.

LORD NORTH'S PRIME MINISTRY

Just as the instability of the 1760s had nothing to do with George's supposed autocratic tendencies, so the longevity of Lord North's ministry did not derive from the prime minister's supposed subservience to the king. If anything, the relationship was the other way about: having at last found a minister who could deliver stable majorities in parliament, George was very glad to follow North's lead. At first North led him, not to confrontation but to conciliation, by persuading his parliamentary followers to accept the withdrawal of all the Townshend duties except that on tea. George had as little interest in America as most of his subjects, so the idea that he wanted to exploit the American tax issue to build a popular following at home is as mythical as Rockingham's and Fox's allegations that he was secretly subverting both British and colonial liberties.

The turning point in George III's reign, with regard to the American colony, was the Boston Tea Party in 1773. Almost every serious politician, Chatham and Rockingham included, was outraged by this act of rebellion. Most concluded that the Americans would never be satisfied by concessions and must be brought firmly into line. George approved the Coercive Acts not as an enemy of liberty, but as the defender of the existing constitution: and in particular, of parliament's lawful supremacy over colonial assemblies. Indeed, he had very little choice. To do otherwise would have been both improper constitutionally and tantamount to giving his support to rebels. No eighteenth century sovereign could have done that.

Once hostilities began, George took little part in directing the conduct of the war. His principal contribution was to encourage his ministers to carry on—especially Lord North, who was thrown into acute depression by the

disastrous battle at Saratoga and wanted to resign his office. While the king's opposition in Parliament was tiny, it was vociferous, and North's gifts for conciliation and parliamentary management were invaluable, so the king refused to let him go. Instead, George paid off North's debts in 1777 and for years monitored his state of mind through a correspondence with Charles Jenkinson and John Robinson. When all else failed, George used emotional blackmail, accusing North of wanting to desert him in his hour of need. The king was also concerned with the raising of troops, the building of warships, and the rewarding of successful commanders. Throughout this period George's aims were in tune with the majority of his members of Parliament and peers in the House of Lords and, after French entry into the war (on the American side) in 1778, with a significant share of popular opinion as well.

WAR AND THE POST-WAR PERIOD

George III's insistence on victory, and his long resistance to the idea of American independence, did not significantly prolong the war. It is true that Rockingham's early commitment to independence made it impossible to include him in the ministry in 1780. His terms included full powers to negotiate peace with the Americans, laws limiting the power of the executive, and the sacking of the Lord North's entire cabinet. This not only offended George's determination to fight to the finish, it also challenged his prerogative to choose ministers. Moreover, the Rockingham Whigs by themselves did not have a majority in the House of Commons, or anything like it. George was therefore under no sort of obligation, constitutional or political, to accept their demands. At that stage, victory in America was still attainable, and even after Yorktown it was still a military, as opposed to a political, possibility.

Only at the end of 1781 did George's views part company with what most others saw as reality. He held onto Lord North as prime minister for as long as possible, but was obliged to let him resign when, on 15 March 1782, the ministry barely survived a vote of no confidence. George then seriously contemplated abdication and retirement to Hanover. In the end, however, he behaved as a constitutional monarch, accepting Rockingham as prime minister and William Fitzmaurice-Petty, Earl of Shelburne, and Charles James Fox as a secretaries of state, and acquiesced to their insistence on American independence.

Having once accepted it, however, he never looked back. When Shelburne fell from power, George accepted the a coalition headed by Fox and Lord North, despite his deep personal aversion to Fox, and allowed it to ratify the peace terms it had just censured in opposition. In 1785 he welcomed the former arch-rebel John Adams as America's ambassador to Britain:

I will be free with you, I was the last to consent to the separation; but the separation having been made and having become inevitable, I have always said, as I say now, that I would be the first to meet the friendship of the United States as an independent power.

With the peace treaties secure, George used the occasion of Fox's India Bill to get rid of the coalition and bring in William Pitt the younger as prime minister in December 1783. The king's partnership with Pitt lasted with only one short break until the latter's premature death on 23 January 1806.

In 1788 George suffered his first serious public bout of the porphyria that had been plaguing him since at least 1762. This is a peculiarly nasty disease, in which low hemoglobin production causes porphyrins to enter the blood stream and attack the nervous system. The physical effects are bad enough, but at the stage it had now reached in George, it causes delirium, loss of self-control, and hallucinations. In other words, it looked like madness. A specialist, complete with straight-jacket and restraining chair, was called in to treat the king. Although the king recovered, the attacks became increasingly frequent, severe, and distressing.

By 1801 the king's previously happy marriage was breaking apart as the queen became terrified of his periodic violence and obscene language. He became thinner, exhausted, less able to cope with crises, and his eyesight began to fail. By the end of 1810 he was permanently incapacitated and in January 1811 Parliament allowed his son to take over his kingly role as prince regent. The last decade of George's life was spent in an imaginary world of the past, as he slowly lost his eyesight altogether and his hearing declined. He died at Windsor on 29 January 1820.

George III was a highly moral man, whose personal life was beyond reproach. An able politician after overcoming the acute learning curve of the early 1760s, he never aspired to be more than a strictly constitutional monarch and had a painfully acute awareness of his constitutional duty. Sometimes that sense of duty was unimaginative, narrow, or even wrongheaded. For example, the reverberations of his refusal to countenance Catholic emancipation because, in his view, it violated his coronation oath, reverberates in Ireland even today. His abhorrence of French republicanism was dogmatic and his patriotism could be chauvinistic. Yet his very prejudices were shared by most of his countrymen, and his uprightness and respectability, combined with homely interests such as farming, made the monarchy a popular symbol of the nation. In a sense, it was his model of monarchy that was picked up by Queen Victoria and was further developed by her twentieth century successors.

SEE ALSO *Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; Stamp Act.*

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revised by John Oliphant

GEORGETOWN, SOUTH CAROLINA.

15 November 1780. Acting on information that this small coastal town off the mouth of the Peedee was garrisoned by only fifty British regulars, Colonel Francis Marion moved to capture it. The regulars, however, were subsequently reinforced by Loyalist militia under Captains Jesse Barefield and James ("Otterskin") Lewis. At dawn on the 15th, Colonel Peter Horry's mounted militia collided with Lewis at White's plantation, and in a short skirmish Lewis was killed and four rebels were captured. Captain John Melton led another mounted force that collided with Barefield's troops in a dense swamp near The Pens, Colonel William Alston's plantation. Barefield was hit in the face and shoulders with buckshot but survived. Marion's nephew Gabriel was unhorsed and subsequently murdered. With his ammunition almost exhausted, Marion withdrew.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

GEORGETOWN, SOUTH CAROLINA.

24 January 1781. Soon after Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee joined the recently promoted General Francis Marion, the two commanders raided Georgetown, which at that time was held by two hundred British troops under Lieutenant Colonel George Campbell. On the night of 22–23 January, the infantry of Lee's Legion dropped down the Peedee and hid on an island near the town. The next night this group landed undetected on the undefended waterfront; Captain Carnes led one party that seized Campbell in his quarters near the parade ground, and Captain John Rudolph led another party into positions from which Rudolph could cut off the garrison as his men moved into the British defenses. Lee's cavalry and Marion's partisans charged through the light defenses on the land side to link up with the Legion infantry. Everything worked perfectly until the rebels discovered that they had nobody to fight. The British soldiers refused to leave their fortified

garrison, which was on the water next to an armed sloop that could provide covering fire, and Lee lacked the necessary means (battering rams, scaling ladders, and artillery) to force them out into the open. Not wanting to take casualties in assaulting the enemy positions, Lee and Marion paroled Campbell and withdrew.

SEE ALSO *Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

GEORGETOWN, SOUTH CAROLINA. 25 July 1781–2 August 1781. Georgetown came into Patriot hands on 6 June 1781 when the small British garrison abandoned its fortifications and sailed to Charleston in the face of a large Patriot force led by General Francis Marion, who had this time brought the necessary tools for a proper siege. In August, after Loyalists had been plundered by the irregulars of General Thomas Sumter, the British retaliated by burning forty-two houses in the town. This resulted in the issuance by Governor John Rutledge of an official nullification of further operations in accordance with “Sumter’s law.” Sumter had retired to his plantation by the end of the month.

SEE ALSO *Sumter, Thomas.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

GEORGIA, MOBILIZATION IN. Georgia, a royal colony since 1752, was the youngest colony seeking independence. Parliament provided an annual subsidy to support civil government, few taxes were collected, and the crown supported territorial expansion. Government gave new settlers land at no cost until 1773 and at modest cost subsequently. Most white males could vote and middling men of property could hold office. The colony was sparsely populated and poor, except in the rice-producing low country, with about 30 percent of the white population living at the subsistence level. A small group of planter elites established rice and indigo plantations along the tidal rivers, and by the early 1770s the slave population almost matched that of the white. The belief that regular troops would arrive in the event of an Indian war was an important aspect of the colonists’ relationship with Great Britain, for gunmen from surrounding Indian tribes outnumbered the militia nearly five to one.

Violence was a part of life in the frontier colony, and geography played a key role in its presence. The coast, cut

by numerous rivers and inlets and protected by a chain of offshore islands, was impossible to defend against pirate vessels of any size. From South Carolina to the north came horse thieves and squatters who encroached upon Indian land. Settlers were isolated and vulnerable, for there were few roads and only a handful of towns, including the capital, Savannah, about 17 miles upriver from the coast, and Augusta, 140 miles away in the backcountry. British-held East Florida, to the south, was even more sparsely populated than Georgia.

The coming of the Revolutionary War heightened the violence already experienced by Georgia’s inhabitants. East Florida remained a royal colony and its ships and mounted raiders plundered and harassed settlers. Creek Indians served as British auxiliaries, terrifying settlers and soldiers. Raiders and partisan bands crossed the Savannah River from South Carolina to plunder and kill. When British and American soldiers arrived, they took stores, crops, and livestock. Deserters from every army plundered. Georgia was a long way from Philadelphia and London, and once armed combat began, neither seats of power paid much attention to supplying men or matériel. Although Georgia at all times had a functioning civil government, it did not have the resources to defend itself adequately.

Rebel activity was slow to build in Georgia. During 1774 Indian attacks occurred in the backcountry, and settlers therefore objected to any revolutionary action, as British troops might be needed to protect them. Governor James Wright helped subdue the opposition movement. No delegates were sent to the first Continental Congress and the rebels’ first Provincial Congress did not support the call for nonimportation measures. In May 1775, after news of the Battle of Lexington reached Charleston, rumor spread into Georgia that the British ministry might not only start a slave insurrection, but also arm the slaves and Indians. The white colonists’ inherent fears of a race war and an Indian war galvanized the Revolutionary cause. Yet as rebels aggressively took military stores and formed a council of safety, some citizens pleaded for the preservation of public peace and for reconciliation. Wright had no military might to put down the rebel disturbances. Although his authority began to diminish when the council of safety took over the militia, he and other crown officials were not harassed.

Members of the second Provincial Congress established a firmer hold on Georgia. They sent delegates to the Second Continental Congress, lowered the voting requirement, and adopted the Association, a policy of nonimportation and nonexportation to Britain and the West Indies. These trade restrictions proved impossible to enforce due to the nature and length of the coastline and the number of citizens continuing to trade with East Florida. Initially, those who refused to sign the Association or to declare support for liberty were

physically harassed, imprisoned, or ordered to leave the colony; over time the response was reduced to the collection of fines. When a convoy of British ships anchored off Tybee Island, rebels placed Wright and other crown officials under house arrest. They escaped down river to the ships in February 1776, expecting British control to be reestablished. Instead, the convoy sailed away after obtaining needed supplies during the Battle of the Rice Boats, taking Wright and the others along. With British authority removed, the unity that had existed among rebel conservatives and radicals came to an end.

REBEL CONTROL

The fabric of Georgia's society began to unravel due to the inexperienced civil leadership of the revolutionaries, limited financial resources, a poorly equipped and divided military, and shrinking manpower. Lack of authority prevented the government from driving out suspected Loyalists, despite the Expulsion Act of 1777. It also was unable to raise money through the confiscation of property belonging to absent Loyalists and those attainted for high treason in the Act of Attainder of 1778. The military could do little to prevent plunderers, outlaws, and pirates from stealing slaves and running off cattle and horses, ruining fields, and forcing settlers to abandon their holdings. The plantation system fell into disrepair, and agricultural routines became disrupted through the loss of both slaves and whites. With no cooperation existing between civil and military authorities, the general population remained apathetic regarding the war.

Georgia's rebel soldiers were ill equipped, rarely paid, plagued by illness, and generally ignored by the Continental Congress. The Georgia Continental Line, established in November 1775, eventually had four battalions, with a regiment of horse; steady loss of men continued until only six officers were left after the British captured Charleston in May 1780. The Georgia State Line contained two minuteman battalions, two legions, several independent companies, and other regular units, and they performed guard duty on the western frontier; but low bounties, insufficient equipment, and poor discipline limited their effectiveness. The Georgia navy consisted of five galleys, eight row galleys, and two sloops in 1776; it could do little to defend coastal waters. The militia, under the state constitution of 1777, consisted of one battalion in each county for every 250 able bodied men or an independent company; militiamen maintained patrols and outposts, but continuous duty was impossible during planting season, and men generally refused to leave their local area. Demoralized and worried about their homes and families, some soldiers deserted or refused to rejoin, while others sickened and died.

Georgia's soldiers could do little against the organized armed forces of East Florida. The Florida Rangers, led by

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brown, raided deep into Georgia, communicating with Loyalists wherever they went. Their primary function was to secure the border and feed the garrison at St. Augustine. The Rangers, with their Indian auxiliaries, drove massive herds of cattle and valuable horses from Georgia and accompanied British regular troops on plundering missions. Between 1776 and 1778, three ill-equipped expeditions, variously including Georgia's militia and navy, South Carolina militia, and Continental troops attempted to subdue East Florida; overall lack of organization and a divided command prevented any military success.

The second and third East Florida expeditions illustrate the high price the Georgia state government paid for its determination to have all military forces, including Continental forces, be subordinate to it. Although neither Governor Button Gwinnett nor Governor John Houstoun had military experience, the state gave them executive power in military matters during the second and third expeditions, respectively. Acrimony between Gwinnett and Continental General Lachlan McIntosh led to a duel; Gwinnett died and McIntosh was forced to leave the state. Their lack of respect for his authority led Houstoun to obtain General Robert Howe's removal as head of the Southern Department and Commodore Oliver Bowen's removal as head of the Georgia navy. The loss of experienced men and the continued factionalism and conflict among civil and military leaders eroded Georgia's defenses.

As Continental currency was scarce, soldiers were usually paid with state currency, which constantly depreciated. Neither soldiers, potential recruits, nor citizens wanted to accept it in exchange for goods and services. The already high cost of all manufactured items increased and horses became unobtainable. The military began to take what it needed without paying, which alienated citizens. Members of the Continental army staff felt their reputations as gentlemen would be destroyed through nonpayment of debt accrued by the army under their name, and valued officers resigned or threatened to resign if their men were not paid. By the summer of 1778 Continental currency arrived to provide back pay due the Georgia Continental troops, but no further money became available prior to the recapture of the state by the British, in December 1778.

BRITISH REOCCUPATION

An invasion force of approximately three thousand British troops captured Savannah on 29 December 1778, meeting a disorganized defense. Known rebels fled into the backcountry to reestablish civil government and re-group military units. Many civilians chose to cooperate with the British, and Loyalists who had fled rebel Georgia now began to return. From this time forward, no decisive military victory occurred to establish dominant control of Georgia and sway the wavering population, which, as

a result, did not rise up to oppose either the British or the rebels.

Both British and rebel civil governments and their armed forces tried to establish authority in Georgia between January 1779 and June 1782. They needed settlers to farm, join the militia, and uphold government; without their support, famine and anarchy would destroy all civil claim to Georgia by either Britain or the United States. As they captured and recaptured territory and reestablished civil government in various parts of Georgia, both powers required oaths of allegiance from the population. This pledging of allegiance lost its binding power, particularly in the backcountry, where some of the settlers had been pressured to change their allegiance seven times between January 1779 and October 1780. The repetitive pattern of oath taking, oath breaking, and renewal of allegiance, coupled with the fact that neither power could protect them, eventually broke down the oath's symbolic power in the eyes of the settlers. By the end of the war, the loyalty oath had been transformed from a political tool wielded by authority into a tool manipulated by the settlers to remain on their land and possibly benefit from land bounties.

The British forces, under Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell, had hoped to live off the land and enjoy the support of an active Loyalist population, but they were disappointed. Unable to benefit from the food supplies in the backcountry, which the rebels held, or repair the dilapidated plantation system in a timely way, the British remained near the coast in order to receive supplies by ship and confiscate civilian supplies. Civilians could not prevent the military from taking what it wanted, and this created an environment of devastation and immense waste. During the spring of 1779 General Augustine Prevost, Campbell's replacement as head of Georgia military, led troops into South Carolina to obtain food. His indiscriminate plundering destroyed any hope of building Loyalist support in that state and provoked retaliatory raids on Georgia for the rest of the war.

Reoccupation brought a return of specie and the reopening of trade, which began to revive Georgia's economy. Upon Governor Wright's return in July, conflict between British civil and military authorities commenced over property, particularly slaves, thousands of whom had been brought back by Prevost from South Carolina. Many inhabitants in and around Savannah, including returning Loyalists, Patriot refugees, and those who had remained in Georgia all along, began to rebuild their former holdings or accrue additional property under reestablished legal processes. The government made an attempt to reorganize the monetary system. Wright's plan to furnish Loyalists with property from confiscated rebel estates and to aid refugees with income from land assets failed due to the continual destruction of the infrastructure by plunderers.

The British established Loyalist militia units among local inhabitants and refugees, but membership was fluid, with men deserting, serving irregularly, and switching allegiance as necessitated by events for the rest of the war. Loyalist provincial units were formed from regular troops, with only one of them known to be composed principally of Georgians. The regular British army in Georgia was systematically reduced in force after December 1778, and those troops remaining were composed primarily of Loyalists and Hessians. There were approximately 500 troops in Savannah and 240 troops in Augusta during 1780; a buildup to approximately 1,000 troops in Savannah and environs came during 1782.

REBEL EFFORTS, 1779

All attempts by the Continental army to drive the British out of Georgia during 1779 failed despite the significant number of troops and militia from Georgia and South Carolina gathered by Continental General Benjamin Lincoln. While rebel militia defeated Loyalist forces at the Battle of Kettle Creek in February, British regular forces defeated rebel militia and Continental forces at Briar Creek in March. In April, Lincoln changed his plan to attack Savannah and the army returned to Charleston. During September and October, Continental troops and militia joined French troops under Admiral-General Count Eustache de la Moignon in the unsuccessful siege of Savannah. The town and its environs were heavily damaged, and intense plundering by French and rebel deserters further worsened conditions there. After the failed siege, the French sailed away, the Continental army returned to South Carolina, and the militia evaporated. The resident population of Georgia remained neutral, for none of these military actions had a significant outcome.

Factionalism crippled rebel civil and military authority in the backcountry during 1779. Four rebel civil governments had been established in Augusta, two of them simultaneously, and personal animosities divided the military command. The Continental Congress recognized the fourth government as constitutional and released to it long-awaited operating funds. Much of this money was apparently spent on extravagant salaries for government officials, while Georgia troops continued to rely on loans from South Carolina to meet military expenses. After the British captured the Continental army in Charleston during May 1780, the Georgia rebel government went into hiding. Until the reestablishment of rebel civil government in August 1781, settlers looked to Governor Wright for help.

BRITISH CIVIL AUTHORITY, 1780

Rebel militiamen captured at Charleston were quickly released on parole. The possibility now existed that the

British might win the war, and many returned to Georgia to regain their property. In July 1780 Wright's reestablished civil government passed the Disqualifying Act, which limited known rebels from holding office but allowed them to live on their property. Parolees now had a chance to reestablish the financial security they had lost when the British reoccupied Georgia, if not earlier. At the same time, they were liable for their debts to Loyalists who had returned to Georgia after 1778, and those known for their depredations against Loyalists were vulnerable to retaliation. Yet others may have joined plundering or partisan bands in order to survive. While their presence generated concern because of their potential to arouse various elements of the population to rebellion or retaliation, Wright hoped to keep the parolees neutral.

Loyalist provincial units under Brown captured Augusta without resistance in June 1780. Later that month hundreds of the rebels paroled in Charleston returned to their homes in the backcountry. Hoping to prevent violence, Wright did not require that they declare their allegiance or surrender their weapons and sent no troops to keep the peace. Rebel Colonel Elijah Clarke rose up with a force of irregulars and pressured many to break their parole and join him in his unsuccessful attack on Augusta that September. British troops drove them out of Georgia, and the army's reprisals against the resident population polarized the backcountry. Those rebels interested in fighting in Georgia now formed partisan bands under local men and made or took what they needed to survive.

With the British civil and military authorities able to provide little protection, lawless bands from both political camps now joined other plunderers. In October 1780 Governor Wright had secured passage of a bill to call out and arm slaves during emergencies. He used slaves to construct new fortifications around Savannah from November to January 1781. By 1781 Wright was providing rice to those owners who could not feed their slaves, hoping to keep the latter alive and available. If unfed, they might run away to join one of the armed communities established by slaves in and around Savannah after the siege and now out of reach of civil authority.

DETERIORATING CONDITIONS, 1781–1782

As a result of British troop movements during the fall of 1780 that eventually led Lord Charles Cornwallis to Yorktown, General Nathanael Greene began to move his Continental troops slowly into the south. As a result, Georgia rebel militiamen fighting in other states returned to the backcountry. During the spring of 1781 they killed at least one hundred loyalists, both officials and settlers. Loyalists began to join rebel bands in order to protect

themselves and their families. Sympathetic to the plight of the settlers, Wright did not blame those who changed their allegiance; instead, he blamed the British military for abandoning the Loyalist population. Rebel forces captured Augusta in June 1781 and ordered Loyalists out of the backcountry. The resulting exodus swelled the population of Savannah, which was fed and housed with parliamentary funds. Wright armed the male refugees, formed new militia units, and raised troops of horsemen while at the same time trying to locate food and maintain the infrastructure of the town.

In August 1781 Greene oversaw the reestablishment of Georgia's rebel government in Augusta. This government immediately offered generous land bounties to citizens who agreed to remain on their land and obey civil and military authority. It offered amnesty, the retention of their property, and land bounties to Loyalists who became soldiers. With settlers now peaceful in the backcountry, rebel forces moved towards Savannah. The state had no funds to pay soldiers and resorted to using confiscated Loyalist property, including slaves, to pay for goods and services.

Plundering, murder, and approaching famine also inhibited recruitment, for potential militiamen would not leave their families and farms unprotected and, as there was no longer any stored food supply, they had to plant or starve. In 1782 rebel Governor John Martin tried to stop the plundering, provide troops, and obtain supplies of powder and lead so men could shoot game. To make matters worse, both armies destroyed food and forage. Martin distributed food rations received from South Carolina via the military commissary, while Wright fed his people with the parliamentary stipend, employed slaves as pioneers to repair the defenses, and made room for more refugees.

In January 1782 Continental General Anthony Wayne came into Georgia with approximately five hundred soldiers. Most left when their enlistment period ended, and Wayne asked the rebel assembly to encourage desertion from Savannah. Despite a superior force, the British made no attempt to attack the modest rebel troops. News reached Savannah in June that General Alexander Leslie had been ordered to evacuate the troops, stunning the Loyalist population. Those who chose to leave had little time to prepare, for the British army departed Savannah on 11 July and spent three weeks staging the evacuation from Tybee Island. Savannah was turned over to Wayne in perfect shape.

The end of the British occupation forced many thousands of Loyalists and their slaves to evacuate. The state desperately needed settlers on the land to support a militia and to provide sufficient manpower to begin to rebuild the shattered agricultural system. While some Loyalists made the choice to leave, others had no choice, for their names appeared in the Confiscation and Banishment Act passed by the rebel government in May 1782. Wayne granted

protection to Loyalist merchants who had valuable goods and provisions to sell and offered full American citizenship to those who joined the Georgia Continentals for two years or the duration of the war. It is impossible to determine the number of people, black and white, evacuated from Georgia in 1782, for many were not documented. Possibly between seven thousand and eight thousand slaves left at this time. The state government made every effort to retain or regain slaves, both in East Florida and in the Indian territory. Most evacuees went to East Florida, either by ship or overland, while other destinations included Jamaica, New York, Nova Scotia, and England. The evacuation of East Florida, due to its cession to Spain, began in 1784 and resulted in the return to the United States of possibly over five thousand whites and uncounted slaves, some resettling in Georgia.

Although the war essentially ended in the South in July 1782, plundering bands continued to threaten civil authority and inhibit rebuilding of the infrastructure. With only a limited number of reliable troops available, Martin and Governor Patrick Tonyn of East Florida agreed to cooperate to prevent crossborder raiding and plundering. The Georgia assembly took a more moderate stance regarding confiscated estates and the return of banished Loyalists. In part this was because the state needed to increase its population and also possibly because loyalty had been broadly viewed by both sides during the war. Georgia continued to be a sparsely populated and violent frontier long after the war, its civil government coping as best it could with the familiar problems of potential Indian war, financial difficulties, factionalism, and an unreliable militia.

SEE ALSO *Augusta, Georgia (14–18 September 1780); Briar Creek, Georgia; Brown, Thomas; Campbell, Archibald; Clarke, Elijah; Georgia Expedition of Wayne; Gwinnett, Button; Houstoun, John; Kettle Creek, Georgia; Martin, John; Prevost, Augustine; Savannah, Georgia (29 December 1778); Wright, Sir James, Governor.*

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Leslie Hall

GEORGIA EXPEDITION OF WAYNE. January–July 1782. On 12 January, General Anthony Wayne crossed the Savannah River with one hundred dragoons commanded by Colonel Anthony White and a detachment of artillery; their mission was restoring American authority in Georgia. Wayne was soon joined by 300 South Carolina mounted infantry under Colonel Wade Hampton and 170 Georgia militia under Colonel James Jackson. Lacking sufficient men for his goals, Wayne urged the state to create an African American regiment but was rebuffed. Wayne was also held back by a paucity of arms and other supplies.

Although Savannah was too strong to be taken with the means at his disposal, Wayne drove the enemy's outposts back into the town, suppressed Loyalist bands, and cut off supplies. Lieutenant Colonel Alured Clarke, commander of British forces in Georgia, ordered a scorched earth policy, and his withdrawing outposts burned what they could not carry back into Savannah. Clarke also called for help from the Cherokees and Creeks, sending out a force to open the way for the Indians. But they encountered stiff resistance from Jackson's militia. Wayne drove reinforcements sent from Savannah back into British lines. On the night of

22–23 January, three hundred Creeks approached Wayne's bivouac with the intention of attacking the pickets, but they accidentally fell upon the main body at 3 A.M. In a fierce action, the Indians were driven off with the loss of their leader, Guristersigo, and seventeen others killed. Wayne's pursuit netted another twelve, who were executed at sunrise. British desertions accelerated, especially among the German and Loyalist troops. General Alexander Leslie, British commander in the South, was concerned that he could not continue operations and proposed a truce to General Nathanael Greene, who saw right through the ploy. Clarke and Governor James Wright suggested a truce to Wayne, with the same results.

After six months of siege, the British evacuated the city for Charleston on 10 and 11 July, taking four thousand Loyalists and five thousand slaves with them. Wayne's troops entered Savannah immediately after the last British troops embarked.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

GEORGIA LINE. The Georgia Line was unique within the Continental Army because the small population base of the state required that a large proportion of its recruiting be conducted outside the territorial boundaries of Georgia. The Line originated with the request by the Continental Congress on 4 November 1775 to raise a single Continental regiment that would be particularly responsible for defense of the Florida border and the seacoast, and would keep watch on the frontier. The Provincial Congress began to form the Line on 20 January 1776, but by the summer it began to request permission to recruit additional regiments in other states. Congress approved two additional regiments on 2 July, specifying that one should be armed with rifles. On the 24th of that month, Congress also approved the transfer to the Continental army of Georgia's four troops of horse and their expansion into a regiment of rangers who could serve on foot or mounted as the situation demanded. Congress added a final regiment on 1 February 1777.

Of the five formations in the Line, the First Georgia Regiment and the Georgia Regiment of Horse Rangers were recruited in the state; the Second Georgia Regiment in Virginia; the Third Georgia Regiment in North Carolina; and the Fifth Georgia Regiment in Pennsylvania. All served exclusively in the south, and all were captured at Charleston on 12 May 1780. All but the First were officially disbanded on 1 January 1781. The remaining unit began reorganizing on 1 January 1783, after the British left Savannah, to

become the three-company Georgia Battalion. It disbanded on 15 November 1783.

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Robert K. Wright Jr.

GÉRARD, CONRAD-ALEXANDRE.

(1729–1790). First French minister to the United States. He received a doctorate of jurisprudence at the University of Strasbourg (1749). Gérard later served at Mannheim as secretary of legation (1753–1759) and at Vienna as first secretary (1761–1766). In 1766 he was promoted at Versailles to first assistant to the ministry. As trusted adviser of the new foreign minister, Vergennes, he became secretary of the Council of State. There he was intermediary with the Americans on behalf of the French government. Signatory to the treaties with the Americans, he was selected to represent the crown in America and arrived in Philadelphia on 12 July 1778. During the period July 1778–October 1779, Gérard was minister plenipotentiary to the Continental Congress. His forceful efforts to micro-manage aspects of American policies led to discontent among some members.

Due to failing health from exhaustion, he was replaced by La Luzerne and returned to France in 1780. That year Gérard was named royal praetor of Strasbourg. He participated in the Assembly of Notables in 1787 and the Assembly of Nobles of Alsace in the election of deputies to the Estates General in 1789, but he was too ill to serve his city and king further.

SEE ALSO *Vergennes, Charles Gravier, comte de; La Luzerne, Anne-César de.*

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Robert Rhodes Crout

GERMAIN, GEORGE *SEE* *Sackville, George*.

GERMAN AUXILIARIES. More than 30,000 Germans fought in the War of American Independence, taking part in every major campaign from the Floridas to Canada; and fighting overseas in the campaigns in the Mediterranean and India. Six independent German states contributed units to the British army for service in America: Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Hanau, Anspach-Bayreuth, Braunschweig-Lüneburg (Brunswick), Anhalt-Zerbst, and Waldeck. Hanover, which was ruled by King George III of England, allowed individual recruiting for British regiments, and sent several units to Gibraltar, Minorca, and India. But German units also served in the armies of Britain's opponents—two other Waldeck regiments were part of the Dutch army, and Zweibrücken provided a number of regiments to France, including the Royal Deux-Ponts Regiment, which was part of General Jean comte de Rochambeau's 1780 to 1782 expedition to assist the Americans.

MYTHS

The common image of the "Hessians" as brutal mercenaries sold for blood money by corrupt rulers is imbedded in the Declaration of Independence and in two hundred years' worth of schoolbooks, but it is not true. It was the result of propaganda efforts initiated by the Continental Congress (with Benjamin Franklin in charge) and by liberal German intellectuals who were deeply influenced by the French Revolution and nineteenth-century nationalism. In point of fact, each of the states that furnished troops to the British did so after negotiating treaties that set forth a variety of conditions and concessions. For example, Hesse-Cassel's situation was the direct opposite of the old myth. It had a formal alliance under which the British and Hanover guaranteed to defend the country from aggressors while the bulk of the nation's army served overseas. In addition, the monies the Landgrave (territorial ruler) gained from the treaty were used to provide social services to the civilian population and to encourage industry.

A second myth is that the Germans deserted in droves whenever they had the chance, or died from combat or

disease, leaving only about 60 percent to return home at the end of the war. This is a wild exaggeration, and attempts to depict all units behaving in a manner that applies to only a few. German losses in the Crown's forces were no worse, overall, than those of the British or the Loyalists. Further, the numbers given for "returning" troops disregard personnel who were sent home earlier than the latter part of 1783. They also ignore the large numbers of troops who chose to take discharges in North America and settled in either Canada or the United States.

The third myth about the Germans is that they were all well-disciplined and drilled in the tradition of Frederick the Great. In this interpretation, historians argue that, when first employed, the Hessians were respected by the British and feared by the Americans. As this theory goes, they quickly found that the traditional tactics of the Potsdam parade ground brought disaster in American conditions. It is true that by the end of the 1777 campaigns, Americans had lost their fears and the British had started to relegate German units to garrison duties or service in the second line of battle formations, but not for the reasons commonly assumed. It was not contempt, but rather the recognition that the very tables of organization of the German units limited their ability to maneuver in broken terrain, although they functioned quite well in situations where a premium was placed on frontal attack or solid defense. German formations like the jägers (riflemen) or the highly-trained chasseurs (light infantry) who had organizational flexibility and training to carry out skirmishing provided British commanders with perhaps their best light troops.

AUGMENTING BRITISH FORCES

When the British government went to war in 1775 the conflict turned out to be very unpopular. The recruits available were barely sufficient to bring existing regiments up to strength. Only one new unit (the Seventy-first Foot) could be raised, and that only by turning to Highland Scots. In this situation the Ministry quickly turned to a century-old tradition and sought to bring foreign units into their service, primarily drawn from the Protestant states in the north-western part of Germany. Some were procured to provide trained units to the generals in North America quickly (raising new regiments in Britain would require a long period of training before they could be sent into combat). Others were obtained to relieve British regiments from garrison duty so that they could be transferred to the war zone.

Preliminary negotiations began on 2 December 1775, and the first three treaties were submitted to Parliament on 29 February 1776. Not counting Hanover, four states concluded treaties in 1776: Brunswick (9 January), Hesse-Cassel (31 January), Hesse-Hanau (5 February), and Waldeck (25 April). While the terms of each treaty varied, basically the British picked up the costs of paying

Auxiliary Units		
State	Units Furnished	Total Manpower Sent
Anspach-Bayreuth	Two infantry regiments with a supporting artillery detachment Six companies of jägers or chasseurs	2,459
Anhalt-Zerbst	One infantry regiment (two battalions) with two-gun artillery detachment	1,260
Braunschweig-Lunenburg	Four infantry regiments One dismounted dragoon regiment One grenadier battalion One chasseur battalion (including a jäger company)	5,723
Hesse-Cassel	Complete division staff Four grenadier battalions 11 Infantry regiments Four garrison infantry regiments (reserve formations called to active duty) Six companies of jägers (one mounted) Three companies of artillery A field hospital	18,970
Hesse-Hanau	One infantry regiment One chasseur battalion One artillery company	2,422
Waldeck	One infantry regiment Supporting artillery detachment (2 guns)	1,225
Total manpower		32,059

Table 1. COURTESY OF THE AUTHOR.

the troops, providing them with food, and transporting them. The Germans retained responsibility for weapons, equipment, and uniforms, and for furnishing replacements. The treaties also called for cash payment to enable the individual states to conduct recruiting and carry out other preparations, and for each casualty—but this was the same practice used when a new unit was formed in Britain or when a unit had to recruit new troops to replace losses. In 1777 Britain made two smaller treaties with Anspach-Bayreuth (1 February) and Anhalt-Zerbst (October, although the troops did not reach Canada until late 1778 due to transportation problems). Some of the contingents increased (especially by adding more jägers) during the course of the war after supplemental treaties. Table 1 gives a summary of the size of each contingent.

SIGNIFICANCE

Three significant British defeats involved forces which were primarily composed of Germans: Trenton, Fort Mercer, and Bennington. These failures have been used to argue that the Germans were not an effective combat force, but purely British or Loyalist engagements also ended in stunning defeats. The truth is that the only way that the Ministry could have procured enough troops for the relief of Canada and the simultaneous capture of New York in 1776 was to turn to the policy of treaties. The troops from Hesse-Cassel, Braunschweig-Lünenburg, and

Hesse-Hanau generally performed credibly, those of Anspach-Bayreuth and Waldeck competently, and only the small Anhalt-Zerbst contingent could be considered sub-par. When employed properly, they were extremely valuable, and once France entered into the war, no British offensive could have been undertaken without having Germans available to garrison the major bases.

German service in the American Revolution had another impact frequently overlooked by American historians—it was an important learning experience for those participants interested in professional development. The Hesse-Cassel army completely changed both its organizational structure and its tactical doctrine after reviewing the lessons of the war, producing units that were much more flexible and patterned after the Americans they had fought. This change made their forces the most effective in the opening years of the Napoleonic Wars. One Hessian, Johann Ewald, would go on to reach the rank of lieutenant general in the Danish army and become the foremost authority on light infantry tactics in that period.

SEE ALSO *Ewald, Johann von.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

GERMAN FLATS (HERKIMER), NEW YORK.

13 September 1778. Originally called Burnet's Field, this settlement was actually a ten-mile stretch of the Mohawk Valley extending west from the mouth of West Canada Creek, with its center five miles south of the subsequently named Herkimer. Its name comes from the fact that the first settlers were German immigrants from the Palatine. It contained about seventy houses on both sides of the river when the Revolution started, including Brigadier General Nicholas Herkimer's stockaded mansion (called Fort Herkimer). Two miles westward on the north bank of the river was Fort Dayton, established by Colonel Elias Dayton in the fall of 1776 on the site of an earlier French and Indian War post. It was one of the few Continental Army posts in the Mohawk Valley and its explicit purpose was to protect German Flats.

In the late summer of 1778, the settlers heard rumors that Joseph Brant and Captain William Caldwell intended to raid German Flats with a force of 300 Loyalists and 150 Mohawk warriors. In response, Colonel Peter Bellingier, commander of Fort Dayton, sent out scouts to probe towards Unadilla, which was suspected of being Brant's base. They were ambushed near the later town of Edmeston. Three scouts were killed but the fourth, Adam Helmer, got away. He had a

German Regiment

reputation as the best cross-country runner in the valley, and his escape is the basis for Henry Fonda's dash in the movie *Drums Along the Mohawk* (1939). Helmer reached the settlement on 13 (or 17) September and gave the alarm in time for most of the inhabitants to retreat into the several local forts. Brant's raiding party came up the Unadilla River by way of Cedarville and arrived on the southern end of the settlement an hour after the alarm. Unaware of the fact that the inhabitants were already warned, he camped for the night near the known Loyalist area of Shoemaker's Tavern (modern Mohawk). The next day the raiders had to content themselves with burning the abandoned farms and mills from Little Falls to Frankford.

On 29 October 1780, Sir John Johnson passed through German Flats after raiding Schoharie Valley. In early 1781 Indians appeared in small parties and destroyed property at German Flats. The hated Walter Butler was captured at Shoemaker's house.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Butler, Walter.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

GERMAN REGIMENT. Early in 1776, Congress decided to raise an eight-company regiment from among the roughly 130,000 people of German birth or descent then living in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. It authorized the regiment on 25 May 1776, to serve for three years or the duration of the war, and on 17 July appointed Nicholas Haussegger, a hatter from Lebanon, Pennsylvania, as colonel. Haussegger had been a captain in the French and Indian War and then the major of the Fourth Pennsylvania Battalion (since 4 January 1776). On 31 December he led ten men on a reconnaissance of Princeton, New Jersey, and surrendered himself and his party to the British. The regiment remained intact after Haussegger's defection. Although forced to retreat under British attack at the Second Battle of Trenton (Assunpink Bridge) on 2 January 1777, it fought well at Princeton (3 January). Congress considered it an "extra" Continental regiment in the reorganization of 1777 (as part of the Maryland Line), and appointed Henry Leonard Philip, baron de Arendt, a veteran of the Prussian service, as its new colonel on

19 March. As a unit of Washington's main army, it was present at Brandywine and was heavily engaged at Germantown. Washington granted de Arendt a leave of absence for health reasons on 18 August 1778; he never reassumed command. The regiment was sent to the Pennsylvania frontier in April 1779, served in Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois, and remained on the frontier until April 1780. It served with the main army until disbanded on 1 January 1781. German-Americans were also prominent in another German regiment, this one authorized by the Virginia Convention as the Eighth Virginia on 11 January 1776. Raised by John Peter Muhlenberg in the frontier counties of Virginia's Shenandoah Valley between 9 February and 4 April, it was adopted into the Continental army on 25 May 1776. After participating in the defense of Charleston, South Carolina, in June 1776, the unit joined Washington's army for the defense of Philadelphia in the summer of 1777. It was consolidated with the Fourth Virginia on 12 May 1779.

SEE ALSO *Haussegger, Nicholas; Muhlenberg, John Peter Gabriel; New Jersey Campaign.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

GERMAN SOLDIERS SERVING IN BRITISH REGIMENTS. In the summer of 1775, British infantry regiments serving in America were ordered augmented by 120 men. The home islands provided the largest proportion of these, but additional men were garnered via contract with Hanoverian Lieutenant Colonel Georg Heinrich Albrecht von Scheithar, who provided 2,000 German recruits to serve in British regiments.

A study of the Twenty-second Regiment of Foot shows on average the Germans comprising 10 percent of each 1776 battalion company, with the flank companies (grenadier and light infantry) containing only veteran soldiers. The Twenty-second Regiment Germans enlisted in England in May 1776 but did not actually join the regiment at Staten Island, New York, until the late summer and autumn of that year.

Desertion proved a problem. British Fourth Brigade orders for 6 May 1777 noted:

the German Recruits . . . may be put together to sleep in one or more Rooms which rooms are to be locked: at 8 at night and Opened: at Reveille beating in the morning that their names may be called: Over Every hour During the day . . . that the Articles of war Against Desertion to be read to them together with these Orders, this Evening for which purpose they are to be Assembled: at the parade of the Regiment: at half past five & That they be told the reason they are treated: in this manner is because of the frequent Desertion Among them at the same time they are to be forbid going to the Waldeck Regiment. (Rees, transcr., "Selected Transcriptions")

Despite this admonition, most of the men served honorably and well through the war.

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John U. Rees

GERMANTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA, BATTLE OF. The very name, "Germantown," says much about the social complexities of the military task that William Howe accepted in agreeing to bring his army to Pennsylvania in 1777 to try to fatally wound the rebellion. When the former Pennsylvania assembly speaker and then Loyalist, Joseph Galloway, assured Howe that Pennsylvanians were eager to return to their allegiance to their king, he was referring primarily to Quakers and other Englishmen, not to the province's German-speaking inhabitants, supposedly nostalgic for George, the former elector of Hanover. As both captured and deserting Hessian mercenaries would discover to their dismay between 1776 and 1783, the colony's Germans were for the most part firmly committed to independence.


Germantown was not named for the hordes of Rhineland migrants who flooded through Philadelphia between 1720 and 1750, creating a Germanic belt in the near-western counties of Northampton, Berks, and parts of Lancaster and York. Its name, rather, derived from the old German Township, settled by people from Frankford and Crefeld in the Roman Empire who were

contemporary with and recruited by William Penn in the 1680s and 1690s. Settling compactly about fifteen miles northwest of Philadelphia, north of the Schuylkill Valley, these people had created an artisanal and craft village by the mid-eighteenth century. The town had a linear streetscape, stretching for a mile mostly along the Germantown Road. Its small houses had backyards, gardens, and orchards, tightly fenced and covered with outbuildings, along a handful of intersecting roads and lanes. These structures were mixed after 1750 with a few large summer houses for members of the provincial gentry, who made the half-day drive from town to escape the heat, noise, and occasional return of pestilence.

BATTLE PLANS

Shortly after the Battle of Brandywine, General Washington moved the Continental army to Germantown before striking up the Schuylkill Valley in an unsuccessful effort to keep the British out of Philadelphia. Thus, he had a much better sense of the ground than he had possessed at Brandywine three weeks before. The army moved by small steps down the Schuylkill between 29 September and 2 October until the troops were within about twenty miles from Philadelphia. Washington drew small reinforcements from the reserve kept in the middle Hudson River Valley in late September. In doing so, he potentially exposed General Horatio Gates—north of Albany and facing British General John Burgoyne's invading force—to attack from behind by any rescue force sent north from New York City by General Henry Clinton to extricate Burgoyne. On 28 September, Washington called a council of war to discuss the possibility of taking offensive action. His generals advised against an immediate attack but urged watching for a favorable opportunity.

General Howe, meanwhile, moved cautiously to take possession of Philadelphia. He sent a garrison force of five thousand troops there directly across the Schuylkill on 26 September but left the bulk of his army at Germantown until he could prepare the city for occupation. He had witnessed civil-military tensions during the previous two years in both Boston and New York. His main objective after Brandywine was to clear obstructions from the Delaware River below Philadelphia so that Admiral Richard Howe's transport fleet could reach the city docks with provisions. Howe's commissary general, Daniel Weir, managed to feed the army from the countryside between Head of Elk and the Schuylkill, reaching Philadelphia with slightly more provisions than he had carried away from the fleet in August. But those supplies would now diminish, and the British would be held politically responsible for any shortages that civilians faced in competition with soldiers. The rebels still held forts at Red Bank in New Jersey and at Mud Island on the



THE GALE GROUP.

Pennsylvania side, near the mouth of the Schuylkill River, and they had obstructed the channels between those positions by placing partially sunken wood and metal barriers called *chevaux-de-frise* across the river. The latter were chained together and threatened to damage British

warships. Washington learned that Howe was making detachments from his force in the city to the lower Delaware as part of an effort to seize the forts and to clear these river obstructions. He informally communicated this news to his general officers, who on 2 October

advised Washington to execute an attack on the British garrison at Germantown.

If General Howe's battle plan for Brandywine was loosely modeled on the one that he had used successfully the year before on Long Island, Washington's thinking about Germantown reflected his successful counterstroke four months later at Trenton and Princeton. The action would begin overnight, it would involve a surprise attack on an exposed outpost, and it would be elaborately timed and conceived, requiring very careful coordination among diverse army units. Washington divided his army, with its militia reinforcements, into four separate columns. The outside wings of the attack would be executed by militiamen, who in some cases were led by regular army officers. The interior columns would be composed of regular troops and led by the officers in whom Washington had the greatest confidence. The army was about fifteen miles above the outer positions of the British force at the northern end of Germantown. The troops were ordered to leave their packs behind to foster mobility, and they carried substantial but finite supplies of ammunition, which amounted to about forty rounds per man.

The largest Continental column, about five thousand troops under General Nathanael Greene, pushed off at mid-evening on 3 October. They marched down Skippack Road, then filed off into Limekiln Road and approached their target from the northwest. Shortly after Greene left, the second Continental column, commanded by General John Sullivan and accompanied by Washington, followed down Skippack Road then turned into Germantown Road, the main street through town. Greene would form the left and Sullivan the right wing of the main Continental attack. Washington ordered about two thousand Pennsylvania militia troops, commanded by the aging but highly regarded John Armstrong, to approach Germantown along the Manatawny or Ridge Road, which followed the Schuylkill, until he reached the junction of the Wissahickon Creek with that river. This force would serve as the right wing of the overall attack. It was intended to be in a position to support the action if the regulars were successful. A smaller group of about one thousand Maryland and New Jersey militia, under Maryland General William Smallwood, took a much more circuitous (and very poorly described in its instructions) route, designed to bring it out to the north of Germantown, to add force to an effort to drive the British downhill toward the Schuylkill River.

As had been the case at Trenton the previous year, the plan assumed that a diverse group of poorly trained units would be able to arrive at the point of battle almost simultaneously. To achieve this end, it was expected that each column would maintain mobile peripheral parties and that couriers would cross back and forth between them, maintaining frequent communications. The

columns were instructed to arrive at their battle positions, within two miles of the enemy's watchmen, by 2 A.M. on 4 October, and then to rest for about two hours. Then they would organize their units and strike at 5 A.M. against the enemy pickets or watchmen. Washington wanted the latter to be quietly overwhelmed with bayonets or, if necessary, captured, to avoid signaling the sleeping encampments at Germantown of the impending attack.

THE BATTLE BEGINS

Major aspects of this attack plan went awry from the beginning, although the operation initially appeared to succeed. Most divisions were late getting to their halting points, although the built-in interval for rest absorbed some of this delay—possibly at the cost of tiredness and confusion after daybreak. Toward dawn, a typical mid-Atlantic early morning autumn fog arose, thicker than the one that had benefited Howe's flanking detachment at Brandywine three weeks before. Somewhere between Chestnut Hill and Mount Airy, well short of the British lines at Germantown, Sullivan's advance units encountered parties of British infantrymen. Thus, the action began not with muffled or bayoneted guardsmen, but rather with a small, sharp, and noisy skirmish. The defenders resisted, then gave ground to an attack force whose size they could not estimate. Both attackers and defenders groped in the murky first light. Retreating British forces set fire to small fields of mature buckwheat plants, ready for harvest, and to hay stubble, both of which burned eerily and smokily. As American troops reached the edges of Germantown proper, the webs of fencing and other agricultural infrastructure that littered the small fields and garden plots behind the houses presented difficult obstacles that had to be passed or dismantled at great risk to the men.

Washington was concerned and confused as much by silences as by familiar battle sounds coming out of the obscure light. He expected noise telling him that Greene's, Armstrong's, and Smallwood's columns had joined or were about to join the battle, but he heard none. He also inferred from the retreat of musket fire in front of him and from its subsequent increase closer in that the British were indeed withdrawing under American pressure, but that Sullivan's troops were discharging their weapons too freely and risking the exhaustion of their limited ammunition supplies. Washington quickly ordered that those troops be restrained from undisciplined firing. On several occasions he moved up right behind the first lines of attackers and had to be urged by his own aides and officers to stand back and avoid exposing himself unnecessarily to gunfire. Again and again he was unable to resist trying to move to the heart of the battle itself.

General Howe, meanwhile, became involved in directing the defense on the other side of the fog. Howe

made his quarters at Stenton, the country house of the prominent Logan family of Pennsylvania, situated about halfway between Germantown and Philadelphia proper. When the action began, Howe was awakened by messengers who could not say for sure whether the army was under sustained attack or merely facing a limited series of tactical probes. Until evidence proved otherwise, he chose to presume the latter. He dressed, mounted his horse, and rode northwest toward the center of Germantown. Arriving near the lines he chastised his troops, saying that he “never saw you retreat before,” and he claimed that the attackers were “only a scouting party.” Howe’s privates knew better, as did, presumably, his dog, who accompanied the general, then wandered out of line in the fog and quickly became a Continental prisoner of war.

As the British retreated into the fog, one hundred members of an infantry regiment somewhat impulsively took shelter in a large stone house sitting back from the Germantown Road by several hundred feet and began barricading its lower doors and windows. This was the summer country home of Benjamin Chew, a Philadelphia gentleman and the late chief justice of the defunct provincial supreme court of Pennsylvania. The redcoats withdrew to the second floor, from whose windows they could pour deadly fire on passing American troops. Washington’s aides and generals debated what to do about this situation. Several of them advocated leaving a guard party near the building to prevent the embedded soldiers from escaping and then diverting the flow of the attack out of range of its sniper fire. However, the commander of Continental artillery, General Henry Knox—a soldier whose somewhat doctrinaire military ideas reflected his earlier career as a colonial bookseller and an avid reader of military histories and treatises—invoked an old aphorism about the dangers of leaving a fortified “castle” in the army’s rear. Washington accepted Knox’s judgment and ordered American artillery to try to reduce the “fort.” The building’s thick stone walls were impervious to cannon fire, however, and the fierce firing kept up by the redcoats prevented their dislodgement by any other means. Washington eventually acceded to the more conservative wisdom of the dissenters and ordered a guard thrown around the house. But a large number of Americans died in the Chew House’s capacious front yard that morning, and valuable time was lost forever. Washington then threw the reserve troops that he had held back from the initial assault on Germantown into the chase. He soon allowed himself to imagine that his enemies were abandoning the field in a disorderly retreat.

THE AMERICAN PLAN DISSOLVES

Something like the opposite was instead happening. As General Howe relinquished the convenient fiction that his forces had been attacked by a “scouting party,” he began to

regain control over his shaken troops. At about the same time, Washington lost a measure of control over his own men. The fog, gunsmoke, and smoke from burning fields, fences, and outbuildings was a disadvantage to troops on both sides, but it was easier for the British to retreat through it than for numerous separate attacking bodies of men to advance while trying to form a unified line. Despite Washington’s orders to conserve ammunition, many of Sullivan’s men began to run out and in the process were losing confidence in their own safety. The other three columns of which the initial American attack consisted had either not become involved in the action at all or had stumbled into it in problematic ways. Down the Wissahickon Ridge toward the Schuylkill River, John Armstrong’s Pennsylvania militia companies had probed their way hesitantly along the riverbank. Upon reaching its junction with Wissahickon Creek, above the Falls of Schuylkill, their only route into the action was uphill and through the mist. It is difficult to conclude that they were very anxious to make that climb into what must have sounded like noisy chaos.

The other body of militia, forming the left wing of the Continental thrust, had been given a very circuitous marching itinerary, with written instructions to guides that invoked local names for mills, lanes, and houses—some of them referring to the names of long-departed owners. Even General Smallwood’s guides had difficulty making sense of these directions, and his forces floundered around ineffectively in the mist on the north side of the town and thus of the battle. More problematic than the units that did not join the clash was the dilemma of the largest single section of the army, under the command of general Greene, that did in fact become belatedly involved. Greene’s column had missed one turn because of a confused guide, and the distance it had been assigned to cover had been miscalculated, preventing it from reaching its staging area on time.

Although Greene’s troops were at first able to push the British units that they encountered back with little difficulty, their lateness in arriving at the center of Germantown prevented them from forming a smooth juncture with Sullivan’s men—some of whom were already retreating as they pushed forward. The confusion was not diminished by the fact that one element of Greene’s party, David Forman’s troop of New Jersey regulars, was wearing captured red British uniforms. At some point, Greene’s troops and elements of Anthony Wayne’s division attached to Sullivan’s column overlapped and began firing at each other in the confusion. One division of Virginia soldiers under Greene’s command was the victim of its own aggressive activity. It fought its way to the Germantown Market Square, at the center of the British encampment, after the American units in the center column had already withdrawn from



The Battle of Germantown. The October 1777 American advance on Benjamin Chew's summer house is depicted in this nineteenth-century engraving by Robert Hinshelwood after a painting by Alonzo Chappel. PICTURE COLLECTION, THE BRANCH LIBRARIES, THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY, ASTOR, LENOX, AND TILDEN FOUNDATIONS.

that area. While the Virginians had taken a number of prisoners, they were eventually themselves surrounded and thus captured en masse.

AMERICAN RETREAT

By shortly after 9 A.M., a general panic began to sweep the American lines, as first individuals and then whole groups of men withdrew in an undisciplined mass. Officers tried to stop the retreat and Washington threw himself into the action behind the lines, trying—as he had successfully done at Brandywine—to shore up a shaky situation. This did no good, and eventually the artillery division and even some of the officers were abandoning the field. By 10 A.M. it was clear to Washington that the only realistic step was to try to extract the army from a hopeless situation. Howe and Cornwallis again did not seem disposed to run a defeated adversary into the ground, and the American retreat became relatively more orderly and gradual with every mile that it moved away from Germantown. The

army followed the same general route to the northwest by which it had arrived that morning, up the east side of the Schuylkill River to well-known places in the northwestern part of Philadelphia County. By nightfall, the exhausted American troops—some of them literally sleeping on the backs of slowly ambling horses—came to a halt at Pennypacker's Mill, about twenty miles north of the Chew House.

The Americans casualties were 152 men killed, over 500 wounded, and more than 400 missing. British sources admitted a total of about 387 casualties, but subsequent estimates are closer to 500, including about 70 men killed and nearly 400 wounded.

Washington began drafting yet another rueful, analytical announcement to Congress conceding an unsuccessful endeavor, this time one in which he firmly believed that victory had been thrown away. His staff and field officers in some cases slept in their clothes that night. Over the next several days they too began to pick through the shards



Attack on the Chew House. A view by the illustrator Howard Pyle of the American attack on the Chew house near Germantown, Pennsylvania. *THE ATTACK UPON THE CHEW HOUSE*, BY PYLE, HOWARD (1853–1911) © DELAWARE ART MUSEUM, WILMINGTON, DE / BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY

of bitter memory, trying to figure out what had gone wrong.

POSTMORTEMS

Washington believed, probably sincerely, that victory had been “declaring itself in our favor” before the unaccountable American panic turned the tide. While we can and should be impressed by the American ability to drive substantial British-trained units back with the benefit of surprise, there is little evidence that Howe was anywhere near to “taking to his ships” that morning (as another American officer believed). The British gave their adversary full credit for its willingness to mount a major offensive a few weeks after having been soundly beaten at Brandywine. Without abandoning his intention to reopen the lower Delaware River as soon as possible, Howe quickly made plans to begin building earthwork redoubts across the neck of land between the Delaware and Schuylkill just north of Philadelphia. He also pressed his aides to complete inventoring available officers’ quarters and building barracks in the city so that he could remove the troops at Germantown from harm’s way by placing them in the garrison.

Eighteenth-century contemporaries and later historians have picked elements of the Germantown battle and battle plan apart in search of either an explanation for the result or for a scapegoat. Washington’s decision to have largely unreliable militia forces operate on the wings of the attack while the center was comprised of units tested at Brandywine has been questioned. Critics have suggested that instead of wandering on the periphery of the battle, militia might have been “stiffened” by their placement between sturdier regular columns. But—given the finite nature and number of approaches to Germantown from the north and west—it is hard to imagine what could have been accomplished by irregulars as the opening battering ram of the surprise. Washington’s decision to treat the problem of the Chew House as a priority item—rather than as an annoyance that could have been isolated and dealt with later—has seemed to many analysts to have been a substantial error of judgment. His initial battle plan, which depended on the ability of multiple columns marching in the dark to time their arrival at the point of attack to within close ranges, now seems almost quixotic. Whatever tribute that plan paid to the resourceful

performance of the “old” army at Trenton ten months before, it was ill adapted to the strengths and weaknesses of its “new” successor. Two months later, in the first days at Valley Forge, Washington would once more envision a complex descent by the whole of what was left of the army on Howe’s lines north of Philadelphia, a movement entirely at odds with his concurrent depiction to Congress of the army’s immobility. Thankfully, he thought better of the idea, and it was quietly shelved.

GERMANTOWN AND SARATOGA

It was at best with mixed feelings that Washington, shortly after extracting his army from Germantown, received notice (and had to announce to his troops) that Horatio Gates’s northern army had won a second major engagement with John Burgoyne’s invading force at Saratoga, New York, and that Burgoyne had agreed to a convention that removed his troops from the war. There would inevitably be invidious comparisons between Gates’s successes in the north and Washington’s bitter defeats in Pennsylvania. In preparing his soldiers for their night-long march to Germantown, Washington had urged them to “Cover! My Countrymen, and fellow soldiers . . . A share of the glory due to heroic deeds.” They would now have to wait for that share. The awkward way in which news of Gates’s triumph was officially sent to Congress would play a part in the perhaps inevitable growth of tensions between Gates and Washington that—before the end of the winter—would threaten the military establishment with internal division.

That tension at the command level had its counterpart in the army in the field. Shortly after Saratoga, Washington ordered substantial reinforcements from Gates’s force to join him in Pennsylvania to continue the campaign to hold the Delaware River. Most of Gates’s soldiers were Yankees and New Yorkers, while many of the men in the main army came from places located from New Jersey through the Lower South. The northerners crossed the Delaware just as the Pennsylvania campaign stalled, and there were predictable personal and cultural tensions between two very different subcultures of Anglo-Americans. Yankees made the word “burgoyne” into a smug verb form to describe their humbling of a superior adversary. Many of them wondered why their new campmates had not done as much to William Howe. These tensions would somehow have to be reconciled at Valley Forge before the army could be “continental” in anything more than name.

TAKING AN OPTIMISTIC VIEW

For what it was worth, many if not most of Washington’s commanders and field officers agreed with him that victory had been at hand at Germantown, and that it had

been snatched away by a stroke of what was more fairly described as bad luck than enemy superiority. If only to console themselves, they quickly reduced these feelings to words in letters to their friends. William Alexander (Lord Stirling) wrote that “this affair will convince the world that we can out general our enemy, that we dare attack them, that we can surprise them, that we can drive them before us several miles.” Benjamin Tallmadge of Connecticut insisted that the Americans had driven their adversaries “from post to post” on 4 October, and he recalled that he had “expected to have been in Philadelphia by ten o’clock.” An army commissary official stationed in New Jersey heard about the “bloody and almost fatal to our enemy [action] at Germantown.” A delegate to Congress in York, Pennsylvania, relayed reports that “a most compleat victory seemed in full prospect [un]till this unfortunate mistake occasioned by the fog snatched it out of our hands.” General Weedon of Virginia rationalized that “tho[ugh] the enterprise miscarried, it was well worth the undertaking, “as . . . [the British] light infantry (the flower of their army) was cut to pieces.” These accounts were at best highly selective, but the officer corps, at least, seems to have embraced them as real by mid-October. They were accompanied by insistent predictions that the army would soon have “another tryal,” “another battle,” “another attack,” and “another brush” with the redcoats, in which the Americans almost universally expected to prevail.

These hopeful predictions were not to come to pass. But their failure to materialize owed more to supply and organizational failures, whose causes were largely invisible to officers and troops, than they did to failures of army nerve. The soldiers—especially the Yankee reinforcements joining the army from the Hudson Valley—saw the sheer abundance of Pennsylvania and wondered why they were going unsupplied in what they portrayed as a biblical Land of Goshen. They also wondered why the local militia was anxious to call it a campaign by November and go home for the winter. The results of these perceptions—set largely in reaction to the complex events of 4 October—shaped the Valley Forge winter.

SEE ALSO *Alexander, William; Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Galloway, Joseph; Greene, Nathanael; Howe, William; Knox, Henry; Philadelphia Campaign; Smallwood, William; Sullivan, John; Tallmadge, Benjamin, Jr.; Wayne, Anthony; Weedon, George.*

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revised by Wayne K. Bodle

GERRY, ELBRIDGE. (1744–1814). Signer, Massachusetts. Born on 17 July 1744 in Marblehead, Massachusetts, Gerry graduated from Harvard in 1762 and joined the family shipping business. Returning to Harvard to get his master's in 1765, he spoke out against British injustices in a college paper. As a merchant and businessman, he soon became wealthy and entered public life in 1772 as a representative in the general court. He met and came under the influence of Samuel Adams at this time, and also served on the Committee of Correspondence, writing the circular letter sent to the other provinces. In 1774 he was elected to the Massachusetts provincial congress, and was active over the next two years in the Committee of Safety and in gathering militia supplies, particularly when enforcement of the Boston Port Bill made Marblehead a leading port of entry. He was chairman of the Committee of Supply until 25 January 1776, when he was sent to the Continental Congress. There he sat on the financial and militia supply committees. He was an early advocate of independence and an eager signer of the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation.

Alarmed by continuing inflation, Gerry proposed measures to halt the currency depreciation and served with Robert Morris on a committee to examine George Washington's plans for the 1777–1778 winter campaign. Their report showed dissatisfaction with the commander's vigor, and Gerry was an avowed supporter of General Thomas Conway. Gerry was not in favor of the French alliance. He supported Arthur Lee, believing that Benjamin Franklin had been corrupted by his stay in France. In 1780, as chairman of the treasury committee, he antagonized Benedict Arnold by examining his financial accounts. In February 1781 he resigned from Congress, charging that personal privilege and states' rights had been infringed upon. He then spent his time in trade and privateering.

Gerry was called to the state senate twice as joint representative, but accepted a seat in the lower house only. He returned to Congress in 1783 and was active in the peace negotiations with Great Britain. After the war, he worked to abolish the standing army and the Order of the Cincinnati, both of which he saw as posing a threat to

republican government. In November 1785 he left Congress and took a seat in the Massachusetts legislature. Although he had been opposed to a strong Federal government, he reversed himself after Shays's Rebellion, 1786–1787, persuaded him that the country was on the verge of anarchy. He sat in the Federal Constitutional Convention and followed an erratic course, proposing and opposing almost at will. He refused to sign the Constitution, largely because it lacked a bill of rights, but supported Washington's government while serving in the House of Representatives from 1789 to 1793.

In 1797 President John Adams sent Gerry to France as part of a special peace mission. When Talleyrand's agents (known as X, Y, and Z) demanded bribes, the other two emissaries, John Marshall and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, went home. Gerry stayed behind and, in Adams's view, made peace possible through his continued negotiations. After several unsuccessful bids for governor, he was elected to that office in 1810 on the Republican ticket, and was re-elected in 1811. This term brought about the "Gerrymander Bill" of 1812, which redistricted the state in such a way as to create Republican senators in excess of the party's voting strength and which created one district that had a salamander-like shape on the map (thus "gerrymander:" Gerry plus salamander). Although the act worked with spectacular success to elect 29 Republican senators and only 11 Federalists, despite nearly equal votes for the two parties, Gerry himself was defeated. Gerry, who favored war with Britain, was elected Madison's vice-president in the 1812 election. He died in Washington on 23 November 1814.

SEE ALSO *Massachusetts Provincial Congress*.

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GIBAULT, PIERRE. (1737–1802). Catholic missionary. Born in Quebec in 1737, Gibault was educated at the Seminary of Quebec and served for a short time at the cathedral. In 1768 Bishop Briand of Quebec sent Gibault to the Illinois country; where Gibault set up residence at Kaskaskia with his mother and sister. The next year he became vicar-general of the territory.

Grateful to George Rogers Clark for his tolerant religious attitude, Father Gibault made himself extremely useful to the Americans in their western operations. He later denied doing anything more than attempting to

avoid bloodshed, but this position appears to have been adopted in 1780 to avoid British charges of treason. In 1785 he moved to Vincennes, and four years later he established his residence in Cahokia. In 1790 he petitioned General Arthur St. Clair for a grant of seminary land to compensate for his losses in the war, and when this was blocked by Bishop John Carroll of Baltimore—who objected to the alienation of church land to an individual clergyman—Father Gibault moved across the Mississippi to become parish priest in the Spanish settlement at New Madrid. He died there early in 1802.

SEE ALSO *Western Operations*.

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GIBSON, GEORGE. (1747–1791). Continental officer. Pennsylvania. Born in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, on 10 October 1747, Gibson joined his brother, John, and together they operated a trading post in Pittsburgh. After that endeavor failed, Gibson returned to eastern Pennsylvania. He served briefly in Dunmore's War (1774). Commissioned Captain of the First Virginia Regiment on 2 February 1776, he organized a company of frontiersmen and took them to join General Hugh Mercer's Brigade at Williamsburg, Virginia. This unit saw no action, but earned a reputation for rowdiness. Appointed agent to deal with Oliver Pollock in New Orleans, he left Fort Pitt on 19 July 1776 with about 25 men disguised as traders, reaching the Spanish city in mid-August, and returned with close to 10,000 pounds of powder. He was promoted to major of the Fourth Virginia Regiment on 4 January 1777, then served in the 1777–1778 military operations in New York and New Jersey. He was promoted to colonel of the First Virginia State Regiment on 5 June 1777. In 1779 he was put in charge of prisoners at York, Pennsylvania, and held this position until January 1782. With the war's end, Gibson returned to his farm at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. In 1791 he was commissioned colonel of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey levies to take part in General Arthur St. Clair's ill-fated expedition against the Indians. Twice wounded at Black Swamp, near Fort Recovery, on 4 November, he was evacuated about 30 miles to Fort Jefferson and died there on 14 December 1791.

SEE ALSO *Gibson, John; Pollock, Oliver*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

GIBSON, JOHN. (1740–1822). Continental officer. Pennsylvania and Virginia. Born in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, on 23 May 1740, Gibson joined General John Forbes's expedition when he was 18, then settled at Fort Pitt to become an Indian trader. He was captured at the start of Pontiac's War, and released in 1764 after a year's captivity. During this period he seems to have been adopted by a Shawnee family and married an Indian woman who may have been Chief John Logan's sister. After resuming his trading enterprise from Fort Pitt, he took part in Dunmore's War and relayed Chief Logan's controversial speech, known as "Logan's Lament."

In 1775 Gibson was an agent of Virginia to the Indians and, being an excellent linguist by this time, he did much to keep them neutral. On 12 November 1776 he was commissioned lieutenant colonel of the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, and on 25 October 1777 he was made colonel of the Sixth Virginia regiment. He took part in operations in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania before transferring west to take part in the inept expedition led by General Lachlan McIntosh in 1778. Gibson was left as commander of the newly established Fort Laurens when McIntosh returned in the late summer or early fall to Fort Pitt, and remained there throughout the winter. Meanwhile, in the reorganization of the Virginia line, he was given command of the Ninth Virginia Regiment on 14 September 1778. Soon after this he apparently returned to the Western Department as second in command to George Rogers Clark for a proposed expedition toward Detroit, but Daniel Brodhead refused to make his regiment available for this operation. Gibson helped oust Brodhead as commander of the Western Department toward the end of the year. He became commander of the Seventh Virginia Regiment on 12 February 1781 and was in command at Fort Pitt for a while before General William Irvine was ordered there on 8 March 1782. On 1 January 1783 he retired from the army, and on 30 September 1783 he was brevetted brigadier general.

Settling in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, he became judge of the court of common pleas and a major general of the militia. With Richard Butler he negotiated the purchase of the "Erie triangle" in 1789. During the Whiskey Rebellion (1794) he made serious enemies among his neighbors and within his own family by siding with the federal authorities. He was secretary of the Indiana Territory from 1801 to 1811, served as acting governor of the new state from 1811 to 1813, and took part in the War of 1812. He died near Pittsburgh on 10 April, 1822.

SEE ALSO *Fort Laurens, Ohio; McIntosh, Lachlan*.

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GIMAT DE SOUBADÈRE, JEAN-JOSEPH. (1747–1793). (Later chevalier de.) Continental officer, aide-de-camp to Lafayette. France. Born in Gers, he became an ensign in the Regiment of Talaru in 1761. Lafayette later indicated that he was a veteran of the German campaigns. On 8 June 1776 he was promoted to first lieutenant in the regiment of Viennois. Recommended by Deane for the rank of major, he went to America with Lafayette as a member of his staff. Reaching Philadelphia in July 1777 with Lafayette, Gimat was commissioned major in the Continental army with retroactive pay and date of rank of 1 December 1776 as recommended by Deane. Lafayette solicited for him the rank of lieutenant colonel, which Congress granted in February 1778, but when Lafayette sought a promotion to colonel for him in October 1778, Congress refused. Gimat served at Lafayette's side at Brandywine, Pennsylvania, Gloucester, New Jersey, and Barren Hill, Pennsylvania. In January 1779 he returned to France on a leave of absence that had been granted by Congress.

In France, Lafayette endorsed petitions for Gimat, and he was awarded the Cross of the Order of Saint Louis (1780) and commissioned a major in the Viennois regiment in 1779, having been promoted to captain in 1778 during his absence. He returned to America with Lafayette. On 17 February 1781 Washington named Gimat commander of a light infantry regiment. Leaving Peekskill, Gimat marched south with Lafayette and led his regiment in the subsequent operations in Virginia. There, Lafayette noted to Washington, Gimat was "particularly beloved" by his troops. He had a prominent part at Green Spring (Jamestown Ford) on 6 July. Lafayette selected him to lead the attack on Redoubt 10 during the operations against Yorktown, but Hamilton claimed the honor by seniority, and Washington chose Hamilton. Gimat's regiment followed in the night attack of 14–15 October, and he was wounded there.

On 4 January 1782 Gimat left Philadelphia for France on indefinite leave, carrying a letter to Lafayette from Washington. His discharge from the Continental army was dated 3 November 1783. On 25 August 1782, at Lafayette's recommendation, he was promoted to colonel in the French army and put in command of the colonial regiment of Martinique. He was governor of Saint Lucia from 21 June 1789 to 3 June 1792, when he

left the service of the French revolutionary government. He was commanding a force of eleven hundred émigrés at Martinique when he was mortally wounded.

SEE ALSO *Barren Hill, Pennsylvania; Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Deane, Silas; Gloucester, New Jersey; Green Spring (Jamestown Ford, Virginia); Lafayette, Marquis de.*

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GIRTY, SIMON. (1741–1818). Loyalist officer. Born near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1741, Girty's father and stepfather were both killed by Indians. In 1756 Girty, his mother, and his three brothers were captured by Indians. After living with the Senecas for three years, he became an interpreter at Fort Pitt in 1759 and a lieutenant of militia. In 1774 he served as a scout under Simon Kenton. At the beginning of the Revolution he continued to serve as an interpreter, helping the Patriot effort to maintain Indian neutrality. But in 1777, after the Shawnees and other Ohio Valley nations went to war against the Patriots, he and his friends, Alexander McKee and Matthew Elliott, were imprisoned at Pittsburgh as Loyalists. The following spring the three men managed to escape to Detroit, where they were given positions with the British, Girty as interpreter to the Iroquois Confederation. From then on Girty figured prominently in western operations, earning a reputation as the "renegade white terror of the Old Northwest." He seemed to be present at every encounter in the West, as he was often confused with his brothers, George and James.

Girty took advantage of the grievances of the Iroquois against white Americans to recruit them to the British side of the war. After operating against Fort Laurens early in 1779, on 4 October he and Elliott led a party of Indians in ambushing Colonel David Rodgers on the Ohio River, killing fifty-seven out of seventy men and capturing six

hundred thousand Spanish dollars in addition to much-needed blankets and other supplies being transported from New Orleans to Fort Pitt. In 1780 he took part in Captain Henry Bird's expedition against the Kentucky settlements, which captured two posts and more than three hundred prisoners. Girty played an important part in Crawford's defeat in June 1782 and witnessed the brutal torture of Crawford.

After taking part in the raid that led to the slaughter of pursuers at Blue Licks, Kentucky, on 19 August 1782, Simon Girty continued to lead Indian raids and to act as an interpreter at most of the conferences between Indians and the British in the Ohio region. He continued in that capacity after the Revolution and took part in the defeat of Arthur St. Clair on 4 November 1791 where, it was charged, he encouraged a warrior to kill the wounded General Richard Butler and chop up his heart for distribution among the tribes. He, McKee, and Elliott were also present at the Battle of Fallen Timbers of 20 August 1794. When Detroit was surrendered to the United States in 1796, Girty moved to Amherstburg just across the border in Canada, continuing to draw his pay as a member of the Indian Department. He died on 18 February 1818.

His brothers James (1743–1817) and George (1745–c. 1812) lived among the Shawnees and Delawares, respectively; both fought with the British and were Indian traders. Modern Saint Marys, Ohio, is on the site of Girty's Town, named after James. A fourth brother, Thomas (1739–1820), was closely associated with the Indians but did not take part in their wars and sided with the Patriots during the Revolution.

SEE ALSO *Blue Licks, Kentucky; Crawford's Defeat; Fort Laurens, Ohio; Kenton, Simon; Western Operations.*

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GIST, CHRISTOPHER. (1705?–1759). Colonial explorer and scout. Maryland. Born near Baltimore, Gist went to work for the Ohio Company in 1750 as a surveyor and cartographer. He accompanied George Washington on his mission into the Ohio country in 1753 and is credited with twice saving Washington's life. He was with Washington in the operations that led to the surrender at Fort Necessity in 1754. The next year he served as Edward Braddock's guide, and with two of his

sons, he fought in the defeat on the Monongahela River. After this defeat, Gist was named captain of the Virginia company of scouts under Washington's command. He also served as commissary of the Virginia militia from 1755 to 1757. He was accused of corruption, but was probably just incompetent. Gist resigned in 1757 when threatened with demotion. At Washington's urging, he was made deputy agent of Indian affairs of the Southern Department. In that capacity he worked to win over Indian allies for the British. He died of smallpox near Winchester, Virginia, on 25 July 1759.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

GIST, MORDECAI. (1743–1792). Continental general. Maryland. Great-grandson of Christopher Guest (d. 1691) and nephew of the famous colonial scout, he received an elementary education and somewhat later entered business in Baltimore. In July 1775 he was elected captain of the Baltimore Independent Company and on 14 January 1776 was commissioned second major of the First Maryland, the famous regiment raised by William Smallwood. He commanded this unit at Long Island in New York on 27 August, where he and his men distinguished themselves in heavy fighting in the open against European professionals. Smallwood commanded the Marylanders at White Plains but was wounded there, and Gist led them in their role as rear guard during the retreat through New Jersey. He was promoted to colonel on 10 December 1776 and commanded the Third Maryland at Germantown. In 1778 he served in the light infantry corps commanded by General Charles Scott. On 9 January 1779 he was appointed brigadier general and assumed command of the Second Maryland Brigade. In April 1780 he started south with Kalb's column. At Camden on 16 August, he won the praise of Kalb and on 14 October 1780 was included in the Camden Thanks of Congress. Gist fought at Yorktown in September and October of 1781, and at Combahee Ferry on 27 August 1782. Retiring on 3 November 1783, he bought a plantation near Charleston and settled there with his third wife. He carried

Gist, Nathaniel

his preoccupation with American politics so far as to name one son Independence (1779) and another States Rights (1787). A grandson, Brigadier General States Rights Gist, was killed in action at Franklin, Tennessee, on 30 November 1864, while leading his Confederate brigade.

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign; Combahee Ferry, South Carolina; Long Island, New York, Battle of; Smallwood, William.*

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revised by Harry M. Ward

GIST, NATHANIEL. (1733–1796). Continental officer. Virginia. Often mistaken for his uncle Nathaniel, this Gist (pronounced "guest") was the son of the famous colonial scout Christopher Gist and first cousin of General Mordecai Gist. He took command of one of the sixteen Additional Continental Regiments on 11 January 1777. The younger Nathaniel Gist lived among the Cherokee as an Indian trader from the mid-1750s until 1775 and was a hunting companion of Daniel Boone. Many scholars maintain that he was the father of Sequoyah (born 1760 or 1761). Gist, who served as a captain of Virginia militia during the Seven Years' War, attempted to persuade the Cherokee to remain neutral during the Revolution, as he also had doubts as to which side to take. By 1776 he had definitely taken the Patriot side and was made a colonel in the Continental Army on 11 January 1777. Washington immediately pressed him into service to negotiate a peace with the Cherokee. By the end of the year, Gist was attempting to persuade Washington to make better use of the Patriots' Indian allies, without much success. Commanding Red Stone Fort in Pennsylvania in 1779, he was sent to reinforce Charleston, becoming a prisoner of war on 12 May 1780. He retired 1 January 1783. In 1793 he moved to his grant of seven thousand acres in Kentucky (awarded by Congress for his services during the Revolution) and died there on his Canewood plantation in 1796. His widow, Judith Cary Bell Gist, married General Charles Scott, who served as governor of Kentucky from 1808 to 1819.

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments; Gist, Christopher; Gist, Mordecai; Scott, Charles.*

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GIST'S LIGHT BRIGADE. A task force commanded by General Mordecai Gist.

SEE ALSO *Combahee Ferry, South Carolina.*

Mark M. Boatner

GIST'S REGIMENT. One of the sixteen "additional continental regiments," it was commanded by Colonel Nathaniel Gist.

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments.*

Mark M. Boatner

GLACIS. A bank sloping away from a fortification in such a way as to expose the attacker to fire from the defenders. Since a considerable amount of labor is usually involved in clearing timber and grading the soil to form a glacis, it normally was found only around permanent fortifications.

Mark M. Boatner

GLOUCESTER, CAPE ANN, MASSACHUSETTS. 8 August 1775. Captain John Linzee of the sixteen-gun sloop-of-war *Falcon* cruising in Massachusetts waters captured an American schooner returning to Gloucester from the West Indies on 1 August, and the following day captured another in Gloucester harbor. On 8 August Linzee sent two of his ship's small boats into the harbor again and became embroiled with the local militia. Linzee lost both of the boats, although American accounts grossly exaggerated his casualties. Fire directed at the town inflamed the Americans. The *Falcon* was later lost at sea in a storm in September 1779.

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

GLOUCESTER, NEW JERSEY. 25 November 1777 (Philadelphia campaign). Leading a reconnaissance in force against Cornwallis's command, Lafayette—with three hundred men from Greene's division—got the better of a skirmish with a more numerous body of Hessians.

SEE ALSO *Lafayette, Marquis de; Philadelphia Campaign.*

Mark M. Boatner

GLOUCESTER, VIRGINIA. 3 October 1781. General Claude-Gabriel, Marquis de Choisy closed in on Gloucester on 3 October, establishing his headquarters at Sewell's Plantation and Ordinary. He formed a cordon completely across the peninsula about three miles out from the British lines and aggressively patrolled the resulting no-man's-land. The defenders under the field command of Banastre Tarleton attempted to oppose this advance but were driven back in a sharp skirmish. This engagement, the only one of substance on the north side of the York River during the siege, began at daybreak when Captain Johann von Ewald moved out of the British works with a task force of about sixty light infantry (primarily from his jäger company) and one hundred light horsemen to establish a screening line while the main body of British and Loyalist infantry conducted a foraging operation. The foragers were falling back to camp about ten in the morning when Choisy pushed forward. Armand, duc de Lauzun's dragoons, about thirty-five of whom were armed with lances, formed the allied vanguard, and the cavalry of Tarleton's Legion covered the British rear. Here is Lauzun's account of what happened:

[When enemy dragoons were reported, he says,] I went forward to learn what I could. I saw a very pretty woman . . . [who] . . . told me that Colonel Tarleton had left her house a moment before; that he was very eager to shake hands with the French Duke. I assured her that I had come on purpose to gratify him. She seemed very sorry for me, judging from experience, I suppose, that Tarleton was irresistible.

Lauzun went on:

I was not a hundred steps from the house when I heard pistol shots from my advance guard. I hurried forward at full speed to find a piece of ground where I could form a line of battle. As I arrived I saw the English cavalry in force three times my own; I charged it without halting; we met hand to hand. Tarleton saw me and rode towards me with pistol raised. We were about to fight single-handed between the two troops when his horse

was thrown by one of his own dragoons pursued by one of my lancers. I rode up to him to capture him [as he lay pinned under his horse]; a troop of English dragoons rode in between us and covered his retreat; he left his horse with me. He charged me twice without breaking my line; I charged the third time, overthrew a part of his cavalry and drove him within the entrenchment of Gloucester. (Lauzun, pp. 207–208)

The action took place along a road that ran between enclosed fields about four miles from Gloucester. This lane debouched into an area where there were woods on Lauzun's left and an open field on the right; half a mile farther along the road was a small redoubt. After the last charge mentioned above by Lauzun, Tarleton reassembled his cavalry behind supporting infantry that came to his rescue and pushed the French hussars back. Next, Virginia militia under the experienced John Mercer came forward to form an unyielding line of allied infantry. Tarleton briefly tested the men, but when they stood firm, he withdrew back into the entrenchments, ending the action.

French casualties were three killed and sixteen wounded; adding Mercer's probably raises the allied total slightly. Estimates of losses on the British side range from twelve to fifty killed, wounded, and captured.

SEE ALSO *Ewald, Johann von; Lauzun, Armand Louis de Gontaut, duc de Biron; Tarleton, Banastre; Yorktown Campaign; Yorktown, Siege of.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

GLOVER, JOHN. (1732–1797). Continental general. Massachusetts. Born in Salem, Massachusetts, on 5 November 1732, Glover moved to nearby Marblehead as a boy and progressed from cordwainer (shoemaker) to wealthy shipowner and merchant. A militia ensign in 1759, by 1773 he was a captain and commanded a company in the regiment of John Gallison. He worked with Elbridge Gerry to establish a smallpox hospital in support of inoculation. Opponents, fearing that partial inoculation would spread the disease, succeeded in preventing the hospital opening in 1773, and then burned the building. A supporter of the Patriot cause, Glover was a member of the Committee of Correspondence and a lieutenant in the town militia. On 19 May 1775 he became a colonel in

the Twenty-first Massachusetts Regiment. After the battle of Bunker Hill, which was fought on 17 June 1775, Glover's regiment joined the troops besieging Boston.

Colonel Glover was charged with equipping and manning armed vessels to attack British supply ships in Massachusetts Bay, and some of his men took part in the capture of the *Nancy*. Glover's regiment was then ordered off to meet a threat against Marblehead and then to protect Beverly. His regiment, now designated the Fourteenth Continental, joined the army in New York City. Glover's unit did not take part in the battle of Long Island on 27 August. Rather, it was sent into the Brooklyn lines on the night of the 29th to extricate General George Washington's encircled army. Glover was put in charge of manning the boats assembled for the evacuation of Long Island on 29 and 30 August, a remarkable operation in which his regiment and the Twenty-seventh Continental Regiment safely ferried men and equipment across East River. At Kip's Bay, on 15 September, his Marbleheaders were rushed up to contain the British beachhead while John Sullivan's Brigade and Henry Knox's guns covered their escape from New York City. Commanding a brigade at Pell's Point on 18 October, Glover fought a well-managed independent action. At White Plains on 28 October, his regiment once again gave a good account of itself.

Washington's famous crossing of the Delaware was made possible by the skilful work of Glover's Marbleheaders under extremely adverse weather conditions and with equipment—Durham Boats—foreign to them. Putting the last man of Washington's main body across at 3 A.M., they participated with Sullivan's Division in the attack on Trenton, on 26 December. Glover's men played a key role in bottling up the enemy's last escape route, and then ferried more than 900 Hessian prisoners back across the Delaware. It was an almost incredible achievement. In 36 hours, in subzero weather, operating much of the time in a storm of wind, hail, rain, and snow, Glover's men put 2,400 troops, 18 cannon, and horses across the river without a loss; marched nine miles to Trenton; fought a battle; marched nine miles back to McKonkey's Ferry with prisoners and captured matériel; and recrossed the river.

The amphibious regiment ended its famous career with this engagement, because its terms of enlistment was complete. Many ex-soldiers became privateersmen. Glover initially declined an appointment as brigadier general, but accepted it in June 1777 in response to a personal request from Washington.

Glover served under Gates in stopping General John Burgoyne's offensive, and escorted the Convention Army to Cambridge, Massachusetts. He commanded one of the two veteran brigades that Washington sent under the Marquis de Lafayette's command to support Sullivan's militia in the Franco-American attack against Newport, Rhode Island, in

1778. In the spring of 1779 he succeeded Sullivan as commander at Providence, Rhode Island, but joined the main army on the Hudson River in June and remained in the highlands during the Yorktown Campaign. Early in 1782 he went to Massachusetts to muster recruits, but bad health led to his retirement on half pay on 22 July 1782. He was brevetted major general on 30 September 1783. He died in Marblehead on 30 January 1797.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne's Offensive; Gerry, Elbridge; Long Island, New York, Evacuation of; Nancy Capture.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

GNADENHUTTEN MASSACRE,

OHIO. 7–8 March 1782. In 1772 the Moravian Brethren established the settlements of Gnadenhutten (huts of mercy) and Schoenbrunn in what was later north-eastern Ohio (Tuscarawas County) on a branch of the Muskingum River. The inhabitants were Christian converts from the Leni Lenape (Delaware) and Mahican tribes. In 1781 the Lenapes broke their tradition of neutrality and sided with the British, placing the still-neutral converts in danger because their missionaries decided to support the Americans. At that point the converts resided at Gnadenhutten and nearby Salem, where the missionaries had hoped they would be out of the zone of conflict. Major Arent de Peyster, the British commandant in Detroit, sent an expedition in August 1781 to forcibly remove the villages so that they could not assist the Americans. The refugees reached the Upper Sandusky on 1 October and struggled to survive the winter. A party returned to the Muskingum to harvest crops and were briefly arrested by suspicious militia. The following February another group went back to work the fields and the Washington County, Pennsylvania, militia mobilized to clear the valley—making no effort to distinguish between the actively hostile bands of Lenapes and the converts.

On the evening of 5 March, militia scouts located Indians near Gnadenhutten; the next day the main body under Colonel David Williamson feigned friendship and entered the village (a detachment simultaneously secured Salem.) On the 7th, when the Salem villagers were brought to Gnadenhutten, the men were seized and tied up in one building, while the women and children were put in a second structure. After voting on the fate of the captives (only sixteen of the militiamen opposed the majority's decision) the prisoners were brought out on the morning of 8 March and brutally

clubbed to death. The exact number of victims is not clear, but it was at least 90 and possibly as high as 140, including 35 children. Williamson's men then burned the two villages and went home. Two young boys survived and brought the news back to the Upper Sandusky. This inexcusable massacre touched off another bitter wave of border warfare.

SEE ALSO *Western Operations*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

GOLDEN HILL, BATTLE OF. 17

January 1770. Beginning in January 1766, the New York assembly resisted providing the funds required under the terms of the Quartering Act (15 May 1765) to house regular troops in the colony, principally in New York City. This opposition led the imperial government to threaten to suspend the assembly until it complied with the requisition, and ultimately to its being prorogued in December 1766. When a new assembly finally voted in December 1769 to appropriate money to house the troops, Alexander McDougall, a leader of the New York Sons of Liberty, published a broadside that began, "To the Betrayed Inhabitants." Friction between the regular troops and inhabitants of New York City finally led to a riot on Golden Hill. The local Sons of Liberty objected when some off-duty soldiers sawed down a liberty pole. When three thousand Sons and their supporters put up a new one, thirty or forty off-duty soldiers armed with bayonets fought citizens armed with swords and clubs. Casualties occurred on both sides over the course of the next two days in what were the most serious civil-military disturbances outside of Boston to that time.

SEE ALSO *Liberty Trees and Poles*; *McDougall, Alexander*; *New York Assembly Suspended*; *Quartering Acts*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

GONDOLA SEE *Gundalow*.

GORDON, WILLIAM. (1728–1807). Historian, clergyman. England and Massachusetts. Born in Hitchin, England, in 1728, Gordon began his ministry

in an Independent church in Ipswich in 1752. Twelve years later he left, after a quarrel with a leading member of the church over the latter's use of workmen on Sunday. He then became minister in Southwark. In 1770, having become sympathetic to the colonial cause and having corresponded with several prominent Americans, he emigrated to Massachusetts. He became pastor of the Third Congregational Church in Roxbury (6 July 1772), and in 1775 was made chaplain of the Provincial Congress. He held the position for less than a year, being dismissed in 1776 in a political dispute. That same year he appointed himself the task of writing a history of the Revolution. Over the next seven years he collected documents, interviewed participants, and traveled widely.

In 1786 Gordon, feeling that the Americans would not accept what he saw as an unbiased history of the Revolution, returned to England. But Gordon found it difficult to get a publisher in England, and he had to remove passages his publisher thought too critical of the government before it could be printed. Gordon's four-volume *History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the Independence of the United States of America* was published in London in 1788. A three-volume American edition was published in New York City the next year. After being considered a prime authority for more than a century, the work was criticized for plagiarizing from the *Annual Register*. The book is nevertheless valuable, because Gordon used letters borrowed from participants (and seldom returned) and corresponded with generals to secure missing details. In 1789 Gordon secured a congregation at St. Neots, in Huntingdonshire. Returning to Ipswich in 1802 he lived the last five years of his life in great poverty, having realized only £300 from the sale of his *History*. He died in Ipswich on 19 October 1807.

SEE ALSO *Burke, Edmund*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

GORDON RIOTS. 2–9 June 1780. The Roman Catholic Relief Act of 1778 in Britain removed restrictions on Catholics. In violent objection to this act, the eccentric Lord George Gordon (1751–1793) headed a Protestant Association in the presentation of a petition to Parliament on 2 June calling for its repeal. That night the mob took control of London, attacking Catholic churches and the houses of well-known Catholics. It took more than

twelve thousand British troops ten days to restore order in the bloodiest riots in British history. Similar riots had already occurred in Glasgow and Edinburgh, but the London riots claimed between seven hundred and a thousand lives. Whereas twenty-one leaders of the crowd were executed and the Lord Mayor of London fined £1,000 for negligence, Gordon was acquitted of treason on the grounds of insanity.

Once generally seen as a curious footnote to the period, the Gordon Riots are now regarded by most historians as extremely important. They put an end to the emerging reform movement in Britain that had been born in response to the failures of the government's policies toward America. The British elite consolidated their support behind the crown, and the general public appears to have rallied to George III at a time when he had broached the idea of abdication with Lord North. As a consequence, the potential impact of the American Revolution was greatly lessened by this renewed support for the king and his government.

SEE ALSO *North, Sir Frederick.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

GORHAM, NATHANIEL. (1738–1796). President of the Continental Congress. Massachusetts. Born in Charlestown, Massachusetts, in May 1738, Gorham was a prosperous merchant who sat in the colonial legislature from 1771 to 1775, in the Provincial Congress from 1774 to 1775, on the Board of War from 1778 to 1781, and in the state constitutional convention from 1779 to 1780. He was in the state senate in 1780 and served in the state house from 1781 to 1787. He was speaker of the house in 1781, 1782, and 1785. He was sent to the Continental Congress in 1782–1783 and 1785–1787. He was elected president of that body on 6 June 1786. He presided over the 1787 federal Constitutional Convention for three weeks, and was influential in his state's ratification of the Constitution the next year. After the war, he and a partner were involved in the development of six million acres ceded by New York to Massachusetts in settlement of a border dispute. Complications over rising prices and Indian claims, however, wiped him out financially, and he died 11 June 1796.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

GORNELL, GEORGE SEE *Mutiny of Gornell.*

GOULD, PASTON. (?–1783). British commander in the South. On 16 October 1755, Gould became a captain in the Twenty-third Foot (an infantry regiment). He became major of the Sixty-eighth Foot on 1 March 1762, and lieutenant colonel of the Thirtieth Foot on 28 March 1764. On 29 August 1777 he was promoted to the rank of colonel. Colonel Gould reached Charleston on 3 June 1781 with reinforcements from Ireland. From that time until the arrival of Lieutenant General Alexander Leslie on 8 November 1781, Gould was the senior British officer in the south. General Henry Clinton gave Gould the local rank of brigadier general upon his arrival in America, and by the time he led reinforcements to join Colonel Alexander Stewart at Monck's Corner on 12 September, he had been given the local rank of major general. Gould was invalided out of the service in 1782, and died the next year.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

GOUVION, JEAN BAPTISTE. (1747–1792). (Chevalier de.) French volunteer. Gouvion was from Toul, the son of a *conseiller du roi*. He was a student-second lieutenant at the engineering school of Mézières (1769–1770) and became an engineer on 1 January 1771. While assigned at Metz, he decided to go to America. On 25 January 1777 he was given leave of absence to go and on 8 July entered the Continental army as major of engineers with rank from 13 February. On 17 November 1777 he advanced to the grade of lieutenant colonel. The fortifications at West Point were planned and executed in part by Gouvion; he also built the redoubt at Verplancks Point and made significant repairs at Fort Schuyler. He served under Duportail in the Yorktown campaign. On 16 November 1781 he was breveted colonel and granted six months' leave to France. Washington commended him in 1783 for "unquestionable proofs of bravery, activity, intelligence and skill" (*Writings*, 27, pp. 40–41). On 10 October 1783 he retired from the Continental army.

He resumed his military career in France, becoming an aide to the *maréchal général* of army operations with the rank of lieutenant colonel. In 1784 he became a chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis. He was promoted to *mestre de camp* in 1787. As a deputy from Paris to the Legislative Assembly in 1791, he served on its military

committee. Rejoining the Army of the Center under Lafayette, he was killed in action at Maubeuge in 1792.

SEE ALSO *Duportail; Fort Schuylers, New York; Lafayette, Marquis de; Verplanck's Point.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

GRAFTON, AUGUSTUS HENRY FITZROY. (1735–1811). British prime minister. Succeeding to his grandfather's dukedom in 1756, Grafton was at first an admirer of Pitt and an ally of Lord Temple. On 9 December 1762 he led the opposition to the peace preliminaries and made a personal attack upon Bute. He was secretary of state for the Northern Department in the Rockingham administration of 1765–1766, resigning two months before the ministry fell. In Chatham's ministry he was first lord of the Treasury, but until 1767, when illness disabled him, the real head of the government was Pitt himself. Grafton stepped reluctantly into the breach but preferred inaction to leadership. In 1769 he was outvoted in the cabinet on the question of retaining Townshend's tea tax. On 30 January 1770, plagued by the opposition of a revived Chatham, he resigned in favor of Lord North.

SEE ALSO *Bute, John Stuart, third Earl of.*

revised by John Oliphant

GRAHAM, JOSEPH. (1759–1836). American officer. Pennsylvania and North Carolina. Born in Chester

County, Pennsylvania, on 13 October 1759, Graham moved south with his family after his father's death in 1763, eventually settling in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. In September 1778 he was commissioned as a lieutenant in the North Carolina Rangers, and later was promoted to captain. He then enlisted with the Fourth North Carolina Continentals, serving a year as quartermaster sergeant. After completing this duty he again volunteered in 1780, was appointed adjutant of a militia regiment, and later became captain of a mounted infantry company. He distinguished himself at Charlotte, North Carolina, on 26 September 1780, where he commanded the rear guard that secured the safe retreat of William Davie's forces from General Charles Cornwallis, receiving nine wounds in the battle. Two months after his recovery he returned to his regiment and remained there until March 1781. In August he organized a dragoon company, and soon thereafter he was promoted to major. For about two months he served near Wilmington, and in November 1781 resigned his commission.

After the war Graham became a successful businessman and local political leader. In 1814 he was appointed commander of a brigade for duty in the Creek War, but delays in equipping his force resulted in its arrival too late to see action. Nonetheless, he was promoted to major general of the North Carolina militia. In 1820 he started writing letters and articles promoting the dubious claims for the Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence. He died at his plantation in Lincoln County, North Carolina, on 12 November 1836.

SEE ALSO *Charlotte, North Carolina; Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

GRANT, JAMES. (1720–1806). British general. In his youth, James Grant studied law, but in September 1741 he abandoned his studies and enlisted in the First Royal Scots Regiment as an ensign. Promoted second lieutenant in May 1742, he was sent to Flanders in June 1744. During the summer he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant, and on 24 October he was made a captain. He fought at Fontenoy (Belgium) on 11 May 1745, emerging from the action without a scratch. Appointed aide-de-camp to General James St. Clair, he was in the raid on Quiberon Bay, off the coast of France, in October 1746. In 1747 and

1748, he accompanied General Arthur St. Clair on a mission to Vienna and Turin. From 1752 to 1755 he tutored St. Clair's nephew, a student at Göttingen, in Germany. In February 1757 he was promoted major in the First Highland Regiment (later the Seventy-seventh Highland Regiment), commanded by Archibald Montgomery. After garrison duty in South Carolina, he joined John Forbes's expedition in 1758 against Fort Duquesne. On 14 September, while leading a reconnaissance party against the French and Indians, he was defeated and captured.

Released in late 1759, Grant accompanied Montgomery as second in command, with the brevet rank of lieutenant colonel, on an expedition against the Cherokees in South Carolina. He campaigned with General Archibald Montgomery during the summer of 1760 against the Cherokee settlements known as the Lower Towns, and in July was promoted permanent lieutenant colonel. In 1761, he commanded his own expedition against the Cherokees, defeating them at the village of Etchoe on 10 June. He was promoted to brevet colonel of the Fortieth Regiment on 25 February 1762, and participated in the siege of Havana, Cuba. After short service as lieutenant governor of Havana, he returned to England in early 1763. Obtaining the governorship of East Florida, he spent the next seven years trying to improve that province. He promoted the cultivation of indigo, dealt fairly with the Indians, and strengthened East Florida's defenses. On 9 May 1771 he returned home to take possession of Ballindalloch, his family's estate in Scotland, which he had inherited the year before.

Fond of high living, the corpulent Grant lived in comfort at Ballindalloch and his London town house. In April 1773 he was elected to the House of Commons and became a firm supporter of the North ministry (the government of Prime Minister Frederick, Lord North). Taking a hard line against Americans who resisted British authority, he advocated coercion and proposed a naval blockade to bring the recalcitrants to heel. On 2 February 1775 he made a disparaging and inflammatory speech against Americans in the House of Commons, which he later attempted to moderate. In March he was promoted brigadier general for America, and on 30 July he joined the British army in Boston. There he advocated harsh, retributive warfare against the rebels and was disgusted when his superiors did not take his advice. He was made colonel of the Fifty-fifth Regiment on 11 December, and two days later was promoted to major general. In the battle of Long Island, on 26 August 1776, he commanded the British left, and on 16 November he assisted in the capture of Fort Washington on Manhattan.

In December 1776, Grant was placed in command of Hessian garrisons in New Jersey. He was surprised on 26 December, when American troops successfully assaulted the garrison at Trenton. Disgusted, he observed

in 1777 that the rebels would neither fight nor surrender. They were, he declared, a bore. In April and June he skirmished against the Americans at Bound Brook and Woodbridge, and he fought well at Brandywine (11 September) and Germantown (4 October). On 20 May 1778 he was criticized for allowing rebel troops to escape an encirclement at Barren Hill, but he fought ably at Monmouth on 28 June. By that time he had become convinced that the war in America was unwinnable, and was happy in October to be ordered to the West Indies.

Grant seized St. Lucia from the French on 13 December, he but lost St. Vincent and Grenada to the enemy in the next few months. Sick and exhausted, he returned to England on 1 August 1779. He resumed his seat in the House of Commons, and served there until his retirement in 1802 at the age of eighty-one. In 1782 he was promoted lieutenant general and appointed governor of Dumbarton Castle. Because of his loyalty to the Pitt ministry, in 1789 he was given the governorship of Stirling Castle. In addition, he was appointed colonel of the Eleventh Regiment on 9 November 1791, given command of troops in northern England in 1793, and promoted to the rank of general in 1796. Only once did he defy Prime Minister William Pitt's wishes, voting against the Slave Trade Bill in 1791. He resigned from the army in 1796, and spent the remainder of his days in comfort and leisure at Ballindalloch.

Early in life, Grant had announced that his intention in life was to secure a good house in London, along with a good cook, good food, good wine—good everything. He succeeded. A bon vivant, he became corpulent and gouty in his old age. But he was also a loyal, competent, intelligent, brave, and idealistic soldier and politician.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars.*

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revised by Paul David Nelson

GRAPE OR GRAPESHOT. Iron balls, held together in a rack or bag, that scatter when discharged from a cannon. Differing from canister only in that the balls are much larger and hence less effective against personnel, grape was designed for fire against enemy gun

batteries, ships, and light fortifications but could also be effective against massed formations.

SEE ALSO *Canister*.

Mark M. Boatner

GRASSE, FRANÇOIS JOSEPH PAUL, COMTE DE. (1722–1788). French admiral. A page of the Knights of Malta (1733), he was inscribed on the rolls of the naval guard in June 1734 and activated that duty in 1737. In 1740 he served in the Antilles and the Mediterranean during the War of Jenkins's Ear. In May 1747 he was captured while serving as an ensign in the battle off Finisterre and was taken to England. A nobleman of one of France's oldest families, six feet two inches tall, and considered one of the handsomest men of the period, he rose steadily in his profession, serving in Indian waters, the West Indies, the expedition against the Moroccan corsairs, and in the Mediterranean before taking command of the Marine Brigade at Saint-Malo in 1773.

On 5 June 1775 he sailed for Saint Domingue as commander of the twenty-six-gun frigate *Amphitrite*. Back in France the next year, he took command of the seventy-four-gun ship of the line *Intrépide* and on 1 June 1778 became a *chef d'escadre*. He commanded a division in the indecisive battle off Ushant on 27 July 1778 before returning to American waters. He commanded a squadron under Estaing in the battle against Admiral Byron off Grenada and in the operation against Savannah. After temporarily commanding the French fleet in the West Indies, he led a squadron in Guichen's engagement with Rodney off Martinique. In bad health, he sailed home with Guichen, reaching Cadiz on 23 October 1780 and Brest on 3 January. Although his health had not recovered and he was almost sixty years old, on 22 March 1781 he was promoted to rear admiral, and the same day he sailed from Brest with a fleet of 20 ships of the line, three frigates, and a convoy of 150 ships for the West Indies.

With discretionary orders to give Rochambeau and Washington whatever support was possible, Grasse played a decisive role in the Yorktown campaign. Consequently, he had a decisive role in the winning of American independence.

He started back for the West Indies on 4 November 1781, and after capturing St. Kitts (12 February 1782) he was—despite efforts of Hood to relieve the eleven-hundred-man garrison—defeated and captured aboard the *Ville de Paris* on 12 April in the battle off Saints Passage (9–12 April). While in London as a prisoner during the

period 2–12 August 1782, he had several conversations with Lord Shelburne, who spoke to him of terms under which the new ministry would consider negotiating peace. The day after he returned to Paris on parole, Grasse sent his nephew to see the comte de Vergennes and give an oral report, and on this same day (17 August) Vergennes used this information to draft his Preliminary Articles of Peace. Grasse then served as an intermediary between Shelburne and his government in this important preliminary phase of the peace negotiations.

Although the official attitude toward his defeat in the West Indies was favorable at this time, Grasse found himself the popular scapegoat for this French disaster. The admiral had bluntly reported to the minister of marine, duc de Castries, that most of his fleet had abandoned him on 12 April 1782. In a flood of letters and memoirs, he spelled out his accusations against his subordinates, particularly Bougainville. The subordinates went to Castries with their counteraccusations, and a publicity storm developed. During four months a tribunal heard 222 witnesses and on 21 May 1784 announced its findings. Bougainville was officially reprimanded for misconduct on the afternoon of the 12th—which amounted to a slap on the wrist. No official action was brought against Grasse, but when he appealed to Louis XVI to pass judgment, he found the king was displeased not by the naval defeat but by Grasse's attempts to clear his own name at the expense of his subordinates and the French navy. He was informed of this in a blunt letter from Castries and advised to retire to his country home. He died suddenly at his town house in Paris. During the French Revolution, his Château de Tilly was destroyed by a mob, and the four captured cannon from Yorktown, which Congress had sent him in 1784, were dragged off to be melted into revolutionary coin.

SEE ALSO *Bougainville, Louis Antoine de; Shelburne, William Petty Fitzmaurice, Earl of; Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Comte de; Yorktown Campaign; Yorktown, Siege of.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

GRASSHOPPER. Lightweight, sturdy, brass three-pounder guns were developed in Britain in the early 1770s and were valued for their high mobility. Officially known as the “Light Infantry Three-Pounder,” mounted on a carriage developed by William Congreve, and elevated by a iron screw rather than a wooden quoin, the gun could be drawn by a single horse (known as a “galloper”) or disassembled and carried on packhorses, or even by the gunners themselves. It was frequently the only artillery piece that could accompany a unit that had to travel light. Its mobility, along with the manner in which this relatively small field piece recoiled when fired, earned it the nickname “grasshopper.”

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

GRASSHOPPERS OF SARATOGA.

Two grasshoppers captured from the British at Saratoga were recaptured at Camden, taken back by the Americans at Cowpens, and recaptured by the British at Guilford Courthouse.

SEE ALSO *Grasshopper*.

Mark M. Boatner

GRAVES, SAMUEL. (1713–1787). British admiral. He began his naval service on HMS *Exeter* in November 1732. Passing for lieutenant on 6 October 1739, he saw service in the War of Jenkins’s Ear and the War of the Austrian Succession. In 1743 he was at Cartagena in the *Norfolk* under his uncle Thomas and served alongside the latter’s son, also Thomas. Samuel attracted attention for his part in the storming of the batteries, and in December he was given the command of the sloop *Bonetta*. He was made post captain the following year and was on active service until 1748. During the Seven Years’ War he took part in the abortive 1757 expedition against Rochefort and commanded the *Duke* in Admiral Hawke’s victory at Quiberon Bay on 20 November 1759. He remained on the *Duke* until 1762, when he was made rear admiral. The peace, however, put him on half pay, though he was raised to vice admiral in October 1770.

On 28 March 1774 he was made commander in chief of the North American squadron, with orders to enforce the Boston Port Act and in particular the blockade of Boston declared by his predecessor. Later he was told to prohibit imports of arms and ammunition into the all colonies. With only nineteen vessels, the wider task was impossible, and even with nine of these off Boston, he could not command all the channels leading to the port. On top of this, he was not officially permitted to seize American ships until September 1775 and was understandably unwilling to allow his commanders to fire unless attacked themselves. His apparent inaction provoked attacks on the government in Parliament, and Sandwich, who did his best to protect Graves, ordered him to attack coastal towns. Predictably, the burning of Falmouth, Massachusetts, on 18 October alienated uncommitted colonists even more surely than British press gangs. Yet Graves was still accused of incompetence and idleness. In the end, even the king wanted him sacked, and Sandwich could not save him. On 27 January he handed over his command and sailed for home. Shortly afterwards his thankless task passed to Lord Richard Howe.

Graves was now politically unemployable, at least in an active post that he would need to salvage his reputation. Even Sandwich’s best efforts could procure him only the Plymouth command, an offer Graves angrily rejected. The spat sealed his fate, and he was never again employed. In January 1778 he became admiral of the Blue and four years later he was advanced to the White. Twice married, he had no children and died in Devon on 8 March 1787.

Graves was a perfectly competent admiral brought up to obey orders and execute the fighting instructions. Given a conventional campaign and an enemy fleet to engage, he might have acquitted himself tolerably well. Confronted with a situation which demanded brilliance, moral daring, and ruthlessness, he was entirely out of his depth. However, it was the ministry’s failure to offer him sufficient ships, adequate orders, and firm political support—as well as the sheer scale of the task—that doomed him to failure.

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revised by John Oliphant

GRAVES, THOMAS. (1725–1802). British admiral. Entering the navy at an early age and made lieutenant on 25 June 1743, he served in a number of actions, including both battles of Cape Finisterre (3 May

and 2 October 1747). He was made post captain on 8 July 1755 and was instrumental in saving Newfoundland in 1761. After varied peacetime service he went in the *Conqueror* to America with Byron in 1778. Promoted to rear admiral on 19 March 1779, he became second in command to Sir Charles Hardy in the Channel Fleet. Here in 1779–1780 he and Richard Kempenfelt experimented with more flexible modes of signaling and fleet control. In the spring of 1780 he sailed with reinforcements for the North American squadron and joined Arbuthnot at New York on 13 July. Graves took part in the action against Destouches on 16 March 1781 and on Arbuthnot's departure took over the North American station.

He found himself facing a crisis: many of his ships were out of repair, and the stocks of naval stores were run down; Arbuthnot had quarrelled with Rodney and Clinton; and warnings from the Admiralty and Rodney told of a large French force in the West Indies. On 28 August 1781, Hood appeared off New York with fourteen of the line and the news that De Grasse had left the West Indies, while other intelligence told Graves that Barras had sailed from Rhode Island. The likely targets were the Chesapeake or New York itself. Three days later Graves sailed for the Chesapeake, but when he arrived on 5 September, De Grasse was already in the bay with twenty-four of the line. Graves, not wishing to be trapped inside, turned seaward to offer battle. In the ensuing action Graves, wary of De Grasse's superior numbers, kept his line of battle tightly closed up and approached the French line diagonally. As a result, his leading ships were heavily engaged, but those in the rear (Hood's) were unable to come up before dark.

Having failed to cripple De Grasse's fleet and fearful of the condition of his own ships, Graves dared not resume the battle. He could have taken Hood's advice to race back to reach Cornwallis at Yorktown, but then the French could have penned him into the bay with possibly dire consequences for New York. On the night of 9–10 September, De Grasse slipped away, and when Graves reached the Chesapeake on the 11th, both French squadrons were there, a combined force of thirty-six of the line. Graves could only return to New York for repairs. Reinforced by five of the line under Rear Admiral Digby and by two latecomers from the West Indies, Graves sailed again on 19 October with twenty-four ships of the line and seven thousand soldiers. It was a desperate venture, and it was probably as well that Cornwallis surrendered the next day. On hearing the news Graves prudently returned to New York, where he handed over to Digby and sailed to take command in the West Indies.

Graves was not blamed for the Yorktown disaster, and he went on to have a distinguished career. Promoted to vice admiral in 1787, he became commander in chief at

Plymouth in 1788. In 1793 he was appointed Lord Howe's second in commanding the Channel fleet. He rose to full admiral in 1794 and commanded the British van in the chase action of 1 June, when his arm was so badly wounded that he had to resign. He was awarded an Irish barony and a pension of one thousand pounds a year.

SEE ALSO *Arbuthnot, Marriot; Destouches, Charles René Dominique Sochet.*

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GRAVIER, CHARLES **SEE** *Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Comte de.*

GRAYSON'S REGIMENT. Grayson's regiment was one of sixteen "additional continental regiments."

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments.*

Mark M. Boatner

GREAT BREWSTER ISLAND, MASSACHUSETTS. American raids of 21 and 31 July 1775 during the siege of Boston. Also called Light House Island, a mile offshore from Nantasket Point, it was successfully raided on 21 July by Major Joseph Vose. Recalled Heath,

The detachment under his command, brought off 1,000 bushels of barley, all the hay, &c. [from Nantasket]—went to Light-House Island; took away the lamps, oil, some gunpowder, the boats, &c. and burnt the wooden parts of the lighthouse. An armed schooner and several boats, with men, engaged the detachment; of the Americans, two were wounded.

The night of 30–31 July, Major Benjamin Tupper led a force of three hundred men in whaleboats to stop repair

work on the lighthouse and capture the British guard and workmen. Tupper's excellent leadership resulted in the killing or capture of the entire enemy detachment, which numbered thirty-two marines, a subaltern, and ten carpenters. Although Tupper's escape was delayed by missing one tide, he evacuated all the enemy wounded and sustained only two casualties.

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege*.

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Mark M. Boatner

GREAT BRIDGE, VIRGINIA. 9 December 1775. In the late fall of 1775, Colonel William Woodford led a patriot force built around the riflemen of the Culpeper Minute Battalion towards Norfolk. Governor Dunmore's defenses began at Great Bridge about nine miles away. Here he had fortified one end of a long causeway the rebels would have to cross on their way to Norfolk; surrounded by tidal swamps and covering a defile, the British position was potentially strong and was made stronger by the removal of part of the causeway's planks. It was held by some three hundred Loyalist levies, some from Dunmore's Ethiopians (a regiment formed from freed slaves) and the others from his all-white Loyal Virginians.

Woodford had built a redoubt at the other end of the causeway, posted Lieutenant Edward Travis there with about ninety men, and encamped the rest of his force on a hill about four hundred yards to the rear. John Marshall, later chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, was a lieutenant in Woodford's command, and his father, Major Thomas Marshall, was also there. A captured British officer later admitted that the senior Marshall's servant pretended to be a deserter and told them there were no more than three hundred "shirt-men" (militia riflemen) at the bridge. This stratagem tempted Dunmore into ordering an assault on the rebel breastworks in an effort (reminiscent of Gage's decision at Bunker Hill) to break the back of Patriot resistance by a show of force. About 3 A.M. he reinforced the causeway with two hundred of his precious regular infantry, men drawn from the Fourteenth Foot. The British also quietly began replacing the planks. The exact number of Americans present as reveille sounded is not known, but it included a detachment of the Second Virginia Regiment (Continental) as well as the minutemen and some militia.

Responding to Governor Dunmore's orders, Captain Charles Fordyce led a frontal attack down the causeway with his 60 grenadiers and another 140 or so available regulars; Captain Samuel Leslie was to follow up with a reserve of 230 Loyalists. As Fordyce crossed the bridge his advance drew fire, alerting the American camp, and Woodford and Major Alexander Spotswood raced forward to reinforce the redoubt. The resulting struggle lasted about a half an hour, with the lead element of Fordyce's grenadiers under the command of a Lieutenant John Batut, bayonets fixed, making it to within a few yards of the redoubt before being decimated and driven back. As at Bunker Hill, the British regulars behaved with great courage and took appalling losses, but to no valid military purpose. Woodford said in his official report to President Edmund Pendleton of the Virginia Convention that the "victory was complete," and that the British withdrew into their fort. Two days later they abandoned the position and its six cannon and fell back to their ships.

The Virginians buried Captain Fordyce and twelve of his men. They also captured Lieutenant Batut and sixteen privates, all wounded. Captured weapons, including three officers' fusils, led the victors to assume (probably optimistically) that there were substantial additional British casualties. The only rebel casualty was one man slightly wounded in the hand.

This was the first real engagement between British soldiers and colonists in Virginia. Like Bunker Hill, it carried significance beyond its numbers or its tactical results, serving to boost American confidence not only in Virginia but also in North Carolina, whose Continentals under Robert Howe arrived almost immediately to reinforce Woodford. Dunmore's evacuation allowed the rebels to occupy Norfolk, which in turn prompted Dunmore's destruction of the town in January 1776.

SEE ALSO *Howe, Robert; Murray, John; Norfolk, Virginia; Virginia, Military Operations in; Woodford, William*.

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

"GREAT JEHOVAH AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS." Four years after the capture of Fort Ticonderoga, New York, on 10 May 1775, Ethan Allen recorded that he had demanded the surprised commandant to surrender, in what has become a famous phrase, "in the name of the Great Jehovah and the Continental Congress."

SEE ALSO *Allen, Ethan; Ticonderoga, New York, American Capture of.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

GREATON, JOHN. (1741–1783). Continental general. Massachusetts. Born on 10 March 1741 at Roxbury, John Greaton was the son of a small-time retail merchant who was also the last landlord of the famous Greyhound Tavern in Roxbury. The son joined his father in the family's businesses and opposed changes in imperial trade regulations after the French and Indian War, in which he apparently did not serve.

Although he was a member of the Anglican Church and accepted a commission from the royal governor as lieutenant in an elite militia unit on 18 November 1774, he also joined the Sons of Liberty and was one of fifteen local leaders chosen by their neighbors on 26 December 1774 to enforce the Continental Congress's nonimportation agreement. The Massachusetts Provincial Congress named him colonel of his local Suffolk County minuteman regiment, and he led part of the regiment in the pursuit of the British from Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775. On 19 May 1775 he was appointed lieutenant colonel of William Heath's regiment, raised for the siege of Boston. Promoted to colonel of the regiment on 1 July after Heath had been made a Continental brigadier general, he led raids on British depots during the siege, the most famous of which was against Long Island in Boston Harbor on 12 July 1775. In the reorganization of the Continental army for 1776, he was named colonel of the Twenty-fourth Continental Regiment on 1 January and on 15 April was ordered to Canada. After arduous and demoralizing service in the north, he took command of the Thirty-Sixth Continental Regiment in October and was named on 1 November 1776 as colonel of the new Third Massachusetts Regiment for 1777. In December 1776 he joined Washington's army and took part in the Battles of Trenton and Princeton. He served in Brigadier General John Nixon's brigade in opposing Burgoyne's invasion in 1777, then became senior officer at Albany and for a time commanded the Northern Department.

Greaton served with his regiment in the main army for the remainder of the war, and as a colonel was given permanent command of the Third Massachusetts Brigade in August 1782. The delay in his promotion to brigadier general seems to have been a result of the reduction in size of the Massachusetts Line, not because he took an active part in expressing to Congress the distress and unrest in the army. He was being considered for promotion in December 1782 when he joined with officers from five states to ask Congress to commute half-pay for life for retired officers, already promised, into five years of full pay or a single lump sum payment. Several months later, Congress agreed to give officers five years of full pay after it had appointed Greaton brigadier general on 7 January 1783. He retired on 3 November and died 16 December 1783 at Roxbury.

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GREAT SAVANNAH, SOUTH CAROLINA. 20 August 1780. When the Whigs of the Williamsburg district (thirty miles up the Peedee from Georgetown) in South Carolina asked that Colonel Francis Marion come take command of their militia, General Horatio Gates, who shared the view of most regulars that the partisans were unreliable, was happy to oblige. Though Gates needed every man for the upcoming confrontation with the British, he ordered Marion to destroy boats along the Santee and to assist in trapping and destroying whatever portion of the British army might escape the defeat Gates expected to inflict around Camden. Marion left Rugeley's Mill on 14 August 1780.

Marion quickly set about organizing his scattered partisan forces. On 17 August he sent Colonel Peter Horry with four new dragoon companies to operate against Georgetown, and with the rest of his command started a march of about sixty miles toward the Santee. On the 19th Marion learned of Gates's defeat at Camden, but he continued his advance without telling his men. That night he received information that a large group of prisoners from Camden had camped with a strong guard on Thomas Sumter's abandoned plantation at Great Savannah, six miles above Nelson's Ferry on the Santee. Although greatly outnumbered, he prepared a surprise attack at dawn. Just before daylight he sent Colonel Hugh Horry with sixteen picked men to block the main road where it crossed a wide

swamp at Horse Creek Pass, and with the rest of his command, Marion circled around to strike the enemy from the rear. The surprise was complete, and elements of the British Sixty-third Regiment and the Prince of Wales Loyal American Volunteers fled before the first onslaught, which inflicted four casualties. Marion took 20 prisoners while liberating 150 soldiers of the Maryland line.

After this coup Marion returned to the protective covering of the swamps while General Charles Cornwallis sent troops to clear the guerrillas from his line of communications with Charleston. On 28 August, Cornwallis ordered Major James Wemyss to march the Sixty-third Regiment from the High Hills of the Santee to Cheraw on the Upper Peedee, and on 5 September, Wemyss started a raid that left a fifteen-mile-wide swath of destruction between these two places.

SEE ALSO *Prince of Wales American Volunteers*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

GREEN, JOHN. (?–1793). Continental officer. Virginia. Green was made captain of the First Virginia Regiment on 6 September 1775, and was promoted to major on 13 August 1776. He was wounded at Mamaroneck on 21 October 1776. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 22 March 1777, colonel of the Tenth Virginia Regiment on 26 January 1778, and transferred to the Sixth Virginia Regiment on 14 September 1778. He joined Nathanael Greene's army with 400 militia in mid-January 1781, before the battle of Cowpens, and commanded the Fourth Virginia Continentals at Guilford, where his regiment was held out of the main line to provide support and protection for the withdrawal of the main body. His troops successfully covered Greene's retreat from the field of battle that day. He commanded the Sixth Virginia Regiment until 1 January 1783, when he retired from military service.

SEE ALSO *Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

GREEN DRAGON TAVERN, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS. The meeting place of the Caucus Club and Sons of Liberty, it has been called "Headquarters of the American Revolution."

SEE ALSO *Caucus Club of Boston*.

Mark M. Boatner

GREENE, CHRISTOPHER. (1737–1781). Continental officer. Rhode Island. Born in Warwick, Rhode Island, on 12 May 1737, Greene was a businessman engaged in the operation of forges, anchor works, dams, and sawmills on the south branch of the Pawtuxet River. He represented Warwick in the Rhode Island legislature in 1771 and 1772. In 1774 he was made a lieutenant in the Kentish Guards, marching with them to Boston on the day of the battles at Lexington and Concord. He was appointed major of James Mitchell Varnum's Rhode Island Regiment on 3 May 1775, and shortly thereafter he moved with them to participate in the siege of Boston.

Volunteering for Benedict Arnold's march to Quebec (September through November 1775), Greene was commissioned as a lieutenant colonel and given command of the first battalion. He was captured during the assault on Quebec on 31 December 1775–1 January 1776, and held prisoner until August 1777. While in captivity he was promoted to the position of colonel of the First Rhode Island Regiment, on 27 February 1777.

Given command of strategic Fort Mercer on the Delaware River, near Philadelphia, Greene conducted its defense and then supervised its evacuation when it was no longer tenable. Congress voted to present him with a sword in recognition of his achievements. Commanding a newly raised regiment of African American troops who had been recruited from slaves freed to serve in the army, he played a prominent and highly commended part in the battle of Rhode Island on 29 August 1778. In both the Fort Mercer and Newport operations he was under the command of his famous kinsman, General Nathanael Greene. After continuing to serve with General George Washington's main army, Greene took command of the lines in Westchester County, New York, in the spring of 1781. He was killed at Croton River on 14 May 1781.

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege; Croton River, New York; Fort Mercer, New Jersey; Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778)*.


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revised by Michael Bellesiles

GREENE, NATHANAEL. (1742–1786). Continental general. Rhode Island. The American who



Nathanael Greene. *Greene, a continental general from Rhode Island, emerged from the American Revolution with a military reputation second only to George Washington's. He is depicted here in a portrait (c. 1783) by Charles Willson Peale.* HULTON ARCHIVE/GETTY IMAGES.

emerged from the Revolution with a military reputation second only to that of General (later President) George Washington was born in Warwick, Rhode Island, to Quaker parents. His father, Nathanael Greene, Sr., had a bias against schooling, preferring that Nathanael, Jr. get his learning in the family business. Nathanael Greene therefore received no formal education. Self-taught, however, he became an avid reader, especially of military subjects, and a book collector. As a youth, Greene worked at the family iron forge at Warwick, and in 1770 he was put in charge of the family forge at Coventry, on the Pawtuxet River. He married Catherine "Kitty" Littlefield in 1774.

GREENE'S RAPID RISE

On the eve of the Revolution in 1774, Greene organized a militia unit, the Kentish Guards, which deed earned him excommunication from the local Quaker Meeting. Members of the Kentish Guards did not elect him an officer because he had a stiff knee and limped slightly, but he demonstrated his patriotism by enlisting as a private. In six months he would be a general.

Greene served in the Rhode Island legislature from 1770 to 1772 and again in 1775. During his final term, attracting notice because of his military knowledge and fervor, he was named to a committee on Rhode Island defenses. To the surprise of many, Greene, without any previous military experience other than being a private in the Kentish Guards, received a commission from the Legislature in May 1775 as a brigadier general of the new Rhode Island Army of Observation. Greene marched his brigade to Cambridge, Massachusetts, where, on 23 May 1775, he joined in the siege of Boston. In Providence at the time, he missed the Battle of Bunker Hill on 17 June 1775. On 22 June Congress brought Greene's brigade into the Continental Army and appointed him a brigadier general—the youngest officer in that grade. During the Boston siege, Greene showed an ability in facilitating logistics and smoothing relationships among troops from different geographical regions.

After the British evacuated Boston, Washington's army headed for New York City and its environs. Greene and his brigade assumed responsibility for defenses on Long Island. On 9 August 1776 Congress promoted Greene to major general, thereby making him a division commander. Too ill at the time, Greene did not participate in the battle of Long Island, 27 August 1776, and was replaced by General John Sullivan, who was captured by the enemy. Although he did not personally participate in the battle of Harlem Heights on 16 September 1776, Greene was nearby, giving encouragement to the troops. On 17 September Greene was placed in command of the Flying Corps, American troops, mainly militia, that were guarding New Jersey. On 15 October Greene led his troops across Arthur Kill to Staten Island, expecting to attack the British post there, but found it too strongly defended. He withdrew his forces to the New Jersey shore.

Unfortunately for Greene's reputation, Washington heeded his advice to retain Forts Washington (on the east bank of the Hudson River, on Manhattan Island) and Lee (on the opposite bank of the Hudson, in New Jersey). As Washington retreated across New Jersey, both forts fell behind British lines. The enemy captured them on 16 and 20 November, respectively. Fort Washington gave up 2,800 prisoners to the British. Despite Greene's bad judgment, Washington continued to trust his advice and hold him in high esteem.

Greene, again commanding a division, demonstrated his reliability at the battles of Trenton (26 December 1776) and Princeton (3 January 1777). During the winter and spring of 1777, Greene set up an advanced line of posts, forming a screen to the coast for Washington's winter quarters at Morristown. Greene's forces and other American troops persistently harassed British foraging and scouting parties, with the occasional result of major skirmishing.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY SKIRMISHES

In March 1777 Washington sent Greene to confer with Congress when that body indicated a growing dissatisfaction with the performance of the army. This and other evidence of Washington's confidence in Greene's judgment led to criticism that Greene was dominating the commander in chief. In May 1777 Greene and Henry Knox were sent to study the terrain of the New York Highlands when it appeared that the British might launch an offensive in that direction. Greene joined Generals Henry Knox and John Sullivan in a threat to resign if Congress appointed a Frenchman, Charles Phillippe Tronson Du Coudray, over their heads. The politicians resented this "dictation" by army officers, and John Adams advised Greene to apologize. Greene refused to do so, and Congress worked out a solution acceptable to the generals, making Du Coudray a major general of the staff. Du Coudray's subsequent accidental death provided a convenient solution to the crisis.

At the battle of Brandywine, 11 September 1777, Greene's division had to shift quickly from the center of the American line to cover the army's right flank against an unexpected assault by the enemy. Greene's troops met the challenge, marching four miles in forty-five minutes. The determined stand by soldiers under one of Greene's brigade commanders, George Weedon, halted the advance of the enemy. At the battle of Germantown, 4 October 1777, although Greene's division, forming the main column, arrived on the field of battle after the action had begun, it pushed the enemy to the Schuylkill River. With utter confusion developing among the American troops, Greene ultimately had no choice but to join the general retreat of the American forces.

AN EXTRAORDINARY ADMINISTRATOR

Greene reluctantly accepted the post of quartermaster general thrust upon him by Congress on 2 March 1778. An exception to the common practice of staff officers not serving in the line, Greene was allowed to retain his field command, meaning that he, too, could participate in battle. Greene, nevertheless, thought he was forfeiting opportunity for glory, the leading motivation for his military service. Writing to General Alexander McDougall on 28 March 1778, Greene said: "All of you will be immortalizing your selves in the golden pages of History, while I am confined to a series of druggery to pave the way for it." Greene presided over a Quartermaster Department, under which an ever expanding number of agencies eventually were subordinated. Ultimately, there were three thousand employees working under Greene's authority. Greene brought greater order to his department. Not only did he

supervise all kinds of provisioning but he also managed site selection and the establishment of camps for Washington's army. In addition, his department supplied General John Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois Indians in summer 1779.

Greene and his two top assistants, Charles Pettit and John Cox, were allowed to share equally in a commission of one percent on all purchases. Until the commission system was abolished by Congress in 1780, this system gave rise to the suspicion that those administering the Quartermaster Department were unfairly reaping great personal profits. Indeed, Greene seemed to have ample funds for investment in shipping, privateering, iron-manufacture, and real estate speculation. Greene was a partner in two firms which did business in supplying the army, albeit minimally. One of these companies was headed by his brother, Jacob, and the other by an associate of Greene's, Jeremiah Wadsworth.

Despite qualms that Greene might be profiteering, Washington remained adamant in his praise of Greene's administration of the Quartermaster Department. Writing to the President of Congress on 3 August 1778, Washington asserted that "the public is much indebted" to Greene "for his judicious management and active exertions in his present department. When he entered upon it, he found it in a most confused, distracted and destitute state. This by his conduct and industry has undergone a very happy change." Indeed, Washington added, the vigorous pursuit of the American army of British troops after they evacuated Philadelphia may be credited to Greene's fine tuning of the Quartermaster Department.

The effects of Greene's able direction of the Quartermaster Department were dramatically apparent during the Morristown winter encampment, 1779–1780, with weather conditions much worse than they had been at Valley Forge. Operations in the summer of 1780 also showed that Greene's system of field depots and his improvement of the transportation system greatly increased the army's mobility. Two of his detractors in Congress, Thomas Mifflin and Timothy Pickering, presented a plan for reorganizing his department. Greene's methods, if not his results, had given Congress grounds for criticism, and the reorganization plan gathered support. Incensed, Greene demanded a vote of confidence but was refused it by Congress. After they adopted the new plan, on 15 July, Greene announced he would no longer serve as Quartermaster General. Congress considered this a second challenge to its authority and after accepting his resignation on 3 August, some delegates made an unsuccessful attempt to have him expelled from the army. With Timothy Pickering as his replacement, Greene himself moved on to assume command of American forces at West Point and the adjacent Highlands, a position just vacated by the treason of General Benedict Arnold.

RETURNING TO THE FIELD

During his tenure as Quartermaster General, Greene, on occasion, exercised field command. When Washington dismissed Charles Lee as commander of the American troops at the battle of Monmouth (28 June 1778), Greene took Lee's place, the British army left the battle site at nightfall. Greene brought his division to aid General John Sullivan's troops against the British in Rhode Island, and was in thick of the battle at Newport on 29 August 1778. In June 1780 Greene commanded 2,500 troops and Henry Lee's Legion to resist General Wilhelm Knyphausen and 5,000 troops in their second invasion of New Jersey. Although Greene himself was not in the forefront of the engagement at Springfield on 23 June 1780, units under his overall command forced the enemy to retreat and withdraw from the state.

Only a few days after Greene assumed his Highlands command, a larger challenge intervened. Authorized by Congress to name a new commander in chief of the southern army, Washington gave the appointment to Greene on 14 October 1780. On his journey southward to his new command, Greene met with the governors and legislatures of Maryland and Virginia and also communicated with officials of Delaware and North Carolina, gathering strong commitments for material aid for the southern army. On 2 December Greene officially took over command of some one thousand Continentals and twelve hundred militia at Charlotte, North Carolina. One of Greene's first actions was the unorthodox decision to divide his army, sending General Daniel Morgan and troops to scour the backcountry. Morgan's resounding victory at Cowpens on 17 January 1781 lured General Charles Cornwallis and his army from his bases in South Carolina in pursuit of Greene's army deep into North Carolina. Again demonstrating ingenuity, Greene led Cornwallis on a wild chase, with the British commander having to discard valuable supplies and munitions. Beating Cornwallis to the Dan River, Greene appropriated all the boats and crossed into Virginia, leaving the British commander in the lurch.

On his return to North Carolina, Greene chose favorable ground and met the enemy at Guilford Courthouse on 15 March 1781. Greene disposed his troops, as he would also do in later battles, and just as Morgan had done at Cowpens: militia in the front line, backed up to Continentals, and on the flanks, cavalry and light infantry. Greene was forced to abandon the battlefield, but not before Cornwallis lost one-fourth of his army in casualties. Biographer Theodore Thayer notes that "the long sequence of brilliant maneuvers which culminated in the Battle of Guilford Courthouse was Nathanael Greene's principal contribution to the final American victory in the War of Independence" (p.331).

Cornwallis licked his wounds at Wilmington, North Carolina, and soon invaded Virginia, leaving other British

troops under Lieutenant Colonel Lord Francis Rawdon to secure the British gains in South Carolina and contend with Greene. Engaging Rawdon at the battle of Hobkirk's Hill (Camden) on 25 April 1781, Greene replicated his operations at Guilford Courthouse, with the same result—once again abandoning the battlefield, but leaving the enemy heavily damaged. From then on, it was a matter of constriction for British forces in South Carolina, the pulling in from interior posts, one by one, through pressure exerted by Greene, Henry Lee's Legion, and militia units. After the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, Greene declared that "we fight, get beat, rise, and fight again" (Thayer, p. 348).

Greene's sole attempt at siege tactics failed when he applied them against the British post at Ninety Six, from 22 May to 19 June 1781. An important mistake was to run an initial parallel line of troops too close to the enemy's fortifications. Greene lifted the siege when Rawdon's relief column approached the fort. Rawdon pursued Greene, but could not catch him. The British commander subsequently ordered the evacuation of Ninety Six, in effect giving Greene the victory. Greene was earning a reputation as "the strategist of the American Revolution." Indeed, Greene wrote General Henry Knox in July 1781: "There are few generals that have run oftener, or more lustily than I have done. But I have taken care not to run too far, and commonly have run as fast forward as backward, to convince the Enemy that we were like a Crab, that could run either way" (Thayer, p. 367).

At Eutaw Springs, South Carolina, on 8 September 1781, Greene fought his last and most bloody battle of the southern campaign. Greene's forces were nearly equal in size to those of the British that were arrayed against him. The battle ended in a draw; Greene withdrew from the field, and the British commander, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Stewart, brought his army southeastward to Charleston. Greene lost one-fourth of his men at Eutaw Springs, whereas the British lost more than forty percent. British troops had now been cleared out of the Deep South except for Charleston and Savannah, although partisan militia leaders and General Anthony Wayne's Continentals performed some mop-up operations.

LIFE AFTER THE WAR

After the war, Greene and his family resided at Mulberry Grove, Georgia, a 2,000-acre plantation, twelve miles from Savannah. The estate had been confiscated from a former Tory governor, John Graham, and given to Greene. Greene cultivated corn, rice, and fruit orchards, and engaged in logging. He struggled in an attempt to pay off enormous debts, accrued in part by his having provided surety for John Banks and Company, which supplied Greene's Southern army. Despite Greene's financial support, the company went bankrupt. Rumors

persisted that Greene profited from the provisioning of his troops. It was discovered that two of Greene's most trusted aides, Robert Burnet and Robert Forsyth, had been secret partners of John Banks and Company, and Greene himself was suspected of having been a silent partner of the firm.

Nathanael Greene died on 19 June 1786, probably from a sunstroke suffered during his homeward trip from Savannah. His wife, Kitty, and five of their children (all under the age of eleven) survived him. Greene would have been pleased had he known that Congress, over the succeeding decade, honored his military service by paying off most of his debts.

GREENE'S LEGACY

The exalted military esteem in which Nathanael Greene is held results from a combination of factors. He retained the complete trust and friendship of George Washington, and, for that matter, of several other key generals, including Henry Knox and Anthony Wayne. Even among the lower-ranked brigadiers, there were many such as George Weedon who cherished Greene as a hero and friend, although the two men were not closely connected. Greene, with a winning smile and cheerful disposition, made friends easily. He had the knack of smoothing out differences among colleagues, whether as a field commander or in his role as quartermaster general. It was also a plus for Greene that he was married to the prettiest wife among the officer corps. Kitty Greene enthralled the commander in chief, who found in her his favorite dancing partner—on one occasion the two danced continuously for three hours. Greene might be compared to General Henry Knox, with whom Washington established a close friendship. Knox gave Washington costly wrong advice (at Germantown), as did Greene (regarding Forts Washington and Lee), and both Greene and Knox were self-taught in military science.

While Greene exhibited congeniality, his character had some defects, namely (as Douglas S. Freeman has noted), "haste in decision, an overconfidence in his judgment, an insistence that his integrity be acknowledged formally whenever any act of his was criticized. The less reason he had for heeding carpers, the more sensitive he became" (*Washington*, vol. 4: p. 367).

Greene proved to be a superb administrator of a large staff department, and he planned and executed complex military operations. He was always solicitous of both public and military officials for the welfare of his men, although he did not hesitate to mete out the death penalty for desertion and mutiny. He also set an example on how to employ flexibility and mobility in the use of his army. In addition, he was willing to borrow from the successful practices of other generals. Learning from Washington,

like Lafayette, Greene was convinced that a maneuver and harassment strategy would pay off in the long run. Greene's major battles in the Southern campaign were fought according to Morgan's tactics at Cowpens, with little variation.

The insufficiency of the British prosecution of the war in the south made Greene's task easier. Cornwallis removed his army, small as it was, from the Carolinas by invading Virginia in May 1781. The total of 5,000 troops dispatched from New York City, including those under Arnold in December 1780 and those under General William Phillips in March 1781, were not matched by reinforcements in the deep south. A circumstance that further contributed to British failure in the Carolinas and Georgia was the neglect to reestablish royal government, except for a limited effort in Georgia. A policy of retrenchment led to withdrawal of British forces to Charleston and Savannah.

When Greene assumed command of the Southern army, the pendulum had already swung against British military fortunes in the region. The crushing of the Loyalist militia at Kings Mountain on 7 October 1780 ruined any chance that the British could count on an outpouring of backcountry Loyalist support. The victory at Cowpens three months later indicated that the British would have difficulty holding onto the interior regions. These were not the only events that eased Greene's mission; also helpful was the relentless pounding of Loyalist positions, ending in victory for the rebels, by partisan leaders such as Thomas Sumter, Andrew Pickens, Francis Marion, and others. The roving Patriot bands, in what amounted to a civil war, also helped to quash potential support for the British cause. If circumstance and British military policies contributed heavily to Greene's success in the southern campaign, this does not render his accomplishments unworthy of praise. Greene's accomplishments in the Southern campaign may not have been extraordinary, but it is undeniable that he was the right man, in the right place, at the right time.

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

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revised by Harry M. Ward

GREEN (OR GREENE'S) SPRING, SOUTH CAROLINA. 8 Aug. 1780. There is some confusion over the exact identity and date of this running battle, which is also known as Second Cedar Spring. Between 150 and 200 mounted Loyalists under Major James Dunlap preceded Major Patrick Ferguson's main column in the advance toward Gilbert Town, South Carolina, during the movements that eventually led to the battle of Kings Mountain. Warned of Dunlap's approach, roughly 400 rebel militia under Lieutenant Colonels Elijah Clarke and William Graham were waiting when the Loyalists attacked before dawn. After a sharp, fifteen-minute skirmish that left many casualties on both sides, the Loyalists were driven back. As Clarke and Graham began their pursuit, Ferguson came up with the main body of troops, and the rebels retreated to higher ground. Judging the rebel position as too strong, Ferguson withdrew. Estimates of the casualties vary widely; though it appears that eight Loyalists and three rebels were killed, with about twenty wounded on each side.

SEE ALSO *Kings Mountain, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

GREEN MOUNTAIN BOYS. Under the leadership of Ethan Allen, whose most famous lieutenants were Ira Allen, Seth Warner, and Remember Baker, the Green Mountain Boys were organized to defend the claims

of settlers in the region that became Vermont. They figured prominently in the capture of Ticonderoga on 10 May 1775, and during the Revolution they were useful in guarding passes through their home country.

SEE ALSO *Allen, Ethan; Ticonderoga, New York, American Capture of; Vermont; Warner, Seth.*

Mark M. Boatner

GREEN'S FARMS, CONNECTICUT. 9 July 1779. Looted and burned during the Connecticut Coast Raid.

SEE ALSO *Connecticut Coast Raid.*

Mark M. Boatner

GREEN SPRING (JAMESTOWN FORD, VIRGINIA). 6 July 1781. Having failed to catch and destroy Lafayette and being ordered by Clinton to detach reinforcements to New York, Cornwallis abandoned his plan of holding Williamsburg and prepared to cross the James River. Lafayette followed cautiously and on 6 July started getting indications that he might catch Cornwallis astride the river.

The historian Henry P. Johnston has written,

Cornwallis had shrewdly conjectured that Lafayette would take the occasion to attack his rear, and when he learned of his approach he did everything to confirm his antagonist in the belief that at that time, the afternoon of the 6th, only his rear remained to cross. Simcoe's Rangers and the baggage alone had passed over (*Yorktown Campaign*, p. 61).

Anthony Wayne led a five-hundred-man advance guard to keep contact and feel out the enemy. When Lafayette joined Wayne at about 1 P.M., there were contradictory reports as to whether the British main body was still on the peninsula or whether only a rear guard remained. Under these circumstances Lafayette ordered the remaining Pennsylvania Continentals and all the light infantry to close upon Wayne's command at Green Spring Plantation. The militia stayed twelve miles to the rear.

While waiting for these reinforcements to advance the six miles from Norrell's Mills, Wayne spent most of the afternoon skirmishing with the enemy. Against the delaying tactics of Tarleton's outposts, the Virginia riflemen of Majors Richard Call and John Willis (about two hundred

men), supported by John Francis Mercer, William Galvan, and William McPherson with their dragoons and light infantry, gained ground steadily. Walter Stewart's Pennsylvania Continental Battalion followed in reserve. From Green Spring Plantation (whose mansion had belonged to Governor Sir William Berkeley), the Americans had to cross four hundred yards of marshy ground to the main Williamsburg-Jamestown road. About a mile along this road the enemy camp, hidden behind some woods, was on the river bank opposite the north end of Jamestown Island. Although the American light forces performed splendidly, shooting down three rear guard commanders in succession, "the striking feature of this preliminary skirmishing," according to Johnston, "was the art practiced by Cornwallis in attempting to draw Wayne and Lafayette to destruction" (ibid., p. 61).

By the time the reinforcements reached Green Spring at about 5 P.M., Wayne was close to the main British army, although he apparently thought he had nothing but a rear guard on his hands. Lafayette, however, seems to have suspected that things were not as they appeared, and he held in reserve at Green Spring the veteran light infantry battalions of Francis Barber and Joseph Vose. Across the swamp to support Wayne went the light infantry battalion of Major John P. Wyllys and the two remaining Pennsylvania battalions, those of Richard Butler and Richard Humpton. Supported by three cannons, these reinforcements brought Wayne's total strength up to about nine hundred men. When Lafayette rode to a tongue of land on the river bank for a personal reconnaissance to see, if possible, whether the main body of enemy troops was still on his side of the James, he discovered the alarming truth and rushed back to keep Wayne from getting drawn into a general engagement. But it was too late.

Cornwallis could have attacked as early as 4 P.M. and crushed Wayne's advance guard, but he waited until he was sure that enough of Lafayette's corps was on the field to make his blow decisive. While the young marquis was making his reconnaissance, Major Galvan was ordered to lead his fifty or sixty light infantry in an attempt to capture an exposed cannon; after a spirited effort he had to fall back on the American left flank. Assured either by this attack or by other evidence that Lafayette's main body was now on the field, Cornwallis sprung the trap. Lieutenant Colonel Yorke's light infantry formed the British right, and the Forty-third, Seventy-sixth, and Eightieth formed the left under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Dundas.

When Wayne suddenly found himself attacked by Cornwallis's entire force, he reacted with courage and also with good tactical sense: he attacked. In what he called "a choice of difficulties," he realized that under the circumstances an attempted retreat might turn into a panic. An attempted stand against such odds would be

disastrous, particularly since the enemy line overlapped both his flanks. Wayne's solution also had the feature of surprise, and it showed an understanding—probably instinctive—of the human factor. There is a chapter of battlefield leadership in this decision.

"The movement was successful, though costly," Johnston has observed. Wayne's men charged through grapeshot and musket fire to within seventy yards of the enemy and stopped them in their tracks for fifteen minutes. Lafayette took a prominent part in salvaging the situation he had not quite been able to prevent. Retreating rapidly but in good order to the reserve line at Green Spring, the Americans remained there a few hours and then withdrew during the night to Chickahominy Church. Since Cornwallis did not attack until "near sunset," as he reported to Clinton, this left him only an hour of daylight for the entire action, and there was no pursuit.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Out of 900 engaged, Wayne lost 28 killed, 99 wounded, and 12 missing. Two guns were lost, one of them a piece captured at Bennington. British losses were 75 killed and wounded. As for numbers, about 7,000 British were on the field, since only Simcoe's Rangers and the baggage had crossed the James, but the Guards, the Twenty-third and Thirty-third Regiments, and Hessians were in reserve when Cornwallis launched his counterattack and participated little, if at all.

COMMENT

Although clearly defeated, Lafayette handled the action well. "The criticism that he exposed his army to destruction, when so much depended upon keeping it intact, is hardly supported by the facts," Johnston has said. His dispositions were such that not more than a third of his regulars could have been destroyed even under the worst possible turn of events. As for Earl Cornwallis, after all his skill in luring "the boy" into position for a knockout, he swung just a little bit too late. "One hour more of daylight must have produced the most disastrous conclusions," said "Light-Horse Harry" Lee. Cornwallis himself said another thirty minutes of daylight would have enabled him to destroy most of Lafayette's force. His military reputation would fare better in India, where he was not opposed to such generals as Lafayette and "Mad Anthony" Wayne.

SEE ALSO *Virginia, Military Operations in.*

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revised by Harry M. Ward

GRENADIERS. One of the flank companies of each British regiment was composed of grenadiers. Originally they had been large, powerful men selected from the battalion (regiment) to throw the “hand bombs” introduced during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). Later they were formed into special companies, and long after their grenade-throwing function had ceased to exist the grenadiers were retained as elite troops. In some cases they were formed into permanent regiments, like the Grenadier Guards. Grenadier and light infantry companies were usually detached from their regiments for special, particularly important, or hazardous combat missions. While the American army copied the British to the extent of having flank companies in each regiment, they had two light infantry companies but no grenadier companies.

SEE ALSO *Flank Companies*.

Mark M. Boatner

GRENVILLE, GEORGE. (1712–1770). British politician and prime minister. Grenville was born at Wotton, Buckinghamshire, on 14 October 1712. His contemporaries often spelled his surname as “Greenville,” and this may have been the accepted pronunciation. He was educated at Eton from 1725 and from 1729 at the Inner Temple, one of the major London law schools. Called to the bar in 1735, he handled family and estate business until about 1744. Through the patronage of his mother’s brother, Richard Temple, Lord Cobham, Grenville became member of Parliament for Buckingham and so—along with young William Pitt—joined the group of Walpole’s opponents dubbed “Cobham’s Cubs” or “Boy Patriots.” His marriage to Elizabeth Wyndham, sister of the later second earl of Egremont, and Pitt’s own marriage in 1754 to Grenville’s sister, cemented and extended his political connections.

In 1744 Grenville became a lord of the Admiralty. In 1747 he moved to the Treasury Board and over the next

seven years became expert on the problems of the national budget. Treasurer to the navy and a privy councillor from 1754, he returned briefly to the Admiralty Board in 1756. Even so, resentful of Pitt’s extravagant spending on the Seven Years’ War, he kept up connections with the Leicester House faction around the future George III. The year after the new king succeeded in 1760, Grenville became leader of the House of Commons under Bute in addition to his post at the Admiralty. In May 1762 he became secretary of state for the North; in October first lord of the Admiralty (exchanging with Halifax); and finally, in 1763, first lord of the Treasury (prime minister). Narrowly surviving an attack on the general warrants used against Wilkes, Grenville turned his attention to postwar finance and colonial questions.

The decision to tax the colonies (not just the American ones) had already been taken in principle by Bute’s ministry, and it fell to Grenville, the financial expert, to devise the means. The reasoning was simple and not at first controversial. Britain had incurred a massive national debt during the war, and the ministry could only keep its House of Commons majority by undertaking to reduce it while lowering the land tax. Moreover, there would have to be a large and expensive peacetime garrison in the American colonies, which had benefited from the war and, compared with the British Isles, were grossly undertaxed. The troops were partly to patrol the Indian frontier but principally to guard against a Bourbon descent on Canada or Florida, which would in turn threaten the other colonies. It therefore seemed perfectly logical and fair to make Americans bear not the whole, but at least a proportion, of the cost.

Grenville’s means, the so-called Grenville Acts, were meant to raise the money in ways that Americans would accept. The Sugar Act actually lowered the duty on foreign molasses but at the same time sought to make sure that it was collected. Stamp duties had long been levied in England, so from London’s perspective it hardly looked like a tyrannical innovation. Moreover, Grenville had no intention of imposing an unpopular tax; when Americans complained of lack of consultation over the Stamp Act, the ministry delayed its implementation so that their views could be heard. It was not until resistance became violent and widespread that Grenville insisted on going ahead with the duty in order to establish Parliament’s right to tax. This provoked some parliamentary opposition, not to the principle but to the wisdom of the measure; but the colonial assemblies’ response to the Quartering Act seemed to justify his attitude. Though his ministry fell in July 1765, in opposition Grenville strenuously opposed the repeal of the Stamp Act.

Grenville should not be dismissed as the accountant who set off American opposition in order to balance the books. He was an energetic prime minister and introduced

a range of domestic economies and administrative reforms. Nor was there such a thing as a “Grenville program.” Grenville actually opposed the frontier boundary line policy adopted in 1763–1764, and the Quartering Act was requested by General George Gage, who was anxious to end the use of private billets. Above all, Grenville understood that Americans were opposed to Parliament raising a colonial revenue by any means and made no distinction between internal and external taxes. For this Pitt mocked him, but the subsequent fiasco of the Townshend duties showed that Grenville had been right all the time.

SEE ALSO *Grenville Acts*.

revised by John Oliphant

GRENVILLE ACTS. Under the leadership of George Grenville, who headed the ministry that came to power in March 1763, the imperial government enacted a number of measures intended to increase the amount of control it exercised over the North American colonies. The decisions were a response both to colonial evasion of the Navigation Acts, scandalously revealed during the final French and Indian War (1759, 1760), and to the needs of the newly expanded empire. From the imperial point of view, reform was urgently required and the measures were reasonable. Because they altered the approach to imperial administration that Britain has followed for half a century (a policy known as “salutary neglect”), many colonists came to believe, erroneously, that the decisions represented a carefully conceived program to deprive Americans of their rights. The measures included reform of the customs service (4 October 1763), the Proclamation of 1763 (7 October 1763), the Revenue Act of 1764 (the so-called Sugar Act, 5 April 1764), the Currency Act of 1764 (19 April 1764), and the Stamp Act (22 March 1765). This last act was the one the colonists found most threatening to their liberties. Not strictly part of the Grenville program but generally blamed on him by the colonists was the Quartering Act (15 May 1765), requested by Major General Thomas Gage, commander in chief in North America, to better house his troops in the colonies.

SEE ALSO *Currency Act; Grenville, George; Proclamation of 1763; Quartering Acts; Salutary Neglect; Stamp Act; Sugar Act*.

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GREY, CHARLES. (1729–1807). (“No-flint.”) British general. At age fourteen he was commissioned an ensign in the Sixth Regiment and in 1746 fought at Culloden. After service at Gibraltar, he was promoted to lieutenant of the Sixth Regiment on 23 December 1752. Three years later he raised an independent company and in May 1755 was promoted to captain of the Twentieth Regiment. He was in the Rochefort expedition in September 1757. At Minden, on 1 August 1759, he was wounded while serving as aide-de-camp to Prince Ferdinand. On 16 October he was in the hottest fighting at Klosterkamp. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Ninety-eighth Regiment on 21 January 1761. Prevented by illness from serving with his regiment at Belle Île (1761) and Havana (1762), he joined the Portuguese army with the rank of colonel in June 1762. He served as aide-de-camp to the Count zu Lippe-Brückenberg and in 1763 was retired on half pay.

For the next decade, Grey did not advance in the army. In 1774 he was promoted to colonel and appointed aide-de-camp to George III. In March 1777 he was made colonel of the Twenty-eighth Regiment and ordered to join the British army at New York with the local rank of major general. On 24 June, in command of the Third Brigade, he skirmished with Lord Stirling at Woodbridge, New Jersey. In August he was promoted to permanent major general and landed with the British army at Head of Elk, Maryland. Leading a night action at Paoli, Pennsylvania, on 21 September, he surprised and overwhelmed Anthony Wayne’s troops with a brilliant bayonet assault. His success established his reputation as a master of light infantry tactics and won him his nickname, “No-flint,” but he was bitterly resented by the Americans. On 4 October at Germantown, Pennsylvania, he led a valiant assault and rescued British soldiers in Chew House.

Grey was involved in an ineffectual attack on the Marquis de Lafayette at Barren Hill on 20 May 1778 and in a more successful one at Monmouth, New Jersey, on 28 June. In September he conducted brilliant amphibious operations against Massachusetts seacoast towns and on the 28th led a successful night bayonet attack against George Baylor’s Third Dragoons at Old Tappan, New York. Criticized by Britons and Americans for allowing his men to perpetrate atrocities during the battle, Grey was unrepentant, for he had become a proponent of sanguinary warfare against his foes. He returned to England on 24 November, convinced that Britain did not possess the will to win the war. In 1782, after service at Plymouth, he was promoted to lieutenant general, knighted, and named commander in chief for North America. He never assumed the office, for ministerial politics precluded his departure. In 1793–1795 he led a successful West Indian expedition and in August 1796 was promoted to general. He commanded England’s southern district from 1796 to

1800. In 1801 he was made a baron, with the style of Baron Grey of Howick, and five years later he was created Viscount Howick and Earl Grey.

Grey was a controversial officer. He was, however, among Britain's best field commanders in the second half of the eighteenth century.

SEE ALSO *Barren Hill, Pennsylvania; Paoli, Pennsylvania.*

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GRIBEAUVAL, JEAN BAPTISTE VAQUETTE DE. (1715–1789). French artillery general. While Gribeauval was captain of artillery in 1752, Minister of War Comte Marc-Pierre d'Argenson sent him to study the use of light cannon in Prussian infantry battalions. In 1776 Saint-Germain named him first inspector of artillery. His system of artillery development, gradually adopted in France between 1764 and 1776, called for lighter, smaller, more mobile guns and more precise calculations in their use; therefore, more highly trained artillerists were required. The adoption of his system in France made vast stocks of effective but heavy, outdated matériel available for the Americans through agents such as Beaumarchais.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

GRIDLEY, RICHARD. (1710–1796). First American chief engineer. Massachusetts. Born on 3 January 1711 at Boston, Gridley was apprenticed to a merchant but developed his talent for mathematics and became a surveyor and civil engineer. He studied under

John Henry Bastide, a British military engineer who was planning the fortifications of Boston and vicinity. In 1745 he was commissioned lieutenant colonel of the artillery train in the expedition against Louisburg, became chief bombardier during the siege, and supervised the erection of the siege batteries. He was rewarded with a commission as captain in one of the British army regiments that garrisoned Louisburg; he retired on half pay when Louisburg was returned to the French in 1749 and his regiment was disbanded. He was a skilled draughtsman, as seen in his *Plan of the City and Fortress of Louisburg*, published at Boston in 1746 and republished at London in 1758. He was Governor William Shirley's engineer on the Kennebec expedition in 1752 and built Fort Western (Augusta, Maine) and Fort Halifax. He was the chief artillery officer during William Johnson's 1755 expedition against Crown Point and, as chief engineer, built Fort William Henry at the head of Lake George. He served at Louisburg under Jeffrey Amherst in 1758 and at Quebec under James Wolfe in 1759. After the French and Indian War, he again retired on half pay and was granted fishing rights in the Magdalen Islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence as well as three thousand acres in New Hampshire. In 1770 he and Edmund Quincy began smelting iron ore in Stoughtonham (later Sharon), Massachusetts.

When the Massachusetts Provincial Congress organized the provincial army for the siege of Boston in late April 1775, it appointed this distinguished veteran, the most experienced military engineer in the province, as chief engineer, although he was already in his sixty-sixth year, and it also gave him the additional task of organizing a train of artillery. He directed the engineering work at Bunker Hill and was wounded in the battle on 17 June. Six days later, the Massachusetts Congress gave him the provincial rank of major general. The Continental Congress appointed him colonel and chief of Continental artillery on 20 September (dropping his provincial rank), but because of his advanced age and querulous nature he was replaced on 17 November 1775 by Henry Knox. He remained the Continental chief engineer, with the rank of colonel, and planned the field works on Dorchester Heights that helped to force the British from Boston. While many officers had a low opinion of his ability, and on 28 April 1776 Washington reprimanded him about his "shameful neglect" of duty, Gridley deserves much credit for successful artillery and engineering work at the siege of Boston. He was succeeded on 5 August 1776 by Rufus Putnam and served thereafter as "Colonel and Engineer," working on the defenses of Boston as engineer general of the Eastern Department from 1 January 1777 until his retirement from the Continental army on 1 January 1781. During 1777 he had some success manufacturing mortars and howitzers for the Continental army at his furnace at Stoughtonham. He died at Canton, Massachusetts, on 21 June 1796.

His brother Jeremiah (1702–1767) was a lawyer who became attorney general of Massachusetts, and in defending writs of assistance in 1761 he became an opponent of a former pupil, James Otis.

SEE ALSO *Bunker Hill, Massachusetts*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

GRIERSON, JAMES. (?–1781). Planter, Loyalist militia officer. Date and place of birth unknown. Grierson moved to Georgia in 1762, settling in St. Paul's Parish. Active as an officer in the colonial militia, he commanded the Loyalist forces of St. Paul's Parish-Richmond County.

A prominent citizen of the backcountry, Grierson owned over one thousand acres and a fortified building or stockade fort in Augusta called Grierson's Fort. He served St. Paul's Parish as tax collector and assessor, surveyor of roads, and justice of the peace. By 1774 he was colonel of the Augusta provincial militia regiment. On 6 August 1775 the Augusta revolutionary committee of safety asked Grierson to call out the militia to protect the town from a potential attack by Loyalist Thomas Brown and his followers. He refused. Despite his loyalty to the crown, however, Grierson served the rebel government when it functioned in the backcountry, continuing as justice of the peace for St. Paul's Parish in 1776 and tax assessor for Augusta and environs in 1778. In January 1779, when British troops came into the backcountry, rebels incorporated the use of Grierson's Fort in their defensive plans. Although Grierson was openly a Loyalist, he remained unmolested in Augusta while rebel government existed there.

Grierson returned to an active role with the Loyalist militia when British forces, under Colonel Thomas Brown, reoccupied Augusta in May 1780. Rebel Colonel Elijah Clarke and partisans unsuccessfully attacked Augusta during August–September 1780, taking Fort Grierson as their temporary headquarters. Grierson arrived with a group of regulars and Indians on 18 September, just in time to pursue fleeing rebels and take prisoners. In retaliation for Clarke's attack, Loyalist troops

destroyed plantations and settlements in the surrounding backcountry and hundreds of women and children fled Georgia. Rebel strength built slowly around Augusta beginning in April 1781. Grierson and Brown sought reinforcements from the British garrison in Savannah in vain. Eventually besieged by rebel forces, on 22 May 1781 Grierson and a detachment of loyalist militia occupied his fort, which was from one-half to three-quarters of a mile west of Fort Cornwallis, a new and well-constructed fortification Brown had built in the center of town and now occupied with his regulars. Quickly overcome by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee's Legion, Grierson and his surviving troops managed to reach Fort Cornwallis. On 5 June, Brown surrendered. Colonel Grierson was taken prisoner under General Andrew Pickens and held at his own fort.

While some sources state Grierson died before reaching Fort Cornwallis, it is generally believed that he was assassinated on 6 June by Captain James Alexander, one of Pickens's men, whose family had suffered under British rule. Some reports indicate that Grierson was shot in front of his children and his body mutilated and thrown in a ditch outside the fort. Lee stated that it was difficult to prevent such murders, and other Loyalists were also killed at this time. General Nathanael Greene offered a reward on 9 June 1781, but no one was arrested.

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Leslie Hall

GRIFFIN, CYRUS. (1748–1810). President of the Continental Congress. Virginia. Born in Farnham Parish, Virginia, on 16 July 1748, Cyrus Griffin studied law in England and Scotland, and in 1770 eloped with the eldest daughter of John Stuart, the sixth Earl of Traquair. After studying in the Middle Temple for three years, Griffin returned to Virginia in 1774, where he practiced law. He was not an advocate of rebellion, believing in the peaceful settlement of the differences between the Crown and the colonies. While in London on business, he sent a "Plan of reconciliation between Great Britain and her Colonies" to the William Legge, the second Earl of Dartmouth and secretary of state to the colonies on 30 December 1775.

Griffin was a member of the Virginia legislature from 1777 to 1778 and was sent to the Continental Congress from 1778 to 1780, where he served on several financial committees. However, the factions in Congress that led to delay and procrastination were distasteful to him, and he welcomed his appointment, on 28 April 1780, as Judge of the court of appeals that heard “cases of capture.” He sat on this court until it was abolished in 1787, at which time he was its presiding judge. In 1782 Griffin was one of the commissioners who settled the contest between Connecticut and Pennsylvania over the Wyoming Valley, deciding for Pennsylvania. He returned to the Virginia legislature from 1786 to 1787, and to the Continental Congress from 1787 to 1788. He was the last to be elected president of the Congress, on 22 January 1788, and he served in that capacity until the Congress permanently adjourned in November 1788. After serving as commissioner to the Creek Nation in 1789, Griffin returned to the bench and served as judge of the U.S. District Court of Virginia from December 1789 until his death in Yorktown, Pennsylvania, on 14 December 1810.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress*.

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GROTON HEIGHTS, CONNECTICUT SEE *Fort Griswold, Connecticut; New London Raid, Connecticut*.

GUERRILLA WAR IN THE NORTH. 1775–1783. The term “guerrilla warfare” came into use after the American Revolution. In the eighteenth century, the term more commonly used was “partisan warfare.” They both mean basically the same thing: a type of warfare where the emphasis is on the use of small parties of warriors, sometimes regular soldiers detached from the professional army and sometimes irregulars and only semi-trained fighters. These forces engage in hit-and-run tactics, ambushes, raids, skirmishes, scouting, and other activities, often around and between the larger regular armies, sometimes in conjunction with them, sometimes totally on their own. In the American Revolution, many different types of partisans existed: Whig and Loyalist militia; Native Americans; civilians unattached to any military unit; and detachments

from the regular armies. In the northern states, this partisan warfare occurred in two main areas: in combination with the regular armies operating in the area, and on its own against partisans of the other side, be they militia, outlaws, or Native warriors.

Usually the goal of this kind of warfare is to engage the enemy in numerous small engagements in order to inflict casualties while avoiding a potentially war-ending, large-scale battle. By using tactics such as hit-and-run and ambushes, the partisan forces attempt to minimize their own losses while causing a slow but steady drain on the opposing forces. In addition, there is psychological and physical wear and tear as the opposing forces have to fight and stand guard constantly, allowing them little time to rest. In effect, a guerrilla strategy is based on the assumption that the guerrilla forces can outlast the enemy, either in terms of numbers or in terms of willpower. However, it is not entirely accurate to claim that the American rebels engaged in a partisan war with this attritional plan in mind. Much of the guerrilla activity in the war, especially in the northern states, occurred on its own, often with vital interests at stake in a particular region and no other forces available except the local irregular forces. On the other hand, generals such as George Washington also learned to employ guerrilla activities deliberately in an effort to wear down the British. Guerrilla warfare in the American Revolution was complex and varied over the course of the eight and one-half years of war.

INITIAL GUERRILLA ACTIVITY

The initial fighting of the Revolutionary War fit the description of guerrilla warfare. When the Massachusetts militia met the advancing British troops on the morning of 19 April 1775, they did not line up and fight it out with the British regulars in a European style of battle. Except for the opening actions in Lexington and Concord themselves, the combat that day degenerated into a running ambush and hit-and-run operation as small units of militia operated on their own, hiding in the woods and buildings and behind fences and targeting the British troops marching down the road. The Lexington militia got its revenge for the casualties taken in the early morning by ambushing the returning British troops just outside of Lexington.

When General George Washington arrived in Boston in July 1775 and took command of the assembled New England provincial regiments, the beginnings of the Continental Army, he made a deliberate decision not to rely solely on a guerrilla style of warfare, despite the urging of generals such as Horatio Gates and Charles Lee, both of whom were veterans of the British army and urged Washington to rely very heavily on the partisan qualities of the local militia. Washington, however, wanted to maintain some semblance of control during the war, and thus he worked at turning the fledgling Continental Army

into a semi-regular force. Still, despite this decision, the northern states would be the center of an active guerrilla war for the next eight years, a type of war that sometimes occurred spontaneously and at other times was directed by Washington and his generals in coordination with the campaigns of the army itself.

The British made a decision that would add an element to the guerrilla warfare in the North early in the war. Agents out of their base at Niagara contacted the nations of the Iroquois Confederation for help in the war against the Americans. The Mohawks and their leader, Joseph Brant, would prove to be excellent guerrilla warriors throughout much of the war along the northwestern frontier of New York and Pennsylvania.

COASTAL PARTISAN OPERATIONS

Partisan warfare started in the middle states after the British captured New York City in 1776. This guerrilla warfare took on several different characteristics. One aspect of the guerrilla activity was the warfare undertaken by the militia, often in conjunction with detachments from the Continental Army, to raid and harass the British and the Loyalists. These operations were normally not connected in any way with the main operations of the larger regular armies, except in a peripheral manner.

Long Island and Connecticut. One of the first efforts occurred between Long Island and Connecticut in what would be called the Whale Boat War. This conflict actually started in August 1776, even before the Continental Army retreated off the island. Washington ordered Lieutenant Colonel Henry Livingston to take his Continental regiment to the east of the American lines and try to prevent or slow any British advance toward the middle of the island. Soon afterward the Americans evacuated the island, and the British began to expand their control eastward; Livingston's men fell back slowly, skirmishing with the British advance. Once the British had secured most of the island, Livingston retreated across the Long Island Sound to Connecticut, but he continually sent raiding parties back onto the island to forage; to harass British, German, and Loyalist garrisons; and to help people escape from the island. Over the next seven years, this war of raids and counterraids raged on, with Long Island Sound serving as the path between the two sides.

In fact, Connecticut's Governor Jonathan Trumbull commissioned about one hundred men to use the whale boats and coordinate with the Connecticut militia along the Sound to raid whenever possible, and occasionally Continental units stationed in the area participated in such raids. The usual targets for these raids were the Loyalist settlements and forts in middle and eastern Long Island, as well as forage being collected for the

British army in nearby New York City. The Whig militia focused on swift descents, a quick raid into the interior, and then a fast retreat off the island. Loyalist parties raided the Connecticut coast, mostly to steal horses and cattle and to capture Whigs to trade for Loyalist prisoners or to ransom for money. To counter these Loyalist attacks, Trumbull had to maintain militia garrisons in most of the seacoast towns throughout the war. Continental units often participated when they were stationed in the area. For example, General Samuel Parsons led two hundred militia and Continentals to Long Island in August 1777. After an unsuccessful siege of a Tory fort, they retreated back to the mainland. By 1778, Washington routinely kept Continental detachments stationed along Connecticut's coast to help defend the ports, and these detachments also participated in the raids, often against Washington's orders. In response, by 1778 the British maintained more and more regular forces on the island to stop these attacks. Throughout the winter of 1778–1779, the Queen's Rangers and a detachment of British grenadiers joined one thousand Loyalist militia to defend the island, and the next summer, the British Light Infantry and the Seventeenth Regiment were both stationed along Long Island Sound. Mainly, the British command was worried about the supplies and forage available in the area.

New York Governor George Clinton denounced the Whale Boat War because it often spilled over into New York, and Washington also urged against it. Finally, in 1781 Trumbull ordered the raids stopped, and by 1782 Sir Henry Clinton had ordered the Loyalists to stop as well. Ultimately, the roughly five thousand refugees from Long Island returned, only to find utter destruction. The Whale Boat War had ruined rich and poor.

Westchester County. Westchester County faced a particularly brutal internecine war for seven long years. In fact, the area was so devastated that it became known as the Neutral Ground, or the No-man's Land. Whig and Loyalist militia, detachments from the armies, and groups of robbers and outlaws attached to neither side plagued the area throughout the entire war. Most of the fighting had little to do with the campaigns of the larger armies; rather, it was for personal plunder and revenge. However, the forage of the area was critical to both armies, so skirmishes and clashes between the foraging parties of both armies were frequent and bloody.

Two of the most notorious units in the county were the Cowboys, Loyalists who ravaged the area for personal gain and to support the British army, and the Skinners, a group of Whig militia who hunted the Cowboys, looted the area, and occasionally brought in supplies for the Continental army. Since the Skinners could not contain and prevent the worst of the Cowboys' depredations, Washington often had to send in Continental units to

help protect the area. He sent in the newly created Light Infantry Corps in 1778 and often positioned other units and detachments in the area, especially during the winter and spring months. The local Whig militiamen of Westchester County were not called to serve outside of the area since the danger to the county was so severe.

Southwestern Connecticut. Caught between the Whale Boat War along the Sound and the bitter partisan struggle in the Neutral Ground was southwestern Connecticut. Raids across the Sound often originated in, or targeted towns in, southwestern Connecticut. Frequently, a Continental unit would be positioned there, so as to be available to help along the Connecticut coast and still be close enough should the British emerge from New York City. In addition, Loyalist and British raiding parties moving through Westchester County often entered the southwestern corner of Connecticut to plunder and burn. William Tryon, the former royal governor of New York, targeted the area several times during the war, mainly to forage but also simply to ravage the area. As with the Norman's Land next door, southwestern Connecticut was virtually abandoned by war's end, despite the constant, valiant efforts of the local militia for seven long years.

New Jersey. New Jersey faced a similar dilemma, caught between the two main armies in the region. The partisan activity began in December 1776, after Washington had retreated through the state into Pennsylvania. British and German soldiers occupied most of the towns in northeastern and central New Jersey, and they treated the local population so brutally that the men of the area forgot their newly taken oaths of allegiance to the king and rose up spontaneously against the occupation army. They targeted lone enemy soldiers, Loyalists, and small patrols moving through the area. This started six years of vicious warfare along the coastal regions of New Jersey. During this time, General Philemon Dickinson rose to prominence as a key leader of the eastern New Jersey militia.

Washington learned here, as he did regarding New York and Connecticut, that the local militia simply could not offer enough protection on its own, so he stationed Continental detachments near the coast to support the militia whenever possible. In particular, as in the Neutral Ground, the forage of the area was vital to both sides. Washington saw the British need for locally gathered supplies as a key weakness in their war effort, and he took full advantage of the situation to force the British into a constantly escalating guerrilla war for food in eastern New Jersey. Parties of militia, Continentals, or both met each British or German or Loyalist foraging party throughout the next six years, at any time of the year, whether in the freezing winter or hot summer. As the skirmishes continued, casualties for both sides mounted,

which was a drain that the British in particular found hard to absorb. At times, these foraging parties could be as large as from one thousand to five thousand men. British commanders between 1776 and 1782, Generals Sir William Howe and Sir Henry Clinton, both complained of the constant fighting, the inability to rest the troops during the winter, and the constant state of fatigue caused by this incessant warfare. Partisan leaders such as the Hessian Johann von Ewald and the British commander of the Queen's Rangers, John Simcoe, admitted that this constant fighting was always to the advantage of the Americans.

New Jersey also had its own Whale Boat War aimed at Staten Island and even western Long Island. In 1780 the Honorable Board of Associated Loyalists was created, and William Franklin, former royal governor of New Jersey, was its first director. The Associated Loyalists targeted New Jersey's coast, mostly to annoy and harass rebel shipping in the area. Since the Loyalists were not paid, they raided for plunder.

This Board of Associated Loyalists at one time had three groups under its command: the Loyalists on Long Island; the Cowboys; and the Loyalists based on Staten Island raiding into New Jersey. Included in the board's forces were numerous escaped slaves who had fled New Jersey.

Southern and southwestern New Jersey saw the emergence of numerous groups of robbers. Some were Loyalists and others were out for themselves. New Jersey militia and occasionally Continentals were sent into the area to stop the raids, with minimal success. In response, the Monmouth County Association for Retaliation was formed in 1780, partly to try to stop Loyalist raids along that county's coast and partly to scour the southern parts of the state. It achieved minimal success at both jobs.

FRONTIER WARFARE

Meanwhile, another brand of guerrilla warfare raged along the northwestern frontier of New York and Pennsylvania. This was a war as old as the English colonies, a war that would continue long after the end of the Revolutionary War. The British were able to convince parts of the Iroquois Confederation, including most of the Mohawk nation, to join them in their fight against the Americans. The frontier raids began in 1777, after the defeat of General Sir John Burgoyne's campaign in northern New York and the aborted siege of Fort Stanwix in western New York. Iroquois parties, often supported by Loyalist forces led usually by John Butler, launched brutal raids deep into New York and Pennsylvania. These attackers were swiftly moving, light parties that could not capture a defended fort but could devastate an area, burning the homes and killing or capturing the inhabitants and just as swiftly disappearing. One of the more successful raids occurred

in June 1778 in the Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania. Roughly 110 Loyalist rangers and 400 Native warriors trapped 800 local militia in a fort. Disaster struck when half the garrison emerged to attack the raiding party and instead ran into an ambush, losing about 300 men killed. The fort subsequently surrendered and the entire settlement was burned. Similar raids up and down the Mohawk River valley were less successful because the inhabitants of the area learned quickly and stayed safe within their small forts and blockhouses. The people of Cherry Valley, New York, saved their lives in November 1778 by staying within the walls of their fort, but they had to watch as the 200 Loyalists and 300 Indians burned their homes.

The frontier war escalated as American parties struck back against the Iroquois. Militia forces burned the towns of Tioga and Unadilla in autumn 1778. In 1779 Washington detached General John Sullivan and over four thousand men from his army to march through the homelands of the Iroquois, while another six hundred men marched from Fort Pitt into the western Iroquois lands. The Native warriors and Loyalist militia avoided battle through most of the summer, but in late August about eight hundred men tried to spring an ambush on the Continentals at Newtown. The American soldiers, however, avoided the trap, and the resulting fighting led to just a few casualties for both sides before the Indians and Tories retreated. Sullivan's army ravaged the area, burning villages and crops, and then retired to the east. The Iroquois were forced to spend the winter near the British post at Niagara.

Despite this setback, the Iroquois and Loyalists continued to raid for the next couple of years. They destroyed several towns along the frontier, and they also turned their anger against another member of the confederation, the Oneidas, who were supporting the Americans in the war. These raids were complemented by similar raids conducted by Canadian warriors along the Lake Champlain valley. In 1780 alone, over three hundred people died, six forts fell, and hundreds of other buildings were burned in northern New York. Local militia proved ineffective against these raids. Brant even led Mohawks into the Ohio territory in 1782. By then, the frontier war had slackened and finally, by the end of 1782, it came to an end for the moment. For the Iroquois, their wars against the Americans were over. However, the frontier war in Ohio was just heating up.

COORDINATED PARTISAN-ARMY OPERATIONS

The other aspect of the guerrilla war in the northern states was its coordination with the campaigns of the regular armies. American generals such as Washington and Horatio Gates became very adept at using partisan warfare to harass and slow the enemy in northern New York,

around New York City, and in Pennsylvania. In fact, it is the coordination of guerrilla and regular styles of warfare that truly made this a revolutionary war.

In northern New York, partisan activity clearly had a direct impact on the outcome of General Burgoyne's campaign in 1777. Initially, local militia responded to Burgoyne's threats to unleash his Indian warriors along the northern frontier by mustering and flocking to the American army in the vicinity. Generals Philip Schuyler and his successor, Horatio Gates, used the militia in a similar way, sending out parties to harass and slow the British advance, to threaten and ultimately cut the British line of supply back to Canada, and to neutralize the threat of the Native American forces. Arriving on 30 August, Daniel Morgan's riflemen in particular were useful in facing the Indian threat. It took Burgoyne's forces two months to move from Fort Ticonderoga to the Hudson River, partially due to the delaying tactics of ambushes, the cutting down of trees, and hit-and-run raids. Militiamen also inflicted stinging losses on the German troops near Bennington in August 1777. In addition, raids against the supply wagons helped keep the British low on supplies even as the climactic battles near Saratoga were fought in September and October 1777. At the same time, militiamen joined with the main American army, so when those battles were fought, Gates commanded close to thirteen thousand soldiers against the seven thousand men remaining with Burgoyne.

In Pennsylvania, during the campaign for Philadelphia in 1777, Washington used detachments and advanced forces to engage in running skirmishes with the British to slow their movements and inflict casualties. After the British landing, Pennsylvania and Delaware militia kept in front of the advance British forces, scouting, removing livestock, and occasionally skirmishing with British detachments. Since the rifle corps was in northern New York with Gates, Washington created a Light Infantry Corps of about seven thousand men, the best marksmen from each regiment, and then put General William Maxwell in command. This corps took post in front of the British, harassing their march, supporting the militia, and in general slowing the British movements. On 3 September 1777, the Light Infantry and militiamen fought the British advance at Cooch's Bridge and Iron Hill, inflicting several casualties and delaying the British for about seven hours. After the Battle of Brandywine in mid-September, Washington used the Light Infantry and the dragoons as a screen to skirmish with the enemy as he withdrew. Once the British had secured Philadelphia, Washington sent Maxwell and about one thousand Continentals to join the local militia southwest of Philadelphia to interrupt the enemy supply line, scout, stop enemy patrols, and protect American commerce in the area.

Washington develops the strategy. Combined guerrilla and regular warfare became most pronounced in the campaigns around New York City. Here, Washington developed this strategy, perfected it, and helped train General Nathanael Greene in its use; Greene would then employ it to perfection in the southern states in 1780–1781. Washington had to overcome his initial bias against irregular forces, but once he did, he learned how best to coordinate their specialties with the army's campaigns. Militia forces in particular were good for scouting and gathering intelligence and for local defense, and they served further as a shield for the army. Once Washington learned how best to employ the militia forces to perform these functions, he was able to maximize his resources to get the best use out of his understrength regular army and the numerous but less reliable local militia.

Perhaps the most innovative use of the militia by Washington was as a shield for the army, what in modern times is called a forward defense. He positioned militia units near the British lines, occasionally supported by Continental detachments nearby that were placed behind the militia. Then, if the British advanced, the militia could skirmish with the enemy, slow its advance even as more militia mustered, with the Continental detachments acting in reserve. This would give Washington time to assess the situation and decide if he wanted to advance the main army to fight or withdraw it to safety. Thus, whereas other aspects of the guerrilla war occurred spontaneously, this type of partisan warfare was employed deliberately by Washington to make full use of the two very different types of forces on which he had to rely. His strategy emerged in 1776–1777, when he began using this guerrilla activity to weaken, wear down, and disrupt British operations and to create an opportunity for the Continental Army to engage the British on better terms in a conventional-style battle.

He first employed this coordination of militia and the army in New Jersey in late 1776, when the local militia rose up against the British occupation of the state. With the British and German garrisons in New Jersey off balance and dealing with the partisan strikes of the local militia and even a detachment of Continentals near Morristown, Washington saw his opportunity and struck first Trenton and then Princeton. About five thousand Continentals and perhaps ten thousand militia struck at the British from New Jersey to Connecticut, forcing the British to contract their lines and abandon much of New Jersey by the end of January 1777.

When Sir William Howe led his army into New Jersey in the spring of 1777, Washington deliberately relied on this combination of regular and irregular operations. The New Jersey militia engaged in a running skirmish with the British and German advance forces, while Washington slowly fed in Continental units, all the while keeping the main army concentrated and available should an

opportunity to strike the harassed British army arise. It did not arise, and he kept his army out of reach behind this moving shield. Ultimately, the British retreated back into their lines after sustaining hundreds of casualties.

General Wilhelm Knyphausen launched a similar offensive in 1780 into New Jersey, with an almost identical result. Militia and Continentals slowed the advance while Washington edged the army ever closer to the front lines. Knyphausen finally decided against engaging Washington on his chosen field and retreated to Staten Island.

Perhaps the most striking use of this combined partisan and regular warfare occurred again in New Jersey, during the Monmouth campaign of 1778. When the British evacuated Philadelphia, Washington first sent Maxwell with the New Jersey Continentals, then Morgan with the Light Infantry, to cooperate with the New Jersey militia in slowing and harassing the British march. Washington then shadowed the British with the main army. By 24 June, five different Continental detachments of totaling thirty-six hundred men were hovering around the British, supported by parties of local militiamen. Washington kept sending more Continentals, so that by 26 June, five thousand Continentals and twenty-five hundred militia had surrounded the British in a moving ring. At that point Washington saw an opportunity and moved the army swiftly to intercept the British, the result being the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse. At the same time, the detachments were ordered to strike at the British supply trains. Thus, partisan strokes distracted the British army and allowed Washington to attack, and the army's attack then distracted the British army and opened the door for more guerrilla attacks. The British commander, Sir Henry Clinton, even admitted after the battle that he had accepted battle partially to try to force Washington to call in his numerous detachments. The Hessian Johann von Ewald saw the march across New Jersey as one in which "each step cost human blood."

Thus, Washington developed a sophisticated strategy that combined guerrilla actions with the campaigns of the regular army. In effect, he combined what could loosely be termed a European style of warfare with a North American style of warfare. Its effectiveness can be seen by the British attempt to emulate this strategy in the northern states. They made use of the Hessian jägers while creating the Queen's Rangers. These Rangers and jägers were often the advance corps or the rearguard during British operations. However, the British never mastered this combination of guerrilla and regular strategy. Their raids tended to be more isolated, seeking to destroy supplies or demoralize the rebels. The British did not coordinate them well with the main army. Washington's ability to fit the irregular aspects of the war into the regular campaigns was a key to his success.

Whether on their own or in conjunction with the regular armies, militia and guerrilla corps had a dramatic

impact on the war in the northern states. Scouting, gathering supplies, skirmishing with the enemy, reinforcing the main army, raiding supply lines, hunting people who supported the opposing side—all of these activities made the war as much a guerrilla war as a conventional one. The final success of the United States is largely due to the Americans' greater success at coordinating the regular and partisan forces in a revolutionary way to defeat the armed might of the enemy.

SEE ALSO *Associated Loyalists; Brant, Joseph; Burgoyne's Offensive; Butler, John; Cherry Valley Massacre, New York; Cooch's Bridge; Cowboys and Skinners; Dickinson, Philemon; Ewald, Johann von; Jägers; Lexington and Concord; Long Island Sound; Long Island, New York (August 1777); Loyalists in the American Revolution; Militia in the North; Monmouth, New Jersey; Morgan, Daniel; Neutral Ground of New York; New Jersey Campaign; Newtown, New York; Norman's Land around New York City; Queen's Rangers; Philadelphia Campaign; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois; Unadilla, New York; Whaleboat Warfare; Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.*

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Mark V. Kwasny

GUICHEN, LUC URBAIN DE BOUËXIC, COMTE DE. (1712–1790).

French admiral. Born at Fougères, he entered the naval service as *garde-marine* in 1730, was promoted to ship's ensign in 1735, served in the Atlantic and English Channel during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), and became ship's lieutenant in 1746 and ship's captain in 1756. He was made a chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis in 1748; in that year he successfully fought off British attackers against his Antilles convoy. Rear admiral in November 1776, he served in the naval division under Orvilliers at the beginning of the war. He distinguished himself in the battle off Ushant on 27 July 1779 and was promoted to lieutenant general. In March 1780 he led a strong squadron to the West Indies to relieve Estaing. He met Grasse in the waters around Martinique and fought three battles with Rodney on 17 April and 15 and 19 May. Although Guichen had no victories, he showed skill in handling his fleet and successfully checked the British. After escorting a convoy back to Cádiz, he placed himself under Estaing's orders and set into Brest in September 1780. Guichen was selected the next year to convoy supplies and reinforcements back to the West Indies. British Admiral Kempenfelt, sent to intercept this convoy, struck the transports in the Bay of Biscay in December with many French losses. In February 1782 he left again with a Spanish squadron to escort to Cádiz some reinforcements for the Antilles and Indies and then failed to intercept Admiral Richard Lord Howe's effort to resupply Gibraltar. After the Peace Treaty of 1783, Guichen ceased to sail.

Though Guichen did not directly act in North America, his movements provided a source of hope that the French squadron at Newport might be sufficiently reinforced to venture out of port. Washington and Lafayette appealed to him in 1780 for a joint operation in the south, but to no avail.

SEE ALSO *Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'*; *Grasse, François Joseph Paul, Comte de*; *Howe, Richard*.

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Robert Rhodes Crout

GUIDES AND PIONEERS. A corps of guides and pioneers was normally to be found in all armies of the eighteenth century, and it usually was recruited from local citizens who knew the country in which the army was operating. Sir William Howe authorized the Guides and Pioneers in December 1776 to support the outpost line around New York City. Men from other colonies also joined the Guides. According to Sir Henry Clinton, "I was reduced to the necessity of reforming some of these nominal [Provincial] battalions [in the summer of 1778] and placing their officers either upon half pay or in a corps of guides and pioneers, which I had instituted principally with a view of affording a maintenance to the most needy." Other men who functioned as intelligence gatherers and spies were given commissions in the Guides to protect them with a cloak of legality in case they were captured in enemy territory. Still others performed the engineering tasks usually associated with the term "pioneers" at this period. Detachments were sent on Tryon's raid on Danbury in late April 1777, on Howe's campaign to Philadelphia later that year, on Clinton's expedition to Charleston in May 1780, and on the three raids into Virginia in 1780–1781 (including thirty men with Benedict Arnold in December 1780). In the New York lines, they operated frequently with Colonel Beverley

Robinson's Loyal Americans. The unit was evacuated to New Brunswick on 12 September 1783 and disbanded there on 10 October.

SEE ALSO *Loyal Americans*; *Robinson, Beverley*.

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
revised by Harold E. Selesky

GUILFORD, SECOND EARL OF. (1732–1792). The title of Frederick North (Lord North) after he succeeded to his father's earldom in 1790.

SEE ALSO *North, Sir Frederick*.

GUILFORD COURTHOUSE, NORTH CAROLINA. The southern campaigns of Major General Nathanael Greene began when he divided his Continental southern army in the face of a larger British army, an unorthodox splitting of the less numerous American force in the face of the larger British army under the command of General Charles Earl Cornwallis. Driven by the logistical necessity of obtaining food and forage, the two double American advances into South Carolina clearly indicated that the British did not totally control the state by the end of 1780. Brigadier General Daniel Morgan's victory at Cowpens (in January 1781) precipitated a British pursuit as Cornwallis tried to recover over 600 prisoners and brought on the "race to the Dan River."

When Greene's army escaped across the river, Cornwallis moved to Hillsborough, North Carolina, to raise troops and refit his men. Greene immediately sent cavalry and light infantry back across the river to harass the British, disrupt recruiting, and prevent foraging. The pressure, and a lack of supplies or recruits, forced Cornwallis to evacuate Hillsborough and move westward. After maneuvering in a circular fashion just east of Cornwallis's base, and avoiding any major engagement,



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Greene moved from his camp at High Rock Ford to the Guilford Courthouse. Apprised of the movement, Cornwallis began a 12 mile march to the battlefield early on morning of 15 March 1781.

Greene was ready to fight, because he had been receiving reinforcements since 1 March that raised his strength to approximately 4,300. These men could be supplied for less than ten days without overextending his logistical


network. Cornwallis knew of the reinforcements, but overestimated their numbers, rating the American force at about 10,000 men against his 1,900 veterans. Half of Greene's troops had not yet seen any heavy action, but they had been drilling intensely for at least a week, ensuring that the militia had a fair grasp of tactical maneuvering and understood linear fighting with volley firing. From about 10 March, Greene's men also received more than adequate supplies of meat and bread, brought in by North Carolina militia and Continental foragers.

AMERICAN DISPOSITIONS

Greene had carefully studied the area in early February, when he considered fighting Cornwallis before retreating into Virginia. The courthouse stood in an extensive clearing on higher ground along the New Garden Road. To the west, the ground dropped off after less than 150 yards into a creek bottom with overgrown fields. Less than a mile west of the courthouse, the New Garden Road emerged from the woods and went downhill, crossing a cleared area that may have recently been plowed. The road continued across a small, marshy stream and left the valley heading west through a defile.

Greene posted three lines across the New Garden Road. The first line was manned by two North Carolina militia brigades numbering about 500 men each. Brigadier General John Butler was south of the road, while Brigadier General Thomas Eaton was on the north side. These militiamen were Greene's least reliable troops. Many were posted behind a fence with a clear, 500-yard field of fire. Between the two brigades, Captain Anthony Singleton placed two six-pounder guns. The outer flanks were strengthened by Continental infantry and riflemen echeloned forward to fire across the militia's front. Cavalry units were posted with these flankers. Lieutenant Colonel William Washington's Third Continental Light Dragoons were on the northern flank, supporting Delaware Captain Robert Kirkwood's 60 veteran Continentals, Virginia Captain Philip Hoffman's approximately 60 Continentals, and Colonel Charles Lynch's 200 Virginia riflemen. After they completed their morning's delaying action, Lee's Legion of 75 horse and 82 infantry, and Colonel William Campbell's 200 Virginia riflemen, took positions on the southern flank.


The second line had two Virginia militia brigades about 300 yards behind the first. Brigadier Generals Edward Stevens and Robert Lawson had approximately 600 men, with four regiments in each brigade. Stevens was south of the road in a very dense forest, whereas Lawson held the north side in slightly thinner woods. Until the flanking parties from the first line withdrew, the Virginia brigades' flanks were unprotected.



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The third line was on high ground, more than 500 yards behind the Virginia militia and posted north of the road. Lieutenant Samuel Finley's two six-pound cannons were posted between the Maryland and Virginia troops of Colonel Otho Holland Williams and Brigadier General Isaac Huger. On the southern end of this line, the Second Maryland Regiment was partially bent back to face open fields south of the courthouse. After pulling back from the second line, Singleton's two six-pound cannons would be placed adjacent to the road in the middle of the Second Maryland. As the line went north, away from the New Garden Road, the next regiment was the First Maryland, then Finley's artillery pieces, and Colonel John Green's Virginia Continental Regiment. The northern end of the third line was manned by Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Hawe's Virginians. Neither Virginia regiment was numbered at this time but Green's would be designated the First Virginia and Hawe's the Second Virginia by mid-April 1781.

The three battle lines bore a superficial resemblance to the deployment of American troops at the Cowpens, in South Carolina, on 17 January 1781. Daniel Morgan, who was present at the Cowpens action, did write to Greene suggesting this formation. There were significant differences, however, because Greene left himself no reserve and the three lines were beyond effective supporting distance. No line could see the other, but this might have proved advantageous for the relatively inexperienced militia. The American positions were dictated by the terrain, and the landscape would impact the battle in dramatic ways. On the east end of the battleground, the ridge above open fields was a logical place for the main line, because it provided open fields of fire for both muskets and artillery. A tree line on the western edge of the battleground also fronted open fields, making the position suitable for longer range firing by riflemen and artillery. In the dense woods between the first and third lines, there was a low ridge that provided a point for the middle line to



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form. While Greene did not have a reserve, he may have envisioned using withdrawing militia if they could be rallied behind the Continentals on the third line.

CORNWALLIS ADVANCES

Cornwallis broke camp about dawn and began moving eastward without breakfast. The 12-mile march from New Garden Meeting House toward Guilford would take some time because of American resistance along the route. About 7:15 A.M., Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton's advance guard clashed with Lieutenant Colonel Henry ("Light Horse Harry") Lee's Partisan Legion, Captain Andrew Wallace's Virginia Continental company, and Colonel William Campbell's Virginia riflemen four miles west of Guilford Courthouse. Both sides claimed the better of this engagement, but Tarleton received a wound that cost him two fingers and Wallace was killed. At about noon the British emerged from the woods onto the battlefield's western end and started deploying. They knew a fight was imminent because Captain Singleton's six-pounders opened fire. Lieutenant John Macleod of the Royal Artillery replied with two three-pounders (he would employ these cannons admirably during the engagement), and Cornwallis made immediate preparations to attack. The British were outgunned in this exchange by the bigger American guns, and MacLeod's assistant, Lieutenant Augustus O'Hara, son of the Guards' General Charles O'Hara, was killed.

The British commander learned nothing of the terrain; his guides "were extremely inaccurate in their description," and prisoners taken that morning "could give me no account of the enemy's order or position." Cornwallis was told that the woods on both sides of the clearing were impracticable for cannon, but apparently was not told that there were other roads heading generally eastward north and south of the battlefield. As a result, the New Garden (or Salisbury) Road became the battle's central axis.

The British deployed with Brigadier General Alexander Leslie south of the road with the Seventy-first Foot (Fraser's Highlanders) and the Hessian Regiment von Bose. North of the road, Cornwallis placed Brigadier General James Webster's brigade, composed of the Twenty-third Foot and the Thirty-third Foot. The rest of his forces were in reserve. The First Battalion of the

Guards was behind Leslie. The Second Battalion of Guards and Grenadiers, all under Brigadier General Charles O'Hara, were behind Webster's brigade. A small body of Jägers (marksmen), the Guards Light Infantry, and Tarleton's 155-man British Legion Dragoons were also in reserve.

THE BATTLE

The battle at Guilford Courthouse can be broken down into a series of phases as the British moved forward and engaged each line. In some ways, each regiment almost literally fought its own separate battle, because terrain and ground cover so obstructed passage of the linear formations and because there was no long range view between the first and third American lines.

Phase I: The North Carolina militia fires and retreats

Approximately 20 minutes after the artillery opened fire, Webster and Leslie started toward the first American line, which stood almost 500 yards away. American flanking riflemen opened fire when the British came within 150 yards, and it is possible some North Carolina militiamen did likewise. The British advance came to a spontaneous halt about 40 yards from the fence. The North Carolinians were crouched down, resting their muskets on the fence, taking a good aim. The British infantry hesitated, knowing a volley of buckshot and ball inside 40 yards would be devastating. Webster rode to the front and ordered them forward as he led the way. The halt was broken and the Twenty-third Regiment rushed on the militiamen, taking a volley as they did so.

The North Carolina militiamen immediately broke and headed for the rear. The rout was so complete that an outraged Greene later asked the North Carolina legislature to call the men back into service for a year as punishment for running away. Lee also thought the rout was mortifying, but he did point out that Forbis's Guilford County company stayed with his legion and fought on.

Lee, on the southern flank, was unaware that some of Eaton's northern flank militiamen also continued the fight by joining William Washington's forces. The additional men were important, because the British could not move against the second American line until they dealt with the American flankers. Since the American flanks held their ground even after the militia fled, Cornwallis was forced to commit all his infantry reserves to extend the battle line before advancing. The troops in von Bose's regiment adjusted their direction, inclining to the southeast against Lee and Campbell, while the Thirty-third Regiment executed a corresponding maneuver against the north flank. When the Light Infantry and Jägers moved with Webster, the Grenadiers and the two Guards battalions advanced to maintain the original line and fill gaps.




Cannon on the Third Line. *An American cannon stands on the third line at the battlefield of Guilford Courthouse National Military Park in North Carolina. © DAVID MUENCH/CORBIS.*

O'Hara's Brigade moved into the battle line with the Grenadiers north of the road, the Second Guards on and south of the road. The First Guards inclined to their right, taking position between von Bose and the Seventy-first. Schematically, the line, from north to south consisted of the Light Infantry and Jäegers, the Thirty-third and Twenty-third Regiments, the Grenadiers, the Second Battalion of the Guards, the Seventy-first, the First Battalion of the Guards and von Bose. Webster personally led the attack, initially with the Twenty-third, but he soon moved to direct the Light Infantry and Thirty-third. O'Hara appears to have stayed with the Second Battalion of the Guards. Leslie is difficult to place but seems to have overseen the Seventy-first. Due to the thickness of the woods, the artillery and dragoons stayed on the road.


Phase II: The Virginia militia are hammered back. Driving through woods so thick that Cornwallis reported

bayonets were almost useless, the British assaulted the second line. The two right flank regiments drove a wedge between the Virginia militia and Lee's flanking troops. The First Battalion of the Guards and von Bose then continued in a southeasterly direction, moving away from the main battle and creating their own separate battle against Lee and Campbell. Washington's flank forces still held the northern flank, extending the Virginia militia line northwards. On at least one occasion, they drove the British back.

The second American line was no pushover. The militia brigades of Stevens and Lawson fought well. Lawson's brigade fared badly because its three regiments were ordered forward, perhaps in response to the Thirty-third moving against Washington. The brigade was split as the advancing Virginians were simply rolled up from their left by the Twenty-third. In the thick woods, the Virginians were slowly driven back, in part because they



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were opposed by Light Infantry and Jägers. The Twenty-third possibly used a faster loading procedure for developed woods fighting, according to the Twenty-third Regiment's Sergeant Lamb (who also reported seeing Virginians behind brush breastworks). Washington counterattacked to relieve the pressure, but Lawson's brigade was no longer on line. Men from Stevens's three regiments fought individual and squad-sized engagements against the Welsh Fusileers, who pursued them eastward through the woods. Now isolated, the flank elements were eventually driven to the rear, while Lawson's one remaining regiment continued fighting on Stevens's right flank.

Stevens's Virginia militia ran away at Camden, and he had no intention of seeing that happen again. He placed men, probably sergeants, behind his battle line. These men were given orders to shoot any man who tried to run. Stevens and his men held their position until he was shot in the thigh. He was evacuated as part of a general withdrawal because the British were already beyond his position on both the north and south. The two regiments on the British far right continued their struggle with Lee and Campbell, but all American forces were pushed eastward. Washington's flankers retired to the third line, conducting a fighting withdrawal.

Phase III: Webster attacks the Continental line. Lieutenant Colonel James Webster advanced more rapidly with the Thirty-third, driving the American flankers and militia back to the main line. Thinner woods, good leadership, and a solid infantry regiment meant that Webster's men reached the American third line first. They came out of the woods, went down a steep slope, and found Greene's best soldiers waiting for them across the little valley. Aligned from north to south were Captain Robert Kirkwood's Delawares, arguably one of the best company formations the Continentals produced during the war. To their south was Huger's Virginia Brigade, then Finley's two guns and the First Maryland. The Americans watched from good defensive terrain as the aggressive Webster

came down the opposite slope, formed to their front, and charged. At close range, the Continentals delivered a murderous fire of musketry and artillery, then followed up with a bayonet attack. The First Maryland inclined to the right and struck Webster's right flank elements. Although severely wounded, and with his command badly hurt and disorganized, Webster withdrew northwestward onto steep, high ground and then repulsed his pursuers. Webster's command was stunned and temporarily out of action.

Phase IV: Cornwallis masses against the third line. As the Virginians filtered back through the dense woods, the British right also came on. O'Hara moved forward with the Second Battalion of the Guards. The Grenadiers lagged slightly behind, hampered by the thick woods. The Twenty-third was disorganized and was also slowed by the dense woods and sporadic militia resistance. The Seventy-first, further south, continued forward but also trailed well behind O'Hara's Guards. Lieutenant Macleod continued moving his three-pounders up the road, partially supported by the Grenadiers, and backed up by the dragoons.

Before they reached the slope leading down to the valley, the Guards had drifted across the road because the terrain sloped in a southerly direction. The Second Guards Battalion commenced their attack without waiting for any assistance. As soon as the Guards came down into the cleared valley west of the courthouse, they attacked. Maryland Colonel Otho Holland Williams, behind the First Maryland, saw the charging Guards and rode out to help direct the Second Maryland, a unit with only six months' service behind it. Without combat experience and with their original officers being replaced by veteran supernumerary Maryland officers, the Second Maryland was about to face elite British infantry. Williams ordered its left flank to wheel right and face the oncoming Guards, then he ordered the entire regiment to charge. After a few steps, the unit was halted. Under fire, the regiment broke as Lieutenant Colonel James Stuart led his Guards into their ranks.

The Guards swarmed through the gap, taking Singleton's two guns, and pushed forward until they were hit by two vicious counterattacks. Washington's dragoons had moved from the right flank along a road and were the first to crash into the Guardsmen. They rode through, wheeled, and came back again, hacking away as they went. At almost the same time, the First Maryland, which Fortescue called "the finest battalion in the American Army" trotted uphill, opened fire, and then charged into the Guards. The Marylanders were led by Lieutenant Colonel John Eager Howard who assumed command when Colonel John Gunby's horse went down, pinning him under it. Militiamen at the courthouse reported that the two regiments were so close their muzzle flashes overlapped as volleys were fired.

Struck in front, flank and rear, the Guards drifted westward, fighting hand to hand in a melee back across the little valley. Stuart was killed in a celebrated "duel" with Maryland Captain John Smith, but his men fought valiantly to avoid annihilation. Some idea of the ferocity of the bayonet fight can be seen in an account provided by Smith's post-war partner, Samuel Mathis:

In the heat & mist of the Battle at Guilford while the Americans & British Troops were intermixed with a charge of Bayonets, Smith & his men were in the throng killing guards & Grenadiers. . . Colonel Stewart [sic] seeing the mischief Smith was doing made up to him through the crowd, dust and smoke unperceived & made a violent lunge at him with his small Sword, the first that Smith saw was the shining Metal . . . he only had time to lean a little to the right, & lift up his left Arm so as to let the polished steel pass under it when the hilt struck his breast, it would have been through his Body but for the haste of the Col & happening to set his foot on the arm of a Man Smith had just cut down. His unsteady Step, the violent lunge & missing his aim brought him with one knee upon the dead man, the Guards came rushing up very throng [sic], Smith had no alternative but to wheel round to the right & give Stewart a back handed Blow over or across the head on which he fell; his orderly sergeant attacked Smith, but Smith's Sergeant dispatched him; a 2d attacked him Smith hewed him down, a 3rd behind him threw down a cartridge & shot him in the back of the head, Smith now fell among the slain but was taken up by his men & brot [sic] off, it was found to be only a Buck Shot lodged against the Skull & had only stunned him.

As the infantry slugged it out, Washington's dragoons began riding across the valley toward a British officer and his aides. By this time, MacLeod had arrived and placed his two guns on a little knoll above the valley's western edge. Cornwallis ordered MacLeod's guns to fire on

Washington's dragoons, but made no mention of the infantry melee behind them, where the Guards and Marylanders were still fighting. Despite the wounded O'Hara's protests, Cornwallis persisted in his decision. Even if Macleod directed his fire so as to spare the British infantry as much as possible, the normal dispersal of grape shot made it inevitable that casualties were inflicted on both sides. Rumors later circulated that Cornwallis had ordered the artillery on his own men to break up the melee between the Marylanders and the Guards, but the fire was meant to halt Washington's dragoons. After the artillery fire, the Guards retired to the western slope, and the Marylanders moved back toward the courthouse.

Final phase: Cornwallis renews attack, Greene retreats.


After Washington was driven back, the Second Guards retired to the west slope and reformed. The Grenadiers, who had come up with McLeod, joined the Guards as the Seventy-first Regiment came into the valley south of the guards. O'Hara, despite his wounds, rallied the Guards and went back across the valley. About this time, the Twenty-third Regiment finally reached the third line vicinity as well, and there it linked with the Thirty-third. The British infantry finally took possession of the third line positions.

Since Greene's men were already withdrawing, the British had no trouble retaking Singleton's guns, and Finley's as well. The four American guns were left on the field because their horses had been killed and Greene did not want to risk men dragging them away by hand. Contrary to later mythology, none of the American guns (six-pounders) had been captured at Cowpens, whereas the British had lost two three-pounders.

Tarleton's dragoons were finally in open ground. About half of them, along with the Seventy-first and Twenty-third, followed after the Americans in a very careful pursuit. The other half rode south, down into the valley, and fell upon the Virginia militiamen who were still conducting a fighting withdrawal.

Both Tarleton and Lee reported that the First Battalion of Guards and von Bose had difficulties with the Americans who swarmed through the woods. Men from von Bose reported their regiment had to fight to their front and rear at one time, and that at another time, the Guards rallied behind them. The Americans were at their best in the thick woods, using trees and brush for cover and concealment, letting the British and Germans advance beyond them and then hitting their rear. It was not an easy fight; one American later reported that they thought the Hessians were Continentals and rushed up shouting, "Liberty! Liberty!," only to be fired upon by the exasperated Germans. After Lee moved his Legion toward the rear, the Virginia flankers got the worst of it because they were on open ground.

Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina



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Cavalry at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse. American cavalry officers skirmish at the 1781 Battle of Guilford Courthouse in this engraving based on a nineteenth-century painting by Alonzo Chappel. © BETTMANN/CORBIS.

By the time Tarleton arrived to charge the Americans on the southern flank, Lee's dragoons, and probably his infantry too, were covering the army's retreat, and Campbell's men were moving toward the courthouse. Tarleton's account suggests his men broke up an organized line, rather than that they were punishing a straggling rear guard. Those Virginians who did encounter Tarleton at this stage were badly hacked up, and Campbell never forgave Lee for abandoning him. This was the dragoons' only effort on the battlefield, because the heavily wooded landscape around Guilford Courthouse was not cavalry country, and Greene's orderly retreat ruled out any effective pursuit.

Greene made his decision to withdraw his army about the time the Second Maryland collapsed. As the army moved north, Greene halted three miles from the battlefield to collect stragglers and check a pursuit that was halfhearted at best. The British were simply worn out by their exertions that day. Greene withdrew to a former camp at Speedwell Iron Works on Troublesome Creek. Cornwallis remained on the field until 18 March, when he began moving toward Wilmington, North Carolina.

NUMBERS, LOSSES, AND LESSONS LEARNED

A few days before the battle, Greene's army numbered 4,449, of whom 1,670 were Continentals and the rest militia. Lee reported the Continentals lost 14 officers and 312 men killed, wounded, and missing. The figures for the militia were never adequately reported. Greene claimed the militia lost 22 killed, 73 wounded, and 885 missing, whereas the Continentals reportedly lost 57 killed, 111 wounded, and 161 missing. The American figures are almost guesswork for the militia, but Continental losses were miniscule when compared with the losses suffered by the British.

Cornwallis's forces numbered approximately 1,900 men. The British lost 532 officers and men, of whom 93 were killed and another 50 were mortally wounded and died within a few days. The Guards also suffered badly, 11 of their 19 officers and 206 out of 462 men were casualties. A total of 41 British officers and men were counted among the dead. These experienced men could not be replaced by local recruiting, even if the Tories had turned out to volunteer. Cornwallis's force was virtually crippled by their casualties.

The British infantry clearly demonstrated outstanding bravery. After short rations over the preceding month, and faced with constant marches, they fought at Guilford Courthouse after a twelve-mile, contested march on empty stomachs. The quality and courage of Cornwallis's troops was certainly borne out by their performance on this day,

In the context of his southern campaigns, and ever since he so perplexingly divided his army at Charlotte in December 1780, Greene had now mastered Charles Cornwallis as a general, in part because of his astute management of his logistics. In some ways, Cornwallis beat himself with his aggressiveness, and with his reliance on magnificent subordinate leaders and troops. In his eagerness to engage Greene, Cornwallis did not conduct an adequate reconnaissance. Once the battle began, he lost effective control of his battalions, leaving their direction to commanders who drifted away from the main axis and lost contact with supporting units. Greene had a similar cadre of outstanding assistants and a hard core of veteran infantrymen who had also fought well. The slighted North Carolina militia performed much better than the Continentals wished to admit. Their initial volley and some flank fighting had contributed to British casualties, perhaps even more than the Virginians, but they were scorned for running away. In September, however, after much more training and led by battle-hardened officers they knew, these same men would fight well at Eutaw Springs.

SEE ALSO *Camden, South Carolina; Cowpens, South Carolina; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

Gulph, The

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revised by Lawrence E. Babits

GULPH, THE. Subsequently West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania, near Matson's Ford.

SEE ALSO *Matson's Ford, Pennsylvania*.

GUN. This word should be restricted to cannon, but in the eighteenth century, as in the twentieth, it also was used to mean a musket or rifle.

Mark M. Boatner

GUNBY, JOHN. (1745–1807). Continental officer. Maryland. Born 10 March 1745, Captain Gunby, the son of a Loyalist, organized an independent company on 14 January 1776, devoting himself primarily to attacking Loyalists. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Seventh Maryland on 10 December and colonel on 17 April 1777. Serving in Smallwood's First Maryland Brigade at Camden, he took no part in the battle. On 1 January 1781 he took command of the First Maryland Continentals, acclaimed as one of the best units in the Continental army, and led them with distinction at Guilford, North Carolina, on 15 March 1781. At Hobkirk's Hill South Carolina, on 25 April 1781, he commanded the First Maryland, whose premature retreat is generally blamed for Greene's defeat. He served the rest of the war. On 30 September 1783 he was brevetted brigadier general, and on 15 December 1783 he left the army. He died on 17 May 1807 at his farm in Snow Hill, Maryland.

SEE ALSO *Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Hobkirk's Hill (Camden), South Carolina*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

GUNDALOW. Sometimes spelled "gundalo" (properly, gondola), this was a boat pointed at both ends, usually flat bottomed, and normally rigged with two square sails on a single mast. Although very fast in a favoring wind, they were essentially rowboats. Gundalows figured prominently in the Champlain squadrons.

SEE ALSO *Champlain Squadrons*.

Mark M. Boatner

GUNPOWDER. Albert Manucy explains that

black powder was used in all firearms until smokeless and other type propellants were invented in the latter 1800's. "Black" powder (which was sometimes brown) is a mixture of about 75 parts saltpeter (potassium nitrate), 15 parts charcoal, and 10 parts sulfur by weight. It will explode because the mixture contains the necessary amount of oxygen for its own combustion. When it burns, it liberates smoky gases (mainly nitrogen and carbon dioxide) that occupy some 300 times as much space as the powder itself. . . . About 1450, powder makers began to "corn" the powder. That is, they formed it into larger grains, with a resulting increase in the velocity of the shot. It was "corned" in fine grains for small arms and coarse for cannon. Making corned powder was fairly simple. The three ingredients were pulverized and mixed, then compressed into cakes which were cut into "corns" or grains. . . . It has always been difficult to make powder twice alike and keep it in condition. . . . Black powder was, and is, both dangerous and unstable. Not only is it sensitive to flame or spark, but it absorbs moisture from the air. (Manucy, pp. 23–25)

Moreover, the components can settle out in storage, with the saltpeter, the heaviest ingredient, settling to the bottom of the cask. Powder casks had to be rolled periodically to ensure that the ingredients remained evenly distributed in the mixture.

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Harold E. Selesky

GUSTAVUS. Pseudonym used by Arnold in Arnold's treason.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason*.

GWINNETT, BUTTON. (1735–1777). Signer. Born at Down Hatherley in Gloucestershire, England, in 1735. He arrived in Savannah in 1765. After failing as a merchant and planter he experienced financial difficulties the rest of his life. He held several minor public offices, and in 1775 he led the radical faction of the local Patriots. As a member of the Georgia council of safety, he was sent on 20 January 1776 to the Continental Congress. He arrived in May, signed the Declaration of Independence, and returned to Georgia in August. While in Congress, he was proposed as a brigadier general, but the Continental brigade in question was given to Lachlan McIntosh, instead.

Gwinnett was elected speaker of the radically controlled Assembly in October 1776 and led the opposition to union with South Carolina and the committee that drafted Georgia's first state constitution, which effectively silenced the conservative faction. In March 1777, after the death of the governor, Archibald Bulloch, Gwinnett was appointed to serve out the term of office and to act as commander in chief of Georgia's military forces. In his short term as governor, he followed extreme radical views and thereby antagonized the conservative faction in the state, including Lachlan McIntosh. Gwinnett had arrested McIntosh's brother on suspicion of treason, and the two men had often clashed over the limits of military and civil authority and state control of Continental troops. Unable to cooperate during the Georgia expedition against British posts in Florida in the spring of 1777, they were both recalled to Savannah by the state assembly, which launched an investigation into their conduct. Although absolved of any blame, Gwinnett failed to win re-election to the governorship. On 19 May he died from wounds suffered in a duel with McIntosh. He is believed to have died insolvent, and there is no record of his grave. The dearth of materials associated with his name has made the few known items quite valuable to collectors. In 1979, his signature (of which only thirty-six are known to exist) brought \$100,000 at auction.

SEE ALSO *McIntosh, Lachlan; Southern Theater, Military Operations in*.

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revised by Leslie Hall

GWYNN ISLAND, VIRGINIA. Chesapeake Bay, 8–10 July 1776. Dunmore's last stand. After setting fire to Norfolk on 1 January, the British spent the next several months operating in the lower Chesapeake Bay, largely obstructing shipping and harassing Patriots living near the shore. On 27 May the royal governor established a base on Gwynn Island at the mouth of the Piankatank River, just south of the mouth of the Rappahannock. The island of twenty-three hundred acres was reasonably safe, lying about five hundred yards from the mainland, and provided a sheltered anchorage for his little provincial fleet. Supported by several small Royal Navy warships, a handful of regulars and some five hundred Tory troops—black and white—Dunmore hoped to maintain a foothold in his province and establish a base from which to raid the neighboring plantations. Local militia mobilized on the mainland and began watching from a distance, but Dunmore's forces sat immobilized by disease, including an outbreak of smallpox.

On 8 July, Brigadier General Andrew Lewis arrived with a brigade of Virginia troops to eliminate this last vestige of royal authority. At 8 A.M. of the 9th, Lewis opened fire at a range of five hundred yards from two batteries. One armed with two eighteen-pound guns put five shots into the governor's flagship, the *Dunmore*, wounding its namesake. A second battery of lighter guns then bombarded the enemy fleet, camp, and fortifications for an hour. Most of the governor's vessels slipped their cables and tried to escape; some ran aground and were burned by their crews. The guns that did fire back were quickly silenced. When no sign of surrender came from the island, the rebel guns resumed their cannonade at noon. The next morning after boats had been found, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander McClanahan crossed with two hundred men and found evidence of the smallpox outbreak that explained why there had been so little resistance. Graves dotted the island, and the dead and dying were scattered about in various directions. The rest had fled with Dunmore.

Gwynn Island, Virginia

British losses included three vessels captured and several more destroyed. It is not known how many personnel were killed or wounded in the attack, but the Americans made no claims, indicating that they could not have been heavy. The only Patriot casualty was Captain Dohickey Arundell, the artillery commander, who was killed “by the bursting of a mortar

of his own invention” (*Virginia Gazette* [Purdy], 19 July 1776).

SEE ALSO *Lewis, Andrew; Norfolk, Virginia; Virginia, Military Operations in.*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

H

HABERSHAM, JAMES. (c. 1712–1775). Merchant, planter, colonial official. Georgia. Born in Beverly, Yorkshire, England, James Habersham left a mercantile career in London and emigrated to Georgia in 1737. Arriving with his friend George Whitefield, the evangelist, Habersham opened a school for destitute children and later cooperated with Whitefield in establishing the Bethesda Orphanage (one of the first in America). He was in charge of that institution from 1741 to 1744. In 1744 he resigned and organized Harris and Habersham, the first and, for many years, most important commercial enterprise in Georgia. He then developed large farming interests, and in 1749 he took the lead in getting the colonial trustees to consent to the importation of slaves. This saved the economy of the colony, converting its agriculture from grapes and silkworms to the profitable cultivation of rice and cotton.

Now the leading merchant and trader, and one of the largest planters, Habersham became president of the colonial council in 1767. A close personal friend and political supporter of royal Governor James Wright, he helped the latter maintain British authority in the province during the Stamp Act crisis and was acting governor during Wright's absence in England from 1771 to 1773. His first-generation brand of loyalism helped delay Georgia's revolutionary movement. Overburdened with work and distressed by the now inevitable revolutionary trend in Georgia, he traveled north for a change of climate and died 28 Aug. 1775 in Brunswick, New Jersey.

Habersham had three surviving sons who were educated at Princeton. Two of them, John and Joseph, became prominent Patriot leaders, and the other was also a Patriot. Their mother was Mary Bolton, whom he wed on 26

December 1740 in a marriage ceremony performed by Whitefield.

SEE ALSO *Habersham, John; Habersham, Joseph; Wright, Sir James, Governor.*

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revised by Leslie Hall

HABERSHAM, JOHN. (1754–1799). Continental officer. Georgia. Third surviving son of James Habersham, John was educated at Princeton and in England before entering business. On 7 January 1776 he became a first lieutenant in the First Georgia Continental Regiment and was promoted to captain on 8 May 1776. He became brigadier major to General Robert Howe on 25 December 1777, major of the First Georgia Regiment on 1 April 1778, was captured at Savannah, 29 December 1778, and was again a prisoner after the surrender of Charleston in May 1780. Exchanged both times, he served to the end of the war under General Anthony Wayne in the liberation of Georgia and then patrolling the eastern Florida border. He served in the state assembly and the Continental Congress in 1785. During the ten years before his early

Habersham, Joseph

death in 1799 he was a planter and customs collector at Savannah.

SEE ALSO *Habersham, James; Habersham, Joseph.*

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revised by Leslie Hall

HABERSHAM, JOSEPH. (1751–1815). Patriot leader, U.S. Postmaster General (1795–1801). Georgia. Second son of the prominent James Habersham, Joseph attended Princeton, and, in 1768, was sent to England. After three years with a mercantile firm he returned to Georgia and was set up in business by his father, first with his elder brother James and then, in 1773, with his kinsman, Joseph Clay.

Although his father was president of the Georgia colonial council and a close friend and supporter of Governor James Wright, Joseph emerged as a Patriot leader. He took Governor Wright and his council prisoner on 18 January 1776.

Habersham was made a major of the First Georgia Continental Regiment on 7 January 1776, he became lieutenant colonel on 5 July and colonel on 17 September 1776. He resigned his military commission in the Continental army on 31 March 1778, for he had alienated the radical faction, thus thwarting his military career. His plans to seek election to the state assembly ended with the British re-occupation of Georgia in late 1778. He moved his family first to the Carolinas and then to Virginia. He took part in the temporary rebel government in Augusta during July 1779 and the disastrous Franco-American attack on Savannah during that October.

After the war Habersham served twice as speaker of the Georgia General Assembly, and in 1788 was a member of the convention that ratified the Federal Constitution in Georgia. President George Washington appointed him Postmaster General in February 1795. He served in this post until President Thomas Jefferson's administration. Pressured to resign, he left this post in November 1801. Returning to Savannah, he resumed his commercial career, and is credited by some to have been the first to export American-grown cotton.

SEE ALSO *Habersham, James; Habersham, John; Wright, Sir James, Governor.*

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revised by Leslie Hall

HADDRELL'S POINT. The rebels fortified this position, in what was later called Mt. Pleasant, prior to the unsuccessful British attack on Sullivan's Island in 1776. They established a three-gun battery there during Clinton's siege of Charleston (1780) to keep the Royal Navy out of the Hog Island Channel and the Cooper River. After Lincoln's surrender on 12 May, the British sent captured American officers to a camp at Haddrell's Point.

Carl P. Borick

HALDIMAND, SIR FREDERICK. (1718–1791). British general and colonial governor. Born in Yverdon, Switzerland, Haldimand first found employment in the Prussian army, serving at Mollwitz, Hohenfriedberg, and Kesseldorf during the War of the Austrian Succession. In 1748 he moved to the regiment of Swiss guards in the Dutch service. On 4 January 1756 he accepted a British offer to be lieutenant colonel of a battalion of the Royal American Regiment, which was to be raised from Dutch and German settlers in Pennsylvania. Arriving in America in 1757, he fought at Ticonderoga in 1758 and in 1759 repelled an attack by four thousand French and Indians on half-rebuilt Oswego. In 1760 he took part in the Montreal campaign, and he liaised with Vaudrieul over the terms of capitulation. He was military governor of the Trois Rivières district until September 1765, after which he was promoted to brigadier general and appointed to succeed Bouquet in command of the Southern Department.

In this role he provided a competent administration of the Floridas from 1769 to 1773. From June 1773 to July 1774 he was acting commander in chief in New York while Gage was in London. However, three less-experienced



The Execution of Nathan Hale. British soldiers march Nathan Hale to the gallows in this nineteenth-century lithograph after an image by J. Ropis. "NATHAN HALE (1755–76) ON THE WAY TO HIS EXECUTION," 1856 (LITHO), ROPIS, J (FL.1856) (AFTER) / BRITISH LIBRARY, LONDON, UK. BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY.

generals had been appointed to assist Gage at Boston, and Haldimand returned to Britain without employment or apparent prospects. Although given the valuable sinecure of inspector general of the West Indian forces, his next active commission was as governor of Canada in 1777. His most pressing task being security, he rightly spent vast sums on presents for the Indians and issued bills of exchange that the treasury was reluctant to honour. He left office in September 1784 and was knighted a year later. He spent most of his final years in London and continued to take an interest in Canadian affairs. He died in Yverdon in June 1791.

John Oliphant

HALE, NATHAN. (1755–1776). Spy, martyr. Continental officer. Connecticut. Born 6 June 1755 in Coventry, Connecticut, Hale graduated from Yale in 1773. He was widely admired for his intelligence and good looks. A teacher when news of Lexington arrived at New London, Hale delivered an impassioned call for rebellion to the town meeting and rushed north to Boston, being commissioned lieutenant in the

Seventh Connecticut militia on 6 July 1775 and captain on 1 September. On 1 January 1776 he became captain in the Nineteenth Continental Regiment. Moving with the army to New York City in early September, he led a group of seamen from his company in capturing a supply sloop from under the guns of the man-of-war *Asia*.

Lieutenant colonel Thomas Knowlton, impressed with this action, selected Hale to command a company of his rangers. When Washington asked for a captain to volunteer from Knowlton's Rangers for an intelligence mission within the enemy lines shortly before the Battle of Harlem Heights, Hale stepped forward after the first appeal had brought no volunteers. In the guise of a school teacher, he left the camp at Harlem Heights on 12 September, moved to Long Island by a roundabout route, gathered the desired information about enemy dispositions, and was captured the night of 21 September as he approached his own lines. At Howe's headquarters, then located at the Beekman mansion, he allegedly was betrayed by his Loyalist cousin, Samuel Hale, Howe's deputy commissioner of prisoners. Since incriminating papers were found on his person and he was not in uniform, there was no question about his being guilty of spying and, without the formality of a trial, Howe ordered him hanged. While awaiting execution on

Sunday, 22 September, he occupied the tent of Captain John Montresor, chief engineer of the British army in America, who treated him with cordiality. Here he wrote to his brother Enoch and to Knowlton, not knowing that the latter had been killed six days earlier. At the gallows he made a statement that closed with, "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country." The phrase undoubtedly was inspired by the lines of Joseph Addison (1672–1719): "What a pity is it? That we can die but once to save our country!" Hale became an instant hero to the American cause.

SEE ALSO *André, John*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HALE, NATHAN. (?–1780). Continental officer. New Hampshire. A captain of New Hampshire minutemen when hostilities with the British began on 19 April 1775, he was a major in the Third New Hampshire on 23 April and remained with that unit when it was redesignated the Second Continental Infantry on 1 January 1776. On 8 November 1776 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Second New Hampshire and was made colonel on 2 April 1777. His unit was in the rear of the retreat from Ticonderoga, guarding the invalids overnight on 6 July 1777. The next morning an advancing party of the enemy caught up with him at Hubbardton, Vermont, and Hale was unable to extricate his unit. Taken prisoner with about one hundred of his men, Hale died on 23 September 1780 while still a captive.

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revised by Frank C. Mevers

HALFWAY SWAMP–SINGLETON’S, SOUTH CAROLINA. 12–13 December 1780. When the newly promoted General Francis Marion learned that the easygoing British Major Robert McLeroth with his Sixty-fourth Regiment was escorting some two hundred recruits of the Seventh Regiment of Foot from Charleston toward Winnsboro, he assembled seven hundred mounted men and moved to intercept this force. Some twenty miles northwest of Nelson’s Ferry on the Santee River, just above Halfway Swamp, Marion

made contact. The British pickets were driven in and their rear guard was attacked while McLeroth took up a defensive position. His path now blocked, McLeroth sent a flag to protest the shooting of pickets and daring Marion to meet him in the open. Marion replied that so long as the British burned houses and continued their raids, he would continue to shoot pickets. As for the fair fight in the open, Marion countered with the suggestion that teams of twenty men should fight it out. This archaic challenge was accepted, a field was selected, and the contest was organized. Marion named Major John Vanderhorst team captain and carefully picked twenty men. The rebels decided to hold their fire until they were within fifty yards. One man was designated to notify Vanderhorst when the range was right, and Marion’s men, each one eyeing his target, moved forward. The deadly game was not played out, however: on orders from its officers, the British team marched off the field, and it became apparent that McLeroth had merely been stalling for time, as he expected reinforcements at any minute.

Captain James Coffin was moving with 140 mounted men to join McLeroth, but when he got word of Marion’s presence, he declined to come forward to attack. Around midnight McLeroth slipped away from his burning campfires and headed toward Singleton’s Mill. Learning of this maneuver, Major John James beat the British to Singleton’s, took position on the hill, delivered one volley at the approaching British, and then, to the amazement of the latter, fled. In fact, the rebels took flight when they discovered that the Singleton family was down with smallpox. Marion withdrew toward Nelson’s Ferry while Coffin joined McLeroth near Singleton’s, and on 16 December the British column reached Winnsboro.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HALIFAX RESOLVES. 12 April 1776. Soon after the patriot victory at Moores Creek Bridge on 27 February 1776, the Fourth Provincial Congress of North Carolina met at Halifax and adopted the set of “resolves” that gave them the distinction of being the first colony to come out officially for independence.

SEE ALSO *Independence; Moores Creek Bridge*.

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Harold E. Selesky

HALL, LYMAN. (1724–1790). Signer. Connecticut. He graduated from Yale in 1747 and was ordained a minister in 1749 in Fairfield, Connecticut. He took up medicine and, abandoning the ministry, set up practice in Wallingford. About 1757 he moved to South Carolina, settling in Charleston as a physician. Hall was granted land in Georgia in 1760 and established a rice plantation near Midway and built a home in Sunbury, St. John's Parish. He returned to South Carolina in 1762 and moved back to Georgia in 1774, soon becoming a radical leader in the area. Leading the other parishes in rebellion, St. John's elected Hall in March 1775 as its delegate to the Continental Congress; the Provincial Congress and then the state legislature chose him as a delegate from 1776 to 1780, although he did not attend after February 1777. Hall and Button Gwinnett led the radical faction in Georgia, which eventually dominated state politics with the adoption of the state constitution in 1777. Calling themselves the Liberty Society, the radicals labeled anyone not in support of their party a Loyalist or Tory. After General Lachlan McIntosh, viewed by radicals with hostility, killed Gwinnett in a duel in May 1777, Hall used every means at his disposal, including coercion, to obtain signatures on a circular letter supporting McIntosh's removal from Georgia. When the British reoccupied Georgia in December 1778, he moved his family first to Charleston and later, it is thought, to Connecticut. He returned at the end of the war to practice medicine in Savannah. Elected governor in 1783, he displayed a broad grasp of the many issues facing the state. He then served in the assembly and as judge of the Inferior Court of Chatham County. In 1790 Hall moved to Burke County, Georgia, where he soon died.

SEE ALSO *Signers*.

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Leslie Hall

HALL, PRINCE. (1735?–1807). Abolitionist. Born in Bridgetown, Barbados, perhaps in 1735, Hall—though the son of an English artisan and a free black woman—was a slave of William Hall. In 1752 he went to Boston, joining the Congregational Church and

gaining his official freedom in 1770, whereupon he opened a leather shop. In 1775 Hall and fourteen other African Americans organized a Masonic lodge in Boston, Hall serving as its "worshipful master" until his death. During the Revolution, Hall made leather drumheads for the Continental army, probably serving briefly as well, and he spoke out often in favor of the abolition of slavery. Hall and seven other African Americans petitioned the Massachusetts assembly in 1777 to end slavery in their state, pointing out the obvious hypocrisy of fighting for freedom while preserving slavery. The petition was sent on to Congress, which ignored it. During Shays's Rebellion in 1786, Hall's Masonic lodge volunteered to raise a militia company to aid the state in putting down the western Massachusetts uprising. Governor John Bowdoin, however, refused their offer. The following year Hall led a petition drive requesting the state to pay for black emigration to Africa, arguing that African Americans could never enjoy freedom in America. Again, Hall was ignored.

In 1788 Hall finally received a positive response to one of his petitions when he and his lodge, supported by Quakers and several clergymen, protested the abduction of free blacks by slave traders operating in Boston. With surprising speed, the state assembly banned the slave trade in Massachusetts in March 1788 and the state successfully negotiated the release of the kidnapped freemen from the French West Indian island of St. Bartholomew. Hall's petitions consistently threw the ideals of the Revolution back at the state's leadership, as when he pointed out in 1787 that, although they paid taxes, blacks did not have access to many public institutions, including the schools. In 1796 Hall opened a school for black children in his home to meet their educational need. Hall died in Boston on 4 December 1807.


SEE ALSO *African Americans in the Revolution.*?

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Michael Bellesiles

HAMILTON, ALEXANDER. (1757–1804). Continental officer, statesman. British West Indies and New York. The son of a Scottish merchant, James Hamilton, and Rachel Faucett Laven, Alexander Hamilton was born on Nevis, in the British West Indies, perhaps on 11 January 1757. Hamilton's mother died when he was three and his father deserted him when he was eight, leaving him an apprentice in a merchant house.



Alexander Hamilton. *America's first secretary of the treasury, in an 1806 portrait by John Trumbull.* SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION.

A Presbyterian clergyman mentored Hamilton and arranged financing for him to attend college in New York.

Hamilton entered King's College (now Columbia) in 1773. He entered rapidly into the world of patriot politics, attending the mass meeting presided over by Alexander McDougall, wherein it was decided to send New York delegates to the first Continental Congress. At the precocious age of seventeen, Hamilton also began speaking to patriot rallies and writing a series of pamphlets highly critical of British policies.

With the commencement of military conflict, Hamilton threw himself into the study of military methods and theory. In 1775 he formed a volunteer artillery company and was commissioned captain of the Provincial Company of New York Artillery on 14 March 1776. The skill with which he commanded his ninety-three gunners won praise from General Nathanael Greene, who is said to have introduced Hamilton to General George Washington. Declining an opportunity to join the staff of General William Alexander (Lord Stirling), he commanded his guns in the battles of Long Island, helped fortify Harlem Heights, and employed two artillery pieces effectively at White Plains. He led his company throughout the New Jersey campaign and saw action at Trenton and Princeton.

On 1 March 1777 he became secretary and aide-de-camp to Washington, who had been impressed by his reputation as a writer and organizer, and desperately needed aides with these qualifications to assist him with military business that went far beyond the command of his little field army. Washington promoted Hamilton to lieutenant colonel. Although Hamilton wrote often of his desire for military glory, he served as Washington's military secretary and close confidant for more than four years.

On 14 December 1780 Hamilton married Elizabeth Schuyler, daughter of General Philip Schuyler, thereby connecting himself with one of the wealthiest and most powerful families in New York. Lest his intentions in this matter be considered mercenary, he appears to have found great happiness in the match. They had eight children. The expansion of the light infantry corps finally gave Hamilton the opportunity he had long sought for—a field command. On 31 July 1781 he was given a battalion in Moses Hazen's Brigade of the Marquis de Lafayette's Division. When an attack on the two redoubts at Yorktown, Pennsylvania, was planned, Hamilton claimed the right to lead one of the columns and acquitted himself with great credit. He was breveted as a colonel on 30 September 1783 and left the service 23 December 1783.

After a year in Congress (1782–1783) he practiced law in New York. In the Annapolis convention of 1786 he drafted the report that led to the Constitutional Convention in 1787, where he became the advocate of a strong central government. Working hard for ratification of the Constitution, he wrote more than half of the Federalist papers and overcame strong opposition in the New York convention to win a close vote of support for the new Constitution. As the new nation's first secretary of the treasury, from 1789 to 1795, Hamilton was the key member of Washington's cabinet, since finances were the most critical problem facing the country. In establishing the "Hamiltonian system" he became leader of the Federalists, and the bitter opponent of the Democrat-Republicans led by Thomas Jefferson.

Hamilton resigned as treasury secretary on 31 January 1795, mainly because he found his salary of \$3,500 a year too small. He resumed his law practice, becoming a key figure in the creation of American contract law. He continued to advise Washington, and helped write the famous "Farewell Address." Hamilton attempted to manipulate the election of 1796 to secure a victory for the Federalist vice presidential candidate, Thomas Pinckney. Instead, he not only alienated John Adams, but also accidentally helped to elect Jefferson to the vice presidency. Despite this failure, Hamilton persisted in trying to undermine Adams's presidency, working to control government operations through the secretaries of the State and Treasury Departments.

When the war with France threatened to break out in 1798, Adams, at Washington's insistence, overlooked his personal feelings for Hamilton and commissioned him major general on 25 July with the post of inspector general. Hamilton served until 15 June 1800, apparently disappointed that Adams chose the path of negotiation over war. At that point Hamilton again attempted a callous and foolish political maneuver to replace Adams with the current Federalist vice presidential nominee, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. He again erred badly, insuring the election of his bitter enemy, Thomas Jefferson.

In 1804 Vice President Burr, who had fallen out of favor with Jefferson, ran for governor of New York. Hamilton actively worked to defeat Burr, who lost a close election. Burr blamed Hamilton for his defeat and challenged him to a duel. On the morning of 11 July 1804, Hamilton was mortally wounded, and the next afternoon he died after excruciating suffering.

Although he sought military glory and performed a valuable administrative function as Washington's secretary, Hamilton's greatest service to the United States came in his support of the Constitution and his work as Treasury Secretary. In the latter role, he deserves praise for promoting government support for the nation's economic development.

SEE ALSO *Harlem Heights, New York; McDougall, Alexander; White Plains, New York; Yorktown Campaign.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

HAMILTON, HENRY. (1734?–1796). (The “Hair Buyer”), British officer. Born in Dublin, perhaps in 1734, Henry Hamilton served under Jeffery Amherst at Louisburg, under James Wolfe at Quebec, in the West Indies as a lieutenant colonel, and was lieutenant governor of Canada and commandant at Detroit from 1775 to 1779. With only a few regulars of the Eighth Regiment under his command, Hamilton exploited Indian hostility toward the encroaching American settlers, cultivating notorious followers such as Simon Girty, Matthew Elliott, and Alexander McKee. Under Hamilton, Detroit became Britain's headquarters and supply base for the Old Northwest. In June 1777 Hamilton received instructions from George Sackville Germain (through Governor Guy Carleton) to send Indian raiders under white leaders to

attack frontier settlements. Although an attack was made on Wheeling on 1 September 1777, General John Burgoyne's offensive drew off most of his Indian warriors. Hamilton was not able to organize these forays until early 1778, when Daniel Boone was a prize catch. General George Rogers Clark's western operations then disrupted Hamilton's plans, and after leading a remarkable march to retake Vincennes, Hamilton was captured 25 February 1779, when Clark surprised him by an even more audacious move. After being kept under close guard for several months in Williamsburg, Virginia, he was subsequently paroled and sent to New York in 1781.

Hamilton received his nickname of “Hair Buyer” because of his supposed practice of paying Indians for the scalps of whites. There is little valid evidence to support these rumors, which Hamilton always denied. After the war Hamilton served as lieutenant governor of Quebec, from 1782 to 1785, and as governor of Bermuda from 1785 to 1794. He became governor of Dominica in 1794, and held that post until his death in 1796.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne's Offensive; Girty, Simon; Western Operations.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

HAMILTON, JOHN. (c. 1740–1816). Loyalist officer. Born around 1740 in Scotland, Hamilton established a trading company in Virginia with his brother and uncle in 1756. They soon spread their operations into North Carolina, becoming the most successful company in that colony by the start of the Revolution. The Hamiltons made clear their loyalty to the crown in 1775, earning the enmity of many neighbors. When they refused to take an oath of allegiance to the Revolutionary government in 1777, they were ordered to leave the state. Enlisting in the British army in New York City, Hamilton traveled to Savannah in 1778 to recruit Loyalist troops in the South, succeeding in enlisting more than seven hundred men into the Royal North Carolina Regiment, which he commanded as lieutenant colonel. After participating in the British campaigns in Georgia and the Carolinas, Hamilton's

regiment joined General Charles Cornwallis on his march into Virginia in 1781. Hamilton was wounded three times before the British surrendered at Yorktown, earning high praise from Cornwallis and other British officers. At the close of the war the Royal North Carolina Regiment was sent to Nova Scotia, where it was disbanded. The following year, 1784, Hamilton went to London to attempt to reclaim some of the two hundred thousand pounds he claimed to have lost because of the Revolution. He stayed in England until 1790, succeeding in recovering fourteen thousand pounds for his family as well as a small pension and land in the Bahamas. Having been named British consul at Norfolk, Virginia, in 1789 (though he took up his position the following year), Hamilton returned to America and stayed in Norfolk until 1812. With the start of the War of 1812, he returned to London, where he died on 12 December 1816.

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Michael Bellesiles

HAMMOND'S STORE RAID OF WILLIAM WASHINGTON. 27–31 December 1780. On 27 December, General Daniel Morgan, camped near Grindall's Shoals on the Pacolet River, detached Colonel William Washington with his 80 dragoons and 200 mounted militia, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James McCall, to attack a party of 250 Loyalists led by Thomas Waters. The Loyalists were ravaging the country along Fairfort Creek (or Fair Forest Creek, between the Pacolet and Enoree). Riding forty miles on the second day, Washington's men found the Loyalists near Hammond's Store (near modern Clinton, South Carolina) and, without a loss to themselves, brutally killed or wounded 150 and captured 40. On the next day, 29 December, Colonel Joseph Hayes rode west with forty dragoons toward Williamson's Plantation, where the Loyalists held a stockaded log house called Fort Williams. The Loyalists abandoned the post to the Patriots and fled to Ninety Six, fifteen miles south southwest of Fort Williams. This action convinced Cornwallis that no reliance could be placed in the Loyalist militia. He determined that he could not start his planned winter offensive into North Carolina until this threat to his rear was eliminated. He therefore sent Tarleton out to deal with Morgan, which led to the Battle of Cowpens.

SEE ALSO *Cowpens, South Carolina*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HAMPTON, VIRGINIA. 24–27 October 1775. The conflict between Governor John Murray, Lord Dunmore and the rebels reached the shooting stage after the frustrated royal governor and his supporting naval forces left the York River. Following the arrival of two hundred reinforcements (Fourteenth Foot) from St. Augustine, Dunmore became more active in Hampton Roads. Captain Squire augmented his marines and sailors with some of the troops and fitted additional tenders. The shallow-draft raiders first probed the Elizabeth River towards Portsmouth and then five crossed over to the peninsula. Landing parties came ashore near Hampton after dark on 25 October and robbed several houses. Captain George Lyne, with the minute company from King and Queen County, responded to the news the following morning along with the local militia and started sniping at the tenders, which returned fire. Regular Virginia troops came up in support but were unable to lure the British ashore. Firing ceased at dark but resumed on the 27th, with the vessels bombarding the town about 8 A.M. During the course of the action, Colonel William Woodford assumed command and drove the tenders back to Norfolk. One tender, the *Hawke*, was captured along with ten crewmen; the Americans believed they had killed or wounded another nine. Squire admitted losing two killed, two wounded, and four prisoners. There were no rebel casualties.

SEE ALSO *Murray, John; Virginia, Military Operations in; Woodford, William*.

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

HAMPTON, WADE. (early 1750s–1835). Planter, politician, soldier. South Carolina. Hampton's birth year and place are unknown, as are his early years. When the Revolution started he was living on the Middle Fork of the Tyger River in South Carolina. In 1776 he was a lieutenant and paymaster of the First South Carolina Regiment and was promoted to captain in 1777. He made a great deal of money selling supplies to the Continental army. On 21 September 1780 he declared himself to be a loyal British subject, but some time prior to 2 April 1781 he renounced this allegiance and joined General Thomas Sumter's

partisans. Commissioned colonel, he became one of Sumter's most valuable subordinates, particularly distinguishing himself at Eutaw Springs in 1781.

After the war he held a number of important political posts, and during the periods 1795–1797 and 1803–1805 served in the U.S. House of Representatives, where he devoted himself to gaining compensation for himself and the other investors in the corrupt Yazoo Company. He opposed the federal Constitution and later became a Republican. On 10 October 1808 he was commissioned colonel of Light Dragoons, and on 15 February 1809 he became a brigadier general. In the fall of that year he succeeded James Wilkinson as commander in New Orleans. In 1811 he brutally suppressed a slave rebellion in the city. In 1812 he took command at Norfolk, Virginia; on 2 March 1813 he was promoted to major general; and in July he was made commander of the forces on Lake Champlain. Wilkinson, for whom Hampton had nothing but contempt, soon became Hampton's senior officer in Military District No. 9 and subsequently blamed him for the failure of the campaign against Montreal in the fall of 1813. Hampton resigned on 16 March 1814.

Hampton never failed to enrich himself, becoming by 1820 one of the wealthiest men in South Carolina. He owned thousands of acres and a thousand slaves, whom he notoriously treated with notable cruelty. At his death in Columbia, South Carolina, on 4 February 1835, he was reputed to be the wealthiest planter in America.

SEE ALSO *Eutaw Springs, South Carolina.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

HANCOCK, JOHN. (1737–1793). Signer. Massachusetts. Born on 12 January 1737 in Braintree, Massachusetts, the son of a minister, John Hancock was orphaned early in life and adopted by his uncle, Thomas Hancock, the richest merchant in Boston. He graduated from Harvard College in 1754 and inherited his uncle's business at the age of twenty-seven in 1764, just as the economy sank into a depression after the end of the final

French and Indian War. Four years later the *Liberty* affair rocketed Hancock into prominence as a victim of the overzealous enforcement of imperial customs regulations. He was elected a Boston selectman (1765–1774) and a member of the General Court (1766–1774), roles in which he displayed a keen political sense that made him a leader who could be trusted to be radical only when reason had failed. He could be a rabble-rouser when necessary (on 5 March 1774 he delivered the annual oration commemorating the victims of the Boston “Massacre”) but generally used his considerable economic clout and social position in more subtle ways to support American rights.

He was elected the first president of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress in October 1774 and was also chairman of the Committee of Safety, which had authority to call out the militia. He and Samuel Adams were specifically excluded from General Thomas Gage's offer of amnesty to rebels (12 June 1775) because their offenses were “of too flagitious a nature.” Hancock was a member of the Continental Congress from 1775 to 1780 and its president from 24 May 1775 until 29 October 1777. Vanity led him to seek appointment as commander-in-chief of the Continental Army, and he felt insulted when the delegates chose Washington instead. But his inclination to suffer politically convenient bouts of ill health would have limited his effectiveness in the field, and he had to take consolation in the fact that, as presiding officer of Congress, he signed the Declaration of Independence first and most prominently. After resigning the presidency for reasons of health, he lost interest in Congress (which had elected the able Henry Laurens to succeed him) and spent much of his time thereafter in Boston. As major general of the Massachusetts militia, he commanded six thousand Massachusetts troops in the operations against Newport, Rhode Island, in the summer of 1778, where he played only a minor role in the failure of the Franco-American attack.

On 1 September 1780 he became the first governor of Massachusetts under the new state constitution. In the throes of a sinking postwar economy and rising popular unrest, he resigned the governorship after a well-timed attack of gout on 29 January 1785, and was out of office during Shays's Rebellion in the winter of 1785–1786. He returned to the governorship in 1787 and pardoned the Shaysites. Although elected president of the state convention to ratify the federal Constitution in 1788, Hancock withdrew with another attack of gout. Despite some reservations about the extent of federal power, Hancock favored ratification, and with the issue in doubt, he returned to the convention and spoke in support of the document, thus playing a major role in winning ratification by a vote of 187 to 176. As William Fowler writes, “this was Hancock's finest moment, for without the

support of Massachusetts the entire constitutional effort might have failed” (“John Hancock,” *American National Biography*). Reelected governor, he was in his ninth term when he died at the age of 56.

“A moderate man who loved to court popularity,” as Fowler describes him, Hancock was a pivotal figure promoting unity and harmony at the center of American politics from the start of the resistance to Britain to the establishment of the new republic.

SEE ALSO *Adams, Samuel; Continental Congress; Declaration of Independence; Liberty Affair; Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778); Shays’s Rebellion; Signers.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

HANCOCK, THE. The *Hancock* was one of the first thirteen frigates of the Continental navy, authorized by Congress on 13 December 1775. It was built at Newburyport, Massachusetts, by John Greenleaf, based on a design by Joshua Humphreys. Placed under the command of Captain John Manley on 17 April 1776, it was launched on 10 July 1776 and spent the next ten months fitting out. It sailed from Boston in company with the Continental frigate *Boston* on 21 May 1777. The two frigates captured HMS *Fox* (twenty-eight guns) on 7 June. Both the *Fox* and the *Hancock* were captured by HMS *Rainbow* (forty-four guns) and HMS *Flora* (thirty-two guns) on 8 July, after a twenty-nine-hour chase. The *Hancock* was taken into the Royal Navy as HMS *Iris* and earned a reputation as one of the world’s fastest and finest frigates. On 8 August 1781, the *Iris* captured the Continental frigate *Trumbull* off the Delaware Capes. The *Iris* was captured by the French in the West Indies on 11 September and used as a cruiser. When the British took Toulon in 1793, they found her dismantled and used as a powder hulk. The Royal Navy blew her up on 18 December as the British evacuated Toulon.

SEE ALSO *Manley, John; Trumbull–Iris Engagement.*

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HANCOCK’S BRIDGE, NEW JERSEY.

21 March 1778. After the action at Quenton’s Bridge, New Jersey, Colonel Charles Mawhood returned to Salem, New Jersey, and planned an attack on Hancock’s Bridge, five miles away on Alloways Creek. This was the last of the pockets of resistance to his foraging expedition, and Mawhood believed that it was defended by two hundred New Jersey militia. Major John Graves Simcoe was given the task with his Queen’s Rangers. He set out on 20 March and moved by boat up Alloways Creek to a point from which they could move cross-country to take the bridge from the rear. The Twenty-seventh Foot approached the other side of the bridge by marching overland from Salem. The operation should have been a great success, but wind and tides held the boats up, and Simcoe and his men had to wade through two miles of swamp. Simcoe did not get into position to attack until the morning of 21 March but quickly eliminated two sentries. The Americans had detected the movement the day before, and most of the militia had already withdrawn. The last twenty men took refuge in Hancock’s brick house. Two companies of the Rangers knocked down the front and back doors and charged in. At this point Simcoe lost control of his men. His Loyalist soldiers killed everyone in the building including the owner and his brother, who were supporters of the King. Simcoe called this “very unfortunate;” the Americans called it a massacre.

SEE ALSO *Quenton’s Bridge, New Jersey.*

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Robert K. Wright Jr.

HAND, EDWARD. (1744–1802). Continental general. Ireland and Pennsylvania. Born 31 December 1744 in Clyduff, Ireland, Hand completed his medical studies at Trinity College in 1766. As surgeon’s mate of the 18th Royal Irish Regiment he came to Philadelphia in 1767. Made an ensign in 1772, he went to Fort Pitt with

the regiment, returned to Philadelphia with the unit in 1774, and then resigned to practice medicine. With the outbreak of Revolution, Hand joined the Americans, serving in the siege of Boston as a lieutenant colonel (25 June 1775) in William Thompson's Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion. Later active in organizing and drilling the Lancaster County Associators, on 1 January 1776 he was assigned to the First Continental Infantry. On 7 March he was made a colonel, and on 1 January 1777 he assumed command of the First Pennsylvania Regiment. (This was the new designation for Thompson's Battalion, which had been renamed twice: from Thompson's Battalion to the First Continental Regiment to the First Pennsylvania Regiment.)

On Long Island he was General George Washington's principal source of information as the British built up strength on Staten Island. His regiment performed well in the events immediately preceding the battle of Long Island and was engaged at White Plains. He and his men executed a skillful and well-disciplined delaying action without which Washington's victory at Princeton, 3 January 1777, would not have been possible. Impressed by Hand's consistently fine conduct, Washington prevailed on Congress to appoint him brigadier general on 1 April 1777. General Hand then went to Fort Pitt with orders to mobilize the militia of western Pennsylvania, push into the Indian country, and destroy the British base at Detroit. In February 1778 Hand moved with 500 militia toward Sandusky, but snow, rain, and swollen streams stopped him short of his objective. On his way back to Fort Pitt he killed and captured some Indian women at Salt Lick, leading to his operation being dubbed the "Squaw Campaign."

Criticized for both this wasted campaign and for his failure to adequately support General George Rogers Clark's western operation, Hand resigned in disgust, and on 8 November 1778 took over from John Stark as commander at Albany. He arrived just in time for the Cherry Valley Massacre and subsequently played a major role in Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois (May–November 1779). During General Wilhelm Knyphausen's raid on Springfield, New Jersey, in June 1780, General Hand led a task force of 500 men, and in August he was given command of a new brigade of light infantry. In that capacity he sat on the court-martial that condemned Major John André to death for spying. When Alexander Scammell resigned as Washington's adjutant general on 16 November 1780, Washington selected Hand to succeed him.

Brevetted as a major general on 30 September 1783, he served until 3 November 1783 and then returned to his medical practice. Active also in political and civic affairs, he was a congressman in 1784–1785, and in 1790 he signed the Pennsylvania state constitution. He was inspector of revenue from 1791–1802. A staunch Federalist, he started

having trouble with his accounts early in the Republican administration, and in 1802 a petition was brought into court to sell his lands in order to cover the losses. He died of a stroke in the midst of this trouble, on 3 September 1802.

SEE ALSO *Cherry Valley Massacre, New York; Scammell, Alexander; Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of Knyphausen; Squaw Campaign; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois.*

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HANGER, GEORGE. (1751–1824). George Hanger, third son of the first baron Coleraine, was born in Gloucestershire, England, on 13 October 1731. He was educated at Eton, where he earned a reputation for the affairs he had with local girls. He went on to the university at Göttingen, where he learned German. Extravagant, eccentric, dissipated, and violent (he fought three duels before he was twenty-one), he learned light cavalry tactics in the Prussian army before buying an ensigncy in the First Foot Guards on 31 January 1771. While a guards officer, he married a Gypsy girl who soon ran off with a tinker. On 20 February 1776 he bought a lieutenantcy in the guards, only to resign on 25 February, allegedly because a more junior officer purchased a promotion over his head. Returning to Germany, he took up a captaincy in the Hessian jägers and sailed with Wilhelm Knyphausen to North America.

Hanger commanded a detachment on the Charleston expedition of 1780, and marched with James Paterson's diversionary column. Afterward he personally reconnoitred the Charleston defenses and advised Sir Henry Clinton on his plan of attack. He became Clinton's aide-de-camp, but was left behind in South Carolina to help Major Patrick Ferguson raise Loyalist militia there. Disliking this employment, he managed to be transferred, with the aid of Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton to the command of the British Legion's light dragoons. Hanger, now a provincial major, took temporary command of the Legion when Tarleton fell seriously ill. However, without Tarleton's inspired direction, he was a poor leader. At Wahab's Plantation on 21 September 1780, he carelessly allowed himself to be surprised by a partisan attack, and five days later he mishandled an attempt to dislodge a weaker American force at Charlotte, where he was wounded. Falling ill of yellow fever, he missed the catastrophes of Cowpens and Yorktown. He was made a major of the British establishment in 1782,

and when the Legion was formally disbanded in 1783, Hanger was put on half pay.

In retirement, Hanger continued his old social habits, acting as bouncer for Tarleton's faro bank in a London tavern, helping him to recruit "bludgeon men" for the Whigs in the 1787 Westminster by-election and becoming a friend of the Prince of Wales. In 1796 he sold his major's commission to raise ready cash, went to debtor's prison from June 1798 to April 1799, and briefly hid from his creditors in Paris. In 1800 he even set himself up as a coal merchant in an effort to secure money, but in 1806 he obtained a military sinecure and in 1808 retired from it on full pay—a blatant fraud and a scandal. He wrote and published works on military and sporting subjects, as well as a two-volume autobiography. He became the third Baron Coleraine on his brother's death in December 1814, but preferred to be known as "Colonel" Hanger, promoting himself to "General" in 1816. Fittingly, the barony became extinct when he died on 31 March 1824.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Clinton, Henry; Knyphausen, Wilhelm; Tarleton, Banastre.*

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revised by John Oliphant

HANGING ROCK, SOUTH CAROLINA. 6 August 1780. In conjunction with his harassment campaign against the British occupying Camden, South Carolina, General Thomas Sumter moved against nearby Rocky Mount on 30 July 1780. At the same time, North Carolina Major William R. Davie, following Sumter's wishes, attacked the enemy garrison at Hanging Rock to divert British attention from Sumter's attack. The enemy garrison at Hanging Rock was under Major John Carden, of the Prince of Wales American Volunteers. In addition to his own unit, some three companies of British Legion Infantry under Captain Kenneth McCulloch, Colonel Morgan Bryan's North Carolina Provincial Regiment of refugees, and some of Colonel Thomas Brown's South Carolina Rangers were also present.

Davie's feint against Hanging Rock came on 1 August, when he led his forty cavalymen and some forty mounted riflemen from the Mecklenburg militia. Davie learned during his approach that three companies of Bryan's Tories were camped near a farmhouse after foraging. Davie divided his men, sending the riflemen to ride into the camp masquerading as Loyalists while his

dragoons waited nearby. The riflemen fired on Bryan's men, who fled toward Davie's dragoons and were driven back into the rifle fire. The Tories were caught at a corner of a fence and were hewn down by the dragoons. Davie later reported that "no prisoners could be safely taken." Davie captured some 60 horses, 100 rifles and muskets, and alarmed the main garrison, then withdrew his troops.

In the meantime, Sumter retreated from Rocky Mount and, upon being reinforced by Davie's 80 men and Colonel Robert Irwin's 400 North Carolina militia, he attacked Hanging Rock at dawn on 6 August. Despite Davie's raid, the post, divided into three camp areas, was unfortified.

Three assault columns that were intended to hit every camp were misdirected. The attack fell on the northern camp, where Bryan's North Carolina refugees were quickly routed. The assault continued against the British Legion infantry, allowing Brown's Rangers to rally and hold a rapidly forming battle line. Heavy fighting, including Legion bayonet charges, took place before the Legion and Rangers began to surrender or withdraw to form a hollow square around an artillery piece. As some militia stopped to plunder, Carden led his regiment from the British right flank in order to block Sumter's pursuit. Sumter's men faced the attack and opened a deadly fire that virtually annihilated the Prince of Wales American Regiment. As his men fell around him, Carden turned command over to Captain John Rousselet, who was the senior ranking Legion captain after McCulloch was mortally wounded in the intense fighting.

British and American accounts differ as to what happened next. Davie apparently outflanked the British line and scattered some Tories, while Sumter continued firing on the hollow square where the Loyalist militia was reforming. Other Americans were plundering the camp when Davie, returning toward Sumter's position, encountered a British Legion company of mounted infantry led by Captains Patrick Stewart and Charles McDonald. According to the history later written by Banastre Tarleton, these men broke the American will to continue fighting, but Davie says that his men drove the Loyalists off. There may be some truth in both accounts. Davie himself noted that the Americans were withdrawing because their ammunition was expended and many were intoxicated. Sumter's men and their plunder moved off, unmolested, shortly after noon, covered by Davie's dragoons.

The hotly contested battle lasted more than five hours, and the casualties reflect close fighting. Sumter said that twenty of his men were killed and another forty were wounded. There is a question as to whether these numbers included the dead and wounded from Davie's troops, because Davie noted severe losses. Tarleton claimed the British Legion alone had three officers and twenty men killed, plus nearly thirty wounded. He also

noted that the Provincials led by Brown and Bryan were badly scattered.

Sumter retired to the Waxhaws, in South Carolina, gathering men and waiting for the arrival of the Maryland and Delaware Division of Continentals, who were then on the march toward South Carolina. His raiding precipitated British reinforcement of the Hanging Rock garrison with the Twenty-third Regiment. Upon the arrival of Continentals under Horatio Gates, the post was abandoned.

Sumter's attack came close to succeeding. His men had broken the will of the Loyalists to resist, and they were scattered. Only the determined resistance of McCulloch, and then Rousselet, with the British Legion infantry, stabilized the situation. As the fight went on, Sumter's men began to run out of ammunition. By that time, Davie and Sumter decided on a withdrawal to save their plunder. The engagement boosted American morale and led more recruits to join Sumter and other partisans. The Loyalists were dismayed, both by Davie's earlier attack and then the ferocity of the main battle.

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign*.

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revised by Lawrence E. Babits

“HANGMAN, YEAR OF THE.” To superstitious patriots, particularly in the Continental Congress, the last three digits of 1777 suggested gibbets awaiting them should their cause fail. Also widely called “the year of the bloody sevens.”

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HANSON, JOHN, JR. (1721–1783). Continental Congress president. Maryland. Born in Port Tobacco Parish, Maryland, on 3 April 1721, Hanson, a wealthy planter and merchant, was a member of the Maryland House of Delegates almost every year from 1757 to 1779, and was extremely active in events leading to the war. He was a member of the legislative committee that drafted instructions for the Maryland delegates to the 1765 Stamp Act Congress. He also signed the

nonimportation agreement that Maryland adopted on 22 June 1769 in protest of the Townshend Acts and was a member of the Association of Maryland that, in June 1774, approved armed resistance to British troops. Serving as treasurer of Frederick County in 1775, he was chairman of the committee of observation and was commissioned, about that same time, by the Maryland convention to start a gun-lock factory at Frederick. He entered the Continental Congress on 14 June 1780 and started working immediately for ratification of the Articles of Confederation. This was completed on 1 March 1781, and Hanson was elected president of the Congress of the Confederation on 5 November 1781, serving a one-year term. He then retired from public life, dying on 15 November 1783.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

HARADEN, JONATHAN. (1744–1803). State naval officer and privateer. Massachusetts. Born in Gloucester, Massachusetts, on 11 November 1744, Haraden started his sea service in July 1776 as a lieutenant on the Massachusetts navy sloop *Tyrannicide*, which was commanded by John Fiske. After two successful cruises that year, Haraden took command of the vessel in 1777, when it was converted into a brigantine. Captain Fiske's *Massachusetts* and Haraden's *Tyrannicide* took 25 prizes from France and Spain, including a transport loaded with Hessian troops. Back to Boston in August 1777, Haraden sailed again in the fall and was in the West Indies during the winter. In the summer of 1778 he started his career as a privateer, commanding the *General Pickering* (16 guns). Distinguishing himself as a commerce raider, he gained a reputation for winning against heavy odds. Off Sandy Hook in October 1779, he captured three enemy privateers in a ninety-minute action and took them all into port. In June 1780 he fought a much more powerful British privateer, the *Achilles*, at close range for nearly three hours in the Bay of Biscay. The *Achilles* broke off the engagement, and Haraden recaptured this twenty-two-gun schooner, which had been taken by the enemy just a few days earlier. When Admiral George Rodney captured the Caribbean island of St. Eustatius for the British, on 3 February 1781, he set a trap that caught Haraden and several of his prizes. After being released, Haraden commanded the *Julius Caesar* (fourteen guns), another Salem privateer, which started operations in 1782. In June of that

Hard Money

year he fought two larger British ships and escaped. He died in Salem, Massachusetts, on 26 November, 1803.

SEE ALSO *Naval Operations, Strategic Overview.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HARD MONEY. The term “hard money” denoted coin or specie, as opposed to paper money.

SEE ALSO *Continental Currency; Money of the Eighteenth Century.*

HARLEM COVE (MANHATTANVILLE), NEW YORK.

16 November 1776. In the British attack on Fort Washington, on this date, Lord Hugh Percy’s column drove in the American pickets at Harlem Cove. They then attacked the forces under Lieutenant Colonel Lambert Cadwalader in the old Harlem Heights defenses, which were located at today’s West 147th, 153d, and 159th Streets).

SEE ALSO *Fort Washington, New York.*

Barnet Schecter

HARLEM HEIGHTS, NEW YORK.

16 September 1776. Admiral Howe’s three warships, which had bombarded New York City from the Hudson as a distraction during the Kips Bay invasion on 15 September, had moved upriver opposite Bloomingdale village (at modern Broadway and One Hundredth Street) to support the western end of the British cordon that extended across Manhattan from river to river. The line included an outpost at McGowan’s Pass (in the northeast corner of modern Central Park) and was anchored on the East River by the captured American fort at Horn’s Hook (on modern East Eighty-ninth Street). Seven miles to the south, New York City had become occupied territory, or as Loyalists saw it, had been liberated. Washington’s forces had taken refuge on Harlem Heights, a rocky plateau (north of modern West 125th Street between the Hudson and Harlem Rivers) that offered a naturally strong defensive position.

The Americans created three parallel lines of forts and trenches across the plateau (at modern 147th, 153rd, and 159th Streets) that sealed off the northern end of Manhattan, protecting Washington’s headquarters in the

Morris house (at modern 161st Street) along with Fort Washington (at modern 183rd Street) and the Kings Bridge at the northern tip of the island. Five thousand American troops occupied the Kings Bridge area, another seventy-five hundred were distributed in the three defensive lines, and some thirty-three hundred under General Nathanael Greene (the brigades of Nixon, Sargent, and Beall) guarded the southern face of Harlem Heights overlooking a valley called the Hollow Way (modern 125th Street, or Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard).

AMERICAN SCOUTS SPARK FIGHTING


Before dawn on 16 September, Washington sent a reconnaissance party of 120 men drawn from Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Knowlton’s Rangers to ascertain the disposition of enemy troops on Bloomingdale Heights (the plateau south of 125th Street, modern Morningside Heights), where the farmland was largely covered with trees that would mask any movement of the British left wing up the Bloomingdale Road (modern Broadway). Washington needed to know if Howe planned to dig in or quickly launch a major offensive.

The scouting party moved south across the Hollow Way and headed for the Bloomingdale Road (which ended at modern 115th Street), where the British were last seen the night before. As the sun came up, the Rangers arrived at Nicholas Jones’s stone farmhouse (at modern 106th Street) and were spotted by the most advanced British pickets, who fired their guns as a signal to the British light infantry and the Forty-second Highlanders camped a little farther south. Knowlton’s men fired a few shots and then retreated behind a stone wall. The British soon advanced in a column, and in the ensuing skirmish each side fired more than one thousand rounds before Knowlton and his men retreated, with ten casualties, across the Hollow Way to the American lines.

A BRITISH TAUNT

Washington had come down from his headquarters to the front lines—to a redoubt on the Point of Rocks, a craggy projection at the southeastern corner of Harlem Heights from which he could look out over Harlem Plains to the east and scan the ragged northern face of the Bloomingdale plateau to the west. A report of the enemy advancing across the plains proved incorrect. Meanwhile, the sounds of Knowlton skirmishing to the west prompted Washington to send his adjutant, Joseph Reed, to look for the Rangers and to see if the British had moved their main force up to Bloomingdale Heights.

Reed reported back to Washington at 9 a.m. that he had found Knowlton and seen the British light infantry moving rapidly northward. Knowlton and his men had just returned to the American lines, and word of their



THE GALE GROUP.

bravery spread quickly through the ranks. Reed urged Washington to use the momentum of Knowlton's mission and draw the British into a larger engagement. Just then, "the enemy appeared in open view," Reed reported

in a letter to his wife, "and in the most insulting manner sounded their bugle horns as is usual after a fox chase. I never felt such a sensation before. It seemed to crown our disgrace."

WASHINGTON DEVICES A TRAP

Washington gave orders for 150 volunteers from Brigadier General John Nixon's brigade to march down into the Hollow Way and engage the attention of the 300 British infantrymen, while a flanking party of 230 men—Reed leading Knowlton's Rangers and three companies of riflemen from Weedon's Third Virginia Regiment under Major Andrew Leitch—crossed the valley to the east to get behind them. Initially, everything went as planned, and the British were lured into a skirmish in the valley by Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Crary and a party of volunteers from his Rhode Island regiment. This was a holding action at long range, with few casualties.

The rest of Nixon's brigade—some eight hundred men—was brought in, and the British were driven back out of the valley to a post-and-rail fence overgrown with bushes (straddling modern Broadway between 123rd and 124th Streets), where they took cover. Nixon's brigade had pressed its attack too soon, however, which meant that the flanking party did not have time to get around behind the British. Instead, Knowlton and Leitch arrived at the fence at the same time as the British, who were thus able to turn and face the attack on their side—not their rear. Knowlton was killed on the spot, and Leitch died of his wounds a day later.

THE FIGHTING ESCALATES

Washington sent in reinforcements, including Connecticut militia, other New Englanders, and parts of two Maryland regiments, along with two fieldpieces that helped dislodge the British from their position behind the fence. The American troops pursued them into the woods, and by noon the British had fallen back to a buckwheat field (the modern site of Barnard College), where they made a stand. Howe dispatched reinforcements and two cannon to confront the eighteen hundred Americans on the field, led by Generals Israel Putnam, Nathanael Greene, and George Clinton (an American cousin of the British general and the first governor of New York State).

Under Major General Alexander Leslie, the British brought in German jägers (riflemen), light infantry, and more Highlanders, who dragged a pair of cannon three miles from the rear to the buckwheat field. The battle raged for two hours until the British—having fired sixty rounds from the cannon—ran low on ammunition and retreated again. The Americans pursued them dangerously close to the British main camp and to Admiral Howe's frigates anchored off Bloomingdale. As Private Joseph Martin later recalled, the American advance ended when the British "found shelter under the cannon of some of their shipping in the North River."

With new reinforcements, the British by this time had five thousand troops on the scene, including British

and Hessian grenadiers. Intent on avoiding a "general engagement" like the disastrous Battle of Long Island, Washington sent his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Tench Tilghman, to pull the troops back. As if answering the morning's insulting bugle call, "they gave a hurra and left the field in good order," Tilghman wrote. The Battle of Harlem Heights ended by 3 P.M. where it had begun at dawn, in front of Nicholas Jones's farmhouse.

AN AMERICAN MORALE BOOST

"This affair I am in hopes will be attended with many salutary consequences," Washington wrote to Congress, "as it seems to have greatly inspired the whole of our troops." Despite the loss of two exceptional officers—Knowlton and Leitch—the relatively small battle raised American morale significantly. After the rout in Brooklyn two weeks earlier, the narrow escape to Manhattan, and the humiliating retreat from Kips Bay, on 16 September the American soldiers learned they could make the enemy's finest troops turn and run. Washington praised "their great resolution and bravery," which put the enemy "to flight when in the open Ground."

On the British side, the Battle of Harlem Heights became a further irritant in the antagonistic relationship between General Howe and his second in command, General Clinton, who was in charge of the most advanced British posts on the morning of the 16th. Clinton was incensed by Howe's order to retreat at the end of the battle. In his account of the war, Clinton later implied that the British should have contested and held Bloomingdale Heights with a larger force, which would have put them in a good position to cross the Harlem River into Morrisania (the modern Bronx), get behind the Americans, and cut off their escape via the Kings Bridge, as he had repeatedly advised. Instead, in October, Howe decided to make a wider encirclement through the dangerous waters of Hell Gate to land at Throg's Neck and Pelham Bay.

Adhering to his policy of not reporting Hessian losses, Howe counted 92 British casualties at Harlem Heights, but in all the toll was 14 killed and 154 wounded. In Washington's initial estimate to Congress, he counted some 40 wounded and a "very inconsiderable" number killed. The final count was about 30 killed and 100 wounded and missing.

SEE ALSO *New York Campaign.*

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Barnet Schecter

HARMAR, JOSIAH. (1753–1813). Continental officer, lieutenant colonel, commandant of the U.S. army, 1784–1791. Pennsylvania. Born in Philadelphia on 10 November 1753, Josiah Harmar was orphaned three months later. He was educated at Robert Proud's Quaker school. Commissioned as a captain of the First Pennsylvania Battalion on 27 October 1775, he was promoted to major in the Third Pennsylvania Battalion on 1 October 1776, and lieutenant colonel of the Sixth Pennsylvania Battalion on 6 June 1777. He saw action in the battles of Brandywine, Monmouth, and Stony Point, and endured the winter of 1777–1778 at Valley Forge. After 9 August 1780, Harmra commanded the Seventh Pennsylvania Battalion, transferring to the Third Pennsylvania in the reorganization of the Pennsylvania Line on 17 January 1781. At this point, Harmar was second in command to Genreal Anthony Wayne in the Yorktown campaign. Transferred to the First Pennsylvania on 1 January 1783, he was promoted to colonel on 30 September 1783 and served until 3 November of that year.

After the reconstitution of the Continental army, Harmar was recalled and made lieutenant-colonel commandant of the First United States Regiment, which constituted the entire army at the time. He held this post from 12 August 1784 to 4 March 1791, being brevetted brigadier general on 31 July 1787.

In 1790 Harmar pushed the Shawnees along the Scioto River, and later in the year he left Fort Washington (Cincinnati) to attack the Indians in the Maumee Valley with a force of 400 regulars and a thousand militia from Kentucky and Pennsylvania. Although his force reached his objective of Miami Town and burned a number of Shawnee settlements, Harmar twice detached units that were mauled by Little Turtle's forces. Coming under withering criticism for this fiasco, Harmar was cleared by a court of inquiry but replaced by General Arthur St. Clair, who went on to suffer even greater failure against the Indians. Harmar resigned from the army on 1 January 1792. From 1792 to 1798 Harmar served as Pennsylvania's Adjutant General. He died on 20 August 1813 at his estate on the Schuylkill River, called, appropriately enough, "The Retreat."

SEE ALSO *Yorktown Campaign*.

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HARPERSFIELD, NEW YORK. 2 April 1780. This exposed settlement, twenty miles south of Cherry Valley and fifteen miles southwest of the Lower Fort of Schoharie Valley, was completely destroyed by Indians and Loyalists under Joseph Brant. Most of the inhabitants had already vacated the settlement, but several were killed and the militia captain and eighteen others were captured. After overhearing the Indians say they planned to attack Upper Fort (near modern Schoharie) if it was not too strongly held, Alexander Harper gave Brant the false information that it was defended by three hundred Continentals. The raiders therefore shifted their focus eastward and attacked Minisink on 14 April before withdrawing.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York*.

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HARRISON, BENJAMIN. (1726?–1791). Signer. Virginia. Born on the family estate in Charles City County, Virginia, Benjamin Harrison belonged to a wealthy and powerful family. He attended the College of William and Mary before taking charge of the family estate, "Berkeley," upon his father's death. He served in the House of Burgesses (1749–1775), frequently as speaker. Although strongly in favor of colonial rights in 1764, he opposed Patrick Henry's 1765 Stamp Act Resolutions as impolitic. By 1773 he was a member of the Committee of Correspondence and completely in favor of resisting British authority. He was appointed to the first Continental Congress, serving until 1777. He was politically active, signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776, and sat on the committees concerned with foreign affairs, war and ordnance, and the navy. Returning to state politics in 1777, he sat in the House of Delegates, 1777–81, 1785–87, serving as its speaker from 1778 to 1781. He was then governor of Virginia for three years. He opposed the federal Constitution at the state ratifying convention of 1788, and was elected governor that year as an antifederalist. He died in office, 24 April 1791. His youngest son, William Henry, and his great-grandson, Benjamin, were presidents of the United States.

SEE ALSO *Henry, Patrick*.

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HART, JOHN. (1714–1779). Signer. New Jersey. Born in Hopewell, New Jersey, in 1714, John Hart served several years (1761–1771) in the provincial legislature. The 1765 Stamp Act aroused his indignation at British oppression, and he became active in the events leading to the Revolution. He was a judge of the court of common pleas when, on 8 July 1774, he was sent to the first provincial congress. He served in that body until June 1776, when he was sent to the Continental Congress, where he signed the Declaration of Independence and served on the Committee of Correspondence. In August 1776 he was elected to the first state assembly and was unanimously chosen speaker. When the British invaded the state of New Jersey, they destroyed Hart's farm and livestock. His family fled, and he and his wife hid in the woods for several days to avoid capture. After the battles of Trenton and Princeton he was able to return to his farm. In March 1777 he became treasurer of the New Jersey Council of Safety, the governing body of the state, as well as returning to the State Assembly as speaker. He held both positions until November 1778, when he became seriously ill. He died in Hopewell, New Jersey, on 11 May 1779.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress*.

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HART, NANCY MORGAN. Patriot heroine. Born in about 1735 on the frontier of Pennsylvania or North Carolina, Nancy grew to be about 6 feet tall, very muscular, cross-eyed, vulgar, and illiterate. She married Benjamin Hart, a prominent citizen by whom she had eight children. The couple settled first in South Carolina in about 1771, and then moved to Georgia. Half a century after the Revolution, her exploits were written up in a Milledgeville (Georgia) newspaper, and in the 1830s were recorded again by Elizabeth Ellet, whose sources were old-timers. She was credited with performing several scouting trips and with entering

Augusta as a “crazy man” to get information about the enemy. One legend holds that six Tories from Augusta entered her house and ordered a meal. While they sat drinking she told her 12-year-old daughter, Sukey, to run off and warn her husband of the intruders. Nancy then managed to slip two of the men's muskets through a hole in the wall before they caught her with the third one in hand. One of the men rushed her, and she used the musket to kill him. Sukey returned to pass her mother a second musket, with which she wounded another Tory. While she covered the rest of the party with the third weapon, her husband arrived with a posse of neighbors, and the surviving Tories were hanged. E. Merton Coulter, a history professor at the University of Georgia, was suspicious of the myth. He investigated, and found that a railroad excavation through the site of Nancy's cabin, done years after the Revolution, had uncovered six skeletons.

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HARTLEY'S REGIMENT. Hartley's regiment was one of sixteen “additional continental regiments.”

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments*.

Mark M. Boatner

HARVEY, EDWARD. (c. 1726–1778). Acting commander in chief of the British army. Harvey, at the time colonel of the Third Regiment of Light-Horse, came to the attention of his superiors in 1764 for the publication of a new drill book, *A New Manual and Platoon Exercise*, that quickly superceded Humphrey Bland's outdated *Military Discipline*. Harvey was promoted to major general in 1768 and made adjutant general of the British army. When John Manners, Marquess of Granby resigned his offices in 1770, the office of commander in chief was not filled. As the highest ranking officer remaining on active duty, Adjutant General Edward Harvey was, in effect, the acting commander in chief. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1772. Having little influence with the Cabinet,

he is remembered only for his pungent professional comments on their mismanagement, particularly of the American colonies and the War for Independence. The flavor of his commentary can be seen in excerpts from his correspondence: "To attempt to conquer it [America] internally by our land force is as wild an idea as ever controverted common sense," he wrote to General Irwin on 30 June 1775, before receiving news of Bunker Hill. The same day he wrote to General William Howe, "Unless a settled plan of operations be agreed upon for next spring our army will be destroyed by damned dribbles." Eight days later he wrote to a Lieutenant Colonel Smith (possibly Francis Smith, who led British forces against the Patriots): "America is an ugly job . . . a damned affair indeed." Harvey's primary concern through most of the war was recruitment, as the British Army found the Revolution dampening what little enthusiasm there was to serve. As the personal military advisor to George III, Harvey attempted to persuade the king that Britain could not win a land war and that the best course of action was to blockade the colonies and negotiate. But the king rejected Harvey's advice. Harvey died suddenly early in 1778.

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HASLET, JOHN. (c.1750–1777). Continental officer. Delaware. Born in Derry, Ireland, he studied theology before turning to medicine at the University of Glasgow. In 1757 he emigrated to Delaware, where he established his practice and became a Presbyterian minister. At the start of the Revolution he was colonel of the Kent County militia. On 19 January 1776 Haslet became colonel of the Delaware Regiment of the Continental Army, which became one of the best in the army, distinguishing itself at Long Island under Major Thomas McDonough. Haslet was absent on court-martial duty during the this battle; but he led the raid to Mamaroneck, New York, which defeated Major Robert Rogers's Loyalists, and rejoined Washington's main body in time for the battle at White Plains, 28 October 1776, where his regiment gained praise for its professional conduct. Haslet was killed in action at Princeton, 3 January 1777.

SEE ALSO *Long Island, New York, Battle of; Mamaroneck, New York; Princeton, New Jersey; White Plains, New York.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HAUSSEGGER, NICHOLAS. (1729?–1786?). Continental officer. Pennsylvania. On 4 January 1776, Nicholas Haussegger became a major in the Fourth Pennsylvania Battalion, and on 17 July was named colonel of the German Regiment. This unit was routed near Trenton, New Jersey, on 2 January 1777, and Haussegger "surrendered under somewhat suspicious circumstances." (Freeman, p. 343) He was paroled to his home in Lancaster County and General George Washington, who suspected Haussegger of treason, had him watched. Under uncertain circumstances, Haussegger returned to the British, but it is unclear if he served with them.

SEE ALSO *German Regiment.*

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HAW RIVER, NORTH CAROLINA.

25 February 1781. General Andrew Pickens and Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee crossed the Dan from Virginia into North Carolina on 18 February, ahead of General Nathanael Greene's main army, with the mission of breaking up the Loyalist uprising for which Cornwallis had called. After a frustrating failure to surprise Colonel Banastre Tarleton, and learning that several hundred mounted militia were marching to join the British in Hillsboro, the rebels decided to try a trick. The green uniform of Lee's Legion was so similar to that of Tarleton's Legion that Lee would pretend his men were a reinforcement sent to join Tarleton. Two captured officers of the latter's command were placed with Lee's cavalry "to give currency to the deception" (Lee, p. 256). This stratagem worked immediately. Two of Colonel John Pyle's approximately three hundred Loyalists rode up and were gulled into thinking that Lee was Tarleton. One was sent back with two rebel dragoons to ask that Pyle pull his troops off to the side of the road so Tarleton could lead his "much fatigued troops . . . without delay to their night positions" (ibid., p. 257). Meanwhile, Pickens's militia, who could be identified by the green twigs in their hats (the insignia of the southern militia), were hidden in the woods. Lee said his plan was to get his cavalry among the unsuspecting enemy troops and then give them the alternatives of disbanding or joining the Patriot side.

Fortunately for Lee's plan, Pyle's mounted men had formed on the right side of the road so that Lee would lead his troopers the length of their front to meet Pyle. Furthermore, they had their rifles and fowling pieces on

their shoulders, so the rebel cavalry, with drawn sabers and close to the heads of the enemy's horses, could do a lot of damage before the Loyalists could recover from their surprise and defend themselves. Here, in Lee's words (writing in the third person) is what happened:

Lee passed along the line at the head of the column with a smiling countenance, dropping, occasionally, expressions complimentary to the good looks and commendable conduct of his loyal friends. At length he reached Colonel Pyle, when the customary civilities were promptly interchanged. Grasping Pyle by the hand, Lee was in the act of consummating his plan, when the enemy's left, discovering Pickens' militia, not sufficiently concealed, began to fire upon the rear of the cavalry commanded by Captain Eggleston. This officer instantly turned upon the foe, as the whole column did immediately afterward. The conflict was quickly decided, and bloody on one side only. Ninety of the royalists were killed, and most of the survivors wounded. Dispersing in every direction, not being pursued, they escaped. During this sudden encounter, in some parts of the line the cry of mercy was heard, coupled with assurance of being our best friends; but no expostulation could be admitted in a conjuncture so critical. Humanity even forbade it, as its first injunction is to take care of your own safety, and our safety was not compatible with that of the supplicants, until disabled to offend. Pyle, falling under many wounds, was left on the field as dying, and yet he survived. We lost not a man, and only one horse.

The British accused Lee of a massacre in violation of the standards of warfare. Lee defended himself by pointing out that he did not order a pursuit of the fleeing Loyalists and did not have much choice but to act with quick brutality, since Tarleton's Legion was only a mile away.

In the following month, on 15 March, Cornwallis fought the battle of Guilford Courthouse without any Loyalist troops in his ranks. The action at Haw River is the main reason why.

SEE ALSO *Altamahaw Ford; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

HAYNE, ISAAC. (1745–1781). Militia officer executed by British. South Carolina. Remembered

primarily as the victim of British injustice, Isaac Hayne was born on 23 September 1745. He was a planter and breeder of fine horses before the war. He and William Hill also owned the iron works in York District, South Carolina, that were destroyed by British and Loyalist raiders led by Captain Christian Huck. At the beginning of the Revolution, Hayne served as a member of the assembly and as a captain in the Colleton militia. He resigned the latter post and re-enlisted as a private when a junior officer was put in command over him. He was captured at Charleston on 12 May 1780, having served in the outposts, and was paroled to his farm on condition that he never again take up arms against the British. Ordered in 1781 to join the British army, he considered his parole invalidated and took the field as a militia colonel. In July he captured General Andrew Williamson, the turncoat, just a few miles from Charleston, but was himself taken prisoner by British troops sent to rescue Williamson. Without a trial, Hayne was condemned to death by Colonel Nesbit Balfour, the British commandant at Charleston, on charges of espionage and treason. Despite a concerted protest by the citizens of Charleston, Haynes was hanged on 4 August 1781.

The fate of “the Martyr Hayne,” as he was instantly labeled, aroused widespread anger. When the issue came up in Parliament, Colonel Balfour attempted to defend himself by blaming Lord Rawdon (George Augustus Francis Rawdon), commander of British troops in the South although not Balfour's direct superior, who had approved the decision to execute Hayne. Rawdon placed the fault right back on Balfour. By their efforts to affix the blame on one another, both implicitly acknowledged their error. General Henry Lee later summarized the American view:

Colonel Hayne was certainly either a prisoner of war, or a British subject. If the latter, he was amenable to the law, and indisputably entitled to the formalities and the aids of trial; but if the former, he was not responsible to the British government, or its military commander, for his lawful conduct in the exercise of arms. Unhappily for this virtuous man, the royal power was fast declining in the South. The inhabitants were eager to cast off the temporary allegiance of conquest; it was deemed necessary to awe them into submission by some distinguished severity, and Hayne was the selected victim! (Lee, pp. 456–457).

By their handling of this case, the British authorities made a martyr out of Isaac Hayne instead of an “example,” thereby defeating the purpose that such a severe act might have accomplished. Nathanael Greene marched his army out of the High Hills of Santee after issuing a proclamation that “reprisals for all such inhuman insults” would be against “officers of the [British] regular forces, and not the deluded Americans who had joined the royal army.” Far

from repressing the sort of insurrection that Hayne had been accused of starting, Balfour sent Carolinians flocking to the American colors.

SEE ALSO *Greene, Nathanael.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

HAYS, MARY LUDWIG. (1754–1832).

Heroine of the Molly Pitcher legend. Pennsylvania. Born on 13 October 1754, near Trenton, New Jersey, Hays worked on her father's dairy farm before becoming a servant in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. At sixteen she married a barber named John Caspar Hays. Five years later she accompanied her husband's regiment, the First Pennsylvania Artillery, when it joined General George Washington's army. During the Monmouth campaign her husband served initially in the infantry, and in the record-breaking heat of 28 June 1778 "Molly" brought water to the troops. In the final phase of the action, John Hays was ordered back to the guns. When he fell wounded Mary Hays stepped up with a rammer staff to take his place in the crew and keep the gun in action.

After her first husband died at the war's end, Hays married George McCauley, a comrade in arms of her former husband, but a man whom she subsequently left because of his shiftlessness. She supported herself as a laundress and nursemaid, never being able to collect a military pension. She died on 22 January 1832, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, where a statue of "Molly Pitcher" commemorates her heroism.

SEE ALSO *Molly Pitcher Legend.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HAZEN, MOSES. (1733–1803). Continental officer. Massachusetts and Canada. Born in Haverhill, Massachusetts, on 1 June 1733, Hazen served as the lieutenant of a ranger company in the Seven Years' War, seeing combat at Crown Point (1750), Louisburg (1758), Quebec (1759), and Sillery (1760). His burning of St. Ann's (Fredericton) and the murder of civilians there earned him a reputation for brutality that did not prevent his promotion to captain and a commendation from General James Wolfe. He settled in Montreal, where he

became a justice of the peace and the center of numerous controversies, including the seduction of a friend's wife. He also found himself regarded with suspicion by both sides, and arrested by each in turn. Left behind by the British retreat, Hazen joined General Richard Montgomery's forces for the operations against Quebec. During the retreat he clashed with Benedict Arnold and was charged with insubordination, but a court-martial acquitted him. Congress recompensed him for property destroyed by the British, and on 22 January 1776 commissioned him colonel of the Second Canadian Regiment. This unit, known as "Congress's Own" and "Hazen's Own," consisted mostly of French-Canadians. The regiment fought at Long Island, Brandywine, and Germantown.

An advocate of further operations into Canada, Hazen was engaged in planning and gathering supplies for the proposed Canada Invasion of 1778. After this misguided scheme was abandoned, Hazen proposed that a military road be constructed to the Canadian border, and in the summer of 1779 he was back in the north working on this project, which became known as "Hazen's Road." Recalled to New Jersey, he tried unsuccessfully to have Congress pay his regiment; but was told that no funds were available. On 29 June 1781 he was brevetted brigadier general, and on 27 September he took command of a brigade in the Marquis de Lafayette's Light Infantry Division. Just before the allied armies closed in on Yorktown, Edward Antill succeeded to the command of "Hazen's Own," which was now part of Hazen's new brigade. Having taken charge of prisoners at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in 1782, he precipitated an embarrassing dilemma for Washington in the Huddy-Asgill Affair. Retiring 1 January 1783, Hazen settled on land he had bought in Vermont during the war. He died deeply in debt on 5 February 1803 in Troy, New York.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Canada Invasion; Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of; Huddy-Asgill Affair; Yorktown Campaign.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

HEATH, WILLIAM. (1737–1814). Continental Army general. Massachusetts. Born at Roxbury on 13 March 1737, Heath was a farmer, militiaman, and politician before the Revolution. He represented Roxbury in the Massachusetts General Court in 1761 and again

from 1771 until its dissolution by General Thomas Gage in 1774. Then he became a member of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts and of the committees of correspondence and safety. He described himself candidly as “of middling stature, light complexion, very corpulent, and bald-headed” (Heath, p. 15). Interested in soldiering from an early age, he read every military work he could get his hands on. He saw no action during the final French and Indian War but joined Boston’s Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company in 1765 and later became captain of his local militia company; as war approached he was active in rousing the militia. On 9 February 1775 the Massachusetts Provincial Congress appointed him one of its five brigadier generals. The first American general on the scene as the British retreated to Boston from Lexington and Concord, he ordered the initial dispositions for what became the siege of Boston. Promoted to major general of Massachusetts troops on 20 June, he was appointed a Continental brigadier general two days later. On 13 March 1776 he led the first detachment of troops from Boston to New York City and became Israel Putnam’s second in command when the latter arrived on 3 April.

Heath was elevated to major general on 9 August 1776 and a month later was one of three senior officers who voted in a council of war to defend New York City. Washington recognized Heath’s limitations and during the New York and New Jersey campaigns posted him where no major threat was expected. On 12 November Heath was placed in command of troops defending the Hudson Highlands. His best chance for distinction as a field commander resulted in the mismanaged diversion against Fort Independence, New York, on 17–18 January 1777. Washington wrote him privately that “your conduct is censured . . . as being fraught with too much caution by which the Army has been disappointed, and in some degree disgraced” (Twhig, p. 240). On 11 February 1777 Heath left Peekskill for a short leave. He reached Roxbury on 19 February and on 14 March had started back toward his headquarters when he received orders to succeed Artemas Ward as commander of the Eastern Department. The highlight of this tour of duty was his temporary custody of Burgoyne and the Convention army. He remained in Boston until 11 June 1779, when he left to join the main army on the Hudson. On 23 June he took command of troops on the east side of the river, the advance posts of which were then at Peekskill. He remained in the Highlands for the rest of the war except for the period from 16 June to 1 October 1780, when he was in Providence to handle the reception of the Comte de Rochambeau’s French expeditionary force. On 1 July 1783 he returned to his farm at Roxbury. He was a member of the state convention that ratified the Constitution, served as a state senator in 1791–1792, and then became a probate judge. He published his

valuable *Memoirs* in 1798. Heath was the last surviving major general of the Revolution when he died on 24 January 1814, in the house where he had been born.

SEE ALSO *Convention Army; Fort Independence Fiasco, New York; Hudson River and the Highlands.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

HEISTER, LEOPOLD PHILIP VON.

(1707–1777). Hessian commander in chief. A veteran of many campaigns in Europe, Heister commanded the first contingent of seventy-eight hundred German troops hired by the British government for service in the American Revolution. These troops landed at Staten Island in early July 1776. Heister commanded the center of the British line in the Battle of Long Island, personally receiving the sword of General Alexander. He led the Germans in the action at White Plains, N.Y., on 28 October 1776. Disagreements with General William Howe and the German defeat at Trenton on 26 December 1776 led to Heister’s recall in 1777, to be succeeded by Knyphausen. Heister died back in Hesse on 19 November 1777.

SEE ALSO *Dormant Commission; Howe, William; Knyphausen, Wilhelm; Long Island, New York, Battle of; Trenton, New Jersey; White Plains, New York.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HENLEY’S REGIMENT.

Henley’s Regiment was one of sixteen “additional continental regiments.”

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments.*

Mark M. Boatner

HENRY, PATRICK.

(1736–1799). Revolutionary orator and statesman. Virginia. Born at Studley,

Virginia, on 29 May 1736, Henry failed twice as a storekeeper and once as a planter by the time he was 23. Deciding to try his luck at law, Henry passed the bar in 1760 without either formal education or even private study with a lawyer. He enjoyed impressive success in his new profession, and his sparkling performance in the Parson's Cause of 1763 established his reputation throughout Virginia. Two years later he became a member of the House of Burgesses, grabbing attention at his first session with his opposition to the Stamp Act. Proposing seven resolutions (29 May 1765), the last of which claimed that Virginia enjoyed complete legislative autonomy, Henry pressed his resolutions in a speech closing with the famous lines: "Caesar had his Brutus—Charles the first, his Cromwell—and George the third—may profit by their example..." Interrupted at this point by cries of treason, Henry supposedly said, "If this be treason, make the most of it." There was some confusion over how many resolutions passed, but Henry saw that the entire list was rushed off in unrevised form to the other colonies. Henry thus became a major political figure throughout the colonies, and for the next five years he dominated public life in Virginia.

Under Henry's leadership, the legislators met at Raleigh Tavern on 27 May 1774 after Governor John Murray, Earl of Dunmore dissolved the Assembly. On 23 March 1775 he urged armed resistance in a speech that declared: "Give me liberty, or give me death!" He had been a delegate to the first Continental Congress and was preparing to attend the second when he learned that Dunmore had seized the ammunition in the arsenal at Williamsburg. On 2 May 1775, Henry marched on Williamsburg with the militia of Hanover County, and two days later Dunmore reimbursed the colony for the powder. On 6 May, Dunmore outlawed "a certain Patrick Henry" for disturbing the peace. On 18 May the outlaw took his seat in Congress, but early in August he returned to Virginia to assist in military preparations. He was appointed colonel of the first regiment formed in Virginia, which made him the commander in chief of all state militia, but Henry's political enemies chose a Committee of Safety and put it under the control of Edmund Pendleton. William Woodford was given command of the force that ran Dunmore out of the colony. Henry was infuriated by this cavalier treatment and he also resented the attitude of the military committee of the Continental Congress, so on 28 February 1776 he resigned his commission and went home.

Henry promptly came back into the political arena when he was elected to the third revolutionary convention. In May he had a decisive part in drafting the Virginia constitution, and on 29 June he was elected governor. In this post he authorized the western operations of George Rogers Clark. Shortly before the end of his tenure, in the

summer of 1779, Virginia was hit by the first of the raids against which it was to show itself virtually helpless. In this initial operation, Admiral George Collier and General Edward Mathew did an estimated £2,000,000 worth of damage without losing a man.

Succeeded by Thomas Jefferson, his close friend and political lieutenant, Patrick Henry retired to a huge tract of land in Henry County, Virginia. In 1780 Henry returned to the state legislature, where he led the opposition to James Madison's efforts to reform the state's constitution. In 1781 he joined those who demanded an investigation of Jefferson's conduct as governor, initiating a feud that lasted the rest of Henry's life. Even though he opposed Jefferson's Statute for Religious Freedom, Henry again became governor, serving from 1784 to 1786. He opposed the Constitution on the grounds of states' rights, almost blocking its ratification in Virginia until Madison outmaneuvered him. Back in the legislature as a convinced antifederalist, Henry blocked Madison's election to the U.S. Senate and led the demand for a second Constitutional Convention.

In declining health, Henry left the assembly and returned to the practice of law. In January 1799 he consented to George Washington's request that he campaign for election as a Federalist to the Virginia House of Delegates, completely reversing political direction. He defeated young John Randolph in this last campaign, but died on 6 June 1799, before he could take his seat.

SEE ALSO *Parson's Cause*; *Woodford, William*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

HERKIMER, NICHOLAS. (1728–1777).

New York militia general. Born near the present town of Herkimer, New York, Nicholas Herkimer was a militia lieutenant during the Seven Years' War. When the Revolution began he was active in patriot affairs in politically divided Tryon County, serving as chairman of the Committee of Safety. In 1776 he was promoted from colonel of militia to brigadier general. In July 1777 he led 380 militia to Unadilla, New York, for a conference with Joseph Brant, who had 130 Mohawk warriors with him. Herkimer hoped to work out some arrangement to keep Brant's Mohawks neutral, but the conference did not accomplish this purpose. After learning that a British

Hewes, Joseph

expedition led by General Barry St. Leger was approaching, and after getting little response from the militia when efforts were made to turn out 200 men for the defense of Fort Schuyler (Stanwix), Herkimer issued a proclamation on 17 July calling on all adult males to appear for service. Eight hundred men responded, and Herkimer led them to the relief of Fort Schuyler. Two days later, on 6 August, he led them into the tragic Oriskany ambush. Herkimer was seriously wounded and his army routed. About ten days later his leg was unskillfully amputated by a French surgeon of Benedict Arnold's command, who could not stop the bleeding. He died 16 August 1777.

SEE ALSO *Brant, Joseph; Oriskany, New York; St. Leger's Expedition; Tryon County, New York.*

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HESSIANS SEE *German Auxiliaries.*

HEWES, JOSEPH. (1730–1779). Signer. North Carolina. Born in Kingston, New Jersey, on 23 January 1730, Hewes moved to Edenton, North Carolina, in 1755, becoming a successful merchant. Reared a Quaker, he had left the sect by the beginning of the Revolution. He was elected to the colonial assembly in 1766 and in 1773 became a member of the Committee of Correspondence. He went to all the provincial congresses and in 1774 was elected to the Continental Congress. Active on several committees, including the Secret Committee responsible for getting supplies for the Continental army, he signed the Declaration of Independence. He was not reelected in 1777. Returning to Congress in 1779, he died on 10 November.

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HEYWARD, THOMAS, JR. (1746–1809). Signer. South Carolina. Born in Saint Helena Parish,

South Carolina, on 28 July 1746, Thomas Heywood Jr. studied in the Middle Temple before becoming a South Carolina lawyer in 1771. From 1772 to 1775, he sat in the state assembly, and in 1775–1776 he went to the Provincial Congresses in Charleston, serving as a member of the Council of Safety. As captain of a militia artillery battalion, he helped to defend Charleston from British attack in late 1775. In February 1776 he was a member of the committee that wrote the state constitution. Sent to the Second Continental Congress, 1776 to 1778, he signed the Declaration of Independence. He returned to Charleston and became a circuit judge. On 4 February 1779 he was wounded while leading the successful attack on the British at Port Royal Island. He was captured the following year when the British took Charleston. Initially paroled, he was one of a group of political leaders arrested by the British and sent as prisoners to St. Augustine, Florida, in August 1780, where they were kept until they were exchanged in July 1781. He sat in the state legislature from 1779 to 1780 and from 1782 to 1790, and served as circuit judge until 1789. He took part in the state's ratifying convention, supporting the Constitution. He also served in the state's Constitutional Convention of 1790, at which time he retired from public life. He was one of the founders and the first president of the South Carolina Agricultural Society in 1785. He died on 22 April 1809.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Siege of 1780.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HICKEY, THOMAS SEE *Mutiny of Hickey.*

HILLSBORO RAID, NORTH CAROLINA. 12 September 1781. On 6 September 1781, Loyalist Colonel David Fanning issued a call for volunteers. Within a short time he had 950 men under his command. He then undertook a long-cherished scheme of capturing rebel Governor Thomas Burke of North Carolina. Reaching Hillsboro the morning of 12 September, having marched all day and all night, he got possession of that place after a skirmish in which he lost only one man (wounded) but killed fifteen Patriots, wounded twenty, and captured more than two hundred. Among his prisoners were Burke, members of the governor's council, several Continental officers, and seventy-one Continental soldiers. He also liberated a number of Loyalist and British soldiers. Leaving Hillsboro at noon, the Loyalist raiders had covered eighteen miles when

they were attacked at Cane Creek (Lindley's Mill) by four hundred Continental soldiers under the command of General John Butler. Colonel Hector McNeil, in command of the advance guard, was lax and thus surprised by the Patriots. He and seven other Loyalists were killed.

To secure his retreat, Fanning then launched an attack. In a four-hour fight, the rebels were finally routed with a loss of twenty-five killed, ninety wounded, and ten captured, but Fanning was badly wounded, twenty of his men were killed, and ninety were wounded. Leaving Fanning and the other wounded behind, Lieutenant Colonels Archibald McDugald and Archibald McKay and Major John Raney succeeded in eluding pursuit with the rest of the expedition until it linked up four days later with the relief column led by Colonel James Henry Craig from Wilmington.

Fanning's coup was a brilliant success. It shook Patriot confidence throughout the South.

SEE ALSO *Craig, James Henry; Fanning, David.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HINRICHS, JOHANN VON. (c.1750–1834). Hessian officer. Arriving with the first contingent of German troops to America in 1776, he served as a jäger lieutenant until promoted to captain in early 1778. He received a severe chest wound after the British occupied New York City and was wounded several other times. In the Charleston operations of 1780 he was actively engaged and left an important historical record in his diary. Although he was schooled as an engineer and distinguished himself during the Revolution as a jäger, he transferred to the infantry in 1784. Soon thereafter he entered the Prussian service, was raised to the nobility, and died in 1834 as a lieutenant general.

SEE ALSO *Jägers; Jungkenn, Friedrich Christian Arnold.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HISTORIOGRAPHY. The historiography of the American Revolution always has been a much larger subject than the historiography of the War of Independence. Consider comments by two of the Revolution's major participants. For John Adams, the real Revolution was the huge change in Americans' attitudes as they abandoned being British. That change was over before a shot was fired. But for Philadelphia's Benjamin Rush, the end of hostilities marked the

beginning of the real Revolution, the change in how Americans lived their lives.

The consequence is that much of the Revolution's most sophisticated study has paid scant attention to the long, bloody, difficult conflict that actually achieved independence. For scholars in Adams's long shadow, primarily interested in problems of language and consciousness, the interest has been to probe the destruction of British identity and the creation of what Gordon Wood has called "the American Science of Politics." For scholars more inspired by Rush, the experience of places, individuals, and groups has loomed larger than campaigns, battles, and generalship.

Most would agree with the proposition that the military narrative is not strong enough by itself to carry the larger Revolutionary story. This is unlike the Civil War, in which the story of armed conflict also is the story of failed southern white nationhood, of slavery's destruction, of African American freedom, and of the transformation of the fundamental terms of American existence. Yet the Revolutionary War is the second longest in American history. Its roughly 30,000 American casualties cannot possibly equate to the Civil War's 630,000, but they struck a much smaller population. Almost every place except central New England saw actual conflict at one point or another.

As Washington Irving's fictional Rip Van Winkle found, the war did leave America a vastly different place. Some of its historians have dealt only with the movement of troops, but many others have understood the need to see the Revolutionary War in all of its complexity. Beginning in the second half of the twentieth century, the problems of military history and revolutionary transformation have come together in sophisticated ways.

ACCOUNTS OF PARTICIPANTS

In the beginning there were the participants. No military leader of the Revolution on either side produced a memoir comparable to the majestic achievement of Ulysses S. Grant. We cannot know the direct, first-hand experiences and remembered consciousness of Washington, Charles Lee, Nathanael Greene, and Henry Knox or of Thomas Gage, William Howe, John Burgoyne, and Henry Clinton.

But ranging from slightly below their level to ordinary privates, participants did believe that their stories were worth recounting. Many of these were published during the nineteenth century, and in 1968 the *New York Times* and Arno Press assembled most of the published editions into one series, called Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution (1968). The books show the Revolutionary War through many eyes and from many perspectives, and they are of great value. The memoirs of

Hessian Major General Friedrich Adolphus Riedesel provide the best single source on Burgoyne's failed campaign down the Champlain-Hudson corridor in 1777. Virtually every historian of the war in the North draws on the rich diary kept by Connecticut private Joseph Plumb Martin during his long service in the Continental army. Between those two extremes, the *Times* series presents a wide variety of experiences, at all ranks and from all sides.

In the aftermath of the actual war, writers set out to create more formal histories, most of which are reprinted in the *Times* series. Necessarily, they took sides. For New York Loyalist Thomas Jones (as for others of his ilk), the story told in his *History of New York during the Revolutionary War* (2 vols., 1879) was of illicit, ungrateful rebellion. For the South Carolina physician David Ramsay, the tale in his *History of the American Revolution* (2 vols., 1793) was of heroic resistance and American liberty. Though Ramsay took direct part in the conflict, his real interest was political rather than military. Plagiarism was not a writerly sin in his time, and Ramsay unashamedly drew much of his account from Britain's *Annual Register*. The playwright Mercy Otis Warren of Boston, whose brother Joseph died at Bunker Hill, gave the war much more extended treatment. In her three-volume *History of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the American Revolution* (1805), the conflict takes up half of the first volume and all of the second. But Warren was partisan in more than simply taking the American side. For her, the real point of the Revolution was not simply American independence, but the triumph of the Jeffersonian vision (limited rather than active government, agriculture-based development, and civil liberties) of what independence should mean.

As the Revolutionary generation aged and memories faded, emphasis shifted. Ordinary men and occasionally ordinary women who had served with the Revolutionary army found reason to recover and tell their personal stories. That was the only way to get the pensions owed them from the federal government, and frequently it meant overcoming the suspicions of latter-day clerks and budget-conscious Congressmen. Their petitions eventually found their way to the National Archives, where they became the stuff of genealogy.

Historians have realized that these accounts present a mosaic of first-hand Revolutionary experience. John C. Dann assembled a collection of them in 1980 as *The Revolution Remembered*, covering the whole war from the firefight at Lexington in 1775 to Washington's departure from command in 1783. However rich the volumes in the *New York Times* series, there is no need anymore to rely on it alone for contemporary perspectives. The full riches of the tales in the archives remain to be exploited. Two studies by Alfred F. Young demonstrate the possibilities. *The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution* (1999) shows the surprises and

changes in one very ordinary man's life. *Masquerade: The Life and Times of Deborah Sampson, Continental Soldier* (2004) turns its subject from a figure of curiosity into a boundary prober (a woman who probed the boundaries of gender and opportunity) who redefined herself in uniform for fourteen undetected months and who grasped the Revolution's possibilities. Many women in addition to Sampson had direct military experience. A few others disguised themselves, though only briefly. Most were "women of the army." Holly A. Mayer tells their story in *Belonging to the Army: Camp Followers and Community during the American Revolution* (1996).

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

While the veterans were telling their stories, nineteenth-century historians were embarking on other tasks. George Bancroft, in particular, set out to tell the American story in epic terms. During his studies in Germany, Bancroft felt the influence of the philosopher G.F.W. Hegel, who insisted that the course of history led to an increase in human freedom. During this time, Bancroft produced a *History of the United States from the Discovery of the Continent* (6 vols., 1888) that construed the entire tale in terms of the rise of American liberty. Bancroft was a staunch follower of President Andrew Jackson, and like Warren before him, he had a political agenda. The war years filled one and one-half volumes. His rhetoric could be overblown, as in his account of the spread of the news of fighting at Lexington and Concord:

Darkness close upon the country . . . but it was no night for sleep. Heralds by swift relays transmitted the war message . . . till village repeated it to village; the sea to the back woods; the plains to the highlands. . . . its loud reveille broke the rest of the trappers of New Hampshire. . . . The hills along the Hudson told to one another the tale. As the summons hurried to the south, it was one day at New York; in one more at Philadelphia. . . . Crossing the Potomac near Mount Vernon, it was sent forward without a halt to Williamsburg.

Bancroft's German training had given him a strong positivistic sense of evidence as well as the capacity for high-flown generalizations about the course of history. Even at its most overblown, his prose rested on hard fact.

Benson J. Lossing's two-volume *Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution* (1860) was another monument of the era. Intended for general readership, it was a compilation of accounts of battles, capsule biographies, and verse, told in good part in the first person as Lossing explored the Revolution's sites. Like the enormous county histories that were popular at the time, Lossing's volumes were lavishly illustrated with steel engravings of historic places, natural features, the dwellings of great men and Lossing's

hosts on his travels, and such latter-day achievements as a suspension bridge across the Niagara River below the Falls. Like Bancroft's account of the history of a United States that did not yet exist, Lossing's volumes indiscriminately included details from the whole colonial era. Its combined total of nearly fifteen hundred closely packed pages presented a formidable reading task. But the book is one to be leafed through and perhaps consulted for facts rather than taken as a narrative or analytical account.

Another nineteenth-century project was simply to assemble and preserve primary materials before the paper crumbled and the ink faded on aging manuscripts. Overt interpretation could wait. The contents of European and American archives, town records, muster rolls, and officers' reports were more important. Yet these collections were haphazard and often incomplete. Peter Force's nine massive volumes of *American Archives* (1837–1853) provide immense detail on the years from 1776 to 1778, but then they stop. Force originally planned at least twenty volumes, funded by the Department of State. Publication stopped when Secretary of State William Marcy withdrew funding. Edmund Bailey O'Callaghan's fifteen-volume *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York* (1853–1887) include three on the war years. Half a century later, New York State archivists assembled an alphabetical list of soldiers who served in the Revolution. Such collections are invaluable for the war's social history. But to put faces on that list of names one must make a long trawl through county and town histories.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

After the turn of the twentieth century, scholarship on the Revolution turned in different directions. One, reflecting America's own emergence as an imperial power, was toward appreciation of Britain's difficulties in dealing with the cantankerous, disobedient, tax-resisting colonists. Another, drawing on the open class divisions of industrial capitalist society, was to break down the hitherto unitary concept of undifferentiated "Americans" into groups that conflicted with one another over the terms and conduct of American life. The first tendency is associated primarily with the work of Charles McLean Andrews and the second with that of Carl Lotus Becker and Charles A. Beard. Yet neither they nor their students and disciples dealt with the problems presented by the actual war.

For the most part, study of the war remained at the level of accounts of campaigns and battles or of particular units. Frequently, that meant recounting familiar tales about a half-organized rabble in arms who managed somehow to face down the might of Britain's majestic, highly trained, well-disciplined, and well-equipped armed forces. Virtually all such writing construed the conflict solely in terms of one white group facing down another white group, with virtually no attention paid to the importance

of the war from the point of view of both Native people and black slaves. To such writers, these people were simply problems to add to the American grievance list against Britain. John Richard Alden's mid-twentieth-century synthesis dismissed Natives, particularly, as no more than "savages" or, in one memorable phrase, "fickle, red-skinned allies." (*The American Revolution*, p. 139)

The British perspective. Matters changed during the twentieth century's second half. One reason was the Revolution's bicentennial, which provoked interest in (and funding for) studies of virtually every aspect of the Revolutionary era, the war included. Another was the emergence of a new style of military history, whose practitioners were interested not simply in armed hostilities but also in the entire social, economic, and cultural experience of warfare. Still another was a broadened scope of American social history, taking into account not only the class divisions that preoccupied early-twentieth-century "progressive" historians such as Becker and Beard but also the experiences of race and gender. It also became possible to take the experiences of both major sides seriously without waving either the Stars and Stripes or the Union Jack. The problem ceased to be one of justifying either the British or the American position and shifted to understanding a complex, total, and in many ways tragic historical process.

An important early statement came in 1964 from Oxford military historian Piers Mackesy. In *The War for America, 1775–1783*, Mackesy sought to understand the whole British experience of a distant, lost war from which Britain extricated itself slowly and painfully but ultimately successfully. Mackesy took London's perspective, in the sense that he set out to understand the problems of logistics, grand strategy, and politics that surrounded actual campaigning. He came closer than any previous historian to appreciating Britain's difficulties. As one instance, though British soldiers were better trained man-to-man than American ones, each of the former also represented a very high investment. Their lives were not to be squandered because every casualty was very difficult and very expensive to replace. This was one reason for the reluctance of British strategists to provide the forces needed or commanders to commit them in battle.

Mackesy also understood the sheer difficulty of supplying the distant troops. Previous accounts of the inland campaigns of Burgoyne in northern New York and of Charles Lord Cornwallis in the South had treated their problems of supply as, in effect, matters of happenstance or foolishness. The tale of Burgoyne's mile-long baggage train, laden with his and his officers' china, good food, and fine wine as well as with the troops' basic needs, is well-known. But Mackesy linked it to the larger problem that any British force faced as soon as it advanced more than a few miles from open water.

Mackesy's principal achievement was to explore the problems that the British effort faced at the very highest levels, among ministers and commanding officers of the army and the fleet. Far from being unified, they were a squabbling, conflicted lot, wracked with mutual antipathy, self-centered ambition, clashing goals, and poor coordination. Lord George Germain, who was war minister for much of the conflict, had no doubts about the goal he was pursuing in the king's name (although privately he wrestled with the lasting shame of his supposed cowardice at the Battle of Minden three decades earlier). His generals and admirals, however, did have doubts. It was impossible to recruit many of Britain's most experienced generals, such as Sir Jeffrey Amherst. But the first commander in chief, Thomas Gage, knew America well. He had replaced Amherst as commander, and his wife, Margaret Kemble, was American. Among the commanders in chief and lesser generals who followed him, both William Howe and John Burgoyne were opposition members of Parliament.

Mackesy also understood that from Britain's viewpoint the war during its course turned into a global conflict. To Americans, the combined French-American victory at Yorktown in 1781 marked the end of the struggle. But to British policy makers another problem loomed from 1778: protecting the West Indies from the combined force of the French and Spanish navies. The Royal Navy did so successfully in 1782 at the Battle of the Saints, capturing the French commander Admiral de Grasse. Yet even with that victory, Britain's problems were not over. The very last armed conflict between representatives of the two sides took place in India, in 1783. It ended without conclusion, thanks to the arrival of the news of a preliminary peace. Mackesy succeeded in turning a favorite American phrase to describe the opening bullets at Lexington in 1775—"the shot heard round the world"—into a statement of literal fact.

Three major works. Three important books by American scholars followed directly on Mackesy's achievement and in the direction he charted. John Shy, a West Point graduate with a Princeton doctorate in history, explored the place of the British army in the coming of the Revolution in *Toward Lexington* (1965). Shy's interest was not at all in the conventional stuff of military history; he was writing about a peacetime army. He understood that the army's very presence was a major irritant to the colonials and sought to explore the reasons. As one reviewer noted, Shy broke free of "headquarters" history and explored the army's role in American society, particularly the ways in which both soldiers and officers came into conflict with their respective civilian counterparts. Sixteen years later, Sylvia Frey extended this theme into the war years with *The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period* (1981). Ira Gruber returned to the level of generals and generalship in *The*

Howe Brothers and the American Revolution (1972). Using previously untouched British archives, he probed the connections between the two brothers' political ambitions, their commissions both to wage war and to negotiate peace, and their duty as joint commanders in chief between 1776 and 1778. Among the problems that Gruber confronted was William Howe's reluctance, particularly, to follow through whenever he seemed to have an advantage over his opposite number, George Washington.

Mackesy's treatment of the large issues of the war from a British (though not chauvinistic) viewpoint virtually required an American-framed riposte on a similar scale. In 1971 Don Higginbotham provided that response with *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763–1789*. As one British reviewer noted, Higginbotham's great theme was to link military experience on the American side to the sort of people Americans were, meaning both their long experience as colonials and their immediate needs as revolutionaries. Mackesy had shown the infighting and sheer inefficiency of the British command and logistic structures, leading to their inability to achieve what policy makers and strategists wanted. Higginbotham began with the fact that though the rebellious colonials had ample experience of subordinate service under British leadership, they had no experience at all at the levels of organizing, financing, supplying, and fighting a major war by themselves. Their eventual success at the first three underpinned their ultimate success at the fourth. Like Mackesy, Higginbotham blended policy level, strategic level, and soldier level history into a coherent account. Taken together, the two books form a remarkably complementary pair.

Shy returned to the subject of the Revolution in 1976 with a collection of essays, *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence*. Published in the aftermath of America's own losing experience in Vietnam, the volume asked what was genuinely revolutionary about the armed conflict. Its centerpiece was his previous contribution to *Essays on the American Revolution* (1973), titled "The Military Conflict as a Revolutionary War." Shy knew better than simply to stamp the American struggle with a latter-day mold constructed from the writings and experiences of Trotsky, Mao, and Giap. But he did understand what already was implicit in the work of Mackesy: the British were using conventional European military means to attempt to suppress an extra-European attempt at revolutionary social and political change. Taken this way, several old-chestnut questions found new answers. One is whether the British "lost" the war through their mistakes or the Americans "won" it by their virtues and the help of their French friends. Another is whether on the American side it is more important to consider the Continental army or the separate state militias. The real point, Shy suggested,

was that from the American perspective the whole experience of war between 1775 and 1781 was “a social process of political education that can be explored and should be analyzed” (*The American Revolution: The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War*, p. 156).

Culture and the military. One major general development in Revolution studies during the twentieth century’s third quarter was an extended exploration of political culture, especially in the work of Bernard Bailyn and Gordon S. Wood. Primarily, this meant the study of civilian writings as Americans wrestled with the problem of creating their eventual republic, but as both Higginbotham and Shy understood, the problem spilled over into military life. Charles Royster rose to the task of linking culture and warfare in *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775–1783* (1979). Densely argued and not reader friendly, Royster’s book set out to bridge the whole gap between conventional (or even new-style) military studies and cultural development. One of his achievements reached right back to Bancroft’s highly dramatized account of the spread of the war news from Lexington in 1775. Bancroft had rightly understood that as the messengers rode north, west, and south, they precipitated a general crisis. Royster described what ensued as *rage militaire*, (martial enthusiasm) and he explored both that phenomenon’s extent and its limits.

In particular, Royster picked up on a point that military historians long had understood. Whatever the importance of the militia, the Continental army had perdured throughout the war and ultimately could claim victory. Royster explored both the tensions between the fact of what Washington would describe as a “respectable army” and a culture that regarded standing armies as dangerous. He also considered the emergence of the army’s officer corps as a self-conscious gentry, however absurd their pretensions appeared to the real gentlemen and outright aristocrats whom they faced. One outcome of the Revolution is the subordination of military might to political control in American life. Royster turned that outcome into something much more complex than Washington’s personal squelching of the Newburgh Conspiracy and his resignation from command in 1783.

Military supply. Culture alone, however, does not keep an army in the field. Supply is not a glamorous subject, but both Mackesy and Higginbotham understood its great importance. E. Wayne Carp addressed the problem squarely in *To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775–1783* (1984). Carp’s insights fitted both with Royster’s and with the earlier economic history of Curtis P. Nettels, *The Emergence of a National Economy, 1775–1815* (1962), developing the point that both the absolute needs of the army and the experience of the people charged

with meeting those needs began the process of transforming divergent provincial and local economies into a single structure.

The local context. James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender brought many of these themes together in their student-level synthesis, *A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789* (1982). At a more specialist level, so did the collection edited by Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, *Arms and Independence: The Military Character of the American Revolution* (1984). Other historians probed the question of the war and its effects from the very different perspective of local and group experience. Unlike general arguments about strategy, political culture, and supply, their studies were concerned with particular people in specific places.

One pioneer study was Robert Gross’s account of *The Minutemen and Their World* (1976). Short and elegant, Gross’s book worked within the then-dominant paradigm of New England town studies to examine how the very ordinary farmers, artisans, and gentlemen of Concord, Massachusetts, came to the point of confronting British regulars at the bridge on the edge of their town on the morning of 19 April 1775. Their town’s moment of actual armed conflict was brief, but it was part of a much larger transformation.

Gross’s townsmen rallied, of course, because messengers like Paul Revere brought them the news that “the Regulars are coming out.” Revere’s ride and the firefights that followed were the moment when uneasy peace bled into conflict that British soldiers and New Englanders alike had been expecting. *Paul Revere’s Ride* (1994), by David Hackett Fischer, explored that tense moment. Like Royster, Fischer wrote in George Bancroft’s long shadow, but more than Bancroft he understood that what happened was the result of intense preparation and organization. New Englanders had risen spontaneously and incoherently in September 1774, when news spread that General Gage had seized the gunpowder in the Cambridge powderhouse. They were quick to rally the following April, and this time they were disciplined and ready. The damage they inflicted on retreating British troops and the impromptu siege that they imposed on occupied Boston sprang from those facts. So did their Pyrrhic victory at Bunker (Breed’s) Hill in June, when they inflicted unacceptable losses on the British before finally retreating.

The war in Connecticut. For most Massachusetts people the war was effectively over after the British withdrew from Boston in March 1776. But for their Connecticut neighbors it had barely begun. The British occupation of New York City and Long Island the following summer made Long Island Sound into a permanent war zone and put great pressure on the people on that zone’s northern side. Richard Buel Jr. explored that problem in *Dear*

Liberty: Connecticut's Mobilization for the Revolutionary War (1980). Like Carp, his prime concern was how people supplied the army. Much more than Carp, however, he dealt with the demands that doing so placed upon civilian life. Beyond supply, Connecticut people had to deal with constant raiding across Long Island Sound. They never endured a major campaign, but the war was on their doorsteps, particularly in 1779, when the British attacked New Haven and destroyed the towns of Fairfield and Norwalk. In Buel's estimation, Connecticut did not fully recover from the war's costs until into the nineteenth century.

NEW YORK WARFARE

Of all the founding states, New York probably suffered longest and most intensely. The British took over its "southern district"—New York City and vicinity—just after independence was declared. They stayed there until 1783, withdrawing only when the Treaty of Paris required them to go. The state lost two of its counties when Vermont seceded from it early in 1777. It experienced not only invasion by the largest seaborne armada the modern world had seen when the Howe brothers drove Washington from Brooklyn and Manhattan, but another major invasion a year later when Burgoyne came south from Montreal. In its western reaches, what had been a mixed society of Native and white people collapsed into a civil war that seemed to pit all against all and that lasted for years. With so much and such extended conflict, it is not surprising that the state generated a rich wartime historiography.

Barnet Schechter's *The Battle for New York: The City at the Heart of the American Revolution* (2002) brings much of that seven-year agony into a single account. Schechter's interest is much larger than the battle of New York that followed immediately on the British invasion, although that does comprise somewhat more than half of his account. To his mind, New York City remained central throughout the war. As he shows, Washington would have agreed, wanting until the very end to achieve military recompense for the humiliation he had suffered at the hands of the Howes. The fiasco of British policy in 1777, when Burgoyne's grand expedition came to nothing and when Howe decided to take Philadelphia, formed part of the larger battle for the city. Within New York, only the western conflict does not fit into Schechter's framework.

Taken on its own, the Saratoga campaign of 1777 has generated a great deal of writing. The most recent complete account is Richard Ketchum's extended narrative, *Saratoga* (2002). But Max Mintz's *The Generals of Saratoga: John Burgoyne and Horatio Gates* (1990) develops the human interest point that the two had known each other since they joined the same British regiment at

the entry-level rank of subaltern during Britain's long contest with the French. That Burgoyne climbed to fame, wealth, and a seat in Parliament while Gates left the army and settled in Virginia, speaks to the large differences between the two sides. It also lends poignancy to their famous exchange at the surrender, when Gates told Burgoyne that he was "very glad" to see him and Burgoyne broke gentlemanly form by replying that he was not glad to see Gates at all.

War against Native peoples. New York's other great conflict was westward. Irregular war broke out in 1777 as Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger led an expedition of regulars, Loyalists, and Native fighters east from Oswego to link up with Burgoyne. The sharpest conflicts came that summer as Patriot militia blundered into slaughter in a ravine near Oriskany, and in 1779, when an American expedition under Generals John Sullivan and James Clinton set out to ravage the country of the Six Nations.

But Isabel Kelsay's more-than-full-length biography, *Joseph Brant: Man of Two Worlds* (1984), more than compensates. Brant acquired a ferocious, Atlantic-spanning reputation, but Kelsay shows both him and his people as caught up in a complex struggle in which they sought their own best interests on completely rational grounds. They were not at all the "merciless Indian savages whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions" whom Jefferson described in the Declaration of Independence. Kelsay shows as well that this struggle was not entirely racial; many of the people whom the highly cultured Brant led in combat were white, not Native at all. Like their settler neighbors, the nations of the Haudenosaunee, the Iroquois Confederation, had split. For each of these convoluted sides, the Revolutionary War amounted to a total conflict that, in fact, did end in mutual "undistinguished destruction."

Colin Calloway has expanded this theme in what is the most comprehensive account of warfare against Native Americans in *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (1995). Calloway understands that to speak simply of "Indians" is to phrase the subject so broadly as to render it meaningless. Instead of synthesizing, he offers close descriptions of eight separate Native communities, from Abenaki people near the St. Lawrence to Choctaws on the Mississippi. Like Kelsay, Calloway understands that Native people split, that they became totally caught up in the war, and that no matter which side they chose, they got little good from the Revolution at all.

Many of the same points emerge from modern studies of the southern interior, including Henry Lumpkin's *From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South* (1981) and such anthologies as *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry during the American Revolution*

(1985), edited by Ronald Hoffman and Peter Albert. For southerners the duration of civil conflict was shorter than for New Yorkers and the Iroquois, really erupting only when British strategy turned southward in 1779. The British hope was to find loyalist support, which did exist. But the reality was to tear the South's tri-racial society to shreds. Cherokee Indians already had experienced Patriot wrath for joining the British side, but they had negotiated their way out of a losing situation at the price of surrendering a huge amount of land.

Impact on Black Americans. In the South and North alike, enslaved and free black people also became part of the Revolutionary struggle. The era saw the beginning of western-hemisphere slavery's long, difficult destruction, and in important ways the war opened into a struggle for black liberation. But as with Native and white people, the broad category "black" is far too simple. On both the British and American sides there were white people who were bothered by slavery and other white people who cared not at all. Some black people found their own freedom under the Union Jack, others under the Stars and Stripes. British General Lord Cornwallis disgraced himself by expelling black people from his ranks during the siege of Yorktown. But to his credit, Sir Guy Carleton, the final commander in chief, refused to permit victorious revolutionaries to remove self-freed slaves from transports about to depart from New York.

The full story of black soldiers remains to be told. But it is explored by Benjamin Quarles (*The Negro in the American Revolution* [1961]) and Sylvia Frey [*Water From the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age* (1991)]. Sydney and Emma Kaplan provide a great deal of evidence in *The Black Presence in the Era of the American Revolution* (1989), including a brief discussion of the so-called Black Regiment of Rhode Island. George Washington's own journey, from rejecting the black men among the New Englanders who besieged to including one largely black Rhode Island company among the troops making the final assault at Yorktown, is described by Henry Wiencek in *An Imperfect God: George Washington, His Slaves, and the Creation of America* (2003).

The Rhode Island Black Regiment deserves a full treatment. But the most famous black unit of the era was Lord Dunmore's Ethiopian Regiment, recruited from among slaves "pertaining to rebels" by Virginia's final royal governor late in 1775. By then Dunmore's own safety required that he be on shipboard in Chesapeake Bay, and his proclamation helped rally white Virginia opinion in favor of independence. Nonetheless, about eight hundred black men made their way to the British, and the uniforms he provided bore the motto "Liberty to Slaves."

Inoculation against smallpox. Sadly, most of them perished in the smallpox epidemic that was breaking out at the same time they tried to claim their freedom. Elisabeth Fenn's *Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775–82* (2001) shows how the war between human beings and the *variola major* virus for control of human bodies intersected with the war of humans with one another for control of America. As she demonstrates, one of Washington's great achievements as the American commander was to require that his soldiers undergo the dangerous process of inoculation rather than wait for the disease to come and take them.

EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

As of 2005, Washington himself is the prime subject of three of the most recent studies of the Revolutionary period. Each has received wide attention. All are part of a general surge of interest in the "founding fathers" on the part of writers, publishers, and the general reading public. One of them, Joseph Ellis's *His Excellency: George Washington* (2004), is a biography in snapshots, devoting two chapters to the war years. In the spirit of his earlier writing, Ellis unashamedly rejects the social history project, presenting what some might call "traditional (narrative, heroic) American history" in virtually pure form.

The other two are more tightly focused in time and much more ambitious intellectually. David Hackett Fischer's *Washington's Crossing* (2004) is in the spirit of his earlier close study, *Paul Revere's Ride*. Fischer rejects all determinism, arguing strongly that historians must deal in the language of change and contingency. Nowhere is this more true for him than in the study of war. But in another sense he draws deeply on social historiography, including its recognition that structures do count. Taking as his theme Emmanuel Leutze's famous painting, *Washington Crossing the Delaware* (1850), he shows that far from being latter-day patriotic bombast, the canvas tells a great deal about the sort of people whom Washington led against Hessians at Trenton and Princeton at the end of 1776, when the Revolution's fortunes and prospects looked very dark. Reaching beyond that core group, he goes on to explore the lives and situations of all ranks among the Hessians Washington attacked, their British allies, Washington's own soldiers, and the civilians who surrounded them all. One of his points is to contrast the two sides in the largest terms, but also to show each as presenting a different face of emerging modernity. The face of the British and their hired Hessians was of hierarchical obedience for the sake of a common cause. The face of the Americans was of voluntary adherence, again for the sake of a common cause. Neither side was capable of fully understanding the other. The result is both a grand

narrative of the first two years of the war and an intense dissection of the participants.

David McCullough's project is very similar in *1776* (2005). His goal is simply to describe one intense year in the fullest possible narrative detail, without theorizing or academic controversy. But, like Fischer, he understands that during that year, a very large number of human beings became caught up in events that were not wholly or even largely of their choosing and that turned on the most fundamental questions that they were capable of imagining.

In one sense, early twenty-first-century accounts of the Revolutionary War have returned full circle to the themes running through the patriotic narratives of Mercy Otis Warren and George Bancroft. In this they were prefigured by the strong emphasis on traditional military history by Robert Middlekauff in *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789* (1982). Taken this way, they can be seen as in reaction to the concern with the experience of minorities and subordinates and to the interest in internal conflict that ran through much of the social history movement of the second half of the twentieth century. Abandoning overt analysis, their authors opt to tell highly readable stories. But no reaction can be complete. Taken in another way, Fischer and McCullough attempt to present a picture of the Revolutionary War not so much in the spirit of George Bancroft, with his unashamedly purple prose, as in the spirit of another great nineteenth-century American writer who is read much more often now than Bancroft: the poet Walt Whitman. Whitman sought to grasp the full complexity of American life in his time. Perhaps the full complexity of the Revolutionary War still eludes writers, at least in terms of a single comprehensive account. But anybody who chooses can learn a great deal about it, particularly if the reader finds that one book leads to another, and then another.

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Edward Countryman

HOAGLANDT'S FARM. Located where Riverside Drive crosses West 115th Street in Manhattan, this was the end of the Bloomingdale Road in 1776. The action of Harlem Heights is sometimes called Hoaglandt's Hill.

SEE ALSO *Harlem Heights, New York*.

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Mark M. Boatner

HOBKIRK'S HILL (CAMDEN), SOUTH CAROLINA. 25 April 1781. When Charles Cornwallis advanced into North Carolina after the Battle of Cowpens, military operations in South Carolina were placed in the hands of Francis, the Lord Rawdon. The principal British post outside Charleston was Camden, the keystone of a defensive arch extending from Georgetown through Camden to Ninety Six and on to Augusta, Georgia.

Major General Nathanael Greene returned to South Carolina after General Cornwallis withdrew to Wilmington, North Carolina. Greene commenced operations at long range by detaching Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee's Partisan Legion to cooperate with Colonel Francis Marion, in part because Rawdon had sent Colonel John Watson with some 500 men to destroy Marion's partisans in the Pee Dee swamps. Greene expected Lee to help block Watson's return to Camden. After covering 140 miles in 14 days, including three days spent crossing the Pee Dee, Greene reached the Camden area. Greene wanted Sumter to join the main army for an attack on Camden, but Sumter did not do so. (See the map "Camden and Vicinity" for Greene's approaches to Hobkirk's Hill and the subsequent battle.)

Greene's arrival failed to surprise Rawdon because Tory agents had continually sent news of his progress to Camden. After Lieutenant Colonel William Washington's dragoons probed British positions on 20 April, Greene learned Camden's fortifications were too strong to be frontally attacked. The Americans then camped on Hobkirk Hill, over a mile outside Camden, and began harassing the British. (The ridge on which the battle was fought is known as Hobkirk Hill, but the battle has, through common usage, become known as Hobkirk's Hill, and that use is continued here.)

On 21 April, Greene learned that Watson was moving toward Camden. To intercept Watson, Greene left Hobkirk Hill and moved east of Camden. The road system would not permit artillery movement so the guns were sent toward Lynches Creek for safety. When Lee and Marion successfully blocked Watson, Greene returned to Hobkirk Hill on 24 April.




Table 1. THE GALE GROUP.

Rawdon was thoroughly familiar with Camden's defenses since he had been posted there since the summer of 1780. With his forces garrisoning scattered outlying posts, and short on supplies and provisions, Rawdon met Greene's threat with skill and audacity. Rawdon was already well-informed of Greene's situation when, on the night of 24–25 April, an American deserter—probably a drummer named James Jones from the Maryland Line—reported that Greene's artillery had been sent away, that Sumter had not arrived, and that Greene's men lacked supplies. The deserter also related Greene's troop dispositions. Rawdon assembled every available man, including convalescents and musicians, and prepared an attack for 25 April.

SETTING AND DISPOSITION

Hobkirk Hill is a sandy ridge north of Camden. The long axis of the hill runs east-west and the Great Road (now Broad Street) from Camden to Waxhaws crosses over about its midpoint. During 1780 the road had been widened to ninety feet. The hill's western slope was somewhat protected by the Wateree; the eastern by swampy bottom lands surrounding Pine Tree Creek and a mill pond. Along the main road, the steep hill sloped southward about one hundred yards onto a densely covered plain that surrounded Logtown, a few hundred yards north of Camden. South of Logtown, the land had been clear-cut, in part by the British to provide clear fields of fire.

Greene disposed his troops skillfully to conform to the terrain. To the southeast, the probable main avenue of approach, he posted Captain Robert Kirkwood's Delaware company with two strong outposts commanded by Captains Perry Benson and Simon Morgan still further south, but less than three hundred yards from the American camp. Patrols covered the southern and western approaches. The main body was camped across Hobkirk Hill in line of battle along the crest with the Great Road

dividing the Virginia and Maryland brigades. It was not a straight line because over one hundred yards separated the First and Second Maryland Regiments. The Second Maryland also extended southeastward, following an extension from the main ridge. Lieutenant Colonel William Washington's dragoons and North Carolina militia were in reserve. Perhaps a third of Washington's men were dismounted due to the shortage of cavalry horses. Greene's men received welcome provisions brought forward by Colonel Edward Carrington, who had marched all night and arrived shortly after sunrise. The artillery returned with Carrington but was not initially posted in the line. Colonel Charles Harrison's forty artillerymen, with their three six-pounders, shortly took up concealed positions, two on the road and one between the First and Second Maryland Regiments.

THE BATTLE

With about eight hundred combatants assembled from his nine-hundred-man garrison, Rawdon moved out of Camden about 9 A.M. on 25 April. The British moved along a terrace west of Pine Tree Creek, planning to exit the lower ground where a little stream, fed by springs behind the Maryland Brigade, flowed into the creek. Instead, they turned west too soon and emerged almost in front of Benson's picket post on the relatively gradual southeastern slopes of Hobkirk Hill.

The Americans were somewhat surprised by the attack because no one reported the British departure from Camden. Since the enemy approached from the expected direction, Benson, Morgan, and then Kirkwood were well placed to slow the attack. The fiercest fighting seems to have occurred in this delaying action as the outposts gave the regiments time to form. The men had already finished cooking and eating the rations brought up by Carrington, and some were washing at the springs.




Table 2. DIAGRAM COURTESY OF THE AUTHOR.

Greene was taking breakfast with officers in the same area when the first shots were fired.

When Rawdon made contact, at about 11 A.M., he deployed in the following manner as shown in table 2. Rawdon also placed Tory marksmen on the left flank. They had instructions to shoot at the American officers.

The British came up the slope and moved west, advancing across the front of the Maryland Brigade toward the main road, where they displayed their column. The three regiments presented a relatively narrow front centered on the road, leading Greene to attack Rawdon rather than wait for the British to reach the main battle line. With Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Ford's Second Maryland left flank already extended well to the front, Greene might be seen as trying a double envelopment, because Lieutenant Colonel Richard Campbell's First Virginia already outflanked the British left. Greene ordered his two flanking regiments to swing forward and enfilade the British line while the two center regiments attacked frontally. He also ordered Washington to make a wide sweep beyond the British left and hit the enemy rear.

The Americans started auspiciously. The outlying pickets had slowed the British advance and forced them to deploy in front of the American center. Once the British advanced, they were surprised and momentarily checked when two American guns were unmasked and opened fire with grape shot at short range, catching the British exposed on the road. As soon as Greene's infantry started forward, however, Rawdon extended his battle line so the British overlapped the American right. Things continued to go well for a few minutes. General Benjamin Huger's Virginia Brigade was still gaining ground against the British left.

For reasons that are still not clear, the veteran First Maryland faltered. Gunby compounded the problem by ordering a short, sixty-yard withdrawal to the foot of the hill to reorganize, but the enemy quickly exploited this error by advancing rapidly. Gunby claimed, and Greene supported him, that he halted the regiment to let the right

wing catch up. The Second Maryland went through a crisis and then withdrew after Ford was mortally wounded. Campbell's First Virginia, exposed to fire from front and flank, also began withdrawing. Hawes's Second Virginia, the only Continental regiment remaining in position, probably saved Greene's army. It checked the enemy pursuit and withdrew only on orders from Greene to avoid encirclement. As the other three regiments began to rally in the rear, Greene ordered a general retreat, just as he had at Guilford Courthouse.

RETREAT

There was a gallant fight to save the three guns. One was run down into a brush-covered hollow and recovered later that day. When the matrosses started abandoning the other two guns, Greene sent Captain John Smith with a company of forty-five young Irishmen of the Maryland line to their rescue. The regulars dropped their tow ropes twice to repulse attacks by Captain John Coffin's sixty New York Provincial dragoons. After enemy infantry fire shot down Smith and all but fourteen of his men, Coffin came back to kill or capture the survivors. Greene returned with some matrosses and personally assisted in towing the guns.

The American dragoons, meanwhile, having been forced to take a very wide route to the west due to the brush, rode into the enemy rear once they reached the clear space around Logtown. Falling upon some two hundred noncombatant support troops and men who had fled from the first artillery fire, Washington stopped to take prisoners instead of moving on to attack the British rear. There is a tale that Rawdon was surrounded and almost captured by the dragoons but saved by a relief force. While it is possible that Rawdon was attempting to rally men broken by the American artillery fire, it is far more likely that he was toward the front, directing his infantry.

When Washington learned of the retreat, he hastily paroled those enemy officers he could not evacuate and rode back encumbered with fifty prisoners. He arrived just in time to save the guns by hitching them to his horses. Some idea of how fast the battle developed can be seen here because all accounts indicate that Washington was still dealing with the prisoners when he learned of the American withdrawal and moved to save the artillery.

Greene retreated two or three miles in good order while an effective rear guard checked pursuit. About 4 P.M., he sent Washington and Kirkwood back to collect wounded, retrieve the last cannon, and round up stragglers. By then, the British, except Coffin's dragoons, had retired to Camden. When Coffin saw the American cavalry advancing, he charged them. Washington set up an ambush that drove the enemy horse off the field in disorder. The Americans camped near the old Camden

battlefield at Saunders Creek and moved back to Rugeley's Mill the next day.

The withdrawals were not panic-stricken rushes to the rear because the men were quickly rallied and fought back. Most accounts agree that it started in Gunby's First Maryland and spread to the Second Maryland and First Virginia. They also agree that Gunby made a mistake in attempting to withdraw and re-form. It is also evident that the loss of American officers figured prominently in the panic. There are conflicting versions of what caused the veteran First Maryland to break.

Greene had ordered the two center regiments to advance without firing. Captain George Armstrong moved out ahead of the First Maryland with two sections (four companies). As the advance got underway, Captain William Beatty Jr., with an additional two-company section moving up the road, was shot, probably at long range by South Carolina royalist riflemen. His company faltered and fell back when he was killed, taking the adjacent company with it. At this point Gunby ordered the regiment's leading elements back to reorganize instead of using Armstrong as a base on which to bring forward the two companies. Even though the regiment rallied, re-formed, and commenced firing on the British, a retrograde movement had begun.

ASSESSMENT

A court of inquiry, called at Gunby's request, found that his "improper and unmilitary" order for the First Maryland Regiment to retire was "in all probability, the only cause why we did not obtain a complete victory." Although the court found no criticism with his personal "spirit and activity," Gunby became the official scapegoat for the loss. This is somewhat unfair as there were many things going on at the time and the main units never came to a close-range engagement.

Greene took about 1,550—including 1,174 Continentals—onto the battlefield. Rawdon's force, reduced by sickness and outlying garrisons, was 800. Losses were about equal on both sides, as Greene reported 266 casualties, of whom 18 were killed, while Rawdon reported a total of 258 lost, 38 of them killed. Greene successfully evacuated his artillery and supply train.

Maryland's Colonel Otho Holland Williams reported there was little heavy fighting, pointing out that few men were wounded with bayonets or buckshot except the advance parties. The heavy fighting seems to have passed rather quickly and was replaced with skirmishing as the Americans attempted to save their artillery and the British conducted a lukewarm pursuit.

Not having destroyed the American army, Rawdon gained nothing from his tactical victory. Faced with growing American numbers, plagued by sickness and an

inability to obtain adequate supplies, he abandoned Camden after destroying much of the town. Greene, with reinforcements coming in, including newly raised North Carolina Continentals, occupied Camden. He then sidestepped the British and headed for Ninety Six. The collapse of the entire outer British defense line was underway once Camden fell to Greene.

SEE ALSO *Cowpens, South Carolina; Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Rawdon-Hastings, Francis; Watson, John Watson Tadwell.*

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Lawrence E. Babits

HOGUN, JAMES. (?–1781). Continental general. Ireland and North Carolina. In about 1751, James Hogun came from Ireland and settled in Halifax County, North Carolina. In 1774 he was in the Halifax Committee of Safety, and he represented his county in the provincial congresses of 1775 and 1776. On 22 April 1776 the Provincial Congress elected him the first major of the Halifax militia, and on 26 November he became colonel of the Seventh North Carolina Continentals. Joining General George Washington's army in July 1777, he fought at Brandywine and Germantown (11 September and 4 October 1777). When Congress called for new Continental regiments, he was ordered home to help raise and organize the four from North Carolina. In August 1778 he reached White Plains, New York, with the first of these regiments. During the last two months of the year, he was involved with fortification work at West Point. Congress appointed Hogun brigadier general on 9 January 1779. After briefly commanding the North Carolina Brigade of Washington's army, on 19 March, Hogun succeeded Benedict Arnold as commander in Philadelphia and retained that position until 22 November 1779. He then led his brigade to the defense of Charleston, arriving 3 March with 700 men after an

arduous march of nearly three months through snow and extreme cold. Taken prisoner when General Benjamin Lincoln surrendered the city on 12 May 1780, Hogue later refused parole in order to stay with his men, who were suffering the hardships of the prison at Haddrel's Point on Sullivan's Island. He died there on 4 January 1781.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Siege of 1780; Haddrel's Point.*

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HOLKER, JEAN. (1745–1822). French merchant, French consular agent. He was born in England and moved to France at an early age. Holker accompanied Gérard to America in 1778 with instructions to gather information on the English and American armies and on American attitudes toward their leaders. He also served as an agent for Le Ray de Chaumont. He presented himself to Congress on 16 June 1778 as “Royal Agent of France,” but since he offered no credentials, Congress deferred; however, on 9 July it did order the Committee of Commerce to contract with him for provisions of blankets and shoes. On 23 July, Gérard announced to Congress his appointment as inspector general of French trade and manufactures, agent to the French navy in all American ports, and French consul for Philadelphia. Holker's appointment was more narrowly defined on 25 June 1780 as consul general for Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and New York. Holker grew wealthy but resigned early in 1781, when the French government prohibited further commercial enterprise by its representatives. After the war he returned to France, having been detained to untangle accounts with Robert Morris, his wartime partner.

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HOLTZENDORFF, LOUIS-CASIMIR, BARON DE.

(1728–?). Continental officer. Prussia–France. He served on the Prussian general staff but was living in Paris by 1775. Silas Deane commissioned Holtzendorff on recommendation by persons “of the first order.” On 17 July 1777 Holtzendorff was commissioned lieutenant colonel in the Continental army in accord with Deane's commission, effective 20 November 1776. He served at Brandywine and Germantown. Washington criticized him indirectly by complaining about foreign officers who lacked good English and an understanding of the “genius of our service and men.” When he sought Washington's “protection” for a projected book on Prussian military tactics, Washington agreed if it appeared in English. Believing himself unappreciated, Holtzendorff petitioned Congress on 31 December 1777 to return to France on the conditions that expenses be paid and he receive a colonel's commission with pay and privileges. On 30 January 1778 Congress granted him permission to resign and on 21 February agreed to pay his recent debts and travel expenses. Back in France, he was made captain of the Anhalt Regiment on 29 April 1779. Through 1779 he continued futilely to petition Franklin and Vergennes for past expenses. He entered the Dutch service in 1785.

SEE ALSO *Deane, Silas.*

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HONDURAS. In September 1779 the Spanish governor of Honduras took the British settlement at St. George's Key, a small island in the harbor of Belize. Shortly before, the British command in Jamaica had sent three ships and a contingent of troops under the command of Major John Dalrymple to reinforce Belize. On 16 October the British recaptured St. George's Key and went on to storm the Spanish fort at Omoa. Though they outnumbered the British nearly two to one and were behind eighteen-foot walls, the Spanish surrendered almost immediately after just two men were wounded; the British suffered no serious casualties. In addition to 365 prisoners, Dalrymple captured gold, ships, and cargoes valued at £600,000.

Dalrymple left a garrison at Omoa and captured the Bay Island of Roatán. Governor Dalling of Jamaica meanwhile had conceived his unfortunate plan for operations in Nicaragua and ordered Dalrymple to destroy and evacuate Omoa. These instructions were not received in time, and on 28 December 1779, the Omoa garrison, devastated by disease, abandoned the post at the approach of a Spanish force.

On 26 August 1782, the new governor general of Jamaica, Major General Archibald Campbell, learned that the Spaniards planned an expedition against Cape Gracias á Dios, the northernmost tip of Nicaragua. He sent Colonel Edward Despard with Major William Odell and 80 of the Loyal American Rangers to launch a "spoiling attack" against the Black River settlement in Honduras about 130 miles northwest of the cape. Covered by the fleet of Commodore Francis Parry—the 50-gun ship *Preston* and five or six frigates—the Loyal American Rangers landed in October 1782 and were immediately joined by 500 runaway slaves and 600 Mosquito Indians, all eager to get even with the Spaniards. The Spanish governor immediately surrendered the garrison, which comprised some 740 men of the Guatemala Regiment. The surrendered blockhouse yielded a large sum of money in addition to quantities of artillery, small arms, and ammunition.

SEE ALSO *Dalrymple, John; Despard, Edward Marcus; Nicaragua; West Indies in the Revolution.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HONORS OF WAR. A military force is said to be accorded "the honors of war" when the terms of its capitulation include the right to march away with colors flying, bands playing, bayonets fixed, and in possession of weapons and equipment. Conditions may vary somewhat in accordance with the agreement worked out between

the opposing commanders. Originally, the honors of war probably were reserved for defenders who had distinguished themselves by a particularly heroic resistance. In practice, however, it is good strategy to gain time and save casualties by convincing the defenders of a strong position to surrender their fortress or terrain in return for being allowed to go free and with honor. Troops accorded the honors of war normally are required to proceed to a specified place before they are free to resume hostilities.

SEE ALSO *Fort Granby, South Carolina.*

Mark M. Boatner

HOOD, SAMUEL. (1724–1816). British admiral. Born in Budleigh, Somerset, on 12 December 1724, the eldest son of a country parson, Hood entered the navy in 1741 and for a time was a follower of Captain George Brydges Rodney. He saw action in the North Sea and the Channel and was in American waters between 1753 and 1756. A captain from 1756, he again served under Rodney when they broke up a French invasion flotilla at Le Havre in 1759. In 1767–1770, as commodore commanding the North American station, he encountered American discontents and warned the government to choose conciliation over provocation. In September 1780 he accepted promotion to rear admiral as the irascible Admiral Rodney's second in command in the West Indies.

After the capture of St. Eustatius in January 1781, Hood was detached to intercept Admiral de Grasse off Martinique, but in the action of 29 April he failed to close with his opponent. Hood blamed Rodney's interference with his initial dispositions, whereas Rodney was quick to criticize Hood's attention to duty. During the Yorktown campaign, Hood claimed later, Admiral Thomas Graves was too slow in starting for the Chesapeake and should have abandoned the strict line of battle to attack French ships as they came out of the bay. But in the ensuing action it was Hood who kept the line so rigidly that his rear division was never engaged. Hood then urged his superior to race back to reach Cornwallis at Yorktown, but Graves, who rightly feared being bottled up there by de Grasse, declined.

In short, Hood, as a subordinate admiral, while possessed of some strategic instinct, was excessively cautious in battle and insolent to the point of insubordination. By contrast, returning to the West Indies as his own master, he displayed unusual talent and determination. Although he failed to save St. Kitts in February 1782, his maneuvers against de Grasse's superior numbers were daring and masterly. When Rodney returned to assume command, Hood became his old self, bombarding him

Hood's Point

with gratuitous advice and later unreasonably criticizing his failure to pursue de Grasse after the victory of The Saints (or Saints Passage) on 12 April 1782. His relationship with Robert Pigot, Rodney's more amiable successor, was little better.

In September 1782 Hood was given an Irish barony and returned home in June 1783. In 1784 he entered Parliament, and from 1788 to 1794 he was a lord of Admiralty. In 1793-1794, as commander in chief in the Mediterranean, he briefly occupied Toulon and conquered Corsica. Dismissed for insubordination in 1795, he became governor of Greenwich Hospital, and Viscount Hood in 1796. He died after a fall at Bath on 27 January 1816.

SEE ALSO *Grasse, François Joseph Paul, Comte de; Graves, Thomas; Pigot, Robert; Rodney, George Bridges; St. Eustatius.*

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John Oliphant

HOOD'S POINT. James River, 3 January 1781. An American battery fired at Arnold's expedition when it anchored near Jamestown late in the evening. Simcoe landed with 130 of the Queen's Rangers reinforced by the flank companies of the Eightieth Regiment, moved about a mile to the fort, and found the garrison had abandoned it.

SEE ALSO *Virginia, Military Operations in.*

Mark M. Boatner

HOOPER, WILLIAM. (1742-1790). Signer. North Carolina. Born in Boston, Massachusetts, on 17 June 1742, William Hooper graduated from Harvard in 1760 and then studied law under James Otis. He moved to Wilmington, North Carolina, in 1764, where he was active in the law and politics. In 1770, as deputy attorney general, he took the royal government's part against the

Regulators, and in 1771 he marched with Governor William Tryon against them. By 1773 he was opposing the Crown's arbitrary measures in the general assembly. A member of the Committee of Correspondence, Hooper presided at the meeting that called the provincial congress, to which he was duly elected. Sent to the Continental Congress (1774-1777), he signed the Declaration of Independence. Active on committees, including the Board of War, Marine Committee, and Secret Committee, he played an important role in helping to arm the Continental army. After getting yellow fever in Philadelphia, Hooper returned to North Carolina and resigned from Congress on 29 April 1777, though he returned to the assembly from 1777 to 1781. The British invasion forced him to flee Wilmington in 1782, and much of his property was then destroyed. Back in the assembly from 1784 to 1786, Hooper was a leader of the conservative faction opposed to debtor relief and in favor of restoring Loyalist property. He died in Hillsborough, North Carolina, on 14 October 1790.

SEE ALSO *Regulators.*

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HOPKINS, ESEK. (1718-1802). First commander in chief of the Continental navy. Rhode Island. Born in Scituate, Rhode Island, on 26 April 1718, Esek Hopkins was a successful sea captain, served as a privateer in the Seven Years' War, and retired to his farm in 1772. Having taken a keen interest in local politics, and being the brother of the most prominent figure in Rhode Island, Stephen Hopkins, Esek became state brigadier general on 4 October 1775 and was put in command of the militia. Stephen, meanwhile, was a delegate to Congress and an influential member of the Marine Committee. When the Continental navy was organized, Esek Hopkins was named commander in chief (confirmed on 22 December 1775), and his son, John Burroughs Hopkins, was appointed captain.

At the beginning of 1776, Congress ordered Hopkins to take his small fleet of eight ships and clear the coast from the Chesapeake Bay to a point south of the British ships. Reasoning that the British were too strong for him to best, Hopkins sailed to Nassau in the Bahamas. After a quick victory that included the taking of a great many cannon and other munitions, Hooper sailed for Rhode Island. On the return voyage, the U.S. fleet encountered a lone British

frigate, the *Glasgow*, which out-sailed, out-fought, and out-foxed the superior American force before getting away. Humiliated, Hopkins was called to Philadelphia and was censured by Congress on 16 August 1776.

Hopkins intended to head back to sea, but his fleet collapsed around him. Congress suspended him from command on 26 March 1777, formally dismissing him on 2 January 1778. He served in the Rhode Island assembly from 1777 to 1786, but never again went to sea. He died on 26 February 1802.

SEE ALSO *Hopkins, Stephen; Naval Operations, Strategic Overview.*

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HOPKINS, JOHN BURROUGHS.

(1742–1796). Continental naval officer. Rhode Island. Born 14 August 1742 in Newport, Rhode Island, Hopkins was the eldest of Esek Hopkins's ten children, and nephew of Stephen Hopkins. He followed family tradition by going to sea early and being politically involved. He led the boats that attacked the British vessel, the *Gaspée*, on 9 June 1772. On 22 December 1775 he became the junior of the first four captains appointed in the new Continental navy and took command of the *Cabot* (14 guns). He took part in the expedition to Nassau led by his father, Esek, and in the embarrassing encounter with the *Glasgow*, which occurred on 6 April 1776. His ship, being in the lead, bore the brunt of the action. Named commander of the frigate *Warren* in 1777, he slipped through the British blockade of Narragansett Bay early in March 1778, took two prizes, and put into Boston Harbor. In 1779, with the *Warren*, *Queen of France*, and *Ranger*, he led a six-week cruise off the Virginia capes that captured the *Jason* (twenty guns) and seven other British ships. Although initially pleased at this triumph, The Marine Committee of Congress learned that Hopkins had failed to follow instructions and ordered an investigation. Hopkins was suspended, and never returned to service in the U.S. navy.

Instead, Hopkins took command of the Massachusetts privateer *Tracy* (sixteen guns) in 1780. He took several prizes before being captured and paroled. The next year he was captain of a Rhode Island privateer sloop, the *Success*. Retiring to private life after the war, he died on 4 March 1796.

SEE ALSO *Hopkins, Esek; Hopkins, Stephen; Naval Operations, Strategic Overview.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HOPKINS, STEPHEN.

(1707–1785). Signer. Rhode Island. Born in Scituate, Rhode Island, on 7 March 1707, Stephen Hopkins sat in the general assembly all but four of the years from 1732 to 1752, and held several other public offices before moving to Providence in 1742 to join his brother Esek in business. He served on the superior court from 1747 to 1749, and became chief justice in 1751. In 1755 he became governor, and held this office until 1768 with the exception of three years when he was defeated by Samuel Ward of Newport, his bitter rival. An early champion of colonial rights and union, Stephen attended the Albany Congress of 1754. In 1764 he wrote *Rights of the Colonies Examined*, in which he argued against the Stamp and Sugar Acts and foreshadowed John Dickinson's theory of colonial home rule. As chief justice of the superior court, he frustrated Crown authorities in the *Gaspée* affair of 1772. He was a delegate to the first and Second Continental Congresses, signed the Declaration of Independence, and was a member of the committee to organize the navy. In this capacity he would appear to have done his country a disservice in supporting the selection of his brother Esek as naval commander in chief. Presumably he was not an innocent bystander when Esek's son, John B. Hopkins, was appointed one of the four captains in the new navy. After serving on the committee for preparing the Articles of Confederation, Stephen Hopkins returned home because of ill health in September 1776. He served in the assembly from 1777 through 1779, and then retired from politics. He died in Providence on 13 July 1785.

SEE ALSO *Gaspée Affair; Hopkins, Esek; Hopkins, John Burroughs.*

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HOPKINSON, FRANCIS.

(1737–1791). Signer, writer, artist. Pennsylvania. His father, an English lawyer, immigrated to Philadelphia in 1731 and became a

member of the governor's council as well as of numerous civic and social organizations. Francis was the first graduate (1757) of the College of Philadelphia (later the University of Pennsylvania). He studied law under Benjamin Chew and was admitted to the bar in 1761, but for the next twelve years he tried a variety of careers. In 1763 he was named customs collector in Salem, New Jersey. In 1766–1767 he made an unsuccessful trip to England for political preferment. After becoming a shopkeeper, he was named customs collector at New Castle, Delaware (about forty miles below Philadelphia). Returning to the law, he set up practice at Bordentown, New Jersey, and was an immediate success. In 1774 he was named to the governor's council, but in that year he published an allegorical political satire, *A Pretty Story*, in which he expressed his ardent Whig convictions. Another similar type of story, called *A Prophecy*, anticipated the Declaration of Independence. Elected to Congress from New Jersey in June 1776, he was one of the Signers. A few months after adoption of the Flag Resolution of 14 June 1777, he was appointed one of three commissioners of the Continental Navy Board. As chairman and secretary he served capably for almost two years before Congress elected him treasurer of loans. A year later, while still holding the latter post, he became judge of the Pennsylvania Admiralty Court. Ten years later in 1789, the court was dissolved and Hopkinson became judge of the U.S. district court of eastern Pennsylvania for the last two years of his short but memorable life.

Hopkinson designed, or had a part in designing, seals of the American Philosophical Society, the State of New Jersey, and what became the University of Pennsylvania. On 25 May 1780 he wrote the Board of Admiralty that he was pleased they liked his design for their seal; he also requested recognition for this work and a number of other "devices." At the top of the list he claimed to have created the Stars and Stripes, later valuing this work at £9 cash or £540 paper money. Congress decided on 23 August 1781 that too many others had worked on design of the flag for Hopkinson to deserve credit for being its originator. Meanwhile, a serious quarrel had resulted in his resignation as treasurer of loans.

Among his wartime writings were *A Letter to Lord Howe*, *A Letter Written by a Foreigner*, and *An Answer to General Burgoyne* (all in 1777). *A Letter to Joseph Galloway* and his famous *Battle of the Kegs* appeared in 1778. In 1781 he wrote words and music of a cantata, *The Temple of Minerva*, celebrating the French alliance. In his later years he invented a ship's log and a shaded candlestick, among other things. He continued to write, producing political essays, general social criticism, satire, and verse. Among his musical compositions was a collection, *Seven Songs for the Harpsichord or Forte Piano* (1788). His son Joseph

followed in his footsteps as a politician, jurist, and composer; Joseph wrote *Hail Columbia*.

SEE ALSO *Battle of the Kegs*; *Burgoyne's Proclamation at Bouquet River*.

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revised by Harry M. Ward

HORRY, DANIEL HUGER. (1737–1785). American officer. South Carolina. A cousin of Peter and Hugh (see below), Horry (pronounced "O'Ree") was a captain of militia at the beginning of the Revolution. After taking part in the defense of Charleston as captain of the Second South Carolina in 1776 and as a colonel in 1780, Horry swore allegiance to the crown after the surrender of Charleston (12 May 1780). With the help of his brother-in-law, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Horry was able to save his estate, Hampton Plantation House, from confiscation.

SEE ALSO *Huger, Benjamin*; *Huger, Daniel*; *Huger, Francis*; *Huger, Isaac*; *Huger, John*; *Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HORRY, HUGH. (1744–1795). American officer. South Carolina. Like his brother Peter Horry, Hugh Horry was a captain of South Carolina militia at the start of the Revolution, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel by 1780. He commanded the mounted troops of Marion's Brigade, becoming a colonel in 1781 and acting commander of the foot element. At Eutaw Springs, 8 September 1781, he was wounded in action.

SEE ALSO *Eutaw Springs, South Carolina*; *Great Savannah*; *Horry, Peter*; *Marion's Brigade*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HORRY, PETER. (1747–1815). American officer, South Carolina. A captain in the Second South Carolina Regiment on 17 June 1775, he was promoted to major on 16 September 1776. Promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Fifth South Carolina militia regiment in 1779, he lost his command when the state consolidated its militia in 1780. After Horatio Gates's defeat at Camden, Horry joined Marion's Brigade, becoming colonel of a regiment of light dragoons. In 1783 he was made brigadier general of the Sixth Brigade of the South Carolina militia, a position he held until 1806. He is remembered mainly for his unhappy collaboration with Parson Weems on the biography of Francis Marion, in which Weems altered much of the material Horry supplied to produce a work of myth rather than history.

SEE ALSO *Georgetown, South Carolina (15 November 1780)*; *Horry, Hugh*; *Marion's Brigade*; *Weems, Mason Locke Parson*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HORSENECK LANDING (WEST GREENWICH), CONNECTICUT.

25–27 February 1779. Major General William Tryon, with a task force of five regiments reinforced by light troops left the vicinity of Kings Bridge, New York, on the 25th to destroy American facilities at Horseneck Landing. The next morning he entered it, brushed aside a Connecticut militia force (of probably less than 150 men) led by Major General Israel Putnam, and then moved on to Greenwich. With the loss of only two or three killed, fourteen wounded, and from twenty to forty captured, Tryon destroyed a salt works, three small cannon, three small vessels, and a store; plundered the settlement; and carried off about two hundred head of cattle and horses. He then successfully withdrew before a much larger militia force could assemble, getting back to Kings Bridge on the 27th. Local lore emphasizes that Putnam escaped capture by a daring ride down a steep, rocky hill that enemy dragoons were afraid to negotiate.

SEE ALSO *Putnam, Israel*; *Tryon, William*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

HORTALEZ & CIE. Although remembered almost entirely for his literary works, Pierre-Augustin Caron (1732–1799), who assumed the title “de Beaumarchais” in 1756, distinguished himself in his father's trade of watchmaking, became accepted at court, and showed himself to have a remarkable business talent. He also had a talent for intrigue. French foreign minister Vergennes sent him to London in April 1775 to retrieve some controversial letters in the possession of former French diplomat Charles d'Eon de Beaumont, who was famous for assuming the persona of a woman. In 1763 Louis XV had ordered d'Eon to survey England for locations of a possible French invasion, but he continued to hold Louis's letters on the matter in hopes of obtaining an increased pension from the king. While performing this assignment, Beaumarchais also took the opportunity to compose for the French government a series of reports on conditions in England and of the unrest in its American colonies.

Back in France, Beaumarchais met with Vergennes on 20 September 1775 and prepared a memorandum to be presented by the French naval minister and former head of the Paris police, Sartine, to Louis XVI, which concluded both that civil war was imminent in England and that “the colonies are lost for the metropole” (Beaumarchais, 2, p. 140). Vergennes pressed Louis for a prompt answer, which he apparently received only orally. On 15 November, Beaumarchais addressed another memorandum to the king, this time supporting a plan for France to seize the British Antilles by surprise, which he believed would have profound impact on the English economy. If the king would provide one million livres to him under the name of “Roderique Hortalez and Company,” he could make it nine million.

AN AID CONTRACT

While in London during the autumn of 1775, Beaumarchais met Arthur Lee, agent there for the Continental Congress Committee of Secret Correspondence. They discussed what Americans would need to succeed—French aid. These discussions led Beaumarchais to write the king again in February 1776 that if French aid were not forthcoming, the American cause might fail, which would threaten the French West Indies. On 2 May, Vergennes wrote Beaumarchais that his proposals were making headway slowly. Before leaving London, he met with Lee one final time, and in that discussion it appears the two failed to agree that French aid would be not an outright gift, but rather an exchange for tobacco and other merchandise. Misunderstanding ensued almost immediately. In his first letter, Lee saw Beaumarchais as a mere façade for French secret aid: “The want of tobacco ought not to hinder your sending out your supplies to the Americans, . . . the essential object is to maintain the war.”

On 10 June 1776 Beaumarchais received one million livres from Duvergier, cashier for the French foreign ministry. Establishing his home and business in a large building once used as the Dutch embassy and now known as the Hôtel des Ambassadeurs de Hollande, he wrote to Congress's agent in Paris, Silas Deane, on 18 July and met him the next day to read his commission and to offer him credit for three million livres, one million already received, another promised by the Spanish, and a third from his friends; he expected tobacco in exchange. Deane's acceptance led Beaumarchais to assume that he had a contract with Congress and that American ships bringing goods would carry munitions back to Americans.

Shortly before the French government approached Beaumarchais in May 1776, it had selected Dr. Barbeu Dubourg, a botanist who knew Franklin, to serve as its intermediary on the matter of secret aid. When the French government decided upon the Hortalez venture conducted through Silas Deane, both Dubourg and Lee were upset and undertook to hamper Beaumarchais. Furthermore, the British ambassador to France, Stormont, learned of Beaumarchais's project and forced the French to issue orders against the shipping of war supplies from French ports. Although Beaumarchais's operations were supposed to be overlooked, a few minor French officials complicated matters by observing the letter of the law and forbidding the shipments. But why were these munitions so available from the French arsenals?

BEAUMARCHAIS'S OPERATIONS

During the years prior to 1776, French weaponry had undergone significant redesign through the efforts of Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval. As an expert on artillery, Gribeauval introduced uniform production and higher standards to the manufacture of cannon and muskets. Consequently, armories overflowed with the outdated munitions. Purchaser of many of these weapons was Carrier de Montieu, who became a source of arms for Beaumarchais's venture.

By 1777 Beaumarchais had more than twelve vessels operating out of Le Havre, Nantes, Bordeaux, and Marseilles. Eventually, he had about forty. From Martinique or Saint Domingue they would sail north. Portsmouth, New Hampshire was port of entry for most of them; they usually stopped at Charleston on the return trip in hopes of picking up rice or tobacco, but usually they returned empty. The first Hortalez convoy reached Portsmouth in early 1777 with three million livres' worth of goods: two hundred field guns, thousands of muskets, a large supply of powder, blankets, clothes, and shoes—enough for twenty-five thousand men. As Beaumarchais's bills came due on 31 May 1777, Vergennes provided him with 400,000 livres. To his

benefactor Beaumarchais wrote, "I can breathe again until the fifteenth." Within a month's time, the venture would cost the French government additional payments, totaling over a million livres.

PAYMENT FROM CONGRESS

As of September, Beaumarchais had yet to receive a cargo from the Continental Congress in compliance with his contract. So he decided to send Theveneau de Francy to America as his agent to Congress and to oversee future business. However, Congress had yet to be informed by the Committee of Secret Correspondence of Deane's contract with Beaumarchais for fear that Tory delegates in Congress would tell the British. Meanwhile, Arthur Lee had been busy spreading the word that the Hortalez firm was a blind for dishonorable business. Two months before Francy's arrival in America, Lee wrote the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 6 October 1777, "The Minister [Vergennes] has repeatedly assured us [Franklin, Deane, and Lee], and that in the most explicit terms, that no return is expected for these subsidies." After the Committee of Commerce examined the evidence brought by Francy, however, Congress authorized the commissioners to settle accounts on 16 April 1778, in which they assured payment for past shipments. Rival factions in Congress then started a long haggle over whether France should be paid for military aid. It was convenient for those in opposition to argue that Beaumarchais and France were acting in self-interest; they capitalized on the fact that France, officially neutral, could not publicly admit the arrangements under which Beaumarchais operated.

Deane reached America in July 1778 after his recall from Paris and fell into an acrimonious controversy with the congressional faction that opposed payment of Beaumarchais. The Virginia Lees and Massachusetts Adamses led this opposition. Deane's supporters finally succeeded in getting Vergennes to write to French minister Gérard on 16 September 1778 that Hortalez & Cie was a private, commercial firm and that some of its stocks had come from French arsenals with the understanding that these stocks would be replaced by the firm. However, before this critical information reached Philadelphia, Deane blew the entire affair into a public scandal by publishing in the 5 December 1778 issue of the *Pennsylvania Packet* a letter that denounced Arthur Lee's machinations and accused Congress of neglect and appalling ignorance of foreign affairs. Congress split into pro- and anti-Deanites. Henry Laurens, a member of the latter element, was forced to resign as president of Congress to be succeeded by John Jay, a friend of Deane. Thomas Paine, then secretary of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, entered the lists as a supporter of Arthur Lee and on 2 January 1779 claimed publicly that he had written

evidence that France had promised the supplies as a gift before Deane ever reached Paris. The French minister issued an official denial, followed up with a formal protest against Paine's indiscretion in revealing "classified" information; on 9 January, Paine resigned under pressure. On 15 January, Beaumarchais was given a written apology from Congress and a pledge of payment.

Yet Franklin did not appear to be satisfied. With the 2,832,000 livres of congressional letters of credit to Beaumarchais coming due in 1782, he wrote a sixteen-page letter to Vergennes's assistant Durival on 12 June 1781 inquiring whether it was in fact a gift. The reply? "The minister knows nothing about them."

On 6 April 1781 Deane submitted an official document showing that, based on his own records, Congress owed Beaumarchais 3.6 million livres. But Beaumarchais's case was hurt by the scandal that wrecked Deane, and settlement was postponed. When Beaumarchais renewed his claims, Congress appointed Arthur Lee and Samuel Osgood in 1787 to examine the Hortalez accounts. They concluded that Beaumarchais owed Congress 742,413 livres. It was not until 1837 that his heirs finally received 800,000 francs.

What was America's reaction to Beaumarchais's efforts in support of the American cause? In October 1778 Beaumarchais's American agent, Francy, wrote him that several members of Congress were about to propose a motion to erect a statue in his honor. Beaumarchais's biographers, Brian Morton and Donald Spinelli, have simply concluded that the statue or any other monument to Beaumarchais was not to be.

SEE ALSO *Beaumarchais and the American Revolution; Deane, Silas; Gérard, Conrad Alexandre; French Covert Aid; Gribeauval, Jean Baptiste Vaquette de; Lee, Arthur; Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Comte de.*

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Robert Rhodes Crout

HOTHAM, WILLIAM. (1736–1813).

British naval officer. Son of the seventh baronet Hotham, William Hotham was born on 8 April 1736 and educated at Westminster School and the Royal Naval College at Portsmouth (1748–1751). After service in the West Indies and North America, he passed for lieutenant on 7 August 1754. A post captain from 1757, he served with some distinction throughout the Seven Years' War. In 1776, flying a commodore's broad pennant in the *Preston*, (50 guns), he escorted a large troop convoy to America and joined the North American squadron under Lord Howe, supporting the landing at Kips Bay on 15 September. During the Philadelphia expedition, he remained at New York as senior naval officer and supported Clinton's offensive into the Hudson Highlands in October 1777, though he had reservations about capturing forts that were not to be held. In July 1778 he took part in the preparations to defend Sandy Hook against Estaing's expected attack. Off Newport on 12 August, he engaged the storm-crippled *Tonnant* (seventy-four guns) until other French ships came to her aid. He was then sent with a reinforcement for Barrington in the West Indies, where on 15 December he played a distinguished part in the battle off St. Lucia. In the summer of 1779 Hotham was at Barbados, and in 1780 he moved his pennant to the *Vengeance* (seventy-four guns). In it he took part in engagements on 17 April and on 15 and 19 May. He was selected to escort the homeward-bound convoy from St. Eustatius but was unable to save the merchant ships from a powerful French squadron off the Scilly Isles on 2 May 1781.

In 1782 Hotham, with his pennant in the *Edgar*, took part in Howe's relief of Gibraltar. He was promoted to rear admiral in 1787 and vice admiral in 1790. In 1795, while in temporary command in the Mediterranean, he won two

minor engagements off Leghorn before being relieved by Jervis in November. It was the last active service for this outstanding junior commander and indifferent commander in chief. He became Baron Hotham in 1797, succeeded to his nephew's baronetcy in 1811, and died on 2 May 1813.

John Oliphant

HOUDIN DE SAINT-MICHEL, MICHEL-GABRIEL. (1739–1802). Continental officer. France. A lieutenant in the Port-au-Prince Regiment, he resigned in 1776 and became first lieutenant of the Fifteenth Massachusetts Regiment on 1 January 1777. After serving against Burgoyne, at Stillwater, at Valley Forge, in the Monmouth Campaign, and at Newport, he was promoted to captain on 28 June 1779 and transferred to Rufus Putnam's Fifth Massachusetts Regiment on 1 January 1781. On 12 June 1783 he joined Sproat's Second Massachusetts Regiment. He was honorably discharged on 1 January 1784. With a strong recommendation from Washington that he deserved a place in the peacetime army, Congress breveted him a major on 8 February 1784. He appears to have gone to France and later returned to America, dying at Albany. Houdin became store-keeper of the U.S. Army in 1801.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne, John; Monmouth, New Jersey; Valley Forge Winter Quarters, Pennsylvania.*

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HOUK, CHRISTIAN SEE *Huck, Christian.*

HOUSTOUN, JOHN. (1750?–1796). Lawyer, politician. Born in Georgia, he was the son of Sir Patrick Houston, baronet and royal official. John Houston set up a law practice in Savannah in 1771 and was involved in revolutionary activities by 1774. Although elected a delegate to the Continental Congress three times, Houston attended only once, from September to December 1775. In May 1777 he was elected a member of the Georgia executive council, and in January 1778 he was chosen governor. In April 1778 the executive council requested that Houston assume executive power over military matters, and he planned the third expedition against the British in East Florida.

On this three-month expedition, Houston was determined that the military be subordinate to the state government. Although he lacked military experience, he commanded the Georgia militia. Neither he nor Colonel Andrew Williamson, who commanded the South Carolina militia, recognized the senior officer present, General Robert Howe, who commanded the Georgia and South Carolina Continental troops. In July, Howe and Colonel Samuel Elbert abandoned the expedition and returned north with their Continental troops. Houston and Williamson soon followed. Houston asked the Continental Congress to pay for this failed expedition, possibly because of Georgia's depreciating currency.

When the British arrived in Savannah in late December 1778, Houston, Howe, and militia Colonel George Walton failed to create a unified defense, and the town was easily taken by superior forces. Houston ordered the seat of government established in Augusta, and he and other prominent rebels headed into the backcountry to escape capture. British forces came into the backcountry in January 1779, and Houston fled Augusta for South Carolina but returned when the British left the area in mid-February. He attempted to organize an assembly during July, and during September and October Houston served on Lachlan McIntosh's staff during the siege of Savannah, although Houston was not a member of the Continental army. He may also have served on McIntosh's staff at Charleston.

At some point, probably after the capture of the Continental army in Charleston during May 1780, Houston considered returning to British-held Georgia. The reestablished royal government applied to him the Disqualifying Act of July 1780, which limited his participation in government but allowed him to return to his property. He petitioned for protection, claiming he had been induced to join the rebellion without any intention of

seeking separation from the empire and that he now feared for his safety if he returned to Georgia. On 20 December 1780 the attorney general determined that only the king's pardon would provide him with the legal protection he sought. Houstoun's brothers Sir Patrick, William, and James chose to align themselves with royal government during this period.

Whatever John Houstoun's motivation, Georgia rebels did not hold his petition against him. He was elected to the rebel assembly in 1782 and elected governor in 1784. He ran unsuccessfully for governor in 1789 and served as the first mayor of Savannah in 1790 and as a state superior court judge in 1791.

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Leslie Hall

HOWARD, JOHN EAGER. (1752–1827). Continental officer. Maryland. Born in Baltimore County, Maryland, on 4 June 1752, Howard became a captain in the Second Maryland Battalion of the Flying Camp in July 1776 and fought at White Plains. On 22 February 1777 he was commissioned major of the Fourth Maryland and saw action at Germantown. Promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Fifth Maryland on 11 March 1778, he fought in the Monmouth campaign. On 22 October 1779, he was transferred to the Second Maryland and distinguished himself at Camden and Cowpens (17 January 1781). For his part in the latter victory he received the thanks of Congress and one of the eight medals awarded by that body. He figured prominently in the battles of Guilford, Hobkirk's Hill, and Eutaw Springs, being wounded in the last action.

Howard was considered a particularly able leader of one of the army's finest regiments. General Henry Lee praised Howard as "one of the five lieutenant-colonels on whom Greene rested throughout the hazardous operations" in the southern campaign. Lee credited Howard with turning the tide of battle at Cowpens and preventing disaster at Guilford and the Eutaws. According to Lee, he "was always to be found where the battle raged, pressing into close action to wrestle with fixed bayonet" (Lee, p. 592).

After the war Howard was a delegate to the Continental Congress (1787–1788), governor of Maryland (1788–1791), and U.S. senator (1796–1803). He was a leader of the Federalists and a candidate for vice president in their

last, unsuccessful campaign in 1816. He died at his home in Baltimore on 12 October 1827.

SEE ALSO *Cowpens, South Carolina; Medals.*

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HOWE, GEORGE AUGUSTUS. (1724–1758). British general and third Viscount Howe. The eldest surviving brother of Richard and William Howe, he entered the First Foot Guards as an ensign in 1745. On 25 February 1757 took command of the Third Battalion of the unconventional Sixtieth Foot, the Royal Americans. Reaching Halifax in July, he became colonel of the Fifty-fifth Foot on 28 September. Howe's warmth and lack of affectation, combined with his energetic interest in forest fighting, won him the admiration of American soldiers at a time when their relations with regular officers were frequently strained. A local brigadier general from 29 December, he was attached to Sir Robert Abercromby's advance on Ticonderoga. On 6 July 1758 Howe was killed in a woodland skirmish near Lake George, and his healthy influence on Anglo-American relations came to an untimely end.

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HOWE, RICHARD. (1726–1799). First Earl Howe and British admiral. The brother of George and William Howe, Richard went to sea very young, serving from 1735 in a merchant ship, the *Thames*. His naval service began on 16 July 1739 on HMS *Pear*. On 24 May 1744 he passed for lieutenant and was promoted to post-captain on 10 April 1746. He distinguished himself with Boscawen in 1755, at Rochefort (September 1757), and at Quiberon Bay (20 November 1759). On 23 May 1757 he was elected member of Parliament for Dartmouth, a seat he held until his elevation to the British

peerage in 1782. (His Irish title of Viscount Howe, inherited from George in 1758, did not debar him from the Commons). In 1762 he took up his parliamentary seat and turned to politics. He was a lord of admiralty (1763–1765) and later treasurer to the navy. During the 1770 Falkland Islands crisis he was rear admiral commanding the Mediterranean fleet.

Howe's period as naval commander in chief and (with his brother William) joint peace commissioner in America is still controversial. The Howes had long-standing contacts with America and Richard Howe met Benjamin Franklin in London in 1774. Howe himself insisted on having political as well as military powers to end the rebellion and was (rightly) dissatisfied with the very limited commission he and William were actually given. His orders to blockade the entire American coastline to intercept military supplies from France were impossible to execute properly, partly because first lord of the admiralty John Montagu, earl of Sandwich, insisted on keeping the bulk of the navy at home. In addition he had to support his brother's military operations, and, on balance, Lord Howe tended to give priority to the latter. Even so, shortages of shipping and supplies, combined with difficult strategic and navigational constraints, gave these operations the appearance of unwonted slowness. These circumstances have been used to argue that the Howes were both incompetent and bent on peace at almost any cost, and that their slowness effectively lost the war for Britain.

When Richard arrived off Staten Island on 12 July 1776, William's army was too small and ill-equipped to attack New York. The brothers had to wait but were not inactive. Between 12 and 18 July Richard pushed a small force high up the Hudson to Tappan Sea, deep in Washington's rear. On 14 July the Howes, knowing they had too little to offer, began negotiations that soon proved futile. But once William was satisfied that his army was ready for a campaign, Richard landed him on Long Island on 22 August. William's victory on 27 August pinned Washington against the water. However, William was reluctant to make a frontal attack on the American earthworks, and contrary winds prevented Richard from getting ships into the East River in time to intercept Washington's escape on 29–30 August. It was now up to Richard Howe to mass boats, transports, and covering warships in the East River ready for the proposed landing at Kip's Bay, Manhattan. That required very precise conditions of wind, tide, and darkness and another inevitable delay. During the pause the Howes again tried negotiations, which duly broke down on 11 September. Within days Richard Howe was able to run vessels into the East River, and the troops landed at Kip's Bay on 15 September. The pattern suggests that, for the Howes, negotiation was a complement to military action, not a substitute.

In 1777 Lord Howe's main preoccupation was the safe conveyance of William's troops to Philadelphia. Once again the Howes faced intractable delays: the late arrival of sufficient shipping from Britain, the need to watch Washington's movements before choosing a landing place, and the consequent decision to disembark in Chesapeake Bay. Philadelphia was occupied on 26 September, but not until 23 November was Lord Howe able to force the Delaware. Both brothers were dissatisfied by the narrowness of their diplomatic powers and by the level of support they received from home. William had already offered his resignation, and Lord Howe followed suit early in 1778. He stayed to confront D'Estaing until 26 September, when he judged it safe to sail for home.

Howe refused to serve again under Sandwich and attacked the government in Parliament. He was given the Channel Fleet by the Rockingham ministry on 2 April 1782, and on 20 April he was raised to the British peerage as Viscount Howe. In October he successfully relieved Gibraltar. Howe was first lord of the admiralty until 1788, when he became Earl Howe. On 1 June 1794, again commanding the Channel Fleet, he won "the Glorious First of June" by piercing the French line. On 12 March 1796 he briefly became admiral of the fleet and the following year personally negotiated an end to the Spithead mutiny. He died in London on 5 August 1799.

SEE ALSO *Howe, George Augustus*; *Howe, William*; *Sandwich, John Montagu, fourth earl of*; *Tappan Sea*.

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HOWE, ROBERT. (1732–1786). Continental general. North Carolina. Son of a wealthy planter on the Cape Fear River, Howe was captain of Fort Johnston in 1766–1767 and 1769–1773. On Governor Tryon's expedition against the Regulators, he was an artillery colonel. An ardent Whig, he served in the North Carolina assembly in 1772–1773 and was a delegate to the Provincial Congress at New Bern in August 1774. The Loyalist governor, Josiah Martin, denounced him on 8 August 1775 for his radical politics and also for his activity in forming and training rebel militia. On 1 September 1775 he became colonel of the Second North Carolina Regiment, and three months later he marched north to assist the Virginians. Widely acclaimed for his success in this affair, he was appointed a Continental brigadier general on 1 March 1776. Returning to the South to help defend Charleston, Howe found that

his plantation at Brunswick had been ravaged by Cornwallis's troops on 12 May.

Howe took command of the Southern Department and was promoted to major general on 20 October 1777. The presence of this North Carolina man at Charleston was resented by South Carolina and Georgia authorities, and Howe's expedition against the British in Florida was a fiasco. Criticism of Howe was led by Christopher Gadsden, and when the latter refused to deny or retract certain statements, the two met in a duel on 13 August 1778. Howe's shot grazed Gadsden's ear, and Gadsden fired in the air. John André wrote a mocking poem about the affair, and Howe and Gadsden ended up being close friends. Benjamin Lincoln succeeded Robert Howe as department commander in September 1778, but Howe continued to command in Georgia. The British capture of Savannah on 29 December 1778 led to such public outcry against the unfortunate Howe that it was necessary for the Continental authorities to order him north in April 1779, even though a court-martial had acquitted him "with highest honor" of any misconduct at Savannah. Washington selected him as president of the court-martial resulting from Benedict Arnold's troubles as commander of Philadelphia. Howe then went to the Hudson Highlands north of New York City and led the unsuccessful operation against Verplanck's Point that was ordered after Wayne's capture of Stony Point in July.

In February 1780 Howe was made commander of West Point. Succeeded by Arnold in August, Howe showed the man who had by then turned traitor around West Point, innocently pointing out its numerous weaknesses. On 29 September he sat with the board of officers that recommended the hanging of Arnold's British contact, John André. He commanded troops from the Highlands that successfully stopped the mutiny of the New Jersey line of 20–25 January 1781. In 1783 he dispersed the Philadelphia mob that had driven Congress out of town.

Resuming the life of a rice planter in 1783, he was appointed by Congress in May 1785 to work on boundary negotiations with the western Indians. He returned to North Carolina the following year and was elected to the state legislature. He died before he could take his seat.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Moores Creek Bridge; Mutiny of the New Jersey Line; Norfolk, Virginia; Savannah, Georgia (29 December 1778); Southern Theater, Military Operations in; Stony Point, New York.*

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HOWE, WILLIAM. (1729–1814). Fifth Viscount Howe, British general. William, younger brother of George Augustus Howe and Richard Howe, was born on 10 August 1729 and educated at home and at Eton (1742–1746). He entered the army in 1746 as a cornet of the Fifteenth Dragoons, and his unusual application and ability, coupled to powerful connections, enabled him to rise rapidly. Promoted to lieutenant in 1747, he served in Flanders until the end of the War of the Austrian Succession. He became a captain in the Twentieth Foot on 2 January 1750 and formed a close friendship with Major James Wolfe. He was made major in the new Sixtieth (later the Fifty-eighth) Regiment in 1756 and became its lieutenant colonel in 1757. He served with distinction at Louisburg in 1758, Quebec (where he led Wolfe's advance guard onto the Plains of Abraham) in 1759, and the capture of Montreal in 1760. He led a brigade at the capture of Belle Isle in 1761 and was adjutant general of the expedition to Havana in 1762. During the years of peace he continued to rise: colonel of the Forty-sixth Foot in 1764, lieutenant governor of the Isle of Wight in 1768 and major general in 1772. In the late summer of 1774 he was given charge of seven line companies learning light infantry tactics on Salisbury Plain. When war broke out in America in 1775, Howe was a successful soldier distinguished for energy, leadership, and courage.

When George was killed in 1758, William replaced him as member of Parliament for Nottingham. He used his seat to oppose the ministry's policy of coercion in 1774 and it was thought he would not agree to serve in America. His appointment as Gage's second in command and prospective successor was thus something of a surprise, which he explained to his constituents as a matter of duty over personal preference. He also seemed to think that a negotiated settlement was still possible and that he might be the man to reach it. This background has led some historians—most prominently and persistently Ira D. Gruber—to attribute his later military failure to overanxiety to find a political solution. (Gruber rightly has little time for older accusations of laziness, self-indulgent living, and overattachment to his American mistress, Mrs. Joshua Loring). The matter is still open to debate. However the alternative argument put many years ago by Piers Mackesy—that Howe was slowed by intractable military difficulties—appears to be more convincing.

When he reached Boston on 25 May 1775, the time for negotiation was already past: Lexington and Concord had been fought and Boston was under siege. Howe planned and led—with great courage—the British attack on Breed's Hill and Bunker Hill on 17 June. The terribly high price of the British victory demonstrated that costly attacks were to be avoided for two reasons: first, the army's qualitative advantage over the rebels must not be eroded



William Howe. General Howe led British forces at the Battle of Bunker Hill and later at the battles of Long Island and Brandywine. © BETTMANN/CORBIS.

by losses, and second, the Americans must not be allowed to gain confidence through even partial successes. On the contrary, the redcoats' superior discipline and skill in maneuver was the key to ultimate victory: pitched battles were to be avoided until victory was certain. All this was conventional military wisdom in 1776: the idea of attacking and annihilating the enemy's army regardless of cost is Napoleonic in origin and by definition was not available to Howe.

STRATEGY IN NEW YORK

He took over command in Gage's absence on 10 October. Compelled to hurriedly evacuate Boston early in 1776, Howe took his army to Halifax to reorganize and await adequate reinforcements and transports. He was still waiting for his reinforcements and campaign equipment when he reached Staten Island off New York late in June and landed his men on 2 July. His brother, Admiral Richard Lord Howe, arrived on the 12th with supporting warships, some reinforcements, and the news that he and William had been appointed peace commissioners. Both brothers knew that their power to offer pardons and an end to restrictions on trade in return for rebel disarmament were out of date and useless. On the other hand Howe needed more men, supplies, and essential camp equipment

before he could risk his precious regulars in a campaign. He had no choice but to wait. Thus, far from changing his strategy to make room for negotiation, as Gruber would have it, he and Richard used the period of enforced inactivity to begin negotiations on 14 July. The overture came to nothing, largely because the Howes would not address Washington as "General"—a point, had they been really serious, they might have overlooked.

But still Howe could not move, largely because everything he needed had to come across the Atlantic and because the government, which determined strategy, sent Clinton off on a wild goose chase to Charleston before he went on to join Howe. Meanwhile, some British regulars and Germans arrived from Europe, but Howe did not feel strong enough to risk an amphibious assault on Long Island until Clinton finally arrived on 12 August. Even then Howe would launch his offensive without the last of his equipment, the camp kettles that were essential to his men's health in the field. When they arrived at the end of August, he promptly attacked Long Island.

Brilliantly outmaneuvering Washington and pinning the rebels against the water at Brooklyn on 27 August, Howe opted for a regular siege of their works rather than an immediate storm. The memory of Bunker Hill cast a long shadow. Howe knew that he must not risk giving the Americans even the illusion of success, a policy that Clinton, who was very critical later when blame had to be apportioned, heartily approved at the time. In the same way, after Washington's escape, Howe planned another outflanking move that would lever Washington out of New York City rather than force him to fight for it street by street. That meant a wait until boats, transports, and supporting warships could be concentrated inside the East River, and once again the Howe brothers used the lull to negotiate. Then the indirect assault began, again catching the Americans off balance and driving them out of the city at minimal risk. Washington escaped, of course, but his army was shaken and demoralized and nearer to the point when Howe could risk a final battle. The pattern was repeated at Harlem and White Plains. Then, when he was sure that Fort Mifflin was isolated and vulnerable, Howe proved he could attack decisively. A few more weeks and Washington's army might have been harried to pieces.

FRUSTRATION IN NEW JERSEY

But the campaigning season was now far advanced. As autumn turned the roads of New York and New Jersey to mud and the soldiers became exhausted, hot pursuit became impossible and Washington escaped behind the Delaware. Howe's army went into winter quarters and on 30 November the brothers used the unavoidable lull to offer a pardon to all who would return to their allegiance within sixty days. This might have succeeded in pacifying

New Jersey but for Washington's double success at Trenton and Princeton, demonstrating that the British army was now dangerously overextended. Howe's subsequent retreat behind the Raritan exposed the New Jersey men who had come out to support him and shook the faith of Loyalists everywhere in the ability of the British army to liberate and protect them. Worse still, it confined the British in New York in an area too small to provide it with adequate supplies, leaving it dangerously dependent upon transatlantic shipments of everything from powder and flints to writing paper and firewood. However, the attempt to overrun and rally support in New Jersey was fully justified by the winter pause in operations, something eighteenth-century commanders took for granted, and one Howe could not ignore if he was to conserve his precious regulars.

INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA

Howe's objective in 1777 was to engage and defeat Washington's army, and all his apparent hesitations and delays sprang from the difficulty of bringing this about. His fundamental strategic error, failure to thrust up the Hudson to meet Burgoyne, was one shared with the ministry and with Burgoyne himself: no one imagined that Burgoyne would need direct help. On the other hand, if Howe could pin down and decisively defeat Washington's army, he would render effective help to Burgoyne while bringing the rebellion swiftly to an end. An amphibious invasion of Pennsylvania would—by threatening Philadelphia—probably force Washington to offer battle on Howe's terms. It would also give Howe secure lines of communication, restore Loyalist confidence, and secure an adequate territory from which to draw supplies. The drawback was that because so many troops had been sent from Britain to Burgoyne rather than to New York, Howe would have to evacuate the Jerseys in order to find enough men for Pennsylvania.

For a moment, Washington's appearance at Middle Brook north of the Raritan seemed to promise a decisive battle without going to Philadelphia at all. In June, Howe successfully lured Washington out of his strong position and tried to cut him off and make him fight in the open. The attempt failed, and Washington escaped to his fastness at Middle Brook. Once again refusing an assault on a strong position—a decision later praised by Charles Lord Cornwallis—Howe then evacuated the Jerseys and resumed his plan to attack Philadelphia.

His primary target was still Washington's army, not the city, and its movements determined his strategy. As in 1776, the embarkation was delayed by the shortages of troops, shipping, and supplies, not to mention contrary winds. Howe had also to make sure that Burgoyne was not running into any unexpected trouble and that Washington did not slip north to intercept him. He had no orders to

march up the Hudson himself, except in an emergency; so far from ignoring his instructions (as Gruber insists he was), Howe was being commendably careful and conscientious. Consequently, there was a three-week pause on Staten Island from 1–23 July before he embarked his fifteen thousand men for Pennsylvania.

Howe already knew that he could land at Chester or New Castle, below the known Delaware forts and obstacles, or in the Chesapeake at Head of Elk, depending on Washington's movements. When the expedition reached the mouth of the Delaware on 30 July, Howe discovered that his opponent had not marched north against New York or Burgoyne, a move which would have ended the whole British expedition. Instead, Washington appeared to have moved south and west, towards the line of the Susquehanna River, behind which he would be hard to get at and would be able to threaten the flank of an advance from the Delaware to Philadelphia. As Howe's primary objective was still Washington's army, he decided to go to Head of Elk, further from Philadelphia but closer to Washington and on a line of operations that would keep the enemy to his front and might—by still threatening Philadelphia—bring him to battle. That meant longer at sea, and when Howe's men disembarked at Head of Elk on 25 August, they were so exhausted that it was the 28th before they could march inland.

Once on the move, Howe consistently outgeneraled Washington. On 11 September he won a clear victory at Brandywine Creek, a battle Washington survived only because Howe's cavalry horses were still in no state to offer hot pursuit. Washington was again outmaneuvered on the Schuylkill, Philadelphia was occupied on 26 September, and Washington's counteroffensive was skillfully contained at Germantown on 4 October.

Washington's army survived, however, and Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga negated all of Howe's achievements in Pennsylvania. Howe, already irritated by criticism from a ministry that had kept him short of men and shipping, offered his resignation on 22 October 1777. On 14 April 1778 he learned that it had been accepted and on 25 May, after Clinton's arrival and the abortive attempt to trap Lafayette at Barren Hill, Howe sailed for home.

RETURN TO BRITAIN

Howe was greeted by a barrage of criticism from the opposition and the press. He and his brother Richard (who returned home on 25 October 1778) insisted on a parliamentary inquiry, and from 22 April to 30 June 1779 they vigorously defended their conduct. In 1780 William gave up his Commons seat and resumed his military career. In 1782 he became a privy councillor and lieutenant general of the ordnance, a post he held

until 1804. He became colonel of the Nineteenth Dragoons in 1786, and after the outbreak of war in 1793 he was given regional commands in the north and east of England. He was governor of Berwick from 1795 to 1808 and of Plymouth from 1808 until his death in 1814. On Richard's death on 5 August 1799, he became the fifth viscount Howe. He died at Plymouth on 12 July 1814.

ASSESSMENT

Although Howe's excessive caution led him to miss decisive opportunities in 1776 and 1777, he was neither lazy nor did Mrs. Loring keep him from operations in the field. It is true that the Philadelphia expedition was partly misconceived: a thrust up the Hudson might have as effectively brought Washington to battle while eliminating most of the risk to Burgoyne. However, that would have sacrificed the political and moral advantages of invading Pennsylvania, not to mention the prospect of conquering a territory large enough to provide adequate supplies. Howe in the field was slow and methodical but his tactical performance was nothing short of stunning. Howe was a capable commander saddled with an enormous task, inadequate means, and (in 1777) a flawed strategy imposed from above.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Burgoyne, John; Clinton, Henry; Cornwallis, Charles; Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of; Howe, Richard; Lexington and Concord; Long Island, New York, Battle of; New York Campaign; Peace Commission of the Howes; Philadelphia Campaign; Princeton, New Jersey; Trenton, New Jersey.*

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revised by John Oliphant

HOWETSON, JAMES. (?–1777). Loyalist officer. Nothing is known of Howetson (also called Hewetson) before his appearance at the beginning of the Revolution as a British lieutenant living on half pay in Lunenburgh, New York. From the start, the local committee of safety kept an eye on him as a suspect person. At the insistence of the Albany committee, he signed a parole

on 30 April 1775 promising to stay near his home, talk with no other Loyalists, and take no action against the Revolution. The committee became aware that he was violating this parole by helping to set up a Loyalist communication network but settled for a mild warning. Shortly after the British captured New York City in September 1776, Howetson received a commission as colonel of the Loyal Volunteers of Albany County. Howetson had the unenviable task of raising this regiment secretly, since he was behind enemy lines. Howetson did not receive any precise orders and so set about planning a number of operations, most importantly to seize the gunpowder stored at Albany; in grandiose moments, his Loyal Volunteers even thought to capture the whole city. None of these plans ever came to fruition. After disarming a few Patriot militia, the Loyal Volunteers fell into a trap set by militia units from New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut at Livingston Manor on 2 May 1777. Over the next few days the Patriots arrested most of the Loyalists, including Howetson, who was charged with treason as he recruited for the enemy while a citizen of New York. A court-martial held on 14 June 1777 found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Howetson was hanged in Albany on 4 July 1777.

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
HOWITZER. A howitzer is a short muzzle-loading, smooth-bore cannon developed to reach targets behind obstructions with explosive projectiles fired at a high angle and a low muzzle velocity. In trajectory and muzzle velocity, it falls between a mortar and a gun. In field service, it could also be used as an antipersonnel weapon, firing grapeshot and canister.

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HUBBARDTON, VERMONT. 7 July 1777. Defeat of American rear guard. After Burgoyne's



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operations made it clear that Ticonderoga could not be held, Arthur St. Clair evacuated the post under cover of darkness on 5–6 July. There were only enough boats for the invalids and baggage, so he marched the main body, about 2,500 strong, on the roundabout route through Castleton following to parallel roads. He intended to join Colonel Long's force at Skenesboro. At the tiny settlement of Hubbardton (later East Hubbardton), Vermont, St. Clair left behind Seth Warner to cover his rear while the column continued another six miles to Castleton, where St. Clair's men camped for the night. Warner's orders were to wait with his 150 men for the rear guard regiments to arrive and then to join the main body at Castleton, but he chose instead to remain in Hubbardton for the night. His command, all Continentals, consisted of his own regiment from Vermont, Colonel Ebenezer Francis's hand-picked 450-man rear guard built around his own Massachusetts regiment, and Colonel Nathan Hale's Second New Hampshire Regiment. Including stragglers, they numbered about 1,000 under experienced commanders, but

they were exhausted. After consulting with the other two colonels, Warner assumed that he was beyond danger. While failing to post adequate security guards, the three components of the force spread out and occupied different pieces of key terrain. That assumption of safety would be a critical error.

The enemy had in fact pursued with uncharacteristic vigor upon realizing that St. Clair's evacuation was not a trap. Simon Fraser's Advance Corps left Mount Independence on 6 July and trailed St. Clair down the miserable roads by only a few hours. The British were followed by Riedesel with a force of Brunswickers, including his own regiment and Breymann's Advance Corps. At about 4 P.M. Riedesel, with his vanguard of jägers and grenadiers, caught up with Fraser and took command by virtue of seniority. Arguing that the heat had been harder for his Germans, he agreed to let Fraser push on another three miles before halting and that both contingents would resume the advance the next morning at 3 o'clock. Fraser bivouacked about three miles from Warner's camp, at the place later called Hubbardton. During the night his

Indians discovered the location of Warner's camp and Fraser planned a dawn attack.

Led by Loyalist and Indian scouts, the British moved on schedule. At about 4:40 A.M. they collided with American pickets and firing began. After considering and discarding the possibility of an ambush, Fraser chose to attack without waiting for the Germans to close up. His column had a leading detachment of the Twenty-fourth Foot, supported by the Earl of Balcarres's light infantry, with Major John Acland's grenadiers bringing up the rear. Around daylight the column hit Hale's regiment finishing its breakfast near Sucker Brook. As they deployed into line, the British came under fire. The first American volley cut down about twenty, killing Major Grant of the Twenty-fourth and wounding Balcarres. Then the action cooled down a bit as Hale's men withdrew.

Francis and Warner had just finished a meeting to discuss orders that a messenger had brought from St. Clair. The general informed them that the British had broken through the boom and sailed to Skenesboro, and he now ordered them to retreat to Rutland. Francis's force had just started its march when British light infantrymen emerged from the woods where they had been sent to maneuver around Hale's rear guard. Francis promptly deployed behind a stone wall and some fallen trees and easily drove the British back. A more cautious Fraser now built up his own forces and the two sides created a one-thousand-yard line of battle. The American left flank was on the slopes of twelve-hundred-foot Zion Hill (as it was later named); Fraser must have instinctively seen that this was critical terrain, and he started thinning out his forces on the left to build up strength to envelop by way of this hill. When his grenadiers clawed their way up the steep, rocky, wooded slopes, the Americans curved this end of their line to the rear, in a maneuver known as "refusing the flank," and kept up their fire. On the other end of the line, Francis started pushing back the weakened British left. The wooded terrain favored the American emphasis on musket fire rather than the bayonet charges and close combat at which the British excelled. As a result Fraser was getting the worst of it when Riedesel's Germans arrived and turned the tide. Riedesel had set out that morning as planned, but when he heard gunfire he hurried forward with his jägers and grenadiers, just as he had done the day before.

The American line held its ground and pulled back only after it was threatened with envelopment. Whether by intent or simply because it made tactical sense on a minute-by-minute basis, Colonels Francis and Hale's survivors both began a type of fighting withdrawal known as delaying on successive positions. This gave the British all they could handle. By this time the fight reached the position where Warner's regiment had formed, and as Riedesel came up he immediately attacked the American

right, having his men sing to the music of their band to dramatize the arrival of reinforcements and exaggerate their size. At this point Francis was killed and his men gave way and raced across Hubbardton Brook. Seeing a bayonet attack coming and knowing that the other two contingents were in retreat, Warner told his men, "Scatter and meet me at Manchester."

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

The two-hour action was "as bloody as Waterloo" in proportion to the numbers engaged. British and German participants actually thought from the intensity of the fight that the Americans had 2,000 or more men when in reality there were only half as many. By the final phase of the action Fraser and Riedesel probably had 850 men in action. American casualties probably amounted to 325 or so, mostly prisoners. British losses appear to have been around 35 killed and 148 wounded; German casualties were relatively light.

SIGNIFICANCE

Although not immediately apparent, the combination of the tough fight here and the companion engagement at Fort Anne took the starch out of Burgoyne's pursuit. Exhausted by their efforts, the elite Anglo-German troops had to stop and refit. That enabled St. Clair to get clear and fall back to the Hudson River while Schuyler's delaying tactics began to destroy the lines of communications. Trading space for time let the Americans recover from the loss of "the Gibraltar of the North" and would make it possible for Burgoyne to blunder into disaster in the fall.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne's Offensive; Fort Anne, New York; Fraser, Simon (1729–1777); Riedesel, Baron Friedrich Adolphus; Skenesboro, New York; Warner, Seth.*

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Robert K. Wright Jr.

HUCK, CHRISTIAN. (c. 1747–1780). Loyalist officer. Little is known of Captain Christian Huck, a Philadelphia Loyalist serving in Tarleton's British Legion. As British and Loyalist raiders ravaged South Carolina

after the surrender of Charleston, Huck commanded a body of cavalry in the outposts around Camden. Not long after destroying the iron works of William Hill and Isaac Hayne, he moved on Williamsons Plantation. Huck had ninety Loyalists and some twenty-five British soldiers under his command when he camped for the night on 11 July 1780. A slave named Watt came across Huck's encampment and informed his owner, Colonel William Bratton. Bratton gathered some 250 militia together and surprised the Loyalists and the British the following morning. Huck and about thirty of his men were killed in this fierce little battle, most of the rest being taken prisoner.

SEE ALSO *Hayne, Isaac; Williamson's Plantation, South Carolina.*

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HUDDY–ASGILL AFFAIR. April–October 1782. On 24 March 1782, Loyalist irregulars captured Captain Joshua Huddy of the New Jersey militia in a surprise attack at Toms River, New Jersey, confining him on a prison ship near New York City. General Henry Clinton's headquarters had given the Associated Loyalists permission to take Huddy and two others for purposes of a prisoner exchange. The Associated Loyalists, apparently acting on orders from William Franklin, had different plans. They were seeking to avenge the death of Philip White, a Loyalist who had been shot while attempting to escape from the New Jersey militia. Though Huddy had no connection to White's death, he was led by a guard commanded by Captain Richard Lippincott to the heights of Middletown and hanged from a tree on 12 April. A placard pinned to his breast read:

We the refugees having long with grief beheld the cruel murders of our brethren, . . . determine not to suffer without taking vengeance, for the numerous cruelties, and thus begin, and have made use of captain Huddy as the first object to present to your view, and further determine to hang man for man, while there is a refugee existing. Up goes Huddy for Philip White. (Smith, 2, p. 1750.)

Huddy's execution became an immediate sensation, infuriating General Clinton, who ordered Lippincott court-martialed, and evoking a rare outburst of ill temper from Washington, who demanded that Clinton deliver the

guilty officer. Clinton, of course, refused, promising Washington that Lippincott would face British justice. But the court-martial ruled that Lippincott had acted on orders from a civil officer, since Franklin was still officially New Jersey's royal governor, and set him free.

Washington insisted on retribution, ordering Colonel Moses Hazen to select a British prisoner by lot for execution. Thirteen British captains picked straws, with the one marked "unfortunate" being pulled by Captain Charles Asgill, who was seventeen years old. Almost immediately, Washington regretted the whole affair and tried to get out of executing Asgill. Congress became involved, launching into a bitter debate in which the majority wanted to mete out "an eye-for-an eye" justice. Elias Boudinot, arguing for clemency, persuaded his colleagues to postpone the vote for a day. The next morning a special courier arrived from the king and queen of France, who had been petitioned by Asgill's family, requesting Asgill's pardon as a personal favor. Much to Washington's, and Asgill's, relief, Congress complied and the affair ended with the full pardon of the young British captain.

SEE ALSO *Asgill, Charles; Associated Loyalists; Boudinot, Elias; Clinton, Henry; Franklin, William; Hazen, Moses.*

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
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HUDSON RIVER AND THE HIGHLANDS. The Hudson River, which could be navigated by the largest warships one hundred miles upstream, was a vital avenue of strategic movement between Canada and the thirteen colonies during the colonial wars and during the Revolution. The Hudson River region was of particular concern to the British during the Revolution because of its high concentration of Loyalists.

The Hudson Highlands are a topographical curiosity in that they cross the strategic Hudson River forty-five miles north of New York City, constituting a natural barrier of easily defensible terrain. Rising above the five-hundred-foot contour, they are the highest ground along the Hudson-Mohawk-Lake Champlain system of waterways. Early in the war, on 25 May 1775, the



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Continental Congress therefore resolved to fortify the Highlands, and a few months later work was started opposite West Point at Martelaer's Rock (later

Constitution Island). Early the next year this effort was abandoned, but Forts Clinton and Montgomery were built astride Popolopen Creek.

Clinton's expedition to the Highlands in October 1777 made short work of these defenses, but for strategic reasons the British were forced to abandon their gains. Washington's engineers took another look at this critical terrain and decided that the main fortification should be at West Point. Planned for the most part by the French engineer Louis de La Radière, construction started on 20 January 1778 by Samuel H. Parsons's brigade. Fort Arnold, later called Fort Clinton, was situated on the tip of the forty-acre plateau that dominated the double right-angle bend of the river at West Point. From March 1778 until June 1780 the Polish engineer Thaddeus Kosciuszko was in charge, and an elaborate system of redoubts and water batteries was constructed. In April 1778 a great sixty-ton chain was stretched across the river to Martelaer's Rock, and the land approaches to West Point from the west were barred by Forts Putnam, Webb, and Wyllys. These were in turn protected by four redoubts.

Despite British efforts, the Hudson Highlands remained in American hands for the rest of the war. Visiting West Point in November 1780, Chevalier de Chastellux was overwhelmed by the engineering wonders accomplished here "by a people, who six years before had scarcely ever seen a cannon."

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason; Burgoyne's Offensive; Clinton's Expedition; Fort Clinton, New York; Fort Montgomery, New York; Kosciuszko, Thaddeus Andrzej Bonaventura; Parsons, Samuel Holden; Stony Point, New York; West Point, New York.*

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HUGER, BENJAMIN. (1746–1779). Militia officer. South Carolina. Fourth eldest of the Huger Brothers, Benjamin Huger was a member of the assembly and the Provincial Congress of 1775. On 17 June 1775 he became lieutenant of the Fourth South Carolina Artillery, and on 16 September 1776 he was promoted to major of his brother Isaac's Fifth South Carolina Rifles. Huger was accidentally killed by friendly troops at Charleston on 11 May 1779.

SEE ALSO *Huger, Daniel; Huger, Francis; Huger, Isaac; Huger, John.*

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HUGER, DANIEL. (1742–1799). Congressman. South Carolina. Eldest of the famous Huger brothers, he served in the South Carolina assembly from 1773 to 1775; was a delegate to the Continental Congress from 1786 to 1788; and was a representative in Congress from 1789 to 1793.

SEE ALSO *Huger, Benjamin; Huger, Francis; Huger, Isaac; Huger, John.*

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HUGER, FRANCIS. (1751–1811). Militia officer. South Carolina. Youngest of the Huger brothers, he became captain in the Second South Carolina Continentals when this unit was organized under Colonel William Moultrie on 17 June 1775. He served under Moultrie in the famous defense of Charleston on 28 June 1776. In 1777 he was named lieutenant colonel and quartermaster general of the Southern Department. He resigned in 1778.

SEE ALSO *Huger, Benjamin; Huger, Daniel; Huger, Isaac; Huger, John.*

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HUGER, ISAAC. (1743–1797). Continental general. South Carolina. One of the Huger Brothers, Isaac Huger served as a lieutenant against the Cherokee in 1761. He was made lieutenant colonel of the First South Carolina Regiment on 17 June 1775, colonel of the Fifth South Carolina Continentals on 16 September 1776, and brigadier general on 9 January 1779. At Stono Ferry, South Carolina, on 20 June 1779, he was severely wounded while leading the left wing. In the fiasco at Savannah, Georgia, on 9 October 1779, he commanded the Georgia and South Carolina militia in an unsuccessful diversion. During the Charleston campaign of 1780 he was routed by Tarleton at Monck's Corner on 14 April. In the Southern campaigns of Nathanael Greene, he led one wing of the army in a remarkable march from Cheraw, South Carolina, to link up with Morgan's wing at Guilford Courthouse. He was seriously wounded at Guilford, North Carolina, on 15 March 1781, but

commanded Greene's right wing at Hobkirk's Hill, South Carolina, on 25 April 1781. His brigade in both of these actions was composed of the Fourth and Fifth Virginia Continentals. He was in the South Carolina General Assembly in 1782.

SEE ALSO *Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Huger, Benjamin; Huger, John.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HUGER, JOHN. (1744–1804). Patriot leader. South Carolina. Third eldest of the Huger Brothers, John Huger and his brother Isaac served as junior officers in the Cherokee expedition of 1761. In the early phases of the Revolution, during 1776 and 1777, he was a militia captain. Under the new state constitution he became South Carolina's first secretary of state.

SEE ALSO *Huger, Benjamin; Huger, Daniel; Huger, Francis; Huger, Isaac.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HULL, WILLIAM. (1753–1825). Continental officer. Connecticut. William Hull was born in Derby, Connecticut, on 24 June 1753, graduated from Yale College when he was nineteen years old, studied law at Litchfield, and was admitted to the bar in 1775. He was appointed a captain-lieutenant in the Seventh Connecticut Regiment on 6 July 1775 and captain on 9 October, and served in the Boston lines. On 1 January 1776 he became captain of the Nineteenth Continental Regiment (Connecticut). He rose steadily in rank, becoming major of the Eighth Massachusetts Regiment on 1 January 1777 and lieutenant colonel of the Third Massachusetts Regiment on 12 August 1779. He served almost continuously, taking part in the battles of White Plains, Trenton, Princeton, Saratoga, Monmouth, and Stony Point, and for three winters in a row commanded the American advanced lines just above New York City. He led the bold raid on Morrisania, New York, on 22–23 January 1781. Brave and energetic, he won commendations from Washington and Congress. Retained in Colonel Henry Jackson's Continental Regiment on 3 November 1783, he served to 20 June 1784.

After leaving the army he returned to the law, became active as a Jeffersonian politician, and helped suppress Shays's Rebellion. President Jefferson appointed Hull governor of the newly organized Michigan Territory on

22 March 1805. President Madison named him a brigadier general on 8 April 1812, with the job of defending the territory with a motley army of militia and volunteers. He suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the British, including the surrender of Detroit on 16 August 1812, and was cashiered after a court-martial presided over by Henry Dearborn. (Three days after he surrendered Detroit, his nephew Captain Isaac Hull won his famous victory over the *Guerrière*.) William Hull spent his remaining years at Newton, Massachusetts, where he had established a home after the Revolution. He published a defense of his conduct at Detroit in 1824, a year before he died at home on 29 November 1825.

SEE ALSO *Dearborn, Henry; Morrisania, New York; Shay's Rebellion.*

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Hull, William. *Memoirs of the Campaign of the North Western Army of the United States.* Boston: True and Greene, 1824.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

HUMPHREYS, DAVID. (1752–1818). Continental officer, diplomat, poet. Born in Derby, Connecticut, on 10 July 1752, Humphreys entered Yale College in 1767, founding a literary society that would become the core of a group known as the Connecticut Wits. The college friends in the group later became prominent writers, including Humphreys, Joel Barlow, Timothy Dwight, and John Trumbull. After being graduated in 1771, Humphreys became a teacher in Wethersfield, Connecticut, and later worked as a tutor at Philipse Manor in New York. Humphreys enlisted in the Continental army in August 1776 as a captain in the Second Connecticut Regiment. He served with Generals Israel Putnam and Nathanael Greene before becoming aide-de-camp to General George Washington on 23 June 1780. In the ensuing years Humphreys traveled everywhere with Washington, wrote hundreds of letters dictated by the general, and became Washington's close friend and confidant, making his own home at Mount Vernon. At the same time, Humphreys began publishing his poetry, starting with *Address to the Armies of the United States of America* in 1779. Most of his early poems were deeply patriotic,

including *The Glory of America* (1782), and were widely reprinted in the American press.

In October 1781 Humphreys was given the honor of taking the news of Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown and the captured British standards to Congress. Over the next two years, he continued to serve as Washington's personal aide. After joining the European commerce commission of Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Benjamin Franklin from 1785 to 1786, Humphreys returned to Mount Vernon as Washington's secretary, a position he held when Washington became president. In response to Shays's Rebellion, he and the other Connecticut Wits produced *The Anarchiad*, which warned of the dangers of uncontrolled democracy. It is probably the only one of Humphreys's poetical works to arouse much interest in modern times. From 1790 to 1800 he undertook a number of diplomatic missions for Washington and Adams, including service as minister to Portugal and Spain. He returned to Connecticut with one hundred merino sheep he had been given as a gift from the king of Spain; with these he started a successful woolen business at Rimmon Falls, where he lived the rest of his life. Over the years he wrote a wide variety of essays and biographies, including *An Essay on the Life of the Honourable Major-General Israel Putnam* (1788) and *The Yankee in England* (1815). But like his poetry, his prose was written in a heavily ornamented rhetorical style that did not survive his own lifetime. On 21 February 1818 he died in his home in what was later renamed Humphreysville.

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HUMPTON, RICHARD. (1733?–1804). Continental officer. England and Pennsylvania. Born in Yorkshire, perhaps in 1733; Richard Humpton was a captain in the British army, taking part in the siege of St. Malo (on the northern coast of Brittany) in 1758. He resigned his commission at the end of the Seven Years' War and settled on an upper branch of the Susquehanna River. Named lieutenant colonel of the Flying Camp on 16 July 1776, he became colonel of the Eleventh Pennsylvania Regiment on 25 October. As General George Washington retreated across New Jersey, Humpton was assigned the task of removing boats from the Delaware River. His

success on this mission helped stop the British pursuit and made possible Washington's counterstroke at Trenton, New Jersey, on 26 December 1776. He fought at Brandywine, and sought a court-martial of General Anthony Wayne for failing to avoid the disastrous battle of Paoli (often called the Paoli Massacre.) He took command of the Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment on 1 July 1778, and of the Sixth Pennsylvania Regiment in the reorganization of 17 January 1781. He led the Second Pennsylvania Regiment from 1783 until the Continental army was disbanded on 3 November 1783. He was brevetted brigadier general on 30 September 1783. After the war he returned to his farm in Pennsylvania, and was adjutant general of the militia until his death on 21 December, 1804.

SEE ALSO *Flying Camp; Paoli, Pennsylvania.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HUNTINGTON, JABEZ. (1719–1786). Merchant, militia general. Connecticut. Born at Norwich, Connecticut, on 7 August 1719, Jabez Huntington graduated from Yale College in 1741. He became a wealthy West Indies trader of great social and political prominence in his home town. An early opponent of increased imperial control, in May 1775 he became a member of the council of safety—the executive authority in Connecticut government—and was one of its most active and important members over the next four years. He devoted himself and his fortune to the patriot cause, even as the war took a heavy toll on his shipping interests. In December 1776 the General Assembly commissioned him major general of the militia in eastern Connecticut and named him to succeed David Wooster as commander of all state militia after Wooster was mortally wounded during the Danbury raid in April 1777. Huntington played an important role in organizing and equipping the militia, but he never took the field himself. In February 1779 he was incapacitated by a nervous disease brought on by overwork. All four of his sons served with distinction in the war. His eldest son, Jedediah Huntington, who married Faith Trumbull, daughter of Jabez's good friend Governor Jonathan Trumbull, retired from the Continental Army as a brevet major general.

SEE ALSO *Huntington, Jedediah; Wooster, David.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

HUNTINGTON, JEDEDIAH. (1743–1818). Continental general. Connecticut. Born at Norwich, Connecticut, on 4 August 1743 and reared amid wealth and great social prominence, Jedediah Huntington graduated from Harvard College in 1763, joined the mercantile business of his father, Jabez Huntington, and became an active Son of Liberty. He was elected ensign of the local militia company in 1769, lieutenant in 1771, and captain in May 1774. The General Assembly appointed him colonel of the Twentieth Militia Regiment in October 1774. On 26 April 1775 he reached Cambridge with elements of his militia regiment and remained for twenty-three days while the New England army was organized to maintain the Boston Siege. The Assembly named him colonel of the Eighth Connecticut Regiment in July 1775, and he led it to Boston in mid-September, where it remained until its enlistment expired on 10 December 1775. He was named colonel of the reorganized unit (Seventeenth Continental Regiment) and led it to New York in April 1776. The regiment fought at Long Island, where it suffered heavily, although Huntington himself was absent sick, and in subsequent skirmishes of the New York Campaign. He was named to command the First Connecticut Regiment (1777) on 1 January 1777 and was ordered to Peekskill in April. He took a detachment to guard Danbury, Connecticut, and participated in skirmishing against the British troops who raided the depot at the end of the month. Congress promoted him to brigadier general on 12 May 1777; he joined Israel Putnam at Peekskill in July but saw no action when Sir Henry Clinton seized Forts Montgomery and Clinton on 6 October. He rejoined the main army near Philadelphia in mid-October, and sat on the court-martial that acquitted Anthony Wayne of dereliction of duty for the surprise attack on his command at Paoli, Pennsylvania. After suffering through the hard winter at Valley Forge, he was part of Charles Lee's advanced force that fought at Monmouth on 28 June 1778. He was a member of the court-martial that convicted Lee of "shameful" conduct and disrespect to Washington (12 August). The regiment spent the winter of 1778–1779 at Danbury while Huntington went home on leave. In 1779 and 1780 he served in the Hudson Highlands and New Jersey, and was a member of the board of general officers that convicted Major John André on 29 September 1780. He remained in the Highlands during the Yorktown campaign, spent much of 1782 recruiting in Connecticut, and helped to found the Society of the Cincinnati at Newburgh, New York, in 1783. Brevetted major general on 30 September 1783, he resumed his commercial affairs at Norwich after 3 November.

Although Huntington was an able officer and was in the field throughout most of the war, he had spent his

military career largely in the management of the army and did not see a great deal of combat. After the war he served as state treasurer and, as a delegate to the state convention, voted to ratify the federal Constitution. President Washington, a personal friend, appointed him collector of customs at New London in 1789, a post he held for twenty-six years. He died at New London on 25 September 1818.

SEE ALSO *André, John; Cincinnati, Society of the; Danbury Raid, Connecticut; Huntington, Jabez; Monmouth, New Jersey.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL. (1731–1796). Signer. Connecticut. Born in Windham, Connecticut, on 3 July 1731 and distantly related to Jabez and Jedediah Huntington (both families were descended from Simon Huntington, who died on the trip to the colonies in 1633), Samuel Huntington was apprenticed to a cooper at the age of sixteen and later worked on his father's farm and in his shop. He studied Latin and the law by himself and, after reading law with a local attorney, was admitted to the bar in 1758. He settled in Norwich two years later and was elected to the General Assembly in May 1765. Appointed King's Attorney for Connecticut the same year, he resigned because he opposed the Stamp Act. The Assembly appointed him a justice of the peace (1765–1775) and a judge of the superior court (1773). An increasingly prominent supporter of colonial rights, he was elected to the governor's council (the upper house of the General Assembly) from 1775 through 1784. In May 1775 the Assembly named him to the committee for the colony's defense and in October elected him to the Continental Congress. One of three Connecticut delegates to sign the Declaration of Independence, he was elected president of Congress, to succeed John Jay, on 29 September 1779. He served until 6 July 1781, when he resigned due to poor health; he returned in 1783 for another year. He was elected lieutenant governor in May 1785 and served as governor from 1786 to 1796. He was a strong supporter of the federal Constitution and helped to get it ratified in Connecticut. He died at Norwich on 5 January 1796.

SEE ALSO *Declaration of Independence; Huntington, Jabez; Huntington, Jedediah.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

HUTCHINSON, THOMAS. (1711–1780). Royal governor of Massachusetts. Great-great-grandson of the famous Anne (Marbury) Hutchinson (1591–1643), who emigrated from England with her husband and children in 1634 and was banished from the Massachusetts Bay Colony for her religious beliefs, Thomas was a leader of the conservatives in the colony before the American Revolution. He entered Harvard at the age of thirteen, graduated in 1727, and three years later received his master of arts degree.

Wealthy, able, and socially part of what he called the “better sort,” his first big step in alienating the “common sort” came in 1749, when his leadership succeeded in establishing “hard money” as the medium of exchange in the colony. He did this through his plan to call in the major portion of the inflated bills of credit, which the government had been issuing since 1690 without adequate backing, and paying these off at the rate of eleven to one by using the £183,650 that England had sent to reimburse Massachusetts for its expenses in the Louisburg expedition. This measure, like the abolishing of the Land Bank (1740–1741), was to the benefit of persons living on fixed incomes and of creditors—who, naturally, were of the “better sort”—and was tremendously unpopular with debtors. He attended the Albany Convention of 1754 and probably had a hand in drafting the famous Plan of Union that is primarily associated with Franklin’s name. In 1758 Hutchinson became lieutenant governor, and in 1760 he became chief justice, a position to which the father of James Otis had aspired. Hutchinson opposed the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act, but only because of their adverse effect on British as well as on colonial trade. Loyal to the authority that had commissioned him, however, he made every effort to enforce the unpopular acts.

Hutchinson had given the popular leaders of Boston several reasons to believe he had a personal interest in enforcing the British measures they found so objectionable. Already a wealthy man, he appropriated more than his fair share of offices and salaries, which brought him perhaps three hundred pounds a year in days when an ordinary family could live comfortably on forty pounds a year. His brother-in-law, Andrew Oliver, was a stamp distributor. So on the night of 26–27 August 1765, his home was sacked by the Boston mob. In the absence of

Sir Francis Bernard, he was acting governor during the period 1769–1771. In the latter year he became governor and served until 1774. Hutchinson weathered the resistance to the Townshend Acts, but during the subsequent lull in agitation he proved his congenital inaptitude for the post he held. The Hutchinson letters affair in 1773 was his final undoing. Then, he unwisely used his influence for the personal profit of himself and his sons, Thomas and Elisha, in the matter of the East India Company’s tea being sent to America. Compounding this, Hutchinson—in refusing to facilitate the removal of this tea—played into the hands of the rabble-rousers and brought on the Boston Tea Party on 16 December 1773.

Although he did not know it at the time, he was through. On 29 June 1774 he reached England, and a few days later he spent two hours reporting to George III on the situation in his province. General Gage had meanwhile taken over as governor, but the understanding was that Hutchinson would return to that post when the crisis was over. Hutchinson had no idea that he would have more than a few months to wait, and he urged on the London authorities a policy of conciliation that he had not followed when he was in a position to do so in Boston. So it was that those of the “common sort” rose as leaders of the American Revolution, and Hutchinson never realized his hope of laying his “bones in New England.”

He was an historian of note, publishing the first volume of his *History of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay* in 1764 and writing the third while exiled in England. (It was published in 1828). He also wrote a pamphlet, *Present State of the Bills of Credit* (1736); *The Witchcraft Delusion of 1692* (1780); and many other works of a political and historical nature.

In 1768 Hutchinson constructed an imaginary dialogue between abstract characters he named “European Englishman” and “American Englishman,” in which the two sides of the imperial controversy exchanged their views with calmness and mutual respect. Never before and never again did Hutchinson come so close to revealing to himself his own divided mind and political ethics. The very names of the speakers in his dialogue suggest how similar—and how vastly different—Hutchinson believed imperial officials and colonial politicians were to each other. There was no more telling a moment in the history of Loyalism.

SEE ALSO *Albany Convention and Plan; Boston Tea Party; Hutchinson Letters Affair; Otis, James.*

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revised by Robert M. Calhoon

HUTCHINSON LETTERS AFFAIR.

1773. Letters written principally to Thomas Whately, former secretary to the British treasury, by Thomas Hutchinson and Andrew Oliver between May 1767 and October 1769, when they were chief justice and province secretary of Massachusetts, respectively, fell into the hands of Benjamin Franklin in late 1772, when Franklin was the agent of the province in London. How Franklin obtained them is not known. The letters urged the imperial government to take a tougher stance with the colonies and were given to Franklin to show him the type of advice from America that was influencing Parliament. Franklin sent the six Hutchinson and four Oliver letters to Thomas Cushing, speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, on 2 December 1772 with the advice that they should be shown to influential patriots for their information only, and should not be copied or published. Samuel Adams read them before a closed session of the House on 2 June 1773 and later had them published. In the resulting scandal, the House petitioned the king to remove Hutchinson and Oliver, and a duel was fought between John Temple, a distant relative of George Grenville, and Thomas Whatley's younger brother William, over the alleged theft of the letters. Franklin then came forward to announce (25 December 1773) that he alone was responsible. The British government disciplined Franklin by removing him as Joint Deputy Postmaster for the British colonies north of North Carolina. Hutchinson, now governor, prorogued the General Court on 9 March 1774 before it could institute impeachment proceedings against him.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

HUTCHINSON'S ISLAND, GEORGIA.

7 March 1776. The Georgia Patriots take control. On 11 May 1775, after news of Lexington and Concord arrived in Savannah, the "Liberty Boys" seized five hundred pounds of powder from the provincial magazine. When an armed British schooner appeared on 2 June, a crowd expressed the town's defiance by spiking a battery in Savannah. Three days later they erected the colony's first liberty pole and paraded under arms. On 13 June they called for a provincial congress to meet on 4 July, and later in the month they helped a South Carolina force drive Indian Superintendent John Stuart to East Florida. After more powder had been seized, Governor Sir James Wright gave up hope of keeping the revolution out of his province and appealed to General Thomas Gage and Admiral Samuel Graves for armed support. Although authority in Georgia passed to a council of safety and the Provincial Congress in July 1775, the royal governor remained unmolested in Savannah until early 1776. When two warships and a loaded transport arrived in belated response to Wright's request for help, the council of safety ordered his arrest to prevent him from rallying Georgia Loyalists. Joseph Habersham, who had risen as leader of the Patriots, led a group that captured the governor on 18 January and placed him under house arrest. He escaped the night of 11 February 1776 and took refuge aboard the *Scarborough*.

After the assembly refused to answer his conciliatory letter of 13 February, Wright resorted to force. The warships moved up the river on 6 March and took eleven rice-laden merchant vessels; troops under Major John Maitland landed on Hutchinson's Island, opposite the town. After their warnings to the British to withdraw were ignored, the rebels set fire to two merchant ships on 7 March. These drifted toward the troop transport and caused a panic. Colonel Stephen Bull arrived about this time with four hundred Carolinians, and the British abandoned their plan for attacking the town. Only two of the rice ships escaped.

Governor Wright left with the British ships, making the return journey to London, where he urged the crown to recapture the province. He returned to Savannah in July 1779, after the British had retaken the city.

SEE ALSO *Wright, Sir James, Governor*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

HYLER, ADAM. Whaleboat guerrilla. New Jersey. A native of Germany, for a time he served in the British navy. Settling in New Brunswick, New Jersey, he had charge of a number of trading vessels. In cooperation

with William Marriner, he figured in a number of daring exploits in the coastal waters between Egg Harbor and Staten Island, where every Tory fisherman was compelled to pay them enormous tribute. Their boats were destroyed by the British in the summer of 1777, but they built new ones and undertook a systematic harassment of the enemy. Hylar captured several small British vessels, and with two armed boats he seized a corvette off Coney Island. He captured a Hessian major in Gowanus one night, surprised and carried off a sergeant's guard from Canarsie, and was the terror of prominent Tories. An attempt to capture

Richard Lippincott, the man charged with murdering Joshua Huddy, was foiled only by the absence of the former from his home in Broad Street in New York City.

SEE ALSO *Huddy–Asgill Affair; Marriner, William.*

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Harry M. Ward

I

ICONOGRAPHY. The War of American Independence led to a large body of visual art. Some met the highest artistic standards of its time; some was naïve. Some came from direct observation; some was constructed remembrance of how an event “ought” to have been. Taken together, the oil paintings, watercolors, and drawings that depict the Revolution give a strong sense of what participants and observers saw at the time.

NARRATIVE PAINTINGS

All of the Revolution’s artists produced their work in the shadow of Benjamin West (1738–1820). Born in Philadelphia, West left for England both to pursue advanced training and to work on topics beyond the limits of provincial culture, particularly history painting. West’s *Death of General Wolfe* (1770, National Gallery of Canada) is considered the first work of modern-dress history painting, thus breaking the convention that history painting dealt with ancient subjects. West took care to model his characters’ faces realistically, but the painting was an allegory of the concept of civic virtue displayed in the North American wilderness. British Major General James Wolfe fell after routing the French under Montcalm and securing North America for the British; as depicted in the painting, Wolfe’s death was transcendent, validating a much larger cause.

Not only West but also the students who gathered in his London studio were now free to explore variations on the modern theme. One student, Matthew Pratt (1734–1805), titled a group portrait *The American School* (1765, Metropolitan Museum of Art). Two members of this school, John Trumbull (1756–1843) and Charles

Willson Peale (1741–1827), took the Revolutionary War as their main subject.

Like West, Trumbull and Peale wanted to escape the confines of portraiture. Trumbull, in particular, produced a series of monumental canvasses on the events of the Revolution. Some of them, such as *The Declaration of Independence* (1786–1794, Yale University) showed civilian events. But Trumbull emulated West’s military subject matter in *The Death of General Wolfe* at least twice. The best known is *The Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker Hill* (1786, Yale University), but *The Death of General Montgomery in the Attack on Quebec* (1786, Yale University) is of equal power. Both canvasses show the Revolutionary leader overwhelmed, Warren by oncoming British troops and Montgomery by figures in frontier garb. West had used a pensive Indian in *The Death of General Wolfe* to indicate the American setting. Trumbull also used figures of color, a carefully observed young black male in *The Death of General Warren* and several Indians in *The Death of General Montgomery*. Sensitive, perhaps, to the problem of slavery, he identified the black figure as on the American side and placed a musket in his hands.

Trumbull did other large war canvasses, including a monumental rendering of the surrender of Hessian Colonel Rall at Trenton on Christmas Day, 1776 (Yale University). Rall, dying of the wounds he has sustained, nevertheless remains upright, propped up by an American. Washington is mounted, extending his right arm in a diagonal line that reaches down across to Rall, who continues it toward a fallen drum. The American commander wears an expression of compassion and pity.



The Death of James Wolfe. Benjamin West's *Death of General Wolfe* (1770) is conventionally considered the first modern-dress history painting, although it is not a literal depiction of the event. This copy of West's painting was rendered around 1770. © COURTESY OF THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL ARMY MUSEUM, LONDON/BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY.

Trumbull completed his war sequence with two versions of *The Surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown* (1797, Yale University; 1824, United States Capitol). In both versions, the British second-in-command, on foot, yields his sword to Washington's delegate, General Benjamin Lincoln. Mounted American and French officers fence the British officer in on both sides, as red-coated troops stand at attention in the deep background. The sky is shot with red and with smoke, suggesting the destruction the British had endured and the larger destruction of Britain's American project. The Union Jack is not to be seen, but both the Bourbon Fleur-de-Lys and the Stars and Stripes flutter in the wind. The British general stands at the bottom of a diagonal line of light that ascends past Lincoln, a more distant Washington, to the triumphant American flag. This time there is no death, only the mixture of triumph and defeat.

Peale never attempted such large themes. Instead, he aimed to capture the likenesses of the Revolution's leaders (a large project to which Trumbull also contributed). But the contrast between Peale's first Washington portrait (1772, Washington and Lee University) and his second (1779, Princeton University) belongs to the war's iconography. In the first, Washington is a naïve provincial, showing off his new wealth and his colonel's uniform. In the second, set at the triumph over British troops at Princeton early in 1777, Washington has become the General, fully in command of himself, of the cannon on which he rests his hand, of the history he is enacting, and of the canvas.

Like virtually all paintings in the genre, these canvasses were inventing tradition. The successes of the American army and militia were undeniable, but Yorktown became possible because the French allies had



George Washington in Militia (1772). In this portrait by Charles Willson Peale, the young Washington appears as a provincial, showing off his new wealth and his colonel's uniform.
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.


what America lacked, a significant navy. To most Americans, however, the naval history of the Revolution is associated with the figure of John Paul Jones, most notably for his victory off the English coast over the British vessel *Serapis*. Jones's own *Bonhomme Richard* sustained so much damage that it sank. Perhaps it is appropriate that one of the best-known paintings of the event is by the English naval painter Robert Dodd (1748–1816), who worked primarily in the London dockland district called Wapping and whose main theme was the glories of the Royal Navy in the age of Nelson. Other images abound. Several are available in the online picture collection of the New York Public Library.

The revolutionary era's tradition of grand-scale narrative painting continued into the nineteenth century. Two different monumental canvasses produced at about the same time depict Washington's crossing of the Delaware River to raid the Hessian forces at Trenton on Christmas Day, 1776. One is by the American painter George Caleb Bingham (1811–1879). Painted between 1856 and 1871 and held by the Chrysler Museum of Art, Norfolk, Virginia, the painting shows Washington astride a white horse, aboard a flat-bottom boat that two men are poling across the nearly-frozen

water. His head defines the top of a triangle. Aura-like, glowing blue sky surrounds him, driving back dark winter clouds to the top of the frame and to his right. The image is crowded with soldiers and with other boats, but it also is static. The two men poling the boat define the sides of the triangle at whose apex is Washington's head, but they seem to be working against one another. Curiously reminiscent of Bingham's better-known *Fur Traders Descending the Missouri* (1845, Metropolitan Museum of Art), the painting projects no internal driving energy.

That is not at all the case with Emmanuel Gottlieb Leutze's (1816–1868) version of the same event (1851, Metropolitan Museum of Art). Although identified as American, Leutze was German-born and identified himself strongly with the failed European democratic revolutions of 1848. As in Bingham's similarly monumental canvas, an aura of bright sky seems to emanate from Washington himself. But unlike the Bingham, Leutze's canvas pulses with energy. The foreground boat, bearing the general, is off-center to the right, with ice-choked water ahead. The water, however, is lit by the bright sky, and the brightness, like the boat itself, seems to be cleaving a way through the ice. The polemen all are pushing in the same direction. Their poles are at the same angle as the pole of the Stars and Stripes behind Washington, which is borne by the future president, James Monroe. As in the Bingham, there are other boats in the background. But instead of forming a jumble, all are pushing in the same direction, and a point of land reaches out from the left as if to meet them. There is a hint of a rainbow's hopeful arc between the top of the flagpole in Washington's boat and the more distant vessels. Washington himself is standing, facing forward, bracing himself against what appears to be a cold wind.

David Hackett Fischer has demonstrated that Leutze took great care in the accurate construction of his image. The flat-bottom vessels are Durham boats, used as river ferries and large enough to hold many people. Passengers usually stood, because the boats were stable on the water. Leutze included a microcosm of American people, including a frontiersman and a black figure. That figure is emblematic of the artist's own strong opposition to slavery and of Washington's transformation on the slavery question. Initially hostile to blacks in his army's ranks, he was changing his mind by the time of the raid on Trenton. In 1781 a light infantry battalion instrumental in the final assault at Yorktown included a Rhode Island company in which blacks were probably the majority. The boatmen of John Glover's Fourteenth Continental mostly came from the fishing port of Marblehead, Massachusetts, and many of them were black. But despite Leutze's care both with iconography and details, the painting has its flaws. As the Stars and Stripes was not adopted until months later, the



Portrait of George Washington (1784). In this later portrait by Peale, Washington has become the general, fully in command of himself, of the cannon upon which he rests his hand, of the history he is enacting, and of the canvas. PENNSYLVANIA ACADEMY OF THE FINE ARTS, PHILADELPHIA, PA/BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY.

flag behind Washington's head should have featured a small Union Jack rather than stars.

IMAGES ON A SMALLER SCALE

The grand narrative paintings by Trumbull, Bingham, and Leutze and the portraits of leaders by Peale and many others form only part of the war's iconography. A remarkable permanent exhibition mounted by the Chicago Historical Society traces the "Voices and Images of the New Nation." The exhibit includes extended coverage of the war, from the opening shots at Lexington to Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown.

Among the prominent items in the display are four color engravings by apprentice silversmith Amos Doolittle of New Haven, Connecticut. Doolittle completed the


series by the end of 1775, and he seems to have based the images on interviews with participants. Rather than heroic deaths and surrenders on the part of towering officers, Doolittle's sequence depicts the coming of battle to two small New England towns.

Unlike Paul Revere's well-known and overtly propagandistic engraving of *The Bloody Massacre perpetrated in King Street, Boston, on March 5, 1770*, showing the Americans killed that night merely as hapless victims, Doolittle presents a crescendo of conflict. The first engraving in the sequence, clearly set at dawn, depicts the initial skirmish at Lexington. The village is in the background, and the eight-hundred-strong British force is snaking its way through the streets and buildings. The image is not large enough to contain them all, and the rearguard is off the edge of the frame to the right. In the mid-foreground one mounted officer has raised his saber to give an order. Responding to the order, the foremost squad of redcoats has opened fire and its members are obscured by the smoke of their muskets. In the foreground the Lexington militia is in a haphazard retreat, with five of its members fallen. Some appear to be only boys. The viewer cannot tell who, if anybody, is in command.

Doolittle's second plate shows *A View of the Town of Concord*. Now the whole British force is in view. Some are drawn up in their ranks, with their arms grounded, but others are entering from the left. There is not a Patriot to be seen. The point of view is from within the town graveyard, where two British figures are standing. Both appear to be officers, and one has a spyglass raised, peering out of the frame and apparently observing more colonials in retreat.

In the two final engravings the dynamic has changed. The third shows the fight at Concord North Bridge, as the colonials resist the British entry. The bridge is in mid-background at almost center frame, forming an arch that both unites and separates the colonial forces to the left and the oncoming redcoats to the right. Now the colonials also are drawn into ranks, with two mounted officers in the lead. They are outnumbered by the enemy, but each side is pushing toward the other, snakelike, and the sense of imminent collision at the apex of the bridge is strong. Taken together, the two forces define a line across the engraving, separating peaceful fields in the foreground from a farmstead and more fields deep in the frame. The two forces are throwing up clouds, which a wind is blowing into the frame so as not to obscure them. The clouds most likely are dust, stirred up by their feet, but could be smoke from their firelocks.

In the final image, set at the southern part of Lexington, the British in retreat are in trouble. Each of the three buildings within the frame is on fire, with smoke billowing to heaven. The British are crossing the frame left to right, in mid-background. In the near foreground



Battle of Lexington. This illustration is an 1832 rendition of an engraving made by Amos Doolittle in 1775. Doolittle based his images of the battle on interviews with participants. THE GRANGER COLLECTION, NEW YORK.

militiamen are sheltered by a stone wall as they prime and aim their muskets. Other Americans are closer to the redcoats, also firing at them, some from the shelter of trees atop a small hill. Deep in the frame, beyond the first line of British troops, patriots appear to be firing at still more redcoats. The British still outnumber the Americans, and in an open field they easily could defeat them with their combination of firepower and discipline. But they are caught from both sides.

Doolittle could not have known how long the War of Independence was going to last. But his four engravings convey a strong sense of the rapid collapse of British intentions—a bold strike to shock and awe the colonials—into a quagmire from which the British could find no easy escape. Doolittle, who had no formal training, fully appreciated color and was skilled at presenting perspective. On the morning of 19 April there were no heroes, no dominant figures, no looming skies, and no apparent allegories. The deaths that he presents in the first of the engravings seem tragic and wasted, rather than gloriously brave and sacrificial. Nonetheless, of all those depicting the Revolution he is perhaps the most successful at capturing the war's intrusion into one small community. It came to many others in about the same way during the years that followed.

Other images in the Chicago exhibit also give the sense of battle as soldiers experienced it. On 11 September 1777

Brigadier General George Weedon wrote an excited diary entry about the encounter between Washington's troops and Sir William Howe's at Brandywine Creek, near Philadelphia. In the diary he also sketched the positions of the respective American units. His haste and excitement come through both in his handwriting and his drawings.

Soldiers also recorded thoughts and visual impressions by engraving the powder horns that they carried. The Chicago exhibit includes several. In 1776 James Pike, probably of New Hampshire, carved an image showing six British "Regulars, the Aggressors," one with a musket to his shoulder firing toward a "Liberty Tree." Five "Provincials Defending" stand on the other side of the tree. Four have their weapons on their shoulders. One is holding his in front of him, as if to deflect the oncoming musket ball. Pike was no Amos Doolittle, let alone a John Trumbull. His figures are crude, even insectlike. But as surely as any grand canvas, his image presents a strong sense of the Revolutionary War's significance, at least as he understood it.

IMAGES OF INDIANS

Willing or not, native people found themselves forced to become participants in the war. Some must undoubtedly have created images to remember and understand their

experiences, but if such images survive, they are hidden from outside eyes. Nonetheless, the iconography that white artists created around Indian figures reveals yet another of the war's dimensions. Two such notable paintings are *The Death of Jane McCrea*, done in 1803 by the New York painter John Vanderlyn (Wadsworth Athenaeum, Hartford, Connecticut) and George Romney's portrait of Thayendanagea/Joseph Brant, done in London in 1776.

Jane McCrea was a young woman engaged to a Loyalist officer who was with General John Burgoyne's expedition in 1777. Setting out to join him, she was killed in a fight between Indian groups, one of which was escorting her. That much is certain, as is her fiancé's horrified recognition of McCrea's scalp when it was brought into Burgoyne's camp. Vanderlyn's painting, done in bright colors, draws not on eyewitness description but rather on a sensationalized description of the murder in Joel Barlow's epic poem, *The Vision of Columbus* (1787). Barlow describes how "two Mohawks meet the maid"; he then instructs, "Historian, Hold!" so that he can dwell on her "globes of snow." In Vanderlyn's rendition she kneels as one of the Indians jerks back her hair. Her bodice is pulled down to reveal her right breast fully. The Indians are shown stripped to the waist, and one has raised a tomahawk to smash her forehead. The sense of imminent rape and murder is very strong. So is the contrast between her gentle and fragile civilized qualities and their savagery.

George Romney's portrait of Brant presents a different image of a warlike Indian. Brant, a literate Anglican and a Freemason, posed for a number of portraits during his lifetime, including one in 1786 for Gilbert Stuart, always insisting on wearing native costume. He posed for Romney while he was an honored guest at the court of George III and the toast of London society. He bears a tomahawk, but it is not raised. He also wears an army officer's gorget, indicating his rank as a British captain, and a fine linen shirt. He is about to return to America, where he will fight, as his concerned expression suggests. But the war he will wage will be for his people's survival, not a mindless bloodbath. A native and a Loyalist, a figure who rose to fame during the War of Independence, his image is as much a part of the war's iconography as any battle scene, or engraved powder horn, or portrait of a white fighting man wearing blue or red.

SEE ALSO *Brant, Joseph; Lexington and Concord; McCrea Atrocity; Princeton, New Jersey; Trenton, New Jersey; Weedon, George; Wolfe, James; Yorktown, Siege of.*

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Edward Countryman

ÎLE AUX NOIX, CANADA. A low, flat, brush-covered island dotted with insect-infested swamps, it was located in a bend of the Richelieu (Sorel) River between the outlet of Lake Champlain and St. Johns. The island was about a mile long and four hundred yards wide. A solitary farm occupied a slight elevation in the middle. The French organized defenses on this unwholesome spot in 1759 after they had been forced by Amherst's advance to abandon their works at Ticonderoga and Crown Point. During the Revolution the island was an intermediate objective of American and British forces in their advances and retreats along the Lake Champlain route. Some eight thousand Americans who camped on the island in June 1776 as survivors of the Canada invasion retreated into New York. Thousands of them fell victim to smallpox, malaria, and dysentery. It subsequently was garrisoned by the British.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion.*

Mark M. Boatner

"ILLUMINATION." As early as 1702, the term "illuminate" meant "to decorate profusely with lights, as a sign of festivity or in honour of some person or some event" (sixth definition in the *Oxford English Dictionary*). A notable instance of such a display occurred on 24 October 1781. Colonel Tench Tilghman had reached Philadelphia at 3:00 A.M. on 22 October with news of the Yorktown surrender. A Committee of Safety handbill, headed "Illumination," announced that "those Citizens who chuse to illuminate on the glorious occasion, will do it this evening at Six, and extinguish their lights at Nine o'clock. Decorum and harmony are earnestly recommended to every citizen, and a general discountenance to the least appearance of riot."

In her account of the Brunswick general Baron Friedrich Riedesel's service in Canada, Louise Hall Tharp related the following anecdote about an illumination at Quebec City:

The next day [4 June 1776] was the birthday of George III. The city of Quebec was "illuminated"

in the evening by means of lighted candles set in every window. It was well known that a good many French people living in Quebec had hoped that the Americans would win. Yet it seemed that in all of Quebec's fifteen hundred houses, everyone was joyously burning candles in honor of the King of England. The reason for this was soon apparent, however. Soldiers were going about heaving rocks through any unlighted windows. (Tharp, pp. 42–43)

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

INDEPENDENCE. There is much conflicting evidence as to when colonists came to the conclusion that political independence from Britain might be desirable. As early as 1701 the Board of Trade thought that the American thirst for independence was notorious. Trying to calm British fears, Benjamin Franklin in a pamphlet published in London in 1763 asserted that the Americans would probably never claim independence. Few Americans before 1763 desired independence. Thereafter, the anger provoked by ill-considered British imperial policies contributed significantly to their growing inclination to contemplate such a step. An unidentified Frenchman traveling through the colonies at the height of the Stamp Act crisis in 1765 reported that “no nation was better calculated for independence, the people were disposed to it, and there was nothing they talked of more” (*American Historical Review*, p. 84). In 1768 the German soldier Johann De Kalb, traveling from the Carolinas to New England, observed that “all the people here are imbued with such a spirit of independence and even license, that if all the provinces can be united under a common representation, an independent state will certainly come forth in time” (ANB). But in 1768 Samuel Adams was undoubtedly in the minority in thinking of independence as a political objective. The idea certainly began to grow in the five years preceding the war, but Rhode Island regiments reporting for the siege of Boston spoke of themselves as being “in his Majesty’s service,” and Congress in its “Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms” (6 July 1775) said: “We have not raised armies with the ambitious design of separating from Great Britain and establishing independent states” (Jensen, p. 842).

There was no general drift by the colonies toward the idea of independence until near the close of 1775. People recognized that the steps already taken to manage and maintain the war effort, including establishing new state governments, amounted to something very much like practical independence. Southerners were particularly incensed by the efforts of Lord Dunmore, the royal governor of Virginia, to raise armed units of runaway slaves. Edward Rutledge of South Carolina wrote home from Philadelphia on 8 December 1775 with some hard questions:

What are the sentiments of the English nation? Are the people of that country determined to force us into independence? . . . Do they expect that after our towns have been destroyed, our liberties repeatedly invaded, our women and children driven from their habitations, . . . our slaves emancipated for the express purpose of massacring their masters, can they, I say, after all their injuries, expect that we shall return to our former connection with a forgiving and cordial disposition? (Smith, p. 463)

Still, in late 1775 the idea of separation was so radical that delegates to Congress delicately approached the problem of how they could lead the people toward an acceptance of independence. Thomas Paine, whose pamphlet *Common Sense* was published on 10 January 1776 and quickly and widely read thereafter, jolted the political system with his matter-of-fact advocacy of independence. The publication of *Common Sense* probably did more than any other single event to clarify thinking on the issue. The North Carolina convention had the distinction of being the first of the ad hoc, extralegal political bodies that now governed the colonies to give official sanction to the call for independence when, on 12 April 1776, it authorized its delegates to join others in Congress who might advocate such a movement. On 4 May the Rhode Island Assembly publicly announced its independence, the first colony to do so. The first colony to instruct its delegates to Congress to take the initiative on this matter was Virginia (15 May 1776), and on 7 June Richard Henry Lee moved a resolution “that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States” (Jensen, p. 867). John Adams seconded the motion, and played an important role in building the congressional consensus that produced the Declaration of Independence.

Such conservative delegates as John Dickinson of Pennsylvania, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, Robert R. Livingston of New York, and even Edward Rutledge remained cautious about independence, overwhelmed by the peril of fighting a war and pessimistic about the future. Dickinson said, “I fear the virtue of Americans. Resentment of the injuries offered to their country may

irritate them to counsels and to actions that may be detrimental to the cause they would dye to advance” (Smith, pp. 352–353). Other delegates of proven courage and patriotism, among them Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, John Jay of New York, George Read of Delaware, James Duane of New York, and Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, also believed that independence was premature. According to Carter Braxton of Virginia (14 April 1776), independence “is in truth a delusive bait which men inconsiderably catch at without knowing the hook to which it is affixed. It is an object to be wished for by every American, when it can be obtained with safety and honor” (Smith, p. 522).

SEE ALSO *De Kalb, Johann; Declaration of Independence; Paine, Thomas.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

INDIANA, VIRGINIA. A tract in what became West Virginia, between the Little Kanawha River and the boundary of Pennsylvania and extending from the

Ohio River on the west to the Monongahela on the east, was known as Indiana. The Iroquois Indians ceded this land to the English in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 in response to the fraudulent claims of a number of merchants, who maintained that the Iroquois had cheated them out of thousands of pounds in goods. Nothing ever came of their plans to organize settlement of this region. By the Treaty of Sycamore Shoals of 1775, this area became part of Benjamin Franklin’s proposed western state of Vandalia.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

INDIANS IN THE COLONIAL WARS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

American Indian peoples played a vital role in the armed conflicts between the European empires in eighteenth-century North America and an equally significant role in the American Revolutionary War. In the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and the Seven Years’ War (1754–1763), both of the contending European powers—France and Great Britain—went to war allied with communities of American Indians. During the American Revolution, both Great Britain and the United States sought Indian allies, although the British were far more successful in this endeavor. Native peoples in eastern North America understood the stakes of the British-American colonists’ struggle for independence, and most believed that they would not benefit from a change in the status quo. Many American Indian communities continued to resist the United States after the Peace of Paris (1783), although dwindling British support made native armed resistance increasingly problematic. Upon the reorganization and strengthening of the United States government with the Constitution of 1787, the majority of eastern Indians attempted to reach some kind of accommodation with the new regime, although usually these accommodations did not favor the Indians.

BACKGROUND: SEVENTEENTH AND EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

By 1740 the majority of American Indian communities of eastern North America had a history of contact and interaction with European settlers stretching back a century, if not longer. Spanish conquistadors had made multiple forays, or *entradas*, into eastern North America during the sixteenth century, although the only significant settlement of the Spanish lasting into the seventeenth century in the East was at St. Augustine in Florida. In the first three

decades of the seventeenth century, English, French, Dutch, and Swedish settlers established settlements along the Atlantic coast. New Netherland was conquered by the English in the Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 1660s, and New Sweden (on the lower Delaware River) was absorbed in the English colonies of Pennsylvania, West Jersey, and Delaware, leaving the colonies of France and Great Britain as the major European imperial presences in eastern North America in the early eighteenth century. Both the French Empire and the British Empire had extensive contacts and sustained interactions with the native peoples of eastern America, although the nature of the relationships varied greatly between the two empires.

Both France and Britain sent settlers to North America, and both groups established diplomatic and commercial relations with their Indian neighbors. Yet each empire emphasized these activities—settlement and Indian diplomacy—in such differing degrees that their colonial empires had become qualitatively different when their relations with American Indians were concerned. In North America, French settlement was concentrated in the St. Lawrence River Valley—including the substantial outposts of Quebec (founded 1608) and Montreal (settled 1638), and a number of peasant cultivators (*habitants*)—and the Lower Mississippi Valley. The bulk of the denizens of New France were either French military officers, fur traders, or Roman Catholic missionaries. Since the mid-seventeenth century, missionaries and fur traders had traveled throughout the Great Lakes Basin, Ohio Valley, and into the Mississippi River Valley, entering into alliances with various Indian communities, erecting a small number of forts and missions, and, in doing so, working to cement political and commercial alliances between the various native peoples and the kingdom of France. In exchange for furs, especially those of the beaver, the French traders provided European manufactured goods the Indians could not make for themselves—firearms, textiles, metal tools, and alcohol—and French Catholic priests provided access to the Sacraments to those Indians who chose to accept them. By 1740 New France was, as the historian Eric Hinderaker puts it, an “empire of commerce,” from which the French extracted wealth in the form of furs acquired through commerce and diplomacy.

The British empire was markedly different. By 1740 Britain’s settler colonies extended from the coast of Maine (then administered by the colony of Massachusetts) in the north to the recently founded colony of Georgia (founded 1732) between the Savannah and St. Mary’s Rivers in the south. Settlers of many European nationalities (and in many places, enslaved Africans) populated each of the thirteen colonies on the Atlantic seaboard, and in most cases these settler populations extended up to the foothills of the Appalachian Mountains. The indigenous peoples of the seaboard had been killed, dispersed, or encapsulated within reservations by British settlers in the seventeenth

and early eighteenth centuries. Although British settlers often engaged their American Indian neighbors in commerce, more often than not they did so as a precursor to the purchase or expropriation of that American Indian community’s lands. The British had constructed an empire of land: settlers came to British North America not to participate in the fur trade or to proselytize to the Indians, but to acquire land in order to build a family farm or a plantation, to provide the mother country with exotic agricultural commodities like tobacco and indigo and raw materials such as timber and naval stores, and also to provide the British West Indies with foodstuffs. A fur trade between British agents and American Indians did exist, but it was not the dominant economic sector in any colony. Thus, for British settlers, interaction with American Indians was usually a means to an end; for French settlers, interaction with American Indians was an end unto itself. The divergent nature of the two empires’ relations with American Indians would influence their conduct in the imperial wars of the mid-eighteenth century and the Revolutionary War.

FRENCH ALLIANCES WITH AMERICAN INDIANS

In large part because they emphasized commerce over acquisition of land, France had a more extensive alliance structure with the American Indians of eastern North America. France’s longest-standing Indian allies were the various Algonquian-speaking peoples of Canada, the Great Lakes Basin, and the Ohio Valley. (Algonquian, the family of Indian languages, is distinct from Algonquin, an Indian nation; the Algonquin were one of many Algonquian tribes.) In the early decades of the seventeenth century, the French made alliances with their near neighbors, the Huron, the Algonquin, and the Montagnai (or Innu). Through the Huron, the French goods came to the more westerly Ottawa. To the south of New France, the Dutch had made an alliance with New Netherland’s nearest neighbors, the Iroquois. Armed with superior Dutch guns, the Iroquois ranged out of their homeland, occupying fur-trapping grounds by force and, more often than not, taking already trapped furs from French allies. The so-called Beaver Wars (c.1640–1701) disrupted Huron communities especially. Some Huron embraced Catholic Christianity and lived alongside the French; others moved westward into the Great Lakes Basin, joining the villages of the Petun, the Erie, and the nation known as the “Neutral.” Iroquois attacks on these peoples followed. As the Huron moved westward, French trappers, traders, and missionaries followed them, and this movement of people opened the door for an expansive French alliance. By the end of the seventeenth century, the bulk of the Great Lakes Algonquians—the Ottawa, the Potawatomi, the Sauk and Fox, and

the Ojibwe (or Chippewa)—as well as the Iroquoian-speaking Huron-Petun and the Siouan-speaking Winnebagos, had all committed themselves to alliance with the French.

The French maintained their alliance through the annual exchange of goods for furs, conducted at a chain of missions, forts, and small settlements that came to dot the shores of the Great Lakes in the seventeenth century and by 1740 stretched the entire length of the Mississippi Valley. French mission towns were founded at Sault Saint Marie (1668), Green Bay (1669), Michilimackinac (1670), and at Kaskaskia among the Algonquian-speaking Illinois (1675). When Jacques Marquette and Louis Joliet traversed the length of the Mississippi River to its mouth in 1673, many French, notably explorer and imperial promoter René-Robert Cavelier, sieur de La Salle, began to imagine a chain of French forts and settlements stretching from Montreal to what would become New Orleans. Although La Salle was killed by the men under his command in 1687 during an abortive attempt to establish a settlement at the mouth of the Mississippi, subsequent French efforts led to the founding of Natchitoches (1714) on the Red River and the strategically invaluable New Orleans (1718) at the mouth of the Mississippi. The French also claimed sovereignty over most of the interior of North America drained by the Mississippi, which they called Louisiana. Yet their nominal control of Louisiana, like that in Canada, was rooted in their constant maintenance of alliances with native peoples. It is important to note that, as the historian Richard White has demonstrated, the French-Algonquian alliances were rooted in mutual misunderstandings as much as they were rooted in common interests. What the French saw as purely commercial transactions, native peoples saw as the exchange of gifts that continually reinforced and reaffirmed fictive kinship relationships. The various Algonquian peoples called every French governor at Montreal by the same name, Onontio, after a Mohawk transliteration of the name of an early governor. Thus, through trade, Indian peoples affirmed timeless identities while the French (and all Europeans) sought to maximize advantage in a marketplace they knew was constantly changing. Both sides realized that they each took something different away from their exchanges, but they tacitly agreed to disagree.

BRITISH ATTEMPTS AT INDIAN ALLIANCES IN THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The British managed similar alliances but on a smaller scale. After they displaced the Dutch in the 1660s and 1670s, and remade New Netherland into New York (confirmed at the Treaty of Westminster, 1674), the British sought to take the place of the Dutch as the main European allies of the Iroquois. It was in the later decades of the seventeenth century that many of the Algonquians, aided by the French, began to push back against the

Iroquois. This ultimately brought the Beaver Wars to an end with the negotiation of the Grande Paix, or Grand Settlement, of 1701 at Montreal, which terminated hostilities between the Iroquois and the French-allied Algonquians. Over the next decades, the Iroquois remained equally divided internally between Francophiles, who advocated a real alliance with France, Anglophiles, who wanted closer ties to the British colonies, and Neutralists, who wanted neither. The Iroquois League moved firmly toward a regular alliance with the British colonies with a 1722 treaty conference at Albany. The 1722 treaty was negotiated between representatives of the original Five Nations and the governors of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Pennsylvania would open Philadelphia to trade, and Virginia agreed to broker an end to hostilities between some of its Indian allies and the Iroquois. All three colonies recognized long-standing (and somewhat unrealistic) claims to Iroquois suzerainty over the Delaware and the Shawnee. The parties came together (minus New York, but with Maryland) two decades later at the Treaty of Lancaster (1744), in which the Iroquois actually sold their shaky claims to the Ohio Valley lands of the Delaware and the Shawnee to the colony of Virginia. The Lancaster treaty coincided with an increased interest among Virginia elites in speculation in trans-Appalachian lands, as well as the beginning of the hostilities on North American ground between Britain and France related to the War of the Austrian Succession.

INDIANS IN THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION (1740–1748)

The British colonials' interest in engagement with American Indian communities was multifaceted. Pennsylvania and Virginia agents penetrated the trans-Appalachian region with increasing frequency in the mid-1740s; traders from Pennsylvania, in particular, could offer Ohio Valley Indians British-made trade goods that were of higher quality than French goods, and they could offer more of them. Many Shawnee, Wyandot, Miami, and other Indians chose alliance and trade with Pennsylvania over New France during these years. The French-Algonquian alliance was weakening. At the same time, few American Indians were willing to join the British in open warfare against the French. Some Iroquois—mostly Mohawk—went along with Crown agent William Johnson's plans to attack Montreal, which did not go well. At the same time, on the southern borderlands, the Creek Indians (ostensibly British allies) refused to follow the orders of the governor of South Carolina, James Glen, to attack the French outpost of Fort Toulouse. Likewise, the French incorporated some of their Algonquian allies in their war effort, but with British traders actively weakening their alliance, they usually did not push too hard. The 1740s was a quiet

period compared to the full-scale warfare in North America in the 1750s and 1760s.

BETWEEN THE WARS, 1748–1754

When the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle ended the War of the Austrian Succession in 1748, the leadership of both the French and British colonies believed that a renewal of war would only be a matter of time. British colonial elites were very concerned that their colonies were unprepared for another war. Many officials and commentators, including Pennsylvania's Benjamin Franklin, New Yorkers Cadwallader Colden and Archibald Kennedy, and Carolina's Edmund Atkin, called for a strengthening of the alliance structure between the British colonies and their Indian neighbors. Indian allies were seen as France's secret weapon, and it was widely argued that the British needed to have Indian allies of their own. While politically aware British Americans called for stronger British-Indian relations, agents of the French Empire were seeking to undermine the inroads the British had already made. New France's governor dispatched Captain Pierre-Joseph Céloron de Blainville on an expedition to traverse the entire Ohio Valley in 1749. While Céloron was supposed to renew the French-Algonquian alliance, his only real substantive accomplishment was to bury a series of lead plates proclaiming the French claim to the Ohio Valley at regular intervals along the river. More direct action was taken in 1752, when Charles Langlade led a force of French, Ottawa, and Ojibwa to destroy the Miami town of Pickawillany, in modern-day central Ohio. Pickawillany was home to a trading post operated by British traders, and its destruction was an active attempt on the part of the French to assert their primacy over the Ohio Valley and its Indian communities. Like the British, the French were preparing for war, and the arrival of Marquis Duquesne, a career military officer, as governor of Canada in 1752 only confirmed this. Building on Langlade's success at Pickawillany, Duquesne in 1753 ordered the construction of four new forts—including Fort Duquesne at the strategically important confluence of the Ohio, Allegheny, and Monongahela Rivers. France thus actively sought to inhibit both British territorial expansion into the Ohio Valley and to prevent British colonial traders from having access to the valley's Indian communities.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR (FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR), 1754–1763

The construction of Fort Duquesne touched off the series of events that led to the beginning of the Seven Years' War. Seeking to assert its claims to the Ohio Forks region, the Virginia colony's legislature dispatched militia colonel George Washington on expeditions toward the Forks in

1753 and 1754. Washington was unable to secure Indian allies of any significant number, and though the French garrisons at Fort Duquesne were relatively small, the large numbers of Indians who came to the fort to trade ensured that French commanders would have ample numbers of allies to draw from to repel British incursions. This was the state of affairs when Washington surrendered the makeshift Fort Necessity in 1754, and when General Edward Braddock's armies suffered defeat (and Braddock himself was killed) in an ambush on the road to the Forks in 1755. As the Seven Years' War (or French and Indian War) erupted, France could count the vast majority of the Algonquian peoples of the Great Lakes Basin and Ohio Valley as allies. The British relationship with many of its Indian allies had grown rocky in the early 1750s; for example, the intercolonial alliance with the Iroquois, the Covenant Chain, was only renewed at the Albany Congress of 1754.

The French followed up their victory over Braddock with further successes in the North American theater over the course of the next two years. By 1757 French forces under General Louis-Joseph, marquis de Montcalm-Gozon de Saint-Véran, penetrated deep into upstate New York via the Lake Champlain–Lake George–Hudson River corridor. Montcalm's success was due in large part to the recruitment of many Algonquian warriors from all over New France, a policy engineered by Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, the Governor of New France. Understanding that he could not field matching numbers of regular troops against the British, Vaudreuil called in as many Indian warriors as he could to allow his commanders to take the offensive as deep as possible into British territory. Montcalm was the most successful at adopting this strategy, but after his capture of Fort William Henry in 1757 it came undone. Vaudreuil having promised them captives to adopt in their communities, the Algonquian warriors did not approve of Montcalm's strict adherence to European rules of warfare and thus took dozens of captives after the formal surrender of Fort William Henry. The loss of life was not great enough to justify the claims of a "massacre" put forward by authors such as Francis Parkman and James Fennimore Cooper, and the ultimate damage at Fort William Henry was done to the French forces rather than the British. Vaudreuil was forced to pay the Algonquians for the return of most of the captives in order to satisfy Montcalm's surrender agreement. With the rules of American Indian warfare thus broken, the French could never again call on the numbers of native allies they had during the campaigns of 1756–1757. Montcalm was forced to fight on the defensive until his defeat (and death) at the hands of James Wolfe at Quebec (1759). New France fell completely to British arms with the surrender of Montreal the following year. British dominion over all

of eastern North America was confirmed with the Treaty of Paris (1763).

THE STRUGGLE FOR A COHERENT INDIAN POLICY, 1763–1775

In the years following the Treaty of Paris, Great Britain's policy of engagement toward the American Indian communities of eastern North America was a confused one, alternately turning on considerations of military and economic expediency, accommodation of Indian interests and expectations, and attempts to mollify growing resentment of imperial policies at the colonial level. With James Wolfe's death at Quebec in 1759, Jeffery Amherst succeeded to the post of commander in chief of British forces in North America. At the war's end, Amherst made a conscious decision to adopt a policy of economizing. He consolidated his scattered frontier forces in a smaller number of posts, and also acted to limit the amount of trade goods regularly given to Indian leaders in the Great Lakes–Ohio Valley region. Most of the Algonquian peoples—the former allies of the French—resented Amherst's new policies deeply, and at the instigation of Ottawa war chief Pontiac and Delaware religious leader Neolin, a pan-Algonquian uprising against British forces began in May 1763. Pontiac's Rebellion, as it became known, lasted into 1765. The main results of the uprising were the removal of Amherst as commander in chief and the British Indian Agents' adoption of the generous trade policies that had characterized the French alliance. On 7 October 1763, the British government also put forward the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which established the spine of the Appalachian Mountains as the boundary line between the British settler colonies on the eastern seaboard and the vast Indian country to the west. During and after Pontiac's Rebellion, the British government sought to maintain peaceful relations with the Indians of eastern North America: it adopted the generous trade and gift-giving policies of the French and also sought to curtail potentially violent interactions between European settlers and Indians.

The new British policy of the mid-1760s provoked discontent in a number of quarters. The British Indian Agents—William Johnson in the north and John Stuart in the south—brokered treaties and deals that often favored their own personal interests; moreover, they favored the interests of some Indian nations over others. A case in point was the Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1768, which Johnson negotiated. This treaty conference brought together representatives of the Iroquois League as well as numerous Algonquian peoples from the Ohio Valley and eastern Great Lakes. Johnson secured a readjustment to the boundary line set forward in the Proclamation of 1763, extending the realm of white settlement out to the Ohio River. He did so, however, by ignoring the western

Indians present and by negotiating through the Iroquois—confirming the claims of Iroquois suzerainty that had been put forward two decades before at the Lancaster Treaty. Johnson also negotiated private land sales from various Indian communities for speculative interests he was involved with outside of the formal treaty negotiations. Thus British policy, as it was experienced, treated some Indian nations better than others.

At the same time, many colonial governments bristled at the restrictions on expansion imposed on them by the Proclamation of 1763. Responding to colonial pressures, in March 1768 the Board of Trade, at the urging of the new American Secretary Wills Hill, earl of Hillsborough, removed control of Indian trade from the Indian superintendents and returned it to the individual colonial governments. The Indian Agents retained control over diplomacy, but each colony began licensing increasing numbers of Indian traders, and many of these men were more interested in Indian lands than they were in Indian trade. Generally speaking, the interests of the colonial governments and the imperial government were divergent: the former wanted expansion of settlement, whereas the latter wanted to preserve the status quo. Indian peoples recognized this and, when the rupture between the two sides finally occurred, were more receptive to agents of the crown than to agents of the colonies.

AMERICAN INDIANS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

With the outbreak of war between the American colonies and the British government in the spring of 1775, the question of which side the various American Indian communities would take in the conflict loomed large. Both the Continental Congress and the British government initially hoped that the various American Indian communities would remain neutral. Nevertheless, preparations were soon made on both sides to attempt to woo Indians into alliance and accommodate them once that was accomplished. To coordinate Indian policy among the thirteen colonies, the Continental Congress created three Indian departments on 12 July 1775. The Northern Department would focus on the Iroquois and all of the nations to their north, the Southern Department on the Cherokees and all nations to the south, and the Middle Department on the Indian nations in between these two. Congress then appointed commissioners for each of these departments who would be responsible for conducting diplomacy and managing military interaction between the Indians and the various American armies. The British retained the Indian Superintendent system, with its Northern and Southern Departments. John Stuart remained southern superintendent at the start of the war; Guy Johnson had succeeded his uncle William Johnson as northern superintendent when the elder Johnson died in 1774. In 1775 and 1776, agents

on both sides made numerous attempts to win as many Indian allies as possible.

As had been the case during the imperial wars of mid-century, British North Americans generally regarded the Iroquois League as the most important of all the eastern Indian nations. The Six Nations' crucial geopolitical position between Loyalist Canada and Patriot New York, placing them on the front lines of any conflict, no doubt played a great role in both sides' strategic calculus. Operating out of a headquarters in Albany, General Philip Schuyler served as the lead Indian commissioner for the Northern Department and made repeated attempts to entice as many of the Iroquois nations to the American side as possible. He held a series of diplomatic conferences with the Iroquois—Albany (1775), German Flats (1776), Albany (1777), and Johnstown (1778)—that had the effect of attracting only a majority of the Oneida and Tuscarora nations to the American side. The bulk of the Iroquois remained loyal to the Johnsons and the British. Members of the Iroquois League would fight on both sides during the Revolutionary War, and Iroquois actually fought against one another during the Battle of Oriskany (1777), a part of John Burgoyne's failed invasion of New York. The nadir of hostilities came with the infamous Sullivan Expedition of 1779, in which General John Sullivan led American troops into the lands of the British-allied Iroquois nations, systematically destroying villages and burning crops. Americans viewed the expedition as retaliation for Indian attacks in Pennsylvania's Wyoming Valley the year before (1778) and also as an attempt to weaken the Iroquois' ability to wage war.

The United States met with similar frustrations in attempting to find Indian allies on the southern and western borderlands. John Stuart succeeded in keeping most of the southern nations either allied with the British or ostensibly neutral. The Cherokee were a prominent exception, openly declaring war on the American colonists in 1776. Cherokee raids were countered by punitive expeditions from all of the southern colonies in the summer and fall of 1776. The Americans destroyed many Cherokee towns and cornfields, and the Cherokee sued for peace a year later. Low-level warfare between Indians and colonists persisted until the formal end of the Revolutionary War. In the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes region, only the Delaware joined wholeheartedly with the American cause. Congress appointed George Morgan, a Pennsylvania merchant and land speculator, as Indian agent for the Middle Department. After much negotiation Morgan succeeded in getting a Delaware delegation, led by pro-American chief White Eyes, to sign a formal treaty at Fort Pitt (1778). After White Eyes was murdered by American settlers, the alliance with the Delaware fell apart, and more Delaware communities in the Ohio Valley lapsed into either neutrality or outright

hostility toward the American cause. Momentary success also occurred in the Ohio Valley with the expedition in 1778–1779 of Virginian George Rogers Clark, who captured British posts at Vincennes and Kaskaskia. The Kaskaskia Indians sent a delegation that was received by Virginia Governor Thomas Jefferson in 1781. The alliance with the Kaskaskia was never formalized via treaty, and Clark's "conquest" of the Northwest proved to be tenuous. Low-level conflict persisted between American settlers in Kentucky and the Shawnee and between American settlers in the Ohio Forks region and Wyandot, Mingo, and other British-allied Algonquians through the remainder of the Revolutionary War and into the 1780s.

Although most eastern Indians fought on the British side and held their ground in trans-Appalachia, with the Peace Treaty of 3 September 1783 British negotiators ceded sovereignty of the entire trans-Appalachian region south of the Great Lakes, north of Florida, and east of the Mississippi to the now-independent United States of America. When commissioners of the American Congress asserted their sovereignty over all of the British-allied (and hence defeated) Indian nations at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1784) and subsequent negotiations, Indian negotiators generally reacted with dismay, and ultimately with continued resistance. General resistance (either through fighting the Americans or ignoring them) would continue until the adoption of a policy of Indian negotiation, put forward by Secretary of War Henry Knox during the first Washington administration (1789–1793), that paid more respect to native sovereignty.

SEE ALSO *Amherst, Jeffery (1717–1797); Austrian Succession, War of the; Braddock, Edward; Clark, George Rogers; Colonial Wars; Fort Stanwix, Treaty of; Fort William Henry (Fort George), New York; Franklin, Benjamin; French and Indian War; Johnson, Guy; Johnson, Sir William; Knox, Henry; Langlede, Charles Michel de; Oriskany, New York; Paris, Treaty of (10 February 1763); Peace Treaty of 3 September 1783; Pontiac's War; Proclamation of 1763; Schuyler, Philip; Stuart, John; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois; Wolfe, James.*

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revised by Leonard J. Sadosky

INTELLIGENCE, AMERICAN. American civilian and military leaders during the Revolution conducted a surprisingly large array of intelligence activities: espionage, violent and non-violent covert action, deceptions, and counterintelligence operations. The impact that these activities had on the course of the war usually is overlooked in military studies and biographies of the period. In contrast to the British army's intelligence system, which was created and controlled from the top down, American intelligence activities initially were decentralized and carried out by self-appointed groups and committees operating on the local level. Fairly soon after hostilities broke out in April 1775, however, the Continental Congress started organizing overseas operations and, after a stumbling start, Continental army commander George Washington became an adept battlefield practitioner of the "black arts."

AN INTELLIGENCE "MILITIA"

The first Patriot intelligence network on record was a secret group in Boston known as the Mechanics. An offshoot of the Sons of Liberty, who had successfully opposed the Stamp Act in 1765, the Mechanics (meaning skilled laborers and artisans) organized resistance to British authority, sabotaged and stole British military equipment in Boston, and gathered intelligence on British troop strength and movements.

Through numerous intelligence sources, the Mechanics saw through the cover story the British devised

to mask their march on Lexington and Concord in April 1775. The best-known Mechanic, Paul Revere, was part of an elaborate warning network of riders and messengers that spread news of the British action over much of eastern Massachusetts within 12 hours.

NATIONAL-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

Later in 1775, the Second Continental Congress began conducting intelligence activities. On 18 September it created a Secret Committee that employed agents to covertly obtain military supplies abroad through intermediaries (in modern parlance, "cutouts" and "fronts"). The Committee also gathered intelligence about hidden Tory ammunition stores and arranged to seize them. Operatives of the committee also plundered British supplies in the southern colonies. Its members included some of the most influential representatives in the Congress, such as Benjamin Franklin, Robert Morris, Robert Livingston, and John Dickinson.

Recognizing the need for foreign intelligence and foreign alliances, the Second Continental Congress created the Committee of Correspondence (soon renamed the Committee of Secret Correspondence) on 29 November 1775. The Committee—America's first foreign intelligence agency—employed secret agents, conducted covert operations, devised codes and ciphers, funded propaganda activities, opened private mail, and developed its own naval force. Its agents overseas included Arthur Deane, a physician in London, and Silas Deane, a former delegate to the Congress, who went to France under cover as a Bermudian merchant to make secret purchases.

After Franklin went to France in 1777 as one of the Congress's emissaries to the royal court, Paris became the hub of American intelligence and propaganda activities in Europe. Operating through front companies and intermediaries, American agents arranged for covert aid shipments from Spain and the Netherlands in their Caribbean territories. The American mission also secretly communicated with Britons and Scots sympathetic to the Patriot cause.

PROPAGANDA AND COVERT ACTION

Patriot leaders ran several efforts to influence European opinion and undermine morale in the British army, particularly by targeting the Hessian mercenaries. The Committee of Secret Correspondence employed Charles Dumas, a Swiss journalist in The Hague, to plant stories in a Dutch newspaper to raise the United States's rating in Dutch credit markets. Franklin was especially imaginative in using propaganda. While in Paris he fabricated a letter purportedly sent by a German prince to the commander of his mercenaries in America. The letter disputed British

casualty figures for the German troops, arguing that the actual number was much higher and that he was being cheated of payments owed him for dead or wounded soldiers. The bogus letter also told the officer to let his wounded soldiers die because the British would pay more for fatalities, and because injured troops might return home unfit for further service. Franklin's forgery was widely circulated in Europe and among Hessian troops in the colonies, and was credited with causing some of the between 5,000 and 6,000 Hessians desertions. On another occasion Franklin created a copy of a Boston newspaper with a phony article that said the British royal governor of Canada was paying his Indian allies for each American scalp they gave him. The story touched off an uproar in Britain, and opposition Whig politicians used it to attack British conduct of the war.

Based on intelligence received by the Committee of Secret Correspondence, the Continental Congress on 15 February 1776 authorized a covert action plan to urge the Canadians to become a "sister colony" in the struggle for independence, and appointed Franklin, Samuel Chase, and Charles Carroll to undertake the mission. They dispatched a French printer to Canada to publish pro-Patriot materials, and Father John Carroll negotiated with the local Catholic clergy. Franklin and his colleagues also were empowered to enlist Canadian fighters in a proxy force and to offer them sanctuary in the thirteen colonies. The overall project failed because of American military excesses against the Canadian populace, hostility of the clergy, and the inability of American commissioners to deliver little more than promises in exchange for Canada's defection.

American revolutionaries conducted many sabotage operations against British targets in the colonies and launched one mission in England. After he went to Paris with the American mission, Silas Deane engaged the services of James Aitken, who offered to sabotage English dockyards with an incendiary device he designed. On 7 December 1776, Aitken set a fire at the Portsmouth dockyard that destroyed many tons of naval supplies. After failing to penetrate the security at Plymouth, Aitken proceeded to Bristol, where he destroyed two warehouses and several homes. In response, the British government stepped up security at all military facilities, offered a reward of £1,000, and even discussed suspending habeas corpus and imposing martial law. Aitken was soon apprehended while carrying a pistol, incendiaries, and a French passport. After a speedy trial, he was hanged on 10 March 1777 in Portsmouth dockyard, where his exploits had begun.

THE FIRST AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF

George Washington was a skilled manager of intelligence. He recruited and debriefed Tory and Patriot sources,

developed informants, interrogated prisoners and travelers, cleverly used deception and propaganda, and practiced sound tradecraft. He recognized the need for multiple sources so reports could be crosschecked, and so the compromise of one asset would not cut off intelligence from an important area. His first recorded expenditure for intelligence came only two weeks after he took command, and during the war he spent more than 10 percent of his military funds on intelligence operations.

However, Washington's first wartime intelligence venture ended in failure. Nathan Hale probably was the best-known but least successful American agent in the War of Independence. He volunteered to spy in British-held New York, but had no espionage training, no contacts or channels of communication, and no cover story to explain his absence from camp. Only his Yale diploma backstopped his cover as an itinerant schoolmaster. British Major Robert Rogers, a hero of the French and Indian War who pretended to be a Patriot spy, tricked Hale into disclosing his mission. Hale was immediately captured and went to the gallows on 22 September 1776, reportedly uttering as his last words a paraphrase of a line from Joseph Addison's play, *Cato*: "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country."

The Hale debacle convinced Washington that he needed an elite detachment dedicated to tactical reconnaissance that reported directly to him. He picked Thomas Knowlton to command the army's first intelligence unit, known as "Knowlton's Rangers"—130 soldiers and 20 officers sent on secret missions too dangerous for regular troops. The date 1776 on the seal of the army's intelligence service today refers to the formation of Knowlton's Rangers. Washington also received vital intelligence from stay-behind agents, such as Hercules Mulligan, who ran a clothing shop in New York frequented by British officers who often let secrets slip while in his store. Mulligan was the first to alert Washington to two British plans to capture the American commander in chief and to a planned incursion into Pennsylvania. Another source in New York was Lieutenant Lewis J. Costigin, who stayed in the city after his release in a prisoner exchange in September 1778. For several months he pretended to be on parole and roamed about, gathering intelligence on British commanders, troop deployments, shipping, and logistics, and then smuggled the information out through underground Patriot communication networks.

FURTHER ESPIONAGE SUCCESSES

John Honeyman's intelligence work for Washington in December 1776 may have helped keep the Continental army in the war. The year before, Honeyman had volunteered his services and, posing as a butcher, passed freely inside British-held areas and observed enemy troop strength and movements. At Trenton he contrived to be

arrested by American pickets as a suspected Tory spy and was brought to Washington, to whom he reported what he had learned. Washington then arranged for Honeyman to “escape” from the American camp so he could return to Trenton with disinformation about the Continentals’ sorry state. His bogus information may have contributed to the complacency of the commander of the Hessian garrison, which was caught by surprise when Washington’s forces attacked across the Delaware River on 26 December. The Trenton victory came at a critical time for the Patriots, providing a huge political and psychological boost.

The most elaborate and productive network Washington oversaw was the Culper Ring in New York and on Long Island. In the summer of 1778, General Sir Henry Clinton occupied the city, while Washington’s forces were scattered around New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Needing intelligence on Clinton’s forces and intentions, Washington ordered Major Benjamin Tallmadge, a native of Long Island, to establish an espionage net. The spy ring eventually had about 20 members who either reported on British activities on Manhattan Island or conveyed the intelligence out of the city to Setauket and across Long Island Sound to Tallmadge’s couriers in Connecticut, who then rode to Washington’s encampment.

Tallmadge’s operatives practiced sophisticated trade-craft that included code names, cover stories, secret writing, encryption, and dead drops. For security reasons, Washington did not have Tallmadge tell him who was in the Culper Ring. Its chief field operative was Abraham Woodhull, a Setauket farmer, whose main agents were a Quaker businessman, Robert Townshend, and the king’s printer in New York, James Rivington. Other key members were Austin Roe, a Setauket tavern keeper whose frequent travels to the city for supplies afforded good cover for his work as a courier, and Caleb Brewster, who took Roe’s messages from dead drops along the south coast of Long Island Sound across to Connecticut.

DECEPTIONS AND DISINFORMATION

To offset British superiority in firepower and number of troops, Washington made frequent use of deception operations. He allowed fabricated documents to fall into the hands of enemy agents or be discussed in their presence; told couriers carrying spurious information to be “captured” by the British; and inserted forged documents in intercepted British pouches that were then sent on to their destinations. He had army procurement officers make false purchases of large quantities of supplies in places picked to convince the British that a sizeable Continental force was massing. After learning from the Culper Ring that the British planned to attack a French expedition that had just landed in Newport, Rhode Island,

Washington planted information with known British agents indicating that he intended to move against New York, and he staged a “march” toward the city. Those ploys persuaded Clinton to call back his troops headed for Rhode Island. A few years later, Washington used similar techniques to hide his movement toward the Chesapeake Bay—and eventual victory at Yorktown—by convincing the British initially that he was again moving on New York.

At Yorktown, James Armistead, a slave who had joined the Marquis de Lafayette’s service with his master’s permission, crossed into General Charles Cornwallis’s lines in the guise of an escaped slave, and was recruited by Cornwallis to return to American lines as a spy. Lafayette gave Armistead a fabricated order supposedly for a large contingent of patriot replacements—a force that did not exist. Armistead delivered the fake order in crumpled, dirty condition to Cornwallis, claiming he found it along a road during his spy mission. Cornwallis believed Armistead and did not learn he had been tricked until after the climactic battle. Another deception operation at Yorktown had Charles Morgan entering Cornwallis’s camp as a “deserter.” When debriefed by the British, he convinced them that Lafayette had enough boats to move all his troops against the British in one landing operation. Cornwallis was duped and dug in, rather than march out of Yorktown.

SECRET WRITING, CODES, AND CIPHERS

American intelligence officers tried to keep their communications secure by concealing the writing, encrypting the message, or both. While serving in Paris, Silas Deane wrote some of his intelligence reports to America with a heat-developing invisible ink. Later, he used a “sympathetic stain” created for secret communications by James Jay, a physician and the brother of John Jay. The stain was more secure than the ink used previously, because it required one chemical for writing the message and a second to develop it. Dr. Jay used the “stain” for reporting military information from London to America, and supplied quantities of the stain to Washington in America and to Deane in Paris. The Culper Ring used the stain for its secret writing.

Patriots used cryptographic methods to make messages incomprehensible to the reader. John Jay and Arthur Lee devised dictionary codes, in which numbers referred to the page and line in an agreed-upon dictionary edition where the plaintext (words of the unencrypted message) could be found. In 1775, Dumas designed the first diplomatic cipher, used by the Continental Congress and Franklin to communicate with agents and ministers in Europe. Dumas’s 682-symbol system substituted numbers for letters in the order in which they appeared in a pre-selected paragraph of French prose. The Culper Ring used

a numerical substitution code that Tallmadge developed. He took several hundred words and several dozen names of people or places and assigned each a number from 1 to 763 (for example, 38 meant attack, 192 stood for fort, Washington was identified as 711, and New York was replaced by 727). After receiving a message from a courier, a female operative in the ring signaled that a dead drop had been filled and identified its location using a code involving laundry hung out to dry. A black petticoat indicated that the drop was full, and the number of handkerchiefs identified the cove on Long Island Sound where the message had been hidden.

The Patriots had two notable successes in breaking British ciphers. In 1775, Elbridge Gerry and the team of Elisha Porter and Reverend Samuel West, working separately at Washington's direction, decrypted a letter that implicated Dr. Benjamin Church, the Continental army's chief surgeon, in enemy espionage. In 1781, James Lovell, who designed cipher systems used by several prominent Americans, cracked the encryption method that British commanders used to communicate with each other. When a dispatch from Cornwallis in Yorktown to Clinton in New York was intercepted, Lovell's cryptanalysis enabled Washington to gauge how desperate Cornwallis's situation was and when to attack the British lines. Soon after, another decrypt by Lovell warned the French fleet off Yorktown that a British relief expedition was approaching. The French scared off the British flotilla, assuring victory for the Americans.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

At the start of the war, American counterintelligence efforts focused on identifying and arresting British agents, Tories, and Tory sympathizers. Several discoveries—Church's service as a British spy; the royal governor of New York's recruitment of agents to sabotage Patriot defenses in and around New York City; and an assassination plot against Washington by his bodyguards—prompted American leaders to give greater attention to counterintelligence. Probably the first Patriot organization created for such purposes was the New York State Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies. Led by future chief justice John Jay, the Committee collected intelligence, apprehended British spies and couriers, and interrogated suspected British sympathizers. The Committee's main area of operation was the strategic Hudson River Valley area, where the British were aggressively enlisting Tory sympathizers. The Committee had the power to arrest and try, to grant bail or parole, and to jail or deport. A company of militia was placed under its command to implement its broad charter. The Committee heard over 500 cases involving disloyalty and subversion.

A few American counterintelligence officers made significant operational achievements. Enoch Crosby was

probably the best known of Jay's agents. A shoemaker by trade, Crosby traveled around the lower Hudson River Valley area in true cover, joining Tory groups, gathering evidence of their pro-British activities, and then passing the information to Jay, who then had the groups arrested. Crosby always managed to "escape" just as the group he had infiltrated was about to be apprehended. His success made him one of the models for the central character in the first espionage novel written in English, James Fenimore Cooper's *The Spy* (1821).

Another successful American counterintelligence officer was Captain David Gray of Massachusetts. Posing as a deserter, Gray entered the service of Colonel Beverly Robinson, a Tory intelligence officer, and became his courier. As a result, the Americans read the contents of each of Robinson's dispatches before their delivery. Gray eventually became the courier for Major Oliver DeLancey Jr., the head of the British secret service in New York. For two years Gray, as DeLancey's courier to Canada, successfully penetrated the principal communications link of the British secret service. Upon completing his assignment, Gray returned to the Continental army, and his name was struck from the deserter list, where Washington had placed it at the beginning of the operation to establish his cover.

The most notorious counterintelligence case of the war involved General Benedict Arnold, an accomplished but ambitious, greedy, and disgruntled Continental army commander. Arnold—whose arduous but abortive wintertime campaign against Quebec in 1775 and serious wound at Saratoga had proven his devotion to the cause—felt aggrieved because he had been passed over for promotion and was court-martialed for financial malfeasance. In addition, he had married a devoted Tory, Peggy Shippen. In May 1779 he began conspiring with a British friend of his wife's, John André. While commander at West Point, he negotiated with the British to surrender that strategically vital installation for £20,000. When Arnold learned that André had been caught, he fled to the British lines and later organized the "American Legion" that staged guerrilla-style raids in Virginia and Connecticut. Arnold's treachery so incensed Washington that he ordered at least two operations to capture the war's most infamous turncoat.

INTELLIGENCE'S IMPACT ON THE WAR'S OUTCOME

Although it is hard to precisely gauge the overall contribution intelligence made to the American victory, it directly contributed to important tactical successes at Trenton, Princeton, Newport, and Yorktown. The war probably would have lasted longer, cost more lives, and caused more social and economic upheaval without the secret activities that the Americans conducted. As the first president, Washington drew on his wartime experience to run

intelligence operations using secret funds he persuaded Congress to appropriate for that purpose.

SEE ALSO *Committee of Secret Correspondence; Deane, Silas; Franklin, Benjamin; Hale, Nathan (1755–1776); Jay, John; Knowlton, Thomas.?*

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David Robarge

INTERIOR LINES. A term used in tactics and strategy to indicate a situation in which one commander has an advantage in being able to employ his forces against the enemy faster than the enemy can counter his moves. A commander may possess interior lines by virtue of a central position with respect to his opponent. This is so self-evident that one is led into error in assuming that there is nothing more to the concept of interior lines. But a commander may also possess interior lines by virtue of having superior lateral communications. Consider Washington's dilemma at the start of the Philadelphia campaign: he was located in New Jersey; the British were in New York City; and Burgoyne's offensive was moving south along the Lake Champlain–Hudson River line. Washington had a "central position" from which, in theory, he could move the bulk of his forces to meet Burgoyne's threat in the north or any of three threats from General Howe in New York City: up the Hudson to join Burgoyne; overland through New Jersey to Philadelphia; or by sea to the Delaware and against Philadelphia. Yet by virtue of their superior lateral communications—which in this instance were by water—the British actually had interior lines.

An understanding of interior lines and a correct use of the concept has been a hallmark of successful tacticians and strategists through the ages; the concept has been misunderstood by other military men and by most writers for the same period. The main purpose of this article is to put the reader on guard: it is beyond the scope of the present work to attempt a complete explanation of what interior lines are, but it is possible to point out what they are not.

Before leaving the subject, however, it should be noted that a commander who does not possess the advantage of interior lines at the start of a campaign may often create the situation by a "strategic penetration." The campaigns of Napoleon offer many examples.

Mark M. Boatner

INTOLERABLE (OR COERCIVE) ACTS. Opposition to the Tea Act, centered at Boston, Massachusetts, and culminating in the Boston Tea Party, led an angry and exasperated Parliament to pass several measures to crush the center of colonial resistance and ensure the effectiveness of increased imperial control.

The Boston Port Act, to take effect on 1 June 1774, prohibited any ship from entering or leaving the port of Boston until restitution had been made for the cost of the tea destroyed in the "tea party." The customs office in Massachusetts was moved to Salem, allowing commerce to continue but bypassing Boston. To intimidate the Boston activists and ensure that duties would be paid if Boston port was opened in the future, Governor Thomas Hutchinson was replaced as governor of Massachusetts by Major General Thomas Gage, commander in chief of British forces in America, who was backed up with four regiments of regular troops.

The Massachusetts Regulating Act, to take effect in stages through 1 October 1774, annulled important parts of the Massachusetts charter of 1691. The first provision gave the king the right to choose the Council (the upper house of the assembly), the second allowed the governor (then General Gage) to appoint judges and sheriffs without local assent, the third prohibited town meetings more than once a year without the governor's permission, and the fourth placed the selection of juries in the hands of the royally appointed sheriffs. By annulling important parts of the Massachusetts charter without due process, these provisions threatened the foundation of government throughout the colonies because they changed "the long-established rule that once a provincial act had been approved by the Crown, the Crown had no authority to repeal or amend it" (Knollenberg, p. 138).

The Administration of Justice Act, to take effect on 1 June 1774, allowed the governor to move the trial of anyone who had been indicted for a capital crime, including murder, while “acting under the direction or order of any magistrate, for the suppression of riots or for the carrying into effect the laws of revenue” to another colony or to Britain (*ibid.*, p. 139).

Although not part of Parliament’s direct response to the Boston Tea Party, two other measures aimed at tightening imperial control—an expansion of the Quartering Acts and the Québec Act—contributed to inflaming colonial opinion against Parliament.

The Intolerable Acts allowed Massachusetts activists to portray themselves as victims of British tyranny, helped opponents of increased imperial control in other colonies to claim that Parliament was threatening the rights and liberties of all colonists, and made the calling of the first Continental Congress seem like the necessary next step.

SEE ALSO *Boston Tea Party; Continental Congress; Gage, Thomas; Hutchinson, Thomas; Quartering Acts; Quebec Act; Tea Act.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

INVALID. Disabled soldier assigned to limited military service (garrison duty or prisoner of war guard).

SEE ALSO *Corps of Invalids.*

Mark M. Boatner

IRISH VOLUNTEERS SEE *Volunteers of Ireland.*

IRON HILL, DELAWARE. 3 September 1777. Another name for the Battle of Cooch’s Bridge.

SEE ALSO *Cooch’s Bridge.*

IROQUOIS LEAGUE. The Iroquois League was the name of the confederation of six distinct Iroquoian-speaking Indian nations: the Mohawks, the

	1763	1775–1783
Mohawk	160	300
Oneida	250	150
tuscarora	140	200
Onondaga	150	300
Cayuga	200	230
Seneca	1,050	400
	1,950	1,580

Table 1. *Number of Warriors in the Iroquois League.* THE GALE GROUP. SOURCE: J. N. B. HEWETT, *HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIANS.*

Cayugas, the Oneidas, the Onondagas, the Senecas, and the Tuscaroras. The Iroquois were arguably the most powerful and important group of American Indians in eastern North America during the eighteenth century. They were firm British allies in the middle decades of the eighteenth century but were sharply divided by the American Revolution. Members of the Iroquois League fought on both the British and American sides during that conflict, and campaigns conducted within the Iroquois homeland proved particularly devastating.

THE COVENANT CHAIN

For most of the eighteenth century, the Iroquois League occupied most of what became upstate New York. The five original nations of the league—the Mohawks, the Cayugas, the Oneidas, the Onondagas, and the Senecas—had been joined together in an alliance that predated European contact. The Iroquois League was not only a political organization but a spiritual one as well, as the origins of the confederation were explained through an elaborate story in the Iroquois mythos that anthropologists and historians label the Deganawidah Epic. The proper name for the political-spiritual Iroquois League was the Great League of Peace and Power, or the Haudenosaunee, the Iroquois word meaning longhouse. Europeans most often referred to the Iroquois League first as the Five Nations and then as the Six Nations after the addition of the Tuscaroras to the League in 1722. The Iroquois political forms included not only the league that bound the member nations to one another, but also a set of foreign alliances, conceptualized as fictive kinship relationships, known as the Covenant Chain. This alliance structure tied together neighboring Indian nations, such as the Delawares, as well as the British colonies that had dealings with the Iroquois and their neighbors. Periodic ceremonies conducted at Albany by colonial officials—notably Sir William Johnson, superintendent of the Northern Indian Department—and Iroquois leaders, which included the exchange of trade goods, served to

renew and “brighten” the Chain. It was through this alliance structure that the Iroquois remained British allies during the Seven Years’ War and into the early part of the American Revolution. It was also under the aegis of the Covenant Chain that the Iroquois claimed title to western lands they sold to various colonial governments.

THE EARLY HOSTILITIES

The Iroquois League and the Covenant Chain Alliance were buffeted in the early years of the American Revolution, and the conflict ultimately split the League and its alliances. In July 1774 the longtime broker of relations between the Iroquois, neighboring Indians, and the British colonists, Sir William Johnson, died. His nephew, Colonel Guy Johnson, succeeded him as superintendent of the Northern Indian Department. Shortly after the death of Sir William, the Iroquois League refused to assist the Shawnee Indians in their conflict against the colony of Virginia in 1774 known as Lord Dunmore’s War. The tensions of 1774 were followed by the outbreak of open hostilities between the British government and the leadership of the American colonies in early 1775.

At the start of the American Revolution the Iroquois League desired to remain neutral and managed to preserve its neutrality during the first year and a half of the conflict. General Thomas Gage warned Guy Johnson that the New England revolutionaries might attempt to influence the Iroquois, especially through the activities of Presbyterian missionary Samuel Kirkland, who had been living with the Oneidas since the early 1760s. Johnson sent an Anglican missionary to the Oneida towns to counter Kirkland’s influence and watched the latter closely. In 1775 the governor of Canada, Guy Carleton, threatened the Iroquois with seizure of their lands if they did not support the crown against the colonists.

DIVISIONS AMONG THE IROQUOIS

At the same time, Kirkland began to advise the Continental Congress on how it might conduct diplomacy with the Iroquois League. Congress had created an Indian Committee in July 1775 and, listening to Kirkland’s advice, it opened negotiations with several Iroquois leaders in August 1775 at Albany. General Philip Schuyler, one of several Indian commissioners for the Northern Department, took the lead in negotiations, convening the conference at Albany and a conference at German Flats the next year. Schuyler could never negotiate with all of the Six Nations, and the Oneidas and Tuscaroras formed the bulk of his negotiating partners. Until the spring of 1776, they were not willing to abandon neutrality. However, by that point in time, the bulk of the Senecas, Cayugas, and Mohawks, along with many Onondagas, openly sided with Guy Johnson and the British government. Fearing

capture by Patriot militias, Johnson had left the Mohawk River Valley in the summer of 1775. The British government had granted lands in Canada to the Mohawks and their leader, Joseph Brant, or Thayendenaga. Many Iroquois communities relocated to the western part of modern upstate New York, where the British post of Fort Niagara served as a communication and commercial center. The British willingness to provide trade goods and a perception that the Americans were more likely to demand further land cessions than were the British both made the western Iroquois steady allies of the British. In contrast, the more easterly Oneidas and Tuscaroras, responsive to Schuyler’s diplomacy and Kirkland’s influence, were openly on the American side by the end of 1776.

DEVASTATING IMPACTS

The campaigns of the War of the American Revolution experienced by the member nations of the Iroquois League proved devastating in a number of respects. The British called on their Iroquois allies to assist them in the campaign of 1777 to conquer the Hudson Valley and seal off New England from the rest of the United States. Not only did the that campaign witness the defeat of the main invasion force under General John Burgoyne, but British and Iroquois forces under Barry St. Leger, attempting to secure Fort Stanwix and the Mohawk Valley, retreated to Canada in the wake of an advance by Benedict Arnold. Before their retreat, St. Leger’s forces defeated an American force at the Battle of Oriskany, a bloody battle that shocked many Iroquois warriors who participated and survived. Two years later, in the late summer and autumn of 1779, General John Sullivan led a detachment of the Continental army into the Iroquois homelands. Sullivan’s forces destroyed forty Iroquois towns and burned cornfields containing 160,000 bushels of corn. Designed to weaken Iroquois support for the British cause, the Sullivan expedition only served to stiffen the resistance of the British-allied western Iroquois to the United States. The expedition did cause many of the Iroquois who had lost their homes to move to the vicinity of Fort Niagara.

TREATY OF FORT STANWIX

With the Treaty of Paris (1783), the sovereignty of the United States and the state of New York over Iroquoia would no longer be contested by the British. Negotiations in September and October of 1784 at Fort Stanwix helped determine how the peace settlement would affect the Iroquois League. Commissioners from the Continental Congress and from the state of New York called representatives from the Iroquois League formally to bring peace to the region. In September 1784, a delegation from the state of New York, led by Governor George Clinton, offered all members of the Iroquois League the opportunity to return

to New York if they would consent to a large sale of lands, at which every Iroquois leader balked. In October 1784 the congressional commissioners met with a smaller number of Iroquois leaders. The commissioners did not ask for a large land sale, but only a confirmation of previous lands sold as well as recognition that the Treaty of Paris had marked out all of the British-allied Iroquois as defeated and conquered peoples, thus giving the Americans rights to any Iroquois lands in the future. The Iroquois leaders present signed the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in order to sign a treaty with Congress and ward off New York, but they would protest American claims to land under so-called “conquest theory” throughout the 1780s.

The Treaties of Paris and Fort Stanwix served to divide the Iroquois League. Many members of the Iroquois League followed Mohawk Joseph Brant to Canada. Governor Frederick Haldimand had given Brant a large grant of land along the Grand River (in modern-day Ontario), where a First Nations Reserve continues to exist in the twenty-first century. The nations of the Iroquois also continue to inhabit reservations in New York and elsewhere in the United States.

SEE ALSO *Brant, Joseph; Fort Stanwix, Treaty of; Johnson, Guy; Johnson, Sir William; Schuyler, Philip John; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois.*

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revised by Leonard J. Sadosky

IRVINE, JAMES. (1735–1819). Continental officer. Born in Philadelphia on 4 August 1735, Irvine was a hatter who joined the militia in 1760, rising quickly to the rank of captain in 1763. During Pontiac's Rebellion, he

took part in Colonel Henry Bouquet's expedition of 1764. Elected a delegate to the Pennsylvania Provincial Congress in 1775, Irvine resigned to accept a commission as lieutenant colonel in the Continental army. After service in Virginia, he joined General Richard Montgomery's invasion of Canada in November 1775. Disappointed with his failure to gain promotion to general he resigned from the army in June 1777 to become brigadier general of the Pennsylvania militia, commanding it at the Battle of Germantown in October. It was Irvine and General William Alexander who advised Washington, contrary to the wishes of the other senior officers, that the army should spend the winter together in a single location at Valley Forge.

When General William Howe led his army out of Philadelphia on 5 December 1777 in an effort to lure Washington into battle, Irvine and six hundred Pennsylvania militia were ordered to determine the enemy's strength. At Chestnut Hill they discovered most of the British army advancing; the militia then fled, leaving Irvine, who had been wounded, a prisoner of the British. He was not exchanged until 1781, receiving the rank of major general of militia and a small pension from Pennsylvania the following year. He was also elected to the state's Executive Council in 1782, becoming its vice president in 1784. After serving a single term in the assembly, Irvine quit politics in 1786. He died in Philadelphia on 28 April 1819.

Michael Bellesiles

IRVINE, WILLIAM. (1741–1804). Continental general. Ireland and Pennsylvania. Born in County Fermanagh, Ireland, on 3 November 1741, Irvine was briefly in the British army but resigned after arguing with a superior officer. He studied medicine at Dublin University and served as a naval surgeon during the Seven Years' War. In 1764 he settled in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, establishing a medical practice there. Siding with the Patriots, he attended the Provincial Congress of 1774 in Philadelphia. On 9 January 1776 he was commissioned a colonel in the Sixth Pennsylvania Regiment, and joined General John Thomas's forces for the invasion of Canada. Captured at Trois Rivières, Canada, on 8 June, he was paroled on 3 August but was not exchanged until 6 May 1778, almost three years later. Almost immediately after his return, he led troops at the battle of Monmouth (New Jersey), on 28 June 1778. In July he sat on the court-martial of Charles Lee, who was convicted of dereliction of duty at Monmouth. On 12 May 1779 he was appointed brigadier general and given command of the Second Brigade of General Anthony Wayne's Pennsylvania Line.

He took part in the unsuccessful operations against Staten Island on 14–15 January and Bull’s Ferry, New Jersey, on 21–22 July 1780.

After failing to raise new troops in Pennsylvania, Irvine was made commander of the western military department on September 1781. When he arrived at Fort Pitt in November, he found that the garrison consisted of 200 regulars. In his estimation, this was too few to take the field. Irvine called for volunteers to launch an attack on the Indians, which led to the massacre of innocent Moravian Indians at Gnaddenhutten (in present-day Ohio) on 8 March 1782. This crime was followed by William Crawford’s disastrous expedition in June. Leaving Fort Pitt on 1 October 1783, Irvine resigned from the army on 3 November. In 1785 he was appointed agent to purchase lands for distribution to Pennsylvania veterans. He recommended purchase of the “triangle” that gave Pennsylvania an outlet on Lake Erie. He was a congressman from 1786 to 1788 and from 1793 to 1795. He was involved in the Whiskey Rebellion, first as a commissioner and then as commander of the state militia. During the French war scare of 1798 he again commanded Pennsylvania troops. He moved from Carlisle to Philadelphia, and in March 1801 was appointed superintendent of military stores there. He died of cholera in Philadelphia on 29 July 1804.

SEE ALSO *Trois Rivières*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

IZARD, RALPH. (1742–1804). American diplomat, U.S. Senator. South Carolina. Born on 23 January 1742 near Charleston, South Carolina, Izard was the son

of a wealthy planter. Sent to school in England when he was 12, Izard graduated from Cambridge in 1761, and returned to South Carolina in 1764. In 1769 he left America with his wife, Alice De Lancey, and lived in Europe for the next decade, where they became the patrons of the American painter John Singleton Copley. The Izards were living in London when the Revolution broke out. Though his wife’s family was Loyalist, Izard reluctantly sided with the Americans. In the fall of 1776 they moved to Paris, where Izard assisted Alexander Gillon to raise funds to purchase warships for the United States.

On 7 May 1777, Congress appointed Izard commissioner to Tuscany. The only problem was that the latter state had no intention of receiving the representative of a would-be state they had not yet recognized. Unable to do anything constructive in the diplomatic field, Izard teamed up with his good friends Arthur and William Lee in an attempt to mar the work of Benjamin Franklin. The Lees and Izard felt that they should handle the negotiations with the French government rather than the plebian Franklin, whom they did not trust. However, Franklin outmaneuvered them and Congress recalled Izard in June 1779. As soon as he reached Philadelphia, however, he discovered that Congress had passed a resolution approving his conduct on 9 August 1780.

In 1782 he was elected to the Continental Congress, and he served until 1783. He declined to run for governor of South Carolina, but served in the legislature and in 1789 was elected to the U.S. Senate. He was president pro tempore in the Third Congress. In 1795 he retired from public life. Two years later he was invalidated by a stroke. He died 30 May 1804.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress; Franklin, Benjamin; Lee, Arthur; Lee, William*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

J

JACKSON, HENRY. (1747–1809). Continental officer. Massachusetts. Born in Boston, before the war Henry Jackson was an officer in the First Corps of Cadets, an elite militia unit that was disbanded during the British occupation. After the British left Boston, six former Cadet officers, including John Hancock and Henry Jackson, organized the Boston Independent Company. The Massachusetts General Court commissioned its officers on 7 December 1776. Because of the company’s elite, voluntary status, Hancock, its nominal leader, was commissioned as colonel, and Henry Jackson, the actual commander, was commissioned as lieutenant colonel.

Jackson led the company on an alarm to Newport, Rhode Island, in mid-April 1777. Commissioned as colonel of one of the sixteen Additional Continental Regiments as from 12 January 1777, he raised the regiment by recruiting around Boston in the spring and summer. With the main army during the Monmouth campaign, he led the regiment back to New England for operations against Newport in 1778 and 1779. On 9 April 1779, the regiment was consolidated with three other understrength Additional Continental Regiments (David Henley’s, William Lee’s, and Henry Sherburne’s), with Jackson continuing in command. Returning to the main army in November 1779, the regiment helped to oppose the Springfield Raid in New Jersey in June 1780.

The unit was redesignated the Sixteenth Massachusetts Regiment on 24 July 1780 and consolidated into the reorganized Massachusetts Line on 1 January 1781. Jackson assumed command of the Ninth Massachusetts and then, on the further consolidation of the Line, of the Fourth Massachusetts on 1 January 1783. He was breveted brigadier general on 30 September, and on 3 November

1783 he became colonel of the First American Regiment. On Evacuation Day, 25 November 1783, he was the “senior infantry officer present” and commanded the 800-man column that marched into New York City. Jackson continued in command of the First American (the only infantry regiment in the American army after the Continental army was disbanded on 31 December 1783) until 20 June 1784, at which time the American standing army was reduced to eighty men. After the war he was major general of the Massachusetts militia (1792–1796), U.S. agent supervising the building of the frigate *Constitution* in 1797, and business agent for his close friend, Henry Knox, especially concerning Knox’s land holdings in Maine.

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments; Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of Knyphausen.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

JACKSON, JAMES. (1757–1806). Soldier, lawyer, politician. Born in Moreton-Hampstead, Devonshire, England, Jackson came to Georgia in 1772. There he read law and served throughout the war, leading militia units and partisan bands.

As a teenager, Jackson participated in the Patriot capture of the powder magazine in Savannah in May 1775 and became captain of the volunteer Light Infantry by March 1776. He resigned this command in 1778 but was appointed brigade major to the Georgia militia and saw action near the East Florida border that November. In

late December he participated in the defense of Savannah, and when the British captured the town, he escaped into South Carolina. His commission expired in late 1778, and he marched as a common soldier under General William Moultrie for a time, apparently joining troops in northern Georgia and western South Carolina in 1779. He participated in the siege of Savannah during the fall of 1779. In March 1780 he was reappointed brigade major of the Georgia militia and killed Lieutenant Governor George Wells in a duel. In May, as a result of the capture of Charleston by the British, Georgia rebel government officials fled into the Carolinas and Jackson went with them.

For the next year he led militia in the Carolinas, seeing action at Blackstocks (1780) and Cowpens (1781), where he acted as brigade major for Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Pickens. He continued to serve under Pickens in North and South Carolina, eventually returning to Georgia as a partisan leader. He participated in the siege and capture of Augusta during the spring of 1781. He was appointed commandant of Augusta and, at the suggestion of General Nathanael Greene, the newly formed state government awarded him a commission as lieutenant colonel and ordered him to form the Georgia State Legion in August 1781. That fall, as British forces pulled back towards Savannah, Jackson captured Ebenezer and the Great Ogeechee Ferry. Jackson and his legion joined General Anthony Wayne's troops in January 1782, serving as the advance guard. When the British completed their evacuation of Savannah on the afternoon of 11 July 1782, Jackson had the honor of receiving the keys to the town and, at the head of his troops, entered through the western gate.

In 1784 the assembly commissioned him colonel of the First or Chatham County Regiment. In 1786 Jackson became brigadier general of the Georgia state militia and in 1792 became major general of the militia. He became a uniting political figure in Georgia, serving thirteen years in the legislature, three years as governor (1798–1801), two years in Congress (1789–1791), and eight years in the U.S. Senate (1793–1795, 1801–1806). Described as short in stature with prominent features and large blue eyes, James Jackson was pugnacious, engaging in at least twenty-three duels and many street brawls. He was also apparently as courageous in politics as on the battlefield, for he became one of the first Republicans in Congress, exposed the Yazoo land fraud, and created Georgia's first true political party.

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Leslie Hall

JACKSON, MICHAEL. (1734–1801). Continental officer. Massachusetts. Born in Newton, Massachusetts, Michael Jackson served as a second lieutenant in Colonel Richard Gridley's provincial regiment in 1756 during the final French and Indian war. The next summer, his father gave him a slaughterhouse and tannery, but he went to war again as a lieutenant in 1761 and 1762. Promoted to captain, he led his minuteman company in the pursuit of the British from Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775. The Massachusetts Committee of Safety commissioned him major of Colonel Thomas Gardner's Regiment on 2 June 1775. He was wounded at Bunker Hill on 17 June. He was named lieutenant colonel of the Sixteenth Continental Regiment for 1776 on 1 January and was wounded on 23 or 24 September in the attack on Montresor's Island in New York.

On 1 January 1777 he was commissioned colonel of the Eighth Massachusetts Regiment. After recruiting the regiment, he marched with it on 6 July 1777 to join Horatio Gates for the Saratoga campaign. In the first consolidation of the Massachusetts Line, on 1 January 1781, he retained command of the Eighth and, although complaining that his wounds rendered him "almost unfit for service," he was transferred as colonel to the Third Massachusetts in the next consolidation (12 June 1783). He was breveted brigadier general on 30 September, and on 3 November 1783 he left the army to return to his occupation as a tanner at Newton, Massachusetts. Five brothers and five of his sons were also in the Continental army.

SEE ALSO *Montresor's Island, New York*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

JACKSON, ROBERT. (1750?–1827). British medical officer. This interesting, if not important, individual was born at Stonebyres, Scotland, around 1750. He spent a little time at Edinburgh University, but learned his trade as a doctor's apprentice in Jamaica, where he worked from 1774 to 1778. In the latter year, disgusted with slavery, he moved to New York. There he became a surgeon's mate in the 71st Highlanders. His unit joined the Southern campaign, with Jackson present for several battles until he was taken prisoner at Cowpens, on 17 January 1781. General Daniel Morgan was so impressed with Jackson that he reportedly released him without bothering with parole.

Jackson officially became a doctor at Leyden in 1785, establishing his practice in Stockton-on-Tees, in Yorkshire, England. In 1793 he launched a personal crusade to reform the corrupt medical service of the British Army. After adventures that included six months in jail for caning the surgeon general, he broke the monopoly of the College of

Physicians over medical appointments in the army through the personal intervention of the Duke of York. He served the British military until 1815 and died on 6 April 1827.

SEE ALSO *Morgan, Daniel*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

JACKSON'S REGIMENT. Henry Jackson of Massachusetts was appointed to command one of the sixteen "Additional Continental Regiments" authorized by Congress on 12 January 1777 as part of the army it wanted to raise for three years of service (or the duration of the war). Organized in the spring and summer of 1777 at Boston, the regiment consisted of seven companies, one of the more fully recruited of the additional regiments. On 9 April 1779 it was consolidated with two other additional continental regiments raised in Massachusetts, Colonel William Lee's, which had been raised in the eastern counties of the state, and Colonel David Henley's, which had been raised in eastern Massachusetts and southern New Hampshire. Now a full regiment of nine companies, it was incorporated into the Massachusetts Line on 18 July 1780 and redesignated the Sixteenth Massachusetts Regiment on 24 July. The regiment was disbanded at New Windsor, New York, in the Hudson Highlands, at the end of its enlistment on 1 January 1781.

Because most of the infantrymen remaining in the Continental army were from Massachusetts, on 23 October 1783 Henry Jackson was authorized to combine them into a single regiment, known both as Jackson's Regiment and the First American Regiment. Disbanded on 20 June 1784, it was the last infantry regiment in the Continental army.

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments; Jackson, Henry*.

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JÄGERS (JAEGERS). Jägers (literally "huntsmen") were a form of light infantry that had their origin in the companies raised by Frederick II of Prussia to counter Austrian mobile light forces called Croats during the War of

the Austrian Succession. They were recruited from foresters and gamekeepers, expert marksmen armed with rifles who knew how to use terrain and cover to best advantage; some were mounted for greater mobility. The French followed suit in 1759 and formed a corps of chasseurs (also, literally, "huntsmen"). One jäger company from Hesse-Cassel went to America with Major General Leopold von Heister in August 1776, and a second (under Captain Johann Ewald) went with Major General Wilhelm von Knyphausen in October 1776. They proved to be so useful in America that, by a special treaty in December 1777, Hesse-Cassel raised its jäger establishment from 260 to 1,067 men, although it is not likely that more than 700 effectives actually were raised. In the summer of 1777 all the Hesse-Cassel and Anspach-Bayreuth jägers, about 600 men, were put under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig von Wurmb to form the Feld Jäger Corps, which served with the main British army at New York City and in the South. The jägers seldom operated as a single unit but generally were detached for such special missions as reconnaissance, headquarters security, advance guards, and to occupy the front trenches at sieges to snipe at the American defenses. Four companies of jägers from Hesse-Hanau and one from Brunswick served with Major General John Burgoyne's expedition from Canada in 1777.

The term "chasseurs" generally was applied to those jägers who served as part of German regiments, as opposed to those gathered together in the Jäger Corps of von Wurmb. A Brunswick chasseur battalion under Lieutenant Colonel von Barner (four companies plus the Brunswick jäger company) formed an important component of Burgoyne's light troops in 1777. And 120 to 200 regimental chasseurs from Hesse-Cassel were formed into a company under Captain George Hanger for the Charleston campaign of 1780. They were among the unlucky passengers on board the *Anna*, which was blown across the Atlantic to England.

Because of their uniforms the jägers were called green-coats. Green remains the traditional uniform color of modern regiments of European (including British) armies who trace their lineage to these light infantry organizations of the eighteenth century.

SEE ALSO *Anna; Ewald, Johann von; German Auxiliaries; Hanger, George; Heister, Leopold Philip von; Knyphausen, Wilhelm*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

JAIL FEVER. A virulent type of typhus fever that developed when men were confined to close quarters, such as in jails or troop transports. The term was first used in 1753.

Mark M. Boatner

JAMAICA (BROOKLAND), NEW YORK. 28 August 1776. The American defeat at Long Island on 27 August resulted in the isolation of a militia force of barely one hundred men under Brigadier General Nathaniel Woodhull, who had been posted on the eastern end of the island with the mission of protecting the inhabitants and driving cattle out of the enemy's reach. Woodhull moved to his headquarters at Jamaica, where he awaited orders and reinforcements. On the night of 28 August, Sir William Erskine led elements of the Seventeenth Light Dragoons and the Seventy-first Highlanders—about 700 troops—in an operation that surprised Woodhull and many of his men at Carpenter's House, Jamaica. Woodhull died as a result of ill treatment in captivity, and through his death became a hero and martyr to the Revolutionary cause.

SEE ALSO *Woodhull, Nathaniel*.

revised by Barnet Schecter

JAMAICA (WEST INDIES). Jamaica was one thousand miles to windward of the principal British and French possessions in the Caribbean. It unquestionably was the largest and richest British possession in the Caribbean, and its capture ranked as Spain's primary objective in the New World. Only sixteen thousand white colonists occupied the island, barely enough to maintain control over the sugar plantations' restive slaves and to deal with hostile Maroons in the mountainous interior. As with other island possessions, Jamaica's planters and British merchants lobbied in London to have large forces of regular troops and Royal Navy vessels sent out, but they used their control of the colony's assembly to oppose spending local money for defense. While the Royal Navy's squadron commander based in Port Royal had the responsibility to protect West Florida, his army counterpart had no connection with Pensacola or Mobile. On the other hand, Governor John Dalling aggressively sought to use Jamaica for operations against Honduras and Nicaragua.

Until Spain entered the conflict upon declaring war with Britain in 1779, Jamaica's role was that of naval base (it had only about five hundred troops in garrison), principally focused on intercepting American trade in the Caribbean and protecting its own semi-annual commercial convoys from privateers. But 1779 changed the picture dramatically, and the North ministry began dispatching large reinforcements to protect the island. The climate, however, had a devastating effect on Europeans. Between 1 August and 31 December 1780, the seven and a half battalions at Jamaica lost eleven hundred men dead, and half of the remaining three thousand were sick. Dalling looked to the southern colonies, where conditions matched Jamaican weather, as a source of troops better suited to defend the island and operate along the coast of the Spanish Main. Although unable to obtain Loyalists, he did get permission to recruit a unit from the American prisoners captured in the fall of Charleston by promising that they would only serve against the Spanish.

SEE ALSO *Honduras; Nicaragua; West Indies in the Revolution; Yorktown Campaign*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

JAMAICA PASS. In the Battle of Long Island on 27 August 1776, the British moved through this place to envelop the American lines.

Mark M. Boatner

JAMESTOWN, VIRGINIA. Here, the abandoned site of the first English settlement in America, Admiral de Grasse disembarked his troops from the West Indies to take part in the Yorktown campaign.

SEE ALSO *Yorktown Campaign; Yorktown, Siege of.*

Mark M. Boatner

JAMESTOWN FORD, VIRGINIA
SEE *Green Spring.*

JAQUETT, PETER. (1754–1834). Continental officer. Delaware. Born at his family home of Long Hook Farm near Wilmington, Delaware, 6 April 1754, Jaquett was an ensign of the Delaware Regiment as of 17 January 1776. He was promoted to second lieutenant on 27 November 1776, first lieutenant on 1 December 1776, and captain on 5 April 1777, seeing action at Princeton. He may have been captured at Camden on 16 August 1780, standing beside Johann de Kalb. Promoted to brevet major on 30 September 1783, Jaquett served until the end of the war, returned home, and died there 5 May 1834.

SEE ALSO *De Kalb, Johann.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

JASPER, WILLIAM. (1750?–1779). Patriot hero. South Carolina. Born in South Carolina around

1750, William Jasper enlisted on 7 July 1775 in Francis Marion's Company for service in William Moultrie's Regiment. During the defense of Charleston in 1776 he braved enemy artillery to replace the flag that had been shot from the parapet of Fort Sullivan (later Fort Moultrie). Given a sword by Governor John Rutledge, he declined a commission, insisting that he was not well enough educated to be an officer. As a roving scout under Moultrie, Marion, and Benjamin Lincoln, successively, he gathered valuable information on British activities. He was killed while planting the colors of the Second South Carolina Regiment on the Spring Hill redoubt in the assault on Savannah on 9 October 1779.

SEE ALSO *Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779).*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

JAY, JOHN. (1745–1829). Statesman, diplomat. New York. Born New York City on 12 December 1745, Jay graduated from King's College (now Columbia) in 1764, was admitted four years later to the bar, and became a successful New York City lawyer. Marriage in 1774 to Sarah, daughter of William Livingston of New Jersey, further extended his family connections. When the Revolution started he supported the Patriot cause, although with moderation. He became a member of the New York City Committee of Correspondence and served in the first and Second Continental Congresses. Although he was opposed to independence in the beginning, and had returned to office in the state legislation when the Declaration of Independence came up for a vote, he nevertheless became ardent in his dedication to the new United States. He helped to get cannon for General George Washington's army, set up a spy ring, and chaired the committee dedicated to battling Loyalists in New York. He guided the formulation of the 1777 state constitution, and served as Chief Justice of New York from 3 May of that year until 1779. Re-elected to Congress in December 1778, he became president of that body on the 10th and held this post until he was named minister to Spain, on 27 September 1779. Meanwhile, he had been elected colonel of the state militia in 1775, but had no military service in the field.

Spain's attitude toward the American Revolution was such that Jay had no chance of getting that country's recognition of the United States, even though it had declared war on Britain. Arriving at Cadiz with his wife on 22 January 1780 and remaining in the country two years, Jay accomplished little more than raising a small loan and getting the Spanish to keep up their secret assistance in war supplies. On 23 June 1782 Jay reached Paris

to take part in the Peace Negotiations. He shared John Adams's suspicion of Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, and helped Adams convince Benjamin Franklin to sign preliminary articles of peace with the British without awaiting French concurrence.

On 24 July 1784 Jay reached New York, having declined the post of minister to London, and found he had been drafted for the post of Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Jay held this post until Thomas Jefferson became the first Secretary of State, on 22 March 1790. His most vexatious problems during this period stemmed from British and Spanish refusal to withdraw their garrisons from territory claimed by the United States. The impotence of the American Confederation weakened Jay's hand, and he became one of the strongest advocates of a strong federal government. He wrote five of the Federalist Papers, blaming ill health for keeping him from contributing more.

Becoming the first Chief Justice of the United States on 4 March 1789 (but serving as ad interim Secretary of State until Jefferson arrived to be sworn in on 22 March 1790), he sat during the first five years during which the Supreme Court's procedures were formed. While Chief Justice he was sent in the summer of 1794 to arrange a peaceful settlement of controversies with Great Britain that threatened war, leading to the politically divisive Jay's Treaty.

Jay had been defeated by George Clinton in 1792 for the governorship of New York, even though Jay got more votes. He returned from England in 1795 to find himself elected, and he served six years (two terms). His administration was conservative and upright, but no great issues arose to challenge it.

Republican strength assured Jay's defeat for governor in 1800, and he declined to run for re-election. His mind set on retirement, he also refused Adams's offer of reappointment as Chief Justice. Jay spent his last twenty-eight years in complete retirement on his 800-acre property at Bedford, Westchester County, New York, where he died on 17 May 1829.

SEE ALSO *Jay's Treaty; Peace Negotiations.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

JAY'S TREATY. 19 November 1794. For a decade after the end of the American Revolution, Britain refused to honor those articles of the Peace Treaty of 1783 calling for its withdrawal of troops from posts in the Northwest that now fell within U.S. territory. Britain's justification was based on the U.S. failure to comply with articles four and five of the treaty which called for payment of pre-Revolutionary War debts to British merchants and reimbursement to Loyalists for property confiscated by the states. The two countries made a number of threatening gestures toward one another after the British Orders in Council of 8 June and 6 November 1793 resulted in the seizure of American ships and crews. President Washington sent John Jay, the chief justice of the United States and author of Washington's Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, to negotiate a treaty with Britain. The Treaty of London, or Jay's Treaty, as it is generally known, was signed on 19 November 1794. The British government agreed to withdraw from all its posts in the Northwest territories by 1 June 1796. The debts were to be referred to joint commissions (British claims of \$2,664,000 were settled on 8 January 1802), as were the problems of the Northeast boundary and compensation for illegal seizures (\$10,345,200, paid by 1802). Various trade agreements were made, but there was no reference to Loyalist claims, the slaves "stolen" by the British during the war, the impressment of American sailors under the Orders in Council, or to allegations that the British incited Indians to make war on the United States. Nor would Britain acknowledge the neutral rights of the United States.

Although Jay had triumphed in getting important concessions and had restored amicable relations that permitted the resumption of trade that was essential for the success of Hamilton's fiscal system, his treaty aroused a popular uproar from many elements whose own interests had been violated or ignored. Southern planters wanted compensation for those slaves who had fled to freedom with the British, and Virginia owed most of the debt that the joint commissions were to settle. Northern shipping and commercial interests were antagonized by the treaty's limitations on their trade with the West Indies, while western settlers wanted a final solution to "the Indian problem." Thomas Jefferson and James Madison denounced the treaty and preferred commercial retaliation against Britain as a means of attaining better terms, even though an embargo would hurt the U.S. economy more than it would the British. After long and bitter debate, the Senate finally ratified the treaty on 24 June 1795 with the stipulation that the article dealing with the West Indies trade be renegotiated. Although Washington had considered the treaty unsatisfactory, he established an important precedent by asserting executive prerogative and refusing the House of Representatives' request of 24 March 1796 for Jay's papers relating to the treaty. The House initially

attempted to block the treaty by denying appropriations, but on 30 April 1796 it approved the requisite funds. One important consequence of Jay's Treaty was to activate and clarify the two factions in Congress into the Federalist and Democratic Republican Parties.

SEE ALSO *Carleton, Guy; Jay, John; Peace Treaty of 3 September 1783.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

JEFFERSON, THOMAS. (1743–1826). Virginia legislator, wartime governor, diplomat, author of the Declaration of Independence, third president of the United States. Thomas Jefferson was born on 13 April 1743 in Albemarle County, the son of Peter Jefferson, a farmer and surveyor, and Jane Randolph, a member of one of Virginia's most prominent families. Peter Jefferson died in 1759, leaving his son about five thousand acres. To this inheritance Thomas Jefferson added eleven thousand acres acquired through his wife, Martha Wayles Skelton, whom he married on 1 January 1772. The latter estate brought with it the heavy indebtedness of his father-in-law, which Jefferson struggled unsuccessfully over a lifetime to extinguish. Although he expressed reservations about the institution of slavery and proposed legislation in Congress to prohibit it in the western territories, Jefferson showed little compunction about slavery. At one time possessing 185 slaves (50 of his own, and 135 belonging to his wife), he did free a few of them toward the end of his life. Jefferson received his elementary education at a plantation school, graduated from the College of William and Mary, read law with George Wythe, was admitted to the bar in 1767, and practiced as an attorney until 1774.

After serving as justice of the peace and parish vestryman, Jefferson was elected to the House of Burgesses in 1769. He served in every succeeding assembly and convention of his province until he was elected to the Continental Congress in 1775. His *Summary View of the Rights of America*, written initially for the benefit of delegates to the First Virginia Convention in 1774 and printed as a pamphlet in the same year, was widely read. This direct attack on the crown did not find much approval at the time, but it placed Jefferson among the leaders of the Revolution. In England his pamphlet was somewhat

modified, probably by Edmund Burke, and widely circulated by friends of America. Cutting at the common root of allegiance, emigration, and colonization—shunning the indirect approach of blaming the ministry for the king's errors—Jefferson's awakening call maintained that:

the relation between Great Britain and these colonies was exactly the same as that of England and Scotland after the accession of James and until the Union (1707): and that our emigration to this country gave England no more rights over us than the emigration of the Danes and Saxons gave to the present authorities of their mother country over England.

The pamphlet ignored the claim that the mother country had protected the colonies during the colonial wars and maintained that since the earlier support had been only with a view to commercial return it could be repaid in trade privileges.

Taking his seat in the Continental Congress in June 1775, Jefferson drafted several appeals that were rejected as being too anti-British at a time when hope of conciliation still existed. After hostilities had broken out at Lexington and Concord, he and John Dickinson wrote the Congressional Resolution justifying armed resistance: "A Declaration of the Causes and Necessities of Taking Up Arms" (6 July 1775).

Following his absence from 28 December 1775 until 14 May 1776—he was called home for personal reasons and was appointed commander of Albemarle militia on 26 September—Jefferson was named by Congress on 11 June 1776 to a committee to draft a declaration of independence. Although changes were made by John Adams and Benjamin Franklin, who, along with Roger Sherman and Robert R. Livingston, were the other committee members, and some by Congress, the Declaration remained essentially his.

Although reelected to Congress, Jefferson felt that his presence was more valuable in Virginia, where he wanted to take part in revising the state's laws. He surrendered his seat in Congress, declined election as a commissioner to serve in Paris with Franklin and Silas Deane, and entered the House of Delegates on 7 October 1776. The four corners of Jefferson's frame for republican government were: abolition of landholding in fee-tail (inheritance limited to a particular class of heirs); abolition of primogeniture; separation of church and state; and a system of public education. Elected to the board of five men to revise the laws of Virginia, Jefferson, George Wythe, and Edmund Pendleton were the only ones to serve to the end. On 18 June 1778 they submitted 126 bills, at least 100 of which were ultimately enacted in substance. Jefferson's education bills failed almost entirely; by 1786 his other three ideals had been achieved.

As a legislator, despite concern for greater equality and democracy, Jefferson showed little regard for protection of civil liberties. His reputation is tarnished by his role in the case of Josiah Philips. Jefferson drew up and introduced in the House of Delegates a bill of attainder against Philips, who as the head of a Tory band in the southeastern counties of Virginia robbed citizens and allegedly committed at least one murder. The bill of attainder, becoming law on 30 May 1778, called for apprehending Philips and putting him to death without legal process. Philips did not surrender during a grace period. Rather than the bill of attainder being invoked, Philip and several associates, when caught, were tried and convicted in a court, not for treason or murder, but for theft of some felt hats and twine. Even many years after this episode, Jefferson insisted that the hanging of Philips under a bill of attainder would have been justified on grounds of expediency during wartime.

On 1 June 1779 Jefferson succeeded Patrick Henry as governor. He was reelected for another single term (1780–1781). As wartime governor Jefferson had little executive authority to compel prosecution of the war effort. He lacked veto power. Fortunately, however, Virginia had a state office for military administration, headed by a commissioner of war (first George Muter and then the very able William Davies). Jefferson as governor had responsibility for activating militia as a home guard, which he found difficult to achieve given the rapid mobility of enemy armies invading his state.

During Jefferson's governorship, four British armies invaded Virginia: General Alexander Leslie's incursion into the Tidewater area, approaching near Williamsburg, from 20 October to 22 November 1780 (Leslie withdrew to take his army to join forces with Cornwallis in the Carolinas); General Benedict Arnold's invasion, beginning December 30, a lightning strike at Richmond on 4 and 5 January 1781; General William Phillips, also invading central Virginia, in April and May 1781; and Cornwallis leaving North Carolina for Virginia in May 1781 and continuing in the state until the siege of Yorktown. Jefferson came in for criticism for being dilatory and lacking in initiative and boldness, particularly in his responses to the Arnold invasion, during which the governor was unable to protect from destruction much of the military stores and documents at the capital. An effort in the legislature to conduct an inquiry into Jefferson's actions during the Arnold invasion failed, and instead he was thanked for his endeavors. Ironically General Phillips, before returning to Virginia with an army, had been one of the prisoners of war (from the British surrender at Saratoga) interned at barracks near Charlottesville and had frequently, along with other captured British officers, been a guest of Jefferson. As governor, Jefferson promoted the western expeditions of George Rogers Clark. Jefferson

faced criticism for temporarily holding a prisoner of Clark's—Henry Hamilton, the "Hair Buyer" governor of Detroit—in a dungeon of the Williamsburg jail and in irons.

Jefferson was chased from his home at Monticello on 4 June 1781, one day after his term as governor expired, by the British Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton and his dragoons. Jefferson's successor, Thomas Nelson, did not assume office until 12 June. Jefferson, frustrated by his experiences in public life, intended to enjoy private pursuits. During a brief retirement he wrote *Notes on the State of Virginia*, a compendium of useful information about Virginia presented in response to queries posed to Jefferson by François Marbois, the French minister to America; this work was first published in Paris in 1785.

The death on 6 September 1782 of his beloved wife, Martha, brought Jefferson out of his retirement. (Only three of their six children survived Martha, and only two, Martha and Mary, reached maturity.) On 12 November 1782 Jefferson was appointed peace commissioner, but negotiations progressed so that his presence was unnecessary before he could sail for France, and the appointment was withdrawn. Elected to Congress, Jefferson served November 1783 to May 1784, being a member of almost every important committee. Among the thirty or more state papers he drafted, Americans should be particularly grateful for his "Notes on the Establishment of a Money Unit," which spared the New World the absurdity of English pounds, shillings, and pence. In his report of 22 March 1784, second only to the Declaration of Independence among his state papers, Jefferson set down practically all the features of the epoch-making Ordinance of 1787, which provided government for the Northwest territory.

On 6 August 1784 Jefferson reached Paris to assist Franklin and John Adams in drawing up treaties of commerce, instructions for which he had himself drafted. In 1785 he succeeded Franklin as minister to France. With the assistance of the Marquis de Lafayette he achieved some commercial concessions. He negotiated a commercial treaty with Prussia in 1785. Early the next year he joined Adams in London to negotiate a similar treaty, but their efforts failed. In October 1789 Jefferson sailed for America on leave of absence to settle private business and to take home his two daughters. With some reluctance he accepted Washington's appointment as secretary of state, being sworn in on 22 March 1790. Jefferson subsequently served as vice president and two terms as the third U.S. president; his Democratic-Republicans opened the way for a two-party system by providing an alternative to the Federalists.

Always intellectually curious, Jefferson pursued a lifetime of scientific studies. In particular he excelled as an architect, helping to bring neoclassicism to America. He

designed his mansion at Monticello, near Charlottesville, moving into his new home in 1772, and was also the architect for other Virginia houses. Jefferson, with the help of Charles-Louis Clérissieu, provided the plans for the new state capitol in Richmond, replicating an extant Roman temple, the *Maison Carrée*, in Nîmes, France; the legislature moved to this edifice in 1788.

Thomas Jefferson died on the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, a few hours before John Adams. He wrote his own epitaph, in which he asked to be remembered for only three things: "Here was buried/ Thomas Jefferson/Author of the Declaration of American Independence/of the Statute of Virginia for religious freedom/and Father of the University of Virginia."

SEE ALSO *Adams, John; Declaration of Independence; Franklin, Benjamin; Lafayette, Marquis de; Tarleton's Virginia Raid of 9–24 July 1781; Washington, George.*

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revised by Harry M. Ward

JENKINS'S EAR, THE WAR OF. 1739–1742. After a quarter-century of relative peace, imperial competition in the West Indies broke out into open war in October 1739, eight years after Spanish coast guards had intercepted and searched a ship commanded by Captain Robert Jenkins, officially on a return voyage from Jamaica but thought by the Spanish to be engaging in

illegal trade with their ports. The coast guard searched Jenkins's ship, tied him to the mainmast, and removed part of an ear, which Jenkins thereafter carried with him in a box, eager to show everyone (including Parliament in March 1738) this tangible evidence of Spanish cruelty. Jenkins's story helped to stir up anti-Spanish and pro-war sentiment throughout the country and was used as part of the justification for a war that George II, important political interests, and a large part of the mercantile community wanted to wage for glory, aggrandizement, and economic advantage.

The war opened well when, in December 1739, Vice Admiral Edward Vernon captured and ransomed Porto Bello on the Spanish Main. But an expedition against Cartagena in 1740, in which soldiers recruited in the colonies composed a substantial part of the land force, was destroyed by hesitant leadership, effective Spanish resistance, and rampant disease. The conflict thereafter merged into the larger and more important War of the Austrian Succession.

SEE ALSO *Austrian Succession, War of the; Vernon, Edward.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

JERSEYFIELD, NEW YORK. 30 October 1781. After the action at Johnstown, New York, on 25 October, Colonel Marinus Willett moved to German Flats on 27 October in an attempt to cut the raiders off from their boats (which were at Oneida Creek). After assembling about four hundred men and sixty friendly Oneidas, he started his pursuit the evening of 28 October. He caught up with a hunting party from Major John Ross's column in the morning of 30 October and scattered it. Late in the afternoon the pursuit engaged Major Walter Butler, who made a stand with the rear guard at Canada Creek. The battlefield is between modern Ohio City and Russia, New York, probably at the ford known as Hess's Rift. The brief firefight ended when Butler was killed, but the delay allowed the main

body to escape. Willett made one last attempt to catch up and then turned back rather than risk wearing his men out.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Butler, Walter; Johnstown, New York.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

JERSEY PRISON SHIP **SEE** *Prisons and Prison Ships.*

JOHNS ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA. 28–29 December 1781. When Major James H. Craig evacuated Wilmington in November 1781, he was posted with some additional infantry and cavalry on Johns Island, near Charleston. The main American army was now located at Pompon on the Stono River, opposite Craig's position. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee conceived an intricate plan of attacking Johns Island. It was to take advantage of the fact that on one or two nights of the month, the tide was low enough for troops to ford the Wapoo River, which separated the island from the mainland. The project was assigned to Lee and Colonel John Laurens. Detachments of Continental troops reinforced Lee's Legion to about seven hundred. Lee's column crossed according to plan but had to be recalled and the operation abandoned when a second column, under Major James Hamilton, got lost and arrived too late to ford the river.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

JOHNS ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA. 4 November 1782. In leading a successful attack against a British foraging party in the vicinity of this island, Captain William Wilmot of the Second Maryland Continentals was killed. Wilmot thus has the dubious honor of being one of, if not the last, soldier killed in the American Revolution.

SEE ALSO *Wheeling, West Virginia.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

JOHNSON, GUY. (c. 1740–1788). Loyalist leader, Indian superintendent. Born in County Meath, Ireland, Johnson immigrated to Boston in 1756 and immediately found his way to the Mohawk Valley, where Sir William Johnson, whom Guy claimed to be his uncle, served as superintendent of Indian affairs. The elder Johnson found work for Guy as his secretary. In the campaign of 1759–1760, he commanded a ranger company under Amherst. In 1762 he became Sir William's deputy for Indian affairs, gaining in that post the confidence of his superior as well as that of the Indians. In 1763 he married Sir William's daughter, Mary, and established a residence, named Guy Hall, near Amsterdam. During the period from 1773 to 1775, he was in the New York assembly and served as militia colonel and adjutant general. In 1774 he succeeded Sir William as superintendent of Indian affairs on the order of General Thomas Gage.

Guy worked to win the Indians to the British side in the conflict that appeared imminent, and in the Council of Oswego during July 1775, he signed up all but two of the Iroquois nations. Forced out of the Mohawk Valley by hostile Patriots, Johnson went to Montreal, accompanied by some Indians and 220 other Loyalists, and offered his services to Governor Guy Carleton. He helped for a time in the defense of St. Johns, but when John Campbell arrived as the new superintendent of Indian affairs, Johnson left for England in November 1775 to press his claim to the position. Accompanied by Joseph Brant, Johnson was unable to regain his office but accepted the position of superintendent of the Iroquois Confederacy. He reached New York City in the summer of 1776, expecting Burgoyne's campaign the following year to open the way up the Hudson and to Montreal. With the failure of Burgoyne's campaign, Johnson decided to stay on in New York City, leaving relations with the Iroquois in the hands of his brother-in-law, Daniel Claus, in Montreal and John Butler at Niagara throughout the critical intervening years of the war. He did, however, manage the John Street Theater, performing in some of its plays. Given that his alleged purpose was to coordinate operations of the main British army with those of the Indians and Loyalists in Canada and the frontier, his long stay in New York City amounted to dereliction of duty.

In the fall of 1779 Johnson moved his headquarters to Niagara, directing a series of raids against the frontier that destroyed large quantities of foodstuffs intended for the Continental forces and driving thousands of settlers east. He also provided for all the Iroquois driven from their homes by the Patriot raids of 1779, earning a reprimand from Governor Frederick Haldimand for spending British funds in a profligate fashion.

In 1783 Johnson resigned his office, being succeeded as Indian superintendent by Sir John Johnson. Guy

Johnson returned to England to press his claim for recompense for property confiscated by the state of New York. He died in London on 5 March 1788.

SEE ALSO *Brant, Joseph; Iroquois League.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

JOHNSON, HENRY. (1748–1835). British officer. Born near Dublin on 1 January 1748, Johnson was commissioned an ensign in the Twenty-eighth Foot Regiment on 19 February 1761. He was made a captain in 1763, and served primarily in the West Indies until 1775. At that time he went to America as a major with the Twenty-eighth Foot, and was assigned to one of the provisional battalions of light infantry during the next three years. On 8 October 1778 he was appointed lieutenant colonel of the Seventeenth Foot Regiment, and was captured with his garrison at Stony Point, New York, on 16 July 1779. He was court-martialed for this defeat, but was acquitted and given command of the Seventeenth Regiment in subsequent operations in Virginia and the Carolinas. After the war he was posted in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, still as commanding officer of the Seventeenth Foot Regiment. From 1793 until 1798 he was inspector-general of recruiting for the English establishment in Ireland. On 5 June 1798 he was given command of 3,000 troops for the defense of New Ross, in Ireland, and in successfully accomplishing his mission he is credited with fighting the hardest action of the Irish rebellion. He was made colonel of the Eighty-first Regiment in 1798, and promoted to lieutenant general the next year, and of Ross Castle in 1801. He was promoted to full general in 1808, and was created a baronet on 1 December 1818. He died in Bath on 18 March 1835.

SEE ALSO *Stony Point, New York.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

JOHNSON, SIR JOHN. (1741–1830). Loyalist leader. New York. Born on 5 November 1741 near Amsterdam, New York, Johnson was the son of Sir William Johnson and one of his servants, Catherine Weissenberg. When only thirteen years old, he served

under his father's command in the battle at Lake George. He also served later in the expeditions to Niagara and Detroit, attaining the rank of captain of militia. He also accompanied his father on his various conferences with the Indians. After seeing service in Pontiac's War he visited England in 1765, where he was knighted. On the death of his father in 1774, he inherited his baronetcy, nearly two hundred thousand acres of land; his father's residence, Johnson Hall; and his father's post as major general of militia. When news of Bunker Hill sent other prominent Mohawk Valley Loyalists flying north into Canada, Johnson remain behind as his wife, Mary Watts, was expecting a child. He entered into correspondence with Governor Tryon in regard to the possibility of organizing the settlers of the valley for the Loyalist cause. In January 1776 the Continental Congress, having learned that munitions were pouring into Johnson Hall, ordered Gen. Philip Schuyler to stop Johnson's warlike preparations. Johnson had mustered some two hundred Highlanders and, during the winter, had started fortifying Johnson Hall. Schuyler and Johnson initially reached an agreement aimed at avoiding violence under which Johnson consented to disarm his supporters and was placed on parole. In May, learning that he was about to be arrested, Johnson broke parole and fled with a large number of his tenants to Canada. Lady Johnson, again pregnant, was taken to Albany as a hostage.

On reaching Montreal, Johnson was commissioned lieutenant colonel and authorized to raise the body of rangers that became known as the Royal Greens. He participated without personal distinction in St. Leger's expedition but commanded the force that defeated the Patriots at Oriskany on 6 August 1777. In 1778 and 1780 he led successful raids into Tryon County. In the autumn of 1779 he was at Niagara and Oswego, engaged in Indian affairs. In September 1781 he commanded a column that was supposed to advance up Lake Champlain to the Hudson while another advanced from Oswego, but this offensive petered out around Lake George.

Johnson then went to England and returned with a commission as brigadier general and another as successor to his brother-in-law, Guy Johnson, as superintendent of Indian affairs. He held the latter position until his death. Settling in Montreal, Johnson devoted his energies to taking care of Loyalist refugees and championing the claims of Britain's Indian allies. He served on the Legislative Council of Quebec from 1786 to 1791 and of Lower Canada, as it was renamed, from 1796 to 1800, meanwhile rebuilding his personal estate to include more than 130,000 acres. He died in Montreal on 4 January 1830.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Johnson, Sir William; Oriskany, New York; St. Leger's Expedition.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

JOHNSON, SIR WILLIAM. (c. 1715–1774). British Superintendent of Indian Affairs. William Johnson was born at Smithtown, near Dunshoughlin, in County Meath, Ireland, probably in 1715. By 1736 he was handling some business for his uncle, Sir Peter Warren, and by about 1738 he had emigrated, with twelve families of tenants, to manage Warren's Mohawk River estate in North America. In 1739 he began living with Catherine Weisenburg, a runaway German servant girl whom he may have married and who bore him three children. Perhaps even before Catherine died in 1759, he had begun a liaison with his housekeeper, the sister of Joseph Brant, a prominent Mohawk leader, who gave him eight more sons and daughters. By 1743 he had made Warren's estate an economic success and moved to his own thousand-acre property and a house he called Fort Johnson. In 1745 he became a justice of the peace, and the following year he began his career as a frontier diplomat.

Johnson's complex economic and personal ties with the Mohawks made him the ideal agent for repairing New York's relations with the Iroquois after the outbreak of formal war with France in 1744. The Confederacy, in a key position between New France and the northern British colonies, had long been enemies of the French, but over the past twenty years had come to resent British traders who cut them out of their role as middle-men in the Indian trades to the north and west. Governor George Johnson of New York, fearing that the Iroquois might join the French, gave William Johnson a colonel's commission and effectively made him New York's Indian agent. Known as *Warraghiyagey* ("he who does much business"), he re-established some British influence among the Six Nations, and, by espousing the Iroquois system of alliances and treaties called the Covenant Chain tried indirectly to exploit the suzerainty they claimed, but did not in fact possess, over neighboring regions. He resigned in 1750 when New York refused to repay part of his considerable diplomatic expenses.

In 1755 Johnson was reappointed Indian agent under Major General Edward Braddock and charged with leading 2,000 provincial troops and 200 Indians against Fort St Frédéric (Crown Point, New York). On the way there, he won the battle of Lake George (8 September), where he was wounded. Although he was unable to push on to Crown Point, his success looked dramatic against the background of Braddock's defeat on

the Ohio River, and he was rewarded with a baronetcy. In 1756, when the Crown needed to appoint two officials to coordinate Indian policy in the north and south respectively, Johnson became Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Southern Department. In that role, although he could not bring all the Iroquois over to the British side, he raised substantial Native American forces and took a leading part in defending the northern colonial frontier.

In 1759, when Brigadier General John Prideaux (who led one of Britain's four divisions in North America) was killed in action near Fort Niagara, Johnson took command of the expedition that captured Fort Niagara on 25 July. When New France fell, Johnson was aware of the need to cultivate and reassure the Ohio and Great Lakes Indians so recently under French influence. He opposed General Jeffery Amherst's ill-informed and myopic policy of cutting back supplies of gifts and trade goods and ignoring traditional diplomatic protocol. Even after Pontiac's War (1763–1766) erupted, Johnson was able to preserve the neutrality of nearly all the Iroquois, and later, as the British gained the upper hand, he helped to restore peace. His 1766 treaty with Pontiac was of key importance.

In succeeding years Johnson advocated firm, defined boundaries, as sketched out in the proclamation of 1763, which was intended to keep white settlers from further encroachments on Indian land. Johnson also favored tight control over Indian trade to prevent fraud and exploitation. Although his activities were mixed with self-serving land deals, he was meticulous in settling disputes through traditional diplomatic forms and spared no expense in the distribution of gifts. In 1768 he negotiated the Treaty of Fort Stanwix which shifted the boundary for settler expansion to the west, and so opened up most of modern West Virginia and Kentucky, and provided a fixed boundary that safeguarded the Native lands to the north and west. This policy would not have been possible except as an imperial scheme, for the individual colonies would hardly have countenanced a bar to further westward expansion. Yet those same colonies, already aroused by what seemed like unjust imperial taxation, were not about to accept imperial regulation of any of their inland frontiers. A land scramble between settlers from Virginia and Pennsylvania followed immediately upon the signing of the treaty, and boundary violations were frequent. Moreover, the treaty rested on the Iroquois' claim to land they did not occupy, so the boundary was unacceptable to the Cherokees and Shawnees who lived there. In 1772 a Virginia-Shawnee conflict over Ohio lands erupted and seemed likely to spread to New York. This became known as Lord Dunmore's War, named for the governor of Virginia, John Murray, fourth Earl of Dunmore. Though seriously ill, Johnson urgently summoned a

council to Johnson Hall, the baronial hall he had built in 1762, where he tried to address Iroquois grievances. On 11 July, after four days of negotiations, he suddenly collapsed and died.

SEE ALSO *Pontiac's War*.

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revised by John Oliphant

JOHNSTONE, GEORGE. (1730–1787). British naval officer. Born in Dumfriesshire, England, in 1730, Johnstone joined the navy in 1744, gaining a reputation for bravery in King George's War. He became a lieutenant in 1749, but left the navy until called back in 1755. He became governor of Western Florida from 1763 to 1767, and was then elected to Parliament in 1768, where he became a thorn in the government's side. A gross public insult to George Sackville Germain resulted in a bloodless duel in December 1770. His conduct as member of the Peace Commission of Carlisle in 1778, wherein he repeatedly attempted to bribe influential Americans, led the American Congress to resolve on 11 August that it could not honorably deal with him any longer, and he resigned on the 26th.

Despite his lack of professional qualification for high command in the navy and his continued opposition to the government, on 6 May 1779 Johnstone accepted command of a small squadron for service off the Portuguese coast. In 1781, after operating off the Cape of Good Hope and scoring some successes, he retired on half pay and returned to Parliament. Having been violent in his attacks on Admiral Richard, Earl Howe in 1779, he now turned on Edward Clive, Earl of Powis, and the conduct of affairs in India. In 1783 he became a director of the East India Company. About two years later he became an invalid and passed unlamented from the public scene, dying at Bristol on 24 May 1787.

SEE ALSO *Peace Commission of Carlisle*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

JOHNSTOWN, NEW YORK. 25 October 1781. In the afternoon of 24 October word reached Colonel Marinus Willett at Fort Rensselaer that a large enemy force was twenty miles away at Warrensbush. Willett assembled his state troops and immediately set out in pursuit, calling on the militia to follow. After marching all night he reached Fort Hunter and learned that the raiders had crossed the Mohawk River and proceeded to Johnstown. A captured straggler provided intelligence that the enemy force consisted of about 800 troops and 120 Indians under Major John Ross and Major Walter Butler. Willett immediately crossed the river as well with 416 men and moved up to within two miles of Johnstown. The raiders were unaware of his approach and had scattered to kill local farmers' cattle. Knowing that he was outnumbered, Willett immediately attacked in the hopes of defeating Ross's party in detail. He advanced directly toward the largest concentration of the British while sending a flanking column under Major Aaron Rowley to take them in the rear. Willett's tired men suddenly panicked and retreated, abandoning their one field piece. A disaster was averted when Rowley's militia and Massachusetts levies struck. The fight lasted until after dark, when Ross broke contact and fell back. Willett spent the night collecting the wounded and reported taking about fifty prisoners while losing forty of his own men. Both sides claimed a victory. Willett lacked solid information about Ross's route and waited for several days before taking further action. Their next engagement was at Jerseyfield on 30 October.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Butler, Walter; Jerseyfield, New York*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

JONES, ALLEN. (1739–1807). Militia general and politician. North Carolina. Allen Jones was born in Surry County, Virginia, on 24 December 1739. He was the elder brother of the more famous Willie Jones. He

went to study at Eton, in England, and on his return to North Carolina he became prominent in politics. In 1771 he assisted Governor William Tryon in operations against the Regulators. In 1776 he was appointed brigadier general for the militia of the Halifax district, and in 1778 he protested on legal grounds the sending of North Carolina militia to South Carolina. A state senator from 1777 to 1779, he was a delegate to the Continental Congress in 1779 and 1780. Unlike his brother, he favored ratification of the federal Constitution.

A large property holder, owning 177 slaves in 1790, he was politically conservative and opposed the confiscation of Loyalists' property after the war. On 14 November 1807 he died at his home, "Mount Gallant," which was across the Roanoke River from "The Grove" owned by his brother.

SEE ALSO *Jones, Willie*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

JONES, JOHN PAUL. (1747–1792). American naval hero. Scotland. Born in Kirkcudbrightshire, on the Solway Firth, John Paul was the son of the gardener at Arbigland, which was the estate of William Craik (father of Dr. James Craik). After receiving a rudimentary education at the Kirkbean Parish school, young John Paul crossed the Solway in 1761 to become apprentice to a shipowner in Whitehaven. On his first voyage he visited his elder brother, William, who was a tailor in Fredericksburg, Virginia. The young mariner was released early from his apprenticeship because his employer went bankrupt, and he shipped aboard a slave ship. Trading between the Guinea coast and Jamaica, he became first mate on another slaver at the age of 19.

THE PRE-WAR YEARS

In 1768 John Paul left the slave trade and booked passage for England, having become dissatisfied with this livelihood. On the way home he took command of the ship when both the captain and the mate died of fever. He brought the ship in safely, and as a reward the owners signed him as captain of one of their merchantmen, the *John of Dumfries*. He made two voyages to the West Indies between 1768 and 1770. During the second voyage he flogged the ship's carpenter for neglect of duty, and a few weeks later this man died at sea onboard a vessel bound for London. When John Paul returned to Kirkcudbright, he was charged with murder by the man's father. He was imprisoned in the town jail briefly, but was later released on bail, and subsequently was cleared of the charge.

John Paul returned to the West Indies trade and established a partnership with a merchant-planter in Tobago. In



John Paul Jones. *The American naval hero, portrayed in a bust (1781) by the French sculptor Jean-Antoine Houdon.* © BURSTEIN COLLECTION/CORBIS.

1773, while commanding the *Betsy of London*, he killed a local man who was the ringleader of his mutinous crew. Although the victim was reported to have impaled himself by rushing into John Paul's sword, John Paul apparently feared the effect adverse public opinion on his chances in a civil court. On the advice of friends, he returned, incognito, to the continent of America, and remained there until a court-martial could be assembled to try the case.

When the Revolution started, John Paul was living in America without employment and reduced to depending upon the charity of friends. Meanwhile he had assumed the surname of Jones—apparently, the name was chosen for no more complicated reason than its obvious merit in concealing his identity. There is a story that the name was selected in gratitude for the hospitality he received at the home of Allen and Willie Jones, but this is supported by nothing more substantial than the traditions of the latter family. During July or August 1775, John Paul Jones went to Philadelphia and was employed in fitting out the *Alfred*,

the first naval ship bought by Congress. He also became friendly with two influential congressional delegates who were prominent in organizing the Continental navy: Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, and Joseph Hewes of North Carolina.

EARLY EXPLOITS IN THE WAR

Jones got into the navy very much the same way a certain equally unprepossessing and politically unimportant individual named Ulysses S. Grant got into the Union army almost a century later—both had congressmen who felt obliged to see that their constituencies received a share of the military commissions being given out. Delegate Hewes of North Carolina insisted that one of the naval lieutenantcies go to a Southerner, and thanks to him the little Scot, who technically was a Virginian but who also had North Carolina connections, was commissioned on 7 December 1775 as the senior first lieutenant.

Jones was first offered command of the sloop *Providence*, but he rejected the offer, preferring to serve instead aboard the *Alfred*, commanded by Dudley Saltonstall, in the belief that he could learn from the experience. Lieutenant Jones sailed in the expedition that captured the British vessel, the *Nassau*, but had no opportunity to distinguish himself. When he was again offered command of the *Providence* in May 1776 he accepted with alacrity, and immediately began to earn a reputation for success that was to have no equal in the Continental navy. A small fleet soon was placed under his command and he was promoted to captain. In a single cruise of the *Providence* he took sixteen prizes and destroyed British fishing boats and facilities at Canso and Ile Madame, Nova Scotia.

When Congress established the relative rankings of naval captains on 10 October 1776, however, they placed Jones at eighteenth. Already unpopular with many of the unremembered Yankee captains who were senior to him on this list, Jones did not suffer this political slight in silence. Congress had recognized his professional abilities, however, and promoted him to command of the *Alfred*, with which he captured the armed transport *Mellish* and its cargo of winter uniforms on 12 November 1776, and took seven other prizes as well. On 14 June 1777 Congress gave him command of sloop *Ranger* and ordered him to sail to Europe, where he was to take command of the *Indien*, which Congress had commissioned to be built at Amsterdam. Jones reached France in December 1777 to find that the frigate was being transferred to France by the American commissioners in Paris.

On 10 April 1778 Jones sailed from Brest in the *Ranger* with a crew of about 140 men and armed with eighteen six-pounders and six swivel guns. Heading for the home waters of his youth, he raided Whitehaven, off the

British coast, on 27–28 April. He then made an unsuccessful attempt to kidnap the Earl of Selkirk, planning to use him as a hostage to assure the proper treatment of American prisoners. The earl was away from home, however, and thus escaped capture. Crossing the Irish Sea to Carrickfergus, Jones captured the British sloop *Drake* in a brilliant one-hour action in which Jones lost eight killed and wounded to the enemy's forty or more casualties. On 8 May he returned to Brest with seven prizes and numerous prisoners to show for his twenty-eight days at sea. His cruise had spread consternation along a considerable portion of the English coast and it marked the start of his international fame.

The French, whose war with England was about to start, hailed Jones as a hero, and the authorities called him to Paris in June for consultation on ways of employing naval forces against England. On 4 February 1779 he was informed that the old East Indiaman *Duras* (with 40 guns) was placed under his command for joint army and navy operations against enemy ports. The Marquis de Lafayette was to command the army element; Jones the naval, but the plans were ultimately abandoned. By the end of the summer, however, the French had fitted out a small fleet of five naval vessels and two privateers for Jones. Benjamin Franklin's *Poor Richard's Almanac* was enjoying a vogue in France at the time that Jones was refitting the *Duras*, and since he was greatly indebted to Franklin for support, Jones renamed his flagship the *Bonhomme Richard*.

THE SERAPIS AND ITS AFTERMATH

With the American flag flying over a makeshift flotilla financed by France, and with most of the ships commanded by French officers resentful of his authority, Jones put to sea from L'Orient on 14 August 1779. Sailing clockwise around the British Isles, up the west coast of Ireland, around Scotland, and to the coast of Yorkshire, Jones captured seventeen ships and made an unsuccessful attempt to capture the port of Leith and hold it to ransom. He then won an engagement with the *Serapis* on 23 September 1779. In this demonstration of superior seamanship and indomitable fighting spirit, John Paul Jones became a great naval hero.

On 3 Oct. he reached the Texel, Holland, having left the crippled *Richard* at sea. (She sank on 25 September.) The British ambassador, in compliance with orders from King George III, demanded that the Dutch seize the ships and crews that Jones had captured, naming Jones a pirate, a rebel, and a criminal. After many difficulties arising from Holland's neutrality, Jones had to turn everything but the *Alliance* over to the French government. He sailed aboard the *Alliance* in December, evaded the British fleet, and reached L'Orient on 10 February 1780 after cruising in the Channel and searching for prizes as far south as Corunna, Spain.

Now occupied primarily with refitting the *Alliance* for his return to America, Jones visited Paris in April 1779 to raise the prize money needed to pay his disgruntled crew. While he was absent from L'Orient, however, he lost his last chance to command a fighting vessel when the mad Pierre de Landais succeeded in resuming command of the *Alliance*. In December 1780 Jones sailed for America as captain of the *Ariel*, which the French had loaned to America for the transportation of military supplies. The crossing was enlivened by Jones's capture of the British ship *Triumph*, but his prize ultimately escaped. In addition, he was forced to suppress a conspiracy among the English members of his crew.

THE ANTICLIMAX

After being abroad for more than three years, Jones reached Philadelphia on 18 February 1781. Senior officers, namely Captains Thomas Read and James Nicholson, blocked a resolution of Congress to make Jones a rear admiral, but on 26 June Congress gave him command of the largest ship of the Continental navy, the *America* (seventy-six guns), which was then under construction at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. After more than a year's frustration in constructing this vessel, Jones saw the *America* turned over to the French.

The best Jones was able to do thereafter was to get permission to sail aboard the flagship of the Marquis Vaudreuil, and he left with the French fleet from Boston for a four-month cruise in the West Indies. After the Continental navy was disbanded, Jones got authority to return to Europe as agent to collect prize money due the United States as the result of his operations during the war. His mission was successful, although payment was slow. Jones returned to the United States for the last time in the summer of 1787, and on 16 October Congress voted him the only gold medal awarded to an officer of the Continental navy.

Early the next year he accepted an offer from Catharine the Great to serve in the Russian navy against the Turks. On 29 May 1788 he raised his flag on a squadron in the Black Sea, but although he played a key role in naval operations that cleared the way for capture of the Turkish fortress at Ochkov, his position in the Russian service was undermined by a jealous French adventurer, Prince Nassau-Siegen. After he rejected Prince Potemkin's offer of command of the Sevastopol fleet, Jones was forced into idleness and returned to St. Petersburg. There he fell victim to a malicious rumor that he had violated a young girl. In September 1789 he left St. Petersburg with nothing but bitterness and the Order of St. Anne to show for his Russian experience.

Although only a few months past his forty-fifth birthday at this time, Jones's health was bad. He spent his last

two years in Paris. Though no longer a popular hero, he had comfortable accommodations and the respect of leaders of the French Revolution. When he died, on 18 July 1792, the French National Assembly took charge of his funeral. Jones did not live long enough to know that, shortly before his death, President George Washington and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson had signed commissions appointing him as a diplomatic agent to treat with the ruler (*bey*) of Algiers for the release of captive Americans.

In 1845 a movement was started to bring Jones's body back to the United States, but his relatives in Scotland blocked it a few years later. In 1899 General Horace Porter, Ambassador in Paris, started a systematic search for his burial site in the old St. Louis cemetery for foreign Protestants (which had been covered by houses). After six years effort, Porter wired back the news that the body of Jones had been found. In 1905 the remains were escorted to America by a naval squadron, and in 1913 they were placed in a \$75,000 tomb in the crypt of the naval academy at Annapolis.

IMPLICATIONS OF A HERO'S LIFE

Superficially, John Paul Jones was a Scottish adventurer, an ex-slaver turned pirate (in the eyes of the British) who used the American Revolution as an opportunity to get a job. He himself said that "I have drawn my Sword in the present generous Struggle for the right of Men; yet I am not in Arms as an American, nor am I in pursuit of Riches . . . I profess myself a Citizen of the World." There is no reason to doubt him more than others of his era, such as Patrick Henry, who expressed similar sentiments. Like many of his contemporaries, he undoubtedly sought fame and glory as well.

Having accepted a commission in the Continental navy, Jones performed his duties with complete political loyalty to the American cause, despite personal disappointments and lack of opportunity to give his remarkable leadership abilities a full test. Nineteenth century Americans saw him as a self-made man, a brave commander who remained cool when battle raged, and the greatest naval hero of the American Revolution. At the turn of the twentieth century, biographers began to emphasize the plans that Jones proposed for the young navy, along with his efforts to increase his professional knowledge, both of which are seen as characteristics of the modern, professional naval officer corps.

The American navy that hails this bachelor as its father would call him a "mustang," and would be happy to have more of his type around in wartime. Archetype of the combat leader, Jones did not look the part. He was short (under 5 feet 7 inches), thin, and homely. Midshipman Nathaniel Fanning, Jones's secretary, described him as being "rather round shouldered, with a visage fierce and

warlike, and wore the appearance of great application to study, which he was fond of." The naval hero is the subject of one of sculptor Jean-Antoine Houdon's finest busts (1780). If this work and Jones's combat record did not assure him of immortality, one of the sayings attributed to him most assuredly has. His stirring remark, "I've just begun to fight" is mentioned in only one participant's account of the *Bonhomme Richard-Serapis* action, but it characterizes the man's combat record. In the words of the inscription on his tomb, "He gave our navy its earliest traditions of heroism and victory."

SEE ALSO *Bonhomme Richard-Serapis Engagement*; Craik, James; Landais, Pierre de.

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revised by James C. Bradford

JONES, THOMAS. (1731–1792). Loyalist historian. New York. Born into a prominent New York family on 30 April 1731 at Fort Neck, Long Island, Jones graduated from Yale in 1750, studied law with his father and Joseph Murray, and set himself up as an attorney in 1755. He became clerk of the Queens County court of common pleas in 1757 and married Anne, daughter of New York's Chief Justice James De Lancey, in 1762. In 1765 he had his residence, Mount Pitt, built on the highest point of land on lower Manhattan, between the Bowery and the East River. One of the finest residences and estates on Manhattan, it was the site of Jones's Hill Fort when Charles Lee organized the defenses of New York City.

In 1773 he succeeded his father, David (1699–1775), as a judge of the provincial supreme court. As a loyal crown official and wealthy man, he was a natural enemy of the Patriots. On 27 June 1776 he was arrested at his home by the New York Committee of Safety. The New York Provincial Congress released him on parole to reappear before it on reasonable notice. On 11 August, Washington

ordered the arrest of all Loyalists likely to aid the British, and Jones was again arrested. Charged with disaffection, he was a prisoner in Connecticut until paroled in December 1776 by Governor Trumbull. He returned to his family's home at Fort Neck and avoided politics.

On 6 November 1779 his house was suddenly entered by a Patriot force under Captain Daniel Hawley of Connecticut. Jones was seized with a view to exchanging him for General Gold Selleck Silliman, a Yale classmate and friend of Jones who had been captured in his home six months earlier by Loyalist raiders. Jones spent the next several months as a sullen guest of Mary Silliman. The exchange was effected in April 1780, shortly after a New York Act of Attainder had confiscated all his property. The next year Jones and his family went to Bath, England, where Jones recovered from injuries received in a sleigh accident in Connecticut. He remained in England, bitter over the outcome of the Revolution and blaming both Britain and America for the destruction of his life and the empire. He settled in Hoddesdon, Hertfordshire, in 1783 and began work on a history of the Revolution, one of the few to give the Loyalist perspective. He finished his history in 1788, but it was not published until 1879, when the New-York Historical Society acquired it from Edward Floyd De Lancey, a distant descendant of Jones's. Jones died in Hoddesdon on 25 July 1792.

SEE ALSO *Attainder, Acts of*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

JONES, WILLIE. (1741–1801). Patriot leader. North Carolina. Younger brother of Allen Jones, Willie (pronounced "Wylie") Jones was born in Northampton County, North Carolina, on 25 May 1741. He studied at Eton and traveled in Europe before returning, in 1760, to become a prominent South Carolina political figure. First elected to the assembly in 1767, Willie was an aide to Governor William Tryon in the Alamance operations against the Regulators. He rose to the position of leader of the democratic element in his state, dominating the legislature, and serving as president of the state's Committee of Public Safety in 1776. He shaped the North Carolina constitution of 1776. In 1780 he was elected to the Continental Congress and served a year, insisting that the end of the war meant the end of a need for the Congress. Fundamentally opposed to the Constitution, he led the movement against it in his state,

and withdrew from public life in 1789 rather than alter his political position. He died in Raleigh, North Carolina, on 18 June 1801.

SEE ALSO *Jones, Allen; Regulators; Tryon, William.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

JUMEL, STEPHEN. (1754–1832). Wine merchant. France. From a family of Bordeaux merchants, Stephen Jumel appeared in New York City in 1795, having been driven from his coffee plantation in Haiti by the slave insurrection of 1790. He amassed a fortune in the wine business and married his longtime mistress Betsey (“Eliza”) Bowen in 1804. In 1810 he bought her the Roger Morris house, which had briefly been General George Washington’s headquarters during the action at Harlem Heights during the Revolutionary War. The house, now known as the Morris-Jumel Mansion, is a museum today. Unable to engineer Betsey’s acceptance into New York society, Jumel and his wife went to Paris in 1815. Betsey returned to New York in 1826 with a power of attorney that she used to take over her husband’s fortune. He returned in 1828 and died in 1832 after falling from a wagon. On 1 July 1833 his widow married Aaron Burr.

SEE ALSO *Burr, Aaron.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

JUNGKENN, FRIEDRICH CHRISTIAN ARNOLD. (1732–1806). Also known as Baron von Münzer von Mohrenstamm. Minister of State for Hesse-Kassel, 1780–1789. Born into a very old family of the lesser German nobility, he entered a Prussian infantry regiment commanded by a cousin, and was an ensign at the age of 21. After a brilliant military career in the Prussian and Hessian services, he reached the rank of major general, and in 1779 was a member of the council of the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, who for some time had been bargaining with the British on the matter of furnishing soldiers for service in America. In 1780 he succeeded Baron Martin Ernst von Schlieffen as minister of state (which included the duties of minister of war). The next year he was commissioned as a lieutenant general.

SEE ALSO *Hessians.*

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JUNIUS. “Junius” was the pen name of an unknown British writer who launched political attacks on the duke of Grafton, the duke of Bedford, and George III and defended the popular cause of John Wilkes. His most notable series appeared in the London *Public Advertiser* between January 1769 and January 1772. The writer has never been identified, but he was clearly a Whig of the Chatham-Grenville faction with access to secret government matters. There is evidence, from handwriting and political outlook, that Junius was Sir Philip Francis (1740–1818), first clerk in the War Office when the series started.

SEE ALSO *Chatham, William Pitt, First Earl of; Grenville, George; Wilkes, John.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

K

KACHLEIN, ANDREW. Also spelled Kichlein. American officer. Pennsylvania. A first lieutenant in the Second Pennsylvania Battalion from 5 January to 21 June 1776, he became a colonel of militia (Heitman) and commanded a force of Berks County riflemen at Long Island on 27 August 1776 as part of Alexander's right wing.

SEE ALSO *Long Island, New York, Battle of.*

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Mark M. Boatner

KACHLEIN, PETER. (?–1789). Also spelled Kichlein. Militia officer. Pennsylvania. A second lieutenant in Baxter's Pennsylvania Battalion of the Flying Camp, he was wounded and captured at Fort Washington on 16 November 1776. He was exchanged in 1778 and died eleven years later.

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KASKASKIA, ILLINOIS. 4 July 1778. British post on the Mississippi seized in the western operations of George Rogers Clark.

SEE ALSO *Western Operations.*

Mark M. Boatner

KEGS, BATTLE OF THE SEE *Battle of the Kegs.*

KEMBLE, PETER. (1704–1789). New Jersey Loyalist. Born in Smyrna of an English father who was a merchant in Turkey and a Greek mother, he was well educated in England before settling in New Jersey around 1730 to become a prosperous, respected, and politically prominent citizen. He was connected by marriage to the Schuylers, De Lanceys, and Van Cortlandts, and the seven children of this union included Stephen and Margaret Kemble, the latter the wife of Thomas Gage. Kemble's home in Brunswick was a stopping place for distinguished travelers between Philadelphia and New York. About 1765 he built the manor near Morristown that was used by Washington's army during the winter quarters of 1779–1780 and 1780–1781. During this time the old Loyalist was treated with the utmost respect by Washington, who had known him before the war. He died at his home in 1789.

SEE ALSO *Gage, Thomas; Kemble, Stephen.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

KEMBLE, STEPHEN. (1730–1822). British officer and Loyalist. New Jersey. Son of Peter Kemble, he was commissioned ensign in the regiment being raised by Colonel Thomas Gage in May 1757. On 8 December 1758 he became that officer's brother-in-law when Gage married Margaret Kemble. After taking part in the siege of Havana in 1762, Stephen Kemble went to Montreal as aide-de-camp to Gage and was promoted to captain in 1765. In 1772, through Gage's influence, Kemble became a major and deputy adjutant general, and was put in charge of the intelligence service. In 1773–1774 Kemble was in England with the Gages. After Gage's recall from Boston in 1775, Kemble remained in that city as deputy adjutant general to Generals William Howe and Henry Clinton. When Arnold's treason began, Clinton was anxious to have John André take over Kemble's duties as head of intelligence, helping to arrange the promotions that allowed André to pay Kemble three hundred pounds for vacating the post. Kemble resigned on 16 September 1779. Meanwhile, Gage arranged an appointment for Kemble as lieutenant colonel in the Sixtieth Regiment, and he was ordered from New York to join his unit in the West Indies, winning promotion to colonel in 1782 as a result of his services in Nicaragua. In 1793 he returned to England as deputy judge advocate of the army. He retired from the military in 1805 and returned to New Jersey, where he died on 20 December 1822.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason; Kemble, Peter.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

KENTON, SIMON. (1755–1836). Frontiersman. Virginia. Born in Fauquier County, Virginia, on 3 April 1755, Simon Kenton fled across the Allegheny Mountains when he was 16, believing he had beaten to death the boy who had married his girlfriend. Under the assumed name of Samuel Butler he hunted, explored, and fought Indians along the Ohio River. He acted as a secret agent in Dunmore's War in 1774, and as a scout he got to know Simon Girty and Daniel Boone. He joined George Rogers Clark and took part in the capture of Kaskaskia and Vincennes in 1778. He accompanied three expeditions against the Shawnee encampment at Chillicothe: Boone's in 1779 and Clark's in 1780 and 1782. After the first of these, Kenton was captured by Indians, sentenced to death, saved by Girty, again condemned, saved once more through the efforts of John

Logan (Tachnedorus, a Native-American leader), and sent to Detroit as a prisoner. He escaped in July 1779. Learning that his boyhood "victim" was alive, he resumed his family name and returned to Virginia. In 1783 he brought his family to settle at Kenton's Station, Kentucky. From 1786 to 1794 he led a group of scouts and spies known as Kenton's Boys, serving with General Anthony Wayne's army in the campaigns of 1793–1794. He moved to Ohio in 1810, constantly acquiring large land holdings, but through ignorance of the law he ended up destitute in his last years. Saved from poverty by a pension from Ohio in 1827, he died in Zanesfield, Ohio, on 29 April 1836.

SEE ALSO *Chillicothe, Ohio; Logan.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

KENTUCKY RAID OF BIRD. May–August 1780. (Ruddle's and Martin's Stations) In late spring 1780 the British on the Great Lakes launched two attacks into the Mississippi Valley. One moved against the Spanish post at St. Louis. The other, led by Captain Henry Bird of the Eighth Foot, left Detroit in April to raid Kentucky. Bird's long-range expedition involved 150 whites; several hundred Indians; and, unusual for wilderness operations, six guns. Moving across Lake Erie and then along the Maumee–(Great) Miami River route to the Ohio, he gained additional Indian supporters until the total force approached one thousand. Bird had wanted to strike Fort Nelson (Louisville), but his allies insisted instead on moving up the Licking River to its fork near modern Falmouth, Kentucky, so that they could hit the less-well-defended interior settlements. Their first target, Ruddle's Station, was a simple stockade defended only by the local inhabitants. They held off the Indians, but when Bird brought up his cannon, the station had to surrender. The raiders had a similarly easy time of it with Martin's Station a few miles away. After destroying outlying farms, Bird withdrew with 350 prisoners and significant amounts of plunder, reaching Detroit on 4 August. Bird's raid altered George Rogers Clark's plans for 1780, diverting him from moving against Detroit so that he could carry out punitive strikes against the Indians.

SEE ALSO *Western Operations*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

KETTLE CREEK, GEORGIA. 14 February 1779. Loyalist defeat. Encouraged by Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell's capture of Savannah on 29 December 1778 and his advance on Augusta, Colonel James Boyd raised a force of 350 Loyalists from his base at Spartanburg, South Carolina, and marched toward Augusta. On the way they were joined by 250 Loyalists from North Carolina commanded by John Moore.

Campbell took Augusta on 29 January and, leaving a Loyalist garrison under Thomas Brown, started establishing posts in western Georgia. There were skirmishes about thirty miles up the Savannah River from Augusta between Patriot Colonel John Dooley and three hundred Loyalists under Colonel McGirth and Major John Hamilton. Dooley had crossed the river and then been driven back into South Carolina by Hamilton when Colonel Andrew Pickens joined him with reinforcements that brought their total strength up to about 350. Pickens assumed command of the combined forces and on 10 February crossed the Savannah at Cowen's Ferry to attack Hamilton. The latter was besieged at Robert Carr's Fort (or Fort Cars) and was in bad straits when Pickens learned of Boyd's approach. The rebels considered Boyd bigger game than Hamilton and started after him. Pickens recrossed the Savannah near Fort Charlotte (close to the junction of the Broad and Savannah Rivers). Learning of his approach, Boyd—who was moving due west toward the Savannah from Ninety Six—headed for the crossing of the river at Cherokee Ford, ten miles north of Fort Charlotte. Here he was stopped by eight men with two swivel guns in a redoubt, but he moved five miles upstream, crossed on rafts, and continued toward Augusta.

Pickens moved upstream on the South Carolina side to cross the Savannah behind Boyd and then followed him down the Georgia side. Oblivious that he was being followed, Boyd crossed the Broad near its junction with the Savannah on the morning of the 13th and camped that night on the north side of Kettle Creek atop a rocky hill. He sent his prisoners on to Augusta, unaware that the British had just abandoned the town earlier that same day. On the morning of the 14th, while Boyd's horses

were turned out to graze and his men were slaughtering cattle, the rebels attacked. Pickens led his troops in a direct assault on the rocky hill where Boyd had his camp, while Dooly and Clarke attacked the camp across the creek from the left and right sides respectively. Disobeying orders, Pickens's advance guard fired on the Loyalist sentries. Alerted to the attack, the Loyalist pickets fired and fell back into camp. Although his troops were in the greatest disorder, Boyd pulled them together and put up a fight that lasted nearly an hour. But Boyd was shot and killed, and the fighting broke into firefights between small groups, much of it in the nearby swamp. The Loyalists lost forty killed and wounded and seventy captured, the Patriots nine killed and twenty-three wounded. The Loyalist prisoners were taken to Ninety Six and tried for treason. Five were hanged there and two more were taken to North Carolina to be hanged; the remainder were pardoned.

Of Boyd's nearly 700 men, 270 reached British lines and were integrated into the North and South Carolina Royal Volunteers. Pickens's strength is generally given as between three hundred and five hundred. His victory prevented any serious rallying of Loyalists in the South for another year and encouraged Patriot militia to flock into General Benjamin Lincoln's camp at Purysburg, leading the latter to undertake his counteroffensive to liberate Georgia.

SEE ALSO *Lincoln, Benjamin; Southern Theater, Military Operations in*.

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KING GEORGE'S WAR. 1744–1745. British colonists called military operations in North America during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) "King George's War," after King George II.

SEE ALSO *Austrian Succession, War of the; Colonial Wars*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

KING'S AMERICAN REGIMENT OF FOOT. This Provincial regiment was raised by Edmund Fanning, a protégé of Governor William Tryon, in Westchester County and on Long Island, New

York, beginning in December 1776. With other elements of the New York garrison, it took part in Sir Henry Clinton's expedition up the Hudson in early October 1777, capturing Verplanck's Point, New York, on 5 October. In July 1778 it was sent to Rhode Island, where it distinguished itself in the Battle of Quaker Hill on 29 August 1778. Back at New York in mid-June 1779, it was immediately attached to Tryon's force, which was sent to raid the coastal towns of New Haven, Fairfield, and Norwalk, Connecticut. It garrisoned Stony Point and Lloyd's Neck until sent in October 1780 as part of Major General Alexander Leslie's raid on Virginia. From there it was sent on to South Carolina, reaching Charleston on 16 December and sent into garrison at Georgetown. It again fought with distinction at Hobkirk's Hill on 25 April 1781 and was thereafter sent to reinforce Savannah, Georgia. The bulk of the regiment returned to Charleston when Savannah was evacuated in July 1782 and then to New York when Charleston was evacuated in December. Having been placed on the American Establishment as the fourth American Regiment on 7 March 1781, it was elevated to the British Establishment on Christmas Day 1782. Evacuated from New York to New Brunswick in early September 1783, it was disbanded on 10 October.

SEE ALSO *Clinton's Expedition; Connecticut Coast Raid; Fanning, Edmund; Hobkirk's Hill (Camden), South Carolina; Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778); Virginia, Military Operations in.*

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KINGS BRIDGE, NEW YORK. The point at which the Post Road crossed Spuyten Duyvil Creek—which separated Manhattan from the Bronx—Kings Bridge was strategically important in the New York campaign and subsequently in the British defense of New York City. It was an objective of American forces under Major General Lincoln in the operations against

Manhattan at the start of the Yorktown campaign in July 1781. The name is also variously spelled King's Bridge and Kingsbridge.

SEE ALSO *Yorktown Campaign; Yorktown, Siege of.*

Mark M. Boatner

KINGS FERRY, NEW YORK. About twenty-five miles north of New York City and half that distance south of West Point, this Hudson River crossing was between Stony Point (on the west bank) and Verplanck's Point. It was strategically important as the southernmost crossing site that the Americans could safely use while the British held New York City.

Mark M. Boatner

KINGS MOUNTAIN, SOUTH CAROLINA. 7 October 1780. Central to the British strategy of shifting the war to the South was the conviction, deeply held by Whitehall's planners, that the two Carolinas and Georgia offered a large and untapped reserve of Loyalists. There needed only the introduction of British forces to bring such men flocking to the King's standard. So mobilized, the Loyalists—just as the British had hoped since the beginning of the war and at each new place they came to—would become a substantial element of the crown's military effort. The raising of Loyalist forces in the form of militia and quasi-regular provincial units could only improve the odds for the British, becoming, perhaps, the deciding factor in the war. At the least, after five years of struggle, new numbers of Loyalist troops would prove useful at a point when the ranks of the British army's regulars were spread from North America and the Caribbean back to the Old World and out to India. Loyalist militiamen and provincials would operate alongside the redcoats, garrison key outposts, and assist in the overall pacification effort.

To this end, after the fall of Charleston (12 May 1780), Sir Henry Clinton appointed Major Patrick Ferguson of the Seventy-first Foot (Fraser's Highlanders) to the position of Inspector of Militia in the Southern Provinces. This appointment placed Ferguson in charge of any Loyalist forces to be raised. It would also, when the invasion of North Carolina came to be contemplated, place him in charge of the western wing of the army commanded by Major General Charles Lord Cornwallis following Clinton's departure for New York. Assisted by Major George Hanger (until 6 August, when the latter assumed the position of second-in-command to Banastre

Tarleton), Ferguson proceeded into the backcountry of South Carolina, that region where the British believed that Loyalists were particularly concentrated. He soon raised some four thousand Loyalist militiamen in the vicinity of Ninety Six, reckoned by both sides the Tories' backcountry stronghold. Ferguson next started pushing north, intending to extend operations that had every appearance of fulfilling British hopes for the potential of the Loyalists. In this same period the Tory leaders Morgan Bryan and John Moore were able, in the Catawba District near the border of the two Carolinas, to bring into the field an additional fifteen hundred men. These Loyalist efforts to raise militia forces were, however, matched by ones on the rebel side, and the rebels extended theirs over a wide area indeed. As Thomas ("Gamecock") Sumter commenced his partisan operations in South Carolina and Colonel Charles McDowell his in North Carolina, a call for assistance was sent to the far side of the Blue Ridge Mountains, to the settlements containing the so-called Over Mountain Men. Recently beleaguered by British-supported Indian attack, these frontiersmen were located in farms and outposts scattered along the valleys of the Holston, Nolichucky, and Watauga rivers in what is now Tennessee. While the Over Mountain Men prepared to answer the call for assistance and the various forces on the two sides continued to form up, a series of raids and skirmishes ensued in the region between the Catawba and Ninety Six. (The principal ones are covered in "Military Operations in the Southern Theater," and only those connected with activities leading to the Battle of Kings Mountain are mentioned here.)

Soon joining Charles McDowell were Colonel Isaac Shelby, with an initial detachment of some six hundred Over Mountain Men, and Colonel Elijah Clarke of Georgia, leading a combined force of Georgia and Carolina militia. Shelby captured Thicketty Fort, South Carolina, on 30 July. Then, on 8 August, in two minor engagements around Wofford's Iron Works (Cedar Springs, also referred to as Old Iron Works), Clarke and Shelby gained no advantage, but soon handed the Loyalists a sharp defeat at Musgrove's Mill on 18 August. They were considering an attack against Ninety Six, about thirty miles away, when news of Horatio Gates's defeat at Camden, on 16 August, prompted them to beat a hasty retreat lest the British forces trap them and bring them to battle. Indeed Ferguson, with his newly raised Tory militiamen, got to within thirty minutes' march of them as they fell back, only to be stopped by a message recalling him to Camden. It was upon reaching that point that Ferguson was briefed by Cornwallis regarding the forthcoming invasion of North Carolina.

Cornwallis's plan was to lead the main portion of his field army north from Camden to Charlotte and Salisbury, a line of march selected because it ran through an area in which the strongest rebel resistance was expected.

Cornwallis was also aware that additional concentrations of Loyalists were located around Cross Creek (now Fayetteville) on the Cape Fear River, over a hundred miles east of Charlotte. The main idea of his plan was thus to effect a link-up of the various Loyalist elements. Certainly there were strong groupings of Loyalists west of the Catawba and in what was then Tryon County, North Carolina. By this northward movement with his main force Cornwallis expected to gain control of a key corridor. He reckoned that joining up the two Loyalist sections to each other would make it possible to establish control over the rest of North Carolina.

Ferguson had previously penetrated as far as Gilbert Town, just across the line from South Carolina, and believed that he had sufficient Loyalist support in the region to dominate it. Cornwallis therefore authorized him to move with an independent force into this area. The British commander, however, had enough misgivings about the plan to express them in a letter to Clinton: "Ferguson is to move into Tryon County with some militia, whom he says he is sure he can depend upon for doing their duty; but I am sorry to say that his own experience, as well as that of every other officer, is totally against him."

This concern notwithstanding, on 8 September Cornwallis marched north with his main body east of the Wateree, and with Tarleton's Legion, reinforced by one gun and a body of light infantry, on the western side of the river. His objective was Charlotte, with Hillsborough to follow. Two weeks into their march, the British ran into resistance. First surprising and then defeating the westernmost British force, Colonel William Davie and a militia force drawn from both Carolinas next fell back to contest Cornwallis's capture of Charlotte, 26 September. The army then stopped to wait for Ferguson to join them from the west. It was from this point in their operations that the British plan for mobilizing the Loyalists began to unravel.

On 7 September Ferguson and a detachment of his force—wearing the red coats of the British army, newly issued, and equipped with muskets and bayonets—crossed into North Carolina and proceeded on to Gilbert Town. His earlier assessment of the locals' Loyalist leanings appeared correct, as many of them came in to take the British oath of allegiance. That not a few of them may have done so as a temporary expedient to protect their property little dissuaded Ferguson from his course. On 10 September he withdrew south to rejoin his main body in an attempt to intercept Clarke, who was leading an expedition against Augusta, Georgia (14–18 September), and whom the British next expected to withdraw into North Carolina. By 23 September Ferguson was back in Gilbert Town, having meanwhile moved about twenty-two miles northwest of the town to Old Fort, near the source of the Catawba in the Blue Ridge Mountains.

Ferguson now boldly announced that the rebellion was finished in his area. Yet trouble was brewing. Before withdrawing on 10 September, he had paroled one Samuel Phillips, a captured rebel, and sent him across the Blue Ridge with a warning to Shelby, the Over Mountain Men's commander. Ferguson's message was brutally simple. If the rebels did not "desist from their opposition to the British arms, and take protection under his standard, he would march his army over the mountains, hang their leaders, and lay their country waste with fire and sword." For the Over Mountain Men, having already decided they needed to go after Ferguson before he could come over the mountains to pursue them, this message could only serve to accelerate their efforts. Moreover, the rebel leaders, although many of their men had had to scatter and were suffering from malnutrition, were considerably advanced in their plans for raising a force from both sides of the mountains. Calls had gone out in all directions for volunteers to rally and stop the invaders. Shelby, meeting with Colonel John Sevier, another Over Mountain leader, made final preparations. Indeed the two men pledged themselves to cover the money taken from the public treasury in order to finance the operations they were about to undertake. Sending out a final call for men, they appealed to Colonel Arthur Campbell in Virginia and Colonels Charles McDowell and Benjamin Cleveland along the North Carolina border. The rendezvous for these various groups was set for 25 September at Sycamore Shoals, on the Watauga River near modern Elizabethton, Tennessee.

More than a thousand men showed up, most of them mounted and carrying the long-barreled rifle of the American frontier. Arthur Campbell's brother-in-law, Colonel William Campbell, so tall and powerfully built he was regarded as a giant, came with four hundred Virginians. Sevier and Shelby arrived with their own groups of Over Mountain Men, and there were as well the little groups of friends and relatives who had gathered to see them off. To send a force back across the mountains to fight Ferguson was risky in the extreme. Some of the Over Mountain Men had to be left behind to defend against Indian attacks, a scourge from which the settlements had already greatly suffered.

All told, the Over Mountain Men made up less than half of the force marching against Ferguson, contradicting a frequently encountered claim that the expedition principally or even solely comprised frontiersmen from Tennessee. In fact, once the Over Mountain Men were joined by several hundred South Carolinians as well as additional North Carolina and Virginia men, the overall force comprised men from up and down the mountains as well as over them.

That said, the Over Mountain portion of the force, leaving its Sycamore Shoals rendezvous on 26 September,

the next day plowed through deep snow on the crest of the mountains. On 30 September they reached McDowell's Plantation at Quaker Meadow (near modern Morgantown, North Carolina), where Charles McDowell's 160-man Burke County militia was assembling. While taking a day's rest after a difficult ninety-mile march, they were joined by Colonel Benjamin Cleveland and Major Joseph Winston, who brought 350 North Carolina militia from the upper Yadkin (Wilkes and Surry Counties of North Carolina). They also learned that Colonel James Williams was raising forces to join them farther south. As they continued toward Gilbert Town, where Ferguson was reported still to be, on 1 October the expedition leaders sent Charles McDowell to confer with Gates, the American commander in the South, in Hillsboro. McDowell's mission was to ask that Gates assign either Daniel Morgan or William Davidson to command them. Meanwhile, having gotten their senior militia officer off the scene, on 2 October they elected William Campbell temporary commander of the combined forces. Major Joseph McDowell assumed command of his brother's regiment.

FERGUSON RETREATS

Meanwhile, on 27 September Ferguson started withdrawing south from Gilbert Town. Agents had by now informed him of the rebels' approach. To what extent this news alarmed him will never be known for certain; it is, however, known that days earlier he had received a message from Lieutenant Colonel John Cruger, British commander at Ninety Six, that Elijah Clarke's forces were on the move. Cruger reported that Clarke and his Georgians might be heading north from Augusta to reinforce this new rebel expedition. On Green River, on 30 September, Ferguson encountered James Crawford and Samuel Chambers, two rebels who had deserted to join the British. From them he gained further information about the expedition, and he sent urgent requests to Cornwallis and Cruger for reinforcements. On 1 October Ferguson turned east toward Charlotte. His purpose in taking this new direction was to deceive the rebels, who would expect him to continue south toward Ninety Six. From Tate's Plantation on Buffalo Creek, ten miles west of Kings Mountain, Ferguson wrote Cornwallis on 5 October: "I am on my march towards you, by a road leading from Cherokee Ford, north of Kings Mountain. Three or four hundred good soldiers, part dragoons, would finish this business. [Something] must be done soon. This is their last push in this quarter and they are extremely desolate and [c]owed."

At this point Ferguson, like Cornwallis, was still not concerned as to his situation. Certainly he had marched only four miles on 2 October, having apparently decided there was no chance of cutting off Clarke. On 6 October he wrote Cornwallis again, stating that he had stopped his

retreat and was planning to make a stand. "I arrived to day at Kings Mountain," his message said, "& have taken a post where I do not think I can be forced by a stronger enemy than that against us." What he did not know when he made this decision was that the British could send him no support. Cruger had written Cornwallis that he did not have enough men to garrison Ninety Six properly, much less to send reinforcements to Ferguson. Tarleton had been desperately ill with malaria the past two weeks. Then, after leading the Legion into Charlotte, his second-in-command, Hanger, had succumbed to the same disease. Moreover, Cornwallis was himself by now incapacitated by a "feverish cold." On 6 October he responded to Ferguson's message of the preceding day by writing that "Tarleton shall pass at some of the upper Fords, and clear the Country; [but] for the present both he and his Corps want a few days rest."

The rebel force—Over Mountain Men, North and South Carolinians, Virginians, all—entered Gilbert Town on 3 October. Next, fooled by Ferguson's change of direction, they lost his trail at Denard's Ford on the Broad River. The night of 4 October they camped at this place, where Ferguson himself had camped three nights before. On 5 October the rebels camped twelve miles farther south, at Alexander's Ford on Green River, where Ferguson had stopped five nights earlier. The next day they picked up the scent, however, and marched twenty-one miles to Cowpens. Colonel James Williams, who had been raising militia from both Carolinas since the previous month, joined the expedition at Cowpens with about four hundred men; his subordinate leaders were William Hill, Edward Lacey, James Hawthorne, Frederick Hambright, William Chronicle, and William Graham. Another reason why Ferguson's change of route might have deceived the rebels was that some of Williams's South Carolinians wanted Campbell's army to keep pushing south and desist from their move against Ferguson; attacking Ninety Six would aid in protecting the property of Patriots in that region from the Loyalists.

When a scout named Joseph Kerr confirmed previous reports of Ferguson's location, nine hundred of "the best horsemen" immediately started forward at 8:00 P.M. on the evening of 6 October. The less-well-mounted horsemen and those on foot were left behind to follow as fast as possible. Speed was everything; the rebels knew that Ferguson had gone to ground, and they were hungry for the kill.

Their enemy's decision to make a stand is a mystery, since he undoubtedly could have retreated to the safety of Cornwallis's main army at Charlotte, some thirty miles away. Ferguson did not know that Cornwallis was unable to send him any appreciable amount of assistance beyond one detachment; aside from that, probably the best explanation for Ferguson's decision is that he thought he had

found a position where he could defeat a large rebel force in battle. He had trained his force to fight in the British manner, with reliance on musket fire and closing with the bayonet on the enemy. The spot he chose to put this technique to the test was a rocky, relatively treeless ridge with steep, heavily wooded, boulder-strewn slopes. It was shaped roughly like a human footprint that pointed to the northeast. Rising 60 feet above the surrounding country, it varied in width between 120 and 60 yards. The slopes were so rugged that Ferguson was content to rely on nature's gifts; he made no effort to improve his position by field fortifications. Next, while he made preparations to defend the entire perimeter of the ridge, he established his camp in parade ground fashion on the broad, northeastern portion. He also sent out about two hundred men to gather forage from the surrounding area. These men would therefore be absent on the morning of the battle, leaving his available strength on Kings Mountain at eight hundred militia and one hundred picked men drawn from the Kings American Rangers, the Queen's Rangers, and the New Jersey Volunteers. These three comprised provincial units made up of Americans, just as was the case with Ferguson's newly raised South Carolina Loyalist militia force. The only man on either side during the battle who was not American would prove to be Patrick Ferguson himself. Thus it is somewhat amusing to see the subsequent action referred to as a battle between "the British" and "the Americans"—it was far more a civil-war encounter fought between Americans.

Having marched all night and all the next morning through rough country—not to mention the preceding movement to Cowpens—the attackers began to lose the fine edge of their enthusiasm by noon of 7 October. It had rained during the night, and a light drizzle kept up after daylight. About noon Shelby had to veto the proposal that the expedition halt for a rest. Interest quickened, however, when they captured two enemy scouts and a messenger. The prisoners confirmed Ferguson's position and furnished an interesting detail that was disseminated through the ranks: the enemy leader could be identified by a checkered shirt, perhaps in a Scottish tartan pattern, worn over his uniform. The rebels also knew that Ferguson could be spotted by a crippled right arm, his elbow having been shattered by an American musket ball at Brandywine three years before.

They had by now followed Ferguson's route to the vicinity of Tate's Plantation near Buffalo Creek. Expecting to find enemy outposts to detect or contest their crossing of the Broad River, they detoured south to Cherokee Ford about two and a half miles below Tate's. They then followed the Ridge Road past present-day Antioch Church, thence north to a point on the modern state boundary some four miles west-northwest of Kings Mountain, and then toward their objective. About a mile away they

halted, hitched their horses, and broke up into four columns. These began moving toward positions, previously assigned, around the ridge. So skillfully was the approach conducted—or so lax Ferguson's security measures—that Shelby's column was within a quarter-mile of the ridge before Loyalist sentries fired their first shots. Ferguson was completely surprised.

For his part, Shelby refused to let his men return fire until they had worked their way well up the slope. Campbell was meanwhile closing in from the opposite side. So also were the other forces moving, Indian fashion, into position. (See map.) The weakness of Ferguson's planning now became apparent: rather than constituting an obstacle to the attackers, the trees, boulders, and ravines on the slopes furnished ideal terrain for their infiltration tactics. Ferguson, the man who had devoted so much effort to introducing the rifle into the British army—who had invented the first true military, as opposed to hunting, rifle, and who was regarded as the best marksman in that army—had made another fatal error: he had decided to defend Kings Mountain with the bayonet-and-volley fire tactics of British regulars. First he sent his men in a bayonet charge against Shelby, who gave ground but whose Over Mountain Men thinned the Loyalist ranks as they fell back. Meanwhile, Campbell's Virginians made their way up the opposite side of the ridge and attacked. "Here they are, boys!" shouted their leader. "Shout like hell and fight like devils." The air was filled, in addition to the crack of long rifles and the ragged musket fire of the Loyalists, by the frontiersmen's yells that were probably the counterpart to the Confederate Yell of eight decades later. In all this the Loyalists tried to charge Virginians just as they had Shelby's Over Mountain Men. These, too, like their comrades, dropped back, firing and inflicting casualties as they did so. Soon Sevier's men reached the crest, and the Loyalists found themselves being pushed back from the "heel" and across the "arch" by the combined forces of three rebel columns. This in turn pushed them back toward the other rebel forces. Ferguson galloped from one threatened point to the next, signaling the attack with a silver whistle that he carried and trying to rally his beleaguered Loyalists. Soon, though, he was having to cut down white flags that started to appear. By the time the defenders had been driven back to their camp area, where Ferguson had hoped to make a successful stand, they found themselves in the open and surrounded by riflemen firing almost at pistol range. When Ferguson suddenly tried to break through the rebel lines with a few officers, he was shot from the saddle. A certain Robert Young claimed that his personal hunting rifle, "Sweet Lips," brought down Ferguson, but there were at least seven other bullets in the dying chieftain.

Captain Abraham de Peyster, a Loyalist officer, stepped forward to take command of the hopeless

situation. From the disorganized mass huddled around the wagons there came shots from those who tried to fight back and white flags from those who tried to surrender. De Peyster finally put up a flag; only with great difficulty did Shelby and Campbell finally stop the rebel firing.

As in other "massacres" (Haw River, Paoli, and Waxhaws, for example), it is hard to determine where the battle ended and the butchery began. The official report of the battle says benignly that after De Peyster's flag went up, the rebels immediately ceased firing and the enemy laid down their arms, most of which were loaded. Another account says that either the surrendered men or some returning foragers fired a shot that mortally wounded Colonel James Williams, and that Campbell then ordered the riflemen around him to shoot into the prisoners; a young officer is quoted as saying, "We killed near a hundred of them and hardly could be restrained from killing the whole." Unquestionably, atrocities were committed by the rebels, but the most balanced version, between the two extremes mentioned above, appears to be the following explanation by Shelby:

It was some time before a complete cessation of the firing on our part could be effected. Our men who had been scattered in the battle were continually coming up and continued to fire, without comprehending in the heat of the moment what had happened; and some who had heard that at Buford's defeat [Waxhaws], the British had refused quarters . . . were willing to follow that bad example.

The action had lasted about an hour. On Sunday, 8 October, the victors left their camp on the battlefield and headed for Gilbert Town. Here thirty prisoners were tried and convicted by an impromptu court. Of these, twelve were condemned to death and nine were actually hanged. These last appear to have been individuals who had been conspicuously brutal in their prosecution of the Loyalist effort in the backcountry's civil war. The other prisoners were entrusted to Cleveland's command and marched to Hillsboro. The rest of the militia army broke up and went home.

CONCLUSIONS

The fight at Kings Mountain in an instant dealt a fatal blow to British hopes for mobilizing and employing a substantial force of Loyalists in the Carolinas. There would be no outpouring of Loyalists after Kings Mountain. Subsequent efforts by Cornwallis to rally men of Loyalist persuasion to his camp would prove a failure. The British might later attempt to reorganize remnants of various Loyalist militia and provincial units into new forces, but these efforts enjoyed little success. Kings

Mountain effectively cowed backcountry Loyalists into submission, just as they had been cowed into submission by rebel actions in the first part of the war and prior to the introduction of British forces in strength into the region. The battle was thus a death knell for a major component of the British strategy for shifting the war to the South: the idea of raising a powerful force of Loyalists that could tip the balance as well as playing a key role in the pacification effort. The results were far-reaching indeed. Sir Henry Clinton called Kings Mountain “the first link of a chain of evils that followed each other in regular succession until they at last ended in the total loss of America.” The battle was, with the other partisan actions and the complete tactical defeat achieved against British regular forces at Cowpens three months later, the turning point of the war in the South. Certainly Kings Mountain shifted forever the balance of rebel-Loyalist armed support in favor of the rebel cause, and it made Cornwallis withdraw into South Carolina (Winnsboro) and delay his new offensive into North Carolina by three months. Ultimately, it enabled Nathanael Greene, immediately upon assuming command of the American army in the South (3 December 1780), to gain time for rebuilding that army and indeed to seize the initiative—and keep it—until the successful conclusion of his southern campaigns.

The rebel commanders—a particularly able and seasoned body of men—demonstrated a striking ability to assemble men from both sides of the mountains and, in a matter of weeks, concentrate them against a potent British threat. Individual differences in point of view yielded quickly to unity of command. The various bands of rebel riflemen acted as a highly mobile force of mounted infantry. They rode their horses to the battle but fought dismounted, where their marksmanship and woodcraft skills were at a premium. British infantry—to include Ferguson’s corps of South Carolina Loyalist militia—lacked the mobility to keep up with their mounted opponents; and Cornwallis had insufficient numbers of cavalry to chase down the rebels or to screen his movements. Cornwallis and Ferguson were both able tacticians. It is thus difficult to account for Cornwallis’s failure to come to Ferguson’s aid—except, of course, for the fact that Ferguson never expressly sent his commander a message stating that he was in peril. Indeed, two days before the battle, he had reported to Cornwallis that the rebels thereabouts appeared cowed. The British error was in misreading the depth and extent of rebel strength—and that rebel commanders could so quickly bring to bear an overwhelming force against Ferguson. That officer, out of hubris or perhaps a misguided faith that he could defeat the rebels at a kind of warfare in which they had gained much recent experience against both Indians and Loyalists, apparently regarded his position as a defensible one. He failed to fortify that position, however, and, trusting in the light-

infantry tactics in which he had trained his Loyalists, looked to draw the rebels into a fight he believed he could win. As Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee put it, Ferguson had tried to defend a position that was “more assailable by the rifle than defensible by the bayonet.” For this miscalculation Ferguson paid with his life.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

The rebel commanders brought some 900 men to the foot of Kings Mountain in the mid-afternoon of 7 October. These were the best-mounted of the rebel force; additional rebel forces numbering some 500 to 800 men had been left behind at Cowpens in order to hasten the pace of the march on Ferguson’s position. In a battle that lasted approximately an hour, the rebels lost 28 killed and 64 wounded. Ferguson’s force is estimated at 1,018, a figure that, if correct, includes the foraging party that probably returned toward the end of the battle. Losses on the British side amounted to 157 killed (including, of course, Ferguson), 163 wounded, and 698 marched off as prisoners of war. Of this last group, most managed to escape on the march toward Hillsboro or shortly thereafter, the rebels being less skilled in security measures than in handling their rifles. Most accounts agree that the rebels captured some 1,400 individual weapons. A possible explanation for this number of muskets being greater than the number of killed or captured Loyalists is that Ferguson may have carried extra stands of arms for the purpose of equipping new recruits along the way.

SEE ALSO *Augusta, Georgia (14–18 September 1780); Charlotte, North Carolina; Clarke, Elijah; Clinton, Henry; Cornwallis, Charles; Cowpens, South Carolina; Cruger, John Harris; De Peyster, Abraham; Ferguson, Patrick; Haw River; Musgrove’s Mill, South Carolina; Ninety Six, South Carolina; Over Mountain Men; Paoli, Pennsylvania; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene; Southern Theater, Military Operations in; Sumter, Thomas; Tarleton, Banastre; Thicketty Fort, South Carolina; Waxhaws, South Carolina.*

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revised by John Gordon

KING'S ROYAL REGIMENT OF NEW YORK. Sir John Johnson, the son of Sir William Johnson, inherited some of his father's position and responsibilities in the Mohawk Valley and with the Iroquois in 1774. Able to fend off the rebels for over a year after the start of hostilities, he was forced to flee his home with two hundred followers on 20 May 1776. On 19 June, Major General Guy Carleton, the governor of Quebec, gave Johnson authority to raise two Provincial battalions. He immediately began recruiting at Chambly, Quebec, principally from among his followers and other refugees for a unit that would be known officially as the King's Royal Regiment of New York, and unofficially as Sir John Johnson's Corps, the King's Royal Yorkers, and from the color of their uniforms, the Royal Greens. The Royal Yorkers sent 133 men with Colonel Barry St. Leger's expedition through the Mohawk Valley in 1777. (Another company was with John Burgoyne's invasion forces in the Lake Champlain Valley.) Fifty-five men of the Royal Yorkers' light company formed the blocking force at the ambush at Oriskany (6 August 1777), and a further seventy men marched from the siege lines around Fort Stanwix later that afternoon, reversing their green coats to confuse the Americans militiamen and gain a momentary advantage.

Over the next four years, the Royal Yorkers spent much of their time and effort in preparing to defend Canada against another rebel invasion. Although their leaders were hostile to each other, the Royal Yorkers also participated with Butler's Rangers in the raids launched from Fort Niagara against the New York frontier. But because few in Canada quickly recognized that Major General John Sullivan's expedition posed a major threat, the Royal Yorkers arrived too late to contest the ravaging of Iroquois lands in August and September 1779. They took part (with Butler's Rangers) in Sir John Johnson's first raid into the Mohawk Valley in the autumn of 1780,

fighting at Klock's Field on 19 October. Four companies were with Walter Butler when he raided the Mohawk Valley in 1781, and they took part in the final action, at Jerseyfield on 30 October 1781, when Walter Butler was killed. Hostilities came to an end in the Mohawk Valley in the summer of 1782. The First Battalion was disbanded on 24 December 1783, the Second in June 1784; many veterans settled with their families in the western part of Quebec province.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Butler's Rangers; Jerseyfield, New York; Johnson, Sir William; Klock's Field, New York; Oriskany, New York; St. Leger's Expedition; Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

KINGSTON, NEW YORK. In a sequel to Clinton's Expedition, General Sir John Vaughan sailed up the Hudson after the British captured Forts Clinton and Montgomery and on 16 October 1777 burned the town of Kingston. He encountered no resistance and inflicted no casualties. This action caused concern in patriot circles that British forces under General Sir Henry Clinton might advance on Albany, but Vaughan's pilots refused to take their ships farther up the river.

SEE ALSO *Clinton's Expedition.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

KING WILLIAM'S WAR. 1689–1697. English colonists called military operations in North America during the War of the League of Augsburg (1689–1697) "King William's War," after King William III.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; League of Augsburg, War of the.*

KIPS BAY, NEW YORK. 15 September 1776. Despite Major General Henry Clinton's advice to land in Westchester County and cut off an American retreat over the Kings Bridge, Major General Henry Howe decided to land at Kips Bay (at the foot of modern East Thirty-fourth Street in Manhattan) to avoid both the dangerous waters at Hell Gate, at the northern end of the East River, and the American fort at Horn's Hook (at the foot of modern East Eighty-ninth Street), where he had initially hoped to land. By having his ships fire on Horn's Hook prior to the invasion and then shifting the landing site to Kips Bay, Howe also gained the element of surprise. On the night of 14 September, four ships sailed southward to support the landing. Eighty-four flatboats, galleys, and bateaux had been concealed in Newtown Creek, directly across the river from Kips Bay.

AMERICAN DISPOSITIONS

Washington's forces were abandoning New York City and retreating up the Manhattan Island. Most of his units were spread thin along the fourteen and one-half miles of the island's length and so were ill-prepared to meet a British invasion, while thirty-five hundred troops remained in the city, removing supplies and heavy artillery. Washington transferred his headquarters that evening to the Morris house, on Harlem Heights in northern Manhattan, giving him a commanding view of Horn's Hook and the village of Nieuw Haarlem, where he expected the British to land. Washington had neglected Kips Bay, another likely place for the invasion because its deep water would allow ships to sail in close to the shore. Also, a large meadow adjacent to the cove provided an excellent landing area. Nonetheless, when the British ships arrived that night, only raw recruits were on hand to confront them from a hastily dug ditch along the bank of the river. Joseph Plumb Martin, then a sixteen-year-old among the "new levies" from Connecticut, recalled that "every half-hour, [American sentinels] passed the watchword to each other, 'All is well.' I heard the British on board their shipping answer, 'We will alter your tune before tomorrow night.' And they were as good as their word for once" (Martin, *Narrative*, p. 30).

NAVAL BOMBARDMENT

By dawn on the fifteenth, the four ships had anchored within one hundred yards of the shore, their combined broadsides bristling with more than eighty cannons. However, the first bombardment came from Admiral Richard Lord Howe's ships on the Hudson River; these ships created a distraction by sailing northward at about 7 A.M., firing whole broadsides into New York City. Then, at 10 A.M., the flotilla emerged from Newtown Creek, carrying four thousand men, and formed a line in the middle of the East River. The men's red uniforms looked

to Martin "like a large clover field in full bloom" as the British ships waited for the tide to change. A little before 11 A.M., the ships began a massive, hour-long bombardment. With cannon balls flying overhead but inflicting few casualties, American officers nonetheless gave the order to retreat, and the British and Hessian troops, emerging from a blanket of white smoke created by the bombardment, came ashore unopposed.

THE CHAOTIC AMERICAN RETREAT

Panic spread among the American troops along the entire shore, and they fled inland to the Post Road. Four miles to the north, Washington heard the bombardment and sped to the scene on horseback with his aides. To the south, in New York City, Major General Israel Putnam heard the British guns and dispatched an entire brigade and three additional regiments to reinforce the troops at the site of the invasion. Confusion reigned among the American forces as troops heading in opposite directions passed each other on the Post Road, some fleeing and others rushing toward the action at Kips Bay.

Washington arrived just north of Inclenberg, the high ground overlooking the landing site, shortly before it was seized by the first wave of British and Hessian troops under Clinton. Washington and his aides tried in vain to organize the fleeing militia into a defensive line (at modern Fifth Avenue and Forty-second Street). "Take the walls!" Washington shouted. "Take the cornfield!" (Johnston, p. 93). The Hessians and British light infantry marched up from Kips Bay, and the panic that had seized the militia quickly spread to the troops dispatched by Putnam, who also threw down their guns and fled. A few Americans who tried to surrender were bayoneted and shot by the Hessians. Washington was reportedly so "distressed and enraged" by the flight of his troops that he "drew his sword and snapped his pistols, to check them" (Stokes, vol. 5, p.1014). For his own safety, Washington's aides seized the reins of his horse and led him away.

THE AMERICAN ESCAPE

After conferring with Washington on horseback, Putnam rode down to the city to rescue the thirty-five hundred remaining troops before the British could cut them off. The men formed a column two miles long and at 4 P.M. embarked on a forced march up the west side of Manhattan in the late summer heat, guided by Putnam and his young aide, Major Aaron Burr, who knew the terrain. Between 2 and 5 P.M., General Howe looked out over Kips Bay from the top of Inclenberg as nine thousand more troops completed their landing. At the estate of Robert Murray on Inclenberg (the modern Murray Hill neighborhood), Mary Murray and two of her daughters entertained Howe and his generals with cakes and

Madeira, giving rise to the myth that the women deliberately delayed the British and saved the American column from destruction. Not until 5 P.M. did a Hessian brigade march south on the Post Road to secure the territory between the beachhead and the city, while Admiral Howe dispatched one hundred marines in small boats to raise the flag in the city itself. General Howe's main force headed north on the Post Road, where American riflemen in front of McGowan's Pass inadvertently deflected them westward (across modern Central Park). However, Putnam's force had just marched past the intersection where the British appeared, and only the last man in the entire American column was killed. The rest reached the safety of Harlem Heights that night.

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Barnet Schecter

KIRKWOOD, ROBERT. (1730–1791). Continental officer. Delaware. Born in New Castle County, Delaware, in 1730, Kirkwood was commissioned lieutenant of the Delaware Regiment on 17 January 1776 and fought with them at Long Island, Trenton, and Princeton. Promoted to captain on 1 December 1776, he led his company in all the important actions in the campaigns in New Jersey and Pennsylvania in 1777 and 1778. In 1780 he went south with General Horatio Gates. The Delaware Regiment lost ten officers in the battle of Camden, and the unit was reorganized into two 96-man companies commanded by the senior remaining captains, Kirkwood and Peter Jaquett. Attached to General Henry Lee's light infantry, these units performed brilliantly throughout Nathanael Greene's southern campaign.

Kirkwood distinguished himself at Cowpens, Guilford, Hobkirk's Hill, and Eutaw Springs. On 30 September 1783 he was brevetted as a major. He moved to Ohio after the war. He was commissioned captain in the Second U.S. Infantry, on 4 March 1791, and was killed in action on 4 November of that year.

SEE ALSO *Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene; St. Clair, Arthur.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

KLOCK'S FIELD, NEW YORK.

19 October 1780. Sir John Johnson had carried out a systematic attack on the Schoharie Valley, 16–18 October 1780, as part of a deliberate effort to drive the frontier back to Schenectady. On 19 October he continued toward Stone Arabia, and at 10:00 A.M. defeated 150 militiamen under Colonel John Brown near Fort Keyser. In the meantime Brigadier General Robert Van Rensselaer had mobilized the Albany County militia and set out in pursuit, with Governor George Clinton (a former Continental Army general) following behind with additional men. At Fort Hunter Colonel Pieter Vrooman joined Van Rensselaer with all of his Fifteenth Albany County Regiment (the inhabitants of the Schoharie Valley) that could be assembled. The militia paused on reaching the village of Sprakers, where they heard the sounds of Brown's defeat. Van Rensselaer did not cross the Mohawk at that point but instead had his men continue on almost to Fort Plain, where he left them to confer with the governor. When he returned he discovered that the men had improvised a bridge from baggage wagons and successfully crossed to the north bank.

Johnson had systematically destroyed Stone Arabia after defeating Brown and then started a slow march east with all his booty, heading toward St. Johnsville. Van Rensselaer could move faster, and he caught up with the rear guard late in the day. Left with no choice but to stand and fight, Johnson threw up a hasty breastwork on the eastern edge of St. Johnsville at a place known as Klock's Field (or Fox's Mills). His force consisted of about five hundred Loyalists from his own Royal Regiment of New York (the Royal Greens) and Lieutenant Colonel John Butler's Rangers, some British regulars, a detachment of Hesse-Hanau jägers, three small fieldpieces, a pair of light mortars, and a force of Indians (mostly Mohawks and Senecas)—somewhere between eight hundred and fifteen hundred men. He employed the jägers and Indians in the woods on his left flank and held the earthwork with the Loyalists.

Knowing that sunset was near, Van Rensselaer launched his attack immediately. Colonel Morgan Lewis commanded the vanguard. The main line had Colonel Abraham Cuyler on the left and Colonel Lewis Dubois

(the former commander of the Fifth New York Regiment) on the right. Sixty pro-American Oneidas screened the right flank. The engaged American force numbered about 850 men. It quickly flushed the Indians and jägers out of the woods and sent them fleeing toward the river, accompanied by Johnson and Joseph Brant, who was wounded in the heel. The majority of the raiders, left without leaders, were surrounded and pinned against the Mohawk River. At this point, to the total astonishment of his defeated enemy, Van Rensselaer decided to break contact and fell back three miles to camp securely in Palatine.

During the night Johnson's survivors set off for Onondaga, where they had left their boats. Two parties of Americans set out in pursuit on the morning of 20 October but failed to catch up, although scouts got close enough to see the last of the raiders embark. The main body headed back to Albany and a rancorous court-martial of their general (who was acquitted).

The operation is significant not so much for the destruction or casualties, which were minimal on both sides, but rather for the sheer size of the contending forces. Johnson's force turned out to be too large to sustain itself and overwhelmed its rudimentary logistics. On the other hand, Governor Clinton told Washington that this raid destroyed more than 150,000 bushels of grain and 200 homes, and deprived the Continental Army in the Hudson Highlands of food for the coming winter.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Fort Keyser, New York; Schoharie Valley, New York.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

KNAPSACKS AND THE SOLDIERS' BURDEN. The individual soldier's load was burdensome in the best of times. British troops carried as much as sixty pounds of equipment and a Continental soldier's usual load was about forty to fifty pounds. Standard campaign gear consisted of a musket, cartridge pouch, forty to sixty cartridges, bayonet and carriage, haversack with two to four days' bread and meat rations (one day's ration weighed approximately two and one-quarter pounds), canteen, blanket, and a knapsack or blanket sling containing extra clothing and other personal necessities. Shared between each mess squad of five or six men were a tin or sheet-iron camp kettle and wooden bowl, along with one or several tomahawks or hatchets. Tent poles were carried only rarely, tentage never.

The standard British knapsack consisted of two large pockets, with a small slit enclosure between, suspended from two shoulder straps. The Continental army copied that design, but used other styles as well. The manufacturer of a single-strap, "new Invented napsack and haversack" in February 1776 claimed it had been adopted by Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Virginia troops. If true, the model likely saw only limited service. A 1781 Continental army return listed 10,350 linen knapsacks (painted and unpainted) and 323 made of "Goat Skin"; the British army more often used the latter material.

British forces often carried blanket slings (tumplines), consisting of a blanket rolled and tied around a single woven linen strap, slung over one shoulder. In 1777, Fortieth Regiment soldiers were issued a linen wallet, placed inside to hold their belongings. Captain William Leslie of the Seventeenth Regiment noted in 1776: "My whole stock consists of two shirts 2 pr of shoes, 2 Handkerchiefs half of which I use, the other half I carry in my Blanket, like a Pedlars Pack" (Cohen, "Captain William Leslie's 'Paths of Glory,'" p. 63).

Blanket rolls, much used in the American Civil War (1861–1865), saw some use in the Revolution. J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur described "six militiamen with linsey-woolsey blankets tied from the right shoulder to the left arm" (St. John de Crèvecoeur, *Letters*, p. 488).

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John U. Rees

KNOWLTON, THOMAS. (1740–1776). Continental officer. Connecticut. Born at West Boxford, Massachusetts, Knowlton moved to Ashford, Connecticut, with his family. First enlisting as a private in Colonel Phineas Lyman's Connecticut provincial regiment in 1757, Knowlton rose to the rank of second lieutenant by the last campaign of the final French and Indian War (1762), when he took part in the siege of Havana. As a militia captain at Ashford, Connecticut, he led his company to Boston for ten days' service after the Lexington alarm. The General Assembly appointed him captain of the fifth company of Israel Putnam's Third Connecticut Regiment on 1 May 1775. He distinguished himself when Colonel William Prescott sent him with two hundred men to help defend the rail fence at the battle of Bunker Hill on 17 June. Promoted to major of the

Knox, Henry

Twentieth Continental Regiment of the reorganized Continental army on 1 January 1776, he led a daring raid into Charlestown, Massachusetts, on 8 January, burning enemy quarters and taking five prisoners. He marched with his regiment to New York City in April and was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 12 August. Although the regiment was stationed in New Jersey, Knowlton reached Long Island with a hundred men the day before the battle (27 August) and was posted at Flatbush Pass. In early September he was ordered to form a small body of rangers for use as skirmishers. Knowlton chose 130 to 140 rangers, mostly from among men he knew in the Connecticut regiments, and led them into their first action, an attempt on 16 September to stop British light infantry from pursuing American forces fleeing north up Manhattan Island. In the ensuing action at Harlem Heights, Knowlton was mortally wounded. In General Orders the next day, Washington lamented the loss of “the gallant and brave Colonel Knowlton, who would have been an honor to any country” (Twohig, p. 320).

SEE ALSO *Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Harlem Heights, New York; Long Island, New York, Battle of.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

KNOX, HENRY. (1750–1806). Continental general and chief of artillery. Massachusetts. Born at Boston on 25 July 1750 and apprenticed to a bookseller after the death of his father, Knox showed an interest in military matters from an early age. He joined the elite local artillery company at the age of eighteen; opened the London Book-Store in 1771, where he read the military books he stocked for the British officers of the Boston garrison, and became second in command of another elite militia company, the Boston Grenadier Corps, in 1772. In July 1773 he lost the third and fourth fingers of his left hand when a fowling piece burst during a hunting trip. On 16 June 1774, despite her parents' objections, he married Lucy Flucker, the daughter of Thomas Flucker, the provincial secretary of Massachusetts. By 1775 he was a beefy young man with a maimed hand earning a good living as the proprietor of a popular bookstore in Boston. He was also a devoted defender of colonial rights, starting from the time he had witnessed the Boston Massacre (5 March



Henry Knox. *The Continental general and America's first secretary of war, in a portrait (c. 1873) by Charles Peale Polk, after an original by Charles Willson Peale.* NATIONAL PORTRAIT GALLERY, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION/ART RESOURCE, NY.

1770) and tried to restrain the British guard commander from firing into the mob.

LEADING THE CONTINENTAL ARTILLERY

Henry and Lucy Knox fled Boston in June 1775, leaving behind his livelihood and her family; Lucy carried through the British lines sewn into her petticoat the sword Henry would carry throughout the war. Knox served as a volunteer on the staff of Artemas Ward during the Battle of Bunker Hill and the start of the Boston siege. He favorably impressed Washington at their first meeting on 5 July 1775. Five months later, on 17 November, Washington appointed the “portly, genial, and enterprising” twenty-five-year-old military amateur as colonel of the (virtually nonexistent) Continental Regiment of Artillery and assigned him the task of bringing to Boston the artillery pieces that lay at Fort Ticonderoga in upstate New York. Knox's achievement gave Washington the means to force the British to evacuate Boston in March 1776.

After laying out the defenses for vulnerable points along the coast in Connecticut and Rhode Island, Knox joined Washington at New York City. He and his gunners rendered valuable service at the Battle of Long Island

(27 August 1776), in the subsequent retreat through New York and New Jersey, and at Trenton and Princeton. The ability of Knox's gunners to bring their pieces into action at Trenton on the morning of 26 December 1776, in the midst of heavy rain and sleet, was a notable achievement. On 27 December 1776 Knox was appointed brigadier general. Aware of the need to begin creating an armaments infrastructure to support the armed struggle, Knox spent the winter of 1776–1777 at Springfield, Massachusetts, establishing workshops and an arsenal while the main army was in winter quarters at Morristown, New Jersey. The arrival of Tronson de Coudray in May 1777 threatened Knox's position as chief of artillery, but Congress found an interim solution until the arrogant foreigner drowned in the Schuylkill River, mourned by no one. Knox's gunners performed well at Brandywine (11 September 1777) and Germantown (4 October), although Knox's advice at Germantown to reduce the Chew House before continuing the advance may have lost Washington a fleeting opportunity for greater success. During the Conway Cabal, Knox was unwaveringly loyal to Washington.

By the spring of 1778 the Continental field artillery had developed from a makeshift organization of inadequate weapons and inexperienced men into a combat arm that very nearly met Washington's needs. Of Knox's achievement, Douglas S. Freeman has written: "if he acquired slowly the fine points of the employment of artillery, he quickly developed high skill in dealing with men. His administration of his arm of the service was quiet and was marred by few jealousies on the part of his subordinates" (*Washington*, 4, p. 131).

Knox continued to merit Washington's high opinion of him throughout the rest of the war. Knox performed particularly well at the Battle of Monmouth (28 June 1778) and the siege of Yorktown (October 1781), where he placed the cannon that forced Cornwallis to surrender. Knox was appointed major general on 22 March 1782, with rank from 15 November 1781. He took command of West Point on 29 August 1782 and took the lead in creating the Society of the Cincinnati in May 1783 at Newburgh; he served as the society's first secretary-general. He succeeded Washington as commander in chief of the rump Continental army on 23 December 1783 and remained in command of its small successor force until 20 June 1784.

AFTER THE REVOLUTION

Returning for a short time to private life in Boston, he became secretary of war under the Confederation on 8 March 1785, where his duties were mainly clerical in an army that numbered less than one thousand men. He advocated national academies to train officers for the army and navy and the establishment of a national militia system, but Congress approved neither proposal. He retained

his post until 28 December 1794, from 12 September 1789 as head of an executive department under the federal Constitution. Knox was the only high officeholder under the Confederation to be continued in office. Initially an ally of secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, who had been one of his artillery captains at Trenton, he was angered by his former subordinate's arrogance and high-handedness. His own efforts as secretary bore fruit in the authorization of six frigates to defend American commerce against the Barbary pirates and in the victory Anthony Wayne won over a Native American coalition at Fallen Timbers on 20 August 1794. Knox's luxurious habits and extravagant entertaining earned him the title "Philadelphia nabob," and along with some unfortunate land speculations in Maine with William Duer, starting in 1791, brought him money problems. When war loomed with France in 1798, he was deeply hurt when Washington, appointed by President John Adams to command the provisional army, nominated him to be the third major general, after Alexander Hamilton and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney; Knox refused and never wrote to Washington again. Knox died prematurely on 25 October 1806 at the age of fifty-six at Thomaston, Maine, when a chicken bone lodged in his intestines.

Knox possessed significant administrative abilities, loyalty to his chief and the cause, and a sanguine outlook that made him a major figure in the winning of American independence. His service in the Continental army was crucial: he "rendered to Washington the most valuable assistance of any of the general officers of the revolutionary war" (Harry M. Ward in ANB). Washington's close friend and confidant for nearly a quarter century, Knox had a deserved pride in his extensive public service, but he also displayed human shortcomings and faults. He could storm and threaten resignation like any brigadier general when Congress promoted other officers over his head. He was a large man—he weighed 280 pounds by 1783—and lived a contented married life with the "lively and meddlesome but amiable" Mrs. Knox, who weighed 250 pounds and bore him twelve children (only three of whom lived to adulthood).

SEE ALSO *Conway Cabal*; *Germantown, Pennsylvania*, *Battle of*; *Knox's "Noble Train of Artillery"*; *Tronson du Coudray*, *Philippe Charles Jean Baptiste*.

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KNOX'S "NOBLE TRAIN OF ARTILLERY." The New England army that besieged Boston after 19 April 1775 lacked the heavy artillery that could force the British to evacuate the town. Various people realized that the best source from which to acquire such guns was Fort Ticonderoga, New York, a lightly manned outpost on Lake Champlain. A group of Americans led by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold (who was acting under authority from the Massachusetts Committee of Safety) captured the fort on 10 May. The next problem was how to move the guns to the siege lines around Boston. Henry Knox proposed a plan to George Washington, and, on 16 November 1775, the general ordered the stout twenty-five-year-old Knox to carry it out. Leaving Cambridge a few days later with his brother and a servant, Knox reached Fort Ticonderoga on 5 December. Apparently in conjunction with Philip Schuyler, commanding the Northern Department, Knox selected fifty-nine artillery pieces (forty-three heavy brass and iron guns, six cohorn mortars, eight siege mortars, and two howitzers) for transport. The pieces were dragged to the fort dock, put on a small gundalow for the short sail to the portage road that led to Lake George, unloaded and dragged by ox team across the portage, loaded onto a scow, a pettiauger, and a batteau, and sailed south to Fort George at the head of the lake. They all arrived by the middle of December. On 12 December, Knox arranged for the construction of forty-two "good strong sleds that will each be able to carry a long cannon clear from dragging on the ground and which will weigh 5400 pounds each." He also hired eighty yoke of oxen to drag the sleds to Springfield, Massachusetts, where he would procure new teams to drag them to Framingham. Fortunately for Knox, the weather turned cold and snowy, freezing roads and streams, thus making it possible for the oxen to drag the sleds with some degree of efficiency. The nearly 300 miles of difficult terrain were covered with a speed that surprised even the impatient and ambitious Knox. From Fort George the sleds went south through Fort Edward, Saratoga, Albany, Kinderhook, and Claverack, and were then hauled east through the steep grades and heavy snows of the Berkshires to Framingham, twenty miles west of

Cambridge. They arrived on 24 January and were parked temporarily; John Adams counted and examined fifty-two cannon. Three of the large, thirteen-inch (bore diameter) siege mortars, including one named the "Old Sow," weighed a ton each. Total weight of the guns and mortars was 119,900 pounds, and the convoy included 2,300 pounds of lead and a barrel of the excellent Ticonderoga flints.

The Americans were able to end the siege of Boston by emplacing many of these heavy guns on Dorchester Heights in early March 1776, an outcome that would not have been possible without the artillery from Ticonderoga. Knox himself called these weapons "a noble train of artillery."

SEE ALSO *Allen, Ethan; Arnold, Benedict; Artillery of the Eighteenth Century; Boston Siege; Dorchester Heights, Massachusetts; Ticonderoga, New York, American Capture of.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

KNYPHAUSEN, WILHELM, BARON VON. (1716–1800). German commander in chief after Leopold Philipp von Heister. Knyphausen entered the Prussian army in 1734 and became a general in 1775. Having been placed in command of the second division of the German troops that were sent for service in America, Knyphausen sailed from Bremen, reaching New York Harbor on 18 October 1776, with 3,997 Hessians and 670 Waldeckers (mercenaries of Germanic descent), and a company of jägers (light infantry). In the same convoy were 3,400 British recruits. The Germans were sent on by water to New Rochelle, and with this base secured, General William Howe continued his pursuit of General George Washington north toward White Plains. General von Heister, the senior German officer in America at the time, led the Hessians at White Plains, New York, on 28 October 1776. Knyphausen led his forces into combat at Fort Mifflin, New York, on 16 November 1776, where the Germans claimed the honor of making the

main attack and where they sustained 330 casualties in heavy fighting, whereas the British lost 122 men.

Disagreements between General Howe and the elderly von Heister, aggravated by the German disaster at Trenton, New Jersey, on 26 December 1776 (where the black uniformed “Regiment Knyphausen” was captured with two others), led to von Heister’s recall in 1777. Knyphausen remained as commander in chief of the German troops in America for the remainder of the war. In addition, his seniority made him the successor of the British commander in chief as well, which would give him command over all British forces in America. To forestall this outcome, special precautions regarding so-called “dormant commissions” were adopted by the London authorities.

During the Philadelphia campaign, Knyphausen commanded one of the two divisions of Howe’s army. He led this force at Brandywine, where his mission was to make Washington believe the main attack was against Chadd’s Ford while General Charles Cornwallis led the other division in a strategic envelopment. His forces were not engaged to any significant degree at Germantown. In the Monmouth campaign he commanded the column that escorted Clinton’s baggage train across New Jersey, and only a body of his grenadiers saw any action on 28 June. Germans deserted in large numbers while the invading army was in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. As many as 440 of them left during the Monmouth campaign alone.

Three months later, Knyphausen led 3,000 men up the east side of the Hudson River in the large-scale foraging expedition that led to the Tappan massacre, but his forces were not involved in that affair. For the remainder of the war he was based in New York, where he commanded during General Henry Clinton’s absence in the Charleston Campaign of 1780. Knyphausen led the Springfield raid into New Jersey in June 1780. As the most senior officer in British service in North America after Clinton, Knyphausen would have taken command had Clinton followed Cornwallis’s request to come to his aid in the Chesapeake. Clinton used Knyphausen’s poor health to justify hesitating to respond to this summons from Cornwallis. Knyphausen returned to Germany in 1782. Before his death in 1800 he was given the post of military governor of Kassel.

SEE ALSO *Dormant Commission; Fort Washington, New York; Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of Knyphausen.*

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KOSCIUSZKO, THADDEUS ANDRZEJ BONAWENTURA. (1746–1817). Continental officer. Poland. Born on his family’s estate



Thaddeus Kosciuszko. *The Polish-born Continental officer and military engineer whose selection and fortification of the Saratoga battlefield made possible the American victory that marked the turning point of the war.* HULTON ARCHIVE/GETTY IMAGES.

near Kosów, Poland, on 12 February 1746, Kosciuszko graduated from the Royal Military School at Warsaw, 1769. As a captain, he was sent to the school of artillery and military engineering at Mézières, France. Returning to Poland, which had just been partially partitioned, in 1774, he found little opportunity for advancing his career, and after an unfortunate love affair he returned to France. With a loan from his brother to pay his passage to America, he reached Philadelphia in August 1776, and in due course the Pennsylvania Committee of Defense employed him to assist in planning the Delaware River forts. This initial assignment gained him a commission from Congress as a colonel of engineers on 18 October 1776. He joined General Horatio Gates at Ticonderoga, and played an important role in stopping General John Burgoyne’s offensive. Kosciuszko’s selection and fortification of the Saratoga battlefield made possible the American victory that marked the turning point of the war.

From March 1778 until June 1780, Kosciuszko was engaged in planning and building the defenses of West Point, a place of utmost strategic importance. By this time, he and Gates had become close friends. Invited to become the chief engineer of the Southern Department, he arrived after Gates’s defeat at Camden but remained to serve under General Nathanael Greene. He was assigned the mission of exploring the Catawba River Valley and was

in charge of transportation during Greene's dramatic race to the Dan River. Kosciuszko's design of wagons with detachable wheels was particularly inspired. In the siege of Ninety-Six, South Carolina, from 22 May to 19 June 1781, Kosciuszko got a costly lesson in the art of practical military engineering, making two mistakes that may well have caused this operation to fail. First, he placed his siege works too close to the British fortifications, and second, he persuaded Greene to attack the British at their strongest point. During the remainder of his service in the southern region, there was more opportunity for him to show his ability as a cavalry leader than as an engineer. In the spring of 1783 he went north with Greene, and in October he was brevetted brigadier general.

In July 1784 he left New York and returned through Paris to Poland. After four years in rural retirement he became a major general in the Polish army, in October 1789. In the spring of 1792 he fought a gallant but futile campaign against the Russian invaders, which earned him promotion to lieutenant general, before his king ended Polish resistance. He and other Polish generals emigrated to Leipzig, and Kosciuszko later went to Paris to enlist the support of the French revolutionary government. The Jacobins withheld French assistance, so Kosciuszko returned to his homeland to lead a noble but unsuccessful

uprising against the Russians and Prussians. Defeated and captured in October 1794, but with his country no longer in existence, Kosciuszko was freed after two years, and in August 1797 arrived in Philadelphia. Congress gave him \$20,000 and 500 acres in Ohio. In May 1798 he left America and went to Paris, where Napoleon earnestly sought his military assistance. Napoleon, however, would not meet Kosciuszko's terms—the promise to support the restoration of Poland. For the rest of his life, Kosciuszko strove for this goal, but without success. Before his death he emancipated his serfs. Money from the sale of his Ohio land was used to establish the Colored School at Newark, New Jersey. He died in Switzerland on 15 October 1817.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne's Offensive; Philadelphia Campaign; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

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LA CORNE SEE *St. Luc de La Corne, Pierre.*

LAFAYETTE, JAMES. (1748?–1830). Continental spy. Since he was born a slave, little is known of Lafayette's early life other than that William Armistead of New Kent County, Virginia, claimed him as property. In 1781 Armistead was a Richmond commissary supplying Continental forces. When the marquis de Lafayette moved south to battle the British under General Charles Cornwallis, he put out a quiet call for spies. James Armistead, as he was then known, won his owner's consent to volunteer, hoping his service might win him freedom. Taking a job as a forager with the British at Portsmouth, Virginia, James moved between the two armies, carrying information to Lafayette. When the British promised him freedom for spying on the Americans, James became a double agent, supplying Cornwallis with false information while keeping Lafayette apprised of British movements. It was the slave James who informed the Americans that Cornwallis intended to fortify Yorktown and wait there for the fleet to extricate his forces, allowing the French and Americans to trap the British force.

Despite his valuable aid in winning the Revolution, James did not receive the reward he expected: after Cornwallis's surrender, William Armistead reclaimed his slave. In 1786 Armistead finally came around to supporting James's petition for freedom as long as he, Armistead, received recompense. Armed with a letter from Lafayette praising his courage, James won a hearing from the

Virginia legislature, which paid Armistead for James's freedom in January 1787. James took the last name of Lafayette, staying in New Kent County and becoming a slave owner himself. In 1816 he received a small pension from the state and in 1824 was recognized in the crowd at Yorktown by Lafayette and warmly greeted. James Lafayette died at his home on 9 August 1830.

SEE ALSO *African Americans in the Revolution.?*

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LAFAYETTE, MARQUIS DE. (1757–1834). (Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier de Lafayette.) Continental general. Before his second birthday he lost his father, a colonel of grenadiers killed at Minden. His mother died before he was thirteen years old, and Lafayette was a wealthy orphan when his grandfather died a few weeks later. When he was age sixteen he married his cousin, Marie Adrienne Françoise de Noailles, and thus strengthened his alliance with one of the most powerful families of France. He had entered the Royal Army as a musketeer on 9 April 1771, was promoted to second lieutenant in the Noailles Regiment on 7 April 1773, and promoted to captain on 19 May 1774. While serving at Metz, he attended a dinner on



Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier de Marquis de Lafayette. *The French general who fought for American independence in a 1791 portrait by Joseph Desire Court.*
© ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS.

8 August 1775 at which the duke of Gloucester expressed some candid and sympathetic views on the course being pursued by the American insurgents. Motivated by his interest in the American cause, he made plans to join the Americans. Knowing that his family and the king would disapprove of his action, he confided in the Comte de Broglie, who introduced him to Johann De Kalb. The latter, already seeking service in America, became a sort of guardian, and after many delays they sailed for America with written agreements from Silas Deane that they would be commissioned major generals. With a party of other soldiers, they landed near Georgetown, South Carolina, on 13 June 1777, and were in Philadelphia six weeks later. Their reception by Congress was chilly, but after Lafayette offered to serve at his own expense and start as a volunteer, Congress on 31 July commissioned him a major general without command. The next day he met Washington, and the American cause acquired a valuable, if enigmatic, asset.

WASHINGTON'S CONCERNS

Washington was at first irritated by Lafayette's expressions of availability for a field command. At the Battle of Brandywine, on 11 September 1777, the ardent volunteer helped check the enemy's advance and was wounded in the left thigh and evacuated to the Moravians' care in Bethlehem. After two months of recuperation, he rejoined the army at White Marsh (after the Battle of Germantown). On 25 November he led a reconnaissance force of Greene's division against the position of Cornwallis at Gloucester, New Jersey, and with three hundred men got the better of a skirmish with a superior force of Hessians. Lafayette's effectiveness in battle complicated Washington's quandry. On 1 November, Washington wrote to Henry Laurens:

I feel myself in a delicate situation. . . . He is extremely solicitous of having a command equal to his rank. . . . It appears to me, from a consideration of his illustrious and important connections, the attachment which he has manifested for our cause, and the consequences which his return in disgust might produce, that it will be advisable to gratify his wishes. . . . Besides, he is sensible, discreet in his manners, has made great proficiency in our language, and from the disposition he discovered at the battle of Brandywine possesses a large share of bravery and military ardor. (Washington, *Papers*, 12, p. 81).

These comments explain more than first meets the eye about Washington's initial hesitations, his change of mind, and later his concerns about Congress's reaction to conferring a command on a foreigner as well as Lafayette's true role in the Revolution.

A FIELD COMMANDER

On 1 December 1777, Congress voted him command of a division of Virginia light troops. After sharing the hardships of Valley Forge and proving himself one of Washington's most stalwart supporters in the so-called Conway Cabal, he went to Albany to lead the proposed Canada invasion of 1778. Returning to Valley Forge in April 1778 after that frustrating experience, he was involved in the action at Barren Hill, Pennsylvania, on 20 May. He then figured prominently in the Monmouth campaign in June. Washington gave him command of the two veteran brigades engaged at Newport in July and August 1778, where he had a prominent part in salvaging the wreck of the first Franco-American venture. When the Peace Commission of Carlisle issued a manifesto questioning France's motives in the alliance, Lafayette challenged Carlisle to a duel, which Carlisle sought to avoid. Washington and Estaing succeeded in urging Lafayette to withdraw from pressing the matter.

TO FRANCE AND BACK

With France's entry into the war in the spring of 1778, Lafayette sought permission from Congress for a leave to return to France, resolve his relations with the king, and "be any way useful" to America. Congress concurred on 21 October and added a letter of recommendation to Louis XVI on Lafayette's behalf. He sailed on 11 January 1779 (his departure having been delayed by a fever), reached Paris a month later, and after a week of "political quarantine" to purge himself of disobedience in defying the royal will in leaving France, he was given a hero's welcome. He was received with favor at court; appointed colonel of dragoons; and, in presenting an accurate picture of affairs in America, won the confidence of Vergennes. Although Lafayette failed to get approval for many of the schemes he advocated—an invasion of England, Ireland, or Canada; hiring part of the Swedish navy for service in America; floating a large loan in Holland—he was successful in endorsing the proposal to send a French expeditionary force to serve under Washington.

On 28 April 1780 he landed at Boston. Rochambeau reached Newport in July, and with Washington's wholehearted support, Lafayette sought to serve as intermediary in working out plans for allied cooperation. When Benedict Arnold's raid in Virginia forced Washington to send regulars there, he selected Lafayette as commander of this detachment. In his Virginia military operations, Lafayette proved himself an effective strategist in eluding the efforts of Cornwallis's larger force to "trap the boy," and at Green Spring on 6 July 1781, he showed ability as a tactician. When Rochambeau and Washington moved south for the Yorktown campaign, Lafayette was given command of the light division for the final action against Cornwallis.

RETURNING HOME

He sailed for home in December 1781 and reached France with lavish commendations from Congress to Louis XVI and instructions to the U.S. ministers in France to confer with him and avail themselves of his assistance. Congress made the *Alliance* available for his crossing. Upon his return to France, Lafayette was promoted to the rank of *maréchal de camp*, effective 19 October 1781. In Europe, along with Estaing, he was assembling an army of twenty-four thousand French and Spanish troops at Cádiz for operations against the British when the word of the treaty arrived. He received the Cross of the Order of Saint Louis in 1783.

PROMOTING FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

In the last half of 1784 he revisited America at Washington's invitation and promoted the cause of a stronger American union. After 1783 he was of great assistance to

various American causes in Europe, working tirelessly for improved Franco-American relations by, among other things, seeking expanded commercial relations between France and America, encouraging Greene and Knox to have their sons educated in France, supporting the Society of Cincinnati, and—especially—aiding Jefferson's mission as minister to France. In 1786 Lafayette's bust (a gift from the state of Virginia) was placed in the Paris City Hall, a signal distinction for a living Frenchman.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

In 1787 he was a member of the Assembly of Notables; in 1789 he represented the nobility of Auvergne in the Estates General. On 11 July he submitted a draft for the Declaration of the Rights of Mankind and the Citizen. On 17 July 1789 he was named commander of the newly established Paris National Guard, a post he kept until autumn 1791, when France completed its written constitution. Having been promoted to lieutenant general on 30 June 1791, he returned to active duty as commander of the Army of the Center on 14 December 1791, when France feared the outbreak of war. The collapse of the monarchy in August 1792 led to his arrest by the Jacobins and his decision to flee to America on 19 August, but he was taken and imprisoned by the Austrians and Prussians in a series of locations until his release in 1797. In March 1800 he returned to France to find his fortune destroyed. He acknowledged Napoleon but declined his offers of a senatorship, the Legion of Honor, and the post of minister to the United States. He also declined President Jefferson's offer in 1805 to become governor of Louisiana.

LATER YEARS

During this period and until 1818 he kept out of politics, cultivating his lands at La Grange, forty-three miles from Paris. He then sat in the Chamber of Deputies until 1824, and in that year accepted the invitation of President Monroe to visit the United States. During the visit, Lafayette was warmly welcomed in every state of the Union, and everywhere Revolutionary War veterans hurried to his side. Of those with whom he had served, he often remembered their names and those of their families. He sailed back for France on 8 September 1825 with a renewed commitment to international causes that he conceived as based on the principles of the American Revolution. Louis-Philippe's assurances of a monarchy "with republican institutions" in the July Revolution of 1830 convinced him to accept the title of commander of the French National Guard until December 1830. Thereafter he continued as a major figure in the opposition until his death. His residences in Paris and in the countryside (La Grange) were the destination for many American visitors during the remainder of his life.

Lafayette spent an estimated \$200,000 of his personal fortune in support of the American Revolution. In 1794 Congress voted him some \$24,500 to cover the salary he had declined during the Revolution, and in 1803 and 1825 that body granted him lands in Louisiana and Florida.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Raid in Virginia; Barren Hill, Pennsylvania; Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Canada Invasion (Planned); De Kalb, Johann; Deane, Silas; Green Spring (Jamestown Ford, Virginia); Laurens, Henry; Monmouth, New Jersey; Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778); Peace Commission of Carlisle; Rochambeau, Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de; Valley Forge Winter Quarters, Pennsylvania; Virginia, Military Operations in; Yorktown Campaign.*

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LAKE GEORGE, NEW YORK. About thirty-five miles long and varying in width between one and three miles, Lake George is connected with Lake Champlain by a swift, narrow channel at Ticonderoga. Because the smaller lake is about 240 feet higher than Lake Champlain, this five-mile channel is not navigable; a portage of about three miles, on the northeast tip of Lake George, was used in the eighteenth century. General John Burgoyne has been criticized for not using this route

during his campaign of 1777. Diamond Island in Lake George was the scene of action in the Ticonderoga Raid, September 1777.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne's Offensive; Champlain, Lake; Ticonderoga Raid.*

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LAKE GEORGE, NEW YORK. 8 September 1755. In the spring of 1755, the British imperial government adopted a two-pronged strategy designed to remove French “encroachments” from lands the British colonies claimed in the interior of North America. The southern prong of the strategy was Braddock’s expedition against Fort Duquesne in the Ohio valley. The northern prong involved two expeditions, one against Fort Niagara (via Oswego on Lake Ontario), and the other against Fort St. Frederic, located at the narrows of Lake Champlain.

Logistical bottlenecks crippled the expedition against Niagara (the British never got beyond Oswego). Facing similar obstacles a second force, made up of 3,000 New England and New York provincials and 300 allied native Americans (mostly Mohawks), and led by William Johnson of New York, reached the head of Lac St. Sacrament (renamed Lake George) only in late August 1755. While Johnson dithered about moving across the lake so late in the year, a counter-expedition led by Jean-Armand Dieskau, New France’s senior military commander, advanced south from Fort St. Frederic with 200 French regulars, 600 Canadian militia, and 700 native American allies. By 7 September, Dieskau was between Johnson and the Hudson River.

The next day, a thousand Massachusetts and Connecticut provincials and Mohawks reconnoitering south from Lake George were roughly handled in an ambush the provincials called the Bloody Morning Scout. When Dieskau followed up with an assault against the hastily fortified provincial camp on the shore of Lake George, his regulars suffered a sharp defeat. Dieskau himself was wounded and captured. Later in the afternoon, a small force of New Hampshire provincials advanced along the track from the Hudson River to Lake George. It came upon some exhausted French and Canadians near a pond in the forest and took revenge for the morning losses in a skirmish known as Bloody Pond. Johnson claimed victory, but he chose not to advance any further. With Braddock’s earlier defeat at Fort Duquesne, the British strategy of 1755 lay in shambles.

SEE ALSO *Bradstreet's Expedition of 1764.*

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LAKE GEORGE, NEW YORK SEE *Ticonderoga Raid.*

LA LUZERNE, ANNE-CÉSAR DE. (1741–1791). (Chevalier de, later Marquis.) Second French minister to the United States. He joined the regiment of French Guards in 1754 and served as a special envoy to the elector of Bavaria from 1777 to 1778. As successor to Gérard, he reached Philadelphia with his secretary, Marbois, after a leisurely overland trip from Boston in the fall of 1779. Luzerne had his credentials and a draft of his address to Congress sent in advance on 4 November. He redrafted it for American tastes and presented it on November 17 to near universal acclaim. In a similar fashion he revealed an astute understanding of American sensitivities and quickly became a major political force in American affairs. When Maryland was persistently blocking ratification of the Articles of Confederation, La Luzerne brought that state into line by suggesting that the French naval forces they were requesting in the Chesapeake for protection against the British would not be possible unless Maryland ratified the Articles. Maryland ratified in February 1781. He was named *maréchal de camp* in December 1781. The minister plenipotentiary remained in America until the summer of 1784. Chevalier of the Order of Saint Louis, he was made a marquis in 1785. He served as ambassador to Great Britain from 1788 until his death in 1791.

SEE ALSO *Barbé-Marbois, François, Marquis de.*

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LAMB, JOHN. (1735–1800). Continental Artillery colonel. New York. Born in New York City, 1 January 1735, Lamb was the son of Anthony Lamb, an accomplice of the famous burglar Jack Sheppard, who had been banished to the colonies in 1724. John Lamb was a good writer and fluent speaker who became a popular leader during the Stamp Act Crisis in 1765, leading the Sons of Liberty and the Committee of Correspondence for the next decade. He led crowd actions against the Stamp Act and the New York Restraining Act of 1767. He was arrested in December 1769 for denouncing the New York Assembly after it had complied with the Quartering Act but was quickly freed. On learning of the events of Lexington and Concord, he and Isaac Sears seized the customs house and British munitions and prevented vessels from leaving New York Harbor.

On 30 July 1775 he was commissioned captain of the Independent Company of New York Artillery. At the head of these regulars he joined Richard Montgomery's column of the Canada Invasion. Active in the operations against St. Johns, Lamb aroused the displeasure of Montgomery, who found the artillery captain brave and intelligent but a troublemaker. Lamb accompanied Benedict Arnold's column in the attack on Quebec, 31 December 1775, a battle in which he was so seriously wounded that he lost an eye and in which he was captured. Paroled 2 August 1776, he was named adjutant general and commandant of Artillery in the Northern Department but was inactive because of his parole. After Congress promoted him to colonel on 1 January 1777, Lamb was exchanged and joined the Continental Army at Morristown. During the Danbury Raid, April 1777, he was wounded at Campo Hill (28 April) in a gallant but unsuccessful attempt with three guns to break up an enemy bayonet attack.

In the reorganization of the Continental Army in early 1778, Lamb joined in the general protestation over adjustment of seniority. In 1779 and 1780 he was artillery commander at West Point, and he commanded the post at the time of Arnold's treason.

Colonel Lamb led his Second Regiment south as part of Knox's Brigade for the Yorktown Campaign. He and his lieutenant colonel, Ebenezer Stevens, won particular praise from Henry Knox for their performance during the siege. Lamb was breveted brigadier general on 30 September 1783.

Elected to the New York Assembly in 1783, he quit the following year to become customs collector for the Port of New York. He became an active opponent of the proposed federal constitution, to the extent that his house was threatened by a Federalist mob. Lamb promptly fortified his home. After ratification Washington appointed him to the collectorship at New York. A few years later, a clerk embezzled a large amount of money. Lamb took full responsibility, selling his property to cover the loss. He resigned his post in 1797 and died in poverty, 31 May 1800. The Lamb Papers are held by the New York Historical Society.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's March to Quebec; Canada Invasion; Danbury Raid, Connecticut; Knox, Henry; Montgomery, Richard; Quartering Acts; Sears, Isaac; Sons of Liberty; St. Johns, Canada (14–18 May 1775); Stamp Act; West Point, New York; Yorktown Campaign.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

LAMB, ROGER. (1756–1830). Irish soldier. A sergeant in the Royal Welch Fusiliers throughout the Revolution, Lamb was the author of *An Original and Authentic Journal of Occurrences during the Late American War* (1809).

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LANDAIS, PIERRE DE. (c. 1731–1820). French naval officer. Of a noble but impoverished Norman family, he entered the navy as a volunteer in 1745. In 1762 he was wounded in action and for a short time was a British prisoner. He accompanied Bougainville on his voyage of discovery around the world from 1766 to 1769. In 1775 he was discharged from the service. On 1 March 1777 Deane gave him a captain's commission and command of a merchantman loaded with supplies for America. He arrived at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on 1 December after a mutiny. Congress later gave him twelve thousand livres for those services in 1779. In 1778 he applied for a command in the Continental navy, but the Marine Committee refused. On 9 May, Congress continued him as captain and six weeks later placed him on the *Alliance*. Samuel Adams considered him "highly esteemed" by the committee. On 15 October he was naturalized as a citizen of Massachusetts. The *Alliance* sailed on 11 January 1779 with Lafayette on board. Again there was an attempted mutiny, but the *Alliance* arrived in Brest on 6 February.

In April 1779 Franklin changed the destination of the *Alliance* and ordered Landais to join the squadron of John Paul Jones. Jones and Landais appear to have taken an instant dislike to each other. During the *Bonhomme Richard–Serapis* engagement on 23 September 1779, Landais unaccountably attacked Jones's ship and

continued to fire on it until the battle ended. On their personal rivalry, Franklin refused to judge and turned the matter over to Congress, but he gave command of the *Alliance* to Jones. Landais claimed that Franklin had no authority to do so. In the absence of Jones from the seaport of Lorient, Arthur Lee, who was returning to America aboard the *Alliance*, named Landais captain of the ship so that the voyage could proceed. Twice the crew mutinied, and the ship was placed under the command of the ranking lieutenant. When it arrived in Boston, naval authorities held a court of inquiry, found Landais guilty, and removed him from the service. In 1782 Congress rejected a report from a committee that he be paid \$2,178.18 to settle his claims for pay, subsistence, and expenses.

On his return to Revolutionary France, Landais was given command of a warship at Brest (1 July 1792). A naval division was put under his command. On 1 January 1793 he was promoted to vice admiral and during that month took part in operations against Cagliari, Sardinia. The following spring he operated off the coast of Brittany (around Belle Île). Mutinies among the crews of Morard de Galles's fleet forced Landais to put into Brest. His commission was revoked on 26 October 1793. In November 1797 he returned to New York. From that time on he pressed his claims for prizes captured by the *Alliance* in 1779. In 1806 Congress paid him four thousand dollars. A bill for his further relief failed in the Senate in 1815. He spent his remaining years impoverished in New York City.

SEE ALSO *Bonhomme Richard–Serapis Engagement.*

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LANGDON, JOHN. (1741–1819). Patriot merchant and politician. New Hampshire. Born at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on 26 June 1741, John Langdon had become a wealthy merchant and shipbuilder resentful of British commercial and civil policies by the early 1770s. He served on the Portsmouth Committee of Correspondence, and in December 1774 he took part in the raid on Fort William and Mary in Portsmouth Harbor. Elected to the legislature in 1775, he served as speaker of the house in the New Hampshire Provincial Congress from 1776 to 1782. That body elected him to the Continental Congress for 1775–1776. On 25 June 1776 Congress named him agent for prizes in New Hampshire, which required him to relinquish his seat at the Continental Congress and return home. He quickly saw the possibilities of naval operations against British shipping, and built several vessels for the government. Among these ships were the *Raleigh*, the first ship to be completed and set sail for the American navy, and the *Ranger*, which was commanded by John Paul Jones. In 1777 he pressured the legislature to appoint and fund John Stark to command a unit to resist General John Burgoyne's invasion through Vermont. Langdon himself led a company of militia which was present at Burgoyne's surrender in Saratoga, and he commanded troops under John Sullivan at Newport in 1778. Having served as president of the state from 1785 to 1787 and from 1788 to 1789, he won election by the legislature to the first U.S. Senate. He served in the Senate from 1789 to 1801, then returned to serve as governor of New Hampshire from 1805 to 1812. He declined later offers of public service. His wife Elizabeth (Sherburne) died in 1813, and he died in Portsmouth 18 September 1819. He was brother to Woodbury Langdon.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne's Offensive*.

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revised by Frank C. Mevers

LANGDON, WOODBURY. (1738?–1805). Patriot merchant, congressman. New Hampshire. Elder brother of John Langdon, Woodbury also acquired wealth before the Revolution but, unlike his brother, took

the conservative side. He kept Portsmouth, New Hampshire, out of the nonimportation agreement of 1769, but was nevertheless elected to the Provincial Congress in 1775. At the outbreak of war, Langdon went to England on financial business. He returned in the summer of 1777 to New York City, where the British insisted he stay. By the end of 1777 he had escaped back to New Hampshire. The legislature elected him to Congress in 1779, but he refused to attend longer than one year. He served as a justice on the superior court from 1782, but was impeached in 1790 for not attending to duty. The electorate rejected his candidacy for a congressional seat in 1796 and 1797. He was married to Sarah, neé Sherburne. He died on 13 January 1805 in Portsmouth.

SEE ALSO *Langdon, John*.

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revised by Frank C. Mevers

LANGLADE, CHARLES MICHEL DE. (1729–1801?). Indian leader. Canada. Born in 1729 near what became Mackinaw City, Michigan, Langlade was the son of a French trader nobleman and an Ottawa woman and was educated by Jesuits. As a boy of ten years old, he joined an Ottawa war party led by his uncle, Nissowaquet, against the Chickasaw. By 1750 he was a cadet in the French colonial troops, and by 1760 he had risen to the grade of lieutenant. Leading his first expedition in June 1752, he drove the Miami Indians and five British traders from Pickawillany (near modern Piqua, Ohio). During the Seven Years' War he was an active leader of Indian auxiliaries. He claimed credit for setting up the ambush in which Braddock was killed in 1755. Two years later he defeated Rogers's Rangers and a large force of Pennsylvania and New Jersey militia led by Colonel John Parker. Taking part in the attack on Fort William Henry, Langlade failed to restrain his Indian forces from slaughtering the British prisoners. Escaping from the fall of Quebec in 1759, he went to Montreal, which he again left before its capture by the British, and returned to Michilimackinac. As second in command of this post, he surrendered it when the commandant deserted the garrison, and Langlade transferred his allegiance to the British.

After supporting the British effectively in Pontiac's War, Langlade established a new home at Green Bay, where he and his father had long had a trading post. Promoted to captain at the beginning of the Revolution, he supported British operations led by Carleton and Burgoyne. After most of Burgoyne's Indian allies left following the capture of Ticonderoga, Langlade persuaded his one hundred Ottawa to stick it out through the Battle of Bennington, when they too returned home. Back in the west, he and his followers opposed the American and Spanish advances into the Old Northwest.

After the war Langlade was granted lands in Canada for his services. He continued his trading activities at Green Bay, where he died, perhaps in 1801.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

LANNEAU'S FERRY *SEE* *Lenud's Ferry, South Carolina*.

LAST AMERICAN GENERAL OF THE REVOLUTION. When Thomas ("Carolina Gamecock") Sumter died in 1832 at the age of ninety-eight, he was the oldest surviving general of the Revolution.

SEE ALSO *Sumter, Thomas*.

Mark M. Boatner

LAST AMERICAN SOLDIER OF THE REVOLUTION. The Annual Report of the commissioner of pensions for 1874 noted that "With the death of Daniel T. Bakeman, of Freedom, Cattaraugus County, N.Y., April 5, 1869, the last of the pensioned soldiers of the Revolution passed away."

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Mark M. Boatner

LAST MILITARY ACTIONS OF THE REVOLUTION.

Several battles are claimed as the last of the American Revolution: Blue Licks, 19 August 1782; Wheeling, 10–11 September 1782; and Johns Island, South Carolina, 4 November 1782. Additionally, a battle between some militia led by John Siever and the Chickamauga Cherokee at Lookout Mountain (near modern Chattanooga) on 20 September 1782 is often called the last military action of the Revolution.

SEE ALSO *Blue Licks, Kentucky; Johns Island, South Carolina (4 November 1782); Wheeling, West Virginia*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

LAUMOY, JEAN-BAPTISTE-JOSEPH, CHEVALIER DE. (1750–1832).

Continental officer. France. The son of an infantry captain who was made a chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis, Jean Baptiste became a second lieutenant at the school of military engineering at Mezières in 1768, and in 1770 he was appointed engineer and first lieutenant. On 1 January 1777 he became a captain and was promoted to major on 1 February through Duportail's efforts. On 13 February Laumoy was awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel by Deane and Franklin, and soon thereafter he left for America via Saint Domingue. He arrived in the early autumn of 1777 and on 17 November was commissioned colonel of engineers. His first action was with Lafayette at Gloucester, New Jersey, on 25 November, after which he went to Valley Forge. Ordered south on 8 February 1779, he was wounded at Stono Ferry on 20 June and taken prisoner at Charleston on 12 May 1780. Washington opposed Duportail's efforts to have him exchanged out of regular order. He was finally exchanged on 26 November 1782, breveted brigadier general on 30 September 1783, and honorably discharged on 10 October.

As *aide maréchal général des logis* from June 1783, he returned to France in December. Made a chevalier in the Order of St. Louis, he took a command in Saint Domingue in July 1785 and at Martinique in February 1789. Promoted to *maréchal de camp* in August 1791, he was made head of Lafayette's general staff in the army

of the Center on 20 April 1792 and fled with him on 19 August after the Jacobin triumph.

Laumoy escaped to America, living around Philadelphia until he was removed from the émigré list. He then returned to France. Unable to secure a military appointment, he officially retired from the army in 1811. Washington complimented Laumoy on his American service and suggested in 1799 that all American officers should in the future have engineering training like him.

SEE ALSO *Engineers*.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

LAURANCE, JOHN. (1750–1810). Judge advocate general of the Continental army. New York. Born near Falmouth, England, in 1750, he moved to New York City in 1767; was admitted to the bar in 1772; and about two years later married Elizabeth, daughter of Alexander McDougall. When the province started raising Continental regiments, he became a second lieutenant in the Fourth New York on 1 August 1775 and took part in the Canada invasion. On the promotion of his father-in-law, Laurance became his aide-de-camp and paymaster. On 11 April 1777 he succeeded William Tudor as judge advocate general on Washington's staff, holding this post until he resigned from the army on 3 June 1782. In his capacity of judge advocate general, he prosecuted the cases of Benedict Arnold and John André, winning commendation from the Continental Congress and leaving the service as a major.

After the war he was active in law and politics. He was a delegate to Congress (1785–1787); served in the state senate (1788–1790); enthusiastically supported the federal Constitution; and on its ratification became the first U.S. representative from New York City, serving in 1789–1793. He was judge of the U.S. district court for the following two years. A Federalist Party supporter, on 8

November 1796 he succeeded his friend Rufus King in the U.S. Senate, resigning this post in August 1800. He died in New York on 11 November 1810.

SEE ALSO *André, John; Arnold, Benedict; McDougall, Alexander*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

LAURENS, HENRY. (1724–1792). Continental Congress president. South Carolina. Born in Charleston, South Carolina, on 24 February 1724, Laurens was clerk first in a Charleston counting house and then in London. Returning to South Carolina, he became a wealthy man, acting as an agent for English land investors. In 1763 Laurens became disgusted that his fortune came from selling and exploiting the labor of slaves, and he quit the slave trade entirely, often expressing his repugnance for the institution. His son John Laurens became an advocate for manumission during the Revolution, but Henry Laurens continued to own slaves the rest of his life, holding title to some 300 people at the time of his death. The popular *Memoirs* of Lauren's daughter Martha (1759–1811), wife of the historian David Ramsay, recorded the family's struggle with the guilt of the slave trade. The Stamp Act made him an avid although not radical agitator; he wrote several pamphlets against the customs service. Retiring from business, he returned to England in 1771, after the death of his wife, to supervise his sons' education and to travel. In 1774 he was one of thirty-eight Americans in England signing a petition to Parliament against the Boston Port Bill, and he returned to America the same year.

Sent to the Provincial Congress in 1775, he was president of both it and the Council of Safety. The following year he helped draft the state's constitution and became vice president of South Carolina. He was active in the defense of Charleston in June 1776 and worked to prevent civil war in the Carolinas. In 1777 he was sent to the Continental Congress and was elected its president on 1 November 1777, succeeding John Hancock. During his term, Congress was split by bitterness and factions, and Laurens was not always nonpartisan, siding occasionally with the Adams-Lee group. He helped suspend the Saratoga Convention on 8 January 1778 and exposed part of the so-called Conway Cabal, strongly supporting Washington. In the Lee-Deane dispute, he was extremely unfair toward Silas Deane, which led to the failure of his motion to suspend hearings until Congress could hold an investigation. Insulted, Laurens resigned the presidency on 9 December 1778, though he stayed in Congress until November 1779. Selected to negotiate a treaty of friendship and commerce with Holland and to arrange for a

ten-million-dollar loan, Laurens left Philadelphia on 13 August 1780 on the brig *Mercury*. The vessel was captured by the British off Newfoundland on 3 September. Laurens threw his official papers overboard, but the British recovered them. One of the captured documents was used by the British as a pretext for declaring war on the Dutch.

After being examined by the Privy Council, Laurens was confined in the Tower of London on 6 October “on suspicion of high treason.” Held almost fifteen months, under conditions so severe at times that his health was seriously impaired, he twice refused a pardon in return for serving the British. In two petitions to British authorities, however, he justified his own role in the American Revolution in terms that some patriots considered unduly subservient. On 31 December 1781 he was finally released on heavy bail (put up by Richard Oswald), thanks to the efforts of Franklin and Edmund Burke, and exchanged for Cornwallis in April 1782. Named one of the commissioners to handle peace negotiations, Laurens reached Paris only two days before the preliminary peace articles were signed. Despite his eleventh-hour arrival, Laurens was useful to the peace commissioners on several points of the treaty. He immediately returned to England to discuss commercial matters with government officials. On 3 August 1784 he was back in New York, and shortly thereafter he reported to Congress on his mission. His final years in public life had not been happy: his health had been broken; his son had been killed in action in the closing phase of the war; and he had suffered enormous property losses. He returned to Charleston early in 1785 and retired to his plantation, Mepkin, on the Cooper River some thirty miles above the city. He died on 8 December 1792 and, as stipulated in his will, was cremated, in what was one of the first instances of this practice in America outside of some Indian cultures.

SEE ALSO *Convention Army; Conway Cabal; Deane, Silas; Lee, William; Oswald, Richard; Peace Negotiations.*

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LAURENS, JOHN. (1754–1782). Continental officer. South Carolina. The son of Henry Laurens, he was educated in England and Geneva and returned to the colonies in 1777. He was Washington’s volunteer aide from September 1777 to March 1779 and September to November 1781, serving often as secretary and translator.

He fought at Brandywine on 11 September 1777 and was wounded at Germantown on 4 October 1777 and at Monmouth on 28 June 1778. On 23 December 1778 he shot General Charles Lee in a duel. He was named lieutenant colonel on 29 March 1779 after having declined a similar commission voted him by Congress on 5 November 1778. In 1779 he was elected to the South Carolina assembly but withdrew from it when the British invaded the state. Joining General Moultrie’s militia, he fought at Charleston against Augustine Prevost and was wounded at Coosashatchie Pass. At Savannah he led the light infantry. He was at Charleston during Clinton’s siege and was captured, paroled, and exchanged. Congress sent him to France in the spring of 1781, when he was twenty-six years old, to help Franklin arrange for more money and supplies. He received the Thanks of Congress for his success in this and then returned to the field. Laurens planned to raise Continental troops in South Carolina and Georgia from the slave population, with the project financed by himself, but the legislature of the two states rejected the enterprise. At Yorktown, he captured a redoubt and, with the Viscount de Noailles, negotiated the surrender with Cornwallis. (The latter was constable of the Tower of London, where the elder Laurens was imprisoned and was exchanged for him.) Young Laurens returned to the South and was killed at Combahee Ferry, South Carolina, on 27 August 1782.

SEE ALSO *Combahee Ferry, South Carolina; Laurens, Henry; Lee, Charles (1731–1782); Moultrie, William.*

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LAUZUN, ARMAND LOUIS DE GONTAUT, DUC DE BIRON. (1747–1793). French officer. Lauzun was an ensign in the French Guards when he entered service in 1761, and was promoted to lieutenant in 1764, then to captain in 1767. He took part in the campaign against Corsica in 1769 and was made a chevalier in the Order of St. Louis. He was promoted to colonel of the Royal Legion (1774), lieutenant mestre de camp of the Royal-Dragoons Regiment (1776), colonel of the Corps of Foreign Volunteers in the navy (1778), and brigadier of the Dragoons.

In 1779 Lauzun commanded an expedition that seized Senegal. In 1780 he was appointed colonel of a Legion of Foreign Volunteers in Rochambeau's army (led by Jean Baptist Donatien de Vimeur, Comte du Rochambeau). Created by royal ordinance of 5 March 1780 and known as "Lauzun's Legion," it was composed of German, Polish, and Irish recruits. Lauzun routed General Banastre Tarleton at Gloucester Neck (Virginia) on 3 October 1781; and was commended by the Virginia delegation to the Congress. Lauzun was selected to carry news of the Yorktown victory to France, but on his return to America his ship was almost captured by a British vessel. Rochambeau handed over the French command in America to Lauzun. General George Washington was impressed by his "politeness, zeal and attention" and complimented him repeatedly. In fact, Washington had hoped that Lauzun would serve in the American peacetime army after the war, but he was recalled to France in 1783 and promoted to mestre de camp. In 1788 he became commander of a cavalry brigade. He served in 1789 as a deputy of the nobles of Le Quercy to the Estates General, was promoted to lieutenant general in 1792, to commander in chief of the army of the Rhine (9 July), the army of Italy (25 December), and the army of the Coasts of La Rochelle (15 May 1793). He was arrested and condemned on 30 December and executed the following day. His name appears on the south side of the Arc de Triomphe. His memoirs are frequently cited by historians of the American Revolution.

SEE ALSO *Gloucester, Virginia*.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

LAWSON, ROBERT. American officer. Virginia. After serving as major in the Fourth Virginia from 13 February 1776, lieutenant colonel after 13 August 1776, and colonel after 19 August 1777, he resigned 17 December 1777 and subsequently saw action at Guilford and in the Yorktown campaign as a brigadier general of the Virginia militia.

SEE ALSO *Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Yorktown Campaign; Yorktown, Siege of*.

Mark M. Boatner

LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG, WAR OF THE. William of Orange, stadtholder of The Netherlands, deposed his father-in-law, James II, as king of England in 1688, and became William III. The new king was the leader of a coalition intended to curb the ambition of France's Louis XIV to dominate Europe. The North American extension of the war to restore the European balance of power was called in the British colonies "King William's War" (1689–1697).

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars*.

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LEAGUE OF NEUTRALS SEE *Armed Neutrality*.

LEARNED, EBENEZER. (1728–1801). Continental general. Massachusetts. Born on 18 April 1728 at Oxford, Massachusetts, Learned was a captain in 1756 in Colonel Timothy Ruggles's provincial regiment during the final French and Indian War. A farmer and innkeeper, he later led the revolutionary movement in his hometown. In 1774 and 1775 he was a delegate to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. Colonel of a Worcester county regiment of minutemen, he led his men to Cambridge on 19 April 1775 and two days later was assigned to the right wing of the Boston army. He returned home on 24 April but on 20 May was commissioned colonel of one of the Massachusetts regiments raised for eight months of service at the siege of Boston. During the battle of Bunker Hill (17 June 1775) his men held the lines at Roxbury and, although they came under desultory fire, were not otherwise engaged. He was named colonel of the Third Continental Regiment (1 January 1776) in the reorganized Continental Army, and on 8 March began to serve as an intermediary between William Howe and George Washington in negotiating the British evacuation of Boston. About 11:00 A.M. on Sunday, 17 March, he unbarred the gates on the main road with his own hands and, because Washington was worried about disease in the dirty and crowded town, marched into Boston at the head of five hundred men who had either survived smallpox or been inoculated against it. His regiment was then assigned to operate whaleboats in Boston Harbor to watch the British fleet before it sailed away.

He resigned on 2 May 1776 because of poor health, but on 4 April 1777 he returned to duty when Congress appointed him a brigadier general. Assigned to command

a brigade of Massachusetts Continental regiments in the Northern Department (Second, Eighth and Ninth Regiments), he collected militia at Forts Edward and Anne and assisted in the evacuation of stores from Ticonderoga before its occupation by Burgoyne (July 1777). He accompanied Arnold in the move to Fort Stanwix that ended Barry St. Leger's expedition, and returned to Horatio Gates's army on 31 August. His Fourth Massachusetts Brigade, reinforced by the First New York and two battalions of New Hampshire militia, was posted on the left wing of the American defenses at Bemis Heights. At Freeman's Farm on 19 September, during the first Battle of Saratoga, much of the brigade lost its way in the dense woods and was not heavily engaged. At Bemis Heights on 7 October, during the second Battle of Saratoga, Benedict Arnold usurped command and led it to flank Breymann's redoubt, whose loss helped seal Burgoyne's fate.

Along with the other New England brigades, Learned moved south to rejoin the main army after Burgoyne's surrender, marching part of the way as escort for the Convention army, as the captive British force was termed. But the winter at Valley Forge proved too debilitating, and Learned again resigned for physical disability on 24 March 1778. He was elected to the convention that adopted the Massachusetts state constitution of 1780 and served as a judge in Worcester County. In 1783 he was a member of the state legislature. In 1786 he supported the Massachusetts government against Daniel Shays's rebels, although this brought him into conflict with his family and neighbors and exposed him to serious personal danger. He died at Oxford on 1 April 1801.

SEE ALSO *Convention Army; Saratoga, First Battle of; Saratoga, Second Battle of; St. Leger's Expedition.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

LE BÈGUE DE PRESLE DUPORTAIL, LOUIS. (1743–1802). Continental general and chief engineer. France. Born at Pithiviers, he was the son of a nobleman who was a *conseiller du roi*. He became a student at the engineering school at Mézières in 1762 but was dismissed for one year. In 1765 he was accepted as *ingénieur ordinaire* and promoted to captain in 1773. On 25 January 1777 he was given leave with the grade of lieutenant colonel to "take care of personal business" (*vaquer à ses affaires particulières*).

Duportail undertook extended negotiations with Franklin and Deane that resulted in a commission in

the Continental army on 13 February 1777. On 8 July, Congress approved his appointment and on 22 July gave him seniority over all engineers previously appointed. On 17 November, Congress named him brigadier general and chief of engineers. Having joined the main army at Morristown, he took part in the Philadelphia campaign. One of his first major assignments was to work on the Delaware River forts, which brought him into conflict with Coudray. He remained with Washington at Valley Forge in 1777–1778 and during the Monmouth campaign of June 1778. Lafayette became impressed with his abilities and called him "one of the best and most honest officers upon this continent." On 29 June 1778 he was sent to work on the defenses of Philadelphia, and in 1779 he served in the Hudson Highlands. In March 1780 he was put under Lincoln's orders but arrived at Charleston too late to play any significant role in the defense of that city. Becoming a prisoner on 12 May 1780, he was exchanged in October 1780 and rejoined Washington in time to play a vital part in the Yorktown campaign.

On 11 May 1779 his title was changed to commandant of the Corps of Engineers and Sappers and Miners. Washington personally commended him for his siege work in the attacks at Yorktown. On 16 November 1781 Duportail was promoted to major general, and on 10 October 1783 he was given leave to resign from the American service with a strong congressional commendation of his "distinguished merit." A memorandum he had prepared on the need for American fortifications was judged by Congress "sound and just." Meanwhile, in the French service Duportail had been made lieutenant colonel attached to the infantry, and on 13 June 1783 he became a French brigadier general of infantry. In 1787 he was authorized to instruct the army of Naples, and he became *maréchal de camp* in 1788. From November 1790 to December 1791, Duportail served as minister of war. In 1792 he was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of the twenty-first military division at Moulins. His politics being suspect, Duportail escaped in 1794 to America, where he became head of the Corps of Engineers. Only after Napoleon's rise to power was his name removed from the émigré list. In 1802 he died at sea while returning to France.

Duportail's services were invaluable to the American cause. He was one of the few foreign officers who genuinely impressed Washington. "I shall ever retain a grateful sense of the aids I have derived from your knowledge and advice to me," Washington wrote.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Siege of 1780; Deane, Silas; Engineers; Franklin, Benjamin; Monmouth, New Jersey; Philadelphia Campaign; Yorktown Campaign; Yorktown, Siege of.*

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
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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

LECHMERE POINT, MASSACHU-

SETTS. 9 November 1775. Lechmere Point (later East Cambridge) extended into Boston Harbor about three-quarters of a mile from the American lines at Prospect Hill; at high tide, it was surrounded by water. On 9 November 1775, nine companies of British light infantry and one hundred grenadiers landed at the point during a very high tide to seize cattle needed for the Boston garrison. Thinking that this incursion might be more than a foraging raid, Colonel William Thompson counterattacked with his Pennsylvania riflemen, and Colonel Benjamin Woodbridge supported Thompson with part of his Massachusetts regiment and part of Colonel John Paterson's Massachusetts regiment. Despite two feet of icy water covering the causeway to what was now in effect an island, the riflemen advanced resolutely, but the British withdrew with ten cattle before the Americans could close with them. Although Washington commended the action in his general orders of 10 November, he later concluded (30 November) that reports of it had been colored; his troops had merely driven off some foragers, and this by musket fire from the safe range of four hundred yards. Only two Americans were wounded.

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege*.



Arthur Lee. *The American diplomat and member of the Virginia House of Delegates and the Continental Congress.* THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

LEE, ARTHUR. (1740–1792). American diplomat, troublemaker. Virginia. Arthur was the youngest of the four famous sons of Thomas Lee and the last of his eleven children. He was about ten years old when he came under the guardianship of his eldest brother, Philip Ludwell, on the death of their father.

IN ENGLISH POLITICS

Young Arthur was sent to Eton, where he spent most of the 1750s. He went on to the University of Edinburgh,

where he studied science, literature, and medicine and took his M.D. degree in 1764. Lee returned to Virginia in 1766 and began practicing medicine in Williamsburg, but he soon caught the Revolutionary fever and lost interest in medicine. In 1768 he returned to London with the intention to study law at the Middle Temple, taking along his brother William to set up business. While in Virginia, he had been made a fellow of the Royal Society in 1766, and once back in England he was named to the Society of Arts and Agriculture. He mingled with London's intellectual elite and frequented the city's cultural events. More importantly, Arthur and William became deeply involved in English politics and associated with the flamboyant John Wilkes, who later called Arthur his "*first and best friend*" (Potts, p. 59). Arthur had a fling at political writing prior to his return to England in 1768, turning out ten "Monitor's Letters" with the purpose of supplementing the "Farmer's Letters" of John Dickinson. Although some Revolutionary leaders (including Jefferson) were unimpressed by these, others thought highly of them; one of the latter was Samuel Adams, who helped Arthur win an appointment in 1770 as London agent of Massachusetts. The diatribes of "Junius," the anonymous Whig political writer of the 1760s, inspired Lee to emulation, and he produced a series of letters signed "Junius Americanus."

Lee joined the petitionary movement that grew out of the Middlesex elections which made Wilkes a national idol and was responsible for a clause in the famous Middlesex Petition protesting against Parliament that drew attention to the "similarity of injustices suffered in England and in America" (*ibid.*, p. 64). In seven years his literary contributions included at least "nine pamphlets, 170 essays, 17 petitions, and 50 anonymous letters in the press" (*ibid.*, p. 71).

BEAUMARCHAIS AND FRENCH AID

At the house of Wilkes in 1775, Arthur Lee met the playwright Beaumarchais. "Arthur Lee was ambitious, impetuous, witty, talkative, and fond of scheming and intriguing," a biographer of the remarkable Frenchman has commented. "In short, he possessed all the good qualities and defects that would please a man like Beaumarchais" (Lemaître, pp. 177–178). The two were soon holding long, confidential conversations, and the seed of secret French aid was sowed. The fruit was Beaumarchais's Hortalez et Cie, a business front. Arthur Lee was furious at being left out of something he had helped start, and his reaction was to accuse everybody concerned of being dishonest, including Benjamin Franklin.

A DIPLOMAT IN EUROPE

Arthur is primarily remembered for the Deane-Lee controversy, but for its origins as a marplot it is necessary to

go back to the year 1775, when in November he was asked by the Secret Committee of Congress to be its correspondent in London. In October 1776 he was appointed to join Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin in Paris to bring about the French alliance. Reaching Paris at the end of December, he was prevailed upon by the two other commissioners to see what might be done in Spain. Going there in February 1777, he was able to get substantial aid from the government through the intermediary of a commercial concern but was not allowed to enter Madrid. A stay in Berlin from May to July was fruitless. Returning to Paris, where there was nothing constructive for him to do, he nosed further into the secret aid business—which Franklin was letting Deane handle by himself—and on 4 October 1777 Lee wrote Samuel Adams and brother Richard Henry Lee that he should be made sole minister to France.

Congress in May 1777 appointed brother William commissioner to Berlin and Austria and Ralph Izard to the court of Tuscany. They spent most of their time in Paris, however, where they joined Arthur in carping against Franklin and Deane. The French alliance nevertheless came about, but the fiscal accounts were in shambles and Lee accused Deane of illegal profiteering. Deane eventually was recalled on the basis of Lee's charges of malfeasance and was ruined. The sordid controversy also made Lee persona non grata with the Comte de Vergennes, and Congress recalled him in September 1779. (William Lee and Izard had been dismissed in June, leaving "the old doctor" the sole commissioner in Paris.)

BACK IN AMERICA

Returning to America in September 1780, Lee was elected to the Virginia House of Delegates in 1781 and to the Continental Congress for the next three years (1782–1784). Harvard awarded him an honorary degree and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Boston elected him a member based on his scientific paper on lightning strikes. In Congress he served on numerous committees, mostly related to Congress's financial and trade policies, and continued to lambaste fellow revolutionaries, but to little effect. Congress made him a commissioner to the Northwest Indians, and he was one of those who negotiated the treaties of Fort Stanwix (22 October 1784) and Fort McIntosh (21 January 1785); fellow commissioners described Lee giving a "most spirited grand speech" that produced a "very good effect" on the negotiations (Potts, pp. 268–272). In July 1785 Congress appointed him to the treasury board (a post he held until the new government was inaugurated), where he became so frustrated at its ineffectual efforts that he declared the "Confederation is crumbling to pieces" (*ibid.*, p. 273). The last thing he found to be against was the Constitution, opposing it because it lacked a declaration of rights. Although Lee courted a number of women,

he never married, and he lived his last few years as a gentleman farmer on his estate, Lansdowne.

Beginning near the end of the twentieth century, the characterization of Lee as abrasive, contentious, morbidly suspicious, and cantankerous was tempered by the realization that he articulated well the “goals, values, and world view” shared by a majority of the American revolutionaries (*ibid.*, pp. 281–282).

SEE ALSO *Deane, Silas; Farmer's Letters; Franklin, Benjamin; Hortalez & Cie; Junius; Lee Family of Virginia; Wilkes, John.*

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revised by Frank E. Grizzard Jr.

LEE, CHARLES. (1731–1782). Continental general, soldier of fortune. England-Virginia. He was educated at schools in England and Switzerland, entering his father's regiment as an ensign in 1746 while still enrolled as a student. About 1748 he joined the Forty-fourth Foot, where he was able to purchase a lieutenant's commission in May 1751. He was on Braddock's expedition (1755) and then went to the Mohawk Valley where he purchased a captain's commission (1756). Adopted by the Mohawks and given the name of Ounewaterika (Boiling Water), he “married” the daughter of a Seneca chief; Lee's Indian wife bore him two children. During Abercromby's attack on Ticonderoga (7 July 1758) he was badly wounded, but he rejoined his regiment for the capture of Niagara and Montreal. He spent the winter of 1760–1761 in England. On 10 August 1761 he was appointed major of the 103rd Regiment and the next year served with real distinction under Burgoyne in Portugal, advancing to major and serving with the local rank of lieutenant colonel. He was retired on half pay in November 1763 when his regiment was disbanded. In 1765 Lee became a soldier of fortune in the Polish army, where he came to be on intimate terms with King Stanislaus Poniatowski. He was promoted to major general in 1767. The next two years he spent in England, where he devoted his time to horses and criticism of the government. He returned to



Charles Lee. The Continental general and soldier of fortune, in an engraving by Robert Pollard, published in England in 1780.
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

Poland in 1769, fought against the Turks, and was invalided home the next year.

POSSIBILITIES IN AMERICA

In 1773 he went to America, where he immediately aligned himself with the revolutionary element. Scouting great possibilities for personal advancement, he urged Patriot leaders to raise an army, and in May 1774 he started buying an estate in Berkeley County, Virginia (later West Virginia), “with the specific motive of recommending himself, as a landowner, to the Continental Congress” (Van Doren, p. 30). Lee already had speculated in land, holding patents to twenty thousand acres in both New York and East Florida and ten thousand more on Prince Edward Island.

The half-pay British lieutenant colonel (promoted in 1772) not only had military experience but was a good pamphleteer and an articulate speaker. Many influential Americans came to look on him as a valuable acquisition, and when Congress appointed him major general on 17 June 1775, he was subordinate only to Washington and Artemas Ward. Since acceptance of this commission would lead to confiscation of his English estates and

because he had not yet paid for his property in Virginia, Lee waited until Congress promised compensation for his property losses before he wrote British authorities about discontinuing his half pay.

SERVICE IN NORTH AND SOUTH

After serving in the Boston siege, where “his dirty habits and obscenity gave offense” but where he was “endured for what he was supposed to know,” Lee was detached in January 1776 and directed to raise volunteers in Connecticut for the defense of New York City (Freeman, vol. 3, p. 373b). He reached the city on 4 February, having been delayed while laid up with the gout. On the 17th he was ordered by Congress to succeed Philip Schuyler in the northern department, but on 1 March a counterorder sent him to command the southern department.

On 7 October 1776 Lee was back in Philadelphia. He had received the thanks of Congress on 20 July for his service at Charleston, and on his return to the city Congress advanced him thirty thousand dollars to pay for his Virginia property. He reached Washington’s army in time for the Battle of White Plains in New York on 28 October and was left at Peekskill with some of the best American troops when the main army went south for the New Jersey campaign. When Washington called for him to rejoin the main army on the retreat to the Delaware, Lee reacted in such a way as to raise suspicion that he hoped for Washington’s defeat so that he could be appointed to succeed him. On 24 November 1776, Lee wrote a letter to Washington’s secretary, Joseph Reed, sharply criticizing Washington as indecisive, which Washington innocently opened by mistake. Although Washington’s reaction insofar as Reed was concerned was one of personal hurt rather than official outrage, he realized he would have to be on guard against the “fickle” Englishman. On 9 December, Lee wrote William Heath that in his opinion, Washington really did not need his support on the Delaware and went on to say: “I am in the hopes here [at Morristown] to reconquer (if I may so express myself) the Jerseys.” He had just penned and dispatched to Gates the famous letter that said, “entre nous a certain great man is damnably deficient” when he was captured at Basking Ridge on 13 December 1776.

PRISON AND COURT-MARTIAL

Germain ordered Lee returned to England for trial as a deserter, but Howe—who thought Lee had resigned his half pay before joining the enemy—did not comply. As a prisoner in New York, Lee conducted himself in such a way as to be accused of treason. What he really hoped to accomplish, however, was a peaceful settlement of the war; he was no Benedict Arnold. On 29 March 1777 he submitted his plan for ending the rebellion by an offensive that would “unhinge the organization of the American

resistance” by gaining control of the middle colonies—Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia (Anderson, pp. 221–222). The British apparently paid little attention to the strategic advice of this former officer.

Exchanged in April 1778, Lee complained to Congress about the promotion of others while he was a prisoner, and on 20 May he was greeted at Valley Forge by officers still unaware of his double-dealing. In the Monmouth campaign of June 1778 he had his first test as a field commander, and in the opinion of most observers he failed it miserably. Washington sternly reprimanded him on the battlefield but otherwise was willing to let the matter rest; Lee himself, however, his “vanity grievously wounded” and his abilities and even courage questioned, angrily defended his own part and “inveighed against Washington’s tactics” (ibid., pp. 228–229). Casting prudence to the wind, he wrote an impertinent letter to Washington demanding a court of inquiry at the same time that Generals Anthony Wayne and Charles Scott reported that Lee’s actions on the field had been highly improper. Thus, the resulting Lee court-martial was brought on not by his performance in the battle but by his conduct afterward.

The charges of “disobedience of orders,” “misbehaviour before the enemy . . . by making an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat,” and “disrespect to the commander in chief” astonished and outraged Lee, and despite a valiant effort to defend himself, he was found guilty and sentenced to be suspended from army command for one year (ibid., pp. 228–239). During his trial he cast aspersions that nearly led to a duel with Wilhelm Steuben. After his “Vindication” appeared in the *Pennsylvania Packet* of 3 December 1778, he was called out and slightly wounded by Colonel John Laurens; the wound was enough to keep him from accepting a challenge from Wayne. By July 1779 he was back at his estate in the Shenandoah, where he “bred horses, enjoyed the company of his dogs, and attempted farming” (Fisher, vol. 2, p. 194). When his year of suspension from command expired, Lee heard a rumor that Congress intended to dismiss him. Although it is doubtful that such an action was under serious contemplation, the letter he addressed to the delegates on this matter was so offensive that on 10 January 1780 Congress did in fact dismiss him from the service. Two days later he left his home and moved to Philadelphia, where he died in 1782.

A MAN OF CONTRADICTIONS

“An enigma Lee was—and still is,” wrote Douglas S. Freeman in 1951, the same year John R. Alden published *General Charles Lee: Traitor or Patriot?*, a study that completely revised the image of this strange but able and much-maligned man. Although Alden wrote that Lee’s “personality remains partly cloaked in mystery,” he reveals much about his subject. Lee was a man of contrasts,

Alden wrote. For example, he was capable of “fervent friendships, and vast hatreds”; “neither ascetic nor saintly”; “vain and ambitious” but conscious of his shortcomings; “enamored of money, but careless about it.” As an intellectual he anticipated Tom Paine but fell short of Edmund Burke, yet he “displayed frequent flashes of brilliance” (pp. 305–306).

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Basking Ridge, New Jersey; Boston Siege; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Heath, William; Lee Court Martial; Monmouth, New Jersey; New Jersey Campaign; New York Campaign; Reed, Joseph; Schuyler, Philip John; Scott, Charles; Wayne, Anthony; White Plains, New York.*

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revised by Frank E. Grizzard Jr.

LEE, CHARLES. (1758–1815). Officer in Virginia navy. Virginia. Brother of “Light-Horse Harry” and Richard Bland Lee, Charles Lee was born at Leesylvania and entered the College of New Jersey (later Princeton) in 1770, receiving his bachelor of arts degree in 1775. There he was commended for “application and genius.” From 1777 to 1789 he appears to have served as a “naval officer of the South Potomac,” after which he became customs collector at Alexandria, serving to April 1793. From 1793 to 1795 Lee represented Fairfax County in the Virginia General Assembly. He handled much of Washington’s legal work after the Revolution, and Washington chose him to replace Edmund Randolph as U.S. attorney general in November 1795, a post he held until 1801. He was named judge of one of the new circuit courts by President Adams, serving as one of the so-called “midnight judges” until Congress in 1802 repealed the Judiciary Act under which he had been appointed. With the fall of the Federalists his political life ended, and he

went into private law practice. (He had been admitted to the bar in June 1794.) A friend of John Marshall, he frequently appeared before the Supreme Court and took part in *Marbury v. Madison* (1803). He was a defense lawyer in the impeachment of Judge Chase (1805) and in the trial of Aaron Burr (1807). Lee spent the last years of his life at his home near Warrenton in Fauquier County.

SEE ALSO *Lee Family of Virginia.*

revised by Frank E. Grizzard Jr.

LEE, FRANCIS LIGHTFOOT. (1734–1797). Member of Congress, Signer. Virginia. One of the famous four brothers of the Lee family, he was tutored at Stratford, the family home, and then left to settle at Coton, a Loudoun County estate he inherited from his father. For ten years starting in 1758, he represented Loudoun in the House of Burgesses. In 1769 he married Rebecca Tayloe and settled at Menokin, a home built for the newlyweds by Tayloe’s father in Richmond County, where the Tayloe family was influential. He represented that county in the Burgesses from 1769 to 1776, taking a bold and effective part in colonial resistance to the Stamp Act and in subsequent measures of defiance to the mother country. He attended the Virginia Convention in 1774, and in 1775 he was elected to the Continental Congress to fill the place of Patrick Henry, serving to 1779. While in Congress he served on numerous committees and became one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence. Although Lee was fiercely patriotic and considered by his brothers to be their superior in matters of political judgment, he was by nature reticent and he tended to avoid public recognition. A niece later described Lee as the “sweetest of all the Lee race.” After leaving Congress, Lee served in the Virginia Senate.

SEE ALSO *Lee Family of Virginia.*

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LEE, HENRY. (1756–1818). (“Light-Horse Harry”), Continental cavalry leader. Virginia. Born at Leesylvania and graduating from the College of New Jersey (later Princeton) at the age of seventeen, he was

admitted to the Middle Temple and was about to leave for England when the war changed his plans. In June 1776 he was commissioned a captain in Theodorick Bland's regiment of Virginia cavalry. In 1777 his company was attached to the First Continental Dragoons and joined Washington's army in New Jersey. At this time Washington was engaged in the perplexing spring maneuvers preceding the Philadelphia campaign and badly needed cavalry for reconnaissance. Although only twenty-one years old at the time, Captain Lee favorably impressed Washington with his soldierly qualities, and they established a close, lifelong friendship. Lee's fine defense of the Spread Eagle Tavern (five miles south and slightly east of Valley Forge) on 20 January 1778 was the immediate cause of a resolution of Congress on 7 April that referred to him as a "brave and prudent officer." The resolution promoted him to major commandant and authorized him to enlarge his corps with two troops of horse. The further addition of three infantry companies in October 1779 resulted in the creation of Lee's Legion, one of the elite units of the war, which under Lee's leadership fought brilliantly in the South.

After the war Lee served in the Virginia House of Delegates, the Confederation Congress, the Virginia ratifying convention, and the U.S. Congress and held the office of governor of Virginia. His eulogy of Washington included the famous words, "First in War, First in Peace, and First in the Hearts of His Countrymen." The father of Confederate general Robert E. Lee, he spent the last years of his life in poor health and poverty.

SEE ALSO *Lee Family of Virginia; Lee's Legion; Philadelphia Campaign.*

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LEE, RICHARD BLAND. (1761–1827). Statesman. This member of the famous Lee family of Virginia, born at Leesylvania, was too young to play any part in the Revolutionary War. He represented Loudoun County in the House of Delegates from 1784 to 1788 and again in 1796, taking a strong Federalist stance. In 1789 he was elected to the first U.S. Congress, where he played a determining role in a major compromise. By changing his

stand as an opponent to Hamilton's plan for federal assumption of state debt, Lee (and a fellow representative from Virginia, Alexander White) got Hamilton's consent to establishing the national capital on the Potomac. Lee left Congress in 1795 and lived on his farm until 1815, when he moved to the District of Columbia. There, he served as a commissioner of war claims and as a judge of the Orphans' Court.

SEE ALSO *Assumption; Lee Family of Virginia.*

revised by Frank E Grizzard Jr.

LEE, RICHARD HENRY. (1732–1794). Member of Congress, Orator, Signer. Virginia. Eldest of the four famous sons of Thomas Lee, he attended England's Wakefield Academy from 1748 to 1751, touring the Continent before returning to the Lee home of Stratford in Virginia in 1752. His career in politics began on a minor note as a justice of the peace in his home county of Westmoreland in 1756; the next year he followed the path of his ancestors to the House of Burgesses, where he became heavily involved in supplying the militia. He also married in 1757, taking his wife, Anne Aylette (d.1768), to Stratford. They remained there until 1763, when Lee established Chantilly-on-the-Potomac, the estate where he would raise nine children and live for the remainder of his life. During those years he began to play a prominent role in the Patriot politics that led to the break with England. He allied with Patrick Henry, with whom he remained close politically and personally for the rest of his life. He coauthored the important Westmoreland Resolves during the Stamp Act crisis, and in 1768 he proposed setting up committees of correspondence. From then to 1773 he kept up his political activity while simultaneously engaging in a profitable tobacco-shipping business with his brother William, who was in London. In 1774 he attended the Virginia Convention.

In the Continental Congress (1774–1780), Lee quickly formed a lasting friendship with John and Sam Adams; he favored strong measures in dealing with the mother country and was one of the first to advocate a direct attack on the king, rather than the ministry, as the oppressor of the colonies. He saw independence primarily as a prerequisite to the essential winning of foreign support, and he had an important part in getting his state to send Congress resolutions on behalf of independence, foreign alliances, and confederation. Having touched off the movement toward independence, Lee left Philadelphia on 13 June 1776 without taking any part in the subsequent drafting of the Declaration of Independence. He subsequently became a Signer, however. His service on eighteen different

committees in his first three months as a delegate gives an indication of his tireless efforts in Congress.

In the late 1770s he took a leading part in convincing fellow Virginians that their sacrifice of claims to western lands was necessary if a confederation were to be achieved. With his brother Arthur he became deeply involved in the controversy with Silas Deane. In May 1779 he was forced by ill health, resulting from arduous work, to resign from Congress, but he came back in 1784 and was elected president of that body; he sat in Congress again in 1787. Meanwhile, despite bad health, he sat in the state House of Delegates. He led opposition to adoption of the Constitution, feeling that the lack of a bill of rights and other features of the document gave the federal government powers that could be abused. Patrick Henry, who shared Lee's objections, was instrumental in getting him elected to the new U.S. Senate, where Lee worked toward amending the Constitution. His principal propositions found their place in the first ten amendments.

In October 1792 he again resigned on grounds of health. A little more than two years later he died at Chantilly, the home he had established around 1757 near the family seat, Stratford.

In addition to politics, Lee ventured into western land speculation, forming with Washington and his brothers the Mississippi Land Company. He was also one of the most outspoken opponents of slavery in the eighteenth century, advocating "liberty and freedom" for Africans by 1759.

SEE ALSO *Adams, Samuel; Deane, Silas; Henry, Patrick; Independence; Lee Family of Virginia; Stamp Act.*

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revised by Frank E. Grizzard Jr.

LEE, WILLIAM. (1739–1795). American merchant, diplomat, troublemaker. Virginia. Only sixteen months older than his brother Arthur, William was closely associated with him in Europe after 1768. In the 1760s William learned the mercantile trade from his elder brother Philip ("Colonel Phil") Ludwell Lee at Stratford and served as secretary for the land speculation venture, the Mississippi Company. On 7 March 1769, soon after reaching London, he married his wealthy cousin Hannah

Philippa Ludwell (d. 1784); later she was the heiress of Green Spring, the Ludwell family seat in Virginia. The next year William partnered in the tobacco trade with Stephen Sayre and the Dennys De Berdts (father and son). With Sayre and Arthur Lee, he became involved in British politics as a supporter of John Wilkes. Both Sayre and William became sheriffs of London (1773), and William soon after became an alderman of the City of London (1775), the only American ever elected to that office. William ran unsuccessfully for Parliament in 1774.

Early in 1777 the commercial committee of Congress, which included Robert Morris and William's brother, Richard Henry Lee, named William and Morris's brother, Thomas Morris, joint commercial agents to handle Congress's business in Europe. In June 1777 William went to France, where to his chagrin he discovered the financial accounts of Congress's agents in disarray and the lines of authority hopelessly confused. Before long, in a series of letters sent back to the states, William and brother Arthur began questioning Silas Deane's financial dealings on behalf of Congress and even Deane's loyalty. Deane's employment of the clever British spy Edward Bancroft seemed to lend credence to their charges, and eventually Congress recalled Deane and held an official inquiry into his actions. In May 1777 Congress appointed William commissioner to Prussia and Austria, but neither power had any idea of recognizing the United States at that time and William was not permitted to visit either capital.

The Lee brothers and Ralph Izard had been rebuffed in their diplomatic assignments, so they stayed in Paris and tried to justify their existence. Their constant complaining tended to undermine Deane and Franklin and led to much animosity among all the parties. Consequences of the resulting controversy included the elimination of William Lee and Izard from their posts in June 1779 and the recall of Arthur Lee three months later.

Meanwhile, however, William Lee had taken a step that led to war between England and Holland. Unable to gain entrée to the Prussian and Austrian courts, he took it on himself to see what he could do in Holland. With a minor Dutch official, John De Neufville, he framed a draft treaty of commerce, and although the Dutch gave no indication of interest in it, Lee proudly sent his draft to Congress. When Henry Laurens was sent to the Netherlands in the summer of 1780 to get a treaty and a loan, the Lees gave him William's "treaty" as a model. Laurens was captured by the British at sea. The historian Helen Augur has written that "Whitehall believed, or chose to believe, William Lee's . . . treaty genuine, and immediately declared war on Holland." (Augur, p. 322)

William lived in Brussels for four years after losing his official status. In September 1783 he retired to Green Spring and died after several years of almost total blindness.

SEE ALSO *Deane, Silas; Laurens, Henry; Lee Family of Virginia; Lee, Arthur.*

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revised by Frank E. Grizzard Jr.

LEE COURT-MARTIAL. 4 July–12 August 1778. Although Washington apparently had no intention of making an official issue of Charles Lee's poor performance at Monmouth on 28 June 1778, Lee sent Washington a letter on 30 June (misdated 1 July) that complained about the "very singular expressions" the commander in chief had addressed to him on the field, accused Washington of "cruel injustice" based on misinformation, and demanded "some reparation for the injury committed." Washington flared up at these personal reflections and promised Lee an official hearing. But Lee would not let it go at that and became even more reckless in two more letters written the same day (the first of these misdaded 28 June), one of which accused Washington of being influenced against Lee by "some of those dirty earwigs who will forever insinuate themselves near persons in high office" (Smith, vol. 2, p. 1103). In response to Lee's request for an immediate court-martial, Washington informed him the same day that he was under arrest and that charges were forthcoming. General William Alexander was named president of the court that convened at Brunswick on 2 July, just five days after the Battle of Monmouth. The court brought three charges: (1) disobedience of orders in not attacking the enemy on 28 June, as instructed; (2) misbehavior before the enemy on the same day by making an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat; and (3) disrespect to the commander in chief in the letters Lee addressed to Washington.

The trial is of interest in revealing Lee's conduct at Monmouth. Though numerous witnesses testified that Lee demonstrated personal courage in the battle, the testimony of John Laurens and Alexander Hamilton established that Lee did not follow orders in moving to make contact, while testimony from William Maxwell, Charles Scott, and Anthony Wayne showed that Lee had no control over the ensuing action. Lee conducted his own defense but with little skill, doing nothing in cross-examination to discredit the evidence submitted against him. The court, which had moved with the army to Paramus, ended its hearing on 9 August and three days later found Lee guilty of all charges. It sentenced him to suspension from command for twelve

months. On 16 August, Washington forwarded the case to Congress without comment for its review, but that body did not start its discussions until 23 October. Lee, meanwhile, went to Philadelphia, where he attempted to win support for his exoneration. On 5 December, Congress voted 15 to 7 to confirm the sentence.

Many of Lee's contemporaries and later scholars felt that, while the first two charges lacked credence, Lee's conduct after the battle bordered on lunacy. Lee's foolish pen brought on the trial and also ruined his excellent chances of having Congress disapprove the sentence of the court. In Philadelphia, Lee made the error of defending himself less than he abused Washington. Lee forced Congress to choose between him and Washington; it sided with the latter.

SEE ALSO *Alexander, William; Hamilton, Alexander; Laurens, John; Lee, Charles (1731–1782); Maxwell, William; Monmouth, New Jersey; Scott, Charles; Wayne, Anthony.*

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
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revised by Michael Bellesiles

LEE FAMILY OF VIRGINIA. "From the landing of the first Lee in 1640 to the rise of the Confederacy in 1861, there were few crises that did not find Lees in the foremost ranks" (Hendrick, *Lees of Virginia*). The founder of the family in America was an Englishman named Richard (c. 1613–1664), who had arrived in Virginia by 1640. He became a large-scale tobacco planter and landowner and held numerous public offices. By his wife Ann Constable, he fathered at least ten children. Their son Richard (II) (1647–1714) married Letitia Corbin (or Lettice Corbyn); they had five sons and a daughter. The eldest, Richard (III), became a London merchant, but his three children returned to Virginia. Philip went to Maryland and left many descendants there. Francis died a bachelor. The daughter married William H. Fitzhugh of Ravenwood, and her descendants married back into the Lee family (hence Fitzhugh Lee [1835–1905], nephew of Robert E. Lee.)

But the branches of the Lee family most famous in history are those established by Thomas and Henry, the fourth and fifth sons. The genealogical table shows, in abbreviated form, the relationships of the various Lees who figured in the Revolution. "Light-Horse Harry" Lee's marriage to his cousin Matilda Lee, heiress of Stratford,



Lee Family of Virginia. THE GALE GROUP.

connected the two branches of the family. Ironically, once the Leesylvania branch inherited the home of the Stratford branch, the former proceeded to lose it through the poor business sense of "Light-Horse Harry"; his failure to manage the estate properly, plus his unfortunate land speculations, led to abandonment of Stratford in 1811—a few years after Robert E. Lee was born there—and its sale in 1828 for a paltry eleven thousand dollars.

The two branches of the Lee family also were connected through the Ludwells of Green Spring. A family of German origin that settled in England, the Ludwells had been established for three generations in America before the third Philip Ludwell died in 1767 and the male line became extinct. The first Philip in America was governor of the Carolinas (1691–1693); he later settled in Virginia and married the widow of Governor Sir William Berkeley (d. 1677). Their son Philip (II) inherited the plantation where the battle of Green Spring was fought between Lafayette and Cornwallis in July 1781. Philip (III) married a Grimes and so did his sister Lucy. The third child of Philip (II), Hannah Ludwell, married Thomas Lee of Stratford.

Now things begin to get more complicated because the Lucy just mentioned had a daughter named Lucy Grymes, who married Henry Lee (II) of Leesylvania. Hence the mothers of the two branches were aunt and niece. Another link through the Ludwells was even more involved: William Lee of the Stratford branch married the daughter and co-heiress of Philip Ludwell III, Hannah Phillippa Ludwell (his mother's niece) and inherited Green Spring. On top of all this, the immigrant founder Richard Lee had served as Governor Berkeley's secretary

William Lee of Stratford worked out the family pedigree in 1771, and Robert E. Lee used this material for his biographical sketch of "Light-Horse Harry" in his edition of the latter's *Memoirs* (1870). The accompanying diagram is based on William Lee's genealogical information with corrections from *Dictionary of American Biography* and Douglas S. Freeman's *R. E. Lee* (4 vols., 1937–1940). The Lees were connected through the Carter family and the Randolph family with many other distinguished Americans.

SEE ALSO *Green (or Greene's) Spring, South Carolina.*

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revised by Frank E. Grizzard Jr.

LEE'S LEGION. Lee's Legion had its origins in Washington's recommendations to Congress of 11 October 1780. Washington wrote, "Tho' in general I dislike independent corps, I think a partizan corps with an army useful in many respects," referring to such duties as reconnaissance, skirmishing with enemy light forces, and general camp and march security (Fitzpatrick, *Writings*, 20, p. 163). He went on to recommend the creation of two

of these highly mobile, mixed units of infantry and cavalry and nominated Charles Armand and Henry Lee to command them. On 21 October, Congress accepted Washington's recommendations. It promoted Major Henry ("Light-Horse Harry") Lee of Virginia to lieutenant colonel and transformed his corps of four mounted troops of partisan light dragoons into a legion of six fifty-man troops, three mounted and three dismounted (the equivalent of light infantry). Lee carefully selected his officers and men from other units of the army, "the officers with reference only to their talents . . . , and the men by a proportionable selection from the troops of each State enlisted for three years or for the war" (Lee, *Memoirs*, pp. 17, 29–30). When the unit reported to Major General Nathanael Greene on 8 January 1781 at the southern army's camp on the Peedee River in South Carolina, the Legion numbered 100 horse and 180 foot.

Lee and his green-coated Legion rendered important service in the South. They earned accolades from their contemporaries (and respect from their opponents) for their ability to move fast and hit hard, and gave Greene a disciplined, well-equipped, and well-mounted force that could operate either with the main army or with the less well-endowed militias of Andrew Pickens, Thomas Sumter, and Francis Marion. Historians have also been impressed. According to the editors of the Greene papers, "Lee performed brilliantly in the South. As Nathanael Greene's most trusted subordinate, he enjoyed great autonomy" (Showman, *Greene Papers*, 6, p. 431). The structure and personnel of the Legion enabled Lee to use his talent as a leader of light troops to best effect. The Legion was disbanded at Winchester, Virginia, on 15 November 1783.

SEE ALSO *Lee, Henry* ("Light-Horse Harry").

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LEE'S REGIMENT. Colonel William R. Lee commanded one of the sixteen "additional continental regiments."

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments*.

Mark M. Boatner

LEGION. In the eighteenth century (and later), a "legion" was a unit composed of infantry and mounted troops. Two were Henry Lee's Legion and Tarleton's British Legion. Other legions of the American army were led by Pulaski and Tuffin in succession and by William Washington. Benedict Arnold's Tory organization was called the American Legion, and this name was applied also to the legions of Tuffin, Pulaski, and Henry Lee.

SEE ALSO *British Legion; Lee's Legion; Pulaski, Casimir; Tuffin, Armand-Charles, Marquis de La Rouerie*.

Mark M. Boatner

L'ENFANT, PIERRE-CHARLES. (1754–1825). Continental officer, architect. France. Son of a painter at the Gobelins factory, he was born in Paris and educated as an architect and engineer. Beginning in 1771 he was a student at the Royal Academy of Painting and Sculpture, where he learned to draw battle scenes and fortifications. To protect him on his Atlantic passage, he was given a commission as lieutenant of colonial troops before signing a contract with Silas Deane that guaranteed him the rank of engineer lieutenant in the American army with rank from 1 December 1776. He went to America with Coudray in September 1777. L'Enfant's contract with Deane was honored by Congress, and he spent the winter at Valley Forge. On 18 February 1778 he was promoted to captain of engineers and attached to the staff of Steuben.

Since stagnation of the war in the North left little prospect of action, L'Enfant arranged a transfer to the South, where he served in the light infantry under John Laurens. Now acting as an infantry officer, he received a serious gunshot wound while leading the advance of the American column against Savannah on 9 October 1779. Left on the field, he was recovered by friendly forces and taken to Charleston for a slow recuperation. He was bedridden as late as January 1780 and at the time of the British landing was still using a crutch. Replacing an American major who was more severely wounded than he, L'Enfant took an active part in the defense of the city. He became a prisoner when the garrison surrendered on 12 May 1780 and was not released until January 1782, when Rochambeau intervened to have him exchanged for Captain Van Eyden.

He returned to Philadelphia and on 2 May 1783 was breveted major. A few weeks later he received a French pension of three hundred livres and was promoted to captain in the French provincial forces. During July and August he accompanied Steuben on his unsuccessful mission to Canada. On 10 June 1783 he transmitted to the Society of the Cincinnati his design for a medal. He left for France in October bearing letters from Washington regarding the Order of the Cincinnati along with his designs for the diploma and insignia. He left American service on 1 January 1784 but settled in Philadelphia.

L'Enfant did several portraits of Washington, designed pavilions and other trappings for military and civic pageants around the city of New York, added adornments to St. Paul's Chapel (1786–1788), and converted the old New York City Hall into Federal Hall when the government was temporarily established in that city. In 1791 he submitted the basic concept for the capital city of Washington. In such a complex undertaking, L'Enfant soon found himself embroiled in continuous controversies. On 28 February 1792 he resigned, writing to Washington:

From a full conviction of the impossibility to effect the intended establishment, while struggling under various difficulties that continually must occur, and which would as certainly prove insurmountable, to late to remedy their ill-consequences; at the same time fearing that by my continuance, you might indulge a fallacious hope of success, by which in the end you must have been deceived, under these impressions do I renounce all concern in it. (Caemmerer, *Life*, p. 213)

Yet he did not leave before he had established the city's fundamental character. In 1792 he was engaged to lay out the city of Paterson, New Jersey, but the next year he was dismissed because of a lack of funds for the project. In 1794 the federal government gave him the job of rebuilding Fort Mifflin, below Philadelphia, and some portions were executed, but again lack of finances did not allow him to complete his plan and little work was done under his supervision.

L'Enfant spent most of his time from 1800 to 1810 trying to obtain payment for his plan of Washington. Although Congress voted him two grants of money and offered him in 1812 the post of engineering professor at West Point, L'Enfant declared himself not suited to teaching. In 1814 he was engaged to undertake a reconstruction of Fort Washington but failed to produce a plan. After that he became a houseguest of the Digges family in Prince George's County, Maryland, until his death. He was buried at the foot of a tree on the Digges estate. In 1909 his body was moved from its grave and reburied at Arlington, Virginia.

SEE ALSO *Cincinnati, Society of the; Deane, Silas; Laurens, John; Rochambeau, Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de; Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von.*

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LENUD'S FERRY, SOUTH CAROLINA.

6 May 1780. After the American defeat at Monck's Corner, South Carolina, on 14 April, the survivors of this action and some fresh cavalry troops from the North gathered at several places on the Santee River. On 5 May Colonel Anthony Walton White crossed the river at Dupui's Ferry and the next morning captured an officer and seventeen light infantrymen at a plantation belonging to the Loyalist Colonel Elias Ball, four miles from Awendaw Bridge. White then headed for Lenud's (often spelled "Lenew's" or "Laneau's") Ferry on the Santee where Colonel Abraham Buford was located with 350 men of his Third Virginia Continental Regiment and a small body of Colonel William Washington's horse. Buford had reached this point in his march to reinforce Charleston, forty miles away, when he learned of the town's surrender and was ordered by Huger to withdraw to Hillsborough, North Carolina.

That same day Tarleton, by coincidence, was moving north with 150 dragoons to reconnoiter Lenud's Ferry. Encountering Colonel Ball, who provided intelligence of the earlier action, he pushed forward with great expedition and about 3 P.M. attacked White at the ferry as he was about to join Buford. There was no contest: White's troopers were surprised by the sudden charge, and Buford's men were standing around the ferry unprepared for action. Tarleton reported 5 American officers and 36 men killed or wounded and 7 officers and 60 dragoons captured. He also claims to have taken all the rebel horses. The British prisoners, who were being ferried across the Santee, freed themselves by pushing their guards overboard in the midst of the action. Tarleton lost 2 men and 4 horses, but an additional 20 horses perished from fatigue on their return to camp. Colonels White and Washington and Major John

L'Epine, Augustin François

Jameson joined those who escaped by swimming the river; a number were drowned in the attempt. Buford met Tarleton next at Waxhaws on 29 May.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Monck's Corner; Waxhaws, South Carolina.*

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L'EPINE, AUGUSTIN FRANÇOIS.

(?–1782?). (also known as des Epiniers or des Epinieres). French volunteer. A nephew of Beaumarchais, he claimed to be a captain in the French service and received a commission from Silas Deane on 5 December 1776. He traveled from Nantes on the *Mercure* with his commission and a stock of his uncle's works for sale in America. Congress hesitatingly approved his commission as a captain on 21 August 1777, and he was sent to Washington's army. He served with Lafayette in Albany during preparations for the aborted Canadian expedition.

Congress promoted him to major on 2 February 1778 "in consideration of the services rendered by his uncle" and his own effectiveness. Laurens wrote to Duponceau that this promotion may have been too hasty. He was aide-de-camp to de Kalb and then to Steuben. On 4 December 1778, Congress granted him a leave of absence for six months to Europe, but since he was unable to leave, he requested and received an extension on 24 September 1779. He was caught in the indecision of whether to choose his military career or his business, because Beaumarchais's American agent Francy had gone to France. Despite Steuben's better judgment, he promised L'Epine in the spring of 1780 that he would save his place as aide.

Unsuccessful in his commercial mission and military career, he appears to have returned to France, to the displeasure of his uncle and the scorn of friends. It appears that after several attempts at suicide, L'Epine finally succeeded.

SEE ALSO *De Kalb, Johann; Lafayette, Marquis de; Laurens, Henry; Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

LESLIE, ALEXANDER. (c. 1740–1794).

British general. A descendant of the earl of Leven, Leslie was lieutenant colonel of the Sixty-fourth Foot at Halifax before being sent to Boston. He commanded the raid intended to destroy a reported artillery depot at Salem, Massachusetts, on 26 February 1775. Confronted by a raised drawbridge, growing numbers of armed militia, and abusive crowds, Leslie could have anticipated Lexington then and there. However, he avoided an armed clash with admirable coolness and restraint, eventually accepting a compromise which allowed him to cross the bridge and immediately march back again without doing any damage. The only casualty was a local militiaman who, having smashed in the last boat on the river, had bared his breast to the troops and received a slight bayonet wound. Leslie was a brigadier general of light infantry at Long Island and Kips Bay and was in command of the British outposts in the fighting at Harlem Heights—the skirmish that significantly bolstered American morale—on 16 September 1776. At White Plains he found a ford across the Bronx River and led two regiments in an unsuccessful bayonet attack on Chatterton's Hill. At Maidenhead on 3 January 1777, his brigade failed to detect Washington's night march on Princeton by a route about three miles away.

In 1780, now a major general, Leslie was ordered by Clinton to the Chesapeake to meet, or at least act as a diversion in favor of, Cornwallis's thrust north into Virginia. Landing at Portsmouth, he received orders from Rawdon, the acting commander while Cornwallis was ill with fever, to bring his twenty-five hundred men to Charleston. Landing there on 16 December, he did not reach Camden until 4 January 1781; his slowness indirectly delayed Cornwallis's reinforcements for Tarleton, so contributing to the Cowpens debacle. Five days later he received orders to join Cornwallis at Winnsboro for the

invasion of North Carolina; he arrived just as Tarleton appeared with the survivors of Cowpens. On 1 February, Leslie and O'Hara were almost drowned at Cowan's Ford on the Catawba when the floodwaters swept their horses downstream. Leslie was in command of the British right at the beginning of the attack at Guilford Courthouse on 15 March and joined O'Hara for the final phase. In July, his health now deteriorating, Leslie was sent back to Charleston and thence to New York. Instead of sending him back on 28 August, as intended, Clinton kept him at headquarters, where he took part in the councils of war during the Yorktown campaign. He finally sailed for Charleston in October to take command in the southern theater after Cornwallis's surrender. Arriving at Charleston on 8 November, he quickly saw that he must limit his operations to hanging onto the city. Exercising the discretion given him by Clinton, he had the Savannah garrison evacuated by sea on 11 July 1782. He left Charleston on 14 December 1782.

Leslie's service was solid rather than distinguished. He was courageous and persistent, and his refusal to be drawn into combat at Salem was commendable. On the other hand, his carelessness at Maidenhead and his slow march to Camden both had serious consequences for the British cause.

SEE ALSO *Cowpens, South Carolina; Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Harlem Heights, New York; Kip's Bay, New York; Long Island, New York, Battle of; Salem, Massachusetts; White Plains, New York.*

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LEWIS, ANDREW. (1720–1781). Continental general. Ireland and Virginia. Born in County Donegal, Ireland, on 9 October 1720, Lewis and his family were among the first white settlers of Augusta County, Virginia, in 1732. He became a lieutenant of the Augusta County militia and a justice of the peace, and he built up a considerable fortune. In 1754 he was with General George Washington at the surrender of Fort Necessity. The next year he was part of Braddock's expedition against Fort Duquesne during the French and Indian Wars, but Lewis was not present at Braddock's defeat. He then commanded the Sandy Creek expedition against the Indians in 1756, during which most of his unit deserted. As part of Forbes's expedition to Fort Duquesne in 1758 he was captured on or about 21 September 1758 with Major

(later Major General) James Grant. Upon his capture he was sent to Montreal. After his release, Lewis participated in important negotiations with the Indians, including the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, which was signed in 1768.

In 1774 Lewis commanded 1,000 men in Dunmore's War and won the decisive victory at Point Pleasant on 10 October of that year. His brother, Charles, was killed in this battle. Lewis was appointed a brigadier general of the Continental army on 1 March 1776. He took command of the forces at Williamsburg, Virginia, and at Gwynn Island on 8–10 July he commanded the action that drove Loyalist Governor John Dunmore out of Virginia. When the promotion list of 19 February 1777 was announced, Lewis thought he deserved an appointment as major general, and resigned on 15 April 1777 for being passed over. He continued to serve in the Virginia militia, however, and also served on Thomas Jefferson's executive council until 26 September 1781, when he died.

Andrew's brother, Thomas (1718–1790), was in the House of Burgesses and in the state conventions that ratified the federal Constitution. Another brother, William (1724–1811), served with him in the colonial wars, rose from lieutenant of the First Virginia Regiment (2 October 1775) to major of the Tenth Virginia Regiment (12 May 1779). William was captured on 12 May 1780 at Charleston, South Carolina, and was a prisoner when the war ended. Andrew's third brother, Charles, was killed under Andrew's command in 1774.

SEE ALSO *Dunmore's (or Cresap's) War.*

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LEWIS, FRANCIS. (1713–1802). Signer. Wales and New York. Born 21 March 1713 in Llandaff, Wales, Francis Lewis was orphaned while very young and raised by relatives. Among those responsible for his upbringing was an uncle who was the dean of St. Paul's in London. Lewis attended Westminster School before going into business in London. In 1738 he came to America and established mercantile houses in New York and Philadelphia. He made several trading voyages to Russia, Europe, and Africa, was twice shipwrecked. Nonetheless, he saw his affairs prosper. In 1756, when he was voluntarily serving as aide-de-camp and clothing contractor for Colonel James Mercer's troops at Oswego, he was captured by Indians and sent to Montreal and then to France. He was then included in a prisoner exchange,

and received a land grant from the British Crown as compensation for his services.

In 1765, a rich man, he retired to Long Island, New York. In 1771, he returned briefly to London to establish his son in business, then went back to Long Island to devote himself to public affairs. He became increasingly involved with Revolutionary activities, and in 1774 was sent to the Provincial Congress. In the Continental Congress that ran from May 1775 to November 1779, he signed the Declaration of Independence. In the fall of 1776, the British destroyed his Long Island house and imprisoned his wife. She was finally exchanged in return for two female Loyalist prisoners, on the personal order of General George Washington, but her health was ruined by her ordeal. She died in 1779. In Congress, Lewis was active on the Marine, Commercial, and Secret committees. From 1779 to 1781 he was one of the Board of Admiralty's commissioners. He died on 31 December 1802 in New York City.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress*.

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LEWIS, MORGAN. (1754–1844). Continental officer. New York. Born in New York City on 16 October 1754, Morgan Lewis was the son of Francis Lewis. After graduating from Princeton in 1773, he studied law with John Jay, and joined the army the summer of 1775. He was captain of a New York militia company at Cambridge, and was promoted to major when his unit became the Second New York Continentals in 1775. The following year he was named colonel and deputy quartermaster general of the Northern army. He was General Horatio Gates's chief of staff at Ticonderoga and Saratoga (19 September 1777), where he accepted the British surrender. He led the advance at Klock's Field on 19 October 1780.

After the war, Lewis returned to the law, passing the bar in 1783. He was elected to the New York Assembly in 1789, the same year that his volunteer militia company escorted the newly elected George Washington to his presidential inauguration. Lewis's marriage in 1779 to Robert R. Livingston's daughter, Gertrude, allied him with the Antifederalist and Republican parties, and he had a successful political career that led to his being elected governor of New York in 1804, beating Aaron Burr. Unable to cope with New York power politics, however, he was soundly defeated by his former supporters in a reelection bid in 1807. During the War of 1812 he served as

brigadier general and quartermaster general of the army. He was promoted to major general on 2 March 1813 and served on the Niagara frontier. From 1813 to 1815 he commanded the New York City area. He died on 7 April 1844, in New York City.

SEE ALSO *Livingston, Robert R.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

LEXINGTON AND CONCORD.

19 April 1775. Because opposition to increased imperial control was turning more violent in Boston, culminating in the Boston Tea Party (16 December 1773), the imperial government decided to reorganize the government of the Province of Massachusetts Bay. As part of a series of measures—the so-called Coercive, or Intolerable, Acts—it closed the port of Boston until restitution was made for the destruction of the East India Company's tea (the Boston Port Act of 31 March 1774); revoked several provisions of the Massachusetts Charter of 1692 to give the royal governor greater power (the Massachusetts Government Act of 20 May 1774); and appointed Major General Thomas Gage, commander in chief of the British army in North America, as royal governor to enforce the acts. Gage arrived at Boston in May 1774 and quickly moved to Salem, where he had been instructed to establish the new seat of royal government in an effort to diminish the importance of Boston and punish the commercial activity of its radical merchants. Although assistance from other colonies kept the people of Boston supplied with foodstuffs and other essentials, normal business was at a standstill after 1 June 1774, when the Port Act went into effect.

PRELIMINARY RESPONSES

Opponents of increased imperial control responded in a variety of ways. They reminded supporters of the crown that shutting down the port of Boston hurt them too, and agitated for a return to the regular channels of imperial commerce. As Gage tried to put in place the restructured government, activists across Massachusetts (especially in Worcester and Berkshire Counties) took steps to keep government in the hands of local leaders who opposed the new measures, and out of the hands of those leaders willing to support Gage.

When the governor tried to terminate the meeting of the Assembly on 17 June, its delegates continued to meet illegally. They called for an intercolonial congress to

concert resistance, to meet at Philadelphia in early September, and named five of their number as delegates. When Gage called a new Assembly for October, the delegates privately met and adjourned to Concord, where they resolved themselves into the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. This was an extra-legal body that effectively governed all of Massachusetts outside Boston. Gage moved back to Boston, in large part to keep closer tabs on his opponents, and abandoned his attempts to enforce the Intolerable Acts outside that city itself.

Over the winter of 1774–1775, the Provincial Congress and its executive arm, the Committee of Safety, assembled the requisite means to resist the imperial government by force of arms, if that became necessary. Because many militia units remained under the command of men who might be reluctant to fight British troops, it created a parallel military structure led by committed activists, and directed them to organize and drill units of volunteers (the minutemen) that would be ready to respond literally at a moment's notice to British incursions. Local activists, with or without the endorsement of the Provincial Congress, endeavored to take control of military stores at Boston and Charlestown, encouraged the seizure of stores in Rhode Island (at Fort Island and New Castle), and arranged to accumulate stores at Concord and Worcester. A network of Committees of Correspondence connected local activists with the Provincial Congress, which itself communicated regularly with activists in other colonies in an effort to ensure that Massachusetts would not be left alone to face British anger. All in all, however, the effort to terrorize those who wanted to remain loyal to the Crown was successful.

GOVERNOR GAGE REACTS

In response to the rising likelihood of armed rebellion, Gage increased the Boston garrison to about 3,500 soldiers and fortified Boston Neck. British troops managed to confiscate gunpowder and firearms from militia depots at Charlestown and Cambridge, but these efforts served mainly to confirm the worst fears of the activists, who responded to the march on Cambridge on 1 September 1774 with the so-called Powder Alarm, a veritable dress rehearsal of their minuteman-based military system. When a reluctant Gage tried again to confiscate military supplies (several old cannon said to be stored at Salem) on 26 February 1775, the expedition failed in ways that increased the confidence of activists that they could mount a successful armed resistance.

Imperial officials, determined to bring Boston and the rest of the province to heel, decided to increase the Boston garrison to 10,000 men, and proposed more coercive acts. Most significantly, they refused to believe they faced a serious rebellion in America. William Legge, who was

the second earl of Dartmouth and secretary of state for the American colonies, told Gage on 27 January 1775 that “the outrages which have been committed were . . . merely the act of a tumultuous rabble, without the appearance of general concert. . . that could render them formidable to a regular force led forth in support of law and government.” To Gage’s claim that it would take 20,000 men to reconquer New England, Dartmouth replied “that such a force cannot be collected without augmenting our army in general to a war-establishment” and asserted that “I am unwilling to believe that matters are as yet come to that issue.” With only 12,000 regular infantry available in all of Britain, an aggressive optimism was the imperial government’s only real option. Some officials in London even suggested that Gage lacked the decisiveness and resolve to deal with the situation.

For several weeks, Gage had been planning an expedition to seize the military supplies at Concord, where his well-organized system of spies and informers told him the activists had gathered an important cache of munitions. He had already sent small groups of regulars marching through the countryside as far as Watertown on several occasions, in part to improve their physical condition and in part to accustom everyone to the idea that it was normal for them to do so. He chose Concord, twenty miles from Boston, as his target because, although it was more than twice as far away as Watertown, it was closer than the other cache at Worcester. He hoped that Concord’s proximity would make render its stores more vulnerable to seizure.

Aware that such action would further enflame the activists, Gage was in a difficult position. He was being pressured to take strong action, but lacked the military means at hand to make that action decisive. London would hold him responsible if he failed to act, and blame him if his actions exacerbated the situation. On 14 April 1775, he received instructions from London which strongly suggested that he should arrest the leaders of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. The adjournment of that body the next day removed the possibility of seizing the activist leaders in one swoop, but, knowing London’s desires, Gage decided on a gamble: he hoped that a quick raid on Concord might stun the activists and deprive them of some of their means to fight. His choice was the best military option among an increasingly unpalatable set of alternatives.

THE STAGE IS SET

Gage set his plan in motion on 15 April, a Saturday, when he ordered the “flank companies” (grenadiers and light infantry) of nine of the ten complete regiments of foot in the Boston garrison (the Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, Twenty-third, Thirty-eighth, Forty-third, Forty-seventh, Fifty-second, and Fifty-ninth Regiments) to be relieved from their normal duties, allegedly to learn new drill formations. To these eighteen companies he added the grenadiers of

the Eighteenth Regiment, and two companies of marines. Thus he fielded a total of nearly 900 men in twenty-one companies, about forty men in each company. He named Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith of the Tenth Regiment to command the expedition. Although an older, heavy-set man, overweight and unfit for arduous service, Smith was “known to be an officer of prudence, moderation, and maturity” (Fischer, p. 85). Marine Major John Pitcairn was named second-in-command. Pitcairn was “a seasoned veteran and general favorite, popular with Whigs as well as Tories” (French, *Concord*, p. 71), the type of man Gage wanted with Smith on a mission that would call for a cool head and good judgment. Smith put Pitcairn in charge of the six light infantry companies that comprised his advance guard. It was a combination of commander and soldiers who had never worked together before, a circumstance whose implications would become clear on Lexington green. Gage also called upon the skills of Hugh, Earl Percy, who was perhaps the best officer in the garrison. Percy was ordered to lead any reserves that might be needed to assist Smith’s forces. The troops themselves were not told where they were going, and elaborate measures were prescribed to assemble them after dark on 18 April.


Gage knew it was impossible to conceal preparations for an expedition from the various bands of townsmen organized by the activists to patrol the city and watch for suspicious troop activity. At about midnight on 15–16 April, for instance, the activists knew that boats which had earlier been gathered from naval vessels in the harbor for repair on shore had been returned to their ships. However, Gage did try to keep secret the exact target of the expedition by limiting knowledge of the plan to only a few officers. According to one tradition, Gage did not even tell Smith until the last minute that his objective was Concord. Ironically, these efforts contributed to delaying the assembly of the expedition, and ultimately proved futile. By the evening of 18 April, the Boston activists had further indications of the British move, and where it was headed. A soldier told the townsman with whom he was billeted that the troops were about to march. Another soldier was left word to fall out at 8 P.M. on Boston Common with a day’s provisions and thirty-six rounds of ammunition. Several people saw another soldier in field dress in a store. After dark on the 18th, just after being told of the expedition by Gage, Percy overheard loiterers on the Common talking about a suspected British attempt to seize the stores at Concord. Gage was shocked when Percy reported this information back to him a few minutes later, since he claimed to have told only one person other than Percy that Smith’s objective was Concord. Doctor Joseph Warren, a principal leader of the activists, may even have had the target confirmed by a highly placed spy, Gage’s own American-born wife, Margaret Kemble Gage, although this allegation remains controversial among historians.

Although Gage knew his plan was compromised, he believed it was too late to revoke Smith’s orders. He understood that the activists would quickly alert the countryside of British movements, and by noon on 18 April he had dispatched a group of twenty officers and sergeants to patrol the roads ahead of the expedition to catch rebel couriers and thus limit the speed with which the news was spread. He also understood that Smith might encounter armed resistance, and he did not underestimate the strength and power it might demonstrate. His assignment of Percy to provide support shows that he knew Smith might need help later in the day. According to Fischer, “his mistake in judgment was not about the probability of resistance, or the motives, tactics, and fighting skills of the New England militia, but about the quality of leadership among them” (p. 86). His written orders to Smith—the document that initiated the train of events that turned the occasionally violent resistance against increased imperial control into open armed rebellion—read as follows:

A Quantity of Ammunition and Provision together with a Number of Cannon and small Arms having been collected at Concord for the avowed Purpose of asserting a Rebellion against His Majesty’s Government, You will march with the Corps of Grenadiers and Light Infantry put under your Command with the utmost expedition and secrecy to Concord, where you will seize and destroy all the Artillery and Ammunition, provisions, Tents, Small Arms, and all military stores whatever (*Paul Revere’s Ride*, p. 85).

PAUL REVERE’S RIDE

On Sunday, 16 April, Dr. Joseph Warren sent Paul Revere to warn John Hancock and Samuel Adams in Lexington that Gage might be sending troops to arrest them. Returning from this mission, Revere arranged with Colonel William Conant and other activist leaders in Charlestown that he would flash the “one if by land, two if by sea” signal from Boston to alert them of British intentions, as a back-up in case no courier was able to escape the town. At about 10 P.M. on 18 April, Warren sent for William Dawes and Paul Revere, and instructed them to take the latest information—that the British were going to move the next day—to Hancock and Adams. Warren first dispatched Dawes, a Boston tanner who had proven to be a resourceful courier on previous occasions, by way of Boston Neck, where Dawes managed to talk his way through the British lines. When Revere got his orders, he arranged with two friends, Captain John Pulling and Robert Newman (the sexton), to show the lantern signal from the steeple of Christ Church, commonly called Old North Church, the tallest point in Boston’s North End. Joshua Bentley and Thomas Richardson then rowed Revere across the Charles River to Charlestown just as



THE GALE GROUP.

the moon was rising. There, Revere checked in with Conant, secured a horse (according to tradition, Deacon John Larkin's mare, Brown Beauty, a fine New England saddlehorse), and pounded across Charlestown Neck at about 11 P.M. It was now bright moonlight. Revere had been warned in Charlestown that British mounted patrols were on the roads ahead.

Cantering west down the Lexington road, Revere saw two mounted men, whom he quickly determined were British officers. Galloping north to escape pursuit, he turned west again through Mystic (now Medford) and Menotomy, a round-about route that, unbeknown to Revere, allowed him to escape the roving British patrols. After alerting the captain of the minutemen in Medford, Revere spread the alarm along the Lexington road. He arrived about midnight at the house of the Reverend Jonas Clark in Lexington, where Hancock and Adams had been guests for almost a month while the Massachusetts Provincial Congress met in Concord. Revere was surprised to find the house guarded. Earlier in the evening, Solomon Brown had returned to

Lexington from Boston and told William Munroe, orderly sergeant of the Lexington minutemen, of seeing nine armed British officers on the road. Munroe turned out eight of his men to stand guard on Clark's house, and Hancock sent Brown with two others to alert Concord.

Dawes reached Lexington about half an hour after Revere, having covered a route almost four miles longer. Revere and Dawes continued on to Concord, and between 1 and 2 A.M. were halfway there when they ran into a British patrol of eight officers and several men. Revere was captured after attempting to get away, and was held in custody with Solomon Brown, his two men, and a fourth individual who turned out to be an innocent peddler—all of whom had been arrested previously. Dawes escaped back to Lexington. Dr. Samuel Prescott, who had joined Revere and Dawes as they left Lexington, escaped to alert Concord. Revere told the British he had alerted the countryside and that 500 militiamen would soon be in Lexington. He also fabricated the story that Smith's column had been delayed. Major Edward Mitchel, who commanded the British patrol, was taken in by Revere's

yarn. The prisoners were held until the patrol neared Lexington and heard the alarm guns.

Mitchel's patrol had questioned the Lexington prisoners about Hancock and Adams, and may have had discretionary orders to capture these two leaders as well. If so, they abandoned the plan when they realized the countryside was alerted and that Smith's column was delayed. The British released the prisoners, after taking their horses, and moved to make contact with Smith. When Hancock and Adams got Revere's first warning, Hancock had insisted he would fall out with the Lexington militia and fight, but when Revere returned to Clark's house with news of the British patrol, Hancock was finally persuaded to escape, instead. Revere accompanied Hancock and Adams a few miles on the road to Woburn, from whence they would leave later in the day for Philadelphia, where the Second Continental Congress was to meet in May. Revere got back to Lexington at sunrise to witness the encounter between the Lexington militiamen and the British column.

SMITH'S ADVANCE

The grenadier and light infantry companies formed on Boston Common at dusk on 18 April. In the pitch darkness before moonrise (9:30 P.M.), they marched with utmost caution to a point near the west side of modern Park Square. Here they were met by the ships' boats and rowed, with muffled oars, across the Charles River to Lechmere Point. The distance by water—the "sea" of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's poem about Paul Revere's ride—was at least a mile and a quarter. The British landed at what was then Phips's Farm, later Lechmere Farm and Point, now East Cambridge (the landscape of Revolutionary landmarks in Boston's Back Bay has been obliterated by filling and construction). Between 11 P.M. and midnight the troops waded ashore to wait, cold and miserable, for about two hours while extra provisions were landed and distributed. Since they were already carrying rations, most of the troops threw away those for which they had been delayed for two vital hours. It was between 1 and 2 A.M. when Smith finally got his column marching, starting them off through a waist deep ford to avoid the noise of crossing a plank bridge.

By the time he reached Menotomy, about 3 A.M., Smith had ample evidence that his advance was expected. According to Gage's report, Smith called his officers together during a halt and issued orders not to fire unless fired upon. Soon thereafter, apparently dissatisfied with the speed of his column, Smith ordered Pitcairn ahead with the six light companies of the advance guard to secure the bridges at Concord. Then, having additional evidence that the countryside was alarmed, he sent word of this development back to Gage and requested reinforcements.


As it turned out, his call for help was the soundest tactical decision he made all day.

Leading Pitcairn's advance guard was a smaller body known in modern military parlance as a "point." These men moved as stealthily as possible, keeping to the sides of the road and taking cover when they spotted anything suspicious. In this manner they soon scooped up the scouts sent out from Lexington to bring word of their approach. They were waiting in the shadows to grab the fourth, Thaddeus Brown, when Brown's horse detected them and refused to be ridden into the trap. Brown finally read his horse's warning, turned, and clattered into Lexington at about 4:30 A.M. to tell Captain John Parker that the British were half a mile away. Pitcairn, meanwhile, had made contact with Mitchel's patrol and had been told Revere's story about the entire countryside being alerted (which was true) and the presence of 500 militiamen in Lexington (which was not). Pitcairn slowed his advance to let Smith's column close up on him a little more.

LEXINGTON

Captain John Parker, a veteran of the final French and Indian war, had turned out his militia company, some 130 men, on Lexington green at about midnight. There, everyone consulted together about what to do when the British arrived. According to Parker's affidavit on 25 April, they "concluded not to be discovered, nor meddle, or make with said regular troops, if they should approach, unless they should insult or molest us." They were not going to hide, but would stand as free men in passive (if armed) protest as the British passed by. Parker's choice of verbs indicate that the militiamen had decided not to try to stop the British, and to engage in armed resistance only if they were attacked. Their decision paralleled the response other militia companies had displayed on prior occasions when the British had marched through the countryside. After about an hour, with that decision made and the report of one scout that there was no evidence of the British on the road to Cambridge, Parker dismissed his men with orders to reassemble at the beating of a drum. Many militiamen repaired to Buckman's Tavern, on the east side of the green, to ward off the effects of a cold night in the company of their fellows and, probably, with the application of some alcohol.

At about 4:30 A.M., when Thaddeus Brown arrived with news that the British column was little over a mile away from Lexington, Parker directed his drummer, William Diamond, to beat the long roll of the call to arms. Some militiamen found that they needed more ammunition and went off to the meeting house, where the town's supply of gunpowder was kept, to get more of this essential commodity. In a disposition taken in 1826, Sylvanus Wood (who attended the assembly that night) reported that only thirty-eight men were present. He knew how many were



“Stand Your Ground.” This stone monument on Lexington Green is inscribed with the famous words that Captain John Parker delivered to American minutemen on 19 April 1775: “Stand your ground. Don’t fire unless fired upon. But if they mean to have a war, let it begin here.” © DAVID MUENCH/CORBIS.

assembled because, he said, he had walked from one end to the other of their single line and counted them all. Although more men continued to arrive, there were probably no more than sixty or seventy men assembled in two ranks on the north side of Lexington’s triangular green that morning. Perhaps some militiamen had opposed the company’s decision to stand in the open while the British marched by, or perhaps they had rethought their willingness to do so during the time they spent at Buckman’s. As the company regathered, Parker ordered his men to load their muskets. Even though they had resolved not to fire unless fired upon, the fact that Parker had them load their muskets indicates that he, at least, was pessimistic about their chances of avoiding a fight.

Several horsemen encountered Pitcairn’s advance guard (less than 250 men) at the outskirts of Lexington.

Officers in the van reported to Pitcairn that one of the horsemen had fired on the column. Whether or not that was actually the case, Pitcairn took no chances and immediately ordered his men to load their muskets. Thus, when the British came in sight of Parker’s militiamen at about 5 A.M., just as the sun was beginning to rise, both sides were primed and ready to react with deadly force. As the British came to the edge of the green, Jesse Adair, the marine lieutenant to whom Pitcairn had given command of the van, saw that to take the left fork and march along the southwest side of the green on the road to Concord would leave armed provincials whose intentions were unknown on the right flank as the light infantry companies marched passed. Adair decided that this situation was unacceptable, and directed the three leading light infantry companies to take the right fork, the road to Bedford, that took them

toward the militia. When Pitcairn arrived at the fork a moment later he ordered the rest of the column to the left, and stopped the third of the three companies that had followed Adair. But the two forward companies (the light infantry of the Fourth and Tenth Regiments) marched on, increasing their pace to the quick march. About seventy yards from the militiamen, they deployed from march column into battle line, an evolution that called for men in the rear to run forward to form three parallel lines. Trained to shout and huzza as they ran into position, we may suppose that on this brisk morning, after a miserable night march, the regulars may have put a little more zest than usual into this shouting and huzza-ing. The vigor of their cries is much commented on in American accounts of the day.

As the British companies formed up, Parker ordered his men to stand fast, but some of them started drifting away, preferring to seek shelter and a better firing position, rather than continue to stand in the open. David H. Fischer quotes William Munro as swearing (in 1822) that Parker said: "Stand your ground! Don't fire unless fired upon! But if they want to have a war let it begin here!" Not quite by accident, but also without deliberate intent on either side to start a war, the two bodies of men faced each other in a suspended instant.

Pitcairn and several other mounted officers galloped from the Concord road toward the left (west) flank of the two platoons of the Tenth Regiment, which had formed a battle line. He had two tasks to accomplish. First, he had to re-establish control over the two companies Adair had placed opposite the militiamen. Undoubtedly confident that the light infantrymen would not fire without orders, he faced a much more difficult second task: to induce or compel the militiamen to lay down their arms, and thus defuse the confrontation. Parker saw that, in a matter of moments, the situation would spiral into a deadly standoff his men had no chance of winning, perhaps not even of surviving, if they stayed where they were. He ordered his men to disperse without firing, but some of the militiamen may not have heard Parker's order.

Most of the militiamen were moving away when a single shot was heard or the flash in the firing pan of a musket was seen. Several shots seemed to follow. A mounted British officer (almost certainly not Pitcairn) may have fired his pistol and shouted "Fire!" Hearing or seeing what they believed were shots fired at them, some light infantrymen fired at the militiamen. Then the rest of the two companies delivered a volley at Parker's dispersing men, at a range of between sixty and seventy yards. They must have fired high, however, for the volley inflicted no casualties. They reloaded by rote, as they had been trained to do, and fired again. The second volley killed one militiaman and wounded others, including Jonas Parker (John Parker's cousin). Jonas Parker stood his gun and tried to

reload, but when the British closed in he was bayoneted. Probably not more than eight Americans shot back during this exchange. The firing was over in a matter of minutes, leaving eight Americans dead (only two where the militia company had formed, the rest as they dispersed) and ten wounded. Jonathan Harrington, mortally wounded, died at the doorstep of his own house, steps from the green, as his wife and family looked on. Only one redcoat was hurt, receiving a slight leg wound. Pitcairn's horse had two light wounds.

At roughly the moment the firing ceased, Lieutenant Colonel Smith arrived on the Lexington green with the main column. He was greeted by the sight of soldiers running about under no officer's command, amid clouds of gray gunpowder smoke and the bodies of wounded and dying militiamen. Smith ordered a drummer to beat the call to arms, and the soldiers slowly responded and fell into line. Perhaps within half an hour, they were marching away down the road toward Concord, six miles away. They now knew that all surprise had been lost and that untold numbers of militiamen from surrounding towns were converging on the column.

WHO FIRED FIRST?

Fully aware of the enormous implications of the Lexington fight, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress on 22 April appointed a committee to take depositions from all the participants and spectators they could find. Elbridge Gerry was chairman, and Colonel James Barrett of Concord was a member. The whole purpose of the Lexington depositions was to establish that Parker's men were dispersing when the British fired the first shot—proof, in American eyes, that the British started the war. The committee's report downplayed—indeed concealed—the fact that the Americans had returned fire, to the point where the men of Concord claimed the honor of firing "the shot heard 'round the world." The depositions taken in 1825 were designed to prove that the men of Lexington had fired back.

Ever since the event itself, controversy has swirled around the question of who fired first. The truth may never be known for certain, but it seems likely that neither the men in Parker's line nor the rank and file light infantrymen were guilty. Historian Allen French has found no real evidence that the British fired first. According to him, "If the first shot came from some young or reckless or irresponsible man, it seems right to believe that he was not among the Americans, who for months had been told, even by their ministers, that they were not to fire first" (*Concord*, p. 111).

Pitcairn's account of the affair at Lexington has come down through Ezra Stiles, then a minister in Newport, Rhode Island, and later president of Yale College. An American by the name of John Brown talked with

Pitcairn about the matter while Brown was a prisoner in Boston awaiting exchange. Brown passed Pitcairn's account on to Deputy Governor Darius Sessions of Rhode Island, who relayed it to Stiles.

According to Stiles:

[Pitcairn] does not say that he saw the Colonists fire first. . . . He expressly says he did not see who fired first; and yet believed the Peasants began. His account is this—that riding up to them he ordered them to disperse; which they not doing instantly, he turned about to order his Troops so to draw out as to surround and disarm them. As he turned he saw a Gun in a Peasant's hand from behind a Wall, flash in the pan without going off; and instantly or very soon 2 or 3 Guns went off by which he found his horse wounded and also a man near him wounded. These Guns he did not see, but believing they could not come from his own people, doubted not and so asserted that they came from our people; and that thus they began the Attack. The Impetuosity of the King's Troops were [sic] such that a promiscuous, uncommanded but general Fire took place, which Pitcairn could not prevent; tho' he struck his staff or Sword downwards with all Earnestness as the signal to forbear or cease firing (quoted in Dexter, *Literary Diary*, I, pp. 604–605).

Stiles concluded that although Pitcairn was innocent of firing the first shot himself and innocent of ordering his men to fire, he was deceived as to the origin of the first shots. Pitcairn's official report, unknown to historians until the twentieth century, said specifically that the firing started when a militiaman's musket flashed in the pan, and shots followed from other militiamen who were not on the green.

In 1925, Harold Murdock offered a hypothesis, sometimes still repeated, that Samuel Adams persuaded John Parker to adopt a provocative position on Lexington green that almost guaranteed a fight. Another historian, Arthur Tourtellot, offered support for this Machiavellian interpretation in 1959. Tourtellot cited the Gage papers, brought to the William L. Clements Library in 1930, which contains letters from Dr. Benjamin Church, a member of the Provincial Congress, who was in a traitorous correspondence with the British general. Church's letters suggest that Samuel Adams sought to make martyrs of the men who fell in the Lexington confrontation because support for the Patriot cause was fading. Hearing the British volleys from two miles away, Samuel Adams is reported to have said to Hancock as they continued their escape, "What a glorious morning this is!" Apparently thinking that Hancock mistook his comment for a weather report, Adams added, "I mean for America." A more plausible interpretation comes from David Fischer:

It is possible that one of these first shots was fired deliberately, either from an emotion of the moment, or a cold-blooded intention to create an incident. More likely, there was an accident. . . . Many weapons at Lexington, both British and American, were worn and defective. An accident might well have occurred on either side. If so, it was an accident that had been waiting to happen" (p. 194).

CONCORD

Samuel Prescott had brought the alarm to Concord between 1 and 2 A.M. The town's three companies of militiamen and the alarm company of old men and boys were soon reinforced by a company from Lincoln, bringing to about 150 men the strength of the colonists who turned out under arms. While a patrol went toward Lexington to verify Prescott's report that the British were coming, the others busied themselves concealing or evacuating the military supplies that had not already been removed the preceding day.

The British column approached Concord about 7 A.M. Militiamen who had taken position on a ridge outside the village were flushed by Pitcairn's flank patrols without a shot being fired on either side. Colonel James Barrett, the 64-year-old local militia commander, had been overseeing the removal or concealment of supplies that had been stored on his farm a few miles beyond Concord. When he returned to the center of town, he ordered his men to withdraw across North Bridge to a ridge overlooking the river and to await reinforcements.

Smith sent one light infantry company to secure South Bridge, and sent seven toward North Bridge. Three of those companies were left at or near the bridge while Captain Lawrence Parsons led the other four to search Barrett's Farm, where the British had been correctly informed most of the rebel supplies were kept. Meanwhile, the grenadiers searched in Concord. Since most of the supplies had been evacuated or hidden, the regulars found little at either location. Apart from stealing the Bible from the town meetinghouse and cutting down the liberty pole, the British troops conducted themselves properly at both places.

American forces on the high ground above North Bridge had grown to 300 or 400 men as reinforcements arrived. They could see smoke rising from the village and, although the British had themselves put out fires they had started in the courthouse and in a blacksmith shop, the militiamen suspected the regulars were burning the town. On orders from Barrett and with instructions not to fire first, they loaded their muskets and started moving toward the bridge.

Captain Walter Laurie's light infantry company of the Forty-third Regiment, numbering about thirty-five men, had been apprehensively watching the militia force



Old North Bridge. Concord's Old North Bridge, where colonial minutemen fought British soldiers on 19 April 1775. The reconstructed bridge is now part of Minute Man National Historic Park. © KEVIN FLEMING/CORBIS.

on the hill increase in size. As the Americans advanced to the music of fifes and drums, the light infantry companies of the Fourth and Tenth Regiments dropped back from more advanced positions to join Laurie at the bridge. Laurie, with a total of about 115 men, sent back to Concord for reinforcements. The Americans halted momentarily on the last rise overlooking the "rude bridge that arched the flood," then Major John Buttrick led his minutemen forward against "the flower of the King's army," as the flank companies were known.

The light infantrymen guarding North Bridge had already shown a propensity to fire without orders at Lexington (about which fight the Concord militia knew little at this time), and now three soldiers again fired without orders, followed by a ragged volley from those, crowded together on the bridge, who could bring their muskets to bear. The minutemen advanced steadily and, fifty yards from the bridge, returned fire with such accuracy that it drove the regulars back in disorder. In this three-minute exchange, the British had three killed and eight wounded, and the Americans lost two killed (Isaac Davis, captain of the Acton minuteman company, and one of his men) and three wounded. As the light infantrymen

fled back to the center of Concord town, they passed two companies of grenadiers, led forward personally by Lieutenant Colonel Smith, who was anxious about the safety of Parsons's four companies returning from Barrett's Farm. Smith made no attempt to retake the bridge to cover Parsons' retreat. Nor did the American militiamen, now divided on either side of the Concord River, make any move to stop the British companies from marching past their front. All the British companies were back in Concord from North Bridge by 11:30 A.M. By noon, Smith had his column in motion on the road back to Boston.

When Parsons's four companies recrossed North Bridge, unopposed, they passed a dying British soldier who appeared to have been mutilated. A young militiaman who crossed the bridge alone after the skirmish had, for some reason, struck a seriously wounded British soldier in the head with an ax or hatchet. Although some writers have tried to explain this senseless act by assuming the boy was half-witted, that does not appear to have been the case. This episode was the basis of reports that the Americans were guilty of atrocities. Gage reported that the soldier had been "scalped, his Head much mangled, and his ears cut off" while still alive. Parsons's men brought the story back

to the rest of Smith's command, and they passed it on to Percy's relief column. The spread of this report helps to account for the ruthlessness many redcoats displayed during the retreat.

MERIAM'S CORNER TO LEXINGTON

The British covered the first mile from Concord without difficulty, but at Meriam's Corner they started running a sixteen-mile gauntlet of fire. The militiamen who had fought at North Bridge had moved north and east across fields to this point, where reinforcements from other villages were converging. As the regulars crowded across a narrow bridge over a small stream, they came under fire at a range of less than 150 yards.

Some Americans fought as individuals, sniping from the cover of walls, hedges, trees, and buildings, but many fought in groups under the direction of senior militia officers. Light infantry flank patrols worked hard to keep individuals out of point-blank range, killing a good many snipers who were careless about their rear, and trapping and annihilating small contingents of Americans. However, the regulars, tired and low on ammunition, could not prevent larger groups of militiamen from firing from within 100 yards. After plowing through at least three ambushes, the regulars knew they were in serious trouble. At Fiske Hill, where they tried unsuccessfully to rally, Pitcairn's horse threw its rider and charged into the American lines with the major's pistols still in their saddle holsters. Colonel Smith was wounded in this action.

PERCY TO THE RESCUE

On the evening of the 18th, Gage had alerted thirty-three-year-old Hugh, Earl Percy for a possible mission to reinforce Smith. Before Gage went to bed on the night of 18–19 April he sent orders for Percy's First Brigade to be ready to move at 4 A.M. But the brigade major was not in his quarters when this order was delivered, and his servant forgot to give it to him when he did get home. At 5 A.M., with Percy's men snug in their bunks, Smith's request for reinforcement arrived. An hour later, most of Percy's brigade had been paraded. At 7 A.M. there were inquiries as to why the marines had not shown up, and it was discovered that their orders had been delivered to Major Pitcairn's quarters! After having lost five hours, Percy finally moved out at 9 A.M.

Percy's force numbered about 1,400 men—the battalion companies of the Fourth, Twenty-third, and Forty-seventh Regiments, plus 460 marines organized into ten companies—accompanied by two six-pound cannon. Crossing Boston Neck, the relief column marched through Roxbury and toward Cambridge. The countryside was ominously deserted. At the Charles River bridge they were slowed briefly because the rebels had removed


the planks, but since these were neatly stacked on the opposite shore the foot soldiers simply crossed on the stringers and replaced enough of the planking for all but the supply train to continue the march. (The two supply wagons and their twelve-man guard were ambushed and captured before they could catch up.) Moving through deserted Cambridge, the relief expedition was unable to get any news of Smith's detachment until it reached Menotomy. Soon the men could hear the firing. Reaching Lexington at about 2:30 P.M., Percy deployed his troops to cover the arrival of Smith's force.

A few minutes later the light infantrymen and grenadiers staggered exhausted into Percy's ranks. The two six-pounders opened fire and scattered the militiamen who had been following just out of musket range to capture stragglers and wounded redcoats. Rebels who took shelter in the meetinghouse were routed by a cannon shot through that edifice. Some regulars took off in pursuit, but were stopped by the swampy ground northwest of the common, behind which the militia had withdrawn. At about 3:15 P.M. Percy got Smith's tired troops back on their feet and resumed the retreat.

Although William Heath, the senior military officer appointed by the Provincial Congress ("Our General"), was now on the scene, a lack of leadership and an absence of tactical cohesion, combined with fatigue, lack of ammunition, and an unwillingness to push the fighting too far kept the American irregulars from putting enough pressure on the rear of the enemy column to slow it down while others circled ahead to cut off its route of retreat, a maneuver that might have prevented the British force from reaching the Charlestown peninsula and the safety of Boston. While a military opportunity may have been lost, such an action would have complicated the political situation, for the American rebels might have had to deal with perhaps as many as 1,800 captured British regulars.

The running fight from Lexington followed the same pattern as before: as the Americans sniped from behind cover and fired in larger bodies from longer range, the British light infantry patrolled the flanks, and the rest of the column struggled along the road. Close fighting in Menotomy resulted in forty casualties on each side. The regulars, enraged by the "cowardly" rebel tactics of firing from cover, broke into houses along the road, killed all males they could find, and looted and burned the buildings.

Approaching Cambridge, where the Americans had gathered to cut him off, Percy executed a skilful feint to indicate a return to Boston by the overland route via Boston Neck that his force had taken that morning. However, he moved instead toward Charlestown. He was twice more brought to bay, at what is now Somerville and again at Prospect Hill. Dusk was falling when his exhausted troops crossed the neck onto Charlestown peninsula and reached the protection of the



THE GALE GROUP.

guns of the Royal Navy ships that were anchored in the harbor. The Americans did not pursue, but fanned out to invest the British and start the siege of Boston.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Although more than 20,000 men were paid for turning out on the Lexington alarm, Frank Coburn has calculated that only 3,760 Americans engaged in the day's fighting at one time or another (*Battle of April 19, 1775*, p. 161); Christopher Ward has further reduced the figure by arguing that "perhaps not more than half that number [fought] at any one time" (p. 50). No one knows for certain how many Americans actively participated at any one point in the Lexington alarm, since fresh militia units were continually arriving, while others were dropping out after exhausting themselves and their ammunition.

American fatalities totalled 50 men, some killed outright, while others died later of their wounds. Another 40 men were wounded, and 5 men were reported missing. According to Gage's official return, the British lost one officer and 64 men, whereas 15 officers and 165 men were wounded, and one officer and 26 men were missing, for a total of 272 casualties or 15 percent out of 1,800 men. Ward calculates that "only one [American] bullet out of 300 found its mark. . . [and] only one [militia] man out of 15 hit anybody" (p. 50). Fischer argues that the "heavy expenditure of shot and powder at long range was part of a highly effective solution to the difficult tactical problem of fighting Regular infantry with militia," and notes that the "ratio of rounds fired to men hit was even higher on the British side than the American" (p. 408).

SIGNIFICANCE

The events at Lexington and Concord marked the transition from intellectual to armed rebellion. The British were unpleasantly surprised by the accurate and sustained musket fire offered by the militiamen, who were relentless in harrying the redcoat column. Both sides understood that the militiamen had displayed greater military skills at many levels than the British, at least, had thought possible.

Politically, the day furnished such abundant evidence of British perfidy that opponents of increased imperial control were able to mobilize enormous popular support against Britain. Fast couriers delivered to other colonies an account that was weighted in favor of the Patriot cause. Israel Bissel left Watertown, six miles west of Boston, at 10:00 on the morning of 19 April with a message from the Committee of Safety to "All Friends of American Liberty" telling of the Lexington affair and the march of Percy's column. He spread the word across Connecticut, and by 23 April was in New York. He continued across New Jersey to carry his message to Philadelphia. A more complete dispatch reached New York on 25 April, and was relayed by express riders who traveled night and day to reach Baltimore by the evening of 27 April, Annapolis by the morning of 28 April, Edentown, North Carolina, on 4 May, and Charlestown, South Carolina, on 10 May.

The American version of the day's events, complete with the depositions of eyewitnesses, reached Britain twelve days before Gage's official report, which arrived on 10 June. Gage had dispatched his report four days ahead of the American letter to "The Inhabitants of Great Britain," but the rebel leaders, aware of the value

of having their story told first, sent their letter by the swiftest ship available, which make a faster passage.

SEE ALSO *Boston Garrison; Boston Siege; Boston Tea Party; Gage, Thomas; Massachusetts Provincial Congress; Pitcairn, John; Pitcairn's Pistols; Powder Alarm; Salem, Massachusetts.*

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LEXINGTON OF THE SEA **SEE** *Machias, Maine.*

LIBERTY AFFAIR. 10 June 1768. The customs officials in Boston had a long-standing grudge against John Hancock, a prosperous merchant who displayed an open contempt toward them but whose careful observance of the laws gave them no opportunity to prosecute him. In one incident two minor customs officers went below decks on one of his ships, where they had no right to be, and he ejected them by force; the attorney general of the province ruled that he was within his rights. Later, his sloop *Liberty* reached Boston from Madeira with twenty-five casks of wine on 9 May 1768, paid the duty, and started taking on a cargo of tar and whale oil. The law required that Hancock give bond for the new cargo before loading it, but the customs commissioners had sanctioned the practice of delaying the bond until a ship cleared the port. The commissioners then initiated several actions, which, though legally justifiable and within their authority, seem to have been motivated by a desire to get even with Hancock. In addition to attempting to secure condemnation of the tar and whale oil for early loading, the commissioners learned from an informant that Hancock had landed more wine than the amount for which he had paid duty, and was thus guilty of smuggling. The commissioners ordered Joseph Harrison, the collector of the port of Boston, to seize the sloop as a preliminary to suing for her condemnation in the local vice-admiralty court. Harrison and Benjamin Hallowell, the comptroller of the port, boarded the *Liberty* on 10 June and seized her by inscribing the broad arrow, the mark of the king's property, on the mainmast.

Thus far, the proceeding was legal and not opposed. But then Hallowell had the sloop, with a wharf official held prisoner in her cabin, towed a quarter-mile to rest under the guns of the fifty-gun frigate *Romney*, whose captain, John Corner, had made himself odious in Boston by his vigorous enforcement of impressment. Moving the sloop from the wharf prompted the Boston mob to gather. Members of the mob assaulted customs officials on the wharf and in the town, and demonstrated around their homes in such a manner that the officials fled for safety to Castle William, from where the commissioners reported to London that the province was in a state of insurrection. The incident led the British authorities to order British troops to Boston, a step they had tried to avoid. On 1 October 1768, two regiments of regulars arrived, inevitably increasing friction with the local inhabitants and setting the stage for the escalation of violence on 5 March 1770 called the Boston Massacre.

SEE ALSO *Boston Garrison; Boston Massacre; Customs Commissioners; Hancock, John.*

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LIBERTY BELL. The bell that would become the Liberty Bell was ordered by the Pennsylvania assembly in 1752 from London’s Whitechapel Foundry. The inscription, in two lines around its circumference, read: “By order of the Assembly of the Province of Pensylvania for the State house in the City of Phila 1752” and “Proclaim Liberty thro’ all the Land to all the Inhabitants thereof. — Levit. XXV.10.” It arrived at Philadelphia in August 1752 and cracked upon testing. It was recast in Philadelphia and hung in the steeple of the State House in June 1753. The 2,080-pound bell, over five feet tall, was rung on many occasions during the imperial crisis, sometimes muffled if the news was considered to be a blow to American liberties. Tradition says that it rang out on 8 July 1776 after the Declaration of Independence was read on the steps of the State House, but given the decrepit state of the steeple, there is reason to doubt the tradition. Because the British were about to occupy Philadelphia, the bell was taken down on 23 September 1777 and carried to Allentown, Pennsylvania. It was brought back on 27 June 1778 but not re-hung for seven years, until a new steeple was constructed in 1785. Rung on many special occasions over the next half century, it seems to have begun to crack sometime in 1835. The final damage, a two-foot-long zigzag crack which silenced it, occurred in 1846 when it was rung on Washington’s birthday. The first documented use of the name “Liberty Bell” occurred in 1839 in William Lloyd Garrison’s anti-slavery newspaper, *The Liberator*.

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LIBERTY STREET JAIL *SEE Prisons and Prison Ships.*

LIBERTY TREES AND POLES. At dawn on 14 August 1765, two effigies were discovered hanging from the branches of the largest of a group of elms in an enclosure where Orange and Essex Streets of Boston converged (later Washington and Essex). One effigy was Andrew Oliver, the Massachusetts native who had agreed to distribute stamps and collect the taxes due under the terms of the Stamp Act. The other effigy was the Devil peeking from a huge boot, a derogatory reference to the earl of Bute, one of the principal advisers to the young King George III, whom Boston radicals blamed for the Stamp Act. The elm tree, already some 120 years old, thus made its professional debut as the original Liberty Tree. Opponents of the Stamp Act rapidly adorned and designated as “liberty trees” prominent trees in the public spaces of other towns throughout the colonies. The Boston tree was cut down by British soldiers in 1775 and yielded fourteen cords of firewood. A “liberty pole” was later erected on the spot.

Radicals in towns that lacked appropriate trees erected liberty poles. One of the best known was erected by the Sons of Liberty at Golden Hill in New York City in 1765 as a location where the Sons and their supporters could meet to agitate for repeal of the Stamp Act. They were so outraged when a group of off-duty soldiers sawed down the liberty pole on 16 January 1766 that a two-day riot ensued.

Liberty trees and poles could also be invested with considerable numerological significance. When the Massachusetts Assembly voted 92 to 17 not to rescind a circular letter to the other colonies in which it advocated resistance to the Townshend Acts, liberty trees were said to have ninety-two branches and the stubs of 17 others. The famous Issue No. 45 of John Wilkes’s magazine, *The North Briton*, that advocated resistance to tyranny inspired ninety-two Sons of Liberty to raise a forty-five-foot-tall liberty pole.

SEE ALSO Golden Hill, Battle of; Massachusetts Circular Letter; Stamp Act; Wilkes, John.

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LIGHT-HOUSE ISLAND (NEAR BOSTON), MASSACHUSETTS *SEE See Great Brewster Island, Massachusetts.*

LIGHT-HOUSE ISLAND, NEW YORK. Another name for Governor’s Island, in New York harbor.

LIGHT-HOUSE ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA. Opposite the main ship channel into Charleston Harbor, this island was the middle portion of a feature known collectively as Morris Island. The lighthouse for which it was named was built in 1767 and is still in place, though it went out of service in 1962. The southern of the three islands making up this feature was called Coffin Land.

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LIGHT INFANTRY. The term “light infantry” denotes infantrymen whose equipment and armament were modified (reduced in weight and made less cumbersome) to give them maximum mobility for their primary role as skirmishers in front of the main line of the regiment. Like their peers in the battalion and grenadier companies, soldiers in the light infantry company were trained to stand shoulder-to-shoulder in a line two or three ranks deep and deliver the volley fire that made linear tactics so effective, and to form up into deeper and narrower columns to assault an enemy with the bayonet. But the light infantryman also had other duties. While the men in the battalion and grenadier companies formed up in line, the light infantrymen would move forward to fight in open order, using speed, agility, and concealment in the terrain to direct an aimed, harassing fire against the enemy line or column, to inflict casualties and sow disorganization before the enemy came into musket range of the line. Light infantrymen had to be fit and agile, with the self-confidence and self-discipline to fight alone or in small groups away from the comfort and security of the line. Because they might also be out of sight of their noncommissioned officers, company officers had to have confidence that the light infantrymen would perform as skirmishers with little supervision and would not take the opportunity to desert.

Light infantry was created to support a system of linear tactics. The need for such troops was recognized across Europe, from the Austrians who faced swarms of Turkish skirmishers in battles on their eastern marches, to the British who had to adapt to war in the Scottish Highlands and the wilderness of North America. Light infantry companies became standard in most European armies during the third quarter of the eighteenth century. In the British army, where they were formed permanently from 1771, their elite status earned them the designation, along with the grenadiers, as flank companies, and entitled them to a position of honor on the left of the regiment when it was drawn up in line (the taller, more imposing grenadiers, as the senior company, took station on the right of the line). Many British officers had gained

experience with light infantry in North America, including Thomas Gage, who raised the Eightieth Regiment of Light Armed Foot in mid-1758; Henri Bouquet, who fought successfully against Native American warriors on the Pennsylvania frontier; and William Howe, who led an ad hoc light infantry battalion at the battle of Quebec (13 September 1759).

Thanks in large part to the special light infantry training camp Howe conducted at Salisbury during August and September 1774, from the very beginning of the Revolution the British used light infantry with great effect as shock troops and skirmishers. It was a common practice for the British army in America to detach the flank companies from each of the regiments present and form them into ad hoc battalions that could be used for especially important or arduous service. At Bunker Hill on 17 June 1775, for example, Howe sent a column of ten light infantry companies down the Mystic River beach in his best opportunity to outflank the rebels. For the New York campaign in 1776, he organized a brigade of four battalions of light infantry companies (and another of four battalions of grenadier companies) to spearhead his army. Charles Lord Cornwallis in particular distinguished himself in the early campaigns as commander of the light infantry corps.

Light infantrymen could also function as rangers (the American term) who acted independently and in advance of the army or participated in the partisan-style “war of posts” between armies. As the war continued, the British main army filled its need for skirmishers by relying on both the Jäger (hunter) companies that came to America as part of the German auxiliary contingents, and certain Loyalist units led by British officers, the most famous of whom was Lieutenant Colonel John Graves Simcoe of the Queen’s Rangers.

American light infantry served most prominently with Washington’s main army, where it evolved from the six companies of Pennsylvania and Virginia riflemen that joined the Continental Army at Cambridge in July 1775 into the light infantry corps organized annually. By 1779 the corps became the elite striking force of the American army. The American light infantry combined two traditions. The riflemen embodied a tradition of adapting the skills honed in fighting native Americans on the frontier to the needs of a European-style army, whereas the corps of light infantry paralleled the British practice of creating elite battalions within an army. Various units of riflemen served with the main army at New York City in 1776, but the first unit created by Washington to function as skirmishers was a small ad hoc ranger battalion formed in early September under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Knowlton of Connecticut. Early in June 1777 Washington ordered Colonel Daniel Morgan of Virginia to form a corps of five hundred riflemen from among Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland riflemen already enlisted in the army.

Morgan's riflemen worked hard for two months screening the main army against British maneuvers in northern New Jersey, while simultaneously trying to determine from his actions the plans Howe had for the 1777 campaign. When Washington sent Morgan and his Corps of Rangers to the Northern army in mid-August to help counter the white and Indian skirmishers supporting Burgoyne's invasion, he wasted little time in creating a new force of light infantry for the main army. On 28 August he ordered that a hundred men be drafted from each of the army's seven brigades. Two days later he placed the formation under the command of Brigadier William Maxwell of New Jersey and gave it the mission of skirmishing in front of Howe's advance from Head of Elk.

After Morgan returned from Saratoga with his rifle corps on 18 November 1777, Washington decided to institutionalize light infantry in the Continental Army. Based on his recommendations to a committee that visited Valley Forge during the winter of 1777–1778, on 27 May 1778 Congress decreed that each eight-company infantry regiment would add a ninth company of light infantry, to be kept up to strength by transfers from the other companies, regardless of how under-strength the rest of the regiment became. Aware that creating light infantry in this manner drew the best soldiers away from battalion companies that might otherwise rely on them to improve the bearing and performance of the entire regiment, Washington balanced this concern against the often pressing need to form an elite corps of light infantry for special missions. Circumstances over the next four years prompted him to detach the bulk of these light infantry companies from their regiments to form a Corps of Light Infantry at some point during the campaigning season, but he always returned them to their institutional and administrative home for the winter.

Major operations ended in 1778 with the battle of Monmouth Courthouse on 28 June. After positioning the main army in the Hudson Highlands to watch the British army now concentrated at New York City, Washington reformed the corps of light infantry on 8 August. "For the safety and ease of the army and to be in greater readiness to attack and repel the enemy," he directed that "a Corps of Light Infantry composed of the best, most hardy and active marksmen and commanded by good partizan officers be draughted from the several brigades, to be commanded by Brigadier General [Charles] Scott [of Virginia]" (Washington, p. 300). For the next three months, Scott and his four battalions actively patrolled the zone between the two armies. When Scott went home on furlough in mid-November, Colonel David Henley, one of his battalion commanders, took over command of the corps until it was disbanded on 1 December. The value Washington placed on the light infantry in an emergency was shown on 4 December, when information that

a British fleet was ascending the Hudson led him to recall the companies and place them under Brigadier General Anthony Wayne of Pennsylvania. They were released again on 4 December when no attack materialized.

The light infantry corps was reformed in June 1779 under Wayne, again with four battalions. It distinguished itself at the attack on Stony Point on 16 July, the pinnacle of American light infantry, and was disbanded after 28 December 1779.

The light infantry corps for the campaign of 1780 was ordered into existence on 16 July and embodied in two three-battalion brigades on 1 August. Initially commanded by Major General Arthur St. Clair, it was led by Major General the marquis de Lafayette from 8 August 1780 until it was disbanded on 26 November 1780. The corps had little opportunity to distinguish itself during a year of relative inactivity in the North.

The light infantry corps for 1781 was reconstituted early in the year (1 February) because of the need to send reinforcements to Virginia to operate against the traitor Benedict Arnold's incursion into that state. Lafayette led twelve hundred light infantry, in three battalions, south in mid-February and reached Head of Elk, Maryland, on 3 March, where he waited to see if a French squadron from Newport could prevent the British from reinforcing Arnold. Despite French failure, Lafayette resumed his southward progress on 4 April and reached Richmond on the evening of 29 April. The three light infantry battalions participated in the summer's campaign in Virginia and were joined on 26 September by two more battalions, part of Washington's force that had left the Hudson Highlands on 20 August. Lafayette remained in command of what was now a light infantry division of two brigades, the flower of the Continental Army, and took part in the operations that culminated in the surrender of Cornwallis's army at Yorktown on 19 October 1781. The light infantry battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton particularly distinguished itself in the assault on Redoubt No. 10 on 14 October. The companies returned to their regiments after Washington's army returned to the Highlands in early December. No separate corps of light infantry appear to have been formed during 1782 or 1783.

SEE ALSO *Bouquet, Henry; Cornwallis, Charles; Ewald, Johann von; Flank Companies; Gage, Thomas; Howe, William; Jägers; Knowlton, Thomas; Maxwell's Light Infantry; Morgan, Daniel; Riflemen; Stony Point, New York; Virginia, Military Operations in; Wayne's Light Infantry; Yorktown Campaign.*

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LILLINGTON, JOHN. Militia officer. North Carolina. The son of General John Alexander Lillington, he came home from college in Philadelphia to fight in the Revolution. Commissioned lieutenant of the First North Carolina on 1 September 1775, he resigned in May 1776 and was colonel of militia from 1779 to 1782.

SEE ALSO *Lillington, John Alexander.*

Mark M. Boatner

LILLINGTON, JOHN ALEXANDER. (1725?–1786). Militia officer. North Carolina. Born in Barbados around 1725, Alexander Lillington was the son of a British officer. His family emigrated to North Carolina in 1734. Apparently he was a wealthy and elderly man when the Revolution started, but he sided from the first with the Patriots. He served on the Wilmington Council of Safety, became a colonel of the militia, and led a force of 150 minutemen from Wilmington in the important victory over the Loyalists at Moores Creek Bridge, North Carolina, on 27 February 1776. On 15 April 1776 he was commissioned as a colonel of the

Sixth North Carolina Regiment, but on 16 May 1776 he resigned and served throughout the rest of the war as a militia brigadier general. He and his son, Colonel John Lillington, took part in General Horatio Gates's ill-fated Camden campaign, probably as part of the fleet-footed North Carolina militia force commanded by Lillington's friend and neighbor, Richard Caswell. After the war he returned to his estate, where he died in 1786.

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign; Lillington, John; Moores Creek Bridge.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

LINCOLN, BENJAMIN. (1733–1810). Continental Army general. Massachusetts. Born at Hingham, Massachusetts, on 24 January 1733, Benjamin Lincoln came from a long-established (since 1632) and locally distinguished family. His father was a maltster, farmer, representative to the General Court, and militia colonel. Although he had only a common school education, he learned to write well; his wartime dispatches showed a good command of the written word. He was chosen town clerk in 1757, justice of the peace in 1762, and became a moderately prosperous farmer. He was appointed adjutant of his father's Suffolk county militia regiment in July 1755, major in 1763, and lieutenant colonel in January 1772. Believing that British policies threatened the "peace, liberty, and safety" of the colonies, he became a strong supporter of "the present struggle against Great Britain" (as quoted by Paul D. Nelson in his article on Lincoln in *American National Biography*, 1999). He served in the General Court (1772–1774), on the Hingham committee of correspondence, and in the Massachusetts Provincial Congress (1774–1775), where he made an important contribution in helping to reorganize the militia and purge Loyalist officers. He marched with his regiment of minutemen on 19 April 1775 but arrived after the fighting had ended.

Lincoln's career during the first year and a half of the war differed from that of other Continental Army general officers in that he devoted his service to his province, not the continent. The Massachusetts Provincial Congress appointed him muster master of its forces on 4 May 1775 and elected him its acting president for the last week of its session in July 1775. But when he met Washington at Cambridge on 3 July 1775, Lincoln's military rank was only that of lieutenant colonel of militia. For the next eighteen months he remained a state militia officer, rising to brigadier general on 8 February 1776 and to major general on 8 May 1776. On 2 August 1776 he was given command of Massachusetts troops around Boston, and in September he commanded the militia

regiments detached to reinforce the defenses of New York City. He fought ably in command of the American right wing in the battle of White Plains on 28 October, which did much to secure Washington's friendship and good opinion of his abilities. In a letter to Congress on 22 January 1777, Washington recommended him as "an excellent officer, and worthy of your notice in the Continental Line." Congress reacted promptly and appointed Lincoln one of five major generals on 19 February 1777, leapfrogging this late-blooming militia general, whose main assignment had been training state troops, over several Continental Army brigadier generals; one of them was Benedict Arnold, who complained until Congress eventually restored his seniority over Lincoln.

As a militia general Lincoln had commanded troops in William Heath's mismanaged diversion against Fort Independence, New York, 17–18 January 1777. Soon thereafter he joined Washington at Morristown with militia reinforcements. At Bound Brook, New Jersey, on 13 April 1777 his advance detachment was surprised by the enemy; he barely escaped capture but managed to extricate his command without serious loss. When Washington saw that the British were probably moving from New York by water to attack Philadelphia, he ordered Lincoln's and Adam Stephen's division to march south toward the Delaware (24 April). But Washington also had to watch the progress of Burgoyne's invasion, and on 24 July he ordered Lincoln to join Philip Schuyler's Northern army and assume command of the New England militia forming east of the Hudson. This mission presented Lincoln with a real test when he arrived to find the militia being commanded by John Stark, who refused to recognize the authority of Congress. Lincoln handled the situation with great tact and helped to get Stark into a position where he could effectively oppose the Bennington raid of August 1777. After directing the fruitful raid on Fort Ticonderoga, which disrupted Burgoyne's supply lines, Lincoln moved his militia to reinforce Gates in the defensive position on Bemis Heights. All his troops arrived by 29 September, although too late for the first Battle of Saratoga (19 September). During the second Battle of Saratoga, 7 October, Lincoln commanded the right wing of the American defenses and saw no action. Leading a small force forward the next day, he received a severe wound in his right ankle from which he never completely recovered. He spent the next ten months convalescing at Hingham.

Rejoining Washington in August 1778, he offered to resign during the controversy Arnold had created over promotions but was prevailed on to remain in the service. On 25 September Congress appointed him commander of the Southern Department, a decision on which Washington was not consulted but of which he approved. Detained ten days in Philadelphia by Congress, he reached Charleston on 4 December 1778, too late to play any part in preventing

the British capture of Savannah on 29 December. (His subsequent actions in Georgia and South Carolina are covered in the entry on the Southern Theater.)

He was paroled after surrendering Charleston on 12 May 1780, but his arrival in Philadelphia was delayed for various reasons until July. He asked for a court of inquiry, but none was appointed and no charges were brought against him. Back on the farm at Hingham, Lincoln waited until November to be exchanged for British major general William Phillips, captured at Saratoga in October 1777. That winter Lincoln raised recruits and gathered supplies in his home state, and received an honorary master of arts degree from Harvard College. He spent the next summer in command of troops in the vicinity of New York City. Because of Lincoln's seniority Washington picked him to lead the American element of the allied army that marched south for the Yorktown campaign. Lincoln commanded the American right wing at the siege of Yorktown and presided over the surrender of Charles Cornwallis on 20 October 1781; Washington accorded him that honor as his senior major general, not to compensate for his surrender at Charleston.

Hoping to take advantage of his administrative abilities, Congress appointed him secretary of war on 30 October 1781, a post he held for two years until the peace treaty was signed. In a resolution of 29 October 1783, Congress told him that it entertained "a high sense of his perseverance, fortitude, activity, fidelity, and capacity in the execution of the office of secretary of war, which important trust he has discharged to their entire satisfaction." Historians have echoed that judgment. He was also elected the first president of the Massachusetts Society of the Cincinnati, a post he held until his death.

He returned to Hingham and almost ruined himself by speculating in land in Maine. In January 1787 he was appointed to lead militia troops against Shays's Rebellion. He defeated the insurgents in battle at Springfield on 27 January, and after a famous night march (2–3 February) captured at Petersham the 150 survivors of Shays's band, whom he then treated with moderation and compassion. He subsequently headed a commission that traveled through western Massachusetts listening to citizen complaints, a demonstration of conciliation that did much to tamp the fires of insurgency. In 1788 he served in the convention to ratify the federal Constitution and worked effectively to achieve that end. That same year he was elected lieutenant governor of Massachusetts, but he lost a reelection bid in 1789. His appointment as collector of the port of Boston in 1789 helped him out of straitened circumstances; he held the post until his political foes forced him to resign on 1 March 1809. He was a federal commissioner to negotiate boundary treaties with the Creek Indians in 1789 and with Indians in the Ohio Valley in 1793. As a member of the American Academy

of Arts and Sciences and of the Massachusetts Historical Society, he wrote papers on such diverse topics as the migration of fish, the soil and climate of Maine, and "The Religious State of the Eastern Counties." He died at Hingham, in the house in which he had been born, on 9 May 1810. Lincoln's papers are held by the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Bennington Raid; Bound Brook, New Jersey; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Fort Independence Fiasco, New York; Saratoga, Second Battle of; Southern Theater, Military Operations in; Ticonderoga Raid; White Plains, New York.*

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LINDLEY'S MILL *SEE Hillsboro Raid, North Carolina.*

LINE. In the linear tactics that dominated land warfare in western Europe in the eighteenth century, the term "line" denoted a row of soldiers standing shoulder to shoulder across the front of a formation. The formation might be two, three, or occasionally more lines deep, but its width was always greater than its depth, making it difficult to maneuver on the battlefield. The tactical value of the line was its ability to bring the maximum number of individual firearms to bear on the enemy without sacrificing too much of the compactness needed to retain command and control on a battlefield. The line won or lost the battle by the disciplined delivery of sustained volley fire. The term "column," on the other hand, denoted a formation whose front was narrow, but whose depth was relatively great; columns

could maneuver more readily on the battlefield and had the capability of punching a hole through a line whose fire discipline was poor.

"Line" also came to mean an army's established, more or less permanent units. In the British army, the "line" meant the numbered units of infantry and cavalry that made up the bulk of the standing forces, not including the units of guards that made up the monarch's household establishment. In the American army, the term was used to distinguish between regiments authorized by Congress and raised for Continental service, and the state and militia units under the control of the state governments, thus making the terms "Continental Army" and "Continental Line" nearly synonymous. Beginning in 1777, nearly all Continental Army units were part of a state's "Line," as in the "Massachusetts Line" or the "Virginia Line." Most officers in both armies held a commission in the line, meaning they were members of the active combat arms; officers commissioned "on the staff" were part of a different hierarchy.

In naval warfare, a "line of battle" denoted a group of large wooden ships whose carriage guns were mounted in broadside, sailing stem to stern so as to bring their batteries to bear on a similarly armed and arranged group of enemy vessels sailing on a parallel or converging course. The pinnacle of naval tactics was to bring the maximum number of broadside guns to bear on the head of the enemy's line, thereby concentrating an artillery crossfire on a few ships that could not respond effectively because they could not fire their guns ahead. This maneuver was called "crossing the T." A "ship of the line [of battle]" designated a warship that was large enough to take part in the main action; in the eighteenth century this meant a warship carrying seventy-four or more heavy guns.

SEE ALSO *Muskets and Musketry.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.

A route by land or water that connects an operating military force with its base and along which move supplies and reinforcements as well as messages.

Mark M. Boatner

LINSTOCK. Device for holding the slow match with which cannon were fired.

Mark M. Boatner

LIPPINCOTT, RICHARD. Loyalist officer in Huddy–Asgill Affair.

SEE ALSO *Huddy–Asgill Affair*.

LITTLE EGG HARBOR, NEW JERSEY. 5–7 October 1778. In the autumn of 1778 Sir Henry Clinton returned to New Jersey by way of conducting a series of major foraging operations. Concurrently, he worked with the Royal Navy to plan a raid to knock out a troublesome privateers' nest a few miles north of modern Atlantic City. On 30 September, Captain Henry Collins put to sea with a task force consisting of his year-old *Zebra* (fourteen guns), four other sloops of war, a brig, and several galleys. The army contingent consisted of three hundred men from the Seventieth Foot and the New Jersey Provincials (Skinner's Brigade), led by Captain Patrick Ferguson. Other than a handful of local militiamen, the only American force in the area was Pulaski's Legion. This combined arms team had been organized in Baltimore during the late spring and summer and consisted of one troop of lancers, two troops of dragoons, one company of riflemen, and two companies of light infantry. Most of the officers were foreign volunteers, and a substantial number of the men were German deserters.

The British arrived offshore on 5 October, and over the course of the next two days they destroyed ten large vessels and assorted storehouses, saltworks, and shipyards as far as twenty miles up the Mullica River. After Ferguson's raiders had embarked in their boats, seven of Pulaski's horsemen appeared and asked to speak to him. Their leader turned out to be Charles Juliat, who had deserted from the Hesse-Cassel Landgraf Regiment in Rhode Island and been appointed by Congress as a volunteer in the Pulaski's Legion. In exchange for a pardon, they guided Ferguson to Pulaski's camp during the night. About 4 A.M. the raiders charged into three houses and killed about fifty of the infantry contingent, mostly by bayonet. Pulaski arrived with the dragoons who had been posted in a second camp, rallied the infantry survivors, and drove Ferguson back to his boats in some confusion and with the loss of several men captured.

The Americans raised the charge of massacre, and the victors of this coup offered the usual denials. Most historians disagree on the date of the action, with estimates ranging between 5 October and 15 October. The action forced Washington to send the legion back from the front to be rebuilt; Collins lost the *Zebra* during the return voyage to New York when it ran aground in a storm. Juliat did not profit from his treason—he remained ostracized by the Hessians.

SEE ALSO *Ferguson, Patrick*.

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

LIVINGSTON, ABRAHAM. (1753–1802). Continental officer. Canada. A brother of Richard and James Livingston, he became captain in the latter's regiment 18 December 1775, serving mostly as a commissary of stores. He resigned his commission 1 January 1781 and served subsequently as captain of New York Levies.

SEE ALSO *Canadian Regiment (First); Livingston, James; Livingston, Richard*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

LIVINGSTON, HENRY BEEKMAN. (1750–1831). Continental officer. New York. Son of Robert R. Livingston, he raised a company and was named captain of the Fourth New York Regiment on 28 June 1775. As aide-de-camp he went with his brother-in-law, General Richard Montgomery, to Quebec from July to December 1775. For his part in the capture of Chambly, he was given a sword of honor by the Continental Congress on 12 December 1775. In February 1776 he became aide-de-camp to Philip Schuyler, and on 21 November of that year he was made colonel of the Fourth New York Regiment. He played a decisive part in the battle of Monmouth on 28 June 1778. In the battle of Rhode Island on 29 August 1778, he and Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens commanded the two columns of light troops that first attacked the oncoming British force. Nathanael Greene commended him for his performance in the battle. He resigned from the army on 13 January 1779. After the Revolution he oversaw the family estate and was active in the Society of the Cincinnati.

SEE ALSO *Livingston, Henry Brockholst; Monmouth, New Jersey*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

LIVINGSTON, HENRY BROCKHOLST. (1757–1823). Continental officer. New York. Born in New York City on 25 November 1757, Henry Brockholst was the son of William Livingston. Brockholst, as he was generally known, graduated from Princeton in 1774 and entered the army in 1775 as captain and aide-de-camp to General Philip Schuyler. In December 1775 he was named major of the Third New York Regiment, and then became aide-de-camp to General Arthur St. Clair on 8 March 1776. A deep admirer of Benedict Arnold, Livingston was present at the Saratoga campaign as a member of Arnold's staff. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel after the battle.

Livingston won praise from General Nathanael Greene for his performance at the battle of Newport on 29 August 1778. In 1779 he took a twelve-month leave of absence to serve as private secretary to his brother-in-law, John Jay, during Jay's mission to Spain. Livingston was captured by the British on his return trip in 1782. Jailed in New York City, he was freed almost immediately on the order of Sir Guy Carleton and sent home on parole. He then went to Albany to study law and was admitted to the bar in 1783. He became a highly successful lawyer and an anti-Federalist. In 1802 he was named to the state supreme court, was co-founder of the New York Historical Society in 1805, and in 1808 helped organize the state's public school system. In 1807 he became associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, which he served on until his death in Washington, D.C., on 18 March 1823.

SEE ALSO *Livingston, Henry Beekman; Livingston, William; Newport, Rhode Island (September 1777).*

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LIVINGSTON, JAMES. (1747–1832). Continental officer. Canada. Born on 27 March 1747, James Livingston was the grandnephew of the powerful Robert Livingston. Though he did not finish college, James became a lawyer by studying with William Smith Jr. in New York City before settling in Montreal sometime in the late 1760s. When the Revolution started, James and his brothers Richard and Abraham joined General Richard Montgomery's forces invading Canada. James recruited over two hundred Canadians and led them in the operations around Chambly on 18 October 1775. On 20

November this unit was designated the First Canadian Regiment, and he was named its colonel. After the disastrous attack on Quebec, in which his forces fled at the beginning, he joined the retreat back to New York. On 8 January 1776, Congress gave him permission to recruit troops in New York. They served under Arnold in the relief of Fort Stanwix and the two Battles of Saratoga.

As commander of the garrisons around Kings Ferry, he figured prominently in the events surrounding Arnold's treason. His firing on the *Vulture* indirectly resulted in Arnold's exposure. Washington was suspicious of Livingston's loyalty. In the reorganization of 1780, Livingston's unit was eliminated and he resigned on 1 January 1781.

Livingston was in the state assembly in 1784–1787 and 1789–1791. He died in Schuylerville, New York, on 29 November 1832.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason; Chambly, Canada (18 October 1775); Montgomery, Richard; Quebec; Smith, William.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

LIVINGSTON, PHILIP. (1716–1778). Signer. New York. Born in Albany, New York, on 15 January 1716, Philip Livingston graduated from Yale in 1737 and became an importer in New York City. He grew wealthy from trade and as a privateer during the wars against the French and entered enthusiastically into the civic life of the city. He contributed to the establishment of Columbia (then King's College) and gave a chair of divinity at Yale. He helped organize the New York Society Library in 1754, and also participated in founding the St. Andrew's Society, the New York Chamber of Commerce, and the New York Hospital. He was elected a city alderman and served from 1754 to 1763. He was also elected to the provincial assembly, serving from 1758 to 1769, serving as speaker of the assembly during the last two years of his tenure.

An early opponent of British policies toward the colonies, he wrote the assembly's petition opposing imperial taxes in 1764 and was a delegate to the Stamp Act Congress in 1765. A moderate Whig, he disapproved of the rioting attributed to the Sons of Liberty. He was defeated for re-election in 1769. He opposed the Intolerable Acts and sat in the Continental Congress from September 1774 until his death on 12 June 1778 in York, Pennsylvania. He was an active member of the Secret Committee that sought to arm the American forces, as well as the Marine Committee and the Committee on Provisioning. Though not present for the debates on the Declaration of Independence, he signed it in August 1776. John Adams describes him as a conservative, saying

Livingston, Richard

“[he] is a great, rough rapid mortal. There is no holding any conversation with him. He blusters away; says if England should turn us adrift, we should instantly go to civil wars among ourselves.”

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress*.

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LIVINGSTON, RICHARD. (1743–1786). Continental officer. Canada. A brother of James Livingston, he was lieutenant colonel of the latter's First Canadian Regiment from 18 December 1775 until 2 November 1779. Richard was captured at Fort Montgomery on 6 October 1777. He resigned his commission on 2 November 1779.

SEE ALSO *Livingston, James*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

LIVINGSTON, ROBERT R. (1746–1813). Statesman, diplomat. New York. Scion of the distinguished Livingston Family, Livingston was born in New York City on 27 November 1746. After graduating from King's College (now Columbia University) in 1765 he studied law, was admitted in 1770 to the bar, and for a short time was in practice together with his college classmate and relative by marriage, John Jay. In 1773 Governor William Tryon named him recorder of the city of New York, but two years later he lost this post because of his Patriot leanings. He immediately was elected to the Continental Congress and was a delegate during the periods 1775–1776, 1779–1781, and 1784–1785. He was on the committee that drafted the Declaration of Independence, but although he felt that independence was both desirable and inevitable he did not think that the time had yet come. Accordingly, Livingston was one of the principal advocates of postponing the issue. He did not vote for the Declaration of Independence, and when the time for signing came he was absent. It should be pointed out, however, that New York did not decide until 9 July that its delegates should vote for independence, and Livingston had left for New York on the 15th

of that month to sit in the newly elected state convention. He also served on a secret committee organizing the defense of the Hudson River and on New York's Committee of Safety. In 1777 he and John Jay worked to craft a conservative state constitution. The convention appointed Livingston the state's chancellor, or chief justice, a position he filled until 1801.

Even while holding these state offices, Livingston remained active in the Continental Congress, working hard and ably on many important committees. In August 1781 Congress elected Livingston secretary of the newly created Department of Foreign Affairs. An ardent nationalist, he supported the Constitution at the New York ratifying convention and administered the oath of office to President George Washington in 1789. Feeling that the new government failed to recognize his services with appropriate patronage, he changed sides and took many of his relatives with him into the Republican camp around 1791. He helped Aaron Burr defeat Philip Schuyler for the U.S. Senate, and disagreed with Alexander Hamilton's financial plans, particularly the matter of "Assumption." A leading opponent of Jay's Treaty, in 1795 he published, under the name of "Cato," his *Examination of the Treaty*. In 1801 he accepted Thomas Jefferson's nomination as minister to France, having previously declined to become Secretary of the Navy. Negotiating the Louisiana Purchase, was, in his view, the greatest accomplishment of his life. Resigning his ministerial post in the autumn of 1804, he retired to the family estate, which was known as "Clermont."

Livingston was the founding president of the American Academy of Fine Arts in 1801. He also played a vital role in the development of the steamboat. While in Paris he had given technical and financial aid that made the experiments of Robert Fulton possible. In 1807, Fulton's invention, the *Clermont*, made the journey from New York City to Albany, becoming the first practical steamboat. Livingston died at home on 26 February 1813.

SEE ALSO *Assumption; Jay, John*.


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LIVINGSTON, WILLIAM. (1723–1790). Congressman, governor of New York. Born in November 1723 in Albany, New York, William Livingston graduated from Yale in 1741 at the head of



Livingston Family of New York. THE GALE GROUP.

his class. He then studied law under James Alexander, gaining admission to the bar in 1745. From early on he was a Presbyterian reformer who argued for religious diversity, which put him at odds with most of his family connections. He routinely opposed projects sponsored by the Anglican faction in New York, such as the establishment of King's College (now Columbia University), and this brought him into dispute with the De Lanceys, a leading Anglican family. This opposition led to the formation of the Livingston and De Lancey factions in provincial politics.

Holding few political offices, Livingston preferred to work behind the scenes. By 1758 his party had wrested control of the assembly from the DeLanceys, and he became the acknowledged leader in the resistance to Crown interference in provincial affairs. When his patrician companions became alarmed at the riots inspired by the Sons of Liberty, Livingston tried to reconcile the Sons and their more radical allies to a temporizing position. This was completely unsuccessful,

and by 1769 the DeLanceys had regained control of the assembly.

Dispirited by his political defeats, Livingston moved in May 1772 to his country house "Liberty Hall" near Elizabethtown, New Jersey. He quickly became a member of the local committee of correspondence and was sent by New Jersey to the first Continental Congress, serving until 5 June 1776. On that date, he took command of the state's militia as brigadier general and resigned on 31 August 1776 upon his election as the state's first governor. He held this post for fourteen trying and violent years. George Washington held Livingston to be the most reliable governor during the Revolution, doing the most to mobilize his state and aid the Continental army. Livingston was a bitter enemy of the Loyalists, who returned the sentiment by attempted to assassinate him on several occasions. Extremely popular with the common people, Livingston worked to redistribute Loyalist land to the poor and was an early opponent of slavery. He attended the Constitutional

Livingston Family of New York

Convention in 1787 and was influential in its ratification in his state on 25 July 1790.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress*.

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LIVINGSTON FAMILY OF NEW YORK. The founder of the family in America was the son of a vigorous Scottish minister, John Livingston, who in 1663 took his family to Rotterdam. Here young Robert Livingston became as fluent in Dutch as he was in English, and when he appeared in Albany in 1674, the year the colony of New York passed from Dutch to English control, he quickly became a success in that hybrid society. His marriage in 1679 to Alida Schuyler, widow of Nicholas Van Rensselaer and sister of Peter Schuyler, brought him social connections with two of the most important families in the province. He established the 160,000-acre manor of Livingston on the east side of the Hudson below Albany (in the present counties of Dutchess and Columbia), and left it to his son Philip. His younger son, Robert, received 13,000 acres at an estate called Clermont. These two sons and their descendants built on the fame and fortune of their father to become a dominant force in New York and beyond.

SEE ALSO *Livingston, Abraham; Livingston, Henry Beekman; Livingston, Henry Brockholst; Livingston, James; Livingston, Philip; Livingston, Richard; Livingston, Robert R.; Livingston, William; Schuyler Family of New York; Van Rensselaer Family of New York*.

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LIVIVS, PETER. (1739–1795). Canadian jurist. Born in Lisbon, Portugal, on 12 July 1739, he settled in New Hampshire in 1763. The following year Livius was given an honorary master of arts degree by Harvard in return for a large donation of books. He was appointed to the governor’s council in 1765 and was made a judge of the court of common pleas in 1768. In the latter position he came into conflict with Governor Benning Wentworth, who found him too sympathetic to the Patriots and finally succeeded in removing him from the bench in 1772. Livius went to England to defend himself and to regain his seat as a judge. He failed in this effort, but in response to a gift, gained admission to the Royal Society, studied law at the Middle Temple, and received an honorary degree from Oxford University.

Finally winning the ear of Lord Dartmouth, the secretary of state for the American colonies, Livius was appointed to the vice-admiralty court in Montreal. He arrived in Quebec just in time to see service during the siege. In August 1776 he was made chief justice of Quebec and appointed to the council. Without official approval, he wrote General John Sullivan suggesting that Sullivan switch to the British side and help in capturing New Hampshire. Publication of this letter proved an embarrassment to the British and led to the confiscation of all Livius’s property by the New Hampshire legislature. Over the next year Livius’s relations with Governor Guy Carleton became increasingly bitter as the chief justice called for the introduction of habeas corpus into Quebec, which was allowed for in the governor’s instructions. On 1 May 1778, Carleton summarily dismissed him from the bench. Livius again went to England to regain a judgeship, persuading the Privy Council to restore him to the bench in March 1779. But he refused to go to Quebec until receiving assurances that he would not once more be removed from office, assurances the Privy Council would not give. As a consequence, he was removed from office in 1786 without having left England. He died near Brighton on 23 July 1795.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

LLOYD'S NECK, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK. 5 September 1779. With 150 dismounted dragoons, Major Benjamin Tallmadge left Shippan Point, near Stamford, Connecticut, and surprised 500 Tories at this place (due south of Stamford). He returned before dawn on the 6th with most of the garrison as prisoners and without having lost a man.

Mark M. Boatner

LOCHRY'S DEFEAT, OHIO RIVER.

24 August 1781. In 1781 Virginia state Brigadier General George Rogers Clark assembled four hundred of his men at Wheeling and started down the Ohio River, hoping to capture Detroit. Most Pennsylvanians were reluctant to participate in the operation and suspected that it was merely an effort by Virginia to extend its claims on disputed lands. Colonel Archibald Lochry, who commanded the Westmoreland County militia, was an exception, and on 23 June he set about collecting a detachment to join Clark. Clark headed for Kaskaskia on 8 August and the next day sent instructions back to Lochry to join him there. Meanwhile Joseph Brant, who earlier had been fighting Colonel Marinus Willett in the Mohawk Valley, was now sent from Detroit with a mixed force of Indians and Loyalists to intercept Clark. Lochry sent a small party ahead of his 107-man force to ask Clark to wait until he could catch up.

Brant reached the Ohio River near the mouth of the Big Miami with his thirty-man vanguard just as the last of Clark's boats were passing out of sight, but in time to capture Lochry's messengers. Another sixty Indians arrived to join Brant before Lochry approached on 24 August. Using the information and one of the captives as a decoy, Brant set up an ambush. Although numbers were about equal, the Pennsylvanians were caught completely by surprise. The Americans had five officers and thirty-six privates killed, twelve officers and forty-eight privates captured. Some of the prisoners, including Lochry, were killed, but at least half eventually returned to Pennsylvania.

SEE ALSO *Brant, Joseph; Clark, George Rogers; Western Operations.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

LOGAN. (1725?–1780). Indian leader in British service. Soyechtowa was probably born at the village of Shamokin, Pennsylvania, in 1725. He was the son of an Oneida chief named Shikellamy. As a young man he took the name of a close friend of his father's, James Logan (1674–1751), who was secretary to William Penn. Sometime in the 1760s Logan led his family and some followers to the upper Ohio River, where they settled outside the authority of the Iroquois Confederacy. In this new location, Logan's people became known as Mingoos. Unfortunately for these Indians, they lived in an area claimed by both Pennsylvania and Virginia. The latter state tried to make good on its claim by instigating an Indian war, assuming that the settlers would turn to the more bellicose province of Virginia for protection, rather than to the more pacifist Pennsylvania.

In the resulting conflict, known as Dunmore's War, 1774, a group of whites led by Michael Cresap attacked the Mingoos, even though they had a long history of friendship with the settlers. Thirteen unarmed Mingoos were killed. The massacre started the desired war, with Logan proving a particularly relentless enemy, taking at least 13 scalps in retribution. Logan's powerfully defiant response to Dunmore's eventual call for peace was made famous by Thomas Jefferson in his *Notes on the State of Virginia* (first published in Paris in 1787, reprinted in the United States at various times, beginning in 1800):

I appeal to any white man to say if ever he entered Logan's cabin hungry, and he gave him not meat; if he ever came cold and naked and he clothed him not. During the last long and bloody war [the Seven Years' War], Logan remained quiet in his cabin, an advocate for peace. Such was my love for the whites, that my countrymen as they passed, said "Logan is the friend of white men." I had even thought to live with you, but for the injuries of one man, Colonel Cresap, who the last spring, in cold blood and unprovoked, murdered all the relations of Logan, not sparing even my women and children. There runs not a drop of my blood in the veins of any living creature. This called on me for revenge. I have sought it; I have killed many; I have fully glutted my vengeance. For my country, I rejoice at the beams of peace. But do not harbor a thought that mine is the joy of fear. Logan never felt fear. He will not turn on his heel to save his life. Who is there to mourn for Logan? Not one!

The authenticity of Logan's message remains hotly contested.

When the Revolution started, Logan was fifty years old and treating his despair with alcohol. He sided with the British, but his role in the war was limited to his part in saving the life of Simon Kenton. He managed this by

London Trading

prevailing on a Canadian trader named Peter Druyer to ransom the condemned frontiersman and turn him over to the British at Detroit. A year later, in 1780, Logan was killed by a nephew during an argument.

SEE ALSO *Dunmore's (or Cresap's) War*; *Kenton, Simon*.

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LONDON TRADING. As soon as the British captured New York City in September 1776, they sought to renew the coastal trade that had helped to provision the city during colonial times. Procuring provision locally would reduce the strain on their trans-Atlantic logistical lifelines, and would have the added benefit of reminding Americans that the consumer goods they had learned to enjoy could still be best obtained from British sources. "London trading," as this brisk business was called, thus simultaneously helped to sustain the British forces and to tempt Americans to return to the empire. Writing in the mid-1800s about this trade, Benson J. Lossing remarks: "From almost every inlet from New London [Connecticut] to Shrewsbury (New Jersey), light boats, freighted with provisions, darted across to the islands [Staten and Long Islands], or to British vessels anchored in the channels" (*Pictorial Field Book*, v.2, p. 851). The Americans responded by trying to interdict the trade, an effort that led to the phenomenon known as "whaleboat warfare," in which Adam Hyler was prominent.

SEE ALSO *Hyler, Adam*; *Whaleboat Warfare*.

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LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK. August 1777. In conjunction with Sullivan's raid to Staten Island on 22 August 1777, General Samuel H. Parsons attacked Setauket, which was defended by 150 Tories of De Lancey's regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Richard

Hewlett. The attack was repulsed "after a brisk cannonade and five hours' perseverance," noted Sir Henry Clinton.

SEE ALSO *Alexander, William*; *Clinton, Henry*; *Cornwallis, Charles*; *Grant, James*; *Heister, Leopold Philip von*; *Howe, Richard*; *Howe, William*; *Jamaica Pass*; *New York Campaign*; *Parsons, Samuel Holden*; *Putnam, Israel*.

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LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK. 10 December 1777. During the course of 1777 Brigadier General Samuel Holden Parsons launched three different raids on Loyalist strongholds on eastern Long Island. Sag Harbor was successfully attacked in May, Setauket unsuccessfully in August. The final effort came in December on the heels of Burgoyne's surrender and the British withdrawal from the Hudson Highlands. Colonel Samuel B. Webb (a former aide of Washington) embarked about four hundred men, mostly from his own Additional Continental Regiment, on the Connecticut state navy's six-gun sloop *Schuyler* (Lieutenant John Kerr) and three other vessels and set out on 9 December from Norwalk, Connecticut, to attack Setauket. During the night the vessels became separated by rough seas, and the *Schuyler* was spotted at dawn off Old Man's Harbor by the Royal Navy's sloop of war *Falcon* (sixteen guns; Lieutenant Harry Harmood). The *Schuyler* tried to run ashore but was grounded two hundred yards out and had to surrender. Webb and sixty-four other men were captured; Lieutenant Kerr and four others escaped.

SEE ALSO *Staten Island, New York*.


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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK, BATTLE OF. 27 August 1776. The Battle of



THE GALE GROUP.

Long Island, known since the late twentieth century as the Battle of Brooklyn, was the largest engagement of the American Revolution, in which nearly twenty thousand British troops, including Scottish and Hessian auxiliaries, supported by an armada of thirty warships, took to the field against nine thousand Americans. Brooklyn in 1776 was the name of a township and a village in Kings County. The modern name for the battle specifies its location on western Long Island while conveying that the battle unfolded across the entire area of the modern borough of Brooklyn.

Strictly speaking, the Battle of Brooklyn was also the first battle in U.S. history, because it occurred just eight weeks after the Continental Congress had issued the Declaration of Independence, on 4 July. Despite the efforts of Walt Whitman and other Long Island natives to enshrine the battle as a sacred milestone on the road to American independence, these distinctions—first battle, largest battle—are little known to the general public. The American defeat on Long Island and the series of retreats that constituted the New York campaign have tended to be overshadowed by clear-cut victories in the canonical story of the Revolution.

The Battle of Brooklyn revealed the inexperience of George Washington and his generals, their inability to deploy troops effectively on a large scale and to anticipate, interpret, and counter the enemy's tactics. After

losing the battle, they were forced to flee Brooklyn Heights, the key piece of ground overlooking and commanding New York, America's second largest city, which soon had to be abandoned to the British. Nonetheless, the battle that threatened to end the American Revolution at a stroke was neither the catastrophic American defeat nor the resounding British victory it might have been. Moreover, Major General William Howe's decision to engage the Americans on Long Island—instead of cutting them off by seizing the Kings Bridge at the northern tip of Manhattan—was “a grave mistake of strategy” (Keegan, p.164). This mistake set the pattern for the rest of the fighting in New York: the Americans escaped several British attempts to encircle them and enough of the army survived to carry on the war for seven more years.

INVASION OF LONG ISLAND

Having arrived in New York from Halifax at the end of June 1776 and established his base on Staten Island, the British commander in chief, Major General William Howe, spent much of the summer amassing an invasion force of twenty-four thousand ground troops, about one-third of them Hessian auxiliaries under Major General Leopold Philip von Heister, and building wooden landing craft with hinged, flat bows that became ramps for amphibious operations. Colonel Edward Hand's Pennsylvania

riflemen, patrolling the Long Island shore, were the first to detect the preparations for the British assault. "At least fourteen sail of transports, some of them crowded with men, now under sail, and more, from the noise, are hoisting anchor," Hand reported on the afternoon of 21 August.

Between 9 A.M. and noon the following day, Vice Admiral Richard Lord Howe, the general's brother and co-commander in chief, stood on the deck of his flagship, the *Eagle*, supervising the invasion—the landing of fifteen thousand troops on the shore of Gravesend Bay. A corps of four thousand troops under Major Generals Henry Clinton and Charles Lord Cornwallis was the first to wade ashore, while successive waves of landing craft swept in behind them, depositing more men, baggage, supplies, wagons, horses, and forty pieces of artillery on Long Island. Admiral Howe's secretary described the operation, involving a flotilla of more than four hundred vessels on a clear, bright morning, as "one of the finest & most picturesque Scenes that the Imagination can fancy or the eye behold."

The frigates *Phoenix*, *Rose*, and *Greyhound* aimed their broadsides at the shore, while two bomb vessels, *Carcass* and *Thunder*, also stood by, equipped with mortars that could pitch explosive shells in a high arc over the invasion force and onto the shore. Rather than contest the landing, Hand and his three hundred riflemen fell back to the wooded ridge called Gowanus Heights, where the Americans intended to make their stand. General Howe's army encamped in an eight-mile arc, occupying southern Kings County in a line roughly parallel to the American positions on Gowanus Heights to the north.

AMERICAN DEFENSES

Cornwallis was sent forward with a substantial detachment of men and six fieldpieces to seize the village of Flatbush and probe the Flatbush Pass, the center of the Americans' outer line of defense on Gowanus Heights. The inner line was two miles to the north, a chain of forts, redoubts, and connecting trenches that sealed off the Brooklyn Heights peninsula, protecting the vital ground where American artillery commanded New York City, just across the East River. To attack the American fortifications at the base of the peninsula, the British would have to go through one of the four passes where roads crossed Gowanus Heights through its natural depressions—from west to east, the Martense Lane, Flatbush, Bedford, and Jamaica passes.

Major General Charles Lee had called for the construction of forts on Brooklyn Heights, and after his departure for Charleston in March, Major General Nathanael Greene had cordoned off the peninsula to protect those forts from the rear. Major General John

Sullivan, who succeeded Greene when he fell ill with camp fever on 15 August, realized that Gowanus Heights offered the Americans a tremendous advantage, an opportunity to ambush the more powerful British army. Sullivan stationed eight hundred men at each of the three westernmost passes, where they cut down trees for roadblocks, threw up breastworks, and mounted artillery. However, Sullivan neglected to fortify the more distant Jamaica Pass, a ravine four miles from the Brooklyn Heights defenses on the far end of the American left wing.

WASHINGTON SUSPECTS A FEINT

On the morning of 22 August, Washington received reports at his headquarters in Manhattan that eight thousand British troops had landed on Long Island, a figure probably based on the assumption that Cornwallis's detachment was the entire invasion force. Since reports from Staten Island the night before had predicted an attack with twenty thousand men "on Long Island and up the North River," Washington assumed the landing of the eight thousand on Long Island was a feint and that the remaining twelve thousand troops were still on transports, ready to land at the Kings Bridge and move south to take New York City. Washington assumed that Howe would try to cut him off from the mainland by seizing the Kings Bridge along with the Freebridge, Manhattan's only links to the mainland, across the Harlem River. Accordingly, Washington sent only six regiments to reinforce Sullivan on Long Island. Sullivan's troops spent a sleepless night on the 22nd, bracing for an attack that never came.

Howe's second-in-command, General Henry Clinton, had strongly urged him to land in lower Westchester County or northern Manhattan to trap the Americans, but Howe had several reasons for taking Long Island first. Most important, Howe intended to drive the Americans off Brooklyn Heights and prevent a repetition of the events in Boston, where American artillery placed on Dorchester Heights had forced the British to abandon the city. Second, while New York City would house the occupying army, Long Island's farms would feed its men and horses. Finally, Howe expected strong Loyalist support when his forces arrived in Kings and Queens Counties.

Much to Washington's consternation, on 23 August his troops provoked ongoing skirmishing on Long Island, which he considered a waste of ammunition and a distraction that might mask the beginning of the enemy's main offensive. American troops stationed in the Flatbush Pass attacked the Hessian guards posted just north of Cornwallis's camp in Flatbush village. The Americans drove the Hessian sentries back toward the village, burned several houses where they had established outposts, and dragged at least one corpse back to the hills as evidence of

contact with these German auxiliaries, whose fearsome reputation preceded them. In the afternoon, the Forty-second Scottish Highlanders brought up two cannon from the village and mounted them on a breastwork across the Flatbush Road, and an exchange of artillery fire lasted for the rest of the day. All of this activity at the center of the American line on Gowanus Heights would indeed prove to be a distraction and would help conceal British intentions.

Washington began taking daily trips to Long Island in order to assess the situation. Still suspecting that the Gravesend landing was a diversion, he moved a thousand men from the Kings Bridge about halfway down the west side of Manhattan with orders to fend off a possible British landing at Bloomingdale village and remain ready to move forward to Brooklyn or back to the Kings Bridge. The arrival of new militia units from Connecticut prompted Washington to send four more regiments to Sullivan on Long Island, but with the proviso that they had to return immediately if Admiral Howe's fleet sailed up to attack the city. Admiral Howe's ships had been trying to enter the East River and bombard the Brooklyn Heights forts, but the wind was against them. The ships had succeeded only in trading cannon fire with the battery at Red Hook, which guarded the Buttermilk Channel between Governors Island and the Brooklyn shore.

On 25 August, the British landed some forty-three hundred Hessians under General von Heister on Long Island, bringing Howe's troop strength to nearly twenty-thousand. Washington no longer doubted that "they mean to land the Main Body of their Army on Long Island, and make their grand push there," and he sent over six more regiments from Manhattan, bringing the American total to almost nine thousand troops (Manders, p. 36). However, most of Washington's regiments were reduced by camp fever to about three-quarters of their full strength, and Howe's troops outnumbered the Americans by more than two to one. The three thousand American troops stationed outside the lines, on Gowanus Heights, were outnumbered by almost seven to one.

With nearly half the army concentrated on Long Island, Washington granted Major General Israel Putnam's request to assume command there. Putnam, as one of the original five major generals appointed by Congress and Washington's highest-ranking subordinate in New York, was entitled to the post. Washington took the command away from Sullivan but adopted his plan to ambush the British at Gowanus Heights as the main strategy for the coming battle. Washington ordered Putnam to deploy his best units to stop the British at the passes and keep them from ever reaching the fortifications across the neck of the peninsula.


THE AMERICANS' LEFT WING VULNERABLE

Putnam directed the entire Long Island operation from his headquarters inside the American lines on Brooklyn Heights. His orders called for about eight hundred men at each of the three western passes and three hundred more in the woods just north of Gowanus Creek, protecting the gap between Red Hook and the western end of the American lines. On 26 August, the eve of the battle, Brigadier General Samuel Holden Parsons was in overall command of the Gowanus Heights deployments. Major General William Alexander, known as Lord Stirling because of his claim to a lapsed Scottish peerage, commanded the American right wing—the Gowanus Road and Martense Lane Pass. Sullivan was in charge of the left and center, which included the Bedford and Flatbush passes.

On the American left wing, in the east, Colonel Samuel Miles patrolled the ridge between the Bedford and Jamaica passes with two battalions of Pennsylvania riflemen. According to Parsons, Miles was "to watch the motion of the enemy on that part, with orders to keep a party constantly reconnoitering to and across the Jamaica Road." Along this six-mile ridge, from one end of Gowanus Heights to the other, "sentinels were so placed as to keep a constant communication between the three guards on the three roads" (Johnston, p. 35).

Miles learned from his scouts that large numbers of British troops were concealed to the south, in particular a contingent at Flatlands (the easternmost village occupied by the British) that could easily march through the Jamaica Pass. Miles also noted that Cornwallis had moved all of his troops out of Flatbush to Flatlands and replaced them with Hessians, revealing that the principal attack would not be at the center, as expected, but farther east. According to Miles, he informed Sullivan of the situation, but nothing was done. For his part, Sullivan pleaded a lack of troops and claimed his own warnings about the Jamaica Pass were ignored by his superiors. He resorted to spending a large sum of his own money, he wrote, to have five officers on horseback patrol the pass at night. Sullivan ordered his scouts to gallop back and alert Miles if the British arrived at the Jamaica Pass. Miles and his riflemen, facing south on the ridge, were to turn east to the Jamaica Road and stall the British advance until more troops could be shifted to that sector.

The lack of cavalry stemmed in part from Washington's decision to turn away a unit from Connecticut because he did not want the burden of feeding its four hundred horses, and the men refused to serve without them. To Washington's annoyance, the cavalry from Kings County was busy helping Brigadier General Nathaniel Woodhull, the commander of the Queens and Suffolk County militias, with a last-minute effort to drive



THE GALE GROUP.

all the remaining horses, cattle, and sheep on western Long Island east to Hempstead Plains away from the British army. Washington had warned New York's revolutionary government, the Provincial Congress, to complete this task earlier in the summer.

Washington came over from Manhattan to inspect the lines on Long Island with an entourage including Putnam, Sullivan, and other officers on the evening of 26 August, but he failed to put enough men on the left flank. It remains unclear whether or not Washington fully inspected and approved the disposition of the troops on Gowanus Heights before he returned to Manhattan on the evening of the 26th. In any event, Washington and his generals' "want of experience to move upon a large scale," which he had confessed in a letter to Congress in June, clearly affected his appraisal of the situation. The reshuffling of British troops at Flatbush was clearly visible through spyglasses and signaled a flanking maneuver to the east, but Washington merely concluded that the enemy "would in a little time make a general attack."

THE BRITISH NIGHT MARCH

The British plan to seize the Jamaica Pass was the work of General Clinton, whose views generally were not well received at headquarters. Howe, as commander in chief, would ultimately bear full responsibility for the bold, risky proposals of his second-in-command and therefore resented his zealous persistence. Howe had ignored

Clinton's advice about landing at the Kings Bridge, and the two men had not been on speaking terms since their arrival on Long Island. Clinton—who knew Long Island well, since he had grown up in New York when his father was the royal governor—refreshed his memory with an extensive reconnaissance mission on the 24th. On the 25th, Clinton offered Howe, through an intermediary, a plan to encircle the Americans on Gowanus Heights by marching at night through the Jamaica Pass. British forces in front of the ridge were to distract the Americans from the flanking column and then press forward in earnest when the encirclement was complete.

Since a British column of more than ten thousand troops would have to travel six miles through enemy territory in the pitch dark, an ambush seemed likely, and Major General James Grant preferred simply to smash his way through the nearby passes. He had fought in America during the French and Indian War and had recently declared in Parliament that with a mere five thousand troops he could march the entire length of the continent and the rebels would be helpless to stop him. General Howe initially agreed with Grant. However, on the 26th, Oliver De Lancey, a New York Loyalist, convinced Howe that with the help of local guides, the mission would succeed. Howe ordered Clinton to go ahead with his plan that evening.

At 8 P.M. on the 26th, a column of about four thousand troops led by Clinton and Cornwallis left

Flatlands with fourteen pieces of field artillery in tow. Clinton left campfires burning and assigned an entire regiment to make ordinary campground sounds in order to mask his intentions and the noise of the advance corps. The British remained on edge during the entire march but encountered no resistance. General Woodhull and his militia had been driving cattle only hours earlier in some fields along Clinton's route and might have spoiled his plans, but they were two miles to the east, along the county line, by the time the British passed that point.

At about 2 A.M. the column approached the Jamaica Pass, and Clinton sent forward a detachment that captured the five mounted officers posted there by Sullivan. Still wary of an ambush at the pass, Clinton seized the local tavern and forced its owner, William Howard, to guide a British patrol across the ridge by a footpath that would allow them to inspect the Jamaica Pass without going through it. At dawn, after the patrol had arrived at the Jamaica Road on the far side of the ridge, Clinton sent his whole force forward to occupy the pass itself.

Two hours later, Clinton was joined by General Howe and an additional six thousand troops. Howe had left Flatlands at midnight, leading a column that stretched for two miles, slowly hauling supplies and fourteen more cannon, but the Americans did not ambush him, either. By capturing civilians and American scouts along their path, the British had silenced them and preserved the element of surprise. The tired soldiers rested briefly, ate a cold breakfast, and set off on the final leg of the grueling march, along the Jamaica Road to the village of Bedford.

DIVERSION ON BRITISH LEFT

Clinton's plan called for General Grant, on the British left wing, and General von Heister at Flatbush in the center, to distract the Americans from the movements of the British flanking column at the Jamaica Pass. During the night, Grant had proceeded up the Gowanus Road toward the Martense Lane Pass with five thousand troops, including two companies of Long Island Tories. At 11 P.M. Edward Hand's riflemen fired on two of Grant's scouts, who had stopped to sample the watermelons growing near the Red Lion Inn at the junction of the Gowanus Road and the Martense Lane Pass. The scouts retreated, and Grant restrained his troops, preferring to hang back and monitor the American position at the inn for the next few hours. Hand's seasoned riflemen were relieved just after midnight, having been on duty for four days straight, and units of new Pennsylvania levies—untested militia—took their place. At about two 2 A.M., when Clinton's advance corps arrived near Howard's House, Grant sent three hundred troops forward to storm the Martense Lane Pass. Major Edward Burd was captured along with a


few of his men, while most of the militia fled up the Gowanus Road.

Burd had managed to dispatch messengers to alert General Putnam, who soon had his troops ready for battle in the trenches and redoubts across the neck of the peninsula. Using signal lights on Brooklyn Heights, Putnam also alerted Washington to come over from Manhattan. Putnam then rode down from Brooklyn Heights to Lord Stirling's camp, next to Nicholas Vechte's farmhouse south of Gowanus Creek. Arriving at about 3 A.M., Putnam called on Stirling to assemble his best units, fend off Grant, and secure the right wing. Stirling marshaled some two thousand men, including troops from Delaware and Pennsylvania along with Colonel William Smallwood's elite Maryland regiment, which was well-trained and -equipped and highly motivated.

General Parsons reached the American right wing ahead of Stirling, however. He found that the British had already come through the woods and were descending the north side of the ridge, apparently marching straight for the neck of the peninsula. Gathering twenty of his fleeing men, Parsons posted them on a hill half a mile in front of the British. Stirling arrived with reinforcements, including a battalion of raw recruits from Pennsylvania under Colonel Samuel Atlee, which quickly occupied a forward position on the left side of a narrow stretch in the road. With the bulk of his men, Stirling formed a line on a piece of high ground behind Atlee. Atlee's unit took the brunt of Grant's fire and lost one man before retreating to a wooded hill on the left, taking up a position flanked by Parsons on one side and the Delaware Continentals, led by Colonel John Haslet, on the other. At around 7 A.M., an American artillery company arrived with two fieldpieces.

Grant drew his forces up in several lines as well, making this the first time during the revolution that the Americans faced the British in regular battle formation in the open field, with only hedges and trees to provide cover. In this sense, the Battle of Brooklyn was the first pitched battle of the war. Unlike Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill, in Brooklyn the Americans did not have the benefit of fortifications or even stone walls. Grant's and Stirling's lines stretched for a quarter of a mile, and—just as Clinton intended—the Americans became convinced that the main British attack would be along the Gowanus Road.

When Grant sent troops forward to attack Stirling's right, the Americans held their ground and opened fire with the two fieldpieces, which drove the British back to their lines. Grant then launched a steady artillery barrage, but the Americans stood firm, despite gruesome casualties. Stirling reportedly told his men about the boast Grant had made in parliament the previous year and exhorted them to show the Englishman he could not even get as far



THE GALE GROUP.

as the millponds behind them with his five thousand men. Unaware of the British flanking column, the Americans on the right wing believed they were fending off the enemy's main thrust.


General Von Heister had agreed to dispatch some Hessian troops westward from Flatbush to link up with Grant, who sent a detachment to look for them. Stirling immediately detected their attempt to join forces and turn his left flank. He ordered Parsons and Atlee to seize the high ground on his left, where they fought off three attacks while losing only a handful of men and inflicting on the British the highest losses in killed and wounded sustained by either side in any sector of the battle. Six miles to the east, however, on the British right wing, the plan to turn the left flank of the entire American army was proceeding smoothly.

HOWE SPRINGS HIS TRAP

Clinton and Howe had marched their column of ten thousand troops through the Jamaica Pass and along the turnpike, reaching the village of Bedford at 9 A.M. The exhausting night march had been well worth the trouble. The British had arrived, apparently undetected, behind the Americans' left and center and were ready to attack. Howe fired two cannon, announcing his arrival to Grant and von Heister on the south side of the ridge and signaling that their function as decoys had ended; they were now to press their attacks in earnest.

The British flanking column had not gone completely undetected. Colonel Miles, guarding the ridge just east of Bedford Pass, was alerted to the British advance along the Jamaica Road by his scouts, and at 7 A.M. he had begun marching east toward the pass with five hundred of his men. Because he was in the woods and the British were on the road, however, Miles passed the front of their column without seeing it and encountered the rear instead. By the time Miles's warning reached Putnam by messenger, Howe's column had arrived at Bedford. The British discovered Miles in the woods before he could retreat, and he was taken prisoner with half of his men while the other half fled back to the forts on the peninsula. The sight of Miles's scattered, fleeing men sowed panic in the American guards at the Bedford Road and further to the west. As the British advanced from the east, more American troops ran for the safety of the fortified lines on Brooklyn Heights. The inner line of defense rapidly became the only one.

Before the British reached the Bedford Pass, the Continentals stationed there had pulled back. Hearing von Heister's artillery in front of them and Howe's signal guns in the rear, they decided not to wait for the trap to close. At the same time, General Sullivan and his men retreated from the Flatbush Pass, and the American center disintegrated. Units from the two passes mingled as they dashed to safety, trying to outrun the British troops dispatched by Cornwallis from the crossroads at Bedford.



THE GALE GROUP.

village. While most of the Americans escaped, some were captured by the British and others were bayoneted by the Hessians, who refused their surrender. The Hessians had been warned that the Americans intended to give them no quarter, according to one British officer, which prompted them to take no prisoners. However, Sullivan, who had stayed behind to ensure an orderly retreat, was captured unharmed in a cornfield by three Hessian grenadiers, suggesting that such lurid tales were exaggerated.

HOWE DECLINES PURSUIT

With hundreds of rebel troops racing through the woods and fields and across Gowanus Creek to reach the forts on the peninsula, and with Cornwallis's grenadiers chasing them right up to the walls, Howe might have won a monumental victory—and probably the war—had he given his troops free rein to storm the American lines. Instead, he repeatedly ordered them to pull back. “Had they been permitted to go on it is my opinion they would have carried the redoubt,” Howe recalled in his official account of the battle:

but as it was apparent that the lines must have been ours at a very cheap rate by regular approaches, I would not risk the loss that might have been sustained in the assault and ordered them back to a hollow way in the front of the works out of the reach of the musketry.

Perhaps because he couldn't bear a repeat of Bunker Hill—where, a year earlier, Americans had held a lightly fortified position and killed or wounded more than one

thousand British troops in a single day—Howe preferred to dig trenches and proceed with a formal siege. Moreover, his troops were exhausted, having marched all night and fought half the morning.

Clinton had disobeyed Howe's orders by allowing Major General John Vaughan and his grenadiers to pursue the fleeing rebels. Howe ordered them to pull back, and Vaughan “stormed with rage” at the lost opportunity. Clinton had hoped the grenadiers would march all the way down the Jamaica Road to the Brooklyn ferry, at which point, “everything on the island must have been ours.” Clinton speculated further that “the entire loss of that army” would have had severe consequences for the American cause “in that early stage of the rebellion.” Clinton's modern biographer, William B. Willcox, was more direct: “Howe lost as good a chance as Britain ever had of winning the war at a stroke” (Clinton, p. 44).

FINAL ACTION: RIGHT WING

With the battle in the center concluded by about 11 A.M., all that remained for the British was to defeat Stirling's forces on the American right, where they remained strongly positioned in the woods near the Gowanus Road. Their position was growing weaker every minute. While Grant pinned the Americans down with an ongoing exchange of artillery fire, von Heister closed in on their left and Cornwallis moved toward their rear. Sensing from the sounds of the battle to the east and the arrival of the Hessians that a trap was closing, Stirling managed to

disengage from Grant, and the crest of the hill temporarily concealed the American retreat.

However, Cornwallis's forces had seized the Vechte farmhouse and were blocking the only escape route over dry land. With Grant closing in on what was now his rear, Stirling ordered his troops to plunge into the marsh on their left and make their way across Gowanus Creek, which was about eighty yards wide along this stretch. The incoming tide created a swift current, and more than a few of the soldiers did not know how to swim.

To shield the fleeing troops from Cornwallis's advance, Stirling took about 250 of his best-trained troops, the Marylanders, and attacked the Vechte farmhouse, where the British had installed themselves and their artillery. The Marylanders formed ranks, charged Cornwallis's position, and fell back into the surrounding woods several times. Major Mordechai Gist recalled that Stirling "encouraged and animated our young soldiers with almost invincible resolution."

Washington and his generals witnessed this sacrificial rearguard action from the Cobble Hill Fort, on a small hill inside the American fortified lines. Washington had remained in New York City until midmorning to contend with a possible attack by part of Admiral Howe's fleet, which had moved up toward the mouth of the East River. With the wind blowing from the north, Washington eventually felt certain the ships would not be able to enter the river, and he had crossed over to Long Island. Tradition holds that when Washington beheld the heroism of Stirling and the Marylanders, he exclaimed with a mixture of admiration and sorrow: "What brave fellows I must lose this day!"

Hopelessly outnumbered and facing a storm of bullets and artillery fire, Gist and Stirling ordered the Marylanders to disperse and save themselves. Gist and eight others escaped across the creek; Stirling, unable to escape, found a way to at least deny the boastful General Grant the satisfaction of capturing him—by surrendering himself to General von Heister. Most of the Marylanders were captured and many were killed in the act of saving hundreds of other Americans: the bulk of the American right wing escaped into the marsh and across Gowanus Creek. After Stirling had disengaged from Grant's forces, Parsons and Atlee found themselves isolated on their hill at the eastern end the line. Retreating from Grant, they were cut off by Cornwallis and could not get to Gowanus Creek. Their men dispersed into the woods and with Atlee, most became prisoners. Parsons hid in a swamp with seven of his men and later reached Brooklyn Heights.

On the evening of 27 August, Washington expected the British to launch a full-scale attack on the fortified lines across the neck of the peninsula. He walked among the troops, alternating between words of encouragement and warnings that any man who abandoned his post

would be shot. At regular intervals along the lines, 120 American grenadiers stood ready with slow matches burning and a half-dozen grenades each in their bags. The British did not attack. Instead, as the sun set and the Americans scanned the plateau, they saw Howe's forces pitch their white tents a mile and a half away and retire for some much needed rest.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Battle of Brooklyn was a disheartening defeat for the Americans, and the failure to secure the Jamaica Pass became the focus of acrimonious debate. "I think the hills might have been well maintained with 5000 men," Brigadier General John Morin Scott wrote to John Jay. "I fear their natural strength was our bane by lulling us into a state of security and enabling the enemy to steal a march on us." General Parsons was more specific in apportioning blame: "I still am of the opinion," Parsons wrote, "if our guards on the West road and Colonel Miles on the East End of the hills had done their duty, the enemy would not have passed those important heights, without such very great loss as would have obliged them to abandon any further enterprise on the Island." Extending this argument, had the Americans held the ridge, and with it Brooklyn Heights, the British might have been forced to leave New York, just as they had been driven out of Boston by the guns on Dorchester Heights. Even the commander in chief was denounced by the rank and file after the disastrous battle: "Would to Heaven General Lee was here, is the language of officers and men," wrote Delaware's Colonel John Haslet.

While these mutual recriminations between the general officers and their subordinates signaled the onset of a severe morale crisis in Washington's army, Howe's incomplete victory on 27 August sowed the seeds of discontent in the British ranks. Had he and his column continued along the Jamaica Road instead of stopping at Bedford and firing the signal guns, Howe probably would have surrounded the American outer lines and cut off every escape route back to Brooklyn Heights. Had he been willing to storm the Brooklyn fortifications when the Americans had initially been routed, he might well have overrun Washington's army. As it was, the bulk of the American forces remained intact inside the Brooklyn Heights defenses.

Howe's official explanation for not storming the lines—that he was protecting his troops—may have been offered to conceal another motive: his reluctance to wipe out the American army. William and Richard Howe's older brother, George, had been killed in the French and Indian War while leading Massachusetts troops, and the younger brothers remained grateful for a marble monument to him in Westminster Abbey funded by the Massachusetts government. Spurred by this bond of friendship with the Americans, Admiral Howe had

convinced the British government to empower him and General Howe not only as co-commanders in chief, but as peace commissioners authorized to negotiate with the rebels. General Howe's restraint at the end of the battle and in the rest of the New York campaign soon suggested to observers at the time on both sides of the Atlantic that he hoped to cow the Americans—not crush them—into submission.

After an army major brought news of Howe's triumph on Long Island to London several weeks later, all of Britain was ecstatic, expecting a prompt end to the war. King George III conferred a knighthood, the Order of Bath, on the commander in chief, henceforth to be known as Sir William. However, the full significance of the battle did not become apparent for several months. By the time the same messenger returned to America in mid-December with reports of British euphoria, the worst repercussions of Howe's failure to win a total victory on Long Island were at hand. The remnants of the American army that slipped through Howe's fingers on Long Island struck back at Trenton and Princeton in late December, reviving the American cause and proving that textbook tactical victories and the conquest of cities were no substitute for capturing or crushing the rebel army.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Howe reported only 61 killed, 267 wounded, and 31 taken prisoner or missing during the Battle of Brooklyn. Even with the Hessian losses—2 killed and 26 wounded—which were routinely excluded from the British figures, all of Howe's forces, by their own accounting, suffered fewer than four hundred casualties. Given the number of Americans who eventually left Long Island after the battle, British estimates of the number of Americans killed or captured—from thirty-three hundred up to four thousand—were clearly exaggerated. Washington initially put his losses at “seven hundred to a thousand killed and taken” and later settled on the figure of eight hundred casualties, “more than three fourths of which were taken prisoners.” Modern authorities agree that Washington was not far off the mark: American losses, they conclude, were close to nine hundred prisoners taken and about two hundred men killed or wounded. The Battle of Brooklyn was not the scene of large-scale slaughter, and while the Americans lost a large number of men as prisoners, the British appear to have suffered a greater loss of men killed and wounded.

SEE ALSO *Parsons, Samuel Holden; Sag Harbor Raid, New York; Webb, Samuel Blatchley.*

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Barnet Schechter

LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK, EVACUATION OF. American evacuation 29–30 August 1776. After the battle of Long Island, on 27 August, the British started formal siege operations against Brooklyn Heights. The north wind that had kept their ships out of the East River on the day of the battle continued to blow, and General George Washington brought reinforcements over from New York City. On the afternoon of 28 August a cold rain began to fall on ground that was already water-soaked, and the demoralized, ill-equipped American troops suffered severely.

The appearance of a redoubt within 600 yards of the American left confirmed Washington's earlier suspicion that the British general, William Howe, was taking his time and did not intend to make an immediate assault on the Brooklyn defenses. Nonetheless, Washington had to cope with the enemy's capability of attacking New York City with fresh troops from Staten Island, as well as the possibility that Howe might trap the Americans by having his ships in Long Island Sound land troops in lower Westchester County to seize the Kings Bridge. After a council of war on the afternoon of 29 August, with unanimous support from his generals, Washington

decided to abandon Long Island and regroup his forces on Manhattan Island.

That morning he had ordered General William Heath and his assistant quartermaster general, Hugh Hughes, to assemble all available boats and move them to the East River by dark. The boats reached Brooklyn Ferry at dusk to supplement the much larger number of boats that the Americans had been using for weeks to move men and supplies across the river. Some accounts imply that only the “miraculous” assembly of boats by Heath and Hughes made the evacuation possible. One historian, Charles Francis Adams, pointed out that Washington was not such an “utter military simpleton” as to “put himself and his army into a most dangerous position depending wholly, or in chief, on some suddenly improvised means of extrication. . . . The mass of what [transportation] was required had already long before been provided” (Adams, p. 42).

To withdraw secretly from Brooklyn Heights and move almost 10,000 inexperienced and demoralized troops across the East River was a military operation to try the skill and courage of veterans. Dusk fell at 7:30, General Alexander McDougall began the embarkation at 8 p.m., and the transfer of troops went well for the first hour. Then the tide reversed direction, flowing south, and the steady wind from the northeast suddenly picked up speed. The American sailboats were nearly swept down to the harbor and the waiting British fleet. The grueling retreat continued with only rowboats until 11 p.m., when the wind began to blow from the southwest. For the next several hours, the water was calm and, as Adams reports, “the boats passed to and fro, favored by a light west breeze, and loaded to the gunwale” (Adams, p. 47).

The only hitch that reportedly took place on Brooklyn Heights occurred when some troops reached the waterfront before their turn to embark and had to be marched back to their posts. This has been dismissed by Douglas Southall Freeman, author of the seven-volume study *George Washington*. However, there was something more to this episode, which might have been fatal. At about 2 a.m. Major Alexander Scammell, then acting as Washington’s aide-de-camp, reported with orders to General Thomas Mifflin, who was commanding the covering force on Brooklyn Heights. (This force was comprised of John Haslet’s Delawares, the remnants of William Smallwood’s Marylanders, John Shee’s and Robert Magaw’s Pennsylvanians, and John Chester’s Connecticut Battalion.) Scammell told Mifflin that his boats were waiting and that Washington wanted him to move immediately to the ferry. Thinking this order premature, Mifflin told Scammell he must be mistaken. Scammell maintained that he was repeating his instructions and that, furthermore, he had already passed them on to other elements of the covering force, which

were then executing them. Mifflin therefore called in the outposts and started moving his troops toward the ferry. When they were well on their way to the landing they met Washington, who accused them of deserting their posts.

“Good God! General Mifflin,” Washington is reported to have said, “I am afraid you have ruined us by so unseasonably withdrawing.”

“I did it by your order,” Mifflin replied.

When it became apparent that Scammell had made a serious mistake, the covering force moved back to their positions, which had been abandoned for nearly an hour. The British were peacefully ignorant of these nocturnal activities. At about 4 a.m. a small British patrol peered into the abandoned forward positions, and half an hour later these were occupied by Howe’s troops. The American rear guard was still at Brooklyn Ferry when the day began to dawn at 4:30 a.m., but a dense fog settled to cover their withdrawal. Among the last to leave was Washington. The evacuation was achieved with the loss of only three stragglers (who had stayed behind to plunder) and five heavy cannon (which could not be manhandled through the hub-deep mud). All other men, artillery, supplies, and horses were safe in New York City by 7 a.m., having been evacuated in eleven hours.

John Glover and Israel Hutchinson’s regiments of Massachusetts fishermen and sailors distinguished themselves in handling the boats that shuttled across the river. There is no report of even a single collision, swamping, or upset, and not one life was lost.

According to Christopher Ward, writing of this event, “Both Howe’s attack [of 27 August] and Washington’s retreat were masterpieces of planning and execution, and each was successful because of the mistakes of the other principal” (Ward, p. 236).

SEE ALSO *Heath, William; Howe, William; McDougall, Alexander.*

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revised by Barnet Schecter

LONG ISLAND OF HOLSTON.

Located on the South Branch of the Holston River at Kingsport, Tennessee, this Long Island figures in the

earliest maps of the “over mountain” settlements. The island was an ancient Cherokee meeting ground and was the site of several treaty signings. One such significant treaty signing brought an end to the Cherokee War of 1776. In that year, Cherokee Chief Dragging Canoe was defeated by American militia at the battle of Long Island Flats. Because of the name of the battle, some sources place the conflict on Long Island itself, whereas, in fact, the Long Island Flats were located across the river, in modern Kingsport. The treaty ending the conflict with the Cherokee, however, was signed on Long Island in 1777.

SEE ALSO *Cherokee War of 1776*.

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revised by **Barnet Schecter**

LONG ISLAND SOUND. With Long Island to the south and Connecticut to the north, the Sound—one hundred miles by twenty miles—figured not only in such regular military operations as Tryon’s Danbury raid, the Connecticut coast raid, and Arnold’s New London raid, but also in the partisan activities known as “whaleboat warfare.”

SEE ALSO *Connecticut Coast Raid; Danbury Raid, Connecticut; New London Raid, Connecticut; Whaleboat Warfare*.

revised by **Michael Bellesiles**

LONGUEUIL, CANADA. Located on the south bank of the St. Lawrence opposite Montreal, this town and La Prairie, ten miles south, were the two main approaches to Montreal from the south. Ethan Allen and John Brown arrived here during Montgomery’s siege of St. Johns and subsequently launched their abortive attack on Montreal on 25 September 1775, in which Brown changed his mind and left Allen unsupported. The main action at Longueuil was on 30 October 1775, when Sir Guy Carleton assembled a force of nearly eight hundred and attempted to relieve St. Johns. The British expedition comprised some of Allan MacLean’s newly raised Royal Highland Emigrants; sixty men of the Royal Fusiliers; a large contingent of Caughnawaga Indians; and mostly Canadian volunteers, both French and English. One contingent of Caughnawagas was led by the notorious St. Luc. The river crossing was

contested by Seth Warner’s Green Mountain Regiment and the Second New York, supported by a four-pounder. Artillery and musket fire drove back the main attacking force. MacLean tried to make a secondary crossing upstream but turned back when he found the site well defended.

When Benedict Arnold led the American garrison out of Montreal after the collapse of the Canada invasion in the summer of 1776, he crossed with his three hundred men to Longueuil. Hotly pursued by Carleton’s forces, he retreated to St. Johns.

SEE ALSO *Montreal (25 September 1775); St. Luc de la Corne, Pierre*.

revised by **Michael Bellesiles**

LORING, JOSHUA. (1744–1789). Loyalist, commissary of prisoners. Massachusetts. Born in Roxbury, Massachusetts, on 1 November 1744, Loring was the son of a British naval officer and privateer of the same name who was one of General Gage’s mandamus councillors. The younger Loring served in the British army for four years. He sold his lieutenant’s commission in 1768 and settled in Boston, having been named to the sinecure of deputy surveyor of the King’s Woods by New Hampshire Governor John Wentworth. Loring sided with the crown during the lead-up to the Revolution, placing such confidence in Britain’s ability to crush the rebellion that he paid five hundred pounds for the office of Suffolk County sheriff in 1775. In March 1776 he left Boston with the British, first for Halifax and then New York, where in early 1777, General William Howe named Loring commissary of prisoners. This remunerative office was undoubtedly obtained through the influence of his unfaithful wife, Elizabeth, who was having a very public affair with General Howe.

The Narrative of Colonel Ethan Allen, published in 1779, made Loring a byword in America for corruption and cruelty. Both British and American officials suspected Loring of profiting excessively from his office, British general James Robertson charging him with billing the government for rations for dead prisoners. Others defended Loring as acting in a professional manner. Returning to England in 1782, Loring sought recompense from the government for the loss of 20,000 acres and property worth over a £1,000; he received £830. He spent the last years of his life in Englefield, Berkshire, where he died on 18 September 1789.

SEE ALSO *Mandamus Councillors*.

revised by **Michael Bellesiles**

LOUDOUN, JOHN CAMPBELL, FOURTH EARL OF. (1705–1782). British general. He entered the army as a cornet in 1727 and succeeded to his title in 1731. He was at Dettingen (1743) and fought against the Jacobites in 1745–1746. In 1755 he reached the rank of major general and in 1756 became titular governor of Virginia, colonel in chief of the new Sixtieth Foot (the Royal Americans) and commander in chief of the British forces in North America. He reached New York on 23 July with a commission urging the wholehearted cooperation of the colonial authorities but found himself confronted with disunity and lack of enthusiasm for the war. Finding provincial soldiers demoralized by defeat and unwilling to accept his authority, he resolved the problem with a mixture of personal tact and a monopoly on munitions. He was less successful with the reluctant colonial governments: his heated insistence on their submission to his commission was entirely understandable but only caused colonial assemblies to fear the imposition of military rule. Militarily, Loudoun was unable to restore the battered reputation of the regular army. His expedition against Louisburg had to be abandoned when the navy was unable to secure local maritime superiority. While he was away Montcalm descended on Fort William Henry and destroyed it. However, Loudoun laid the administrative and logistical foundations for future victory, establishing an efficient commissariat, stockpiles of supplies, and a proper system of supply wagons and boats. Just as significantly, he began the process of creating light infantry units operating with Indian allies. Yet, despite these unobtrusive but critical advances, the spectacular military failures—due partly to meddling by William Pitt—were laid wholly at Loudoun’s door. He was recalled in December 1757.

SEE ALSO *Austrian Succession, War of the; Chatham, William Pitt, First Earl of; Fort William Henry (Fort George), New York; Louisburg, Canada.*

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revised by John Oliphant

LOUISBURG, CANADA. Erected at enormous expense by the French beginning in 1720, this powerful fortress on the eastern shore of Cape Breton

Island was second only to Quebec City in importance during the French regime. It guarded the approaches to the St. Lawrence and was the center of the cod fisheries. Captured in June 1745 by a force of New England colonists led by William Pepperrell, with the support of a British squadron under Peter Warren, it was returned to France by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, to the intense resentment of the British colonists. A British expeditionary force under Jeffery Amherst recaptured it in July 1758. The English spelling is Louisburg, but some writers favor Louisbourg, the French spelling.

SEE ALSO *Amherst, Jeffery (1717–1797); Colonial Wars; Pepperrell, Sir William; Shirley, William.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

LOUIS XVI IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. Louis XVI came to the French throne in 1774 at age nineteen with a determination to reestablish France’s position as the premier monarchy of Europe; regain the monarch’s authority as “most Christian majesty”; and overcome France’s disastrous losses to England in the Seven Years’ War, albeit with a hesitation to undertake outright warfare. Turgot, his comptroller-general of finances from 1774 to 1776, was initially a restraining influence on the more aggressive plans of foreign minister Vergennes. Louis, however, convinced by Vergennes that Anglo-American reconciliation might threaten its valuable West Indies colonies, decided to assist the Americans minimally. His goals were to exhaust the English and to keep the Americans involved in their differences with England, providing a small amount of aid that would keep them engaged in the conflict without developing American resentment toward the French.

Louis hesitated to commit to formal alliance and American independence until news of Germantown and Saratoga in 1777 led him to fear Anglo-America rapprochement. The alliance treaties followed quickly in March 1778, and with them openly declared conflict. Congress responded by proclaiming Louis “defender of the rights of mankind.” Louis’s support of the Americans was part of a larger strategic policy in which France sought to determine the balance of power partly by becoming a commercial and diplomatic patron of weaker monarchies and republics, including the United States, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and some independent German states. The resulting financial burdens were compounded by the global extent of the war from 1778 to 1783 and the refinance of France’s existing debt. Unable to reform

France's financial system, Louis begrudgingly accepted a series of political reforms in the 1780s that put him between irreconcilable domestic forces. Yet without Louis's assistance—first through secret aid like that funneled through Hortalez & Cie, and later through open aid under the French alliance—it is doubtful the Americans could have won.

SEE ALSO *French Alliance; Hortalez & Cie; Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Comte de.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

LOVELL, JAMES. (1737–1814). Continental Congressman. Massachusetts. Born in Boston on 31 October 1737, James Lovell graduated from Harvard in 1756, having become an accomplished linguist and mathematician. He became an instructor under his father (John Lovell) in the South Grammar (now Boston Latin) School. During these years his reputation as an orator increased, and in 1771 he was chosen to deliver the first commemorative speech on the Boston Massacre. This widely reprinted speech made him a well known Patriot figure. The school was closed by the British on 19 April 1775, even though the senior Lovell was a Loyalist.

James Lovell was arrested for spying on 27 June 1775 and was confined in the Provost's Prison. When the British evacuated Boston in March 1776, they took Lovell with them to Halifax, where he shared a cell with Ethan Allen. Lovell was exchanged for Colonel Philip Skene in November 1776 and returned to a welcoming Boston. A few days later, he was sent to the Continental Congress, taking his seat on 4 February 1777 and serving until April 1782. Lovell worked nearly as hard in Congress as his cousin, John Adams, serving on numerous committees and editing the *Journals of the Congress* for publication. He conducted very important work on the Committee for Foreign Affairs, including developing the cipher used by

American agents abroad and acted as Congress's French translator. In addition, he played an active role in practically all the controversies of the Congress, including the Deane affair, in which Silas Deane faced charges ranging from profiteering to treason, and the Conway cabal, in which a group of Continental officers sought to replace Washington as commander in chief. A fervid admirer of General Horatio Gates, Lovell was a sarcastic critic of General George Washington. He took Gates's side in his quarrel with General Philip Schuyler, and encouraged Gates to deal directly with Congress, going over Washington's head. A scandal over indiscreet letters to Abigail Adams and a possible affair with his landlady led Lovell to resign from Congress in 1782. He returned to Boston to serve as receiver of Continental taxes. He became customs collector for the state in 1788, and in 1789 was appointed naval officer for Boston and Charlestown. His son was also named James Lovell, and served as a Continental officer. The senior James Lovell died in Windham, Maine, on 14 July 1814.

SEE ALSO *Conway Cabal; Lovell, John.*

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LOVELL, JAMES, JR. (1758–1850). Continental officer. Massachusetts. Son of James Lovell, he graduated from Harvard in 1776 and became an ensign in Henry Lee's Continental Regiment, 25 May 1777. Named regimental adjutant on 10 May 1778, he transferred to Henry Jackson's Massachusetts Regiment on 22 April 1779 as adjutant. In March 1780 he transferred to Lee's Battalion of Light Dragoons and was adjutant until the end of the war.

SEE ALSO *Lovell, James.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

LOVELL, JOHN. (1710–1778). Loyalist. Massachusetts. Born in Boston on 1 April 1710, Lovell graduated from Harvard in 1728 and became an usher of the South Grammar (later Boston Latin) School the next year. In 1734 he was named headmaster and continued in this post until the British military authorities closed

Loyal American Rangers

the school on 19 April 1775. Over the years he taught many boys who would later become leaders of the Revolutionary struggle, including Samuel Adams, Robert Treat Paine, John Hancock, and Henry Knox. When the British withdrew to Nova Scotia in March 1776, he chose loyalty to the crown and followed them to Halifax, where he died two years later. His son James, who chose the other side, was held prisoner there briefly by the British in 1776.

SEE ALSO *Lovell, James*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

LOYAL AMERICAN RANGERS.

Raised in New York by Major William Odell in late 1780 from among Continental army prisoners and deserters, this Provincial regiment was sent to Jamaica in January 1781. It was to be sent to help defend Pensacola, but that town surrendered to the Spanish on 9 May before the regiment arrived. A detachment was later sent to raid Black River, Honduras, in August 1782. After Odell's death on 6 January 1783, the regiment was merged with the duke of Cumberland's regiment.

SEE ALSO *Honduras; Odell, William*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

LOYAL AMERICANS. This Provincial regiment was raised by Beverley Robinson in New York City in the spring of 1777. It was recruited largely from among his tenants and followers, who had fled from his estates in the Hudson Valley. It took part in Sir Henry Clinton's expedition to the Highlands, where Robinson led it with distinction in the capture of Fort Montgomery on 6 October 1777. A detachment was part of the garrison that was surprised and captured at Stony Point, New York, on 16 July 1779. The regiment went from New York to Virginia with Benedict Arnold on 20 December 1780, returning in June 1781, and it went with Arnold again to raid New London, Connecticut, on 6 September. It evacuated to Nova Scotia in 1783, where it was disbanded.

SEE ALSO *Clinton's Expedition; Connecticut Raid; Robinson, Beverley; Stony Point, New York; Virginia, Military Operations in; New London Raid, Connecticut*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

LOYALISTS. Histories of the Loyalists fall into two groups. The first and older tradition, flourishing from the Revolution itself until the World War II, considered them to have been a force unto themselves, a phalanx of conservative colonists committed to values of order, subordination, and imperial ambition who bravely stood athwart the libertarian, egalitarian, middle-class aspirations of their Patriot antagonists. Since 1945, historians of the Loyalists have situated them within, rather than athwart, the Revolution, recognizing that with a few notable exceptions, the so-called Tories were in fact Whiggish in their understanding of the British Constitution and reluctantly unwilling to embrace actual independence under republican government when those realities descended on them sometime between 1774 and 1777.

Generations of nineteenth-century American schoolchildren were taught that if anything during the American Revolution was lower than a British regular or a Hessian it was a Tory or Loyalist. What good could possibly be said about a native-born American who sided with the British? With the publication of Claude H. Van Tyne's *Loyalists in the American Revolution* in 1902, a revisionist trend got under way that tended to glorify Loyalists as honorable people victimized by diabolical mobs. This tendency was epitomized in the works of Kenneth Roberts, particularly in *Oliver Wiswell* (1940). The truth lies somewhere in between; this article will not presume to say just where but, rather, will attempt to outline the views of historical authorities.

CHARACTERIZING THE TORIES

Here, for a starter, is the statement of Canadian historian Henry Smith Williams:

It is but truth to say the loyalists . . . were the makers of Canada. They were an army of leaders.



Loyalist Uniform Button. This button, decorated with a crown and the letters RP (Royal Provincials), adorned a uniform worn by a North Carolina Loyalist who served King George III during the American Revolution. © TED SPIEGEL/CORBIS.

The most influential judges, the most distinguished lawyers, the most capable and prominent physicians, the most highly educated clergy, the members of the council of various colonies, the crown officials, the people of culture and social distinction—these . . . were the loyalists. Canada owes deep gratitude to her southern kinsmen, who thus, from Maine to Georgia, picked out their choicest spirits, and sent them forth to people our northern wilds. (Steele, *American Campaigns*, p. 12).

Van Tyne gives an interesting breakdown of the categories of Tories before the arrival of Gage in Boston: (1) officeholders, whose income was at stake; (2) “those gregarious persons whose friends were among the official class”; (3) Anglican clergymen, many of whom had motives similar to those of the crown officials; (4) “conservative people of all classes, who glided easily in the old channels”; (5) “dynastic” Tories who believed in kings; (6) “legality” Tories who thought Parliament had a right to tax; (7) religious Tories, whose dogma was “Fear God and honor the King”; and (8) “factional” Tories whose action

was determined by family friends and old political animosities. The De Lanceys in New York became Loyalists because Livingstons were Whigs. Christopher Sower in Pennsylvania embraced the opposition primarily because the Patriot leadership of his region represented the critics of his family and religious sect. The antipathy of the Otises toward British authority stemmed from a personal animosity toward Governor Bernard.

Yet the Loyalists showed a peculiar inability to organize. “It is not far wrong to say that a genuine Loyalist party did not exist in the colonies until the commercial war failed and the real war began,” Van Tyne has said. (*War of Independence*, p. 22n). “Instead,” he has written, “of taking part in the colonial politics, they withdrew, in many cases, and looked frowningly on while rebellion advanced by leaps and bounds” (*Loyalists*, p. 87).

WHERE TORY STRENGTH LAY

Surprisingly, the greatest Loyalist strength appears to have been in the frontier regions. Colonel Rankin headed a

movement in Pennsylvania and adjacent areas. The border warfare in New York and the civil war that raged in the southern theater are other examples. Organized Tory resistance was promptly squelched in Virginia when the fighting started; farther south the rebels also got the upper hand initially, but subsequent Tory uprisings were serious.

In the north, the Loyalists first acted as associated bands but then enlisted by the thousands in the British army. H. E. Egerton has written:

New York alone furnished about 15,000 to the British Army and over 8,000 Loyalist militia. All of the other colonies furnished about as many more, so that we may safely say that 50,000 soldiers, either regular or militia, were drawn into the service of Great Britain from her American sympathizers. Tories formed no inconsiderable part of Burgoyne's army. Even when they did not join, their known presence in large numbers among the inhabitants of the region prevented the Americans from leaving their homes to join the American army. The British forces were also greatly helped in the matter of supplies by the Tory inhabitants (*Causes and Character*, p. 178).

"New York supplied more recruits to George III than to George Washington," Crane Brinton has written. "It has been estimated that perhaps only one third of the colonists actively backed the Revolution" (p. 317). The Tories may be correct in claiming to have had more long-term troops in service than the rebels after 1778, Lynn Montross has written in *Rag Tag, and Bobtail* (1952). This was because the British could equip them. Although no fewer than sixty-nine Loyalist regiments were organized to the extent of seeking volunteers, at least twenty-one of these actually took the field with an average strength of several hundred men each.

LOYALIST IMPACT ON STRATEGY

The Loyalists had an interesting effect on British strategic planners, who tended to anticipate more support than existed in regions of America where they had not yet operated. When Tory support failed to materialize in New England, the British expected to find it in New York and shifted military operations there. Simultaneously, they got drawn into the Charleston expedition of Clinton in 1776. The hope of Loyalist assistance had a part in luring them into the unfortunate Bennington raid. Ferguson's defeat at Kings Mountain also stemmed from this fallacy. Another effect of the Loyalists was in restricting British strategic movement when they became burdened with Loyalists who had to be evacuated or protected. One reason why Sir William Howe went from Boston to Halifax rather than directly to New York was that he had to evacuate Tories from Boston. A reason that Howe permitted himself to get overextended in the winter of 1776 was because he had to

outpost Trenton, Bordentown, Princeton, and Brunswick to protect the Tories of New Jersey. The isolated post of Ninety-Six, South Carolina, had to be garrisoned (by a northern Tory unit) for the protection of loyal inhabitants of the region. The two most brilliant American victories, Trenton and Cowpens, can be traced indirectly to the need for the British to overextend themselves to protect Loyalists.

REPRESSION OF TORIES

Persecution of the Loyalists started with mob action by the Sons of Liberty and continued throughout the Revolution. Matthew Steele has stated that "while liberty-loving pamphleteers were writing about the 'rights of man,' thousands of our patriotic ancestors were subjecting innocent, but loyal, persons to every sort of indignity and torture. . . . There was absolutely no freedom of the press or tongue, save for those that expressed opinions against the government" (p. 12). Test laws and statutes confiscating Tory property were passed. Perhaps forty thousand Loyalists were expelled from the states. New York made \$3.6 million from the sale of confiscated property, and Maryland collected over \$2 million. When the British evacuated New York City in 1783, they took out seven thousand Tories, and the estimated total of those who left America during the Revolution is almost one hundred thousand. In July 1783 the British government established a commission that examined 4,118 claims before it finished in 1790, having allotted almost £3.3 million to compensate loyal Americans for their losses.

SEE ALSO *Bennington Raid; Border Warfare in New York; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Cherry Valley Massacre, New York; Cowpens, South Carolina; Howe, William; Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Otis, James; Rankin, William; Southern Theater, Military Operations in; Sower, Christopher; Test Oath; Trenton, New Jersey; Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.*

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LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

At every point during the American Revolution, Loyalists spotted and exploited serious weaknesses in the movement for American independence. To these bold challenges, Patriots responded with some of their most creative, resourceful, stalwart—and in the long run, successful—exertions.

Loyalist remonstrance and Patriot countermeasures began amid the earliest and most authentically revolutionary action by representatives of the people. Beginning during the Stamp Act crisis of 1765 and continuing into the Townshend duties upheaval, 1768 to 1769, spokesmen for colonial liberty backed up words of protests with deeds of resistance, specifically boycotts of commerce with Britain. Repeal of the Stamp Act seemed to validate this political strategy, although popular leaders had no way of knowing that the trade boycott had little influence on Parliament and that it was in fact the unenforceability of a law opposed by angry mobs that forced the British to back down.

The Townshend duties boycotts, four years later, collapsed amid acrimony when loyal colonists, so-called Tories, publicized secretive importations of British goods by the very Whig merchants who had boasted of their defiance of British taxation of imperial trade. Thus, when the first Continental Congress devised a program of economic warfare beginning on 1 December 1774 with nonimportation, and continuing into nonexportation and nonconsumption of British goods in 1775, Congress added the provision that enforcement of this grandly titled “Continental Association” would be the sole responsibility of “local committees.”

Local committees, elected by voice vote of spontaneous gatherings, came into being within weeks. The newly elected committees invariably repaired to nearby taverns to discuss in a public setting how they should proceed to enforce the trade boycott. The committeemen knew that neither posting guards nor investigating suspicious sounds in darkened coastal waters were likely to be any more effective against violators than such tactics had been against colonial smugglers who for decades had brought French molasses or Dutch tea into North America. Smuggling had not been so much a criminal matter as a means for colonial merchants to protect themselves from the most arbitrary

and damaging of British mercantile interference in colonial economic life. Vice Admiralty judges often acquitted accused smugglers tried on the basis of inconclusive evidence, and in such cases merchants and vindicated ship owners recovered their losses by suing customs agents for civil damages in provincial courts with sympathetic juries.

The Committees of Inspection or Safety elected in the closing weeks of 1774 were determined not to be put on the defensive. They invited the public to send them the names of potential supporters of the crown; then the Committees summoned these suspects to testify as to their fidelity to the cause of American liberty. The great majority of those accused of harboring Tory sentiments pleaded with committeemen that they stood side by side with their Whig neighbors in opposing the Coercive Acts of 1774 and earlier British measures to tax Americans and extend the power of the British to regulate and discipline her colonial subjects. Committees of Safety usually warned these hapless victims of revolutionary justice to behave inoffensively, and when in doubt required that these “persons inimical to the liberties of America” post bond to guarantee their good behavior for the duration of the conflict. Serious potential violators of the Continental Association generally refused to appear before Committees of Safety; at the risk of their property and livelihoods they slipped into Boston in 1774–1775 or into New York after September 1776.

A handful of foolhardy Tories stood up to inquisitorial committeemen. One Anglican cleric who refused an order to read aloud the Declaration of Independence demanded, “What is my crime? Is it those connections [to God and the Church of England] I cannot dissolve?” Reverend Jacob Bailey, speaking before the Pownalboro, Massachusetts, Committee of Safety, answered his own question: “I am criminal only for choosing to suffer a penalty . . . to an order of council [i.e., a patriot Committee] than to feel the eternal reproaches of a guilty conscience.” Committeemen found declarations of that kind difficult to answer. Fortunately for their peace of mind, such ethical clarity in Loyalist testimony was exceptional. A more common response was that of Enoch Bartlett, in Haverhill, Massachusetts: “As my comfort does so much depend on the regard and good will of the people among whom I live, I hereby give under my hand that I will not sell tea or act any public [manner] contrary to the minds of the people.”

No one, not even the delegates to the first Continental Congress, anticipated that revolutionary committees would spring to life in every coastal and many inland communities, but they did. By the early summer of 1775, there were approximately seven thousand committeemen in the rebellious colonies. They became the infrastructure of the revolutionary movement in 1775 until new state governments came into existence in 1776 and

1777. By that time thousands of Loyalists had fled to the protection of the British army.

Newly elected legislatures confiscated the property these Loyalists left behind and declared the departed king's friends guilty of treason. With these legislative enactments, patriot governments grappled with the questions of who was a subject of the king and what was the difference between a subject and a citizen? Those questions were the heart of *Respublica v. Chapman*, a case that reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1781. Chief Justice Thomas McKean recognized that every inhabitant of an American state had had a right to choose, over a reasonable period of time, whether to declare allegiance to the Revolution or to adhere to the crown. For Pennsylvanians, he ruled that permissible interval of choice began on 14 May 1776 (the date that Congress annulled the Penn Charter) and 11 February 1777 (when the state legislature enacted a treason statute making allegiance and protection reciprocal). At the time that the defendant, Samuel Chapman, departed from Pennsylvania to join the British Legion on 26 December 1776, McKean instructed the jury, "Pennsylvania was not a nation at war with another nation, but a country in a state of *civil war*."

McKean's ruling had widespread consequences. State governments were already discovering that they had neither the resources nor the political will to prosecute thousands of Loyalists. Prosecutors often reduced criminal charges from treason to the lesser offense of misprision of treason. Loyalist defendants turned the law on its head simply by injecting issues of conscience into legal proceedings. When the Pennsylvania member of the Schwenkfelder sect of German pietists, young George Kriebel, refused to report for militia duty because warfare violated his conscience, the judge disallowed his excuse because German pietists were not strict pacifists in the same sense as were Quakers. They simply consulted God's direction on a day-to-day basis and assumed that God took a dim view of human warfare and civil commotion. Kriebel's father, George Kriebel Sr., created an uproar in court by interrupting proceedings to tell the judge that his son could not bear arms in the Revolution because God had not yet decided which side should enjoy divine favor by allowing either the British or the Americans to win a decisive victory.

There were thousands of George Kriebels. Recognizing the significance of the undecideds, the historian John Shy in 1965 suggested in a memorandum to the Pentagon that, in its early stages, the Vietnam War was an insurgency rather than a conventional conflict. As Shy explained to Defense department officials seeking historical guidance, insurgencies had been "triangular conflicts" where noncombatants in the middle comprised a great floating mass of humanity whom organized armies strived to overawe, coerce, intimidate, or inspire as circumstances required. On the heels of Shy's report, two historians

independently calculated that 18 percent of the colonial populace were Loyalists in arms or Loyalist partisans actively supporting the insurgency (a fluctuating 15 to 20 percent of the white population). Probably twice that number (30 to 40 percent) were Continental soldiers or militia or civilians voting in elections, paying taxes, and actively supporting the cause of independence. These estimates indicated that neutralists averse to both sides comprised a pool of 40 to 55 percent of British North American society.

This triangularity had important implications for British and American commanders. First, the Revolution could count on fiscal, military, and moral support from less than half of the populace at any given moment. "Congress," one Continental officer dourly observed, "have left it in the power of the states to starve the Army at pleasure." Until 1778 Congress paid for the war by printing Continental currency, allowing it to depreciate in value and inflation to set Congress's and the army's purchasing power. When this string ran out, Congress turned responsibility for financing the war over to the states. By 1781 the states had exhausted their resources and their taxing authority, and army commissary officers resorted to confiscation of needed supplies, albeit papered over with reimbursement promissory notes collectable after the war ended. By July 1781 this expedient was nearly exhausted. When the French fleet sailed toward the Chesapeake, and Washington and Rochambeau prepared to move their armies for an assault on Yorktown, Washington knew it would be the last military operation he could sustain. Nothing fed Loyalist hopes as much as these reports of fiscal chaos—certain proof that the rebellion was about to collapse if only the British army moved aggressively to crush the uprising. What Loyalist impatience with British military lassitude could not admit was that British offensive operations caused more disorder than Loyalist Provincial Corps following in the rear could mop up effectively.

A second implication of military triangularity took hold in the garrison towns occupied for varying periods of time by the British army: Boston (1774–1776); Norfolk (1775–1776); New York (1776–1783); Newport (1776–1778); Philadelphia (1777–1778); Savannah (1778–1782); Charleston (1780–1782); and Wilmington, North Carolina (1781), as well as bases in loyal Canadian and Floridian colonies: Quebec (1776–1783), St. Augustine (1775–1784), and Pensacola (1775–1784). Except for Savannah, a showcase for reconciliation, all of the garrison towns in rebellious colonies were under martial law. They were awash in money, spent by the British army and navy; crowded with Loyalist exiles from the Patriot-occupied mainland; filled with intrigue, paranoia, and desperation; and they served as staging areas for British offensive operations. News filtering outward from

the garrison towns painted a picture of British corruption and military uncertainty, whereas the information flowing from revolutionary America into the garrison towns emphasized inflation, civil unrest, and the demagoguery of Patriot politicians. Neither side in the war possessed a realistic understanding of the other.

Finally, military triangularity reflected racial triangularity. At the outset of the war, hardliners in the War Office proposed putting the fear of God into settlers of the colonial frontier by instigating Indian attacks against frontier farms and settlements. Only with the most strenuous efforts did Board of Trade professionals, the Superintendents of Indian Affairs, deter this ill-advised tactic. However, white Patriots were not so easily dissuaded. Patriot forces in the southern colonies staged preemptive raids against Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole villages, driving adult males into the forest and destroying the food supply for the women, children, and the aged who stayed behind. In 1779 the Northern Department of the Continental army, commanded by General John Sullivan, swept through pro-British Mohawk Indian villages in New York state, inflicting the same counter-revolutionary terror.

Of the half million slaves in the American colonies, 10 percent secured their own freedom during the revolutionary upheaval. The institution of slavery atrophied in the northern colonies. Lord Dunmore's Ethiopian Regiment enticed more than eight hundred Virginia slaves to rally to the king's standard. Chesapeake region runaways found employment in merchant marine vessels sailing from middle colony ports. Some Carolina and Georgia low-country slaves formed maroon communities in the interior. When the British evacuated Charleston and Savannah in November 1782, they took with them, into continued years of bondage in the West Indies, the slave property of Loyalist planters. When the British evacuated New York thirteen months later, they carried to an uncertain freedom in Nova Scotia and later Sierra Leone between five hundred and a thousand former slaves who were now free black dockyard workers.

General Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown did not decimate British military power. General Guy Carleton, commander of British forces in Canada since 1776, succeeded Henry Clinton as commander of British forces in North America in 1782. From his headquarters in New York City, Carleton observed the Loyalist populace in the largest British garrison town. Throughout 1781 the New York City Loyalists—sobered by British military reverses in the Carolinas—filled garrison town newspapers with realistic assessments of the condition of the empire. In sharp contrast to their shrill vindictiveness during the early years of the war, many loyal New Yorkers now calmly faced the prospect of British defeat. In newspaper essays and in coffeehouse conversations, Loyalists in all of the

garrison towns, especially New York, pondered their fate in the event of British defeat and abandonment. They anticipated that their old Patriot neighbors would disagree about how noncombatant crown supporters should be treated, and they took heart when patriot leaders Aedanus Burke, in South Carolina in 1782, and Alexander Hamilton, in New York two years later, declared that America could not afford the luxury of civic vengeance and argued powerfully that conciliation of internal foes was a defining mark of a civilized nation.

Carleton thereupon drafted recommendations for peacemaking in America based on Loyalist hopes and Patriot weaknesses. General Washington did not possess the military strength, and Congress did not have the political will, to drive the British from the Savannah, Charleston, and Savannah garrison towns. Carleton advised the newly formed ministry led by the Earl of Shelburne ministry in England—known for its sympathy with colonial grievances in the late 1760s—to sit tight and let political disunity and economic troubles in the American states begin to work to the advantage of the empire. At the very least, he predicted, the Americans might be willing to concede a symbolic connection to the British crown in return for British evacuation of the garrison towns and normal diplomatic relations. Carleton's advice arrived too late; Shelburne and his successor, Lord Rockingham, had already conceded independence in negotiations with John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay.

In return for outright independence, and recognition of the Mississippi River as the western boundary of the new nation, the American negotiators promised that Congress would "earnestly recommend" that the states cease confiscation of Loyalist property and that British creditors could sue in American courts to recover prerevolutionary debts. And while the Mississippi River as a western boundary included vast stretches of the northwest territories from which American forces had not dislodged the British, peace terms said nothing about the status of the river itself. European powers, along with many American Loyalists, assumed that the Mississippi Valley would become an international zone of commercial, military, and diplomatic penetration for decades to come. Two gifted and opportunistic Loyalists, Alexander McGillivray and William Augustus Bowles, both acculturated Creek Indians, positioned the Creeks to be the regional middlemen providing military security and commercial alliances for British and European operatives along the Gulf Coast and lower Mississippi. The Napoleonic Wars brought this geopolitical adventure to naught. To pay for his invasion of Russia, Napoleon sold all of the land drained by the western tributaries of the Mississippi to the United States in 1803; to prevent Napoleon from building a fleet in low-country shipyards capable of driving the British navy from

the world's oceans, Britain withdrew its garrisons at Fort Detroit and Fort Niagara, abandoning Indian allies and a commercial foothold in the upper Mississippi Valley.

In a final irony, the widows and children of wealthy Loyalist exiles returned to New York and Boston in the 1780s, 1790s, and early 1800s to reclaim family property. Federalist lawyers and judges were unwilling to suppose that the wife of a Loyalist, even a Loyalist traitor to the United States, could have “a mind” and “will of her own.” “Can we believe,” Judge Theodore Sedgewick asked rhetorically, “that a wife, for so respecting the general understanding of her husband as to submit her opinions to his on a subject so all-important as this, should lose her own property and forfeit the inheritance of her children?”

When, however, Florence Cooke, the wife of a Loyalist mechanic in Charleston, South Carolina, returned to the state, with husband in tow, she petitioned the legislature to understand that her husband had not been well “versed in publick troubles,” lacked the force of personality “to do any political good or harm,” and at the very worst “he might have said an idle thing” in criticism of the Revolution. “The change . . . in Charles Town,” by which she meant nothing less than the Revolution itself, had been “too powerful for his situation and circumstances to withstand.” Even if technically guilty of a crime, she declared, he would now throw himself on the mercy of the court. As the lawyer who drafted her petition confidently predicted, “she pledges that she will exert all the ascendancy of a wife & friend to make him a good man and a useful citizen.”

Where a large estate and the interests of the aristocracy in upholding the patriarchal authority of husbands were at stake, a Loyalist widow returned from exile, in the eyes of the law, possessed no “mind of her own”; but in South Carolina, less than a month after British evacuation, a skilled mechanic who could maintain winches and carts essential to loading and unloading ships and thereby restore the economy was welcome. And if, in the bargain, his strong-willed spouse, declaring her “affection for the independence and freedom of her country,” vouchsafed her husband's political rehabilitation, then this couple constituted a civic asset.

In 1784 Congress sent John Adams to represent the United States at the Court of St. James. Attending the London theater, Adams ran into an old friend, Loyalist exile Jonathan Sewall. They spoke warmly about the days of their youth when, as young lawyers in the early 1760s, Sewall had advised a hesitant Adams to represent Boston in the Massachusetts House of Representatives—to become a popular tribune of the people because that was a service lawyers could provide their society. As a social newcomer, Adams could risk political contamination, whereas he, Sewall, seeking to rehabilitate a famous family fallen on hard times, could not take such a chance and had no choice but to become a supporter of the crown and—if

push came to shove—a loyal defender of the imperial status quo. Both men silently remembered Sewall's fateful advice to Adams and Sewall's painful dilemma.

That night, Sewall wrote in his diary how unsuited Adams was to the courtly life of diplomacy. He was too earnest and serious, too full of Enlightenment knowledge about trade and geopolitics, too inept at flattery and flirting, and not nearly cynical enough. Adams came away in a pensive mood, reflecting with utter sadness on Sewall's pact with the devil of imperial preferment, the waste of a promising young intellect, the blighting of a generous temperament.

SEE ALSO *Admiralty Courts; African Americans in the Revolution; Carleton, Guy; Continental Congress; Independence; Indians in the Colonial Wars and the American Revolution; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; Loyalists; McGillivray, Alexander; Nonimportation; Rockingham, Charles Watson-Wentworth, Second Marquess of; Shelburne, William Petty Fitzmaurice, earl of; Stamp Act; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois; Townshend Acts.*

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LOYAL NINE. An offshoot of the Caucus Club that evolved into the active leadership of the Sons of Liberty, the Loyal Nine operated behind the scenes to connect the upper-class resistance to increased imperial regulation with the artisans, shopkeepers, sailors, and young toughs who provided the manpower and muscle of the movement. Coalescing in the summer of 1765 as part of the opposition to the Stamp Act, the Nine had connections running up and down Boston society. Samuel Adams was not a member of the Nine, but he maintained close ties with them, as did Joseph Warren. The Nine were, according to historian John

C. Miller: John Avery (a distiller, Harvard College classmate of Joseph Warren, and secretary of the group), John Smith (a brazier), Thomas Crafts (a painter), Benjamin Edes (printer of the *Boston Gazette*), Stephen Cleverly (a brazier), Thomas Chase (a distiller), Joseph Field (a ship captain), George Trott (a jeweler), and Henry Bass (a cousin of Samuel Adams). Captain Henry Welles may also have been a member.

SEE ALSO *Adams, Samuel; Caucus Club of Boston; Sons of Liberty; Stamp Act.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

LUDLOW, GABRIEL. (1736–1808). Loyalist. Born on Long Island, New York, on 16 April 1736 to a wealthy merchant family, Ludlow, whose brother George sat on New York's supreme court, became governor of King's College in 1760. In 1775 he was appointed colonel of the Queens County militia and became immediately embroiled in revolutionary politics. At the beginning of the Revolution, the Ludlow brothers sought to unite the Loyalists to contest the Patriots for control of Long Island, but they realized that that the latter had the upper hand. The Ludlows and most other Long Island Loyalists went into hiding, emerging a year later, in 1776, when the British landed. Gabriel Ludlow recruited and commanded seven hundred men who were formed into the Third Battalion of Oliver De Lancey's New York Volunteers. He spent the rest of the war defending Long Island from Patriot raiding parties and entertaining British officers and officials. In 1779 the New York state assembly declared Ludlow a traitor and confiscated his estate, though it was not able to claim most of Ludlow's property until after the war. Ludlow left with the British in 1783, spending the next year in London lobbying for recompense for his personal losses of £2,500 (he received £1,450) and for the creation of New Brunswick as a Loyalist province. Ludlow crossed to New Brunswick in 1784, having been appointed a member of its council. The following year he was named judge of the vice admiralty court and mayor of St. John. Over the ensuing years he became one of the province's most prosperous merchants and political

leaders, as well as brigadier general of militia. He died at his home on 12 February 1808.

SEE ALSO *Ludlow, George.*

Michael Bellesiles

LUDLOW, GEORGE. (1734–1808). Loyalist. Born on Long Island, New York, in 1734 to a wealthy merchant family, Ludlow was a respected attorney when he was appointed to the New York council in 1768; the following year he became a member of the supreme court. Though not politically active, he joined his brother Gabriel in attempting to organize Long Island's Loyalists at the start of the Revolution, spending a year in hiding until the British landed in August 1776. After General William Howe's victory over Washington, Ludlow returned to the reconstituted provincial supreme court, which met in British-occupied New York City. When William Smith was appointed chief justice in 1778, Ludlow felt personally slighted and resigned from the court. In 1779 the New York state assembly declared Ludlow a traitor and confiscated his estate. In 1780 James Robertson, the royal governor, appointed him to the lucrative positions of master of the rolls and superintendent of the Long Island police. Ludlow made the most of his offices, charging high fees and dispensing rough justice. As a consequence, he alienated much of the Long Island population and cost the British a great deal of support. Other Loyalists charged Ludlow and Robertson with engaging in smuggling, though the validity of these charges remains uncertain. It is evident that Ludlow made a great deal of money in the three years he was known as "the tyrant of Long Island."

Ludlow left with the British in 1783 and spent the next year in London seeking recompense for the £7,000 he claimed to have lost in the Revolution (he received £2,500) and joining his brother in lobbying for the creation of New Brunswick as a Loyalist province. In 1784 Ludlow was appointed to the New Brunswick council and chief justice of the supreme court, holding those offices until his death in Fredericton, New Brunswick, on 13 November 1808.

SEE ALSO *Ludlow, Gabriel.*

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Michael Bellesiles

LYNCH, CHARLES. (1736–1796). Militia officer, possible source of the phrase “lynch law.” Virginia. Born somewhere in Virginia in 1736, Charles Lynch was elected a justice of the peace in 1767 and expelled from his Quaker meeting for taking the oath of office. Entering the House of Burgesses in 1769, he retained his seat until the Revolution. He signed the Williamsburg protests against taxation in 1769 and 1774, attended the state constitutional convention in 1776, sat in the House of Delegates until 1778, and raised troops. On 24 February 1778 he was made a colonel of militia. In 1780 he led the militia in an extra-legal campaign in southwest Virginia, holding drumhead (informal and extra-legal) courts and punishing Loyalists, slaves, and striking Welch miners with whippings and forced service in the Continental army. Many scholars argue that these actions inspired the phrase “lynch law,” though others credit Captain William Lynch (no relation) of Pittsylvania, Virginia, with giving his name to organized extra-legal violence in 1780.

At the end of 1782 the Virginia assembly declared Charles Lynch’s actions legitimate. In the spring of 1781 he led a regiment of 200 Virginia riflemen south to reinforce Nathanael Greene. Many of his men were ex-Continentalists whose enlistments had expired. With the elite Delaware Continentalists of Captain Robert H. Kirkwood, his volunteers formed the infantry of William Washington’s new legion. At Guilford Courthouse, on 15 March 1781, Lynch and Kirkwood held the right flank of Greene’s first line, performing well in the battle. Lynch’s men remained with Greene in the Carolinas until General Charles Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown. Lynch returned to his duties as justice of the peace, and later served inconspicuously in the state senate between May 1784 and December 1789. Lynch died at his home in Campbell County, Virginia, on 29 October 1796.

SEE ALSO *Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Washington, William.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

LYNCH, THOMAS. (1727–1776). Continental Congressman. South Carolina. Born in South

Carolina in 1727, Thomas Lynch inherited large land holdings and considerable wealth. He sat in the provincial assembly almost every year from 1752 until 1774. A delegate to the Stamp Act Congress of 1765, he was sent to the first Continental Congress in 1774. There he opposed importation of British goods but remained open to negotiation. He was re-elected to Congress, but a stroke in early 1776 cut short his political career. His only son, Thomas Jr., was sent to Congress to aid him, and together they started home, but a second stroke in Annapolis killed him in December 1776.

SEE ALSO *Lynch, Thomas, Jr.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

LYNCH, THOMAS, JR. (1749–1779). Signer. South Carolina. Born in Winyah, South Carolina, on 5 August 1749, Thomas Lynch Jr. was sent at 12 to England, to study at Eton, Cambridge, and in the Middle Temple. He returned home in 1772. He decided not to practice law, and his father, Thomas Lynch Sr., concurred, having himself decided that his son should enter public life. While running his North Santee plantation, a gift from his father, Thomas Jr. became influential in Patriot circles. In 1774–1776, he sat in the provincial congress and, also in 1776, was on the state constitutional committee and in the first general assembly. On 12 June 1775 he was named a captain in the First South Carolina Regiment, caught a bilious fever while recruiting his company, was left in permanently poor health, and never commanded the company. On 23 March 1776, he was sent by the general assembly to the Continental Congress as an additional delegate to assist his ailing father, who had suffered a paralytic stroke. However, his own health was too feeble to allow him to participate actively in the Congress, although he voted for and signed the Declaration of Independence. In the fall of 1776, ailing father and son started south, but the elder Lynch died in Maryland, near Annapolis, and the younger reached home seriously ill. In late 1779, in hopes of finding a better climate, he sailed with his wife for the south of France. Their ship was never heard from, and is presumed to have been lost at sea with all hands.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress; Lynch, Thomas.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

*Encyclopedia of the
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MACHIAS, MAINE. 12 June 1775. On 2 June 1775 the British schooner *Margaretta* (four guns) entered the port of Machias, in the province of Maine, with two sloops (*Polly* and *Unity*) to get lumber for the British garrison in Boston. Determined to prevent the British from accomplishing their mission, local Patriots conceived a plan to capture the enemy officers while they were in church on 11 June. But Midshipman James Moore, commander of the *Margaretta*, and some of his officers escaped through the windows of the church and regained their ship. A hastily organized pursuit by about forty volunteers under Jeremiah O'Brien and Joseph Wheaton resulted in capture of the *Unity* on Sunday and of the *Margaretta* the next day (12 June). A considerable chase had ended with a brisk skirmish in which seven men were killed or wounded on each side. Midshipman Moore was among the dead. O'Brien became the first naval hero on the Patriot side, and the action is generally considered to be the first naval engagement of the war.

O'Brien was given command of the *Unity*, which was armed with guns from the captured schooner and renamed the *Machias Liberty*. A few weeks later he captured the British naval schooner *Diligent* and her tender off Machias without a shot, and, under his command, the two schooners became the first ships of the Massachusetts navy.

SEE ALSO *O'Brien, Jeremiah.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

MACLEAN, ALLAN. (1725–1798). British army officer. Born at Torloisk on the Isle of Mull, Scotland, MacLean was a Jacobite officer in the rising of 1745–1746 and afterward took service in the Scots brigade in the Dutch Republic. Wounded and captured with Francis MacLean at Bergen-op-Zoom, he was at once paroled and exchanged in 1748. In 1750 he took advantage of George II's amnesty to Scots rebels to return home. Now apparently reconciled to the Hanoverian regime, he became a lieutenant in the new Sixtieth Foot (Royal Americans) on 8 January 1756. He was wounded at Ticonderoga in 1758, promoted captain-lieutenant on 27 July, and on 16 January 1759 transferred to a New York independent company with the rank of captain. He was wounded again at Niagara later in the year and took part in the capture of Quebec. Returning to Scotland in 1761, he raised the 144th Regiment of Royal Highland Volunteers and served as major-commandant in America until it was disbanded in 1763. Now on half-pay, he was granted land on St. John (now Prince Edward) Island but did not live there, for he married in Westminster, London, in 1771. He was restored to full pay by promotion to lieutenant colonel by brevet on 25 May 1772.

On June 1775 MacLean was commissioned to raise a provincial regiment, the Royal Highland Emigrants, which he recruited mostly from veterans settled on

Prince Edward Island. His officers were nearly all MacLeans from Mull or Morvern. When the Americans invaded Canada in the autumn, he marched from Quebec to reinforce Governor Guy Carleton at Montreal, and later attempted unsuccessfully to relieve St. Johns. Learning of Benedict Arnold's appearance opposite Quebec, he made a forced march with about eighty men, arriving at Quebec on 13 November, six days ahead of Carleton. Appointed second in command, he repulsed the final American attack on 31 December with heavy losses. On 6 May 1776, when General John Burgoyne's reinforcements arrived, MacLean led a sortie that routed the few remaining besiegers. He then remained in Quebec to feed reinforcements through to Carleton as he completed the expulsion of the American forces. That summer MacLean visited Britain, in the vain hope that the government would honor a promise to make his regiment permanent. Returning to Canada in 1777, he was made military governor of Montreal and a local brigadier general. In late September he reinforced Fort Ticonderoga, and in October, after the Saratoga disaster, he fell back to a defensive position at St. Johns. He was at Quebec in the winter of 1778, where he organized amateur theatricals. In 1779 his regiment was at last made permanent as the Eighty-fourth Foot, but it was Henry Clinton, not MacLean, who became its colonel. In 1781 he was posted to Niagara and became colonel by brevet on 17 November 1782. He returned to Britain in 1783, retired the following year, and settled in London, where he died on 18 February 1797.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's March to Quebec; MacLean, Francis; Quebec (Canada Invasion); St. John's, Canada (5 September–2 November 1775); Ticonderoga, New York, American Capture of.*

revised by John Oliphant

MACLEAN, FRANCIS. (1718–1781). British officer. Commissioned as an ensign in the Cameronians in 1738 and promoted in 1742, Francis MacLean resigned in 1745 to join the Clan Maclean Battalion of the Jacobite army as a lieutenant. He became a fugitive after the battle of Culloden, in which insurgents challenged the rule of the British king. He joined the Dutch army, but resigned his Dutch commission in 1750, when he rejoined the British army and purchased a lieutenancy in the forty-second ("Black Watch") Regiment two years later. As a captain of this regiment he fought in Canada and the West Indies before taking part in the capture of Belle Isle, off Brittany, in 1761.

Having distinguished himself in Portugal during the years from 1762 to 1778, he was ordered back to England,

promoted to brigadier general, and sent to Canada as governor of Halifax. After routing the Patriots who mounted the Penobscot expedition, a naval assault that took place from July to August 1779, MacLean returned to Halifax, where he died on 4 May 1781.

SEE ALSO *Culloden Moor, Scotland; Penobscot Expedition, Maine.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MACLEAN'S CORPS. MacLean's Corps is another name for the Provincial Regiment, officially the Royal Highland Emigrants, raised in Canada in 1775 by Lieutenant Colonel Allan MacLean. They were recruited from among Highland veterans of the French and Indian War.

SEE ALSO *MacLean, Allan.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

MAD ANTHONY. Nickname of Anthony Wayne.

SEE ALSO *Wayne, Anthony.*

Mark M. Boatner

MADISON, JAMES. (1751–1836). Continental congressman, fourth president of the United States. Virginia. Born on 5 March 1751 in King George County, Virginia, James Madison received his bachelor's degree from the College of New Jersey (later Princeton University) in 1771 and remained another year for further study. An early advocate of religious toleration, Madison also favored being prepared to defend Virginia's civil liberties by force of arms. He was elected to the Orange County committee of safety on 22 December 1774, but there is no proof that he wrote its enthusiastic response of 19 May 1775 to Patrick Henry's call for arming the militia. On 25 April 1776 he was chosen as a delegate to the fifth Virginia convention. Although the twenty-five-year-old Madison held a militia commission as colonel, he was "too slightly built (5'6" [tall], thin, with light blue eyes and dark brown hair) and too frail (subject to fits of a sort of epilepsy) to take the field" (*Revolutionary Virginia*, 1, p. 471). He served on the committee that framed the

state constitution and bill of rights and proposed an amendment declaring that “all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise” of religion. A member of the first assembly under the new constitution, he was not reelected in 1777 because he refused to canvass or buy drinks for votes. In November 1777, however, the assembly elected him to the governor’s council, and two years later it elected him to the Continental Congress.

Taking his seat on 20 March 1780, he served in Congress until November 1783, where he “acquired a continental reputation for his mastery of legislative business” and was “soon regarded as the most effective member of the Congress” (Lance Banning in ANB). He supported efforts by Robert Morris to reform the department of finance and advocated levying duties on foreign imports to raise a national revenue. In September 1783 he worked out an agreement by which Virginia agree to cede its claims to the territory north of the Ohio River (thus creating a national domain) and, by suggesting that five slaves be considered the equivalent of three free persons, he broke a deadlock about how to use population figures to calculate state contributions to the central government.

His most important contribution to the new nation was his work in framing the federal Constitution at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787. Madison wrote twenty-nine numbers of *The Federalist* urging ratification of the document, and then he drafted its first ten amendments (the Bill of Rights) and guided them through the House of Representatives, in which he sat as majority leader until 1797. He was Jefferson’s secretary of state (1801–1809) and twice won the presidency, serving from 1809 to 1817. But the disgraceful performance of an unprepared and disunited country in the War of 1812 cost him popularity. He retired to his country home, Montpelier, after his presidency and spent the rest of his life as a country gentleman. He died at Montpelier on 28 June 1836.

Dolley Payne Todd, a widow, was introduced to Madison by Aaron Burr, and they were married in 1794. Almost twenty years younger than her husband, Dolley was friendly and tactful and had a remarkable memory. She was extremely popular and earned a reputation as an effective Washington hostess. Fleeing from the British invaders of Washington in August 1814, she saved many state papers and the Gilbert Stuart portrait of George Washington. After her husband’s death she moved into a house on Lafayette Square, opposite the White House. She died on 12 July 1849 at Washington, D.C.

SEE ALSO *Populations of Great Britain and America*.

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MAHAM, HEZEKIAH. (1739–1789). Militia officer. South Carolina. Born in St. Stephen’s Parish, South Carolina, on 26 June 1739, Hezekiah Maham was active in Patriot politics and had been a member of the First South Carolina Provincial Congress before becoming a captain in Isaac Huger’s First South Carolina Rifle Regiment in 1776. He took part in the unsuccessful defense of Savannah on 29 December 1778, and the action at Stono Ferry on 29 June 1779, before becoming a major of the State Dragoons. In 1780 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel, and the next year he became colonel of an independent dragoon regiment. The siege tower known by his name was first used in the capture of Fort Watson on April 1781. Maham took part in the actions at Quinby Bridge on 17 July 1781 and Fair Lawn on 27 November 1781, in addition to many smaller, independent operations. While home on sick leave, he was captured in August 1782 and paroled, seeing no further combat. He died in 1789.

SEE ALSO *Fair Lawn, South Carolina; Fort Watson, South Carolina (15–23 April 1781)*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MAITLAND, JOHN. (?–1779). British army officer. Eighth son of the earl of Lauderdale, he had been a lieutenant colonel of marines and member of Parliament for Haddington before appointment as lieutenant colonel of the First Battalion of a Highland regiment, the Seventy-first Foot, on 14 October 1778. He was with Archibald Campbell at the fall of Savannah on 29 December. In command of Prevost’s rearguard when he retreated from Charleston, Maitland won the action at Stono Ferry (20 June 1779) before withdrawing to Port Royal Island (Beaufort). Although already ill with malaria, he then made an epic eighty-mile withdrawal by swamps and waterways, evading French blockaders and American troops to join Prevost at Savannah. He died a few days

Malcolm's Regiment

after the repulse of the Franco-American assault on 9 October 1779.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Raid of Prevost; Savannah, Georgia (29 December 1778); Stono Ferry, South Carolina.*

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revised by John Oliphant

MALCOLM'S REGIMENT. Colonel William Malcolm commanded one of the sixteen "additional Continental Regiments."

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments.*

Mark M. Boatner

MALMÉDY, MARQUIS DE. Continental officer. He appears to have descended from an Irish family named Gray that settled in France. As a *sous lieutenant* of cavalry in the French army, Malmédy reached America in 1776 from Martinique and was breveted major in the Continental army on 19 September of that year. In December 1776 he was made chief engineer and director of defense works in the Rhode Island militia with the rank of brigadier general, largely on a recommendation of Charles Lee that included the warning, "You must excuse his heat of temper at times."

On 10 May 1777, two months after his services to Rhode Island were terminated by the arrival of Continental officers, he was given the Continental commission of colonel. Malmédy wrote to Washington complaining that this rank was beneath his merit and his former grade. In a blistering reply, Washington expressed his astonishment that the former lieutenant did not feel Congress had recognized his service in commissioning him a colonel. When Gates requested Malmédy's transfer to his forces, Washington replied that he was "glad" to approve the transfer.

Malmédy commanded a light infantry company on one flank of the American force at Stono Ferry, South Carolina, on 20 June 1779. After Gates's defeat at Camden, Malmédy was accused of spreading "poison" about Greene and calling for his dismissal. Before the Battle of Ninety Six, Greene sent him to the North Carolina legislature to obtain supplies and militia, a task with which he had difficulty. At Eutaw Springs, South

Carolina, on 8 September 1781, Malmédy commanded the North Carolina militia, for which Greene commended his "great gallantry and good conduct" on the battlefield.

After refusing to carry dispatches to the governor of North Carolina, Malmédy appears to have been killed in a duel in November 1781. On 13 March 1782, Robert Morris directed the paymaster to pay \$3,025 to his estate. Malmady, Malmedy, and Malmédy-Gray are variations of his name.

SEE ALSO *Eutaw Springs, South Carolina.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

MAMARONECK, NEW YORK. Raid of 22 October 1776. During the American withdrawal from Pell's Point and Harlem Heights to White Plains, New York, the village of Mamaroneck was abandoned by the Americans—unjustifiably, in General George Washington's view. The area was then occupied by Major Robert Rogers and his notorious "Queen's American Rangers," an aggressive band of Loyalists who had been attacking local militia companies and raiding supply depots. They formed a detached camp of about 500 men near the British right wing at New Rochelle. Colonel John Haslet was selected to lead his Delaware Regiment, reinforced by certain Virginia and Maryland companies to a total strength of 750, in a raid against Mamaroneck. With accurate information about Rogers's dispositions, Haslet started out near White Plains, marched some five miles, slipped undetected past the British flank, and silenced the single sentinel who covered the approach to Rogers's bivouac. During the day, however, Rogers had realized the possibilities of surprise along this route and had posted sixty men between the lone sentinel and his main camp. Haslet's advance guard stumbled on this unsuspected force, and a melee ensued. The enemy added to the confusion by echoing the cry, "Surrender, you Tory dogs! Surrender!" The Americans managed to capture thirty-six prisoners,

sixty muskets, sixty highly prized blankets, and a pair of colors, all of which they evacuated safely. Rogers's main camp forced the raiders to withdraw after an exchange of fire. American casualties were three killed and twelve wounded; there is no record of enemy losses. The incident boosted American morale.

SEE ALSO *Haslet, John; Rogers, Robert.*

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revised by Barnet Schecter

MANCHAC POST (FORT BUTE).

Bayou Manchac or the Iberville River was the northern boundary of the Spanish Isle of Orleans and provided a water route from the Mississippi east into the Amite River and through Lakes Maurepas, Pontchartrain, and Borgne into the Gulf of Mexico. Pierre Le Moyne, Sieur d'Iberville, used this route when he returned in 1699 from his exploration up the Mississippi to the mouth of the Red River. Because the Treaty of Paris in 1763 left the Isle of Orleans in Spanish hands (ceded by France in 1762), this route was of vital importance as an outlet for British navigation from the upper Mississippi. At the mouth of the Manchac–Iberville stream, on the Mississippi, the British established Fort Bute or Manchac Post in 1763. From then until its capture by Governor Bernardo de Gálvez on 7 September 1779, it was an important military and trading post. The Battle of Fort Bute, as it is often called, was the opening salvo in Spain's war on Britain in North America. Even though a hurricane had destroyed much of Gálvez's fleet on 15 August, the governor quickly assembled a small army of regulars and Acadian and Spanish militia, and led them on a brutal eleven-day march through the bayou. The Spanish attack caught the garrison completely by surprise, as they were unaware that Spain and Britain were at war.

SEE ALSO *Gálvez, Bernardo de.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MANDAMUS COUNCILLORS. The Massachusetts Government Act of 20 May 1774 (also called the Massachusetts Regulating Act), one of the

Intolerable Acts, prescribed that effective 1 August the Massachusetts Council, the upper house of the legislature, would no longer be elected by a joint vote of the incoming members of the House of Representatives and the outgoing members of the Council (as provided for in the Charter of 1692). Rather, it would be appointed by the governor on a "royal writ of mandamus." The thirty-six men appointed by Governor Thomas Gage, only two of whom had been among the twenty-eight councillors elected previously, became marked men, their names being published by the radical press along with the "Addressers" and "Protesters." Only twenty-five of the thirty-six accepted the position, and nine of them soon resigned. Six of the remaining councillors lived in Boston, where they were protected, up to a point, by the British army. Of the final ten who lived elsewhere, all were driven into exile in Boston. After John Murray, a long-time representative from Rutland, had fled to Boston, a group of neighbors, men who had voted for him since 1751, told his son that his house would be destroyed if he did not resign. A mob of four thousand armed men forced Thomas Oliver to resign. Old Israel Williams of Hatfield tried to hide in his chimney when a mob came calling, but he was smoked out when the doors were closed and a fire started indoors. These episodes of intimidation and violence demonstrate the power of the resistance movement to force a renunciation of those traditional leaders who tried to remain loyal to Britain.

SEE ALSO *Addressers; Protesters.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

MANHATTAN ISLAND, NEW YORK. At the time of the Revolution this was also called City Island, New York Island, and York Island. At its northern tip was strategically important Kings Bridge.

SEE ALSO *Kings Bridge, New York.*

Mark M. Boatner

MANLEY, JOHN. (1732?–1793). American naval officer. Massachusetts. John Manley may have been born in Torquay, England, perhaps in 1732, and may have served in the British navy. It is known that Manley was living in Boston in the late 1750s and was the captain of a merchant ship. He was selected by General George Washington to command one of the vessels in the “navy” being organized in the fall of 1775 to operate against British supply vessels. As captain of the armed schooner, *Lee*, he left Plymouth on 4 November 1775, but his first three captures were all returned to their owners. Toward the end of the month he made the first important capture of the war, when he took the *Nancy* and its shipment of 2,000 muskets and other munitions in the entrance to Boston harbor, within sight of its escort. The next month he took several other prizes and was hailed as a naval hero. In January 1776 Washington named him commander of his “navy.” Congress confirmed Manley as a captain in the new Continental navy on 17 April 1776. With his flag aboard the thirty-two-gun *Hancock*, he made several successful cruises. On 8 June he and the *Boston* captured the twenty-eight-gun frigate *Fox*, but on 7 July he and his prize were taken off Halifax by the forty-four-gun *Rainbow*, which was commanded by Sir George Collier. Even though the Americans out-gunned the British, the commander of the *Boston*, Captain Hector McNeill, who loathed Manley, refused to come to the *Hancock*’s aid. After being confined on a prison ship in New York Harbor, Manley was exchanged in March 1778. A court-martial acquitted him of losing his ship, but McNeill was suspended from the navy.

With no suitable new command awaiting him, Manley went to sea as a privateer, and in the fall of 1778 made a successful cruise in the *Marlborough*. Early in 1779, as captain of the *Cumberland*, he was captured by the *Pomona* near Barbados. Escaping from prison, he was captured again while making his second cruise in the *Jason*, and spent two years in Old Mill Prison, England, before being exchanged. In September 1782 he took command of the *Hague*, one of two frigates remaining in the Continental navy. (The other was Commodore John Barry’s *Alliance*.) Manley’s last cruise, in the West Indies, was marked by a brilliant escape from a British ship of the line (seventy-four guns) and by his capture of the *Baille* in January 1783. This conferred upon him the distinction of closing the regular maritime operations of the United States in the Revolution: The man who took the first important prize of the war also took the last one captured by a Continental ship. He died in Boston on 12 February 1793.

SEE ALSO *Privateers and Privateering*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MANTELET. A movable shelter to protect men attacking a fortified place. British engineer Moncrieff used them in the Charleston expedition of 1780.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Regular Approaches*.

MANUFACTURING IN AMERICA.

American industry had not developed sufficiently by the time of the Revolution to be able to supply the rebel armies with the means to resist increased imperial control, and few of the shortcomings in the supply of manufactured goods were remedied during the war. The limited American industrial base was overwhelmed by the sudden, sharp, and continuing spike in demand for clothing, weapons, shelter, munitions, and the whole host of other things required to sustain the war effort. Enlisting men into military service meant that manpower was being reallocated away from manufacturing, and this phenomenon, plus the often extreme dislocation caused by active military operations, ensured that Americans remained dependent on foreign, especially French, sources of supply until 1783.

Before the war, the British imperial government had discouraged the development of manufacturing in the colonies, preferring to use them as sources of raw materials and markets for finished goods. Because the cost of land in the colonies was relatively low and the cost of labor relatively high, those colonists who managed to accumulate risk capital generally invested it in acquiring land rather than in establishing manufactories. A notable exception was the shipbuilding industry: by 1760 a third of all British tonnage was American-built. In the ten years up to 1775, 25,000 tons a year were turned out, at costs that were 20 to 50 percent lower than in Europe, thanks largely to the widespread local availability of timber and naval stores.

The manufacture of iron goods provides an example of the handicaps under which American industry labored. Iron manufacturing actually expanded rapidly before the war, despite restrictions in 1750 and 1757 under the Navigation Acts, because the demand was so high. In 1775 the colonies produced 15 percent of the world’s

iron, but imperial legislation inhibited the development of the sorts of workshops needed to turn bar iron into finished products. Imported iron goods were cheaper than nearly anything that could be produced domestically, including such simple items as iron nails. Efforts were made at the outset of the war to expand the capacity to manufacture metal goods, and to produce war materiel. By late 1775, the foundries of Philadelphia were casting cannon of bronze and iron, but they ceased these operations after a few years. Salisbury Furnace, in northwest Connecticut, also started casting cannon in 1775, but it, too, had almost ceased to operate by 1778. Technical knowledge was undeveloped, and the homemade products were inferior and more expensive than cannon imported from France.

American gunsmiths were among the finest craftsmen of individual firearms in the world and although, for example, more than 4,000 stand of arms were made in Pennsylvania over the winter of 1775–1776, they did not develop the mass production techniques needed to meet the extraordinary demand for small arms during the war. The arsenal at Springfield, Massachusetts, established in 1778, was so poorly managed that, in 1780, the Board of War recommended it be abandoned. A new United States arsenal was established at Springfield only in 1794.

Gunpowder was the single most important manufactured commodity necessary to wage an armed struggle, and the American armies never had enough of it. Six powder mills in Pennsylvania managed to produce several thousand pounds of powder a week by 1776, but a general shortage of saltpeter and sulfur, plus a lack of technical knowledge, frustrated this and other local efforts. American gunpowder was considered to be inferior in quality, and more expensive, than gunpowder manufactured in, and imported from, Europe. The Continental Congress and individual states bent every effort to acquire gunpowder and other munitions from overseas suppliers, especially in France, and managed to import directly or via the West Indies sufficient quantities to sustain the war effort through 1775 and 1776. The clandestine activities of Pierre Caron de Beaumarchais and his front company of Hortalez et Cie began to have an impact on army supplies in 1777. Once France openly allied with the rebels in February 1778, a steady stream of clothing and munitions made its way to American ports, where it faced the further problems involved in transporting the material to the American armies. The relative abundance and low cost of French supplies further dampened American efforts to supply war materiel for themselves. For example, lead mines in Virginia were abandoned early in the war, in part because importing lead from France was cheaper.

Textiles were another area of critical shortage. Women made linen at home, but the colonies had little wool for winter clothing and blankets. Canvas was needed

for tents and sails, but demand rose so rapidly that supplies could not keep up. Canvas already in use for awnings and sails was remanufactured to provide tents and idle ships were eyed for the cloth in their sails. Pre-war efforts to pressure the imperial government to reverse its policies by refusing to import British manufactures had given an impetus to weaving, but the industry had not developed sufficiently to supply clothes for soldiers whose constant activity created a continual need for resupply.

Non-importation had also given an impetus to shoemakers, and during the war the Americans tried to manage the problem of turning the hides of cattle slaughtered for the army into shoes. A commissary of hides was appointed in 1777 to organize and oversee this task, but the results were unsatisfactory. The pressure to produce more shoes, a soldier's most indispensable article of clothing, led to shortcuts in the tanning process and in sewing shoes. The result was uncomfortable footwear that lacked durability.

Manufacturing enterprises in colonial America tended to be concentrated in towns and cities, where markets attracted the largest numbers of artisans and skilled workers. Philadelphia, for example, was a center for the production of hats, shoes, stockings, earthenware, cordage, and soap. Market pressures also created areas of specialized manufacturing. Lancaster, Pennsylvania, was a center of woolen and linen weaving as well as gunsmithing. Lynn, Massachusetts, was known for its concentration of families that produced shoes. Other enterprises, especially the production of raw metals, were located in areas, mostly rural, where the required resources were grouped closely together. The Brown family of Providence, Rhode Island, for example, established an iron furnace at Hope, on the Pawtuxet River, where ore, wood for conversion to charcoal, limestone, and water power were all readily available.

SEE ALSO *Mercantilism; Muskets and Musketry; Naval Stores; Nonimportation; Supply of the Continental Army.*

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MARINE COMMITTEE. Formally established by Congress on 14 December 1775 with thirteen members, one from each colony, the Marine Committee was the immediate successor of the Naval Committee as Congress’s agent for directing naval affairs. Its most important accomplishment was probably its first: sponsorship of a Rhode Island proposal to create an actual navy, made up of thirteen purpose-built warships rather than a passel of converted merchantmen. Plagued by a constant turnover in membership, it struggled to build the land-based infrastructure of administration needed to support ships at sea. Unable to exercise effective control over its far-flung agents, especially the Navy Board of the Eastern Department at Boston, and enmeshed in an accounting nightmare of cost overruns and unclear expenditures, it failed on three successive occasions in the spring of 1779 to reach a quorum. It took the Congress the rest of the year to decide what to do, but finally in December the delegates decided to replace it with a Board of Admiralty, consisting of two delegates and three commissioners who were not members of Congress.

SEE ALSO *Naval Committee; Naval Operations, Strategic Overview.*

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MARINES. One theory as to the origin of “marines” as a distinct category of troops stems from the requirement in the early eighteenth century to protect British officers on shipboard from their “pressed” crews (men who had been, in essence, kidnapped and forced to serve on ships—a common recruitment method in use at the time). The marines, in this circumstance, were a species of seaborne military police. But there also was a requirement for crack troops who could constitute landing parties, boarding parties, and deliver musket fire from the rigging in close sea fights.

British marines made up a considerable portion of the Boston Garrison. Although they did not accompany the British column to Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775, a marine officer, Major John Pitcairn, was second-in-command of this force and figured prominently in the day’s historic events. Two battalions of British marines took part in the assault on Bunker Hill, where Pitcairn was mortally wounded. British and French marines figured in subsequent land operations in America and in practically all sea battles. When determining force strength, the rule of thumb was one marine assigned on board a ship for each gun.

The first American use of marines can be traced to the War of Jenkins’s Ear (1739–1843, fought in retaliation for an act of Spanish torture against a British privateer). At that time, an American regiment of marines was raised in 1740. Commanded by Colonel William Gooch of Virginia and officially identified as the Sixty-First Foot, “Gooch’s Marines” were raised in the colonies and fought creditably in the West Indies. American marines served on board privateers during the French and Indian War (1754–1763), and were sometimes known as “gentlemen sailors.”

On 10 November 1775 the Second Continental Congress resolved that two battalions of American marines be raised. Established as a package deal offered by the Committee on Nova Scotia, the two battalions were designed to be used as an amphibious landing force, for a projected naval expedition against British facilities at Halifax. In December, officers assembled their marines as the Continental navy put together its first squadron. On 3 January 1776, the fleet sailed from Philadelphia. With hopes of gaining powder for Washington's beleaguered army before Boston, 230 marines and fifty seamen landed on the island of New Providence two months later. The island's two forts were captured and all military stores and ordnance on the island were removed.

The first Continental marine detachment on record, however, was the seventeen-man group under Lieutenant James Watson that served on board the sloop *Enterprise* from 3 May 1775. Although originally from Connecticut, on 10 June they came under control of the Continental Congress when the delegates voted themselves the control of all forces on Lake Champlain. This marine force later took part in the battle of Valcour Island, 11–13 October 1776.

Throughout the remainder of the war, marines continued to serve on board Continental ships, and in one instance, with the Continental army during the battles of Trenton and Princeton, both in New Jersey. The concept of an independent corps of marines quickly disappeared, but their "amphibious" nature did not. In October 1777, marines executed a landing off Billingsport, New Jersey, and evacuated the besieged American garrison. In January the following year, marines captured and briefly held the island of New Providence for a second time.

A company of marines under Captain James Willing left Fort Pitt on 10 January 1778 in the armed boat *Rattletrap* for an expedition to New Orleans, and on 3 February the company took part in the capture of two French trading vessels near Kaskaskia. Along the lower Mississippi, Willing's marines raided Loyalist settlements in an attempt to wrest control of the river. The company reached New Orleans, where Willing remained, but a portion returned to Kaskaskia, Illinois, under the command of Captain Robert George and enlisted in a new artillery company. This unit participated in George Rogers Clark's operations against the Indians. The remainder later took part in the abortive attempt to seize Mobile, in British controlled West Florida.

The major marine amphibious effort came in July 1779. A joint force made up of New England militia and state troops, along with the Continental navy force engaged in an expedition to seize a British fort that had been established at Penobscot Bay, Massachusetts (now a part of Maine). Although the intervention of a superior British squadron prevented the successful accomplishment

of the assigned mission, the force of slightly more than 300 Continental and state marines performed admirably. They also took part in the unsuccessful defense of Charleston in 1780. On the high seas they were in practically every battle involving privateers and ships of the state navies, as well as those battles in which ships of the Continental navy were engaged. Marines served under John Paul Jones in his raids on Whitehaven, England, and St. Mary's Isle, Scotland, and were with him in the *Bonhomme Richard-Serapis* engagement on 23 September 1779.

James Fenimore Cooper has written:

At no period of the naval history of the world, is it probable that Marines were more important than during the War of the Revolution. In many instances they preserved the vessels to the country, by suppressing the turbulence of ill-assorted crews [in accordance with what was mentioned at the beginning of this article as their original purpose], and the effect of their fire . . . has usually been singularly creditable to their steadiness and discipline.

The navy and marines ceased to exist in 1783 and were not revived until 1794, when American merchant ships were attacked by the corsairs of the Barbary Coast of Northern Africa. The need to protect American shipping led to the revival of the navy, and by the spring of 1798 there were marines on board the ships that had been completed to address this emergency. On 11 July 1798 the U.S. Marine Corps became an individual service within the American navy.

SEE ALSO *Clark, George Rogers; Fort Montagu, Bahamas; Kaskaskia, Illinois; Pitcairn, John; Princeton, New Jersey; Trenton, New Jersey; Valcour Island.*

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revised by Charles R. Smith

MARION, FRANCIS. (1732–1795). Southern partisan leader who came to be known as the "Swamp Fox." South Carolina. The grandson of Huguenots who came to South Carolina in 1690, Marion has been described as being "not larger than a New England lobster, and might easily enough have been put into a quart pot" (Bass, pp. 6, 11). He was a frail child with badly formed knees and ankles. When he was about six years old



Francis Marion. *Marion, a wily partisan leader from South Carolina, became known as the "Swamp Fox."* © BETTMANN/CORBIS

his family moved from St. John's Parish (in modern Berkeley County, astride the Cooper River) to the vicinity of Georgetown. He was reared under modest circumstances and received a country school education. After surviving a shipwreck at the age of sixteen, he settled down to the life of a farmer on the family property.

In 1761 he was a lieutenant in the militia company of Captain William Moultrie that took part in the Cherokee Expedition led by Colonel James Grant. In his first experience under fire, Marion was selected to lead an attack to clear an Indian force from a critical defile, and despite sustaining twenty-one casualties in his party of thirty men, he accomplished the mission. His performance having been witnessed by important South Carolina men, he rose to a position of respect in his community. In 1773 he was able to buy Pond Bluff plantation on the Santee River, four miles below Eutaw Springs. In 1775 he was a delegate to the South Carolina Provincial Congress, and on 17 June was named a captain in Moultrie's Second South Carolina Regiment. He took part in the bloodless operations that drove the royal governor from South Carolina, and on 10 February 1776 he was at Charleston, ready to take part in the fortification of the harbor. On 22 February he was promoted to the rank of major (although some scholars date his promotion to 14 November 1775).

In the defense of Charleston, 28 June 1776, Major Marion commanded the heavy guns on the left side of Fort Sullivan (later Fort Moultrie), and tradition has it that he

fired the last shot of the engagement. On 23 November (again, there is some disagreement of the date) he became a lieutenant colonel, and on 23 September 1778 he took command of the regiment. Owing to a new congressional policy of keeping regimental commanders in the grade of lieutenant colonel, (to simplify the matter of prisoner exchange, which was done on a grade-for-grade basis), his title was lieutenant colonel, commandant of the Second South Carolina Regiment. Military operations in the Southern theater had been limited up until this time, and monotony increased the problems of commanders. Marion, however, established high standards of discipline. At Savannah, on 9 October 1779, he led his regiment in a gallant but unsuccessful assault.

When General Benjamin Lincoln returned to Charleston, Marion commanded the three regiments left at Sheldon, South Carolina. On 19 March 1780 he resumed command of his own regiment at Charleston. When the city was surrendered on 12 May, he is said to have had a lucky break that saved him from capture. Soon after his arrival in the city, the austere little Huguenot attended a dinner party given by Moultrie's adjutant general, Captain Alexander McQueen. According to historian Benson J. Lossing, "the host, determined that all of his guests should drink his wine freely, locked the door to prevent their departure. Marion would not submit to this act of "social tyranny," and leaped from a second story window to the ground. His ankle was broken, and before communication toward the Santee was closed he was carried to his residence, in St. John's parish, on a litter." (p. 769)

With all organized resistance in the South soon destroyed, Marion and a few followers joined General Johann De Kalb at Coxe's Mill on Deep River in North Carolina. He was sent to Cole's Bridge, but rejoined the American force about 3 August as it moved into South Carolina under General Horatio Gates. He was received unenthusiastically by the regulars in that force. When the Williamsburg district militia petitioned Gates for a Continental officer, Gates chose Marion, who left the Continentals around 14–15 August. Thus Marion avoided being involved in disaster at Camden. After the action at Great Savannah on 20 August, in which he rescued 147 Continentals that had been captured at Camden, Marion then led his 52 men in an audacious ambush that scattered 250 militia under Major Ganey near Blue Savannah on 4 September. Marion then retreated into North Carolina and camped at White Marsh, but returned to South Carolina, routed the Tory outpost of Colonel Ball at Black Mingo Creek on 29 September, and broke up a Tory uprising at Tearcoat Swamp on 26 October 1780.

After the British disaster at Kings Mountain (7 October), Marion's operations were of such concern to General Charles Cornwallis that he gave General Benastre Tarleton permission to take most of his legion

off in an attempt to eliminate this guerrilla menace. While Tarleton was gone, General Thomas Sumter's operations at Fishdam Ford (9 November) were so successful that Cornwallis sent an urgent order for Tarleton's return to the vicinity of Winnsboro. "Come, my boys! Let us go back, and we will find the Gamecock [as Sumter was known]," Tarleton is reported to have said after trailing Marion for seven hours through 26 miles of swamp. "But as for this damned old fox, the devil himself could not catch him!" (Rankin, p. 113) Unsuccessful in an attack on Georgetown on 15 November, Marion skirmished with a British column at Halfway Swamp on 12–13 December 1780, and then established a camp on Snow's Island. This "island" was a low ridge, five miles long and two miles wide, that was protected by the Peedee River on the east, Lynches River on the north, and Clark's Creek on the south and west. It is traditionally believed to have been the Swamp Fox's favorite base. Here he now organized "Marion's Brigade."

Nathanael Greene's southern campaigns were now under way, but after teaming up briefly with Lee's Legion for the raid against Georgetown on 24 January 1781, Marion was left to his own devices for another three months. In February 1781, Thomas Sumter started an expedition into Marion's district, and called on the Swamp Fox to join him. The two partisan leaders did not succeed in uniting, and as Sumter withdrew the British undertook a serious campaign to wipe out Marion's guerrillas.

Lieutenant Colonel John W. T. Watson was detached with a force of Tories "for the purpose of dispersing the plunderers that infested the eastern frontier." Since Watson was lieutenant colonel of the Third Foot Guards, some writers have assumed that he led this crack regiment, but Watson himself states that Rawdon (Sir Francis Rawdon-Hastings, a British commander) gave him a detachment of the Sixty-fourth Foot Brigade in addition to the Tories of Major John Harrison's Regiment. Marion checked Watson at Wiboo Swamp and blocked his drive toward Kingstree at Lower Bridge. Marion caught Watson as he crossed the Sampit River on the way to the British base at Georgetown. In the confrontation, Watson's horse and about twenty of his men were killed. "I have never seen such shooting before in my life," said Watson, but he complained that Marion "would not fight like a gentleman or a Christian." This battle successfully drove the British out of Marion's district.

While Marion was scoring this remarkable success, however, the enemy achieved one that was equally brilliant: Colonel Welbore Doyle found and destroyed Marion's base at Snow's Island. Hugh Horry led the pursuit of Doyle's New York Volunteers, and Marion followed with the rest of his command. After Horry had shot down nine and captured sixteen, and after two casualties were inflicted on the enemy rear guard at

Witherspoon's Ferry, Colonel Doyle destroyed his own baggage to speed his rush to Camden. It was not Marion's pursuit that prompted this sudden speed, but a message from Rawdon that Greene's army was again approaching Camden. Marion made contact with Henry Lee's Legion at Black River on 14 April, but only eighty partisans now remained with him. The rest had gone home. Nevertheless, Marion and Lee operated together during April and May 1781 to capture Fort Watson and Fort Motte, two critical outposts that protected British supply lines between Charleston and Camden.

Marion occupied Georgetown on 28 May, and then moved farther south to support the attacks on Augusta and Ninety Six. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Stewart cleverly eluded Marion's attempt to block his move from Charleston to reinforce Rawdon at Orangeburg.

While Greene's main body was recuperating in the Santee Hills, Marion came under the orders of Sumter and took part in an unfortunate action at Quinby Bridge, 17 July. Marion had such sufficient doubts regarding Sumter's leadership that he had avoided service under "the Gamecock." These doubts were realized in this poorly managed and costly skirmish. Marion then raced off to win a skirmish at Parker's Ferry. The date of this skirmish is in question, and many sources give 13 August as the date. However, a letter from Marion to Nathanael Greene gives the date as 30 August. After the skirmish, Marion rejoined Greene to command the militia forces of North and South Carolina, including his own brigade, at Eutaw Springs on 8 September. It was due largely to Marion's personal influence on the field that Greene could tell Congress, "the militia gained much honor by their firmness," and could write Steuben, "such conduct would have graced the veterans of the Great King of Prussia."

Elected to the state senate, Marion was at Jacksonboro for the General Assembly, beginning on 8 January 1782, but his brigade was given the mission of protecting the area. On 10 January he wrote Colonel Peter Horry and asked him to assume command, but on 24 February Marion had to take leave from his urgent political duties and rush back to take over. There was jealousy between Horry and Colonel Hezekiah Maham, who commanded the brigade's dragoons, prompting these officers to find one pretext after another to turn their responsibilities over to subordinates. At this critical moment, Colonel Benjamin Thompson led a 700-man expedition from Charleston, crossed the Cooper River on 23 February, and scattered Marion's divided forces. He rallied the remnants and directed a counterattack, but poor execution on the part of some of his untrained horsemen led to another reverse near Wambaw Bridge, about forty miles northeast of Charleston. Marion withdrew to his old camp at Cantey's Plantation (near Murray's Ferry), much demoralized by this sorry performance. The next summer

found Marion again assigned the mission of patrolling east of the Cooper River. At Fair Lawn, on 29 August 1782, he ambushed a force of 200 dragoons under Major Thomas Fraser, who had been sent from Charleston to surprise him. Captain Gavin Witherspoon's reconnaissance party led the enemy into a trap that cost Fraser twenty men. The British captured an ammunition wagon, however, and Marion was forced to retreat for lack of powder. He had fought his last action.

When the war ended, Marion was appointed commandant of Fort Johnson, a sinecure that brought £500 a year and compensated him somewhat for having lost virtually all his personal property during the Revolution. He was re-elected to the state senate in 1782 and 1784, and sat in the state's constitutional convention in 1790. Also in 1790 Marion left his post at Fort Johnson, and in 1791 he was elected to fill an unexpired term in the state senate. Meanwhile, in 1786, he married Mary Esther Videau, a wealthy spinster cousin about his own age. He died on 27 February 1795 at the age of about 63.

The "Marion Legend" has long obscured the history of his life, and the principal villain is Parson Weems, who also invented much of the "Washington Legend." Weems rewrote a manuscript on Marion's life that Peter Horry had drafted, taking some liberties with the details. After reading the Weems's book, Horry wrote him in despair: "Most certainly 'tis not my history, but your romance." William James, who joined Marion at the age of 15, wrote a simple biographical sketch of his idol, and William Gilmore Simms fashioned this into another fantasy. Historian Robert D. Bass gives this summary of the "Swamp Fox":

He was neither a Robin Hood nor a Chevalier Bayard. He was a moody, introverted, semiliterate genius who rose from private to Brigadier General through an intuitive grasp of strategy and tactics, personal bravery, devotion to duty, and worship of liberty. . . . By nature Marion was gentle, kind, and humane. Yet his orders, orderly books, battle reports, and personal letters reveal another side of his character. He shot pickets, retaliated from ambush, failed to honor flags of truce, and knowingly violated international law. He could forgive the Tories, and yet he could court-martial his closest friend. (p. 4)

Unlike Thomas Sumter, Marion could subordinate himself to higher military authority and fit his partisan operations into the over-all strategy of leaders like Nathanael Greene. While most famous as a guerrilla, he had the military standards of a regular soldier.

SEE ALSO *Black Mingo Creek, South Carolina; Camden Campaign; Cherokee Expedition of James Grant; Eutaw Springs, South Carolina; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

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revised by Steven D. Smith

MARION'S BRIGADE. After being named brigadier general of the South Carolina militia in December 1780, Marion was given command of all regiments east of the Santee, Wateree, and Catawba Rivers. The brigade's composition changed frequently, but began with the cavalry under the command of Colonel Peter Horry and was comprised of troops under Major Lemuel Benson and Captains John Baxter, John Postell, Daniel Conyers, and James McCauley. Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Horry (Peter's brother) commanded the foot regiment, while Colonel Adam McDonald was on parole. Companies were headed by Major John James and Captains John James, James Postell, and James Witherspoon. Colonel Hugh Ervin was Marion's second in command. Serving as aides de camp were Captains John Milton, Lewis Ogier, and Thomas Elliott, the latter handling the semiliterate commander's correspondence. An estimated 2,500 men served at one time or another in the brigade.

SEE ALSO *Marion, Francis.*

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revised by Steven D. Smith

MARJORIBANKS, JOHN. (1757–1781). British officer, hero of Eutaw Springs. Commissioned as an ensign on 24 May 1749, John Marjoribanks became a lieutenant in the Scotch-Dutch Brigade on 21 October

1749. He was promoted to lieutenant in the Nineteenth Foot Brigade on 22 September 1757, and was wounded in the siege of Belle Isle (1761), after which he was promoted to captain of the 108th Foot Brigade. On 2 April 1762 he returned to the Nineteenth Foot as captain-lieutenant, was advanced to captain on 15 June 1763, to brevet-major on 29 August 1777, and to major on 17 November 1780. From December 1779 to June 1780 he commanded a light infantry company at Kilkenny, Ireland. Sent to reinforce General Henry Clinton in the South, Marjoribanks and his regiment arrived at Charleston on 4 June 1781, and marched with Lord Francis Rawdon-Hastings to the relief of Ninety Six. As commander of the flank battalion he was mortally wounded at Eutaw Springs on 8 September, and died 23 October 1781.

SEE ALSO *Eutaw Springs, South Carolina; Rawdon-Hastings, Francis.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MARKSMANSHIP. Military marksmanship during the eighteenth century was tailored to the requirements of linear tactics. Measured against the norms that began to be developed at the end of the nineteenth century, marksmanship in line regiments during the Revolution ranged from very bad to almost nonexistent. Specialized units armed with rifled muskets were a partial exception, but even here the ratio of hits to shots fired was low by modern standards. Historian Christopher Ward calculated that at Lexington and Concord (19 April 1775), “only one American bullet out of 300 found its mark . . . [and] only one [militia]man out of 15 hit anybody” (p. 50). At Wetzell’s Mills, North Carolina, on 6 March 1781, twenty-five expert riflemen, all of them veterans of the action at Kings Mountain, in South Carolina, fired from relatively close range at the gallant British Lieutenant Colonel James Webster as he led his troops on horseback across a ford they were covering. Eight or nine of these riflemen even succeeded in firing twice, and Webster was not hit once.

British regulars were not taught to aim, because in the case of linear tactics, the volume of fire was more important than its accuracy. Indeed, their Long Land Service musket (the Brown Bess) did not have a rear sight and had only the bayonet lug for a front sight. An American, captured at Fort Washington (16 November 1776), reported that not fewer than ten muskets were fired at his group within a range of forty to fifty yards, some at within twenty yards, and he was alive to give this critique: “I observed that they took no aim, and the moment of presenting and firing was the same” (Curtis, p. 19). Given

that the weight of the musket was concentrated in its barrel, firing by volleys was prone to shooting both over and under the nominal target. Soldiers might hold the barrel too high with their left hand at the start of a fire fight, thereby sending their projectile over the target, while fatigue later in the encounter might cause them to let the barrel droop, causing the projectile to hit the ground in front of the target.

It is also worth remembering that eighteenth-century firearms were based on a double-ignition principle. The striking of flint on steel produced the sparks that ignited the powder in the priming pan, which then communicated part of the explosion through the touch hole to the main charge in the barrel. Many things could go wrong to interrupt the sequence. Wet weather could so dampen gunpowder that only about one shot in four could even be fired. Flints had to be held tightly and at the right angle in the jaws of the lock, and their utility could deteriorate quickly. Whereas a good American flint could be used to fire sixty rounds without resharping, a British flint was good for only six.

Legends abound about American marksmanship. Perhaps the tallest of the tall tales was reported on 1 October 1774 by John Andrews, a Boston resident, and is quoted by the historians Henry S. Commager and Richard B. Morris:

It’s common for the [British] soldiers to fire at a target fixed in the stream at the bottom of the common. A countryman stood by a few days ago, and laughed very heartily at the whole regiment’s firing, and not one being able to hit it. The officer observed him, and asked why he laughed. . . . “I laugh to see how awkward they fire. Why, I’ll be bount I hit it ten times running” (*Spirit of ’76*, p. 30).

The British officer then challenged the boastful American to prove his ability, whereupon the American, who carefully loaded the musket offered by the officer, hit the target three consecutive times. Andrews’ narrative continues:

He took aim, and the ball went as exact in the middle as possible. The officers as well as soldiers stared, and thought the Devil was in the man. “Why,” says the countryman, “I’ll tell you naow. I have got a boy at home that will toss up an apple and shoot out all the seeds as it’s coming down” (*Spirit of ’76*, p. 30).

The rifle shot that mortally wounded Brigadier General Simon Fraser at the battle of Freeman’s Farm (First Battle of Saratoga, 19 September 1777) apparently was one of a dozen shots fired from a range of perhaps a quarter of a mile. Daniel Morgan, commander of an ad hoc unit of riflemen, sent as many as twelve of the men

he considered his best shots into the tree canopy, to gain them elevation and a clear field of fire. One of them—in the nineteenth century the credit was lodged with Timothy Murphy—managed to hit an average-size man riding a horse 440 yards away. It seems reasonable to conclude that this success was as much a matter of luck as of skill.

SEE ALSO *Lexington and Concord; Murphy, Timothy; Wetzell's Mills, North Carolina.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

MARQUE AND REPRISAL, LETTERS OF. Papers authorizing the operations of privateers. The ship itself was often referred to as a letter of marque.

SEE ALSO *Privateers and Privateering.*

Mark M. Boatner

MARRINER, WILLIAM. Whaleboat guerrilla. New Jersey. Natives of New Brunswick, he and Adam Hyler operated in small boats between Egg Harbor (near modern Atlantic City, New Jersey) and Staten Island to prey on British and Loyalist vessels. Captain Marriner was a prisoner on Long Island; after being exchanged he returned to capture his captor, a Major Sherbrook. He also captured the Loyalist Simon Cortelyou from his house on Long Island. Marriner was particularly busy in 1780, famously capturing two British ships on successive days in August.

SEE ALSO *Hyler, Adam.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MARSHALL, JOHN. (1755–1835). Continental army officer, fourth chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Virginia. Marshall first saw action as an officer in the Culpeper minutemen in the operations that drove Lord Dunmore, the royal governor, from Virginia at Great Bridge on 9 December 1775 and at Norfolk on 1 January 1776. On 30 July 1776 he became a first lieutenant in the Third Virginia Continental Regiment. He was promoted to captain lieutenant in the Fifteenth Virginia in December, with rank retroactive to 31 July 1776. On 20 November 1777 Marshall was appointed deputy judge advocate, and on 1 July 1778 he was promoted to captain. On 14 September 1778 he transferred to the Seventh Virginia, and on 12 February 1781 he retired from the army. He fought at Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth, and Stony Point and also survived the winter at Valley Forge, where he said he served “with brave men from different states who were risking life and everything valuable in a common cause.”

In the spring and summer of 1780 he attended a course of law lectures given at the College of William and Mary by Professor George Wythe, Jefferson’s mentor, and on 28 August 1780 he was admitted to the Virginia bar. In 1783 he moved to Richmond from the frontier region where he had been reared and quickly became a successful lawyer. He was a member of the Virginia assembly (1782–1791 and 1795–1797), a delegate to the state convention that ratified the federal Constitution, and a member of the XYZ mission to France (1797–1798). He was a Federalist congressman from 1799 to 1800 and succeeded Timothy Pickering as secretary of state in May 1800. President John Adams nominated him to succeed Chief Justice Ellsworth of the U.S. Supreme Court, a position he accepted on 4 February 1801. During the next thirty-four years, the Court under his leadership became “the preeminent guardian and interpreter of the Constitution . . . and arbiter of conflicts arising from the clash of federal and state sovereignties” (Charles F. Hobson in ANB). His five-volume *Life of Washington* was published between 1804 and 1807.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

MARTHA'S VINEYARD RAID. 10–11 September 1778. After his Bedford–Fair Haven Raid in Massachusetts, on 6 September, Major General Charles Grey descended on the island of Martha's Vineyard to continue the British policy of harassing the New England coast. He landed at Holmes's Hole (Vineyard Haven), confiscated the militia's weapons, and wrecked its salt works. By destroying the vessels he found, Grey seriously hurt the island's whaling industry. His expedition also confiscated thousands of sheep and several hundred cattle to feed the garrison of New York.

SEE ALSO *Bedford–Fair Haven Raid, Massachusetts.*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

MARTIN, JOHN. (1730?–1786). Soldier, politician. Born in Rhode Island, Martin moved to Georgia with his brother James in 1767. He served in a number of public offices, beginning in 1775 as a delegate from the town and district of Savannah to the first Provincial Congress and then on the Council of Safety. This was followed by election to public office for Chatham County as sheriff (1778–1779), justice of the peace (1781), and member of the assembly (1782). In the military he served as first lieutenant, then captain, of the Seventh Company of the Georgia Continental Battalion (1776); lieutenant colonel of the First Battalion, First Regiment (1777); town major of Savannah (1778); and lieutenant colonel, Chatham County (1781). In October 1781 he was appointed commissary in charge of military stores and elected governor in January 1782.

Continental General Nathanael Greene sent General Anthony Wayne and his forces into Georgia that month, and Martin saw to it that the rebel militia and civil government cooperated as fully as possible. Martin and Greene had met in the vicinity of the Congaree River in South Carolina, probably in 1781, and each left a favorable impression on the other. Martin did his best to get militia into the field and supplies to the troops, but this was difficult to achieve due to near-famine conditions. While offering attractive bounties for joining the militia, Martin gave precedence to the planting of crops. He also located food supplies in neighboring states for the commissary to distribute to needy civilians. As Wayne, along with supporting militia, closed in on the British in Savannah, Martin moved the seat of government out of the backcountry. The British evacuated Savannah in July 1782, and the state government was reestablished there for the first time since 1778.

Martin's administrative abilities and understanding of human nature enabled him to guide Georgia on its

first steps toward rebuilding its shattered infrastructure. Violence did not end with the departure of the British, and Martin expressed his determination to end plundering. He used former raiders and the limited militia forces available to curb widespread outlaw activities and to locate badly needed slaves, horses, and cattle hidden by plundering gangs. Martin gained East Florida Governor Patrick Tonyn's cooperation in curtailing crossborder plundering activities. While he was unsuccessful in getting the General Assembly to adopt a lenient attitude toward Loyalists and the confiscation of their property, Martin correctly anticipated that it would eventually do so. The board of commissioners he established to manage confiscated property remained active for forty years.

Martin served as state treasurer in 1783–1784, and in early 1783 he was appointed a commissioner to meet with Creek and Cherokee Indians; he did not attend, however. Although little is known of his private life, he mentioned that his family was dependent upon food from the commissary during 1782, and he married Mary Deborah Spencer in December 1783. Martin died during January 1786 while traveling west for the recovery of his health.

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Leslie Hall

MARTIN, JOSIAH. (1737–1786). Royal governor of North Carolina, British officer. Born in Dublin, Ireland, on 23 April 1737, Josiah Martin entered the army in 1757. He saw action on Martinique and Guadeloupe, and took part in the Canadian campaign, rising in rank to lieutenant colonel of the 22d Foot Regiment. In 1761 he married his cousin, Elizabeth Martin, of "Rockhall" on Long Island. In 1764 he joined the Sixty-eighth Regiment on Antigua, where he stayed until bad health forced him to sell his commission as lieutenant colonel in 1769. Aided by family connections, he was commissioned the royal governor of North Carolina in 1770, succeeding William Tryon. He took up his new office at New Bern on 12 August 1771.

Arriving shortly after Tryon had forcefully put down the Regulators, Martin faced a number of difficult obstacles. He was immediately embroiled in a losing battle on matters of taxation, the "foreign attachment issue" when the legislature insisted on the right of North Carolina creditors to seize the property of British debtors, and other local matters. Since he could not reconcile the demands of the assembly with his instructions from the Crown, Governor Martin saw the colony's juridical system collapse even before he was faced with the local Patriot movement that started in 1774. He had the unfortunate impression that he could muster sufficient Loyalist strength to hold his province, and in March 1775 he urged General Thomas Gage to send him arms and ammunition. As the Patriot militia gathered around him, Martin sent his family off to New York, and on 31 May 1775 he himself fled to the safety of Fort Johnston, on Cape Fear, in South Carolina. On 18 July he boarded the *H.M.S. Cruizer*, just a jump ahead of capture.

Martin's incorrect evaluation of the local situation, coupled with that of other royal governors-in-exile, led the British to send Henry Clinton's ill-fated expedition to Charleston in 1776 and helped bring about the abortive Loyalist uprising that was crushed at Moores Creek Bridge on 27 February 1776.

After watching the Charleston fiasco in June, Martin went to his wife's home on Long Island. In 1779 he returned to Charleston with Clinton and served creditably as a volunteer under General Charles Cornwallis in the Carolinas in 1780 and 1781, taking part in the battles of Camden and Guilford. Again bothered by ill health, he left Cornwallis at Wilmington in April 1781, and after a visit to Long Island he sailed to London. He drew his salary as governor until October 1783 and was compensated for the loss of his property in North Carolina. He died in London on 13 April 1786.

SEE ALSO *Regulators; Tryon, William.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MARTIN'S STATION, KENTUCKY.

Because Kentucky was part of Virginia during the Revolution, it may be said that two places existed in the Old Dominion called Martin's Station. The more famous was on the Wilderness Road in the western tip of modern

Virginia and within twenty miles of Cumberland Gap. The other Martin's Station, named for John Martin, was captured and destroyed by British and Indian forces in the Kentucky Raid of Bird in June 1780.

SEE ALSO *Kentucky Raid of Bird.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MARYLAND, MOBILIZATION IN.

Because of its proprietary government, the movement towards independence in Maryland involved opposition to the Calvert family's control of the colony as well as increasing discontent with parliamentary policies regarding imperial governance. By 1773 the last vestiges of proprietary support had disappeared in the General Assembly and control of Maryland's local and colonial government increasingly fell to extralegal county meetings, committees of observation, provincial conventions, and a council of safety. The mobilization for such "out-of-door" politics required the traditional gentry-led, antiproprietary leadership to negotiate an often treacherous path through the forests of reaction, moderation, and radicalism.

For example, the enforcement of the Continental Congress's Articles of Association required coercion of those loyal to the crown. Coercion sometimes required the use of force; often this force came from crowd mobilization by some of the most radical leaders. For instance, when one Annapolis merchant attempted to unload tea from the brigantine *Peggy Stewart* in October 1774, a mass meeting dominated by militiamen defied conservative advice and forced the merchant to burn not only the tea but the ship carrying it. The arson of the *Perry Stewart* was so radical that the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr. commented that "Annapolis had out-Bostoned Boston" (*Colonial Merchants*, p. 392).

As in other colonies, the Maryland Convention reacted adversely to the Intolerable Acts, and in February 1775 it issued an "Association of Freemen of Maryland." This document required the signature of each citizen to support the colonial cause or be disarmed. Those not signing and posting a bond for good behavior were to be imprisoned. While many Loyalists voluntarily left the colony, others were forced to leave as local committees of observation became increasingly more radical.

By the next summer, the February association was no longer sufficient, and a second document, "Association of Freemen of Maryland, July 26, 1775," pledged military and financial support against British armed forces in American to back the common colonial quest "for the lives, liberties and properties of the subjects in the united colonies." While the proprietary governor, Robert Eden,

tried valiantly to preserve a nominal “hold on the Helm of Government,” he feared he would be unable to steer a course that would avoid “those Shoals, which all here must sooner or later . . . be shipwreck’d upon.” He lost his symbolic control of the ship of state when the council of safety allowed him to escape in April 1776.

REVOLUTIONARY MILITIA

As Governor Eden became a mere figurehead, the real power devolved to the extralegal agencies. The Maryland Convention that met in December 1774 created a rudimentary military force when it resolved that “a well regulated militia, composed of the gentlemen, freeholders, and other freemen, is the natural strength and the only stable security of a free government.” The convention then argued that the creation of a militia relieved the British government of the necessity of taxing colonials for the maintenance of “any standing army (ever dangerous to liberty) in this province.” It then disbanded the largely moribund colonial militia system and created a new militia under its direction. The governor lost to the convention his power to appoint officers and to direct the deployment of the militia. Soon volunteer militia companies appeared throughout the province, each electing its own officers. But these companies needed funds to purchase arms and ammunition and local Patriots began demanding “voluntary contributions” from all citizens for their support, in effect, taxation without official sanction. This effort sparked considerable controversy between those supporting the resistance to the crown and those opposing it. With the outbreak of hostilities in Massachusetts in April 1775, the situation became grave, and greater organization was required.

Not only did the convention face the possibility of military opposition from the British, it also found the militia companies becoming an enforcement arm of the increasingly more radical county committees of observation. A third threat emerged when Governor Lord Dunmore of Virginia offered freedom to slaves and indentured servants who joined him in opposition to the revolutionary movement. This required the regularization of the military structure of the province to defend against a possible social upheaval. The July–August convention called again for every able-bodied freeman to enroll in the common militia and declared that every eight companies constituted a battalion. These units constituted a strategic reserve. The more active component was forty companies of minutemen with twenty-nine Western Shore companies organized into three battalions and with eleven independent companies on the Eastern Shore. The convention armed the minutemen companies with provincial weapons. For both the common militia and minuteman battalions, the convention assumed the right to commission the field grade command and staff officers rather than have them elected, as were company officers.

But legal structure and reality differed greatly. By the time of the December 1775–January 1776 meeting of the convention, it had become apparent that reorganization was necessary. This time the convention disbanded the minutemen units and created a force of regular Maryland troops consisting of a battalion and seven independent companies of infantry plus two batteries of artillery. The regular battalion contained eight infantry companies and one light infantry company and was stationed at Annapolis and Baltimore. The convention posted two of the regular companies on the southern Western Shore and the remaining five on the Eastern Shore. These regular troops numbered only two thousand under the command of Colonel William Smallwood, with all of the officers commissioned by the convention rather than by election. Its leadership included some of the most ardent advocates of American rights; Smallwood, his regimental lieutenant colonel, and four of his captains were also members of the convention. This unit became the basis of the famous Maryland Line, one of General George Washington’s most famous Continental army fighting units. Its reputation for gallantry is the reason Maryland calls itself the “Old Line State.”

The remaining common militia units became one of the most important and, at least early in the independence movement, most radical elements in the revolutionary era. The pressure to enforce the universality of militia service brought tensions between those with Loyalist, neutral, and religious objections to joining and those who felt it was necessary to present a united front against British tyranny. Revolutionary leaders learned to accept those with traditional religious pacifist orientations, such as the Quakers and German pietistic sects. Dealing with Anglicans, Methodists, and Baptists who objected to this particular war and often had Loyalist leanings proved a more difficult problem. Nonetheless, the revolutionaries gradually obligated most white adult males to military service and with it the semblance of treason to the British Crown.

The militia units became the enforcement arm of the revolutionary movement. They forced individuals to observe the importation and exportation policies of the Continental Congress; those who did not obey were subject to punishment or banishment. They enforced the ordinances of the revolutionary conventions and later of the state government. They maintained order throughout most of the state with the exception of the lower Eastern Shore. The militia became the police force of the new state government and legitimized it in the eyes of residents who had to obey state laws and officials. From its ranks, the state’s Continental Line recruited replacements. Because Maryland was never occupied by British soldiers, the militiamen never had to counter regular soldiers. But because the state’s Chesapeake coastline was constantly threatened by British and Loyalist raids, eventually most

white adult males took up arms merely to protect themselves from raiders who made little distinction in their activities between the persons and property of Loyalists, neutrals, or Revolutionaries.

During 1775–1776 a few militia regiments called for far more dramatic social and political change than the more traditional antiproprietary leadership thought necessary. Perhaps the most dramatic representation of the radical position was that of the Anne Arundel militia resolves of July 1776, which urged the adoption of a new state constitution with universal white manhood suffrage, a plural executive, an annually elected legislature, elected county officers, real estate instead of poll taxes, and low fees for officials. These resolves also called for the election of all militia officers, including those of field grade and general ranks, and opposed the creation of standing armies. While these ideals were too radical for the long-established leadership to incorporate into the constitution of 1776, they demonstrated how the requirement to mobilize a militia system dramatized a desire for a more egalitarian social and political order. The historian Ronald Hoffman has argued that the members of the traditional elite “sacrificed principle for power” in order to overcome “the disequilibrating social forces unleashed by the revolutionary movement” and thereby preserved their leadership status from those they considered to be egalitarian demagogues (*Spirit of Dissension*, pp. 3, 222).

The greatest military crisis in the state’s history came in 1777, when Admiral Richard Lord Howe brought into Chesapeake Bay 267 sail, including 26 men-of-war, and General Sir William Howe’s army. Many militia units did not muster, while those that did often were without arms, gunpowder, or shot. There was more bravado than bravery among those assembled to defend Annapolis and Baltimore, but fortunately the admiral headed for the Head of Elk, where he disembarked his brother’s army for its assault on the Continental army in Pennsylvania. For the next several months Royal Navy vessels and Loyalist privateers created considerable alarm but did little damage along the Chesapeake coast. More dangerous were Loyalist uprisings on the Delmarva Peninsula during late 1777 and the first half of 1778. With the British army ensconced in Philadelphia and Royal Navy ships in the Chesapeake, militia units failed to muster and Loyalists openly flaunted their political preferences. The most significant event was an insurrection in Queen Anne’s County led by a romantic figure named Cheney “China” Clow in the spring of 1778. Brigadier General William Smallwood led the suppression effort that forced Clow and his followers into the Eastern Shore swamps, where they hid out but did little damage for several years.

For most of the war, ground operations of Loyalists were centered in the lower Eastern Shore and the Potomac River. In many respects the militia became more efficient

as it devised means to react quickly upon learning of the approach of the enemy, to move threatened livestock and foodstuffs inland, to operate under the command of a county lieutenant who coordinated local defenses, and to incorporate returning Continental army veterans into leadership positions. For instance, Charles County’s lieutenant was Colonel Francis Ware, a distinguished veteran of the Maryland Line’s campaigns of 1775–1776, whose leadership contributed significantly to the defense of the Lower Potomac Valley. Success in these activities involved coordination of local militia regiments with state naval vessels.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

Because the people of Maryland and Virginia depended so much on the Chesapeake for their livelihoods and the bay presented an inviting avenue for British and Loyalist incursions along the vulnerable coastline, the colony’s Patriot leadership provided naval as well as ground forces. In 1775 Maryland created its own navy by converting a merchant ship into the *Defence*, carrying eighteen six-pounder and two four-pounder cannon. Its mission was to escort merchant vessels past Lord Dunmore’s outpost at Norfolk and to clear enemy raiders from the Chesapeake Bay. Commanded by James Nicholson, she drove off the British sixteen-gun sloop-of-war *Otter* on 9 March 1776. When Nicholson became a Continental navy captain, command of the *Defence* went to Captain George Cook, formerly of the Royal Navy, who took her on a successful Atlantic cruise until November. The vessel remained inactive until it served as a state-owned merchantman sailing to France in 1778–1779. Sold to a Baltimore merchant in 1779, the *Defence* concluded its wartime career carrying supplies to the French navy in the West Indies.

Besides James Nicholson, who became the Continental navy’s senior officer, Maryland furnished a number of leading officers in the continental service; these included such distinguished commanders as Lambert Wicks and Joshua Barney. To man their vessels, hundreds of the state’s sons served in the junior officer and enlisted ranks.

Far more damaging to the enemy than the state’s Continental navy contributions were the efforts of her privateers. From Baltimore there sailed 250 privateers, and other ports provided more vessels that crippled British commercial shipping from the Irish Sea to the Caribbean. By 1778 over 559 captures were recorded by the state’s daring seamen, who found themselves amply rewarded for the risks they took. Often these efforts were combined with the transportation of foodstuffs to the French West Indies. However, the profits to owners, officers, and crew were such that privateering adversely affected recruitment for the Continental army and Continental navy.

One of the most famous of these privateers was the brig *Sturdy Beggar*, owned by a group of Baltimore merchants, whose Caribbean exploits in 1776–1777 resulted in several notable captures, including a merchant vessel from Senegal containing gold dust, ivory, and over four hundred slaves that sold in Hispaniola for over twenty thousand pounds. Before she sank in a storm, *Sturdy Beggar* earned an infamous reputation among British merchantmen. The naval historian William James Morgan concluded, however, that “American privateers were a festering and annoying thorn in the British Lion’s paw, but they were in no manner the decisive factor in the outcome of the war” (Morgan, “American Privateering,” p. 86).

Besides these private enterprises, the state found itself involved in thwarting Royal Navy and Loyalist forays along the shores of the Chesapeake Bay. In June 1776 the council of safety let contracts for the construction of seven row galleys. While the exact dimensions of these vessels are unknown, they probably had a keel length of eighty-one feet but drew only eight feet of water. Problems procuring cordage, sailcloth, anchors, guns, and other items delayed the completion of five of these vessels in late 1777. As a result, they were unable to counter Vice Admiral Richard Lord Howe’s incursion into the bay the summer of 1777. But for the next two years these vessels escorted merchant vessels and troop convoys, hindered smuggling, served as police boats, and transported war matériel. Usually armed with between two and four eighteen-pounders and ten to fourteen four-pounders, these small vessels combined with those of Virginia were able to keep the bay mostly under Patriot control until early 1780. At that time Maryland sold the galleys. Shortly thereafter, the British returned to the lower bay area and depredations along Maryland’s bay shore resumed.

Throughout the war Loyalism flourished on the Eastern Shore, particularly in Dorchester, Worcester, and Somerset Counties. Whenever British warships appeared, small Loyalist craft joined them and conducted raids against Patriot leaders, magazines, tobacco warehouses, military supplies, naval and commercial vessels, and private property. One such raid came in 1779, when Commodore Sir George Collier conducted an expedition into the lower bay that brought with it the plundering of accompanying privateers. Operating out of the islands on Tangier Sound, armed Loyalist barges grew bolder after British army units occupied the James River and Norfolk area in 1780. They were navigated by knowledgeable local watermen. “Commodore” Joseph Wheland commanded four armed barges that raided in St. Mary’s, Dorchester, and Somerset Counties. This plundering activity continued well into 1783, long after Lord Cornwallis’s surrender at Yorktown.

To counter these activities, the Maryland leadership had to rebuild the state’s naval forces. In the autumn of

1780 the General Assembly enacted the Bay Defence Act, and the state began gradually to build a series of barges for shoal water operations. This pace was too deliberate for those on the lower Eastern Shore, and privately built barges with crews of approximately twenty-five men soon began operating in local defensive operations. Small squadrons commanded by local commodores such as Zedekiah Walley and Thomas Grason appeared in 1781. Since the British navy operated in the bay at this time, Grason found it difficult to recruit men for his four-barge squadron, but he boldly undertook to counter a five-barge Loyalist force in the Tangier Islands on 10 May 1781 and lost his life and flagship in the process.

French naval dominance of the bay in the late summer and fall of 1781 curtailed Loyalist operations. During this time the state mobilized every possible water craft to transport the Continental and French armies from the north end of the bay to the encampment near Yorktown. The Yorktown victory did not end the Loyalist-Patriot struggle in the central Chesapeake Bay; instead, it seems to have intensified in 1782. A Virginia Loyalist named James Kidd, with seven barges and a galley, engaged Commodore Walley’s Maryland squadron near Tangier Island. The subsequent Battle of the Barges or of Crager’s Strait on 30 November 1782 was the bloodiest naval engagement of the Revolution in Maryland. The Loyalists drove off the Americans, killed Commodore Walley, and captured his flagship. The victory emboldened the Loyalists for months thereafter. The state’s final naval activity of the war was a successful raid by army Captain John Lynn against a Loyalist base on Devil’s Island (later Deal’s Island) on 21 March 1783.

CONTINENTAL ARMY UNITS

The regular Maryland troops of the December 1775 convention became part of the Continental army in the summer of 1776 as the 1st and 2nd Maryland Regiments. They participated in the defense of New York City, New Jersey, and Philadelphia during the 1776–1777 campaigns. In 1777 the 3rd, 5th, and 7th Maryland Regiments joined the Continental army, and along with the 1st Regiment became part of the 1st Maryland Brigade. The 4th and 6th Maryland Regiments became part of the 2nd Maryland Brigade along with the 2nd Regiment. Collectively known as the Maryland Line, these brigades fought in the 1777 and 1778 campaigns in New Jersey and Pennsylvania and remained part of the main army until the spring of 1780, when they were reassigned to the Southern Department and served in the Carolinas for the remainder of the war. All the Maryland regiments were reorganized in 1779 to consist of nine companies. William Smallwood eventually became a major general in the Continental army and commanded the Marylanders for most of the war.

Recruitment remained a constant problem as losses to battle, disease, accident, and desertion depleted the ranks. For instance, in the winter of 1777–1778, the Maryland and Delaware brigades stayed in Wilmington, Delaware, where they recruited replacements. Losses in the Southern Campaign, especially after the Battle of Camden, forced General Nathanael Greene to refill the 1st and 2nd Regiments from a provisional brigade created from the remnants of the Maryland and Delaware Lines. He disbanded the 6th and 7th Regiments. The 3rd, 4th, and 5th Regiments returned as cadre units to Maryland and recruited slowly. Eventually, they returned to the Southern Department—the 5th in February 1781, the 3rd in August, and the 4th in September. The latter two participated in the Yorktown siege. Another recruitment effort came during the winter of 1781–1782 and included bounties that the state hoped would entice enlistments and which in fact secured 308 new men. The battle honors of these seven regiments are now perpetuated in the 175th Infantry of the Maryland National Guard.

LOYALIST UNITS

From 1775 to the end of the war, Maryland's mobilization efforts also included a number of Loyalist units, mostly from the Eastern Shore. During the British occupation of Philadelphia, General Howe commissioned James Chalmers lieutenant colonel of the Maryland Loyalist Battalion. It recruited over three hundred men for a unit that participated in the 1778 New Jersey campaign and spent most of the war in Pensacola, Florida. More than half its men were lost to disease, death, and desertion, and the Spanish captured its remnants at Pensacola in 1781. Only fifty survivors received grants in New Brunswick, Canada, after the war was over.

By far the largest number of Loyalists fought in irregular militia and naval units in the wetlands and islands of the Eastern Shore, where they cooperated with Loyalists from southern Delaware and Virginia's Eastern Shore to harass the Revolutionaries and to support British forces in the area. Attempts to eradicate them by both Continental army and Maryland militia forces never completely achieved their goal, and the Loyalists continued their hit-and-run tactics until 1783.

THE YORKTOWN CAMPAIGN

Continental army Brigadier General Mordecai Gist was in Baltimore when word was received that the Continental and French armies were coming to the Chesapeake. Gist immediately organized the owners and captains of vessels in the harbor to go to the Head of Elk to carry arriving units, ordnance, and supplies for movement to Yorktown. Soon more vessels sailed northward to engage in a massive transportation effort. Governor Thomas Sim Lee ordered

a mobilization of militia units from across the Western Shore to march to Annapolis and Baltimore and assist in the effort. John Calhoun and Henry Hollingsworth, commissary generals of the Western and Eastern Shores respectively, worked under great stress to provide foodstuffs, supplies, and forage for the allied armies. After delivering the initial shipments to Yorktown, Maryland vessels returned to Georgetown, Annapolis, Baltimore, Head of Elk, and Eastern Shore ports for new cargoes for the allied forces. Gist found that the prospect of victory encouraged enlistments in the Maryland Line, which he took to Yorktown. George Washington later wrote that the supplies provided by the state were "so liberal, that they remove every apprehension of Want."

The war severely damaged Maryland's tobacco-centered economy, but it stimulated a variety of industrial activities, including the production of guns and gunpowder, iron, blankets and other textiles, shoes, saddles, and harnesses and the agricultural production of cereal grains and livestock. Rural Frederick County also found itself providing guards and food for the thousands of prisoners of war that were brought there following victories from Trenton to Yorktown. In Baltimore, water-powered enterprises dyed and carded wool; made linen, paper, and hardware; and ground flour. Baltimore shipyards build the continental cruisers *Hornet*, *Wasp*, and *Virginia*, plus a host of privateers. Like the rest of the fledgling Republic, the state found inflation eroding the financial situation of many of its citizens. The financial cost of the war created considerable stress in state politics from the late 1770s until the ratification of the Constitution in 1789.

SUMMARY

Because it was never invaded, Maryland's mobilization effort primarily consisted of providing a manpower base for important elements of the Continental army, the Continental navy, and privateer naval forces. Its militia served to keep Loyalism to a minimum except in the lower Eastern Shore, and its agricultural and industrial output made important contributions to the war effort. While its Loyalist battalion served the British army well, it was the partisan bands of Loyalists on the Eastern Shore that proved a pacification problem throughout the war.

SEE ALSO *Chase, Samuel; Eden, Robert; Gist, Mordecai; Paca, William; Smallwood, William; Stone, Thomas.*

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David Curtis Skaggs

MARYLAND LINE. The Maryland Line, despite its significant combat performances from Long Island in 1776 through the southern campaigns of Horatio Gates and Nathanael Greene, is one of the least understood of the state lines in the Revolutionary War. It started on 1 January 1776 as full-time state troops authorized by the Maryland Convention—a single regiment plus seven independent infantry companies (there were also two artillery companies). The Continental rifle companies raised in 1775 were organized under the supervision of the Frederick County Committee of Safety, not the Convention. In the summer of 1776 the Congress created two Extra Continental Regiments—the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment and the German Battalion—and Maryland furnished half of each of these. The riflemen, the German Battalion, and the artillery companies furnished by Maryland to the war effort were not formally a part of the Maryland Line. The state also agreed to send four volunteer militia battalions to the Flying Camp (a flying camp was a unit specifically intended to operate swiftly in response to a threat; it was the era's equivalent of today's "mobile strike force").

The Maryland Line in the Continental army appeared on 17 August 1776, when Congress assigned a quota of two infantry regiments to Maryland and the state troops changed their status without creating a second command and staff element for the independent companies. The expanded quota assigned for 1777 called for eight regiments. Careful groundwork by a visiting committee on 10 December 1776 assigned the officers who were in charge of raising the companies called for by the quota. The old regiment reenlisted as the First Maryland Regiment and the independent companies as the Second; the Third through Seventh Regiments were built around the rest of the veterans of the 1776 campaign. The cadre for the Third Regiment came from some of the regulars, but the others drew from the four flying camp battalions. Maryland refused to form an eighth regiment, arguing that its contributions to the two extra Continental Regiments counted as a whole additional regiment. This issue remained a bone of contention until 1781.

The Maryland Line served as a two-brigade division (with one outside regiment filling the hole left by the "missing" Eighth) and marched south to reinforce Charleston in 1780 with the Delaware Regiment. The division did not arrive before the city fell, but formed the heart of the replacement southern army of Major General Horatio Gates. On 15 July 1780 at Deep River, North Carolina, Major General Johann De Kalb issued division orders that temporarily reorganized the division for better combat efficiency into a single brigade of four full battalions, and sent the surplus officers home to recruit, planning to resume the official configuration when the replacements arrived. The First

and Seventh Regiments formed the First Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Adams. The Second Maryland and the Delaware Regiment formed the Second Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Ford. The Third and Fifth Regiments formed the Third Battalion, under Colonel John Gunby. The Fourth and Sixth Regiments formed the Fourth Battalion under Colonel Williams.

At Camden the brigade fought brilliantly, but suffered heavy losses. This led to a second provisional reorganization at Hillsboro, North Carolina, on 3 September 1780. The survivors now formed a single, full-strength regiment commanded by Colonel Otho Holland Williams and deploying as two four-company battalions plus a light company. Officially the Maryland Line dropped to five regiments on 1 January 1781, but in reality the two battalions were reconstituted as the First and Second Maryland Regiments, which fought under Major General Nathaniel Greene. When replacements arrived in February 1781, these troops were used to nominally reconstitute the Fifth Regiment. In practice they formed a company that served in combat as attachments to the First and Second Regiments. The Third and Fourth Regiments reorganized later in the year in Maryland, and served in the Yorktown campaign before heading south. In 1782 and 1783, as the British evacuated the south, Greene sent the Marylanders home in stages, with the last of the Line disbanding on 15 November 1783.

SEE ALSO *Gates, Horatio; Greene, Nathanael; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

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Robert K. Wright Jr.

MASON, GEORGE. (1725–1792). American statesman, constitutionalist. Virginia. Born in Stafford County, Virginia, in 1725, George Mason was the son of a wealthy planter. He became well known as the master of Gunston Hall, built on the Potomac River below Alexandria between 1755 and 1758, which was accounted one of the finest buildings in colonial Virginia. For several reasons, his important role in the years preceding the Revolution were played off stage: he valued his privacy, suffered from chronic ill health, his wife died early in 1773, and he had nine children. He sat in the House of Burgesses from 1758 to 1761, served as Treasurer of Ohio County in 1752, and came to know every powerful man in the Chesapeake region over the ensuing twenty years.

In 1769 he drafted the nonimportation agreement introduced in the assembly by his friend and neighbor, George Washington. He did likewise with the Fairfax resolves of 18 July 1774. In July 1775 he succeeded Washington in the Virginia convention. He was immediately elected to the Committee of Safety that took over the powers vacated by John Murray Dunmore. As a member of the May 1776 convention, he framed the Virginia Bill of Rights and Constitution. This piece of writing had wide influence: Thomas Jefferson drew on it in drafting the first part of the Declaration of Independence; it was copied by many states; it was the basis for the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution; and it even had influence in the French Revolution. Mason's state constitution was also a remarkably successful pioneering effort. He was involved with the revision of state laws and with disestablishment. He was on the committee that authorized the Western operations of George Rogers Clark, and he received Clark's full report.

A believer in states' rights, Mason was one of three of the forty-two delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia who refused to sign the final draft. (The others were Gerry and Edmund Randolph.) His views were expressed in "Objections to This Constitution of Government," which was widely read and influenced the structure of other anti-federalist writings. He attended the Virginia ratifying convention, where he and Patrick Henry almost succeeded in defeating the Constitution. Mason never reconciled to the new form of government, even after the passage of the Bill of Rights. He died at Gunston Hall on 7 October 1792.

SEE ALSO *Murray, John.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MASONRY IN AMERICA. Early in the seventeenth century, a society of London stone workers started admitting honorary members as “accepted masons” and initiating them into their secret signs and legendary history. By the early 1730s, lodges affiliated with the grand lodge of London had formed in the colonies. The Philadelphia lodge lasted only five years but was revived in 1749 by Benjamin Franklin. In Boston, the original lodge flourished and another was organized in 1756. They included such men as James Otis, Joseph Warren, and Paul Revere, part of a self-selected group based on shared values rather than on wealth or prestige. Men became Masons for a variety of reasons, “including status enhancement, social mobility, camaraderie, civic-mindedness, the satisfaction of mastering a ritual, or curiosity about the occult” (York). Their belief in the brotherhood of man happened to coincide with the spirit of the American Revolution. Many prominent Revolutionaries therefore happened to be Masons, and the secret nature of their meetings lent itself to radical politics. Washington was initiated in Fredericksburg, Virginia, in 1752, took the oath of office as president of the United States on his Masonic bible, and used a Masonic trowel to lay the cornerstone of the Capitol building.

The historian Neil L. York has stated: “It is doubtful whether Freemasons *qua* Freemasons played a significant role in the American Revolution, even as their members joined the Revolutionary movement or stayed loyal to Britain. Masonry as an institution did not figure in the eventual revolt; even so, the ideas and values of Masons may have played a role, along with other beliefs that historians have traditionally linked to the Revolutionary cause.”

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MASSACHUSETTS, MOBILIZATION IN. When Britain forced France to concede its colonies in North America in 1763, Americans were jubilant

and proud. While basking in victory, Britain determined to reduce its war debt and to rationalize its expanded colonial holdings. By 1775, Americans’ political views had shifted diametrically from taking pride in the British empire to making war against Britain as a result of the headlong conflict between British policies and the colonial experience of political and economic autonomy.

POLITICIZATION

British decisions to limit settlement in the Ohio Valley (Proclamation Line, 1763) frustrated land-hungry colonists. The Sugar Act (1764) and the Stamp Tax (1765) struck at the pocketbooks of colonists across the board. The Sons of Liberty organized to promote street protests that prevented the Stamp Act from going into effect. Parliament repealed the Stamp Act in 1766, but simultaneously claimed its right to “make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies and people of America, in all cases whatsoever” (Declaratory Act). They followed up with a series of new taxes on imported goods (Townsend Revenue Act), and attitudes both in America and Britain hardened over who would control colonial policy. What seemed reasonable to Parliament was perceived by Americans as an assault on their traditional constitutional rights.

Massachusetts leaders like Samuel Adams and James Otis turned the new British policies into public debates. In response to British-imposed taxes, women joined men in boycotting British goods. Radical polemicists inundated Massachusetts with political broadsides and pamphlets that drew increasing numbers of ordinary citizens into imperial politics. However, many Americans were reluctant to side with radical critics of Britain. Some Massachusetts merchants with ties to London, office holders, royal appointees, and others with an affinity for Britain, felt that the economic and political interests of the colonies were best served by remaining within the empire. Others, like Massachusetts-born Governor Thomas Hutchinson and stamp distributor Andrew Oliver, considered the rebellious faction as “rabble” who threatened social stability.

British authorities responded to the harassment of royal officials by stationing troops in Boston in 1768, and tensions between Bostonians and British troops flared sporadically into violence (Boston Massacre, 1770). In 1772, Boston political radicals (Whigs) led by Samuel Adams formed the first Committee of Correspondence after a dispute over control of judges’ salaries. Their litany of complaints addressed royal tax policies, tax collectors, the quartering of troops, judicial jurisdictions, the independence of colonial assemblies, restrictions of colonial manufacturers, and a controversial British proposal for an American episcopate. New Englanders saw expansion of



The Site of the Boston Massacre. A circle of cobblestones in front of Boston's Old State House marks the site of the Boston Massacre, a clash in March 1770 between colonists and British soldiers that left five Americans dead. © KEVIN FLEMING/CORBIS

the Church of England as a direct attack on their congregations. The Committee of Correspondence framed its campaign as a defense of their traditional rights as Englishmen to stimulate popular political debate. Local committees quickly dominated local governance and put pressure on Loyalist sympathizers (Tories). Still, many Americans remained reluctant to disavow Loyalty to the crown, blaming Parliament or other political officials for the ills that had befallen the colonies.


When Parliament passed the Tea Act (1773) granting exclusive distribution to the failing East India Company, public protest ignited, culminating in the destruction at Boston harbor of British-owned tea (Boston Tea Party, 1773). Outraged British authorities determined to punish the people of Massachusetts and the port of Boston with the passage of the Intolerable (Coercive) Acts in 1774. Key provisions of the Intolerable Acts closed the port and suspended local government. Massachusetts activists were poised to respond. They met across the state in county conventions and vowed to defend their liberties and to prepare for armed resistance, if necessary.

In August 1774, royal Governor General Thomas Gage learned that county conventions were meeting to challenge his administration of British policy. Berkshire County was first, but nearly every county quickly followed, to discuss how to respond to what they saw as a royal *coup d'état*. After the Worcester County convention in September 1774, 6,000 militiamen assembled on Worcester common to prevent royally appointed judges from opening the courts. Additionally, the Worcester convention voted a series of resolves that rounded out its "revolution" by taking control of the militia. All militia officers with royal appointments were ordered to publicly resign, and the towns were ordered to select new officers. General Gage wrote Lord Dartmouth (William Legge) in London that "the Flames of sedition had spread universally throughout the Country beyond Conception."

The county resolutions demonstrate a convergence of thought rather than simply a top-down inculcation of revolutionary discourse. Popular political activism conjoined with continuous missteps by the British imperial government to produce a cautious consensus among the people of Massachusetts, expressed as concern with "the dangerous and alarming situation of public affairs," and they determined to adopt a course that would "promote the true interest of his majesty, and the peace, welfare, and prosperity of the province." The Massachusetts Provincial Congress continued to meet, despite being banned, and ordered that tax collections be withheld from the royal collector, Harrison Gray. Having taken control of local government, the militia, and tax revenue, Massachusetts colonists decided to arm themselves.

In October 1774, the Provincial Congress drew up a shopping list for some £20,000 of arms, including 5,000 muskets and bayonets, five tons of lead musket-balls, some twenty field pieces, and thirty tons of shot. "Apprehensive of the most fatal consequences" resulting from Britain's warlike preparations, subversions of constitutional rights, and endangerment of "lives, liberties, and properties," the Congress resolved that there ought to be a provincial Committee of Safety responsible for monitoring threats and mustering the militia in defense of the province. New militia officers filled the spots vacated by discredited Loyalists.

Additionally, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress ordered the formation of armed companies comprising "fifty privates who shall equip and hold themselves in readiness, on the shortest notice from the said committee of safety, to march." These "minutemen" were to be rapid response teams, ready to defend against any British incursions into the countryside. While riding through Massachusetts, Ezra Stiles noted that "at every house Women & Children [were] making Cartridges, running Bullets, making Wallets, baking Biscuit, crying and bemoaning, and at the same time animating their Husbands and Sons to fight for their Liberties" (Stiles, 1901, p. 180).



The Bostonians in Distress. This mezzotint, attributed to Philip Dawe and published in London in 1774, depicts the plight of Boston residents after the passage of the Intolerable Acts. Bostonians are shown in a cage suspended from the liberty tree, which is surrounded by British cannons, soldiers, and warships. The men feeding the encaged Bostonians represent colonists who sent supplies to the city during the crisis. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION



The Lexington Minuteman. Erected in 1900 on Lexington Battle Green, this statue by sculptor Henry Hudson Kitson commemorates the militia who fought against British incursions into the countryside. © KEVIN FLEMING/CORBIS

THE MILITIA TRADITION

Once a decision was reached to arm its citizens, Massachusetts set out to reinvigorate its militia, which, John Adams wrote, was one of the cornerstones of colonial society. In the seventeenth century the New England militia was a ubiquitous institution that obligated every free, white, adult male from sixteen to sixty, with few exceptions, to serve in defense of his local community. In the eighteenth century, local militias were not, for the most part, a significant fighting force, and they served primarily as a manpower pool for military service in the eighteenth-century British-French imperial wars.

According to the militia tradition, independent-minded colonial recruits enlisted for a fixed time with set pay rates, specified rations, and strict geographic limits. Expedition service was a voluntary contract, while local militia duty was a civic obligation. The French-Indian War (1756–1763) was an important training ground for the generation of American colonists who fought in the Revolution. American governments and merchants had gained experience in meeting the logistical demands of armies. Most importantly, the imperial expeditionary

experience provided a traditional model for meeting emergencies and staffing long-term expeditionary forces.

THE REVOLUTION, EARLY STAGES

When tensions between the royal governor and the people of Massachusetts erupted in open hostilities at Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775, thousands of Massachusetts militia surrounded the British garrison in Boston. Local militias immediately swept through their locales to neutralize potentially dangerous Loyalists. However, no sooner had the Americans caged up a powerful British army in Boston than the minutemen citizen-soldiers began to return to their farms and spring planting, leaving provincial commanders without enough troops to fortify their lines. The minute companies were only provisioned for fourteen days and were not prepared for a long siege. This first exodus of troops exemplifies a pattern of the ebb and flow of manpower into and out of the American armies that characterized mobilization throughout the eight-year war.

Massachusetts quickly called for an army of 30,000 to maintain the siege at Boston. Enlistments were to last for eight months, on the model of the earlier colonial expeditionary forces. Recruiting efforts were slow, not because of a lack of enthusiasm, but because of the prevailing belief in volunteerism, in limited contractual obligations, and in short-term service. Racial attitudes also slowed enlistment. In May 1775, the Committee of Safety in Massachusetts ordered that “no slaves be admitted into this army upon any consideration whatever,” despite the presence of a number of African Americans already serving in militia companies.

In June 1775, the Continental Congress agreed to nationalize the military effort and take responsibility for the Massachusetts army, selecting Virginian Colonel George Washington as commander in chief. The army of 15,000 soldiers that Washington inherited upon his arrival in Massachusetts was an amateur enterprise by every measure except magnitude. The American army was short of everything but manpower, and its most critical shortage was of arms and ammunition. Enough Massachusetts citizen-soldiers had turned out to deter a major counteroffensive by the British. However, the first year of the war caught Americans in the contradiction of committing themselves more deeply to a full-scale war, while maintaining that they were only fighting for the restoration of their rights as Englishmen.

When the opening hostilities did not produce reconciliation with Britain, American leaders had to prepare for a long-term struggle. In the fall of 1775, Congress approved a plan for a “Continental Army” that would constitute a stable and truly national military. The decision was made to recruit men for one year of duty, a compromise between Washington’s desire for professional

troops and public resistance to a standing army. Year-round soldiering was not part of traditional colonial military experience, and long enlistments hindered recruiting. American mobilization survived the rotation of troops because local militia companies turned out to fill the gaps while regiments were being reformed.

The first year of the Revolution provided a stark contrast between citizen-soldiers and professional European troops, as raw American recruits had to learn military skills and regulations in the field. This accounts in part for the unpredictable performance of American troops, but over time, as soldiers rotated in and out of service, the pool of experienced manpower grew. General Washington celebrated the survival of the colonial army at the end of its first year: "To maintain a post within musket shot of the Enemy for six months together, without powder, and at the same time to disband one Army and recruit another within that distance of twenty odd British regiments is more than probably ever was attempted" (Fitzpatrick, vol. 4, 1970, p. 208).

In the second year of fighting, the war was transformed from a fight to preserve the traditional rights of Englishmen to a war for political independence from Britain, and Massachusetts mobilization developed the procedures it would employ for the rest of the war. Mobilization began with Continental Congress requisitions to the state for troops and materials. State officials divided the quotas for recruits according to county populations, and then spread the quota among the towns, where the ultimate responsibility fell for maintaining the stream of recruits. Town records show improvised and modified incentives for each call for troops, as wary Yankees negotiated the best possible contract for their military services. Towns tailored their contracts to the changing marketplace for manpower, offering the most for longer term Continental enlistments and less for short-term militia calls. The bounties were reduced for service in New England and increased for out-of-state postings.

RECRUITMENT, ENLISTMENT, AND THE DRAFT

When sufficient recruits were not forthcoming, Massachusetts employed drafts, but in the Revolution a draft had a different meaning than it does in modern America. The modern draft brings the full power of the federal government to bear directly upon individuals, whereas recruiting in the Revolution left it to the towns to best determine how to raise troops. There was considerable room for negotiation in the context of local government. Not everyone was expected to serve personally, but everyone had a civic obligation to help the town meet its quotas.

The first "draft" in Massachusetts took place on 11 July 1776, the last in March 1782. Towns divided the

taxpayer list or the militia roll into "classes" or small groups of from eight or ten up to twenty individuals. Each "class" would then be responsible for producing one enlistee. Individuals in the class often pooled their resources to sweeten the official state or national bounties to entice a recruit. Failure to comply invited penalties that included fines, but in Massachusetts, social pressure was more important and effective than any coercive power, because the drafts were conducted by local officials dealing with their neighbors. In fact, social pressure was the only really effective leverage available, because fines were not easily collected. General Charles Lee once said that Americans would only fight if they wanted to; they could not be forcibly marched off to war.

The absence of coercive power to enforce conscription meant that the transitions of army personnel were unnerving to the officers who contended with a professional British opponent. Each year, after negotiations, Massachusetts men turned out to fill the ranks, but people generally felt that the military obligation ought to be widely shared among all of the able-bodied men. Despite a degree of uncertainty, the continued flow of recruits demonstrates that the recruiting processes, though decentralized and market-based, remained reasonably effective. Civil authorities in Massachusetts towns maintained sufficient credibility and popular support to sustain the flow of men and materials to the army. When recruiting was slow, the militia could be called to fill the shortfalls that typically occurred during the winter months, when regular enlistments expired and new recruits were forming replacement regiments.

In the second year of fighting, Washington pressed for longer enlistments to build a professional army capable of standing up to the British regulars. However, Americans were suspicious of establishing a professional army. They worried about the expense of a standing army, and popular republican rhetoric touted the superiority of the American citizen-soldier over European mercenaries. Despite these reservations, in late 1776 Congress called for a new establishment of eighty-eight battalions (regiments) to serve for three years or "during the war." The task remained to win over the sentiments of potential recruits. In the early months of 1777, the American army sent many junior officers like Lieutenant Henry Sewall to their home towns across Massachusetts to enroll recruits for the new three-year terms in the Continental army. In support of Congress, the Massachusetts General Court issued a resolve "demanding 1/7 part of the Militia to engage for 3 Years in the Continental Service." This call for troops was read in meeting houses across the state, but young men accustomed to the militia tradition of short term engagements were leery of the new call for multi-year tours of duty. To meet the new quotas, many towns

ordered a draft. The minutes of a town meeting in Northampton in April 1777 illustrate the process:

The Town then voted that the Officers of the several Companies of the Militia within this Town should be directed to ascertain the number of men that are still wanting in their respective companies and [divide] them in so many classes as there are men wanting . . . and enjoin it upon each of those Classes to procure one good effective man to engage in the Continental Service. (Holbrook, microfiche 138, nos. 24, 72)

Draftees would be paid the thirty pounds bounty by the town committee.

Even as Washington slowly built a national army, the Massachusetts militia continued to play a critical role. The British surrender at Saratoga in 1777 was arguably one of the war's most pivotal moments, and it was accomplished by an American army reinforced by a large number of militia from Massachusetts. In addition to vigorous militia recruiting, Massachusetts mobilization produced robust levels of recruits for the Continental lines and state regiments. Throughout a steady barrage of calls for recruits and materials in 1777, Massachusetts produced increasing numbers of troops serving for longer terms than before, and the cumulative effect of that upswing carried forward into subsequent years.

THE REVOLUTION, LATER YEARS

In 1778 and 1779 Massachusetts mobilization produced recruits in an uneven stream to the Continental Army, while simultaneously providing state militia to the Rhode Island campaign and the Penobscot Expedition. Meeting the quotas of 1778–1779 required almost continual recruiting in Massachusetts. Requisitions came at a rate of two, three, or four per month, and Massachusetts towns faced increasing difficulty meeting their quotas as the pool of men who had not already served grew ever smaller. Participation rates gradually diminished as the main British threats moved southward in 1779, and the main theaters of operation became more remote from Massachusetts.

The ongoing calls for troops were matched by continuous calls for shoes, blankets, beef, and all manner of things that are the lifeline of an army in the field. Massachusetts found it increasingly difficult to meet the calls for supplies as the wartime economy deteriorated. In Plymouth and Salem, the fishing and merchant vessels lay perishing at the wharves, according to observers, and the men went off to the army or aboard privateers, leaving the local economy and their families in dire straits. Nonetheless, Massachusetts towns repeatedly agreed to fulfill requisitions for the army and to subsidize soldiers' families at home.

During 1780s about half of the Massachusetts soldiers that had been mobilized were serving on active duty with the Continental Army in New York, the remainder in New England. They engaged in constant, small-scale fighting along the coast from New Jersey to Maine. In response to a Congressional request, Massachusetts called for 4,240 recruits to fill Continental vacancies in December 1780. This act authorized towns to classify their inhabitants and increased fines for shortages to £128 per man. The turnout was slow, but steady. Even after the American victory at Yorktown, the British still had two large armies in the field, at New York and in the South, and troop requisitions continued. Massachusetts was called to provide 1,500 Continental recruits on 1 March 1782. Bounties were increased, but deflation exacerbated a difficult situation. Active-duty pay had become nearly worthless. Depreciation so reduced the value of the currency that the town of Beverly offered a recruiting bounty consisting of a hundred pounds of beef, coffee, and sugar, ten bushels of corn, and fifty pounds of cotton.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS

In the final analysis, the decentralized character of patriot organization was less efficient than the imperial bureaucracy, but the effectiveness of the Massachusetts mobilization lay in the fact that decisions to support the war were ultimately made locally. Younger men took the brunt of service in later years, as families adjusted to the necessity of long term service. Recruits who lived in regions with the worst economic disruption, like Salem, turned to the Continental army to make a living. African Americans and Native Americans strengthened their claims to freedom and citizenship through military service.

Mobilization tapped young men seeking excitement, those with ambition, and others who were attracted by the incentives and promise of army pay during a period of economic disruption. Some rural debtors saw the war as a chance to redistribute power in a legal system that seemed to privilege merchants and bankers. But the strength of the Massachusetts mobilization derived from the sense of Massachusetts soldiers that they had "Something more at Stake than fighting for six Pence per Day." Many were stirred by the rhetoric of liberty, which warned that they must fight or become "hewers of wood and drawers of water to British lords and bishops." Washington never assembled a professional army in parity with that of the British empire, but he was successful, nonetheless, and his success was due, in part, to the fact that Massachusetts primarily mobilized the sons of the Yankee farmers, seamen, and merchants who served as citizens, not as hired mercenaries. In a sense, the successes and shortcomings of the mobilization in Massachusetts amounted to an ongoing popular referendum on the war itself.

The Massachusetts mobilization tapped recruits from across the social spectrum of their communities. A large proportion of them had strong social and economic ties to their communities, through marriage, kinship, and economic stakes in their towns. There were complaints of inferior quality troops, like those voiced by General “Mad Anthony” Wayne, who remonstrated that one-third of his troops were “Negroes, Indians, and Children,” but empirical evidence indicates that most Massachusetts soldiers who mobilized were yeoman farmers or their sons. The patterns of enlistments among Massachusetts soldiers in Continental, state, and local militia suggest that the multi-tiered mobilization system of local militia, state regiments, and the Continental army was suited to Massachusetts. Soldiers served at different times in different units—local, state, or Continental—depending on circumstances in their own lives and in the fortunes of the war. Mobilization was most successful with limited-term enlistments, in the militia tradition, and with the wide distribution of the obligations of military service among the adult male population.

AFTER THE WAR

As the war wound down in 1783, the new United States set a precedent that would last until World War II, that is, as soon as the fighting was over, the army was dismantled. Besides the deep-rooted suspicion of standing armies, the economic demands of maintaining an army had become almost unbearable during the latter years of the war. As early as March 1780, Massachusetts General William Heath reported that the people in the western counties were overwrought by taxes and were calling conventions, reminiscent of those of 1774, to discuss how to attack the problem.

While the state’s war debt and currency policies were the underlying causes of irritation, western Massachusetts farmers felt that the burden fell disproportionately upon them. The discontinuance of wartime paper money meant taxes and debts had to be paid in sterling currency while prices were falling for farm commodities. However, the problem was exacerbated by the fact that farmers had benefited from high commodity prices during the war and had taken on imprudent levels of debt. Battles between farmers and tax collectors became common, and servicing debts during a period of deflation was nearly impossible. The first explosion came in February 1782, when a Hampshire County convention determined to close the county court in order to end foreclosure proceedings. Samuel Adams went out to Hampshire in the summer of 1782 in an unsuccessful attempt to quiet the protests. More than sixty Hampshire County soldiers turned out in June 1782, not on alarm to meet the British, but to defend the new state government against irate citizens, pitting veterans against veterans who felt

the government was not considering their interests. The protesters were dispersed, but the underlying problems were not resolved. Within a few years, Continental Army veteran Captain Daniel Shays came out of the hills to lead a larger insurrection of disgruntled farmers. This event so unsettled the Massachusetts elite that they joined the call for a constitutional convention in 1787.

SEE ALSO *Bounties (Commercial); Continental Army Draft; Massachusetts Provincial Congress; Minutemen; Sons of Liberty.*

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MASSACHUSETTS CIRCULAR LETTER. 11 February 1768. To inform the other twelve colonies of the steps taken by the Massachusetts General Court to oppose the Townshend Revenue Act, this letter, drafted by James Otis and Samuel Adams, was approved on 11 February 1768 and sent to the speakers of the assemblies in the other British colonies in North America. It denounced the act as "taxation without representation," reasserted that Americans could never be represented in Parliament, attacked British moves to make colonial governors and judges independent of colonial assemblies, and invited proposals for concerted resistance.

Governor Francis Bernard dissolved the Massachusetts General Court on 4 March 1768 on the grounds that the circular letter was seditious. Before other colonial governors received a message from the earl of Hillsborough, (the new secretary of state for the American colonies), dated 21 April, asking them to prevent their assemblies from endorsing the letter, Virginia (14 April), New Jersey (6 May), and Connecticut (10 June) had already voted to support the Massachusetts position. After Hillsborough's letter arrived, eight more colonies joined in questioning the right of Parliament to levy taxes of any kind in the colonies. The New York assembly, the last to act, adopted in December a resolution urging the repeal of the Townshend Act.

Meanwhile, Adams, Otis, and Joseph Hawley led the majority in the Massachusetts House of Representatives that on 30 June 1768 voted ninety-two to seventeen against rescinding the letter. "The Massachusetts 92" became, like issue No. 45 of John Wilkes's *North Briton*, an emblem of resistance to tyrannical government. Governor Bernard dissolved the new General Court on 1 July. The seventeen "Rescinders" were publicly vilified and physically intimidated by the Sons of Liberty, and five lost their seats in the election of May 1769.

SEE ALSO *Adams, Samuel; Otis, James; Taxation without Representation Is Tyranny; Taxation, External and Internal; Wilkes, John.*

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MASSACHUSETTS LINE. Massachusetts furnished more regiments to the Continental Army than any other state, and the story of its line is the most complex. Although the Provincial Congress was in the process of planning a "Constitutional Army" to keep watch over the royal forces in Boston in early 1775, the fighting at Lexington and Concord caught it by surprise. Minutemen and militia had already set up siege lines around the port by the time that the Committee of Safety began to take charge, on 21 April 1775. The Committee voted to enlist 8,000 of those men and organize them into regiments subject to approval when the Provincial Congress reassembled. Two months later, on 14 June, when the Continental Congress adopted the existing forces as the Continental army, the colony still was unable to give precise information on exactly what units existed and how many men they contained. As it turned out, they had created twenty-three infantry regiments and one of artillery. These carried the names of their colonels. Massachusetts also furnished Henry Knox's Artillery Regiment and the First Continental Artillery, neither of which were part of the Massachusetts Line.

On 1 January 1776 the reorganized and reenlisted infantrymen became Sixteen of the numbered Continental Regiments: 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 18th, 21st, 23d, 24th, 25th, 26th, and 27th. The 1777 quota established by the Continental Congress dropped to fifteen regiments, mostly by consolidating and reorganizing existing units. The old Twelfth and Fourteenth Regiments disbanded and four new units were formed, again drawing heavily on veterans. In marked contrast to the other states, the Massachusetts units did not take numbers until 1 August 1779, as the army attempted to sort out competing claims to seniority. The quota fell to ten regiments in 1781, to eight on 1 January 1783, and to four on 15 June of that year, when the men who had enlisted for the duration of the war were sent home on furlough. On 3 November 1783 the entire infantry contingent of the Continental Army dropped to the 500 Massachusetts men of Jackson's Continental Regiment in garrison at West Point. That unit went home on 20 June 1784.

Because Boston had been under British occupation when Massachusetts raised its forces in 1775 and 1776, its population had not been given the responsibility for forming any units. Individuals who had escaped from

the city served, but only as individuals. When the 1777 reorganization took place, the absence of existing Boston units meant that it was again omitted. But since the city was now free and had made substantial progress in its recovery, General George Washington remedied the omission by allocating three additional Continental Regiments to Massachusetts officers, with the expectation that they would concentrate their recruiting efforts in Boston. Henley's, Henry Jackson's and Lee's had trouble reaching full strength, forming only five, seven, and six companies respectively. They formed a provisional group which joined the main army in 1777, leaving recruiters behind. Late in October the provisional formation broke up and its troops were assigned to Jackson's and Lee's units, while the men still in Boston became Henley's. On 9 April 1779 Washington amalgamated the three units under Jackson. On 24 July 1780 the state adopted Jackson's unit and it joined the line as the Sixteenth Massachusetts Regiment.

SEE ALSO Knox's "Noble Train of Artillery"; Minutemen.

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MASSACHUSETTS PROVINCIAL CONGRESS.

1774. The Massachusetts Government Act of 20 May 1774 virtually annulled the Massachusetts Charter of 1692. It stripped the General Assembly (the lower house of the General Court) of its charter right to elect the Council (the upper house) and prescribed that, effective 1 August, members of the Council would be appointed by the king and hold office at his pleasure. In accordance with the king's orders, Major General Thomas Gage (the royal governor of Massachusetts as well as the British commander in chief in North America) moved the seat of the Massachusetts government to Salem, where on 17 June the Assembly met under protest against its removal from Boston. After locking the door to prevent Gage's order to dissolve the legislature from taking effect, the Assembly proposed that a congress of delegates from all the continental North American colonies be held at Philadelphia in early September 1774 to concert a collective response to these violations of self-government. The Assembly promptly elected five delegates to represent Massachusetts.

A few weeks later Gage appointed thirty-six members to the Governor's Council, the so-called mandamus councillors because they were appointed by a writ of mandamus. Eleven immediately declined to serve, and the others came under such public pressure that they were forced to take refuge in Boston. On 1 September, the same day he sent 250 soldiers to seize government gunpowder from the Cambridge powder house, Gage called for the Council and General Assembly to meet together in a General Court at Salem on 5 October. Dismayed by the enormous turnout of armed citizens who responded to his seizure of the powder, and unable in the subsequent days to find a means to quiet the province, Gage on 28 September withdrew the

summons because he realized that his fugitive councillors would not be permitted to attend. Opponents of the Government Act chose to assume that Gage had no right to cancel his call for the Assembly to meet, so a majority of towns around the colony elected delegates to that body, who were seated at Salem on the announced date, 5 October. Gage made it a point not to appear, and after two days the delegates adjourned to Concord, where on 11 October they organized themselves into a provincial congress and elected John Hancock as president of this extralegal body. The Provincial Congress thereafter operated as the government of all Massachusetts outside British-controlled Boston.

SEE ALSO *Gage, Thomas; Mandamus Councillors.*

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MASSACRES AND “MASSACRES.”

SEE *Boston Massacre; Cherry Valley Massacre, New York; Gnadenbutten Massacre, Ohio; Haw River; Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey; Logan; Paoli, Pennsylvania; Paxton Boys; Tappan Massacre, New Jersey; Waxhaws, South Carolina; Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.*

MATHEW, EDWARD. (1729–1805). British general. He entered the Coldstream Guards (Second Foot Guards) as an ensign in 1746 and in 1775 rose to colonel and aide-de-camp to George III. He went to North America as a brigadier general in 1776 and led a brigade of guards at Kips Bay on Manhattan on 15 September. At the taking of Fort Washington he led the two light infantry battalions that secured a foothold for Cornwallis's troops below Laurel Hill. He was promoted major general in America in 1778 and on the general establishment in 1779. In May of that year he made a dramatically successful raid on the Virginia coast with Admiral George Collier. In 1780 he led a brigade during Knyphausen's Springfield raid and commanded the turning movement across Vauxhall Bridge on 23 June. He returned to Britain later in the year and became

commander in chief in the West Indies in November. He rose to full general in 1797.

SEE ALSO *Collier, George; Fort Washington, New York; Kips Bay, New York; Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of Knyphausen.*

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MATHEWS, GEORGE. (1739–1812). Continental officer, postwar governor of Georgia. Virginia and Georgia. Born in Augusta County, Virginia, George Mathews was the son of an Irish immigrant. He led a volunteer company against the Indians when he was twenty-two, and took part in the battle at Point Pleasant (in what is now West Virginia) on 10 October 1774. He became a lieutenant colonel of the Ninth Virginia Regiment on 4 March 1776, and was promoted to colonel on 10 February 1777. With this unit he fought at the Brandywine, and led the regiment in a deep penetration at Germantown, Pennsylvania, on 4 October 1777, where he and most of the Ninth Virginians were surrounded and captured. Mathews is said to have received nine bayonet wounds. After spending several months on a prison ship in New York Harbor, he was exchanged on 5 December 1781. On his release he joined Nathanael Greene's army in the south as a colonel in the Third Virginia Regiment led by Abraham Buford. He was breveted as a brigadier general on 30 September 1782.

By 1785 Mathews had moved his family to Georgia. He became a brigadier general of the militia, was elected governor in 1787, represented the state in Congress from 1789 to 1791, and again served as governor from 1793 to 1796. During the latter period he opposed the trans-Oconee adventures of Elijah Clarke and signed the notorious Yazoo Act, which authorized the sale of millions of acres of Georgia land to land speculating companies for ridiculously low prices. In 1798 President Adams nominated him as the first governor of the Mississippi Territory, but within a month his name was withdrawn because of dubious new land speculations and for suspected complicity in the Blount conspiracy, which sought to help British interests gain a foothold in Spanish-held territory in what is now Louisiana.

Mathews then became involved in highly questionable activities whose aim was to draw the then Spanish-held territories of east and west Florida into the United States. His technique was ahead of the times—he sought

first to stir up an insurrection of the English-speaking element, then to support these insurrectionists with recruits from Georgia, and finally to bring in “volunteers” from U.S. regular army units. Although the local military commander put a stop to that last part of the plan, the “insurgents” nonetheless rose up and, on 17 March 1812, they declared their independence of Spain. With the insurgents and Georgia volunteers, Mathews took formal possession of Fernandina on 18 March in the name of the United States, and by June was within sight of St. Augustine. Secretary of State James Monroe finally stepped in to repudiate Mathews and bring his adventure to a halt. Mathews was on his way to defend himself before the federal government when he died at Augusta, Georgia, in 1812.

SEE ALSO *Dunmore's (or Cresap's) War; Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

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MATROSS. A soldier who assists artillery gunners in loading, firing, sponging, and moving the guns.

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MATSON'S FORD, PENNSYLVANIA.

11 December 1777. After Howe's sortie toward Whitemarsh from 5 to 8 December, Cornwallis was sent from Philadelphia with thirty-five hundred men and almost all the dragoons and mounted jägers to forage along the south bank of the Schuylkill. He left the night of 10–11 December—at 3 A.M., according to André. By coincidence, Washington started from Whitemarsh toward Valley Forge winter quarters on the 11th, and his leading elements clashed with the foragers at the Gulph, near Matson's Ford (modern West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania) just after crossing the Schuylkill. The

American vanguard withdrew, destroying its makeshift bridge of wagons and planks. The raiders returned to Philadelphia the evening of the 12th with two thousand sheep and cattle (Baurmeister, *Journals*, p. 139). Washington's army stayed on the north bank through the 13th, remained in the vicinity of the Gulph until the 19th, and then moved to Valley Forge.

SEE ALSO *Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania.*

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MAWHOOD, CHARLES. (?–1780).

British officer. Cornet in the First Dragoons from 13 August 1752 and lieutenant from 8 November 1756, he became captain-lieutenant in the Fifteenth Light Dragoons on 20 March 1759, captain in the Eighteenth Light Dragoons on 6 December 1759, major in the Third Foot (Bufs) on 17 May 1763, and lieutenant of the Nineteenth Foot on 17 June 1767. On 26 October 1775 he became lieutenant colonel of the Seventeenth Foot, a unit that had been sent to America prior to August of that year (Fortescue, vol. 3, p. 173 n.). He led British forces at Princeton on 3 January 1777, Quinton's Bridge on 18 March 1778, and Hancock's Bridge on 21 March 1778. Having been appointed colonel of the Seventy-second Regiment (Manchester Volunteers) on 16 December 1777, he died on 29 August 1780, shortly after joining his regiment at Gibraltar.

SEE ALSO *Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey; Princeton, New Jersey; Quinton's Bridge, New Jersey.*

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MAXWELL, WILLIAM. (1733–1793).

Continental general. Ireland-New Jersey. Coming to America with his Scots-Irish parents around 1747, Maxwell received a very ordinary education as a farm boy

in what became Warren County. At the age of twenty-five, during the French and Indian War, he became an ensign in Colonel John Johnston's New Jersey Regiment and subsequently a lieutenant in the New Jersey Regiment of Colonel Peter Schuyler. On 8 July 1758 he and his fellow New Jersey Blues were ensconced in the rear guard of General James Abercromby's expeditionary force in its futile, bloody assault on Fort Ticonderoga.

Leaving the army in 1760, Maxwell entered British military service as a civilian post commissary and was stationed at frontier forts of New York and the Great Lakes area, ranging from Schenectady to Detroit. From 1766 to 1773 Maxwell dispensed provisions for two companies of the Royal (Sixtieth) American Regiment at Fort Michimackinac. Maxwell managed to hold his own among the rough-hewn, carefree troops at Michimackinac. When most of the Sixtieth was transferred to the West Indies, Maxwell returned to New Jersey to work his parents' farm. He soon became a leader in the Revolutionary movement.

"Scotch Willie" was a tall, ruddy-faced, stalwart man who spoke with a Scottish brogue. He was a member of the New Jersey Provincial Congresses of May and October 1775 and in August of that year became chairman of the Sussex county committee of safety. On 8 November he was commissioned colonel and raised the Second New Jersey Regiment. In February 1776 he marched north with five full companies and joined the American force invading Canada just as it began its retreat. He had charge of the rear guard of American troops as it skirmished with the enemy. Maxwell commanded his regiment in the disaster at Trois Rivières on 8 June and was one of those who, the next month, opposed abandonment of Crown Point. He complained to Congress when Arthur St. Clair was promoted ahead of him on 9 August. On 23 October he was appointed brigadier general. He returned to his home state about the time that the British turned to chase Washington's army across the Delaware. Maxwell had the assignment of clearing boats from the Delaware River so that the British could not use them. In command of four new regiments of New Jersey Continentals, on 21 December, Maxwell was sent by Washington to take charge of the militia at Morristown. A few days later, after the American success at Trenton, Maxwell got Washington's appeal for a diversionary effort against the British flank to speed the enemy's withdrawal from New Jersey, but he was not able to accomplish anything worthwhile.

Maxwell became the first commander of the light infantry corps, which was initially formed to oppose the advance of the enemy on Philadelphia. His troops bravely engaged the British van on 3 September 1777 at Cooch's Bridge (Iron Hill). At the Battle of Brandywine on 11 September 1777, Maxwell's light infantry harassed lead units of the British army as he and his men conducted a retrograde movement back across the Brandywine.

A principal critic of Maxwell at this time was one of the light infantrymen, Major William Heth, a veteran of Morgan's Rifles, who wrote his former commander on 2 October that since the enemy's landing at Head of Elk, "Maxwell's Corps 'twas expected would do great things—we had opportunities—and any body but an old-woman, would have availed themselves of them—He is to be sure—a Damnd bitch of a General."

At the Battle of Germantown on 4 October 1777, the New Jersey Continentals suffered heavy casualties as they unsuccessfully stormed the Benjamin Chew house. After this battle Maxwell stood a court-martial, charged generally with misconduct and excessive drinking. On 4 November he was given what the historian Douglas Freeman has called "something of a Scotch verdict" (Freeman, vol. 4, p. 535). He was not exonerated, but the charges were not proved. During the winter at Valley Forge, Maxwell's brigade comprised the First, Second, Third, and Fourth New Jersey Regiments.

On 7 May 1778 Maxwell was ordered to Mount Holly, New Jersey, as Washington coped with the complex strategic problems preceding the Monmouth campaign. Maxwell figured prominently in the maneuvers that followed and in the Battle of Monmouth on 28 June. He testified at Lee's court-martial that the accused was so out of touch with the tactical situation in the initial phase of the battle that he did not know on which wing Maxwell's brigade was located.

In July 1778 Maxwell guarded the New Jersey coast opposite Staten Island, and he continued with this mission until the next year, when he led his brigade in Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois. He returned to New Jersey and opposed General Wilhelm Knyphausen's Springfield raid on 7 and 23 June 1780. For reasons unknown, but certainly relating to a cabal of New Jersey officers from the Elizabethtown area, Maxwell was pressured into resigning from the army in July 1780; upon reflection he tried to withdraw his resignation, but Congress accepted it. Maxwell was elected to the New Jersey assembly for one term in 1783. He took over the ownership and management of his parents' farm (just south of Phillipsburg, New Jersey; the farmhouse is extant). Maxwell never married. He died suddenly while visiting the farm of his neighbor, Colonel Charles Stewart.

Maxwell was one of Washington's most reliable generals. Although regarded as a bit of a comical character, he performed brilliantly whenever he was given command responsibility in the field.

SEE ALSO *Lee Court Martial; Monmouth, New Jersey.*

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revised by Harry M. Ward

MAXWELL'S LIGHT INFANTRY.

Having detached Colonel Daniel Morgan and his Corps of Rangers to the Northern Army to help defeat the white and native American skirmishers supporting Burgoyne's invasion, Washington on 28 August 1777 ordered the creation of a new formation to take its place. He directed that each of his seven brigades detach 9 officers and 108 enlisted men to form an elite corps of light infantry, and two days later placed this 800-man force under the command of Brigadier General William Maxwell of New Jersey. Washington ordered Maxwell to skirmish in front of Sir William Howe's army as it advanced from Head of Elk, Maryland, toward Philadelphia. On 2 September Washington sent Colonel Charles Armand's four-company partisan corps to join the light infantry and ordered Maxwell to?

Be prepared to give them [the British] as much trouble as you possibly can. You should keep small parties upon every road that you may be sure of the one they take, and always be careful to keep rather upon their left flank, because they cannot in that case cut you off from out main body (Washington, *Papers*, Vol. 11, pp. 127–128).

The light infantry men fought their first action at Cooch's Bridge, Pennsylvania, on 3 September 1777, but ran out of ammunition and, lacking bayonets, were forced to retreat by a British bayonet charge. They were part of Major General Benjamin Lincoln's division at the battle of Brandywine (11 September 1777), initially posted on the enemy side of Brandywine Creek, and then helped to defend Chadd's Ford. They covered the retreat of the main body of Washington's army, collecting stragglers and the wounded. The corps was disbanded on 25 September, and Maxwell resumed command of the New Jersey Brigade. Reconstituted by 28 September, although now with only 450 men, it was held in reserve during the battle of Germantown on 4 October 1777 and was permanently disbanded shortly thereafter. Maxwell was later acquitted by a court-martial of charges brought by a senior subordinate, Lieutenant Colonel William Heth of Virginia, that he had been drunk at Brandywine.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Cooch's Bridge; Light Infantry; Maxwell, William.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

MCALLISTER, ARCHIBALD. (?–1781).

Continental officer. Maryland. A lieutenant in the Maryland battalion of the Flying Camp in July 1776, he became an ensign in the Second Maryland Continentals on 10 December, was promoted to second lieutenant of the First Maryland on 17 April 1777, and became first lieutenant on 27 May 1778. With Michael Rudolph, he was breveted captain on 24 September 1779 for their "military caution so happily combined with daring activity" at Paulus Hook, in the words of the congressional resolution. He died on 16 January 1781 (The name is also spelled McCallister).

SEE ALSO *Flying Camp; Paulus Hook, New Jersey; Rudolph, Michael.*

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MCARTHUR, ARCHIBALD.

British officer. Promoted to captain of the Fifty-fourth Foot on 1 September 1771 and to major of the Seventy-first Foot on 16 November 1777, he was captured at Cowpens on 17 January 1781. On 24 April 1781 he was made lieutenant of the Third Battalion of the Sixtieth (Royal Americans) (Ford, *British Officers*).

SEE ALSO *Cowpens, South Carolina.*

Mark M. Boatner

MCCREA ATROCITY. Daughter of a New Jersey Presbyterian minister, Jane McCrea (also known as Jenny) lived with a brother who had settled along the Hudson River about halfway between Saratoga and Fort Edward. She was engaged to Lieutenant David Jones, a Loyalist with Burgoyne's invading army. When her brother moved to Albany in early 1777, McCrea went to Fort Edward with the hope of meeting her fiancé when the invaders arrived. She was taken in as a guest by the elderly Mrs. McNeil, a cousin of British General Simon Fraser. On 27 July 1777 a band of Burgoyne's Indians reached abandoned Fort Edward, two days ahead of the main body of the British army. Taking the two women, they started back to Fort Ann, where the army had its headquarters at the time. They arrived with Mrs. McNeil and a scalp that was promptly identified by Jones as that of his fiancée, Jane McCrea. The most generally accepted version of her death is that she had been shot, scalped, and stripped of her clothing after her drunken captors had gotten into an altercation as to which should be her guard.

Burgoyne was put in a difficult position. If he disciplined the murderer he risked losing his Indian allies; but doing nothing would be condoning the murder. Burgoyne chose to pardon the murderer and deliver a lecture to his allies on the need to show restraint in warfare. The lecture did not go over well, and most of the Indians left Burgoyne's camp.

General Horatio Gates wrote Burgoyne personally, holding him responsible for the murder. Burgoyne wrote back in a lame attempt to defend his pardoning of the murderer as "more efficacious than an execution to prevent similar mischiefs."

The Patriots skillfully exploited this atrocity to whip up popular indignation against the invaders. Ironically, the murder of this Loyalist woman became a very effective recruiting tool for the United States. Washington wrote militia officers throughout New England urging them to turn out to save their own wives and daughters from a fate similar to McCrea's. The story spread with remarkable rapidity. Newspapers in every state published it as a dire warning of the fate that faced all American women if the British won. The first fruit of this propaganda campaign came at Bennington, where an unexpectedly large and effective body of militia turned out and annihilated a detachment from Burgoyne's army. Militiamen continued to gather, and they proved a major factor in the ultimate defeat of Burgoyne. The story of Jenny McCrea's murder, as improved by American propagandists, played a large part in mustering this mushroom army.

SEE ALSO *Propaganda in the American Revolution*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MCCULLOCH'S LEAP. After bringing reinforcements to Wheeling on 1 September 1777, Major Samuel McCulloch (or McCulloch) was separated from his men and pursued by Indians. He later claimed to have escaped by riding his horse down an almost vertical, 150-foot precipice to the bank of Wheeling Creek and across the stream to safety. How much of this descent was free fall and how much of it was a perilous slide is uncertain. Although Benson J. Lossing speaks of a "momentous leap," he calls the cliff "almost perpendicular" and says the horse and rider "reached the foot of the bluff" and then "dashed through the creek," making good his escape.

SEE ALSO *Wheeling, West Virginia*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MCDONALD, DONALD. A major in the British army at the outbreak of the Revolution, this elderly veteran of Culloden saw action at Bunker Hill before being appointed by General Gage to recruit Loyalists in North Carolina. Promoted to brigadier general of militia, he figured prominently in the Loyalist defeat at Moores Creek Bridge, 27 February 1776, was paroled and later exchanged in Philadelphia. Continuing to serve until the end of the Revolution, he died shortly thereafter in London. American accounts generally spell his name as given above, but he himself signed as MacDonald.

SEE ALSO *Moores Creek Bridge*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MCDONALD, FLORA. (1722–1790). Jacobite and Tory heroine. As a schoolgirl, Flora McDonald (her name is also often spelled MacDonald) helped Charles Edward Stuart (known in history as "Bonnie

Prince Charlie" and "the Young Pretender") escape to the Isle of Skye in June 1746, after the battle of Culloden. Captured, tried as a traitor to the British Crown, and imprisoned in the Tower of London, MacDonald was eventually released after the story of her exploit aroused national admiration. She even was presented in court, and when George II asked why she had helped an enemy of the kingdom she replied, "It was no more than I would have done for your majesty, had you been in like situation." This simple answer epitomized the "defense" that won her life and freedom.

Four years later, on 6 November 1750, Flora married Allan McDonald (a kinsman). In August 1774 she went with him and their children to join the colony of Highlanders that had settled in North Carolina. Here she did much to rally the Scots to the standard of Donald McDonald, who commanded Loyalist forces at the Battle of Moores Creek. Her husband, who had become a Tory brigadier general, was captured at Moores Creek Bridge on 27 February 1776 and sent to Halifax, Virginia. On his advice, Flora returned to Scotland in 1779, and he followed later. Two of their sons were lost with the French warship, the *Ville de Paris*, on 12 April 1782, when its commander, Francois Joseph Paul Grasse surrendered the ship. Flora is buried on the Isle of Skye.

SEE ALSO *Grasse, François Joseph Paul, Comte de; McDonald, Donald; Moores Creek Bridge.*

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revised by Robert M. Calhoon

MCDUGALL, ALEXANDER. (1732–1786). Continental general. Scotland and New York. Born at Islay, of the Inner Hebrides Islands, in 1732, McDougall came to America with his family at the age of six, and they settled in New York City. McDougall commanded two privateers during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), the *Barrington* and *Tiger*. Having accumulated sufficient capital, he set up a store in New York City, became a successful merchant, and undertook to educate himself. With the Stamp Act of 1765, he emerged as one of the most prominent radical leaders in New York.

In 1769 he wrote under the pseudonym "A Son of Liberty" the popular pamphlet, "To the Betrayed Inhabitants of the City and Colony of New-York." The New York assembly declared this document libelous and ordered McDougall's arrest on 8 February 1770. Refusing to give bail, he was thrown into prison and became famous

as "the John Wilkes of America." (Wilkes was a newspaper publisher in England who was famous for his attacks on the king and the Parliament.) Imprisoned for 162 days, McDougall was never convicted of a crime, and the government finally had to release him. Organizing the opposition to the Tea Act, he presided over the "meeting in the Fields" on 6 July 1774 that proclaimed the people's willingness to resist the Coercive Acts of Parliament. In addition, he served in the provincial congress of 1774–1775.

With the outbreak of the Revolution, McDougall became actively involved in the New York City militia, becoming its commanding colonel. Commissioned colonel of the First New York Regiment on 30 June 1776, he was appointed brigadier general on 9 August, just before the start of the New York campaign. He took part in the battles of White Plains (28 October 1776) and Germantown (4 October 1777), but rendered his most important service in the Hudson Highlands, where he was the commanding general during much of the war. Having been appointed a Continental major general on 20 October 1777, he succeeded Benedict Arnold as commander at West Point in 1780. He represented New York in the Continental Congress of 1781–1782, declined appointment as minister of marines in 1781, was court-martialed in 1782 for insubordination to William Heath and reprimanded, and twice headed delegations of officers to discuss pay problems with Congress, in 1780 and 1782.

McDougall retired from the Continental army on 3 November 1783, as served as state senator (1783–1786) and in Congress (1784–1785). The man who had roused rabble in his youth grew conservative with age, becoming an ally of Alexander Hamilton and the first president of the Bank of New York. He died in New York City on 9 June 1786.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress; Fields, Meeting in the.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MCGOWN'S PASS, NEW YORK. McGown's Pass (also spelled McGowan's Pass) is a defile located at the northeast corner of modern Central Park, where the Post Road ran between two steep hills before winding down a steep grade to Harlem Plains. This terrain feature was one of British General William Howe's objectives after landing at Kips Bay on 15 September 1776.

William Smallwood's First Maryland Regiment, much reduced by losses suffered at the battle of Long Island, was posted in front of the pass that day to stall the British advance. The Marylanders had orders to fall back to the pass and ambush the British there. Instead, the Marylanders inadvertently deflected the British toward a column of Americans escaping up the west side of Manhattan. The pass was held by Lord Hugh Percy when the main British force moved toward White Plains. Here the traitor William Demont entered the British lines, and it was from this position that Percy started his attack on Fort Washington, on 16 November 1776.

SEE ALSO *Demont, William; Kips Bay, New York; Long Island, New York, Battle of.*

revised by Barnet Schecter

MCINTOSH, JOHN. (1755–1826). Continental officer. Georgia. A nephew of Lachlan McIntosh and born in McIntosh County, Georgia, John McIntosh was an officer of the Georgia Line in 1775 and on 7 January 1776 became a captain in the First Georgia Regiment. On 1 April 1778 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and commandant of the Third Georgia Regiment. In his *Historical Register of the Continental Army* (1893), the military historian Francis B. Heitman identifies McIntosh by the nickname “Come and take it,” a phrase included in his reply of 25 November 1778 to the demand of Colonel Lewis V. Fuser that McIntosh surrender Fort Morris (Georgia, near Sunbury) with the honors of war. He was not present at the British capture of Sunbury on 9 January 1779, but was taken prisoner at Briar Creek, 3 March 1779, and was exchanged in the fall of 1780 (possibly early September) for John Harris Cruger, who had been captured in June 1780. After returning from captivity, McIntosh served to the end of the war.

Moving to Florida after the war, McIntosh settled on St. Johns River. There he was suddenly arrested by Spanish troops and imprisoned at St. Augustine on suspicion of illegal activities against the government. He then was held for a year in Morro Castle, Havana. After his release, McIntosh is credited with further acts against the Spanish in Florida, including his participation in a successful attack on a fort near Jacksonville, on the shores of the St. John's River. Some historians also suggest that, during the last months of the War of 1812, he was a major general of militia at Mobile, Alabama, but this is not confirmed in Heitman's *Register*.

SEE ALSO *Fort Morris, Georgia; McIntosh, Lachlan.*

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revised by Leslie Hall

MCINTOSH, LACHLAN. (1725 or 1727–1806). Continental general. Scotland and Georgia. Born at Inverness, Scotland, Lachlan McIntosh came to Georgia with his parents in 1736, shortly after James Oglethorpe established that colony, and settled at the place later named Darien. Little is known of his life prior to 1775. One historian, Benson Lossing, suggests that his father was taken as a prisoner to St. Augustine when Lachlan was 13 years old. In 1748 Lachlan went to Charleston, South Carolina where he is said to have become a friend of Henry Laurens, a future signer of the Declaration of Independence. It is believed that McIntosh lived in Laurens's home, and that he became a clerk in Laurens's counting house. Lossing further suggests that, when he returned home from Charleston, he became a surveyor and “was considered the handsomest man in Georgia.”

In July 1775 McIntosh appeared in Savannah as a member of the Georgia Provincial Congress. On 7 January 1776 McIntosh became a colonel in a Georgia battalion that later was augmented and incorporated into the Continental army. On 16 September 1776 he was promoted to brigadier general. A pragmatist, McIntosh tried to defend Georgia from its many enemies with his few and ill-supplied troops. In March 1776 he organized the defense of Savannah from British naval vessels, with little support from citizens or civil authority. In August 1776 he raided northern East Florida, breaking up the Loyalist settlements north of St. Johns River, but had to pull back across the Altamaha River in October. Fort McIntosh, the southernmost rebel fort and named for him, surrendered to the British and was burned by them in February 1777. McIntosh's recommendation to Washington that a large force should defend Georgia went unheeded.

McIntosh also requested clarification regarding whether civil or Continental authority held control of the military. While the question went unanswered in the abstract, it was dramatically played out in Georgia.

Beginning in late 1776 and lasting throughout the war, the radical faction, which supported state control over the military, campaigned vigorously to discredit General McIntosh, in part by declaring that he and various family members were Tories. In late 1776 they accused his brother William of conniving with the enemy and forced him to resign his commission. Button Gwinnett, leader of the radical faction, became president of Georgia in March 1777, and arrested another McIntosh brother, George, on suspicion of treason. Neither McIntosh nor Gwinnett would relinquish authority during the subsequent military expedition to invade East Florida, which failed as a result. They fought a duel, and Gwinnett died of his wounds. The radical faction circulated a petition to have McIntosh removed from the state. Prior to any formal action by the assembly, McIntosh was ordered to report to General George Washington for reassignment.

In December 1777 McIntosh joined the army under Washington at Valley Forge and was placed in charge of the North Carolina Brigade. He then inspected military hospitals in Pennsylvania and New Jersey and in May 1778 was placed in command of the Western Department with headquarters at Fort Pitt (now Pittsburg). He established Fort McIntosh and Fort Laurens (both in Ohio), despite encountering factionalism and lack of cooperation. Back in Georgia by July 1779, McIntosh assumed command of both the Continental and militia forces in the state, and radicals launched a renewed effort to discredit him. His wife and children were trapped in Savannah as siege preparations began in September 1779 and his request that all women and children be allowed to leave the town was denied, first by the British and then by the French and rebels.

McIntosh led Benjamin Lincoln's march from Charleston to make contact with Admiral Charles Hector Theodat Estaing, urging the latter to attack promptly (which he did not do), and commanding the First and Fifth South Carolina Regiments, along with some Georgia militia, in the second echelon of the attack. During November 1779, George Walton requested that the Continental Congress remove McIntosh from command. In February 1780 Congress did so, and McIntosh was informed while he was serving in the defense of Charleston. He became a prisoner of war on 12 May 1780, when Lincoln surrendered Charleston. He was released during the summer of 1781 and went to Philadelphia, where the Continental Congress cleared him of all charges in July.

McIntosh returned to Georgia in 1783, "incredibly poor," as he put it. In February 1783 the Georgia assembly declared Walton's 1779 accusations against him to be unjust. This did not inhibit Walton's appointment as Chief Justice of the state, however. McIntosh's son, Captain William McIntosh, publicly horsewhipped Walton after his first session in court. McIntosh was

brevetted as a major general in 1784. He never recovered financially from the war and took little part in public life.

SEE ALSO *Fort Laurens, Ohio; Fort McIntosh, Georgia; Gwinnett, Button; Lincoln, Benjamin; McIntosh, John.*

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revised by Leslie Hall

McKEAN, THOMAS. (1734–1817). Signer. Delaware and Pennsylvania. Born in Chester County, Pennsylvania, on 19 March 1734, Thomas McKean studied law with his cousin, David Finney, in Delaware, and set up a prosperous practice in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey. Living mostly in Delaware until 1773, he served as deputy attorney-general in 1756, clerk of the assembly from 1757 to 1759, and in the assembly from 1762 to 1779. He was speaker of the assembly in both 1772 and 1779. In 1762 he helped Caesar Rodney revise the state assembly laws. Becoming increasingly outspoken against British rule, McKean was one of the more radical members of the Stamp Act Congress of 1765. As justice of the court of common pleas and quarter sessions, he ordered the use of unstamped paper. As speaker of the assembly he led the movement in December 1772 for a colonial congress.

McKean entered the first Continental Congress in 1774 as a delegate from Delaware. In the Second Continental Congress he advocated reconciliation with England until early 1776, then started working for independence, serving on the vital Secret Committee. Although still a member of the Delaware delegation, he was influential in swaying opinion in Pennsylvania toward independence. When his vote for the resolution for independence was tied with that of fellow delegate George Reed, McKean's initiative brought Caesar Rodney, the third Delaware representative, racing back to cast the decisive vote.

Exactly when he became a signer of the Declaration of Independence is uncertain. Returning to Delaware,

McKean led a battalion of Philadelphia Associators (a militia unit) to Perth Amboy to reinforce General George Washington's hard-pressed army on 2 August 1776. He then went to Dover, where he helped frame the first constitution of Delaware. Failing re-election to Congress—he did not sit during the period from December 1776 to January 1778—McKean became speaker of the Delaware Assembly. For two months of 1777 he was acting president of the state. During the period from 1777 to 1799 he also was chief justice of Pennsylvania, but he remained politically active in Delaware and was re-elected to Congress from that state.

On 10 July 1781 he was elected president of Congress, serving in Congress until 1783. In 1787 he sat in the Pennsylvania constitutional ratification convention, where he supported the Constitution. He drew many protests in Pennsylvania from those who felt he should not hold so many important and conflicting political jobs. In 1792 the Federalist foreign policy drove him to the other party, and in 1799 he was elected governor of Pennsylvania as a Jeffersonian. He served three tumultuous terms, being frequently accused of nepotism, constitutional violation, and other abuses of the office. McKean died in Philadelphia on 24 June 1817.

SEE ALSO *Associators*.

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McKEE, ALEXANDER. (1735?–1799). Loyalist Indian agent. Born on the western Pennsylvania frontier, Alexander McKee was the son of fur trader Thomas McKee and a Shawnee mother. He served with British forces during the French and Indian War (1754–1763), acting as a scout during General John Forbes's expedition to the forks of the Ohio River and taking part in James Grant's ill-fated attack against Fort Duquesne in September 1758.

Resigning from the military in 1759, McKee remained at Fort Pitt to act as George Croghan's assistant at the garrison's Indian trading post. In 1766, Sir William Johnson, superintendent of the British Indian Department, named McKee to the post of Indian commissary for Fort Pitt and charged him with the responsibility of regulating the fur trade with tribes throughout the Ohio Valley. In 1769, he married a Shawnee woman living in western

Ohio. By the early 1770s his career had brought him land, wealth, and influence both among Native peoples and British officials.

After the beginning of the Revolution, McKee remained in Pittsburgh and discretely aided British interests within the region. Publicly, however, he disavowed his affiliation with the Crown in an attempt to protect his substantial economic assets in the Upper Ohio Valley and to provide a measure of personal protection in what was becoming an increasingly hostile environment. Threatened with arrest, assault, and death by area Patriots in March 1778, he joined Matthew Elliott, Simon Girty, and several others in fleeing Pittsburgh for British-held Detroit.

In June 1778, Henry Hamilton, the British lieutenant governor of Detroit, commissioned McKee as a captain in the British Indian Department. McKee spent the remainder of the conflict cementing the Crown's alliance with the region's Indian nations and participating in raids against Patriot settlements throughout the Ohio Valley. He accompanied Hamilton in an expedition against Vincennes in late 1778. In 1780 he led successful attacks against (Joseph) Martin's and (Isaac) Ruddell's Stations in Kentucky, and in 1781 participated in the defeat of Colonel William Crawford near Upper Sandusky. In 1782 he commanded an expedition against (William) Bryant's Station in Kentucky and defeated Kentucky irregulars at the Battle of Blue Licks. At the war's conclusion, he held a series of councils with the Ohio Country Indian nations, at which he convinced them to accept the terms of the 1783 Treaty of Paris.

Following the war, he remained active in the Indian Department. At the time of his death he held the position of deputy superintendent general and inspector for Indian affairs for Upper and Lower Canada.

SEE ALSO *Indians in the Colonial Wars and the American Revolution*.

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Larry L. Nelson

McKINLY, JOHN. (1721–1796). President of Delaware. Ireland and Delaware. Born in Ireland on 24 February 1721, McKinly moved to Wilmington, Delaware, in the 1740s. He practiced medicine and was

active in local civil and militia affairs. He served as sheriff (1757–1759) and was twelve times elected chief Burgess of the borough of Wilmington, between 1759 and 1776. In October 1771 he was elected to the colonial assembly, two years later he became a member of the assembly's five-man standing Committee of Correspondence, and he had a part in the major events leading to his state's joining the Continental Association (28 November 1774). He served as chairman of the Committee of Vigilance, and was charged with the enforcement of that Committee's rulings.

In September 1775 he became president of the Delaware Council of Safety and brigadier general of the New Castle County militia. The following year he was elected speaker of the new House of Representatives. In February 1777 McKinly was chosen president and commander in chief of Delaware for a term of three years. When the British occupied Wilmington on the night of 12–13 September 1777, shortly after the battle of Brandywine (11 September), they took McKinly prisoner and evacuated him to Philadelphia after the capture of that city. When the British left Philadelphia, they took him to New York City, where he was paroled in August 1778. Having gone to Philadelphia to get agreement of the Continental Congress, he was exchanged for William Franklin, former Royal governor of New Jersey, and in September he was free to resume his medical practice in Wilmington. McKinly took no further part in public life, refusing his election to the Continental Congress in 1784. He died in Wilmington, Delaware, on 31 August 1796.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

McLANE, ALLEN. (1746–1829). Continental Army officer. Delaware. McLane was born in Philadelphia, the son of Allan McLeane, a leather breeches maker who had come to America in 1738 from Scotland. In 1767–1769 young Allen traveled to Europe and visited cousins in Scotland. By 1770 he had settled at Smyrna, Delaware. In July 1775 he changed his name to McLane “to avoid confusion with that renegade Scot serving the Hanoverian King,” a reference to Allan MacLean, who had just reached Canada to recruit his Royal Highland Emigrants. His father died about this time, leaving Allan property worth more than fifteen thousand dollars.

After fighting as a volunteer at Great Bridge, Virginia, on 9 December 1775 and at Norfolk on 1 January 1776, McLane served with Washington's army in New York as lieutenant and adjutant of Caesar Rodney's militia regiment. At Long Island on 27 August 1776, he captured a British patrol. After fighting at White Plains on 28 October, he was with the rear guard in the retreat across New Jersey, took part in the attack on Trenton, and was promoted for gallantry at Princeton on 3 January 1777. He was promoted to captain in Colonel John Patton's Additional Continental Regiment in early 1777. After seeing action at Cooch's Bridge and the Brandywine on 3 and 11 September 1777, he was detached to raise in Delaware his own company of about one hundred men, to which task he dedicated his personal fortune.

After serving as advance guard for Washington's main column at Germantown on 4 October 1777, McLane on 7 November was given the mission of screening the army as it prepared to take up winter quarters at Valley Forge. On 3 December he warned Washington of a large-scale sortie from Philadelphia, intelligence that contributed to the Continental Army's successful defense of its concentration around White Marsh a few days later. McLane's company harassed enemy convoys and foraging parties so successfully during the winter that they earned the nickname of “market stoppers.” During January and February 1778 his men gathered livestock in Delaware and the Eastern Shore of Maryland to supply Valley Forge and Smallwood's command at Wilmington. Rejoining the main army with 100 to 150 mounted men, he resumed his reconnaissance missions, reinforced on occasion by 50 Oneida Indian scouts. As the Mischianza was breaking up in Philadelphia, around dawn of 19 May, his company, supported by a company of dragoons, brought many a red-eyed redcoat running to repel an “attack” he simulated by galloping along the enemy's outpost line dropping iron pots full of gunpowder and scrap metal. The next night his scouts detected the movement to surprise Lafayette at Barren Hill, a piece of good outpost work that saved a large portion of the army from ambush. On 8 June he himself narrowly escaped an ambush. He may well have been the first American to reenter Philadelphia when the British evacuated the city ten days later. He apparently had an instinctive dislike for Benedict Arnold; soon after Arnold took command in Philadelphia, McLane went to Washington to expose Arnold's profiteering. For his pains he received a rebuke from Washington.

During the Monmouth Campaign of June–July 1778, McLane's company operated with Dickinson's militia, and he claimed to have lost only four men killed in taking more than three hundred stragglers. The company was attached to Henry Lee's new “Partisan Corps” on 13 July 1779. Under Lee's command he had an important role in the events leading up to Wayne's capture of Stony

Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence

Point on 16 July, and he figured prominently in Lee's raid on Paulus Hook on 19 August 1779. McLane envied Lee, however, and Washington solved the problem by sending McLane to reinforce Lincoln at Charleston. Fortunate in not reaching the city in time to be captured, he came under Steuben's command and was promoted to major.

Early in June 1781 he left Philadelphia carrying dispatches that urged de Grasse to come from the West Indies to support Washington and Rochambeau. On the return voyage he commanded the marine company on the privateer *Congress* (twenty-four guns) during its capture of the British sloop of war *Savage* (sixteen guns). During the Yorktown campaign he scouted New York City from Long Island to keep Washington informed on the essential point of whether the British were detaching strength to reinforce Cornwallis. He retired on 9 November 1782, a brevet major.

His personal fortune gone, McLane entered a mercantile venture with Robert Morris. In 1789 Washington named him the first federal marshal for Delaware and in 1797 made him collector for the port of Wilmington, a post he retained for the rest of his life. He commanded the defenses of Wilmington during the War of 1812, observed the British capture of Washington, and commented that with the three hundred men he had led at Paulus Hook he could have saved the capital.

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments; Barren Hill, Pennsylvania; Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of; Long Island, New York, Battle of; MacLean, Allan; Mischianza, Philadelphia; Paulus Hook, New Jersey; Stony Point, New York; Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

MECKLENBURG DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. On 31 May 1775 a committee met at Charlotte, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, and drew up twenty resolutions for the North Carolina delegation to present to the Continental Congress. They stated—among other things—that all laws and commissions derived from royal or Parliamentary authority were suspended and that all legislative or executive power henceforth should come

from the Provisional Congress of each colony under the Continental Congress. Although adopted, the resolutions never were presented to Congress. In 1819 the *Raleigh Register* printed what was claimed to be a document that the Charlotte committeemen had adopted on 20 May 1775, in which they declared themselves “a free and independent people” and which contained other phrases later made famous in the Declaration of Independence.

Before his death in 1826, Thomas Jefferson rejected the “Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence” as spurious. Nonetheless, for many years it was believed, primarily by people in North Carolina, that the Mecklenburg document had inspired the real Declaration of Independence. No written copy of the document was found until 1847, when a copy of a Charleston newspaper of 16 June 1775 was discovered to contain the full text of the twenty resolutions adopted 31 May 1775. The word “independence” was not mentioned. The explanation appears to be this: The records of the 31 May proceedings were destroyed by a fire in 1800; the version printed in 1819 was from memory—including that of the North Carolina iron manufacturer Joseph Graham, who had been fifteen years old at the time—and was embellished with phrases taken from the real Declaration of Independence. All evidence to the contrary has not prevented people from insisting on the veracity of the fraudulent document and posting it on web sites. These two documents, the real Resolves of 31 May and the contrived “Declaration” of 20 May, and their dates are often confused. For instance, the state of North Carolina still features the date of the fictional document on its seal and flag.

SEE ALSO *Graham, Joseph.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MEDALS. During the nine years of the War for Independence, Congress voted to award eight medals to officers of the Continental army in recognition of significant accomplishments on the battlefield. The first was given to George Washington to commemorate the taking of Boston in March 1776. The next went to Horatio Gates for the capture of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga in October 1777. Four were awarded in 1779 for victories that were not of the same significance as Boston or Saratoga. Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, Colonel Walter

Stewart, and Lieutenant Colonel François Teissedre de Fleury received medals for the capture of Stony Point on 16 July 1779, and Major Henry Lee received a medal for the raid on Paulus Hook on 19 August 1779. The last two congressional medals were awarded to Brigadier General Daniel Morgan and Colonel John Eager Howard for the victory at Cowpens on 17 January 1781, a success that provided a significant fillip to the morale of American troops in the South.

SEE ALSO *Howard, John Eager; Lee, Henry* (“*Light-Horse Harry*”); *Morgan, Daniel; Stewart, Walter; Teissedre de Fleury, François Louis; Wayne, Anthony.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

MEDICAL PRACTICE DURING THE REVOLUTION.

On both sides in the American Revolution, many more soldiers died from disease than in combat, and many more died from wounds than were killed outright. The most feared killer in North America at this time was smallpox, which played a critical role in defeating the American invasion of Canada. As a result of that disaster Washington instituted a requirement in the winter of 1776–1777 requiring all new recruits to undergo inoculation for that disease before reporting to the army. This was one of the first instances, worldwide, of that now-common practice. Other diseases swept through eighteenth-century army camps, including diphtheria, dysentery, malaria, measles, and even scurvy. Surgery was primitive, and because microbes and sterilization were not yet understood, those who survived the shock and the bleeding risked lethal infections.

Armies at the time of the Revolution provided a surgeon and surgeon’s mates at the regimental level and a more extensive medical staff charged with operating hospitals—both fixed ones at major bases and field hospitals that accompanied forces on military operations. The regimental personnel provided battlefield triage and critical care; the hospitals conducted long-term treatment with a staff of trained medical personnel (physicians, the lower-status surgeons, and apothecaries) supplemented by civilians employed as nurses, orderlies, cooks, and individuals performing any other appropriate support functions. Most combat medical care came after the shooting stopped. The regimental quartermaster would search for the wounded using the regiment’s fifers and drummers as stretcher-bearers. Naval vessels of any size also carried a surgeon and sometimes an assistant; large squadrons, or more commonly their bases, would also have hospital ships, which were most often converted obsolete warships.

British military medical practices were quite conventional and operated with the disadvantage that all supplies and replacement personnel had to come three thousand miles from the British Isles. The Hesse-Cassel contingent of Germans also had its own medical staff that operated a hospital; the smaller German forces had much more modest provisions. All of the German regiments had a slightly different arrangement than those of the British or Americans. They would have a surgeon for the regiment but provided a surgeon’s mate (*Feldscher*) for each company, although this individual had far less training than his Anglo-American counterparts.

Within the Continental Army treatment tended to be easier because inoculation centers and hospitals could be placed almost anywhere except on the immediate front lines. The army had a much more difficult time creating an effective and efficient medical administration. The colonies had excellent doctors, including some who had trained in London and Edinburgh. Although in many ways the American doctors were more skillful than the Royal Army’s, they lacked infrastructure and a logistical system that could provide specialized medicines. The Continental Congress also had trouble finding a proper head for its medical program. The first choice was Benjamin Church of Massachusetts, who turned out to be a British spy. John Morgan succeeded Church; although a good doctor and administrator, he had an abrasive personality and made so many enemies that he had to be relieved. The third head, William Shippen Jr., was also relieved, a victim of professional back-stabbing. Both of those men were Philadelphians. Benjamin Rush, like his two predecessors a Philadelphian, became mixed up in political intrigue and also had to be jettisoned. On 17 January 1781 Congress appointed John Cochran of New Jersey, a veteran of the French and Indian War, and in him finally found a competent head who served until the end of the war. The head of the Continental Army medical department carried the title of director general.

SEE ALSO *Church, Benjamin; Cochran, John; Morgan, John; Rush, Benjamin; Shippen Family of Philadelphia.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

MEETING ENGAGEMENT. The term “meeting engagement” is applied to a battle that takes place before either side can execute its planned attack or defense. Normally, both sides are still moving part of their forces toward the battlefield while other troops are already engaged in combat. Such encounters hold enormous potential for the side that can better understand what is happening on a fluid battlefield and can better direct forces to take advantage of often fleeting opportunities for success. The encounters at Princeton (3 January 1777) and at Monmouth (28 June 1778) are good examples of meeting engagements in America’s War for Independence.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

MEIGS, RETURN JONATHAN. (1740–1823). Continental officer. Connecticut. Son of a hatter named Return Meigs, Return Jonathan Meigs was born in Middletown, Connecticut, and became a merchant in his hometown. Elected lieutenant of his local militia company (in the Sixth Militia Regiment) in October 1772, he won promotion to captain in October 1774 and led the company to Boston, where it served for eight days after the Lexington alarm. Appointed major of the Second Connecticut Regiment on 1 May 1775, he served over the summer at the siege of Boston and in

September volunteered as second-in-command of Lieutenant Colonel Roger Enos’s battalion in Arnold’s march to Quebec. Meigs continued with part of the battalion after Enos turned back. He was captured after scaling the walls of Quebec on 31 December 1775. Paroled in May 1776, he returned to Connecticut in July and was formally exchanged on 10 January 1777. On 22 February he became lieutenant colonel of Colonel Henry Sherburne’s Additional Continental Regiment.

Meigs is famous for his brilliant Sag Harbor raid in New York on 23 May 1777, for which Congress voted him an “elegant sword.” On 10 September he was appointed colonel of the Sixth Connecticut (“Leather Cap”) Regiment, and during the summer and fall of 1777 he led it in the principal actions along the Hudson. He headed a composite regiment of Connecticut light infantry at Stony Point on 16 July 1779. Washington sent him a personal note of thanks for his part in stopping the Mutiny of the Connecticut Line on 25 May 1780, and his regiment was one of the first sent to reinforce the Hudson Highlands when Arnold’s treason was discovered in September. He retired on 1 January 1781, when the Connecticut Line was consolidated and reduced.

Becoming interested in western lands, he secured an appointment as one of the Ohio Company’s surveyors. In April 1788 he led a small party of settlers that founded the town of Marietta at the mouth of the Muskingum River on the Ohio. An important leader in early Ohio, in 1801 he was also appointed agent to the Cherokee. Known for trying to deal firmly but fairly with Native Americans, he endeavored to get the best deal he could for the tribes while promoting their acculturation and acceptance of white settlement. He died of pneumonia at the age of eighty-two in 1823. His son and namesake became governor of Ohio, U.S. senator, and postmaster general.

SEE ALSO *Arnold’s March to Quebec; Mutiny of the Connecticut Line; Sag Harbor Raid, New York; Sherburne’s Regiment; Stony Point, New York.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

MERCANTILISM. Mercantilism is the name for a set of beliefs that developed in Europe in the sixteenth century about how the components of society could best be organized to promote the public good. Developed in

policies, regulations, and laws through the eighteenth century, mercantilism was intended to support the nation-states of western Europe by channeling private economic behavior for the benefit of the state. A form of economic nationalism, it found expression in efforts by governments to regulate trade and commerce, maintain a favorable balance of trade, develop agriculture and manufacturing, keep up a strong merchant marine, establish colonies for the enrichment of the mother country, create monopolies in foreign trade, and accumulate gold and silver (on the premise that specie alone is wealth). There was no single set of policies advocated by all states, just a sense that the accumulation of wealth and prosperity was a zero-sum game in which ad hoc measures ought to be taken to keep one's own advantage from slipping away to a foreign competitor.

According to the tenets of mercantilism, colonies existed primarily to furnish the mother country with commodities (gold, silver, raw materials) and markets that could not be obtained at home or were too expensive to obtain from competitors. In various statutes, rulings, and proclamations over more than a century, from the first Navigation Act in 1651 to the set of regulations and taxes imposed after the French and Indian War, the imperial government in London tried to translate the broad precepts of mercantilism into effective policy. For most of that time, these policies were more or less benign, even beneficial, because they guaranteed markets for colonial goods, offered some protection against foreign competitors, and did not greatly conflict with what might be called the natural flow of commerce. But policies that might have been appropriate for infant colonial economies seemed much less so, to the colonists, as their economic activity grew in size, complexity, and ambition. Mercantilism, considered as a set of beliefs, did not cause the colonists to rebel. It would be more appropriate to say that a too-rigid adherence by successive imperial politicians to policies that seemed to privilege the British economy caused a growing number of colonists to rethink the value of their relationship with the mother country and to perceive in its actions much they came to regard as tyrannical.

SEE ALSO *Background and Origins of the Revolution*.

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revised by *Harold E. Selesky*

MERCER, HUGH. (1725?–1777). Continental general. Scotland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Born in Aberdeen, Scotland, perhaps in 1725, Hugh Mercer was educated as a doctor at the University of Aberdeen (1740–1744) and was in the surgeons' corps of Prince Charles Edward in 1745. After the battle of Culloden he emigrated to America, settling near what is now Mercersburg, Pennsylvania. He became a captain in the Pennsylvania Regiment during the Seven Years' War, and may have been present at Major General Edward Braddock's defeat by the Indians at the Monongahela River (near modern Pittsburgh). He took part in the expedition against the Indian settlement at Kittanning, Pennsylvania (September 1756) and was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the militia. Then, after General John Forbes's expedition to Fort Duquesne (1758), he was promoted to colonel of the Third Battalion on 23 April 1759, and was made commandant of Fort Pitt.

During these frontier operations, Mercer met George Washington, and it may have been at Washington's suggestion that Mercer moved to Fredericksburg, Virginia, where he opened an apothecary shop. On 12 September 1775 he was elected colonel of the minutemen in four counties. Having narrowly lost out to Patrick Henry for command of the First Virginia Regiment, the fifty-year-old doctor was commissioned colonel of the Third Virginia Regiment on 13 February 1776. Appointed brigadier general of the Continental army on 5 June, he was put in command of the flying camp, comprised of mobile militia forces. He led a column at Trenton, New Jersey, and is one of several officers credited in contemporary accounts with suggesting the strategy leading to the triumph at Princeton, New Jersey, on 3 January 1777. Mortally wounded in this action, he died on 11 January of that same year.

SEE ALSO *Flying Camp; Princeton, New Jersey; Trenton, New Jersey*.

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revised by *Michael Bellesiles*

MERLON. Part of a fortification wall, or of the battlements on top of the wall, between two embrasures (openings).

Mark M. Boatner

METHODISTS. The military conflict of the Revolutionary era dramatically reshaped the Methodist movement in America, from a small missionary wing of the Church of England to a rising evangelical power. But this transformation had little to do with the compatibility of Anglican John Wesley's version of Christianity with the American struggle for independence. Rather, the formation of what was to become the largest denomination in the United States on the eve of the Civil War emerged from the lessons that American Methodists drew from their wartime sufferings, and from their leaders' ability to seize opportunities.

THE PROBLEM OF LOYALISM

On the eve of Lexington and Concord in April 1775, the Methodists in America were comprised of a small band of traveling preachers, led by minister John Wesley's Scottish deputy, Thomas Rankin, and a little over 3,000 adherents. Although Methodist converts first immigrated to New York and Maryland in the early 1760s, Wesley's itinerants had arrived only in 1769, in the midst of the Patriot movement. Rankin was known to the American Whigs primarily as a critic of American slavery, and the Methodists' mission to recruit free people and slaves did not win them friends in the Patriot leadership. Congregationalists and Presbyterians, who still adhered to the Calvinist doctrine of predestination and among whom many favored the American cause, condemned the Methodists for teaching that individuals possessed free will to achieve, or conversely to fall away from, Christian rebirth. The ordained ministers of the Church of England considered Wesley's itinerants to be uneducated upstarts with too great an insistence on the equality of all believers. Whether or not the Methodists had a future in America depended on their English founder's willingness to send over more British preachers. Wesley, an old man and concerned with his legacy in Britain, had other priorities.

American resistance to Parliamentary measures was largely ignored by the rank-and-file itinerants, instructed by their leaders to avoid political conflicts. But as American resistance gathered steam in the mid-1770s, Wesley boldly attacked the Patriots in a series of royalist pamphlets. The first, titled *A Calm Address to Our American Colonies* and published in 1775, borrowed from a pamphlet by Samuel Johnson, asserted that the colonists were "descendants of men who either had no votes, or resigned them by emigration." It was further argued that the American Whigs had been duped by enemies of the monarchy—the former Puritans of New England—aiming to erect "their dear [Puritan] Commonwealth upon its ruins."

The outbreak of war with Britain placed Wesley's American followers in an inevitably difficult position.

Although a small cohort of the preachers were Americans—generally under the guidance of a maverick Irish itinerant, Robert Strawbridge—most were British and several were overtly Loyalist. Noteworthy among the latter was Thomas Webb, an aging veteran of the French and Indian War and popular preacher in New Jersey. Webb maintained a correspondence with William Legge, the second earl of Dartmouth, Secretary for the Colonies, and a Methodist patron in Britain. In this correspondence, Webb claimed to have provided the British command with intelligence on General George Washington's attack on Trenton on 26 December 1776. Webb's activities, which included gathering information on American military movements in Baltimore County, prompted at least one Maryland official to report that the Methodists used religious recruitment to mask their conspiracy against the American cause. Webb was ultimately arrested and sent into exile.

In 1777, several other Methodists, including British itinerant Martin Rodda in Maryland and American Tory Cheney Clow in Delaware, raised armed forces against the Americans. Other British preachers proselytized among the regulars in British-occupied New York. But most, including Thomas Rankin, returned to Britain. Of the more than sixty preachers recruited by the Wesleys between 1773 and 1777, only twenty-eight, or fewer than half, were still traveling through the colonies in 1778. Of Wesley's formally licensed preachers, only one, Francis Asbury, remained in Patriot territory.

PATRIOT SENTIMENT AND THE MISSIONARY CAUSE

The Loyalist reputation of the Methodists was tempered by the number of adherents who supported the Patriots. Marylanders Samuel Owings Jr., Richard Dallam, and Jesse Hollingsworth served the Patriot military in varying capacities. Owings was a colonel in the Soldier's Delight Battalion of Militia in Baltimore County; Dallam served in the Harford County Rifles; and Hollingsworth was a privateer. In New Jersey, John Fitch, who later invented the steamboat, as well as James Sterling and Thomas Ware were all prominent Methodist Patriots. Fitch served time on a British prison ship in New York harbor. Undoubtedly, many more examples have escaped the historical record.

Many American Methodists, furthermore, struggled less about taking sides than about the proper role of Christian missionaries, especially since recruitment to the itinerancy was a relatively simple process that did not require ordination. Preacher John Littlejohn complained of being fatherless and friendless because he was not a Patriot volunteer, but he believed the American cause was blessed by God. Marylander Joseph Everett's conversion transformed him from a Whig and active militiaman into a pacifist itinerant, but he did



America's First Methodist Episcopal Church (c. 1768). This church in New York, seen here in an engraving by Joseph B. Smith, was reputedly the first Methodist Episcopal Church in America. © MUSEUM OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK/CORBIS

not become a Loyalist in the process. Preacher Jesse Lee refused to bear arms, but served as a wagon driver for the Continental army in North Carolina. Thomas Ware came to view warfare as a worldly distraction, but he was nonetheless a war veteran.

Beginning in 1776, American itinerants in New Jersey and Maryland nonetheless faced prosecution for non-adherence to militia drafts, and many were subject to mob violence. State loyalty oaths in Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania restricted the preachers' mobility. For example, the Maryland Act for the Better Security of Government, passed in December 1777, required an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the state government, and barred non-compliers from many activities, including preaching. The itinerants objected to the form of the oath and many were indicted—twenty alone in October 1778—for preaching without having taken the oath. Several served jail sentences or paid substantial fines. A number of the American command, particularly General William Smallwood, repeated the charge that the itinerants were a threat to the common cause.

A TRANSFORMATION OF PERCEPTION

As the war continued into the late 1770s and early 1780s, courts in the upper Chesapeake Valley faced numerous cases involving religious pacifists drawn from among the Quakers, Mennonites, and Moravians, as well as the Methodists. This led to the practical need to ease up on prosecutions. Instead, hostility to the Methodist itinerants came from other quarters. Throughout the war, the preachers had persisted in recruiting African Americans, laborers, and women, single and married, into their movement, with or without the permission of their masters or husbands. This was perceived as a threat to the order and authority of households and plantations, which was feared by customary authorities everywhere, but especially in the South. Freeborn Garrettson and Philip Gatch, both of Maryland, left vivid descriptions of their trials in the face of mob violence during the war. Garrettson was persecuted, in part, for his strong opposition to slaveholding; and Gatch for converting one man's wife, for which he was treated to a tarring that blinded him in one eye.

Despite these inauspicious circumstances, the conflict with Britain would ultimately serve the American Methodists well. By 1782, the year the war ended, close to 12,000 Americans, especially in Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, had joined the movement, four times as many as at the start of the war. Judging by later numbers, African Americans probably comprised from 10 to 15 percent of this followership, and made up a great proportion of audiences who attended Methodist preaching without creating formal societies.

This slow but impressive success would ultimately explode after 1800, for essentially two reasons. One was that the war had seriously undermined the Anglican presence in America, particularly in the Middle Atlantic and southern states, where the Methodists were most active. The Church of England was a rising power in the colonies, but nearly 40 percent of its American clergy were Loyalists and few Anglican churches were still functioning north of Delaware shortly after independence. The declining condition of the Church of England—once the proud ecclesiastical elite of the colonies—prompted Robert Strawbridge's followers to meet in Fluvanna, Virginia in 1777. During this meeting they formed themselves into an informal presbytery with powers to administer baptism and communion—the powers heretofore restricted to an ordained clergy. Francis Asbury strongly opposed this unorthodox move, but the Methodists soon moved into the Anglican vacuum. Wesley's postwar emissary, Thomas Coke, persuaded Asbury and the Americans to form the Methodist Episcopal Church in Baltimore in December 1784. In a sermon delivered on 27 December 1784 (and printed in Baltimore the following year), Coke proclaimed that the Revolution had struck off the "intolerable fetters" that tied the Methodists to the Anglicans and had "broken the anti-christian union which before subsisted between Church and State." The Anglicans' decline meant the Methodists' rise.

The second more comprehensive reason for Methodist success was the nature of the audience attracted by their egalitarian message—women, African Americans, and other laboring-class men—many of whom were outsiders to the revolutionary leadership. They joined Methodist churches run largely by professionals—middling merchants, and assorted industrial capitalists in the cities, and farmer gentry in the countryside and on the western frontier. But the opportunities to rise in these churches and especially in the ministry were very great. There seemed to be few people unaffected by the Methodist message, and many were as drawn to it as the Patriots had been to republican virtue.

In time the Methodists would claim as close a tie to the founding conflict of the United States as any other denomination, and would lose the memory of their low reputation during the war. But without the solidarity that their wartime sufferings provided, and the conditions that

the war itself created, the Methodists might have become one missionary agency among the many. Instead, in the eighty years following the Revolutionary war, they outpaced all other Protestant churches in popularity and geographical expanse and became a dominant force in American culture and society.

SEE ALSO *Religion and the American Revolution*.

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Dee E. Andrews

METUCHEN MEETING HOUSE, NEW JERSEY

SEE *Short Hills, New Jersey*.

M'FINGAL. Published in 1782, *M'Fingal* is the eponymous name of the pseudo-Scottish poet in the mock epic poem by John Trumbull. Written in the satiric style of the seventeenth-century English versifier Samuel Butler, the author of *Hudibras*, this crude but effective epigrammatic form was a popular vehicle in America for political commentary at the time of the Revolution. Condemned in Britain, the poem was very popular in the United States in celebrating the struggle for independence.

SEE ALSO *Salem, Massachusetts; Trumbull, John (the poet)*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

MIDDLE BROOK, NEW JERSEY SEE

Bound Brook, New Jersey.

MIDDLE FORT, NEW YORK.

Middleburg, New York. With Upper and Lower Forts, Middle Fort was built to defend the Schoharie Valley.

SEE ALSO *Schoharie Valley, New York.*

Mark M. Boatner

MIDDLETON, ARTHUR. (1743–1787).

Signer. South Carolina. Born on the South Carolina estate of his wealthy father, Henry Middleton, in 1743, Arthur Middleton, like so many of his class in the South, was educated in England. After two years of travel in Europe he returned to South Carolina in 1763 and married the daughter of Walter Izard. In 1765 he was elected to the state House of Representatives, where he sat for many years. He was elected to the South Carolina Provincial Congress of 1775, and served on the Committee of Safety. He took his father's seat in the Continental Congress in 1776, signed the Declaration of Independence, and was a delegate again in 1777. In 1778 he declined the governorship. After taking an active part in the defense of Charleston, he became a prisoner on 12 May 1780 and was sent to St. Augustine. Exchanged in July 1781, he returned to Congress for two more years. With the war's end he refused another term in Congress. He returned to "Middleton Place," his estate on the Ashley River, near Charleston, inherited from his mother in 1771 and partially destroyed by the British in 1780. He died there 1 January 1787.

SEE ALSO *Middleton, Henry.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MIDDLETON, HENRY. (1717–1784).

Second president of the Continental Congress. South Carolina. Born in 1717 on his father's plantation near Charlestown, South Carolina, Henry Middleton would become one of the largest land- and slave-owners in the state. He was educated in England and elected to the state assembly shortly after his return, serving as speaker in 1747 and 1754. In 1755 he became commissioner of Indian affairs. He sat on the state council until he resigned in 1770 to become leader of the opposition. Sent to the first Continental Congress, he succeeded Peyton

Randolph as president on 22 October 1774, and held this office until the re-election of Randolph on 10 May 1775. He also was president of the South Carolina Provincial Congress from 1775 to 1776. An advocate of reconciliation, he refused re-election to the Continental Congress in February 1776, when the radicals seemed to gain control. He was succeeded by his son, Arthur. Although a member of the Council of Safety after 16 November 1775, and active in state affairs until General Henry Clinton's invasion of the South in the spring of 1780. At that point, he came to feel that the Patriot cause was hopeless. After the fall of Charleston, he sought and received the protection of the British, but did not suffer property loss as a consequence. He died in Charleston, South Carolina, on 13 June 1784.

SEE ALSO *Middleton, Arthur.*

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MIDDLETON FAMILY OF SOUTH CAROLINA.


The Middletons were among the dozen or so families that controlled South Carolina during the eighteenth century. As was the case throughout the colonies, the imperial crisis divided families. Henry Middleton (1717–1784) represented South Carolina in the Continental Congress (and served as its president from 22 October 1774 to 10 May 1775), but resigned in February 1776 because he disagreed with the drift toward independence. His eldest son, Arthur Middleton (1742–1787), was an early supporter of a total break with Britain, and, as a delegate to Congress from 26 February 1776, he voted for independence. Although Henry accepted British protection after the fall of Charleston, his estates were neither confiscated nor amerced, in part because of his son's prominence in the Patriot cause but also because he had lent the state over 100,000 pounds.

SEE ALSO *Middleton, Arthur; Middleton, Henry.*

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Middleton Family of South Carolina. THE GALE GROUP

MIFFLIN, THOMAS. (1744–1800). Continental general, politician. Pennsylvania. Born in Philadelphia of Quaker parents on 10 January 1744, Mifflin graduated from the College of Philadelphia in 1760 and entered a business partnership with his brother before entering politics. He was in the Pennsylvania Provincial Assembly in 1772 and 1773, one of the most radical members of the Continental Congress in 1774, and an ardent Whig in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives until 1775. In the early stages of the war he was active in recruiting and training troops, which led his Quaker meeting to expel him. He was elected major of a volunteer company of troops. On 4 July he became one of General George Washington's aides-de-camp, and on 14 August he became quartermaster general. He was promoted to colonel on 22 December, brigadier general on 16 May 1776, and major general on 19 February 1777. Mifflin had been exceptionally valuable as a soldier-politician, famous for enhancing troop morale with his speeches. But his tenure as quartermaster general was marked by controversy and charges of corruption and inefficiency. He resigned that post in October 1777. Blamed for the sufferings during the Valley Forge Winter Quarters and closely linked with

the Conway cabal that sought to dismiss George Washington, Mifflin resigned from the army in August 1778.

Despite its many suspicions regarding Mifflin's conduct, Congress appointed him as one of the commissioners charged with reorganizing the military in 1780. He was a delegate to Congress from 1782 to 1784. He was elected president of that body in 1783 and received Washington's resignation of his military commission (December 23, 1783). Continuing an active career in state and national politics, Mifflin attended the 1787 Constitutional Convention, supporting the federal Constitution. He presided over the Pennsylvania constitutional convention of 1790, served as governor of Pennsylvania from 1790 to 1799, and personally commanded the militia to put down the Whiskey insurrection of 1794. Mifflin remained remarkably inconsistent in his politics, inspiring profound anger from his many political opponents; yet he kept winning elections. He died at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, on 20 January 1800.

SEE ALSO *Supply of the Continental Army; Valley Forge Winter Quarters, Pennsylvania.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MILE SQUARE, NEW YORK. Later in Yonkers, this place got its name when a tract of land one mile square was sold in 1676. It was the scene of skirmishes after the British landing at Pell's Point and in their movement to White Plains in October 1776.

SEE ALSO *Pell's Point, New York; White Plains, New York.*

Mark M. Boatner

MILITARY JUSTICE. Military justice during the Revolutionary War played an important role in making the military subordinate to civilian authority and in making soldiers out of ordinary citizens. For the soldiers, military law not only enforced discipline on the field of battle and in camp but also enforced the respect for rank necessary for military discipline. In developing the policies and practices of military justice, officers, soldiers, and policy makers drew on their experience of observing the British army, the experiences of organizing militia and colonial troops for imperial wars, and accepted civilian practices. They established a system of military justice that through courts-martial and corporal and capital punishment helped make the Continental army into an effective fighting force.

THE COLONIAL TRADITION

When the colonists came to North America, they brought a distrust of standing armies with them from Britain. A standing army is one that exists at all times, not just when there is war with an external enemy. Many British people thought that a standing army was a potential threat to liberty because when it was not engaged in fighting an enemy, it might be used by a monarch against the citizens. In British law, one of the important ways that a standing army was kept under civilian control was to require soldiers to surrender some civil rights when they enlisted. Soldiers were brought to trial very quickly; they could receive a capital sentence handed down with only a two-thirds majority rather than the unanimous verdict needed in civilian life; and most importantly, they lost the right to a jury trial. They became subject to courts-martial, where

the presiding panel was both judge and jury. And, finally, soldiers could be sentenced to corporal punishments much more brutal than anything a civilian court was likely to hand down.

The colonists adapted these practices in organizing their local militias and the provincial troops that they raised to fight alongside the British in imperial wars. Militia regulations usually avoided corporal punishment since many militiamen were taxpayers and voters, so instead offenders were punished by fines. But in those colonies where slaves, indentured servants, or apprentices were allowed to serve, corporal punishment was used, as those men had no money.

For their provincial armies, colonial governments felt that service in faraway places for long periods of time and often involving large numbers of poor men meant that sentences had to be tougher. Most colonies used punishments that reflected their civilian practices and held to a maximum punishment of thirty-nine lashes. The thirty-nine-lash limit came from the biblical injunction in Deuteronomy, "Forty stripes he may give him, and not exceed," (Deut. 25:3) and in Paul's Second Letter to the Corinthians. In the latter Paul noted "Of the Jews five times received I forty stripes save one" (2 Cor. 11:24). Therefore, most civilian courts held to the thirty-nine-lash limit, occasionally going over it for multiple offenders. New England colonial assemblies followed this practice for their provincial armies, but some southern colonies, such as Virginia, allowed more severe punishments. In 1757, during the Seven Years' War, the British decided that all provincial troops would come under British military law when they were operating with the British army. From that date on, colonial troops came under a system many saw as barbaric.

The British Army used the lash freely, supplemented by a wide range of other punishments, such as running the gauntlet. There was no limit to lash sentences, which were commonly for more than seven hundred lashes and sometimes as high as fifteen hundred. For these sentences prisoners would be lashed in installments. Colonists were appalled, and even some British officers had come to question the usefulness of these sentences. Consequently, some colonial officers did what they could to prevent their men from being subject to British military justice.

By the time the Revolutionary War began in 1775, then, colonists had gained a great deal of experience with writing articles of war, the codes that laid out military regulations. Naturally, in the first weeks colonial assemblies quickly produced legislation that looked very much like the codes they had written for their provincial armies. Massachusetts passed its legislation first, setting up the usual courts-martial system but limiting the number of lashes to thirty-nine. In the preamble, the assembly indicated it was avoiding the "severe articles and rules (except

in capital cases) and cruel punishments as are usually practised in standing armies,” hoping instead that soldiers and officers would obey the rules for “their own honor and the public good.” The Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire assemblies quickly passed articles modeled on those of Massachusetts, and so did the Continental Congress when it organized the Continental Army in June 1775.

THE CONTINENTAL ARMY

The Continental Congress accepted that the way to subordinate the army to civilian authority was that its servicemen had to surrender some civil liberties. The first judge advocate general, William Tudor, a Boston lawyer and a friend and former clerk of John Adams, stated that “When a man assumes a Soldier, he lays aside the Citizen, & must be content to submit to a temporary relinquishment of some of his civil Rights” (“Remarks on the Rules”). It quickly became clear to some in Congress, to Washington and other military leaders, and to Tudor that the thirty-nine-lash limit was too lenient and that the army needed harsher punishments if it was to become a disciplined body.

The first changes to the Continental articles of war came in November 1775 when sedition, mutiny, giving information to the enemy, and desertion were made capital offenses. Massachusetts’ objections to “cruel punishments” soon disappeared. In the summer of 1776, as the army faced a string of military setbacks, Congress set to work revising the articles and Tudor, on behalf of Washington and others, lobbied Congress for change. On 20 September 1776, Congress passed new articles of war. The legislation was modeled closely on the British articles of war but limited the number of lashes to one hundred.

For New England soldiers, the new legislation was a radical departure from previous military practice. For the first year of the war, courts-martial sentencing New England soldiers had rested heavily on fining, shaming punishments such as having to walk around camp wearing humiliating signs, and lash sentences well below the thirty-nine-lash limit. By the end of the year, once the new regulations had been distributed and officially read to the assembled troops, one-hundred-lash sentences became common and shaming punishments, although still occasionally used, became much less frequent.

A different kind of transition took place for the troops from South Carolina. The South Carolina assembly had decided to adopt the British articles to regulate its troops from the beginning of the conflict. Courts-martial had handed down sentences as high as eight hundred lashes, and although most of these had been partially remitted

and lesser sentences given, punishments were usually well above one hundred lashes. South Carolina was very different from New England, which was a collection of homogeneous societies where for the first year of the war at least, men of property served as ordinary soldiers. With a large slave population and a small wealthy planter class, South Carolina had some difficulty finding soldiers for its forces. Young planters competed for the officer corps but soldiers were poor farmers, laborers, and recent immigrants. The legislature saw these as men in need of a firm hand and so adopted harsh punishments. For these soldiers, when their regiments were transferred into the Continental army, the new Continental articles meant their conditions of service became less harsh as one hundred lashes quickly became their standard punishment, too.

The articles of September 1776 stood without alteration for the duration of the war. There was only one other serious attempt to try to change them. In 1781, after the mutiny of the Pennsylvania line, Washington asked Congress for the lash limit to be increased to five hundred. The lower limit, Washington felt, forced court-martial panels to hand down too many death sentences. Although a congressional committee recommended the change to the higher number, it was voted down in Congress. The one-hundred-lash limit stayed.

The fast acceptance of the 1776 articles and the regularizing of court-martial practices was part of a number of changes within the army. That fall, Congress reorganized the army and allowed for longer terms of enlistment that enabled soldiers to develop a greater sense of professionalism. Some states introduced drafts in 1777 that drew many poorer men into the army, men who accepted their subordinate status more readily. The skills of soldiers and officers improved, especially after the arrival of Baron Von Steuben in 1778 to help in training. A standardized and predictable system of military justice was a critical part of these changes.

MILITIA PUNISHMENTS

Men in the militia continued to be largely free from corporal punishments. In the September 1776 articles of war, Congress tried to make the militia subject to harsher punishments when it was “joined, or acting in conjunction with” the Continental Army. However, there was a provision that court-martial panels could only be made up of officers from the militia corps with which the offender served, so in practice, little changed. Courts-martial were few and sentences other than fines were rare. When a lash sentence was given, it was to someone who was an outsider to the community, such as a transient or a recently arrived immigrant who might be serving as a substitute.

THE DEATH PENALTY

The death penalty was widely used in the military, most commonly for desertion. It was also used for mutiny, aiding the enemy, or leaving the field of battle without authority, but these were rare cases compared to the number of sentences for desertion from camp or on the march. All executions were carried out in front of all troops in the area so they could be suitably awed by military authority and threatened by what their own fate would be if they transgressed. However, reprieves were common. Washington used the death penalty sparingly. His soldiers were mostly volunteers who served for short terms. His goal was to instill discipline but not to appear so brutal that punishment actually encouraged further desertions or that men declined to reenlist when their terms were up. At the most, no more than 30 percent of capital sentences were carried out and possibly much less.

A DISCIPLINED ARMY

Central to military justice was the hierarchy of army life. Only officers, who were by legal definition gentlemen, sat on court-martial panels, yet it was mostly soldiers who stood charged before them with crimes. Thus, the panel members were not peers of the accused. Only soldiers were ever subject to corporal punishment. When officers were convicted of crimes, their punishments ranged from a private reprimand to being cashiered, or dismissed, from the service. When corporal punishment was inflicted, it was carried out by other soldiers supervised by officers. An important part of military regulations was that soldiers had to show appropriate deference to officers, saluting them and otherwise being respectful to them. Courts-martial were critical in forcing soldiers into habits of respect.

Courts-martial were busiest and handed down their most severe sentences when the army was in a difficult position, for example, during the bad winter at Valley Forge or on the disastrous expedition to Florida in 1778, when too many unhappy soldiers were deserting. But more commonly, military justice was concerned with the discipline of camp life, and panels focused their attention on soldiers' drunkenness, sleeping on duty, and petty theft.

Colonists blended military traditions, civilian practices, and experience to create an effective fighting force. The system of military justice established during the Revolutionary War continued with only minor revisions until after World War II, when Congress passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950.

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MILITARY MANUALS. Scores of military manuals were used, and useful, during the Revolutionary War. Among the works popular with both armies were Humphrey Bland's *Treatise of Military Discipline* (8th ed., 1759), comte Lancelot Turpin de Crisse's *Essay on the Art of War* (1761), and Campbell Dalrymple's *Military Essay* (1761). The hodgepodge of American officers in particular sought direction. Hessian Captain Johann Ewald was impressed by the variety of publications found in American officers' captured knapsacks, writing in December 1777,

when we examined the haversack of the enemy, which contained only two shirts, we also found the most excellent military books translated into their language. For example, Turpin, Jenny, Grandmaison, La Croix, Tielke's *Field Engineer*, and the *Instructions* of the great Frederick to his generals I have found more than one hundred times. Moreover, several of their officers had designed excellent small handbooks and distributed them. . . . I have exhorted our gentlemen many times to read and emulate these people, who only two years before were hunters, lawyers, physicians, clergymen, tradesmen, innkeepers, shoemakers, and tailors. (Edwald, p. 108)

The single most important American work was Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben's standardized manual of discipline, introduced in the spring of 1778 and published in 1779. Steuben's system did not appreciably simplify the largely ornamental manual of arms, but did introduce set marching rates and uniform tactical formations, for the first time allowing Continental regiments to work as a unified battlefield force.

British forces were fortunate in beginning the conflict with a uniform set of regulations, Edward Harvey's *Manual Exercise as Ordered by His Majesty in 1764*, a treatise that provided a single rule book on which all

crown regiments based field organization, formations, and maneuvers. Another influential work was the never-published system of light infantry drill introduced by General Sir William Howe at the Salisbury, England, training camp in late summer 1774. Howe's drill was an expansion of General George Townshend's "Rules and Orders for the Discipline of the Light Infantry Companies in His Majesty's Army in Ireland" (1772). The lessons instilled at Salisbury had a profound effect on the conduct of the American war.

SEE ALSO *Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von.*

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MILITIA IN THE NORTH. The opening shots of the Revolutionary War brought the local colonial militia into the spotlight, forcing the local militiamen into a combat role against the army of their king. However, even as these local civilians took up arms, they also shouldered other responsibilities that would prove critical to the overall success of the American rebels in this war against the British Empire. Militia soldiers were used not only to fight alongside the Continental soldiers and to serve as partisans in a guerrilla war throughout the northern states; they also served the local political needs of the rebel Whig leaders, spy on enemy activities, act as enforcers for political leaders, round up enemies of the state, and generally do whatever task had to be done when there was no one else available to do it. The militia proved to be versatile and adaptive in this revolutionary war fought throughout the northern states.

SOCIAL CONTROL

The months following Lexington and Concord saw the militia emerge quickly as a ready source of social control for the emerging rebel governments in the northern colonies. Even as Whig committees and conventions passed regulations to restrain and punish colonists who remained

loyal to the British government, the politicians turned to the local militia forces to enforce them. Anyone speaking out against the Whig-controlled colonies became targets of Whig militia forces. Also targeted were those who provided information or supplies to the British forces stationed along the coast, notably in New York City and Boston. Local militia forces were well organized and prepared to fulfill this vital role in the opening months of the war, whereas the British authorities did not make full use of pro-British Loyalists, who were less numerous and more scattered throughout the northern colonies. Local committees, backed by the armed might of the Whig-controlled militia, were able to intimidate the Loyalists, forcing many to take oaths of allegiance to the newly forming Whig governments and imprisoning and exiling those who refused. This form of social and political control was directed by local and colonial authorities.

Loyalist leaders faced a serious danger posed by the local Whig militia. One of the most notorious Whig militiamen in the early war was Isaac Sears of New York. Contrary to General George Washington's orders, Sears attempted unsuccessfully to kidnap New York's royal governor, William Tryon, in August 1775. In November 1775 Sears entered New York City with about eighty volunteers, took the Loyalist James Rivington's press, and then disarmed some Loyalists in Westchester County. In New Jersey, militiamen held the royal governor, William Franklin, a prisoner in February 1776; later, in the summer of 1776, New Jersey militiamen arrested Franklin and sent him to prison in Connecticut, where he stayed until his release in 1778.

In general, Washington fully supported efforts to suppress the Loyalist population in the northern colonies. Militia forces were used to suppress Loyalist threats, especially around New York City, in the spring and summer of 1776. The arrival of the British forces in July and August 1776 increased the threat from internal anti-revolutionary resistance and thus led to increased use of Whig militia to maintain control of the Loyalist population in the area. New York established a secret committee to counter any Loyalists who tried to influence people to support the British or resist the new Whig government. Militia soldiers were responsible for seizing anyone accused of treason against the newly formed United States, and they tried to prevent all communication between British forces on the coast and Loyalists in the interior.

Throughout the middle states, in particular, militia forces were used to disarm suspect people because of a heightened fear that they might try to join the British forces in the area. Dealing with such threats often took precedence over filling recruitment needs for the Continental army. For example, in the summer of 1776 New Jersey's Provincial Convention excused the militia of Loyalist-infested Monmouth County from providing its

quota to fulfill a request from the Continental Congress. Washington at times even supported militia activities against Loyalists with detachments of the Continental army. At other times, he released militiamen from the army to return to their home counties in order to suppress Loyalist activities.

The movement of suspected people was monitored by militia troops. Connecticut required people to have certified passes to travel throughout the state, and militia soldiers inspected these passes. This helped prevent Loyalists from forming larger forces and also helped prevent them from sending intelligence and supplies to the British forces stationed nearby.

At times, the local need to control dangerous people took precedence over the military needs of the army. In September 1776, as Washington fought desperately to hold Manhattan Island and prevent British landings along the coast, the New York Convention refused to call out all of the militia from the southern counties of the state because of the large number of Loyalists and slaves in the area. Connecticut also retained militia units for internal control and defense during the summer and autumn. Washington understood these local needs and accepted these actions. In fact, he would at times detach militia units to help suppress Loyalists. In October 1776 he sent a detachment of Massachusetts militia from Manhattan Island to help the New York Convention stop an anticipated Loyalist uprising along the Hudson River. As his army retreated across New Jersey in November 1776, Washington detached a regiment of New Jersey militia to go to Monmouth County to prevent a threatened Loyalist insurrection. Washington even allowed his scouts, both Continentals and militia, to plunder Loyalists and keep the plunder as a reward for their service, but by 1777 Washington had stopped this practice. He preferred to leave it up to the state governments to deal with Loyalists and their property.

The presence of the large British force in New York City heightened fears of Loyalist trouble, so the state government created the Committee for Detecting Conspiracies and authorized it to use militia forces as necessary to prevent hostile uprisings within the state. Other states had similar committees, which used militia troops to maintain a watch on suspected people within their states.

Ultimately, once the Whigs had established control of the state governments in 1776, the militia became the main policing force for these new governments. For the rest of the war, they used militia detachments to hunt down suspected Loyalists. Militiamen were especially active in performing this duty during the lulls in the active campaign seasons of the main armies. For example, in the spring of 1777 New York militia troops scoured the region known as the Highlands and the area between the

American and British lines for Loyalists, breaking up Loyalist bands and generally trying to intimidate those hostile to the United States. In fact, throughout the early war years in particular, the state governments had to carefully balance the needs of the war itself with the need to maintain internal control, including the suppression of Loyalist dangers. Fortunately for the war effort, the governments of the northern states proved very good at maintaining this balance, making militia forces available for the field even while retaining others at home in the state to keep the peace.

The internal threat from Loyalists had largely ended by 1778. States like New York and New Jersey had recurring problems near the British stronghold of New York City, but elsewhere throughout the northern states, the threat of Loyalist uprisings had mostly ended by then. Monmouth County, New Jersey, and the Neutral Ground in New York between the American and British armies remained the only places that faced any kind of threat from Loyalists. The threat in Monmouth, however, remained so intense that as late as November 1779, Washington sent a detachment of Continental soldiers into Monmouth to support the local militia in its endeavors to suppress the remaining Loyalist danger. As the militiamen went home, more Continentals were sent into the county to control the population. Thus, Washington understood the critical need to prevent any Loyalist uprising to gain any foothold within the states and had learned to use regular soldiers from the Continental Army when necessary to support the militia in this vital work.

The other area that remained a dangerous zone right until the end was Westchester County, New York, along with western Fairfield County, Connecticut, the site of the infamous Neutral Ground. As soon as the British army occupied New York City in September 1776, the area around it became a scene of constant raids, larceny, and brutality. Much of it was loosely connected to the armies and the campaigns, but the presence of numerous Loyalists made it imperative for the state government to suppress them. Loyalists raided, took livestock, and forced inhabitants to flee the area. Sometimes these raids were intended to help the British, but often they were made just for the sake of plunder and revenge. The New York government, headed by Governor George Clinton, maintained a constant presence of Whig militia in Westchester County until the end of the war. By 1781, as with Monmouth County, Washington began to increase the Continental presence to relieve the exhausted militia forces, which had stood guard for the previous five years.

Militiamen not only helped hunt dangerous persons, but also helped escort endangered people from areas about to be overrun by the enemy. This duty became especially important on eastern Long Island after the British landed

and captured Brooklyn in late August 1776. Even as some militiamen skirmished with the British forces advancing eastward across Long Island, others helped move people, goods, and livestock across Long Island Sound to Connecticut.

The Highlands of New York, situated along the Hudson River north of New York City, also contained many lawless bands. The Committee for Detecting Conspiracies sent militiamen into the area to hunt down these robbers, but with little success. Only the end of the war, and with it the loss of the British market in New York City, brought an end to these outlaws' careers.

BALANCING THE MILITIA'S DUTIES

Another balancing act that the state and national leadership had to maintain in relation to the militia was the very real need for the militiamen to be available for farming. During the spring planting season and the late summer and autumn harvest season, these men were needed to produce the food necessary to feed not only the army, but also the civilian population. Washington and his generals learned early in the war that to call out the militia in the spring or late summer was usually an exercise in frustration, and if the militia was in the field when these key farming seasons arrived, they tended to melt away quickly. By the latter years of the war, Washington often planned his militia requests by the season, and at critical times in the agricultural cycle he expected the militiamen to turn out only in a military emergency. State governments also understood the vital logistical significance of planting and harvesting and therefore allowed units, or at least parts of them, to go home when farming needs called. When Washington tried to coordinate as large a force as possible to meet with expected French forces later in the war, he would hold off calling out the militia until after spring planting, or if some militia were already mustered and it became clear the French were late or would not arrive, he would release them for the harvest.

In addition, Washington had to learn to respect the local needs that the state governments had for their militia. As he did when he released militia units to suppress Loyalist activity, he also had to learn to leave militia available for the other duties so critical within the states. He did, in fact, learn this after the 1776 campaign. In 1776, when he tried to draw out every available militiaman from the neighboring states, Washington found the state governments reluctant to part with all of their internal strength; he also found that the militia soldiers were reluctant to leave their homes undefended from enemy soldiers and internal dangers and that they also hated to leave their farms untended. Washington quickly became aware that the militia worked best when left for local duties, military and nonmilitary alike. Over the years, he and the other army generals learned to use the militia for reinforcements

sparingly, leaving them available for all of the local duties so vital to securing the states.

The militia of New Jersey provided another service to the army outside of the latter's campaigns. In January 1781 the Pennsylvania Continentals mutinied, and Washington feared that British leaders might try to induce the mutineers to join the British in New York City. Governor William Livingston of New Jersey immediately ordered General Philemon Dickinson, the commander of the eastern New Jersey militia, to station militia detachments along all of the roads between the Pennsylvanians' camp in Trenton and Staten Island. Thus, the militia not only guarded against any move by the mutineers toward the British but helped prevent the British from contacting the Pennsylvania troops. Fortunately for the Continental army, this mutiny ended calmly, but it was followed almost immediately by a mutiny of the New Jersey Continentals. When these new mutineers learned that a substantial force of New Jersey militia had already assembled nearby, they returned to their barracks. Thus, the New Jersey militia helped avert two major crises in the early months of 1781.

LATE WAR DUTIES

As the war drew toward a close in 1782–1783, the militia began to take on new roles, even as it continued to perform some of its traditional functions. Militiamen continued to guard areas such as the Neutral Ground, trying to stop plundering and raids by outlaws loyal to neither side. Efforts by the British commanders in New York City, Washington, and New York's Governor Clinton to stop the brutal raids of Whig and Loyalist forces against each other proved only partially successful. Occasional raids occurred throughout the summer of 1782 as partisan soldiers from both sides captured and plundered each other. As late as the early spring of 1783, Whig militia launched attacks on Loyalist bases, including the key one at Morrisania, New York.

Finally, in April 1783, orders for a cease-fire were issued from the British and American headquarters. As the war came to an end, the state militia began to make the transition to a peacetime role. In Connecticut, for example, militiamen remained on guard in southwestern Connecticut to protect equipment and defensive works, mainly from plundering by local inhabitants. Throughout the summer, militiamen guarded forts along the coast to prevent people living nearby from stealing supplies and hardware. Three men stood guard in New London as of September 1783, and their officers asked to be relieved because the locals not only kept stealing state property but also threatened to blow up the fort along with its men. Even after the British evacuated New York City in November 1783, militia officers were authorized by the Connecticut state

legislature to enlist men to continue to stand guard, no longer against British or Loyalist threats, but against dangers posed by local inhabitants.

Meanwhile, in Westchester County, the New York state government found it could not immediately regain control of the dangerous and volatile situation caused by lawless bands. As the British and American armies contracted their lines, the Neutral Ground was unguarded by soldiers from either side, thus leaving the door open for an escalation of raids and plundering by the bands that infested the area. Governor Clinton wanted to reestablish civilian control as quickly as possible, and so naturally he turned to the militia of the area to help him achieve this important purpose. Washington, understanding the importance of a swift and peaceful transition from civil war to civilian government, sent a Continental detachment to support the New York militia in the area. Despite the best efforts by the British commander, General Sir Guy Carleton, Washington, and Governor Clinton, the outlaws in the area continued to raid. These plunderers clearly worked for neither side, but only for themselves. A clear example was Captain Isaac Honeywell and his group of fifty men, who refused to obey commands from Governor Clinton to stop all activities. Such activities by Honeywell's and a few other bands continued throughout the summer of 1783, even as New York militia moved into the area to hunt them down and protect local political authority.

Committees began to emerge, especially along the war-torn coastal areas, that used militiamen to hunt down and harass Loyalists in the area. As a result, an increased number of Loyalists asked General Carleton for permission to leave with the British army, which in turn delayed the British withdrawal from New York, which in a vicious cycle delayed efforts to reestablish civilian control of the affected areas.

A similar situation existed in Monmouth County, New Jersey, where local militia formed a Committee of Retaliation to control the Loyalist element in the county as the war drew to an end. The committee had control of the local sheriffs and courts and thus could treat inhabitants pretty much as it pleased. The committee's men plundered people accused of being Loyalists and made sure they never won any local election. Others were jailed only on the basis of a simple accusation. Former Brigadier General David Forman was one of the leaders of this committee. Complaints against it were numerous but largely ignored.

Such activities were at their worst in Westchester County. The New York government set up commissioners to deal with the area's Loyalists, who were allowed to leave with a minimal share of their possessions. These commissioners used local militia to force Loyalists who resisted into leaving. In the process, many pro-British Americans received brutal treatment and lost most if not all of their

goods, and some were prevented from getting to their homes and families. Honeywell was one of the most notorious of these commissioners, brutalizing many Loyalists, some of whom simply fled to the British army in New York City. Governor Clinton sent in other militia to try to establish some control, and Washington even sent in some light infantry from the army to help. By late summer, Washington reported that some order had finally been established.

Finally, the British army completed its evacuation of New York City in November 1783, and when George Washington and George Clinton rode triumphantly into the city, they arrived with an escort of Westchester Light Dragoons. Thus, the militia of the state of New York provided the honor guard for the moment of victory.

Questions existed then and have persisted concerning the efficiency of the militia in its many combat roles during the war. However, there is little doubt that the local militia of the northern states proved very effective in its primary role of protecting the states from internal dangers posed by the pro-British Loyalists. Whig militia suppressed the Loyalists from the start, and British sympathizers never gained a real foothold within the states. As the war progressed, the need to suppress Loyalists declined, but right until the end of the war, and even into the postwar period, militiamen prevented Loyalists from ever posing any real threat to Whig control of the northern states. Another vital aspect of the success of the war in the North was the cooperation between Washington and the state governments. The commander in chief understood the very real needs of the state governments to maintain internal control, and not only did he release or avoid calling the militia when it was needed elsewhere, but he also proved increasingly willing to detach Continental forces to support the militia in its efforts to suppress dangers.

SEE ALSO *Clinton, George; Franklin, William; Hudson River and the Highlands; Neutral Ground of New York; Sears, Isaac; Tryon, William.*

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MILLSTONE, NEW JERSEY SEE *Somerset Courthouse*.

MINDEN, BATTLE OF. 1 August 1759. Britain sent an expeditionary force to the continent in August 1758 as part of an Anglo-Hanoverian-Prussian army to defend George II's beloved electorate of Hanover against France. The decisive action took place a year later on the plain outside the Westphalian fortress of Minden, for which the battle was named. Six British infantry battalions, three of which had been part of the column at Fontenoy fourteen years earlier, advanced by mistake from the allied center toward the French lines. Although exposed on three sides, this force—reinforced by three Hanoverian battalions and supported by the superb allied field artillery—shattered more than fifty squadrons of French cavalry and thirty-one battalions of French infantry sent against it in a display of controlled fire discipline (rolling volleys by platoons) of which there were few peers in the eighteenth century. With a gaping hole torn in their center, the French retreated and never menaced Hanover again for the remainder of the war. Controversy swirled around the battle because the senior British officer present, George Sackville (later George Germain), was alleged to have disobeyed the orders of the army commander, Ferdinand, duke of Brunswick, to bring his right wing cavalry to the timely support of the advancing infantry. A cloud hung over Sackville for the rest of his life, including during his service as principal architect of the military response to the American rebellion. Many other veterans of the battle also played prominent roles in the war of American independence. Among those who distinguished themselves at Minden were William Phillips (commander of the artillery), Friedrich von Riedesel, Charles Grey, and Hugh Percy. The father of the marquis de Lafayette was killed leading the Touraine Regiment, which subsequently took part in the Yorktown Campaign.

SEE ALSO *Fontenoy, Battle of; Germain, George Sackville; Grey, Charles ("No-flint"); Percy, Hugh; Phillips, William; Riedesel, Baron Friedrich Adolphus; Seven Years' War*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

MINISINK, NEW YORK. 19–22 July 1779. While the Patriots were slowly preparing for Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois, the Mohawk chief Joseph Brant led a force of Indians and Loyalists down the Delaware from Oquaga. Leaving his main body at Grassy Brook on the east bank of the Delaware, he moved on with sixty Indians and twenty-seven Loyalists to surprise the village of Minisink on the night of 19–20 July.

This village was about twenty-five miles east of Grassy Brook and ten miles northwest of Goshen. Brant entered the sleeping village and had several fires started before the inhabitants awoke to their danger. Making no effort to man their "paltry stockade-fort," they took to the hills. The raiders were bent on booty and destruction, and therefore let most of the settlers escape. Brant reported that four scalps and three prisoners were taken. After looting and burning the fort, mill, and twelve houses and doing their best to damage the crops and drive off the livestock, the raiders retraced their route toward Grassy Brook.

Word of the raid reached Lieutenant Colonel (also Dr.) Benjamin Tusten in Goshen the next day. In answer to his call, 149 militia reported for duty at Minisink. Tusten argued against pursuing the renowned Brant, but the inexperienced militia was swayed by Major Samuel Meeker, who mounted his horse, drew forth his sword, and shouted: "Let the brave men follow me; the cowards may stay behind!" Their manhood challenged, most of the men moved forward, giving Tusten little choice but to join in. The small force followed Brant's trail for seventeen miles before camping for the night.

The next morning, 22 July, Colonel John Hathorn joined them with a few men of his Warwick regiment and, being senior to Tusten, he assumed command. They covered only a few miles before coming upon the recently occupied camp of the enemy. The number of still-smoking fires in the campsite indicated a larger force than the Patriot militia might prudently challenge. Again Tusten counseled caution but was ignored. Captain

Bezaleel Tyler led the advance party but was almost immediately shot by an unseen Indian, a clear indication that Brant knew he was being pursued. But Hathorn pressed forward, catching sight of Brant crossing the Delaware near the mouth of the Lackawaxen. Hathorn planned to ambush Brant, but the latter doubled back behind the Americans, ambushing them in turn.

After a few shots had been exchanged, Brant claimed, he walked forward to tell his enemy it was cut off and to offer quarter. His answer was a shot that hit his belt and that, but for this good luck, might well have been fatal. Early in the hard-fought contest, Brant executed a skillful maneuver that cut off one-third of the militia force. The rest were surrounded, with Brant holding the high ground, patiently firing the occasional shot at the militiamen as they wasted their ammunition in ineffective fire. Around dusk, when the defenders were low on ammunition, Brant noticed that a rebel who held one corner of the position had been taken out of action. His attack penetrated this weak spot, organized resistance collapsed, and a massacre started. Tusten was killed with 17 wounded that he had been tending. Several men were shot as they tried to swim the Delaware. Of the 170 militia, only 30 returned home, while Brant's smaller force suffered only a few casualties. The monument to this battle erected in Goshen lists the names of 45 of those killed in the battle. Hathorn was on hand to lay the monument's cornerstone in 1822.

Brant's raid may have been intended as a strategic diversion to draw rebel forces away from Clinton and Sullivan in order to delay preparations for Sullivan's expedition. Alternatively, Brant may have been seeking provisions in striking at Minisink. He had no intention of doing battle with the militia, which foolishly insisted on pursuing one of the best frontier fighters of the Revolution.

SEE ALSO *Brant, Joseph; Oquaga; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MINISINK, NEW YORK. c. 4 April 1780. This place was revisited by Brant after his destruction of Harpersfield on 2 April.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Harpersfield, New York.*

Mark M. Boatner

MINUTEMEN. The term *minutemen* denotes members of the militia who volunteered to be ready to turn out for active service at literally a moment's notice. While the need to spring instantly into arms existed from the earliest days of settlement, in Massachusetts at least, the term *minnit men* seems to have been used first in 1756, during the French and Indian War. In the months before the outbreak of hostilities with Britain, volunteer military organizations with this mandate sprang up in all the colonies, although not all of these units were institutionally distinct from the militia.

The term *minuteman* is most closely associated with the units that appeared in Massachusetts in the wake of the Powder Alarm of 1 September 1774. As a means of eliminating supporters of royal government from the existing militia organizations, the Worcester County Convention called on 6 September for the resignations of all officers in the three county regiments and for the town militia companies to elect new officers. The town companies were rearranged to form seven new regiments, and new field officers were elected and instructed to organize one-third of the men in each new regiment to be ready to assemble under arms on a minute's notice. On 21 September 1774, this rapid-response portion of the militia was specifically referred to as "minutemen." The Massachusetts Provincial Congress, meeting in October, found that the militia in other counties were adopting the same system, and on 26 October it directed that this reorganization be completed across the colony.

Over the next six months, the process of purging royal supporters and creating new minuteman companies was undertaken with a mixture of urgency and deliberateness. The transition had not been completed by mid-April 1775, but enough had been accomplished so that the opponents of royal government were in firm command of the dual system of militia and minutemen when the regulars marched out of Boston on the night of 18 April. The men who stood in Captain John Parker's company on Lexington green on the morning of 19 April 1775 were true minutemen, and minuteman companies from surrounding towns led the attack at Concord Bridge later in the day. While the minutemen fulfilled the function for which they had been created, the bulk of the Massachusetts citizen-soldiers who turned out on 19 April were enrolled in ordinary or "common" militia companies. Once in the field, there was little to distinguish minuteman from militiaman, although the parallel command structure did have to be sorted out during active combat. When the Provincial Congress a few days later authorized the creation of volunteer companies enlisted for eight months of service (to the end of December 1775), the separate structure of minuteman companies and regiments was allowed to lapse. Men who had served in the minuteman and militia companies on 19 April formed the backbone

of the “eight-months’ army,” demonstrating once again their willingness to undertake the defense of their rights by force of arms.

On 18 July 1775, Congress recommended that other colonies organize units of minutemen for short terms of service, and Maryland, North Carolina, New Hampshire, and Connecticut are known to have complied. The creation of separate minuteman companies was generally replaced by designating a rotating portion of the existing militia companies as the first responders.

SEE ALSO *Lexington and Concord*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

MIRÓ, ESTEBAN RODRÍGUEZ. (1744–1795). Spanish officer and governor. Born in Reus, Spain, in 1744, Miró served during the Seven Years’ War in the Zamora Regiment, taking part in the invasion of Portugal in 1762. After the war he transferred to the Corona Regiment as a lieutenant, serving in Mexico into the early 1770s. After taking part in the unsuccessful attack on Algiers in 1775, he attended the Avila Military Academy. In 1778 he went to Louisiana as second in command of the Fixed Louisiana Infantry and was brevetted lieutenant colonel. When Spain declared war on Britain, Miró acted as aide-de-camp to Governor Bernardo de Gálvez in the campaigns that seized British garrisons in West Florida: Manchac and Baton Rouge in 1779, Mobile in 1780, and Pensacola in 1781. In the latter year Miró was promoted to colonel and made commander of his regiment the following year. In January 1782 he became acting governor of Louisiana and West Florida, being named governor in August 1785 and intendant in 1788. After the Revolution, Miró’s primary responsibility was keeping the new American Republic out of Spanish territory. In addition to negotiating two treaties clarifying

their mutual boundaries, he subsidized Indian nations to resist U.S. attacks, supplying them with arms through British firms, and built a series of forts along the Mississippi. After closing the Mississippi River to the Americans in 1784, Miró had to contend with several invasion threats, most notably from Georgia in 1785. Lacking sufficient troops for the protection of Louisiana, he funded the wild schemes of Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkinson, the former Continental officer and adventurer, who came to New Orleans in 1787. Miró resigned on 30 December 1791 and returned to Spain. With the war against France in 1793, Miró returned to duty as a field marshal, dying while on the front on 4 June 1795.

SEE ALSO *Gálvez, Bernardo de; New Orleans; Wilkinson, James*.

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MISCHIANZA, PHILADELPHIA.

18 May 1778. Also known as “Howe’s Farewell Party,” this extravaganza was organized and directed by Captain John André and Captain Oliver De Lancey to mark General William Howe’s departure as commander in chief of the British army in America. The *Mischianza*, which is an Italian term for a medley or mixture of different forms of entertainment, featured a grand regatta of decorated barges, gun salutes, a mock tournament between the Knights of the Blended Roses and the Burning Mountain, a banquet, fireworks, and a concluding exhibition in which an allegorical Fame saluted Howe with the words, “Thy laurels shall never fade.” Loyalist American girls graced the event, and soldiers participated as silk-clad pages. The hosts sent 750 invitations, and the affair lasted from 4 P.M. to 4 A.M. A London firm is said to have sold 12,000 pounds’ worth of silk, laces, and other fine materials for use in the event. Not everyone in the city was impressed. In her diary, Elizabeth Drinker, an affluent Philadelphia Quaker, dismissed these displays of excess as just so many “scenes of Folly and Vanity.” André wrote a long account of the party that was published in the *Annual Register for 1778* and can be found in *The Spirit of Seventy-Six*, edited by Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris.

SEE ALSO *André, John; De Lancey, Oliver (1749–1822); Howe, William*.

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MOBILE. 14 March 1780. Captured by the Spanish. Considered a satellite of Jamaica's defense, the unhealthy British post at Mobile was garrisoned by three hundred men. It was captured after a brief siege by Bernardo de Gálvez, the governor of Louisiana, with a small force supported by a single armed vessel. Pensacola was saved by the intervention of a British squadron but fell the next year.

SEE ALSO *Jamaica (West Indies); Pensacola, Florida.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MOHAWK VALLEY, NEW YORK.

A strategic avenue of approach into the American colonies from Canada and situated in Tryon County, it was the objective of St. Leger's offensive in 1777 and a cockpit of border warfare.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; St. Leger's Expedition; Tryon County, New York.*

Mark M. Boatner

MOLLY PITCHER LEGEND. The term "Molly Pitcher" seems to have been applied generically to the women—soldiers' wives or other camp followers—who carried pitchers of water to thirsty soldiers on the battlefield. The name "Molly Pitcher" came to be applied in the nineteenth century to two women whose husbands served in the American army. Margaret Corbin helped man an artillery piece after her husband, a gunner, was killed at the Battle of Fort Mifflin (16 September 1776). The name is more often associated with Mary Hays McCauley, a stout, strong Irish woman from Carlisle, Pennsylvania, who helped man a cannon in Captain Francis Proctor's company of the Fourth Continental Artillery at the Battle of Monmouth (28 June 1778). In his memoirs, published in 1830, Joseph Plumb Martin recorded his eyewitness account of the woman we know as Molly Pitcher:

A woman whose husband belonged to the artillery and who was then attached to a piece in the engagement, attended with her husband at the piece the whole time. While in the act of reaching [for] a cartridge and having one of her feet as far before the other as she could step, a cannon shot from the enemy passed directly between her legs without doing any other damage than carrying away all the lower part of her petticoat. Looking at it with apparent unconcern, she observed that it was lucky it did not pass a little higher, for in that case it might have carried away something else, and continued her occupation.

Mary McCauley died in 1832.

SEE ALSO *Corbin, Margaret Cochran.*

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MONCK'S CORNER, SOUTH CAROLINA.

14 April 1780. During the Charleston expedition of 1780, Clinton sent Lieutenant Colonel James Webster, with Tarleton's cavalry, to threaten the American line of communication east of the Cooper River. Tarleton moved with his legion and Ferguson's corps toward Monck's Corner on the evening of 13 April. A captured slave revealed complete information about Huger's dispositions and served as guide. About 3 A.M. the British made contact, routed the Continental cavalry posted in front of Biggin's Bridge, and then scattered the militia posted to the rear near Biggin's Church. Tarleton's troops temporarily captured Lieutenant Colonel William Washington, but he escaped in the darkness. Lieutenant Colonel Webster arrived on the 15th with two regiments to consolidate Tarleton's gains, and the rebel line of communications to Charleston was seriously hindered. Tarleton commented that his surprise was made easier by Huger's faulty tactical dispositions: not only had he failed

to send out patrols to detect and delay an enemy's approach, but he had used mounted troops to screen the bridgehead instead of employing foot troops on this mission.

Huger's command consisted of militia (many of them without arms) and from three hundred to five hundred Continental cavalry. The latter comprised remnants of the regiments of Baylor, Bland, Horry, and Moylan, plus what was left of Pulaski's legion (under Major Vernier, who was mortally wounded).

American losses were fifteen killed and eighteen wounded. Including the wounded, sixty-three men were captured along with ninety-eight dragoon horses and forty-two wagons loaded with food, clothing, cavalry equipment, and ammunition. The defeat prevented the Patriot cavalry from actively opposing the British for several weeks. Tarleton reported one officer and two of his men wounded and five horses killed and wounded.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Vernier, Pierre-François.*

revised by Carl P. Borick

MONCK'S CORNER, SOUTH CAROLINA. 27 November 1781. A British logistical base lay a few miles east of the village of Monck's Corner at Fair Lawn Plantation on the Cooper River, guarded by a small redoubt. A British field hospital was located in the brick mansion. On 27 November Brigadier General Francis Marion raided the base with about six hundred men. The fifty defenders of the redoubt under Captain Murdock McLean refused to surrender, but the hospital was captured and the doctors and ambulatory wounded taken away as prisoners; the others were left behind on parole. Soon afterward the mansion caught fire and burned to the ground.

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MONCKTON, HENRY. (1740–1778). British officer. Fourth son of John Monckton, the first Viscount Galway, and brother of Robert Monckton, he commanded the Forty-Fifth Foot, known as the Sherwood Foresters, from 25 July 1771. He led this unit as part of

Henry Clinton's right wing in the battle of Long Island. As commander of the Second Battalion of grenadiers, he was wounded and captured at Monmouth, 28 June 1778, dying from his wounds a few hours later.

SEE ALSO *Monckton, Robert; Monmouth, New Jersey.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MONCKTON, ROBERT. (1726–1782). British army officer and colonial governor. Second son of the first viscount Galway and his wife, Lady Elizabeth Manners, who was the daughter of the second duke of Rutland, Monckton was educated at Westminster School from 1737. He entered the Third Foot Guards as an ensign in 1741. He fought in Germany and the Netherlands during the War of the Austrian Succession, including the battles of Dettingen (1743) and Fontenoy (1745). He became a captain in the Thirty-fourth Foot in 1744, major in 1747, and lieutenant colonel in the Forty-seventh Foot in 1751. In the latter year he was also elected to Parliament.

In 1752 he joined the Forty-seventh in Nova Scotia. He was commander of Fort Lawrence on the Bay of Fundy before becoming a member of the provincial council at Halifax in August 1753. A little later he pacified some rioting German settlers without bloodshed. On 21 August 1754 he became lieutenant governor of Annapolis Royal, and in Boston that winter he helped to plan the northern prong of the British offensive for 1755: a surprise attack on the French forts dominating the isthmus between the peninsula of Nova Scotia and the mainland. While Edward Braddock was defeated and William Shirley and William Johnson failed, Monckton at the head of 2,000 Massachusetts volunteers and 280 regulars, took Forts Beauséjour and Gaspereau with hardly a shot fired. The success emboldened Governor Charles Lawrence to demand an oath of allegiance from the French Acadians, who had passively or actively resisted British rule since 1713. Monckton had the still controversial duty of rounding up 1,100 of those who refused and deporting them for dispersal among the mainland colonies. In December he became lieutenant governor at Halifax and on 20 December 1757 colonel commandant of the Second Battalion of the Sixtieth Foot, the Royal Americans. Toward the end of 1758 he destroyed French settlements on the St. Johns River, and in 1759 he was James Wolfe's second in command during the Quebec campaign. Badly wounded in the battle on the Plains of Abraham, he became colonel of the Seventeenth Foot on 24 October. In 1760 he was sent to Philadelphia to command the troops in the south; in February 1761 he was promoted

major general, and in March he became governor of New York. In 1762 he led the successful assault on Martinique before returning to New York in June. Twelve months later he sailed for England, where in 1770 he was promoted lieutenant general. In 1769 he lost heavily on East India Company stock, making him desperate for further military employment. In 1773 his application to be commander in chief in India was refused, but his sympathies obliged him to decline a consolation offer of the same post in America. He died in London on 21 May 1782.

SEE ALSO *Abraham, Plains of (Quebec); Austrian Succession, War of the; Braddock, Edward; Shirley, William; Wolfe, James.*

revised by John Oliphant

MONCRIEFF, JAMES. (1744–1793). British military engineer and army officer. Born in Fife, Scotland, James Moncrieff trained at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, from 11 March 1759 to 28 January 1762, when he was appointed to the post of practitioner engineer with the rank of ensign. He served at the siege of Havana, where he joined the One-hundredth Foot and was wounded. When the One-hundredth was disbanded in 1763, Moncrieff transferred to the Royal Engineers, afterwards serving mainly in the West Indies and mainland North America. He was promoted sub-engineer and lieutenant on 4 December 1770 and to captain on 10 January 1776. He probably served in the New York campaign, and in 1777 built across the Raritan River a bridge that was sufficiently unusual for a model to be kept at Woolwich. He may have been briefly captured by American raiders on Long Island early in 1778, but at Brandywine he led the Fourth Foot Regiment across Chadd's Ford in the wake of the Seventy-first Regiment, Ferguson's Riflemen (named for their commander, Major Patrick Ferguson), and the Queen's Rangers. The following month Moncrieff was commended for his part in capturing an American warship, the *Delaware*.

It was, however, in the southern campaigns that Moncrieff became famous. He accompanied Andre Prevost's expedition to Savannah, Georgia, and participated in the abortive attack on Charleston, South Carolina, in May 1779. When Prevost fell back to Savannah, Moncrieff was with the rearguard that was left on James Island under John Maitland's command. On 20 June Moncrieff took part in the successful action at Stono Ferry, and personally captured an ammunition wagon, while in pursuit of the fleeing enemy. Arriving in Savannah, he energetically devised and built the defensive works that enabled Prevost to repulse an attack led by Benjamin Lincoln and Charles

Hector Theodat D'Estaing on 9 October. He was brevetted major on 27 December, and remained at Savannah until the arrival of Henry Clinton's Charleston expedition in February 1780. At the siege of Charleston, it was the steady approach of his works and batteries, built with the aid of huge mantelets (protective screens) shipped from New York, that compelled Lincoln to surrender on 12 May. Moncrieff remained in Charleston as chief engineer, now with particular responsibility for its defenses. Brevetted lieutenant colonel on 7 September 1780, he settled into Charleston society and was elected president of the St. Andrew's Society in 1781.

Moncrieff's works were built by hundreds of African (slave) laborers. Moncrieff was keenly aware of the Crown's responsibility for their welfare, and even suggested forming a brigade of black soldiers. It may have been he who organized the evacuation of about 800 slaves when the British left the city on 14 December 1782. The Americans called this theft, and accused Moncrieff of profiteering by sending 200 of them to his own plantations in Florida.

After the war Moncrieff was chiefly employed in southern England, becoming quartermaster general on 14 July, but he had to wait until 18 November 1790 to be promoted colonel in the army. On 25 February 1793, Moncrieff's extraordinary expertise and achievements brought him the post of quartermaster general (and unofficial chief engineer) to the duke of York's expedition to the Austrian Netherlands. Moncrieff, a regimental lieutenant colonel Moncrieff distinguished himself at the successful sieges of Valenciennes and Mons, but was mortally wounded during a French sortie from Dunkirk on 6 September. He died the following day, and was buried with full honors at Ostend on 10 September 1793.

SEE ALSO *Maitland, John; Stono Ferry, South Carolina.*

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MONEY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. A chronic shortage of specie existed in the British colonies before 1775. The colonies mined no precious metals and, because the cost of imports always exceeded the value of exports, most of the specie that flowed into the colonies flowed back out to Britain to pay for imported goods. Efforts to create a circulating



Continental Dollar. *This American coin, issued in 1776, was probably minted in New York City. Although its exact denomination is uncertain, its value is surmised to have been one dollar.* THE GRANGER COLLECTION, NEW YORK

currency were closely regulated by Britain, so the colonists were compelled to use readily available commodities like tobacco as substitutes and to maintain complicated accounts of book debts. Britain also discouraged colonial efforts to coin money, like the crude silver pieces minted in Massachusetts between 1652 and 1682, the best-known of which was the Pine Tree shilling, about the size of a modern quarter.

In the absence of locally minted coins, many different coins minted by the imperial powers circulated in the British colonies. The value of these coins was based on intrinsic value, fineness, and weight, the latter being affected by wear and sometimes by clipping or other forms of mutilation. Spanish coins, most of them minted in the New World, eventually predominated, especially the Spanish milled dollar or piece of eight, a silver coin about the size of a modern silver dollar.

Paper money was produced in the colonies for the first time in 1690, when Massachusetts printed twenty-shilling bills of credit to pay for the expedition against Canada. Britain monitored the paper bills of credit issued thereafter by the colonies, most closely in New England, an effort that generally kept the depreciation of the currency under reasonable control. It has been estimated that the money

supply in 1775 amounted to over twelve million dollars, about four million in paper currency and the rest, perhaps as much as ten million dollars, in specie.

After 1775 the high demand for all metals and the flood of new paper currency combined to drive specie out of circulation. The only coins minted during the war were the Continental dollars of 1776 (six thousand in pewter, many fewer in brass and silver) and a handful of Massachusetts and New Hampshire patterns; the new nation relied almost entirely on various forms of paper money as its circulating currency until 1780, when specie became more plentiful. Shortly after the Articles of Confederation took effect on 1 March 1781, Robert Morris, the superintendent of finance, began to make plans to establish a mint, an authority given to Congress by Article 9. However, by the time he had the plan in place in August 1783, the end of the war, the scarcity of silver bullion, and the need to economize on congressional expenses combined to scuttle the project. The first dollar coins were issued by the United States in 1794, modeled on the Spanish dollar.

Money accounts in the colonies were almost always kept in pounds, shillings, and pence: twelve pence to a shilling and twenty shillings (240 pence) to a pound.

Money reckoned in “pounds sterling,” in values tied to specie by the British government, was always worth more than any of the local currencies, which were also denominated in pounds, shillings, and pence and whose value against sterling fluctuated widely across the colonies. In the late colonial period, a British pound sterling had a value of one pound 6 shillings 89 pence (320 pence) in Massachusetts, one pound 13 shillings 4 pence (400 pence) in Pennsylvania, and one pound 15 shillings 7 pence (427 pence) in New York. Maryland issued the first paper money denominated in dollars in 1767. When Congress authorized the emission of three million dollars on 22 June 1775, it made the paper money payable in Spanish milled dollars; a Spanish dollar was worth roughly 4 shillings 6 pence in sterling, 6 shillings in Massachusetts, 7 shillings 6 pence in Pennsylvania, and 8 shillings in New York. In his report to Congress (2 September 1776) on the value of the coins in circulation relative to the Spanish milled dollar, Thomas Jefferson was the first to use a decimal notation, and he continued to be an advocate of the system. On 6 July 1785, while Jefferson was in Paris as minister to France, Congress adopted his decimal system, with the dollar as the standard unit.

SEE ALSO *Continental Currency; Hard Money; Specie.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY. The Battle of Monmouth, on 28 June 1778, was one of the most complex, least decisive, and ultimately most controversial actions fought by the Continental army during the Revolution. It implicated the reputation of George

Washington, the army’s commander in chief; it ended the military career of Washington’s principal subordinate commander, Charles Lee; and in many respects it ended both the middle period of the war and major campaigning in the northern states. Understanding the dynamics of the battle is impossible without considering the state of the Revolution itself in the early summer of 1778.


THE BATTLE’S CONTEXT

The Valley Forge winter ended neither with a bang nor with a whimper, but rather with a frenetic flurry of activity as both sides adjusted to the fact that a war for independence had become entangled with—or even subsumed by—a world war between Great Britain and France. The announcement in early May 1778 of the February treaties of alliance and commerce between France and the United States provided the occasion for a demonstration at Valley Forge of the new drilling skills of the American army after six weeks of intensive training under the Prussian volunteer, Friedrich Steuben. Whether or not the army’s capacity to march, whirl, and display on the camp’s Grand Parade ground would reflect or predict its ability to perform better in harsh combat conditions than it had the previous year at Brandywine and Germantown was not known. Whether its next battle, at Monmouth seven weeks later, meaningfully tested that question, is a matter of debate among modern historians. The view expressed below is that it did not.

The entry of France into the war meant that Britain would reduce its levels of material involvement in the North American colonies, first in order to protect its even more vital economic interests in the West Indies sugar islands, which were sure to be a focus of naval activity, and second in order to guard against invasion across the English Channel. On the North American continent, military resources would be deployed more selectively. New York City would remain the British headquarters. Major detachments would be made to the Caribbean and to East and West Florida. The British army would intensify its search for a soft or vulnerable location where enthusiastic civilian support of the king would multiply the return on military investment. Pennsylvania had clearly not proved to be such a place during and after the 1777 campaign. In practice, British land campaigning would be pulled toward the one remaining area where this theory had not been tested: the southern plantation states. There, land troops could also cooperate more easily and supportively with British naval forces operating nearby, in and around the Caribbean Basin.

MARCHING THROUGH NEW JERSEY

The new British commander in chief, Henry Clinton, arrived in Philadelphia in early May to take command of



THE GALE GROUP

the army from William Howe. He had been directed by the War Office to detach troops to the southern theaters from that place. Operating within a reasonable window of command discretion, however, he decided that such a delicate operation could best be performed from New York rather than Philadelphia. He therefore began preparing the army for withdrawal from Pennsylvania. When the large and influential Delaware Valley Loyalist community, whose members had risked their fortunes for the crown, resisted being abandoned by the redcoats, Clinton knew that he would have to offer its members passage to New York. This would encumber Lord Howe's fleet and require the British army to march back overland to New York.

Washington and his commanders knew that Philadelphia would be evacuated soon. During the spring he canvassed his generals on a range of options, from attacking Philadelphia, to transferring the "seat of war" to New York, to letting the British initiate the campaign. The generals split on these alternatives and Washington himself chose to wait and see. By early June the decision made itself. The British accelerated their preparations to retreat to New York while the Americans concentrated on building up their forces, making logistical preparations

for the new campaign, and pressing Steuben's training program to the maximum possible extent.

Clinton began loading his ships and ferrying troops and equipment across the Delaware to New Jersey after 11 June. Washington's logistical officers responded by plotting out routes toward the Delaware above Trenton and from there toward the Hudson, and by stocking supply depots along those routes. On 16 June, Washington issued orders for the army's march toward three river crossing points between Coryell's Ferry and Easton. The news two days later that the British had evacuated Philadelphia triggered a race toward the north. The British force of about ten thousand men (many of the German troops were sent with the fleet) marched in two parallel columns north through New Jersey along the Delaware River toward Allentown, southeast of Trenton. They were encumbered by a large baggage train, which—with the columns themselves—stretched awkwardly for almost twelve miles. The weather was hot and the roads were badly worn. Washington's troops left Valley Forge, continuing to display their ability to march very quickly, something that they had done the previous summer and fall, long before Steuben began to train them. Lightly encumbered by baggage, they reached and crossed the

Delaware before Clinton's force reached the bend in that river below Trenton. When Washington reassembled his army in Hopewell, New Jersey, he decided that it might be appropriate to go on the offensive. A council of war on 24 June split on the matter. A majority of generals, led by Charles Lee, argued for at most a cautious engagement with rear elements of Clinton's force but for avoiding a general engagement. A smaller number, articulated by Nathanael Greene and Anthony Wayne, wanted more aggressive measures. Washington favored the latter position but held his counsel.

Clinton's scouts kept him aware of the shadowy presence of this Continental escort, and—feeling pressured by it—he abandoned plans to march straight across the waist of New Jersey to New Brunswick and Perth Amboy, and from there across Staten Island toward New York City. Instead, Clinton bent his march northeast toward Sandy Hook, in Monmouth County, from where the army would have to be ferried up the harbor to the tip of Manhattan Island. This course took the British army through an alternating landscape of farmland and barrens or wetlands, with the latter increasing as it approached the Atlantic coast. The roads became increasingly sandy. The army, now marching as a single column rather than two, spread over an even longer stretch of terrain. Soldiers in woolen uniforms began to feel the effects of an early summer heat wave.

The Americans were moving due east from Princeton through Cranbury, closing on the left rear flank of the British army. Clinton sent much of his baggage, and the units in which he had the least confidence—consisting of about four thousand troops—to the front of his column, under the command of the German general, Wilhelm Knyphausen. He commanded the main body of the army itself, numbering about six thousand men, from the center, and dispatched Lord Cornwallis to the rear of the column to guard against sniping attacks. He intended to have Knyphausen march rapidly toward Middletown and then to Sandy Hook. Cornwallis would move more leisurely, while Clinton himself would lag in the middle in order to be able to support Cornwallis if his tempting presence drew the Americans into a general engagement. Clinton's main responsibility was to get his army back into headquarters unharmed and quickly enough to make the strategic detachments ordered by the War Department. But he had no objection to an opportunity to bloody his adversary on the way there if Washington was willing to fight it out.

THE BATTLE SETTING


On 25 June, Washington decided to send forward a probing detachment of about fifteen hundred men to see if Cornwallis's rear guard might be roughed up. He offered

command of the detachment, as a matter of protocol, to General Lee, but Lee—having counseled against aggressive tactics and considering the projected probe to be at best a paltry maneuver—refused the assignment. Washington then gave his protégé, the Marquis de Lafayette, the command of the enterprise. As an evolving series of decisions increased the number of troops committed to the enterprise to twenty-five hundred, and then to four thousand men, Lee reconsidered the matter and claimed the right to command it as a prerogative of his rank as second-in-command of the army as a whole. Washington may have thought better about allowing a dissenter against offensive action to undertake the project, but he again deferred to Lee's entitlement as a matter of military custom. By late in the day on the 27th, the detachment had been increased again to about five thousand men.

On that day the British rested at a sandy crossroads village called Monmouth Court House, where the seat of the county government and its judicial bodies sat. The courthouse lay at the intersection of five roads that converged from all directions across central northeastern New Jersey. A small stream called Wemrock Brook, and its several branches, carved the countryside into a series of ravines—designated the West, Middle, and East Ravines—interspersed with piney woods and marshy lowlands. Washington did no more—indeed, he did considerably less—than he had done the day before the Battle of Brandywine nine months earlier, to survey the ground that might be fought over. If he had developed an overly complex tactical plan for the attack at Germantown, now he obviated that difficulty by developing no particular plan at all. Rather, he directed Lee and his subordinate officers, the Marquis de Lafayette, and Generals Anthony Wayne, William Maxwell, and Charles Scott, to push ahead of the main American force and to make contact the next day with rear units of Clinton's army. If they could precipitate a significant engagement without becoming overwhelmed, they should do that. Washington promised to be following nearby with the main body of the army, close enough to the action to reinforce Lee and his commanders whenever necessary.

EARLY AMERICAN RETREAT

In the middle of the night on 27 June, Clinton sent Knyphausen and his segment of the army forward toward Middletown with the baggage train. Clinton followed with the rest of the army toward daybreak on the 28th. Washington had almost immediate notice of the movement and he ordered Lee to engage the enemy as soon as possible. Some of Lee's skirmishers clashed briefly and inconclusively with Knyphausen's force beyond the sleeping village, but they broke off the chase. Lee then brought his main body of troops up and formed a line along the road between the courthouse and the East Ravine to the



Monmouth Battle Plan. This map, drawn in 1778, shows the position of troops before the Battle in Monmouth in New Jersey on 28 June 1778. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GEOGRAPHY AND MAP DIVISION

northwest. Clinton waited until Knyphausen's troops and wagons were well under way and then ordered Cornwallis to turn around and march back to Monmouth to receive Lee's force. Lee's improvised arrangement of units was struggling to maintain its shape as more and more British troops arrived on the battlefield against it. His efforts to shift regiments from one location to another as the clash grew were counterproductive. It soon became clear that generals such as Lafayette and Wayne, who had advocated engaging the British in councils of war, were less than confident under the direction of Lee, who had not. The confusion communicated itself to ordinary soldiers as an invitation to panic, and groups of men began to withdraw in search of safer positions. Lee decided that he had little ability to protect his force as a whole, especially against mounted redcoats, who could maneuver easily in sand and swamps while exhausted American infantrymen were all but helpless there. Lee tried to retract his troops toward the second ravine, but the retreat quickly became a general one.

Washington, meanwhile, pursuant to his promise to Lee and the other commanders the previous evening, was hurrying his main body of troops toward Monmouth

Court House to support what he hoped would become a decisively successful action. He expressed puzzlement when initial indications that the battle had been joined were followed by silence as the retreat began. Lee, Wayne, and Lafayette heroically struggled with some success to reform their units and to stop the withdrawal, but stragglers from the various divisions moved to the west. By ones and twos, and then by small groups, these individuals came into Washington's line of vision as he hurried toward the village. He incredulously and angrily queried several of these parties, not wanting to believe, and then not understanding, as evidence mounted of an action going badly wrong.

Washington finally encountered Lee himself near the West Ravine. He heatedly demanded an explanation of the situation from Lee, who took several minutes even to become coherent. Lee believed that he had creditably extracted his force from imminent disaster stemming from intelligence problems and insubordinate assistants, complicated by Clinton's unexpected willingness to commit a large part of his force to repel an attack on his rear guard. He professed incredulity that, instead of being congratulated, he was subjected to an impromptu cross-

examination. When Washington expressed angry dissatisfaction with Lee's explanations, perhaps inevitably, the latter reminded his commander that he had urged against instigating a general action. This rightly caused Washington to exclaim that orders were orders, whatever the recipient may have thought about their soundness, and, inevitably, to wonder why Lee had accepted the command of the detachment in the first place if he was opposed to its mission.

Both men then remembered that a battle was raging around them, and Washington, as was his custom, moved forward toward the fighting to try to restore order. At Brandywine the previous year, he had done the same thing, except that he had then worked toward the rear of the Birmingham Meeting clash. At Monmouth he headed forward toward the point of action. Before he moved out, Washington ordered Nathanael Greene, who was in the main section of the army that had arrived with Washington, to move his division to the right onto a hill to try to cover the battlefield. Greene took several artillery units with him and scrambled onto the elevation.

THE AMERICANS REGROUP

Washington then learned that Cornwallis, after allowing the Americans to retreat in front of him with relatively little pressure, had begun to advance, hoping to turn the withdrawal into a rout like the one at Germantown. The redcoats were less than fifteen minutes away, moving between the East and Middle Ravines. Washington assumed that the British would continue their march toward Middletown and Sandy Hook after repelling Lee's probe, rather than continue the action. The news that he was mistaken portended a long and difficult afternoon. His aides found an officer from the New Jersey line who was familiar with the ground in the area and who suggested that it could be defended. Washington ordered that the most stricken and heat-exhausted of the retreating troops should be taken into the woods in the immediate rear to be cooled, calmed, and refreshed. Of the remaining units in the forward group, Anthony Wayne's appeared to be the most intact. Washington sought to use it to anchor a holding action until he could bring the fresh troops that he had brought forward into play. He ordered several broken regiments to merge temporarily into a new one and placed them behind a hedgerow near the West Ravine. Wayne would nominally command the holding action. Washington and Charles Lee achieved a sort of impromptu battlefield détente when the commander in chief asked, and his subordinate agreed, that Lee assume command of the rear guard supporting Wayne's troops. Nathanael Greene's force—including some artillery—which had shifted to the American right, overlooked the scene from an elevation known as Comb's Hill. Henry Knox, the commander of the Continental artillery forces,

took the rest of his gunmen to an elevation on the left side of the American line, which also commanded the impending clash.

Before these positions could be consolidated the advancing redcoats, displaying the wall of bayonets that were famously presumed to terrorize less seasoned and less disciplined troops, reached the front and fell on the Americans. General Clinton also brought up mounted troops—another element in which the British had a clear technical superiority to the revolutionaries. These cavalry charged into the Continental line. The fighting became fierce in the late afternoon heat. The Americans at first seemed to buckle under the pressure but then regrouped and resisted furiously. Gradually and grudgingly, the Continentals yielded control of the West Ravine, but Lee's reserves absorbed some of the pressure and prevented the American line from breaking down. At this point the American artillery, advantageously positioned on the heights on both sides of the battlefield, emerged as a decisive element. Greene's units and Knox's force fired from close range into both sides of the British advance, and redcoat casualties mounted sharply. Clinton's heavy guns attempted to suppress the American fire, but they were firing from the plain onto small rises on either side and were unable to accomplish their objective. The general slope of the ground meant that the British were mostly fighting uphill, even when they moved forward.

Clinton made several more almost desperate efforts to throw enough strength at the American line to break it and thereby to secure the ground beyond the ravine, but in every case the advances were driven back with heavy casualties on both sides. After 5 P.M., with considerable daylight remaining barely a week past the summer solstice, there were indications that the British attack was ebbing. Washington was tempted to resume the role of the aggressor and to try to drive the British from the battlefield, but with the continuing heat, the need to attend to casualties, and a sense of the army's long-term interests, he declined to do so. Clinton withdrew his army to Monmouth Court House and camped overnight. As William Howe had done at Brandywine, Washington camped on the battlefield, claiming one of the main technical criteria of victory. He planned to resume the action in the morning, but the British rose early and marched toward Sandy Hook, from where they were ferried into New York City.

WHO WON?

While both sides claimed victory in the engagement, they implicitly did so on the basis of different assessments of what the battle had been about and what their objectives for it were. For the first time in a year and one-half—since Trenton and Princeton—the Americans could make a plausible claim to be called the victors in a significant armywide confrontation. Their casualties were somewhat



Molly Pitcher. *Mary Hays McCauley, better known as Molly Pitcher, carried pitchers of water to American troops and helped operate a cannon during the Battle of Monmouth in June 1778. Nineteenth-century engraving.* THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

fewer than those of the British (see below); they slept on the core part of the battlefield while the enemy pulled back and then withdrew altogether; and they measurably improved their confidence in terms of being able to hold their own in the face of enemy fire. Still, the battle itself was a hybrid or even a mongrelized event, and the British had a plausible case to make as well. General Clinton was trying to get his awkward train of men and equipment back to New York City, and he did so expeditiously, after fighting off a concerted rebel effort to disrupt his march. From the British perspective, a rebel insurgency had morphed into a more familiar Atlantic and even a global war against an enemy that they knew well how to fight. They were determined to embrace that reality, and Monmouth did nothing to prevent that end.

POST-ACTION CONTROVERSY

The outcome at Monmouth at first split and then solidified the American command structure. Although Washington and Charles Lee patched up their confront-

ation and worked together on the battlefield to extract the army from danger, Lee could not contain his anger. He had expected to be praised for doing just that with the forward elements when he met Washington behind the Middle Ravine on June 28, and he was amazed to be criticized instead. Several days of brooding enlarged this hurt into the sense that he had actually delivered Clinton's and Cornwallis's rear guard into Washington's hands on advantageous terrain, and that he was thus significantly responsible for any success. Washington could brook neither of these claims, especially since they were delivered to him in several impetuous and curt letters, which implied that Lee hoped to defend his honor in an administrative proceeding. Washington was more than willing to give him that opportunity. On 30 June he had Lee formally arrested in preparation for a court-martial. He charged Lee with disobedience of his orders for failing to attack the enemy, of "misbehavior" for "making an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat," and finally with displaying disrespect to himself in the course of their post-battle correspondence.

To address these charges here would be to re-describe the battle and is not really necessary. Historians generally agree that Lee was innocent of the first two charges but unquestionably guilty of the third. The strategic and political needs of the Continental establishment itself, and of its military institutions, cannot be separated from an account of the post-action controversy. Washington had withstood what he and his partisans believed to have been a winter-long effort by his enemies—represented principally by General Thomas Conway—to undermine his position and supplant him from his command. He had made significant strides in shaping the army that he himself called “new” the previous summer into a credible long-term military instrument. The Revolution had been irrevocably transformed by the reality of French diplomatic recognition and material assistance and by the fact of the new international war.

How these circumstances would impact the battlefield was not clear, but the commander in chief’s impregnable control of the army had to be reaffirmed. Washington’s officer corps had overwhelmingly rallied around him at Valley Forge, despite some inevitable carping and complaint. The court-martial staff was drawn from that corps, and Lee’s fate was sealed: he was convicted on all three of Washington’s charges. Congress confirmed the result, although it modified some of the specific language of the decree and softened the penalty. Lee was suspended from his commission in late 1778 and—after continuing to protest bitterly his innocence—dismissed from the army two years later. He died in 1782 in obscurity and became a temporary scapegoat for the Revolution’s travails. If not for the disgrace in 1780 of Benedict Arnold—who spent the week of Monmouth reestablishing Revolutionary control in Philadelphia as its temporary military governor—Lee might have become the great scapegoat of the war itself.

ASSESSING STEUBEN’S IMPACT

As it had after another engagement in central New Jersey eighteen months before—the Battle of Princeton—the Continental army veered northwest from Monmouth Court House in a relatively exuberant mood. If it had not earned an unequivocal victory, it had at least showed its mettle and resourcefulness. It is doubtful that Monmouth provides, as some scholars have claimed, the “proof of the forge,” convincing evidence of the transformational character of the army’s stoic virtue on the Schuylkill River and of Friedrich Steuben’s professional training of its members. The battle was too idiosyncratic in its structure and cadence to constitute such a test. The Continentals showed much of the willingness to attack a stronger force that they had done at Germantown the year before. When that attack quickly unravelled—whether

because of the ineptness of Lee or the impulsiveness of his immediate subordinates—the privates showed the same ability to regroup under hot fire that they had done at Brandywine. Once Washington reestablished a stable front line, they withstood repeated charges from some of Clinton’s best units in a way that may well suggest general improvements over the preceding ten months. This probably reflects, however, the contributions of Continental artillery forces, which seized advantageous high ground on either side of the West Ravine, and whose members repeatedly fired devastating volleys into the flanks of the British attackers during the last hours of the battle. If so, it should be noted that these skillful, fractious individualists were less involved in Steuben’s training exercises at Valley Forge than perhaps any other parts of the army.

After Monmouth, the army did little if any organizationwide campaigning in the North for the rest of the war. Washington marched his force to White Plains, New York, east of the Hudson River. After surveying its condition, he gradually distributed it along a broad crescent running from Fairfield, Connecticut, to Westchester County, New York, then stretching across the Hudson at the Highlands and finally curving south and east across the New York-New Jersey border to an anchor on the Atlantic near New Brunswick and Perth Amboy. The “lessons” of Valley Forge that Washington applied between 1778 and 1783 reflected the value of maintaining an alert but loose grip around an entrenched, urban enemy headquarters.

The patrolling and skirmishing that the army did in support of this modest but critical mission depended less on Steuben’s manual of arms and close-order drill than on a pride in military professionalism and a commitment to the principles of civilian supremacy and republican liberty. The impromptu Continental march to Yorktown and the 1781 siege there, as well as the use of elements from the northern army in the chaotic southern campaigns of 1778–1781, may reinforce Monmouth’s role in demonstrating the army’s conventional combat prowess imbibed at Valley Forge. But if this is the case, that point remains to be demonstrated.

CASUALTIES

These are more highly disputed and indeterminable than for most Revolutionary war actions. The Americans suffered at least 106 men killed, 161 wounded, and 95 missing, some of whom undoubtedly died, probably of the heat, and were buried in the woods near the battlefield. The British admitted losses of 177 killed, 170 wounded, and 64 missing. Again, heat-related deaths were considerable on both sides and may not have been included in official totals.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Clinton, Henry; Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of; Greene, Nathanael; Howe, William; Knyphausen, Wilhelm;*

Lafayette, Marquis de; Lee Court Martial; Lee, Charles (1731–1782); Maxwell, William; Princeton, New Jersey; Scott, Charles; Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von; Wayne, Anthony.

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revised by Wayne K. Bodle

MONROE, JAMES. (1758–1831). Continental army officer and fifth president of the United States. Virginia. Born in Westmoreland County, Virginia, on 28 April 1758, Monroe was the son of a modestly prosperous family. He entered the College of William and Mary in 1774 but left on 28 September 1775 to enlist as a second lieutenant in Colonel Hugh Mercer's Third Virginia Regiment. He volunteered to accompany Thomas Knowlton and his rangers in attempting to encircle the British light infantry at Harlem Heights on 16 September 1776. Monroe also fought at White Plains (28 October) and at Trenton (26 December), where he helped to lead the vanguard and was seriously wounded. He was promoted to major on 20 November 1777 and named aide-de-camp to William Alexander (Lord Stirling). He fought at Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth before resigning on 20 November 1778.

In 1780 Monroe began studying law under Thomas Jefferson, then governor of Virginia, and stayed with him until 1783. He was elected to the House of Burgesses in 1782 and later sat in the Confederation Congress (1783–1786). In 1786 he married Elizabeth Kortwright, the daughter of a New York City merchant who was a Loyalist officer. He was a member of the state convention that ratified the Constitution and was a prominent anti-Federalist. He served as a U.S. Senator (1790–1794), minister to France (1794–1796), governor of Virginia (1799–1802 and 1811), negotiator for the Louisiana Purchase (1803), minister to Great Britain (1803–1807), secretary of state (1811–1817), secretary of war (1814–1815), and president (1817–1825). The most notable accomplishments during his two terms as president were in foreign affairs, including the acquisition of Florida and the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine (2 December 1823).

SEE ALSO *Harlem Heights, New York; Trenton, New Jersey.*

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MONTGOMERY, RICHARD. (1738–1775). Continental general. Ireland and New York. Richard Montgomery was born in Swords, Ireland, on 2 December 1738. The son of an Irish member of Parliament, he became an ensign in the Seventeenth Foot in 1756. Going to Canada the next year (1757), he took part in the siege of Louisburg (1758), was promoted to lieutenant, and served under Jeffery Amherst in the successful operations against Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and Montreal. Meanwhile, he became regimental adjutant in 1760. In the West Indies he was at the capture of Martinique and Havana (1762), becoming a captain by the end of those actions. Returning to Great Britain, he became a friend of Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox, two prominent Whig politicians of the time, and was greatly influenced by their liberal views. Disgusted with the British patronage system and his failure to advance further in the army, he sold his commission on 6 April 1772 and emigrated to America, settling on a 67-acre farm he had bought at Kings Bridge, New York. Having married Janet Livingston, the daughter of Robert R. Livingston, Montgomery became quickly involved in American politics and was elected a delegate to New York's first provincial congress in May 1775. He accepted a commission as Continental brigadier general on 22 June 1775.

Leaving his young wife and their new home near Rhinebeck (her estate), Montgomery went north to become second in command to General Philip Schuyler in the invasion of Canada in 1775 and 1776. With Schuyler soon evacuated for illness, Montgomery showed real military ability in leading an offensive into Canada, despite the poor quality of troops and subordinate leaders at his disposal and the logistical problems he faced. After taking St. Johns on 5 September–2 November 1775, and Montreal shortly afterwards, he pushed on to make the unsuccessful attack on Quebec (31 December–1 January 1776). He was killed in the latter action, never knowing that Congress had made him a major general on 9 December 1775. In death, Montgomery became a hero and martyr to the cause of American independence.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion; Quebec (Canada Invasion); St. John's, Canada (5 September–2 November 1775).*



The Death of General Montgomery in the Attack on Quebec (1786). John Trumbull's dramatic painting depicts Richard Montgomery's battlefield death in December 1775 during the American attack on Quebec. LANDOV

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MONTMORENCI FALLS, CANADA.

31 July 1759. On the north shore of the St. Lawrence River below these falls, a few miles east of Quebec City, Major General James Wolfe tried to penetrate the French defenses. His lack of success prolonged the siege of Quebec and ultimately persuaded him to undertake the gamble of threatening Quebec from the bluffs west of the city, on the Plains of Abraham.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; Plains of Abraham (13 September 1759).*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

MONTOUR FAMILY. Elizabeth Catherine “Madam” Montour was born at Trois-Rivières, Quebec, in 1667, the daughter of Pierre Couc dit Lafleur and his Algonquian wife, Marie Miteouamigoukoue. Her family was involved in the Indian trade, which is how she met Roland Montour, a Seneca, whom she married, spending the rest of her life among the Iroquois. Madam Montour, as she was widely known, was employed as an interpreter by New York’s governor, Robert Hunter, and served in the same capacity for the Iroquois on many occasions. Her first husband was killed in the early 1720s, apparently while fighting the Catawba in South Carolina. In 1727 she married Carondowana, an Oneida chief. She died near the town named in her honor, Montoursville, Pennsylvania, in 1753.

Madam Montour’s son, Andrew, also known as Sattelihu, was an accomplished linguist, serving as an interpreter at many conferences between colonial governments and Indians. He received a captain’s commission from Virginia in 1754 and served as a guide for British and allied Indians during the Seven Years’ War, being present at both Fort Necessity and Braddock’s defeat.

Pennsylvania rewarded him with two land grants. He died in 1772.

Andrew Montour's son, John, also served as an interpreter for the British and the American colonists. During the Revolution he led a company of Delaware Indians allied to the rebels.

Madam Montour's niece, "French Margaret," married an Indian and had daughters named Catherine and Esther. The latter married a ruling chief and lived near Tioga. She may have taken part in the Wyoming Valley Massacre and was accused of murdering prisoners.

SEE ALSO *Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MONTREAL. 25 September 1775. Ethan Allen's abortive attack. When Richard Montgomery started his siege of St. Johns (now St-Jean, Quebec), he sent Ethan Allen ahead to recruit Canadians along the Richelieu River for the American army. John Brown went toward La Prairie with the same purpose while Canadians James Livingston and Jeremy Duggan also started assembling men around Chambly and Pointe Olivier. Allen discovered widespread opposition among the farmers to Governor Guy Carleton's efforts to mobilize the Canadian militia; he decided to try taking Montréal, which was virtually undefended owing to the governor's decision to concentrate his regulars at the border. Although the colony's fate seemed to be hanging in the balance, Allen could not find enough men willing to attack immediately. He turned back briefly to join forces with Brown and Duggan and developed a plan to capture the city. Allen would cross the St. Lawrence with his 110 men (30 Americans and 80 Canadians) at Longueuil below Montreal while Brown with 200 crossed upstream at La Prairie; the two forces would then attack simultaneously.

Allen and Duggan began crossing at 10 P.M. on 24 September, but he had to shuttle the men over in canoes. By dawn on the next day, Allen's band was in the village of Longue-Pointe, but Brown had not been able to get across. Allen was immediately detected, and the inhabitants of the city shut its gates, buying time for the surprised Carleton to organize his defenses. Encouraged by the support he was receiving from the population, Carleton sallied out with a polyglot force: 34 regulars from the Twenty-Sixth Foot, 20 staff members of the Indian Department, 80 English-speaking Canadians, 120 French-speaking Canadians, and a half-dozen Indians. At the approach of this force, most of Allen's Canadians melted away. The dozen or so left, plus the Americans, tried to set up a defense at Ruisseau-des-Soeurs but were quickly overwhelmed.

Carleton lost 3 killed and 2 wounded; Allen and 35 of his band were captured and 5 were killed.

This quixotic escapade had an impact far beyond the tiny numbers involved. It shored up British morale, encouraged the northern Indians, and kept most Canadians sitting on the fence. It also left Carleton free and gave Quebec City time to prepare its own defenses.

SEE ALSO *Allen, Ethan; Brown, John; Canada Invasion; St. John's, Canada (5 September–2 November 1775).*

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MONTREAL. 13 November 1775. Occupied by Americans. The fall of St. Johns on 2 November left Montreal open to capture. Brigadier General Richard Montgomery sent an advance detachment of Americans and Canadians toward Sorel the next day, and they brushed aside light resistance; Montgomery followed with his main body two days later. The first of Montgomery's men crossed the St. Lawrence River and landed upstream from Montreal on 11 November. Governor Guy Carleton had only about a hundred troops and a few militia, so during the night of 12–13 November he spiked his cannon and embarked on a few small vessels; in the morning of 13 November the citizens opened the gates of the city to the Americans. The garrison's retreat was turned back twice by blocking positions set up at Sorel. Carleton escaped on 19 November by disguising himself as a Canadian and reached Quebec the next day on the armed scow *Fell*. Brigadier Richard Prescott and the bulk of the garrison surrendered on 20 November along with their collection of small vessels headed by the six-gun brig *Gaspée*.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion; Quebec (Canada Invasion); St. John's, Canada (5 September–2 November 1775).*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

MONTRESOR, JAMES GABRIEL. (1702–1776). Military engineer in the colonial wars. Son of a naturalized Huguenot immigrant, Montresor entered the Royal Artillery in 1724 and over the next thirty years

served as a surveyor and military engineer at Minorca and Gibraltar, where he became chief engineer in 1746. In 1754 he was appointed Braddock's chief engineer, but because of ill health did not arrive in Virginia until after the debacle at the Monongahela. Thereafter, he supervised the construction or repair of most of the forts on the New York frontier as director of engineers and lieutenant colonel after 4 January 1758 and served under Amherst in the 1759 campaign. Plagued by ill health, he was allowed to return on leave to England in the spring of 1760. John Montresor was a son of his first marriage.

SEE ALSO *Montresor, John*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

MONTRESOR, JOHN. (1736–1799). British military engineer. Born at Gibraltar, the son of James Gabriel Montresor, John Montresor went to America ahead of his father in 1754 and, appointed an additional engineer by Edward Braddock, was wounded at the Monongahela on (9 July 1755). He then served on the New York frontier and took part in the earl of Loudoun's so-called Cabbage Planting Expedition to Halifax, Nova Scotia, in 1757. He served under Jeffrey Amherst at the capture of Louisburg (1758), James Wolfe at the siege of Quebec (1759), and James Murray in the final conquest of Canada in 1760. During most of this time he specialized in scouting missions and dispatch carrying. In 1761 he explored the route up the Kennebec River in Maine that was later used by Benedict Arnold in his march to Quebec.

At the start of Pontiac's uprising, Lieutenant Montresor was sent from New York City with letters for the commander at Detroit. Delayed at Niagara for almost a month awaiting passage, he sailed on 26 August 1763 with provisions and a seventeen-man detachment of the Seventeenth Regiment commanded by Captain Edward Hope. Shipwrecked two days later, Montresor fortified the temporary camp and enabled the survivors and a one-hundred-man reinforcement that arrived on 2 September to beat off Indian attacks that lasted from dawn to dusk on 3 September. Finally reaching Detroit, he stayed there until 20 November 1763, when he left with Robert Rogers (the famous ranger) and a large detachment to return to Niagara. The next year he fortified the portage at the latter place and went with John Bradstreet to Detroit, where he improved the defenses.

He returned from England in 1766 as a captain lieutenant and barrackmaster. During the next few years he worked on fortifications or barracks at New York City, Boston, Philadelphia, and the Bahamas. Montresor surveyed the boundary line between New York and

New Jersey in 1769, and in 1772 he bought what was later called Randall's Island in the East River and lived there with his wife and family.

Montresor saw considerable service during the first three years of the War of American Independence. He was present at Lexington and Concord (19 April 1775) and laid out a redoubt on Bunker Hill to cover the retreat of the British to Boston that General Thomas Gage ordered abandoned later that day. He fought in the Battle of Bunker Hill on 17 June to regain the position Gage had let slip away two months earlier. Montresor was appointed chief engineer in America on 10 December 1775 and promoted to captain on 10 January 1776. He blew up Castle William, at the mouth of Boston harbor, when the British evacuated in March. He served as an aide to William Howe at the Battle of Long Island (27 August 1776), directed the artillery at the Battle of Brandywine (11 September 1777), and was present at the Battle of Germantown (4 October 1777). He supervised the construction of the British defenses around Philadelphia in the fall of 1777 and directed the attack on the Delaware River forts. (He had begun the fort on Mud Island, renamed Fort Mifflin, in 1771.) He organized the *Mischianza*, an elaborate entertainment held on 18 May 1778 at Philadelphia to honor Howe on the eve of his return to Britain. He fought under Sir Henry Clinton, Howe's successor, at Monmouth (28 June 1778), but his ties to Howe seem to have incurred him the displeasure of Clinton, who praised James Moncrieff as "an engineer who understood his business" but did not mention John Montresor once in his memoirs. Montresor returned to England later that year and retired from the army. He died in debtor's prison at Maidstone on 26 June 1799.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's March to Quebec; Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Moncrieff, James; Montresor, James Gabriel; Montresor's Island, New York*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

MONTRESOR'S ISLAND, NEW YORK. Owned by John Montresor from 1772 until the British evacuation of New York in November 1783, Montresor's Island (now called Randall's Island) lies at the mouth of the Harlem River. It was occupied by the British on 10 September 1776. "From that well-chosen advance post," comments the historian Douglas Southall Freeman, "they could land either on the plains of Harlem, south of

Kings Bridge, or on the Morrisania estate, whence they could flank the position at Kings Bridge by a march of six or seven miles" (vol. IV, p. 187). Up until this time it had been used by the Americans as an isolation area for troops inoculated with smallpox. Learning from two deserters that the island was lightly held, General William Heath got General George Washington's authority to retake it. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Jackson of the Sixteenth Massachusetts Continental Infantry led 240 men in an attempt to surprise the outpost at dawn on 23 September (some sources give 24 September as the date of this action).

An American sentinel near the mouth of Harlem Creek had not been informed of this operation and fired at the friendly force as it passed on the way to Montresor's Island. Jackson landed about dawn with three field officers and men from the first boat. When the British guard attacked, the men in the other two boats pulled away instead of landing to join their leaders. In the withdrawal, about fourteen Americans were killed, wounded, or captured. Major Thomas Henly, General Heath's aide-de-camp, who had insisted on accompanying the attack, was killed as he re-entered the boat. Jackson was wounded by a musket ball in the leg. Freeman notes: "The delinquents in the other boats were arrested, and tried by court-martial, and one of the Captains cashiered" (vol. IV, pp. 73–76).

SEE ALSO *Heath, William; Jackson, Michael; Montresor, John.*

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MOODY, JAMES. (1744–1809). Loyalist spy. Born in Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey, on 31 December 1744, Moody settled as a farmer in Knowlton. He demonstrated no interest in politics until 1777, when he refused to swear allegiance to the state's revolutionary government. After being beaten by members of the local committee of safety, he was fired upon by the Knowlton militia near his house. All the shots missed, however, and Moody fled to the British lines, where he enlisted in the New Jersey Volunteers. He took part in numerous raids behind enemy lines to gather information, destroy arms depots, seize foodstuffs, capture Patriot officers and officials, and recruit Loyalists. Moody gained a reputation as being very good at these tasks and was credited with enlisting five hundred men to the Loyalist cause in 1777 alone. On 17 July 1780 he was returning to British lines at Bull's Ferry, New Jersey, when it came under a Patriot attack in

which he was captured. Imprisoned at West Point under inhumane conditions, he was transferred to Washington's camp for trial as a spy, making a bold escape on 21 September. Back in New York City, he was promoted to lieutenant. A trap was set for Moody in May 1781, and he was surprised by seventy militiamen. They opened fire and demonstrated their marksmanship when all of them missed. In his last raid that November, Moody attempted to steal congressional papers in Philadelphia but was betrayed. Moody escaped, but his brother was captured and executed.

In 1782 he went to London, where he wrote a popular account of his experiences. The crown awarded him an annual pension of £100, in addition to £1,608 to cover his losses. In 1785 Moody settled in Sissiboo, Nova Scotia, where he became a successful builder, local official, colonel of militia, and representative in the assembly from 1793 to 1806. He died in Sissiboo on 6 April 1809.

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Michael Bellesiles

MOORE, ALFRED. (1755–1810). Continental officer, jurist. North Carolina. Born in New Hanover County, North Carolina, on 21 May 1755, Moore was the son of Judge Maurice Moore, with whom he studied law. He was licensed to practice in 1775, and on 1 September 1775 he became a captain in the First North Carolina Regiment, which was commanded by his uncle, James Moore. He took part in the Moores Creek Bridge campaign in February 1776 and the defense of Charleston in June. On 8 March 1777 he resigned his commission, but he continued to serve as a colonel of militia. In this capacity he was active in harassing the British based at Wilmington, Delaware, through much of 1781. The British plundered and burned his plantation in Brunswick County, North Carolina, in retribution. Moore joined the pursuit of General Charles Cornwallis's army into Virginia, and was present for the surrender at Yorktown in October 1781.

Elected attorney general of North Carolina on 3 May 1782, Moore served with distinction until 1791. He then went on to become a successful criminal lawyer. President John Adams appointed him an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in December 1799. In 1804 he had to

resign because of poor health. He died at his estate on 15 October 1810.

SEE ALSO *Moore, James; Moore, Maurice.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MOORE, JAMES. (1737–1777). Continental general. North Carolina. Born in New Hanover County, North Carolina, in 1737, Moore served in the Seven Years' War as a captain. For a year he was commandant of Fort Johnston at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. In provincial politics he sat in the House of Commons from 1764 to 1771 and in 1773. He actively opposed enforcement of the Stamp Act in 1765 and became a Son of Liberty at that time. During the troubles with the Regulators (an ad hoc organization of private citizens who took law enforcement in their own hands) he sided with the eastern oligarchy and the established government. He served as an artillery colonel in Governor William Tryon's expedition of 1768 and in the battle of Alamance, in North Carolina, on 16 May 1771.

Moore played a prominent role in driving Governor Josiah Martin from the province, being the first to sign the circular letter calling for the first Revolutionary Provincial Congress, which was held in New Bern in August 1774. He represented his county (New Hanover) at the Third Provincial Congress, which met on 20 August 1775 at Hillsboro. On 1 September he was selected by this body to command the First North Carolina Continental Regiment. In this capacity he directed the campaign that ended with the important victory at Moore's Creek Bridge on 27 February 1776.

Appointed brigadier general by Congress on 1 March 1776, he was made commander in chief of the Patriot forces in North Carolina. During the defense of Charleston that year, Moore had the relatively inactive role of observing a small British fleet in the Cape Fear River. On 29 November he was ordered to Charleston, where he remained until February 1777. On 5 February he was ordered north to join General George Washington. He died suddenly at Wilmington, North Carolina, where his command had been delayed by lack of money for supplies, on 15 April 1777.

SEE ALSO *Moore's Creek Bridge; Regulators.*

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MOORE, MAURICE. (1735–1777). North Carolina jurist and Patriot. North Carolina. Born in New Hanover County, North Carolina, Maurice Moore was the brother of General James Moore, brother-in-law of General John Ashe, and father of Justice Alfred Moore. He became a prominent politician at a young age, entering the assembly in 1757, where he sat nearly every year until 1774. His support of the royal government led to his appointment to Governor William Tryon's council in 1760 (he served a year) and to an associate judgeship. His pamphlet attacking the Stamp Act on the grounds that there was no American representation in Parliament led to his suspension as judge, but he was reinstated in 1768 and served until the court ceased to function in 1772.

Although he initially sympathized with the Regulators, Moore served as a colonel in Tryon's expedition against them in 1768 and was a judge in the Regulator trials of 1768 and 1771 (after the battle of Alamance). Having become bitterly hated by the Regulators, he switched sides again, becoming their champion and calling for leniency. In the Revolutionary politics that led to war with Great Britain, Moore served on important committees of the Third Provincial Congress in 1775, but was considered to be too conservative to become a leader. His brother's victory over the Loyalists at Moore's Creek Bridge destroyed all chances for the course he advocated: reconciliation on the basis of political conditions in 1763. Although elected to the Fifth Provincial Congress of November 1776, he did not attend. Equally suspected by both Patriots and Loyalists, Moore retired from politics and died early in 1777 at his home in Brunswick.

SEE ALSO *Moore, James.*

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MOORE'S CREEK BRIDGE. 27 February 1776. Reports of Lexington and Concord so fanned the flames of revolution in North Carolina that within a few months the royal governor, Josiah Martin, fled; the so-called Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence was adopted; a provincial congress was organized; and North Carolina raised two Continental regiments.

In spite of this revolutionary progress, North Carolina was deeply divided. In part, these divisions were the legacy of the recent Regulator conflict, but there was strong

Loyalist sentiment as well as numerous advocates of neutrality. Those supporting the crown included a variety of groups across the entire colony. Some had been Piedmont Regulators; others were Tidewater planters or Highland Scots along the Cape Fear River. They were united only by their opposition to the revolt, and in some cases, opposition was created by antipathy toward the rebellion's leadership. Quakers and German Pietists, wanting nothing to do with either side's politics, sought only to be left alone. Perhaps only 30 percent actively supported the Whig cause. The Provincial Congress had little or no success in winning over the lukewarm and disaffected, but the Loyalists were not united initially. Their inertia enabled North Carolina to assist Virginia and South Carolina and be ready when the Loyalists finally began active opposition.

TORY PLANS AND WHIG RESPONSE

General Henry Clinton's Charleston expedition in 1776 was prompted largely by Martin's assurance, supported by other refugee governors and planters, that the South could be retained if a military force were present to support the Loyalists. Dartmouth approved Clinton's strategic diversion; Lord Germain endorsed it despite the protests of Generals Edward Harvey and William Howe. When Martin learned that reinforcements to augment Clinton's expedition would leave Ireland on 1 December 1775, he made plans for a coordinated Loyalist uprising in North Carolina. Included in his plans were instructions to the Loyalists to have their troops at Brunswick Town on 15 February.

In the meantime, General Thomas Gage sent Lieutenant Colonel Donald McDonald and Captain Donald McLeod to North Carolina to recruit for the Royal Highland Emigrant Regiment. Arriving in Cross Creek (later Fayetteville), the two officers, Allen McDonald, and other Highland Scots raised the royal standard at Cross Creek on 5 February 1775, calling for armed supporters to assemble. Because of his reputation as a veteran of Culloden and the work of others, including the legendary Flora McDonald, one thousand Highland Scots had gathered by 18 February. Most were recent immigrants motivated not so much by loyalty to George III as by their dislike for the Lowlanders and Ulstermen so prominent in the rebel camp. Another five hundred men, including former Regulators, joined McDonald at Cross Creek.

In the absence of Colonel Robert Howe's Second North Carolina Regiment, Colonel James Moore's First North Carolina Continentals, about 650 men and five guns, formed the nucleus of the force that marched from Wilmington and camped about twelve miles south of Cross Creek at Rockfish Creek on 15 February. On the 18th Moore was joined by Colonel Alexander Lillington's 150 Wilmington minutemen, Colonel James Kenan's 200

Duplin County militia, and John Ashe's 100 Volunteer Independent Rangers.

About this time, McDonald sent Moore a copy of Governor Martin's proclamation and a letter calling on Whigs to join the royalist colors. After a delay in sending an express message to Colonel Richard Caswell, who was approaching from New Bern with eight hundred Partisan Rangers, Moore sent McDonald the Test Oath with the suggestion that bloodshed be avoided by the Loyalists joining the Whigs.

GATHERING AT MOORES CREEK

By this time McDonald knew the enemy was gathering around him. He decided to avoid a general engagement and march to the coast. His route was generally east across the Cape Fear and South Rivers, thence southeast toward Wilmington. Moore had to withdraw along the Cape Fear River and then intercept McDonald's march. When Caswell reported that he was between the Black River and Moore's Creek, and that the Loyalists had crossed the former, Moore sent word to stop the Tories at Moore's Creek Bridge, about eighteen miles above Wilmington. He asked Caswell to meet him there if possible, otherwise to follow the enemy toward that place.

Lillington and Ashe reached Moore's Creek on the 25th. Caswell arrived the next day and threw up earthworks on the enemy (or west) side of the narrow but deep stream. He later abandoned the west camp and joined Lillington and Ashe on the east side, where a breastwork had been erected. After removing some of the bridge flooring, leaving a gap where the enemy could cross only on the log stringers, the one thousand Whigs deployed to cover the bridge. If subsequent Tory accounts are to be believed, the Whigs also greased the stringers. Through the chilly night of 26–27 February, they rested on their arms. Lillington seems to deserve most of the credit for the preparations at the bridge and for the subsequent action. Moore, at Elizabethtown blocking the route to Cape Fear, did not arrive until after the battle.

The Tories had been advancing for three days through rough, swampy terrain, and late on 26 February they camped six miles from the bridge. After scouts reported the enemy occupying a position on the west bank of Moore's Creek (see above), the Loyalists resumed their advance at 1 A.M. McDonald had become ill on 26 February, and command passed to Donald McLeod, now promoted to lieutenant colonel of the North Carolina Loyalist militia. Captain John Campbell led the advance guard of eighty picked Scots armed only with claymores; fourteen hundred men made up the main body, and three hundred riflemen brought up the rear. A shortage of arms meant that only about five hundred men were equipped for combat.

THE FIGHTING

The Tories intended to surprise the Whigs camped on the west bank. On entering the camp, they found it abandoned. This led the Tories to believe that their crossing would be unchallenged. As they formed into a battle line before crossing the bridge, rifle shots were fired near the bridge. Campbell's advance guard, accompanied by a few others, including McLeod, immediately went out onto the bridge, shouting "King George and Broadwords!" Once across, they moved up the road at a rush. Whig infantry and two artillery pieces opened fire at a range of thirty yards from behind breastworks, and the Tory attack was shattered. McLeod and Campbell were killed with several of their men within a few paces of their objective. Others were hit on the bridge or simply fell into the deep stream and drowned.

The Whigs then counterattacked. Some rushed forward to replace planks on the bridge and pursue the panic-stricken Tories. A small detachment forded the creek, pushed through the swamp, and hit the enemy rear.

Moore had directed the Second and Fourth North Carolina Regiments, under Lieutenant Colonels Alexander Martin and James Thackston, to occupy Cross Creek, and their presence undoubtedly accounts for the numerous prisoners and weapons taken after the battle. General McDonald, several other officers, and 850 men were taken prisoner. The booty included £15,000 in specie, 13 wagons, 1,500 rifles, 350 muskets, and 150 swords and dirks. This haul came not only from prisoners but also from known and suspected Tories in the region. The prisoners were jailed and their property was subjected to looting and burning, forcing many Highlanders to flee the province.

About thirty Tories were killed or wounded in the brief action at the bridge. Moore estimated total enemy casualties in killed, wounded, or drowned as about fifty. Only two defenders were hit, and one, John Grady, died on 2 March.

COMMENT

While Moore, Lillington, and Caswell deserve praise, as do the North Carolina political leaders responsible for raising their armed forces, the king's representatives failed him at all levels of planning and execution. Governor Josiah Martin was overoptimistic about Loyalist support and premature in calling it out. The Charleston expedition, delayed by late arrival of the fleet, was doomed to failure because local support had been defeated. McLeod went forward without knowing what lay in front of them. The east bank breastworks were not only across the road, but paralleled it. McLeod appears to have run into a classic ambush and paid the price. At least nine bullets and some twenty-four shot

struck him down, evidence the Whigs were firing buck and ball, and at very short range.

The Halifax Resolves were adopted on 12 April 1776 by North Carolina's Provincial Congress, and exactly a month later, Sir Henry Clinton declared North Carolina in a state of rebellion. Lord Cornwallis landed from Clinton's fleet at Brunswick Town and ravaged the area. Colonel Robert Howe's plantation was virtually destroyed and Brunswick Town burned, but North Carolina was spared further British military operations for almost five more years. The delay bought by the Whig victory at Moores Creek Bridge gave the new North Carolina state government time to solidify its hold over the populace and build the infrastructure that would support the revolt.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Halifax Resolves; McDonald, Flora; Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence; Norfolk, Virginia; Reedy River, South Carolina; Regulators; Test Oath.*

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revised by Lawrence E. Babits

MORAVIAN SETTLEMENTS. Count Nicolaus Ludwig Zinzendorf (1700–1760) helped revive the evangelical sect of Protestants called Moravians after giving a group of them refuge on his Saxon estate in 1722. He looked to the New World as a place where the Moravians could escape persecution and exercise their missionary zeal. Bishop Augustus Gottlieb Spangenberg (1704–1792) reached Georgia in 1735 with a few Swiss colonists, and thirty other Moravians later followed. In 1741 the Moravians established Nazareth and Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, as a communistic society. That year Count Zinzendorf arrived in America with hopes of uniting all German Protestants in Pennsylvania. Despite many Protestants' suspicious attitude toward his pacifist and generous theology, which included an opposition to slavery, Zinzendorf exerted an important influence on ecclesiastical affairs in the colonies. His daughter Benigna organized what would become the Moravian College in Bethlehem.

As Zinzendorf left, Spangenberg, the newly appointed bishop of the North American Moravians, returned. In 1749 he was removed from his office in

disputes over church politics but, because of mismanagement by his successor, was reinstated in 1751. He led a party of Bethlehem Moravians south to find a new home, and in August 1753 they purchased 100,000 acres from Lord Granville in North Carolina, where they established what was known as the Wachovia: the towns of Betharaba (Dutch Fort), Bethania, Friedberg, Friedland, Hope, and Salem. The latter is now part of Winston-Salem. Spangenberg's new settlements were organized under a plan of family life, as opposed to communistic labor, and became the Moravian center of the South. The North Carolina Moravian towns were trade centers that served much of the South. They suffered from robberies by highwayman during the war.

As a result of immigration, the Moravian population of Pennsylvania swelled to 2,500 people by 1775. The Moravians were more active than any other religious body in conducting missionary work among the Indians, enjoying particular success among the Mahicans and Delawares, hundreds of whom converted to Christianity. Their converts were given special protection by the government of Pennsylvania, which promised their security from attacks by both white settlers and non-Christian Indians, though that status did not save them from attacks by frontier militia during the Seven Years' War and the American Revolution.

As pacifists, the Moravians generally attempted to avoid the American Revolution, though many served in non-combatant roles with the Patriot side. In December 1776 George Washington appropriated the Brothers' House (the residence for single men) in the Bethlehem community for use as a military hospital. By the time the hospital was moved from this site in April 1778, more than 1,000 Continental soldiers were treated, with many Moravians offering their services. The Moravians worked hard to protect Christian Indians from the war's violence, with mixed results. A few missionaries, most famously David Zeisberger, served as translators and even intelligence agents for the Patriots. Like the Quakers, the Moravians were persecuted for their pacifism. Finding greater security in isolation, the Moravians withdrew further into their communities at Bethlehem and Salem, as the Revolution put a halt to many of their missionary activities.

SEE ALSO *Gnadenbutten Massacre, Ohio; Zeisberger, David.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MORGAN, DANIEL. (1735?–1802). Continental general. New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Morgan's place and year of birth are uncertain. After quarreling with his father, a Welch immigrant, Morgan

moved to the Shenandoah Valley in 1753, working as a farm laborer and teamster. In 1755 he joined Edward Braddock's expedition as a teamster, where he was punished with a life-threatening 500 stripes for knocking down a British officer who had hit him with a sword. After Braddock's defeat, Morgan helped to evacuate the wounded and hauled supplies to frontier posts. In 1758 Morgan became an ensign. While carrying dispatches to Winchester he was struck by an Indian bullet that passed through his neck and his mouth. He lost all the teeth on one side of his face. In 1762 he took possession of a small grant near Winchester, Virginia, and moved in with Abigail Curry, whom he married ten years later. The next year he served as a lieutenant in Pontiac's War, and he took part in Dunmore's War (1774). In between, he prospered as a farmer and slave owner.

Commissioned a captain of one of the two Virginia rifle companies on 22 June 1775, he enlisted the prescribed 96 men in the next ten days, and led them the 600 miles to the Boston lines without losing a man.

Morgan's company volunteered to join Benedict Arnold in his march to Quebec, which occurred from September to November 1775. In the disastrous assault on Quebec, 31 December, Morgan took command from the wounded Arnold and drove on with magnificent élan until subordinates prevailed on him to make a decision that probably was fatal to the enterprise. A prisoner in Quebec until the next summer, he returned on parole and was included in a prisoner exchange in January 1777. Commissioned a colonel of the Eleventh Virginia Regiment by Congress, Morgan joined Washington's main army a few months later. After serving with distinction in the New Jersey operations of 1777, Morgan was selected by Washington to lead 500 riflemen personally selected by the commanding general. This unit was known as "the Corps of Rangers." Washington then ordered this corps, the only rifle unit in the American army, to join the campaign against General John Burgoyne.

Morgan and his riflemen played a decisive role in winning the two battles of Saratoga, which occurred on 19 September and 7 October 1777, decimating the British in both instances. Morgan immediately led his corps back to Washington's main army, arriving in time to skirmish several times with British troops in December 1777. While in winter quarters at Valley Forge, Morgan's Eleventh Virginia Regiment was brigaded with the Seventh Virginia Regiment under the command of Brigadier General William Woodford. Morgan was not engaged in the battle of Monmouth on 28 June 1778, but he did conduct a preliminary harassment and a vigorous pursuit after that action.

Morgan took an extended furlough from the army on 18 July 1779, after Anthony Wayne rather than Morgan was chosen to command a new light infantry brigade. Congress ordered him in June 1780 to report to Horatio Gates in the southern theater of operations, but he declined to comply. He took this action in protest, since Congress apparently did not value his services highly enough to accompany its call with the restoration of his relative rank, much less make him a general. When Morgan learned of the disaster at Camden, however, he rejoined the army regardless of rank. On 2 October he was given command of a corps of light troops that had been organized by Gates. On 13 October Congress at last appointed him brigadier general, and when Nathanael Greene succeeded Gates he confirmed the assignment of Morgan as commander of the elite corps.

At Cowpens, South Carolina, on 17 January 1781, Morgan displayed tactical genius in feigning a rout before turning on Lieutenant Colonel Banastre "Butcher" Tarleton's legion and winning a battle that is considered a classic. Morgan then, and wisely, started running again. Soon after linking up with the main body under Greene,

Morgan, riddled with disease, took a leave of absence (10 February 1781).

Morgan was deaf, at first, to appeals to support the Marquis de Lafayette in halting British raids in Virginia, although he did arrive after the real danger was over. Back on the frontier, the old warrior's aches and pains—arthritis, rheumatism, and sciatica, according to different accounts—did not prevent an active life in diverse enterprises. As a major general, Morgan led the Virginia militia into Pennsylvania during the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, encountering no opposition. He ran unsuccessfully for Congress as a Federalist in 1795, and was elected in 1797. Ill health forced Morgan's decision not to seek re-election. He retired to Winchester, the old teamster now a major landowner, and died there in 1802.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's March to Quebec; Cowpens, South Carolina; Riflemen.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MORGAN, JOHN. (1735–1789). Medical director of the Continental army. Pennsylvania. Born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on 16 October 1735, Morgan graduated with the first class of the College of Philadelphia (now the University of Pennsylvania) in 1757. Almost immediately he enlisted as a lieutenant and surgeon for the provincial troops during the Seven Years' War. In 1760 he undertook a period of study abroad, during which he enjoyed a very successful education in London and Edinburgh. His studies culminated in his election to the Royal College of Physicians and to the Royal Society in 1765. He returned to Philadelphia that year, and played a key role in establishing a medical school at his alma mater, becoming its first professor. In doing so, he acted without consulting other Philadelphia physicians, and thus made a bitter enemy of William Shippen, Jr.

On 17 October 1775 the Continental Congress elected Morgan to be the director-general of hospitals and physician-in-chief of the American army. Joining the army at Cambridge and accompanying it later to New York, he worked skillfully to achieve an efficient organization of his service but, in so doing, made so many enemies that, on 9 October 1776, he was demoted, his directorship being reduced to only those hospitals east of the Hudson River. On 9 January 1777 he was removed even from this reduced authority without explanation and replaced by his old Philadelphia rival, Shippen. Embittered, Morgan published "A Vindication" in 1777,

making the inevitable charges of Congressional meddling and the plotting of “a mean and invidious set of men” to remove him. Although he was cleared of any misconduct by Congress in 1779, he considered himself disgraced and withdrew from public life, except to bring charges of fraud against Shippen, who was court-martialed in 1781 and forced to resign. Morgan died in Philadelphia on 15 October 1789.

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MORNINGSIDE HEIGHTS (MANHATTAN), NEW YORK. Modern name of Vandewater’s Heights, which figured in the Battle of Harlem Heights on 16 September 1776.

SEE ALSO *Harlem Heights, New York*.

Mark M. Boatner

MORRIS, GOUVERNEUR. (1752–1816). American statesman. New York. Born on 30 January 1752 in the manor house at Morrisania (now the Bronx), Gouverneur Morris was reared as a cultured provincial aristocrat and the son of a judge of the court of vice-admiralty. His mother, Sarah Gouverneur, was the daughter of the speaker of the New York Assembly.

Morris graduated from King’s College (now Columbia) in 1768, studied under William Smith, later chief justice of New York, and was admitted to the bar at the age of 19, in 1771. He soon built up a successful practice in New York City. As a member of the landed aristocracy, he naturally had misgivings about revolution. Although his half-brothers, Lewis and Richard, were Patriots, his mother was a Loyalist and his half-brother, Staats Morris, was a general in the British army. Gouverneur Morris nevertheless adhered to the Patriot cause when it appeared that war was inevitable, despite expressing fears, in 1774, that this would bring “the domination of a riotous mob.” In 1775 he was elected to the New York Provincial Congress, where he proposed a plan for a Continental paper currency that was adopted by the Continental Congress. Over the next two years he promoted a strong central government, with representatives selected from electoral districts rather than states.

With John Jay and Robert L. Livingston, he drafted the constitution under which New York was governed for the next 50 years. Responsible for the constitution’s conservative franchise-property qualification, Morris surprised many contemporaries with his consistent and impassioned opposition to slavery. He strongly supported General Philip Schuyler and, with Jay, attempted to prevent Schuyler from being superseded by Horatio Gates. Elected to Congress in October 1777, the youthful Morris was interested primarily in financial, military, and diplomatic matters. He drafted many important documents, including the diplomatic instructions for Benjamin Franklin and, later, for the peace commissioners. One of his most dramatic actions came in the official response to the Britain’s conciliatory Carlisle Commission of 1778. Morris called for the United States to be “an Assylum to mankind. America shall receive to her bosom and comfort and cheer the oppressed, the miserable, and the poor of every nation and of every clime.” He visited Valley Forge early in 1778, and returned to Philadelphia committed to military reforms, and was a firm supporter of General George Washington.

Defeated for re-election to Congress because he refused to enlist congressional support for the claims of New York in the dispute over Vermont, Morris transferred his citizenship to Pennsylvania and set up his home and law practice in Philadelphia. Pursuing an early interest in currency and credit, he contributed a brilliant series of financial articles to the *Pennsylvania Packet* from February to April 1780, under the pen name “An American.” This brought him an invitation to serve as assistant to Robert Morris (the “financier of the Revolution,” no relation to Gouverneur) in 1781. He held this post until 1785, while Robert Morris performed his remarkable feat of keeping the United States solvent. Gouverneur Morris worked out a decimal system of coinage later perfected by Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton that spared America the miserable pounds, shillings, and pence of the mother country. That same year he put forth a proposal for a Bank of North America, which Congress chartered in December 1781 and funded with a large French loan.

By a narrow majority, the Pennsylvania Assembly chose Morris as one of its delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787. An opponent of democracy—“Give the votes to the people who have no property and they will sell them to the rich,” he said—Morris worked at the Convention to craft a conservative constitution that would respect private property, except for ownership of slaves, and which would foster a strong central government. Morris was almost responsible for the collapse of the Convention when he demanded that they take a stand against the spread of slavery. He lost this battle to the supposed compromise of the three-fifths clause, but put aside his doubts in support of the finished document. Now

only 35, Morris abandoned his political career and returned to Morrisania, which he had bought from his elder half-brother, but soon went to Europe (in 1789) as agent for Robert Morris and other business associates.

Early in 1792, Washington appointed Morris to the post of minister to France. Morris openly supported the monarchy and feared the consequences of the revolution, which did not endear him to most French. In 1794, in retaliation for the American dismissal of its envoy to the United States (Edmund Charles "Citizen" Genet), the French government requested that Washington recall Morris, which he did. Morris went from Paris to London and attempted to persuade Britain's prime minister, William Pitt, to invade France.

After another four years traveling through Europe, Morris returned to the United States in 1798. In April 1800 he had what he called in his diary "the misfortune" to be elected a Federalist senator to fill an unexpired term. With the Jeffersonians in control of the legislature, Morris was not re-elected and in 1802 again retired to Morrisania, spending the last thirteen years of his life there. In 1810 he joined with De Witt Clinton in proposing the construction of the Erie Canal, serving as chairman of the board of canal commissioners from 1810 to 1816. By 1814 he had lost all hope that the United States could survive, and proposed that New York and New England secede and form a separate country.

SEE ALSO *Burr, Aaron*.

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MORRIS, LEWIS. (1726–1798). Signer, militia general. New York. Born at the family manor of Morrisania in Westchester County, New York, on 8 April 1726, Morris attended Yale College. He left Yale in 1746, before he finished his degree, and assisted his father in the management of the extensive family estates. On the death of his father in 1762, Lewis Morris became the third and last lord of the family manor. Now, for the first time, he showed an interest in politics. After a single term in the provincial assembly in 1769, and finding that few of his Westchester County constituents endorsed his anti-British sentiments, he succeeded in organizing that minority. Despite opposition from the powerful families of the area—the De Lanceys, Pells, and Philippses—he succeeded in having a meeting called on 28 March 1775 to select the county's deputies to the

provincial convention in New York City. Morris was named chairman of the eight-man delegation elected by his faction. At the convention Morris was elected a delegate to the Continental Congress, an honor he had enthusiastically sought.

Taking his seat on 15 May 1775, and remaining a delegate for two years, Morris served on committees to decide what posts should be defended in New York, to acquire military stores and munitions, and to deal with Indian affairs. On 7 June 1776 he was appointed brigadier general of the Westchester County militia, and was on leave of absence from Congress when the Declaration of Independence was approved. Later in 1776 he returned to Philadelphia and became a signer of that document. He took part in the New York campaign of 1776, when the forces of General William Howe chased George Washington and his troops right through the Morris family manor and the rest of Westchester. For the remainder of the war, Morris retained his militia rank but his services appear to have been valued by the state more in the civil domain. He was county judge in Westchester from 1777 to 1778, and served intermittently in the upper house of the state legislature between 1777 and 1790.

At the end of the war he retired as a major general of militia and restored Morrisania, which had been the scene of skirmishes on 5 August 1779, 22 January 1781, and 4 March 1782. Morris was at the Poughkeepsie ratification convention in 1788, where he supported the adoption of the federal Constitution that his half-brother, Gouverneur Morris, had helped to draft. He died at his estate on 22 January 1798.

SEE ALSO *Morris, Gouverneur*.

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MORRIS, ROBERT. (1734–1806). Merchant and congressman, called the "Financier of the Revolution." Pennsylvania. Robert Morris was born in Liverpool, England, on 20 January 1735. At the age of thirteen he came to America with his father and went to work in the Philadelphia mercantile house of Charles Willing. By 1754 he had become a partner. Three years later, with Charles's son Thomas, he formed Willing and Morris, a firm that with its successors held a leading position in American trade for the next thirty-nine years. His first public political act was to sign the nonimportation



Robert Morris. *The “Financier of the American Revolution” and a signer of the Declaration of Independence, in a portrait (c. 1782) by Charles Willson Peale.* PENNSYLVANIA ACADEMY OF FINE ARTS, PHILADELPHIA, PA/BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY

agreement of 1765; thereafter, he served on many committees formed to resist increased imperial control. After the shooting started in April 1775, Morris became a leading figure in the Patriot cause. On 30 June 1775 the assembly named him to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety, where his commercial talents were immediately put to use; when Franklin was absent, Morris ran the council.

VITAL WORK IN CONGRESS

Elected to the Second Continental Congress in November 1775, he quickly became a member of several important congressional committees, including the Secret Committee of Trade, “Congress’s war department,” where he succeeded his partner, Willing. Among many other activities, he personally arranged for the procurement of vessels, munitions, and naval armament in November 1775 and drew up the instruction for Silas Deane in February 1776, all the while continuing to tend to the commercial affairs of Willing and Morris. In performing his valuable official services he remained a businessman, collecting his broker’s commissions and

overlooking no opportunity to make a profit. While he made great profits, largely because of his ability, he also took huge risks in accomplishing the financial missions assigned by Congress and the Pennsylvania authorities, a fact that was understood and accepted by his colleagues. According to John Adams, in a letter to Horatio Gates on 27 April 1776:

I think he has a masterly Understanding, an open Temper and an honest Heart: and if he does not always vote for What you and I should think proper, it is because he thinks that a large Body of People remains, who are not yet of his Mind. He has vast designs in the mercantile Way. And no doubt pursues mercantile Ends, which are always gain; but he is an excellent Member of our Body. (Taylor, *Adams Papers*, 4, p. 148)

Morris thought the movement toward independence in 1776 was premature. He abstained from voting on the Declaration of Independence in July, but when he saw it was the will of the majority, he signed the document in August 1776. When Congress fled to Baltimore in December 1776, Morris remained in Philadelphia to carry out the work of the Secret Committee and on 21 December was designated by Congress along with George Clymer and George Walton as its executive committee. As Washington prepared the desperate strategy that was to end with his brilliant riposte at Trenton and Princeton, it was Morris who furnished him the necessary backing of the civil authority of the country. Simultaneously looking after the commercial interests of his firm—which may have been an important reason why he did not flee to Baltimore—Morris bore a tremendous personal burden at this critical period of American history and carried it off without a stumble.

In March 1778 Morris signed the Articles of Confederation. From August to 1 November 1778, the expiration of his term, he was chairman of Congress’s Committee on Finance. Ineligible for reelection under the terms of the new state constitution of Pennsylvania, Morris was immediately elected to the Pennsylvania assembly and took his seat on 6 November.

TAINTED BY SCANDAL

The burden of his dual public and private role had already begun to take its toll. During the winter of 1777–1778, the misconduct of Thomas Morris, a younger half-brother for whom Robert had secured appointment as commercial agent in France, precipitated a temporary misunderstanding between Morris and the American commissioners in Paris, Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin. The controversy that followed the recall of Deane involved Morris after January 1779, when Thomas Paine attacked Morris and Deane in the press and Henry Laurens, then

president of Congress, charged Willing and Morris with fraud in the management of the covert operations of Hortalez et Cie that sent vital military supplies across the Atlantic. An investigation exonerated both Hortalez et Cie and Willing and Morris, but public opinion—led by opponents who resented his success—began to turn against Morris. He was denied reelection to Congress in November 1779, although a year later he regained his seat in the Pennsylvania assembly, where he served until June 1781. In these years, he was acknowledged as the leading merchant in America and probably its wealthiest citizen.

SUPERINTENDENT OF FINANCE

Meanwhile, the financial underpinning of the Revolution had collapsed. On the nomination of Hamilton, Congress on 20 February 1781 named Morris superintendent of finance, a unique office established to salvage what appeared to be a near-total loss of confidence in the fiscal management of the Confederation government. Insisting first that Congress permit him to continue his personal business and that he be allowed to control the personnel of his department, Morris accepted the post on 14 May. He had always been opposed to the carefree and financially irresponsible procedures that had led to the collapse of the Continental currency, including the price controls and legal pressure designed to make people accept worthless paper money at par value. With the government nearly insolvent, Morris, according to the historian Clarence L. Ver Steeg:

believed that the public credit of the Confederation could be revived only by utilizing private credit. He took steps to achieve two goals: in the short term to provide the military with supplies to win the war; and, more important, in the long term to introduce a comprehensive national financial program to strengthen the Confederation politically. (Ver Steeg, ANB)

He persuaded Congress to charter the Bank of North America (and used its bank notes to pay urgent expenses, especially pay and supplies for the Continental army), pledged his own personal credit to the government (and issued “Morris’s notes” to supplement the public credit), and extolled the virtues of funding the public debt by means of a permanent national revenue. The message he sent to Congress about funding on 29 July 1782 has been called “the most important single American state paper on public credit written prior to 1790,” but the scheme failed when Rhode Island and Virginia rejected the impost that would have provided the revenue stream.

Relying on various economies in purchasing and administration, his own Morris’s notes, some financial sleight of hand, and the loan of two hundred thousand

dollars in specie from France, he financed the Yorktown campaign, which so foreclosed British military options to regain her colonies that it broke Britain’s will to continue the fight. Morris endured a torrent of criticism, especially because he contracted for the public as many debts during his two years in office as there had been before his advent. Since the states still refused to accept their obligations and furnish the revenue needed for a viable currency, Congress remained impotent. In despair and disgust, Morris submitted his resignation on 24 January 1783, part of a plan to shock the states into action that included foreknowledge of the effort undertaken by Gouverneur Morris (no relation) and Alexander Hamilton to foment unrest in the Continental army as a pressure tactic. Washington quashed this so-called Newburgh conspiracy in March. But since nobody stepped forth to take Morris’s job, in May he was prevailed upon to retain his office and eventually found the funds—with the help of a Dutch loan secured by John Adams—to pay and demobilize the army by the end of the year. Morris finally resigned his office in September 1784.

FINANCIAL DOWNFALL

Convinced of the need for a strong central government, he served in the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and actively supported the Federalists thereafter. He declined Washington’s offer to be the first secretary of the treasury (he recommended Hamilton instead) but served in the Senate from 1789 through 1795. His financial downfall came because he overextended himself in land speculation. In February 1798 he was hauled off for over three and a half years in debtors’ prison. Released on 26 August 1801 under terms of the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1800, he lived his last five years in a small house in Philadelphia, supported by the annuity Gouverneur Morris had secured for his wife. He died on 8 May 1806.

SEE ALSO *Deane, Silas; Finances of the Revolution; Hortalez & Cie; Newburgh Addresses.*

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MORRIS, ROBERT. (1745–1815). Jurist. Natural son of Robert Hunter Morris and grandson of the first lord of the manor of Morrisania.

SEE ALSO *Morris, Robert Hunter.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MORRIS, ROBERT HUNTER. (1713?–1764). Chief justice of New Jersey, governor of Pennsylvania. Born at the family manor in Westchester County, New York, perhaps in 1713, Robert Morris was the second son of the wealthy and powerful Lewis Morris, first lord of the manor of Morrisania. When Lewis Morris became governor of New Jersey in 1738 he made his son, Robert, chief justice of that state. In this capacity, Robert Morris belligerently supported his father's defense of the royal prerogative. In the 1740s he was the most active member of the East Jersey Board of Proprietors, which sought to throw settlers off their lands and led to a decade of controversy in New Jersey. Morris went to London in 1749 to make the case for using British troops to put down the riots. While in London he became close to the Penn family. In 1754 Thomas Penn, proprietor of Pennsylvania, appointed Morris deputy governor of that state. Morris immediately came into conflict with the Quaker-dominated legislature, which refused to allow a militia or to approve military funding. They also failed to pay Morris a salary, leading to his resignation in 1756. He returned to his job as chief justice in New Jersey, a position he had held even while in Britain and Pennsylvania for nearly seven years. He continued as chief justice until his death on 27 January 1764, after a wild night with a minister's wife. He never married, but had at least three children. One of these, Robert Morris (c. 1745–1815), inherited most of his large estate and was chief justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court from 1777 to 1779.

SEE ALSO *Morris, Gouverneur; Morris, Lewis.*

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
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MORRIS, ROGER. (1727–1794). British officer and Loyalist. Born in Yorkshire, England, on 28 January 1727, Morris served at the Battles of Falkirk and Culloden and then in Flanders as a captain of the Forty-eighth Regiment. In 1755 he went to America as General Edward Braddock's aide-de-camp and was wounded in the disastrous expedition against Fort Duquesne on 9 July 1755. After purchasing the rank of major in the Thirty-fifth Regiment on 16 February 1758, Morris served at the siege of Louisbourg, the capture and defense of Quebec, the siege of Montreal, and as aide-de-camp to Generals Thomas Gage and Jeffrey Amherst. In May 1760 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Forty-seventh Regiment. Having married Mary Philipse, one of the wealthiest women in America, in 1758, Morris sold his commission in 1764 and settled in New York City, becoming a member of the colony's royal council. With the outbreak of the Revolution, Morris went to England, returning in December 1777, when the British restored the council under Governor James Robertson. Morris again served on the council, was given the rank of colonel, and from January 1779 until the end of the war was inspector of refugee claims. The New York legislature confiscated Morris's property, worth an estimated quarter-million pounds in October 1777. Morris left New York City with the British army. Back in London, he petitioned the government for £68,384, which he claimed was the value of property lost in the Revolution; the government awarded him £12,205. He and his family settled in York, where he died on 13 September 1794.

Michael Bellesiles

MORRISANIA, NEW YORK. Actions at. Located in what now is the South Bronx, Morrisania was the ancestral home of the Morris family. It first experienced the war by being on the British route of advance to White Plains during the New York Campaign. Thereafter it became a key point in the British defensive lines and a frequent camp location for Loyalist forces. The three most serious skirmishes there occurred on 5 August 1779, 22 January 1781, and 4 March 1782. Only the second of these is mentioned in most accounts of the war. In a bold raid that pushed more than three miles within the British lines, Lieutenant Colonel William Hull of Parsons's Connecticut Brigade attacked the quarters of the Third Battalion of De Lancey's Loyalist Brigade. He burned barracks and the ponton bridge over the Harlem River, destroyed a great store of forage, and at the price of twenty-five casualties withdrew with fifty-two prisoners, some horses, and some cattle. At daybreak on 23 January, Lieutenant Colonel James De Lancey and his Refugee



Morris Family of New York. THE GALE GROUP

troops contested the rebels' retreat as far as Williams's bridge, which was defended on the far side by Patriot troops. The Refugees then fell back.

In the maneuvers of July 1781 preceding the Yorktown Campaign, the duc de Lauzun proposed another attack on De Lancey's battalion, but when the element of surprise was compromised the plan was canceled.

SEE ALSO *Morris, Gouverneur; Morris, Lewis; Yorktown Campaign.*

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MORRIS FAMILY OF NEW YORK.

The founder of the family in America was Richard Morris (1616-1672), a veteran of Cromwell's army, who became a merchant in Barbados and married the wealthy Sarah Pole. With his brother Lewis (1601-1691), he bought 500 acres in New York just north of the Harlem River, then known as Bronck's land (now the Bronx). Richard and Sarah Morris died there in 1672, only two years after the purchase, and their infant son, Lewis (1671-1746), was adopted by his uncle Lewis. Lewis Morris (1601-1691)

built the Bronx estate to almost 2,000 acres and also acquired 3,500 acres in Monmouth County, New Jersey, all of which he passed on to his nephew and ward in 1691. In May 1697 the New York estate became the manor of Morrisania. Richard and Sarah's son Lewis (1671-1746) then became first lord of the manor, a title that passed to his son Lewis (1698-1762), the second lord, who passed it on to his son, Lewis Morris (1726-1798), the third (and last) lord of the manor and a Signer. Lewis the Signer's brother Staats Long (1728-1800) served in the British army, although not in America during the Revolution. Another brother, Richard (1730-1810), was chief justice of the supreme court of the state of New York. And his half-brother, Gouverneur Morris (1752-1816), was a delegate to the Continental Congress, a close associate of Robert Morris, the so-called "Financier of the Revolution" (who was no kin), one of the architects of the Constitution, and minister plenipotentiary to France. Lewis the second lord's brother, Robert Hunter Morris (c.1714-1764), was chief justice of New Jersey and governor of Pennsylvania, and his illegitimate son Robert (c.1745-1815) became chief justice of the state of New Jersey in 1777.

SEE ALSO *Morris, Gouverneur; Morris, Lewis; Morris, Robert (1734-1806); Morris, Robert Hunter; Morrisania, New York.*

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MORRISTOWN WINTER QUARTERS, NEW JERSEY. 6 January–28 May 1777. After his operations at Trenton and Princeton, Washington established winter quarters at Morristown. Although he first considered this to be merely a temporary location, the merits of the place became more apparent as circumstances required him to prolong his stay. Several ranges of hills protected his army from the enemy, whose winter quarters were around New York City, thirty miles away. Morristown, though a small town of some fifty houses, was centrally located with respect to the British main outposts at Newark, Perth Amboy, and Brunswick (later New Brunswick), and it constituted a sort of flanking position from which Washington could threaten an enemy move up the Hudson or through New Jersey toward Philadelphia. Morristown was also in the center of an important agricultural region, which not only gave Washington access to important resources but also denied them to the enemy, and the place was close to the forges and furnaces of Hibernia, Mount Hope, Ringwood, and Charlottenburg.

While coping with the eternal problems of recruiting, reorganization, and logistics, Washington undertook a bold medical program of inoculating his troops and the neighborhood civilians against smallpox, which initially helped to spread the disease to those who had not been inoculated. Though his army shrank by a high rate of desertion to just over three thousand men, Washington kept up a vigorous patrol activity against the enemy in New Jersey. By the time General Howe bestirred himself and resumed operations in May 1777, Washington's army had been built up to over eight thousand effectives and was reasonably well supplied. Washington and his army returned to Morristown for the horrific winter of 1779–1780.

SEE ALSO *Philadelphia Campaign; Princeton, New Jersey; Trenton, New Jersey.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MORRISTOWN WINTER QUARTERS, NEW JERSEY. 1 December 1779–22 June 1780. As 1779 dragged to a close without major military

operations in the North, and after Admiral Charles EStaing failed to appear off Sandy Hook with his powerful French force, Washington decided on 30 November that the main army would go into winter quarters just outside Morristown, New Jersey. The weather turned bitterly cold and most units were faced with a hard march to reach Morristown. Units started arriving the first week in December, and the last arrived at the end of that month. Four Massachusetts brigades were left in the Highlands; Poor's brigade and most of the cavalry units were sent to Danbury, Connecticut, with the mission of guarding the coastal towns on Long Island Sound; and the North Carolina brigade and Pawley's New York state troops were posted with Lee's dragoons around Suffern, New York.

The winter quarters of 1779–1780 became an ordeal of almost unbelievable suffering because of the record-breaking cold. As desertions rose and his army declined to around ten thousand men, Washington wrote the governors of all the states on 16 December, "The situation of the Army with respect to supplies is beyond description alarming" (Washington, Series 3c, Letterbox 3). With his men already on half rations, conditions were about to get worse. The commissariat again broke down and the troops at Morristown faced death from cold and starvation. At least the army had the experience of previous winter encampments to draw on, and the soldiers built an extensive "log-house city," consuming about six hundred acres of woodland. Soldier huts had a standard floor plan of about fourteen by fifteen feet and accommodated twelve men; they were about six and one-half feet high at the eaves, with wooden bunks, a fireplace at one end, and a door at the other. Construction was of notched logs, and chinks of clay sealed the walls. Windows apparently were not cut until spring. The huts were in rows of eight, three or four rows to a regiment. Officers' cabins were larger and less crowded. Parade grounds and company streets were laid out at regular intervals. Most of the men were able to move into huts before the end of December, but it was another six weeks before all the officers were accommodated.

Jockey Hollow was the name of the site about three miles southwest of Morristown where most of the army was camped—here were seven infantry brigades: Hand's New York, the First and Second Maryland, the First and Second Connecticut, and the First and Second Pennsylvania; The three Virginia brigades (Muhlenberg's, Scott's, and Woodford's), Stark's brigade; and the New Jersey brigade occupied separate camps within a mile of Jockey Hollow. Knox's artillery brigade and the gun park were about a mile west of Morristown. "On the Lines" were detachments at Princeton, Brunswick, Perth Amboy, Rahway, Westfield, Springfield, Paramus, and other outposts. These detachments, totaling from two hundred to two thousand at different times, were periodically relieved.

The severity of the winter limited military operations during the first months of 1780, but it also made possible the remarkable (although unsuccessful) Staten Island expedition of Alexander on 14–15 January. The action at Young's House in New York on 3 February was a British attempt to annihilate a unit "on the Lines." The British operations around Springfield, New Jersey, from 7 June to 23 June heralded the start of the 1780 campaign in the North.

SEE ALSO *Alexander, William; Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'; Hand, Edward; Morristown Winter Quarters, New Jersey (6 January–28 May, 1777); Poor, Enoch; Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of Knyphausen; Stark, John; Staten Island Expedition of Alexander; Young's House.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MORTAR. So named because of its resemblance to pharmacist's mortar, a military mortar is a short gun used for firing projectiles at a high angle. It is most suitable for lobbing projectiles over walls of fortifications and over high ground that would mask the target from weapons having a flatter trajectory or for firing from and into heavy woods. There were gigantic siege mortars and diminutive coehorns or royals.

Mark M. Boatner

MORTON, JOHN. (1725?–1777). Signer. Pennsylvania. Born in Tinicum, Pennsylvania, perhaps in 1725, Morton was elected to the Provincial Assembly in 1756, serving nearly every year until 1776, the last two as speaker. Meanwhile he had been justice of the peace for Chester (now Delaware) County, and served as judge on several courts. He attended the Stamp Act Congress in 1765 and was in the Continental Congress from 1774 to early in 1777. He played a critical role in organizing Pennsylvania's first militia in 1775. An advocate of independence, he joined with Benjamin Franklin and James Wilson to give the Pennsylvania delegation a majority of one in voting for the Declaration of Independence, and he was one of those who signed that document. He was

chairman of the Committee of the Whole that adopted the Articles of Confederation, which were ratified after his death. After an extended illness, he died at his home in Tinicum, Pennsylvania, on 1 April 1777.

SEE ALSO *Declaration of Independence.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MOTTIN DE LA BALME, AUGUSTIN.

(1736–1780). French volunteer. Though of noble ancestry, he was the son of a bourgeois father and a mother who was the daughter of a *conseiller du roi*. He entered the Scottish company of Gendarmerie in 1757 and became quartermaster with the rank of cavalry captain in 1765. Having been employed at the school of horsemanship, he wrote two books on the cavalry. Deane wrote to Congress recommending him in October 1776, but La Balme was unable to get out of France. He approached Franklin in December about an American command. Masquerading as a doctor, he embarked at Bordeaux with two other officers on 15 February 1777 carrying Franklin's introduction of 20 January 1777. It recommended him as an able cavalry officer who might be valuable in forming that branch of service.

On 26 May 1777 La Balme was commissioned lieutenant colonel of cavalry in the Continental army. Continuing to promote himself among the members of Congress, he presented copies of his two books to John Adams in June. On 8 July he was promoted to colonel and inspector general of cavalry, but he submitted his resignation to Congress on 3 October because Pulaski had been preferred to command the cavalry. La Balme proposed to Henry Laurens a Canadian project for exciting a "revolution," which Laurens referred to the Board of War. When it finally recommended an "irruption... into Canada," it was to be under the command of Lafayette; Congress approved the proposal on 22 January 1778. On 13 February 1778 Congress accepted his resignation with "no farther occasion for his services." Henry Laurens complained to his son John—perhaps tongue in cheek—that La Balme had not left him any books.

In 1778 La Balme received authority from Gates in 1778 to take part in the operations around Albany. He organized a bureau twenty-eight miles from Philadelphia and issued manifestos in French, English, and German calling for volunteers to join the cause of liberty.

On 13 May 1779 he left Boston with others to rally support in the frontier settlement of Machias. Arriving on the 19th, he established contact with Indians who traded at the village and was warmly received by the former subjects of the French king. Because of events described in connection with the Penobscot expedition, La Balme's timing was unfortunate. He organized a body of Indians and marched toward the British, but their force was crushed by superior numbers. La Balme was captured, but he escaped or was exchanged.

In reply to his 5 March 1780 request, Washington declined to give him a certificate of service. The commander in chief had earlier complained that La Balme never entered into his inspector duties. James Lovell on 17 April 1780 returned copies of La Balme's European letters of recommendation to him, adding his regrets that "America did not longer than seven months enjoy the benefits of your exertions as inspector general." On 27 June 1780 he was at Pittsburgh, and for the next three months he conducted recruiting operations in the direction of Vincennes, Cahokia, and Kaskaskia. With about one hundred French and American volunteers, he started on his own an advance through Kaskaskia toward Detroit. La Balme was killed on 5 November 1780 by Indians under the orders of Little Turtle. About forty of his men died in the massacre.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion (Planned); Deane, Silas; Franklin, Benjamin; Laurens, Henry; Penobscot Expedition, Maine; Pulaski, Casimir.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

MOULTRIE, JOHN. (1729–1798). Loyalist lieutenant governor of East Florida. South Carolina-Florida. Born in Charleston, South Carolina, on 18 January 1729, Moultrie in 1749 became the first American to graduate from Edinburgh with a medical degree. His thesis was the first study of yellow fever in North America and became the standard work on the subject for a century. Returning to Charleston in 1749, he established a practice that he abandoned in 1753 upon marrying the wealthy Dorothy Morton, who died four years later. Entering the assembly in 1761, Moultrie held a number of offices, including posts in the militia. In 1760 he became a major in the Provincial Regiment, joining the following year in the Cherokee expedition of Grant, in which Moultrie was responsible for the garrison of Ninety Six. After he took the side of Lieutenant Colonel James Grant in his dispute with Colonel Thomas Middleton, Moultrie became a favorite of Grant.

When Grant established the government of East Florida in 1763, he named Moultrie to the council, where he served as president from 1765 to 1771. Moultrie took up fourteen thousand acres in land grants, built a mansion called Bella Vista near St. Augustine, and when he succeeded Grant as acting lieutenant governor in 1771 (Grant was invalided home and arranged for Moultrie's appointment to become permanent), he sold his South Carolina properties and moved his two hundred slaves to Florida. He immediately entered into a sharp political dispute with Chief Justice William Drayton, who promoted the creation of a legislature in Florida. Moultrie preferred executive rule, especially as he was the chief executive until the arrival of the new governor, Colonel Patrick Tonyn, on 1 March 1774. Moultrie sided with the British during the Revolution and helped organize the militia, of which he was colonel. In July 1784, when England handed Florida over to Spain, he sailed to England and three years later was awarded about forty-five hundred pounds for his war losses, slightly more than half of his claim. He settled in Shropshire, where he died on 19 March 1798. Three brothers, Alexander, Thomas, and William, were Patriot soldiers.

SEE ALSO *Cherokee Expedition of James Grant.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MOULTRIE, WILLIAM. (1730–1805). Continental general. South Carolina. Born in Charleston, South Carolina, on 23 November 1730, Moultrie was a member of the Commons House through most of the 1750s. Appointed captain in the militia on 16 September 1760, he took part in Lieutenant Colonel James Grant's expedition against the Cherokee in 1761. He remained active in the militia, rising to colonel in 1774, and served in the South Carolina Provincial Congresses of 1775–1776. On 17 June 1775 he became colonel of the Second South Carolina Regiment, leading a notorious raid in November against an encampment of escaped slaves on Sullivan's Island that resulted in the slaughter of fifty people. Against the Charleston expedition of Clinton in June 1776, he became a national hero in his defense of the palmetto and sand fort that was renamed in his honor. He was appointed a Continental brigadier general on 16 September 1777 but had no opportunity for significant field operations until after the British capture of Savannah on 29 December 1778. During Lincoln's operations in the southern theater, Moultrie was employed in a semi-independent role. He commanded the successful action at Beaufort, South Carolina, on 3 February 1779. When General Augustin Prevost pushed through his screening force and threatened Charleston on 11–12 May, Moultrie helped organize the defenses of the city. He was criticized for failing to act aggressively at Port Royal on 3 February 1779 and Stono Ferry on 20 June 1779, allowing the British to get away in each instance.

When Charleston fell to the British in May 1780, Moultrie became a prisoner of war, spending almost two years in the British prison at Haddrell's Point, South Carolina. He was freed as part of the exchange for General Burgoyne in February 1782, and on 15 October he became a Continental major general—the last officer appointed to that grade—but the fighting was over. In 1783 he sat in the South Carolina House of Representatives and the next year was lieutenant governor. He served two terms as governor (1785–1787 and 1792–1794). He was a federalist member of the state ratifying convention in 1788. He died at Northampton, South Carolina, on 27 September 1805.

SEE ALSO *Beaufort, South Carolina; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Charleston, South Carolina; Southern Theater, Military Operations in.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MOUNT PLEASANT, NEW YORK
SEE *Young's House.*

MOUNT PLEASANT, SOUTH CAROLINA **SEE** *Haddrell's Point.*

MOUNT WASHINGTON, NEW YORK. (Washington Heights). Site of Fort Washington, which was renamed Fort Mifflin after its capture by the British on 8 November 1776.

SEE ALSO *Fort Washington, New York.*

Mark M. Boatner

MOYLAN, STEPHEN. (1737–1811). Continental officer. Ireland and Pennsylvania. Born in Cork in 1737, Moylan was the son of a prosperous Catholic merchant. Following in his father's trade, he too became a widely traveled merchant before settling in Philadelphia in 1768. On the recommendation of a friend, John Dickinson, he became muster-master general of the Continental army on 11 August 1775. He joined General George Washington at Cambridge, where his duties included the fitting-out of privateers. On 5 March 1776 he became secretary to Washington, and on 5 June Congress elected him quartermaster general, with the rank of colonel. He succeeded Thomas Mifflin in this new post.

Moylan was not successful as quartermaster general, although it must be pointed out that his difficulties were virtually insurmountable. Washington blamed him for failing to get more of the army's matériel away from Long Island and New York City during the American army's retreat in the summer of 1776. Moylan resigned as quartermaster general on 28 September 1776, and Mifflin was reappointed to the post. Moylan remained on Washington's staff as a volunteer, however, and served with distinction in the victory at Princeton on 3 January 1777. He responded to a request from Washington to raise

a mounted regiment, which started as a Pennsylvania volunteer unit, the First Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment. This later became the Fourth Continental Dragoons. Moylan was commissioned colonel of this unit on 5 January, an assignment he held for the rest of the war.

Casimir Pulaski's appointment as over-all cavalry commander on 21 September 1777 raised problems of cooperation that came to a head in the next month. Acquitted of court-martial charges pressed by Pulaski in October, Moylan spent the winter at Valley Forge and became temporary commander of the four mounted regiments when Pulaski resigned this post in March 1778. For the next three years he served on the Hudson River and in Connecticut, taking part in the battle of Monmouth on 28 June 1778. He also participated in Anthony Wayne's expedition to Bull's Ferry, New Jersey in July 1780 and the Southern campaign of 1780 and 1781. After Charles Cornwallis surrendered in the name of the British forces, Moylan's health forced him to return to Philadelphia. He was brevetted as a brigadier general on 3 November 1783, the date he left the army. After the war Moylan again became a merchant. Washington appointed him commissioner of loans in Philadelphia in 1793. He died in Philadelphia on 11 April, 1811.

SEE ALSO *Mifflin, Thomas; Monmouth, New Jersey; Princeton, New Jersey.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MUHLENBERG, JOHN PETER GABRIEL. (1746–1807). Lutheran clergyman, Continental general, politician. Pennsylvania and Virginia. Born 1 October 1746 in Trappe, Pennsylvania, Muhlenberg was sent by his father, a Lutheran missionary, to Halle, Germany, at the age of sixteen to be educated. It was hoped that he would become a minister. Instead, he was apprenticed to a grocer in Lübeck. After three years of misery, Muhlenberg ran away and in 1766 joined the 60th Foot ("Royal Americans"). As secretary to one of the regiment's officers, he traveled to Philadelphia and was discharged in 1767. He studied theology and became an assistant to his father.

In 1772 he moved to Woodstock, Virginia, to be pastor of the large colony of German immigrants in the Shenandoah Valley. That same year he went to England, and on 23 April 1772 was ordained by the bishop of

London. Back in the Shenandoah Valley, he soon emerged as a leader of his community, being elected to the House of Burgesses in 1774. He became associated with the Patriot cause and was elected chair of the Dunmore County Committee of Correspondence and Safety. In March 1775 he became a member of the Virginia Convention, and on 12 January 1776 he accepted their appointment as a militia colonel charged with raising a regiment. He preached a famous final sermon back in Woodstock. "There is a time for all things," he said, taking his text from Ecclesiastes 3:1, "a time to preach and a time to pray; but there is also a time to fight, and that time has now come." At this point he supposedly threw aside his robes to reveal his militia uniform, ordered the drums to beat for recruits, and enlisted most of the adult males in his congregation into the Eighth Virginia, which was better known as the "German Regiment." Marching south, the regiment helped repel General Henry Clinton's Charleston expedition in 1776. Afterwards, they continued into Georgia, where disease eventually forced the unit to return to Virginia.

Muhlenberg was appointed brigadier general on 21 February 1777, and his brigade saw action as part of General Nathanael Greene's division at the battle of the Brandywine River, on 11 September 1777. At Germantown, on 4 October 1777, "the Parson-General," as he was known, led his brigade in a deep penetration of the enemy's line, and then fought his way back as superior enemy forces tried to cut him off.

After the winter at Valley Forge, Muhlenberg, William Woodford, and George Weedon, became engaged in the patriot pastime of fighting over primacy of rank. At Monmouth, on 28 June 1778, Muhlenberg commanded the second line of Greene's right wing, which was not engaged until the final phase of the battle. Later in 1778 Muhlenberg was assigned to Israel Putnam's division on the Hudson River, and he commanded the division during the winter while Putnam was absent. After winter quarters at Middlebrook, Muhlenberg commanded a 300-man reserve during Anthony Wayne's assault on Stony Point on 16 July 1779. In December he was sent by General George Washington to take command in Virginia, but it was March 1780 before he reached Richmond. During this delay, caused by snows of the exceptional winter, Friedrich Steuben was given chief command in Virginia, and Muhlenberg became his second. He was involved in the unsuccessful attempt to keep William Phillips and Benedict Arnold from destroying supplies in Petersburg on 25 April 1781. He and Weedon then worked to assemble Virginia militia units and continued to command troops on the south bank of the James River. In the final operations against General Charles Cornwallis, Muhlenberg commanded a brigade in the light infantry division led by the Marquis de Lafayette and again in the assault on Redoubt Number Ten during the Yorktown campaign.

Brevetted a major general on 30 September 1783, Muhlenberg retired on 3 November, settled his affairs at Woodstock, and moved to Philadelphia. Among the Pennsylvania Germans, he now was a hero second only to Washington, and a political career lay before him. In 1784 he was elected to the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, and during the period 1785–1788 he was vice president of the state under Benjamin Franklin. He was influential in the early adoption of the Constitution in the state, and both he and his brother, Frederick, were elected representatives to the first Congress. Defeated for re-election, he returned to Congress in 1793–1795 and 1799–1801. On 18 February 1801 he was elected senator, but resigned a month later to become supervisor of revenue in Philadelphia. From 1802 until his death five years later he was collector of customs in the city. He died at his home at Gray's Ferry, Pennsylvania, on 1 October 1807.

SEE ALSO *German Regiment; Yorktown Campaign.*

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MURPHY, TIMOTHY. (1751–1818). War hero. Pennsylvania. A legendary Continental rifleman, perhaps the most famous marksman of the Revolution, Murphy was born near the Delaware Water Gap in 1751. As a young man he settled in the Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania. On 29 June 1775, he and his brother John were mustered into Captain John Lowdon's Northumberland County militia company.

Murphy served in the Boston siege, at Long Island, and in the New Jersey campaign. In the summer of 1777 he was one of 250 picked riflemen sent north under Morgan to oppose Burgoyne. Murphy is generally credited with shooting Sir Francis Clerke and General Simon Fraser in the Second Battle of Saratoga on 7 October 1777, although no contemporary account validates this claim. Many unverifiable legends circulate around Murphy, such as his ability to hit a target at three hundred yards and the claim that he used a double-barreled rifle that is not known to have existed during the Revolution.

Murphy was at Valley Forge. He did not take part in the Battle of Monmouth but the next day, on 29 June 1778, he, his constant companion David Elerson, and two other riflemen captured the elaborate coach of a British general. Moving north with three companies of Morgan's Riflemen to the Mohawk Valley, Murphy tracked down and killed the notorious Christopher

Service. He took part in the action at Unadilla in October 1778 in the pursuit of the raiders who had sacked Cherry Valley and also participated in Sullivan's expedition. When his enlistment with Morgan's Riflemen expired in late 1779, Murphy enrolled in Captain Jacob Hager's company of Peter Vrooman's Albany County militia (Fifteenth Regiment). Scouting with militia captain Alexander Harper in the Delaware County forest during the spring of 1780, he was captured by Indians and taken toward Oquago. During the night he and another captive freed each other's bonds and methodically knifed ten sleeping Indians before making their escape.

During the action at Schoharie Valley on 15–19 October 1780, Murphy famously fired on British officers attempting to surrender. Early in 1781 he reenlisted in the Continental army and served in the Pennsylvania Line under General Anthony Wayne and was present at Yorktown. After the war he returned to the Wyoming Valley and became active in local politics. He died in 1818.

SEE ALSO *Clerke, Sir Francis Carr; Fraser, Simon (1729–1777); Saratoga, Second Battle of; Schoharie Valley, New York.*

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MURRAY, DAVID SEE *Stormont, David Murray, Seventh Viscount.*

MURRAY, JOHN. Royal governor of Virginia. Son of the third earl of Dunmore, John Murray succeeded his father to become the fourth earl of Dunmore in 1756, and it is by this name that he is best known. He was an army officer from 1749 to 1760, when he resigned his commission. He was elected in 1761 as one of sixteen Scottish peers to sit in Parliament. He supported Lord North for the office of prime minister, and in 1770, when Lord North took that office, Dunmore was named governor of New York by Wills Hill, the earl of Hillsborough, who was the colonial secretary at the time.

Arriving in New York on 19 October 1770, Dunmore readily accepted and participated in the provincial aristocracy's thirst for land speculation. Eleven months later he was promoted to governor of Virginia, Britain's most important mainland colony, to succeed Governor Norborne Berkeley, baron de Botetourt, who had died

on 15 October 1770. Dunmore arrived at Williamsburg in September 1771, and was initially popular with Virginia's land-hungry aristocrats, including George Washington. The House of Burgesses even named the new frontier counties of Dunmore and Fincastle (another of his titles) in his honor.

When the Shawnee, beset by land-hungry whites from Pennsylvania and Virginia, precipitated a conflict, Dunmore responded by raising the western militia and taking the field himself to subdue the tribe and lay claim to their lands. When Colonel Andrew Lewis defeated the Shawnee at Point Pleasant on 10 October 1774, Dunmore reached the zenith of his popularity in the colony, a fact which was reflected by his naming his eleventh child Virginia in January 1775.

Attention paid to frontier matters diverted Dunmore from a rising tide of opposition to imperial control in Virginia. The first discordant note was struck in 1773, when Dunmore dissolved the House of Burgesses after it proposed forming a committee of correspondence. He did the same thing the next year when the burgesses set a day of mourning over the Boston Port Bill. While he was away on the frontier in 1774, the first Virginia Convention embargoed British trade, began to make preparations for armed resistance, and sent delegates to the first Continental Congress. Dunmore thought the unrest was the work of a few troublemakers and took measures in the spring of 1775 that shattered his reputation with Virginians, making him arguably the most reviled of all the royal governors.

On 21 April Dunmore seized the gunpowder in the Williamsburg magazine, threatened to raise the slaves against those who protested this action, and broke completely with the House of Burgesses on 1 June 1775 over Lord North's peace proposal. He and his family fled to the safety of a British warship on 8 June. With a small fleet, he eventually gathered in the strongly Loyalist Norfolk area a force composed of sailors, marines, and a few companies of the Fourteenth Regiment of Foot. He also began to recruit the Queen's Own Royal Regiment and the Ethiopian Regiment, made up of runaway slaves. With this amphibious force, he raided the area around the tidewater through the fall, but the presence of runaway slaves as soldiers in his force was inflammatory to nearly every white Virginian. On 14 November 1775 he issued his Emancipation Proclamation which, by offering freedom to military-age male slaves who left their rebel masters to join him, destroyed his appeal with the rebel aristocrats.

Overconfidence led to Dunmore's defeat by Colonel William Woodford at Great Bridge, Virginia, on 9 December 1775, after which Dunmore withdrew to his ships. An attempt to retake part of the town on 1 January 1776 led to its destruction, for which Dunmore was blamed. Sir Henry Clinton made contact with Dunmore in February, but Clinton was on his way to Charlestown,

South Carolina, and left no reinforcements. By May 1776 Dunmore had to withdraw to Gwynn Island, from which he was driven in July. He raided up the Chesapeake River to the Potomac before sailing for New York with a force that included the 300 soldiers of the Ethiopian Regiment. He shortly returned to Britain. He again sat as a Scottish peer in Parliament before being named governor of the Bahamas from 1786 to 1796. He died at Ramsgate, Kent, on 25 February 1809.

SEE ALSO *Great Bridge, Virginia; Gwynn Island, Virginia; Hampton, Virginia.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

MURRAY HILL MYTH. Historians have contended that after his landing at Kips Bay on 15 September 1776, Sir Henry Clinton could have moved promptly across the island of Manhattan, a mere three thousand yards, and captured a large portion of the American army. The story of Mary Murray first appeared in Dr. James Thacher's *A Military Journal during the American Revolutionary War* (2d ed., 1827) and seemed so plausible that other writers picked it up. After the landing the American militia fled in panic, isolating General Israel Putnam's thirty-five hundred Continentals. At this point Mrs. Murray, a Quaker and wife of the merchant Robert Murray, invited General William Howe and Governor William Tryon (and in some versions, General Clinton as well) in for some wine and cakes. Apparently the British army ground to a halt while their commanders enjoyed Mrs. Murray's Madeira and witty conversation, and Putnam's troops made good their escape. As Thacher wrote in his journal on 20 September 1776, "It has since become a common saying among our officers that Mrs. Murray saved this part of the American army."

Historians disagree about these events. Almost all early American scholars from Benson Lossing to George Bancroft to John Fiske accepted the story without question. Most contemporary popular histories of the Revolution also repeat the story as fact. More careful scholars, such as Samuel Willard Crompton, argue that the evidence leaves little doubt that Mary Murray entertained the British commanders at her house on Murray

Hill, but that these refreshments in no way stopped the British army from performing its duties. Putnam's escape has more to do with the American's evasive skills and with the realities of securing the ground after a successful landing. There is absolutely no evidence that Mary Murray, whose husband had Loyalist leanings, had any ulterior motive.

SEE ALSO *Kips Bay, New York.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

MUSGRAVE, THOMAS. (1738–1812). British officer. Born on 26 November 1738 at Hayton Castle, Cumberland, Musgrave entered the army in 1754 as an ensign in the Third (“Buffs”) Regiment. After serving in the Sixty-fourth Regiment and being brevetted as a major in 1772, he joined the Fortieth Foot Regiment and came to America with this unit in 1776, gaining promotion to lieutenant colonel after the battle of Long Island on 28 August 1776. Commanding the Fortieth in the Philadelphia campaign, he distinguished himself in the defense of the Chew House at Germantown on 4 October 1777. The next year he accompanied General James Grant's expedition to St. Lucia as quartermaster general. Invalided home, he was made a colonel and aide-de-camp to the King in 1782. In this same year he returned to America as a brigadier general to serve as the last British commandant of New York City. He then went to India, was promoted to major general in 1790, to lieutenant general in 1797, and to full general in 1802. He died at his London home on 31 December 1812.

SEE ALSO *Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MUSGROVE'S MILL, SOUTH CAROLINA. 18 August 1780. In the skirmishing that preceded the Battle of Kings Mountain, Lieutenant Colonels Elijah Clarke, Isaac Shelby, and James Williams combined their two hundred volunteers from Georgia, the Watauga settlements, and South Carolina, respectively, sharing the command between them. They attempted a surprise attack against the Loyalists at the rear of Major Patrick

Ferguson's main force. They launched their assault at Musgrove's Mill on the Enoree River. But the surprise failed and Ferguson turned on them. The rebels took up a defensive position and repulsed an attack in which they claimed to have killed sixty-three Loyalists, wounded ninety, and captured seventy, with a loss of only four rebels killed and eight wounded. If these figures are accurate, they make this one of the most one-sided battles of the Revolution.

SEE ALSO *Kings Mountain, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MUSIC, MILITARY. Military music was essential to the Revolutionary armies, contributing greatly to discipline and order both in camp and on the battlefield. Specialized drum and fife signals called musicians or officers to assemble and detachments to gather wood or informed the men when it was time to receive rations. Music provided a cadence to regulate the marching rate, and transmitted or supplemented officers' commands in battle.

MUSICALLY REGULATED ACTIVITIES

George Washington early on recognized the value of well-trained musicians, as indicated in his 4 June 1777 general orders: “The music of the army being in general very bad; it is expected, that the drum and fife Majors exert themselves to improve it. . . . Nothing is more agreeable, and ornamental, than good music; every officer, for the credit of his corps, should take care to provide it.” He then outlined the musically regulated daily routine. “The *revelle* to be beaten at day-break—the *troop* at 8 o'clock in the morning, and *retreat* at sunset.” Two days later he ordered, “The morning gun at day-break to be a signal for the *revelle*; and the evening gun at sun-set a signal for the *retreat*.” To these calls can be added the end of day “tap-too,” when “all lights must be put out at 9 o'Clock in the evening, and every man to his tent.”

The routine was altered for an army on the move, General Washington giving details on 16 August 1777:

1. When the army is to march, the General (and not the *Revelle*) is to beat in the morning.
2. At the beating of the General, the officers and soldiers are to dress and prepare themselves for the march, packing up and loading their baggage.
3. At the beating of the troop, they are to strike all their tents and put them in the wagons.



The Spirit of '76 (1875) by Archibald Willard. During battles of the American Revolution, musicians playing fifes and drums helped transmit messages from commanders. The music also helped bolster soldiers' morale. LANDOV

4. At least a quarter of an hour before the time appointed for marching, the rummings are to beat a march, upon which the troops are to march out and form at the head of their encampment. . . . Precisely at the hour appointed for marching, the drummers beat the march a second time, at that part of the line from which the march is to be made . . . upon which the troops face or wheel . . . and instantly begin the march.

Further orders, tinged with criticism, were issued for the march through Philadelphia later the same month:

The drums and fifes of each brigade are to be collected in the center of it; and a tune for the quick step played, but with such moderation, that the men may step to it with ease; and without *dancing* along, or totally disregarding the music, as too often has been the case.

Whatever the musical quality, the daily schedule often changed to fit situational needs.

Several works have discussed battlefield drum signals, most notably Raoul Camus's *Military Music of the American Revolution* (1976), but there is much yet to be learned on their practical use. William Windham's *Plan of*

Discipline for the Use of the Norfolk Militia (1768) provided twenty drum commands for everything from "Fix bayonets, marching" to "Form Battalion!" Other manuals followed suit. In actuality, battle and maneuver signals varied. During Major General John Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois in 1779, orders for 4 August stipulated signals for marching in files, advancing by sections and platoons, closing columns, and displaying into line. By comparison, Major General Friedrich Wilhelm de Steuben's *Regulations* (1779) gives only three different signals for marching forces: the "Front to halt," "the Front to advance quicker," and "to march slower." In 1780 British Captain John Peebles of the Forty-second Regiment noted the "General Rules for Manouvring the Batt[alio]n. by the Commanding Officer," appended to which are "Signals by Drum":

1. *Preparative* to begin firing by Companies, which is to go on as fast as each is loaded till the first part of the General when not a shot more is ever to be fired.
2. *Grenad[ie]rs March* to advance in Line.
3. *Point of War* to Charge.
4. *To Arms* to form the Batt[alio]n. (whether advancing or Retreating in Column) upon the leading division.
5. *Double flam* to halt Upon the word forward, in forming, the Divisions to run up in Order.

HORNS

Another instrument, the bugle horn (also called the French, hunting, or German post-horn) was commonly used by light and mounted troops. Horns were especially associated with the British light infantry. Massachusetts Lieutenant Joseph Hodgekins wrote of the Battle of Harlem Heights (16 September 1776), "The Enemy Halted Back of an hill and Blood [blowed] a french Horn which whas for a Reinforcement." Xavier della Gatta's painting, *The Battle of Germantown* (1782), shows a horn-blowing musician at the head of two files of British light infantry, and the song "A Soldier" (1778) begins with the lines:

Hark! hark! the bugle's lofty sound
Which makes the woods and rocks around
Repeat the martial strain,
Proclaims the light-arm'd British troops.

It is uncertain when American light troops first used horns, but during the Monmouth campaign in June 1778, New York Lieutenant Bernardus Swartwout noted,

- [25 June] The Horn blowed (a substitute for a drum in the [light] Infantry corps) we marched about four miles . . .

- [26 June] At the sound of the horn we marched eight miles and halted.

Bands of music, playing orchestral instruments, were also present with some units, serving a largely ornamental purpose. Most British regiments had their own bands at one time or another, several surrendering at Saratoga and Yorktown. Only a few Continental units followed suit, most notably the Third and Fourth Artillery, Second Virginia, and Webb's Additional Regiments.

Proficient field musicians (drummers, fifers, and for light troops and cavalry, buglers) were hard to find. That was because they were expected to learn many tunes, from popular melodies like "Roslyn Castle" to practical beats such as "Water Call" or "Roast Beef."

UNIFORMS

Recognizing musicians' special duties, efforts were made to provide them with regimental coats with reversed colors based on European practice. In May 1777 the Continental clothier general informed Colonel Elias Dayton of the Third New Jersey that "there is 395 Blue coats faced red on the road from Boston . . . which I design to furnish your regmt. . . I have also . . . sent you 12 Red Coats fac'd with blue of the clothing taken from the enemy for your drums & fifes." This variation was not always possible, as some units wore un-dyed linen hunting shirts, while in the autumn of 1778 Washington's army was issued French-made coats of blue or brown with red facings, with no distinction for musicians.

MUSICIANS' AGE AND EXPERIENCES

Because of their responsibilities, musicians were relatively mature, in the Continental army on average 18.5 years (the average age for drummers was 19 years, for fifers 17). Youthful musicians were sometimes kept out of harm's way. Drummer James Holmes of the Eleventh Pennsylvania Regiment, 13 years old when he joined in 1778, stated "he was not in Any engagements not being permitted by his Captain, [and] on account of his Youth was generally ordered to the rear." Younger and smaller musicians were more likely to play the fife, with some fifers changing to the drum as they matured. In 1782 Congress decided to take new musicians from the ranks, causing some difficulty, as a Tenth Massachusetts officer testified, "we want three Drummers and two Fifers but at present can find but one Fifer and two Drummers who have natural Geniuses for music . . . they are men of small stature and I believe will answer the purpose."

Musicians sometimes experienced duty-related hardships. Revolutionary fifer Samuel Dewees also served in the Fries Rebellion of 1799. Sent to recruit troops in Northampton, Pennsylvania, he stayed "two or three days . . . I had played the fife so much at this place,

I began to spit blood. . . . By the aid of the Doctor's medicine and the kind nursing treatment . . . I was restored to health again in a few days and able to play the fife as usual." Fifer Swain Parsel of the Third New Jersey Regiment had a similar experience. He "enlisted in the beginning of [1776] . . . as a fifer for one year." Reenlisting in the same regiment, "the practice of fifing being injurious to his health, he entered the ranks as a private soldier."

MEMENTOS OF SERVICE

Prospective pensioner John McElroy of the Eleventh Pennsylvania had a unique story to tell, stating in his pension deposition, "As to my ocupation I have none being nearly blind by reason of my eyes being nearly destroyed by the accidental bursting of cartriges in the year 1779 at Sunbury Pennsylvania." Despite his injury McElroy was appointed fife major in 1780. John McElroy and Aaron Thompson of the Third New Jersey both retained mementos of their military service well after the war. The former wrote in 1820 that "I have my old Fife and knapsack yet," while a friend of Thompson noted after his death that he "had heard him [Thompson], often say so, and mention, the fact of his, having mutilated his fife in order to prevent its being stolen and that he might preserve it, as a relic, of his services in that Struggle."

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John U. Rees

MUSKETS AND MUSKETRY. The principal infantry projectile weapon of the eighteenth century was the muzzle-loading flintlock musket. Using a complex double-ignition system, this smoothbore firearm threw a lead ball weighing about an ounce and up to three-quarters of an inch in diameter with an accuracy and rate of fire that suited the linear tactics used by western European armies and their colonial descendants in this period. Personal firearms had been introduced on a mass scale in the sixteenth century and incorporated into the linear tactical formations that were then dominated by thrusting and cutting weapons. As incremental improvements in the technology of firing the weapon were developed (the manner of igniting the gunpowder went from using a slow-burning match to striking flint on steel), firearms gradually replaced pikes and pole arms. The most common firearm, and the prototype of most other military firearms of the period, was the British army's famous Long Land Service musket, colloquially known as the Brown Bess.

Authors writing after the development of rifled military firearms have denigrated the musket for its inaccuracy at ranges much above fifty yards. By modern standards, it certainly was an imprecise weapon. But it is also true that the smoothbore musket was deeply intertwined with the history and technology of infantry combat of the period, as well as with social attitudes about who should fight and how they should be organized to succeed in battle. Rather than viewing the smoothbore musket as the ineffective precursor of subsequent improvements, it should be recognized as the most effective infantry combat weapon of its day, both influencing and being influenced by contemporary infantry tactics, an integral part of how societies and their leaders went about achieving the ultimate goal of prevailing on the battlefield.

DEPLOYMENT AND DISCIPLINE

The smoothbore musket was designed to be fired on command in massed volleys by soldiers standing upright shoulder to shoulder in lines several ranks deep. Volley fire could be based on groups as small as a platoon (say, at full strength, perhaps twenty-five men) or as large as a battalion, in numbers approaching a thousand men. Recognizing that bringing the maximum number of muskets to bear was the best way to impose one's will on the

enemy, beginning in the seventeenth-century commanders gradually thinned down their lines from the eight or ten men deep appropriate for combat with pikes and pole arms to three ranks. The first rank of musketeers, with bayonets fixed, would kneel before firing and might remain in that position without reloading, partly because it was difficult to reload a muzzle-loading musket while on one knee and partly to offer with their bayonets protection for their colleagues against a charge by cavalry or infantry. At the same time, the men in the second and third lines would stand and fire, the third line firing in the gaps—next to the shoulders—of the men in the second line. In a well-organized, full-strength battalion, commanders might reserve another line of “file closers,” drawn up at a short distance behind the third line, men who would step up when soldiers on the firing line fell wounded or killed. The British army was generally better trained than its European competitors in firing volleys by platoons, a more flexible tactic that gave fire all along the face of a battalion while ensuring that a portion of the soldiers were always loaded and ready to fire against any unexpected approach by the enemy.

At a range of fifty yards, volleys fired by soldiers arrayed in line would lay down a pattern of fire—more like that from a shotgun than from a precision firearm—that could have a devastating impact on a group of enemy soldiers similarly arranged. The key to success in battle was creating a larger volume of continuous fire than your enemy could produce. If a projectile struck a soldier, its low muzzle velocity meant that it would splay and produce an exit wound far larger than its point of entry. Firing as fast as one could reload in the general direction of the enemy line produced a hail of bullets that could unnerve a foe, almost regardless of how many projectiles actually struck home. No soldier would consciously want to take the chance of being hit; only the most rigorous inculcation of discipline could allow a soldier to suspend rational thought, as it were, and to keep reloading and firing in the hope that, if enough of his colleagues did the same thing, they might overmatch the enemy's musketry and simultaneously be safe against a bayonet charge from opponents who were, after all, only fifty yards away, perhaps obscured behind the cloud of gun smoke that hid them from observation.

ACCURACY OF FIRE

Accuracy, in the sense of aiming at a particular individual soldier on the opposite side and actually hitting your target, was not a significant part of the system of linear tactics. George Hanger remembered that:

A soldier's musket, if not exceedingly ill-bored (as many of them are), will strike the figure of a man

at eighty yards; it may even at 100; but a soldier must be very unfortunate indeed who shall be wounded by a common musket at 150 yards, provided his antagonist aims at him. . . . I do maintain . . . that no man was ever killed at 200 yards, by a common soldier's musket, by the person who aimed at him. (Peterson, p. 163)

Greater accuracy at longer ranges was, of course, possible. Gunsmiths had long understood that cutting slightly twisting grooves along the interior length of a gun barrel would impart spin to a projectile that had been wedged tightly enough on top of the powder charge that it deformed slightly when the powder exploded, thus enabling it to grip the lands (as the grooves were called) and go spinning down the barrel. The projectile had enough velocity to be effective at a range of up to three hundred yards. Riflemen were superior to musketeers on certain special missions but were no match in a linear battle because of their slow rate of fire and because their rifles lacked bayonets. Their marksmanship was less astounding than claimed at the time or than is popularly assumed.

RATE OF FIRE

The primary aim of military discipline was to produce soldiers who could endure the enormous physical and psychological strain that was part of fighting in a line, while simultaneously performing properly and efficiently the dozen or so motions necessary to reload their muskets. Constant practice was essential in giving the soldier the confidence and experience to fire and reload faster than an opponent who was going through the same motions trying to kill or incapacitate him. An average soldier might be able to fire two rounds a minute, while a nimble and well-trained man might be able to get off as many as four or five shots, meaning that he took only twelve to fifteen seconds to reload. (It was alleged, by Prussians no doubt, that Frederick II's troops could fire six rounds per minute, a remarkable figure that accomplished its objective if it induced nervous Austrians, Russians, and Frenchmen to glance about for a line of retreat even before coming within range of the rapid-fire Prussians.) In battle, speed in reloading was, according to the historian Harold L. Peterson, "everything. Speed for the defending force to pour as many bullets into the attacking force as possible; speed for the attacking force to close with its adversary before it had been too severely decimated to have sufficient strength to carry the position" with the bayonet (*Arms and Armor*, pp. 160, 162).

High rates of fire were possible only because the musket was designed to have enough windage (the gap between the spherical projectile and the inside of the barrel) so that the bullet essentially fell into place at the bottom of the barrel. Ramrods (thin, wooden, dowel-like

sticks) were carried by every musketeer and used to tamp the bullet tightly against the powder charge in the barrel, thereby creating a tighter seal that maximized the propulsive force exerted on the bullet. The first volley in any battle always tended to be the most effective because soldiers would take time before going into action to load and carefully ram the first round in place, time they would not have to seal the second and subsequent rounds. If tactical circumstances required the soldier to fix his foot-long bayonet on the end of the muzzle of his firearm (held in place by a lug that doubled as the only aiming device the weapon possessed), then reloading would become a more complex process. It was said that one of the marks of a battalion that had been in a stiff firefight was the scraped and bloody knuckles of soldiers forced to reload with bayonets fixed.

IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE USE

A rate of fire of even two rounds a minute was bound to decline quickly in battle. Black powder, the only available propellant, combusted incompletely and left a residue that clogged the touch hole (the vent whereby the explosion of the priming powder in the pan, ignited by the striking of flint on steel, communicated itself to the main charge in the barrel). The flints themselves were held precariously in a set of steel jaws called a cock or a hammer; the soldier had to tighten a small screw to clamp the flint in the proper position, with enough of an edge exposed so that it would produce a shower of sparks when the soldier pulled the trigger that released the spring which snapped it down against the steel (also called the frizzen or the battery). Flints were fragile and susceptible to cracking and flaking. They would have to be replaced if broken, or reset if misaligned; we can only begin to imagine how difficult that process must have been in the heat of battle.

Even when the charge was properly loaded in the gun barrel and the flint was held firm and ready in the jaws of the hammer, a whole host of things could still go wrong that would prevent the soldier from using his weapon effectively. Black powder is hygroscopic, so even the smallest amount of moisture would destroy its explosive potential; a rainstorm in the middle of a battle would turn the contest into a bayonet fight. Moreover, its constituent ingredients separate and settle out over time and with motion, a characteristic seen more often when gunpowder was stored or transported in large wooden barrels. If, while loading, the soldier placed too little powder in the priming pan, failed to close the steel tightly over the pan, or did not examine and, if necessary, clean the touch hole, the initial explosion of powder would not ignite the main charge, a phenomenon known as "flash in the pan." The soldier would be left with a live charge in the barrel and a number of equally bad choices about how to fix the problem. A fumble-fingered soldier might not successfully extract

the ramrod in time with his colleagues and, in order to maintain volley fire, be compelled to present arms and fire away his ramrod. The hammer normally rested in the ready position, where a notch on its sear exerted minimal tension on the spring while the musket was being loaded. Before firing, the soldier had to pull the hammer back to the point where a second sear engaged and exerted the maximum tension on the leaf spring so that when released by the trigger, it would snap forward with maximum force against the steel, a position called “full cock.” At any point once the musket was loaded, the hammer might jump free from the ready position and strike the steel with enough force so that the weapon fired; this sequence of accidents became known as “going off at half-cock.”

It is also worth remembering that fatigue played a role in reducing the effectiveness of the men who wielded the smoothbore musket. On a hot summer day in western Europe, soldiers dressed in wool coats would quickly begin to slow down and wear out as they constantly loaded and fired their weapons. If the air were still, they would soon be breathing an unhealthy amount of gun smoke. Even if water were available, there might be no time for the soldier to slake his thirst or rinse from his mouth the taste and grit of the gunpowder he ingested in the process of ripping open cartridges with his teeth. Finally, the musket was so barrel-heavy that fatigue might cause the soldier to lower the barrel to the point where his bullets struck the ground in front of his line rather than flying in a slow arc to impact on the enemy line.

TACTICS FOR VICTORY

The pinnacle of smoothbore-musket-based linear tactics was to coordinate an advance on the enemy so as to maximize the impact of one’s musketry. With muskets loaded and bayonets fixed, the attackers moved forward, keeping their alignment, knowing that until within one hundred yards they were relatively safe from enemy musketry. Their officers tried to exert leadership and impose discipline so that they could induce the men to hold their fire. The object was to receive the enemy’s first volley, absorb the losses, and continue advancing to a point so close to the enemy’s line that one’s own first volley produced many casualties, enough to make the enemy break and run. The British army brought to North America a reputation for battlefield success earned by the repeated application of these tactics, most notably against the French. When, for example, British and French commanders at the Battle of Fontenoy on 11 May 1745 invited each other to fire first, they were shrewdly trying to gain an advantage, not being naively gallant. French discipline broke first, and the British survivors methodically annihilated their opponent with coolly delivered volley fire.

The symbiosis between smoothbore musketry and linear tactics produced battles in western Europe that were

complex ballets of coordinated motion. Every man on the field had a specific part in the dance, from the soldier with the courage to stand in line and the training to reload until disabled by bullets or fatigue, up the chain of command to officers who had to judge the right moment to maneuver the appropriate units over suitable ground to engage an enemy with the best chance of winning the fight. Even though most of the men in the ranks were illiterate, unhealthy, and destined for a cruel fate, they were not unthinking cogs in some aristocratic machine. Battle was a far cry from being a clash of faceless automatons marching soullessly toward the cauldron of fire created by an inept tactical system.

AMERICAN MUSKETRY

At the start of the hostilities with Britain, many influential American leaders, including George Washington, wanted to create a “continental army” based on European-style smoothbore muskets and linear tactics. Their desire was in large part the product of political and ideological calculations. They wanted to prove to their oppressors that they were a civilized people fighting for its rights and therefore worthy of respect, not a bunch of dirty, savage rebels taking potshots at their betters from behind trees because they were afraid to stand and fight. They recognized, too, that a European-style army was their best chance of winning a clear-cut victory that might shorten the war, reduce the enormous costs involved, and minimize the disruption and strain war would inevitably impose on American society.

But Americans could never create an exact duplicate of the British army. It took long enlistments and intensive training to make men proficient in linear tactics, and Americans were generally disinclined to undertake either. Instead, they created a hybrid version of war making, a version that combined elements of linear tactics with the experience they had gained over the course of a century and a half confronting Native Americans and European competitors. In general, they tried to avoid open-field, stand-up fights against British regulars early in the war because they understood they were unprepared to fight in that fashion. They largely succeeded in dodging that sort of combat, in part because the British army’s vision of war making based on linear tactics did not offer it any easy ways of forcing a reluctant opponent to fight. As hostilities continued, American units gradually gained experience and began to venture into more stand-up fights, as at Saratoga in September and October 1777. At Valley Forge over the winter of 1777–1778, Friedrich Steuben began the process of regularizing, standardizing, and installing a stripped-down system of linear tactics for the Continental army. The improved performance of Washington’s army at the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse on 28 June 1778 demonstrated that American regular units were approaching a large-scale parity with the British army in America.

The colonists had no capacity to manufacture large numbers of new muskets in 1775. They began the war with a hodgepodge of firearms, mostly leftovers from shipments Britain had sent to arm provincial soldiers during the colonial wars, some still in government storage, but most in the hands of the men who had taken them to war. Privately owned guns from a variety of sources were a significant component of the firearms used before 1777. Many were remanufactured from parts salvaged from worn out or discarded muskets, including—in New England and New York—the recycling of weapons acquired in war and trade from Canada. Captured British arms were also part of the mix, whether sequestered from local royal sources (as in the raid on Fort William and Mary at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on 14–15 December 1777) or captured by privateers from supply ships intended for British garrisons. The supply of firearms did not always meet the demand, and the pace of operations and the carelessness of American soldiers imposed a further drain on the number of serviceable muskets. Both the states and the Continental Congress immediately saw the need to acquire more firearms and did what they could to encourage local manufacture. Early in the war, committees of safety let contracts to local gunsmiths to produce muskets of a standard size and caliber; in the age before manufactured parts were interchangeable, all muskets were still the products of skilled craftsmen. There were centers of production across the colonies, including Harvard, Massachusetts, Goshen, Connecticut, Trenton, New Jersey, and Philadelphia, where the committee of safety led by Benjamin Franklin contracted for muskets from local gunsmiths in July 1775. That same month, Virginia established its own state arms manufactory at Fredericksburg. Congress later established its own Continental firearms factory at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, along with a shop that produced gunlocks in Trenton.

Despite herculean efforts to ramp up domestic manufacture, the demand for firearms could not have been met without supplies purchased from overseas. Individual states sent agents to Europe to purchase muskets, gunpowder, flints, and lead; the fruits of their efforts were smuggled into the colonies, mostly through the Dutch West Indies island of St. Eustatius. Congress itself sent Silas Deane of Connecticut to France in March 1776 with instructions to solicit clothing and arms for twenty-five thousand men. In May, France decided to supply military material to the colonies under the guise of the fictitious trading company Hortalez & Cie, run by Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais. Eventually, over 100,000 high-quality French military muskets were sent to the Americans, firearms that provided a critical boost in the fighting power of the rebel armies. For example, thirty-seven thousand stand arrived at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in the spring of 1777, many of which armed

the troops that stopped Burgoyne's army at Saratoga. The victory at Saratoga, in turn, was crucial in prompting France to enter into a treaty of alliance with the United States 6 February 1778, after which French supplies could flow openly across the Atlantic. The French muskets, of .69 caliber, were largely a combination of the 1766 model and upgrades of earlier models undertaken between 1768 and 1773. They were produced at the three royal arms manufactories of St. Etienne, Maubeuge, and Charleville, the last named becoming the common designation for all French muskets. The French model 1766 was chosen as the design for the first muskets produced in the United States after the war, the model 1795.

SEE ALSO *Bayonets and Bayonet Attacks*; *Brown Bess*; *Fontenoy, Battle of*; *French Covert Aid*; *Hanger, George*; *Line*; *Marksmanship*; *Riflemen*; *Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

MUTINY ACT OF 1765 **SEE** *Quartering Acts*.

MUTINY OF GORNELL. April 1782. Inadequate supplies and other administrative grievances, combined with a lack of military activity, produced considerable discontent in Major General Nathanael Greene's southern army in October 1781. When these same conditions reappeared in the spring of 1782, the Pennsylvania

Mutiny of Griffin

battalions that had marched south under Brigadier General Anthony Wayne after Yorktown became the most agitated, still feeling lingering resentment from their previous mutiny. Before this trouble could spread to the Maryland troops, Greene determined to crack down, especially as he suspected British agents to be at work. Greene arrested the ringleader, a Sergeant Gornell, and tried him in a court-martial. On 23 April he was executed, ending the disturbance. The historian Carl Van Doren has identified him as George Goznall of the Second Pennsylvania Regiment.

SEE ALSO *Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene*.

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

MUTINY OF GRIFFIN. October 1781. Continental private Timothy Griffin of South Carolina got drunk and insulted an officer. He was shot for mutinous conduct.

SEE ALSO *Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

MUTINY OF HICKEY. June 1776. On 15 June 1776, when General George Washington was in New York City and Governor William Tryon was a refugee aboard a British ship in the harbor, Thomas Hickey and another Continental soldier were brought before the Provincial Congress on the charge of passing counterfeit currency. Both men were members of Washington's Life Guard, a special military unit. In jail, Hickey bragged openly about being part of a conspiracy to turn against the Americans as soon as the British army arrived. Another prisoner, who had conversed with both Hickey and the soldier who had been arrested with him, informed the authorities. The plot allegedly involved blowing up American powder magazines, setting fire to New York City, spiking the cannons, destroying the Kings Bridge, and assassinating Washington. The extent of the conspiracy was so magnified and propagandized, however, that the facts were never known for certain.

It seems to have been established at Hickey's trial that Governor Tryon had been sending money to Gilbert Forbes, a gunsmith on Broadway, to recruit men for the king. The money was passed by Mayor David Mathews of New York, who had authority to visit Tryon and who claimed he did not know the purpose of the money. There was no proof that Tryon was counterfeiting money on

shipboard, or that he had offered land bounties to stimulate recruiting. Nor could it be proved that as many as 700 men had signed up for the plot, much less that the plans included the assassination of Washington and other leaders.

John Jay headed the committee that investigated the affair for the New York authorities. Only Hickey was tried, but 13 others, including Forbes and Mathews, were imprisoned in Connecticut. They all escaped or were sent back to New York before they could be given a hearing. Hickey was convicted of mutiny and sedition by a court-martial on 26 June 1776, and two days later was hanged on the Common in the presence of 20,000 spectators. It was the first military execution of the American Revolution. The main result of the affair was to further blacken the name of "Loyalist."

SEE ALSO *Jay, John; Tryon, William*.

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MUTINY OF THE CONNECTICUT LINE.

25 May 1780. While in quarters at Basking Ridge, New Jersey, near Morristown, the Eighth Connecticut Regiment turned out about dusk on 25 May to protest a lack of food. There were no ringleaders in this spontaneous event, which spread to the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Connecticut Regiments as well. Colonel Walter Stewart of Pennsylvania mediated a settlement and the troops returned to their huts, although Colonel R. J. Meigs, acting brigade commander, had been accidentally bayoneted in the side. The historian Carl Van Doren has said, "The whole affair was soon over and afterwards disregarded" (*Mutiny*, pp. 22–23).

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MUTINY OF THE FIRST NEW YORK REGIMENT.

June 1780. Thirty-one men of the First New York Regiment deserted from Fort

Schuyler (Stanwix) in early June 1780. Lieutenant Abraham Hardenbergh led a party of Oneidas in pursuit to prevent the deserters from joining the British. The fugitives were caught while in the process of crossing a river, and thirteen were shot. According to Carl Van Doren, “This is perhaps the only time in the history of the American Army when an officer used Indians to kill white soldiers” (*Mutiny in January*, p. 20).

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MUTINY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS LINE.

1 January 1780. William Heath wrote in his memoirs: “Early in the morning about 100 soldiers belonging to the Massachusetts regiments [of the West Point garrison] . . . marched off with intent to go home: they were pursued and brought back: some of them were punished; the greater part of them pardoned.” Once back in quarters the individual cases were reviewed, and some of the men received their discharges. As would be the case again a year later, the cause of the problem was a difference of opinion on the meaning of the phrase—regarding length of service—“three years or the duration.”

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MUTINY OF THE NEW JERSEY LINE.

20–27 January 1781. The two regiments of the reorganized New Jersey Brigade were in winter quarters at Pompton, New Jersey, with a small detachment at Suffern, New York, when the Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line started on 1 January. Brigadier General Anthony Wayne ordered part of the brigade south, and they eventually camped at Chatham under the command of Elias Dayton. The portion of the brigade remaining at Pompton was commanded by Colonel Israel Shreve. Having the same complaints as the Pennsylvania regulars, men of the Jersey Brigade followed developments of the

Pennsylvania mutiny with avid attention. Even after New Jersey granted its men some of the benefits won by the Pennsylvania troops, a mutiny broke out on 20 January at Pompton. In many ways it seemed a small-scale repetition of the recently concluded performance. Several hundred men left their camp at Pompton and headed for Chatham. Shreve trailed them, just as Wayne had followed the Pennsylvanians. Dayton managed to disperse much of his detachment before the Pompton mutineers arrived on 21 January, so only a few recruits were acquired at Chatham. After two disorderly days the Pompton group agreed to follow Shreve back to camp, and the men were promised pardon if they subsequently behaved.

Washington, meanwhile, learned of the new disorder the evening of 21 January and ordered Major General William Heath in the Highlands to make five or six hundred good troops available to stamp it out. He placed Major General Robert Howe in command of the operation and told him to enforce unconditional submission. After a hard march through deep snow the troops from around West Point reached Ringwood, New Jersey, on 25 January. Here they were joined by other reliable units and by three guns. Washington arrived at midnight the next night and Howe led his command forward an hour later.

The troops at Pompton, eight miles away, became disorderly again soon after their return from Chatham. They obeyed some officers but not others. Sergeants George Grant, Jonathan Nichols, and John Minthorn had been the nominal leaders of the original uprising (although they apparently were forced by their men into assuming leadership); Sergeants David Gilmore (or Gilmour) and John Tuttle were the most conspicuous agitators of the later disorders.

With some well-founded doubts about whether his Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire troops would do their duty, Howe surrounded the Pompton encampment before daylight on 27 January. With the three cannon in plain view of the huts, Howe sent in word for the mutineers to assemble without arms. After some hesitation they complied.

Officers of the New Jersey Brigade submitted the names of the worst offenders and from these candidates selected one from each regiment (including a veteran of the Third New Jersey, which had been disbanded on 1 January in the reorganization). Grant, Gilmore, and Tuttle were named, tried on the spot, and sentenced to be shot immediately. The latter two were executed by a firing party formed by twelve other mutineers who had been named as prominent offenders. Grant was reprieved at the last minute; Van Doren comments that “it is tempting to guess that he may have been privately told by Shreve not to worry over the trial and sentence” (*Mutiny*

in *January*, p. 223). A journal kept by a contemporary, Dr. Thacher, who saw the trials and executions, gives no indication that he suspected Grant's case was rigged.

SEE ALSO *Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line*; *Shreve, Israel*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

MUTINY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LINE. 1–10 January 1781. Inactivity during winter quarters, plus accumulated grievances about food, clothing, quarters, pay, bounties, and terms of enlistment, finally led the Pennsylvania Continentals to mutiny on 1 January 1781. Many of these troops had enlisted "for three years or during the war"; they contended that the phrase "whichever comes first" was implied and that their contracts were now fulfilled. Almost nothing is known for certain about how this mutiny was organized—the mutineers kept no written records and none of them wrote of the event afterward. The names of only two leaders are known for sure: William Bowzar, secretary of the twelve-man Board of Sergeants that represented the mutineers, and Daniel Connell, who signed the Board's final communication. A man named Williams—probably John Williams—was president of the Board of Sergeants, but does not appear to have been the real leader or organizer of the revolt.

THE MUTINY BEGINS

The ten disaffected infantry regiments and the artillery regiment of General Anthony Wayne's Pennsylvania Line were encamped near Morristown, New Jersey, where they occupied huts built during the previous winter at Jockey Hollow (also known as Mount Kemble). The total strength in officers and men was about 2,500. The mutiny started about 10 P.M. the evening of 1 January, when soldiers emerged from their huts under arms and with field equipment, captured the guns and ammunition, and assembled to march away. Initially, fewer than half the men participated, and probably not more than 1,500 eventually joined the march. During a confused hour before they left camp, the mutineers resisted the efforts and the eloquence of Wayne and about 100 officers to stop

them. They did this with a remarkable lack of violence, offering with the simple argument that the officers could do nothing to settle their grievances—they intended to present these directly to Congress in Philadelphia.

Lieutenant Francis White and Captain Samuel Tolbert were shot (not fatally) while trying to keep their men from moving to the assembly area. Captain Adam Bettin was mortally wounded by a soldier who was chasing Lieutenant Colonel William Butler (of the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment) and who mistook Bettin for Butler. One man was killed accidentally by a fellow mutineer who, unknown to the other, had replaced the regular guard on the captured magazine. These are the only identified casualties, although it is hard to believe that there were not others.

When Wayne rode onto the scene with several field officers he was unable to restore order, but according to one participant, Lieutenant Enos Reeves, the men stated "it was not their intention to hurt or disturb an officer of the Line, two or three individuals excepted." The majority of the troops were reluctant to join the mutiny. The Second Pennsylvania Regiment of Colonel Walter Stewart was forced at bayonet point to go along. Captain Thomas Campbell turned out part of the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment and attempted to recapture the artillery, but his men would not carry through with the attack. The Fifth (Colonel Francis Johnston) and Ninth (Colonel Richard Butler) Regiments occupied huts some distance from the others, and joined only after being threatened with the cannon. Other men hid as mutineers ran from hut to hut gathering supporters. At 11 P.M. the column marched away to camp at Vealtown (Bernardsville), New Jersey, four miles distant, to await stragglers before resuming their advance toward Philadelphia the next morning.

Wayne had long feared a mutiny, and had urged higher authority to do something about the legitimate grievances of his troops, but he was surprised by the events that had just taken place. Powerless to stop the marchers, and not a bit sure they did not intend to go over to the enemy—or that the British would not strike at this critical time—Wayne prepared to follow his men and try to restore order. He was accompanied by Colonels Walter Stewart and Richard Butler. Before the dawn of 2 January, however, Wayne wrote out "what he called an order but what was a request and a promise":

Agreeably [sic] to the proposition of a very large proportion of the worthy soldiery last evening, General Wayne hereby desires the noncommissioned officers and privates to appoint one man from each regiment, to represent their grievances to the General, who on the sacred honor of a gentleman and a soldier does hereby solemnly promise to exert every power to obtain immediate

redress of those grievances; and he further plights that honor that no man shall receive the least injury on account of the part they have taken on the occasion.

The mutineers entered Princeton in the late afternoon or evening of 3 January, took control of this village of some 70 houses, and prepared to wait there until Congress responded to the appeals they had sent forward to Philadelphia. The Board of Sergeants established themselves in the ruins of Nassau Hall and the men pitched tents south of the College. The sergeants had sent back a delegation to confer with Wayne, who was following at a safe distance, but they would not halt their advance on Princeton to let him address the troops. The sergeants had also furnished Wayne with a personal guard, and when the general and his colonels took up quarters in a tavern near Nassau Hall on 3 January they had some doubts as to whether this guard was a mark of respect or indicated that they were hostages.

PRELIMINARIES AT PRINCETON

During Thursday, 4 January, Wayne and the colonels negotiated with the Board, and later in the day Wayne sent word to the state authorities—the Council of Pennsylvania—that somebody should come and consult with the mutineers. Congress and the Pennsylvania Council, both sitting in what is now Independence Hall, had learned on 3 January of the alarming developments at Morristown. That afternoon Congress appointed a committee to deal with the Pennsylvania Council on the mutiny. When the Council received Wayne's letter on Friday, it met with the committee of Congress and decided to send Joseph Reed, President of the Pennsylvania Council and therefore of the state, and General James Potter, a militia officer and Council member. The three original members of the Congressional committee—General John Sullivan, the Reverend John Witherspoon, and John Mathews—were now augmented by Samuel John Atlee and Theodorick Bland. Reed and Potter left Philadelphia late Friday afternoon with an escort of twenty light horsemen from the famous city troop, and entered Trenton by noon the next day (6 January). Sullivan's committee (less Mathews, who stayed in Philadelphia) reached Trenton after dark on 6 January and stayed there during the negotiations. Captain Samuel Morris, with the rest of his Philadelphia Light Horse, accompanied them.

Meanwhile, the Board of Sergeants had had a number of visitors in Princeton on 4 January. Major General Arthur St. Clair, senior officer of the Pennsylvania Line; the Marquis de Lafayette; and Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens were in Philadelphia on 3 January when the newly created Congressional committee decided that some officers should go see what could be done about the mutiny.

These three were received by the Board of Sergeants and talked to Wayne, but the Board then told them to leave—the sergeants preferred to continue their negotiations through Wayne, Butler, and Stewart. On this same day, Colonel Thomas Craig approached with eighty armed officers from Morristown and sent word to Wayne of his coming. The officers were not allowed to enter Princeton, and they sat out the subsequent negotiations at Pennington, nine miles away. Some members of the New Jersey legislature also showed up on 4 January from Trenton, but they were not allowed to enter Princeton.

General George Washington, the commander in chief, got his first news of the mutiny about noon on 3 January. Located at New Windsor with the main portion of the army, he was too far away to exert much influence on subsequent events, and as it turned out, Wayne on his own initiative was following almost precisely the course Washington advocated. Washington's letter of 3 January, received by Wayne on 7 January, recommended that Wayne stay with his troubled men, that he not attempt force, and that he try to have the mutineers move south of the Delaware River. Washington disagreed with Wayne's proposal that Congress leave Philadelphia in order to avoid the mutineers, but this point turned out to be academic once Congress decided to stay. Washington had made preparations to ride south, but changed his mind at 7 A.M. on 4 January when he realized he could not arrive in time and that he had the more important task of keeping the mutiny from spreading through the rest of the army. The sympathy of the troops was with the mutineers, particularly since the latter had shown such good discipline in pressing their demands and displayed no disposition to deal with the enemy. Nonetheless, civil and military authorities went ahead with plans to surround Princeton with militia and regulars.

British headquarters in New York City had learned of the mutiny before Washington, and Sir Henry Clinton promptly sought a means of exploiting the situation. He alerted troops for a possible march into New Jersey and started looking for emissaries to offer the mutineers pardon, payment of the money owed them by Congress, and the privilege of declining military service if they would come over to the British.

REED REPRESENTS THE CONGRESS

Many agencies were concerned with the mutiny, but Joseph Reed promptly assumed the key role. Although General Potter stayed by Reed's side, Potter contributed nothing but an occasional signature. The Congressional committee (Sullivan, Witherspoon, and Mathews) may be regarded as a rubber stamp that waited in Trenton to approve Reed's solution. Washington was virtually out of the picture. St. Clair sat at Morristown, in command of the troops who had not joined the mutiny, and muttered

about using force. So, probably, did the eighty officers who had left the government's bed and board to live at their own expense at Pennington.

Reed did not go straight to Princeton where, for all he knew, Wayne and the colonels were prisoners and his own safety would be uncertain; he undertook a line of action designed to remind the anonymous sergeants of his personal dignity and their lack of status. Reed started a correspondence with Wayne, but wrote with the expectation that these letters would be read by the sergeants. When he received a letter from Sergeant Bowzar assuring him safe conduct—for several days the Board was not convinced that President Reed had really been sent to deal with them—Reed played dumb and, in a letter to Wayne wrote: "I have received a letter from Mr. Bowzar, who signs as secretary but does not say to whom." Reed very well knew "to whom" Bowzar was secretary, but he wanted to avoid even tacit recognition of the Board and to stress that Wayne was still their lawful commander.

Reed and Potter had ridden on to Maidenhead (now Lawrenceville, four miles south-west of Princeton) on Saturday evening and they now proposed that Wayne meet them there. After the sergeants were made to understand that Reed's reluctance to enter Princeton was due to their inhospitality toward St. Clair, Wayne sent word he would meet Reed at Maidenhead Sunday morning. Reed returned to Trenton, where the Committee (which arrived that evening) gave him final guidance.

A significant development took place during the night. Clinton's emissaries—John Mason and a guide named James Ogden—got into Princeton and presented the enemy's proposals to Sergeant Williams. The latter promptly slapped them under guard and delivered them to Wayne at 4 A.M. Reed was riding to Maidenhead Sunday morning when he met the prisoners being escorted to Trenton. Any suspicion that the mutineers were flirting with the enemy was now dispelled. Taking the prisoners with him, Reed rode on to Maidenhead, met Wayne, and accepted the latter's recommendation that they proceed to Princeton. Meanwhile, just as Wayne, Reed, and their parties were leaving Maidenhead, a message came from the Board of Sergeants asking that the captive emissaries be returned to their custody. Apparently the mutineers had figured, on second thought, that they would be in a better bargaining position if they held these two men.

The mutineers were formed along the post road to honor Reed's arrival at about 3 P.M. In this unreal situation Reed took the salutes of sergeants, who stood before their men in the positions normally occupied by officers, and he returned the salutes ("though much against my inclination"). The artillery was drawn up to fire a salute, but Reed or Wayne managed to stop this rendering of honors, on the ground that it might alarm the countryside.

NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN

The first order of business in Princeton on that Sunday afternoon was what to do with Mason and Ogden. Van Doren writes that "Reed and the officers were plainly much afraid that the British would land and the mutineers either join them, or refuse to fight, or try to drive some bargain before they fought" (p. 127). Most of the sergeants favored Wayne's proposal that the men be promptly executed as spies, but Williams, who was a British deserter, and another sergeant of the same antecedence blocked this solution. Williams had the novel idea of sending the men back to Clinton "with a taunting message." Reed objected to this pointless suggestion and proposed a compromise that was adopted: the sergeants would hold the prisoners subject to Reed's call, and their disposition would be decided later. Meanwhile there was fresh intelligence of an enemy move from Staten Island into New Jersey, and there was now no time to waste in settling the mutiny.

A good deal of preliminary work had already been done between Wayne and the sergeants. The Committee of Congress had instructed Reed to honor Wayne's promise of total amnesty, and they agreed that the men should not be considered traitors unless they were considering deserting to the enemy or refused to compromise on terms for settling the mutiny. It had also been decided in Trenton that men who had enlisted for three years or for the war should be discharged if they had served three years and had not re-enlisted. Men who had voluntarily enlisted or re-enlisted for the war were not, however, to be released.

At the Sunday night conference in Princeton, the sergeants advanced a single proposal that embodied the wishes of the men who had the longest service and who represented the strongest of several factions in their camp. This proposal was:

That all and every such men as was enlisted in the years 1776 and 1777 and received the bounty of twenty dollars, shall be without any delay discharged and all the arrears of pay and clothing to be paid unto them immediately when discharged; with respect to the depreciation of pay the State to give them sufficient certificates and security for such sums as they shall become due.

Reed could not agree to this proposal, because it would permit the release of men specifically precluded by the guidance he had received from the Committee of Congress. Although this proposal was undoubtedly phrased to release some men not honestly entitled to discharge, the sergeants proceeded to open the eyes of the President of Pennsylvania—and, to a lesser extent, those of their commanding officer of the Line—to certain sharp and dishonest practices that military officers had employed in enlisting them. In short, according to Van Doren, "the enlistment papers did not tell all the truth of what had happened" (p. 128).

The sergeants showed much difference of opinion among themselves. They were incapable of drafting a new set of compromise proposals, they had doubts about getting the men to accept such proposals if drafted, and Sergeant Williams was not the man to unify their demands. In order to have some basis for working out a solution. Reed undertook to write up a document which, Van Doren reports, “promised as much as he thought he could perform and as little as he thought the men would accept.” (p. 130) After some minor alterations by Wayne, Reed’s proposals were generally as follows: no man would be held beyond the time for which he freely and voluntarily enlisted; a commission would decide on disputed terms of enlistment; if enlistment papers were not promptly produced by official custodians, the soldier’s oath on the matter would be accepted; and back pay, adjustment for depreciation, and clothing shortages would be taken care of as soon as possible.

RESOLUTION OF THE MUTINY

On Monday, 8 January, the mutineers announced their general acceptance of Reed’s proposals, and on the next morning they marched to Trenton for final negotiations. That evening, the Board of Sergeants had a long conference with the Committee of Congress. On the morning of 10 January Reed informed the sergeants that, since they had accepted his proposals and these would now go into effect, he would like the spies surrendered as evidence of the mutineers’ willingness to abide by their agreement. The Board countered with a demand that the mutineers remain together under arms until final arrangements were completed. Reed refused to accept this condition and asked for a final answer within two hours. Within the time limit the Board agreed to give up the prisoners and to turn in their weapons. This communication came “Signed by the Board in the absence of the President, [by] Daniel Connell, Member.” Van Doren comments that Williams and Bowzar may actually have been absent, or they may have been unwilling to sign this paper. John Mason and James Ogden, Clinton’s emissaries, were convicted on 10 January of spying and were hanged the next morning. Mason was a hard character with a long record as a criminal Loyalist. Ogden is known in history only as Mason’s guide.

Putting the settlement into effect involved resolving a number of knotty problems and took several weeks. On 29 January, however, Wayne wrote Washington that the task was completed. About 1,250 infantrymen and 67 artillerymen were discharged; nearly 1,150 remained. Enlistment papers had been gathered quickly and most of them clearly committed the men for the duration of the war, but the commissioners discharged men of the first five infantry regiments and most of the artillery by 21 January without waiting for the papers, and many men got away on false

oaths. There was talk of bringing action against these perjured soldiers, but the State decided against this because it was finding it impossible to raise the money to fulfill its own part of the bargain. A high percentage of the discharged men subsequently re-enlisted, and all the Pennsylvania Line—mutineers and others—were furloughed until 15 March, with instructions to rendezvous at various places in accordance with a reorganization plan that originally had been scheduled for 1 January. This plan, which went into effect on 17 January, eliminated the Seventh through Eleventh Pennsylvania Regiments and deployed the others as follows: the First and Second were placed under Daniel Brodhead and Walter Stewart at Philadelphia; the Third, under Thomas Craig, at Reading; the Fourth, under William Butler, at Carlisle; the Fifth, under Richard Butler, at York; and the Sixth, under Richard Humpton, at Lancaster. Only recruiting sergeants and musicians were not given furloughs.

Other soldiers with the same grievances as the Pennsylvania Line had followed these developments with keen interest. The mutiny of the New Jersey Line, which took place between 20 and 25 January, was the most significant result. Wayne was preparing to lead the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Pennsylvania Regiments to join Lafayette when a small-scale mutiny flared up in York, Pennsylvania. As a result of this action, six men were convicted and four of them executed on 22 May.

SEE ALSO *Mutiny of Gornell; Mutiny of the New Jersey Line; Pennsylvania, Mobilization in; Reed, Joseph; St. Clair, Arthur; Sullivan, John; Wayne, Anthony; Witherspoon, John.*

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MUTINY ON PROSPECT HILL.

10 September 1775. Cambridge, Massachusetts. Riflemen from Pennsylvania and Virginia served effectively at the siege of Boston, but their ill discipline in camp was a constant cause of concern to those responsible for military law and order. The worst incident, on Sunday, 10 September, reached the dangerous depths of mutiny. Such behavior had to be suppressed before other riflemen decided they, too, could disobey army regulations. When the adjutant of Colonel William Thompson’s Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion, Lieutenant David Ziegler, confined a

sergeant for “neglect of duty and murmuring,” members of the sergeant’s company threatened to release him (*Pennsylvania Archives*, second series, 10, p. 8). As Ziegler reported his action to the colonel and lieutenant colonel, the men made good on their threat. The officers seized the malefactor and sent him to the main guard in Cambridge. Some men of Captain James Ross’s notably ill-disciplined company from Lancaster County swore to release him and, joined by men of other companies, a group of thirty-two riflemen headed for the jail with loaded weapons. The guard detail was strengthened to five hundred men, and several Rhode Island regiments were turned out under arms for what could have been the biggest brawl of the Boston siege. The mutineers had gone about half a mile when they were confronted on Prospect Hill by General Washington, along with Charles Lee and Nathanael Greene. Washington ordered the mutineers to ground their arms, which they did “immediately” (*ibid.*, 10, p. 9). Another Pennsylvania rifle company (Captain George Nagel’s men from Berks County) surrounded the subdued riflemen and marched them back to camp, backed up by two New England regiments.

In a court-martial on 12 September, of which Colonel John Nixon of Massachusetts was president, thirty-three men were convicted of disobedient and mutinous behavior. Since a draconian sentence ran the risk of reigniting and spreading the mutiny, the court was content with fining each mutineer twenty shillings. The ringleader, John Leaman, got the additional punishment of six days’ imprisonment. The riflemen did not threaten to spring him, but they continued to be a disciplinary problem throughout the siege.

SEE ALSO *Riflemen*.

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MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS.

The historical record does not always supply sufficient evidence from which to build unassailable conclusions about what happened in the past. Even when the evidence

is abundant, different people may, in good faith, interpret it in different ways. Because all historical scholarship is a form of argument in which the interpreter emphasizes certain facts and points of view to build a case for his or her particular conclusions, it is easy to see how the history of so complex an event as the American Revolution offers a fertile field for nearly endless revision.

In the decades since the end of the war, historians have combed through the evidence and examined again and again what we think we know about people and events, and in the process they have corrected many misconceptions and altered many interpretations. Sometimes a closer look was all that was needed. Examples abound. The noble titles “Lord Stirling” (William Alexander), “Baron von” Steuben, and “Baron de” Kalb were all bestowed by those individuals on themselves. Early commentators elevated the resolves adopted by a committee at Charlotte, North Carolina, in May 1775 into a “Mecklenburg [County] Declaration of Independence.” Americans celebrate the 4th of July as Independence Day, even though the Declaration of Independence was adopted, not signed, on the 4th.

Other misconceptions arise out of undocumented assertions that we, after all, cannot say definitively are not true. It just sounds better if Ethan Allen demanded the surrender of Fort Ticonderoga with the ringing phrase “in the name of the Great Jehovah and the Continental Congress,” or if John Parker declared on Lexington green that “if they [the British] want war, let it begin here!” Some stories are so appealing that we want them to be true, like the heroism of Molly Pitcher, the devotion of Betsy Ross, or the intrigue of the silver bullets of Ticonderoga. Other stories fit our preconceptions, like Washington’s alleged temper tantrums at Kips Bay and Monmouth or the idea that he almost won at Germantown. Many misconceptions arise from the opinions some contemporaries used to smear the reputations of particular individuals. Both Walter Butler and Simon Girty were accused of atrocities at places where they were not present. William Howe was allegedly a libertine whose indiscretions caused him to lose the war (the Murray Hill Myth). Benedict Arnold was clearly a black-hearted traitor (the Arnold Legend). His treason, for Americans the most discordant note in the entire symphony of the founding of the Republic, has led to questions about whether Arnold or Gates deserves credit for the victory over Burgoyne at the Second Battle of Saratoga and over the role played by Peggy Shippen Arnold in her husband’s defection.

It is worthwhile to distinguish misconceptions from myths. Myths may or may not have a firmer grounding in the evidence than misconceptions, but they almost always gain a wider currency because they reflect or support some idea that is fundamental to how a society

views, understands, and even defines itself. Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon in the Revolution is the myth of the militia. Americans wanted to believe that they were virtuous men fighting in the righteous cause of resisting British tyranny. Rather than relying on an odious standing army like their oppressors, Americans were free men who turned out to protect their rights. No matter that they might lack formal military training, Americans believed that, as citizen-soldiers, they had had the determination and ingenuity to win through to victory, a point of view that minimized the crucial contributions made by both the Continental army and their French allies.

The nineteenth century saw the apogee of this attitude. On 4 July 1837 the people of Concord dedicated a memorial obelisk on the site where their ancestors had stood against the British on 19 April 1775. Ralph Waldo Emerson solemnized the occasion with his "Concord Hymn," in words that entered our language and still fill Americans with pride and awe:

By the rude bridge that arched the flood,
Their flag to April's breeze unfurled,
Here once the embattled farmers stood
And fired the shot heard round the world.

Thirty-eight years later, on the centennial of the fight at Concord Bridge, the townspeople unveiled the great visual symbol of how Americans remembered their Revolution. The bronze statue, the *Minuteman*, was the first landmark in the distinguished career of the then twenty-five-year-old sculptor Daniel Chester French. (His final contribution to the American pantheon would be the statue of Abraham Lincoln sitting as the centerpiece of the Lincoln Memorial.). The *Minuteman* immediately took its place alongside the Liberty Bell among the icons of the Revolution. Dressed in civilian clothes, the handsome young farmer stands forthrightly in his field, one hand on his plow, the other clutching the musket he is about to use to defend his land and his liberty. So powerful was the moment captured by French that the *Minuteman* came in the twentieth century to embody all the virtues of American citizen-soldiers in the fights against fascism and communism. So powerful, too, was the legacy of French's evocation that historians have been working to place it in its proper context ever since.

SEE ALSO *Militia in the North; Propaganda in the American Revolution; Riflemen.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

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NANCY CAPTURE. 28 November 1775. On 8 September H.M. Frigate *Phoenix* departed England escorting a convoy of victuallers and two ordnance transports to Boston. The convoy was scattered by storms as it made its way across the Atlantic, and the frigate reached Boston on 9 November to report that one of the transports, the brigantine Nancy, was missing. Acting on information possibly sent by Arthur Lee, Washington alerted his small squadron of cruisers to be on the watch. One of those vessels, the 74-ton schooner *Lee* (formerly the *Two Brothers*) had recently been fitted out with six small cannon in Marblehead by John Glover and on 28 October she was officially commissioned under the command of Captain John Manley with a crew made up of seamen detached from Washington's infantry regiments. At dusk on 28 November Manley captured the much larger (250-ton) but unarmed *Nancy*.

This was the first important prize taken by the Americans, and Washington sent reinforcements to Cape Ann to secure her. She yielded 2,000 muskets, 100,000 flints, 30,000 round shot, 30 tons of musket shot, and a 13-inch brass mortar weighing over 2,700 pounds. The latter entered into American service and was dubbed "*Congress*" in a joyous mock christening ceremony. The materiel taken from the *Nancy* provided significant logistical support for the ordnance-starved Continental Army.

While this event is not mentioned in many general accounts of the Revolution, Major General William Howe immediately wrote to the Ministry to warn them that the capture gave the Americans the ability to set Boston on fire if they chose to exercise it. (Naval Documents, 2:1251–1252.) Although not technically a navy victory, this capture was the highlight of the Americans' first efforts

at sea and gave an important impetus to the establishment of the Continental Navy. More importantly, the loss shocked the British government and brought a major change in policy requiring the Admiralty to provide escorts for all Ordnance Department shipments, and for all ordnance vessels hereafter to be armed and capable of self-defense.

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NANTASKET POINT, MASSACHUSETTS SEE *Great Brewster Island, Massachusetts.*

NANTASKET ROAD, MASSACHUSETTS. 17 and 19 May 1776. When the British evacuated Boston, they left behind a small naval force in Nantasket Road (the point where vessels entering Boston Harbor from the open sea would assemble to await favorable tides) to protect transports and merchantmen known to be coming from Europe from interception by Washington's squadron or privateers. On 17 May, Captain James Mugford, in the sixty-ton schooner *Franklin* (sixty), captured the three-hundred-ton ordnance ship *Hope*, which was bringing a cargo that included one thousand carbines and fifteen hundred barrels of gunpowder from Ireland in sight of British warships. Two days later, while cruising in company with the tiny privateer *Lady Washington* (seven men), Mugford ran aground near

Point Shirley. Eager for revenge, the British sent about two hundred men in a dozen or so small boats to attack her after darkness fell. After a half-hour fight in which the only American casualty was Mugford, who was killed, the battered British withdrew. Americans estimated that the enemy suffered forty or fifty killed or wounded. The British would lose several troop transports before the Americans constructed a heavy battery that chased the Royal Navy off.

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NASH, ABNER. (1740–1786). War governor of North Carolina. North Carolina and Virginia. Born in Amelia County, Virginia, around 1740, Abner Nash became an attorney and served in the Virginia legislature from 1761 to 1762. He then moved to Halifax, North Carolina, with his brother Francis Nash in 1762. Elected to the North Carolina Assembly in 1764, 1765, and from 1770 to 1771, Nash married the widow of Governor Arthur Dobbs. He sued the estate of the governor for his wife's property in a case that eventually set the assembly against the royal governor and accelerated the controversy with the Crown. Following the death of his wife in 1771, Nash moved to New Bern, serving in Tryon's forces as a major of militia at the battle at Alamance on 16 May 1771. The following year he became a leader of the Patriot cause, helping to drive Governor Martin out of North Carolina. He served in the Provincial Congress and on the provincial council from 1774 to 1776.

After helping to write North Carolina's constitution, Nash was elected the first speaker of the House of Commons in 1777, moving up to the state senate in 1779, where he was again elected speaker. In the spring of 1780, as his state became a theater of active military operations, Nash was elected governor. While he was energetic, he chafed under the constitutional weaknesses of his office and then objected to what he considered to be unconstitutional acts by the Assembly in appointing Richard Caswell as commander of the militia, in establishing a board of war and, subsequently, in creating a council extraordinary with powers that undermined his own. The Loyalist uprising of 1781 led to the temporary dissolution of the state's government, as well as to the burning of Nash's home during Major James Craig's raid on New Bern in August 1781. Declining a second term, Nash returned to the House of Commons in 1782, 1784, and 1785. He declined election to Congress in 1778, but accepted in 1782, 1783, and 1785. However, he did not attend a single session in these last two years. Elected again in 1786, Nash decided to attend Congress, but died in New York City on 2 December 1786.

SEE ALSO *Alamance, Battle of the; Nash, Francis.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

NASH, FRANCIS. (1742–1777). Continental general. Virginia and North Carolina. Born in Amelia County, Virginia, 1742, Nash moved to Halifax, North Carolina, with his brother Abner Nash in 1762, where he became a merchant and attorney. In 1763 he became clerk of the court of pleas and quarter sessions. He was representative from Orange County to the House of Commons in 1764, 1765, and 1771, and for Hillsboro from 1773 to 1775. He became a target of the Regulators, ad hoc groups in North and South Carolina who resisted what they saw as the biased legal system of the coastal elite. The Regulators charged Nash with taking excessive fees for his services.

Nash served in William Tryon's forces as a captain of militia at the battle at Alamance on 16 May 1771. As the Revolution approached, he identified himself with the Patriots. He was elected to the second and third provisional congresses of North Carolina in April and August 1775, and on 1 September was named lieutenant colonel of the First North Carolina Continentals. He was promoted to colonel on 10 April 1776, became brigadier general on 5 February 1777, was ordered to raise troops in western North Carolina, and joined General George Washington for the Philadelphia campaign. He commanded a brigade in Nathanael Greene's division at the battle of the Brandywine on 11 September, but did not reach Plowed Hill in time to see action. At Germantown on 4 October 1777, his thigh was broken by a cannon ball as he led his North Carolina brigade into action from the reserve. He died on 7 October, 1777.

SEE ALSO *Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of; Nash, Abner; Regulators.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

NASSAU, BAHAMAS. 3–4 March 1776. In the first major operation of the Continental Navy, Commodore Esek Hopkins sailed from Delaware Bay on 18 February 1776. Acting on intelligence that the British had a large amount of materiel stored on the island of New Providence in the Bahamas, but no troops to protect them,

Congress sent the squadron to seize them. The Americans assembled at nearby Abacco, transferring all their marines to the sloop *Providence* and two captured local fishing sloops. Early in the afternoon of 3 March, Captain Samuel Nicholas, senior marine officer, led 250 men ashore and quickly captured Fort Montagu after token resistance. During the night Governor Montfort Browne removed most of the gunpowder stored in Fort Nassau, the other defensive work, and moved it to the Royal Navy's schooner *St. John* and a merchant sloop, and sent them off to St. Augustine. On 4 March the Americans moved on to secure Fort Nassau and the rest of the stores. Over the next two weeks the squadron loaded sixteen mortars, fifty-two cannon, and a large amount of ammunition. It sailed for home on 16 March with Governor Browne and two other prisoners.

SEE ALSO *Bahamas*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

NASSAU RAID OF RATHBUN. 27–30 January 1778. Marines and seamen from Captain John Peck Rathbun's twelve-gun sloop *Providence* rowed ashore and landed on New Providence Island in the Bahamas at midnight on 27 January. Under the command of Marine Captain John Trevett, they marched overland and seized Fort Nassau in the dark. Reinforced by liberated prisoners of war, Trevett proceeded to capture five anchored vessels before the sloop could overcome adverse winds and enter the harbor. The Americans then dismantled Fort Montagu. Rathbun loaded sixteen hundred pounds of captured gunpowder, spiked the guns of the forts, and departed late on 30 January. This raid is considered to mark the first time that the Stars and Stripes flew over a foreign fortification.

SEE ALSO *Bahamas; Rathbun, John Peck*.

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NAVAL COMMITTEE. On Friday, 13 October 1775, the Continental Congress resolved, “after some debate,” that two ships, one a “swift sailing vessel, to carry ten carriage guns, and a proportionable number of swivels, with eighty men,” the other of fourteen carriage guns, “be fitted, with all possible dispatch . . . to cruize eastward, for intercepting such transports as may be laden with warlike stores and other supplies for our enemies, and for other purposes as the Congress shall direct” (Clark, pp. 441–442). It then appointed three of its members as a committee to procure the two vessels: Silas Deane of Connecticut, John Langdon of New Hampshire, and Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina. On 30 October, Congress resolved to procure two additional, larger vessels, one of twenty guns and another of thirty-six guns, “to be employed for the protection and defence of the United Colonies” (Clark p. 647). It added four new members to the committee: John Adams of Massachusetts (who had been a constant advocate of creating a Continental navy), Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island, Joseph Hewes of North Carolina, and Richard Henry Lee of Virginia. During the day the committee members attended sessions of Congress and, every evening at six o'clock, met in a rented room in the Tun Tavern on the Philadelphia waterfront “in order,” as Adams wrote, “to dispatch this business with all possible celerity” (Butterfield, p. 345). They accomplished an amazing amount of work in a matter of weeks—what Adams later called “the pleasantest part of my labours for the four years I spent in Congress” (Butterfield, p. 202). On 14 December, Congress established a standing Marine Committee, which took over, and expanded on, the functions of the Naval Committee.

SEE ALSO *Marine Committee; Naval Operations, Strategic Overview*.

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NAVAL OPERATIONS, BRITISH.

In the eighteenth century the Royal Navy was Britain's principal instrument of foreign policy. It was a powerful, complex, and ponderous institution. More than two centuries of war had dramatically increased its technological sophistication, on the one hand, and had burdened it with dogmatic tradition, on the other. The Royal Navy's warships made their sixteenth-century ancestors look like ornate toys. But the tactical and strategic thinking that governed those ships' behavior had stagnated for several generations.

The great event of naval history was the sea battle, and the professional bible of the British admiral was a document called the Fighting Instructions, which told him how to bring about such an event. The opposing fleets would form themselves into long, straight "lines of battle" and spend a grisly afternoon slamming cannonballs into each other, giving one side decisive victory and turning some admiral into a national hero. That, at least, was how the navy, the government, and the public perceived British naval history. The truth was considerably different.

In 1775 Britain had spent thirty-one of the preceding ninety years at war with France. During that period the fleet action on the classical model—two parallel lines of battle exchanging broadsides with decisive results—had never taken place. When rival fleets did encounter each other, things seldom went according to the Fighting Instructions. Either the French would withdraw to leeward, a land mass would intrude at an awkward point, or the British formation would fall apart. The blame usually would be attributed to either French cowardice or some British admiral's ineptitude. Few in the British naval establishment considered the possibility that their concepts of strategy and tactics might be flawed. Still fewer bothered to consider how an eighteenth-century navy could suppress a revolution.

The administration of the Royal Navy was presided over by the lords of the Admiralty, headed by John, fourth earl of Sandwich. When word reached the Admiralty office (in late May 1775, five weeks after the fact) that the Revolutionary War had started, they had to confront an unusual problem: how best to employ the world's largest navy against an enemy that had no navy at all. The two obvious answers were, first, for the navy to collaborate with the army in amphibious operations, and second, to set up a naval blockade of the rebellious colonies. The Admiralty instructed its senior officer in North America, Vice Admiral Samuel Graves, to carry out those two tasks.

Both sorts of operation turned out to be more complex than expected. Graves never had enough ships at his disposal to hinder colonial trade significantly. He did launch one amphibious raid, on the village of Falmouth in northern Massachusetts (later Maine), on 18 October 1775, but the incident turned into a public relations disaster without accomplishing anything of military consequence.

THE HOWES

In 1776 Vice Admiral Richard Lord Howe and his brother, General William Howe, took over the British command in North America. With the largest combined military and naval force Britain had ever sent overseas at their disposal, they were expected to end the Revolution by means of brute force. General Howe was to capture New York City, and Admiral Howe was to clamp a blockade on all the ports of the colonies and destroy the rebels' economic capacity.

Historians have been unable to figure out why the Howe brothers failed. One scholar, Ira Gruber, has suggested that the Howes' fascination with diplomacy led to their downfall. They had insisted on being named commissioners of the peace, with authority to negotiate a treaty on almost any terms (except American independence). According to Gruber, the Howes were so determined to resolve the conflict peaceably that they sacrificed several military opportunities to win it. The admiral, for instance, ordered his warships to seize only those merchant ships that could be identified with certainty as carrying cargoes to support the rebel military effort. Peaceable merchantmen that were carrying merchandise to loyal businessmen were not to be molested, and the colonial fishing fleet was allowed to carry on business as usual.

The scarcity of Howe papers makes it impossible to prove or disprove Gruber's theory, but in any case the British blockade never achieved the government's objectives. Howe constantly begged his superiors to send him more ships. Like every other naval officer in every war, he never got as many ships as he thought he needed. Even if it had been carried out with the vigor Sandwich wanted, though, the blockade probably would have been too porous to undermine the rebel war effort.

In the campaign of 1777, the Royal Navy got another key assignment: transporting a large segment of the army from New York to some point within striking range of the colonies' largest city, Philadelphia. The initial plan was to approach it via Delaware Bay, but the rebels had established an elaborate series of defenses and obstructions in its mouth. The Howes therefore decided to take their fleet to Philadelphia by way of Chesapeake Bay.

The voyage up the Chesapeake was skillfully executed but, even by eighteenth-century standards, depressingly slow. By the time the army landed at the northern end of the bay it was late August. General Howe made relatively quick work of taking Philadelphia, but in the meantime, some two hundred miles to the north, the British army that General John Burgoyne's army had brought down from Canada was expiring. On 17 October 1777 Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga.

FRANCE ENTERS THE WAR

When France declared war on Britain on 13 March 1778, the fundamental nature of the conflict changed. For its first three years it had been a relatively small-scale fight between a rebellious element of a colonial society and an imperial government. Henceforth it would have to be perceived as the latest in the series of dynastic struggles that had dominated Europe for generations. North America had become one theater in a world war.

It would be, to a large extent, a naval war, and the various offices along Whitehall initially tried to fight it by adopting the same strategy that had won the last one. Tradition and experience suggested that the naval effort should be centered on Europe, with naval squadrons blockading the French fleets in their Atlantic and Mediterranean bases. Smaller British forces could be sent off to conduct limited offensives against the French possessions in the East and West Indies and to foil any enemy thrust that might develop.

Four days after the French declaration of war, the Admiralty sent Lord Howe a secret dispatch: "We judge it necessary . . . to acquaint your Lordship that the object of the War being now changed, and the Contest in America being a secondary consideration, the principal object must be the distressing [of] France and defending His Majesty's own possessions against Hostile Attempts." The British war effort in North America was to become strictly defensive. The bulk of the Royal Navy would return to the role in which it was most comfortable: fighting the French (and, eventually, the Spanish as well) in European waters.

EARLY BRITISH-FRENCH SKIRMISHING

On 23 July 1778 a British fleet encountered a French fleet off the island of Ushant, near the mouth of the English Channel. The ensuing battle, like most such affairs, was indecisive; its chief consequence was a feud between two British admirals, Augustus Keppel and Sir Hugh Palliser.

Another British force, commanded by Admiral Sir Charles Hardy, spent the following summer glowering sullenly at a combined French and Spanish squadron under the comte d'Orvilliers. Hardy, suffering from advanced age, ill health, and a remarkable lack of energy, made little effort to bring his enemy to action, and d'Orvilliers eventually decided to return to port. No Franco-Spanish invasion ever materialized.

In the western hemisphere both the British and the French had to operate in two distinct but interrelated theaters: North America and the West Indies. For the rest of the war the navies played an intricate game of chess on two overlapping boards, with the lucrative sugar islands as the stakes. It was a strange, complicated war, with armies fighting repeatedly over the same real estate and navies transporting the armies, escorting and pursuing

convoys, and occasionally fighting battles that ended before either admiral could claim victory. All participants had to pay heed to one inescapable fact of nature: between August and November of each year the war must take an intermission. No sane naval officer tried to navigate in the Caribbean during the hurricane season.

The first move was made by a French admiral, the comte d'Estaing. In July 1778 d'Estaing brought twelve ships-of-the-line to New York. Lord Howe, though outnumbered and outgunned, defended the harbor so skillfully that d'Estaing retreated. He then proceeded to Narragansett Bay and made a half-hearted attempt to seize control of Rhode Island. Howe followed him, and the two fleets were on the verge of fighting a battle in Long Island Sound when a storm came up and separated them. D'Estaing then withdrew to Boston.

The Admiralty had dispatched a squadron under Vice Admiral John Byron in pursuit of d'Estaing. After one of the most difficult crossings on record, Byron arrived at New York in September 1778. Lord Howe, disgusted and enervated by the turn the war in North America had taken, resigned his command and sailed for England. A few weeks later D'Estaing, having repaired the storm damage his ships had suffered, decided, in accordance with his orders, to take his fleet to the West Indies. Byron followed.

SHIFT TO THE SOUTH

The command of the Royal Navy's forces in North America thereupon fell onto the shoulders of the unimpressive Vice Admiral James Gambier. He happened to be on hand when, during the winter of 1778–1779, the British military effort began to shift in the direction it would take for the remainder of the war. The government was concerned about the safety of the southern colonies. If, as expected, Spain were to enter the war, its bases in the Caribbean and at New Orleans would be excellent staging areas for an attack on Georgia or the Carolinas.

On 29 December 1778 a naval squadron under Commodore Hyde Parker the Younger landed a force of Hessians, Loyalists, and Scottish Highlanders on the coast of Georgia. The army commander, Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell, promptly took the city of Savannah and made himself master of Georgia, thereby returning one of the thirteen colonies to British rule.

To command in the "secondary" theater of North America, the Admiralty next selected Vice Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, an officer of limited experience, ill health, and advanced age. His tenure in command was characterized by frequent accusations of ineptitude and his colossal feud with his army counterpart, General Sir Henry Clinton. Arbuthnot seems to have found Clinton an irritating and uncooperative colleague;

Clinton concluded that Arbuthnot was incompetent and either out of his mind or hopelessly senile.

The two did manage to collaborate effectively in one of the most important British victories of the war: the capture of Charleston, South Carolina. By this time the Royal Navy had worked out most of the problems involved in landing an army on a hostile shore. The siege of Charleston took more than four months, but the city's surrender, on 12 May 1780, gave the British a major base of operations in the southern colonies.

TERNAY AND DES TOUCHES

In the meantime another squadron of French ships-of-the-line, commanded by the chevalier de Ternay, was sailing for North America. When intelligence of that development reached London, the Admiralty placed six ships-of-the-line under the command of Rear Admiral Thomas Graves. As Byron had chased d'Estaing, Graves was to chase Ternay.

Ternay was hardly a dynamic officer, but his arrival in North America had far-reaching consequences. His seven French ships-of-the-line anchored in the harbor of Newport, Rhode Island—which the British had evacuated—on 10 July 1780, landed six thousand troops under the comte de Rochambeau.

Arbuthnot, with the newly arrived Graves as his second in command, spent eight months sailing back and forth in Long Island Sound, keeping Ternay's ships under blockade. Ternay himself died of an undiagnosed fever shortly before Christmas. His successor was Commodore Souchet des Touches, a younger man of considerable ability. On 8 March 1781 des Touches took his squadron to sea, carrying a detachment of Rochambeau's army. The French objective was Chesapeake Bay, where des Touches intended to land the troops and attack a British force under the newly recruited Brigadier General Benedict Arnold.

Arbuthnot caught up with des Touches off the mouth of the Chesapeake on 16 March 1781. The ensuing Battle of Cape Henry was typical of its species: a murky affair of dirty weather, misinterpreted signal flags, and missed opportunities. Des Touches was a skilled officer who did not want to fight—the most difficult sort of adversary to defeat. At the end of the day Arbuthnot was in possession of the battlefield, but the French fleet sailed back toward Rhode Island with minimal damage.

THE WEST INDIES

The powerful British battle fleet stationed in the West Indies was known as the Leeward Islands Squadron. From 1779 onward it was commanded by Britain's foremost naval hero of the day, Admiral Sir George Rodney. On 3 February 1781, having been informed that the States

General of Holland had entered the war on the American side, Rodney seized the Dutch island of St. Eustatius. The capture of that tiny but wealthy island set into motion a series of naval events that led directly to American independence.

The two officers in charge of British naval affairs at the most crucial juncture of the naval war were thrust into the historical limelight by accident. On 4 July 1781 Admiral Arbuthnot sailed for England, turning the North American Squadron over to Thomas Graves. On 1 August, Rodney, having spent the past six months snapping up and condemning merchant ships that had sailed into his arms at St. Eustatius, also departed for home—largely because, with the St. Eustatius prize money due to land in his bank account, his financial affairs demanded his attention. Rodney took three ships-of-the-line with him and sent another to Jamaica for repairs. He left the remainder of the Leeward Islands Squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Sir Samuel Hood.

The French naval force in the Caribbean consisted of twenty-four ships-of-the-line commanded by the comte de Grasse. Rodney's departure coincided with the beginning of the hurricane season. Calculating that de Grasse might take some of his ships to North America, Rodney ordered Hood to look for them.

CHESAPEAKE BAY

Hood, not a man to loiter while his enemy was on the move, made his way up the American coast as rapidly as he could. He paused briefly at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay, where seven thousand troops under Charles Lord Cornwallis were establishing a post at the mouth of the York River. Seeing no sign of de Grasse, Hood continued on to New York. Arriving there on 28 August, he introduced himself to Graves and told him that a French fleet was operating somewhere off the coast.

Hood was junior to Graves, so when the two combined their forces, the latter was in command. Their nineteen ships-of-the-line sailed from New York on 31 August and headed south, intending to find de Grasse and fight a battle with him. The British arrived off the Chesapeake Capes on 5 September 1781 to find that de Grasse's entire fleet was anchored just inside the bay.

The Battle of the Chesapeake was one of the most important naval actions in history. Tactically, it was remarkable only in that the British tactical system worked even less efficiently than usual. The opposing fleets arranged themselves into more-or-less parallel lines of battle, intent on deciding the outcome with their great guns. The ships in the British van grappled with their French opposite numbers in accordance with the Fighting Instructions, but the rear division, under Hood's command, failed to become engaged. Afterward,

Graves claimed Hood had ignored a signal ordering his division into action; Hood claimed Graves had flown an incomprehensible combination of signal flags.

The outcome of the battle was tactically indecisive but strategically crucial. Several ships on both sides were damaged; one British ship had to be scuttled. The fleets remained in sight of each other for four days, drifting gradually away from the Chesapeake as their crews worked to repair the damage.

On the morning of 10 September the French vanished. Graves sent frigates to look for them and discovered that de Grasse had anchored his fleet in a powerful position blocking entrance to the bay. Having fought a traditional battle to a draw and seeing no likelihood of winning another one, Graves took his fleet back to New York.

While Graves, Hood, and de Grasse were fighting the Battle of the Chesapeake, the Franco-American army under George Washington and the comte de Rochambeau was marching headlong to the southward. Its target was Cornwallis's little army, which had dug in around the village of Yorktown.

Graves and General Clinton worked up an elaborate plan to break the siege of Yorktown. On 19 October 1781 the biggest British naval force ever seen in North American waters sailed from New York. Embarked on board the warships were more than seven thousand troops. Clinton and Graves intended to force their way through de Grasse's fleet, land the troops at Yorktown, and relieve Cornwallis. It was a desperate scheme but, if nothing else, the War of American Independence would end with an epic sea and land action.

The great battle, however, never took place. On the same day the fleet sailed from New York, Cornwallis surrendered.

BATTLE OF THE SAINTES

On the morning of 12 April 1782, near a West Indies archipelago called the Saintes, Rodney caught up with de Grasse. The two commanders arranged their fleets in the standard lines of battle. A stroke of luck, however, kept the Battle of the Saintes from becoming one more in the list of indecisive eighteenth-century sea fights. A gap appeared in the French line, and several of Rodney's ships went through it to assault a section of the French formation from both sides simultaneously. By sunset, five French ships-of-the-line had surrendered.

FAILED STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

Rodney's victory gave British diplomats a powerful card to play during the peace negotiations, ensuring that Britain would keep its possessions in the West Indies. The Saintes also obscured, temporarily, the fact that the Royal Navy had lost one of the great naval wars of the eighteenth

century. Some of the reasons had to do with ineptitude and bad luck. Others were rooted deep in the British military and naval establishment.

Neither the earl of Sandwich, Lord George Germain, nor anyone else in the British government ever produced a coherent scheme for fighting the naval war. In its early stages the Revolution presented problems that the most original naval thinking probably would have been unable to solve. But from 1778 onward, the Royal Navy was fighting the war it had been built to fight, and it found that conflict just as difficult to win.

The administration's decision to treat the American theater as secondary seemed a shrewd and dynamic move. The government failed to realize, however, that such decisions could not be taken unilaterally. The French made North America a center of their military effort because that was the only theater where their alliance with the United States could benefit them. The British let the French take the naval initiative in North America and failed, until the fact had been brought to their attention in the most brutal manner imaginable, to realize that giving up that initiative might mean losing the colonies.

The Admiralty relied on what may be called the "detachment theory," assuming that if the two belligerents had about the same number of ships-of-the-line in the same hemisphere, things would eventually work out in Britain's favor. Such thinking ignored the realities of naval warfare. Fleets moved fast and communications were slow. After the enemy had been handed the opportunity to take the offensive, the only effective way to frustrate him was to defend every place at which he might strike, and that was impossible. To chase him in the hope of catching him before he struck anywhere was to invite disaster. The Battle of the Chesapeake was the product of personality clashes, coincidences, and remarkable international cooperation between the Americans and the French. But it would not have taken a great strategic brain to figure out that something of the sort was bound to happen eventually.

Eight years of fighting failed to persuade the government to establish a clearly defined, understandable chain of command. Sir George Rodney's assertion that one general and one admiral should command in America and the West Indies fell on deaf ears. Furthermore, no one seems to have suggested that either the admiral or the general in North America be directed to take orders from the other. Asking two individuals whose professional reputations were in constant jeopardy to collaborate harmoniously under outdated orders that came from three thousand miles away was asking the near impossible.

The British land and naval commanders suffered from a misconception of how this particular war worked. William Howe and Henry Clinton tried to win it by occupying geographic objectives, thereby avoiding the

decisive battlefield encounter with Washington's army that probably offered the best chance of British victory. In Europe that strategy might have made sense, but neither the generals, the admirals, nor their superiors in London realized a basic truth about the War of American Independence: there was no geographic objective that the rebels could not afford to lose. During the course of the war the British army, with the Royal Navy's assistance, took, and held for some prolonged period, every major city in the colonies. Yet the war continued—and the longer it continued, the harder it was for the British to win.

While the generals were looking for ways to occupy real estate without fighting battles, the admirals were searching for the opportunity to fight sea battles. A century after the Revolution, Alfred Thayer Mahan, the most influential of naval philosophers, articulated the theory that the sea battle was the centerpiece of naval warfare. The British admirals of the eighteenth century, though they never voiced such a doctrine as coherently as Mahan did, probably had some notion that destroying the French fleet would let them get on with the business of suppressing the Revolution. But in the war's early stages the Royal Navy's command of the sea had been uncontested, and Britain had found the commodity almost useless. Little if any evidence suggests that a British victory in a naval battle with the French would have prevented, or even significantly delayed, American independence.

In any case, British doctrine almost guaranteed that no such victory would take place. The Royal Navy, like most of its European counterparts, operated on the basis of tactical theories based on the uniquely simple strategic realities of the Anglo-Dutch Wars. The War of American Independence established that those theories would not work in any other context. The concept of the line of battle was predicated on the assumption that the opposing admirals would have identical strategic objectives and would try to fight a battle as a means of achieving them. In the wars between Britain and France that situation rarely, if ever, existed. The basic naval tactic of European navies, the line of battle, was successful in making defeat unlikely. Richard Howe, Marriot Arbuthnot, and Thomas Graves merely committed the standard sin of their generation in failing to realize that the line of battle also made victory almost impossible.

Asking a navy to suppress a revolution was like asking a whale to catch a bird: the excess of force was ludicrous but the inevitable outcome was frustration. The War of American Independence subjected the Royal Navy's human and material resources to demands that they simply could not meet. The navy was asked to meet French and Spanish invasion threats, defend Gibraltar and India, maintain supply lines between England and the West Indies, protect British commerce from privateers and cruisers—and simultaneously help the army fight a war

in North America. Until the last moment the war hung in the balance, for the rebel military effort had problems of its own. Whether the British could have won the war is debatable. But it is reasonable to suspect that a final British victory would have occurred not because of the Royal Navy but in spite of it.

SEE ALSO *Arbuthnot, Marriot; Byron, John; Chesapeake Capes; Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'; Falmouth, Massachusetts; Gambier, Baron James; Grasse, François Joseph Paul, Comte de; Graves, Samuel; Hood, Samuel; Howe, Richard; Parker, Sir Hyde, Jr.; Rodney, George Bridges; Sandwich, John Montagu, fourth earl of; Ternay, Charles Louis d'Arzac, chevalier de; Yorktown Campaign.*

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John A. Tilley

NAVAL OPERATIONS, FRENCH.

One of the prime factors in the defeat of Great Britain, and thus of the establishment of the United States of America as an independent nation, was the remarkable military role played by the French navy during the conflict. Traditionally the underdog since the 1690s when pitted against Britain's Royal Navy, France's navy defied the British against the odds and was often successful between 1778 and 1783.

REVITALIZING THE FLEET

This transformation of the French navy from a relatively moribund force in 1760 to a vigorous and aggressive entity by 1778 was not achieved overnight. It was a process that had started in the final years of the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), during which the French fleet had been rendered incapable of seriously challenging the British enemy. The loss of substantial naval power, leading to the loss of overseas territories and trade as well as a metropolitan coastline open to naval raids, provoked a strong reaction in France for the navy's rehabilitation. The whole country rallied to the idea, and even before the Seven Years' War had ended, money was being raised by public subscriptions to build ships-of-the-line, mostly of seventy-four guns. This is how such ships as the seventy-four-gun *Le Marseillais*, the seventy-four-gun *Bourgogne*, and the ninety-gun *Ville de Paris* were financed; they were named after the donating cities or provinces. The new vessels, especially the seventy-four-gun ships, were remarkably fast and sturdy, with well-designed gun decks allowing a maximum of firepower. The gunners were relentlessly trained and became very proficient.

During this era, the duc de Choiseul came to power as prime minister, holding the portfolios of the ministries of war, foreign affairs, and the navy. The energetic Choiseul was given wide authority in these desperate times, and he used them fully. Naval budgets rose sharply, while incompetent officers were retired in favor of younger men with fresh ideas. The education of officer-cadets and officers was considerably expanded, and examinations for proficiency were introduced. The organization of officers was transformed by a series of orders in 1765 that checked the powers of the administrative officers "of the quill pen" in favor of the fighting officers "of the sword," who now had the last word when it came to resources and supplies for combat vessels. Engineers had also become something of a power in the officers' structure, and they were now told to design the best ships possible for the fighting fleet officers. Transformations came to naval bases as well. Brest now became the primary base with thirty ships-of-the-line, while the main bases of Toulon and Rochefort got twelve each. Lorient was added in 1770. Secondary bases at Bayonne, Marseille, and Bordeaux were activated. In

1768, a base in Corsica was added to counter the British at Minorca. Overseas, naval bases at Martinique, Haiti, and Mauritius formed part of the French navy's network.

Choiseul lost power in 1770, and for a few years the navy was in something of a limbo, but this situation was temporary. The appointment of Antoine de Sartine as minister in 1774 brought a new round of reforms and fostered the fleet's capacity and fighting spirit. Now technically equal to or better than anything afloat, its main and largely unsolvable problem was a shortage of sailors to man what was becoming a truly large fleet. The impact of this shortage included a reduction in the number of training cruises the squadrons could undertake.

THE WAR STARTS

The outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775 quickly raised tensions between France and Britain, with many Frenchmen itching to avenge the humiliations of the Seven Years' War. The fleet was obviously going to be at the forefront of an eventual conflict, and preparations were accordingly made. The naval budget shot up from 47 million French pounds in 1776 to 125 million two years later. This time, France was putting in substantial money to match its ambitions. The American victory at Saratoga in October 1777 had a great impact in France, and it was now a question of when the break with Britain would come, particularly after the Treaty of Alliance between France and the United States was made in February 1778.

As it turned out, the break came off the coast of Brittany in a naval engagement on 17 June 1778 between the French frigate *La Belle-Poule* and the British frigate *Arethusa*, detached from Admiral Keppel's squadron and sent to keep an eye on Brest. After a ferocious fight, both damaged ships went back to their bases and claimed victory, but the real victory went to the French. The *Belle-Poule* had not been struck, and it became a symbolic embodiment of the fleet's new fighting spirit. Thousands lined the walls of Brest, cheering her wildly as she proudly entered the harbor. Before long, all of France was cheering her. After this first action of the new war against Britain, King Louis XVI on 10 July ordered his fleet to give chase to the British. It was a declaration of war.

In July 1778 the French navy had fifty-two ships-of-the-line in commission against the British Royal Navy's sixty-six. At the time, some thirty French ships were deployed on France's Atlantic coast, five in the Mediterranean, twelve en route to America, and two in the Indian Ocean. The British had thirty-one ships in Britain, nineteen in America (including five in the West Indies), two in the Indian Ocean, one off St. Helena, and only one in the Mediterranean. France also had some thirty frigates. The French navy then had about 75,000 sailors led by some 1,300 officers while the Royal Navy

had about 85,000 officers and men. Two years later, the French navy stood at seventy-nine ships-of-the-line, eighty-six frigates, and one hundred and seventy-four lesser vessels. A tremendous effort had raised the budget to 155 million, but the Royal Navy had grown as well, to ninety five ships-of-the-line. The French were therefore numerically weaker, but the British had to detach many ships overseas, including along the North American coast. It was not quite an even match, but if France deployed its squadrons wisely, it stood a chance of some success.

Leadership was the unknown factor in the French navy. Would the new admirals be able to hold their own against Britain's renowned flag officers? Certainly, ministers such as Choiseul and de Sartine spared no effort to find talent and intelligence, wherever it was. Too often in the past, the French flag officers had been seen as too cautious and conservative, so that tactical initiative sometimes escaped their grasp. A new generation of "fighting" officers was required to counter the more conservative elements in the fleet. One way to do this was to seek brilliant officers in the army and entice them into the navy. Louis-Antoine de Bougainville and the count d'Estaing had been brought in this way by Choiseul. There were also talented officers commissioned within the navy who despaired of the ambient conservatism in tactical theory and whose innovative spirit had to be channeled. An example was Pierre André de Suffren. His aggressive stance previously had largely benefited the Order of Malta's navy; now, however, he was given a decent command in his own French navy. Also, not all of the older able officers were excluded from senior commands. The comte d'Orvilliers was sixty-eight years old in 1778; the comte de Guichen was sixty-six. They were shrewd masters of maneuvers, and their experience was valued.

EARLY FRENCH SUCCESSES

D'Orvilliers led the Brest fleet of twenty-seven ships that met, on 27 July 1778, Admiral Keppel's thirty Royal Navy ships off the Île de Ouessant (Ushant) off Brittany. The action was inconclusive, and both sides claimed victory, but the French had more grounds to be pleased. The British squadron had certainly not vanquished the French; rather, it had met an opponent that had badly damaged many of its ships thanks to remarkably good shooting. D'Orvilliers had not destroyed the British but had kept his position. This was very bad news for the British, whose control of the French coast now vanished and who now had to protect the English Channel at all cost.

Meanwhile, Admiral Estaing had sailed with twelve ships-of-the-line for North America. His squadron's arrival in August 1778 at Newport, Rhode Island, brought a palpable sign to the Americans that they now had a

powerful ally. After some inconclusive engagements with elements of Admiral William Howe's fleet, Estaing sailed for the West Indies. There, the aggressive governor general of Martinique, the marquis de Bouillé, had already captured Dominica from the British. During the following years, this daring and brilliant officer, who would later be all but forgotten, masterminded the conquest of most of the British Leeward and Windward Islands, often personally taking part in the assaults. De Bouillé was an ideal officer for working with a fleet commander, as he understood combined operations perfectly. It seems, however, that Estaing was less proficient in this area, and in November things were rather bungled at St. Lucia, to Bouillé's considerable disappointment.

The naval campaigns of 1779 got off to a brilliant start for the French in the West Indies, with Bouillé's and Estaing's assault on Grenada on July 3 and the repulse of Admiral Byron's relieving British squadron three days later. The island of St. Vincent had already fallen in late June. Estaing then sailed for Haiti, picked up troops there, and landed them for a joint operation with the Americans against Savannah, Georgia, in October. The siege failed, however, and Estaing, who was badly wounded in the attempt, finally sailed for Europe. Elsewhere, a small squadron under the comte de Vaudreuil had captured the British forts on the coast of Senegal.

THE SPANISH AGENDA

Meanwhile, Spain had declared war on Britain on 16 June 1779. This brought the world's third largest navy into the conflict, which gave the allies on paper a comfortable superiority of some ninety ships-of-the-line over the Royal Navy. However, the Spanish navy's strategic objectives were historically quite different than those of the French or the British. Spain's fleet was far more concerned with protection, notably for the safety of the treasure convoys from America, than with fast movements and elaborate maneuvers. Spanish ships were therefore built as floating fortresses and were thus slower than other vessels of their class. As a result, Spanish navy officers tended to be cautious and did not have a truly aggressive stance or doctrine. The courts of France and Spain had hatched a plan for a combined Hispano-French fleet of sixty-six ships-of-the-line to take control of the English Channel and land a French army in England. Overall command was given to Spanish Admiral de Cordoba with French Admiral d'Orvilliers as second-in-command. The British Isles certainly feared an invasion that summer, but nothing went according to plan for the allies. Besides operational difficulties, bad weather set in. And the reinforced Royal Navy home fleet was not about to be swept away from the Channel. The invasion plan was finally abandoned and the joint fleet went back into Brest in late September.

BATTLES OF 1780–1783

In February 1780 Admiral Guichen sailed for the West Indies; in April and May, his twenty-two ships fought inconclusive engagements with Admiral Rodney's twenty-one ships. On 12 July, Admiral de Ternay with seven ships arrived at Newport and landed General Rochambeau with a French army of five thousand men to assist the Americans. The French squadron stayed on the New England coast to counter British naval movements. In Europe, de Cordoba and d'Orvilliers captured a British convoy of some sixty supply ships intended for America on 9 August. In October the portfolio of minister of the navy passed from de Sartines to the marquis de Castries. He also proved to be a most able administrator.

In March 1781 a small squadron of five ships under Admiral Suffren sailed for the Indian Ocean. On 16 April he attacked and damaged a Royal Navy squadron of six ships moored at La Praya in the Cape Verde Island, thus preventing an attack on the Dutch Cape Colony. (The Netherlands had declared war on Britain the previous year.) There were great plans for joint operations with the Spanish in the Mediterranean for 1781. Minorca and Gibraltar, the latter under siege since 1779, were still British. De Guichen's twenty-four ships joined de Cordoba's twenty-two ships and landed Spanish and

French troops on Minorca in August. The island finally capitulated in early February 1782, eliminating the British presence in the western Mediterranean. Only Gibraltar would remain British as the Spanish repeatedly failed to thwart the Royal Navy's supply convoys. America was not neglected, and the comte de Grasse now assumed command of the West Indies fleet. On 2 June he landed troops that captured Tobago. In July he sailed from Martinique and, after a stop in Haiti to embark three thousand troops, arrived in Chesapeake Bay in late August. There, the French squadron that had sailed down from New England reinforced his fleet. On 5 September, Admiral Graves arrived in the area with nineteen ships and was quite surprised to find a large French squadron of twenty-four ships there. In the ensuing Battle of the Virginia Capes, de Grasse drove Graves off, and the fate of the British army in Yorktown, besieged by Washington and Rochambeau's troops, was sealed. The place surrendered on 19 October.

The year 1782 started with a French assault on St. Kitts, which capitulated on 13 February, leading to the surrender of Nevis and Montserrat. In Versailles and Madrid, a joint attack on Jamaica was planned. The Spanish fleet at Havana would join de Grasse's squadron at Haiti and there embark some seven thousand French and Spanish troops to invade the British island. The

British naval forces simply had to prevent the junction and, on 12 April, Admiral Rodney's ships intercepted de Grasse's fleet off the Saints archipelago in the Windward Islands. In the ensuing battle, four French ships and Admiral de Grasse were captured and the expedition to Jamaica cancelled as a result. Rodney's victory, hailed as a triumph by countless British historians, was not a major setback to the French. Since de Grasse was not a popular commander, some did not regret his loss, and most of his fleet actually made its junction with Admiral Salcedo's fifteen Spanish ships-of-the-line. By the end of the year, more French ships had arrived in the West Indies to replace the losses.

During the last year of the war, the most notable actions occurred in the Indian Ocean. There, Suffren fought a series of engagements that revealed his great innovative talent in naval tactics. Had his battle orders been fully obeyed by his conservative captains, it is likely that the British would have been beaten. By June 1783, he nevertheless had pushed back Admiral Hughes's squadron and landed a French army in southern India to assist Indian princes against the British. The arrival of a frigate from Europe bearing news of the peace treaty stopped the hostilities and probably saved the British from defeat.

As it was, Suffren came back to France in triumph, rightly acknowledged as the country's best admiral. The war had been won, American independence had been secured, and France's navy had regained the nation's place as a redoubtable world power.

SEE ALSO *Bougainville, Louis Antoine de; Chesapeake Capes; Choiseul, Etienne François, Comte de Stainville; Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'; French Alliance; Grasse, François Joseph Paul, Comte de; Rochambeau, (fils) Donatien Marie Joseph de Vimeur; Rochambeau, Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de; Rodney, George Bridges; Spanish Participation in the American Revolution; St. Kitts, Captured by the French; Suffren de Saint Tropez, Pierre André de; Ternay, Charles Louis d'Arzac, chevalier de; Yorktown Campaign; Yorktown, Siege of.*

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René Chartrand

NAVAL OPERATIONS, STRATEGIC OVERVIEW.

In theory, Britain's Royal Navy should have been the key to crushing the American Revolution. It was the most powerful navy in the history of the world; the American colonies were so disposed along the coast and so divided by estuaries and navigable rivers as to make all regions accessible to sea power; and the rebelling colonies lacked the resources necessary for constructing a navy capable of contending with that of the mother country. Yet the Royal Navy did not win the war, and even before 1778, when France sent ships to support the colonies, the British failed to exploit an advantage that should have been decisive. As a result, the naval battles of the Revolution were secondary in strategic importance to the land operations, which British strategists expected to produce a quick victory early in the war. Meanwhile, privateering was exploited by the colonists, to their great advantage.

In 1775 Britain's Royal Navy had 131 ships of the line and 139 craft of other classes. By 1783 this total of 270 had been swelled to 468, of which about 100—mainly frigates and lighter vessels—were committed in America. In quality, however, the British navy was in an incredibly bad state. Many of the ships had been reduced by neglect to virtual wrecks, many of its officers and men were substandard, and debts incurred while fighting the French and Indian War had led to cuts in government spending, which left the Royal Navy without a supply of seasoned timber for ship construction.

Those ships which the navy could send to North American waters in 1775 and 1776 were employed mostly in rendering assistance to Royal governors and supporting army operations, rather than in blockading the American coast. During the summer of 1776, Royal Navy vessels were involved in evacuating army troops from Boston and supporting expeditions against Quebec, New York City, and the Carolinas. The next year they supported the campaign against Philadelphia. This left colonial ports open to receive assistance from other European nations (particularly France) and to export commodities to pay for munitions and interest on loans. That the Royal navy could have blockaded the American coast to economically strangle the rebellion is demonstrated the success of its blockade of the coast between Cape Cod and Delaware Bay during the winter of 1776–1777, a time when it was not needed to support the army.

“WASHINGTON’S NAVY”

An action off Machias, in Maine, in May 1775, has been called the first naval engagement of the war, although this is stretching the point somewhat. A few months later, during the Boston Siege, General George Washington organized a flotilla of six schooners and a brigantine to prey on enemy supply ships. He had the double purpose of depriving the enemy of cargoes and of getting critically needed supplies for his own forces.

On 2 September 1775 he commissioned the *Hannah*, which has been called America’s first war vessel. (The *Machias Liberty*, rechristened after the action of May 1775, could probably be called the first war vessel in the service of an American state.) Washington’s little navy took thirty-five prizes, with cargoes valued at over \$600,000, before it was absorbed into the Continental navy. Captain John Manley made the most important capture when he took the *Nancy*, on about 27 August 1775.

THE CONTINENTAL NAVY

“What think you of an American Fleet?” asked John Adams in a letter of 19 Oct. 1775 to James Warren. “I don’t mean 100 ships of the Line,” he went on to say, but suggested instead that the colonists should be able to create a small force that could do something. The idea was popular with the New England delegates and opposed by others, but by the end of the month Congress had authorized four armed vessels and, on 30 October, it appointed John Adams and six others to constitute a Naval Committee. On 10 November the Marines were born, and on 23 November Congress considered John Adams’s draft of “rules for the government of the American navy,” based on those of the British. On 25 November Congress passed the resolutions that established the American navy.

Naval affairs were controlled thereafter by various bodies designated by Congress. Until December 1779 a Marine Committee of thirteen members, one from each colony, was responsible. The Board of Admiralty was then established, to comprise three private citizens and two members of Congress. After 1781 the administration was handled by Robert Morris, Director of Finance, as an addition to his normal duties. Subordinate boards in Boston and Philadelphia were also established.

Esek Hopkins was appointed commander in chief of this fleet of eight vessels purchased and assembled at Philadelphia by the end of the year. The largest were the merchant vessels *Alfred* and *Columbus*, which had been converted into frigates of 24 and 20 guns. Others were the brigs *Andrea Doria* and *Cabot* with fourteen six-pound guns apiece, and the *Providence* (twelve guns), *Hornet* (ten guns), and the *Wasp* and *Fly*, each with eight guns. The captains, in order of seniority, were Dudley Saltonstall, Abraham

Whipple, Nicholas Biddle, and John B. Hopkins. Heading the list of lieutenants was John Paul Jones.

Ice-bound in the Delaware for several weeks after all other preparations were completed, the American navy put to sea on 17 February 1776. Congress had given Esek Hopkins orders to clear the Chesapeake Bay of Lord Dunmore’s fleet, drive the British from the Carolina coasts, and then run the Royal Navy away from Rhode Island—obviously an overly ambitious set of orders for a force of only eight ships mounting 110 guns. At the time, the British had seventy-eight ships with over 2,000 guns in American waters. But Hopkins took advantage of a discretionary clause in his orders that authorized him to use his judgment in adopting whatever other course of action appeared to be more promising.

Hopkins sailed directly to the Bahamas, where he captured Nassau on 3–4 March. Returning to the American coast, he took a British armed schooner and a brig before the unfortunate encounter occurred between his flagship, the *Alfred*, and the British vessel, the *Glasgow*, which occurred on 6 April. The American ships put into New London and then went to Providence, Rhode Island. As a result of the 6 April action, Esek Hopkins was through as commander in chief of the Continental navy. A court-martial convicted Captain John Hazard of cowardice, and John Paul Jones succeeded him as commander of Hazard’s ship, the *Providence*. Although he was placed behind seventeen other captains on the seniority list established by Congress in October 1776, Jones promptly established himself as the top American naval commander. During the last six months of 1776 he captured or destroyed five transports, two ships, six schooners, seven brigantines, a sloop, and a sixteen-gun privateer. Most valuable of these prizes was the armed transport *Mellish*, which carried a cargo of winter uniforms and other supplies intended for Quebec, on 12 November 1776. Further naval operations occurring during the first two years of the war occurred on Lake Champlain, including the action at Valcour Island in October 1776.

Naval supremacy was the cornerstone of British strategy in America during the years 1776–1777. It enabled them to evacuate Boston in March 1776, and to mass a large army on Staten Island for the New York campaign after dispatching Henry Clinton’s expedition to Charleston. This superiority made the Hudson River a line of operations, while confronting Washington with the problems of defending against an amphibious attack toward Philadelphia and such southern ports as Charleston, South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia.

OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS

The Franco-American alliance, negotiated in February 1778 was scheduled to take effect should war break out

between France and Britain, which it did in June of that year. This event significantly altered the strategic situation by shifting the balance of naval forces in the war. In 1778 France had seventy-nine ships of the line in service compared to the Royal navy's seventy-three. This gap widened further after Spain, which had forty-nine ships of the line, entered the war as an ally of France (although not of the United States) on 21 June 1779. With the widening of the war, operations could be anticipated on a worldwide basis, much like those of the Seven Years' War, which had recently concluded.

Prior to this time, naval operations had been limited almost exclusively to American waters, although a few American warships had appeared in the Atlantic off Europe. Continental ships were tasked with conveying American diplomats to Europe, and, during the first of such voyage, Captain Lambert Wickes took as prizes two British merchantmen while delivering Benjamin Franklin to France (26 October–4 December 1776). After landing Franklin at Auray, Wickes cruised the English Channel, taking five more prizes. Joined by ships commanded by Captains Henry Johnson and Samuel Nicholson, Wickes, aboard the *Reprisal*, circumnavigated Ireland clockwise and, in the Irish Sea, took captive eight merchantmen and destroyed another ten. Six months later Gustavus Conyngham, in command of the lugger *Surprise* (owned in part by the American government), carried two British ships into Dunkirk. He returned to sea with a commission in the Continental navy and, in a two-month cruise, took additional prizes before shifting his base of operations to Spain. He then crossed the Atlantic to the Caribbean in 1778. Meanwhile, John Paul Jones had arrived in France in command of the *Ranger*.

Open war between Britain and France was precipitated by the clash off Ushant, an island off Brittany, on 27 July 1778. French Admiral Louis Guillouet, comte d'Orvilliers, put to sea on 8 July with plans to intercept homebound British convoys. British Admiral Augustus Viscount Keppel weighed anchor the next day with orders to protect the convoys. The fleets sighted one another on 23 July and, after extended maneuvering, passed on opposite tacks and exchanged broadsides before the French eluded the British and returned to port. For the next year France sent fleets to America while working to lure Spain into active involvement in the war.

When Britain rejected Spain's 3 April 1779 ultimatum that it cede Gibraltar in return for Spanish neutrality in the war, Spain began conducting joint naval operations with the French in May, and, a month later, formally entered the war. Mustering a superior number of warships in the eastern Atlantic, the French and Spanish laid siege to Gibraltar from 21 June 1779 to 6 February 1783, and planned a joint invasion of the Isle of Wight. The invasion was so ill-managed that it disintegrated before a single

soldier reached English soil. The Royal Navy was able to slip enough supply vessels through the Franco-Spanish blockade of Gibraltar to keep its defenders provisioned. On 16 January 1780, Admiral George B. Rodney, in command of a convoy en route to Gibraltar, defeated a squadron under the command of Spanish Admiral Juan Langara, sinking one ship, driving two to destruction on shoals, and capturing four before resupplying Gibraltar. After capturing Minorca in the Mediterranean (5 February 1782), the allies launched an assault on Gibraltar on 13–14 September 1782, but were rebuffed. The British garrison held out until it was reinforced and resupplied by a fleet commanded by Admiral Richard Howe.

During 1780 Britain's naval position eroded further when Russia formed the League of Armed Neutrality, and war broke out with the Netherlands on 20 December 1780. The following spring, Admiral Pierre André de Suffren, in command of a French fleet en route to reinforce the Dutch colony at the Cape of Good Hope, sailed into Porto Praya in the Cape Verde Islands. There, on 16 April 1781, he found a British squadron commanded by Commodore George Johnston at anchor, and, disregarding Portuguese neutrality, attacked and crippled the British expedition which was also bound for the Cape.

The British naval position remained precarious in American waters during 1781, but it improved in Europe during the summer. On 5 August 1781, Admiral Sir Hyde Parker defeated a Dutch squadron commanded by Admiral Johann A. Zoutman in the battle of Dogger Bank, off the Northumberland coast. Four months later Admiral Richard Kempenfelt defeated a French squadron commanded by Admiral Luc Urbain Bouëxic, comte de Guichen, at the second battle of Ushant (12 December 1781), capturing fifteen of the twenty merchantmen de Guichen was attempting to convoy to the West Indies. From that point forward, British leaders could feel confident of their position in European waters and direct the majority of their naval resources to American waters, where they regained control of the Caribbean in the battle of the Saints, 9–12 April 1782.

FRENCH FLEET IN AMERICAN WATERS

French naval operations were no more conclusive off North America until 1781. Even before a formal declaration of war between England, France dispatched Admiral Charles, comte d'Estaing and a large French fleet to America with orders to support Continental army operations. The result was a heart-breaking series of failures. After taking eighty-seven days to cross the Atlantic, d'Estaing arrived too late to bottle up the British fleet in the Chesapeake, was too timid to attack Admiral Richard Howe's fleet at New York, 11–22 July, failed at Newport on 29 July–31 August, and abandoned a proposed attack on Newfoundland, before sailing for the West Indies in

November. There he did some damage to the British, but failed to gain any real advantage. In September and October 1779, he returned to North America, but refused to remain off Savannah long enough to force the surrender of the British garrison that had captured the city on 29 December 1778. In 1780 France shifted its primary naval attention to the West Indies. Without a French fleet on the American coast, Henry Clinton was free to launch his expedition against Charleston, which resulted in the scuttling of the *Queen of France* and the capture of the *Ranger*, *Providence*, and *Boston*, all of which were taken into the Royal Navy.

Alarmed by the French capture of St. Vincent and Grenada in June and July, Britain dispatched a fleet to the Caribbean under the command of Admiral Sir George Rodney in late 1779. His fleet duelled indecisively with that of comte de Guichen in 1780 and 1781 and sought to counter the capture of Mobile and Pensacola by Spanish forces led by Benardo de Gálvez. Though inconclusive in the Caribbean, naval operations set the stage for the decisive American victory in the war, when the French fleet of Admiral François Joseph, comte de Grasse, sailed north from the West Indies to participate in the Yorktown campaign of 1781.

OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

After attacking the British at Praya, Suffren continued on to Ile de France in the Indian Ocean, arriving in October 1781. On 7 December he weighed anchor for India and captured the HMS *Hannibal* (18 Jan 1782), which was also en route to India. When Commodore Thomas, comte d'Orves died, Suffren succeeded him as commander of all eighteen French warships in the Indian Ocean.

Learning of the Dutch entry into the war, Admiral Sir Edward Hughes seized the Dutch port of Trincomalee to prevent its use by the French fleet (5–11 January 1782). Determined to seize a base for his fleet that was nearer to India than Ile de France, Suffren sought battle with Hughes, who had eleven warships. Over the next eighteen months, Suffren and Hughes fought a series of engagements, off Sadras (17 February), Provedien (12 April), Negapatam (6 July), and Trincomalee (3 September). No ships were lost by either side, but Suffren kept the British on the defensive. This allowed Suffren to land troops and support France's ally, Hyder Ali, who had captured the British-held Cuddalore (4 April 1782). Suffren also was able to seize the anchorage at Trincomalee on 30 August 1782. Its position in India threatened, Britain sent reinforcements to Hughes, including five ships of the line, bringing his forces to eighteen by the spring of 1783. Suffren received three additional ships of the line by March. The fleets

fought another inconclusive battle off Cuddalore on 23 April 1783 before news arrived of the war's end.

AMERICAN NAVAL BATTLES

While Britain and France focused on European waters during 1779, on the West Indies between 1780 and 1782, and the Indian Ocean during 1782 and 1783, the five remaining Continental navy vessels, *Trumbull*, *Deane*, *Alliance*, *Confederacy*, and *Saratoga*, were able to get to sea. Captain James Nicholson took command of the *Trumbull* in September 1779, and fit the frigate out for sea over the winter. In the spring he cruised the American coast from Boston to New York to drive off British privateers. On 2 June 1780, he engaged the British ship, the *Watt*, in a battle that was second in severity only to that between the *Bonhomme Richard* and *Serapis* of the previous fall. The following summer, Nicholson was forced to strike his colors in the engagement with the *Iris* on 8 August 1781.

During the same period the *Deane*, *Confederacy*, and *Saratoga* cruised the Caribbean before taking on military stores and escorting a convoy carrying additional stores for the Continental army. On 18 March 1781 the *Saratoga* sank when caught in a sudden gale three days out of Cape François, Hispaniola. A month later two British warships captured the *Confederacy* off the Virginia Capes. Only the *Deane* reached port safely, arriving in Boston. In late 1782 the *Deane* sailed to the West Indies, where it eluded capture by at least four British warships which thought that they had cornered John Manley and the *Deane* off Martinique in January 1783.

Among Continental Navy vessels, only the *Alliance* and *Deane* enjoyed significant success during the closing years of the war. When Silas Deane's loyalty came under suspicion, the *Deane* was renamed the *Hague*, set sail for the West Indies under the command John Manley, and captured the *Baille* in January 1783. More illustrious was the career of the *Alliance*. On 29 May 1781, it forced the British brigs *Trepassy* and *Atalanta* to strike their colors. It also fought the war's final naval engagement (excepting some privateering exploits) when, under the command of John Barry, it fought the *Sybilie* off the coast of Florida in March 1783.

Meanwhile, state navy vessels scored their two greatest oceanic victories. A frigate from the Massachusetts navy won a memorable victory in the *Protector–Duff* engagement of 9 June 1780. Two years later the Pennsylvania navy sloop-of-war, *Hyder Ally*, captured the British brig *General Monk* after a fierce half hour battle off Delaware Bay on 8 April 1782.

In summary, the raid on Nassau on March 1776, was virtually the only planned major operation of the Continental navy. A total of fifty-three ships served in



John Paul Jones Engages the Serapis. American naval officer John Paul Jones became a great hero when on 23 September 1779, he commanded the *Bonhomme Richard* in a daring battle at sea against the British *Serapis*. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

the Continental fleet. Of the 13 original frigates, only four were at sea by 1777, and only two (Barry's *Alliance* and Manley's *Hague*) were in action in 1783. Lack of resources kept the rebels from getting to sea anything larger than a frigate, and privateering proved to be a more formidable enemy than the British navy.

Whereas the Continental and state navies did not commission more than a hundred ships during the war, the British increased their navy from 270 to 468 ships, 174 of which carried sixty or more guns. The American frigates nevertheless sank or captured almost 200 British vessels. Privateers cost the British another 600 ships. The Royal Navy performed miserably under a succession of incompetent admirals and an inept ministry. In 1783, however, the British navy rebounded from adversity, and its successes in the West Indies, European waters, and India enabled Britain to stiffen its terms of peace with America and to convince France and Spain that the war should end.

SEE ALSO *Alfred-Glasgow Encounter; Armed Neutrality; Bonhomme Richard–Serapis Engagement; Hopkins, Esek; Howe, Richard; Jones, John Paul; Machias, Maine; Manley, John; Marines; Nassau; Naval Committee; Rodney, George Bridges; Trumbull–Iris Engagement; Trumbull–Watt Engagement; Virginia, Military Operations in; West Indies in the Revolution; Wickes, Lambert.*

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James C. Bradford

NAVAL STORES. The term “naval stores” refers to various items, materials, and substances that were essential to building, maintaining, and operating the wooden sailing ships that made up the navies and merchant fleets of the world from ancient times. Many products were derived from pine trees in the southern colonies, including resin, tar, pitch, and turpentine, and were valued for their ability

to help ships withstand salt water. The term also included other items, like the masts and spars made from the tall white pines growing in the interior of New England and cordage made of hemp; it sometimes included certain types of insect-resistant timbers from which durable hulls could be constructed. At the turn of the twenty-first century, much of the world's supply of pine-based naval stores comes from the American Southeast, but before the establishment of Britain's North American colonies, western Europe's principal source for these substances, and for the tall, straight pine trees needed for a ship's masts, was the Baltic region. Naval stores were so important to Britain's naval and maritime strength that in 1704 they were designated enumerated commodities that the colonies could send only to the mother country.

SEE ALSO *Enumerated Articles*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

NELSON, HORATIO. (1758–1805). British admiral and naval hero. Nelson first went to sea in 1770 in a ship commanded by his uncle, and passed for lieutenant on 9 April 1777. In the West Indies in 1778 he was taken up by Peter Parker, who took him into his flagship, gave him the brig *Badger* in 1778, and in 1779 appointed him to a post ship, the frigate *Hinchinbrook*. His first experiences of action came in the expedition to Nicaragua, where disease nearly killed him. In 1783 he unsuccessfully attacked the French garrison of Turk's Island in the Bahamas.

SEE ALSO *Bahamas*.

revised by John Oliphant

NELSON, THOMAS. (1739–1789). Patriot, Signer, militia general, governor of Virginia. Born in Yorktown, Virginia, on 26 December 1738, Nelson was the son of the wealthy merchant, planter, and council member known as “President (William) Nelson.” Thomas Nelson was educated in England, spending three years at Cambridge. Returning to Yorktown in 1761, he immediately found a place in the House of Burgesses and as a colonel of militia with the assistance of his father. In 1764 he took his place on the King's Council. On his father's death in 1772, Nelson inherited 20,000 acres and 400 slaves, although his style of living kept him perpetually in debt. Remaining in the Burgesses through this period, Nelson became steadily more political. By 1774 he was calling for a boycott of all British goods and led a local tea

party. When state regiments were organized in July 1775, Nelson became a colonel in the Second Virginia Regiment. He resigned this commission later in the year when he was elected to fill the vacant seat of George Washington in the Continental Congress. The new Virginia delegate played a leading role in getting his state to support independence, and he signed the Declaration of Independence. In May 1777 a sudden and serious illness forced his resignation from Congress. In 1779 he was re-elected, but after a few months he again had to resign because of asthma.

Nelson was appointed brigadier general and commander of Virginia's state forces in August 1777. When Congress called for volunteer units, he raised a cavalry troop largely at his own expense. He led them to Philadelphia, but they were disbanded when Congress decided they could not be supported financially. In 1779 the British started a series of devastating raids in Virginia, and Nelson took the leading part in organizing militia resistance. On 12 June 1781 he was elected governor to succeed the militarily inept Thomas Jefferson, and he was given emergency powers by the frightened refugees of the raid on Charlottesville.

During the six months of his governorship, Nelson was virtually a military dictator. He struggled to raise the men and supplies needed to support the Marquis de Lafayette's 1781 expedition to secure Virginia, and when Washington and the comte de Rochambeau (Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur) marched south, the governor-general was in the field to join them for the kill, even directing artillery fire against his own house to support the military effort. In November 1781 he resigned his commission, again because of illness aggravated by asthma.

Nelson had signed off on huge loans during the Revolution in order to arm and equip Virginia's forces. The legislature refused to reimburse Nelson for any of the extensive debts he had accrued in the state's service. Nelson devoted the rest of his life attempting to pay off his creditors. He died at his plantation in Hanover County, Virginia, on 4 January 1789.

SEE ALSO *Yorktown Campaign*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

NELSON, WILLIAM, JR. (1756?–1813). Continental officer. Virginia. Of the Nelson family, he graduated from William and Mary in 1776 and returned

as professor of law from 1803 until his death ten years later. He was a militia private in 1775 and on 29 February 1776 became a major in the Seventh Virginia Continentals. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 7 Oct. 1776. He resigned his commission on 25 October 1777. He and his brother Robert were captured by Tarleton in June 1781 during the Charlottesville raid but were immediately released on parole. He admitted that he preferred reading to either the practice of law or overseeing his plantations and investments, and excelled only at reading.

SEE ALSO *Charlottesville Raid, Virginia; Nelson Family of Virginia*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

NELSON FAMILY OF VIRGINIA.

“Scotch Tom” Nelson (1677–1745) came to Virginia from Penrith, a town on the English side of the Scottish border that then was part of Scotland. Around 1700 he settled at Yorktown, Virginia, and became a wealthy merchant, slave trader, and landholder. His son Thomas (c. 1716–1782) was defeated by Patrick Henry in the first election for governor under the new constitution of Virginia (29 June 1776). Known as “Secretary Nelson,” being secretary of the governor's council for thirty years, his elder brother was “President” William Nelson (1711–1772), who was in the Virginia Council from 1744 until his death, president of that body for many years, and ex officio acting governor from the death of Botetourt to the arrival of Dunmore (October 1770–August 1771). Between them, these two brothers dominated the government of pre-Revolutionary Virginia. William's eldest son, Thomas Nelson Jr., was a signer of the Declaration of Independence. Two others, Robert and William Nelson Jr. also achieved some eminence.

SEE ALSO *Nelson, Thomas; Nelson, William, Jr.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

NEUTRAL GROUND OF NEW YORK.

1776–1783. The term applies, narrowly, to the territory east of the Hudson River between the British positions around New York City (on Manhattan Island at Kings Bridge, where the Boston Post Road crossed the Harlem River) north to the American positions in the southern part of the Highlands of the Hudson. Extending roughly thirty miles north and south, it

included most of The Bronx and Westchester County. A broader definition extends the term to include the entire wedge of land beginning at the northern end of Manhattan Island and fanning out north up the Hudson River and northeast along Long Island Sound toward Connecticut.

There was nothing “neutral” about the Neutral Ground. The term meant that neither side had the capacity to control what happened in this region. Each side could deploy sufficient forces to obtain a temporary superiority, but both were too close to the main forces of the enemy to linger for too long in the Neutral Ground. The modern equivalent would be the no-man’s-land between the established positions of two rival armies. Civilians found it extremely difficult to live in the area, since parties from both sides continually raided and ravaged their farms and possessions.

Conditions similar to those existing in the Neutral Ground also afflicted New Jersey from the Amboys and New Brunswick north through the Hackensack Valley into southern Orange County, New York, on the west side of the Hudson River, but the term “neutral ground” did not normally include this region.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

NEUVILLE. Two French brothers incorrectly identified in American works as the chevalier de la Neuville and Noirmont de la Neuville should properly be identified by the family name of Penot Lombart. They are most properly identified as Louis Pierre Penot Lombart, chevalier de La Neuville, and Rene-Hippolyte Penot Lombart de Noirmont de la Neuville.

SEE ALSO *Penot Lombart de Noirmont, Rene-Hippolyte; Penot Lombart, Louis-Pierre.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

NEVILLE, JOHN. (1731–1803). Continental officer. Virginia. Born in Prince William County, Virginia, in 1731, Neville took part in Braddock’s expedition to capture Fort Duquesne in 1755, during the French and Indian Wars (1689–1763). He then settled near Winchester, where he became sheriff. He later bought large tracts of land near Pittsburgh and became joint holder of an additional 1,000 acres as a reward for his military service. In August 1775 the Virginia Committee of Safety ordered him to occupy Fort Pitt, and he was commandant of that frontier post for the next year. Commissioned as a lieutenant colonel of the Twelfth

Virginians on 12 November 1776, Neville fought with General George Washington’s army at Trenton, Princeton, and Germantown. On 11 December 1777 he became a colonel of the Eighth Virginians and led them in the Monmouth campaign. Transferred to the Fourth Virginians on 14 September 1778, he was brevetted as a brigadier general on 30 September 1783.

Neville’s land became part of Pennsylvania after the war. He was appointed to the position of U.S. Inspector of Excise (in addition to the other offices he held), and became the primary target of the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. Crowd actions halted his tax collecting, burned his house, and drove him into temporary exile, but he returned with the federal force that put down the rebellion. He died at his estate on Montour’s Island, near Pittsburgh, on 29 July, 1803.

SEE ALSO *Monmouth, New Jersey.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

NEVILLE, PRESLEY. (1756–1818). Continental officer. Son of John Neville, Presley Neville was born in Pittsburgh and graduated from the College of Philadelphia in 1775. On 9 November 1776 he became a lieutenant in the Twelfth Virginia Regiment (of which his father was lieutenant colonel), and transferred to the Eighth Virginia Regiment on 14 September 1778. In that same year he served as aide-de-camp to the Marquis de Lafayette with the temporary grade of manor. On 21 October 1778 he became brevet lieutenant colonel. On 10 May 1779 he was given the regular rank of captain, and on 12 May 1780 he was captured at Charleston. He was included in a prisoner exchange a year later. After this he became brigade inspector and was elected to the state assembly. He married a daughter of Daniel Morgan, and from 1792 until his death in 1818 he was a merchant in Pittsburgh.

SEE ALSO *Neville, John.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

NEW BERN, NORTH CAROLINA. August 1781. On 1 August, Major James Craig led 250 British regulars and 80 Loyalists north from Wilmington on a punitive expedition. Reinforced en route by another three

hundred Loyalists, he destroyed rebel plantations along his seventy-five-mile march to New Bern; entered that town on 19 August; destroyed property; and returned to Wilmington, meanwhile burning additional Whig plantations. Craig also liberated several scores of slaves along the way.

SEE ALSO *Wilmington, North Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

NEW BRUNSWICK, NEW JERSEY.

The town was generally known as Brunswick during the Revolution, although both names were used. The original settlement was called Inian's [sic] Ferry and was home to the Lenape people. General William Howe's troops seized the city in their sweep through New Jersey in December 1776, creating panic in Philadelphia.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

NEWBURGH ADDRESSES.

10 and 12 March 1783. Angered that their pay was several months in arrears and that Congress consistently opposed pensions for members of the Continental army, a number of officers began planning what verged on a coup. They were spurred on by some members of Congress and also by Robert Morris, the superintendent of finance, who hoped to use the crisis to increase national power, and especially to levy taxes. Early in January 1783 a delegation of officers sent Congress a memorial listing officer grievances. Major General Alexander McDougall headed the committee of senior officers that formulated this document and took it to Philadelphia. The prime organizer of the movement, however, was Colonel Walter Stewart, who argued that the officers should act in concert to insist that Congress promptly pay all that had been promised them. It is not clear how far the officers were willing to go to win their demands, but there were rumors of marching on Philadelphia and seizing power.

Washington supported the monetary claims of his officers and often called on Congress to make good on its promises. Washington was aware of the increasing discontent among his officers but suspected nothing ominous until 10 March, when he was handed a written call for a meeting of general and field officers the next day and was also given a copy of the fiery and rhetorical appeal subsequently known as the first Newburgh address. The anonymous document proposed that the officers inform Congress that unless their demands were met, they would refuse to disband when the war ended, and that if the war

should continue, they would "retire to some unsettled country" and leave Congress without an army. In General Orders of 11 March, Washington denounced the "irregular invitation" and the "disorderly proceedings" and directed that representatives of all regiments meet on 15 March to decide how "to attain the just and important object in view." A second anonymous address appeared on 12 March, expressing the crafty view that the language of Washington's General Orders made him party to the complaints. Deeply worried, the commander in chief reported developments to Congress. He realized that he would also have to step forward at the meeting of the 15th and do all within his power to keep his officers from going further with their movement.

What followed was one of the most dramatic moments of the Revolution. Visibly agitated, Washington appeared before a tense group of officers on 15 March and read them a statement he had prepared, probably with the help of Jonathan Trumbull Jr. Commenting that the anonymous addresses showed a good literary style, he criticized them for the implication that the civil authorities were guilty of "premeditated injustice." He denounced the alternatives proposed in the first address and entreated his officers to not take "any measures which, viewed in the calm light of reason, will lessen the dignity and sully the glory you have hitherto maintained." He warned that the Revolution itself was at stake, with the threat of civil war looming before them. Climaxing his appeal with a call for them to once more show their greater patriotism in the face of adversity, Washington assured them that by trusting in the American people to do right, "you will, by the dignity of your conduct, afford occasion for Posterity to say, when speaking of the glorious example you have exhibited to Mankind, 'had this day been wanting, the World have never seen the last state of perfection to which human nature is capable of attaining'" (Fitzpatrick, ed., 26, pp. 226–227).

Not quite sure that he had convinced his officers that Congress meant well toward them, Washington took from his pocket a letter from Virginia delegate Joseph Jones, who had written of the financial problems with which Congress had to cope before it could meet the just claims of the officers. After stumbling over the closely written letter, Washington stopped to get out his glasses "and begged the indulgence of his audience while he put them on, observing at the same time that he had grown grey in their service and now found himself growing blind" (Smith, 2, p. 1770). The assembled officers were deeply moved by these simple and sincere remarks, and by the time Washington left the meeting a few minutes later, the conspiracy was dead. Against mild opposition from Timothy Pickering, the meeting voted Washington its thanks and, without dissent, expressed its confidence in the justice of Congress and repudiated the anonymous addresses issued in the officers' names.

Washington never knew the entire history of these addresses, which were the work of General Horatio Gates's aide-de-camp, Major John Armstrong Jr. They were copied by Gates's friend, Captain Christopher Richmond, and distributed by Major William Barber. Armstrong and others considered reviving the movement in April 1783, but they abandoned their plans when Armstrong came to believe they had been revealed to Washington.

In his handling of this incident, Washington demonstrated firm leadership and set the stage for the peaceful demobilization of the Continental Army. Congress remained weak and unable to pay its soldiers as it had promised.

SEE ALSO *Armstrong, John Jr.; McDougall, Alexander; Morris, Robert (1734–1806); Pickering, Timothy; Stewart, Walter; Trumbull, Jonathan, Jr.; Washington, George.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

NEWCASTLE, THOMAS PELHAM

HOLLES, DUKE OF. (1793–1768). British statesman. A privy councillor from 1717, in 1724 Newcastle became one of Robert Walpole's secretaries of state. From the start he understood the need for a European ally, preferably the Hapsburg monarchy, in order to offset a move by France, possibly in alliance with Spain, against an isolated Britain. In 1754–1756, when he was prime minister, he failed to anticipate Maria Theresa's move toward France and found himself committed to Prussia instead. The initial disasters of the Seven Years' War drove him from office in 1756. However, once William Pitt recognized the necessity of Newcastle's "continental" policy, Newcastle returned as nominal prime minister in 1757. Later, especially after Pitt's resignation in 1761, Newcastle shared Lord Bute's alarm at the spiraling national debt; but, to avoid future diplomatic isolation, he opposed the government's desertion of Prussia. Obligated to resign in May 1762, he found his influence gravely weakened, and he was unable to work with Pitt in opposition. Apart from a few months

as lord privy seal in 1765, his days in office were over. Perhaps his last significant act was to support both repeal of the Stamp Act and the Declaratory Act, and to persuade George III that Rockingham's conciliation policy was correct.

Historians used to portray Newcastle as a comically inept politician who owed his prominence entirely to his great wealth and parliamentary interest. However, toward the end of the twentieth century a more balanced picture emerged: Newcastle may have lacked the judgment and confidence of a prime minister, but he had diligence, skill with people, a good grasp of detail, and energetic (if not always coherent) oratory. Above all, he consistently worked to avoid the very isolation that proved so calamitous during the War of American Independence.

SEE ALSO *Chatham, William Pitt, First Earl of; Declaratory Act; Rockingham, Charles Watson-Wentworth, Second Marquess of; Stamp Act; Walpole, Horatio (or Horace).*

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revised by John Oliphant

NEW HAMPSHIRE, MOBILIZATION

IN. After much careful research in the 1930s, the New Hampshire historian Richard Francis Upton concluded that mobilization there seems to have begun spontaneously in the winter of 1774–1775. As early as 28 May 1773 the New Hampshire legislative assembly had established a Standing Committee of Correspondence in response to the circular letter sent from the Virginia Committee of Correspondence. New Hampshire's Royal Governor John Wentworth promptly adjourned the assembly. It met again on 7 April 1774 and formed another Committee of Correspondence on 28 May.

Wentworth again adjourned it until 8 June, at which time he dissolved the assembly, not calling for it to reconvene until 4 May 1775. In keeping with suggestions from other states, New Hampshire's legislative leaders called an extralegal meeting of the assembly for 21 July 1774 to elect delegates to a general congress scheduled to convene in Philadelphia on 1 September 1774. This New Hampshire Assembly, the first of New Hampshire's five Provincial Congresses, selected Nathaniel Folsom and John Sullivan, a Durham lawyer, to attend the general congress but adjourned without establishing any military organization outside of the existing militia. Counties had held their own political organization but likewise had avoided any formal military development.

New Hampshire citizens had been affected by the Stamp Act, the Intolerable Acts, and the attempts to tax tea, but until 1775 few thought in terms of military retaliation against the mother country. Early in December 1774 the New Hampshire Committee of Correspondence sent around a written appeal to each town urging participation in the Continental Association, an effort led by the Continental Congress to limit trade with Britain. There is no record that any town rejected the association.

In Philadelphia, in the fall of 1774, the Continental Congress met but established no military. As the royal government tightened its control, several New Hampshire leaders worried about the potential need for arms and ammunition. To secure munitions, a force put together by John Langdon and John Sullivan slipped into British Fort William and Mary in Portsmouth Harbor on the night of 14 December 1774 and took gunpowder from the seven troopers that guarded it. Upon news of the battles at Lexington and Concord in neighboring Massachusetts, New Hampshire began its mobilization efforts in earnest. New Hampshire's Fourth Provincial Congress, meeting on 17 May 1775, with 133 delegates attending, ignored the royal government at Portsmouth and established a tax to raise funds, created a post office to enhance communication, and voted to raise a force of two thousand men ages fifteen to fifty, to be organized into three regiments, for six months' service. The mobilization was achieved in three weeks' time—a notable feat for a small province with a population estimated at 100,000, larger only than Georgia, Delaware, and Rhode Island.

Yet armed forces were already part of New Hampshire's heritage. Militia units stood in nearly every town. Under colonial law each male inhabitant between the ages of sixteen and sixty was required to maintain arms and ammunition, and each town had to provide its militia with gunpowder, lead, and flints. The frontiers to the north and west had required continuous observation. Calls to the General Court (the legislature) for men, arms, and gunpowder had come continuously from those

regions as settlements and towns encroached on territory that had been traditionally home to the Abenakis and other Indian tribes. In addition, having seen New Hampshire thrive under the lengthy administration of Governor Benning Wentworth (from 1741 to 1767), and having a generally good relationship with his nephew and successor, Governor John Wentworth, many residents had taken part in the Louisbourg campaigns of the 1740s and 1750s, and many, including John Stark and Robert Rogers, had played significant roles in helping the British control French aggression during the French and Indian War in the 1750s.

The two thousand New Hampshire men mobilized for the war effort included those who had already gone individually or in small groups to aid Massachusetts following Lexington and Concord. These men were designated as part of the First New Hampshire Regiment to be under the command of Colonel John Stark of Dunbarton. The Third Provincial Congress on 21 April 1775 appointed Colonel Nathaniel Folsom of Exeter to the rank of brigadier general with the charge to coordinate and command those troops. In late June, as part of its mobilization for a possibly extended conflict, the Fourth Provincial Congress made Folsom a major general. The Second and Third New Hampshire Regiments were created on 24 May 1775 and placed under the command of Colonel Enoch Poor of Exeter and Colonel James Reed of Fitzwilliam. Both Poor and Reed, having earned military respect through command of their local militia, were in positions to inspire men to join the ranks.

While these developments were taking place in Exeter, John Sullivan, serving as a delegate to the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, was exhibiting great personal presence and passionate opposition to Parliament. Sullivan had displayed military skill in 1774 while commanding militia forces as well as in the raid on Fort William and Mary, and was well-respected at home. In Congress, Sullivan vociferously opposed what he considered to be Parliament's oppression, calling the Quebec Act Britain's most dangerous. On 22 June 1775 Congress appointed him a brigadier general under George Washington, and on 27 June he joined Washington at Cambridge.

When the new rebel army, under the overall command of General Artemas Ward, encountered its first major contest, on 17 June, at Bunker Hill and Breed's Hill, New Hampshire regiments played a vital role. Although Colonel James Reed was ill, his troops displayed the knowledge and extensive training that Reed had given them. Under the command of John Stark, and in unison with Stark's First Regiment, Reed's men manned their places along the famous "rail fence" and valiantly defended their positions by remaining steady and firing low.

The Committee of Safety, chaired by Meshech Weare, loomed large in New Hampshire's war efforts.

Established by the Provincial Congress on 26 May 1775, the Committee's charge was to fill the gap left by the absence of a chief executive and thus to execute policy efficiently, secretly, and speedily. The Committee entertained questions, correspondence, petitions, and visitors. During the war it heard arguments, made thousands of recommendations and executive decisions, oversaw security measures, solved disputes, directed military activity, and regulated trade. The Committee's most important power, according to Upton, was the authority it held over a network of local committees of safety.

In addition to the three infantry regiments authorized and formed in 1775, the state sanctioned Bedel's Regiment of Rangers, authorized on 26 May 1775 to be commanded by Captain Timothy Bedell of Grafton County; Long's Regiment, authorized in May 1776 and formed by Pierce Long at New Castle; and Whitcomb's Rangers, authorized 15 October 1776 and attached as an element of the Northern Department. Bedel had begun to form his regiment in January 1776 near Plymouth, to take part in the Canada Expedition then in progress. Men signing on were to get a bounty of forty shillings plus one month's pay as authorized by the Continental Congress. Officers were to receive two months pay plus bounty. Bedel's unit was disbanded on 1 January 1777 in Coos County, Long's in July 1777 in New York, and Whitcomb's on 1 January 1781 at Coos County. One goal that neither the Committee of Safety nor the General Court could meet was the formation of an artillery regiment. There simply were not enough artillery volunteers or supplies. In fact, following the evacuation of the British from Boston in March 1776, the New Hampshire Committee of Safety dispatched Captain Titus Salter of Portsmouth to regain the artillery that had been lent to the Continental Army. He was to return with the cannon, balls, supplies, and an engineer to operate the artillery. Salter reported in April that he had seen four cannon belonging to New Hampshire, with balls and supplies, but that he could not find any engineer who would return with him.

All three of New Hampshire's regular infantry regiments went through several organizational alterations between the Northern Department and the Main Army of George Washington. The original Third Regiment, formed under Reed, was disbanded on 1 January 1781 at Continental Village, New York. The Second Regiment, originally under Poor, was consolidated with the New Hampshire Regiment (the original First Regiment) on 22 June 1783, and the original First Regiment was disbanded as the New Hampshire Regiment on 1 January 1784.

As the war progressed, victories, assignments to meet specific needs, and individual characteristics of officers all helped spur on generally slow recruitment. A sufficient number of men agreed to join the expedition to Canada in

late fall of 1776, but others felt the need to return to their farms and families. By the end of 1776 they were ready to return home, and most did so. Following the victories at Trenton and Princeton, recruitment again generally filled quotas imposed by the state on the towns. When it became generally known that the British planned to send General John Burgoyne's army from Canada over Lake Champlain to Albany and then to merge with its army in New York City to cut off New England, in the summer of 1777, New Hampshire men stepped forward. This was to bring the conflict to New Hampshire's backyard. John Stark, though upset at being passed over by the Continental Congress for a generalship, as a state general was able to raise an entire regiment inside of several weeks, owing largely to his personal power of persuasion. Stark's men slowed Burgoyne's advance at Bennington and finally brought him to captivity at Saratoga.

In 1778 men went to serve in Rhode Island with the mission of protecting New England from invasion. Similarly, in 1779, when John Sullivan led off his expedition from Easton, Pennsylvania, young New Hampshire recruits, were present, including Colonel Enoch Poor's Second New Hampshire Regiment. The brusque Sullivan and the trusted Poor led them to victory over the Six Nations in western Pennsylvania and New York.

Mobilization meant guarding the coasts, the port, and commercial traffic to the state. The Continental Congress authorized the building of thirteen navy ships, one of which the Naval Committee assigned to New Hampshire. John Langdon, who owned a shipyard in Portsmouth, contracted to build New Hampshire's ship. So efficient was the project that the *Raleigh* resulted as the first of the thirteen to be built and put into service. (Today the building of the ship is the central symbol on New Hampshire's state flag.) Congress authorized two more ships during the war to be built in New Hampshire—the *Ranger*, which sailed under John Paul Jones, and the *America*.

The war proved a burden for many and was not borne cheerfully. Those who sent husbands or sons suffered from loss of their presence on the farm or in the shop. Numerous petitions to the legislature, for two decades after the war, asked for disability relief or reimbursement of expenses for a wide variety of wounds, losses, and general expenses. During the war and into the 1780s, everyone felt the effects of devalued currency, leading to a clamor for issuance of state paper money. Individuals pelted the legislature with demands for unpaid wages, compensation for lost time and production on farms, reimbursements for medical costs, pensions due but never received, and satisfaction of claims for disabilities from wounds and lost limbs. As late as June 1792, Thomas How, a farmer in Barrington, was seeking wages and bounty payment due for service in the Second

Regiment during 1777. His petition, one of many, refers to having returned from the “horrors of war” only to be forgotten and overlooked.

Mobilization delayed the adoption of a new state constitution. The January 1776 Plan, hailed today as the first American written constitution, was intended to be very temporary. Not until 1779 did policy makers put a proposal before the people, who then voted it down. The people then rejected another in 1781, and another in 1782, before adopting one in October of 1783 that took effect with the opening of the legislative session on 2 June 1784. Among other articles, it established a state senate of twelve popularly elected members, thus creating a true bicameral legislature. The constitution retained the Executive Council, still very active in 2005, as a form of restraint on the executive and the legislative branches.

New Hampshire was the ninth (thus the operative) state to ratify the proposed Federal Constitution on 21 June 1788. As a United States senator, John Langdon held the Bible on which Washington took his oath of office as President of the United States.

SEE ALSO *Fort William and Mary, New Hampshire; Langdon, John; New Hampshire Line; Poor, Enoch; Quebec Act; Reed, James; Stark, John; Sullivan, John; Ward, Artemas.*

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NEW HAMPSHIRE LINE. New Hampshire mobilized volunteers to participate in the siege of Boston as soon as news arrived of the fighting at Lexington and Concord, but did not take formal action until the Provincial Congress met on 17 May 1775. Three days later it voted to form 2,000 men into a brigade of three

infantry regiments, using most of the volunteers at Boston for the first and completing the two others by new recruiting. The colonels of the regiments were John Stark (for the First New Hampshire Regiment), Enoch Poor (for the Second), and James Reed (for the Third). Nathaniel Folsom was the brigadier general. In 1776 they reenlisted respectively as the Fifth, Eighth, and Second Continental Regiments, respectively, reverting to their old state numerical designations in 1777. The Third Regiment disbanded on 1 January 1781. On 1 March 1783 the First became the New Hampshire Regiment, while the Second was reduced to the New Hampshire Battalion. Those two units were merged on 22 June 1783 as a five-company battalion and disbanded on 1 January 1784 at New Windsor, New York. In addition to the formal New Hampshire Line, the state also furnished three other infantry units to the Continental army. These were employed primarily on the northern frontier: Bedel’s Regiment (which operated as rangers) in 1775–1776; Long’s Regiment (1776–1777); and Whitcomb’s Rangers (1776–1780).

SEE ALSO *Lexington and Concord.*

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NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT. 5–6 July 1779. Plundered during Connecticut coast raid.

SEE ALSO *Connecticut Coast Raid.*

Mark M. Boatner

NEW JERSEY, MOBILIZATION IN. In war, as in real estate, location can be everything. During the war for American Independence, location determined that New Jersey would be one of the most active—if not *the* most active—theaters of operations. Situated between the chief British garrison in New York and the de facto

rebel capital in Philadelphia, New Jersey became the contested middle ground. Between 1775 and 1783, the state witnessed some 600 large and small (mostly small) actions, including naval engagements fought on the state's rivers or off its long coastline. Military affairs became part of the state's routine. Morristown (often called the "military capital of the Revolution") emerged as a critical base area, and the main contingent of the Continental army spent more time in New Jersey than in any other the state, including the winters of 1777 (Morristown), 1778–1779 (Middlebrook), and 1779–1780 (Morristown again, the bitterest winter of the war). For soldiers and civilians alike, conflict, or the threat of conflict, was a virtual constant in most parts of the state.

Yet New Jersey was not originally a hotbed of revolutionary sentiment. In fact, through the early 1770s, most residents were generally content to remain within the empire. New Jersey was a small colony of no more than 120,000 people, and it lacked urban centers or significant commercial communities to feel the sting of British mercantilist policies. Without claims to western lands, New Jersey also remained calm in the face of the Proclamation of 1763, which curtailed settlement beyond the established colonial frontier. Nor did the colony have a redcoat garrison, the source of so much friction in Massachusetts and New York. Indeed, New Jersey had gotten along rather well with the British regulars quartered there during the French and Indian War—army payrolls and contracts were boons to the local economy. Even the Stamp Act crisis found the colonial legislature reticent to mount a protest. Although local political officials ultimately agreed to participate, they initially declined to send delegates to the Stamp Act Congress. A large Quaker population shrank from conflict with Britain; and in any case, with much of the colony's economic prosperity dependent on its larger neighbors, New York and Pennsylvania, New Jersey Patriots would have been largely powerless had the two more influential colonies not acted first.

Opponents of the British government gained traction, however, as protests broadened in the other colonies. There was considerable anger in New Jersey over British opposition to the colony's effort to issue its own currency, a measure dear to New Jersey's largely agricultural populace; and local Patriots did join the inter-colonial protests against the Tea Act. As in the other colonies, an informal Whig political infrastructure gradually supplanted or took over established local and provincial governments, and by 1775 the Whigs effectively controlled New Jersey. Still, sentiment for outright independence remained muted. While a small number of New Jersey volunteers marched north to join the rebel army besieging Boston, Patriots did not oust the royal governor, William Franklin, until June 1776. The definitive break with the empire came only in

July, when a new state constitution finally declared New Jersey independent.

It remained for New Jersey to defend its newly proclaimed independence. Until the contest ended in 1783, the state struggled to mobilize its human and material resources and to coordinate its war effort with the other rebellious states and the Continental Congress. It was never easy, as manpower was always in short supply and New Jersey lacked any significant manufacturing or financial base. But efforts to maintain the fight were sustained, and sometimes imaginative, even if results were uneven.

MILITARY STRUCTURE

New Jersey troops served in three legally distinct military organizations: the militia, which served rotating tours of duty of short duration, and which could be called out at any time in emergency situations; "state troops," raised for long-term duty within the state; and New Jersey's Continental regiments. In addition to these formal organizations, however, Jerseymen also bore arms in ad hoc, irregular outfits, in an active privateer fleet, and in Continental battalions raised under direct Congressional authority. Over the course of the war, many men saw action in several of these guises.

The formal militia structure emerged from what was left of the colonial militia (purged of Tory personnel) and units raised on private or local authority, mostly during the spring of 1775. The first militia law (June 1775) called for the enrollment of all men between the ages of 16 and 50 into companies of about eighty men each. They were to elect their company officers, who in turn elected regimental officers. Companies were based on townships, and it was not uncommon to find ten or fewer family names comprising the bulk of a militia company. Companies reported to county-based regiments. Many subsequent laws attempted to improve militia effectiveness through experiments with "minute" companies, unit boundary changes, and brigade organizations. Throughout the war, however, most militia operations were local, and regional commanders had a great deal of autonomy. Regimental efforts were of limited scale and duration, and the brigades were never effective.

Whatever its organizational limitations, the New Jersey militia became a potent force. True, it performed poorly during the early stages of the British invasion of 1776, famously evoking Commander-in-Chief George Washington's wrath. But it quickly rebounded and played a major role in the revival of Whig military fortunes in late 1776 and early 1777. While there was never the level of militia participation that Patriot leaders desired, enough men came out to keep the local troops functional. Over the course of the war, the militia made any British moves into the New Jersey interior dangerous; and the militias proved

invaluable in suppressing the Tories, guarding regional crops and supplies, providing local security and intelligence, and, buttressed by Continentals, fighting in occasional large-scale actions (such as Monmouth in 1778 and Springfield in 1780). Certainly the British came to dread the incessant harassment by local rebels that occurred during operations in New Jersey; and in the end, the lack of any tight, statewide legal or command structure made little difference in militia effectiveness.

From time to time, New Jersey also raised “state troops.” There were units recruited for longer-term duty than the militia—generally six or nine months—during periods of particular need or when the state was unable to persuade Continental commanders to post regulars in New Jersey. These troops took on in-state assignments, usually the guarding of sensitive coastal locations or along the northwestern frontier, and in positions across from British-occupied New York. Three artillery companies (of sixty-four men each) were raised over 1776 and 1777, while a more ambitious effort tried to field 2700 infantry between November 1776 and April 1777. Subsequent legislation kept various bodies of state troops in the field through the end of 1782, by which time every county had at least one company assigned to it. In effect, these troops were state regulars, and many of them saw considerable action in conjunction with Continental and militia forces.

However, most New Jersey troops who served as regulars did so in the Continental line. In the autumn of 1775, Congress asked New Jersey to raise two battalions, with a third requested in April 1776. These men were to serve for a year, and with enthusiasm for the cause high, the state enlisted approximately 2,000 men relatively quickly. Some companies, recruited by their company commanders and other junior officers, were filled within days. Despite supply shortages, they deployed to the northern theater of operations, where two of the regiments suffered cruelly in the debacle of the Canadian invasion. The last of these Continentals returned home by February 1777, and a core of the veterans reenlisted. However, many others, discouraged by hard service in 1776—including major losses to disease—had had enough and were lost to the Patriot effort.

New Jersey recruited a “Second Establishment” beginning in late 1776 (although enlistments did not begin in earnest until early 1777). This time, Congress asked the state for four regiments, for a total of 2,720 men of all ranks. These soldiers would be enlisted for three years or the duration (in other words, “for the war”). Of the requested number, however, the state could raise only 1,586, and only three of the regiments maintained reasonable strength levels. With the ranks thin, Congress reduced the New Jersey quota to three regiments in 1779, with an official roster of 1,566 officers and men. But the actual tally for the New Jersey Brigade (for most of the war, the

regiments served as a brigade under Brigadier General William Maxwell) rarely exceeded 1,200 men. Indeed, in 1781, Congress allowed the consolidation of the New Jersey Brigade into two regiments, the total strength of which generally remained below 700 men. Jerseymen also served in regiments raised directly under Congressional authority (the “sixteen additional regiments” and artillery and other units outside of the New Jersey Brigade). But throughout the war, New Jersey Patriots complained that the manpower quotas requested of their state were simply more than the small state could field.

RECRUITING

There was some validity to such complaints, as the realities of recruiting and maintaining troop strength actually were daunting. New Jersey’s human resources were too limited to maintain a large militia, the state troops, government functions, the farming economy, and Continental battalions. Of the state’s 120,000 residents, probably fewer than 25,000 were men of military age. But of these, some 6,000 were Quakers and thus lost to the recruiting pool; and a conservative estimate indicates that another 3,200 were lost to the Tories, including about 1,900 Jerseymen who served as Loyalist regulars (the balance were variously organized “refugees” raiding their home state out of New York, “Pine Robbers” in southern New Jersey, or other local irregulars). The privateer fleet drained additional manpower, and the state granted exemptions to teachers, elected officials, iron workers, express riders, and various government employees. In all, at least 10,000 men were not available for any sort of military duty. The remaining manpower (probably around 14,000 individuals, not much more) had to be shared with agriculture. New Jersey’s rich farms were not only vital to the state economy, but also a critical source of military food and forage (and thus hotly contested by the rival armies). Heavy calls on the state militia could be economically disruptive, and thus highly unpopular.

Thus, even as New Jersey complained about the number of men it was to levy, there still was general agreement that the use of regular troops seemed the most efficient use of the state’s limited human resources. Washington, of course, as well as many other Patriots, preferred regular Continentals for practical military reasons. Regulars were enlisted for a minimum of three years, better trained and disciplined, and lacked qualms about long-term operations in distant theaters. But (no doubt to spur Continental enlistments) Washington and other senior commanders also pointed out that a stable force of regulars would reduce the necessity for many militia call-ups. New Jersey’s governor, William Livingston, agreed, arguing for the “superiority” of a policy that recruited men the economy needed least as regulars—implying the poor

and rootless— and leaving “the more industrious farmer” to his husbandry.

This is essentially what New Jersey tried to do as it recruited the Second Establishment. Significantly, recruiting operations changed. Formerly, officers recruited their own units. There was thus no central recruiting service to forward new men to the Continental battalions. But by late 1776, most officers could not be spared off the lines for recruiting purposes. Although Washington sent officers on this duty whenever he could, Congress asked the states to put recruiting on a firmer institutional footing. In October 1777, the New Jersey legislature designated the counties as recruiting districts, and assigned two civilian recruiting officers (although some of them may have been militia officers) to each. The law also allowed extra recruiters for locales where recruiting seemed especially promising. The effects of this system were uncertain. Continental officers still recruited Jerseymen personally when they could; and by 1780, each New Jersey battalion also assigned an officer to full-time recruiting duty in the state. The recruiting districts probably helped, but they neither replaced personal recruiting by unit commanders nor ended manpower shortages.

The fiscal aspects of recruiting were important as well. Perhaps the most expensive (and best publicized) aspects of recruiting were bounty monies. A Congressional bounty of January 1777, allowing each soldier \$20, a clothing allotment, and a hundred acres after the war (for men who served for the duration), proved too little to attract enough men. Consequently, states, and even towns, offered supplemental enticements. New Jersey towns never issued bounties, but by 1778 the state was offering recruits \$40, a blanket, clothing, and—if they enlisted by October 1778—a regimental coat and more clothes. In 1779, this increased to \$250 above the Continental bounty. At this juncture, Washington and Congress feared dissension between veterans and new recruits enlisted under the more lucrative state bounties. The states, however, still went their own ways, and in 1780 New Jersey even increased its bounty to \$1,000, with subsequent increases to adjust for inflation. Recruiting personnel also received bounties. In 1779, New Jersey gave recruiters \$20 a man, a sum increased in 1780 to \$200. In 1781, payments were made in specie, also to compensate for inflation. Although not mentioned in the laws, noncommissioned personnel also received bounties for signing up recruits. In addition, the state provided funds to support recruits until they reached their units, and even paid \$16 per man to the muster master who swore them into the army.

Obviously, any funding shortage imperiled recruiting. Whenever it could, New Jersey turned to Congress to pay recruiting bills; but this aid was never sufficient or punctual, and the state often had to use its own resources.

In 1778 and 1781 the legislature enacted loans to cover recruiting costs. Some New Jersey Patriots became so distressed with the high costs of raising men, and so incensed with Congress for failing to reimburse the state, that they threatened to halt recruiting operations. It was an empty threat, but indicative of the strain that recruiting placed on the state.

ALTERNATIVES TO REGULAR RECRUITMENT

Even with the inducements of bounties, however, it became clear that voluntary enlistments would never fill the New Jersey Brigade. The alternative was conscription, and the idea was not new. During the French and Indian War, Quaker opposition had prevented New Jersey from drafting militiamen for long-term duty. Yet other states had; and as early as 1776, Washington had suggested that New Jersey implement a draft to meet its Continental manpower quotas. Initially, the state balked, but in April 1778, faced with a dire recruiting shortfall, the legislature acted.

The new law divided the militia regiments into “classes” of eighteen men. Upon a full regimental muster, commissioners were to explain the recruiting laws and bounties, and then allow each class ten days to present a volunteer or substitute to serve nine months in the New Jersey Brigade. If, after ten days, a class did not present a recruit, one of the men in the class would be drafted by lot, and he then had five days to report for duty, find a substitute, or pay a \$300 fine. Over April and May, the militia sent hundreds of draftees and substitutes to the army in consequence of this law, and New Jersey raised more Continentals in 1778 than in any other year. This success, however, was countered by popular distaste for the draft, and the law was allowed to lapse. A draft for six months of duty, passed in 1780, was less successful; after this, New Jersey simply lived with troop shortages and a small New Jersey Brigade for the rest of the conflict.

It is worth noting that not all recruiting activity took place within the formal recruiting structure, or within established regulations. In January, 1777, Washington issued recruiting regulations calling for freemen between seventeen and fifty years old, excluding enemy deserters and Tories. New Jersey, however, was never so particular. The state immediately decided it could not rely solely on “freeman volunteers,” and in April 1777, it acted on a Congressional suggestion to exempt any two militiamen from duty if they found a Continental substitute. The legislature also asked persons otherwise exempted to hire substitutes and made provisions for enlisting indentured servants. Nor did New Jersey demand only “freemen.” Any “able . . . bodied and effective volunteers” were sufficient. The use of servants and other substitutes

demonstrated less a commitment to a yeoman soldiery ideal than to filling the ranks with anyone available.

In fact, with scant manpower among New Jersey Patriots, the state turned a blind eye to virtually all of Washington's recruiting prohibitions. Enemy deserters appeared frequently in New Jersey ranks, especially as the war dragged on and recruiting became harder. Tories served as Continentals as well. Men accused of Loyalism frequently received a choice of punishment, including hanging, or enlisting in the New Jersey line. In one dramatic incident, the state Council of Safety condemned seventy-five Tories at Morristown and hanged two as an example to the others—who promptly joined the Continental Army. Petty criminals often received similar treatment. There is no complete documentation of the number of Tories and felons compelled into the New Jersey ranks, but available records attest to over two hundred, hardly an insignificant number given the manpower needs of the day.

Yet the mobilization effort was more successful than recruiting difficulties and the thin rosters of the New Jersey Continentals indicated. Accurate numbers are unavailable, but by the end of the conflict, something under 4,000 Jerseymen had served in Continental ranks, while another 10,000 (more or less) saw duty with the militia, state troops, or in supply or other capacities with some military organization. No doubt some men were counted more than once in these tallies (such as those militiamen who also served a tour in the New Jersey Brigade as draftees). In addition, there is evidence that men from neighboring states and even some foreigners served in New Jersey ranks. Even so, given the limited manpower pool—recalling here the losses to Quaker pacifism, loyalism, official exemptions, and other causes—the state did quite well in exploiting its human resources; in fact, it came close to using every available man.

MANPOWER: WHO SERVED?

The social profile of the New Jersey regulars reflected a recruiting effort that, as Governor Livingston put it, tried to leave farmers to their fields and put the least prosperous into the rank and file. A majority of the troops were young; more than 54 percent were twenty-two years old or younger, while over 73 percent were no more than twenty-seven. Most also came from the lowest socio-economic strata. Of the soldiers carried on state tax rolls, fully 90 percent came from the poorest two-thirds of the population, while 61 percent came from the poorest third of taxpayers. Probably some 60 percent of the regulars owned nothing of consequence at all. In a state where 30 percent of the populace owned at least 100 acres of land, only 9 percent of the Continentals could say the same. Many of these men were poor by virtue of youth—they

simply were too young to have established themselves, or to have inherited property, before enlisting. But there is no doubt that New Jersey regulars tended toward the lowest rungs of the state's economic ladder. For many of these men, the bounties of 100 acres must have seemed quite appealing.

In marked contrast to the enlisted men, New Jersey officers were well-to-do. Eighty-four percent came from the wealthiest third of society, and almost 32 percent from the upper tenth. The officer corps also held proportionately more of the largest farms than either the enlisted ranks or the general population. Indeed, just over 31 percent of the officers used slave labor on their farms. While there were some poorer officers, few (if any) advanced beyond captain. The New Jersey officers, then, represented the state's traditional social elite; and in the eighteenth century, it was normal for military elites to derive from social elites.

None of this is to argue that the enlisted New Jersey Continentals were essentially a coerced force. Far from it: they served for a variety of reasons, some with a genuine enthusiasm for the cause. Most rendered faithful service, often under appalling conditions, in a war they could have avoided. But most also left little enough behind them when they enlisted, and with only shallow roots in society, the Continental Army offered (at least at this stage of their lives) more than the civilian world.

WAR MATERIEL

New Jersey also mobilized its material resources, although beyond agriculture these were quite limited. Significantly, there was no pre-war armaments industry at all. The militia and the first Continental regiments had to rely on privately-owned weapons and munitions, supplemented by purchases from out of state. In 1776, the state initially could arm only two of its Continental regiments. Weapons shortages delayed the march of the third considerably. But maintaining even such arms as New Jersey could find was difficult, because the state lacked enough skilled gunsmiths and blacksmiths. The most prominent gunsmith was Ebenezer Cowell, whose shop in Trenton manufactured gunlocks under a contract with the Continental Congress. But the invasion of 1776 drove him out of Trenton, and he transferred his operations to Pennsylvania for the rest of the war. The events of 1776 also displaced other Patriot blacksmiths and gunsmiths, which seriously disrupted local production of war materiel. Some blacksmiths were able to produce limited numbers of bayonets, ram rods, and other accoutrements, and a trickle of gun repairs continued. Yet the number of guns and parts produced were small, and New Jersey troops were largely dependent on imported arms throughout the war.

Gunpowder was a problem as well. New Jersey had essential deposits of sulfur and saltpeter, and Patriot authorities provided incentives for production of these commodities. But the state had no powder mill. Responding to a Congressional plea, the New Jersey Provincial Congress loaned Colonel Jacob Ford Jr. the funds to construct a mill in Morristown. Ford was in production by August 1776, and the powder mill operated through at least 1779 (the records are obscure thereafter). Production was sometimes impressive—up to 750 pounds of powder per week—but the Morristown mill was the only one established in New Jersey. Consequently, the state's over-all contribution to patriot gunpowder supplies was never great. Nevertheless, at a time when American munitions manufacturing was in its infancy, and when munitions were in demand, for a vital period Morristown remained a steady source of crucial powder supply.

The only major industrial success was in iron. The state was rich in ore, and small-scale production had begun in the late colonial period. By 1775, New Jersey had seventeen furnaces producing pig iron and twenty-two forges capable of producing wrought iron—from which blacksmiths could produce tools, blades, and other implements. The furnaces also could turn out shot and, as war production geared up, cannon. During the conflict, the British destroyed or otherwise halted production at some of these facilities. In 1778, for example, royal troops wrecked important iron works at Bordentown and Mount Holly, which never went back into service. But twelve of the furnaces and seventeen forges remained safely in Patriot hands. The most productive works lay north of Morristown at Hibernia, Mount Hope, and other locations in Morris and Bergen Counties.

Iron production also faced problems. Interruptions in mining could disrupt the furnaces, and skilled labor was always at a premium. Ironmasters used anyone helpful as workers. Hessian and British deserters, and some prisoners, worked at furnaces and forges, and the state agreed to exempt skilled ironworkers from militia duty in order to assist production. Inflation and other fiscal challenges also threatened operations, but iron production managed to expand over the course of the war. In 1777 alone, the Hibernia furnace produced some 120 tons of shot for the army, and was successfully casting and boring cannons. New Jersey production—or American production generally—never made the Patriot military self-sufficient in iron weapons or munitions, but in this area, at least, a domestic industry made dramatic strides.

THE IMPACT OF MOBILIZATION AND WAR

New Jersey began to mobilize in the spring of 1775 and remained on a war footing for eight years. The duration of the war, coupled with the virtually constant military

presence in the state, left a varied legacy. There was considerable physical damage. Some towns, such as Connecticut Farms and Springfield, suffered major battle damage, pillaging, and wanton destruction. Churches and public buildings along the various British lines of march suffered as well, with Presbyterian churches singled out for particular British wrath. Private homes also were targets, and hundreds of farms lost fences, livestock, and crops to pillaging or hungry soldiers in both armies. Bergen and Middlesex Counties were especially hard hit during 1776, and foraging in 1777 led to damage and theft on farms across central New Jersey. Well over 600 farms, buildings, or other private properties were plundered, damaged, or destroyed in Middlesex County alone. Despite pleas for help, there was little the financially-strapped state—New Jersey government debts totaled some \$750,000—could do for these communities and individuals. Indeed, the state felt it had to raise taxes to meet its obligations, and New Jersey property owners faced some of the stiffest tax bills that any generation in the state would see down to the Civil War.

There was considerable social dislocation as well. Thousands of Tories had been driven into exile, and their estates often were seized and sold off by the state. The vast majority never returned to New Jersey. Major real estate interests, notably the East Jersey Board of Proprietors, ended the war with their business affairs in disarray. Renters had not made payments, business records were scattered or lost, and some prominent proprietors had fled with the British. Moreover, demobilization had sent most troops home only with promissory notes, and most of these men found few immediate prospects in the civilian economy. Hundreds of war widows and orphans had little access to public support, which was small enough anyway, and had only meager private resources to sustain them.

Somewhat perversely, however, agriculture prospered in the final two years of the struggle. Without any major battles, the occasional skirmishes did not prevent a flourishing if illegal trade between New Jersey farmers and the British garrison in New York City. This commerce brought welcome consumer goods as well as specie into the state, relieving some of the hardships of the war years. But a major economic downturn followed the departure of the British in 1783, and farmers, like almost everyone else, were hard pressed to pay taxes and to make ends meet. Even the iron industry suffered before resuming normal production by 1787. Merchants, hoping to develop international trade out of New Jersey ports, lacked capital and trading connections, and retreated largely into local or coastal commerce.

The distress was general across New Jersey, but the state showed considerable ingenuity in dealing with the situation. A series of fiscal measures, including paper

money issued against landed security, gave the state a stable currency and allowed debtors to pay their bills with public securities. While refusing further financial support to the Congress, New Jersey did assume payment of the interest on Continental debts held by its citizens, and it implemented a special tax to pay arrears due New Jersey soldiers and military suppliers. By 1787, the state's fiscal house was generally in order, most war-related damage had been repaired, and the post-war economic slump was passing. Given New Jersey's location as a chief military theater, the impact of the war could have been much worse, and the state's problems in the so-called "critical period" were more political (especially in its relations with the larger states and the Confederation) than economic or social.

SEE ALSO *Continental Army, Draft; Livingston, William; Middle Brook, New Jersey; Monmouth, New Jersey.*

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Mark Edward Lender

NEW JERSEY BRIGADE. Early in the war, training and unit cohesiveness was difficult for many Continental brigades, there being no comprehensive program in place for a uniform system of tactical formations and field maneuver. This matter, therefore, was left to individual division or brigade commanders. Added to

this was the matter of brigade subunits' detached service and the absorption of troops from disbanded units. Despite recruiting shortfalls and desertion, some continuity was achieved at the company and regimental level, with a core of veteran soldiers remaining, many of whom served side by side with the same comrades and officers for the entire war. This leavening of old soldiers was important. In New Jersey, for example, the brigade's composite regiments were augmented by short-term drafts and volunteers in 1778 and 1780, or as companies swelled with soldiers from the disbanded Jersey regiments from 1779 onwards. The advent of Major General Wilhelm Friedrich von Steuben's uniform system of maneuver in 1778 (published in spring 1779) further alleviated the problem of attaining and maintaining cohesive tactical units.

The New Jersey Brigade, originally comprising the First through Fourth Regiments, first served as such beginning in May 1777, and until 1780 was commanded by Brigadier General William Maxwell. Following the 1776 campaign, when three regiments served their single-year enlistment in Canada and New York, four New Jersey regiments were authorized in 1777, all the men signing on for three years or the war's duration. Two others, Forman's and Spencer's Additional Regiments, recruited all or a portion of their men in New Jersey, the latter's unofficial title being the Fifth, later the Fourth, New Jersey. In 1779 Forman's regiment was absorbed by Spencer's, that unit serving with the Jersey Brigade beginning in 1779 until its men were dispersed among the two remaining Jersey regiments in January 1781. As the conflict went on, the numbered Jersey regiments were reduced: in 1779 to three regiments; in 1781 to two; and in the war's final year, one regiment and one battalion.

The brigade served together at the Battles of Short Hills, Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth, Connecticut Farms, Springfield, and Yorktown and in Major John Sullivan's expedition in 1779 against the Iroquois. The First and Third Regiments fought at Staten Island in August 1777, while the New Jersey Light Companies served with the Marquis de Lafayette's Light Division in 1780 and went with Lafayette to Virginia in the spring and summer of 1781.

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John U. Rees

NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN. November 1776–January 1777. After the Battle of White Plains on 28 October 1776, Washington set up three principal concentrations of forces to enable him to block British efforts in case Sir William Howe tried to move east, north, or southwest. Washington would keep one large part of the army (7,000) in New Jersey, using Fort Lee as his base; Major General Charles Lee would keep a similar force (7,000 of the best troops) in Westchester County to block an advance into New England; and Major General William Heath would use the smallest of the pieces (4,000) to protect the Hudson Highlands forts and lines of communications between Washington and Lee. A small force remained on the northern tip of Manhattan, but it was to be withdrawn to New Jersey.

The balance of that plan collapsed when Howe suddenly shifted his troops and captured Fort Washington, New York, on 16 November 1776 and Fort Lee, New Jersey, on the 18th. Washington was forced to retreat to Newark, opening a gap between his troops and the other contingents. As the British maintained pursuit and forced him to keep falling back, the chances of being able to use the coordinated action upon which the original disposition depended gradually evaporated.

As early as 10 November, after the Battle of White Plains and before loss of the Hudson River forts, Washington had written Lee: "If the enemy should remove the whole, or the greatest part of their force, to the west side of Hudson river, I have no doubt of your following with all possible dispatch, leaving the militia and invalids to cover the frontiers of Connecticut in case of need." On 20 November, Washington suggested that Lee cross the river and there await further orders. The next day Washington reiterated that Lee should make this move, unless "some new event should occur, or some more cogent reason present itself." Lee's inaction has led to speculations that he was deliberately jeopardizing the American cause by allowing the British to defeat the forces under Washington's personal command so that Congress would make him commander in chief, but there is no proof to support this charge. Lee had not received a specific order, and he still thought that his force would be more effective east of the Hudson. Instead of going himself, he tried to order Heath to send two thousand of his garrison to Washington, arguing that Heath was closer and could get reinforcements to Washington sooner. Heath, however, had direct orders from Washington not to weaken his defenses of the strategic river crossings under any circumstances, and so he refused Lee.

Howe did not move against Heath and clear the lower Hudson because the onset of winter would limit naval support and make it too hard to retain any gains; the notion of cooperating with British forces from Canada had not been part of anyone's plans for the year. He

also saw no value in trying to invade New England because the region was too strongly behind the Revolution; the plan for the year had called for isolating it and slowly wearing down the will to resist by bringing the other colonies back into the fold. Nor did Howe see any realistic chance to move against Philadelphia with his entire force, knowing that he still had to consolidate his hold on New York and its environs and that it was too late in the year to risk the long overland movement that would be involved. Instead, he began preparations to go into winter quarters.

The Royal Navy did not consider New York to be a suitable port in cold weather, an opinion that modern Americans find extremely hard to understand. Admiral Richard Howe and his captains felt that Newport, Rhode Island, was a far better winter anchorage, and William Howe agreed to get it for them. General Henry Clinton left New York with six thousand troops on 1 December and sailed through Long Island Sound, landing and securing Newport on the 7th without any casualties.

WASHINGTON RETREATS

As part of his plan to establish winter quarters, Howe wanted to gain space and access to forage by placing part of the British forces in New Jersey. He sent Cornwallis from Fort Lee with instructions to push Washington beyond Brunswick; Cornwallis boasted that he would catch Washington as a hunter bags a fox. Washington started his withdrawal on 21 November to avoid being trapped east of the Passaic River and reached Newark on the 22nd. There he paused and regrouped by sending the sick to safety at Morristown and detaching other troops to stamp out the first hints of a Loyalist uprising near Monmouth; other officers were sent to assemble all the boats on the Delaware River. Meanwhile, Congress searched the Philadelphia area for additional forces to send to his aid, mobilizing three battalions of the city's Associator infantry under Colonel Lambert Cadwalader and Captain Samuel Morris's City Troop of light horse and giving orders to Captain Thomas Forrest's company of full-time state artillery to go with them. Washington withdrew from Newark on the 28th in two columns, keeping ahead of the British vanguard. The Americans followed two different routes to Brunswick, and from there they crossed the Raritan River just ahead of the jägers leading Cornwallis's advance. The pursuit had failed to catch Washington, and now Cornwallis's exhausted men had to stop and rest.

On 1 December the enlistments of the Flying Camp's militia regiments officially expired and most of the remaining members headed home, further reducing Washington's effectives. That same day the British began pushing across the Raritan but were held at bay by an aggressive rear guard that included Captain Alexander

Hamilton's company of New York artillery. On the 2nd, Washington reached Princeton and directed Brigadier General William Alexander (Lord Stirling) to remain with his and Brigadier General Adam Stephen's brigades (fourteen hundred men from Virginia and Delaware). Their mission was to buy time for the rest of the army to cross over the Delaware River to safety on the Pennsylvania side. While men and supplies ferried across using the boats assembled earlier, Washington started reinforcing Stirling's group. On the 6th, however, Howe joined Cornwallis at Brunswick with several more brigades of British and Hesse-Cassel regulars and then advanced to Princeton the next day. Stirling did not engage, but fell slowly back as ordered, and by the end of the afternoon of the 7th, most of the men had safely crossed using Beatty's ferry and the Trenton ferry. The rear guard crossed early on the 8th, just as the leading British patrols entered Trenton. Cornwallis wasted a day unsuccessfully searching for boats to use in getting his troops across.

For his part, Washington deployed his men along a twenty-five-mile front and began moving supplies forward from Philadelphia to refit the exhausted regiments. The right was opposite Burlington, New Jersey, and the center rested near the Pennsylvania side of McKonkey's Ferry (the New Jersey end later became Taylorsville). Having missed his fox, Cornwallis got permission to stop at the Delaware, and he began to establish winter garrisons in New Jersey. On 13 December, the day Lee was captured at Basking Ridge, Howe announced that the year's campaign had ended. The preceding day Congress had resolved to move from Philadelphia to Baltimore. Howe believed the campaign had come to an end. While older authors (depending heavily on allegations made by disgruntled Loyalists after the war) have accused Howe of being lazy or of "pulling his punches" in order to try to find a way to end the war through negotiations, the simple fact is that he had accomplished as much as the weak British logistical system would allow. He and Clinton had favored contracting the occupied zone to a line between Brunswick and Newark, but Cornwallis persuaded him to hold a greater area. Howe established forward garrisons at Bordentown, Pennington, and Trenton, with a larger base twenty-five miles to the rear at Brunswick. The rationale for this expanded area was that every square mile held encouraged Loyalist support and deprived Washington of recruits; the British felt there were only minimal risks to the more extended lines of communications.


WASHINGTON STRIKES BACK

Washington was not as badly off as American mythology depicts. The retreat through New Jersey had been executed with precision, exploiting the superior land mobility of the American forces to carefully stay out of range of the

British. Detachments assembled in the hills to the west of the British supply lines during the withdrawal, creating a potential for future attacks on rear areas. Washington's defensive positions along the bend of the Delaware River provided access to the logistical support of the depots in Philadelphia. And during the month of December, reinforcements began arriving. Militia detachments came from New Jersey; Colonel John Cadwalader came up with one thousand Philadelphia Associators; several new Continental regiments came up from recruiting areas, including the German Battalion that Congress released from garrison duty in Philadelphia; and veteran troops from other commands in the north worked their way around the British. On the 20th, Sullivan (who took command when Lee was captured) joined with two thousand of the men originally left on the east side of the Hudson, and Brigadier General Benedict Arnold was a day's march behind with seven more regiments from the Lake Champlain front. Also on the 20th, Brigadier General Alexander McDougall reached Morristown with three regiments of Continentals from Heath's forces to reinforce seven hundred New Jersey militia. Washington sent Brigadier General William Maxwell, a native of the area, to take command and begin harassing British supply trains. And Thomas Paine's first number of *The Crisis* was beginning to have a major impact on military and civilian morale.

By Christmas, Washington had some seven thousand officers and men under his immediate command capable of offensive action. More militia, stiffened by another brigade of Continentals, guarded positions further downstream but still close enough to cooperate. Washington also knew that the enlistments of many of the Continentals would expire on 31 December, and his officers began making passionate appeals for them to volunteer to stay another six weeks until the new recruits could arrive. But Washington wanted to use the veterans before year's end while he knew they would be available, and so he issued orders for a blow against the scattered British garrisons. On Christmas night his main force crossed the ice-choked Delaware and defeated the Hessians at Trenton, New Jersey, on 26 December 1776.

When the last of the Americans returned to the Pennsylvania side of the Delaware at daylight on 27 December, Washington watched the British reaction. The Bordentown garrison (another Hesse-Cassel brigade) immediately fell back to Princeton, policing up the Trenton survivors on the way. Cadwalader crossed back over to the east bank at midday and began probing towards Burlington to develop better intelligence. He reached Burlington that night and started receiving additional militia coming up from Philadelphia. As intelligence started to flow, Washington began to contemplate another offensive blow—this time a spoiling attack.



Battle of Princeton (1786). *This painting by William Mercer is a dramatic illustration of the battle between troops led by Washington and Cornwallis in Princeton, New Jersey, on 3 January 1777.* © ATWATER KENT MUSEUM OF PHILADELPHIA/BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY

THE PRINCETON CAMPAIGN BEGINS

On 30 December, Washington—having regrouped, received new supplies, and moved the prisoners to the rear—started back across the Delaware. The Americans reoccupied Trenton and sent patrols forward. The next evening copies of the congressional resolutions that granted Washington dictatorial powers reached Trenton. Although his numbers had been somewhat reduced by expired enlistments and detachments left in Pennsylvania, Washington still had over six thousand men available, thanks to the two thousand militia reinforcements. He also knew that the British had moved more troops into New Jersey and had them on the way to Princeton. When those forces arrived he would be outnumbered by several thousand. So he ordered Cadwalader and Mifflin to join him with their militia forces. He also sent a covering force to delay the expected enemy approach from Princeton.

This covering force was made up of the riflemen from Colonel Edward Hand's First Continental Regiment, Colonel Nicholas Haussegger's German Battalion, and Colonel Charles Scott with the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Virginia Regiments, reinforced by the six cannon of

Forrest's artillery company. On 1 January they were in position along Five Mile Run (later Little Shabbakunk Creek), and on the next day, while Cadwalader's units were still arriving at Trenton, the British appeared on the road from Princeton. Brigadier General Matthias de Roche-Fermoy, the American commander, inexplicably left the advanced position for Trenton, but Hand took over and conducted the delaying action with great skill. Five times the Americans caught the approaching column and forced the enemy to deploy, taking advantage of every creek and defile. Sometimes it was only fire from pickets, other times it was a more substantial blocking party, as at Five Mile Run and Big Shabbakunk Creek. Each time Cornwallis's men had to deploy for a coordinated attack, wasting valuable daylight. Hand then dropped back in good order and with few casualties. Half a mile north of Trenton at Stockton Hollow, the Americans made another stand, this time from woods behind a ravine. Once again the British had to deploy from column into line in the slush of open fields, where they were particularly vulnerable to Hand's riflemen and Forrest's guns, and to bring up artillery. The covering force, supported by other troops, then continued its delaying action through the

town at about 4 P.M. and finally reached the main line Washington had set up south of Assunpink Creek. At about sunset, Cornwallis's larger force faced some sixty-eight hundred men in a very strong defensive position, and in the twilight—around 4:45–5:00 P.M.—he launched a series of probing attacks on the various fords. The Americans held firm and shattered a series of attempts by Hessian grenadiers and British infantry to storm the bridge. Washington had achieved his vitally important purpose of delaying a coordinated attack on his main position during daylight, and in this Second Battle of Trenton probably inflicted 365 casualties at relatively small cost. The American units conducted themselves well, and Washington's defensive battle was brilliantly managed.

However, the Americans were in a bad spot: they were outnumbered; vulnerable to being enveloped or pounded by artillery on 3 January; and lacked the boats to fall back across the Delaware. Thanks to the Americans' domination of the reconnaissance-counter-reconnaissance contest, Washington knew that another course of action was open. It was risky and unorthodox, but it caught Cornwallis flat-footed. Patrols had determined that the back roads were open and that Princeton and Brunswick in the British rear were vulnerable. Leaving his campfires burning, Washington slipped out of his positions during the night to execute the brilliant strategic envelopment that led to the Battle of Princeton on 3 January.

The American army then went into winter quarters at Morristown, New Jersey. On 4–6 January, other American contingents attacked patrols near Springfield, and the confused British evacuated Elizabethtown.

SIGNIFICANCE

In a whirlwind campaign that Frederick the Great at the time called a masterpiece and that the historian Howard H. Peckham has called "The Nine Days' Wonder," Washington had driven Howe from all his posts in New Jersey except Amboy and Brunswick. Although five thousand British remained in each of the latter places, they presented no strategic threat. American morale bounded upwards; New Jersey Loyalists who had revealed themselves had to flee. The time and space bought by a cadre of veteran Continentals and their supporting militia enabled the new, larger Continental army of 1777 to recruit and come forward.

Howe's failures in this campaign resulted from an understandable overconfidence based on the earlier success in taking New York. He might have shown more caution had he considered the strong fights put up by various Continental formations on Long Island, Harlem Heights, and Pell's Point, but that is more apparent in hindsight than it was in December 1776. Conventional

thinking by the winter garrison commander, especially Colonel Rall, gave Washington his opening, and the Virginian took full advantage of it. Cornwallis, an aggressive commander, reacted as he often would during this war by trying to force a decisive action on a more mobile opponent, ignoring critical logistics. During the spring the "forage war" in New Jersey would gradually convince Howe that an overland move against Philadelphia in 1777 simply was not feasible.

SEE ALSO *Associators; Basking Ridge, New Jersey; Fort Lee, New Jersey; Fort Washington, New York; Morristown Winter Quarters, New Jersey (6 January–28 May, 1777); Princeton, New Jersey; Trenton, New Jersey; Washington's "Dictatorial Powers"; White Plains, New York.*

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NEW JERSEY LINE. New Jersey was one of the states which raised its line in response to a request from the Continental Congress. On 9 October 1775 the Congress asked for two regiments, which the New Jersey Provincial Congress agreed to organize on the 26th of that month. These were the First New Jersey Regiment, raised in East Jersey (the northeastern part of the colony), and the Second, raised in West Jersey. On 8 January 1776 Congress directed the Second Regiment to move as soon as possible to support the invasion of Canada, and two days later approved raising a third regiment. During February the First Regiment started deploying to New York City, and the Third followed as soon as it was formed. Both later moved up to the Northern

Department. In 1777 the Congress increased the state's quota to four regiments by reenlisting the three existing ones and forming one more. Declining manpower led to the disbanding of the Fourth New Jersey Regiment on 7 February 1779, incorporating its members into the remaining three to bring them up to strength. In 1781 the quota again dropped, calling for two regiments that were formed using the same process. Finally, on 1 March 1783, the First Regiment became the New Jersey Regiment, and the Second Regiment shrank to become the four-company New Jersey Battalion. Both units were furloughed on 6 June of that year and were formally disbanded on 15 November 1783. One other infantry regiment was recruited primarily in New Jersey in 1777. This was Spencer's Additional Continental Regiment, which was often called the Fifth New Jersey Regiment, particularly after absorbing New Jersey men from Forman's and Malcolm's Additional Regiments in 1779), but it was never part of the New Jersey Line. The state also furnished several artillery companies and a company of light dragoons to the Continental army.

SEE ALSO *Spencer's Regiment*.

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NEW JERSEY VOLUNTEERS. Cortlandt Skinner, the last royal attorney general of New Jersey, was commissioned a brigadier general of Provincial forces on 4 September 1776, authorized to raise a brigade of six battalions from among the numerous New Jersey Loyalists already organized and organizing to fight the rebels.

Although none of the battalions reached its authorized strength of five hundred men each, the New Jersey Volunteers was the largest single Provincial unit raised during the war.

The First and Second Battalions were part of the force that chased Washington as he retreated from Fort Lee, New Jersey, in December 1776, and were successful in raising recruits, especially in Monmouth County. Headquartered at New Brunswick, New Jersey, after Washington's victories at Trenton (26 December 1776) and Princeton (3 January 1777), they retired to Staten Island when William Howe withdrew his forces from New Jersey in June 1777 as a prelude to the Philadelphia campaign. The Second Battalion was converted to artillery on 30 April 1777, accompanied Howe to Philadelphia, fought at Monmouth (28 June 1778), was reconverted to infantry in November 1779, sent into garrison at Lloyd's Neck and Sandy Hook, and disbanded in June 1781.

The five other battalions continued to mount forays into New Jersey from their base on Staten Island, and although initially surprised by rebel Major General John Sullivan's counterraid on 22 August 1777, they managed to defeat the raiders, the Fourth Battalion distinguishing itself in action against the New Jersey Continentals. The number of battalions was reduced to four on 25 April 1778, when the Fifth merged with the First and the Sixth merged with the Third. In late November 1778, the Third Battalion was sent south as part of Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell's expedition to capture Savannah, Georgia (29 December 1778), beginning a long association with the First Battalion of Delancey's Brigade. It extended through the defense of Savannah against Franco-American attack (9 October 1779) and the defense of Ninety Six, South Carolina (May–June 1781), against Nathanael Greene, culminating at the hard-fought battle of Eutaw Springs (8 September 1781), where the Third Battalion suffered 40 percent of its strength killed, wounded, and missing. (It returned to New York in January 1783, after the evacuation of Charleston). The battalions also contributed drafts to two temporary units raised from among the Provincial regiments for service in the south: Major Patrick Ferguson's corps, American Volunteers, that was captured at Kings Mountain (7 October 1780), and the Provincial Light Infantry Battalion that operated in the South from December 1780 until its last battle, at Eutaw Springs.

Back north, a detachment of the Fourth Battalion helped defend Paulus Hook against Henry Lee on 19 August 1779, and the First and Fourth Battalions participated in Baron von Knyphausen's raid on Springfield, New Jersey, during June 1780. The Fourth (renumbered the Third after the disbanding of the Second Battalion) was part of Benedict Arnold's force that raided New London, Connecticut, on 6 September 1781. The

two battalions were together at Newtown, Long Island, by the summer of 1782 and—joined by the Third (by then the Second) Battalion from Charleston—sailed on 3 September 1783 from New York for New Brunswick, where they were disbanded on 10 October.

Cortland Skinner rarely led his brigade on active operations. Most of his time was spent coordinating the gathering of intelligence in New Jersey from his base on Staten Island.

SEE ALSO *Eutaw Springs, South Carolina; Georgia, Mobilization in; New London Raid, Connecticut; Paulus Hook, New Jersey; Savannah, Georgia (29 December 1778); Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779); Skinner, Cortlandt; Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of Knyphausen.*

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NEW LONDON RAID, CONNECTICUT. 6 September 1781. As a diversion to draw strength from the allied army marching south for the Yorktown Campaign, Benedict Arnold proposed another amphibious raid on the Connecticut coast. New London became the target because it was the state's most active port, held important stores, and was in easy striking distance (135 miles). In addition, Arnold knew it well because he had been born and raised nearby. The town was on the west bank of the Thames River and about three miles from its mouth. A mile below New London and on the same side of the river was a small work called Fort Trumbull; oriented for protection of the harbor and virtually defenseless from the land side, it was occupied by twenty-four state troops under Captain Adam Shapley. Across the river was Fort Griswold (on Groton Heights), a more substantial square fortification with stone walls, fraised ditch, and outworks. Lieutenant Colonel William Ledyard commanded here with a 140-man garrison drawn from the local militia.

Arnold intended a night attack, but the adverse wind held him offshore until 9 A.M. on 6 September. He landed at 10 A.M. on the west bank with the Thirty-eighth Foot, two Loyalist regiments (the Loyal Americans and the American Legion), a detachment of jägers, and some guns. Major Edmund Eyre landed on the other side of the river with the Fortieth and Fifty-fourth Foot, the Third Battalion of New Jersey Volunteers, a jäger detachment, and artillery.

Captain Millett was detached from Arnold's column with four companies of the Thirty-eighth (subsequently joined by Captain Frink's Loyalist company) to take Fort Trumbull. Captain Shapley delivered one volley of grape and musketry, spiked his eight guns, and crossed to reinforce Ledyard at Fort Griswold. Arnold pushed on to New London, sweeping aside minor resistance at "Fort Nonsense" and a couple of points along the road. In New London local Loyalists helped carry out the destruction of public buildings and storehouses, but damage spread to private property as well. After the war an investigation estimated the value at almost a half-million dollars, including a significant number of dwellings that had not been legitimate military targets. About a dozen ships were destroyed, but fifteen escaped up the river. Patriot propagandists accused Arnold of viewing the scene with the satisfaction of a Nero, but he claimed his men made every effort to put out the fires that started accidentally.

Fort Griswold, meanwhile, put up fierce resistance for forty minutes and threw back several attacks. Eyre fell mortally wounded in the first assault, and Major Montgomery was killed as he mounted the parapet. As the British finally overran the fort, Ledyard attempted to surrender, but was stabbed with his own sword and then bayoneted to death.

Governor Trumbull reported American losses at Fort Griswold as 70 to 80 killed, all but 3 of them after the surrender. Arnold reported that he found 85 dead and 60 wounded, most of them mortally, in the fort. He also stated that he took 70 prisoners, not including seriously wounded who were left behind on parole. Total American losses (including those on the west bank) were about 240. Arnold admitted his own casualties as 48 men killed and 145 wounded, which testifies to the stubborn defense of Fort Griswold.

This was the last large action in the North during the Revolution. It contributed nothing to the British war effort, and it further blackened Arnold's name—although the evidence does not support propagandists' allegations that he deliberately carried out an atrocity.

SEE ALSO *Fraise; Propaganda in the American Revolution.*

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NEW ORLEANS. A source of Spanish military aid. When the British naval blockade cut off normal routes of American supply from Europe, the colonists turned to Spanish New Orleans as well as the Dutch and French West Indies. Although the Spanish were careful to avoid war with Great Britain, they had much to gain by furnishing supplies to the rebels, not the least of which was the weakening of their British competitor. Oliver Pollock was invaluable as the intermediary between American agents and the Spanish authorities starting in 1776, and the rebels were able to purchase weapons, ammunition, blankets, and such critical medical supplies as quinine. These supplies were moved up the Mississippi under the Spanish flag, which got them safely past British posts above New Orleans. Under the governorship of Bernardo de Gálvez, who succeeded Luis de Unzaga in 1777, the support became even more significant. Spanish supplies sent by Gálvez made George Rogers Clark's campaign in the Northwest possible. French entry into the war opened the Atlantic routes of supply in 1778, and the Spanish alliance in 1779 eliminated the need for secrecy in the river trade, which by then had diminished in importance.

SEE ALSO *Pollock, Oliver.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND. September 1777. An amphibious operation from Tiverton, Massachusetts, against the British position on the island of Rhode Island was cancelled at the last minute when Major General Joseph Spencer learned that his plan had been compromised.

SEE ALSO *Spencer, Joseph.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND. 29 July–31 August 1778. Franco-American failure. In December 1776 General Sir Henry Clinton was sent from New York to occupy Newport, which the Royal Navy considered a superior winter anchorage to New York. By the summer of 1778 the British had already survived two American efforts to oust them and had developed a significant network of defensive fortifications. In June 1778 the 3,000-man garrison under Major General Robert Pigot included four Hesse-Cassel regiments, three British regiments, and one Loyalist regiment, along with a detachment of artillery. On 15 July, following

the evacuation of Philadelphia, a reinforcement convoy landed an additional 2,000 men, including one British regiment, two Anspach-Bayreuth regiments, and another Loyalist regiment. Meanwhile the Americans had begun massing an assault force at Providence under Major General John Sullivan. These troops included about a thousand Continentals and a variety of militia and state troops that had been maintaining a loose cordon. When it became apparent that the task force of Admiral Charles comte d'Estaing could not participate in an attack on New York because of British ships stationed inside Sandy Hook, Congress proposed an attack on Pigot at Newport.

In preparation for a combined operation that held such promise Washington called on the New England states to mobilize 5,000 New England men. He also sent Sullivan the veteran Continental brigades of James Varnum and John Glover and two additional major generals with special backgrounds: the Frenchman the Marquis de Lafayette and Nathanael Greene, a Rhode Island native. Although it took a long time to assemble the militia and volunteers, they eventually gave Sullivan an army of about 10,000 by early August. In accordance with Washington's instructions to provide stiffening to the volunteers, he mixed the militia and Continental units to organize two divisions, one under Greene and the other under Lafayette. D'Estaing had an impressive fleet and several thousand troops serving as ships' garrisons that he could put ashore for land operations.

The French fleet reached Rhode Island (Point Judith) on 29 July and established contact with the American army. Despite the tone of exaggerated compliment to Sullivan in d'Estaing's early communications, there was friction between the two allied leaders from the start. And unlike the situation with Lieutenant General comte de Rochambeau's later expedition, the two forces this time had no appreciation for each other and no common tactical doctrine. D'Estaing had expected everything to be ready when he appeared and was not impressed by Sullivan's preparations: "We found that the troops were still at home," d'Estaing wrote in his report of 5 November (quoted in Dearden, *Rhode Island Campaign*, p. 48). He mistook Varnum's and Glover's Continental brigades for militia and complained that the Americans did not have water and provisions ready for his ships when they arrived.

While Sullivan collected the boats needed to move the troops from the mainland the French started isolating the British. On 30 July two frigates and a brigantine moved into the East Passage, and the Royal Navy's crews had to destroy the sloop of war *Kingsfisher* and the galleys *Alarm* and *Spitfire* to prevent their capture. On 5 August three ships of the line in the West Passage moved around the northern tip of Conanicut Island and caught another portion of the British garrison's squadron by surprise, forcing the crews to destroy the frigates *Cerberus*, *Juno*,

Orpheus, and *Lark* and the galley *Pigot*. Other vessels were scuttled over a period of days to form underwater obstructions blocking approaches to the Newport harbor. The grounded sailors now took up positions manning defensive batteries in the British lines.

Despite misgivings, d'Estaing agreed to Sullivan's concept of operations. On 8 August his ships would enter the Middle Passage, running past the British defenses. The next night (9–10 August) Sullivan's troops would cross from Tiverton to the northeast tip of Rhode Island and prepare to attack south. Early on 10 August the French were to land as many men as possible on the west side of the island, opposite the Americans, and bombard the enemy fortifications from the water; the combined ground forces would then assault. The French moved up the Middle Passage according to plan on 8 August, forcing the British to scuttle their last two warships, the frigate *Flora* and the sloop *Falcon*, and destroy the last of the transports.

Then the trouble started. Shortly after dark Pigot withdrew his units on the north end of the island and concentrated all 6,700 men at the main defensive lines. In the morning of 9 August Sullivan wrote to d'Estaing confirming the plan to carry out the invasion as planned on 10 August. But at 8 A.M. Sullivan confirmed reports from British deserters and realized that Pigot had fallen back, so he immediately crossed over to occupy the northern works before the enemy could return. When d'Estaing learned of the landing, only an hour after he had received the earlier message, many of the French officers were offended by what they interpreted to be a breach of military etiquette—the Americans landing ahead of the French, and without prior notification. In spite of this, d'Estaing began preparing to land his own troops when about noon a large fleet was detected offshore.

At 3 P.M. a scouting frigate confirmed that the ships were those of Howe's fleet from New York. Admiral d'Estaing now had to make a decision: continue on with the invasion as planned, or stand out to sea with his warships to deal with the new problem. Given the size advantage of his force, he could easily have duplicated Howe's earlier feat at Sandy Hook and denied the British any chance to come to Pigot's aid.

NAVAL ACTION OFF NEWPORT, 10–12 AUGUST 1778


Since the standoff at Sandy Hook, Admiral Lord Richard Howe had received two additional ships of the line (one from the squadron under Admiral John Byron sent out from England to offset d'Estaing) and two fifty-gun ships. Howe was bothered by adverse winds, but finally sailed from Sandy Hook on 6 August with a squadron of seven ships of the line, five fifties (which could be pressed into fighting in the line), seven frigates, two bomb ketches, three

smaller warships, and four galleys; the Twenty-third Foot (Royal Welch Fusiliers) embarked to augment his marines. On 9 August, while Howe anchored off Point Judith, the southerly wind held the French in position, but during the night it shifted to the north. About 8:00 A.M. on 10 August, d'Estaing stood out to sea to give battle with a squadron of eleven ships of the line, one fifty, and four frigates. When Howe detected this movement he detached one of his frigates to escort the smaller craft back to New York and took the main body (including the fireships) out to sea. Knowing that he was outnumbered, and more importantly that he was outgunned (both in numbers and in size) by the larger French ships, he retreated to the south.

For the rest of that day and the next Howe maneuvered, trying to gain the weather gauge, which was the only condition under which he could even think about engaging in line of battle. That night the weather deteriorated, and heavy seas and gale-force winds scattered both fleets and inflicted considerable damage before blowing out on 13 August. Howe was left with one fifty, four frigates, and an armed ship still sailing in company; the rest were limping back to Sandy Hook for repairs. However, as the day ended two of the other British fifties—*Renown* and *Preston*—fell in with two of the large but badly damaged French ships of the line. The eighty-gun flagship *Languedoc* had lost all of her masts in the storm and was virtually defenseless; the seventy-four-gun *Marseillois* had only one of her masts left, drastically reducing her maneuverability. The British pounded both vessels until darkness fell but were driven off by other French ships the next morning when they sought to resume the battle. Three days later, on 19 August, another fifty, the *Isis*, fought for an hour and a half with the seventy-four-gun *César* twenty leagues from Sandy Hook before the two battered antagonists separated. Howe finally rejoined the rest of his squadron at New York on 18 August, while d'Estaing returned to Rhode Island on 20 August to take stock of his condition. On the night of 21–22 August, knowing that Byron could arrive at any time and shift the balance of power, d'Estaing sailed off to carry out repairs at Boston.

THE AMERICANS CARRY ON

The land forces continued their contest while the fleets were gone. The handful of French frigates left in harbor gave the Allies total control of the coastal waters, so Sullivan continued bringing his troops across to the island and, after the storm cleared, on 15 August pushed south to camp two miles from the outer line of Pigot's fortifications. These works stretched 1,372 yards across the island and were held by 1,900 men. They posed a formidable challenge, so Sullivan started the approach trenches for a formal siege. He concentrated on the eastern side of the line, apparently leaving the other side for the French as in the original plan.



THE GALE GROUP

The steady massing of forces left Pigot increasingly worried. Despite the strong natural advantages of the terrain he held, he knew that control of the sea would leave him vulnerable to flank or rear attacks and subject to being starved into surrender. D'Estaing's reappearance on 20 August further eroded British morale. The pendulum quickly swung the other way when the French departed for Boston. The volunteers and militia started melting away while infuriated American officers made heated comments that would poison diplomatic relations. Sullivan kept his positions for several days in the hopes that something positive might happen but quietly started moving supplies and heavy equipment back to the mainland. Information from Washington alerted Sullivan that Howe and Clinton were assembling a strong relief force in New York, and when three British frigates arrived he correctly concluded that the task force would soon follow. At 8:00 P.M. on 28 August Sullivan started slowly withdrawing his remaining 5,000–6,000 men.

BATTLE OF RHODE ISLAND, 29 AUGUST

The Americans halted at 3 A.M. in the vicinity of Butts Hill, where there were some covering earthworks. They were twelve miles north of Newport. Glover's brigade held the left (east) end of the line; Colonel Christopher Greene commanded a brigade in the center with Brigadier General Ezekiel Cornell's brigade on his right; on the west end was Varnum's brigade. Detachments protected both coasts back to Bristol Ferry, while a skirmish line stood in front. Pigot detected the withdrawal at first light and decided to harass the Americans. About 6:30 he sent forward three columns, with covering parties, but retained over half of his strength in the fortifications as a precaution. Major General Richard Prescott moved in the center with the Thirty-eighth and Fifty-fourth Foot; Brigadier Francis Smith went up the east road with the Twenty-second and Forty-third Foot plus the flank companies of the Thirty-eighth and Fifty-fourth. Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Lossburg took the west road with the two Anspach-Bayreuth regiments led by Captain Wilhelm von der Malsburg's and Captain August Christian Noltenius's Hesse-Cassel chasseur companies. A half-hour later the chasseurs collided with Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens's skirmish force and the battle began. Moments later Smith on the other side of the island, who had not put out flankers or an advance guard, walked into a trap set by Colonel Henry Beekman Livingston's covering force.

The firing made it clear to Pigot that Smith was in a significant fight, and he started feeding in reinforcements. He ordered Prescott to send him the Fifty-Fourth while Pigot sent up the Loyalists of the Prince of Wales's Volunteers. He also pushed up the Hesse-Cassel Huyn Regiment and Fanning's Kings American Regiment to

Lossburg. The covering parties fell back to the main American line, fighting all the way, and the British formed a line of battle on Turkey and Quaker Hills.

Before all of the supporting forces had come up, Smith launched an attack on the east that Glover stopped cold. The British supporting artillery then entered the fight about 9 A.M. and action settled back down to sporadic skirmishing. Four British ships moved up into position off the western shore and at 10 A.M. opened fire on the American right. With this support Pigot shifted his main effort to envelop Sullivan's right. Lossburg's troops charged the First Rhode Island Regiment holding the key redoubt but were driven back twice. Meanwhile some heavy American guns chased the ships back to a position off the British flank. Between 2 and 3 P.M. Lossburg made a third try and after some initial success was pushed back by Nathanael Greene's counterattack. When the American force on that wing of increased about 1,500 men, Greene moved forward towards Turkey Hill. At this point Sullivan called Greene off rather than risk a defeat. Both sides kept up sporadic fire until dark.

Pigot sent back to Newport for additional artillery, and Sullivan made a show of preparing to receive his attack, but neither commander wanted to bring on a decisive battle. During the night of 30–31 August, however, the Americans successfully executed the difficult operation of evacuating the island. Most of the troops crossed to Tiverton. A smaller number of troops crossed to Bristol, where the heavy baggage and stores had been sent earlier. Clinton reached Newport the morning of 1 September with 5,000 troops, bringing the campaign to an end. Sullivan's army discharged the bulk of the militia, and the Continentals moved to Providence. On the way back to New York, Clinton detached Major General Charles Grey for operations in Massachusetts (the Bedford–Fair Haven Raid, 6 September, and Martha's Vineyard raid, 10–11 September 1778).

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

American losses were 30 killed, 137 wounded, and 44 missing on 29 August. Pigot reported his casualties officially as 38 killed, 210 wounded, and 44 missing—most of the casualties among the German units. One Anspacher thought the true total was closer to 400.

SIGNIFICANCE

From a military standpoint neither side gained any significant advantage from the attack on Newport. Howe survived until Byron's arrival restored British control of the seas. Pigot (unlike Cornwallis in 1781) hung on until relief arrived, but the British had seen how tenuous their hold was, and within a year would voluntarily evacuate the

outpost. The need to mount a rescue operation delayed Clinton from complying with the Ministry's orders to transfer forces to the Caribbean and initiate a "southern strategy," but did not cause any fatal harm.

Perhaps the worst damage came in the rift that opened between the Americans and the French. Popular anger erupted in Boston while d'Estaing was repairing his ships. On 5 September the young chevalier de Saint Sauveur was mortally wounded when he tried to stop a Boston mob from pilfering a bakery established by the fleet in the town. Three or four French sailors were killed at Charlestown in another riot. Finally the Massachusetts House of Delegates resolved to erect a monument over Saint Sauveur's grave. Preceded by the failure outside New York, 11–22 July 1778, and followed by the fiasco at Savannah, 9 October 1779, d'Estaing's performance at Newport did not bode well. But on 10 July 1780 a new French expedition, commanded by a much more diplomatic general, Rochambeau, landed in Newport and restored harmony, making the Yorktown campaign possible.

SEE ALSO *Bedford–Fair Haven Raid, Massachusetts; Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'; Martha's Vineyard Raid; New York Campaign; Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779); Weather Gauge.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

NEWTOWN, NEW YORK. 29 August 1779. In a move known as Sullivan's Expedition, Major General John Sullivan left Tioga on 26 August with 4,000 troops and advanced slowly up the left (east) bank of the Chemung River. Major John Butler, a Loyalist who had been watching Sullivan's buildup from Genesee, moved to join his son Walter fourteen miles from Tioga. Together

they then pushed on with 250 Loyalists and 15 men of the British Eighth Foot and reinforced the 800 Indians and Loyalists under Joseph Brant near the destroyed village of Chemung. Against John Butler's judgment—the Indians insisted on making a stand—these forces prepared an elaborate ambush near Newtown, about six miles southeast of modern Elmira. A camouflaged log breastwork along a ridge parallel to the river had its left side anchored by a steep hill and right protected by a defile. The plan was not particularly original: throw Sullivan's column into confusion by surprise fire from the flank and then charge both ends. Brant and Captain John McDonnell (a Loyalist who had been with Brant at Cherry Valley) commanded the Indians and some Loyalists on the right, which was the least vulnerable sector. The left, under Walter Butler, and the center, under John Butler, contained mostly Loyalists and the sprinkling of regulars.

About 11 A.M. the advance guard of Sullivan's column approached the location. Alert members from the Rifle Corps spotted the trap. This warning let Sullivan halt the column and organize an attack. Major James Parr with his three companies of riflemen were attached to Enoch Poor's Brigade, and Poor was directed to envelop the enemy left. James Clinton's Division was to follow in support. The light howitzers and field pieces were to provide enfilade fire support.

In a well-managed maneuver through difficult terrain and against sporadic musket fire, Poor led his column onto the steep hill the Butlers had expected to protect their flank. The New Englanders charged with the bayonet, and the artillery opened up about the same time. According to John Butler, "the shells bursting beyond us made the Indians imagine the enemy had got their artillery around us and so startled and confused them that great part of them ran off."

Brant held a larger Indian force together, however, and put up a stiff fight against the much larger number of Continental veterans. Colonel John Reid's Second New Hampshire Regiment, on the right of Poor's Brigade, was hit on three sides by a savage counterattack but got prompt support from the Third New Hampshire Regiment and two of Clinton's New York regiments. Meanwhile, the brigades of Hand and Maxwell worked their way along the river and got on the enemy's right flank. The defenders, now at risk of annihilation, managed to break contact and retreat safely to Nanticoke, five miles away. Some of Sullivan's troops pursued less than half that distance.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

The American losses were only 3 killed and 33 wounded. Sullivan reported to Congress that the total loss on the campaign only amounted to 40. Butler admitted the loss of 5 killed or captured and 3 wounded, and while these are

probably well under the true numbers, they could not have been too great.

SIGNIFICANCE

Newtown is an example of the flexibility of the tactical system implemented by Washington and Steuben since the majority of the infantrymen engaged here were not from the frontier. The enemy certainly had made blunders (that is, electing to fight at Newtown and failing to withdraw as soon as it became apparent that the ambush had failed) and Sullivan did hold a four-to-one superiority, but critics have charged that Sullivan failed because he did not pursue aggressively. This charge is faulty—he correctly chose to remain focused on the primary objectives of the campaign and followed Washington’s instructions to avoid needless risk.

SEE ALSO *Sullivan’s Expedition against the Iroquois.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

NEW YORK. 11–22 July 1778. D’Estaing at the bar. On 8 July the comte d’Estaing reached the Delaware Capes after taking eighty-seven days to cross the Atlantic from Toulon. Three days earlier the British fleet had completed ferrying Clinton’s army from the vicinity of Sandy Hook at the heights of Navesink, where they had marched after evacuating Philadelphia. Although the slow passage of the French fleet across the Atlantic had saved the British fleet from being trapped in the Delaware, Admiral Richard Howe’s problem now was to protect his fleet in New York Harbor against a superior force. D’Estaing’s problem, on the other hand, was to get ships drawing twenty-seven feet across a bar where there were no more than twenty-one feet of water at low tide.

D’Estaing wasted no time off the Delaware when he saw there was no enemy fleet to engage and no promise of making contact with Washington. He had many sick aboard and was low on water and provisions, so on 9 July he sailed north to New York, reaching Sandy Hook on the 11th after capturing a number of British supply vessels. At Sandy Hook the American pilot who had come aboard off the Delaware reneged on his promise to take the fleet inside the Hook. It was not until 16 July that John

Laurens reached the fleet to establish liaison between d’Estaing and Washington. Laurens informed d’Estaing of the near impossibility of crossing the bar into New York Harbor for an attack on the British.

After days at anchor off the treacherous coast while the best available pilots were consulted, d’Estaing was told they could take his ships in only if a strong northeast wind coincided with a spring tide. Ignorant of the deeper draft of the French ships, Sir Henry Clinton considered abandoning New York before the expected attack. But on 20 July the French admiral decided to leave New York and follow Washington’s suggestion of a combined French and American operation against the British at Newport, Rhode Island.

Many military historians have been critical of d’Estaing for failing to chance crossing the bar into New York Harbor, insisting that a bolder commander might have won the Revolution by trapping the British in New York. Others agree with d’Estaing in thinking that such an effort would have been foolhardy and have led to the destruction of the French fleet.

The French Alliance was off to a bad start. Until Rochambeau arrived in America, it would deteriorate further.

SEE ALSO *French Alliance; Laurens, John; Monmouth, New Jersey.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

NEW YORK, MOBILIZATION IN.

New York was one of the major theaters of the War of Independence, and it endured hard conflict longer than any other state. Perhaps its people suffered worst of all from war’s destruction. The war struck New Yorkers like none in their past, and no New Yorker escaped it. How it came to them and how they joined in it began a redefinition of what it meant to be a New Yorker, of how New York’s people dealt with each other, and even of the boundaries within which they lived.

There is no adequate account of how New Yorkers came to join the Continental Army and the revolutionary militia. We know little about how their previous lives fed into military service and have only fragmentary information about how they mustered for service, what they did on duty, and how they met their needs for food, shelter, and weapons. This entry summarizes what we do know.

Conflict had played an important role in shaping colonial New York. The Dutch founders had waged war against the Indians of the Hudson Valley. The Five Haudenosaunee Nations (the French called them the Iroquois) had fought the French and other Indians, in

good part to control the trade in beaver pelts; these wars continued after the English conquered Nieuw Amsterdam and Beverwyck in 1664 and renamed them New York and Albany. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Iroquois were exhausted. In the “Grand Settlement” of 1702 they promised neutrality to the French and, to placate their English allies, deeded over a hunting ground they did not possess, sprawling across the Niagara Peninsula to Detroit and perhaps beyond. Even after the outbreak of the final Anglo-French war for empire in 1755, the Iroquois tried to play off the Europeans; but with the defeat of the French the Iroquois were no longer able to balance the European powers. Although some Senecas joined in Pontiac’s Rebellion in 1763 to drive the British back, most Iroquois understood that warfare on their own against the Europeans was futile.

Although the line of settlement was pushed in, until 1761 farmers and artisans prospered—and merchants got rich—by supplying the foodstuffs and goods that fed and equipped the British soldiers and sailors who flowed through New York City to the war fronts north and west of Albany. Seventy-five New York City privateers preyed on French shipping, and some of their captains and owners also got rich. But the end of wartime procurement brought economic depression. Profits sank and jobs became scarce. City people suffered, whereas mixed-crop farmers in the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys could alter what they planted and survive.

Peace allowed settlement to spread into the territory between Lake Champlain and the Connecticut River, but new opportunities raised new issues. Although the Privy Council awarded title to the region to New York in 1764—it was also claimed by New Hampshire and Massachusetts—it could not prevent Connecticut migrants from entering the region. In the Hudson Valley, New Englanders pushing westward joined with long-term tenants to protest against economic conditions on estates in the valley, and in some cases the estates’ very existence. In 1766 tenants from Westchester County north to Albany rose in protest. The royal governor had to dispatch British troops, accompanied by light artillery, from New York City to quell the insurrection.

All of these issues—Indian-white relations, postwar economic woes, uncertain land boundaries, a quasi-feudal land system, and the irritating presence of British troops—shaped the ways New Yorkers confronted the imperial crisis between 1765 and 1775. In New York City the combination of British troops and economic doldrums proved volatile. Two garrison companies had been stationed in the city since the conquest in 1664, but after 1763 the garrison rose to several regiments. Off-duty soldiers chopped down the Liberty Poles raised by radical New Yorkers and brawled with civilians in taverns. Even worse, they competed with local residents for scarce jobs.

In January 1770 the rage spilled out into fights on the city’s streets, but no shots were fired; a similar situation in Boston led two months later to the Boston Massacre. Like the residents of Boston, many ordinary people in New York City disliked the “lobsterbacks” and were just as ready to organize to protest their presence, although many of their leaders tagged behind.

Massachusetts was ready to resist when the imperial government punished Boston for the “destruction of the tea” at the Boston Tea Party. New Yorkers were slower, but they did follow. During 1774 and early 1775 committees of correspondence (the “Fifty-One”) and inspection (the “Sixty”) formed in New York City to exchange information and to enforce the Continental Association. The First Continental Congress wanted committees of inspection everywhere, but they appeared only in a few places in New York: at Rye in Westchester County in August 1774; at Albany over the winter; at Kingston in December; and at New Windsor in Ulster County not until March 1775. The committee of Palatine District, in the upper Mohawk Valley, met in secret for fear of the power of Sir William Johnson’s family. These committees made no bid to overthrow colonial and royal institutions, as did their Massachusetts counterparts in the late summer and autumn of 1774.

Governor William Tryon remained popular (though New Yorkers loathed Lieutenant Governor Cadwallader Colden, who stood in while Tryon journeyed to England). The provincial assembly made laws, the mayors and city councils in New York and Albany continued to pass ordinances, and the courts stayed open. A few zealots, such as the radical leaders Isaac Sears and Alexander McDougall, wanted to go farther, but they knew they could not. McDougall was “sure . . . that we shall be the last of the provinces to the northward of Georgia, that will appeal to the sword.” James Duane, his reluctant fellow patriot, agreed in principle: “It seems to be agreed here that every pacific and persuasive Expedient ought to be tried before a Recourse to Arms can be justified.” New Yorkers were not ready for war, and despite the hot temper of some in the city, most of the province’s people had no desire for confrontation. Many Americans outside the province scorned New York’s apparent timidity.

Yet observant people could see that New Yorkers were not timid. They remembered the ferocious, destructive protests that had nullified the Stamp Act in 1765–1766 and the subsequent brawls with the garrison soldiers. In New York City a “committee of mechanics” took shape and bought its own meeting place. Outside the city, branches of the Sons of Liberty sprang up. During the crisis of 1773–1774 over East India Company tea, the zealous McDougall horrified the cautious William Smith Jr. by suggesting that “we prevent the landing [of the tea] and kill the Gov[ernor]. and the council.” It was dark humor, but like all joking it



New Yorkers Defend a Liberty Pole. In New York City, the combination of British troops and economic doldrums proved volatile. Off-duty soldiers brawled with civilians in taverns and chopped down Liberty Poles raised by radical New Yorkers. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

had a kernel of truth. While New Englanders were preparing for war, New Yorkers were donating goods and labor to support them. New Yorkers even destroyed a small tea cargo themselves in April 1774 when the ship *London* tried to bring some in secretly.

New Yorkers as a whole were not in a state of readiness to resist British authority in 1775. The closest they came was in New York City, but even there the likes of Duane did not want to make preparations. The likes of McDougall did not yet dare. Reluctant or bold, they understood that New York did not have and could not yet have anything like the province wide organization and the growing consciousness that Boston's leaders had fostered since well before the tea crisis. They understood that their province was far more heterogeneous, far more complex than the Yankee colonies. No amount of preparation could have mobilized New York's diverse people at the same time, at least in the same direction. But McDougall had predicted in 1774 to William Cooper of Massachusetts that "the attack of the Troops on your People" might make his fellows "fly to arms." The news from Lexington proved him right.

This was the moment that New York City radical leaders and Sons of Liberty like Isaac Sears and Alexander McDougall had been waiting for; it was the moment that cooler heads like James Duane and John Jay anticipated without relish; and it was also the moment that William Smith, who wanted desperately to remain neutral, and outright loyalists like King's College president Myles Cooper had foreseen with dread. When the news of the fighting in Massachusetts reached New York City on 23 April 1775, Sears seized the initiative. Organizing other Sons of Liberty and the "negroes, boys, sailors, and pickpockets," as well as many hard-working laborers and artisans, he led a march on the city armory, broke in, and handed out its contents. Another crowd stopped a sloop from sailing for Boston with provisions for the British troops there. Events cascaded. On 6 June, Marinus Willett, who would become a colonel in the Continental Army, led a group that seized the firearms of British soldiers who were being taken on shipboard to prevent them from deserting. As late as July it seemed to one

observer that “all authority, power, and government . . . is in the hands of the lower class of people.”

But crowd action was not enough. New York City replaced its 60-member committee of observation and inspection with a 100-member committee of safety. Albany’s half-secret committee published a call for meetings in every town in Albany county, “to take the sense of the citizens.” The result was the creation of a 153-member committee of “safety, protection, and correspondence,” empowered to “transact all such measures . . . as may tend to the welfare of the American cause.” Committees took shape in the other counties as well. Building on a short-lived Provincial Convention, elections for the new committees also chose delegates to the first of four Provincial Congresses. Congresses and committees alike began to drain power from the old institutions. On 3 May 1775 Albany’s new committee of safety organized a “strict and strong watch, well armed and under proper discipline,” and called on townsmen to form militia companies. Five days later New York City’s Committee of One Hundred ordered that all known opponents of the movement be stripped of their firearms. It too was organizing militia companies, urging them to start training and secure munitions and supplies. But British troops remained in the city, and the sixty-four-gun ship *Asia* lay at anchor off lower Manhattan. Not wanting a confrontation, or the damage that would result if the *Asia* fired on the town, radical leaders agreed that the British army and the navy should continue to receive supplies. As a precaution, the Provincial Congress resolved that the militia be “in constant readiness” to repel any attempt to take over and restore the old government’s full power.

New York was passing through a situation of “dual power,” as two sets of institutions, one dying and the other emerging, and their incumbents vied for control. Such a situation is at the very heart of a political revolution. At the end of 1775, when Governor Tryon dissolved the assembly and called an election for its successor, the first congress also dissolved and called an election of its own. Tryon’s goal was to stop the revolutionary movement. The congress’s goal was to “awe a corrupt Assembly . . . from interfering with political subjects.” The new assembly that Tryon hoped for never met. When the new provincial congress did assemble, there was no “official” institution to compete with it. In 1775 New York, like the other provinces, followed Massachusetts in preparing seriously for armed conflict, each at its own pace but in the same direction. Although the outbreak of fighting had provoked a sharp, if short-lived, burst of anger among New Yorkers, even loyalists-to-be, New Yorkers mobilized for conflict not as a united people but rather with the prospect of deep division.

Governor Tryon returned to New York from England on 25 June, the same day Washington passed through the

city on his way to take command in Boston. Tryon wisely stayed on shipboard to avoid the celebrations for Washington, and both men received warm welcomes. Nonetheless, British authority was eroding. For his own safety Tryon retreated to the *Asia* and then to the merchant vessel *Duchess of Gordon*. In a nighttime operation on 22 August, with the approval of the Provincial Congress, the Sons of Liberty began removing cannon that had been stored for shipment at the Battery. The *Asia* did fire, including one full broadside at 3 A.M. The gunners aimed only at the storage site of the cannon and, despite the terrifying noise, the city suffered little damage. The next day the tenuous truce returned, but the balance of power had shifted a bit: the rebels now controlled twenty-one pieces of heavy artillery.

At the same time, the Provincial Congress was organizing four regiments to meet New York’s quota of Continental Army troops. Each regiment was raised in a particular part of the colony, with the officers, who raised soldiers to earn their rank, reflecting the prevailing political sentiments of their region. The First Regiment was raised in New York City and County, with a strong cadre of officers with military experience in the final French and Indian war or in the city’s elite militia battalions. The Second Regiment came from northern New York, from the city of Albany north through Albany and Charlotte Counties toward Canada, Tryon County (the Mohawk Valley), and Cumberland County (the Hampshire Grants, later the State of Vermont); it had a strong Dutch influence. The Third Regiment was raised mainly in the Hudson Valley between Albany and New York City, on the west side in Ulster and Orange Counties and on the east side in Dutchess County; a company from Suffolk County on Long Island completed the regiment. The Fourth Regiment came from the counties around New York City: southern Dutchess, Westchester, King’s (Brooklyn), Queen’s, and Richmond (Staten Island).

Enlistment records and the pension applications of elderly veterans that are preserved in the National Archives give us a glimpse of the men who joined and how they served in the war. The median age of 286 noncommissioned officers and men in the Third Regiment, for example, was 23 years (the average was 25 years). In height, they averaged over 5 feet, 8 1/2 inches tall; 70 percent had a fair complexion, sixteen were pockmarked, and one had a harelip. Three-quarters were born in the colonies (54 percent in New York itself); Irish were the majority of the foreign-born. Half described themselves as laborers, less than 10 percent were farmers, and the rest were artisans of some sort, mostly weavers and shoemakers.

We know more about New Yorkers’ scramble for officer commissions. The Continental Congress recognized New York’s importance by allocating it several general officer appointments. The senior appointee was Major

General Philip Schuyler, a grandee landlord from Albany County, but the English-born and professionally trained Brigadier General Richard Montgomery was probably the most talented officer; he died in the assault on Quebec on 31 December 1775. In subsequent years, the former radical leader Alexander McDougall and the Ulster County brothers George and James Clinton received Continental commissions. James Clinton led one wing of the American army that ravaged Iroquois country in 1779 and opened the way for the ruthless destruction of Iroquois power after the war. Most of the generals associated with New York campaigns—including Washington; Arthur St. Clair at Ticonderoga; John Stark at Bennington; Horatio Gates, Benedict Arnold, and Benjamin Lincoln at Saratoga; John Sullivan on the 1779 Iroquois campaign; and Anthony Wayne in the Hudson Highlands—were not New York-born.

The unpretentious George Clinton, who held both militia and Continental commissions as a brigadier general, became the first commander of the state militia at the age of thirty-six. He proved more popular than Schuyler with New York's soldiers, and their votes gave him the state governorship in 1777. County and local notables scrambled for lesser rank, in both the Continental Army and the militia. After the war, scarcely a legislator or judge could not call himself general, colonel, major, or at least captain. Most militia officers provided important, if unremarkable, service. A few gained wider renown. Nicholas Herkimer was perhaps the most famous militia general. A local notable in the Mohawk Valley, he won election to the new state legislature. He won enduring military fame by helping to turn back St. Leger's expedition in 1777. Although British troops, their Loyalist allies, and pro-British Iroquois trapped his force of Tryon County militiamen in a ravine at Oriskany on 6 August and inflicted heavy casualties, including mortally wounding Herkimer himself, the expedition itself was crippled.

For militiamen, the first stage in commitment was to sign a voluntary "military association," or else face the contempt of neighbors. But not everybody joined in. Even in the heated atmosphere of the spring of 1775, the prosperous, mostly Dutch people of Richmond, King's, and Queen's Counties wanted nothing to do with the revolutionary movement. Efforts to organize committees and militia units among them came to virtually nothing. Continental general Charles Lee moved troops into Queen's County in January 1776, disarmed its open Loyalists, and arrested eighteen leaders. Still, its people would not support the patriots: 462 of them signed Lee's oath that they would not actively aid the British, and 340 more swore that they had surrendered all their firearms, but with no promises about future conduct. After the British arrived in August, more than 1,300 men signed a congratulatory address to the conquerors. Such men

joined royalist militia units, raiding across Long Island Sound into Westchester County and Connecticut. But as with the patriot militia, we know far too little about them.

Serious "disaffection" appeared upstate as well. One in eight of the potential militiamen in Orange County refused the military association, more than half of them from just one town, Haverstraw. About the same proportion refused in Ulster, the next county to the north on the west bank of the Hudson. In Westchester, Dutchess, and Albany Counties, thousands refused and were stripped of their firearms. A clandestine meeting late in 1776 on the Helderberg Escarpment west of Albany shows such men, mostly tenant farmers from the Manor of Rensselaerswyck, making up their minds. Thanks to a spy from the revolutionary committee, we know that one of them, a recent Scottish immigrant named John Commons, put the question. Supporters of Congress should leave, he said; the king's friends should stay. But Commons did not "know who was right." Until the end of the war patriot militiamen and the "Commissioners for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies" worked hard to keep these "disaffected" under control.

The most enduring and most fiercely fought problems erupted in the upper Mohawk Valley, where white settlement melded into Indian country. There was no simple demarcation. The Mohawks were fragmented and surrounded by whites, with whom they often worshipped, prayed, and intermarried. Farther west, white land grants and settlements pressed in on the Oneidas. The situation of the Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas seemed safer, but whites were firmly emplaced at Oswego and Niagara. At war's outbreak the Haudenosaunee "great league" still held the Iroquois together, but on religious terms that allowed them to maintain peace among themselves, not as a political unit that would let them act together in wartime. Their other pan-tribal institution was the "Covenant Chain," in which the Six Nations were the central links binding other Indians, separate British colonies, and the distant crown. But the crown's hold on the colonies was shaking. Would the chain still reach to London? Would it stop in Albany, where New York leaders were reviving their earlier primacy in Iroquois affairs? Or would it end now at Congress, in Philadelphia?

The white Mohawk Valley was fragmented too. Until his death late in 1774, Sir William Johnson was a great lord in all but formal title of nobility. He treated the largely Scottish Catholic tenant laborers on his enormous estate well, supplying needs and forgiving debts. He controlled assembly elections and decided who would be sheriff or judge. He had good relations with most of the Iroquois, particularly the Mohawks and the Senecas. These relations did not extend to many of the Oneidas, who did not think Johnson would help them protect their land. Knowing they needed a white ally, they looked to



Mrs. Schuyler Burning her Wheat Fields on the Approach of the British. This engraving, based on an 1852 painting by Emanuel Leutze, depicts a legend in which the wife of American General Philip Schuyler set fire to their wheat fields near Saratoga, New York, to deny sustenance to British troops. HULTON ARCHIVE/GETTY IMAGES

Samuel Kirkland, a pro-American, New England-born Presbyterian minister who had promised never to acquire an acre of their land. Yet the baronet did not own the whole valley. German and English settlers were moving in, resentful of his power, envious of his great landholdings, and casting covetous eyes on Indian land.

Johnson's heirs intended to keep the power and influence the baronet had acquired. Perhaps they did not learn about the secret committee that formed in 1774; but after Lexington there was no hiding. In June 1775 the committee called an open-air militia election. Sir John Johnson chanced to be passing and broke into the meeting, flailing his horsewhip at the candidate for captain. Another contretemps the next month saw five hundred of his armed tenants face down an equal number of insurgents at his own house, Johnson Hall. Leaders from Albany arranged a truce, but it did not last. Western New York and the Six Nations country were embarking on years of bitter warfare that would devastate the Indian and white communities alike. At the war's end the destruction of Iroquois power and grabbing of Iroquois property would surge, regardless

of what side the Indians chose, as New York assumed its modern shape. But this was not a race war. There were Indians and whites on both sides: Mohawks and Oneidas, Scots and Germans, tenants and freeholders chose for their own reasons.

Where they could, African Americans chose sides for their own reasons too, particularly after British commander Sir Henry Clinton promised freedom to slaves of rebels who would join him. Slavery was beginning to crumble; black men enlisted, fought, and won freedom on both sides. Still, white New Yorkers were among the slowest of all northerners to wake up to the great contradiction between the Revolution's claim that all men are created equal and the harsh reality that white men imposed on black people. At the war's end Patriots would try to reclaim slaves who had rallied to Sir Henry. The British refused in as many cases as they could.

Women in New York also had choices to make. They felt the same patriotic desires and pressures for action that led women elsewhere into open politics. Some ended their marriages rather than accept their husbands' political



The Burning of New York City. British soldiers attack suspected arsonists as New York City burns on the night of 19 September 1776, during the British occupation. The scene is depicted here in a late-eighteenth-century French engraving. HULTON ARCHIVE/GETTY IMAGES

decisions. In 1778 and 1779 Hudson Valley women joined crowds that sought to set prices on necessary goods, sometimes with soldiers' protection. Cross-dressing soldier Deborah Sampson saw combat as "Robert Shurtleff" on New York ground. Throughout revolutionary America, women learned that bearing the burden of supporting the war on the home front on their own, with their men sometimes far away, transformed them.

In the Green Mountains, Yankee migrants turned "revolutionary outlaws" nullified New York authority by the early 1770s, closing courts, breaking jails, horsewhipping officials, and driving out New York settlers. Lexington and Concord brought a brief reconciliation. Ethan Allen, leader of the Green Mountain Boys, joined Benedict Arnold to seize decrepit Fort Ticonderoga and its valuable artillery. Condemned to death by name in a New York statute of 1774, Allen appeared before the Provincial Congress and accepted its commission as colonel. Late in 1776 his followers realized that they could grasp their own independence, if they were bold. To New York they became "revolted subjects" living in the "pretended state" of Vermont. But New York needed them. When his army bogged down in the upper Hudson Valley north of Albany in the late summer of 1777, General John Burgoyne sent a

raiding party of German troops toward Bennington. Green Mountain Boys and New Hampshire militia met the raid; some pretended to be Loyalists and led the Germans into a bloody trap. The expedition's failure helped to guarantee that Burgoyne's army would not reach Albany, where it intended to link up with other British troops coming down the Mohawk Valley and up the Hudson.

Burgoyne's southward advance from Montreal toward Albany was the second (of two) great military tests of mobilized New York. The first had been Washington's futile defense of New York City and successful retreat from it a year earlier, in 1776. Both the battle for New York and the battles around Saratoga were national efforts, with the Continental Army at the center. The American commander at Saratoga was British-born Horatio Gates, who lived in Virginia. Gates had replaced New York's Schuyler both because Schuyler had endorsed his subordinate's decision to abandon Fort Ticonderoga rather than try to block Burgoyne and because ordinary troops disliked him. Schuyler did, however, initiate a scorched-earth strategy along Burgoyne's route south from Lake Champlain, which succeeded in its goal of delaying the British, isolating them from their supplies, and weakening them to the point that Gates could defeat them.

New Yorkers by themselves could not have raised sufficient troops for either campaign. Regiments from other states made up the bulk of the American forces at both New York City in 1776 and Saratoga in 1777. Continental soldiers from the fishing ports of Massachusetts ferried much of Washington's army from Long Island to safety on Manhattan Island in August 1776. Beginning in the late summer of 1777, New Englanders were foremost among the militia who swelled Gates's army to the point that it vastly outnumbered the invaders. Despite a wave of panic as Burgoyne advanced south, New Yorkers did turn out at Saratoga in large numbers, where their presence tipped the scales even though they engaged in little fighting. When 1,800 Albany County militiamen joined the American force it helped to convince the British that their cause was hopeless. So stripped was the Hudson Valley during the Saratoga crisis that there was no resistance to a small British expedition that burned and ravaged as far north as Kingston, in a vain effort to support Burgoyne.

New Yorkers of all sorts remained mobilized for five years after Saratoga. Continentals and patriot militiamen faced down Loyalists and raiders both in the Iroquois borderlands and in Westchester County around New York City. Even after Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown in October 1781, the rump of the Continental Army remained camped at Newburgh, expecting a final battle for New York City itself that never came. Like the story of how New Yorkers entered the Revolutionary War, the story of how they endured the war and, eventually, left it behind remains to be explored more fully.

SEE ALSO *Allen, Ethan; Arnold, Benedict; Bennington Raid; Boston Massacre; Boston Tea Party; Clinton, George; Clinton, James; Duane, James; Gates, Horatio; Herkimer, Nicholas; Iroquois League; Jay, John; Johnson, Sir John; Johnson, Sir William; Lincoln, Benjamin; McDougall, Alexander; Montgomery, Richard; Oriskany, New York; Pontiac's War; Sampson, Deborah; Saratoga, First Battle of; Saratoga, Second Battle of; Schuyler, Philip John; Sears, Isaac; Smith, William (II); Sons of Liberty; St. Clair, Arthur; St. Leger's Expedition; Stark, John; Sullivan, John; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois; Ticonderoga, New York, American Capture of; Tryon, William; Wayne, Anthony; Willett, Marinus.*

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Edward Countryman

NEW YORK ASSEMBLY SUSPENDED. 1767–1769. On 13 December 1765, Major General Thomas Gage, the British commander in chief in North America, asked Governor Henry Moore to request the New York assembly to make provisions for complying with the Quartering Act. The assembly refused full compliance in January 1766, contending that because more regular troops were stationed at New York City (Gage's headquarters) than in any other colony, New York was being unfairly burdened by the act. On 13 June 1766, Moore again informed the assembly that provisions should be made for quartering more regular troops expected to arrive at New York City. On the 19th the assembly again refused full compliance, pleading insufficient financial resources. A period of mounting tension led to a clash between soldiers and citizens on 11 August. When the assembly refused for a third time to support the Quartering Act (15 December), the governor prorogued it (19 December). On 15 June 1767 the king gave his assent to Charles Townshend's act suspending the legislative powers of the New York assembly, effective from 1 October until such time as it complied with the Quartering Act. About the same time, the assembly finally voted some funds for troop support, and the governor used this as a basis for not carrying out the suspension. Although the assembly was never suspended, the willingness of the imperial government to take this drastic step showed the colonists the extent to which the mother country was ready to browbeat them into submission.

When the Board of Trade reviewed the matter in May 1768, it ruled that the acts of the New York assembly after 1 October 1767 were invalid. After a new assembly was dissolved for failure to cooperate, a

third one, elected in January 1769, made the required provisions for quartering in December 1769 when it voted an appropriation of two thousand pounds. The radicals considered this compliance a betrayal by the assembly, and the ensuing friction between soldiers and citizens culminated in the “battle” of Golden Hill on 19 January 1770.

SEE ALSO *Gage, Thomas; Golden Hill, Battle of; Quartering Acts; Townshend, Charles.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

NEW YORK CAMPAIGN. In a letter of 6 January 1776, John Adams directed George Washington’s attention to New York, to the “vast Importance of that City, Province, and the [Hudson] River which is in it.” New York, Adams wrote, was “the Nexus of the Northern and Southern Colonies, as a kind of Key to the whole Continent . . . a Passage to Canada, to the Great Lakes, and to all the Indian Nations. No Effort to Secure it ought to be omitted.” Besieged in Boston—a peninsula with a very narrow neck—the British were keenly aware of New York City’s strategic advantages. Located at the center of the Atlantic seaboard and at the mouth of a deep, navigable river penetrating some three hundred miles northward towards Fort Ticonderoga, New York, was the portal to the Lake Champlain-Lake George-Hudson River axis, a water highway used to transport invading armies to and from Canada during the French and Indian War.

Stung by their defeats at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill, the British by August 1775 had devised a new grand strategy. By having one army seize New York City and march northward to rendezvous at Albany with a second force coming down from Canada, the British intended to divide the colonies along the line of the Hudson River. The American struggle for independence was expected to collapse if New England could be isolated

from other cockpits of the rebellion in the mid-Atlantic and southern provinces. The British were forced to retreat from Boston to Halifax when the Americans placed artillery on Dorchester Heights. Departing on 17 March 1776, they planned to regroup and follow the advice of Lord George Germain, soon to become secretary of state for the American colonies, to deliver a “decisive blow” at New York.

AMERICAN DEFENSES

Washington, who remained in Boston with the army in case the British retreat was merely a feint, had dispatched his second in command, Major General Charles Lee, to recruit volunteers in Connecticut and begin the work of fortifying New York City. Arriving on 4 February, Lee concluded that the city, covering less than a square mile at the southern tip of Manhattan, would ultimately be captured by the British because their powerful navy would dominate the surrounding waterways. Nonetheless, with forts and trenches in and around the city and barricades at every street corner, Lee hoped to inflict heavy losses on the invaders by drawing them into protracted urban warfare.

Lee’s plan also focused on sealing off both ends of the East River with sunken obstructions and shore batteries and controlling Brooklyn Heights, which would secure Manhattan’s entire east side while enabling the Americans to command the city with their artillery, as they had done from Dorchester Heights outside Boston. However, Lee’s plan failed to capitalize on two choke points: the channel at Sandy Hook, which was the only entrance to the Lower Bay from the Atlantic, and the Narrows between Staten Island and western Long Island leading to the Upper Bay. A combination of shore batteries and artillery mounted on floating platforms might have taken a heavy toll on the British fleet passing single file through these straits, but these recommendations from at least one New York resident and from Congress were never implemented.

Nonetheless, John Adams and other members of the Continental Congress were so pleased with the work Lee had begun that he was sent to perform similar service in Charleston, South Carolina. This faith in Lee’s abilities stemmed in part from the congressmen’s own lack of military experience. Moreover, they ultimately concurred with Lee’s assessment of the situation: they could not hope to mount a successful defense of the New York archipelago against the world’s greatest naval power, but they calculated that the second largest city in America (after Philadelphia) should not be handed over without a fight. To do so would depress American morale, pushing tenuous supporters of the Revolution and neutrals into the Loyalist camp.

AMERICAN DISPOSITIONS

When Lee departed on 7 March, Brigadier General William Alexander, known as Lord Stirling because of his claim to a Scottish peerage, assumed command in New York and supervised the construction of the forts. Ten days later, when the British evacuated Boston, Washington was convinced they were headed for New York and began sending his best units down to the city. New York was “a post of infinite importance both to them and us,” Washington wrote, “and much depends on priority of possession.” The brigades of Thompson, Heath, Sullivan, Greene, and Spencer traveled over muddy roads and by boat from Connecticut, reaching New York by early April, followed by Major General Israel Putnam, who imposed martial law in the city and commanded the army until Washington arrived on 13 April.

Washington reorganized the army into four brigades under Heath, Spencer, Stirling, and Greene, assigning the first three to complete the defenses on Manhattan and sending Greene to Long Island. With nineteen thousand troops present and fit for duty, Washington spread them out in a thin defensive line broken by two rivers and stretching from the New Jersey shore in the west and eastward through northern Manhattan, New York City, Governors Island, and onto Long Island.

In addition to the many miles of shoreline where the British might land to capture New York City, the threat of an invasion from Canada also diluted Washington’s forces. Following orders from Congress, Washington in May dispatched ten regiments under Thompson and Sullivan to reinforce the American invasion of Canada, led by Major General John Thomas, whose forces continued to besiege Quebec. Congress hoped to secure the northern border with a fourteenth colony in Canada; Britain’s two-pronged strategy meant that Washington had to fight for both ends of the Champlain-Hudson corridor at once.

LORD HOWE’S PEACE INITIATIVE

On the other hand, the American expedition in Canada forced the British commander in chief, Major General William Howe, to divert troops from Halifax to the St. Lawrence River, which delayed his departure for New York until June 1776. During the last week of June, Howe and his fleet of 130 ships—the largest ever seen in North America—sailed past Sandy Hook and arrived in the Lower Bay. On 2 July, the day Congress voted for independence, Howe’s forces sailed unopposed through the Narrows and landed on Staten Island.

On 12 July, with a strong wind blowing from the south, the British sent two ships, the *Phoenix* and *Rose*, up the Hudson to test the American defenses. American shore batteries blazed away but did little more than damage the rigging on the warships. The American

guns were not powerful enough, the river was too wide at its mouth, and with the wind at their backs the British vessels were too swift. The British captains celebrated by breaking out the claret and punch while they proceeded up the river as far as Tarrytown, thirty miles north of New York City. For the Americans, it was a distressing start to the New York campaign. The British had demonstrated that they could enter the Hudson both to control the river and to arm the Loyalists along its banks, while interrupting American communications and supply lines leading down from Albany to New York City. The British also stood a good chance of destroying several American frigates then under construction further upriver.

That same evening, Vice Admiral Richard Lord Howe, the general’s brother and co-commander in chief, arrived from England after an arduous Atlantic crossing and protracted negotiations in London with George Germain, the American secretary who finally conferred the title of peace commissioner on both brothers. Having lost their older brother, George, who was killed in 1758 while leading Massachusetts troops in the French and Indian War, Richard and William Howe were deeply grateful for the creation of a monument to him in Westminster Abbey funded by the Massachusetts government, and they considered Americans their friends and countrymen. The Howe brothers hoped an overwhelming show of force in New York would bring the Americans to the negotiating table and end the rebellion without further bloodshed.

General William Howe greeted his brother and informed him of the Declaration of Independence; the Americans had dug in and were prepared to fight. Nonetheless, on the following day, 13 July, Admiral Richard Howe proceeded with his peace initiative. He issued a proclamation offering to pardon any colonists who would return to the fold and help reestablish the royal governments in America. Admiral Howe also dispatched letters to this effect to each of the colonial governors, leaving them unsealed so that couriers would report their contents to the Continental Congress. Thus began the Howe brothers’ attempt to wield the olive branch in one hand and the sword in the other, a strategy that would punctuate the New York campaign over the next several months and significantly shape its outcome.

Without acknowledging Washington’s rank as the commander in chief of a national army, on 13 July, Admiral Howe addressed a letter to him proposing a face-to-face meeting. When a British naval officer attempted to deliver the letter the following day under a flag of truce, Washington’s aides rejected the overture, insisting that he be addressed in writing by his proper title. On the third attempt, the messenger verbally requested a meeting between “His Excellency General

Washington” and the adjutant general of the British army, and it was duly arranged for 20 July.

Washington received Admiral Howe’s envoy at his headquarters but spurned the idea that Americans should seek pardons from the British and retreat from the defense of their natural rights. Knowing that the British did not recognize the legitimacy of the Continental Congress, he nonetheless directed Admiral Howe to that body as the proper authority for conducting negotiations. In the meantime, Howe’s letters to the governors had reached Congress as he had expected, and the members decided to publish them immediately in order to expose what they viewed as a hollow peace offer and to dispel any impression among Americans that Congress was intransigent.

BRITISH DELAYS AND BUILDUP

Thwarted in his diplomatic initiative, Admiral Howe was ready to try force, but General Howe, despite the passage of three weeks since the arrival of the British fleet in New York, insisted on delaying the campaign further. Displaying the caution that would mark his conduct throughout the battle for New York, Howe decided to wait for reinforcements and for camp equipment, including kettles and canteens his troops would need in the summer heat.

On 1 August, Major General Henry Clinton and his subordinate, Major General Lord Charles Cornwallis, returned to New York with three thousand troops aboard the battered British fleet. The fleet had not overcome the fortifications designed by Charles Lee and so had failed to capture Charleston at the end of June. General Howe had been eager to put some distance between himself and Clinton, his second in command, after they quarreled over tactics at Bunker Hill a year earlier. Clinton’s return after failing in his first independent command did not improve their relationship.

On Staten Island, the British built wooden landing craft with hinged bows to facilitate amphibious operations with troops, horses, and artillery. On 12 August a convoy of more than one hundred ships arrived after a three-and-one-half-month passage from Europe on stormy seas. Escorted by ships of the line, the eight-five transports carried one thousand British Guards and a contingent of seventy-eight hundred Hessians, the first such auxiliaries to arrive in America. The British also organized a regiment of some eight hundred fugitive black slaves from various states, including Virginia, where a proclamation by Lord Dunmore, the royal governor, had promised freedom to able-bodied indentured servants and slaves willing to desert their “Rebel” owners and fight for the king.

By mid-August the British invasion force had reached full strength, with some twenty-four-thousand ground troops and ten thousand sailors to man the rigging and

guns of thirty warships along with four hundred supply ships and transports. Rivaling the population of Philadelphia, this was the largest expeditionary force in British history before the twentieth century. It was also the greatest concentration of forces the British would have in America at any time during the Revolution. The New York campaign presented the British with their best opportunity to win the war quickly and decisively.

BRITISH STRATEGIC OPTIONS

Such a bold stroke was imperative, because the task of subduing and occupying the American colonies would be too great even for the Howe brothers’ mighty army and fleet. Admiral Howe had only seventy-three warships in the North American squadron with which to support the army’s operations in Quebec, Halifax, New York, and St. Augustine while blockading all of American trade from Nova Scotia to Florida. General Howe faced an analogous problem on land, where his force was totally inadequate to occupy the vast expanses of the North American continent. Germain believed this problem would be overcome when British military victories emboldened American Loyalists—the vast, silent majority, in his view—to defy the Continental Congress and local Revolutionary leaders and to help reestablish royal governments throughout the colonies.

General Howe had publicly declared that the entire British army was not large enough to occupy America, and he concluded that the best way to avoid a long and costly war was to capture Washington’s army or destroy it in a single decisive battle. However, on the eve of launching the New York campaign in mid-August, he suddenly switched to a plan that would drive them out of the area, enabling the British to use New York as a base of operations. Howe’s new strategy would lead to multiple campaigns and rely on a gradual collapse of the rebellion with a minimum of casualties on both sides.

Howe had been chosen to put down the American rebellion because of his success during the French and Indian War using the unconventional tactics demanded by the varied and densely wooded terrain of the New World. However, with the sudden shift of strategy in New York, he reverted to traditional principles of military science, which emphasized the capture of key territory: high ground, water routes, and cities. The loss of New York was expected to confront the Americans with the hopelessness of their cause and prompt them to surrender before massive casualties could engender lasting bitterness.

Much of the Howe brothers’ personal correspondence has been destroyed by fire, and beyond their official pronouncements, their precise motives remain unclear. Nonetheless, William Howe’s reversal in mid-August suggests that his brother Richard and his peace initiative had

exerted a strong influence on him during the preceding month. General Howe's new, more cautious approach also appears to have been a defensive reaction to British losses at Bunker Hill, the defeat of the Charleston expedition by American shore batteries, and his overestimate of Washington's forces in New York, which he placed at thirty-five thousand. Also, Howe was intent on protecting his troops, who would soon be adept at fighting in the terrain of the colonies—and difficult to replace.

Clinton argued for a landing at the northern tip of Manhattan to cut the Americans off on two islands—Manhattan and Long Island—but General Howe rejected the proposal. The disagreement echoed the situation at Bunker Hill, where Howe had disregarded Clinton's advice to land behind the Americans and trap them by seizing the neck of the Charlestown peninsula. In New York, Howe decided instead to land on Long Island in order to capture Brooklyn Heights and to keep the Americans from dominating the city with their artillery, much as they had done from Dorchester Heights outside Boston.

This plan would keep Howe's forces more concentrated and less vulnerable than if they were spread out in northern Manhattan, Staten Island, and Long Island. Moreover, the farmland of Long Island promised to feed the British army, making it less dependent on shipments of food from England, which might be delayed or destroyed in the three-thousand-mile Atlantic crossing. Finally, Howe, like Germain, expected Loyalists to turn out in large numbers on Long Island to welcome and support the British invasion.

COMPLETION OF AMERICAN DEFENSES

While the British spent the summer building up their invasion force, Washington's troops completed and extended Charles Lee's plan for the American fortifications. In June, Washington had decided to fortify the northern end of Manhattan in order to control the Kings Bridge and the Freebridge, the island's only links to the mainland. Washington would need them both for supplies coming in and as escape routes should the army be forced to retreat. The main citadel, soon named Fort Washington, was enormous, but it was crudely constructed and inadequate to withstand a siege. Fort Constitution, later called Fort Lee, was built directly across the Hudson from Fort Washington in order to aim guns from both shores at a line of obstructions in the river. Fort Independence was added in lower Westchester County to support Fort Washington and protect the Kings Bridge from the north.

On Long Island, Major General Nathanael Greene had put his four thousand troops to work on a new chain of forts, redoubts, and connecting trenches a mile and one-


half long across the neck of the peninsula to protect the Brooklyn Heights forts from the rear. Three more forts were built inside this principal line. The soldiers' habit of relieving themselves in the ditches around the forts caused fecal contamination of the water supply, which spread typhoid fever and typhus in the American ranks. Disease significantly impacted Washington's fighting strength, incapacitating one-quarter of his troops. General Greene was stricken with a high fever on 15 August, leaving Washington without the trusted commander most familiar with the critical Brooklyn Heights fortifications—and with the surrounding terrain.

Major General John Sullivan was appointed to fill Greene's command, and Sullivan made the most important addition to Charles Lee's scheme of defense: he decided to take advantage of the natural barrier provided by Gowanus Heights, a densely wooded ridge running parallel to the chain of redoubts and two miles to the south. To attack the American fortifications at the base of the peninsula, the British would have to go through one of the four passes where roads crossed the ridge through its natural depressions. Sullivan had fortified the three westernmost passes and planned to station eight hundred men at each one, where they could attack the advancing British forces and then drop back to Brooklyn Heights. However, the Jamaica Pass, four miles from the Brooklyn Heights fortifications on the American left wing, was left virtually unguarded.

INVASION OF LONG ISLAND

Misinformed by spies on Staten Island, Washington on 21 August anticipated a three-pronged attack—on Long Island, the Kings Bridge, and the New Jersey shore—and his troops were spread out in a precarious line straddling the Hudson and East Rivers. If British ships took control of either one, the American army would be divided into several parts that could easily be trapped. Such was the dilemma of defending the New York archipelago: Washington could only put his troops on alert for a possible night attack and await the results. The aggressive plan of cutting off and capturing the Americans resembled Clinton's approach, not General Howe's, and the attack on 21 August never came. Instead, the skies opened and barraged Washington's troops with rain, thunder, and lightning in massive doses, striking terror into the American camps and causing more than a dozen deaths along with other casualties.

On 22 August the British invaded Long Island, landing fifteen thousand troops at Gravesend Bay. Washington received erroneous reports that only eight thousand British troops had landed and still expected another twelve thousand to land at Kings Bridge. However, on 25 August, after the landing of almost five thousand Hessian troops, Washington was convinced that the main attack would be



The Battle of Long Island. *The passage of British troops from Staten Island to Gravesend Bay on 22 August 1776 is depicted in this nineteenth-century wood engraving.* THE GRANGER COLLECTION, NEW YORK

on Long Island, and he brought over additional reinforcements. With some nine thousand troops, the Americans were still outnumbered more than two to one by the twenty thousand British and Hessian soldiers on Long Island. Together, the number of participants from both sides made the ensuing engagement—the Battle of Long Island—the largest battle of the American Revolution.

BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND

On 26 August, the eve of the battle, Oliver De Lancey, a Loyalist adviser to General Howe, convinced him that a daring plan devised by Clinton to outflank the Americans at the Jamaica Pass was feasible with the help of local guides. That night the British marched a large column of troops around the American left wing and through the pass. They arrived behind the American positions on Gowanus Heights on the following morning, 27 August, and fired two cannon, signaling to the British forces arrayed in front of the ridge to press their attacks. The Americans sensed the trap and fled from the ridge to the fortifications on Brooklyn Heights. Some eight hundred Americans were captured, but a sacrificial rearguard action by Lord Stirling and the First Maryland Regiment on the right wing enabled hundreds of others to escape across Gowanus Creek.

AMERICAN EVACUATION TO MANHATTAN

The Battle of Long Island was not the massive slaughter that has often been described, but it was, nonetheless, a traumatic defeat for the Americans, who were penned in behind their line of defense with their backs to the East River. However, a strong wind blowing from the northeast kept the British fleet from sailing up the river to cut off their retreat, and General Howe opted to begin siege operations instead of storming the American lines, believing he could accomplish his purpose that way with fewer casualties. This gave Washington time to carry out a thorough evacuation of his men and matériel across the East River on the night of 29 August, leaving the British stunned and empty-handed.

Washington had reviewed the American disposition of troops on the eve of the Battle of Long Island and bore ultimate responsibility for the failure to secure the Jamaica Pass. More important in the long run was Howe's failure to follow up his victory on 27 August, which led to speculation that his friendly feelings for the Americans were shaping his strategy and tactics. Indeed, a two-week lull in the fighting that followed the American evacuation also reinforced the impression that the Howe brothers were reluctant to crush the rebels.

BATTLE FOR MANHATTAN

On 11 September, Admiral Howe hosted a peace conference on Staten Island attended by Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge. Howe emphasized his gratitude for the monument to his brother George and a desire to reunite the colonies with the mother country. Having issued the Declaration of Independence, and mindful of displaying their steadfastness to their French and Dutch allies, the Americans refused to negotiate, and the conference ended abruptly.

Washington, who had secured the permission of Congress to abandon New York City to the British, began evacuating his forces up to a naturally strong defensive position on the plateau of Harlem Heights in northern Manhattan. At the same time, he dispatched Nathan Hale to spy on the British and determine when and where they would invade Manhattan. Washington also deployed the first combat submarine, the *Turtle*, which nearly succeeded in blowing up Admiral Howe's flagship, the *Eagle*. While the retreat was still in progress, hostilities resumed on 15 September with the British invasion of Manhattan at Kips Bay and the capture of New York City. American militiamen fled the British bombardment at Kips Bay despite Washington's personal efforts to rally them.

On a hill overlooking the landing area, General Howe and his top aides spent two hours taking tea at the home of Robert and Mary Murray while they waited for the troops

to disembark and while thirty-five-hundred American troops escaped up the west side of the island. The incident gave rise to a morale-boosting myth in the American army that Mary Murray and her two daughters had deliberately charmed and delayed the British high command in order to save the American troops, who would otherwise have been trapped on the southern end of Manhattan. Howe's cautious approach of waiting for the invasion force to reach full strength before setting out across the width of Manhattan further fueled discontent among junior officers over the commander in chief's failure to pursue the Americans vigorously.

On 16 September, Washington sent an elite corps of rangers under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Knowlton to reconnoiter Bloomingdale Heights, the plateau to the south of the American position, in order to determine British dispositions and plans. The rangers clashed with British forces, sparking the Battle of Harlem Heights, a small but significant morale-building victory for the Americans, who saw the British turn and flee for the first time. The British suffered a far more serious setback on 20–21 September, when a fire in New York destroyed a thousand buildings, one-quarter of the city. Convinced that American incendiaries had started the fire, the British became highly protective of their base of operations in New York, a habit that greatly influenced their strategic planning for the rest of the war. The British captured Nathan Hale and hanged him as a spy on 22 September.

INVASION OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY

Having failed in their first two attempts to trap the Americans—in Brooklyn and in lower Manhattan—the British launched a third amphibious landing, this time in Westchester County, in order to get behind Washington's position on Harlem Heights and cut him off from the mainland while severing his supply lines to Connecticut. On 12 October they sailed up through Hell Gate and landed on Throg's Neck, an island at high tide, where the Americans had pulled up the planks on the footbridges across the creek, enabling twenty-five riflemen behind a woodpile to fend off four thousand British troops.

Having lost several days, the British re-embarked and made a second landing at Pelham Bay, where Colonel John Glover and his regiment ambushed them from behind the stone walls lining the roads. The Battle of Pelham Bay was strategically important, because it delayed the British for a day while Washington's vulnerable army of thirteen thousand retreating troops made its way from Harlem Heights to White Plains. Washington entrenched his forces in the hills around the town. In the Battle of White Plains on 28 October, the British captured Chatterton's Hill on the American right wing, but at a high cost in casualties. Washington retreated into the hills north of White Plains, and Howe once again failed to

follow up swiftly. When Howe was ready to attack, a rainstorm lasting twenty hours cancelled his offensive.

FALL OF FORT WASHINGTON

On 2 November, Howe gave up the chase and headed south to capture Fort Washington in northern Manhattan. Fort Washington was now an American outpost behind British lines and had to be wiped out to consolidate Howe's grip on New York City and its environs. Fort Washington, along with Fort Lee, directly across the Hudson, was supposed to keep the British out of the river but had proved ineffective. Greene had told Washington the fort could be defended and if necessary evacuated across the river to New Jersey. Washington was dubious about the value of the fort but deferred to Greene as the commander on the spot. On 16 November, Howe issued an ultimatum for the surrender of the fort, and Colonel Robert McGaw, the garrison commander, refused. The British closed in on four fronts, securing the fort, a huge cache of supplies, some twenty-eight hundred American prisoners, and the entire northern end of Manhattan. This brought American losses in the New York campaign—killed, wounded, and captured—to forty-four hundred. The Americans captured in the campaign were among the estimated eleven thousand who perished during the war on British prison ships in Brooklyn's Wallabout Bay.

SIGNIFICANCE

The fall of Fort Washington, often erroneously labeled the worst American defeat of the war, ended the New York campaign and—along with the Battle of Long Island and the flight of the militia at Kips Bay—cast a pall on its memory. (In fact, the worst single loss of the war was Clinton's capture of Charleston, South Carolina, in 1780, when he seized the neck of the peninsula on which the city was built and took fifty-five hundred American prisoners.) Had the Howe brothers followed Clinton's very similar advice with regard to New York City, the American cause might have been crushed in 1776. Instead, Washington and his French allies adopted the tactics the British had failed to use in the New York campaign to trap them on the Yorktown peninsula in 1781, ushering in their final defeat two years later.

In New York, Washington's ability to execute timely retreats and prevent such a scenario from unfolding in favor of the British exposed General Howe's sluggish movements, cast doubt on his determination to defeat the Americans, and began to destroy his reputation. With the exception of the catastrophe at Fort Washington, the New York campaign was viewed by some contemporaries as a victory in disguise. Washington was in flight across New Jersey with a greatly diminished army at the end of

November 1776, but the core of a fighting force had escaped to carry on the Revolution. The British had captured a city they considered strategically vital, but maintaining control of New York during the next seven years would in large part cost them the war: reluctant to spare troops and ships from the defense of their principal base, the British failed to rescue Burgoyne at Saratoga in 1777 and Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781—the two critical turning points of the American Revolution.

During the military occupation of the city from 1776 to 1783, the British also lost the battle for the hearts and minds of their Loyalist supporters. In the absence of civil courts, British soldiers and officials committed abuses and crimes against civilians with impunity. Corruption and profiteering within the army were rampant, while the city, crowded with Tory refugees, suffered from hyperinflation and acute shortages of shelter, food, and fuel. Efforts to reform the military regime and restore civil law came too late for the British to regain the moral high ground. On 25 November 1783, the British evacuated New York and, in a peaceful transfer, Washington triumphantly marched into the city he had lost in the campaign of 1776.

SEE ALSO *Harlem Heights, New York; Kips Bay, New York; Long Island, New York, Battle of; Staten Island Peace Conference; White Plains, New York.*

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Barnet Schechter

NEW YORK CITY FIRE. 20–21 September 1776. Shortly after midnight on 21 September a fire broke out in a wooden house near Whitehall Slip and spread rapidly north with the help of a stiff breeze. A shift of wind at about 2 A.M. confined the fire to an area between Broadway and the Hudson River, but 493 houses were destroyed before British troops and residents of the city could put out the flames. The British accused the Americans of setting the fire, but the charge was never supported by anything more than circumstantial evidence. More than 200 suspects were questioned and released, but no one was ever convicted. The fire caused the British army a great deal of trouble, because they had counted on billeting troops in the city. During the seven years of British occupation, from 1776 to 1783, New York—having lost a quarter of its buildings in the fire—endured an acute housing shortage as Loyalist refugees flocked to the city. Despite the temptation to burn New York and deprive the enemy of winter quarters, Congress had prohibited the destruction of the city on the assumption that the Americans would eventually win it back. General George Washington commented that “Providence, or some good honest fellow, has done more for us than we were disposed to do for ourselves.”

SEE ALSO *New York.*

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revised by Barnet Schechter

NEW YORK LINE. New York was the first of the colonies outside of New England to face the idea of raising full-time troops, fearing exposure to British attacks from the sea or Canada. The Continental Congress recommended that it raise defensive garrisons on 25 May 1775. Six days later the Provincial Congress in New York City accepted the concept, although it did not decide on the composition of that force until 30 June. Meanwhile, on 14 June 1775 when it created the Continental Army, the Philadelphia body adopted the New York forces about to be raised as part of the national force. That summer the

New York Line came into being with four regiments. In the first year of the war these units held New York City, began fortifying the Hudson Highlands, and deployed to Lake Champlain and Canada.

When enlistments expired, the New Yorkers went through a bit of a tangled reorganization. One unit, Nicholson's Regiment, was created in Canada from veterans of all four of the 1775 regiments who had agreed to remain on duty during the siege of Quebec. The First, Third, and Fourth New York Regiments of 1775 regrouped and became (respectively) the First, Second, and Third New York Regiments of 1776. The 1775 Second Regiment, which was the unit raised in the northern end of the state, reenlisted under its former colonel, Goose Van Schaick, and returned to Canada as Van Schaick's Regiment, while a new Fourth Regiment was recruited in the same geographical area. In June 1776 other veterans, especially from that part of the 1775 Third New York which had gone into Canada, regrouped in the north as Dubois's Regiment. Thus the state provided a total of seven infantry regiments during the year.

In 1777, Congress reduced New York's quota to five regiments, partially reflecting the loss of New York City and Long Island to the British. The old First New York, which was the city's regiment, was disbanded, as was Nicholson's statewide formation. The two Albany-area regiments, Van Schaick's and the Fourth, merged and reenlisted as the new First New York Regiment. The 1776 Second and Third New York Regiments became, respectively, the 1777 Fourth and Second Regiments, while Dubois's Regiment became the new Third. Finally, a new Fifth New York Regiment was recruited, although with a heavy veteran cadre drawn primarily from the downstate counties. On 1 January 1781 the quota dropped further, to just two regiments. This was achieved by consolidating the First and Third Regiments of 1777 to form a new First New York Regiment, and the combining the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Regiments of 1777 to form the new Second New York. Both of these units served until the end of the war.

New York also contributed several other Continental Army elements which did not form part of the Line: Warner's Extra Continental Regiment (the Green Mountain Boys—Vermont was still a part of New York); most of Malcolm's Additional Continental Regiment; and the majority of the Second Continental Artillery Regiment were all recruited from New York.

SEE ALSO *Green Mountain Boys*.

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Robert K. Wright Jr.

NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS. Major General Thomas Gage, the British commander in North America, began the process of raising this unit when he sent two lieutenants from Boston to New York City on 18 July 1775 with orders:

"to receive on board your [transport] ship such men as may be inclined to serve His Majesty, and you are particularly to attend to the arrival of ships from Scotland, and to procure as many men out of them as you possibly can, and . . . not to suffer any of those emigrants to join the rebels on shore."

The Volunteers were formally established at Halifax, Nova Scotia, in January and February 1776, and two companies joined William Howe's expedition against New York City in July. They fought at Long Island, White Plains, and Fort Washington and then became part of the garrison of New York City, joining other British and Provincial light forces in skirmishing against the Americans. With other elements of the New York garrison, they took part in Sir Henry Clinton's capture of Fort Montgomery, New York, on 6 October 1777. Sent south in late November 1778 under Lieutenant Colonel George Turnbull as part of Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell's expedition against Savannah, Georgia, the

Volunteers stayed to help defend the city from the Franco-American counterattack in September–October 1779. On the American Establishment as the Third American Regiment from 2 May 1779, the Volunteers joined Clinton's expedition against Charleston, South Carolina, in May 1780. They remained in the South and fought at Hobkirk's Hill, outside Camden, on 25 April 1781, and again at Eutaw Springs on 8 September. Back in New York by August 1782, they were evacuated to Canada the next year and disbanded.

SEE ALSO *Turnbull, George*.

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revised by *Harold E. Selesky*

NICARAGUA. The operations of Britain in Central America were part of its war against Spain. They initially began as retaliatory actions against the Spanish with the relatively modest enterprise of taking the port of Omoa in Honduras. The success of the assault, which included the capture of large amounts of bullion, emboldened more ambitious plans that were attempted in 1780. The object was no less than to divide the Spanish Empire in the Americas and to open commercial routes with the Pacific by an expedition along the San Juan River through Lake Nicaragua to Granada and León. It was envisaged that, by creating of chain of posts across Central America, a single force might divide the northern and southern dominions of Spanish America. The plan also anticipated the possibility of fermenting insurrections among the Indians and other inhabitants against Spain, taking advantage of the presence of British settlers on the Mosquito Shore and the Moskito Indians.

The plan was primarily conceived by the governor of Jamaica, Major General John Dalling. On 3 February 1780 a force of four hundred regulars under Captain Polson sailed from Jamaica. They were accompanied by H.M.S. *Hinchinbrook*, commanded by Captain Horatio Nelson, the future victor of Trafalgar. The expedition stalled for three weeks at Cape Gracias à Dios before

departing for the mouth of the San Juan on April 1. In fact, the river proved a major obstacle. Its navigation caused delays that deprived the expedition of the vital element of surprise and that exposed the troops to onset of the season of torrential rainfall before they had taken possession of the river. It proved dangerously shallow and unnavigable in some sections.

The enterprise proved a fiasco. It succeeded in the capture, after a six-day siege, of Fort San Juan on 29 April but failed to reach Lake Nicaragua and was called off by the middle of May. Colonel Stephen Kemble, who had assumed the command, withdrew to the sea, leaving a small garrison at the fort, which was subsequently evacuated and partly demolished on 4 January 1781. The original plan was conceived in ignorance of the realities of the region's geography, while the expectations of support among Native people and settlers were too optimistic. The primary reason for failure was disease among the troops. Dr. Benjamin Moseley, who participated in the expedition, calculated that of about 1,800 people involved, not more than 380 ever returned. Six of the nine officers lost their lives. Only 10 of the 200 crew members survived in the *Hinchinbroke*. Nelson and Lieutenant Edward Marcus Despard had to position the guns themselves owing to sickness among the troops at Fort San Juan. They alone received credit for their valor in what was otherwise regarded as a debacle.

The British government had committed additional resources for the campaign at a time when it denied extra troops to Sir Henry Clinton in New York. It is another example of the extent to which British interests outside North America deflected resources from the war for America after 1778. The Spanish, after repulsing the attack, fortified the mouth of the river to the lake and began their own offensive, in which they successfully removed the British from the Mosquito Shore.

SEE ALSO *Despard, Edward Marcus*.

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revised by *Andrew O'Shaughnessy*

NICHOLAS, SAMUEL. (1744–1790). Senior Continental marine officer. A native of Philadelphia, Samuel Nicholas was appointed captain of marines on 28 November 1775, and his commission was confirmed

prior to that of any other officer of the Continental naval service. It remains uncertain whether he achieved his appointment because of his vocation or through a recommendation by one or more of his many prominent Philadelphia acquaintances. He led the storming of Fort Montagu, New Providence, Bahamas, on 3–4 March 1776, and on 25 June was promoted to major. He commanded the Marine battalion of 150 men that reinforced General George Washington's army at Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey, on 2–3 January 1777. From 1777 to 1780 he executed orders for the Marine Committee and the Board of Admiralty as a major of marines and as a muster master. He died in 1790 in Philadelphia.

SEE ALSO *Marines*.

revised by Charles R. Smith

NICOLA, LEWIS. (1717?–1807). Continental officer. Ireland and Pennsylvania. Probably born in Ireland, perhaps in 1717, Nicola joined the British army as ensign in 1740, rising to the rank of major. He resigned his commission in 1766 to emigrate to America. Settling in Philadelphia, he established the *American Magazine* in 1769 and became active in the American Philosophical Society.

Early in 1776, Nicola became the barrack master of Philadelphia, and from December 1776 until February 1782 he was town major in command of the volunteer "home guards." In June 1777 Congress put him in command of the Invalid Regiment of Continental soldiers seriously wounded yet still capable of service, and among the useful duties he found for these incapacitated veterans was the instruction of recruits. Meanwhile he had been active as a recruiting officer, compiled and published *A Treatise of Military Exercise* (1776), and translated and published the Chevalier de Clairac's *L'Ingénieur de Campagne: or Field Engineer* (1776) and General De Grandmaison's *A Treatise, on the Military Service, of Light Horse and Light Infantry* (1777).

For about two years, starting in the summer of 1781, Nicola was with the main encampment of the army around Newburgh. In May 1782 he wrote to General George Washington, proposing that a monarchy be established with the commander-in-chief as king. Though others probably supported Nicola's proposal, Washington ignored it and it received no further attention. Congress did not know about Nicola's proposal that they be put out of business and innocently included Nicola among the twenty-six officers brevetted as brigadier generals in their resolution of 30 September 1783. He held various offices

in Philadelphia until 1798, when he moved to Alexandria, Virginia., where he died on 9 August 1807.

SEE ALSO *Invalid*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

NINETY SIX, SOUTH CAROLINA.

Before the Revolution, the settlement called Ninety Six was a stockaded village on the "Charleston Path" into Cherokee territory and a critical junction in South Carolina's trade with Native Americans. Its name came from the erroneous belief that it was 96 miles from Fort Prince George, but the straight-line distance actually was less than 65 miles. It was the center of conflict between Tories and Patriots of the region in 1775 (see next article). When the British reoccupied the South in 1780 they established an important post at Ninety Six: in addition to being healthy and already fortified to a degree, its location maintained contact with the Indians and formed a base to rally local Loyalists. Unfortunately for the British, it also threatened the "Over Mountain" white settlements in what is now Tennessee. One reason why Cornwallis reacted so promptly to Morgan's movements before the battle of Cowpens was because he thought Morgan's objective was Ninety Six. The most important action at Ninety Six, was Greene's siege of 22 May–19 June 1781 (see below).

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

NINETY SIX, SOUTH CAROLINA.

19 November 1775. As tension mounted between Patriots and Loyalists, the South Carolina Council of Safety sent William H. Drayton, a member of the Provincial Congress, and the Reverend William Tennent inland during the month of August 1775 to organize Patriot forces. The Loyalist leaders Thomas Fletchall, Moses Kirkland, Robert and Patrick Cunningham, and Thomas Brown reacted by taking the field with a body of armed supporters. In September, one thousand Patriot militia under Drayton were confronted near Ninety Six by a larger force under Fletchall. Drayton persuaded the Loyalists to disperse, but they were later encouraged by his inability to rally militia and took the field again. On 3 November, Patrick Cunningham seized a group of wagons carrying a large shipment of gunpowder and lead that was intended as a gift from the Council of Safety to the Cherokee. On 19 November about six hundred Patriots under Major Andrew Williamson were driven into Ninety Six by eighteen

hundred Loyalists. For two days these frontiersmen exchanged heavy gunfire, the Loyalists losing four killed and twenty wounded, while the Patriots lost one dead and a dozen wounded. Facing a stalemate, the two sides agreed to a truce under which they would go their separate ways.

SEE ALSO *Reedy River, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

NINETY SIX, SOUTH CAROLINA.

22 May–19 June 1781. Being the most important interior post after Camden, South Carolina, Ninety Six became Nathanael Greene's objective after the British abandoned Camden. Francis Lord Rawdon ordered Ninety Six evacuated, but his message was intercepted. At the time of Greene's approach, this strategic post had been considerably strengthened by Lieutenant Henry Haldane, a British army engineer. A stockade surrounded the village. On the east end was the Star Fort, a strong, star-shaped redoubt encircled by a ditch and abatis. Connected by a covered way to the west end of the village was an outpost called Fort Holmes, which consisted of a stockade to protect parties going for water from a little stream. The tactical weakness of the position came from the lack of a more protected source of water. At the time Lieutenant Colonel John Harris Cruger commanded a garrison of some 550 Loyalists at Ninety Six. Provincial units were the Second Battalion of James De Lancey's Brigade (New York; 150 men) and part of Skinner's New Jersey Volunteers (200 men), backed up by 200 South Carolina militia. The northern troops were veterans who had started their operations on Long Island and who had been seasoned not only by the partisan warfare of the South but also by service with British regulars at Savannah, Charleston, and around Camden; they were dedicated Loyalists who believed that loss of their fort would devastate the region's Tories. Provisions were adequate, but their artillery was limited to three three-pounders.

The Southern Department army under Greene reached Ninety Six on 22 May in a driving rain. Henry Lee's Partisan Corps was off supporting Andrew Pickens's militia in the siege of Augusta (22 May–5 June), Thomas Sumter was still fighting his own war and not paying attention to Greene, and Francis Marion was occupied dogging Rawdon's heels from Camden to the vicinity of Charleston (at Monck's Corner) and then patrolling the lower Santee (after taking Georgetown, South Carolina on 29 May). Greene had about one thousand regulars at Ninety Six and hoped to be reinforced as the detachments completed their missions. However, he had to start operations against a strong position with the forces immediately available. His

most reliable troops were his two weak infantry brigades—the more experienced Maryland and Delaware veterans and the reconstituted Virginians—backed up by a small North Carolina militia contingent. Lacking heavy artillery—which were too difficult to bring along the wretched road network—Greene had no choice but to undertake formal siege operations by regular approaches.

GREENE'S ERRORS

After a hasty reconnaissance by his engineer, Thaddeus Kosciuszko, Greene—who was inexperienced in this type of operation—committed two errors right off the bat that would hobble the American siege. First, he directed his main effort against the strongest point of Cruger's defenses, the Star Redoubt, instead of against his water supply. Second, he started his works too close to the enemy's lines.

Cruger had seen Greene's scouts appear on 21 May and the main army arrive the next day to make camp at four points around his post. The morning of the 22d a rebel trench was seen a mere seventy yards away from the abatis that surrounded the Star. At 11 A.M. Cruger had completed construction of a gun platform on which his men had been working for several days. Covered by a surprise artillery fire from this platform and by small arms fire as well, Lieutenant John Roney sallied forth to wipe out the rebel work party. He was followed by militia and black laborers who filled in the trench and withdrew with the enemy's tools before Greene could react. It was a brilliant little coup, although Roney was mortally wounded.

The night of 23–24 May, Greene started his trenches a second time, at the respectable distance of four hundred yards. The defenders sent out raiding parties at night to interrupt this work, but by 3 June the second parallel of the formal siege's three-step approach was completed and the rebels were at about the point where Roney had scored his victory, some sixty yards from the Star Fort. Using the Fort Mott experience, Greene had also erected a Maham Tower. Cruger reacted by adding three feet of sandbags to the Star Fort but was unable to set the tower on fire with artillery hot shot. Greene now went through the formality of summoning the garrison to surrender, which Cruger refused, although he had already run out of fresh food and estimated that he only had a month's worth of supplies left. On the positive side, his losses to date had been insignificant and, unknown to the garrison, a powerful force of three fresh regiments from Ireland had just landed in Charleston to reinforce Rawdon.

As Greene's artillery raked the Star and the village from the completed portion of the approaches, work on the third and last leg of Kosciuszko's parallels went on night and day. Cruger ordered trenches dug for the protection of the refugees. When the attackers tried to set fire

to the buildings with fire arrows, Cruger had the shingle roofs stripped off. When enemy artillery made the gun platform in the Star untenable during daylight, the defenders used them only at night.

AMERICAN REINFORCEMENTS

On 8 June Henry “Light-Horse Harry” Lee arrived from the successful capture of Augusta with major reinforcements in the form of his Second Partisan Corps. The defenders had momentarily hoped this troop movement was Rawdon coming to their rescue, knowing neither that he had only set out from Charleston the day before nor that his relief column had to take a roundabout route to avoid being ambushed. Now, as part of Lee’s force marched within artillery range of the fort with its prisoners from Fort Cornwallis at Augusta, Georgia, the Ninety Six garrison assumed that Greene was conducting psychological warfare. They particularly objected to the thought that the rebels were using prisoners to shield themselves from retaliatory fire. Henry Lee presented a different picture, saying that the officer commanding this detachment took the wrong road and was “very severely reprimanded by Lieutenant Colonel Lee, for the danger to which his inadvertence had exposed the corps.”

Lee’s reinforcements allowed Greene to begin additional siege operations from the north, correcting the flaws in his original attack plan by finally applying pressure against Fort Holmes with a view to cutting off the enemy’s water supply. Although Lee said in his *Memoirs* that Kosciuszko’s “blunders lost us Ninety Six” and comments on his failure to attack the water supply, Lee does not claim credit for proposing that his troops be assigned this mission; the historian Christopher Ward, on the other hand, has said in *The War of the Revolution* that Lee “immediately suggested” the plan, and others have echoed this opinion. (Most likely, the belief that Lee made the proposal is a logical assumption that just happens to be wrong, since false modesty was not one of Lee’s character defects.)

Cruger continued to maintain an active defense, sending out frequent patrols under the cover of darkness to check on American activities and to try slowing down the siege by damaging the artillery and trenches. On the night of 9–10 June the defenders sent two raiding parties. One overran a four-gun battery but lacked the specialized equipment needed to spike the tubes and put them out of action; on the other hand, this party discovered the mouth of the mine that had been started north of the Star. The other group of raiders attacked the covering party in Lee’s sector.

GREENE’S DECISIONS

On 11 June, Greene got a message from Sumter saying that British reinforcements had reached Charleston and

were marching to the relief of Ninety Six. He responded in two ways. First, he ordered Pickens and William Washington, with all his cavalry, to join Sumter and Marion in blocking this movement. Then he redoubled his efforts to reduce the little fortress. At 11 A.M. on the 12th, covered by “a dark, violent storm . . . from the west, without rain,” a sergeant and nine privates of the Legion infantry crawled toward Fort Holmes in an attempt to set fire to the stockade; they were discovered in the act of starting the fire and the sergeant and five men were killed (Lee, op. cit., 373). But by the 17th the Americans were finally able to cut the garrison off from normal access to its water supply.

Cruger’s hopes rebounded that same day, however, when the first messenger from Rawdon finally made it through the besiegers’ lines. He reported that the relief column was on the march. Sumter had assumed that Rawdon would march by way of Fort Granby, and by trying to block that route he took himself out of position so that Rawdon slipped past the trap.

Greene now had three alternatives: give up the entire operation and retreat; move against Rawdon; or storm the fort before Rawdon could arrive, even though the parallels had not yet been completed. With only half the number of regular infantry as Rawdon, Greene adopted the third alternative. According to Lee, Greene probably would have retreated, but:

his soldiers, with one voice, entreated to be led against the fort. The American army having witnessed the unconquerable spirit which actuated their general . . . recollected, with pain and remorse, that by the misbehavior of one regiment at the battle of Guilford, and of another at Hobkirk’s Hill, their beloved general had been deprived of his merited laurels; and they supplicated their officers to entreat their commander to give them now an opportunity of obliterating their former disgrace. This generous ardor could not be resisted by Greene.

THE ASSAULT

A coordinated attack by Lee and Lieutenant Colonel Richard Campbell was to be made against Fort Holmes and the Star Redoubt, covered by an artillery barrage and snipers in the Maham Tower. The advance team, known in the era as the Forlorn Hope, was commanded by Captain Michael Rudolph on Lee’s front and by Lieutenants Isaac Duval and Samuel Seldon on Campbell’s. Another team, equipped with iron hooks on long poles to pull down the sandbags and fascines to bridge the ditch, followed the Forlorn Hope at the Star. Assault forces moved into position in the trenches at 11 A.M. on the 18th. A signal cannon fired at noon began the assault.

Rudolph fought his way into Fort Holmes, which was now lightly held; the rest of Lee's infantry and Kirkwood's company followed. Lee then awaited the outcome of Campbell's attack and prepared to attack across the stream. The assault groups of Duval and Seldon moved forward as planned. Axmen cut gaps through the abatis at two points; others used the fascines to fill in the ditch, and the men with the hooks began pulling down sandbags. Campbell's main body waited for the gaps to open while the remaining Virginia and Maryland Continentals fired by platoons from their trenches.

Cruger had chosen to mass his three small guns in an attempt to make them decisive, and he personally directed their fire. He first engaged Lee but then shifted the guns against Campbell with greater effect. The Star was defended by Major Green and 150 New York Loyalists. Seeing that passive measures would lead inevitably to defeat, he gambled and launched most of his men in a counterattack. Two thirty-man groups under Captains Thomas French and Peter Campbell exited from a sally port behind the Star, circled in opposite directions to the front, and attack the rebels who were in defilade in the ditch. American supporting fire prevented the defenders from engaging troops in the ditch by sweeping away anyone who exposed himself in an effort to lean over. This aggressive solution succeeded in defeating the Forlorn Hope in desperate hand-to-hand combat after both Duval and Seldon were disabled by wounds. At that point Campbell's attack failed and the men retreated. Forty-five minutes after it had begun, the assault was over.

Greene had been beaten again; although his men performed as well as any commander could ask, he, Kosciuszko, and Sumter had made too many mistakes against an enemy that was energetic and well-led. Lee's forces withdrew from Fort Holmes after dark, and Greene lifted the siege on the 19th. That day he fell back ten miles to put the Saluda River between his men and Rawdon. The cavalry rejoined him there, and the Americans then retreated in the direction of Charlotte, North Carolina, to begin refitting and preparing for their next mission. Rawdon reached Ninety Six the morning of the 21st, having marched almost two hundred miles under a blazing sun through desolated country with two thousand troops. After a dramatic welcome by Cruger and his garrison, Rawdon pursued Greene, but when he reached the Enoree River (about thirty miles northeast of Ninety Six), he received intelligence that convinced him he was too far behind and so returned to Ninety Six. In spite of Cruger's heroics, the strategic situation rendered Ninety Six untenable. Rawdon had no choice but to abandon the post and fall back toward Charleston, harassed by the American cavalry and militia. Marching back and forth caused particular suffering for his three new regiments (3d, 19th, and 30th Foot), which had just completed the

arduous voyage from Ireland and had not yet acclimated themselves.

LOSSES

During the 28-day siege, the rebels lost 185 killed and wounded, according to Lee. Ward has said they lost 147: 57 killed, 70 wounded, and 20 missing. Cruger lost 27 killed and 58 wounded. Only one officer was killed on each side, Roney and George Armstrong (First Maryland).

SIGNIFICANCE

The siege of Ninety Six marked the last gasp of the crown's southern strategy. Local Loyalist support had not been sufficient to exert a hold on the interior portions of Georgia or the Carolinas, and the ministry never had enough regular troops to commit to hold all of the ports and inland settlements. Greene's policy of preserving his main Southern Department force of Continentals and maneuvering it in a manner that tied up Rawdon's regulars, while at the same time using Lee and Washington to "stiffen" the southern partisans, succeeded. Although he never won a decisive battlefield victory, his subordinates systematically eliminated all of the outlying posts. The siege would also be Rawdon's last engagement before he started back to Britain (and was captured at sea).

SEE ALSO *Augusta, Georgia (22 May–5 June 1781); Cruger, John Harris; De Lancey, James; Kosciuszko, Thaddeus Andrzej Bonawentura; Lee, Henry ("Light-Horse Harry"); Marion, Francis; Monck's Corner, South Carolina; Pickens, Andrew; Rawdon-Hastings, Francis; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene; Sumter, Thomas; Washington, William.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

NIXON, JOHN. (1727–1815). Continental general. Massachusetts. Son of a man who also spelled his name Nickson, he was born at Framingham, Massachusetts, on 1 March 1727. At age eighteen he enlisted in Sir William

Pepperrell's Regiment and took part in the attack on Louisburg, Canada, in 1745. He was a lieutenant in the first contingent (7 March 1755) raised in Massachusetts at the start of the final French and Indian War, became a captain six months later (8 September) in Colonel Timothy Ruggles's Regiment, and fought at the battle of Lake George. He spent the winter on the frontier, and the next year was again a captain under Ruggles. After moving over the Framingham town line to Sudbury in 1758, he served as a captain in three more expeditions (1759, 1761, and 1762).

On 19 April 1775 he marched as captain of the minuteman company from Sudbury to the South Bridge at Concord, and there joined in harrying the British back to Boston. Five days later, he was appointed a colonel in the Massachusetts eight-months' army. He led his men across Charlestown Neck to support the redoubt and breastworks at Bunker Hill on 17 June and was seriously wounded in action. He took part in the siege of Boston and the defense of New York City, becoming colonel of the Fourth Continental Regiment on 1 January 1776 and brigadier general on 9 August 1776. His brigade of three Rhode Island and two Massachusetts regiments was assigned to Major General Nathanael Greene's division. It did not take part in the battle of Long Island, but a detachment was heavily engaged at Harlem Heights on 16 September and again at White Plains on 28 October. Nixon's brigade remained in the Hudson Highlands at the start of the New Jersey campaign, but moved south with the column led by Major General Charles Lee. During the Trenton campaign the brigade was down the Delaware River with the forces led by John Cadwalader and saw no action.

Appointed to command the First Massachusetts Brigade (Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Regiments) at the start of the 1777 campaign, Nixon and his men were ordered to reinforce the Northern army against the invasion of Burgoyne's army, reaching Fort Edward on 13 July. Major General Philip Schuyler, commander of the Northern Department, was anxious for reinforcement and complained that Nixon had taken four days to cover 46 miles with his brigade of only 575 rank and file fit for duty. Major General Horatio Gates, who replaced Schuyler on 4 August, placed Nixon's brigade on the extreme right of the defensive line atop Bemis Heights, overlooking the Hudson River, and it held this position during the two battles of Saratoga. The brigade led the tardy pursuit, however, and was halted at the Fishkill on 11 October after drawing fire from what Gates suddenly learned was not the enemy's rear guard but his main force. Nixon suffered permanent impairment to an eye and an ear during the fighting when a cannon ball passed close to his head. After escorting the Saratoga prisoners to Cambridge, Nixon spent several months on sick leave, married the widow of a comrade killed at Harlem Heights (Micajah Gleason), sat on the court-martial of

Philip Schuyler (October 1778), and on 12 September 1780 resigned because of ill health.

He took no part in public life after the war. About seven years before his death he moved from Sudbury to Middlebury, Vermont, where he died on 24 March 1815.

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege; Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Harlem Heights, New York; Saratoga, First Battle of; Saratoga, Second Battle of.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

NIXON, JOHN. (1733–1808). Patriot merchant, financier. Pennsylvania. Born in Philadelphia in 1733, Nixon (not to be confused with General John Nixon) inherited his father's shipping business and wharf in Philadelphia when he was about sixteen years old. He was soon a leading figure in the city's public affairs, becoming a lieutenant of the Dock Ward Company in 1756, signing the nonimportation agreement in 1765, helped organize the "Silk Stockings" volunteer militia (Third Battalion of Associators) of which he was lieutenant colonel, and in late 1775, acted as president of the provincial Committee of Safety when Benjamin Franklin and Robert Morris were absent. In 1776 he had a particularly active year; after commanding the defense of Fort Island in the Delaware in May, he took command of the Philadelphia city guard, served on the Continental Navy Board, gave the first public reading of the Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia on 8 July, marched a short time later with his battalion to the defense of Amboy, and then took the field in the Trenton and Princeton campaign, succeeding John Cadwalader as colonel.

In 1779 he was an auditor of public accounts and was involved in settling and adjusting the depreciated Continental currency. The next spring he helped organize the Bank of Pennsylvania to supply the army, contributed five thousand pounds, and was appointed one of its two directors. In 1784 he became a director of the Bank of North America; in 1792 he became its second president and held this post until his death. Meanwhile, he was a city alderman from 1789 to 1796. His son, Henry, married a daughter of Robert Morris and was the bank's fourth president. Nixon died in Philadelphia on 31 December 1808.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

NOAILLES, LOUIS MARIE. (1756–1804). French officer. Born in Paris on 17 April 1756, the vicomte de Noailles was the son of Marshal Philippe duc de Mouchy. Becoming a captain at the age of seventeen, Noailles sought to go to America with his brother-in-law, the marquis de Lafayette, but was discouraged by his family. Instead he was appointed aide to the quartermaster in 1778 and made second in command of the Hussards regiment in 1779. Gaining a reputation for his cool head at the siege of Grenada in July 1779, Noailles took part in the unsuccessful attempt to capture Savannah, where he again distinguished himself. Awarded the chevalier de Saint-Louis on 20 January 1780, Noailles joined Rochambeau's army in Rhode Island in July 1780. Active in the Battle of Yorktown in October 1781, he was given the honor of serving as the official French representative at Cornwallis's surrender. Returning to France with Lafayette, Noailles was made commandant of the King's Dragoons on 27 January 1782. In the early phase of the French Revolution, Noailles was a prominent liberal, serving in the Estates-General, where he and Lafayette led the contingent of aristocrats who joined with the other orders in creating the National Assembly on 25 June 1789 and proposing an end to all privileges of the nobility on 4 August. In 1791 he was elected president of the Constituent Assembly. Noailles fled France for England in 1792 as the Revolution spun out of control, moving on the following year to Philadelphia, where he became a successful businessman. In 1802 he went to the West Indies, again taking command of French troops. He was wounded in a sea battle and died in Havana on 7 January 1804.

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“NO-FLINT.” Nickname of Charles Grey.

SEE ALSO *Grey, Charles* (“No-flint”).

NO-MAN'S LAND AROUND NEW YORK CITY. Westchester County, New York, had the misfortune to be situated between the American and British lines for seven years, from 1776 to 1783. During that time detachments from both armies, as well as local militia for both sides and outlaws and plunderers for

neither side, ravaged the countryside and the population. A county that started the war as a prosperous farming area with perhaps twenty-two thousand people would end the war with a mostly depleted populace, farms ruined, and years of rebuilding ahead of it. This Neutral Zone, as it was often called during the war, proved to be one of the deadliest and most dangerous locations in the American Revolution, caught in the crosshairs of the two contending armies.

The trouble for this doomed region actually began in November 1775, when a Whig supporter of the rebellion, Isaac Sears, decided to take matters into his own hands and led a band of eighty supporters into New York City and destroyed James Rivington's pro-British printing press. Sears and his men then left the city and headed toward Connecticut, stopping along the way in Westchester County to disarm several Loyalists. Other Loyalists throughout the New York City area began to band together to protect themselves from similar treatment.

THE BRITISH ARMY ARRIVES

The real problems started after the British army arrived in August 1776 and took control of New York City in a series of battles between August and October 1776. The British maintained a garrison in the county from that point until the end of the war, evacuating in November 1783. During that time the British lines usually extended about ten miles north of Manhattan Island, up to Phillipsburgh on the Hudson River to the north and eastward to Eastchester on Long Island Sound. The American lines were centered on Peekskill and the southern part of the Highlands, a rough and mountainous region that extended on both sides of the Hudson River about twenty-five miles north of Manhattan Island. The land in between these lines became the Neutral Zone, a battleground for every type of military formation, from scouting parties and foragers from the regular armies to militia and to lawless elements intent on plundering for their own profit. Many men fled the area, especially Loyalist males, who feared harassment, imprisonment, or even death at the hands of the Whig militia and outlaws roaming the area. Many of these Loyalist men would make their way to New York City and ultimately join bands of Loyalists that raided back into the Neutral Zone.

Soon after the British occupied Staten Island, Manhattan Island, and Long Island, the Whig-controlled New York state convention ordered all livestock and grain in the area between the armies to be confiscated to keep it out of the hands of the enemy. New York militia forces swarmed through the region, taking everything they could find. This process became an annual event, as parties from both sides tried desperately to control the vital food supplies of the area. Since the British were often low on

food in New York City, they were especially desirous of obtaining as many supplies as they could from the territory north of their lines.

COWBOYS AND SKINNERS

Into this vacuum emerged the Cowboys, a mostly pro-British unit made up of Loyalist militiamen and some soldiers detached or deserted from the British army itself. William Tryon, the former royal governor of New York, initially raised the unit. The Cowboys specialized in rustling cattle from farms in the area and from herds being driven from New England through the area south toward the American forces in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The Cowboys' numbers varied from a few dozen to a few hundred over the years. By 1780 they were commanded by the notorious Loyalist, James De Lancey. They raided throughout Westchester County, often preying on the easiest targets, such as lone farmers, plundering them and then moving on. They were not interested in fighting, just stealing. At times, the Cowboys would act in conjunction with units detached from the British army in order to gather forage and other supplies to be taken back to the army for its use. In addition, the Cowboys often sold their plunder to the British army, making a good profit for themselves.

Another Loyalist unit that raided the area was the Loyalist Westchester Refugees, created by the British command in 1777. These partisans were considered more of a combat unit, sent out to fight the growing partisan war against Whig militia forces and Continental army detachments operating in the area, as well as collecting plunder when possible. The Westchester Refugees numbered about five hundred men by the end of the war, usually about half of them mounted when going into action.

The main rebel unit that emerged in this Neutral Zone was the Skinners. This force consisted of local militiamen and other raiders unattached to any particular military unit. The Skinners were less careful about whom they plundered than were the Cowboys, as they stole from anyone on either side of the war. The Westchester militia was not called to serve outside of the county because of the chaotic and dangerous situation that existed there, so the local militiamen were free to focus their energies on plundering the area and hunting the Cowboys. Occasionally, detachments from nearby Continental units assisted the Skinners on their raids. The Skinners had a brutal reputation, perhaps worse than the Cowboys, and there were reports of Skinners using torture to get local inhabitants to reveal the whereabouts of their valuables. At times, the Skinners would even sell stolen goods to the Cowboys to buy goods from within the British lines in New York City. Skinners also were known to steal cattle from within the American lines, claiming they thought they were taking the cattle from the Cowboys.

One unexpected benefit that came from this incessant warfare between the Cowboys and the Skinners was the capture of Major John André, the agent who was in contact with Benedict Arnold during his treasonous activity in 1780. A party of local militia, out hunting Cowboys, ran into André, questioned him, refused an offer of money from him, and sent him to General George Washington, who was at West Point at that time. This action helped prevent the fall of the fort at West Point to the British, which Arnold and André were trying to coordinate.

Washington's Continental army became directly involved in the hunt for the Cowboys and the effort to stop the plundering in 1778, when he used the newly created Light Infantry Corps to guard the Neutral Zone. This unit consisted of regular infantry and dragoons as well as Westchester militia forces. The fighting in the area escalated that autumn when the Light Infantry corps skirmished with Hessian Jägers and Lieutenant Colonel John Simcoe's Queen's Rangers. In 1781 Washington ordered a mixed force of militia and Continentals to attack De Lancey's base at Morrisania. They burned the barracks, killed and captured over seventy Loyalists, and lost only twenty-five men. However, nearby British soldiers garrisoning a fort joined the surviving Loyalists and then pursued the American force on its withdrawal. Such larger-scale operations might slow down the raids for a while but never stopped them. Well into 1783, the Cowboys and Skinners pursued their careers of plunder and theft.

THE ARMIES BATTLE

Another aspect of the war in this Neutral Zone was the constant skirmishing between the two main armies stationed in the area. Westchester County became a battleground, twelve months a year for almost six years, as both armies contended for critical forage and supplies as well as trying to keep the other side as far away as possible. This no-man's-land was a very dangerous place to be, stuck right between the lines of what usually amounted to the two largest forces for both sides during the war.

At its least perilous, this Neutral Zone was the crossroads through which the contending forces traveled to get at each other. This started in January 1777, when New York militia forces assembled at North Castle and marched against the British fortifications near Manhattan Island. Then, starting in the winter of 1777, Washington initiated a deliberate policy of harassing all enemy movement outside of the British lines, and this led to constant skirmishing between units of the main armies and associated militia forces. The Neutral Zone became a key battlefield of this struggle over the next years. The American goals were to collect the forage of the area, deny it to the enemy, and force the British to fight constantly and thus take losses. The local Westchester militia, aided at times by militia from southwestern Connecticut,

had the primary responsibility for protecting the region. Continental troops usually garrisoned the forts in the Highlands north of the area and occasionally moved into the no-man's-land to lend a hand. In addition, as noted earlier, in a few instances Washington ordered larger army units, such as the Light Infantry Corps, into the region. Winter and spring were the most deadly times for the skirmishing in the area. During the summer and autumn, the armies tended to focus on the larger campaigns, and this left the region mostly to the continued contest between forces such as the Cowboys and Skinners.

The maneuvers in the area tended to target either opposing supply concentrations or local fortifications. In the spring of 1777 the British moved up the Hudson River and attacked the American supply magazine at Peekskill, while in August 1777, Americans moved against the British post at Kings Bridge at the northern end of Manhattan Island. In September–October 1777, British General Sir Henry Clinton moved in force against the American forts in the Highlands. Though the Neutral Zone was not a prime target of these kinds of maneuvers, soldiers from both sides regularly traversed the area. Clinton's operation of 1777 included subsidiary raids into Westchester County to divert American militia forces. As the Americans withdrew northward, Connecticut militia tried to fill the void, but with only partial success. British foragers collected supplies, while Loyalists under Tryon moved toward the Connecticut border. Connecticut militia forces were able to repel this advance. As the British withdrew back toward New York City in late October, General Israel Putnam pursued them through this Neutral Zone, while Continental and militia forces from Connecticut pushed southwestward to support Putnam. In November, Putnam threatened the British posts near Manhattan Island but withdrew without seriously attacking.

In 1778 George Clinton, the governor of New York, ordered long-term militia units to stand guard in Westchester County to protect the forage of the area and to prevent communication between the Loyalists and the British army. A regiment of Continental soldiers remained at White Plains to support the local militia. One regiment of Westchester militia, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Morris Graham, took post very near the British garrison at Fort Independence, just outside New York City. From this advanced post, Graham was able to scout on enemy movements and engage any enemy parties when they first emerged from the British lines. Meanwhile, Connecticut militia continued to guard southwestern Connecticut and help support the Westchester militia as well.

By this point, Washington had learned the need to support the militia in the Neutral Zone, and in the spring of 1778 he ordered a cavalry regiment to station itself along the Hudson to be available. He also advised commanders in the area to keep the infantry, both regular and militia, back

nearer fortifications, while sending out only light infantry and cavalry to engage the enemy. Washington, as always, also urged offensive operations against nearby British outposts, but General Horatio Gates, who commanded in the region, declined, considering such moves too risky.

Later that summer, after the British had evacuated Philadelphia and the two main armies had returned to their positions in and around New York City, Washington took further measures to deal with the growing problems in Westchester County. This is when he decided to place a newly created Continental unit there. First, a party of two thousand regulars and militia scoured the area for forage at his behest; then he sent in the Light Infantry Corps, commanded by General Charles Scott. Consisting of Continental infantry, a New York state militia regiment, and the army's dragoons, this corps maintained a forward defense to block British incursions and protect the inhabitants from plundering. Washington withdrew this corps in September, but he kept Continental detachments in the area to support the local militia and to relieve it from its constant duty. Later that autumn, Scott's Light Infantry Corps returned to the area to collect forage once again and to prevent British raids.

Governor Clinton also tried to support the local militia of the Neutral Zone. He ordered militia rangers and other militia detachments into the area from neighboring locations to ease the burden of the local militia and to help hunt down plunderers such as the Cowboys.

In September 1778 the British launched large-scale raids into New Jersey and up the Hudson River, and in the Neutral Zone, Scott's Corps fell back slowly, fighting and skirmishing with the advancing enemy forces. The British commander, Sir Henry Clinton, used this advance to collect supplies and to lure Washington into a large-scale battle. Clinton succeeded at his first goal but failed to gain his desired battle. As always, the people of Westchester County found themselves caught between the movements of the opposing armies.

On the other hand, because of the heightened fears for the area, Washington maintained a strong Continental presence in the county through the winter of 1778–1779. This lent increased protection for the inhabitants and allowed the local militia to gain some needed rest. But still the raids and plundering continued. British raiding parties, consisting of from one to four thousand soldiers, marched through the area in November and December, gathering everything they could find. In addition, these parties in December tried but failed to strike the Continental army's baggage train.

Increasingly, the British need for supplies drove their policy in the Neutral Zone. The month of January 1779 was a time of crisis for the British as supply levels hit critically low levels in New York City. Loyalists, Cowboys, and many others looking to make money tried

to get supplies from Westchester County to the city to sell for hard British gold, and Continental patrols and local militia tried to intercept them. Despite the strenuous efforts to stop such trade, the British were able to acquire enough supplies to last until a supply fleet arrived in late January.

Again, in May–June 1779 British forces advanced northward through the county to attack American positions at Stony Point and Verplank's Point. As the British lingered in the area, Washington detached Continental units to join with the local militia to harass the British advance forces and to threaten their rear by marching through the Neutral Zone behind the British force. Finally, the British withdrew toward the city, but they took the field again in July, marching northeastward toward Connecticut in conjunction with increased amphibious raids along Long Island Sound. The British marched through Westchester County from Phillipsburgh on the Hudson to Mamaroneck on the Sound, right through the heart of the Neutral Zone. Then they marched to Bedford, burned it, and finally withdrew back to Kings Bridge. Finally, by late July 1779, these latest maneuvers came to an end, and a relative calm descended on the Neutral Zone once again. Raids and counterraids continued through the autumn months.

LATE WAR RAIDS

This pattern persisted for the next two years as large-scale operations were few in Westchester County, but foraging, raids, and skirmishes were constant, towns were burned, and people fled. Early in the winter of 1779–1780 saw raids by Connecticut militia against a Loyalist base near the Cowboy base at Morrisania in January and a clash in February between British, German, and Loyalist forces on one side and Continentals stationed just north of the British lines on the other. Fortunately, these raids were actually fewer in number during this winter than previously because a large portion of the British army was with Sir Henry Clinton in South Carolina, and General Wilhelm Knyphausen, commanding in New York City, feared to send out too many men.

Throughout the campaigning season, Westchester County was pretty well protected by the proximity of larger units from the Continental army, but by September, Washington had begun to withdraw the army, and by December 1780 the army was going into winter quarters, leaving Westchester County once again open to the increased depredations of Loyalists, Cowboys, and Skinners. More and more inhabitants fled and more and more towns became deserted. The Neutral Zone was becoming a literal no-man's-land as few men were still living in the area. The militia detachments and Loyalist raiders were often the only men there. By the end of 1780, North Castle and Bedford were both mostly destroyed and empty. The British were scouring the area with abandon,

gathering supplies from as far away as the Connecticut border. About two thousand Continentals were sent to Bedford, but they were of little help in stopping the depredations through the early months of 1781, as even southwestern Connecticut towns were increasingly abandoned.

In fact, the devastation was so bad in Westchester County by the summer of 1781 that when the French army marched through on its way to join Washington outside New York City, many French officers were shocked at what they saw. The arrival of the French in New York in July 1781 led to larger-scale fighting in the part of Westchester County near the British lines. As French and American forces linked, they advanced through the area towards Kings Bridge and Morrisania. British units emerged from their lines, and over the next two days confused fighting raged throughout the area. In the end, both armies disengaged and withdrew, ending the possibility of a full-scale battle. The Cowboy base at Morrisania survived, much to the misfortune of the people still living in the Neutral Zone.

After this, the usual patterns of raids and revenge plagued the no-man's-land through the rest of 1781 and into 1782. Winter skirmishing and depredations, including attacks on North Castle and Morrisania, all occurred once again, with no real change in the situation other than more death, destruction, and misery for the few people still living in the area. The major victory of the Continental and French armies at Yorktown did not immediately end the brutal contest in the Neutral Zone. Loyalists, local militia, and detachments of Continental soldiers continued to skirmish right through the spring of 1782.

Finally, in May 1782 the British commanders in New York City ordered all such raids by British and Loyalist parties to stop, and slowly the hostilities in Westchester County eased but did not totally end. Increasingly, the raids were now made by outlaws and plunderers out for themselves rather than organized units fighting for one side or the other. However, as late as March 1783, local militia attacked the Loyalist base at Morrisania one last time.

By April 1783 both sides had ordered an end to all fighting, but until the state government could reestablish civilian control, people took advantage of the chaos and continued to plunder and steal from local inhabitants. New York militia and even Continental detachments were sent into the area to aid civilian authority in establishing control, but renegade bands continued to scour the area. This violence continued right up until the final evacuation of the British army from New York City in November 1783. At that point, the relentless partisan war, constant raids, and plundering and looting finally came to an end in this divided and war-torn no-man's-land.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason; Cowboys and Skinners; De Lancey, James; Guerrilla War in the North; Hudson*

River and the Highlands; Loyalists in the American Revolution; Militia in the North; Queen's Royal Rangers; Scott, Charles; Sears, Isaac; Tryon, William.

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NONIMPORTATION. Nonimportation was a form of economic sanction by which the colonies sought on several occasions to pressure Parliament to repeal acts they found offensive or illegal. The idea that the colonies should unite in boycotting the importation of British goods was first proposed at a Boston town meeting on 24 May 1764 that had been called to denounce provisions in the Sugar Act. The potential effectiveness of a peaceful economic protest appealed to activists elsewhere, and by the end of the year merchants in other colonies, notably New York, had agreed, or been pressured, to accept nonimportation. The Stamp Act of 1765 gave added urgency to the program, but repeal of the act, news of which arrived at New York City on 26 April 1766, led to abandonment of nonimportation.

The Townshend Revenue Act of 1767 revived the idea of nonimportation, and by the end of 1769 only merchants in New Hampshire had not joined the local Associations that sprang up to enforce nonimportation. The agreements were effective enough so that the value of British imports was reduced by almost 40 percent between 1768 and 1769. When the Townshend duties were limited to tea in April 1770, the appearance of some success and an unwillingness to endure further economic pain led merchants and others to abandon nonimportation, despite efforts by Boston activists to keep the movement alive. The collapse of nonimportation started at Albany, Providence, and Newport in May 1770 and spread to New York City in July; by the end of the year Philadelphia (12 September), Boston (12 October), and Charleston, South Carolina (13 December), had withdrawn from the nonimportation associations. Virginia, which had organized the first Association, finally abandoned the idea in July 1771.

The effectiveness of nonimportation always depended on collective action and cumulative effect. Merchants who originally advocated nonimportation might later take the initiative in ending it when it went on too long and brought them to the verge of economic ruin. Nonimportation depended on vigilant and widespread enforcement by local extralegal groups that were willing to use threats and intimidation to secure compliance, and some merchants were horrified that this tactic was passing from their control into the hands of the activists and the mob. Nonimportation sputtered out in 1771 because the pain was too great, the provocation too small, the impact on imperial policy too unclear, and the prospect of social instability too great. The collapse of nonimportation was a severe setback for the activists, who lamented that "the Spirit of Patriotism seems expiring in America in general" (Miller, p. 315).

Nonimportation was revived a final time in September 1774. At that time the first Continental Congress recommended it as appropriate action to protest the Intolerable Acts.

SEE ALSO *Association; Continental Congress; Grenville Acts; Stamp Act; Sugar Act; Townshend Acts.*

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NOOKS HILL, MASSACHUSETTS
SEE *Dorchester Heights, Massachusetts.*

NORFOLK, VIRGINIA. 1 January 1776. Burned by Lord Dunmore. After defeating Dunmore's forces at Great Bridge on 9 December 1775, Colonel William Woodford entered Norfolk on the 13th. Colonel Robert Howe arrived the next day with a North Carolina regiment and took command. Dunmore had taken refuge on British ships in the harbor where he and his Loyalist recruits suffered from cramped accommodations and lack of provisions. When Colonel Howe refused to stop snipers on shore from firing at the shipping and refused to supply provisions, Dunmore announced the morning of 31 December that he was going to bombard the town. At 4 A.M. of the New Year he put his threat into effect. Captain Edward Bellew's squadron of one frigate and two sloops, backed up by tenders and Dunmore's provincial flotilla, shot into the town for twenty-five hours and landing parties set fire to warehouses near the waterfront. Wind helped spread the flames through the prosperous town of six thousand inhabitants. A few men were wounded on each side, along with a few noncombatants. Lieutenant Colonel Edward Stevens was conspicuous in fighting off the landing parties.

The historian Lynn Montross had correctly identified the long-term significance of the action in saying that "as Virginia's largest town went up in flames the loyalist cause perished with it" (*Reluctant Rebels*, p. 134). The portion of the town that had not been destroyed was razed to prevent its use by the enemy when Colonel Howe ordered the last troops withdrawn on 8 February. Dunmore then landed and built barracks with a view to maintaining a beachhead, but Howe's troops, from their camps at Kemp's Landing, Great Bridge, and Suffolk, made it impossible for the enemy to get provisions from the countryside. With his miserable collection of refugees and Loyalist militia, Dunmore returned to his ships and on 26 May left to establish a new base on Gwynn Island.

SEE ALSO *Gwynn Island, Virginia; Howe, Robert; Murray, John; Woodford, William.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

NORTH, SIR FREDERICK. (1732–1792). British politician and prime minister. He was born on 13 April 1732 in Albermarle Street, off Piccadilly in London. The eldest son of Frederick North, Lord Guilford, and his first wife, Lady Lucy Montagu, he came of a line of courtiers, politicians, and crown servants

stretching back to the reign of Henry VIII. Through his mother he was related to Lord Halifax and young William, second earl of Dartmouth, later became his stepbrother and close friend. Because Guilford was tutor in the household of Frederick, prince of Wales, North was closely connected to the Leicester House interest and knew George III from birth. This connection, alongside his upright character, was to serve North well in later days.

Educated at Eton (the first of his family to go there) and Trinity College, Oxford, young North displayed a curious mixture of conscientious scholarship, sobriety, deep-rooted conservatism, popularity, wit, a generous sense of humor, and a constitutional inability seriously to challenge authority. Because his father refused to make him a generous allowance and died only two years before his son, North was far from wealthy by the standards of his class and needed to achieve and keep office in order to make ends meet. All these characteristics had a bearing upon his long tenure as first minister.

North came down from Oxford in 1751 and, after taking the Grand Tour with Dartmouth, entered Parliament for his father's pocket borough of Banbury in Oxfordshire, a seat he was to hold until his father's death almost forty years later. Thus, although known by the courtesy title of "Lord North," he spent almost the whole of his political life in the House of Commons.

While George II lived, North was confined to opposition by his links with Leicester House, but he nevertheless built up a reputation for honesty, ability, and an almost unrivaled grasp of financial issues. In 1767 he became Grafton's chancellor of the Exchequer and in 1770 the first lord of the Treasury and head of the ministry. Coming to office after a string of unstable and short-lived administrations, his great gift was the ability to keep a parliamentary majority together. Here his popularity, moral character, and dislike of radical change were great strengths. But the real key was to placate the independent country squires on the cross-benches by keeping the land tax down. Given the size of the national debt left over from the Seven Years' War, the need to keep up a significant army in America, and the failure to raise revenue from the relatively undertaxed colonists, this was a nearly impossible task. Economies were essential. That meant keeping the smallest possible armed forces, which in turn led North to take an overly sanguine view of both the Bourbon menace and the situation in America. On these grounds he must take some responsibility for the ultimate loss of the colonies. On the other hand, he kept his ministry together for twelve years, a considerable achievement.

THE TEA ACT

An understanding of North's Tea Act requires a global rather than a transatlantic perspective. Dangerously

isolated in Europe since 1763, Britain had good reason to fear a French war of revenge, perhaps in alliance with Spain. Rumors that the French were preparing to intervene in India, rapidly succeeded by the Falkland Islands crisis, led North to reform and tighten government control over the ailing East India Company by the Regulating Act of 1773. The *quid pro quo* was to be government financial support and permission for the company to market its tea directly to the colonies. The Tea Act of 1773 thus really had its roots in Britain's dangerous strategic isolation. The hope that the tea concession would ruin American smugglers, so forcing the colonies to accept the tea duty and tacitly acknowledge Parliament's right to tax, certainly existed. But it was never the primary purpose of a law intended to mitigate serious financial, naval, and military weaknesses.

AN INADEQUATE AMERICAN POLICY

In these circumstances, there was a certain amount of wish fulfillment in North's appreciation of the situation in the colonies. The ministry consistently underestimated both the extent of American resistance and the level of force necessary to suppress it. The coercive legislation that followed the Boston Tea Party rested on the notion that the trouble was principally confined to a violent New England (principally Massachusetts) minority. Even after war broke out in 1775 the government at first preferred a largely paper blockade to sending adequate military reinforcements with a view to reconquest. At the same time, North had to watch his European enemies in home waters, in the Americas, and in the East; yet he still would not allow Sandwich properly to prepare the fleet. The situation became critical when France openly entered the conflict in 1778 and desperate when the Spanish fleet was thrown into the balance in 1779. Such a crisis needed a war minister of genius, able to take the right strategic decisions and impose a coherent policy upon his colleagues.

Unfortunately, North—for all his more attractive virtues—was no Pitt. He failed to resolve the ruinous differences between Germain and Sandwich, and even after Germain's departure, he allowed the situation to drift. North, from 1779 without faith in the war, would have resigned but for George III's insistence that he stay. Consequently, the war in America was carried on with inadequate numbers and insufficient naval support until the debacle of Yorktown.

AFTER HIS MINISTRY'S FALL

After Yorktown, even North found it impossible to stay in office, and only the king's desire made him hang on until March 1782, when he resigned. However, he was far from finished. In February 1783 he joined with Fox to bring down Shelburne's ministry over the preliminary peace

terms. On 2 April, despite his loathing for Fox, the king was forced to accept Portland as nominal first minister with North and Fox as secretaries of state.

It was, however, a short-lived and limited triumph. Alliance with Fox the opportunist seriously compromised North's reputation for integrity, and the king was anxious to get rid of his new ministers at the first opportunity. In the end, North and Fox had to accept the very terms they had just censured in order to avoid charges of warmongering and intransigence. Ironically, North was finally laid low by the old problem of India, when the defeat of Fox's India Bill of 1783 in the Lords allowed the king to immediately sack his ministers. North never held high office again. He succeeded his father as Lord Guilford in 1790 and died two years later in 1792.

SEE ALSO *Fox, Charles James; Tea Act.*

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NORTH CAROLINA, MOBILIZATION IN.

Of all the rebellious mainland colonies at the approach of conflict with Britain, North Carolina was arguably the least commercial, the most internally fractured, and the most diffusely settled. Each of these attributes contributed to North Carolina's difficulties mobilizing resources during the eight-year struggle, and so each merits some explanation at the outset.

Commercially speaking, North Carolina's extensive network of barrier islands severely hampered the development of good port facilities and discouraged shipping. The main exception was the lower Cape Fear River, and especially the hubs at Wilmington and Brunswick, from which North Carolinians exported rice and pine-based naval stores. North Carolina in the late 1760s and early 1770s was also racked by a serious internal rebellion, known as the Regulator movement, led primarily by farmers of the Piedmont region (between the coastal plain and the Blue Ridge mountains) against the authority of the royal governor and the colonial Assembly. Drawn out over several years, this crisis proved a major distraction from other political issues and ended only through a climactic battlefield confrontation between the militia and the assembled Regulators. The rebellion highlighted a serious split between the eastern and western portions of the

colony, which in turn reflected North Carolina's history of settlement. Where the east had primarily been settled by English immigrants coming from overseas or from eastern Virginia, the western counties were filled with Scots-Irish, Germans, and some Englishmen who had come down the Great Wagon Road from the valley of Pennsylvania and Virginia. This settlement pattern limited familial connections between east and west, and although this did not cause the Regulator rebellion, it certainly did not help in easing the tensions the rebellion created. Furthermore, this pattern of settlement left wide expanses of the colony only sparsely settled, a factor that would prove significant in the recruiting and supplying of armies during the war.

IMPERIAL TENSION

North Carolina's history and its economic and demographic condition also shaped its approach to the imperial tensions developing with the mother country. North Carolinians reacted to the Stamp Act along lines very similar to most of the other colonies. While the first colonial riot took place in Boston on 14 August 1765, North Carolina remained quiet into the fall. The approach of the 1 November 1765 date for the enactment of the law and word of resistance in New England and elsewhere spurred North Carolinians to riot, especially in the main coastal towns of Wilmington and Brunswick. North Carolina's protestors borrowed from two traditions to structure their actions. One was the familiar crowd-based, festive burnings of symbolic effigies, at times expanding into an obstructionist riot. Significant to the later development of armed resistance, however, North Carolinians also responded militarily, calling out the armed militia to prevent the landing of the stamps and marching in soldierly fashion (possibly armed) to the governor's house to demand the resignation of the comptroller. Festive and military-style protests often overlapped, but the striking willingness to resort to the potent symbolism of armed resistance held ramifications for the future.

The repeal of the Stamp Act muted imperial tensions in North Carolina for years to come. The Townshend Act of 1767 caused fewer problems in the relatively less commercial colony, although the Assembly did prepare to adopt resolutions condemning the act. The governor then dissolved the Assembly, leading many of the legislators to meet extralegally and create a nonimportation association. Nonimportation never gained much purchase in North Carolina, and in part the crisis was overshadowed by the now burgeoning Regulator movement. The Assembly finally locked horns with the governor in 1773 when they could not agree on a bill to keep the county and superior courts in session. Without an agreement, the courts lapsed, affecting virtually everyone in the colony. Most easterners blamed the royal governor (now Josiah

Martin), whereas many western residents, still embittered from the suppression of the Regulator movement, blamed the Assembly. When the Assembly convened again in December 1773 its members virtually refused to do business, passing only one act. At the urging of Virginia, however, the Assembly did create a Committee of Correspondence, composed of prominent easterners, to coordinate resistance efforts with those of other colonies.

The Committee kept abreast of developments in other colonies and guided the colony's response to Parliament's punitive laws passed to punish Boston for the Boston Tea Party (the so-called Intolerable Acts). North Carolina followed Virginia's lead in protesting the acts, and then called the first of five extralegal Provincial Congresses to determine their response. The Congress in turn created local Committees of Correspondence and Committees of Safety, designed to spread information and to enforce the resolutions of the Congress. Thus by the spring of 1775 a skeleton of an alternative government existed, particularly but not exclusively in the eastern port towns. It would take a major catalyst, however, for resistance to ignite and become general.

THE DECISION FOR WAR: LEXINGTON AND CONCORD, SLAVES, AND INDIANS

It seems clear, at least in North Carolina, that the catalyst for the crucial transition from resistance, to armed resistance, to revolution was initially the British march on Concord, and then the apparent threats to mobilize slaves and Indians against the colonists. The rhetoric in reaction to the Intolerable Acts had been heated and defiant, but the reaction to Lexington and Concord, and specifically to the reports of atrocities and unprovoked killings—however exaggerated—was explosive. Whig adherents rallied supporters with the oldest and most legitimate recruiting cry: self-defense. To "repel force by force" had always been acceptable. Blood had been shed, and that simple fact changed the game enormously.

Whigs in Craven and New Bern Counties immediately propagated an Association oath that promised resistance while still professing loyalty to the king. But other Whigs in North Carolina went much further. In the Piedmont county of Mecklenburg, word of the march on Concord led the committee there, led by Thomas Polk and affirmed by the mustered militia, to issue a much more radical document. The so-called Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence, published on 16 June 1775, denied the authority of Parliament and even that of the king. These political responses to apparent British atrocities then fed into other colonial fears.

For eastern North Carolinians a major worry was that Governor Martin would incite a slave rebellion. Such a fear was all too vivid in the eastern counties, with their

large population of slaves: in 1767 in the lower Cape Fear region the black population was 62 percent of the total. Accusing the British of seeking to inspire a slave rebellion was standard practice in the days immediately after Lexington, and in June the Whigs accused Governor Martin of planning to arm the slaves and of offering them freedom if they would fight for the king. On 15 July 1775 the Safety Committee of Pitt County reported that a slave in Beaufort County had confessed a projected insurrection. Forty slaves were quickly arrested, jailed, and interrogated. Other county committees quickly joined the chorus of connecting suspected slave conspiracies to the active encouragement of British officials. Finally, Governor Lord Dunmore of Virginia seemingly justified North Carolinians' suspicions of royal governors when he announced in November 1775 that he would arm the Indians and free those slaves who joined his force.

Whereas fears of slave rebellion agitated easterners, fears of a Cherokee invasion rallied the westerners. Whig publicists regularly served up the probable use of Indians against the colonies as proof of the essential corruption of Britain. The Cherokees did in fact launch raids in North and South Carolina in the early summer of 1776. As David Ramsay wrote immediately after the war, in his *History of the Revolution in South-Carolina*, those attacks "increased the unanimity of the inhabitants. . . . Several who called themselves Tories in 1775 became active Whigs in 1776, and cheerfully took arms in the first instance against Indians, and in the second against Great-Britain" (vol. 1, p. 160).

The development of imperial tensions in the 1760s and 1770s, followed by the striking reports of violence in Massachusetts and the apparent impending use of slaves and Indians, combined to strengthen the will to resist. These factors provided a powerful element of legitimacy to the resistance movement and pushed many fence sitters off the fence. Having mobilized the will to resist, it was still necessary to seize the reins of power, organize and equip that will, lend it shape, and prepare it to fight a war. Fortunately, the long development of colonial institutions and the drawn-out evolution of tensions with Britain had already created the necessary bureaucratic infrastructure and skills.

SEIZING CONTROL

Increasingly confident of popular support, the county committees and the Provincial Congress moved to seize control of government. Over the course of the summer of 1775, county after county established Revolutionary committees, who first identified their enemies and the waverers by requiring the Association oath, and then assumed a judicial role in enforcing their own edicts and those of the Continental Congress. Intimidation played a major role in this process, as armed militiamen served the

committees as enforcers; in perhaps the most telling moment of all, in June 1775, John Ashe, who had recently resigned his colonelcy in the New Hanover militia regiment, marched into Wilmington leading several hundred militiamen and demanded that the merchants of the town subscribe to the Association oath. When asked his authority for making such a demand, Ashe merely pointed to the assembled troops.

Such a basis for government invited a certain level of anarchy, and in some cases the local committees, or individuals acting on their own initiative, pushed the limits of revolutionary propriety. Royal government also evaporated in July as Governor Martin took refuge aboard ship, from which he prorogued the Assembly and later refused to call it into session at all. Recognizing these problems, the Whig leadership in late summer called for a new Provincial Congress to take up the duties of a central government. The Congress momentarily adopted a moderate stance toward independence, but did create the political, economic, and military mechanisms that independence would require. Politically they established a provincial executive council of thirteen men to oversee district committees of safety, who in turn supervised the county and town committees. The council, and through them the committees, were given the operational control of the province's military and the right to draw on the provincial treasury. Congress proceeded to create both.

ESTABLISHING AN ARMY

In September 1775, as part of its other measures creating an alternative government, the Provincial Congress formally organized a military, creating two regiments of Continental troops and outlining a new framework for the state militia. The new militia law differed only slightly from its colonial antecedents, the most important differences being administrative. First, the new law divided the province into six districts, allowing for a brigadier general to organize and command the forces of each district. Each district would nominally comprise a brigade formed of the county-based regiments. Second, the local companies were divided into five classes or divisions. One consisted of the old and infirm; the other four served to spread the burden of service. When the militia were called up, in theory only one class, or division, from each company would be susceptible to service and then usually for only three months. The law also specified that musters be held monthly rather than at the more occasional intervals of the colonial era. Finally, the Congress created a separate organization known as the minutemen. The minutemen proved to be a short-lived institution, largely collapsing by the end of 1776.

In the course of forming its military North Carolina made a distinct effort to found them on European principles of discipline. North Carolina even requested copies of

Thomas Simes's *Military Guide* from the Continental Congress, and duly received twelve dozen copies in August 1776, along with twenty-four copies of Simes's *New System of Military Discipline*. Unfortunately, the Congress was unwilling, and probably unable, to impose a strong centralized control over the militia. The Congress expressly left it to the individual companies to establish rules to cover misbehavior and disobedience.

The military also needed equipment, and the Congress sought to cover that problem by establishing a Committee of Secrecy to encourage the production of war materiel. To finance the new troops and pay for supplies, the Congress assumed the power to tax, creating a two-shilling poll tax that would begin in 1777, and on its strength issuing £125,000 in bills of credit.

THE CHALLENGES OF 1775 AND 1776

These basic structures of government and military organization would continue, with some modification and much expansion, throughout the war. But first they had to survive the major challenges of 1775 and 1776. In late 1775 North Carolina dispatched troops against threats to Norfolk and to the South Carolina backcountry even as it continued to struggle to pin down the loyalties of its own inhabitants and arrange for a stream of arms and supplies—a stream that would rarely ever exceed a trickle. At the same time Governor Martin convinced the British government that the Loyalists in the area awaited only a contingent of British regulars to spark a full-scale counter-revolution. Persuaded that such help was imminent, on 10 January 1776, Martin called on the Loyalists to rise. Some fourteen hundred, mostly recently arrived Highland Scots, did so, leading to a much larger mobilization of Whig forces, who decisively defeated the Loyalists at Moores Creek Bridge on 27 February.

In the end the victory at Moores Creek Bridge squashed any further effort by the British to reassert control over North Carolina until 1780. But in March and April of 1776 that was not yet apparent, and the decision for independence had not yet been made. The Fourth Provincial Congress convened in April and vastly expanded North Carolina's commitment to war at the same time as it put the province on a firm path to independence. The Congress increased North Carolina's Continental regiments from two to six (there would eventually be ten); called up eastern militiamen in response to a British fleet assembled at the mouth of the Cape Fear under Sir Peter Parker; issued £500,000 more in bills of credit; appointed county collectors of arms; and proposed measures to encourage the production of saltpeter, gunpowder, salt, iron, and weapons. On 12 April the Congress passed the Halifax Resolves, making North Carolina the first colony to urge the Continental Congress to proclaim independence.

There remained yet one further challenge to the Whigs in 1776, and it served to confirm for many their disgust with British rule: beginning with intermittent attacks in April, by July the Cherokees were moving against the western settlements on a large scale. Brigadier General Griffith Rutherford mustered the western militia, and in conjunction with Virginia and South Carolina forces, marched into and devastated the Cherokee towns in August and September.

THE DEMANDS OF A DISTANT WAR, 1777–1779

Although the war moved away from the South after the defeat of Parker's attempt on Charleston, South Carolina, in June 1778 (some fourteen hundred North Carolina troops participated in the defense), the demands on the resources of the state continued. Calls for men were nearly constant. Although it is impossible to accurately quantify the number of North Carolinians who actually served in the ranks of the Continentals and the militia over the course of the whole war, the sum of calls for troops announced in these years of relative quiet in the South give some sense of the squeeze on North Carolina's manpower. From 1777 to 1779 there were seven separate major calls for men totaling 11,348. All of these were for expeditionary forces and thus did not include numerous local militia musters for routine enforcement or in response to several local Tory risings. These numbers also do not include those who were already serving in North Carolina's Continental regiments in Washington's army to the north. Nowhere near 11,348 men actually responded to those requests, in part because that number was roughly 15 percent of the white male population of North Carolina; but it is indicative of the recruiting pressure on the state.

The constant demand for men was not always met with enthusiasm, and the actual process for selecting recruits varied widely. The legislature usually assigned a quota to each county, set a bounty for volunteers, and provided a lower bounty for those drafted to make up the quota. Theoretically, this system accommodated the division of the militia into the four classes specified in the militia law passed at the beginning of the war (the fifth division of the infirm and elderly had been eliminated). A draft supposedly would come from one of the four "classes," and that class would not be susceptible to another draft until the other three had had their turn. The class system was used, but not necessarily as strictly as intended. In practice at the county level a call for troops led to a muster, where the militia officers called for volunteers. When insufficient numbers came forward the officers would arrange some kind of draft. Those arrangements varied and aroused numerous protests.

There are differing accounts of how men were selected for the draft. In some units names were “drawn,” whereas other units, according to the law passed in April 1778, “elected” those who were to be drafted. Other, probably illegal, methods further inspired resistance to the draft. In an old and widespread tradition, drafted men could also hire substitutes (or persuade relatives to substitute).

The new Whig government had also embarked on an increasingly severe program of confiscating Loyalist property and requiring and actually enforcing the taking of the loyalty oath. These two measures, in combination with the unpopular demands for troops, generated resistance. In turn, the North Carolina government relied on the militia to enforce these measures, in what came to be called “scouring for Tories.” Drafting, oath-taking, confiscating, and scouring all contributed to keeping a large portion of the countryside at a slow boil, in some cases creating “Tories” where none had been before. But if the Tories (and some wishful neutrals) were outraged, the Whigs were scared. Real and reported Tory conspiracies, violent draft resistance, Indian scares, and projected British landings all contributed to an environment of fear. Loyalist and neutral resistance and Whig fear mutually reinforced each other. Reports, for example, of a band of draft resisters would lead to a call for militia to hold them in check. To raise that militia, a draft might be required, and the militia would need to be supplied from local sources. Some of those militia units, once in the field, found it all too easy to commit acts of violence that further alienated the waverers.

The Provincial Congress had designed a supply system to avoid alienating the countryside, and through 1779 the system more or less worked. The state had a quartermaster-general who oversaw the quartermasters of each militia district. The law specified that no goods could be taken without a press warrant signed by two justices of the peace of that county. Furthermore, two “indifferent” people had to appraise the items pressed, and the owner would either be paid in North Carolina currency or be given a certificate. The system was far from perfect, and the ad hoc measures taken in 1776 to increase gunpowder or iron production had had only minimal effects. Furthermore, North Carolina’s soldiers were rarely well-dressed; in 1778 the legislature conceded that they could not handle the load and delegated to the counties the task of supplying basic clothing. It was in 1779, however, that all the state and Continental currencies began to devalue at a terrific rate, and when the British invaded the state in 1780–1781, the system virtually collapsed.

NADIR AND TRIUMPH, 1780–1782

The problems of mobilization dramatically escalated as the British turned to a southern strategy and then successfully

captured Charleston, South Carolina, in May 1780. More than two thousand North Carolina troops, militia and Continental, were captured at Charleston, and the state struggled to replace them. To make matters worse in North Carolina, in January 1781 a separate British expedition descended on Wilmington by sea and established a garrison there. Mobilization of the will to fight became crucial. Where initially despair had set in after the disaster at Charleston and then at Camden, British actions quickly supplied the necessary anger; and where official means of raising troops faltered, volunteer organizations often filled the gap.

We can never know all the reasons why men rallied as volunteers to the Whig cause in 1780 and 1781. It is clear that the official raising of militia troops continued, and militia brigades continued to take their place in the ranks of the American army re-formed after Camden by Continental Army General Nathanael Greene. Indeed, in the face of crisis, North Carolina virtually abandoned recruiting for its Continental regiments, focusing instead on the militia. There were now, however, additional units of volunteers, more or less formally acknowledged by the state. Some of the men in these units were motivated by the hope of plundering their neighbors; some were surely motivated by the cause itself; but many served in fear of British atrocity or in hopes of revenge. Whatever the case, the volunteers had a profound impact on the war, both in increasing the level of fratricidal violence between themselves and Loyalists, and in providing all of the manpower for the crucial victory at Kings Mountain, South Carolina.

Meanwhile the collapse of the American currencies and the locust-like eating habits of armies criss-crossing a sparsely settled backcountry caused the already tenuous supply system to disintegrate. Backcountry residents, especially along the much contested border with South Carolina, found themselves plagued by provisioning agents from both sides. In 1780 the state government had concluded that running the war with a legislative committee was inefficient and replaced it with the Board of War (composed of five commissioners elected by the legislature). In 1781 the Board was replaced by the Council Extraordinary (composed of three men advising the governor). In March 1781 this Council, in response to the logistical crisis, enacted a tax in kind for all those areas not already denuded by the competing armies. Under this plan each household would give up one-fifth of its bacon and salted meat for the army, but even this expedient suffered from a lack of transport to move supplies to the army.

In yet another move born of desperation, captured Loyalists were frequently forced to enlist in Continental or militia service to expiate their sins. For example, most of the nearly six hundred prisoners taken at Kings Mountain

were paroled on the condition that they enlist for a three-month tour in the militia. This was not an isolated incident, and in fact such enlistments became virtually state policy in the last year of the war.

Even after General Cornwallis's army moved on to Virginia and ultimate defeat at Yorktown, North Carolina continued to contend with several active and successful Loyalist units, as well as with the British garrison in Wilmington (evacuated in November 1781)—all while attempting to support Greene's reconquest of South Carolina.

MAKING PEACE

Finally, in May 1782, David Fanning, the last major Loyalist guerrilla leader, fled the state for South Carolina. With his departure the internal war in the state quickly tapered off, and the rebel government could turn to the problems of peace. A year later the state finally declared an amnesty covering most Tories, although specifically excluding certain groups; it appears that North Carolina for the most part peacefully reintegrated the former Loyalists into a peacetime society, although not without economic cost. One telling statistic is that 57 percent of the surviving officers of Fanning's notorious guerrilla band were still living in the United States, the majority in North Carolina. Their fates speak well for reintegration. On the other hand, the state government felt compelled to protect Whig fighters who were occasionally brought to trial for their crimes in the years after the war. No comprehensive survey exists, but there were several notable cases of men tried for illegitimate violence in the 1780s to whom the legislature granted protection from prosecution.

CONCLUSION

The complexities and difficulties faced by the North Carolina revolutionary government in mobilizing men and materials to fight such a long war can hardly be fathomed. Relative to their available resources, the state did a remarkable job. The key to mobilizing men and materiel, however, rested in the mobilization of will. The will to fight was born in a sense of betrayal at the outset of the war, but sustaining it proved another matter. At times will almost faltered, but a complex combination of fear, desire for revenge, a commitment to independence, and a belief that the new state government would bring order kept men in the ranks. The flow of materiel, on the other hand, depended largely on the desperate perseverance of a few state leaders.

SEE ALSO *African Americans in the Revolution; Ashe, John; Charleston Siege of 1780; Fanning, David; Indians in the Colonial Wars and the American Revolution; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; Kings*

Mountain, South Carolina; Lexington and Concord; Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence; Moores Creek Bridge; Nonimportation; Regulators; Rutherford, Griffith; Stamp Act; Townshend Acts.

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Wayne E. Lee

NORTH CAROLINA LINE. North Carolina created its first two full-time regiments on 1 September 1775 and they passed to the Continental Army on 28 November 1775, when the Congress accepted them. Four more regiments were added during 1776, and in the expansion of 1777 the total number of regiments rose to nine, all of which were sent north to serve with Commander in Chief George Washington. One of the Additional Continental Regiments (Sheppard's) was known familiarly as the Tenth North Carolina Regiment

North's Plan for Reconciliation

and also served in Pennsylvania, but technically it was not considered to be part of the state line. The Seventh through Ninth North Carolina Regiments and Sheppard's unit were disbanded at Valley Forge on 1 June 1778, and the men were redistributed in an effort to maintain troop strength. The remaining regiments moved back to North Carolina, and in November 1779 all of the enlisted men from the Fourth through Sixth North Carolina Regiments transferred to replace the troops of the First and Third, which had been captured at Charleston. On 1 January 1781 the state's quota of regiments dropped to three, but only the First and Second Regiments were able to fill their ranks and return to combat status that summer. The last of the Line went home on furlough in early April 1783 and then were formally disbanded on 15 November 1783. North Carolina also raised three separate troops of light dragoons and a separate artillery company for the Continental army in 1776 and 1777, but these units were not part of the state line.

SEE ALSO *Charleston, South Carolina*.

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Robert K. Wright Jr.

NORTH'S PLAN FOR RECONCILIATION. 1775. With the grudging consent of George III, Lord North presented a plan for reconciliation, often called the "olive branch," that was received by the House of Lords on 20 February 1775, endorsed by the House of Commons on 27 February, and rejected by the Continental Congress on 31 July 1775. The plan prescribed that the British would deal with individual

colonies and thereby avoided tacit recognition of the Continental Congress. By its terms, Parliament had royal approval to "forbear to any further duty, tax or assessment," though it could still lay regulatory ("external") taxes on any American colony whose own assembly passed "internal" taxes to support the civil government and judiciary and to provide for the common defense. Though North hoped to deal with individual colonies, their legislatures also rejected the proposal. "This was merely a repetition of the gesture that Grenville had made in advance of the stamp act, and it was still as vague and undefined, still as unacceptable, as it had been then," the historian Edmund Morgan has commented. (*Birth*, p. 69).

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

NORTHUMBERLAND, DUKE OF.

Hugh Percy inherited the title of duke of Northumberland on the death of his father, the first duke, in 1786. He was known as Lord or Earl Percy between 1766 and 1786.

SEE ALSO *Percy, Hugh*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

NORWALK, CONNECTICUT. 11 July 1779. Plundered and destroyed during Connecticut coast raid.

SEE ALSO *Connecticut Coast Raid*.

Mark M. Boatner

NS SEE *Calendars, Old and New Style*.

O

O'BRIEN, JEREMIAH. (1744–1818). American naval officer. Maine. Born in Kittery, Maine, which was then in the province of Massachusetts, in 1744, O'Brien and his family moved to Machias, Maine, in 1765. He became the first naval hero of the Revolution in the action off Machias in May 1775. Commanding a small fleet of the Massachusetts navy, he took a few prizes before his ships were put out of commission in the fall of 1776. As a privateer he was captain of the *Resolution* in 1777 and captured the British-owned *Scarborough*. His *Hannibal* was captured in 1780, and he was imprisoned by the British, first in the *Jersey* prison ship at New York, and then in Mill Prison, England. After suffering considerable hardship, he escaped. Free again, he commanded the *Hibernia* and then the *Tiger*. For the last seven years of his life he was collector of customs at Machias, where he died on 5 September 1818.

SEE ALSO *Machias, Maine*.

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ODELL, JONATHAN. (1737–1818). Loyalist secret agent, satirist. New Jersey. Descended from William Odell, who settled in Concord, Massachusetts, around 1639 and a grandson of the Reverend Jonathan Dickinson, the first president of Princeton, Jonathan

graduated from the latter college in 1759, was educated as a doctor, and became a surgeon in the British army. After serving in the West Indies he left the army, studied in England for the Anglican ministry, and in January 1767 was ordained. In July 1767 he became a missionary in Burlington, New Jersey, under the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. In addition, he took up the practice of medicine in 1771. While studying in England he had shown a talent for poetry, and in the early stages of the Revolution he so antagonized the Patriots with his Loyalist verses that on 20 July 1776 New Jersey's Provincial Congress ordered that he be placed on parole, whereby his movements were limited to within a short distance of Burlington. On 18 December he escaped to the British.

Becoming a secret agent, he joined Joseph Stansbury in handling the correspondence between Arnold and André during Arnold's treason. He published essays and verses in Rivington's *Gazette* in New York City and other newspapers that lampooned patriots of New Jersey. His political verses have been described as among the most effective of the time. The versatile Odell was chaplain of a regiment of Pennsylvania Tories, a translator of French and Spanish political documents, and assistant secretary to the board of directors of the Associated Loyalists. On 1 July 1783 he became assistant secretary to Guy Carleton, who then was the British commander in chief in America. Odell went to England with Carleton after the war, taking his wife and three children, but in 1784 he returned to the Loyalist settlement in New Brunswick, Canada. Throughout his years in New Jersey and New York, he had been closely associated with New Jersey's royal governor, William Franklin, who was the godfather of his only

son. The latter, William Franklin Odell (1774–1844), is confused with the Tory leader, William Odell.

Jonathan Odell's poetry mirrored Loyalist consciousness. Writing as "Yoric" in 1776 and 1777, Odell shamelessly puffed William Howe's military reputation and boosted Loyalist morale during the occupation of Philadelphia, masking his impatience with Howe's restrained use of military force because he needed the general's patronage to work as pro-British poet and essayist. By the time Odell wrote his longest and most serious Loyalist poem in 1780, *The American Times*, he had become "America's first anti-war poet," condemning British taxation of the colonies as "the kindler of the flame," "unjust," "unwise," "impolitic and open to abuse."

Odell's furtive, energetic activity in the New York garrison town must be viewed through the lens of his poetic sensibility. As a biographer and literary student of his poetry has observed, "the violent, paranoid, harshly judgmental political culture" of the New York city loyalist community profoundly "disturbed" Odell. His "poetry political intelligence [was] of a very high order: the aesthetic ordering of disorder" (Edelberg, "Jonathan Odell and Philip Freneau," p. 118).

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason; Odell, William; Stansbury, Joseph.*

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revised by Robert M. Calhoon

ODELL, WILLIAM. Loyalist officer who raised and commanded the Loyal American Rangers. He became notorious among Patriot prisoners of war for his methods of recruitment, which mixed threats with offers of good food and other luxuries if the prisoners would join his Rangers. A major in 1780, Odell was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1783 and stationed in Jamaica after the war.

SEE ALSO *Loyal American Rangers.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

OGDEN, AARON. (1756–1839). Continental officer, governor of New Jersey, steamboat pioneer. New Jersey. Brother of Matthias Ogden, Aaron Ogden was born in Elizabethtown, New Jersey, on 3 December 1756. He graduated from Princeton in 1773 in the same class as Harry ("Light Horse") Lee and a year behind Aaron Burr, who was a childhood companion. After teaching school for three years he became paymaster of a militia regiment on 8 December 1775. His first military exploit was to assist in the capture of the Blue Mountain Valley in January 1776. On 26 November 1776 he was commissioned as a first lieutenant in the First New Jersey Continental Regiment, his brother's unit. He became regimental paymaster on 1 February 1777, fought at the Brandywine, was made brigade major of William Maxwell's light infantry brigade on 7 March 1778. In the Monmouth campaign he served in the advance element under General Charles Lee. During this campaign he also served as assistant aide-de-camp to General William Alexander, having been promoted to captain of the First New Jersey Regiment on 2 February 1779.

During the next year, Ogden was Maxwell's aide-de-camp during John Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois, and in 1780 he took part in the delaying action of Maxwell's brigade against Wilhelm Knyphausen's raid against Springfield, Connecticut. When Maxwell resigned, Ogden joined the light infantry corps of the Marquis de Lafayette. In the fruitless exchange of correspondence between Sir Henry Clinton and Commander in Chief George Washington that preceded John André's execution as a spy for his role in Benedict Arnold's treason, Captain Ogden served as a courier between British and American headquarters. His part in the dubious matter of proposing the exchange of André for Benedict Arnold seems to have been nothing more than the delivery of the letter written in a disguised hand by Alexander Hamilton. Ogden was wounded during the Yorktown campaign, during the storming of Redoubt Ten on 14 October 1781.

After the war he studied law with his brother Robert and became one of the leading lawyers in New Jersey. When war with France threatened the new nation, he became lieutenant colonel of the Eleventh United States Infantry on 8 January 1799 and deputy quartermaster general of the army, being discharged on 15 June 1800. In 1812 he was elected governor of New Jersey on a peace ticket but defeated the next year. President James Madison nominated him to the rank of major general in 1813, apparently with the intention of giving him a command

in Canada, but Ogden declined in order to retain command of the state militia.

During the War of 1812 Ogden turned from the law to participate in a steamboat venture that was his undoing. Having built the *Sea Horse* in 1811, he proposed to operate a line between Elizabethtown Point (New Jersey) and New York City, but in 1813 the monopoly of James Fulton and Robert R. Livingston was upheld, and his boat was barred from New York waters. He then got into a long, expensive monopoly fight with another line, that of Thomas Gibbons. Ogden won his case in the New York courts, but lost the Supreme Court appeal in *Gibbons v. Ogden*, 1824. In 1829 Congress created the post of customs collector at Jersey City for Ogden. Despite this assistance, the impoverished Ogden was soon imprisoned for debt, but the New York legislature—apparently at the instigation of Burr—released him by passing a quick bill prohibiting the imprisonment of Revolutionary War veterans for debt. He died in Jersey City, New Jersey, on 19 April 1839.

SEE ALSO *Ogden, Matthias; Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of Knyphausen.*

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OGDEN, MATTHIAS. (1754–1791). Continental officer. New Jersey. John Ogden emigrated from Hampshire, England, to Long Island about 1640. In 1664 he established himself at Elizabethtown, New Jersey. His descendants were prominent in the province. Robert (1716–1787), father of Matthias, was a member of the king's council, speaker of the legislature in 1763, delegate to the Stamp Act Congress (New York City, 1765), and chairman of the Elizabethtown committee of safety in 1776.

Matthias and Aaron Burr left the college at Princeton after the Battle of Bunker Hill, joined the Boston army, and as unattached volunteers accompanied Arnold's march to Quebec. Ogden made the first attempt to present Arnold's surrender summons at Quebec and "retreated in quick time" after an eighteen-pound shot hit the ground near him. He was wounded in the attack on the city that started 31 December 1775. Having served as brigadier major in this expedition, he became lieutenant colonel of the First New Jersey Continentals on 7 March 1776 and assumed command of the regiment on 1 January 1777. As part of General Lord Stirling's division his regiment performed well in slowing the British advance on "the

plowed hill" in the Battle of the Brandywine on 11 September 1777. During the Valley Forge winter quarters, he was in the brigade of William Maxwell. In the Battle of Monmouth of 28 June 1778, he took part in the initial action under Charles Lee. At the latter's court-martial, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Harrison testified that in attempting to find out why Lee was retreating, he came on Ogden's regiment, which was near the rear of the column. "He appeared to be exceedingly exasperated," Harrison testified, "and said, 'By God! they are flying from a shadow.'" He was captured at Elizabethtown on 5 October 1780 and exchanged in April 1781. He fought at Yorktown in September–October of 1781.

Colonel Ogden proposed a plan for the capture of Prince William Henry, the future William IV, when the sixteen-year-old prince was in New York City. According to General William Heath, the rebels learned on 30 September 1781 that the prince had arrived five days earlier with Admiral Digby and was lodged in the mansion of Gerardus Beekman in Hanover Square. Washington approved Ogden's plan of leading forty officers and men into the city on a rainy night to land near the mansion and kidnap Digby and William. The plan was compromised, however, and had to be abandoned.

On 21 April 1783 Ogden was granted leave to visit Europe and did not return to the army. Louis XVI honored him with *le droit du tabouret*, (the right of the stool) which permitted him to sit in the royal presence. He returned to the United States with news of the Treaty of Paris. Congress breveted him brigadier general on 30 September 1783.

After the war Ogden had many business interests, including land speculation, the minting of coins, and the practice of law. He died of yellow fever in 1791.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Digby, Robert; Maxwell, William.*

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revised by Harry M. Ward

OGHKWAGA. Variant of Oquaga.

SEE ALSO *Oquaga.*

O'HARA, CHARLES. (1740?–1802). General of the British Coldstream Guards. Charles O'Hara was the illegitimate son of James O'Hara, who was the second Lord Trawley and colonel of the Coldstream Guards. Charles O'Hara was educated at Westminster School, appointed cornet of the Third Dragoons on 23 December 1752, and on 14 January 1756 entered his father's regiment with the grade of "lieutenant and captain." After service in Germany and Portugal, O'Hara was appointed commandant of the Africa Corps at Goree, Senegal, on 25 July 1766 with the rank of lieutenant colonel. The Africa Corps was a unit composed of military offenders who were pardoned in exchange for life service in Africa. Maintaining his seniority in the Coldstream, he was named captain and lieutenant colonel of that regiment in 1769, and was made brevet colonel in 1777.

Highly critical of the British policy toward America, O'Hara favored a ruthless approach that would bring the war to civilians. He arrived in New York City in October 1780, and went from there with his Guards Brigade to join General Charles Cornwallis's southern operations. He spearheaded the latter's frustrating pursuit of American general Nathanael Greene across North Carolina to the Dan River, leading the gallant attack at Cowan's Ford on 1 February 1781.

Commanding the Second Battalion of Guards at Guilford on 15 March 1781, O'Hara rallied his troops after receiving one dangerous wound and led them forward again to deliver the final blow that broke the resistance of Greene's army. During that attack he was wounded a second time. Moving to Virginia with Cornwallis, O'Hara represented the British in the Yorktown surrender, and dined that night with General George Washington. When he was exchanged on 9 February 1782 he returned to England as a newly appointed major general, and received the highest praise from Cornwallis.

After serving in Jamaica and as the commanding officer at Gibraltar from 1787 to 1789, O'Hara was appointed lieutenant governor of Gibraltar in 1792, and promoted to lieutenant general in the following year. He was captured on 23 November 1793 at Fort Mulgrove, Toulon (France), in the operations that brought an obscure French officer named Napoleon to the attention of his military superiors. Imprisoned in Luxembourg, he was exchanged for Rochambeau in August 1795, named governor of Gibraltar, and promoted to full general in 1798. He proved himself an efficient commander of that stronghold during this critical time. After much suffering from his wounds he died at Gibraltar on 21 February 1802.

SEE ALSO *Cornwallis, Charles; Cowans Ford, North Carolina; Yorktown Campaign.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

OHIO COMPANY OF ASSOCIATES.

1787. Under the leadership of Rufus Putnam and Benjamin Tupper, two Continental army brigadier generals from Massachusetts, former officers and soldiers formed an association for the settlement of western lands. On 1 March 1786 their delegates met in Boston to organize a company for the purchase of land around what is now Marietta, Ohio. After former Major General Samuel Holden Parsons had proved unsatisfactory in the role, the Reverend Manasseh Cutler became the company's representative before Congress and, jointly with a group of New York speculators led by William Duer, he eventually made arrangements to purchase 1,781,760 acres of western land. The terms were \$500,000 down and the same amount when the survey was completed, but both sums could be paid in government securities worth about twelve cents on the dollar. The Scioto Company of Duer was authorized to buy nearly 500,000 acres.

The Ohio Associates were unable to complete their payments, but Congress granted them title to 750,000 acres, granted 100,000 acres free to actual settlers, and authorized that 214,285 acres be bought with army warrants. Rufus Putnam led the group that established Adelphia, Ohio, on 7 April 1788.

SEE ALSO *Duer, William; Parsons, Samuel Holden; Putnam, Rufus; Tupper, Benjamin.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

OHIO COMPANY OF VIRGINIA.

1747–1773. A group of prominent land speculators in Virginia organized this company in 1747 to promote settlement and trade with the Indians in the Ohio Valley. The imperial government in London viewed the company as a useful means to promote British territorial claims in the area. In March 1749 the Privy Council directed Governor William Gooch to grant to the company 500,000 acres in the upper Ohio Valley, which he did on 12 April 1749. After explorations by Christopher Gist in 1750 and 1751, the company established a string of storehouses on the route across the Appalachians to the Ohio country, culminating in February 1754, when construction began on Fort Prince George at the Forks of the Ohio (later Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania).

The new governor of Virginia, Robert Dinwiddie, a strong supporter of the company, had already commissioned George Washington to lead a force to support the new fort at the Forks when a French counter-expedition captured the place on 17 April. The clash on 28 May between Washington's force and a French force from France's new Fort Duquesne at the Forks led to the

French and Indian War; because the frontier remained a battleground, the clash also resulted in a temporary cessation in the company's plans to send settlers into the Ohio valley. Victory in the war ousted the French from Canada, and the Treaty of Paris (10 February 1763) extinguished all French claims to the Ohio region. But the British Crown's Proclamation of 1763 (7 October) recognized Native American claims to ownership of much of the Ohio Valley, including the land granted to the company. The Ohio Company was unsuccessful in persuading the crown to recognize its grant, and in 1773 the crown re-granted the company's land to the Walpole (or Grand Ohio) Company. George Mason became a member of the Ohio Company in 1752 and served as its treasurer until its rights were transferred in 1773.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; Mason, George; Washington, George.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

OLIVE BRANCH PETITION. 5 July 1775. After the first armed clashes of the Revolution (Lexington and Concord, Bunker Hill), the Patriots made one more attempt to settle their grievances with Great Britain by means short of war. Written by John Dickinson, adopted on 5 July by the delegates in the Continental Congress (who, however, signed as individuals and not as members of the Congress), and carried to London by Richard Penn (a staunch Loyalist and descendant of William Penn), the petition reiterated the grievances of the colonists but professed their attachment to the king, expressed the desire for a restoration of harmony, and begged the king to prevent further hostile action until a reconciliation could be worked out. Penn reached London on 14 August 1775. On 9 November 1775 the Continental Congress learned that George III had refused to see Penn or receive his petition.

Mark M. Boatner

OMOA *SEE Honduras.*

“ON COMMAND.” “On Command” in eighteenth-century military parlance meant “on detached service.”

ONONDAGA CASTLE, NEW YORK.

19–25 April 1779. As a preliminary response to British raids on the Mohawk Valley, which would lead to John Sullivan's expedition, Colonel Gose Van Schaick led a 550-man force from his First New York Regiment and Colonel Peter Gansevoort's Third New York Regiment on a 180-mile sweep against the Onondaga villages between Fort Stanwix and Oswego. Without losing a man, he inflicted heavy damage, including destroying the primary village, known as the Onondaga Castle. On 10 May the Continental Congress thanked the participants in a special resolve.

SEE ALSO *Gansevoort, Peter; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois; Van Schaick, Gose.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

“ON THE LINES”. Outposted towns or other locations were referred to as being “on the lines” when the bulk of the army was in winter quarters or otherwise disposed in garrison.

Mark M. Boatner

OQUAGA (ONOQUAGA), NEW YORK.

Iroquois village on the east branch of the Susquehanna River about twenty miles southwest of Unadilla (near Windsor). In 1765 it had about 750 inhabitants, most of them Oneidas. It was Joseph Brant's headquarters during St. Leger's Expedition and in much of the subsequent border warfare in New York. Its name is Mohawk for “place of wild grapes,” and the *Handbook of American Indians* gives over fifty spelling variations ranging from Anaquago through Oghkwaga to Skawaghkee. The village was destroyed in October 1778 by troops under Colonel William Butler and Colonel Philip Van Cortlandt.

Orangeburg, South Carolina

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; St. Leger's Expedition; Unadilla, New York.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

ORANGEBURG, SOUTH CAROLINA.

11 May 1781. Refusing to join General Nathanael Greene for the campaign leading to the Battle of Hobkirk's Hill, General Thomas Sumter led his partisans first against Fort Granby but, finding it too strongly defended, decided to take Orangeburg on the North Edisto River, fifty miles south. Lieutenant Colonel Francis Rawdon had ordered this post abandoned, but the message was not received. After Sumter invested it, the garrison of fifteen British regulars and some thirty Loyalists surrendered without a fight. There were no casualties on either side.

SEE ALSO *Hobkirk's Hill (Camden), South Carolina; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ORANGE RANGERS SEE *Coffin, John.*

ORANGETOWN, NEW YORK. Another name for Tappan.

ORISKANY, NEW YORK. 6 August 1777. St. Leger's expedition was a few days' march from Fort Schuyler (Stanwix). During the march a friendly Oneida reported its advance on 30 July to Brigadier General Nicholas Herkimer, commander of the Tryon County, New York, militia brigade. Despite the settlers' considerable concern for the safety of their families, Herkimer managed to assemble about eight hundred men. On 4 August they left Fort Dayton escorting a supply convoy

of forty ox carts to Stanwix. They camped the next night about ten miles short of Stanwix at Deerfield, and Herkimer sent runners ahead to inform Colonel Peter Gansevoort and ask him to make a sortie from the fort as they approached.

In the morning of 6 August, the cautious Herkimer wanted to wait for Gansevoort's cannon signal indicating the beginning of the sortie before starting forward. However, his regimental commanders—Ebenezer Cox, Jacob Klock, Frederick Visscher, and Peter Bellinger—insisted on an immediate advance. Against his better judgment Herkimer authorized the move, leaving most of the carts behind under guard and eliminating advance and flank guards in the hope of improving the column's speed. The legend that the colonels shamed him into this decision by questioning his courage and loyalty seems to be based on the claim of nineteenth-century historian Benson J. Lossing and not on contemporary accounts.

St. Leger learned of Herkimer's approach on the evening of the 5th. During the night the British commander detached Joseph Brant with a mixed party variously estimated at from four hundred to seven hundred men to ambush them. Brant selected a place later known as Battle Brook, six miles from the fort, where a ravine two-hundred-yards wide could be crossed only on a corduroy causeway and where the surrounding woods provided concealment. Brant assigned his Loyalists—part of John Johnson's Royal Regiment of New York (Royal Greens) and a small contingent of rangers recently raised by John Butler—to form the blocking force, and he put the larger contingent of Indians (mostly Mohawk and Seneca) in positions from which to attack the flanks and rear.

Herkimer's sixty Oneida scouts somehow failed to detect signs of the ambush, and when the twenty-man vanguard stopped to drink from the stream, the half-mile-long column plunged blindly ahead. The front was on the west bank, climbing up the ridge; the fifteen carts were on the bridge; and Visscher's regiment (about two hundred strong) as rear guard had not yet started across when the shooting began. Either Brandt's men got trigger-happy, the most probable explanation, or some alert militiamen saw something, but in any case the result was that the trap snapped shut prematurely.

Although some of Visscher's men apparently panicked, the rest reacted with a courage and tactical instinct seldom shown by veterans. Instead of bunching on the road, they counterattacked and fought their way out of the kill zone. The Indians' inability to follow up the initial surprise and close in for the kill let the militia take up defensive positions on higher ground. The wounded Herkimer had the saddle taken from his dead horse and placed on the ground among his men. He then sat on it to direct the fight; although presenting a conspicuous target,

he is said to have calmly smoked his pipe and refused all urging to take cover. The Americans formed first in small groups, which made them vulnerable from all directions, but then they tied together into a single perimeter.

The action started at 10 A.M.; after three-quarters of an hour, the vicious fighting stopped temporarily when heavy rain silenced all firearms for an hour. During this enforced armistice Herkimer ordered another change in tactics. Individual defenders had been strung along his perimeter, and the Indians would wait until a man fired and then rush in to dispatch him with a tomahawk before he could reload. So the militia started operating in mutually supporting pairs: while one reloaded, the other held his fire to pick off any enemy who charged.

When Major Stephen Watts arrived with a reinforcement of Royal Greens, Butler had them turn their coats inside out and approach the beleaguered Americans in the guise of a friendly sortie from Fort Stanwix. A sharp-eyed Palatine recognized a neighbor just in time, and a terrific hand-to-hand fight ensued. At about 1 P.M., an hour into the post-rainstorm, second phase of the battle, John Butler heard firing from Fort Stanwix and correctly guessed that the Americans were making a sortie. By this time the Indians were ready to quit, and the sortie's threat to their camps gave urgency to their desire to break contact. As their allies retreated, the remaining Loyalists also withdrew.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Because the participants were all irregulars, accurate statistics are not possible. American historians such as Benson Lossing tend to inflate the militia's losses. While officer casualties were heavy—Herkimer died of his wounds; one of the four colonels died and another was captured—the assertion that 160 men were killed is surely inflated. It is more probable that the number reflects total casualties, including the walking wounded. Estimates of Brant's losses are also higher in historians' accounts than they probably were on the battlefield. Probably from 70 to 100 Indians were killed or wounded, and the Loyalists' casualties must be added to that total.

SIGNIFICANCE

It is hard to make a case that this battle affected the outcome of the 1777 campaign, or even that it altered the outcome of the siege of the fort. But it was very important for the local history of the Mohawk Valley, poisoning relations between former neighbors. And the superb fight put up by relatively untrained militia in an ambush that would have tested veteran troops became an important morale factor.

SEE ALSO *Brant, Joseph; Butler, John; Fort Schuyler, New York; Herkimer, Nicholas; Johnson, Sir John; St. Leger's Expedition.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

OS **SEE** *Calendars, Old and New Style.*

OSBORNE'S (JAMES RIVER),

VIRGINIA. 27 April 1781. Osborne's on the James River served as the main facility for the small Virginia state navy, which by 1781 lay in mothballs under the guard of a small caretaker detachment. Major General William Phillips marched from Petersburg the morning of the 27th with the main British force and proceeded to Chesterfield Court House to keep the Americans at bay. Learning of the weak defenses, he detached Benedict Arnold with a strike force built around John Simcoe's Queen's Rangers, the Hessian jägers, and the Seventy-sixth and Eightieth Foot to destroy them. Arnold skillfully employed four light British field-pieces to drive the supporting militia from the opposite bank, and one of them silenced the *Tempest*, the only vessel capable of action, when a lucky shot severed its cable. The caretaker crews attempted to set the vessels on fire, but quick action by Simcoe's men secured them. Arnold captured five vessels and more than two thousand hogsheads of tobacco. A number of other craft and the shore installations were destroyed.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Petersburg, Virginia; Phillips, William; Simcoe, John Graves; Virginia, Military Operations in.*

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OSWALD, ELEAZER. (1755–1795). Continental artillery officer, journalist. England and Connecticut. Born in Falmouth, England, in 1755, Oswald became sympathetic to the American cause and emigrated to New York City in about 1770. He apprenticed himself to the publisher of the *New-York Journal*, John Holt, whose daughter he married. He served as a private during the “Lexington Alarm” (19 April 1775) and volunteered to join Benedict Arnold’s forces in their march to Quebec. He became Arnold’s secretary and commanded the forlorn hope at Quebec, where he was wounded and captured on 31 December 1775. Exchanged on 10 January 1777, he was commissioned lieutenant colonel in John Lamb’s Second Continental Artillery, and became famous as an artillerist. He particularly distinguished himself at Compo Hill during the Danbury raid of April 1777. After the battle of Monmouth on 28 June 1778, he was praised in official orders for his performance. As a result of his failure to be credited with the seniority he felt he deserved, Oswald resigned from the army in 1779.

Oswald then joined William Goddard in publishing the *Maryland Journal*, in which he printed General Charles Lee’s criticisms of General George Washington. This article led to a popular demonstration against Oswald, and he was forced to publish an apology. In April 1782 he started publishing the violently partisan *Independent Gazetteer* in Philadelphia. Between 1782 and 1787 he also took over Holt’s old New York City paper and published it as the *Independent Gazette, or New York Journal Revived*. He attacked the policies of Alexander Hamilton and challenged him to a duel, but friends adjusted the matter before the confrontation could take place. In 1792 Oswald left his publishing interests in the hands of his wife, Elizabeth, and went to England and then to France. There he was commissioned as a colonel of the artillery and regimental commander in the Republican army, seeing action at Gemape (France). Sent on a secret mission in connection with a contemplated French invasion of Ireland, he reached that country and submitted his report. Receiving no further instructions from his superiors at Vergennes, he returned to the United States. Shortly after reaching New York City, Oswald died of yellow fever, on 30 September 1795.

SEE ALSO *Compo Hill; Danbury Raid, Connecticut.*

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
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OSWALD, RICHARD. (1705–1784). British diplomat. Scotland. Married to Mary Ramsay, whom Robert Burns celebrated in one of his poems, he was related to the famous Continental artillery officer, Eleazer Oswald. Richard spent many years in America, first as a factor for his cousins’ Glasgow firm and then for his own London company that specialized in the sugar, tobacco, and slave trades. During the Revolution he worked behind the scenes to try to persuade the government toward a policy of conciliation. In 1781 he put up fifty thousand pounds to bail his old friend Henry Laurens out of the Tower. In March 1782 Lord Rockingham selected Oswald, an ally of the earl of Shelburne, for the peace negotiations in Paris. Initially frustrated by the other members of the commission who represented Shelburne’s opponents within the government, Oswald became the sole responsible British representative during the final peace negotiations following Lord Rockingham’s death in July and replacement as chief minister by Shelburne. Oswald, like Shelburne and most British merchants, was most concerned to maintain profitable trade relations with the United States and worked to craft a final peace treaty that would protect British economic interests. Though the terms of the treaty led to the removal of both Shelburne and Oswald, the terms Oswald negotiated remained the final treaty agreed to in Paris in September 1783. Oswald died in London the following November.

SEE ALSO *Oswald, Eleazer; Peace Negotiations.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

OTIS, JAMES. (1725–1783). Patriot politician, publicist, and orator. Massachusetts. Otis, born in West Barnstable, Massachusetts on 2 February 1725, graduated in 1743 from Harvard, which he hated. He then studied law under Jeremiah Gridley, a prominent Boston attorney, after which he established his own practice in Boston in 1750. In 1755 Otis married the wealthy Ruth Cunningham. Within a few years, Otis was considered one of the leading lawyers in the province. He was an expert in common, civil, and admiralty law, in addition to being a scholar whose *Rudiments of Latin Prosody* (1760) became a Harvard text. In 1761 he resigned his lucrative office as king’s advocate general of the vice admiralty court at Boston rather than argue for the Writs of Assistance, unlimited search warrants that allowed the authorities to search anywhere they pleased. Instead, Otis took the side of the Boston merchants in opposing the writs, which the royal customs collectors were seeking in order to find evidence of the violation of the Sugar Act of 1733.



James Otis. *The American patriot, statesman, and all-around agitator in a nineteenth-century engraving by Oliver Pelton.* THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

In his famous speech against the writs, delivered on 24 February 1761, Otis gave one of the earliest statements of the doctrine that a law that violates “Natural Law” is void. He decried the writs as an exercise of arbitrary power and, as such, contrary to the British constitution. No formal record of his argument exists, but young John Adams took notes and, 60 years later, recalled: “Otis was a flame of fire! . . . He hurried away everything before him. American independence was then and there born” (Adams, vol. 10, p. 247). Otis lost the case to Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson, who argued that the Massachusetts Superior Court had the same power as British courts, which had been granted the authority to issue such writs by Parliament. In 1766 the British vacated Hutchinson’s ruling on the grounds that this act of Parliament did not apply to Massachusetts. Otis’s arguments against the writs of assistance did not circulate widely, but exerted great intellectual influence among the emerging patriot leadership.

Some scholars have questioned Otis’s motivation in opposing British authority, finding personal causes in his resignation from his post as advocate general in 1760. It is known that Otis blamed Governor Francis Bernard and then-Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson for

violating an agreement to elevate the senior James Otis to the Superior Court. Much to the shock of the two James Otises, Hutchinson was himself made chief justice (13 November 1760), even though he continued to serve as lieutenant governor of Massachusetts. The younger Otis denied that his opposition to arbitrary government was motivated by a desire to avenge frustrated family ambitions.

In May 1761, two months after his famous speech against the writs, Otis became one of Boston’s four representatives to the provincial legislature. His father was re-elected as speaker of the House, and the two Otises formed a popular bloc of Boston and rural interests to oppose the crown officials. In 1762 Otis wrote his first pamphlet, “A Vindication of the Conduct of the House of Representatives,” in which he put forth the proposition that the legislature had complete power of the purse; the executive could spend no funds without their approval. In 1764 he wrote “The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved,” putting forth the increasingly popular idea that there could be no taxation without representation, and the following year published “A Vindication of the British Colonies,” mocking the British principle of virtual representation.

Yet even as Otis put forth a series of radical political positions, he cautioned moderation in resistance. Otis was made head of the Massachusetts Committee of Correspondence in 1764, and the next year he made a proposal that resulted in the Stamp Act Congress. He considered the Virginia resolves of Patrick Henry treasonable, and on 26 November 1765 wrote that he preferred “dutiful and loyal Addresses to his Majesty and his Parliament, who alone under God can extricate the Colonies from the painful Scenes of Tumult, Confusion, & Distress.” At the Stamp Act Congress he argued for petitions rather than resistance. Even when British troops landed at Boston in 1768, Otis persisted in his insistence that no action beyond petitioning and letter writing was appropriate.

Though he stood still while political affairs accelerated away from him, Otis continued to play a key role in Massachusetts through 1770. Elected to the General Court in the spring of 1766, he formed a triumvirate with Samuel Adams and Joseph Hawley that led the legislative attack against the embattled Governor Francis Bernard and his deputy, Hutchinson. Otis presided over the town meeting that revived the nonimportation movement (28 October 1767), and, with Samuel Adams produced the Massachusetts circular letter, leading the majority that voted not to rescind it. Throughout these activities, which caused British authorities to threaten Adams and Otis with trial for treason, Otis viewed the idea of independence with abhorrence and repeatedly opposed what he saw as mob violence. Although his

confederates worried about the violence of Otis's tongue, it was he who time and again stopped them from actions that would have provoked a crisis. He organized and moderated the town meeting of 12–13 September 1768 that quashed Samuel Adams's calls for armed resistance against the British regulars coming to establish the Boston Garrison.

Otis fell from leadership under unusual circumstances. On the evening of 5 September 1769 he charged into the British Coffee House and loudly demanded an apology from some officials who had accused him of provoking disloyalty. In a brawl that followed, John Robinson laid Otis's head open with a sword. The blow, aggravated by heavy drinking, drove Otis over the brink of madness, and although his reason returned from time to time he was finished as a public figure. He sued Robinson, was awarded damages of £2,000, and then refused any restitution beyond his legal and medical costs. In 1771 he seemed so completely restored that he returned to the general court, but in December he was declared legally insane. With a borrowed musket he rushed into the Battle of Bunker Hill, 17 June 1775, and emerged unscathed. Early in 1778 he was able, during one of his periodic lucid intervals, to argue a case in Boston, but he found the physical exertion too much and the darkness descended. Although he sometimes became violent and had to be tied down, during most of his final years he was harmless. The end came dramatically to this man who could have been the protagonist of a classical tragedy. Otis had always predicted that he would be killed by lightning, and on 23 May 1783 he was struck by lightning while standing on a friend's doorstep.

SEE ALSO *Adams, John; Adams, Samuel; Boston Garrison; Massachusetts Circular Letter.*

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OTTO, BODO. (1711–1787). Continental army surgeon. Pennsylvania. Born in Hanover, Germany, in 1711, Bodo Otto studied medicine for several years before setting up his practice in Luneberg in 1736. In 1755 he emigrated to Philadelphia, moving in 1773 to Reading,

Pennsylvania, where he achieved great influence among the German population. At the start of the Revolution he was a leader in the Patriot cause. He held several elected offices before being appointed senior surgeon of the Middle Division in 1776, seeing action at Long Island that summer. On 17 February 1777 the Continental Congress ordered Otto to establish a smallpox hospital at Trenton, New Jersey, where he remained until September. He was then assigned to a hospital at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, where he served until the spring of 1778. He next took charge of the hospitals at Yellow Springs, near Valley Forge, where he remained for the duration of the war. During this period he held a commission as colonel in the New Jersey militia. When the medical department was reorganized, Otto was one of fifteen physicians selected for the hospital department. He was given the title of Hospital Physician and Surgeon on 6 October 1780. He retired from the army on 1 February 1782 and reopened his Philadelphia office, but soon moved to Baltimore, Maryland. In 1784 he moved to Reading, Pennsylvania, where he died on 12 June 1787. Three of his sons assisted him during his Revolutionary War service.

SEE ALSO *Medical Practice during the Revolution.*

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“OUT LIERS.” Patriots, particularly in the Carolinas, who left their families at home and hid out to avoid taking the oath of allegiance to the King. The term also was applied to patriots or Tories escaping the vengeance of their political enemies.

Mark M. Boatner

OVER MOUNTAIN MEN. Although this term is loosely applied to other groups of American colonists beyond the Blue Ridge Mountains, it is more accurately restricted to those living in what later became Tennessee. Also known as back water men—“apparently,” according to Sydney George Fisher, “because they lived beyond the sources of the eastern rivers, and on the waters which flowed into the Mississippi”—their principal settlements were along the Watauga, Nolachucky (later

Nolichucky), and Holston Rivers (*Struggle for American Independence*, vol. 2, p. 350 n.). Principal leaders were John Sevier and Isaac Shelby. Although they are often referred to as “mountain men,” Fisher points out that “very few people lived in the mountains at the time of the Revolution, and the Back Water men were merely North Carolinians, mostly of Scotch-Irish stock, who had crossed the mountains to enjoy the level and fertile lands of Tennessee, in the same way that the Virginians who followed Boone crossed the mountains into Kentucky” (ibid., vol. 2, p. 351 n.). Another misconception is that the Battle of Kings Mountain was won by the over mountain men; although their leaders, Shelby and Sevier, deserve credit for this *levée en masse*, their manpower contribution was only 480 out of the 1,800 or so who eventually arrived on the eve of the battle.

Aside from their part in the skirmishes leading up to this battle and in the battle itself, the over mountain men did little fighting. Sevier and Shelby showed up with some men after the Battle of Eutaw Springs (8 September 1781),

but they faded back into the mountains when Greene asked them to reinforce Marion during the subsequent operations leading up to the advance on Dorchester, South Carolina, on 1 December 1781 (Ward, *War of the Revolution*, p. 838). William Campbell’s Virginia mountain riflemen, who figured prominently at Kings Mountain and appeared in the final phases of Lafayette’s maneuvering against Cornwallis in the Virginia military operations, were not over mountain men in the strict sense of the term.

SEE ALSO *Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Virginia, Military Operations in.*

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Mark M. Boatner

P

PACA, WILLIAM. (1740–1799). Signer, governor of Maryland, jurist. Maryland. Born near Abingdon, Maryland, on 31 October 1740, Paca graduated from Philadelphia College in 1759, entered the Middle Temple in 1760, and was admitted to the bar in Annapolis the following year. In 1765 he and Samuel Chase organized the Anne Arundel County Sons of Liberty in opposition to the Stamp Act. He was in the Maryland legislature from 1771 to 1774, when he became a member of the Committee of Correspondence and a delegate to the first Continental Congress. After his state removed restrictions from its delegates in June 1776, Paca voted for independence and became a signer of the Declaration of Independence. He remained a delegate to the Continental Congress through 1777, helped frame the Maryland constitution in August 1776, and served as state senator from 1777 to 1779. In 1778 he became chief judge of the Maryland General Court. Two years later, Congress made him chief justice of the court of appeals in admiralty and prize cases. In November 1782 he was elected governor. Twice re-elected, he served until 26 November 1785. During this period he took a particular interest in veterans' affairs. He finally voted for the Constitution as submitted to the Maryland Convention of 1788, although he was far from satisfied with the document and had proposed 28 amendments. Washington appointed Paca as a federal district judge in 1789, and he held this post until his death on 13 October 1799.

SEE ALSO *Sons of Liberty*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

PAINE, ROBERT TREAT. (1731–1814). Signer, jurist. Massachusetts. Born in Boston, Massachusetts, on 11 March 1731, Robert Treat Paine graduated from Harvard in 1749, served as chaplain on the Crown Point Expedition of 1755, and signed on as a whaler for a long sea voyage to Carolina, Europe, and Greenland. Admitted to the bar in 1757, he practiced first in Boston, but in 1761 moved his office to Taunton. His identification with the Patriot movement led to his selection as associate prosecuting attorney in the trial resulting from the Boston "Massacre," and his prosecution of British Captain Thomas Preston, although unsuccessful, gave him widespread publicity as an advocate of colonial rights. He represented Taunton in the Provincial Assembly during the periods 1773–1775 and 1777–1778. He was delegate to the first Continental Congress, and served in the Second Congress until the end of 1776. Initially opposed to independence, Paine signed both the Olive Branch petition (a final attempt to avoid war with Britain) and the Declaration of Independence. He also had been chairman of the committee to provide gunpowder for the Patriot forces, and after leaving the Congress he continued to experiment with its manufacture. Again elected to Congress in 1777, Paine declined to assume his office, remaining in Massachusetts to serve as speaker in the assembly. Later that year he became the first attorney general of the state. In 1787 he prosecuted those charged in Shays's Rebellion, a clash between local farmers and merchants which had occurred in the previous year. Paine declined a Massachusetts supreme court appointment in 1783 on financial grounds, but finally accepted the position in 1790. After 14 years in this post he was forced by

increasing deafness to retire from the bench. He died in Boston on 11 June 1814.

SEE ALSO *Olive Branch Petition; Shays's Rebellion.*

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
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PAINE, THOMAS. (1737–1809). British author and revolutionary. Thomas Paine was born at Thetford, an inland Norfolk town, on 29 January 1737, the son of a Quaker stay maker and tenant farmer. He was later confirmed in the Church of England, his mother's faith, although his father forbade him to learn Latin and Greek when he entered the local grammar school at seven. He showed some ability at mathematics and literature and absorbed the seagoing stories of one of the masters, before leaving at eleven to be apprenticed to his father. Early in the Seven Years' War, when he was about twenty, he joined the privateer *King of Prussia* for one or possibly more voyages. At around this time he also worked for a London stay maker, thus combining the prim with the semi-piratical. In the spring of 1758 he was employed by a Dover stay maker, and in 1759 he set up on his own account in Sandwich. Here he seems to have become a Methodist lay preacher, at a time when Methodism was an evangelical movement within the Church of England. He married Mary Lambert in September and, when his business began to fail, moved with her to Margate where in 1760 she died in childbirth. In 1762, after training in Thetford, he entered the excise service only to be dismissed two years later for malpractice. He had to return to stay making until he was reinstated in 1766. While waiting for a posting he taught in two London schools, and in February 1768 he accepted an excise job in Lewes, Sussex. There, though a poor public speaker, he was prominent in the town debating society and wrote some poems and other literary pieces. He lodged at first in the High Street with the family of the innkeeper Samuel Ollive, with whom he set up a tobacco mill to supplement his excise pay. After Ollive died in 1769, he started a shop with Ollive's widow and in 1771 married her daughter, Elizabeth.

Up to this time he appears to have been some sort of Whig, but he began to move in a radical direction by



Thomas Paine. The political writer and philosopher Thomas Paine in a portrait (c.1806) by John Wesley Jarvis. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

writing his first political pamphlet, *The Case of the Officers of Excise*, which argued for higher salaries. Toward the end of 1772 he travelled up to London with a petition signed by three thousand excise men, and although his lobbying was ignored by both ministers and Parliament, he associated with Oliver Goldsmith, moved in scientific circles, and probably met Benjamin Franklin. He returned to Lewes in April 1773 to find his businesses in ruins. Twelve months later he was sacked by the excise board for neglect of duty and forced to sell the tobacco mill. In May he and Elizabeth parted, and in June their separation became formal. In October, with a letter of introduction from Franklin in his pocket, he took ship for America.

Soon after his arrival in Philadelphia on 30 November 1774, he met Franklin's son-in-law, Richard Bache, and went into partnership with the bookseller Robert Aitkin to found the *Pennsylvania Magazine*. One of Paine's contributions, an argument against slavery, led to a meeting with the physician Benjamin Rush, who in the autumn of 1775 encouraged Paine to write a pamphlet in favor of independence.

Common Sense, “written by an Englishman,” appeared in Philadelphia on 10 January 1776, price two shillings. It was unique in that it was written for an audience wider than the educated elite and in that it articulated radical notions already abroad but until then never so directly or plainly expressed. Paine argued that society, in its natural origins, was free and without government. As vice crept in laws, governments became a necessary evil at best, repressive tyrannies at worst. The earliest, most nearly natural, and least repressive form of government was republican, whereas monarchy was a later invention that enslaved the people. Paine claimed that in “the early ages of the world, according to the Scripture chronology there were no kings; the consequence of which was there were no wars”; this was breathtakingly specious and misleading, but Paine, of course, was dealing in effects, not facts. Having established that monarchical Europe was corrupt and war-ridden, he went on to argue that even the British constitution was no more than a mongrel blend of republican freedoms with monarchical and aristocratic remnants. It was now America’s divinely appointed destiny, her duty to the world, to break free of this old world corruption and establish a pure free republic. “O receive the fugitive, and prepare in time an asylum for mankind!”

While hardly original, and assailable on many counts, this brilliant piece of propaganda reduced argument for independence to a formula anyone could understand. Appearing on the very day of news of the king’s rejection of American petitions, it turned disappointment into outright hostility to monarchy, especially among artisans whose notion of a republic was quite different from that of grandees like Washington. Pirate editions appeared within three weeks, (120,000) copies of Paine’s version alone were sold within three months, and total sales may have reached 500,000 in America and abroad. There were immediate counter-blasts from those who (like James Chalmers) opposed independence and those who (like John Adams) disliked Paine’s kind of republic: a united republic with a single legislature elected on the widest possible franchise. As “The Forester,” Paine found himself composing replies to these criticisms and becoming drawn into both local provincial politics and the politics of the Continental Congress. He may even have helped to draw up Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, passed by Congress on 4 July 1776.

A few days later, having committed himself to the war of words, Paine now tried to join in the shooting war with a company of Philadelphia volunteers marching to join the “flying camp,” Washington’s mobile strategic reserve, forming at Amboy, near New York. William Howe, of course, did not attack until late August, so Paine became a headquarters secretary. Even after Howe struck, like so many unfit flying camp soldiers Paine saw little or nothing

of the front line. He became aide-de-camp to Nathanael Greene at Fort Lee, where most of the garrison was from flying camp units, and wrote propaganda reports, playing down major defeats, playing up minor successes, and explaining away Washington’s blunders. He escaped across the Delaware in 1776 and returned to Philadelphia to find revolutionary morale in collapse. He immediately began writing a series of propaganda essays, starting with *The American Crisis*, brilliantly designed to stiffen rebel resolve in adversity. More practically, he became secretary first to a mission to the Susquehanna Indians and, beginning in March 1777, to the congressional committee on foreign affairs. In September, with Washington defeated at Brandywine and Howe’s army at the gates of Philadelphia, Paine fled from the city and soon after became the Pennsylvania observer with Washington’s army.

With France’s entry into the war early in 1778, and with Congress’s return to Philadelphia in June, Paine began to believe that victory was assured. In October he revived *American Crisis* number 6, shortly followed by number 7, to attack the Carlisle mission’s peace proposals. His secretarial duties with the foreign affairs committee, while not demanding, and probably intended merely to provide him with a living, gave him an inflated idea of his political importance, which led him to accuse Silas Deane of profiteering in collusion with French interests. The dispute seriously embarrassed the French government, and in January 1799 Congress forced him to resign. Short of income, Paine took a job in a merchant’s office before entering a bitter dispute over America’s Newfoundland fishing rights, which he defended. In November he returned to respectability with appointment as clerk to the Pennsylvania assembly. In May 1780, driven by his belief that rich and poor had a common stake in victory, he made a first move toward establishing the Bank of North America to raise funds for the war. In 1781 he was dissuaded from going home to stir up revolution in Britain and took part in a successful mission to France instead. Later in the year he once again combined conviction with pecuniary need by writing for Congress a series of tracts demanding more powerful federal government. He was probably getting money from the French as well, so *Crisis* number 11 decried the notion that America could possibly make peace separately from her Bourbon allies.

In 1784 he was rewarded with a confiscated Loyalist estate and grants from the federal and Pennsylvania governments. He divided his time between a property in Bordertown, New Jersey, and New York City, writing in support of the independence of the Bank of North America, dabbling in scientific experiments, and developing plans for an iron bridge across the Schuylkill River. When the cost of the bridge turned out to be

beyond American resources, he took his models to Europe in the spring of 1787, eventually persuading a Rotherham firm to put a scaled-down version across the Thames. The bridge, erected in May 1790, was a failure by the autumn, but Paine was already launched on a new journalistic project—the defense of the French Revolution.

He answered Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (November 1790) with *The Rights of Man* (21 February 1791), a muddled scissors-and-paste job that nevertheless became immensely popular. In April 1791 he returned to France, where he joined the Girondins (also called the Brissotins after their leader, Brissot de Warville) as a republican publicist. Returning to Britain in February 1792, he brought out a much more coherent second part of the *Rights of Man*, which credited the American Revolution with sparking the revolt against European despotisms and suggested a union between a republican Britain and France. Already rewarded with French citizenship, Paine prudently retired to Paris in September, where he became a member of the Convention, was briefly imprisoned under the Jacobins, and wrote *The Age of Reason*, an attack on organized religion. In 1796 he bitterly attacked Washington, who he thought had abandoned France. He returned to America in 1802 and died there on 8 June 1809.

Paine was a man of humble origins in an age when aristocratic connections mattered, who failed in both business and the service of the state. Combined with a modest education, a talented pen, and a gift for polemic, it is hardly surprising that he turned a prolific, radical pamphleteer. Against that accomplishment must be set his alcoholism, laziness, inordinate vanity, and carelessness with money. Neither a systematic philosopher nor a careful historian, he never let facts get in the way of his grand polemic. Nevertheless, his capacity to articulate and popularize radical ideas turned him into perhaps the greatest propagandist of the age of revolution.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Burke, Edmund; Deane, Silas; Franklin, Benjamin; Howe, William; Propaganda in the American Revolution; Rush, Benjamin; Washington, George.*

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revised by John Oliphant

PALATINE, NEW YORK (19 OCTOBER 1780) SEE *Fort Keyser, New York.*

PAOLI, PENNSYLVANIA. 21 September 1777. When Washington withdrew across Parker's Ford on 19 September, he left Brigadier General Anthony Wayne's Pennsylvania Division (perhaps fifteen hundred men and four guns) on the west side of the Schuylkill to observe Howe and to strike his rear should he attempt to force a passage across the river. But Wayne was strictly ordered to avoid being caught by the British main body. On the 20th, Wayne camped along a wooded ridge 1.75 miles southwest of the General Paoli Tavern and about 4.5 miles from Howe's position in the South Valley Hills.

Howe decided to strike at this force while it was isolated and sent Major General Charles "No Flint" Grey with almost two thousand men to make a night attack. Grey marched at 10 P.M. on the 20th with the Second Battalion of Light Infantry, supported by the Forty-second ("Black Watch") and the Forty-fourth Foot. He was followed an hour later by the Fortieth and Fifty-fifth Foot under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Musgrave. Since accidental discharges of muskets were the most common way to betray night attacks, Grey directed that the British regulars were to remove the flints from their weapons and rely entirely on the bayonet, thereby earning his nickname. Musgrave's column did not directly figure in the resulting battle, as his task was to cut the Lancaster Road and prevent Wayne from retreating.

Grey's main body, with a dozen dragoons attached, probably amounted to from twelve hundred to fifteen hundred men. The light infantry led, with the Forty-fourth following and the Highlanders at the end of the column. Expertly guided by several local Loyalists, Grey made a fast and skilful approach. Mounted videttes and American sentries detected the movement and fired sporadically, while the British guides became confused just as they reached the outskirts of Wayne's bivouac. As they made contact, the light company of the Fifty-second Foot led the British advance. The attack hit about one in the morning, striking the Seventh Pennsylvania Regiment, which bore the brunt of the blow. Its resistance, with support, bought time for the rest of the division to disengage and for all of the artillery to get to safety. British pursuit continued for several miles.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Estimates of Wayne's losses ran as high as 500 (Howe's claim), but modern investigations have identified 163 individuals by name and conclude that the probable total

count was at least 53 killed and another 200 wounded or captured. The British lost no more than 20 killed and 40 wounded, although Howe reported less. Civilian accounts of the “mangled dead” gave rise to the perception of a “Paoli Massacre.”

SIGNIFICANCE

This engagement had very little impact on the Philadelphia campaign, although American propagandists succeeded in whipping up anti-British sentiment with exaggerated accusations that Grey’s men had refused quarter and massacred defenseless patriots who tried to surrender. Wayne was acquitted by a court-martial “with the highest honors” of charges that he had failed to heed “timely notice” of the attack.

SEE ALSO *Philadelphia Campaign*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

PARALLELS SEE *Regular Approaches*.

PARIS, TREATY OF. 10 February 1763. The Treaty of Paris ended the French and Indian War in North America and the Seven Years’ War in Europe. France ceded to Britain all claims to Canada, Acadia, Cape Breton Island, and the islands in the St. Lawrence, in effect all her territories east of the Mississippi River, retaining only the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and fishing rights off Newfoundland. To compensate Spain for her losses as France’s ally, France had previously ceded to Spain by the secret Treaty of San Ildefonso on 3 November 1762 the Isle of Orleans (New Orleans) and all her territory west of the Mississippi. The Treaty of Paris thus completed the removal of French power from North America and left only Britain and Spain as imperial powers on the continent. Of the West Indies islands captured during the war, Martinique and Guadeloupe were restored to France; St. Vincent, Dominica, and Tobago were restored to Britain. Britain restored Cuba to Spain in return for the Floridas. Spain acknowledged Britain’s rights to maintain

log-cutting settlements in Central America. France agreed to evacuate her position in Hanover and to restore Minorca to the British. The status quo in India was restored.

The Treaty of Paris ratified Britain’s preeminent position in Europe and North America, but while Britons rejoiced in the success of their armies and navies, those very victories, by so thoroughly upsetting the balance of power, left their leaders to deal with a world in which her foes would be eager for revenge. France was temporarily shattered, exhausted, and humiliated, but she had not been, nor could have been, permanently crippled. Britain now had also to deal with other complications, especially regarding how to govern the newly enlarged empire. Some Englishmen recognized the emerging problem of imperial governance and even argued that, instead of Canada, Britain should have retained the sugar-rich island of Guadeloupe.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

PARIS, TREATY OF. SEE *Peace Treaty of 3 September 1783*.

PARKER, SIR HYDE. (1714–1782/3). British admiral. Hyde Parker served in merchant ships before entering the navy at the advanced age of twenty-four. A post-captain from 1748, he was in the East Indies from 1760 to 1764, and was next employed in the Channel in 1776–1777. On 26 January 1778 he was promoted rear admiral and appointed John Byron’s second in command of the squadron that chased d’Estaing to North America and the West Indies. From August 1779 Parker was in temporary command in the Leeward Islands, and in March 1780 he prevented an attack on St. Lucia by Comte de Guichen’s numerically superior fleet. When George Rodney arrived, Parker stayed on as his second in command and led the van in the indecisive action off Martinique on 17 April. Because Rodney had not properly explained his intentions, Parker had not engaged as he wanted; although not blamed directly, Parker was sent home with the trade convoy in July. On 26 September 1780 he was promoted vice admiral, and on 5 August 1781 he failed to destroy a Dutch force of similar size in an action off the Dogger Bank. Blaming the Admiralty, Parker resigned, telling the king that he should employ younger commanders and better ships. In 1782 the Rockingham ministry appointed him commander in chief in the East Indies, and on 10 July he succeeded to his brother’s baronetcy. He sailed in October, but sometime after leaving Rio on 12 December his ship was lost at sea. Its fate has never been established.

SEE ALSO *Byron, John; Dutch Participation in the American Revolution; Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'; Guichen, Luc Urbain de Bouexic, Comte de; Rodney, George Bridges.*

revised by John Oliphant

PARKER, SIR HYDE, JR. (1739–1807). British admiral. Second son of vice admiral Sir Hyde Parker, baronet (1714–1782), Parker served for some time in his father's ships, rising to the post of captain on 5 July 1763. From 1763 he served in West Indian and North American waters. At New York on 12–18 July 1776 he led the raid to Tappan Sea aboard the *Phoenix* (40 guns), and on 27 August his ship helped to cover General William Howe's landing on Long Island. In October he was again in action in the North River. He convoyed troops to Savannah at the end of 1778. In 1779 the *Phoenix* returned to Britain, where her captain was knighted for his services at New York Escorting an outward-bound Jamaica convoy, the *Phoenix* was wrecked in a hurricane off Cuba on 4 October 1780. Parker got most of his crew ashore with rescued provisions and guns, constructed defence works, and held off enemy forces until they were rescued. He was with his father's squadron in the Dogger Bank action on 5 August 1781 and, aboard the *Goliath*, he took part in the relief of Gibraltar in 1782. Promoted to rear admiral in February 1793, he served with Samuel Lord Hood at Toulon and Corsica. A vice admiral from 1794, in 1796 he promptly pursued a Spanish squadron across the Atlantic after it had escaped from Cadiz, and from 1796 to 1800 he was in command at Jamaica. At Copenhagen in 1801, his famously ill-judged signal to Admiral Horatio, Lord Nelson to withdraw, and his subsequent failure to advance into the Baltic Sea, ruined his reputation. He was not employed again. However, the hesitation and slowness of 1801, and the inevitable comparison with Nelson, should not be allowed to obscure his considerable achievements.

SEE ALSO *Long Island, New York (August 1777); Tappan Sea.*

revised by John Oliphant

PARKER, JOHN. (1729–1775). Hero of the battle of Lexington. Massachusetts. A native of Lexington, Massachusetts, John Parker served in the

French and Indian War, fighting at Louisburg and Quebec and probably serving as one of Robert Roger's rangers for a time. When the Revolution started he was a farmer and mechanic, and held various town offices. As captain of the local company of minutemen, he figured prominently in the battle of Lexington, 19 April 1775. It is unlikely that he said the famous words carved on the stone at Lexington: "Stand your ground. Don't fire unless fired upon. But if they mean to have a war, let it begin here." This is, however, what he should have said. Parker assembled as many militia as possible after the action on the green, then marched toward Concord to harass the British on their retreat to Boston. He then led a small force to Cambridge, but was too ill to take part in subsequent actions. He died on 17 September 1775.

SEE ALSO *Lexington and Concord.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

PARKER, SIR PETER. (1721–1811). British admiral. A post-captain from 1747, in October 1775 Parker was appointed commodore with orders to escort Charles Cornwallis's transports to America. Unable to sail until February 1776, and delayed by storms en route, the convoy did not join Henry Clinton until May. Parker and Clinton then cooperated to attack the fort on Sullivan's Island in Charleston Harbor on 28 June 1776. Although the troops were unable to reach the fort, the naval bombardment was frustrated only when three of Parker's ships ran aground. Parker then joined William Howe at New York and supported the landings on Long Island. He escorted Clinton's expedition to Rhode Island and remained there well into 1777. Promoted rear admiral on 20 May 1777, he was later appointed to command the Jamaica station, where in 1778 he became Horatio Nelson's chief patron. Promoted vice admiral on 29 March 1779, Parker supported Dalling's expeditions to Honduras and Nicaragua (1779–1780). Concerned for the safety of Jamaica, he resisted demands to send naval support to save Mobile and Pensacola and was slow to release ships to reinforce the North American squadron under Thomas Graves and Samuel Hood in 1781. Parker was awarded a baronetcy on 13 January 1783 and in due course rose to admiral of the fleet. He died in London on 21 December 1811.

SEE ALSO *Jamaica (West Indies); Long Island, New York, Battle of; Sullivan's Island.*

revised by John Oliphant

PARKERS FERRY, SOUTH CAROLINA.

13 August 1781. Colonel William Harden commanded a body of rebel troops near this place, some thirty miles west northwest of Charleston, when British Major Thomas Fraser was sent with 200 dragoons to support an uprising of some 450 Loyalists. Harden called for help, and General Nathanael Greene called on General Francis Marion to respond as he thought fit. Leaving his base in the Santee Hills, Marion led two hundred picked men on a remarkable march of about one hundred miles, moving only at night and undetected by the enemy. He reached Harden on 13 August and immediately set up an ambush on the causeway leading to Parkers Ferry. He then sent a party of his fastest horsemen to lure Fraser into the trap. Fraser took the bait and charged in to take a surprise fire of buckshot at fifty yards range. Courageously, Fraser rallied his men, launched another attack in the face of a second volley, and was hit by a third when his horsemen again came parallel to the hidden partisans. Marion estimated that his forces had killed or wounded one hundred of the enemy without losing a single man. Because Marion's ammunition was almost exhausted, he could not exploit this success by pursuing the enemy and so returned to his base. After covering a total of four hundred miles, he rejoined Greene in time for the major engagement at Eutaw Springs.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

PARLEY. As early as the sixteenth century, this term was used to mean an informal conference between military opponents to treat or discuss terms. A parley usually was requested to discuss surrender, but it also was called to arrange a truce to care for wounded men lying between the lines. It often was a means of gaining time. A parley with the Indians was known in America as a powow.

SEE ALSO *Chamade.*

revised by Mark M. Boatner

PAROLE. Derived from the French *parole d'honneur* (word of honor), a parole is a pledge or oath under

which a prisoner of war is released with the understanding that he will not again bear arms until exchanged. Sometimes the parole included geographical restrictions. The victor often is happy to parole prisoners because this relieves him of the administrative burden of caring for them; also, sometimes he does not have the transportation or guards to evacuate prisoners, particularly the wounded. Another sense of "parole," as defined in Thomas Wilhelm's *Military Dictionary* (rev. ed, 1881), is a "watch-word differing from the countersign in that it is only communicated to officers of the guard, while the countersign is given to all members."

revised by Mark M. Boatner

PARSONS, SAMUEL HOLDEN.

(1737–1789). Continental general. Connecticut. Born on 14 May 1737 at Lyme, Connecticut, Parsons was the son of a clergyman whose support for George Whitefield made him so unpopular with his congregation that he moved to Newburyport, Massachusetts, in 1746. The son graduated from Harvard College in 1756 and returned to Lyme, where his mother, Phebe Griswold, had important family connections. He studied law under his uncle, Matthew Griswold (later deputy governor and governor of Connecticut), was admitted to the bar in 1759, and settled in Lyme where he became a prominent figure in Patriot politics. He was repeatedly elected to the General Assembly after 1762 (he served eighteen consecutive terms) and was appointed king's attorney for New London County in 1773, the same year he became a member of the assembly's committee of correspondence. He moved to New London in 1774.

An early advocate of independence, he was one of the first to suggest holding an intercolonial congress. As lieutenant colonel of the Third Militia Regiment from October 1774, he led a company to Boston on news of the Lexington alarm (19 April 1775). He figured prominently in the plan to capture Fort Ticonderoga (accomplished on 10 May) and was named colonel of the Sixth Connecticut Regiment on 1 May 1775. He remained on duty at New London until 17 June, when the governor's council ordered his regiment to Boston where, stationed at Roxbury, it took part in the Boston siege until the end of its enlistment on 10 December. From his old regiment, Parsons recruited the Tenth Continental Regiment for 1776 and was ordered to New York City in April. Promoted to brigadier general on 9 August 1776, Parsons was heavily engaged in the fighting on the American right (William Alexander's wing) at the Battle of Long Island on 27 August and distinguished himself by holding his

position until almost completely surrounded. His letters of 29 August and 8 October 1776 to John Adams provide some of the best descriptions of the battlefield; the historian Douglas Freeman has called his 8 October 1776 letter "a model of lucid and simple explanation" (vol. 4, p. 158). At Kips Bay on 15 September, his brigade of Connecticut Continentals proved it could run as well as militia, but he himself joined Washington in trying to stop the rout. After the Battle of Harlem Heights, he was posted in the Highlands until December 1776, when he was detached to reinforce Washington's troops in New Jersey.

Parsons spent the rest of the war recruiting in Connecticut, commanding troops in the Hudson Highlands, and orchestrating the defense of the Connecticut shore against British raiders. From his recruiting post at New Haven, he was unable to oppose William Tryon's Danbury raid in late April 1777. In late September he warned Israel Putnam that three thousand British reinforcements had reached New York City, but he could do little in response when these troops were employed in Clinton's expedition up the Hudson in October. He spent the winter of 1778–1779 in charge of construction at West Point. In July 1779 he finally managed to deploy 150 Continental recruits to attack British raiders at Norwalk, but he could not help other towns along Long Island Sound that were attacked at the same time. In December 1779 he succeeded Israel Putnam as commander of the Connecticut division, always stationed in or near the Highlands, and on 23 October 1780 he was promoted to major general. He devoted most of his energy to keeping the Connecticut Line in good order, a difficult job amid privation and inaction. He organized occasional raids into the Neutral Ground, the most successful of which was Lieutenant Colonel William Hull's attack on Morrisania on 22–23 January 1781, for which he received the thanks of Congress.

As early as December 1777, Parsons had been alarmed by the depreciation of Continental currency, which was wiping out the small fortune he had invested in government securities when he entered the army. A year later he was increasingly impatient to be released from military service, but Congress would not approve his resignation because his efforts were too valuable. During this time he dealt with the double agent William Heron on espionage matters, and Heron thought the discontented general might be won over to the British cause, but according to the historian Carl Van Doren, Parsons "never showed himself disloyal or treacherous" (p. 400).

Retiring from the army on 22 July 1782, Parsons practiced law in Middletown, Connecticut, and was elected several times to the legislature. He was quick to see the advantages of getting government land in exchange for his pay certificates and undertook to get an appointment that would enable him to evaluate western lands.

This opportunity came when Congress named him an Indian commissioner on 22 September 1785. He then became a promoter of the Ohio Company and on 8 March 1787 was chosen one of its three directors. In October he was named the first judge of the Northwest Territory and in April 1788 moved to Adelphia (later Marietta, Ohio). At the age of fifty-one he embarked on the life of a frontiersman and undertook to recoup his fortune. He drowned on 17 November 1789 when his canoe capsized in the rapids of the Big Beaver River while he was returning from a visit to the Western Reserve, where he also had an interest.

SEE ALSO *Clinton's Expedition; Kip's Bay, New York; Long Island, New York, Battle of; Morrisania, New York; Ticonderoga, New York, American Capture of.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

PARSON'S CAUSE. 1763. When droughts in the 1750s brought on several crop failures and shot up the price of tobacco, the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1755 and 1758 passed the Two Penny Acts, which made it temporarily legal to pay debts formerly callable in tobacco at the rate of two pence a pound. This price was considerably below the soaring free market price of tobacco, which reached four and a half pence a pound in Virginia currency. The Anglican clergy in Virginia was collectively entitled to an annual salary of 17,280 pounds of tobacco a year, and some clergymen clamored to collect the windfall increase in the value of their maintenance. They took their case to the colony's Privy Council, which on 29 August 1759 exercised its right by disallowing the act of 1758 on the grounds that it did not have the required clause suspending its operation until approved by the king, thereby enabling the clergy to sue for the anticipated value of their salary.

The Reverend James Maury presented such a suit in the Hanover County court in 1763, and the judges had to declare the act null and void. But when a jury was called to determine how much the “parson” would collect, young Patrick Henry’s brilliant defense resulted in Maury’s being awarded only one penny. The effort of the Anglican clergy to profit from the economic distress inflicted by natural causes, as well as the unwillingness of the imperial government to allow a colony to deal in a timely way with an unforeseen natural disaster, began to sour many Virginians on the imperial connection. The case also marked the beginning of Henry’s political career.

SEE ALSO *Henry, Patrick.*

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PATERSON, JAMES. British general. Appointed adjutant general in America on 11 July 1776, he held this office until he was sent home with dispatches after the Battle of Monmouth on 28 June 1778. With the local rank of brigadier general, he commanded three infantry battalions and a jäger detachment in the capture of Stony Point on 1 June 1779. Taking part in the Charleston expedition of Clinton in 1780, Paterson initially was put in command of a force that was to make a diversion toward Augusta, Georgia, but subsequently was called back to support the siege of Charleston. He returned with Clinton to New York City in June 1780. In the spring of 1781 he commanded the defenses of Staten Island and in October of that year was preparing to take part in the expedition to relieve the siege of Yorktown when news was received of Cornwallis’s surrender.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Stony Point, New York.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

PATERSON, JOHN. (1744–1808). Continental general. Connecticut-Massachusetts. Born at Farmington in late 1743 or early 1744, John Paterson was the son of John Paterson, who served in six campaigns of the French and Indian War and who died at Havana on 5 September 1762, just before his son graduated from

Yale College. The son taught school for several years while studying the law and then began to practice. In 1774 he moved to Lenox, Massachusetts, and quickly became prominent in the Revolutionary politics of Berkshire County. He was elected to the General Court in May 1774, was a member of the county convention in July 1774 that supported Boston’s boycott of British imports, and in 1774 and 1775 sat in the Provincial Congress, which appointed him colonel of his local minuteman regiment. An impressive-looking man, over six feet tall and vigorous until late in life, he had long shown a taste for military life. When news of Lexington and Concord reached Lenox, he marched within eighteen hours (on 22 April) for Boston with his regiment fully armed and almost completely in uniform. On 27 May 1775 he was commissioned colonel of a provincial regiment created around six of the former minuteman companies. The regiment was posted near Prospect Hill, where it built and garrisoned Fort No. 3, and served through the siege of Boston. It was held in reserve during the Battle of Bunker Hill. On 9 November 1775 it was involved in driving off an enemy foraging raid on Lechmere Point.

Paterson continued in service as colonel of the Fifteenth Continental Regiment from 1 January 1776. In March 1776 he accompanied the army to New York City and was then sent with Brigadier General William Thompson to Canada. Major Henry Sherburne led one hundred men of the regiment to relieve a American force under attack at The Cedars and was nearly wiped out in an ambush on 20 May. Paterson and the rest of the regiment retreated south up Lake Champlain with Benedict Arnold’s column. After working on the defenses of Mount Independence, opposite Ticonderoga, from July until November 1776, he moved south to join Washington’s army on the Delaware and took part in the Battles of Trenton and Princeton.

He was promoted to brigadier general on 21 February 1777 and returned to the Northern Department with his brigade, serving with Matthias de Fermoy’s and Enoch Poor’s brigades under Arthur St. Clair in the operations that ended with the evacuation of Ticonderoga from 2 to 5 July. His Third Massachusetts Brigade (10th, 11th, 12th, and 14th Massachusetts Regiments) helped to hold the lines on Bemis Heights, not seeing combat at Freeman’s Farm (19 September 1777). At Bemis Heights (7 October) the brigade joined Benedict Arnold in the attack on the Balcarres redoubt, where Paterson’s horse was shot out from under him by a cannonball. The brigade wintered at Valley Forge in 1777–1778 and participated in the Monmouth Campaign in June and July 1778, without seeing any action. Paterson spent the rest of the war in the Hudson Highlands, watching the Massachusetts Line deteriorate through inaction. He sat on the court-martial that condemned John André to be hung as a spy in September 1780. He helped to found the Society of the Cincinnati, was

breveted major general on 30 September 1783, and retired from the army on 3 November.

Paterson resumed his law practice at Lenox after the war and held many public offices. In early 1786 he helped Rufus Putnam and Benjamin Tupper organize the Ohio Company and later that year displayed compassion and moderation in helping to end Shays's Rebellion as commander of the Berkshire militia. In 1790 Paterson became a proprietor of the Boston Purchase (ten townships in Broome and Tioga Counties in New York, north of the Susquehanna River and west of the Chenango River), and in 1791 he moved to Lisle (later Whitney's Point) with his family. He served in the New York legislature (1792–1793), the state constitutional convention of 1801, and in the U.S. House of Representatives (1803–1805). In 1798 he was appointed to the bench and was judge of the two counties. He died on 19 July 1808 at Lisle.

SEE ALSO *Cedars, The; Lechmere Point, Massachusetts; Ticonderoga, New York, British Capture of.*

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PATTISON, JAMES. (1724–1805). British general. An artillery officer, he was promoted to colonel on 25 April 1777 and reached New York on 24 September 1777 with the "local rank" of brigadier general. Clinton promoted him to major general on 19 February 1779. After assisting General James Paterson in the operations against Stony Point and Verplancks Point on 1 June 1779, he won the praise of Clinton for his work in organizing a local militia for the defense of New York City. Although Pattison served as commandant of New York City during most if not all of his time in America, he also commanded a brigade in the field operations during June 1779. On 4 September 1780 he sailed from New York to England with the fleet that took Governor Tryon home.

SEE ALSO *Paterson, James.*

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Mark M. Boatner

PATTON'S REGIMENT. Colonel John Patton commanded one of the sixteen "additional Continental regiments."

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments.*

Mark M. Boatner

PAULDING, JOHN. (1758–1818). A captor of John André. New York. Paulding claimed to have served the Patriot cause throughout the Revolution, being taken prisoner by the British three times and escaping heroically in each instance. However, there is no evidence for his claims and many contemporaries and scholars have charged that he was a highwayman rather than a patriot soldier. What is known is that Paulding, Isaac Van Wart, and David Williams volunteered for the militia in 1780, shortly after New York passed a law allowing those who seized Loyalists or enemy agents to keep any property they found on the prisoner. This motivation accounted for André's capture, as the three men rifled his pockets looking for valuables. Congress rewarded Paulding, Van Wart, and Williams with a silver medal and a \$200 pension; in addition a county in Ohio was named for each of the three men. Paulding's seventh child, Hiram Paulding (1797–1878), later became a naval hero.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

PAULUS HOOK, NEW JERSEY. 19 August 1779. Henry Lee's Raid. Soon after Brigadier General Anthony Wayne's brilliant coup at Stony Point on 16 July, reconnaissance elements pushed south into Bergen County, New Jersey, to look for new opportunities. One of these was Captain Allan McLane's company. Raised in Delaware, it had just been assigned to Major Henry Lee's Corps of Partisan Light Dragoons as its fourth troop, serving on foot in a light infantry configuration. Under Washington's instructions McLane started from a position at Schraalenburgh and, without ever spending two nights in the same location, he systematically swept Bergen County over a span of ten days. He also used men from the immediate area, posing as farmers selling their produce, to enter the British strongpoint at Paulus Hook. Although Washington's primary focus at this point was strengthening the fortress complex at West Point, the critical strategic pivot for the second half of the war, he still wanted to maintain morale and whittle down the British

by conducting set-piece attacks on isolated outposts. McLane's information provided such an opportunity.

BRITISH DEFENSE WORKS

Paulus (or Powles) Hook (in modern Jersey City, near Washington and Grand Streets) was a low point of sand protruding into the Hudson that formed the western end of a ferry. Americans had started fortifying it in the 1776 campaign, and the works had been greatly expanded by the British, who used it as a bridgehead for foraging operations in Bergen County. The most commonly cited British map, in the Clinton Papers in at Ann Arbor, Michigan, does not show the actual defenses at the time of the American attack in 1778. The Hesse-Cassel topographical engineers made a detailed inspection of the site right after the attack, and this better depiction is in the Portuguese army archives in Lisbon. It confirms that the British had dug a ditch to separate the higher ground at the tip of the peninsula from a wide salt marsh and then flooded it to serve as a moat.

A causeway led from the ferry landing across about five hundred yards of marsh before reaching dry ground; a creek fordable in only two places ran through the marsh. In addition to a double row of abatis, a palisade wall made from logs inside the ditch provided security for the enclosure, which contained a number of buildings. A large blockhouse protected the gate and the drawbridge over the moat, while two smaller ones supported the palisade. Several breastworks at various points on the perimeter furnished further security.

Inside the enclosure on low elevations were two redoubts, each surrounded by its own ditch and abatis. One, which mounted six cannon, was a circle about 150 feet across. The other was slightly larger, shaped like an oval and 150 feet wide and 250 feet long; it mounted four guns. Major William Sutherland of the Royal Garrison Battalion commanded the post. His troops consisted of a detachment of his own unit, which was formed from invalids who had been transferred from line units, the Loyalists of Lieutenant Colonel Abraham Van Buskirk's Fourth Battalion of the New Jersey Volunteers (Cortlandt Skinner's), some men from the Royal Artillery, a handful of men from the Sixty-fourth Foot, Captain Francis Dundas's light infantry company from the Guards Brigade, and forty Hessians from the Erb Prinz Regiment under Captain Henrich Sebastian von Schallern. At the time of the attack this force probably amounted to between 200 and 220 men, as a large number of Van Buskirk's men were absent on a foraging expedition and Dundas and von Schallern's men had only arrived the night before the attack to take their place.


THE AMERICAN ATTACK FORCE

While historians have engaged in controversy over who planned the attack, the reality of military operations is

that no plan has a single author. In this case, Washington provided the overall guidance; the attack on Stony Point provided a tactical model; McLane provided the detailed intelligence; and Lee had the command. The specifics probably evolved in discussions between McLane and Lee. A general supervision came from Major General William Alexander (Lord Stirling), whose division had geographical responsibility for Bergen County, and Washington insisted that he give a final blessing to the plan to ensure that it was feasible and to furnish the majority of the troops and the party that would cover the task force as it withdrew. To carry out the operation, Lee had his own unit and three hundred of Stirling's men. Lee formed them into three columns plus a reserve. The left (east) column formed the main effort under Lee himself, with McLane's and part of John Rudolph's troop serving dismounted and one hundred men from the First Virginia Brigade; Lieutenant James Armstrong led its "forlorn hope" (vanguard) from Rudolph's troop. The right (west) column had one hundred men from the Second Virginia Brigade with Lieutenant Mark Vanduval leading its "forlorn hope." The center column had one hundred men from the First Maryland Brigade under Captain Levin Handy plus Forsyth's and the rest of Rudolph's troop, who were dismounted; Lieutenant Philip Reid had this "forlorn hope." Lee left his mounted element under Captain Henry Peyton as part of the covering party along with some Virginia infantry under Captain Nathan Reid.

THE ATTACK

On Wednesday, 18 August, Lee set out from Paramus at 10:30 in the morning, using wagons to convey the impression that he was only on a foraging expedition. His unit and the Marylanders linked up with the Virginia detachment at New Bridge, and at about 4:30 in the afternoon they started a twenty-mile march towards their assault positions, planning to make the attack about 3 A.M. in order to take advantage of darkness. Guides got them lost, and a variety of delays caused by the "friction of war" caused them to reach the edge of the marsh an hour late; they were worried about first light, which could come at any time. Rudolph went forward on a reconnaissance and returned with the news that the operation was still feasible, an important point as Washington had given orders that prohibited the attack if it did not achieve surprise. From here the center column had the mission of proceeding down the causeway, breaking through the gate, and securing the blockhouse at that location. The other two columns went along the river edge and struck the fort from the corners, secured their respective blockhouses, and then pushed into the center to attack the oval redoubt. As at Stony Point, the muskets were not loaded and the men were told not to make any noise, even cheering, to buy time for the



THE GALE GROUP

prisoners and supplies to be collected and the task force to withdraw with minimal risk of detection.

The columns reached the edge of the moat undetected, and the “forlorn hopes” waded across. Just as they were emerging, the first sentry detected the Americans and fired a warning shot, but to no avail. The columns quickly broke in before the sleepy defenders could react. All of the

blockhouses fell as planned, and the oval redoubt followed swiftly. Only small pockets put up any resistance; the rest of the British and Loyalists surrendered almost immediately. But von Schallern’s Hessians had been more alert at the circular redoubt and could not be talked into laying down their arms. Knowing that nothing was to be gained by trying to assault it, Lee quickly gathered up the

prisoners and headed back to the mainland. He had neither the time nor the equipment to spike the cannon that fell into American hands, nor did he catch Major Sutherland, who had made it into the German strong point.

Lee's fears that firing would alert the British in New York City, a mile and a half away on the east side of the Hudson, were well-founded. They heard the shooting, but since Sutherland never fired the signal to indicate that he was under attack, Major General James Pattison assumed that it was only Van Buskirk's party skirmishing with militia. Not until a messenger came over from Sutherland did he learn the truth. At that point he quickly sent Lieutenant Colonel Cosmo Gordon of the Guards Brigade across with the rest of the flank companies of the brigade, some artillerymen, and one hundred more Germans.

WITHDRAWAL

Lee's withdrawal followed the plan, although he was now running well behind schedule. He headed for Douwe's Ferry, where Peyton's men were supposed to be waiting with boats to cross the Hackensack River. After putting that obstacle between his force and any pursuit, he intended to take the Polifly Road back to New Bridge. But when the attack party had not appeared an hour after schedule, Peyton assumed that the attack had been called off and headed back to Newark with the boats. Fortunately, McLane had excellent knowledge of the various roads as the result of his original reconnaissance, and Lee quickly changed the withdrawal route to the more dangerous Bergen Road. The rear guard trying to cover the main body got lucky when Captain Thomas Catlett arrived with fifty fresh men (Virginians who had missed the original attack) who had dry ammunition. There was a chance encounter with some of Van Buskirk's foragers near Liberty Pole Tavern (at modern Englewood), but it never developed into anything significant, and Gordon's light infantry never caught up. Lee arrived safely at New Bridge at around 1 P.M.

The next day, 20 August, a furious General Clinton convened a court-martial to try Sutherland on charges of general misconduct. He was acquitted but shortly thereafter was transferred to Bermuda.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Lee lost only two men killed and three wounded, which was very light, given that he had more than four hundred men in the action. The low numbers came from the tactics of the surprise attack and the cover of the darkness that prevented any type of a coherent defense. British official reports claimed that they had lost only 9 killed, 2 wounded, and 113 missing, but as usual these figures carefully omitted the Germans and the Loyalists. A more

reasonable estimate is 173 killed, wounded or captured; only about 50 of the men in Paulus Hook escaped.

SIGNIFICANCE

The action amounted to nothing more than a mosquito bite from a military point of view, but it had an important impact on the morale of the Americans and British, with the latter considering the poor showing of the garrison as a mark of dishonor. The Germans all took enormous pride in von Schallern's performance. The Continental Congress voted Lee a gold medal like those given for Stony Point, which prompted a lingering war of memoirs with some of the officers from the attached infantry involving perceived slights and squabbles about who deserved credit for what.

SEE ALSO *Forlorn Hope*; *Lee, Henry* ("Light-Horse Harry"); *MacLean, Allan*.

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PAXTON BOYS. 1763–1765. As a result of Indian depredations that began during the French and Indian War and culminated in Pontiac's uprising, many Scots-Irish and German settlers on the Pennsylvania frontier came to believe that they had license to exterminate all Native Americans. They also nursed a grudge against the Quaker-dominated government of the colony, which they thought should have done more to protect their homes and families. On 14 December 1763, some fifty-seven rangers from Paxton and Donegal in Lancaster County, led by Lazarus Stewart, senselessly massacred six Christian Indians living at Conestoga Manor, eight miles west of Lancaster. Two weeks later, another gang rode into Lancaster and, pushing aside token resistance from the sheriff, broke into the workhouse where they slaughtered the remaining fourteen Conestoga Indians who had taken shelter there. Five of the twenty Indians were women and

eight were children. Governor John Penn ordered the culprits brought to trial, but sympathetic justices and juries made this impossible. The “Boys” then undertook a political campaign to win better representation for the settlers in the legislature and backed it up with the very real threat of violence. In early February 1764, some 600 of them marched under arms towards Philadelphia, intending, it seems, to kill 140 Indians who had taken refuge in the city’s military barracks. When 250 of them reached Germantown, they were confronted by over 500 armed citizen-volunteers and 250 regular troops, with artillery at the ready. The crisis abated when the “Boys” accepted promises of amnesty for their previous actions from government spokesmen (including Benjamin Franklin), along with the promise of a chance to present their grievances to the governor and legislature. “Their major grievances—paucity of frontier defenses, underrepresentation, and Quaker favoritism to Indians—received scant attention from the legislature,” according to the historian Alden T. Vaughn. (“Frontier Banditti,” p. 85).

Thereafter, the Pennsylvania frontier degenerated into a morass of violence and murder, where white men were effectively free to kill Indians at will and where no Indian could expect to receive any sort of legal protection or justice. In May 1765 at Sideling Hill, a group of frontier banditti with blackened faces, called by some the “Black Boys,” even went so far as to hijack a convoy of gifts and trade goods being sent to Fort Pitt and faced down the regular troops sent to recover the wagons. From London, Franklin was aghast: “The outrages committed by the frontier people are really amazing,” he said (*ibid.*, p. 87). By then, the name “Paxton Boys” had become an umbrella term for all frontiersmen who were willing to use violence to achieve their ends. As can readily be imagined, Native Americans on the Pennsylvania frontier had no sympathy for the rebel fight against the British imperial government after 1775.

Lazarus Stewart, disgusted with the proprietary government and threatened with prosecution, moved with his followers to the Wyoming Valley in 1769 and was granted a township by the Connecticut authorities. He was killed in the Wyoming Valley massacre of 3–4 July 1778.

SEE ALSO *Pontiac’s War*.

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PAY, BOUNTIES, AND RATIONS.

Raising armies and making war were the costliest activities that societies in the eighteenth century could undertake. Governments of every description invariably tried to keep their expenses as low as possible, even to the extent of placing cost-cutting ahead of fielding effective forces. Feeding, clothing, equipping, and transporting troops were the biggest ongoing expenses, but the costs of procuring and paying soldiers were also substantial. A society’s willingness to pay bounties to procure the services of some of its members, the rates of pay society’s leaders thought were appropriate for different war-related activities, and even the fact that the amount of rations varied according to rank all provide insight into how a society thought about making war, over and above the actual amounts involved. Pay, bounties, and rations are related and are therefore considered together.

PAY

Everyone understood that soldiers had to be paid for their service. Historically, rates of pay were low in both the British and American armies. In the British army, soldiers were recruited from the bottom of the social hierarchy and so were believed by most of the elite to be worth only the lowest possible amount of pay. During the Revolution, the pay of a British private amounted, nominally, to eight shillings a day, from which were deducted the costs of food, clothing, repair of equipment, and various fees. The net amount paid in specie to the private often hovered around zero, a reality that did nothing to promote recruiting in an age when the standard of living was rising.

In the colonies, low pay reflected both the lack of financial resources and the fact that military service still retained some aspects of the early days of settlement, when men had to serve if their community was to survive. There were variations in the rates of pay among the colonies—higher in the northern colonies, lower in the South—reflecting each colony’s historical experience, most recently in the French and Indian War.

Massachusetts set the pace for rates of pay at the start of the war. A private in the militia who turned out for the Lexington alarm or who enlisted in the eight-months’ army received two pounds per calendar month. The Continental Congress on 14 June gave privates in the new rifle companies from Pennsylvania and Virginia \$6.67 per calendar month, an amount roughly equivalent

to the Massachusetts pay. A captain in the 1775 army received three times as much per month as a private (twenty dollars), while a colonel received two-and-a-half times as much as a captain (fifty dollars). (Captains in the artillery got more, \$26.67 per month.) Delegates from the southern colonies objected that the pay of officers was too low and that of privates too high, and perhaps too that most of the pay was going to New Englanders. They forced a three-member congressional committee sent to Cambridge in October 1775 to ask Washington what he thought the rates of pay ought to be for the new 1776 army. A conference of Washington, the committee, and seven senior leaders from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island “unanimously agreed” that the pay of the privates “cannot be reduced, and agreed by a majority that raising the pay of the officers would be inconvenient and improper” (Chase, ed., *Papers*, vol. 1, p. 191). Explaining its opposition to reducing pay, the conference stated, “It [appeared] on a full discussion and consideration of all circumstances that any attempt to reduce the present pay would probably prevent the soldiers [from] re-enlisting.” Congress accepted the recommendations about privates but on 4 November raised the pay of an infantry captain to \$26.67 per month, the existing artillery captain’s rate. A British captain drew about twice as much as an American captain, but a more significant difference was that he could buy almost anything he needed at moderate rates.

Continental pay rates remained at these levels for over two and one-half years, even as the currency began to inflate. Congress next revised pay rates on 27 May 1778, when it raised the pay for an infantry colonel to \$75 dollars per month and an infantry captain to \$40 per month but amazingly left a private’s pay at \$6.67 per month. (Privates in the artillery, cavalry, and military police received \$8.33 per month.) There the rates remained for the rest of the war. Inequities in the pay scales between the Continental army and the militia, constant arrears in pay, and rampant inflation plagued American commanders, including Washington, and created serious morale problems. When Congress proved unable to pay even these sums, the long-suffering Continentals mutinied. When, after Yorktown, the regiments were first consolidated and then disbanded, Continental soldiers left the service with little more than Congress’s promise to pay their wages in the future. Many soldiers sold those chits to brokers in return for some immediate funds to get home or to a place they thought offered a better economic opportunity.

BOUNTIES

The colonies frequently used enlistment bounties during the wars against the French, especially during the French and Indian War, and continued the practice when they undertook to raise troops to oppose the British. Bounties were offered for a man’s enlistment, but also if he came

equipped with a gun and a blanket, a useful way of accumulating civilian items for war service in the absence of a well-developed supply network. Because bounties fostered voluntary enlistment, they also allowed leaders to avoid straining their authority by trying to draft men for military service.

Congress took up the issue of bounties when it came time to enlist a new army for 1776. Influenced by delegates from the southern colonies, it initially refused to offer any bounty but agreed to an advance payment of forty shillings, equal to one month’s pay. According to John Adams (in a letter of 25 November 1775 to a fellow New Englander), the southerners’ opposition to bounties, and higher wages, was a cultural phenomenon: “These gentlemen are accustomed, habituated to higher notions of themselves and the distinctions between them and the common people, than we are.”

Congress tried to hold the line against rising expenses but grudgingly came to realize that money was the key to raising and keeping an army. On 19 January 1776 it advised the states to offer a bounty of \$6.33 (one month’s pay) to all men who would enlist with a good firearm, a bayonet, and other accoutrements and to offer \$4 to those who enlisted without these items. On 26 June the delegates resolved to offer ten dollars to all men who would enlist for three years. A few weeks later they extended this offer to all regulars who would continue their service in the Continental army for three years after expiration of their current tour. On 16 September, when it voted to raise an army of eighty-eight battalions for 1777, Congress increased the bounty to twenty dollars plus one hundred acres to all enlisted men who would agree to serve “during the war.” Two days later it extended this offer to all “who are enlisted or shall enlist for during the war” in the Continental army. Any of these veteran enlistees who had already received a Continental bounty of ten dollars for a former enlistment would, however, receive only ten dollars more under the new offer. On 8 October, Congress agreed to give a twenty-dollar suit of clothes each year (or the same amount in cash if the man’s captain would certify that he had procured such a suit himself) to all men enlisted for the duration. Officers were authorized recruiting expenses at the rate of \$1.33 per new man.

Washington, a taxpayer as well as the commander in chief, disliked bounties but soon realized that the system was a necessary evil. Writing to John Hancock, president of Congress, from the “Heights of Harlem” on 25 September 1776 as his army was about to be kicked out of New York, Washington offered some of his most candid comments on the character of the American army:

With respect to the men, nothing but a good bounty can obtain them upon a permanent establishment, and for no shorter time than the

continuance of the war, ought they to be engaged, as facts incontestibly prove, that the difficulty and cost of enlistments increase with time. When the army was first raised at Cambridge, I am persuaded the men might have been got without a bounty for the war; after this, they began to see that the contest was not likely to end so speedily as was imagined, and to feel their consequence by remarking that to get the militia in, in the course of the last year, many towns were induced to give them a bounty. . . . [I]f the present opportunity is slip'd, I am persuaded that twelve months more will increase our difficulties four fold. I shall therefore take the freedom of giving it as my opinion that a good bounty be immediately offered, aided by the proffer of at least 100 or 150 acres of land and a suit of cloaths and blanket to each non-com[mis]sion'd officer and soldier, as I have good authority for saying, that however high the mens pay may appear, it is barely sufficient in the present scarcity and dearness of all kinds of goods, to keep them in cloaths, much less afford support to their families. (Chase, ed., *Papers*, vol. 6, pp. 395–396)

The states, also faced with the problem of raising men, undertook to compete for recruits by increasing their bounties. Early in 1777 some of the New England states agreed to offer \$33.33 in addition to the \$20 set by Congress. When Massachusetts then doubled this ante, offering \$86.67, other states fell in line and some went higher. These offers curtailed reenlistments in the Continental regiments, and they also led men to desert the Continental army in order to enlist fraudulently in state regiments for the larger bounty. Bounty jumpers would enlist, collect their bounty, desert, reenlist, and collect another.

The bounty battle continued to rage throughout the war as the conflict wore on and the currency rapidly lost value. On 23 January 1779, Congress authorized Washington to grant up to two hundred dollars to each able-bodied man who would enlist or reenlist for the war. On 9 March, the delegates resolved to pay this bounty out of the Continental treasury to men recruited by the states or, if the state was giving this amount or more, to credit the state with two hundred dollars for each man enlisted against its quota. On 29 March, Congress recommended that Virginia and North Carolina raise as many regular battalions as possible and give the recruits the two-hundred-dollar bounty for a single year's service in Virginia, the Carolinas, or Georgia.

Again the states outbid the central government. New Jersey added \$250 to the congressional bounty of \$200, land, and clothing. On 3 May 1779, Virginia offered \$750, a suit of clothes each year, and 100 acres of land to men who signed up for the duration; the state deducted and

retained from this bounty the cash and clothing offered by Congress. In 1780 New Jersey increased its bounty to one thousand dollars more than all Continental offers. Much of this increase was due to depreciation of Continental currency, which hit the officers particularly hard, and on 21 October 1780, Congress finally adopted Washington's urgent recommendation that—in order to keep good officers in service until the end of the war—they be granted half pay for life.

As the war dragged on, the bounty offers became very creative. To meet their quotas of recruits, many states by 1780 had organized their citizens into “classes” in each locality, distributing the wealthy and the poor into groups that were then responsible for finding one soldier. In Salem, Massachusetts, in June 1780, one class offered an eighteen-year-old man a series of inducements to serve in the Continental army: a few dollars in specie; several hundred dollars in the rapidly inflating paper currency; and half a dozen head of three-year-old cattle when he completed his enlistment, thereby paying for service now with animals that the class did not then possess and which the young man might not live to collect.

RATIONS

Integrated with the system of pay and bounties was the matter of rations. Whereas a private soldier was entitled to a single ration (three meals a day), officers were authorized extra rations in an effort to provide them the wherewithal to set a table befitting their rank. For example, the scale prescribed by Congress on 22 April 1782 was five rations for a major general, four for a brigadier general, two for a lieutenant colonel commandant, one and a half for a major or captain, and one for a subaltern.

The Continental Congress prescribed the army's ration on 12 September 1775. As finalized on 4 November, the ration was to:

consist of the following kind and quantity of provisions: 1 pound of beef, or 1/2 pound of pork or 1 pound of salt fish, per day; 1 pound of bread or flour, per day; 3 pints of peas or beans per week, or vegetables equivalent, at one dollar per bushel for peas or beans; 1 pint of milk, per man per day, or at the rate of 1–72 of a dollar; 1 half pint of rice, or one pint of Indian meal, per man per week; 1 quart of spruce beer or cider per man per day, or nine gallons of molasses, per company of 100 men per week; 3 pounds of candles to 100 men per week, for guards; 24 pounds of [soft] soap, or 8 pounds of hard soap, for 100 men per week.

The ration, heavy on salted meat and carbohydrates, was roughly equivalent to what civilians were eating and was only occasionally supplemented with fresh provisions. Foodstuffs, of course, had to be chosen with an eye to what

could be procured locally and transported with the army. Keeping food edible and water potable were the primary considerations; there was no awareness of whether or not the diet was nutritious or whether it provided soldiers with the caloric intake required to maintain their level of activity. Alcohol, in the form of spruce beer, hard cider, rum, and even whiskey (the latter two were authorized but seldom issued because of expense), was important because it reduced reliance on water that might be contaminated, or when mixed together with water, as in grog (water cut with rum), rendered water at least semi-potable.

Congress or the commander in chief might authorize a particular type and quantity of foodstuff, but as was the case with pay, it was not always possible to provide the prescribed amount. As long as the army was stationary in the Boston area, Quartermaster General Jonathan Trumbull Jr. could draw on the relatively abundant resources of the rich Connecticut River valley and actually issued the troops more than the prescribed ration. Active operations always increased the difficulty of providing food to the troops, and nearly every campaign of the war saw soldiers enduring some form of privation. Poorly preserved meat, grains infested with insects, and even otherwise inedible plant matter like unripe fruits and vegetables were better than no food, although they could cause gastrointestinal distress that sometimes, as at the Battle of Camden (16 August 1780), could have tactical significance.

Insufficient logistics, especially in winter, inflicted enormous suffering on American troops. Benedict Arnold's men were reduced to boiling shoe leather to survive their march to Quebec in the fall of 1775, and the winter encampments of Washington's army at Morristown and Valley Forge became notorious examples of the privations soldiers could endure when necessary. Competition with the French expeditionary force that arrived at Newport, Rhode Island, in July 1780 put further strain on the procurement system, especially since the French paid in specie while the Americans offered only nearly worthless paper money. The dislocations caused by wartime operations, the lack of credit, British naval superiority, and competing demands for labor all reduced the food supply, as did crop diseases, most notably the Hessian fly that attacked the wheat crop.

The British ration varied in accordance with what was locally available, but in a representative contract of 1778–1779, it provided each soldier with one pound of flour per day, either one pound of beef or slightly more than nine ounces of pork per day, three pints of peas per week, one-half pound of oatmeal per week, and either six ounces of butter or eight ounces of cheese per week. The British relied in part on preserved food that was shipped across the Atlantic from England and Ireland, and although stocks on hand occasionally dipped to worrisome levels, they generally did a good job in feeding their armies. They

were also adept at fashioning local procurement networks for their garrisons at New York City, Philadelphia, Newport, and Charleston. Indeed, without a brisk and clandestine trade with American suppliers, they would have been hard put to sustain those enclaves.

Although quartermasters in both armies issued firewood and cooking utensils when possible, soldiers prepared their meals individually or formed small groups in which men took turns cooking. Since flour and beef were the only items usually issued, food preparation was an all-too-simple task. According to the historian Erna Risch, “an unrelieved diet of half-cooked meat and hard bread was responsible for much of the sickness that reduced the strength of the Army when it frequently was most needed” (p. 10).

SEE ALSO *Quartermasters of the Continental Army.*

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PEACE COMMISSION OF CARLISLE. 1778. Stunned by Britain's defeat at Saratoga and fearing that its former colonies would enter into an alliance with France, Lord North reversed direction in early 1778 and proposed to Parliament that

Britain send a peace commission with powers to negotiate with Congress and promise to suspend all acts affecting America passed since 1763. Parliament approved the “Royal Instructions to the Peace Commission” on 16 March 1778. To head the commission, North selected Frederick Howard, fifth Earl of Carlisle, a young man not yet thirty but very wealthy and a gambling friend of opposition leader Charles James Fox (which was expected to please the Americans). In addition to the Howe brothers, already in America, North also appointed William Eden, a close friend of Carlisle since Eton and member of the Board of Trade, Captain George Johnstone of the Royal Navy, a former governor of West Florida who had fought a duel with George Sackville Germain in December 1770. The commission’s secretary was Adam Ferguson, renowned professor of moral philosophy at Edinburgh, whose work had influenced many American leaders. Carlisle and his colleagues left Portsmouth on the sixty-four-gun *Trident* on 16 April. Also on board was Lord Cornwallis, on his way to become Henry Clinton’s second in command. They reached Philadelphia on 6 June.

Carlisle immediately encountered almost insurmountable obstacles: Congress had resolved on 22 April that any man or group that came to terms with the commission was an enemy of the United States; furthermore, Clinton was preparing to evacuate Philadelphia. When Carlisle requested a conference, Congress replied on 17 June that the only negotiable points were British withdrawal and recognition of independence. Before leaving Philadelphia, Johnstone attempted to bribe Congressmen Joseph Reed, Robert Morris, and Francis Dana; this led to his resignation on 26 August. Funds for covert activities had been given to the commission, and Sir John Temple and John Berkenhout followed Carlisle from England to join him in New York City as secret agents early in August. The last week of August, Berkenhout left New York City with a pass from Clinton, managed to pick up a pass from U.S. General William Maxwell at Elizabeth, New Jersey, and proceeded to Philadelphia. Introducing himself to Richard Henry Lee as a friend of Arthur Lee—he had known the latter in London—the agent pretended interest in settling in America. But a suspicious Maxwell warned Richard Lee, and Berkenhout was questioned by the Council of Pennsylvania on 3 September, jailed, paroled on 14 September, and on 19 September was back in New York City, his mission having only further prejudiced Congress against dealing with the commission.

As early as 21 July, Carlisle admitted to his wife that his mission was a complete failure and indicated that the government had no idea what the situation was in America. Congress itself circulated Parliament’s act of conciliation and the peace commission’s proposals. At spontaneous

demonstrations the public denounced and burned these documents, indicating to Carlisle that the “common people hate us in their hearts.” In October Lafayette challenged Carlisle to a duel on the grounds that he was personally responsible for the commission’s attacks on France in letters to Congress; on 11 October Carlisle informed the offended Frenchman that he was answerable only to his country for his “public conduct and language,” and Lafayette ended in looking somewhat ridiculous. On 3 October Carlisle and Eden made a fruitless appeal directly to the people, offering a general pardon for past disloyalty and full pardons to all military or civil officers who asked for it within the next forty days. They met only mockery.

Conceding failure, the commissioners left on 20 December 1778, Carlisle issuing a parting proclamation warning the Americans that by the French treaty they would become tributaries of France, leaving Britain no choice but to “destroy” the colonies. This statement, like so many other actions of the British government, undermined the Loyalists while strengthening the conviction among common Americans that independence was the wisest course of action.

SEE ALSO *Germain, George Sackville.*

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PEACE COMMISSION OF THE HOWES. 1776–1778. Early suggestions by British politicians to send commissioners to settle the dispute with the American colonies had been rejected by George III as an indication of weakness. In March 1776 the government gave overall command for the war against the colonies to Admiral Lord Richard Howe, who favored a policy of conciliation and insisted that he and his brother, General William Howe, retain the right to negotiate a peace with the rebels. Though Admiral Howe’s final instructions of 6 May 1776 authorized the two brothers, as special commissioners,

to do little more than offer pardons, the Howes were assured that they could negotiate once they had crushed the rebellion. In reality, their mission was in many ways critically handicapped from the start as there was no way that either the King or Lord North was willing to weaken Parliamentary supremacy or British sovereignty by entering into some substantive compromise with the American rebels. Further complicating their task was the requirement that the Howes win approval from the government for any concessions they might grant the Americans, necessitating the usual long delay of trans-Atlantic communication. They also had little hope of persuading the rebels of entering into such hazy negotiations.

On 7 June 1776, soon after reaching Massachusetts with a large naval force and reinforcements for his brother, Lord Howe issued a declaration announcing his role as commissioner and stating his authority to grant pardons but not mentioning the rest of what Sir William later characterized as “our very limited commission and instructions.” On 14 July, the Howes issued a joint declaration and sent a copy under a flag of truce addressed to “George Washington, Esq. etc. etc.” Colonels Reed and Knox, on instructions from General Washington, informed the British emissary that they knew of no such person in the American army as the gentleman to whom the envelope was addressed. When Lieutenant Colonel James Paterson, General Howe’s adjutant general, finally got to Washington with a lame explanation about the “etc. etc.” and informed the rebel commander of the Howes’ authority and desire for negotiations, Washington replied that he had no authority as the military commander to work out any accommodation, but commented that the Howes appeared to offer nothing but pardon, which the Americans did not need nor desire.

The next overture came after the British victories on Long Island, which led to the peace conference on Staten Island on 11 September 1776, which in turn led nowhere. When these meetings proved pointless, the Howes issued a proclamation appealing directly to the people on 19 September; there is no evidence that anyone paid attention to this offer of pardon.

On 30 November, when rebel military fortunes were at a particularly low ebb, the Howes offered absolute pardon to all those who would subscribe to a declaration of allegiance within sixty days. For a few days it appeared that this offer, in combination with the British advance, would bring all of New Jersey into submission, but several things combined to sour this effort. First, the misconduct of British troops alienated the people of New Jersey. Second, Washington issued a proclamation stating that anybody who received a pardon had the choice of surrendering it and swearing allegiance to the American cause or moving immediately within the British lines. Third, Washington’s winter campaign of 1776–1777 gave new

heart to those backing independence. Furthermore, Germain took exception to this wholesale offer of pardons, and although he gave his formal approval to the idea, he warned the Howes in a letter of 18 May 1777 not to be too softhearted. By this time, however, the Howes had about given up hope of a peaceful solution to the war. During the winter of 1776–1777 they attempted, through Charles Lee, who was their prisoner in New York City, to have Congress send two or three members to visit him, but Congress flatly refused. The Howes made no further significant efforts toward a political settlement, though they were both appointed to the peace commission of Carlisle, which reached America early in 1778. They played almost no part in this commission’s activities. In summary, the Howes’s hopes for a negotiated settlement to the war that kept the colonies within the empire went against both the actual policies of their government, which was intent on defeating the rebellion, and the realities of American independence.

SEE ALSO *Lee, Charles (1731–1782); New Jersey Campaign; Peace Conference on Staten Island.*

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PEACE CONFERENCE ON STATEN ISLAND. 11 September 1776. General John Sullivan, who was captured in the Battle of Long Island on 27 August 1776, got the impression from discussions with Admiral Lord Richard Howe that the Howe brothers had greater powers under their peace commissions than the Americans realized. After a congenial dinner together, Lord Howe persuaded Sullivan to visit Congress with a proposal that they begin talks toward a possible negotiated settlement. Howe deliberately left all the particulars vague. Sullivan arrived in Philadelphia to make his report to Congress, which was less than enthusiastic. After some heated debate, Congress resolved on 5 September to send a committee to find out whether Lord Howe could treat with representatives of Congress and, if so, what proposals

he had for negotiations. Congress hoped thereby to both delay the attack on New York City and give a public indication of its desire for peace. Although Lord Howe was disappointed to learn upon Sullivan's return, on 9 September, that the committee was coming not to treat but merely to secure information, he and his brother decided to go ahead with the conference in hopes that negotiations might follow.

On 7 September, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge were elected for this mission, and on the 11th they met with Lord Howe on Staten Island, opposite Amboy. General William Howe excused himself because of military duties. Richard Howe was extremely gracious, but Adams was convinced that he knew nothing of the real causes of the Revolution and Franklin mildly mocked the admiral. The Americans confirmed their previous understanding that the Howes had no real power and that anything to which they agreed would have to be referred back to London. Although Lord Howe painted the rosiest possible picture of what he hoped to do for the Americans, he was honest, telling the representatives of Congress that he could not actually enter into a treaty with Congress and that all he could offer were assurances that George III and Parliament "were very favorably inclined toward redressing the grievances and reforming the administration of the American colonies" (Smith, p. 758). Adams politely informed Howe that they would only negotiate further in the name of the Congress and that a "complete revolution" had occurred in America from which there was no turning back. This left no basis for further discussion, and after expressions of personal good will, the three went back to Philadelphia and reported to Congress on the 17th. Howe reported himself disillusioned, finding the Americans dogmatic and their leaders "men of low or of suspicious Character" (*ibid.*, 1, p. 758). Adams, Franklin, and Rutledge, for their part, thought Howe out of touch with reality and lacking sufficient authority to warrant further discussions.

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PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. 1780–1784. Military operations in America virtually ceased when Cornwallis surrendered on 19 October 1781. The British proclaimed a cessation of hostilities on 4 February 1783, and Congress issued a similar proclamation on 11 April 1783. What follows is a chronology of steps leading to the uneasy peace.

On 15 February 1779 a committee of Congress completed a report on minimum peace demands. They were independence, specific boundaries, British withdrawal from all U.S. territory, fishing rights in the waters off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, and free navigation of the Mississippi River. This report was submitted to Congress on 23 February. Only the last two points were controversial, and on 14 August, Congress accepted all points but the one having to do with fishing, though the final instructions concerning peace negotiations were not completed until the end of September. On 27 September 1779, Congress selected John Adams to negotiate peace with England and also to draw up a commercial treaty and John Jay as minister to Spain with instructions to confer on the peace treaty with the leaders of that country. Each man, however, found that his mission was premature.

On 11 June 1781 Congress, largely in response to the demands of the French minister to the United States, the chevalier de la Luzerne, that Adams be recalled, decided to have the peace with Britain negotiated by a committee rather than by Adams alone. Jay was named to this committee on the 13th; Franklin, Henry Laurens, and Jefferson were appointed on the 14th. The next day Congress limited essential peace demands to independence and sovereignty, giving the committee discretion on all other points, including borders. Furthermore, in deference to the nation without whose help victory would have been impossible, Congress instructed the commissioners to act only with the knowledge and approval of the French ministry and to be "ultimately governed by the advice of the French Court or Minister" (Commager and Morris, p. 1251). Jefferson never left America, and Laurens was captured at sea by the British (3 September 1780).

On 12 April 1782, Richard Oswald reached Paris as representative of the Rockingham ministry and started talks with Franklin, the only American commissioner on the scene. Before leaving for France, Oswald—an old friend of Laurens—paid Laurens's bail and helped him get to the Netherlands to meet with Adams. Adams was at The Hague to secure Dutch recognition of the United States (which came on 19 April), arrange a loan, and bring about a treaty of amity and commerce (obtained in October 1782). Laurens returned to London and did not reach Paris until November 1782.

On 19 September the new Shelburne ministry authorized Oswald to treat with the commissioners of the "13 United States." This tacit recognition of independence started formal negotiations between Oswald, Franklin, and Jay. On 5 October, Jay gave Oswald the draft of a preliminary treaty. Henry Strachey joined Oswald on 28 October and by about 1 November, Jay and Adams (who reached Paris on 26 October) prevailed

on Franklin to exclude France from preliminary treaty negotiations in violation of their congressional instructions. On 5 November a new set of articles was agreed to by the U.S. and British commissioners. With a few last-minute modifications, agreed to on 30 November, these articles became the final Peace Treaty of 3 September 1783. Vergennes, meanwhile, voiced his objections to the unilateral action of the commission but was impressed by the favorable results it had achieved. Franklin's tactful reply to the French minister on 17 December 1782 and the latter's desire for a speedy settlement prevented serious discord; so much so that Franklin was able to squeeze another huge loan out of the French government.

The treaty won for the United States almost everything Congress had originally desired, from Britain's recognition of American independence and a promise to withdraw all their troops to rights of navigation on the Mississippi and some fishing rights. Most astounding, however, were the new borders of the United States, which extended well beyond the original thirteen colonies to include the entire Northwest territory. Just about the only thing Britain received in return were American promises to honor pre-war debts and to recompense Loyalists for their losses. But the British also got what they were desperate for, namely, peace, as America's allies followed its lead in coming to terms with the British. In addition, as Jonathan Dull has written of the treaty, "The terms represented a considerable triumph for the American commissioners, but their victory was partly illusory," as so many details remained unstated and would haunt U.S. relations with Britain for the next half century (*Diplomatic History*, p. 150) Equally disruptive of relations between these two nations was the conviction on the part of most British leaders that the United States could not possibly last as an independent republic.

On 20 January 1783, Great Britain signed preliminary articles with France and Spain. Peace preliminaries then were complete and hostilities were officially ended. On 4 February the British Parliament proclaimed the cessation of hostilities. Though furious over the generosity of the treaty with the United States, Parliament voted 207 to 190 on 21 February to both approve and denounce the treaty. Shelburne resigned as prime minister, and Parliament eventually saw no alternative but to accede to the treaty in order to end a long and devastating war. Congress received the text of the provisional treaty on 13 March and on 11 April proclaimed hostilities ended. After considerable criticism of the commissioners for not consulting France, Congress ratified the provisional treaty on 15 April. On 3 September the treaty was signed in Paris, on 14 January 1784 it was ratified by Congress, and on 12 May ratifications were exchanged to complete the peace negotiations. Both Spain and Great Britain found reasons for not honoring all the terms of the treaty.

SEE ALSO *Jay's Treaty; Peace Treaty of 3 September 1783; Spanish Participation in the American Revolution.*

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PEACE OF PARIS SEE *Paris, Treaty of (10 February 1763).*

PEACE TREATY OF 3 SEPTEMBER

1783. After the peace negotiations that started in 1781, the treaty was signed in Paris on 3 September. The nine articles may be summarized as follows: (1) U.S. independence was recognized by Great Britain; (2) the U.S. boundaries were established as the St. Croix River between Maine and Nova Scotia, the St. Lawrence–Atlantic watershed, the forty-fifth parallel, a line through the Great Lakes westward to the Mississippi and down that river to the thirty-first parallel, eastward along that parallel, and the Apalachicola and St. Mary's Rivers to the Atlantic; (3) the United States obtained the "right" to fish off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia and the "liberty" to cure their fish on unsettled beaches of Labrador, the Magdalen Islands, and Nova Scotia; (4) creditors of each country were to be paid by citizens of the other; (5) Congress would "earnestly recommend" that states fully restore the rights and property of Loyalists; (6) no future action would be taken against any person for his or her actions during the war just ended; (7) hostilities were to end and all British forces were to be evacuated "with all convenient speed"; (8) navigation of the Mississippi "from its source to the ocean shall forever remain free" to U.S. and British citizens; and (9) conquests made by either country from the other before the arrival of the peace terms would be restored.

The treaty was ratified by Congress on 14 January 1784, and on 12 May ratifications were exchanged to complete the action. Jay's Treaty of 1794 and Pinckney's

Treaty of 1795 ended many U.S. difficulties with, respectively, Britain and Spain that arose from the treaty.

SEE ALSO *Jay's Treaty; Peace Negotiations; Spanish Participation in the American Revolution.*

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PEALE, CHARLES WILLSON. (1741–1827). Portrait painter, naturalist, Patriot. Maryland. Born on 15 April 1741 in Queen Anne's County, Maryland, Charles Willson Peale was son of a forger who had been shipped to America in 1735 as a punishment for his crimes. Charles Peale became a saddler, but his success as an amateur portrait painter encouraged him to seek instruction in art, and in 1767 he was accepted as a student of Benjamin West, in London. Three years later he returned to Maryland and soon was established as a portrait painter in the middle provinces. Early in 1776 he moved to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where many prominent Patriots subsequently sat for him.

Peale enlisted in the Philadelphia militia in 1776 and was elected lieutenant. After taking part in the Trenton–Princeton campaign, he was promoted to captain of the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment of Foot. Until the British evacuation of Philadelphia, Captain Peale served with the army, and while in uniform he painted many miniatures of American officers. He also held a number of public offices, being chairman of the Constitutional Society and a representative in the Pennsylvania General Assembly from 1779 to 1781. Identified with the radical democrats, Peale lost his wealthier clients, forcing him to abandon politics entirely in 1787.

During the post-war depression he started engraving mezzotints of his portraits. At this time he also developed an interest in natural history after recovering and making drawings of two skeletons of mammoths. His art gallery became a repository of natural curiosities, and evolved into the Philadelphia Museum. The Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts owed its establishment in 1805 largely to Peale's efforts. Peale is best known for his many pictures of Washington. An estimated 60 such pictures were created between 1776 and 1795, and seven of these were done from life. Peale died in Philadelphia on 22 February 1827.

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PEEKSKILL RAID, NEW YORK. 23

March 1777. Peekskill served as an important riverside depot for American forces in the Hudson Highlands during the winter of 1776–1777. To disrupt the fortification efforts and the assembly of newly raised Continental regiments, William Howe dispatched a small raiding force upriver on 22 March. Lieutenant Colonel John Bird, with five hundred men and four light guns, provided the land contingent; the frigate *Brune*, three galleys, four transports, and eight flatboats made up the naval component. After feinting to draw the American defenders off, Bird's men landed at Lunt's Cove about 1 P.M. on the 23rd; Brigadier General Alexander McDougall's small garrison burned some of the stores and withdrew. One American was killed; Bird had no casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Marinus Willett led a Patriot force from Fort Constitution against the raiders on the 24th and captured a cloak that would become part of the Fort Stanwix flag later in the year. This action confirmed Washington's belief in the importance of the forts and passes of the Hudson; it encouraged the British to undertake the Danbury raid on 23–28 April.

SEE ALSO *Danbury Raid, Connecticut; Howe, William; McDougall, Alexander.*

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PELL'S POINT, NEW YORK.

18 October 1776. Frustrated in his attack on Throg's Neck, New York, British General William Howe shifted his line of operations to Pell's Point, three miles to the north. Meanwhile, General George Washington had started withdrawing northward from Harlem Heights, having scouted Howe's latest attempt to encircle him and decided that the American positions were untenable.

In the Pell's Point area was a small brigade commanded by Colonel John Glover. It consisted of about 750 men from four Massachusetts regiments: his own Marbleheaders, Joseph Read's, William Shepard's, and Laommi Baldwin's. They were supported by three guns.

From his position near Eastchester (about a mile from Pell's Point), Glover looked out over Eastchester Bay early on 18 October and saw that British ships had come in during the night. He ordered a captain and forty men forward as a delaying force. Meanwhile, he deployed the rest of his brigade behind the stone walls on both sides of the road the British would have to take from the shore to the interior of Westchester County, thus creating an ambush. Read's regiment was on the left, Shepard's on the right, and Baldwin's still further back on the left; Glover's regiment was in reserve to the rear.

The American delaying force exchanged fire with the British advance party and fell back in good order. Read's regiment, which was the first to come within range (the other two being echeloned to his right rear) let the British get within 100 feet before rising from behind a stone wall to deliver a fire that drove the enemy back. It was an hour and a half before the British main body organized an attack, which was supported by seven guns. Read's men fired seven volleys before withdrawing behind Shepard's regiment. The latter poured forth seventeen volleys, forcing the British to make several attacks before they could advance. Glover then ordered a withdrawal to a new position, which the enemy did not attack. The two forces exchanged artillery fire until after dark, when Glover withdrew another three miles and pitched camp.

American losses were eight killed and thirteen wounded. Among the latter was Shepard. Howe reported three killed and twenty wounded, but his figures may not have included the Hessians, who comprised most of the attacking force. However, the adjutant general of the Hessian forces, Carl Leopold Baurmeister, also passed over the action without any mention of German casualties. While the number of Hessian casualties remains in doubt, historians agree on the strategic importance of the battle: Glover delayed the British for an entire day, and helped Washington reach the safety of White Plains before Howe could intercept the American retreat.

On 21 October the British occupied New Rochelle, New York, without resistance. On that same day, Washington's forces were hurrying to White Plains, New York, which they expected to be Howe's next objective. John Haslet raided the detached Tory camp of Robert Rogers at Mamaroneck, New York, on 22 October of that year.

SEE ALSO *Harlem Heights, New York; Long Island, New York, Battle of; Throg's Neck, New York.*

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PENN, JOHN. (1740–1788). Signer. Virginia and North Carolina. Born in Caroline County, Virginia, 6 May 1740, John Penn studied law with his kinsman Edmund Pendleton, passing the bar in 1761. He moved to Williamsboro, North Carolina, in 1774, where he became a local political leader. He was elected to the Continental Congress in 1775, serving until 1780, becoming famous for rarely speaking in public yet having an active social life. Initially favoring reconciliation, Penn became an advocate in 1776 of both independence and foreign alliances, and signed the Declaration of Independence. During the foreign affairs controversy involving Silas Deane and Richard Henry Lee, Penn became such a violent defender of Robert Morris against the accusations of Henry Laurens (a Deane supporter) that, in January 1779, Laurens challenged Penn to a duel. As he assisted his elderly opponent across the street from the boarding house they shared, Penn realized the absurdity of the situation and suggested that they call it off. Laurens agreed.

Returning to his state, Penn became a member of the North Carolina board of war in 1780. General Charles Cornwallis was moving north, the state authorities were clashing with the Continental officers that were being sent to defend the South, and Penn waged an administrative battle against all three. His post was abolished when Thomas Burke became governor of North Carolina in 1781. In July he returned to the private practice of law. He died on 14 September 1788.

SEE ALSO *Deane, Silas.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

PENNSYLVANIA, MOBILIZATION

IN. In 1680, founder William Penn established Pennsylvania to serve as a Quaker colony and as an

experiment in diversity. He succeeded beyond his fondest dreams and most dreaded nightmares—by the late eighteenth century, Pennsylvania had become one of the most varied polities in the Atlantic world.

A COMPLEX COLONY

Although technically under the umbrella of a single colonial and, later, state government, Revolutionary-era Pennsylvania consisted of four distinct regions, each with its own political, economic, ethnic, and geographic characteristics. Each of these regions experienced the upheavals of imperial and internal conflict differently from the others. Furthermore, Pennsylvanians jealously guarded local control over their affairs, and often conceived politics on local, colonial-state, and national scales. Thus, although connected by shared governmental structures and engaged in the same imperial and national struggles, Pennsylvanians mobilized for and fought several connected but unique American Revolutions.

From east to west, Pennsylvania was home to a major Atlantic port city, a few counties of primarily English Quaker stock that held disproportionate political power in the colonial legislature, a large and very agriculturally productive central area settled mostly by Germans and Scots-Irish, and rugged western country hotly contested among two groups of settlers and several Indian groups. Boasting a population of over 20,000 people in 1770, Philadelphia had grown to become the largest city in the British colonies, and indeed one of the largest in the British empire, and it was the colony's economic, cultural, and political capital. The city's artisans and laborers produced a myriad of goods, while its merchants bought grains, beef, flour, and other local surplus commodities and distributed them throughout the Atlantic world in exchange for goods that they distributed throughout the colony.

Bucks and Chester Counties, adjacent to Philadelphia, generally provided goods as well as political sympathy for Philadelphia. Together with Philadelphia, these two counties held enough seats in the colonial legislature to dictate colonial policy, and both areas proved at best to be ambivalent about the Revolutionary cause. Central Pennsylvania boasted perhaps the finest farmland in the Atlantic world—it was called by many “the best poor man's country.” Its residents provided most of Pennsylvania's men, materials, and passion in support of the rebel side. Finally, the Juniata and Wyoming Valleys became the site of some of the Revolution's most brutal fighting. In the Juniata Valley, the violence largely occurred between whites and Indians. In Wyoming Valley, rival groups of white settlers battled over land claims rather than over ideology or imperial authority.

ROOTS OF RESISTANCE

In contrast to the colony's diversity and internal conflict, most Pennsylvanians hesitated to engage in resistance against British imperial policies. In this they reflected the attitudes of their middle-colony neighbors more than those of their New England or Virginia cousins. During the late 1760s and early 1770s, with the exception of the Stamp Act that was universally opposed in all the continental colonies, few Pennsylvanians strongly objected too, much less protested, changes in imperial policy. For decades two elite, Philadelphia-based political factions had dominated Pennsylvania politics: a proprietary party that supported the Penn family and was composed primarily of Anglicans and Presbyterians, and an assembly party that favored converting Pennsylvania to a crown colony and was composed primarily of Quakers and their allies. While quick to oppose each other's policies, both factions were cautious when it came to resisting royal authority.

The first rumblings of discontent came from Philadelphia. This is not surprising, given that the city was more closely connected through commerce and politics to the empire and to other colonists than were the other Pennsylvania communities. Thus it was only natural that the people of the city were the first to sense and react to changes in the political winds. Even here, however, resistance to the Stamp Act that sparked such vehement demonstrations in New York, Boston, and elsewhere in the spring of 1765 resulted in comparatively muted protests. Neither of the two elite political factions favored strong action. Not until March 1769 did Philadelphia merchants finally and reluctantly join the non-importation agreements that other colonial merchants had immediately initiated to protest the Townsend Duties that had been passed nearly two years before, and the Quaker City men only did so after much prodding from a popular coalition of laborers and artisans. That radical coalition managed to get several of its members elected to the city council from 1770 on, and would lead the colony-wide resistance to British rule.

Although resistance to British authority built slowly in Pennsylvania, events moved swiftly from 1774 forward. Despite the local protests of Philadelphia's popular coalition and a colonies-wide call for delegates to attend the first Continental Congress, Governor John Penn decided upon a course of inaction by not allowing the colonial legislature to meet. He thereby effectively prevented the colony's elected representatives from selecting delegates to the Convention, which nonetheless would be held in Philadelphia. Accordingly, the city radicals and their moderate allies began the process of creating a network of Committees of Correspondence that served as the backbone of resistance to British authority and the skeletal beginnings of Pennsylvania's Revolutionary government. These Committees nominated delegates to the Continental Congress, which soon returned the favor

by authorizing Committees of Associators (whose members were often the same as those who staffed the Committees) to enforce Continental Congress edicts and, after 1775, to raise militias.

Throughout Pennsylvania, these Committees took it upon themselves to supplant legal authorities and to harass those that opposed them or even tried to remain above the fray. They were especially effective in central Pennsylvania, which soon surpassed Philadelphia in terms of support for the rebellion. Nonetheless, unlike in most other colonies, the colonial assembly still steadfastly clung to its vision of an America that remained underneath the protection and authority of Britain, neither recognizing the Committees nor voting for independence—despite meeting in the same building as the Continental Congress while it debated the issue of independence during the spring of 1776.

The Committees of Correspondence finally called for a Provincial Assembly to write a new constitution in June 1776. In some ways, Pennsylvania's resulting founding document was the most democratic of all the new state constitutions, in that it established a unicameral legislature, legislators served one-year terms, the executive branch had almost no power, and nearly all white men could potentially be eligible to vote. However, that last and most crucial measure—the extension of the franchise—was only offered to those willing to swear allegiance to the new government. In requiring this, the new constitution created both a political and religious litmus test for citizenship. Those who did not support the new government or its policies, or those whose religions did not allow swearing (a provision clearly directed at Quakers, who could not take oaths), were not only out of power but beyond civil protection. The Quaker colony was dead, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania took its place.

REVOLUTIONARY GOALS

Pennsylvanians fought the Revolution within Pennsylvania on two parallel tracks. In most of the new state, Revolutionaries had seized the upper hand by the summer of 1776. Thus, on a state scale, the goals at first were clear. The Revolutionaries fought to secure their own sovereignty—that is, to establish and maintain Pennsylvania as a republican member of the new United States. The Loyalists, on the other hand, fought to restore the authority of their sovereign, King George III. In more practical terms, for Revolutionaries at the beginning of the War this meant pursuing a defensive strategy of defending the new state's territory and waters from the depredations of British regulars, auxiliaries, and their Indian allies, while for Loyalists it entailed encouraging British troops and their allies to re-establish control. The main exceptions to that rule would be Philadelphia for a brief time, which the British occupied from September, 1777 to June, 1778; parts of the


Wyoming Valley controlled by nominal Loyalists; and areas of western Pennsylvania—especially the Juniata Valley—that constituted a no-man's-land for much of the war.

Viewed from the local level, however, Pennsylvanians fought for a variety of ends. In Philadelphia, radical workers and tradesmen aimed to keep and institutionalize the power they had gained through the Committees of Correspondence. Not only did they want a more egalitarian government, but they also hoped to use it to enforce an economy in which local needs and fair prices for necessary goods superceded transatlantic commerce and profiteering. Many were also sympathetic to the state's largest concentration of enslaved African Americans, who saw the Revolution as their opportunity for freedom. Other tradesmen, including a large portion of the merchant community, sided with moderate Revolutionaries, who hoped that the Revolution would bring relief from imperial trade restrictions without replacing those measures with American ones or upending the colonial social, political, and economic order. Philadelphia remained home to a large Loyalist population, although as many as 3,000 fled when the British occupying forces evacuated in the summer of 1778.

While many states were home to “disaffected”—that is, people who tried to avoid choosing sides, generally out of fear—Pennsylvania was unusual in that a significant slice of Philadelphia's population and an even larger proportion of the people in nearby Bucks and Chester Counties refused to fight at all: the pacifist principles of the Quakers prohibited taking up arms under any circumstances, and indeed, during the course of the war, Quaker meetings in Pennsylvania shunned members who joined the fight on either side. Members of some pacifist German religious settlements, such as the Moravians and the Mennonites, did the same. In addition, Bucks and Chester Counties also hosted many disaffected and only a small but active community of Revolutionaries.

Most central Pennsylvanians strongly supported the Revolutionary effort. Much of the German population there fought in the Revolution to demonstrate their equality to their English-speaking neighbors. Having suffered under-representation in the colonial Pennsylvania legislature, central Pennsylvanian Revolutionaries also saw the war as a chance to level the political playing field with eastern Pennsylvanians. At the same time, many men in local Committees of Associators exploited their positions in order to establish local politics along new lines and to settle local scores, nearly always in the name of weeding out perceived traitors but often with the purpose of humiliating or fleeing unpopular neighbors.

Wyoming Valley residents welcomed the Revolution merely by taking on new labels. Both the colonial Pennsylvania and Connecticut governments claimed the



Paoli Tavern (1777) by Saverio Xavier della Gatta. *On 21 September 1777, British forces led by General Charles Grey staged a nighttime attack on General Anthony Wayne's brigade near Paoli Tavern in Pennsylvania. The encamped Americans were taken by surprise and dozens were killed. The attack became known as the "Paoli Massacre."* PAOLI TAVERN, 1777 (OIL ON CANVAS) BY GATTA, SAVIERO (FL.1777-1820) VALLEY FORGE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, VALLEY FORGE, PA/BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY

land, so the white settlers who upheld Pennsylvania claims (called "Pennamites") and those supporting Connecticut authority (called "Yankees") had already been skirmishing since 1769. The two groups quickly took sides in the Revolutionary conflict. The now-Loyal Pennamites and the Revolutionary Yankees remained much less concerned about who governed in Pennsylvania (or, for that matter, in Connecticut) than they were about gaining clear title to their lands.

Finally, in the Juniata Valley, most whites did not hesitate to take arms on the Revolutionary side. For decades, they had complained that the eastern-tilted, Quaker-heavy legislature had neither the interest nor the stomach to drive Indians off lands that the Juniata settlers coveted, or even to retaliate for what settlers argued were Indian atrocities (notwithstanding that white settlers committed more than their share). Like those in the central part of the state, they were heartened by the combination of increased legislative representation and the effectual banishment of Quakers from government. At the same time, Indian groups such as the Iroquois, Delawares, and Ohios had little love for Pennsylvania settlers and could easily see that the British would be more likely to protect their interests than would

the new Pennsylvania government. Accordingly, the Native Americans of the region either took the British side almost immediately or were to drawn into the fight against the Revolutionaries as the violence mounted.

JOINING THE FIGHT

Just as much of the fighting in Pennsylvania hinged on local relationships and ambitions, Pennsylvania's efforts at mobilization and supply were often prompted by national or state officials, but took place mostly at the local level, especially in terms of recruitment. Pennsylvanians not only fought in Continental units (which were collectively known as the "Pennsylvania Line"), but also as members of the state militias, as sailors in the Pennsylvania navy, and as irregulars on both sides of the conflict. In the first year or two of the campaign, many Pennsylvanians were eager to serve. That eagerness would not last.

Unique among the colonies, Pennsylvania had little militia tradition to call on: because of the long-standing pacifist influence of the Quakers in the colonial legislature, the colony had never established a permanent militia, although it had briefly raised troops at a couple of junctures

during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). Revolutionary Pennsylvanians first organized fighting forces in May 1775, after they learned of the battles of Lexington and Concord. Local Committees of Associators, already active in enforcing boycotts of British goods and essentially in control of local affairs in much of the state, formed militias to send to Massachusetts. In many areas, for the first two years of the war these local, voluntary, loosely-organized units often did more to establish what they considered a proper Revolutionary order at home than they contributed to combat, especially because some of their more militarily inclined members joined up with Continental forces. In the Wyoming Valley, little additional organization was necessary. After all, these men had already been engaged in skirmishes for six years before war broke out in Massachusetts.

In the Juniata Valley and other western areas, the colonial government had done all it could to restrain frontier violence, so settlers needed little prompting from outside to begin hostilities with Indians, regardless of whether those Indians were friendly or hostile. For their part, motivated by their desire to protect their land and to revenge their losses, and prompted by British promises of security and arms, the Iroquois retaliated against the settlers, as did Ohios. Eventually, the Delaware also joined the fight on the British side. Although they tended to act in small raiding parties, on occasion the Native American groups could raise large forces and work in concert with Loyalists to overwhelm their settler opponents.

Pennsylvanians mobilized to fight both on land and on water. In July 1775 the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety established the Pennsylvania navy. The navy was charged with defending the Delaware River, which offered access to the Atlantic for the state's eastern counties and for Philadelphia. As with the Associators, service was voluntary and the response was impressive. Within a year more than 700 men had enlisted and they had already built a 27-craft fleet, including galleys, fire rafts, and floating batteries. They would construct yet another 21 smaller boats by the end of 1776.

Pennsylvania's contribution to the Continental army was swift, significant, and sustained. In June 1775 the Continental Congress more formally requested that Pennsylvania raise six companies of riflemen. Enthusiasm was so strong that enough men volunteered to fill out nine companies of what became the Pennsylvania Battalion of Riflemen. Later that year Pennsylvania formed a number of new units to contribute to the Continental cause: one artillery company and one infantry battalion in October, four more infantry battalions in December, and yet another infantry battalion in early January 1776. By the spring of 1776, it became clear to Pennsylvania legislators that they could not depend upon the Continental army to protect the state, so in March the state government authorized the

formation of a rifle regiment to consist of 1,000 men and a musketry regiment to consist of 500 men. Nonetheless, in response to George Washington's desperate request for reinforcements on Long Island, these units, too, were transferred from state to Continental command. They would eventually be incorporated into the Continental army. Within the next year, the state raised another eight regiments to join the Continentals, including a cavalry regiment, a regiment dedicated to supply and ordnance repair, and one of German-speaking soldiers primarily recruited from the central part of the state.

Of course, the war effort on all sides involved much more than combat. In Bucks and Chester Counties, although most farmers were at best reluctant to join the either side, they did not hesitate to sell flour, meat, and butter to either side. Indeed, they preferred to supply the British, because the British paid more regularly and with more reliable money. More eager to support the Revolutionary side, farmers in the productive and relatively peaceful central part of the state may have supplied more grain to the Continental army than farmers in any other part of the country. And when men went off to fight, women served in their stead by keeping the farms operating until their husbands returned, if they did return. Women also contributed by weaving homespun to replace British textile imports after they were cut off. Established in 1780, the Ladies Association of Philadelphia raised money that it hoped to use to buy ammunition for the Continentals. Washington, disturbed by the propriety of having women supplying war materiel, gently replied that he would prefer shirts and blankets, which, given the ragged condition of soldiers' clothing, probably was a more significant contribution to the troops than bullets would have been.

A LONG WAR

By 1777 Pennsylvanians had realized that the war would be a drawn-out affair, and, as in most of the states, early enthusiasm had given way to a combination of grim determination and fatalistic resignation. Recognizing that the volunteer Associators possessed neither the will or the numbers to defend the state, in March 1777 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania officially established a militia system. Even though it did provide some manpower, like the state government whose banner it flew it seemed designed for widescale participation but minimal effectiveness. All white men between 18 and 53 and able to bear arms were to enroll in neighborhood training companies, each of which was divided into eight classes. Upon necessity, the state could call up classes from various counties—but only for two-month stints, after which they would be replaced by the next class in line until the state exhausted the eight-class rotation and began the cycle again. Furthermore, would-be soldiers found it easy to

avoid duty, either by hiring substitutes or paying fines. Men's increased readiness to pay their way out of service served as a significant revenue enhancer for militia operations. Still, the few men unwilling or unable to avoid militia duty complained bitterly and with reason about the state's inability to pay them on a regular basis, if at all.

The Pennsylvania Line suffered the physical, emotional, and even financial ravages of war. Combat took some—for example, two entire companies wiped out during the disastrous Continental foray into Canada in late 1775—more died from disease. Soldiers grumbled that while they continued to serve, civilians seemed increasingly disengaged from the cause. After the initial rush to sign up, enthusiasm had dwindled to the point at which Congress, with no other good options, decided to extend their enlistments, first from two years to three, and then, in 1780, for as long as the war would last. To add insult to injury, although fewer and fewer men volunteered to reinforce their depleted ranks, new recruits got bonuses larger than the men who had served for years. Fed up, in Morristown on 1 January 1781, every unit in the Pennsylvania line stationed at Morristown mutinied. Most of the men were discharged, significantly depleting Pennsylvania's contribution to Continental forces.

Exhaustion set in among the civilian population, as well. Philadelphians weary of the British occupation became even more impatient with inflated grain prices, while Pennsylvanians in nearly all parts of the state became increasingly frustrated with the depreciation of Pennsylvania and Continental currency that threatened to cripple the economy. The presence of British troops in Philadelphia and Continental ones at Valley Forge had led to the depletion of firewood and livestock in the eastern part of the state. In Pennsylvania's western reaches, the scattered violence of the early parts of the war became increasingly widespread, vicious, and brutal by the late 1770s, with whites and Indians striking at each others' homes, fields, and children with little discrimination. Nonetheless, unrest continued there until 1783. In the Wyoming Valley, the combatants prolonged the fight even more. There, hostilities lasted until 1784, although many families grew increasingly fatigued by the strain and stress of more than a decade of raids and reprisals.

EVALUATING EFFORTS

As the war came to a close, Pennsylvanians could begin to assess what they had lost and gained through the use of violence. By the early 1780s, the Philadelphia radicals began to lose their grip on city politics, as did their radical counterparts in the state legislature. In the late 1780s, Pennsylvania's more moderate men successfully passed new city and state government structures that tempered the city and state's radical leanings. The test oath was abolished but, even so, Quakers never regained the

political prominence they had held before the Revolution. As a prime example of this shift, the new 1790s state government kept its predecessor's militia system, which it would not revise until 1842. Central and western Pennsylvanians continued to enjoy more proportional representation than they had under the colonial structure, and white settlers thus had some confidence that the state would help them keep the gains they had won against their Indian foes, who retreated further westward and entered into fierce competition with the Indian groups already in the Great Lakes area.

Nonetheless, not all the groups that appeared to be on the winning side ended up better off. Ironically, the Loyalist Pennamites won in the Continental Congress what they could not gain by force in the Wyoming Valley: the national government honored the Pennsylvania claims, thus spurning the Yankee settlers who had supported its cause. Men who had served in the militia and Continental army waited years for their pay, and many ended up selling off their government IOUs for far less than face value in the tough economy of the 1780s. Soldiers who had been paid in land certificates either had to sell them off or move far away, and the national government did not offer the soldiers any land in Pennsylvania. During the 1780s and early 1790s, farmers in the central part of the state engaged in a series of court and road closings in response to the state government's conservative turn in economic policy. In 1794 many of those same farmers joined the Whiskey Rebellion to protest federal taxes that, to them, resembled the British taxes that had angered them two decades earlier. Washington, now president, led federal troops to put down the revolt. The Revolutionary War was now over in Pennsylvania.

SEE ALSO *Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line.*

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Andrew M. Schocket

PENOBSCOT EXPEDITION,

MAINE. May–August 1779. In February 1779 General Henry Clinton in New York informed Brigadier Francis McLean in Halifax that the king wished to have a fort and settlement established on the Penobscot River and that he, Clinton, had decided to conduct the operation from Halifax rather than New York. After carrying on further discussions and allowing time for making preparations, Clinton on 13 April ordered McLean to proceed. The task force left Halifax on 30 May with 440 men from the Seventy-fourth Foot and 200 from McLean's own Eighty-second Foot, a slightly larger garrison than Clinton had contemplated. McLean explained that he intended to use the extra men as an amphibious raiding party once the fort was completed. A frigate and four sloops of war escorted the transports, which arrived at Magebeguiduce (near modern Castine, Maine) on the Penobscot River on 12 June and landed four days later. Actual construction of the four-bastioned square fort began only at the start of July. On the 21st of that month, when McLean learned that an American force had left Boston, only two of the bastions had low walls; the ditch was not finished; and the only guns mounted were four twelve-pounders in a detached battery guarding the anchorage, which held three sloops of war.

As soon as they learned of the invasion of their "Downeast" territory, Massachusetts organized an expedition to eliminate the threat. Generals Solomon Lovell and Peleg Wadsworth commanded the one thousand militia

and state troops that were quickly assembled at Boston. Continental navy Captain Dudley Saltonstall led the two-thousand-man naval element composed of three ships of the Continental navy (the thirty-two-gun frigate Warren served as his flagship), three brigs from the Massachusetts state navy, one New Hampshire state navy vessel, a dozen hired privateers, and about twenty transports. The task force sailed from Boston on 19 July and arrived in Penobscot Bay on the 25th. After some inconsequential skirmishing, the Americans finally started landing on 28 July, the same day that a British rescue force from New York City dropped down to Sandy Hook.

The Americans remained unaware of their danger, and Lovell proceeded in a deliberate manner. Saltonstall had urged a more aggressive course, but the authority for land operations lay with Lovell. Siege batteries opened fire on the 30th. Commodore Sir George Collier arrived on 11 August from Sandy Hook with ten vessels, including the sixty-four-gun ship of the line *Raisnable*, five frigates, a sloop of war, and sixteen hundred troops. They found the American squadron drawn up at the mouth of the river and promptly bottled up the inferior force. Much to Collier's surprise, the Americans promptly fled upstream. The British pursued but were only able to capture one ship; the American crews destroyed the rest of their squadron to prevent its capture. On the land side, the American force abandoned its positions during the night of 13–14 August and joined the ships' crews in an arduous retreat through the wilderness. The British maintained a strong post at Penobscot for the rest of the war.

Recriminations abounded and several American officers were court-martialed for misconduct. Paul Revere, who commanded the artillery, was acquitted. Lovell and Wadsworth were praised by the Massachusetts authorities. The state authorities blamed Saltonstall, and on 7 October 1779, Congress dismissed him from the service.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

The Americans lost 474 men, several cannon, and all of the ships on the expedition. British casualties were 18 men killed; 2 officers and 38 enlisted men wounded (5 of whom died soon after); and 11 men missing.

SIGNIFICANCE

The affair had little impact outside of Maine and aside from the dissension caused in the American ranks. British possession of the area did not survive the peace treaty.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

PENOT LOMBART, LOUIS-PIERRE. Chevalier de La Neuville (1744–1800). French volunteer. On 25 February 1750, La Neuville became a lieutenant in the Paris militia, and in 1759 he was promoted to captain of the same unit. In 1759 he was made captain and in 1766 became *aide-major* in the regiment of recruits of the colonies. In 1774 he was appointed major of the Provincial Regiment of Laon. He was bestowed the title of chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis in 1776. On 5 March 1777 the court granted him leave of absence for the alleged purpose of tending to business in Saint Domingue but actually to enable him (and his brother) to fight the British in North America. He wrote Franklin on 16 March 1777 that he was prepared to go to America whether as a colonel or volunteer.

Arriving in America with glowing letters of recommendation and accompanied by his younger brother, René Hippolyte, La Neuville was appointed colonel with rank as of 21 March 1777. On 14 May he was named inspector general of the Northern Army (under Gates) with the promise that he would be promoted at the end of three months in accordance with his merit. A year later he was still waiting for advancement. In May 1778 he was recommended to Congress for promotion to brigadier general, and on 28 June General Parsons signed a eulogistic recommendation regarding his service, but Congress postponed action on 29 July. Congress finally breveted him brigadier general on 14 October 1778, with date of rank of 14 August, and on 4 December accepted his request for retirement. On 11 January 1779 he sailed with Lafayette for France, carrying a glowing commendation from Gates. On 24 June 1780 he received a commission in the French army as a lieutenant colonel. Two years later he asked for permission to return to America, but Ségur refused the necessary authority. In early 1783 he was placed in command of a battalion of colonial auxiliaries at Cadiz preparing to accompany the proposed expedition to the West Indies, but the peace intervened. Lafayette appears to have written a recommendation in his file in 1787 stating that “M. de La Neuville has always shown

much intelligence and zeal. He conducted himself perfectly in America” (Lasseray, *Les Français*, vol. 2, p. 356). He was in New York in 1790 on business when his uncle, Lieutenant General Merlet, sought on his behalf the rank of adjutant general. He returned to France that year. La Neuville retired effective 20 March 1791 and died during the Napoleonic era.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

PENOT LOMBART DE NOIRMONT, RENÉ HIPPOLYTE. (1750–1792). French volunteer. A *sous lieutenant* attached to the dragoons on 1768, he became lieutenant in the Royal Comtois infantry five years later. In February 1777 he received a leave of absence to accompany his older brother, Louis-Pierre, to America. On 13 December 1777 he entered the American army as a volunteer, and from that date to 28 April 1778 was Thomas Conway's aide-de-camp. On 14 May 1778 he became assistant inspector general of infantry in the Northern Army, where his brother had been serving as inspector general for the preceding year. He was promoted to major on 29 July with date of rank of 13 December 1777. Next assigned as aide de camp to Lafayette, he held this position until the latter returned to France in January 1779. Noirmont was ordered by Congress on 1 April 1779 to join Lincoln in the Southern Department. In the operations around Savannah, he served as a lieutenant of infantry. Lafayette having noted in his 27 October and 22 December 1778 recommendations to Congress that Noirmont had commanded many French officers then serving as lieutenant colonels, Congress finally

breveted him lieutenant colonel on 18 November 1779 in recognition of his services and granted him leave to return to France.

On 1 January 1781 Noirmont was ordered to the West Indies and assigned to the chasseur company of the Second Battalion, Royal Comtois. He returned to France in 1784 and in 1788 was made a chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis. He became lieutenant colonel in his reorganized infantry regiment in July 1791 and served there until he was discharged. Three weeks later, on 30 November, he became captain in the Garde Constitutionnelle. He was at the Tuileries palace when the monarchy fell on 10 August 1792, was arrested, and on 2 or 3 September 1792 he died in the general massacre of prisoners.

SEE ALSO *Conway, Thomas*.

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PENSACOLA, FLORIDA. 9 May 1781. Captured by the Spanish. The unhealthy British outpost and seat of the British government of West Florida was threatened by Louisiana Governor Bernardo de Gálvez in March 1780, when Mobile was captured. Pensacola's strong defenses convinced Gálvez that he needed a larger force for the attack, and he went to Havana to organize the expedition. However, a hurricane scattered his fleet in October, and it was not until the following February that he was able to sail for Florida. Meanwhile, Governor Sir John Dalling of Jamaica, who was responsible for Pensacola, wanted to reinforce that base with a regiment of American Loyalists but was unable to get the necessary naval escort.

The British garrison at Pensacola was commanded by General John Campbell and counted nine hundred regulars, primarily of the Sixteenth Foot and Sixtieth Regiments, the latter composed largely of Germans, and two battalions of provincial infantry from Maryland and Pennsylvania. The fortifications bristled with cannon. When the Spanish naval commanders saw these cannon

in early March, they refused to enter the bay. Not so easily intimidated, Gálvez took command of the brig *Galveztown* and led his colonial troops aboard a flotilla of smaller craft to land near the British fort. Shamed, the rest of the Spanish navy followed, landing several thousand troops. A rather leisurely siege ensued. It was not until the end of April that the Spanish began firing in earnest upon the British positions. On 8 May one of their shells landed on the fort's principal magazine, setting off an explosion that killed or wounded nearly one hundred of Campbell's men and demolished one of redoubts in the process. The Spanish attacked and were being beaten off by the British the first time. But the Spanish then seized part of the fort's walls and set up cannon with which they could fire down into the garrison. Campbell capitulated the next day. West Florida was now in Spanish hands. Gálvez was rewarded with promotion to lieutenant general and ennobled by Carlos III.

SEE ALSO *Jamaica (West Indies); Mobile*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

PENSIONS AND PENSIONERS.

Between 1775 and 1906 state and federal governments awarded pensions to about 55,000 Revolutionary War veterans and 23,000 of their widows at a cost of nearly \$70 million, an amount greater than was spent winning independence. These entitlements resulted from the adoption of colonial precedents, a fundamental change in the political culture and status of veterans, and a new social policy that departed from the Founders' principles.

THE REVOLUTION: INVALID AND HALF-PAY PENSIONS

At the beginning of the Revolution, states continued practices inherited from English and colonial militia laws by providing pensions for injured soldiers. The amount of the invalid pension was rated to the degree of the soldier's disability, which was measured by the capacity of the veteran to work rather than by the type of injury. Invalid pensions were dispersed by local officials and would increase or decrease with changes in the veteran's ability to be self-supporting. Benefits varied according to local law and custom. States also provided pensions for widows and orphans of soldiers who died in service. This aid more closely resembled poor relief than an entitlement. Generally, recipients had to be destitute before being eligible for assistance. Support ended when the widow remarried. As in prior wars, pensions for invalids and widows were intended to assist the recruitment and retention of soldiers, although they were not part of the formal

agreements for enlistment. Revolutionary governments continued to distinguish between wages obligated by contract and benefits granted in cases of disability or death. Wages were enforceable under law. Pensions, on the other hand, were discretionary and thus could be changed or withdrawn.

Federal pension laws began when the struggle for independence required Americans to form a national army instead of relying on local militias and state troops. In 1776 the Continental Congress passed the first national pension law, which applied only to invalids who served in Washington's army. The law provided half-pay for life for any soldier or officer who lost a limb in battle or who was disabled so as to be unable to work. The law also granted partial benefits to men who were disabled but still capable of some labor. Adopting the British practice of an invalid corps, these invalid men could be called on to do light military duty. Although the law was federal, administration and payment were left to the states. In 1778 the law providing for Continental soldiers expanded to cover any soldier who fought in the militia. In 1785 Congress tried to standardize benefits by recommending that states grant half-pay to totally disabled officers, \$5.00 a month to noncommissioned officers and soldiers who were unable to work, and partial benefits to all invalids rated by the degree of their disability. Whereas the 1776 law treated all invalids equally, the 1785 resolutions marked a significant change in the principle of invalid benefits by distinguishing between officers and men.

In 1790, after adoption of the Constitution, the federal government assumed payment of invalid pensions from the states. In 1792 the federal government took over the administration of the invalid pension program for veterans of the Continental Army. By 1800 the program enrolled about 1,500 men and cost less than \$100,000 a year. In 1806 Congress consolidated all invalid programs by extending benefits to all Revolutionary War soldiers. Furthermore, Congress provided benefits to any veteran who had become disabled after the war owing to causes directly related to their service. Under this law the War Department required court-certified medical proof of the disability and evidence linking it to military service. In 1808 the federal government assumed all payments for invalid pensions, thereby ending remaining state programs. In 1816 benefits were increased to privates and officers below the rank of captain. Even so, the program remained small, with 2,200 recipients at an annual cost of about \$200,000.

Departing from English practices, revolutionary leaders opposed lifetime service pensions to officers because they were antithetical to republican ideals. These leaders believed such pensions subverted civic virtue by creating a privileged class of "placemen and pensioners." In 1776 Washington rejected half-pay pensions for officers, but in

1777 he advocated them to slow the resignation of officers. He argued that the officers must be tied to service by self-interest as well as devotion to liberty. Thus arose a contentious issue that was not resolved until 1828. Its history is a reflection of the conflict between revolutionary ideals and expedient measures needed to sustain the army.

In 1778 Congress approved a compromise measure that provided half-pay to officers for seven years and one year's pay, or \$80, to noncommissioned officers and men who served until the end of the war. In 1780 officers, with Washington's support, succeeded in getting a reluctant Congress to award them half-pay pension for life if they served throughout the war. Officers viewed the pension as part of their wages and as compensation for their sacrifices. Opponents of the pensions, by contrast, viewed the measure as a stopgap to retain officers. But more important, they deplored what they saw as the creation of a privileged class sustained by public taxes. The pensions, in their view, were more suited to a corrupt monarchy than to a new republic, in which citizen-soldiers should return to the ranks of civilian life without preferment. The newly formed Society of Cincinnati, whose membership was limited to officers and their male heirs, added a taint of aristocracy to the disparity between lifetime pensions for officers and the one-time payment of \$80 to the rank and file who also served until the end of the war. The uproar of insurrection in 1783 coming from officers encamped in Newburgh, New York, further discredited the claim for half-pay. In early 1783, with the end of the war in sight, Congress reneged on its promise to award half-pay pensions for life. The country was bankrupt and could not pay them. Nevertheless, Congress compromised by awarding officers certificates worth five years' full pay and bearing 6 percent interest until redeemed. All others still received one year's pay. Upon leaving the army in 1783 most officers, desperate for cash, sold their commutation certificates at a fraction of their value. A bitter seed had been planted among these veterans.

In 1790, under Hamilton's plan of assuming debts incurred during the Revolution, the federal government redeemed the certificates at face value, a windfall for speculators and the few officers who held them. Rather than concluding the matter, these payments led to nearly forty years of lobbying and petitions by officers to secure half-pay pensions. Officers claimed that they had been cheated twice—once by their government, which had reneged on its promise in 1783, and again by speculators, who exploited men who had given years of service to their country. In 1809, 1810, and 1819, and from 1825 to 1827, officers submitted claims to Congress stating that they had a legal right to the pensions. Congress rejected these claims on the grounds that its obligations toward these veterans had been met with the 1783 commutation certificates.

The half-pay controversy ended in 1828, when Congress granted full-pay pensions for life to any soldier—not only officers—who had served until the end of the war. This solution upheld the objection made in 1783 that half-pay pensions for officers only was a practice associated with aristocratic societies. The law also sustained the principle that pensions were a gratuity, not a property right protected by contract as the officers claimed. This resolution of the half-pay controversy was less a testimony to the persistence of officers, however, than it was to a fundamental change in American political culture, social policy, and the status of veterans in American society. The passage of the Revolutionary War Pension Act in 1818 codified this shift and established a new precedent for veterans' benefits that eventually benefited those nagging officers.

VETERANS AS ICONS

Following the war and through the first decade of the nineteenth century, Fourth of July celebrants reserved their accolades for the war's leaders while still paying paid tribute to the "Spartan mothers" and the citizen-soldiers represented by militia. The contributions of the Continental Army, on the other hand, were diminished because of lingering anti-army sentiment. In light of the Newburgh conspiracy and demands for half-pay pensions, many viewed professional troops as vice-ridden and their officers as presumptuous and self-serving.

Between 1804 and 1816 the cultural status of rank-and-file veterans of the Continental Army was transformed. To a new generation, veterans emerged as icons of the spirit of '76, a combination of militant patriotism and self-sacrifice for revolutionary ideals. They were idealized as models of American character whose example would unite the nation and inspire future generations to achieve even greater patriotic deeds. The generation that came of age following the Revolution sought to memorialize veterans and show their gratitude toward them, especially as their numbers declined. Thinking of how future generations would view them, younger Americans were aware that neglecting the soldiers of the Revolution would dishonor the nation.

The esteemed status that veterans came to enjoy was partly a product of early nineteenth-century revisionist histories of the Revolution, which focused on the valor of the Continental Army. These histories recounted how the army overcame privations made vivid by images of bloody feet and hunger at Valley Forge. They portrayed the army as composed of citizen-soldiers, unlike England's army of social dregs and misfits, and as an exception to the rule that professional soldiers were a threat to liberty. The Newburgh conspiracy was recast from near treason to an expression of anguish by soldiers who had endured years of suffering as a result of the public's hostility toward them and its failure to pay and provide for them. The troops' restraint

and loyalty under these conditions were celebrated as evidence of their virtue, whereas during the Revolution their demands for pensions were viewed as confirmation of their corruption. By removing the stain of treason and highlighting the courage of Continental veterans, revisionist histories provided younger Americans a view of the Revolution that accentuated the role of ordinary soldiers in securing Independence and as models of the spirit of '76.

Political conflict over defense policies during Thomas Jefferson's administration and military failures in the War of 1812 also elevated the status of Revolutionary War veterans. Republicans and Federalists used veterans as political symbols in their rhetorical clashes over foreign and defense policies. They celebrated veterans to portray themselves as defenders of the Revolution and protectors of American security. Republicans also used veterans to reinforce their image as the party of the people, as they had in 1808 by honoring the thousands of revolutionary soldiers who died on English prison ships in New York City.

The war with England (1812–1815) tested the nation's patriotism and military. Instead of a renewal of the spirit of '76, however, Americans experienced defeat, failure to fill ranks, and deep sectional divisions. Americans looked for lessons from the Revolution to explain their failures and for guidance to build a stronger and more united nation. Nationalists, informed by revisionist histories of the Revolution, made military valor a central theme in uniting the country and defining the character of Americans. Revolutionary War veterans became the symbols of renewed nationalism. Comparing America to ancient Greece and Rome, nationalists called for the preservation of battlefields and encampments such as Valley Forge, for monuments to fallen heroes including a national military cemetery, and for artists and writers to memorialize Revolutionary War veterans.

Sentimentalism and nostalgia reinforced nationalism. Orators and writers invoked the image of suffering soldiers in an effort to shape the public's attitude toward veterans. Romantic stories of their suffering while in service to the nation and in their old age conveyed the soldiers' heroism and sacrifice, establishing them as models of American character. At the same time, this emphasis on veterans' suffering highlighted the nation's ingratitude toward the soldiers who had won independence. Society's failure to aid these aged veterans tarnished America's reputation and set a poor example for future generations.

Veterans contributed to view that they deserved and needed assistance. Old soldiers applying for disability pensions, rather than making medical claims, portrayed themselves as becoming infirm and poor as a result of hardships while in service. They distinguished themselves from paupers, who had brought on their own miseries as a result of vice, by casting their poverty and infirmities as the price paid for the nation's independence. Rather than

evidence of shame and personal failure, their infirmities and poverty became symbols of courage and devotion to the revolutionary spirit.

REVOLUTIONARY WAR PENSION ACT OF 1818

In December 1817 President James Monroe called on the nation to honor and assist the nation's Revolutionary War veterans by awarding life-time pensions to all men who had served in the war and who needed assistance. With the federal treasury overflowing, he urged Congress to act quickly for the few thousand thought to be still alive. Monroe viewed the pensions as a debt of gratitude to these veterans and as a means to unite the nation by renewing its revolutionary heritage. Considering that in 1816 Congress had given itself a substantial raise and increased benefits to disabled veterans, withholding pensions for Revolutionary War veterans would appear crass and heartless.

The public and House of Representatives responded enthusiastically to Monroe's request. The House passed a bill that provided pensions to all veterans of the Revolution in the amount of \$8 for men and \$20 for officers, the same rates paid under the 1816 Invalid Pension Act to totally disabled men and captains. Although the bill restricted eligibility to men "who were in reduced circumstances," the wording was intentionally vague so as not to exclude any veteran except for a few wealthy individuals. The Senate, however, fought over veterans' pensions.

The original draft of the Senate version of the bill restricted the pension to Continental soldiers who served for three years or the duration of the war. This version resembled the claim for half-pay pensions submitted by officers and set off a bitter conflict in the Senate. Opponents argued that service pensions were unconstitutional because granting them exceeded Congress's enumerated powers; that such pensions were antithetical to the principles of the Revolution because they singled out a class of men for preferment; and that restricting benefits to Continental soldiers distorted the true history of the Revolutionary War by ignoring the contributions of militia and the sacrifices of civilians. Opponents and supporters alike attacked the indigence qualification as demeaning and inconsistent with the nation's wish to honor veterans. After the bill survived a vote to kill it, senators from the New England and middle Atlantic states united to expand eligibility to Continental soldiers who served at least nine months. In the House, even supporters of the original comprehensive bill voted to pass the Senate's restricted version. As one congressman remarked, half a loaf was better than none. With signing of the law in March 1818 the precedent was established to extend benefits to all other veterans.

The 1818 Pension Act awarded \$240 a year to officers and \$96 to rank and file who served at least nine months in the Continental Army and who were "in reduced circumstance and need of assistance from their country." The implementation of the law was a cause for public celebration, especially during Fourth of July parades when veterans mustered to submit their applications for pensions before courts. Rather than the few thousand pensioners expected to apply, by December 1818 the War Department received nearly 25,000 applications, overwhelming the pension office. The cost had increased from an estimated \$300,000 to \$2,000,000, with a further increase predicted to reach \$5,000,000. In addition, the pension program was rocked by scandal involving fraud and corruption. In 1820 Congress amended the law by suspending all recipients and requiring them to reapply with proof of their poverty in the form of an inventory of all of their possessions except for clothing and bedding. The number of recipients was reduced by a few thousand and the scandal subsided. Although the pension office established a means test, it applied it liberally by awarding pensions to veterans who deeded their property to kin or caregivers in return for housing and support. Legally, these veterans were poor but not destitute. Through successful administration, the pension program became entrenched, and veterans regained their image as worthy recipients. In 1823 Congress extended benefits to Continental veterans who had disposed of their property to pass the means test. With this amendment nearly every veteran who met the service qualification was eligible for the pension.

America's first entitlement program eventually benefited just over 20,000 veterans and some 47,000 of their dependents. By enacting service pensions the Monroe administration departed fundamentally from the principles that had guided the Founders. The act established the precedent for the use of entitlement programs not only for veterans but for others groups to address a wide variety of social issues.

PENSION ACTS OF 1832 AND 1836

The expansion of benefits to Continental Army veterans established a pattern that was repeated in the Pension Acts of 1832 and 1836. Facing a budget surplus, in 1829 President Andrew Jackson proposed that service pensions be awarded to veterans of the Revolution not yet covered under existing law. Echoing the arguments for and against the precedent-setting act in 1818, Congress debated the extension of benefits. The pension proposal also became part of the sectional conflict in the Senate over the tariff, with opponents alleging that the purpose of the bill was to support the continuation of high tariffs that produced income for the federal government. Veterans' affairs continued to be enmeshed with larger political issues. Nevertheless, Congress approved a bill granting full pay

for life to any veteran who had completed a total of two years of service, whether in the Continental Army, militia, or state regiments. As with prior laws, officers were to receive up to \$20 a month. The bill also granted partial pensions rated by the months of service to any soldier who served a total of six to twenty-four months at any time during the war. Unlike the 1818 and especially the 1820 laws, the 1832 law did not require an oath of poverty or a means test. In essence, the 1832 law implemented the intent of the first bill introduced to Congress in 1818 that proposed service pensions to all veterans.

Once again, Congress had grossly underestimated the number of recipients and the cost of the program. Instead of the projected 9,000 to 10,000 recipients and \$450,000 in cost, nearly 28,000 veterans received the pension at an annual cost of \$1.8 million. Fraud and corruption marred the program, leading some to observe that there would be more pensioners than there were soldiers in the Revolution. Congress responded by making the Pension Office a separate branch of the War Department. In 1834 Commissioner James L. Edwards, who had headed the branch since 1818, reported that about 43,000 veterans were then on the pension rolls under the various acts of Congress and that \$2,325,000 had been paid that year, a figure that represented about 20 percent of the federal expenditures that year.

CONCLUSION

The pension laws greatly benefited veterans and their families. Unlike poor relief, which varied by need and could end with improved circumstances, the pensions provided a stable, guaranteed annual income. Pensions were welcomed locally because men who received them would not become paupers in need of other forms of public assistance. On the social level, pensioners reliant on their children for support regained at least some of their independence, to the mutual benefit of both generations. Veterans used their pensions to support their dependents and in some cases to reunite families divided by poverty. Besides the financial and family benefits, service pensions elevated veterans' status by honoring them as patriots who deserved the nation's gratitude. Subsequent veterans' benefits were built on this cultural and political heritage.

With even more federal revenue to spend, in 1836 Congress awarded pensions for widows of any soldier who would have been eligible for a pension under the Pension Act of 1832. The law restricted eligibility to wives who became widows when their husbands died while serving in the Revolution. In subsequent years, eligibility expanded to include nearly every veteran's widow. In 1906, 130 years after declaring independence, the pension program for Revolutionary War soldiers ended with the final payment to a veteran's widow.

SEE ALSO *Cincinnati, Society of the; Congress; Continental Army, Social History; Continental Congress.*

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John Resch

PEPPERRELL, SIR WILLIAM. (1696–1759). Colonial merchant and military officer, first American-born baronet. Born at Kittery, Maine, on 27 June 1696, William Pepperrell was the son of one of the most prosperous merchants in New England. He received a limited formal education and joined his father as a partner in the senior Pepperrell's mercantile firm. He was elected to the General Court in 1726, appointed colonel of all the militia in Maine the same year, elected to the governor's council in 1727, and appointed chief justice of the York county court in 1730. By the time his father died in 1734, Pepperrell was one of the wealthiest and most prominent residents of Massachusetts, and certainly the most influential man in Maine.

Pepperrell's greatest fame derived from his command of the New England expedition that captured the French fortress of Louisburg on Cape Breton Island in 1745. Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts was the principal architect of the expedition, and he gave Pepperrell command of the provincial forces because of his prominence, popularity, mercantile connections, and experience as militia colonel in Maine. The New England colonies

raised and transported a forty-three-hundred-man force to Cape Breton Island, and in their most notable feat of arms before the Revolution, managed to force Louisburg to capitulate on 17 June 1745. While good luck, strong backs, and French mistakes contributed greatly to this outcome, Pepperrell was responsible for keeping the army together and, critically, for maintaining good relations with Commodore Sir Peter Warren, the commander of the Royal Navy squadron that convoyed the New England transports and blockaded Louisburg. For his success in this operation, Pepperrell was commissioned a colonel in the British army on 1 September 1745 and allowed to raise his own colonial regiment as part of the garrison of the conquered town, the governorship of which he shared with Warren until late in the spring of 1746. In November 1746 he was created a baronet, the first native-born American to be so honored. (The regiment was disbanded when Louisburg was returned to the French in 1748 at the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.)

Promoted to major general on 27 February 1755, he commanded on the eastern frontier in Maine during the unfortunate military events elsewhere that year. For about six months between the death of Lieutenant Governor Spencer Phips and the arrival of Governor Thomas Pownall in August 1757, Pepperrell was de facto governor of Massachusetts by virtue of being president of the governor's council. After raising troops for the defense of Massachusetts, he was commissioned lieutenant general in the British army on 20 February 1759 but was prevented by failing health from taking part in subsequent operations of the French and Indian War. He died on 6 July 1759 at Kittery.

Pepperrell's only son died unmarried, but his grandson, William Pepperrell Sparhawk, inherited the bulk of his estate after accepting the stipulation of the will that he change his name to Pepperrell. In 1774 his grandson also was created baronet. A Loyalist, he fled to England shortly thereafter and lost his entire estate by confiscation.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; Shirley, William.*

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PERCY, HUGH. (1742–1817). British army officer and politician. Hugh Percy was born in London on 14 August 1742. He was the eldest son of Sir Hugh Smithson, who in 1750 changed his name to Percy when he inherited the dukedom of Northumberland from his

father-in-law. He was educated at Eton (1753–1758) before being gazetted as an ensign in the Twenty-fourth Foot on 1 May 1759. It is possible that he fought at Minden, Germany, during the Seven Years' War. He exchanged into the Eighty-fifth Regiment of Foot as captain only weeks after his seventeenth birthday. Percy was at St. John's College, Cambridge, in 1760, but his university studies barely interrupted his accelerated military career. In 1762 he became lieutenant colonel in both the Eleventh Foot and the Grenadier Guards. In 1763 he was elected to Parliament, where he supported the Grenville legislation, which included the Stamp Act. In 1764 he married the third daughter and in 1766 he voted against repealing the Stamp Act. A supporter of the ministry of William Pitt (the elder), Earl of Chatham, he was made colonel of the Fifth Regiment in 1768, and from 1770 he opposed Lord North, Pitt's rival and successor to the post of prime minister. In 1774 Percy left with his regiment for America.

On 19 April 1775 Percy took 1,400 infantry and two six-pound cannon out of Boston to rescue Colonel Francis Smith's force as it marched back from Concord under fire. At Lexington he coolly deployed his troops to cover Smith's men while they reformed, and then made a fighting retreat to Boston. Now a local hero, Percy was given a local promotion to major general (effective only in America) in July, and the rank was officially recognized throughout the army in September of that year. He became a full general in America on 26 March 1776. He led a division at Long Island (Brooklyn) on 27 August and at the storming of Fort Washington on 16 November. In December he went with Sir Henry Clinton's expedition to capture Newport, Rhode Island, where he remained after Clinton's departure in January 1777 and became surprisingly popular there. However, he fell out with William Howe, who repeatedly interfered with Percy's command and criticized his decisions. Percy may, as might be expected with a young man owing his rapid rise a powerful family, have thought Howe insufficiently deferential to his social rank. He sailed for home on 5 May 1777, officially to inherit his mother's barony, but in fact to escape further disagreements with his commander in chief. Though promoted to lieutenant general in August, and to general in 1793, he saw no further active service.

In 1779 Percy divorced his wife and remarried. He inherited his father's title, estates, and parliamentary influence in 1786, and for a short time he supported the prime ministerial policies of William Pitt, the younger. Howe apart, most people found Percy modest and courteous. His generosity matched his exceptional wealth—he paid homeward fares and gratuities to the widows of his men who were killed in America—and was famous as a considerate landlord. He died in London on 10 July 1817.

SEE ALSO *Clinton, Henry; Howe, William; Lexington and Concord.*

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PERTH AMBOY, NEW JERSEY SEE *Amboy, New Jersey*

PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA. 25 April 1781. The combined forces of Benedict Arnold and William Phillips landed at City Point on 24 April and advanced the next day toward Petersburg, where Muhlenberg guarded important military supplies and tobacco with some one thousand militia. About noon the British, advancing along the road on the south bank of the Appomattox River, came in sight of the rebel position near Blandford, a village about a mile east of Petersburg. Phillips, an artilleryman by training, demonstrated a very high degree of skill in this action. He knew that he enjoyed a wide advantage in both numbers and quality of men, but also that he could not replace losses anywhere near as easily as the Americans. Therefore, Phillips refused to pay the price of a frontal attack and opted to maneuver Muhlenberg out of position. Jägers hit the flank of the American outpost line and drove them back on the main battle position. John Simcoe's Rangers and the light infantry fixed and enveloped the Americans, who put up a spirited defense for a while. But when the British finally got four of their own guns into position on the American right and the turning movement was detected by the defenders, Muhlenberg started an orderly withdrawal. By the time Phillips cautiously advanced to the high ground near Blandford Church, Muhlenberg had made it across the Appomattox and destroyed the bridge.

In this creditable little action, each side probably suffered sixty or seventy casualties. Phillips burned four thousand hogsheads of tobacco and several small vessels, but he did not destroy the buildings. The main body went on to destroy barracks and stores at Chesterfield Court

House on 27 April, while Arnold led a column to surprise and destroy a rebel force at Osborne's on the same day.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Muhlenberg, John Peter Gabriel; Osborne's (James River), Virginia; Phillips, William; Simcoe, John Graves; Virginia, Military Operations in.*

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PHILADELPHIA. Located about one hundred miles up the Delaware from the Atlantic, Philadelphia was established in 1682 by William Penn as a Quaker colony. Its name means "City of Brotherly Love." The site was first occupied by the Delaware or Leni Lenape people, and the Swedes established a settlement there not later than 1643. Often considered the first truly American city in layout because of its grid pattern, it had parallel streets that were numbered and cross streets that were named after trees. As early as 1751, the city had illuminated its streets and organized a body of paid constables to replace the traditional nightwatch. In 1768, when London and Paris still contended with medieval filth, Philadelphia contracted for garbage collection and street cleaning. After a lusty growth in the decade preceding the Revolution, by 1775 Philadelphia's population of an estimated thirty-eight thousand was third in the British realm behind only London and Edinburgh. London had 750,000 people, followed by Edinburgh with just over 40,000. Philadelphia was the center of manufacturing in America. The first Continental Congress met at Philadelphia in 1774, and Congress sat there during most of the war.

When the British occupied this capital on 26 September 1777, nearly six hundred houses were unoccupied, over two hundred shops were closed, and fewer than fifty-five hundred males of military age (from eighteen to sixty years) were in town. Most of the latter were Quakers and Loyalists. Most scholars agree that the British occupation of Philadelphia served no real strategic purpose. Congress moved to York, carrying on its business there, and Philadelphia proved a poor base for the British. The American public saw more evidence of British decadence as stories of their wild parties and luxurious living leaked out. As Benson Bobrick has written, "the apparent moral contrast between the self-indulgent Howe in Philadelphia and the spartan Washington at Valley Forge—Vice and Virtue—could not have been more pronounced" (*Angel in*

Philadelphia Campaign

the Whirlwind, p. 311). On 18 June 1778 the British army evacuated the city. Within hours, General Benedict Arnold led American forces back into their capital, which he commanded as military governor until March 1779.

SEE ALSO *Manufacturing in America; Monmouth, New Jersey*.

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PHILADELPHIA CAMPAIGN. During the last week of 1776 and the first week of 1777, a disintegrating American army closing out a disappointing campaign won two small but sharp engagements with regular British and Hessian mercenary forces at Trenton and Princeton, in New Jersey. These unexpected setbacks cost the British their hard-earned ascendancy in New Jersey, as well as the widespread assumption that the Revolution would soon end favorably to them in military terms. The British commander in chief, William Howe, withdrew his troops to winter quarters in New York City, leaving a small garrisoning force to secure an enclave in eastern New Jersey near Perth Amboy. Howe's American counterpart, George Washington, briefly considered attacking that remnant of British strength, but instead he prudently led his rapidly dwindling force to winter camps in the hills around Morristown, New Jersey.

The Trenton-Princeton campaign was of incalculable morale and psychological advantage to American revolutionaries, and it was politically critical to the rebel governments; but it did nothing to preserve the existence of what Washington soon remembered as his "old" army. Indeed, his object in placing that force in the Morris County hills was less to protect it than to conceal its dissolution from the enemy and from Americans as well. Some scholars have argued that one dividend of the year-ending triumphs was the retention of a core group of about one thousand veterans of 1776 who agreed to remain in arms indefinitely, as a skeleton force around which Washington could build his "new" army. Surviving strength records for the Continental Army are nowhere more fragmentary than for the first three months of 1777, however, and this claim is very doubtful. From Morristown in February, March, and April, Washington presided over the almost complete departure of his veteran troops, as his terse hints to civilian

leaders and military peers suggest, while waiting for their long-promised replacements to materialize.

The sobering, but gratifying, end of the 1776 campaign persuaded an ideologically and fiscally reluctant Continental Congress to heed Washington's pleas to authorize the formation of a large "standing" army of soldiers enlisted for at least three years or the duration of the war. While recruiting officers scoured the hills of New England, ports in the Middle Atlantic states, and the southern backcountry, for men willing to accept these terms, Washington could do little except fret and try to keep the formal shell of his army alive. He borrowed militia forces from the Middle Atlantic states and deployed them with the dwindling remnants of his old force, maneuvering in and out of the New Jersey hills, both to beleaguer the enemy's Raritan River enclave and to deceive his foes about his temporary weakness. Washington expressed recurrent surprise that Howe and his aides did not see through this charade, and the contempt he came to feel toward his adversaries for their carelessness in this regard may explain some aspects of his behavior during the 1777 campaign.

William Howe, meanwhile, rightly considered Washington too strongly situated to attack, whatever his strength in troops, and instead contemplated how to launch a new campaign in the spring. The overall British campaign plan had evolved since the late fall of 1776 in personal discussions in London by Howe's subordinate, General John Burgoyne—who had returned to London to promote his ideas—and in correspondence between Howe and the British secretary of state for the American colonies, George Sackville Germain. That plan involved an invasion, led by Burgoyne, down the Lake Champlain-Hudson River corridor from Canada to New York City to isolate the militant head of the rebellion in New England from what Britain hoped was the more moderate rest of the continent. Howe's specific role in supporting this operation was left at best ambiguous in these discussions. Howe wanted to end the rebellion in the Middle Atlantic states by carrying the fight to Pennsylvania. He was encouraged in this notion by Pennsylvania Loyalists, especially by that colony's former Assembly Speaker Joseph Galloway, who claimed that Pennsylvanians were eager to return to their king's side with protection from his army. Howe believed that he could achieve this and still return to New York, if necessary, to support Burgoyne's campaign.

Washington understood that he would soon engage Howe's forces, whether in the lower Hudson Valley or elsewhere in the Middle States, and he desperately tried to organize and if possible train the new recruits who began reaching his camps near Morristown in early May. Scholars have debated the social and economic character of the "new" army and its successors later in the war. A broad but disputed consensus suggests that the American

regular army after 1776 was drawn from poorer and socially less secure groups than the broad cross-section of the populace who responded eagerly to the 1775 mobilization. This social transition had important implications for the army's military temperament and for its relationship to the larger society. Washington himself, viewing the new musters, speculated that recruiting agents were now meeting their goals from among "a Lower Class of People." Whatever their origins, the belated opening of the 1777 campaign allowed Washington to give at least some conditioning exercise to the recruits, even if more formal training was impossible. In June Howe moved large numbers of troops into New Jersey. By threatening to cross the flat lowlands toward the Delaware River, he hoped to lure Washington down from the Morris hills for the decisive engagement he craved. Washington might have willingly met his adversary in the hills, but he refused to fight on Howe's chosen ground. In early July, Howe withdrew his forces to Staten Island, where he loaded about fourteen thousand of them on the oceangoing transports of his brother, Adm. Richard Howe. The fleet put to sea on 23 July, leaving about seven thousand redcoats in New York City under the command of Howe's subordinate, General Henry Clinton.

Intelligence reports about the destination of the British force varied wildly and changed frequently. Washington knew that Howe might sail north to belabor the New England coast, trapping that region between Atlantic and interior invaders. He also might head south to secure a port like Charleston, or to harass the Chesapeake and Carolina coasts as their vital staple crops of tobacco and rice neared harvest. Or, Howe might lure the Continental Army off guard and return to New York to support Burgoyne's invasion of the Hudson. Delegates to the Continental Congress understandably credited threats to their own constituents most heavily, and that weak and regionally factionalized body exerted contradictory pressures on the army's leadership.

The Howe fleet was sighted in the mouth of the Delaware Bay on 29 July, supporting the view of many that the British in fact intended to rout the American civilian government and capture Philadelphia. Washington, who had marched his men back and forth across central New Jersey for two weeks, entered Pennsylvania the next day. The sudden disappearance of the fleet into the Atlantic upset these calculations, and strategic or political debates immediately resumed. Washington camped his force of ten thousand men in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, to await events, but he was prepared to march north or south as needed. Finally, on 23 August, reliable intelligence showed that the Howes were sailing up the Chesapeake Bay. General Howe still intended to campaign for Pennsylvania, if by a different route than he had initially imagined.

Howe's army began landing at the head of the Elk River in Maryland on 25 August. The men were considerably weakened by five weeks on shipboard, and the horses and other animals on which they depended for mobility were in even worse shape. It took several days for British commanders to prepare for overland campaigning. Howe's critics have complained that he used weeks of the summer campaign season bringing his army only fifty miles closer to Philadelphia than it had been in New Jersey. But until that time, the friendliness of Quaker Pennsylvanians was only an untested promise from Joseph Galloway. The disinclination for rebellion—identified at the time as "disaffection"—by inhabitants of Maryland's eastern shore and the lower counties of Delaware was well-known. Additionally, by opening the campaign near the narrow neck of the Delmarva Peninsula, Howe could threaten Washington's southern supply lines even as Burgoyne might succeed at severing the northern ones.

When it was clear that Howe would invade Pennsylvania from the south, Washington marched his army through Philadelphia, fretting about whether its members made a sufficiently "military" appearance to sustain morale among civilians and especially delegates to Congress. He brought the army to Wilmington, Delaware. Then, when the British left Head of Elk, he backtracked into Chester County, Pennsylvania, skirmishing and trying to stay between the redcoats and both Philadelphia on the one hand and, on the other, the vital American supply depots and forges in the upper Schuylkill Valley near Reading. By 10 September the Americans had formed behind Brandywine Creek, near the small village of Chads Ford. Howe's efforts the next day to force passage of that place provoked the first pitched battle of the 1777 campaign.

That engagement began in the morning with artillery fire and maneuvering in the British lines south of the Brandywine. Washington feared a direct assault across that stream, which was running low in the late summer heat, and he concentrated his forces there, detaching units to cover other fords several miles north and south of that point. Howe, who the previous year at Long Island had observed American difficulty responding to flanking attacks, left the Hessian general, Wilhelm von Knyphausen, with five thousand troops to maneuver and display noisily at Chads Ford. With his subordinate, Charles Lord Cornwallis, Howe marched nine thousand men northwest along the Brandywine to obscure fords across the two branches into which the creek divided. Washington either ignored or failed to receive warnings from soldiers and local farmers about this maneuver. Soldiers were presumed not to know the local territory well, while its inhabitants were mostly Quakers whose political reliability the army doubted. Joseph Galloway's boast that Pennsylvanians would eagerly deliver their province back to their king was about to be tested in the field.



Washington's Headquarters at Brandywine. Shortly before the Battle of Brandywine in September 1777, General Washington moved his headquarters to this farmhouse near Chadds Ford. © RICHARD CUMMINS/CORBIS

In the late afternoon of a hot day, Howe and Cornwallis's troops fell on the army's right flank, commanded by General John Sullivan of New Hampshire. Their assault was somewhat halting, which allowed Sullivan to prepare for the blow, but the attack unraveled the American line. Washington, once he was convinced that the attack was in earnest, rushed two divisions from the center of his lines, and eventually a third, into the breach. Fighting desperately for several hours, the Americans stabilized the situation sufficiently to organize an orderly retreat. The Battle of Brandywine resulted in an unequivocal victory for the British side, but the inexperienced Americans emerged from it with a sense that they could survive on the field with their enemy. Washington had casualties of about three hundred killed, as many wounded, and perhaps three hundred prisoners of war. Howe lost ninety men killed and about five times that many wounded. The British rested on the battlefield for a day while the Americans limped away toward Philadelphia.

When Congress received formal notice of the day's result (the cacophony of battle itself was audible in

Philadelphia, and confused oral reports filtered into the city that night), it made plans to relocate the seat of government if necessary. The weak and embattled state government arrested and exiled to Virginia a group of mostly Quaker men of doubtful political loyalty. The documentary records of the Independence and war efforts were dispersed. The soon-to-be-named Liberty Bell was sent to the Lehigh Valley for safekeeping. Civilians of "disaffected" sentiment began to taunt their "patriot" neighbors and to prepare for occupation.

On September 16 advance elements of both armies stumbled into each other in Chester County and another decisive battle seemed likely. A fierce rainstorm, however, washed out the encounter. The Americans retreated to the upper Schuylkill Valley in search of dry munitions. Howe led his army to an obscure iron-making settlement on the Schuylkill River called Valley Forge. They burned the industrial facilities there and crossed the river into Philadelphia County. Congress adjourned on 18 September and went to Lancaster. When the state government arrived a few days later and claimed that town, the dispirited rump of Continental delegates

trooped off to York, a relatively new frontier settlement west of the Susquehanna River, to await events.

On the night of 20 September, a detachment of about fifteen hundred American troops that Washington had sent under Pennsylvania general Anthony Wayne to shadow the British was attacked in their camp at Paoli by a much larger force of redcoats. The rebels were savaged, mostly receiving bayonet wounds, and the event was spun into the Paoli “Massacre,” an important propaganda issue for the Patriot side. For the second year in a row it looked like the military part of the Revolution was disintegrating. Howe adroitly maneuvered his forces in the middle Schuylkill Valley to threaten both Philadelphia and the Reading storage depots. Washington chose to protect the latter, and on 26 September Philadelphia was lost. Thousands of pro-revolutionary civilians fled west with the political bodies, but thousands more remained behind. The demeanor of even the evacuees was more determined—and far less visibly panicked—than had been the case in 1776 immediately before the Trenton surprise. This little-noted fact would soon have important military consequences.

Howe at first brought only 5,000 troops into the city proper, which extended between the Delaware and Schuylkill Rivers, and ran from modern Vine Street to South Street in the north and south. He had witnessed civil-military tensions in Boston and New York before 1777, and he needed time to prepare the town for occupation. He left nine thousand troops camped in and around Germantown, a small crafts and manufacturing village currently inside the municipal limits of Philadelphia but then a half-day’s march to the northwest. In addition to political sensitivities, Howe needed to open the Delaware River and make contact with his brother’s fleet. Richard Howe had left the army in the Elk River and sailed around the Delmarva Peninsula in late August to return to the Delaware Bay. Below Philadelphia, rebel authorities had blockaded the river by building fortifications on either bank and placing floating obstructions hazardous to vessels in the shipping lanes. On the New Jersey side of the river lay Fort Mercer. On an island in the channel near the mouth of the Schuylkill River, where Philadelphia’s airport is today, the Americans built a facility called Mud Fort, or Fort Mifflin. Admiral Howe anchored his fleet just below this bottleneck and began cautious operations, assisted by his brother’s troops, to reopen the river.

The British army, and especially the largely Loyalist or neutralist residual civilian population of Philadelphia, were dependent on the stores and provisions in the fleet’s holds. William Howe’s commissary general reported that the army had lived off the land during the late summer, reaching Philadelphia with slightly more provisions than it had taken from Head of Elk. Those supplies began to dwindle rapidly now. If the British could not feed civilians, they would risk the political consequences of their

alienation. Suspecting that Howe’s tactical attention was divided between the river and the land sides of his defensive lines, and impressed by his own army’s resilience after Brandywine, Washington began planning an assault on Germantown. During the last week of September, the Continental Army moved cautiously down the northern side of the Schuylkill River. Morale at headquarters was boosted on 28 September when preliminary news arrived from the north of American general Horatio Gates’s success in stopping Burgoyne’s invading army in the first Battle of Freeman’s Farm, near Saratoga, New York.

On 3 October Washington divided his army into four columns, one of which was largely made up of Pennsylvania militia troops. These forces marched along four parallel roads toward Germantown. Washington planned for the columns to reach the British lines simultaneously at dawn and to fall on the surprised redcoats in successive waves. The plan was too complicated for the brave but inexperienced American soldiers and officers to execute. The day began well. The American columns marched under cover of an early autumn fog, and they were successful in surprising the British sentries. The two middle columns converged on the Germantown Road running through the village and drove the enemy back. The militia column, marching along the Schuylkill River, however, became lost in the fog and never found its way up from the ravine and into the battle. The leftmost column arrived too late and fell in on the rear and flank of the third column. Those forces soon engaged each other in a “friendly fire” episode. General Howe, awakened at his billet near Philadelphia, raced north with reinforcements and rallied his troops. American units fired too freely and began to exhaust their ammunition. Gun smoke added to the fog as a disorienting force, and Continental soldiers began to panic and withdraw from the field. The retreat became general as officers were unable to calm their men. Washington’s unfortunate effort to seize the large stone house of colonial Pennsylvania’s former chief justice, Benjamin Chew—into which British soldiers had retreated—consumed too much of his attention and contributed to the momentum shift. Once the Americans were in full retreat they continued so for more than twenty miles, coming to an exhausted halt far into the wilds of upper Philadelphia County.

The British thus had their second successive indisputable victory over the Americans. The rebels suffered casualties of about 150 killed, 500 wounded, and over 400 captured, while Howe’s total losses in all categories were about 550. The British held the field at the day’s end. Continental officers, however, saw more evidence at Germantown to reinforce their impressions from Brandywine that the performance gap between their troops and the enemy was not that great. Their correspondence emphasized their misfortune in snatching defeat

from the jaws of victory, and their firm expectation of soon having “another brush” with Howe’s troops, from which many of them confidently expected to emerge victorious. The specific accuracy of this view is less important than the fact of its existence, and its implications for the army’s willingness to endure. Until the Howe brothers succeeded in opening the Delaware River, many rebels doubted that the British would be able to consolidate their successes in Pennsylvania. And the enemy remained subject to news of reverses in other sectors. This recurred on 15 October, when Washington learned that Horatio Gates had followed up on his initial success against Burgoyne and defeated the British in a second battle near Saratoga. That defeat led to Burgoyne’s effective surrender, and at least to the temporary removal of the northern British army from the field.

As these mixed events occurred on American battlefields, developments in parts of the military establishment ordinarily less visible than armies themselves converged to change the direction of the Philadelphia campaign. The complex logistical organizations that Congress had created in 1775 to supply and transport the army began to unravel during the early fall of 1777. Congress reformed the commissary department in the spring, replacing New England officers with merchants from the Middle Atlantic states thought better suited to the new “seat of war.” The idea worked on paper but it failed disastrously in the field. The army discovered this only when food and supplies mysteriously failed to arrive in its camps in sufficient amounts in mid-October. By early November neither the ambitious dreams of the junior and middle-grade officers nor the far more cautious hopes of their headquarters-level superiors were realistic. Washington had to bring the army to rest at Whitemarsh, north of Germantown, to have any hope of feeding it, and he began to develop a more subtle plan to neutralize the British strategic and political advantages resulting from their capture of Philadelphia.

After November 1 the focus of the campaign—to the extent that it still had one—lay in the increasingly violent struggle for control of the Delaware River below Philadelphia. The Continental Army, as such, had only a modest formal role to play in that struggle. Washington brought it to the camp at Whitemarsh so that the struggling commissary functionaries would have a reliable stationary target to which to direct whatever food and supplies they obtained. The actual management of the river war fell to the commanders of the two forts, to the state militia forces in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey who supported their operations, and to a crazy-quilt collection of Continental and Pennsylvania “navy” forces who operated on the river in small row galley vessels with initiative and bravery but relatively little heed to centralized command.

From Whitemarsh, Washington developed an impromptu secondary “front” in support of the river battle, which spread around the entire perimeter of occupied Philadelphia. To relieve the ecological strain on his weak commissary, he detached small parties of troops to patrol in the countryside. These forces were especially useful in contesting British efforts to run overland night convoys to bring their own supplies from ships at anchor below the forts to Philadelphia. The extent to which the British—at the end of a 3,000-mile supply line from England and Ireland—faced material shortages before and during the winter of 1777–1778 has not been appreciated because of the folkloric concentration on the epic of the Valley Forge winter. Until the Delaware was opened—and the river was known to be vulnerable to icing over during the eighteenth century—it could not be presumed that they would be able to hold Philadelphia.

Whether by design or otherwise, detachments from camp also served to relieve strain on the morale of Continental soldiers, and to give them at least the illusion that they were doing what they had joined the army to do—engage in active military operations. The mood of the camp in mid-November began the cyclical oscillations between dejection, exhilaration, and grim determination that would characterize the army’s experience at Valley Forge the next winter. The army itself became more diverse as a result of the relocation to Pennsylvania of troops from the northern army that had defeated general Burgoyne. As soon as he was confident that Burgoyne’s Convention Army would remain in captivity, Washington ordered his commanders in the central Hudson Valley to send him large numbers of troops as he attempted to close the campaign season with a triumph. Thousands of these soldiers reached Whitemarsh in November. They arrived at a scene of stasis, frustration, and some real deprivation. The northern troops were mostly Yankees or New Yorkers, and they mixed uneasily with the Middle Atlantic and southern troops who dominated the “main” army. The New Englanders could boast of their success—indeed, they quickly elevated the term “burgoyne” to the status of a generic verb—and they understandably wondered aloud what their new comrades had accomplished that autumn.

Washington kept as many of his troops as possible on rotating detached duty in the countryside. Many of the New Englanders were sent to New Jersey, where they supported the efforts of local units to defend Fort Mercer. There, on 22 October, a British overland assault led by Hessian mercenaries was repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. Other Continentals patrolled roads in the three Pennsylvania counties outside the city—Bucks, Philadelphia, and especially Chester—where they developed a taste for partisan skirmishing that would prove useful the next winter when the army struggled to pacify the occupied countryside. Regrettably, some of them also

developed talents and a taste for abusing civilian “peasants,” plundering the goods of supposedly “disaffected” Pennsylvanians, and similar activities that presented Washington with a constant menu of delicate public relations work with civilians. Soldiers, especially recruits from land-poor environments in northern New England and the southern backcountry, had never seen countryside as rich and prosperous as that in southeastern Pennsylvania’s “best poor man’s country.” Their arrival there coincided exactly with the army’s plunge into material misery. They were less apt to attribute their new travails to bureaucratic shortcomings than to the moral deficiencies of Pennsylvania’s mixed population. The terms “Quaker” or “quaking” became handy substitutes for unfamiliar sociocultural groups.

The battle for control of the Delaware came to a crescendo during the first two weeks of November, and, perhaps inevitably—given the extent of the logistical immobility of so many Continental troops—the British finally prevailed. William Howe’s forces slowly established battle platforms on the marshy ground behind Mud Island, where Fort Mifflin lay, while his brother’s warships carefully maneuvered upriver toward the *chevaux de frise* which obstructed the channels. Placing the fort in nearly point-blank range, the British began bombarding it day and night, slowly reducing its crude structures and earthworks to a pulpy mass of earth and debris. The defenders heroically endured this bombardment and fought back as well as they could for as long as they could. Continental and state “navy” forces flitted about on the river in small row galleys and other vessels and did what they could to endanger Lord Howe’s sailors and their expensive warships. In the end, access and artillery power prevailed. On 16 November, Fort Mifflin surrendered. The Americans continued to hold its companion facility, Fort Mercer, on the New Jersey side, but without the Pennsylvania installation it could not provide coverage of the wide river. Washington detached generals to consider the wisdom of holding Fort Mercer, but they could not report favorably on the plan, and that site was abandoned on 20 November.

The loss of the forts ensured that the British would be able to remain in Philadelphia. But what had they won? Admiral Howe completed the work of clearing the obstructions from the river channels and was able to bring his transports to the city’s docks by early December. His brother was already receiving criticism in London and in army circles for becoming bogged down in Pennsylvania while Burgoyne’s invasion was swallowed up. Discouraged, Howe offered the king his resignation in October. The battle for the river was an enormously noisy affair, and reports from civilians indicate that the roar of artillery fire and the explosion of several British ships that ran aground could be heard dozens of miles inland. This reminds us that the campaign for Pennsylvania was not fought on an empty

or abstract topography, but rather that it involved the reactions and ultimately the allegiances of the members of a complex, plural, modern society. Pennsylvania never produced the caricatured Quaker and other eager subjects of the king, waiting patiently for their liberation from republican radicals, that Joseph Galloway had described to General Howe. Rather, it was the diverse and dynamic community that individuals from the generation of William Penn to that of Benjamin Franklin had struggled to understand and govern.

The same civilian diaries and letters that tell us about the noise of war also document the ability of civilians to learn about and for the most part successfully adapt to the confusion and danger of war. Pacifists and profiteers, and ordinary citizens in between those extremes, closely watched the occupation of their world, adapted to military ways, adopted military vocabularies, and otherwise taught themselves to survive. Benjamin Franklin, in Paris hoping to negotiate a treaty of alliance with France, may or may not have proclaimed that “Philadelphia has taken general Howe.” But in the long run, and even in the medium, the social order of the Delaware Valley rose up, enveloped, and in a manner triumphed over the best intentions of its invaders.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Burgoyne, John; Burgoyne’s Offensive; Clinton, Henry; Cornwallis, Charles; Fort Mercer, New Jersey; Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania; Franklin, Benjamin; Galloway, Joseph; Gates, Horatio; Germain, George Sackville; Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of; Howe, Richard; Howe, William; Knyphausen, Wilhelm; Liberty Bell; Morristown Winter Quarters, New Jersey (6 January–28 May, 1777); Paoli, Pennsylvania; Princeton, New Jersey; Quakers; Saratoga, First Battle of; Saratoga, Second Battle of; Sullivan, John; Trenton, New Jersey; Valley Forge Winter Quarters, Pennsylvania; Valley Forge, Pennsylvania; Wayne, Anthony; Whitmarsh, Pennsylvania.*

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revised by Wayne K. Bodle

PHILLIPS, WILLIAM. (c.1731–1781). British army officer. Phillips entered the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, on 1 August 1740 and rose with a rapidity that suggests powerful patronage. Early in 1747 he became a “lieutenant fireworker”; from 1750 to 1756 he was quartermaster to the Royal Regiment of Artillery; and from 1 April 1756 he was a first lieutenant and aide-de-camp to Sir John Ligonier, lieutenant general of the ordnance. During the Seven Years’ War he served in Germany, where he founded the Royal Artillery’s first band. In 1758 he was given a brigade of artillery, and at Minden (1759) he led it through a wood to engage the French guns. At Warburg (30 July 1760) he brought his guns up at a gallop to support Lord Granby’s cavalry brigade, an unprecedented feat that impressed friend and foe alike. He was made a lieutenant colonel in the army on 15 August. From 1763 to 1775 he served in the Mediterranean and Woolwich and became lieutenant governor of Windsor Castle; during this time he also had two affairs and six children. Through his friendship with Sir Henry Clinton, he held a parliamentary seat from 1774 to 1780.

Phillips served under John Burgoyne and Guy Carleton in Canada in 1776, and from July to December was commandant at St. Johns, where he supervised the building of Carleton’s Lake Champlain flotilla. In 1777 he took charge of the preparatory and supply arrangements for Burgoyne’s expedition, being promoted major of artillery in April. His diligence prompted Burgoyne to give him command of mixed formations in the field, and on 5–6 July it was his energetic siting of four guns on Mount Defiance, dominating Ticonderoga and the bridge that was the Americans’ only means of retreat, that forced the rebels to abandon the fort. At Stillwater, New York, in the Battle of Saratoga, he led the British left (including Baron Riedesel’s Germans) and on 19 September personally led the Fourth Foot into battle in an attack that saved the day. After Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga on 17 October 1777, Phillips became a prisoner of war, taking command of the Convention Army upon Burgoyne’s departure in April 1778. His captors so disliked his persistent protests about treatment of his men that, when in June he vociferously denounced the shooting of an officer by a sentry, they briefly locked him up. During the appalling winter march to Virginia (November 1778–1779), Phillips borrowed money to keep his men fed. In August he and Riedesel were paroled, an agreement honored by Congress only after Phillips protested to Washington. Reaching New York in November 1779, he was adviser to his friend Sir Henry Clinton and in July 1780 was promoted lieutenant colonel in the artillery. In October he and Riedesel were formally exchanged in October, and thus free to serve once more.

Clinton sent him with two thousand men to the Chesapeake, where he was to join and take over from

Arnold, secure the James and Elizabeth Rivers, and support Charles Cornwallis’s operations. On 25 April he defeated a body of militia near Petersburg, Virginia; two days later his artillery destroyed a small American flotilla at Osborne’s landing, on the James River; and on 30 April he directed a successful raid against rebel stores at Manchester. The next day at Osborne’s landing he went down with typhoid fever and died at Petersburg on the 13 May 1781.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne’s Offensive; Champlain Squadrons; Convention Army; Osborne’s (James River), Virginia; Petersburg, Virginia; Riedesel, Baron Friedrich Adolphus; Saratoga Surrender.*

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PHIPP’S FARM. 9 November 1775. Alternate name for Lechmere Point.

SEE ALSO *Lechmere Point, Massachusetts.*

PICKENS, ANDREW. (1739–1817). Militia general. South Carolina. Born near Paxton, Pennsylvania, on 19 September 1739, Andrew Pickens moved south with his parents and other Scotch-Irish families through the Shenandoah Valley, where they lived for a while. They ultimately settled on an 800-acre holding on Waxhaw Creek, South Carolina. Two years after taking part in James Grant’s expedition against the Cherokee in 1761, Pickens and his brother sold their inheritance and obtained lands on Long Cane Creek in South Carolina. At the outbreak of the Revolution he was a farmer and justice of the peace. As a captain of militia, he took part in the conflict at Ninety Six on 19 November 1775. His services in the war against the Loyalists over the next two years brought him promotion to colonel, and he contributed greatly to the Patriot victory at the battle of Kettle Creek, Georgia, on 14 February 1779.

After the surrender of Charleston in May 1780 and the subsequent conquest of the southern states by the British, Pickens surrendered a fort in the Ninety-Six district and, with 300 of his men, went home on parole. When Captain James Dunlap’s Loyalists plundered his plantation, Pickens gave notice that his parole was no longer valid and took the field again. With Francis

Marion and Thomas Sumter he was one of the most prominent partisan leaders in the subsequent guerrilla warfare of the region.

For his part in the victory at Cowpens, South Carolina, on 17 January 1781, he was given a sword by Congress and a commission as brigadier general from his state. In April of that year he raised a regiment of "state regulars" who were to be paid according to Sumter's Law, which permitted soldiers to take their pay in plunder gained from Loyalists. With these forces, Pickens had an active part in the capture of Augusta, Georgia, and the unsuccessful siege of Ninety-Six, May–June 1781. He and his troops also took part in the last pitched battle in the south, at Eutaw Springs, on 8 September 1781, where he was wounded. He contributed to the final operations in the South by carrying out punitive expeditions against the Cherokee in 1782.

Elected to represent the Ninety-Six district in the Jacksonboro Assembly in 1783, Pickens served in the state legislature until 1788, returning in 1796–1799, and 1812–1813. He was also elected to the state senate, in which he served from 1790 to 1791, and to Congress, from 1793 to 1795. In 1794 he became major general of the South Carolina militia, and for many years was engaged in dealing with the Indians on boundary matters. Pickens favored a peace policy, helping to negotiate the Hopewell and Coleraine Treaties (1786 and 1796, respectively). He died at his Tamassee, South Carolina, plantation on 11 August 1817.

SEE ALSO *Kettle Creek, Georgia; Pickens's Punitive Expeditions.*

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PICKENS'S PUNITIVE EXPEDITIONS. Andrew Pickens first fought against the Cherokees in 1761. As a major of militia he led the forces that destroyed their settlements in the western Carolinas in the summer of 1776, winning a key victory at Tugaloo River on 10 August 1776. In 1779 the Cherokees again allied with the British in hopes of retaining their lands after the war ended. Starting in late August, General Pickens led a campaign of less than three weeks in which he killed forty Cherokees, burned thirteen towns, and took many

prisoners while sustaining a loss of only two wounded. In his *Memoirs* (1827), Harry Lee commented on 'Pickens's effective use of mounted troops, against which the Indians proved to be surprisingly vulnerable. In 1782 Pickens and Colonel Elijah Clarke again moved against the Cherokees, first in March and April, then in September and October. These two swift campaigns forced the Cherokees to surrender all their lands south of the Savannah River and east of the Chattahoochie to the state of Georgia.

SEE ALSO *Georgia Expedition of Wayne.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

PICKERING, TIMOTHY. (1745–1829). Continental officer, adjutant general, quartermaster general. Massachusetts. Born on 17 July 1745 into a family that had been prominent in Salem since 1637, he graduated from Harvard College in 1763. He was employed in Salem in the office of the Essex County register of deeds until the eve of the war, as register from October 1774. Meanwhile, he studied law and in 1768 was admitted to the bar. He also studied military history and tactics beginning in 1766, when Governor Francis Bernard appointed him a lieutenant in the Essex County militia. His neighbors elected him to the town's committee of correspondence, and in February 1775 the Massachusetts Provincial Congress appointed him colonel of the First Regiment of the Essex County militia. His *Easy Plan of Discipline for a Militia*, published in 1775, was adopted by Massachusetts the next year and was widely used in the American army until replaced by the famous manual of Steuben after 1778.

Not initially an advocate of armed resistance to British authority, he "delayed rather than lead his regiment" in the Lexington Alarm of 19 April 1775 (ANB). He took no part in the siege of Boston or the 1776 campaign. Recognizing that no reconciliation was possible, early in 1777 Pickering led a volunteer unit to reinforce Washington's army at Morristown. Because Horatio Gates wanted to resign as adjutant general, Washington prevailed upon Pickering to replace him. Despite his lack of military experience, Pickering performed his exacting and tedious duties with competence, and he even showed a good grasp of tactics. He saw the dangers of Washington's plan for the Battle of Germantown (4 October 1777) and even urged the commander in chief to bypass the strong point at the Chew House.

When Congress organized a new Board of War (made up of persons outside Congress) during the Conway Cabal episode, it pulled Pickering out of Washington's headquarters to be a member. He was

elected to the board on 7 November 1777, but since nobody qualified to take over as adjutant general was immediately available, he did not leave this post until 13 January 1778. Washington named Pickering to succeed Nathanael Greene as quartermaster general on 5 August 1780. Pickering wrote back on the 11th that since the appointment was altogether unexpected, it would be some time before he could wind up his affairs in Philadelphia. When Pickering had not arrived by 15 September, Washington sent him orders to report. Holding this vital post until 25 July 1785, he showed “indefatigable industry and iron determination” (DAB). A splenetic conservative—a curmudgeon devoid of illusions—on 6 March 1778 he wrote: “If we should fail at last, the Americans can blame only their own negligence, avarice, and want of almost every public virtue.”

After going into business in Philadelphia he moved to the Wyoming Valley in early 1787 and was involved in the dispute between Pennsylvania authorities and the Connecticut settlers. He became “land poor,” and to improve his finances he decided to seek a post in the new federal government. In the fall of 1790 President Washington appointed him to negotiate with the Senecas to prevent them from going to war against the United States. In what his modern biographer calls the “high point” of his public career, Pickering “proved patient, understanding, and sympathetic in his several negotiations with the Seneca, Oneida and other tribes. He made every effort to protect Native American peoples from exploitation by greedy land speculators” (ANB). Washington rewarded him with the job of postmaster general on 12 August 1791 and promoted him to secretary of war on 2 January 1795, replacing Henry Knox. He was secretary of state from August 1795 until 10 May 1800 but was dismissed after intriguing with Alexander Hamilton and other Federalists against President John Adams. He went back to Wyoming, but his Federalist friends arranged for the purchase of his lands and his return to Massachusetts, where they hoped he might come to the aid of the party. He was a senator from Massachusetts from 1803 to 1811 and became a formidable debater. Pickering’s years in the Senate were marred by his leadership of an abortive scheme in 1803–1804 to take New York, New Jersey, and the five New England states out of the union to form a northern confederacy. Denied reelection to the Senate, he was elected to the House and served from 1813 to 1817. He died at Salem on 29 January 1829.

SEE ALSO *Conway Cabal*.

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PIECEMEAL. “Piecemeal” is the military term for committing portions of a command into action as they become available on the battlefield. It is good tactics provided it is possible to build up a preponderant force (superior combat power) faster than the enemy, and it is common in a “meeting engagement.”

SEE ALSO *Meeting Engagement*.

revised by Mark M. Boatner

PIGOT, SIR ROBERT. (1720–1796). British general. A small, strongly built man, Pigot served in the War of the Austrian Succession, and in Minorca and Scotland from 1749 to 1752. Lieutenant colonel of the Thirty-eighth Foot from 1764, he went to America in 1774. In 1775 Pigot was with Lord Percy’s column sent to rescue the force falling back from Concord. At Bunker Hill, as a local brigadier general, he led the left wing with great courage and distinction, being promoted colonel of the Thirty-eighth on 11 December 1776. He commanded William Howe’s Second Brigade at Long Island (27 August 1776). In May 1777 he inherited his brother’s baronetcy; he became commander of the Rhode Island garrison on 15 July and was promoted major general on 29 August. In August 1778 he held Newport against John Sullivan’s army and comte d’Estaing’s fleet, and on 29 August he tried unsuccessfully to dislodge Sullivan from Butts Hill. He gave up the command in October and sailed for home in 1779. He was made lieutenant general on 20 November 1782.

SEE ALSO *Long Island, New York, Battle of; Newport, Rhode Island (September 1777)*.

revised by John Oliphant

PINCKNEY, CHARLES. (1757–1824). Militia officer, governor of South Carolina, statesman, diplomat. South Carolina. Born on 26 October 1757 in Charleston, South Carolina, Pinckney studied law with his father just before the Revolution. Elected to the South Carolina House of Representatives in 1779, he was a

militia lieutenant at Savannah, Georgia, in October 1779 and became a prisoner of war when Charleston surrendered on 12 May 1780. Refusing to follow his father's example of pledging allegiance to the British Crown, Pinckney remained a prisoner until June 1781. He served in Congress from 1 November 1784 until 21 February 1787. Pinckney attended the Constitutional Convention of 1788, where he made numerous proposals that became part of the finished document and successfully insisted that the Constitution defend slavery.

After working hard to achieve ratification of the Constitution in South Carolina, he was governor of that state from January 1789 to December 1792. His alienation from the Federalists may have started when his cousin, Thomas Pinckney, was given the post of minister to Great Britain—a position that he wanted for himself. He denounced John Jay's treaty in 1795, defeated his brother-in-law, Henry Laurens, Jr., to win a third term as governor in 1796, and in 1798 was elected to the U.S. Senate with the same back-country Republican support that enabled him to beat Laurens. He led Republican senators against the administration, and later managed Thomas Jefferson's presidential campaign in South Carolina, which led to his estrangement from his strongly Federalist cousins, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and Thomas Pinckney. His effective support of Jefferson, who became president in 1801, won him an appointment that year as minister to Spain.

Returning to Charleston in January 1806, Pinckney served a fourth term as governor. Elected to Congress in 1814, Pinckney fought for Missouri's admission as a slave state in 1820, insisting that Congress could never touch that institution. At the end of this term, Pinckney retired to Charleston, South Carolina, where he died on 29 October 1824.

SEE ALSO *Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth; Pinckney, Thomas.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

PINCKNEY, CHARLES COTESWORTH. (1746–1825). Brevet brigadier general in the Continental army, statesman, diplomat. South Carolina. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney was born on 14 February 1745 in Charleston, South Carolina. When his father became the agent representing South Carolina's

interests in England in 1753, young Charles and his brother, Thomas, went to live London with their parents. After graduating from Oxford, 1764, Pinckney went on to further his training as a barrister at the Middle Temple, and was admitted to the bar in 1769. Pinckney then returned to South Carolina and was immediately elected to the legislature, where he sided with the Patriot cause. Already very wealthy, in 1773 he married Sarah Middleton, the daughter of the extremely rich Henry Middleton, who was prominent in South Carolina politics.

At the outbreak of the Revolution, Pinckney moved rapidly to prepare South Carolina for war. On 22 April 1775 he led a group in seizing British munitions. As a member of the Committee on Intelligence, he worked to enlist support from the backcountry and to plan the defense of Charleston, even while he chaired the committee that drafted the conservative constitution adopted by South Carolina in March 1776. Pinckney became senior captain of the First Regiment of South Carolina troops on 17 June 1775. Promoted almost immediately, he served under William Moultrie in the defense of Fort Sullivan (later renamed Fort Moultrie) on 28 June. Promoted to colonel on 16 September 1776, he took leave from his regiment and served as General George Washington's aide-de-camp at Brandywine and Germantown in the fall of 1777. He then led his regiment in an abortive expedition against Florida in 1778.

Meanwhile, Pinckney continued to advance his political career. He became president of the South Carolina senate in January 1779. He was involved in the military alarms and excursions occasioned by Augustin Prevost's appearance at Charleston on 11 and 12 May 1779. During the Charleston operations that occurred during the following year, Pinckney commanded Fort Moultrie. There was little action at this location, but Pinckney's insistence on the defense of the city led to Benjamin Lincoln's disastrous surrender on 12 May 1780. Pinckney spent the rest of the war on parole in Philadelphia, being included in an official prisoner exchange in February 1782. Rejoining the army, he served until 3 November 1783, on which date he was brevetted as a brigadier general.

In 1782 Pinckney was elected to the South Carolina legislature, and after the war he resumed his law practice and re-entered public life. Although a zealous Anglican and conservative Federalist, he strongly advocated disestablishment and opposed the imposition of any religious test for political office. After taking a prominent part in the Federal Convention (1787), the state convention that ratified the Constitution (1788), and the state constitutional convention of 1790, he set some sort of a record in declining presidential appointments. In 1791 he declined command of the army, leaving Arthur St. Clair to take the post. Both Pinckney and his brother-in-law, Edward Rutledge, turned down President Washington's urgent

request that one of them become an associate justice on the Supreme Court. In addition, he twice refused the post of Secretary of War, and in August 1795 he declined to become Secretary of State.

Finally accepting an offer from Washington, he went to Paris in December 1796 as James Monroe's successor in the post of Minister to France. The revolutionary government in power there refused to accept Pinckney's credentials, however, and he subsequently was threatened with arrest. In February 1797 he stormed off to Holland, but in October of that same year he was back in Paris on a special diplomatic mission that resulted in the attempt by three French representatives to extort bribes from Pinckney in order to secure treaty negotiations. Dubbed the "XYZ Affair" (because the French officials were designated by these letters in American diplomatic dispatches), the extortion attempt failed due to Pinckney's integrity. In fact, when "X" made his proposal to Pinckney and pressed for an answer, Pinckney replied, "It is No! No! Not a sixpence!" The affair led many in America to call for war against France, and in preparation for that possibility Pinckney was commissioned as a major general on 19 July 1798. In this capacity he commanded the forces and installations in Virginia and Kentucky, and in the territories to the south. He served until 15 June 1800, after which he ran for the office of vice president as the Federalist nominee. He was that party's (unsuccessful) presidential candidate in 1804 and 1808, as well. He died in Charleston, South Carolina, on 16 August 1825.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Pinckney, Thomas.*

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
revised by Michael Bellesiles

PINCKNEY, THOMAS. (1750–1828). Continental officer, South Carolina governor, diplomat. South Carolina. Born in Charleston, South Carolina, on 23 October 1750, Pinckney shared a European education with his elder brother, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, graduating from Oxford in 1768 before studying law at the Middle Temple and being admitted to the bar in 1774. He returned to Charleston the same year and set up his legal practice. Early the next year he became a lieutenant of rangers and—like his brother—captain in the First South Carolina Regiment (17 June 1775). He performed highly successful service as a recruiting and training officer before

assuming the duties of a military engineer at Fort Johnson at Charleston Harbor. After having an orchestra seat while his brother and Colonel Moultrie defended Fort Sullivan, Thomas was assigned to defend that post in August 1776. Except for a few months' absence recruiting in Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, he stayed two years at what was now called Fort Moultrie. On 17 May 1778 he was promoted to major, again helped organize and train new troops, and then took part in the unsuccessful expedition against Florida. As aide-de-camp to Lincoln he was at Stono Ferry, and as aide de camp to d'Estaing participated in the attack on Savannah on 9 October 1779.

Pinckney served in the legislature of 1778 and kept up his law practice while also serving in the army. In May 1779 the British burned his plantation and liberated his slaves. In 1780 he took part in the defense of Charleston, but he was sent from the city before the final stages of the siege to hurry forward reinforcements and escaped capture. After making his way to Washington's headquarters, he returned to the South, became aide-de-camp to Gates on 3 August 1780, was seriously wounded at Camden on 16 August, and was taken prisoner. Paroled to Philadelphia with his brother, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who had been captured at Charleston, Thomas Pinckney was exchanged in December 1780. In September 1781 he was recruiting in Virginia, where he met Lafayette and served under the latter's command through the siege of Yorktown; they became good friends. Pinckney also was a partisan of Gates, and on his return to South Carolina at the end of the war published a defense of him.

Pinckney became a successful Charleston lawyer after the war and served as governor from 1787 to 1789. In 1791 Washington made him minister to Great Britain. Though not very successful as ambassador to that nation, and offended by John Jay's appointment to negotiate a treaty with Britain, Pinckney enjoyed a triumph in his negotiations with Spain. With a combination of bold persistence (which had not worked in London) and unflinching tact, his efforts resulted in Pinckney's Treaty of 27 October 1795. Back in London, Thomas worked unsuccessfully to win Lafayette's release from an Austrian prison. Pinckney returned to South Carolina in September 1796, having been nominated by the Federalists for vice president. But Hamilton's conniving to have him elected president in order to defeat John Adams resulted in Pinckney's getting neither post. (His brother Charles Cotesworth lost out in a similar manner in the 1800 election, while their cousin Charles was building his own political career in the Jeffersonian camp.) He served in Congress from 1797 to 1801, when he retired from politics. He was appointed major general on 27 March 1812, but as commander of the region from North Carolina to the Mississippi he saw no active service during the War of 1812. He succeeded Andrew Jackson after the Creek War



Pinckney Family of South Carolina. THE GALE GROUP

and negotiated the peace treaty. He died in Charleston on 2 November 1828.

SEE ALSO *Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'*; *Lafayette, Marquis de*; *Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth*; *Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779)*; *Southern Theater, Military Operations in*; *Spanish Participation in the American Revolution.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

PINCKNEY FAMILY OF SOUTH CAROLINA. During the colonial period, members of a few dozen families, including the Pinckneys, Rutledges, and Middletons, controlled South Carolina's Commons House of Assembly and dominated the Council (the upper house) until 1765, when they began to lose some power to British-born placeholders. The families intermarried to the point where they created a vast cousinage; the Pinckneys, for example, strengthened their ties by marrying into the Laurens and Middleton families. The first Charles Pinckney (1699?–1758) was chief justice of South Carolina (1752–1753) and the colony's agent in England (1753–1758). His nephew, the second Charles (1732–1782), father of the third Charles, was a wealthy lawyer and planter who was first president of the first South Carolina Provincial Congress (January–June 1775). He fled

Charleston in April 1780 but voluntarily returned in June and gave his parole. Two years later, his estate was amerced 12 percent; it would have been confiscated had not the rest of the family, including his son Charles and nephew Charles Cotesworth, been prominent Patriots.

SEE ALSO *Middleton Family of South Carolina*; *Pinckney, Charles*; *Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth*; *Pinckney, Thomas*; *Rutledge, Edward Ned.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

PISCATAWAY, NEW JERSEY. 10 May 1777. Major General Adam Stephen played a major role in the skirmishing between American patrols and British foraging expeditions in northern New Jersey during the early months of 1777. This role fell to him in large measure because his Virginia regiments had not been affected by the expiration of enlistments as the majority of units in the main army had been. British forces occupied positions stretching from Brunswick to Amboy. Acting on his own authority, Stephen decided to make a surprise attack on Piscataway, about midway between the extremes of the British line; the garrison consisted of the Highlanders of the Forty-second Foot (Black Watch) supported by six companies of light infantry. Stephen formed an 800-man strike force from detachments of the regiments in his division, but the British detected its approach and augmented the normal picket with another

300 men. The raiders collided with that outpost and a fight ensued which lasted about an hour and one-half until additional British troops arrived and forced Stephen's men to withdraw. Stephen reported that he had lost 3 killed and 24 wounded; he felt that the British had lost about 70 dead and another 120 wounded. British accounts claimed that they had lost one man wounded and estimated American casualties at 11 killed, 17 wounded, 33 captured, and an additional 73 missing. The truth is probably in between, as several Hessian accounts put the American casualties around 50 or 60 and the British put them closer to 30. Stephen filed his official report two days later, and Washington immediately rebuked him for exaggeration, citing contradictory reports he had received from other officers. While the skirmish itself had no military significance, it severely strained the "always uneasy relations" between the two generals (Ward, pp. 168–172).

SEE ALSO *Stephen, Adam*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

PITCAIRN, JOHN. (1722–1775). British officer. Born at Dysart, Scotland, the son of a minister, he was commissioned a lieutenant in the Royal Marines in 1746. He was promoted to captain on 8 June 1756 and to major on 19 April 1771. He commanded a battalion of four hundred marines sent to garrison Boston in November 1774. He had a reputation for piety as well as for being a tough but fair disciplinarian who was well liked by his men, living with them in barracks "to keep them from their pernicious rum" (ANB). General Thomas Gage appointed him to settle disputes between soldiers and civilians, in which role he earned the respect of the people of Boston.

Gage named him as second in command of the expedition to Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775. He led the advanced party of six light infantry companies onto Lexington Green in the early morning of the 19th, deployed his men when he saw Captain John Parker's minutemen in formation alongside the road to Concord, and lost control of the situation for several fateful minutes. When a shot rang out (or perhaps the sound was just the fizzle of powder exploding in pan of a flintlock), the light infantrymen fired into the minutemen, and although Pitcairn did his utmost to stop this unauthorized fire, eight Americans died. Pitcairn, a major of marines, was that day in command of

soldiers from six different infantry regiments. Neither Pitcairn nor the soldiers had trained or worked together before, and perhaps this unfamiliarity and lack of cohesion led the soldiers to disobey the major's positive order not to fire into the American ranks. The British marched on to Concord, but on the return to Boston they were almost engulfed by American militiamen firing from behind cover every step of the way. Pitcairn's horse, wounded at Lexington, finally threw him and ran into the American lines with a brace of his pistols on its saddle.

At the battle of Bunker Hill on 17 June 1775, Pitcairn commanded the marine battalion that was part of Robert Pigot's left wing demonstrating in front of the Breed's Hill redoubt. In the final assault, he led his men forward with the cry of, "Now for the glory of the marines." In one of the final volleys from the redoubt, his chest was crushed by a bullet said to have been fired by an African American, Peter Salem, an encounter that John Trumbull featured in the background of his painting, *The Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker's Hill*. Pitcairn was carried to a boat by his son, a marine lieutenant, but despite the efforts of Dr. Thomas Kast to stop the flow of blood, he died at Boston either later that day or early the next morning. He left eleven children. Ezra Stiles, Congregational minister at Newport and later president of Yale College, provided an appropriate epitaph when he wrote in his "Literary Diary" on 21 August 1775 that Pitcairn was "a good man in a bad cause."

SEE ALSO *Lexington and Concord*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

PITCAIRN'S PISTOLS. Major John Pitcairn of the Royal Marines led the advanced guard of the British raid on Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts, on 19 April 1775. His horse threw him during the action at Fiske Hill near Concord and bolted into the American lines, where the two silver-mounted Scottish pistols that he carried on his horse furniture were captured by an American militiaman. The pistols were acquired by Major General Israel Putnam, who carried them during the war. They are now in the Lexington Historical Society.

SEE ALSO *Pitcairn, John*.

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PITCHER, MOLLY SEE *Molly Pitcher Legend.*

PITT, WILLIAM (THE ELDER) SEE *Chatham, William Pitt, First Earl of.*

PITTSBURGH. Previously Fort Pitt. Located west of the Alleghenies at the point where the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers join to form the Ohio, the Forks of the Ohio—as the place was first known—was of key strategic importance as soon as white men started pushing into the Ohio Valley. In 1731 a few Frenchmen tried to establish a settlement but were soon driven off by the Shawnees. In 1748 the colonies of Pennsylvania and Virginia, both of which claimed the area, started trading activities that brought them into conflict with the French and led to the last of the colonial wars. In April 1754 a French force began construction of Fort Duquesne and subsequently defeated expeditions under Washington and Braddock to drive it out. The Forbes expedition forced the French to destroy Fort Duquesne, and Bouquet occupied the site on 25 November 1758 on behalf of the British, beginning reconstruction of the fortification under its new name of Fort Pitt.

In October 1772 General Gage ordered Fort Pitt abandoned, and it was partially dismantled. In January 1774 Dr. John Connolly occupied the place with an armed body of Virginia men to defy the Pennsylvania claim to the disputed region. But Connolly turned his attention to the local Indians, launching attacks that led to Dunmore's War in 1774. With the start of the Revolution, Virginia maintained Fort Pitt, using it as the headquarters for its western militia operations. But in 1777 increased attack from British, Indians, and Loyalists led Congress to claim control of the fort, appointing General Edward Hand its commander. During the rest of the Revolution, Pittsburgh was American army headquarters for western operations. Fort Pitt and West Point were the only military fortifications maintained by the U.S. Army after the Revolution.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; Connolly, John; Dunmore's (or Cresap's) War; Forbes's Expedition to Fort Duquesne; Western Operations.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

PLAINS OF ABRAHAM. 13 September 1759. On the night of 12–13 September 1759, forty-five

hundred British troops led by Major General James Wolfe landed in a cove on the north side of the St. Lawrence above Quebec City and managed to climb the bluff to a thousand-yard-wide, relatively level area about a mile from the western walls of the city. Wolfe's reckless plan put the bulk of the army that had invested Quebec since 28 June in an untenable position; it could not be resupplied, French light forces were closing on its rear; and the impregnable walls of the city were to its front. Wolfe was saved from disaster and ignominy by the even more foolish response of the French commander, the marquis de Montcalm, who unaccountably decided to accept Wolfe's offer of battle. The French fought valiantly, some approaching to as close as forty yards from the British line, which stood stock-still, reserving its fire until the French were close enough. When the British opened fire with rolling platoon volleys and in some cases with volleys by entire regiments, the French line shattered and the men fled to safety behind the walls of Quebec. Both Wolfe and Montcalm were mortally wounded. Wolfe's senior unwounded subordinate, Brigadier General George Townshend, called off the pursuit and set about besieging the city from the west. The French were so rattled that they capitulated without resistance on 18 September 1759.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; Wolfe, James.*

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PLAINS OF ABRAHAM. 28 April 1760. Brigadier General James Murray, who commanded the British garrison of Quebec City over the winter of 1759–1760, sought to stop a French force advancing from Montreal, under the chevalier de Levis, first at the village of Ste. Foy, six miles from Quebec (from which an alternate name of the ensuing battle is derived). Murray pulled back, however, to the Plains of Abraham about a mile from the city, roughly the same site on which James Wolfe had defeated the marquis de Montcalm on 13 September 1759. The Second Battle of Quebec was much more sanguinary than the first, and it resulted in a British defeat that left Murray penned up in Quebec. The British kept control of Quebec, and with it the base from which to launch the conquest of the remainder of New France, only because the first ship to make its way up the still ice-choked St. Lawrence that spring, on 12 May, was a British vessel, HMS *Vanguard*.

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PLAINS OF ABRAHAM. 15 November 1775. After completing his famous march from Boston across Maine to Quebec city, Benedict Arnold crossed the St. Lawrence with seven hundred men, climbed the bluffs west of Quebec City, and established himself roughly on the same piece of relatively flat ground where the British under James Wolfe had defeated the French under the marquis de Montcalm sixteen years earlier (13 September 1759). His attempt to bluff the Quebec garrison into surrender was unsuccessful.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Arnold's March to Quebec; Canada Invasion.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

PLAINS OF ABRAHAM. 6 May 1776. At the end of a long winter in which Quebec City was loosely besieged by American forces, Major General Guy Carleton sallied forth from the city with 900 men and 4 guns. Carleton's forces routed the remaining 250 disease-ridden American soldiers under Major General John Thomas.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion; Carleton, Guy; Thomas, John.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

POINT. Modern technical term for a patrol or reconnaissance party that precedes an advance guard or follows a rear guard.

Mark M. Boatner

POINT OF FORK, VIRGINIA. 5 June 1781. With the worn-out men of the Queen's Rangers and the remnants of the Seventy-first Foot, John Simcoe

moved from Cornwallis's camp on the North Anna to raid Friedrich von Steuben's main supply depot at Point of Fork. This place was where the Fluvanna and Rivanna joined to form the James River, about forty-five miles above Richmond. Steuben was located there with about four hundred of his Continental recruits. Learning of Simcoe's roundabout approach only at the last minute, the Americans were caught trying to evacuate the supplies across the Fluvanna. Simcoe skillfully entered Point of Fork with his one hundred cavalry, three hundred infantry, and one light three-pounder shortly before nightfall. Unable to pursue because he lacked boats, Simcoe knew that he had one major advantage over Steuben. Because the Americans lacked cavalry, they could not perform adequate reconnaissance. Simcoe deployed his troops along the river and lighted campfires to exaggerate his strength and make it appear that he was the advance of the entire British army. Deceived, Steuben abandoned the stores and marched his troops to safety during the night. The next morning Simcoe sent men across in canoes to destroy the supplies.

SEE ALSO *Cornwallis, Charles; Simcoe, John Graves; Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von; Virginia, Military Operations in.*

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Robert K. Wright Jr.

POLLOCK, OLIVER. (1737?–1823). Patriot supply agent. Ireland, Pennsylvania, New Orleans. Born at Donaghedy, Ireland, perhaps in 1737, Pollock emigrated with his father and brother in 1760, settling in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Becoming a West Indies trader, he moved to Havana in 1762 and then New Orleans in 1768, where his Catholicism aided positive relations with the Spanish authorities. When Captain George Gibson arrived on his mission to acquire munitions for Virginia in 1776, Pollock got the covert assistance of the Spanish government in sending Gibson back to Fort Pitt with almost ten thousand pounds of powder. Despite efforts of the British to stop him, Pollock furnished vital supplies for the western operations of George Rogers Clark. His friendship with Louisiana governor Bernardo de Gálvez proved of enormous value to the Americans, as did Pollock's personal generosity. By the end of 1777 he had sent seventy thousand dollars worth of supplies on his own credit, and when

this was exhausted in July 1779, he mortgaged personal property to raise one hundred thousand dollars and borrow another two hundred thousand. Having become commercial agent for Congress early in 1778, he procured goods from Spanish creditors for Washington's army. In 1779 he accompanied Gálvez in the capture of Manchac, Baton Rouge, and Natchez.

Although his postwar commercial ventures were highly successful, Congress and Virginia were slow in reimbursing him, and he spent eighteen months in custody for failure to satisfy his creditors. U.S. and state authorities eventually paid many of his claims, albeit thirty years after the Revolution ended. Pollock did not hold a grudge, serving from 1783 to 1785 as U.S. commercial representative in Havana and moving back to Carlisle in the 1790s. In 1805 he moved to Baltimore, where he headed up a successful business in the Caribbean trade. He died in Pinckneyville, Mississippi, on 17 December 1823.

SEE ALSO *Clark, George Rogers; Gibson, George; Western Operations.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

POMEROY, SETH. (1706–1777). Continental general. Massachusetts. Born on 20 May 1706, he was a member of a family long prominent in Northampton. Seth took up the family trade of gunsmithing and became a solid and prosperous local citizen. He was commissioned a militia ensign in 1743 and a captain the next year. In 1745 the Massachusetts assembly appointed him major of the Fourth Regiment in the Louisburg expedition, and he performed valuable service in repairing captured French cannon for use against the defenders. He spent the next three years as major of the troops defending the frontier in western Massachusetts. At the start of the French and Indian War, he was appointed lieutenant colonel of Colonel Ephraim Williams's regiment of provincial troops from western Massachusetts that was raised for William Johnson's attack on Crown Point. After Williams was killed in the Bloody Morning Scout, he led the regiment in the heaviest fighting of the Battle of Lake George in New York on 8 September

1755 and, according to legend, captured Baron Dieskau, the French commander.

Not interested in local politics but considered by his neighbors to be a firm supporter of American rights, in 1774 he sat on the Northampton committee of safety and represented the town in the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, which appointed him a brigadier general of militia in October 1774. With Artemas Ward and Jedidiah Preble, he was responsible for preparing the militia for the day that resistance to increased imperial control led to war. His principal service was in helping to raise and train soldiers in western Massachusetts in 1775 and 1776. The sixty-nine-year-old veteran rode from Northampton to Cambridge in a single day to participate in the Battle of Bunker Hill on 17 June 1775. Carrying the musket he himself had made and had used at Louisburg thirty years earlier, he rode to Charlestown Neck on a borrowed horse, turned it over to a sentry so as not to expose it to enemy fire, and walked to the rail fence, where his presence helped to steady the younger men. In the action that followed, Pomeroy fought as a volunteer, had the stock of his musket shattered by an enemy ball, and "still facing the enemy," withdrew with the forces of Thomas Knowlton and John Stark at the end of the day (Ward, 1, p. 95).

The Provincial Congress named him a major general of militia on 20 June 1775, and the Continental Congress appointed him its first-ranking brigadier general on 22 June 1775, but he declined the latter appointment on 19 July and was superseded by John Thomas. On 19 February 1777, he died of pleurisy at Peekskill while on his way to join Washington's army in New Jersey. Few personal details are known about the man whom legend describes as a tall, lean, and intrepid soldier.

SEE ALSO *Thomas, John.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

PONTCHARTRAIN. A French fort at Detroit and a lake in Louisiana, they were named for the minister of the navy of Louis XIV.

Mark M. Boatner

PONTIAC'S WAR. 1763–1766. The surrender of Canada to General Jeffrey Amherst (8 September 1760) gave the British title to the French posts in the territory known as the Old Northwest. Major Robert Rogers led a party to take possession of Detroit on 29 November 1760, and other scattered forts were subsequently garrisoned by small detachments of regulars, most of them from the Sixtieth (“Royal American”) Regiment. In addition to these forts, thousands of Native Americans now fell under British claims to jurisdiction.

DETERIORATING BRITISH–NATIVE AMERICAN RELATIONS

Unlike the French, the British demonstrated a notable lack of sensitivity to their new subjects. Most importantly, the British government did nothing to halt the migration of their white subjects onto Indian lands in the Ohio River Valley. The Ottawa war leader Pontiac (c. 1720–1769) found many Indian nations receptive to his charge that the English intended to conquer their territories, as evidenced by the large number of British forts in these areas. Further exacerbating the situation, Amherst put a halt to the traditional annual distribution of gifts (clothing, arms and ammunition, food, and iron goods) to the Indians.

Captain Donald Campbell, commandant at Detroit, and Indian Superintendent Sir William Johnson initially managed to keep the peace, but Pontiac found a valuable ally in a visionary called the Delaware Prophet, who preached that the Indians should seek regeneration by eliminating the corrupting influence of the white man and his accompanying vices. Combining the Prophet's millennial teachings with the very real threat of English encroachments on their hereditary lands, Pontiac succeeded by early 1763 in forging a broad coalition of Indian nations that included the Ojibwa, Huron, Potawatomi, Seneca, and his own Ottawa.

From his base in three towns near Detroit, Pontiac launched the initial attack against the 120-man garrison at Fort Detroit, now commanded by Major Henry Gladwin. Gladwin correctly anticipated an assault, frustrating several attempts by Pontiac to take the fort by stealth in early May 1763. On 9 May the Ottawa attacked isolated settlers outside Fort Detroit and laid siege to the garrison. Within a few weeks other war parties took every fort west of Niagara except Detroit and Pitt. Sandusky (Ohio) fell on 16 May, followed by Fort St. Joseph on 25 May, Fort Miami on 27 May; Fort Ouiatenon on 1 June, and Fort Michilimackinac on the next day. Seeing British defenses collapsing, the commander of Fort Edward Augustus abandoned his post in mid June. Between 16 and 20 May, Forts Venango, Le Boeuf, and Presque Isle (Erie) also fell, with only the garrison at Le Boeuf successfully escaping to Fort Pitt.

The garrisons of most of these posts were slaughtered. Forts Ligonier and Bedford, along the Forbes Road east of Fort Pitt, repelled Indian attacks in June. The largest and most well coordinated Indian victory came at Devil's Hole near Niagara on 14 September, when a force of 300 Seneca ambushed a convoy of twenty-five wagons bound for Detroit, killing all but two of the thirty-one soldiers in its escort. The sounds of battle drew eighty regulars from Fort Niagara into a second ambush, which left fifty-one dead. By the time the rest of the fort's garrison arrived, the Seneca had departed with all the supplies, and the British had suffered their greatest defeat of the war.

The year 1763 is commonly taken as the start of the Revolutionary era, and many scholars hold that the weakness of Amherst's response to Pontiac's uprising may have misled many colonists into believing that there was little reality behind the boasts of British military might. Amherst saw matters very differently. He expected the colonists to play an active role in resisting this war on their frontier. But the settlers whose presence in the west had precipitated this conflict fled to the safety of the east, leaving Amherst with only a few absurdly weak garrisons—Fort Ligonier, for instance, was held by just twelve soldiers. Further limiting Amherst's options was the refusal of most of the colonies to offer any assistance. Then Amherst made the mistake of turning first for help to Pennsylvania, a province which did not have a militia. With time, Amherst was able to find just enough troops to battle Pontiac to a draw. British success hinged on their holding on to Forts Detroit and Pitt. Lacking artillery, Pontiac's only hope for capturing these outposts lay in breaking their lines of supply and starving their garrisons.

SIEGE OF DETROIT

Lieutenant Abraham Cuyler of the Queen's Rangers had left Niagara on 13 May with ninety-six men and 139 barrels of provisions in ten bateaux, bound for Detroit. Unaware that hostilities had broken out, he landed at Point Pelee, about twenty-five miles from Detroit, after dark on 28 May, being immediately attacked by Pontiac's forces. Cuyler escaped back to Niagara with only forty of his men. Cuyler returned on 30 June aboard the sloop *Michigan* with a reinforcement of fifty-five men and a quantity of supplies. Amherst sent his aide-de-camp, Captain James Dalyell, from headquarters in New York City via Albany and Niagara to collect reinforcements for Gladwin's garrison. Robert Rogers and twenty-one New York militia joined him at Albany, and he reached Niagara on 6 July with 200 men from the Fifty-fifth and Sixtieth Regiments. Picking up forty men of the eightieth Regiment at Niagara, Dalyell loaded his force in twenty-two bateaux and made the hazardous voyage to Detroit, arriving on 29 July with 260 men.

Against his better judgment, Gladwin acceded to the ambitious young aide's insistent demand that he be permitted to lead a sortie. Pontiac expected such action, and was waiting in ambush at the point where a narrow timber bridge crossed a creek two miles from the fort. At 2:30 on the morning of 31 July, 247 officers and men moved out from the fort. By 8 o'clock the survivors got back, owing largely to the rearguard action of Rogers and the sound leadership of Captain James Grant. Dalyell and 19 of his men were killed, and another thirty-seven were wounded at what became known as Bloody Run.

Pontiac's situation had been impossible from the start. Without supplies and matériel for siege operations, Pontiac was unable to properly besiege Detroit, which kept open its line of communications by water to Niagara. By September, Pontiac's allies began to melt away, frustrated by the stalemate which left them hungrier than the troops inside the fort. On 29 October Pontiac received official word from the French commander at Fort de Chartres of the Peace of Paris, in which France officially handed over the northwest to the British. On 31 October 1763 Pontiac wrote Gladwin a note of farewell and left the area with his remaining followers.

FORT PITT HOLDS OUT

Fort Pitt was commanded by the Swiss Captain Simeon Ecuyer, who bears the dubious distinction of carrying out General Amherst's grotesque suggestion that he employ biological warfare against the Indians. To indicate that his position was well supplied, Ecuyer provided the besieging Indians not only with food and alcohol, but also with blankets contaminated with small pox. With a garrison of 250 regulars and militia, sixteen cannon, and a well-fortified position, Ecuyer was not alarmed about the security of his post. By the end of June Colonel Henry Bouquet, who called Indians "vermin," had assembled a relief column of 460 regulars at Carlisle—214 men of the Forty-second ("Black Watch"), 133 of the Seventy-seventh Highlanders, a battalion of the Sixtieth ("Royal Americans"), and a party of rangers. His departure was delayed until 18 July because of difficulty finding wagons willing to ride into the middle of a war zone.

By 2 August Bouquet had reached Fort Ligonier, having been forced to drop off regulars along the way to protect the panic-stricken settlers. He then pushed forward without his wagons but with 340 horses loaded with flour toward the fort from which no news had been heard for over a month. A parley with Delaware and Shawnee chiefs was held on 26 July, for which Ecuyer refused to leave Fort Pitt. The Indians launched an attack on the following day, but then abruptly lifted their siege on 1 August. Ecuyer, who had been wounded by an arrow, knew that they were going to attack Bouquet.

At 1 P.M. on 5 August 1763, Bouquet's advance guard was suddenly attacked at Edge Hill, twenty-six miles east of Fort Pitt, in what is known as the battle of Bushy Run. The regulars, who had already marched seventeen miles that day, attacked with bayonets to relieve the advance guard, but the Delaware, Shawnee, Mingo, and Wyandot worked their way around Bouquet and kept up a galling fire until dark (around 8 P.M.). Bouquet formed his forces onto a little hill behind stacked bags of flour for the night. Several officers and about 60 men had already been killed or wounded, the troops were tired from the long march and the seven-hour battle, and they suffered severely from lack of water.

The Indians renewed their attack at first light, but since victory was almost inevitable they confined their efforts to sniping. The regulars held their position, but time was against them. At 10 A.M. the British began to weaken from sheer exhaustion, the Indians saw men withdrawing from a portion of the perimeter, and they rushed toward this gap. Bouquet had resorted to a desperate stratagem, having pulled two companies from the west side of the line and sent them around to a point from which they could counterattack the south flank of the expected penetration. The Indians met this surprise fire bravely, but retreated when the regulars charged with bayonets. Then the Indians were again surprised, as Bouquet had advanced two more companies to the area of the expected Indian retreat, and their bayonet charge shattered the Indian forces, who fled in disorder.

Bushy Run proved a bloody battle, as Bouquet lost fifty killed and sixty wounded, with Indian losses estimated at sixty killed, including the able Delaware war chief, Wolf. With a fourth of his force killed or wounded, Bouquet limped into Fort Pitt on 10 August, unable to press the attack against the demoralized Indians, but having nonetheless won a significant victory.

LATER EXPEDITIONS AGAINST PONTIAC

Before he was recalled to England, Amherst had planned two expeditions against Pontiac's coalition: one from Niagara to Detroit and then south from Lake Erie against the Delaware and Shawnee in what now is central Ohio; the other to penetrate into this same area from Pittsburgh. Amherst's successor, General Thomas Gage, carried out these plans. The first of these operations, John Bradstreet's expedition of 1764, was badly mismanaged, but the other, Bouquet's expedition of 1764, was a complete success. Pontiac finally submitted to Sir William Johnson at Oswego on 24 July 1766, and was thereafter loyal to the British. On 20 April 1769 he was assassinated by a Peoria in Cahokia, Illinois.

As Ian Steele summarized, it produced "an unprecedented balance of power." The war "had become a

stalemate, and the peace was an accommodation” (Steele, p. 246). The Indians had learned that they could not take the major British outposts, and that their lack of materials crippled any sustained military effort. The British, for their part, felt that allowing unhindered access to the northwest by their colonists at this time was not worth the high cost of defeating the Indians. They therefore returned to the practice of giving annual gifts to the those Indian nations that remained on friendly terms and promised to uphold the Proclamation of 1763, which sought to halt this westward migration. Although the war ended as a major success for the Native Americans, it was a victory that stood only until the creation of the United States, ten years later.

SEE ALSO *Biological Warfare; Bushy Run, Pennsylvania; Indians in the Colonial Wars and in the American Revolution; Proclamation of 1763.*

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Michael Bellesiles

POOR, ENOCH. (1736–1780). Continental general. Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Great-grandson of an English immigrant who settled at Newbury, Massachusetts, he was reared on the family farm in North Andover, Massachusetts, had little education, and was apprenticed to a cabinetmaker. In 1755 he took part in Colonel John Winslow’s expedition to Acadia. Around 1760 he moved to Exeter, New Hampshire, where he established himself as a merchant and shipbuilder. After holding various public offices and being elected to sit in two of New Hampshire’s provincial congresses, on 24 May 1775 he was named colonel of the Second New Hampshire Regiment. His regiment’s first mission was to build fire rafts to protect Exeter and to work on coastal defenses. Poor then led his force to the Boston lines, moved to New York City in the spring of 1776, and was later sent to strengthen the forces withdrawing up Lake Champlain. In the council of war on 5 July 1776, he argued against the abandonment of Crown Point and organized a protest by twenty-one field grade officers (including John Stark and William Maxwell) to Washington when Schuyler wisely decided the place was untenable. He was president of the court-martial that acquitted Moses Hazen and ordered the arrest of Benedict Arnold. In December 1776 he went south to join Washington’s army for operations at Trenton and

Princeton, and on 21 February 1777 he was promoted to brigadier general. Although his record had been as good as many others promoted to general officer rank, he owed his advancement partly to a factional dispute brought about through Colonel John Stark’s abrupt departure from command due to what he thought was Congress’s inept process of promotion.

After the perplexing British movements that preceded the Philadelphia campaign, his brigade and Varnum’s were detached to Peekskill. Poor subsequently took part in the operations at Ticonderoga on 5 July 1777. His brigade of eight hundred men moved forward on the American right to open the Second Battle of Saratoga on 7 October 1777, and the men performed well. He then rejoined Washington for winter quarters at Valley Forge and had a prominent part in the action at Barren Hill on 20 May 1778. As part of Charles Lee’s command, he marched with the first troops to leave Valley Forge for the Monmouth campaign, and he led one of the final movements of the battle of 28 June.

During the winter of 1779–1780, his brigade was posted at Danbury, Connecticut. Ordered to join Sullivan’s expedition against the Iroquois, his troops figured prominently in the Battle at Newtown, New York, on 29 August 1779, which was the only major action of the campaign. In 1780 his brigade was incorporated into Lafayette’s Light Infantry Division. He died 8 September 1780 at Paramus, New Jersey, of typhus (then called putrid fever).

SEE ALSO *Barren Hill, Pennsylvania; Monmouth, New Jersey; Newtown, New York.*

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revised by Frank C. Mevers

POPULATIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA. In 1775 the British had an estimated 8,000,000 people; 2,350,000 of these could be considered the military manpower of the nation. However, the standard calculation for the eighteenth century is that one-tenth of the total population constituted

Population of the United States						
State	1775			1790		
	White	Black	(est.) Total	White	Black	Total
Connecticut	198,076	5,279	203,355	232,374	5,572	237,946
Delaware	39,550	2,157	41,707	46,310	12,786	59,096
Georgia	14,981	12,484	27,465	52,886	29,662	82,548
Kentucky				61,133	12,544	73,677
Maine*	45,625	471	46,096	96,002	538	96,540
Maryland	134,844	65,856	200,700	208,649	111,079	319,728
Massachusetts	276,125	4,595	280,720	373,324	5,463	378,787
New Hampshire	80,644	656	81,300	141,097	788	141,885
New Jersey	125,781	9,032	134,813	169,954	14,185	184,139
New York	163,560	22,656	186,216	314,142	25,978	340,120
North Carolina	149,930	81,780	231,710	288,204	105,547	393,751
Pennsylvania	275,397	6,769	282,166	424,099	10,274	434,373
Rhode Island	56,366	3,796	60,162	64,470	4,355	68,825
South Carolina	57,652	88,334	145,986	140,178	108,895	249,073
Tennessee	940	235	1,175	31,913	3,778	35,691
Vermont	17,331	53	17,384	85,154	271	85,425
Virginia	304,807	220,435	525,242	391,524	300,213	691,737
TOTAL	1,941,609	524,588	2,466,197	3,172,006	757,208	3,929,214

*Part of Massachusetts until 1821.

SOURCES: Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970* (CD-ROM; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 2: 1168–71; United States Census Office, *Return of the Whole Number of Persons within the Several Districts of the United States* (Philadelphia: Childs and Swaine, 1791); R.C. Simmons, *The American Colonies: From Settlement to Independence* (New York, 1976), 175–77; Michael A. Bellesiles, *Revolutionary Outlaws: Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence on the Early American Frontier* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993) 280–83.

THE GALE GROUP

the potential arms-bearing population. Realistically, then, Britain had some 800,000 young men who were eligible for military service. Complaining of his difficulties in mobilizing an army for the Revolutionary War, Lord Shelburne commented that whereas 300,000 Englishmen entered the armies in the Seven Years' War, only 30,000 men, including German troops, could be raised to put down the American rebellion.

Since the first census was not until 1790, it is difficult to be certain about the population of the American colonies. The standard current estimate is that approximately 2,500,000 people lived in the thirteen colonies in 1775 (excluding Indians), of whom 460,000 were slaves. (Estimates for 1775 are based on censuses taken in some of the colonies during the Revolutionary period and projections derived from the degree of population growth discernable in these years, roughly 3.5 percent per year between 1760 and 1790.) Excluding the slaves, whom Congress initially did not allow to serve in the Continental army, the colonies could expect to draw upon some 200,000 men.

It is impossible to know what percentage of the population supported independence or how many remained loyal to the crown. Political allegiances could shift over time for any number of reasons, such as slaves being

offered their freedom for joining the British. There were also dramatically different levels of commitment to politics. It seems most probable that the majority of Americans remained neutral throughout the Revolution. Given the size of the contending military forces, it appears obvious that most Americans gave only lip service to one side or the other. It is even difficult to determine the number of Loyalists who went into exile after the war, with estimates running from 85,000 to 200,000.

Approximate populations of major American cities in 1776 were: Philadelphia, 38,000; New York City, 25,000; Boston, 16,000; Charleston, 12,000; and Newport, 11,000. Although London's population of 750,000 dwarfed Philadelphia's, the Quaker City outranked Bristol and Dublin as the third largest city of the British empire—Edinburgh was second, having some 40,000 people.

The Native American population remains subject to speculation. Estimates of the number living east of the Mississippi River run between twenty-five thousand and one hundred thousand.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

PORT ROYAL ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA, SEE *Beaufort South Carolina*.

PORT'S FERRY, PEE DEE RIVER, SOUTH CAROLINA. Benjamin Port's ferry was an important river crossing and Francis Marion campsite near Snow's Island. Marion built a redoubt on the east bank in September 1780. Colonel Henry Lee also camped there in January 1781. The crossing is about three miles below the modern U.S. Highway 378 bridge.

SEE ALSO *Marion, Francis*.

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revised by Steven D. Smith

POUNDRIDGE, NEW YORK. 2 July 1779. As part of the intense skirmishing for control of the Neutral Ground, after dark on 1 July, Sir Henry Clinton sent Banastre Tarleton with two hundred men toward this place, twenty miles northeast of White Plains. Tarleton's command included seventy regulars from the Seventeenth Light Dragoons, detachments of John Simcoe's Queen's Rangers and his own British Legion, and a detail of mounted jägers. His target was being used as a base for Westchester County militia, stiffened by part of Colonel Elisha Sheldon's Second Continental Light Dragoons. When his guide briefly took a wrong road, Sheldon's videttes spotted the British. Tarleton launched a charge that pushed Sheldon back two miles from the village before reaction forces began pouring in and he had to withdraw, completing a sixty-four-mile round trip in twenty-three hours. The raiders burned several buildings, including the church, to retaliate for snipers, and carried away a flag that had been found with some officers'

baggage. Although he claimed to have inflicted twenty-six or twenty-seven casualties, the Americans actually lost ten wounded and eight missing in action; Tarleton admitted having one man killed and one wounded. He gloated over the raid, but like most such actions in the area, it was inconclusive.

SEE ALSO *Clinton, Henry; Simcoe, John Graves; Tarleton, Banastre*.

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

POWDER ALARM (CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS). 1 September 1774. As defiance of imperial regulation in Boston became more ominous, Major General Thomas Gage, British commander in chief in North America, decided on a risky move. Through the summer of 1774, agents and supporters of royal government had given him detailed information about the cannon, powder, and other military stores the radicals were collecting and hiding in Cambridge. On 27 August the town of Medford removed from the provincial powder house on Quarry Hill in Charlestown the last of the gunpowder belonging to the towns. All that remained were the 250 half-barrels of powder that belonged to the province and were thus legally under the control of Gage. Believing that keeping the gunpowder out of the hands of the radicals outweighed the risk of inflaming his opponents, he ordered the powder removed to Castle William in Boston Harbor. Before 5 A.M. on the morning of 1 September 1774, about 250 regulars embarked in thirteen longboats from Royal Navy ships in the harbor and were rowed up the Mystic River to the Ten Hills area of Charlestown, where they debarked and marched overland about a mile to the powder house. A detachment continued on to Cambridge, where the soldiers borrowed horses from a tavern keeper and confiscated two small field guns recently procured by the town militia. Both British forces accomplished their mission efficiently and without violence. By noon the munitions had arrived safely at Castle William.

The countryside was inflamed by reports that the redcoats had sallied forth in large numbers. As the news spread (by midnight it was known forty miles away in Shrewsbury), rumors embellished it: the citizens of Cambridge had resisted, the troops had fired, and six Patriots were dead. The Boston garrison was marching out in force! By the morning of 2 September, four thousand armed men had crowded into Cambridge, and more were coming. Word reached Israel Putnam at Pomfret, Connecticut, on 3 September that British ships had bombarded Boston and that as many as thirty thousand militia were moving toward Cambridge. The first Continental

Congress, meeting at Philadelphia, learned of the “dreadful catastrophe” on 6 September (Smith, p. 49). According to John Adams, Congress “received by an express an intimation of the bombardment of Boston, a confused account, but an alarming one indeed” (Smith, p. 27). The effect was electric, and helped at a significant moment to strengthen the resolve of those delegates who refused to submit to an imperial government willing to use armed force in this manner. Two days later, after Adams had learned that “no blood had been spilled,” he wrote to his wife that “every gentleman seems to regard the bombardment of Boston as the bombardment of the capital of his own province. Our deliberations are grave and serious indeed” (Smith, p. 49).

The excitement died down as the rumors were proved to be false, but the episode had been an impressive demonstration of how ready the radicals were to touch off the powder keg. On 5 September Gage ordered the erection of defensive works on Boston Neck, an understandable military precaution but one that again alarmed the countryside and gave the radicals more evidence of imperial tyranny with which to bolster their calls for resistance. The delegates to the Continental Congress began to worry less about their differences and more about the task ahead.

SEE ALSO *Adams, John; Continental Congress; Gage, Thomas.*

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POWLES HOOK, NEW JERSEY SEE *Paulus Hook, New Jersey.*

POWNALL, THOMAS. (1722–1805). Colonial governor. Born on 4 September 1722 and educated at Lincoln and Trinity College (Cambridge), after 1743 Thomas Pownall entered the office of the Board of

Trade, where his brother was secretary. He accompanied Sir Danvers Osborn to New York as the new governor's secretary and remained after Osborn committed suicide in October 1753. In May 1755 he was appointed lieutenant governor of New Jersey and began a lifelong friendship with Benjamin Franklin. Attending the Albany Conference as an observer, he presented a memorandum on the importance of the Great Lakes to British control of the continent. He returned to England early in 1756, where he presented a paper stressing the need for unity of command in America and urging the need to gain control of Lake Ontario. Pownall accompanied Lord Loudoun, the new commander in chief, to America as his secretary, but he returned to London in October 1756 to present Loudoun's case against William Shirley. William Pitt was so impressed by the ambitious, knowledgeable student of colonial affairs that he appointed Pownall to succeed Shirley as governor of Massachusetts.

The thirty-five-year-old governor reached Boston on 3 August 1757. Reacting promptly to a desperate call from Major General Daniel Webb for reinforcements in the Hudson River-Lake Champlain corridor, he called out the militia without waiting to get the assembly's approval, but the troops were too late to prevent the surrender of Fort William Henry on 9 August. For the three years of his administration, he promoted the participation of Massachusetts in the French and Indian War, but he alienated the friends of Shirley, antagonized such crown supporters as Thomas Hutchinson, and clashed with Loudoun over the war powers claimed by the military. His only military exploit was as leader of the expedition to build a fort on the Penobscot River in Maine in May 1759.

The Board of Trade ordered him to South Carolina as governor in November 1759, but he resigned without assuming office. In the summer of 1761 he became commissary general to the Anglo-Hanoverian army on the Rhine, a post he held until the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763. In 1764, he published his famous *Administration of the Colonies*, in which he argued for greater centralization of colonial administration. It ran to five editions, the last in 1777.

In 1767 he was elected to Parliament and supported North's measures against the colonies. He opposed Burke's bill for conciliation but introduced a peace bill on 24 May 1780 when he realized that the war was lost. In the summer of 1781 he declined to run again for Parliament and spent the rest of his life in travel and writing. He died at Bath, England, on 25 February 1805.

SEE ALSO *Chatham, William Pitt, First Earl of; Fort William Henry (Fort George), New York; Unity of Command.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

POWOW. Derived from Indian words for a priest, wizard, or magician, the term “powow” (or “powwow”) came to mean “the noisy festivities preceding a council, expedition, or hunt; or a council or parley” (*Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico*, “Powow”).

SEE ALSO *Parley*.

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PRESBYTERIANS. While most Christian groups in America supported the War for Independence, Presbyterians were distinctive with respect to the extent and intensity of their enthusiasm for revolution. The denomination contained comparatively few Loyalists, the great exception being Scottish merchants, British officials, and Scottish Highlanders resident in the colonies, who tended to maintain their allegiance to the crown throughout the war. The denomination also contained few neutrals, especially after the war got under way, and fewer pacifists. Rather, the great majority of Presbyterians were Patriots, who in terms of the depth of support for and breadth of participation in the war had no rivals among the other major denominations, with the possible exception of the New England Congregationalists. Historians have frequently commented on the Presbyterian penchant for patriotism and, like Leonard Trinterud, author of *The Forming of an American Tradition* (1949), have wondered whether there wasn't “something inherent in Presbyterianism that made the cause of colonial independence congenial to it” (pp. 251–252).

SOURCES OF PRESBYTERIAN PATRIOTISM

American Presbyterian patriotism flowed from three initially separate streams of Reformed Protestant dissenting thought and behavior, each of which was intrinsic to the denomination's rise to religious and political prominence in the colonies. First, colonial Presbyterianism was founded on principles of English Puritan religious dissent,

revived by second and third generations of New Englanders embroiled in ecclesiastical conflict with the leaders of the Congregational way. Proclaiming the freedom to leave New England and to create their own churches, the dissenters formed in the Middle Atlantic region the first Presbyterian communities in America.

A second stream of dissent was Scotch-Irish Presbyterianism. Over 100,000 Presbyterians migrated from Northern Ireland to the colonies in the period from 1717 to 1776, populating principally the mid-Atlantic colonies of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and adding greatly to the strength of Presbyterianism there. Having faced and resisted English religious and political persecution for many decades, the Ulsterites added to the church strong traditions of dissent that easily overlapped with and, in turn, deepened those inherited from British and early New England Puritans.

A third stream was the Great Awakening, an inter-colonial religious revival sparked by the transatlantic evangelical ministry of George Whitefield, an English divine. Evangelizing the mid-Atlantic and southern frontiers during the 1740s and 1750s, Presbyterian revivalists helped convert frontier settlers, often of Scotch-Irish extraction, to New Light ideals of personal piety and individual conscience that rejected inherited authority and doctrinal traditions. In the period after the Great Awakening, the New Light converged with the other two dissenting streams of the denomination.

Puritan evangelism, religious revivalism, and Scots-Irish immigration together turned Presbyterianism into the second largest and the fastest growing denomination in America (as recently as 1700 it had been among the smallest). In the midst of this dramatic surge in membership, colonial Presbyterians succeeded in building a unified national Church, one based on a network of synods, presbyteries, and sessions, and on an American identity separate from the Ulster and Scotch Presbyterian churches. This identity contained radical political as well as religious elements. New principles of political dissent, introduced to Americans through the writings of English liberals such as John Locke, intermingled with traditions of Puritan, Scots-Irish, and New Light dissent. Initially, early modern English political science was considered a godless set of ideas, highly antagonist to Christian doctrine and theology. But during the Anglo-French wars of the 1740s and 1750s, Presbyterian ministers, among others, were found mixing political with religious dissent in diatribes denouncing “papalist” and “monarchist” French threats to American freedoms. When the crisis with England erupted, Presbyterians, redirecting their diatribes against their own mother country, lost much of their earlier reluctance to combine liberalism and Christian dissent, however increasingly volatile the compound. Presbyterians became widely known as uniquely patriotic, as is indicated

by the many contemporary comments on the war as a “Presbyterian War.”

PRESBYTERIANS IN REVOLUTION AND WAR

The war years led Presbyterians to fully embrace republican ideals and to complete the process of synthesizing them with Christian theology. The Presbyterians were not alone in effecting this merger, however. Other American denominations, especially the Congregationalists, helped to create a truly unique blend of republican and Christian convictions, the likes of which the world had never seen. Although Presbyterians never adopted a formal position on the conflict, it came close to doing so in May 1775 when, in response to Lexington and Concord, the synod of New York and Philadelphia issued a pastoral letter to the membership seeking to explain the nature of the crisis. This and other documents, including war sermons delivered by Presbyterian ministers and radical statements issued by the local laity, reveal a generally unified liberal-Presbyterian rationale for war and revolution.

Presbyterians saw themselves, first and foremost, as Christians, which meant that they were conscience-bound to support the Christian gospel of peace. As Christians they had consistently prayed for reconciliation with Britain throughout the crisis. They also had hesitated to criticize the king and his Parliament, and had sought to restrain the passions of the masses. But Britain had refused reconciliation, and had begun to commit atrocities against the colonists. By 1775 Presbyterians believed their backs were against the wall, and by 1776 they were convinced they had no recourse but to go to war against the mother country.

To Presbyterians this was thus a just war, a point that both Christian and liberal dissenting ideals could be used to defend. Christians, who professed to be lovers of peace, nevertheless had a duty to resist tyranny, even if the tyrant were a Christian king. In the face of tyranny, non-resistance or even passive resistance were not viable options. Once convinced of the the tyranny of the king, Presbyterians had a God-given responsibility to resist, even if that meant loss of limb or life. As an American battle flag proclaimed, “RESISTANCE TO TYRANTS IS OBEDIENCE TO GOD.”

Presbyterians freely inserted liberal ideals into war sermons to strengthen the “just war” defense, borrowing freely from the ideas of Locke, among others. Political power had bounds and limits that rulers could not breach without threatening the natural rights and liberties of the people set by the laws of God and of reason. Britain had exceeded these bounds and, therefore, the people had the right to resist and to establish a new government, more attentive to their needs and happiness. Abraham Ketteltas, a Pennsylvania Presbyterian minister, put succinctly the

multiple Christian and liberal justifications for war: “The cause of this American Continent, against the measures of a cruel, bloody, and vindictive ministry, is the cause of God. We are contending for the rights of mankind.”

In addition to a “just war” defense, liberal and Christian ideals were brought together to prepare Presbyterians for the urgent yet fearful task of waging war against the world’s mightiest military power. Such times called for civic virtue, the sacrifice of self for country, as well as Christian courage and fortitude. The New Light movement’s stress on religious conversion was used to assuage rising Presbyterian anxieties regarding the war. Within the New Light movement, the main argument was that conversion, by giving believers assurance of salvation, provided the perfect antidote to fear of death, and thus the perfect source of Christian courage. Presbyterians also stressed the centrality of conversion to the achievement of success on the field of battle: “There is no soldier so undaunted as the pious man, no army so formidable as those who are superior to the fear of death” (quoted in Trinterud, p. 247).

Furthermore, Presbyterians argued that Christian piety and liberal ideals had to be mutually reinforcing if the republican revolution were to succeed. The Continental Congress could not achieve the democratic goals of the revolution unless it had the respect and support of all the people. Presbyterians could ensure political solidarity by working to unite Christians behind the new republic. By exercising Christian charity towards all religious denominations in America, Presbyterians could lay the groundwork for Christian, and hence republican, union.

Finally, Presbyterians saw religious and civil liberty as formerly antagonistic, but now necessary allies in the revolutionary struggle. There was “no example in history,” the Synod of May 1775 observed, “in which civil liberty was destroyed, and the rights of conscience preserved entire” (Trinterud, p. 248). As John Witherspoon, president of the Presbyterian College of New Jersey, put it, “our civil and religious liberties, and consequently in a great measure the temporal and eternal happiness of us and our posterity, depended on the issue” of the war.

Historians have argued that the Christian use of republican language may have been determinative in drawing believers into the war and revolution. Certainly, Presbyterians helped lead the ideological campaign against Britain, and contributed a disproportionate number of people to the conflict. A particularly striking instance of this comes from the records of the College of New Jersey, now Princeton University. The college contributed so many leaders to the war and revolution that it became known as a “seminar of sedition” or “the Cradle of Liberty.” Of 279 students who matriculated between 1746 and 1768 and were still alive in 1775, 94 saw some kind of service in the military, while only 8 became Loyalists. In addition, of the 178 students who studied under President Witherspoon in

the period 1769–1775, 105 became important state or national officials, while a mere two became Royalists. By comparison, as many as 50 percent and 22 percent of King's College and Yale College students, respectively, whose political allegiance is known, were Loyalists.

IMPACT OF REVOLUTION ON PRESBYTERIANISM

Because of the political and religious changes wrought by war and revolution, Presbyterians saw a new ecclesiastical world arising once the smoke of battle had cleared. More than anything else, the disestablishment of the Anglican Church and the promotion of religious equality presented the Presbyterian Church with new challenges. Faced with rising competition for adherents from new denominations, especially the Methodists and the Baptists, Presbyterians responded by rejecting the idea of a state church and pushing the idea of the liberal arts school as the chief instrument of Presbyterian proselytism. In tune with the great ideological synthesis of 1776, they argued that a Liberal education would strengthen the church as well as the new republic, for knowledge of the world was a prerequisite for virtuous citizenship.

In the process of rushing to establish academies and colleges in the post-Revolution period, Presbyterians created what amounted to an educational empire. Because of their unique stress on higher education, Presbyterians acquired a distinctive denominational identity, which could be used for evangelical purposes in a world now marked by religious competition. Gone were the days of working for Christian union; Presbyterianism during the nineteenth century became a denomination devoted more to spreading distinctive modes of piety than to elaborating principles of American patriotism.

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Gerald F. Moran

PRESCOTT, OLIVER. (1731–1804). Physician and militia general. Massachusetts. Born on 27 April 1731, the son of Benjamin and Abigail Oliver Prescott and younger brother of William Prescott, he was graduated from Harvard College in 1750 and built a successful medical practice in Groton, his birthplace. He was chairman of the town committee that protested the Stamp Act in 1765 and clerk of the town's committee of correspondence in 1774. He served in the militia before the Revolution, became brigadier general of the Middlesex County militia when the war started, and was promoted to second major general of the state militia in 1778. During the Boston siege, he was charged with setting up checkpoints to stop communication between the British garrison and pro-British sympathizers in the countryside. He held a number of important civil posts, helping to enforce the Association of 1774, serving on the Massachusetts supreme executive council from 1777 to 1780, sitting as judge of probate for Middlesex County from 1779 until his death, and playing a vital role in establishing Groton Academy. During Shays's Rebellion, he was active in recruiting and the dispatch of intelligence to the state authorities. Over six feet tall, inclined to being overweight, deaf in his later years, courtly in manner, he was a kindly and popular man. He died at Groton on 17 November 1804.

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege; Prescott, William.*

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PRESCOTT, RICHARD. (1725–1788). British general. Born in England in 1725, Prescott became a major in the Thirty-third Foot on 20 December 1756 and a lieutenant colonel of the Fiftieth Foot in May 1762, serving in Germany during the Seven Years' War. In 1773 he was brevetted colonel of the Seventh Foot and ordered to Canada, where his notorious abuse of the captured

Ethan Allen was followed by his own capture on 17 November 1775 when he failed in an attempt to escape from Montreal to Quebec. Holding the local rank of brigadier general, Prescott was exchanged for General John Sullivan in September 1776. In November 1776 Prescott became colonel of his regiment and the next month he was third in command of the British expedition that occupied Newport. Remaining there as commander of the garrison, he made himself an object of American hatred. On the night of 9–10 July 1777 he was taken prisoner by Major William Barton (1748–1831) and forty men in a daring raid. Despite his humiliating capture, Prescott was promoted to major general on 29 August 1777 while still a POW. Exchanged on 6 May 1778 for General Charles Lee, Prescott briefly resumed his command in Newport before being superseded by General Robert Pigot. He commanded a brigade in the Battle of Rhode Island on 29 August. About a year later he succeeded Pigot and in October 1779 complied with the orders of Clinton to destroy the works and evacuate his garrison of slightly more than four thousand effectives to New York. On 26 November 1782, he was promoted to lieutenant general. He died in England in October 1788.

SEE ALSO *Allen, Ethan; Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778).*

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PRESCOTT, ROBERT. (1727–1815). British general. Born in Lancashire in 1727 (N.S.), Prescott was gazetted captain of the Fifteenth Foot in 1755 and saw action with them at Rochefort in 1757 and at Amherst's capture of Louisburg in 1758. The next year he was aide-de-camp to Amherst before joining the command of James Wolfe. In March 1761 he became major of the Ninety-fifth Foot and took part in Robert Monckton's expedition against Martinique. In November 1762 he advanced to the grade of lieutenant colonel. On 8 September 1775 he became lieutenant colonel of the Twenty-eighth Regiment and took part in the New York campaign (Long Island, Westchester County, and the capture of Fort Washington). He took part in the Philadelphia campaign and saw action at the Brandywine in 1777. The next year he was named first brigadier in James Grant's expedition against St. Lucia. On 6 July 1779 he was promoted to colonel and on 19 October 1781 he became a major general. Advanced to lieutenant general on 12 October 1793, he received orders to take command at Barbados. The next February he sailed for Martinique, landed unopposed, and on 22 March received the surrender of the island. In

1796 he succeeded Carleton as governor of Canada, and on 1 January 1798 he was promoted to full general. He was recalled in 1799, when Sir Robert Milnes became governor, and settled in Sussex, where he died on 21 December 1815 at Rose Green.

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PRESCOTT, SAMUEL. (1751–1777). Physician. Massachusetts. Son of Dr. Abel and Abigail Brigham Prescott, he studied medicine with his father and began practicing with him in their home town of Concord, Massachusetts. An opponent of British policies, he stumbled upon the action for which he is best remembered early on the morning of 19 April 1775. Riding home to Concord from a meeting in Lexington, he met Paul Revere and William Dawes, who were carrying news that the British were on the move to confiscate provincial military stores at Concord. The trio rode on together. When they were approached by British officers on horseback, Dawes escaped, but Revere and Prescott were stopped. Both riders evaded their captors, although Revere was captured again momentarily. Prescott, thoroughly familiar with the countryside, made his escape and rode on to warn the minutemen at Lincoln and Concord, thereby enabling the activists to hide the munitions that were essential for armed resistance at Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts on 19 April 1775. Prescott served as a surgeon at Ticonderoga in 1776. About a year later he was captured on board a privateer and died while imprisoned at Halifax.

SEE ALSO *Lexington and Concord; Revere, Paul.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

PRESCOTT, WILLIAM. (1726–1795). Continental officer. Massachusetts. Born at Groton, Massachusetts, on 20 February 1726, the elder brother of Oliver Prescott, William Prescott served as a lieutenant in the expedition that took Louisburg in 1745. He settled in Pepperell, Massachusetts, became a prosperous farmer and militia captain (1756), and married Abigail Hale in 1757. Colonel of a regiment of Middlesex County minutemen, he arrived too late to see action at Concord on 19 April 1775, but he marched on to Cambridge, where he later became a member of the council of war and colonel of a provincial regiment.

On the night of 16–17 June 1775, he led his regiment and an assortment of others onto the Charlestown peninsula to fortify Breed's Hill. Over six feet tall, well-built, and possessing strong, clean-cut features, he had a way of inspiring respect and obedience as a military leader. The historian Christopher M. Ward has observed, "His customary movements were unhurried, and his coolness and self-possession in moments of danger were notable" (Ward, p. 76). As dawn broke on 17 June, he walked the parapet of the redoubt as his men dug furiously at his feet to finish their fortification before the British attacked it. A story based on later recollection captured the moment, even if it may be apocryphal:

It is said that [Thomas] Gage, studying him [Prescott] from Boston as Prescott stood on the parapet, handed his [spy]glass to Abijah Willard, the councillor, and asked if he knew him. Willard named him: his own brother-in law. "Will he fight?" asked Gage. Willard replied, "I cannot answer for his men, but Prescott will fight you to the gates of hell." (French, p. 219)

He led his men in the defense of the redoubt, the most prominent portion of the field, against a series of British attacks. They retired only when their ammunition was exhausted and the British were about to envelop their position. Prescott's inspired leadership, along with equal efforts by Thomas Knowlton and John Stark, prevented the collapse of the American defenses and ensured that the British would gain no quick military victory that might have shattered the rebellion. He served for the remainder of the Boston siege and was appointed colonel of the Seventh Continental Regiment for 1776. He took part in the evacuation of Long Island and the action at Kips Bay. The elderly warrior, who was further handicapped physically by an injury sustained in farm work, retired to his home at the end of the campaign. In September 1777 he served as a volunteer in the militia sent to help stop Burgoyne's invasion from the north. Bunker Hill had showcased his talents, but an opportunity never again presented itself for him to repeat the performance. He died at Pepperell on 13 October 1795.

SEE ALSO *Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Prescott, Oliver.*

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PREUDHOMME DE BORRE, PHILIPPE HUBERT, CHEVALIER DE.

(1717–1790 or 1791). Continental general. France. Entering the French army as a volunteer on the rolls of the Regiment of Champagne in 1740, he became *sous lieutenant* in 1741, lieutenant in 1742, and captain of a cavalry regiment (in Brittany, later Burgundy) in 1744. During the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), he took part in several campaigns. In June 1745 he received four saber strokes on the head and one on the wrist; one hand was disabled permanently. He was deactivated in 1749. Promoted to lieutenant colonel, he organized a regiment from Liège (his birthplace) and was made a chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis in 1757. When his unit was reorganized in 1762, Borre was reassigned in grade to the Metz garrison and again deactivated later that year.

With a commission of brigadier general and official authority to go to America, Borre sailed from Le Havre on 14 December 1776 with Coudray and a large French contingent aboard the *Amphirite*, but Coudray forced him off the ship. Borre changed to the *Mercur*e and reached Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on 17 March. Reporting to Washington on 17 May, he was given a commission as brigadier general with date of rank from 1 December 1776. On 21 May he took command at Princeton of a brigade composed of Baron d'Arendt's German battalion and the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Maryland Continental Regiments and served in New Jersey during the summer of 1777. Borre drew Washington's ire when he took matters into his own hands and hanged a Tory civilian. In a blistering letter of 3 August, Washington ordered him not to take such initiative: "The temper of the Americans . . . will not countenance proceedings of this nature," the commander in chief wrote. Borre then tried and removed Major Thomas Mullens for insubordination, which Washington eventually supported. Borre commanded a brigade in the Staten Island raid of Sullivan on 22 August and at Brandywine on 11 September 1777. When Washington called for a court of inquiry on his behavior at Brandywine, Congress recalled him from the army on 13 September. The next day he offered his resignation, which was accepted. Borre later complained to Congress not only that he had been condemned without a hearing but that he deserved promotion to major general; Congress, however, rejected his request on 4 October. Richard Henry Lee was of the opinion that Congress's treatment of Borre was unfair.

Sailing from Charleston on 20 January 1779, the chevalier carried dispatches to d'Estaing at Cap Français in Saint Domingue. He reembarked on the *Andromaque* on 15 May, witnessed the fight in which this ship sank the British privateer *Tartar*, and reached Brest on 5 July. He received the rank of brigadier general in the French army

on 1 March 1780. As early as 5 April, action was initiated to retire him for physical disability.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

PRÉVOST, AUGUSTIN. (1723–1786). British general. A French-speaking Protestant born in Geneva, Prévost served as a major in the Sixtieth Foot (Royal Americans) on 9 January 1756 and was dangerously wounded while serving under James Wolfe in the Quebec campaign of 1759. On 20 March 1761 he was promoted lieutenant colonel. In 1765 he married Nanette (Ann), daughter of Chevalier George Grand, an Amsterdam banker. Three sons and two daughters survived their father; the eldest, Sir George Prevost (born in New Jersey on 19 May 1767), became governor-in-chief of British North America in 1811 and oversaw the defense of his provinces from 1812 to 1814.

At the beginning of the War of American Independence, Prévost was the British military commander in East Florida. He left St. Augustine on 23 December 1778 with orders to cooperate with Archibald Campbell (who took Savannah from the rebels on 29 December) and take overall command of the British forces in the South. He captured Sunbury, Georgia, after a three-day siege on 9 January 1779, joined forces with Campbell, and on 19 February was promoted major general. While Campbell marched to Augusta, Prévost confronted the combined armies of Benjamin Lincoln and Robert Howe across the Savannah River. An amphibious operation against the rebel coast at Beaufort was beaten off; but on 3 March he annihilated John Ashe's force at Briar Creek, where Prévost's younger brother Marc led the enveloping column. When Lincoln thrust at Augusta, Prévost responded with a lunge at Charleston before withdrawing toward

Savannah. Supported by the talented military engineer James Moncrieff, he skillfully held the city against the combined Franco-American attack in October 1779. This victory consolidated the British hold on Georgia, attracted considerable Loyalist support, and damaged Americans' faith in the French alliance. Afterward Prévost returned to Britain, where he died in 1786.

SEE ALSO *Briar Creek, Georgia; Moncrieff, James; Savannah, Georgia (29 December 1778); Sunbury, Georgia (9 January 1779).*

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revised by John Oliphant

PRIME MINISTERS OF BRITAIN.

"Prime minister" was the popular term used in Britain to designate the leader of the group or faction wielding the powers of government. According to the theory of balanced (or mixed) government, the king ruled the nation through his ministers who sat in Parliament, especially in the House of Commons, because it was that house alone that could originate the all-important measures having to do with money and taxes. The king had a great deal of leeway to select a prime minister and government, and generally sought someone whose policies he could endorse and whose personality he found compatible. Once satisfied he had found the right person, the king would ask him to form a government to manage the affairs of state, that is, to prepare a slate of men who would fill the offices of state because of their talents, their political connections, or a combination of both. The prime minister usually filled one of the senior offices of state, as there was no position called "prime minister" until the twentieth century.

The first statesman in British history who properly deserved to be called prime minister was Robert Walpole, first earl of Orford, who held sway between 1721 and 1742 during the reigns of George I and George II. Walpole was succeeded by the elderly Spencer Compton, the earl of Wilmington, who died on 2 July 1743. Wilmington was followed by Henry Pelham, a skilled parliamentary manager, who died on 6 March 1754. On Pelham's death, George II called on Pelham's brother, Thomas Pelham-Holles, the duke of Newcastle, whose strength was the management of patronage, to form a government. Newcastle, however, proved to be a poor

manager of the war that broke out in North America in 1754 and extended to Europe in 1756. After installing a caretaker ministry led by William Cavendish, the fourth duke of Devonshire (October 1756 to April 1757), the king was forced to ask William Pitt the elder, later the earl of Chatham, to join in a coalition with Newcastle from 1757 to 1761. Pitt was a charismatic speaker in the House of Commons and a talented organizer of strategies and armies, but he was anathema to the king because of a lifetime spent opposing subsidy treaties for Hanover. When Pitt and Newcastle fell from power, the new king, George III, appointed his close friend and mentor, John Stuart, the third earl of Bute, as his principal minister, but the Scotsman was forced to resign on 8 April 1763 because he lacked support in Parliament. Rather than reappoint Newcastle and Pitt, the king turned to George Grenville, supposedly Bute's puppet but a force in the House of Commons in his own right. Best remembered for his advocacy of plans to tax and better control the American colonies, Grenville was dismissed on 10 July 1765 because the king found him "insolent in attitude and tedious in behaviour" (Beckett and Thomas).

The king next turned to Charles Watson-Wentworth, the second marquess of Rockingham, a younger member of the Newcastle-Pitt faction. An inexperienced administrator and poor parliamentary manager, he was more moderate than the king on American regulation and was dismissed on 30 July 1766. With nowhere else to turn, the king asked Chatham (Pitt) to form another ministry. But Chatham was physically frail, now a member of the House of Lords, and made haughty by his wartime success. Progressively retiring from business, he resigned in October 1768. Augustus Henry FitzRoy, the third duke of Grafton, who had been effective head of Chatham's ministry for over a year, became the next prime minister, but parliamentary politics and the deteriorating American situation led to his resignation on 30 January 1770. Frederick, Lord North, a true Commons man, had already agreed to become first lord of the Treasury (28 January).

For the next twelve years, with the king's firm friendship and support, North led the government with great skill as the American crisis turned into the American rebellion. Worn out by bad news from America and constant sniping from parliamentary opponents of the American war, he decided to resign on 20 March 1782, although his policies were still firmly supported by George III, who accused North of desertion when he resigned. Rockingham returned as prime minister, without the full confidence of the king; he died on 1 July 1782, before he could see the culmination of the negotiations he had set in train to end the war. William Petty, the second earl of Shelburne, continued many of Rockingham's initiatives, including peace with the United States (preliminaries were signed on 30 November), but he was personally unpopular

and unskilled in Parliament. He resigned on 22 February 1783 but stayed on until a coalition ministry under William Cavendish-Bentinck, the third duke of Portland, took office on 2 April 1783. The king had already come to detest the coalition by the time Charles James Fox introduced the India bill on 18 November. Seeing the bill as an attack on the prerogatives of the monarchy, the king took the unconstitutional step of comportsing privately with Chatham's son, William Pitt the Younger, the rising star in Parliament, to take over the government. The coalition collapsed in December 1783, after the peace treaty ending the War of American Independence had been signed, and Pitt assumed office, inaugurating a period of relative calm that would be broken only by the next great war, against Revolutionary France.

The history of the prime ministership in this period highlights the reality that British politics was governed by the twin needs to manage Parliament, where intensely local and personal political relationships regularly overrode considerations of imperial policy, and to work with George III, Farmer George, the quintessential Englishman who could and did play an active role in shaping politics according to his notions of the place of the monarch in mixed government. A system of governance that had grown out of the interplay of forces in an island kingdom had yet to develop the means to govern an empire.

SEE ALSO *Bute, John Stuart, Third Earl of; Chatham, William Pitt, First Earl of; George III; Grafton, Augustus Henry Fitzroy; Grenville, George; Newcastle, Thomas Pelham Holes, Duke of; North, Sir Frederick; Rockingham, Charles Watson-Wentworth, Second Marquess of; Walpole, Sir Robert.*

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PRINCE OF WALES AMERICAN VOLUNTEERS. Montfort Browne, governor of the Island of New Providence in the Bahamas from 1774 to 1780, was captured in the raid on Nassau on 3–4 March 1776. He and Major Cortlandt Skinner were exchanged in September 1776 for rebel Major General William Alexander (Lord Stirling). Early in 1777 Browne began raising a Provincial regiment on Long Island, largely from among Loyalist refugees from Connecticut. Mustered on 21 April, three days later it joined Major General William Tryon's force in the raid on Danbury, Connecticut. In August 1777 it numbered 450 men and was stationed at Kings Bridge, New York. On 24 May 1778 it embarked for Newport, Rhode Island, landing on 11 June, and fought in the battle of

Quaker Hill (Newport) on 28 August. After being evacuated from Rhode Island in October 1779, it served on Long Island until 25 March 1780, when it embarked with Lord Rawdon for the South. A detachment was virtually annihilated at Hanging Rock, South Carolina, on 6 August 1780; another detachment suffered heavy losses when attacked by Francis Marion at Great Savannah on 20 August. More losses were incurred when Major Andrew Maxwell surrendered Fort Granby to Henry Lee on 15 May 1781. The remainder of the regiment evacuated from Charleston in December 1782 and returned to New York. It was part of the Long Island garrison until 12 September 1783, when it embarked for New Brunswick, where it was disbanded on 10 October.

SEE ALSO *Browne, Montfort; Fort Granby, South Carolina; Great Savannah; Hanging Rock, South Carolina; Nassau Raid of Rathbun; Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778); Skinner, Cortlandt.*

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
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY. 3 January 1777. Although his covering forces under Colonel Edward Hand delayed General Charles Cornwallis's approach to Trenton on 2 January so that the British did not reach the main American battle position along Assunpink Creek until dark, Washington knew that he could not stand up against the superior British forces upon the resumption of their attack the next day. Cornwallis was so sure of victory that he sought to avoid needless casualties and opted to wait until daylight rather than try to continue advancing in the dark.

Washington probably selected the position along Assunpink Creek with the thought of maneuvering in


the direction of Princeton before he could be trapped. Washington convened a council of war in the evening of 2 January and, as was his custom, encouraged every member freely to speak his mind. Several offered an alternative to standing and fighting or risking a difficult night retreat. Brigadier General Arthur St. Clair had been on the extreme American right flank during the action that day and his patrols had uncovered a roundabout route to the north via Quaker Bridge. He suggested using that way to bypass Cornwallis; the Americans could then push six more miles and reach Princeton, where roads would allow them to go on to Brunswick. Adjutant General Joseph Reed, who had grown up in the area, confirmed the accuracy of the patrols' report and said that his own patrols with the Philadelphia Light Horse had found no evidence that the British were watching the route. At that point Brigadier General Hugh Mercer suggested that the move would appear to the public to be an advance, not a retreat, which would have a very important political impact. By the time the meeting broke up, virtually every member had supported this option, and Washington started making detailed plans to hit Princeton at dawn. As another piece of good fortune, the temperature dropped twenty degrees in a few hours, freezing muddy roads and making a rapid march possible.

MOVING TOWARD PRINCETON

Washington left a few hundred men to keep campfires burning as a deception, and the British interpreted the movements they saw as American preparations for another night attack like the one delivered on 26 December. At 1 A.M. on the 3rd, the last of the baggage and heavy guns headed south to Burlington under Brigadier General Adam Stephen, and Washington's main body started moving. Every precaution was taken to ensure secrecy. Only the generals knew where the expedition was headed, orders were given in whispers, and wheels of gun carriages were wrapped with rags to muffle their sound. It was a difficult feat for the veterans and the inexperienced militia, a few of whom panicked near South Trenton when they mistook another unit for Hessians. The column moved southeast for a bit to get clear of the lines and then swung east and finally turned north at Sandtown, a route that also had the added advantage of avoiding Brigadier Alexander Leslie's twelve hundred men in Maidenhead. At about first light (6:50 A.M.) it began to cross Stony Brook and deploy for the final advance. Major General John Sullivan took three brigades to the right in order to swing around and hit Princeton from the east. The main body under Washington and Major General Nathanael Greene formed the left wing and headed roughly north along a sunken road with Mercer's brigade in the lead. The scheme of maneuver was to have Sullivan drive the British to Worth's Mill,



Plan of Princeton. This American reconnaissance map, prepared in December 1776, shows the position of "Gen Lesley, or headquarters," near Princeton, New Jersey. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GEOGRAPHY AND MAP DIVISION



THE GALE GROUP

where part of Greene's force would be in a blocking position along Stony Brook, while the rest pushed on into town. Once again the Americans had missed their dawn attack because it had taken about five hours to travel nine miles, but they had done so without being detected.

Princeton was occupied by about twelve hundred British from Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mawhood's Fourth Brigade, which had orders to move up to join Cornwallis on the 3rd. About 5 A.M., unaware of Washington's approach, Mawhood set out with two of his regiments (the Seventeenth and Fifty-fifth Foot), some artillery pieces, a cumbersome supply convoy, and part of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons. He intended to join Leslie at Maidenhead and then move on to Trenton. The other regiment, the Fortieth Foot, stayed in Princeton to guard supplies. Shortly after sunrise (7:22), Mawhood had already crossed Stony Brook Bridge with the Seventeenth and part of the Fifty-fifth when his flankers detected Sullivan's column a mile away. Mawhood formed up to consider falling back to defend Princeton or pushing on to Maidenhead. But because he thought the Americans were trying to escape from a defeat at Trenton, he set out to attack them instead.

THE BATTLE

Because of the sunken road Mawhood did not see Greene's force, nor did Greene see him. Washington was on higher

ground, however, and sent a messenger to tell Greene to change the plan and advance on the British as soon as he got clear of the ravine. As Mercer came into the open, he and Mawhood both headed for the high ground on William Clark's farm, and particularly for his orchard. Fifty dismounted British dragoons got there first, but Mercer's larger vanguard soon started gaining the upper hand. Both sides fed in more troops as fast as they came up, and they began exchanging volleys at a range of from forty to fifty yards. Mercer's men were getting the better of the fight, thanks to the presence of a number of companies armed with rifles, but after about five minutes, Mawhood launched a bayonet charge. Unable to counter because the rifles had no bayonets, the Americans crumbled. Mercer himself went down as did Colonel John Haslett, who was next in command, and a number of other key officers.

Colonel John Cadwalader's brigade of Philadelphia Associators, including Captain Joseph Moulder's artillery company, arrived at this time, and the British halted. Cadwalader attacked but was driven back in some confusion. That short pause, however, let other Americans (particularly Colonel Daniel Hitchcock's New England Continentals) build up a new line supported by eight guns firing from a hilltop. Washington himself came up and helped to rally Mercer's and Cadwalader's men. Then the Americans advanced using platoon volleys and at a range of thirty yards broke Mawhood's line. The remnants



The Death of General Mercer at the Battle of Princeton, January 3, 1777. John Trumbull's painting depicts General Hugh Mercer's death in battle after Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mawhood's brigade launched a withering bayonet charge. © FRANCIS G. MAYER/CORBIS

of the Seventeenth Foot headed towards Maidenhead, having entered the battle with about 250 men and endured around 100 killed or wounded and another 35 captured. The Fifty-fifth and the supply convoy fell back on Princeton. Meanwhile, the Fortieth Foot had heard the gunfire and formed up on the college grounds; it then moved up to the outskirts of the village.

Sullivan's right wing now entered the fight with Colonel Paul Dudley Sargent's brigade in the lead. They smashed into the line that the Fortieth was attempting to defend (at modern Frog Hollow) before it had been organized, driving the British back through town. Part of the Fortieth occupied Nassau Hall, the college building. Captain Alexander Hamilton unlimbered his guns and fired a round into the building; the 194 men inside promptly surrendered. The remaining 200 or so British troops retreated all the way to Brunswick, losing about 50 more prisoners along the way.

Cornwallis had started moving from Trenton as soon as he saw that the Americans were gone. As soon as Princeton had been secured, Washington sent Major John Kelly with a substantial militia force back to destroy the bridge over Stony Brook. This delayed Cornwallis's movement, and

the last Americans left town as the first enemy troops entered from the south. Although Washington wanted to continue his raid to Brunswick, his tired troops were not equal to the task. So rather than risk losing all that he had gained, he headed for safety in the high ground around Morristown and went into winter quarters on the 6th.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

In the forty-five-minute battle near Princeton, the Americans lost around 35 killed and the same number wounded out of a total force of around 5,000—most of whom did not engage closely. Howe's notoriously shady official casualty reports admitted 28 killed, 58 wounded, and 187 missing. A more accurate accounting would be around 450 total losses, with 222 killed and wounded out of the 450 or so who bore the brunt of the fighting.

SIGNIFICANCE

The battle at Princeton effectively ended the British effort to occupy New Jersey outside of the strip near New York, where they could be supported and supplied by sea. It is

significant primarily in the context of the greater campaign, and more for the political impact than the actual military damage inflicted. Unlike Trenton, which Howe and the ministry could blame on faults of the Germans, this time British regulars had been chewed up.

SEE ALSO *Hand, Edward; New Jersey Campaign.*

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PRISONS AND PRISON SHIPS. The lot of the Revolutionary War prisoner was hard, not solely because of deliberate policy, but also as neither the British nor the Americans were prepared in 1775 to take care of those they caught. Normal jail facilities soon were filled with political prisoners, both Whigs and Loyalists. Then came the large hauls: some four thousand rebels taken around New York City in 1776; nearly one thousand Germans at Trenton in 1776 and 1777; approximately five thousand British, Germans, and Canadians marched off from Saratoga as the Convention Army in 1777; over five thousand Americans surrendered in May 1780 at Charleston; and perhaps eight thousand British taken captive at Yorktown in October 1781. Naval prisoners continued to be taken throughout this period—fishermen, privateers, officers and men of the regular navies, and such special diplomatic prizes as Henry Laurens.

While the written record abounds with stories of hardships, atrocities, and escapes, precise facts and accurate figures about prisoners during the Revolution are difficult to arrive at and have only recently been explored by historians. We do not know how many were taken, although there is some reason to believe that the numbers for each side were about even at around twenty thousand each. Except for the notorious Simsbury mines in Connecticut, the Americans lacked—even more than the British—the means of securing prisoners. Most prisoners of war held by the Patriots were interned in the interiors of states, especially Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, where conditions were more healthful than that experienced by the prisoners of the British. Captured British and Germans tended to drift away from American camps after relatively short confinements; the Germans, in particular, were allowed and even encouraged to “escape” in the knowledge that they tended to end up as American farmhands rather than return to their British masters.


EXCHANGE OF OFFICERS

At the start of the war the two sides had no idea how to treat their prisoners. The British especially were at a loss. Many agreed with Lord Germain who thought that since those captured were rebels, they should be hanged. Many more saw the wisdom of the generals in the field, who appreciated that if they started hanging American prisoners, the Americans would reciprocate. The issue became an international one with the capture of Ethan Allen at Montreal in September 1775. The British authorities in Canada hated Allen, not just for the humiliating capture of Fort Ticonderoga, but also because of his efforts to arouse the Caughnawagas and other people of Canada against British rule. General Richard Prescott wanted to shoot him on the spot. But instead he was thrown in chains and sent to England, until allies there filed a writ of habeas corpus demanding that he either have charges brought against him, be declared a prisoner of war, or be freed. Baffled, the government decided to send Allen and most other prisoners back to America. Efforts to effect Allen's exchange for an officer of an equal rank, the traditional European method of handling officers, brought Washington into a long correspondence with the Howe brothers. The latter refused to address the former as a general, and Washington would not talk with the brothers unless they recognized his rank. When Washington heard of Allen's harsh treatment, he threatened to treat British officers the same way. Problems in connection with the exchange of prisoners prolonged the misery of captives and ran up the death rate. Finally, each side decided simply to ignore the details and proceed in traditional manner, exchanging officers and using a system of parole under which those captured agreed not to fight until they were exchanged.

RANK-AND-FILE SOLDIERS

However, the private soldier was treated with gruesome brutality, as Allen described in his popular *Narrative* of 1779. Most American military prisoners were packed into improvised jails and prison ships to suffer and die in large numbers. Elias Boudinot was the American commissary general of prisoners during 1777 and 1778, when policies concerning the prisoners of war (POWs) were put into place; his British counterpart was the corrupt Joshua Loring, whose wife, Elizabeth Lloyd, was the famous mistress of General Howe. Other British commissaries of prisoners were men named David Sproat and James [?] Lennox.

Britain's New York prisons. Infamous British prisons in New York City were Van Cortlandt's Sugar House (northwest corner of Trinity churchyard), Rhinelander's (corner of William and Duane Streets), the Liberty Street Sugar House (Nos. 34 and 36 Liberty Street), and the Provost Jail. The latter had been constructed in the Fields in 1758



Mill Prison. Some American seamen captured at sea by the British during the American Revolution were held at Mill Prison in Plymouth, England. At the end of the war, there were more than one thousand seamen in captivity in Britain, primarily in Forton and Mill prisons. *PLAN OF MILL PRISON* (W/C AND INK ON PAPER) BY AMERICAN SCHOOL, 19TH CENTURY; PEABODY ESSEX MUSEUM, SALEM, MA/ BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY

and was known as the New Jail. It was administered by the notorious William Cunningham. The Provost and Liberty jails, in that order, were the most dreaded by patriots. Other places in New York City were used as prisons: some of the Dissenter churches, the hospital, King's College (Columbia), and one or more other sugar houses.

British prison ships. The prison ships were probably more horrible than the land jails. Originally used for naval captives, they subsequently were filled with soldiers. The British started using them not only to solve their problems of space in New York City—particularly after the fire of September 1776—but because they promised to be more secure and more healthful than conventional jails. Both assumptions proved wrong: any prisoner who could swim could escape from a ship more easily than from a land jail; improper administration of the prison ships—overcrowding, poor sanitation, inadequate food—turned them into death traps. Though again figures are only rough estimates, some seven thousand to ten thousand Americans died on these ships during the Revolution, the latter figure

supported by the discovery in 1803 of thousands of skeletons around the shores of Wallabout Bay.

Most notorious was the *Jersey*, a sixty-four-gun ship that had been dismantled in 1776 as unfit for service and that held one thousand or more prisoners. Other ships in Wallabout Bay were the *Hunter* and the *Stromboli*. The hospital ship *Scorpion* was moored off Paulus Hook; one of its guests was Philip Freneau, who wrote a dramatic poem about the horrors and hopelessness of life aboard a prison ship. At least thirteen different ships were used around New York City during the war. Others, of course, were used elsewhere. The *Sandwich*—although not a prison ship—was used to take political prisoners to St. Augustine from Charleston.

Other British prisoners. Other Americans were jailed at Halifax, and those taken on the high seas or in European waters saw the inside of such famous English prisons as Dartmoor, Old Mill Prison at Plymouth, Forton Prison at Portsmouth, and the Tower of London. Continental army prisoners taken at Charleston on 12 May 1780 were imprisoned for thirteen months at nearby Haddrel's

Point, where they suffered great hardships. Some elected to join the British army or to serve in units formed to fight in the West Indies. But the majority turned down freedom at the cost of serving the British. "The integrity of these suffering prisoners is hardly credible," Allen wrote. "Many hundreds, I am confident, submitted to death, rather than enlist in British service." Allen used his tale of the British mistreatment of POWs to persuade the public that Americans had no kinship with their enemy. Allen and many others reported on the privation that drove men to eat rats and insects, wood and stone; in one notorious instance, a prisoner ate his own fingers. It is certainly the case that stories of the horrific prisons in which Americans were placed fed patriotic feelings.

Seamen, and even fishermen, taken by the British were given the choice of joining the Royal Navy or spending the war in British jails. At the end of the war there were more than one thousand seamen in captivity in Britain, primarily in Forton and Mill prisons. Their treatment, being more routine, did not descend to the appalling levels of the prison ships.

IMPRISONING LOYALISTS

While the British were uncertain how to treat the American rebels, the latter also could not agree on their policy toward Loyalists. Some wanted to treat them as POWs and inter them with British and German prisoners; local Patriot leaders tended to take the view that they were criminals or traitors and should be dealt with accordingly. The Patriot government of New York imprisoned many Loyalists under the Kingston Court House, where the Provincial Congress held its sessions. The overcrowding and filth reached such a level that they disrupted the Congress's sessions. After many representatives complained, the Loyalists were moved to prison ships in the Hudson. In other states, some officials made arrangements with Loyalists taken in combat, confining them to their homes, while others hanged them on the spot. Americans, however, had very little experience incarcerating large numbers of people; most colonial towns did not have a jail. As a consequence, Loyalists often found it easy to escape, even from the brutal Simsbury mines. It seems that far fewer prisoners died in American hands than in British, but that may have as much to do with the lack of opportunity as with standards of humanity.

SEE ALSO *Boudinot, Elias; Convention Army; Cunningham, William; Exchange of Prisoners; Laurens, Henry.*

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PRIVATEERS AND PRIVATEERING.

The term "privateer" refers to a privately owned and armed vessel that operates under the terms of a letter of marque, a document that allows the vessel to attack the enemies of its sovereign nation without the danger of being branded a pirate. The term itself, which can be traced to 1664, apparently is an abbreviation of "private man of war." Before that date, however, privateers were simply referred to as letters of marque, named after the document that legally separated their actions from piracy.

PRE-REVOLUTIONARY PRIVATEERING

Commerce raiding under the auspices of national sanction began as early as the thirteenth century in Europe. The crown traditionally issued letters of marque and reprisal to merchants during times of war. These documents were fundamentally based on the concept of reprisal. For instance, in 1242, when French vessels attacked the English coastline, Henry III issued letters of marque to the English merchants who had lost vessels to the attackers. Possession of a letter of marque legally separated a privateer from a pirate, which made the difference between life and death if captured. Whereas privateers sailed in the name of their mother country and within the constraints of a formal legal system, pirates illegally seized vessels without any recognition of nationality or sovereignty. Privateer prizes were adjudicated in admiralty courts, and the proceeds from the prizes were divided among crew and owners, with a portion given to the monarch. Based on such principles, the system remained essentially the same until the middle of the seventeenth century, when territorial expansion became increasingly important in the minds of most European politicians.

Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, American colonists actively participated in Britain's commerce-raiding operations. Americans sanctioned, commanded, and served on privateers during every major intercolonial conflict of the period. During the colonial era, privateering reached an apogee along the North American Atlantic coast. Privateering's popularity

soared throughout the British Empire. From the docks of London to the wharves of Charleston, wealthy merchants invested in privateering ventures. The profitability of privateering provided capital to many colonial economies. Colonial newspapers devoted entire pages to royal proclamations encouraging privateering, as well as advertisements on behalf of privateer owners. They reported the capture of prizes and the subsequent auctions of the cargoes.

During war years, seamen flocked to privateers in the hope of escaping service onboard Royal Navy vessels. Because it contributed to a state's sea power without putting large financial stress upon the national treasury, privateering offered a popular means of warfare during an age dominated by mercantilist ideas. Consequently, American society had become well accustomed to the privateering enterprise by the beginning of the American Revolution.

LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR PRIVATEERING

At the beginning of the Revolution, the rebelling colonies were faced with a series of dilemmas. How would they defeat or even challenge the mighty Royal navy? Would America's ports be laid waste by cannon shot and their commerce destroyed by blockades? There was no American navy, and the idea of building one seemed utterly foreign to most members of the Continental Congress. Although the colonies had united for mutual protection, most were primarily concerned with their own defenses on a local scale.

Faced with such daunting problems, the colonies and the Continental Congress had three options. The first involved building a national navy, something that Congress began on 14 December 1775, despite a complete lack of funds, equipment, and men. Most Americans, however, understood that confronting British naval power head-on was all but impossible. The second option concerned coastal defense through navies funded and outfitted by individual colonies. Nearly every colony chose this method of defense in late 1775 and early 1776. Nevertheless, relying on each state to finance a navy also proved to be impossible. Consequently, the colonies turned to privateering. In November 1775, Massachusetts began issuing letters of marque and reprisal, soon to be followed by several of the other colonies.

Privateering clearly provided Americans the best possible method of fighting the British at sea. On March 23, 1776, Congress resolved that: "The inhabitants of these colonies be permitted to fit out armed vessels to cruize on the enemies of these United Colonies," and that "all ships and other vessels . . . belonging to any inhabitant or inhabitants of Great Britain, taken on the high seas, or between

high and low water mark, by any armed vessel, fitted out by any private person or persons, and to whom commissions shall be granted, and being libeled and prosecuted . . . shall be deemed and adjudged to be lawful prize." Prizes were to be adjudicated in official state admiralty courts established upon the recommendations of Congress in 1775. Although suggested by Congress, these were not federal courts. The state courts, presided over by a judge and his marshal, both of whom were appointed by the state assemblies, included jury trials, payment in proportion of the vessel as salvage in the case of recapture, and a form of appeals. Congress established a federal appellate court, the first true federal court, and provided that appellants would pay triple costs if the state admiralty court's judgment was affirmed.

In legalizing privateering and recommending the establishment of admiralty courts, Congress realized the necessity of producing letters of marque for those individuals fitting out armed vessels. The commission, which closely resembled a British letter of marque, had blanks to be filled in by the state committees of safety or governors identifying the vessel, the master and owners, and the number of guns and crew. Obtaining a commission required posting a bond insuring compliance with congressional rules and regulations. Congress drafted the bond forms and issued them to naval officers in various ports and to the state governors.

NUMBER, NATURE, AND EFFECT OF PRIVATEERS

The total number of American privateers that operated from 1775 to 1783 is impossible to fully determine. Nevertheless, an intelligent estimate can be made that nearly 3,000 American private men-of-war set sail, of which some 2,768 have been identified to date by historian Joshua Howard. Earlier estimates were based solely on the Congressional records and those of a few New England states. However, these estimates excluded the activities of southern privateers, and so do not accurately reflect the true number. The majority of the privateers appear to be more accurately described as trading vessels than as war ships. The average American privateer carried only four guns and a crew of fifteen men, making it quite unlikely that most would have been strong enough to capture an enemy merchant vessel. This supports the conclusion that American privateers operated for the country's economic survival as much as for taking prizes. However, such vessels as the *Grand Turk*, carrying 28 guns and a 140-man crew and the 26-gun brig *Sturdy Beggar* with a crew of 105, indicate that some vessels were specifically intended for fighting.

The actual effect American privateers had on the outcome of the war has been hotly debated. Many historians have rightfully claimed that privateers took available

seamen away from the Continental navy. Others have pointed out that the Continental navy never formed a viable threat to the Royal navy, and that privateering was indeed the fledgling nation's best option. Lloyd's of London records nearly 3,000 British vessels as having been captured. A good proportion of these were evidently retaken, however the number is most likely not completely accurate. Several privateers, such as the *John Hancock*, *General Stark*, and *Rattlesnake* performed several successful voyages, capturing numerous British prizes. Although British shipping continued to rise during the war, American privateers played an important role in dampening the morale of the British public, as well as providing much needed goods to the Patriot cause. Whether for patriotism or profits, or a combination of the two, America's privateersmen played an important and quite often neglected role in winning the country's independence from Britain.

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revised by Joshua Howard

PRIZES AND PRIZE MONEY. Although associated primarily with operations at sea, prize money also was awarded to officers and men who captured enemy property on land. The value of the capture was computed and prize money was awarded in accordance with a scale based on rank. Few disputes were as bitter and long lasting as those over prize money, with different ships, officers, and entire military services fighting over who deserved what share of captured property. For instance, after the British took Charleston in May 1780, the navy entered its claim to all of the goods seized, seeking to cut the army out of any share of the prize money. Sir Henry Clinton appealed to the

Privy Council for a fair consideration of the army's claim but never received satisfaction.

In addition to every form of moveable property being subject to claims of ownership by the soldiers or sailors who captured them, slaves were considered prizes of war. Some Patriots were troubled by this standard. When a company of the Green Mountain Regiment captured a British officer in 1775, the company's men were informed that they were now considered the owner of his slave and her child. They voted unanimously that slavery violated the cause for which they fought and issued the woman a document proclaiming her freedom. Other Continental soldiers were not so scrupulous in their adherence to the ideals of liberty.

As for naval prizes and prize money, under maritime law the private property of an enemy power captured at sea under certain legal circumstances was a prize, and the proceeds of its sale were normally adjudicated by a prize court. On the English side, a healthy proportion, usually one-third, of all captured goods went to the king. Prize money usually went in its entirety to privateersmen, but if the prize were taken by a warship, then only half of the prize's value, prorated in accordance with the normal pay scale, went to the officers and men, with the rest going into state or congressional coffers. A prize master and crew took the captured ship into a home port or that of an allied power for condemnation in accordance with prize law. If the capture were illegal, that is, inside neutral waters and by a ship not bearing letters of marque and reprisal, the prize court would release the ship and award damages. Sailors were well aware that privateers did far better in the winning of prizes than ships of the Continental navy, and they therefore generally preferred service in the former over the latter. Later estimates of the amount awarded in prizes supports the judgment of the seamen. Eighteen million dollars worth of prizes were taken by six hundred American privateers whose crews averaged one hundred men, compared to two hundred prizes claimed by the Continental navy worth some six million dollars.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

PROCLAMATION OF 1763. 7 October 1763. To reduce Indian unrest stemming from land frauds and westward expansion, the imperial government and

several colonies had taken largely ineffective steps before 1763 to limit the migration of white settlers into lands claimed or controlled by Native Americans. The end of the French and Indian War opened the gates for a flood of settlers into western lands, putting further pressure on tribes trying to resist the creeping tide of white settlement. Moreover, the expulsion of the French from Canada eliminated the possibility that the tribes might strike a balance between competing European powers and thus negotiate a better deal for themselves.

Aware of the problem, Lord Shelburne, the president of the Board of Trade, drafted a plan that was put in final form by his successor, the earl of Hillsborough, and rushed to King George III for his signature on 7 October 1763. The Proclamation of 1763 was intended to provide a comprehensive solution to a wide range of issues raised by the expansion of the empire. Territories recently won from France were organized into four distinct and separate governments: the provinces of Quebec, East Florida, West Florida, and Grenada, the latter actually comprising the island of Grenada, the Grenadines, Dominica, St. Vincent, and Tobago, all in the West Indies. The boundary of Georgia was extended south from the Altamaha River to the St. Mary's River, the northern boundary of East Florida. The new province of Quebec (encompassing only the eastern portion of the former New France, from the St. Lawrence valley northwards) was put under English law, a provision that alarmed the overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, formerly French, inhabitants. The colonies reacted most strongly to the provision of the proclamation that established, for an indefinite period, a line along the watershed of the Allegheny Mountains as the western limit of British settlement and, in a modification of Shelburne's draft, ordered the withdrawal of colonists already west of this line, which meant those in the upper Ohio Valley. A vast territory west of Quebec and the Alleghenies was reserved for the indigenous Native Americans, who were nominally placed under the government of the British army, which was to garrison forts in the region to keep the peace and especially to regulate trade with the natives. The act specifically mentioned colonial land frauds and other offenses against the Indians and went into great detail about how these were to be prevented in the future.

The colonists strongly opposed the proclamation, which withdrew lands promised to veterans of the French and Indian War, restricted trade with the Indians, and curtailed the claims of the so-called Three-Sided colonies. Land speculators and frontiersmen objected to the restrictions on western migration. Canadians resented the imposition of English law, fearing it would be anti-Catholic and would call into question legal precedents established under the French regime. The colonists also recognized that the proclamation confined them to the seaboard, where they could be more easily

controlled by the mother country; eliminated the chance for debtors to avoid prosecution by escaping over the Alleghenies; and curtailed the economic opportunities that seemed to shimmer just over the crest of the mountains.

SEE ALSO *Pontiac's War; Three-Sided States.*

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PROPAGANDA IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

Americans realized early in their dispute with the mother country that they needed to tell their side of the story quickly and effectively in order to persuade people at home and abroad of the probity and justice of their cause. Their efforts to mould public opinion were often highly successful. Paul Revere's engraving of the Boston Massacre of 5 March 1770 made the case for activists in the other colonies that a garrison of regular soldiers was deadly for innocent, unoffending civilians. The murder of Jane McCrea showed that no one was safe from British-incited "savages." Americans condemned the successful British surprise attacks at Paoli, Pennsylvania, Tappan, New Jersey, and Wyoming, Pennsylvania, as "massacres." Contemporaries so besmirched the reputations of David Fanning, Banastre Tarleton, Joseph Brant, and Walter Butler that historians have been grappling to separate truth from fiction ever since.

SEE ALSO *Taxation without Representation Is Tyranny.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

PROSPECT HILL. This is an obvious name to give to any hill from which there is a good view. One was located near Cambridge, Massachusetts, and another was the place to which the American outposts withdrew in the preliminary maneuvers leading to the Battle of Long Island.

SEE ALSO *Long Island, New York, Battle of; Mutiny on Prospect Hill.*

Mark M. Boatner

PROTECTOR—ADMIRAL DUFF ENGAGEMENT.

9 June 1780. Massachusetts constructed the twenty-six-gun frigate *Protector* for her state navy in 1779, probably following the design of the Continental Navy's *Boston*. On 9 June 1780, during her first cruise, she ran into the thirty-two-gun privateer *Admiral Duff* from Liverpool, a converted East Indiaman. The engagement off the banks of Newfoundland was unusually fierce and ended only when the *Admiral Duff* sank with only fifty-five survivors. Captain John Foster Williams's frigate was also badly damaged, and was almost captured by the Royal Navy's *Thames* (thirty-two guns) in a running fight on her way back to Massachusetts.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

PROTESTERS. This name was applied by Boston radicals to merchants in Massachusetts who refused to support the Solemn League and Covenant, a circular letter in which the Boston Committee of Correspondence asked every adult "to suspend all commercial intercourse" with Britain from 31 August 1774 until the Boston Port Act was repealed.

SEE ALSO *Solemn League and Covenant.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

PROVINCIAL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

American colonists who continued to be loyal to King George III organized military units to fight the rebels almost immediately after the start of hostilities in the spring of 1775. The Loyalist military response took forms that varied from what amounted to like-minded groups of thugs that banded together to support themselves with violence directed usually against the rebels

to fully fledged military units with excellent discipline, superb tactical skills, and all the esprit de corps that uniforms, accoutrements, and distinctive emblems could reflect and reinforce. The military value of Loyalist units was a function of how and when they were raised, and by whom. The men in most of these formations were as capable of performing valuable military service—such as standing in battle, skirmishing in support of regular troops, ambushing rebel units, and raiding rebel settlements—as any American soldiers raised and led under similar circumstances. The men on both sides of the imperial civil war who trailed off into activity of no appreciable military value were nothing more than bandits and outlaws, and they had little if any positive impact on achieving the political outcomes each side was trying to obtain.

The majority of Loyalist units formed in America were authorized by the British commanders in chief in America or Canada and were thus entitled to be called "Provincials," an extension of the name applied by the British to colonial regiments raised during the French and Indian War. These Provincials were raised for a fixed term of service (usually two years or the duration of the war), were paid, clothed, armed, fed, and housed by the British government, were subject to the same discipline, and were liable for service anywhere in North America. They were not legally part of the regular establishment, having been created for temporary service in a particular theater. On 2 May 1779, however, three Provincial regiments were placed on a hybrid American Establishment that offered them higher status and certain tangible benefits like access to better clothing and half pay for officers upon disbanding. The first three units—the Queen's Rangers (or Queen's American Rangers), the Volunteers of Ireland, and the New York Volunteers—were designated the First through Third American Regiments, and they were followed on 7 March 1781 by two more American regiments, the King's American Regiment (Fourth) and the cavalry of the British Legion (Fifth). On Christmas Day 1782, four of the American Regiments (all but the Third) were elevated to the British Establishment, a mark of royal favor that allowed their officers the chance to find a place in the permanent military forces of the crown. All of the Provincial regiments were disbanded at the end of the war.

Major General William Tryon, the former royal governor of North Carolina and New York, was the commander in chief of the Provincial forces in America, headquartered at New York City. Oliver De Lancey of New York (formerly commanding De Lancey's Brigade) was the senior brigadier general. The other brigadier generals were Cortlandt Skinner of New Jersey (New Jersey Volunteers); Montford Browne, governor of the Island of New Providence in the Bahamas (Prince of Wales's

American Regiment); and in 1780, Benedict Arnold, the rebel defector. Alexander Innes served as inspector general, and Edward Winslow as muster-master general.

Any calculations concerning the Loyalist military effort—the history and number of Loyalist military units, the overall strength of those units, and the impact of armed Loyalism on the outcome of the War for American Independence—are complicated by a lack of records and problems in defining whom to count as a Loyalist. There seem to have been over 150 named Loyalist units during eight years of war, ranging from companies with a few tens of men to multiple-battalion regiments of well over one thousand soldiers. Somewhere between seventy and one hundred units seem to have had a significant military presence, at least to the extent of continuing to seek recruits and achieving an extended military presence. Perhaps three dozen units took the field with a maximum known strength of at least several hundred men; these are the units that can claim to have contributed materially to the British war effort.

The peak of Loyalist fighting strength—nearly ten thousand officers and men on the rolls of Sir Henry Clinton's command, headquartered at New York City—was recorded on 15 December 1780, but that figure does not include the units operating under Major General Frederick Haldimand's command from Canada or several units still in the process of organizing. According to Paul H. Smith, approximately twenty-one thousand men "saw service in the provincial corps during the War for Independence," but Nan Cole and Todd Braisted contend that "All told, perhaps 50,000 served at one time or another, on the land and on the sea," a difference that seems to rest on Smith's reliance on muster roll data and Cole's and Braisted's desire to be inclusive ("American Loyalists," p. 266; Cole and Braisted, "On-Line.")

SEE ALSO *Associated Loyalists; British Legion; Butler's Rangers; Guides and Pioneers; King's American Regiment of Foot; Loyal Americans; Loyalists in the American Revolution; New Jersey Volunteers; New York Volunteers; Queen's Rangers; Queen's Royal Rangers; Regular Establishment; Royal Highland Emigrants; Volunteers of Ireland.*

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PROVOST JAIL **SEE** *Prisons and Prison Ships.*

PRUSSIA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

On 6 April 1776, the Continental Congress resolved to open trade to all nations except Great Britain. While this international trade plan was developing, the fundamental question was whether the foreign governments involved might also be enlisted to protect or even legitimize that trade. Because of the structure of the Prussian state, its king, Frederick the Great, set foreign policy. His relationship with Britain had been strained before the disturbances in North America developed. During the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), Britain's alliance with Prussia had been abandoned by the policies of Britain's prime minister, John Stuart, the third Earl of Bute, in favor of reaching a settlement with Britain and Prussia's mutual enemy, France. Frederick felt himself betrayed. A decade later (at the time of the first Polish partition), Frederick was further embittered by the British attempt to prevent him from acquiring Danzig.

As the American crisis intensified, Frederick became a close observer of developments. Frederick was interested in seeing Britain humbled while trying to keep Prussia out of direct involvement. When his adviser, Count Joachim Karl von Maltzan, suggested open commercial relations with the Americans, Frederick replied on 3 June 1776 that the American situation was still too problematical and that, without a navy, Prussia would be unable to protect the trade. Therefore, Frederick was determined to maintain a strict neutrality. In November 1776, Silas Deane sent William Carmichael to Berlin to make proposals for direct trade. Frederick again declined, preferring that all such trade be conducted through French ports. On 14 February 1777, Deane, Benjamin Franklin, and Arthur Lee sent Frederick copies of the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation to indicate American resolve. This time Frederick instructed his foreign minister, Gebhardt Wilhelm von der Schulenberg, not to completely refuse—he hoped not to offend the colonies but to keep them in a friendly disposition. When the commissioners (a group including Deane, Franklin, and Lee) proposed sending a formal representative to his court, Frederick declined, but before his reply could be received, Arthur Lee arrived in

Berlin. The Prussians were willing to tolerate Lee's presence, provided that he act in a private capacity. This he was willing to do until the Elliot Affair.

On 26 June, during the absence of Lee from his residence, the British minister to Prussia, Hugh Elliot, sent one of his servants to take Lee's papers and have them copied. Elliot's private secretary, Robert Liston, carried the copies to London and sent the servant out of Prussia. Elliot, sensing an impending diplomatic furor over the theft of the papers, immediately acknowledged personal responsibility for the act. Frederick, hoping to avoid a diplomatic crisis, suspended all further investigations into the matter. Lee left Berlin amid the failed negotiations. During Lee's absence, his secretary, Stephen Sayre, attempted to continue negotiations with Prussia with a proposal that Prussia take the island of Dominica in exchange for sending Prussian officers to serve in the American army. This aroused little interest from Frederick. Further relations between Prussia and the Americans would be conducted by correspondence alone.

When Lee wrote again to propose the opening of Prussian ports to American vessels, Frederick instructed Schulenberg to "[p]ut him off with compliments." Frederick now acted to refuse the British permission to cross his lands with their mercenaries from Bayreuth, Anspach, and Cassel. Yet Frederick's actions were not so much a support of the American cause as concern about potential mutinies among these mercenaries. When Arthur Lee wrote to inform Schulenberg about American successes in the battle of Saratoga, Frederick directed his minister to reply that he was waiting on France to recognize American independence. This time the Prussians made a counter proposal: If the Americans wanted munitions, they were free to purchase them through the firm of Splittgerber. Arthur Lee purchased 800 guns, only to discover later that they were useless.

Through 1778, Frederick continued to resist William Lee's proposals for formal relations. On 2 January 1778, Schulenburg wrote to Lee that Prussian ports would be open to "all nations who come there to trade in goods not forbidden," but Prussia would not protect those vessels nor permit prizes into its ports. What especially interested Frederick was the Silesian linen trade, which had largely been a pre-war American market through Britain. It constituted one-third of Prussian exports. Yet Frederick did not recognize American independence until after Britain had. Only in June 1783 did the Prussian minister to France, Baron Bernhard Wilhelm von der Goltz, propose to Franklin a formal commercial agreement between the two countries. A commercial treaty would not be signed until 10 September 1785.

Had Frederick been friendlier to Britain, France might have hesitated to tie itself to the American cause, and more German states might have provided mercenaries

to the British. Frederick seems to have been oblivious to any ideological significance from the American Revolution. As he had informed Prince Henry in 1777, "[w]ithout shocking anyone, we are profiting quietly from the opportunity offered to us."

SEE ALSO *Deane, Silas; Franklin, Benjamin; German Auxiliaries; Lee, Arthur.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

PULASKI, CASIMIR. (1748–1779). Continental Army cavalry leader. Poland. A well-educated nobleman, Pulaski entered military service in 1767 and the next year fought with his family against the Russians, but he was forced to flee to Turkey after the first partition of Poland in 1773. By late 1775 he was in Paris, without money or prospects. He was introduced to Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane and expressed an interest in joining the American struggle for independence. With a letter of introduction from Franklin and with funds advanced by Deane, Pulaski reached Boston in July 1777 and met with Washington a month later, during which meeting they spoke about his cavalry experience in Poland.

He served as a volunteer aide-de-camp to Washington at the Battle of the Brandywine, on 11 September, and performed so well in reconnoitering enemy positions and rallying dispirited American troops that Washington thought he might be the man to command the four regiments of dragoons authorized by Congress. Washington proposed his appointment to Congress in a letter dated 27 August. Congress created the post of "Commander of the Horse" on 15 September and appointed Pulaski to the position with the rank of brigadier general.

Like many of the other foreign officers in the Continental Army, Pulaski had already created considerable animosity by demanding a rank subordinate only to that of Washington and Lafayette. Unable to speak much English and unwilling to take orders from Washington (but reporting directly to Congress), he quickly became embroiled in controversy. He took little part in the Battle of Germantown on 4 October 1777 but thereafter performed outpost duty at Trenton and Flemington while the army was in winter quarters at Valley Forge and acted with Wayne on foraging expeditions. The two men did not get along, Wayne believing that Pulaski disparaged the fighting abilities of American soldiers and Pulaski resenting the fact that American officers disliked taking orders from a foreigner. During this time, he preferred court-martial charges against Stephen Moylan, one of his regimental commanders, for "disobedience to the orders of General Pulaski, a cowardly and ungentlemanly action in striking Mr. Zielinski, a gentleman and officer in the Polish service, when disarmed . . . and giving irritating language to General Pulaski" (Freeman, vol. 4, p. 537 n.). Moylan was acquitted but became Pulaski's ardent enemy.

In March 1778 Pulaski resigned his post as chief of cavalry and to add to his grievances, Moylan was temporarily elevated to fill it. Congress granted Pulaski's request to raise an independent body of mounted troops and approved his proposal to include prisoners and deserters if Washington had no objection. Despite Washington's disapproval of his recruiting scheme, Pulaski started gathering prisoners over the summer from his headquarters at Baltimore. On 17 September he appeared before Congress to complain that he was being given no opportunity for action. Less than a fortnight later he got his chance. Ordered to Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey, to guard stores, his poorly disciplined and carelessly deployed legion was surprised by Ferguson on 4–5 October 1778. When the Cherry Valley Massacre in New York on 11 November brought cries for the protection of frontier settlements, his legion was posted on the Delaware River at Minisink. From there he wrote Congress plaintively on 26 November that he could find "nothing but bears to fight."

With the British capture of Savannah, Georgia, on 29 December 1778 and the desperate need for American cavalry in the South, on 2 February 1779 Pulaski was

ordered to march to Charleston, South Carolina. He arrived in time to help defend the town against Prevost's raid, but when he crossed the Cooper from his post at Haddrell's Point on 11 May in an attempt to ambush a detachment of the enemy, he was badly beaten. Now under Lincoln's command, he wrote Congress on 19 August to complain of the "ill treatment" he had encountered in the American army, although he expressed hopes that he might still have a chance to prove his devotion to the American cause. He led the advance of Lincoln's army that besieged Savannah in late September and established communication with the French fleet. Mortally wounded in a gallant but foolhardy cavalry charge on 9 October 1779, he died aboard the U.S. brig *Wasp*, probably on the 11th, after a surgeon had been unable to extract a grapeshot from his upper right thigh. He was buried at sea.

It has been said that "his American career was . . . a chronicle of disaster and embittered disappointment." However, the commentator continues, "his gallant death served to ennoble even his mistakes in the eyes of posterity" (Frank Monaghan in *DAB* 15, pp. 259–260).

SEE ALSO *Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey; Minisink, New York (19–22 July, 1779); Savannah, Georgia (29 December 1778).*

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PUNISHMENTS. Punishment in the military forces of the eighteenth century was intended to maintain the order and subordination necessary for proper and effective operation in the face of the enemy, with the ultimate goal of defeating the enemy before he defeated you. While the pain and suffering inflicted on soldiers and sailors were incredibly severe by modern standards, most of those who labored under military discipline accepted the need for the physical punishment of bad behavior, as long as it could be seen to be applied equally to similar infractions. Soldiers and sailors who brought the bad habits of civilian life into military service could be expected to be flogged for offenses like theft, gambling, and drunkenness, and to receive no sympathy from their peers who would otherwise have been their victims. The special circumstances of military and naval service also introduced a set of offenses that had no parallel in civilian life (like sleeping on guard duty, disrespect of officers, desertion, and mutiny) or that sometimes had a different standard of punishment than might apply to a similar crime in civilian life.

Flogging on the bare back with a nine-strand whip, called a cat-o'-nine-tails, was the most common punishment, performed by a drummer or drummers under the supervision of the regimental surgeon. It was intended both to punish current bad behavior and deter future misbehavior, impressing the miscreant with the seriousness of his offense but not killing him. Although flogging could maim a man for life, soldiers and sailors were too scarce a commodity to be regularly subjected to savage punishment and thereby rendered unable to perform the services for which they had been recruited in the first place. The system of military discipline gave officers considerable leeway when sitting on courts martial in judgment of men who were, in European armies at least, considered to be their social inferiors. While there was the occasional sadist in the officer corps, and many officers could be inattentive to the welfare of their men and their regiment, good officers tried to apply punishment fairly, with the goal of maintaining order among groups of unruly, mostly unmarried men, and of ensuring that in battle they responded swiftly and predictably to their officers' commands. Still, the scale and intensity of corporal punishment in European armies and navies seem cruel and capricious to the modern reader. A court-martial might award three hundred lashes for a misdemeanor infraction, or it might condemn a man it had to punish but thought it might rehabilitate to a thousand lashes. This latter punishment was administered in increments, but nonetheless approached a death sentence.

Colonial Americans generally found corporal punishment, as applied in the British army, to be excessive and distasteful, perhaps more because it ratified and emphasized the social gulf between officers and men than because of the severity itself. Americans derided the "Bloody Backs" (British enlisted men) for accepting this sort of degradation and, at the start of the Revolution, believed that they did not need to be beaten to be good soldiers. Their first articles of war (in Massachusetts and adopted by the Continental Congress) set a limit of thirty-nine lashes even for the most serious non-capital infractions. This limitation caused problems because it deprived General George Washington and his officers of a graduated scale of punishment. Congress gradually adopted a more flexible system, assigning a higher number of lashes for more serious crimes, thus disabusing Americans of the notion that discipline could be maintained by their innate virtuous behavior rather than by physical sanctions.

Some enlightened contemporaries questioned not the need for discipline, but differed as to the best means of maintaining it. Reflecting in his journal on soldiers who were marauding in the neighborhood of their winter quarters, Dr. James Thacher noted on 1 January 1780 that:

General Washington . . . is determined that discipline and subordination in camp shall be rigidly

enforced and maintained. The whole army has been sufficiently warned, and cautioned against robbing the inhabitants, . . . and no soldier is subjected to punishment without a fair trial.

While Thatcher understood that corporal punishment "may be made sufficiently severe as a commutation for the punishment of death in ordinary cases," he remarked that it "has become a subject of animadversion and both the policy and propriety of the measure have been called into question." He went on to note:

[I]t is objected that corporeal punishment is disreputable to an army; it will never reclaim the unprincipled villain, and it has a tendency to repress the spirit of ambition and enterprise in the young soldier; and the individual thus ignominiously treated, can never, in case of promotion for meritorious services, be received with complacency as a companion for other officers. . . . it remains to be decided, which is the most eligible for the purpose of maintaining that subordination so indispensable in all armies.

Much time would elapse before less draconian solutions won general acceptance. Flogging was not abolished in the U.S. Army until 1861, and other corporal punishments, like "riding the wooden horse," survived through the Civil War. The extent to which military justice was balanced between punishment and correction is seen in the way Washington occasionally used his power to commute a death sentence to make a point with his troops. Soldiers would be drawn up in formation on three sides of a square, assembled to witness the execution of serious criminals—deserters, murderers, mutineers—who were sitting or standing along the fourth side, when word would arrive that the commander in chief had pardoned one or more of the malefactors, perhaps because they were young soldiers led astray by their more culpable elders. One or more executions of those deemed to be hardened criminals would proceed, with the commuted—but flogged—survivors serving as living reminders that discipline would be enforced.

SEE ALSO *Bloody Backs; Corporal Punishment.*

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PURSUIT PROBLEMS. The term “pursuit” means, in a tactical context, harrying a foe defeated on the battlefield in order to increase the enemy’s disorganization and casualties. It is a way of using relentless speed and fresh troops to capitalize on battlefield success and inflict an even greater defeat on the enemy. Pursuit is difficult to accomplish because it requires a commander to look beyond the battlefield, anticipate the outcome, and collect forces in the right places to exploit what are sometimes fleeting opportunities. Eighteenth-century armies that were infantry heavy and used cavalry largely as battlefield shock troops were poorly configured for pursuit. Since most terrain in eastern North America was unsuitable for cavalry, European competitors during the colonial wars rarely expended the time and the almost prohibitive expense to get horse soldiers to the battlefield. The British had experimented with incorporating light cavalry, the most useful force for pursuing a broken foe, into the overall scheme of linear tactics. However, the only British victory in America that culminated in an effective pursuit was Camden, South Carolina, on 16 August 1780.

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

PUTNAM, ISRAEL. (1718–1790). Continental general. Connecticut. Born at Salem Village (later Danvers), Massachusetts, on 7 January 1718, “Old Put” was already an American hero when the Revolution started. Because he showed no interest in schooling, Putnam received only scant formal education. He moved to Pomfret, Connecticut, around 1740 and became a prosperous farmer. Although only about five feet six inches tall, he was powerfully built, square-jawed, and had a love for outdoor activity. One of the earliest legends associated with him is that in the winter of 1742–1743 he killed a large wolf in her den.

FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR

At the start of the French and Indian War in June 1755, this thirty-seven-year-old farmer left his wife and six children to enlist as a private in the Connecticut provincials. He displayed notable leadership and coolness under fire at the



Israel Putnam. A Continental general who had fought in the French and Indian War, “Old Put” was already an American hero when the Revolution started. © BETTMANN/CORBIS

Battle of Lake George (8 September) and shortly thereafter volunteered to join Robert Rogers’s rangers. He proved adept at the hard and dangerous work of scouting and reconnaissance and was soon captain of an ad hoc Connecticut ranger company. He spent most of the next eight years in the field, much of the time leading rangers and scouts. Promoted to major in 1758, he was captured after a botched ambush in late July 1758 and was about to be burned at the stake by French-allied Native American warriors when he was rescued by a French officer. He spent four months as a prisoner in Canada, was exchanged, and was then promoted to lieutenant colonel, serving in that rank for the rest of the war (1759–1762, 1764).

In 1760 he marched with Jeffrey Amherst from Oswego to Montreal. Two years later he was among the few survivors of a shipwreck off Cuba in the disease-ridden expedition that captured Havana, and in 1764 he commanded Connecticut’s five companies in John Bradstreet’s march to Detroit during Pontiac’s War. Connecticut’s most famous soldier returned to his farm in Pomfret, married a second time (3 June 1767), and set up a tavern in the house his new wife had inherited from her first husband. He left home for an extended period only once more, from 1772 to 1774, when he and the former senior officer of Connecticut provincials, Major General Phineas Lyman, went up the

Mississippi as far as Natchez to examine land granted to Connecticut veterans of the Havana expedition and to see what possibilities existed for land speculation.

PATRIOT LEADER

At home in Pomfret, Putnam became a prominent member of the Sons of Liberty. He opposed the Stamp Act and led the mob of former soldiers that forced the colony's stamp distributor to resign. When the imperial government closed the port of Boston, he drove a herd of 125 sheep there to relieve the hunger of the townspeople (15 August 1774). He responded with his customary audacity when rumors arrived on 3 September that General Thomas Gage had seized provincial gunpowder at Charlestown, Massachusetts. Although he held no rank in the militia, he initiated the call that prompted perhaps a thousand armed Connecticut men to march toward Boston on the Powder Alarm. When the news that actual fighting had broken out at Lexington reached Pomfret on 19 April 1775, Putnam was plowing on his farm, and according to legend, he was said to have left the plow in the furrow, unhitched one of the horses, left word for the militia to follow, and ridden one hundred miles in eighteen hours to Cambridge.

In late April 1775, the General Assembly appointed him second brigadier general (after Major General David Wooster and First Brigadier General Joseph Spencer) and then colonel of the Third Connecticut Regiment (1 May), in which ranks he served during the first few weeks of the Boston siege. With typical aggressiveness, on 13 May he led two thousand men through the deserted streets of Charlestown "to show themselves to the regulars," but this reckless action did not draw a response (French, p. 187). A skirmish with British raiders removing cattle from Noodle's Island in Boston Harbor on 25 May so impressed Congress, sitting in Philadelphia, that it appointed him a Continental major general, fourth in seniority to Washington himself, an egregious violation of the Connecticut pecking order that enraged Wooster and Spencer. Although he had actual command only over the two Connecticut regiments then at Cambridge, he urged his Massachusetts colleagues to act aggressively in response to William Howe's plan to break the Boston siege. In the council of war that preceded the Battle of Breed's Hill (17 June 1775), he is alleged to have said that "Americans are not at all afraid of their heads, though very much afraid of their legs; if you cover these, they will fight forever" (Frothingham, p. 116). During the battle itself, he labored hard to send reinforcements to Colonel William Prescott and is alleged to have given the order (conventional wisdom in the age of smoothbore musketry and also attributed to, among others, Prescott himself), "Don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes." His display of confidence, vigor, and aggressiveness helped to

sustain American morale and was the pinnacle of his career. After Washington arrived at Cambridge on 3 July, Putnam commanded the American center.

SUBSEQUENT CAMPAIGNS

At the start of the New York Campaign, Putnam was in overall command at New York City for a short period before Washington arrived. On 24 August 1776 he superseded John Sullivan in command of the forces that were later defeated in the Battle of Long Island on 27 August 1776. During the remainder of the New York Campaign and Washington's withdrawal to the Delaware, Putnam played no significant part. He was put in command of Philadelphia toward the end of the year, and when the British consolidated their position in northern New Jersey after Washington's victories at Trenton and Princeton, Putnam commanded the American wing posted at Princeton from January to mid-May 1777.

By this time, it was apparent to Washington that the old hero lacked the qualities of a field commander. In May 1777 he was made commander of the Hudson Highlands. He failed to prevent Sir Henry Clinton from capturing Forts Clinton and Montgomery on 6 October and from burning the town of Kingston on the 16th. Although a court of inquiry cleared Putnam of any misconduct or negligence in the temporary loss of the forts, Washington granted his request for a leave of absence to attend to family business and replaced him with Alexander McDougall on 16 March 1778.

During the winter of 1778–1779, Putnam commanded the forces quartered around Redding, Connecticut. On 26 February 1779 he is alleged to have escaped from Loyalist raiders near Stamford, Connecticut, by riding his horse in a headlong gallop down a flight of rocky steps, an improbable display of horsemanship by a sixty-one-year-old man but not out of character with either the man himself or the legend. In May he was in command of American forces on the west side of the Hudson until a paralytic stroke in December 1779 forced his retirement. He died at Brooklyn, Connecticut, on 29 May 1790 after an illness of two days. He was a cousin of Rufus Putnam and a granduncle of the founder of the G. P. Putnam's Sons publishing house.

ASSESSMENT

Putnam's greatest strength as a soldier was his ability to inspire raw American soldiers with confidence in their martial skill; his contributions during the early stages of the Boston siege were especially important. A courageous, energetic, and optimistic officer on the battlefield—"as colonel of a fighting regiment, he would have been admirably placed," the historian Christopher Ward has stated—he lacked the patience, insight, and administrative acumen

to succeed as a general (vol. 1, p. 76). Putnam's enduring appeal rests on the image of him as a "self-made man, unlettered but wise, brave yet compassionate" (Bruce C. Daniels in ANB), the very embodiment of the ideal American citizen, a "rough-hewn Cincinnatus" who ranked "second only to Washington in the pantheon of revolutionary heroes" (Paul D. Nelseon in ODNB). Timothy Dwight, who served with him in the Highlands and was later president of Yale College, composed this epitaph: "Ever attentive to the lives and happiness of his men, he dared to lead where any dared to follow."

SEE ALSO *Clinton's Expedition; Long Island, New York, Battle of; New York Campaign.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

PUTNAM, RUFUS. (1738–1824). Continental general and engineer. Massachusetts. Putnam was born at Sutton, Massachusetts. His father died when he was seven; after his mother remarried, the boy was reared by relatives. In 1754 he was apprenticed to a millwright in Brookfield. Three years later he enlisted as a private in the Massachusetts provincial service during the French and Indian War. He was a sergeant by 1759 and an ensign in 1760. Six feet tall and noted for his strength and activity, he had "a peculiar oblique expression" caused by a childhood eye injury (DAB). He lacked formal schooling, but his efforts at self-education supplemented his practical training, which he put to good use in the construction of defensive works around Lake Champlain. Back in Brookfield after the war, he farmed, built mills, and—having taught himself geometry—was supporting himself as a surveyor when the

war broke out. In 1773 he helped survey lands granted to veterans along the Mississippi River.

He had just passed his thirty-seventh birthday when he became lieutenant colonel of Colonel David Brewer's Massachusetts Regiment on 19 May 1775. He became involved in military engineering during the Boston siege and made the valuable suggestion that timber frames (chandeliers) be used to solve the problem of erecting fortifications on frozen ground, a technique that contributed to the American success at Dorchester Heights on 4–5 March 1776. Meanwhile, he was commissioned lieutenant colonel of the Twenty-second Continental Infantry (Connecticut) on 1 January 1776. After he had worked on the defenses of New York City, Congress promoted him to colonel on 5 August and named him acting chief engineer. Putnam resigned this appointment when Congress would not establish a corps of engineers, but in November 1776 he accepted a commission as colonel of the Fifth Massachusetts Regiment for 1777. He served at Saratoga under Horatio Gates, in John Nixon's First Massachusetts Brigade, but saw no important action. He served in the Hudson Highlands for much of the rest of the war, working on the defenses of West Point and its supporting posts. On 7 January 1783 he was appointed brigadier general. Putnam was prominent in presenting officer grievances to the state and Confederation authorities, and in June he chaired the board of officers that framed the Newburgh petition asking Congress for some definite provision to be made to give veterans land bounties in the Ohio territory, something Congress refused to do. On 3 November 1783 he retired from the army. "As a soldier he was brave and resourceful, but he was neither a great strategist nor an eminent military engineer" (DAB). He was limited by his lack of education, particularly in mathematics.

Between the summer of 1784 and the fall of 1785, Putnam surveyed lands in Maine (then a part of Massachusetts) and administered their sale as the state's superintendent of Surveys of Eastern Lands. In early 1786 he and Benjamin Tupper took the lead in organizing the Ohio Company of Associates, a joint-stock venture that attracted many veterans who were interested in moving west. Congress sold 1.5 million acres on the north bank of the Ohio River to the company in 1787. Putnam reached Adelphia (later Marietta, Ohio) on 7 April 1788 as superintendent of the company. President Washington appointed him a judge for the Northwest Territory in March 1790. As a brigadier general in the regular army (4 May 1792), he took part in negotiating Indian treaties and participated in the operations of Anthony Wayne. He became the first surveyor general of federal lands in Ohio, holding this post from 1 October 1796 until 1803. He died at Marietta on 4 May 1824.

SEE ALSO *Dorchester Heights, Massachusetts; Ohio Company of Associates; Wayne, Anthony.*

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PUTRID FEVER. SEE *TYPHUS.*

Q

QUAKER GUN SEE *Rugeley's Mills*.

QUAKERS. For the approximately sixty thousand members of the Society of Friends—known as Friends or Quakers—the American Revolution was a trying time. During a military conflict in which Americans were forced to choose sides, most Friends throughout British North America followed their spiritual convictions and rejected violence. Quaker pacifism arose from their belief that all individuals possessed an “Inner Light” and were thus spiritual equals before God who must be treated with kindness and respect. As a result, Quakers refused to take sides in the Revolutionary War, nor did they offer support to the military efforts of either American or British forces. At the same time, their spiritual beliefs led them to aid all those who suffered because of the war. Though Quaker charity work often garnered praise during and after the war, their refusal to choose sides after 1775 led to regular harassment, financial hardships, and deep suspicion, particularly among American Patriots, the most ardent of whom viewed Friends as closet Loyalists.

A MILITANT PACIFIST STANCE

It had not always been so. When the imperial conflict between Great Britain and the colonies erupted in the mid-1760s, Quakers supported the Patriot cause and agreed that the colonies had a right to protest (peacefully) British incursions upon their liberties, particularly the imposition of taxes by the British Parliament without the consent of provincial assemblies. As the crisis deepened,

however, leading Friends worried that the coercive and extralegal nature of the Patriot response, particularly the enforcement of nonimportation agreements and the growing danger of crowd violence, threatened to violate the Quaker peace testimony. As a result, in January 1775 the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, which played a leading role in establishing the rules (or discipline) of Quaker conduct, issued an epistle addressed to American Friends which declared that participation in the resistance movement constituted a violation of the sect’s religious principles. After violence erupted in 1775, Quakers adopted a more resolute stand in favor of absolute neutrality. In January 1776 the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting issued an epistle addressed to the public at large designed to explain the sect’s neutrality and avert a final break with Great Britain. Unfortunately, this public statement, which compared the “peace and plenty” Americans enjoyed under British rule with the “calamities and afflictions” that plagued public life in 1776, was interpreted by Patriots such as Thomas Paine, in a postscript to the second edition of *Common Sense*, as a sign of Friends’ Tory sympathies. Quakers fell into further disrepute in August 1777, when Congress published a fabricated letter from the nonexistent “Spanktown Yearly Meeting” addressed to British military leaders that described in detail the size and location of George Washington’s forces in Pennsylvania. Despite the Society’s rebuttals, the widely publicized letter further stirred anti-Quaker sentiment.

A month later, this hostile environment and the British army’s advance on Philadelphia prompted Congress to order the arrest of over forty suspected Loyalists, including many of Philadelphia’s leading Quakers. Offered their freedom in exchange for pledging loyalty to Pennsylvania,

eighteen Quakers could not in good conscience take the oath and remained incarcerated without charge. Ultimately, they were transported to Winchester, Virginia, where they were held for over seven months. Despite relatively tolerable conditions, two of the “Virginia exiles” died during the incarceration, while all faced the emotional trauma and economic disruption that resulted from enforced separation from their families, friends, and business concerns. Most galling to the exiles, however, was that they were held without charge or trial. For Quakers, the denial of habeas corpus seemed to belie the cause for which Patriots were fighting. Ultimately, many Patriots raised the same concerns, though it was mid-April 1778 before Congress and Pennsylvania ordered the exiles returned to the state and released. This episode was the most notorious example of repression faced by the Quakers, revealing that by 1777 many Patriots viewed Friends and Loyalists as one and the same.

In the meantime, the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting decided to clarify the sect’s discipline to ensure that Quakers throughout America responded to threats in a unified fashion. Friends, the meeting decided in epistles issued in September and December 1776, were not allowed to hold positions in the new state governments, serve in the military in any capacity, or pay any war taxes or military fines. Failure to follow these injunctions, the Philadelphia Meeting added, would result in disownment from the sect. By mid-1777, all the yearly meetings in America had embraced these measures, ensuring that Friends throughout the new nation embraced a militant pacifist stance.

HARDSHIPS

Though conditions differed in each state, Quaker pacifists faced real hardships during the war. First, most of the various Patriot governments tried to force Friends to serve in the military, particularly during times of manpower shortages. Young Quaker men who refused service were frequently threatened, publicly ridiculed, or jailed and, less frequently, beaten or forcibly marched to the front. Quakers meticulously documented these abuses in newly-created executive committees, or “Meetings for Sufferings,” believing that their trials represented an opportunity to spread their spiritual truths. Some Quakers, however, were unable to abide by the strict pacifism of the sect, particularly because so many shared the goals—political and civil liberty—if not the tactics of the Patriots. In all, some one thousand Friends were disowned for serving in the military over the course of the war, and in 1781 a small group of Philadelphia Friends who actively supported the Revolutionary cause established the Free Quakers, which survived as a separate meeting into the early nineteenth century. Still, despite the hardships involved, the vast majority of Friends remained faithful to the peace testimony and refused to serve in the military.

If demands for military service were the most visible problem faced by Quaker pacifists, a more widespread difficulty was the fines imposed by states for nonservice or refusing to hire substitutes. Seeking to avoid complicity in war making in any way, Friends refused to hire substitutes or pay fines for nonservice. The states responded by distraining, or seizing, Quaker property and jailing those who owned little of value. Ultimately, the loss of property was the biggest problem Quakers faced during the war, with estimated losses amounting to over 100,000 pounds. As in the case of military service, some Friends found themselves unable to uphold this aspect of the peace testimony; over the course of the war, local meetings dealt with over 450 individuals who paid fines or hired substitutes; ultimately, the meetings disowned 250. Still, it is striking how rare such violations were.

A third problem facing Friends during the war was the taking of loyalty oaths. Friends had long rejected oath taking, but during the Revolution oaths became still more problematic, because Quakers believed that by swearing loyalty to the new governments, they would be sanctioning the violence that created them. For this decision, Quakers suffered a variety of punishments. A Pennsylvania law of 1778, for example, denied nonjuror Friends access to the courts; required that they pay double (and later treble) taxes; and closed the medical, legal, and educational professions to them. Still, only 187 Friends were disowned for taking loyalty oaths.

The payment of taxes presented larger problems for Quakers. Though the sect agreed that Friends should refuse to pay specific war taxes, they divided over whether members should pay general taxes that were used for both peaceful and military purposes. The Philadelphia and Virginia Yearly Meetings called on members to avoid paying all taxes to the new American governments during wartime, but other meetings were less adamant, and ultimately no meeting made the payment of general taxes a disownable offense. Still, if calls for broad tax resistance failed to generate widespread support, the American Revolution marked the first time Friends as a body refused to pay war taxes. For their stand, Quakers suffered the distraint of property, in the process paying far more to the state governments than had they paid the taxes. Quakers also divided on whether they could use Continental currency, created to fund the war, in good conscience. A minority of steadfast Friends condemned the use of paper money, but ultimately the yearly meetings left this issue up the conscience of individuals, because widespread support for such radical measures did not exist.

AID TO THE SUFFERING

If Quaker spiritual values prompted Friends to embrace neutrality, they also pointed in another direction: providing aid to those who suffered because of war. Thus,

despite their economic woes, the Society generously provided aid to Quakers and non-Quakers alike who faced hardship as a result of the fighting. For Friends, charitable contributions of this kind became an ideal way to display their spiritual principles while simultaneously enabling them to contribute to the new civil society taking shape in America. Early in the war, Friends sent aid to beleaguered families in New England and Norfolk, and the British occupations of New York in 1776 and Philadelphia in 1777–1778 prompted similar outpourings of relief. When the war turned south in 1778, Quakers raised funds for war-ravaged civilians in Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia. Friends also provided medical aid to wounded soldiers and helped to bury the dead of both armies when fighting took place in their vicinity.

The American Revolution was a time of suffering for Quakers. Paradoxically, however, the depredations of war also enabled the sect to forge a new sense of unity and strengthen its internal discipline. Perhaps more important, the war enabled Quakers to establish a novel public role for themselves in the new nation. During the war, Friends viewed both their willingness to suffer for their beliefs and their relief efforts as testimony to their higher spiritual values. After the war, they continued to adopt unpopular positions—opposition to slavery, defending the interests of Indians, and continued pacifism—as part of an ongoing battle to improve the nation by spreading virtue. In effect, Quakers became the conscience of the nation.

SEE ALSO *Religion and the American Revolution*.

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A. Glenn Crothers

QUARTER. As a noun the word means the promise not to kill an enemy soldier if he surrenders; a soldier may

offer quarter to an enemy who appears to be losing the fight, or the latter may "cry quarter"—ask for quarter. After the Battle of the Waxhaws in North Carolina on 29 May 1780, in which Patriots were said to have been killed after demanding quarter, the expression "Tarleton's Quarter" arose to mean "no quarter."

As a verb, "to quarter" means to put soldiers into "quarters" (billets, barracks, or other form of lodging).

SEE ALSO *Quartering Acts; Waxhaws, South Carolina*.

Mark M. Boatner

QUARTERING ACTS. 15 May 1765 and 2 June 1774. The Mutiny Act of 1765 was passed to improve discipline of the British army throughout the world, and it included a provision for quartering troops in private houses. Alarmed by the latter provision, Americans adopted the evasion of refusing to recognize any clause of the act that did not refer specifically to overseas British possessions. A supplementary act, generally known as the Quartering Act, was therefore passed—at the request of Major General Thomas Gage, commander in chief in North America—that required colonial authorities to furnish barracks and supplies to British troops in America. This Quartering Act was to take effect on 24 March 1765 and to be in force for two years; it eliminated the provision for billeting troops in private houses. Colonial assemblies not only were reluctant to vote money for such a purpose, but they also realized that compliance with this act would be evidence that they acknowledged the right of Parliament to tax them without their consent. They therefore were careful not to meet fully the requirements for supplies or else they furnished them as a gift. In 1766 a second act authorized the use of public houses and unoccupied houses for billets. On 2 June 1774 the act was applied to all the colonies and extended to include occupied dwellings.

SEE ALSO *New York Assembly Suspended*.

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QUARTERMASTERS OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY SEE *Supply of the Continental Army*.

QUEBEC (CANADA INVASION). 31 December 1775–1 January 1776. Lacking siege artillery, faced with expiring enlistments, and unable to bluff the defenders into surrender, General Richard Montgomery determined that his only chance of capturing the fortified city of Quebec was by assault. But with only one thousand men against seventeen hundred assorted defenders, Montgomery would have to surprise the enemy. The operation would have to be undertaken at night and under cover of a snowstorm to permit getting close enough for the assault to have some hope for success. The western walls, facing the Plains of Abraham, being too strong to attack, the final plan called for feints in this area while Arnold and Montgomery converged on the lower town from opposite sides. The latter forces were to link up at Mountain Street, force Prescott Gate, and push their way into the upper town. British General Guy Carleton had, unfortunately for the Americans, seen that the attack would probably be directed against the lower town, and he had organized his defenses accordingly. The Sault-au-matelot, a narrow, winding street that Arnold's column would have to follow to reach the heart of the lower town from the north, was well defended. Astride the route that Montgomery would have to follow to enter the lower town from the other direction, the defenders had erected a blockhouse with a battery, called Pot-Ash, two hundred yards behind it, from which they could deliver cannon and musket fire along the narrow road before them.

On 29 and 30 December 1775, the weather was fair, but signs of bad weather became apparent on the 31st. The sky clouded over during the afternoon, the wind rose, and whiffs of fine snow appeared. Soon after dark a fierce snowstorm was in progress. The rebel forces assembled at 2 A.M. and two hours later were moving out. The feints fizzled out quickly without deceiving Carleton in the least; Colonel James Livingston's small force of Canadians approached St. John's Gate but then broke and ran; and one hundred Massachusetts men under Captain Jacob Brown (brother of John Brown) delivered a sustained

fire against the Cape Diamond bastion, but without any significant effect.

MONTGOMERY'S COLUMN

From his position on the Plains of Abraham, Montgomery led three hundred men of the First New York through the howling blizzard, down a mile of narrow, twisting, snow-choked trail to Wolfe's Cove. From this point they struggled along the river's edge with their cumbersome scaling ladders. The Canadian guards in the blockhouse fled when they saw the rebels approaching. As Montgomery led the advance guard of some twenty men up to the battery, the defenders fired their cannon at near point-blank range, instantly killing Montgomery; Captain John Macpherson, his aide-de-camp; Captain Jacob Cheeseman; and two others. Only Aaron Burr, Edward Antil, and one or two men escaped unhurt. The unheroic Colonel Donald Campbell took command and led the New Yorkers to the rear, leaving Arnold unsupported.

ARNOLD'S COLUMN

Arnold led the vanguard of twenty-five men parallel to the northern wall of Quebec and within fifty yards of its defenders, through the suburb of St. Roque, and toward the Sault-au-matelot's northern end. Captain John Lamb followed with a six-pounder on a sled and forty artillerymen. In single file came the rest of Arnold's command: Virginia riflemen under Captain Dan Morgan and Pennsylvania riflemen under Lieutenant Archibald Steele and Captain William Hendricks. With the exception of Captain Henry Dearborn's company, which was late assembling, the New Englanders, with some forty Canadians and Indians, brought up the rear for a total strength of about six hundred men.

Arnold passed a two-gun battery undetected and was beyond the Palace Gate when the enemy opened fire from the wall. The Americans sustained several casualties as they pushed on another few hundred yards and came up against the first barrier outside the lower town. Lamb's cannon was supposed to be used to batter this down, but it had overturned and been abandoned. Although the weather had rendered most of their muskets useless, the rebels pressed ahead with their attack. Arnold was taken out of action by a leg wound, but Morgan assumed command and carried the first barrier, cutting off and capturing about fifty of its defenders. Morgan was blasted from the top of the first scaling ladder and knocked back into the snow, uninjured, but with his face pocked with grains of burned powder. He roared back to his feet, up the ladder, and over the barrier at the head of his men. The advance guard charged into the Sault-au-matelot to the next barrier, some three hundred yards away. Captain Humphreys led the attack against the next barricade but was killed as

his men were driven back by bayonets, Carleton having been able to move defenders from elsewhere in the city to this position. With the British firing on the attackers from the houses above, Morgan ordered his troops to seek cover in nearby buildings. Before the Americans could effect their retreat, Carleton sent a force of two hundred men with two cannon to block their escape. Dearborn's company was surprised just outside the gate and overwhelmed. Arnold and many of his men managed to get away by fleeing across frozen St. Charles Bay; the remaining attackers, 426 men including Morgan, surrendered around 9 A.M.

Carleton lost five killed and thirteen wounded; the Americans suffered sixty casualties. The loss of Montgomery was a particularly hard blow for the rebels, since he was a general of exceptional promise.

CRITIQUE

Montgomery's attack was audacious and foolhardy, an act of desperation. A coordinated attack in a snowstorm is always a risky enterprise, especially with largely untrained troops. Montgomery refused to consider retreating back to winter bases, feeling that he had a unique opportunity to expel the British from Canada. Hampered by the short enlistments of his soldiers and faced with enormous provisioning difficulties, he hoped that a bold stroke would overwhelm the enemy. Unfortunately for the Americans, Carleton proved a well organized and intelligent opponent.

SEE ALSO *Brown, John; Burr, Aaron; Canada Invasion; Carleton, Guy; Dearborn, Henry; Lamb, John; Montgomery, Richard; Morgan, Daniel.*

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QUEBEC. 6 May 1776. A sortie by General Guy Carleton routed General John Thomas's force of American besiegers. The Americans fled, beginning the collapse of their northern army. Carleton did not pursue them, waiting for the arrival of his reinforcements under the command of General John Burgoyne.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

QUEBEC (STADACONA). Site of an Iroquois village named Stadacona (also called Kanata, the Iroquoian word for village, from which Canada gets its name) when first visited by Jacques Cartier in 1535, the town of Quebec was founded (and named) by Champlain in 1608. When captured by the British in 1629, the village—which served primarily as a trade and missionary center—had only two permanently settled families. Returned to France in 1632, Quebec was unsuccessfully besieged by Sir William Phips in 1690, and a large British expedition under Sir Hovenden Walker was shipwrecked in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in 1711 as it advanced on Quebec. The church Notre Dame des Victoires, begun in 1688 and finished in 1723, commemorates these British failures. The British under General James Wolfe captured Quebec in 1759 and the city passed into British hands, becoming the capital of Canada in 1763. Some 1,500 houses had been built in the Upper and Lower Town by 1775. (Construction of the citadel, located atop the 333-foot Cape Diamond, was not begun until 1823, but the place was well fortified.)

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; Quebec Act.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

QUEBEC ACT. 20 May 1774. Although projected before the destruction of the tea in Boston Harbor that provoked the imperial government to crack down on Massachusetts, the Quebec Act alarmed the colonies as much as did the so-called Intolerable Acts. By extending Canada's boundaries to the Ohio River, it removed from control of the established colonies some of the western territories claimed by Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Virginia. By granting the French Canadians full enjoyment of their religion, it in effect established the Roman Catholic Church in Canada. By recognizing the mechanisms of land tenure that had been used under the French regime, it calmed Canadian nerves about the security of their property. By making the members of the royal council that governed the colony serve at the whim of the king, it strengthened the hand of the royal governor in dealing with the colony's legislature. All of these provisions were rooted in sound governmental reform for a conquered colony that had been under what amounted to military government since 1763. But in the context of the imperial crisis, each provision exacerbated an existing cause of controversy between the established colonies and the mother country. For most Canadians, the reestablishment of familiar customs and traditions made them less resentful of British rule, but because the act also favored

Queen Anne's War

the traditional sources of power in Canadian society, Canadians were not actively loyal to Britain so much as neutral when the American rebels invaded in the summer of 1775.

SEE ALSO *Canada in the Revolution; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts.*

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QUEEN ANNE'S WAR. 1702–1713. British colonists called military operations in North America during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) “Queen Anne’s War,” after Queen Anne.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; Spanish Succession, War of the.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

QUEEN'S ROYAL RANGERS. This name was applied to a proposed Provincial regiment that was to be formed by Dr. John Connolly on the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontiers in the autumn of 1775.

SEE ALSO *Connolly, John.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

QUINBY BRIDGE, SOUTH CAROLINA. 17 July 1781. While General Nathanael Greene's army was resting in the Santee Hills, General Thomas Sumter got authority to employ the forces of Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee and General Francis Marion with his own to attack the outpost at Monck's Corner. The latter position was commanded by Lieutenant John Coates, who had his unseasoned Nineteenth Regiment and some mounted South Carolina rangers led by Major Thomas Fraser. When Sumter attempted a turning movement on 14 July, Coates withdrew to a strong defensive position around Biggin Church. On the afternoon of the 15th, as the Patriots settled into a camp expecting to do battle the next day, Coates launched a

bold attack. Caught off guard—and without proper pickets—Sumter's forces were on the verge of collapse when Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lacey led a counterattack that drove Fraser's Loyalists back to their positions around the church. Sumter again prepared for a difficult assault on Coates's force. But at about 3 A.M. on the morning of the 17th, he set fire to the church and withdrew another eighteen miles down the Cooper River toward Charleston, stopping at Quinby Bridge and placing his troops along the creek. To frustrate a cavalry pursuit he had loosened the flooring of the bridge but was waiting for his rear guard and baggage to cross before removing the planks. Unknown to Coates, Lee had captured his rear guard and the dragoons charged across the bridge, surprising the British and driving off all but Coates and a few men who stood by him. But the planks in the bridge had been loosened by the horses rushing across, creating an impassable gap that prevented anyone else from crossing. The British infantry rallied to their hard-pressed commander, forcing Lee's dragoons to retreat into the adjacent woods.

Marion arrived to reconnoiter with Lee and they decided the enemy position was now too strong to attack, especially as Coates had an artillery piece and they did not. But when Sumter came on the scene with his infantry at about 5 P.M., he overruled them. The British had formed a hollow square with a howitzer covering their front and their flanks protected by outbuildings and the rail fences of Captain Thomas Shubrick's plantation. Sumter formed Marion's infantry on the left, Colonel Thomas Taylor's veteran militia regiment and his own troops in the center, and Colonel Peter Horry's cavalry on the right flank. Taylor charged across an open field and took position along a fence, but the British counterattacked and drove Taylor's militia back. Marion's infantry moved over to reoccupy the fence line but had to withdraw after sustaining fifty casualties and almost exhausting its ammunition supply. Sumter's men, meanwhile, had been firing from the protection of buildings, and he had failed to bring forward his artillery. Furious at this useless sacrifice and at Sumter's failure to support the attack properly, Taylor walked up to his commander and informed him he would no longer serve under him. Marion and Lee, disgusted by Sumter's mismanagement of the approach march and by the abortive attack (in which Lee had not participated), retreated fifteen miles with their dead and wounded. The next morning they both left Sumter. Meanwhile, British reinforcements, numbering about seven hundred men, were on the way to join Coates, and Sumter's position was no longer tenable. The British suffered forty-four casualties, the Americans sixty.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

QUINTON'S BRIDGE, NEW JERSEY.

18 March 1778. Colonel Charles Mawhood embarked on transports on 12 March 1778 and dropped down the Delaware River to forage. His command consisted of British regulars, primarily from the Thirty-Seventh Foot and Forty-Sixth Foot, and Loyalists from the Queen's Rangers (Major John Graves Simcoe) and a detachment from the New Jersey Volunteers (Brigadier Cortlandt Skinner). He put Simcoe ashore at 3 A.M. on 17 March about six miles from Salem, New Jersey, with orders to seize horses and mount his sixty hussars. Simcoe was then to proceed overland to Salem while Mawhood landed directly there with the task force's infantry. Mawhood planned on the next day to sweep four miles southward through the peninsula formed by Salem and Aloes (or Alloway) Creeks. Mawhood expected to find American militia at three bridges that crossed Aloes Creek: Hancock's, nearest to the Delaware River; Quinton's in the middle; and Thompson's farthest upstream. Mobilized men from Cumberland and Salem Counties actually held Hancock's and Quinton's, with Colonel Asher Holmes in command at Quinton's. Mawhood planned to put screening parties to watch the two bridges while the bulk of his force carried out the foraging. But he also sent a force to Thompson's to move downstream on the Salem side of the creek to try to surprise the defenders of Quinton's, who would have seen only the screening party.

Mawhood accompanied Simcoe to Thompson's on 18 March and proceeded down the road paralleling the creek until he got within two hundred yards of the bridge. Messengers established contact with the screening party (seventy men from the Seventeenth Foot) and learned that the Americans were behind some breastworks on the steep opposite bank but that they had not occupied Wetherby's Tavern on the near bank. Captain Francis Stephenson moved through an orchard and occupied the tavern with his light infantry company of the Queen's Rangers without being detected; two other companies took cover behind a

fence under the command of Captain John Saunders. The rest of the task force remained in some woods behind Saunders's position. Once everyone was in place, Mawhood had the detachment of the Seventeenth make a show of calling in their sentries and retreating down the road toward Salem. Holmes's men were taken in by the deception, and about two hundred of them replaced the planks on the bridge and crossed over in two groups to follow the retreating party.

A mounted officer went ahead of the first militia group and was passing the fence when one of the rangers started to laugh. He wheeled and started to gallop back to warn the militiamen but was quickly shot off his horse and captured. Saunders's men charged forward while Stephenson's poured out of the house. Cut off, the lead militia force retreated downstream through open fields, pursued by the mounted hussars and Mawhood's main body. Simcoe moved up to the bridge with the detachment of the Seventeenth and the Queen's Rangers' companies of grenadiers and Highlanders. The Americans fell back from the heights; Mawhood decided not to risk crossing and instead led the force back to Salem. One American was killed and the officer (who turned out to be a French volunteer) and several others were captured. Mawhood had one man mortally wounded. Simcoe believed that a large number of Americans were drowned trying to cross the creek, but there is no confirmation of this. Mawhood next attacked Hancock's Bridge on 21 March.

SEE ALSO *Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey; Mawhood, Charles; Simcoe, John Graves.*

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RAID. In the strict strategic or tactical sense, a raid differs from other offensive operations in that the attacker does not intend to hold the objective once he has taken it. Raids can be on a small (tactical) scale, to capture prisoners, knock out gun positions, or disrupt an enemy attack before it starts (a “spoiling attack”). Examples are the operations against Great Brewster Island, Massachusetts, during the Boston siege, and Abercromby’s sortie during the Yorktown siege. Strategic raids were those to Lexington and Concord, Bennington, and Paulus Hook. The attack on Stony Point on 16 July 1779 was not planned as a raid, but Washington subsequently decided that the captured position could not be held, so it turned out to be a raid after all.

SEE ALSO *Bennington Raid; Great Brewster Island, Massachusetts; Lexington and Concord; Paulus Hook, New Jersey; Stony Point, New York.*

Mark M. Boatner

RAKE. To fire down the length of a vessel’s deck. This is the sailor’s equivalent of the soldier’s enfilade.

SEE ALSO *Enfilade.*

Mark M. Boatner

RALL, JOHANN GOTTLIEB. (1720?–1776). Hessian colonel at Trenton. Born in Hesse-Kassel,

probably in 1720, he was a veteran of the Seven Years’ War and was proud of having subsequently fought the Turks in the army of Russian general Alexis Orloff. Rall made the journey to America with his regiment when they were hired from the elector of Hesse-Kassel in 1776 by the British. He led his regiment with vigor and distinction at White Plains and Fort Washington. Ignorant of English and contemptuous of the poorly trained American soldiers, Rall was given command of the isolated yet critical outpost at Trenton. He was mortally wounded in Washington’s attack on Trenton on 26 December 1776, dying later that day.

SEE ALSO *Fort Washington, New York; Trenton, New Jersey; White Plains, New York.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

RAMSAY, DAVID. (1749–1815). Historian, physician, politician. Pennsylvania-South Carolina. Born in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, on 2 April 1749, Ramsay graduated from Princeton in 1765, studied medicine with Benjamin Rush, and obtained his degree from the College of Pennsylvania in 1772. In 1773 he opened his practice in Charleston. Although successful as a doctor, he soon became absorbed in local politics and represented Charleston in the legislature from 1776 to the end of the

war, also serving on the governor's council. He served as a physician with the South Carolina troops at the sieges of Savannah in 1779 and Charleston in 1780. After the fall of the latter city, the British exiled Ramsay and thirty-two other eminent Charlestonians to St. Augustine. The following year these exiles were released and sent to Philadelphia. Ramsay was a delegate to the Continental Congress in 1782–1783 and 1785–1786. While John Hancock dallied over accepting the office of president of Congress, the delegates in New York City created the post of "Chairman of Congress" and elected Ramsay to fill it. He held this title until Nathaniel Gorham was elected president of Congress on 6 June 1786. As a delegate he supported moves to strengthen the central government. From 1784 to 1790 he was again in the South Carolina House of Representatives, and from 1791 to 1797 he sat in the state senate, serving as president of that body the entire time. A delegate to the South Carolina ratifying convention, Ramsay was a firm supporter of the Constitution. A moderate Federalist and representative of the Tidewater class, he opposed the issue of paper money, the easing of the obligations of debtors, and the importation of slaves. When he ran for the U.S. House in 1788 and the Senate in 1794, his support for his brother-in-law John Laurens's plan to enlist black troops during the Revolution came back to haunt him, and he was defeated as a suspected opponent of slavery.

Although able, honest, and influential in public affairs, he was inept in matters of personal finance and by 1798 had bankrupted himself by unwise and disorderly speculation and investment. As a doctor he subscribed to the unfortunate "system" of his friend Rush, but nevertheless he made important contributions to medical knowledge.

Despite his distinction as a doctor and political leader, Ramsay is best remembered as an historian. With a facile pen and a copious memory, he turned out a number of works. His several histories of the Revolutionary period, most particularly the *History of the American Revolution* (2 vols., 1789), set the national narrative of the war for the next several generations and went part way towards Ramsay's goal of crafting a national identity. But as he correctly predicted, slavery would undermine that goal. Ramsay died 8 May 1815, two days after being shot in the back by a maniac against whose sanity he had testified.

SEE ALSO *Hancock, John; Rush, Benjamin.*

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RAMSAY, NATHANIEL. (1741–1817). Congressional officer, politician. Maryland. The elder brother of David Ramsay, Nathaniel Ramsay was born in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, on 1 May 1741. Graduating from Princeton in 1767 (two years later than the brother, who was eight years his junior), he studied law and settled in Cecil County, Maryland. In 1775 he was a delegate to the Maryland Convention and to the Continental Congress. On 14 January 1776 he was chosen captain in Smallwood's Maryland regiment. The next July that unit became part of the Continental army and distinguished itself at Long Island in August 1776. On 10 December 1776, Ramsay was commissioned its lieutenant colonel when the regiment was redesignated the Third Maryland, "Smallwood's Regiment." Ramsay is particularly famous for his role in checking the retreat of the American army at Monmouth on 28 June 1778, giving Washington time to rally his army. Ramsay was wounded, left for dead, and captured. On parole until his exchange on 14 December 1780, he retired from the army on 1 January 1781.

Returning to Congress where his brother David also was serving, from 1785 to 1787, he became U.S. marshal for the district of Maryland in 1790. Four years later he became naval officer of the Baltimore district, a position he held until his death on 23 October 1817.

SEE ALSO *Ramsay, David.*

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RAMSEUR'S MILL, NORTH CAROLINA. 20 June 1780. Also known as Ramsour's, Ramsauer's, and Ramsay's Mill. The surrender of Charleston on 12 May 1780 and the establishment of British posts at Camden, Cheraw, and Ninety Six made it

apparent that the Revolutionary War was about to move into North Carolina. During the four preceding years there had been only one military engagement in the state, the Battle of Moores Creek Bridge, on 27 February 1776, and that humiliating Loyalist defeat had left the Patriots more or less in control of the state. But in the summer of 1780 the North Carolina Loyalists believed the time had come to rise up and even some scores. Although General Charles Cornwallis expressed the desire that the Loyalists delay their military activities until the wheat crop was harvested, thereby avoiding another premature uprising and also assuring provisions for his invading army, the North Carolina Loyalists did not wait. Colonel John Moore, returning to Ramseur's Mill in June after serving under Cornwallis in South Carolina, called a meeting of the area's leading Loyalists on 10 June at his father's house. Before the forty men left the meeting, at which Moore revealed Cornwallis's plan for pushing northward into the state, they learned that Major Joseph McDowell was approaching with a company of rebel militia. The Loyalists made an unsuccessful attempt to surprise McDowell. Moore then issued instructions for Loyalists to assemble at Ramseur's Mill. By 20 June he had thirteen hundred men, although one-quarter were unarmed.

The Patriots, meanwhile, had responded to General Griffith Rutherford's call for militia. While eight hundred gathered near Charlotte, Colonel Francis Locke assembled another four hundred at Mountain Creek, near Moore's camp, and on 19 June moved out to surprise the Loyalists. His column was led by three small groups of mounted men; the rest of his force, most of whom had never served in combat, followed in a double file.

Moore's men were camped on a hill about three hundred yards from the mill and half a mile north of the village later known as Lincolnton. At the approach of the rebel horsemen, a twelve-man outpost fired and fled six hundred yards to the Loyalist camp, which they threw into confusion. But the Loyalists had a clear field of fire facing downhill, and they easily repulsed the horsemen when the latter tried to charge up the hill. The unarmed Loyalists fled, but the others formed together and marched on the approaching militia. Neither side had much in the way of organization or command, and the battle consisted mostly of small groups clustering together, moving and firing at will. The Loyalists retreated back up the hill, followed by most of the rebels, some of whom worked their way around to the other side of the hill. Neither side had bayonets; lack of uniforms or insignia made it difficult to tell friend from foe, and many a skull was cracked by a "friendly" musket butt. Loyalist Captain Daniel Warlick rallied his men time and again to counterattack, but William Shays, seeing this, worked his way stealthily forward until he was in position to drop Warlick with a bullet. The Loyalist resistance faltered but rallied behind a creek at the base of the hill.

Locke could re-form only 110 of his original 400 men on the hill for the expected counterattack, and he sent an urgent message to Rutherford to hurry forward with the column from Charlotte. But the Loyalists had had enough. Moore joined Cornwallis at Camden with only thirty men.

Not more than 275 of Locke's 400 were actually engaged, but over 150 were killed and wounded; Loyalist losses were about the same, and they had approximately 700 engaged. Both forces dissolved after the battle; even the victorious Patriots simply drifted home afterward, and Locke was unable to organize any sort of pursuit.

Moore's abortive action was a disaster for the British cause, and Cornwallis threatened to court-martial him for violating instructions. When Cornwallis finally did get into North Carolina, most Loyalists were afraid to support him, and the British lost more by desertion than they gained in recruits.

SEE ALSO *Moores Creek Bridge*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

RANDOLPH, EDMUND JENINGS. (1753–1813). Statesman, U.S. attorney general and secretary of state. Virginia. Born on 10 August 1753 in Williamsburg, Virginia, Randolph attended William and Mary College and studied law with his father. When the war started, his parents left immediately for England. Randolph did not share their politics and joined the Continental army at Cambridge, becoming Washington's aide-de-camp on 15 August 1775. With the sudden death of his uncle, Peyton Randolph, on 22 October 1775, Edmund Randolph left the army and returned to Williamsburg. The next year he sat in the Virginia Convention, serving on the committee that drafted the state's constitution and Declaration of Rights. He became the state's first attorney general the same year. Holding this office until 1786, Randolph went to the Continental Congress in 1779. He soon resigned, but returned to Congress for most of 1781, where he befriended James Madison. On 7 November 1786 he defeated Richard Henry Lee and Theodorick Bland to become governor, and he led his state's delegation to the Federal Convention in 1787. He joined George Mason in refusing to sign the completed Constitution, believing that it was not sufficiently republican, but he suddenly reversed his position at the start of Virginia's ratifying convention in 1788, arguing strenuously that if Virginia did not ratify the Constitution, the United States would cease to exist. Shortly after the Convention ratified the Constitution, Randolph resigned as governor to enter the state legislature and take part in revising the Virginia legal code.

Washington appointed Randolph the nation's first attorney general in 1789. Later, Randolph succeeded Jefferson as secretary of state, holding that post in 1794–1795. After serving creditably through the storms of "Citizen" Genet's and Gouverneur Morris's recalls and the negotiations that led to Jay's Treaty, Randolph resigned on 19 August 1795. He had been charged by French minister Fauchet, Genet's successor, with improper conduct in negotiating the treaty; the charges, contained in a letter from Fauchet to his government that had been intercepted and revealed by the British, were subsequently found to be false. Returning to law practice, he served as senior defense counsel in the treason trial of Aaron Burr. He died at one of his plantations near Millwood, Virginia, on 12 September 1813.

SEE ALSO *Randolph, Peyton*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

RANDOLPH, PEYTON. (1721–1775). Crown official, first president of the Continental Congress. Virginia. Born in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1721, Randolph was the son of the wealthy and powerful Sir John Randolph. He went from William and Mary College, from which he did not graduate, to the Middle Temple in 1739 and was admitted to the bar in 1744. Returning the same year to Williamsburg as the colony's attorney general, he served in the House of Burgesses from 1748 until the termination of that assembly in 1775. When Randolph took the burgess's side in the pistole controversy of 1751–1754, he was dismissed as attorney general. In 1755 he organized a company of one hundred lawyers and other gentlemen who, at their own expense, moved out to support the survivors of Braddock's defeat. A major speculator in western lands, Randolph saw opportunity in the American conflict with the British Crown, overcoming his fear of the radical tendencies of some of his allies to become a leader of the Patriot cause. Randolph was elected speaker of the Burgesses in 1766, holding that office until he adjourned its last session in May 1775. Chairing the first three Virginia Conventions in 1774 and 1775, he topped the list of delegates to the first Continental Congress and became the first president of that body, serving from 5 September to 21 October 1774. In bad health, Randolph was succeeded by Henry Middleton on 22 October 1774 but was reelected to Congress on 10 May 1775. Two weeks later he had to

give up this post, and five months later he died suddenly of apoplexy in Philadelphia on 22 October 1775. Randolph exemplified the manner in which even conservative political leaders were attracted to the rebellion against British rule. Many Virginians looked to him to keep the insurgency in check and guide it away from radicalism.

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
RANDOLPH FAMILY OF VIRGINIA.

The first William Randolph (c.1651–1711), an English gentleman, came to Virginia from Warwickshire around 1673 and in 1684 bought lands on the south bank of the James River that had been known from earliest colonial times as Turkey Island. By 1705 he owned ten thousand acres in Henrico County alone, and he willed a plantation to each of his seven sons. Meanwhile he had held a number of official appointments, including that of King's Attorney (an office subsequently held by his son John and the latter's two sons) and in 1699 he had been appointed lieutenant colonel of militia. Sometime prior to 1681 he married into the Isham family of "Bermuda Hundred," and the descendants of Colonel William and Mary Isham Randolph included not only those who retained the family name but also Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, Henry "Light-Horse Harry" Lee, and the latter's son, Robert E. Lee. Colonel Randolph was among the founders (in 1693) of the College of William and Mary. Six of his seven sons attended the college, as did Jefferson and Marshall.

SEE ALSO *Randolph, Edmund Jenings; Randolph, Peyton*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

RANK AND FILE. In both the American and British armies, the term "rank and file" meant the enlisted men present in the line of battle with weapons in their hands ready to fight, including corporals and privates but not sergeants and drummers. In tactical terms, "rank" referred to the men standing more or less shoulder to shoulder facing forward next to each other and forming the front of a unit. In the linear formations used until the middle of the nineteenth century, a unit could be drawn up with a depth of several ranks. Every effort was devoted



Randolph Family of Virginia. THE GALE GROUP

to maximizing the firepower that could be brought to bear on the ground directly ahead of the unit. In a three-rank formation, for example, the front rank would kneel (either ready to fire or presenting bayonets to hold off cavalry), the second rank would stand and fire in the gaps of the first rank, and the third rank would stand and fire in the gaps of the second rank, over the heads of the men in the first rank. Gradually from the last decades of the seventeenth century, the number of ranks was reduced, as commanders experimented with gaining breadth of formation at the expense of depth, until by the time of the War for American Independence, regiments in formal battle order in North America were typically arrayed in a depth of two ranks, the rear rank firing in the gaps of the front rank. "File" referred to the group of soldiers standing more or less directly behind each other, from the front rank to the rear rank of the formation.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

RANKIN, WILLIAM. Loyalist leader. Pennsylvania. Until the Declaration of Independence, this influential landowner, judge, member of the assembly, and colonel of militia in York, Pennsylvania, had been a Whig. He then secretly switched sides, continuing to command a regiment of militia while looking for an

opportunity to serve the crown. When ordered in 1776 to capture certain Loyalists of York County and destroy their estates, he contrived instead to assist them while giving the appearance of obeying his instructions. In 1778 he started organizing the Loyalists of Lancaster and York Counties, and eventually those of adjacent regions of Maryland and Delaware as well, until he claimed that six thousand would answer his call for an uprising, almost certainly a wishful exaggeration. Rankin established an intelligence network, maintaining contact with General Henry Clinton through his brother-in-law, Andrew Fürstner, and dealing with John André through Christopher Sower. When General John Sullivan's expedition of 1779 against the Iroquois was being planned, Rankin and other Loyalist leaders tried unsuccessfully to have one of their supporters put in command of the Pennsylvania militia that was to accompany the regulars. "If this can be obtained, of which they have the fairest prospects," Sower informed Clinton, "Colonel [John] Butler will have little to fear." Sower also told Clinton that if he would direct that Butler make a raid on Carlisle, where the principal rebel supply depot was located, Rankin and his supporters could not only assist in this operation but could also arm themselves for future action.

After André's death, Rankin and his associates in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland sent an address to the king through John Graves Simcoe—who had been André's friend and in whom they apparently had more

confidence than Clinton—proposing that Simcoe lead an operation into the Chesapeake Bay area to rally the local Loyalists. Simcoe forwarded this communication to Clinton on 2 November 1780, and the British commander in chief ordered Arnold and Simcoe to conduct a raid in Virginia in December 1780 that Clinton supposed might partly satisfy the hopes of Rankin's supporters. But the Pennsylvania Loyalists did not rise.

Rankin was imprisoned in March 1781 but escaped to New York City within a month. Again he urged operations to the south, and on 30 April 1781, Clinton wrote Phillips in Virginia: "I do not now send Colonel Rankin to you (as I at first proposed), but I enclose his proposals. You will see by them that he is not much of an officer. But he appears to be a plain sensible man worth attending to, and Simcoe can explain a thousand things respecting him and his association which I cannot in a letter." Rankin made one brief visit to Virginia, where Cornwallis had arrived to take command, and finding no support from Cornwallis for a campaign into Pennsylvania, he returned to New York. Three years of planning an uprising had come to nothing. When the British evacuated New York in November 1783, Rankin went to England, where he lived on a pension of £120 a year and was awarded £2,320 to cover the loss of property confiscated by Pennsylvania.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Butler, John; Sower, Christopher.*

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RASTEL, PHILIPPE FRANÇOIS, SIEUR DE ROCHEBLAVE.

(c.1735–1802). A French soldier who came to Quebec during the Seven Years' War, serving primarily in the Ohio region, including at Kaskaskia. After the war he transferred his allegiance to the Spanish, commanding the troops in the Illinois country. In 1773 he fell out with the Spanish governor and became commandant of Kaskaskia for the British. He was captured there at Fort Gage by George Rogers Clark on the evening of 4 July 1778. Sent to prison in Virginia, he was paroled and returned to New York City about a year later. After the war he settled in Montreal, serving as a member of the assembly from 1792 until his death in 1802.

SEE ALSO *Western Operations.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

RATHBUN, JOHN PECK.

(1746–1823). Continental naval officer. Rhode Island. Having gone to sea as a boy, this virtually unknown officer (whose name is also spelled Rathburne and Rathbourne) served almost continuously on the *Providence* (twelve guns), first under John Hazard and then under John Paul Jones, taking command in May 1777. In a raid on the Bahamas he captured Nassau with his fifty-man crew, held it three days, liberated thirty American prisoners, and without the loss of a man withdrew with two captured schooners, a sixteen-gun ship, a brig, and a considerable quantity of war matériel. A year later he assumed command of the *Queen of France* (twenty-eight guns). In mid-July 1779 he was with Abraham Whipple when three American ships made one of the richest captures of the war.

Rathbun was captured with Whipple's small fleet at Charleston on 12 May 1780. Paroled, he returned to Boston and on 4 August 1781 got command of the brig *Wexford*, a twenty-gun privateer. Little more is known of Rathbun.

SEE ALSO *Whipple, Abraham.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

RAVELIN. An outwork of two faces, pointed toward the enemy, open to the rear like a *flèche* or *redan* but placed outside the ditch of a fortification to cover the portion of the wall between two bastions (the curtain).

SEE ALSO *Flèche; Redan.*

Mark M. Boatner

RAWDON-HASTINGS, FRANCIS.

(1754–1826). British officer, later the first Marquess of Hastings and the second Earl of Moira. He was a distinguished soldier in the War for America, serving seven years with only one short furlough, and was still in his twenties when he went home, in 1781. Of noble ancestry, he was the son of John, Baron Rawdon, later the first Earl of Moira, and Lady Elizabeth Hastings, daughter of the ninth Earl of Huntingdon. In America, he was known by the courtesy title of Lord Rawdon. A tall, stately, grave man, he loved the profession of arms and exuded a soldierly air. He was educated at Harrow, and on 7 August 1771 entered the army as an ensign in the Fifteenth Regiment. On 23 October he also entered University College, Oxford, where he studied for two years. In 1773, he toured the continent in the company of his uncle, Lord Huntingdon.

He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant in the Fifth Regiment on 20 October 1773, and on 7 May 1774 he accompanied his regiment to Boston, Massachusetts.

EDUCATION AS A SOLDIER

Lord Rawdon reached Boston in July, when tensions between the colonies and Britain were escalating. General Thomas Gage commanded there. He joined the grenadier company of the Fifth Regiment, commanded by Captain George Harris, to replace a wounded lieutenant. In the battle of Bunker Hill on 17 June, he came under fire for the first time. Although he survived without a scratch, he received a bullet through his hat. When Captain Harris was wounded, Rawdon took command of the grenadiers and performed gallantly under fire. General John Burgoyne declared that Rawdon made his military reputation for life on that day. He was promoted captain in the Sixty-third Regiment on 12 July, and during the following winter performed in amateur theatricals. On 13 January he was appointed aide-de-camp to General Henry Clinton, and also deputy adjutant general. He served with Clinton during operations against North Carolina in May 1776, and in June observed abortive assaults by Clinton and Rear Admiral Sir Peter Parker on Charleston.

Rawdon returned with Clinton to New York in July 1776, arriving just in time to join General William Howe, the new British commander in chief, in opening his campaign. He was with Clinton at the battles of Long Island on 27 August, Kips Bay on 15 September, and White Plains on 28 October. During this time Clinton and his staff, Rawdon included, achieved a reputation for military excellence among British officers. In early December he joined Clinton in successful operations against Rhode Island, after which the two officers went home to Britain for the winter. Returning to New York on 5 July 1777, they remained there when Howe sailed southward with the main army to attack Philadelphia. Rawdon was with Clinton during successful attacks on America's highland forts in early October, and on 7 October was dispatched to Howe's headquarters in Philadelphia with the news. After a few weeks' stay there, he returned to New York, where he spent the winter of 1777–1778. On 1 May 1778 he accompanied Clinton to Philadelphia, when Clinton assumed command of British armies in America.

With Clinton's encouragement, Lord Rawdon began raising a provincial regiment of Loyalists on 25 May. Recruiting this corps, the Volunteers of Ireland, from Irish deserters from the American army, Rawdon assumed most of the expenses involved. He was appointed its commander with the provincial rank of colonel. The Volunteers of Ireland proved to be one of the most effective provincial corps in British service. On 15 June Rawdon also was promoted permanent lieutenant colonel and appointed adjutant general. In the battle of Monmouth on 28 June,

during the British retreat across New Jersey, Rawdon formed the British line of battle for Clinton, and performed other services. In July, after reaching New York City, he served temporarily on board the flagship of Admiral Lord Richard Howe. He accompanied Clinton and General Charles Grey a month later, when they went to the relief of the British garrison at Rhode Island.

During the next few months, Rawdon and Clinton gradually became estranged. On one occasion Clinton even publicly chastised Rawdon for supposed *gaucheries* in protocol. On 3 September 1779 Rawdon angrily resigned as adjutant general. He was left behind on 26 December when Clinton embarked with 7,600 men for his second expedition to Charleston. But in March 1780, Rawdon was ordered southward with a reinforcement of 2,500 soldiers. He joined Lord Charles Cornwallis's forces, and on 25 April assisted in capturing rebel works on Lempriere's and Haddrell's Points.

After Charleston's surrender on 12 May Rawdon was given command of a British garrison of 2,500 men at Camden. There he battled partisans, and in August he maneuvered against an American army led by Horatio Gates as it approached Camden. On 14 August, General Charles Cornwallis, who assumed command in the South after Clinton returned to New York, took charge of Rawdon's forces. Two days later, in the battle of Camden, Rawdon commanded the British left wing, acquitting himself well against Gates's regulars. He accompanied Cornwallis's army as it advanced to Charlotte in October, and as it fell back to Winnsboro after Patrick Ferguson was defeated at Kings Mountain on 7 October. Because Cornwallis was ill with a fever during the withdrawal, Rawdon was given temporary command. In the winter of 1780–1781 he commanded once more at Camden.

THE MATURE OFFICER

On 1 January 1781 Cornwallis invaded North Carolina, leaving Rawdon in command of the 8,000 British troops in South Carolina and Georgia. Promoted brigadier general in America at this time, Rawdon did not receive his commission before he departed America in August 1781. In South Carolina during the next few months, Rawdon came into his own as a soldier, demonstrating outstanding generalship against his able opponent, Nathanael Greene. After Cornwallis and Greene fought the battle of Guilford Courthouse on 15 March 1781, Cornwallis remained in North Carolina while Greene marched against Rawdon at Camden. Rawdon was gradually isolated there as Greene, Thomas Sumter, Francis Marion, and Henry Lee attacked his supply lines to Charleston. On 25 April, Rawdon and Greene fought the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, just north of Camden. Although Rawdon defeated Greene in a brilliantly conducted battle, he was compelled to abandon Camden on 10 May.

Retreating to Monck's Corner, thirty miles above Charleston, Rawdon gradually abandoned or lost most of his posts in South Carolina and Georgia. He contracted his defensive lines to protect Charleston and Savannah, and awaited expected reinforcements from Ireland. In late May he learned that Greene had besieged Ninety Six, and that its garrison of 550 New York Loyalists refused to surrender. On 3 June he received the reinforcements, 1,800 troops from Ireland, and marched to the relief of Ninety Six. Arriving on 21 June, he learned that Greene had retired northward the day before. On 3 July he abandoned Ninety Six and marched to Orangeburg. His health having been destroyed by a virulent fever, he turned over his command to Colonel Alexander Stewart on 20 July, and sailed for England on 21 August. His ship was seized by a French privateer, and he spent the next four months in captivity before his release was secured. In 1782 he successfully defended himself in Parliament against charges that he had acted with excessive cruelty in executing an American prisoner, Isaac Hayne, without trial. He was appointed lieutenant colonel of the 105th Regiment (formerly the Volunteers of Ireland) on 21 March 1782. On 20 November he was promoted permanent colonel and appointed aide-de-camp to the king.

LATER CAREER

Upon his return to England, Rawdon began a thirty-two year career as a politician by being elected to the Irish House of Commons. After his elevation to a barony on 5 March 1783, he became a member of the British House of Lords. At first a supporter of the Whigs, he later represented the interests of the Prince of Wales. He was master general of the ordnance in the Grenville ministry from 1806 to 1807, and attempted without success to form his own ministry in 1812. He succeeded as Earl of Moira on 20 June 1793, and on 12 October was promoted major general. In 1794 he served with distinction in the Duke of York's army in Flanders, battling the French. He was promoted lieutenant general on 1 January 1798, and general on 25 September 1803. He commanded in Scotland from February 1803 to February 1805. He was appointed colonel of the Twenty-seventh Regiment on 21 May 1804, and made constable of the Tower on 1 March 1806. He married Flora, Countess of Loudoun in 1804; they had six children. He was invested with the Order of the Garter on 12 June 1812.

Rawdon (now Lord Moira) was exceedingly extravagant with money. During his lifetime he squandered a huge estate and ran up debts of almost £1,000,000 in early nineteenth-century currency. By 1812 he was compelled to seek employment as governor-general of India. During his service in India, from 1813 to 1823, he prosecuted two successful wars: the Nepal War, 1814–1816, and the Third Maratha War, 1817–1819. In February

1817 he was created Marquess of Hastings, and twice received unanimous votes of thanks from Parliament. He implemented reforms in education, the press, and the judiciary. Additionally, he increased the annual profits of the East India Company. Coming under suspicion of giving special favors to his friends, although not guilty, he was removed from office. In 1824 he was given a sinecure, the governorship of Malta, and there ended his career of public service.

During his long and active life, Rawdon's first love was the military, and he developed into a sound strategist, tactician, and leader of men. In both America and India, he manifested the highest levels of military ability, organizing and directing armies to triumphs on the battlefield. He deserves his high reputation as a soldier.

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revised by Paul David Nelson

RAWLINGS'S REGIMENT. Colonel Moses Rawlings commanded one of the sixteen "additional Continental regiments."

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments*.

Mark M. Boatner

READ, CHARLES. (1715–1780). American deserter. New Jersey. Born in Philadelphia on 1 February 1715, Read succeeded his father as collector of the port of Burlington, New Jersey. He became a lawyer in 1753 and served several terms as mayor of Burlington. In the early 1760s he was appointed a judge on the New Jersey supreme court, holding that position and the collector's

post until the start of the Revolution, when he resigned to serve as a colonel of militia. In 1776 he attended the convention that framed New Jersey's constitution and on 18 July was made colonel of a battalion of the flying camp. For reasons unknown, Read went over to the British in December 1776. He died in North Carolina in 1780.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

READ, GEORGE. (1733–1798). Lawyer, Signer, acting president of Delaware. Born in Cecil County, Maryland, on 18 September 1733, Read studied law in Philadelphia; was admitted to the bar in 1753; and settled in New Castle, Delaware. In 1763 he was elected attorney general of Delaware, holding this post for the next decade. Read's politics matched those of his close friend, John Dickinson. He was active in resisting British authority, being a leader of his province's committees of correspondence. In the Continental Congress from 1774 until September 1777, he opposed independence but became a Signer and enthusiastic supporter of the Declaration of Independence once it was adopted. He played a prominent part in shaping the state constitution and in 1776 became vice president of Delaware. When President John McKinly was captured by the British at Wilmington in September 1777, Read left Philadelphia to take over his duties and performed them until being relieved, at his own request, on 31 March 1778. He is credited with getting the maximum possible support of the war effort out of a lukewarm people and an inexperienced, incompletely organized legislature.

Continuing as a member of the Delaware Council, he played a prominent part in postwar politics. As an upholder of the rights of small states at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and sharing the ideas of Hamilton for the strongest possible central government, he nevertheless accepted the Convention's compromises and is credited for his state's being the first to ratify the Constitution. Elected to the first U.S. Senate in 1788, Read supported the Washington administration on the assumption of state debts, the national bank, and the excise law. On 18 September 1793, Read resigned from the Senate to become chief justice of Delaware, a post he held until his death on 21 September 1798.

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READ, JAMES. (1743–1822). Militia officer, naval commissioner. Delaware. One of the Read brothers, James Read first served with the Pennsylvania militia, seeing combat at Trenton, Princeton, Brandywine, and Germantown and rising to the rank of major. On 4 November 1778 he was appointed one of three naval commissioners for the middle states, and on 11 January 1781 he was invested with sole power to conduct the navy board.

SEE ALSO *Read Brothers of Delaware*.

revised by Frank C. Mevers

READ, THOMAS. (1740?–1788). American naval officer. Delaware. The third of the Read brothers, he was master of vessels in the West Indies and Atlantic trade prior to being commissioned captain of the Pennsylvania navy on 23 October 1775. Commodore of thirteen rowing galleys initially, he took command of the newly purchased *Montgomery* in March 1776 and was stationed at Fort Island to guard the *chevaux de frise* (chains for blocking passage). On 5 June he became eighth-ranking captain in the Continental navy and was assigned to command the frigate *George Washington*. This vessel not being completed when the British pushed Washington back to the Delaware, Read marched on 5 December with a naval battery to join the army and took part in the defense of Assumpink Creek, near Trenton, the afternoon of 2 January 1777. When the British captured Philadelphia, Read and his superior, John Barry, dismantled and scuttled their ships, the *Washington* and *Effingham*, just below Bordentown in December 1777, and on 7 May 1778 they were destroyed by the British. Read saw little sea duty during the remainder of the war. In April 1778 he was in Baltimore fitting out the fast brigantine *Baltimore*, apparently making a single voyage in that ship. In February 1779 he was ordered to take station in the Chesapeake. Later in the year he was put in command of the frigate *Bourbon* being built in Connecticut, but the vessel was never completed. In 1780 he took out the privateer *Patty of Philadelphia*, and he was at sea in 1782. As captain of the frigate *Alliance*, purchased by his friend Robert Morris, Read made a remarkably fast trip to China by a new route east of the Dutch Indies. He left Philadelphia on 7 June 1787, reached Canton on 22 December, and was back at Philadelphia on 17 September 1788 with a tea cargo valued at \$500,000. He died five weeks later.

SEE ALSO *Princeton, New Jersey; Read Brothers of Delaware*.

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READ BROTHERS OF DELAWARE.

Their father, John (1688–1756), a descendant of Sir Thomas Read of Berkshire, emigrated from Dublin, Ireland, in the early eighteenth century and became a large landholder in Maryland and Delaware. With six associates he established Charlestown at the head of Chesapeake Bay as a trade rival to Baltimore. Soon after 1734 he moved to nearby New Castle, Delaware. He and Mary Howell had three distinguished sons, George (b. 1733), Thomas (b. 1740?), and James (b. 1743). Another son, William, was in business in Havana. The Read brothers were closely associated with Robert Morris during and after the Revolution.

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RECRUITING IN GREAT BRIT-


AIN. At the time of the American Revolution, the strength of the British army was augmented in various ways. The most important, because it produced the majority of recruits, was the voluntary enlistment of individuals. The War Office issued to an existing regiment a set of “beating orders,” whereupon the regiment would send out recruiting parties, usually an officer, several noncommissioned officers, and a drummer, who beat his drum to attract a crowd that the officer would then harangue in hopes of persuading eligible men “to take the king’s shilling,” as enlistment was colloquially known. A recruit had to be a Protestant, free from rupture and fits, “in no way troubled by lameness . . . but have the perfect use of his limbs,” and not be a runaway apprentice or a militia man (Houlding, p. 117n). In times of high manpower demand, substantial bounties and a reduced time of service (during the war, rather than for life) might be offered. In peacetime, coercion was used to force into military service some of those who had run afoul of the law, but its principal use was to enable justices of the peace and constables to compel the unemployed (the “idle and disorderly”) into the ranks (ibid., p. 118). Wartime shortages frequently led to the enactment of a Press Act (as in 1778–1779), the principal purpose of which was “never simply to take up the rogues, vagabonds, and others socially undesirable but

rather *pour encourager les autres*—to drive others to volunteer for fear of being pressed” (ibid., p. 118). (Volunteers had the choice of which regiment they would join, at least initially, while draftees had none.)

The process of recruiting individuals led to a slow growth in the number of men under arms. Military service was not popular most of the time, even less so when the opponents were colonial Americans. Soldier pay was low (eight pence a day for a private), discipline could be brutal, living conditions could be miserable, and life aboard a transport bound for overseas service could be extremely taxing. Ireland, normally a good recruiting area, was enjoying a rare prosperity and thus was a source of fewer recruits than in prior years. Individual recruiting, however, did have the advantage of introducing individuals into an existing structure and tradition of training and discipline. George III insisted that the army be recruited this way at the start of the War for American Independence, both to preserve the old corps and to safeguard the value of the commissions of officers in those regiments against an influx of officers from newly raised corps.

The alternative to individual recruitment was a throwback to the days when colonels owned the regiments they raised and acted as a subcontractor by, in effect, renting their regiment to the army. The crown would contract with a distinguished officer or prominent civilian to raise a regiment as an entirety, giving him beating orders and bounty money for each recruit, and the right to sub-subcontract to company officers who were confirmed in their rank only when they had recruited a specified number of soldiers. This process, called “raising for rank,” was employed only once early in the war, to create the hard-fighting Seventy-first Regiment of Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders), but it became more common after 1778, when the need for complete regiments outweighed the king’s scruples. Burgoyne’s surrender and the entry of France into the war spurred voluntary mobilization in Britain; thirty-one regiments of foot were formed between 1778 and 1781, many of them in Scotland and most for domestic service.

The quickest way of augmenting the British army also had traditional roots: hiring complete regiments of well-trained professional soldiers from various German principalities. Only by hiring German auxiliaries was Britain able to send Major General William Howe’s enormous expeditionary force against New York City in 1776. This heavy reliance on German troops diminished after 1778, when France entered the war. By 1781, only 9 percent of British army expenditures was used to hire Germans, compared with 24 percent in 1760, at the height of the Seven Years’ War. According to Stephen Conway, “The Germans had become proportionately less important because more Britons and Irishmen than ever before went into uniform, and significant numbers of these



British Recruiting Poster. This poster, published in 1781, depicts British soldiers and armaments, along with scenes of swordplay and soldiers interacting with civilians. It is signed at the bottom with the name of a soldier and his enlistment date. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

Redan

British and Irish soldiers, sailors, marines, militiamen, and volunteers came from social and occupational backgrounds not normally associated with eighteenth-century military or naval service" (p. 13).

British regiments serving in America also recruited locally among Loyalists and even accepted American deserters into their ranks. Approximately 250 of these deserters were evacuated from Yorktown on the *Bonetta* before Cornwallis's surrender.

SEE ALSO *German Auxiliaries*.

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REDAN. A field work of two sides, pointing toward the enemy and open to the rear. It is virtually the same thing as a *flèche* or ravelin.

SEE ALSO *Flèche; Ravelin*.

Mark M. Boatner

RED BANK, NEW JERSEY SEE *Fort Mercer, New Jersey*.

REDOUBT. A relatively small, independent outwork, completely enclosed. Fortresses are surrounded by redoubts covering the main avenues of enemy approach.

Mark M. Boatner

REED, JAMES. (1723–1807). Continental general. Massachusetts-New Hampshire. His great-

grandfather and grandfather emigrated (together) from England in 1635 and settled a few years later in Woburn, Massachusetts, where James was born in 1723. An elementary education enabled him to become a tailor. By 1748 he was a tavern keeper in Lunenburg and a selectman. As a captain during the French and Indian War, he took part in the expedition to Crown Point in 1755, Abercromby's mismanaged operations of 1758 (including Ticonderoga), and the final campaigns under Amherst. About 1765 he moved to Fitzwilliam, New Hampshire, where he kept a tavern, served in the militia, and was a large landowner. At the outbreak of the Revolutionary War he raised a unit and on 28 April 1775 was commissioned colonel of the Third New Hampshire Regiment. His regiment marched to Boston and was posted near Charlestown Neck on 14 June. On 17 June his troops marched to battle under John Stark's command. It was this body of New Hampshire troops that General Howe observed moving from the true Bunker Hill to reinforce the redoubt on Breed's Hill and that caused him to delay his attack until more British troops landed. It was with Thomas Knowlton, along the "rail fence," that Reed's troops displayed the military discipline that Reed had instilled in them. In the military reorganization of January 1776, Reed's regiment became the Second Continental Infantry. After Bunker Hill, Reed was ordered to the Northern Department to reinforce the army that had retreated from Canada. There he suffered a sudden illness, probably smallpox, that left him blind and partially deaf. In August 1776 he accepted a commission as a brigadier general in the expectation that he would recover, but in September 1776 his impairment led him to resign. Despite his disability he lived another thirty years and remarried after the death of his first wife in 1791. He died in Fitchburg, Massachusetts, in 1807. His son, Sylvanus (d. 1798), was commissioned an ensign in January 1776 and served as an adjutant to General John Sullivan during the operations at Newport in 1778.

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revised by Frank C. Mevers

REED, JOSEPH. (1741–1785). Patriot statesman and soldier. New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Born in Trenton, New Jersey, on 27 August 1741, Joseph Reed was the son of a wealthy merchant. He graduated from the College of New Jersey (now Princeton) in 1757, continuing to study law over the next three years with Richard

Stockton, a future signer of the Declaration of Independence. Reed also earned a master's degree, then went to study English law at the Middle Temple in London. Reed returned to Trenton in 1765 to find that his father had gone bankrupt and his studies were at an end.

After practicing law in Trenton and developing an extensive business that brought him into contact with important leaders in other colonies, Reed established his law practice in Philadelphia in 1770. In November 1774 he became a member of the committee of correspondence, and in the following year he was president of the Second Provincial Congress. Cosmopolitan, intellectual, and of a courteous nature, he reluctantly abandoned the cause of conciliation with Britain, but was often accused of lacking enthusiasm for the Patriot cause and of being too cautious in military affairs.

At the outbreak of hostilities the 34-year-old Reed was appointed lieutenant colonel of the militia, and on 19 June he agreed to join General George Washington as a temporary staff officer. With the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Continental army, he served as Washington's military secretary from 4 July 1775–16 May 1776. During this period he took an extended leave to serve in the Continental Congress. In March 1776 Washington was able to offer him the post of adjutant general, but Reed accepted only after considerable urging. His appointment, which carried the rank of colonel and gave him the equivalent of £700 a year, was dated 5 June 1776. The income apparently was an important consideration in his acceptance.

The shift of military operations from Boston to New York presented difficult problems that made Washington particularly anxious to regain the services of Reed, whose character, exceptional intelligence, legal experience, and skill as a writer the commander in chief valued highly. Reed played an important role in the military and political features of the New York campaign. He advocated that New York City be abandoned and destroyed to keep the British from using it for a base. He also advocated that Fort Washington be abandoned. When subsequent events bore out his judgment on Fort Washington, Reed wrote to Charles Lee criticizing Washington's direction of the campaign, an exchange which Washington stumbled upon but was able to overlook.

Reed was a key figure in the Trenton-Princeton operations, furnishing valuable information for the surprise attack on Trenton and the succeeding campaign. On the night of 28–29 December 1776, Reed hid in a house in Bordentown and received reports of Donop's movements that led him to recommend that Washington further advance into New Jersey. On the 29th he reported to Washington on the situation he found in Trenton, and this reinforced Washington's decision to cross back over

the Delaware that day. With a dozen light horsemen, Reed pushed on to the outposts of Princeton on 2 January, and sent back the report that British reserves were moving toward that place.

Reed resigned from the army on 22 January 1777. Named brigadier general but denied command of the cavalry he had expected, Reed declined the appointment but served as an unpaid, volunteer aide-de-camp for Washington at Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth. He also declined the position of chief justice under the new constitution of Pennsylvania, accepting the advice of friends that he should not be associated with this radical government, but he accepted election to Congress, and in 1778 sat on many important committees.

In 1778 Reed prevented scandal by reporting directly to Congress on efforts by Lord Carlisle's peace commission to bribe him to support reconciliation with Britain. Through much of that year he proved his loyalty by prosecuting a series of treason trials, including several against Quakers who opposed the war on religious grounds. From December 1778 until 1781 he was president of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania. In this capacity he led the state's attack on Benedict Arnold and had the key role in settling the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line in January 1781.

After losing an election to the assembly in 1781, Reed resumed his law practice. The following year he failed in his bid to become Chief Justice of Pennsylvania. Despite this rebuff, he successfully defended Pennsylvania before a special court empanelled by Congress to resolve the dispute with Connecticut over their competing claims to the Wyoming Valley. Also in 1782, Reed and General John Cadwalader of the Pennsylvania militia launched a nasty public feud after the latter accused Reed of lacking support for American independence and accused him of a weak military performance. While most contemporaries sided with Reed, who devoted a great deal of energy to the patriot cause, historians continue to debate his loyalty. Reed visited England in 1784 and was elected to Congress on his return. But his declining health prevented him from serving and Reed died the next year, at the age of 44.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Peace Commission of Carlisle; Peace Commission of the Howes.*

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REEDY RIVER, SOUTH CAROLINA.

22 December 1775. After the truce that resulted from the actions at Ninety Six on 19 November, the Council of Safety sent a force of South Carolina militia and newly raised regulars under Colonel Richard Richardson and Lieutenant Colonel William Thomson into the region between the Broad and Saluda Rivers to break up Loyalists assembling there. They were reinforced by 700 North Carolina militia under Colonels Thomas Polk and Griffith Rutherford and 220 Continental regulars under Colonel Alexander Martin. By December the Patriot army totaled more than four thousand men, the largest force yet seen in the South. Loyalist resistance collapsed in the face of this strength, and Richardson captured leaders, including Thomas Fletchall, who was discovered hiding in a hollow tree. The only Loyalist unit that refused to disband, commanded by Patrick Cunningham, retreated to Cherokee territory. Richardson sent Thomson with his rangers to hunt them down. On the morning of 22 December, Thomson came upon their camp in the cane-brake next to the Reedy River. Loyalist pickets saw the Patriots before they were finished surrounding the camp and opened fire. No rangers were injured, and they took 130 prisoners while inflicting six casualties on the Loyalists. But Cunningham escaped with a handful of followers and joined the Cherokees further south. An error in dating has occasionally led some to believe that Reedy River and the Cane Brake were two separate battles.

SEE ALSO *Ninety Six, South Carolina (19 November 1775)*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

REGIMENT. The British regiment, after which the regiments of the Continental army were modeled, was both an administrative organization and the principal tactical formation of the period. For almost all purposes, the terms “regiment” and “battalion” were synonymous, since most regiments had only one active-service battalion. The nominal head of a British regiment was its colonel, but the unit was normally led in battle by its second-ranking officer, the lieutenant colonel. The normal British regiment was composed of ten companies, eight of which were called “battalion,” “line,” or “hat” companies, after their tricorne hats. Two companies were called “flank” companies because, when the battalion was arrayed in line of battle, the grenadiers formed on the right of the battalion and the light infantry on the left.

British regiments were generally known by the names of their colonels until 1752, when they were numbered in order of seniority by the date when they were first created.

Many regiments had additional titles, most of which were honorifics granted by the king for some sort of outstanding service. Thus, the Fourth Regiment was the “King’s Own” and the Eighth the “King’s.” Other titles combined a geographic location with royal favor: the Forty-second Regiment was the Royal Highland Regiment and the Sixtieth was the Royal American Regiment. Still others combined location, favor, and a reference to a former function: the Twenty-first Regiment was the Royal North British Fusiliers, and the Twenty-third was the Royal Welch Fusiliers, a fusil being a short flintlock fire-arm originally carried by regiments detailed to guard the artillery train, where the burning embers of the matchlocks carried by the other regiments might ignite open casks of gunpowder. Finally, several regiments newly raised in the Scottish Highlands combined the names of their colonels or the location of their muster with the term “Highlanders.” For example, the British regiment that fought in more battles in the American war than any other was the Seventy-first Regiment, Fraser Highlanders.

Americans generally followed the British military models they had used effectively throughout the colonial wars, now with the additional desire of giving their armed forces credibility and respectability. At the start of the war, each colony raised its own regiments, generally with eight companies per regiment, but with regimental strengths that varied across the colonies because companies’ strengths were different. Regiments from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, for example, were supposed to number 590 enlisted men at one time, while those from Connecticut varied from 1,000 to 600. In November 1775, Congress attempted to create a true “Continental army” for 1776 by merging the individual contingents of the four New England colonies, plus one Pennsylvania rifle regiment (essentially Washington’s main army around Boston), into one numerical sequence of twenty-seven regiments. It prescribed that each regiment should have eight companies whose strength was set at 91 officers and men each, or a total of 728 men in a regiment. In the army of eighty-eight regiments raised for three years of service from 1 January 1777, most infantry regiments reverted to state designations. Those that did not initially carry a state number, like the sixteen Additional Continental Regiments, were raised by the states as part of their quotas, and those that became viable units eventually received state numbers. Congress continued the eight-company structure for the 1777 regiments and added a ninth company (light infantry) in 1779. In the American army, the colonel would be expected to lead the regiment himself. In 1781 Congress abolished the rank of colonel and created in its place the rank of lieutenant colonel commandant for regimental commanders. Since prisoners were exchanged on the basis of actual rank, the

Continental army needed more lieutenant colonels to swap for British regimental commanders.

The prescribed table of organization, called the “establishment,” was in most cases no more than a pious hope. American regiments almost never operated in the field with the numbers required by the table. British regiments, too, were almost always understrength, although to a lesser extent because their recruiting system was better. For example, the average strength of the regiments under Washington at the Battle of Long Island on 27 August 1776 was about 350 officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates fit for duty. As the 1777 three-years army gave way to the 1780 reorganization, the tables of organization were revised to fit reality. Inspector General Friedrich Steuben reported that a minimum of 324 men in 9 companies (36 men per company) was required in each regiment for service in the field.

Because American militia units were organized on a geographical basis, militia regiments followed no standard table of organization and could vary wildly in size, especially when every able-bodied man turned out to resist a British incursion. At Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775, for example, the mix of militia and minuteman regiments averaged 292 men per regiment.

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments; Battalion; Exchange of Prisoners; Flank Companies; Light Infantry; Rank and File; Regular Establishment.*

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REGULAR APPROACHES. One meaning of “approaches” is “entrenchments, etc., by which the besiegers draw closer to the besieged” (*Oxford Universal Dictionary*). When one reads that the attacker “undertook regular approaches,” it means that he declined to attempt capturing a place by immediate assault (which often is less costly in the end) and elected the time-consuming and laborious process of formal siege operations. The basic

technique was to dig a first “parallel” just outside the defender’s artillery range; to run forward a zigzag trench, or sap; and then to dig a second parallel. This process is continued, with successive parallels enabling the besieger to move forward his work parties and artillery until the enemy surrenders or until a final assault can be made against his weakened fortifications.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Siege of 1780; Pensacola, Florida; Sap; Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779); St. Leger’s Expedition.*

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Mark M. Boatner

REGULAR ESTABLISHMENT. The term “establishment” refers to several aspects of the organizational structure of the British army. At the highest level, the “regular establishment” was the entire standing British army, divided between the handful of household regiments of the king and the much larger number of regiments of the line. Together, they formed a permanent force that was administered by the king and the Parliament in accordance with laws and regulations that governed the pay, conditions of service, promotion, and retirement of its personnel; it was the equivalent of the modern U.S. regular army. The regular army was divided between two establishments, the British and the Irish, that varied in size and composition over time according to different combinations of need, cost, and tradition.

Strategic and operational requirements dictated which regiments served in different theaters, not which establishment they happened to be on. After the Peace of Paris in 1763, 17,500 men were stationed in Britain, 12,000 in Ireland, 10,000 in America, and over 4,000 at Minorca and Gibraltar. These allocations, plus 1,800 artillerymen, made a total of roughly 45,000 men to garrison an unprecedented worldwide empire. A dozen years later, on the verge of a war to suppress the rebellion in the American colonies, the number and distribution of troops were roughly the same. By the end of 1781, when large-scale active operations ceased, the British army numbered some 110,000 men, 57,000 of whom were serving in North America.

The expansion of the army in wartime was a common feature of the way Britain made war, as was the corresponding reduction in size and number of regiments when the war was over. In this way, the army can be said to have had both a wartime and a peacetime establishment.

During the War of American Independence, the British government created a hybrid form of establishment that reflected the wartime expansion of the number of men under British arms and in British pay. Effective 2 May 1779, the five most proficient and hardest fighting of the units raised among American Loyalists were placed on a new Provincial (or American) Establishment. The boost to the morale of Loyalist soldiers far outweighed the military value of this designation, although being placed on an establishment did mean that the officers were legally entitled to half pay for life when their regiment was disbanded. Four of the five were placed on the British Establishment on Christmas Day 1782; all were disbanded by the end of 1783.

Finally, “establishment” also refers to the authorized size of the army’s constituent regiments. After the middle of the eighteenth century, a regiment was commonly composed of ten companies, eight of which were called, variously, battalion, line, or hat companies. The remaining two companies were elite formations, called flank companies from their standard position on the flanks of the regiment when it was drawn up in linear formation. Each wore specialized headgear, the grenadiers wearing tall, cone-shaped caps that did not interfere with the arm motion involved in throwing a grenade, the light infantry a cut-down version of the standard line company tricorne hat, as befitted a company intended to skirmish ahead of the battalion line. The numerical size of the regiment varied with the authorized size of its companies, which varied in this period from thirty-eight to fifty-six men per company.

SEE ALSO *Flank Companies; Provincial Military Organizations; Regiment.*

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REGULATORS. After the final French and Indian war, regulator movements arose in the piedmont upcountry of the Carolinas which had, according to the

Oxford English Dictionary, “the professed object of supplying the want of the regular administration of justice.” In North Carolina, piedmont farmers who believed they were being exploited by tidewater elites began to organize politically in 1766 to seek legal redress of their grievances. They wanted, among other things, more equitable representation in the provincial assembly for the rapidly growing piedmont counties, and an end to corruption and the embezzlement of public funds by easterners acting in the name of the Crown. According to Marjoleine Kars the backcountry settlers “repeatedly petitioned the governor and the assembly, tried to set up meetings with local officials, and brought suits against officials. When such legal measures had little effect, they resorted to extralegal action: they refused to pay taxes, repossessed property seized for public sale to satisfy debts and taxes, and disrupted court proceedings” (Kars, p. 2). Their campaign of insurgency and intimidation culminated at Hillsborough in September 1770, when a group of regulators disrupted the superior court session and destroyed the house of Edmund Fanning, one of the most rapacious crown officials.

Governor William Tryon acted quickly to quell what he viewed as a spreading insurrection. With the support of the tidewater elite and the non-regulator faction of the piedmont elite, the assembly on 15 January 1771 passed a Riot Act that gave Tryon sweeping powers to raise the militia and hunt down regulators who refused to surrender. Tryon’s army of 1,100 militiamen, overwhelmingly from the tidewater counties, arrived in the piedmont in early May 1771, and on the 16th met and defeated the disorganized regulators at the battle of the Alamance. Tryon’s force marched through the piedmont for nearly a month after the battle, waging a campaign of intimidation and terror, seizing supplies, and destroying crops, orchards, and rail fences.

Tryon had one insurgent leader executed on the battlefield, six more hanged on 19 June at Hillsborough, and compelled nearly 6,500 backcountry settlers to swear allegiance to the government as the price of reconciliation. According to Kars, this amounted to three quarters of the free white male population in the backcountry (Kars, p. 240). Many former regulators later migrated to the trans-Allegheny region, one group settling on the Watauga river in what is now Tennessee. Tryon arrived back in New Bern in late June, and on the 30th sailed away to his new appointment as governor of New York, taking along his good friend Edmund Fanning as his personal secretary.

The new royal governor, Josiah Martin, arrived on 11 August, and immediately adopted a conciliatory policy toward the regulators. His conciliation came too late to win the regulators over to the royal cause, but the disaffected in the piedmont were also only lukewarm adherents to the anti-imperial cause. Neither Tryon nor

the tidewater elites had ever championed solutions to the problems of the piedmont farmers, and they were therefore reluctant to join the elites of eastern North Carolina when they led the colony into rebellion against imperial control in the spring of 1775.

The regulator movement in South Carolina (1767–1769) stemmed from a desire on the part of members of the nascent upcountry planter class to suppress lawlessness and restore order on the frontier following the Cherokee Expedition of 1763. In South Carolina’s case, the people of both the tidewater and piedmont regions supported this vigilante movement, which faded as it accomplished its goals over the next few years. Owing largely to the prudence of Lieutenant Governor William Bull, the interior settlements were quiet from 1769 until the Revolution.

SEE ALSO *Alamance, Battle of the; Fanning, Edmund; Over Mountain Men; Tryon, William.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. Historians of the military conflict of the Revolutionary era have paid scant attention to religion. While political and social historians argue that religious belief and affiliation were critical ingredients in the coming of independence and the forming of the new republic, major works on the Revolutionary War include few references to churches, creeds, clergy, denominations, religious movements, and even chaplains. At the same time, the war itself—the armies and navies, commanders, soldiers, spies, prisoners of war, campaigns, and civil violence—make barely an appearance in political and social

histories. What accounts for this lack of connection between scholars’ approaches to the war?

One simple answer is that ministers generally don’t take up arms—though the Revolution provides numerous exceptions—and churches don’t prosecute wars. But such assumptions of the separation of clerical and military spheres are themselves artifacts of the enlightened era in which the Revolutionary War took place. A more compelling explanation is that the relationship between religion and the war is far from unambiguous. For while religious ideology and affiliation served as an important, if not the main, inspiration for large numbers of Americans to become involved in, to oppose, or to ignore the war effort, and while the conflict produced a marked change in the direction of American religious culture, the military architects of the new American nation had no particular religious “policy” in mind, and many fighting men appeared to have been indifferent to the religious consequence of the war. The war was over the birth of a new nation, rather than a new nation-with-church, as had been the case in the past.

This was not surprising, since the prosecutors of the war on both sides needed to recruit Americans from every background; and for many Americans, the ecclesiastical tyranny of tax-supported religious establishments was another form of oppression they were fighting against. Anti-Catholicism and opposition to an Anglican bishopric in the colonies were long-standing manifestations of this resistance. At the same time, Loyalists, many of them Anglicans, bemoaned attacks upon “liberal” Christianity by those they considered to be religious fanatics and heirs to the Puritan Revolution. The “peace churches,” in the meanwhile, aimed to keep government out of their lives entirely.

Ultimately, a people not only numerous and armed, to use historian John Shy’s phrase, but also religious and armed would produce two religious outcomes in their fight with Britain: a more “liberal” form of church and state relations in the United States than existed either in the colonies or the mother country, and a national culture based on a unitary “civil religion” rather than one denominational identity. But the many religious conflicts that characterized the war suggest that these results were not entirely expected.

“PASSIONATE PROTESTANTISM” VERSUS “PAPIST TYRANNY”

Pro-war polemicists, political activists, and Patriot clergy possessed what one historian, Robert Middlekauff, has described as “the moral dispositions of a passionate Protestantism” (p. 48). From the Commonwealth writers of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, they had inherited the political values of popular sovereignty, social contract theory, and the protection of life, liberty and property; and the religious virtues of frugality, hard work, and biblical faith. In the heated opening years of the

conflict, it would not take much to persuade many Americans that the British had betrayed those shared ideals.

The British Parliament obliged by passing the Quebec Act, the religious Rubicon of the Revolution Legislated in the Spring of 1774 under the guidance of William Legge, Lord Dartmouth, the head cabinet officer for the colonies, the act provided toleration (along with some tax support) for Roman Catholicism and extended the boundaries of Quebec south to the Ohio River and west to the Mississippi River. In a stroke, the act effectively barred migration of Americans into the northwest, placing the region instead into the hands of Catholic settlers and a Catholic bishop—the very powers that British Americans had been fighting since the start of the Anglo-French Wars in 1689.

The reconstitution of Quebec and its religious implications formed the larger continental context of the war. It accounted for the misguided invasion of Canada by American forces in 1775 and Americans' persistent efforts to win victory on the frontier. Although Lord Dartmouth was a "low church" Anglican who favored a faith based on daily piety and evangelical conversion rather than the power of church officialdom, the statute persuaded large numbers of Americans that the British government aimed to institute a papal-style regency in North America. Many believed that, in this way, a corrupt British government would enslave Americans and enrich itself off the spoils of the continent. How did so many Americans and British come to such differing perspectives on the action of the British ministry?

CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

The combatants on both sides of the Revolution shared the political heritage of civil and religious liberty from Puritan and Enlightenment sources, but Whigs and Patriots especially emphasized that relationship. Altogether, New England Congregationalists and Presbyterians, Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, many Baptists, and many low church Anglicans in the South—all in one way or another heirs of the Puritans or Puritan values—probably encompassed nearly half (fifty percent) of the church-attending population in America. The great majority sympathized with or overtly supported the Patriot cause. Speaking interchangeably in the language of Old Testament prophets and the discourse of enlightened, rational religion, their ministers exhorted Americans to love liberty, imitate virtue, reverence their pious but bold ancestors, and resist passive obedience to British political and clerical authorities. Their listeners were not always aware of these multiple sources. Captain Levi Preston, a participant at Lexington and Concord, had never heard of the great Commonwealth writers James Harrington, Algernon Sidney, or John Locke; instead he knew his Bible, church catechism, and almanacs, and sang the psalms and hymns of Isaac Watts. Yet his explanation


for fighting in the first skirmish of the war was clearly Commonwealth-inspired: "[W]hat we meant in going for those Redcoats was this: we always had governed ourselves and we always meant to. They didn't mean we should."

At the same time, Americans' understanding of religious liberty would undergo a significant transformation in the crucible of the war, from a condition "tolerated" by government to a one existing by natural right. Consequently, New England Baptists led by Isaac Backus and John Leland supported independence in the expectation that it would not only rid Americans of British control but also produce the disestablishment of the Congregational Church in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, and the Anglican Church in the lower counties of New York and the southern states. In Virginia, they were joined by Presbyterians, who described church establishments as a form of religious bondage no worse than civil bondage and petitioned the Virginia state legislature to eliminate tax support for the Church of England.

The demand for freedom of conscience—the other element of religious freedom—also inspired figures like the commander of the Green Mountain Boys, Ethan Allen, to reject traditional Christianity entirely, in favor of Deism. The Franco-American Alliance in 1778, bringing thousands of French troops onto American soil, likely also exposed American soldiers to advanced forms of freethinking and anticlericalism, although the evidence is sketchy. At the least, the alliance dramatically modified the "No King, No Popery" rhetoric of many leading Patriots, and prompted General Washington to outlaw anti-Catholic Guy Fawkes Day celebrations in the Continental Army. This rejection of anti-Catholic antipathy and the new commitment to freedom of conscience for American Catholics was surely one of the more remarkable reversals of the war.

POPULAR MILLENNIALISM

Many historians have argued that the Patriots' powerful convictions regarding the justice of their cause, their ability to attract a wide and popular following, and their endurance through eight years of violent conflict can only be understood as a byproduct of biblical millennialism—a far more powerful form of theological worldview than Enlightenment-influenced forms of theology. American millennialists indeed believed that Great Britain was the new Anti-Christ, Americans were the chosen people, and North America would be the scene of Christ's Second Coming. But Americans were also attracted to a "secular millennialism" that combined biblical predictions of America's destiny with rationalist attacks on established authority in the manner of Thomas Paine's enormously influential *Common Sense*. The pamphlet's millennial-style passages are well known. "We have it in our power to begin the world over again, . . ." Paine wrote, adding: "The birth-day of a new-



Prayer in Congress. This illustration by H. B. Hall after T. H. Matteson offers an image of the delegates to the Continental Congress in prayer in September 1774 in Philadelphia. LANDOV

world is at hand.” In Paine’s view this new world would be far from a theocracy, grounded not on ecclesiastical authority, but on the principles of a democratic republic and equal rights. Secular millennialism like Paine’s marked the beginnings of an American “civil religion,” although it would be some years before Americans recognized its ingredients as a commonly shared national faith.

HIGH CHURCH LOYALISTS

The Whigs and more radical Patriots did not have a monopoly on religious culture, and one of the ironies of the Revolutionary conflict is how often Loyalists and pacifists saw the pro-independence party as the one which was oppressing Americans’ religious and civil liberties. If there was a significantly “liberal” religious group outside the early Unitarian-leaning Congregationalists of Boston, it was the “high church” Anglicans, whose attachment to the enlightened ideals of reasonable Christianity was unmatched. Concentrated in the North, the high

church Anglicans epitomized the Anglicizing preferences of many wealthy Americans. They favored the advancement of gentility, British culture and literature, missionary outreach to the “heathens” throughout the empire, elegant ecclesiastical architecture, and other features of the Anglican “Renaissance” of the eighteenth century. They also supported the establishment of an episcopacy in America in order to expedite the ordination of ministers, a position opposed by most southern, “low church” Anglicans and increasingly excoriated by other Protestants. Joining them in enlightened religious practice were the moderate Scottish Presbyterians (as opposed to the strenuously Calvinist Scotch-Irish Presbyterians), Scottish Anglicans like William Smith, Provost of the College of Philadelphia, and Scottish highlander immigrants concentrated in North Carolina. But altogether these groups likely represented less than ten percent of the church-going population on the eve of the war.

Anglican Samuel Seabury (later to be anointed as the first Protestant Episcopal Bishop in America) accurately

defined the Revolution as a civil war, and forcefully argued that the Continental Congress itself was tyrannical, especially in its arbitrary armed resistance against the British authorities. Seabury insisted that the Patriots were bringing about the very conditions that they claimed to oppose and would soon be forced to support a permanent British military establishment. British officers, Hessian observers, and Loyalists alike believed the Patriots were carrying on the Puritan fight against king and episcopacy from the 1640s into the 1770s. An American Loyalist surgeon communicating with the British command described the men encamped around Boston in 1775 as heirs to Oliver Cromwell's army. A British major expressed the point more succinctly: "It is your G-d damned Religion of this Country that ruins the Country; Damn your Religion" (Royster, p. 19). The American rebellion, the British believed—lumping together Congregationalists and their fellow former Puritans—was a "Presbyterian war." In the view of many of their clergy, the Patriot attack on enlightened religion and English culture was proof of the conflict's perversity.

QUAKERS AND GERMAN PACIFISTS

The certainty of High church Anglicans of their own liberty-loving rectitude was undercut by their persistent opposition to republican government and by their conservative social mores. This was not the case for the many religious pacifists in the states, including some Baptists, the "Peace Germans" (Amish, Brethren, Dunkards, Mennonites, and Moravians), and experimental groups like the Shakers and Universal Friends. Most important among these was the Religious Society of Friends, or Quakers, at one time (with Congregationalists and Anglicans) one of the three largest denominations in the colonies. Altogether, the peace churches probably comprised more than fifteen percent of the American population, and they were concentrated in key strategic areas, including the Hudson River Valley, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. They were distinguished by a pietist theology focusing on conformity to Christian simplicity and spiritual mysticism; by long experience of government harassment; by democratic church politics; and by unparalleled advocacy of gender equality. Although largely unexamined by historians, this last attribute, including the degree to which pietist women bore the burden of persecution equally with pietist men, may have been a central reason for the groups' long-standing abstention from the bearing of arms.

The Quakers' "peace testimony" was forged in the previous century of conflict between Puritans and Anglicans. The Quakers blocked the formation of a Pennsylvania militia before the French and Indian War drove them from power, and the Philadelphia Yearly

Meeting likewise opposed the general militia law at the start of the Revolutionary war. The Patriot leadership alternatively viewed the Friends as a "mischievous" threat and likely Tories or as uncooperative nuisances. But a significant minority of Quakers (more than 750) in the new states, nicknamed "Fighting Quakers," believed that the Quaker doctrine of the inner light—and the millennial destiny of America—necessitated support for the enlightened American cause. Key Patriot Quakers were Thomas Paine (a lapsed English Friend), Betsy Ross (disowned, along with other important Patriot radicals, by the Philadelphia Friends), and Continental Army General Nathanael Greene, the indispensable man of the southern campaigns.

The German sects were universally pacifist, but the Baptists were divided between those who were confident in the future of religious freedom in America and those less convinced of this outcome: the former became Patriots, the latter—much smaller in number—became noncombatants. These groups were joined as well by John Wesley's "connexion" of unordained Methodist preachers, only recently arrived from Britain and comprised of increasing numbers of Americans. For all of these groups, the greatest tests of their faith came with state laws requiring loyalty oaths and militia service. Non-associators (that is, those who did not comply with the laws) were to be barred from public preaching or teaching, fined, or jailed. As a result, the war produced the first religious arguments in favor of resistance to the draft (for militia duty). And, once state authorities realized that their efforts to punish non-associators were counter-productive, the conflict also produced the first informal but state-sponsored recognition of conscientious-objector status based on religion.

CLERGY AND CHURCH FABRIC

The voice of clergymen in promoting and opposing American independence, the fate of their congregations and church buildings, and the experience of army chaplains illustrate further the ways in which collective groups of religious believers shaped the course of the war and experienced its consequences. American clergy were compelling figures on both sides of the military conflict. Called the "black regiment" after their clerical garb, American Patriot clergy in particular included liberal Congregationalists like Jonathan Mayhew and Charles Chauncy in Boston; moderate Congregationalists like Samuel Cooper in the same city; revivalist Ezra Stiles, president of Yale College in Connecticut; moderate Scottish Presbyterian John Witherspoon, president of the College of New Jersey; Jacob Duche at Christ Church in Philadelphia (before the cause of independence forced him into the Loyalist camp); and many Scotch-Irish Presbyterians in New York, New Jersey, and the southern states, and on the western frontier. In Virginia, "Fighting Parson" John Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg, for just one example, left his Lutheran

congregation in the Shenandoah Valley to join the Virginia militia and was ultimately commissioned as a brigadier general in the Continental army. The British correctly blamed American ministers for whipping up the *rage militaire* in the first year of the war, and the Continental Congress and state legislature relied on them to communicate with the larger American public to the end of the conflict.

Such partisanship had its price. The British never intruded far enough into New England to wreak havoc on dispersed congregations, burn church buildings, or silence the meetinghouse bells that called out the minutemen time and again. But to the south of New England the Patriot clergy faced significant threats to life and limb, and their churches were frequently desecrated or destroyed. In New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, the British regularly burned Patriot meetinghouses or turned their copious spaces into horse stables and military hospitals. The main focus of both the British and Loyalist militias were the meetinghouses of Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, the largest non-English group in rebellion. Judging by the speed with which one Presbyterian pastor in western North Carolina responded to the threat of British incursion—stopping mid-sermon to form a company, which he then led against the invading forces—the British had reason to fear the popular strength of this particular denomination.

On the other side, high church Anglican clergy complained of their treatment at the hands of the Sons of Liberty, Committees of Observation, Committees of Safety, and less respectable groups. In New York they faced arrest and jailing, conscription for militia duty, and then fines for non-attendance. Their homes and offices were broken into by Patriot crowds and militia. The low church clergy of Virginia and the rest of the South were protected by their powerful vestries: more than half supported the American cause and a good number of their ministers joined the armed forces. But most of the northern Anglican clergy emigrated to Canada or returned to Britain, leaving their churches abandoned and shuttered. On the eve of 19 April 1775, one such sanctuary, the Old North (Christ) Church in Boston, provided the literal and figurative scaffolding for the start of the war.

The Quakers, “Peace” Germans, and other pacifists, although not providing any fighting parsons, were still affected by the military conflict. In 1777, the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania accused the Philadelphia Quaker leadership of Toryism, and sent fifteen prominent Quakers to a prison camp in Virginia. Non-associator Methodist preachers were fined and jailed on a regular basis and were frequent objects of abuse by Patriot mobs. Their British-born leader, Francis Asbury, went into seclusion in loyalist Delaware.

CHAPLAINS IN THE CAMPS

The other significant service provided by clergy on both sides was as army chaplains. Military chaplains were first recruited for service in May 1775, by the new Massachusetts state government. With Washington’s encouragement, the Continental Congress quickly established the office of the regimental chaplaincy in the Continental Army. In 1777 Congress elevated the office into a brigade chaplaincy. The chaplain received a colonel’s pay as an incentive for enlistment and facilitate the expansion of the work of a relatively small numbers of ministers over greater numbers of troops. Washington delayed the establishment of this new office in order to prevent a reduction in the ministers’ effectiveness. The brigade chaplain was expected to be an experienced clergyman with an established public reputation for piety, virtue, and learning. His duties included administering two Sunday services weekly and attending the sick and dying. Many also sought the advice of commanders in providing the appropriate martial content to their sermons.

The British army, of course, also included military chaplains, with many of the same duties as the Americans. But in both cases, although receiving commissioned rank and providing indispensable spiritual and medical assistance to fighting men, the work of regimental and brigade chaplains was of a different order of difficulty from their civilian work. British regimental chaplains frequently paid substitutes to take their places. These men, and those connected with them, faced genuine danger, even when not engaged in conflict. One example of this is found in the tragic killing of Presbyterian chaplain James Caldwell’s wife in their New Jersey home by a British officer, who apparently singled out the minister’s family for punishment. Caldwell’s later murder by a disgruntled American soldier, makes clear that the threat came not only from the enemy.

Chaplains also came face to face with the real spiritual state of enlisted men. The British chaplains were specifically instructed to monitor the soldiers’ behavior, from cursing and profanity to gambling and resorting to prostitutes. British commanders spoke glowingly of the piety of the Hessians who, in contrast to often indifferent British troops, broke into hymn-singing spontaneously and regularly, including before combat. As the *rage militaire* of the start of the war subsided, the regiments of the Continental army were filled with poor farmers, laboring men, and former slaves—more typical of British enlisted men than were the minutemen at the start of the war. The recollections of wartime participation by many of these soldiers contain almost no religious content. In a notable exception, black veteran Jehu Grant implied that religious education, might have deterred his enlistment since, had he “been taught to read or understand the precepts of the Gospel, ‘Servants obey your masters,’” he might not have



Prayer at Valley Forge. This nineteenth-century engraving by John McRae after a painting by H. Brueckner imagines General Washington in prayer during the difficult winter at Valley Forge. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

joined the military. Instead, his inspiration came from popular songs of liberty that “saluted my ear, thrilled through my heart” (Dann, p. 28).

One Baptist chaplain, Ebenezer David, was dismayed by the irreligious attitudes of the enlisted men in Rhode Island. But David was witnessing a new world, in which religious provincialism was fading fast. He worked with John Murray, a Universalist, who preached salvation for all believers—heretical doctrine to most Calvinists like David. He became fascinated with better ways of practicing medicine, a new professional outlet. He was surely familiar with some of the 200 black men who comprised the First Rhode Island Regiment, a new population of fighting men. Before he died of a fever at Valley Forge in the Winter of 1778, David was freely using soldiers’ slang like “pilcocke” to refer to doctors and “camp geniuses” to describe camp followers, and he may have thought of himself as a “pulpit drum.” Perhaps he came to better understand the earthy point of view of enlisted men like Joseph Plumb Martin. Recollecting his long service with the Continental army, Martin mordantly paraphrased

Tom Paine: “I often found that those times not only tried men’s souls, but their bodies too; I know they did mine, and that effectually.”

CONTESTED TERRAIN

Ultimately, for both American and British military commands, perhaps the biggest challenge in dealing with the religious implications of the war was determining who was reliably on which side. Historian Kevin Phillips has demonstrated how consistently regionally or ethnically defined denominational identity led to political allegiance in the war (*The Cousins’ Wars*), as described above. But Phillips also confirms the importance of the divided or neutral (as opposed to pacifist) denominations. Various sources suggest that as many as twenty-five percent of church-attending Americans fit this description: including Huguenots, “Church Germans” (Lutherans and German Reformed), Dutch Reformed, Methodist laypeople (as opposed to their frequently pacifist ministers), Roman Catholics (English, Irish, and Canadian), and Jews. Added to these were as many as one-third of all

Anglicans, if the affiliations of Anglican ministers is taken as an indicator of their parishioners' views. British and American contenders alike were eager to have these populations on their side, making the regions south of New England not only militarily but also culturally contested terrain.

Phillips also correctly argues that the allegiance of blacks and Indians was of utmost importance in winning the war. Although conclusions are inevitably tentative with these far less well documented populations, the choices made by slaves, free blacks, and frontier tribes were likely to be as strongly influenced by denominational allegiance or religious conviction as were the choices made by whites in the conflict. So Lemuel Haynes, a Connecticut Congregationalist and later the first ordained African American minister of any denomination, joined the Continental Army immediately upon his emancipation. Phillis Wheatley, an evangelical Christian, was the first African American published author, and among her many poems was a paean to General Washington. James Forten, Philadelphia sailmaker and Anglican, was also an early abolitionist: he joined the liberty-loving Patriots.

How many of the black men in the First Rhode Island Regiment were native Baptists, inclined to the Patriots' side, cannot be known; but southerners must have regretted their unwillingness to accustom their slaves to the advantages of low church Anglicanism and fidelity to Whig mores when thousands escaped and fled behind British lines during "Lord Dunmore's War" in 1775. As many as 20,000 slaves in South Carolina alone were estimated to have joined the British. Many were betrayed by the British command and re-enslaved in the West Indies or impressed as "military slaves" into British regiments. Others were more fortunate—black Loyalist men and women alike escaped to new lives in Nova Scotia, where they joined Methodist and Baptist churches, membership so frequently denied them by slavemasters.

Similarly, victory in the West depended on the constancy of hundreds of potential Indian allies and French Catholic settlers. The Mohawks, including Chief Joseph Brant, an Anglican convert, allied with the British. So did the Cherokees and Creeks, working through Superintendent John Stuart, a moderate Scot and Loyalist. But the Stockbridge Indians, educated at the Presbyterian Mission in that Massachusetts town, were on the American side, and Superintendent Sir William Johnson feared the effect that Calvinist missionaries might have among the Iroquois. American commander George Rogers Clark promised political and religious freedom to French settlers and Indian tribes in Ohio Country, smoothing the way for American acquisition in the Treaty of Paris in 1783. Pietist Indians, on the other hand, like the ninety-six Moravians Indians, men, women and children massacred by American soldiers in

northern Pennsylvania near the end of the war, were caught in the middle.

Here the story of religion and the Revolutionary war comes full circle. The depredations and displacements experienced by so many Indians during the conflict led to the revival of a quiescent nativism among northwestern and southwestern tribes. Aiming to rebuild Indian unity and to drive the whites back to the Appalachians, the new nativism was advanced by Chief Tecumseh and his brother, Shawnee Prophet, in the very same territory that had been assigned to Quebec in 1774. The Revolutionary war continued here in altered form for another thirty years.

CONCLUSIONS

Religious culture had an impact on the character, course, and consequences of the war. Without the anti-papal propaganda, the wedding of religious and political liberty, and the millennial expectations that formed the great triad of religious inspiration throughout the war, it is difficult to imagine the conflict lasting long beyond the arrival of the Howe brothers (George, Richard, and William) in 1776. Without the British conviction that the rebellion was a recurrence of Puritan treason against an anointed king, the British army's hatred of New England and violence against Congregationalist and Presbyterian churches would be inexplicable. And without the long historical experience of brutal religious warfare and persecution in their own histories, not least of all against women in these faiths, the rejection of the virile world of military service by German sects and Society of Friends might seem less worthy than they were.

The war also prompted a series of dramatic reversals in what might otherwise have been the natural progression toward Anglican cultural and institutional dominance, living in unquiet but tolerable coexistence with Calvinist adherents on the one hand and pietist pacifists on the other. Instead it produced the collapse of Anglican authority; New Englanders' abandonment of both anti-Catholicism and strict Calvinism; the rising popularity, even during the war, of emerging pietist—rather than scrupulously Calvinist—evangelical movements like the Methodists and Baptists, not least of all among African Americans. And finally, the war contributed to the initiation of new forms of tribal religious unity among Indians.

Most critically for the nation state, freedom of conscience and freedom from church establishments, though far from fully institutionalized, were increasingly espoused as aspects of American civil religion. So was the millennial-style conviction, expressed by General Washington in his *Circular to the States* in June 1783, that the future happiness of millions depended upon the favorable outcome of the great experiment in republican government, now that the war was won. Americans have come to adhere to this

Resources of America and Great Britain Compared

understanding of the special character of the Revolution, but for many combatants and noncombatants recovering from the political and religious enmities of the war, such a consensus was yet to be built.

SEE ALSO *Associators; Methodists; Presbyterians; Quakers; Roman Catholics; Stuart, John.*

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Dee E. Andrews

RESOURCES OF AMERICA AND GREAT BRITAIN COMPARED.

By every measure of military potential, the resources available to the British government vastly exceeded what the American colonists could muster. The population of the British Isles in 1775 was perhaps 12 million people, roughly five times the 2.5 million people in the colonies; the British advantage was even greater if the half-million slaves are subtracted from the colonial total. Britain maintained a standing army of perhaps 36,000 men, some 13,000 soldiers less than its authorized strength, along with 16,000 sailors who manned the Royal Navy's 270 ships. In nearly every category, too, Britain had the capacity to build up its military power faster than the colonies. The key factor here was not merely Britain's vastly greater wealth, but the existence of proven financial markets and mechanisms that would allow the government to borrow at reasonable interest rates. Britain could mobilize liquid capital to pay for more ships, more soldiers (recruited at home or hired on the Continent), and more military material (manufactured at home or purchased on the Continent) than could the colonies. By the end of the war in 1783, over 200,000 of George III's subjects from the British Isles were under arms (100,000 in the army and 107,000 in the navy), to which should be added nearly 30,000 German auxiliaries and at least 21,000 American loyalists. The Royal Navy numbered 468 ships in 1783, despite having lost 200 vessels to various causes during the war. Despite some shortfalls, British merchant shipping was able to transport soldiers and matériel across the Atlantic with reasonable efficiency, a necessary requirement for a war waged so far from sources of replacement and supply.

Still, given the staggering logistical and command problems in fighting a transatlantic war, the margin for error was sometimes very thin: only one British supply ship passed safely from Britain to Boston between August and November 1775. Faced with a colonial rebellion of

unprecedented size and scope and with traditional enemies, especially France, waiting for an opportunity to exact revenge, Britain's leaders had to make the right decisions rapidly and use military force to maximum effect to achieve a political solution to the conflict, the only real way of returning the colonies to their prior political allegiance. The entry of France into the war as a partner of the American rebels in February 1778 turned a rebellion into a world war and forced the British to raise, equip, and field unprecedented numbers of armed forces.

AMERICAN RESOURCES

The contrast with the armed forces available to the colonial governments at the start of the conflict was so extreme as to be laughable. The colonies maintained no soldiers under arms in peacetime and relied for their defense (or for rebellion) on a militia that theoretically included all able-bodied men from eighteen years of age upwards to fifty, fifty-five, and even sixty years old, varying by colony. The most experienced soldiers in the colonies were the veterans of the French and Indian War, an invaluable resource for training and command purposes, but too few in number and, by 1775, too old to fill the ranks. The colonies maintained no standing navies, but here again would have to rely on veterans of the largely private war vessels (privateers) that had filled the seas in previous conflicts.

A questionnaire from Lord Dartmouth to all colonial governors in 1773 revealed the sorry state of military preparedness on the eve of the war. Virginia and New Jersey reported "not one fort now." All New Hampshire reported was a "quite ruinous" stone castle at Portsmouth, and Pennsylvania reported only a half-finished fort in the Delaware River to ward off pirates. Boston's Castle William was in ill repair, and there were only a few batteries to protect the other Massachusetts ports. Georgia had four forts. New York had a fort and batteries at the mouth of the Hudson River and forts at Albany and Schenectady, but none was properly equipped with cannon or adequately supplied.

One must assume that American military potential was not negligible, at least in the minds of the men who wanted to fight; presumably, enough colonists were convinced that they could successfully resist the British and defend their political freedoms by force of arms, or else they would not have begun an armed resistance in the first place. But American potential was largely latent, and it would take time to ramp it up to a point where enough potential had been transformed into actual, operational capability for success to be possible. Since manufacturing in the colonies was inadequate to support sustained combat, most military supplies would have to be purchased abroad (largely on credit) and shipped across the Atlantic. Because building an armaments industry in America was

out of the question, access to European sources of all sorts of military supplies was crucial.

Americans had the advantage of fighting on their own ground, where they were familiar with the types of terrain and climate that might limit the effectiveness of European-trained regulars. Few Americans, however, had training or experience as military engineers and artillerymen, and even fewer had any experience in army organization, administration, and training. (Washington, who had observed how Edward Braddock in 1755 and John Forbes in 1758 handled an expeditionary force, probably had more experience in these areas than any other American.) While many officers had tactical experience in the colonial wars and would provide essential leadership for the young soldiers in the army, the slow development of expertise above the regimental level was a nearly fatal shortcoming. Although urban dwellers might have limited experience with firearms, the fact that outside the cities the economy of the colonies was agricultural meant that many people owned and had some experience using guns. Settlers along the frontier in the interior had more experience hunting for game with Pennsylvania rifles, and many had participated in recent campaigns against Native American tribes. Despite the widespread ownership of firearms, owning a gun was a far cry from knowing how to use it in a military situation. Learning how to do that would inevitably take time.

LOYALISTS

The presence of Loyalists (in significant numbers in parts of New York, Pennsylvania, and the South) was not usually a handicap to the American war effort, since the rebels achieved and maintained political superiority in most areas. The actual or expected presence of British forces, on the other hand, could cause a recrudescence of Loyalist activity and led to major problems in the South. The British, however, suffered from a disinclination to mobilize Loyalist support early in the war and tended to base strategy on the assumption that Loyalists were present in large numbers and could be counted on for support in regions where the king's troops had not yet tried to operate. Once France entered the war in February 1778, British strategy relegated the suppression of the rebellion to second place behind survival against the rejuvenated forces of an ancient enemy. Reliance on residual Loyalist sentiment in the South was the only option open to the British, and it became their "southern strategy" in and after 1778.

LEADERSHIP

Leadership is the vital ingredient that transforms military potential into success in war. British military leaders were generally competent professional soldiers, no more or less

prone to infighting than their American counterparts. British political leaders might be seen in retrospect as behaving in ways that lacked imagination and scope, but faced with a transatlantic military problem of unprecedented complexity, they generally acted with intelligence and dispatch in ways for which their experience had prepared them. Unfortunately for the survival of the first British Empire, the same lack of vision and statesmanship that had led them to lose the political allegiance of the American colonists also crippled the development of the indispensable political component that was needed to suppress the rebellion.

American military leadership was beset by inter-colonial and sectional difficulties at the beginning of the war, not a surprising situation in what was essentially a military alliance of thirteen separate sovereignties. Men of talent worked unremittingly—none more so than Washington—to meet the challenge of organizing effective military forces from the most unpromising of parts. Much of American military activity continued throughout the war to have an ad hoc quality; significant mistakes in judgment were made by many senior officers, including Washington. But none of the mistakes proved to be fatal, and in large part because Washington inspired others with his commitment never to give up the fight, the American military had achieved by 1777 the most it could hope to achieve: by not losing, it ensured that the British would not win. Washington may have been the finest manipulator of military force ever to arise from the American nation, but even he could not win the war with American resources alone. When French aid arrived in sufficient quantity and with excellent leadership, Washington was astute enough to maximize its benefits to achieve a victory at Yorktown that proved to be the makeweight in shifting British political will toward ending active hostilities.

American political leadership also reflected the fact that the colonies were partners, not part of a single sovereignty. More political infighting occurred in Congress's management of the war than in the army, and Congress was less of a nation-building factor than was the Continental army. Congress did not squarely face the problem of how to pay for the war and so contributed significantly to the single greatest danger threatening the new nation: the collapse of the economy. But here, too, ad hoc solutions were found, and at the time of greatest danger, Robert Morris managed to use his financial expertise to cobble together an economic bandage that, with the help of many other financiers, agents, ambassadors, and people of good will, kept the nation afloat just long enough so that a peace treaty could be secured. In the end, American political will sustained the military effort to secure independence better than British political will sustained the military effort to suppress the rebellion. But only by a hair's breadth.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; Loyalists in the American Revolution; Manufacturing in America; Militia in the North; Populations of Great Britain and America; Recruiting in Great Britain; Riflemen.*

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REVERE, PAUL. (1735–1818). Patriot, artisan, and courier. Massachusetts. Known to every American schoolchild for his midnight ride, immortalized in the poem by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1861), Paul Revere was a relatively unknown figure until the appearance of that work. Yet Revere deserves an important place in American history, not particularly for his dramatic ride to warn the patriots of the British advance on Lexington and Concord, 19 April 1775, but for his activities as a leader among Boston's artisans, mariners, and shopkeepers, as an effective political cartoonist, and for several other important rides before and after he became the official courier for the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. He was also one of the period's finest silversmiths and pioneered significant developments in metallurgy and founding.

Revere was the third of thirteen children born to Apollos Rivoire, a Huguenot who came to Boston from Bordeaux, France, at the age of thirteen to apprentice to the silversmith John Coney. He Anglicized his name to make it easier to pronounce. His mother was Deborah Hitchbourn, whose family owned the Boston wharf of that name. Paul learned his father's trade, and served as a second lieutenant of artillery in the Crown Point expedition of 1756. There being an abundance of silversmiths in Boston, Revere branched out into copperplate engraving (portraits, a songbook, political cartoons, seals, bookplates, and coats-of-arms), and manufacturing dental devices. A strong opponent of British imperial policies, he was an influential leader in the artisan community of Boston, where his prominence brought him into close contact with John Hancock, Samuel Adams, and Dr. Joseph Warren. His engraving of the Boston Massacre of 3 March 1770 is a masterwork of visual propaganda, designed to tell the story of Boston's outraged and injured innocence to the rest of the colonies. He helped organized the Boston Tea Party on 16 December 1773 and likely participated as one of the "Indians."



Paul Revere. Although best known for his dramatic ride in April 1775, Paul Revere, shown here in a 1768 portrait by John Singleton Copley, was one of the period's finest silversmiths.
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Revere began his career as a trusted courier after the Tea Party, when he made the long ride, in mid-winter, to inform New York City's Sons of Liberty of the event. The next spring he rode to New York City and Philadelphia with word of the Boston Port Bill and with an appeal for help. He carried the Suffolk Resolves (September 1774) to Philadelphia. When the radicals learned that General Gage had ordered the seizure of valuable military supplies at Fort William and Mary, Revere galloped to Durham, New Hampshire to warn John Sullivan, and then rode on to alert the radicals of Portsmouth. Two days before making his most famous ride he rode to warn the radicals to move their military stores from Concord.

Although he wanted a military commission, Revere was kept busy printing currency for the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, at Watertown where he set up shop during the siege of Boston, and learning how to make gunpowder at Canton, Massachusetts. On 29 March 1776 he became a member of the Boston committee of correspondence. On 10 April 1776, he was appointed major in a state regiment raised to fortify and defend Boston, and a month later he was appointed major in the state train of artillery, with the same mission. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the state train on 27 November 1776, and was given command of Castle William at the mouth of Boston Harbor. In early

September 1777, he escorted Brunswick prisoners, captured at Bennington, from Worcester to Boston, and on the 27th was ordered to join in the expedition against Newport, Rhode Island, which proved abortive. On 1 March 1778 his command of Castle William was extended to include defensive works on Governor's Island and Long Island, and he remained in command of the state train when it was reduced to three companies in early 1779.

Opportunity for field service came finally when he was ordered on 8 July 1779 "to hold himself and one hundred of the matrosses [artillerymen] under his command, including proper officers, in readiness at one hours notice to embark for the defence of this state, and attack the enemy at Penobscot" [the Majorbagaduce peninsula (the spelling varies), now Castine, in Penobscot Bay, Maine]. The Penobscot Expedition, July–August 1779, was a fiasco, and in the epidemic of recrimination that ensued, Revere was accused by Captain Thomas Carnes, who commanded the marines aboard the *Putnam*, of disobedience, unsoldierly conduct, and cowardice. Brigadier General Peleg Wadsworth, second-in-command of the expedition, also criticized his performance. On 6 September 1779 Revere was relieved of command at Castle Island and placed under house arrest. Historian Jayne E. Triber notes that a court of inquiry held in mid-September "neither condemned nor acquitted him," and that a second inquiry, on 16 November 1779, found him culpable for "disputing the orders of Brigadier General Wadsworth" and of leaving Penobscot River "without particular orders from his superior officer" (p. 138). After many delays a formal court-martial convened in February 1782 and found that he had refused "to deliver a certain boat to the order of General Wadsworth when upon the retreat up Penobscot River from Major Bagwaduce: but the Court taking into consideration the suddenness of the refusal, and more especially that the same boat was in fact employed by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Revere to effect the purpose ordered by the General . . . , are of the opinion that . . . Revere be acquitted of this charge." On the charge of leaving Penobscot River without orders, "the Court considers that the whole army was in great confusion and so scattered and dispersed, that no regular orders were or could be given, are of the opinion, that Lieutenant Colonel Paul Revere, be acquitted with equal honor as the other officers in the same expedition."

Revere, meanwhile, had been expanding his business as a silversmith. He also continued to be active in civic affairs, especially in working for ratification of the federal Constitution in January 1788. With his reputation as an innovative silversmith already established, he turned to the casting of bells and cannon at the foundry he opened in Boston's North End in November 1788. It later supplied the bolts, spikes, pumps, and copper accessories for the USS *Constitution* ("Old Ironsides"), the frigate built at the

Charlestown Navy Yard in 1797–1798. In January 1801 he embarked on his most significant industrial venture, the manufacture of sheet copper in a mill built on the site of the Revolutionary War powder mill at Canton, Massachusetts. The business prospered, and it produced rolled copper for the dome of the Massachusetts State House, a new copper bottom for the Constitution in 1803, and in 1808–1809 boilers for a steam boat built by Robert Fulton. By his first wife, Sarah Orne, whom he married 17 August 1757, he had eight children. By his second, Rachel Walker, whom he married 10 October 1773, he had eight more. He died at the age of 83 at Boston.

SEE ALSO *Fort William and Mary, New Hampshire; Lexington and Concord; Penobscot Expedition, Maine.*

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RHODE ISLAND, BATTLE OF **SEE** *Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778).*

RHODE ISLAND LINE. On 25 April 1775 the Rhode Island Assembly created an “Army of Observation” under Brigadier General Nathanael Greene to assist in the siege of Boston. This force was made up of three infantry regiments and an artillery company. Colonels James Varnum, Daniel Hitchcock, and Thomas Church commanded the three regiments. In 1776 the first two regiments reenlisted as the Ninth and Eleventh Continental Regiments, and in 1777 they became the First and Second Rhode Island Regiments. Church’s regiment disbanded on 31 December 1775. The First and Second Rhode Island Regiments merged as the Rhode Island Regiment on 1 January 1781, reorganized as the smaller Rhode Island Battalion on 1 March 1783, and disbanded its last two companies on Christmas Day, 1783. During the winter of 1775–1776, Rhode Island formed two new regiments in the state troops. This were led by Colonel William Richmond and Colonel Henry Babcock (later Colonel Christopher Lippitt). These regiments were later transferred them

to the Continental Army—they disbanded during the 1776–1777 winter. The artillery company technically was not part of the state’s line.

The two regiments suffered heavy losses during the defense of the Delaware River in the fall of 1777, and at Valley Forge the First Regiment transferred all of its rank and file to fill up the Second, and sent the officers and sergeants home to recruit additional troops. The legislature supported that effort by passing legislation to allow slaves to voluntarily enlist for the duration of the war. Slaves were purchased by the state, which granted them their freedom when they were discharged from military service. The First Regiment has sometimes been misidentified being African American, but in reality it was really a regiment of “men of colour” and included Native Americans and men of mixed ancestry. All of the officers and sergeants were white. The experiment in segregated troops ended on 1 January 1781, when the First and Second Regiments merged into a single, fully-integrated unit.

SEE ALSO *African Americans in the Revolution.*

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RICHMOND, VIRGINIA. 5–7 January 1781. Although it had a population of only eighteen hundred, half of them slaves, Richmond on the James River offered a secure place for supplies. Because it was also less vulnerable to a sudden amphibious attack than Williamsburg, it became the new capital of Virginia in May 1779. When Brigadier General Benedict Arnold’s

expedition landed eight hundred troops at Westover, thirty miles downriver, on 4 January, Governor Thomas Jefferson could only mobilize between two hundred and three hundred men to defend the town. The Americans moved most of the military supplies to safety before Arnold arrived on the 5th. The defenders withdrew without firing a shot and the British did not conduct a serious pursuit. Lieutenant Colonel John Graves Simcoe then led his Queen's Rangers and the flank companies of the Eightieth Foot to destroy the nearby Westham Foundry. After burning warehouses and a number of other buildings, Arnold withdrew on the 6th and arrived back at Westover on the 7th, losing nine men to desertion or straggling.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Jefferson, Thomas; Simcoe, John Graves; Virginia, Military Operations in.*

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RIDGEFIELD, CONNECTICUT.

27 April 1777. As the British raiding force under Major General William Tryon retired from Danbury, Connecticut, militiamen gathered along its route back to the coast. Generals Benedict Arnold, David Wooster, and Gold Selleck Silliman managed to organize a blocking force at Ridgefield, about fifteen miles south of Danbury and made a gallant attempt to trap the raiders.

SEE ALSO *Danbury Raid, Connecticut; Silliman, Gold Selleck; Tryon, William; Wooster, David.?*

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RIEDESEL, BARON FRIEDRICH ADOLPHUS.

(1738–1800). German general. Born in Lauterbach, Hesse, on June 3, 1738, Riedesel was attending the law school at Marburg when he was commissioned as an ensign in the Hessian battalion on duty in the city. At the age of 18 he went to England with a German regiment in the service of King George II. In the following year he returned to the Continent to serve in the Seven Years' War. He became aide-de-camp to Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, distinguishing himself in the duke's campaigns, particularly at the Battle of Minden.

Feeling that he was not advancing rapidly enough in the Hessian army, he entered the service of the Duke of Brunswick, where he could capitalize on his friendship with Ferdinand. By 1761 he commanded two Brunswick regiments.

As a 37-year-old colonel of carabineers, Riedesel was commanding the garrison at Wolfenbützel in January 1776 when the Duke of Brunswick contracted with King George III to furnish a body of 3,936 infantrymen and 336 dismounted dragoons for service in America. Riedesel, promoted to major general, was named commander of the first contingent of 2,282 troops, and on 4 April he sailed from Dover for America. On 1 June 1776 the convoy reached Quebec, bringing the reinforcements that Sir Guy Carleton needed to restore British control of Canada. After spending a year in Canada, where he was joined by his wife and three daughters, Riedesel took part in General John Burgoyne's offensive, which was an attempt to isolate New England from the rest of the colonies. He particularly distinguished himself at Hubbardton on 7 July 1777, strongly objected to the disastrous raid on Bennington, and showed particularly vigorous leadership in the first battle of Saratoga. When Burgoyne was forced to surrender on 17 October 1777, Riedesel and General William Phillips were eventually exchanged for General Benjamin Lincoln on 13 October 1780.

After being given the local rank of lieutenant general and named commander on Long Island, Riedesel was ordered back to Canada in the summer of 1781. He went with a plan proposed by Sir Henry Clinton to Sir Frederick Haldimand for an offensive from the north. However, he did not submit this proposal until 25 September 1781, so it is obvious that Clinton could not expect this assistance to arrive until the campaign of 1782. By that time, the war was effectively over.

In mid-August 1783 the Riedesel family sailed from Quebec, reached England a month later, and were cordially received by the royal family. After a stay in London, they returned to Brunswick. Of the 4,000 troops who had followed Riedesel to Canada, only 2,800 returned. On 8 October 1783 he led these soldiers in a grand review for the new Duke of Brunswick. It was Riedesel's good fortune to be received as a hero, unlike another old Hessian, General Leopold von Heister, whom General William Howe blamed for the defeat at Trenton and had recalled in 1777, never to see further military duty. In contrast, the disaster at Saratoga was so great that the British hierarchy carefully avoided blaming anyone for the surrender and praised Riedesel for his bravery and fortitude. In 1787 Riedesel was promoted to lieutenant general and sent as commander of the Brunswick troops to support the Stadtholder (analogous to governor) of the southern provinces of Holland. After six years on this assignment he

retired, only to be recalled to become commandant of the city of Brunswick, an office he held until he died on 6 January 1800. After his death, his wife, Friederike C. L. von Riedesel (1746–1808), published what has been called one of the most memorable memoirs to emerge from the American Revolution. It first appeared in Berlin in 1800.

SEE ALSO *Bennington Raid*; *Burgoyne's Offensive*; *Hubbardton, Vermont*; *Saratoga, First Battle of*.

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RIFLEMEN. A rifle differed from a musket in that a rifle (also called a rifled musket) had grooves cut in a spiral configuration down the length of its barrel that, when the weapon was discharged, imparted spin to the projectile. This spin was enough to stabilize the projectile's flight and give it both a longer range and greater accuracy. The barrels of muskets, by contrast, were smooth (hence the term "smooth-bore") and, when the weapon was fired, imparted no spin to the projectile. Where a musket might have some accuracy out to about sixty yards (although they were not intended for aimed fire), rifles could reach two to three hundred yards with some hope that the projectile would hit the target at which it was aimed.

The rifle's advantage in accuracy and range was well known in Europe from the sixteenth century. Hunters and early gunsmiths had found that wrapping the marble-shaped projectile in a greased patch of cloth or leather enabled it better to grip the rifling, and had the added advantage of loosening incompletely combusted gunpowder from the barrels' interior with each round. By the time of the Revolution, all armies placed a few such weapons in the hands of specialized marksmen. But the rifle's great drawback, which greatly limited its use as a military weapon, was the time, effort, and precision required to reload it. Moreover, because of the difficulties of reloading, the rifle could not be fitted with a socket bayonet. The musket, again in contrast, was much less of a precision weapon. It could take rough handling by a raw recruit who could learn by rote the physical motions he needed to load and fire the weapon in a way that maximized its capacity for high volumes of unaimed volley fire.

German immigrants brought the skills of rifle construction to America beginning about 1720, and by 1760 gunsmiths in the backcountry of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas had evolved a unique American firearm. Typically, the American long rifle, as its name indicates, had a long barrel (forty inches or more, to allow for more complete combustion of the powder charge and a steadier aim), a smaller bore (to reduce the weight of the weapon and the projectiles, although at the cost of reduced stopping power), and a higher ratio of powder to projectile (to increase the distance the round would travel). In the hands of a well-practiced shooter who knew the characteristics of his particular weapon, the long rifle was a formidable firearm, and made the men who carried it into battle formidable light infantry troops. Exaggerated stories of prowess in marksmanship and reloading made them seem even more formidable. It was reported that, to the amazement of British regulars, an American frontiersman not only could deliver a reasonably high rate of fire (perhaps two, even three, rounds per minute) but also could reload on the run.

The Continental Congress had such a high opinion of the long rifle that its first important military decision (14 June 1775) was to authorize the raising of "six companies of expert riflemen" in Pennsylvania, along with two each in Maryland and Virginia. The response in Pennsylvania was so great that Congress raised this state's authorization to eight companies (22 June); they were subsequently organized as Colonel William Thompson's Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion. Men in the Valley of Virginia were just as enthusiastic. Daniel Morgan, a veteran of both the final French and Indian war and Dunmore's War, raised a company of 96 men in Frederick county, 40 percent more than his authorized strength, and marched 600 miles to Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 21 days (15 July–6 August)—an average of 28½ miles a day—without losing a man from fatigue or illness. This feat allegedly moved Washington to tears. Although Morgan got the most publicity (most of the achievements of riflemen with the main army are associated with him), other rifle company commanders, like Michael Cresap and Hugh Stephenson, demonstrated comparable leadership skills.

The rifled gun was unknown in New England at this time, and the riflemen were as much of a curiosity around Boston as they would have been around London. John Adams, for example, wrote to his wife (17 June 1775) about "a peculiar kind of musket, called a rifle." The frontiersmen dazzled the Boston army with their marksmanship, but they soon became a disciplinary problem because of their rowdy, frontier ways. In the most serious incident, the so-called mutiny on Prospect Hill on 10 September 1775, some Pennsylvania "shirtmen" (as riflemen were called because of the hunting shirts they wore) tried to liberate a sergeant from confinement for neglect of

duty and precipitated a confrontation with Washington, Charles Lee, Nathanael Greene, and an armed regiment of Rhode Islanders.

Several rifle-armed units served with the main army at New York City in 1776, including the First Continental Regiment (formerly Thompson's Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion), Colonel Samuel Miles's Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment, and Colonel Hugh Stephenson's Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment; the first two saw hard fighting on Long Island, and Stephenson's was captured at Fort Washington, where Stephenson himself was killed. Service around New York highlighted the disadvantages of the rifle on a battlefield dominated by linear tactics. The man with the smoothbore musket—capable of putting out a higher volume of fire, accurate enough for the tactics of the day, and armed with a bayonet—was the man who won or lost battles. When Maryland offered to send a rifle company to Philadelphia for the Continental Army in October 1776, the secretary of the Board of War indicated his gratitude. However, the secretary wrote that “if muskets were given them instead of rifles the service would be more benefitted, as there is a superabundance of riflemen in the Army. Were it in the power of Congress to supply muskets they would speedily reduce the number of rifles and replace them with the former, as they are more easily kept in order, can be fired oftener and have the advantage of Bayonets.”

The virtues of riflemen, when given tasks appropriate to their abilities, were on display in the 1777 campaign. Daniel Morgan returned to active duty in early June, when Washington ordered him to assemble a Corps of Rangers from among Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania riflemen who had already enlisted in the army. (Bored by inaction at the siege of Boston, he volunteered for Benedict Arnold's march to Quebec, was captured at Quebec City on 31 December 1775, and was exchanged in January 1777.) Before it was disbanded at the end of 1778, Morgan's corps of riflemen would become the most famous rifle-armed unit in the Continental Army. For two months, the riflemen screened the main army against British maneuvers in northern New Jersey, and then were sent to the Northern Army in mid-August to help counter the white and Indian skirmishers supporting Burgoyne's invasion. According to Washington, Morgan's men were all “well acquainted with the use of rifles, and with that mode of fighting which is necessary to make them a good counterpoise to the Indians.” They had great success in turning the tables, intimidating enemy skirmishers in the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys and preventing Burgoyne from understanding the size and location of the American forces arrayed against him. On both occasions when Burgoyne tried to break through the American barrier on Bemis Heights (19 September and 7 October), Horatio Gates sent Morgan out into the

rolling, wooded terrain to blunt the British advance. The key to the American success was the fact that Gates paired the riflemen with a composite battalion of light infantrymen, led by Major Henry Dearborn and armed with bayonet-bearing, smooth-bore muskets. Whenever British troops launched a bayonet charge across a clearing in a desperate attempt to rid themselves of the galling, longer-range fire of the riflemen, they were met on the other side by Dearborn's bayonets. The two American units worked together to create a lethal battlefield puzzle that the British at Saratoga did not solve.

When the Americans failed to coordinate the rifle with the bayonet, there were many talented British and Hessian leaders of light infantry who would make them pay dearly. Lieutenant Colonel John Graves Simcoe, who, as commander of the Queen's Rangers, faced American skirmishers in many encounters in New Jersey and Virginia, thought that American riflemen “were by no means the most formidable of the rebel troops; their not being armed with bayonets permitted their opponents to take liberties with them” (Peterson, pp. 200–201). Major George Hanger, who commanded both Hessian jägers and the cavalry of Banastre Tarleton's British Legion, wrote:

Riflemen as riflemen only, are a very feeble foe and not to be trusted alone any distance from camp; and at the outposts they must ever be supported by regulars, or they will constantly be beaten in, and compelled to retire. . . . When Morgan's riflemen came down to Pennsylvania from Canada [on 18 November 1777], flushed with success gained over Burgoyne's army, they marched to attack our light infantry, under Colonel [Robert] Abercrombie. The moment they appeared before him he ordered his troops to charge them with the bayonet; not one man out of four, had time to fire, and those that did had no time given them to load again; the light infantry not only dispersed them instantly but drove them for miles over the country. They never attacked, or even looked at, our light infantry again, without a regular force to support them. (Peterson, *Arms and Armor*, pp. 201 and 202, quoting Hanger, *To All Sportsmen and Particularly to Farmers, and Gamekeepers* [London, 1814], pp. 199 and 200).

Presumably the action Hanger described took place at Whitemarsh on 5–8 December, or at Matson's Ford on 11 December 1777. By that time, Morgan's riflemen may not have been at their best after months of hard campaigning; when Nathanael Greene had attempted to reinforce Fort Mercer, one of the Delaware River forts, in early November, only 170 riflemen had shoes stout enough so that they could accompany him. Washington himself understood the need for bayonets. When the riflemen went north to stop Burgoyne in 1777, Washington replaced them with a corps of bayonet-armed light

infantry. He embodied a corps of light infantry for the campaigning season in each of the four succeeding years.

The war in the south in 1780 and 1781 also provided evidence of the value of rifles. Both Morgan at Cowpens (17 January 1781) and Greene at Guilford Courthouse (15 March 1781) deployed rifle-armed militiamen where they would not have to stand unsupported against British bayonets. The earlier action at Kings Mountain, South Carolina (7 October 1780), demonstrated a different lesson, that rifle-armed frontiersmen could beat a smaller number of bayonet-armed Loyalists on steep and heavily wooded terrain utterly unsuited to any version of linear tactics. It is ironical that this victory was won over Major Patrick Ferguson, Britain's foremost exponent of the rifle. Ferguson had invented an advanced breech-loading rifle, a hundred examples of which were issued to a corps of picked marksmen during the Brandywine campaign. These weapons, which were withdrawn from service when Ferguson was wounded and the corps disbanded, supplemented the thousand Pattern 1776 muzzle-loading rifles, with twenty-eight-inch barrels, issued in 1777 to light infantry companies and a few Loyalist units to counter the American long rifle. An estimated four thousand short-barreled rifles were available to the jägers who came to America as part of the German mercenary contingents; some were personal weapons, others were standard military models.

SEE ALSO *Abercromby, Sir Robert; Bayonets and Bayonet Attacks; Cowpens, South Carolina; Cresap, Michael; Ewald, Johann von; Ferguson, Patrick; Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Hanger, George; Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Light Infantry; Matson's Ford, Pennsylvania; Morgan, Daniel; Muskets and Musketry; Mutiny on Prospect Hill; Simcoe, John Graves; Thompson, William; Thompson's Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion; Whitmarsh, Pennsylvania.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

RITZEMA, RUDOLPHUS. (1738?–1803). Continental officer, turncoat. Rudolphus Ritzema graduated from King's College (later Columbia) in 1758. On 30 June 1775 he became a lieutenant colonel of the First New York Regiment. Taking part in the invasion of Canada under General Richard Montgomery's command, Ritzema was promoted to colonel of the regiment on 28 November 1775 and assumed command of the Third New York Regiment on 28 March 1776. He was praised for his performance during the battle at White Plains on 28 October 1776. Having been superceded by his rival Colonel Philip Van Cortlandt and convinced that the patriots were on the verge of defeat, Ritzema deserted to the British in November 1776. He held the rank of lieutenant colonel, but little more is known about Ritzema's life after his defection. He died in 1795.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

RIVINGTON, JAMES. (1724–1802). Bookseller, journalist, printer. Born in London on 17 August 1724, Rivington was the son of the publisher Charles Rivington. He and his brother John (1720–1792) continued their father's publishing business until March 1756 and then went into partnership with the firm of James Fletcher Jr. After a smashing success with Smollett's *History of England* and other works, Rivington indulged in a period of high living, gambling, and neglect of business that ended his publishing career in England. Declaring bankruptcy in 1760, he went to America and opened bookstores in New York City, Philadelphia, and Boston. About 1765 he concentrated his book business in New York City, but the next year he moved to Annapolis, remaining until his Maryland Lottery, a land scheme, led to bankruptcy. Again he recovered quickly from business failure, this time by marrying a wealthy widow, Elizabeth Van Horne, in 1769. He returned to publishing books, enjoying a modest success.

On 18 March 1773 he published a preliminary, free issue of what was to be *Rivington's New-York Gazeteer*. Unlike other American newspapers, this one proposed to appeal to all interests, to be nonpartisan, and to give good coverage to international news. Well edited and excellent in typography and layout, it was a success. Within little more than a year its circulation had reached thirty-six hundred copies, an impressive figure for the time.

But freedom of the press did not fit the views of the Sons of Liberty. They did not want both sides of the controversy with Britain to be printed, especially as Rivington's Loyalist views became more apparent. Several Whig meetings condemned Rivington's policy and, although he signed their Association after being arrested, his plant was attacked and destroyed on 27 November 1775 by a crowd led by Isaac Sears, who ordered the type carried away to be made into bullets. The Provincial Congress and then the Continental Congress investigated the loyalty of Rivington, who attempted to make peace with the Patriots. Giving up on this effort, he and his family sailed for England in January 1776. Appointed King's Printer in New York City, he returned to start publication on 4 October 1777 of a strictly Loyalist paper. *Rivington's New York Loyal Gazette* changed its title on 13 December 1777 to the *Royal Gazette*. During the period from May 1778 to July 1783, Rivington set up a mutual arrangement with other New York papers whereby they jointly produced what was virtually a daily newspaper for the first time in America.

When the British left New York in 1783, Rivington stayed behind. He removed the royal arms from his paper and changed its name to *Rivington's New York Gazette and Universal Advertiser* but could only keep the unpopular paper in circulation until 31 December 1783. He tried to stay in business as a bookseller and stationer but ended up in debtor's prison from 1797 to 1801, dying poor in New York on 4 July 1802. There has been some question as to why Rivington was allowed to stay in New York after the British evacuated. An old story held that Washington ordered that Rivington be protected because the publisher had spied for the Americans during the British occupation, but there is no solid evidence supporting this interpretation. More likely the victorious Patriots simply did not see him as much of a threat.

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ROBERTSON, JAMES. (1717–1788). British officer and governor. Born in Newbigging, Scotland, on 29 June 1717, Robertson enlisted in the army as a private, earning promotion to sergeant before receiving a commission in the marines in 1739. He served in the wars against France and in Scotland against the Jacobite rising of 1745. Shortly thereafter he was able to purchase the rank of captain in the earl of Loudoun's regiment, seeing service in Ireland before going to America as a major in 1756. Robertson served as deputy quartermaster general during the Seven Years' War, seeing action at Louisburg, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point;

became a lieutenant colonel in 1760; and supervised Britain's acquisition of the Floridas at the war's end. His testimony in 1765 before Parliament is credited with spurring the passage of the Quartering Act.

Robertson, who lived in New York City during the Seven Years' War, was promoted to brigadier general at the start of the Revolution, advising General William Howe in the campaign that led to the successful occupation of that city in 1776. Promoted to major general, he was named military commandant of the city. Believing that most Americans were loyal to the crown, Robertson urged the restoration of civil government in occupied territories to win public support. In 1779 the royal government of New York was reestablished, with Robertson, now a lieutenant general, as governor. During his term as governor, he had to contend not just with Patriot raids and a flood of Loyalist refugees, but also with the politics of the officer corps and the opposition of many Loyalists to his policy of conciliation. He was also charged with incompetence, womanizing, senility, corruption, and smuggling; the charge of senility probably being inaccurate. Most significantly, General Sir Henry Clinton refused to end martial law, thereby alienating most of the inhabitants of New York City and Long Island. Out of office with the war's end, Robertson, now a wealthy man, moved to London, where he died on 4 March 1788.

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Michael Bellesiles

ROBINSON, BEVERLEY. (1721–1792). (later changed to Beverly). Tory leader. Virginia-New York. Born in Middlesex County, Virginia, on 11 January 1723 to a prominent family—his father, John, was president of the Virginia council and acting governor at his death in 1749—Robinson raised a company in 1746 for a proposed expedition against Canada that never materialized. He led his troops to New York, where he stayed, becoming a business partner of Oliver De Lancey and marrying the wealthy Susanna Philipse in 1748. Robinson held a wide variety of offices, from judge to colonel of the Dutchess County militia to New York's commissary and paymaster during the Seven Years' War. He built a stately home called "Beverly" on the Hudson River, two miles south of West Point. One of his many visitors was George Washington, who stopped in to borrow money from Robinson in 1756. As one of the owners of the Highland

Patent, lands seized from the Wappinger Indians while they were off fighting for the British during the Seven Years' War, Robinson was a target of the riots by the local white settlers against this land grab. In 1765 Robinson had to flee to the safety of New York City until the government put down this uprising the following year.

By the time the Revolution started, he had increased his wife's fortune to include tens of thousands of acres—annual rents alone amounted to £1,250—and had become one of the state's wealthiest landowners. Initially, Robinson hoped to remain neutral during the Revolution. But on 20 February 1777, after John Jay told him he would have to choose one side or the other, Robinson refused to take the oath of allegiance. Leaving his fine house, which subsequently was used variously as American headquarters for the Highlands district and as a hospital, Robinson took refuge with the British in New York City. Here he raised, mostly among his tenants, the Loyal American Regiment, of which he was made colonel. Later he was named colonel and director of the Loyal Guides and Pioneers as well. He led his troops with distinction on several occasions, particularly in the storming of Fort Montgomery on 6 October 1777, during Clinton's expedition to the Highlands.

His main contribution, however, was in the secret service. General Henry Clinton used Robinson in an attempt to recruit leading Americans to the British. Robinson's efforts failed with General Israel Putnam (whose headquarters was in Robinson's house) and Colonel Ethan Allen but had more success with General Benedict Arnold. Robinson made the arrangements for a meeting between André and Arnold and served as Clinton's emissary to Washington in the effort to save André's life. In early 1780 the New York legislature banished Robinson and confiscated his property. In August 1782 he left New York for England. Appointed to the first council of New Brunswick, Robinson never took his seat, staying in England to pursue his claim for compensation of eighty thousand pounds; he eventually received seventeen thousand pounds for the loss of his estate. He settled in Thornbury, near Bath, where he died on 9 April 1792. Four of his sons fought with the British during the Revolution; one became a lieutenant general, another commissary general; both were knighted. The other two sons settled in New Brunswick.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason; Clinton's Expedition.*

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ROCHAMBEAU (FILS), DONATIEN MARIE JOSEPH DE VIMEUR, VICOMTE DE. (1755–1813). French officer, son of the comte de Rochambeau. Entering the service in the Auvergne Regiment in 1767, he was attached to the artillery regiment of Besançon in 1769. In January 1779 he was named *mestre de camp en second* of the Bourbonnais Regiment. The next year he accompanied his father to America as assistant adjutant general. On 28 October 1780 he returned to France with dispatches, and in May 1781 he was back in America. Remaining with his father until the end of hostilities, he was promoted to colonel commanding the Saintonge Regiment on 11 November 1782 and in 1783 was promoted to command of the Royal Auvergne Regiment and made a chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis. In 1791 he became a *maréchal de camp* and lieutenant general on 9 July 1792.

In August 1792 he was appointed governor general of the Leeward Islands. After pacifying Saint Domingue and forcing his royalist predecessor, the comte de Behagues, to abandon Martinique, he surrendered on 22 March 1794 to a British force. Later he was reappointed as governor general of Saint Domingue but was recalled and imprisoned by the Directory. He returned to Saint Domingue under the command of Leclerc and succeeded him on 1 January 1803, but he surrendered to the British on 28 November 1803. He was then imprisoned in Jamaica and England until his exchange in 1811. As a division commander in the corps of Lauriston in 1813, he participated in the Battles of Lutzen and Bautzen and died at Leipzig. In that final campaign, Napoleon made him an officer in the Legion of Honor.

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ROCHAMBEAU, JEAN-BAPTISTE DONATIEN DE VIMEUR, COMTE DE.

(1725–1807). Commander of the French army in America. Born at Vendôme of an old and honorable family, he was being trained for the church (the traditional career for a third son) when his older brother died. At the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), he was commissioned in the cavalry regiment of Saint-Simon. In 1743 he took command of a cavalry troop (company), having served in Bohemia, Bavaria, and on the Rhine. In 1747 Rochambeau was promoted to colonel of the infantry Regiment de la Marche, and the next year he was appointed aide-de-camp to the duke of Orleans. He sustained a serious thigh wound at the battle of Laufeldt; took part in the siege of Maestricht (1748); became governor of Vendôme (1749); distinguished himself in the capture of Port Mahon, Minorca, from the British in 1756; and was promoted to brigadier general. He fought in Germany, where he distinguished himself at Crefeld, took command of the Auvergne Regiment in 1759, and saved the French army from a surprise attack at Clostercamp in October 1760. Wounded several times in the latter action, Rochambeau was commended for personal bravery and fine tactics and promoted to the rank of *maréchal de camp*. Early in 1761 he was named inspector general of infantry. In 1771 he was awarded the Great Cross of the Order of Saint Louis and in 1776 became governor of Villefranche-en-Roussillon, which provided him a steady, substantial revenue.

In 1780 Rochambeau was given command of the expeditionary force sent to America to start a new and decisive phase of the French alliance. Possessing the necessary virtues for such a command, Rochambeau was a consummate professional. Promoted to lieutenant general for this assignment, he took command of some seventy-six hundred soldiers assembled at Brest. He sailed on 1 May 1780 with the fifty-five hundred for whom there were transport accommodations, and with the escort of Admiral Ternay's fleet, he arrived off Newport on 11 July.

Rochambeau faced a difficult task. His instructions required his troops to act as auxiliaries to the Americans, yielding them the place of honor, and he was to maintain good relations with the them. If the British triumphed, he was to withdraw his force to Saint Domingue. Up until his arrival in America, the French alliance had been a frustrating disappointment to the Patriots, owing largely to the failures of Rochambeau's predecessor, Estaing. The British fleet promptly bottled up Ternay. Rochambeau was, because of his instructions, hesitant to commit to battle without clear superiority.

Since Washington did not understand French and Rochambeau did not understand English, Washington sought to use Lafayette as a mediator between the two.



Comte de Rochambeau. *The commander of the French army in America, in a nineteenth-century painting by Charles-Philippe Larivière.* CHATEAU DE VERSAILLES, FRANCE, GIRAUDON/BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY

Yet when Lafayette tried to advise the old veteran on the unique nature of American combat, Rochambeau took offense, particularly as he was unclear which part of the advice was Washington's and which Lafayette's. The two disagreed over the feasibility of an assault on New York City and Long Island. With irritation and delicacy, Rochambeau wrote the impatient youth that in resisting his appeals, "Allow an old father to reply to you as a cherished son whom he loves and esteems immensely." Yet Rochambeau was not so delicate with La Luzerne; he complained about Lafayette's letters, written "surely at the instigation of some hotheaded persons." Complicating Rochambeau's problems was the inability of the French war and naval departments to send the full expeditionary force across the Atlantic in the spring of 1780; this was aggravated by lack of Spanish participation.

In Newport the French forces, systematically isolated from the local population, exercised cordial relations with the Americans. During their stay, they put a significant quantity of specie into the American economy, an amount

that has been estimated at four million dollars. At a meeting with Washington at Hartford, Rochambeau made it clear that the French would not participate in any campaign during 1780. Inactivity began to create morale problems among Rochambeau's officers. Rochambeau's son, the vicomte de Rochambeau, reached Boston early in May 1781 with Admiral Barras and the bad news that the second division of French forces would not come; the good news, however, was that admiral Grasse was headed for the West Indies and would be available in "July or August." When Rochambeau and Washington met at Wethersfield, Connecticut, on 21–23 May 1781, Rochambeau was free to make only vague references to Grasse's availability. The combined French-American operation near New York was stalled in August until news arrived on 14 August of Grasse's movement toward North America.

Events led ultimately to Cornwallis's isolation on the Yorktown peninsula; Grasse's arrival in the Chesapeake, which closed off any British evacuation; and the superiority of land and naval forces that would result in the Yorktown siege. According to Captain Ludwig von Closen, Rochambeau had already participated in fourteen sieges. The standard principles had been laid out by the military engineer Sébastien Vauban a hundred years earlier. Rochambeau and Washington made plans with Grasse in a meeting on 17 September and the admiral agreed to remain in the Chesapeake to the end of October. The siege commenced on 9 October and ended on 17 October. As Rochambeau would later recall, when Cornwallis's representative at the surrender ceremony tried to hand him his sword, "I pointed to General Washington . . . and told him that the French army being only an auxiliary on this continent, it devolved on the American General to tender him his orders."

In the aftermath of Yorktown, Rochambeau began planning the campaign of 1782, but without the naval force that would be necessary to act. By mid-1782, Rochambeau received word that the French fleet in the West Indies would return to Boston in August, and Rochambeau left Williamsburg on 1 July. At Philadelphia, Washington sought to interest him in a Canadian campaign, but Rochambeau ruled that it was beyond his instructions. Most of the French force left Boston on 24 November. Rochambeau sailed from Anne Arundel County, Maryland, on 8 January 1783, pursued by a British frigate across the Atlantic to Nantes, which he reached on 20 February. Louis XVI recognized his achievement with official commendation and royal favors that included the Blue Ribbon of the Order of the Holy Spirit, the highest honor the king could confer. Early in 1784 he was made commander of the northern district of France at Calais, where he remained for four years. Rochambeau took part in the second Assembly of Notables. Given command of the important Alsace

district in 1789, he was forced by ill health to retire in December of that year. In September 1790 he was put in command of the army of the North, and in December 1791 he became a marshal of France. During the Terror he was arrested and escaped the guillotine only because Robespierre's death brought a halt to the Terror. Rochambeau was released on 27 October 1794 after a six-months' detention. He lived out his life quietly on his estate near Vendôme.

SEE ALSO *Barras de Saint-Laurent, Jacques-Melchior, Comte de; Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'; French Alliance; Grasse, François Joseph Paul, Comte de; La Luzerne, Chevalier Anne-César de; Lafayette, Marquis de; Spanish Participation in the American Revolution; Ternay, Charles Louis d'Arzac, Chevalier de; Yorktown Campaign; Yorktown, Siege of.*

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ROCHE, FERMOY **SEE** *Fermoy, Matthias Alexis de Roche.*

ROCHEBLAVE, CHEVALIER DE
SEE *See Rastel, Philippe Francois sieur de Rocheblave.*

ROCKINGHAM, CHARLES WATSON-WENTWORTH, SECOND MARQUESS

OF. (1730–1782). British prime minister. Born in Yorkshire on 13 May 1730, Wentworth entered Eton in 1738 and from 1746 to 1750 (when he succeeded his father as marquess of Rockingham) studied under tutors in Geneva and in Italy. He served as prime minister from 1765 to 1766. His profound belief in parliamentary supremacy and instinct for compromise led him to drive through the Declaratory Act alongside the repeal of the Stamp Act. As the leader of a faction in Parliament who opposed Lord North's American policy, he condemned the Boston Tea Party and supported the Coercive (or Intolerable) Acts and the Quebec Act of 1774; nevertheless he demanded the repeal of Charles Townshend's tea duty. An indolent politician prone to blame failure on court conspiracies, his leadership of the Rockingham Whigs was due primarily to his immense wealth and charm. During the war he defended Vice-Admiral Augustus Keppel in his court-martial (1778), attacked the earl of Sandwich's management of the navy, and organized the defense of Hull against American naval officer John Paul Jones. Not until 1780 did he reluctantly conclude that American independence was inevitable. When Lord North fell in 1782, Rockingham became prime minister again; but his cabinet was split between the views of Charles Fox and William Shelburne over the timing of a grant of independence. Rockingham died on 1 July before the dispute could be resolved.

SEE ALSO *Declaratory Act; Fox, Charles James; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; North, Sir Frederick; Quebec Act; Shelburne, William Petty Fitzmaurice, earl of; Stamp Act; Townshend Acts.*

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ROCKY MOUNT, SOUTH CAROLINA.

1 August 1780. Following the destruction of Loyalist Captain Christian Huck's detachment at Williamson's Plantation on 12 July 1780, more Whigs joined Thomas Sumter's Patriot force. With Continental troops approaching, Sumter felt he could operate more boldly against British lines of communications between Charleston and Camden and other interior posts. After

notifying Major General Johann De Kalb about the possibilities, Sumter moved against Rocky Mount with about 600 men on 30 July, while Major William R. Davie threatened Hanging Rock, to the north. At that time, these two posts were garrisoned only by Loyalist provincial troops, because British regulars had been drawn closer to Camden.

Sumter's troops included South Carolina militia under the leadership of Colonels William Hill and Andrew Neale. In addition, he had the North Carolina militia of Colonel John Irwin. At Rocky Mount, Lieutenant Colonel George Turnbull held a strong, naturally defensible position with 150 New York Volunteers and 150 South Carolina Loyalist militia. Two fortified houses and a strong building with loopholes had been built on the knoll and were surrounded by an abatis (a defensive construction made of felled trees pointing outward toward the enemy). Sumter arrived at Rocky Mount early on 1 August and, rather than immediately attacking, called on Turnbull to surrender. Already alerted, the Tories told Sumter to "come and take it."

The post was assaulted repeatedly, although without the benefit of artillery, and the abatis was finally penetrated. During the initial action six men were lost, including Colonel Neale, from the Patriot side. Once through the outer defense, the attackers found the buildings well defended by heavy musket fire. Sumter sent men to burn the houses, even rolling a wagon filled with combustibles against one. Once the fire took hold, the defenders tried to surrender. A sudden rainstorm put out the fire and the Tories resumed fighting. Frustrated, Sumter withdrew to his camp near Land's Ford on the Catawba.

The engagement lasted almost eight hours, but was largely carried out through long-range skirmishing because few wished to overly expose themselves to injury. By the end of the battle, both sides had lost approximately a dozen killed and wounded. After a brief respite, Sumter went on to attack Hanging Rock, North Carolina, on 6 August 1780.

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign; Hanging Rock, South Carolina.*

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revised by Lawrence E. Babits

RODNEY, CAESAR. (1728–1784). Signer. Delaware. Born in Kent County, Delaware, on 7 October 1728, Caesar Rodney was high sheriff there from 1755 to 1758. He also served the county as justice of the peace and as and county judge. In 1756 he was named militia captain and held other important public offices. He was elected to the colonial legislature nearly every year from 1758 to 1776, serving as speaker in 1769 and from 1773 to 1776. He was an active delegate to the 1765 Stamp Act Congress in New York City. An early supporter of colonial rights, he was chairman of the Delaware Committee of Safety and was sent to the Continental Congress in 1774 and 1775. He was named a colonel in the Delaware militia in May 1775 and was promoted to brigadier general in the following September. During 1776 he sat in the Continental Congress and was influential in suppressing the Loyalists in Delaware. His hasty return to Congress on 2 July 1776 enabled the Delaware delegation to vote two-to-one for Richard Henry Lee's resolution for independence and for the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. A conservative backlash in Delaware excluded Rodney from the state's constitutional convention, the new legislature, and the next Continental Congress.

Rodney turned his attention to military affairs, and was active on the councils of safety and inspection. He helped collect supplies, recruited for General George Washington's army, and in raised militia companies. General William Alexander made him post commandant at Trenton, New Jersey, for a few weeks, and he then served at Morristown, New Jersey, but with Washington's permission returned home in February 1777. During the British advance into his state he commanded the militia, and in September 1777 he was named state major general. In March 1778 he was elected President of Delaware. He held this post until November 1781. Chosen for Congress that year and in 1783, he did not take his seat due to ill health. In 1784 he became speaker of the state senate, which met at his home to save him from having to travel. He died at home on 26 June 1784 from cancer of the face, a condition from which he had suffered for about ten years.

SEE ALSO *Declaration of Independence*.

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RODNEY, GEORGE BRIDGES. (c. 1718–1792). First baron Rodney, British admiral and politician. George Rodney was baptized on 14 February 1718 at



George Bridges Rodney. *The British admiral, in an engraving based on a 1761 painting by Joshua Reynolds.* THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

St. Giles-in-the-Fields, Middlesex, on the edge of London. His soldier father lost heavily in the South Sea Bubble and George became dependent upon wealthier relatives, an experience which may partly explain his later eye for prize money. Educated at Harrow School he joined HMS *Sutherland* as a "volunteer per order," a young prospective officer, on 7 July 1732. He became a lieutenant in 1740 and a post captain on 31 March 1743. Rodney distinguished himself in Hawke's "general chase" action off Ushant on 14 October 1747 and was commodore and governor of Newfoundland (1749–1752), after which he turned to politics and the gaming tables. During the Seven Years' War he conveyed Amherst to the siege of Louisburg (1758) and, promoted to rear admiral, bombarded and blockaded a French invasion flotilla at Le Havre. Appointed to the Leeward Islands station, he cooperated with Monckton in the conquest in 1759 of Martinique, St. Lucia, Grenada, and St. Vincent. When ordered to support the attack on Havana he kept back some ships to cover Jamaica, a foretaste of his way with orders he thought inappropriate or unwise. Fortunately for him, the expedition was an outstanding success. In 1763 he was made a baronet and, two years later, governor of Greenwich Hospital.

Rodney now fell into serious financial trouble, and not entirely because of his addiction to gambling. He had been a member of Parliament from 1752 to 1754 and again from 1761, but up to 1768 his election expenses had been defrayed by patrons. However, he had to find thirty thousand pounds for the election in 1768 out of his own pocket which, combined with a foolish agreement with a loan shark, ruined him. The Falkland Islands crisis of 1771 brought him command of the Jamaica squadron, but he was not allowed to keep the Greenwich governorship and its income. He returned home in 1774 to find his pay frozen over some unauthorized dockyard expenditure. When Parliament was dissolved Rodney, having lost his immunity from arrest, obtained leave of absence and fled to France.

When war with France broke out in 1778, Rodney was eager for command but dared not leave that country until the duc de Biron generously lent him one thousand louis to cover his debts. In May 1778 he returned to London, where his arrears of pay were released to him and he repaid his English creditors. Finally, in December 1779 he was appointed commander in chief in the Leeward Islands, with orders to relieve Gibraltar on the way.

NEW TACTICS

On 7 January 1780 he captured most of a large Spanish convoy off Cape St. Vincent and nine days later virtually destroyed a smaller Spanish squadron in the famous Moonlight Battle. Rodney then took his own convoy safely into Gibraltar and sailed to the West Indies with four ships of the line to add to the seventeen under Hyde Parker and Joshua Rowley. On 7 April Rodney led this combined fleet against the comte de Guichen off Martinique, aiming to concentrate on either the enemy's van or rear. Unfortunately, he had not fully explained his tactics to his officers, many of whom stuck to the formal line of battle and rendered the engagement inconclusive. Rodney learned the lesson and drilled the fleet in his new tactics. In encounters on 15 and 19 May the fleet responded better, only to be thwarted by the wind and Guichen's refusal to engage closely. Nevertheless, Rodney had become a leader in the growing revolution in naval tactics. Unwilling to encourage individual initiative or scrap the official fighting instructions, he had nevertheless adapted the general chase technique to concentrate on parts of an enemy line and, where possible, to break it.

POOR RELATIONS WITH SUBORDINATES

As the hurricane season approached, Rodney's penchant for arrogant and tactless handling of subordinates came to the fore. It was customary for squadrons to leave the West Indies at this time of the year and Rodney, fearing that all or part of the French fleet might go to North America,

sailed for New York. This move, while it violated the letter of his orders, followed Admiralty expectations that the American stations would support each other. Unfortunately, Rodney tactlessly asserted his technical seniority over Vice Admiral Arbuthnot, interfered with his dispositions, appointed his own followers into Arbuthnot's ships, and claimed the commander in chief's share of prize money. On his return to the West Indies in November, Rodney alienated Peter Parker by demanding a monopoly of the overstretched Jamaica dockyards to repair his storm-damaged ships. Finally, on 7 January 1781 Rodney's erstwhile protégé, rear admiral Sir Samuel Hood, arrived to be second in command. Hood was as opinionated and touchy as Rodney and ever ready to criticise his superiors. His first opportunity came on 3 February, when Rodney and general John Vaughan took from the Dutch that emporium of contraband, St. Eustatius. Rodney immediately claimed the booty, much of it belonging to British merchants, as prize and shipped it for home in a special convoy. Hood accused Rodney of neglecting his strategic priorities in order to cover this convoy against any French sorties from Martinique. Thus were laid the seeds of the calamitous failure of cooperation of 1781.

In April, De Grasse brought twenty more ships of the line to the West Indies. Although warned, Rodney did not attempt to intercept him with his whole fleet. Hood, with a detachment, engaged De Grasse indecisively on 29 April and the two fleets did not fight again, apart from a single indecisive encounter off Tobago on 5 June. During this time and later, Rodney failed to keep close track of De Grasse's movements and to keep in touch with Arbuthnot. When the hurricane season came round again, Rodney had intelligence that De Grasse would sail northwards; but he neither gave Arbuthnot's successor, Thomas Graves, adequate information nor sent to him timely and adequate reinforcements. Instead, complaining of ill health and fretting about the lost St. Eustatius convoy, which had been intercepted by the French in European waters, he sailed for home on 1 August. He left Hood in command with instructions to send to Graves help which turned out to be too little and too late.

DEFEAT OF DE GRASSE

At home he retired to Bath and proceeded, as the news of Graves's failure and Cornwallis's surrender filtered through, to compose his own version of events. His famous Bath letter of 19 October, he for example, gave a very misleading view of the intelligence he was supposed to have sent to Graves. The government still thought highly enough of Rodney to send him back to the Caribbean with reinforcements to counter a new French offensive. On 19 February he rejoined Hood at St. Lucia to find St. Eustatius,

Demerara, St. Kitts, and Montserrat already lost. With Jamaica known to be De Grasse's next target, Rodney deployed his fleet to stop De Grasse at Martinique joining the rest of the invasion force at Haiti, moves which Hood characteristically denounced as disastrous. He was quite wrong.

On 9 April 1782 Rodney intercepted De Grasse near the islets called the Saints between Guadeloupe and Dominica. For three days Rodney struggled to close with the French as they worked their way to windward. On 12 April he succeeded, forming line of battle and engaging the French center soon after 8 A.M. The wind now veered four points, creating openings in the French line. Rodney at once ordered his ships through the gaps, breaking the French line into fragments. All afternoon Rodney pursued the disorganized survivors and by evening his ships had already taken six ships of the line, a frigate, and a sloop. When De Grasse's flagship, the 110-gun *Ville de Paris*, struck, Rodney finally called off the chase. In theory, as Hood was all too quick to point out, a chase through the night might have destroyed the French fleet entirely. Rodney, however, had to take account of the damage to his own ships and the dangers of collisions in the dark; his decision was probably wise.

The victory re-established British supremacy in the Caribbean, preserved Jamaica, and strengthened Britain's hand in the Paris peace negotiations. In May, Charles James Fox moved a vote of thanks in the House of Commons, thus embarrassing the new Rockingham administration, which had already sent Pigot to replace Rodney. The government responded by giving Rodney a barony, encouraging the Commons to vote him two thousand pounds per annum, and winding up a committee of inquiry into the St. Eustatius affair. In theory, Rodney should have returned home in September to find himself a wealthy national hero.

It was not to be. His failure to pursue the French into the night was publicly attacked by Hood, who claimed that Rodney was too preoccupied with securing the French flagship to see the bigger picture. Others suggested that the idea of breaking the French line came from Rodney's flag captain, Charles Douglas. Finally, while the Commons inquiry had folded, the merchants with claims against Rodney's St. Eustatius seizures continued to pursue him in the courts. Eventually their claims amounted to more than the total value of the lost convoy, and Rodney spent the last ten years of his life struggling to meet them.

ASSESSMENT

George Rodney was an inspired but flawed leader. There is no doubting his arrogance and tactlessness, his failure to cooperate properly with Graves during the Yorktown crisis, and his near-obsession with prize money. He was

unreceptive to the new tactical ideas of Howe, Kempenfelt, and Graves, but his own tactical ideas, which reached triumphant maturity at the Saints, were far ahead of their time. The matter of who actually suggested breaking the line on 12 April 1781 is immaterial, for Rodney's ideas and training lay behind it, and it was Rodney's instantaneous decision that carried it into execution. Those who criticize Rodney for not being Nelson forget that without the Saints, there might have been no Trafalgar.

SEE ALSO *Grasse, François Joseph Paul, Comte de; Hood, Samuel.*

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RODNEY, THOMAS. (1744–1811). Continental Congressman. Delaware. Born in Sussex County, Delaware, on 4 June, 1744, Rodney was named justice of the peace in 1770 and reappointed in 1774. In the following year he became a member of the state assembly, the Council of Safety, the Committee of Observations, and a captain in the state militia. During General George Washington's retreat across New Jersey in 1776, Rodney and his company joined General John Cadwalader at Bristol, Pennsylvania, on Christmas Day. They fought in the second battle of Trenton and at Princeton. In 1777, when the British invaded Delaware, Rodney joined his brother, Caesar, as adjutant. He was the Delaware Judge of the Admiralty from 1778 to 1785, and from 1781 to 1788 was sent to the Continental Congress five times. In 1786 and 1787 he was also in the state assembly, and served as speaker of that body in 1787. In 1803 he was named U.S. judge for the Missouri territory. The town of Rodney, Mississippi, where he owned a great deal of land, was named for him. He died there on 2 January 1811.

SEE ALSO *Rodney, Caesar.*

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ROGERS, ROBERT. (1731–1795). Ranger hero of colonial wars, Loyalist. New Hampshire. Born in Methuen, Massachusetts, on 7 November 1731, Rogers entered the New Hampshire Regiment in 1755 to escape prosecution for counterfeiting. After showing skill as a leader of raids and scouting expeditions, in March 1756 he became captain of an independent ranger company, and in 1758 Abercromby made him the major of nine such companies to be used for reconnaissance; they became known collectively as “Rogers’s Rangers.” After serving with Loudoun at Halifax (1757), with Abercromby at Ticonderoga (1758), and with Amherst at Crown Point (1759)—during which campaign he destroyed the St. Francis Indians in an audacious raid—he took part in the final operations against Montreal in 1760 and then went west to receive the surrender of Detroit and down the Scioto River to Sonioto (Shawneetown) on the Ohio. Lieutenants in Rogers’s Rangers were John Stark, Israel Putnam, and James Dalyell (killed at Detroit in Pontiac’s Rebellion).

In 1761 Rogers led an independent company in the Cherokee expedition of James Grant. During Pontiac’s Rebellion he commanded an independent New York company and took part in the relief and defense of Detroit. In 1765 he fled to England to avoid prosecution for his debts and illegal trading with the Indians. In England he published two accounts of his military service, *Journals* (1769) and *A Concise Account of North America* (1770), along with a play, *Ponteach: or the Savages of America* (1776), often accounted one of the first American dramas.

Rogers returned to America in 1766 as commander of Fort Michilimackinac. After repeated violations of his instructions, he was charged by Gage in 1768 with embezzlement of public property and with treasonable dealings with the French but was acquitted at a court-martial for lack of evidence. Returning to England in 1769, he was unable to get another appointment and was jailed for his debts until bailed out by his brother James. In 1775 he returned to America, perhaps as a spy for the British.

In 1776 Washington ordered Rogers imprisoned on suspicion of espionage. Escaping to the British, he was commissioned to raise the Queen’s American Rangers. Defeated at White Plains, he was removed from his command and replaced by James.

In 1780 Rogers returned to England. He died in a cheap London boardinghouse on 18 May 1795.

SEE ALSO *Cherokee Expedition of James Grant; Pontiac’s War; Putnam, Israel; Stark, John.*

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ROMAN CATHOLICS. Roman Catholicism was a small but diverse religious community in 1776. Numbering about twenty-five thousand members (just one percent of the American population), it was confined principally to the states of Pennsylvania and Maryland, where there had evolved distinctive versions of the faith that produced different but equally fervent responses to war and revolution.

AMERICAN CATHOLICS’ RELIGIOUS CULTURE

Maryland Catholicism was English, rural, and hierarchical, composed of a gentry class with extensive holdings in tobacco plantations and slaves; a middling group of small planters and farmers engaged in subsistence and commercial agriculture; and African slaves, three thousand of whom belonged to the church. Ministering to Maryland Catholics were seven Jesuit priests, who operated farms that served both as mission stations for an itinerant clergy and as informal parish churches.

Pennsylvania Catholicism, on the other hand, had a sizable urban, ethnic contingent. St. Joseph’s Church, founded in Philadelphia in 1734 as the first urban Catholic Church in America, contained a rich ethnic mix of forty Irish, English, and Germans. By 1776 the church had grown to twelve hundred and included French as well as English, Irish, and Germans. Most of the parishioners were laborers, servants, and sailors, but the church came to include a group of English and Irish merchants whose rise to economic power reflected Philadelphia’s growth as a seaport. Pennsylvania Catholicism had a lesser rural component, which was in part developed by Jesuit missionaries from St. Joseph’s and in part by migrants and their Jesuit pastors from Maryland and Germany.

Catholics faced complex problems when the onset of Revolution made a choice of loyalties both mandatory and urgent. But from whom could they seek counsel on the crisis? Turning to the hierarchy for leadership was a possibility, but suppression of the Jesuits in 1773 had thrown the American clergy, Jesuits all, into a state of disarray. Suppression forced Jesuits to become secular priests, subject no longer to the direct authority of the Jesuit missionary superior but to the bishop of London. In addition, the Declaration of Independence and war severed formal ties between American Catholics and the London hierarchy, leaving leadership of the church in the hands of the Reverend John Lewis, pastor of Bohemia Manor, Maryland. But because he had received his appointment from the bishop of London, not a few American priests refused to submit to his authority. Individual pastors called upon Catholics to take the oath of loyalty to the Revolution and defended the morality of the war against England, but most priests were loath to enter the fray,

believing that they should have “little to do with civil broils and troubled waters” (Henley, p. 179).

In the absence of clerical leadership, responsibility for steering the Church through the “troubled waters” of war and revolution was assumed by Catholic laymen belonging primarily to two elite groups. These were the Maryland gentry and the Philadelphia mercantile community.

THE REVOLUTION IN MARYLAND

The atmosphere in America in 1776 was hardly conducive to Catholic cooperation with the Patriots. Penal laws proscribing the civil or religious rights—or both—of Catholics existed in all the colonies, including Maryland. In addition, revolutionary ideology had heightened anti-Catholicism as Patriots blamed the crisis on the British royal court’s flirtations with “popery.” The Quebec Act of 1774, which extended religious toleration to the Catholics of Canada, raised American anti-papalism to a fever pitch. “GEORGE III REX. AND THE LIBERTIES OF AMERICA. NO POPERY,” proclaimed a rebel banner. If American Catholics had good reasons for hesitating to join the “glorious cause” against England, they had equally strong reasons for choosing neither loyalty or neutrality. Siding with England raised the same objections as adopting patriotism, for England was as anti-Catholic as America. On the other hand, neutrality would subject Catholics to even more harassment than they had suffered under the penal laws.

Faced with difficult choices, many American Catholics were persuaded into choosing patriotism over neutrality or loyalty by laymen who had risen quickly to the defense of American liberty. To be sure, more than a few Catholics became Tories, but not in Maryland, where Loyalists were rare.

Charles Carroll of Carrollton, a Maryland planter and one of the wealthiest men in America, was the pre-eminent lay leader of the Catholic radical movement in America. Carroll chose to enter the political fray against England as early as 1773, when he published a pamphlet defending the principle of no taxation without representation against the conservative Maryland pamphleteer, Daniel Dulany. The pamphlet gained him notoriety in non-Catholic as well as Catholic circles, elevating him to a position of national leadership in the movement toward independence. He served as an adviser to the Continental Congress; made a trip to Canada in 1775 to secure that country’s support for the Revolution; was elected a delegate to the Maryland Convention in 1776 that formed the new state constitution; and was the first to sign the Declaration of Independence as a newly elected delegate to Congress. For the remainder of the war he represented Maryland either in Congress or in the state’s senate.

Carroll’s radicalism must have come as a shock to Americans accustomed to associating Catholicism in religion with absolutism in politics. But his Jesuit teachers, who were active in the European Enlightenment, had taught him well the philosophy of republicanism, including natural rights theory and the legitimacy of revolution against tyrants. So when the crisis with England hit, Carroll immediately recognized in the rapidly evolving revolutionary ideology ideas that were congenial with his own. Carroll’s great contribution to American Catholicism, at the moment of its inception, was to demonstrate, both in word and in deed, the compatibility between Catholic liberalism and the ideals of the new Republic.

THE REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA

In Pennsylvania, the local Catholic merchant community of Philadelphia provided the leadership for Catholics choosing to participate in the radical movement. Unlike Maryland’s Catholics, they distinguished themselves less in civil than in military affairs, serving principally in the Continental army and not in provincial militias, as was mainly the case with Catholic combatants in Maryland. This was due in part to their proximity to Congress, which sat in Philadelphia for much of the war, and in part to their commercial and financial expertise, which were in great demand. In addition, Philadelphia’s sizable community of laborers, a class from which the bulk of the Continental army’s enlistees was recruited, provided a natural constituency for Catholic merchants inclined to express their patriotism by raising a troop of soldiers.

Stephen Moylan was Philadelphia’s answer to Charles Carroll. A member of a prominent Catholic family and a wealthy wholesale merchant, Moylan was “the outstanding American Catholic soldier in the Revolution” (Metzger, p. 218). He threw himself into the war as early as 1775, when in the wake of Lexington and Concord he financed a contingent of Catholic volunteers, drawn in part from the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, a fraternal society that had recently elected him president. He then led it to Boston to join Washington’s new army. Moylan went on to serve the Continental army in other important military capacities. Then, in January 1777, he became commander of the Fourth Continental Dragoons, a position he held to 1783, when he became a brigadier general.

Other Catholic merchants, drawing upon similar sources of wealth and commercial expertise, also moved into important congressional military and fiscal offices during the war. Two of Stephen Moylan’s brothers played major roles in the fiscal affairs of the army, one as a commercial agent of the United States in France, the other as clothier general of the Continental forces. Thomas Fitz Simmons and George Meade, his brother-in-law, were partners in Meade and Company, an import and export

firm that traded mainly with the West Indies. Throughout the war, the firm of Meade and Company engaged in a number of licit and illicit commercial activities, including privateering, for the purpose of provisioning American armies and French naval forces in desperate need of military supplies. Many of the privateers recruited for service by the two men came from the Catholic community of St. Mary's, which saw at least fourteen of its parishioners serve as privateers for Fitz Simmons and Meade. Such examples offer a mere glimpse into a complex community of Philadelphia's Catholic merchants and traders who made an impact on the Revolution.

In contrast to this record of patriotic leadership is the evidence regarding Catholic Toryism, which seemed to have been confined largely to Philadelphia and its environs. Catholic Loyalists made a brief but conspicuous appearance in Philadelphia between September 1777 and June 1778, when the town was under British occupation. Upon capturing Philadelphia, the British organized "three regiments of provincials," including one "wholly made up of Roman Catholics" (*ibid.*, pp. 244–245). But the force disbanded soon after the British abandoned Philadelphia in June 1778 and returned to New York, a city in which Catholics were a rarity. As historians have found, Philadelphia's Catholic Tories were not confined to any one class or ethnic group, but cut across all segments of the society.

IMPACT OF THE REVOLUTION

Despite their differences, American Catholics generally supported the Revolution, and as a result reaped the benefits of its success. Most revolutionary governments, including Maryland and Pennsylvania, abolished all penal laws against Catholics and implemented ideals of religious toleration, freedom, and equality. The impact on Catholics was immediate. Liberated from civil and religious restraints, American Catholics were free to form a new American church according to the principles of the religion and the Revolution. Leading Catholics in the radical transformation of the Church was the Reverend John Carroll, cousin of Charles of Carrollton, and—like Charles—educated in republicanism at various Jesuit schools in Europe. Returning to Maryland in 1774, he led an inconspicuous life as a missionary priest until 1784, when he was appointed superior of American missions. Committed primarily to the revival of Catholic devotion to the sacraments, Carroll took full advantage of the new toleration towards Catholics, convening the first American diocesan synod in 1791, in an effort to revitalize Catholic lay piety. Carroll was also guided by a vision of a national church with an independent system of governance, an objective achieved through the formation of institutions that also served as instruments of Catholic revival, the most significant of which was the system

of Catholic colleges founded soon after Carroll became the first American bishop in 1789. These included St. John's College (1789), Georgetown University (1791), St. Mary's Sulpician Seminary (1791), and Baltimore College (1803). Having demonstrated their worth as American Patriots, American Catholics suffered significantly less discrimination from Protestants until the arrival of the Irish in the nineteenth century.

SEE ALSO *Carroll, Charles; Moylan, Stephen.*

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Gerald F. Moran

ROSENTHAL, GUSTAV HEINRICH WETTER VON. (1753–1829). Born on 1 January 1753, Rosenthal (Rozental in Russian) was a nobleman of the Russian Empire. He came from a Baltic German family of the *Estländische Ritterschaft* (Noble Corporation of Estland), which owned estates throughout what is now Estonia. After studying law at the University of Göttingen, the baron went to St. Petersburg. There he fatally wounded his opponent in a duel and fled Russia for England. Learning of the events in the colonies and seeking refuge from his strict father, he sailed to America in 1775. After briefly studying medicine, he joined the Continental Army as Lieutenant "John Rose," becoming the only Russian subject and Baltic German to fight for the American patriots; throughout his stay in America, he would conceal his origins. On 12 June 1777 he was

made surgeon of William Irvine's Seventh Pennsylvania Regiment and was at Valley Forge. Found not competent as a doctor, Rose was transferred to the army's General Hospital at Yellow Springs as a surgeon's mate under the name of Gustavus Henderson, before returning to the Seventh Pennsylvania as a lieutenant in the brigade staff. He subsequently served in the Continental navy as a surgeon but was captured on the privateer *Revenge* (commanded by Gustavus Conygham) on 27 April 1779 and imprisoned.

Exchanged, Rose joined the Fourth Pennsylvania at Carlisle on 1 April 1781, became Irvine's aide-de-camp on 8 July 1781, was promoted to the rank of major, and headed to the western frontier with Irvine when the general was ordered on 8 March 1782 to take command at Fort Pitt. In part because of his refined manners, Rose became a great favorite of Irvine (who praised him in a letter to Washington) and his family. Based on his popularity with the local militia, Irvine appointed "Major Rose" as the aide-de-camp to Colonel William Crawford during his expedition to Sandusky. (In his private journal Rosenthal was highly critical of Crawford's leadership.) In the chaos after their defeat at the Battle of Sandusky in early June 1782, Rose and Colonel David Williamson led the successful retreat of the routed American volunteers back to Fort Pitt. For his bravery and combat command skills throughout the expedition, Rose was widely commended by his fellow officers. Transferred to the Third Pennsylvania on 1 January 1783, Rose successfully saw to it that Irvine's troops received their final payment. After his honorable discharge in June 1783, Rose was chosen by his fellow Pennsylvania Line officers to lobby on their behalf at the Pennsylvania Legislature during the negotiations on land grants along the Susquehanna and Allegheny.

Having been pardoned in Russia, Rosenthal left America in April 1784 bound for Estland. Rosenthal divulged his story to Irvine as his ship waited to sail from Philadelphia. Back in Estland, he married and became a major in the Russian army. Rosenthal served as the "captain of the nobility" of Estland from 1803 to 1806, during which time the province became a center of liberal agrarian reform. Although the U.S. government granted Rosenthal bounty land in Ohio, and Pennsylvania gave him two tracts in the northwest part of the state, he never returned to America. He died in Reval on 26 June 1829.

SEE ALSO *Crawford, William; Irvine, William.*

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revised by Philip Curtis Skaggs

ROSS, BETSY SEE *Flag, American.*

ROSS, GEORGE. (1730–1779). Signer, jurist. Delaware and Pennsylvania. Born at New Castle, Delaware, on 10 May 1730, George Ross became a lawyer in 1750 and established a successful practice at Lancaster, Pennsylvania. He was elected to the Provincial Assembly in 1768, and served in that body until 1775. He was also elected to the provincial conference at Philadelphia and, subsequently, to the first Continental Congress in 1774. A member of the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety in 1775, he wrote rules of conduct for the state's military forces. He also served briefly as a colonel of the Pennsylvania Associators (an organization created by Benjamin Franklin, devoted to the defense of the Patriot cause) and attended the Second Continental Congress. An advocate of peaceful relations with the Indians, he helped negotiate the Fort Pitt treaty in 1776. That same year he was vice president of the Pennsylvania constitutional convention, although he opposed the final product as too democratic. He was re-elected to the Continental Congress on 20 July 1776 and signed the Declaration of Independence on 2 August. In 1778 Ross returned to the Pennsylvania Assembly, where he was elected vice president.

As judge of the Pennsylvania admiralty court, to which he was appointed in March 1779, Ross heard the significant *Olmsted et al. v. Rittenhouse's Executors* case. The British sloop *Active* had left Jamaica in August 1778 and sailed for New York. Four American crewmen, including Gideon Olmsted of Connecticut, took over the ship the night of 6 September. Two days later the *Active* was seized by the Pennsylvania brigantine *Convention* and the privateer *Gerard*. The captains of these ships claimed a share of the prize, which Olmsted contested. Although Ross sympathized with Olmsted, he confirmed the jury's verdict awarding the Connecticut captors one-fourth of the prize money. On 15 December a committee of Congress annulled the verdict and gave the entire prize to Olmsted and his three companions. Ross refused to acknowledge Congress's action, starting a controversy that raged between Congress and Pennsylvania until the U.S. Supreme Court

upheld Congress in 1809. On 14 July 1779 Ross died suddenly of gout at his home in Lancaster.

SEE ALSO *Active Case*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ROYAL. A small mortar. A royal sail and mast were above the topgallant sail and mast.

Mark M. Boatner

ROYAL AMERICAN REGIMENT.

The Royal American Regiment entered the British Establishment on Christmas Day 1755 as the Sixty-second Regiment of Foot, an unusual four-battalion unit to be raised principally in Britain's North American colonies for service there. Renumbered the Sixtieth Regiment of Foot on 27 December 1757, Robert Rogers led two hundred men of the First Battalion west to receive the surrender of French posts in 1760.

Men of the Royal American Regiment were garrisoning the lonely western posts in 1763 when Pontiac's War broke out. They were part of the relief expedition under Colonel Henry Bouquet that defeated the Indians at Bushy Run on 5–6 August 1763 and joined Bouquet again for his expedition in 1764. The Third and Fourth Battalions then were disbanded, and the First and Second were sent to the West Indies.

When the American war started, the Third and Fourth Battalions were re-formed in Europe with Hanoverians and British soldiers and sent to Florida. Three companies from these battalions fought at Briar Creek, Georgia, on 3 March 1779, and they held one of the gun batteries and with the marines sallied forth from the Spring Hill Redoubt to clinch the British victory at Savannah on 9 October 1779. Thereafter, they helped to defend British possessions on the Gulf coast. Eight companies were surrendered with the garrison of Pensacola on 9 May 1781. The Third and Fourth Battalions were disbanded in 1783, and reconstituted in 1787.

The First and Second Battalions remained in the West Indies during the Revolution. At St. Vincent, the sickly garrison of four hundred Royal Americans surrendered to the comte d'Estaing on 16 June 1779. Men of the regiment were also stationed at Antigua and took part in the operations in Nicaragua in 1780.

Remnants of all four battalions were sent to St. Augustine, Florida, in November 1782, and from thence to New York, where the men were drafted into other

regiments and the officers sent home to recruit new battalions for the Sixtieth

SEE ALSO *Bouquet, Henry; Bouquet's Expedition of 1764; Briar Creek, Georgia; Bushy Run, Pennsylvania; Monckton, Robert; Nicaragua; Pensacola, Florida; Pontiac's War; Rogers, Robert; Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779)*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA.

The English settlement of North America was undertaken by groups of private individuals; the colonies were only gradually brought under the control of royal government. By 1763, nine of the thirteen colonies that would rebel in 1775 had royal governors. Pennsylvania and Maryland remained in the hands of their proprietors, and Connecticut and Rhode Island continued to elect their own governors under their seventeenth-century charters. Massachusetts was anomalous, with a royally appointed governor operating under a revised charter of 1692, until its privileges were wiped out by the Massachusetts Government Act of 1774, one of the so-called Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts.

Every colony had an elected assembly. The eight royal colonies had a governor and council (the upper house of the legislature) appointed by the crown and an assembly (lower house) chosen by a larger and more broadly based white male electorate than anywhere in Britain. The governor, as executive head of the legislature and the king's chief representative, was expected to execute the instructions he received from London, usually from the Board of Trade. The colonial assemblies waged a century-long struggle to limit his authority. After 1680 the assemblies had authority to initiate all colonial laws. The governor either vetoed the laws or sent them to the Privy Council, which had authority to accept or cancel (disallow) them. The assemblies also gained the all-important right to make financial appropriations and supervise actual expenditures; thereby, they got the whip hand on the governor and the provincial judges by controlling their salaries. The imperial government tried to make the assemblies establish fixed annual salaries, but the assemblies fought off all of the crown's efforts to establish a fixed civil list in the colonies, which would have given the governor a powerful patronage weapon. The assemblies were particularly successful in gaining ground against the governor during wartime,

when they could bargain harder for additional power against a governor whose top priority was to have money available to pay for pressing military needs.

Sometimes the imperial government helped its governors, as when it succeeded after 1761 in establishing the governor's right to appoint judges "during the pleasure of the Crown," whereas the assemblies had fought to permit them to retain office "during good behavior." (Resentment over this point is reflected in the Declaration of Independence.) But London could also undercut its representative. After 1763 the secretary of state for the American colonies began appointing an increasing number of imperial officials, including the naval officer responsible for enforcing the Navigation Acts, an innovation that further reduced the patronage the governor controlled.

Royal governors acted as mediators between the demands of the imperial government in London and the needs and desires of the colonial oligarchs. Many royal governors were intelligent, clever politicians who understood that ingratiating themselves with the local leaders was the best way to persuade them to adhere to imperial controls. When there was a congruence of interest between London and the colony, the job of being a royal governor could be relatively pleasant. More often, however, the royal governor was obliged by his superiors to impose rules and regulations that local leaders resented or resisted. When that happened, a royal governor would need all the talents and powers he could muster to chivvy, cajole, and if necessary, coerce the colony into compliance. Successful royal government required the governors—indeed all imperial officials—to be honest, disinterested, and savvy politicians. Unfortunately for the prestige and, ultimately, the survival of royal government in America, the job of royal governor could also be extremely lucrative, and it attracted too many men who were venial, grasping, and contemptuous of the Americans they were supposed to govern effectively.

The only colonial governor who wholeheartedly supported the Revolution and remained in office was Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut. Joseph Wanton Sr. of Rhode Island was deemed by the assembly to be a lukewarm supporter of resistance and was replaced by Nicholas Cooke. Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts had already given way to a military government led by Major General Thomas Gage; the former governor died in exile in London. William Tryon, who served as royal governor in North Carolina and New York, returned to his former life as an army officer, became the senior general officer of the Provincial (Loyalist) troops, and commanded several significant raids to suppress the rebels. William Franklin, the illegitimate son of Benjamin Franklin, was the last royal governor of New Jersey, and he too was prominent in trying to organize Loyalists to fight the rebels. Governors Josiah Martin, who succeeded Tryon in North Carolina, Sir William Campbell of South Carolina, Sir James Wright

of Georgia, and John Murray, fourth earl of Dunmore, of Virginia were all forced early in the war to flee for their own safety. Their overly optimistic reports of potential Loyalist support in the South led the British to send Major General Henry Clinton on an ill-fated expedition against Charleston, South Carolina, in the summer of 1776.

SEE ALSO *Campbell, William; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Disallowance; Franklin, William; Hutchinson, Thomas; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; Martin, Josiah; Murray, John; Townshend Acts; Trade, The Board of; Trumbull, Jonathan, Sr.; Tryon, William; Wright, Sir James, Governor.*

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ROYAL GREENS. The King's Royal Regiment of New York was also known as the Royal Greens, from the color of their uniforms.

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ROYAL HIGHLAND EMIGRANTS. This Provincial regiment was the result of Allan McLane's efforts to enlist veteran Highland soldiers who had settled in Canada and the American colonies after the end

of the French and Indian War. The first officers were commissioned in June 1775, and they spread out over northeastern British North America to recruit veterans as well as recently arrived emigrants from the Highlands. Two battalions were eventually raised, the First under Lieutenant Colonel MacLean at Quebec and the Second at Halifax, Nova Scotia, under Lieutenant Colonel John Small. Although the First Battalion was initially outfitted in green coats, the standard color of the Provincial service, both eventually received red coats with blue facings, bonnets, and kilts, uniforms modeled on that of the Forty-second Regiment of Foot (Royal Highland Regiment). The First Battalion remained in Canada throughout the war, rendering its most important service in helping to defeat the American attack on Quebec City in December 1775–January 1776. A detachment was sent to the relief of Fort Cumberland in 1776; other detachments participated in raids on the American frontier. The Second Battalion sent detachments far and wide in British North America, from Newfoundland to Jamaica, serving most notably in the South after April 1781. Placed on the British Establishment in December 1778–January 1779 as the Eighty-fourth Regiment of Foot (Royal Highland Emigrants), the Second Battalion was disbanded in Nova Scotia in 1783 and the First Battalion in Upper Canada in 1784.

SEE ALSO *MacLean, Allan*.

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revised by *Harold E. Selesky*

RUDLE'S STATION, KENTUCKY

SEE *Kentucky Raid of Bird*.

RUDOLPH, JOHN. (?–1782). Continental officer. Maryland. Joining Lee's legion as a lieutenant of light dragoons on 20 April 1778, he was promoted to

captain on 1 October 1778 and to major in 1781, dying on 8 December 1782. Brother of Michael Rudolph.

SEE ALSO *Rudolph, Michael*.

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Mark M. Boatner

RUDOLPH, MICHAEL.

(1754?–1794). Continental officer of Lee's Legion. Maryland. Born in Maryland, perhas in 1754, Michael Rudolph and his brother, John, joined General Henry Lee's Legion in April 1778. Michael began with the rank of sergeant major, and on 1 April 1779 was made regimental quartermaster. Three months later he was promoted to lieutenant, and in a resolution of the Continental Congress on 24 September 1779 he and Archibald McAllister were brevetted as captains for their heroism in leading their forces in the successful surprise attack against the British position at Paulus Hook, New Jersey, on 19 August of that year. On 1 November 1779 he was confirmed in the rank of captain. In the Southern campaigns of General Nathanael Greene, Captain Rudolph performed gallantly and effectively with the infantry of Lee's Legion, being mentioned particularly in connection with the actions at Guilford, North Carolina, and Ninety Six and Eutaw Springs, both in South Carolina.

Serving to the end of the war, Rudolph settled at Savannah, Georgia, as a farmer and collector of taxes. He was commissioned a captain of the First U.S. Infantry on 3 June 1790 and as a major of light dragoons on 5 March 1792. On 22 February 1793 he was named adjutant and given the post of Inspector of the Army. Resigning on 17 July of that year he entered the West Indies trade. Two years later he vanished at sea.

SEE ALSO *Lee's Legion; McAllister, Archibald; Paulus Hook, New Jersey*.

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RUGELEY, COLONEL HENRY.

Loyalist officer. A leader of Loyalist forces in South Carolina, Rugeley held the rank of colonel in 1780. His home, Clermont or Rugeley's Mills, located twelve miles north of Camden on the road between that strategic place and Charlotte, North Carolina, figured prominently in

the war. Rugeley maintained friendships with several members of the Patriot elite during the Revolution, on one occasion in 1780 giving Governor John Rutledge, who was staying at Clermont, advance warning of a raid by Tarleton, allowing the governor to escape. His unit performed well in holding the center of the line in the fierce battle of Hanging Rock on 6 August 1780. Rugeley's military career came to a humiliating end in the action known as Rugeley's Mills when on 4 December 1780 he surrendered his entire command to William Washington's smaller force of dragoons. At the end of the Revolution, Rugeley settled in Jamaica.

SEE ALSO *Rugeley's Mills*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

RUGELEY'S MILLS (CLERMONT), SOUTH CAROLINA. 4 December 1780. As part of General Daniel Morgan's newly organized light corps, Lieutenant Colonel William Washington rode with his dragoons to investigate a report that Colonel Henry Rugeley had gathered a body of Loyalist militia at his farm just north of Camden. Washington found the enemy in a fortified log barn surrounded by a ditch and abatis. Unable to make any impression with small arms and lacking artillery, he tried the Quaker gun trick—making a fake cannon out of a pine log, moving it into view, and summoning the Loyalists to surrender or be blown to bits. The ruse worked. Out came Colonel Rugeley, a major, and just over a hundred privates. They were marched back to the American camp, and the military career of Rugeley was ended.

SEE ALSO *Rugeley, Colonel Henry*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

RUGGLES, TIMOTHY. (1711–1795). Loyalist. Born in Rochester, Massachusetts, on 20 October 1711, Ruggles graduated from Harvard in 1732, setting up his legal practice in Plymouth the following year. Ruggles served numerous terms in the assembly from Plymouth, Sandwich, and Hardwick and was the assembly speaker in 1762. A militia colonel at the start of the Seven Years' War, he raised a regiment for Sir William Johnson's unsuccessful expedition against Crown Point in 1755 and then again in the failed effort to relieve Fort William Henry in 1757. Promoted to brigadier general in 1758, he commanded the right wing of the

army during General James Abercromby's doomed attack on Fort Ticonderoga. In 1760 he finally took part in a successful military action, leading American troops in the Montreal campaign. Named to the Worcester County court of common pleas in 1757, he became its chief justice in 1762.

In the political conflicts leading up to the Revolution, Ruggles consistently sided with the royal governors of Massachusetts, Francis Bernard and Thomas Hutchinson. Elected to the Stamp Act Congress of 1765, over whose deliberations he presided, he refused to sign its petition to the king and walked out, earning a reprimand from the Massachusetts assembly. In 1768 Ruggles was the only member of the assembly to vote against the nonimportation agreement and was one of the notorious seventeen representatives who voted to rescind the assembly's Circular Letter. By 1771 Ruggles's hometown of Hardwick was so deeply polarized that it was unable to decide on delegates to the assembly and sent no one. That polarization reached into his family, as his brother Benjamin adamantly supported the Patriot cause and threatened his brother with death if he continued to support the crown. Three of Ruggles's sons were Loyalists, but his wife and four daughters stood with the Patriots. In 1774, while Ruggles was away serving on the Mandamus Council, his house was plundered, the crowd apparently led by Benjamin Ruggles. Timothy Ruggles responded by raising a company of Loyalists to protect each others' property, and he told General Thomas Gage that he was prepared to raise a regiment of Loyalists. Gage's refusal infuriated Ruggles, who sat out the siege of Boston and was evacuated to Halifax when the British abandoned the city in March 1776. Joining General William Howe's army, Ruggles was given command of the Staten Island garrison, but Howe also rebuffed his offers to recruit a regiment. He spent the rest of the war trying to convince the British, who tended to hold the Loyalists in contempt, to allow him to raise and lead Loyalist troops until he left New York City in 1783 for Nova Scotia. The government rewarded his services with a large pension and five thousand pounds to cover his losses during the war. (Ruggles claimed twenty thousand pounds in losses.) He died in Wilmot, Nova Scotia, on 4 August 1795.

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Michael Bellesiles

RUMFORD, COUNT SEE *Thompson, Benjamin Count Rumford*.

RUSH, BENJAMIN. (1746–1813). Physician, Signer. Pennsylvania. Six years after graduating from Princeton, he entered the University of Edinburgh to complete his medical studies. In June 1768 he received his medical degree and went to London for intern training. At Edinburgh and London he showed a lively interest in what would later be called social science. Young Dr. Rush returned to Philadelphia in 1769 and soon was appointed professor of chemistry at the College of Philadelphia, the first such chair established in America. He also built up a successful medical practice and found time to associate with such Patriot leaders as Thomas Paine, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson. In London he had been on friendly terms with Benjamin Franklin. In June 1776 he took a leading part in the movement toward independence, and the next month he became a delegate to the Continental Congress. He signed the Declaration of Independence on 2 August 1776.

Rush had volunteered in 1775 for service in the army, and he may have been an army surgeon in 1775–1776. On 11 April 1777 he became surgeon general of the Middle Department. His military career was brief. Not finding the administration of the medical service to his liking, he charged Dr. William Shippen with inefficiency, but a congressional investigation upheld Shippen. Dr. Rush then concluded that Washington's handling of military matters was unsatisfactory. After helping start what became known as the Conway Cabal, Rush wrote Patrick Henry anonymously from Yorktown on 12 January 1778 to recommend that Washington be replaced by Gates or Conway. Governor Henry forwarded the letter to Washington; the latter recognized Rush's excellent penmanship and confronted him with this evidence of personal disloyalty. Rush resigned on 30 April 1778.

Returning to his practice, Rush became a surgeon at the Pennsylvania Hospital, a position he held until his death. He specialized in care for mentally ill patients and became known as the "father of American psychiatry." He established the first free dispensary in America (1786), became president of the country's first antislavery society, demanded penal reforms, advocated the abolition of capital punishment, and supported free public education. He was responsible for the establishment of Dickinson College (1783). In the political arena he urged acceptance of the federal Constitution and was rewarded by President Adams with the post of treasurer of the U.S. Mint (1797–1813). In the field of medicine he developed a revolutionary "system" that, in simplest terms, was built around the hypothesis that all diseases resulted from too much or too little nervous stimulation and that all could be treated the same way: by drastic bleeding (draining up to four-fifths of the patient's blood) and purging. This approach was soon condemned as idiotic, and it is fortunate that Rush lacked either the time or the inclination to test his hypothesis.

Rush is credited with pioneering in a number of medical fields, including experimental physiology, dental decay, and veterinary training. His medical essays earned literary distinction.

SEE ALSO *Conway Cabal*.

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revised by Harry M. Ward

RUSSELL, WILLIAM, SR. (?–1793). Continental officer. Virginia. Moving from Culpeper County to the Virginia frontier about ten years before the Revolution, he became colonel of the Thirteenth Virginia on 19 December 1776 and transferred to the Fifth Virginia on 14 September 1778. He was taken prisoner at Charleston on 12 May 1780, was exchanged six months later, and served until 3 November 1783. On the latter date he was breveted brigadier general. Father of William Russell Jr.

SEE ALSO *Russell, William, Jr.*

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Mark M. Boatner

RUSSELL, WILLIAM, JR. (1758–1825). Militia officer. Virginia. Born in Culpeper County, Virginia, in 1758, Russell claimed that at age fifteen he was on an expedition with Daniel Boone. During the Revolution he served as a militia lieutenant and was at Kings Mountain, South Carolina, in October 1780. As a militia captain he fought against the Cherokee and then took part in negotiating a peace treaty. Serving under William Campbell, Russell saw action at Wetzell's Mills and Guilford, North Carolina, in March 1781. Moving to Kentucky after the war, he took part in several campaigns against the Indians, leading the Kentucky volunteers in the

final operations of General Anthony Wayne. Active in the movement for Kentucky statehood, he was elected annually to the legislature from 1792 until 1808, when President Madison appointed him colonel of the Seventh U.S. Infantry. Succeeding General William Henry Harrison as commander of the Indiana–Illinois–Missouri frontier in 1811, he led the 1812 expedition against the Peoria Indians. He died in Fayette County, Kentucky, on 3 July, 1825.

SEE ALSO *Campbell, William.*

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RUSSIA MERCHANT. This 243-ton British transport, carrying two hundred artillery personnel, fundered with valuable supplies needed for Clinton's Charleston expedition of 1780. All personnel were apparently saved, but the ship sank with four thousand muskets shipped for the use of Georgia Tories, which deprived the British of many armed irregulars. The loss also made Clinton more dependent upon his naval commander, Arbuthnot, from whom he had to borrow guns, shot, and powder. Some of the artillerymen from the ship reached the Charleston lines on 6 April 1780 from the Bermudas.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780.*

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RUTHERFORD, GRIFFITH. (1731?–1805). Southern Patriot. North Carolina. Born in Ireland, perhaps in 1731, Rutherford settled in western North Carolina. He became a captain of militia in 1760, served in the North Carolina assembly from 1766 to 1775, was a sheriff from 1767 to 1769, and managed the difficult task of appeasing both sides in the Regulator crisis of 1769–1771. In 1775 he sat in the Provincial Congress, which made him colonel of the Rowan County militia, a militia that he led against backcountry Loyalists. On 22 June 1776

he was made brigadier general of state troops. In the Cherokee War of 1776, he led twenty-four hundred troops, combining with South Carolina militia to burn thirty-six Cherokee towns, which was hailed as a great victory. He took part in the unsuccessful efforts to keep the British from overrunning Georgia in the winter of 1778–1779, leading eight hundred men to reinforce Lincoln; his command was posted at Mathew's Bluff, South Carolina, when the Patriots were defeated, five miles away, at Briar Creek on 3 March 1779. Returning to North Carolina, he called out the militia to inflict a decisive defeat on the Loyalists at Ramseur's Mill on 20 June 1780, although he himself did not arrive in time to take part in the battle. He commanded a brigade at Camden on 16 August 1780, was wounded there, and was captured by Tarleton in the pursuit that followed the battle.

Held prisoner first at Charleston and then at St. Augustine, Rutherford was exchanged on 22 June 1781; he then returned to the field. He took command of Wilmington after its evacuation on 18 November 1781. He served off and on in the North Carolina senate from 1777 to 1786, being identified with the radicals, who favored a powerful legislature with equal representation for the western counties. He also advocated against former Loyalists, whom he called "imps of hell."

An opponent of the Constitution of 1787, Rutherford attended the first North Carolina ratifying convention in 1788, which rejected the Constitution. A major speculator in western lands, he moved into what became the state of Tennessee in 1792, and after September 1794, when it became a separate territory, was president of the legislative council. He died in Sumner County, Tennessee, on 10 August 1805.

SEE ALSO *Briar Creek, Georgia; Cherokee War of 1776; Ramseur's Mill, North Carolina; Regulators.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

RUTLEDGE, EDWARD. (1749–1800). Member of Continental Congress and U.S. House of Representative, Signer, governor of South Carolina. Born in Christ Church Parish, South Carolina on 23 November 1749, Rutledge studied law with his elder brother, John Rutledge, entered the Middle Temple in 1767, and was admitted to the English bar in 1772. He returned to Charleston in January 1773 and a few months later represented the printer Thomas Powell in a case which established that the South Carolina Council could not order someone sent to jail. Rutledge served in the first and second South Carolina Provincial Congresses. Elected with brother John to the first and

Second Continental Congresses, the youthful Edward was characterized acidly by John Adams as “a perfect Bob-o-Lincoln—a swallow, a sparrow, . . . jejune, inane and puerile.” Adams held the other Rutledge in equal contempt. Taking over leadership of the delegation after the departure of his brother and Gadsden, in 1776 Edward delayed action on the resolution for independence almost a month before finally influencing his delegation to vote for it on 2 July. Although he felt that confederation should have preceded independence, he was afraid of a strong central government. In all this he represented the views of the planter oligarchy of his state.

After accompanying John Adams and Benjamin Franklin to the Peace Conference on Staten Island on 11 Sept. 1776, in November 1776 Rutledge returned to South Carolina, where he was a member of the assembly until 1780 as well as a captain of artillery. After taking part in the action at Beaufort (Port Royal) on 3 February 1779, he became a prisoner when Charleston surrendered on 12 May 1780. Imprisoned at St. Augustine from September 1780 to July 1781, he lived in Philadelphia until most of the South had been liberated by Greene. He returned in time to sit in the Jacksonboro assembly that his brother convened in January 1782.

After the war he prospered in private and public life. He retained his aristocratic outlook while representing Charleston in the House of Representatives from 1782 to 1796 and in the state conventions of 1788 and 1790. He was an influential Federalist, elected to the state senate in 1796 and as governor in 1798. He died in Charleston on 23 January 1800.

SEE ALSO *Peace Conference on Staten Island.*

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RUTLEDGE, JOHN. (1739–1800). Member of the Continental Congress, governor of South Carolina. Born in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1739, Rutledge studied law in Charleston before entering the Middle Temple in 1754, being admitted to the English bar in 1760. Returning to South Carolina, he built a thriving law practice, became a wealthy planter owning some thirty thousand acres and hundreds of slaves, served in the Commons House (1761–1775), attended the Stamp Act Congress in 1765, was a delegate to the

Continental Congress (1774–1775), helped draft South Carolina’s conservative state constitution of 1776, and became president of the South Carolina General Assembly (1776–1778). Objecting to the new constitution of 1778 as too democratic, Rutledge quit the assembly in March. In the desperate situation presented by the British invasion of the South, Rutledge was elected governor in January 1779, being the first Patriot to hold that post. (His predecessor, Rawlins Lowndes, had been the last to use the title of president of South Carolina.) When General Prevost menaced Charleston on 11–12 May 1779, the new governor favored the proposal by his council that the state should promise the British to remain neutral if Prevost would withdraw. The honor of South Carolina was saved by opposition to this deal from Gadsden, John Laurens, and Moultrie, and Lincoln arrived by forced marches, leading to Prevost’s retreat from the state.

When Clinton closed in on Charleston in March 1780, the assembly adjourned after giving Rutledge virtual dictatorial powers. A month before Charleston’s surrender, Rutledge slipped out of the doomed city to rally state resources in the interior. Tarleton was trying to capture him when the warning of Colonel Henry Rugeley saved the governor. Rutledge withdrew across the North Carolina border and joined the army of Gates in its move toward Camden. After that disastrous battle, he commissioned Thomas Sumter, Francis Marion, and other militia officers to conduct partisan operations and went to Philadelphia to urge that American regulars be sent to liberate the South.

Returning to his state in August 1781, he tackled the tremendous economic, legal, and military problems left in the wake of Greene’s successful campaign. On 20 November he called for election of members of a legislature to meet at Jacksonboro on 8 January 1782, where he oversaw the confiscation of Loyalist estates. His term as governor ended on 29 January, and he returned to the legislature, serving also as a delegate to Congress in 1781–1783. In 1784 he was appointed senior judge on the state chancery court. Rutledge played a prominent role at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, ensuring that slavery was protected by the new frame of government, and was appointed to the first U.S. Supreme Court by Washington. Objecting to the need to ride the circuit of the southern district, Rutledge quit the court in February 1791 to accept appointment as chief justice of the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas. In response to Rutledge’s request in June 1795 to succeed John Jay as Supreme Court chief justice, Washington immediately nominated him. At the same time, however, Jay’s Treaty was published, and Rutledge killed his chances of Senate confirmation by leading a bitter attack on the treaty. Since the death of his wife, Elizabeth Grimké, in 1792,

Rutledge, John

Rutledge had showed signs of mental instability. About the time the Senate rejected his nomination in December 1795, he was forced by his derangement to withdraw from public life. He died in Charleston on 18 July 1800.

SEE ALSO *Rugeley, Colonel Henry*.

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S

SACKVILLE, GEORGE. (1716–1785). Later Germain. Soldier and secretary of state for the colonies (1775–1782). Born in London on 26 June 1716, he was known from 1720 as Lord George Sackville and then Lord George Germain from 1770; subsequently, he became Viscount Sackville in February 1782. His father, Lionel Sackville, seventh earl and (from 1720) first duke of Dorset, made lavish use of his patronage and influence to start George on careers in the army and in politics. This influence was not inconsiderable—George I was George Sackville’s godfather and George II his father’s friend—and like many younger sons of the period, Sackville came to understand very well the need to court great men. His weakness was a tendency to overplay his hand, which, combined with a tendency to deviousness and arrogance, could alienate patrons and allies as easily as his ability and charm could win them.

PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CAREER

He was educated at Westminster School and at Trinity College, Dublin, which was then more academically rigorous than either Oxford or Cambridge. At the age of eighteen, he graduated with a master of arts degree and was at once bought a commission in the Seventh Horse, a regiment on the Irish establishment. In 1736 he accompanied his father, lord lieutenant of Ireland, on a diplomatic mission to Paris. Returning to Dublin in 1737 as aide to the new lord lieutenant, he was promoted to captain in his regiment and appointed to the Privy Council of Ireland. In 1741 he became lieutenant colonel in the Twenty-eighth Foot and also became a member of Parliament for the first time.

By then Britain was officially at war with Spain and, following the Prussian attack on the Hapsburg Empire, unofficially with France. Sackville went to war for the first time with the allied Pragmatic Army, which was intended to keep the enemy out of Hanover (George II’s other realm) and the Austrian Netherlands. He is supposed to have distinguished himself near Dettingen on the river Main (in 1743, and on 11 May 1745 he was severely wounded in the chest at Fontenoy. He recovered in time to serve against the Jacobites and, as colonel of the Twentieth Foot, was prominent in the pursuit of the fugitives after Culloden. He was briefly governor of Dover Castle, and his father’s influence ensured that he was chosen as member of Parliament for Dover before returning to the Pragmatic Army. In November 1749 he took over command of the Twelfth Dragoons before moving in 1750 to his old regiment, the Seventh Horse. By 1750 he was demonstrating considerable promise in Parliament, and during his father’s second term in Ireland (1751–1756) was his principal secretary and secretary at war. Although his combative manner as secretary at war earned widespread disapproval, Germain, promoted to major general in 1755, continued to be a significant military and political figure during the first part of the Seven Years’ War.

After taking part in the abortive raid on St. Malo in September 1758, he became second in command of the British contribution to Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick’s allied army in Hanover. Soon afterwards, on his superior’s death, he succeeded to command of the British contingent. His rise ended when, as commander of the British cavalry at Minden, he refused to obey repeated orders to charge the retreating French army. Sackville argued that

the duke of Brunswick's commands were unclear and impracticable. Others, however, said he was motivated by personal pique and even cowardice. Although he was dismissed from his command, the affair might have come to nothing had not Sackville insisted upon a court-martial to clear his name. Sure of acquittal, he paraded such disdain for the court that on 5 April 1760 he was convicted of disobedience and declared unfit to serve the king in any military capacity. The king at once expelled him from the Privy Council, and he was effectively shut out of office of any kind for fifteen years. Only in the autumn of 1775 did North bring him in as secretary of state for the colonies.

NEW YORK CAMPAIGN

It thus fell to Sackville, now Lord George Germain, to direct the war in America. It may have been a mistake to place army officers under a man who had been so spectacularly disgraced for military misconduct, and still more one who did not get on with Carleton and Howe. But Germain had his virtues. Far from being the lazy bungler of legend, he was an efficient administrator and a perceptive strategist. Even before he took office he was arguing cogently in favor of a descent upon New York, which would make an ideal base from which to cut off New England and begin the recovery of the other provinces. Its capacious harbor would provide a safe haven for warships, transports, and supply vessels while the Hudson Valley would provide a waterway to the interior. The experience of Bunker Hill suggested that any frontal attack on a prepared position, even when manned by inexperienced militia, would be unacceptably costly, and that any breakout from Boston would probably involve a succession of such attacks. However, an American army driven from New York City would have no strong place to make a stand short of the Delaware or the upper Hudson. Moreover, the middle colonies, where the Loyalists were believed to be stronger than in New England, would throw their weight into the balance once the British Army arrived to rescue them from the rebels. This analysis, though based upon imperfect knowledge, was intelligent and essentially sound. Pursued vigorously, it would have given the British at least a chance of securing victory before France could effectively intervene.

Where Germain, like other ministers, failed was in underestimating the scale of the revolt and therefore the scale of force needed to put it down. New England, and Boston in particular, had long been thought to be the heart of the rebellion. Curiously, this went with an underestimate of Loyalist strength in the middle colonies and an exaggeration in respect of the South. In 1776 the result was an unnecessary dissipation of force, which allowed Washington to survive his defeats and prevented Howe from giving adequate protection to the Tories of New

York and New Jersey. Germain failed to learn the lesson for the campaign of 1777: the Saratoga debacle came about partly because he did not order Howe directly to support Burgoyne. Yet he was neither lazy nor negligent nor uncommonly lacking in perception: no one in Britain dreamed that Burgoyne would need to be rescued.

A BOLD APPROACH

Germain's political weakness was that he could not carry his colleagues with him without North's support, and North, better at conciliation than decision, was no Pitt. Germain was left to wrangle with Sandwich, who wanted to keep the bulk of the fleet in home waters in anticipation of a Bourbon invasion. There were strong arguments on both sides, but the effect of the dispute was to leave British land forces in America without adequate logistical or naval support. The results were crippling. In 1776 Howe's reinforcements and essential equipment arrived far too late in the season. In 1777 a lack of transports and escorts delayed the attack on Philadelphia as decisively as Howe's excessive caution, and afterwards the naval forces available were unable to quickly open the Delaware.

The moment France entered the war in 1778, the British army in America was in danger. The appearance of a powerful squadron off New York or the Delaware, combined with a land blockade, would cut off essential supplies and rapidly lead to capitulation. The Royal navy could not simultaneously keep a protective force in North American waters, cover the Channel, and meet its commitments elsewhere. Yet Germain remained an advocate of boldness in America. His decision to abandon Philadelphia was justifiable on two grounds. First, Philadelphia was now a strategic liability, with its only supply route via the Delaware constantly under threat. As it was, a French fleet appeared off the Delaware, forcing the troops to escape overland. Second, garrisoning the city and guarding the river tied up forces that could have been better used in offensive operations elsewhere—for example, to exploit the supposed Loyalist strength in the southern colonies and for an attack on French sugar islands. Third, the naval peril would remain the same, whether British strategy was offensive or defensive, and an aggressive policy promised at least a chance of victory. The plan's great weakness, as Sir Henry Clinton never tired of pointing out, was that it further dispersed the available troops and given early and vigorous Franco-American cooperation, should have led rapidly to defeat.

GERMAIN'S PLAN ALMOST SUCCEEDS

Yet, thanks partly to French mistakes, it came very close to success. Savannah was taken and held, Charleston and

most of South Carolina fell, and American attempts at reconquest were routed. North Carolina was invaded. By 1781 Washington himself thought that the British might win the war. In the end, Germain's strategy was ruined by Cornwallis's overland march into Virginia (which Germain himself approved), which cut him off from the seaborne support so crucial to British successes. This critical error was followed by the ill fortune of an unprecedented coordination of French and American sea and land forces and capitulation at Yorktown. Even then the significance of Yorktown, where fewer than four thousand troops were lost, was political rather than military. Coming on top of reverses elsewhere, it turned the majority in Parliament against the war and raised demands for a change of ministry.

Germain still wanted to fight on. After all, Clinton's main army was intact and the British still held New York, Charleston, and Savannah. From these bases, amphibious operations could be launched to mobilize Loyalist support around the lower Delaware. It was a workable plan and consistent with his policy since 1778. But now he was completely isolated, even within the cabinet, and by the year's end he was asking the king's leave to resign. He finally left office on 10 February 1782, some weeks before the fall of the North administration.

Germain was neither a minister of genius nor an engaging personality. He could not obtain the consistent support of North and Sandwich, he made serious strategic errors, and he underestimated the popularity and determination of the rebels. Yet he was far from alone in these failings. In addition, he was intelligent, able, and conscientious. While his offensive strategy from 1778 carried with it enormous risks, it also brought the British within sight of victory.

SEE ALSO *North, Sir Frederick*; *Sandwich, John Montagu, fourth earl of*.

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revised by John Oliphant

SAG HARBOR RAID, NEW YORK.

23–24 May 1777. In retaliation for Tryon's Danbury raid, Colonel R. J. Meigs planned an attack on a British foraging party that had gone from New York City to Sag Harbor, near the eastern end of Long Island. The British

force comprised 12 vessels, an armed schooner of 12 guns that carried 40 men, and a 70-man company of the Second Battalion of James De Lancey's brigade. Leaving Guilford, Connecticut, with 170 men of Sherburne's Additional Continental Regiment in 13 whaleboats and escorted by two armed sloops, Meigs moved across Long Island Sound under cover of darkness, landed on Long Island, and surprised the Loyalists before dawn. After killing six, capturing the rest, burning all the vessels except the schooner, and destroying the stores, Meigs withdrew without the loss of a man. He was back at Guilford by noon, having covered almost 100 miles in 18 hours. Congress commended the raiders on 25 July.

SEE ALSO *Meigs, Return Jonathan*.

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ST. CLAIR, ARTHUR. (1737–1818).

Continental general. Scotland–Massachusetts–Pennsylvania. Born in Thurso, Scotland, on 23 March 1737, St. Clair gave up his medical education to buy an ensign's commission in the Sixtieth Foot (Royal Americans) on 13 May 1757. He took part in Amherst's capture of Louisburg and Wolfe's attack on Quebec, was promoted to lieutenant on 17 April 1759, resigned on 16 April 1762, and settled in Boston. After his Massachusetts wife inherited fourteen thousand pounds, he moved to the Pennsylvania frontier, where he used this money and his own military service claims to buy some four thousand acres in the Ligonier Valley. This made him the largest resident landowner "beyond the mountains," and he soon attained considerable influence. He was involved in the ugly land disputes between Pennsylvania and Virginia, but the latter province had gained the upper hand and St. Clair, an advocate of Pennsylvania's rights, accomplished little.

The Revolution made that dispute moot. In July 1775 he became colonel of a militia regiment, and in the fall he played a minor role in negotiations with Indians at Fort Pitt. On 3 January 1776 he became colonel of the Second Pennsylvania Battalion, led it north, and took part in the disaster at Trois Rivières in Canada on 8 June. On 9 August he was appointed brigadier general and in November he joined Washington's army. Authorized by the commander in chief to raise the New Jersey militia, he was at Trenton and Princeton. On 19 February 1777 he was promoted to major general and returned to the

Northern Department to succeed Gates as commander on Lake Champlain.

His abandonment of Ticonderoga on 2–5 July 1777 climaxed his career as a field commander. St. Clair used sound military judgment in not risking his command in the defense of this untenable position and showed rare moral courage in ordering the withdrawal. Furthermore, his plans for this difficult operation were excellent, though ruined by incompetent subordinates. A court-martial in 1778 cleared him, but in their search for a scapegoat, many people suspected St. Clair of disloyalty. His foreign birth made this suspicion plausible, and when Arnold's treason in 1780 brought rumors that another high-ranking American officer was involved in dealings with the enemy, St. Clair's name was again mentioned.

The discredited general served Washington as a volunteer aide-de-camp at Brandywine, assisted Sullivan in mounting his expedition against the Indians, was a commissioner to arrange a cartel with the British at Amboy on 9 March 1780, served on the board that investigated André's conduct, and commanded West Point in October 1780. He had a minor part in settling the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line, helped raise troops for the Yorktown campaign, and joined Washington a few days before Cornwallis surrendered. Soon thereafter he led two thousand regulars south to reinforce Greene, joining him near Charleston on 4 January 1782. On 3 November 1783 he retired from the Continental army.

St. Clair was in Congress from 2 November 1785 to 28 November 1787, and ended as president of that body. He became the first governor of the Northwest Territory, serving in 1789–1802. On 4 March 1791 he was named major general and commander of the U.S. Army. Badly defeated by the Miami Indians under Little Turtle on 4 November, he was refused a court of inquiry and on 5 March 1792 resigned his military commission. A congressional investigation cleared him of responsibility for the disaster. Jefferson removed him as governor in 1802 because St. Clair opposed statehood for Ohio. Unable to gain remuneration from Congress for his many financial losses, St. Clair retired to a simple log cabin in Chestnut Ridge, Pennsylvania, where he died in a carriage accident on 31 August 1818.

SEE ALSO *Champe, John; Ticonderoga, New York, British Capture of; Trenton, New Jersey; Trois Rivières.*

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ST. EUSTATIUS. Taken by the Dutch in 1632, this island of about nine square miles in size, located eight miles northwest of St. Kitts, became one of the leading centers of West Indies trade in the eighteenth century. It came to be called the "Golden Rock" as Dutch merchants took advantage of its neutral status to make money selling to all sides during wartime. At the beginning of the Revolution it was a center of contraband trade between Europe and America, with even British merchants being involved. On 16 November 1776, Governor Johannes de Graaf ordered Fort Oranje to fire what is regarded as the first official salute of the American flag as the Continental navy ship *Andrew Doria* entered the harbor. De Graaf was recalled as a result of British diplomatic pressure, but although guilty of encouraging trade with the rebels, he was exonerated and sent back to his post. When Admiral George Rodney learned that Britain had declared war on the Netherlands, he moved almost immediately against the Dutch island. He and General John Vaughan took the Dutch, who were still unaware of the declaration of war, by surprise, capturing St. Eustatius on 3 February 1781. However, because Rodney was busy plundering St. Eustatius, he failed to intercept De Grasse's fleet on its way to the Chesapeake, where it helped trap Cornwallis's army. The French captured first Rodney's prize fleet and then St. Eustatius on 26 November 1781.

SEE ALSO *Rodney, George Bridges.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

ST. FRANCIS INDIANS *SEE* *Abenaki.*

ST. JOHN (ACADIA). Quebec. This town, later the largest city in New Brunswick, Canada, is likely to be confused with St. Johns on the Richelieu River, later called St. Jean, in Quebec Province, Canada. The St. John

in New Brunswick was a center of Loyalist settlement after the Revolution. St. John's (written with an apostrophe) is in Newfoundland.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ST. JOHN'S, CANADA. (now called St-Jean), 14–18 May 1775. As part of the operation against Ticonderoga on 10 May, the Americans had sent a detachment to capture Skenesboro. On the afternoon of 14 May, this party reported to Benedict Arnold with a captured schooner, and Arnold immediately headed for St. John's with fifty of his men in the vessel now called *Liberty*. Ethan Allen followed in bateaux with about sixty men. Early on 17 May Arnold surprised the fifteen-man British garrison; captured the fifty-five-ton sloop *George* (no guns mounted), which in American hands would become the *Enterprise*; destroyed five bateaux; evacuated the prisoners, some stores, and the prizes; and headed back for Ticonderoga. About fifteen miles away he encountered Allen, who—despite Arnold's advice—decided to occupy and hold St. John's. Allen landed just before dark and made dispositions to ambush the British relief column advancing from Chambly, twelve miles away. But then he wisely reconsidered and withdrew his undisciplined, tired, and hungry men. Just before dawn the pursuit caught Allen's rear guard. Arnold had no casualties, and Allen lost three prisoners.

USAGE NOTE. This place is variously identified in the primary sources as Saint John, Saint John's, or St. Johns. The original French settlers called it St. Jean-Iberville. The correct modern usage is St-Jean. In 1775 it consisted of a fort and a small settlement nearby, both with the same name. See next article for strategic importance of this place and the sources.

SEE ALSO *Ticonderoga, New York, American Capture of*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

ST. JOHN'S, CANADA. 5 September–2 November 1775. Twenty miles southeast of Montreal and near the head of navigation from Lake Champlain down the Richelieu River to the St. Lawrence, St. John's occupied a critical position along a historic invasion route. Military works established there by the Marquis de Montcalm in 1758 were enlarged and strengthened by Guy Carleton, governor of Quebec and commander of British forces in Canada, after the fall of Ticonderoga. Carleton considered it to be critical to the defense of Canada. In addition to the fortifications and barracks

complex, St. John's also had a small shipyard and a modest civilian settlement. When the Americans approached on 5 September, Major Charles Preston was in command with about two hundred regulars from the Twenty-sixth Foot and small Indian contingent.

On 17 August, General Philip Schuyler left Brigadier General Richard Montgomery in temporary command on Lake Champlain and went to Albany for a meeting. While Schuyler was gone, Montgomery learned that the British were rushing to complete two small vessels under construction at St. John's and realized that naval control of Lake Champlain could be lost. The crisis did not allow him to get Schuyler's approval to cross the border. On 28 August he set out for Ile aux Noix, a swampy island in the Richelieu, twenty miles south of St. John's; here he intended to set up defenses that could prevent the vessels from entering the lake.

Montgomery's command comprised about 1,200 men and a few cannon. They moved north in a small fleet of two sailing vessels (the sloop *Enterprise* and schooner *Liberty*), and an assortment of bateaux and canoes. Troops involved were most of Waterbury's Fifth Connecticut Regiment and half of the First New York Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema. The latter included Captain Gershom Mott's infantrymen, who had been temporarily converted to an artillery section.

Schuyler caught up with his aggressive subordinate the morning of 4 September, approved his action, and by night the invaders were at Ile aux Noix. Although the expected Canadian allies did not appear to reinforce them, neither did the majority of the French-speaking militia turn out for Carleton. Schuyler stripped his men of baggage and pushed toward St. John's. On 6 September they landed a mile and a half away and were advancing through the swamps to attack when a flank patrol ran into an Indian ambush. The resulting skirmish in dense underbrush ended when the Indians withdrew, but the Americans lost sixteen men and did not pursue. That night a man who was apparently sympathetic to the American cause visited Schuyler's entrenched camp and convinced him that St. John's was too strongly held for him to capture, so the next day he fell back to Ile aux Noix.

Additional Connecticut and New York troops arrived, swelling Schuyler's strength to about 1,700 men (more than twice the entire strength of British regulars in Canada). Although his health was failing, Schuyler sent out aggressive combat patrols to gather better intelligence and prepared for a second attack. Montgomery and Ritzema landed at the previous camp site after dark on 10 September. Montgomery remained with a party at the site while Ritzema and 500 New Yorkers started forward with the mission of investing St. John's from the north. Within fifteen minutes the advance turned into a fiasco. In the darkness of the heavy woods, the skittish

New Yorkers thought they were ambushed and stampeded back to the boats. Montgomery rallied them and tried again. The second movement ground to a halt when Preston's cannon fired a few rounds and the vanguard had a small skirmish. About 3 A.M. the Americans withdrew to the beachhead. A third try the next morning ended when the men were panicked by a report that the *Royal Savage*, one of the new ships, was near their boats and ready to go into action, and Montgomery had to return to his base.

Back on Ile aux Noix, Montgomery assumed command on 16 September when Schuyler was invalidated to the rear. Despite a sick list of 600, and all the makings of a mutiny among his demoralized, ill-disciplined troops, Montgomery was able to resume the offensive. He had received additional reinforcements: 170 Green Mountain Boys under Seth Warner, 100 New Hampshire Rangers under Timothy Bedel, and an Independent Company of Volunteers that included some Dartmouth students. Others were on the way.

THE BRITISH DEFENSE

Rather than pull in his outposts and concentrate his meager forces around Montreal and Quebec, General Carleton adopted a "forward strategy": he reinforced St. John's to a total of 500 regulars from the Seventh ("Royal Fusiliers") and Twenty-sixth Foot. Another 90 officers and men of the Seventh Foot were posted at nearby Chambly. Preston was further reinforced by 225 men scraped together from all the sources at Carleton's disposal: an ensign and 12 sailors from the Gaspée, 100 Canadian militia, and 70 of Allan MacLean's newly recruited Royal Highland Emigrants.

On 17 September Montgomery finally made it to St. John's and began siege operations. The Americans contended with illness, cold weather, swampy ground, and a shortage of supplies as they struggled to construct their lines and batteries. Although an effective artillery fire could be delivered into the British camp, the raw Americans lacked the training and discipline to take the place by assault.

Schuyler at Ticonderoga kept pushing food forward, which boosted morale considerably. With the surrender of Chambly on 18 October, the Americans obtained supplies that permitted successful conclusion of the siege. The arrival of Captain John Lamb's artillery company (along with more Connecticut infantry) soon after enabled the attackers to utilize that materiel effectively. Carleton's attempt to rescue Preston was stopped at Longueuil on 30 October, when American forces kept the British from crossing the St. Lawrence; another detachment kept MacLean from crossing farther up the river. After having delayed the American invasion almost two months, and with only three days' supplies left, Preston surrendered

St. John's on 2 November 1775. Among the prisoners was Lieutenant John André. During the actual forty-six-day siege, few men were killed on either side.

SIGNIFICANCE

Although Carleton lost most of his regular troops at Chambly and St. John's, the time spent eliminating them bought him time to organize resistance at Quebec. Forcing the Americans to fight a winter campaign is generally considered to have saved Canada for the British.

SEE ALSO *André, John; Canada Invasion; Chambly, Canada; Green Mountain Boys; Longueuil, Canada.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

ST. KITTS, CAPTURED BY THE FRENCH. 11 January–12 February 1782. The fall of St. Kitts represented the nadir of the Revolutionary War for the British. The rumor of the loss, together with that of Minorca, circulated in England in the last weeks of the government of Lord North and encouraged opposition claims that the ministry was not only losing the former colonies of North America but also destroying the rest of the British Empire.

After the Battle of Yorktown, French Admiral De Grasse ignored the requests of George Washington to remain in America and sailed for the Caribbean on 4 November 1781, arriving in Martinique on 26 November. After two failed attempts to attack Barbados in December, he landed unopposed in St. Kitts on 11 January 1782 with eight thousand troops commanded by the governor of Martinique, the marquis de Bouillé, who immediately captured the capital city of Basseterre. They forced the twelve thousand British military regulars and militia to retreat to a defensive position nine miles away in the formidable fortifications at Brimstone Hill, against which the French began siege operations.

On 24 January, almost two weeks after the start of the siege, Admiral Hood arrived with a relief expedition of twenty-two ships from Barbados against the superior fleet of twenty-nine ships under De Grasse. In a brilliant maneuver, Hood managed to lure the French fleet from its moorings and to displace it with his own fleet, but apart from an exchange of messages on the first day, he was

unable to communicate with the besieged garrison despite landing troops under General Robert Prescott, who engaged in an intense action that left both sides claiming victory. On 12 February, after almost five weeks of resistance, the sick and exhausted garrison on Brimstone Hill, depleted of ammunition and provisions, with only five hundred men left in defense, finally submitted to the French, giving them full possession of St. Kitts and the neighboring island of Nevis. On 20 February, Montserrat also capitulated to the French.

Hood blamed the loss of St. Kitts upon the treachery of the colonists, who he claimed had failed to remove ammunition near the fortifications that were used by the French, who had lost their own cannon at sea. In fact, the fault was due more to the negligence of the local army commanders and to their long-running dispute with the governor of the island. The defense of Brimstone Hill contributed to the delay of De Grasse's plan to combine with the Spanish fleet in an attack on Jamaica. It also allowed Admiral Sir George Rodney crucial time to arrive with reinforcements from England to link with Hood, which paved the way for the British victory over the French at the Battle of the Saintes.

SEE ALSO *Naval Operations, British; Naval Operations, French; West Indies in the Revolution.*

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revised by Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy

ST. LEGER, BARRY. (1737–1789). British officer. St. Leger entered the army as an ensign of the Twenty-eighth Foot on 27 April 1756, becoming known during the Seven Years' War as a good leader in frontier warfare. His experience in this war included service under Abercromby in 1757, the siege of Louisburg in 1758, and the capture of Quebec by Wolfe in 1759. In July 1760 he became brigadier major, in which capacity he participated in the campaign that captured Montreal. On 16 August 1762 he was promoted to major of the Ninety-fifth Foot.

As a lieutenant colonel he led St. Leger's expedition (June–8 September 1777), the operation for which he is generally remembered. During the remainder of the Revolution he commanded a body of rangers in operations based out of Montreal, being promoted to colonel in 1780. In 1781 he led two unsuccessful expeditions, one aimed at

capturing Philip Schuyler and another to meet commissioners from Vermont at Ticonderoga to bring that region back under crown control. He served in Canada until 1785, when his name disappeared from the Army List.

SEE ALSO *St. Leger's Expedition.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ST. LEGER'S EXPEDITION. June–September 1777. General John Burgoyne's "Thoughts for Conducting the War on the Side of Canada" received approval from the British government and formed the basis for his operations in 1777. A part of that plan involved a small secondary attack from Canada advancing through western New York by way of the grain-producing Mohawk Valley. Burgoyne envisioned this column joining his own main force at Albany. Although this plan had some military value as a diversion, the significant advantages were political. If, as expected, the column rolled over patriot opposition, it would encourage both the Loyalists and the Indian tribes to actively support Burgoyne.

Energetic Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger of the Thirty-fourth Foot left Montreal on 23 June 1777, reached Oswego on 25 July, and started his offensive the next day. (At this time Burgoyne was almost to the Hudson.) St. Leger's column, about 2,000 strong, consisted of an unusually mixed force. Half were Indians, and a third were Loyalist and Canadian auxiliaries. Only 340 could be called regulars, small detachments of British Eighth and Thirty-fourth Foot and part of the Hesse-Hanau Jäger Corps. The latter, a mix of true jägers and light infantry (chasseurs), comprised the advance elements of a brand-new unit that rushed into action as soon as they arrived from Europe and were probably still trying to recover from their voyage. The best Loyalist troops came from Sir John Johnson's Royal Regiment of New York, also known as the Royal Greens; the others, led by John Butler, were of value in working alongside the Indians but not in heavy fighting. The Canadian militia acted only as a labor and transportation element. Artillery support comprised forty men with two six-pounders, two three-pounders, and four small mortars. Larger guns capable of knocking down fortifications could not make it through the wilderness, and transportation concerns drastically limited artillery ammunition.

St. Leger advanced at the creditable rate of ten miles a day through a wilderness worse than the one Burgoyne faced. St. Leger's vanguard reached Fort Stanwix on 2 August, followed on the next day by the main body. Just before the British approached from the west, a

hundred Massachusetts Continentals from James Wesson's Regiment escorting a supply convoy entered the fort from the east, swelling the garrison to about eight hundred. Burgoyne based his "Thoughts" on outdated intelligence that seriously underestimated both the probable opposing force and the condition of the old works. St. Leger had enough men to invest the fort but not to storm it. He staged a review in sight of the garrison, trying to bluff them into surrendering. When that failed he went through the motions of a formal siege, hoping for some type of lucky break.

THE AMERICAN DEFENSES

Strategic Fort Stanwix had been erected at the Oneida Carrying Place (modern Rome, New York) during the French and Indian War. Americans reoccupied it and had seriously started refurbishing it in 1776, renaming it Fort Schuyler (the new name has largely been ignored by historians). Colonel Peter Gansevoort's Third New York Regiment took over as the garrison in April 1777. The regiment had a strong cadre of experienced veterans and an exceptionally capable second in command, Lieutenant Colonel Marinus Willett. When the siege began, the garrison had the Third New York, about half of Wesson's, and some artillerymen. Terrain favored the defense, and the fort constituted a formidable obstacle for anything short of heavy artillery. The large rectangular earthwork with bastions at the corners had seventeen-foot-high walls and was surrounded by a fourteen-foot-high stockade and a forty-foot-wide dry ditch. St. Leger threw a loose cordon of Indians around the fort but put the bulk of his men into three main camps that formed a triangle about a mile on each side. Regulars occupied the largest camp, more than a quarter of a mile northeast of the fort on slightly higher ground. Most of the Loyalists and Indians occupied the Lower Landing on the west bank of the Mohawk and half a mile from the fort. The rest of the Loyalists set up the smallest camp on Wood Creek, also half a mile from the fort.

Indian marksmen and jägers sniped at the fort on 4 and 5 August while large work parties tried to clear Wood Creek and cut sixteen miles of supply track through the woods. St. Leger kept about 250 regulars in camp as a reaction force. In the evening of 5 August, a message from Molly Brant gave word that an American relief column was ten miles away. Although his forces were already dispersed, the British commander accepted the danger of splitting them further.

The Battle at Oriskany, 6 August, ended in a tactical draw, but St. Leger's troops did turn back Nicholas Herkimer's relief column, leading the invaders to believe that they had won a victory. In the long run, however, it led to St. Leger's failure. The Indians had borne the brunt of the battle and suffered heavier losses than usual. Then

they returned to find that their camp had been smashed during their absence by a sortie. Messengers sent ahead of Herkimer's relief column informed Gansevoort of Herkimer's coming and asked him to make a diversion to cover the final approach march. After waiting for the end of the same shower that caused the lull at Oriskany, Willett led 250 men with one field piece out the sallyport. He easily scattered the few enemies in his way, methodically ransacked the camps, and returned to the fort before St. Leger could intervene, all without the loss of a single man.

ARNOLD RELIEVES STANWIX

When news of Oriskany reached General Philip Schuyler at Stillwater, Burgoyne was only twenty-four miles away at Fort Edward with about seven thousand men. Schuyler knew that his policy of obstructing the roads and streams ensured that Burgoyne could not cover the distance at a sufficient pace to prevent the Americans from detaching enough troops to raise the siege. But he did have significant political problems. A faction in Congress already sought to strip his command because of the loss of Ticonderoga. Now New Englanders, including some of his own officers, raised the charge that in order to protect his fellow New Yorkers Schuyler would draw off the troops protecting the New England frontier. Schuyler accepted the risk to his reputation and started organizing the relief of Fort Stanwix. Although the column would normally have needed only a brigadier general as commander, Major General Benedict Arnold exercised his seniority to claim the post.

On the evening of the Oriskany ambush of Herkimer's relief troops, St. Leger started trying to persuade Gansevoort to surrender because the relief force had been thrown back. He sent him a letter from two American prisoners, Colonel Peter Bellinger and Major John Frey, recommending that the garrison give up. Whether or not they wrote it under duress is a point of debate among historians. Either way, real negotiations began the next day when St. Leger called for a cease-fire and the Americans allowed three officers, including John Butler, suitably blindfolded, to enter and meet with the senior officers of the garrison. The British informed Gansevoort of the terms: the Indians had reluctantly agreed to spare American lives and personal property if the garrison would surrender; otherwise, St. Leger would probably be powerless to prevent the savages from massacring the inhabitants of the valley. This summons was a deliberate attempt to conjure up memories of the Fort William Henry Massacre during the French and Indian War. The reference had exactly the opposite effect, infuriating the American officers.

Gansevoort agreed to St. Leger's proposal for a three-day armistice. Willett and an experienced frontiersman from the Third New York (Lieutenant Levi Stockwell)

slipped away at 10 p.m. on 10 August, worked their way through the lines via a cedar swamp, and reached the American outpost at Fort Dayton where he learned from Colonel Wesson that Schuyler had in fact already ordered a relief column. Willett met Arnold at Albany and accompanied the column back to Fort Dayton, reaching it on 21 August. The remnants of the Tryon County militia brigade (smashed at Oriskany) mobilized a hundred men to support the Continentals, and on 23 August Arnold started on the final leg of the journey to Stanwix. After covering ten miles, he received a message from Gansevoort reporting that St. Leger was retreating.

HON YOST'S RUSE

Lieutenant Colonel John Brooks, who later became governor of Massachusetts, may have suggested the stratagem that Arnold readily approved: The Americans held an individual named Hon Yost Schuyler, who had been sentenced to death for participating in a Loyalist plot. This man, apparently retarded, had lived among the Iroquois and exercised influence on them because of his mental condition. Arnold offered to reprieve him (while holding a brother as hostage) if Hon Yost went ahead of the column and told St. Leger's Indians exaggerated stories of the relief column's strength. The stratagem worked.

Arnold reached Fort Stanwix the evening of 23 August. A detachment shadowed St. Leger back to Lake Oneida, and scouts watched the last enemy boats pull out of range. Arnold left reinforcements with Gansevoort and led the main part of his column, about twelve hundred men, back to Albany. They rejoined the northern army during the first week of September as it moved to the battlefield near Saratoga.

Although historians generally accept the story of Hon Yost's trick, it was probably not decisive in St. Leger's decision to fall back. He had no hope of overpowering the fort, only of playing for time until the Americans gave up. When Gansevoort did not crumble, the game was over. The entire operation had little military impact on either the campaign or the outcome of the war, but it had enormous significance for the Mohawk Valley: it polarized the inhabitants (Indians as well as the white settlers) and set the stage for years of bitter frontier warfare, in a sense starting the process of breaking the unity and power of the Iroquois Confederacy.

SEE ALSO *Brant, Molly; Burgoyne's Offensive; Fort Stanwix, New York; Oriskany, New York; Schuyler, Hon Yost; Tryon County, New York.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI. 25 May 1780. A British expedition sent out by Lieutenant Governor Patrick Sinclair from Michilimackinac was repulsed by Captain Don Fernando de Leyba, Spanish commandant of San Luis de Ylinueses (modern St. Louis, Missouri). Sinclair had hoped to gain significant control over the Indian trade on the Upper Mississippi River by pushing the Spanish and Americans out of the Illinois region. The raiders amounted to as many as 1,000 Indians and a handful of British under the leadership of Emanuel Hesse, but they were not prepared to encounter resistance. Leyba's 29 regulars and about 280 French-speaking militia refused to be intimidated, and Hesse withdrew in part because he feared being hit in the rear by Americans from Cahokia. A companion British force from Detroit had greater success in June in capturing Riddle's and Martin's Stations in Kentucky. A retaliatory Spanish counteroffensive took Fort Saint Joseph on 12 February 1781.

SEE ALSO *Fort Saint Joseph, Michigan.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

ST. LUC DE LA CORNE, PIERRE (OR LOUIS). French Canadian soldier. Known by many variations of this name, St. Luc was a Quebecois who played a key role in French and Indian military operations during the Seven Years' War. Present for the siege and slaughter at Fort William Henry in 1757, he was

wounded at the Rapids, Lake Ontario, in 1759 while serving as a commander of French colonial troops. He was again wounded when General James Wolfe took Quebec that same year.

When Canada passed into British hands, St. Luc started a long and effective career in organizing and leading Indian auxiliaries, though it is unclear if he was always loyal to the British. There is some evidence that during Pontiac's War (1763–1766) St. Luc attempted to persuade the Indians along the St. Lawrence to join in the uprising against the British. At the start of the Revolution St. Luc worked to unite the Iroquois Confederation with Abenakis and Caughnawagas against the colonists, with mixed success. During the siege of Saint Johns by General Robert Montgomery from September through November 1775, St. Luc sent over some Caughnawagas to propose an "accommodation." Montgomery distrusted St. Luc, whom he called "cunning as the devil," but he sent "a New Englander (John Brown) to negotiate with him," Montgomery finding New Englanders to be equally cunning. The conference between the "devil" and the "New Englander" came to nothing, however.

St. Luc and General Sir Guy Carleton were repulsed at Longueuil on 30 Oct. 1775 when they attempted to relieve the installation at Saint Johns. Charles Michel de Langlade and St. Luc led the Indians during General John Burgoyne's offensive. St. Luc is said to have advised the British commander not to punish the Native American charged with killing and scalping a young woman named Jane McCrea, an event that galvanized support for the American cause against the British. In the raid on Bennington, Vermont, the Indians were led by St. Luc and the Canadians by his son-in-law, Charles de Lanaudière.

SEE ALSO *Abenaki; Bennington Raid; Brown, John; Caughnawaga; McCrea Atrocity.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ST. LUCIA, CAPTURED BY THE BRITISH. 12–28 December 1778. Following the declaration of war by France in 1778, Britain briefly subordinated military activities in North America for objectives in the Caribbean. Although almost paralyzed by divisions about how best to respond to the new threat, the cabinet agreed upon a plan for the conquest of St. Lucia on 14 March. With its view of Martinique's Fort Royal Harbor, it was strategically important to the British as the main gateway to French Martinique, the base of the French navy in the Americas. It possessed a fine harbor at Gros Islet Bay that was more spacious than the narrow anchorage at English Harbour in Antigua.

The plans were carried out in the utmost secrecy. Lord George Germain directed Sir Henry Clinton to send five thousand troops and most the ships of the line in America to participate in the conquest of St. Lucia. Rear Admiral Barrington, commanding the naval squadron in the Leeward Islands, was ordered to wait at Barbados to be joined by an expeditionary force, with the result that he was unable to sail to the defense of Dominica, which fell to the French on 7 September. The arrival of the troop convoys was long delayed owing to Clinton's need to evacuate Philadelphia and the delay of naval reinforcements from England, commanded by Byron, due to bad weather. The expedition under Major General James Grant did not leave New York until 4 November. It was fortunate not to have suffered capture by the French, since it sailed on a parallel course with the fleet of Admiral D'Estaing, who simultaneously left Boston for Martinique.

Grant, together with Admiral William Hotham commanding the troop transports, arrived in Barbados on 10 December. They landed at St. Lucia on 12 December and, with the arrival of the remaining troops, conquered the island on the 14th, only hours before the arrival of Admiral D'Estaing with a superior fleet and 9,000 troops from Martinique. Finding the British in possession of the island, D'Estaing was unable to dislodge Barrington's squadron at Cul de Sac. On the 16th he landed his troops and attempted to storm the British lines at La Vigie in order to open the harbor to his fleet. His two attempts were successfully repulsed, with—after three hours of intense action—1,300 wounded and 400 dead, compared to 158 British wounded and 13 killed. After almost ten days of inaction, D'Estaing embarked his troops and on the 29th finally quit the island for Martinique.

The St. Lucia campaign seriously compromised the British war for America. The British withdrew from Philadelphia primarily to free five thousand troops for the conquest, despite the warning of Sir Henry Clinton that the loss of the troops, together with redeployments to Florida and Canada, might force him to abandon his headquarters in New York for Halifax. By forcing the abandonment of Philadelphia, the campaign also undermined the negotiating strength of the Carlisle Peace Commission.

SEE ALSO *Naval Operations, British; Naval Operations, French; West Indies in the Revolution.*

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revised by Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy

SAINT-SIMON, CLAUDE HENRI DE ROUVROY, COMTE DE.

(1760–1825). French officer, social philosopher. He entered the French army in 1775 as a second lieutenant, was promoted to captain in the cavalry of the Touraine Regiment on 3 June 1779, and transferred to the infantry of that regiment on 14 November 1779. His regiment sailed from Brest for Saint Domingue in the autumn of 1779. He participated in attacks on Barbados during April and May 1780 and was transferred later to the Spanish service in the Caribbean. He received permission from Governor Lillancourt of Saint-Domingue to join Grasse's 1781 force sailing for America. At the siege of Yorktown he commanded the regimental gunners. He left Virginia with Grasse's force on 4 November. His siegecraft skills led to another victory in the capture of Brimstone Hill, Saint Kitts, in February 1782. On 12 April 1782 he was captured in the action off Saints Passage and taken to Jamaica. In 1782 he was made a *mestre de camp en second* in the Aquitaine Regiment on 1 January 1784 and colonel attached to the cavalry in 1788. In 1790 he was made a chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis.

He played no important part in the French Revolution but was imprisoned during the Terror. To finance his project of reorganizing society he had made a small fortune in land speculation during the French Revolution, but he lost it and spent most of his remaining years in poverty. Shortly before his death he published his *New Christianity* (1825), a seminal work in French socialism. He summed up the importance of his American experience to his later life this way: "It was in America, while fighting in the cause of industrial liberty, that I conceived the first desire to see this plant from another world come to flower in my own country."

SEE ALSO *West Indies in the Revolution.*

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SAINT-SIMON MONTBLÉRU, CLAUDE-ANNE DE ROUVRAY, MARQUIS DE.

(1743–1819). French general. Often confused with his brother, Claude de Rouvroy,

baron de Saint-Simon (1752–1811), and his cousin, Claude-Henri de Rouvray, comte de Saint-Simon (1760–1825), he was commander of the French troops that reached Yorktown with Admiral Grasse. The 3,470 man division served under Lafayette.

SEE ALSO *Yorktown Campaign; Yorktown, Siege of.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

SALEM, MASSACHUSETTS. 26 February 1775. On orders from Major General Thomas Gage, the British commander in chief in North America, Colonel Alexander Leslie sailed with his Sixty-fourth Regiment of Foot from Castle William (in Boston Harbor) at midnight on 25 February 1775 to destroy an ordnance depot reported to be at Salem. The raiders dropped anchor about twelve hours later in Marblehead Bay, and at about 2 P.M. they started the five-mile march to Salem. Major John Pedrick, an American whom Leslie knew and believed to be loyal, managed to pass through the 240-man column of redcoats on horseback and race ahead to alert the citizens of Salem, who were attending church. Colonel Timothy Pickering, the local militia commander, sent forty minutemen to Captain Robert Foster's forge near the North River Bridge to remove nineteen brass cannon that were there to be fitted with carriages. When the regulars arrived, the cannon had been removed, the draw of the bridge leading to the forge had been opened, and a large crowd had joined the militia on the opposite bank.

Some redcoats barely failed to capture the last available boat in the area, but Joseph Wicher smashed in its bottom and then, in a grandstand gesture, bared his breast—literally—to the enemy. A British soldier obliged

him with a bayonet thrust that inflicted a slight but bloody wound. When the British threatened to fire, the Loyalist minister Thomas Barnard and Captain John Felt countered with a face-saving offer to let them cross unmolested if they would then withdraw peacefully. Leslie accepted, marched his troops some 30 rods (165 yards) to the agreed limiting point, faced about, and headed back to Marblehead. Despite its comic-opera nature, this affair came close to setting off the “shot heard round the world”; a company of Danvers militia arrived just as the British were leaving, and other armed citizens were gathering. Salem can claim the distinction of seeing the first shedding of American blood; it also generated a Barbara Fritchie-type heroine in Sarah Tarrant, who after taunting the redcoats from an open window and being threatened by one of them, is alleged to have said, “Fire if you have the courage, but I doubt it” (Commager and Morris, eds., p. 65). Leslie is said to have retreated to the tune of *The World Turned Upside Down*.

SEE ALSO *Leslie, Alexander; World Turned Upside Down*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SALEM, OHIO TERRITORY **SEE**
Gnadenbutten Massacre, Ohio.

SALLY PORT. A sally or sortie is a going forth, particularly by besieged against besiegers. A sally port is an opening in a fortification to permit this operation.

Mark M. Boatner

SALOMON, HAYM. (c. 1740–1785). Patriot financier. Born to Jewish parents in Poland around 1740, Salomon had settled in New York City by 1775. After serving briefly as a sutler provisioning the American forces around Lake Champlain, he returned to New York City just before the British captured the it and decided to stay on under the occupation. Briefly imprisoned in the

provost’s jail on suspicion of being an American agent, he was released under the supervision of General Leopold Heister, commander of the German troops in the city. Heister employed Salomon, who spoke German and several other languages, in his commissary department. Salomon took advantage of the situation to improve his own economic standing even while endangering himself by encouraging German troops to defect to the Patriot side and providing money to American and French prisoners. Discovered in August 1778, he fled the city just ahead of arrest by the British and made for Philadelphia. Congress ignored his petition for help and Salomon, though destitute, set himself up as a financier, where his language skills proved useful as he became the primary dealer in foreign bills of exchange. In June 1781 Robert Morris, the superintendent of finance for the United States, turned to Salomon to handle Congress’s foreign transactions, most particularly the sale of U.S. notes. As the economy of the nation worsened, Salomon played an ever-more-critical role in buttressing the nation’s finances. In July 1782 he became Congress’s official broker and was widely respected for his honesty and generosity. He died in Philadelphia on 6 January 1785, leaving his family mostly worthless U.S. securities.

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SALT. Salt was vital to the American economy, because it was needed to preserve meat and fish. While salt-making was one of the earliest industries attempted in the colonies, the commodity was not produced in sufficient quantity and had to be imported. Turks Island in the West Indies was the principal source, and the Royal navy was able to cut off this supply to all but smugglers and privateers during the War for American Independence. (Naval vessels could carried salt as ballast and would trade it for fresh provisions whenever possible.)

The great Onondaga salt deposits in New York were known in the seventeenth century, but they were not worked until after the war, nor were the large deposits of rock salt that later supplied the country. When the shortage became critical, the Americans set up salt factories along the coast, from Cape Cod to Georgia, to produce salt by evaporating sea water. Bounties were offered and state works were established, and even

Benjamin Franklin turned his talents to drawing up instructions for salt production. During the war era, non-combatants went to considerable lengths to procure the commodity. On 29 August 1777 John Adams wrote to his wife from Philadelphia that “all the old women and young children are gone down to the Jersey shore to make salt. Salt water is boiling all around the coast.” Nonetheless, the shortage was never alleviated. Profiteers did a thriving business, and mobs rioted for salt. Salt works themselves were prime objectives for British sea-borne raiders, and many were destroyed by the coastal storms for which the North Atlantic seaboard is noted.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SALTONSTALL, DUDLEY. (1738–1796). Continental naval officer. Connecticut. Born at New London, Connecticut, on 8 September 1738, Saltonstall was a merchant captain in the West Indies trade and a privateer during the Seven Years’ War. At the start of the Revolution he commanded the fort at New London but sought his own ship in the new U.S. Navy. Through the intercession of his brother-in-law, Silas Deane, who was a member of Congress’s naval committee, Saltonstall was given command of Esek Hopkins’s flagship, the *Alfred*, on 27 November 1775. Taking part in the first of the war’s naval operations, he was exonerated after several courts-martial and a congressional investigation of wrongdoing in the Alfred–Glasgow encounter of 6 April 1776. The next year he was named to command the new frigate *Trumbull*. Although this vessel did not get to sea for two years because it could not get over the shallows of the harbor where it was built, Saltonstall did command a ship by the same name and captured two British transports off Virginia. He succeeded the more capable John B. Hopkins as captain of the *Warren* (thirty-two guns) and commanded the fleet in the Penobscot expedition disaster. After a court-martial in Boston, he was dismissed from the navy on 27 December 1779. He later was successful as a privateer and after the war returned to the merchant service. He died of yellow fever in Haiti in 1796.

SEE ALSO *Alfred–Glasgow Encounter; Naval Operations, Strategic Overview; Penobscot Expedition, Maine.*

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SALUTARY NEGLECT. In the generation of British politicians that arose after the end of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), management of domestic politics, especially in Parliament, was more important than the close supervision of overseas colonies. Accommodation of interests and the promotion of trade were valued more highly than strict enforcement of the Navigation Acts or confrontation over new policy initiatives, so much so that the years after the rise of Robert Walpole as the king’s chief minister in 1721, to about the middle of the eighteenth century, were called a period of “salutary neglect.” To be sure, when serious conflicts of interest arose, the concerns of North American colonists were subordinated. In the Hat Act of 1732, English hatters won from Parliament a prohibition against the production of hats in the colonies. In the Molasses Act of 1733, British West Indian sugar planters influenced Parliament to levy a higher duty on sugar from the French islands as the price of allowing North Americans to continue importing a non-British-produced commodity. Nonetheless, local elites in the colonies were able to prosper, consolidate their positions, and become self-aware in a time when the burden of empire was comparatively light. By mid-century, when this period began to come to an end after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, colonial elites had come to view “salutary neglect” as the correct state of affairs between the mother country and the North American colonies. Many colonists believed they participated in the crisis of the final French and Indian war as junior partners rather than subordinates, and thus were stunned when, after 1763, the imperial government began to enforce regulations and generate new ways of mulcting the colonial economies.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SAMPSON, DEBORAH. (1760–1827). Continental heroine. Massachusetts. Born in Plympton, Massachusetts, on 17 December 1760, Sampson was reared by relatives and friends until she was ten years old and was an indentured servant the next eight years. By the time she was twenty, she had educated herself to the degree of qualifying as a part-time teacher. Early in 1782 she masqueraded as a man and enlisted in the Massachusetts militia as Timothy Thayer, but she was exposed while drinking in a tavern. In May 1782 she enlisted as Robert Shurtleiff in Captain George Webb's company of the Fourth Massachusetts Regiment. Sampson marched to West Point with her outfit on 23 May. She gave a good account of herself in skirmishes with Loyalists at Tappan Zee and Tarrytown, New York. She was wounded in the latter encounter and carried to the aid station with a serious musket wound in the thigh. Knowing that she again faced exposure, she removed the musket ball herself. After another skirmish at Fort Edward, she was transferred to Philadelphia, where she came down with a fever. She was treated by Dr. Barnabas Binney, who discovered her secret but concealed it. After joining the Eleventh Massachusetts Regiment for a surveying expedition in western Pennsylvania, Sampson returned to West Point. Robert Shurtleiff was honorably discharged on 23 October 1783.

Sampson married Benjamin Gannett, a farmer of Sharon, Massachusetts, in 1784. The couple had three children. Sampson did not conceal her service record. In 1797 she related her experiences to Herman Mann, who published *The Female Review: or, Memoirs of an American Young Lady* (1797). In 1802 she began giving lectures in New England and New York. As perhaps the first female lecturer in the country, she delivered a set speech about her experiences and normally concluded by appearing in military costume to do the manual of arms. After Massachusetts awarded her a bonus, Congress in 1805 gave her a pension of four dollars a month as an invalided soldier, and in 1818 this was doubled. She died in Sharon on 29 April 1827.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

SANDERS (OR SAUNDERS) CREEK, SOUTH CAROLINA *SEE Camden Campaign.*

SANDUSKY, OHIO. 4–5 June 1782. Site of Crawford's defeat.

SEE ALSO *Crawford's Defeat.*

SANDWICH, JOHN MONTAGU, FOURTH EARL OF. (1718–1792). First lord of the Admiralty. Sandwich was once denounced by Whiggish historians as lazy, corrupt, and largely responsible for the unprepared state of the Royal Navy for war in 1778. More recent research has shown that Sandwich was, in fact (for his time), a hardworking and conscientious administrator, who repeatedly warned his colleagues of the danger of falling behind Bourbon preparations, and did his best to mitigate the effects of parsimony. His preference for a concentration in home waters had much to recommend it. If he can be taken to task, it is for his ruinous clash with Germain over strategy; his ill-concealed ambition and his cleverness, which made him an object of suspicion; and his failure to argue clearly his case.

Born on 13 November 1718, he was first educated at Eton, where he received a thorough classical education. In 1729 he succeeded to the earldom on the death of his father. Leaving Eton in 1735, he spent two years at Trinity College, Cambridge, before embarking upon a tour of the Ottoman Empire, including Constantinople, Greece, and Egypt. In Florence during 1737 he met Dorothy Fane, the younger daughter of an Irish peer, and on his return from the East they married on 3 March 1741.

Entering politics, Sandwich became the duke of Bedford's deputy at the Admiralty, where he worked closely with Admiral George Lord Anson on the development of the Western Squadron strategy. In 1748, still collaborating with Anson, he became first lord of the Admiralty and launched an investigation into the state of the dockyards, only to lose office in 1751 as part of an assault on his patron, Bedford. He did not regain office until 1763, when he again briefly became first lord before being moved to the secretaryship of state for the Northern Department and becoming responsible for the prosecution of John Wilkes. Sandwich lost office when Grenville ministry fell in July 1765, but he became first lord for the third time under North in 1771.

Once again he threw himself into dockyard reform, energetically resisted North's plans for economy, and restored the navy's stocks of seasoned timber within three years. He expanded building capacity by contracting some work to private yards. Long before war with France broke out in 1778, Sandwich repeatedly warned the ministry to fully mobilize the fleet in anticipation of a Bourbon threat—warnings that were ignored until too late.

Sandwich's demands for a concentration in home waters were opposed by Germain, who had the direction of the war in America. Sandwich failed to prevent the detachment of Byron in hot pursuit of the Toulon fleet in April 1778, a move which arguably saved New York but so weakened Keppel that he was unable to win a decisive victory off Ushant in July. It turned out to be the last chance to do so before Spain intervened in 1779. Even then, Sandwich had the worst of the strategic argument and repeated detachments were made to American waters, with the result that a Franco-Spanish fleet briefly dominated the Channel and posed a real danger of invasion. On the other hand, Sandwich generally managed to keep these detachments relatively weak, and there was little coordination between them, a strategic failing for which he must shoulder some responsibility and which in 1781 led to the Yorktown catastrophe.

But in other spheres Sandwich was brilliantly successful. By 1782 the Royal Navy had achieved parity with the combined Bourbon fleets, and the British ships had the advantage of copper bottoms. Sandwich lost office forever when North fell in 1782, but he had laid the foundations of the naval recovery that allowed Britain to survive as a Great Power. He died in London on 30 April 1792 and was buried at Barnwell, Northamptonshire, on 8 May.

He may or may not have invented the sandwich, but if he did it was probably connected with his work habits rather than with gambling. There is no evidence to sustain the suspicions of corruption and quite a lot to the contrary. His exceptional ability and ambition made him many enemies, as did his refusal to promote except on merit. As an administrator, however, he had the respect of his admirals. Though unimpressive as a wartime strategist, he held fast to the fundamental principle of concentration in home waters—the key to British naval success in a hostile Europe.

SEE ALSO *North, Sir Frederick.*

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revised by John Oliphant

SAN ILDEFONSO, TREATY OF SEE *Paris, Treaty of, 10 February 1763.*

SAP. Underground gallery dug to get beneath fortifications, usually for the purpose of blowing a mine. It is also a trench pushed toward the enemy by digging at the saphead (head of the sap) while using the trench for defilade. If the earth is thrown to one side for additional protection, it is known as a full or single sap; if dirt is thrown to form parapets on both sides, it becomes a double sap. A flying sap is one constructed under fire by using two gabions for cover and pushing them forward, side by side, as the work progresses. A sap roller is a gabion rolled forward to protect the sappers as they work. A sapper is a military engineer trained not only for this type of siege work but also for other varieties of field fortification.

SEE ALSO *Gabion.*

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
SARATOGA, FIRST BATTLE OF. 19

September 1777. John Burgoyne's offensive entered its final phase on 13 September when he crossed to the west side of the Hudson River. The slow movement southward resulted partly from inadequate transportation, but also from a collapse of intelligence. The losses suffered at Bennington and the constant attrition of sniping and disease had stripped away most of the Loyalists, Canadians, and Indians who had been his sources of information. In fact, he only realized that Horatio Gates's main force was nearby when he heard the reveille drums of the American camp on 16 September. He halted and only moved another three miles on the 17th. At that point he deployed along a front extending about a mile and a half west from Sword's House. The 18th produced no further intelligence, and he developed plans to carry out a reconnaissance in force to assess the situation.

The Americans had observed Burgoyne's every move, and their patrols harassed his advance. Gates's army now numbered at least seven thousand, with more militia arriving every day. They had been digging in on the commanding ground of Bemis Heights since 12 September. Knowing that time was on his side because Burgoyne had cut his own lines of communication, the American commander chose to exploit the tactical advantage of defending a fortified position.

BURGOYNE'S PLAN

The reconnaissance in force would be executed by three task forces. Brigadier Simon Fraser, with about twenty-two hundred men, would make a wide sweep on the right to the vicinity of the clearing known as Freeman's Farm. His command consisted of his own Twenty-fourth



BATTLE OF SARATOGA. THE GALE GROUP

Foot; Major John Ackland's light infantry battalion; Major Alexander, earl Balcarres's battalion of grenadiers; Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Breymann's battalions of Brunswick grenadiers; and the remaining Canadians, Indians, and Loyalists. The center column of about eleven hundred men from the Twentieth, Twenty-first, and Sixty-second Foot under Brigadier James Hamilton was to move south and then turn west to make contact with Fraser. Burgoyne accompanied Hamilton, and the reserve (Ninth Foot) followed closely behind. The left (east) column, eleven hundred Germans commanded by General Friedrich Riedesel and accompanied by General William Phillips and the artillery, took the river road. Hoffman Nickerson is on target with his comment: "What was next to be done—if the Americans did not come out and attack one or more of the advancing columns—we do not know" (p. 305). Since Burgoyne's troops were moving in broken, wooded terrain without the means of coordinating the three columns, the plan invited defeat in detail.

The 19th dawned cold and foggy but turned bright and clear by 11 A.M. A signal gun then set the columns in motion; an American patrol on the east bank of the Hudson quickly reported this to Gates. At about 12:30 the advance guard of the center column occupied the cabin of Freeman's Farm, and Burgoyne halted for word of


Fraser's location. Riedesel, slowed by the need to repair bridges, was on the river road due east of Freeman's Farm and about a mile and a half away.

Gates waited passively until Benedict Arnold's arguments finally persuaded him to send Daniel Morgan's riflemen and Dearborn's light infantry out from his left (east) to make contact. Arnold's division, on this flank, was alerted to support them.

THE ACTION BEGINS

About 1 P.M., Morgan encountered the pickets of the center column. Accurate fire picked off every British officer and many of the men and drove the survivors back to Hamilton's line. The riflemen pursued too aggressively and were in turn driven off by the British. In the heavy brush Morgan at first thought that his corps had been destroyed, but the scattered soldiers reassembled at the sound of his turkey call.

The skirmish briefly unnerved the some of Hamilton's men, but order returned quickly and Burgoyne decided he could no longer sit idle while waiting for word from Fraser. Again a signal gun told the other two forces to move. The center column moved out into the clearing of Freeman's Farm with the Twentieth on the left,



BATTLE OF SARATOGA. THE GALE GROUP.

the Twenty-first on the right, and the Sixty-second in the middle; the Ninth Foot continued as the reserve.

PHASE TWO

Morgan and Dearborn held positions along the southern edge of the clearing, and Arnold had already started at least seven of his regiments forward from Bemis Heights to support them. The First and Third New Hampshire Regiments, under Colonels Joseph Cilley and Alexander Scammell, were the first to arrive, and they formed to the left; others extended the line to the right as they arrived. Arnold arrived fairly soon, although charges and countercharges in his later argument with Gates have confused some historians on this point.

The fighting in the clearing became heavy at about 3 P.M. and continued until sunset. Each side advanced multiple times, but every advance was repulsed. Americans relied on numbers and accurate musket fire, the British on supporting artillery fire. It is a myth that this part of the engagement pitted inappropriate European tactics against American militiamen adept at frontier warfare. The heavy

fighting at the clearing took place between two bodies of regular troops, both using linear tactics and both fully under the control of their officers.

PHASE THREE

Riedesel had heard the firefight start and sent two companies of the Rhetz Regiment forward to find out what lay in front; Phillips left to learn about the firing. On his own initiative he also called artillery forward, sent four guns to support Hamilton, and sent his aide to ask Burgoyne for orders. The latter returned around 5 o'clock with instructions to leave a force to defend the river road and bring the rest to attack the American east flank and take pressure off the center column. The buildup of American forces had required the three regiments at Freeman's Farm to thin out to prevent being overlapped, especially on their right. This left the Sixty-second Foot in the center in a particularly exposed position, especially when it surged forward in a counterattack. The center column was in a desperate situation when the Germans came to its support.

Riedesel, on the other hand, risked annihilation of his force on the river as well as loss of the vital bateaux and

supply train he was protecting on that flank. But he accepted this risk and moved out with about five hundred infantry and two guns (his own regiment, the other two companies of the Rhetz, and six-pounders from the Hesse-Hanau Artillery Company). With the same vigor he had shown at Hubbardton in rescuing Fraser, the major general led the two Rhetz companies west along a road that he had previously reconnoitered. Reaching the top of a hill, he saw the desperate situation of the British and immediately committed the two companies without waiting for the rest of his men to catch up; as at Hubbardton, he ordered them to advance cheering and beating their drums.

The American right flank (the New Hampshire regiments and a detachment of Massachusetts Continentals) rested on the North Branch Ravine, which prevented their extending in Riedesel's direction. Instead, as fresh regiments came up from Bemis Heights, they reinforced the west end of the line. Furthermore, three hours of heavy combat left them tired and unable to devote any men to patrol beyond their flank. The sound of Riedesel's volley fire from this quarter took them by surprise. The Americans still outnumbered the enemy by about two to one and Hamilton's troops were almost fought out at this point, but Arnold was with Gates at Bemis Heights when the Germans arrived on the battlefield and was not in a position to exploit the situation; he had ridden back to get more troops. Gates did release Learned's Brigade, but it went to the west flank as well and engaged Fraser's wing, contributing nothing to the main fight at Freeman's Farm.

Burgoyne launched a counterattack when Riedesel's reinforcements were available. The Americans held their ground at first, but then started drawing back. Darkness was falling and they lacked unity of command.

Fraser had been off in the wilderness while Burgoyne and the center column fought for their lives. Late in the day his forward elements exchanged fire with those of Learned, but that was the extent of the action in this part of the battlefield.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Burgoyne lost about 160 men killed, 364 wounded and 42 missing. But they were not evenly distributed. The Germans only had eighteen men wounded, and Fraser's units also came out relatively unscathed. It appears that Hamilton's three regiments went into action with about 800 effectives and took 350 casualties (44 percent). The Sixty-second Foot alone went into action with 300; three officers and 50 men died and another eight officers and 101 enlisted men were wounded.

Americans suffered half as many casualties. Estimates vary—and because the troops engaged were from militia units or detachments, the number could be off—but casualties probably totaled 319: 8 officers and 57 men

killed, 21 officers and 197 men wounded, and 36 reported missing.

SIGNIFICANCE

Burgoyne could and did claim the victory, since he camped on the battlefield. But he had no chance of defeating Gates before the battle began, and the day's losses doomed his expedition.

Gates's performance in the battle was cautious. Unwilling to risk an unnecessary defeat, he failed to see that he had an opportunity to crush Burgoyne on the spot by defeating the columns in detail. Suspensions that the personality conflict between Gates and Arnold played a large part in Gates's reluctance to give Arnold free rein are probably overstated. They fell apart after the action, not before.

Many historians refer to this engagement as the First Battle of Freeman's Farm, a more precise designation. But as in the case of Bunker Hill, Saratoga is more popular.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Bennington Raid; Burgoyne's Offensive; Dearborn, Henry; Defeat in Detail; Fraser, Simon (1729–1777); Hubbardton, Vermont; Learned, Ebenezer; Morgan, Daniel; Phillips, William; Riedesel, Baron Friedrich Adolphus; Scammell, Alexander.*


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SARATOGA, SECOND BATTLE OF.

7 October 1777. Lieutenant General John Burgoyne held his first council of war in the evening of 4 October to discuss options with his key subordinates, a day after the British went on reduced rations after the damage they had suffered during the first battle of Saratoga (also called the battle of Freeman's Farm). At this point, it was clear that the American right was too strong to attack, and Burgoyne proposed moving with most of his troops to strike Gates's left. The other generals objected to the high risk of leaving only 800 men behind to guard the camp and escape route, pointing out that if the Americans struck them during the flanking maneuver, the whole force would be trapped. In a second meeting on the next night, Major General Friedrich Riedesel suggested falling back. Burgoyne rejected the idea of retreat but did agree to a compromise,



SECOND BATTLE OF SARATOGA. THE GALE GROUP

in which the British would conduct another reconnaissance in force on 7 October. For this second probe, Burgoyne planned to use 1,500 of his remaining regulars and all of the 600 auxiliaries remaining (50 Indians, 100 Canadians, and 450 Loyalists). The regulars would advance in three columns, while Captain Alexander Fraser with the auxiliaries and his marksmen swung west to screen the right column. If the effort discovered weakness, then a full attack would be made the next day. If it did not, then Burgoyne would begin withdrawing to the Batten Kill River on 11 October. To boost morale, rum was distributed to the troops on 6 October.

THE BATTLE: PHASE ONE

Between 11 P.M. and midnight, Captain Fraser's force set out to take up screening positions in the western hills. At about 1 A.M. the three columns started to advance southwest from their entrenchments, moving slowly to open roads for the artillery. After moving less than a mile, Burgoyne's main body formed a line 1,000 yards long

on a gentle rise north of Mill Creek. While staff officers standing on the roof of an abandoned cabin tried unsuccessfully to locate Patriot general Horatio Gates's position with spyglasses, the men started digging in and a party was called up from the rear to collect forage in the 300-yard wide wheat field in front of the line. Major Alexander (Lindsay), Earl of Balcarres held the right (west) side of the line with his light infantry and the Twenty-fourth Foot; Riedesel took the center with a composite group of 500 Germans and two Hesse-Hanau six-pound cannons; on the left were the British grenadiers under Major John Acland.

By European standards it was a good position, although 1,000 yards of front overextended the 1,500 troops. It also furnished excellent observation and fields of fire to the front for the two German guns, and for a Royal Artillery force equipped with two twelve-pounders, four more six-pounders, and two howitzers. The defect of the position lay in the fact that woods on both flanks could provide cover for approaching Americans.

When Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkinson returned from checking outpost reports that the enemy was forming along Mill Creek, Gates—who apparently had learned something from the previous battle (at Freeman’s Farm)—accepted Colonel Daniel Morgan’s suggestion that his riflemen move out against the British west flank. “Order on Morgan to begin the game,” is the theatrical quote attributed to Gates, by historian Richard Ketchum (*Saratoga*, p. 394). While Morgan worked around the high ground to turn Burgoyne’s west flank, Major General Benedict Arnold (suspended from command earlier) arrived and asked Gates for permission to move forward and check if the 300-man picket needed help. Gates reluctantly agreed, but sent Major General Benjamin Lincoln along as well. They came back in a half-hour and reported that the British were maneuvering in strength against the west flank. Arnold became agitated and was sent away, but Lincoln talked Gates into sending Brigadier General Enoch Poor, with three regiments from his brigade, to reinforce Morgan. This was a modest part of the 12,000-man army in the American camp (half of them Continentals), but it was a significant challenge for Burgoyne’s reconnaissance party.

The battle actually started when Poor’s Continental regiments under Colonels John Cilley (First New Hampshire), Nathan Hale (Second New Hampshire), and Alexander Scammell (Third New Hampshire) reached Burgoyne’s left (east) flank and formed up about 2:30 P.M. They coolly ignored twelve-pounder artillery fire and started forward against Acland’s grenadiers, who were posted on higher ground. Major Acland mistakenly ordered a bayonet charge that Poor shattered with accurate fire; the major himself went down with wounds in both legs and was captured. The disorderly retreat of his men threw the adjacent German troops into confusion as well. The New Hampshire veterans also overran the four British guns on this flank before the British could fire a shot. Meanwhile, American reinforcements started arriving to build up the firing line and extend it to the west.

The collapse of so many of the British and German infantrymen turned the cabin, which the British had hastily augmented with earthworks, into a semi-isolated strongpoint. The British twelve-pounders and the two Hesse-Hanau six-pounders carried the burden of holding this improvised fort, with the assistance of pockets of musketeers who were still putting up resistance. The gunners drove back two American charges, expending three wagon-loads of ammunition in the process, before the cannon became too hot to touch and mounting casualties made their position untenable. They had to abandon all the guns in order to get away.

Meanwhile Morgan had also been in action. After first routing Captain Fraser’s flank security in the woods, Morgan swung around and came in to hit Balcarres’ end

of the British line in the flank and rear. As the British light infantry were changing forward to meet his attack, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Dearborn’s own light infantry arrived routed them with devastating musket fire. Balcarres rallied his men a short distance to the rear, but was unable to hold his position. Burgoyne sent his aide, Captain Sir Francis Carr Clerke, forward to order the last of the reconnaissance force to withdraw, but Clerke was mortally wounded and captured before he could complete the mission. Brigadier General Ebenezer Learned’s brigade now came onto the field between Morgan and Poor, further tipping the scales in favor of the Americans. The opening round to the action ended as Arnold, who had no official standing whatsoever, appeared and led Learned’s men directly at Lieutenant Colonel Ernst von Speth’s German reinforcements. Speth stood his ground to cover the British withdrawal into the formidable earthworks known as the Balcarres and Breymann redoubts, and then fell back himself.

British General Simon Fraser had been conspicuous throughout the action. Now he committed his own regiment, the Twenty-fourth Foot, which was still relatively fresh, in attempt to cover the light infantry survivors. Either Arnold or Morgan recognized that Fraser’s inspired leadership was a decisive factor holding the British together. Orders were given to rifleman Timothy Murphy to take him out. Murphy climbed up a tree to get into a better firing position, and with his third shot hit Fraser in the stomach. As their general was carried off the field, the British delaying position collapsed. Further strengthening the Patriot forces were Brigadier General Abraham Ten Broeck’s 1,800 militiamen, who now arrived to augment Arnold’s force.

PHASE TWO

At this point in the action, the Americans had accomplished their original objective of driving back Burgoyne before he could gain any information about Gates’s main line of resistance on Bemis Heights, New York, and they had inflicted punishing casualties on the enemy, but Arnold was not satisfied. Drawing in elements from two Massachusetts Continental brigades—Brigadier General John Glover’s Second and Brigadier General John Paterson’s Third—he resumed the attack in an effort to make this battle the decisive one of the campaign. His assault on the Balcarres redoubt got through the abatis (defensive shields made of felled trees and brush) but was stopped by the light infantry and other survivors of the initial action who had taken refuge here and driven back.

Leaving men behind to keep this outpost neutralized, Arnold raced off to see what could be done elsewhere. Finding Learned’s Fourth Massachusetts Brigade arriving on the field, Arnold led it in an attack that cleared several stockaded cabins that covered the gap between the

Balcarres and the Breymann redoubts. Then he took men through the newly created hole and overran Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Breymann's position from the rear. Arnold himself went down with a wound—this was the third time in the war that his leg had been hit. Breymann was killed—tradition holds that one of his own men killed him for using his sword on the grenadiers to keep them from fleeing. Darkness and exhaustion brought the battle to an end.

NUMBERS, LOSSES, AND SIGNIFICANCE

Gates's losses were estimated at about 30 killed and 100 wounded. Burgoyne's troops suffered much worse. His losses numbered 184 killed, 264 wounded, and 183 captured. Thirty one of his officers were casualties, including Fraser, who died from his wounds. Riedesel's Germans had 94 killed, 67 wounded, and 102 prisoners of war. Loyalists, Indians, and Canadians appear to have suffered relatively few losses. While not all of these casualties were from the actual reconnaissance force, Burgoyne's "butcher's bill" represented a total equal to more than half of the number he had committed to action that morning.

It is hard to rate this engagement as decisive, since Burgoyne was already effectively doomed and Gates merely had to hold on and wait for starvation to eliminate the invaders. Nor did it make much sense from the British point of view, as Burgoyne had nothing to gain even if the reconnaissance had been unopposed. However, it did have enormous political consequences for the victors, for it helped enormously in gaining support both within the Americas and abroad. Arnold's role was controversial on that day, and has remained so ever since, thanks to the Gates–Schuyler Controversy: General Philip Schuyler supporters in the summer political dispute over who would command the Northern Department tend to exaggerate Arnold's impact (he was on Schuyler's side), while Gates's advocates went to the other extreme.

Personalities aside, the deeper impact of the campaign in general, and this battle in particular, came in the struggle that winter for the future course of the Revolution's military institutions. The more radical Whig politicians and many subsequent historians portrayed the militia as playing a critical role, and therefore thought that Washington's insistence on a large, well-trained regular army was excessive and potentially anti-democratic. A close examination of the day's events, however, shows very clearly that virtually the entire combat on the American side was carried out by the Continentals: Morgan's rifle corps, the New Hampshire Brigade, and the three Massachusetts Brigades, with their supporting artillery. The militia had been invaluable in isolating the battlefield but it was the regulars who had to carry the fight.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne's Offensive; Gates-Schuyler Controversy; Saratoga, First Battle of.*

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SARATOGA SURRENDER. 17 October 1777. On 13 October, John Burgoyne's officers unanimously agreed he should treat for surrender on honorable terms, and Burgoyne sent an officer to Horatio Gates proposing to begin negotiations. Gates consented, and the next day Major Robert Kingston, Burgoyne's adjutant general, was led blindfolded to the American headquarters. To the amazement of the British emissary (as well as Gates's aide, James Wilkinson), Gates immediately produced from his pocket a paper saying that only unconditional surrender would be considered. While this has sometimes been called a blunder, Gates was simply following classic European protocol. Burgoyne countered with an equally conventional response: in addition to demanding the honors of war, he now proposed that his command be paroled "upon condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest." This was a technical distinction, but one of great consequences that had been last used by a British commander at Kloster-Campen during the Seven Years' War. The men of the defeated force did not become prisoners of war, but rather would be allowed to depart the theater of war and fight elsewhere—or to release British troops in European garrisons, which would then come to America and fight. Uncertainty as to the status of Clinton's expedition and unwillingness to risk casualties in a frontal assault on the British defenses led Gates to agree to the outline of the terms on the 15th, provided that Burgoyne signed the capitulation by 2 P.M.

This last proviso was a blunder. Although Burgoyne had no hope of escape, he interpreted from the urgency of this time schedule that his adversary was worried about the British forces from the south. So Burgoyne agreed "in principle" but insisted on more time to work out details. Both commanders then appointed representatives with full powers to negotiate for them: Wilkinson and militia brigadier general William Whipple (a Signer of the Declaration of Independence) were the Americans;



Surrender of General Burgoyne at Saratoga (1820–1821). John Trumbull's painting of General John Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga in October 1777 dramatizes the moment when Horatio Gates rebuffs Burgoyne's offer to turn over his sword. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Sutherland and Captain James Craig were their counterparts. They met between the lines and drew up articles of capitulation that all four signed at 8 P.M. At 11 o'clock that night Wilkinson was given a letter from Craig saying Burgoyne would sign the agreement if it were termed a convention rather than a capitulation. Gates promptly sent his consent, incorrectly feeling that there was no material distinction between the words.

On this same evening (the 15th) Burgoyne learned from a Loyalist messenger that Clinton's forces had taken the Highlands, had reached Esopus, and had probably gotten to Albany. He called a council of war to consider this development. His officers voted 14 to 8 that he could not honorably withdraw from a treaty he had promised to sign and, by the same majority, that the favorable terms should not be thrown away on the strength of the Tory's dubious report. Burgoyne now seemingly attempted to out-blunder Gates. He announced that he was not bound by these votes and, to stall for time, on 16 October he informed Gates he had learned that the

latter had detached a considerable force, which meant that the Americans might no longer have the numerical superiority that had persuaded him to start negotiations. Burgoyne, therefore, wanted to verify the remaining American strength. Gates sent Wilkinson to ask Burgoyne if he intended to resume hostilities. Faced with the possibility of being crushed, Burgoyne finally agreed at 9 A.M. on the 17th.

Riding forward on 17 October in a splendid uniform, Burgoyne was introduced by Wilkinson to a small, plainly clad American general. "The fortune of war, General Gates, has made me your prisoner," the Englishman reportedly said. "I shall always be ready to testify that it has not been through any fault of your Excellency," Gates is supposed to have replied. Burgoyne handed Gates his sword and Gates returned it to Burgoyne. The senior officers of both sides then went to dinner while Burgoyne's men laid down their arms, as the terms specified, under their own officers' orders. Under the agreement, officers would retain their side arms and the Convention Army would be allowed to march to Boston under guard to await the arrival of

transports to take them to Europe. Meanwhile, as required by honors of war, American musicians played British or German marches to show respect for the defeated, and British and German musicians played American tunes.

A political firestorm erupted when Washington and Congress learned of the terms of the surrender. Washington correctly recognized that the British could simply rotate troops and make good the supposed losses. More to the point, the Virginian knew that the British had renounced the Kloster-Kampen agreement as soon as their men were out of French custody, and he feared similar duplicity.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne, John; Burgoyne's Offensive; Clinton's Expedition; Convention Army; Gates, Horatio; Honors of War; Parole; Whipple, William; Wilkinson, James.*

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SAUCISSON. A large fascine.

SEE ALSO *Fascine.*

SAVANNAH, GEORGIA *SEE Hutchinson's Island.*

SAVANNAH, GEORGIA. 29 December 1778. British capture. Determined to reclaim the southern colonies for the Crown, Lord George Germain (then Secretary of State for the American colonies) ordered Sir Henry Clinton to focus his energies on Georgia and the Carolinas. Clinton selected Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell to lead this operation. On 27 November 1778 Campbell left Sandy Hook with 3,500 troops escorted by a squadron under Commodore Hyde Parker. On 23 December the expedition anchored off Tybee Island at the mouth of the Savannah River. Meanwhile, Clinton had ordered General Augustine Prevost, commander of British forces in East Florida, to move north to cooperate with Campbell in the capture of Savannah and take overall command. Major General Robert Howe, whom the

government of Georgia blamed for the failed rebel invasion of Florida earlier that year, was waiting for his replacement, General Benjamin Lincoln, to arrive. Howe commanded the rebel's southern army, and was stationed at Charleston, South Carolina. Once Howe determined that Savannah was a likely target, he hurried south with the two inexperienced South Carolina regiments, led by Colonel Isaac Huger and Lieutenant Colonel William Thompson. Howe was joined by Colonel Samuel Elbert and his Georgia Continentals, bringing his total force to some 900 Continentals and 150 militia. Howe's forces established themselves at Sunbury, about twenty miles south of Savannah.

Lacking information on which to plan his actions, Campbell sent Grenadier Captain Sir James Baird ashore on the night of 25–26 December with a light infantry company. Baird picked up two men, one of them a slave who furnished what Campbell called “the most satisfactory intelligence concerning the state of matters at Savannah.” This information convinced the British commander that he and Parker could capture the town without waiting for Prevost. The closest high ground for a landing between Tybee and Savannah was at Girardeau's Plantation, about two miles below the town. Parker's ships reached the area about 4 o'clock on the afternoon of 28 December and drove off two rebel galleys, but could not put the troops ashore until the following morning. About daybreak of 29 December, Lieutenant Colonel John Maitland went ashore with the light infantry of the Seventy-first Regiment, and a few Loyalist New York Volunteers, totaling 120 men. From the levee on which they landed, a narrow causeway led 600 yards across flooded rice lands to Brewton's Hill where Captain John C. Smith was posted with fifty South Carolina Continentals, Howe calculating that this attack was a feint by the British. The Continentals held a strong position among a group of buildings. Their famed marksmen opened fire on the advancing British, who rushed forward with bayonets. The Continentals retreated in good order, having killed Captain Charles Cameron, who was leading the attack, and two of his men. The Highlanders secured the beachhead, allowing the rest of Campbell's force to land.

Leaving 200 Continentals at Sunbury, Howe moved his remaining forces into Savannah. The old fortifications of the town were untenable, having been allowed to fall into disrepair, so Howe established his main line of defense a mile southeast of the town, to cover the road that led from the enemy landing site. This road crossed a marshy stream by a causeway and was flanked on the river side by the rice swamps of Governor James Wright's Plantation and by wooded swamps on the other side. The American left, extending from the road to the rice swamps, was held by a mixed force of 200 Georgia militia and Continentals under Colonel Elbert. On the right were Huger's Fifth South Carolina Regiment and Thompson's

Third South Carolina Rangers, totaling nearly 470 men. Colonel George Walton (a signer of the Declaration of Independence) was posted toward the rear in some buildings (“the new barracks”) with 100 Georgia militia and a cannon. Another gun was on the left flank, and two more were in the center of the main line, on the road. Howe had additional militia covering his flanks. This line was 100 yards behind the stream mentioned earlier. The bridge at that point was destroyed, and halfway between this stream and the American line a trench was dug at what Campbell called “a critical spot between [the] two swamps.” Although outnumbered four to one, the Americans appeared to be in a good position that left the enemy no choice but to make a costly frontal assault.

About 3 P.M. on 29 December the British light infantry advance guard halted and formed on the river side of the road, 800 yards from the American line. The main body of the British force halted on open ground, 200 yards to the rear. “I could discover from the movements of the enemy that they wished and expected an attack upon their left,” says Campbell in his report, “and I was desirous of cherishing the opinion.” But Campbell was approached by an old slave named Quamino Dolly, who told him of an obscure path through the swamps and around the American right.

Campbell skillfully used both this intelligence and the ground, while taking advantage of Howe’s preconceptions, to achieve surprise. He sent Baird’s light infantry forward to convey the impression that he was preparing an attack on the American left. Then, using a “happy fall of ground,” he had Baird and 350 of his men follow Quamino Dolly to the rear of the rebel forces and circle around to execute the turning movement. Colonel George Turnbull’s New York Volunteers, 180 strong, fell in behind the light infantry to reinforce their maneuver.

Innocent of the real danger, Howe ineffectively cannonaded Campbell’s line. Baird reached the White Bluff road undetected and pressed on to wipe out Walton’s Georgia unit by an attack from their flank and rear, taking Walton prisoner. At the sound of this action, Campbell had his cannon run forward from concealed positions to open on the American line, and his infantry charged with fixed bayonets. Howe ordered a general retreat across the Musgrove Swamp causeway, west of the town, but his men had to fight their way through enemy forces that had gotten there first. The retreat became a rout. The American right and center got across with difficulty, few of them having fired a shot and many throwing their muskets aside as they rushed to get away. Elbert’s Georgians were cut off from the causeway and had to retreat through flooded Musgrove Swamp—many drowned and others were captured. Only thirty escaped. Colonel Huger managed a heroic rearguard action, aided by Colonel Owen Roberts, who managed to rescue three of the rebel’s artillery

pieces. Howe camped for the night at Cherokee Hill, eight miles away, as Campbell swept into Savannah. He then retreated to General Lincoln’s camp at Purysburg, on the South Carolina side of the Savannah River.

In this, the second battle of Savannah, Georgia, the Americans lost eighty-three killed or drowned and 453 (including thirty-eight officers) captured. The whole campaign cost the British three killed and seventeen wounded; none of the dead falling in the main attack. In Savannah the British took three ships, three brigs, eight smaller craft, forty-eight cannon, twenty-three mortars, and large quantities of supplies. They also captured 817 muskets, small arms the rebels could ill afford to lose. As for numbers involved, Campbell’s strength of 3,500 is accepted but is somewhat academic, since Baird’s light infantry and the Highlanders did almost all the fighting. Howe had 700 Continentals, counting the 200 in reserve, and 150 militia in the action. But in reality few of these forces did any fighting.

Although a court of inquiry cleared Howe of blame for the defeat, his career as a field commander was over. Strategically, he was blamed for attempting a stand with untrained troops against superior numbers when he could have retreated to join Lincoln, after which a strengthened American army could have returned to take Savannah. Tactically, he was criticized for not challenging Campbell’s landing, not launching a counterattack immediately after the landing, and failing to guard the route by which he was turned. Campbell, on the other hand, deserves the highest praise for his strategy and tactics; as a result of his success Savannah and most of Georgia remained under British control until almost the end of the Revolution. Nonetheless, the British high command refused to promote Campbell for several years.


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revised by Michael Bellesiles

SAVANNAH, GEORGIA. 9 October 1779. Franco-American fiasco. After the British capture of Savannah, Georgia, on 29 December, 1778, and subsequent actions that occurred in the southern theater, both sides suspended operations during the intensely hot and unhealthy summer months. Charleston, South Carolina, was still in American hands, but the British held Savannah



THE GALE GROUP

and several outposts. Sir James Wright returned from England on 20 July to resume his post as royal governor in Savannah, where General Augustine Prevost, military commander in the south, also had his headquarters. The town was garrisoned by about 2,400 troops, a large percentage of whom were Loyalists.

WAITING FOR D'ESTAING

Admiral-General Count Charles-Hector Théodat d'Estaing had sailed to the West Indies after the disappointing allied effort against Newport in August 1778. He had discretionary orders to aid the rebels if circumstances permitted, and had promised to return in May 1779. British and American commanders in North America were therefore anxiously anticipating his reappearance,

although they had no idea where he might appear. From Charleston, General Benjamin Lincoln and the French council appealed for d'Estaing's assistance, and although Commander in Chief George Washington had plans for combined operations in the north, the independent Frenchman decided to strike the British in the south.

Sending five ships ahead to notify Charleston of his coming, d'Estaing followed with thirty-three warships (totaling more than 2,000 guns) and transports bearing over 4,000 troops. His appearance off the Georgia coast on 4 September was so unexpected that he easily captured the fifty-gun *Experiment*, the frigate *Ariel*, and two store ships. He also captured Brigadier General George Garth, on his way to succeed Prevost as military commander, and £30,000 for the Savannah garrison's payroll. When news of

d'Estaing's return reached New York City on 8 October, there was much consternation as to where the French would strike. General Charles Cornwallis was just about to leave with 4,000 men for the defense of Jamaica. His departure was stopped, and Sir Henry Clinton evacuated the British garrison from Rhode Island to New York. While Clinton waited and worried about Georgia, Washington was hoping for reports of French sails off Sandy Hook.

When the French fleet disappeared the evening of 4 September, Prevost hoped he was safe from attack. He sent his chief engineer, Captain James Moncrieff, with 100 infantry to reinforce the outpost on Tybee Island, in the mouth of the Savannah River. But the French reappeared on the 6th, and three days later started landing troops on the south side of the island. Moncrieff spiked his guns and withdrew. British ships moved into the river, and six of them were sunk to bar the channel. Lieutenant Colonel John Cruger was ordered to bring his battalion back to Savannah from Fort Sunbury, and Lieutenant Colonel John Maitland was ordered to bring his 800 men back from Beaufort on Port Royal Island.

While his fleet blockaded the coast, d'Estaing started landing troops on 12 September at Beaulieu, a point some fourteen miles south of Savannah. When he had gotten ashore with 1,500 men, bad weather set in and he was left in this vulnerable situation for several days, until the rest of his landing force and the supplies could join him. The next morning, advance American units under General Lachlan McIntosh and General Casimir Pulaski met with d'Estaing and advised him that the main body of Continental forces were still on their way from Charleston.

THE RUN-UP TO BATTLE

General Lincoln and his army had still not arrived by the morning of 16 September. General McIntosh advised d'Estaing attack Savannah immediately, as the British were still preparing their defenses. However, the French artillery had not yet landed, so d'Estaing instead called on Prevost to surrender. Playing for time, Prevost requested and was granted twenty-four hours to consider. During this truce Maitland reached Savannah with his troops from Beaufort, after a remarkable movement through swamps and streams to elude the French blockade and the American forces on the mainland. Since Cruger had already arrived from Sunbury, Prevost now had 3,200 regulars, plus a considerable number of Loyalists and slaves who would be useful in the defense. Prevost sent word he would fight.

Lincoln joined d'Estaing the evening of 16 September, swelling the American ranks to 1,500 (600 Continentals, Pulaski's 200 cavalry, and 750 militia). Unfortunately for the allies, there was a notable coolness between d'Estaing and Lincoln which undermined coordination. Lincoln was furious that d'Estaing had granted Prevost a 24-hour truce,

giving the British time to finish their defensive perimeter. The French commander in turn treated Lincoln with cold contempt, failing to keep him informed of French intentions. Continental officers found the French arrogant, while their French counterparts were particularly unimpressed with the militia, who were untrained, poorly armed, and had a habit of fleeing in the face of the enemy.

Although many Continental officers hoped for an immediate assault on Savannah, d'Estaing decided—apparently with Lincoln's agreement—to undertake a siege. Since guns and supplies had to be hauled fourteen miles from the landing site, and heavy rains delayed operations, regular approaches were not started until the night of 23–24 September, and the bombardment did not begin until the night of 3–4 October. Meanwhile, d'Estaing was under pressure from his naval captains to abandon the expedition. The fleet was in need of repairs, the hurricane season was approaching, they were vulnerable to attack by the British fleet, and their men were dying of scurvy at the rate of thirty-five men each day. D'Estaing had agreed to stay ashore only ten or fifteen days, which his engineers said would be enough time to capture the city. But when ten days had elapsed and his engineers estimated they would need ten more, he refused to delay further. After a council of war on 8 October, d'Estaing ordered an attack to be made the next day at dawn.

BRITISH DISPOSITIONS

With the excellent engineering services of James Moncrieff, Prevost had constructed a line of field fortifications in a rough half-circle to cover the land approaches to Savannah. The five-day bombardment had damaged many of the 430 houses in the town and had inflicted casualties among noncombatants, but the earthworks were virtually unscathed. Prevost realized that the right half of his line was the most vulnerable, and organized his defenses accordingly. The wooded marshes to the west, known as Yamacraw Swamp, would give an enemy concealment to within fifty yards of his fortifications in this area, and to cover this threat Moncrieff constructed the Sailors' Battery (see sketch), which was manned by sailors with nine-pound cannon. Additionally, the armed brig *Germain* was stationed in the river to deliver enfilade fire along this northwest flank.

The broad finger of flat ground leading toward Spring Hill from the southwest was recognized as excellent terrain for the type of open-field operations preferred by European commanders. A strong redoubt was therefore built on Spring Hill and manned initially by dismounted dragoons and supported by a regiment of South Carolina Loyalists. Along the quarter-mile that separated Spring Hill from the Sailors' Battery were two more redoubts and a second battery. Smaller fortifications and outposts covered the

gaps, and a strong line of earthworks protected the right flank of the Spring Hill (or Ebenezer Road) redoubt.

Continuing counterclockwise around Prevost's perimeter, a fourth redoubt, commanded by Cruger, covered the road leading to Savannah from the south; a fifth redoubt, commanded by Major James Wright, the governor's son, was situated on the northeast end of the line. Lesser defensive works were located along the entire line, most of which was fronted by a ditch and abatis. The regular regiments and the better Loyalist units were deployed to the rear.

THE ATTACK

The allies planned their main attack just where Prevost says he expected it—against Spring Hill. A secondary attack by General Arthur Dillon's Irish Regiment (serving in the French army) was to move secretly from the northwest and follow a defiladed route that would enable it to turn the enemy's right near the Sailors' Battery. General Isaac Huger prepared to lead 500 militia from the south toward Cruger's redoubt. His mission was to make a feint

that would draw the enemy's attention away from the main effort, and to break through the defenses if this appeared to be possible.

All the flanking operations failed. Dillon's column lost its way in the swamp, emerged in plain view of the enemy's lines, fought fiercely, and was driven back by fire. Huger's command was also forced to withdraw without getting close enough to threaten the British left flank.

The attack on Spring Hill was supposed to be made by three French and two American columns. To get into position, the French had to march about half a mile west to the American camp and then move north to the line of departure. Here they would deploy along the edge of a woods in a "line of columns" and be prepared on signal to attack in a northeastly direction, across about 500 yards of open ground toward Spring Hill. Two American columns were to form on their left and attack Spring Hill from the west. These preliminary movements were supposed to take place so that a coordinated attack could be made at dawn, which was about 5 A.M.

The French were late getting started, and when the first French column reached its position on the right flank of the line of departure at around dawn, d'Estaing led it forward without waiting for the others to file off to the left. This column was assailed by grapeshot as they moved across the open space and by musket fire when they reached the abatis, with d'Estaing himself being twice wounded. The French columns quickly broke apart, with most of the troops making for the safety of the woods to their left.

In the American zone, Pulaski's 200 horsemen were supposed to lead the approach, pull off to the left, wait for the abatis to be breached, and charge through the gap. Colonel John Laurens would lead the Second South Carolina Continentals and the First Battalion of Charleston militia against the Spring Hill redoubt while General McIntosh brought up the rear with the First and Fifth South Carolina Continentals and some Georgia regulars. Colonel Francis Marion's Second South Carolina Continentals spearheaded the attack through heavy frontal and enfilade fire from an enemy that was now thoroughly alerted. They crossed the open area, swarmed over the ditch, hacked their way through the abatis, and planted their Crescent Flag and the French flag on the parapet of the Spring Hill redoubt. This marked the high tide of their attack, however, and the South Carolina troops were unable to press on any further. Both the French and Continental color guards were killed. A Lieutenant Gray replaced the flags and was killed in turn. Sergeant William Jasper, of Fort Sullivan fame, was mortally wounded while putting the flags up for a third time.

As Laurens's men began their retreat, the British counterattacked with the grenadiers of the Sixtieth Regiment and a small company of marines. Major Beamsley Glazier led this sortie and in fierce, hand-to-hand fighting drove back the French and Americans who had clung to their forward positions.

While this fight was going on, Pulaski was trying to force his way between Spring Hill and the works to its west. Cavalry is unsuited for an attack against organized defenses, and the infantry had not carried out the plan of breaching the abatis for him. The gallant Polish volunteer nevertheless led his troopers forward. They were caught in the abatis and badly shot up by well-organized enemy fire that covered this obstacle. When Pulaski was carried, mortally wounded, from the field, Colonel Daniel Horry took command and tried to continue the attack, but the cavalry fell back before this strong British position.

McIntosh arrived to meet a scene of bloody confusion. The retreating cavalry had swept away part of Laurens's command as they moved into Yamacraw Swamp, and Laurens had lost effective control of his scattered and disorganized units. The wounded d'Estaing was trying to rally the French troops, and when McIntosh asked him for

instructions he was told to circle left so as not to interfere with the French reorganization. The fresh American column was consequently diverted into Yamacraw Swamp, where its left flank came under fire from the *Germain*, and was still floundering there when the sounds of battle died down. Major Thomas Pinckney went forward on reconnaissance and returned to report that not an allied soldier was left standing in front of Spring Hill. McIntosh therefore ordered his column to withdraw, and the battle ended.

NUMBERS, LOSSES, AND AFTERMATH

A combined force of 3,100 Americans and 4,500 French faced 4,813 British, German, and Loyalist troops in the Savannah operations. Of these, about 3,500 French and 1,500 American troops took part in the battle of 9 October. The rebels lost fifty-eight killed and 181 wounded, the French suffered fifty-nine killed and 526 wounded, for a total of 824 casualties. In contrast the British lost sixteen killed and thirty-nine wounded. This accounts for the majority of losses during the whole campaign, which lasted from 15 September through 9 October. The allies suffered an estimated 940 total casualties, and the British forces had 296 killed and wounded. The Continentals could bring just ten cannon to bear, while the French had forty-nine and the British some eighty-five pieces of artillery.

Although Lincoln urged d'Estaing to continue the siege, the French commander determined that this operation was hopeless. On 20 October the French returned to their ships and Lincoln was then obliged to retreat to Charleston. The Americans were bitter about the impotency of the French alliance and almost uniformly blamed d'Estaing for the failure of the Savannah campaign; but they had all underestimated the British strength and the effectiveness of Moncrief's defenses. Discouragement naturally was strongest in the south, and the militia which had been gathering at Charleston started melting home.

General Sir Henry Clinton was greatly encouraged by the failure of the allied attack on Savannah. With d'Estaing's failure, he was now free to undertake his long-considered return to Charleston.

SEE ALSO *Clinton, Henry; Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'; French Alliance; Southern Theater, Military Operations in.*

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SAVANNAH, GEORGIA (BRITISH OCCUPATION).

29 December 1778–11 July 1782. The town of Savannah, Georgia, was occupied by the British for three and one-half years. Except for the joint French-American effort to recapture the city in 1779, the British rule was largely peaceful.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

SCAMMELL, ALEXANDER.

(1747–1781). Continental officer. Massachusetts. Having come from Portsmouth, England, his parents settled in Mendon (later Milford), Massachusetts, about 1737. Alexander's father was a prominent and well-to-do doctor who died when the boy was six years old. Graduating from Harvard in

1769, Alexander taught school, worked as a surveyor, and then studied law in the office of John Sullivan in Durham, New Hampshire. In December 1774 he joined with Sullivan in the raid on Fort William and Mary to obtain powder for the local militia. He was appointed a major in the New Hampshire militia in April 1775 and brigadier major of Sullivan's brigade on 21 September 1775, serving at Bunker Hill, in the Boston Siege, and in Canada. He returned to New York City with Sullivan, was appointed his aide-de-camp on 14 August 1776, and as acting aide-de-camp to Washington made a mistake that might have lost the War of Independence for the Americans. At 2 A.M. on the morning of 30 August Scammell relayed to General Thomas Mifflin what he understood to be Washington's order to immediately move to the boats waiting to ferry Mifflin's force from Brooklyn Heights on Long Island to New York City on Manhattan. This caused Mifflin's force to be ahead of its scheduled evacuation, upsetting

Washington, but, more importantly, also leaving dangerously exposed the outposts that Mifflin's men had been guarding. This did not slow his military advancement; on 29 October he was made a brigadier major in Charles Lee's division, and on 8 November 1776 he took over as colonel of the Third New Hampshire Regiment and was with Washington at the Delaware crossings in December 1776 and January 1777. Returning to the Northern Department following the battles at Trenton and Princeton, he was present when St. Clair evacuated Ticonderoga on 5 July 1777 and led his regiment in the two Battles of Saratoga; in one of the latter actions he was slightly wounded.

On 5 January 1778 he succeeded Timothy Pickering as Washington's adjutant general, in which capacity it was his duty to arrest Charles Lee and, curiously, to execute his British counterpart, John André. It was during this period that Scammell worked with Steuben to standardize the army's paperwork and general administration. On 16 November 1780 Scammell submitted his resignation as adjutant general to take command of the First New Hampshire, but it was not until 1 January 1781 that he actually left Washington's staff. He commanded 400 light infantry in the preliminary operations against Manhattan in July 1781. At the siege of Yorktown, Scammell was inspecting his line when he was surprised by a detail of the enemy. Despite his surrender, he suffered a gunshot wound. Released and taken to Williamsburg in hopes of recovery, he died there on 6 October 1781. There can be no doubt as to his popularity; many late-eighteenth-century diarists and letter writers commented on the sad event. New Hampshire named a significant bridge near Portsmouth in his honor.

SEE ALSO *Long Island, New York, Evacuation of.*

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revised by Frank C. Mevers

SCHAFFNER, GEORGE. Continental officer. Pennsylvania. Little is known of Schaffner's early life. He enrolled as a private in Abraham de Huff's company of Atlee's Pennsylvania musket battalion of militia in March

1776. Promoted to sergeant, he went with his unit to Philadelphia and reached Amboy on 21 July and New York City on 11 August. Eight days later he was promoted to ensign, and on 25 August he fought in General Alexander's right wing at Long Island. Remnants of his unit were incorporated into Samuel Miles's regiment for the march to Fort Lee and then to the Delaware. As part of Hand's brigade, Schaffner fought at Trenton and Princeton. On 4 February 1777 he became a second lieutenant in John Paul Schott's company of Ottendorf's battalion, which was soon incorporated into the First Battalion, Continental Partisan Legion, commanded by Colonel Armand-Tuffin. Schaffner fought at Short Hills, Brandywine, and Germantown. On 8 February 1778 he was promoted to captain, and to major on 1 December. He was honorably discharged on 25 November 1783.

Having become an intimate friend of the remarkable Armand-Tuffin, he accompanied the latter to France. He supported Tuffin in the Brittany uprising and was arrested on 24 August 1792 but released a few days later. From December 1792 to January 1793 he visited London as Tuffin's liaison officer to the émigrés. Learning that friends of his were being executed, Schaffner returned to France, joined the Vendée counterrevolutionaries, and disappeared. According to Lenôtre, he was captured in an action on the Loire and died in the *noyades* (judicial drownings).

SEE ALSO *Tuffin, Marquis de La Rouerie Armand-Charles.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

SHELL'S BUSH, NEW YORK. 6 August 1781. Donald McDonald, with sixty Indians and Loyalists, surprised this small community while its inhabitants were working in the fields. Most settlers ran for Fort Dayton, five miles to the south, but John Christian Schell, a wealthy German, made a stand in his fortified home. Two sons who had been with him in the fields were captured, but Schell, his wife, and six other sons made it to the blockhouse and held off the raiders, who were unable to set the place on fire. McDonald was wounded and dragged inside after trying to force the door with a crowbar; he died the next day. The frustrated enemy finally withdrew. Patriots claimed that eleven assailants were killed and six wounded, and the captured boys said another nine died of wounds before reaching Canada. The defenders suffered no casualties. John Schell was mortally wounded and one of his sons killed a short time later while in their fields.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York.*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

SCHOENBRUNN, OHIO TERRITORYSEE *Gnadenhutten Massacre, Ohio.***SCHOHARIE VALLEY, NEW YORK.**

15–19 October 1780. Sir John Johnson led a force of between eight hundred and fifteen hundred Loyalists, British regulars, and Indians into the Schoharie Valley from the southwest on 15 October. That night he bypassed the Upper Fort and, burning farms as he went, approached the Middle Fort early on 16 October. Major Melancthon Woolsey, commanding Middle Fort, sent out a 40-man reconnaissance force which withdrew before Johnson's forces. The garrison of 150 "three-months men" and 50 militia found themselves besieged by a vastly superior enemy possessing artillery in the shape of a grasshopper (a three-pound brass cannon).

Major Woolsey was ready to discuss surrender. But when a flag of truce started forward, Timothy Murphy fired on it. Woolsey and his officers were outraged at this breach of etiquette and discipline but failed to prevent Murphy from repeating the performance twice more. When Woolsey ordered a white flag raised, Murphy threatened to kill the man who moved to comply. While the militia in the fort argued among themselves, Johnson's raiders pillaged and burned everything in the area. They finally abandoned the siege and continued down the Schoharie, burning nearly every building in the valley before crossing the Mohawk. Schoharie Valley had been an important source of provisions for the Continental army; Washington wrote that it had furnished eighty thousand bushels of grain for public use. A strong west wind fanned the fires started by the raiders, and by the time Johnson's column cleared the Lower Fort, at 4 P.M. on the 17th, the prosperous valley was in flames. Informed that "the enemy have burnt the whole of Schohary," General Robert Van Rensselaer gathered a force to meet Johnson, but Van Rensselaer arrived well after the British and Loyalists had left the area. Loyalist houses left by the invaders were destroyed by the Patriots.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Johnson, Sir John; Klock's Field, New York; Murphy, Timothy.*

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SCHUYLER, HON YOST. A mentally disturbed nephew of General Herkimer whom Benedict

Arnold used to panic the Indians around Fort Stanwix by spreading rumors of a vast American army approaching their positions. As his Indian allies fled, St. Leger's Expedition collapsed.

SEE ALSO *St. Leger's Expedition.*


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SCHUYLER, PHILIP JOHN. (1733–1804). Continental general. New York. Scion of one of New York's most ancient, honorable, and well-heeled Dutch families, Philip Schuyler was connected by marriage to just about all the others. Born in Albany, New York, 10 November 1733, Schuyler was commissioned as a captain at the beginning of the Seven Year's War, fought at Lake George on 8 September 1755, and almost immediately thereafter showed the military inclinations that were to characterize his Revolutionary War career—he became a logistician.

Even before 1755 Schuyler had had his first attack of rheumatic gout, a hereditary disease that troubled him throughout his life and that may well have inclined him toward army administration rather than field commands. After the action at Lake George, he was detailed to escort the French prisoners of war to Albany. Having handed over the prisoners, he married Catherine Van Rensselaer on 17 September, and then rejoined his unit. He established a military depot at Fort Edward, and the next spring served under Colonel John Bradstreet in carrying provisions to Oswego. Resigning his commission in 1757, he kept up his commissary interests and derived a substantial income from provisioning the army. In 1758 he returned to military service as deputy commissary with the rank of major, taking part in the unsuccessful attack on Fort Ticonderoga and the capture of Fort Frontenac. During 1759–1760 he operated from Albany, provisioning General Jeffery Amherst's forces. Schuyler had become a close friend of Bradstreet, with whom he sailed to England in February 1761 to settle his accounts with the War Office. At the end of the last colonial war, he was therefore a man with rich experience in provisioning field forces.

Coincident with the Peace of Paris in 1763, Schuyler settled his father's estate, inheriting thousands of acres in the Mohawk and Hudson valleys. In addition he received from his uncle, Philip, the old Schuyler homestead near West Troy and, his favorite heritage, lands in the Saratoga patent (a territory measuring about six square miles along the Hudson River). He became an efficient manager of these lands and a happy family man.

Elected to the state assembly in 1768, Schuyler proved to be an ardent Patriot but an opponent of the radical Sons



Philip Schuyler. *The American statesman and Continental Army officer who helped delay the British advance in New York in 1777, in a portrait (1792) by John Trumbull.* © NEW-YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY, NEW YORK/BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY

of Liberty and other advocates of mob action. Because he was a commissioner in the boundary dispute with Massachusetts and New Hampshire over the region that later became Vermont (which always found in favor of the large New York landowners), many of his fellow New Englanders came to distrust Schuyler as a self-interested elitist. When the Continental Congress started naming generals, one of the top ones had to be from New York, and on 15 June 1775 Schuyler became a major general and commander of the Northern Department. Of Commander in Chief George Washington's generals, only Artemas Ward and Charles Lee ranked above Schuyler.

In preparing for the invasion of Canada, this austere Dutch patrician showed his good and bad qualities as a senior commander. Knowing the importance of logistics, he was slow getting started, and he had only the half-hearted support of the New Englanders at the outset. He further alienated these republicans by his personal manner and by his insistence on discipline. When he finally took the field to lead his troops down Lake Champlain into Canada, he almost immediately was prostrated by rheumatic gout. General Richard Montgomery took command of the field army, and Schuyler directed the forwarding of supplies from Albany. He also negotiated the neutrality of


the Indians who comprised the Six Nations, an important requisite to the invasion of Canada.

The events leading to Schuyler's downfall at the hands of Congress started on 9 January 1777, when the delegates voted to dismiss Dr. Samuel Stringer, who served as the director of hospitals in the Northern Department. Schuyler vehemently protested this interference in his command. Congress reprimanded Schuyler in an insulting fashion and ordered Horatio Gates north to take over as commander of the American forces then (March 1777) at Ticonderoga. Schuyler visited Washington's headquarters early in April to protest this action, and then went to Philadelphia, where he won the first round of this dispute with Congress. As a result, that body clarified Gates's status as subordinate to Schuyler. Given the alternative of accepting this position or resuming his post of adjutant general, Gates left the Northern Department and rushed to Congress to lodge his own complaint.

Schuyler returned to find his army weak and demoralized. Except for his indecisiveness in connection with the defense of Ticonderoga, Schuyler's generalship in the initial stages of General John Burgoyne's offensive was sound. After abandoning Ticonderoga to the British, Schuyler sent Benedict Arnold to lift the siege of Fort Stanwix, acted with intelligence to slow down Burgoyne's advance, and frantically attempted to raise troops to confront the British. But the loss of Ticonderoga was enough to rally his enemies in Congress. On 4 August 1777 the delegates ordered Gates to relieve Schuyler. It was more than a year before Schuyler had the satisfaction of being acquitted by a court-martial (in October 1778) of charges of incompetence. On 19 April 1779 he resigned his commission.

Although he left the army under humiliating circumstances, Schuyler continued to serve the American cause. He remained on the Board of Commissioners for Indian Affairs and performed valuable service in reducing the ravages of the border warfare along the Iroquois frontier. In 1779 he advised Washington on the campaign by Generals John Sullivan and George Clinton against the Iroquois. The British thought highly enough of his work at negotiating their Indian alliances that they made three attempts at kidnapping Schuyler.

Having already served in the Second Continental Congress (1775) and again in 1777, Schuyler returned as a delegate from New York in 1779–1780. Near the end of this service, he prepared a report on depreciated currency and the issue of new bills of credit that was adopted with only slight modifications. From 13 April until 11 August 1780 he was chairman of a committee at Washington's headquarters, assisting the latter in reorganizing the army's staff departments and working out a scheme for effective cooperation with the French expeditionary forces. From 1780 until 1798 he held public office continuously at the state and federal level, highlighted by two short terms in the first U.S. Senate (1789–1791, 1797–1798). As an



Schuyler Family of New York. THE GALE GROUP

adherent of a strong central government, Schuyler supported the federal Constitution as well as New York's abandonment of its claims to Vermont. During his many terms in the state senate, he firmly advocated internal improvements that would enhance New York's commercial development, serving as the president of the state's canal company from 1792 until his death on 18 November 1804.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne's Offensive; Canada Invasion; Gates, Horatio.*

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SCHUYLER FAMILY OF NEW YORK. Philip Pieterse Schuyler (pronounced "sky-ler") emigrated from Amsterdam and first appears in the

records of Albany on the occasion of his marriage, in 1650, to the daughter of the resident director of Rensselaerswyck. He was a merchant and held offices under both the Dutch and English governments of the colony. His second son, Peter, married Engeltie Van Schaick, and their daughter Margarita married the nephew of the first Robert Livingston. Her sons were the soldiers in the Canada branch of the Livingston family, and her granddaughter tightened the Schuyler-Livingston bonds by marrying the first Robert R. Livingston. Peter's second wife Maria was the daughter of Jeremias Van Rensselaer, a son of the first patroon of Rensselaerswyck. In 1720 Peter and Maria's son Philip married his cousin Margarita, a remarkable woman who helped rear her nephew Philip John Schuyler, the Revolutionary War general.

SEE ALSO *Livingston Family of New York; Schuyler, Philip John; Van Rensselaer Family of New York.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

"SCOTCH WILLIE" SEE *Maxwell, William.*

SCOTT, CHARLES. (1739-1813). Continental general. Virginia. Born near Richmond, Virginia, in 1739, Scott served as a noncommissioned officer under Washington in Braddock's expedition. At the start of the

Revolution, he raised the first volunteer troops south of the James River in Virginia and commanded a company at Williamsburg in July 1775. On 13 February 1776 he was commissioned lieutenant colonel of the Second Virginia Regiment, on 7 May he became colonel of the Fifth Virginia, and on 12 August 1776 he took command of the Third Virginia. He led this regiment well at Trenton and as part of the covering force that so effectively delayed the British advance before Washington scored his victory at Princeton on 3 January 1777. Promoted to brigadier general on 2 April at Washington's urging, he and the brigade of William Woodford constituted General Adam Stephen's division. He was heavily engaged at Brandywine, facing the British turning column before Washington reinforced that flank. As part of Greene's column he saw action at Germantown, where his performance was severely criticized in a letter from Stephen to Washington on 7 October 1777. After spending the winter at Valley Forge he had a prominent role in the Monmouth campaign, first as commander of a large detachment and finally as part of Charles Lee's command in the battle of 28 June. He is responsible for the dubious but beloved story of Washington's cursing out Lee, and he testified effectively against the latter at the Lee court-martial.

Scott spent 1779 recruiting troops in Virginia. Ordered south to reinforce Lincoln, he was captured at Charleston on 12 May 1780, paroled, and exchanged for Lieutenant Colonel Lord Francis Rawdon in February 1782. He was brevetted major general on 30 September 1783.

In 1785 he moved to Kentucky. He was a representative in the Virginia assembly from Woodford County in 1789 and 1790. In April 1790 he took part in Harmar's unsuccessful expedition. The next year he was brigadier general of Kentucky levies and, with Colonel James Wilkinson as second-in-command, led them against the Indians on the Wabash River (23 May–4 June). In October 1793 he joined Anthony Wayne for an expedition against the Indians, but it was abandoned. On 20 August 1794 he led about fifteen hundred mounted volunteers in Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers, though his own troops failed to arrive in time for the battle. Scott served as governor of Kentucky in 1808–1812, vigorously preparing Kentucky for war with Britain and promoting the career of William Henry Harrison. He died at his plantation in Clark County, Kentucky, on 22 October 1813.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of; Monmouth, New Jersey; Princeton, New Jersey.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

SCOTTISH LEGION SEE *British Legion.*

SEARS, ISAAC. (1730?–1786). Privateer, New York City radical leader. Both Sears's date and place of birth remain contested. He became a seaman and during the French and Indian War established a reputation as a privateer that made him a recognized leader of the sailors and shopkeepers of the New York City waterfront. As a Son of Liberty, "King" Sears was a leader of nearly every crowd action in New York City for ten years. He was wounded on 11 August 1766 in events related to the suspension of the New York assembly. In 1774 he led the Sons of Liberty in turning back the first tea ship and dumping the cargo of the second into the water. Having worked with John Lamb and Joseph Allicocke in 1765 to propose that the Sons of Liberty be organized into a continental military union, he worked with Alexander McDougall in 1774 in proposing to the Boston Committee of Correspondence that a meeting be held of delegates from the principal towns. This led indirectly to the first Continental Congress and showed the considerable scope of Sears as a revolutionary leader.

Arrested on 15 April 1775 for calling on the public to procure arms, he was rescued at the prison door by his supporters. When news of Lexington and Concord reached the city on 23 April, he and John Lamb led 360 men in scattering Loyalist leaders and officials, seizing arms from the arsenal, taking over the customs house, and preventing vessels from leaving. Sears also initiated the regular military training of his followers. The commander of the British ship *Asia* threatened to shell his house, persuading Sears to retreat to New England. In November 1775 he returned to lead crowds that burned a naval supply ship, captured prominent Loyalists, and wrecked James Rivington's press. He was commissioned by Charles Lee in January 1776 to administer the oath of allegiance to Loyalists on Long Island, raise volunteers in Connecticut, and capture British supplies for the army. With New York City under British control, Sears removed to Boston and returned to privateering from 1777 to 1783, at which he was very successful. Returning to New York City when the British left at the end of 1783, Sears led the effort to punish former Loyalists. Sears died on 28 October 1786 of fever aboard the *Empress of China* during its historic first journey to Canton, China.

SEE ALSO *New York Assembly Suspended.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

SECONDARY ATTACK. A commander normally groups his forces so as to provide for a main attack, secondary attack, and reserve. The secondary attack is allocated minimum essential combat power and has the missions of deceiving the enemy as to the location of the main attack, of forcing him to commit his reserve prematurely and at the wrong place, and of fixing enemy troops in position so they cannot be shifted to oppose the main attack. By the use of his reserve or by other means, the commander may convert his secondary attack into a main attack.

Mark M. Boatner

SECRET COMMITTEE OF CON-

GRESS. Congress created this standing committee (sometimes confused with the Committee of Secret Correspondence) on 18 September 1775 with responsibility for organizing the procurement of war supplies. Given wide powers, large sums of money, and authorization to keep its proceedings secret—it destroyed many of its records—the Secret Committee was effective largely because of its first chairman, Thomas Willing, who was succeeded in December 1775 by his business partner, Robert Morris. (On 30 January 1776, the latter was appointed also to the other secret committee.) Other original members were Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, Robert R. Livingston, John Alsop, John Dickinson, Thomas McKean, John Langdon, and Samuel Ward. The members of this committee tended to be men experienced in foreign trade, leading to some serious conflicts of interest. The biggest contracts went to the firm of Willing and Morris; to relatives and friends of Deane; and to firms connected with Alsop, Livingston, and Francis Lewis (who subsequently joined the committee). Criticism of the committee's activities increased as the war progressed, with the Adamses and Lees unsuccessfully demanding an investigation into war profiteering.

Authority of the Secret Committee soon was extended to include supplies other than guns and ammunition. In January 1776 it was asked to import medicines, surgical instruments, blankets, cotton goods, and various metals. Soon it controlled virtually all foreign trade. One of the most questionable operations of the committee started in January 1776, when Congress voted it forty thousand pounds for the importation of Indian gifts; contracting merchants were allowed a commission of 5 percent, and the government insured their vessels against British seizures. Three of the four contracting merchants were members of the Secret Committee: Morris, Alsop, and Lewis. The other was Philip Livingston, a cousin of

another member of the committee. In April the Secret Committee was empowered to arm and man vessels in foreign countries for the work of Congress, thereby becoming involved in privateering.

The body launched itself boldly into the field of foreign affairs when, in conjunction with the Committee of Secret Correspondence, it sent Silas Deane to France. Affairs of the two secret committees became hopelessly scrambled early in 1777 when Franklin, Deane, and Arthur Lee began their duties as peace commissioners. The name of the Secret Committee was therefore changed in July 1777 to the Committee of Commerce, which later evolved into the Department of Commerce, and the Committee of Secret Correspondence became the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 17 April 1777.

SEE ALSO *Alsop, John; Committee of Secret Correspondence; Deane, Silas; Dickinson, John; Franklin, Benjamin; Hortalez & Cie; Langdon, John; Lewis, Francis; Livingston, Philip; Livingston, Robert R.; McKean, Thomas; Morris, Robert (1734–1806); Privateers and Privateering; Ward, Samuel.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

SENDER, ISAAC. (1755–1799). Army physician, diarist. New Hampshire and Rhode Island. Born in New Hampshire, Isaac Senter went to Newport, Rhode Island, early in life and studied medicine under Dr. Thomas Moffat. At the age of twenty he joined the Boston army as a surgeon and volunteered for Benedict Arnold's march to Quebec.

In November 1775 Senter became surgeon of the Third Rhode Island Regiment, a position he held until March 1776. Subsequently he was hospital surgeon from 20 July 1776 to April 1779, and surgeon-general of the Rhode Island Militia from 1779 to 1781. He established a private practice in Pawtucket, but later moved to Newport, Rhode Island, becoming an eminent surgeon there. An honorary member of the medical societies of London, Edinburgh, and Massachusetts, he was president of the Rhode Island Society of the Cincinnati for many years. He died in Newport on 20 December 1799.

SEE ALSO *Medical Practice during the Revolution.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

SERLE, AMBROSE. (1742–1812). Devotional writer, colonial official, and naval officer. An evangelical Anglican, he became undersecretary to William Legge, earl of Dartmouth, in 1772, went to America in 1774, and was in New York from 1776 to 1778. There he acted as William Lord Howe's secretary, for a time controlled the local press, and published a religious argument against the Revolution, *Americans against Liberty* (1775). His letters and journal, edited by E. H. Tatum and published by the Huntington Library as *The Journal of Ambrose Serle, Secretary to Lord Howe, 1776–1778*, (1940), are invaluable sources for historians.

revised by John Oliphant

SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 1756–1763. All four of the major European wars between 1689 and 1763 also involved conflict among the imperial powers in North America and the West Indies. The first three (the War of the League of Augsburg, the War of the Spanish Succession, and the War of the Austrian Succession) began in Europe and spread across the Atlantic. The final conflict in this sequence was unique in that it began in the Ohio Valley and then spread to the European Continent. Known, confusingly, in America as "the" French and Indian War (1754–1763), this conflict is known in Europe by its duration, the roughly seven years between 18 May 1756 (when Britain declared war against France) and 10 February 1763 (when the Peace of Paris was signed).

Although Britain had hoped to confine to North America its fight to remove what it considered to be French encroachments on lands it claimed in the Ohio Valley, events beyond its control ensured that this would not happen. Since 1689, Britain had followed a national security policy of joining with other European powers to curb the efforts of France to dominate the Continent. Pursuing this policy required Britain's leaders to strike a balance between committing troops to campaigns against French armies and crippling the French economy by using its naval superiority to cut off France's overseas trade while simultaneously subsidizing its allies to do

the actual fighting on the Continent. By the middle of the eighteenth century, this "blue-water strategy" of relying on allies and the Royal Navy had become more feasible. French overseas commerce had grown into a substantial part of the overall French economy, while despite the tug of the Hanoverian connection on George II (who was simultaneously Elector of Hanover), there was a growing reluctance on the part of British politicians to be drawn into struggles on the European Continent. Britain had supported Austria with money and troops during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and was trying to re-knit an alliance structure that would keep the balance of power stable through money and diplomacy.

France, too, wanted to concentrate on events overseas, but both powers were drawn into a European war when Frederick II of Prussia attacked Saxony in an effort to preempt a new grand alliance of Austria, Russia, and a reluctant France from squeezing him back to being a secondary power. Britain had no choice but to ally with Frederick and send troops and subsidies to the Continent. Although the British army initially performed badly in Germany, Frederick managed to hold off encirclement by hard marching and heavy casualties. British performance improved, culminating in a tactical triumph over the French at Minden on 1 August 1759, but by that time the bulk of Britain's money, troops, and attention had been shifted to North America. The death of the anti-Prussian czarina of Russia on 6 January 1762 ultimately broke the alliance and saved Frederick. After several years of frustration in North America, the combination of British naval superiority and a series of slow but steady land campaigns that culminated in James Wolfe's lucky victory at the Plains of Abraham in Quebec on 13 September 1759 capped an *annus mirabilis* (year of miracles) that left Britain dominant at sea and in North America.

Even before the Peace of Paris ratified Britain's tremendous success, its leaders were grappling with the problems of how to pay the expenses incurred during the war and how to reorder the newly expanded empire. Their choices precipitated the War for American Independence.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; French and Indian War; Minden, Battle of; Pitt, William (the elder); Plains of Abraham (13 September 1759).*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SEVIER, JOHN. (1745–1815). Pioneer, militia officer, first governor of Tennessee. Born near the site of New Market, Virginia, on 23 September 1745, Sevier worked at farming, trading, tavern keeping, and surveying before moving southward in 1773 along the mountain valleys to the Holston settlements.

In 1776 Sevier joined in petitioning that North Carolina extend its jurisdiction over the Watauga and Holston settlements, and when this request was granted he became first a representative to the Provincial Congress and then lieutenant colonel of the militia. In 1777 he was promoted to colonel. Until 1780, however, Sevier took no active part in military operations. At the head of 240 Over Mountain Men, Sevier became one of the heroes of Kings Mountain in South Carolina on 7 October 1780. Immediately after his return from that victory, he started his career as leader of punitive expeditions against the Cherokees, or to be more specific, against the Chickamauga element of that tribe. In 1781 he again moved eastward across the mountains, this time with two hundred men, to support American regulars and militia against the British and Loyalist forces, though seeing little action.

When the war ended, Sevier entered into a project to establish a colony at Muscle Shoals, and he was so engaged when his Holston and Watauga neighbors started a movement to become a separate state. He was elected governor of the state of Franklin in 1785. Three years later this “state” collapsed, and Sevier was arrested for treason. North Carolina chose the path of reconciliation, pardoning Sevier, making him a brigadier general of the militia, and accepting him into the senate upon his election from Greene County that same year. The next year he was elected to Congress. When Tennessee was admitted as a new state he became its first governor, serving from 1796 to 1801 and holding this post again from 1803 to 1809. Two years later he was reelected to Congress and served until his death near Fort Decatur on 24 September 1815.

SEE ALSO *Indians in the Colonial Wars and the American Revolution; Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Over Mountain Men.*

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SHARON SPRINGS SWAMP, NEW YORK.

10 July 1781. Colonel Marinus Willett was in command of the force of New York state troops that took over responsibility for the defense of the Mohawk Valley from the Continentals at the beginning of July 1781. He set up headquarters at Fort Rensselaer (locally known as Fort Plain, later as Canajoharie) and immediately received word that large forces were moving against the settlements. On 9 July, Willett detected smoke rising in the southeast and assumed that the raiders were attacking Currytown, about eleven miles away. Earlier that morning Willett had sent out a thirty-five-man patrol under Captain Gross to Thurlough, but on seeing the smoke he sent a messenger to redirect the patrol towards Currytown. Willett also sent Captain Robert McKean with sixteen more of the state troops in the same direction, telling him to collect all the local militiamen he could as he advanced. McKean arrived in time to help the inhabitants put out burning buildings. Willett himself assembled a pursuit force and set out at dusk, picking up the two captains' detachments. By this time he had learned that the enemy was camped for the night about eighteen miles away in Sharon Springs Swamp (as it was subsequently called). The Americans (now numbering about 170 men) kept moving through the night, hoping to surprise the enemy soldiers at dawn before they were alert. However, his guide got lost for a while in the dark, and as a consequence, Willett arrived at 6 A.M. on the 10th to find the two hundred Indians and Loyalists formed up on high ground.

Willett determined to engage them, since the two forces were about equal in numbers, but as he was completing his deployment the Indians charged. The disciplined Americans repulsed the first attack in the center and then used their reserves under McKean to throw back a second charge on the American right flank. After an hour and one-half of combat, the Indians broke contact and withdrew by breaking into small parties. Willett said that he lost five killed and nine wounded, including the mortally wounded McKean, who died on the way back to Fort Rensselaer. He estimated the Indian losses at around forty based on the large number of dead left on the battlefield. The victory bought the valley several months of quiet. The city council of Albany voted the freedom of the city to Willett in honor of this action.

Shaw, Samuel

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Currytown, New York.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

SHAW, SAMUEL. (1754–1794). Continental officer. Massachusetts. Born at Boston on 2 October 1754, Samuel Shaw was the son of a prominent merchant and went to work in a countinghouse. As a lieutenant in Colonel Henry Knox's Continental Artillery Regiment from 10 December 1775, he served in the siege of Boston, the New York campaign (for a time at Fort Washington), and the Battles of Trenton and Princeton. He was regimental adjutant from May 1776. He was promoted to captain lieutenant in Colonel John Crane's Third Continental Artillery on 1 January 1777 and to captain on 12 April 1780. He was present at Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth. He spent most of his time as a staff officer, as brigade major of Knox's artillery brigade from 10 May 1777 to 31 December 1779, and thereafter until November 1783 as aide-de-camp to Knox with the rank of major (in the Corps of Artillery after 17 June 1783). His *Journals* are a particularly valuable source of information on the events surrounding the Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line in January 1781 and the Newburgh Addresses in March 1783. He was with Washington's army when it reoccupied New York City on 25 November 1783 and assisted in disbanding the Continental army thereafter. He helped Knox organize the Society of the Cincinnati. When he left the service, Washington commended him for his intelligence, energy, and courage.

On 22 February 1784 he sailed from New York City as supercargo on the *Empress of China*, the first American ship to engage in the China trade. He arrived home on 11 May 1785 with a valuable cargo of tea, silk, and other commodities. Later that year Knox appointed him to a clerkship in the War Department, but he resigned when Congress made him the first American consul in Canton (January 1786). He sailed from New York City on 4 February 1786 and returned home on 17 July 1789. He was reappointed by President Washington and returned to China, where he served from March 1790 to January 1792. He married at Boston on 21 August 1792. Washington renewed his appointment and he sailed for China a fourth time. Delayed at Bombay because of

typhoons, he contracted a liver disease and did not reach Canton until 2 November 1793. He left China on 17 March 1794 and died near the Cape of Good Hope on 30 May 1794. He was buried at sea.

SEE ALSO *Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line; Newburgh Addresses.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SHAWNEE. The Shawnee Indians were a large and strategically significant Algonkian-speaking Indian nation that dominated the Ohio River Valley during the eighteenth century. The Shawnee were generally hostile to British and then American incursions into the Ohio Valley during the middle decades of the eighteenth century. During the War of the American Revolution and its immediate aftermath, the Shawnee would lead armed resistance against American settlements in Virginia's Kentucky District. Shawnee warriors, notably Tecumseh, would continue to fight against the United States intermittently through the end of the War of 1812.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Shawnee were a mobile and divided people. The Shawnee were divided into five units, or divisions, each centered on a town named after the division. The five divisions were Chillicothe, Thawekila, Maquachake, Kispoki, and Piqua, although transliterations of these names vary from source to source. The Shawnee had close relationships with the Creek, the Delaware, and the Iroquois League, although relations with the Iroquois League were often hostile, with the Iroquois pushing the Shawnee out of the Ohio Valley during the Beaver Wars of the seventeenth century. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Shawnee had returned to the Ohio Valley, migrating from modern-day Pennsylvania to modern-day Ohio. Shawnee towns oscillated between alliance with the French and the English during the 1750s, but most Shawnee ultimately fought on the British side during the Seven Years' War.

After the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768), in which the Iroquois League sold to Virginia title to the Ohio Valley (claiming ownership of the land by right of conquest from its seventeenth century victories over the Shawnee), Virginian settlers began moving through the Cumberland Gap and into Kentucky in the early 1770s. Kentucky, although not home to Shawnee towns, was a prime hunting ground, and Virginian settlements

threatened to disrupt Shawnee subsistence. The Shawnee actively sought to push Virginian settlers out of the Ohio Valley. The culmination of this incipient conflict was Lord Dunmore's War (1774), in which Virginia's governor backed the initiatives of settlers and speculators to claim Ohio Valley lands. No other Indian nation would ally with the Shawnee during Lord Dunmore's War, and Shawnee leaders were forced to accept the Ohio River as a boundary between Indian and European settlement. Tensions between settlers in Kentucky and the Shawnee towns in Ohio never really abated.

Many Shawnee hoped to remain neutral during the American Revolution, but violence perpetrated by American settlers pushed the Shawnee to the British side. One of the loudest advocates for peace and neutrality was the Maquachake chief, Cornstalk, who corresponded regularly with Congressional Indian agent George Morgan. Cornstalk and other Maquachake leaders were so committed to neutrality that they announced plans to separate their peace faction and found a new town. In October 1777, Cornstalk led a peace delegation to Fort Randolph on the Kanawha River. There he was captured and detained by the fort commander, Captain Matthew Arbuckle. Captain Arbuckle then imprisoned Cornstalk's son, Elinipsico, who had come to Fort Randolph to inquire about his father's condition. The Shawnees remained imprisoned through early November 1777, when a party of local militia, seeking retaliation for the death of a white settler, broke into the fort and killed all of the Shawnee under guard, including Cornstalk.

While Cornstalk's death was officially denounced by Congress, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, Shawnee outrage at the chief's killing fueled a wave of retaliation and pushed most Shawnee away from the American side, at least during the Revolutionary war. One noted battle that occurred in the wake of Cornstalk's death was a raid by a Chillicothe war chief, Black Fish, in which he captured Kentucky settler Daniel Boone. Interestingly, Cornstalk's Maquachakes continued to pursue a policy of peace and neutrality with the Americans and the British. Most of the other Shawnee towns relocated closer to Sandusky and Detroit after the winter of 1777–1778. Beyond a faction of the Maquachakes, led by Chief Moluntha, most Shawnee sided with the British.

After the Peace of Paris, most Shawnee kept the United States at arm's length. The Shawnee did not join in the Treaty of Fort McIntosh (1785) and resoundingly rejected the "conquest theory" formulation of sovereignty that the Confederation Congress put forward in 1784 and after. While some Shawnee leaders (mostly Maquachake, Cornstalk's heir as the advocate for peace and coexistence) signed the subsequent Treaty of Fort Finney (1786), the majority still did want a treaty with the Americans. Their forbearance was understandable. As later in 1786,

Kentucky militiamen attacked the Maquachake towns and killed chief Moluntha. During the 1790s, the Shawnee formed a large part of the pan-Indian resistance to the federal government led by the Miami chief, Little Turtle. In 1795, the Shawnee signed the Treaty of Greenville, terminating the resistance. However, a minority of the Shawnee, driven primarily by the Kispoki leader, Tecumseh, and his brother Tenskwatawa, would continue the resistance against the Americans until Tecumseh's death in Ontario at the battle of the Thames River (1813) during the War of 1812. After the War of 1812, the Shawnee were removed west of the Mississippi by the United States government, with most ending up in Oklahoma.

SEE ALSO *French and Indian War; Indians in the Colonial Wars and the American Revolution.*

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Leonard J. Sadosky

SHAYS, DANIEL. (1747–1825). Continental officer, insurrectionist. Massachusetts. Born in Hopkinton, Massachusetts, Daniel Shays (the spelling varies) had married and moved to Shutesbury before the Revolution. Shays marched on the Lexington alarm as a sergeant in Captain Reuben Dickinson's company of minutemen in Colonel Benjamin Ruggles Woodbridge's Hampshire County regiment of minutemen, and he served for eleven days. Shays was promoted to second lieutenant in Dickinson's company of Woodbridge's regiment, now enlisted for eight months of service to besiege Boston, and he behaved well at the Battle of Bunker Hill. He served as a lieutenant in Colonel James M. Varnum's Ninth Continental Regiment (Rhode Island) in the New York and New Jersey campaigns of 1776. He was promoted to captain in Colonel Rufus Putnam's Fifth Massachusetts Regiment on 1 January 1777 and served at Ticonderoga and Saratoga, where he again

distinguished himself. He was detached to the corps of light infantry, a temporary unit raised for the campaigning season, in 1779 and again in 1780. He participated in Anthony Wayne's attack at Stony Point on 16 July 1779. In May 1780 the senior light infantry officers each received a sword from the marquis de Lafayette, the new commander; Shays sold this gift, probably because he already owned a serviceable weapon and needed the money. A man of humble origin, he was a brave and efficient officer who was considerate of his subordinates and popular with his men.

He resigned on 14 October 1780 and settled as a farmer in Pelham, where he sat on the local committee of safety in 1781 and 1782. He is remembered for lending his name to Shays's Rebellion of 1786–1787, although others were as active as he was in this popular uprising against what some residents in central and western Massachusetts perceived as oppression by eastern monied interests. Shays fled to Vermont until he was pardoned in June 1788. After the pardon he moved to Schoharie County, New York, and then to Sparta, New York, where he died in September 1825.

SEE ALSO *Shays's Rebellion; Stony Point, New York.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

SHAYS'S REBELLION. 31 August 1786–4 February 1787. As the American states struggled with the problems of establishing a viable economy despite a postwar depression, the collapse of the currency, and an aversion to taxation rooted in their colonial past, an armed revolt against constituted authority arose in central and western Massachusetts. A grassroots insurgency movement with many local leaders, the so-called rebellion came to be known by the name of one of its leaders, Daniel Shays (1747–1825), who had returned to his farm in Pelham, Massachusetts, after retiring from the Continental army in 1781 as a captain in the Fifth Massachusetts Regiment. Those who had so recently united in revolt against British authority were now divided in opinion as to whether the “right of revolution” could be exercised any time citizens objected to governmental authority. Many small farmers in towns across central and western Massachusetts objected to the General Assembly's decision that debts had to be paid in specie, a position supported by the mercantile elites in coastal towns but that posed a significant hardship in agricultural regions that lacked ready access to hard money. They also objected to the mounting number of farm and home foreclosures that threatened to strip them of the economic independence that was a central pillar of their political independence.

Mob actions started on 31 August 1786, when armed men prevented the Hampshire county court from sitting at Northampton. After similar events took place at Worcester, Concord, and Great Barrington, Governor James Bowdoin sent William Shepard (formerly colonel of the Fourth Massachusetts Regiment and now a militia major general) with six hundred militiamen to protect the state's Supreme Court, then sitting at Springfield. Five hundred insurgents confronted the militia on 26 September and obliged the court to adjourn. Because Springfield was the site of a federal arsenal, Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, on 20 October authorized the raising of 1,340 federal troops, mostly in Massachusetts and Connecticut, ostensibly for service against the Indians in the Ohio Valley but which could also be used against the insurgents. However, the slow process of raising this force meant that suppressing the insurgency depended on the willingness of Massachusetts state militiamen to act effectively against their fellow citizens.

Toward the end of 1786, as the insurgency collapsed in other parts of the state, Shays marched on Springfield the day after Christmas with some twelve hundred men to reinforce those already there under Luke Day (formerly a captain in the Seventh Massachusetts Regiment). While Shepard's small militia force continued to guard the arsenal and on 25 January 1787 repulsed a mismanaged attack by the insurgents, Governor Bowdoin called forty-four hundred militiamen into service (mainly from eastern counties) and placed at their head Major General Benjamin Lincoln, who, as Washington's second-in-command, had accepted the British surrender at Yorktown on 19 October 1781. When official funds were not rapidly forthcoming, Lincoln raised twenty thousand dollars from private sources to pay the troops. Lincoln's little army arrived at Springfield on 27 January, dispersed the force under Day, and pursued Shays toward Petersham through a blizzard. Early on 4 February, Lincoln completed a vigorous night march to surprise the insurgents, capturing 150 men and scattering the rest. By the end of February, the insurgency had been suppressed.

Acting quickly to calm public anger and quench any remaining embers of armed resistance, the Massachusetts government offered pardons to all but Shays, Day, and two others; it finally pardoned Shays, who had fled to upper New York State, on 13 June 1788, when it was clear that the violence was finished. While some looked on the insurgency as evidence that a republican form of government was too weak to be feasible, the majority interpreted the experience to mean that a stronger central government was necessary, in part to provide the means to suppress such uprisings but, better still, to prevent them by enacting measures that would improve economic conditions so that a state would not have to adopt policies that

set one group of its citizens against another. Thus, Shays's Rebellion strengthened the arguments of those who sought to create a new national government and helped to speed the movement toward the creation and adoption of a new federal Constitution. The rebellion also had an immediate impact that brought relief to those who had undertaken armed resistance: the Massachusetts legislature postponed imposition of a direct tax and limited the liability of debtors, exempting tools and certain personal effects from sale to satisfy creditors. It was a small victory, but sufficient to tamp down resentment.

SEE ALSO *Lincoln, Benjamin; Shays, Daniel; Shepard, William.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SHELburne, WILLIAM PETTY FITZMAURICE, EARL OF. (1737–1805). British politician and prime minister. Born in Dublin, Fitzmaurice (later Petty) joined the Twentieth Regiment and served at Rochefort (1757), Minden (1759), and Kloster Kamp (1760). He was promoted colonel and appointed aide-de-camp to George III in 1760, and in 1761 he succeeded his father as earl of Shelburne. In 1763 he became president of the Board of Trade under George Grenville, fruitlessly challenging Lord Egremont's control of American policy and demanding equal access to the king. Quarreling with Lord Halifax, the other secretary of state, over the prosecution of John Wilkes, he tired of his position and resigned after only four months. Now an acolyte of William Pitt, earl of Chatham, in 1766 he supported the repeal of the Stamp Act, opposed the Declaratory Act, and became secretary of state for the Southern Department in Chatham's second ministry. In cabinet he unsuccessfully resisted Charles Townshend's duties and the persecution of Wilkes: when Chatham resigned in 1768, Shelburne went too. In opposition he spoke against the deployment of troops in Boston (1768), the Coercive Acts, and, at least at first, the war in America. However, his frequently declared opposition to American independence made him acceptable to George III as secretary of state in the second Rockingham government. He

quarreled with Charles Fox, the other secretary, over the peace negotiations, and sent his own representative to Paris. When Rockingham died, Shelburne became prime minister. He concluded a separate peace with the Americans but at the price of accepting both independence and the American refusal to compensate Loyalists. These issues did not prevent ratification, but they brought his ministry down early in 1783. He did not return to office under William Pitt the younger in 1784 but was raised to marquess of Lansdowne.

SEE ALSO *Chatham, William Pitt, First Earl of; Declaratory Act; Fox, Charles James; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; Stamp Act; Townshend Acts; Townshend, Charles; Wilkes, John.*

revised by John Oliphant

SHELBY, ISAAC. (1750–1826). Militia leader, first governor of Kentucky. Born near Hagerstown, Maryland, on 11 December 1750, Isaac Shelby moved with his family to the Holston settlements in what was then the westernmost part of Virginia, and in 1774 he served in his father's Fincastle County militia company as a lieutenant. He distinguished himself in the battle of Point Pleasant, West Virginia, on 10 October 1774. Until July 1775 he was second in command of the garrison at Point Pleasant. After surveying lands in Kentucky for the Transylvania Company—and for himself—he was appointed captain of a company of Virginia militia in July 1776. For the next three years he was engaged in providing supplies for various frontier garrisons and for the expeditions of Lachlan McIntosh (1778) and George Rogers Clark (1779). In 1779 he was elected to the Virginia legislature for Washington County.

Early in 1780 he was appointed colonel of militia in Sullivan County, North Carolina. In July 1780 he joined General Charles McDowell with about 600 "Over Mountain Men" and helped in the capture of Thicketty Fort, in South Carolina. He then combined forces with Elijah Clarke to repulse a Loyalist attack at Cedar Springs, South Carolina, on 8 August, and to win the engagement at Musgrove's Mill ten days later.

Shelby figured prominently in the victory at Kings Mountain, South Carolina, on 7 October 1780. He was also present for the victory at Cowpens, also in South Carolina. Fear of the Cherokee kept Shelby's troops close to home until a treaty was negotiated on 20 July 1781. With 200 men Shelby joined Colonel Hezekiah Maham to capture a British post at Fair Lawn, near Monck's Corner, South Carolina, on 27 November 1781. While

engaged in this expedition, Shelby was elected to the North Carolina legislature. He attended its sessions in December 1781 and, re-elected, he sat in the sessions held at Hillsboro in April 1782.

In 1783 Shelby moved to Kentucky, where he was a member of the conventions of 1787, 1788, and 1789 that prepared the way for statehood. On 4 June 1792 he took office as the state's first governor, but four years later he declined re-election and devoted the next 15 years to his private affairs. In August 1812 he again became governor, and the next year led 4,000 volunteers north to take part in the victory over the British at the Thames River, near Ontario, on 5 October 1813. In March 1817 he declined the portfolio of Secretary of War, which was offered to him by President James Monroe. Shelby died at his home in Lincoln County, Kentucky, on 18 July 1826.

SEE ALSO *Dunmore's (or Cresap's) War; Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Over Mountain Men.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

SHELDON, ELISHA. (1740–1796). Colonel of the Second Dragoons. Connecticut. Little is known of Sheldon's early life other than that he was born in Lyme, Connecticut, 6 Mar 1740. After commanding a battalion of Connecticut light cavalry from June 1776, he was commissioned as a colonel on 12 December 1776 and commanded the Second Dragoons, known as "Sheldon's Light Dragoons," from then until the end of the war. In the Philadelphia Campaign of 1777 he performed the normal cavalry tasks of reconnoitering the enemy's movements. Thereafter he served on the east side of the Hudson River. General Banastre Tarleton made an unsuccessful attempt to defeat him at Poundridge, New York, on 2 July 1779. As part of his preparations to give West Point to the British, Benedict Arnold had to hoodwink Sheldon into permitting "John Anderson" (John André) to enter the American lines. Sheldon had been temporarily succeeded by his lieutenant colonel, John Jameson, when "John Anderson" arrived.

Sheldon was brevetted as a brigadier general on 30 September 1780. In the operations against Manhattan preceding the Yorktown campaign, Sheldon took part in the unsuccessful attempt on 3 July 1781 to surprise Oliver De Lancey's Loyalist forces near Morrisania, New York. When the allies marched to Virginia he remained under William Heath, serving in in the Highlands Department

(around the Hudson River). After the war Sheldon moved to Vermont, where the town of Sheldon Springs was named in his honor.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason; Poundridge, New York.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

SHEPARD, WILLIAM. (1737–1817). Continental officer. Massachusetts. Born in Westfield, Massachusetts, William Shepard was the son of a tanner and deacon of the local Congregational church. He enlisted as a private in a Massachusetts provincial regiment at the age of seventeen, in 1755. By the end of the final French and Indian war, he was a captain with six years of valuable military experience. A farmer, selectman, and member of the Westfield Committee of Correspondence prior to the Revolution, he led his company of Colonel Timothy Danielson's minuteman regiment in response to the Lexington alarm in April 1775, and was elected lieutenant colonel of Danielson's regiment in May 1775, while serving in the New England army besieging Boston. On 1 January 1776 he was named lieutenant colonel of the Third Continental Infantry (Massachusetts), was wounded at the battle of Long Island on 27 August, and was promoted to colonel on 2 October, with seniority from 4 May. He performed well, but was wounded again, at Pell's Point, New York, on 18 October 1776. On 1 January 1777 he took command of the Fourth Massachusetts and led his regiment in the battles around Saratoga as part of John Glover's Second Massachusetts Brigade. After spending the winter at Valley Forge, he went on recruiting duty around Springfield, Massachusetts. By the time he retired from the army, on 1 January 1783, he had fought in twenty-two separate engagements. Brevetted a brigadier general on 30 September 1783, he returned to his farm at Westfield.

As a major general of militia in Hampshire County in 1786, Shepard defended the federal court at Springfield during Shays's Rebellion. Starting on 25 January 1787, he held off Shays's attack on the arsenal until General Benjamin Lincoln arrived with a relief force. He was never fully reimbursed for public expenditures from his own pocket, and some of his personal property was destroyed by Shays's sympathizers. In addition to other public offices, he served in the House of Representatives for three two-year terms, starting in March 1797. He spent his last fifteen years quietly on his farm.

SEE ALSO *Lincoln, Benjamin; Pell's Point, New York.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

SHERBURNE'S REGIMENT. Commanded by Colonel Henry Sherburne, it was one of the sixteen "additional Continental regiments." Lieutenant Colonel Return J. Meigs served with it 22 February–22 May 1777, and Major William Bradford served 12 January 1777–1 January 1781.

Mark M. Boatner

SHERMAN, ROGER. (1722–1793). Statesman and Signer. Massachusetts and Connecticut. Roger Sherman epitomizes the self-made man. Educated in country schools near his father's farm at Stoughton (now Sharon), Massachusetts, just south of Boston, he had a natural thirst for knowledge and a methodical approach to self-education. He read widely in history, law, politics, mathematics, and theology. Apprenticed as a cobbler, he is said to have worked with an open book always before him. In June 1743, after the death of his father, he moved to New Milford, Connecticut, where his elder brother had settled. Tradition says that he walked the entire distance, some 170 miles by road, with his cobbler's tools on his back. He had tremendous energy and versatility. His interest in mathematics led to his appointment as Litchfield County surveyor (1745–1758), and to the creation of a series of almanacs based on his own astronomical calculations (1750–1761). Interested in fiscal stability, he published in 1752 a pamphlet entitled *A Caveat Against Injustice, or an Enquiry into the Evil Consequences of a Fluctuating Medium of Exchange*.

He was admitted to the bar in 1754, held many of public offices (including delegate to the Assembly and commissary for the Connecticut provincial troops during the final French and Indian war), and made a good deal of money, not only as a multiple officeholder but also as a prominent local merchant. He moved to New Haven, Connecticut, in 1760 to enhance his mercantile prospects. He was elected treasurer of Yale College in 1765, a post he held until 1776, when politics began to consume most of his time and energy. He had been elected to the General Assembly from New Milford (1755–1761) and also from New Haven (1764–1766). In May 1766 his opposition to the Stamp Act led voters to elevate him to the governor's council, where he served for the next nineteen years.

By experience and temperament, Sherman was well qualified to represent Connecticut in the Continental Congress. He served as a delegate from September 1774 to November 1781, and again for the first six months of 1784. Perhaps because of his undramatic personality and lack of oratorical skill, he is not remembered as the author of any particular act of that body, but the stern old Puritan

was, in the words of John Adams, "honest as an angel and as firm in the cause of American independence as Mount Atlas." Sherman accumulated more legislative experience than any other delegate. He served on the committee to draft the Declaration of Independence, on various ways and means committees, on the boards of war and ordnance, on the treasury board, and on the committee on Indian affairs. With Yankee standards of frugality, and based on his considerable fiscal experience before and during the war, Sherman defied popular opinion to argue for sound currency, minimum government borrowing, and higher taxes. He also disregarded the vested interests of friends and former business associates to advocate Connecticut's cession of western land claims.

In addition to his extensive congressional duties, he also undertook important state business. He served on the Connecticut council of safety (1777–1779, 1782), and in 1783 he and Richard Law worked five months to revise the state's statutory laws. In the federal convention of 1787 he introduced and took the leading part in promoting the so-called Connecticut Compromise, whereby smaller states retained an equal voice in the Senate to balance the predominance of the more populous states in the House of Representatives. He served in the House from 1789 to 1791, and in the Senate from 1791 to 1793. He has the distinction of being the only man to sign four of the great documents of the Continental Congress: the Articles of Association of 1774, the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the Articles of Confederation in 1779, and the federal Constitution in 1787.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SHIP OF THE LINE. A "ship of the line" was a warship that was sufficiently large and well-armed so that it could lie in line of battle, where its guns, mounted in broadside, could bear on the enemy. A system of six "rates" was introduced by Lord George Anson, first lord of the Admiralty in the early 1750s, that grouped warships according to how many guns they carried. Only the first three rates were considered to be ships of the line. A "first-rate" carried upwards of one hundred guns, a "second-rate" from eighty-four to one hundred guns, and a "third-rate" from seventy to eighty-four guns. During

Shippen Family of Philadelphia

the War for American Independence, a third-rate of seventy-four guns was the most common type.

SEE ALSO *Line*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

SHIPPEN FAMILY OF PHILADELPHIA. Edward Shippen (1729–1806), in the fourth generation of a wealthy and powerful Philadelphia Quaker family, became chief justice of Pennsylvania after the Revolution. He attained this post despite the fact that he had been a moderate Loyalist and that his daughter Margaret (Peggy) was married to Benedict Arnold.

William Shippen (1736–1808), Edward's cousin and son of Dr. William Shippen II (a delegate to the Continental Congress in 1779–1780), was a physician and pioneer teacher of anatomy and midwifery. About 1760 he married Alice Lee, sister of Richard Henry, Francis Lightfoot, William, and Arthur Lee. After studying under William Hunter in London, Shippen started teaching anatomy in Philadelphia on 16 November 1762. Despite popular objections to his use of human bodies, which included attacks on his surgery, Shippen became professor of surgery and anatomy in the newly established medical school of the College of Philadelphia in 1765. He was also one of the few doctors in America to teach midwifery to both men and women.

In July 1776 William Shippen was appointed chief physician of the Continental army hospital in New Jersey, and in October he became director general of all hospitals west of the Hudson. On 11 April 1777 he succeeded John Morgan as chief physician and director general of all Continental army hospitals. His appointment undoubtedly was earned to a large extent by the plan for reorganization of the medical service that he had submitted to Congress in March 1777 and that was adopted almost in its entirety. Morgan, who had once been a close friend, accused Shippen of engineering his discharge and Benjamin Rush charged him with inefficiency. Shippen was arrested in October 1780 and charged with speculating in hospital stores and incompetence. He admitted the former but fought the latter, being acquitted by a bitterly divided court-martial and barely escaping censure by Congress. On 3 January 1781 he resigned from the army and continued his career as a teacher and practitioner. The scandals that drove him from his position with the army did not harm his later career, as he became a prominent professor at the University of Pennsylvania and president of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia from 1805 until his death on 11 July 1808.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Lee Family of Virginia; Morgan, John; Rush, Benjamin*.

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SHIRLEY, WILLIAM. (1694–1771). Colonial governor of Massachusetts. Son of a London merchant who died when he was only seven, William Shirley grew up amidst aristocratic connections but without the financial means for the life to which he aspired. He was graduated from Cambridge University, was admitted to the bar in 1720, and practiced law in London for the next eleven years. During this time he increased his circle of influential connections but not his financial status. Deciding to emigrate to America, he reached Boston in 1731 with a letter of introduction to Governor Jonathan Belcher from the duke of Newcastle, who was an acquaintance of the family and Shirley's lifelong patron. A long period of place-hunting was marked by his appointment as judge of the vice-admiralty court in New England in 1733 and, soon thereafter, as advocate general (prosecutor) of the court. In his search for higher office, Shirley undertook to undermine the already shaky reputation of Belcher, and on 25 May 1741 succeeded him as governor of Massachusetts.

Faced with the problem of liquidating various banking schemes that made the finances of the colony unstable, and with the need to strengthen military defenses because war with France appeared to be inevitable, Shirley restored public credit by closely regulating the use of tax money to redeem paper currency and by holding out the prospect of increased trade and a larger empire when French ambitions were defeated. He proved himself an able and tactful administrator. Shortly after Britain declared war on France in late 1744, Shirley proposed an expedition to capture Louisbourg, the French fortress that threatened the New England fisheries, and in early 1745 he secured from the Massachusetts General Court and from neighboring colonies approval for his scheme. Shirley's popularity soared when, on 17 June 1745, Louisbourg surrendered to an expeditionary force of New Englanders under William Pepperrell and the supporting British fleet under Commodore Peter Warren. He made sure that the specie that Parliament voted in 1748 to reimburse Massachusetts for its expenses in the Louisbourg expedition was used to reestablish the finances of the province on a firm basis. Shirley was in Paris from 1749 to 1753 as a commissioner to establish the boundary between New England and

French Canada. On his return to Massachusetts, he worked to prepare for the expected renewal of hostilities with the French in America.

In April 1755 Edward Braddock, the new British commander in North America, appointed Shirley as his second in command and gave him the task of mounting an expedition against Fort Niagara. Logistical obstacles prevented Shirley from ever reaching his target. One of his sons died of fever on this expedition, and his eldest son was killed at the Monongahela on 9 July while serving as Braddock's secretary. Shirley became British commander in chief in North America after Braddock's death, but his indecisiveness led to the loss of Oswego in 1756. He was succeeded by the Earl of Loudoun in July 1756, when the home authorities became dissatisfied with his conduct of military affairs. Loudoun developed an intense dislike for Shirley, who was finally recalled to England to face charges not only of mismanagement of military strategy and organization but also of irregularities in his financial accounts. It was his misfortune to arrive just as the tenure of the duke of Newcastle was ending, but in the fall of 1757 the War Office was forced to drop its court-martial charges for lack of evidence. Meanwhile, Thomas Pownall took office as governor of Massachusetts. Promoted to lieutenant general, Shirley became governor of the Bahamas in 1761, after having been denied the governorship of Jamaica. In 1767 he relinquished the governorship to his only surviving son, Thomas, and two years later he returned to his home at Roxbury, Massachusetts, where he died in March 1771.

SEE ALSO *Belcher, Jonathan; Pownall, Thomas.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SHIRTMEN. A term for American riflemen, it appears to have been coined by the British and applied originally to the Virginia riflemen. In his entry of 20 July 1775, Thacher speaks of the arrival of Pennsylvania and Maryland riflemen in the Boston lines: "They are dressed in white frocks, or rifle-shirts, and round hats."

SEE ALSO *Great Bridge, Virginia; Riflemen.*

Mark M. Boatner

SHOEMAKER'S HOUSE SEE *Butler, Walter; German Flats, New York.*

SHORT HILLS (METUCHEN), NEW JERSEY.

26 June 1777. During the "June Maneuvers" of the Philadelphia Campaign, Lieutenant General William Howe maintained strong forces in the Brunswick-Amboy area close to the shore and yet in a position to carry out foraging activities. Washington concentrated his main force in an excellent defensive position on the high ground around Quibble Town (modern New Market) and Bound Brook. To hold the foragers in check he pushed forward a task force built around a division consisting of the New Jersey Brigade and Conway's Third Pennsylvania Brigade, led by William Alexander (known as Lord Stirling). Relying on his men's knowledge of the local area, Alexander camped near Metuchen Meeting House, about five miles northwest of Amboy. While in this position Howe made his last effort to bring Washington to decisive battle in the New York area before sailing to Philadelphia. At 1 A.M. on 26 June, the British moved out in two columns. Howe planned to annihilate Alexander and then capture the passes to Middle Brook, which would force Washington into the open. The movement of such a large force could not be hidden, and Washington easily fell back to a more secure location.

The British boasted of defeating Alexander, and historians have often depicted the operation as an example of the inferiority of the Continentals' training. However, the reality is more complex. Alexander's troops displayed great coolness in forming for battle and staged a successful withdrawal while covering Washington. The British pursued some five miles without being able to cut him off. Casualties were light, but Alexander's rear guard lost three field guns. The next day Howe withdrew to Amboy and embarked on 30 June, having accomplished nothing from this affair.

Although "Short Hills" is used here to designate the affair, the name is confusing because the Short Hills Meeting House (Milburn, New Jersey) was actually near Springfield, more than twelve miles away. The incident might more logically be called the Affair at Metuchen Meeting House.

SEE ALSO *Philadelphia Campaign; Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of Knyphausen.*

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

SHORT HILLS (7–23 JUNE 1780)

SEE *Springfield, New Jersey, Raid of Knyphausen.*

SHREVE, ISRAEL. (?–1799). Continental officer. New Jersey. Lieutenant colonel of the Second New Jersey on 31 October 1775, he was colonel on 28 November 1776 and served until he retired on 1 January 1781 when the reorganization of the New Jersey Line took effect, but stayed on duty long enough to deal with the mutiny of the New Jersey Line of 20–27 January 1781. When George Washington wrote Shreve for an explanation of his failure to put in an appearance on 27 January, Shreve mentioned nothing about being out of the service but said, “[I] thought it best to not go to camp until the matter was over, as those who suffered might look up to me for to intercede for their pardon.” Washington did not learn until 7 February that Shreve had left the service when the New Jersey Brigade was reorganized as of 1 January 1781. Elias Dayton theoretically moved from command of the Third New Jersey to succeed Shreve as commander of the Second New Jersey.

A loyal Patriot who had been impoverished by his long war service, the immensely fat Shreve was an incompetent officer. His slim prospects for promotion to brigadier general were killed by Washington’s statement in December 1780 that “here I drop the curtain.” (Van Doren, p. 209).

During his six years of service, Shreve fought in skirmishes in New Jersey, the invasion of Canada in 1776, and the battles of Monmouth and Springfield. A farmer after the war, he moved to western Pennsylvania, where he died the same day as Washington.

SEE ALSO *Dayton, Elias; Mutiny of the New Jersey Line; New Jersey Line.*

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revised by Harry M. Ward

SHURTLEFF, ROBERT. Alias under which Deborah Sampson enlisted in the Continental Army.

SEE ALSO *Sampson, Deborah.*

Mark M. Boatner

SIGNERS. In American history, a “signer” is one of the fifty-six members of the Second Continental Congress who signed the Declaration of Independence on or after 2 August 1776. The document was officially adopted on 4 July 1776, but it was signed only after it was engrossed on parchment (written out in a large, clear hand), a process that was completed on 2 August. On that date John Hancock of Massachusetts, the president of Congress, signed first, followed by forty-nine other delegates, beginning below and to the right of the text, in geographic order of the states from north to south. Six more delegates signed after 2 August, one of whom, Thomas McKean of Delaware, claimed to have signed before the end of the year but in fact had not done so by 18 January 1777 and may not have signed until 1781. All of the delegates signed, not as individuals, but in their capacity as members of a state delegation.

The signers were those men who happened to be delegates on 2 August. Of the fifty-six signers, fourteen had not been present on 2 July, when Richard Henry Lee’s resolution declaring independence was adopted, or on 4 July, when the Declaration itself was approved. Eight delegates who were present on 2 or 4 July did not sign the engrossed copy of the Declaration, including John Dickinson of Pennsylvania and Robert R. Livingston of New York, who both thought independence premature, although Livingston had been a member of the committee to draft the Declaration. Opponents of the document who nevertheless signed it on 2 August were Carter Braxton of Virginia, Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, George Read of Delaware, and Edward Rutledge of South Carolina. Among the delegates no longer in Congress, and who therefore could not sign, were George Washington of Virginia, John Sullivan of New Hampshire, and George Clinton of New York, all of whom were in active military service, and Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina and Patrick Henry of Virginia, who were active in the governments of their home states. Men prominent in later years, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and James Monroe, had not yet been elected to Congress.

The fifty-six signers were nearly all well educated and prosperous and represented a cross-section of the elite leadership of the rebellion. Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania was the oldest (seventy years old) and the American with the greatest international reputation. Edward Rutledge of South Carolina was the youngest (twenty-six years old). Most were in their thirties and forties. Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Maryland, lived the longest, dying at the age of ninety-five in 1832. All but eight signers had been born in the colonies; the eight immigrants had been born in the British Isles. Two were bachelors—Caesar Rodney and Joseph Hewes—while Carter Braxton was the father of eighteen children. Francis Hopkinson was a musician and poet, Lyman

Hall and John Witherspoon were clergymen. Lawyers predominated (twenty-four of fifty-six). Sixteen signers also signed the Articles of Confederation, and six also signed the federal Constitution. Only Roger Sherman of Connecticut and Robert Morris of Pennsylvania signed the Declaration, the Articles, and the Constitution.

Delegates not present on 2 or 4 July, who signed on 2 August:

- William Williams, Connecticut
- Lewis Morris, New York
- Benjamin Rush, Pennsylvania
- George Clymer, Pennsylvania
- James Smith, Pennsylvania
- George Taylor, Pennsylvania
- George Ross, Pennsylvania
- Samuel Chase, Maryland
- Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Maryland
- William Hooper, North Carolina

Delegates not present on 2 or 4 July, who signed after 2 August:

- Oliver Wolcott, Connecticut
- Mathew Thornton, New Hampshire
- Richard Henry Lee, Virginia
- George Wythe, Virginia

Delegates present on 2 or 4 July, who signed after 2 August:

- Elbridge Gerry, Massachusetts
- Thomas McKean, Delaware

Delegates present on 2 or 4 July, who did not sign:

- John Alsop, New York
- George Clinton, New York
- Robert R. Livingston, New York
- Henry Wisner, New York
- John Dickinson, Pennsylvania
- Charles Humphreys, Pennsylvania
- Thomas Willing, Pennsylvania
- John Rogers, Maryland

Considering the bleak outlook for the American cause in August 1776, the signers are particularly to be admired for signing a document for which they would

have been hung as traitors and rebels had Britain won the war and reestablished royal control of the colonies. The danger to the signers was so great that their names were held secret until 18 January 1777, when the victories at Trenton and Princeton prompted Congress to take the bold step of ordering an authenticated copy of the Declaration of Independence and the names of the signers to be sent to each state. Although no signer died directly at the hands of the British, Francis Lewis of New York and Richard Stockton of New Jersey each suffered a particularly hard fate at their hands. Both had their homes destroyed, and Lewis's wife and Stockton suffered a captivity that ruined their health. John Hart of New Jersey saw his farm destroyed, and he and his wife had to hide in the woods for months, ruining her health. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts and Thomas Jefferson of Virginia escaped capture by minutes, and another six were fortunate enough to avoid being taken by enemy forces sent in their pursuit. Homes of fifteen signers were destroyed.

A list of the fifty-six signers, arranged both alphabetically and by state, is contained in the Appendices. All are sketched individually in this book.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress; Declaration of Independence; Independence.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SIGN MANUAL. The term “sign manual” had two meanings in the eighteenth century. In one sense, it meant the signature of the sovereign on a document to signify royal authentication. It also meant the regulations governing naval tactics contained in a manual (small book) of signals (signs) that would be flown from the flagship to direct an engagement.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

SILLIMAN, GOLD SELLECK. (1732–1790). Militia general. Connecticut. Born at Fairfield, Gold Selleck Silliman was the son of Ebenezer Silliman (1707–1775), who was a member of the governor’s council from 1739 to 1765 and a judge of the superior court from 1743 to 1765. Gold Selleck was graduated from Yale College in 1752, and eventually became an attorney. Captain of a militia troop of horse in May 1769, he was appointed major of the local militia regiment in January 1774, lieutenant colonel in November, and colonel in May 1775. Silliman led his militia regiment to New York on temporary duty in March 1776, and returned in early July as colonel of the newly-raised First Connecticut Battalion, one of seven the General Assembly had created to reinforce Commander in Chief George Washington’s army. During the New York campaign he commanded his regiment at Long Island (it had rotated to the rear on the day of the battle, 27 August), in the evacuation of New York City on 15 September, and at White Plains on 28 October, where he distinguished himself. He returned home by 25 December. The Assembly had already appointed him brigadier general of the Fourth Militia Brigade, in southwestern Connecticut closest to the British at New York City. In addition to dealing with a constant stream of raids and counter-raids across the no-man’s land on land and sea that separated the antagonists, Silliman saw action in the Danbury Raid of 24–26 April 1777 and led 1,800 militiamen to the Hudson Highlands in October 1777 in response to Sir Henry Clinton’s attack. Captured by Loyalists on 1 May 1779, he was paroled on Long Island and exchanged a year later for a Yale contemporary, the Loyalist judge Thomas Jones, taken on 9 November 1779 to force Silliman’s release. The exchange took place in the middle of Long Island Sound on 27 April 1780. He returned home broken in health and impoverished. He resumed his legal career, but resigned his commission at the end of 1781. He died at his home in Fairfield. His sons and grandsons became famous as scientists and lawyers.

SEE ALSO *Danbury Raid, Connecticut; Jones, Thomas.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SILVER BULLET TRICK. Messengers or spies would sometimes carry a message in a hollow, silver bullet that could be swallowed to prevent incrimination if

they were captured. In his journal entry of 14 October 1777, Dr. James Thacher wrote:

After the capture of Fort Montgomery, Sir Henry Clinton dispatched a messenger by the name of Daniel Taylor to Burgoyne with the intelligence; fortunately he was taken on his way as a spy, and finding himself in danger, he was seen to turn aside and take something from his pocket and swallow it. General George Clinton, into whose hands he had fallen, ordered a severe dose of emetic tartar to be administered. This produced the happiest effect as respects the prescriber; but it proved fatal to the patient. He discharged a small silver bullet, which being unscrewed, was found to enclose a letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Burgoyne (p. 106).

The spy was tried, convicted, and executed. It is not known how common was this method of secreting messages.

SEE ALSO *Clinton’s Expedition.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

SIMCOE, JOHN GRAVES. (1752–1806). British commander of the Queen’s Rangers. Son of a Royal Navy captain who died at Quebec in 1759, John Simcoe was schooled at Exeter Grammar School, Eton College, and Merton College, Oxford, before becoming an ensign in the Thirty-Fifth Foot on 27 April 1770. He served as adjutant from 27 March 1772, and was promoted lieutenant (by purchase) on 12 March 1774. In April 1775 he embarked with his regiment from Cork as part of the first reinforcement for the army at Boston, where he arrived two days after the battle of Bunker Hill. He saw active service around Boston for the remainder of the year. On 27 December 1775 he purchased a captaincy in the Fortieth Foot, and served with his new regiment in the New York campaign in 1776 and the Philadelphia campaign in 1777. He was severely wounded at the Brandywine River on 11 September 1777, and on 15 October was given the provincial rank of major and named commander of the Queen’s Rangers. “He wanted to form a combined light corps which would be especially suited for service in America but would also introduce a more general reform of British military practice. Their training gave little attention to formal drill, but insisted on physical fitness, rapid movement, bayonet fighting, and most particularly, discipline in the field” (S. R. Mealing in

DCB). He led this Loyalist legion of light horse and foot troops in the skirmishes at Quintan's Bridge and Hancock's Bridge, both in New Jersey, in March 1778, and in the action at Crooked Billet, Pennsylvania, on 1 May, before taking part in the Monmouth campaign and winning promotion to the provincial rank of lieutenant colonel commandant in June. He took part in the foraging expedition that led to the Tappan massacre in New York on 28 September 1778, but was not engaged in the action itself. On 1 June 1779 his rangers took part in the capture of Stony Point and Verplanck's Point, and they raided Poundridge, New York, on 2 July 1779. He narrowly escaped death when he was ambushed, wounded, and captured with four of his men on 17 October after a successful raid from Amboy to Somerset Court House, New Jersey. He was exchanged on 31 December 1779. "As contemptuous of the military capacity of his adversaries as he was of their republicanism, his leadership made the Queen's Rangers the most successful of the American loyalist corps" (John A. Houlding in ODNB).

When the traitor Benedict Arnold was sent to raid Virginia a year later, Sir Henry Clinton included these instructions (14 December): "Having sent Lieutenant Colonels Dundas and Simcoe (officers of great experience and much in my confidence) with you, I am to desire that you will always consult those gentlemen previous to your undertaking any operation of consequence." Highlights of Simcoe's operations in Virginia were his rout of the militia defenders of Richmond on 5 January 1781, his surprise and rout of another militia concentration by a night raid to Charles City Court House on 8 January, his part in the attack at Petersburg on 25 April, his raid to scatter Friedrich Steuben's command at Point of Fork on 5 June, and his battle at Spencer's Tavern on 26 June. During the Yorktown siege he was posted on the north bank of the York River at Gloucester, and surrendered there with the rest of Cornwallis's army on 20 October 1781.

Promoted to brevet lieutenant colonel in the British Army on 19 December 1781 and invalided home the same month, he married in 1782 and until 1790 divided his time between London and his family estate in Devon. He then entered parliament. On the division of Canada in 1791 he was appointed the first lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, under Governor-General Sir Guy Carleton. He and his family arrived at Quebec on 11 November 1791, where they wintered. He arrived at Newark, the temporary capital of Upper Canada (now Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario), on 26 July 1792. While his plans "to create a bastion of social and political conservatism and to prevent the emergence of American-style frontier democracy" (ODNB) were beyond his capacity to accomplish in the short term, "he gave both expression and impetus to the blend of conservatism, loyalty, and emphasis on economic progress that was to dominate the

province after the War of 1812. The most persistently energetic governor sent to British North America after the American Revolution, he had not only the most articulate faith in its imperial destiny but also the most sympathetic appreciation of the interest and aspirations of its inhabitants" (DCB). Ill health forced his resignation in the summer of 1796.

On 10 November 1796 he was appointed commander of the recently captured island of San Domingo. He returned to England in July 1797, again in ill health. In 1801 he commanded at Plymouth when Napoleon's invasion was expected. In July 1806 he was named commander in chief in India but, his health broken, he took sick on the way out, returned home, and died at Exeter on 26 October 1806.

Simcoe's self-published *Journal of the Operations of the Queen's Rangers*, released in Exeter in 1787) was "the outstanding tactical study of the *petite guerre* to emerge from the eighteenth-century American wars, an invaluable training and tactical manual for officers soon to be engaged with the light forces of the French revolutionary armies" (ODNB). It is also a valuable historical account, particularly for the host of skirmishes in which he participated.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SIMITIERE, PIERRE-EUGÈNE DU.

(1736–1784). Artist. Switzerland Born in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1736, Simitiere went to the West Indies when he was about fourteen years old. He settled in Philadelphia in 1766. Around 1779 he drew the portraits of Commander in Chief George Washington, Friedrich Wilhelm Augustus von Steuben, Silas Deane, Joseph Reed, Gouverneur Morris, John Dickinson, Benedict Arnold, and many other prominent Americans. Engraved in Paris, published there in 1781, pirated in England (1783), and reprinted many times, Simitiere's engravings became the standard visual portraits of the Revolutionary leadership. Simitiere was an avid collector of natural curiosities, books, and pamphlets. In 1782 he opened his celebrated collection to the public as the "American Museum" in Philadelphia, where he died in October 1784.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

SIMSBURY MINES, CONNECTICUT.

Abandoned copper mines, ten miles northwest of Hartford, where Loyalist prisoners were incarcerated.

Mark M. Boatner

SKENE, PHILIP. (1725–1810). Loyalist. Born in London on 9 January 1725, Skene entered the First Royal Regiment in 1741 and was in the Battles of Cartagena, Porto Bello, Dettingen, Fontenoy, and Culloden, where he was wounded. In 1750 he was promoted to lieutenant and in 1756 to captain. He served under William Lord Howe in the failed attack on Ticonderoga in 1758, again being wounded. The following year he acted with great heroism during General Jeffrey Amherst's capture of Ticonderoga and prevented the explosion of the fort's powder magazine. For this action he was promoted to major and took part in the subsequent operations against Martinique and Havana. In 1762 he was made provost marshal of Havana.

With Amherst's support, Skene in 1759 received the first of several land grants that would eventually total fifty thousand acres on Lake Champlain. In 1763 he brought 270 veterans of the Cuban campaign to Wood Creek, settling them as his tenants. He founded Skenesboro (later Whitehall), New York, in 1765 and was named colonel of militia in 1768, selling his British officer's commission the following year. Part of his domain lay in the Hampshire Grants (later Vermont), and in the controversy between New York and the region's settlers, Skene sided with New York. In this matter he shared cause with Philip Schuyler, whom he had known during the campaigns of 1758. By 1774 he had a flourishing little wilderness empire with sawmills, foundries, and shipyards, and he planned to end the land dispute in the Green Mountains by creating a new colony based at Skenesboro. Skene went to England that year, gaining appointment as lieutenant governor of Ticonderoga and Crown Point as the first step toward the creation of a new province.

But events interfered with his plans. After Ethan Allen captured Ticonderoga on 10 May 1775, he sent a force to seize Skenesboro, taking Skene's son and daughters prisoner. When Skene landed in Philadelphia in June 1775, he was immediately arrested and sent to internment

in Connecticut. He was exchanged in October 1776 and returned to England, then coming back to join Burgoyne's offensive on Lake Champlain. Although he expected to assume his duties as governor of the region, he became Burgoyne's principal Loyalist adviser and in this capacity—much resented by the other Loyalists—he took part in subsequent military operations. Skene gave Burgoyne two disastrous pieces of advice: that most New Yorkers were loyal to the crown and would rise up to join Burgoyne as he advanced, and that the British forces should march overland to the Hudson via Skenesboro rather than taking the quicker and easier route on Lake George. Many contemporaries became convinced that Skene made the latter recommendation in order for Burgoyne's forces to build a road from Ticonderoga to Skenesboro. The ensuing military route through the woods and swamps became known as Skene's Road. He accompanied the Bennington raid in August 1777 and showed personal courage in the portion of that operation known as Breymann's defeat, escaping in the confusion and finding his way back to Burgoyne's main force.

Skene was paroled in 1778 and returned to England. The following year New York confiscated his property, for which he received £20,350 from the crown. Skene spent the remainder of his life in England, dying there on 9 June 1810.

SEE ALSO *Bennington Raid; Burgoyne's Offensive; Ticonderoga, New York, American Capture of.*

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SKENESBORO, NEW YORK. Later Whitehall, New York. 6 July 1777. After John Burgoyne closed in on Ticonderoga on 2–5 July, Arthur St. Clair evacuated the position during the night of 5–6 July. He led the main body of American troops overland to Castleton, intending to continue to Skenesboro. Colonel Pierce Long commanded those retreating by water directly to Skenesboro using the five armed vessels that remained of the Champlain squadron and 220 small boats. Long had some 450 effectives escorting the invalids and all stores and artillery that could be saved. Leaving Ticonderoga shortly after midnight, he made two tactical errors that jeopardized his operation: (1) assuming that the boom and bridge between Ticonderoga and Mount Independence would delay pursuit, he took his time sailing up the lake;

and (2) he made no attempt to set up positions along the winding watercourse to check the enemy's advance.

Burgoyne needed less than half an hour to shoot his way through the undefended obstacle, and by 3 P.M. his pursuing squadron was only three miles from Skenesboro, where Long had landed two hours earlier. In a piecemeal commitment, Burgoyne put three regiments (the Ninth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first Foot) ashore in South Bay to move overland and cut off Long's retreat south from Skenesboro; he then continued with the rest of his force by water to attack Skenesboro from the north by way of Wood Creek. But since Burgoyne did not give the enveloping force enough time to get into position, Long escaped the trap. Setting fire to everything that would burn, Long hurried south toward Fort Anne with the 150 men of his rear guard as Burgoyne approached Skenesboro. This moment marked the end of the American naval presence on the lakes during the war. The British captured the galley *Trumbull* (10 guns) and schooner *Revenge* (8), but Long was able to successfully burn or blow up the sloop *Enterprise* (12), the schooner *Liberty* (8), and the galley *Gates* (4).

Early on 7 July, Lieutenant Colonel Hill pursued with his Ninth Regiment. That led to its near annihilation at Fort Anne on 8 July.

Long's poor management of his part of the evacuation from Ticonderoga deprived the Americans of time they should have been able to gain in delaying Burgoyne's offensive. It also forced St. Clair to make a seven-day detour with the main body to bypass captured Skenesboro.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne, John; Burgoyne's Offensive; Champlain Squadrons; Fort Anne, New York; St. Clair, Arthur; Ticonderoga, New York, British Capture of.*

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SKINNER, CORTLANDT. (1728–1799). Loyalist officer. New Jersey. Related to prominent families of New Jersey and New York, Skinner served briefly as attorney general of New Jersey in 1775. As speaker of the assembly, he cast the deciding vote to petition King George for a redress of grievances in an effort to avoid more radical measures. As a major of Loyalist troops he was captured, and in September 1776 he and Governor Montfort Browne of New Providence in the Bahamas were exchanged for General William Alexander. The British

then made him a brigadier general of provincials, and he was authorized to raise a body of Loyalists. These were organized into the several battalions of Skinner's Brigade (one commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Abram Van Buskirk). After the war he was put on half pay as a brigadier general for life. Skinner died in Bristol, England, in 1799. One of his daughters married Sir William Robinson, commissary general of the British army, and another married Field Marshal Sir George Nugent. His son, Philip Kearny Skinner, was a British lieutenant general in 1825.

SEE ALSO *Cowboys and Skinners.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

SKINNERS **SEE** *Cowboys and Skinners.*

SMALLWOOD, WILLIAM. (1732–1792). Continental general. Maryland. Born in Charles County, Maryland, in 1732, William Smallwood went to school in England and served in the Seven Years' War. In 1761 he was a delegate from Charles County to the Maryland assembly, where he served until 1774, doing particularly important work on the Arms and Ammunition Committee. A staunch patriot, Smallwood attended the Maryland Provincial Congresses of 1774, 1775, and 1776.

On 14 January 1776 Smallwood was commissioned as a colonel and raised the unit that was to become famous as Smallwood's Maryland Battalion (or Regiment). Smallwood and his unit left Annapolis on 10 July 1776 and marched to join Washington's army in New York. Smallwood's troops distinguished themselves in the battle of Long Island on 27 August, fighting under General William Alexander on the American right flank, but was, at the time, under the leadership of Mordecai Gist. (Smallwood himself was absent on court-martial duty in New York City during this action, which established the reputation of his regiment). Smallwood was wounded while leading his battalion at White Plains on 28 October, where the troops again distinguished themselves in several phases of that battle.

Promoted to brigadier general on 23 October, Smallwood's had not recovered from his wounds in time for him to take part in the New Jersey campaign, and in December he was sent to raise new levies in Maryland and Delaware, and to suppress a Loyalist uprising on the Eastern Shore in Virginia. His brigade was left south of the Schuylkill River in September 1777, with orders to

cooperate with General Anthony Wayne's Brigade in retarding the British advance on Philadelphia, but Wayne's disaster at Paoli, Pennsylvania, on 21 September, ended this strategy before it could start.

In the battle of Germantown, Pennsylvania, on 4 October, Smallwood commanded a militia force that he criticized bitterly for lacking skill and discipline. When the army went into winter quarters at Valley Forge, Smallwood was given command of General John Sullivan's division and ordered to Wilmington, Delaware, with the mission of protecting supplies at Head of Elk (a settlement in Maryland). In addition, he was ordered to observe British movements in the Chesapeake Bay. In April 1780 he marched with Johann de Kalb's command to take part in operations in the Southern theater. In reserve at the start of the disastrous battle of Camden, South Carolina, on 16 August 1780, he was separated from his brigade and swept to the rear by the flood of fugitives. With de Kalb's death, Smallwood became division commander, and was appointed major general on 15 September. When General Freidrich von Steuben was made his immediate commander, Smallwood objected to serving under a foreigner and threatened to resign. General Nathanael Greene solved the problem by sending Smallwood to Maryland to raise troops and assemble supplies, and Smallwood won praise for his energy in both these tasks. He remained in the service until 15 November 1783. He declined to accept when he was elected as a delegate to Congress on 4 December 1784, but was elected governor the next year and served three consecutive one-year terms. In 1791 he was elected to the state senate, serving as its president until his death on 14 February 1792.

SEE ALSO *Long Island, New York, Battle of; White Plains, New York.*

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SMITH, FRANCIS. (1723–1791). British officer. Commissioned lieutenant in the Royal Fusiliers on 25 April 1741, he became captain in the Tenth Foot on 23 June 1747 and on 16 January 1762 became brevetted lieutenant colonel of the regiment. The next month he was promoted to lieutenant colonel, and in 1767 he took the regiment to America. Known for his girth and caution,

Smith was promoted to brevetted colonel on 8 September 1775. His seniority in the Boston garrison seems to have been his only qualification for selection to command the expedition to Lexington and Concord. Having received a serious leg wound in the action at Fiske Hill, outside Concord, on 19 April 1775, he applied for retirement in August but was retained in the service and promoted. Before the end of the year he became colonel and aide-de-camp to the king. As a local brigadier general he showed as little skill at Dorchester Heights in March 1776 as he had at Concord. He commanded a brigade at Long Island in August 1776 and at Quaker Hill in the Battle of Rhode Island in August 1778. Before the end of the year his regiment returned to England to recruit and reform. He was promoted to major general in 1779 and lieutenant general in 1787. The unanswered question is why.

SEE ALSO *Dorchester Heights, Massachusetts; Lexington and Concord; Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778).*

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SMITH, JAMES. (1719–1806). Signer. Ireland–Pennsylvania. Born in Ireland, 17 Sept. 1719, Smith and his family settled in York Co., Pennsylvania in 1729. James was schooled in Philadelphia, admitted to the bar in 1745, and soon thereafter he became a lawyer and surveyor on the frontier near Shippensburg. Four or five years later he returned to York, which remained his home for the rest of his life. Although the only lawyer in town until 1769, he found little legal work and in 1771 he launched an unsuccessful iron manufacturing business that cost him £5,000 before he sold out in 1778. Meanwhile he had become a leader of the backcountry and Patriot causes. In July 1774 he read his "Essay on the Constitutional Power of Great Britain over the colonies in America" to the provincial conference. He also urged nonimportation and advocated that a general congress of the colonies be called. Returning to York full of revolutionary zeal, in Dec. 1774 he raised a volunteer company, was elected its captain, expanded this unit into a battalion, and accepted the honorary title of colonel. He was a delegate to the provincial congresses of Jan. 1775, June 1776, and in the constitutional convention of 1776 he was on the committee that drafted a state constitution. On 20 July, before the state convention had been in session a week, he was elected to the

Continental Congress where he signed the Declaration of Independence. He did not return to Congress for the next session, but was re-elected on 10 December 1777 and sat as a delegate the next year. He declined re-election, but thanks to the efforts of General Howe the Continental Congress came to him, and while that body met in York the board of war held its meetings in Smith's office.

He held a number of political posts after the war, was brigadier general of militia in 1782, and was counselor for his state in the Wyoming Valley controversy. Between 1781 and his retirement in 1801 he acquired a substantial estate through the practice of law. He died in York, 11 July 1806.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

SMITH, JOSHUA HETT. (1736–1818). Lawyer. New York. A son of William Smith, Joshua Smith was a successful lawyer in the tradition of his father and elder brother, Chief Justice William Smith. Although his father and brother were suspected of having Loyalist sympathies, Joshua was an active Patriot, a member of the New York Provincial Congress, and a member of the militia. His wife was from South Carolina, and he had met General Robert Howe in Charleston in 1778. When the latter assumed command at West Point, Smith directed Howe's secret service. When Arnold succeeded Howe, he asked Smith to continue his intelligence work. Thus it was that Smith became—apparently in all innocence—a key actor in the events connected with Arnold's treasonous activities. Although acquitted of any part in Arnold's treason on 26 October 1780, Smith was imprisoned by New York authorities as a suspected Loyalist. In May 1781 he escaped from the Goshen jail, reached New York City the next month, and was given a stipend of one dollar a day by the British. Late in November 1783 he went to England, and in 1801 he returned to the United States. Although his property had not been confiscated, he had lost most of his fortune. Though returning to his legal practice, he never attained much prominence, and he died in New York City in 1818.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason; Smith, William (I); Smith, William (II).*

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SMITH, WILLIAM (I). (1697–1769). Colonial jurist. New York. Born in Buckinghamshire on 8 October 1697, Smith was the son of a tallow chandler who brought his family from England to New York in 1715. Smith graduated from Yale in 1719 and three years later received his master of arts degree. He remained at Yale as a tutor until April 1724, when he turned down the position of rector and moved to New York, becoming a member of the bar. Smith became a prominent attorney and ally of the Livingstons, joining their battle against the governor's authority and the De Lancey family. His most famous case was that of the printer John Peter Zenger from 1734 to 1736. For his role in defending Zenger's right to publish, Smith and his partner, James Alexander, were disbarred, leaving Zenger to look outside New York for his next attorney, Andrew Hamilton of Philadelphia. It took two years, but Smith and Alexander finally won readmission to the bar through the intercession of the assembly. In 1760 he declined the office of chief justice of New York, since it was to be held at the pleasure of the governor, but was associate justice of the supreme court from 1763 until his death in New York City on 22 November 1769. By his first wife, Mary, daughter of René and Blanche (Du Bois) Het, he had fifteen children, including William (II) and Joshua Hett Smith.

SEE ALSO *Smith, Joshua Hett; Smith, William (II).*

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SMITH, WILLIAM (II). (1728–1793). Jurist, historian, Loyalist. Eldest son of William Smith (I), he graduated from Yale in 1745, studied law in his father's office with William Livingston, was admitted to the bar in 1750, and in partnership with Livingston became a highly successful lawyer. At the request of the state authorities, he and Livingston compiled the *Laws of New-York from the Year 1691 to 1751, Inclusive (1752)* and *Laws of New-York . . . 1752–1762 (1762)*; these were the first two digests of New York statutes. With Livingston and John Morin Scott, he wrote *A Review of the Military Operations in North America: From . . . 1753, to . . . 1756 (1757)*; reprinted in 1801, this was a defense of Governor William Shirley and a criticism of James De Lancey, Thomas Pownall, and Sir

William Johnson. Smith is best-known for his *History of the Late Province of New York* (2 vols., 1829), which evolved from his *History . . . of New-York to the Year 1732* (1757), and to which Smith subsequently added a continuation to the year 1762. His "Historical Memoirs," which extend to the year 1783 and exist in six manuscript volumes in the New York Public Library, have been said by the historian Richard B. Morris to be essential for comprehending New York's situation at the time of the Revolution.

The chief justice of New York from 1763 to 1782 (nominally), and his father's successor on the royal council in 1767, Smith had a career during the Revolution that Morris has described as politically unique. When in 1777 he refused to give the test oath, he was ordered to Livingston Manor on the Hudson, and when he again refused the next year, he was banished to British-occupied New York City.

Smith was the most original and subtle of the Loyalist political thinkers. From 1767 until 1778 he positioned himself as "a loyal Wigg, one of King William's Wiggs, for Liberty and the Constitution," knowing full well that in the colonies Whigs were, at the minimum, staunch opponents of taxation by Parliament and executive undermining of provincial self-government (Upton, p. 110). He pursued a two-pronged strategy to preserve both liberty and empire.

First, he devised and privately circulated a constitutional treatise proposing that the British Constitution, as applied to the colonies, "ought to bend and sooner or later will bend" to accommodate the political maturity and continental extent of British North America. Projecting from Benjamin Franklin's work on colonial demography and predicting that the American population would double every generation, he anticipated the moment, sometime in the mid-nineteenth century, when the capitol of the empire would move west from London to New York. Counseling patience, he argued for awaiting that eventual shift in the balance of power within the empire.

The second prong of his loyal Whiggery was to become, as a member of the royal council, the gray eminence behind New York's royal governor, William Tryon. In that role he detached Tryon from the De Lancey faction in the distribution of land grants and then guided Tryon through the Tea Act crisis without violence.

In January 1776 he admitted the collapse of both strategies. No colonial politician or British statesman embraced his proposals for constitutional reform of the empire. Smith's "Thoughts as a Rule for My Own Conduct at This Melancholy Hour of Approaching Distress" condemned both British policy and American rebelliousness. His behind-the-scenes role exhausted, he told his neighbors on the Haverstraw, New York, Committee of Safety on 4 July 1776 that he could not endorse the measures of the Second Continental Congress

because "I persuade myself that Great Britain will discern the propriety of negotiating for a pacification."

Patriot officials in New York waited until 1778 to force the issue, and when the summons came to commit himself, Smith slipped quietly into the New York City garrison town where Lord North's negotiators on the Carlisle Peace Commission were sampling opinion on the subject of reconciliation. One of the commissioners took the measure of Smith's character and politics: "he is subtle, cool & persuasive [but] he may be secured [to the British side] by an application to his ambition."

General Henry Clinton tried, but Smith remained elusive. Nonetheless, and in contrast with his friend and fellow moderate, William Samuel Johnson, who made peace with the Connecticut state government in 1779, Smith had already burned his bridges. General Guy Carleton, Clinton's successor in 1782, shared Smith's hope for an eleventh-hour reconciliation, but nothing came of it, and in 1783 Smith went into exile in England. The ministry rewarded him with the chief justiceship of Quebec, where he died in 1793. Joshua Hett Smith was a brother of William (II).

SEE ALSO *Carleton, Guy; Clinton, Henry; De Lancey, James; Johnson, Sir William; Livingston, William; Pownall, Thomas; Shirley, William; Smith, Joshua Hett; Smith, William (I); Test Oath.*

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revised by Robert M. Calhoon

SMITH'S POINT, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK *SEE Fort George, Long Island, New York.*

SOLDIERS' RATIONS. Prussian King Frederick the Great wrote in 1747, "The foundation of an army is the belly." Major General Henry Knox weighed in on the subject in 1781: "To subsist an Army well, requires the utmost attention and exertion. Unless an Army is properly fed, all calculations and schemes of enterprize are in vain. . . . Experience has often convinced

us of the truth of this assertion, and some times at too dear a rate." These lessons were quickly learned by Revolutionary soldiers. Private Joseph Plumb Martin recalled an incident while serving in the Connecticut militia in New York in 1776: "Having had nothing to eat for forty-eight hours . . . one of the men . . . complained of being hungry. The colonel, putting his hand into his coat pocket, took out a piece of an ear of Indian corn burnt as black as a coal. 'Here,' said he . . . 'eat this and learn to be a soldier.'" Later, Martin happily devoured broiled fresh beef "black as coal on the outside and . . . raw on the inside," a meal that, Delaware Captain Enoch Anderson noted, "to hungry soldiers . . . tasted sweet." But poor or inadequate provisions were hardly the everyday lot, and commanders did all they could to provide troops decent, sustaining food.

DIET

A British memorandum found at Yorktown, Virginia, in October 1781, listed Major General Charles Lord Cornwallis's soldiers' daily allowance: one pound beef or nine ounces pork, one pound of flour or bread, three-sevenths pint of peas, and one-sixth quart "Rum or Spirits." A half pint of oatmeal or rice and 6 ounces of butter for seven days was also issued. The document also noted, "Since the troops have been upon this island, spruce beer has been issued at 8 quarts for 7 days. N.B. When the small species are not delivered, 12 oz of pork are allowed." "Small species" for British troops at Yorktown included sugar, chocolate, and coffee. Sauerkraut was also issued on occasion to British troops to minimize the effects of scurvy for soldiers in garrison or winter quarters.

Continental army rations mirrored the British model, but provisions were constantly modified. In July 1777 Major General William Heath ordered that rations include beer, butter, and "1 Jill of Rum Pr. Man each Day on Fatigue" as well as "Vinegar occasionally." After a winter at Valley Forge spent eating mostly meat and flour, in April fish, bacon, and "Pease, or Beans" were added to the daily ration; four months later both soft and hard breads (biscuit), as well as butter, were being issued. For seven months in 1780, New Jersey troops received extraordinary state stores consisting of rum, sugar, and coffee in substantial quantities and small amounts of chocolate, tea, pepper, and vinegar.

Further variation in the soldiers' diet was possible through the purchase of foodstuff from sutlers or local farmers at camp markets. George Washington noted in the summer of 1777 that "nothing can be more comfortable and wholesome to the army than vegetables, [and] every encouragement is to be given to the Country people, to bring them in." A large variety of items were available at these markets for those soldiers who had money to spend or items to barter. An August 1777 document listed "the Prices

of Articles sold in Camp," among them butter, "Mutton & Lamb," veal, milk, potatoes, squashes, "Beans or Peas in the Pod," cucumbers, "Pig[s] for roasting," and "Turnips Carrits & Beets." A 1779 order regulating "the prises of fresh Provisions, spirits, and shugar, and so forth, Hereafter to be given to farmers and others, seling to the army," included many of the items above, as well as turkeys; geese; ducks; "Dunghill fowls"; chickens; cheese; eggs; cabbage heads; "Sallets, Carrats, Pasnips"; lump, loaf, and brown sugar; honey; and vinegar plus a variety of beverages.

Foraging, authorized or not, was always an option. In 1778 at the Gulph in Pennsylvania, orders for Jackson's Additional Regiment stated, "Complaint has been made by many of the Inhabitants near this post of their Spring Houses being broke open & large quantities of Butter, Cheese, Bread & many other valuable articles stole from them, and it is strongly suspected these Robberies have been committed by some of the soldiers." From near Woodbridge, New Jersey, Colonel Israel Shreve wrote his wife: "I Rode All over this Village through the Gardens in search of Asparigas [but] found none, All the Beds being Cut that Day by the soldiers."

COOKING METHODS

Early in the war, General Washington set forth what he considered proper cooking methods:

Head-Quarters, Middle-Brook [New Jersey], June 2, 1777. . . . Each regiment, or corps to appoint, by rotation, a regimental officer of the day . . . to inspect the food of the men, both as to the quality and the manner of dressing it, obliging the men to accustom themselves more to boiled meats and soups, and less to broiled and roasted, which as a constant diet, is destructive to their health. (Fitzpatrick, ed. *Writings*, 8, p. 171)

The only army-issue cooking and eating utensils were tin or sheet-iron camp kettles, with one wooden bowl per kettle, iron pots and wooden trenchers for garrison quarters or barracks, and usually inadequate supplies of spoons. In January 1777 Colonel Timothy Pickering described a typical kettle-cooked meal: "for two thirds of the week flour was dealt out, which the soldiers made, some into cakes, and some into dumplings, boiled with their meat."

Lacking kettles, soldiers were forced to prepare their rations crudely. Private Elijah Fisher recounted in November 1777 that

we had no tents nor anithing to Cook our Provisions in and that was Prity Poor for beef was very leen and no salt nor any way to Cook it but to throw it on the Coles and brile it and the warter we had to Drink and to mix our flower with was out of a brook that run along by the Camps and so many dippin and washin [in] it maid it very Dirty and muddy. (p. 7)

The same month Connecticut surgeon Jonathan Todd described the firecake commonly eaten in such circumstances: "Our Flower we Wet with Water & Roll it in dirt & Ashes to bake it in a Horrible Manner."

British and German troops cooked the same way when campaigning. A British officer told of raw beef being issued the men under Major General John Burgoyne in New York during 1777, "which they eat, dressed upon wood ashes, without either bread or salt." German Sergeant Berthold Koch of the Regiment Von Bose, described the period following the Battle of Guilford Courthouse in 1781:

We remained on the battlefield for three days, under the open skies without tents . . . each man, officers as well as privates, received four measures of corn instead of bread and for meat, such cattle as the enemy had left behind. . . . We placed the corn on the fire to cook it. Then it was taken from the container and eaten. The meat was either boiled or roasted on sticks and eaten. . . . On 20 March we began our withdrawal. . . . We marched eighteen miles each day. . . . At evening we camped and the royal militia brought us cattle and some flour. The cattle were slaughtered and the meat was cooked or roasted and the flour made into cakes and cooked on a board in the fire. (Burgoyne, *Enemy Views*, pp. 450–451)

They marched north, and "on 5 April we went to Williamsburg in Virginia. . . . We received a double ration of rum each day at that place and our full provision of meat and ship's bread."

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John U. Rees

SOLDIERS' SHELTER. Tents were the preferred method for sheltering troops in moderate weather during the Revolutionary War. They were described by Quartermaster General Timothy Pickering as "the most expensive & essential article of camp equipage," and tent size, quality, and availability were important considerations for both sides throughout the war.

British army tents were more or less standardized, as was the number of soldiers apportioned to a tent. Lewis Lochee's *Essay on Castrametation* (1778) noted British soldiers' tents "are large enough to lodge 5 men" and stated their size as "about 6 feet high . . . [and] about 7 feet long." Lochee's camp layout indicates a common tent length of nine feet, perhaps adding two extra feet for a belled storage extension at the tent's rear. British officers preferred marquee or wall tents, but on campaign many used common tents or brush wigwams.

Following chronic standardization problems, in January 1781 the Continental army "Soldiers Tent" dimensions were set at "7 Feet Square [and] 7 Feet Height." The next year large numbers of French tents were imported; French common tents being larger, they were able to house eight or nine men. Most often used were common tents for the rank and file (and occasionally officers), horseman's and wall tents (usually for staff and company officers), and marquee tents (for generals and field officers). Several other variations, such as half-wall, square, and bell (for musket storage) tents, were used to a lesser degree.

In August 1777 Major General John Sullivan apportioned to his division "a tent to each Field officer, one to two Commissioned & Staff officers, one to 4 Serjts & one to 6 Privates including Corporals, as Well as Waggoners weomen &c." The American army allotment of May 1779 was even more detailed:

- One Marquee and one Horseman's tent for the Field Officers.
- One horseman's tent for the officers of each company.
- One Wall'd tent for the Adjutant.

- One ditto for the Quarter Master.
- One ditto for the Surgeon and Mate.
- One ditto for the Pay-Master.
- One common tent for Serjeant Majr. and Qr. Mastr. Serjeant.
- One ditto for the Fife and Drum Major.
- One ditto for the non commissioned officers of each company
- and one for every six privates including Drums and Fifes. (*Writings of George Washington*, pp. 162–163)

Soldiers occasionally built makeshift shelters when tents were unavailable due to supply shortages or lack of transportation. American soldiers' names for such dwellings included "brush Hutt," "bush housen," and "hemlock bowhouses." While differences in construction existed among them, all the aforesaid shelters were enclosed lodgings with frames made of cut trees or tree limbs and covered with leafy branches or pine boughs. There were other shelter types. A "booth" seems to have referred to an open lean-to; sheds were similar in construction to brush huts but covered with milled lumber, fence rails, corn-shocks, or straw. Bowers were flat-topped structures used primarily for sun protection, though there are indications some bowers were built as lean-tos for both overnight shelter and shade. British soldiers began using ad hoc campaign shelters as early as 1776, building them more often and relying upon their shelter for longer periods (for example, in the Philadelphia campaign of 1777 and late-war southern campaigns) than did their Continental army counterparts. British troops used both bowers and "wigwams," the latter a popular appellation probably begun as a derogatory term for any ad hoc shelter; as the war progressed, wigwams (usually some form of brush hut) became customarily adopted as a useful and acceptable alternative to tents.

In wintertime both armies resorted to soldier-built log huts, with barracks and local civilian housing used as occasion allowed. The Valley Forge huts varied in design but were supposed to adhere to stipulated measurements. New Jersey Ensign George Ewing described the living quarters:

the huts eighteen by sixteen feet long six feet to the eves built of loggs and covered with staves / the chimney in the east end the door in the South side / the Officers huts in the rear of the mens / twelve men in each hut and two cores of Officers in a hut. (*Military Journal*, pp. 25–26)

A study of two Continental soldiers' diaries covering the years from 1776 to 1781 gives some idea of campaign shelter trends. On 979 days shelter was mentioned (not

including winter camps). Of these, on 699 nights (71 percent) tents were used, while the men slept in buildings for 111 nights (11 percent). Of the rest, 98 nights (10 percent) were spent in the open, 36 (4 percent) were spent in makeshift shelters, and 35 (4 percent) were spent on shipboard. The light troops of both sides tended to live without tents more often than other troops.

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John U. Rees

SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT. The Boston Committee of Correspondence, headed by Samuel Adams, sent a circular letter to Massachusetts towns dated 8 June 1774, in which it asked all adults "to suspend all commercial intercourse" with Britain from 31 August until the Boston Port Act (by which Britain had closed the port of Boston for all shipping) was repealed. To emphasize the seriousness of the matter, and in an appeal to memories of the religious covenants to which the first settlers had subscribed, the committee dubbed its request a "solemn league and covenant," and threatened to publish the names of those people who did not comply, whom it termed "protesters." Merchants throughout Massachusetts objected to the committee's request, because they could not stop the shipment of goods from their British suppliers in time

Somerset Courthouse

to meet the deadline and would thus be stuck with merchandise they could not sell. The request failed to garner widespread support, forcing Adams and the Boston radicals to defer the issues of nonimportation and nonconsumption to the Continental Congress, which was scheduled to meet at Philadelphia in September 1774.

SEE ALSO *Adams, Samuel.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SOMERSET COURTHOUSE. On the Millstone River about halfway between Morristown and Trenton, Somerset Courthouse (later Millstone) figured prominently in New Jersey's military operations. Washington's army spent the night there after the Princeton victory on 3 January 1777, skirmishes took place there while the rebels were in their Morristown Winter Quarters from January to May 1777, and British forces occupied the village during their perplexing "June Maneuvers" of the Philadelphia campaign of 1777. More notably, on 20 January 1777, General Philemon Dickinson led New Jersey militia in a daring encounter with Cornwallis's troops. On 17 June 1777 Colonel Daniel Morgan's riflemen and other light troops attacked the British redoubts being built at that time. John Simcoe conducted a successful raid against this place but was captured on 17 October 1779 as he withdrew.

SEE ALSO *Dickinson, Philemon; Philadelphia Campaign; Simcoe, John Graves.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

SONS OF LIBERTY. When colonists came together in 1765 to protest and nullify the Stamp Act, they called their organization the Sons of Liberty. They took their name from Isaac Barré's speech of 6 February 1765 in the House of Commons opposing that act. Barré had closed his remarks with a reference to the colonists as "the sons of liberty."

In the name of liberty, the Sons were responsible for many acts of mob violence aimed at intimidating those who wished to remain loyal to the king, including the

application of hot tar and feathers to the bodies of those whose conception of liberty did not suit their own. A mob inspired by, although not operating under the direction of, the Boston Sons of Liberty on 26 August 1765 burned the records of the local vice admiralty court, ransacked the homes of the comptroller of the currency, and looted the home and library of Governor Thomas Hutchinson. The effectiveness of this sort of intimidation, even when threats were not accompanied by violence, is shown by the fact that all stamp agents in the colonies had resigned before the Stamp Act was supposed to become law (1 November 1765).

SEE ALSO *Tar and Feathers.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

SOUTH AMBOY, NEW JERSEY SEE *Amboy, New Jersey.*

SOUTH CAROLINA, FLAG OF. "As there was no national flag at the time [Sept. 1775]," wrote William Moultrie in his *Memoirs*, "I was desired by the [Charleston] Council of Safety to have one made, upon which, as the state troops were clothed in blue, and the fort [Fort Johnson on James Island] was garrisoned by the first and second regiments, who wore a silver crescent on the front of their caps, I had a large blue flag made, with a crescent in the dexter corner. . . . This was the first American flag displayed in the South."

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Mark M. Boatner

SOUTH CAROLINA, MOBILIZATION IN. When South Carolinians faced the imperial crisis of the 1770s, they did so as a divided people. South Carolina was geographically divided into two regions: a coastal low country of plantations worked by the colony's slave majority, where life centered on the social, cultural, and political capital, Charleston; and the

back country, populated largely by recent immigrants from the northern colonies. Lacking proportional representation in the colonial assembly, and having belatedly received an effective judicial system, back country settlers harbored more grievances against low country Carolinians than they did against British rule.

In the low country resided the wealthiest men in the thirteen colonies. Though their wealth depended on rice and indigo, crops whose value was tied directly to British trade, these men resisted the tightening of imperial control with self-confidence born of their command over the environment, the colony, and their slaves.

It has been difficult for historians to determine why some Carolinians chose loyalty and others chose rebellion. Ethnicity played some role, as Scots in the low country and Germans in the back country tended to support royal rule. Before the disestablishment of the Anglican church, religious dissenters in the backcountry were skeptical of the Revolution. In the back country, the political decision of an influential man often meant the difference between the local population choosing to remain loyal or to embrace revolution. Some low country Carolinians supported opposition to parliamentary acts but not the independence that came in 1776. What is clear is that South Carolinians were more politically divided than most other Americans. After the British largely conquered the province in 1780, these divisions produced the bitterest fighting of the American Revolution.

SOUTH CAROLINA MOBILIZES (1775)

Revolutionary mobilization began in earnest when news of the battles of Lexington and Concord reached South Carolina. In response, the colony's Provincial Congress met from 1–22 June 1775. The provincial militia, divided into twelve infantry regiments drawn from different districts, provided a ready-made source of mobilization. Members of the congress, however, worried about the allegiance of some militia officers and units. These concerns eventually led to a decision to drop some officers and to draft volunteers to serve in the militia ranks. In the June session, these concerns led to the formation of a volunteer army led by appointed, gentleman officers. The resulting military establishment revealed the low country's political control—despite having less than forty percent of the province's population, the low country possessed seventy percent of the seats in congress. The congress established two 750-man infantry regiments in the low country, and a back country regiment of 450 mounted rangers.

Later in the session the congress opted to cut expenses, and reduced the infantry regiments to ten fifty-man companies and the regiment of rangers to nine thirty-man companies. To meet projected expenses for pay and

supplies, the delegates opted to issue £1,000,000 currency rather than levy taxes. In other moves that placed the province on the path to military conflict with Britain, the congress authorized the seizure of weapons and gunpowder from the colony's magazine, and gunpowder from vessels headed to Georgia and East Florida. Before convening, the delegates left virtually unlimited executive authority in the hands of a thirteen-member Council of Safety, which oversaw regular and militia forces.

In July the Council of Safety ordered the seizure of arms and ammunition at Fort Charlotte, a post on the Savannah River. Though the operation was carried out successfully, loyal militia recaptured the arms. The Council of Safety first tried diplomacy to calm matters. Additional unrest in November produced a different response. The Provincial Congress, which was then in session, ordered the back country militia to embody and defeat the Loyalists. Colonel Ralph Richardson of Camden raised a force of 2,500 men, which included some North Carolina units, and conducted operations that ended the Loyalist threat in the back country for the next four years. The December "snow campaign" demonstrated that revolutionaries could quickly mobilize a sizable backcountry force, despite numerous Loyalists in the region.

FURTHER MOBILIZATION

(1775–1776)

While the Provincial Congress acted aggressively to end Loyalist unrest, it also made changes to its earlier military establishment. In November 1775, the representatives created the Fourth South Carolina Regiment of Artillery, a smaller regiment with three 100-man companies, to man the batteries at Charleston. Additional changes occurred three months later. On 22 February the congress authorized the original three regiments to augment their numbers until they reached full strength. The congress also established two new regiments of riflemen in the low country and back country respectively: The Fifth South Carolina, with seven 100-man companies, and the Sixth South Carolina, with five 100-man companies.

In 1776 the state's regiments were transferred to the Continental army, but only after negotiations with the Continental Congress. The state had already met Congress's quota of five infantry regiments, but complications over different enlistment periods and pay schedules compelled the Council of Safety to resist full incorporation of its army into the Continental line. In June 1776, Congress adopted South Carolina's regiments into the Continental army, but kept the soldiers under the state's articles of war and their original terms of enlistment. In a concession to concerns over the defense of South Carolina, more than one-third of its troops could not be sent outside the state without the prior approval of Congress.

A BRITISH ATTACK AND A CHEROKEE WAR (1776)

In June 1776, South Carolina's ability to mobilize faced a major test with the arrival of a British expeditionary force. Manning the defenses of Charleston were 6,500 soldiers, most of whom were South Carolina regulars and militia. On 28 June, the British directed a naval attack against Sullivan's Island, where the Carolinians had constructed a fort of palmetto logs and sand. The defenders of this fort, Colonel William Moultrie and 435 men of the Second South Carolina Regiment and the Fourth Regiment of Artillery, stood firm, inflicting major damage on the British ships. Charleston did not face another British attack for almost three years.

Soon after the British departed, a new threat broke out in South Carolina's interior. The Cherokees openly sided with the British and initiated a frontier war. Sensing an opportunity to eliminate the Cherokees, South Carolina's back country militia quickly mobilized. Joining this force were Carolinians who either had been neutral or slightly pro-British but now united against the threat back country settlers feared most. In August Colonel Andrew Williamson, at the head of about 1,200 militia, attacked and devastated the lower Cherokee towns. Williamson then joined militia from North Carolina and Virginia in laying waste to upper Cherokee towns. The Cherokees ceased to be a major threat. In 1777 they signed a treaty that ceded all their lands in South Carolina.

South Carolinians took great pride in the victories of 1776. Long an internal threat, the Cherokees had been eliminated. Despite the assistance of North Carolina Continentals and militia and the leadership of overall commander Major General Charles Lee, most of the forces defending Charleston had been South Carolina regulars and militia. The victory at Sullivan's Island resulted from equal parts British incompetence and Carolina pluck, but South Carolinians chose to remember the latter and forget the former. The ensuing period of relative quiet produced an apathy born of the certainty that they could again rise and meet threats when the need arose.

QUIET PRODUCES APATHY (1777–1778)

During the next two years, British ships patrolled the coast and disrupted the trade that was South Carolina's lifeline. The state responded by forming its own navy, which over the course of its checkered history numbered about one dozen vessels. The state's naval ships succeeded in capturing prizes, but were unable to drive British cruisers from Charleston. In 1778 the state legislature commissioned Commodore Alexander Gillon to purchase three frigates in Europe. Gillon leased a forty-four gun frigate, formerly owned by France, which he named *South Carolina*. The

frigate *South Carolina* did not depart Europe until the summer of 1781 and never reached South Carolina waters. This expensive venture cost about half a million dollars and involved the government in litigation with European claimants until the 1850s.

In 1778 a new state constitution provided for a governor and an advisory privy council, and a bicameral legislature composed of a senate and a house of representatives. It was left to this state government to deal with problems caused by dwindling enthusiasm for the war. Like Americans in other states, South Carolinians responded to the outbreak of hostilities with patriotic fervor that subsided over time. In 1776 more than 2,000 South Carolinians served as regular troops. Over the next two years, the state had difficulty meeting its quota of Continental soldiers, who dropped to 1,200. The General Assembly employed different expedients to increase the state's regular forces. In 1778, in an apparent act of desperation, the legislators authorized that vagrants be forcibly enlisted in the state's regiments. To attract volunteers, the representatives offered each enlistee 100 acres of land in the recently acquired Cherokee territory.

A military debacle in 1778 caused further problems. South Carolina contributed regular and militia troops to an invasion of British East Florida: Colonel Charles Cotesworth Pinckney commanded 600 soldiers from South Carolina's First, Third, and Sixth Regiments, and Colonel Andrew Williamson commanded 800 militia. Williamson's force arrived near the end of the expedition, which was marred by poor planning and squabbles between civilian and military authorities. Of Pinckney's troops, about 300 died or were hospitalized, South Carolina could ill afford this loss of manpower.

Manpower problems grew more serious in December 1778, when the British inaugurated their southern strategy with the capture of Savannah, Georgia. Once Georgia was secured, the British planned to invade South Carolina. The war had returned, this time with a vengeance.

A RENEWED BRITISH THREAT (1779)

Only 1,000 regulars remained to defend the state. Desiring Continental reinforcements, Governor John Rutledge dispatched Daniel Huger to Philadelphia to plead for aid. Huger testified before a committee of Congress that South Carolina had difficulties raising large numbers of militia because white men preferred to remain home and prevent their slaves from rebelling or fleeing to the British. With the concurrence of South Carolina delegates Henry Laurens and William Henry Drayton, Congress recommended that South Carolina and Georgia enlist 3,000 slaves as Continentals and promise them freedom in return for their service. Congress dispatched Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, the

originator of this plan, to South Carolina to persuade the state government to act.

When news of Congress's resolution reached South Carolina in late April 1779, the state already faced a British invasion. General Augustine Prevost had made a diversionary incursion into South Carolina to lure Major General Benjamin Lincoln, the new commander of the Southern Department, from an invasion of Georgia's backcountry. Finding the path to Charleston open, Prevost went beyond his original intent. By 11 May Prevost, with 2,500 troops, faced Charleston, which was defended by a comparable number of militia. Expecting reinforcements from Congress and receiving instead a recommendation to arm slaves, Governor Rutledge and the privy council offered to surrender Charleston in return for the state's neutrality. Prevost rejected the offer and retreated to avoid entrapment by Lincoln's force, which was returning from Georgia.

This brief crisis revealed the limits of the low country leadership's willingness to mobilize the state's population to win independence. They had no problem using slaves as laborers: In 1778 the General Assembly revised the militia law to use slaves in support roles. But the state's leaders refused to augment their dwindling regular forces by mobilizing slaves as soldiers. The crisis revealed other limits of mobilization. To meet the British threat, Governor Rutledge had hoped to mobilize 5,000 militia but raised only half that number. When Prevost threatened Charleston, numerous low country militia chose to desert and protect their homes rather than defend the state's capital.

With the British in Georgia, South Carolina's government needed to fill its Continental ranks and make changes in the disposition of its militia. Later that summer the General Assembly rejected Laurens's black regiment plan, but offered a 500-dollar bounty and 100 acres of land to every white man who enlisted, and an additional \$2,500 at the end of 21 months of service. As for the militia, the legislators made decisions that seemed counterproductive. They refused to put the militia under the Continental articles of war, as requested by General Lincoln. Instead, they placed the militia into three classifications, each subject to successive terms of service limited to two months. None of these moves produced the mobilization of soldiers needed to defend the state.

Low country Carolinians were aroused in September, when a French fleet under Count Charles d'Estaing arrived to support combined operations against the British. South Carolina regulars and militia comprised most of the fifteen hundred soldiers Lincoln led in the siege of Savannah. On 9 October, in a desperate assault on the British defenses, 250 South Carolina Continentals were among the casualties.

After his return to South Carolina, Lincoln requested Continental reinforcements from the North. He now commanded a force of 3,600 soldiers, which included Continentals from Virginia and militia from North Carolina, and 800 South Carolina Continentals, as well as more than 1,000 low country militia. General George Washington responded by ordering North Carolina and Virginia Continentals to South Carolina.

THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON (1780)

The British returned to Charleston in early 1780, bringing a larger fleet and army, along with a methodical approach that won them the success denied at Sullivan's Island. They faced an unprepared South Carolina. At the General Assembly meeting in January, Governor Rutledge acknowledged that the bounties approved the previous summer had attracted no new Continental enlistments. The Continental Congress responded to these declining numbers by ordering that South Carolina's four infantry regiments be consolidated into two. Nor had efforts to mobilize the militia been successful. The back country militia proved unwilling to leave home and defend the hot, humid, and unhealthy low country. The General Assembly again rejected Laurens's proposal that it arm slaves.

After a brave but hopeless defense, Charleston surrendered on 11 May. Of more than 5,500 American prisoners, 830 were South Carolina Continentals and 1,000 were Charleston militiamen. Facing its gravest crisis of the war, South Carolina managed to mobilize only one-third of the force that defended Charleston.

THE PARTISAN WAR (1780–1782)

With the surrender of Charleston, South Carolina's Continental line ceased to be. The full conquest of the state appeared only a matter of time. A series of counterproductive British actions, however, stimulated resistance and mobilization in the back country. Outraged by British and Loyalist punitive raids, and unwilling to abide a requirement that they swear allegiance and defend royal authority, Carolinians took up arms and fought as partisans (guerrillas). Mobile and flexible in numbers, partisan units operated in the back country under Thomas Sumter and Andrew Pickens, and in the low country under Francis Marion. These partisan bands engaged in hit-and-run raids that disrupted enemy supply lines and occupied the attention of large numbers of redcoats and Loyalist militia. The partisans, in effect, kept the Revolution alive in South Carolina during the summer and early fall of 1780.

Irregular forces played important roles in major battles that turned the tide of the war in the South. At Kings Mountain in October 1780, South Carolina back country militia, joined by "over-mountain" men from Virginia,

North Carolina, and what is now Tennessee, killed, captured, or wounded over 1,000 Loyalists. At Cowpens in January 1781, South Carolina militia and their counterparts from North Carolina and Virginia, under the astute leadership of Brigadier General Daniel Morgan, fought well alongside Continentals in a pitched battle that led to the total defeat of the British force.

Cowpens was the first major battle after Major General Nathanael Greene arrived to take command of the Southern Department. Greene coordinated the movements of his Continentals with militia and partisan forces. In the spring and summer of 1781, a combination of Continentals, militia, and partisans employed set battles, sieges, and guerrilla tactics to push the British back to Charleston. Controlling only Charleston and its environs, the British stayed put until they evacuated on 14 December 1782.

Because of the nature of the conflict, which often degenerated from a civil war between rebel and Loyalist Carolinians to a blood feud pitting neighbor against neighbor, it is difficult to assess the numbers of South Carolinians who mobilized to defeat the British and their Loyalist allies in 1780 and 1781. Some measure of understanding of the activity of South Carolinians can be gained by examining the number of engagements where they fought without assistance from Continentals. From July to December 1780, South Carolina partisans fought twenty-six engagements against British or Loyalist forces. The partisans suffered over 800 casualties, but inflicted nearly 2,500 casualties on their enemies. In the following year, at least sixty-two battles or skirmishes were fought in South Carolina, and in forty-five of these engagements South Carolina partisans or militia fought without outside assistance. A low country elite led South Carolina into revolution, but back country settlers fought the battles that won independence.

THE LEGACIES OF WAR

The site of 137 battles, South Carolina was the major battleground of the War of Independence. The conflict's human and financial toll was immense. The human cost, in lives lost or affected by the war, was incalculable but enduring. The financial costs for the state were more accessible. While South Carolinians fought mainly at home, their state government contributed willingly to the financial needs of the common cause. In 1783 South Carolina was the only state to pay the full requisition of the Continental Congress. To win independence, South Carolina's government spent almost \$5.4 million (comparable to about \$89.2 million today), which, per capita, was the largest expense incurred by any state. One factor in South Carolina's support for the federal Constitution of 1787 was the belief that the state would become a creditor once its accounts were balanced. South

Carolina's representatives strongly supported Alexander Hamilton's plan to assume state debts. During debate, an opponent of assumption argued that it was unfair for other states to pay South Carolina's debts, for they were incurred in part because of its dubious naval expenditures.

Events late in the war foreshadowed the settlement of differences between the low country and back country (later called the upcountry). In January 1782, the General Assembly met for the first time in two years. With the British still holding Charleston, legislators considered ways to raise regular troops. They again rejected forming black regiments, but found another use for slaves: White men who enlisted as soldiers would receive one slave for each year of service. This plan mirrored Thomas Sumter's policy of offering captured slaves as a bounty to his soldiers. Slave ownership eventually linked the wealthy planters of the state's two regions, especially after cotton became a staple crop in the upcountry.

South Carolinians were justifiably proud of their contributions to winning the War of Independence. They tended to glorify their partisans, downplay Greene's Continentals, and gloss over the debacles of 1779 and 1780. Congressman Aedanus Burke probably spoke for many Carolinians when he hotly responded to Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's eulogy of Nathanael Greene. Hamilton called the militia "the mimicry of soldiership." Speaking before the House of Representatives and Hamilton, Burke lauded the militia's contributions and called the treasury secretary a liar. The two men avoided a duel but the incident revealed a final legacy of mobilization during the Revolution. South Carolinians were defensive of their revolutionary heritage, which was inextricably bound with their sense of honor.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Raid of Prevost; Charleston Siege of 1780; Cherokee War of 1776; Cowpens, South Carolina; Drayton, William Henry; Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'; Huger, Daniel; Laurens, Henry; Lincoln, Benjamin; Marion, Francis; Moultrie, William; Pickens, Andrew; Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth; Prevost, Augustine; Provincial Military Organizations; Rutledge, John; South Carolina Line; Sullivan's Island; Sumter, Thomas; Williamson, Andrew.*

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Gregory D. Massey

SOUTH CAROLINA LINE. South Carolina's Continental army contingent spent a large part of its existence being torn between the demands of the state government and the directions of the Continental Congress—more so than any other state's Line. It began on 4 June 1775, when the Provincial Congress reacted to the news of Lexington by creating three regiments: two of infantry and a third of "horse rangers." The rangers were recruited in the frontier zone, and had a minor mutiny because of the officers' personal disputes and some latent Loyalist tendencies. The Provincial Congress added a fourth regiment, of artillery men, on 12 November 1775 to defend Charleston. Meanwhile, on 4 November, the Continental Congress had authorized the recruitment of three infantry regiments as South Carolina's quota. This caused the Provincial Congress to pass a comprehensive defense bill on 22 February 1776 which retained the existing regiments and added a new, fifth regiment as riflemen. It rejected the Continental Congress's offer

with thanks. Six days later it added a second rifle regiment. On 25 March 1776 the Continental Congress increased its authorization for South Carolina's military units to five regiments, but not until 18 June did it finally resolve the status issue to the state's satisfaction. The compromise accepted all six regiments as raised by the state (over time the tables of organization were brought into conformity), but promised that no more than a third of the men could be sent outside the boundaries of South Carolina without a specific authorizing resolution. This news did not reach Charleston until after the first British attack on the city so, in the eyes of the state, the defense of Fort Moultrie was carried out by state troops who had only temporarily accepted the orders of the Continental army generals. Recruiting lagged due to lingering friction between the two governments, and on 11 February 1780 the Line was reduced to three infantry regiments plus the artillery regiment. All were captured at Charleston on 12 May of that year, and were formally disbanded on 1 January 1781, except for the First South Carolina Regiment. It remained a paper organization until the winter of 1782–1783, when three companies were formed from its members. These were furloughed when the British evacuated Charleston, and were finally disbanded on 15 November 1783. The South Carolina Line was unique in having its artillery regiment legally acknowledged as part of the line.

SEE ALSO *South Carolina, Mobilization in.*

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Robert K. Wright Jr.

SOUTHERN CAMPAIGNS OF NATHANAEL GREENE.

December 1780–December 1781. Following Horatio Gates's defeat at Camden, South Carolina, Washington's supporters in the Continental Congress allowed the commander in chief to select a new commanding general for the Southern Department, a break from its earlier insistence on reserving the choice of such important positions to civilian authority. Washington did not hesitate in picking Nathanael Greene, knowing that his experiences as both a combat commander and the quartermaster general made Greene the best choice to rebuild a shattered department. But he also ordered Inspector General Friedrich von Steuben to proceed south as well, informing him that he was to take over the department's base area in Virginia and begin passing supplies and reinforcements on to Greene. Greene moved rapidly southward, meeting with civilian leaders along the way, and reached Charlotte, North Carolina, on 2 December. He took command from Gates the next day.

GREENE SPLITS HIS FORCES

On paper, and in the eyes of the British, Greene's army was weak, demoralized, and poorly clothed and equipped. The theater of operations had few roads and limited agricultural resources, most of which lay in enemy hands. And civilian confidence in the Congress and the army lay at an all-time low. But he had several hidden advantages: the heart of his force consisted of veteran Continental infantry, artillery, and cavalry from Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia; his lines of communications northward were intact; and the majority of the population supported his cause. Greene felt confident that in time he could rebuild the department's field army into an effective fighting force but knew that he also had to restore the will to resist by avoiding the appearance of being on the defensive.

Greene's first decisions revealed pure military genius. One of Gates's final acts as department commander had been to detach a small mobile force under Daniel Morgan to probe along the inland routes toward the British outposts at Ninety Six and Augusta. Instead of following the conventional wisdom of recalling those troops, Greene did the exact opposite. Although the textbook solution called for an outnumbered general never to split his force in the face of a superior enemy, Greene actually reinforced Morgan. He fell back with his main body (about eleven hundred Continentals) to a camp selected by Thaddeus Kosciuszko near Cheraw, where he could regroup in some security and in a healthy environment. Morgan took six hundred of the best men to circle around the inland flank of Cornwallis (leading a four-thousand-man field army) and encourage the uprising of the militia of the Catawba district.

In a move that was to prove decisive in subsequent operations, Greene ordered his quartermaster general, Edward Carrington, to continue the mission Gates had previously given him to reconnoiter routes back to Virginia. Greene understood that in the Deep South, where roads were few and far apart, the rivers played a critical role. The waterways basically flowed from west to east, at right angles to the roads. While settlers had used them to push inland, from a military standpoint they actually became critically important obstacles. Close to the coast in the lowlands, they were numerous and frequently flooded, making the movement of large bodies of troops impossible. And in the Piedmont, where the climate was better for military operations, they could be crossed only at a relatively small number of ferries or fords. Furthermore, British seapower could not come far enough inland because of the fall line to land either troops or large quantities of supplies. Greene therefore instructed Kosciuszko and Edward Stevens not only to map the Yadkin and Catawba Rivers, identifying all the critical crossing points, but also to collect or construct boats that could be moved by wagon from one river line to another as a bridging train.

When this strategy revealed itself to Cornwallis, the British general was smart enough to see dangers in Greene's unorthodoxy that were not apparent to such subordinates as Banastre Tarleton—or to many later historians. The Napoleonic solution might seem to be for Cornwallis to use his interior lines for a defeat in detail of Greene's forces, which were eventually separated by about 120 miles (from Cheraw to Cowpens). But the realities of terrain and communications made such an approach risky. If Cornwallis moved in force against Cheraw, Morgan could attack Ninety Six and Augusta; if Cornwallis moved in force against Morgan, Greene could attack Charleston. If Cornwallis ignored Greene and Morgan to resume his invasion north, they would be a threat to his flanks and rear. If Cornwallis sat in Winnsboro and did nothing—which was highly unlikely—Greene's dual tasks of rehabilitation and harassment would be simplified. (This analysis of the situation is Greene's own.) Although Greene, who died in 1786, would never hear of Napoleon, who was born in 1769, he was taking advantage of his superior mobility to observe Napoleon's principle that an army must separate to live (off the country) but unite to fight.

Greene left Charlotte on 20 December and reached Cheraw on the 26th. His troops included 650 veteran Continentals plus almost as many Virginia and Maryland replacements, some of whom were also veterans who had reenlisted. They were soon reinforced by 400 more Virginia recruits under Colonel John Greene, the first of the detachments pushed forward by Steuben. Lee's Second Partisan Corps arrived on 13 January 1781, and

Nathanael Greene immediately sent it to support Marion (who raided Georgetown, South Carolina, on 24 January).

Morgan left Charlotte on 21 December with 320 Maryland and Delaware Continentals, 200 Virginia riflemen—all of the infantry under John Howard—and about 80 light dragoons under William Washington. He set off to join the North Carolina militia of General William Davidson and operate between the Broad and Pacolet Rivers to protect patriots of the region, harass the enemy, and gather supplies. Morgan had orders to rejoin the main army or harass the enemy's flank and rear if Cornwallis should advance in the direction of Greene's wing.

CORNWALLIS REACTS

Cornwallis received his last major reinforcements from Clinton in mid-December, when Major General Alexander Leslie landed in Charleston with fifteen hundred additional veteran troops. After calling them forward, Cornwallis began to assemble a field force of about four thousand men at Winnsboro. He counted on leaving about the same number behind to hold his scattered posts but recognized that they were less capable soldiers. Before Cornwallis could start taking the offensive again, he began getting disturbing intelligence of the American troop movements. Although he tended to discredit the early reports, by 26 December he was sufficiently alarmed to write Tarleton, who was about twenty miles west on the Broad River with some nine hundred men, to say that "Morgan and [William] Washington have passed Broad river" and asking that he "try to get all possible intelligence of Morgan." On the evening of 1 January 1781, Earl Cornwallis got unnerving reports from two different sources that Morgan was approaching Ninety Six with three thousand men. Cornwallis ordered Tarleton to protect this strategically important place and to find Morgan. "Let me know if you think that the moving the whole, or any part of my corps, can be of use," he told Tarleton.

Morgan had, in fact, reached the Pacolet River on Christmas after a tough fifty-eight-mile march across rain-soaked country. Two days later Washington rode south on his Hammond's Store Raid, which was the basis of the alarming, but incorrect, reports that Ninety Six was threatened.

Cornwallis was relieved by Tarleton's reports that although Morgan was not to be found, he was not around Ninety Six. The earl had confided to Tarleton on 27 December that he planned to resume the offensive northward, and Tarleton realized Cornwallis was reluctant to undertake this operation until Morgan was off his mind. On 4 January, therefore, Tarleton proposed a plan. He asked for reinforcements with which he would move to destroy Morgan or, more probably, drive him north toward Kings Mountain; the main army would advance

simultaneously toward the latter point from Winnsboro to trap Morgan should he elude Tarleton. Cornwallis agreed and on the evening of 5 January wrote that he would head north on Sunday, 7 January. He also ordered the fifteen hundred troops of Major General Leslie to leave Camden on 9 January to join the main army on its march.

Meanwhile, Morgan had written Greene on 4 January that because of insufficient forage, he would have either to retreat or to move toward Georgia. Greene answered on 13 January, asking Morgan "hold your ground if possible . . . disagreeable consequences that will result from a retreat." If that was not possible, he suggested that Morgan move toward Ninety Six or elsewhere in the vicinity if this might alleviate his supply problem. (This is apparently the basis for the belief that Morgan's original directive told him to attack Ninety Six and Augusta.) "Colonel Tarleton is said to be on his way to pay you a visit," Greene concluded cheerily. "I doubt not but he will have a decent reception and a proper dismissal."

Rain continued to impede operations, and Tarleton was stopped at Duggin's Plantation on Indian Creek between 6 and 9 January, waiting for a chance to continue north across the swollen Enoree. Cornwallis left Winnsboro on the 8th but took until the 16th to cover forty miles to Turkey Creek. During the critical period of 9–16 January, Cornwallis got only one message from Tarleton; as a result he did not know that on the 14th Tarleton had crossed the Enoree and the Tyger and was in hot pursuit of Morgan. Nor did Tarleton know that Cornwallis had slowed his own advance on the assumption that Tarleton was still being held back by swollen rivers. Too late to remedy matters, Tarleton sent this message from Pacolet at 8 o'clock on the morning of 16 January: "My Lord, I have been most cruelly retarded by the waters. Morgan is in force and gone for Cherokee Ford. I am now on my march. I wish he would be stopped."

On the 15th, when Morgan learned that Tarleton had crossed the Tyger with a force reported to number up to twelve hundred, Morgan wrote Greene: "My force is inadequate to the attempts you have hinted at" (see above). During the day of the 15th, Tarleton probed for a place to cross the Pacolet but found every ford guarded. That night he faked a march up the river toward Wofford's Iron Works and went silently into bivouac; after the Americans outposts had taken the bait and moved up the river opposite him, Tarleton countermarched and crossed the Pacolet, unopposed, six miles below Morgan at Easterwood Shoals. Morgan's scouts brought him this bad news as the Americans were preparing breakfast at about 6 A.M. on the 16th, and a half hour later the rebels were streaking north to put Broad River between them and their pursuers. After eating Morgan's breakfast, Tarleton sent the message quoted above. At Cowpens however, on

17 January, Morgan turned at bay to beat Tarleton in a little jewel of a battle.

HARE AND HOUNDS

Had Cornwallis been at Kings Mountain, as he had so optimistically planned, Greene's campaigns in the South might have ended here. But the realities of operations in adverse terrain and weather had left him still at Turkey Creek, thirty miles from Cowpens, when he learned on the evening of the 17th that Tarleton had been beaten. He had decided to wait there for Leslie who, ironically, arrived about the time "Bloody" Tarleton rode in with his two hundred survivors on the 18th.

Morgan wasted no time. Not more than two hours after the battle he marched east, crossed the Broad River, and camped six miles from the scene of his triumph. Early the next morning he was racing toward Ramseur's Mill (later Lincolnton). He crossed Sherrald's (or Sherrill's) Ford the morning of the 23rd and went into camp with the Catawba between him and pursuit. (He had unburdened himself of the prisoners by detaching Pickens with most of the militia and Washington's cavalry to escort them to Island Ford on the upper Catawba, where a commissary for prisoners sent them on to Virginia. Pickens rejoined Morgan's camp behind Sherrald's Ford.)


The first impact of Tarleton's defeat came from the way it crippled Cornwallis's reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities. He did not take up the pursuit until 19 January. Then, apparently thinking Morgan might still be around Cowpens, his force of almost 3,000 trudged northwest toward Kings Mountain. Two days later, after Tarleton finally was able to scout west of the Broad, Cornwallis corrected his course and picked up the trail. But the two lost days kept the British from reaching Ramseur's Mill until about 7 A.M. on the 25th. At this point, as it had earlier in the war in December 1776, Cornwallis's youth and inexperience led him to make a terrible mistake. Frustrated by the slow pace of march and unaware that it was caused by the weak nature of the British logistical structure coupled with the terrain and the lack of civilian support, the British commander now decided to convert his entire command into light troops in order to run Morgan to ground. He ordered all impedimenta destroyed, and during the next two days at Ramseur's Mill, his troops burned all their tents and all the wagons except the minimum number needed for ammunition, salt, medical supplies, and casualties; all the provisions that could not be packed into haversacks were destroyed, even the rum. The historian Christopher Ward has suggested in *War of the Revolution* (1952) that this may explain the 250 desertions at Ramseur's.

This dramatic move proved futile and, in the long run, disastrous. Cornwallis misread his opponents and

instinctively sought to apply the same boldness that had worked against Lincoln and Gates. He should now have remembered the mission that Clinton had given him when placing him in command in the South and that Germain had assigned in the original instructions for a southern campaign. British forces first had to secure the agricultural resources needed to supply the West Indies, and they were to do it by organizing the Loyalists behind a secure screen of regular troops. For Cornwallis in January of 1781, North Carolina was to be invaded only if South Carolina and Georgia were properly secured; Cornwallis had abandoned his first invasion when Ferguson was destroyed at Kings Mountain and should again have done so when Tarleton met so similar a fate.

When Greene received word on 23 January of Morgan's victory, he was, naturally, delighted, but he also realized the mortal danger his army now faced. From the beginning Greene's southern campaign assumed that he might have to retreat, and he now profited from the careful plans of the previous weeks. As soon as he realized that Cornwallis was going to advance, Greene began carefully to trade space for time. Huger was directed to move his wing of the army from Cheraw toward Salisbury, on Morgan's line of retreat, as soon as possible. Commissaries at Salisbury and Hillsboro were told to get ready to move their prisoners and stores into Virginia. Carrington was told to assemble boats on the Dan. On 28 January, Greene left Cheraw with a small escort for a hazardous cross-country ride of 125 miles to join Morgan on his line of retreat. The same day Huger started his march, having previously sent nonessential baggage, the weakest horses, and the worst wagons to Hillsboro.

Greene joined Morgan in his camp behind the Catawba on 30 January. He found that Morgan, the Old Wagoner, thought the entire army should retreat west into the mountains. But Greene correctly interpreted Cornwallis's baggage-burning as an indication that the British would try to stabilize the situation in South Carolina by intercepting American men and supplies in North Carolina. By choosing to fall back in front of the British, Greene knew that he could draw Cornwallis further away from his bases while simultaneously shortening the Americans' lines of supply. At some point along that path Greene knew that a British mistake might give him the opportunity to turn the tables. Greene issued orders for Lee's Legion to rejoin him from the lower Peedee, where it had been operating with Marion. He wrote Huger of the ambitious new plan and urged him to hurry to effect a junction with Morgan. Although he first intended using Morgan's men to delay the enemy's crossing of the swollen Catawba, when the river started going down he ordered Morgan to continue his retreat to Salisbury, where he hoped Huger would soon arrive.



RACE TO THE DAN
 JAN.-FEB. '81

DP

THE GALE GROUP

ACTION ON THE CATAWBA

General William Davidson had turned out eight hundred North Carolina militia and more were supposed to be coming. In Greene's master plan, as in Morgan's tactical plan at Cowpens, the militia forces played a valuable economy-of-force role, screening the Continentals from having to engage the British prematurely and wearing Cornwallis down. Greene planned to use Davidson's men to cover the four crossing sites along a thirty-mile front where Cornwallis might move. Shortly after 2 P.M. on the 31st, when Morgan's troops had already started toward the Yadkin, Greene met with Davidson, Morgan, and William Washington at Beattie's Ford on the Catawba to plan the defense of that obstacle. (Details of this commanders' conference are given because they clear up considerable confusion as to who was where at this important moment.) The British had been camped across the river for two days waiting for the water to go down, and an advance guard of four hundred or five hundred men appeared on the hill overlooking the stream as this twenty-minute conference started. When the meeting broke up, Morgan and Washington rode off to join their troops (temporarily commanded by Howard), Greene left with one aide to help assemble North Carolina militia a few miles behind the river, and Davidson made final arrangements to defend the fords.

Two fords had been obstructed with felled trees and could be held by small detachments. Davidson ordered patrols to watch most of the river during the night and concentrated the bulk of his militia around the remaining two crossing points. Beattie's Ford had not been obstructed because civilian refugees were still using it; about three hundred men took up defensive positions there. Four to six miles downstream, at a private crossing called Cowan's, Davidson put about the same number.

Thinking Morgan's troops were around Beattie's, Cornwallis planned a demonstration there, to consist only of an artillery bombardment; Lieutenant Colonel James Webster would command this operation. Cornwallis would lead the main body across Cowan's Ford at dawn and encircle Morgan at the principal ford. The troops turned out at 1 A.M. on 1 February and moved toward the river. The demonstration fizzled out in the rain. But Cornwallis was able to force a crossing at Cowan's Ford led by the heroics of the Guards Brigade. General Davidson fell in this action, and without his leadership the militia scattered. Webster crossed later in the day without opposition. At Tarrant's Tavern, about ten miles beyond the river, Tarleton scattered another militia group. Although Cornwallis had not come close to catching Morgan, the defeats temporarily demoralized the North Carolina militia. Greene wrote on 13 February that all but about eighty had deserted him, which was an

exaggeration, but the rest of his retreat took place with less support than before.

OPERATIONS ON THE YADKIN

From Salisbury, where he arrived alone during the early hours of 2 February, Greene sent word to Huger to rendezvous with Morgan at Guilford Courthouse unless he was within twenty-four hours of Salisbury. When Morgan reached the Yadkin on 2 February, boats were waiting, and he crossed at Trading (Trader's) Ford during the night. The British advance guard under General O'Hara arrived too late to accomplish anything more than rout the militiamen who were guarding a few wagons left by fleeing civilians.

Having been frustrated at the Catawba and the Yadkin, Cornwallis still hoped to catch Greene before he could reach the Dan. Greene's movement north from Trading Ford the evening of 4 February supported Cornwallis's belief that the Americans lacked the necessary boats to cross the lower Dan and would head for the fords upstream. But the rebels turned east a few miles before reaching Salem and, after a march of forty-seven miles in forty-eight hours, camped near Guilford Courthouse on the 7th. On this day they were joined by Huger and Lee. Huger's troops had completed a remarkable march under adverse weather conditions and with pitifully inadequate clothing—many of them barefooted—without the loss of a man.

RACE TO THE DAN

Greene studied the ground and gave serious consideration to making a stand at Guilford, but a council of officers persuaded him not to do so. Tradition holds that Greene hoped to fight there to encourage the militia but chose not to when relatively few of them mobilized. The truth is probably that Greene correctly assessed that the tables had not yet turned. His fifteen hundred or so reliable Continentals were still outnumbered by the enemy's estimated twenty-five hundred regulars, so Greene kept falling back. Henry Lee gave this explanation of Greene's plans for further retreat:

The British general was 25 miles from Guilford Court-House; equally near with Greene to Dix's Ferry on the Dan, and nearer to the upper shallows or points of that river, which were supposed to be fordable, notwithstanding the late swell of water. Lieutenant Colonel Carrington, quartermaster-general, suggested the propriety of passing at Irwin's Ferry, 17 [this should be 70] miles from Guilford Court-House, and 20 below Dix's. Boyd's Ferry was four miles below Irwin's; and the boats might be easily brought down from Dix's to assist in transporting the army at these near and lower ferries. The plan of Lieutenant Colonel Carrington was adopted, and that officer charged with the requisite preparations. (*Memoirs*, p. 236)

A 700-man light corps, including all the cavalry and the best infantry troops, was organized to serve as rear guard and also to draw the enemy away from Greene's line of retreat. William Washington commanded the mounted element, 240 men, which included his own dragoons and the cavalry of Lee's Partisan Corps. John Howard commanded the infantry element, which included his 280-man battalion, Lee's 120 foot troops, and 60 Virginia militia armed with rifles.

Morgan was asked to command this body, but he declined on grounds of bad health and intimated that he would like to retire. Lee says he was asked to persuade Morgan to "obey the universal wish" and even argued that "the brigadier's retirement at that crisis might induce an opinion unfavorable to his patriotism." Although this almost swayed the Old Wagoner, on 10 February, Greene granted him his requested leave of absence. Morgan was suffering from sciatica, rheumatism, and a less delicate ailment "so that I scarcely can sit upon my horse," as he wrote Greene on the 5th. (There is no reason to believe, as some have charged, that his real reason for leaving was to dissociate himself from a strategy he considered too hazardous.) Command of the rear guard fell into the capable hands of Otho Williams.

Cornwallis, still blocked at Trading Ford by high water and a lack of boats, and still holding his preconceived idea of Greene's route, sent Tarleton with his cavalry and the Twenty-third Foot up the Yadkin toward Shallow Ford, twenty-five miles north. Meeting no resistance, Tarleton crossed on the 6th, and Cornwallis left Salisbury with his main body on the 7th and entered Salem on the 9th. Greene left Guilford with the main body on the 10th and headed for Carrington's crossing sites, seventy miles beeline to the northeast. Williams got in front of Cornwallis this same day, with the immediate result that the British checked their advance to close up ranks and reconnoiter. The British then started a vigorous pursuit of Williams, who succeeded for about two days in drawing them in the desired direction. Through intermittent rain and snow, over red clay roads that were churned into mud during the day and frozen into the thus-distorted surface at night, the armies struggled along on three parallel routes. Williams kept on the middle route, with the enemy to his left rear. Lee's cavalry had the particularly exhausting and nerve-racking mission of bringing up the rear and of watching for any indication that Cornwallis might have discovered the true situation. Lee had to keep the enemy advance guard from circling to the right to get between him and Williams; the latter had to avoid being cut off from Greene by the same maneuver. This meant that half of Lee's troopers were on duty every night and got only six hours' rest out of forty-eight. Lee pointed out, however, that the enemy cavalry "although more numerous . . . was far inferior in regard to size, condition, and activity of their horses."

Before dawn of the 13th, Tarleton informed Cornwallis that Greene's main body was headed for the lower Dan. Ordering his van to proceed as if the army were still following the former route, Cornwallis started on a forced march and soon found a causeway that led to the road Williams had been following with his infantry. As on previous days, the Americans had broken camp at 3 A.M., marched rapidly, and stopped for their one meal of the day. Mounted outposts covered the rear and reported that the enemy was moving forward in the normal manner. Having completed his preparations along the Dan, Quartermaster General Carrington was commanding the dragoon detachment in contact with the British van. His periodic reports informed Lee that the enemy was advancing at the usual pace. Suddenly, an excited civilian appeared to report that Cornwallis was on the other road and less than four miles away. Williams had ordered Lee to send a cavalry detachment back with this man to check on this report, and soon after Captain James Armstrong departed on this mission, a report from Carrington, saying that the enemy to his front had slowed down, confirmed the previous intelligence. Williams then ordered Lee to reinforce Armstrong and to take command.

This led to a clash in which eighteen of Tarleton's troopers were killed. Lee was about to hang the enemy commander, Captain Thomas Miller, in reprisal for the cold-blooded killing of his unarmed, teenage bugler by Miller's men, when the enemy van approached. (The boy, whose name was Gillies, had been ordered to lend his horse to the civilian when the latter was sent forward with a dragoon patrol. Lee then led his detachment off to the side of the highway and the boy was sent back to tell Williams no contact had yet been made. The dragoon patrol soon reappeared with the enemy hard on its heels. Not seeing Lee's detachment and unable to overtake the American patrol, some enemy dragoons ran down the unarmed bugler and sabered him as he lay on the ground. Lee then descended on the British, killed eighteen, and captured Miller and all but two of his men as they tried to escape. Miller argued that since he was on an intelligence mission, he had tried to save the boy's life, and he was not hanged.)

The Americans then resumed their retreat with Lee bringing up the rear and looking for a chance to chop off the head of Cornwallis's advance guard should they made the mistake of getting beyond supporting distance. "The skilful enemy never permitted any risk in detail, but preserved his whole force for one decisive struggle," said Lee. As the day of 13 February wore on—and both sides would have approved that choice of verb—Williams decided he had accomplished his mission by luring Cornwallis toward Dix's Ferry. Ordering Lee to continue screening to the rear with a small force, Williams led his main body onto a more direct route toward Irwin's Ferry. Cornwallis soon

detected this change of route and came close to surprising Lee's men when they pulled off onto what they hoped was an obscure side road for the breakfast they had missed. A moment's hesitation by the British point and the superiority of the Americans' horses enabled them to escape. In his *Memoirs*, Lee called his momentary but near-fatal lapse of judgment "criminal improvidence!"

Cornwallis felt that he was coming close to his objective and pushed his men even harder into the night. The Americans had a bad moment about 8 P.M., when they saw campfires and thought they marked Greene's bivouac, but to their immense relief they found he had left this camp two days earlier and that a handful of local inhabitants were keeping the fires going to guide Williams's men. When the British stopped, so did the rebels, but at midnight the race was on again. They were still forty miles from the Dan. At night the combination of wet and cold added a crust of frost to the deep mud of the road. On the 14th, both sides stopped for only one hour to rest during the morning. At about noon came a message from Greene: "All our troops are over. . . . I am ready to receive you and give you a hearty welcome." It was dated 5:12 P.M. of the preceding day.

O'Hara's British vanguard heard the Americans cheer and made one final rush in an attempt to trap the rebels against the river. But although the British marched forty miles in those last twenty-four hours, the Americans covered the distance in sixteen hours. Thus, Greene was able to drop Lee off at about 3 P.M. some fourteen miles from the river and continue safely to Boyd's Ferry. The infantry reached the bank before sunset to find boats waiting. Lee's cavalry arrived between 8 and 9 P.M. and crossed on the same boats (the horses swimming, as was normal practice). "In the last boat, the quarter-master-general, attended by Lieutenant-Colonel Lee and the rear troop, reached the friendly shore," said Lee in his *Memoirs*.

Thus ended Greene's first campaign in the South. Part of his army had won a battle against Tarleton and then all of it had run two hundred miles for dear life. For the first time in the war not a single Continental soldier held any of the territory south of Virginia. Greene's pleasure over this apparent defeat and Cornwallis's bitter disappointment over this apparent triumph illustrate a fundamental principle of war—no matter how much territory you occupy, you have not won until you destroy the enemy's armed force. Washington had been proving this in the North; now his disciple Greene was doing it in the South.

The what-ifs of the Race to the Dan have tantalized historians ever since 1781. If Cornwallis had caught and destroyed Greene's army, one line goes, he would have been able to link up with Benedict Arnold (then carrying out a raid along the James River) and swell their combined force by liberating the Convention Army and the

Cowpens prisoners. As a consequence, this scenario goes, all four southern provinces would have come back under royal authority. That is wishful thinking, however, because it ignores the reality of logistics and numerical strength. Cornwallis had quite literally run his small army into the ground, and as it lay panting on the south bank of the Dan, he had to start worrying about finding a way to get back to some safe location to resupply and refit his men.

WINNING THE CAROLINAS

Now what? Cornwallis lacked the boats to follow Greene. He could not maneuver upstream to cross at the fords because Greene could too easily counter such moves. He could not go downstream, as the terrain in that direction became more swampy. Nor could he rest in place. Winnsboro lay 250 miles to the rear as the crow flies, and Charleston was another 125 miles beyond. Every round of ammunition and every morsel of food would have to be transported along that tortured route, open to raiding attack by militia, and there were not enough British, German, or Loyalist troops in the South to secure it, nor were there wagons and horses to transport the supplies. In effect, since crossing the Catawba, every step Cornwallis took had overextended the British and increased American resistance by compressing the Patriots like a spring toward the bases in Virginia.

Cornwallis had no alternative but to withdraw, and on 17 February 1781 he started moving slowly toward Hillsboro, North Carolina. Here he issued a proclamation inviting "faithful and loyal subjects" to escape "the cruel tyranny under which they have groaned for many years"; they could save themselves by rallying around the royal standard with their arms and ten days' supply of groceries. Ironically, the "raising of the royal standard" in this case, as in others during the war, merely tempted locals with Loyalists sympathies into revealing themselves. When the royal troops marched away, as they inevitably did, the Patriots took their revenge. After this pattern had happened a few times, no more supporters of the crown could be found who were willing to speak up. Germain and Clinton's hopes for a secure South were slowly crushed by the tactical requirements of Cornwallis's movements.

Greene's situation was by no means rosy. His Continentals troops had also been worn down during the retreat, and the North Carolina militia was disorganized and demoralized. The Virginia militia was beginning to turn out, however, and Greene discovered that Steuben's efforts had assembled supplies and new recruits for him in Virginia. Greene shifted his main body to Halifax Court House, which became his new base. But he also pushed his light elements across the river a day after the British left it.

On 18 February, Lee's Partisan Corps, supported by two companies of Maryland Continentals, crossed the

Dan to operate with Pickens and his seven hundred newly raised militia. Colonel Otho Williams crossed two days later with the light infantry that had comprised a rear guard less than a week before. As soon as he was joined by six hundred Virginia militia under General Edward Stevens, Greene himself moved into North Carolina. His plan was to keep as much pressure on Cornwallis as possible—cutting up his foraging parties and discouraging the Loyalists from rising—while continuing to build his own army up with recruits and mobilized militia. The water level in the Dan was falling rapidly, and Greene did not want to give his opponent a chance either to resume the offensive or to escape.

In an action known as Haw River (Pyle's Defeat), on 25 February, Lee surprised and destroyed a Loyalist force with a violence reminiscent of The Waxhaws. The totality of that defeat, made possible by the fact that Pyle mistook the green of Lee's uniforms for those of the Provincials, effectively ended North Carolina's Tory militia. After some replenishment, Cornwallis took the field again and tried for several weeks to bring Greene to battle. Superior American mobility enabled Greene to maneuver away from danger and avoid a general engagement under any conditions that would have favored the British. The opposing forces did have one sharp skirmish at Wetzell's Mill on 6 March. Finally, in mid-March, Greene felt that he had attracted as many men as he could sustain and accepted the fight that Cornwallis sought.

At Guilford Courthouse on 15 March 1781, Cornwallis attacked and scored a hard-won tactical victory. But it was a strategic defeat, since it bled him dry and left him with no alternative but retreat.

CORNWALLIS WITHDRAWS TO WILMINGTON

Although Camden, South Carolina, the second most important British post in the South after Charleston, was closer than Wilmington, North Carolina, by forty miles, retreat to Camden would have meant the failure of Cornwallis's entire campaign. Instead, he opted to head toward the British coastal base at Wilmington on the Cape Fear River. Here he could be supplied by sea. Furthermore, Cornwallis believed that Greene would follow him. If Greene did so, it would keep the American field army away from South Carolina and Georgia. Wilmington had many features of a flanking position, but Greene quickly demonstrated that it lacked the essential one.


Giving his men two days' rest and abandoning his wounded, Cornwallis started withdrawing on 18 March; Greene followed immediately. On the 28th, Greene had an opportunity to hit the enemy forces while they were astride the Deep River at Ramsay's Mill, but he lacked the strength to assure success. In keeping with the

fundamental concept behind the whole campaign, Greene refused to risk a devastating defeat for the chance of a decisive blow. He knew that time and attrition worked for the Americans as long as the Southern Department's field army remained intact. Cornwallis withdrew unmolested to Cross Creek (later Fayetteville). Since supplies he had ordered sent to this place were not there, he continued on to Wilmington, arriving on 7 April. (On the 24th he marched north to Virginia.)

GREENE VERSUS RAWDON

The Virginia and North Carolina militias had completed their six weeks' service, and Greene released them with thanks. Although some had run at Guilford, others had stood firm and softened up the redcoats for the Continentals in the main line. More to the point, the citizen soldiers had made that battle possible and had fulfilled their mission. Rather than overextending them, Greene chose to simplify his own logistics by sending them home. After remaining at Ramsay's Mill from 29 March until 5 April, Greene headed for South Carolina.

The two commanders reviewed the lessons of the preceding months and drew different conclusions. As the next stage unfolded, the failure of Cornwallis's strategic conception became as apparent as the soundness of Greene's vision. Determined to replace Clinton's defensive policy with an aggressive one, Cornwallis became fixated on the Southern Department's apparent ability to keep rising again. He kept searching for a way to press the offensive in an effort to cut off the rebels from their northern sources of support, first by pressing to Camden, then to North Carolina, and now by striking against the base areas in Virginia. Each time he compounded his errors; each time he proved to be incapable of looking beyond the battlefield to see the whole of the theater of operations. This lack of vision would be a critical factor in how Britain lost the war. As for the immediate operational situation, however, withdrawing to Wilmington—rather than dropping back to Camden, where Rawdon was located with almost 2,000 troops—surrendered the initiative. He had, in effect, abandoned Rawdon to fend for himself. Ramsay's Mill (where Greene stopped his pursuit), Wilmington, and Camden form an equilateral triangle, the points being about 120 miles apart. If Cornwallis had had the strength in Wilmington to threaten Greene's line of communications as the latter operated toward Camden, then the earl would have had the flanking position mentioned earlier. But he did not. Greene, knowing this, turned his back on Wilmington to hunt down Rawdon. In failing to follow, Cornwallis had made a gambler's desperate wager that he could conquer Virginia before the relentless American pressure ground down his subordinates in South Carolina and Georgia.



SOUTHERN CAMPAIGNS OF NATHANAEL GREENE. THE GALE GROUP.

Greene's army now contained a solid, veteran Continental cadre over fifteen hundred strong. One brigade comprised the reconstituted First and Second Virginia battalions, the other the First and Second Maryland. Rounding out the heart of the army were artillerymen from the First Continental Artillery Regiment, William Washington's dragoons (now a composite force of the First and Third Legionary Corps), and the combined arms team of Lee's Second Partisan Corps. Partisan forces of Marion in the Peedee swamps, Sumter on the Broad River, and Pickens in western South Carolina had been harassing the British and could now join forces with Greene as he marched south. Even more importantly, militia forces from Virginia and North Carolina had discovered a successful technique for making a contribution. Mobilizing only as needed for decisive engagement (thereby simplifying Greene's supply problems) and using former Continental officers like Stevens and Lawson and a healthy leavening of Valley Forge veterans as a cadre, they provided a far more effective battlefield force than the militia that had appeared earlier in the war. With a little lead time, this "surge" capacity enabled Greene to achieve the principle of mass at the point of his own choosing.

The youthful but capable Rawdon had on paper a strength of 8,141 British regulars, German regulars, and Provincials with which to hold an area of about 25,000 square miles—that is, a rough parallelogram measuring approximately 120 miles on a side. Rawdon himself held Camden, which would inevitably be Greene's first major objective and which was the northernmost point of the parallelogram, with almost a quarter of his total strength. Along the coast were the major posts of Charleston and Savannah along with the less important one at Georgetown. Far to the interior were Augusta, Ninety Six, and Fort Granby. These bases played an important role in maintaining Loyalist support and preserving any hope of coordination with pro-British Indian tribes. Orangeburg, Fort Watson, and Fort Motte served as connecting links between Charleston and these more distant strongpoints.

When Greene advanced on Camden he initiated a coordinated strategy worked out with the partisan leaders. Pickens threatened Ninety Six to keep reinforcements from being detached from that place. Greene called Sumter to the field army near Camden. Marion's mission was to move out of his Peedee swamps and join Henry "Light-Horse Harry" Lee in an attack on Fort Watson. Lee's primary mission at the onset of the offensive was to screen against a possible move by Cornwallis from Wilmington; as soon as it could be determined that Cornwallis was not heading south, he raced to join Marion.

The successful siege of Fort Watson on 15–23 April ended with the capture of that place and its garrison by Lee

and Marion with only minor losses. The action is more significant, however, for the light it sheds on the new tactics of cooperation employed in the Southern Department. These were built upon earlier experiments in the north but reached new heights of success during 1781 in South Carolina and Georgia. They relied on an experienced cadre of local partisans, under charismatic leaders, to maintain constant pressure on British lines of communication and to develop combat intelligence. When opportunities arose, the much larger number of part-time militia could rapidly assemble, relying on horses for mobility while fighting dismounted. And for important targets the partisans would be reinforced by Lee's Second Partisan Corps, which was specifically tailored to carry out deep operations. Combining the strengths of different groups made the resulting strike force much more flexible. An example of the creative ability to solve problems came immediately from the invention of the Maham Tower, first used in attacking Fort Watson. The man for whom the fort was named, British Colonel John Watson, had been detached from Camden earlier with five hundred of Rawdon's Tory troops to look for Marion in the vicinity of Georgetown (that is, the Peedee swamps), and uncertainty as to his location played a significant part in the operations around Camden as well as at Fort Watson.

At Hobkirk's Hill on 25 April, just outside of Camden, Rawdon defeated Greene in an action that left Greene "almost frantic with vexation and disappointment" (Alden, p. 263). (It was on this occasion that Greene made the statement that summarizes his southern campaigns: "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again.") Greene's problems in coordinating his strategy against the various enemy posts, and also in Rawdon's success at making the best of his scattered dispositions, are clearly visible in the action around Camden. Greene had given the partisan chiefs assignments largely intended to isolate Rawdon so that the Continental field force could crush him. But Pickens was unable to threaten Ninety Six enough and Rawdon got reinforcements from that place. Sumter, the Gamecock, simply ignored the request that he join Greene near Camden (see below). Marion and Lee were supposed to join Greene, or at least to keep Watson from joining Rawdon; although Watson did not reach Camden until after the battle (7 May), he kept Marion and Lee so busy chasing him that they were not present at the Battle of Hobkirk's Hill.

On the other hand, Rawdon could not profit from his temporary victory and had to fall back. Sumter then took Orangeburg on 11 May. Marion and Lee took Fort Motte on 12 May, and Lee took Fort Granby on 15 May.

"With his usual rather arrogant independence," as the historian Christopher Ward had put it, the Gamecock had gone off to attack Fort Granby instead of joining Greene outside of Camden. He had then broken off this attack to

take Orangeburg, about thirty miles south-southeast; he then retraced his steps to find that Fort Granby had already surrendered to Lee. At this point, the historian Francis Vinton Greene has written:

Sumter felt that Lee had stolen his glory and complained to [Nathanael] Greene of Lee's conduct, stating that he considered it "for the good of the public to do it without regulars." Greene replied that Lee had acted in accordance with his orders; whereupon Sumter sent in his resignation. Greene diplomatically persuaded him to withdraw it, and he afterward rendered excellent service, in co-operation with Lee, in the vicinity of Charleston. (*Revolutionary War*, p. 249)

Greene's leadership ability in managing to hold together a collection of difficult personalities is reminiscent of Eisenhower's performance during World War II.

ROUND TWO

On 10 May, Rawdon abandoned Camden. Taking a more realistic view of the military situation than his patron, Cornwallis, he tried at least to accomplish the ministry's basic orders to hold on to the rice-producing coastal region by concentrating his resources. His own battered force reached Monck's Corner on the 24th. Georgetown's garrison, under pressure from Marion, evacuated by sea on the 23rd. Rawdon also ordered Fort Granby and Ninety Six abandoned, but they did not get the word in time.

Greene moved against Ninety Six on 9 May and detached Lee with some newly raised militia to join Pickens around Augusta. The siege of of Augusta on 22 May–5 June led to the surrender of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brown's 630-man garrison of regulars and Georgia Tories after stubborn resistance. The siege of Ninety Six during 22 May–19 June did not end with equal success. Greene broke of his attack just as the rebels appeared to be on the point of a hard-won success against the die-hard garrison of Lieutenant John Cruger. Rawdon had just received three fresh regiments from Ireland, the last reinforcements sent out to North America in the war. He was able to assemble a relief column of 2,000, elude Sumter's delaying force, and move rapidly to Cruger's support. Greene wisely avoided the risk of a decisive action in the field and retreated on 20 June. Rawdon pursued about 25 miles but turned back when Greene headed for safety behind the Broad River.

Rawdon ordered Ninety Six abandoned, leaving the place himself on 3 July and withdrawing through Fort Granby to Orangeburg. Here he was joined by Cruger from Ninety Six and by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Stewart and his Third Regiment from Charleston. Greene withdrew his Continental regiments into the

Santee Hills to wait out the worst of the summer heat in a relatively healthy location. Rawdon left Stuart at Orangeburg and returned to Charleston with five hundred men; Marion, Sumter, and Lee dogged his heels to within five miles of the city. This ended the second phase. In less than eight months Greene had won back almost the entire South except for footholds around Savannah and Charleston. His little army had marched 950 miles, fought three battles and numerous minor engagements, captured 9 posts, and taken nearly 3,000 prisoners.

ROUND THREE

During the six weeks his army spent in the Santee Hills, Greene drew a stream of reinforcements that pushed his Continental infantry total to over two thousand. Sumter spent this period around Fort Granby, while Marion was at Nelson's Ferry and Pickens was in his home territory around Ninety Six. Rawdon fell ill and sailed (he was captured en route) home to recuperate, leaving Stuart in command. The latter moved up from Orangeburg to a position sixteen miles from Greene, with the flooded Congaree River between them, and could not be tricked out of position when Greene sent raids all the way to the outskirts of Charleston.

On 22 August 1781, Greene resumed the offensive. High water levels on the Santee and Wateree made him take a long detour through Camden to get at Stuart, and the latter withdrew to Eutaw Springs, where he could be supplied better from Charleston. On 7 September, Greene was joined by Marion, bringing his strength up to about twenty-four hundred. The next morning Stuart was surprised to find Greene on top of him, but he formed in time to meet Greene's attack. The Battle of Eutaw Springs of 8 September left Stuart in possession of the hotly contested field but so weakened that he had to withdraw to Monck's Corner. Greene had lost his fourth battle but had practically won his campaign.

The little southern army withdrew back into the Santee Hills again for badly needed rest and recuperation. Within ten days Greene had only one thousand men fit for duty as sickness and expiration of militia services thinned his ranks. The end of active campaigning gave men time to worry about their arrears in pay, inadequate clothing, and other grievances. A mutiny was brewing when one Timothy Griffin staggered onto the parade ground as the Maryland Continentals were being admonished by their officers for recent lax discipline. "Stand to it, boys!" shouted Griffin. "Damn my blood if I would give an inch!" This happened on 21 October, and the rest of Greene's command watched him shot the next afternoon for encouraging mutiny and desertion, which discouraged the others.

Cornwallis had surrendered three days earlier, and General Arthur St. Clair soon started south with two

thousand Pennsylvania and Virginia regulars to reinforce Greene. Before he arrived on 4 January 1782, however, the southern army had to take the field to quell a Tory uprising that followed Fanning's Hillsboro Raid on 12 September. The attack on Dorchester on 1 December forced the last British outpost back into Charleston.

On 9 December, Greene joined the rest of his army at the place called Round O, about thirty-five miles west of Charleston, and St. Clair's troops arrived there on 4 January 1782. Wilmington having been evacuated in November, the British in the South were now confined to Charleston and Savannah.

Most accounts of the Revolution in the South end at this point with a general statement that it was over. The following military events are, however, worth recording: Johns Island on 28–29 December 1781; the Mutiny of Cornell on April 1782; the Georgia expedition of Anthony Wayne; and Combahee Ferry on 27 August 1782. The British evacuated Savannah on 11 July 1782 and Charleston on 14 December 1782.

Greene remained at Charleston until August 1783, after news of the peace treaty had arrived. He then returned to Rhode Island, being hailed along the way with the respect and admiration he had earned. After two years of getting his tangled personal affairs in order, he moved to an estate that the Georgia legislature had given him near Savannah. But his days were limited.

SIGNIFICANCE

The reputation Nathanael Greene won in his southern campaigns has worn well in the hands of historians. Initial writers emphasized the role of the Continentals; the generation of historians writing in the twentieth century shifted the attention to the irregulars, sometimes forgetting that Marion and Sumter in fact had been trained as Continental officers. The more modern interpretation tends to emphasize that both groups played important parts, with Greene emerging as the man who found a way to make them work together. It is clear that the Patriots of the Lower South, although they might have been able to continue guerrilla fighting indefinitely, could hardly have dealt effectively with the British and their Tory allies without the assistance of the regulars from the Upper South (Virginia and Maryland) and Delaware. On the other hand, Greene could hardly have kept the field without the aid of Davidson, Marion, Sumter, Pickens, Clarke, and their partisan bands.

Nor was the glory monopolized by the American Patriots. Rawdon, O'Hara, Cruger, Webster, and others had shown magnificent leadership; Camden, Cowan's Ford, and Guilford are names of which the British army is proud. Cruger's defense of Ninety Six and Rawdon's relief of that place were splendid military accomplishments.

SEE ALSO *Augusta, Georgia* (22 May–5 June 1781); *Carrington, Edward*; *Combahee Ferry, South Carolina*; *Convention Army*; *Cowans Ford, North Carolina*; *Cowpens, South Carolina*; *Cruger, John Harris*; *Davidson, William Lee*; *Defeat in Detail*; *Dorchester, South Carolina*; *Eutaw Springs, South Carolina*; *Flanking Position*; *Fort Granby, South Carolina*; *Fort Motte, South Carolina*; *Fort Watson, South Carolina* (15–23 April 1781); *Gates, Horatio*; *Georgetown, South Carolina* (24 January 1781); *Georgia Expedition of Wayne*; *Graham, Joseph*; *Greene, Nathanael*; *Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina*; *Hammonds Store Raid of William Washington*; *Haw River, North Carolina*; *Hillsboro Raid, North Carolina*; *Hobkirk's Hill (Camden), South Carolina*; *Howard, John Eager*; *Interior Lines*; *Johns Island, South Carolina* (28–29 December, 1781); *Kosciuszko, Thaddeus Andrzej*; *Bonawentura*; *Leslie, Alexander*; *Morgan, Daniel*; *Ninety Six, South Carolina*; *Orangeburg, South Carolina*; *Point*; *Rawdon-Hastings, Francis*; *Southern Theater, Military Operations in*; *Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von*; *Stewart, Alexander*; *Tarleton, Banastre*; *Tarrant's Tavern, North Carolina*; *Watson, John*; *Watson Tadwell*; *Wetzell's Mills, North Carolina*; *Williams, Otho Holland*; *Yorktown Campaign*; *Yorktown, Siege of*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

SOUTHERN THEATER, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN. The primary focus of military operations in the Revolutionary War was the North until after the Battle of Monmouth, New Jersey, 28 June 1778. Then, as the British adopted a southern strategy, the conflict moved south and ended, to all intents and purposes, at Yorktown, Virginia, 19 October 1781.

1775: SOUTHERN REBELS GAIN CONTROL

With major military events taking place around Boston and in Canada, the British sent few regulars to support the embattled Loyalists in the South. The year ended with the rebels generally in control of all four southern provinces. As in all the colonies, most initial actions involved the seizure of British munitions and posts. For instance, the South Carolina militia under Major James Mayson seized Fort Charlotte and its military supplies on 12 July 1775, only to immediately surrender the position to Loyalist militia under Captain Moses Kirkland. Most of these seizures of arms and ammunition did not involve bloodshed. That situation changed in October 1775 with the battle of Hampton, Virginia. Five more battles followed that year in the South: Kemp's Landing, Virginia, in early November, in which Governor John Murray, Lord Dunmore, scattered the Virginia militia (leading to his proclamation offering freedom to the slaves at that site on 7 November); the Hog Island Channel Fight, South Carolina, of 11–12 November; Ninety Six, South Carolina, 19–21 November; Great Bridge, Virginia, 9 December; and Cane Brake (Reedy River), South Carolina, 22 December. Each of these actions involved Patriot and Loyalist militia, giving a preview, albeit a tame one, of the civil war nature of the fighting that was to rage later in the South.

1776: THE REBELS MAINTAIN CONTROL


The London authorities counted strongly on Loyalist support in putting down the rebellion, but they sorely misunderstood the ability of the Loyalists to sustain a military presence on their own. They also generally believed their own misinformation on the number of Loyalists in the South; the majority of whites, it appears, would have preferred for both sides to just leave them alone. Frustrated around Boston and encouraged by reports of the fugitive governors from the Southern provinces, the British launched the Charleston Expedition of General Sir Henry Clinton in 1776. But before the British could get going with this operation their hopes for Loyalist support were crushed at Norfolk, Virginia, 1 January, and Moores Creek Bridge, North Carolina, 27 February. After a humiliating defeat at Charleston, 28 June, the British expedition limped back to join General Sir William Howe on Staten Island for the New York Campaign. The only other significant actions in the South during the year were at Hutchinson's Island, Georgia, 7 March; Gwynn Island, Virginia, 8–10 July; Rayborn Creek, South Carolina, 15 July; and Essenecca Town, South Carolina, 1 August 1776; and a number of naval encounters in the Chesapeake.

1777–1779: AFTER QUIET, THE WAR MOVES SOUTH

While decisive events took place in other theaters, armed actions in the South in 1777 were limited to some minor skirmishes and the battles at Fort McIntosh, Georgia, 2–4 February, and Fort Henry, Virginia, 1 September.

The French Alliance, signed in Paris on 6 February 1778, changed, in theory, the entire complexion of the Revolutionary War. In addition to the free flow of munitions and other supplies to the rebels and the addition of thousands of professional soldiers, France's entry into the war challenged the naval supremacy that had given the British such great strategic flexibility: the ability to move large bodies of troops along the coasts and up the rivers of America. Actually, the British had not capitalized fully on this advantage, and it was almost three years before the French fleet made any decisive contribution to American strategy; but this new element figured prominently in British planning.

Major General Robert Howe was the first commander of the rebel Southern army, and in the spring of 1778 he endeavored to mount an expedition to invade East Florida, where General Augustine Prevost was reported to be receiving British reinforcements. With about 550 Continental troops and the militia commands of Colonels Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Stephen Bull, Andrew Williamson, and Governor John Houstoun (of Georgia) numbering an addition 1,500 men, as well as naval units commanded



Southern Theater. THE GALE GROUP

by Commodore Oliver Bowen, Howe reached the Altamaha River on 20 May. Here his proposed attack on St. Augustine aborted because Houstoun and Williamson refused to take orders from Howe. Dissolution of the expedition was speeded by hunger and sickness.

The British then undertook operations that resulted in the capture of Savannah, 29 December 1778, by Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell's expedition from New York. Prevost marched north to take Sunbury, Georgia, 9 January 1779, and assumed command of British operations in the South. These campaigns reflected a new British strategy which sought to reclaim the southern colonies one by one for British rule. The first indication of the success of this policy was the restoration of James Wright as governor of Georgia in July 1779.

LINCOLN'S OPERATIONS

Major General Benjamin Lincoln was appointed commander of the Southern Department in September 1778 while Howe was operating in Georgia. When Howe

retreated from Savannah he joined forces with Lincoln, who had moved south to Purysburg, on the South Carolina side of the Savannah River. The Americans then numbered 1,121 Continentals and 2,518 militia; but only 2,428 were fit for duty, and the militia demonstrated a lack of military ability. Prevost moved up to face Lincoln across the river with just under 1,000 British regulars, 700 Germans, some 100 Creeks, and 600 Loyalists. Campbell went inland to take Augusta, 29 January, with virtually no opposition.

As the two main armies faced each other across the formidable barrier of the swamp-bordered Savannah River, Prevost capitalized on his available naval forces to make the first move: he sent a force of about 200 men to take Port Royal Island. This turning movement was frustrated by General William Moultrie at Beaufort, South Carolina, 3 February 1779.

Moultrie's success swelled Lincoln's ranks with militia reinforcements, and he undertook a counteroffensive to recover Georgia. General Andrew Williamson moved with

1,200 men to a position across the river from Campbell's isolated force in Augusta. General Griffith Rutherford led 800 men to Black Swamp, about ten miles upstream from Purysburg. General John Ashe was then sent with 1,500 to join Williamson opposite Augusta. After Ashe crossed the river and started down the right bank in the tracks of Campbell, who had evacuated Augusta the evening before, Colonel Andrew Pickens won his victory at nearby Kettle Creek, Georgia, 14 February. The British under Lieutenant Colonel Mark Prevost executed a brilliant little operation that destroyed Ashe's column at Briar Creek, Georgia, 3 March. But Campbell had to pull his forces back from Augusta, as there was no general rising of Loyalists and he feared being cut off by the Patriot militia from Savannah.

Despite Campbell's retreat, the victory at Briar Creek made the recovery of Georgia for the Patriots that year highly unlikely, most particularly as they now were running dangerously low of arms and ammunition. Nonetheless, Lincoln remained optimistic, especially after a supply of firearms arrived from the Dutch West Indies in mid-April. Leaving Moultrie with 1,000 men at Purysburg and Black Swamp, Lincoln marched up the left bank of the river toward Augusta with the remaining 4,000. Lincoln's goal remains unclear, since Campbell's troops had already retreated to the coast and there were few active Loyalists left in the area of Augusta. Apparently he hoped to give the Georgia legislature, which was reconvening in Augusta, a needed morale boost. Prevost countered with the indirect strategy of pushing through Moultrie's covering force to bring Lincoln back by threatening Charleston. Lincoln recognized this as a diversion and continued his march toward Augusta, but Prevost met so little resistance that he moved on to threaten Charleston, 11–12 May. Lincoln stopped his advance at Silver Bluff, South Carolina, about ten miles short of Augusta, and came puffing back toward Charleston. Prevost withdrew by way of the coastal islands. In a mismanaged attempt to destroy the British rear guard of Lieutenant Colonel John Maitland, the rebels were beaten at Stono Ferry, 20 June 1779. Maitland was left with a strong outpost on Port Royal Island, and Prevost withdrew his main body to Savannah.

The Franco-American attempt to recapture Savannah, 9 October 1779, not only left the place in British hands but also generated more Loyalist support, dropped Patriot morale to a new low, and further disillusioned the Americans about the value of the French alliance.

1780: THE SOUTH BECOMES A MAJOR THEATER

The Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780 brought the Revolutionary War south to stay. The surrender of

Lincoln's army on 12 May was the greatest British triumph of the war. This campaign also brought into prominence a British cavalry leader, Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, whose victories—at Monck's Corner, 14 April; Lenud's Ferry, 6 May; and at the Waxhaws, 29 May—wiped out all organized Patriot resistance in South Carolina that had not been destroyed at Charleston.

When Clinton left for New York on 5 June with about a third of the troops he had brought on this expedition, General Charles Cornwallis was left with 8,345 men to maintain and extend British control of the South. With his main body at Charleston, and strong detachments at Savannah, Augusta, and Ninety Six, Cornwallis established a forward base at Camden and pushed outposts to Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, and Cheraw. Another post was established at Georgetown, near the mouth of the Peedee River. Within this arc of over 350 miles were many other posts needed to secure lines of communications and rally Loyalists. The latter were counted on to hold this vast area of some 15,000 square miles. Once more the British miscalculated Loyalist strength.

During the three months that followed the surrender of Charleston, the Carolinas were the scene of skirmishes between bands of patriots and Loyalists. Pickens, Francis Marion, and Thomas Sumter emerged as the most prominent partisans in the actions against Loyalist forces, including those led by the British officers Tarleton and Major Patrick Ferguson. Many of these skirmishes were connected with the campaigns leading to the battles of Camden and Kings Mountain. Others took place at Ramseur's Mill, North Carolina, 20 June; Williamson's Plantation, South Carolina, 12 July; Rocky Mount, South Carolina, 30 July, Green Spring, South Carolina, 1 Aug., and Hanging Rock, South Carolina, 6 and 12 August. The Revolution in the south in the years 1779 to 1781 became a civil war, with all the cruelty and bitterness that tends to mark such conflicts.

AMERICAN REGULARS RETURN

Early in 1780 the French government warned Congress that the Patriots must do more for themselves and rely less on the French Alliance to win the war for them. Washington sent General Johann de Kalb south in April with a small body of Continental troops around whom they hoped the Southern militia would rally. Lincoln's surrender at Charleston shook patriot resolve, and Congress recognized the necessity of a major success in that theater of operations. Over Washington's recommendation of General Nathanael Greene, they turned on 13 July to the victor of Saratoga, General Horatio Gates, to serve as commander of the Southern Department.

Kalb, meanwhile, had left Morristown on 16 April with the Maryland and Delaware Continental contingents

that constituted the main portion of the Southern army throughout most of the subsequent campaigning. The First Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General William Smallwood, was composed of the First, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Maryland. The Second Brigade of General Mordecai Gist comprised the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Maryland, and the Delaware Regiment. Kalb also had Colonel Charles Harrison's First Continental Artillery Regiment with its eighteen cannon. Marching through Philadelphia to Head of Elk, the infantry proceeded by water to Petersburg, Virginia, and the artillery continued by land. From Petersburg Kalb moved at the rate of fifteen to eighteen miles a day. On 20 June he learned of Charleston's surrender five weeks earlier (12 May). Because the purpose of his expedition was to help defend Charleston, Kalb was faced with a decision as to what he should do next. The hoped-for militia reinforcements failed to arrive in any appreciable numbers while he camped at Parson's Plantation, North Carolina, about thirty-five miles northeast of Hillsboro. Showing the initiative and resolution that were lacking in so many native-born Patriots during the Revolution, he led his regulars farther southwest. He reached Hillsboro on 22 June. Despite the heat, insects, lack of adequate equipment, and almost total lack of provisions, the expedition struggled on to Buffalo Ford on Deep River, about fifty miles north-northeast of the enemy post at Cheraw, South Carolina. Here he was joined by 120 survivors of Pulaski's Legion, now commanded by Colonel Charles Armand. But the large force of well-fed North Carolina militia under Major General Richard Caswell refused to join him, and he was unable to make contact with the Virginia forces of General Edward Stevens and Colonel Charles Porterfield, who were known to be in the field. During the two weeks he camped at Buffalo Ford, Kalb learned of Gates's appointment. His persevering efforts having gone almost completely unrewarded, the giant Bavarian moved his camp along Deep River to Hollingsworth's Farm and surrendered command to Gates on the latter's arrival on 25 July.

In the Camden Campaign, July–August 1780, Gates ignored the good advice of Kalb and several of the southern militia commanders, leading his army to a disaster that almost equaled Lincoln's surrender at Charleston. Kalb died of multiple wounds in the Battle of Camden, 16 August, while Gates fled the field and Tarleton wiped out Sumter's detachment at Fishing Creek, 18 August.

REORGANIZATION AFTER CAMDEN

Realizing that their previous three choices to command the Southern army—Generals Howe, Lincoln, and Gates—had proven less than stellar, Congress resolved on 5 October 1780 that General Washington should select the new commanding general. Washington immediately

chose General Nathanael Greene, with General Friedrich von Steuben as second in command.

Before Greene arrived at Charlotte, North Carolina (2 December) to take command, however, Gates had reorganized the puny remnants of his army. Of four thousand that had constituted this force before Camden, only about seven hundred made their way back to Hillsboro, North Carolina. Most of them lacked weapons, having thrown them aside so as to not impede their flight. Congress resolved to forward food and other supplies, but none were forthcoming. The militia presented no problem of reorganization given that few, if any, of those from North Carolina showed up, and the fleet-footed Virginia militiamen who found their way to the rendezvous soon went home. This left only the regulars, and what was left of two brigades had to be consolidated to form a single regiment of two battalions. A third regiment was constituted a short time later when Colonel Abraham Buford arrived with the portion of his Third Virginia Continentals that had survived the Battle of the Waxhaws (29 May) plus two hundred recruits; fifty of Porterfield's light infantry also came into camp. Early in October, Gates organized a corps of light troops by taking selected men from the regiments; this formed the nucleus of General Daniel Morgan's division, which played a pivotal role in Greene's operations.

OPERATIONS AFTER CAMDEN

Cornwallis did not wait for Greene's arrival to take the field. Clinton had left Cornwallis with instructions to make the security of South Carolina his primary objective, but the ambitious earl also got authority to communicate directly with the London authorities, and the latter endorsed his more aggressive strategy to extend British control into North Carolina. On 8 September 1780, therefore, he started an offensive.

At Kings Mountain, South Carolina, 7 October, the Patriots won a victory over Major Patrick Ferguson. Clinton later called this victory "the first link of a chain of evils that followed each other in regular succession until they at last ended in the total loss of America."

In response to direction from London, where Cornwallis's strategy was favored over his own, Clinton had ordered Major General Alexander Leslie to move from New York with 2,500 troops to the Chesapeake; here he was to link up with Cornwallis as the latter pushed into Virginia, or at least to block movement of American reinforcements south. Leslie sailed from New York on 16 October with the British Guards, Eighty-second and Eighty-fourth Regiments, the Bose's German Regiment, and Loyalist units commanded by Lieutenant Colonels Edmund Fanning and John W. T. Watson. Although the Kings Mountain disaster had already occurred

(7 October), Leslie landed at Portsmouth, Virginia, as originally planned. Here he received orders from Lieutenant Colonel Francis Rawdon, who was acting commander while Cornwallis was incapacitated by fever, to bring his force to Charleston. Leslie sailed from Portsmouth on 23 November, reached Charleston on 16 December, and marched inland with 1,500 troops to arrive at Camden on 4 January 1781. The Eighty-second and Eighty-fourth stayed in Charleston, and Fanning went to Georgetown.

Cornwallis, meanwhile, had retreated from Charlotte to Winnsboro, South Carolina, which he reached in late October 1780. While the bulk of his army remained inactive he devoted his attention to suppressing the partisans. Marion's raids on the line of communications between Charleston and Camden were particularly troublesome. Marion sallied forth from his camp at Snow Island and routed a body of Loyalist militia under Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Tynes at Tearcoat Swamp, 26 October. Then he materialized out of the Black River swamps to cross the High Hills of Santee and camp astride the British supply line at Singleton's Mills. Cornwallis gave Tarleton permission to take most of his Legion off to catch Marion, but Tarleton was led a merry chase during which he never caught sight of Marion's men. A frustrated Cornwallis ordered Tarleton to turn his attention instead to Sumter, who had just defeated Major James Wemyss at Fishdam Ford, South Carolina, 9 November 1780. This victory brought swarms of Patriots to Sumter's camp and seriously alarmed Cornwallis about the safety of his rear area, particularly Ninety Six. On 20 November Tarleton finally brought Sumter to ground at Blackstock's Plantation, South Carolina, a hard-fought skirmish of which it is difficult to say who won.

GREENE TAKES THE OFFENSIVE

Greene assumed command on 3 December and almost immediately took the offensive in an extraordinarily unorthodox manner. The highlights include Morgan's brilliant victory over Tarleton at Cowpens, South Carolina, 17 January 1781; Greene's masterful retreat to the Dan River; his return to North Carolina and tactical defeat but strategic victory at Guilford Courthouse, 15 March; Cornwallis's retreat to Wilmington; Rawdon's victory over Greene at Hobkirk's Hill (Camden), South Carolina, 25 April; Greene's mopping up in the Carolinas; and the final major engagement, at Eutaw Springs, South Carolina, 8 September 1781.

Meanwhile, Virginia was the scene of devastating raids as the British shifted troops into that area from the stalemated north. Lafayette was sent there with an expeditionary force, and Cornwallis appeared from Wilmington. At first Cornwallis pursued Lafayette, hoping to crush his small army, but as the American force grew in size,

Lafayette cleverly outmaneuvered Cornwallis and began his retreat to the Chesapeake that culminated in the confrontation at Yorktown.

SEE ALSO *Beaufort, South Carolina; Blackstock's, South Carolina; Briar Creek, Georgia; Camden Campaign; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Charleston Raid of Prevost; Cherokee War of 1776; Cowpens, South Carolina; Eutaw Springs, South Carolina; Fishdam Ford, South Carolina; Fishing Creek, North Carolina; Fort McIntosh, Georgia; Great Bridge, Virginia; Green (or Greene's) Spring, South Carolina; Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Gwynn Island, Virginia; Hampton, Virginia; Hanging Rock, South Carolina; Hutchinson's Island, Georgia; Kettle Creek, Georgia; Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Lenud's Ferry, South Carolina; Monck's Corner, South Carolina; Moores Creek Bridge; Ninety Six, South Carolina (19 November 1775); North Carolina, Mobilization in; Ramseur's Mill, North Carolina; Reedy River, South Carolina; Rocky Mount, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia (29 December 1778); Savannah, Georgia (9 October 1779); Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene; Stono Ferry, South Carolina; Sunbury, Georgia (9 January 1779); Virginia, Military Operations in; Waxhaws, South Carolina; Wheeling, West Virginia; Williamson's Plantation, South Carolina; Yorktown Campaign.*

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SOWER, CHRISTOPHER. (1754–1799). Loyalist. Pennsylvania. Born on 27 January 1754 at Germantown, Pennsylvania, Sower (Sauer) was the grandson and son of prominent printers of the same name, all three of whom operated a German language press. The father, a bishop of the Dunkards, a pacifist denomination,

had all his property, worth more than ten thousand pounds, confiscated by Pennsylvania for his views. The younger Christopher Sower and his brother Peter published the *Germantowner Zeitung*, which published articles disrespectful of the Patriot cause. In 1776 Pennsylvania ordered the suspension of the newspaper. When the British arrived, Sower moved to Philadelphia in September 1777 and continued his paper under the title of *Staats Courier*. On 5 December 1777 he was wounded and captured at Germantown (presumably in connection with the affair of Whitemarsh) and on 10 January 1778 was exchanged. He went to New York City when the British evacuated Philadelphia in June 1778.

In New York City he became the link between Sir Henry Clinton and the Pennsylvania Loyalists in the frontier counties of Lancaster, Northumberland, and York. During the next three years he was the principal agent for William Rankin, working as well with Major John André. When the British evacuated New York City in 1783 he went to England, where he was granted £1,289 to cover his war losses by confiscation. Two years later he went to New Brunswick as the king's printer and deputy postmaster general, publishing the *Royal Gazette*. In 1799 he returned to the United States, dying at the home of his brother Samuel in Baltimore on 3 July 1799.

SEE ALSO *Rankin, William; Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania.*

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SPALDING, SIMON. (1742–1814). Continental officer. Connecticut–Pennsylvania. Born in Plainfield, Connecticut, on 16 January 1742, Spalding moved to the Wyoming Valley in 1772. On 26 August 1776 he became a second lieutenant of Ransom's Wyoming Valley company. Promoted to first lieutenant on 1 January 1777, he saw action at Bound Brook, New Jersey, on 13 April 1777, where he was given credit for effecting the successful retreat of the American forces. Promoted to captain on 24 June 1778, he led Connecticut troops to reinforce the Wyoming Valley but was nearly fifty miles away when the Wyoming Valley massacre took place on 3–4 July 1778. He commanded his company with distinction in Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois in 1779. Transferred to the First Connecticut on 1 January 1781, he retired two years later. On 30 May 1783 he moved up the Wyoming Valley to settle at

Shesequin, where he eventually became brigadier general of militia. He died there on 24 January 1814.

SEE ALSO *Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

SPANGENBERG, AUGUSTUS SEE *Moravian Settlements.*

SPANISH PARTICIPATION IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

Spain played a signal role in the American Revolution as a supply source for munitions and other material for the Americans. After 1779, Spain's military forces won significant victories against Great Britain, thereby helping to bring the war towards a conclusive defeat of the British. Spain, along with her ally France, had been a traditional and long-standing international rival of the British since the beginnings of the colonial era. These powers had fought a series of European intercolonial wars from the late 1680s until the 1760s. This heritage of warfare guaranteed that Spain would view the American Revolution as an opportunity to weaken, if not destroy, the British Empire. However, as a major colonial power herself, Spain had no sympathy for the rebel goals. The Spanish king and his ministers absolutely did not support the concept of colonials who might revolt against the authority of a sovereign. Spain therefore adopted a bifurcated policy: she would support the American cause as a mechanism to damage the British Empire; but she would not form an alliance with the infant United States until after the American Revolution. Given this policy, Spanish involvement in the American Revolution fell into two distinct eras. First, from 1775 until 1779, Spain secretly furnished badly needed supplies to the Americans in order to animate them in their revolt against British colonial authority, but in so doing refused to ally with the rebels. Second, after the summer of 1779, Spain entered the wider European war as a combatant against the British, but did not sign an alliance with the Continental Congress or coordinate her military campaigns with those of the infant United States.

LOUISIANA AND CUBA

Spanish Louisiana and Cuba served as important centers for Spain's participation in the Revolution, especially regarding the respective cities of New Orleans and Havana. Spanish officials in both ports played significant roles at every stage of Spain's involvement in the revolt.

Louisiana, along with its capital New Orleans, had only recently become a Spanish colonial possession when the French king transferred it to his Bourbon cousin at the treaty negotiations that occurred during the Peace of Paris in 1763. As part of this settlement, the Isle of Orleans which contained the province's capital, along with all lands on the west bank of the Mississippi River, became part of the new colony of British West Florida after 1763, with its capital at Pensacola. This meant that towns north of New Orleans, including Baton Rouge and Natchez, became British, along with Mobile and the other settlements along the Gulf Coast. Respective colonies in North America belonging to Spain and Great Britain thus touched as contiguous territories along the lower Mississippi for the very first time since the beginnings of European colonization in the New World. This geographical reality would have profound implications for Spanish participation in the American Revolution. A Spanish governor based at New Orleans served as the civil and military commander of the colony, serving in that regard as the subordinate of the Captain-General of Cuba. Located at Havana, the Captain-General commanded all of Spain's military forces throughout the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, making him an important figure in Spain's involvement in the American Revolution.

MOUNTING COLONIAL UNREST

Both of these Spanish officials became aware of the governmental problems in British America during the late 1760s and early 1770s as controversy brewed between the English colonists on the Atlantic coast and the home government in London. The governor of Louisiana, Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, routinely heard reports about events in America from his neighbors in West Florida. He dutifully passed this news on to his superiors in Cuba and Spain, where the highest level of policy makers in the king's inner circle of advisors considered this information. In addition, the Captain-General of Cuba regularly heard reports about the growing crisis in the British colonies from the maritime traffic in the region.

By 1770, these two officials had decided to create a secret intelligence network in the lower Mississippi valley, along the Gulf Coast, and in the Caribbean for the purpose of gathering news and information about the expanding crisis in the British colonies. They did so with the full approval of the Spanish court, where the king and his ministers were primarily concerned about the military defense of Spain's colonies in the face of an open colonial war in British North America. As part of this espionage network, the Captain-General routinely dispatched Cuban fishing boats to the South Atlantic coast in order to scout the sea-lanes and talk to the masters of ships sailing to and from ports in the British colonies. He also recruited two Spanish subjects who were living in

British West Florida to provide regular intelligence about English naval and troop movements in the region. One of them, Father Pedro Camps, was a Roman Catholic Priest living at New Smyrna. While the other, Luciano Herrera, resided at St. Augustine.

Herrera, a Spanish merchant who continued to reside in East Florida after the British took it over, had many contacts among English officials and residents in the city. Both of these men proved to be fruitful sources for Spain about events in North America all during the course of the Revolution. While the Captain-General was occupied with the sea lanes around East Florida, the governor of Louisiana continued to monitor events in West Florida while he routinely interviewed English ship captains passing New Orleans on the Mississippi about occurrences in the British colonies of the Atlantic coast. He also permitted Louisiana merchant vessels to call at Pensacola and Mobile under the guise of conducting illegal trade, with their true purpose to gather information of events in the British colonies. In 1772, Governor Unzaga dispatched a confidential agent from Louisiana to New York and Philadelphia for the secret purpose of learning about recent events there. This person, Juan Surriret, was a prosperous merchant who had many commercial ties to mercantile houses in major ports of the Atlantic coast. Surriret employed these contacts as sources of information while he visited with them under the ruse of conducting private commerce. Returning en route to New Orleans from the east coast, he stopped at Pensacola, observing much British naval activity that proved useful to the Spanish. Surriret's mission was a great success.

By the time of Lexington and Concord (April 1775), Spanish officials in North America and in Spain had become reasonably well-informed about the unrest in the British colonies. Governor Unzaga at New Orleans heard early reports of the outbreak of fighting in Massachusetts within weeks of the events while the Captain-General quickly confirmed these reports as both men continued to gather news about the revolt during the ensuing months and years. By mid-1775, all of the information from the rebellious colonies had permitted the Spanish king and his ministers to craft a well-reasoned, official foreign policy and international response to the American Revolution. The Spanish would remain neutral in the ensuing conflict, and openly refused to engage in any action that might cause the British to turn their wrath against Spain or her new world colonies. The king and his ministers did not believe that their military had been adequately prepared for war. They feared that the rebellious British colonies might well lose their revolt, thus freeing a mobilized English army and navy to attack Spain or her possessions, especially if Spain politically supported the rebel colonists. Neutrality would give Spain the opportunity to prepare her military for eventual participation, should the opportunity for open

conflict with Great Britain later present itself. At the same time, however, Spanish officials, including King Charles III, secretly wished for a rebel American victory, since such an occurrence would seriously damage the rival British Empire. For that reason, the Spanish decided to assist the rebels with all possible secrecy and confidentiality. The Spanish king's resolve to follow this risky policy increased when he learned that France had also decided on a similar response to events in British North America.

OPPORTUNITIES TO ASSIST

An unexpected opportunity for Spain to assist the American rebels came in the summer of 1776, when Captain George Gibson arrived at New Orleans in command of a company of soldiers from Virginia. They had floated down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers under the pretense of being merchants engaged in frontier trade. They carried a confidential letter from General Charles Lee, who served as George Washington's second-in-command. Lee, who pointed out that, since Spain was Britain's long-standing international enemy, the Spanish might furnish a stream of badly needed supplies, including weapons, munitions, medicines, and other items. These could be shipped to New Orleans where they would be transferred to boats that would be poled up the inland rivers to Fort Pitt. Governor Unzaga, who had no instructions from Spain on these matters, quickly reported this request while he temporized with Captain Gibson, permitting the American officer to purchase gunpowder and other materials already on hand in the Louisiana capital.

While making his purchases, Captain Gibson made contact with Oliver Pollock, a Scot-Irish merchant who lived in New Orleans. A native of Ulster, Pollock had migrated first to Pennsylvania and then, in 1762, to Havana, where he found great prosperity as a merchant. He moved to New Orleans in the late 1760s, took Spanish citizenship, and had become one of the wealthiest merchants in Louisiana by the time of the American Revolution. Pollock quickly embraced the rebel cause, for which he manifested a great fervor and enthusiastic support. Pollock eagerly sold Captain Gibson the desired supplies and arranged for them to be shipped to Fort Pitt. Pollock also wrote a letter to the Continental Congress, which accompanied the shipment of supplies, in which he pledged his support for the Revolution and offered his services as the American supply agent at New Orleans. The Secret Committee of Correspondence of the Congress accepted Pollock's offer and, in the following year, appointed him as its official supply agent at New Orleans. For the next several years, Pollock shipped dozens of boatloads of material up the rivers to Fort Pitt while he liberally paid for much of this merchandise with personal drafts on his own accounts, pending eventual reimbursement from the Congress.

In the meantime, Unzaga's sending of Gibson's letter to his superiors in Madrid set in motion a larger, centrally directed effort by which Spain began to supply the Americans surreptitiously. A meeting of the king and the Spanish council of ministers resolved to create a regularized supply network in order to assist the rebel Americans. They dispatched a Cuban, Miguel Antonio Eduardo, to New Orleans with additional military supplies that soon found their way into American hands. The Spanish court also enlisted the services of a Spanish merchant from Bilbao, Diego de Gardoqui, who spoke fluent English and who had extensive mercantile experience in trading with the British Atlantic ports.

At the suggestion of the Spanish chief minister, Gardoqui formed a dummy merchant house under the guise of seeking quick profits from private trade with the rebels. In reality, all of the military supplies that his firm shipped to the rebellious Americans through Havana and other ports in the Caribbean were secretly supplied from the Spanish government as unofficial aid to the American cause. An additional chance to assist the Continental Congress occurred when an American envoy, Arthur Lee, appeared in Spain. The Marquis de Grimaldi, the Spanish minister of state, met secretly with Lee and publicly rebuffed his requests for aid, in keeping with Spain's official policy of neutrality. In secret, however, Grimaldi arranged for an under-the-table loan in the amount of one million dollars, which the Americans used to purchase additional supplies from other European sources.

Spanish espionage efforts also continued as supplies began to flow from Spain. Both the governor of Louisiana and the Captain-General of Cuba sent additional agents to various locations on the Atlantic coast to gather information about the revolt. Juan de Miralles, a Cuban merchant from Havana, proved to be the most important of these confidential agents. At the specific request of the Spanish court at Madrid, the Captain-General dispatched Miralles to Philadelphia to report on events at the Continental Congress. He left Havana in late 1777, landed at Charleston, and visited along the route with various American leaders as he traveled to the meeting place of the Congress. Miralles claimed to be a private merchant interested in fostering trade relations with the infant United States. His distinguished demeanor, official bearing, and extensive correspondence with individuals in Spain and Cuba, however, made his true status obvious to Congress and its members.

As the months progressed, the Americans increasingly treated Miralles as if he were Spain's unofficial envoy in the United States capital, which increasingly became an accurate description of Miralles's true role in Philadelphia. By 1778, the Spaniard enjoyed in a *de facto* manner all the rights and privileges normally accorded to an authorized diplomatic envoy. Miralles obliged by speaking for Spain

at the Continental Congress, while he continued to fulfill his initial mission by sending a steady stream of news and information to his superiors.

THE REVOLUTION MOVES SOUTH

While Miralles established himself at the Congress, the American Revolution came to the lower Mississippi valley when a rebel expedition floated down the river to attack British West-Florida. Early in 1778, Pennsylvania Captain James Willing led a company of armed men on an attack against British settlements along the river. He took the town of Natchez, captured British ships that were plying the Mississippi, and sacked plantations belonging to West Floridian residents.

Willing arrived at New Orleans in the mid-spring of 1778, anxious to sell his plunder in order to raise money for the United States. Oliver Pollock, as the congressional agent in the city, eagerly assisted in the sales and, importantly, convinced the governor to offer Willing and his men protection. Louisiana had a new governor, Bernardo de Gálvez, who was very much a partisan of American independence. The son of a powerful Spanish family, Governor Gálvez saw the revolt as a way to defeat the British and end the centuries-old rivalry with them. He therefore welcomed the American expedition to New Orleans and rebuffed British complaints about the courtesies he extended to Willing and his men. Gálvez's support ensured that Oliver Pollock would be able to increase the amount of supplies being shipped from New Orleans, and that city became an important supply depot for the American cause.

CHALLENGING SPAIN'S NEUTRALITY POLICY

The Franco-American Alliance of February, 1778 (which partially resulted from the victory at Saratoga), radically changed the nature of Spanish participation in the Revolution. France, a European power traditionally allied with Spain, joined the conflict as an official ally of the United States and as a belligerent to Great Britain. This development forced Spain to continue its policy of neutrality alone. High-ranking ministers at the Spanish court therefore debated during the spring of 1778 about joining France and declaring war on Great Britain. After lengthy discussion, the Spanish king and his ministers decided to continue their neutral policies. They reasoned that the Spanish army and navy was not yet ready to achieve the specific war goals they wished to gain in a conflict with Great Britain. Specifically, Spain wanted to regain possession of Gibraltar, drive the British from both East and West Florida, sweep the English settlements from the Logwood coasts of Central America and end definitively the special trading concessions for British merchants in

some Spanish colonies which had been a provision of the Peace of Paris, 1763.

Spain would thus only enter the conflict when her ministers and king believed the military was strong enough to achieve these objectives. Even then, Spain might not risk a formal diplomatic alliance with the United States, as France had done when it entered the conflict. Important figures at the Spanish court, including the powerful Conde de Floridablanca who served as chief minister of the state, worried that the westward expanding young United States would replace Great Britain as a territorial rival for Spain in North America. Floridablanca, as Spain's highest ranking royal advisor, resolved that even if his nation entered the conflict as a belligerent, it would not sign a treaty of amity or commerce with the United States.

The successful campaigns of George Roger Clark in the Illinois country of the Mississippi valley confirmed these fears for Spain. Floating down the Ohio during the summer of 1778, Clark and his men won a series of victories at Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Vincennes that swept the British from the region by early 1779. These conquests would not have been possible without the aid and support provided to Clark by Oliver Pollock at New Orleans. He liberally supplied anything the American general requested to hold the Illinois country, to the point of making possible the first settlement by the United States on the Mississippi River. This was at Fort Jefferson, established in 1780 near the confluence point of the great river with the Ohio on the northern edge of Spanish Louisiana. Spain's reaction to George Rogers Clark's conquest of western territory became apparent at Philadelphia in late 1779, when Juan de Miralles began to argue informally that, should the United States win the war, Spain might not grant it free navigation rights on the Mississippi as had been the case for Great Britain.

Nonetheless, Clark's victories in the Mississippi valley served as a motivating factor that pushed Spain towards declaring war on Great Britain. In the late spring of 1779, the Spanish colonial minister warned Louisiana governor Gálvez to prepare for an imminent declaration of war, which came officially on 21 June. True to established policy, Spain declared war against Great Britain, but did not recognize the United States as an ally. Nonetheless, both nations agreed to exchange informal envoys who would serve as the recognized spokespersons of their respective governments. Juan de Miralles became the recognized "Spanish observer" at the Continental Congress, while that body dispatched a New Yorker, John Jay, to Spain as its envoy. Jay had instructions to negotiate an alliance with Spain, but no such treaty came to pass during the two years of his residence at Madrid because the Spanish court refused to consider it.

Spain's entrance into the war began a series of military victories between 1779 and 1781 that fulfilled many of its

war goals, especially along the Gulf coast and the lower Mississippi valley. Bernardo de Gálvez had astutely prepared the Spanish military forces in Louisiana for successful attacks on West Florida. During the fall of 1779, Governor Gálvez and his forces captured the British post at Baton Rouge. Natchez surrendered soon thereafter. The following spring Mobile fell to the Spanish. Then, in the spring of 1781, Gálvez led a combined army and navy attack against Pensacola, the British colonial capital. Spain also enjoyed successes further to the north when, in 1780, the Commander turned back a British attack on St. Louis. Spain's efforts to block additional British attacks on the Mississippi valley met with further good fortune when a Spanish force captured Fort St. Joseph in present-day Michigan, thereby thwarting additional English incursions into the region from Detroit.

Spain also met with limited success in dislodging the British from their establishments in Central America. In 1779, an army commanded by Matias de Gálvez, the father of the Louisiana governor, captured the British posts at Belize and Rotan. He also withstood an English counter-attack against Spanish positions in modern Nicaragua. In the Caribbean, a 1782 Spanish naval expedition commanded by Juan María de Cagigal forced the British surrender of New Providence Island.

In spite of these victories, however, Spain failed to achieve her major goal of reacquiring Gibraltar. In cooperation with French forces, Spain laid siege to the British fortress at Gibraltar in June of 1779, as soon as war had been declared. More than five thousand British forces, led by General George Elliot, held the great rock's impenetrable defenses with steadfast resolution. The British could easily secure needed foodstuffs and supplies from Moroccan smugglers from across the Straits, which ensured that the siege of Gibraltar would be the longest running military engagement of the American Revolution.

AFTER THE WAR

The siege lasted until 1783, and Spain proved incapable of dislodging the British from their Mediterranean stronghold. By 1782, the Spanish king and his ministers were growing weary anyway of continuing major military operations against the British. The surrender at Yorktown had effectively settled the outcome of the Revolution in favor of the Americans. Thereafter, Floridablanca and his fellow Spanish ministers mostly fretted about the potential of the United States to become a new rival on the borders of Spanish America. For that reason, Spain began to plan her diplomacy to gain as much as possible from the forthcoming peace negotiations that would end the worldwide conflict in 1783.

The fact that each participating nation signed a separate, bilateral treaty at the Peace of Paris of that year was a

diplomatic development that worked to Spain's advantage. Her diplomats at Paris were able to obscure the boundaries between Spanish Florida and the territories to the north that were claimed by the United States. The border asserted by Spain in its treaty with the United States placed the boundary line at one place while Spain's accord with Great Britain, the previous master of the whole territory, drew it at another latitude. This gave Spain the opportunity after the war to maintain a large hegemony in the lower Mississippi valley and Gulf Coast regions than would have been the case had the treaties been more straightforward.

Hence, during the years following the American Revolution, Spain maintained cordial, yet less than cooperative, relations with the United States. In the year after the Peace of Paris, 1783, Spanish officials closed the free navigation of the Mississippi River to United States citizens. The arrival of Diego de Gardoqui, in his capacity as Spain's first accredited Charge d'Affairs at Philadelphia in 1785, did not result in a formal treaty between Spain and the United States over western boundary issues and American navigation rights on the Mississippi. An accord on these matters did not come until the Treaty of San Lorenzo in 1795. This agreement finally did settle the boundary question, permitted United States citizens free navigation of the great river, and granted them the "right of deposit" at New Orleans coming down the river for transshipment to international markets.

Nonetheless, the secret support that Spain gave to the United States during the American Revolution proved to be a decisive factor in sustaining the rebel cause. Once the Spanish entered the conflict in 1779, their campaigns also assisted the United States, even though the two nations never coordinated their military actions. The pressure of Spain's attacks against the British in the Mississippi valley, the Gulf coast and the Caribbean, along with the siege of Gibraltar, diverted British military resources that otherwise would have been directed against the rebel Americans and the fighting that took place in North America.

SEE ALSO *Pensacola, Florida; Pollock, Oliver.*

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Light Townsend Cummins

SPANISH SUCCESSION, WAR OF THE. 1701–1714. After Carlos II, the last Habsburg king of Spain, died without issue in 1700, Louis XIV of France accepted the Spanish throne on behalf of his Bourbon nephew. A coalition of Protestant powers led by England's William III had already fought one war to curb Louis's ambitions, and now William's successor, his sister-in-law, Queen Anne, led another coalition with the same objective. The fighting in North America that pitted British colonists against the French in New France and the Spanish in Florida was called Queen Anne's War (1702–1713), and is covered under Colonial Wars.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars; League of Augsburg, War of the; Queen Anne's War.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

SPECIE. The term "specie" is used to denote metal coin, or "hard money," as opposed to paper money.

SEE ALSO *Continental Currency; Money of the Eighteenth Century.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

SPENCER, JOSEPH. (1714–1789). Continental general. Connecticut. Born in East Haddam,

Connecticut, Joseph Spencer was a prominent farmer, merchant, and attorney in the lower Connecticut valley. He was first elected as a deputy to the General Assembly in 1750, and served until he was elected to the governor's council as an opponent of the Stamp Act in May 1766. Major of the Twelfth Militia Regiment in October 1757, he served as a major (1758) and lieutenant colonel (1759 and 1760) in Connecticut's provincial regiments during the colony's years of maximum effort during the final French and Indian War. Appointed lieutenant colonel (1764) and then colonel (1766) of the Twelfth Militia, Spencer led a militia company from East Haddam to Boston after the Lexington alarm, and stayed for two weeks. The Assembly appointed the sixty-year-old politician and veteran as first brigadier general of Connecticut troops in April 1775, and he recruited and led the Second Regiment (of which he was simultaneously colonel) to Boston to join the New England army besieging the town.

On 20 June 1775 Congress ignored his Connecticut seniority by making him as a brigadier general while appointing Israel Putnam, his Connecticut subordinate, a major general. Incensed at this affront, Spencer went home. His conduct provoked a storm of criticism. Silas Deane, one of Connecticut's delegates to the Continental Congress at Philadelphia, wrote on 20 July that "the voice here is that he acted a part inconsistent with the character either of a soldier, a patriot, or even of a common gentleman to desert his post in an hour of danger, to sacrifice his country, which he certainly did as far as was in his power, and to turn his back sullenly on his general [Washington]." Connecticut's senior leaders, not wanting to lose the services of an important political figure or further divide a cause whose only hope of success lay in unity, had already acted. On the morning of 13 July, Governor Jonathan Trumbull and his council sent two of their number (Samuel Huntington and William Williams) to talk to Spencer at Gray's Tavern and persuade him to reconsider. That afternoon, they all met with Spencer "on the subject matter of his being superseded by the General Congress, . . . which he thinks very hard of and resents," and persuaded him "to return to the army and not at present quit the service.". Spencer served through the rest of the siege, and then went south with the army to New York City. On 9 August 1776 he was promoted to major general.

At a council of war on 8 September, Spencer voted with George Clinton and William Heath not to evacuate the army from New York City, at the southern tip of Manhattan Island. Events proved that the trio was too sanguine about the possibility of holding the city. When the British subsequently landed at Kips Bay, on the east side of the island several miles north of the city, the American troops remaining in New York were lucky to escape. But Alexander McDougall was too harsh, when,

years later, he labeled the trio as “a fool, a knave and an honest, obstinate man.” In December 1776 Spencer was ordered to New England and established his headquarters at Providence, Rhode Island, where he worked to contain the British who had just taken Newport. In September 1777 he organized an amphibious attack from Tiverton against the island of Rhode Island, but canceled the operation after the troops had loaded into boats, when he learned that the plan had been compromised. Indignant about a proposed inquiry by Congress into the cause of this failure, Spencer requested a court of inquiry and was exonerated. He resigned his commission on 13 January 1778 and returned to Connecticut. He immediately became, again, a prominent figure in state government. He was named to the Council of Safety, elected to the Assembly (May 1778), re-elected to the governor’s council (May 1779), and elected by the Assembly to Congress, where he served from June through September 1779. Historian Douglas Freeman’s comment that neither William Heath nor Spencer “had done anything more than discharge routine duties without displaying such scandalous incompetence or sloth as to make their removal a public necessity” (*Washington*, IV, p. 367) overlooks the extent to which the war was directed from the American side by local politicians whose appreciation of military realities was limited.

SEE ALSO *New York*.

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SPENCER’S REGIMENT. Spencer’s Regiment, commanded by Colonel Oliver Spencer, was one of the sixteen “additional Continental regiments.”

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments*.

Mark M. Boatner

SPENCER’S TAVERN, VIRGINIA. 26 June 1781. (VIRGINIA MILITARY OPERATIONS.) When reinforcements joined Lafayette, Cornwallis retreated slowly through Richmond, arriving at Williamsburg on 25 June, where he would remain until 4 July. Lafayette

followed at a respectable distance, remaining wary of a trap, and on 26 June was at Tyree’s Plantation, some 20 miles from Williamsburg. Meanwhile, Simcoe had separated from the main British column on 23 June with his Queen’s Rangers, one light three-pounder, and some Hessian jägers to destroy rebel stores on the Chickahominy River. Lafayette countered by detaching Colonel Richard Butler with his Pennsylvania Regiment, Majors Call and Willis with a body of Virginia riflemen, and Major William McPherson with 120 mounted troops to intercept Simcoe on his return. After an all-night march, they surprised Simcoe seven miles northwest of Williamsburg at Spencer’s Tavern (or Ordinary). At sunrise McPherson had mounted 50 light infantrymen double with 50 of his dragoons to speed up the pursuit, and this detachment closed in for a brief hand-to-hand action while the main bodies came forward. Simcoe’s Rangers drove McPherson back, but Call and Willis came up and were hotly engaged with Simcoe’s infantry when his dragoons hit their flank and pushed them back on Butler’s Pennsylvania Continentals. Simcoe briefly had the advantage in the confused fighting that followed, but fearing that Lafayette’s entire army might be at hand, he took the first opportunity to break off the action and fall back to Williamsburg. Since Cornwallis was moving forward with a strong reinforcement, Butler was equally anxious to see this skirmish end.

The Americans lost nine men killed, 14 wounded, and 13 missing. Cornwallis reported 33 casualties; this figure is accepted by historians, although Lafayette thought the enemy lost 60 men killed and 100 wounded. A more reasonable calculation put Simcoe’s losses at 11 dead and 26 wounded). Simcoe describes the action in detail and claims it was a sizable engagement won by his generalship (Simcoe, *Operations of Queen’s Rangers*, 236; Johnston, *Yorktown*, 56 n.), yet he left the field and his wounded in the hands of the enemy. In point of fact it tended to bolster American morale and provided Cornwallis with a reason to decline Clinton’s request to transfer men back to New York.

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

SPLIT ROCK (LAKE CHAMPLAIN), NEW YORK. 13 October 1776. Brigadier General Benedict Arnold’s battered squadron, fleeing south after the battle of Valcour Island, was overtaken just south of Split Rock. The galley *Washington* was captured; the galley *Congress* and three gondolas (*Boston*; *New Haven*, *Connecticut*; and *Spitfire*) beached at Ferris Bay (now Arnold’s Bay, Vermont) and were set on fire to prevent

capture. A different Split Rock figured in the action at Pell's Point (now in Pelham Bay Park, the Bronx).

SEE ALSO *Valcour Island*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

SPONTOON. The espontoon, spontoon, or half pike was a badge of officer's rank that evolved from the halberd, and until a few years before the American Revolution it was carried by all foot officers of all armies. It was replaced by the fusil, the change taking place in France in 1754 and in England in 1786. British troops in America started abandoning spontoons much earlier, however. Braddock ordered them left behind in 1755 when he departed Alexandria, Virginia, for his defeat in the wilderness, and almost all British regiments abandoned them for active field service during the American Revolution.

SEE ALSO *Fusils and Fusiliers*.

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SPRINGFIELD, NEW JERSEY, RAID OF KNYPHAUSEN. 7–23 June 1780. Prior to the return of Clinton from his Charleston expedition, General William Knyphausen (who was temporarily in command in New York) received reports that Washington's army was mutinous and might be won over. Being led to believe also that the civil population might rally to support him, Knyphausen organized a force of five thousand for a large-scale raid, landed it at De Hart's Point, near Elizabethtown, and on 7 June marched toward Morristown. Washington received this disturbing information the evening of the 7th, but when he reached Short Hills the next day he learned that Colonel Elias Dayton's regiment of Maxwell's brigade, promptly reinforced by neighborhood militia, had so successfully blocked the enemy advance that it had gotten only as far as Springfield Bridge and had then pulled back and started

entrenching. Knyphausen's position on the afternoon of 7 June was on high ground northwest of Connecticut Farms (later Union, New Jersey), a settlement about two and a half miles southeast of Springfield.

British intelligence had obviously erred badly: the natives not only were hostile but efficient. General Thomas Stirling, who commanded Knyphausen's vanguard, was wounded. At Connecticut Farms, the rebels held off the Hessian vanguard with fixed bayonets. The invaders burned about thirty buildings in Connecticut Farms and, to the mystification of Washington, withdrew during the night of 8–9 June to De Hart's Point and dug in. It was a peculiar situation: Knyphausen had withdrawn simply because his original mission, based on faulty intelligence, obviously could not be accomplished. Washington, on the other hand, had no way of knowing that the explanation for the enemy's peculiar conduct was this simple—he suspected they were up to something logical, such as feinting in New Jersey before making a main effort up the Hudson. "Our situation," said Washington on the 14th, "is as embarrassing as you can imagine," and then he had to add: "When they unite their force, it will be infinitely more so." He recalled Henry Lee's Light Horse (which had received orders on 30 March to prepare to move to South Carolina), sent for other mounted troops to perform the reconnaissance missions that were now so important, and organized a force of five hundred men under Brigadier General Edward Hand to harass the enemy position at De Hart's Point.

When Washington learned on 20 June that six British warships had sailed up the Hudson to Verplancks Point and, "with as little apparent reason for going as for coming, had dropped down the river again," (Freeman, vol. 5, p. 172) he had to redeploy his forces so as to meet an attack against West Point and also to watch for a main effort in New Jersey. So he moved his main body to Pompton, where it would be closer to West Point yet still within sixteen miles of Springfield, and he left Nathanael Greene at the latter place with about one thousand Continental troops to watch Knyphausen. General Maxwell's Continentals and General Philemon Dickinson's militia were still in the field to support Greene.

Clinton had reached Sandy Hook on 17 June. Learning then of Knyphausen's operation and its lack of success, he also received information from Benedict Arnold (dated 12 June) that the French expeditionary force of comte de Rochambeau would soon reach Newport, Rhode Island. The British commander realized that by committing troops to support Knyphausen's stalled offensive against Washington, he would leave New York City open to a possible French attack. The mysterious British movement up the Hudson (see above) had been prompted by Clinton's fear that Washington might try to cross the river and join forces

with the French, a movement Washington actually did not make until 31 July. (The French did not actually reach Newport until 12 July, and Clinton did not get word of their arrival until the 18th.)

A SECOND ATTACK

Meanwhile, Clinton prepared to advance into Westchester County, and Knyphausen built a pontoon bridge between Elizabethtown and Staten Island for a rapid junction with the main army after the British learned of Washington's movement toward West Point. Clinton and Knyphausen therefore organized a feint against Springfield and a stronger effort against Morristown on 23 June. Although one reason might have been to save face, Knyphausen's new thrust was ordered by Clinton to retard Washington's suspected movement of his entire army up the Hudson and to gain time for the troops just returning from Charleston to be transported up the Hudson to block Washington.

At 6 A.M. on 23 June, Washington heard the sound of cannon on Greene's front, and in midmorning he received an alarming report from Greene: "The enemy are out on their march towards this place [Springfield] in full force, having received a considerable reenforcement last night" (Freeman, 5, p. 173). According to the Hessian officer Carl Leopold Baurmeister, Knyphausen's original expedition had consisted of the British Guards; the Twenty-second, Thirty-seventh, Thirty-eighth, Forty-third, and Fifty-seventh Regiments; two battalions of Cortland Skinner's West Jersey Volunteers; two Anspach regiments; the entire Anspach and Hessian Jäger Corps; the Seventeenth Light Dragoons; von Diemar's Hussars; the mounted Queen's Rangers (Simcoe's); the Leib Regiment; and the Landgraf, Donop, Büнау, and Bose Regiments. Brigades were commanded by Generals von Lossberg, von Hachenberg, Mathew, Skinner, and Thomas Stirling. James Robertson, commandant of New York, and Governor Tryon accompanied Knyphausen as volunteers. The reinforcements mentioned by Greene were the Forty-second Regiment and the rest of Simcoe's Rangers. The Leib regiment and Jäger Corps returned to Staten Island to resupply their ammunition after the action of 7 June and, presumably, returned to New Jersey

The enemy's second advance on Springfield was, like the first, contested by Maxwell's brigade. Greene positioned his regulars and Dickinson's militia to cover the bridge at Springfield, and Lee's dragoons operated with Maxwell's delaying force. On approaching Springfield, Knyphausen sent half his force to envelop Greene's left by way of the Vauxhall Bridge and to get to his rear at Chatham. Lee's dragoons and Dayton's Third New Jersey delayed the enveloping column under General Edward Mathew at Vauxhall Bridge and then dropped back to hold another position on the Vauxhall Road to protect

Greene's left. Knyphausen's frontal attack was held up for forty minutes by Colonel Israel Angell's Rhode Island Regiment, which then dropped back to a new position with Colonel William Shreve's New Jersey militia. Greene reinforced Lee with two regiments of regulars (Colonel Henry Jackson's Massachusetts and Colonel S. B. Webb's Connecticut) to block Mathew, and he concentrated the rest of his command on high ground behind Springfield. Knyphausen was reluctant to attack Greene and broke off the action. After burning all but four of the fifty houses in Springfield, he withdrew during the afternoon and crossed his bridge to Staten Island. Washington had had no alternative but to start back from Pompton to support Greene and to order supplies evacuated from Morristown, but he covered only five or six miles on 23 June and that night received the good news that Greene would not need his help after all.

New Jersey had once more been cleared of British troops. Jerseyites, far from being swayed back toward King George, were aroused by the destruction of Connecticut Farms and Springfield. They were particularly outraged by the Patriot propaganda which claimed that the Reverend James Caldwell's wife, killed at Connecticut Farms on 7 June, had been shot by an enemy soldier as she sat by a window with her children.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Patriot losses on 7 June were about fifteen killed and forty wounded, according to Colonel Sylvanus Seeley of the New Jersey militia. Major Baurmeister estimated that the eight hundred men under General Maxwell in Elizabethtown had been reinforced by militia and regulars to a total of twenty-five hundred by the time they withdrew to Springfield Bridge. Army surgeon Dr. James Thacher said the rebels took twenty prisoners in this first action, but enemy killed and wounded are not reported by either side.

According to Douglas S. Freeman, on 23 June the rebels lost fifteen killed, forty-nine wounded, and nine missing. This may, however, be the total casualties for the period 7–23 June, since it bears a strange similarity to the figures already quoted for the 7th, and in *The War of the Revolution* (vol. 2, 1952), Christopher Ward says American losses for the entire period were thirteen killed, sixty-one wounded, and nine missing. Seeley, however, is specific in saying that fifteen were killed and forty wounded on 7 June. Knyphausen's losses on the 23rd are not known; Thacher said American troops found fifteen bodies and several fresh graves, and that the inhabitants reported seeing eight or ten wagon loads of dead and wounded. Enemy strength on the 23rd was between five and six thousand. Greene had about one thousand at Springfield, and Maxwell may have had almost that

Springfield, New York

many troops, including militia harassing the enemy's advance.

SEE ALSO *Maxwell, William.*

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revised by Harry M. Ward

SPRINGFIELD, NEW YORK. May 1778. In the spring of 1778, after the repulse of St. Leger's expedition, Joseph Brant returned with his Indian troops and a large number of Loyalists to Oquaga. After sending out parties to attack isolated farms, he carried out his first large-scale raid in the Mohawk Valley in May. His objective was Springfield, at the head of Lake Otsego, a little less than ten miles west northwest of Cherry Valley and somewhat more than that distance south of Fort Herkimer. Brant took the town without loss of life and burned all the houses but one, moving all the women and children into that house for safety. Several men and a considerable amount of property were evacuated to Oquaga, while eighty refugees from the town made their way to Schenectady.

SEE ALSO *Oquaga; St. Leger's Expedition.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

SPRUCE BEER. Part of the American ration, it was made by boiling an extract from leaves and branches of the spruce fir with sugar or molasses and fermenting with yeast.

Mark M. Boatner

SPUYTEN DUYVIL, NEW YORK.

Probably a corruption of the Dutch for "in spite of the Devil," this creek marks the northern boundary of Manhattan Island. The Post Road crossed it at the Kings Bridge, which made the latter of great strategic importance: Along with the Freebridge, it was the island's only link to the mainland. As Douglas Southall Freeman has noted, "there is always a question where Spuyten Duyvil ends and Harlem Creek, now the Harlem River, begins" (vol. III, p. 470 n.), because the two constituted in 1776, as they do today, a continuous waterway between the Hudson and East Rivers. The British used this route in moving troops from the Hudson into the Harlem River to attack Fort Washington, 16 November 1776.

The sinuous creek was straightened and parts of it filled in during the completion of the Harlem River Ship Canal in 1923. The Marble Hill neighborhood was cut off from Manhattan. The site of the Kings Bridge is now on dry land, lying north of the canal near West 231st Street and Marble Hill Avenue.

SEE ALSO *Harlem Heights, New York.*

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revised by Barnet Schecter

SQUAW CAMPAIGN. February 1778.

"Squaw campaign" was the derisive name given to Edward Hand's unsuccessful expedition from Fort Pitt (later Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) against British-held Detroit.

SEE ALSO *Hand, Edward.*

revised by Harold S. Selesky

STAFF OFFICERS. Over the course of the war, the American concept of the military staff was influenced by three traditions of how the administration and management of armies ought to be organized and ought to function. Not surprisingly, at the start of the war the Congress and General Washington adopted the British model, the fundamentals of which had been laid down by the duke of Marlborough during the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713) and with which the colonists had become familiar during the French and Indian War (1754–1763). In each army, British and American, the principal staff officers involved in preparing

the army for operations were the adjutant general, the quartermaster general, and the commissary general. The adjutant general recorded and transmitted orders from the commander in chief to the army, maintained the records of musters that told the commander how many soldiers were ready to fight, and handled all the paperwork on personnel matters. The quartermaster general organized the acquisition and transportation to camp of all the material goods the army needed to fight effectively, established and managed the camps that sheltered the soldiers, and oversaw just about everything else connected with operations. The commissary general was responsible for all matters involving food and forage.

THE CONTINENTAL STAFF

Congress began the long process of evolving the staff of the Continental Army on 16 June 1775, when it created five senior staff positions at the same time that it appointed the army's first general officers, but it did not fill all the slots immediately. It appointed Horatio Gates as adjutant general on 17 June and continued Richard Gridley, the officer Massachusetts had appointed as its chief engineer. It waited until 19 July to appoint Joseph Trumbull as commissary general, the same day it authorized, at Washington's request, a wagon master and a commissary of artillery stores; Washington appointed John Goddard and Ezekiel Cheever to fill these positions. The last days of July saw a spate of appointments. Congress named Benjamin Church as director general and chief of the medical department on 25 July, and on 27 July it appointed James Warren as paymaster general and Robert Erskine as geographer and surveyor to the army. Two days later it created the office of judge advocate and named William Tudor to the post; in 1776 the title was changed to judge advocate general. (Tudor was succeeded by John Laurance on 11 April 1777; Laurance served until 3 June 1782, when Colonel Thomas Edwards was appointed to the office.) Stephen Moylan was named commissary general of musters on 11 August, and finally, on 14 August, Washington appointed Thomas Mifflin as quartermaster general.

Most of the army's high-level administrative work was accomplished by these staff officers, who oversaw the implementation of orders from Washington and the Congress by their deputies and assistant deputies. During the first years of the war, the army was administered through its regiments, which were also its principal combat organizations. Regimental staff typically included an adjutant, a quartermaster, a commissary, a paymaster, a surgeon and surgeon's mate, and a chaplain. The first four of these positions were generally filled by line officers, who thus bore dual responsibilities in their regiments. (On 29 July 1775, Congress made provision to pay chaplains, turning volunteer clergymen into formal members of regimental and brigade staffs.) Regiments were

always brigaded together under a brigadier general, but these groupings were initially ad hoc formations whose composition could change rapidly. Beginning with the enlistment of men into the army for three years or the duration of the war (1 January 1777), brigade composition became more stable, and more staff work was accomplished at the brigade level, under the supervision of the brigade major. Eighteenth-century armies did not have standing corps and divisions; these additional layers of operational control were institutionalized in the much larger armies that European states fielded around the turn of the nineteenth century.

OTHER INFLUENCES

As the war continued, the American understanding of the military staff was influenced by aspects of the French staff system, especially the concept of an inspector general that was brought to America by the many French volunteers who served in the American army. By 1777 the Continental army was maturing as an institution, and both Congress and General Washington saw the need to improve the competence and professionalism of a force that was clearly going to exist for several more years. Congress appointed Colonel Augustin Mottin de la Balme as inspector general of cavalry on 8 July 1777, and on 11 August named Philippe Tronson de Coudray a "major general of the staff" and inspector general of ordnance and military stores, more to quiet this troublesome Frenchman than out of respect for his abilities.

On 26 October 1777, as he contemplated how to dislodge the British from Philadelphia, Washington sent a circular letter to his generals, asking them for, among other things, a recommendation on whether an inspector general should be appointed to establish uniformity in drill, troop training, and command procedure, "as the time of the Adjutant General seems to be totally engaged with other business." Washington wanted the office to be filled by an acceptable, professionally trained foreign officer who would act as an overall inspector general, and he later indicated that the idea of an inspector general had originated with Henry, Baron d'Arendt. The generals concurred with Washington's proposal on 29 October, but before Washington could find time from the press of field duties to get congressional approval, the delegates acted. On 13 December 1777 Congress created the post of inspector general, directed that this officer report directly to it, and appointed Brigadier General Thomas Conway as "Inspector General of the Army," which some delegates meant as criticism of Washington's leadership. The commander in chief deftly parried this insult, and the French-Irish troublemaker never functioned as inspector general.

The Continental army's first actual inspector general was Friedrich Steuben, whom Congress appointed on

5 May 1778. Steuben had already acted as a de facto inspector general during the winter encampment at Valley Forge, where his modesty, sincerity, and earnest attention to training soldiers in an adaptation of Prussian drill fulfilled the requirements set out by Washington and his generals in October 1777. Aspects of the Prussian staff model, which was becoming highly influential as armies digested the success of Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War, were adapted by Steuben for the Continental army after he became inspector general. His efforts to standardize the equipment and training of the army was intended to produce more uniform regiments that would be under greater central control and approach interchangeability on the battlefield. A formal complaint against "the progressive encroachment of a new-fangled power" was submitted by Brigadier General James M. Varnum, a Rhode Islander who was "filled with horror" when Steuben's inspectors called for reports on men fit for duty (Hittle, pp. 179–180).

The northern and southern military departments had staff officers corresponding to those in Washington's main army or those answerable directly to Congress. Each department had, for example, a deputy quartermaster general, and each brigade an assistant deputy quartermaster general. The same nomenclature applied generally to the adjutant general, the inspector general, and other staff positions. Although Edward Carrington was technically a deputy quartermaster general, as the quartermaster general of Major General Nathanael Greene's Southern Department in 1780–1781, he can sensibly be referred to as "Greene's quartermaster general."

Another category of staff officer contributed significantly to the administration and operation of the Continental army. It had long been a tradition in the British army for senior officers to rely heavily on their aides-de-camp and military secretaries to help them conduct business and operate their command. When he was appointed commander in chief, Washington requested and Congress approved the appointment of three aides-de-camp and a secretary. It was only with the help of these men, a total of thirty-two over the course of the war, that Washington was able to transmit orders, manage an enormous correspondence (some twelve thousand letters and orders went out at his direction or over his signature during eight years of war, the vast majority produced by his secretaries), and keep himself informed of the daily activities of the forces under his command as well as understand what was going on in theaters far removed. Not formally vested with specific responsibilities, the men who served as aides-de-camp to general officers had to have the intelligence, talent, and experience to deal with whatever task needed to be accomplished. Washington generally chose his aides well; they tended to leave his

military family, as the close-knit group of trusted aides around the general was called, only when they needed respite from the burden of work or wanted to serve more actively in a line command. Washington's military family, with the general acting in the role of pater familias, was the operational heart of the main Continental army.

SEE ALSO *Adjutants; Church, Benjamin; Conway Cabal; Conway, Thomas; Engineers; Erskine, Robert; Gates, Horatio; Gridley, Richard; Laurance, John; Medical Practice during the Revolution; Mifflin, Thomas; Mottin de La Balme, Augustin; Moylan, Stephen; Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von; Supply of the Continental Army; Tronson du Coudray, Philippe Charles Jean Baptiste; Trumbull, Joseph; Warren, James.*

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STAMP ACT. (22 March 1765–18 March 1766) and Stamp Act Congress (7–25 October 1765). The Stamp Act was one of the measures Parliament enacted in the wake of the final French and Indian War to increase imperial supervision of and control over the existing British colonies, the French territories conquered during the war, and the Native Americans in the Ohio Valley who faced a rising tide of encroachment by colonial settlers. Imperial officials decided to keep in North America some of the regular troops who had spearheaded the conquest of New France, initially at least to keep the peace in the areas formerly under French control, especially west of the Appalachians. While not a clearly thought through part of the plan, regular troops would also serve to support imperial authority by reminding restive American colonists of the power and reach of the British Empire.

Supporting this military establishment was expensive. Since imperial officials faced a vastly increased national debt at home and believed that the troops protected (and thus benefited) the colonies, they not unreasonably

expected Americans to help pay part of the cost. Prime Minister George Grenville intended the Stamp Act to raise a revenue of £60,000 a year in the colonies to pay part of the estimated £350,000 cost of maintaining 10,000 British troops in North America. The act, which passed through Parliament with little debate and no understanding that it would meet colonial resistance, extended to the colonies a form of taxation already in use in Britain. (Imperial officials were not deterred by the fact that a similar tax that had been enacted earlier by the colonial legislatures in New York and Massachusetts had proved so unpopular that it was quickly abandoned.) Taking effect on 1 November 1765, the Stamp Act taxed various types of printed matter (newspapers, broadsides, pamphlets), all types of legal documents, and even included dice and playing cards. Taxes were to be paid in specie (a significant problem in societies where hard money was scarce), transactions made in violation of the act would be deemed invalid, and penalties for infringements could be imposed by vice-admiralty courts as well as by colonial common law courts. In an attempt to win support for the act in the colonies, Grenville appointed Americans as stamp agents. Richard Henry Lee and other prominent colonists eagerly sought the posts, which paid £300 a year and offered patronage possibilities.

The Stamp Act was the first direct tax Parliament had levied on the colonies. Since it followed other measures (the Sugar Act and the Currency Act) and contained provisions like expanded jurisdiction for the vice-admiralty courts, many Americans came to believe that the new era of increased imperial supervision would restrict their economic freedom and curtail their civil liberties. They contended that they had contributed significant financial resources to Britain's victory in the final French and Indian War (thereby ignoring substantial subsidies the colonies had received from Parliament), and they believed that because they were suffering through a postwar depression partly because of those exertions, they would be unable to pay such a tax. More troubling was Parliament's assumption that it had a right to impose taxes on the colonies without the consent of their local legislative assemblies, a position opponents summarized in the slogan "taxation without representation is tyranny." Moreover, the authority granted to the vice-admiralty courts to decide customs enforcement cases without trial by jury seemed to pose a serious threat to civil liberties. The Stamp Act generated opposition in all geographical sections of America and from many diverse and influential groups, including lawyers (whose business would be particularly hard hit), printers, tavern keepers, land speculators, merchants, and ship-owners. The fact that Grenville proposed the stamp tax almost a year before Parliament enacted it gave colonial leaders additional time to think about the nature of the colonies' relationship with the mother country.

Opponents of increased imperial supervision moved swiftly to organize resistance. They took to the public prints to explain their objections and to generate support. Attorney Daniel Dulany of Maryland argued in *Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies* (1765) that the act was illegal because the colonies were not actually represented in Parliament. Other activists took a stand in their legislative assemblies. Patrick Henry first rose to prominence when he introduced the Virginia Resolves into the House of Burgesses in May 1765. John Adams, too, gained notoriety by drafting instructions that his home town of Braintree, Massachusetts, gave to its assembly delegates to object to the Stamp Act. Still others acted extralegally in ways that were a familiar part of the political process. They gathered together in groups called the Sons of Liberty and were not averse to using intimidation and mob action to force all the stamp agents to resign their commissions in the autumn of 1765. The opponents were so successful that only in Georgia, whose governor was the remarkable Sir James Wright, was the Stamp Act ever put into effect, and there it was only enforced to a limited degree. Elsewhere, colonial courts initially closed rather than use the stamps, and they later resumed business without stamps, an open violation of the act. In Rhode Island, where the governor refused to execute the Stamp Act, the courts never closed.

Opposition to the Stamp Act forced colonists to consider their place in the empire, and perhaps most importantly in the long term, broke down intercolonial differences by promoting communication and cooperation among like-minded leaders in all colonies. A significant step in that process was initiated by James Otis of Massachusetts, who, understanding that the colonies' objections would be taken more seriously if they acted together, proposed that each colonial assembly send delegates to meet in a congress and explore the possibility of concerted opposition. His proposal won the support of the Massachusetts assembly and was endorsed by the assemblies in South Carolina, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Maryland; these six colonies sent official delegates to the Stamp Act Congress. The assemblies in New Jersey, Delaware, and New York took no formal action, but did send delegates. Virginia, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Georgia did not participate.

Twenty-seven delegates from nine colonies met in the Stamp Act Congress at New York City on 7–25 October 1765. They formulated fourteen resolutions in a Declaration of Rights and Grievances (drafted by John Dickinson) that denied Parliament's right to tax the colonies and condemned the extension of vice-admiralty-court jurisdiction. The Congress delivered its resolutions in the form of petitions to the king and both houses of Parliament. None of these appeals caused imperial officials

to rethink their position that Parliament had a fundamental right to legislate in all matters for the colonies, including the right to impose taxes to support regular troops and imperial administrators.

In Britain, doubts about the wisdom of the Stamp Act had been building even before it took effect. Grenville advocated the enforcement of his act by military force, but he had been replaced as prime minister in July 1765, and the new prime minister—the marquis of Rockingham—was reluctant to support such a drastic and expensive response. In December 1765 Parliament received numerous petitions for repeal from British merchants, who feared a loss of trade with the colonies as a result of nonimportation and an American austerity program. In January 1766 William Pitt, the single most influential political figure in Parliament, called for repeal of the Stamp Act, but at the same time he expressed the widely held opinion that Parliament ought to assert its “sovereign authority over the colonies . . . to extend to every point of legislation whatsoever, that we may bind their trade, confine their manufactures, and exercise every power whatsoever, except that of taking their money out of their pockets without their consent.” Benjamin Franklin, then a colonial agent in London, gave Commons cogent testimony in February 1766 that the colonies not only should not but could not pay, and he warned that military action might cause rebellion.

Repeal of the Stamp Act received royal assent on 18 March, to take effect on 1 May 1766. Opponents of increased imperial control rejoiced when the news reached American shores on 26 April. They overlooked or ignored the significance of the position outlined by Pitt. Those ideas had been forcefully expressed in the Declaratory Act, which Parliament had passed as a prelude to repealing the Stamp Act.

SEE ALSO *Adams, John; Admiralty Courts; Declaratory Act; Dulany, Daniel; Grenville, George; Henry, Patrick; Nonimportation; Otis, James; Pontiac's War; Sons of Liberty; Taxation without Representation Is Tyranny; Virginia Resolves of 1765; Wright, Sir James, Governor.*

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STANSBURY, JOSEPH. (c. 1742–1809). Loyalist secret agent, poet. England-Pennsylvania. Son of a London haberdasher, Stansbury immigrated to Philadelphia in 1767, opening a china store. He became well-known for his humorous and satirical songs. Although he sympathized with the Patriots, he opposed separation from the empire and in 1776 was briefly imprisoned for his Loyalist sentiments. He held several minor British posts during the occupation of Philadelphia, signed the oath of allegiance to the Patriot cause after the British left, paid for substitutes in the Pennsylvania militia, and remained in the city until he was arrested for treason in 1780. After six months in jail he was permitted to leave the city with his family for New York City, the Patriots remaining ignorant of his role in Arnold's treason.

In New York he continued to write political songs and satirical prose. Stansbury's writings lacked the bitterness and anger that marked the works of the other Loyalist poet, Jonathan Odell. In August 1783 Stansbury went to Nova Scotia for a year and then to England, where the commission on Loyalist claims disallowed his appeal for one thousand pounds on the grounds that his loyalty had been too flexible. In November 1785 he resumed his business in Philadelphia, but in 1793 he gave up and moved back to New York City, where he was secretary of the United Insurance Company until his death in 1809.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason; Odell, Jonathan.*

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STARK, JOHN. (1728–1822). Continental general. New Hampshire. Son of a Scots-Irishman who came to New Hampshire in 1720, he was a woodsman and Indian fighter. In 1755 he participated in the operations leading to the defeat of Baron Dieskau and then served as a lieutenant and captain of rangers led by Robert Rogers. In January 1757 he walked forty miles through deep snow to bring assistance to the wounded, having previously been engaged in a day of fighting and an all-night march. After taking part in Amherst's campaign against Ticonderoga and Crown Point in 1759, he returned to central New Hampshire, where he helped establish a new township, originally called Starksville and later renamed Dunbarton.

On 23 April 1775 the New Hampshire house appointed Stark colonel of the first New Hampshire Regiment. He quickly raised fourteen companies, which

he led to join Washington's army at Medford, Massachusetts. In the battle on 17 June he led his men and others under the command of Colonel James Reed to hold the American Line along the famous "rail fence" at Bunker Hill. Following the British evacuation of Boston in March 1776, Colonel Stark obeyed orders to lead his men to New York where, as colonel of the Fifth Continental, he helped prepare the defenses of New York City. In May he went with reinforcements to Canada, where he was in command at Montreal for a brief time during the summer. In early fall he marched his troops back to Crown Point, then to Ticonderoga, and then on to Pennsylvania, where he again joined Washington's camp as part of General John Sullivan's brigade. Stark's regiment participated in the crossing of the Delaware on 26 December 1776 and in the subsequent victorious battle at Trenton. While some New Hampshire men went home at the end of 1776, Stark crossed the Delaware again with Washington on 2 January 1777 and again faced the British at Trenton and on to secure Princeton, taking a significant number of Hessian prisoners. When Congress appointed Enoch Poor as its brigadier general from New Hampshire early in 1777, Stark felt that his previous experience, his age, and his seniority of command had been ignored. Stark returned to the state legislature meeting at Exeter, New Hampshire, in April, where he appeared before that body to resign his command.

As the British under General John Burgoyne threatened New England from Canada, the New Hampshire legislature on 18 July 1777 called upon Stark to accept the state rank of brigadier general to lead one of its two militia brigades to Vermont to stop the redcoats. Between 19 July and 24 July, Stark raised fifteen hundred men with whom he crippled Burgoyne at Bennington on 16 August 1777 and helped force British capitulation at Saratoga. At Bennington, Stark won one of the most spectacular and decisive successes of the Revolution.

When he left his post and returned to New Hampshire, after others whom he considered less qualified were promoted over him, Congress first to reprimanded him for his insubordination and then appointed him brigadier general on 4 October 1777. In the final stage of Burgoyne's offensive, he led the force that cut off Gentleman Johnny's last escape route. John Stark had an uncanny way of being at the critical and unexpected place to ruin British plans, first at Bunker Hill, then at Bennington, and finally at Saratoga. He remained on active duty for the rest of the war, twice commanding the Northern Department, being involved in the planned Canada invasion of 1778, serving under Gates in Rhode Island in 1779, and taking part in New Jersey operations in the summer of 1780. While serving at West Point, he sat on André's board of inquiry. Suffering from arthritis,

he spent much time over the next few years at home in Dunbarton. Brevetted major general on 30 September 1783, he retired from the army on 3 November of that year and went home. Unlike other war heroes, he stayed out of public life, finding enough to do managing his large farm and eleven children. He lived to be ninety-three years old, expiring on 8 May 1822 at home.

A man of medium height, bold features, keen light blue eyes, and compressed lips, John Stark was a man who generated legends. Most of them appear to have a kernel of truth. One rare quality that emerges from his picturesque battlefield remarks is an appreciation of the human factor in war. When he refused to hurry his men through an artillery barrage because "one fresh man in action is worth ten fatigued men," he not only was saving energy but was calming down a body of inexperienced officers and men who were on the verge of panic. When he said, "Boys, aim at their waistbands," he was enunciating more military wisdom than meets the eye for an era when European soldiers usually aimed only in the general direction of the enemy. (In addition, the men would not fire too early if they waited until they could see their enemies' waistbands.)

At Bennington he reportedly said, "We'll beat them before night, or Molly Stark will be a widow." He apparently had a gift for making such memorable remarks. To Stark's discredit it must be said that except at Bunker Hill, he showed a consistently insubordinate character; but for his incredible luck, he would not be the national hero he remains. He refused to join the Order of the Cincinnati owing to his opposition to military organizations in principle.

A brother, William (1724–c.1776), served in Rogers's Rangers, fighting at Ticonderoga, Louisburg, and Quebec. He defected to the enemy when the Americans would not give him command of a regiment at the start of the Revolution and died after a fall from his horse. A son, Caleb (1759–1838), was a fifteen-year-old ensign in his father's regiment at Bunker Hill and finished the war as a brigade major. After becoming a Boston businessman, he moved to Ohio in 1828.

SEE ALSO *Bennington Raid; Bunker Hill, Massachusetts; Burgoyne's Offensive.*

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STARS AND STRIPES SEE *Flag, American*.

STATEN ISLAND, NEW YORK.

22 August 1777. Sullivan's raid. Once Lieutenant General William Howe set sail, Washington started the bulk of the main army south to protect Philadelphia. Major General John Sullivan, in command of the division composed of the First and Second Maryland Brigades, lagged behind. On 3 August Washington told Sullivan to hold in place at Hanover, New Jersey, where the division could move north to reinforce the Hudson Highlands or south to Philadelphia once the situation clarified. The Americans sought to keep Sir Henry Clinton, left by Howe as the British commander in New York, immobilized by giving indications that they would attack the city's defenses at Kings Bridge, Long Island, and Staten Island. The first two threats turned out to be feints, but Sullivan actually landed on Staten Island with his division. According to Clinton, they

effected an almost total surprise of two provincial battalions belonging to Skinner's Brigade, and after setting fire to the magazines at Decker's Ferry were on their march to Richmond; while another corps, that had landed on the west part of the island for the purpose of cutting off three other provincial battalions, had taken Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence, with the great part of his battalion, prisoners, and only missed the remainder by Lieutenant Colonels Dongan and Allen having the presence of mind to throw them into some old rebel works at Prince's Bay. (*American Rebellion*, 68 n.)

Despite Sullivan's initial success, Brigadier John Campbell used the regular regiments stationed on the island, especially the Fifty-second Foot and the Waldeck Regiment, to stop him cold. The Americans rapidly lost cohesion and withdrew to the Jersey shore with the loss of between somewhere between 170 and 259, mostly troops captured during the withdrawal.

American histories of the war usually pass over this action rather casually as an embarrassingly inept sideshow for which Sullivan was court-martialed and acquitted. Clinton on the other hand obsessed over the tenuous nature of his hold on New York and believed that the defeat prevented Washington from taking advantage of Howe's departure to make a major attack. In reality, the greatest impact of the operation was political. The middle states' delegates in Congress used the defeat to attack the New Englander, Sullivan, in retaliation for the New England delegates' role in replacing General Philip Schuyler with Horatio Gates.

SEE ALSO *Philadelphia Campaign*.

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STATEN ISLAND EXPEDITION OF ALEXANDER.

14–15 January 1780. The winter of 1779–1780 was the coldest in New York City's recorded history, with ice making water communications between Manhattan and Staten Island all but impossible by mid-January, and allowing heavy artillery pieces to be pulled across the Hudson River to Paulus Hook by teams of horses. At the same time General Henry Clinton was in South Carolina with a large portion of the British forces stationed in North America. Major General James Pattison commanded at New York in his absence, and feared that Washington would take advantage of the two unique situations to attack. Although the weather was too severe for a major operation, on the night of 14–15 January, General William Alexander (known as Lord Stirling) led three thousand men across the ice from Elizabethtown Point to Staten Island. The defenders spotted the move and took cover in their fortifications. After spending a miserable twenty-four hours in the subzero weather and deep snow, the Americans withdrew with seventeen prisoners and a small quantity of loot. Alexander had six men killed and about five hundred "slightly frozen" (in the words of a contemporary). In a classic example of the bitterness of the between-the-lines raiding during the time the British

held New York, New Jersey militia on this raid stripped Loyalists' farms; the British retaliated ten days later by burning the academy at Newark and the courthouse and meeting house at Elizabethtown.

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STATEN ISLAND PEACE CONFERENCE

SEE *Peace Conference on Staten Island*.

STEDMAN, CHARLES. (1753–1812). British officer, historian. Born in Philadelphia, Stedman studied at William and Mary College and took the British side at the start of the Revolution, serving as commissary under Sir William Howe. Fluent in German, he was liaison to the German troops serving with the British. Twice wounded during Howe's and Cornwallis's campaigns, Stedman was also twice taken prisoner, escaping from the same jail that held Major André. After the war he served on the commission established to examine Loyalist claims. His *History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War* (2 vols., 1794) became the standard British work on the Revolution, sparking a lively dispute with Sir Henry Clinton over a number of petty details. In his later years, Stedman was a deputy comptroller of the British stamp office.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

STEPHEN, ADAM. (c. 1721–1791). Continental general. Virginia. Educated as a surgeon in Scotland and England and a former naval surgeon, Stephen emigrated to Virginia in 1748. Finding too many physicians in Virginia and ambitious to enter the ranks of the gentry, he acquired a huge plantation in the Shenandoah Valley and produced flour and livestock, among other commodities; during the Revolutionary War he established an arms manufactory on his property. While serving in the French and Indian War, Stephen—as a lieutenant colonel—was second in command to George Washington in the Virginia Regiment. Thus, he participated in the clashes with French and Indian troops at Little

Meadows and Great Meadows in 1754, the ill-fated Braddock expedition of 1755, and in the Forbes expedition of 1758. He himself conducted the heroic defense of Fort Mifflin in July 1759. Stephen commanded the Virginia Regiment in operations against the Cherokees in 1761. During the war Washington was almost always absent from his troops, who were stationed at Forts Cumberland and Loudoun and elsewhere, and hence Stephen had the responsibility of immediate command. Washington early developed a dislike of Stephen, considering him conniving and insubordinate. The relationship became somewhat humorous. The two men ran against each other for a seat in the House of Burgesses from Frederick County, Virginia; Washington accused Stephen of engaging in dirty politics, while the future commander in chief was doing much the same thing.

Appointed colonel of the Fourth Virginia Regiment on 13 February 1776 and brigadier general on 4 September 1776, Stephen jeopardized Washington's Trenton raid by sending an unauthorized patrol across the Delaware on Christmas Day, coming across Stephen's wandering troops after he himself had crossed the Delaware. Washington turned on Stephen in one of his occasional bursts of flaming temper. "You sir," said Washington, "may have ruined all my plans." As it was, the premature crossing worked in favor of the Americans; the Hessian commander at Trenton mistook this episode as the one reported to him in intelligence of an American crossing, and therefore took no further precautions to impede an American attack.

As a major general (appointed 19 February 1777), Stephen sent troops on missions of his own devising and submitted exaggerated reports of their success. On 10 May he attempted to surprise the Forty-second Highlanders at Piscataway, New Jersey. Although repulsed and driven back toward his own camp, he reported a gallant success in which at least two hundred of the enemy were killed. Washington questioned Stephen's veracity and pointed out to Stephen that "your account . . . is favorable, but I am sorry to add, widely different from those I have had from others."

The divisions of Stephen and Wayne collided during the Battle of Germantown on 4 October 1777, a misfortune that probably caused the panic of Washington's attacking force. Shortly afterwards, Stephen was brought before a court of inquiry and then a court-martial, where in the latter he was charged with "unofficerlike behaviour" in the march from northern New Jersey preliminary to the Philadelphia campaign and during the battles of Brandywine and Germantown and also charged with "drunkenness." He was found guilty for not restraining retreating soldiers at Germantown and also for being "frequently intoxicated since in the service." Despite his

appeal of the verdict to Congress, Stephen was “dismissed” (not cashiered) from the army. The case against Stephen had not been strong. Working against him was his advanced age (fifty-six years), flamboyance, and outspokenness. Upon Stephen’s removal, Washington assigned Stephen’s division to Lafayette.

Stephen retired to his plantation in western Virginia. He founded Martinsburg (later in West Virginia), which was incorporated in 1778, and reestablished his residence there at an eight-room stone house finished in 1789. The house and grounds became an historical park with a small museum. Evidence that his dismissal from the army was considered an injustice is his service in the Virginia House of Delegates from 1780 to 1785 and in the state convention for ratifying the U.S. Constitution in June 1788. Stephen never married but had a daughter by his mistress; the daughter, Ann, married Alexander Spotswood Dandridge, brother-in-law of Patrick Henry and second cousin of Martha Washington.

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STEUBEN, FRIEDRICH WILHELM VON. (1730–1794). Inspector General of the Continental Army. Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben was the grandson of Augustin Steube, a minister of the German Reformed Church. The grandfather inserted the “von” in the family name about 1708 as a sign of aristocratic status, although he technically had no right to do so. The man who became the foremost military instructor of the American Revolution was born in Magdeburg, Germany, while his father, Wilhelm Augustus von Steuben, an engineer lieutenant in the Prussian army, was stationed there. His early youth was spent in Russia. At the age of ten he returned to Germany with his parents, was schooled by Jesuits in Breslau, and at seventeen became a Prussian officer with the rank of ensign. During the Seven Years’ War, from 1756 to 1763, he served first as a lieutenant in an infantry

regiment and then as adjutant of a partisan corps. Later in the war he was promoted to captain and was made an assistant quartermaster at the general headquarters. Captured by the Russians in the fall of 1762, he was released a short time later, and the following spring he carried a diplomatic dispatch from Czar Peter III to Frederick the Great.

Although Steuben never held the high rank and influential positions in Prussian service that he later claimed, his early military training and experience should not be undervalued. As a junior officer, he mastered the rigorous Prussian drill system that was respected throughout Europe for its efficiency and effectiveness, and as an adjutant and an assistant quartermaster, he became proficient in every phrase of military administration from supply to battlefield organization and discipline. His skills and knowledge fitted him almost perfectly to become the sort of chief of staff that George Washington needed to help make the Continental army a more fully competent and stable professional force.

Steuben was discharged from the Prussian army in 1763, at the age of only 33, for reasons that are obscure. The next year he became chamberlain (*hofmarschall*) at the court of Hohenzollern-Hechingen, a small south German principality, where he subsequently assumed his title of baron (*freiherr*). When his prince closed the court in 1771 and went incognito to France, where he hoped to live more economically, Steuben accompanied him. In 1774 they were back in Germany, having failed to achieve solvency. One year later Steuben was beset by rumors that were never proven or subsequently revived of behaving inappropriately with young boys. He was forced to seek other employment.

After several unsuccessful attempts to enter European armies (France, Austria, Baden), Steuben met a friend of Benjamin Franklin who suggested to the latter, then one of the American commissioners in Paris, that Steuben could render valuable service in America. Having pursued this lead to Paris, where he arrived during the summer of 1777, Steuben had the good fortune of being endorsed by the French minister of war, Claude-Louis, comte de St. Germain, who recognized the value of his Prussian military training. Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais, the French playwright who was secretly aiding the Americans, advanced travel funds from his company, Roderique Hortalez et Cie, and on 4 September 1778 the resourceful Franklin penned a letter introducing Steuben to Washington as “a Lieutenant General in the King of Prussia’s Service.” With all these bogus credentials, Lieutenant General Baron von Steuben left Marseilles on 26 September. He arrived at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on 1 December, and after spending several weeks at Boston being royally entertained, he reached York, Pennsylvania, where the Continental Congress was then sitting, on about



Baron von Steuben. *The Prussian-born director of training and inspector general of the Continental Army, in a copy of a portrait (c. 1780) by Ralph Earl.* LANDOV

5 February 1778. Congress, he learned, had already accepted the offer made in his letter to Congress of 6 December to serve for the time being as an unpaid volunteer, and on 23 February 1778 he reported to Washington at Valley Forge.

At Washington's request, Steuben began a comprehensive new program of drill instruction for the Continental army in late March 1778. Although he at first spoke only German and French, Steuben drafted a series of lessons that skillfully adapted Prussian methods to American needs and temperament, employing the assistance of his English-speaking, French aide-de-camp, Pierre Etienne Du Ponceau. He started with a model company of about 150 hand-picked men, and spread his instruction in a sort of geometric progression through the little army. An essential element of his successful formula was Steuben's picturesque personality. He stood before the ill-clad Continentals in a magnificent uniform, and put on a show worthy of paid admission. According to Du Ponceau, when Steuben could no longer curse his awkward pupils in German and French, he would call on both Du Ponceau and his French-speaking American aide, Captain Benjamin Walker, "to come and swear for me in

English, these fellows won't do what I bid them." Ponceau went on to observe that "a good natured smile then went through the ranks, and at last the maneuver or the movement was properly performed."

The drill improvements that Steuben began introducing at Valley Forge did much more than simply make the Continentals look better on the parade ground. In the methodical brand of warfare that was practiced in the eighteenth century, the soldiers' ability to march in large formations on the battlefield with precision and discipline often made the difference between victory and defeat. Steuben's achievement was not in teaching the Continentals how to march—something that most of them already could do—but in enabling them to march together in brigades and divisions with greater efficiency by instituting a uniform and innovative, army-wide drill system. Although the stalemate that generally prevailed in the northern states after the spring of 1778 meant that the results of Steuben's work were never fully tested in open battle, they were partially displayed at Barren Hill on 20 May 1778, and at Monmouth, on 28 June 1778, where the troops' new training significantly aided Continental officers in maintaining control under dangerous circumstances. Washington was sufficiently pleased with the progress that had been made within a few weeks time that, on 30 April 1778, he recommended Steuben's appointment as inspector general of the army with the rank of major general, and on 5 May Congress confirmed the promotion.

During the Monmouth campaign, the new inspector general served in Washington's headquarters, and in the final phase of the battle of 28 June, he helped collect some of the disorganized American units. A few weeks later, during his court-martial for misconduct at Monmouth Court House, Charles Lee referred to Steuben as one of "the very distant spectators of the manoeuvres" on that day. The Prussian subsequently challenged Lee to a duel over his remarks, but was satisfied when Lee explained that he meant no offense.

After temporarily commanding the right wing of the Continental Army in July 1778, Steuben spent much of the rest of the year training troops and negotiating with Congress over the organization and powers of the inspector general's department. The next winter he prepared his *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States*, which became known as the "Blue Book." Serving as the principal military guide not only for the Continental army but also for the first generation of United States Army officers and soldiers, this manual contained both a revamped version of the drill system that Steuben had devised at Valley Forge and a compendium of the latest administrative practices used in European armies. Continuing his duties of training and instilling discipline in 1779 and 1780, Steuben

began making regular inspections of the regiments, and he set up a badly needed system of property accountability. During the winter of 1779–1780 he was Washington’s representative to Congress on matters of army reorganization.

When Nathanael Greene was given command of the Southern Department in the fall of 1780, Steuben went along, and since most of Greene’s support—personnel as well as provisions—would come from Virginia, he stayed there. Bluntly insisting that democratic procedures be sacrificed to military expediency, Steuben was ill suited to deal with Governor Thomas Jefferson and the Virginia legislature. As the senior Continental officer in the Old Dominion during the winter and early spring of 1781, Steuben commanded the pitifully small Continental contingent and the hastily assembled militiamen who tried unsuccessfully to check Benedict Arnold’s and William Phillips’s raids in force up the James River.

When the Marquis de Lafayette arrived in Virginia at the end of April, Steuben yielded his command to the newcomer and focused on the job of gathering reinforcements and supplies for Greene’s army in the Carolinas. Steuben encountered a firestorm of public criticism in June 1781 when, during General Charles Cornwallis’s invasion of Virginia, he failed to save the supply depot at Point of Fork from enemy raiders and then began marching his detachment of about five hundred Continental recruits south to join Greene. Realizing his mistake only after several days, he reversed his march, delivered his recruits to Lafayette, and took an extended sick leave. Steuben rejoined the army for the Yorktown campaign, taking command of one of the three divisions of Washington’s force and giving the benefit of his experience in siege warfare. This was the closest he came to realizing his long cherished desire for a prestigious field command suited to his rank.

Steuben continued serving as inspector general during the last two years of the war. In the spring of 1783 he assisted Washington in planning for the demobilization of the Continental army and the future defense of the United States. He also was actively involved in the creation of the Society of the Cincinnati, and warmly approved of its controversial provision for hereditary membership. In August 1783 he went to Canada to receive the surrender of British frontier posts, but found that Canadian governor, Frederick Haldimand, had no authority to treat with him. Steuben resigned his commission on 21 March 1784.

Having become an American citizen by an act of the Pennsylvania legislature in March 1783 and the New York legislature in July 1786, Steuben established residence at the “Louvre,” a country estate on Manhattan Island, and became a prominent and popular social figure. He lived far beyond his means, however, and was soon in serious

financial straits. In June 1790 the new federal government granted him a yearly pension of \$2,500 instead of a lump sum settlement of his Revolutionary War claims, and it was only the following October, when Alexander Hamilton and other friends got him a “friendly mortgage” on the 16,000 acres given him by New York in 1786, that Steuben’s financial affairs were straightened out. During his last years, the old bachelor spent summers on his Mohawk Valley property north of Utica (near modern Remsen), New York, and his winters in New York City. He willed his property to his former aides, William North and Benjamin Walker.

Steuben’s legacy to the American people was the high standard of professional military discipline and efficiency that he managed to introduce within the larger framework of liberty and independence—a standard that sustained the Continental army through five years of war following Valley Forge and won it the respect of its French allies. Steuben never claimed to have worked miracles on the drill field. “I leave it to your other Correspondents,” he wrote Benjamin Franklin on 28 September 1779, “to give you an Account of the present State of our Army; If they tell you that our Order & Discipline Equals that of the French and Prussian Armies, do not believe them, but do not believe them neither, if they compare our Troops to those of the Pope, & take a just medium between those two Extremes.” Steuben knew, however, the practical value of what he accomplished, as did the Continental officers and soldiers who were his students. A master teacher by any measure, Steuben did not rely on rote lessons taken from an old drill book of his youth, but rather he borrowed freely from the newest sources of military knowledge available—Prussian, Austrian, French, and British—to create a strong but flexible system of command and control designed to enable Americans to deal effectively with the various military situations that they faced in winning their freedom and consolidating their hold over almost half a continent.

SEE ALSO *Valley Forge Winter Quarters, Pennsylvania.*

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STEVENS, EDWARD. (1745–1820). Militia general. Virginia. Born in Culpeper County, Virginia, in 1745, Stevens commanded a militia battalion at Great Bridge, Virginia, in December 1775 and became colonel of the Tenth Virginia Continentals on 12 November 1776. Joining Washington's army in New Jersey, he took part in the Battles of Brandywine and Germantown. Stevens resigned from the Continental Army on 31 January 1778 and was appointed brigadier general of the Virginia militia in 1779. He joined Gates's army with seven hundred militia at Rugeley's Mills on 14 August 1780. Although he showed personal courage at the battle of Camden, two days later his troops disgraced themselves. After discharging these men on the expiration of their enlistments, Stevens rejoined Greene before the latter retreated across the Dan River and was appointed by Greene to command the Halifax County militia. He and his irregulars distinguished themselves at Guilford, where he was wounded severely. Three months later he commanded one of the three Virginia brigades that joined Lafayette, and he led his brigade of 750 men in the Yorktown campaign. Promoted to major general of militia, he also served as state senator from the adoption of the Virginia constitution of 1776 until 1790.

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign; Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Yorktown Campaign; Yorktown, Siege of.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

STEWART, ALEXANDER. (1741–1794). British army officer in the South. He entered the army as an ensign in the Thirty-seventh Foot on 8 April 1755 and remained with it until he was promoted lieutenant colonel of the Third Foot (the "Buffs") on 7 July 1775. He reached Charleston on 4 June 1781 and took over command of the field force at Orangeburg, South Carolina, from Francis Rawdon. He was not, however, in overall command in the South or even in South Carolina, where his superior was Colonel Paston Gould. At Eutaw Springs on 8 September, Stewart won a hard-fought victory in the last major engagement of the war. However, losses on both sides were high—the highest in terms of numbers engaged of any battle in the war—and the British, less able than their foes to withstand such attrition, had to withdraw toward Charleston. At Monck's Corner on 12 September 1781, he met the Thirtieth Foot led by Gould, to whom he handed over command. Stewart subsequently commanded the troops defending Charleston Neck. He was promoted colonel on 16 May 1782 and major general on 25 April 1790.

SEE ALSO *Eutaw Springs, South Carolina; Gould, Paston; Monck's Corner, South Carolina; Orangeburg, South Carolina.*

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STEWART, WALTER. (1756–1796). Continental officer. Pennsylvania. At the start of the Revolution he raised a company for the Third Pennsylvania Battalion, was commissioned captain on 5 January 1776, became aide-de-camp to Gates on 26 May, and was promoted to major on 7 June 1776. Commissioned colonel of a Pennsylvania state regiment (militia) on 17 June 1777, he left Gates and assumed command on 6 July to take part in Washington's Philadelphia campaign. His green regiment distinguished itself at Brandywine, where as part of Weedon's brigade (with Edward Stevens's Tenth Virginia) it held a defile near Dilworth until the main army could make good its retreat. In the action at Germantown he fought on Washington's left wing. The next month, on 12 November 1777, his regiment joined the Continental army as the Thirteenth Pennsylvania. This unit was not with the army in the Valley Forge winter quarters but was part of Lee's command in the Battle of Monmouth on 28 June 1778. Bringing up the rear of the retreat with

Nathaniel Ramsey's Third Maryland, it was halted by Washington, faced about, and used as a delaying force until the main battle position was organized. On 1 July the regiment was merged with the Second Pennsylvania under Stewart's command.

Colonel Stewart has been described by Freeman as "an officer of fine presence and persuasive manner" (Freeman, vol. 5, p. 165). He was regarded as one of the handsomest men in the American army. The young colonel also appears to have been an outstanding mediator: he intervened to make peace between Gates and Wilkinson (in connection with the Conway Cabal) in February 1778; stepped in to help dissolve the mutiny of the Connecticut Line on 25 May 1780; and had a prominent part in helping Wayne settle the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line on 1–10 January 1781. He marched south under Wayne to take part in Lafayette's operations against Cornwallis and was engaged at Green Spring, Virginia, on 6 July 1781. He served under Wayne in Steuben's division during the Yorktown campaign. Stewart retired on 1 January 1783 and went to Philadelphia. At the insistence of Washington, he was recalled as inspector general of the Northern Department. He agitated the discontent that led to the Newburgh Addresses. Brevetted brigadier general on 30 September 1783, he became a prominent merchant in Philadelphia and major general of militia.

SEE ALSO *Green Spring (Jamestown Ford, Virginia); Mutiny of the Connecticut Line; Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line; Newburgh Addresses; Virginia, Military Operations in; Virginia, Military Operations in; Yorktown Campaign.*

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STILES, EZRA. (1727–1795). Clergyman, scholar, and president of Yale College. Born in North Haven, Connecticut, Stiles was graduated from Yale College in 1746. Although he studied theology and was licensed to preach on 30 May 1749, he remained at Yale as an

instructor (called tutor). He delayed entering actively into the ministry until 1755 when he was ordained as pastor of the Second Congregational Church at Newport, Rhode Island, where he remained for twenty-two years. A man of omnivorous curiosity, he accumulated information and correspondents in enormous quantities. Among other activities, he kept a meteorological notebook (taking temperature readings with a thermometer given him by Benjamin Franklin), experimented with the growing of silk worms (to provide a luxury commodity with which to redress the balance of payments deficits with Britain), accumulated population statistics, studied Hebrew and the Kabala, and closely followed the development of and resistance to British imperial policy in the 1760s and 1770s, all while ministering to an active congregation. His "Stamp Act Notebook" is an important source of information about colonial resistance to that measure. He corresponded with a host of luminaries in the colonies and across the Atlantic, and became so well known that the University of Edinburgh awarded him an honorary doctorate in 1765. Driven out of his ministry by the British occupation of Newport in December 1776, he and his family became refugees in Tiverton, Rhode Island. In the spring of 1778 he accepted the presidency of Yale College, an office he discharged with great devotion and ability during a particularly difficult period. College administrator, intellectual, and minister, the physically delicate Stiles showed tremendous energy and ability in a great variety of pursuits. He died at 68 of "bilious fever."

SEE ALSO *Franklin, Benjamin.*

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STILLWATER, NEW YORK. On the west bank of the Hudson, about eleven miles below Saratoga, this was the place to which General Phillip Schuyler withdrew his army before Burgoyne's offensive on 3 August 1777. He then retreated a further twelve miles south, to the mouth of the Mohawk River. After General Horatio Gates relieved Schuyler as commander of the Northern army on 19 August, Gates moved back to Stillwater on

8 September. Four days later the Northern army moved three miles north to occupy defensive positions at Bemis Heights. The decisive battles that then took place in this area on 19 September and 7 October are known variously by the names of Stillwater, Bemis Heights, Freeman's Farm, and Saratoga. Purely for the purpose of grouping the descriptions and maps of these actions, they are referred to here as the First and Second Battles of Saratoga.

SEE ALSO *Saratoga, First Battle of; Saratoga, Second Battle of.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

STIRLING, LORD SEE *Alexander, William.*

STOCKTON, RICHARD. (1730–1781). Signer, lawyer. New Jersey. Born in Princeton, New Jersey, on 1 October 1730, Stockton graduated from the College of New Jersey at Newark in 1748, was admitted to the bar in 1754, and within ten years was recognized as one of the most eloquent lawyers in the middle colonies. Among the prominent lawyers he trained were Elias Boudinot and Joseph Reed. In 1766 he went as a trustee of his alma mater to Scotland to offer its presidency to John Witherspoon.

While in Britain, Stockton was received by the king and by Lord Rockingham (Charles Watson-Wentworth), and he was given the freedom of the city of Edinburgh. Returning to America in 1767, he entered politics, and the next year was named to the provincial council. He originally advocated conciliation with Great Britain, but opposed their taxing powers, even when Governor William Franklin appointed him to the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1774. Late in 1774 he sent Lord Dartmouth (William Legge) a plan for settlement on the basis of continued allegiance to the crown but freedom from parliamentary control. Sent to the Continental Congress, he took his seat on 1 July 1776, voting for independence on the following day and signing the Declaration of Independence. On 30 August he tied with William Livingston for Governor of New Jersey and the next day, after the latter was chosen for the office by a single vote, Stockton declined the post of chief justice to remain in Congress. After serving on many important committees, on 26 September he and George Clymer were appointed to inspect the Northern army, which was then reorganizing after failure of the Canada invasion. Returning home as the British invaded New Jersey, he evacuated his family safely to the home of a friend in Monmouth County, but there he was betrayed by a Loyalist and captured on 30 November

1776. Taken first to Perth Amboy and then imprisoned in the infamous provost jail in New York City, he was subjected to cruel treatment that broke his spirit and led him to sign the amnesty proclamation declaring his loyalty to the king, making him the only signer of the Declaration of Independence to renounce his vote. Meanwhile, his home had been pillaged and his library burned. On 3 January 1777 Congress formally protested to the British and made efforts to secure his exchange. When he finally was liberated Stockton's health was shattered, his home, "Morven," was destroyed, and he found himself shunned by former friends. He died on 28 February 1781 after a long bout with cancer.

SEE ALSO *Witherspoon, John.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

STONE, THOMAS. (1743–1787). Signer. Maryland. Born in Charles County, Maryland, 1743, Stone studied law with Thomas Johnson in Annapolis, was admitted to the bar in 1764, and four years later married the wealthy Margaret Brown. In 1771 he bought land near Port Tobacco, Charles County, and established a successful legal practice. In 1774, Stone was one of the sheriff's lawyers who prosecuted Thomas Johnson, Samuel Chase, and William Paca for contesting the legality of poll taxes for supporting the clergy. Although a conservative, Stone sided with the Patriots when the break came with England. He served in the Continental Congress from 13 May 1775 until October 1778, except for a portion of 1777, when he declined re-election. Fellow signers of the Declaration of Independence from Maryland were Chase and Paca, and Johnson also served in Congress with Stone.

Stone also served in the Maryland Convention of 1775–1776, and in the state senate from 1776 to 1791, becoming known mostly for his silence. He appears to have retained his moderate views toward war with England, and one of his few recorded speeches advocated coming to terms with Lord Richard Howe in September 1776. He resumed his seat in Congress on 26 March 1784. Toward the end of this session he was named president pro tempore, but he declined re-election to Congress and resumed his law practice. He was named to the federal Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, but declined to serve on account of his wife's illness. She

died in June 1787 Stone gave up his work and died of “melancholy” on 5 October 1787.

SEE ALSO *Chase, Samuel; Paca, William.*

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STONE ARABIA, NEW YORK. A Mohawk Valley settlement burned on 19 October 1780 in Tory raid.

SEE ALSO *Fort Keyser, New York.*

Mark M. Boatner

STONO FERRY, SOUTH CAROLINA. 20 June 1779. General Augustine Prevost withdrew from Charleston, 11–12 May, and headed toward Savannah. When he reached Johns Island he left Lieutenant Colonel John Maitland in command of a 900-man rear guard to cover Stono Ferry, which connected Johns Island with the mainland. Maitland hastily built three redoubts and an abatis on the mainland side of the ferry to cover the position. On his left he placed his German troops with the North and South Carolina Loyalists holding the redoubts to the left and the center under Lieutenant Colonel John Hamilton, while the right consisted of his Seventy-first Highlands Regiment commanded by Major Duncan McPherson. He had six artillery pieces.

General Benjamin Lincoln had about 6,500 troops in Charleston and decided to attack this isolated British outpost with a force of 1,200. He personally led the main effort, which crossed the Ashley River about midnight and undertook an eight-mile approach march to hit the enemy position on James Island around dawn. General William Moultrie was supposed to support this operation by a secondary attack against Johns Island to keep Maitland from moving reinforcements across Stono Inlet to the bridgehead, but he failed to cross the river. Lincoln’s main body was organized into a right wing of South and North Carolina militia troops under General Jethro Sumner with two cannon and General Casimir Pulaski’s Legion, a left wing of Continental troops and four cannon under General Isaac Huger, a Virginia militia force with two cannon under Colonel David Mason in reserve, light

infantry companies covering each flank (Lieutenant Colonel Francis Malmedy on the right and Lieutenant Colonel John Henderson on the left), and a rear guard of Lieutenant Colonel David Horry’s South Carolina cavalry.

Henderson’s flank patrol made contact first. Maitland thought these forces were just more of the skirmishers who had harassed his line for the past two days and sent two companies of Highlanders to drive them away. Henderson ordered a bayonet charge that killed or wounded nearly half their number and drove them back into their defenses. The rebels advanced to within sixty yards of the abatis on the right when the British opened fire. Disobeying orders to press forward with their bayonets, the Patriots began exchanging fire with the British. On the British right, the Germans broke before a fierce assault and fled. Maitland shifted part of the Seventy-first to stop the advancing rebels and rallied the Germans to return to the fight. Maitland then started bringing reserves over from Johns Island; Lincoln ordered a retreat, which was effectively covered by his cavalry and the Virginia militia.

American losses in this poorly conceived operation were heavy: 146 killed or wounded (including 24 officers) and 155 missing. Most of the latter were deserters, since the British apparently took no prisoners. The British lost 26 killed, 103 wounded, and 1 missing.

The only thing Lincoln achieved by his attack was to speed up the course of action already agreed on by the British commander. Prevost returned with the main body of troops to Savannah while Maitland abandoned his bridgehead on 23 June and retreated to Beaufort (Port Royal Island), where he established a defensive position.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Raid of Prevost; Lincoln, Benjamin; Maitland, John; Prevost, Augustine.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

STONY POINT, NEW YORK. 16 July 1779. Anthony Wayne’s coup de main. After a quiet winter and spring, on 28 May 1779 a large British expedition started north from Kings Bridge in four columns supported by vessels in the Hudson River. General Clinton’s objective was to cut the primary route used by the Americans to move provisions from New England to West Point and its supporting forts, forcing the supplies to take a lengthy detour. The lines of communications crossed the Hudson River at Kings Ferry, the southern entrance to the Hudson Highlands, about fifteen miles below West Point. Easily defended hills anchored both ends of the ferry: Stony Point on the west and Verplanck’s Point on the east. The former was lightly held, but Fort

Lafayette stood on Verplanck's. The next day an expedition returning from a raid on Virginia sailed up the river to cooperate. Some of the British landed on 30 May and started working overland; the rest stayed on the transports and landed farther north the next day. Stony Point was taken without a shot on the afternoon of 31 May when its forty-man garrison withdrew to avoid being cut off. The British immediately landed some heavy artillery, including a ten-inch mortar and an eight-inch howitzer, and moved the pieces to the top from which they opened fire on Verplanck's. The seventy-five North Carolina troops holding Fort Lafayette were trapped; surrender was their only option.

Since 1778 Washington had considered the West Point complex to be the "key to the Continent" and maneuvered his field forces both to support the garrison there and to use the Highlands complex as a strategic pivot. When Clinton set out, most of Washington's brigades shifted north. The primary road from New Jersey to West Point ran through a valley known as Smith's Clove; Washington initially put his headquarters at the southern end by Smith's Tavern, although he later shifted to a safer position at New Windsor. Within a few days the Americans could see that Clinton did not intend to advance up the Hudson but only to build more formidable defenses to hold the ferry.

During June the Americans kept a close watch on the British progress. On 15 June Washington told Major Henry Lee to gather information about the Stony Point position and on 2 July Lee sent Captain Allen McLane into the works disguised as a local farmer. On 28 June Washington directed Brigadier General Anthony Wayne to study the possibilities of retaking Kings Ferry with his newly assembled light infantry corps. Washington personally reconnoitered Stony Point with Wayne on 6 July, covered by Lee's light dragoons and McLane's attached infantry company, and Wayne briefed him on a plan for a surprise night attack. Based largely on McLane's information that the works were incomplete, Washington approved. To keep the plan simple the Americans would not make a simultaneous attack on Verplanck's Point but instead would move troops into a position to do so if the more dominant Stony Point fell.


The Hudson at the ferry is only a half-mile wide and is actually an estuary subject to the tides. Just south of the ferry landing, a sharp hill rose 150 feet above the water. Marshes surrounded the north, west, and south sides of the hill, and the river covered the east. Two separate lines of abatis further obstructed the slopes, the first at the base of the hill, the second about 200 yards away protecting the crest. A semi-enclosed fort at the crest contained the bulk of the garrison, with three nearby batteries dominating the river. Trees had been cleared in front of the forward abatis, and some outworks covered the most likely avenue

of approach where the ferry road crossed a causeway. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Johnson held the position with the battalion companies of his Seventeenth Foot, the two grenadier companies of the Seventy-first Foot (Highlanders), a 60-man detachment of the Loyal Americans, a composite 51-man detachment of the Royal Artillery, and 15 guns; total strength was about 625.

Wayne's recently assembled light infantry corps consisted of the light companies detached from their parent regiments and now formed a large 1,200-man brigade. Colonel Christian Febiger (a Dane) commanded the First Regiment drawn from Virginia and Pennsylvania units, assisted by Lieutenant Colonel François Louis de Fleury and Major Thomas Posey. Colonel Richard Butler's Second Regiment with companies from Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania had Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Hay and Major John Stewart as battalion commanders. The Third Regiment, all Connecticut men, was commanded by Colonel Return Meigs, Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Sherman and Captain Henry Champion. The Fourth Regiment had not completely formed yet but contained Massachusetts troops under Major William Hull and North Carolinians under Major Hardy Murfree. Captains James Pendleton and Thomas Barr accompanied the expedition with twenty-four gunners and two small pieces, but did not take part in the attack. Supporting troops in reserve included Lee's contingent and three hundred infantry under Brigadier General John Peter Muhlenberg.

About noon on 15 July the American light infantry and the two guns started a fifteen-mile approach march from their camp near Fort Montgomery. They swung inland to avoid detection, at one point taking a trail so primitive the men had to move single file. Around 8 P.M. they reached the final assembly area a mile and a half west of Stony Point at a place called Springsteel's and ate dinner. Because surprise was essential, Wayne prescribed strict security measures: Lee cleared civilians and dogs from the line of march and kept Johnson's positions under observation; only a few officers knew the objective; and guards surrounded the final assembly area to prevent a last-minute deserter from alerting the British. Wayne also issued orders forbidding the men (except a designated covering force under Murfree) from loading their muskets; attacking with just fixed bayonets would ensure that an accidental discharge could not give warning.

A dark night and high tide favored the attackers as they started forward about 11:30 P.M. Wayne planned to penetrate the enemy's defenses at two points, one column hitting on the north, near the ferry landing, and the other to the south, where the defenses were closest to the main enemy works. Each of the two assault columns had the same arrangement. In the lead came a 20-man "forlorn



THE GALE GROUP

hope” to hack through the abatis; then an advance party of 150 men under selected officers followed to immediately exploit the breakthrough; and finally the third element was the main body to keep up the momentum of the attack and push on to the objective. The third force in Wayne’s plan was Major Murfree’s covering party, who would open fire on the British center by the causeway at the start of the attack as a diversion with Lee in support; his men were the only ones authorized to fire during the operation.

Wayne personally led the larger south column since it would make the main effort. It waded through marsh and along the bank of the river on the downstream side and turned ashore after passing the first line of abatis. Fleury’s advance party estimated that they waded through water four feet deep, while Meigs led the main body. Butler’s left column used a similar technique but entered the water well north of the causeway and also bypassed the first line of defense.

Schematically, the attack formation was as follows in table 1.

Shortly after midnight the two attack columns made contact, almost simultaneously, and the British sentries opened fire. The light infantry pressed forward without shooting back. The forlorn hopes chopped and clawed through a few minor obstacles and rushed for the second abatis with the advance parties on their heels. Murfree started his demonstration in the center and immediately succeeded in achieving his mission. Johnson charged down the hill with half his garrison—six companies of the Seventeenth—to repel the attack he thought was coming over the causeway.

Although most of the British firing was directed at shadows, the musketry began to take a toll of those at the front. Wayne went down briefly when a ball grazed his head but revived and maintained command. Four other officers from Meigs’s regiment of the main column were hit. Fleury caught up with Lieutenant George Knox’s forlorn hope and became the first man to enter the works, with Knox a close second and three sergeants following in order: Baker and Spencer from Virginia and




Table 1. American Attack Formation at Stony Point.
THE GALE GROUP

Donlop from Pennsylvania. This sequence is a matter of exact record because cash prizes of \$500 to \$100 had been announced for the first five to enter the works. Fleury personally pulled down the British flag.

The left column had farther to go, and also took casualties on the final approach, including wounds to Febiger and Hay. Lieutenant James Gibbons spearheaded their attack and took seventeen casualties out of his twenty men, but Major Stewart was right behind him with the advance party. In company with Colonel Butler the left column reached the fort only a few minutes after the right.

When Johnson heard the sounds of the battle he tried to move back up to the fort but was cut off and captured by Febiger's regiment. Posey's battalion overwhelmed the other two companies of the Seventeenth Foot in the fort, and Meigs's regiment captured the Loyalist detachment on the east side of the hill. Thirty minutes after the columns crossed the beach, the fight was over, and without any of the British being killed while attempting to surrender. A British officer, Commodore George Collier, entered this comment in his journal:

The rebels had made the attack with a bravery they never before exhibited, and they showed at this moment a generosity and clemency which during the course of the rebellion had no parallel. There was light sufficient after getting up the heights to show them many of the British troops with arms in their hands; instead of putting them to death, they called to them 'to throw their arms down if they expected any quarter. (Quoted in Johnston, *The Storming of Stony Point*, p. 135.)

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Wayne lost 15 killed and 84 wounded out of a total force engaged that probably amounted to 1,350. Johnson's official

after-action report listed 22 killed, 74 wounded, and 472 captured; he also reported 58 missing, and only one of them is known to have actually escaped to safety. So an accurate estimate of total British casualties would be 626.

The Americans also captured a significant amount of equipment, stores and ammunition, and the fifteen guns the British had emplaced. Washington sent vessels down from West Point to take the items away, but British warships damaged the galley *Lady Washington*, which had the brass artillery on board. Her crew ran the vessel ashore and burned her.

SEQUEL

The attack on Stony Point alerted Verplanck's Point, and Clinton reacted swiftly to reinforce Fort Lafayette. Guns on Stony Point were at least 1,500 yards from the east bank, too far for bombardment to have any effect. British warships prevented any kind of attack from the river and made it impossible for troops to cross from the west bank without going far upriver first. And the terrain at Verplanck's worked in Clinton's favor.

Washington wisely decided the defense of Stony Point would require more men than it was worth, so he ordered the works destroyed, and on 18 July Wayne's troops were withdrawn. Clinton reoccupied the place the next day; he then established a stronger garrison and rebuilt the defenses—only to abandon Kings Ferry altogether in the fall. He realized that if the river froze it would prevent supply or reinforcement.

For this brilliant exploit Congress voted its thanks to Wayne and a gold medal. Fleury and Stewart were voted silver medals; Lieutenants Gibbons and Knox got brevet promotions.

SIGNIFICANCE

The operation had little strategic value, but it was a morale builder for the American army and people; it had the opposite effect on the British, but to a lesser degree. For Clinton the attack's immediate impact stemmed from the loss of the Seventeenth Foot and the grenadier companies of the Seventy-First as combat elements for the rest of the war. Stony Point's greatest impact came in its validation of the level of tactical training instituted by Washington and "Baron" Friedrich Steuben's "Blue Book." The first copies of the manual reached the Highlands in time for the light infantry to use them in their final preparations.

SEE ALSO *Hudson River and the Highlands*; *McLane, Allan*.

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Anthony Wayne at Stony Point. General Wayne leads American troops into battle in July 1779 at Stony Point near the Hudson River in New York. Although the operation at Stony Point had little strategic value, it was a morale builder for the American army.

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STORMONT, DAVID MURRAY, SEVENTH VISCOUNT. (1727–1796). British ambassador to Versailles, 1772 to March 1778. Through an efficient net of informers, Stormont's task was to monitor secret French aid to the American rebels, while postponing open war for as long as possible. He made frequent protests against such aid and against the use of French posts by American privateers. As secretary of state for the Northern Department (October 1779–

March 1782) and virtually foreign minister, he competently directed Britain's European affairs until the end of the war.

SEE ALSO *French Covert Aid*.

revised by John Oliphant

STRATEGIC ENVELOPMENT. A turning movement.

SEE ALSO *Turning Movement*.

STUART, SIR CHARLES. (1753–1810). British officer. Born in London in January 1753, Stuart was the son of the future prime minister, the earl of Bute. The younger Stuart became an ensign in 1768, purchasing the rank of lieutenant of the Seventh Regiment in 1770 and of captain of the Thirty-seventh Regiment in 1773.

Sent to America with his regiment in 1775, Stuart saw action at Bunker Hill that year and then in Howe's New York campaign of 1776, during which he was elected to Parliament for Bossiney. He earned promotion to lieutenant colonel of the Twenty-sixth Regiment in 1777. Critical of the conduct of the war, Stuart left America in 1779. His opposition to the policies of George Germain prevented his gaining a command outside of America, while King George's hostility to Stuart's father, the king's one-time mentor but now a loathed reminder of past failures, frustrated his efforts to become a diplomat. The war with France revived his military career as he was given command of the army in Corsica, where he won praise for his bravery at the Battle of Calvi. In 1797 he commanded British forces in Portugal. The following year his brilliantly executed capture of Minorca led to his being made a knight of the Bath and governor of Minorca. His inability to get along with his superiors led to his resignation in April 1800 with the rank of lieutenant general. He died at his home in Surrey on 25 March 1801.

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STUART, JOHN. (1718–1779). British superintendent of Indian affairs. The son of a merchant and magistrate, John Stuart was born in Inverness on 25 September 1718. Educated at Inverness grammar school, at the age of seventeen he took a position in a London mercantile business that traded with Spain. His business was interrupted by the War of Jenkins's Ear (1739), which in 1740 merged into the War of Austrian Succession. Stuart then circumnavigated the globe with Commodore George Anson's expedition to the Pacific, serving as clerk, purser and midshipman. In 1748 Stuart emigrated to Charleston, South Carolina, where he married, had two children, failed in an initial mercantile venture, and gradually established himself as a prominent citizen. It may have been in this period that he first came into contact with the Cherokees and other Native American nations of the hinterland.

During the early part of the Seven Years War, while serving at Fort Loudoun in the Overhill country of what is now Tennessee, Stuart established himself as a trusted friend of the Cherokees. In 1759, when that fort was starved into surrender and some of the garrison was massacred, Stuart not only survived but was allowed to escape from captivity. Stuart disliked the genocidal blood-

lust that gripped Charleston during the Anglo-Cherokee War that followed, and supported his fellow Scot, Lieutenant Colonel James Grant, when he ended the conflict on terms far more generous than those demanded by South Carolina. Stuart's conviction that only a strong imperial authority could impose a stable and just frontier settlement probably dates from this period. So too, do the beginnings of a fracture in South Carolina between those who supported Grant and Stuart and the many who resented imperial interference in the colony's affairs.

In 1762 Stuart succeeded the deceased Edmund Atkin as superintendent of Indian affairs for the southern department. Lord Egremont (Charles Windham), the new secretary of state, was already mapping out an imperial plan for frontier management, including a fixed boundary line between white and Indian territories and a closely regulated Indian trade. His scheme was given official form in the Proclamation of 1763, which prohibited colonial expansion beyond the frontier, and gave Stuart a degree of autonomy of which his counterpart in the northern department, Sir William Johnson, could only dream (Johnson's efforts were frequently frustrated by the clumsy intervention of Jeffery Amherst, the British commander in chief in North America and technically his superior). At the Congress of Augusta in November 1763, Stuart was able to promise the suspicious Indian nations of the southern department security for their lands and an adequate trade. He also distributed presents—paid for by Egremont—on an unprecedented scale. He followed this up with a series of smaller local conferences which gradually established the line of the fixed boundary. Thereafter he urged the imperial government to take direct control of the frontier areas, forbidding private land sales and closely regulating traders. He received limited support until the very eve of war; but because his policy ran counter to aggressive powerful economic and expansionist interests, by early 1775 opinion in the south was polarised over frontier issues. Men like Henry Laurens, who had supported Grant and Stuart in 1761, were now revolutionaries.

In 1775 he was very quick to move against his American rivals for influence in the Indian nations, exploiting the fact that British control of the seas and the Floridas allowed him to promise more and better trade goods than the rebels could provide. Moreover, in time of war he could compensate friendly warriors far more generously with presents—a crucial point for peoples who stood to lose not only their winter hunting but their crops and homes as well. Forced to flee from Charleston in September 1775, when the royal government collapsed, he moved first to Georgia, then to St. Augustine in June 1776, and later to Pensacola, which became his permanent base of operations. Fearing that indiscriminate attacks would only alienate potential Loyalists, Stuart responded cautiously to General Thomas Gage's orders to encourage the Indian nations

to take up arms, though carefully concerted operations against specific targets would be another matter. He did not always succeed in restraining his Native American protégés, and their operations against the colonies were not always successful—the Cherokee war of 1776 being a key example. However, with generous backing from London, and his own high personal standing among them, Stuart managed to keep the vast majority of southern Indians friendly or neutral. In February 1778 he sent emissaries to obtain Cherokee and Seminole support for the coming attacks on Georgia, and in March he sent small mixed forces to the lower Mississippi. The work he had done lived on long after his death in Pensacola on 21 March 1779.

Stuart has been accused of being an extremist and, by neglecting the Americans' perspectives and interests, of pushing otherwise well-disposed colonists into the arms of revolution. On the other hand, Stuart like most southern Indians, understood that the aims of colonial assemblies, frontier traders, and rogue settlers were incompatible with those of the Indians, and therefore with a stable frontier. The only alternative was tough imperial control, and there is something to be said for Stuart's complaint that there was not enough of it at a sufficiently early stage. Whether the eighteenth century British empire was capable of exerting such authority is another question.

SEE ALSO *Cherokee; French and Indian War; Southern Theater, Military Operations in.*

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revised by John Oliphant

SUFFOLK RESOLVES. 9–17 September 1774. Delegates from towns across Massachusetts met

in county conventions in early September 1774 to coordinate their opposition to the Intolerable Acts. The Suffolk county convention adopted a set of resolves on 9 September, drafted by Joseph Warren, that summarized the state of the imperial relationship as seen from Massachusetts. While acknowledging George III as king “agreeable to compact,” the resolves rejected the Intolerable Acts as “gross infractions of those rights to which we are justly entitled by the laws of nature, the British constitution, and the charter of this province” and denounced them “as the attempts of a wicked administration to enslave America” (Knollenberg, p. 312). They recommended a stoppage of trade with Britain and the withholding of taxes from the Crown until the acts were repealed, and urged the citizens of Massachusetts to “use their utmost diligence to acquaint themselves with the art of war as soon as possible” (Knollenberg, pp. 312–313).

A copy of the resolves was rushed by Paul Revere to the Massachusetts delegates attending the first Continental Congress at Philadelphia. Revere arrived on 16 September, and the next day the Massachusetts delegates presented the resolves to Congress for approval. While more conservative delegates from other colonies had no sympathy for the acts, they were initially reluctant to endorse such militant resolves. But, not wanting to seem to question the need to resist the acts, they finally voted with their colleagues to endorse the resolves. The vote gave important support to the radicals in Massachusetts and made reconciliation with the imperial government even more difficult to achieve.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; Warren, Joseph.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SUFFREN DE SAINT TROPEZ, PIERRE ANDRÉ DE. (1729–1788). French admiral. Born to a noble family in Provence, he entered the Naval Guards in October 1743 and served the next year off Toulon on the *Solide*, on which he participated in the Battle of Cape Sicié in February 1744. Next he served in the West Indies and in 1746 took part in the expedition of D’Anville in Acadia. The following year he was captured by the British in the Bay of Biscay. He was promoted to

ship's ensign in 1748 and participated in galley duty from 1749 to 1751. He was promoted to ship's lieutenant in 1756, commanded the *Singe* in Duchaffault's squadron in the Larache affair in 1765, became a frigate captain in 1767, and *capitaine de vaisseau* in 1772. He became commander of the *Fantasque* in 1777.

When France declared war on England, Suffren served as commander of the same vessel under Estaing in 1778–1779. On 5 August 1778 he distinguished himself at Newport, where he forced entry into the harbor and hastened the torching of five English vessels. In action against Admiral Byron off Grenada, he held the line despite the loss of sixty-two men aboard his ship. He strongly disapproved of the restrained tactics of Estaing and made this known in official communications to his admiral. The latter nevertheless recommended that Suffren be given command of the *Héros* and a division of five vessels that the French planned to send to help the Dutch defend their Cape of Good Hope colony against an expected British attack. On 22 March 1781 Suffren sailed from Brest with Grasse to the Azores and went on toward southern Africa. On 16 April he successfully attacked the English expedition under Admiral Johnstone upon finding it anchored off the Cape Verde Islands, technically in the neutral waters of Portugal. After saving the Cape Colony from capture, Suffren continued on to India where, in a series of four savage actions at Sadras, Provedien, Negapatam, and Trincomalé, he fought Sir Edward Hughes to a standstill. He was promoted to lieutenant general in February 1783, returned to Toulon in March 1784, and was promoted to vice admiral in April. As Anglo-French tensions were increasing in 1787, he was given command of the squadron at Brest. He died suddenly at Paris in December 1788.

SEE ALSO *Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'*; *Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778)*.

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

SUGAR ACT. The Revenue Act of 1764, usually known as the Sugar Act, had two purposes. First, it was

intended to raise money from trade to and between the British colonies in America. It levied import duties on a list of enumerated commodities (including sugar, indigo, coffee, wine, and various cloths) and made the Molasses Act of 1733 perpetual, although it cut the duty on molasses in half, from six pence to three pence per gallon, to make evasion of the tax less attractive. Monies raised in America were reserved "to be from time to time disposed of by Parliament towards defraying the necessary expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the British colonies and plantations in America" (section 11). Second, it revamped and reinvigorated the customs service charged with the collection of these import duties. Two provisions attracted the most colonial opposition. By the terms of the first, legal cases in which the validity of seizures of ships and goods were determined could now be adjudicated in a new vice-admiralty court in Halifax, Nova Scotia, instead of in local colonial courts that were more susceptible to popular pressure. By virtue of the second, customs officials were relieved of liability for unlawful seizures if "the judge or court indicates there was probable cause for seizure" (section 46).

SEE ALSO *Grenville Acts; Vice-Admiralty Courts*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SULLIVAN, JOHN. (1740–1795). Continental general. New Hampshire. Born of parents who had arrived about 1723 as redemptioners from Ireland, he became an "able, if somewhat litigious, lawyer" practicing in Durham, New Hampshire. In 1772 he was a major in his local New Hampshire militia unit and in September 1774 was seated in the Continental Congress. Home in December, he and John Langdon led a group of volunteers that captured Fort William and Mary at the entrance to Portsmouth harbor. He took his seat in the Second Continental Congress on 10 May 1775 and was appointed a Continental brigadier general on 22 June. During the Boston siege he commanded a brigade at Winter Hill, except for a period in October 1775 when he organized the defenses of Portsmouth. After the British evacuation of Boston he led a column of reinforcements to join the Canada invasion. Reaching St. Johns on 1 June 1776, he

assumed command of the army when General John Thomas died the next day. Without adequate intelligence of enemy strength or position, Sullivan allowed Brigadier General William Thompson to join the force of Arthur St. Clair to attack a British force at Trois Rivières. Thompson lost the element of surprise and, with most of his force, was taken prisoner. After the defeat at Trois Rivières on 8 June, Sullivan ordered the retreat up Lake Champlain.

NEW YORK

His army was at Crown Point when Gates superseded him in command. Sullivan left the theater of operations with threats of resignation and took his grievance to Congress. He was prevailed on to remain in service, reached New York City on 21 July, and was appointed major general on 9 August 1776. On 20 August he succeeded Greene as commander on Long Island, but four days later Washington put Israel Putnam in top command. Captured in the Battle of Long Island on 27 August, Sullivan went to Philadelphia with a message for Congress from British General William Howe that led to the fruitless peace conference of 11 September 1776. He was exchanged for General Richard Prescott about 25 September and was back at Washington's headquarters on the 27th. Given command of a division, he took part in the remaining phase of the New York campaign.

NEW JERSEY AND PENNSYLVANIA

At the start of the New Jersey campaign, Sullivan's division was on the Hudson as part of General Charles Lee's command. He succeeded Lee when the latter was captured and joined Washington west of the Delaware on 20 December with the remaining two thousand of the five thousand troops with which Lee had started. At Trenton he led the right column and rendered valuable service in the American victory. He commanded the main body in the advance on Princeton but contributed nothing significant to that success.

While the army was in winter quarters around Morristown during the first part of 1777, Sullivan commanded forces on outpost duty and was in the exposed position at Princeton when the British undertook the mystifying "June maneuvers" that started the Philadelphia campaign. He led an unsuccessful operation against Staten Island on 22 August and then hurried south in time to fight at Brandywine on 11 September. Meanwhile, he had made enemies in Congress by joining Greene and Knox in threatening to resign over the Tronson de Coudray affair, an action that politicians considered an attempt by generals to "dictate" to civil authority. In September 1777 a proposal was advanced in Congress to suspend him from command while an inquiry was made into his failure at Staten Island, and



John Sullivan. The Continental general and governor of New Hampshire, in a mezzotint (1776) attributed to C. Corbutt.
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delegate Thomas Burke of North Carolina charged him with misconduct at Brandywine. Washington refused to relieve Sullivan, whom he regarded as one of his more valuable commanders, and Sullivan led a column at Germantown on 4 October. Meanwhile, he was cleared of charges in connection with the Staten Island expedition.

NEWPORT AND THE IROQUOIS

He spent the winter at Valley Forge. Sullivan may have been to some degree involved in the Conway Cabal. Freeman has said that Sullivan's "love of popularity had led him to seek the good will of parties to the controversy" (Freeman, vol. 4, p. 608). Early in 1778 he was named to succeed General Joseph Spencer as commander in Rhode Island, "not because of any special fitness for the post," according to Freeman, "but because the New Hampshire General happened to be more readily available than any other officer of appropriate rank" (*ibid.*, vol. 4, p. 613). He turned out to be singularly unqualified for what Freeman has called the "puzzling experiment in cooperation," the Franco-American operation against Newport on 29 July–31 August 1778.

Perhaps in testimony to his previously good record, not to mention his political connections in New England, Sullivan's military career survived the Newport affair. In March 1779 he left Providence and led a force of 2,300 from its gathering place of Easton, PA, on 31 July 1779 on a punitive expedition against the Six Nations. Following the Susquehanna River to Wyoming, then to Tioga, they reached Chemung on 11 August joining an army under General James Clinton on 22 August. Sullivan's expedition fought its largest battle at Newtown where most of the enemy retreated successfully to the west. The army continued its march, destroying villages and crops in its wake, going northwest to Genesee Castle before returning to Easton on about 12 October. Indian raids continued much as they had prior to the expedition leading historians, like the Continental Congress, to question the value of the expedition. His health impaired by this experience in the out-of-doors, he resigned from the army on 30 November 1779. The canny Irishman did not leave his last command without, however, securing a semipolitical endorsement of his Iroquois expedition from his officers.

LATER CAREER

Sullivan promptly secured reelection to Congress. He was chairman of the committee appointed on 3 January 1781 to represent Congress in settling the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line. During this term in Congress his brother Daniel, who was fatally ill from his mistreatment on a British prison hulk, brought him a peace feeler from the enemy. Sullivan refused to have anything to do with the communication but referred it to La Luzerne, the French minister to the United States. Since Sullivan had borrowed money from the minister, post mortem charges were made that the general had been paid for this service. This accusation, however, has been completely discredited.

In 1782 Sullivan was a member of his state's constitutional convention, was elected attorney general, and was also elected as a member of the New Hampshire assembly; he was elected speaker of the assembly in the spring of 1785. In spring elections in 1786 he was elected President of the State and handled the paper money riots of that year firmly but coolly. Elected governor of New Hampshire in 1786, 1787, and 1789, he actively supported adoption of the federal Constitution. The last years of Sullivan's life were spent as a federal judge. He died on 23 January 1795. Sullivan's brother, James (1744–1808), was one of the most prominent lawyers in Massachusetts and a political figure of great power and wealth.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Canada Invasion; Conway Cabal; Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of; Long Island, New York, Battle of; Mutiny of the*

Pennsylvania Line; New Jersey Campaign; Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778); Peace Conference on Staten Island; Philadelphia Campaign; Princeton, New Jersey; Staten Island, New York; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois; Trenton, New Jersey; Tronson du Coudray, Philippe Charles Jean Baptiste.

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revised by Frank C. Mevers

SULLIVAN'S EXPEDITION AGAINST THE IROQUOIS. The Sullivan expedition, or the Sullivan-Clinton expedition, is the name given to the Continental army's invasion of the Iroquois homeland, conducted between May and November 1779. George Washington designed the campaign to punish the British-allied Iroquois nations for a series of frontier raids the year before (including the Wyoming Valley massacre) and to force the Iroquois out of the war. Major General John Sullivan commanded the main body of the troops, which entered Iroquoia via the Susquehanna Valley, while a smaller column of troops under Brigadier General James Clinton entered Iroquoia through the

Mohawk Valley. After defeating the only organized resistance it faced at Newtown, the Sullivan expedition proceeded to destroy Iroquois towns and cornfields. The expedition devastated the Iroquois League and, because of the tactics used, remains controversial into the twenty-first century.

ORIGINS AND PLANNING

In the summer of 1778, British irregulars under John Butler and British-allied Iroquois warriors launched a series of raids against Patriot communities on the Pennsylvania and New York frontiers, including the Wyoming Valley massacre (June 1778) and the Cherry Valley massacre (November 1778). Accounts of the massacres circulated widely on the American side, and public pressure on the Continental army to respond to these attacks was high. In the winter of 1778–1779, Washington began to plan a campaign to take Fort Niagara. Its strategic significance was multifold: it controlled a major choke point between British Canada and the United States and it also served as a main distribution point for British trade goods and arms to their Iroquois allies. Washington soon realized that taking Niagara would probably be beyond the realm of possibility for the operation he was planning. Because of the constraints of manpower and supply, he planned a more modest expedition that would attack the British-allied Iroquois directly. Attacking Niagara was retained as a secondary objective.

Washington initially offered the command of the Iroquois invasion to Major General Horatio Gates, who turned it down on account of his age. Washington's offer then went to New Hampshire's Major General John Sullivan in March 1779. Washington made the ultimate objectives of Sullivan's operations clear in a letter of 31 May 1779. Sullivan was to attack "the hostile tribes of the Six Nations" and insure "the total destruction and devastation of their settlements and the capture of as many prisoners of every age and sex as possible." Washington also explained to Sullivan that it was "essential to ruin their crops now in the ground" and to prevent them from "planting more." Washington suggested that Sullivan enter Iroquoia through the Susquehanna Valley, establish a fort at Tioga (at the confluence of the Chemung and Susquehanna Rivers), and then proceed into the lands of the Seneca following the Chemung River. Washington also ordered Brigadier General James Clinton to the town of Canajoharie, in the Mohawk Valley, to support Sullivan's operations. Initial planning envisioned Clinton entering Iroquoia from the east, but he moved his troops through Otsego Lake into the Susquehanna Valley and rendezvoused with Sullivan at Tioga. A five-hundred-man force under Colonel Gose Van Schaick did use the eastern route, however. Van Schaick left Fort Stanwix in April

1779 and attacked and destroyed the town of Onondaga. Finally, Washington ordered the commander at Fort Pitt, Colonel Daniel Brodhead, to lead a small body of troops up the Allegheny River to harass Iroquois communities on the northern stretches of the river. Although Washington doubted that Brodhead could rendezvous with Sullivan and Clinton, he kept that option open.

THE ARMIES ADVANCE

Sullivan's troops began assembling at Easton, Pennsylvania, in early May; Sullivan arrived there on 7 May. His troops did not begin to move until 18 June and did not leave the Wyoming Valley until 31 July. Sullivan reached Tioga on 10 August 1779 and immediately began the construction of Fort Sullivan. A small party under Captain John Cummings traveled up the Chemung River and reconnoitered the Iroquois village of Chemung on 11 August. A somewhat larger detachment under General Edward Hand attacked and destroyed the village the next day. (The village had been evacuated by the Iroquois and the British before Hand's arrival.) Clinton began his preparations in June, completing his portage from the Mohawk Valley to Lake Otsego on 17 June. Clinton departed Otsego on 9 August, made contact with General Enoch Poor (whom Sullivan had ordered up the Susquehanna to find Clinton) on 19 August, and arrived at Tioga on 22 August.

Combined at Tioga, Sullivan's and Clinton's forces numbered about six thousand combatants and support personnel. Combat troops number about four thousand. The troops were composed of fifteen regiments of infantry and one regiment of artillery. The sixteen regiments were organized into four brigades under the command of Clinton, Hand, Poor, and General William Maxwell. The expedition included a small cavalry division of about seventy-five horses, commanded by Colonel Thomas Proctor. The expedition also employed a small number of Oneida, Tuscarora, and Stockbridge Mochian Indians as guides and scouts. The expedition's numbers were further augmented by noncombat support personnel, estimated to be two thousand in number. These included the "women of the army" (often called camp followers), whose numbers included nurses, cooks, and washerwomen. The expedition also employed boat crews, engineers, chaplains, surveyors, pioneers, and teamsters. The expedition carried its boats and other equipment with it. All of this served to slow its pace.

BRITISH PREPARATIONS

John Butler, the British commander at Fort Niagara, was aware of all aspects of the expedition: Van Schaick's April raid; the movement of Brodhead up the Allegheny; and the advance of Sullivan's columns to Tioga. Lacking a regular

army of any size in his department, Butler could do little to halt Sullivan's advance. Butler consulted with Mohawk leader Joseph Brant and planned to gather a force of British rangers, Loyalists, and British-allied Iroquois warriors to harass Sullivan's column as it moved up the Chemung River. Butler was astonished by the size of Sullivan's expeditionary force, and he feared that Fort Niagara was Sullivan's ultimate target. Butler and Brant planned to make their first attempt to slow Sullivan at Newtown (modern Elmira, New York).

THE BATTLE OF NEWTOWN

The size of Sullivan's force dictated slow and deliberate movement. His full force left Tioga on 26 August, traveled up the Chemung River and camped at the ruins of Chemung on 28 August, and finally approached the village of Newtown on the morning of 29 August. Newtown was located at a bend in the Chemung River below a substantial hill; the ground was suitable for an ambush. Butler's Iroquois were stationed in an ambush on a small hill outside Newtown. The Iroquois attempted to lure Sullivan's men into an ambush, but the first parties to encounter them—Major James Parr's riflemen and infantry under General Hand—did not give chase. Sullivan then ordered Colonel Thomas Proctor's artillery regiment forward. Proctor's artillery devastated the Iroquois position, precipitating the retreat of Butler's forces from the battlefield and from Newtown itself. Their withdrawal was so precipitous that the brigades of Poor and Clinton, attempting a flanking maneuver, did not have time to get into position before the British-Iroquois retreat. Sullivan had won what would be the one pitched battle of the entire invasion of Iroquoia. Newtown was burned to the ground after the battle was over.

FURTHER OPERATIONS

For the remainder of their campaign, Sullivan's troops would not meet the kind of organized, sustained resistance they encountered at Newtown. In keeping with Iroquois traditions of war making, in which pitched battles were to be avoided and casualties minimized, the British-allied Iroquois opted to remove from their towns with the plan to return after the Americans had passed through. The move kept casualties to a minimum but gave Sullivan free reign to destroy towns and cornfields. Fearing that Sullivan's ultimate objective was Niagara, Butler attempted to organize additional ambushes to slow Sullivan. However, the extended nature of Sullivan's supply lines and the consequent slowness of his march always gave the Iroquois time to retreat further.

Sullivan's troops destroyed the Seneca settlement called Catherine's Town, south of Seneca Lake, on 1 September. By 7 September, Sullivan's forces had

reached the northern end of Seneca Lake, where they occupied and destroyed the village of Candasaga, or Seneca Castle. Sullivan's troops then moved westward to attack the Seneca town of Genesee Castle, also known as Little Beard's Town. On the night of 12–13 September, a party under Lieutenant Thomas Boyd, sent to reconnoiter the area near Genesee Castle, was ambushed by the Senecas. Most of the party, which numbered twenty-three men, were killed; only Boyd and a private were captured alive, and they were killed the next day. The destruction of Boyd's party caused the highest number of losses suffered by Sullivan during any one engagement of the expedition. On 14 September, Sullivan entered Genesee Castle without opposition and burned it to the ground the following day.

Sullivan then turned his expedition back east. Between his departure from Genesee Castle and his arrival back at Tioga on 30 September, Sullivan sent several detachments of his forces through Iroquoia to commit further acts of destruction. William Butler was dispatched to destroy the towns of the Cayuga along Cayuga Lake. Colonel Peter Gansevoort was sent eastward into the Mohawk country to destroy the Lower Mohawk Castle on his way to Albany. Smaller detachments were dispatched to destroy villages throughout the Finger Lakes region. The total devastation was enormous. Numbers vary from account to account, but at least 40 Iroquois villages were burned to the ground and at least 160,000 bushels of Iroquois corn were destroyed. Sullivan's troops destroyed the fort at Tioga on 3 October and arrived in the Wyoming Valley on 8 October.

AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS

Although casualties suffered by both sides during the Sullivan expedition itself were fairly light, a severe impact on the Iroquois was felt soon after. The winter of 1779–1780 was exceptionally cold and harsh, and with most of their food stores destroyed, the British-allied Iroquois found subsistence a difficult prospect. Many did not survive the winter. Most Iroquois reconstituted their villages around Fort Niagara. The destruction of their home villages prompted many Iroquois to leave New York altogether and resettle inside Canada. Governor Haldimand endorsed this migration when he granted Mohawk leader Joseph Brant rights to a large reserve along Ontario's Grand River in 1784.

Although Sullivan succeeded in bringing devastation to Iroquoia, this destruction did not achieve the goal of knocking the Iroquois out of the war. Ironically, since the British-allied Iroquois removed to the area near Niagara after the expedition, the effect was to push them into closer alliance with the British. By late 1780, Iroquois were fighting alongside British troops in the western

theater once more. Modern military historians have seen the Sullivan expedition as a failure, since it did not accomplish its strategic objectives. Modern American Indian historians have been even less generous, lamenting the destruction of Iroquois culture and civilization the Sullivan Expedition exacerbated. Although the Six Nations survived the Revolutionary War, they never regained the preeminent political and diplomatic position they had held for over a century before the American Revolution. Finally, the Sullivan expedition, and the orders of George Washington that set it into motion, remain a source of controversy and anger for many modern members of the Iroquois nations. For most Americans, George Washington is remembered as the "father of the country," but for most Iroquois, he is known as the "town destroyer" because of the actions wrought by the Sullivan expedition.

SEE ALSO *Butler, John; Clinton, James; Newtown, New York; Sullivan, John.*

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SULLIVAN'S ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA. June 1776 and May 1780. The site of Fort Sullivan, which was renamed Fort Moultrie, this island was successfully defended against the Charleston expedition of Clinton in 1776 and fell to the British without resistance during the Charleston expedition of Clinton in 1780.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780.*

revised by Carl P. Borick

SUMNER, JETHRO. (1735–1785). Continental general. Virginia and North Carolina. Sumner served in the Virginia militia throughout the Seven

Years' War, becoming a paymaster and commander of Fort Bedford in 1760. Four years later he moved to North Carolina, married Mary Hurst, and with a large inheritance from his wife became a planter and tavern owner at the seat of what became Warren County. He became a justice of the peace in 1768 and was county sheriff from 1772 to 1777. He was elected to the Third Provincial Congress in 1775, which appointed him major of the Halifax County militia. He went north to support the Virginians at Norfolk during the last two months of the year, became a colonel of the Third Battalion of the North Carolina Continentals on 15 April 1776, and participated in the defense of Charleston in June. In September he was detached from the forces moving toward Florida and sent to raise supplies in North Carolina. The next spring he led his unit north, fought at Brandywine and Germantown, and spent the winter at Valley Forge. Early in 1778 he was invalided home and spent the summer recruiting regulars. Promoted to brigadier general on 9 January 1779, he led his new Continental brigade at Stono Ferry, South Carolina, on 20 June 1779, but illness again forced him home.

After spending more than a year recruiting in North Carolina, he commanded a militia brigade in opposing the advance of General Charles Cornwallis to Charlotte, North Carolina, in September 1780. When William Smallwood was given command of state troops in October, Sumner refused to continue serving in the field. In February 1781 he acceded to Nathanael Greene's request to return to active duty, even while continuing his recruiting efforts, at which he excelled. His major combat service of the Revolution came as commander of three small North Carolina Continental battalions at Eutaw Springs, South Carolina, on 8 September 1781. Here his men performed with great credit. He was in command of military forces in North Carolina for the remainder of the war, taking part in small actions, and on 3 November 1783 he retired. He died at his home 18 March 1785.

SEE ALSO *Eutaw Springs, South Carolina; Norfolk, Virginia; Stono Ferry, South Carolina.*

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
SUMTER, THOMAS. (1734–1832). Militia general. South Carolina. Thomas Sumter was born on 14 August 1734 near Charlottesville, Virginia. He served as a

sergeant of Virginia troops in the 1761 campaign against the Cherokees. At the end, of that campaign he escorted a troop of Cherokee leaders to England and back. On their return to the Cherokee nation, Sumter fought a French officer, the Baron des Jonnes, whom he found attempting to recruit the Cherokee. He emerged victorious, and took the baron prisoner.

Sumter was jailed for debt in Staunton, Virginia, in 1765, but he escaped and fled to South Carolina. There he opened a store near Eutaw Springs and married a wealthy widow, Mary Cantey Jameson, in 1767. By 1775 he owned thousands of acres, mills, and many slaves. Sumter was elected to the first and second provincial congresses, which became the new state assembly in 1776. He also captained a company of mounted rangers under Colonel Richard Richardson, defeating a group of Loyalists in the “snow campaign” of December 1775 (so called because of the record fifteen inches of snow that had just fallen). The following year he was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Second (later Sixth) Rifle Regiment that formed part of the defense of Charleston against General Henry Clinton’s attack in July 1776. Sumter’s regiment became part of the Continental army, participating in some minor skirmishes against the Cherokee and in limited military operations in South Carolina and Georgia. In 1778 Sumter joined with General Robert Howe in planning the aborted invasion of Florida, but contracted malaria and resigned on 19 September 1778. When parts of his plantation were burned and his slaves were liberated by Captain Charles Campbell of Banastre Tarleton’s Legion in 1780, Sumter headed for the Patriot stronghold west of the Catawba River and started raising volunteers. He was soon joined by a number of other officers seeking to resist the successful British forces.

Sumter’s partisans struck first at Williamson’s Plantation, on 12 July 1780, gaining a victory that brought him more volunteers. Repulsed at Rocky Mount on 1 August, Sumter went on to success at Hanging Rock on 6 August. His lack of strategic sense first showed itself in the Camden campaign. On 18 August, after General Horatio Gates accepted his request for a reinforcement and just before the main army advanced to defeat at Camden, Sumter was badly beaten by Tarleton at Fishing Creek. He soon resumed operations, however, and on 6 October was named senior brigadier general of the South Carolina militia. Although the action at Fishdam Ford, on 9 November, was a draw, he foiled an attempt by the notorious Major James Wemyss to annihilate him and inspired a Patriot uprising that panicked Cornwallis. Sumter fought Tarleton to a bloody standstill at Blackstocks on 20 November, but was badly wounded.

By this time Sumter was known as “The Carolina Gamecock,” for the cock’s feather he wore in his hat. Sending word for Francis Marion to join forces with



Thomas Sumter. Known as the “Carolina Gamecock” for the cock’s feather he wore in his hat, Thomas Sumter was a bold and imaginative partisan leader, but a less effective tactical commander. Nineteenth-century engraving by George Parker after a portrait by Charles Willson Peale. © STAPLETON COLLECTION/CORBIS

him, Sumter started down the Congaree River on 16 February 1781 in hopes of inspiring more enlistments as he made his way to the Santee River. He would support this operation logistically by capturing the enemy base of Fort Granby. Marion knew that the British were reinforcing the posts along their line of communications and was pessimistic about the success of Sumter’s strategy, but being the junior brigadier general, he prepared to join Sumter. Sumter launched his attack on Fort Granby before dawn on 19 February, before Marion could arrive. The next day he had to retreat as Colonel Welbore Doyle’s New York Volunteers approached to relieve the garrison. The partisans moved 35 miles downriver and surprised the post at Belleville, but had to withdraw when enemy forces approached from Camden. On 28 February he launched an attack against Fort Watson without having properly reconnoitered the outpost, and therefore suffered a costly repulse.

When he learned that Colonel John Watson was preparing to attack him with overwhelming force, Sumter moved to his plantation to pick up his paralytic wife and young son, and started withdrawing northward. After moving some 40 miles to the Bradley Plantation, between the Black and Lynches rivers, he waited until

6 March before giving up hope of seeing Marion and then continued his retreat northward. On that same day, Major Thomas Fraser's Loyal South Carolina Regiment attacked Sumter's force, the partisans escaping with the loss of ten killed and about forty wounded. His own ill-advised campaign was over, but as Nathanael Greene's army approached he ignored the latter's requests to join him in an attack on Francis Rawdon's principal post.

Sumter wanted to fight his own little war. When Greene needed his support at Hobkirk's Hill, Sumter struck at Fort Granby, instead. He broke off that attack, however, to capture Orangeburg on 11 May, and then threatened to resign from the army because Henry Lee had taken Granby while he was otherwise occupied. Greene placated Sumter, who then came up with his controversial plan of raising troops by "Sumter's law": to recruit dependable mounted militia for ten months, Sumter proposed paying them in plunder taken from Loyalists in a sort of "pay as you go" scheme. He succeeded in assembling men, but touched off a renewed wave of vicious civil war and earned a disreputable reputation that dogged him to the grave. When he finally moved south to support Greene, his strategic blunders contributed to the American failure at Ninety Six.

Sumter then got Marion and Lee put under his command and launched a campaign that ended in the mismanaged attack at Quinby Bridge on 17 July. On the 25th he sent a force to plunder Loyalists in Georgetown. The British retaliated by virtually destroying Georgetown on 2 August. Perceiving Sumter's policies as counterproductive, Governor John Rutledge, who had just arrived to restore civil government in South Carolina, issued a proclamation terminating "Sumter's law" by prohibiting plundering. This action also ended Sumter's military career. Bothered by his wound, exhausted by his campaigns, and with his name "almost universally odious" (as Henry Lee put it), Sumter retired to his plantation. Sumter was elected state senator, and sat in the assembly that met 8 January 1782 at Jacksonboro. He resigned his military commission the next month.

After the war he was given the thanks of the South Carolina senate and a gold medal. Sumter served many terms in the South Carolina statehouse. After an investigation into his use of "Sumter's law," Sumter was exonerated, and the legislatures of North and South Carolina forbade state courts to entertain damage suits connected with this matter. He founded Stateburg, South Carolina, which he attempted to have made the state capital, without success. An anti-federalist, he voted against the Constitution in the South Carolina ratifying convention. Elected to the First Congress, he worked to limited federal powers. Suspected of speculation in government paper, he was defeated for re-election in 1793 but returned to Congress in 1796 as an adherent of Thomas Jefferson's. He served in the House of Representatives until elected to the Senate in December 1801 and resigned from Congress in December

1810. For the next 22 years he was harried by litigation and creditors. In 1827 the South Carolina legislature granted him a lifetime moratorium for his debt to the state bank. He lived to be 98, the oldest surviving general of the war, dying 1 June 1832.

SEE ALSO *Blackstock's, South Carolina; Camden Campaign; Carolina Gamecock; Fishdam Ford, South Carolina; Fishing Creek, North Carolina; Hanging Rock, South Carolina; Hobkirk's Hill (Camden), South Carolina; Ninety Six, South Carolina; Orangeburg, South Carolina; Rocky Mount, South Carolina.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

SUNBURY (FORT MORRIS), GEORGIA. 25 November 1778. Lieutenant Colonel Lewis V. Fuser's effort to take this position was foiled by firm resistance from the rebel commander.

SEE ALSO *McIntosh, John.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

SUNBURY (FORT MORRIS), GEORGIA. 9 January 1779. British capture. Major Joseph Lane was left with two hundred Continentals to defend this place when the rest of General Robert Howe's Southern army left for the operation that ended in the British capture of Savannah, 29 December 1778. General Augustine Prevost left St. Augustine on 23 December with about two thousand men and attacked Sunbury on 6 January. Three days later the British got their artillery into position, and Lane surrendered. American casualties were four killed and seven wounded; the British captured twenty-four cannon and a quantity of stores, losing one man killed and three wounded.

SEE ALSO *Savannah, Georgia (29 December 1778).*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

SUPPLY OF THE CONTINENTAL

ARMY. The American rebels started the war with almost none of the supplies required to arm, clothe, shelter, or otherwise equip, maneuver, and support army or naval forces. They lacked powder, muskets, cannon, lead, bayonets, cartridge boxes, cartridge paper, textiles, entrenching tools, and such camp equipment as kettles. The supplying of food was less of a problem while the army was stationary around Boston, but the shortage of salt meant that meat and fish could not be preserved. Manufacturing in America was undeveloped when the war started and never was built up to a point where it contributed significantly to the war effort; virtually all the shortages had to be made up by captures from the British or by purchase on credit from friendly powers (France, Spain, and the Netherlands).

The basic structure of American procurement was adapted from the way the British army organized and administered its supply system. On 16 June 1775, Congress created two supply offices, the quartermaster general and the commissary general of stores and purchases, both of which were required to report to the delegates. But since these departments began operating from a standing start in an economy much less well developed and flexible than Britain's, their efforts were often ad hoc and had about them an air of desperation. Given the difficulties they faced, American supply officers in most cases accomplished great feats in keeping the Continental army in the field and able to fight.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL

Until the reorganization of 1780, the American quartermaster general had duties and responsibilities far beyond those of the modern quartermaster. In addition to the procurement and distribution of supplies other than food and clothing, he was the principal staff officer involved in the movement of troops and therefore responsible for route reconnaissance; the repair and maintenance of roads and bridges; the layout, organization, and construction of camps; and the supply and maintenance of wagons and teams and of boats for water movement. Washington therefore felt the need for this key staff officer soon after assuming command at Boston and asked for authority to make his own appointment. When this was granted on 19 July 1775, Washington named Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania to the post on 14 August. Stephen Moylan took over the office in June 1776 but proved unequal to the task, and four months later Mifflin was back. He was seldom at Washington's headquarters in 1777, but his duties were performed by three subordinates: Joseph Thornsby, whom Washington appointed wagonmaster general in May; Clement Biddle, appointed commissary general of forage on 1 July; and Colonel

Henry Emanuel Lutterloh (or Lutterlough), an officer who had served as a quartermaster in the army of the duke of Brunswick, whom, at Washington's suggestion, Mifflin made his deputy.

Quartermaster operations, severely strained in 1776, suffered further dislocation in 1777, primarily in the field of transportation and distribution. Congress detained Mifflin in Philadelphia over matters of reorganization, and he remained in the city to stimulate recruiting and later to move stores out of the way of the British threat. On 8 October 1777 he submitted his resignation on grounds of ill health, but Congress, whose indecision and neglect had contributed to the collapse of the supply system, did not accept the resignation until 7 November. Then, the next day, the delegates asked Mifflin to carry on until they could get around to picking his successor. Mifflin, who had been appointed to the new Board of War, retaining the rank but not the pay of a major general, simply told his deputy, Lutterloh, to take over as quartermaster general. This shuffling of personnel came at a time when defeats in the field, and the need to keep operating in the face of the British occupation of Philadelphia, had already dislocated the supply system and contributed to the army's suffering during the winter encampment at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania.

With the lament that "No body ever heard of a quarter Master in history as such," the capable Major General Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island reluctantly accepted the noncombatant office of quartermaster general on 2 March 1778 and held it until 5 August 1780. Two able men were prevailed on to be his deputies: John Cox was to make all purchases and examine all stores; Charles Pettit would keep the books and the cash. Congress put Greene and his deputies on a commission system, whereby they could retain one percent of the money spent by the Quartermaster Department. The three men agreed to divide this amount equally.

COMMISSARY GENERAL

On 19 July 1775, Congress appointed Joseph Trumbull, the son of Connecticut governor Jonathan Trumbull, as commissary general. His department, charged with feeding the army, functioned well until the war moved from the Boston area to New York and New Jersey, when it faced the unprecedented challenges of reconnecting logistical arrangements in a war that went from the defense of extended positions to the near chaos of defeat and retreat.

After the disasters of 1776—the loss of New York City and the retreat through New Jersey—Congress was seized by what Richard Henry Lee would later call a veritable "rage for reformation," most of which was directed against the Commissary Department. On the recommendation of the Board of War, and in line with



Wagon Train. *In this nineteenth-century engraving General Washington and his staff welcome a wagon train carrying supplies for the Continental Army.* THE GRANGER COLLECTION, NEW YORK

Washington's ideas, the delegates split Trumbull's office into a commissary general of purchases and a commissary general of issues. Fully a year before Congress made the decision, Trumbull had wholeheartedly supported this division of his office but made a strong argument that he and his deputies be taken off a fixed salary. He reiterated an earlier proposal that he receive a one-half of one percent commission on all money passing through his hands, and that 2.5 percent be retained by the deputies purchasing subsistence. The morale of Trumbull's assistants was low because of criticism and because Congress had been so slow to prescribe regulations for the department.

On 10 June 1777 Congress finally produced a long, detailed set of regulations prescribing how records would be kept, how government animals would be branded, and other minutiae. On 18 June it elected officers for the new organization. Although he apparently was not officially notified until 5 July, Trumbull was retained in the establishment as commissary general of purchases, and his deputies were William Ayles, William Buchanan, Jacob Cuyler, and Jeremiah Wadsworth. The second post was given to Charles Stewart (who retained it until the end of the Yorktown campaign), and his deputies were William

Mumford, Matthew Irwin, and Elisha Avery. Congress paid little attention to Trumbull's recommendations, particularly with regard to his proposal about commissions. Trumbull tried to hold his department together while he argued with Congress on modification of its plan, but the delegates refused to yield ground and Trumbull's deputies began to resign. On 19 July, Trumbull submitted his resignation with the request that it be effective 20 August 1777. Buchanan was named (5 August) to succeed him. After Buchanan's resignation on 23 March 1778, Jeremiah Wadsworth took over the office on 9 April. After Wadsworth resigned on 1 January 1780, Ephraim Blaine became commissary general of purchases and held the post until it was abolished after the Yorktown campaign, in October 1781.

CLOTHIER GENERAL

Although the supply of clothing fell in the domain of the commissary general, the quartermaster general, Mifflin, had temporarily handled this responsibility in 1775. When Congress got around to reorganizing the supply services after the evacuation of New York City, its first act was to create the office of commissary of clothing. This

official would submit regimental clothing to the states and receive and pay for deliveries; regimental paymasters then would receive the clothing, make issue to the troops, and deduct the costs from the soldiers' wages. George Measam was appointed to this post in the southern army on 16 October 1776, a week after Congress created it, and at the same time Washington was authorized to fill the post in his own army. On 20 December, Washington wrote Congress to recommend that a clothier general for the Continental army (rather than one for each field army) be appointed, and a week later the delegates agreed, although they did not prescribe his authority.

James Mease, a Philadelphia merchant and former butler who had been commissary to Pennsylvania troops since 25 January 1776 and who had executed supply orders for Congress, asked Washington for this post on 6 January 1777 and received it four days later. He reported to Washington's camp in February 1777. On 19 July, Washington reported that "I have no reason to accuse the Clothier General of inattention to his department, and therefore, as his supplies are incompetent to the wants of the army, I am to suppose his resources are unequal." Shoes were a particular problem, the shortage rendering some organizations, in Washington's words on 23 June, "almost entirely incapable of doing duty." Congress had established a Hide Department (22 November 1776) to take custody of the original wrappings of cattle slaughtered for the army. Now it directed the commissary of hides to exchange these for tanned leather or for shoes; if this proved unfeasible, the commissary of hides could set up the tanyards, secure the other necessary materials and workmen, and produce the shoes, or he could contract for their manufacture. The Hide Department was then put under the Board of War, which directed that it make deliveries of leather to the commissary of military stores for the production of other equipment. Six weeks after the man selected by Congress declined to serve as commissary of hides, George Ewing was appointed to the post on 5 August 1777. He resigned on 20 April 1779, and the Board of War came up with a new plan under which five commissioners were appointed: William Henry for Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware; John Mehelm for New Jersey; Moses Hatfield for New York; Robert Lamb for Massachusetts; and George Starr for Connecticut.

Washington had meanwhile grown increasingly dissatisfied with Mease's performance. In April 1778 he asked Congress to investigate, and on 4 August he wrote that Mease was unfit for the post. Mease's functions were reduced as clothing started to arrive from France, the states were directed to supply their own troops, and the Board of War took over the purchase of items for the Continental army. Late in 1778 Washington told a visiting congressional committee that a reorganization of the Clothing

Department was still necessary, and on 23 March 1779 the delegates got around to acting. Mease had submitted his resignation in December 1777, offering to stay in office until a successor was named, but on grounds of ill health he left the main army and operated from Lancaster, Pennsylvania. After two others had declined the new office as set up in March 1779, James Wilkinson accepted on 24 July. He was to take orders from Washington and the Board of War, and each state would appoint its own clothier.

EXPANDING THE QUARTERMASTER DEPARTMENT

In 1775 the quartermaster general had operated with two assistants and some forty clerks, laborers, wagonmasters, and superintendents. By 1780 the quartermaster general and his two assistants had 28 deputies and 109 assistant deputies plus many storekeepers; clerks; barrackmasters; express riders; laborers; and superintendents of government property, roads, stables, woodyards, and horseyards. The forage branch had a commissary general and assistant, 25 deputies, and 128 assistant deputies as well as clerks, forage masters, measurers, collectors, weighers, stackers, superintendents, and laborers. The wagon branch had a wagonmaster general, eleven deputies, plus many wagon masters, wagoners, packhorse masters, and packhorsemen. The boat department had superintendents, masters of vessels, mates, and boatmen. In 1780 the Quartermaster Department employed almost 3,000 people at an estimated monthly payroll of \$407,593, a sum that excluded the commissions paid to the quartermaster general, his assistants, and the commissary general of forage but included those paid to some, but not all, of their deputies.

In 1779 the operations of the quartermaster general and the commissary general came under mounting criticism. Expenditures of the two departments had more than quadrupled, from \$9,272,534 in 1776 to \$37,202,421 in 1778, and in May 1779 Congress's committee on the treasury estimated that at least \$200 million would have to be spent that year by the two departments unless finances could be put on a firmer basis. The larger problem, of course, was the extraordinary depreciation of the Continental currency. The extremely severe weather, the suffering of the army at its winter encampment at Morristown, New Jersey, during 1779–1780, and the suspicion that all purchasing agents were getting rich on the commission system all brought such animosity against the two department heads that Greene and Wadsworth both threatened to resign. Only Congress's public statement of confidence in their activity kept them in office until the fall, when both officials tendered their resignations. Congress accepted Wadsworth's on 1 January 1780 and Greene's on 5 August 1780.

THE WAR'S LAST YEARS

Greene's successor, Timothy Pickering, the former adjutant general and member of the Board of War, was named to the position on 5 August but did not wind up his affairs in Philadelphia and report for duty until late September; he would hold the office until 25 July 1785. Pickering operated under the reorganization plan Congress had implemented on 15 July 1780. For the first time, the duties of the quartermaster general no longer included any of the operational functions inherited with the model adopted from the British army. Pickering and all subsequent quartermasters general of the American army have been concerned only with supply. With much noise about "four years of wasteful profusion," Pickering undertook to eliminate the "superfluities" in his department and "lop them off" (Risch, *Supplying*, p. 62). But the real requirement was money to make the supply system work, and this was not available in sufficient quantities to buy food and clothing or to transport what little was received. The situation was so desperate that Washington had to furlough many troops for want of food and clothing when he went into winter quarters in December 1780, and Greene's southern army also went threadbare and hungry. These shortages, plus pay and enlistment grievances, contributed significantly to the troop mutinies of 1781.

In the spring of 1781 the New England states again came through with provisions, thanks largely to the efforts of Major General William Heath, whom Washington sent to request help. Congress then established a new system whereby private contractors, instead of the states, procured, delivered, and issued the rations. Robert Morris, the newly appointed superintendent of finance, worked out the details and raised the cash. It took the combined and cooperative efforts of the quartermaster general, the state deputy quartermasters, and the superintendent of finance to provide Washington with the means to move the Franco-American army from the Hudson Valley southward 450 miles to the James River and defeat Earl Cornwallis, a prodigious achievement accomplished between 14 August and 19 October 1781.

After the victorious Yorktown campaign, Quartermaster General Pickering took charge of all arrangements for returning American troops to the North. He also took charge of much of the captured British matériel, sending some of it to Greene in the South. He provided wood and straw for the army hospitals at Williamsburg and Hanover, Virginia; handled claims for damages and debts incurred by the allied armies in Virginia; and during the winter of 1781–1782 was involved in settling the transportation accounts arising from the campaign.

As early as 1781 Morris, whose role in restructuring and sustaining the finances of the Revolution made him increasingly prominent in matters of army supply, was responsible for purchasing clothing. Soon he was making all contracts for

supplies, and on application of the clothier general was providing funds to pay for the manufacture of clothing. Wilkinson resigned as clothier general on 27 March 1781 and was succeeded by John Moylan, a brother of Stephen.

As the year 1781 ended, Morris had taken over the duties of the commissary generals of purchases and of issues, both Blaine and Stewart relinquishing their posts without waiting for Congress to accept their resignations. Morris, by one means or another, furnished clothes for the army, "not as fully as Washington desired but nevertheless more adequately than in earlier years of the war" (Risch, *Supplying*, p. 71). Elimination of the commissary departments made it possible to consolidate many supply functions and to reduce overhead, an economy measure that Pickering heartily supported. Congress put other reforms into effect, and before the end of 1782, Pickering's staff was reduced to ten officers. On 25 July 1785 it abolished the office of the quartermaster general.

The remarkable and unsung Edward Carrington served as Greene's quartermaster general in the Southern Department. His success in equipping and feeding the troops under extraordinarily difficult circumstances earned him a lasting reputation; Alexander Hamilton nominated him to be quartermaster general of the U.S. Army in the mobilization for the Quasi-War against France in 1798.

SEE ALSO *Board of War; Carrington, Edward; Continental Currency; Greene, Nathanael; Heath, William; Manufacturing in America; Mifflin, Thomas; Morris, Robert (1734–1806); Morristown Winter Quarters, New Jersey (1 December 1779–22 June 1780); Moylan, Stephen; Pay, Bounties and Rations; Pickering, Timothy; Salt; Valley Forge Winter Quarters, Pennsylvania.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

SUTHERLAND, WILLIAM. British officer. A Lieutenant William Sutherland of the Thirty-eighth Foot Brigade took part in the expedition to Lexington and

Concord (Massachusetts), and his account is in the papers of Thomas Gage that are held by the Clements Library at Ann Arbor, Michigan. It is likely, but not certain, that this is the same William Sutherland who served as captain of the 55th Foot Brigade and adjutant and aide-de-camp to General Henry Clinton in 1778. This latter Sutherland raised and commanded a light infantry unit that may have become the cadre for the British Legion. He also saved Clinton's life at Monmouth and commanded the Corps of Invalids that reached Bermuda on 2 November 1778 to constitute the first garrison of that place during the Revolution. He may also be the unlucky commander of Paulus Hook during the operations there on 19 August 1779, and subsequently court-martialed for his conduct. To further confuse the identification, there was a Lieutenant Colonel Sutherland commanding a force comprising the Ninth and Forty-seventh Regiments in the final phase of Burgoyne's offensive in 1777.

SEE ALSO *British Legion; Burgoyne's Offensive; Invalid; Paulus Hook, New Jersey.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

SWAMP FEVER. Malaria.

SWAMP FOX. Francis Marion.

SEE ALSO *Marion, Francis.*

SWAN SHOT. Large shot, but smaller than buck-shot, used for hunting large fowl and small game and occasionally used in battle.

Mark M. Boatner

SWIFT, HEMAN. Continental officer. Connecticut. Heman Swift enlisted as a private in the Fourth Connecticut Provincial Regiment in September 1755, was a corporal in the militia sent to reinforce Fort William Henry when it was besieged by the French in August 1757, and was appointed a lieutenant in the provincial regiments for the three years of Connecticut's maximum effort during the final French and Indian war (1758–1760). He was elected a deputy to the General Assembly from Cornwall, in the far northwest corner of Connecticut, in the early 1770s. In June 1776, the Assembly appointed him colonel of a Connecticut state regiment, one of two such regiments it authorized to reinforce the Northern Department. The regiments were stationed at Fort Ticonderoga and came home in November. He became colonel of the Seventh Connecticut Regiment in the Continental Army on 1 January 1777 and served with it as part of the main army throughout the war. On the consolidation of the Connecticut Line on 1 January 1781, he was transferred to command the Second Connecticut Regiment. On 28 September 1781 he was sent from the Hudson Highlands with 300 infantry and some light artillery to Ramapo, New Jersey, to support the militia against a possible British raid from Staten Island. In June 1783 he was retained as colonel of the last consolidated Connecticut regiment. On 30 September, he was breveted brigadier general and in December 1783 retired from the army.

SEE ALSO *Fort William Henry (Fort George), New York; Hudson River and the Highlands.*

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TACTICS AND MANEUVERS.

Revolutionary-era battle tactics depended largely on disciplined troops maneuvering in compact formations that were able to deploy quickly from column into line and deliver massed volleys of musketry or execute a bayonet charge. Artillery supported infantry formations, occasionally delivering a massed cannonade in field battles or serving in its classic siege role of destroying enemy fortifications and the will to resist. Cavalry operated only in small bodies, occasionally as shock troops but more often in reconnaissance and the pursuit of a demoralized enemy.

Building on experiences in the Seven Years' War in Europe and America, light troops and innovative battle formations were increasingly used, and commanders gained invaluable experience with both. The early British adoption in 1776 of a two-rank, open-order line of battle for all infantry units was in response to the broken, wooded North American terrain and was made possible by British troop discipline, small numbers of opposing cavalry, and American inexperience. Later in the war, notably at Cowpens, the drawbacks of such loose formations were made apparent when faced and occasionally overthrown by veteran Continental regiments.

On 21 September 1777, Brigadier General Thomas Conway described problems poorly trained Continental troops experienced at the Battle of Brandywine that year: "Troops of this Army . . . Appear to Manoeuvre upon false principles . . . I Could not Discover . . . the Least notion of displaying Columns & forming [line] briskly upon all Emergencies" (Continental Congress, *Papers*, reel 178, p. 71). These deficiencies were rectified with the armywide adoption in the spring of 1778 of Major General Friedrich

Wilhelm de Steuben's uniform system of maneuver. Steuben's system introduced standard marching rates and methods of changing formation, simplifying command and control, and improving army cohesion. These innovations were set within a closely monitored training program that ensured minimum variation in interpreting the new instructions. The first real combat test came at the Battle of Monmouth on 28 June 1778, where the newly trained troops performed well. The fact that much of the burden was successfully borne by provisional battalions of picked men from different regiments, sometimes operating under unfamiliar officers, is a tribute to the efficacy of Steuben's work.

Both armies' tactical systems were based on the latest European military practice, including theories concerning the primacy of columns over lines (or vice versa) when attacking. Both formations were used in line of battle during the war, with linear formations preferred for forward regiments, while supporting units remained in easily maneuvered columns ready to deploy when needed.

Irregular warfare played a part, too. Early on, General George Washington's forces often relied on hit-and-run tactics. A French volunteer said of the American army in 1777, "The maneuver that it executes best . . . A regiment places itself behind some . . . bushes and waits, well hidden, for the enemy. They stick their muskets through the bushes, take careful aim, fire, and fall back . . . a quarter of a league. . . . If the enemy appears, they repeat the same maneuver several times" (Idzerda, ed., *Lafayette*, 1, p. 81). The practice continued into 1778, when Brigadier General William Maxwell noted on 19 June, "The Enemy . . . is coming on the Road to EvesHam. They got a full fire from Captain Ross [Third New Jersey] this

morning with 50 men which threw them into a great confusion. He came off some distance & Post[ed] them to give them More in a nother place" (*Presidential Papers Microfilm*, series 4, reel 50).

Militia units fought in line of battle, but they were better known for less formal warfare. Hessian Captain Johann Ewald asked,

What can you do to those small bands who have learned to fight separate, who know how to use any molehill for their protection, and who, when attacked, run back as fast as they will approach you again . . .? Never have I seen these maneuvers carried out better than by the American militia, especially that . . . of Jersey. If you were forced to retreat through these people you could be certain of having them constantly around you. (*Treatise*, p. 115)

SEE ALSO *Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von*.

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John U. Rees

TALLMADGE, BENJAMIN, JR. (1754–1835). Continental officer, manager of Washington's secret service. Born in Brookhaven, New York, on 25 February 1754, Tallmadge graduated from Yale in 1773 and became superintendent of the high school at Wethersfield, Connecticut. He left this post to fight in the Revolution, being made lieutenant and adjutant in Chester's Connecticut State Regiment on 20 June 1776, captain on 14 December 1776, and major on 7 April 1777 and was brevetted lieutenant colonel on 30 September 1783. He saw action at Long Island, White Plains, Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth. For his raid to Fort George, Long Island, on 21–23 November 1780, he was commended by Washington and Congress. During the period 1778–1783, after the cessation of major military operations in the North, Tallmadge was primarily

occupied with the management of Washington's secret service. His initiative after the capture of "John Anderson" led to the exposure of Arnold's treason. He was in charge of John André while the latter was a prisoner. He developed a deep affection for André and found his execution deeply troubling.

After the war Tallmadge was a businessman in Litchfield, Connecticut. In 1800 he was elected as a Federalist to Congress and served until 1817. He died in Litchfield on 7 March 1835.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason; Fort George, Long Island, New York*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

TAPPAN MASSACRE, NEW JERSEY.

28 September 1778. Once Admiral Howe's fleet returned from ending the threat from d'Estaing's squadron, Major General Henry Clinton could risk sending large foraging parties to sweep through Westchester County and northern New Jersey. On the night of 21–22 September Major General Charles Cornwallis crossed to Bergen on the west side of the Hudson with some 5,000 men (Wilhelm Knyphausen would start a similar operation on the east side with 3,000 on 30 September). As Cornwallis established a forward base on the site of Fort Lee, Washington augmented the screening forces and told Major General Anthony Wayne to try and limit the depredations. Wayne posted the New Jersey militia of General William Winds at New Tappan while the Third Continental Light Dragoons of Colonel George Baylor occupied Old Tappan, two and a half miles away. Cornwallis aggressively sought ways to cut off and annihilate small parties and focused on Tappan, where he thought about seven hundred militia lay. During the night of 27–28 September he sent out two columns. Cornwallis himself led the right; Major General Charles "No-flint" Grey of Paoli the left. Deserters warned Winds in time to pull back, but Grey learned that Baylor was nearby and switched objectives. After a successful approach under cover of darkness, undoubtedly with the assistance of Loyalist guides, Grey's men silenced a twelve-man guard and surrounded three barns in which about 120 troopers slept. The Second Light Infantry Battalion charged in with the bayonet and smashed the regiment as a fighting force without firing a shot. Even

Kemble felt that the British troops got out of control and killed men trying to surrender.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Baylor lost about 120 men, of whom Grey killed about 50 and captured about 50. Baylor was among the prisoners. Major Alexander Clough and seven other officers were mortally wounded.

SIGNIFICANCE

The operation had no impact on operations other than forcing Washington to send the survivors back to Virginia under Lieutenant Colonel William Washington to recover, and thus made a key player available for later campaigns in the south. But the “massacre” did inflame the Patriots. More important, Baylor’s failure to provide adequate security did not obscure a fundamental weakness in using mounted units in such missions without giving them infantry support. Washington learned this lesson: in January 1781 the light dragoon regiments converted into combined arms legions.

SEE ALSO *Paoli, Pennsylvania*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

TAPPAN SEA. 12–18 July 1776. The Tappan Sea, now called Tappan Zee, is the widest stretch of the Hudson River, to the north of Manhattan. On 12 July, 10 days after the British troop build-up started on Staten Island, the warships *Phoenix* (forty guns) and *Rose* (twenty guns), along with a schooner and two tenders, ran the American batteries that were supposed to be guarding the entrance to the Hudson and sailed forty miles upstream to anchor, virtually unscathed, in the Tappan Sea. On 3 August Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Tupper led five small boats in a gallant but unsuccessful attack against the flotilla. On 16 August an attack by fire rafts also failed, although the Phoenix was seriously threatened and the British commander was so alarmed by this attempt

that he withdrew. Rerunning the gauntlet, he rejoined the fleet on 18 July.

This naval demonstration demoralized the Americans, showing that British ships could move at will against the flanks and rear of the main army in and around New York City. Commander in Chief George Washington and his generals were further bewildered as to Howe’s strategy—where would he move from Staten Island? As for the immediate purpose of the naval demonstration, other than testing American defenses, and preparing for a link-up with General John Burgoyne’s expected advance from Canada, Washington supposed that it was to cut the flow of American supplies by water and land along the Hudson, or to supply arms to Loyalists in the region.

One serious aspect of the affair was the ludicrously poor performance of many American troops. Not more than half the artillerymen went to their guns, and these scored only a few insignificant hits, although they fired almost 200 shots at close range. Several men were killed or wounded because they carelessly failed to sponge their guns, while hundreds of troops neglected their duties to play spectator.

SEE ALSO *New York Campaign*.

revised by Barnet Schecter

TAR AND FEATHERS. A form of punishment in which the victim is coated with molten pitch or tar and then covered with feathers. Although it was an official punishment in England as early as the twelfth century, it is associated in America with mob action. The Sons of Liberty used the punishment against Loyalists and crown officials; a Boston rebel got the treatment in 1755. In the opening scenes of the historical novel *Oliver Wiswell* (1940), Kenneth Roberts gives a vivid and horrible picture of a man tarred, feathered, and ridden on a rail.

Mark M. Boatner

TARLETON, BANASTRE. (1754–1833). Baronet, British army officer and politician. Tarleton, born in Liverpool on 21 August 1754, was the son of a merchant and ship owner in the sugar and slave trades who became mayor of the city in 1764. Banastre entered the Middle Temple, a leading London law school, in April 1770 and matriculated at University College, Oxford, in November 1771. It seems likely that he was destined for a

legal career in conjunction with the family business. When his father died in 1773, however, he inherited £5,000 and proceeded to gamble it away. On 20 April 1775, to evade ruin he bought, with his mother's assistance, a cornetcy in the First Dragoon Guards. After training he volunteered for service in America, reaching Cape Fear with Charles Cornwallis's troops on 3 May 1776.

Tarleton took part in the unsuccessful Charleston Expedition before serving in New York. Attached to the Sixteenth Light Dragoons when they arrived from Britain, he took part in the surprise attack that captured rebel general Charles Lee at Basking Ridge, New Jersey, on 13 December 1776. He was promoted captain in January 1777 and served in the Pennsylvania campaign. On 8 January 1778 he was made captain in the Seventy-ninth Foot but continued to make his mark as a daring and energetic cavalry commander. He also acquired a reputation for ruthlessness toward suspected civilian rebels, an attitude apparently sharpened by the acute supply difficulties faced by the British army in America. As he wrote to John André on 19 February 1779, "Coolness Apathy & Civil Law will never supply Hussars with Horses." To what extent he acted on his words is another matter.

Later in the year he became the lieutenant colonel commandant of Cathcart's Legion, soon renamed the British Legion, a Loyalist cavalry and mounted infantry formation which often operated with the Seventeenth Dragoons. On 2 July 1779 he led 360 cavalry against Poundridge, New York, where he failed to capture Major Ebenezer Lockwood. Sent south with Clinton's Charleston expedition in 1780, on 23 March his Legion routed a body of rebel militia and dragoons and captured some badly needed horses. Three days later he was worsted in a skirmish around Rutledge's Plantation, which almost led to Clinton's capture; but his greatest triumphs were yet to come. On 14 April Tarleton took Monck's Corner on the Cooper River, thus completing the isolation of Benjamin Lincoln's army in Charleston. Charleston surrendered on 12 May and with it Lincoln's entire force. On 6 May he surprised a rebel force at Lenud's Ferry on the Santee River, and on 29 May he annihilated a rebel force twice the size of his own at Waxhaws.

Here there occurred an incident that seemed to confirm Tarleton's reputation as a ruthless commander. In the final charge, Tarleton cut down an American officer as he struggled to raise a white flag. At that moment Tarleton's horse was shot from under him and he went down. Seeing their commander fall, his soldiers went berserk, killing every rebel they could reach until they were brought back under control. Although it better illustrated the Legion's brittle discipline than any personal vindictiveness by Tarleton, rebel propaganda quickly branded him "Bloody Tarleton" and coined the term "Tarleton's quarter." Though no more justified than the opprobrium flung

under similar circumstances at Charles "No-flint" Grey, the story may have blackened the British cause in the eyes of southern civilians, and was certainly used to justify American outrages later on.

At Camden, South Carolina, on 16 August he was loosed to drive Thomas Gage's broken army from the battlefield, after which Cornwallis sent him in pursuit of Thomas Sumter. Two days later, Tarleton surprised and destroyed his quarry at Fishing Creek, North Carolina. Although Sumter himself escaped, 150 Americans were killed, 300 taken, and numerous British prisoners and supply wagons recaptured.

It is a measure of Tarleton's leadership that the Legion was far less successful when, as at Williamson's Plantation on 12 July, he was not in direct command. Soon after Fishing Creek he fell seriously ill with a fever and in subsequent actions at Wahab's Plantation (21 September) and Charlotte (26 September), the Legion did badly. Tarleton's illness was also partly responsible for Cornwallis's failure to send help to Patrick Ferguson in time to prevent the disaster at Kings Mountain, South Carolina, on 7 October. Tarleton rose from his sickbed to track Francis Marion through the lower Peedee swamps; but before he could catch him, Cornwallis recalled him to deal with Sumter, who was threatening Ninety Six, South Carolina. At Blackstocks on 20 November 1780 Tarleton, with only 270 men engaged, fought 1,000 rebels to a standstill, badly wounded Sumter, and deflected the threat to Ninety Six. Despite his heavy losses, it was a striking success.

Tarleton's reputation as a light cavalry and counter-partisan leader now stood very high. However, he turned out to be less successful as a conventional battlefield commander, leading a balanced force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery against Daniel Morgan at Cowpens on 17 January 1781. Tarleton launched a well-conceived attack which nearly succeeded. However, Morgan had chosen a position that forced his shaky militia to stand and fight, and had deployed his riflemen in depth to slow down the British advance. When the attacking troops were exhausted he counterattacked, the British force broke, and two-thirds were killed or taken. Tarleton rallied some dragoons, burned his baggage, and fought a personal duel with William Washington before escaping with about 300 men. His Legion, lacking his personal direction, had done badly, and his name for generalship was severely damaged. Although Cornwallis defended his performance, he never gave Tarleton another independent command, and their earlier free and easy relations came to an end. However, that was not the end of Tarleton's career, reputation, or successes.

At Tarrant's Tavern on 1 February 1781, he surprised and dispersed a numerically superior force so successfully that few militia turned out against Cornwallis as he

marched deeper into North Carolina. He provided vigorous support for the infantry Cornwallis sent to surprise Greene's advance guard at Wetzell's Mills on 6 March. Nine days later at Guilford Courthouse, he fought a heavy advance guard action and suffered a wound that later cost him two fingers. At the end of the day he led his cavalry against the American rear guard and was wounded again. He marched into Virginia with Cornwallis and on 4 June raided on Charlottesville, capturing seven members of the legislature, narrowly missing Thomas Jefferson himself, and destroyed a thousand muskets and four hundred barrels of gunpowder. From 9 to 24 July he carried out a long-range raid against enemy stores, covering over two hundred miles, outrunning all pursuit and news of his position. It was a brilliant feat, although results were relatively insignificant compared with his losses in skirmishes and from the heat. During the final stages of the campaign, he joined Thomas Dundas at Gloucester Point across the river from Yorktown, where on 3 October he was pinned under his fallen horse and almost taken by advancing French cavalry. When Cornwallis surrendered two weeks later, Tarleton became a prisoner of war.

Returning home on parole in January 1782, Tarleton found himself a national hero. Befriended by the Prince of Wales and painted in Legion uniform by Sir Joshua Reynolds and Thomas Gainsborough, the foremost portrait painters of the day, he began a five-year-long affair with Perdita (Mrs. Mary Robinson), an actress, poet, and ex-mistress of the prince. He lived extravagantly and gambled heavily. In 1787, embroiled in a dispute about his conduct at Cowpens, he published his *History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America* (1787), a usefully detailed but self-serving account which attacked Cornwallis. It may have also been intended to further his political ambitions. In 1790, following a narrow defeat in 1784, he became the Foxite member of Parliament for Liverpool. In Parliament he spoke on military matters and, reflecting his constituents' concerns, in defense of the slave trade. He became a major general in 1794, lieutenant general in 1801, and full general in 1812, but, apart from a brief assignment in Portugal in 1798, he never held another active command. He married Priscilla Susan Bertie in 1798 and became a baronet in 1816. He died in Hertfordshire on 23 January 1833.

Tarleton was probably the finest commander of light cavalry on either side in the War of American Independence. Such success so young probably went to his head and his reputation for vanity was probably well earned. His own utterances and the criticisms of fellow officers give some colour to accusations of ruthless brutality. However, the direct evidence against him is thin and should be understood in the context of the brutalising partisan war, in which both sides committed outrages.

The vilification of "Bloody Tarleton" probably owes more to his military skills than to his vices.

SEE ALSO *Blackstock's, South Carolina; British Legion; Camden Campaign; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Cowpens, South Carolina; Fishing Creek, North Carolina; Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Lee, Charles (1731–1782); Lenud's Ferry, South Carolina; Monck's Corner, South Carolina; Morgan, Daniel; Tarleton's Quarter; Tarleton's Virginia Raid of 9–24 July 1781; Tarrant's Tavern, North Carolina; Wahab's Plantation, North Carolina; Washington, William; Waxhaws, South Carolina; Wetzell's Mills, North Carolina; Williamson's Plantation, South Carolina.*

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revised by John Oliphant

TARLETON'S LEGION **SEE** *British Legion*.

TARLETON'S QUARTER. This cynical term for "no quarter" was coined after Tarleton's victory at the Waxhaws in South Carolina on 29 May 1780.

SEE ALSO *Waxhaws, South Carolina.*

Mark M. Boatner

TARLETON'S VIRGINIA RAID OF 9–24 JULY 1781. Intent on destroying the rebels' public and private stores, Cornwallis ordered Tarleton to ride through Prince Edward Court House to New London, Virginia, more than 150 miles west of Cornwallis' new base at Suffolk on the south side of the James River. Tarleton left Cobham (opposite Jamestown Island) on 9 July and rode through Petersburg, Amelia Court House, Prince Edward Court House, Charlotte, New London, and Bedford. Here he camped in the rich grasslands at the foot of the Blue Ridge Mountains for two

days and collected some of the finest horses in America. Task forces of this type were too strong to be opposed by the Virginia militia which by this point in the war lacked adequate arms. But Lafayette sent Wayne into Amelia County with his Pennsylvania Continentals to try to intercept Tarleton on his return. Morgan was assembling a second strong force at Goode's Bridge, near Petersburg, for the same purpose. Learning of this threat, Tarleton burned his three light wagons and returned by a more southerly route through Lunenburg County. Despite intense July heat, which limited his movement to the early morning and late afternoon, Tarleton covered 30 or 40 miles a day and outran all news of his location; he was never in danger. On 24 July he returned to Suffolk, having covered 400 miles in 15 days. It was a remarkable performance, but Tarleton noted that:

The stores destroyed, either of a public or private nature, were not in quantity or value equivalent to the damage sustained in the skirmishes on the route, and the loss of men and horses by the excessive heat of the climate.

SEE ALSO *Virginia Military Operations*.

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

TARRANT, CAESAR. (c. 1740–1797). Patriot seaman. Born a slave in Virginia around 1740, Caesar took the last name of his owner, Carter Tarrant. Acquiring the unusual skill of river pilot, a knowledge generally denied to slaves for fear that they would use it to escape, Tarrant saw the American Revolution as a chance to gain his freedom. Though Virginia's royal governor, Lord Dunmore, promised freedom to slaves who joined his forces, Tarrant offered his skills to the Patriots and was named a pilot in the Virginia navy in 1775. Over the next three years he guided ships through the state's coastal waters and became a trusted pilot. In 1777 a small fleet under the command of Commodore Richard Taylor gave battle to the *Lord Howe*. Piloting the *Patriot*, Tarrant rammed it into the larger British ship. In the ensuing battle, Tarrant acted with great courage, earning his captain's praise. He behaved similarly in a number of other encounters with the British, for which the Americans rewarded him by returning him to slavery. In 1789, five years after the death of Carter Tarrant, the Virginia assembly finally corrected this injustice by granting Tarrant his freedom, paying Mary Tarrant recompense. Tarrant devoted the rest of his life to attempting to purchase his family's freedom, buying his wife and one daughter in 1793 but leaving two other children enslaved. He clearly earned the respect of his fellow pilots, who petitioned the

assembly in 1791 to grant qualified free blacks like Tarrant pilot licenses. He died in Hampton, Virginia, in 1797.

SEE ALSO *African Americans in the Revolution*.

Michael Bellesiles

TARRANT, SARAH SEE *Salem, Massachusetts*.

TARRANT'S TAVERN, NORTH CAROLINA. 1 February 1781. After Cornwallis crossed the Catawba River at Cowan's Ford, Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, who had already crossed at Beattie's Ford, moved swiftly to this place, about ten miles from the river, to strike a body of some two hundred North Carolina militia assembling there. Although outnumbered, Tarleton risked an attack. Stung by their commander's taunt to "Remember the Cowpens," Tarleton's dragoons charged and routed the militia, whose muskets were mostly soaked by the rain and inoperable. Tarleton doubled the number of Patriot militia in his account of the battle and exaggerated its casualties, but the victory was definitely quick and easy, the Patriots losing ten dead without firing a shot. The North Carolina militia was dispersed and demoralized by its defeat. What Tarleton did not know was that he had narrowly missed capturing General Nathanael Greene in his pursuit immediately after the action.

SEE ALSO *Torrence's Tavern, North Carolina*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

TAXATION, EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL. Before 1765, Americans had not clearly thought through an answer to the question of Parliament's right to levy taxes on the colonies. There was general agreement that Parliament had the right to regulate trade, a consequence of which might be the raising of a revenue through customs duties on imports. The imperial government's attempt to tax Americans directly with the Stamp Act forced the colonists to clarify their thinking. In the process, a significant number of them came to believe that Parliament did not have the right to lay any tax on Americans, even to regulate trade. However, in order to facilitate repeal of the Stamp Act by

Parliament, several influential individuals on both sides of the Atlantic—including William Pitt and Benjamin Franklin—introduced the idea that the colonists objected only to internal taxes, such as those prescribed by the Stamp Act, but conceded Parliament’s right to raise a revenue through trade regulation. The stance was disingenuous at best, since most Americans made no distinction between external and internal taxes, and it introduced confusion into both policy decisions at the time and accounts of later historians. Charles Townshend, chancellor of the exchequer, cleverly constructed his revenue act in 1767 to avoid levying internal taxes, thereby “honoring” the colonists’ distinction while also taking advantage of their failure to adopt a strong position prior to 1765 against all forms of parliamentary taxation. The purpose of the Massachusetts Circular Letter was to organize American resistance to all forms of parliamentary taxation, whether external or internal.

SEE ALSO *Declaratory Act; Massachusetts Circular Letter; Stamp Act; Townshend Revenue Act; Townshend, Charles.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION IS TYRANNY. There was no disagreement in Britain or America about the basic truth of this idea, first used by John Hampden in 1637 against Charles I, but by the middle of the eighteenth century “representation” had come to mean different things on opposite sides of the Atlantic. In theory, Parliament had the right to levy taxes in Britain because its members acted in the name and for the interest of the entire realm. Every Englishman was “virtually” represented in Parliament, whether or not he had actually participated in choosing its members. After the final French and Indian War, imperial officials who wanted to increase Britain’s control over its colonies argued that the interests of the American colonists were represented in Parliament in the same way, and that Parliament thus had the right to levy taxes on the colonists to support the greater good of the whole empire.

American colonists generally rejected the notion of “virtual representation.” (The most notable argument was put forward by Daniel Dulany, an attorney from Maryland.) Their view of representation was based on the idea that delegates elected by voters to the local legislative assembly should “represent” the concerns of their constituents in a particular geographic locality. Since no men elected in North America sat in Parliament, that body could not fairly represent the colonists and thus could not levy taxes on people it did not represent.

Parliament had levied customs duties on parts of American trade before 1764, but that form of taxation had not become a widespread grievance because the duties were relatively easy to evade. In that year, however, imperial officials signaled that they were going to enforce a revised customs schedule and intended to levy a direct stamp tax on the colonists. These decisions generated an unprecedented level of resentment in the colonies, as much because Parliament was unilaterally changing the existing system as because of the tax itself. Many Americans concluded that taxing them in these ways was unconstitutional and “tyrannical.” The slogan, “Taxation without representation is tyranny,” summarized these beliefs, and variations on it became a powerful means of spreading the patriot message in 1764–1765. (John Adams remembered that James Otis had used the phrase in his famous oration against the writs of assistance on 24 February 1761, but Adams’s memory was not always accurate.)

SEE ALSO *Dulany, Daniel.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

TAYLOR, GEORGE. (1716?–1781). Signer. Ireland-Pennsylvania. What is reasonably certain about Taylor’s early life is that he settled in East Nantmeal, Pennsylvania, in 1736, became clerk in an iron works, rose to the position of manager, and in 1742 married his boss’s widow, whose legacy hastened his success. Around 1754 he moved to Durham, Pennsylvania, opened a successful ironworks, and settled in Easton, Pennsylvania, in 1764, being elected that year to the first of five one-year terms in the provincial assembly. He became a leader of the proprietary party, opposing Franklin and those who favored crown rule. He was a member of the local committee to choose delegates for the Stamp Act Congress, and he later was chairman of the Northampton County meeting to protest the Boston Port Bill in 1774. After being named to the county committee of correspondence, in July 1775 he became colonel of the Third Battalion of the Bucks County militia, and on 20 July 1776 he became

a delegate to the Continental Congress when it was decided to replace the representatives who refused to sign the Declaration of Independence. He became a Signer on 2 August but resigned from Congress in March 1777 having taken no other part in the business of Congress other than to treat with the Susquehanna Indians in January 1777 at the Easton conference. Nor did he take any active part as a militia officer, although he retained the title of colonel.

He sat briefly in the Supreme Executive Council of his state in 1777 but retired for ill health after six weeks. He spent the next several years overseeing the production of cannonballs at his Durham foundry and another in Greenwich, New Jersey. He died in Durham on 23 February 1781, leaving behind a number of illegitimate children.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

TEA ACT. 10 May 1773. Colonial Americans drank lots of tea. From 1764 through 1768, exports of tea from England to the colonies averaged nearly 565,000 pounds a year. But, with the adoption of nonimportation by the colonies, that average dropped to less than 215,000 pounds a year from 1769 to 1772. To save the corrupt and mismanaged East India Company from bankruptcy, Parliament authorized it to send half a million pounds of tea to America for sale with payment of only the nominal 3 pence a pound in American duty, and with reimbursement for the British duty previously paid. This meant that East India Company tea could undersell smuggled Dutch tea as well as legally imported tea. Consignees were designated in New York, Charleston, Philadelphia, and Boston to receive the shipment.

The Philadelphia consignees were forced to resign by a committee that had been appointed for this purpose by a mass meeting on 16 October 1773. The New York consignees resigned after harbor pilots were warned not to board the tea ships and the Sons of Liberty branded tea importers as enemies of America. The Charleston tea ship arrived on 2 December, but the consignees were forced to resign the next day, and the tea was impounded after the lapse of the prescribed twenty-day waiting period. (In July 1776 it was auctioned by the Revolutionary government.)

In Boston, a town meeting on 5 and 6 November endorsed the Philadelphia resolves, but the consignees would not resign. Local radicals decided to destroy the tea, which they accomplished at the Boston Tea Party on 16 December 1773.

SEE ALSO *Boston Tea Party; Nonimportation.*

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TEARCOAT SWAMP, SOUTH CAROLINA.

25 October 1780. Also known as Tarcote and Tarcot Swamp. With instructions from General Horatio Gates to continue his harassment of the enemy's rear, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Marion established a base at Port's Ferry. On 24 October he learned that Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Tynes was assembling Loyalist militia near Tearcoat Swamp, in the vicinity of where U.S. Highway 301 now crosses Black River. Marion was able to arm his 150 recruits with British firearms he had seized from the Loyalists at Nelson's Ferry. Marching quickly, Marion's force surprised the Loyalists shortly after midnight. Tynes apparently failed to post sentries, allowing the rebels to rush into the Loyalist camp firing their weapons. They received no return fire and routed the Loyalists, who lost 3 dead, 14 wounded, 23 prisoners, 80 good horses captured with their bridles, saddles, and blankets, and 80 new British muskets. More important, however, Loyalist activities in the area of the Santee and Pee Dee Rivers of South Carolina were completely squelched, and many Loyalists joined Marion.

SEE ALSO *Marion, Francis; Port's Ferry, Pee Dee River, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

TEISSÈDRE DE FLEURY, FRANÇOIS LOUIS.

(1749–before 1814). (Viscomte de.) French volunteer. Born at Saint-Hippolyte, Aveyron, he was a volunteer in the infantry regiment of Roergue starting 15 May 1768, had become a *sous lieutenant* by August, and was promoted to *sous aide major* on 5 February 1772. He was made First Lieutenant in 1777 and left for America with Tronson du Coudray. When Congress refused to employ Coudray and his officers, Fleury joined the army as a volunteer. In the affair of Piscataway, New Jersey, on 10 May 1777, he

distinguished himself, and Congress commissioned him captain of engineers on 22 May.

On 3 October 1777, Washington appointed Fleury brigade major to Pulaski with the comment that he was “to be respected as such.” Serving at Fort Mifflin as an engineer, he came into conflict with the fort’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Smith, whom Washington eventually ordered “to make the best arrangement.” Because of what Congress termed his “disinterested gallantry,” they breveted Fleury a lieutenant colonel on 26 November. During January and February 1778, Congress had hoped he would set fire to British shipping on the Delaware River, but he was not able to carry out his project. This plan was interrupted by his desire to join Lafayette for the expedition to Canada; Fleury had sought to command a corps of French Canadians there, but Lafayette’s Canadian campaign was cancelled later in February. In April 1778, in the absence of an army assignment, Washington sent Fleury temporarily as subinspector under Steuben to maneuver and discipline the troops of Brigadier General Smallwood. In June he was attached to General Lee’s division but the following month was sent as Washington’s representative with Hamilton to Estaing in Newport. As Fleury’s furlough from the French army was running out, he requested Congress on 29 November to intercede directly with French minister Gérard, but Washington opposed congressional intervention with foreign powers. Washington again ordered Fleury to assist in battalion training in late April 1779.

Fleury’s performance in the attack on Stony Point on 16 July 1779 eclipsed his other achievements. He was the first to enter and took its flag. When he requested the flag from Congress, it balked and voted him one of eight congressional medals bestowed during the nine years of the war. Hamilton even suggested that he become secretary to La Luzerne. Congress granted him leave on 27 September to return to France and commended him further on 1 October 1779, which caused him to delay his plans and to consider joining Estaing in South Carolina. He left for France shortly afterward. In response to a recommendation from Vergennes, he was promoted on 19 March 1780 to major in the Saintonge Regiment and in 1781 was made a chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis. Rushing to join his regiment, he asked Franklin to send the medal to his father and returned under Rochambeau to America. On 22 May 1780 Congress extended his leave to enable him to serve with the French forces, but in January 1781 it suspended his pay and benefits during his absence from the American army. He returned as a major in the Saintonge regiment of Rochambeau’s army and distinguished himself at the siege of Yorktown. In October 1782 Rochambeau put Fleury in command of a French force stationed in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to repulse a possible British attack. Following his return to France in June 1783, Franklin presented him with a duplicate medal in gold on 15 August 1783.

On 16 January 1784, Fleury was appointed colonel of the Pondichéry Regiment and made commandant of Ile-de-France and Ile-de-Bourbon in 1785. In April 1790 he returned to France and on 30 June 1791 was promoted to *maréchal de camp*. On 30 April 1792 he was wounded in the retreat from Mons when he tried to rally the rear guard. His ill health forced his resignation on 24 June 1792, and he retired to Rebais. In 1799 he was living in Grenoble and appears to have died in Paris sometime before 1814.

SEE ALSO *Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d’; Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania; Gérard, Conrad Alexandre; Hamilton, Alexander; La Luzerne, Anne-César de; Lee, Charles (1731–1782); Medals; Smallwood, William; Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von; Stony Point, New York.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

TEMPLE, JOHN. (1732–1798). British official. Born in Boston in 1732, Temple went to London in 1761 in search of preferment. Aided by family connections, which included Earl Temple and future prime minister George Grenville, he was named lieutenant governor of New Hampshire and surveyor general of customs. Temple earned the approval of colonial merchants for his fair implementation of the tax laws; his not very secret opposition to the Stamp Act; and his bitter dispute with the Massachusetts governor, Francis Bernard, whom he accused of fraud. In 1767 he further cemented his warm relations with Boston Patriots by marrying Elizabeth Bowdoin, daughter of James Bowdoin. Appointed to the Board of Customs that same year, Temple was the only one of the five commissioners not driven out of Boston by an angry crowd. Using Temple's local approval against him, Governor Bernard succeeded in getting Temple fired.

Back in England in 1771, Temple—unable to regain his position—turned to extortion, threatening to publish his correspondence unless new employment was found for him. Lord North gave in, making Temple surveyor general of customs for England. The publication of Governor Thomas Hutchinson's letters in 1772 cast suspicion on Temple as the source of these documents, leading to a duel with William Whately in which the latter was wounded. Temple again lost his position, even after Benjamin Franklin admitted that he had leaked the letters. In 1778 Lord North sent Temple to Boston as a gesture towards reconciliation with the Patriots, but Congress refused to listen to him, and he returned to England the following year. In 1785 he was named the first British consul to the United States. He died in New York City on 17 November 1798.

SEE ALSO *Hutchinson Letters Affair*.

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Michael Bellesiles

TERNAY, CHARLES LOUIS D'ARSAC, CHEVALIER DE. (1722–1780). French admiral. Of an old Breton family with a naval tradition, he entered the French naval school in 1738. After taking part in the unsuccessful defense of Louisburg in 1757, he commanded a division of gunboats on the St. Lawrence. Promoted to captain, he participated in a raid that captured Saint John, New Brunswick, on 2 June 1762. After the peace of 1763 he served on the Leeward Islands station and later was promoted to brigadier general of the naval forces. In 1772 he retired as *chef d'escadre* and was

appointed governor general of the island of Bourbon. He left this post in 1779 to reenter the active service.

Early in 1780 he organized the fleet that was to escort the expeditionary force of the comte de Rochambeau to America. With eight ships of the line, two frigates, and two *bomb-gallions*, he arrived off Newport on 10 July 1780, just three days before a British fleet under Admiral Thomas Graves arrived off Sandy Hook to give the British an advantage of thirteen more powerful ships of the line against Ternay's eight. (One of Ternay's ships was being used as a transport.) Lafayette as Washington's representative met with Ternay and Rochambeau on 30 July. While Ternay expressed a willingness to take naval action when there was naval superiority, he and Rochambeau agreed that without it, no action would occur. That was in line with their instructions. As a senior officer, however, Ternay took a quick dislike to the opinions of the young Lafayette. The British eventually bottled up Ternay's fleet in Newport. The Americans, on the other hand, were bitterly disappointed to find that they had to spend an inactive season because the French could not achieve the all-important naval superiority. Ternay died on 15 December 1780 in Newport of a fever. Upon reflection after Ternay's death, Lafayette wrote that "he was ill-tempered and stubborn, but firm, clear-sighted, and intelligent, and all things considered, his death is a loss to us." Following Ternay's death, the French fleet was commanded by Destouches until the arrival of Barras in May 1781.

SEE ALSO *Graves, Thomas; Lafayette, Marquis de; Rochambeau, Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de*.

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TEST OATH. To force a declaration of principles from those who were indifferent or were secret enemies of the Revolution, state legislatures enacted "test" laws. The

oath demanded by these laws varied in the different colonies that adopted the laws, but in general they prescribed loyalty to the Patriot cause, disloyalty to the British government, and a promise not to aid and abet the enemy. In the test acts passed before the Declaration of Independence, “the oath of abjuration and allegiance was omitted” (Van Tyne, p. 131). The British offered various inducements to Americans to swear an oath of allegiance. These included the Peace Commission of the Howes and their offer of 30 November 1776 and the efforts of Patrick Ferguson during the Kings Mountain campaign.

SEE ALSO *Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Peace Commission of the Howes.*

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Mark M. Boatner

THACHER, JAMES. (1754–1844). Continental surgeon and diarist. Massachusetts. James Thacher was the son of a poor farmer who had the good fortune to be apprenticed at the age of sixteen to Abner Hersey, the leading physician in Thacher’s hometown of Barnstable, where he received five years of arduous training. When the war began, Thacher applied to serve in the provincial hospital at Cambridge, was accepted by the medical examiners on 10 July and started his duties five days later. In an account of the examination of another candidate he recorded in his *Military Journal*, Thacher reported that the candidate, asked how he would induce a sweat in a patient to remedy rheumatism, replied that “I would have him examined by a medical committee.”

In February 1776 Thacher was named surgeon’s mate of Colonel Asa Whitcomb’s Sixth Continental Infantry (Massachusetts), then recruiting at its camp on Prospect Hill. He marched with the regiment to Canada and took part in the retreat from Ticonderoga. On 1 April 1777 he was assigned as surgeon’s mate to the General Hospital at Albany but went with the regiment when it moved to West Point. He returned to the field as surgeon of the First Virginia State Regiment on 10 November 1778 and spent the winter in quarters at Middlebrook, New Jersey. He transferred in June 1779 to Colonel Henry Jackson’s Additional Continental Regiment, then stationed in Providence, Rhode Island, and marched with it to Boston, where it embarked on transports to reinforce the Penobscot expedition. Delayed by contrary winds, the transports put into Portsmouth, New Hampshire, thereby

enabling the regiment to escape capture at Penobscot. He spent the arduous winter of 1779–1780 in New Jersey and witnessed the execution of Major John André on 1 October 1780. When his regiment (designated the Sixteenth Massachusetts beginning 23 July 1780) was absorbed in the reduction of the Massachusetts Line on 1 January 1781, he remained as surgeon of the Ninth Massachusetts. On 17 July 1781 he was detached as surgeon to the elite battalion of light infantry led by Colonel Alexander Scammell and served through the Yorktown campaign. He retired on 1 January 1783.

Thacher is famous for the *Military Journal* he kept during the Revolutionary War, first published in 1823, with a second edition in 1827 and many reprints thereafter. He wrote his journal in a lively style and included valuable information on army life and senior commanders, particularly Washington, Lafayette, and Steuben. His account of military medicine is regrettably slender. He “failed to give many details of his hospital experiences, except in regard to smallpox inoculation, which he carried out on a large scale” (Henry R. Viets in DAB). Since he wrote about matters about which he had no firsthand knowledge, it is important to distinguish that information from episodes in which he personally participated.

After the war he became a prominent physician in Plymouth. “Small of stature, light and agile in movements, Thacher was fond of social intercourse, yet regularly studious” (DAB). An astute observer, he produced important books on medicine and contemporary medical biography, including *The American Medical Biography* (1828). He also wrote on orchards (1822, 1825), bees (1829), ghosts (1831), and the history of the town of Plymouth (1832, 1835).

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments; Canada Invasion; Penobscot Expedition, Maine.*

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THICKETTY FORT (FORT ANDERSON), SOUTH CAROLINA. 30 July 1780. In one of the actions that preceded the Battle of Kings Mountain, Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Shelby led six hundred men against the Loyalist post at Thicketty Fort, on the headwaters of the Pacolet, ten miles southeast of Cowpens, and without firing a shot persuaded the garrison to surrender.

SEE ALSO *Kings Mountain, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

THOMAS, JOHN. (1724–1776). Continental general. Massachusetts. Born in Marshfield, Massachusetts, John Thomas studied medicine under Dr. Simon Tufts in Medford. Thomas began his military career on 1 March 1746, when Governor William Shirley appointed him as a surgeon's mate to the garrison at Annapolis Royal. He served the next year under General Samuel Waldo in Nova Scotia, and returned to the region in 1755 as a lieutenant and again in 1759–1760 as colonel of a provincial regiment. In the summer of 1760 he commanded a provincial regiment in Sir Jeffrey Amherst's advance down Lake Champlain, and led the left wing of Colonel William Haviland's detachment that joined in the capture of Montreal on 8 September 1760. Thomas spent the next 15 years engaged primarily in the practice of medicine at Kingston, Massachusetts. When the revolutionary movement started, he joined the Sons of Liberty. As the siege of Boston began, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress needed to bring order to the army, so it appointed this experienced senior officer as colonel of a regiment raised in Plymouth County, and on 25 May 1775 named him lieutenant general (second-in-command) of all Massachusetts troops. He commanded the right wing of the army at Roxbury, facing the British across Boston Neck.

In his fiftieth year, he stood six feet tall, had a distinguished face, and a commanding presence. When Congress prepared its first list of eight brigadier generals (22 June 1775), it did not fully consider military seniority at the state level, and appointed the mediocre William Heath and the superannuated Seth Pomeroy over the capable Thomas. On 10 July, in his first detailed report to Congress about conditions around Boston, General George Washington hinted broadly that Congress should remedy the situation. When Pomeroy declined his appointment, Congress made Thomas the senior brigadier general. Meanwhile, Thomas had conducted himself with decorum and had demonstrated his superiority as a military leader. Washington gave him the job of occupying Dorchester Heights, and on the evening of 4 March 1776 Thomas led 3,000 men across Dorchester Neck to take possession of this critical hill overlooking Boston Harbor. The successful completion of this critical operation gained him even higher esteem in the eyes of Washington and the Boston army.

On 6 March 1776 Thomas was promoted to major general and ordered north, where disaster had already struck during the invasion of Canada. He left Roxbury

on 22 March, reached Albany on the 28th, and on 1 May took command of the American army around Quebec. The very next day he got the bad news that a British relief expedition was coming up the St. Lawrence River, and on 6 May he had to start a demoralized and disorganized retreat toward Montreal. He contracted the smallpox that was decimating his army and died on 2 June at Sorel.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion; Dorchester Heights, Massachusetts.*

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THOMPSON, BENJAMIN COUNTRUMFORD. (1753–1814). Colonial administrator, physicist, Loyalist. Massachusetts-New Hampshire. Born in Woburn, Massachusetts, on 26 March 1753, Thompson—famous as one of America's leading scientists and a mean-spirited social climber—was self educated, only attending a few lectures at Harvard in 1770. In 1771 he became a schoolteacher in Concord, New Hampshire, where he met and, the following year married, the widow Sarah Walker Rolfe, the largest landholder in the region. They separated in 1775, but Thompson was able to hold on to a great deal of his wife's wealth. Through her, Thompson met Governor John Wentworth, who appointed the twenty-year-old teacher with no military background a major of militia in 1773. Though the Patriots suspected Thompson of favoring the crown as early as 1774, the smooth-talking major persuaded two inquiries of his patriotism. He associated with Patriots in Massachusetts, gaining information about the Continental army encircling Boston and passing on what he learned to General Thomas Gage. In October 1775, suspecting his cover was blown, he joined the British in Boston, sailing from there to England in March 1776. There he became a favorite of Lord George Germain, who appointed him to the sinecure of secretary of Georgia. In September 1780 Thompson became undersecretary of state for the Northern Department, and in October 1781 he returned to America as lieutenant colonel of the King's American Dragoons, seeing some action around Charleston in March 1782 and commanding a regiment on Long Island, in New York, until April 1783.

In August 1783, having returned to England, he was made colonel of the King's American Dragoons and was retired on half pay. He was knighted on 23 February 1784

and for the next eleven years he served the elector of Bavaria as minister of war, minister of police, and grand chamberlain. In addition to reforming the Bavarian army, Thompson conducted important research in these years on the nature of heat and light and introduced the potato to central Europe. In 1791 he was made count of the Holy Roman Empire and chose his title of Rumford from the township of his wife, though he had not seen her since 1775. Thompson returned to England in 1795, inventing the famous Rumford Lamp, a more efficient oil lamp, sometime thereafter. In 1796 he published his *Essays, Political, Economical, and Philosophical* and gave one thousand pounds to the Royal Society and five thousand dollars to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences to award Rumford Medals for distinguished work on heat or light. He did some of the first research into air pollution and nutrition and developed a nonsmoking and highly efficient fireplace known as the Rumford Roaster that came into extensive use in Great Britain and America.

In 1802 he settled in Paris, where in 1805 he married Marie Anne Pierrette, the widow of the eminent chemist Antoine Lavoisier; they separated four years later. He died at Auteuil on 21 August 1814, leaving funds to create the Rumford professorship of physics at Harvard University.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

THOMPSON, WILLIAM. (1736?–1781). Continental general. Pennsylvania. Born in Ireland, Thompson settled near Carlisle and became a surveyor and justice of the peace. He served as a captain under John Armstrong Sr. in the expedition of Pennsylvania troops against the Indian settlements at Kittanning, Pennsylvania, on 8 September 1756 and after the Seven Years' War took part in locating lands granted to officers on the western frontier of the province. Appointed commander with the rank of colonel of one of Pennsylvania's battalions raised in response to the news of Lexington, Thompson arrived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in early August 1775. His unit, known as Thompson's Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion (or Regiment) until the reorganization of 1 January 1776, when it became the First Continental Infantry, was appraised as more trouble than it was worth in the Boston siege. Thompson commanded the attack on Lechmere Point on 9 November 1775, and although he was commended the next day in general orders, Washington subsequently realized that the operation had been less admirable than indicated by the first reports.

The historian Douglas Freeman has said, "Washington privately opposed an excessively responsible assignment for William Thompson, whose seniority seemed to him to be more fortuitously conferred than valiantly earned" (Freeman, vol. 4, pp. 73 and 84). Congress, however, appointed him brigadier general on 1 March 1776 before receiving Washington's views. He was named to command the first reinforcements sent to Canada, and on 21 April he sailed up the Hudson with the regiments of Bond, Greaton, Paterson, and Poor. Thompson commanded the disastrous attack at Trois Rivières on 8 June 1776 and was taken prisoner. Although back in Philadelphia on parole two months later, it was four years before his exchange was effected. Meanwhile, he became so offensive in accusing Congressman Thomas McKean of hindering his exchange that he was censured by Congress on 23 November 1778. Thompson apologized to Congress, but McKean pressed a libel suit, was awarded damages of £5,700, and then released Thompson from payment. Thompson died near Carlisle on 3 September 1781, less than a year after being exchanged for Baron Riedesel.

SEE ALSO *Lechmere Point, Massachusetts; Riflemen; Trois Rivières.*

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THOMPSON'S PENNSYLVANIA RIFLE BATTALION. Although the Continental Congress called for only six companies of riflemen from Pennsylvania, so many volunteers presented themselves that they were formed into nine companies and organized as a battalion under the command of Colonel William Thompson. The unit was created on 25 June 1775. It was reorganized on 1 January 1776 as the First Continental Infantry and as the First Pennsylvania on 1 January 1777 (Heitman, *Historical Register*, p. 47). Edward Hand was lieutenant colonel of the first organization, and Robert Magaw was its major.

SEE ALSO *Riflemen; Thompson, William.*

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Mark M. Boatner

THORNTON, MATTHEW. (1714–1803). Signer. Ireland–Massachusetts–New Hampshire. Born in Ireland of Scots-Irish ancestry, he came to America with his parents around 1718 and lived in Maine before moving to the neighborhood of Worcester, Massachusetts. He completed his medical studies in 1740 and started a practice in the Scots-Irish colony of Londonderry, New Hampshire. In 1745 he took part in the Louisbourg expedition as an “under-surgeon.” In 1758 Londonderry elected him to the provincial assembly. He was commissioned a militia colonel in 1770 and sent off troops to Massachusetts in April 1775. His militia commission was reinstated by the provincial congress of New Hampshire, but Thornton, over sixty years old, saw no further active military duty.

In 1775 he was elected president of the provincial congress, which the same year selected him as chairman of the committee of safety that was, in effect, the local Patriot government. From 1776 to 1782 he was an associate justice of the superior court. During the war years he served as speaker of the house, member of the executive council, and president of the state constitutional convention.

He served one term in Congress (1776–1777) and is believed to have been the last delegate to sign the Declaration of Independence, in November 1776, as it lay on the table. In 1780 he moved to Merrimack County where he practiced politics but not medicine. He served in the newly created state senate in 1784–1786.

He had married Hannah (Jack) about 1760. They had five children. Dr. Thornton died on 24 June 1803 while visiting his daughter in Newburyport, Massachusetts.

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revised by Frank C. Mevers

THREADWELL’S NECK *SEE* *Treadwell’s Neck, Long Island, New York.*

THREE-SIDED STATES. “Three-sided states” were those that, as colonies, had sea-to-sea charters or some other claim to western land. The four-sided or

nonlanded states were New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland. The latter states strongly supported the idea that Congress should have the power to establish the boundaries of the “landed” states; this issue held up ratification of the Articles of Confederation.

SEE ALSO *Articles of Confederation.*

Mark M. Boatner

THROG’S NECK, NEW YORK. 12–18 October 1776. Throg’s Neck (or Point) was also known as Frog’s or Throck’s Point. It was apparently named after John Throgmorton (or Throckmorton) who settled there in 1643. Known today as Throg’s Neck, it is now also known as Schuyler Park, located in the southeast corner of the Bronx.

To avoid American General George Washington’s strong defenses on Harlem Heights, British General William Howe planned an amphibious envelopment with most of his forces. The exceptions were one brigade of Hessians and two of British, all under the command of Lord Hugh Percy, who would hold the lines around McGown’s Pass to cover New York City. At 9 A.M. on 12 October about 4,000 British started landing, unopposed, at Throg’s Neck from 80 vessels that had left Kips Bay the night before. Thick fog in the dangerous waters of Hell Gate nearly turned the expedition into a disaster, but Admiral Richard Howe and his officers managed to get through with minimal losses. By afternoon, most of General Howe’s force was ashore. He did not know, however, that Throg’s Neck was virtually an island, being surrounded by water at high tide. As soon as the British started inland, they found a marshy creek that could be crossed in only two places: a causeway and bridge on one side, and a ford on the other. Colonel Edward Hand’s thirty-man guard from his First Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment (William Heath’s Division), firing from concealed positions, stopped them cold.

Reinforcements soon arrived to swell the defenders’ ranks to 1,800 and bottle up Howe’s force. These reinforcements were Prescott’s Massachusetts Continental Regiment and a three-pounder (cannon) at the causeway, and John Graham’s New York Continental Regiment, with a six-pounder at the ford. Further reinforcements, in the form of Alexander McDougall’s brigade, arrived the evening of 12 October. Frustrated, Howe took six days to prepare for his next move, the landing at Pell’s Point. It is interesting to speculate on what would have resulted had Howe forced his way

through Hand's thirty riflemen and moved against the Kings Bridge, eight miles away.

SEE ALSO *Pell's Point, New York.*

revised by Barnet Schecter

THRUSTON, CHARLES MYNN. (1738–1812). Continental officer. Virginia. Born in Gloucester County, Virginia, in 1738, Thruston graduated from William and Mary and studied theology in England. Returning to Virginia after ordination in the Church of England, he settled in the Shenandoah Valley. For his service as a militia lieutenant in 1754 he was given title to two thousand acres in Fincastle County, but in 1770 he became so discouraged about the prospects of actually getting this land that he sold his claim for £10 to a former companion in arms named George Washington. The “warrior parson,” as he was known, raised a company of volunteers at the beginning of the Revolution, was commissioned a captain, was badly wounded at Trenton, and subsequently was appointed colonel of an “additional continental regiment” on 15 January 1777. Thruston lost an arm at Amboy on 8 March 1777 and resigned from the army on 1 January 1779. After the war Thruston was a judge and member of the legislature. In 1808 he moved to Louisiana and died four years later near New Orleans.

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

THRUSTON'S REGIMENT. Thruston's Regiment was one of the sixteen “additional Continental regiments.”

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments.*

Mark M. Boatner

TICONDEROGA, NEW YORK. 1755–1759. In October 1755 the Marquis de Lotbinière started construction of a fort the French called Carillon at the place later known as Ticonderoga. The fort was an outpost for Fort St. Frederick (Crown Point). Montcalm was

defending Fort Carillon with 3,526 men on 8 July 1758 when Abercromby attacked with a force of 16,000. Instead of taking his time and bringing up heavy artillery, Abercromby launched a direct assault. In one of their costliest failures of the century, the British lost almost 2,000 killed and wounded while inflicting under 400 casualties on the French. Lord George Howe, Abercromby's popular second in command and the elder brother of Richard and William, died on 6 July in a preliminary skirmish. On 26 July 1759 the French blew up the fort when its capture by General Jeffrey Amherst was inevitable.

SEE ALSO *Colonial Wars.*

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TICONDEROGA, NEW YORK, AMERICAN CAPTURE OF. 10 May 1775. Captured by the Americans. The idea of capturing this strategically located post and its deposit of military stores appeared obvious to many of the Patriot leaders in April 1775. The old French works were occupied by a small British garrison under Captain William Delaplace. Early in 1775 this officer reported suspicious activity around his isolated post to General Gage, assuming that there might be an attempt from the settlers in the New Hampshire Grants to steal some of his ammunition. He promised Gage that he would take “every necessary precaution to frustrate their designs.” Still, as the leader of the Green Mountain Boys, Ethan Allen, discovered, Delaplace remained completely unaware of the worsening relations between the colonists and Britain. Governor Guy Carleton in Canada planned to reinforce the fort in the months ahead but made no effort to inform Delaplace about the war that broke out in Massachusetts on 19 April.

ALLEN AND ARNOLD

In Hartford, Samuel H. Parsons, Silas Deane, and others organized an expedition that was a private enterprise but that had the tacit approval of the Connecticut assembly. After sending a proposal to Ethan Allen at Bennington to gather some Green Mountain Boys for the operation, the first of the Connecticut group left Hartford on 28 April and were followed the next day by others. About twenty Connecticut men were joined in Pittsfield, Massachusetts,

by James Easton and John Brown, who had assembled about fifty Massachusetts volunteers. At Castleton on 7 May, they joined one hundred Green Mountain Boys raised by Allen, with another one hundred on the way. The next day they chose a Committee of War, chaired by Edward Mott of the Hartford Committee of Safety, elected Ethan Allen commander, and drew up their plan of attack. Allen, who had stationed guards on all the roads leading to the fort to keep information of the war from filtering through to Delaplace, sent Noah Phelps inside, pretending to be a hunter in need of a haircut and shave. Phelps reported that, incredibly, the British still had no idea that they were at war. If alerted, they could put up a stiff resistance, being well supplied with munitions and artillery. On 9 May, Allen moved with the main body to Hand's Cove, a point on Lake Champlain's east shore just over a mile from Fort Ticonderoga (at modern Orwell, New York, then called Shoreham.) Allen sent Samuel Herrick with a thirty-man detachment to Skenesboro to seize Colonel Philip Skene and a large schooner for use in the crossing to Fort Ticonderoga. Asa Douglass was sent to Crown Point to hire that garrison's boats for use in the attack.

Meanwhile, Captain Benedict Arnold had persuaded the Massachusetts Committee of Safety to let him lead an expedition against Ticonderoga, receiving authorization on 3 May to raise up to four hundred men. Three days later, however, he learned of Allen's undertaking and rushed to Castleton, accompanied by only a servant, arriving the evening of 9 May. He immediately claimed command of the operation. Colonels Allen and Easton asked the assembled men for their judgment, which was that they would go home rather than accept Arnold's command. Allen soothed Arnold's injured pride by offering to let the captain march at his side at the head of the column. Arnold, who added only himself to the unit's strength, accepted.

Shortly before the dawn of 10 May, nearly three hundred men were at Hand's Cove waiting for boats. Two scows finally arrived, one brought by two boys who had heard of the operation and the other brought by Asa Douglass. Realizing the importance of surprise, Allen decided not to wait any longer for the boats from Skenesboro, packed eighty-five men into the available boats, and headed for the opposite bank. Squalls of wind and rain had made the two-mile crossing hazardous but probably benefited the attackers by covering their noise.

THE CAPTURE

The Green Mountain Boys rushed up the path from the cove below the fort, with Allen and Arnold quick stepping at their head in a race to be first to the narrow covered way with a small gate leading into the fort. Allen won. A British sentry's musket misfired as he sought to shoot Allen, who knocked him aside and then hit a second sentry with the

flat of his sword. The huge Allen grabbed this sentry and forced him to act as a guide to the officers' quarters as his men swarmed into the fort behind him. As his men ran for the barracks, Allen banged on the commandant's door, shouting, "Come out of there, you damned British rat!" Lieutenant Jocelyn Feltham, who had arrived twelve days previously with the advance element of a twenty-man reinforcement Carleton was sending to Delaplace from Canada, appeared at the door wearing his coat and carrying his breeches.

Thinking Feltham was Captain Delaplace, Allen called on him to surrender the fort. When the lieutenant demanded to know by what authority he had entered the king's fort, Allen responded, "In the name of the great Jehovah and the Continental Congress." At this point Delaplace, who had taken the time to dress fully, appeared and, seeing his sleepy and unarmed soldiers being herded out of their barracks, surrendered the fort. Allen immediately sent Seth Warner and Levi Allen with one hundred men to capture Crown Point.

Prisoners consisted of two officers and forty-eight men, many of them invalids, as well as twenty-four women and children. Captured matériel at Ticonderoga and Crown Point included at least seventy-eight serviceable cannon out of more than two hundred taken, six mortars, three howitzers, thousands of cannon balls, thirty thousand flints, some twenty casks and powder, and other stores.

In a small schooner and several bateaux captured at Skenesboro, Arnold led a successful raid to St. Johns, Canada, on 17 May. Allen followed and made an ill-advised and unsuccessful attempt to hold this last post against British reinforcements from nearby Chambly.

AFTERMATH

When Congress learned 18 May that Ticonderoga had been taken, it ordered the fort abandoned and all the military stores carefully inventoried and evacuated to the south end of Lake George. An absolute refusal from Allen, followed by protests from New York and New England, forced Congress to pass a resolution on 31 May that Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point be held. Arnold considered himself in command of these two places, creating enormous difficulties for the rebels. A Massachusetts committee, however, arrived to inform him that he was to be second in command to Colonel Benjamin Hinman, who had been sent with fourteen hundred Connecticut men to garrison the captured posts. Arnold resigned his Massachusetts commission and left the service with his first of a succession of grievances.

SEE ALSO *Crown Point, New York; Deane, Silas; Green Mountain Boys; Invalid; Knox's "Noble Train of Artillery"; Skene, Philip; St. John's, Canada (14–18 May 1775).*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

TICONDEROGA, NEW YORK, BRITISH CAPTURE OF. 2–5 July 1777. Captured by the British during Burgoyne's offensive. After the Americans evacuated Crown Point in July 1776, they accelerated efforts to strengthen Fort Ticonderoga. Much of the work was planned by young John Trumbull, and the professional engineering talent was furnished by Thaddeus Kosciuszko. The old fort was partially repaired and blockhouses were erected, the old French earthworks that barred an approach from the northwest were improved, and a new barbette battery was constructed on Mount Hope. Mount Independence was fortified and a bridge of boats spanned the quarter-mile water gap between it and Ticonderoga, while a barrier of log booms and iron chains was constructed north of the bridge. Trumbull pointed out to his skeptical commander that artillery from a hill known as Mount Defiance would threaten the main defenses, and with Wayne and Arnold he climbed the eight-hundred-foot hill to prove that the crest was accessible. The American General Arthur St. Clair, the commander, had only one-fifth of the troop strength needed to man existing works properly, and he left Mount Defiance undefended.

It was apparent to Trumbull and most of the other officers that there was little hope of defending Ticonderoga with such a small force against Burgoyne's army. Schuyler's suggestion that only Mount Independence be occupied was twice approved by Congress. But the popular image of Ticonderoga as impregnable and a symbol of security precluded its immediate abandonment. As General Gates pointed out, the boom was an essential feature of the defenses, and unless it was defended at both ends, the enemy could break through and turn Mount Independence. On 20 June, Schuyler and the four generals on the spot decided to hold Ticonderoga as long as possible and then defend Mount Independence.

AMERICAN DISPOSITIONS

St. Clair had taken command at Ticonderoga on 12 June, less than a month before the attack. His three senior subordinates, Brigadier Generals Matthias Fermoy, John Paterson, and Enoch Poo, failed to gain distinction during

the war. St. Clair's 2,500 troops included 10 Continental and 2 militia regiments, 250 artillerymen, 124 artificers, and some scouts; however, they were an ill-disciplined group.

British forces totaled about seven thousand regulars and another twenty-five hundred or so white and Indian auxiliaries. The troops were well equipped, well disciplined, and well led, excepting Burgoyne.


THE ATTACK

British General Simon Fraser's Advance Corps left Crown Point on 26 June and was two miles from Ticonderoga when the rest of Burgoyne's force landed behind him. The German Wing debarked on the east shore, and the British Wing landed on the other. On 2 July, Fraser cautiously took possession of Mount Hope, cutting off the American route to Lake George. St. Clair's outpost set fire to its works at 9 A.M. and then retreated, the enemy arriving four hours later. The British moved cautiously along the peninsula, making contact with the main defenses at about 3 P.M. American officers watched this advance while their men, on St. Clair's orders, held their fire. When Colonel James Wilkinson saw an enemy skirmisher stop a mere forty paces away, he ordered a sergeant to pick him off, touching off an unauthorized fire from the rest of the waiting rebels. As U.S. officers ran around trying to stop the firing, the enemy dropped back out of range, leaving the prostrate form of the man Wilkinson had ordered shot—a drunken member of the Forty-Seventh Regiment, who was unscathed. In addition to eight cannon, the Americans had fired an estimated three thousand rounds from one thousand muskets at less than one hundred yards, demonstrating their marksmanship by hitting just three of their targets.

The Germans on the other side of the lake had meanwhile pushed forward to East Creek. There, the advance elements under Breymann drew artillery fire from Mount Independence.

From a prisoner, St. Clair learned the extent of Burgoyne's numbers. The Americans' situation was not yet critical, however, since their line of communication by water to Skenesboro was still open and the threat of a German envelopment of the Mount Independence position was considerably reduced by the obstacle of East Creek and its swamps. St. Clair hoped that Burgoyne would make the error of a frontal attack against Ticonderoga from the northwest

On 3 July, Burgoyne occupied Mount Hope in force, and a relatively harmless artillery exchange ensued. Gall's brigade was taken from Riedesel to reinforce the right wing, and some Canadians and Indians, along with Captain Fraser's light infantry company, were shifted across the lake to Riedesel. The latter was given the mission



THE GALE GROUP

of turning the Mount Independence position and cutting the line of communication to Skenesboro.

On 4 July, Burgoyne's chief engineer, Lieutenant Twiss, reconnoitered Mount Defiance, reporting that the hill was within effective artillery range of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence and that the necessary roadwork to get guns into position could be done within twenty-four hours. The energetic Major General William Phillips took command of the operation with the comment, "Where a

goat can go, a man can go; and where a man can go he can haul up a gun." Four twelve-pounders were in position, ready to open fire at noon of 6 July.

The significance of these guns was not that they could deliver a fire of sufficient intensity and accuracy to make the American positions untenable; the range, about twenty-two hundred yards, was too great for precision fire with the guns of the day, and the improvised road up the northwest slopes of Mount Defiance would not permit

the ammunition supply needed for sustained fire. On the other hand, the guns could threaten the bridge and wreak havoc among boats brought up to evacuate the garrison. Perhaps the most significant threat was to the morale of the defenders. The British made the mistake of letting the Americans see their preparations on 5 July. St. Clair called a council of war at 3 P.M., which ended with a unanimous decision to pull out.

TICONDEROGA ABANDONED

The heavy American cannonade at dusk on 5 July should have tipped Burgoyne off to American plans but did not. After carrying as much matériel down to the boats as possible, some four hundred to five hundred troops commanded by Colonel Pierce Long left Ticonderoga with the artillery, supplies, and wounded shortly after midnight and headed for Skenesboro. The rest of the garrison headed across the bridge of boats about two hours later. Since there was no road south along the lake, St. Clair planned to lead the main body by way of Castleton to join Long at Skenesboro.

A well-planned retreat was marred by a series of mishaps. First, General Fermoy went to sleep without giving the withdrawal orders to all his troops on Mount Independence. Then, when he got ready to leave at about 3 A.M., he set fire to his quarters, contrary to St. Clair's orders, illuminating the scene for Riedesel, who sent troops by boat to harass the withdrawal. Finally, the four gunners posted to deliver enfilade fire along the bridge got drunk and went to sleep; an Indian with the party that captured them almost did their duty for them when he accidentally touched off one of the cannon with a slow match, but the shot passed harmlessly over the heads of the British troops on the bridge.

Burgoyne himself did not learn until dawn that St. Clair had slipped away, but he then reacted with exceptional vigor. Ordering General Fraser to march quickly to overtake the main body that was moving overland, he personally led the pursuit by water. Burgoyne caught up with Long at Skenesboro on 6 July and pushed his pursuit to Fort Anne on 8 July. Fraser surprised the rear guard of St. Clair's column at Hubbardton on 7 July, where he won a costly victory with Riedesel's timely support.

COMMENT

The fall of Ticonderoga depressed the spirits of Americans and sent those of their enemy soaring. King George rushed into the queen's dressing room shouting, "I have beat them! I have beat all the Americans!" A court-martial acquitted St. Clair with honor; forced by political considerations to bait the Ticonderoga trap, he saved his army.

Burgoyne, on the other hand, revealed his mediocrity. He had opened the attic door of the American colonies, but by failing to annihilate its defenders had won what Napoleon called an ordinary victory.

SEE ALSO *Burgoyne's Offensive; Fermoy, Matthias Alexis de Roche; Fort Anne, New York; Hubbardton, Vermont; Kosciuszko, Thaddeus Andrzej Bonawentura; Marksmanship; Paterson, John; Poor, Enoch; Skenesboro, New York; Trumbull, John.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

TICONDEROGA RAID. September 1777. After the British capture of Ticonderoga on 5 July, Major General Benjamin Lincoln was ordered to Vermont to organize and command New England militia being raised in the region. One of his missions was to threaten Burgoyne's long lines of communication to Canada, and in September, after the Battle of Bennington, Lincoln saw his chance. Remaining at Pawlet with five hundred troops, Lincoln sent three five-hundred-man detachments to disrupt British supply lines. The principal effort was assigned to Colonel John Brown, who was to attack Ticonderoga from the west. Colonel Samuel Johnson was to support him by a diversion against Mount Independence, across the lake. Colonel Ruggles Woodbridge was to occupy Skenesboro, which the British had abandoned, and move south through Fort Anne to Fort Edward.

British Brigadier General Henry Powell commanded Ticonderoga and its outposts. Apparently feeling secure, he had disposed his nine hundred soldiers carelessly and had not posted adequate security detachments. Brown was therefore able to spend two days undetected in the area before attacking at daybreak on 18 September. Rushing the Lake George landing (at the outlet from that lake into Lake Champlain) and overwhelming the sergeant's guard on Mount Defiance, the Americans had little difficulty in gaining control of everything on the west shore except the French stone fort and the Grenadier's Battery at the tip of the peninsula. Brown also freed over one hundred American prisoners while capturing three hundred of the enemy. However,

Johnson reached Mount Independence too late in the day to surprise the Prince Frederick Regiment stationed there. Powell refused to surrender Ticonderoga, which was defended by the Fifty-third Regiment, and Brown lacked the heavy artillery and other supplies needed to reduce it. The Americans cannonaded the positions for four days and then withdrew.

Using captured boats, Brown moved up Lake George with 420 men, planning to surprise the British post at Diamond Island, 25 miles south of Ticonderoga, at dawn on the 23rd. He was frustrated by adverse winds, and by the time he could launch his attack, at about 9 A.M. on 24 September, the two companies that constituted the British garrison had been warned of his approach by a paroled Loyalist. Brown soon saw that the artillery on his boats was no match for enemy guns firing from breastworks, and he withdrew after a short bombardment. The Americans landed on the east shore, burned their boats, and rejoined Lincoln.

Although short of complete success, the raid was strategically important. Brown brought back information that Burgoyne had provisions for no more than four weeks. The confidence of the British was shaken by this unexpected threat to their lines of communication, and news of the raid was received in Gates's camp on 21 September with prolonged cheering and a thirteen-gun salute. A few days later Burgoyne, whose troops were close enough to hear the celebration on Bemis Heights, got the bad news from a prisoner released precisely to report the ill tidings.

SEE ALSO *Bennington Raid; Burgoyne's Offensive.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

TILGHMAN, TENCH. (1744–1786). Aide-de-camp and military secretary to Washington. Maryland-Pennsylvania. Born in Talbot County, Maryland, on 25 December 1744, Tilghman graduated in 1761 from what became the University of Pennsylvania and became a merchant in Philadelphia. On the eve of the Revolution, and in opposition to his Loyalist father, he liquidated his business and in 1775 was secretary and treasurer of the Continental Congress's commissioners to the Iroquois. In July 1776 he was commissioned captain of an independent company that subsequently joined a Pennsylvania battalion of the Flying Camp. On 8 August 1776 he began his duties in Washington's headquarters as a volunteer

military secretary. On 1 April 1777 he was given the rank of lieutenant colonel, but his volunteer status without pay was continued until the Continental Congress responded favorably to Washington's personal appeal of 11 May 1781 that Tilghman receive a formal commission.

Honored by Washington with the mission of taking news of the Yorktown surrender to the Continental Congress, Tilghman reached Philadelphia at 3 A.M. on 22 October 1781. A week later the delegates resolved that he be given a sword and horse in gratitude for his service. Tilghman served as Washington's personal secretary for seven years, longer than any of the other thirty-two aides, becoming a close friend of the commander in chief. On 9 June 1783 Tilghman married his cousin, Anna Maria, younger daughter of Matthew Tilghman (1718–1790), a powerful Maryland political figure and member of Congress. Two years after entering into a business association in Baltimore with Robert Morris, Tilghman died on 18 April 1786.

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TONYN, PATRICK. (1725–1804). British officer, governor of East Florida. Born in Ireland in 1725, Tonym, the son of Lieutenant Colonel Charles William Tonym (d. 1754), joined his father's regiment, the Sixth (Inniskilling) Dragoons on 16 March 1744 and was promoted to captain on 10 May 1751. After seeing action in Germany in 1758, on 12 August 1761 he became lieutenant colonel of the 104th Foot. On 1 March 1774 he reached East Florida to succeed John Moultrie as governor, and he held this post until 1785, coming into repeated conflict with the region's settlers and his fellow officials but keeping the province in the empire. Tonym made East Florida a haven for southern Loyalists, raised the East Florida Rangers to harass the Patriots in Georgia and South Carolina, and enlisted Seminole and Creek support for the British. With his province returned to Spain in the peace treaty ending the Revolution, Tonym spent his last two years as governor seeing to the relocation of Loyalists and those inhabitants who wanted to leave, as well as the evacuation of military bases and the contentious transfer of authority to the Spanish. Meanwhile he had been promoted to colonel on 29 August 1777 and to

major general on 19 October 1781. In 1793 he became a lieutenant general, and on 1 January 1798 he was promoted to full general. He died on 30 December 1804 in London.

SEE ALSO *Moultrie, John*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

TORRENCE'S TAVERN, NORTH CAROLINA SEE *Tarrant's Tavern*.

TORY RANGERS SEE *Butler's Rangers*.

TOUSARD, ANN-LOUIS. (1749–1817). French and U.S. officer. Born in Paris on 12 March 1749, Tousard, the son of a general, graduated from the French Artillery Academy and volunteered for service with the Americans in the Revolution. He arrived in America during April 1777 as part of the group led by Philippe Tronson du Coudray. After the latter's death in October, Tousard became a captain attached to the marquis de Lafayette's staff. After taking part in the Battles of Germantown and Brandywine, Tousard spent the winter of 1777–1778 at Valley Forge. In March 1778 he was appointed military adviser to allied Oneida Indians. He was present with the Oneidas when they covered Lafayette's retreat before a far superior British force at the Battle of Barren Hill on 21 May 1778. Tousard then transferred to the staff of General John Sullivan for the unsuccessful French-American campaign against Newport, Rhode Island. Tousard lost his right arm during the Battle of Quaker Hill on 28 August 1778. His heroic performance in that battle earned him promotion to lieutenant colonel of the Continental army on 29 October 1778. Returning to France, he received the Royal Order of St. Louis on 3 July 1779 and was made a major of artillery on 5 April 1780.

In 1784 Tousard was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the French army and stationed on Saint-Domingue (Haiti). In the slave revolt led by Toussaint L'Ouverture,

Tousard in 1791–1792 commanded troops battling the slaves and attempted to persuade the local government to arm free blacks but was ignored. Nonetheless, he was blamed for the failure of the colonial officials to obey orders from France in this regard and was arrested and imprisoned. U.S. pressure effected his release in February 1793, and he settled on a farm outside Wilmington, Delaware.

In April 1795 President George Washington appointed Tousard a major in the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers, beginning a period in which he had enormous influence on the U.S. military. After supervising the construction of several significant fortifications, he restructured the U.S. artillery service on the French model, bringing uniformity to its use of cannon. In 1798 he laid out the plans for what would become the Military Academy at West Point. Also, his *American Artillerists Companion* (1809) became the standard text for the instruction of artillery use in the United States. Along the way he aided Eleuthère Irénée du Pont in establishing gunpowder mills in Delaware, which would prove vital to American interests. After being named inspector of artillery in 1800, Tousard became commander of the Second Artillery Regiment in January 1801. Incredibly, when the Academy at West Point was completed in 1802, President Thomas Jefferson passed over Tousard for superintendent because he was French. Tousard resigned in March 1802, returning to the French army as a battalion commander in General Victor Leclerc's failed attempt to conquer Haiti. Tousard served as a French consul in the United States during 1805–1816, returning in the latter year to France, where he died in Paris on 10 April 1817.

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TOWNSHEND, CHARLES. (1725–1767). British politician. Second son of the third Viscount Townshend, he was educated at Clare College, Cambridge, Leiden University, and Lincoln's Inn, and was called to the bar in 1747. In the same year he was elected to Parliament for Great Yarmouth, and in 1748 he became a member of the Board of Trade. Here he impressed the president, Lord Halifax, whose intelligence and energy had considerable influence on colonial policy, and under him acquired considerable knowledge of imperial affairs. By 1753 he was thinking in terms of giving governors and

other officials permanent financial independence of the colonial assemblies. At about this time he began to emerge as an impressive debater in the House of Commons, and in 1754 he moved to the Admiralty.

In 1755 he married the wealthy and influential widow of the earl of Dalkeith, so achieving considerable political independence. He now declared his opposition to the Duke of Newcastle's Europe-centered foreign policy and what he saw as neglect of American defense. He remained out of office from the formation of the first ministry of William Pitt, earl of Chatham, in 1756 until after George III's accession in 1760, partly because he was distrusted, partly because he was too clever for comfort. In March 1761 he became secretary at war but complained that he was not made leader of the House of Commons as well. Having now, like Pitt, reversed his earlier position, he urged the government to remain involved in the war in Germany: a commitment Lord Bute and George III were anxious to end. In December he resigned, apparently in protest over the terms of the Peace of Paris, which, to general confusion, he then defended in debate.

In March 1763, having at last obtained the presidency of the Board of Trade, he unsuccessfully proposed a measure that anticipated the Sugar Act of 1764. Although initially excluded from George Grenville's ministry, he supported the Stamp Act in February 1765 and was rewarded with the office of paymaster on 24 May. The following year he opposed the repeal of the Stamp Act. In 1766 he became Chatham's chancellor of the exchequer. Townshend then took advantage of Chatham's illness to prevent a government takeover of Bengal, while at the same time speculating with government money in East India stock.

He also carried the most moderate of the three suggested punishments for New York's defiance of the 1765 Mutiny Act: a temporary suspension of the colonial assembly's right to legislate. The cabinet, already committed to colonial taxation for military purposes, was now considering ways and means. Townshend persuaded ministers to widen the aim to giving colonial officials financial independence of the assemblies, the idea he had first proposed in 1753. By selecting customs duties he exploited the American distinction between internal and external taxes, not realizing that the real objection was *any* revenue-raising measure, as opposed to one designed to manage trade. A deficit arising from a ministerial defeat on the land tax was made up by thorough auditing and had nothing to do with the Townshend duties.

Townshend died suddenly on 4 September 1767. Although a brilliant speaker, he had never inspired confidence, and his frequent changes of allegiance deservedly earned him the nickname "the shuttlecock," or, as he expressed it in his "Champagne speech" on the East

India Company measures, "the weathercock." He spent years in relatively minor offices and was chancellor only for a matter of months. Yet in that office he was assiduous and able, and his attitude toward American problems remained consistent and sincere from 1753 to his death.

SEE ALSO *Chatham, William Pitt, First Earl of; Grenville, George; Newcastle, Thomas Pelham Holies, Duke of; Stamp Act; Townshend Acts.*

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TOWNSHEND ACTS. 1767. These were the Townshend Revenue Act, an act establishing a new system of customs commissioners, and an act suspending the New York assembly. The Farmer's Letters expressed colonial objection to the acts.

SEE ALSO *Customs Commissioners; Farmer's Letters; New York Assembly Suspended; Townshend Revenue Act.*

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TOWNSHEND REVENUE ACT. 26 June 1767. Charles Townshend, who became chancellor of the exchequer on 2 August 1766, renewed the imperial government's efforts to raise revenue in America with the Revenue Act of 1767, passed by the House of Commons on 26 June 1767. Customs duties levied on glass, lead, painters' colors, paper, and, especially, tea imported into the colonies were expected to raise £40,000 annually. In raising revenue via customs duties, a supposedly "external" tax, Townshend sought to cloak taxation with the mantle of trade regulation, thus avoiding colonial opposition to an "internal" tax like the stamp tax of 1765.

The duties were to be paid in specie (metal currency), a requirement that put a drag on colonial economies that

lacked adequate circulating currencies, but the manner in which the monies were raised proved to be less controversial than the uses to which Townshend proposed to put them. The funds would be used first to pay for “defraying the charges of the administration of justice, and the support of the government” in the colonies (Section 5 of the Act), including the payment of fixed salaries to royal officials. Any remaining funds would be devoted to paying British military expenses in the colonies. Since the colonial assemblies had fought long and successfully to maintain the power of the purse and to frustrate royal attempts to establish a fixed civil list in the colonies, it was the loss of control over the salaries of royal officials that particularly alarmed them. Many Americans believed that colonial governors would be bolder in violating colonial rights and trampling on American liberty, now that they were freed from the need to conciliate the local assemblies who had formerly paid their salaries.

To provide for efficient collection of the new duties, the Townshend Revenue Act and a companion measure generally legalized writs of assistance, extended the system of vice-admiralty courts, and set up a new American Board of Customs Commissioners. Receiving royal assent on 29 June, the act was to take effect on 20 November 1767. Townshend died on 4 September, leaving his successors the task of enforcing his act. Americans countered the act by reviving nonimportation. Their resistance proved so successful that on 12 April 1770 the House of Commons voted to repeal all the Townshend duties, effective 1 December 1770, except the one on tea.

SEE ALSO *Customs Commissioners; Massachusetts Circular Letter; Nonimportation; Royal Government in America; Townshend, Charles; Vice-Admiralty Courts; Writs of Assistance.*

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TRADE, ACTS OF *SEE Navigation Acts.*

TRADE, THE BOARD OF. 1696–1782. In 1696 William III created “A Board of Commissioners for Trade and Plantations” (the Board of Trade) as the principal manager of colonial affairs. Headed by a president who was also the first lord of trade, the Board had eight paid members and seven senior political officials who reviewed and reported to the Privy Council on colonial legislation, and recommended appointments of colonial officials. The activity of the Board varied according to the energy and interest of the first lord, reaching a high point when George Montagu Dunk, the earl of Halifax, became president in 1748 and going into a decline during the final French and Indian war (1756–1763). After Wills Hill, the earl of Hillsborough, became secretary of state for the American colonies and president of the Board of Trade in 1768, a single person continued to hold both positions until the board was abolished in 1782.

The Treasury Board also played a prominent part in colonial affairs because the Navigation Acts, particularly that of 1673, gave it authority over the Customs Commissioners, who had jurisdiction over collectors, searchers, and surveyors of customs in the colonies.

SEE ALSO *Background and Origins of the Revolution; Customs Commissioners; Disallowance; Germain, George Sackville; Royal Government in America; Vice-Admiralty Courts.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

TRAINBAND OR TRAIN-BAND.

Appearing in 1630, the word is a clipped form of “trained band” and meant “militia.”

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TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNICATION *SEE Atlantic Crossing.*

TRANSPORT. Wheeled vehicles, the mainstay of transport, were needed to move large quantities of military goods for the Revolutionary armies. A Continental army Wagon Department, subordinate to the quartermaster

general, was created in 1777 to deal with increasingly complex transportation needs. Headed by a wagonmaster general, deputies were assigned to the main army and each regional military department. The Northern Department's deputy wagonmaster general alone had five wagonmasters under his direction; they, in turn, each had charge of one or more wagon brigades, comprising ten to twelve vehicles and drivers. The historian Erna Risch has noted, "The [1777] regulation establishing the Wagon Department remained in effect until 1780, when Congress drastically reorganized the Quartermaster's Department following the adoption of the system of specific supplies [via state governments]" (*Supplying Washington's Army*, p. 71).

Large numbers and various types of vehicles were needed for both the supply lines and army carriage. An October 1780 Continental army "Estimate of Waggon's" listed "Total waggons for a regiment" as four "4 horse close covered waggons," one "2 horse close covered waggon or tumbrel," six "4 horse open waggons," and one "2 horse open waggon or tumbrel." Another document included brigade support vehicles, namely one covered wagon for the brigade quartermaster and stores, four open wagons for the commissary and provisions, two open wagons for the foragemaster, two open wagons for the commissary of military stores "for spare ammunition and arms," one traveling forge, and two covered wagons for ammunition. "Close" covered wagons had a canvas tarpaulin fitting snugly over the vehicle's load. Other wagons were topped with a high-standing, cloth-covered frame or bonnet. Depending on circumstances, American and British forces also used sleds and often packhorses.

Finding suitable wagons was a concern of Francis Rush Clark, "Inspector and Superintendent of His Majesty's Provision Train of Wagons and Horses," who wrote of British transport in 1776 and 1777

The English Waggons, sent over for the use of the Army, were undoubtedly much heavier, than was either necessary or proper . . . [and] Orders were given, to hire Country Waggons in preference. . . . Nothing of this sort could be constructed more unfit for an Army. They are so slight, as to be perpetually in want of repair. . . . These were taken pro miscuously from the Farmers on Long Island & Staten Island, & some from the Jerseys. Many of them in a wretch'd Condition, & none having any Cover[s].

Clark's solution was to devise an "English reduced" wagon, having "One of the English Waggons . . . alter'd & set up upon the same principle, & reduced in Weight from 1350 lb to 900 lb, & made up very serviceable, & with some still lighter."

Both sides procured civilian wagons, and some, such as the large but serviceable Pennsylvania Conestogas, were used predominantly as long-distance carriers rather than

for regimental baggage. Suitability for campaign use was based on a vehicle's balance of endurance, capacity, and weight. One Conestoga example, dating to about 1762, had a bed four feet wide by fourteen feet long (comparable in size to the cumbersome "English Waggons"), and a June 1781 Continental artillery transport estimate called for "Waggons or carts well covered each to carry about 1400 lbs." According to Superintendent Clark, the "large English" wagon was about the same weight as a "Philadelphia Waggon" (1,350 pounds, 12 feet 3 inches long). Among the several vehicle types noted by Clark were the "Dutch or American" wagon (700 to 800 pounds, 9 feet 10 inches long), the "English reduced" (850 pounds), and the 700-pound "new Waggon with Rope Sides & Bottom, [that] runs light & handy." Clark stated this last vehicle "has been greatly approved by all that have seen it, as the best & most fit for American Service":

The Body of this Waggon is 10 Feet long, & 3 Feet 6 Inches wide, The Sides are 18 Inches high, & turn down with hinges; a Box before, a hind Board framed light, to take off at pleasure, The Hind Wheels 4 Feet 8 Inches high, & the Fore Wheels 3 Feet 8 Inches high. . . . This Waggon is made 4 Inches lower before than behind, which greatly facilitates the draught & light going, & the floor & Sides are made of Rope, spun of old Cordage, as few or no boards are to be purchased in these times . . . if thought better, the floor & sides might be made with thin, light battins, flat hoops or twisted hay (ibid).

Army trains could be inordinately long, and that of Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton's during the Monmouth campaign was likely the war's largest, with 1500 wagons taking up "near twelve miles" of road.

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John U. Rees

TRANSPORTS, HORRORS OF BRITISH SOLDIER LIFE ABOARD

SEE *Atlantic Crossing*.

TRAVERSE. A wall or other structure across the approach to a fortification or across an interior portion to cut off a part. It also meant right angles in the trace of a trench or parapet to minimize enfilade. See maps accompanying Saratoga battles.

SEE ALSO *Enfilade; Fort Mercer, New Jersey; Saratoga Surrender; Saratoga, First Battle of; Saratoga, Second Battle of*.

Mark M. Boatner

TREADWELL'S NECK, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK.

10 October 1781. At 4 A.M. Major Lemuel Trescott attacked Fort Slongo with 150 dismounted troopers of the Second Continental Dragoons and took the Tory garrison without losing a man. After destroying the blockhouse he withdrew across Long Island Sound with twenty-one prisoners and captured matériel.

Mark M. Boatner

TREATIES. Treaties are alphabetized by—or cross-referenced from—the identifying name of where they were concluded.

Mark M. Boatner

TRENTON, NEW JERSEY. 26 December 1776. Trenton was held by the Hesse-Cassel brigade of Colonel Johann Rall, which had distinguished itself during the battles at White Plains and Fort Mifflin. The brigade consisted of three regiments—the experienced Füsilier-Regiment von Lossburg and the Füsilier-Regiment von Knyphausen, along with the Landgrenadiere Regiment von Rall. This latter unit was formed in 1776 by splitting a two-battalion regiment (the other battalion stayed in Germany). In peacetime it maintained lower tables of organization than the other field regiments, meaning


that it had absorbed many new replacements in the spring and lacked the quality and cohesion of normal Hessian units. All three regiments had absorbed relatively heavy casualties already, and many of the officers who had been wounded were still in New York receiving medical attention. The brigade had six artillery pieces (two per regiment) with their gun crews, a detachment of jägers, and a small detachment of British light dragoons.

Rall himself was a commander with important political connections and great personal bravery. However, he had certain shortcomings that combined to produce spectacular failure at Trenton: like General Edward Braddock in the French and Indian War, he had a very conventional tactical sense and he severely underestimated his opponents. His superiors understood his inexperience at independent command, but the four senior officers who would normally have commanded the brigade were all ill. Although relatively isolated from the other garrisons at Princeton and Bordentown, he saw no need to construct fortifications, but he did establish some outposts and conducted morning and evening patrols of the nearby countryside. Near dusk on Christmas day Rall personally led one such patrol, which skirmished with an unauthorized American patrol. The brigade had gone into winter quarters and occupied various buildings in Trenton, a policy that kept them protected from the miserable wet and cold weather but required the regiments to take time to assemble in the event of an emergency. Also, the wear and tear of constant small skirmishing and nightly alerts had worn them down. On Christmas night a howling northeaster finally gave them a chance to relax a bit, since it was clear to all that the Americans would be quiet for a change.

WASHINGTON'S PLAN

Selecting the isolated post of Trenton as his objective, Washington—on the west bank of the Delaware River—devised a scheme of maneuver utilizing three separate groups. Brigadier General James Ewing would cross the Delaware with eight hundred militia at Trenton Ferry and occupy the south bank of Assunpink Creek to block the enemy's retreat in that direction. Colonel John Cadwalader was to lead eighteen hundred men—his Philadelphia Associators, supported by Colonel Daniel Hitchcock's Continental brigade—across the river at Burlington and block the garrison at Bordentown from reinforcing Trenton. Weather, particularly the ice on the river, prevented the supporting attacks from taking place. Ewing never got across the river; Cadwalader only got the van of his force over before conditions deteriorated and he had to pull them back.

The main body under Washington's personal command planned to cross at McKonkey's Ferry (later Washington Crossing), nine miles upstream, and separate



The Passage of the Delaware (1819) by Thomas Sully. On Christmas night 1776, General Washington led American troops across the cold, icy Delaware River before marching toward Trenton. **THE PASSAGE OF THE DELAWARE, 1819 (OIL ON CANVAS) BY SULLY, THOMAS (1783–1872) © MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS/BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY**

into two columns. Major General John Sullivan's (Brigadier General Arthur St. Clair's, Colonel John Glover's, and Colonel Paul D. Sargent's brigades) would advance along the River Road. Washington and Major General Nathanael Greene would lead the brigades of Brigadier Generals Hugh Mercer, Adam Stephen, Lord Stirling, and Matthias Roche de Fermoy inland and attack down the Pennington Road. Washington allocated a total of eighteen cannon to these two columns, about three times the ratio of guns normally found in European warfare. Four accompanied each lead brigade, with three others at the head of each of the supporting brigades and two with each column's trail brigade. The plan called for the two columns to synchronize watches and strike the village from the north before dawn, which would come about 5 A.M.

THE ATTACK

Washington's column got off late and only reached the assembly area starting at 6 P.M. The men embarked in the

dark in Durham boats and assorted other river craft manned by Glover's Fourteenth Continental Regiment, watermen from the Philadelphia Associators, and the local ferrymen. In a remarkable feat, the force crossed eight hundred feet to the east bank in the face of the strong current; floating ice; bitter cold; and a storm of wind, hail, rain, and snow that started about 11 P.M. Not a man was lost, and the artillery and horses also made it, but way behind schedule. Although the debarkation was supposed to be accomplished by midnight, leaving five hours to reach Trenton before daybreak, the last man was not landed until 3 A.M., and the troops were not ready to start marching for another hour.

Despite the delays, a number of events combined to favor the American attack. British intelligence had been collecting information from Loyalist sympathizers, but reports back estimated that only American raiding patrols would cross the river. That had been the experience of a week or more, and on the morning of the 25th, Rall himself

had led a sweep that clashed with an unauthorized probe by Captain Richard Clough Anderson of the Fifth Virginia Regiment and later in the day with a second raiding party from the Fourth Virginia Regiment under Captain George Wallis. Each morning Rall had his pickets make a dawn sweep of the immediate vicinity, which normally returned about sunrise (on the 26th at about 7:20 A.M.). By moving later than they had planned, the Americans avoided this patrol and therefore remained undetected.

At Birmingham, about four miles from its landing, the attacking force split into its two columns. Turning left to pick up the Pennington Road so as to approach Trenton from the north, Greene had Stephen's Virginia Continental brigade in the lead, followed by Mercer and Stirling and the Philadelphia Light Horse. Its vanguard consisted of forty men from the Third Virginia Regiment under Captain William Washington and Lieutenant James Monroe. Washington accompanied this column as did Fermoy's brigade, which would peel off and hold the Princeton road to prevent reinforcement of the Hessians. Sullivan continued down the River Road with the troops of St. Clair in front, followed by Glover and then Sargent. They would approach Trenton from the northwest. Captain John Flahaven led the vanguard of this column with forty men from the First New Jersey Regiment.

At about 7:30 A.M., American scouts located the Hessian outposts about a mile from the center of town. Fifty jägers under Lieutenant Friedrich von Grothausen covered the more dangerous River Road while a smaller force under Lieutenant Johann Andreas Wiederhold of the Knyphausen regiment held a building at the intersection of the Scotch and Pennington Roads, with about twenty assorted men; similar small detachments watched the Princeton Road and the bridge over the Assunpink, with the British dragoons further downstream. Washington therefore had Greene stop and deploy under the cover of woods into three brigade-sized columns before making their final advance. Wiederhold's men spotted them at the last second and got off a few shots about 8 A.M. Then they fell back on the billets of Captain Ernst von Altenbockum's No. 3 Company of Lossburg; that force fell out and also put up a brief resistance before falling back. Three minutes after Wiederhold was engaged, the artillery leading Sullivan's column opened fire on the outpost at the River Road.

Despite the myths, Rall was not drunk when the shooting started. But because the Hessians had gone into winter quarters, the companies were billeted in multiple buildings and required considerable time to assemble into regimental formations capable of actually fighting, a process complicated by the fact that the officers had to turn the five administrative companies into eight firing platoons before it could engage. The Rall and Lossburg regiments were generally situated in the north end of town, while Knyphausen's was in south end. Each day one


regiment was designated as the "alert" regiment and kept under tighter control so that it could assemble first and give the other two more time. Rall's had assumed that duty at 4 P.M. on Christmas Day and was to form up on King Street. The Lossburg was supposed to use Queen Street, and the Knyphausen would form along the creek.

Although the Hessians turned with a reasonable amount of speed, Washington's posting of artillery in the van enabled the gunners to enfilade the regiments by firing down the street. Captain Alexander Hamilton's company broke up Rall's regiment as it was trying to sort itself out, and—together with Captain Thomas Forrest's guns firing down Queen Street—silenced the four Hessian guns in the center of town. The infantry followed with a charge, since the wet conditions limited the men's ability to reload their muskets effectively. William Washington and Monroe were both wounded as they overran the Lieutenant Johannes Englehard's two cannon supporting Rall's regiment in King Street. Sullivan's troops, meanwhile, had penetrated the south end of the village led by St. Clair's brigade and drove back the Knyphausen regiment before it could effectively organize. Several hundred of the jägers and Knyphausen men escaped over the bridge across the Assunpink because Ewing's force was not there to block them. Glover's brigade pushed directly on to finally seal the bridge, while Sergeant's concentrated on securing the old barracks building.

From the Hessian point of view the scene was one of indescribable confusion. Converging American columns pushed forward on their designated lines of advance and drove the Germans into the open east of town. Rall's remnants took shelter in an apple orchard, where they were joined by most of the Lossburg (without their cannon, which had become bogged down in low ground). Two counterattacks simply never made any headway and the two regiments were pounded by artillery fire. The Knyphausen regiment fought a separate battle in the south end of town and was similarly driven into fields near the creek without its guns. Efforts to find a route to escape proved useless, and as casualties began to mount (Rall himself went down mortally wounded), the senior officer still on his feet, Lieutenant Colonel Franziscus Scheffer of Lossburg, ordered the survivors to give up. Stirling's brigade took the surrender of the Rall-Lossburg force, while the Knyphausen element ground its arms to Sullivan slightly later, at about 9:30 A.M. Overall, the engagement lasted roughly ninety minutes from first skirmish to last surrender; heavy fighting lasted only from thirty to forty-five minutes. This variation explains the discrepancies in different accounts.

AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL

The inability of Ewing and Cadwalader to accomplish their missions made it out of the question for



THE GALE GROUP

Washington to continue his offensive to Princeton and Brunswick. With a large body of prisoners to evacuate, his own men exhausted, and knowing that other enemy forces were nearby, Washington had no choice but to withdraw. The return proved even more arduous than the advance because the icing had gotten worse. Evacuation started at noon, and the rear guard did not reach its bivouacs until noon on the 27th.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

While most sources state that Washington crossed with about twenty-four hundred troops and eighteen guns, a more accurate estimate can be made from the returns compiled on 22 December. (St. Clair's brigade was not included in the return.) Green's column had around three thousand officers and men and Sullivan over thirty-five hundred. The two American casualties that are positively known are William Washington and James Monroe, both wounded. Washington also reported one or two privates wounded in the action, and probably several more men died as a result of exposure.

Of the 1,400 Hessians, 106 were killed or wounded (5 officers, 17 men killed; 6 officers, 78 men wounded). Including wounded prisoners, 918 Hessians were captured (32 officers, 92 noncommissioned officers,

29 individuals in such categories as musician and surgeon's mate, 25 servants, and 740 rank and file). The rest escaped. None of the handful of British light dragoons was a casualty.

SIGNIFICANCE

It is hard to overstate the importance of this battle to the American cause. It started the reversal of fortunes that kept the Revolution alive and began the erosion of the Germans' reputation of invincibility that culminated the following autumn at Red Bank. Americans no longer feared them, and the British started to relegate them mostly to garrison activity. And, most significantly, the experimental use of combined arms brigades in this battle convinced Washington to adopt that formation permanently.

SEE ALSO *Alexander, William; Cadwalader, John; Durham Boats; Fermoy, Matthias Alexis de Roche; Fort Washington, New York; Glover, John; Greene, Nathanael; Hamilton, Alexander; Mercer, Hugh; Monroe, James; New Jersey Campaign; Rall, Johann Gottlieb; St. Clair, Arthur; Stephen, Adam; Sullivan, John; Washington, William; White Plains, New York.*

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TRESCOTT, LEMUEL. (1751–1826). Continental officer, Massachusetts. Born at Dorchester, Massachusetts, on 23 March 1751, Trescott was commissioned as a captain in Colonel John Brewer's Massachusetts Regiment on 19 May 1775. He held this rank in the Sixth Continental Regiment (Massachusetts) in 1776, and in Colonel David Henley's Additional Continental Regiment in 1777. On 20 May 1778 he was promoted to major, and on 22 April 1779 was transferred to Colonel Henry Jackson's Additional Continental Regiment, which was designated the Sixteenth Massachusetts on 23 July 1780. Major Trescott was transferred to the Ninth Massachusetts on 1 January 1781 and led the raid on Treadwell's Neck, 10 October 1781. As the Massachusetts Line shrank through two successive reorganizations, he became major of the Seventh Massachusetts on 1 January 1783 and, nominally, of the Fourth Massachusetts on 12 June 1783. On furlough in Connecticut from 24 April 1783, he remained on the rolls until the Continental Army was disbanded in November 1783. On 4 March 1791, he returned to military service as major of the Second United States Infantry, serving until he resigned on 28 December 1791. He settled on Passamaquoddy Bay, Maine, and engaged in lumbering with Colonel John Crane, formerly of the Continental artillery. He died at Lubec, Maine, on 13 August 1826.

SEE ALSO *Long Island, New York; Treadwell's Neck.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

TROIS RIVIÈRES. 8 June 1776. Canada Invasion. An American defeat during the Canada invasion. When American reinforcements under Generals John Sullivan and William Thompson assembled at St. Johns on 1 June, they learned of the shattered condition of the army that General John Thomas had led back from Quebec. American authorities still hoped to hold Canada as the fourteenth colony, and to further that goal, the Canadian Department field army would attempt to push back toward Quebec. Sullivan directed Thompson to take two thousand of the best troops to attack Trois Rivières as

a staging area. This town lay on the north bank of the St. Lawrence, about halfway between Montreal and Quebec, and was believed by Sullivan to be held by only four hundred men. Actually, General Burgoyne's regulars had started arriving there by ship, and the place was defended by about six thousand men under Brigadier General Simon Fraser.

Starting on 6 June, Thompson dropped down the river in bateaux to a point 10 miles from his objective. Moving by water again the next night, he landed at 3 A.M. on the morning of the 8th about 3 miles away. Here he left 250 men to guard the boats and started forward in four columns led by Arthur St. Clair, William Irvine, William Maxwell, and Anthony Wayne. (Thompson and these four subordinates all were outstanding commanders.) A plan calling for multiple elements moving in the dark over unfamiliar terrain to strike a target simultaneously was probably beyond the troops' abilities. Trouble started when their guide got lost and the men spent hours floundering in a swamp, which exhausted the troops. When they finally reached the river road shortly before dawn, three British warships chased them back into the cover of the swamp.

That firing of the warships alerted the British. Troops in the town moved into defensive positions, while those still on shipping poured ashore. Combat patrols sent out soon made contact with the American advance and identified the threat. About 7 A.M. Anthony Wayne led two hundred men in an attack that routed a patrol, and Thompson followed with the rest of the command to continue the pursuit. But the Americans then hit a line of entrenchments manned by vastly superior forces and covered by guns from the river. Unaware of the true odds, Thompson attacked and was repulsed. With a misguided courage he tried to organize another attempt, but his command was too scattered, and nothing more than an irregular patter of musketry could be delivered. In a matter of minutes the battle was over and the Americans found themselves in a race to escape capture.

Carleton pursued but used caution. He also took advantage of having absolute control of the sea (in this case, the river) and sent his armed vessels upstream to cut Thompson off. The boat guard escaped with its bateaux, but the rest of the Americans had to make their way out through swamps in great hardship and under constant threat of attack by Indians or Canadian Loyalists. The last of the eleven hundred survivors straggled into Sorel the evening of 11 June.

Total American losses were about four hundred, mostly prisoners. Thompson was one of the captives. The British lost five killed and fourteen wounded.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion; Irvine, William; Maxwell, William; St. Clair, Arthur; Sullivan, John; Thomas, John; Thompson, William; Wayne, Anthony.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

TRONSON DU COUDRAY, PHILIPPE CHARLES JEAN BAPTISTE.

(1738–1777). Continental general. France. Born in Reims, he became an artillery lieutenant in 1760 and a captain in 1766. On 14 September 1768 he was promoted to *chef de brigade*. His brother, Alexandre, was lawyer to Marie Antoinette. He tutored the king's brothers, the comte d'Artois and the duc de Chartres, in the art of war and was technical adviser to several ministers of war, including Saint Germain. He was also a prolific writer. Selected to cull the arsenals for matériel that might be sent covertly to America without impairing French combat effectiveness, he worked with the great Gribeauval, whose new system of artillery had just been adopted in France. He also supervised the selection of artillery and engineer officers who would go to America as technical advisers. Gribeauval, Beaumarchais, and Silas Deane were impressed not only by his zeal and professional competence but also by his spirit of cooperation. On 11 September 1776 Deane signed an agreement that du Coudray would accompany a shipment of officers, men, and matériel to America and would then be commissioned major general with the title of general of artillery and ordinance, and that he would have "the direction of whatever relates to the Artillery and Corps of Engineers."

Du Coudray reached America in May 1777. Although Deane had exceeded his authority, Congress had to treat du Coudray with respect for fear of alienating powers near the French throne. John Adams expressed the quandary in two letters of June 1777. To Nathanael Greene, he swore that a foreigner such as du Coudray "shall never have my consent to be at the head of the artillery." Yet to James Warren he wrote, "His interest is so great and so near the throne, that it would be impolitick not to avail ourselves of him." Greene, Knox, and Sullivan threatened Congress in a letter read on 5 July that they would resign if du Coudray were made senior to them. Congress responded on 7 July by denouncing their threats as an "invasion of the liberties of the people." Four other French engineers who had arrived before him—Duportail, Gouvion, Laumoy, and La Radière—complained that he was not even in the French Royal Corps of Engineers. On 11 August, Congress voted a solution that at least satisfied

the disgruntled American generals. They made du Coudray a major general "of the staff," as they later did with Conway, so he had no command authority over the major generals "of the line." Instead, they declared him inspector general of ordnance and military manufactories. Congress still had contrived nothing more than an interim solution, but the problem soon resolved itself. On 15 September 1777, he rode his horse onto the Schuylkill Ferry; the horse was spooked and rode out the other end and into the river. Du Coudray was drowned. He was buried that afternoon in Philadelphia.

SEE ALSO *Adams, John; Beaumarchais and the American Revolution; Conway, Thomas; Deane, Silas; Duportail; Gouvion, Jean Baptiste; Greene, Nathanael; Laumoy, Jean Baptiste Joseph, Chevalier de.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

TRUMBULL, BENJAMIN. (1735–1820). Clergyman and historian. Connecticut. Eldest son of Benjamin Trumbull Sr., Trumbull was graduated from Yale College in 1759 and studied theology under Eleazar Wheelock. On 24 December 1760 he became pastor of the Congregational Church in New Haven, where, save for six months in 1776, he served continuously until his death sixty years later. His single absence was to serve as chaplain of Wadsworth's Brigade from 24 June to 25 December 1776. At the urging of prominent citizens of Connecticut, including Governor Jonathan Trumbull, he undertook to write the history of his state. Without neglecting his pastoral duties, and working under great difficulties, it took him more than 20 years to publish his *Complete History of Connecticut from 1630 to 1713* (1797). An expanded, two volume edition appeared in 1818: *Complete History of Connecticut . . . to the Year 1764*. His *General History of the United States . . . 1492–1792* was to be a three-volume work, but he lived to complete only the first volume, to the year 1765, which appeared in 1810. He published 16

other pamphlets and books, three of them political and the others religious in nature. From material collected by Trumbull, *A Compendium of the Indian Wars in New England*, edited by F. B. Hartranft, was published in 1924. Trumbull's faithful chronicle of events in Connecticut retains considerable historical value.

SEE ALSO *Trumbull Family*; *Trumbull, John*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

TRUMBULL, JOHN. (1756–1843). “The painter of the Revolution.” Connecticut. The youngest of six children of Governor Jonathan Trumbull, John was a sickly child who had severe convulsions caused by overlapping bones of the skull. This defect healed in his third year, but he severely injured his left eye about a year later. Interested in drawing early in life, he was prevented by his father from studying under John Singleton Copley in Boston. He was sent instead to Harvard College, from which he graduated in 1773. He started teaching school in Lebanon, and continued to teach himself art. When the war began John was appointed adjutant to General Joseph Spencer, and on 27 July 1775 became an aide to General George Washington, who had seen some of Trumbull's drawings of enemy positions and thought he could put his talents to military use. Trumbull did not feel at ease in this post, however, and he accepted a commission as brigade major on 15 August 1775. He took part in the action on Dorchester Heights, went with the army to New York City, and on 28 June 1776 became deputy adjutant general to Horatio Gates, with the rank of colonel. He resigned on 19 April 1777 and spent time in Boston studying art before volunteering as an aide to John Sullivan for the actions around Newport, Rhode Island, between July and August 1778. In May 1780 he sailed for France and, with the help of Benjamin Franklin and John Temple, got himself accepted as a pupil by Benjamin West in London. On 19 November 1780 he was arrested on suspicion of treason and ultimately released through the efforts of Charles Fox and Edmund Burke. He moved to the Continent, attempted to raise a loan for Connecticut through his father's Dutch bankers, and then returned to Boston.

By December 1783 Trumbull was back in London at the studio of West. After two years painting classical subjects, he turned to the history of the American Revolution. The first paintings in this series, the “The Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker's Hill” and “The Death of General Montgomery in the Attack of Quebec,” were done under the direction of West and were heavily influenced by West's own “Death of General Wolfe at

Quebec” (1772). They were completed in the spring of 1786. Trumbull started “The Declaration of Independence.” This work took eight years to complete, in part because thirty-six of the forty-eight portraits in it were done from life. His “The Surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown,” “The Death of General Mercer at the Battle of Princeton,” and “The Capture of the Hessians at Trenton” were also done in West's studio. Meanwhile he had gone to Paris to have his first two American works published as engravings. Finding that his American subjects were not particularly relished in England, he painted a British success, “Sortie Made by the Garrison at Gibraltar.” In 1787 and 1789 he revisited Paris to paint portraits of French and British officers. He stayed with Jefferson, who offered him a post as private secretary, but Trumbull declined and in 1789 returned to America.

In Philadelphia Trumbull did a number of portraits, starting with Washington. In 1793 he became private secretary to John Jay, and used the opportunity to return to Europe to supervise the engraving of the work he had already completed. He performed his official duties with distinction, and returned to America in the spring of 1804 with a pretty English wife, Sarah Hope, néé Harvey. He resumed his painting, but his art had declined. In March 1817 he was commissioned by Congress to do four life-size, 12-by-18-foot paintings for the Capitol, which was being restored after suffering damage during the War of 1812. Working in New York City from miniatures previously executed, he took seven years to complete the canvases, for which he was paid \$8,000 apiece. The paintings—“The Surrender of General Burgoyne at Saratoga,” “The Surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown,” “The Declaration of Independence,” and “The Resignation of Washington”—were controversial. The one-eyed Trumbull's greatest skill was as a miniaturist; he had not done large figures well even during his prime.

In 1831 he gave his unsold paintings to Yale College in return for an annuity, and designed a building to hold them, thus creating the first college-affiliated art gallery in the United States. Becoming cantankerous and haughty as disappointments and waning talent clouded his old age, Trumbull published his *Autobiography* in 1841. He died two years later at the age of 87. The art historian Theodore Sizer concludes that “. . . no schoolboy but sees the Revolution through his eyes. His 250 to 300 faithful representations, drawn from life, of the principal actors and actions of the Revolution make him at once the chief, the most prolific, and the most competent visual recorder of that heroic period.”

SEE ALSO *Trumbull Family*.



The Sortie Made by the Garrison at Gibraltar (1789). Trumbull painted this scene of a famous episode in British history when he discovered that his American subjects were not particularly relished in England. © GEOFFREY CLEMENTS/CORBIS

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

TRUMBULL, JOHN (THE POET).

(1751–1831). Connecticut. A second cousin of the painter John Trumbull, this John Trumbull is remembered for his comic epic, *M’Fingal*, the narrative of a Tory squire’s misfortunes. “Reprinted more than 30 times between 1782 and 1840, it was the most popular American poem of its length before Longfellow’s *Evangeline*” (Alexander

Cowie in DAB). “It borrowed much of its style from the seventeenth-century English versifier, Samuel Butler, the author of *Hudibras*. Hudibrastic satire, crude but sometimes effectively epigrammatic, was popular in America at this time as a vehicle for the expression of political grievances” (Dennis R. Dean in ODNB). Trumbull wanted to pioneer an independent American aesthetic in poetry, but it was a goal he did not achieve. “He could not conceive of poetry in forms not established by English predecessors. In politics as in literature, Trumbull was fundamentally conservative” (ibid.).

Tremendously precocious, he passed the entrance examination to Yale College at the age of seven but was forced to wait until the more mature age of thirteen before being allowed to enter. He was graduated in 1767 and received his master’s degree in 1770. In 1773 he passed his bar examination and moved to Boston, where he continued his studies under John Adams. When Adams left Boston in August 1774, Trumbull moved to New Haven, which he left in 1777 for the relative safety of his native Westbury (later in Watertown), Connecticut

Although he was a Patriot and had been writing clever satire since his college days, Trumbull's work had little popular appeal during the war. *M'Fingal* was published early in 1776, almost simultaneously with Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*; it had only three editions during the war, whereas 120,000 copies of *Common Sense* were sold within less than three months. Not until after the war was *M'Fingal* accepted as an important literary achievement. Although Trumbull was the leader of an important group of writers and poets called the Connecticut (or Hartford) Wits, after 1782 his main interest turned to law and politics. He held his first office in 1789, when he became state's attorney for Hartford County. Appointed judge of the Connecticut superior court in 1801 and judge of the supreme court of errors in 1808, he lost these positions for political reasons in 1819. The next year, *The Poetical Works of John Trumbull* was published in two volumes. Five years later he moved to Detroit, where he died after living there six years.

SEE ALSO *M'Fingal*; *Salem, Massachusetts*; *Trumbull Family*.

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TRUMBULL, JONATHAN, SR.

(1710–1785). Governor of Connecticut. The great-grandson of the founder of the Trumbull Family in Connecticut, Jonathan changed the spelling of his name from Trumble in 1766. Having graduated from Harvard College in 1727, he was preparing for the ministry when his elder brother, Joseph, died in 1731. Joseph had been their father's associate in a large mercantile business in Lebanon, Connecticut, and Jonathan felt it was his duty to succeed him in this responsibility. By 1760 he was a major figure in the commerce of the colony, but a credit crisis during the depression that followed the final French and Indian war left him virtually bankrupt in 1762. His economic travails did not affect his standing with the voters of Connecticut, however. He rose steadily in politics, and in 1766 he became deputy governor and chief justice. On the death of Governor William Pitkin in October 1769, Trumbull succeeded to the governorship, an office to which he was re-elected annually until his voluntary retirement in 1784, the year before his death.

A strong supporter of colonial rights and an early advocate for independence, Trumbull was a pillar of the Patriot cause. He was the only colonial governor to retain his office even after the colony gained its independence and became a state, and the only governor to serve throughout the war. Connecticut was a major source of

war materiel, especially during the first two years of the conflict. Trumbull's main contribution to the war effort was organizing its resources of food, clothing, and munitions for use by General George Washington's army, a job for which his experience and connections as a merchant prepared him well. He was such an important figure that he received an average of three letters a month from Washington during this period. (Washington's first commissary general was the governor's son, Joseph Trumbull, and the second was another Connecticut man, Jeremiah Wadsworth. The Connecticut Coast Raid of July 1779 was prompted by a desire of the British to end the state's contributions to the rebel army.)

Trumbull had to cope with political opposition at home, where his policies seemed to favor mercantile and commercial groups over farmers and artisans. It was also rumored that he was secretly trading with the enemy. In the gubernatorial elections of 1780 through 1783 his popular majority was reduced to a mere plurality, but the General Assembly voted to retain him in office each year. In January 1782 he demanded a legislative investigation. He was completely vindicated, and the investigation found evidence that the rumors were enemy-inspired. He was about 5 feet 7 inches in height, austere in dress and manner, and very much what the French traveler, the Marquis de Chastellux, called "the great magistrate of a little republic."

Writing in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, historian Bruce C. Daniels notes the following:

Instead of courting voters and listening to their opinions, he expected the deference he felt he had earned through a lifetime of service. More dignified and reserved than haughty, Trumbull nevertheless appeared remote and cold to the new type of participatory voter who emerged during the revolutionary era—a great leader of a movement whose inner vitality tragically escaped his knowledge.

Trumbull retired in May 1784 in the face of certain electoral defeat. He spent his last fifteen months straightening out his long-neglected personal affairs.

In the nineteenth century, several biographers erroneously claimed that Trumbull was the prototype for "Brother Jonathan," the name invented by whig historians to describe their ideal of the simple citizen of the fledgling republic. Few images of Trumbull could be further from the truth.

SEE ALSO *Connecticut Coast Raid*; *Trumbull Family*; *Trumbull, Joseph*; *Wadsworth, Jeremiah*.

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TRUMBULL, JONATHAN, JR.

(1740–1809). Paymaster General, comptroller of the treasury, military secretary to Washington. Connecticut. Son and namesake of Governor Jonathan Trumbull Sr. and kin to other famous members of the Trumbull Family, Jonathan Jr. entered Harvard College at the age of 15 and graduated in 1759. Like his older brother, Joseph, he joined the family mercantile business in Lebanon, Connecticut, and ran it after 1767 when their father became more involved in the politics of resisting British imperial policies. His neighbors elected him a town selectman in 1770, and sent him to the General Assembly in 1774 and 1775. On 28 July 1775 Congress named him paymaster general of the Northern Department, a difficult office that he held until 29 July 1778. At that time he resigned to settle the accounts of his brother, Joseph, who had been commissary general of the Continental Army and who had died on 23 July.

On 3 November 1778 Congress unanimously elected him as the first comptroller of the treasury, and he served for six months until resigning in April 1779. In November he declined the office of commissioner of the board of the treasury. When Alexander Hamilton asked to leave General George Washington's staff in February 1781, Washington chose Trumbull as Hamilton's successor. Appointed lieutenant colonel and military secretary on 8 June 1781, Trumbull served through the Yorktown Campaign and to the end of the war. He resigned on 23 December 1783 and returned to Lebanon to take care of his personal affairs.

A strong supporter of the federal Constitution, Trumbull was elected to the first three congresses of the new government and became speaker of the House of Representatives in October 1794. He served three years in the Senate (1794–1796), resigning in June 1796 when elected deputy governor of Connecticut. He succeeded the late Governor Oliver Wolcott in December 1797, and held the post until he died of dropsy on 7 August 1809. Among his last political acts was his refusal to authorize the

use of Connecticut militia to enforce the Embargo Act, which closed all American ports to foreign trade. Although a strong nationalist, in January of 1809 he defied the Act of Congress (1807) because he considered it a violation of states' rights. The act was repealed in March 1809.

SEE ALSO *Hamilton, Alexander; Trumbull Family.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

TRUMBULL, JOSEPH. (1738–1778). First

commissary general of the Continental army. Connecticut. Eldest son of Governor Jonathan Trumbull and brother of the younger Jonathan Trumbull and of the painter John Trumbull, Joseph graduated from Harvard College in 1756. After studying the law, he joined his father's mercantile firm in Lebanon, one of the most important retail and wholesale businesses in eastern Connecticut. As one of Lebanon's representatives in the General Assembly after 1767, he shared his family's dislike of British colonial policies. In May 1773 the Assembly appointed him a member of its Committee of Correspondence, and in August 1774 elected him to the first Continental Congress as an alternate to Roger Sherman, but he did not get the opportunity to take a seat. Although he had served as captain of his local militia company in Lebanon, the Assembly selected him in April 1775 to be commissary general of the Connecticut forces at the Boston Siege because of his extensive mercantile and political connections. Impressed by his performance, and fully aware of the important role Governor Trumbull played in supporting the cause and the army, Commander in Chief George Washington on 10 July urged Congress to appoint Joseph as commissary general of the Continental Army. On 19 July 1775 the delegates complied with this request, giving Trumbull the rank and pay of a colonel and the job of feeding the army.

Logistics can be an overwhelming task in a modern army, but for Trumbull it was a pioneer effort in which he was handicapped not only by his own lack of logistical experience but also by lack of funds, lack of transportation, lack of support from jealous state and Congressional authorities, and lack of qualified subordinates. He was charged with dishonesty, but an inquiry directed by Washington in December 1775 exonerated him. In 1776

General Phillip Schuyler challenged his authority to control the provisioning of the Northern army, but Congress and Washington upheld Trumbull's position. His performance had not been perfect, however. The inquiry in December 1775 found fault with the prices he fixed for provisions, although it held that no fraud was involved, and his conduct in the clash with Schuyler had reflected the ill-tempered rivalry between New York and New England. In the spring of 1777 an impatient Congress approved an ill-advised reorganization that split Trumbull's job in two: one commissary general for purchases and another for issues. Trumbull refused the purchasing post because his deputies would report directly to Congress rather than to him. He pronounced the system unworkable and resigned on 2 August 1777. (When Congress re-established in the spring of 1778 the system under which Trumbull had operated, Jeremiah Wadsworth became commissary general.) Appointed by Congress to the new Board of War on 27 November 1777, he was forced by ill health to resign on 18 April 1778. Worn down by his labors, he died 23 July 1778 at the age of 41. Faced by the complexity of supplying an army of unprecedented size that operated over vast distances, a problem exacerbated by the structural impediments, inefficiencies, inelasticity, and inexperience that were endemic in the late colonial economy, Trumbull did a masterful job of providing the material resources that enabled the American army to fight.

SEE ALSO *Trumbull Family; Wadsworth, Jeremiah.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

TRUMBULL FAMILY. John Trumble founded the American branch of the Trumbull family when he emigrated from England to Roxbury, Massachusetts, in 1639. The spelling "Trumbull" was adopted in 1766 by John's great-grandson Jonathan (1710–1785) and by other branches of the family about two years later. Several members of the family were famous during the Revolutionary era. Jonathan was governor of Connecticut from 1769 to 1784. His sons also had notable careers: Jonathan Jr. was governor of Connecticut from 1797 to 1809, Joseph was the first commissary general of the Continental Army, and John painted portraits of many

important figures of the revolutionary era. Two other Trumbulls were the sons of two first cousins of Jonathan the elder, and therefore were second cousins of the three brothers just mentioned. These cousins are Benjamin (1735–1820), a clergyman and historian, and John (1751–1831), a poet, wit, and jurist.

SEE ALSO *Trumbull, Benjamin; Trumbull, John; Trumbull, John (the poet); Trumbull, Jonathan, Jr.; Trumbull, Jonathan, Sr.; Trumbull, Joseph.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

TRUMBULL–IRIS ENGAGEMENT.

9 August 1781. Captain James Nicholson departed the Delaware Capes on 8 August, escorting a twenty-eight-sail convoy to the West Indies with his own twenty-eight-gun *Trumbull* and two privateers. The *Trumbull*, the last of the original Continental Navy frigates, had a crew composed for the most part of British deserters. The next day three British vessels gave chase, and the convoy scattered. The *Trumbull* was pulling away when a squall tore way part of two of her masts and left the rigging in shambles. Unable to get away, Nicholson tried to jettison the guns; but most of the crew refused to come on deck. The lead British frigate came up, the thirty-two-gun *Iris*. This vessel was the Continental Navy's *Hancock*, captured in 1777 by the *Rainbow* and taken into the Royal Navy under a new name. Nicholson, Lieutenants Richard Dale and Alexander Murray, and a small minority of the crew resisted for an hour and a half before being captured. The eighteen-gun *General Monk* came up at the end of the action but did not get a share of the prize money. Ironically, she had formerly been the American privateer *General Washington*.

SEE ALSO *Trumbull–Watt Engagement.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

TRUMBULL–WATT ENGAGEMENT.

1 June 1780. In May 1780 the last of the original Continental Navy frigates, the twenty-eight-gun

Trumbull, finally got to sea from New London, Connecticut, on her maiden voyage. On 1 June, about 250 miles north of Bermuda, Captain James Nicholson detected a sail and turned to investigate. The vessel was a thirty-two-gun ship from Liverpool, the *Watt*, sailing under a letter of marque and reprisal and commanded by John Coulthard. About twelve hours later, at 1 P.M., Nicholson cleared for action, and shortly thereafter the vessels engaged. In one of the hottest engagements of the naval war, they hammered away at each other at a range of fifty to eighty yards for two and a half hours, then separated. The *Watt* limped away to New York; the *Trumbull* had sustained so much damage that she could not catch up and headed for Boston. Nicholson's green crew had about 40 casualties out of 199 men; *Watt* had about 90 killed and wounded.

SEE ALSO *Trumbull–Iris Engagement*.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

TRYON, WILLIAM. (1729–1788). Royal governor of North Carolina and New York, British general. Well born, Tryon used his family connections to secure a lieutenancy in the prestigious First Regiment of Foot Guards in 1751. He was promoted to the rank of captain the same year. In 1757, he married Margaret Wake, heiress of a fortune and a relative of Lord Hillsborough (Wills Hill). Tryon saw military service during the Seven Years' War, during which he was in the Cherbourg-St. Malo operation (1758) and was almost killed. Also in 1758, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. Through the influence of Hillsborough, he was appointed lieutenant governor of North Carolina in 1764. A year later, when Governor Arthur Dobbs died, he was appointed governor.

Proving himself a successful administrator, Tryon reorganized the province's taxes; established the Anglican Church and a postal system; improved defenses; erected "Tryon Palace," a new governor's mansion at New Bern; drew a boundary between North and South Carolina; and attempted, unsuccessfully, to get London's approval for a provincial currency. He sympathized with the Carolinians in their opposition to the Stamp Act in 1765 and the Townshend Duties in 1769, but

nevertheless attempted to enforce the measures. His final act as governor of North Carolina was to defeat the frontiersmen known as Regulators in the battle of the Alamance on 16 May 1771.

Replacing Lord Dunmore (John Murray) as governor of New York in late 1771, Tryon had difficulties with frontiersmen there as well. He became embroiled in a border controversy between New York and New Hampshire over the region that became Vermont. He got into difficulties with London when he granted enormous tracts of land to colonial aristocrats, and to himself. His avowed aim, as he explained to the British ministry, was to counteract "the general leveling spirit" that prevailed in many of England's American colonies, by imposing aristocratic landlords on tenants. In 1772 he also fostered hierarchy by establishing a militia system that granted all officers' commissions to "Gentlemen of first families" and created several independent companies for the provinces' richest citizens,

When Tryon was confronted in the mid-1770s with radical New Yorkers' resistance to the Tea Act, he attempted to isolate the protesters from the rest of the population. At the same time, he implored the ministry in London to end attempts to tax Americans. Failing in both these matters, he fled on 19 October 1775 to a British ship in New York harbor. Although he retained the governorship for the remainder of his tenure in the colonies, he concentrated on service in the British army. Having been promoted colonel in 1772, he used his military authority to organize Loyalist militias in New York. He welcomed General William Howe's army in July 1776, and acted as Howe's adviser during the fighting for the remainder of the year. On 1 January 1777 he was commissioned a major general in America and given command of Loyalist regiments in Howe's army. In April he led a successful raid against Danbury, Connecticut, and in October he joined Sir Henry Clinton in attacking the Highland Forts on the Hudson River. In 1778, he was appointed colonel of the Seventieth Regiment.

A year later, Tryon conducted savage attacks against Horseneck, New Haven, and Norwalk, all in Connecticut. Practicing what he called "desolation warfare," he unleashed merciless operations against both civilians and soldiers in an attempt to break their will to resist. In 1780, convinced that the war was unwinnable, he abandoned this policy. After serving in operations against Connecticut Farms and Springfield, New Jersey, in June 1780, he resigned his civil and military offices and returned to England. There he lived quietly and comfortably with his family until his death on 17 January 1788.

Before the War for America commenced in 1775, Tryon had sided with the colonists in opposing parliamentary taxes, even though he favored social hierarchy and

believed the Americans were too democratic. Hence, he was generally popular. But his advocacy of sanguinary warfare after that time destroyed his popularity and convinced the rebels that he was a brutal despot. By his own lights a friend of America, he found himself in an impossible situation, for Britain refused to make timely and necessary concessions in the early 1770s. Through no fault of his own, he was a victim of forces over which he exerted no control.

SEE ALSO *Dunmore's (or Cresap's) War; Regulators.*

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revised by Paul David Nelson

TRYON COUNTY, NEW YORK.

The half of New York province bordering on Canada and the Iroquois country was taken from Albany County in 1772 and named Tryon County in honor of Governor William Tryon. It comprised all the Mohawk Valley from a point about ten miles west of Schenectady and contained all the colonial settlements west and southwest of that place. (The main settlements of the Schoharie Valley were in Albany County.) It was renamed Montgomery County in 1784.

Sir William Johnson dominated the affairs of Tryon County until his death in 1774, when Guy Johnson became the leader of the Loyalist element. The latter group was driven into exile and returned to ravage the Mohawk Valley; the region, in fact, was subject to violent civil war between Patriot and Loyalist forces through much of the Revolution, with occasional incursions by Indians, British, and Continental troops.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Johnson, Guy; Johnson, Sir William; Tryon, William.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

TRYON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA.

Named for Governor William Tryon in 1769, it was located in the southwest part of the province and was a Loyalist stronghold for much of the Revolution. In 1779 the North Carolina legislature terminated Tryon County, forming the area into Rutherford and Lincoln Counties.

SEE ALSO *Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Tryon, William.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

TUFFIN, ARMAND CHARLES, MARQUIS DE LA ROUËRIE.

(1750–1793). French volunteer. Known in America as Colonel Armand, this wealthy nobleman was born at Fougères, France. Flag ensign in the French Guard in 1766, he was promoted to first ensign in 1771 and *sous lieutenant* on 9 April 1775. He seriously wounded the king's cousin, the comte de Bourbon-Beset, in a duel and was exiled from court. Toward the end of 1776 he sailed for America on the *Morris*. When three British warships pursued it into Chesapeake Bay, he and his companions defended themselves until forced to run the ship aground, abandon and destroy it, and escape overland on 11 April 1777.

On 10 May Robert Morris wrote a letter of introduction for Armand to Washington in which he stated that the Frenchman brought credit from “a Gentn to whom America is under the most important obligations.” In fact, Congress's initial decision to appoint him a major was quickly modified on 10 May to the rank of colonel. Armand would become one of the few foreign officers who impressed Washington.

For what must have been their first action, at Short Hills on 26 June 1777, Armand's men fought against great odds; the unit lost thirty killed out of eighty engaged, and Armand saved a gun by his personal courage. He also exhibited great skill at Head of Elk; Brandywine; Whitemarsh; and, particularly, for his attack against Cornwallis's rear guard while serving as Lafayette's second in command in New Jersey. He was at Valley Forge and Monmouth and then engaged in partisan operations in Westchester County, New York, and Connecticut.

On 27 December 1777, Armand proposed creation of a partisan force, an idea that Lafayette supported in a deluge of letters. Washington at first strongly opposed the inclusion of British deserters, who he feared would be “debauching our own men” but later preferred it as a means of employing foreign officers. Congress eventually

relented and on 25 June 1778 authorized a unit of Free and Independent Chasseurs.

Congress rejected Armand's request for promotion to brigadier general. When he then requested a leave of absence to return to France, Congress complied (probably to his surprise) on 5 February 1779 but commended him for his "disinterested zeal & services." He decided to delay his departure, and Congress complied by modifying the leave until the end of the next campaign.

On 18 January 1780 the Board of War supported Armand's promotion before Congress, but Washington opposed it as fomenting "jealousies and discontents" among the other officers. Armand requested his transfer to the Southern Department and the merger of his corps with Pulaski, which Washington endorsed on 6 February 1780. He joined de Kalb in North Carolina in July 1780, after the fall of Charleston. The next month Armand's troops were given an improper mission by Gates and performed poorly at Camden. On 21 October 1780 the old Pulaski Legion was redesignated Armand's Partisan Corps. Again in November 1780, Congress denied his request for promotion to Brigadier General. In February 1781 he received six months' leave to return to France to obtain clothing and equipment for his corps at his own expense, but he returned in time for the final operations in Virginia. Some forty survivors of his unit joined Lafayette in May 1781 and fought at Green Spring on 6 July. On 13 February 1782 Washington sent Armand and his legion to South Carolina, where he remained until recalled to the main army in September. On 26 March 1783 he was appointed brigadier general and chief of cavalry. Having been highly commended by Congress for his war service, Armand was discharged on 25 November 1783. Washington glowingly detailed his record of service in a letter of 15 December 1783. When Armand petitioned Congress on 22 January 1784 for an advance, Congress responded by simply commending him on 27 February 1784 for his "bravery, activity and zeal." He embarked from Philadelphia for France on 18 May 1784 after severely criticizing the French minister, Barbé de Marbois. On 8 April 1784, Congress authorized the issuing of notes to pay Armand.

Armand received the cross of the Order of Saint Louis in 1781, but upon his return to France, he did not receive command of a regiment. Instead he was offered the rank of colonel and command of the cavalry battalion of Le Roussillon, which he refused. He joined a group of other Breton nobles who carried the complaints of those nobles to the king and who were imprisoned in the Bastille in July 1788 for their insolence. In 1791 he headed a secret organization stretching from Brittany through Anjou and Poitou to act with emigré armies. He died the night of 29–30 January 1793 at the Chateau of Guyomarais.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Camden, South Carolina; De Kalb, Johann; Green Spring (Jamestown Ford, Virginia); Monmouth, New Jersey; Morris, Robert (1734–1806); Short Hills (Metuchen), New Jersey; Valley Forge Winter Quarters, Pennsylvania; Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

TUPPER, BENJAMIN. (1738–1792). Continental officer. Massachusetts. Born in Stoughton (later Sharon), Massachusetts, on 11 March 1738, Tupper's father died when he was young, and after a common school education, the boy was apprenticed to a Dorchester tanner until he was sixteen years old. During the French and Indian War he served in the company commanded by his uncle, Captain Nathaniel Perry, and became a sergeant in 1759. After a few years as a school-teacher in Easton, Massachusetts, he married in 1762, and moved to Chesterfield, in the western part of the province, two years later. In 1774 he served as a militia lieutenant in ridding his area of Tory influence. On 25 April 1775 he became major of Colonel John Fellows's Massachusetts Regiment. Early on the morning of 8 July, he and Captain John Crane led a party of volunteers and two guns in a raid that routed the British from an outpost on Boston Neck. On 31 July he led a highly successful raid to Great

Brewster Island to destroy the Boston lighthouse. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 4 November, and in the reorganization of 1 January 1776, he became lieutenant colonel of the Twenty-first Continental Regiment. Commanding a flotilla of gunboats and galleys on the Hudson River, on 3 August he attacked the British ships that had penetrated to the Tappan Sea on 12–18 July. After taking part in the Battle of Long Island on 27 August, he was named lieutenant colonel of the Second Massachusetts Regiment on 1 November 1776 and colonel of the Eleventh Massachusetts Regiment on 7 July 1777.

He fought in the campaign against Burgoyne as part of John Paterson's Third Massachusetts Brigade and spent the winter of 1777–1778 with the main army at Valley Forge. He participated in the Monmouth Campaign (June 1778), worked on the defenses of West Point, and served on the New York frontier. In the reorganization of 1 January 1781 he assumed command of the Tenth Massachusetts, and in the reorganization of 1 January 1783 he was transferred to the Sixth Massachusetts. He retired from the army on 12 June and was breveted brigadier general on 30 September 1783.

Returning to Chesterfield, he was elected to the state legislature. During Shays's Rebellion of 1786–1787 he had an active part in the defense of nearby Springfield. Having signed the Newburgh Petition of 1783 asking Congress to give western lands to veterans, he was intimately involved during the last ten years of his life with the westward movement. He represented Massachusetts in the corps of state surveyors under Thomas Hutchins sent west by Congress in 1785 and joined Rufus Putnam in forming the Ohio Company of Associates in January 1786. In early 1788 they led the first settlers to what became Marietta, Ohio. Both veterans took a leading part in the affairs of the new settlement. Tupper died at Marietta on 7 June 1792.

SEE ALSO *Great Brewster Island, Massachusetts.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

TURNBULL, GEORGE. Loyalist officer. Credited as the first into Fort Montgomery on 6 October 1777, Captain Turnbull of De Lancey's Loyal American Regiment was promoted for his heroism and given command of one of the battalions. The following year he went south with the expedition of Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell that captured Savannah on 29 December 1778. As part of General James Paterson's command, Turnbull—now a lieutenant colonel—participated in the Charleston expedition in 1780 and remained

with the main British army while the other De Lancey battalion, commanded by J. Harris Cruger, was stationed at Ninety Six. As part of the defenses of Camden, Turnbull commanded the outpost at Rocky Mount. From here he sent out the expedition that came to grief at Williamson's Plantation on 12 July 1780, and he successfully held out in the face of Sumter's attack against Rocky Mount on 1 August 1780.

SEE ALSO *Rocky Mount, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia (29 December 1778); Williamson's Plantation, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

TURNING MOVEMENT. A wide (strategic) envelopment that avoids the enemy's main battle position and by threatening some vital point to his rear forces him to leave his original position either to defend that vital point or to take some other course of action. The term comes from its effect of turning the enemy out of his position, not because it is executed by one's turning around (enveloping) him. The term is employed in its correct sense in military works but is too esoteric for most popular writers, who incorrectly use it to mean any kind of envelopment, tactical or strategic. Howe's maneuver at Brandywine and Washington's at Princeton are examples of turning movements.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Princeton, New Jersey.*

Mark M. Boatner

TURTLE BAY, NEW YORK. Turtle Bay was a small, rock-bound cove in the East River at the foot of today's 47th Street in Manhattan. The area has been reclaimed and is now covered by the United Nations Park, which is located north of the United Nations building. While the cove once did contain turtles, its name is more probably a corruption of its early Dutch name, Deutal Bay, because it was shaped like a knife-blade, *deutal* in Dutch.

The cove was the site of a British storehouse that was captured at midnight on 20 July 1775. This coup was led by John Lamb, Isaac Sears, Alexander McDougall, and Marinus Willett, all of whom were New York Sons of Liberty who later became famous in the Revolution. The raiders left Greenwich, Connecticut, in a sloop, passed through Hell Gate at

Turtle Bay, New York

twilight, and surprised the guard at midnight. The storehouse was still standing seventy-five years later, and is the subject of a sketch by Benson J. Lossing. Part of General George Washington's army was posted here in September 1776 before the British landed at nearby Kips Bay (which was located at present-day 34th Street in Manhattan).

SEE ALSO *New York Campaign*.

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revised by Barnet Schecter

TWO PENNY ACTS SEE *Parson's Cause*.

U

UNADILLA, NEW YORK. 6–8 October 1778. On the boundary line fixed in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 between the Iroquois Confederation and colonial settlements of Tryon County, Unadilla was inhabited by whites when the Revolution started. In June 1777 Joseph Brant arrived with about seventy-five Indians, demanding provisions. The inhabitants, hoping to avoid conflict, gave him what he demanded, but when the Indians returned two days later for a forced requisition of livestock, the inhabitants decided it was time to leave for a more secure location. General Nicholas Herkimer marched to Unadilla in July with 380 militia and met with Brant. The Mohawk chief apparently was feuding with Guy Johnson, superintendent of Indian affairs and Loyalist leader, at the time and sought to negotiate neutrality for provisions. When Brant and Herkimer could come to no understanding, the latter withdrew, leaving Brant in control of Unadilla, which he made his headquarters. Located on the Susquehanna about twenty miles above Oquaga and forty miles south of Lake Otsego, Unadilla was a natural assembly area for attacks on the settlements in Mohawk Valley. After Brant had used it for precisely this purpose, raiding German Flats on 13 September 1778, the rebels countered with a punitive expedition against Unadilla.

Lieutenant Colonel William Butler left Schoharie on 2 October with his Fourth Pennsylvania Continentals, a detachment of Morgan's riflemen, and a small body of rangers. Moving down the upper reaches of the Delaware, he spent sixteen days destroying Indian posts around Unadilla. Brant was raiding Cookhouse, on the Delaware due east of Oquaga, when his stores at the latter place were destroyed and he was forced to return to Unadilla. He

retaliated with the Cherry Valley Massacre on 11 November 1778.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Cherry Valley Massacre, New York; German Flats, New York.*

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UNIFORMS OF THE REVOLUTION.

Military apparel of standard material, cut, color, and appearance came into widespread use only about a century before the American Revolution. Several trends influenced the adoption of uniforms. Because regimental commanders in European armies were required to furnish their men with clothing, and clothing was cheaper to buy in bulk, "uniformity" had an economic basis. Properly cut and sewn, uniforms gave the soldier a set of clothes in which he could fight and work effectively. Uniforms could be adorned in various ways, which was both a way to identify leaders within a unit and a means of distinguishing among units. Distinctive uniforms helped to raise morale, make recruiting easier, and identify units on the battlefield.

DISTINCTIVENESS IN UNIFORMS

Because uniforms were first introduced when European armies fought each other at close range on compact

battlefields, with infantrymen arrayed shoulder to shoulder in the linear tactics of the period, uniforms were designed to be distinctive and visible. Rather than the dull colors and camouflage patterns that have been synonymous with soldiers' clothing since the late nineteenth century, uniforms in the eighteenth century were generally meant to be seen. Certain uniform colors became associated with particular states: white with France; blue with Prussia; and none more so than scarlet with Britain, although there was enough variation within armies and coalition partners so that a commander on a swirling battlefield would have been unwise to assume that he could always distinguish friends from foes by the color of their uniforms.

Soldiers received only one set of clothes, which, when complete, might comprise a coat of relatively heavy fabric (usually with long tails that were normally turned up), a lighter-weight waistcoat, a linen shirt, a pair of coarse breeches (or gaiters or overalls, as available), a pair of short linen stockings, and rough leather shoes. Various buckles and buttons kept the clothing in place, along with the accoutrements that hung on leather belts from the soldier's shoulders and waist. Adornments in the British army included such details as lace around the coat's buttonholes, burnished coat buttons bearing the regimental number, and pressed metal helmet plates on the tall caps of the elite grenadiers that carried distinctive devices of king and country. The chief means of distinguishing among similarly uniformed British regiments were the coat's facings, the contrasting colors of cloth turned up at the collar, cuffs, and lapels that were set by royal warrant in 1768.

As a mark of special favor, usually to recall some battlefield achievement, certain British regiments bore the adjective "royal" in their name and were allowed to wear blue facings, as, for example, the 7th (Royal Fusiliers), the 23rd (Royal Welsh Fusiliers), the 42nd (Royal Highland Regiment), and the 60th (Royal American Regiment). Other facing colors included variations on yellow (buff for the 3rd, 14th, and 22nd; pale yellow for the 20th, 26th, and 30th; and just yellow for the 9th and 38th), orange (35th), gosling green (5th), willow green (24th), black (50th and 58th), white (43rd and 47th), and even red (33rd). Perhaps the least uniform aspect of British army clothing were the kilts worn first by the 42nd Highlanders and subsequently by all newly raised Highland Scots regiments. Uniforms were paid for by deductions from the soldiers' wages and were replaced only when they wore out.

During the War for American Independence, British redcoats fought alongside two other groups of soldiers with different uniform traditions. Of the contingents of line infantry hired from six German states to augment the British forces, five followed the dominant Prussian uniform style in color (blue) and cut. Only the Anhalt-Zerbst

troops were uniformed in white coats in the more ornate Austrian style. Loyalist units, when uniformed, received green coats early in the war and red coats after 1778. The most effective and renowned of the German and Loyalist units were the light troops, mounted and on foot, all of whom wore green coats during the war. The jägers from Hesse-Cassel wore grass green coats, faced and lined with crimson red, and black felt bicorne hats, similar in style to the Prussian jägers on which they were modeled. John Graves Simcoe's Queen's Rangers and Banastre Tarleton's British Legion retained their green uniforms after 1778. Both units were so active and tenacious that the color green earned them their opponents' fear and respect. The Rangers' silver crescent moon, worn points up on the front of their light infantry caps, was the most distinctive, and distinguished, Loyalist military insignia of the war.

AMERICAN UNIFORMS TO 1779

American soldiers had been raised in the British uniform tradition during the colonial period, but their sources of supply were so haphazard and varied that their appearance in the field was usually anything but uniform. Regulations during the French and Indian War had generally called for provincial troops to be outfitted in blue coats. George Washington, for instance, had a formal portrait painted by Charles Willson Peale in April 1772 in which he wore the blue coat with red facings of the Virginia Regiment. In May 1775 he wore to sessions of the Continental Congress the blue coat with buff facings of the Fairfax Independent Company, blue and buff being the traditional colors of the Whigs who opposed royal tyranny. Since the motives for joining the militia were social and political as well as martial, some militia units, particularly in urban areas like New York City, Philadelphia, and Charleston, had uniforms. Otherwise, militia units in all regions throughout the war turned out in their own civilian clothing, with their own weapons and accoutrements. A few units raised after the outbreak of hostilities were well uniformed in blue, notably Captain John Chester's company from Wethersfield, Connecticut, at the siege of Boston, and Colonel John Haslett's Delaware Battalion, the "blue hen's chicks," that marched from Wilmington for the defense of New York City in 1776. Regiments raised in New York and Pennsylvania in 1775 and 1776 wore a mix of blue, green, and brown coats, the last two colors being popular because the dyes were locally available. Some officers from New England wore their old uniforms from the French and Indian War, but most soldiers across the colonies went to war in what amounted to a combination of their everyday work clothes and a uniform coat.

Washington, who understood the morale value of a good uniform, made every effort to acquire appropriate clothing for his troops. When the Virginia and

Pennsylvania riflemen arrived at Cambridge wearing hunting shirts, a garment well-known to Washington, the commander in chief recommended to Congress that, because “the army in general, [and the troops raised in Massachusetts in particular, [are] very deficient in necessary clothing, . . . I am of the opinion that a number of hunting shirts not less than 10,000 would in a great degree remove this difficulty in the cheapest and quickest manner.” Hunting shirts were relatively easy to make, being, according to Silas Deane, who had seen Pennsylvania riflemen in Philadelphia, a piece of stout linen cloth dyed the color of “a dry or fading leaf” that is made into a “kind of frock . . . reaching down below the knee, open before, with a large cape,” wrapped “around them tight” and tied “with their belt in which hangs their tomahawk” (Smith, *Letters of Delegates*, 1, pp. 436–438). Washington wanted the shirts in order to give the army a uniform appearance and “abolish those provincial distinctions which lead to jealousy and dissatisfaction,” but he was also aware of the psychological value of the hunting shirt, since the British would prudently assume that any American wearing one might be a crack shot. Congress agreed with Washington’s suggestion and directed him to buy tow cloth (made of short, broken fibers from flax, hemp, or jute) in Rhode Island and Connecticut, but when the cloth proved to be unavailable, the idea was abandoned.

The Continental army retained a motley appearance as long as it relied on domestic cloth production (linen was woven at home, but wool and woolen cloth were scarce), British uniforms found in supply ships captured by American privateers, or contracts made with European suppliers by American purchasing agents overseas. For his additional Continental Regiment, Colonel Samuel Blatchley Webb commandeered scarlet coats intended for British regiments in Canada that had been captured at sea in December 1776. The Second Pennsylvania, while at Valley Forge, received royal blue coats with scarlet facings, part of an order for thirty thousand uniforms placed with French manufacturers by Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin, the American commissioners to France. The Fourth New York in late 1778 received white coats faced with red from Boston suppliers. Colonel George Baylor outfitted his Third Regiment of Light Dragoons in 1778 in white coats with blue facings.

AMERICAN UNIFORMS FROM 1779

Only in the wake of the formal alliance with France did the Americans have access to sufficient stocks of uniforms for Washington to designate blue as the official army uniform color on 2 October 1779. The regulations specified that Continental infantry regiments from New England would wear blue faced with white; those from New York and New Jersey blue faced with buff; those from Pennsylvania,

Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia blue faced with red; and those from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia blue faced with blue. The artillery would wear blue faced with scarlet, and the light dragoons blue faced with white. Even after these regulations were promulgated, the uniforms of many units escaped standardization. When sent south in October 1780, Lee’s Legion, for example, wore short green jackets resembling those worn by the Queen’s Rangers and the British Legion.

In fact, Continental army units were lucky to get any clothing and shoes at all. The modern renderings of such superb artists and researchers as Charles M. Lefferts, H. Charles McBarron Jr., Frederick P. Todd, John R. Elting, Rene Chartrand, Peter F. Copeland, Eric I. Manders, Frederic Ray Jr., Herbert Knotel, Frederick T. Chapman, Clyde A. Risley, Eugene Lelievre, Don Troiani, and a host of others suggest, for purposes of illustration, a uniformity that rarely existed during the war. All armies had supply problems, and soldiers always had to accept what they could get.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. This name first appears in the Declaration of Independence, which is headed “The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States of America.” Elsewhere in the document, the “united” is not capitalized, although the last paragraph states, “these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be, Free and Independent States. . . .” On the same day that they adopted the Declaration of Independence, 4 July 1776, the delegates first used the name of the new nation in their Journals when John

Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson were elected to a committee “to bring in a device for a seal of the United States of America” (*Journals of the Continental Congress 1774 to 1789*, vol. 5, p. 518). The phrase “United States of North America” appeared in the Franco-American treaties of 1778 and occasionally was employed in official pronouncements. Congress resolved on 11 July 1778 that “United States of America” would be used on its bills of exchange, and it has been used since as the official name.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

UNITY OF COMMAND. One principle of war on which strategists still disagree is the method whereby the essential “unity of effort” is to be achieved in military operations, particularly when one is dealing with a military force of different services (for example, army and navy) and of different nationalities. The American army feels that unity of command means that “for every task there should be unity of effort under one responsible commander.” Other services contend that this

“unity of effort” can be achieved by “cooperation” among commanders, and that there is no necessity to go so far as to put “one responsible commander” in overall charge. There was a time in the history of war when various “arms”—such as infantry, artillery, and cavalry—refused to serve under the overall command of one officer from one arm. As late as the American Revolution, there was some question as to whether a British artillery general had the authority to command a force that included other arms. During the Revolution, the British had separate army and navy commanders in chief in America: Gage, William Howe, and Clinton were commanders in chief of the British army in America; they could ask the commander in chief of the Royal Navy in American waters to cooperate, but they could not order him to follow a certain course of action. The objections to unity of command—in the early twenty-first century and in the eighteenth—are that one service does not want to surrender control of its forces to a commander of another service, who might misuse them; the navy, for example, does not trust an army general to take the proper care of an expensive fleet in the support of land operations. Thus, there was no unity of command in the allied operations at Newport in 1778 or at Leyte Gulf (Philippine Islands) in 1944. There was, rather, “cooperation.”

SEE ALSO *Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778)*.

Mark M. Boatner

V

VACANT REGIMENT. German regiments (or battalions) were so called when the colonel by whose name they had been known was no longer in command. Baurmeister, for example, refers in a letter of 2 June 1777 to “the Regiment vacant Rail.” The latter unit was commanded in turn by Rall, Woellwarth, Trumbach, and d’Angelli; it was a “vacant regiment” during the intervening periods.

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
VALCOUR ISLAND. 11–13 October 1776. Upon collapse of the ill-fated Canada invasion, the British prepared a counteroffensive. In June 1776 they forced the Americans to withdraw from Canada, pursuing them as far as Fort Chambly on the Richelieu River. Control of Lake Champlain was critical to operations in northern New York because the only passable road hugged the western shore of the lake and troops or supplies moving along it would be vulnerable to waterborne attack. Thus, both sides hastened to assemble fleets.

Major General Sir Guy Carleton established a base at St. Johns on the Richelieu River and spent the summer constructing vessels, while the Americans did the same at Skenesboro at the southern end of Lake Champlain. On 10 September, Carleton’s army, including Major General von Riedesel’s five thousand German mercenaries, began moving southward. Leaving four regiments and part of a fifth with some artillery to secure St. Johns and Fort

Chambly, Carleton sent a younger brother, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Carleton, south with four hundred Indians in canoes; these were reinforced later with one hundred Canadian volunteers and thirteen hundred Germans. Brigadier General Simon Fraser went into position about five miles north of the New York state line with the light infantry, grenadiers, and the Twenty-fourth Foot. Ile aux Noix, which the British had taken in August and later organized into a fortified base, was occupied by Burgoyne with six regiments (the Ninth, Twenty-first, Thirty-first, Forty-seventh, Riedesel, and Hanau). Captain Thomas Pringle, Carleton’s naval commander, set sail with twenty-five vessels on 3 October, the day after work was completed on the sloop of war *Inflexible*. On 14 October, Burgoyne and Fraser started forward with all but two of Carleton’s British regiments (the Twentieth and Sixty-first garrisoned Ile aux Noix). (All German troops were left in Canada except the Hanau artillery, which was on the *Thunderer*.)

THE BATTLE

Having left Crown Point on 24 August with the ten craft that were ready, Brigadier General Benedict Arnold moved north to Windmill Point, near the Canadian border. Threatened in these narrow waters by some of Carleton’s Indians, he had withdrawn to the vicinity of Cumberland Head by 19 September. Then, having taken soundings of the half-mile channel between rocky Valcour Island and the west shore, Arnold skillfully anchored his ships in a crescent-shaped formation across the channel on the 23rd. The day of the battle he had fifteen vessels under his command: the sloop *Enterprise*; the schooners *Royal Savage* and *Revenge*; the galleys



The Battle of Valcour Island. This naval battle, pictured here in a contemporary engraving published by William Faden, was fought in October 1776 near Valcour Island on Lake Champlain. AP/WWP/SPECIAL COLLECTIONS UVM LIBRARIES

Congress, *Trumbull*, and *Washington*; the cutter *Lee*; and eight gundalows. (The Gates galley was still under construction at Ticonderoga, the schooner *Liberty* had been sent after supplies, and there is no record of a ninth gundalow, *Success*, being present.)

Carleton sailed southward cautiously until 11 October, when he rounded Cumberland Head with a strong wind behind him and overshot his quarry by two miles before he realized it. The *Revenge* sighted the oncoming British fleet as it cleared Cumberland Head at 8 A.M. and scurried into Valcour Channel to inform Arnold, who quickly assembled his commanding officers on the *Congress*, went over his brilliantly unorthodox plan, and exhorted them to put up a “resolute” defense. When Brigadier General David Waterbury, his second in command, advised executing a fighting retreat to Ticonderoga, Arnold overruled him, explaining that given the uncertainty of winds and inexperience of his crews, such a maneuver would be more dangerous than making a stand. Arnold ordered the *Revenge* to sail toward the enemy until spotted, then return and join the line of battle; ordered his four fastest vessels, *Royal Savage*, *Congress*, *Trumbull*, and *Washington*, to sally forth to inflict what damage they might, but also to draw the enemy into the southern end of the channel and minimize the chance that Carleton might be smart enough either to anchor out of range and await a southern wind or return up the lake to come around the northern end of Valcour; and ordered his (Arnold’s) other craft to form a line of battle across the channel, facing south.

When Arnold and his galleys and schooners withdrew, beating against the wind, the British impetuously gave chase. Caught by winds made treacherous by the cliffs and tall timber along the shorelines, the *Royal Savage* grounded on the southwest tip of Valcour Island. The British schooner *Carleton* (armed with twelve cannon that fired six-pound shot), which aggressively led the attack, blasted the unfortunate *Royal Savage* with a crippling broadside and was passing, with all sails set, along the American front when it was suddenly betrayed by the same wind and whirled straight toward the American boats. Under heavy musket and cannon fire, Lieutenant James Dacres, its commander, anchored the *Carleton* and then, with a spring in its cable, swung it into position to fire broadside. British gunboats moved to support Dacres, but four of the five larger vessels were prevented by the northerly wind from entering the fray. By 12:30 P.M., a general engagement was in progress. At a range of 350 yards, with observation impeded by a haze of gun smoke, the two forces hammered away. In the absence of trained gunners, Arnold personally pointed most of the cannon fired from the *Congress*.

After about an hour, the spring was shot away from the battered *Carleton*, which then turned on the anchor to face helplessly toward the converging fire of Arnold’s fleet. When Pringle signaled it to withdraw, nineteen-year-old Midshipman Edward Pellew, in command since Dacres and the next-senior officer had been knocked out of action, climbed onto the bowsprit and tried to make a jib draw into the northeast wind and bring it about to sail

away. Unsuccessful, he remained a conspicuous target of massed cannon and musket fire until he could throw a line to two boats that came up to tow the *Carleton* to safety.

The chagrined crew of the *Royal Savage* manned its guns until driven off by gunfire. A crew from the *Thunderer* boarded it and manned the guns until driven off by American fire. When the Americans tried to return, a crew from the *Maria* beat them to it and set the vessel afire. After dark, the *Royal Savage* exploded when the flames reached its magazine.

The British gunboats withdrew as dusk fell (around 5 o'clock) and continued their fire until dark from a line six hundred to seven hundred yards farther south. About the same time, the *Inflexible* managed to come up and deliver five broadsides that silenced Arnold's guns.

Carleton's Indian auxiliaries had landed on both shores of Valcour Channel and began to deliver. They delivered a harassing, but generally ineffective, musket fire from the trees.

THE PURSUIT

The British thought they had Arnold trapped and expected to destroy him the next day in Valcour Channel, but Arnold had not finished outgeneraling Carleton. Aided by a northeast breeze, a dark night, dense fog, and Carleton's fear of the shoals along the shoreline, Arnold's battered flotilla escaped by rowing with muffled oars single file between the western end of the British line and the shore. Colonel Edward Wiggesworth led with the *Trumbull* at 7 P.M.; the *Congress* and *Washington* brought up the rear. (Two vessels remained in the channel: the *Royal Savage*, which was on fire, and a gundalow, the *Philadelphia*, which sank an hour after the battle ended.) By midnight the last vessel had passed the British. Unfortunately, the slight north wind that had aided their escape turned, and by dawn their ten hours of backbreaking rowing and pumping had taken the last five of Arnold's battered craft a mere eight miles. At Schuyler's Island, desperate attempts at repair were made. The gundalows *Providence* and *New York* were unsalvageable, so their equipment was removed and they were scuttled in fifty fathoms. The *Jersey* foundered on a rock and, being too waterlogged to burn, had to be abandoned. At about 1:30 P.M. the hastily repaired *Congress* and *Washington* started rowing south.

When dawn revealed Arnold's escape, Carleton sent scouts to track him, set out in pursuit himself, and then returned to his starting point to relay orders to the army to move southward. This allowed the Americans to keep ahead of their hunters on 12 October, but the next day the British closed the gap. At dawn on the 13th, after creeping six miles in sixteen hours, Arnold and his last two vessels were abreast of Willsborough, twenty-eight

miles from Crown Point. When the wind turned to the northeast the British benefited first and got to within a mile before the sails of the slower-moving American vessels began to fill. At 11 A.M. at Split Rock, the end came quickly. The *Maria*, followed by the *Inflexible* and the *Carleton*, forced Waterbury to surrender the *Washington* and his 110 men. The *Lee* ran ashore and was abandoned. The *Congress* and four gundalows (that had fallen back from Wiggesworth's group) kept up a running fight against the three enemy ships, which used their speed and maneuverability to rake the Americans at point-blank range. In a final act of defiance, the die-hard Arnold signaled his ships to windward, a maneuver the British could not follow, and the Americans rowed for Buttonmould Bay on the east (Vermont) shore. Here he beached and burned his wrecks with their colors still flying. That night Arnold reached Crown Point (ten miles away) with two hundred men, having escaped an Indian ambush en route. At Crown Point, Arnold found the *Trumbull*, *Enterprise*, *Revenge*, *Liberty*, and (according to some reports) "one gundalow."

Unable to hold Crown Point against such heavy odds, Arnold burned its buildings. He then withdrew to Fort Ticonderoga with his survivors of Valcour Island and with Lieutenant Colonel Hartley's garrison of the Sixth Pennsylvania.

CONCLUSIONS

Benedict Arnold's name is forever linked to treason, but on Lake Champlain, against all odds, he constructed a squadron that may well have saved the American Revolution by delaying the British invasion of 1776 until it was too late in the season for Carleton to press further southward. Arnold had lost the entire squadron, but the stout resistance of his men led Carleton to fear that if the defenders of Fort Ticonderoga fought as tenaciously, then winter would close in before it could be taken. Thus, on 2 November he began withdrawing to Canada.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Of the eighteen or nineteen vessels comprising Arnold's portion of the Champlain squadrons, he lost eleven of the fifteen that probably were present at Valcour Island. The day of the battle he lost 60 killed and wounded out of some 750 present (assuming absence of the 16th vessel, the *Success*). Two days later on 13 October, he lost another twenty killed and wounded and the entire crew of the *Washington* galley was captured; some of the twenty killed and wounded were undoubtedly among the latter. The *Congress* lost twenty-seven out of a crew of seventy-three. Carleton paroled Brigadier General Waterbury and the rest of the prisoners from the *Washington*, who arrived at Fort Ticonderoga with such praise of Carleton's generous

treatment that they were immediately sent home to prevent their lowering the will of others in the American camp to resist.

Aside from the *Carleton* and, toward the end, the *Inflexible*, the only British ships engaged in the battle of Valcour Island were the seventeen to twenty gunboats. Total British strength, including those on ships that did nothing more than shell from a distance, was 670 seamen and four companies of the Twenty-ninth Regiment (serving as marines on the four larger vessels). Since the inexperienced American gunners failed to sink any of the gunboats or damage the *Carleton* enough to keep it out of action on the pursuit, British losses must have been light.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Canada Invasion; Carleton, Guy; Champlain Squadrons; Champlain, Lake; Fraser, Simon (1729–1777); Maxwell, William; Riedesel, Baron Friedrich Adolphus.*

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revised by James C. Bradford

VALENTINE'S HILL, NEW YORK.

Just north of Spuyten Duyvil, this was the site of Fort Independence.

SEE ALSO *Fort Independence Fiasco, New York; Spuyten Duyvil, New York.*

Mark M. Boatner

VALLEY FORGE, PENNSYLVANIA.

18 September 1777. In 1777 the Continental Army maintained a small depot at Valley Forge, using it to store bread, flour, and grain and iron tools and equipment, mostly products of Colonel William Dewees's iron forge. The British advance toward Philadelphia threatened the depot. In the afternoon of 18 September Lieutenant

Colonel Alexander Hamilton, Captain Henry Lee, and eight dragoons arrived to assist Dewees in removing the materiel. At this point General William Howe arrived at Tredyffrin, four miles away. Informed of the depot by a local Loyalist sympathizer, he detached Lieutenant Colonel William Harcourt with part of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons and three companies of light infantry to capture it. A small skirmish took place as Lee retreated west and Hamilton crossed the Schuylkill in a scow. One American was killed and another man wounded; Hamilton's and British major Peter Craig's horses were also shot. Most of the supplies fell into Howe's hands, but the incident is significant primarily because it was the largest military engagement to take place at the famous site.

SEE ALSO *Philadelphia Campaign.*

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

VALLEY FORGE WINTER QUARTERS, PENNSYLVANIA.

19 December 1777 to 19 June 1778. The men that marched into Valley Forge, and into legend, on 19 December 1777 were tired, hungry, and very poorly clad. They had lost the battles of Brandywine and Germantown, and seen their capitol occupied, but had just faced down General William Howe at Whitemarsh (5–8 December 1777), daring him to assault. Carried with them was a "collective intransigence" that held the force together against the enemy, even in the face of neglect by their fellow Americans. General George Weedon wrote on 17 December 1777 that the men's zeal for their country was unabated and that they seemed determined to turn hardships into diversion. The day after arriving at Valley Forge, General Jedediah Huntington wrote "the Army is well disposed and will try to make the best of it." More than a quarter of the army was now composed of New England brigades, whose morale was high, for they had seen the greatest American triumph to date—the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga.

Winter quarters had been discussed at a council of war on 29 October 1777, but a decision regarding their establishment was deferred. The commander in chief, General George Washington, never wrote his reasons for choosing Valley Forge as the winter quarters for his army, but he had held several councils of war considering the options of staying in the field, attacking the British, or going into quarters. The last was the eventual selection, but his

generals mostly favored wintering at Wilmington, Delaware, or pulling back into Pennsylvania to a line from Reading to Lancaster. This would have exposed much of the productive part of the state to enemy ravaging, angered both the state and Continental governments, and been difficult with the number of refugees and army sick already in those areas.

Wilmington could be surprised by British forces coming down the river, or Howe could move westward into Pennsylvania, cutting off supply stores and easily capturing thousands of Americans in hospitals. The British general might even move into Chester County and isolate the Continental force in the Delmarva peninsula. Despite this, Washington decided to split his force, and on 19 December he sent William Smallwood with two brigades to Wilmington, where they remained until late May 1778.

On making the decision for Valley Forge, Washington sent his men to a relatively unsettled triangular area of small farms and woodlands, about two miles long and a mile and a quarter wide. About eighteen miles in a straight line to Philadelphia but longer by road, the high ground could be fortified and would serve to protect most of the state from the ravages of the enemy. It was well located, strategically, and out of the way of the bulk of the civilian population. These sterling military qualities were lost on the troops who huddled in makeshift shelters until they could complete their log huts. On 25 December Major General Johann de Kalb called it the worst part of Pennsylvania, and considered that the advice to station the army there arose from a private interest, or people whose intention was the ruin of the cause.

In the view of the troops, they lacked everything they needed, except trees to cut for shelters, but even axes were in short supply. Washington ordered that the camp be carefully laid out and that log huts, measuring fourteen by sixteen feet, be constructed for every twelve enlisted men. These were mostly completed by the middle of January 1778. However, archeological work has discovered that many of the huts were not constructed in accordance with Washington's instructions.

LOGISTICS

According to historian John Buchanan: "At Valley Forge the problem was the all-important logistical system" which had disintegrated so pitifully that the "army almost perished at Valley Forge" (pp. 286–287). The soldiers had been hungry for weeks and poorly clad for months. The reasons for this were many, but a series of failures by the Continental Congress were at the forefront. It can be fairly said that throughout the war, the army suffered more by neglect from fellow Americans than from any enemy activities.

The major responsibility of the quartermaster department was to meet the army's transportation needs, but

Congressional price restrictions made private teamsters reluctant to haul cargoes for the army. In October 1777, Quartermaster General Thomas Mifflin resigned, and his post was left empty for nearly five months. His chief deputy was incapable of bringing order as winter came on and roads were turned into quagmires.

The commissary department purchased food, and the clothier department purchased and distributed clothing. Both departments were dependent on the quartermaster department for transportation of their goods. Congress had reorganized the commissary department in the summer of 1777, and Joseph Trumbull, then the highly competent commissary, resigned—as did most of his deputies. Trumbull's replacement, William Buchanan, tried and failed to fulfill the office, and after another Congressional reorganization of the department, Buchanan was replaced with Jeremiah Wadsworth in April 1778, who was far more effective.

Clothier General James Mease also failed to produce the desired results. His performance is shown by the phrase that was coined in the army to describe the chronic disease of inadequate clothing: "the Meases." Alexander Hamilton noted that, as early as September 1777, Washington had sent him to collect blankets and clothing from citizens as the "distressed situation of the army for want of blankets and many necessary articles of clothing, is truly deplorable . . . if unremoved, would involve the ruin of the army, and perhaps the ruin of America" (*Hamilton Papers*, vol. 1, pp. 330–331). Things were much worse in December, and the storied "bloody footprints" in the snow were a reality. Although imports, captures, and domestic production reduced the clothing problems, as late as 6 June 1778 there were still 805 men in camp "destitute of Cloaths & Necessaries."

The army went through two starving times: right after they arrived at Valley Forge, and mid-February 1778, which was the worst. The average daily consumption in December was over 33,600 pounds of bread and flour and 34,500 pounds of meat. All of this had to be purchased at varying distances from camp, then transported via wagon or on the hoof to the army through roads that were almost impassable. The shortage of grain meant that the animals got only such grain that the men didn't eat, and hard work and lack of adequate forage therefore killed hundreds of horses, worsening the transportation problems.

Mid-February marked the most desperate time in the camp. On 16 February Washington wrote to Governor George Clinton that "For some days past, there has been little less than a famine in camp. A part of the army has been a week, without any kind of flesh, and the rest three or four days. Naked and starving as they are, we cannot enough admire the incomparable patience and fidelity of the soldiery." On that same day a delegate to Congress,



Washington and Lafayette at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. *George Washington and the Marquis de Lafayette stand amongst shivering soldiers during the harsh winter of 1777 to 1778, in a nineteenth-century engraving by Henry Bryan Hall after a painting by Alonzo Chappel.* NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

Francis Dana, reported: “Sunday morning colonel Brewer’s regiment rose in a body and proceeded to general Patterson’s quarters . . . laid before him their complaints, and threatened to quit the army. By a prudent conduct he quieted them. . . . The same spirit was rising in other regiments, but has been happily suppressed for the present by the prudence of some of their officers. But no prudence or management, without meat, can satisfy the hungry man.”

Henry Lee, Nathanael Greene, and Anthony Wayne were sent out on major foraging expeditions to find what they could in New Jersey, Southeastern Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland. Had it not been for the food supplies they brought in, the army would almost certainly have dissolved. Better weather, the appointment of Greene as quartermaster general in March, and the arrival of food supplies from more distant states, after repeated appeals from Washington, eased the supply problems. Also by April, Congress realized that its parsimony the year before had nearly wrecked the army,

and moved to the other extreme of pouring money into supply operations.

The 1777 campaign had produced thousands of wounded and sick soldiers. These were sent to temporary hospitals and then on to makeshift facilities, often in church buildings in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. On 22 December, reports showed 3,948 men as sick absent. While the majority of the absentees were in Pennsylvania or New Jersey, many were from the brigades who joined after Saratoga and had been left in other states. As late as 6 June 3,158 ailing men were present at Valley Forge. A high proportion of those had been made ill from the ongoing smallpox inoculation program that Washington had initiated in January.

The hospital department was also short of food and clothing and lacked medical supplies. The total number of soldiers who died during the six month encampment will never be accurately known, but it was approximately 1,800 to 1,900. Most died at hospitals miles or states away from Valley Forge. Poor recordkeeping stifled accuracy. The

records of the Reading, Pennsylvania, hospital from September 1777 through 16 April 1778 showed 132 men “dead and deserted” without specifying which had occurred in any individual instance.

As soon as the 1777 campaign ended, hundreds of officers submitted requests to resign, some from camp, others from their hometowns, to which they had returned on furloughs. Many were in poor health or had significant personal issues, but some just wanted to get out of the army. Numerous resignations were accepted, which allowed the winnowing out of the weak and half-hearted, leaving a more professional corps of officers. As most regiments were grossly short of privates, the loss of many officers did not seem to have had serious consequences. The officers who remained were cheered when, on 15 May, Congress promised those who continued until the end of the war would receive half-pay for seven years after the end of the struggle.

DISCIPLINE

The Continental Army has sometimes been depicted as so ignorant of military training that they had to walk into Valley Forge in Indian file. This was far from accurate. The troops had been training since the beginning of the war, and Washington regularly emphasized to the officers they were to oversee training every day the weather allowed. Yet despite this training, different officers used different methods and techniques of maneuver, which led to confusion and inefficiency in maneuvers.

The contributions of Friedrich Steuben have sometimes been magnified, but his arrival at Valley Forge on 23 February was a major turning point. A soldier of fortune, he initially impressed Washington because he did not demand pay or rank. All he asked was that his expenses be paid. After a few weeks of review, Steuben began to train a model company consisting of the commander in chief’s Guard of Virginians, with 100 men from other states annexed to it. On 8 April Adjutant General Alexander Scammell wrote

He [Steuben] has undertaken the Discipline of the army & shows himself to be a perfect Master of it, not only in the grand manievres but in every Minutia—to see . . . with a grace particular to himself, to take under his direction, a Squad, or ten or twelve men in Capacity of a Drill [Sergeant] induce the Officers & men to admire him—and improve exceeding fast under his Instructions.

The men and officers learned the new close order drill that Steuben introduced, and this was followed by the manual of arms and use of the bayonet. The seasoned and dedicated veterans understood the need for firm leadership and coordinated responses to orders, which probably helped the successful spread of the discipline. Washington was so impressed that he recommended

Steuben be appointed inspector general with the rank of major general, and Congress agreed with alacrity.

Though some historians believe that the Battle of Monmouth was did not prove the efficacy and importance of Steuben’s reforms, his contemporaries showed great respect for the training he provided and the improvements he accomplished. On 6 December 1785, Horatio Gates wrote to Steuben regarding his plans to leave America. “I am distressed at your determination to leave this country. The soldiers part with their military father, when you go from them; they never knew a regular system of discipline until you came and taught it them.”

“JOY SPARKLES IN EVERY EYE”

Washington was blessed by the relative inactivity of the enemy. For all of March the army could not muster 4,000 privates fit for duty. The low point was on 7 March, when only 3,301 rank and file were available, another 3,796 soldiers who were sick but present for duty, and 2,028 were unfit for duty due to lack of shoes and clothing. Had Howe attacked with his superior numbers, the main Continental army would likely have suffered a stunning defeat. The British did send out regular patrols, particularly to protect citizens bringing food into the city to sell, and also to cut wood and forage for themselves. There were frequent skirmishes and several small-scale actions: at Quinton’s Bridge, New Jersey, on 18 March; Hancock’s Bridge, New Jersey, on 21 March; and Crooked Billet, Pennsylvania on 1 May 1778, but there were no major engagements.

By April things were much improved at Valley Forge and the best news of all arrived in early May, when news of the treaties with France arrived. Washington stated “I believe no event was ever received with more heartfelt joy.” The treaty of amity and commerce, which opened French ports and several in the West Indies to American ships, and the treaty of alliance had been signed on 6 February. French recognition of American independence made war with Britain inevitable, and it was so by mid-June. This brought into effect the treaty of alliance, the purpose of which was to maintain the independence of the United States.

An elaborate ceremony was planned for 6 May with a *feu de joie*—three volleys of musket fire by the complete army, three rounds of artillery fire, and, as Private Elijah Fisher recounted it, “three Cheers for the King of France and three for the Friendly Powers of Europe and three Cheers for the Thirteen United States of Amarica.” All American prisoners in the provost jail were released, and all the officers were invited by Washington to dine with him. The afternoon was spent in joviality and toasts.

Two weeks later the Marquis de Lafayette led a detachment of several thousand men out of camp, and narrowly

escaped annihilation at Barren Hill, Pennsylvania, but Steuben's training program bore its first fruit and the force evaded the enemy. When the British abandoned Philadelphia in June, Washington led a revitalized army from Valley Forge to chase Henry Clinton across New Jersey in the Monmouth campaign.

The renewed army enchanted Chaplain David Griffith, who returned from furlough and wrote on 3 June "The Army is . . . but very differently circumstanced; things seem much mended for the better. Everything wears the appearance of neatness and order. . . . The strictest attention is paid to discipline since the appointment of the new Inspector-General, the Baron Steuben (A Prussian), and I think the whole army is much improved in that particular."

SEE ALSO *Commissaries of the Continental Army; Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von; Washington, George.*

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
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revised by Joseph Lee Boyle

VAN CORTLANDT, PHILIP. (1749–1831). Continental officer. New York. Born in New York City on 21 August 1749 to great privilege, Van Cortlandt was the eldest son of Pierre Van Cortlandt (1721–1814), who was the first lieutenant governor of New York (elected in 1777 and periodically reelected for eighteen years), and Joanna Livingston. Van Cortlandt spent the ten years preceding the Revolution on the family estate, where he surveyed, disposed of tracts of land that had been part of the original manor, and operated mills for his father. In April 1775 he attended the Provincial Convention and the next month was selected as a representative from Westchester County to the first Provincial Congress of New York.

Commissioned lieutenant colonel of the Fourth New York Regiment on 18 June 1775, he reached Albany about the end of August with four companies but was prevented by sickness from participating in Montgomery's wing of the Canada invasion. He served on Washington's staff for a short time before being commissioned colonel of the Second New York Continental Regiment on 21 November 1776. This vacancy resulted from the defection of Rudolph Ritzema to the British. Philip joined his unit at Trenton the day after the battle and commanded it the rest of the war. Ordered to Peekskill, he was moving north to oppose St. Leger's expedition when Benedict Arnold's success in August 1777 led to his being attached instead to the main northern army. His regiment took part in both Battles of Saratoga, coming up among the last to reinforce Arnold at Freeman's Farm and serving in Poor's brigade in the



Van Cortlandt Family of New York. THE GALE GROUP

battle of 7 October. He rejoined the main army for winter quarters at Valley Forge. His regiment was stationed in Ulster County, New York, and as part of Clinton's division accompanied Sullivan's expedition against the Iroquois in 1779. He sat on the court-martial of Arnold (26 December 1779–26 January 1780) and, in disagreement with the majority sentence of a reprimand, felt that Arnold should be dismissed from the service. In the spring of 1780 he was sent to Fort Edward, New York, and later in the year was ordered to Schenectady, where the Second, Fourth, and Fifth New York Continentals were consolidated under his command. In June 1781 he was ordered south to join the forces preparing to march against Cornwallis in Virginia, and in the Yorktown campaign he was conspicuous for bravery and resourcefulness while serving under the Marquis de Lafayette. He was breveted brigadier general on 30 September 1782 for his performance at Yorktown.

After the war, Van Cortlandt was a commissioner of the appropriation of Loyalist lands in New York. As a delegate to the Poughkeepsie convention in 1788, Van Cortlandt opposed his father and his political ally, Governor George Clinton, and voted for ratification of the federal Constitution. After sitting in the state assembly in 1788–1790 and the state senate in 1791–1793, he entered the U.S. House of Representatives in December 1793 and served seventeen years, though—having become a Jeffersonian and supporter of slavery—he won some narrow victories, one by just thirteen votes. Undistinguished as a congressman, he lost his seat in the 1808 election after he had first voted for and then against Jefferson's Embargo Act. He emerged from retirement to accompany Lafayette on a large part of his triumphal tour in 1824 and died at his manor on 5 November 1831.

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict; Border Warfare in New York; Ritzema, Rudolphus.*

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VAN CORTLANDT FAMILY OF NEW YORK.

Oloff Stevenszen (1600–1684) was born and reared in the Netherlands. He came to New Amsterdam in 1638 and in 1643 adopted the surname Van Cortlandt, probably because he came from the small village of Cortlandt in the province of Utrecht. His eldest child, Stephanus (1643–1700), became a prominent merchant and colonial official; his great-grandson was Philip Van Cortlandt. Oloff's youngest child, Jacobus (1658–1739), was a wealthy merchant and landholder in Westchester County whose estate in New York City became Van Cortlandt Park. John Jay was his grandson.


SEE ALSO *Jay, John; Van Cortlandt, Philip.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

VANDEWATER'S HEIGHTS. Later called Morningside Heights, this place figured in the Battle of Harlem Heights in Manhattan on 16 September 1776.

SEE ALSO *Harlem Heights, New York.*

Mark M. Boatner



Van Rensselaer Family of New York. THE GALE GROUP

VAN RENSSELAER FAMILY OF NEW YORK.

Kiliaen van Rensselaer (1595–1644) was first patroon (lord) of Rensselaerswyck, a manor on the Hudson River around Albany that was the first and the only successful patroonship in New Netherland. His son Nicholas (1636–1678), a clergyman who came to New York in 1674, married Alida Schuyler, who, after his death in 1678, married Robert Livingston. Kiliaen’s other son, Jeremias (1632–1674), married Maria, the daughter of Oloff Van Cortlandt. Their son Kiliaen (or Killian), the second lord, married his first cousin Maria Van Cortlandt (1643–1700). Their grandson was Stephen Van Rensselaer, the seventh patroon, who married Catharine Livingston, daughter of Philip Livingston, the Signer. Their son Stephen, the eighth patroon (1764–1839), married Margaret Schuyler, daughter of Major General Philip Schuyler.

SEE ALSO *Livingston Family of New York; Schuyler Family of New York; Schuyler, Philip John; Van Cortlandt Family of New York.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

VAN SCHAICK, GOSE. (1736–1789). Continental officer. New York. Also known as Goosen and Gosen. Van Schaick was born in Albany on

15 September 1736. He was the son of Sybrant Van Schaick, Albany’s mayor from 1756 to 1761. A lieutenant in the Crown Point expedition of 1756 and a militia captain with Bradstreet in the capture of Fort Frontenac in 1758, he was promoted to lieutenant in 1760. He served first with the Second New York Provincials and then with the First New York Regiment in the final operations of the Seven Years’ War.

Van Schaick was a member of the Albany Committee of Safety at the beginning of the Revolution. He was commissioned colonel of the Second New York on 28 June 1775, joining Montgomery on Lake Champlain with four hundred men in September for the Canada invasion, though they were limited to outpost duty. The next spring he was stationed at Johnstown in the Mohawk Valley as commander of the First New York. He was wounded at Ticonderoga on 6 July 1777. In the Battle of Monmouth in New Jersey on 28 June 1778, he commanded a brigade under William Alexander.

The operation for which he is best known is the raid against the Onondagas in April 1779, which preceded Sullivan’s expedition. He left Fort Stanwix with 550 men and in a march of 180 miles in five and a half days destroyed a neutral Onondaga village of about 50 houses, took 37 prisoners, killed 15 Indians, picked up 100 muskets, and returned without losing a man. For this achievement in defeating a previously nonhostile group of Indians, he was given the “Thanks of Congress” on 10 May 1779. He was in command at Albany while General

James Clinton accompanied Sullivan's expedition. As part of Clinton's division, he marched south for the Yorktown campaign. Van Schaick spent much of the war arguing questions of seniority and seeking promotion. On 10 October 1783 he was brevetted brigadier general, and the next month he retired from the Continental army. He died of facial cancer in Albany on 4 July 1789.

SEE ALSO *Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

VAN WART, ISAAC. (1760–1828). A captor of John André. New York. A Westchester County farmer, he took part with John Paulding and David Williams in the capture of John André. He had no other known military career. Like his two cohorts in the capture of André, he received from Congress a silver medal and a small pension.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

VARICK, RICHARD. (1753–1831). Continental officer. New York. Born in Hackensack, New Jersey, on 25 March 1753, Varick studied law in New York City, establishing a practice with John Morin Scott just as the Revolution started. On 28 June 1775 he was made captain in the First New York Regiment, becoming military secretary to General Schuyler the following month and gaining a reputation for efficiency in adverse situations. On 25 September he was made deputy muster master general of the Northern army, and on 10 April 1777, following the reorganization of the Muster Department, he became lieutenant colonel and deputy commissary of musters, a position he held until June 1780, when the department was terminated.

In August 1780 he became aide-de-camp to General Arnold at West Point, Varick having become a friend and supporter of Arnold during the Saratoga campaign. Both Varick and the other aide, Franks, soon became uneasy about their general's activities as the new commander of West Point, but they thought that he was engaged in nothing more dishonorable than profiteering. Duped not only by his chief but also by the latter's lovely young wife,

Colonel Varick was cleared by a court of inquiry that met on 2 November 1780 at West Point. He nevertheless remained under some suspicion, and although he wished to remain in the army, he was left without military employment. In May 1781 he was selected by Washington as his confidential secretary to supervise a staff of writers in the arrangement, classification, and copying of all the correspondence and other papers of the Continental army located at Washington's headquarters. This helped to restore Varick's reputation. Establishing his office at Poughkeepsie, Varick and his assistants spent more than two years in compiling the forty-four folio volumes known as the Varick Transcripts, later deposited in the Library of Congress and of great value to historians.

In 1784 Varick became the recorder of New York City. With Samuel Jones he codified New York State's statutes enacted since the Revolution in *Laws of the State of New York* (2 vols., 1789). Speaker of the New York assembly in 1787–1788, attorney general in 1788–1789, he then served as mayor from 1789 until 1801, when Aaron Burr's new machine swept the Federalists out of power. A founder of the American Bible Society, he was its president from 1828 until his death in Jersey City, New Jersey, on 30 July 1831.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason; Burr, Aaron*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

VARNUM, JAMES MITCHELL. (1748–1789). Continental general. Massachusetts–Rhode Island. Born at Dracut, Massachusetts, on 17 December 1748, Varnum entered Harvard College in 1765 and remained until April 1768, his junior year. When he was asked to leave after leading a protest against the college tutors. He entered Rhode Island College (now Brown University) and graduated with honors in its first class in 1769. He was admitted to the Rhode Island bar in 1771, and rapidly became a successful lawyer renowned for his courtroom oratory. A physically powerful man who was interested in gymnastics and military drill, he was elected captain of the Kentish Guards, an elite militia unit in which his friend Nathanael Greene served as a private.

Before dawn on the day of Lexington and Concord (19 April 1775), Varnum was awakened at Dracut by the alarm gun at Tewksbury, where Paul Revere's message had been received at 2 A.M. He was commissioned colonel of the First Rhode Island Regiment on 3 May, and marched to the Boston siege, where he and his regiment served on

the right wing of the army in a brigade commanded by Greene, his former subordinate. Varnum re-raised the regiment, now called the Ninth Continental Regiment (Rhode Island) for 1776, and let it go to New York, where it helped to erect fortifications around Brooklyn Heights. The regiment fought in the Battles of Long Island, Harlem Heights (though Varnum was absent), and White Plains. Dissatisfied with his prospects for promotion to brigadier general, he left the continental service in mid-December after the Rhode Island Assembly named him brigadier general of the state militia. On 1 January 1777, he was appointed colonel of the First Rhode Island for 1777, but it was death of his rival Daniel Hitchcock, wounded at Princeton and dead a week later, that cleared the way for his promotion to brigadier general on 21 February and his return to the continental service. He spent the winter recruiting and overseeing smallpox inoculations, and had just rejoined Washington's army when the British undertook their perplexing "June maneuvers" of the Philadelphia campaign. His brigade of Connecticut and Rhode Island troops was not formally assigned to a division, and he did not receive an order to attack the retreating British forces around Brunswick on 22 June. After taking part in the Battle of Germantown, he displayed personal heroism in the failed defense of Forts Mercer and Mifflin.

He took a dim view of Valley Forge. "The situation of the camp is such that in all human probability the army must soon dissolve," he wrote Greene on 12 February 1778 from that dismal encampment. "It is unparalleled in the history of mankind to establish winter quarters in a country wasted and without a single magazine." After having an active part in the Monmouth campaign, serving in Lee's division, he marched under Lafayette to support General John Sullivan at Newport in July–August 1778. In Rhode Island he advocated that an African American unit be raised, and the battalion that was created performed well in the action of 29 August.

A mutiny broke out in Varnum's brigade in early 1779. After Varnum expressed sympathy for his unpaid troops, he entered into an extended controversy with Sullivan that led to Varnum's resignation from the Continental army on 5 March 1779. Returning to his law practice, Varnum was named major general of the Rhode Island militia in April 1779. In this capacity he supported the French army of Rochambeau in July and August 1780. He was elected in May 1780 to the Continental Congress, serving in 1780–1782 and 1786–1787. In August 1787 Varnum, a director of the Ohio Company (its mandate being to purchase Northwest Territory lands west of the Seven Ranges), was appointed a judge for the Northwest Territory. Although in poor health, he rode on horseback to Marietta, Ohio, arriving on 5 June 1788. He had an active role in framing a code of territorial laws before his death there on 9 January 1789.

SEE ALSO *Greene, Nathanael; Monmouth, New Jersey; Newport, Rhode Island (29 July–31 August 1778); Philadelphia Campaign.*

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VAUGHAN, JOHN. (c. 1731–1795). British general. John Vaughan, the second son of the Third Viscount Lisburne, became a lieutenant of marines in 1746 and transferred to a cornetcy in the Tenth Dragoons in 1748. Propelled by a combination of ability and family influence, he quickly rose to lieutenant (1751) and captain (1754). After serving in Germany in the early years of the Seven Years War, he raised the Ninety-fourth Foot in 1759 and became its lieutenant colonel in 1760. He led the regiment in North America and the West Indies, distinguishing himself at the taking of Martinique in 1762. On 25 November, when the regiment disbanded, Vaughan took over the Sixteenth Regiment, serving with it in America until 1767 and in Ireland thereafter. In 1772 he was promoted to colonel and in 1774 he entered Parliament, representing Berwick-on-Tweed.

In 1775 Vaughan moved to the Forty-sixth Foot Regiment, and embarked with them for America in 1776. Arriving with General Charles Cornwallis's reinforcements from Ireland, he took part in the abortive Charleston expedition as a brigadier general before moving on to New York. He led attacks at Long Island (Brooklyn) on 27 August and at Kips Bay on 15 September, and was wounded in the thigh at White Plains on 28 October.

Vaughan, now known as a valiant commander, briefly visited Britain with Cornwallis before returning to America and being promoted major general on the regular establishment on 29 August 1777. He had a horse shot from under him at the storming of Fort Montgomery in the Hudson Highlands in October 1777, and led the 2,000 troops that were carried up river by Sir James Wallace in a vain attempt to reach General John Burgoyne. During this raid, Vaughan burnt the

settlement of Aescopus (later Kingston) as well as farms and settlements to within forty-six miles of Albany, earning from the rebels the hostile epithet "General Aescopus." In 1779 he was back with General Henry Clinton's second Hudson expedition, capturing Verplanck's Point on 1 June 1779. In December he embarked for Britain, where he was given a dormant commission as British commander in the southern colonies, should Cornwallis refuse to return there.

When Cornwallis did return, Vaughan was made commander in chief of the Leeward Islands. Reaching Barbados in February 1780, he abandoned Grant's basically defensive approach and gathered troops for assaults on the French islands. However, he had reckoned without Admiral George Rodney's failure to win supremacy at sea and could do nothing until he and Rodney took St. Eustatius from the Dutch in February 1781. Vaughan later denied in parliament that he had profited from this operation; but he had substantial wealth from unknown sources even before the war, and his large disbursements afterward still require explanation.

On 20 November 1782 Vaughan was promoted to lieutenant general and retired from active service. In parliament he tried unsuccessfully to bargain his vote for a colonial governorship from the administrations of the Earl of Shelburne and William Pitt, but he did at last obtain a knighthood in 1792. Recalled to active duty in 1793, he was sent to succeed Sir Charles Grey in the Windward Islands in 1794. There he was beset by lack of troops, fever, and French-inspired slave and Carib risings. The government contributed to his difficulties by refusing to allow him to raise black troops, a prohibition that Vaughan at times defied. He died unmarried, probably of a bowel complaint, possibly of poison, at Martinique on 30 June 1795.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Clinton, Henry; Cornwallis, Charles.*

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On 6 September 1778 Vence took part in the capture of Dominique and Governor General Bouillé breveted him *lieutenant de frégate*. In December he saw action aboard the *Truite* off Saint Lucia. He then served aboard the *Cérés* and subsequently on the *Languedoc*, Admiral d'Estaing's flagship. On 4 July 1779 he spearheaded the French attack at Grenada, taking the main enemy battery, cutting down the Union Jack, and holding his position against heavy odds until d'Estaing arrived with the main body. Promoted to *lieutenant de vaisseau*, he led an attack at Savannah that got into the British works before being driven back. He was made chevalier in the Order of Saint Louis in 1780 and was later admitted to the Society of the Cincinnati.

Made captain of the port of Grenada in 1780, he served in 1782 on the *Terrible* in the Franco-Spanish squadron at Cadiz. *Capitaine de vaisseau* in November 1792 and commanding the *Duquesne*, he campaigned in the Mediterranean and at Tunis. On 10 March 1793 he was given command of the *Heureux* and on 16 November became vice admiral. In 1800, as maritime prefect of Toulon, he commanded an armed squadron at Brest whose duty was to protect the anticipated invasion of England. His criticism of the project drew the ire of Naval Minister Decrès, and he was retired on 16 October 1803.

SEE ALSO *Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'.*

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VENCE, JEAN GASPARD. (1747–1808). French privateer, admiral. Son of a merchant marine captain, he was born in Marseilles. In 1762 he sailed to the West Indies. The following year he served aboard the warship *Protecteur* in combat against English privateers. In 1777 he went to Martinique, was commissioned as a privateer, and in May sailed in the *Tigre*. In 40 actions before the war, he took 211 prizes.

VERGENNES, CHARLES GRAVIER, COMTE DE. (1717–1787). French foreign minister. Born at Dijon, he started his diplomatic career under his uncle, Chevignard de Chavigny, at Lisbon and at Frankfurt (1740–1745) and then represented the French monarchy at the courts of Trier (1750), Constantinople (1754–1768), and Stockholm (1771–1774). When Louis XVI ascended the throne in 1774, Vergennes became foreign minister. With a desire to restore France to its

status as preeminent European power by reducing English power, organizing a tier of client states in alliance with France, and renewing an alliance with the Swiss cantons (1777), he sought to aid the Americans clandestinely until French military and naval strength could be restored and the king could be convinced to undertake a formal war against England. He proceeded with much greater caution than an earlier foreign minister, Choiseul.

Events of 1775 in America led Vergennes to believe that the colonists were serious about resisting the British government. The danger to France was that after committing themselves against the British, the latter might quickly settle the problem in America—by diplomacy or arms—and then turn their entire strength against France. Having previously refused to act on hints from American agents (for example, Arthur Lee in London) that the colonists would welcome aid from their traditional enemy, France, should a shooting war develop with England, Vergennes now agreed to the exploratory mission of Achard de Bonvouloir. At the same time Vergennes undertook a study of secret aid that led to establishment of Beaumarchais's Hortalez & Cie.

French statesmen were faced with the problem of when it would be wise to fight England, even with that country being handicapped by its war in America. Turgot, controller general of finances, was opposed for a number of reasons but finally agreed to secret aid. The other problem was that of getting support from Spain, a country with grave fears that the success of revolution in the thirteen colonies of North America might inspire Spanish colonies to revolt.

Vergennes succeeded first in getting his own government and that of Spain to support the plan for secret aid through Hortalez & Cie. In the summer of 1776, Vergennes was ready to go to war against Britain if Spain would join in, but upon learning of the British victory at Long Island, he decided it would be better for France to restrict assistance to secret aid until it could be sure the Americans could continue the war long enough for open assistance to do them any good. Two months before Burgoyne's defeat at Saratoga and influenced largely by Washington's brilliant riposte in the Trenton-Princeton campaign, Vergennes in July 1777 again officially proposed armed intervention by France and Spain. France had lost the restraining influence of Turgot, but Spain had a new foreign minister, the Conde Floridablanca, who lacked the enthusiasm of his predecessor, Grimaldi, for participation in a shooting alliance. Spanish hesitancy to agree to Vergennes's plan as well as reports of Burgoyne's initial successes in his invasion from Canada led the French foreign minister to delay his schemes. Lord Stormont, the British ambassador in Paris, had meanwhile succeeded in seriously embarrassing Vergennes by finding out details of the latter's secret aid and making official protests, an embarrassment to the French king.

The Saratoga surrender, Germantown, and Franklin's diplomacy in Paris led ultimately to the French alliance, which Congress ratified on 4 May 1778. Vergennes's policy partially prevailed, to the benefit of the Americans—who probably never could have achieved independence without active French participation in the war in America. In 1784 Vergennes wrote to Louis XVI that England was “bent under the weight of an enormous debt which is crushing her.” However, the burdens of the global war and active intervention with its client states had also overburdened the French economy and accelerated the financial crisis that would lead to the French Revolution. Vergennes sought to tie England to France through a commercial treaty in 1786. Exhausted by the efforts, he died during deliberations.

SEE ALSO *Achard de Bonvouloir et Loyauté, Julien Alexandre; Choiseul, Etienne François, Comte de Stainville; French Alliance; Germantown, Pennsylvania, Battle of; Hortalez & Cie; Lee, Arthur.*

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VERMONT. Vermont was a largely unsurveyed wilderness in the mid-eighteenth century, except for Fort Dummer in the southeast and some Abenaki villages to the north. The area was claimed by New York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, but none of these provinces seemed interested in settling the region, even after New Hampshire's Governor Benning Wentworth granted a patent for a township in 1749, which he named Bennington in his own honor. By 1764, over the strenuous objections of New York's government, Wentworth had issued the rights to 129 townships west of the Connecticut River, and settlement had begun in what became known as

the New Hampshire Grants. That same year the king issued a royal proclamation setting the Connecticut River as the border between New Hampshire and New York, thereby officially voiding the existence of all the Grants towns. New York immediately began carving the region up into large land grants shared among the province's leading families. In 1770 the Green Mountain Boys under Ethan Allen started resisting the civil power of New York. Royal Governor William Tryon and then Patriot Governor George Clinton opposed the Grants' claims to sovereignty, but without success. General Philip Schuyler of New York sided with his government, which was one of the reasons why New Englanders resented being under his command during the Revolution. In 1777 the Grants declared independence, becoming the state of Vermont. New York consistently opposed the new state, with Governor Clinton twice threatening to abandon the Revolution if Congress recognized Vermont. In 1790 New York formally relinquished claim to the region, and in 1791 Vermont became the fourteenth state.

SEE ALSO *Allen, Ethan; Skene, Philip; Tryon, William.*

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VERMONT, MOBILIZATION IN.

On 21 April 1775, angry settlers living along the west side of the Connecticut River met in convention in the town of Westminster. Their outrage grew from what quickly became known as the Westminster Massacre, an effort by New York to assert its authority to a territory occupied mostly by people whose land grants came from the colony of New Hampshire. New York's officials had been too energetic, killing two men and wounding ten more. These settlers looked for leadership to an imposing figure from the other side of the Green Mountains, Ethan Allen. Allen gave eloquent voice to their claims to the land they worked and to the authority of their traditional New England town structures. What they all feared was ending up like the poor tenant farmers of New York, "peasants" tied to land they could never own in a political system dominated by the great landlords. Even as Allen was writing their public protest against the tyranny of New York, word arrived that galvanized the convention and the region they called the New Hampshire Grants and redirected their energy toward a new enemy.

What the Westminster Convention heard was that just two days earlier, British regulars had fired on

American farmers at Lexington. There was little doubt in the minds of those attending the convention that resistance to ministerial authority had now become war. They also shared deep misgivings about their degree of preparation for a conflict with the world's most powerful empire.

Rushing back over the mountains, Allen called together a hasty meeting of militia officers and town leaders who decided to stand with the rest of America against the British "and thereby annihilate the old quarrel with the government of New-York by swallowing it up in the general conflict for liberty." They assumed that once the Grants settlers demonstrated their loyalty to the common cause that Congress would not "in any manner countenance their being deprived of their liberty by subjecting them under the power of a government [New York] which they detest more than that of the British" (Walton, ed., *Records*, pp.447–448).

Deciding for war required that they confront a number of difficult issues. Allen and his fellow officers understood that they needed four things for war: money, munitions, men, and motivation. In 1775 the New Hampshire Grants possessed the last two of these but had little hope for money and munitions. The Grants had one major advantage over the rest of the American colonies—they had been in open rebellion for five years, but against New York rather than Britain. The Grants had no legal existence. The British king had given the Green Mountains region by colonial charters to New York, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. As a consequence, all three colonies issued land grants in the area, New York to wealthy, politically connected absentee owners, the other two states to anyone willing to pay their low fees. When the British Privy Council decided that New York held the right to all the land west of the Connecticut River and north of the Massachusetts border, the other governments abandoned those living in the Grants to their own devices. New York's officials proceeded to evict the settlers they saw as nothing but squatters.

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN STRUCTURES

At this juncture, in 1770, the extended Allen family settled in the Grants. In July 1770 Ethan Allen, the head of this clan, called a meeting at Stephen Fay's Catamount Tavern in Bennington and organized an extralegal militia company, the Green Mountain Boys. Over the next four years, eight companies with some three hundred men organized on the west side of the Green Mountains. Anyone could claim membership in the Green Mountain Boys by sticking a fir twig in his hat or hair. Its loose structure formed the primary strength of the organization, drawing ever more of the community into the resistance movement. Membership was entirely voluntary, as was showing up; but their "colonel commandant," Ethan Allen, had a notable ability to arouse the settlers to turn out for service.

Later observers such as Generals Philip Schuyler and Richard Montgomery; Governor Guy Carleton; and even Allen's bitter rival, Benedict Arnold, acknowledged his charismatic skill as a recruiter. Allen excelled at what he called "preaching politics."

Motivation required organization to be effective. In 1774 the region's towns organized committees of correspondence to strengthen their link with the rest of the American colonies. They were quickly followed by a series of conventions of the region's towns, the struggle against British authority thus reinforcing their search for autonomy. On the west side of the Green Mountains, these conventions built upon the preexisting structure of the Green Mountain Boys and committees of correspondence. On the east side, the conventions met as the result of individual initiative. There was a fluid authority, as town meetings simply adjourned in order to reconstitute themselves as committees of safety to oversee a temporary crisis. In 1775 the crisis seemed to become permanent.

CAPTURING TICONDEROGA

Motivated by a fear of losing all they had built in the Green Mountains, the region's settlers willingly appeared for service in support of their rebellion. But they seriously lacked the material by which they could expect to engage in war against the British Empire. All those who visited the Grants noted their poverty. Noah Phelps, who reconnoitered the area for Connecticut, reported on its destitution to the General Assembly, doubting that the settlers could sustain any military action without external assistance. For munitions the Grants had to rely mostly on what the settlers had brought with them, primarily old muskets from the Seven Years' War or earlier. For gunpowder they needed to turn to the distant markets of Albany or Montreal. There were no local manufacturers of either guns or powder, and only a few of either in the whole of the American colonies. Ironically, the American colonies' prime source for munitions prior to 1775 was exactly the country against which they were now revolting. Not surprisingly, then, the Green Mountain Boys looked to the same source for the arms and ammunition they would need to launch their war against Britain. They looked west, to a fort sitting on a high bluff above Lake Champlain.

Fort Ticonderoga loomed large in the imagination of the American colonists. It was at this stone bastion that Montcalm had inflicted his notorious defeat on Abercrombie's superior force of fifteen thousand British and American troops in 1758. The fort, which passed into British hands with the Treaty of Paris in 1763, acquired the reputation of being the key to control of the northern colonies. To attack such an imposing fort seemed the height of folly. But in the last days of April, that was exactly what Ethan Allen proposed to do.

Allen ordered the mobilization of the Green Mountain Boys and the stationing of guards on all the roads leading to Fort Ticonderoga, successfully isolating the British and keeping information of Lexington from them. The Grants benefited from having an experienced and organized military force with a clearly established chain of command. Within seventy-two hours of Allen's mobilization order, all eight companies of Green Mountain Boys had appeared for duty.

For money the Grants turned to the other provinces. Allen sent his brothers Heman and Levi to Hartford to seek financial support. They returned with three hundred pounds "borrowed" from the Connecticut treasury. (Connecticut would eventually spend fifteen hundred pounds on the campaign.) Allen sent two men to Albany with this money to purchase gunpowder and other supplies for his troops.

An ad hoc council or war met in Castleton on 8 May and planned the attack on Fort Ticonderoga. Clearly, surprise was essential. The following night two hundred men gathered at Hand's Cove just a mile from the fort. For some reason Canada's governor Carleton did not see fit to inform Captain William Delaplace of the threat he faced, guaranteeing the operation's success; Delaplace surrendered his sword to Allen without any idea that Britain was at war with anyone. The American haul was enormous. In addition to their 50 prisoners, the Americans seized 120 iron and 2 brass cannon, 50 swivel guns, 2 10-inch mortars, 10 barrels of musket balls, 3 cartloads of flints, 30 gun carriages, 10 casks of powder, hundreds of shells, materials for a boat, food stuffs, and a large supply of rum "for the refreshment of the fatigued soldiery" (Allen to Delaplace, 10 May 1775, Stevens Papers).

Allen immediately sent Seth Warner and Levi Allen north to capture Crown Point, where the Americans gained an additional 113 cannon, hundreds of muskets, and numerous casks of powder. While most of the other munitions went to the Continental Army, the Green Mountain Boys armed themselves with sufficient muskets and ammunition to last them for the next two years of war. The material captured on Lake Champlain in those first days of the northern campaign also supplied the Green Mountain Regiment organized in July 1775 under the command of Seth Warner.

The major stumbling block to mobilization was fear. Many hesitated to act, including the Continental Congress. The capture of Ticonderoga had been the first obviously offensive act of the war, and many patriots remained uncertain of its wisdom. Congress apologized to the Canadian people for the unfortunate seizure of the fortress and ordered Allen to move the cannon and other supplies at Ticonderoga to the far end of Lake George to await a peace settlement with England. Allen ignored

Congress's order, firing off an angry letter reminding that body that it was at war and needed to act quickly.

Yet the commanders of these volunteer forces had little or no experience keeping troops in the field. Provisioning alone was a daunting task. After having seized the British garrisons on Lake Champlain, Allen realized that he was not in the least aware how to maintain his troops in their positions there. He wrote the Albany Committee of Safety that his men only had enough food for four days and that most of the cannon were not mounted. Thus, the arrival of Generals Schuyler and Montgomery was an enormous relief to all the officers except Arnold, who first refused to give up his command and then resigned in a huff. The two generals were experienced officers who knew what to do and could take responsibility for organizing the next step of the campaign. The inexperienced Grants officers would learn the necessary skills as they went along.

FORMING A STATE GOVERNMENT

Despite all the initiative they had demonstrated in the first months of the Revolution, the Grants settlers lacked a preexisting political structure. Whereas the other colonies all had legislatures and court systems upon which they could build their new republican governments, the Grants had to create it all from scratch. It should not be too surprising then that their town meetings served as the building blocks and model for the state they created.

At first the region operated as it had prior to April 1775, relying on local committees of safety to address matters dealing with the Revolutionary struggle. These were supplemented by a number of ad hoc committees and the occasional convention addressing regional issues. But as New York refused to abandon its pre-Revolutionary claims to the territory, the Grants settlers found it necessary to create their own state to secure their revolution.

The war itself mobilized the Grants and crafted the kind of republic it became. In a series of six conventions between April 1775 and January 1777, the Grants moved slowly toward unification and independence. The earliest conventions concentrated almost entirely on military matters, postponing political disputes in the name of a requisite unity. For a time it seemed that the east-side towns would sit out the Revolution, only Townshend sending a representative to any of the first four conventions. Attempting to overcome this coolness, the Dorset Convention of July 1776 produced an "Association" for submission to the people, claiming to act for Congress, which had requested "that every honest Friend to the Liberties of America . . . should subscribe an Association, binding themselves as Members of some Body or Community" (Walton, ed., *Records*, 1, pp. 21–22). Signers of the Dorset Association swore to protect the United States, but as inhabitants of the Grants, not as New Yorkers. Emphasizing its jurisdiction,

the Dorset Convention appointed a committee of war responsible for military procurement and oversight of the local committees of safety. The convention charged the committees with policing anyone who refused to sign the association as an enemy of the people.

Despite the military disasters of 1776, most of the region's inhabitants chose to identify with the Revolutionary struggle. The Grants leaders took these affirmations as excuse enough to call another convention at Westminster in January 1777. The convention voted unanimously that the Grants become "a new and separate state; and for the future conduct themselves as such," legitimating its action with John Adams's congressional resolution of 10 May 1776 (Proctor, p. 63). This resolution recommended that "where no government sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs has been hitherto established," that the inhabitants should "adopt such government as shall in the opinion of the Representatives of the people best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents"—an exact description of the Grants, the convention asserted (Walton, ed., *Records*, 1, pp. 40–44). The convention closed its business by applying for admission to Congress and voting to raise more troops for Warner's regiment, which it claimed as its own.

By the time the constitutional convention opened its meeting in Windsor on 2 July 1777, the state had a new name, Vermont. The state also had a spur to act quickly, as the northern defenses crumbled before General John Burgoyne's onslaught. Over the next week, the convention, guided by Ira Allen and Thomas Chittenden, wrote the most democratic constitution of its time. It also launched the structure by which Vermont would meet its enemies on the field of battle, leaving most authority in the towns, though granting strong executive powers to a governor and council elected directly by the people. On 8 July, during the last reading of the constitution, news arrived of Ticonderoga's fall and Warner's defeat at Hubbardton. The enemy had overrun the homes of many delegates and threatened to make the convention's proceedings moot. It passed the constitution unanimously, arranged for a statewide election in December, appointed a Council of Safety to oversee the war effort until the new government was approved by the people. The delegates then scattered to their militia units.

OPPOSING BURGOYNE'S INVASION

The newly constituted Vermont Council of Safety's first action was to call out the Green Mountain Boys to resist Burgoyne's invasion. They followed this up with an appeal to New Hampshire and Massachusetts for assistance, a step that had not occurred to any of the Continental army's generals. When Burgoyne sent Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Baum to Bennington, the gathered militiamen rejected General Benjamin Lincoln's claim to command and his order that they march to the Hudson. Instead,

they turned to Colonel Warner and Colonel John Stark of New Hampshire. The complicated plan devised by these two commanders succeeded beyond their expectations, defeating both Baum's regiment and the relief force under Lieutenant Colonel Henrick von Breymann on 16 August 1777. In addition to seven hundred prisoners, the New Englanders also captured four brass cannon and hundreds of high-quality muskets that would serve the region's militia well in the years ahead.

Rearmed and invigorated by its triumph, Vermont's militia was sent by the Council of Safety on a campaign of harassment, breaking Burgoyne's lines of communication and retreat, driving the British into their defenses at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, seizing Skenesboro and Mount Defiance, and capturing hundreds of prisoners and most of the supplies bound for the dispirited British army. General Horatio Gates finally persuaded the Council of Safety to send its troops beyond its borders. In early October the Vermont militia settled on the heights above Fort Edward. When Burgoyne finally attempted his retreat in mid-October he found his way blocked and his army completely encircled. Vermont had demonstrated an ability to overcome its many shortfalls to field an effective military force.

The war brought the Vermont towns together in battle, intensifying each participant's identification with the new state and nation. Town militia acted as coherent units, and battles were often family affairs with sons and fathers, brothers and cousins standing side by side. Unlike in other states where the poorest were generally sent to serve, sparsely populated Vermont called on most of its citizens to participate in the war effort. The loss of a family member or neighbor further personalized the conflict. Militia companies thus served as what the historian John Shy has called "the infrastructure of revolutionary government" and also as sources of political education (*A People Numerous and Armed*, p. 177). Risking one's life for a cause made political goals all the more personal.

STATE FINANCES

Even while the Council of Safety worked to maintain its security against external threats, it turned on internal enemies. In July 1777, Ira Allen oversaw the creation of a commission of confiscation to seize the property of Loyalists, finding precedent in New York's commissioners of sequestration. Identifying and punishing the enemies of the people not only removed a potential threat to the state's security, it also increased the state's wealth from the auction of seized property. The state used the funds raised from the rent or sale of confiscated property to pay for its military. As Allen honestly admitted, "In consequence of internal divisions, and to make government popular, it was thought good policy not to lay any taxes on the people but to raise a sufficient revenue out of the

property confiscated" (Allen, *Natural and Political History*, p. 111). The assembly supplemented these funds by authorizing itself to sell off all unappropriated lands in northern Vermont, tens of thousands of acres with which to meet government expenses while attracting new settlers. Most of Vermont's income between 1777 and 1786 came from land sales: £190,433 from confiscated lands, £66,815 from land grants, and £44,948 from taxes. Comparing this with the tax burden common in the other states, it is clear that Vermont's citizens had a solid financial incentive to support their government.

Thomas Chittenden, governor throughout the Revolutionary period, and his council oversaw the daily operation of the state and its war effort. No detail appeared too trivial for the council, from determining the ownership of a specific firearm to locating American prisoners of war held in Canada to providing aid during the winter to the families of those manning the state's forts. The state felt free to deal with these matters in practically any way it saw fit. As Governor Chittenden wrote, the Constitution "placed no embarrassing restrictions on the power of the legislature respecting the finances" of Vermont. Towns held a similar authority. In 1780 the legislature declared that town meetings might impose whatever taxes they felt necessary.

CONGRESS REFUSES TO HELP

Despite the boon gained from selling confiscated lands, the Revolution proved a significant drain on Vermont's limited resources. Bordering Canada, facing persistent invasion threats, uncertain of its own legitimacy, Vermont spent most of the war in a state of war readiness. The state's Board of War, which overlapped with the governor's council, proclaimed a defensive line across the center of the state in 1779, relocating women and children to homes in the safer southern districts. Ethan Allen, who chaired the board, oversaw the construction and manning of a series of garrisons across the state. The militia was kept in constant readiness, being called out several times in 1780 in response to British probes. The only help Vermont got from the rest of the United States was orders of Congress in 1779 and 1780 that it cease to exist.

The Vermonters learned that they could not rely on the rest of America for aid; they had to find their own way. For example, in 1779 Chittenden requested ammunition for the state militia from Isaac Tichenor, commissary general of the Continental army's Bennington arsenal. Backed by Congress, Tichenor refused this request, leaving Allen to rush to Connecticut and purchase munitions with his personal credit.

NEGOTIATING WITH THE BRITISH

Allen understood that if the British again invaded from Canada that the Continental army would do nothing until

the enemy troops entered New York. The Royalton raid of October 1780 clarified Vermont's isolation, as Indians and Loyalists burned the town, killed two people, and took thirty-two captives. Under these circumstances, Allen felt justified in concocting a separate peace.

When Major Charles Carleton descended Lake Champlain with one thousand British troops in the fall of 1780, Governor Chittenden responded to the appeal of New York's Governor Clinton for help by calling out the state's militia. As the British burned Fort Edward, the New York militia refused to march. Allen shadowed the British, waiting for assistance that never came. Allen never admitted it in public, but he and his Board of War knew that a British attack would be a losing proposition for Vermont. For this reason, and to avoid bankruptcy from the state's being on a constant war footing, Allen sought the alternative path of negotiation. His discussions with the British, in which he hinted that Vermont might be interested in becoming a British province if Congress continued to ignore it, led to a truce in December 1780 that held on the Champlain frontier through the rest of the Revolution. In an ironic twist, Allen refused to agree to a ceasefire unless New York was included. Even Governor Clinton had to admit in an angry letter to Washington that Allen had saved New York from invasion.

VERMONT BATTLES NEW YORK

Congress might continue to deny the existence of Vermont, but the state was an established fact by 1781. The state's solidity was clearly demonstrated in the last military encounter of the Revolution on the northern frontier, though in the "Battle" of Walloomsac, Vermont's troops defended their state against an invasion from New York rather than Canada. As 1781 drew to a close and the Lake Champlain truce held, Governor Clinton decided it was time to move against his breakaway northeastern counties. Clinton ordered General Peter Gansevoort to call out the northern militia of New York and march on Bennington, expecting that this show of force would be sufficient to put an end to the so-called state of Vermont. Though only two hundred militia turned out for service, Gansevoort followed his orders and led them east. Governor Chittenden ordered out the Bennington militia, which also numbered two hundred men. On 20 December 1781 the two miniature armies met at the Walloomsac. After exchanging insults and threats, the two sides settled in, each claiming to lay siege to the other. General Allen, who had been in Castleton, mobilized more state forces and rushed south with these reinforcements and an old cannon taken from Ticonderoga back in 1775. The New York militia took one look at the superior forces arriving on the other side of the meandering creek and went home. Vermont won its

final victory of the war without firing a shot. The state's ability to call out its troops and their actually showing up proved sufficient to sustain its independence until Congress finally acknowledged reality and welcomed Vermont into the union as the fourteenth state in 1791.

SEE ALSO *Allen, Ethan; Allen, Ira; Hubbardton, Vermont; Warner, Seth.*

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Michael Bellesiles

VERNIER, PIERRE-JEAN-FRANÇOIS. (1736–1780). Officer in Pulaski's Legion. Born at Belfort, France, he became a volunteer in the Fischer corps in 1752, was made lieutenant in a regiment of foreign volunteers of Tirant in 1756, took part in the action at Saint Cast on 11 September 1758, and received a gunshot wound in the thigh at Vildungen on 25 July 1760. He was taken into the Legion of Conflans in 1763, retired on 1 January 1768, and was assigned to the Invalides in Paris.

Having been recommended by Franklin along with others in the Marquis de Brétigny's party in June 1777, he was captured that year by the English and imprisoned at Saint Augustine with Brétigny. He eventually made his way to America with Brétigny, and Congress appointed him a major in Pulaski's Legion on 23 February 1779.

According to Johann Ewald's diary, he was mortally wounded in a surprise attack by Tarleton's cavalry near Monck's Corner, South Carolina on 14 April 1780. His last name is often spelled "Vernie." In *Dictionnaire des officiers de l'armée royale* (1982), Bodinier lists his given names as "Jean François" or "François Jean."

SEE ALSO *Franklin, Benjamin; Monck's Corner, South Carolina (14 April 1780); Tarleton, Banastre.*

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revised by Robert Rhodes Crout

VERNON, EDWARD. (1685–1757). British admiral. In 1740 Vernon, popularly known as "Old Grog" from his grogram cloak, ordered that the daily rum issue in his squadron be diluted with three parts water—hence the naval name "grog" for watered-down rum. Vernon's capture of Porto Bello in 1739 made him famous, and his reputation survived the disastrous attempt on Cartagena in 1741. Lawrence Washington, the half-brother from whom George Washington inherited his estate, named Mount Vernon in his honor.

revised by John Oliphant

VERPLANCK'S POINT. On the east bank of the Hudson River, with Stony Point it covered King's Ferry at the southern approach to the Hudson Highlands. On 1 June 1779 the British captured Fort Lafayette, which had been built on this place, in the operations preceding the action at Stony Point on 16 July 1779.

SEE ALSO *Stony Point, New York.*

Mark M. Boatner

VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS. The branch of Anglo-American law dealing with maritime matters is known as admiralty law. The High Court of Admiralty was created in England in the fourteenth century, and spawned regional tribunals known as vice-admiralty courts. Because the imperial government did not establish vice-admiralty courts in the colonies at the start of settlement, most admiralty cases were tried in civil courts. The Navigation Act of 1696 systematically established vice-admiralty courts in the American colonies, with a jurisdiction broader than that of their English counterparts, in order to enable them to enforce the Navigation Acts. Cases involving the seizure of ships at sea during wartime were placed under the jurisdiction of these courts in 1708, as were cases involving the sequestration of timber for use by the Royal Navy in 1722. The Townshend Acts of 1767 extended the system by establishing vice-admiralty courts at Halifax, (Nova Scotia), Boston (Massachusetts), Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), and Charleston (South Carolina). The older courts continued to function, but the new ones took over appellate jurisdiction, although further appeal to the Privy Council was permitted.

Vice-admiralty courts were unpopular with Americans because their purpose was to enforce Britain's control over the colonial economy. It was particularly galling that the courts were staffed by imperial placemen who exercised summary jurisdiction over local merchants. The absence of trial by jury reduced local influence on the courts and allowed them more latitude in helping the Customs Commissioners prosecute smugglers and collect the fees levied by the various acts of trade.

SEE ALSO *Customs Commissioners; Townshend Acts.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

VIGO, JOSEPH MARIA FRANCESCO. (1747–1836). Spanish officer, frontier merchant. Born in Mondovi, Italy, Vigo joined the Spanish army as a young man, being stationed in Cuba and then New Orleans in the 1760s. Leaving the military around 1770, he entered into the fur trade, working closely with Native Americans and French traders. In 1772 he settled in the new Spanish post of St. Louis, eventually establishing a partnership with the lieutenant governor of Louisiana, Fernando de Leyba. The latter secretly encouraged Vigo to assist Colonel George Rogers Clark in his 1778 campaign against British outposts in the Old Northwest. Vigo responded with financial aid, which proved essential since Clark had no other way of purchasing supplies from the Spanish or the French in Vincennes. After

loaning Clark nearly ten thousand dollars, Vigo set out for Vincennes, which had just been captured by Henry Hamilton's British forces. Unaware of Spanish sympathy for the Americans, Hamilton let Vigo leave, the latter traveling to Kaskaskia, where Clark was stationed. Guided by Vigo's thorough intelligence on the British position, Clark launched his surprising and successful winter attack on Vincennes in February 1779. After the Revolution, Vigo moved to Vincennes, marrying an American woman, Elizabeth Shannon. He continued to be active in the fur trade and to supply American forces with goods. He also was an agent for the Miami Company. Named a colonel of militia in 1790, he acted on behalf of the United States in negotiations with various Indians nations over the next fifteen years. The decline of the fur trade in the early 1800s and his inability to obtain payment for the funds he had advanced to the Americans during the Revolution led to Vigo's economic failure. He died in Vincennes homeless and poor on 22 March 1836.

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Michael Bellesiles

VINCENNES, INDIANA. This French settlement on the Wabash shifted allegiance to Virginia on 20 July 1778, was retaken by the British on 17 December, and capitulated to the Americans on 24–25 February 1779.

SEE ALSO *Western Operations*.

Mark M. Boatner

VIOLENCE. It goes without saying that violence played a significant role in the outbreak and over the course of the American Revolution. It was, after all, a *war* for American independence. The nature and meaning of that violence, however, demands interpretation. Perhaps the foremost task in the interpretation of revolutionary-era violence, whether protest or war, is to understand it from the perspective of contemporaries. With regard to war, for example, contemporaries understood that war naturally carried with it death and destruction. The killing of hundreds or thousands in the context of the battlefield excited no repugnance or outrage—fear, worry, desperation, yes, but not outrage. However, acts

considered atrocities or, more simply, behavior outside accepted norms for wartime violence, did inspire outraged reaction, and the political consequences could be significant. Again, whether referring to the riots of the prewar period of imperial tension, or to the acts of competing armies, historians have confronted a similar question: what in fact was the relationship between violence and political reaction? Did it provide a “liberating” quality that fostered democratization, or did it simply inspire fear and thus a conservative reaction? Perhaps violence led to both outcomes in different circumstances, and the trick is to find the source of the difference.

RIOT AND PROTEST

At one level colonists saw violence as simply one more tool in the arsenal of political protest. As tensions in the imperial relationship rose and fell, violence as a way of communicating discontent always existed as an option. This understanding of protest violence as communicative is crucial. It reminds us that late eighteenth-century colonial protestors and rioters were hoping for a response—an alteration in existing conditions or relationships. They were not trying to destroy or fundamentally rewrite the nature of society. As a result of this overall intention, they structured their violent behavior in such a way as to convey both their intent and their sense of their own legitimacy in so acting. Communicative rioters (as opposed to the riots of the truly hopeless, which are usually much more violent) are playing to audiences: themselves, their opponents, and, crucially, the undecided.

In the eighteenth century that desire to convey legitimacy led rioters to lean on precedent. They acted violently in ways calculated to seem familiar; much of their violence, such as mock trials and mock hangings, for example, simulated penal measures. Riots were also in part public festivals, drawing on imagery and practices from more peaceful kinds of festivals. Of particular importance in Boston, for example, was the annual Pope's Day (transmuted from England's Guy Fawkes Day) festival (5 November), which provided much of the structure for political riots there during the 1760s and 1770s. Because rioters also intended to correct problems, they often focused on particular persons with whom they had a grievance. Mock trials and hangings incorporated the shaming qualities of many judicial punishments of the era, thus putting public pressure on the targeted individual. Not all scholars are comfortable with this limited characterization of eighteenth-century American rioting as communicative in nature; yet that characterization is hard to dispute for those protests most closely associated with the colony-mother country relationship.

In contrast, local riots, especially over the access to land, could be much less restrained, especially when they were less public; some were not even “riots” so much as a raid on

someone else's home. Violent behavior that remained within expectations about rioting, conforming to penal and festive traditions without seeming too greatly to threaten the social order, were generally tolerated; the "audience" understood them as forms of communication. Authorities, whether local or imperial, usually reacted by at least appearing to fix the problem, while also publicly deploring the violence and officially asserting the sanctity of the state and the social hierarchy. Behavior that seemed outside the expected norms generated much more stringent reactions.

This basic understanding of protest violence can be found operating from the earliest clashes of the revolutionary era right up to the outbreak of war. The Stamp Act riots are exemplary. Colonists around the continent began their protests almost as soon as the law's passage became known. Crucially, however, they began their protests in writing, fulfilling a standard "requirement" prior to a riot: the need to petition peacefully for redress. The first act of violence hit Boston on 14 August 1765, when the South End mob, spurred on by Samuel Adams and the Loyal Nine, hanged an effigy of the new stamp distributor, Andrew Oliver, paraded the effigy through town, and then tore down the stamp distribution building as well as Oliver's house. Oliver promptly resigned his distributorship. The Boston violence peaked eleven days later when the rioters pillaged and destroyed the mansion of Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson. Word of Boston's riots spread quickly around the colonies, and as 1 November (the date for the law to take effect) approached, riots broke out in nearly every colony. In most of them the violence remained confined to the most visible symbols of the act: forcing distributors to resign, preventing the landing of the stamps, or tearing up customs records. The rioters effectively nullified the act, and Parliament got the message. Parliament repealed the act in early 1766, at least momentarily confirming for Americans the effectiveness of their actions.

Although many observers considered the destruction of Hutchinson's house to be excessive, for the most part rioters around the colonies worked hand in glove with local elites and were specific and discriminatory in their violence, while fully adhering to the penal and festive traditions of riot. Some scholars have even argued that the colonists understood such corrective riots as part of a legal process of popular enforcement. Events in New York City were in marked contrast to the Boston riots. There the Stamp Act riots quickly spun out of control, gripping the city for a full twelve months. The scholar Philip Ranlet has argued that this experience of excessive protest violence energized moderate and conservative forces within the city's leadership and led New York in the succeeding years to be among the most reluctant of the revolutionary colonies.

The Stamp Act episode set another precedent that would contribute strongly to the character of later imperial

riots. The intercolonial Stamp Act Congress, with its call for a boycott of English goods, set a precedent for future cooperation among the colonies, and the boycott required enforcement. Rioters thus found a further basis for their legitimacy as popular enforcers of a local congress's decrees. Violence came part and parcel with the developing notion of popular sovereignty—with the people's will defined in extralegal conventions and conferences, and enforced in the streets.

The almost refined quality of the protest riots, and the increasing control over the rioters' behavior exercised by an elite committed to principles of preserving property, culminated in the Boston Tea Party. This was a highly controlled protest exercise that in fact generated little to no actual violence. In Boston the "rioters" even replaced a broken padlock and punished those few who tried to steal tea for personal use. During a similar tea dumping in New York "persons of reputation" stationed themselves on the ship to make sure that the crowd only dumped tea. The British reaction, however, was of a different order. Despite a clearly expressed colonial restraint, Parliament and the ministry saw only the destruction of valuable property and retaliated with a series of punitive acts, the Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts. Britain's outraged response would eventually create the circumstances for the march on Concord, and the violence there would lead to war.

Violence as a component of the protests between 1765 and 1774 advanced the level of friction and disgust on both sides of the Atlantic, and thus helped lead to revolution. This was true in part because violence as a tool of communication is an awkward medium, easily misunderstood and frequently hard to keep "on message" when passions of the moment break free of control. The infamous Boston Massacre represents a good example. The poorer workers of urban Boston had grown to resent moonlighting British regulars and had begun insulting and challenging them in the streets. On that particular March night in 1770 the resentments of the workers spiraled out of control, and their taunts and rocks finally led a small, scared troop of soldiers to open fire. Passion and fear ended up dictating the violence on both sides, and no clear message emerged except for the propagandized version later constructed by the Whig leadership: the redcoats were in Boston to impose tyranny. It was easy to take rhetorical advantage of violence.

Imperial protest violence had other effects. The consistent use of riot as a means of popular expression over a long period of time helped widen the political public. As large numbers of people participated in political action in the streets, they felt included in the wider discussion, and this helped create an expectation that they would be included in all political discussions. Furthermore, American militia laws (in most colonies) that nominally required all free men to own weapons meant that a riot always held the menace, and sometimes the actual

presence, of armed force. In many circumstances, in fact, the militia formed the nucleus of a body of protestors. In the minds of the colonists, such a body of men, in their ranks with their officers at their head, did indeed represent the political will of the people. From a British perspective, such a body of men represented a dramatic escalation away from traditionally structured riots and toward something that looked much more like a rebellion.

WAR

Eighteenth-century Americans were no less cognizant than we that war inevitably entailed a certain amount of indiscriminate destruction and death. War, and the violence therein, carried with it a certain legitimacy. That legitimacy did not extend to acts seen as outside the bounds of acceptable wartime behavior. The issue of the legitimacy of wartime violence, especially in terms of the political effect of that violence, was most pertinent in the interactions of armies and civilians. Eighteenth-century European armies, although still highly cosmopolitan and international, were nevertheless uniformed, and the distinction between soldier and civilian was at least theoretically clear. During the Revolution, as civilians suffered from the actions of soldiers who were clearly soldiers, or from the actions of irregulars pretending to be soldiers, or as soldiers suffered from the actions of guerrillas not in uniform, resentment and anger built, leading to an escalation and intensification of violence.

The War of Independence was in fact an ideal arena for an escalation of violence based on perceptions of illegitimacy. First of all, it had begun with an act widely perceived as an atrocity: American propagandists portrayed the British march on Concord, and especially British actions on the march back, as unprovoked attacks on civilians, women, and children. Reports of Lexington and Concord played a major role in spurring the *rage militaire*—the filling of the ranks of the Continental Army and the militias during 1775 and 1776. As for the British, they initially conceived of the war as a rebellion; both by tradition and by recent codification (in the juristic works of Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel), rebels in arms merited no restraint. This attitude plagued British planners and officers throughout the war, as they never consistently settled on a policy of fire-and-sword destruction (as appropriate to a rebellion) versus one of conciliation and counter-revolution. Even those counterrevolutionary activities that the British did undertake—supporting Loyalists, encouraging slave revolt, and leaning on Indian allies—were all seen by colonists as acts outside the bounds of legitimacy, and thus all were used as excuses for intensifying violence. Finally, and perhaps most significant in terms of day-to-day activity over an eight-year war, were logistical difficulties for both sides—for the British, the Atlantic Ocean; for the Americans, financial and demographic shortfalls. These

difficulties led to a nearly constant reliance on the populace for supply, and the impressment of supplies from locals has ever been fraught with the potential for violence. Such violence might be considered the collateral damage of an early modern army on the move, but by the late eighteenth century it had come to be regarded as illegitimate.

Historians have approached the topic of wartime violence in various ways. Nineteenth-century folklorists tended to exaggerate the level of British and Loyalist atrocity, and their accounts held sway for many years. Later historians preferred to avoid the subject in favor of a cleaner political or military narrative. Some scholars have begun to move past nineteenth-century assumptions to ask just how bad the violence was. More significantly, other historians have returned to the issue of violence as part of an effort to understand the experience of the home front, both for its own sake and for its possible radicalizing influence on postwar popular politics. Some scholars have used the contours of the violence (who used violence, against whom, and how) to examine issues of regional and social relationships. Following one such approach, historians have argued that the violence represented a continuation of prewar social struggles exacerbated by the elite-led revolutionary government. The alternative argument contends that localism and a desire for order were more central and that, in the end, the Whig government was the most effective in meeting those demands for order.

Just how bad was the wartime violence? There is no general consensus on the issue. The answer depends on perspective—whether you were an Indian, a Tory, a householder in a theater of operations, a British soldier, or a Continental Army soldier. The war was fought on a continental scale, with operations of varying intensities in widely dispersed locales; all had consequences for residents in the area. Whether driven by an ideological belief in the cause or by an intensely localist instinct for self-preservation, much of the unconventional violence of the war followed the patterns of violence in other “people’s wars” in its intensity and in its tendency to escalate through upward spiraling rounds of retaliation. It is also true, however, that despite Whig propaganda to the contrary, much of the conventional confrontation between British forces and Washington’s Continentals tended to follow eighteenth-century prescriptions for restraint in war. There were glaring exceptions, especially by the British, perhaps most famously the poor conditions and treatment of American prisoners of war, or such events as the 1780 massacre of surrendering Continentals at Waxhaws, South Carolina, by Banastre “Bloody” Tarleton. Washington, for his part, was largely successful in containing the worst effects of an army on the move—never perfectly, but nevertheless impressively.

The conflicts between Whig and Loyalist adherents generated significantly more violence, and in some regions apparently deteriorated into widespread destruction and

vigilantism. Even in this environment of civil war, however, both sides sought to clothe their actions in legitimacy either through pretensions at judicial forms or with reference to the Law of Retaliation. The famous hanging of Loyalist prisoners taken after battle at Kings Mountain, South Carolina, for example, followed not only a consultation of the North Carolina law for the establishment of a court, but also a trial, complete with references to retaliation for Loyalist violence in South Carolina. In the end only nine of some six hundred prisoners were hanged. The remainder were marched away and for the most part forced to enlist in the Patriot militia. In one sense, the easiest way to acknowledge the restraint that persisted even in the worst episodes of Whig–Tory violence is to compare it to the kind of warfare waged against Indian enemies. In the campaigns against the Cherokees or against the Iroquois, the precedents of white–Indian war and the all-consuming desire for land required little to no restraint. Few rules applied, and women, children, the old, and the towns and crops themselves were all regarded as legitimate targets.

Even more elusive is a consensus on the political ramifications of the experience of violence. Indeed, the debate on the political ramifications of the Revolution as a whole still rages on, and the impact of violence alone is a mere subset of the larger question. The historian Richard Maxwell Brown has suggested that the whole experience of resistance and war contributed to an expansion of the expectations of popular sovereignty. John Shy and Alan Kulikoff each have gone farther, arguing that military participation and the widespread violence of the war deepened democratic impulses. Contradicting Shy and Kulikoff, Sung Bok Kim has argued that sheer exhaustion from the high level of violence in Westchester County, New York, in fact brought about a depoliticization. A. Roger Ekirch has argued that the level of violence in North Carolina inspired a demand for a return to older standards of order and thus won support in the countryside for the order-imposing Whigs. It is possible to see a trend toward greater centralized control of the militias, at least in North and South Carolina, as a response to the unconstrained militias who were sowing violence in the countryside. The conservative reaction of the late 1780s is usually blamed on the experience of a weak central government during the war. Its inefficacy in raising money and running a war frustrated many, and led some leaders (including George Washington and Alexander Hamilton) to demand a more powerful government. The experience of violence may have had a similar effect on a more popular, visceral level. Some revolutionary leaders had lost their confidence in the ability of republican virtue to contain excessive violence and now instead looked to establish stronger forms of authority. Other colonists, having engaged in violence during the war, expected a similar freedom to be violent in the early republic.

SEE ALSO *Boston Massacre; Boston Tea Party; Guerrilla War in the North; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; Kings Mountain, South Carolina; Stamp Act; Tarleton, Banastre; Waxhaws, South Carolina.*

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Wayne E. Lee

VIRGINIA, MILITARY OPERATIONS

IN. Like Massachusetts, Virginia's Whigs took steps to prepare for possible armed conflict before the fighting actually began at Lexington. In late 1774 and early 1775 volunteer companies outside the militia system appeared. The first extra-legal Virginia Convention met from 20 to 27 March 1775 to take the place of the House of Burgesses when the royal governor (John Murray, the Fourth Earl of Dunmore) refused to call it into session. In spite of Patrick Henry's impassioned "liberty or death" speech, the convention rejected his call to raise troops. Then, on 20 April, Dunmore had a party come ashore before dawn and move the colony's gunpowder and store of arms from the Williamsburg magazine to the Royal Navy's schooner *Magdalen* in the James River. This action infuriated the Whigs and many of the volunteer companies quickly assembled in Williamsburg. Cooler heads avoided violence, but the political situation continued to deteriorate and on 8 June 1775 the Governor fled to the *Magdalen*, which was now anchored off Yorktown, and shifted his activities to Norfolk where Loyalist sentiment was stronger.

By the time the second Virginia Convention assembled in Richmond on 17 July 1775, the representatives knew that the war had started and that the Continental Congress had raised troops, including two companies of riflemen in Virginia. Two days later it voted to raise troops. By the time the convention adjourned on 26 August, it had expanded its military actions to include forming two full-time regiments to confront Dunmore and a number of separate companies to occupy frontier forts in case the Indians attacked. It had also taken control of the militia structure and supplemented the local defense force with a set of minute battalions to replace the volunteer companies. The minutemen undertook extra training, and provided a force that could mobilize quickly and move to a threatened location outside its own immediate area. Patrick Henry, despite a lack of military experience, became the colony's commander in chief.

Confrontation finally erupted in Hampton between 24 and 27 October. One of Dunmore's tenders had gone aground and was destroyed by the militia. In retaliation, Dunmore sent parties ashore to destroy several houses, and the troops who were camped in Williamsburg on the grounds of the college responded. A skirmish resulted, marking the first engagement of the war in Virginia. The following month a second area of confrontation developed on the south side of the James River, and both sides established outposts near Great Bridge, with more skirmishing on 15 November at Kemp's Landing. In his report to London on 6 December, Dunmore claimed that popular support for this minor engagement led him to "erect the King's Standard." This phrase describes a formal step


in the suppression of rebellion, requiring all residents to assemble under arms to defend the Crown and making a refusal to comply an act of treason punishable by death. He also used his authority as the captain-general of the colony to raise two groups of Provincial forces—the Queen's Own Loyal Virginia Regiment and Lord Dunmore's Ethiopian Regiment. The latter unit consisted of slaves who had left their masters to join the British, serving under white officers and noncommissioned officers.

After some further skirmishing, Colonel William Woodford moved a force of the regulars (who would become Continentals on 28 December 1775) and minute-men. They defeated the governor's forces at Great Bridge on 9 December, and occupied Norfolk five days later. Crowded aboard ships in the Elizabeth River and unable to get provisions, Dunmore turned the guns of his small squadron on Norfolk on 1 January 1776. Destruction of the largest town in Virginia completed the polarization of the colony and eroded much of the remaining Loyalist support. Dunmore had to evacuate the lower Hampton Roads area and tried to set up a new base in Chesapeake Bay, but was driven from Gwynn Island on 8–10 July 1776. The forces that survived this defeat and a smallpox epidemic sailed further up the bay to the Potomac River. After burning several plantations and engaging militia from both Virginia and Maryland, Dunmore finally put out to sea on 7 August 1776.

BRITISH RAIDS, 1779–1781

Virginia was spared any further military action east of the mountains during the three years following Dunmore's departure. The state supported the 1776 defense of Charleston, South Carolina, but sent most of its Continentals north to fight in George Washington's main army. Then, on 4 December 1779, the Continental Congress (at Washington's suggestion) ordered the Virginia moved to the Southern Department, where it would spend the rest of the war. Meanwhile the Chesapeake Bay had emerged as a critical component of the American economy because the tobacco from Virginia and Maryland had become the cash export crop which propped up the foreign credit needed to import military supplies and manufactured goods. Destroying that trade played a very important role in George Sackville Germain's "southern strategy," which was adopted after the French entered the war. In addition to a loose naval blockade, General Henry Clinton undertook a series of raids as soon as he could spare the resources.

Mathew-Collier raid, 1779. The first of these amphibious operations departed from New York on 4 May 1779 under Commodore Sir John Collier and Major General Edward Mathew. It was a relatively modest expedition, with three regiments (one each of Highlanders, Germans, and Loyalists) and several flank companies. The troops were



Virginia Military Operations: I. THE GALE GROUP

on board 22 transports, escorted by one ship of the line, one frigate, four smaller warships, and four privateers. They entered Chesapeake Bay on 8 May and came in Hampton Roads on the next day. On the 10th the expedition crossed over to the mouth of the Elizabeth River and took Fort Nelson before moving on to nearby Portsmouth. Over the course of several days the invaders captured or destroyed ships, supplies, and tobacco in the various communities within reach of the water, penetrating as far as Suffolk. They finally departed the Bay on 26 May, having inflicted major damage with almost no casualties, and reached New York on the 29th.

Leslie's raid, 1780. On 12 October 1780 Clinton issued orders to Major General Alexander Leslie to take a 2,500-man task force to the Chesapeake Bay and try to carry out a diversionary operation to take pressure off of Lieutenant General Charles Cornwallis in North Carolina. While giving Leslie a free hand to pick the best way of accomplishing his task, Clinton recommended that he sail up the James River and destroy the magazines at Petersburg and Richmond, and then fall back to set up a base on the Elizabeth River. Once in the bay, Leslie's force would fall under Cornwallis's operational control. Leslie's key units were the Guards Brigade, the Eighty-second Foot, the

Hesse-Cassel Regiment von Bose, and several Loyalist units. It put out from Sandy Hook on the 17th with two frigates and a sloop as escorts and quickly reached the Chesapeake, putting troops ashore at Portsmouth on the evening of 22 October. From there, raiding parties struck Hampton, Newport News, and Nansemond County. Meanwhile, Leslie received word from Colonel Francis Rawdon telling him that Cornwallis would prefer that the expedition move on to the field force in North Carolina. Up until this point, the limited state and Continental forces in Virginia under Brigadier General Peter Muhlenberg could only watch from a safe distance. Acting on Rawdon's information, Leslie embarked on 11 to 16 November and sailed south on 22 November, when winds finally permitted them to sail. The raid itself was more of a nuisance than a real threat to the state, but Leslie's report to Clinton set the stage for future actions. He said that he had left his fortifications at Portsmouth intact, and he recommended that future operations in the Chesapeake Bay employ shallow-draft craft to carry out economic raids throughout the bay's watershed.

Arnold's raid, 1781. The third attack on Virginia came as the result of Clinton's continuing desire to interrupt the state's support for Major General Nathanael Greene's

operations against Cornwallis in the Carolinas. On 20 December 1780 Benedict Arnold, now a British general, sailed from New York with about 1,600 troops and supporting warships to conduct amphibious operations. On 30 December they reached Hampton Roads and found that the state authorities did not have the resources to put up much of a defense. Arnold moved up the James River with his remaining 1,200 men in captured American vessels. They destroyed the battery at Hood's Point on 3 January 1781 and occupied Richmond on 5–6 January. After destroying the important Westham Foundry, burning tobacco, supplies, and some buildings, Arnold withdrew to Westover. Lieutenant John Graves Simcoe broke up a militia concentration at Charles City Courthouse on the 8th, and then the force embarked and slowly worked its way back downriver. On 23 January, from a base at Portsmouth, Arnold sent word to Clinton that he and his subordinates believed that the ability to exploit their control over the Virginia waterways would enable a relatively small force to negate the huge manpower advantage of the American militia. They merely felt that there were better places than Portsmouth to use as the base.


Lafayette's expedition, 1781. Although Virginia itself lacked the resources to defend itself, and Governor Thomas Jefferson did not possess the expertise to deal with Arnold, Washington stepped in. While the prospect of capturing the traitor was appealing, the American leaders and their French allies in Newport, Rhode Island, saw the exposed nature of the Portsmouth base as an opportunity to crush an isolated British force. He picked Major General Lafayette (Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Montier) to lead an elite force south, and asked the French to provide a naval force to prevent Arnold's escape. On 19 February, Washington's main army's light infantry companies assembled at Peekskill as three regiments, commanded by Joseph Vose, Jean-Joseph de Gimat, and Francis Barber. The assembled force included four artillery companies under Lieutenant Colonel Ebenezer Stevens. With three light infantry regiments drawn from the New England and New Jersey Continentals, Lafayette's command was about 1,500 officers and men when it started south.

The companion French effort bogged down when it ran into a streak of bad luck. A storm scattered the British squadron watching Newport, enabling a ship of the line, two frigates, and a cutter to get to sea on 9 February 1781. These ships entered the Chesapeake Bay on 13 February. Although they captured eleven British vessels, including the forty-four-gun frigate *Romulus*, they could not trap Arnold because the French ships drew too much water to work their way up the Elizabeth River to Portsmouth. The task force returned to Newport on 24 February. A much larger task force, including nearly 1,200 troops, sailed under the command of Captain Charles Destouches on

8 March, five days after Lafayette reached Head of Elk on his overland march to Annapolis (the designated rendezvous point). Admiral Marriott Arbuthnot started out thirty-six hours behind the French, but actually arrived ahead of them. The French had seven ships of the line, two frigates, and an armed storeship; Arbuthnot had seven ships of the line, one fifty-gun ship, and three frigates. The squadrons engaged just outside the mouth of Chesapeake Bay on 16 March. Destouches emerged from this fight, which lasted an hour and forty-five minutes, in slightly better shape than his adversary, but he abandoned the expedition because he could not put his troops ashore. Arbuthnot limped into the Chesapeake and made contact with Arnold.

With the sea routes now open, Clinton sent Major General William Phillips with 2,000 more troops to reinforce Arnold and to assume command. His orders, issued on 10 March, gave Phillips the task of holding a Chesapeake base (Portsmouth, or some other port) and destroying American magazines at Petersburg, Appomattox, or along the James River. Phillips's convoy anchored in Hampton Roads on 25 March, bringing the total Crown force in Virginia to at least 3,000 men, and he assumed command two days later. Major General Frederick Steuben was the Continental army commander opposing Phillips, having been assigned to the state by Greene to organize the flow of replacements and supplies to the south. While there were relatively few Continentals available, mostly green troops, Brigadier Generals Muhlenberg, Thomas Nelson, and George Weedon had built up some 4,000 militia and state troops in the general area. This mix could not pose a threat of assaulting Portsmouth, but they were strong enough to limit the ability of the British to penetrate very far inland. Lafayette's far more dangerous light infantry command was still in Maryland, more than 150 miles from Richmond.

Meanwhile, Phillips did not sit idle. As soon as he felt the defenses of Portsmouth were completed, he started sending out raiding parties. The first departed on 18 April and went up the James River; Arnold led one division ashore near Williamsburg, while a second party landed above. The goal was to trap the Americans occupying the town, but the force failed in that object and pushed on into Yorktown on the other side of the Peninsula, where it destroyed the abandoned American defenses. A brief skirmish took place at Burrell's Ferry. The British then resumed their movement upriver, with the objective of confronting the Americans who had concentrated at Petersburg. Phillips landed at City Point on 24 April and, despite brief resistance by Steuben, took Petersburg on 25 April. Phillips then took part of the force on to Chesterfield Courthouse, while Arnold detoured to destroy the remnants of the Virginia state navy at Osborne's on 27 April. The columns reunited and continued on to Manchester on the south bank of the James opposite Richmond. Arriving in the morning of the 30th,



Virginia Military Operations: 2. THE GALE GROUP

they discovered that Lafayette had arrived in Richmond the evening before with his Continental light infantry.

LAFAYETTE'S MARCH TO RICHMOND


The inability of the French Rhode Island squadron to reach Virginia, combined with Phillips's expedition, altered the nature of Lafayette's expedition. Instead of waiting for transports, he moved overland with the mission of keeping the British from interfering with the southern army's lines of communications. In Baltimore Lafayette borrowed £2,000 from the merchants to buy material for summer clothing to replace the winter uniforms of his troops. Expecting the British to head for Richmond, Lafayette left his tents and artillery to follow at their own pace and, moving by forced marches; he left Baltimore on 19 April, moving through Alexandria, Fredericksburg, and Bowling Green to reach Richmond the evening of the 29th, a few hours ahead of Phillips. Surprised by this speed, Phillips withdrew to the vicinity of Jamestown Island. Learning on 7 May that Cornwallis was moving to join him at Petersburg, Phillips re-entered that place on the 10th. Cornwallis arrived on the 20th, seven days after Phillips died of a sudden illness. Later, additional troops (the Seventeenth and Forty-third Foot and the two

Anspach-Bayreuth regiments) from Clinton landed at Portsmouth.

CORNWALLIS VS. LAFAYETTE

British strategy in Virginia failed in one of its main objectives: to help Cornwallis hold the Carolinas and Georgia. In complete defiance of Clinton's instructions to make the security of South Carolina and Georgia his primary mission, Cornwallis had chosen to invade Virginia, leaving Rawdon to try and keep Greene at bay. After assuming command at Petersburg, Cornwallis controlled about 7,200 British, German, and Loyalist troops, of whom some 5,300 were rank-and-file soldiers that Clinton considered fully fit for duty.

Lafayette, meanwhile, had assumed command from Steuben as the senior Continental officer in Virginia. His troops consisted of his three light infantry regiments, 500 eighteen-month-service Virginia Continental recruits assembled by Steuben into provisional battalions, the remnants of Armand's First Partisan Corps, some Virginia state troops, and two companies of volunteer horsemen under John Mercer and Nicholas Moore. Working to assemble and hold together several thousand militia were Muhlenberg and Weedon (both Virginia




Virginia Military Operations: 3. THE GALE GROUP

Continental officers), state Brigadier Generals Robert Lawson and Edward Stevens (two former Continental colonels), and Thomas Nelson, the brigadier general who had just succeeded Thomas Jefferson as governor. Riflemen from the western counties were requested, but they did not arrive until relatively late in the campaign. The critical reinforcement whose delayed arrival shaped Lafayette's strategy was the body of Pennsylvania regulars under Anthony Wayne.

Cornwallis left Petersburg on 24 May, crossed the James River at Westover, and camped at Hanover Junction on 1 June. (Arnold left for New York on the 6th, taking two Loyalist regiments.) Lafayette fell back from Winston's Bridge, eight miles north of Richmond, on 28 May, and covered 70 miles in seven days. To keep in a position to be reinforced by Wayne and Steuben, he retreated north through the wilderness to Ely's Ford on the Rapidan River, 20 miles above Fredericksburg. Cornwallis pursued only 30 miles, stopping on the North Anna River. Unable to catch the Americans and force them to give battle, he now turned his attention to destroying materiel. General Banastre Tarleton led a raid to Charlottesville on 4 June, and Simcoe led another to Point of Fork on 5 June. Meanwhile, Cornwallis moved slowly toward Point of Fork, about 45 miles up the James River from Richmond, and established a camp at Elk Hill after brushing aside Steuben's token resistance. His raiders joined him here on 9 June, and he prepared to send Tarleton to raid the supply point at Albemarle Old Courthouse (on the James, 20 miles west of Elk Hill).

Cornwallis cancelled this new operation when he learned that Wayne had finally joined Lafayette and that their combined forces were moving toward Elk Hill. Wayne's departure from York, Pennsylvania, had been delayed by lack of supplies and unsatisfied payrolls. He was about to start when his troops, most of whom had been reorganized after the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line, showed signs of another mutiny. (This time they were dissatisfied about being paid in Continental currency without the depreciated value added.) Wayne showed no leniency, and executed seven ringleaders of the rebellion. Leaving York the morning of 26 May, Wayne's troops marched into Lafayette's camp on 10 June. Wayne himself had ridden ahead to meet Lafayette about three days earlier. Numbering about 1,000 good troops, Wayne's corps consisted of three provisional Pennsylvania infantry regiments under Richard Butler, Walter Stewart, and Richard Humpton, supported by a detachment of the Fourth Continental Artillery, with six guns.

While this reinforcement did not increase Lafayette's strength enough to risk a major battle, it did enable him to move closer and thereby stop the unopposed raiding. As soon as the forces joined, the Americans moved south from Raccoon Ford on the Rapidan River and, by the morning of 12 June, Lafayette held an excellent defensive position behind Mechunck Creek. There he blocked any British move on Charlottesville (13 miles to the west) and Staunton, where the Americans had moved the stores from Albemarle Old Courthouse. There he was joined



Virginia Military Operations: 4. THE GALE GROUP

by 600 of the frontier riflemen led by William Campbell. Meanwhile, Cornwallis had begun getting letters from Clinton demanding that he pull into a defensive shell and return 3,000 troops to help protect New York City from the Franco-American attack that Clinton was convinced was coming. Although not immediately apparent, the tide had turned. On 15 June Cornwallis left Elk Hill and fell back, reaching Richmond on the 16th. Four days later he started down the Virginia peninsula to Williamsburg, with Lafayette cautiously following and looking for chances to nibble away at the rear guard.

Cornwallis reached Williamsburg on 25 June and remained there until 4 July. The first skirmish between the Marquis de Lafayette and the Earl of Cornwallis came on 26 July at Spencer's Tavern (called Spencer's Ordinary in the eighteenth century), seven miles from Williamsburg. A more serious engagement came when Cornwallis left Williamsburg and began crossing to the south side of the James River near the site of the Jamestown settlement. Cornwallis deliberately tried to lure Lafayette into a trap at Green Spring on 6 July, but the Americans fell back after some heavy fighting. Lafayette withdrew to Malvern Hill; Cornwallis continued east to Suffolk. He then moved to the Portsmouth base, which he didn't like. (The 3,000-man detachment he expected never was sent.) Tarleton's Virginia Raid, which took place from 9–24 July 1781, was a dramatic cavalry operation, but it was meaningless. The stage was now set for the Yorktown Campaign.

SIGNIFICANCE

Governor Thomas Nelson summarized the impact of the war's Virginia campaigns in a letter he sent from Richmond to Washington on 27 July 1781. He wrote that they (the campaigns) "have made Whigs of Tories." By this, Nelson meant that each appearance by the Crown's forces prompted Loyalists to reveal themselves; and each time, when the British left, the Loyalists had to leave as well, or suffer the wrath of their neighbors. Other sympathizers turned against the king's men when they saw indiscriminate destruction and plundering. By the summer of 1781, very few Loyalists remained in the Old Dominion. Nelson also pointed out that each invasion saw a sea-borne force arrive and strike at areas which were lightly defended and then withdraw as the Americans assembled troops. It became clear that, sooner or later, British luck would run out.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Raid in Virginia; Chesapeake Bay; Great Bridge, Virginia; Hampton, Virginia; Henry, Patrick; Lafayette, Marquis de; Murray, John; Virginia, Mobilization in.*

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VIRGINIA, MOBILIZATION IN. In 1775 Virginians began an eight-year-long war with Britain that they had neither predicted nor desired. What became the War for Independence was one of the longest, most divisive, and deadliest conflicts since the colony's founding and would at times bring the Old Dominion to its knees. Mobilization for the Revolutionary War strained the resources even of Virginia, the most valuable British mainland colony, and as in many other colonies, it exacerbated preexisting social tensions and created new divisions—mainly over the important questions of who should serve and who should pay for the costs of war. But

mobilization in Virginia was also hampered in significant and sometimes surprising ways by the presence of hundreds of thousands of enslaved workers in the colony. In the end, the demands of war in a slave society would prove crippling as Virginia struggled throughout the conflict to mobilize effectively.

Though Virginians had participated in the colonial protests over British imperial measures since the mid-1760s—and, indeed, had been at the forefront of many of them—Patriot leaders stepped up their resistance once the British response to the Boston Tea Party became clear. The more militant Patriot leaders throughout the eastern seaboard circulated plans for a continental congress and a plan of association that included a boycott of trade between Britain and the mainland colonies. As the summer progressed, however, there were growing fears that more than just economic resistance might be necessary to counter the British; indeed, the Boston Port Act in particular was seen by some as an invasion, and from the middle of 1774, many travelers in Virginia began to note the increased militancy of many Virginians.

INDEPENDENT COMPANIES

At first, Patriot leaders began organizing themselves into Independent Companies of Gentlemen Volunteers. That is because the established militia was still technically under the control of the royal governor, Lord Dunmore. Moreover, the militia had played a diminishing role in the lives of most Virginians over previous decades, and Patriot leaders were still unclear how their fellow white Virginians would react to a general call for mobilization. The Independent Companies would allow Patriot leaders to present a show of militancy to both British officials and to the increasingly restive slaves of Virginians; ready Patriots for possible conflict; and provide a training ground for gentlemen, who could then become officers if resistance escalated. Though few ordinary Virginians seemed interested in the Independent Companies, Governor Dunmore became increasingly irritated by their presence.

Only two days after General Gage marched out and provoked the famous confrontations at Lexington and Concord—an event still unknown to Virginians—Governor Dunmore made a move against militants in his colony, seizing gunpowder from the Williamsburg public magazine in the early hours of 21 April 1775. Unlike Gage's ill-fated expedition, however, there was no bloodshed in Virginia. Dunmore claimed that he had removed the powder because of rumors that Virginia's enslaved population intended to rise up against its white masters. At the same time, Dunmore warned that he would arm enslaved Virginians if Patriot leaders did not curb the militants in the Independent Companies. Given that many slaves had already begun making their way to

the governor with offers of help, moderates feared that Dunmore's threats were not idle ones.

Dunmore's actions and threats stirred up a hornet's nest, and thousands of white Virginians flew to arms. While moderate Patriot leaders appealed for calm and tried to avert civil war, ordinary Virginians swelled the ranks of the Independent Companies, elected their own officers, and debated whether to march against the governor. After several weeks of aggressive posturing and skirmishing, and after hearing of news of the Battle of Breed's Hill outside Boston, militants forced Dunmore to flee for safety on board one of the royal ships in the Chesapeake Bay. Though the perceived erosion of political rights helped convince some Virginians to mobilize for possible conflict, particular local issues—especially threats of armed insurrections by enslaved Virginians—helped spur mobilization on a broader scale, which in turn contributed to the rapid deterioration of imperial relations in the colony. Dunmore's flight from Williamsburg on 8 June 1775, at least in retrospect, signaled the end of royal government in Virginia.

Faced with almost inevitable war against Britain and anxious to reassert control over the increasingly anarchic situation in Virginia, Patriot leaders quickly moved to curb the militancy of the autonomous Independent Companies by replacing them with a more structured, hierarchical, and responsive military organization, one that fused elements of old and new military thinking. In the third Virginia Convention in July 1775, Patriot leaders devised a three-tiered military organization. Drawing on past military experience—most recently in the Seven Years' War—they ordered the creation of two regiments of regular troops that would serve as Virginia's contingent of Continental soldiers but act as a permanent home guard. Patriot leaders also resurrected the militia, in which all white males between the ages of eighteen and fifty would be enrolled. Finally, Patriot leaders also called for the recruitment of sixteen battalions of elite militia, called the minutemen, who would serve as a first line of defence for the colony against the British. Patriot leaders hoped that such a system would not only protect them from the British, but that it would also deter black Virginians from taking advantage of the civil war and making their own bids for freedom. To ensure this dual role, Patriot leaders gave commanding officers in the militia new powers to appoint and lead slave patrols and exempted from service altogether all overseers of at least four enslaved Virginians.

If these initial proposals reflected a concern about race and slavery within Virginia, they also reflected Patriot leaders' class-based perspectives on mobilization. For it was clear from the outset that most of these leaders believed that the two regiments of Continental soldiers should and would be composed of men similar in social

standing as those drafted to serve in regular units in the Seven Years' War—the poor and marginal. Many gentlemen warned their sons to stay clear of the regular service and not to serve as mere “common Soldiers.” Instead, many secured appointments as officers in the service. But if service in the regular army proved unattractive for gentlemen and their sons, service in the minutemen proved unattractive for many ordinary white Virginians. Having elected their own officers in the Independent Companies, few former volunteers were happy about having appointed officers imposed on them from above and paid much more than enlisted men. And while they acted spontaneously in the Independent Companies, most would-be minutemen were reluctant to spend any unnecessary time away from their farms training in the new service as required by law. Finally, many poorer or smallholding militiamen particularly resented the exemptions allowed in the militia. They believed the exemption of overseers shielded wealthier slave owners from military service at the expense of non-slaveholders. Patriot leaders wanted a disciplined armed force that they could control; ordinary white Virginians wanted a greater say in return for the sacrifices they were being asked to make.

RECRUITING THE POOR

By choosing order over democracy, Patriot leaders quashed enthusiasm for the cause. In the end, too few Virginians stepped forward to make the minutemen service a viable defense force. Incredibly, the minutemen service stalled even after Governor Dunmore had upped the ante in Virginia in November 1775 by declaring the slaves and servants of rebel masters free if they could reach his lines and join him to fight against the Patriot forces. Even the renewed threat of racial war failed to mobilize middling white Virginians in sufficient numbers, and not for the last time in the conflict. Consequently, by December 1775 Patriot leaders had all but scrapped the minutemen service and, in desperation, instead called for a vastly enlarged regular service that they hoped would serve as a permanent wartime professional army for the protection of the state. At the same time, they also pleaded with Congress to include this contingent as part of Virginia's contribution to the Continental army. In doing so, the leading Patriots signaled that they would not rely on middling citizens in the militia for the colony's defense; instead, they would award generous enlistment bounties and regular pay to anyone who would give up their independence and submit to the more onerous regulations governing the Continental army. To put it another way, as early as the end of 1775, Virginia's leaders had concluded that it was better to pay the poor to fight on behalf of taxpaying citizens and the ruling class than to send the sons of the elite and middling classes to war and risk social upheaval.

Initially, this policy enjoyed some success. Enlistments for the newly enlarged regular army were brisk throughout the early months of 1776. But as bad news from the northern theater began to reach Virginia in the early summer, enlistments began to fall off. And as Washington called for increasing numbers of soldiers to stave off British advances around New York, fewer Virginians stepped forward as it looked more and more likely that they would be sent northward, far from their homes and families. In turn, Patriot leaders began thinking about new ways of “encouraging” enlistments into the army, revealing more explicitly their thinking about who ought to serve. At the end of 1776, for example, the assembly gave justices of the peace and the governor wide powers to imprison and ultimately impress “rogues and vagabonds” into the armed services. By the spring of 1777, the assembly also sanctioned the recruitment of free blacks into the army.

With still only as little as one-quarter of its new quota raised by May 1777, Virginia also succumbed to pressure from Washington and Congress and instituted a draft for soldiers. But contrary to congressional recommendations that men be drafted universally, Virginia legislators decided that draftees would be those who could “be best spared, and will be most serviceable,” to be decided by the field officers and the top four magistrates of the county. Virginia’s Revolutionary leaders, then, fell back on a colonial strategy of targeting the more vulnerable in society. As one recruiting officer put it later in the year, the draft was designed to force the “expendables” into service, or more explicitly, according to one Virginian, the “Lazy fellows who lurk about and are pests to Society.”

If Revolutionary leaders and middling Virginians were content to shift the burden of fighting, the lower sort upon whom that burden fell were quick to fight back. Would-be recruits forced Patriots to raise bounty money, bargained with their neighbors for their services, and resisted and evaded the draft when coerced into service. In some places, they violently resisted any and all attempts to conscript soldiers. In other places, once drafted they simply deserted and found refuge, usually with friends and family. Lower-class resistance was so vehement that, by early 1778, Virginia legislators were forced to abandon the idea of raising men by a draft altogether and turned instead to high bounties and short terms of service. When the assembly made economic enticements the sole inducement to join the army in 1778 and 1779, the inflation of bounty rewards accelerated. By the fall of 1779, the sums given to recruits for the army had reached critical and crippling proportions. Because of rising inflation, Edmund Pendleton thought that almost every man enlisted had cost, on average, about five thousand pounds each.

Some Virginians, of course, were happy to serve on any terms. Many men, for example, were willing to

exchange one kind of bondage for another. In 1775 the third Virginia Convention had forbidden recruiters to enlist any servants at all unless they were apprentices who had the written consent of their masters. Yet desperation drove recruiters to enlist anyone who seemed willing to serve. Indentured and convict servants took full advantage. But enslaved Virginians also took advantage of the desperate need for soldiers by offering themselves to recruiters under the guise of being freemen. The prohibition of 1775 against enlisting servants presumably applied to enslaved Virginians, for on that front the Convention was completely silent. However, at some point between 1775 and early 1777, desperate recruiters began allowing free blacks into the Virginia line. But enslaved Virginians knew that in the face of a shortage of white enlistments, recruiters were more likely to enlist blacks whether enslaved or free. By the middle years of the war, blacks constituted a significant minority in Virginia’s line in the Continental army. Because middling and upper-class whites refused to fight for themselves, and because even lower-class whites only reluctantly joined the army, necessity forced white Virginians to rely on blacks for their defense.

The end result of lower-class resistance through the middle years of the war was that the war effort simply ground to a halt. Despite the pleas of Continental officials, Virginia legislators failed to put teeth into their recruiting laws through the latter part of 1778, throughout 1779, and into 1780. The returns of the First Virginia Regiment, probably the strongest regiment from the state at any given moment during the war, showed the shortcomings of Virginia military policy in the war’s midyears. In September 1776 there were 590 men enrolled in the regiment (though only 406 were present and fit for duty). By the end of 1779, even after being reinforced with remnants of the Ninth and Tenth Virginia Regiments, the First consisted of only 295 men, most of whose terms of service were expiring. Finally, just before its capture at Charleston, South Carolina, in May 1780, the strength of the Regiment was listed at just 195 effective men. “Virginia,” wrote one army chaplain definitively, “makes the poorest figure of any State in the Recruiting way.”

THE WAR MOVES SOUTHWARD

While Virginians divided among themselves and hoped for peace, the British began moving to bring the war to the South and open up a new front in the stagnating conflict. With the British believing themselves to be at a stalemate in the North, the southern colonies began to look more inviting to them by 1778–1779. It was not until British strategy shifted southward that state leaders again took the war seriously—only, in fact, when Virginia lost the remnants of its contingent of Continental soldiers at the fall of Charleston in 1780. The members of the assembly, under mounting pressure from Congress and from officers such

as Washington, finally expanded their mobilization efforts. They did so by putting increased pressure on the middling classes, both by requiring from them more extensive militia service and by reinstating and expanding the draft, this time to include all men.

Calls on the militia for more frequent service in Virginia and in neighboring states escalated after 1778 in the face of British raids. But the more the assembly and governor called on the militia, the more middling white Virginians protested. Ordinary farmers and planters demanded that calls be limited, for short terms of service, and for service only close to home. Most were adamant that they would not serve outside the state, and particularly in the hotter climates of the states to the south of them. But middling men in the militia were equally insistent that their taxpaying status should exempt them from fighting altogether and that the state ought to spend their tax money on raising a proper army and filling it with their lower-class neighbors. Petitioners in the militia claimed that full citizens of the new Republic had the right not to serve but to pay others to do it for them. Only by pushing lower-class men into a permanent army, they warned, could the government quell the “great uneasiness and disquiet in the Country” caused by militia call outs and high taxes.

SLAVERY AND RECRUITMENT

But middling Virginians were equally concerned about serving in the military because of the shadow of slavery. The presence of a large number of enslaved Virginians in the state affected mobilization in several significant ways. In the first place, many slaveholders were worried about losing their valuable property amidst the British raids and invasion. But many white Virginians also harbored a deep-seated fear that Virginia’s enslaved population might do more than just take the opportunity to escape to the British. With first-hand accounts raising alarms, they feared that Virginia’s slaves would revolt and kill their masters. Such worries, perhaps predictably, kept many militia at home when the British invaded the state.

Slavery also had a less obvious impact on mobilization in Virginia. Though many historians have assumed that slavery helped unify white communities in times of trouble, the ownership of enslaved Virginians actually aggravated deep divisions among whites. Nonslaveholders, for example, were quick to claim that military service for slaveholders was much less of a burden than for those without slaves. Slaveowners still had someone to labor for them in their absence. Moreover, many nonslaveholders believed that slaveholders had enjoyed too many exemptions from fighting altogether. Under the strain of war, resentments became glaring divides. In the midst of one British raid up the Potomac, for example, many of the militia of the Northern Neck refused to serve, declaring

“the Rich wanted the Poor to fight for them, to defend there property, whilst they refused to fight for themselves.” Slaveholding, then, particularly towards the end of the war, increasingly became the touchstone for class divisions among white Virginians.

Given these seemingly intractable considerations, Patriot leaders were forced into thinking about some revolutionary proposals. In the fall of 1780, Virginia legislators announced a radical new plan to raise a more permanent army. They proposed offering volunteers, in addition to the Continental bounty (which still included a parcel of land), an enslaved Virginian between the ages of ten and forty years old. After years of resistance and holding out for the best leverage for their services, lower-class Virginians were finally able to extract a huge windfall in return for serving in the military. Not only would they get enough land to vote, but they would also receive money enough to establish themselves and even an enslaved Virginian to make that land more productive. And legislators may have hoped that in addition to raising a more permanent army, they were also making a judicious move to shore up what was clearly a tenuous alliance between poor whites and wealthy slave owners to resist the British invasion.

Significantly, Revolutionary leaders stopped short of making the most obvious move of enlisting slaves rather than using them as part of the bounty to enlist poor whites. James Madison, for example, thought it would be much better if Patriot leaders in Virginia took the more obvious step and allow enslaved Virginians themselves to serve. He thought that such a move would “certainly be more consonant to the principles of liberty which ought never to be lost sight of in a contest for liberty.” Most of Madison’s elite colleagues in the assembly, however, were not prepared to move so far. The war had already chipped away at the institution of slavery on a number of different fronts. Many gentlemen believed that officially arming enslaved Virginians and offering them their freedom would amount to a virtual emancipation call across the state. Patriot leaders were not going to go that far, regardless of the costs.

INVASION OF VIRGINIA

As it turned out, the new recruiting law was undermined by a fresh British offensive in the state that began in January 1781. Increased militia call outs and general protests against the new law ensured that it was ineffective. Few recruits actually stepped forward, and many counties refused to implement the recruiting law in sympathy with their militia or in fear of what might happen if they did. Worse, though, when local officials tried forcibly to draft men, it caused widespread unease, discontent, and in some cases collective and violent resistance. As for the permanent army Washington wanted, in 1781 Virginia managed to scrape up just 773 men, or a mere 24 percent of the 3,250 men for whom Washington had called. Pressure

from below thoroughly disabled mobilization for the regular army in 1781. Though repeated British invasions helped undermine the draft in Virginia, the militia's sometimes intense, sometimes passive, but persistent local resistance to state laws had brought recruiting to a halt.

Nor did white Virginians do much better in rallying themselves to the battlefield as militia. As the British made further inroads into the state, Virginians seemed powerless to stop them, and many militiamen throughout Virginia actually rioted in protest against both the draft for Continental soldiers and the militia call outs. In the end, while Washington and Lafayette hurried to Virginia with the remains of the Continental army in the hopes of trapping Cornwallis at Yorktown, white Virginians divided among themselves. The end of the war came at Yorktown, but with only an indifferent contribution from Virginians. Even the best estimates of the number of militia at Yorktown show that perhaps no more than 3,000 Virginia militia out of a potential 50,000 participated in some way; 7,800 French troops and over 5,000 Continental troops—mainly from states north of Virginia—played the greatest role. In the critical year of 1781, Revolutionary leaders in Virginia reaped the fruits of the divisive policies they had sown over the preceding years of war.

AFTER THE WAR

Close attention to mobilization, then, reveals that like many other states, Virginia was wracked by internal divisions and conflicts, often over the all-important question of who should serve or at least bear the burden of the costs of the war. Such conflicts continued in the postwar era but significantly, most protagonists then rested the legitimacy of their arguments on their wartime sacrifices, however great or small. Middling Virginians, for example, complained about and evaded high postwar taxes by claiming that they had already made tremendous sacrifices during the war. They also fundamentally changed the tax structure of the new state by continuing to argue that all men ought to bear a share of the costs of the war in proportion to their wealth. Though poorer Virginians and even blacks joined the army and helped win the war, middling militia who stayed at home claimed the fruits of the Revolution. Indeed, slaveholding Virginians even used enslaved Virginians' resistance to justify continued bondage and used their own wartime sacrifices and military service, however limited they may have been, to justify their efforts to keep a tenacious hold on their human property. In doing so, slaveholders used Revolutionary principles and their Revolutionary participation to legitimate the continued enslavement of black Virginians.

Moreover, wartime divisions took on particular importance in America because the war was so central to the political settlement that occurred in many states during the war and, shortly thereafter, at a national level. For

example, precisely because so many people defended their own interests and refused to fight the war on terms proposed by elites, elites themselves in turn began thinking about new ways of organizing society and politics to protect the fragile republican experiment of which they were only nominally in charge by the end of the war. Indeed, the divisive and crippling experience of the war helped produce a small group of committed nationalists—including George Washington and many other Continental army officers who had been frustrated by the conflicts at the state level that had undermined the war effort. At the same time, many state leaders believed that Virginia had been abandoned by its northern neighbors in the latter stages of the war and blamed their internal problems on the lack of cooperation between the states. Thus, the political issues that divided Americans in the run-up to the passage of the Constitution and that continued to plague national politics in the 1790s and beyond may, in part at least, be traced to the problems faced by the different states in mobilizing for the War for Independence.

SEE ALSO *Virginia, Military Operations in.*

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Virginia Line

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VIRGINIA LINE. Along with Massachusetts, Virginia was one of the most populous of the original thirteen states and, as such, both Massachusetts and Virginia each furnished the largest of the state Lines. While the first Virginia Continental units were the two rifle companies formed in June 1775, these were never part of the Line. The state's infantry force began on 21 August 1775 as two full-time regiments, created by the Virginia Convention as part of a comprehensive defense program. This program also included independent frontier guard companies, minutemen, and a reorganized militia. These units were transferred to the Continental army on 1 November. On 28 December the Continental Congress asked Virginia to increase the force to six regiments, but the Convention actually voted instead to raise a total of nine regiments on 11 January 1776. This brought the first two up to a uniform strength and added seven new ones, including one (the Eighth) recruited primarily from the ethnic German settlers in the northwestern part of the colony, and another (the Ninth) raised mostly in the Delmarva Peninsula ("Eastern Shore"). The Continental Congress accepted all nine into their service. A final six regiments were added when the Army was expanded for 1777, producing four Virginia brigades formed into two divisions.

Although Virginia raised the regiments with relative ease, the state had a much harder time keeping them up to strength and making good the losses from combat and by the expiration of the original enlistments. Two consecutive temporary consolidations took place in 1778 in an effort to keep all active units at effective strength for combat, with surplus officers returning home to try to recruit. The state government even loaned its own two infantry battalions to General George Washington to help offset the losses. Finally, on 12 May 1779, Washington faced the

fact that his native state just could not provide all the troops he needed, and he reluctantly reorganized and renumbered the Line's regiments to a total of eleven units. When the Line was sent in December of that year to reinforce the Southern Department, it carried out another temporary reorganization by transferring the enlisted men into the three senior regiments and promising to organize contingents of new men or veterans who would reenlist if given a furlough to follow.

The first two of those detachments joined the regiments in Charleston in time to be captured; the third was destroyed by Banastre Tarleton at the Waxhaws soon thereafter. Major General Frederick Steuben accompanied Nathaniel Greene to the south at the end of 1780 and remained in Virginia to organize the efforts to rebuild a semblance of a Line. More provisional battalions were formed in time to either join Greene in the Carolinas or help at Yorktown; and for the remainder of the war only provisional formations remained. There was one exception to this provisional approach—the Virginia contingent at Fort Pitt. In May 1778 the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment (which came from the frontier) was sent there, and the regiment remained there despite being renumbered first as the Ninth and then as the Seventh, until it was disbanded on 1 January 1783. The official Virginia quota of regiments dropped to six in 1781 and to two in 1783 before being disbanded on 15 November 1783.

In addition to the Line itself, Virginia also contributed half of the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment, the majority of the First Continental Artillery Regiment, the First and Third Continental Light Dragoons, most of Henry Lee's Second Partisan Corps, and a special unit to guard the prisoner of war facilities in Charlottesville (the Regiment of Guards). It also recruited large elements of Grayson's, Gist's, and Thruston's Additional Continental Regiments.

SEE ALSO *Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene*.

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VIRGINIA RESOLVES OF 1765.

Patrick Henry, who had been a member of the House of Burgesses for nine days, introduced on 29 May 1765, in the last days of the session, perhaps as many as seven resolutions that expressed opposition to the Stamp Act. The resolutions were debated on the 30th, during which Henry made allusions that, since Caesar had his Brutus and Charles II his Cromwell, he hoped that "some good American would stand up, in favour of his country," for which hint of treason he was reprimanded by the speaker, and after which he apologized for his remarks (Morgan, p. 46). The first four resolutions were passed, "the greatest majority being 22 to 17." The fifth resolution, declaring that the Burgesses "have the only and sole exclusive right and power to lay taxes and impositions upon the inhabitants of this colony," passed by 20 to 19 (*ibid.*, pp. 47–48).

(Only 39 burgesses remained in Williamsburg, the rest of the 116 members having already gone home.) The next day, conservative burgesses forced the House to rescind the fifth resolution. But then an extraordinary thing happened, as described by the historians Edmund and Helen Morgan: "Henry and his friends, having failed to secure the passage of their most radical items in the House of Burgesses, were able to get them passed unanimously in the newspapers: every newspaper which carried the resolutions printed the fifth, sixth, and seventh as though they had been adopted" (*Stamp Act Crisis*, p. 102). Beginning with the *Newport Mercury* of Rhode Island on 24 June, the printing of the final three resolutions made the House of Burgesses appear to be much more radical than it actually was. These inaccurate reports lifted the spirits of Stamp Act opponents throughout the colonies and gave new life to the movement to resist imperial control.

SEE ALSO *Henry, Patrick; Stamp Act.*

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VIRGINIA RESOLVES OF 1769. 16

May 1769. Framed by George Mason, introduced in the House of Burgesses by Washington on 16 May, and unanimously adopted the same day, these resolutions asserted that only the governor and the provincial legislature had the right to lay taxes in Virginia. They implied censure of the British ministry's denunciation of the Virginia and Massachusetts circular letters, and they condemned the Parliamentary proposal that an ancient law of Henry VIII be revived to bring American malcontents to England for trial. Governor Norborne Berkeley, baron de Botetourt, promptly dissolved the assembly, but the Burgesses met informally and on 18 May adopted the Virginia Association.

SEE ALSO *Association; Massachusetts Circular Letter.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

VOLUNTEERS OF IRELAND. This Provincial regiment was created by Sir Henry Clinton in the summer of 1778 at the behest of Lord George Germain. In a letter to Germain on 23 October, Clinton stated that he wanted “to try all means . . . to draw off from the American army the number of Europeans which constituted its principal force” (“On-Line Institute”). Although based on a smug misreading of the composition of the American army, the effort produced an effective regiment. In his memoirs, Clinton recalled the difficulties he had in implementing Germain’s suggestion. Regretting that “no very large portion of the friendly colonists who had taken refuge within our posts seemed much inclined to add to their other sufferings those of a military life,” he nevertheless

had recourse to those sources from whence the rebels themselves drew most of their best soldiers—I mean the Irish and other Europeans who had [recently] settled in America. As it was difficult, however, to hold forth terms of sufficient advantage to these emigrants to incite them to quit their present service [i.e., desert] without running a risk of giving umbrage to the natives of America who had, with voluntary zeal, entered into the first provincial corps that had been raised, I made use of another lure, which I thought might prove equally effectual. This was to endeavor to work upon the national attachment of the Irish by inviting them into a regiment whose officers should all be from that country, and placing at its head a nobleman of popular character and ability. Accordingly, before I left Philadelphia [16 June 1778], I began to form such a corps, under the title of the Volunteers of Ireland and the command of Lord Rawdon, whose zeal I knew would lead him to spare neither [personal] expense nor pains to complete its numbers and render it useful and respectable.

The Volunteers “afterward filled fast and, being employed on active service the rest of the war, had frequent opportunities of signaling themselves.”

In May 1779 the Volunteers were placed on the American Establishment as the Second American Regiment (Volunteers of Ireland) and joined the expedition sent to

Virginia for the Mathew-Collier Raid. The next year they arrived with the reinforcements from New York to take part in the final operations of the Charleston campaign of 1780. At Hobkirk’s Hill, South Carolina, on 25 April 1781, they particularly distinguished themselves under the overall command of their founder. In his report of the action to Earl Cornwallis, Rawdon, in command of the British occupation of South Carolina, wrote on 26 April 1781:

We were so fortunate in our march [against Nathanael Greene’s position outside Camden] that we were not discovered till the flank companies of the Volunteers of Ireland, which led our column, fell in with Greene’s pickets. The pickets, though supported, were instantly driven in and followed to their camp. . . . I had ordered Lieutenant Colonel Campbell to lead the attack with the Sixty-third and King’s American Regiments, which he performed with great spirit. The extent of the enemy’s line soon obliged me to throw forward the Volunteers of Ireland also. Those three corps quickly gained the summit of the hill; and, giving room for the rest of our force to act, the rout of the enemy was immediately decided.

The Volunteers were placed on the British Establishment on Christmas Day 1782, as the 105th Regiment of Foot. In April 1783 the officers and non-commissioned officers were sent to Ireland to raise a new regiment, and the men were transferred to other Provincial regiments then serving at Charleston, effectively disbanding the Volunteers. The 105th Regiment was disbanded in Britain in January 1784.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Clinton, Henry; Hobkirk’s Hill (Camden), South Carolina; Rawdon-Hastings, Francis; Virginia, Military Operations in.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

VON STEUBEN SEE *Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von.*

VOSE, JOSEPH. (1738–1816). Continental officer. Massachusetts. Eldest brother in a large, extended kinship of Voses in Milton, Massachusetts, Joseph was major in General William Heath's Massachusetts Regiment from 1 May to December 1775, serving with his brothers, Captain Elijah Vose and Lieutenant Bill Vose. Joseph distinguished himself in the raid on Great Brewster Island on 21 July, and his promotion to lieutenant colonel was backdated to 1 July. In the army's reorganization of 1 January 1776 he became lieutenant colonel of Colonel John Groaton's Twenty-Fourth Continental Regiment, and served with it in the Canada campaign. By 8 December, he was at Peekskill, New York, on his way to join General George Washington's main army, in command of a single unit made up of the remnants of the Twenty-Fourth, Colonel William Bond's Twenty-Fourth Continental Regiment, and Colonel Elisha Porter's Massachusetts state regiment. In the next reorganization (1 January 1777), he was named lieutenant colonel of the First Massachusetts (6 November 1776) and promoted to colonel on 22 April 1777 when the original colonel, John Paterson, became a brigadier general. He was rejoined in the regiment by his brother Elijah (now a lieutenant colonel); brother Bill continued as a staff officer (paymaster). The First Massachusetts Regiment was part of John Glover's Second Massachusetts Brigade that held the American

right flank at Saratoga, after which Vose led it south to join the main army for the winter of 1777–1778 at Valley Forge. He took part in the Monmouth, New Jersey, campaign of June–July 1778, and then marched east for the operations under John Sullivan at Newport, Rhode Island, the next month. He was back in the Hudson Highlands in the summer of 1779.

On 17 February 1781, "the eight eldest companies" (in the words of William Heath) of the Massachusetts line were formed into a battalion under Colonel Vose and Major Caleb Gibbs (*Memoirs*, p. 288). This elite unit formed part of the Marquis de Lafayette's force that marched south from West Point for Military operations in Virginia in the summer of 1781. During the Yorktown campaign it was in John P. G. Muhlenberg's First Brigade of Lafayette's light infantry division. In the reorganization of 13 June 1783 Vose was continued in command of one of the four Massachusetts regiments formed of men whose enlistments had not expired. As a brevet brigadier general (promoted to the rank on 30 September 1783), he led his unit into New York City on Evacuation Day, 25 November 1783. After the war he returned to his farm in Milton, Massachusetts.

SEE ALSO *Great Brewster Island, Massachusetts.*

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W

WADSWORTH, JEREMIAH. (1743–1804). Commissary general of the Continental army and congressman. Connecticut. Jeremiah Wadsworth went to sea at the age of 18 to improve his health. He started as a common sailor aboard one of the ships owned by his uncle, Matthew Talbott, rose to the rank of ship captain, and by 1771 was a wealthy man. In April 1775 the General Assembly appointed him as one of nine merchants to serve as commissaries for the Connecticut forces at New York and Boston. Commissary General Joseph Trumbull chose him to serve as commissary for the Eastern Department in 1776, and on 18 June 1777 Congress elected him deputy commissary general of purchases. He resigned this post in August 1777. When Congress re-established the previous system under which Joseph Trumbull had operated, Wadsworth again became commissary general and held this post from April 1778 until he resigned on 4 December 1779. Operating under circumstances that were both extraordinary and unprecedented, Wadsworth earned General George Washington's commendation for managing to keep the Continental army supplied. He also worked well with Nathanael Greene, the army's quartermaster, who became his partner in private mercantile ventures from 1779 to 1785. Wadsworth was commissary for the comte de Rochambeau's army from its arrival at Newport in 1780 until it departed for home in 1782, and in the summer of 1783 he went to Paris to settle accounts. Like Robert Morris, Wadsworth made a substantial personal profit from his public activities. He was a delegate to the Confederation Congress in 1788, and the same year supported ratification of the federal Constitution in the Connecticut state convention. A Federalist member of the first Congress, he supported Alexander Hamilton's

scheme for the federal assumption of state debts from the Revolution. He resigned in March 1795. A pioneer in American business, banking, insurance, and cattle breeding, he died at Hartford, Connecticut.

SEE ALSO *Trumbull, Joseph.*

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WAGONER, OLD. Nickname of Daniel Morgan.

SEE ALSO *Morgan, Daniel.*

WAHAB'S PLANTATION, NORTH CAROLINA. 21 September 1780. Tarleton's Legion, reinforced, moved on the left (west) of the British army that advanced toward Charlotte. During this advance, Tarleton came down with yellow fever and command passed to Major George Hanger. Acting on intelligence reports that the Legion was camped at Wahab's Plantation, home of Captain James Wahab of the rebel militia, Colonel William Davie approached the

plantation with eighty mounted partisans and seventy riflemen in two small companies under Major George Davidson at around sunrise on 21 September. Oblivious to the presence of enemy troops nearby, the British had called in their sentries and more than sixty men were now sitting their horses on a road near one of the plantation houses. Davie's force, guided by Captain Wahab, broke into two units; one, under Davidson, seized the plantation house, while the mounted troops used a cornfield as cover to emerge on the road below the Loyalists.

When Davie attacked up the road at the same moment that Davidson's men stormed the house, the Loyalists were caught completely by surprise. In just a few minutes, fifteen or twenty Loyalists were killed, forty were wounded, and rest of the Loyal Legion fled in disorder. There was only one American casualty, and this a man who was wounded during the pursuit when mistaken for an enemy. The rebels carried off 96 fully equipped horses and 120 stand of arms, retreating before a British relief force. Davie returned to camp at Providence after covering sixty miles in less than twenty-four hours. The British responded by burning Wahab's house. Davie and Hanger met next at Charlotte, North Carolina, on 26 September.

SEE ALSO *Charlotte, North Carolina; Kings Mountain, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WALLABOUT BAY, BROOKLYN, NEW YORK. The site of what would become the New York Naval Shipyard, this is where the *Jersey* and other British prison ships were moored and where the British dumped the bodies of thousands of dead prisoners. Nathanael Greene oversaw the construction of Fort Putnam, which overlooks the bay, in 1776.

SEE ALSO *Prisons and Prison Ships.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WALLACE, SIR JAMES. (1731–1803). British naval officer. Wallace entered the Royal Naval Academy at Portsmouth in 1746. He fought in the Seven Years' War and was promoted post-captain on 10 January 1771. In November he was given the frigate *Rose* (twenty guns), which he took to North America in 1774. Based at Newport in 1775–1776, he vigorously conducted raids on rebel-held coastal towns and harbors. In July 1776 he was given *Experiment* (fifty guns), and in January 1777

carried despatches home to Britain, where he was knighted on 13 February. In July he returned to the North American station and in October took part in Henry Clinton's expedition to the Highlands, pushing on with John Vaughan to Kingston and beyond. In 1778 *Experiment* took part in the relief of Newport and in August evaded capture by sailing into Long Island Sound and through Hell Gate, a passage previously thought impossible for a two-decker. In December she was severely damaged by a storm off Virginia, and Wallace took her home for repairs. Sailing with Marriot Arbuthnot's squadron in May 1779, he took part in the relief of Jersey in the English Channel and destroyed the French squadron in Cancale Bay in northwest France. Rejoining Arbuthnot in Torbay in southwest England, he returned with him to New York. Sent south with pay for the troops in Georgia, in September 1779 he ran into part of comte d'Estaing's squadron and was captured. Acquitted at the ensuing court martial, he took command of *Nonsuch* (sixty-four guns) in March 1780, and in July captured the corvette *Hussard* and the frigate *Belle Poule*. In 1781 he took part in George Darby's relief of Gibraltar and on the return voyage engaged and severely damaged an eighty-gun ship. In January 1782 he sailed in the *Warrior* (seventy-four guns) with George Rodney to the West Indies, where he took part in the battle of the Saints. He returned to Britain in 1783 and served as commander in chief in Newfoundland from 1793 to 1796.

SEE ALSO *Arbuthnot, Marriot; Clinton's Expedition; Kingston, New York.*

revised by John Oliphant

WALLIS, SAMUEL. (?–1798). Loyalist secret agent. Born in Maryland of Quaker descent, he became a substantial Philadelphia merchant, shipper, and speculator long before the War of American Independence. An investor in frontier lands, he took advantage of the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix to build a substantial house in Muncy, Pennsylvania, on the west branch of the Susquehanna River, about twenty-five miles north of Fort Augusta at Sunbury. He used to spend the summers there, returning to Philadelphia for the winter. When the British arrived in Pennsylvania in 1777–1778, he worked secretly for them and helped to organize Loyalist raids on the frontier. In 1778, during a major Indian raid, nearby settlers took refuge in Wallis's stone dwelling before moving on to Sunbury. Afterward, Wallis had the effrontery to demand a garrison of Continental troops to supplement the useless militia. In August a detachment of the Sixth Pennsylvania Regiment was posted close by. Later he was asked to draw up a map of

the Iroquois country for use by Sullivan in his expedition in 1779. He is supposed to have supplied a false map—intended to send Sullivan a hundred miles astray—while providing the British with an accurate one. Unfortunately, as neither map has ever been found, and Sullivan did not stray out of his way, the story may be untrue.

Wallis used his house as a rendezvous for British and Loyalist frontier agents, and he was one of the spies who reported to John André and George Beckwith, Henry Clinton's intelligence chiefs in New York. André made use of him in mid-1779 when Benedict Arnold was making overtures from Philadelphia. Beckwith tried to get Wallis to exploit the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line (1–10 January 1781), but the opportunity passed before anything could be done. He continued to send intelligence and food shipments to the British army until 1782, all the time keeping up close personal contacts with the Continental Congress and posing as a Whig. In 1782 he moved permanently to Muncy, expanded his land holdings to about seven thousand acres, and—especially as the agent of the Holland Land Company—became a major speculator in lands farther west. He died of smallpox in Philadelphia in 1798; his fortune, possibly owing to the concurrent financial crisis, was lost.

So good was Wallis's cover that his Loyalist activities went unsuspected until the Clinton and Arnold papers reached the public domain in the early twentieth century. His significance lies less in the damage he may have caused the rebels—which in the nature of things is hard to evaluate—but as a rare known example of the operations of a British agent. Many others, like Wallis, must have contributed to the jigsaw André and Beckwith labored to assemble for Clinton. Like him, too, they may have honestly worked for a British victory while taking care to be on the winning side in the end.

SEE ALSO *André, John; Arnold's Treason; Beckwith, George; Clinton, Henry; Fort Stanwix, Treaty of; Sullivan's Expedition against the Iroquois.*

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WALPOLE, HORACE OR HORATIO. (1717–1797). Diarist, author, politician, patron of the arts, and fourth earl of Orford. Walpole, the youngest child of Sir Robert Walpole, left an immense volume of

letters and diaries that provide a fertile source for historians studying the eighteenth century. His waspish and often prejudiced observations must be treated with caution, but the memoirs in particular contain a great deal of accurate political information. The first letters were published in 1798, soon after his death, as *The Works of Horatio Walpole, Earl of Orford*, in five volumes edited by Robert Walpole and Mary Berry. The *Reminiscences written by Mr Horace Walpole in 1788*, originally published in 1819, were reedited by Paget Toynbee and published by Clarendon Press in 1924. *Memoirs of the Reign of King George II* first appeared in 1822 and were published again, in an edition by John Brooke, by Yale University Press, in 1985. *Memoirs of the Reign of King George III* followed in 1845; these were reedited by Derek Jarrett and published by Yale University Press in 2000. *The Last Journals of Horace Walpole* appeared in 1859, followed by a revised edition in 1910. Although he entered Parliament in 1754, his political activities were marginal.

SEE ALSO *Walpole, Sir Robert.*

revised by John Oliphant

WALPOLE, SIR ROBERT. (1676–1745). British politician. Often described as the first “prime minister,” he dominated British politics for over twenty years and was once regarded as the architect of Georgian stability. A masterly parliamentary manager with the full confidence of George I and George II, his sheer political longevity shaped the office he held. Horace (or Horatio) Walpole, the diarist, was his son.

SEE ALSO *Walpole, Horatio (or Horace).*

revised by John Oliphant

WALTON, GEORGE. (c. 1749–1804). Signer, governor of Georgia. Virginia and Georgia. Born in Cumberland County, Virginia, George Walton was orphaned and apprenticed to a carpenter. At the end of his apprenticeship, in 1769, he moved to Savannah, studied law, and was admitted to the bar in 1774. As early as July of that year he was one of the local Patriots urging action against Britain, and he had a leading role in putting Georgia in the Patriot camp. Named a delegate to the Continental Congress on 2 February 1776, he sat for the periods 1776–1777 and 1780–1781.

On 9 January 1778 he was named a colonel of militia, and he was severely wounded in the thigh and

captured during the unsuccessful defense of Savannah, Georgia, on 29 December 1778. He was exchanged in Sept. 1779, during the unsuccessful siege of Savannah by rebel and French troops. General Benjamin Lincoln urged him to establish a constitutional government in Augusta, thus replacing the unconstitutional supreme executive council currently functioning there. Walton complied with Lincoln's suggestion. Although Walton's newly established government was not considered any more constitutional than its previous form, Walton nonetheless held the position of governor between November 1779 and January 1780. In this capacity he sent a request to the Continental Congress for the transfer of General Lachlan McIntosh, which bore the fraudulent signature of William Glascock, speaker of the assembly. Congress complied with Walton's request; however, in 1781 they repealed the resolution.

Walton was not returned to Congress after his 1781 term, and he remained in Philadelphia with his family until late 1782. Although the 1783 Georgia assembly censured him for the forgery on his request to have McIntosh removed, they elected him chief justice, an influential position he filled for six years. After serving as governor in 1789, he became a district superior-court judge under the new state constitution. In late 1795 he filled the unexpired U.S. Senate term of James Jackson, but was not returned to the Senate.

SEE ALSO *McIntosh, Lachlan*.

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revised by Leslie Hall

WARD, ARTEMAS. (1727–1800). American politician and Continental general. Massachusetts. Artemas Ward was born in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, and was graduated from Harvard College in 1748. He opened a retail store in his home town, married, and became a prominent figure in local political and judicial affairs. Appointed a major in the local militia regiment on 28 January 1755, Ward turned out with his men in August 1757 when the French took Fort William Henry at the head of Lake George. The next year he was appointed major in Colonel William Williams's Massachusetts provincial regiment, was

promoted lieutenant colonel on 3 July 1758, and five days later participated in James Abercromby's disastrous attack on Ticonderoga. He returned from that campaign with his health permanently impaired.

A strong and vocal supporter of colonial rights, he worked with Samuel Adams and other leaders to oppose the Stamp Act in 1765. In retaliation, the royal governor, Francis Bernard, removed him from the colonelcy of the local militia regiment to which he had been appointed on 1 July 1762. From that point on, Ward was a principal leader of the resistance in Worcester County. He believed that Providence had blessed Massachusetts and its inhabitants as the chosen people, and that British policies were interfering with that happy relationship. The Massachusetts Provincial Congress appointed him a brigadier general on 26 October 1774, and promoted him to senior major general on 15 January 1775. Sick in bed when news of the Lexington alarm (19 April) reached him, he rode at dawn the next day to assume command of the forces around Boston, and directed operations until Washington arrived on 2 July. On 19 May the provincial congress named this stern-looking man of medium height, heavy in body and slow of speech (Freeman, *George Washington*, III, p. 477), as commander in chief of the Massachusetts army. In that position, Ward also exercised significant coordinating authority over the contingents from other colonies. Involved in planning the occupation of the Charlestown peninsula in mid-June 1775, he ably funneled men and material to the battle of Bunker Hill (17 June) from his headquarters at Cambridge.

On the same day, in Philadelphia, the Continental Congress appointed Ward the senior major general of the Continental army, second only to George Washington as commander-in-chief. Washington and Ward had a sometimes tense working relationship. Although Washington placed Ward in command of the important right wing of the American army at Roxbury, Ward, understandably, was disappointed about being superseded as commander-in-chief. He also resented Washington's evident conviction that troops of the Boston army, including those from Massachusetts, left something to be desired in the way of military proficiency.

After the British evacuated from Boston, Ward submitted his resignation (22 March), withdrew it, and then resubmitted it on 12 April. On 23 April Congress accepted it with little appearance of reluctance, but at Washington's request Ward retained his post until the end of May, until the problem of a replacement could be solved. Tensions exploded when Washington wrote Ward that he had been informed that troops performing outpost duty on Bunker Hill and Dorchester Neck were being excused from work on the city's fortifications. Ward fired back on 9 May that this information was an "injurious falsehood" and complained that "because 1,500 men could not throw up the

works as fast as 6,000 or 7,000 had done in time past, there appeared to some an unaccountable delay.” When he learned that Ward had withdrawn his original resignation, Washington wrote Charles Lee that Ward probably wanted to stay by “the smoke of his own chimney.” The Massachusetts authorities had begun to indicate some dissatisfaction with Ward’s performance, and when this was reported to Washington he asked (13 May), “If General W is judged an improper person to command five Regiments in a peaceful camp or garrison . . . why was he appointed to the first military command in the Massachusetts government?” After giving up direct responsibility for the defense of Boston, Ward remained as commander of the Eastern Department until succeeded by William Heath on 20 March 1777.

Ward remained an important leader in Massachusetts civil government, to the extent his poor health would allow. He was a member of the Executive Council (1778 and 1780–1782), a delegate to the Continental Congress (1780–1781), and a member of the state legislature (1782–1787). He strongly opposed Shays’s Rebellion, to the point of standing before insurgent bayonets on 5 September 1786 in an unsuccessful attempt to keep the Worcester County courts open. A Federalist, he sat in the House of Representatives from 1791 until illness forced him to resign in 1795. He died at his home (still standing) in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts.

Of this austere, unsympathetic Yankee who might well have had Washington’s task, Douglas S. Freeman has this epitaph: “Perhaps he deserved more credit than he received. He kept the Army together in front of Boston until Washington came, and after that, however much he felt aggrieved, he did not add to his successor’s difficulties by organizing the discontented” (*George Washington*, III, p. 495a). Ward’s papers are scattered among the Massachusetts Historical Society, the Massachusetts State Archives, and the American Antiquarian Society.

SEE ALSO *Boston Siege; Washington, George.*

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WARD, SAMUEL. (1725–1776). Governor of Rhode Island, member of Continental Congress. Born in Newport, Rhode Island, on 27 May 1725, Ward was son of a prosperous merchant who was governor of Rhode Island from 1740 to 1742. Samuel himself was elected governor in

1762, 1765, and 1766. In Rhode Island politics, Ward was leader of the conservative group centered around the merchants of Newport, while Stephen Hopkins was the more successful champion of the Providence radicals, though Ward had led the opposition to the Stamp Act while he was governor. In 1774 the former political enemies were united as delegates to the first Continental Congress. In the Second Congress, Ward presided frequently over the Committee of the Whole, becoming a firm advocate of independence before Hopkins. He died of smallpox in Philadelphia on 26 March 1776. He was the father of Samuel Ward Jr.

SEE ALSO *Hopkins, Stephen; Stephen, Adam; Ward, Samuel, Jr.*

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WARD, SAMUEL, JR. (1756–1832). Continental officer. Rhode Island. Second son of Governor Samuel Ward of Rhode Island, Ward graduated with honors in 1771 from what became Brown University. On 3 May 1775 he was commissioned captain in the First Rhode Island Regiment, and on 31 December he was taken prisoner at Quebec. Exchanged in August 1776, he returned from Canada and on 12 January 1777 was promoted to major, First Rhode Island. He was with the main army at Morristown and then went north to oppose Burgoyne’s offensive. After spending the winter at Valley Forge, he fought at Newport (July–August 1778), and on 12 April 1779 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. He resigned his army commission on 1 January 1781 and started a business career that led him to travel extensively. In 1788 he became one of the first American merchants to visit the Far East. He was in Paris when Louis XVI was sentenced to death in January 1793.

SEE ALSO *Ward, Samuel.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WARNER, SETH. (1743–1784). Militia officer. Vermont. Born in Woodbury (later Roxbury), Connecticut, on 6 May 1743, Warner moved with his

family to Bennington, Vermont, in 1763 and became a leader of the Green Mountain Boys. On 9 March 1774 he was outlawed by New York, and a reward was offered for his arrest. He took part in the capture of Ticonderoga on 10 May 1775 and occupied Crown Point two days later. At a council held at the latter the next month, he and Ethan Allen were named to ask Congress to create a Green Mountain regiment in the Continental army. Their mission was successful, and on 26 July, Warner was elected commander with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

Returning to Lake Champlain, he joined Montgomery's wing of the Canada invasion and fought at Longueuil on 31 October 1775, defeating a far superior British force. In the retreat from Canada he commanded rear guard actions and also raised reinforcements in Vermont. At Hubbardton on 7 July 1777, his rear guard was surprised and defeated. Rallying his forces, Warner arrived for the final and decisive phase of the Battle of Bennington on 16 August 1777. In October the Green Mountain Regiment joined the forces of General Horatio Gates at Stillwater. On 20 March 1778 he was promoted to brigadier general of Vermont militia, having been given the grade of colonel of one of the Additional Continental Regiments on 5 July 1776. Warner and his regiment spent the rest of the war at various northern outposts. In 1780 he was wounded during a skirmish with Indians on Lake George.

Warner's constant hard service left him in declining health. He and his regiment were retired on 1 January 1783. He died at his home in Woodbury on 26 December 1784.

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments; Bennington Raid; Crown Point, New York; Gates, Horatio; Green Mountain Boys; Hubbardton, Vermont; Longueuil, Canada; Ticonderoga, New York, American Capture of.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

WARNER'S REGIMENT. Warner's regiment was organized on 5 July 1776 and in 1777 became one of the sixteen "additional Continental regiments."

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments.*

Mark M. Boatner

WARRANT MEN. Six fictitious persons in almost all British foot regiments whose pay was distributed as follows: the pay of two men went to widows of regimental officers; the pay of the others went to reimburse the colonel for deserters' clothing, for recruiting, and for the personal use of the colonel and regimental agent.

SEE ALSO *Contingent Men.*

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Mark M. Boatner

WARREN, JAMES. (1726–1808). Political leader. Massachusetts. The eldest son of James and Penelope (Winslow) Warren, he was not related to Joseph and John Warren, who also achieved some fame during the Revolutionary War era. Born at Plymouth, James was graduated from Harvard College in 1745, succeeded his father as Plymouth county sheriff in 1757, and pursued careers as a merchant and gentleman farmer. In 1754 he married the sister of James Otis; Mercy Otis Warren (1728–1814) is remembered as a poet and one of the most perceptive of the first generation of historians of the Revolution.

James sat in the lower house of the Massachusetts General Court and the Provincial Congress from 1766 until 1778. He was speaker in 1769 and 1770, and helped to establish the local Committee of Correspondence. He was a close friend of John and Samuel Adams, and succeeded Joseph Warren as president of the Provincial Congress. He became speaker of the House of Representatives in the new General Court. Between 27 July 1775 and 19 April 1776 he was paymaster general of the Continental army, and from 1776 to 1781 he was on the Navy Board for the Eastern Department. When, in September 1776, the General Court designated him one of three major generals to lead a force into Rhode Island, he was unwilling to serve under a Continental officer of lesser rank and excused himself on the grounds of a recent illness. The next year he resigned his commission to avoid another such situation, and his political enemy, John Hancock, used this to undermine his reputation to such a degree that Warren failed to be re-elected to the legislature in 1778. In 1779 he won re-election, but was unable to win again until 1787. He held a number of offices after the war, but was unable to amass the political power needed to compete with such antagonists as Hancock. "I am content to move in a small sphere," he had written to John Adams in 1775. "I expect no distinction but that of

an honest man who has exerted every nerve.” Yet when he later sought and failed to achieve such distinctions as the office of lieutenant governor and member of Congress he was resentful. “His mind has been soured, and he became discontented and querulous,” wrote John Quincy Adams. He opposed ratification of the federal Constitution in 1788, believing that it would lead to a dissolution of the state governments, and became an Anti-Federalist.

SEE ALSO *Hancock, John*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

WARREN, JOHN. (1753–1815). Continental surgeon. Massachusetts. After studying under his elder brother, Joseph Warren, John became a successful doctor in Boston. In 1773 he joined Colonel Timothy Pickering’s regiment as a surgeon, and on hearing of his brother Joseph’s death at Bunker Hill, he volunteered for service in the ranks. At the age of just twenty-two, however, he became senior surgeon of the hospital at Cambridge. In 1776 he was transferred to New York and was appointed surgeon of the general hospital on Long Island. After serving with Washington’s army at Trenton and Princeton, he returned to Boston in April 1777 to resume his medical practice while performing the duties of a military surgeon in the army hospital there. He became one of the leading New England surgeons of his day, performed one of the first abdominal operations in America, and was a founder of the Harvard Medical School.

SEE ALSO *Warren, Joseph*.

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WARREN, JOSEPH. (1741–1775). Patriot leader killed at Bunker Hill. Massachusetts. Born at Roxbury, Joseph Warren distinguished himself at Harvard College, from which he graduated in 1759, and became a successful medical doctor in Boston. His willingness to inoculate patients against smallpox during an outbreak of the disease established his reputation as the foremost physician in Massachusetts. John Adams was one of his patients, and he was closely associated with Samuel Adams during the Stamp Act crisis. In the

political turmoil of Boston he distinguished himself as a political writer, orator, and organizer, along with Samuel Adams, John Hancock, and James Otis. In 1770 he was a member of the committee to demand the removal of British troops from Boston after the “Massacre,” and in 1772 and 1775 he delivered celebrated commemorative addresses on the anniversary of the event. He drafted the Suffolk Resolves in 1774, and succeeded Samuel Adams as head of the committee of safety.

On the eve of Lexington and Concord he remained in Boston, despite the danger to himself, and sent out his friend Paul Revere (and William Dawes) to warn the Patriots. He left Boston the next morning and took an active part in the day’s fighting. Succeeding John Hancock as president of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress on 23 April 1775, on 20 May he became head of the committee to organize the army in Massachusetts. In both positions Warren did more than any other leader to transform the mob of minuteman and militia that had sent the British scurrying back to Boston into an army capable of maintaining the siege of Boston.

In the early stages of the siege Warren proved to be a savvy and aggressive leader, so aggressive that on several occasions he accompanied American forces skirmishing with the British, despite having no military rank. On 14 June he was elected major general of the militia, having declined the post of physician general, but he had not received his commission when he went to fight on the Charlestown peninsula, and therefore he technically had no official military rank. On the night of 16–17 June he sat with the Provincial Congress at Watertown, on the morning of the 17th he met with the Committee of Safety at Cambridge, and that afternoon he went out to Bunker Hill, where the battle was about to start. Israel Putnam offered to turn over his command, but Warren said, with apparent sincerity, but disingenuously since he was the most important Patriot leader in New England, that he had come as a volunteer to serve where he would be most useful. Proceeding to the redoubt on Breed’s Hill, Warren again declined to assume the command from William Prescott, who now faced the British assault with Warren at his side. In the final phase of the action Warren was shot in the face and died instantly, one of only thirty Americans who were killed in the redoubt.

Warren was buried on Bunker Hill with the other American dead in an unmarked grave. When the British left Boston nine months after the battle, his body was positively identified by the two artificial teeth Revere had made for his friend shortly before his death. This was one of the first recorded instances of identifying a corpse by its dental records.

SEE ALSO *Lexington and Concord; Revere, Paul; Suffolk Resolves*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

WARREN OR WHITE HORSE TAVERN, PENNSYLVANIA. 16 September 1777. Five days after the Battle of the Brandywine, the opposing armies converged on White Horse Tavern (in latter-day Planebrook, Pennsylvania) and on the Admiral Warren Tavern (three miles east in latter-day Malvern).

Each commander learned early in the day of the other's approach and both prepared for a major engagement. Pulaski was sent forward with the American cavalry and three hundred supporting infantry as a delaying force, but the infantry ran as soon as fired on, and Pulaski had to retreat before the advancing British.

At about 1 P.M. the brigades of Wayne and Maxwell met Knyphausen's column near Boot Tavern and almost cut off a reconnaissance party of jägers commanded by Colonel von Donop, but the Americans were soon forced back by jäger reinforcements and Hessian grenadiers. The main bodies were squaring off for a major battle when nature intervened.

A heavy rain drenched both armies. As one German officer wrote: "I wish I could give a description of the downpour which began during the engagement and continued until the next morning. It came down so hard that in a few moments we were drenched and sank in mud up to our calves" (Baurmeister, *Revolution*, p. 114).


Because of defective cartridge boxes—the leather tops did not extend sufficiently to keep out the rain—the Americans lost, according to General Henry Knox, four hundred thousand rounds, and many regiments were unable to fire a shot. The British, on the other hand, lost little ammunition and Washington had no choice but to retreat.

SEE ALSO *Philadelphia Campaign*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles



Porthole Portrait of George Washington (1795). *The Continental commander and first president of the United States in a portrait by Rembrandt Peale.* © BUTLER INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN ART, YOUNGSTOWN, OH/BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY

WASHINGTON, GEORGE. (1732–1799). Commander in chief of the Continental army, first president of the United States. Virginia. Born on 11 February 1732, George Washington was the first child of Augustine Washington (1694–1743) by his second wife, Mary Ball (c.1708–1789), who then lived on the family plantation near Pope's Creek, by the Potomac River, in Westmoreland County, Virginia. On the death of Augustine Washington in 1743, the family estate passed to George's elder half-brother, Lawrence (c.1718–1752). Lawrence settled at Mount Vernon, Virginia, an estate that was named for the British admiral under whom Lawrence had served in a British expedition against Carthage (now in Colombia) in 1740.

Washington was taught by private tutors at home until he was fifteen, excelling at mathematics, which would serve him well as a surveyor. His education prepared him for the role of a Virginia gentleman, and he worked to meet the standards of civility and conduct that such a station would imply. This striving for acceptance was a lifelong feature of his character, evolving from a quest for economic advantage in his youth to a prickliness

about his reputation as an adult. As a young man, Washington learned how to face adversity, take corrective action, and emerge chastened and more determined.

In 1748, Lawrence Washington's connections gained George an appointment as surveyor of the Northern Neck Proprietary, a huge area of land claimed by Lord Thomas Fairfax. In 1751 Lawrence, whose already delicate health had been ruined at Carthage, went to Barbados in the West Indies to seek relief from what was probably tuberculosis. His brother George accompanied him on this trip. When Lawrence died on 26 June 1752, his will made George executor of his estate and residuary heir of Mount Vernon. George's feet were now firmly planted among the aristocrats of Virginia.

SEVEN YEARS' WAR

French claims to the Ohio River Valley worried many Virginians, who viewed those lands as prime territory for their own speculation and settlement. On 28 August 1753, the British government ordered Lieutenant Governor Robert Dinwiddie to investigate the French incursions and, if necessary, "to drive them off by force of arms" (Abbot, *Washington Papers, Colonial*, 1, p. 57). Washington volunteered to warn the French to abandon their new posts. He left Fort Le Bouef on 31 October 1753 on the first mission of his military career. With a small party guided by the frontiersman Christopher Gist, Washington delivered his message to the French and returned to Williamsburg with the scornful reply.

Appointed lieutenant colonel at the age of twenty-two, Washington was given command of the force Dinwiddie ordered to expel the French from their western posts. Washington reached the Great Meadows (present day Union Town, Pennsylvania) on 24 May 1754, and began construction of Fort Necessity. Learning of the approach of French troops, Washington led a mixed force of forty Virginians and a dozen Native American allies to ambush the French on the morning of 28 May. His troops killed thirteen Frenchmen, including their commander, Ensign Joseph Coulon de Jumonville. He was apprised by scouts that seven hundred more Frenchmen and Indians were advancing toward him, led by Jumonville's elder brother. Washington retreated to the Great Meadows, where his four hundred men were surrounded on 1 July. Because Fort Necessity was incomplete and badly sited, Washington signed a surrender written in French (which he did not speak) admitting culpability for Jumonville's "assassination." The surrender, and its imputation of dishonorable conduct in Jumonville's death, was a bitter humiliation that Washington never forgot.

Washington's defeat was the opening engagement in what became known as the Seven Years' or French and Indian War. Even before receiving news of the debacle at

Fort Necessity, the British government decided to remove the French from the western frontier, appointing Major General Edward Braddock as commander in chief for North America. Braddock arrived in Virginia in February 1755 with two regiments that were to form the core of an expedition to oust the French from the Forks of the Ohio River, where the Allegheny and the Monongahela meet to form the Ohio. Washington was with Braddock on 9 July when nearly nine hundred French and Indian fighters surprised Braddock's army ten miles east of Fort Duquesne. Washington, who had been ill with a fever, distinguished himself in the intense combat that killed or wounded two-thirds of the Anglo-American force. He helped carry the mortally wounded Braddock away from the battle, and led the shattered army in its humiliating retreat.

Appointed colonel of the Virginia Regiment on 14 August 1755, Washington devoted the next two years to coping with the problems of commanding seven hundred soldiers strung out along a 350-mile frontier. He gained valuable, if frustrating, experience in dealing with obtuse officers, recalcitrant soldiers, intractable logistical problems, and demanding civilian superiors. He also confronted the elitism of the British high command. In February 1756 Washington went to Boston to meet with William Shirley, the Royal governor of Massachusetts and Braddock's successor as commander in chief. At this meeting, Washington proposed making the Virginia Regiment—and its commander—part of the regular British army. Shirley rejected the idea out of hand. The failure of these efforts to gain imperial preferment convinced Washington that his future lay with Virginia rather than with the wider empire.

When William Pitt became prime minister of Britain in 1757, he included in his grand plans for 1758 an expedition to reduce Fort Duquesne and so avenge Braddock's defeat. Pitt named Brigadier General John Forbes to lead the campaign, and Forbes shrewdly persuaded Washington to remain in service, thereby retaining his unparalleled expertise in frontier warfare. Serving under Forbes gave Washington an important opportunity to work with and observe a British professional officer, one more capable than Braddock. Forbes moved slowly but inexorably forward with his five thousand provincials and seventeen hundred regulars. With their position in the Ohio valley collapsing, and Forbes just twelve miles away by 23 November—Washington's First Virginia Regiment led the advance guard—the French evacuated and blew up Fort Duquesne. With the frontier now secure and land speculation beckoning, Washington resigned his commission in December 1758, and on 6 January 1759 married the wealthy widow Martha Dandridge Custis (1732–1802). The twenty-six-year-old Virginian emerged from his first period of military service with a reputation as a brave, ambitious, and hard-driving officer. In terms of the breadth of his experience and the length of his service,

Washington was, at that point, the foremost colonial American soldier.

ROAD TO REVOLUTION

Washington, his wife, and his two step-children settled down at Mount Vernon. With Martha's property added to his own inheritance, he was now one of the richest planters in Virginia, though, like most wealthy planters, he carried an enormous debt. Washington spent sixteen years (1759–1775) focused on his personal economy. He decided on what to grow in which fields (he moved in 1765–1766 from cultivating tobacco to growing wheat), managed his largely slave labor force (216 workers and their families in February 1786, and 317 by July 1799), marketed his crops, kept his accounts, speculated in western lands, and renovated his mansion. As a member of the elite he also served in the House of Burgesses, gaining the respect of his peers, though not rising to leadership positions in the colony.

Washington viewed the Stamp Act of 1765 as bad economic policy, but played no significant role in the opposition to this or other British legislation until 1769. Then he promoted the non-importation association designed to force repeal of the Townshend Acts. When the Royal governor, Norborne Berkeley, baron de Botetourt, dissolved the House of Burgesses on 9 May 1769, Washington was among the members who reconvened at Williamsburg's Raleigh Tavern. He was named to the committee that, on the next day, presented George Mason's non-importation plan for adoption by the extra-legally assembled burgesses. Siding with the radicals, Washington opposed making petitions to the king and parliament, not only because they would be scorned, but because he did not believe in begging for rights. His response in June 1774 to "the oppressive and arbitrary act of Parliament for stopping up the port" of Boston, reflects his mature judgment:

the ministry may rely on it that Americans will never be taxed without their own consent, that the cause of Boston . . . now is and ever will be considered as the cause of America (not that we approve their conduct in destroying the tea), and that we shall not suffer ourselves to be sacrificed by piecemeal (*ibid.*, 10, pp. 95–96).

His letters show that he comprehended the political course the Patriots were taking and recognized that the course led to war with Britain.

The next step in Washington's carefully considered support for American rights came in August 1774, when he accepted the Virginia Convention's appointment as delegate to the first Continental Congress, where his participation was not remarkable. He urged that military preparations get under way, personally drilled volunteers, and sat on the Virginia Convention's committee "to


prepare a plan for embodying, arming and disciplining" men who would be able "immediately" to put the colony "into a posture of defence" (*ibid.*, p. 309). On 25 March, the Convention elected him as a delegate to the Second Continental Congress, where he was conspicuous as the only member habitually to attend sessions dressed in a military uniform. With no recorded dissent, the delegates decided to adopt a European-style military organization, one that derived from the colonies' own military experience, as the principal vehicle for the armed defense of their rights. On 15 June 1775, on the motion of John Adams of Massachusetts, Washington was unanimously selected by Congress as commander in chief of this force, newly styled the Continental Army, which, at that point, comprised only the recently raised regiments of the four New England colonies.

The choice of Washington for this unprecedented position was both shrewd and nearly inevitable. A prominent member of the ruling class in the most powerful and important colony, Washington was clearly an ardent defender of colonial rights and possessed more military experience than anyone else in Congress. Washington brought many skills, some not yet evident, to his new responsibility. Perhaps the most important of these was his thoroughgoing belief in the subordination of the military to civilian control. The irony in Washington's position was that he was being called upon to establish and command an Americanized version of the standing army that was regarded as the principal threat to American liberty.

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN

Commissioned on 19 June 1775, Washington departed for Cambridge four days later. He reached New York City on 25 June, and there began two streams of communication that he would faithfully continue, and that would consume an enormous amount of his time and energy, for the rest of the war. He wrote the first in a long series of letters to Congress to explain the situations he encountered, the steps he had taken, and the actions he thought Congress should take. Congress and its principal military officer were breaking new ground with every decision they made, and they had to communicate, and negotiate, about nearly everything. Washington believed that he owed his colleagues in Congress, and the political leaders at state and local levels with whom he also regularly corresponded, his best advice about how to manage the armed resistance to Britain, its policies, and supporters. So far as operational necessity allowed, he left the final decision up to civilian policy makers.

The second line of correspondence was equally important. He began to correspond with the commander of the New York Department, Major General Philip Schuyler, who led the only American forces then in the field, apart from the main army around Boston.



George Washington's Dress Sword and Pistol. This sword and pistol are now held by the New York State Archive and the New York State Library, along with numerous other items related to Washington and the American Revolution. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Washington did this, in part, to exercise the oversight he believed was required of a commander in chief. However, he also sought to keep himself apprised of developments in other theaters that could affect the overall war effort and his own direction of the main American army. His instructions to Schuyler to obey the orders of Congress “with as much precision and exactness as possible” (*ibid.*, p. 37) reflected the fact that time and distance would not allow him to exercise close control over forces elsewhere.

Washington arrived at Cambridge on 2 July 1775, and took formal command the next day of the New England troops besieging Boston. He faced two immediate and ongoing problems, one administrative and organizational, the other operational. His principal challenge was to prepare American recruits to face in battle, and to defeat, the soldiers of an army that was better trained, better equipped, and more responsive to its officers than was his own force. By temperament and experience a believer in social hierarchy, Washington also knew that military success would hinge on how well he and his officers could command soldiers who were unused to

military discipline. To set a good example of the care and attention he expected from his officers, Washington immediately began the practice of riding around the army each morning. He was thereby able to observe and be observed by his troops. Since he was an excellent horseman, the display presented by the tall, powerfully built, and well-acquainted general riding by in firm control of a strong horse must have had a positive effect on the army.

Administrative minutiae consumed much of Washington's time. He put in place the new people and procedures established by Congress to feed, pay, and supply the soldiers. He paid particular attention to imposing order, discipline, and central control on an army created just eleven weeks earlier. He had to know the state of the army—especially how many men were fit for duty—and to ensure that the soldiers had enough food, shelter, and equipment (clothing, arms, and gunpowder) so that they were a viable force. Tasks that were routine in the British army had to be explained to American soldiers, none perhaps more essential than the proper management of latrines. In his first set of general orders (4 July), he

included an exhortation to unity: “it is hoped that all distinctions of colonies will be laid aside, so that one and the same spirit may animate the whole, and the only contest be, who shall render . . . the most essential service to the great and common cause in which we are all engaged” (*ibid.*, p. 54).

As the military leader of a coalition, Washington had to exercise tact in dealing with governments, officers, and soldiers alike. In public and to Congress he told the truth, but remained upbeat. On 10 July, he told John Hancock that he took “a sincere pleasure in observing that there are materials for a good army, a great number of able-bodied men [who are] active [and] zealous in the cause and of unquestionable courage” (*ibid.*, p. 91). In private, to his cousin and business manager Lund Washington, he was less sanguine. On 20 August he observed of the Massachusetts troops: “their officers generally speaking are the most indifferent kind of people I ever saw. . . . I daresay the men would fight very well (if properly officered), although they are an exceeding dirty and nasty people” (*ibid.*, pp. 335–336). When the Connecticut regiments, whose enlistments expired on 1 December, chose to leave camp and march home, an enraged Washington could do nothing to stop them.

Washington’s second major problem was deciding what to do with the army, which reached a peak strength of nearly 19,000 officers and men fit for duty in August 1775, once he was satisfied it was ready to fight. He had to find the best use of the military means at hand to reverse British oppression before the cost of the army—the strain it placed on the lines of authority in society as much as the expense of raising, paying, feeding, and equipping it—proved more than the colonies could bear.

Washington, who was deliberative and cautious most of the time, also possessed a streak of aggressiveness that was fueled by an ever-growing anxiety about the expense of, and social dangers posed by, keeping soldiers idle under arms for long periods. These considerations found expression in his continuing desire to use the army for offensive action that was sometimes fantastically over-ambitious. On 8 September, with winter on the horizon and, more importantly, the enlistments of the bulk of his army set to expire by 1 January, Washington asked his generals—all New Englanders—if an assault on the British in Boston by boat was advisable. Unsurprisingly, they decided the project was “not expedient.” Then, after going through the trauma and anxiety of seeing the 1775 army dissolve away and being forced to raise the 1776 army in the face of the enemy, he proposed on 16 February 1776 to attack Boston across the ice of Back Bay. Again, his generals vetoed the idea, and Washington admitted that “perhaps the irksomeness of my situation led me to undertake more than could be warranted by prudence” (*ibid.*, 3, p. 370). The arrival of Colonel Henry Knox with heavy artillery from Fort Ticonderoga allowed Washington to speed the

British evacuation from Boston without having to risk his authority by ordering an assault his men might have refused to undertake.

In his first campaign as commander in chief, Washington faced nearly all the issues that would plague him for the next eight years. He had to keep Congress informed about the military situation and seek its sanction for measures he knew were important but about which his former colleagues often held different views. He also had to maintain good relations with local leaders while keeping his eye on the central issue—building and maintaining an army that could defeat the British. This often meant denying requests to disperse soldiers from his army for local defense. If he wanted to undertake a particular course of action, he knew he had to seek the advice of his subordinates, the men who would know best whether or not the soldiers might obey his orders. To his credit, Washington listened carefully to his generals and often deferred to their arguments. Because the army had not been enlisted for the duration of the war—Americans could not have been persuaded in 1775 to enlist in what was in effect a standing army—he had to manage the dissolution of one army and the raising of its successor, knowing that the British might at any moment take advantage of the opportunity to cripple his force. Nearly every decision he made established new traditions, sometimes on the remnants of prior colonial experience, but in circumstances made new and more dangerous by the need for larger numbers of troops. He gained vivid experience in the reality of something he already well understood: commanding an army in America was as much a political process as a military one. His actions cannot therefore be evaluated exclusively, or even primarily, from a military point of view.

MANEUVER WAR IN 1776

After the British evacuated Boston in March 1776, Washington moved his army toward New York City, the most obvious place where the enemy would strike next. The decision to defend New York City was made for political reasons because, militarily, the area was so laced by rivers and estuaries that it was nearly indefensible with land forces. Without naval forces capable of contesting control of the water with the Royal navy, Washington convinced himself that shore batteries could so command the water passages around Manhattan Island and the western quarter of Long Island that fending off the British forces might be possible. With an army composed of half-trained Continentals and untrained militia, and, most importantly, an officer corps—up to and including Washington—that was utterly inexperienced in maneuver warfare, the Americans stood on the defensive.

By early July 1776, Washington had over 12,000 men in the area. Continentals from New England, New York, Maryland, and Delaware formed the core of the army, their

numbers augmented by militia and flying camp units that continued to come in even as the Howe brothers (William and Richard) massed the largest expeditionary force Britain had ever sent overseas to take back the city and begin the reconquest of America. Washington made a mistake by dividing his forces, sending part of his army to oppose William Howe on Long Island in August. An unsettled command structure, faulty reconnaissance, and widespread inexperience in making and interpreting decisions amid the chaos of battle deprived the American army of any chance of success. With the concurrence of a council of war composed of his surviving generals, Washington decided on 29 August to evacuate Long Island. He was very lucky to get his army back to Manhattan, an accomplishment made possible only by an extraordinary effort by men determined to escape the trap and General William Howe's failure to pursue the Americans vigorously. Howe hesitated, offering the carrot of a political solution in tandem with the stick of a military beating. Washington always deferred Howe's overtures to Congress.

Washington then prepared to defend Manhattan Island, a decision again based on political rather than military logic. When the British landed at Kips Bay on 15 September, all of Washington's personal efforts to stem the flight of several Connecticut state regiments defending the landing beach were for naught. The American army was saved once more by Howe's deliberate pace. Although American rangers bloodied the nose of the British pursuit at Harlem Heights the next day, by the end of the month Washington's army was being consistently pushed around and beaten by a British army far superior at maneuver warfare.

On 25 September, while staying at Colonel Roger Morris's house on Harlem Heights, Washington made his case to John Hancock, then president of Congress, for the kind of army he needed to defeat the British. Written under the pressure of impending defeat, the arguments are among his most candid remarks about the character of his officers and soldiers, and the paramount importance of proper leadership. With the enlistment of his troops set to expire at year's end, Washington wrote:

We are now as it were, upon the eve of another dissolution of our army. The remembrance of the difficulties which happened upon that occasion last year, . . . satisfy me, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that unless some speedy and effectual measures are adopted by Congress, our cause will be lost.

The bounties and pay offered by Congress convinced him that only a "trifling" number would reenlist. The core issue before Congress, Washington argued, was retaining experienced soldiers and officers. Doing so required that

Congress recognize that the members of the army are motivated, like most others, by self-interest.

The few, therefore, who act upon principles of disinterestedness, are, comparatively speaking, no more than a drop in the ocean. It becomes evidently clear then, that as this contest is not likely to be the work of a day, as the war must be carried on systematically, and to do it, you must have good officers, there are, in my judgment, no other possible means to obtain them but by establishing your army upon a permanent footing, and giving your officers good pay. . . . nothing but a good bounty can obtain them [the soldiers] upon a permanent establishment, and for no shorter period than the continuance of the war ought they to be engaged, as facts incontrovertibly prove, that the difficulty and the cost of enlistment, increase with time.

He went on to argue that Congress must act on these recommendations despite the cost. "[H]owever high the mens' pay may appear, it is barely sufficient in the present scarcity and dearness of all kinds of goods, to keep them in cloths, much less afford support to their families" (Twohig, *Washington Papers*, 6, pp. 394–396).

Washington asserted that, if pay and bounties were raised to attract the right sort of officers and men, he would soon have an army capable of beating British regulars. Because he believed a long-service, and therefore well-trained, standing army was absolutely necessary, he downplayed the fear that such a force might destroy civil liberties, which was the great bugbear of Whig political philosophy: "The jealousies of a standing army, and the evils to be apprehended from one, are remote, and in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one . . . is certain, and inevitable ruin" (*ibid.*, p. 397). Washington accepted responsibility for his inability to defeat the British, but felt success was impossible "unless there is a thorough change in our military system" (*ibid.*, p. 400).

Washington's analysis was accurate on nearly every point, but Congress never followed his advice so completely that he could build the army he wanted. One of his greatest military attributes was a willingness and ability to create a viable military force from the materials his civilian superiors and American society gave him. His other great military attribute was an indomitable spirit. On one key point, however Washington was wrong. Although prospects looked dim, and got worse, the cause was not lost, in large part because Washington himself refused to give up.

As Howe continued to outflank the Americans and force their retreat, Washington concluded by mid-October that his position on the north end of Manhattan

Island was untenable. He withdrew north to Westchester County, but decided, on Nathanael Greene's advice, to leave a strong garrison behind at Fort Washington. It was a decision based more on pride than military reality, and it cost the Americans dearly. Howe decided after the battle at White Plains (28 October) not to chase the Americans further north. Instead, he turned back south and, on 16 November, took the fort, along with its stockpile of weapons and ammunition. Washington's reputation sank to a new low as he led his army west over the Hudson and across northern New Jersey.

The flight of the American army was precipitous and, as militia went home and detachments left to cover other possible British targets, the main army was reduced on 22 December to less than 6,100 effective men. Washington did not panic. He sent parties ahead to gather up all the boats on the Delaware River. He thought that "the design of General Howe is to possess himself of Philadelphia this winter, if possible" (*ibid.*, p. 381). As he told Hancock on 20 December, "in truth, I do not see what is to prevent him, as ten days more will put an end to the existence of our army" (*ibid.*, p. 382). He understood that Howe's larger objective was to keep pressure on the Continentals in order to prevent recruitment for the following year. "If every nerve is not strained to recruit the new army with all possible expedition, I think the game is pretty near up" (*ibid.*, p. 370).

Because of the gravity of the military situation, Washington asked Congress for an extraordinary grant of power. Speed in decision-making was essential: if "every matter that in its nature is self evident, is to be referred to Congress, . . . so much time must necessarily elapse as to defeat the end in view." He understood that "It may be said that this is an application for powers, that are too dangerous to be entrusted. I can only add, that desperate diseases require desperate remedies" (*ibid.*, p. 382). On 27 December, Congress granted, for a term of six months, Washington's request for extraordinary powers to sustain the army under his command. By that time, Washington had already acted with the remnant of the 1776 army to rescue the American cause from the brink of extinction. It must have given him enormous satisfaction to know that, on the same day that Congress acted, he had dispatched to Hancock his account of the success at Trenton on Christmas Day.

Washington's decisions to attack the British outpost at Trenton on 25–26 December 1776, and to follow up that success with a spoiling attack on the British pursuit at Princeton on 3 January 1777, were his most important of the war. Few commanders could have achieved offensive maneuvers of this type in the dead of winter, with demoralized, starved, and ill supplied troops. The riposte had military value—it pushed in the British outpost line and

saved Philadelphia—but its transcendent impact was on the psychology of the war. The British army under Howe pushed aside the American forces defending New York City, reestablished British control over important areas, and began a cascade of defections from the rebel cause. But Howe was too enamored of positional warfare, so he failed to realize that his true target ought to have been the destruction of Washington's army. When Washington demonstrated in convincing fashion at Trenton and Princeton that the American army was still alive and dangerous, he won for the American cause the opportunity to continue the fight into 1777.

SURVIVAL

The 1776 campaign had been so disruptive that it took Washington and his officers well into the new year to organize a new army. The disasters of 1776 persuaded Congress that Washington was right to advocate longer enlistments. It therefore authorized recruiting soldiers for three years of service, or for the duration of the war. Many veterans re-enlisted, but it took until mid-year for them to recuperate physically and be joined by sufficient new recruits to make a respectable army. Fortunately for Washington, the British also needed several months to ready their forces.

Skirmishing in northern New Jersey had convinced Howe that an overland campaign against Philadelphia would be too costly, so he decided to transport his army by sea to attack the American capital. Recognizing that Howe was his most dangerous opponent, but not knowing exactly where or when he would strike, Washington gambled by sending some of his best troops to reinforce the northern army, which faced John Burgoyne's troops who were advancing south from Montreal. With that help, and an abundance of militia flowing in from New England and New York, the northern army stopped Burgoyne's advance and forced him to surrender at Saratoga on 17 October 1777. Meanwhile, in early August, the British fleet carrying Howe's army had already been spotted at the mouth of the Delaware River. Although it put out to sea and disappeared, by the time it reappeared in the Chesapeake and began disembarking the invasion force on 22 August, Washington had his hands full directing the defense of Philadelphia.

As had been the case with New York City in 1776, Washington had to defend Philadelphia for political reasons, although the city's setting afforded the Americans a greater chance for success in 1777. By threatening the American capital, Howe sought both to discredit the rebel government and to pin Washington's army to its defense, thus affording the British forces an opportunity to destroy it. When Washington took up a position behind Brandywine Creek, thirty miles west of the city, he was fully aware that Howe might seek to outflank him, as he

had done so often in 1776. The fog of war made British movements difficult to confirm, and, despite hard fighting and improved tactical control, the ensuing battle (11 September) once again showed the immaturity of the Continental Army's command structure and its lack of battle management skills. The army escaped the British pincers, but could not prevent the enemy from occupying Philadelphia on 23 September.

Washington still thought he might be able to force Howe out by holding several forts on the Delaware below the city, thus preventing the British from readily supplying the city by water. To help distract the British from concentrating on reducing the forts, Washington launched on 4 October an overly complicated, four-pronged attack on British defenses five miles north of the city, at Germantown. Chronic difficulties in command were exacerbated by a literal fog that covered the battlefield. Washington accepted Henry Knox's advice that the Americans reduce a British fortified post at the Chew House (in Germantown) before advancing further, a decision which slowed the momentum of the American advance and contributed significantly to the failure of the attack. The American forts on the Delaware held out until the third week of November, but could not prevail against the full weight of British land and sea power.

INTERLUDE AT VALLEY FORGE

Having failed to hold the capital, Washington set about containing the military damage to the cause. After considering several potential encampments at a greater distance from Philadelphia, he chose a position at Valley Forge, twenty-five miles west of the city. From here he could closely observe the British and respond quickly to any foray into the countryside. The army went into winter quarters on 11 December 1777, very late in the season, and suffered enormously from a logistics crisis that had been building for several months. Valley Forge became the archetype of Revolutionary War winter encampments, although the suffering endured in 1776–1777 and 1780–1781 was probably more intense and widespread.

Washington's unceasing efforts to remedy the supply problems did much to cement his reputation with the army. Concentrating the troops further dislocated the logistics system, but gave Washington an opportunity for training that he and the army had not had in 1775–1776 or 1776–1777. Baron Friedrich Wilhelm Augustus von Steuben arrived in camp on 24 February 1778, and began the process of standardizing the training and regularizing the drill of the army. His efforts helped veteran officers and men better understand what was expected of them on the battlefield, and gave Washington for the first time a reason to expect that his orders might be carried out in a similar way across the army. Steuben's efforts as inspector general

also helped to give the commander in chief more uniform tactical combat units, thus potentially increasing the flexibility of the army on the battlefield.

At the same time that the army was maturing, Washington faced the most notorious, if perhaps not the most serious, attempt to unseat him. In the autumn of 1777, Brigadier General Thomas Conway, a French volunteer of Irish descent and no discernable ability, became the vehicle for discontent with the state of the war. Conway was a public critic of Washington's leadership, and the efforts of some Congressional delegates to promote him to major general over the heads of the other brigadiers sparked in Washington the suspicion of a conspiracy directed against him. Washington was insistent as any of his subordinates that proper respect be paid to seniority, and more sensitive, in private, about his reputation than most of them. Therefore, the news of Conway's ascendancy provoked Washington to write a sharp letter to Richard Henry Lee on 16 October. Calling Conway an officer whose merit "exists more in his own imagination than in reality," he told Lee that "I have been a slave to the service. I have undergone more than most men are aware of, to harmonize so many discordant parts, but it will be impossible for me to be of any further service if such insuperable difficulties [as Conway's promotion] are thrown in my way" (*ibid.*, 11, pp. 529–530). Conway was not the only man proposed to replace Washington at the head of the army. Some delegates to Congress supported Horatio Gates, the victor over Burgoyne. In effect, he forced Congress to choose between him and someone else (Gates may have been the candidate of some delegates), a response that, coming in the wake of the defeat at Germantown, reflected his own uncertainty and frustration about the loss of Philadelphia. The fact that he continued to try to root out conspirators into February 1778 (long after Conway's resignation showed the depth of his anger at being under-appreciated).

RETURN TO BATTLE

The newly refurbished Continental Army, 12,000 men now healthy and well-supplied, left Valley Forge on 18 June 1778, in pursuit of the British army retreating overland from Philadelphia to New York City. Washington saw an opportunity to land a hard blow on his nemesis, the British army, and he dispatched a strong advance guard, five thousand men under Charles Lee, to harass the British and bring them to bay before they reached the safety of their fleet at Sandy Hook.

Lee, to whom Washington had not given more than general instructions, found his force overextended when the British rear guard turned to fight at Monmouth Court House on 27 June. As the American advance guard retreated, under pressure but in good order on a day when

the temperature soared to 110 degrees, Washington came up with the main army and encountered Lee, who could not give a coherent account of the whereabouts of his troops. Some observers remembered that Washington, who was extremely anxious about losing an unprecedented opportunity to hurt the British army, lost his temper and berated Lee. If so, he quickly recovered his self-control and spent the rest of the day stemming the retreat and establishing a defensive position. He was unceasingly active and repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire, reaching a pinnacle of effective battle management of the best army America had yet fielded. When the British rear guard broke off the encounter, having successfully covered the retreat of the army, Washington's men were so spent that they could not offer pursuit.

Monmouth Court House was the last battlefield on which Washington would exercise overall field command. The character of the war was changing—news of the French alliance had been received and celebrated on 6 May, before the army left Valley Forge—and Washington's role would also change. His contributions to this point had been crucial. More than any other individual, he had turned the army kicked out of New York City in 1776 into a competent fighting force, achieving his goal of creating a force able to match the British army. By building and preserving the army, he had, in effect, kept the Americans from losing the war. But Britain was not yet ready to concede the political independence of its colonies, even though its failure to suppress the rebellion had blossomed into another world war against its ancient enemy, France.

Having managed not to lose the war militarily, Washington now faced the equally formidable task of applying military power to induce Britain to recognize American independence. Washington's new task was two-fold: keeping the Continental army in a state of readiness, while learning to cooperate with new allies—Spain and, most particularly, France—to achieve victory. French land forces were only potentially significant, but Washington understood that French naval power was crucial to transforming the outcome of the conflict from 'not losing' to 'winning.'

STALEMATE AND FRENCH AID

Washington's immediate challenge after 1778 was to hold the army together. As the British shifted the main theater of operations to the south, Washington's army continued to hold a wide perimeter around British-occupied New York City. Lacking the means to assault the British defenses, Washington was reduced to fighting what he called a "war of posts," a term that described on-going, small-scale fighting between detachments of the main armies. The Americans had, of course, engaged in this sort of partisan war since 1775, but now supporting it became the principal activity of the main army.

Historians have applied the adjective "Fabian" to much of Washington's strategy, because his efforts to avoid allowing the British to trap his army into fighting at a disadvantage echoed what Quintus Fabius Maximus had done to preserve Rome against the Carthaginian army under Hannibal Barca during the second Punic war (218–202 B.C.). In doing so, they have underestimated the extent to which Washington wanted to act aggressively to end a financially ruinous and socially disruptive war as quickly as possible. They overlook the fact that this "Fabian" style was imposed upon him by Britain's efforts to end the war quickly and by the manifest deficiencies of his army to meet and defeat that challenge. When, after Valley Forge, Washington at last had an army capable of beating the British in battle, he found that the enemy had shifted the battleground and refused to fight the war for which he was now better prepared.

Holding an army together required more than the endless paperwork that consumed much of Washington's time and energy. Washington knew that the fighting skills of an idle army would erode almost as fast as its discontent would grow. He kept his troops busy drilling, skirmishing, and building encampments. He drew together in the summer of 1779 an elite force of light infantry that stormed the British outpost of Stony Point on 16 July, and sent another force to raid Paulus Hook on 19 August. The bulk of the campaigning that summer was done away from the main army by Continental troops that Washington sent in May under John Sullivan to ravage the British-allied Iroquois Confederacy. The expedition reduced the danger to American settlers along the frontier in New York and Pennsylvania, but it held no prospect of ending the stalemate with Britain.

With the enlistments of many of his soldiers set to expire starting on 1 January 1780, Washington faced yet again the prospect of re-creating the Continental Army, the third time he had to undertake that unsettling job since 1775. By the early fall of 1780, more than 12,000 men who had enlisted for three years of service would complete their obligation, leaving Washington with a nominal strength of only the 15,000 men who had enlisted for the duration of the war. Although he had been a consistent and persistent advocate of longer enlistments, he now saw that annual enlistments, with the states' drafting their quota of soldiers if necessary, was "the surest and most certain if not the only means left us, of maintaining the army on a proper and respectable ground" (Fitzpatrick, *Washington Writings*, 17, p. 127). It was a policy he had first advocated as a stop-gap in February 1778, but now it became the centerpiece of his efforts to keep an army in the field during the war's fifth year. Despite considerable grumbling among New England troops about when, exactly, their enlistments expired—the discontent reached mutiny among some Massachusetts troops on 1 January 1780 and

affected Connecticut troops on 25 May—he managed to re-create a smaller army around a core of veterans.

As Washington watched events in the south unfold disastrously during the summer of 1780, he could take comfort in the fact that a French expeditionary force was making its way to America. Its commander, the comte de Rochambeau, arrived at Newport, Rhode Island, on 10 July, and Washington went to Hartford to meet with him on 22 September to press his plan to attack New York City. For this plan, the support of French naval power was crucial. He candidly told Rochambeau that his army was on the eve of another reorganization, and that without a decision from a dithering Congress on how to augment the army, he would have only six thousand men available after 1 January 1781, too few for the contemplated attack. He asked if the French could augment their land forces to fifteen thousand men, and thus bear the brunt of the fighting. His plans remained in abeyance when he left Hartford to return to the Hudson Highlands and rode into the worst nightmare of the war.

No event shocked Washington and the rebel cause more than the treason of Benedict Arnold and his attempt to turn over the key post of West Point to the British. The loss of West Point would have forced Washington to retreat north from the Highlands and impeded east-west communication and transportation across the Hudson River. But without a strong follow-up by the British—an impossibility given their commitments further south—these military consequences could have been mitigated and endured. Washington called Arnold's conduct "so villainously perfidious, that there are no terms that can describe the baseness of his heart" (*ibid.*, 20, p. 213). Arnold's treason was so serious because it highlighted how fragile the Patriot cause might be, raising the specter that it might collapse from within. Washington, as usual, put the best public face that he could on the events. He congratulated the army, saying that its ability had caused the British to despair "of carrying their point by force" and forced them into "practicing every base art to effect by bribery and corruption what they cannot accomplish in a manly way" (*ibid.*, p. 95). To Rochambeau, he struck a more worldly pose: "traitors are the growth of every country and in a revolution of the present nature, it is more to be wondered at, that the catalogue is so small than that there have been found a few" (*ibid.*, p. 97).

The fall and winter of 1780–1781 was the nadir of the American military effort. There was no settled plan on how to use French help, treason had been detected but was still hanging in the air, and, early in January, the largest mutinies ever to erupt in the Continental Army, broke out among Pennsylvania troops at Morristown, New Jersey, spreading to New Jersey soldiers stationed at Pompton three weeks later. The same point Washington made

about Arnold's treason could be applied to the army. Given the string of continuing deprivation, recent idleness, doubts about the terms of their enlistment, and endless unfulfilled promises of support from Congress and the states, it is a wonder that the soldiers did not mutiny more often than they did. Washington, who was fully aware of the state of the army, knew he had to move carefully to restore discipline without spreading the discontent and turning the army into a dangerous mob of armed men. He could not leave his headquarters at New Windsor, New York, until he was assured that the West Point garrison, which had shown "some symptoms of a similar intention," would not also mutiny (*ibid.*, 21, p. 65). Washington left it to Anthony Wayne, the commander of the Pennsylvania Division, and other influential officers to quell the mutiny. To Wayne, he observed (8 January) that "such measures founded in justice, and a proper degree of generosity, as will have a tendency to conciliate" the men would be most appropriate, a concise statement of what it took to be a leader of American soldiers, then and now (*ibid.*, p. 71).

In his general orders of January 1781, Washington exhorted the army to endure in the face of adversity. His words summarize his views about the course of the war to that point:

We began the contest for liberty and independence ill provided with the means of war, relying on our own patriotism to supply the deficiency. We expected to encounter many wants and distresses, and we should neither shrink from them when they happen nor fly in the face of law and government to procure redress. . . . [I]t is our duty to bear present evils with fortitude, looking forward to the period when our country will have it more in its power to reward our services (Fitzpatrick, *Washington Writings*, 21, p. 159).

Americans' self-image of the virtue of their actions was at stake. In public, Washington blamed the British for appealing to the weaknesses of the average American soldier, blaming them for the recent mutinies. In private, however, he admitted that the men had been driven to extremes by the neglect of the civilian authorities. They were not traitors—he early laid to rest the suspicion that they might join the enemy—but men with legitimate grievances. Far more than his pious words, it was the reputation that Washington, and many of his officers, had earned as paternal advocates of their men that prevented the mutinies from so crippling the army that the British might have had an opportunity at the eleventh hour to crush the rebellion.

Instead, it was Washington who, as the war entered its sixth year, had the chance to win the victory. On 22 May 1781, he met with Rochambeau at Wethersfield, Connecticut, to push his plan to attack the British garrison

at New York City, which had been weakened when it sent detachments to the southern theater. To Washington, New York City was the best target for a joint Franco-American operation. By early August, however, and after having probed its outer defenses, he reluctantly acknowledged that it was still too strongly held. At a conference with Rochambeau at Dobb's Ferry on 19 July, he proposed sending a joint force to oppose British operations in Virginia, thus putting aside his earlier objections to campaigning so far from New York City and in a climate less healthy for his troops.

On 14 August, Washington learned that the French West Indies fleet, sailing under the comte de Grasse, was headed to the Chesapeake. Then, in a decision that ranks second in importance and audacity only to the attack on Trenton in 1776, and which together marks him as the most audacious gambler in the history of American arms, Washington decided to shift the theater of war from the Hudson to the Chesapeake. Although previous joint ventures with the French—at Newport and Savannah—had failed, he realized that he had to take advantage of when and where the French chose to employ their naval power if he were to have any chance of breaking the military stalemate. With great secrecy about its final destination, the allied army—the French expeditionary corps and the best of the reorganized American army—began moving west across the Hudson and then southward on 18 August. Organizing that transit was a masterstroke of military logistics, the most impressive achievement of its kind to that date. The arriving troops tipped the balance against the British field army under Earl Cornwallis, but it was the draw earned by the French fleet at the Battle of the Chesapeake Capes on 5 September that ensured the success of Washington's gamble.

THE WAR WINDS DOWN

The surrender of Cornwallis's army at Yorktown on 19 October 1781 ultimately made Britain's political leaders realize they did not have the resources to re-conquer their North American colonies by force of arms. It was not, however, the end of war. Washington wanted to continue the successful Franco-American partnership into the following year. To this end, he wrote to de Grasse on 28 October proposing a rendezvous with the fleet in the Chesapeake in 1782, when a decision would be made to move against either New York City or Charleston, South Carolina. De Grasse was understandably non-committal. Nevertheless, as the Continental troops made their way north to the Hudson for the winter, Washington's hopes for such an alliance were high, raised no doubt by his first visits to Mount Vernon since the war began (9–12 September on the march south, 13–20 November on the way north). He wintered at Philadelphia, but had returned to the Highlands by the time he received news that George

Rodney's destruction of the French fleet at the Saintes (near Martinique) in early April had scuttled his plans for 1782.

Holding the army together while the political and diplomatic process wound its way to a final peace treaty was Washington's main preoccupation after Yorktown. The army's continued existence signified American willingness to continue military operations if necessary. Instead of a year of victory, however, 1782 turned into a year of frustration, with no significant military activity to relieve the main army's idleness.

The men endured, but by early 1783, some officers had had enough of Congress's failure to carry through on its promise of pay and rewards. A dissident group circulated two petitions, the gist of which was a threat to use force to make Congress comply. The Newburgh Addresses, named for the location of the headquarters of the army, constituted the most serious challenge to Washington's leadership since the "Conway Cabal" in 1777. They also represented the most dangerous attempt during the Revolution by military officers to dominate the civilian leadership, a circumstance that gave credence to those who thought the Continental Army a dangerous standing army. Washington put a quick and effective end to these efforts at a meeting of his officers on 15 March.

Four days later, on 19 March 1783, Washington received news that the preliminary articles of peace had been signed in Paris on 20 January. Ever cautious, he kept a much reduced Continental Army together over the summer, its strength eroded by his liberal use of furloughs to send men home and reduce the expense to the public of maintaining them. On 8 June he sent to the states a circular letter that distilled the lessons he had learned during his command of the Continental Army, an intrusion into the nexus between civilian and military that all his recipients did not appreciate. The most important point, "essential to the well being, I may even venture to say, to the existence of the United States as an independent power" was "an indissoluble union of the states under one federal head" (*ibid.*, 26, p. 487). Washington thus staked out a position as a strong nationalist, an unsurprising position considering his experience in command of the army.

Washington disbanded the last major units of the Continental Army on 3 November, keeping under arms less than a thousand men, whose principal service was to reclaim and occupy New York City on 25 November. It was an emotional month for Washington, returning in triumph to the scene of his earlier defeat. On 4 December, the day the last British ship sailed from the harbor, he bid farewell to his officers at Fraunces Tavern. On this occasion he was, for once, rendered speechless by the depth of his feelings for the men he had led since July 1775. On 23 December he returned his commission as commander in chief to Congress, then meeting in the



General George Washington Resigning his Commission (1783) by John Trumbull. *Washington submitted his resignation as commander in chief to Congress at the Maryland State House in Annapolis on 23 December 1783. Trumbull's painting shows Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, and Martha Washington in attendance.* LANDOV

Maryland State House in Annapolis, and returned to Mount Vernon.

POST-WAR, PRESIDENCY, AND RETIREMENT

Washington's stature and reputation meant that he continued to be involved in public affairs, even as he set about restoring his plantations after an absence of more than eight years. Always interested in western lands, he was involved in shaping the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. More aware than anyone else of the perils of a weak central government, he supported efforts to strengthen the federal union that culminated in the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787, over which he presided.

After the Constitution was ratified, Washington was the unanimous choice for president, taking office on 30 April 1789 in New York City. He was re-elected in 1792, and in 1796 he refused to stand for a third term. During his presidency, he supported the financial plans of Alexander Hamilton to stabilize the new nation's currency and credit, maintained United States' neutrality during the European war that broke out in 1793, upheld federal

authority to impose an excise tax during the Whiskey Insurrection in 1794, and endorsed Jay's Treaty by which the British finally evacuated posts in the Northwest Territory in 1795. In addition, he appointed Anthony Wayne to command the Legion of the United States, which defeated the Indians at the battle of Fallen Timbers on 20 August 1794, thus opening the Northwest Territory to unrestricted white settlement.

Washington's two terms as president were not without controversy, nor did his great reputation protect him from personal criticism. Rejecting the need for party politics in a republic, he attempted to balance one faction against the other in his cabinet, and concluded his presidency with his "Farewell Address" warning against foreign entanglements. In 1798, President John Adams named Washington as commander in chief of the provisional army that was raised for the expected war with France. Washington's will, dated 9 July 1799, provided, after the death of his wife, for the manumission and financial support of his slaves. He died on 14 December 1799 at Mount Vernon, where he was buried.

Standing well over six feet tall, strongly built, and weighing about 210 pounds, Washington was an

imposing physical presence. Except for bad teeth and bouts of debilitating gastrointestinal tuberculosis during the Seven Years' War, he enjoyed remarkably vigorous health until his final illness (a throat infection of some sort). He and Martha, who had spent every possible moment of the war with her husband, had no children, probably because tuberculosis had made Washington infertile. He regarded her two surviving children with her first husband as his own. Prior to her own death, on 22 May 1802, Martha destroyed all but three of the letters George had sent to her.

ASSESSMENT

Washington's military abilities have earned few accolades from historians. Mark Boatner, for example, in the first edition of this encyclopedia, said he had "character and fortitude but a lack of real genius," and regarded Washington's performance at Trenton and Princeton as "his only flash of strategic genius." In terms of battles won, number of troops under his personal direction, or depth of military thinking, Washington does not rank among history's great military leaders. But, although he served under arms longer than anyone else in his generation, he did not consider himself to be a professional soldier, and he cannot be judged by the standards that subsequent generations developed to evaluate success in that field. Rather, he was the quintessential American soldier, a person for whom military service was a central part of his definition of what it meant to be a citizen in his society. In terms of what he accomplished in using force of arms to protect and defend that society, he ranks as the most adroit manipulator of armed force in American history.

Interested in military glory from an early age, Washington managed to survive and—more importantly—to learn from his experiences in the Seven Years' War. In the fifteen years thereafter, he matured and crafted the public face by which we know him best. He channeled his ambitions into paths that were socially acceptable in Virginia society, and won what he always craved—the admiration of his peers. He remained vain and sensitive to criticism of his character and motives, and seems to have adopted a reserved manner to shield himself from insult. With the characteristics of his personality fully in place, Washington in 1775 was a middle-aged man of wealth and stature who believed the society he knew and loved was under attack, and who also believed that it was his obligation as a member of that society to devote his skills and energy to its preservation.

The value of Washington's contribution to winning the war for American Independence and establishing the new nation cannot be overstated. Nearly everything he did as commander in chief of the Continental Army established precedents for the principal American military force

fighting the British. His extraordinary talents as a military administrator helped to sustain the army physically, and his abilities as spokesman for its interests helped to sustain its morale. Two dimensions of his character were especially vital to his success. First, he refused to give up the struggle, even in the darkest days of the war. Second, he never wavered from the principle of civilian control of the military, even to the point of straining the war effort almost to the breaking point. In the end, he accomplished what he had set out to do. He compelled Britain by force of arms to acknowledge the political independence of its former colonies, without sending those colonies into a spiral of political chaos and social disorder. Remarkably, circumstances gave Washington the opportunity to repeat this performance as president of the new United States. He well merited the oft-quoted words of Henry Lee in his funeral oration before members of Congress: "first in war, first in peace, first in the hearts of his countrymen."

SEE ALSO *Braddock, Edward; Conway Cabal; Forbes's Expedition to Fort Duquesne; French Alliance; French and Indian War; Mason, George; Stamp Act; Townshend Acts; Valley Forge Winter Quarters, Pennsylvania.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

WASHINGTON, WILLIAM. (1752–1810). Continental officer. Virginia. Born 28 February 1752 on his family's plantation in Stafford County, Virginia, Washington was studying for the ministry when the Revolution started. On 25 February 1776 he was commissioned captain in the Third Virginia Continentals, in which he served during the New York and New Jersey campaigns, seeing combat for the first time at Harlem Heights. Leading the attack on cannon in King Street with Lieutenant James Monroe at Trenton, he was wounded in the hand by a musket ball. Promoted to major in the Fourth Continental Dragoons on

27 January 1777, Washington served at the Battles of Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth. After the Tappan massacre in New Jersey on 28 September 1778 that decimated the Third Dragoons of Colonel George Baylor, Washington's cousin—General George Washington—put him in command of the remnants on 20 November 1778.

Late in 1779 Washington moved south with his rebuilt regiment. During the initial phase of the Charleston campaign Washington skirmished with Tarleton on several occasions, getting the better of him at Rantowles on 27 March after also defeating the North Carolina Loyalists under Colonel John Hamilton. Washington was lucky to escape with his life at Monck's Corner and then Lenud's Ferry a few weeks later. After Charleston fell, Washington and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony White (of Moylan's regiment) withdrew into eastern North Carolina to recover and recruit.

Washington scored a clever victory at Rugeley's Mills, South Carolina, on 4 December 1780 and struck next in his Hammond's store raid on 27–31 December. This was the start of operations that led to Morgan's victory at Cowpens on 17 January 1781, where Washington distinguished himself in the battle and closed the action with a dramatic personal encounter with Tarleton witnessed by John Marshall. In the "Race to the Dan" and Greene's counteroffensive, Washington's cavalry was prominent, bringing up the rear of the retreat or leading the advance. After performing with valor at Guilford and Hobkirk's Hill (where only fifty-six of his remaining eighty-seven men were mounted), he was wounded and captured in the Battle of Eutaw Springs on 8 September 1781. While a prisoner in Charleston, Washington married Jane Elliott and stayed in the city after the British left at the end of 1783. He served seventeen years in the South Carolina legislature but refused to consider running for governor. On 19 July 1798, during the French crisis, he was commissioned brigadier general and served until 15 June 1800. He died at his home in Charleston on 6 March 1810.

SEE ALSO *Cowpens, South Carolina; Eutaw Springs, South Carolina; Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Hammonds Store Raid of William Washington; Hobkirk's Hill (Camden), South Carolina; Lenud's Ferry, South Carolina; Monck's Corner, South Carolina; Rugeley's Mills; Tappan Massacre, New Jersey; Tarleton, Banastre.*

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WASHINGTON'S "DICTATORIAL POWERS."

27 December 1776–27 June 1777. When the British advance reached the Delaware River in December 1776, Congress fled from Philadelphia to Baltimore (26 December) and the fate of the Revolution appeared to rest solely in military hands. Before Congress adjourned, it resolved "that, until the Congress shall otherwise order, General Washington be possessed of full power to order and direct all things relative to the [military] department, and to the operations of the war" (*Journals*, 6, p. 1027). Writing on 20 December that "ten days more will put an end to the existence of our army" unless drastic measures were accepted, Washington asked for more sufficient and specific authority to deal with the military emergency. He pointed out that if

every matter that in its nature is self-evident, is to be referred to Congress, at a distance of 130 or 40 miles [to Baltimore], so much time must necessarily elapse, as to defeat the end in view. It may be said, that this is an application for powers, that are too dangerous to be entrusted. I can only add that, desperate diseases require desperate remedies and with truth declare, that I have no lust after power. (Twohig, ed., 7, p. 382)

Robert Morris carried the burden of administration until 21 December, when Congress appointed George Clymer and George Walton of Georgia to join him in a three-man committee "with powers to execute such continental business as may be proper and necessary to be done at Philadelphia" (*Journals*, 6, p. 1032). Washington dealt with this committee as he planned the counteroffensive that resulted in the brilliant victory at Trenton on Christmas Day. On the evening of 31 December, an express reached his headquarters with a congressional resolution adopted in Baltimore on 27 December:

This Congress, having maturely considered the present crisis; and having perfect reliance on the wisdom, vigour, and uprightness of General Washington, do, hereby, Resolve, That General Washington shall be, and he is hereby, vested with full, ample, and complete powers to raise and collect together, in the most speedy and effectual manner, from any or all of these United States, sixteen battalions of infantry, in addition to those already voted by Congress; to appoint officers for the said battalions; to raise, officer, and equip three thousand light horse; three regiments of artillery, and a corps of engineers, and to establish their pay; to apply to any of the states for such aid of the militia as he shall judge necessary; to form such magazines of provisions, and in such places, as he shall think proper; to displace and appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier general, and to fill

up all vacancies in every other department in the American armies; to take, wherever he may be, whatever he may want for the use of the army, if the inhabitants will not sell it, allowing reasonable price for the same; to arrest and confine persons who refuse to take the continental currency, or are otherwise disaffected to the American cause; and return to the states of which they are citizens, their names, and the nature of their offences, together with the witnesses to prove them: That the foregoing powers be vested in General Washington, for and during the term of six months from the date hereof, unless sooner determined by Congress. (*ibid.*, 6, pp. 1045–1046)

The delegates were obviously breathing more easily in Baltimore when, after Washington's Trenton victory, they felt some further statement as to their position was in order. In a circular letter of 30 December 1776, it informed the thirteen states that:

Congress would not have Consented to the Vesting of such Powers in the military department . . . if the Situation of Public Affairs did not require at this Crisis a Decision and Vigour, which Distance and Numbers Deny to Assemblies far Remov'd from each other, and from the immediate Seat of War. (*ibid.*, 6, p. 1053)

It is evident from the wording of the 27 December resolve that the powers granted Washington were far from "dictatorial." When he used his authority to make all citizens who had taken the British offer of protection surrender the papers they had accepted or move within the British lines, Congress violently criticized this policy. He has been criticized by historians for failing to use fully his power to take provisions for his army from the profiteering inhabitants of New Jersey. Yet in January 1777, thanks largely to his new, temporary authority, Washington was able to start rebuilding a real army.

When in the fall of 1777 the British army again approached Philadelphia, Congress again evacuated the capital, heading through Lancaster to York, Pennsylvania, and again it gave Washington "dictatorial" powers. This time it was for a six-day period only, and he used the authority sparingly.

SEE ALSO *Continental Congress; New Jersey Campaign; Philadelphia Campaign; Princeton, New Jersey; Trenton, New Jersey.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

WATERCRAFT. Revolutionary North America was a region of crude road networks and rigorous terrain intersected by hundreds of waterways. While watercraft played a secondary role on the military supply lines and during many campaigns, it was a crucial one.

British and American forces used numerous vessel types. Sloops, schooners, shallops, and pettiaugers (not to be confused with the similarly named log canoes, called periaugers, pettiaguas, or pettiaugers) were sailing vessels used to transport troops and supplies. Gunboats, galleys, and xebecs were oar-driven craft for river and lake defense. Ferryboats, Durham boats, scows, barges, bateaux, and other flat-bottomed craft carried troops and supplies up and down rivers and lakes or ferried them across bodies of water. Other small vessels, particularly whaleboats, filled important roles as attack craft, guard boats, and logistical support.

By the time of the Revolution the British navy was adept at amphibious operations, and the Royal Navy King's Boat was much used on the lower Hudson, in the Chesapeake, and along the Atlantic coastline. They were propelled with twenty oars, crewed by twenty-five men, and carried as many as fifty troops, though for various reasons the craft were often loaded to only 50 or 70 percent of passenger capacity. These craft were effective troop carriers, though barely seaworthy, difficult to row and maneuver, and detested by Royal Navy personnel. Major General William Phillips suggested building a modified design for use on the northern inland campaign:

June 3rd 1776. Lieutenant Twiss is to proceed to Three Rivers and give his directions for constructing of Boats the description . . . is, a Common flat Bottom called a Kings Boat or Royal Boat calculated to Carry from 30 to 40 men with Stores and Provisions, with this only difference, that the Bow of each Boat is to be made square resembling an English punt for the conveniency of disembarking the Troops by the means of a kind of Broad Gang board with Loop-holes made in it for musquetry, and which may serve as a mantlet when advancing towards an Enemy, and must be made strong accordingly. (Hagist, "Extracts," p. 23)

It is not known if Phillips's vessels were ever built and used.

Of all the watercraft that served the armies, none were more important or ubiquitous than flat-bottomed boats. Among those craft, bateaux were foremost. Inexpensive to build, crude but effective, bateaux were also clumsy and leaky. Quartermaster General Timothy Pickering described them in 1782, "The common batteaux being built with pine boards, are of course very tender, and altogether unsuitable for the rough services to which those in common use are applied: they require, besides, at least five hands to work them to advantage" (*George Washington Papers*, series 4, reel 83). Bateaux were particularly useful in northern New York and Canada, where waterways provided the only reliable transportation network. Used in large numbers during the French and Indian War, they conspicuously served on General Benedict Arnold's march to Quebec in 1775, again in the Saratoga campaign of 1777, and as wagon boats (large bateaux mounted on carriages) in the Carolina and Yorktown campaigns.

Quartermaster General Thomas Mifflin noted several Continental flatboat types at Coryell's Ferry, Pennsylvania, in June 1777:

We have here 3 large Artillery Flats, [and] four Scows, each of which will carry a loaded Wagon with Horses, 4 flat boats, each to carry 80 Men, 13 Boats on Wagons at this place and 5 others on the Way 6 Miles from this Ferry each of which Wagon Boats will carry 40 Men[,] All which will transport 3 p[ieces]. Artillery with Matrosses & Horses, 4 Wagons & Horses, and 1000 Men at a Try. (*George Washington Papers* series 4, reel 42)

Transporting large quantities of men and materiel across waterways, while a common event, was a complicated affair. The difficulties of a Hudson River crossing in December 1780 were described by Richard Platt: "By 12 [noon] our van was at Kings ferry - [but] found only one sloop, a scow & five flat boats" (*War Department Collection*, reel 82, no. 23737). A large portion of the baggage for two Massachusetts brigades

was embarked by 4 P.M. & [the] vessel saild - the same Night the Baggage Waggons & Horses of the Conn[ecticu]t Line crossd - yesterday (tho not till late) a reinforcement of sloops & 3 or 4 small Batteaux arrived - the Conn[ecticu]t Division, Artillery, Ammunition Waggons & Horses belonging were put over & a sloop loaded with M[assachusetts]. Baggage - last Night Col Baldwin's Corps [of Artificers] & apparatus helped themselves across - and [the] light waggons of ye. 4th. M[ass].B[rigade]. & many of the 3rd. by the Assistance of Col Sprout's men were transported. (ibid.)

Wateree Ferry, South Carolina

After all this labor there was still more to do: "This morning remains to be unloaded two sloops containing Jersey Baggage & the same Vessels to take in the remainder of the Massachusetts's Baggage & whatever Hutting tools &c Major Kiers has to send (ibid.)."

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WATEREE FERRY, SOUTH CAROLINA. 15 August 1780. After Major General Horatio Gates approved General Thomas Sumter's secondary efforts against British communications in the action known as the Camden campaign, Sumter asked for reinforcements to attack a post guarding the Wateree River ferry crossing connecting Camden with Ninety Six. Gates detached one hundred Maryland Continentals, two guns, and three hundred North Carolina militia, under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Woolford of the Fifth Maryland Regiment, who joined Sumter on 14 August.

The British garrisoned a small redoubt called Fort Cary, named after Loyalist Colonel James Cary (Carey) who commanded it, at the west end of Wateree Ferry. On 15 August, the day after Woolford joined him, Sumter sent Colonel Thomas Taylor, with his Kershaw District militiamen, to surprise Fort Cary. Taylor captured Colonel Cary, thirty men, and thirty-six wagons loaded with clothing, food, and rum. Later that day, fifty-six more wagons with

supplies and baggage, seventy British invalid soldiers, and a cattle herd coming from Ninety Six were taken.

Sumter initially wanted to hold the river crossing, but started withdrawing up the Wateree's west bank after he learned that the British were preparing to cross the river and retrieve their prisoners and stores. After hearing the fighting at the battle of Camden (16 August), and then learning of Horatio Gates's defeat shortly thereafter, Sumter moved further north. He made camp at Fishing Creek on 18 August. His encampment was inadequately secured, however, and his troops were surprised by the enemy. His 800-man command was annihilated and the supplies they carried were retaken by Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton with only 160 dragoons and light infantry.

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign; Fishing Creek, North Carolina; Sumter, Thomas.*

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revised by Lawrence E. Babits

WATSON, JOHN WATSON TADWELL. (1748–1826). British officer. Born in London in 1748, Watson entered the Third Foot Guards in April 1767 and on 20 November 1778 became captain and lieutenant colonel of that regiment. On 16 October 1780 he sailed from New York in the expedition of General Leslie that was diverted from Virginia to reinforce Cornwallis in the Carolinas. While Cornwallis was pursuing Greene, Watson was instructed to secure his lines of supply. Identifying Francis Marion as a major threat to continued British control of South Carolina, Watson took five hundred picked men and went in pursuit. He left Fort Watson on 5 March 1781 and started down the Santee, but in a brilliant series of guerrilla actions, Marion blocked Watson's advance and drove him into the British base at Georgetown. Marion then joined "Light Horse Harry" Lee to capture Fort Watson on 15–23 April. His force much weakened by battle losses, sickness, and the detachment of troops to strengthen the Georgetown garrison, Watson rejoined Rawdon at Camden on 7 May. He was too late to take part in the battle of Hobkirk's Hill on 25 April, but incorrect information about his movements affected American actions at that battle.

Watson was promoted to colonel in 1783 and became a full general in April 1808. He died in Calais, France, on 11 June 1826.

SEE ALSO *Fort Watson, South Carolina (15–23 April 1781)*; *Hobkirk's Hill (Camden), South Carolina*; *Marion, Francis*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WAUCHOPE SEE *Wahab's Plantation, North Carolina*.

WAWARSING, NEW YORK. 22 August 1781. About four hundred Tories and Indians under Captain William Caldwell appeared in Ulster County and destroyed isolated settlements before the militia, under Colonel Albert Pawling, turned out and drove the raiders off with considerable losses. The principal action took place at Wawarsing, on the southern edge of the Catskills about twenty miles west of the Hudson.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York*.

Mark M. Boatner

WAXHAWS, SOUTH CAROLINA.

29 May 1780. Marching to reinforce Charleston during Clinton's siege of 1780, Colonel Abraham Buford's Third Virginia Continentals could get no closer than Lenud's Ferry (Santee River), since British forces under Cornwallis had already established control of the intervening forty miles. When Charleston surrendered on 12 May, Buford's regiment and a few cavalry survivors of the skirmishes at Lenud's Ferry and Monck's Corner were the only organized American military troops left in South Carolina. Huger therefore ordered Buford to withdraw to Hillsborough, and Cornwallis—with twenty-five hundred men—started in pursuit from Huger's Bridge on 18 May. Realizing that his foot troops could not overcome Buford's ten-day lead, Cornwallis turned this mission over to Tarleton, whose dragoons had been sweeping the country toward Georgetown.

On 27 May, Tarleton—with 40 men of the Seventeenth Dragoons and 130 cavalry and 100 infantry of the Legion (many of them riding double with the horsemen)—left Cornwallis's command at Nelson's

Ferry and started in hot pursuit. Although the weather was oppressively hot and the men and horses were already tired from vigorous campaigning, Tarleton's Tories and British dragoons had covered the 60 miles to Camden by the next afternoon. They already knew that Governor John Rutledge was traveling with Buford's command, and at Camden they learned that on 26 May, Buford had left Rugeley's Mill, only 12 miles away. Tarleton rested his troops and mounts until 2 A.M. on the 29th, and by early afternoon his leading element had closed in on Buford's rear guard. The British had covered 105 miles in 54 hours, although they had ridden many horses to death and Tarleton's column was badly strung out.

Warned of this pursuit, Rutledge rode ahead to safety. Buford's supply train and field guns were also ahead of the column, and his 350 or so Virginia Continentals were moving on the double. Tarleton first sent an officer forward under a flag of truce to demand surrender; this, he claimed candidly, was a stratagem to deceive Buford into thinking that British numbers were greater and, therefore, to induce him to consider surrender.

About 3 P.M., the British advance guard attacked and badly chopped up the small rear guard commanded by Lieutenant Pearson, and Buford turned to face the enemy. Holding out a small reserve, he formed his available infantry and cavalry in a single line near the road in an open wood. Tarleton deployed in three elements: Major Cochrane with sixty dragoons and about fifty infantry on his right to move forward first and "gall the enemy's flank"; thirty selected dragoons and some infantry, Tarleton's left wing, which he would personally lead against Buford's right and rear; and the Seventeenth Dragoons with the rest of the available infantry to attack the American center. The British commander, with an eye not only for sound tactical deployment but also for psychological effect, selected a small hill opposite the enemy center, in plain view of it, and ordered the rest of his command to form there as they reached the battlefield.

Since the American artillery was not in position, the British formed within three hundred yards of Buford's line without drawing any fire. Tarleton then launched his attack. When his troopers had charged to within fifty paces, they were astounded to hear Continental officers order their men to hold their fire until the British were nearer! The volley they fired came too late to check the rush of horses, and within moments, the cavalry broke the Patriot line and went to work with their sabers.

"TARLETON'S QUARTER"

When Buford saw he was being surrounded, he sent a flag of truce to Tarleton. The officer carrying the flag seems

never to have reached Tarleton, however, possibly because the British commander had his horse killed from under him near this point in the action. Before he could mount another, “a report amongst the cavalry that they had lost their commanding officer . . . stimulated the soldiers to a vindictive asperity not easily restrained” (Tarleton, pp. 30–31).

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Patriot accounts claimed that Tarleton’s men inhumanly butchered Continentals who were in the process of surrendering. Although evidence of British and Loyalist troops murdering soldiers who had thrown down their arms is sketchy, American casualties bear out the one-sided nature of the action. Their losses were 113 killed and 203 captured; 150 of the latter were too badly wounded to be moved, and most of the other 53 prisoners were wounded. Buford and a few other mounted men escaped from the battlefield. The only other survivors were 100 infantry who had been at the head of the retreat and were not in the action.

Tarleton’s account indicates that about 200 of his 270 troops were on hand for the attack. He gave his casualties as 19 men and 31 horses killed or wounded.

COMMENT

The propaganda-inspired uproar about a “massacre” has obscured the brilliance of Tarleton’s pursuit and attack. With professional detachment he credited his opponent with blunders that made the victory possible. Even allowing for poor discipline and low morale, Buford should have been able to fight off a tired enemy he outnumbered two to one. Although he did not have time to find good defensive terrain, he might have formed his wagons into a defensive perimeter and used his guns and infantry in a “hedgehog” the enemy would not have been able to successfully attack. Ordering his men to hold their fire was a case of applying a sound military principle at the wrong time. Tarleton suggested that a fire by platoons or battalions beginning at a greater range would have been much more effective.

As for the morality displayed by the victor, a successful cavalry charge exploited by a bayonet attack is bound to be messy, and the dividing line between military success and slaughter depends on which side one is on. While scholars have debated whether the Waxhaws was in fact a massacre, the important point is that Patriots perceived that Tarleton’s men had acted viciously. Commanders at Kings Mountain, Cowpens, and other battles throughout the South would use the exaggerated accounts of Tarleton’s cruelty to motivate their men.

Unknown at home prior to the action at Waxhaws, Tarleton was now a British hero. But to the American army,

“Tarleton’s quarter” became a synonym for the butchery of surrendered men, and “Bloody Tarleton” is a name more familiar in America today than it is in England.

SEE ALSO *Carter, John Champe; Lenud’s Ferry, South Carolina; Monck’s Corner, South Carolina (14 April 1780); Paoli, Pennsylvania.*

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revised by Carl P. Borick

WAYNE, ANTHONY. (1745–1796). Continental general. Anthony Wayne was born at the family estate of Waynesborough in Chester County, Pennsylvania. He was the son of Isaac Wayne, a prosperous farmer and tanner. At an early age, he challenged his father’s authority by resisting farm work. Hence, the elder Wayne enrolled him in a school run by his uncle, Gilbert Wayne. There, he did well in mathematics. After studying for two years at Philadelphia Academy, he became a surveyor in Chester County at the age of eighteen. In 1765, he was hired by a land company to survey and settle a tract of land in Nova Scotia. On 25 March 1766 he married Mary Penrose; they had two children. Later he was estranged from his wife and took up with a Wilmington socialite named Mary Vining. When his father died in 1776 he inherited Waynesborough.

SERVICE IN THE REVOLUTION

As antagonisms grew between Britain and America in the 1770s, Wayne emerged as a leader of Pennsylvania Patriots. He was a sturdy, handsome, well-educated, and established citizen. Though given to swearing, bombast, vanity, and impulsiveness, he was admired and respected by his neighbors. In 1774 he was elected chairman of the Chester County Committee of Safety and to a term in the Provincial Assembly. During the following year he turned his attention to things martial, helping to organize and drill militiamen. Appointed colonel of the Fourth Pennsylvania Battalion on 3 January 1776, he marched with his soldiers in mid-May to the Continental army’s encampment at New York. From there he almost immediately proceeded to reinforce an American army that was withdrawing from Canada. At Trois Rivières on 8 June, while serving under the command of General William Thompson, he was involved in a hot battle with the British and received a slight wound in the leg. After withdrawing into New York, he was given command of Fort Ticonderoga. During the following



Anthony Wayne. Wayne, who came to be known as “Mad Anthony” during the war, was a handsome, well-educated, and established Pennsylvania citizen, much admired and respected by his neighbors. Nineteenth-century engraving by John Francis Eugene Prud’Homme after a painting by John Trumbull.

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winter, he battled cold, lack of provisions, and near-mutiny among his disgruntled soldiers.

On 21 February 1777 Wayne was promoted brigadier general. Rejoining the main Continental army at Morristown, New Jersey, on 20 May, he was given command of the Pennsylvania Line, even though he did not receive the commensurate rank of major general. In the battle of the Brandywine on 11 September, General George Washington posted him at Chadd’s Ford, in command of the army’s left wing. He performed with zeal and competence, covering the army’s retreat after Washington’s right wing was routed. On 18 September he was detached with 1,500 men to harass the British army’s rear as it marched toward Philadelphia. On the evening of 20 September, he was surprised in camp at Paoli by General Charles Grey, who commanded 5,000 soldiers. Routed from the field, he suffered 200 men killed and another 150 wounded. His opponent, Grey, had only ten casualties. Wayne was charged with negligence, and although acquitted by a court-martial, he was haunted long thereafter by accusations of military ineptitude. In the battle of

Germantown on 4 October, he avenged his insult at Paoli by leading his Pennsylvanians in furious assaults against the enemy. On the brink of victory, he descried musket fire at his rear and was forced to retreat. Soon Washington’s army was in flight, with Wayne once more covering the withdrawal.

For some months afterward, as he lived through the travails of the army’s winter encampment at Valley Forge, Wayne was disgusted with Washington’s leadership. At the battle of Monmouth on 28 June 1778 he was given a large role by Washington. Fighting furiously, he earned the military glory that he cherished. His confidence in Washington restored, he served on a court-martial of Charles Lee, who was charged with military incompetence and insubordination. He also came close to fighting a duel with Lee over these matters. On 21 June 1779 Washington gave him command of an elite corps of Continental light infantry, numbering 2,000 men. These troops he led on the night of 15 July against Stony Point, a strategically important British post on the Hudson River below West Point. Overwhelming the defenders, he received a slight wound to the head and immortality as a soldier. Shortly thereafter, the light infantry corps was disbanded. On 20 July 1780 he commanded an unsuccessful assault against a British blockhouse at Bull’s Ferry, New Jersey. Two months later, he frustrated Benedict Arnold’s attempt to deliver West Point into enemy hands by marching his soldiers quickly to the defense of that post.

On 1 January 1781 Wayne’s Pennsylvania troops mutinied, after months of discontented grumbling. In a display of good sense and courage, he managed to placate the soldiers while presenting their demands to Congress. By the end of January, many of his troops had been discharged. In May, Wayne and the remaining 800 troops were ordered to join the Marquis de Lafayette’s army in Virginia. After quelling two more mutinies, Wayne proceeded southward and, on 6 July, audaciously attacked Lord Charles Cornwallis’s entire army at Green Spring. Only his steely fearlessness managed to extricate him from this dangerous predicament. Thereafter, he was known as “Mad Anthony” Wayne.

Wounded in the leg by an American sentry on 2 September, he was not present at General Charles Cornwallis’s surrender at Yorktown on 19 October. In early 1782 he assumed command of American forces in Georgia, and for the next seven months battled British Loyalists, Creeks, and Cherokees. After the enemy evacuated Savannah in 11 July, Wayne joined Nathanael Greene in South Carolina. There he fell ill with a fever that nearly killed him. On 14 December the British withdrew from Charleston, South Carolina, and eight months later Wayne returned to Pennsylvania. He was promoted brevet major general on 30 September 1783, and on 3 November resigned from the army.

COMMAND OF THE LEGION

In late 1783 Wayne was elected to the Pennsylvania Council of Censors and the Assembly. He served as an assemblyman for two years, and in 1787 was a member of the Pennsylvania convention that ratified the new Constitution. Given a rice plantation by Georgia for his wartime services there, he went deeply in debt in a futile effort to make it pay. Finally he had to sell the plantation. In 1791 he was elected to Congress in Georgia, but served only seventeen days before his seat was declared vacant because of election irregularities. On 5 March 1792 he was appointed commander of the American army that was fighting Indians in the Northwest, with the rank of major general. He replaced Arthur St. Clair, who had been defeated in battle the year before. Taking command at Pittsburgh, he devoted the next two years to the careful training of his army in the use of the bayonet and musket. He marched northward from Cincinnati into Indian country, establishing military posts as he went. On 20 August 1794, on the Maumee River, he routed an Indian army in the battle of Fallen Timbers, and broke the will of the natives to resist American hegemony. In 1795 he negotiated the Treaty of Greenville, thus confirming the submission of the Northwest Indians. Praised for his exploits, he was touted in the east as a possible secretary of war, but never got the appointment. He died of gout on 15 December 1796 at Presque Isle, and was buried there. On 3 October 1809 he was exhumed, then reinterred at St. David's Church near Waynesborough on 3 October 1809. A courageous and intelligent military leader, Anthony Wayne deserves his reputation as one of America's great soldiers.

SEE ALSO *Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania; Green Spring (Jamestown Ford, Virginia); Stony Point, New York.*

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revised by Paul David Nelson

WAYNE'S LIGHT INFANTRY. Relying on small partisan corps, including Major Henry Lee's legion, for outpost duty early in the campaigning season, General Washington waited until 15 June 1779 to reconstitute the Corps of Light Infantry. Colonel Richard Butler of Pennsylvania supervised the assembly of the four battalions at Fort Montgomery, in the Hudson Highlands, until Washington directed Brigadier General Anthony Wayne of Pennsylvania to assume command of the Continental Army's elite light infantry corps on 1 July. The composition of his twelve-hundred-man force is given in the entry on the attack on Stony Point (16 July 1779), the most famous engagement in the history of the Continental Army's light infantry and one that demonstrated that at least some American soldiers were now mature professionals. On 30 November orders were issued for the corps to disband but for the companies to be ready to reassemble on one day's notice. Before these orders had been completely executed, several companies were retained around West Point to meet any movements the British might make up the Hudson. Washington wrote to Wayne on 28 December ordering all companies to return to their parent organizations, adding: "Before the separation of the corps, I beg the favor of you to present my warmest thanks to the officers and men and assure them that I have a high sense of the zeal, gallantry, and good conduct of the former and of the bravery and fidelity of the latter" (Washington, 17, p. 329).

SEE ALSO *Butler, Richard; Lee, Henry ("Light-Horse Harry"); Light Infantry; Stony Point, New York; Wayne, Anthony.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

WAYNE'S PENNSYLVANIA LINE IN VIRGINIA. After the reorganization following the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line, General Anthony Wayne left York, Pennsylvania, on 26 May 1781 with the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Pennsylvania Regiments (about 1,000 infantry in all), and Proctor's Fourth Continental

Artillery (6 cannon and 90 men). He joined Lafayette on 10 June 1781.

SEE ALSO *Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line; Virginia, Military Operations in.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WEATHER GAUGE. In the days of fighting sail, maneuvering to obtain and to hold the weather gauge was of prime importance in naval engagements because it allowed the ship that possessed it to dictate the terms of the engagement. A ship was said to have the weather gage, or “the advantage of the wind,” when she could steer straight for an opponent while the latter would have to tack into the wind.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

WEBB, SAMUEL BLATCHLEY. (1753–1807). Continental officer. Connecticut. Born on 15 December 1753 at Wethersfield, Connecticut, Webb was the stepson of Silas Deane and became his stepfather’s private secretary. Both men were involved in the colonial resistance to increased imperial control. When the General Assembly elected Deane a delegate to the first Continental Congress, Webb accompanied him to Philadelphia in September 1774. Webb marched with his militia company to Boston in the aftermath of the Lexington alarm (April 1775) and was commissioned first lieutenant of Captain John Chester’s Wethersfield company of Joseph Spencer’s Second Connecticut Regiment on 1 May 1775. He was wounded in the Battle of Bunker Hill (17 June 1775), and five days later, thanks to his stepfather’s influence, he became aide-de-camp to Major General Israel Putnam, with the rank of major.

On 21 June 1776 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and became aide and private secretary to Washington. With Joseph Reed and Henry Knox, in July he met the British officer who was attempting to deliver a letter addressed to “George Washington, Esq. etc. etc” from the Howes as part of their peace efforts. He was present at the Battle of Long Island (27 August 1776), was wounded at White Plains (28 October 1776) and again at Trenton (2 January 1777), and was present at Princeton (3 January 1777). On 11 January 1777 Webb was commissioned colonel of one of the sixteen Additional Continental Regiments, and he served in the Hudson Highlands during that summer’s

campaigns. Along with part of his regiment, he was captured in the unsuccessful attack against Long Island, New York, on 10 December 1777, and not exchanged until January 1781. His regiment was transferred to the Connecticut Line in June 1780 as the Ninth Connecticut. On 1 January 1781 it was consolidated with the Second Connecticut, and the combined unit was redesignated the Third Connecticut. Webb commanded this regiment through a further consolidation on 1 January 1783 and until it was disbanded in June. He left the service on 3 June 1783 and was breveted brigadier general on 30 September 1783. From 1789 until his death on 3 December 1807, he lived at Claverack, New York.

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments; Long Island, New York, Battle of; Peace Commission of the Howes.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

WEBB, THOMAS. (1725–1796). British officer and evangelist. Born in England on 31 May 1725, Webb became quartermaster of the Forty-eighth Regiment on 29 October 1754, and he was promoted to lieutenant on 9 November 1755. After serving at the siege of Louisburg in 1758, he was seriously wounded at the Battle of Montmorency on 31 July 1759. He settled in Albany, marrying an American woman and writing *Military Treatise on the Appointments of the Army* (1760). This small book pointed out the difficulties of supplying troops with sufficient weaponry in America and the inadequacy of British weapons for that service, recommending lighter guns. After his wife died, Webb returned to Britain to sell his commission, falling into a depression that ended with a vision of Christ in March 1765. Becoming a Methodist itinerant, he traveled through England and New York in his British uniform, employing his military persona and rhetoric to maximum effect. His vigorous style attracted attention and money, the latter helping to build churches in New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New Jersey. He also aroused a great deal of skepticism from those, such as Charles Wesley, who thought his stories unlikely and his visions slightly unnerving. Webb was a regular correspondent of the earl of Dartmouth, keeping the colonial secretary advised of events in America. These exchanges led to Webb’s being arrested on suspicion of spying, and he was jailed at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

Webb's second wife, Grace Gilbert, personally persuaded General Washington to free her husband on condition that he return to England, which he and his family did in August 1778. Webb continued to preach around England, finally settling in Bristol, where he died on 20 December 1796.

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Michael Bellesiles

WEBB'S REGIMENT. Webb's regiment, under Colonel Samuel B. Webb, was one of the sixteen "additional Continental regiments."

SEE ALSO *Additional Continental Regiments*.

Mark M. Boatner

WEBSTER, JAMES. (1743?–1781). British officer. Webster became a lieutenant in the Thirty-third Foot (West Riding) on 10 May 1760 and was promoted to captain in 1763, to major in 1771, and to lieutenant colonel on 9 April 1774. Cornwallis commanded the Third-third from March 1766 until he was promoted to major general in 1775, when Webster took over command as lieutenant colonel, continuing to serve under Cornwallis in the New York and New Jersey campaigns. In the Philadelphia campaign, the Thirty-third was in Grey's brigade of Cornwallis's command. In the Battle of Monmouth on 28 June 1778, it was Webster who came onto the field in the final stage of the action to make it possible for Clinton to extricate the light infantry.

Webster was promoted to brigadier in 1779. When Clinton withdrew forces from the Hudson Highlands and Rhode Island for Governor Tryon's Connecticut coast raid (July 1779), he left the Thirty-third Foot, Robinson's Loyal American Regiment, and half of Ferguson's corps to hold Fort Lafayette at Verplanck's Point under Webster's command.

Sailing south on 26 December 1779 with Clinton's Charleston expedition, Webster commanded a task force of fourteen hundred men that operated against Lincoln's line of communications from Charleston. Commanding a brigade composed of his own regiment, three light infantry companies, and the Twenty-third Fusiliers, he distinguished himself at Camden, where he was slightly wounded. In the unsuccessful pursuit of Greene to the Dan River, Webster commanded the force that conducted

the demonstration against Beattie's Ford when Cornwallis made his main crossing of the Catawba at Cowan's Ford, 1 February 1781. He defied American marksmanship to lead his brigade forward at Wetzell's Mills, North Carolina, on 6 March 1781.

At Guilford on 15 March 1781, Webster particularly distinguished himself from the opening movement of the battle to the end. Mortally wounded in this action, he died a fortnight later.

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1780; Cornwallis, Charles; Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Marksmanship; Monmouth, New Jersey; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene; Wetzell's Mills, North Carolina*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WEEDON, GEORGE. (1730–1793). Continental general. Virginia. A Fredericksburg innkeeper and prewar acquaintance of Washington, he served in the French and Indian War, rising to captain. He was characterized in 1774 by an English visitor as "very active in blowing the seeds of sedition." He became lieutenant colonel of the Third Virginia on 13 February 1776 and colonel on 13 August, joined Washington's army in mid-September with slightly more than six hundred men, and took part in the New York and New Jersey campaigns. On 20 February 1777 he became acting adjutant general to Washington and on 21 February was promoted to brigadier general. After a long leave of absence he rejoined the army at Morristown in time for the Philadelphia campaign. Leading Greene's division, he reached the Plowed Hill at Brandywine just as the American defenses were collapsing; his men calmly opened ranks to let the fugitives pass and reformed to check the enemy. As part of Greene's column he participated in the attack at Germantown and expressed the (questionable) view that the Americans were within fifteen minutes of victory when their attack collapsed. He was among the nine brigadier generals who memorialized Congress against General Thomas Conway's promotion and has been characterized with General John Peter Muhlenberg and William Woodford as one of the "jealous, ambitious men" competing for promotion (Freeman, vol. 4, p. 613 n.). On 18 August 1778 he appealed to Congress to be put on the inactive list; by November "Weedon had gone home and kept both his complaint and his commission" as a Continental brigadier general (ibid, 5, p. 79). In the Virginia military operations that followed, Weedon helped organize military resistance to the British raids and in the Yorktown campaign commanded the militia investing Gloucester.

“Joe Gourd,” as the tavern-keeping general was known to his soldiers, idolized the former patron who became commander in chief. On 14 April 1777 he wrote John Page,

no other man but our present General, who is the greatest that ever did or ever will adorn our earth, could have supported himself under the many disappointments and disgraces he was subjected to from this singular system of carrying on a war against the most formidable enemy in the world (ibid., 4, p. 411 n.).

He died in November 1793. Weedon was the brother-in-law of General Hugh Mercer. Weedon's wife, Catherine, raised Mercer's two sons after Mercer's death at the Battle of Princeton.

SEE ALSO *Virginia, Military Operations in.*

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revised by Harry M. Ward

WEEMS, MASON LOCKE PARSON. (1759–1825). Clergyman, bookseller, writer. Born in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, on 11 October 1759, Weems studied medicine at the University of Edinburgh and returned to Maryland sometime during the Revolution. Weems went to England in 1782 seeking ordination in the Church of England, but he had to wait until 1784 for Parliament to pass an act allowing for the ordination of ministers who would not take the oath of allegiance to the king. He was finally ordained on 12 September 1784, when he returned to his home county. He quit the ministry in 1792 to act as an agent for publisher Mathew Carey, a career he followed during the rest of his life, becoming a highly successful editor and writer. His *A History of the Life and Death, Virtues and Exploits of General George Washington*, published in 1800, went through some seventy editions in his lifetime. It is

primarily a work of fiction and was responsible for some of the iconic tales of Washington and the American Revolution. They included the highly dubious cherry tree story, which appeared in the fifth edition (1806). He wrote biographies of several other Revolutionary figures, as well as some of the first temperance books published in the United States. He died at Beaufort, South Carolina, on 23 May 1825.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

WELZELL'S MILLS, NORTH CAROLINA

SEE *Wetzell's Mills, North Carolina.*

WEMYSS, JAMES. British officer. An ensign in the Fortieth Foot on 6 April 1766, he was promoted to captain in that regiment on 14 March 1771 and commanded the Loyalist Queen's Rangers at Brandywine on 11 September 1777. On 10 August 1778 he was promoted to major of the Sixty-third Foot. With the start of major British military operations in the South, he became second only to Tarleton as the object of hatred among Patriots. He was defeated, wounded, and captured by Sumter at Fishdam Ford, South Carolina, on 9 November 1780. On 22 August 1783 he became a major in the army and on 20 September 1787 was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Sixty-third Foot. Two years later he disappeared from the Army Lists.

SEE ALSO *Brandywine, Pennsylvania; Fishdam Ford, South Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WENTWORTH, PAUL. (c. 1736–1793). Double spy. New Hampshire. Probably born in Barbados, Wentworth claimed kinship with anyone having the same last name, including Governor Benning Wentworth of New Hampshire. He moved to Portsmouth in the 1750s, gaining the governor's patronage. Around 1760 he moved to Surinam, where he

married a rich widow, inheriting her sugar plantation when she died shortly thereafter. In 1766 Wentworth went to London, setting himself up as a stock speculator and becoming friends with John Wentworth. When the latter succeeded his uncle as governor of New Hampshire, he appointed Paul Wentworth the province's agent to Parliament and a member of the council, even though the two offices required that he be on opposite sides of the Atlantic. Wentworth determined that the crown offered greater preferment than the patriots could ever hope to match, and in 1772 began feeding information to the king's secret service.

At the beginning of the Revolution, Sir William Eden, head of the British secret service, granted Wentworth a salary of five hundred pounds per year. As soon as Congress sent Silas Deane to Paris in 1776, Eden instructed Wentworth to spy on the American delegation to the French court. Since Deane and Benjamin Franklin were both old friends of his, Wentworth found it easy to establish the necessary connections. On Franklin's recommendation Edward Bancroft, whom Wentworth had hired as a doctor for his Surinam plantation in 1764, was added to the American mission in Paris. Wentworth now recruited him to spy for the British in December 1776. The two men also used their inside information from both sides of the war to speculate with some success on the stock market.

When, after Burgoyne's surrender, the British felt they could offer the Americans some terms short of complete independence, Wentworth was selected to feel out the American commissioners in Paris. He had to wait almost four weeks there before the suspicious Benjamin Franklin agreed to a meeting on 6 January 1778. Secretary Eden had given Wentworth a letter to show Franklin that came with an assurance that it was from a source close to the throne; the letter said that England would fight another ten years to prevent American independence. Franklin said that America would fight fifty years to win it and that both countries would be better off when they were bound only by peaceful commerce. Not only did Wentworth's mission fail to do any good for England, but Vergennes used it to accelerate the French Alliance by pointing out to the kings of France and Spain that the Americans might be making peace with Great Britain. Louis XVI consented to the Franco-American treaty the day after Wentworth saw Franklin.

Hoping that a British victory would save him his New Hampshire estates and aspiring to a title, a seat in Parliament, and an important office, Wentworth appointed and directed spies, used their reports to furnish military intelligence to the British, and in various disguises made frequent trips to the European Continent. After his visit to Franklin, however, he was so well known to French police that he had to remain in London.

Wentworth's rewards were meager: only a seat in Parliament in 1780, which he held just six weeks before being defeated in the general election of that year. George III had little confidence in Wentworth's reports and disapproved of his stock speculation. After failing in his political career, Wentworth retired to his Surinam plantation and died there in December 1793.

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WEST CANADA CREEK, NEW YORK


SEE *Jerseyfield, New York*.

WESTERN OPERATIONS. The Western Theater was comprised of the area lying north and west of the Ohio River, south of the Great Lakes, and east of the Mississippi River. Just as Niagara was the British base for raids against American border settlements in New York and eastern Pennsylvania, Detroit became headquarters for British operations against Patriot settlements in western Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky. American officials established their base of operations at Fort Pitt (Pittsburgh).

Military planners on both sides of the war realized that the contest would neither be won nor lost in the west. Separated from supplies and reinforcements by the Appalachian Mountains, British officials at Detroit and their counterparts in Pittsburgh watched as the war turned into an unending series of raids and counter raids. These marauds, any one of which could be brutal in the extreme, were never strong enough nor sustained for a sufficient period of time to inflict a fatal blow upon the enemy. Nonetheless, the theater remained an actively contested zone throughout the war.

THE NATIVE AMERICAN QUESTION

Although British forces employed Indian allies against the Americans in the East as early as 1775, as the war began in the West, both sides attempted to secure Native American neutrality. Sir Guy Carleton, the commander of British forces in Canada, feared that an overt military alliance with the region's Indians would fuel widespread resentment against Crown interests, and emphatically opposed the use of Native American forces against Americans from 1775 throughout much of 1777.



THE GALE GROUP

British officials attempted to sway Native sentiment by reaffirming the Proclamation of 1763, signed at the conclusion of the French and Indian War. Under this treaty, the Crown recognized Native American territorial claims within the region and promised to enforce a ban on American settlement beyond the crest of the Appalachian Mountains. Likewise, American authorities held a series of councils with the Ohio Country Indian nations that concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Pittsburgh in October 1776. In exchange for Native American neutrality, American officials acknowledged Indian sovereignty and also recognized Native American territorial claims north and west of the Ohio River.

Despite American efforts, after the outbreak of hostilities, Native American sympathies gravitated generally toward the British. Native American resentment was real. The American invasion of Canada in 1775 and 1776 greatly diminished the flow of British trade goods to the west. Further, Americans had become increasingly insistent in violating the settlement boundary established in 1763 and had established permanent settlements in Kentucky, at Harrodsburg in 1774 and at Boonesborough and St. Asaph in 1775.

In June 1777, British colonial secretary Lord George Germain ordered Carleton and Henry Hamilton, the British colonial governor at Detroit, to establish a formal military alliance with the region's Indian nations and employ them against American settlements throughout the Ohio Valley. In July, fifteen parties from Detroit conducted extensive raids along the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontiers. Americans were outraged and claimed that Hamilton had deliberately ordered the murder of defenseless women and children. The charge was untrue, but among Americans, Hamilton became one of the most despised figures along the western border.

In January 1778, Patriot forces in Pittsburgh launched an ambitious raid against British holdings along the lower Mississippi. Commanded by James Willing, the American force, consisting of an armed flatboat and twenty-six soldiers, descended the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers for the purpose of apprehending British supplies and disrupting British operations wherever possible. A short distance below the Wabash, Willing captured a large bateau containing furs bound for Cahokia. The following day, he also commanded a second craft carrying a cargo of brandy. Once on the Mississippi, Willing surprised a British detachment near Walnut Hills; captured Anthony Hutchins, a well-known

Loyalist living along the river and then ransacked the Hutchins estate; plundered Natchez; looted Manchak; and seized two British vessels, the *Rebecca* and *Neptune*, before reaching port at New Orleans in late February. The Willing raid was a bold stroke that broadly diminished British influence in the region. Moreover, it also promised to destabilize Great Britain's political and commercial alliances with the region's Indians if Crown authorities did not respond aggressively.

Hamilton was alarmed both by the Willing raid and the Americans' continuing infringement into Kentucky and western Virginia. Convinced that the rebels' ability to penetrate the Ohio Country would eventually pose a direct threat to Detroit, he organized a strike against Pittsburgh. Hamilton sent the plan to Carleton for approval in late July, but on 8 August he learned that an American frontiersman, George Rogers Clark, and a small force of backwoods irregulars had crossed deep into the Illinois country and taken possession of Vincennes on the Wabash River in present-day southwestern Indiana. Clark's advance put an end to the planned action against Fort Pitt.

CLARK'S 1778 CAMPAIGN FOR VINCENNES

Born near Charlottesville, Virginia, in 1752, Clark became a surveyor while a young man. When the Revolution began, he was living in Kentucky, at the time still part of Virginia. Clark was appointed a lieutenant colonel in the Virginia militia in 1777. In the wake of escalating Indian violence that year, Clark devised a plan to take offensive action against the British and their Native American allies north of the Ohio River. Virginia officials, including Governor Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, and George Mason, approved the proposal in early 1778. The scheme called for Clark to raise a small force, descend the Ohio River, and occupy Kaskaskia, a French village near the Mississippi River in southern Illinois. However, the Virginia Assembly's instructions gave Clark wide latitude in conducting his campaign and urged him to consider moving against other settlements within the region, including Vincennes and Detroit, if circumstances permitted.

Clark began his expedition in May 1778. After descending the Ohio from Pittsburgh, Clark established his base camp on Corn Island at the falls of the Ohio River (Louisville, Kentucky). He spent a brief time training his men, then began his thrust against the British on 24 June. The American force was small, consisting of about 180 men divided into four companies commanded by Captains John Montgomery, Joseph Bowman, Leonard Helm, and William Harrod.

Navigating the Ohio in flatboats, Clark reached the mouth of the Tennessee River on 28 June. That evening

his guards apprehended a group of American hunters who had been in Kaskaskia only eight days before. They reported that the British commander at Kaskaskia, Philippe de Rastel, chevalier de Rocheblave, had placed the village's militia on alert and sent spies to the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to watch for any approach by American forces. But they also claimed that the militia was weak and untrained, and that if Clark could approach the town undetected, he could seize the village before the residents could mount a resistance. As a result of this intelligence, the following day Clark decided to land his force at Fort Massiac, an abandoned British outpost a few miles below the Tennessee River opposite present-day Paducah, Kentucky, and use an old buffalo trace or hunters' road that ran from that location to Kaskaskia (a distance of about 120 miles) to attack the settlement from the southeast.

The Americans reached Kaskaskia after nightfall on 4 July. Clark divided his men into two columns to seize the town and safeguard the approaches leading into the village, and sent a third group of spies, led by Simon Kenton, directly to de Rocheblave's residence. De Rocheblave was quickly arrested and the village subdued without incident. The following day, Clark sent an emissary to open communication with Spanish officials across the Mississippi River and successfully deployed a thirty-man detachment accompanied by a small French delegation from the village to secure Prairie du Rocher, fifteen miles north of Kaskaskia. The detachment also secured Philippi, a smaller settlement nine miles further up the Mississippi River, and Cahokia, fifty miles north of Kaskaskia, opposite present-day St. Louis.

After consolidating his gains, Clark opened negotiations with the region's Indians, and sent two French envoys from Kaskaskia, Father Pierre Gibault and Dr. Jean Baptiste Laffont, to Vincennes. Skillful diplomacy convinced the various tribes to remain neutral, and Gibault and Laffont's efforts prompted Vincennes's residents to join the American cause. As a result, Clark placed Captain Leonard Helm in command of Fort Sackville at Vincennes. By early August, the peaceful conquest of the Illinois country was complete and had provided Clark with a strong forward base from which he could threaten Detroit.

THE BRITISH RETAKE VINCENNES

British authorities reacted immediately once they learned of Clark's incursion. In Detroit, Hamilton prepared an expedition to the Wabash River to repatriate the occupied settlement. Hamilton's force, consisting of forty British regulars, 125 French militia, and approximately seventy Native American allies, set out from Detroit on 7 October 1778. Traveling the length of the Maumee River, the raiding party then portaged to the Wabash River and proceeded directly to Vincennes, gathering additional

Indian support along the way. As Hamilton approached his objective, his force numbered more than 500 men.

Vincennes and the small American garrison at Fort Sackville surrendered at once when confronted by the over-whelming British force. But at this critical juncture, Hamilton made a series of errors that led ultimately to the mission's failure. Concerned about his ability to conduct a winter offensive, Hamilton declined to move immediately against Kaskaskia and Cahokia, electing instead to winter at Fort Sackville before resuming operations the following spring. Secondly, he allowed most of his Indian allies to depart and permitted most of his militia to return to Detroit. Lastly, he seriously underestimated Clark's resourcefulness and resolve.

Clark learned of Hamilton's arrival on 29 January 1779 and quickly determined to undertake a daring mid-winter attack to reclaim Vincennes. On 4 February, Clark deployed a small vessel, the *Willing*, carrying forty-six soldiers and a small artillery piece, down the Mississippi and up the Ohio and Wabash Rivers. He ordered the company to halt at the White River below Vincennes, and waited while Clark personally led the main force overland. The following day, Clark and between 130 and 170 men, nearly half of whom were French volunteers, set out from Kaskaskia for Vincennes.

Clark's journey would be arduous. An unusually mild and wet winter had flooded much of southern Illinois. Although Clark easily traversed the first 100 miles, when he entered the Wabash watershed on 15 February, he discovered that much of his route was covered by two to four feet of water. The flooding reduced the supply of game in the area, and Clark's men soon found themselves without rations. Further, the weather turned frigid. Clark's men were wet, cold, exhausted, and on the verge of starvation. Nonetheless, Clark pushed on, arriving outside of Vincennes shortly after dark on 23 February.

Clark quickly obtained the allegiance of the town's French citizens and commenced the attack on Fort Sackville that evening. Through a series of deceptive displays, Clark convinced Hamilton that his force was much larger than it actually was, and in a personal negotiation with the British commander, Clark implied that if the Americans stormed the fort, the British could expect no quarter. Convinced that he was facing a superior force and with grave doubts concerning the continued loyalty both of his Indian allies and the French militia within his fort, Hamilton surrendered the following day.

Clark's activity in the Illinois country was the most successful American campaign in the west during the Revolution. Hamilton's capture diminished British influence, provided an important psychological boost to American forces throughout the Ohio Valley, and prompted a new wave of settlement into western Virginia and Kentucky. However, Clark was never able

to capitalize on his victory and strike directly at Detroit. He planned expeditions in 1779, 1780, and 1781, but never was given the means for the operations and, instead, spent the remainder of the war countering a renewed wave of British-led assaults against American settlements.

BRITISH OPERATIONS

Hamilton's capture was a serious, but not catastrophic blow to British efforts in the West. Clark's dramatic re-emergence on the Wabash rekindled fears of an American offensive against Detroit, and British officials redoubled their efforts to reenergize their alliance with the western nations.

In early spring 1780, Hamilton's successor, Major Arent DePeyster, proposed an offensive against a string of stockaded civilian settlements, or stations, in Kentucky, hoping to divert American attention from Detroit, demoralize the western settlements, and encourage the Crown's Native American allies to renew their allegiance. DePeyster ordered Captain Henry Bird to lead the expedition, and placed Indian agent Alexander McKee in charge of the force's Native American contingent.

Bird left Detroit on 25 May 1780 with 150 soldiers, two small caliber cannon, and nearly 100 Indians. As the expedition moved southward, additional Indians joined the force and eventually numbered in excess of 850. Bird directed his command against Martin's and Ruddell's Stations on the Licking River in northern Kentucky. Both communities had been founded in 1775 and were each home to about twenty families.

Bird attacked and reduced Ruddell's Station on 24 June and Martin's Station the following day. Lacking the provisions and supplies to continue, Bird withdrew from Kentucky and returned safely to Detroit in early August with nearly 300 prisoners and a great deal of personal property. The expedition successfully demonstrated British resolve to the region's Indians and proved that British forces could attack settlements deep within Kentucky virtually unmolested.

In 1781 Clark attempted to form an expedition against Detroit and raised four hundred volunteers at Pittsburgh. Clark and his command departed Fort Pitt down the Ohio River for Fort Nelson, at the falls on the Ohio River, in early August and sent word to his second-in-command, Captain Archibald Lochry, to follow with additional troops. Lochry, however, was never able to overtake the senior officer. Spies and deserters had informed British officials of Clark's expedition, and a large party of Indians led by the Mohawk chief, Joseph Brant, was waiting in ambush for the Americans at the mouth of the Great Miami River. Brant's men were unable to attack Clark's force as he passed, but shortly afterwards they captured an American officer and seven of Lochry's

men, an advance guard sent by Lochry to convince Clark to stop and consolidate his force. Using the prisoners as decoys, Brant lured the main body of Lochry's troops ashore on 24 August. The ambush destroyed the American detachment, killing Lochry and thirty-seven others, and capturing every other member of the 101-man expedition.

In late-summer 1782, McKee and Captain William Caldwell led a second raid into Kentucky. Thirty rangers and nearly 300 Indians attacked Bryant's Station, on the Elkhorn River near present-day Lexington, on 12 August. The Americans had been warned of the British approach and repulsed the attack. At the end of the siege's second day, Caldwell destroyed the settlement's crops and livestock and withdrew to the Blue Licks on the Licking River.

Soon, 182 Kentucky militia, led by John Todd and including Daniel Boone and his son Israel, were in pursuit. At the Blue Licks, Todd permitted his men to be drawn into an ambush. In the fierce battle that followed, nearly seventy of the Americans were killed, including Israel Boone and Thomas Boone, Daniel's nephew. Caldwell remained at Blue Licks one more day, hoping to lure a second American patrol into the same trap. When the Kentuckians did not advance, Caldwell withdrew back to Detroit.

AMERICAN OPERATIONS

In 1778 American officials at Fort Pitt began a second offensive against Detroit. The plan called for General Lachlan McIntosh to lead an expedition into Ohio, constructing a string of forts as he advanced westward. These posts would serve as forward bases from which to attack Detroit, discourage Native Americans loyal to the British from attacking frontier settlements in Pennsylvania and western Virginia, and reassure neutral Christian Delawares living in eastern Ohio.

McIntosh began the invasion in the fall of 1778. The Americans constructed Fort McIntosh at the mouth of Beaver Creek near Beaver, Pennsylvania, and advanced to the Tuscarawas River near present-day Bolivar, Ohio. In December, McIntosh halted for the winter and constructed Fort Laurens, naming the post for Henry Laurens, then President of the Continental Congress. After the post was finished, McIntosh and most of his command returned to Pittsburg, leaving 172 troops from Pennsylvania and Virginia under the command of Colonel John Gibson.

British officials were aware of the American advance, and in January 1779 a reconnaissance party led by Simon Girty attacked a small party from the fort, killing two and capturing another. On 22 February 1779, a larger British force commanded by Captain Henry Bird laid siege to the post. McIntosh attempted to reinforce the beleaguered garrison, but was unsuccessful. The British forced the

Americans to undergo a season of deprivation, and the Americans became so desperate they were reduced to boiling their moccasins for stew. Nonetheless, the British could not force the garrison's surrender. On 22 March they lifted the siege and returned to Detroit. In the wake of the attack, American officials concluded that the post could not serve its purpose and abandoned the fort on 2 August 1779.

In May 1779 John Bowman led an expedition from Kentucky against Shawnee villages clustered along the Little Miami River in Ohio. The attack was poorly orchestrated and his command was more concerned with acquiring plunder than fighting. Bowman's men put the Shawnee villages to the torch and accumulated more than 180 horses and other property, but at the cost of nine dead and several wounded. A few defenders were killed, but most escaped and approximately forty Shawnee adults and boys were able to harass Bowman's nearly 300-man force along its entire retreat to the Ohio River. While revealing the Shawnees' vulnerability to attack, the raid was a tactical failure and had little lasting effect.

In 1780 Clark undertook a punitive expedition against the Ohio Indian nations in retaliation for Bird and McKee's raid against Martin's and Ruddell's Stations. Clark learned of the Bird invasion in early June. By July, he had determined to strike against Chillicothe and Pickaway, Shawnee settlements on the Miami River in Ohio. Assembling nearly 1,000 Kentucky troops near the mouth of the Licking River near present-day Covington, Kentucky, Clark began his advance on 2 August.

Clark reached Chillicothe on 6 August, but found that the Shawnees had burned and then evacuated the town in anticipation of Clark's arrival. The Americans destroyed anything left standing, cut down several hundred acres of corn, and moved against Pickaway the following day. The Shawnees were prepared and had constructed what Clark described as "strongholds," "works," and a "very strong" blockhouse enclosed by a triangular stockade with which to meet the attackers.

Clark commenced a general engagement in late afternoon. Strong Indian resistance stalled the Americans' advance, and the battle did not conclude until evening, when Clark deployed two small caliber cannon against the Shawnees. The Kentuckians took possession of the village, but most of the defenders slipped away. The following day, Clark's men destroyed approximately 800 acres of crops containing an estimated 36,000 bushels of corn. On 9 August, the army began its withdrawal. Clark reached the Ohio River on 14 August and, following an auction of Shawnee plunder, disbanded his force.

The attack heightened growing tension between Crown officials and their allies, who claimed that Detroit was slow to send troops and other support in the days leading up to the engagement. Further, the loss of such a

prodigious supply of food placed a serious burden on British officials as they attempted to provision the Shawnees throughout the following winter and spring. Ultimately, however, the raid had inflicted few casualties and diminished neither the Shawnees' willingness nor ability to continue the war.

In March 1782 Pennsylvania irregulars led by Colonel David Williams undertook an expedition against Gnadenhutten on the Tuscarawas River in Ohio. The Indian village was home to a congregation of Moravian Delawares. Williamson believed, incorrectly, that the Delawares had participated in several raids against western Pennsylvania. By feigning friendship, the Pennsylvanians lured nearly 100 of the Delaware into two cabins, after which Williamson and his men bludgeoned ninety-six men, women, and infants to death. The massacre was the worst atrocity perpetrated during the war.

On 25 May 1782, 400 Pennsylvania troops commanded by Colonel William Crawford began an expedition against Wyandot and Delaware towns located on the Sandusky River near present-day Upper Sandusky, Ohio. Among the Americans were Williamson and several other Gnadenhutten murderers. Crawford encountered stiff resistance near the Sandusky River on 6 June, losing nearly 50 men in the engagement. The following day, the Indians renewed the attack, capturing Crawford and scattering his army. Crawford was tortured and killed in revenge for the Gnadenhutten massacre. Ironically, Williamson escaped and returned safely to Pennsylvania. The Crawford expedition marked the last campaign in the Western Theater.

CONCLUSIONS

The campaigns fought in the West had little impact on the outcome of the conflict. However, Clark's success in Illinois allowed American negotiators to claim control over the region during peace negotiations at war's end. The Treaty of Paris, which ended the conflict in 1783, awarded the territory to the United States. The region's Indians continued to resist expansion into the region until the battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 and the subsequent Treaty of Greenville, signed in August 1795. The pact led to the eventual admittance of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin into the federal union.

SEE ALSO *Clark, George Rogers; Indians in the Colonial Wars and the American Revolution; Shawnee; Vincennes, Indiana.*

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revised by Larry L. Nelson

WESTERN RESERVE. About three million acres in the northeast corner of modern Ohio were reserved by Connecticut when that state surrendered claims to all other western lands in 1786. A 500,000-acre tract known as the Fire Lands (later the counties of Huron, Erie, and the eastern tip of Ottawa) was used to repay citizens of Danbury, Fairfield, Norwalk, New Haven, and New London for war losses.

Mark M. Boatner

WEST INDIES IN THE REVOLUTION. The West Indies were a major theater of the American Revolutionary War. This was because they were divided among the colonial powers of Britain,



THE GALE GROUP

France, Spain, and the Netherlands, all of whom were belligerents at some stage of the Revolutionary War. Furthermore, they were economically important as the principal market for the slave trade in the Americas and as the primary source of the sugar and rum consumed in Europe and America.

The six British colonies in the Caribbean—Jamaica; Grenada, which included Tobago; Barbados; the Leeward Islands; St. Vincent; and Dominica—did not ally themselves with the thirteen mainland colonies, even though they were tied closely to the rebel colonies by trade before the war. Their political systems, including elected assemblies, were similar to those of the mainland colonies, and their plantation systems shared much in common with the southern mainland colonies, especially South Carolina. Nevertheless, they did not unite in even a limited campaign of opposition to Britain or engage in a pamphlet war with Britain. They continued to affirm their belief in parliamentary sovereignty. Unlike Bermuda, they did not send delegates to the Continental Congress. It was only on the eve of the war that they made sympathetic gestures to the mainland cause, but this sudden change of tone was motivated primarily by their desire to prevent a war that was likely to have adverse economic consequences for the

British West Indies. Their loyalty during the imperial crisis was based on their reliance upon the home government for defense owing to their greater vulnerability to slave revolts and foreign attack. In addition, they were economically dependent upon their monopoly of the sugar market in Britain. The white colonists on the islands were also more closely connected with the mother country; many of the elite returned to Britain for their education and even settled there as wealthy absentees.

From the outset, the Revolutionary War involved the West Indies. The islands became an essential channel of gunpowder and military supplies provided by the French and Dutch for the state militias and the Continental army. American privateers were also active in attempting to destroy Britain's lucrative trade with the Caribbean. The British islands did not initially face a threat of invasion, although privateers raided Nassau (New Providence) in the Bahamas in 1776 and twice attacked Tobago in 1777. The first foreign salute of the American flag occurred in the Caribbean in 1776 in the Danish island of St. Croix in October and by the Dutch Fort Orange at St. Eustatius, which saluted the flag flying from a ship of the Continental navy, the *Andrew Doria*, on 16 November. General Sir William Howe attempted with little success to

obtain troops from Jamaica and supplies from Barbados. He did not receive the troops from Jamaica, where their embarkation coincided with a major slave revolt that an inquiry by the local assembly concluded to be inspired by the anticipated withdrawal of the troops. Howe received some food provisions from Barbados, but the island was on the verge of famine. In the Leeward Islands, which had previously relied on food imports from British North America, there were such shortages that an estimated one-fifth of the slave population died in Antigua. Agents of the Continental Congress and the state governments were dispersed throughout the French and Dutch islands, including William Bingham, who operated in Martinique. His mission was not only to procure supplies and to assist privateers but also to create incidents likely to provoke war between Britain and France.

STRATEGY PRIORITIES

The war in the West Indies was transformed by the entry into the war of France in 1778 and Spain in 1779. The islands became a major theater of the conflict and the relative strength of the respective navies became critical. The British navy was overstretched, with often fewer ships than islands in the eastern Caribbean. The navy had to provide convoys for merchant ships in both the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic. It not only had to protect the home waters and to blockade the coast of North America, but also to defend British colonies in the Mediterranean, India, and the Caribbean along with slave trading posts on the west coast of Africa. The colonists in the British islands regarded the navy as their only means of defense and were inclined to submit to invasion rather than risk the destruction of their plantations. The reliance on the navy was greater still owing to the inadequacy of the size of the army garrisons. However, the earl of Sandwich, the first lord of the Admiralty, was primarily concerned with the defense of Britain. His strategy was largely reactive, with British fleets countering their opponents by shadowing and pursuing enemy fleets. His caution was due to the uncertainty about whether the destination of the enemy fleets was the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic, the North Sea, the Mediterranean, or the English Channel. The danger of this policy was that a superior enemy fleet might gain naval superiority for sufficient time to inflict a major blow before the arrival of the pursuing British fleet.

The climate and wind directions also presented particular problems for strategy in the West Indies. The fleets were unsafe in the islands during the hurricane months from the beginning of August to early November. It was therefore customary to leave only a minimal presence during the hurricane season. The trade winds blew from east to west for much of the year, which had the effect of dividing the small islands of the eastern Caribbean, known

as the Lesser Antilles, which included the Leeward and Windward Islands, from the large islands to the west, the Greater Antilles, which included Cuba, Puerto Rico, St. Domingue (Haiti), Santo Domingo, and Jamaica. A ship could sail from Barbados to Jamaica in about a week, but the return journey against adverse winds might take as long as a voyage across the Atlantic. The possession of the most easterly islands was therefore particularly desirable. The primary naval bases of Britain and France were in the Lesser Antilles, at English Harbour in Antigua and Fort Royal in Martinique.

France was more concerned with strategic objectives in the Caribbean than in North America. On the outbreak of war with Britain in 1778, it seized the initiative in the Caribbean, where the marquis de Bouillé, the governor of Martinique, conquered Dominica in September. The small local defense force was easily overwhelmed by an invasion army of two thousand. There were no casualties on either side. The French conquered the island before news of the expedition reached the British admiral in the eastern Caribbean, who was unable to come to the rescue because of orders to remain in Barbados, where he was to join a secret expedition for the conquest of St. Lucia. The fall of Dominica enabled the French to consolidate their own colonial possessions and to divide the British islands in the eastern Caribbean. The British, however, more than compensated themselves for this loss by capturing St. Lucia.

Britain persisted in the war for America partly in the belief that the loss of the thirteen colonies might be followed by the loss of the British West Indies. George III regarded the possession of the island colonies as essential for generating the wealth to wage the war and to preserve national greatness. There was even discussion within the cabinet of withdrawing from America to launch an offensive war in the Caribbean. The strategic importance of the islands explains why the British temporarily subordinated military activities in North America for objectives in the West Indies in 1778. The government withdrew five thousand troops from New York for the conquest of St. Lucia, a strategic priority given its fine harbor at Gros Islet Bay, which enabled the British navy to observe the movements of the French navy around the neighboring island of Martinique. However, the divisions within the government about strategic priorities and the fatal delays in mounting the expedition allowed France to take Dominica before the arrival of the expedition from New York.

EARLY FRENCH VICTORIES

The war in the Caribbean gradually deteriorated for the British during 1779. In the summer, France again seized the initiative in the West Indies. On 18 June, St. Vincent surrendered without a shot fired to Admiral Charles D'Estaing and four hundred troops under the chevalier du Romain. There was not a single British artillery officer

on the island nor anyone else with knowledge of artillery. There was virtually no gunpowder or provisions in the islands. The French landed less than two miles from Kingston, where there were forty-four British soldiers and the governor was only able to assemble an additional thirty-five militiamen. Less than a month later on 4 July, the French seized Grenada, the largest sugar producer after Jamaica in the British West Indies. Governor Lord Macartney attempted to defend the island with a force of only 150 regulars and 300 militia against 3,000 French troops. The predominantly French free black and free colored population hastened his surrender by deserting the garrison.

The British loss of St. Vincent and Grenada illustrated the problems facing the Royal Navy in the Caribbean. Vice Admiral John Byron had to leave Barbados and St. Lucia twice in a month to go to the defense of St. Kitts, which was under apprehension of an attack by the French Admiral D'Estaing. It was while he was escorting the homeward-bound convoy from St. Kitts that D'Estaing attacked St. Vincent and Grenada. Byron was unable to reach Grenada until two days after the surrender. The French, in the meantime, had gained naval supremacy with reinforcements from Commodore la Motte-Picquet in June. Off Grenada, the inferior fleet of Byron fought an indecisive sea battle against D'Estaing's fleet and then returned to St. Kitts with 183 killed and 340 wounded, as well as considerable damage to masts and rigging. The condition of the British fleet left the way open for D'Estaing to attack the remaining British colonies in the Caribbean. The latter were under constant apprehension of an invasion throughout the rest of the summer. In September, the importance of the islands to Britain was demonstrated by the willingness of Sir Henry Clinton to send Lord Cornwallis and four thousand troops to the defense of Jamaica in response to an invasion scare. The expedition was called off when the alarm proved false; D'Estaing intended instead to retake Georgia.

SPAIN IN THE WAR

The entry of Spain into the war further expanded British operations in the Caribbean in 1779. There were informal British settlements along the coasts of Nicaragua and the Gulf of Honduras. In retaliation for a raid by the Spanish, the British seized the port of Omoa in the Gulf of Honduras. The success of the assault, which included the capture of large amounts of bullion, emboldened more ambitious plans that were attempted in 1780. The object was no less than to divide the Spanish Empire in the Americas and to open commercial routes with the Pacific by an expedition along the San Juan River through Lake Nicaragua to Grenada and León. The plan was conceived by the governor of Jamaica, Major General John Dalling. On 3 February 1780 a force of four hundred regulars

under Captain Polson sailed from Jamaica. They were accompanied by HMS *Hinchinbrook*, commanded by Captain Horatio Nelson, the future victor of Trafalgar. The enterprise proved a fiasco. It succeeded in the capture of Fort St. Juan but failed to reach the lake and was called off in May. The fort was subsequently evacuated and partly demolished on 4 January 1781.

BRITISH SUCCESS AND FAILURE

The French were less successful in 1780. In the last week of March, Admiral De Guichen arrived at Martinique with large reinforcements to take command of French forces in the West Indies. The British, meanwhile, had appointed Major General John Vaughan to be commander in chief in the Leeward Islands. A veteran of campaigns in America, he arrived in Barbados on 14 February. De Guichen attempted to attack St. Lucia with twenty-one ships of the line, but Sir Hyde Parker's sixteen ships and Vaughan's defenses forced him to abandon the attempt and return to Martinique. On 17 April, Admiral Sir George Rodney fought an indecisive naval battle with twenty ships of the line against De Guichen's superior French fleet of twenty-three. Although outnumbered, he regarded the battle as a great missed opportunity to defeat the French. He variously blamed some of his captains for failing to follow his orders during the battle and the Dutch at St. Eustatius who refitted the French fleet but refused the British. Rodney confronted De Guichen again with similarly inconclusive exchanges between the two fleets during 15–20 May. After De Guichen sailed for Europe, Rodney left for New York.

Rodney returned to St. Lucia in December. On the 16th he sailed for St. Vincent with a force of soldiers under Vaughan, but the French defenses were found to be too strong for any prospect of a successful attack. On 27 January 1781, Rodney and Vaughan received orders for the immediate capture of St. Eustatius; they carried out the attack before the inhabitants were even aware of the outbreak of war between Britain and the Netherlands. The war was partly motivated by British anger at the assistance given by the Dutch to the rebel cause in America through St. Eustatius. On 3 February 1781, St. Eustatius surrendered unconditionally to the combined British forces. The island was incapable of resistance, with a garrison of less than sixty men and a single frigate against fifteen British warships and three thousand troops. The British proceeded to capture most of the remaining Dutch territories in the Caribbean, including the islands of St. Martin and Saba, and the South American colonies of Demerara and Essequibo (Guyana). They also took French St. Bartholomew.

The British successes in the Caribbean were short lived. Rodney failed to mount any more offensives but instead spent weeks presiding over the indiscriminate plunder of St. Eustatius. He treated all the inhabitants,

who included some British subjects, as smugglers, pirates, and traitors and therefore denied them the usual protection of their private property according to the laws of war. The episode caused an outcry, led in Parliament by Edmund Burke. In the meantime, Rodney delegated the task of intercepting the arrival of the French fleet of Admiral De Grasse to Admiral Sir Samuel Hood off Martinique. De Grasse, the new French commander in chief, avoided the British fleet and sailed his ships into Fort Royal on 29 April, where they joined four other ships that the British had blockaded at Martinique. On the night of the 10 May, the French again attempted St. Lucia but reembarked after finding it too well defended. A few days later, De Grasse sent a small squadron and twelve hundred troops to Tobago; they landed unopposed on the 23rd and forced its surrender on 2 June. Rodney appeared two days later but was unable to reverse the victory. De Grasse avoided a naval engagement and sailed via St. Domingue to play a critical role at the Battle of Yorktown.

AFTER YORKTOWN

The British defeat at Yorktown in October 1781 marked an escalation of the war in the Caribbean, leaving the French to resume the offensive. France and Spain planned to attack Jamaica. While awaiting the return of De Grasse from Virginia, the marquis de Bouillé seized the opportunity to recapture the British-occupied Dutch islands of St. Martin and Saba. On 15 November he also recaptured St. Eustatius from the British. Unable to land his 2,000 troops owing to a heavy surf, he made a bold surprise attack with only 300 men against a garrison of 723 troops under Colonel Cockburn and captured prizes of two million livres, including pay for the British army in North America. In the meantime, De Grasse had declined the request of George Washington that he and the French fleet remain in North America and assist in an attack on Charleston. He had already overstayed his orders to return to the Caribbean with the object of a combined attack with the Spanish fleet against Jamaica. De Grasse reached Martinique the day after De Bouillé's capture of St. Eustatius. While waiting for reinforcements and the juncture of the Spanish fleet, he made several attempts on British islands in the Lesser Antilles, but bad weather foiled his designs on Barbados and a determined defense twice repulsed his efforts to take St. Lucia. Accompanied by the same victorious French army and commanders that had served at Yorktown, De Grasse landed at St. Kitts on 11 January 1782, but he faced a determined opposition from the garrison of Brimstone Hill and did not secure the surrender of the island until 11 February. The fall of St. Kitts was quickly followed by Nevis and Montserrat and then Demerara and Essequibo.

The Caribbean became the main theater of military operations in the final year of the war. Hood's fleet was

reinforced by Rodney on the 25th, preceding the departure of De Grasse from Martinique for St. Domingue, where he planned to join the Spanish fleet and to embark French troops for the invasion of Jamaica. With additional reinforcements, Rodney enjoyed naval superiority with thirty-seven ships of the line against De Grasse's thirty-three effective sail of the line and two fifty-gun ships. On 12 April 1782, in a passage of islands between Dominica and Guadeloupe called the Saintes, he encountered Rodney and the British fleet in what proved to be one of the most decisive British naval victories before Trafalgar. During the Battle of the Saintes, Rodney captured the French flagship, the *Ville de Paris*, together with Admiral de Grasse and four ships carrying the siege artillery intended for Jamaica.

Rodney consequently became one of the few heroes of the Revolutionary War, although there was some criticism of his failure to continue the pursuit of the French fleet after the battle. The victory did not allay fears of an Franco-Spanish invasion of Jamaica. While Rodney sailed for Jamaica in May, a Spanish force captured the Bahamas. The British, therefore, continued to prepare for the continuation of the war and even sent orders to Guy Carleton, the commander in chief in America, to move to the Caribbean. Nevertheless, the only significant action was the recapture of Honduras by the British in October. The peace preliminaries in Europe ended the military preparations for new campaigns in the Caribbean. Rodney's victory helped Britain obtain generous terms from France and Spain at the Treaty of Paris in 1783. The British had lost seven islands and made only one conquest, but they were forced by the terms of the peace to cede only Tobago and St. Lucia to France and the coastal settlements along the shore of Nicaragua to Spain.

ASSESSMENTS

The war in the Caribbean was inextricably linked with the war in North America. Rodney and Clinton had even suggested a supreme commander in chief for both the Caribbean and North America. Many British officers who served in North America also served in the Caribbean, including Colonel Archibald Campbell, Major John Dalrymple, Colonel William Dalrymple, Major General George Garth, Major General James Grant, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Kemble, Major General Alexander Leslie, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Musgrave, Major General Charles O'Hara, Lord Charles Montagu, Major General Edward Mathew, Major General Robert Prescott, Major General Augustine Prevost, and Major General John Vaughan.

The defense of the West Indies contributed to the British defeat in North America. Britain had to deploy resources in the former that might otherwise have served in the latter. These included naval convoys to protect

merchant ships against privateers and enemy fleets. In 1778 Sir Henry Clinton withdrew from Philadelphia to free five thousand troops for the conquest of St. Lucia, together with an additional three thousand troops for service in Florida and Canada. Clinton resented their loss, particularly because the German mercenary regiments were debarred by their contracts from serving in the Caribbean, which forced him to send British regiments that he regarded as much superior. Clinton was promised the return of the troops from the Caribbean, and he later blamed their absence for his subsequent failure to aggressively engage the Continental army. Historians have long criticized Lord George Germain or the commanding officers in the Caribbean for the dispersion of these troops throughout the Leeward Islands, but the British had little choice, since the islands had insufficient garrisons to withstand attacks and the cabinet was under constant political pressure for better protection from the opposition parties and the powerful West India lobby in London.

The troops that served on other campaigns in the West Indies might similarly have reinforced Clinton. Furthermore, the British regiments in the islands had to be continually replenished owing to the high mortality rates due primarily to malaria. During the American War, 11 percent of the troops died on the voyage to the Caribbean. The annual mortality rate of soldiers in the Caribbean was 15 percent, compared to 6 percent for those stationed in New York and 1 percent in Canada. Without a single shot being fired, the British lost 3,500 troops in three and one-half years in Jamaica. Of the 1,008 men of the Seventy-eighth Regiment stationed at Kingston in 1779, only 18 were still alive in 1783. Of 7,000 troops sent to Jamaica, only 2,000 were fit for duty in April 1782.

Rodney's failure to intercept the arrival of De Grasse's fleet at Martinique before the Battle of Yorktown had the greatest strategic implications for the British war in America. Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis were led to expect by the ministry in London that Rodney would either check De Grasse in the Caribbean or follow him to North America. Rodney instead spent three months presiding over the sale of goods at St. Eustatius and left Hood to prevent De Grasse's entry into Martinique. Hood argued with Rodney about his orders for positioning the British fleet outside Martinique, orders that he believed were motivated by Rodney's greater interest in protecting prize convoys from St. Eustatius to Britain than in inhibiting the movements of De Grasse. Rodney compounded the failure by not following De Grasse to America, which again delegated the responsibility of the pursuit to Hood. Rodney instead pleaded ill-health and returned to England, where his first priority was to defend himself in Parliament against critics like Edmund Burke, who were demanding an inquiry into his behavior at St. Eustatius. His departure contributed to the numerical inferiority of the British fleet at the Battle

of the Virginia Capes (in the Chesapeake), which sealed the fate of Cornwallis. His absence also deprived the navy of the most brilliant and the most senior British naval commander in the Americas.

SEE ALSO *Estaing, Charles Hector Théodat, Comte d'; French Alliance; Grasse, François Joseph Paul, Comte de; Jamaica (West Indies); Naval Operations, French; Nicaragua; Rodney, George Bridges; Spanish Participation in the American Revolution; St. Eustatius; St. Kitts, Captured by the French; St. Lucia, Captured by the British; Vaughan, John.*

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revised by Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy

WESTMORELAND, PENNSYLVANIA. Township into which Wyoming Valley settlements were incorporated by Connecticut in January 1774.

SEE ALSO *Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania.*

Mark M. Boatner

WEST POINT, NEW YORK. Located on the west side of a sharp bend of the Hudson River seven miles below Fishkill, West Point was not fortified until after Clinton's expedition of October 1777 demonstrated the inadequacy of the Patriots' existing defenses. It became, in Washington's words, the "key to America," and was to have been the prize of Arnold's treason. From the completion of its works in 1778, Washington made it the center of his defensive lines against the British in New York. Many scholars hold that it served effectively to bottle the British into their positions in New York City, while others find it insignificant to the total war effort. With patrols ranging widely from this base, the Americans were able to put serious pressure on the British supply system.

A detachment of the Corps of Invalids was assigned there in 1781 to instruct officer candidates, but the plan did not materialize. Washington first proposed the establishment of a military academy at this site in 1783. Instead, Congress terminated the Continental army the next year (2 June 1784), replacing it the following day with the miniscule U.S. Army. West Point was garrisoned by fifty-five men under a captain who were charged with maintaining the decaying fort. Later it was home for the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers established on 9 May 1794, and on 4 July 1802 the U.S. Military Academy started operating with ten cadets present. West Point is the oldest continuously garrisoned U.S. military post.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason; Clinton's Expedition; Corps of Invalids; Hudson River and the Highlands.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WETHERSFIELD CONFERENCE, CONNECTICUT. 21 May 1781. In a historic meeting at Wethersfield between Washington and the comte de Rochambeau, commander of the French forces, a plan was made for an all-out attack on the British in New York City, which Washington hoped would be the decisive

campaign of the war. (This was not the genesis—except indirectly—of the Yorktown campaign, as has been frequently claimed.) After the meeting, Washington wrote to all the New England assemblies requesting more than six thousand militia to supplement his forces for the upcoming attack on General Clinton. The very next day, Rochambeau's senior officers persuaded him to switch their campaign to the Chesapeake; Washington insisted on the original proposal to which Rochambeau had agreed, but the French eventually persuaded the Americans to head south.

The Wethersfield Plan was potentially compromised on 3 June when Sir Henry Clinton received a captured copy and became aware of the Washington's plan of operation. The oldest permanently inhabited township in Connecticut, Wethersfield became a suburb of Hartford.

SEE ALSO *Yorktown Campaign.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WETZELL'S MILLS (OR MILL), NORTH CAROLINA. 6 March 1781. The day after General Charles Cornwallis started withdrawing from the Dan River toward Hillsboro, North Carolina (17 February 1781), General Nathanael Greene sent over his advance elements with the intention of harassing the British until he had received reinforcements and could face Cornwallis in a pitched battle. The opposing forces clashed first at Clapp's Mills, 2 March. At 3 A.M. the morning of 6 March, Cornwallis undertook a movement by which he hoped to surprise Colonel Otho Williams's advance element, which was guarding a large supply of food at Wetzell's Mills on the Reedy Fork, and draw Greene into a general engagement. By 8 A.M. the British were within two miles of Colonel William Campbell's detachment of about 150 Virginia militia when their presence was detected. Sending Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee's Legion and Colonel William Washington's dragoons to support Campbell, Williams started withdrawing along Reedy Fork from his camp at High Rock Ford to the ford at Wetzell's Mills.

Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton's cavalry and a thousand infantry of Lieutenant Colonel James Webster's Brigade (Twenty-third, Thirty-third, Seventy-first, Light Infantry Company of the Guards, and some jägers) pushed forward aggressively, while Cornwallis followed with the main body. Colonel William Preston commanded a covering force of Virginia militia while Campbell, Lee, and Washington made good their retreat across the ford at Wetzell's Mills. Seeing that the numerically superior

British had too many opportunities to turn him out of a defensive position along Reedy Fork, Williams ordered Campbell, Lee, and Washington to delay as long as possible at Wetzell's Mills while the rest of the light corps continued their retreat toward Greene's camp. The delaying force was directed to withdraw when faced with the danger of being overwhelmed.

Lee posted a company of Preston's riflemen to cover the ford, deployed the Legion infantry in a line parallel to the creek, and placed Campbell's men and the remainder of Preston's in some heavy woods so that their left flank tied in with the right flank of the Legion infantry. Lee's cavalry were to the rear where they could protect the militia horses and also be prepared to cover the retreat of the first line.

The Guards led Webster's Brigade in an attempt to force a crossing of the creek at the ford. When they were driven back by well-aimed fire from Preston's riflemen, Webster rode up to lead them across. The British infantry then stormed the high bank on which the defenders were deployed, and Tarleton's cavalry splashed across the ford and got into a position to cut off the Americans if they did not withdraw promptly. Covered by the Legion cavalry, the delaying force withdrew five miles while the British maintained pressure. Cornwallis then accepted the fact that his attempt had failed and withdrew. Williams had been able to extract his entire force from a well-coordinated British attack and to bring away all the foodstuffs stored at Wetzell's for use by the Continentals. Greene had marched the main body to the ironworks on Troublesome Creek.

Losses were about fifty killed and wounded on each side. The next encounter between Greene and Cornwallis was the major engagement at Guilford Courthouse, 15 March 1781.

SEE ALSO *Clapp's Mills, North Carolina; Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Marksmanship; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WHALEBOAT WARFARE. Whaleboat warfare was the name given to the water-borne guerrilla operations and small-boat privateering that was waged across Long Island Sound and along the New Jersey coast (including Staten Island) between the British and the rebels after Sir William Howe captured New York City in September 1776. The name derives from the fact that the raiders typically used whaleboats—sturdy but handy and relatively capacious wooden boats, propelled generally by oarsmen, that had been developed to hunt whales along

the New England coast—to sneak across the water quickly and quietly under cover of night.

SEE ALSO *Blue Mountain Valley off Sandy Hook, New Jersey; Hylar, Adam; London Trading; Marriner, William; Meigs, Return Jonathan; Tallmadge, Benjamin, Jr.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

WHEELING, WEST VIRGINIA. 31 August–1 September 1777 and 11–13 September 1782. This site on the Ohio River was first settled in 1769 by Ebenezer Zane. During Dunmore's War, Fort Fincastle was built there in 1774 by William Crawford; in 1776 it was renamed Fort Henry for Patrick Henry. The exposed and isolated settlement in the Dark and Bloody Ground was often the target of Indian raids. On the last day of August 1777, however, it was attacked by almost four hundred Indians and besieged for twenty-three hours. Colonel Sheppard lost twenty-three men of his forty-two-man garrison in preliminary skirmishes during the early morning hours, yet refused to surrender, withstanding a six-hour fire delivered from the cover of the abandoned cabins. After a lull the Indians resumed their attack at 2:30 P.M. The next morning at 4 A.M., Colonel Swearingen got into the fort with fourteen reinforcements and Major McCulloch arrived later with forty mounted men. After burning the settlement and killing what livestock they could find, the Indians withdrew. None of the defenders was killed after the initial attack.

In what may technically be the last battle of the war (the alternative being at Johns Island, South Carolina, on 4 Nov. 1782), Fort Henry held off 250 Indians and 40 Loyalists during 11–13 September 1782. It was probably during the latter action that Elizabeth Zane performed her feat of valor: during a lull in the battle, she volunteered to leave the fort and get a keg of badly needed powder from her brother Ebenezer's cabin, sixty yards away across open ground. Zane argued that the Indians might be so surprised to see a woman walking out of the fort that they would be slow to fire. Either through shock or respect, the Indians did not fire on Zane as she strolled to the cabin. However, they did begin shooting when she emerged with the powder keg. Defying myths of eagle-eyed shots, not a single shot hit Zane as she raced across the open ground just a few feet from the Indians' position, reaching the fort unscathed.

SEE ALSO *Crawford, William; Dark and Bloody Ground; Johns Island, South Carolina (4 November 1782); McCulloch's Leap.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

WHIGS AND TORIES. The names “Whigs” and “Tories” were applied from the middle of the seventeenth century to political groupings in Parliament that were held together by shifting combinations of patronage, personal loyalties, special interests, and political principles; they were not organized political parties in the modern sense. The names continued to be used even as the people and issues changed over time. The Whigs, broadly, supported Parliamentary supremacy and commercial expansion. From the Revolution of 1688, they tarred the Tories with the stain of royal absolutism. Toryism finally collapsed after extreme elements tried to overthrow the Hanoverian succession in 1715. Politics during the reigns of George I and II (1714–1760) became a contest about who would wield power and patronage. Issues of principle were still hotly debated, but the main fight was for preferment within an established system of politics based on the supremacy of the king-in-Parliament, what Englishmen called mixed government. With the accession of George III, some groups of Whigs supported the right of the king to be more assertive in choosing and controlling his ministers, provided he had the support of a majority in the House of Commons. Other Whigs contended that Parliament alone, which they intended to dominate, should select and control the ministers. George and his supporters, called the “king’s friends,” jostled for a greater role for the king during the 1760s, at enormous cost for the consistency of colonial policy. With the appointment of Lord North in 1770, George finally had a prime minister with whom he could work.

Americans who objected to increased imperial control of the colonies adopted the name “Whig” to denote their commitment to legislative supremacy, in this case to the supremacy of their own local legislatures over ministers, Parliament, and eventually a king who they believed were exercising arbitrary and tyrannical power over them. Using this name also connected them in spirit to the long list of people who had opposed conspiracies against the rights of Englishmen. The fact that George and his ministers had the approval of their own legislature—and were themselves staunch defenders of legislative supremacy—was not something American whigs chose to acknowledge. Consistent with this point of view, after 1775 American Whigs labeled those who continued to support the king “Tories.” Supporters of the king called themselves “Loyalists.”

SEE ALSO *George III.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

WHIPPLE, ABRAHAM. (1733–1819). Continental naval officer. Rhode Island. Born in Providence, Rhode Island, on 26 September 1733, Whipple married Sarah Hopkins, the sister of Esek and Stephen Hopkins, in 1761. During the Seven Years’ War he served as a privateer, first under Esek Hopkins’s command and then as captain of the *Game Cock*. With the latter he captured twenty-three French vessels in 1759–1760, earning a reputation as the colony’s most experienced sea captain. In 1772 he led the attack on the British schooner *Gaspée*, becoming a hero among American radicals.

Whipple was appointed commodore of the little (two-ship) Rhode Island fleet when it was organized in 1775. On 15 June 1775, the day he received his commission, he captured a British tender, the first official American prize of the Revolution. One of the first captains of the Continental navy, he commanded the *Columbus* (twenty guns) in the first naval operation of the war. In 1778 he took the *Providence* (twelve guns) to Europe, was presented to the French king, and took a few prizes. In mid-July 1779, while his *Providence* was cruising with Rathbun’s *Queen of France* and the *Ranger*, he had the good fortune of drifting into a British convoy of heavily laden East Indiamen off Newfoundland in a heavy fog. Thanks largely to the initiative of Rathbun, he cut eleven of the ships out of the convoy and got eight of them safely to Boston. Sold for one million dollars, they constituted one of the richest single captures of the war.

Later in the year he reached Charleston with four Continental vessels and was given responsibility for the naval defense of the doomed city. He became a prisoner on 12 May 1780, when the city was surrendered to Clinton, and for the remainder of the war he was on parole at Chester, Pennsylvania.

Returning to Providence in 1783, Whipple decided in 1788 to move west to Marietta, Ohio. He died there on 27 May 1819.

SEE ALSO *Hopkins, Stephen; Naval Operations, Strategic Overview; Rathbun, John Peck.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

WHIPPLE, WILLIAM. (1730–1785). Signer. Maine-New Hampshire. A descendant of Matthew Whipple, who came to America from England prior to 1638, William was born on 14 January 1730 in Kittery (in what became Maine). After attending local schools he went to sea, was made master of a vessel while still in his early twenties, and engaged in slave trading. He left the sea in 1760 when he entered a business partnership with his brother, Joseph, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, a short distance from his birthplace. After playing a prominent part in the Revolutionary politics of his region, he was elected to the Continental Congress in 1776 and remained a delegate until he declined reelection in 1780. He signed the Declaration of Independence, was active in committees, and showed an exceptionally realistic attitude on such vital matters as the need for heavy taxation to finance the struggle, the need for reforms in the commissary and recruiting systems, the importance of naval operations, and the requirement for military success in America rather than diplomatic cleverness in Europe to win the war. He left Congress temporarily to serve as a brigadier general (appointed by the New Hampshire state legislature on 18 July 1777) in command of the First Brigade of the state militia in the two Battles of Saratoga and in Sullivan's Newport operations in 1778. He and General Glover commanded the troops that escorted Burgoyne's captured army to Cambridge. During the period 1780–1784 Whipple sat in the state assembly, and from 1782 until his death in 1785, he was associate justice of the New Hampshire superior court. Only fifty-five years old when he died on 28 November 1785, he had been performing his arduous duties for several years while in bad health and with the belief—confirmed by autopsy—that he was in danger of sudden death. Whipple had married Catherine Moffatt in 1767, and they had lived in a house owned by her family that overlooked Portsmouth Harbor.

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WHITCOMB, JOHN. (1713–1785). Militia general. Massachusetts. Older brother of Asa Whitcomb, John Whitcomb (also spelled Whetcomb) served as a field officer in the Massachusetts provincial regiments during several campaigns of the final French and Indian war (1755, 1758, and 1760). After the war he became a prominent political leader in Bolton, Massachusetts, and was commissioned brigadier general by the Massachusetts Provincial Congress on 15 February 1775. As colonel of the local Worcester County minuteman regiment, he participated in the pursuit of the British after Lexington and Concord, 19 April 1775. He was elected first major general of the Massachusetts provincial army on 13 June 1775, and commanded at Lechmere Point during the battle of Bunker Hill. Passed over by Congress in the first round of appointments, he was elected a brigadier general on 5 June 1776, but declined the commission because of his age.

SEE ALSO *Lexington and Concord*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

WHITEFIELD, GEORGE. (1714–1770). Anglican evangelist. George Whitefield (pronounced Whitfield) was closely identified with John and Charles Wesley, the founders of Methodism, until 1741 when he began to espouse Calvinistic views. Whitefield made seven trips to America before the Revolution. He was appointed minister of Savannah, in the newly founded colony of Georgia, and in 1739 established an orphanage called Bethesda some ten miles from the city. He toured the colonies from Georgia to New Hampshire several times, with the avowed purpose of raising money for his orphanage. Hugely popular on his first itinerancy in 1740–1741, he preached to enormous numbers of people in the open air, and sparked what contemporaries believed was a revival of interest in religion so overwhelming that it could properly be called a "great awakening." His popularity declined as the number of new souls to be saved diminished, and as some established clergy came to view his revivals as overwrought displays of emotion and enthusiasm. Nonetheless, if we believe the figures he gave for the numbers who heard him preach, he was seen by more people in more places than anyone before him in British

colonial America. By showing people in widely distant places that they shared an interest in the revival of religion, he contributed to eroding the insularity and provincialism that had hitherto isolated colonial Americans.

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WHITEHAVEN, ENGLAND. 22–23

April 1778. On 10 April Captain John Paul Jones sailed in the eighteen-gun sloop *Ranger* from Brest, France. He was under the orders of the American commissioners in Paris to attack British commercial shipping in the Irish Sea and along Britain's west coast. After taking a number of prizes, including the revenue cutter *Hussar*, Jones headed for Whitehaven, a small port on the west coast of England, roughly due east of Belfast. The target had no particular value, but it was a location Jones knew intimately from his youth. Winds failed while the *Ranger* was far outside the harbor, requiring Jones to have his ships' boats row for three hours to reach their objective late on 22 April. Jones spiked the few guns and burned some small craft, and departed in the morning. Although there had been minimal physical damage, the psychological impact on the nation was enormous, as this marked one of the few times in a century when an enemy had actually landed in England. Jones then crossed to St. Mary's Island on the other side of Solway Firth, hoping to kidnap the earl of Selkirk (to exchange for captured American seamen); but his landing party learned that the nobleman was not home. The next day, back in Belfast Lough, he captured the fourteen-gun Royal Navy sloop *Drake* off Carrickfergus. Jones arrived at Brest with his prizes on 8 May.

SEE ALSO *Jones, John Paul*.

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WHITE HORSE TAVERN, PENNSYLVANIA. 21 September 1777. John Kerlin's White Horse Tavern was located about eight miles east

of Downingtown, Pennsylvania, in what is now East Whitehead Township. During the Philadelphia Campaign it served as an important landmark because it lay at the junction of six important roads. During the night of 20–21 September, Brigadier General William Smallwood led 2,100 Maryland militia down the road from Downingtown, trying to get past the British in the dark and link up with Brigadier General Anthony Wayne's Pennsylvania Continentals in nearby Paoli. Shortly after midnight, as they were moving east along what is now King Road, a patrol from Major John Maitland's Second Battalion of Light Infantry opened fire. This was a violation of Major General Charles Grey's direct orders to Maitland to have his men move with unloaded muskets. An American fell, and the bulk of the militia stampeded to the rear. Very soon after, Major Caleb North arrived from Wayne with orders telling Smallwood to fall back to White Horse. Smallwood, North, and Colonel Mordecai Gist had a narrow escape in the dark during the retreat when a group of militia mistook them for British cavalry and opened fire, killing a private from the First Continental Light Dragoons. American losses were three killed and three wounded; no British were hurt.

SEE ALSO *Philadelphia Campaign*.

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WHITEMARSH, PENNSYLVANIA.

5–8 December 1777. George Washington kept his headquarters in Whitemarsh from 2 November to 10 December 1777 as the final struggle for control of the Delaware River played out. There, he began staff discussions to decide where to establish winter quarters. Before he could fall back or winter weather could prevent further action, Sir William Howe determined to make one more effort to bring his opponent to battle. But American intelligence reports kept Washington alert. For example, Mrs. Lydia Darragh (according to tradition) overheard British plans and sent word out of the city that a large British force would move during the night of 4–5 December to strike the American camp. As he so often did during the campaign, Howe marched in two columns, one primarily British and the other mostly German. Charles Lord Cornwallis's element marched directly along the Germantown Road. That movement was detected by Captain Allan McLane's outpost around 3 A.M. at Beggarstown (later Mount Airy), and the patrol immediately alerted Washington. British light

infantry in Cornwallis's van kept going to Chestnut Hill and then halted there at dawn while the commanders pushed ahead to inspect the American positions.

Finding the Americans already deployed, Cornwallis opted for caution and waited at Chestnut Hill for Wilhelm Knyphausen to arrive with the other column. By mid-morning Washington had sent out a strong combat patrol to obtain exact information on the enemy's size, location, and intentions. Brigadier General James Irvine, now leading Pennsylvania militia but formerly an experienced Continental officer, tangled with the light infantry for about twenty minutes. The militia withdrew after a wounded Irvine and about sixteen of his men had been captured. Howe spent the next two days cautiously probing but concluded that Washington's defenses were too strong and returned to Philadelphia. Although there were several more foraging operations by the British before the end of the year, the Whitemarsh probe marked the end of the campaign.

Howe's force probably approached ten thousand men; Washington most likely had slightly more men available. American losses seem to have been about forty, only six of whom were killed. British casualties were lighter, apparently amounting to one officer killed and a dozen men wounded on the 5th, although more men seem to have been picked off or to have deserted during the maneuvering.

SEE ALSO *Cornwallis, Charles; Howe, William; Irvine, James; Knyphausen, Wilhelm; Washington, George.*

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WHITE PLAINS, NEW YORK. During the American retreat from northern Manhattan to Westchester County on 18–22 October, Washington knew that his forces would be surrounded if Major General William Howe reached White Plains first and proceeded westward to the Hudson River for a rendezvous with his brother's fleet at Tarrytown. If the Americans arrived first, the hills around White Plains would provide a strong defensive position. In addition, a substantial depot had already been established there with supplies sent from Connecticut. Washington ordered Major General William Alexander (Lord Stirling) to hurry ahead and secure the depot.

AMERICAN DISPOSITIONS

Stirling arrived on 21 October and Washington followed later that day. Immediately entrenching his forces in a

three-mile line, Washington secured his flanks with the steep and wooded Chatterton's Hill on the right and a nearby lake on the left. Chatterton's Hill was separated from the American right wing by the Bronx River, but Washington occupied it to prevent the British from mounting artillery there. He sent his chief engineer, Colonel Rufus Putnam, and four regiments of levies—two from Massachusetts, one from New York, and one from New Jersey—to fortify the hill; and General Alexander McDougall's regiment was assigned to defend it, with orders to retreat, if necessary, to the American right wing. Washington later added Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema's Third New York, Colonel William Smallwood's Maryland Continental regiment, Colonel Charles Webb's Nineteenth Continental Connecticut regiment, and Colonel John Haslet's Delaware Continental regiment for a total of 1,600 two thousand troops and two fieldpieces on the hill.

BRITISH DELAYS

Howe had lost three days at New Rochelle waiting for eight thousand Hessian reinforcements under Lieutenant General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, who finally joined him on 22 October. Howe proceeded north to Mamaroneck, where he paused for another four days while sending Clinton ahead to reconnoiter the ground within three miles of the American position. Clinton recommended the same kind of tactics that had succeeded on Long Island: extensive reconnaissance; diversionary detachments; and, finally, marching all night to attack the American lines at dawn. Howe initially agreed, but he changed his mind on the 27th and sent Clinton forward to determine if an immediate attack seemed feasible. Clinton recommended against it, since Washington's flanks were protected by the Bronx River and the hills, enabling him to retreat whenever he chose.

THE BRITISH ATTACK

Nonetheless, on the cold, bright morning of 28 October, Howe ordered a frontal attack on the American lines. The fourteen thousand British troops were arrayed in several columns, as Clinton recommended, and he led the one farthest to the right, assigned to outflank the Americans while they fought the British column on the left. Washington and his generals were on horseback that morning, discussing which of the surrounding hills should be occupied, when they learned that the British were advancing. General Spencer, with eight hundred Connecticut men, was sent to confront the British vanguard. They crossed the Bronx River and gathered behind a stone wall to await the enemy. They skirmished with some Hessians across an apple orchard until Clinton's flanking column forced them to retreat from the stone wall with heavy losses.

FIGHT FOR CHATTERTON'S HILL

The Americans retreated across the Bronx River and up Chatterton's Hill with the Hessians in pursuit. General McDougall's troops, shielded by a stone wall at the crest of the hill and supported by Captain Alexander Hamilton's artillery company, poured a volley into the Hessian column, inflicting numerous casualties and sending them back down the hill in disorder. The Hessians regrouped and, with reinforcements, made a second attempt, but McDougall's men "gave them a second warm reception" (Tallmadge, p. 14).

However, the column of eight regiments on the British left began crossing the Bronx River, sending three Hessian regiments to some ridges half a mile south of Chatterton's Hill. From there and from the east, the British began to pound the hill with their artillery. The militia panicked and tried to flee, but then they were rallied and put on the right flank behind Smallwood.

While additional Hessian units paused to build a bridge and were attacked by Smallwood and Ritzema, General Alexander Leslie's regiments forded the river further south and, supported by the cannonade from a dozen guns, charged up the steep, densely wooded slope. The dry autumn leaves and branches, ignited by British artillery shells, created a screen of smoke and fire that partially concealed Leslie's men during their ascent. However, the British gunners had to desist when the soldiers neared the top for fear of hitting them, and Leslie's troops fell back with heavy losses.

Undeterred, the rest of the British column crossed the river, formed a line, and swept up the hill under a hail of musket fire and grapeshot. Attacked by the Hessians under Colonel Johann Rall, the militia bolted, exposing the American right flank. Haslet's and Smallwood's troops put up stiff resistance, exacting an exorbitant price in British and Hessian lives before they retreated. The Americans suffered 175 casualties in the fight for Chatterton's Hill, later called the Battle of White Plains, but even by Howe's official estimate, they had inflicted more than 200 on the British. Including the Hessians, that number rose to 313.

FURTHER BRITISH DELAYS

The carnage on Chatterton's Hill discouraged Howe from further attacks on the American lines. With Bunker Hill, Long Island, Harlem Heights, and now White Plains, a pattern had emerged: after a show of American resistance, Howe refrained from a frontal assault—even when he had the advantage. Instead, on 28 October both sides hunkered down for a heavy exchange of artillery fire that continued throughout the day. British forces on Chatterton's Hill augmented the American fortifications, while Howe once again waited for reinforcements, losing

two more critical days in which he might have stormed Washington's lines.

Six regiments of Hessians and one of Waldeckers newly arrived from Germany were brought to White Plains from Staten Island by Lord Percy on 30 October. Howe was finally ready to renew the offensive on 31 October, but a heavy rainstorm lasting twenty-hours forced a delay. The next day Howe's forces moved forward, only to find that Washington had moved out of reach, into the higher and steeper hills of North Castle Heights.

SEE ALSO *New York Campaign*.

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Barnet Schecter

WICKES, LAMBERT. (1742?–1777). Continental naval officer. Maryland. Born at Eastern Neck Island, Maryland, perhaps in 1742, Wickes went to sea early in life. By 1769 he had become a ship's captain, and by 1774 he was part owner of a ship, the *Neptune*. While in London in December of that year, he discovered that his ship was carrying tea. He ordered it put off and sailed for America. The ship that took his consignment, the *Peggy Stewart*, was burned along with its tea when it arrived in Annapolis.

Wickes's courageous devotion to the Patriot cause and acquaintance with Robert Morris were factors in his getting command of the Continental armed ship *Reprisal* (eighteen guns) in March 1776. On 3 July he sailed from Cape May after a sharp engagement in which his brother Richard was killed, and on 27 July he appeared off Martinique after sending three prizes back to Philadelphia. Defeating HMS *Shark* outside the harbor of St. Pierre, the first American naval battle in foreign waters, Wickes reached Philadelphia in September with a valuable cargo of powder, five hundred muskets, and clothing. He sailed secretly from Philadelphia on 26 October with Benjamin Franklin aboard and reached France on 28 November, having taken two English prizes en route. In January 1777 he took five British prizes in the Channel.

In April the American commissioners in Paris put him in command of a small force comprising his ship and those

of Captains Henry Johnson and Samuel Nicholson. Under orders from Franklin and Deane to carry out a cruise in the Irish Sea, Wickes sailed from France on 28 May. Circling around Ireland, the captains entered the Irish Channel from the north, captured eighteen small merchantmen (eight were kept as prizes, the rest destroyed), and escaped through the British forces guarding the south end of the channel. When almost back to France, the American raiders sighted a huge enemy warship that turned out to be the *Burford* (seventy-four guns). Wickes signaled for Johnson, Nicholson, and the prizes accompanying them to scatter and fly for safety while he tried to escape from the faster, more heavily armed ship of the line. The chase started shortly before noon on 27 June 1777, and the *Reprisal* managed to keep just out of range until 7 P.M., when the *Burford* got close enough to start-dropping gunshot on the deck. Wickes jettisoned all his cannon and swivels and raced away from the British.

Lord Stormont protested so vigorously with the French government for allowing American ships to use their ports that Wickes was detained at St. Malo until 14 September, when he sailed for America. His ship foundered off the Banks of Newfoundland on 1 October 1777 in a heavy storm, and only the cook survived.

SEE ALSO *Conyngham, Gustavus*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

WILKES, JOHN. (1725–1797). British politician. Wilkes was born in Clerkenwell, London, on 17 October 1725, the second son of a malt distiller. Educated at a Hertford school from 1734, in 1744 he entered the University of Leiden. Here he rebelled against his mother's Presbyterianism with endless bouts of womanizing and drinking. His arranged marriage in 1747 to Mary Mead, puritanical and ten years his senior, had no effect on his behavior. However, her dowry, the manor of Aylesbury in Buckinghamshire, secured Wilkes's status as a landed gentleman. He joined Sir Francis Dashwood's "Monks of Medmenham," a secret society that met at the ruins of Medmenham Abbey to engage in obscene parodies of Roman Catholic ritual. In 1754 he composed an obscene *Essay on Woman*, a satire on Alexander Pope's *Essay on Man*; fatefully, he had thirteen copies printed for private circulation. Meanwhile his life as a witty and generous man about town, combined with his first attempts to enter politics, proved enormously expensive. In 1758 he

was permanently separated from his wife, to whom he paid £200 a year in return for possession of the manor.

In 1757, with the support of his neighbors the Grenvilles—Richard Grenville, first Earl Temple, and his brother, George Grenville (who was the brother-in-law of William Pitt)—he was elected member of Parliament for Aylesbury. However, Wilkes was a poor and infrequent speaker and of little use to the ministry. Consequently his ambitious requests to be appointed to the Board of Trade, ambassador to Constantinople, and governor of Quebec fell on deaf ears. Under Temple's patronage, Wilkes spoke up for Pitt after the latter's resignation in October 1761 but made little impression. He had finally to accept that he was no orator and could not hope to make his way in the House of Commons.

Wilkes, funded by Temple, now turned to journalism. The new Lord Bute ministry was negotiating peace on terms unacceptable to Pitt and his allies, and badly needed a pen to counter Bute's journal *The Briton*, edited by the Scottish novelist Tobias Smollett. After writing a few articles for existing journals, on 6 June 1762 Wilkes founded *The North Briton*, the title being an ironic reference to the Scot Bute's supposed takeover of English politics. Wilkes reminded readers of the ancient Franco-Scots alliance against England and falsely hinted that Bute owed his position to a liaison with the king's mother. The claim rightly angered George III, but it went down very well with the London crowds: a gibbet bearing a top boot and a petticoat became a familiar symbol in popular demonstrations. Although this gutter journalism soon alarmed Pitt and Temple, they were not inclined to stop it, and Wilkes cleverly avoided giving grounds for prosecution. Private victims were less restrained: in 1763 the artist William Hogarth published a savage caricature which has ever since perpetuated an image of Wilkes as surpassingly ugly.

Bute, wearied and distressed by such attacks, resigned on 8 April 1763 to be succeeded by George Grenville, who had fallen out with Temple and Pitt in 1761. Grenville ended the parliamentary session with a king's speech praising the peace settlement, and on 23 April Wilkes struck. Number 45 of *The North Briton* attacked the treaties and suggested that the king had lied on his prime minister's instructions. This was enough to goad ministers into bringing a charge of seditious libel. The problem was that the articles in number 45 were anonymous, and, although everyone knew Wilkes had written them, there was no legal proof of authorship. Lord Halifax, secretary of state for the north, therefore issued a general warrant for the arrest of the unnamed authors, printers, and publishers. Most of those arrested were quickly released, but crucially they provided firm evidence that Wilkes had wielded the offending pen. Halifax could then have issued a warrant naming Wilkes. Instead, he took legal advice as

to whether Wilkes could be arrested on the existing general warrant. The reply was that Wilkes's parliamentary privilege protected him from arrest except on charges of treason, felony, or actual breach of the king's peace; number 45 tended to a breach of the peace and for that the general warrant would suffice. Reassured, on 30 April Halifax and his colleagues had Wilkes arrested and his papers seized.

This was a disaster. Although there were plenty of precedents for ministers using general warrants, their legality was uncertain and had already been questioned. Moreover, the view that Wilkes was guilty of a breach of the peace was open to question. Temple at once obtained a writ of habeas corpus, and on 6 May Chief Justice Sir Charles Pratt, a supporter of Pitt, heard the case in the Court of Common Pleas. In his defense Wilkes claimed that he was acting for those who had no political voice—and at least some spectators thought he meant it. When he was freed on grounds of parliamentary privilege the crowd in Westminster Hall, thinking he had been acquitted, raised the cry "Wilkes and liberty!"

Wilkes and his friends now counterattacked, bringing a series of prosecutions for wrongful arrest and seizure against the ministers, their undersecretaries, and king's messengers who had executed the warrant. Their cause was assisted by the now widespread concern about the principle of general warrants, even among those who despised Wilkes as a man. On 3 December Pratt ruled that general warrants could not be used to authorize searches of unspecified buildings and awarded Wilkes £4,000 in damages against the government. In January 1764 the Commons expelled Wilkes without a vote; but on 17 February the government survived a motion condemning general warrants only by begging to await the courts' decisions. On 18 June 1764 and 8 November 1765, Lord Chief Justice Mansfield ruled that general warrants could not be used against persons. Finally, Pratt (now Lord Camden) found that, except in cases of treason, secretaries of state could not issue warrants for even named persons. In this way Wilkes's scurrilous opportunism produced landmark protection for the liberty of the subject, the freedom of the press, and private property. Wilkes, however, was not there to see the fullness of his triumph: by then he was an exiled outlaw in France.

Shortly after the case against Wilkes collapsed, the ministry's agents had obtained one of the printed copies of *Essay on Woman*, which (the print claimed) had been edited by a bishop. Ribald mirth greeted the earl of Sandwich, secretary of state for the northern department, when he read it to the Lords on 15 November 1763. Nevertheless, the peers promptly declared it blasphemous. On the same day the Commons resolved that number 45 was a seditious libel and that seditious libels were not protected by parliamentary privilege. During this debate Samuel Atkins, the secretary to the treasury, called Wilkes

a coward, and in the ensuing pistol duel Wilkes was severely wounded in the stomach. He still had the crowd on his side: when, on 3 December, number 45 was to be ceremonially burned in Cheapside, the crowd attacked the sheriffs, rescued the papers, and burned a top boot in its place. However, it could do him little good. Too ill to attend Parliament or court, and unwilling to face the inevitable prosecutions, Wilkes decamped to France on 25 December 1763. When he repeatedly failed to appear in King's Bench, he was outlawed in November 1764. He remained abroad for four years, writing, traveling in France and Italy, getting robbed by a teenage mistress and by his English agent, and failing to live within his precarious means. In the end his French debts forced him to flee to Leiden, where he enrolled in his old university as a precaution against prosecution.

He returned to Britain in 1768, hoping for a pardon and, lacking a patron, for popular election to a seat in Parliament. Promising to surrender when the court of King's Bench next met, he was triumphantly returned as member for Middlesex, where he had attracted hordes of skilled workers pressed by high prices and lack of work. In spite of almost nightly demonstrations in his favor, Wilkes took care not to use the crowd as a weapon. He surrendered to the court and—his outlawry being quashed on a technicality—accepted two years' imprisonment for seditious libel and blasphemy. Now a political martyr, Wilkes lived comfortably in prison and continued his political activity. On 3 February 1769 the Commons voted to expel him, but at the ensuing Middlesex election he was returned unopposed. Once again he was expelled, the House declaring him incapable of election: and once again he was re-elected without a contest. Yet again he was expelled. This time the ministry put up its own candidate, Colonel Luttrell, who, though defeated by a landslide vote, was nevertheless declared elected. This blatant attack on the principle of representation, even though aimed at an obnoxious individual, united the opposition leaders in January 1770. The prime minister, the duke of Grafton, was forced to resign. But Wilkes and the opposition had not triumphed: Lord North's new ministry declined to unseat Luttrell in favor of Wilkes.

Wilkes now turned to building up a power base in the City of London, where he had been elected alderman in January 1769. In 1771 he orchestrated a successful City challenge to the ban on parliamentary reporting, advocated annual parliamentary elections, and was elected sheriff. In 1774 he became lord mayor, and Middlesex re-elected him to Parliament. In the House he advocated the parliamentary reform and full civil rights for Dissenters and Catholics.

From the beginning of the colonial troubles, Wilkes was opposed to American independence. In 1765 he thought the Stamp Act riots little short of rebellion.

However, public adulation in America, he was persuaded, sincerely or otherwise, to exploit the idea of a trans-Atlantic plot to subvert English liberties. By 1767 he was praising the resistance to the Townshend duties, and in 1768 he denounced the deployment of troops against civilians in Boston. From then until 1774 Wilkes had little use for American issues as his Middlesex election and City politics provided plentiful antigovernment ammunition. Although he organized petitions against the Coercive Acts and denounced parliamentary taxation of the colonies, he did not oppose parliamentary supremacy until October 1775. By 1777 he was arguing that the war was bloody and futile and recommended conciliation. On 10 December, after news of Saratoga, he moved for the repeal of the Declaratory Act only as a last-ditch means of persuading the rebels to forgo independence. Not until the failure of the 1778 Carlisle Peace Commission was Wilkes induced to speak for independence, and then only as an expedient to end an unwinnable war. Even this position was so unpopular that his radical power base in City politics wasted away. It was further weakened by his part in suppressing the anti-Catholic Gordon Riots in 1780. By the end of the war the once terrible Wilkes had become respectable, and in 1790 he abandoned his Middlesex seat without a contest. He died in London on 26 December 1797.

Whatever popular legend might say, his espousal of American causes was at best lukewarm and always subservient to his domestic and personal agenda. However, at first for his own ends, later also from reasons of principle, Wilkes had campaigned for traditional liberties for over two decades. His career had seen the demise of general warrants, the establishment of the supremacy of electors over parliamentary privilege, and vindication of the right to report debates. Politics was no longer a closed world, and the way was paved for reform, which followed in the nineteenth century. Above all he had shown how an unsavory personality might be a powerful vehicle for lofty causes.

SEE ALSO *Bute, John Stuart, Third Earl of; Chatham, William Pitt, First Earl of; Gordon Riots; Grafton, Augustus Henry Fitzroy; Grenville, George; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; Sandwich, John Montagu, fourth earl of; Stamp Act; Townshend Acts.*

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revised by John Oliphant

WILKINSON, JAMES. (1757–1825). Continental officer, scoundrel. Maryland. Wilkinson, who was born in Benedict, Maryland, had just finished his medical studies and opened a practice in Monocacy, Maryland, when the war began. As a volunteer in William Thompson's Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment from 9 September 1775 to March 1776, he joined the forces investing Boston, where he volunteered to join Benedict Arnold's march to Quebec. In the course of the march he became friends with Arnold. Having been promoted to captain of the Second Continental Infantry in March 1776, Wilkinson remained with Arnold until December 1776, when the latter had reached Albany after the retreat from Canada. Briefly a member of General Horatio Gates's staff, Wilkinson was again promoted, this time to lieutenant colonel of Thomas Hartley's Continental Regiment on 12 January 1777 and served as deputy adjutant general of the Northern Department from 24 May 1777 to 6 March 1778. He figured in the actions at Ticonderoga in July 1777 and Saratoga on 7 October 1777.

Named by Gates to take the news of the Saratoga surrender to Congress, Wilkinson did not reach York, Pennsylvania, until 31 October, and did not make up his written report until 3 November 1777. The 20-year-old aide had stopped off in Reading, Pennsylvania, for some courting, and while at the headquarters of General William Alexander he dropped a bit of gossip that brought the Conway Cabal to a head. Wilkinson's degree of personal involvement in the cabal is not known.

Young Wilkinson was an unpopular man in York for having kept Congress writhing on a rack of suspense. They took a dim view of Gates's request that he be breveted brigadier general, but on 6 November they granted the request and tried to calm the outraged uproar in the army by appointing him secretary to the new Board of War. In an effort to vindicate himself from the accusation of betraying the confidence of Gates, Wilkinson threatened to fight a duel with General Alexander, and a duel with Gates was called off at the last minute. Wilkinson resigned from the Board of War on 29 March 1778. His letter of resignation was so insulting to Gates that Congress ordered it destroyed.

Appointed clothier-general of the Continental army on 24 July 1779, Wilkinson resigned on 27 March 1781 because of irregularities in his accounts. While in uniform Wilkinson had proved himself guilty of intrigue and excessive drinking; now he added greed to the list of his vices. Just before resigning, he married Ann Biddle, daughter of the wealthy Quaker merchant, John Biddle.

After the war, Wilkinson entered into intrigue on an interstate and even international scale. He moved to Kentucky in 1784, using his wife's money to purchase land. He soon became prominent in trade and politics, supplanting George Rogers Clark as leader in that region.

In the Spanish Conspiracy—the purpose of which may have been to set up a separate republic in the West allied to Spain, or may have been a plot to force the admission of Kentucky to the United States—he appears to have intrigued both with and against Spain. Wilkinson swore allegiance to the king of Spain, for which he received an annual pension of \$2,000. Thinking they were aiding his efforts to attach Kentucky to their empire, the Spanish opened the Mississippi River to American traffic. In 1791 Wilkinson applied for a military commission, was made lieutenant colonel commanding the Second U.S. Infantry on 22 October 1791, and served as second-in-command to Anthony Wayne in his operations against the Indians. Appointed brigadier general on 5 March 1792, he intrigued against Wayne even while serving under his command during the campaign that culminated in the battle of Fallen Timbers (30 August, 1794), where Wilkinson demonstrated bravery. Wilkinson succeeded Wayne as commander in chief on Wayne's death in 1796, passing on information to the Spanish while commanding the American army. As governor of Louisiana (1805) he became involved in the Aaron Burr conspiracy, disclosed the plot in which he was an accomplice if not the originator, evaded the persistent efforts of Congress to prove his complicity, and in 1811 won acquittal at a court-martial (an outcome regretted by President James Madison). Restored to command, he was made a major general on 2 March 1813, but so mishandled the northern campaign of the War of 1812 that he was called before a court of inquiry. In 1815 he was exonerated, although not returned to duty, and on 15 June 1815 was honorably discharged.

Wilkinson settled in New Orleans after the war, where he ran through his remaining resources. In 1822 he went to Mexico City as an agent for the American Bible Society, but was actually seeking land grants in Texas. Wilkinson died there on 28 December 1825. As one writer put it: "It is not certain whether the Mexican climate or the use of opium did more to hasten his end" (Nickerson, p. 428).

SEE ALSO *Arnold, Benedict.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

WILLETT, MARINUS. (1740–1830). Continental officer. New York. Born near Jamaica, New York, on 31 July 1740, Willett was a cabinetmaker in New York City who joined the militia during the Seven Years' War. In 1758 he was named a lieutenant in Oliver De Lancey's New York Regiment in 1758 and served on the unfortunate expedition of James Abercromby to Ticonderoga as well as in Bradstreet's capture of Frontenac. During the years leading up to the Revolution he was a fiery and effective Son of Liberty, taking part in numerous crowd actions, including the attack on the New York City arsenal on 23 April 1775, and preventing the British from evacuating five wagonloads of weapons and ammunition when they left the city on 6 June. On the 28th he became captain in Alexander McDougall's First New York Regiment; joined Montgomery's wing of the Canada invasion; and on 3 November 1775 was left in command of St. Johns, returning with his men to New York City when their enlistments ended in May 1776. He led militia units at the Battle of Long Island on 27 August 1776 and was active in the ensuing encounters around New York City. On 21 November he became lieutenant colonel of the Third New York and was put in command of Fort Constitution opposite West Point, driving the British away in the Peekskill raid of 23 March 1777.

On 18 May 1777 he was transferred to Fort Stanwix, where he had served briefly in 1758. Here, as second in command to Peter Gansevoort, he distinguished himself in stopping St. Leger's expedition of June–September 1777. For his gallant sortie on 6 August he was voted "an elegant sword" by Congress. He served under Charles Scott at Monmouth in June 1778 and then took part in the raid against the Onondagas before joining Sullivan's expedition of May–November 1779. On 1 July 1780 he was appointed lieutenant commanding the Fifth New York and in November was promoted to colonel. When the five New York regiments were consolidated into two on 1 January 1781, Willett retired, but he soon accepted Governor Clinton's request to command New York levies and militia in the border warfare of 1781. In that fighting he did a remarkable job in driving Loyalist and Indian raiders out of the Mohawk Valley. In February 1783 he led an abortive attempt to attack Oswego by a midwinter advance on snowshoes.

Elected to the state assembly in 1783, he vacated his seat to become sheriff of New York City and County, serving seven years in this post in 1784–1788 and 1792–1796. In 1790 he was highly successful as Washington's personal representative in making a peace treaty with the Creeks. Willett became wealthy on confiscated Loyalist estates, served briefly as mayor of New York City in 1807–1808, and remained active in local politics. He died on 22 August 1830.

SEE ALSO *Border Warfare in New York; Peekskill Raid, New York; St. Leger's Expedition.*

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WILLIAMS, DAVID. (1754–1831). A captor of John André. New York. Enlisting in 1775, he served in the operations against St. Johns and Quebec in 1775 and 1776. In 1779 he left the army. The following year he was one of André's three captors. After the war he bought a farm near the Catskill Mountains that had belonged to Daniel Shays.

SEE ALSO *Arnold's Treason.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WILLIAMS, OTHO HOLLAND. (1749–1794). Continental general. Maryland. Born in Prince Georges County, Maryland, in March 1749, Williams worked in the county clerk's office at Baltimore from 1767 until 1774, when he returned to his home in Frederick to start a commercial career. The Revolution interfered with those plans. On 22 June 1775 he became lieutenant in Captain Thomas Price's Frederick City Rifle Corps and marched with it to join the Boston army. When the Virginia and Maryland riflemen were combined to form Colonel Hugh Stephenson's regiment on 27 June 1776, Williams was made major of that unit and after Stephenson's death that August succeeded him as commander. At Fort Washington, New York, on 16 November 1776, he received a serious wound in the groin and was taken prisoner. He was initially on parole in New York City but was confined on suspicion of secretly corresponding with Washington. Sharing a cell with Ethan Allen, he was not exchanged until 16 January 1778, by which time his health had been permanently impaired by inadequate food and harsh treatment. Meanwhile, however, he had been promoted to colonel of the Sixth Maryland on 10 December 1776, and he led that unit in the Monmouth campaign.

On 16 April 1780 he left Morristown, New Jersey, with the force of Continental troops being led by De Kalb into the southern theater. As a result of the Camden campaign of July and August, Colonel Williams became

well-known not only as an outstanding combat commander but also as the author of the informative and well-written *Narrative of the Campaign of 1780*, published in 1822. Serving as assistant adjutant general to Gates, he performed brilliantly at Camden on 16 August. In the reorganization preceding the arrival of Greene, Williams was put in command of a special corps of light troops. Greene made him adjutant general, however, and Williams was with the left wing of the army at Cheraw when Daniel Morgan led the light troops on the maneuver that resulted in the victory at Cowpens.

When Morgan declined to take command of the rear guard of elite troops that Greene formed to cover his race for the Dan, Williams was given this vital duty. Williams accomplished his hazardous mission brilliantly. He then led the return of Greene's army into North Carolina, frustrating an attempt by Cornwallis to surprise and annihilate him at Wetzell's Mills on 6 March 1781. He played a distinguished part in the Battles of Guilford on 15 March, Hobkirk's Hill on 25 April, and particularly at Eutaw Springs on 8 September 1781. Although he commanded a brigade of Continentals in each of these three major engagements, he was not promoted to brigadier general until 9 May 1782. He retired on 16 January 1783, having been elected naval officer of the Baltimore district on the 6th. He became collector of the port of Baltimore and a successful merchant. In May 1792 he declined the post of second-in-command of the U.S. Army with the rank of brigadier general because of ill health. He died on 15 July 1794 at Miller's Town, Virginia.

SEE ALSO *Camden Campaign; Eutaw Springs, South Carolina; Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina; Hobkirk's Hill (Camden), South Carolina; Southern Campaigns of Nathanael Greene; Southern Theater, Military Operations in; Wetzell's Mills, North Carolina.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

WILLIAMS, WILLIAM. (1731–1811). Signer. Connecticut. William Williams was born at Lebanon, Connecticut, on 18 March 1731. He graduated from Harvard College in 1751; studied theology under his father, a Congregational minister; and in 1755 served on the staff of his cousin, Ephraim Williams, during William Johnson's expedition against Crown Point during the

French and Indian War. Returning home, he went into business and launched a long and distinguished career in public service. He was a selectman of Lebanon (1760–1785), town clerk (1752–1796), representative in the assembly (1757–1776 and 1781–1784), member of the governor's council (1776–1780 and 1784–1803), probate judge (1775–1809), and judge of the Windham county court (1776–1806). His political career was undoubtedly helped by his marriage on 14 February 1771 to Mary, the daughter of Governor Jonathan Trumbull and sister of the younger Jonathan Trumbull.

Religious faith was at the center of Williams's character and was the source of his unwavering devotion to the cause of American rights. Less cosmopolitan than most senior Connecticut leaders, he made his most important contributions at the state level. He helped his father-in-law with numerous state papers and also contributed essays to local newspapers supporting the American cause. As speaker of the assembly after October 1774, he played a major role in preparing Connecticut for war and in establishing the Council of Safety, the executive body that advised the governor between sessions of the assembly. In May 1775 he financed on his personal credit the dispatch of Connecticut troops to Ticonderoga. Commissioned colonel of the Twelfth Militia Regiment the same month, he resigned a year later to sit in the Continental Congress. He served two terms (July–November 1776 and June–December 1777). As a delegate, on 2 August he signed the Declaration of Independence, a document he had played no role in drafting or adopting since he had not arrived in Philadelphia until 28 July. Williams helped draft the Articles of Confederation, and he served on the Board of War from October to December 1777. In 1779 he offered a quantity of his own hard cash in exchange for virtually worthless Continental paper money so that supplies could be purchased for the army, one of many instances in which he sacrificed his own resources for the American cause and one of the reasons why he was left in penury at war's end. He demonstrated his personal courage by riding twenty-three miles in three hours to volunteer his services in repelling Benedict Arnold's New London raid on 6 September 1781.

Politically active after the war, Williams supported local interests rather than a strong central government, opposed half-pay and commutation for Continental officers, and distrusted the Society of the Cincinnati. But at the Connecticut ratifying convention in January 1788, he voted to support the federal Constitution, thus violating the instructions he had received from his home town. He remained on the Council until 1803, and served as a judge until 1810. He died at Lebanon on 2 August 1811.

SEE ALSO *New London Raid, Connecticut.*

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WILLIAMSON, ANDREW. (1730–1786). Turncoat militia general. South Carolina. Born in Scotland, Williamson came to South Carolina with his family some time before 1750, making his living driving cattle. In 1760 Williamson was commissioned lieutenant of militia, and he served in James Grant's Cherokee expedition of 1761. Four years later he was established as a store owner and planter near Ninety Six, and in July 1768 he joined other local Regulators in a petition to the legislature. When the Revolution started he was a major of militia and leading Patriot. In November 1775 he held off the Loyalists besieging his fort at Ninety Six for three days and then participated in the "Snow Campaign" that captured Loyalists hiding in Cherokee country. The following summer he led close to two thousand militia and Indians in the Cherokee War of 1776 and was promoted to state brigadier general in 1778. (Andrew Pickens succeeded him as colonel.) He also served in South Carolina's first and second Provincial Congresses in 1775 and 1776 and in the assembly from 1776 to 1780. Taking part in the expedition of General Robert Howe against Florida in the spring of 1778, his refusal to take orders from Howe contributed to the American failure. In the unsuccessful operations of Lincoln against Prevost, Williamson commanded twelve hundred men opposite Augusta and helped force back the British at Briar Creek on 3 March 1779. In October 1779 Williamson took part in the unsuccessful Franco-American assault on Savannah. During the Charleston campaign the next year his militia refused to participate and Williamson himself, with some three hundred men, remained idle at Ninety Six.

Initially announcing his intention to continue the fight against the British, he suddenly surrendered the fort. Released by the British, Williamson traveled about the western part of the state encouraging his one-time followers to give up the fight. Accused of treason, he was kidnapped by some friends who tried to determine his loyalties, but he remained obscure. Released, he went straight to Charleston, settling under British rule.

Recaptured in July 1781 by Colonel Isaac Hayne, Williamson was promptly rescued by the British, who hanged Hayne. Williamson was blamed for Hayne's hanging, and in 1782 the legislature confiscated his property. As the war came to an end, General Nathanael Greene informed the South Carolina legislature that

Williamson had risked his life in passing information to the Americans. The legislature returned his property, and he died at his plantation in St. Paul's Parish on 21 March 1786.

SEE ALSO *Briar Creek, Georgia; Cherokee Expedition of James Grant; Hayne, Isaac; Regulators.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WILLIAMSON'S PLANTATION, SOUTH CAROLINA. 12 July 1780. Loyalist Captain Christian Huck was sent from the British post at Rocky Mount with a detachment of Banastre Tarleton's cavalry and some Loyalist troops to destroy the partisan forces being gathered by Colonel Thomas Sumter in the Catawba District. Huck's force of thirty-five cavalry, twenty mounted infantry of the New York Volunteers, and sixty other Loyalists reached James Williamson's plantation (now Brattonville) on 11 July. At the house of Captain James McClure, Huck caught the younger James McClure and his brother-in-law, Edward Martin, melting pewter dishes to make bullets. He looted the house, announced that he would hang the two rebels the next day, and slapped Mary McClure with the flat of his sword when she pleaded for their lives. The raiders then looted the house of Colonel William Bratton before camping at the plantation half a mile away. Mary McClure slipped off and rode thirty miles to Sumter's camp, where she informed her father of the raid. Bratton and McClure started off with 150 mounted volunteers and were joined by another 350 under Captain Edward Lacey Jr., Colonel William Hill, and Colonel Andrew Neal. But a great number of these men, more than half, left the column before they reached their goal.

During the approach, Lacey had posted a guard around his own house to keep his Loyalist father from alerting the enemy; the enterprising old gentleman escaped, was recaptured, and the son ordered him tied to his bed. When the column reached Bratton's house, a quarter of a mile from Huck's camp, they found that the enemy had pitched their tents between the rail fences that lined the road to Williamson's house.

Taking advantage of Huck's lack of security and his vulnerable situation, the rebels launched a surprise attack at dawn. They approached in two groups from opposite sides so as to cut the enemy off from their horses. Reveille came as the Americans opened fire at seventy-five yards. The Loyalists tried to fight back, but the rail fences kept them from charging with their bayonets and the rebel fire inflicted heavy casualties. Huck was mortally wounded

when he rushed from the house and tried to rally his troops. Only 12 of the Legion cavalry and about the same number of others escaped from the force of about 115 Loyalists in the camp. The rebels had one man killed. Young McClure and Martin were found tied in a corncrib and freed.

Tarleton was in Charleston when this action took place. His violent reaction to the misuse of his Legion by Lieutenant Colonel Francis Rawdon in such dangerous piecemeal operations led General Charles Cornwallis to write Rawdon a sharp note. This episode was the beginning of Tarleton's bitterness not only toward Rawdon but also toward Cornwallis.

The rebels' success greatly assisted Sumter's recruiting and enabled him to attack Rocky Mount, 1 August 1780.

SEE ALSO *Huck, Christian; Rawdon-Hastings, Francis; Rocky Mount, South Carolina; Tarleton, Banastre.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WILLIAMSON'S PLANTATION, SOUTH CAROLINA SEE *Hammond's Store Raid of William Washington.*

WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA. 1 February–18 November 1781. British occupation. To provide a closer supply port for his operations into North Carolina, General Charles Cornwallis directed Lieutenant Colonel Nisbet Balfour, commandant at Charleston, to send a force to seize and hold Wilmington. Major James H. Craig took the town with four hundred regulars on 1 February, meeting little resistance. He captured the prominent patriots John Ashe and Cornelius Harnett, both of whom died in captivity, and won so much Loyalist support that the rebel leader, Colonel Joseph Hawkins, subsequently found it almost impossible to raise troops or supplies in Duplin County. Cornwallis retreated to Wilmington after the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, arriving 7 April and leaving eighteen days later for Virginia. In July Craig commissioned David Fanning a colonel with orders to rally North Carolina's Loyalists, and this remarkable partisan leader subsequently used Wilmington as a sort of administrative base.

With a well-mounted and well-led body of regulars, mostly from his Eighty-second Regiment, and supported by local partisans, Craig himself conducted raids that compared favorably in speed of execution with those of

Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton. One of the most devastating of these raids was launched against New Bern in August 1781. During his occupation of Wilmington, Craig converted the Episcopal church into a citadel. The British commander prudently evacuated the town on 18 November 1781 to avoid being cut off by the column of regulars General Arthur St. Clair was leading south to reinforce General Nathanael Greene after the Yorktown surrender. Craig also evacuated all the region's Loyalists who asked to leave with the British to Charleston.

SEE ALSO *Craig, James Henry; Hillsboro Raid, North Carolina; New Bern, North Carolina.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WILMOT, WILLIAM. (c. 1745–1782). Continental officer. Maryland. Often called the last casualty of the Revolution, he was commissioned first lieutenant in the Third Maryland on 10 December 1776. He was promoted to captain on 15 October 1777, transferred to the Second Maryland on 1 January 1781, and killed in a British ambush at Johns Island, South Carolina, on 4 November 1782.

SEE ALSO *Johns Island, South Carolina (4 November 1782).*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WILSON, JAMES. (1742–1798). Signer, jurist, speculator. Scotland and Pennsylvania. Born in Carskerdo, Scotland, on 14 September 1742, Wilson studied at St. Andrews, Glasgow, and Edinburgh (1757–1765). While learning accounting in the latter city, Wilson suddenly decided to move to America. He reached Philadelphia in the middle of the Stamp Act crisis and immediately began tutoring Latin at the College of Philadelphia. The following year, 1766, he abandoned teaching to study law under John Dickinson. Admitted to the bar in 1767, he practiced briefly at Reading, Pennsylvania, before moving to the Scots-Irish community of Carlisle and married Rachel Bird. Here he quickly became the leading lawyer and acquired a taste for land speculation. Having also taken an active part in Patriot politics, on 12 July 1774 he became chairman of the local Committee of Correspondence and was elected to the first Provincial Congress.

That same year, 1774, Wilson published *Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament*, which argued that Parliament had no authority of any kind over the colonists and advocated that America become an independent state within the British empire. Even more dramatically, Wilson insisted that legitimate authority derived solely from the people. This pamphlet was widely read, and it immediately marked Wilson as a leading intellectual in the Patriot struggle.

On 3 May 1775 Wilson was elected colonel of the Fourth Battalion of the Cumberland County associators, and served as commissioner and superintendent of Indian affairs for the Middle Department in 1775, although an Indian conference at Pittsburgh was fruitless. Elected to the Continental on 6 May 1775, Wilson was quickly recognized as an able writer, and he was called on to draft a number of papers. Early in 1776 he was directed to craft an address to the people, to prepare them for the idea of independence, but Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* made Wilson's task unnecessary; it was never published. Although Wilson believed in independence for America, he shared the convictions of conservatives such as John Dickinson, Edward Rutledge, and Robert R. Livingston, that neither the American people nor their government were capable at that time of making this jump. Wilson and James Duane led the opposition against John Adams and Richard Henry Lee in the four-day debate on the preamble to the Congressional resolution in favor of independence (May 1776). "Before we are prepared to build the new house," Wilson asked, "why should we pull down the old one, and expose ourselves to the inclemencies of the season?" After continuing to oppose the Declaration of Independence in the debate of 8 June, Wilson joined Benjamin Franklin and John Morton in voting for it on 2 July, and eventually signed the finished document. Wilson's heated opposition to the new state constitution resulted in his being removed from the Pennsylvania delegation to Congress on 14 September 1777. This ended his congressional career during the war, but he returned to Congress in 1783 and for the period 1785–1787.

Wilson's conservative views and his continued opposition to the state constitution, which he considered too "democratic," made him so unpopular in Philadelphia that he had to spend the winter of 1777–1778 in Annapolis, Maryland. When he returned to the city he had to barricade his house for protection against the mob. Though Wilson supported independence and the war effort, and his wife Rachel raised more money for the troops than anyone else, he allied himself with the state's financial elite, apparently not hiding his desire to become one of them. As a consequence, he was identified with the conservative opposition to the more democratic impulses of the Revolution. Wilson compounded this negative

image by defending Loyalists in court. In October 1779 “Fort Wilson” was attacked by a militia force in response to a handbill of 4 October calling on them to “drive off from the city all disaffected persons and those who supported them.” Wilson and his friends were rescued by the timely arrival of the First City Troop and President Joseph Reed (the title of president was accorded to the head of the Pennsylvania government at the time).

In the last years of the Revolution, Wilson took part in many speculative schemes, and he became legal adviser to Robert Morris in the formation of the Bank of America in 1780. Wilson borrowed heavily from the bank to finance his other investments, particularly in land. Wilson’s postwar congressional career was highlighted by his proposal to erect states in the western lands (9 April 1783) and the major part he played in the adoption of the Constitution. Wilson sought a strong central government that could promote national economic development. He favored proportional representation, opposed slavery, and generally demonstrated a greater commitment to democracy than most of the other delegates. On the other hand, he did not completely trust the people, proposing a powerful President with an absolute veto over all legislation. Ultimately, though, Wilson went along with the Convention and helped craft the final wording of the Constitution, taking an active part in gaining its ratification. Wilson modeled Pennsylvania’s state constitution of 1790, which he largely wrote, on the federal constitution. Replacing the democratic constitution of 1776, Wilson’s frame of government sought a careful balance between the three branches of government.

Wilson sought the office of chief justice of the United States in 1789, writing to President George Washington to apply for the position. The President was a bit taken aback, but did name him an associate justice on the first court. On 17 August 1789, Wilson was appointed to the chair of law at the College of Philadelphia. Alert to the possibilities of establishing a new system of American jurisprudence, he launched a series of lectures in which he departed from Blackstonian views and contended instead that law was the rule of the individual, “whose obedience the law requires.” Blackstone had defined law as the rule of a sovereign superior and maintained that revolution was illegal, whereas Wilson maintained that sovereignty resided in the individual and used this as the basis for legally justifying the American Revolution. Wilson’s call for an American common law fell on deaf ears, most American jurists preferring statute and constitutional law as the nation’s legal basis.

Wilson’s early interest in land speculation continued throughout his life, and ultimately led to his destruction. Having been interested in various western land companies in 1785—he was president of the Illinois and Wabash Company—in 1792 he involved the Holland Land

Company in unwise purchases in Pennsylvania and New York, and three years later he bought a large interest in one of the Yazoo companies which were later shown to be involved in a massive land-fraud scheme in Georgia. In 1797 the bubble of speculation burst as Wilson was launching into a grandiose plan for immigration and colonization. That summer he moved to Burlington, New Jersey, to avoid arrest for debt, but he retained his supreme court seat despite talk of impeachment. His mind began to break under the stress of this financial and professional failure. Early in 1798 he moved to the home of a friend in Edenton, North Carolina, and on 21 August he died of what was called a “violent nervous fever.”

SEE ALSO *Independence*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

WINN, RICHARD. (c. 1750–c. 1824). Militia officer. Born in Fauquier County, Virginia, around 1750, Winn went to South Carolina in 1768, working as a surveyor and becoming a large landowner. With the start of the Revolution, he received a lieutenant’s commission in Colonel William Thompson’s rangers. During General Henry Clinton’s assault on Charleston in 1776, Winn’s unit prevented the landing of British troops before Fort Sullivan. Promoted to captain, he was placed in command of Fort McIntosh in southeast Georgia, which was overwhelmed by Loyalists and Indians on 4 February 1777. Paroled to his home, Winn served in the legislature from 1779 to 1786 and trained militia until the British capture of Charleston on 12 May 1780, when he was promoted to major and raised militia to contest British control of South Carolina. On 29 May 1780 his volunteers defeated a Loyalist company at Moberley’s Meetinghouse before crossing over to North Carolina to join General Griffith Rutherford’s forces in their significant victory over the Loyalists at Ramsour’s Mill on 20 June 1780. While Winn was engaged in this campaign, British troops burned his Winnsboro home. Promoted to colonel of militia, he served under General Thomas Sumter, leading his troops to several more minor victories and displaying particular heroism at the battle of Hanging Rock on 6 August 1780, in which he was wounded. After another fierce engagement at Fishdam Ford on 9 November 1780, Winn

fought his last, inconclusive battle against Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton's Loyalist cavalry at Blackstocks, South Carolina, on 20 November 1780. Made brigadier general at the war's end, Winn served in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1793–1797 and 1803–1813 and as lieutenant governor in 1800–1802. He was also major general of the Second Division of the South Carolina militia from 1800 to 1811. In 1812 he moved with his family to Tennessee, dying there at Winnsborough, perhaps in 1824.

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Michael Bellesiles

WINTER OF 1779–1780. The winter of 1779–1780 has been called among the harshest in the eighteenth century. A total of twenty-eight snowstorms hit the United States, some dropping snow for several days in succession. The temperature rarely rose above freezing as the Delaware and Hudson Rivers froze over. Sledges moved regularly across ten miles of ice between Annapolis and the opposite shore of the Chesapeake. Wild animals were almost exterminated. General Alexander (Lord Stirling) marched over a saltwater channel to make his unsuccessful Staten Island raid—even his artillery passed over the six miles of open water safely. Washington's main army suffered much more, because of this weather, in their Morristown winter quarters than they had at Valley Forge two years earlier, with snow lying six feet deep. The British in New York suffered almost as much as the economy of the United States ground to a halt and food became scarce everywhere. As inflation took off, Washington found it ever more difficult to obtain much needed supplies for his shrinking army.

SEE ALSO *Morristown Winter Quarters, New Jersey (1 December 1779–22 June 1780)*; *Staten Island, New York*.

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WITHERSPOON, JOHN. (1723–1794). Signer, clergyman, college president, member of Congress. Scotland–New Jersey. Born in Gifford, Scotland, on 5 February 1723, Witherspoon was the son of a minister

and followed his father's calling. At the early age of sixteen he earned a master of arts degree from the University of Edinburgh, getting his divinity degree in 1743. Ordained on 11 April 1745, he became minister to Beith in Ayrshire. That same year he raised troops to oppose Charles Stuart, was taken prisoner at the Battle of Falkirk, and suffered a brief but harsh imprisonment in Castle Doune before Stuart was defeated. Witherspoon became well-known as a leader of the Popular Party in the Church of Scotland, which argued for the right of congregations to pick their own ministers and against the secular ways of the Moderates. In 1757 he became pastor in Paisley, and his fame spread to America. Richard Stockton was sent from New Jersey in 1766 to offer Witherspoon the presidency of the College of New Jersey (later called Princeton). But Witherspoon's wife, Elizabeth Montgomery, did not want to leave Scotland. Two years later Benjamin Rush, who was studying medicine in Edinburgh, made a personal appeal to the Witherspoons, winning them both over. They arrived in Princeton on 12 August 1768.

As president of the College of New Jersey, Witherspoon infused new life into the institution, building up its endowment, its faculty, and its student body until the military events of 1776 interfered. Before the war broke out he had introduced the study of philosophy, French, history, and oratory. Not a profound scholar himself but with the ability of a real educator, he deplored book learning for its own sake, discouraged pure scholarship, and worked on the theory that an education should make a man useful in public life.

Although he disapproved of ministers taking part in politics, he quickly gravitated to the Patriot camp, awarding honorary degrees to John Dickinson, Joseph Galloway, and John Hancock for their defense of liberty. In 1774 he became a member of the Somerset County Committee of Correspondence, attended provincial conventions, and took a prominent part in the imprisonment of the Loyalist governor William Franklin. On 22 June 1776 he was chosen as a delegate to the Continental Congress, arriving in time to vote for independence and to sign the Declaration. He remained a delegate until November 1782, serving on more than one hundred committees, including the committee on secret correspondence for foreign affairs, and on the Board of War. He also worked to silence the Loyalist publishers Benjamin Towne of Philadelphia and James Rivington of New York, as well as writing pamphlets in opposition to the issue of paper money.

After leaving Congress, Witherspoon was elected to the New Jersey legislature in 1783 and 1789 and was a federalist member of the New Jersey ratifying convention in 1787. He devoted most of his energies until his death on 15 November 1794 to rebuilding the College of New Jersey.

Witherspoon also left his mark on American religion. He had reached America at a time when the Presbyterian

Church was badly divided between the New and Old Side elements engendered by the Great Awakening of the 1740s. He played a key role in unifying America's Presbyterians and was closely identified its growth in the mid-Atlantic states and on the frontier. By 1776, with the help of a large influx of Scots-Irish, the church was firmly entrenched in the new country. From 1785 to 1789 Witherspoon helped organize the church nationwide, assisting in the crafting of its catechisms, confessions of faith, and government.

SEE ALSO *Stockton, Richard.*

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WOEDTKE, FREDERICK WILLIAM, BARON DE. (1740?–1776). Continental general. Prussia. Born in Prussia, perhaps in 1740, Woedtke claimed to have been a major in the Prussian army. In early 1776 he appeared in Philadelphia with a strong letter of recommendation from Benjamin Franklin. Congress commissioned him brigadier general on 16 March 1776 and assigned him to the Northern Army. He is known to have attended the council of war at Crown Point on 5 July and to have died at Lake George on 28 July 1776. James Wilkinson characterized both Matthias Fermoy and Woedtke as worthless drunkards, one of the few subjects on which one feels historically safe in accepting Wilkinson's testimony.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion; Fermoy, Matthias Alexis de Roche.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WOLCOTT, ERASTUS. (1722–1793). Militia general and judge. Connecticut. Elder brother of Oliver Wolcott, Erastus rose to prominence in his family's ancestral home town of Windsor (East Windsor after 1768), Connecticut, and was first elected to the General Assembly in 1758. The Assembly named him to its nine-member Committee of Correspondence in May 1773, and chose him as a delegate to the first Continental Congress in September 1774, but then and later he declined to serve politically outside Connecticut. In late

April 1775, the Assembly sent him, along with the pro-British William Samuel Johnson, to confer with General Gage in Boston about a cessation of hostilities, but they achieved nothing of note. He was elected Assembly speaker in May 1776.

Wolcott led Connecticut troops in the field on several occasions. Colonel of his local militia regiment from October 1774, he led a reinforcement of militia to Boston early in January 1776 to help General George Washington hold the lines while the Continental Army of 1776 was recruited. As colonel of a regiment of state troops, he commanded the New London forts during the summer of 1776. Named brigadier general of the first brigade of the reorganized Connecticut militia in December 1776, he acted principally to draft and equip men to reinforce state and continental forces, but commanded a militia detachment on the Hudson River from April to June 1777. An occasional member of the state's Council of Safety, he resigned his militia rank in January 1781 in protest over Governor Jonathan Trumbull's direction of the war effort. After the war he became a judge of the Connecticut supreme court.

SEE ALSO *Trumbull, John.*

revised by Harold E. Selesky

WOLCOTT, OLIVER. (1726–1797). Signer, militia general. Connecticut. Oliver Wolcott, the youngest son of Governor Roger Wolcott (1679–1767), was a scion of one of Connecticut's most prominent families. He was graduated from Yale College in 1747 and immediately took up a commission to raise and command a volunteer company on the New York frontier during the French and Indian Wars. After the end of the war (1748) he studied medicine with his brother Alexander, but in October 1751 he became a merchant at Litchfield, the seat of a new county in northwest Connecticut where his father owned property. Over the next twenty-five years he became the most important man in the region. His father named him county sheriff in 1751, an office he held for twenty years. His neighbors elected him to the Connecticut Assembly in 1764, and voters across the colony elected him to the Governor's Council in 1771. Other important offices followed: judge of the local probate court in May 1772, and county judge and colonel of the local militia regiment in May 1774. A strong supporter of colonial rights, and ultimately of independence, he was moderator of the Litchfield town meeting that condemned the Intolerable Acts, and later served on town and county committees of inspection and safety.

Wolcott played a larger role in Connecticut than he did nationally. After serving as one of the nine commissioners to procure supplies for Connecticut forces, in July 1775 Congress appointed him as one of five commissioners of Indian affairs for the Northern Department. Elected to the Continental Congress in October 1775, he had to leave Philadelphia because of illness just before the Declaration of Independence was signed; he signed the document on 1 October 1776, after his return. On his way home in late June 1776 he brought to Litchfield the equestrian statue of George III that had been torn down by a New York City mob, and oversaw its transformation into over 42,000 lead bullets. Elected a delegate to Congress through 1783 (except in 1779), his participation was not noteworthy, in part because he was absent for six to nine months every year on other business. In August 1776 he commanded (as a brigadier general) the fourteen militia regiments sent to reinforce General Israel Putnam on the Hudson River. In December 1776 he was named to command the Litchfield county militia brigade, and in September 1777 he led several hundred volunteers to oppose General John Burgoyne's invasion. He was promoted to major general commanding the Connecticut militia in May 1779 and directed, with limited success, resistance to the Connecticut Coast Raids in July of that year. He was also a member of the state's Council of Safety (1780–1783).

After the war Wolcott helped to negotiate two treaties that opened Indian land to white settlement, with the Iroquois at Fort Stanwix in 1784 and with the Wyandottes five years later, that cleared title to the Western Reserve. He supported the federal Constitution and voted for it as a member of Connecticut's ratifying convention. Lieutenant governor from May 1787, he became governor when Samuel Huntington died in January 1796. He died in office less than two years later.

His son and namesake (1760–1833) saw service as a volunteer in 1777 and 1779. Declining a commission in the army, he served in the Quartermaster Department as storekeeper in the depot at Litchfield. He was later U.S. Secretary of the Treasury (1795–1800) and governor of Connecticut (1817–1827).

SEE ALSO *Connecticut Coast Raid*; *Western Reserve*.

revised by Harold E. Selesky

WOLFE, JAMES. (1727–1759). British general. Born on 2 January 1727, Wolfe was commissioned second lieutenant in the First Marines in 1741 and exchanged into the Twelfth Foot in 1742. At Dettingen (Germany) on 27 June 1743 he came to the attention of the Duke of

Cumberland (Prince William Augustus). Wolfe's subsequent promotions, to lieutenant (July 1743), captain in the Fourth Foot (1744), and brigade major in Flanders (1745), were due to the duke's patronage. Wolfe served as a staff officer against the Jacobites in the battles of Falkirk and Culloden, and was badly wounded in the battle at Laffeld on 21 June 1746. He became a major in the Twentieth Foot in 1749 and its lieutenant colonel in March 1750.

As commandant of the Twentieth Foot, Wolfe developed an improved, simplified system of platoon firing. He also introduced a new bayonet technique, in which the musket with the fixed blade was not hefted overhead but levelled at the hip, thus making it an effective offensive weapon. Noticing that French military writers were interested in the technique of attacking in massed column, Wolfe worked out the most effective defence against it: a massed battalion volley delivered in line, followed by a bayonet charge. These innovations, adopted for the whole army in 1764, were to have a significant impact on the infantry's performance in the War of American Independence and beyond. In 1757, returning from a staff posting with the failed expedition against Rochefort, on the French coast, he began to work out a manual for combined operations, drawing on his recent experience of what not to do.

On 23 January 1758 Wolfe was made brigadier general in North America to serve under Jeffery Amherst in the Louisburg expedition. Wolfe led the light infantry assault that enabled the army to get safely ashore, and his brigade's batteries made the breach that forced the garrison to surrender on 27 July. It was now too late in the year to move on Quebec, and the news of General James Abercromby's fiasco at Ticonderoga sent Amherst hurrying back to New York. Wolfe promptly took himself home and obtained command of the Quebec expedition, with the rank of major general in North America, on 30 December 1758. At the siege of Quebec he displayed major weaknesses in troop management, and the difficulties of implementing his initial plan of attack made him look hesitant and uncertain.

However, Wolfe's death in battle on 13 September 1759, after the famous night climb to the Heights of Abraham, made him an iconic national hero. Two dramatic, but historically inaccurate paintings depicted his death, and his statue still looks out over Greenwich in London, where he was buried. Yet his most important legacy was his system of battlefield tactics, which carried the British Army through the American Revolution and at last immortalized a far greater commander: Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington and victor of Waterloo.

SEE ALSO *Abercromby, James (1706–1781)*; *Plains of Abraham (13 September 1759)*.

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WOODFORD, WILLIAM. (1734–1780). Continental general. Virginia. Son of Major William Woodford, an Englishman who settled in Caroline County and grandson of Dr. William Cocke, secretary of the colony, he received the normal education for a young Virginian of the better class and served as a militia officer in the French and Indian War. In 1774 he was a member of the county committee of correspondence and of the committee to enforce the Association. The next year he sat as Edmund Pendleton's alternate in the Virginia Convention from 17 July to 9 August.

On 5 August he was appointed colonel of the Third Regiment and at Hampton on 24–25 October 1775, Great Bridge on 9 December, and Norfolk on 1 January 1776, he had a leading role in the fight that drove Lord Dunmore out of the province. In the closing months of 1775, when he was given the mission of opposing Dunmore around Norfolk, Woodford got into a warm dispute with Patrick Henry over the scope of their respective commands. As colonel of the First Regiment, Henry was the senior officer and would normally have had the honor given to Woodford in making the principal military effort in the colony. On 13 February 1776 Woodford became colonel of the Second Virginia Continental Regiment. Woodford resigned in September because Andrew Lewis had been promoted over him, but Woodford returned when Congress appointed him brigadier general on 21 February 1777. He was wounded in the hand at Brandywine but fought at Germantown three weeks later (4 October 1777). During the army's encampment at Valley Forge he quarreled over the relative rank of Muhlenberg, Weedon, and himself in what Douglas Freeman has referred to as a "clash of jealous and ambitious men" (Freeman, vol. 4, p. 613 and n.). He took part in the Monmouth campaign and subsequent operations in New Jersey. On 13 December 1779 he received orders to lead 750 Virginia Continentals to the relief of Charleston. After marching 500 miles in 28 days during the dead of winter, his column arrived on 6 April 1780.

Taken prisoner with the Charleston garrison on 12 May 1780 and sent to New York, Woodford died in captivity on 13 November 1780 and was buried in Old Trinity Church Yard. Woodford County, Kentucky, was named for him in 1789.

SEE ALSO *Charleston Siege of 1780; Great Bridge, Virginia; Hampton, Virginia; Norfolk, Virginia.*

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revised by Harry M. Ward

WOODHULL, NATHANIEL. (1722–1776). Militia general. New York. A major under Abercromby in the Ticonderoga and Crown Point operations of 1758, he accompanied Bradstreet's expedition against Fort Frontenac and was a colonel under Amherst in 1760. A wealthy landowner, he was active in Patriot politics, serving as president of the New York Provincial Congress in 1775 and 1776. Appointed brigadier general of the militia in Suffolk and Queens Counties in October 1775, he was surprised at Jamaica on 28 August 1776 and wounded in the arm. He died on 20 September of gangrene after his arm was removed by a surgeon.

SEE ALSO *De Lancey, Oliver (1749–1822); Jamaica (Brookland), New York.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

WOOSTER, DAVID. (1711–1777). Continental general. Connecticut. Born at Stratford, Connecticut, on 2 March 1711, the son of a mason, Wooster was graduated from Yale College in 1738. He was appointed lieutenant of the Connecticut armed sloop *Defense* in 1741 and the next year was promoted to its captain. In 1745 Wooster was one of eight captains in the Connecticut regiment on the Louisburg expedition, and on 4 July he sailed for France with French prisoners for exchange. He was commissioned on 24 September 1745 as a captain in the new British provincial regiment of Sir William Pepperrell, in garrison at Louisburg, but retired on half pay in 1748 when the fortress was returned to the French at the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. He married the daughter of Thomas Clap, the president of Yale College, in March 1746, became a merchant at New Haven, and in 1750 helped to organize one of the first lodges of Free

Masons in Connecticut. During the French and Indian War, he was colonel of a Connecticut provincial regiment in 1756 and again in 1758–1760, taking part in the attack on Ticonderoga in 1758 and in later operations under Jeffrey Amherst. In 1763 he became customs collector at New Haven.

In April 1775 the General Assembly appointed this sixty-four-year-old veteran of two colonial wars as its major general of the six regiments to be raised for “the safety and defence of the colony.” In conformity with Connecticut practice, he was simultaneously colonel of the First Regiment (raised in New Haven County) and captain of the regiment’s first company. At the request of the New York assembly, the Connecticut governor’s council ordered Wooster on 19 June to march with his regiment and Colonel David Waterbury’s Fifth Regiment (raised in Fairfield County) to New York City. During the summer of 1775 he commanded Connecticut troops on Long Island and at Harlem. Congress named Wooster as the fourth brigadier general of the Continental army on 22 June. He was the only major general of militia not given the equivalent rank in the Continental army and was piqued at being passed over by younger men with less military experience, as well as by Israel Putnam, formerly subordinate in Connecticut rank but who was now a Continental major general. Ordered to report to Major General Philip Schuyler in the Northern Department, he left New York City on 28 September. Although Wooster quarreled with Schuyler during the Canada invasion, he took part in the siege and capture of St. Johns and remained commandant at Montreal when Richard Montgomery moved against Quebec. On Montgomery’s death on 1 January 1776, Wooster assumed command in Canada. On 2 April, Wooster reached the outskirts of Quebec, where he quarreled with Benedict Arnold, but was succeeded on 1 May by John Thomas.

Wooster’s service in Canada confirmed his incapacity for high command. “A general . . . of a hayfield,” is Justin H. Smith’s characterization of him (vol. 2, p. 230). He was “dull and uninspired, garrulous about his thirty years of service . . . tactless, hearty rather than firm with his undisciplined troops who adored him, at times brutal towards the civilian population of Montreal” (Stanley M. Pargellis in DAB). The death of Thomas on 2 June 1776 again left Wooster as senior officer in Canada but Congress, informed by its commissioners in Montreal of his incompetence, recalled him immediately. An official inquiry exonerated him of misconduct and kept him on the rolls as a brigadier general without employment—he was given no further assignment in the Continental army.

He was reappointed major general of Connecticut militia on 23 October 1776 and that winter commanded a small force on the border with New York. He joined William Heath for the mismanaged diversion against Fort

Independence, New York, on 17–18 January 1777. Mortally wounded on 27 April at Ridgefield while opposing William Tryon’s Danbury raid, he died on 2 May at Danbury. Congress voted him a monument but never got around to having it built. The Masons erected a monument to Wooster at Danbury in 1854.

SEE ALSO *Canada Invasion; Danbury Raid, Connecticut; Fort Independence Fiasco, New York.*

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“WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN, THE.”

The 1828 edition of Garden’s *Anecdotes of the Revolution* is responsible for the much-repeated statement that, following surrender, the forces of British General Charles Cornwallis marched out of Yorktown, Pennsylvania, with their bands playing a piece called “The World Turned Upside Down,” and implied that the tune was played frequently throughout the war years. The only thing that can be said with certainty is that a piece of music by this name did exist—in fact, there were several tunes known by this name—and that at least one of them was popular during the Revolution. It also seems certain that various pieces of music were played during the surrender ceremonies, and that bands and pipers participated, not just drummers.

Commager and Morris report that “[t]he version which has the strongest support in tradition and which . . . we would like to believe was played appeared in the *Gentleman’s Magazine* of 1766, beginning ‘Goody Bull and her daughter fell out’” (where the words are reproduced but not the music). Nothing about “the world turned upside down” appears in the words of this song, however. The same authorities give another song for which a case has been made, and in which the words do appear:

If Buttercups buzzed after the bee,
If boats were on land, churches on sea,

[If] Summer were spring and the t’other way
round,
Then all the world would be upside down.

Freeman has examined this mystery with assistance from the Music Division of the Library of Congress. He reproduces the score of a piece titled “When the King

Enjoys His Own Again,” from which numerous other songs and ballads were adapted, including one called “The World Turned Upside Down.” According to the Library of Congress, Freeman’s suggested score is generally assumed to be the tune played at the Yorktown surrender, and Freeman furnishes additional support for this theory (pp. 388–389).

According to Bass, the British soldiers were amused by this choice of music, “for they knew the tune as the old Jacobite serenade to Prince Charlie: ‘When the King Enjoys His Own Again!’” (p. 4). The British are also supposed to have played this tune when they retreated from Salem, Massachusetts, on 26 February 1775.

SEE ALSO *Culloden Moor, Scotland.*

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

WRIGHT, GOVERNOR SIR JAMES. (1716–1785). Royal governor of Georgia. South Carolina-Georgia. Often confused with his son, Major Sir James Wright, the senior Wright was born in London on 8 May 1716, moving with his family to Charleston in 1730 when his father, Robert, became chief justice of South Carolina. Wright studied law and became South Carolina’s attorney general in 1739. In 1757 he went to London as the province’s agent. On 13 May 1760 he was appointed lieutenant governor of Georgia, becoming governor the following year.

Most of Wright’s governorship was devoted to maintaining peace between the Indians and the people he called “Crackers,” aggressive settlers who violated English laws and Indian property rights in their move westward. Though there were protests against the Stamp Act, Georgia was the only colony in which they were sold. On 2 January 1766 Wright led a detachment of mounted rangers to break up a crowd of two hundred men in the port who were threatening to seize and destroy the recently arrived stamps. On 4 February he defied a body of three hundred armed countrymen who came into Savannah to make him stop the issue of the stamps, and public opinion finally rallied to his defense of law and order.

Governor Wright performed his duties capably and without any further serious challenge to his authority. In 1773 he won a high degree of popularity in the province when he negotiated a new Indian treaty that opened up more lands to white settlement, effectively negating the Proclamation Line of 1763. His handling of the Creek War of 1773–1774 was brilliant, using trade sanctions rather than violence to bring the Creek to negotiate an end to the conflict. The crown rewarded Wright on 8 December 1772 by making him a baronet. News of Lexington and Concord changed the situation in Georgia. The Liberty Boys of Savannah, led by young Joseph Habersham, defied royal authority and, on 11 May, seized five hundred pounds of powder from the provincial magazine. On 2 June they spiked a battery in Savannah; three days later they erected the first liberty pole in the province and paraded with fixed bayonets. On 4 July the Provincial Congress met and took control of the province. Wright remained another six months, hoping for the armed assistance needed to restore his authority, but when two warships and a troop transport arrived in January 1776, the Patriots promptly arrested Wright to keep him from rallying the Loyalists around this nucleus of regulars. Held incommunicado for a month, he finally escaped and took refuge aboard a warship. He made an unsuccessful attempt to take Savannah by force but in February 1776 gave up hope of restoring control and sailed for Halifax; two months later he left Halifax for England.

In 1779, after the British had recaptured Savannah, Wright returned to his former post, arriving 14 June and convening a Loyalist assembly. Wright and General Augustine Prevost defended Savannah against a Franco-American siege in September-October 1779. Over the next year Georgia and South Carolina were restored to British authority. Wright opposed Cornwallis’s policy of pushing north from South Carolina, leaving the two southern states exposed to attack. Lee took Augusta in June 1780, and Savannah was isolated until the British surrendered the city in July 1782, contrary to Wright’s wishes. Losing eleven plantations and more than five hundred slaves to confiscation by the victorious Patriots, Wright headed the commission that awarded compensation for Loyalist losses during the Revolution. Wright received nothing from his commission, though he estimated his loss at thirty-three thousand pounds. However, the government gave him an annual pension of five hundred pounds. He died in Westminster on 20 November 1785.

Governor Wright’s brother Jermyn commanded a Loyalist strongpoint on the St. Mary’s River in East Florida that the Patriots attacked several times without success. The governor’s son, Sir James Wright (d. 1816), inherited the title on the death of his father. Commissioned a major in 1779, he commanded the

Georgia Loyalists at the defense of Savannah. In 1782 this unit became part of the King's (Carolina) Rangers.

SEE ALSO *Hutchinson's Island, Georgia*.

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

WRITS OF ASSISTANCE. Writs of assistance were general search warrants that authorized customs officers to search private warehouses and homes for contraband during daylight hours, and to call on provincial officers for assistance. The imperial government authorized their use in the colonies in 1755 to combat widespread smuggling to the French West Indies and the evasion of the Molasses Act of 1733, but they were not widely used until 1760, when customs officers began a wide-scale seizure of illicit cargoes in Boston.

Writs of assistance were valid only during the reign of the incumbent monarch (George II) and expired on his death in October 1760. Customs officials applied for a renewal of these general search warrants, but Boston merchants opposed a renewal and retained James Otis Jr., and Oxenbridge Thacher to represent them in a suit before the Massachusetts Superior Court. Otis made the most important argument against the writs, on constitutional grounds. If the writs were made legal by act of Parliament, then the act of Parliament was wrong because Parliament could not make any act that violated a citizen's natural rights. The argument, while unsuccessful, helped to lay the foundation for the transfer of the locus of sovereignty from statute law to a more nebulous concept of natural law, which Americans would refine and draw on for the next thirty years. The controversy over the legality of these writs was so toxic that customs officials never again applied for a general writ of assistance in Massachusetts.

The imperial government extended the use of the general writs of assistance to the other colonies in Section 10 of the Townshend Revenue Act of 1767, but colonial courts narrowly construed the provision to require only the granting of so-called particular or special writs that specified the object of the search. This way of finessing the law allowed the other colonies to avoid the situation Massachusetts had faced in 1760 and 1761.

SEE ALSO *Otis, James; Townshend Revenue Act*.

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revised by Harold E. Selesky

WYANDOT. A remnant of the once large and powerful Huron Indian nation, the Wyandot Indians were a small but strategically significant Indian nation who, during the eighteenth century, inhabited the southern Great Lakes basin. The Wyandot were British allies during the War of the American Revolution.

In the early seventeenth century, the Huron Indians inhabited a region (Huronion) on the south end of the Georgian Bay, in modern-day Ontario. The Huron spoke a northern Iroquoian language and subsisted through a combination of agriculture, hunting, and farming. The Huron, along with their neighbors and close relatives the Petun, may have numbered between eighteen thousand and thirty thousand in the 1610s and 1620s. The Huron were decimated by epidemics of European diseases in the 1630s and then fared poorly in the Beaver Wars against the Iroquois League after 1640. The community that became the Wyandot opted to leave Huronion in the 1650s. (The Huron called themselves the Wendat.) It was likely a small community, as eighteenth-century accounts of the Wyandot population fix the number of Wyandot warriors between 150 and 250.

The Wyandot migrated throughout the northern Great Lakes during the second half of the seventeenth century and eventually settled in the area around Detroit after 1701. The Wyandot were one of many Indian nations to establish communities near the French post at Detroit. The Wyandot ranged into modern-day Ohio to hunt and began to establish contact with British traders in the mid-1740s. French agents strengthened their alliance with the Wyandot (and other Indians) and the Wyandot fought on the French side in the Seven Years' War, participating in the 1755 defeat of Edward Braddock. After participating in Pontiac's Rebellion, the Wyandot committed themselves to alliance with the British. They remained on the British side during the American Revolution. From their community at Sandusky, on Lake Erie, the Wyandot were active in the harassment of the communities of the Pennsylvania

Wyoming Valley Massacre, Pennsylvania

frontier. They were part of the force that defeated the William Crawford expedition of 1782 and that famously captured Crawford and burned him at the stake.

The Wyandot were part of the Ohio Valley alliance that resisted the United States until Anthony Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers (1794). The Wyandot signed the Treaty of Greenville (1795). After a series of subsequent treaties, the Wyandot were eventually removed west of the Mississippi—first to Kansas (1843) and then to Oklahoma (between 1855 and 1870)—where they remain today.

SEE ALSO *Braddock, Edward; Crawford, William; Crawford's Defeat; Indians in the Colonial Wars and the American Revolution; Pontiac's War; Wayne, Anthony.*

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revised by Leonard J. Sadosky

WYOMING VALLEY MASSACRE, PENNSYLVANIA. 3–4 July 1778. Although the name was applied to most of the northern quarter of Pennsylvania, the Wyoming Valley of the Revolution was the twenty-five-mile stretch of the Susquehanna River below the mouth of the Lackawanna River, including modern Wilkes-Barre. "Wyoming" comes from the Delaware Indian name M'cheuwómink, "upon the great plain." The Wyoming Valley Massacre had its origins partially in local disputes. Conflicting claims of Connecticut and Pennsylvania resulted in regular clashes after the original Connecticut settlement in 1753. In January 1774 the Connecticut General Assembly, defying Pennsylvania's claims, incorporated the settlement into a chartered township called Westmoreland. By 1775 the three thousand inhabitants of the isolated valley split between the more numerous "Yankees" and the "Pennamites," although the two groups shared a strong attachment to the Patriot cause. But a number of Loyalist families began moving into the area from the Hudson and

Mohawk Valleys, most prominently the Wintermoot family.

In response to this influx of new settlers, who made no apologies for their loyalty to the king, the original settlers formed committees of vigilance. They arrested several of the newcomers and sent them off to Connecticut, where many ended up in the Connecticut Mines or Simsbury Prison. The Wintermoots had purchased land toward the head of the valley and proceeded to construct a fort. This was common sense in a region vulnerable to Indian raids, but under the circumstances the Patriot settlers thought it wise to start throwing up some forts of their own. About two miles above the Wintermoots they built Fort Jenkins. Forty Fort, a blockhouse whose name came from the first forty Connecticut pioneers, was strengthened. Plans were made to build and renovate other posts.

Meanwhile, the valley sent off two companies of regulars, eighty-two men each, to join Washington. Also, Patriot committees continued their vigilance, sending more accused Tories to the mines and further alienating neighbors with differing political views.

War had lurked around the edges of Wyoming Valley for some months. During St. Leger's expedition in June–Sept. 1777, stray Indians appeared. In January 1778, twenty-seven suspected Tories were arrested and eighteen were sent to prison in Connecticut. The other nine fled, probably to Niagara, and were followed by many other Loyalists from the Wyoming region. At British headquarters in Niagara, meanwhile, Major John Butler was preparing another series of raids against the exposed U.S. frontier.

THE BRITISH APPROACH WYOMING

Butler left Niagara in June 1778 with his Rangers, a detachment of Johnson's Royal Greens, and an assortment of volunteers from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, about four hundred loyalists in all. As deputy of the Indian forces, Butler had the support of about five hundred Iroquois, mainly Senecas and Cayugas, under the command of a chief named Gi-en-gwahtoh. Though the strength of Butler's command remains in dispute, his forces definitely outnumbered the militia he encountered in Wyoming Valley.

The invasion route was eastward toward Tryon County, southward along Seneca Lake, and on to Tioga. The latter was roughly fifty miles up the Susquehanna River from the head of Wyoming Valley. While waiting for boats and rafts to be built, Butler sent raiding parties to the West Branch of the Susquehanna. On 27 June his entire force reached Wyalusing, and the next day the men camped at a rebel mill about twenty miles from their objective. Lacking provisions, Butler welcomed the arrival of several Wintermoots with fourteen cows and an offer to surrender their fort if promised safety.

The Wintermoots also supplied valuable intelligence, informing Butler that, though the Patriots expected a raid, the Continental army had been unable to spare any troops for their defense, Washington being in the midst of the Monmouth campaign during 16 June–5 July. The local defense was a hastily assembled company of from forty to sixty men at Forty Fort, commanded by Captain Detrick Hewett. Colonel Zebulon Butler (no relation to Major John Butler), a Continental officer home on leave, was given overall command of the situation and called on the militia to turn out. Many of the local militia insisted on staying at the seven other forts that extended ten miles on both sides of the river. Colonel Butler was able to raise some three hundred militia to reinforce Hewett's volunteers and arrived at Forty Fort on 1 July. Major John Butler's forces entered the valley from the west and quickly took possession of Fort Jenkins and a little fort called Exeter. He established headquarters at Wintermoot's fort (as his blockhouse was known). The Patriots clashed with an Indian patrol that surprised and murdered some men working in a field near Fort Jenkins; the Patriots then withdrew to Forty Fort.

THE BATTLE OF WYOMING

On 3 July, Colonel Zebulon Butler fell for one of the oldest tricks in the book. Major John Butler had Fort Wintermoot set on fire and pretended to retreat, drawing Colonel Butler and his militia out of Forty Fort. Rather than proceeding cautiously and sending out scouts to determine the exact movements of the Loyalists and Indians, Colonel Butler rushed forward, apparently shouting taunts at what he took to be the retreating British forces. The Patriots were scattered over an open field, with Butler commanding the right, Colonel Nathan Denison the left, and Hewett's volunteers in the center. Major Butler anchored his left flank on Wintermoot's fort, where he personally commanded his Rangers, deploying the Indians on the opposite flank, and placing the Greens in the center. When the Patriots returned the fire of Butler's troops, the Indians rushed upon them with axes, knives, and hatchets before they could reload. The Patriots fled in panic, many of them throwing down their muskets and several dozen leaping into the Susquehanna in an effort to swim to safety. The Indians pursued the latter into the water, killing most of them. Many of the Patriots ran for Forty Fort but were intercepted by Butler's Loyalists.

The exact number killed in this battle is unknown, but at least twenty militia officers and three Continental officers were killed, including Hewett. Major Butler claimed to have killed 227 patriots while losing just two Rangers and one of his Indian allies. Only 60 patriots escaped the vigorous pursuit, and Denison led some of these back to Forty Fort to protect the women and

children. Zebulon Butler was less heroic, not stopping until he reached Fort Wyoming at Wilkes-Barre, where he gathered such regulars as he could and withdrew from the valley. The slaughter of fugitives and torture of prisoners continued through the night of 3–4 July. J. Hector St. John Crèvecoeur wrote, "It is said that those who were then made prisoners were tied to small trees and burnt the evening of the same day" as the battle (Smith 2: 1157). Some accounts say that prisoners were thrown into a fire and held there by pitchforks.

During the night a few reinforcements under John Franklin reached Forty Fort, but Denison accepted John Butler's surrender terms the next morning. These terms required the people of the Wyoming Valley to not take up arms again during the war, demolish their garrisons, and spare loyalists from further persecution while restoring their lost property.

For the Loyalists, the battle at Forty Fort was a great victory. As Richard McGinnis described events, "Thus did loyalty and good order that day triumph over confusion and treason, the goodness of our cause, aided and assisted by the blessing of Divine Providence, in some measure help to restore the ancient constitution of our mother country, governed by the best of kings" (Commager and Morris, p. 1007).

The Patriots, of course, had a very different view. Atrocity tales quickly circulated and multiplied until not a single inhabitant of the Wyoming Valley, it seemed, remained alive. Newspapers throughout America reported on the Loyalists refusing quarter to rebel brothers, the roasting of prisoners, the slaughter of babies, and several instances of parricide. Revenge was called for and promised.

Major Butler withdrew from the Wyoming Valley on 8 July, having accomplished his primary purposes of destroying a Patriot stronghold and spreading terror throughout the U.S. frontier. He reported the destruction of one thousand houses and the capture and evacuation of one thousand head of cattle, as well as large numbers of sheep and pigs. Butler reached Tioga on 10 July, and four days later he started for Niagara. Small bands of Indians continued to roam the defenseless settlement, however, destroying crops, burning buildings, and menacing the remaining inhabitants.

A relief column of Connecticut troops led by Captain Simon Spalding was nearly fifty miles away from Wilkes-Barre the day of the battle. When Spalding got within twelve miles of the valley, his scouts reported the enemy was still there in strength, so he wisely withdrew to Stroudsburg. Colonel Butler assembled some settlers and troops and returned to Wilkes-Barre on 3 August. Colonel Thomas Hartley arrived with the Eleventh Pennsylvania Regiment to protect the valley until the crops were salvaged and the enemy threat was gone.

In September came the first of the promised reprisals as 130 patriots under Hartley and Denison, who broke his parole in volunteering to serve, moved up the East Branch of the Susquehanna destroying several Indian villages and taking a few prisoners. They withdrew upon learning that the Indians were massing under Joseph Brant around Unadilla. A few settlers strove to get crops planted even though the season was well advanced, and several were killed in isolated attacks by Indians. It was not until 22 October that the rebel dead were collected on the battleground and buried in a common grave.

COMMENTS

Major John Butler deserves his due as a military commander. This fifty-three-year-old officer led his mixed force almost two hundred miles through the wilderness from Niagara, achieving a highly effective surprise. Patriot authorities, civil and military, local and elsewhere, failed to do what they could with available resources, and the militia showed no spirit of courage or sacrifice in organizing its own security before John Butler reached Tioga in overwhelming strength. Zebulon Butler's handling of the situation on 3 July was singularly inept: he and Denison herded their troops forward to be slaughtered by an enemy superior in numbers and quality. John Butler's vigorous pursuit resulted in the tactician's dream: a battle of annihilation. In justice to the officers and men who tried to defend Wyoming Valley on 3 July, it must be reiterated that it was already too late to overcome Butler's tactical surprise.

John Butler always denied that any massacre occurred. In his report, written 12 July at Tioga, he concluded: "But what gives me the sincerest satisfaction is that . . . not a single person was hurt except such as were in arms, to these in truth the Indians gave no quarter" (Swiggett, p. 133). However, the treatment of prisoners after the battle, though grotesquely exaggerated, spread the perception of barbaric treatment and fed popular demands for retribution. The virulence of frontier warfare accelerated after July 1778.

SEE ALSO *Butler, John; Butler, Zebulon; Denison, Nathan; Monmouth, New Jersey; Spalding, Simon; St. Leger's Expedition.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

WYTHE, GEORGE. (1726?–1806). Signer, statesman, jurist, law professor. Virginia. Born on the family plantation in Elizabeth City County, Virginia, perhaps in 1726, Wythe was educated by his mother. After studying law with his uncle, he was admitted to the bar in 1746. In 1753 he replaced Peyton Randolph as Virginia's attorney general. After receiving only one vote when he ran for the Burgesses from his home county, Wythe moved to Williamsburg, representing the town in the assembly in 1754–1755.

Wythe's brilliant career was closely related to those of several exceptional men who were his intimate friends or, later, students. In 1758, after being admitted to the bar of the General Court, he started a profitable friendship with the new lieutenant governor, Francis Fauquier. Another close friend at this time was William Small, professor of mathematics and natural philosophy at William and Mary. Later he was to be a friend and teacher of Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe, and Henry Clay.

During the years leading up to the break with England, Wythe was a representative in the House of Burgesses (1754–1755, 1758–1768), clerk of that body, 1769–1775, and mayor of Williamsburg (1768). In the controversy leading to Patrick Henry's triumph in the Parson's Cause, Wythe presided over the court that upheld Virginia's action against the claim of the Reverend Thomas Warrington for damages. In 1764 he drafted a protest to the Stamp Act (1765) that so far exceeded most of his colleagues' ideas of permissible candor that they toned it down considerably before adoption. In 1774 he served on the Williamsburg committee that enforced the nonimportation agreements.

In 1775 Wythe showed a wisdom surpassing that of the political majority when he recommended that Virginia organize a regular army and not a militia. As a delegate to the Continental Congress in 1775–1776, he ably supported Richard Henry Lee's resolution for independence and signed the Declaration. With Jefferson and Edmund Pendleton, he accomplished the monumental task of revising the laws of Virginia; their committee reported 126 bills in 1779, though the assembly rejected many of them. Meanwhile, Wythe was speaker in the House of Delegates in 1777 and the next year assumed the title of chancellor when he became one of three judges in the state's high court of chancery. Like most states, Virginia

had a bicameral assembly, the House of Delegates and the Senate, the names they still use today. On 4 December 1779 he was named to a chair of law at William and Mary, the first chair of law established in an American college. He held the position until 1790.

Though elected to the Constitutional Convention in 1787, Wythe had to resign his seat and return home due to the fatal illness of his wife. The following year he was elected to Virginia's ratifying convention, even though he did not run for the office. His influence at the convention in favor of the Constitution is often credited with swaying many votes. His opinion that slavery violated the Virginia bill of rights received a less favorable hearing.

His death was tragic and bizarre. Wythe had moved to Richmond in 1791. In his will he left most of his estate to his only sister's grandson, George Wythe Sweeney, with a legacy for a servant that was to pass to Sweeney if the

servant died. In 1806, tired of waiting for his inheritance, Sweeney poisoned some coffee with arsenic in order to kill both the servant and Wythe. The servant died first, but Wythe lived long enough to disinherit Sweeney. The latter escaped conviction for murder since the testimony of the principal witness, Wythe's freedwoman cook, was not admissible in court since she was black.

SEE ALSO *Parson's Cause; Virginia, Military Operations in.*

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revised by Michael Bellesiles

Y-Z

YAGERS SEE *Jägers*.

“YANKEE DOODLE.” Of unknown origin and existing in almost countless versions, this song is generally attributed to a British surgeon in Lord Amherst’s army named Richard Shuckburgh, who supposedly wrote it in 1755 to ridicule provincial troops. It was first used as a marching song by the British and appeared in Andrew Barton’s 1767 play, *The Disappointment*. It is known that by 1768 crowds partying in Boston sang “Yankee Doodle” in celebration. The British played it when they left the surrender field at Saratoga, not in derision but because they had been instructed to play something light. By that time it was a song closely identified with the Patriots.

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YANKEE HERO–MILFORD ENGAGEMENT. 7 June 1776. While making a quick dash from Newburyport to Boston with a skeleton crew, the American privateer *Yankee Hero* ran into the British

warship *Milford* off Cape Ann. Captain James Tracy’s fourteen-gun brig was badly overmatched by Captain John Burr’s twenty-eight-gun frigate. The British accounts say there was a short engagement, ending with Tracy’s surrender at 5:50 P.M.; the American version says Tracy and his men put up gallant defense for over two hours. The Americans had sixteen or seventeen casualties, including Tracy who was wounded; the British admitted to having only one marine wounded.

revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

YORKTOWN, SIEGE OF. September–October 1781. Admiral Francois Jean Paul, Comte de Grasse’s twenty-eight ships of the line arrived at the mouth of the Chesapeake River on 30 August 1781. The fleet, serving the Patriot cause, caught two British frigates at anchor, capturing one and sending the other into the York River. As a result, the Royal navy in New York received no notice that De Grasse was in Virginia. De Grasse brought 3,300 French troops from the West Indies, commanded by Major General Claude-Anne, marquis de Saint-Simon, Montbléru.

While Saint-Simon’s troops were landing at Jamestown on 5 September 1781, Lieutenant General Charles Lord Cornwallis had one last chance to fight his way up the peninsula to Richmond and retreat into the Carolinas. The commander of American troops in Virginia, Major General the Marquis de Lafayette anxiously deployed his forces so as to block this route. After some probing, Cornwallis declined to make the attempt. Confidently

expecting the Royal navy would rescue him, Cornwallis continued to fortify his positions at Yorktown and Gloucester Point to await their arrival. This opportunity closed when Admiral de Grasse's fleet drove the Royal navy off in the battle of the Chesapeake Capes, and Admiral Jacques Melchior Saint-Laurent Barras brought his squadron from Newport into the bay while the two fleets were still at sea. Meanwhile, the Franco-American armies commanded by Major General George Washington and Lieutenant General the comte de Rochambeau (Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur) progressed from New York towards the Chesapeake. As he moved southward, Washington picked up new troops, such as the Third and Fourth Regiments of the Maryland Line, which had recently been recruited at Baltimore. Joining them in Virginia were that commonwealth's militiamen, who were commanded by Virginia's governor, Thomas Nelson. The Chesapeake encirclement was complete when all these troops arrived at Williamsburg by 26 September.

As he withdrew within Yorktown, Lord Cornwallis faced a severe moral dilemma. While his troops marched through Virginia they were viewed as liberators to thousands of African American slaves, who flocked to their columns and provided domestic labor for the troops, intelligence information for the staff, and geographic familiarity with the countryside that proved particularly useful. According to Hessian Captain Johann Ewald, every officer had four to six blacks and a similar number of horses, as well as one or two "Negresses for cook and maid." Every soldier's woman had a couple of black servants and eventually every enlisted man had "his Negro, who carried his provisions and bundles." For the enslaved, a red coat was a symbol of liberty. They brought with them foodstuffs, horses, cattle, sheep, and poultry. Estimates of the number of blacks with Cornwallis start at 3,000 and go to many times that number.

The hard hand of war inflicted by the British and their black Loyalist allies impoverished the Lower Neck and Southside Virginia. But close confinement within British fortifications at Portsmouth and Yorktown contributed to the spread of the dreaded smallpox, typhus, and typhoid, which apparently killed many of the self-made freedmen. Although their labor contributed significantly to the construction of fortifications at both places, in the end they died or were among the approximately 2,000 blacks that Cornwallis ultimately expelled from Yorktown. Their story is one of the great tragedies of the Yorktown siege.

BRITISH DEFENSES

Cornwallis established his main line of defense close to the town, with an average depth of only 400 yards between the river and the line of fortifications, and with a width of only 1,200 yards. Yorktown was not selected as a place for withstanding a protracted siege and did not provide

good defensive terrain. It was flat, offering little defilade and depriving the defenders of the other advantages of high ground (observation, fields of fire). Yorktown Creek and Wormley Creek would have furnished excellent natural obstacles on which to organize a defense if the British garrison had been large enough to cover such a long perimeter, but this was beyond their capability, particularly in the absence of naval superiority.


The inner line of fortifications comprised ten batteries, some sixty-five guns, and eight redoubts. The principal strongpoint was known as the "horn work," and was located astride the road from Hampton. Forward of this position, to defend the half-mile of flat ground between the heads of the two creeks, were several outworks. This area, part of which was known as Pigeon Quarter, was the principal approach for an attacker. Along the river, west of Yorktown and covering the Williamsburg Road where it entered from that direction, was a strong position called the Fusilier Redoubt, since it was held by a detachment from the Royal Welch Fusiliers (Twenty-third Regiment). On the opposite flank were the detached Redoubts Nine and Ten.

Gloucester Point was important not only in connection with Cornwallis's original mission of establishing a naval station but also as a base for foraging. The position was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Dundas, and its fortifications included four redoubts, three batteries, and a line of entrenchments.

ORDER OF BATTLE

On 27 September Washington organized the American Continentals into three divisions of two brigades each. These were commanded by the Marquis de Lafayette, Benjamin Lincoln, and Baron Friedrich Wilhelm Augustus von Steuben. The artillery brigade, small troops of cavalry, and detachments of sappers and miners rounded out the regular units. The total strength of the Continental troops approximated 5,500. Additionally, Governor Thomas Nelson of Virginia commanded a division of militiamen of approximately 3,500. Governor Nelson personally financed many of the Virginia militiamen, and the failure of the Commonwealth to reimburse him contributed to his subsequent financial difficulties.

Rochambeau's contingent was made up of the four regiments that had marched from Newport (the Regiments Bourbonnais, Royal Deux-Ponts, Soissonais, Saintonge) and the three that had come with de Grasse (Regiments Agenais, Gâtinais, and Touraine) plus 600 artillerymen, the Duke de Lauzun's Legion (comprising horse and foot soldiers), and marines detached for operations against Gloucester. Total French ground forces amounted to approximately 8,600, to which must be added at least 19,000 French sailors who manned the ships blockading the entrance to the Chesapeake and the mouth of the York



The Battle of Yorktown. This French map (1781) shows the positions of troops and ships in Washington's victory over Cornwallis at Yorktown. © CORBIS


River from British relief efforts. Obviously, the French contribution to the victory vastly outnumbered that provided by the Americans. Nonetheless, Washington commanded the allied ground forces.

To defend Yorktown and Gloucester, Cornwallis had what historian Henry P. Johnston terms "the élite of the King's army in America." He had brought the following units from the Carolinas: the Brigade of Guards, the Twenty-third, Thirty-third, and Seventy-first Foot Regiments, the light infantry company of the Eighty-second Regiment, Banastre Tarleton's British Legion, the North Carolina Volunteers, and the German Bose Regiment. The remainder of his troops had come south with Benedict Arnold and William Phillips: two battalions of light infantry, the Seventeenth, Forty-third, Seventy-sixth and Eightieth Regiments, the Queen's Rangers, two Anspach Battalions, the Hessian Regiment Prince Hereditaire, and a jäger company. These were

supplemented by a Royal artillery detachment, in addition to naval guns and gunners. About 800 marines were also on hand, plus pioneers and other detachments. Total ground forces totaled approximately 8,900 before the siege began. The Royal navy forces included approximately 850 sailors and ten naval vessels plus several dozen transports, victuallers, and privateers. Cornwallis had the heavy guns from the ships installed in the Yorktown fortifications. There was dearth of senior officers, however. Brigadier General Charles O'Hara was the only other general, and among the field grade officers there were only two colonels, twelve lieutenant colonels, and twelve majors.

PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS

The American allied forces started from Williamsburg on the morning of 28 September and moved to within a mile of



THE GALE GROUP

the Yorktown defenses by dark. The light infantry of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Abercromby was on the British right, but withdrew as the French wing advanced in that

sector, and Tarleton's mounted troops withdrew to the Moore House when the American wing arrived to the southeast of Yorktown. Cornwallis sought to pollute area

wells by having animal carcasses and the bodies of deceased african americans thrown into them. He began forcing his black refugees out of the little town. On 29 September Washington and his officers examined the enemy position while their troops deployed to invest Yorktown. Orders were issued for the siege artillery and stores to move up from Trebell's Landing on the James River—a difficult operation because sufficient draft animals were not available and the heavy guns had to be moved over ten miles of sandy roads.

De Grasse stationed Admiral Barras and ships of the line off Cape Henry at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay, and ordered several frigates to lie off Old Point Comfort (modern Fort Monroe), while the remainder of the French naval forces blockaded the British naval vessels in the York River. A British attempt on 21 September to employ several merchantmen as fireships against the French had failed to dislodge the enemy. By early October ten merchantmen had been sunk in front of Yorktown in an effort to impede the French men-of-war.

On Sunday morning, 30 September, the Americans and their allies were pleasantly surprised to discover that the enemy had abandoned the three outposts covering the approach from the southwest—the two astride Goosley Road in the Pigeon Quarter and another one to the north covering a road across the top of Yorktown Creek. Although Cornwallis has been severely criticized for his failure to hold these positions to buy time, his decision was sound in the light of the information available to him. He had received word from Sir Henry Clinton on the 29th that a fleet would leave New York for his relief on about 5 October. Since the three abandoned outposts were vulnerable to envelopment by the superior allied force, Cornwallis believed he could best employ his limited forces in a defense of the inner line during the week or so it would take for relief to arrive.

At Gloucester, General George Weedon's Virginia militia, which opposed the British garrison under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Dundas, were reinforced on 28 September by Lauzun's Legion. On 1 October, General Claude-Gabriel, marquis de Choisy assumed overall command and, about the same time, 800 French marines were detached for service on this front. Tarleton's Legion joined Dundas on 2 October. After a spirited clash at Gloucester on 3 October, Choisy kept the British bottled up until the end of the campaign.

REGULAR APPROACHES STARTED

Washington and Rochambeau wasted no time undertaking the siege of Cornwallis's position. On 6 October the main allied force opposite Yorktown was ready to break ground for their formal siege operations. Following techniques developed by French marshal Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban early in the century, French engineers directed the

implementation of his principles of investiture, circumvallation, countervallation, bombardment, and excavation of parallel entrenchments that went ever closer to the British lines. While the French pushed forward on the left, driving the pickets into the Fusilier Redoubt and forcing the Royal Welch Fusiliers to make a stubborn defense of their position, the Americans began edging closer on the right.

To divert attention from the main effort, Saint-Simon's troops started a Flying Sap toward the Fusilier's Redoubt. Meanwhile, the trace of the 2,000 yard-long first parallel was staked out by engineers and well-organized work parties moved forward after dark to dig. Favored by a dark, rainy night and sandy soil, some 1,500 men shoveled enough dirt to have protection in their trench and four redoubts before daylight. Saint-Simon's diversion started drawing enemy fire about 9 P.M. (a French deserter had alerted the British), but the working parties were subjected to little shelling during the night. Cornwallis probably did not realize that the first parallel had been started until the morning of 7 October, when his troops could see it at a distance of 600 to 800 yards from their positions.

On 9 October the first allied batteries were ready to start the bombardment. To divert British attention from the allied right, Washington gave Saint-Simon the honor of opening the show at 3 P.M. on the opposite flank. Early the next day another four batteries were in action—two French and two American—bringing the total to at least 46 pieces. By 10 A.M. allied fire had inflicted such damage that the British could return only about six rounds per hour. The superiority of French artillery and the expertise of French engineers proved decisive in the prosecution of the siege.

On 10 October the battery commanded by Captain Thomas Machin began a bombardment of the town with targeting advice from Governor Thomas Nelson, who directed fire against his uncle's house because he thought it was the location of Cornwallis's headquarters. Actually the British general was in a bunker near the hornwork.

French artillery hot shot set the British frigate *Charon* on fire during the night of 10–11 October, and another three or four vessels were also destroyed by hot shot from Saint-Simon's guns. The British moved the remainder of their vessels closer to Gloucester to evade the French artillerymen. *Charon* was the largest of vessels in the York River which were either destroyed, scuttled, or surrendered by the British. Meanwhile De Grasse sent planned to send *Le Vaillant* (sixty-four guns) and *L'Expériment* (fifty guns) up the York to bombard the town and fleet from the river. This never happened due to the surrender.

ASSAULT OF REDOUBTS NINE AND TEN

Work had been started on the second parallel on 11 October, but two detached British works, Redoubts Nine and Ten, had to be reduced before the American

end of this parallel could be completed. As a preliminary step in the reduction of these two positions, French engineers directed construction of an *epaulement* (a raised defensive wall or elevation) on the eastern end of the second parallel as close to the redoubts as this work could be accomplished. Digging started at dusk on 11 October. All possible allied artillery was brought to bear on the two redoubts, and on 14 October Washington was told that an assault was now feasible.

Redoubt Number Ten was closer to the York River, and Alexander Hamilton claimed the honor of leading the American assault there. Grenadiers and chasseurs of the Gâtinais and Royal Deux-Ponts would make a simultaneous attack on Redoubt Number Nine. It would be commanded by Colonel Guillaume, comte de Deux-Ponts with Colonel Claude, Baron d'Estrade as second in command.

Saint-Simon and Choisy started were to conduct diversionary demonstrations on the Allied left wing and at Gloucester, but these efforts began after the redoubts had fallen. At 7:00 P.M., Hamilton and Deux-Ponts sent their troops forward silently into the darkness. The Americans had their muskets unloaded, and they took Redoubt Ten by the bayonet.

The French column had advanced about 120 yards when they were challenged by a sentry from the parapet of Redoubt Number Nine. The 120 British and Hessian defenders under Lieutenant Duncan McPherson then opened fire as the French rushed forward. While the pioneers worked to clear obstructions so that the entire column could scale the parapet, other officers and men went up without waiting for support.

After inflicting heavy losses on the French before they scaled the parapet, the defenders tried to take refuge behind a line of large casks within the redoubt. The French fired into the huddled mass, and then prepared to close with cold steel. The British and Hessians threw down their arms and surrendered. General Antoine-Charles, baron de Vioménil, who had over-all command of the French attack, arrived and ordered Deux-Ponts to consolidate his position and prepare for a counterattack from the main enemy lines. This threat, however, did not materialize.

Hamilton's attack took place simultaneously, and the Americans were fired on shortly after the Hessian sentinel challenged the French column, some 200 yards away. Lieutenant John Mansfield led his forlorn unit of twenty men from the Fourth Connecticut Regiment into the redoubt, and was supported immediately by the leading battalion. The attack was a brilliant success, costing the Americans only nine killed and twenty-five wounded. The French lost fifteen killed and seventy-seven wounded. In Redoubt Number Ten the enemy had six officers and

sixty-seven men captured; eighteen were killed and fifty captured in Redoubt Number Nine.

Cornwallis did not counterattack, but he massed all possible guns against the captured works. The allies moved working parties out immediately to throw up a protective wall of dirt at the back of the redoubts and to incorporate them into the already completed portion of the second parallel.

ABERCROMBY'S SORTIE AND ESCAPE FAILURE

Completion of the second parallel had not only the obvious effect of moving allied guns within closer range of the enemy lines, but it also permitted batteries to enfilade the defenders. The standard reaction to such a threat is for the defenders to sally forth and spike the most dangerous guns. Therefore, at about 4 A.M. on 16 October, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Abercromby led 350 hand-picked British troops out on this mission. Hitting near the boundary between French and American troops in the second parallel, and near two unfinished batteries where no working parties were then located, Abercromby led his raid westward along the trench. Pretending to be an American detachment, he surprised an element of the Agenais Regiment, most of whom were asleep. After spiking four guns he continued down the trench until he sighted another position. Louis-Marie, count de Noailles discovered the British and started a fight that drove them back to their lines. The raiders had nonetheless spiked two of the American guns before withdrawing. However, the guns had been ineffectually spiked with bayonet points, and the allies had them back in action within six hours.

On the night of 16–17 October, Cornwallis tried to ferry his effective troops across the river, with a view to fighting his way to New York via the Gloucester lines. Insufficient boats and an exceptionally severe storm frustrated this effort. On 17 October, the fourth anniversary of General John Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga (New York), the allied artillery started the heaviest bombardment yet delivered. According to some estimates, more than one hundred artillery pieces were in action.

SURRENDER

Sometime between 9 and 10 A.M. on 17 October, a British drummer appeared on the parapet of the horn work. A redcoated officer then came out in front of the lines with a white handkerchief. The guns gradually fell silent. An American ran out, blindfolded the officer, and led him into the lines. The British officer bore a message from Cornwallis to Washington proposing surrender.

The British commander asked for a 24-hour truce to work out terms. Washington gave him two hours to submit



The Surrender of Yorktown. *The siege left Yorktown in a state of ruin. The surrendered forces remained two days before leaving under militia escort for camps in Maryland and Virginia. During this time, trenches were filled in to prevent their use by a returning enemy force.* THE SURRENDER OF YORKTOWN, 19TH OCTOBER 1781 (OIL ON CANVAS) BY BLARENBERGHE, LOUIS NICOLAS VAN (1716–94) CHATEAU DE VERSAILLES, FRANCE / GIRAUDON / BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY

his proposals. The latter were received about 4:30 P.M., and commissioners met the next morning (18 October) at the Moore House (home of Augustine Moore) to settle details. Dundas and Major Alexander Ross represented Cornwallis; Noailles and John Laurens represented the allies. Washington had stated that “The same Honors will be granted to the Surrendering Army as were granted to the Garrison of Charles Town,” but British appeals and objections resulted in a prolonged and heated session at the Moore House. Washington’s representatives could show him only a rough draft by midnight, but the morning of 20 October he had written his comments on the draft, had the surrender document transcribed, and sent it to Cornwallis to be signed by 11 A.M. Cornwallis was also informed that Washington expected the garrison to march out at 2 P.M. to surrender. Between 11 A.M. and noon the document was back, bearing the signatures of Cornwallis and Captain Thomas Symonds, who was the senior British naval officer present. Washington, Rochambeau, and Barras signed for the allies.

Except for the article based on British precedent at Charleston, that “The troops shall march out, with colors cased, and drums beating a British or a German march,”

the surrender terms were honorable. Cornwallis and his principal officers could return to Europe on parole or go to an American port in British hands. The sloop *Bonetta* was put at the temporary disposal of Cornwallis “to receive an Aid de Camp to carry dispatches to Sir Henry Clinton; and such soldiers as he may think proper to send to New York.” This last provision was a device for getting rid of American deserters to whom Washington could not grant prisoner-of-war status and with whose disciplining he did not wish to be burdened. The troop capacity of the *Bonetta* was 250, and most of those who reached New York on 2 November aboard her were deserters and Loyalists. Surrender terms permitted the British officers to retain their side arms and all personnel to keep their personal effects. The infantry of the Gloucester garrison grounded their arms there, but the John Graves Simcoe’s and Tarleton’s cavalry capitulated with their swords drawn and their trumpets sounding.

At noon two detachments of 100 men each—one French, one American—occupied two British redoubts southeast of Yorktown. The rest of the victorious army formed on both sides of the Hampton road, along which the vanquished would march to the surrender field, about

a mile and a half south of Yorktown. At 2 P.M. the British troops came slowly down the road, allegedly to the tune of "The World Turned Upside Down," but contemporary accounts mention only "melancholy marches."

The man most intimately responsible for their predicament was not, however, at their head. Cornwallis was "sick," so General Charles O'Hara of the Guards acted as his deputy. An interesting scene of military etiquette resulted when O'Hara asked his French escort to point out Rochambeau and the Guardsman then raced ahead to present himself to this officer. With a devastating *savoir faire*, Rochambeau pointed across the road to Washington. The ruddy Irishman bowed and turned about to face Washington, with an apology for his "mistake." Seeing that Cornwallis would not appear, Washington directed O'Hara to his second in command, General Benjamin Lincoln. A persistent myth is that Lincoln received the surrender in compensation for his surrender at Charleston; However, it was a matter of military etiquette that Washington sent the British general to his American counterpart.

Between lines of finely dressed French troops and shabbily dressed American ones, the British and German regiments arrived one by one to present arms; ground their weapons, accoutrements, and cased colors; and return to Yorktown. Some of the prisoners threw their muskets onto the ground in an effort to damage them. There are no authentic details on the surrender of the colors.

NUMBERS AND LOSSES

Of the 16,600 allied ground forces in Yorktown and Gloucester, casualties did not exceed 400. Cornwallis had an initial strength of at least 9,750. A total of 8,087 soldiers and sailors surrendered. Surrendered troops would subsequently be marched to camps in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.

Captured British property included 244 pieces of artillery, at least 2,857 small arms, 24 transports (many of which were small craft), 40 wagons and teams, 260 horses, a military chest of £2,116, and 24 regimental standards, plus ammunition and stores. Cornwallis had surrendered one fourth of the total British military strength in America. Prior to the surrender, the British scuttled most of their naval and cargo vessels.

SEQUEL

By mid-September, Henry Clinton had decided to send a relief expedition to Yorktown, but there were numerous delays even after the arrival of Admiral Robert Digby (who was to transport Clinton's troops) and the repair of damages inflicted by De Grasse off the Chesapeake Capes on 5 September. Clinton sighted the capes on 24 October but, as a French officer put it, "il était trop tard.

La Poule était mangée" ("Too late. The hen had been eaten"). Learning of the surrender, Clinton returned to New York without a fight. Even if he had arrived earlier, De Grasse's foresight in bringing his entire fleet from the West Indies virtually assured that Graves, Digby, and Hood would not have been able to fight their way through and land Clinton's troops at Yorktown.

Washington did his utmost to persuade De Grasse to remain long enough to support operations against the Southern ports. The admiral reluctantly refused, however. His refusal was the consequence of his agreement with the Spanish authorities as to when they might expect his return to the West Indies. On 5 November he sailed away, but he promised to return the following summer.

The siege left Yorktown in a state of ruin from which it never recovered. The surrendered forces remained two days before leaving under militia escort for camps in Maryland and Virginia, and during this time their officers were treated to a series of dinners. Trenches were filled in to prevent their use by a returning enemy force, and the allied army was dispersed. General Arthur St. Clair started south with 2,000 Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware regulars, to reinforce General Nathanael Greene. Washington led the rest of the Americans back to their posts on the Hudson River. Rochambeau's troops remained in Virginia until spring, and on 23 June 1782 started their march back to Newport, Rhode Island.

Congress learned of the victory at Yorktown when Tench Tilghman reached Philadelphia at 3 A.M. on 22 October. As the news traveled north and south there were celebrations throughout the new nation. The fateful news arrived in London about noon on Sunday, 25 November. Frederick Lord North, then prime minister of Britain, who had retained his aplomb through previous disasters, is reported to have received this last intelligence with, "Oh God! It is all over!" The coordinated campaign strategy, the tactical victory of De Grasse's French naval forces over the British fleet, combined with the skillful prosecution of the siege, produced the most decisive military victory of the American war. Historian Jerome Greene concludes: "Contrasted with the British facility for ineptitude and mismanagement, the Allies exhibited a cohesion of purpose paralleled by an admirable ability to coordinate their maneuvers toward the desired objective." Although it would take two years more to conclude the Peace of Paris, after 19 October 1781 the independence of the United States of America was never in doubt.

SEE ALSO *Chesapeake Capes; Flying Sap; Gloucester, Virginia; O'Hara, Charles; World Turned Upside Down.*

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David Curtis Skaggs

YORKTOWN CAMPAIGN. May–October 1781. Patriot fortunes were at particularly low ebb during the winter and spring of 1781. Finances had finally collapsed completely. The British were firmly established in the far south, and Virginia's military operations had left that state ravaged by enemy raiders. Mutiny erupted in the unpaid, ill-fed, badly clothed, sickly, and seemingly forgotten Continental army. The alliance with the French, now in its third year, had been a big disappointment.

EUROPEAN PRELIMINARIES

General George Washington discouragingly wrote in his diary that May:

In a word—instead of having everything in readiness to take the Field, we have nothing—and instead of having the prospect of a glorious offensive campaign before us, we have a bewildered, and gloomy defensive one—unless we should receive a powerful aid of Ships—Land Troops and Money from our generous allies & these, at present, are too contingent to build upon.

Troops, ships, and money from the French allies that was a key to victory, but there also had to be a decisive and coordinated point of attack. Where would that be?

To Paris went the Donatien-Marie-Joseph de Vimeur, vicomte de Rochambeau, son of the commander of 5,500 French troops at Newport, Rhode Island. With him went John Laurens, aide-de-camp to Washington and son of the former president of the Continental Congress (now imprisoned in the Tower of London), bearing a letter from the Marquis de Lafayette. All beseeched their European allies for monetary, military, and naval assistance.

As the collapse of the American resistance seemed imminent, the French and Spanish governments made significant efforts to support the colonial revolt and bolster their own strategic objectives in the New World. In the first months of 1781 they developed a series of strategic decisions that impacted upon the American quest for independence in a dramatic fashion. Paris and Madrid officials decided to concentrate their resources in the Caribbean, and French naval assistance was sent to North America in the autumn of 1781. The principal Franco-Spanish objective was Jamaica, but islands in the Lesser Antilles and the Floridas also invited their attention. From France sailed an armada, commanded by Admiral François-Joseph-Paul, comte de Grasse, bound for the West Indies. A sub-division, commanded by the Bailli de Suffren, headed for the Indian Ocean. The Spanish Council of the Indies dispatched Don Francisco Saavedra de Sangronis as commissioner regio to push a more activist policy among the sometime reluctant military and naval commanders headquartered in Havana. He was also charged to support Louisiana Governor Bernardo de Gálvez's plan to drive the British from West Florida.

For the British there was a sense of elation and desperation. On the one hand, the American revolt seemed about to implode in a burst of exhaustion, financial distress, and military failures. On the other, the British faced problems of strategic overreach, thinly dispersed forces, and uncooperative leadership. They concentrated their American army at New York, but had separate expeditionary forces in the Caribbean, the Floridas, the Carolinas, and Virginia. Should they lose naval superiority, any one of these forces might find itself entrapped by a superior Franco-American or Franco-Spanish combined operation. All sides concentrated their naval forces in the West Indies, where the lucrative sugar islands proved inviting targets of opportunity.

COMMAND CONFERENCES

The key to understanding the Yorktown campaign can be found in three critical allied commander conferences and a series of contradictory, confused, and contrary decisions by semi-independent British commanders that collectively led to the most daring, dramatic, and successful combined arms victory in the age of fighting sail. The first conference occurred in February 1781 when Saavedra met with Spanish army and navy commanders in Havana and secured a reluctant agreement to support Gálvez's expedition against Pensacola. Of particular importance here was the willingness of Commodore the chevalier de Monteil to employ his French naval squadron (temporarily in Havana) in support of this expedition. The agreement brought into being a degree of inter-allied cooperation not seen previously in the Caribbean.

The British surrender of Pensacola in May earned Gálvez a promotion to field marshal and his designation as commander of Spanish ground forces in the Caribbean. He then dispatched his long-time friend, Saavedra, to sail with Monteil to Saint-Domingue (now Santo Domingo, capital of the Dominican Republic) to coordinate operations with De Grasse, who was expected from France. The battle for Pensacola exposed the vulnerability of isolated British garrisons to combined operations that secured local naval control. The French and Spanish understood this, but British leadership ignored the lessons of West Florida and the near loss of Savannah in 1779. Meanwhile, the picture for the Americans suddenly brightened. First, in March, at Guilford Courthouse in North Carolina, Major General Nathanael Greene lost a battle to General Charles Lord Cornwallis. This nominal defeat, however, so depleted the British general's forces that he withdrew to Wilmington to resupply his troops. This withdrawal to the coast uncovered the Carolinas for possible reconquest by Greene's Continental and militia troops.

The second conference occurred in mid-May, when Commodore Jacques-Melchior-St. Laurent, comte de Barras arrived in Boston on the frigate *Concorde*. He did not bring with him the hoped-for second division of French troops to Newport, Rhode Island, but he provided Lieutenant General Jean-Baptiste-Donatien de Vimeur, Comte de Rochambeau a confidential letter indicating that De Grasse was to come to the North American coast during the Caribbean hurricane season. Although not yet authorized to give this last important piece of news to Washington, Rochambeau did propose that the two senior commanders meet to decide what might be done with the forces at hand. The American commander understood the criticality of naval superiority to military success, but had experienced disappointment after disappointment with the French Navy's inability to secure dominance at crucial points along the North American coast in previous years. The latest example came in March 1781, when Captain Charles-René-Dominique Gochet, the chevalier des Touches secured a tactical victory over a Royal navy squadron off the Virginia coast and then threw away the opportunity to isolate a British raiding party in the Chesapeake by returning to Rhode Island.

General Sir Henry Clinton was in and around New York City with about 10,500 rank and file troops, whereas Washington had 3,500 Continentals in the Hudson Highlands. The French fleet was bottled up at Newport with about 5,000 French troops. Lafayette was in Virginia with a sizable detachment of Continental troops, prepared to oppose the British raiding parties in that region, and Anthony Wayne was preparing to add his support with more regulars. Greene was doing what he could to contain the forces of Cornwallis in the Carolinas. What Cornwallis would do from his Wilmington base was unknown.

Enemy forces were also known to be coming up Lake Champlain from Canada, and an invasion of northern New York was a possibility.

Washington and Rochambeau conferred at Wethersfield, Connecticut, on 22 May 1781, with this strategic situation as the backdrop for their deliberations. They also shared the disappointing knowledge that Barras lacked the naval strength to join in amphibious operations unless he received huge reinforcements. Washington therefore proposed a joint Franco-American ground operation against New York City. The American commander believed New York was the decisive point of attack, and that it would be extremely hazardous to march 450 miles to the Chesapeake Bay in a hot summer under the possibility of securing French naval superiority (never before achieved) against a mere raiding party. Rochambeau objected strenuously, realizing that the British had spent five years fortifying the New York islands and possessed army and naval superiority and interior lines to thwart any attack. He also understood that it would be extremely difficult for the deep-draft, heavily armed French vessels to cross the bar at Sandy Hook and enter New York harbor.

Washington obstinately stuck to the idea of a New York campaign, and Rochambeau reluctantly agreed that the proposed plan was the best possible option, at least for the time being. However, Rochambeau asked what might be done later, if naval reinforcements from the West Indies happened to become available? It is important to note that Rochambeau was not authorized at this time inform Washington that De Grasse actually was under orders to effect such cooperation. It is therefore incorrect to say, as many writers have, that the "Wethersfield Plan" visualized the strategy of the Yorktown Campaign. Washington's restrained reply was that, with effective French naval support, the strategic possibilities would be almost unlimited. The two commanders decided at Wethersfield that De Grasse should be asked to come north as soon as possible, and that Rochambeau would move his army towards New York, where they would probe Clinton's position.

Back in Newport on May 28, Rochambeau wrote to De Grasse a critical letter that undercut much of what Washington desired. He painted a gloomy picture of the situation and urged the admiral to bring money, soldiers, and ships northward as soon as possible. While acknowledging that he and Washington had agreed in choosing New York as the primary target, he also noted that the "southwesterly winds and the state of distress in Virginia will probably make you prefer the Chesapeake Bay." Enclosed in this epistle was a copy of a letter from Anne César, chevalier de La Luzerne, then serving as French ambassador to the United States. The letter, addressed to Barras and Rochambeau, stated that it appeared "imperative to take into the Chesapeake all the naval forces of the king

along with whatever land forces the generals judge suitable.” This enclosure was critical to the operational decision that was made in the West Indies. Nearly important was a second letter, dated 6 June, in which Rochambeau reported that the funds necessary to pay and to supply the French army would dry up by mid-October unless De Grasse brought with him 1,200,000 livres in specie.

LORD CORNWALLIS’S FATAL DECISION

Meanwhile, in the south, Cornwallis devised an operational plan that made the Chesapeake option much more inviting to America and its allies than it had been when Washington and Rochambeau met in Wethersfield. When Clinton left Cornwallis to command British forces in the South after the capture of Charleston (12 May 1780), Clinton instructed his subordinate to make the security of South Carolina his primary concern. Clinton’s over-all strategy for the prosecution of the war in America was, for the time being, defensive. He planned to hold the vital bases at New York, Charleston, and Savannah until the government furnished the reinforcements he considered necessary for further offensive operations. Although Sir Henry has never been called a military genius, his estimate of the situation was sound. He called for 10,000 more troops and the assurance of continued naval supremacy for operations in 1781. Most historians agree with the soundness of this assessment.

The zealous Cornwallis, however, had other ideas. The best way to defend South Carolina, he proposed, was to attack into North Carolina and destroy what little American armed strength was located there. Clinton had no objection, provided that Cornwallis remembered his primary mission. Since New York was too far away for Clinton to control the operations of Cornwallis, the latter was granted the authority to communicate directly with London. While Cornwallis was preparing for his move into North Carolina he learned that American General Horatio Gates was advancing against his forward bases. Ignoring the odds, Cornwallis took the offensive, and brilliantly defeated Gates at Camden on 16 August 1780. Some have said that this victory cost the British the war.

Cornwallis sent his aide-de-camp, Captain Alexander Ross, to carry the news of the victory at Camden to London. When he returned from England in December, Ross informed Cornwallis that he had the favor of Lord George Germain, the American Secretary. Dazzled by the Camden victory, Germain virtually gave Cornwallis free rein in the south. As a result, Cornwallis’s attitude toward Clinton was no longer that of a subordinate to a superior. Germain thought he found in the relatively youthful Cornwallis a general who would implement what historian John W. Fortescue has called Germain’s “insane schemes of conquest without garrisons and of invasions without communications” (*History*, III, p. 358).

Despite the British disasters at Kings Mountain (7 October 1780), and Cowpens (17 January 1781), and the failure of expected Loyalist support in North Carolina, Cornwallis followed Gates’s successor, Major General Nathanael Greene to the Dan River. He ignored Clinton’s instructions to make the security of South Carolina his primary concern, and refused to withdraw from an untenable position around Hillsboro, North Carolina. His Pyrrhic victory at Guilford Courthouse on 15 March 1781 forced him to withdraw, but instead of falling back to Camden, South Carolina, he moved to Wilmington, North Carolina. Furthermore, he so misrepresented the facts of the Guilford engagement that Clinton and the London authorities were led to believe he had gained control of North Carolina. By the time they knew the truth, Cornwallis was marching to Virginia and Greene was moving against the scattered British forces of the young Francis Lord Rawdon in South Carolina.

When Clinton received the incredible news that Cornwallis had abandoned the Carolinas and arrived at Petersburg, Virginia, he expressed his disapproval. However, he was presented with a *fait accompli*, and so he acquiesced in the Virginia move. Exasperated by Lord George Germain’s meddling and by the government’s support of Cornwallis’s strategy in the Carolinas, which favored expansion over pacification, Clinton decided to resign “the instant I could with propriety.” Consequently, Clinton gave his subordinate complete freedom of action, even though he wished Cornwallis was back in South Carolina. Fortescue says that Clinton “kept Cornwallis close at hand in order to resign the command to him, instead of sending him back, as he ought, to Carolina” (*History*, III, p. 391).

The famed Hessian jäger commander, Johann Ewald, could not understand why Cornwallis would throw away hard won ground in the Carolinas for less acreage in Virginia. Shortly after allied commanders returned from Wethersfield to their camps to prepare for the coming campaign, they learned that Cornwallis had reached Virginia. This meant Lafayette was in a dangerous position, and that plans for the diversion against New York would have to be speeded up in the hope that Clinton might reduce his forces in Virginia to defend his main North American base. It also meant that the Chesapeake option contained a much more inviting target than existed at the time of the Wethersfield meeting.

ALARMING DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE ALLIES

The Americans and their allies were now faced with certain alarming developments. The most serious was that the Wethersfield plan had been compromised. On 3 June, Clinton received an intercepted copy of the plan. This was ironic, for the intercept persuaded Clinton of a Franco-American attack on New York to such an extent

that Washington and Rochambeau were in Philadelphia before Clinton began to anticipate a possible switch to the Chesapeake strategy.

The next bad news came from Commodore Barras. He was under orders to withdraw from Newport to provide greater base security at Boston once Rochambeau's army left Rhode Island. If he did so, he could have undertaken a profitable raiding campaign in the Bay of Fundy and Gulf of St. Lawrence during the summer. In a delicate negotiation, however, Rochambeau persuaded Barras to stay in Newport under the protection of a few French troops and American militiamen. If he remained, operations could be more easily coordinated between Barras, Rochambeau, and De Grasse, and Barras would be more readily available to transport the siege artillery left in Newport to whatever location in which it might be needed. However, Washington also received news that British forces had pushed up Lake Champlain to Crown Point, and he had to resist the proposal that he detach regulars to meet a possible invasion of northern New York.

DECISIONS IN THE WEST INDIES

On 20 June the *Concorde* sailed out of Boston for the West Indies carrying messages from Barras, Rochambeau, and La Luzerne to Admiral De Grasse, along with several pilots who had knowledge of navigation in American waters. A few days later, Saavedra accompanied Monteil's squadron heading for Cap Français, Saint-Domingue (modern Cap-Haïtien, Haiti). Both awaited De Grasse—he arrived on 16 July. After reading the dispatches from the north, De Grasse decided that the Chesapeake Bay would be his destination. De Grasse then met with Saavedra on board *La Ville de Paris* in the third and most crucial allied conference of the year. After several days of discussions, they concluded a Franco-Spanish concord known as the De Grasse-Saavedra Agreement.


This document permitted a most critical element in the Chesapeake encirclement. Both men concluded that the onset of the hurricane season required them to postpone any invasion of Jamaica until early 1782. This understanding freed ground and naval forces for use in operations elsewhere. Although De Grasse desired Spanish ships to accompany him northward, Saavedra knew that the Spanish government could not endorse the direct support of the United States that such a move would constitute. Instead, they compromised. De Grasse would surprise everyone and take all his ships of the line to North America, whereas Saavedra promised to send four Spanish naval vessels from Havana to Cap Français to protect the French merchantmen anchored there. Later, in Havana, a very frustrated Saavedra would be unable to convince Admiral José de Solano to honor this commitment, but fortunately, the Spanish ships were not needed. Saavedra also agreed to release a French army force that had been stationed at

Saint-Domingue and allocated to Gálvez's command for the Jamaica invasion. These troops were made available to De Grasse for employment on the American coast. As a consequence, De Grasse would bring with him approximately 3,300 infantry, 100 artillerymen, 100 dragoons, 10 field pieces, and a few siege guns and mortars.

De Grasse and Saavedra then turned to a consideration of future operations. De Grasse promised that he would return to the West Indies in October. He further agreed that the French would allow Gálvez to command ground forces in attacks on the British Windward Islands, should the Spanish desire to make this a combined operation. (As it turned out this winter campaign was solely a French one.) It was understood that Gálvez would command the ground troops and De Grasse the naval vessels during the Jamaica campaign.

The single element remaining on the agenda concerned the money Rochambeau requested to support the proposed operations. Much to De Grasse's disgust, the French merchants and planters on Saint-Domingue refused to loan money to this purpose, and he was forced to go begging to Saavedra. The Spaniard agreed to seek funds in Havana. This decision forced De Grasse to make another choice. Instead of sailing east of the Bahama Islands toward the American coast, he would have to negotiate the shallow Bahama Channel between those islands and Cuba so that he could pick up any funds Saavedra might acquire. The Spaniard sailed ahead, and in Havana he secured overnight loans from local citizens amounting to 1.2 million livres. These funds were forwarded to De Grasse near Matanzas, on the northeast Cuban coast. This, too, was ironic. Forced to sail in the Bahama Channel, rather than directly into American coastal waters, De Grasse evaded any British sighting of his fleet. This permitted him to sail toward the Chesapeake without his opponent knowing the strength of his forces or his destination. Meanwhile, the *Concorde* sailed northward with news of De Grasse's intentions for the anxious Washington, Rochambeau, and Barras.

The British failed to understand the size of De Grasse's fleet and the risks the French admiral would take. This incomprehension contributed to the inadequate force deployment by Admiral Sir George Rodney, commander of the Royal navy fleet in the Caribbean. Rodney made three conventional assumptions about French naval behavior, based on past experience, and these assumptions proved totally wrong in this instance. His first error was in assuming that part of De Grasse's fleet would be diverted from military action to serve as escorts to convey homeward the merchantmen in port in the West Indies. His second mistake was to assume that some of De Grasse's fleet would remain in the West Indies, which led to his third erroneous assumption, that only about ten French ships of the line would make the trip to North America. Rodney made no



THE GALE GROUP

effort to ascertain the accuracy of these conclusions. For instance, he did not order any of his frigates to shadow De Grasse's movements. Instead, the ailing Rodney took three

ships of the line with him to convoy British merchantmen home and sent three more in a convoy to Jamaica. Two of these were to sail to New York, but they did not arrive in

time. Finally, he sent Admiral Sir Samuel Hood with fourteen to join Admiral Thomas Graves in New York. In addition, he sent a dispatch to Graves directing him to meet Hood at the Chesapeake, but the French captured the ship carrying this message. Thus, De Grasse's audacity was rivaled by British complacency and misfortune.

De Grasse left Saint-Domingue on 5 August, and sailed slowly through the Bahama Channel with Spanish pilots. The twenty-eight French liners spent one day loading the 1,200,000 livres from Havana before proceeding northward. Hood and his fourteen ships left Antigua on 10 August. Because they sailed east of the Bahamas, they missed sighting De Grasse's fleet. Sir Samuel arrived at the Chesapeake Capes on 25 August, and found neither Admiral Graves, whom he expected, nor the French, whom he anticipated. He therefore continued north to New York where, on 28 August, he alerted Graves of the danger to Cornwallis. Royal naval forces numbered nineteen ships of the line, compared to De Grasse's twenty-eight. Neither British admiral realized that their French opponents overmatched them in fleet strength.

OPERATIONS AGAINST MANHATTAN

The junction of Rochambeau's forces with those of Washington did not take place until six weeks after plans were made at Wethersfield. The French infantry left Newport on 9 June and moved twenty-five miles north, to Providence. On 18 June the French troops started west. Washington, meanwhile, reorganized his own forces, and by 24 June he was camped near Peekskill, New York, awaiting Rochambeau's arrival. On the 28th, however, he conceived the ambitious plan of capturing the British posts on the north end of Manhattan Island so as to speed up subsequent operations against Clinton.

Major General Benjamin Lincoln was given 800 good troops for this surprise attack—400 light infantry under Colonel Alexander Scammell, the battalion of Lieutenant Colonel Ebenezer Sprout, and a detachment of artillery. They were to descend the Hudson River from Peekskill on the night of 2–3 July, capture the works around Kings Bridge, and raid Forts Tryon and Knyphausen (formerly Fort Washington). If this plan did not turn out to be feasible, Lincoln was to land above Spuyten Duyvil and support an attack by the duc de Lauzun's Legion, and the Connecticut militia against the Tory troops of Oliver De Lancey Jr., who were deployed around Morrisania, northeast of Kings Bridge. The complicated plan was coordinated with Rochambeau, who gave his full cooperation, Washington personally supervised most of the preparations, but everything went wrong.

Washington had advanced with the rest of his force to Valentine's Hill, four miles above Kings Bridge, to support Lincoln, and Rochambeau was asked to hurry toward

the same point. After spending the day of the 3 July reconnoitering for further operations against Manhattan, Washington withdrew his entire force to Dobb's Ferry on 4 July, and the French joined him there on the 6th.


During the four days starting 21 July, 5,000 French and American troops pushed out to form a screen while Washington and Rochambeau, with an escort of 150 Continentals, thoroughly reconnoitered the northern defenses of Manhattan. This convinced them that an attack would require formal siege operations, which they lacked the means to undertake. Allied plans now hung on word from De Grasse. There was still no suspicion that the closing scene of the American Revolution would be enacted at a place called Yorktown, Virginia.

CONFUSION IN VIRGINIA

After failing in his efforts to trap Lafayette, Cornwallis reached Williamsburg, Virginia, on 25 June. There he received Clinton's letter of 11 June, which said: "I beg leave to recommend it to you, as soon as you have finished the active operations you may be now engaged in, to take a defensive station in any healthy situation you choose, be it at Williamsburg or Yorktown." Clinton also requested that a major portion of Cornwallis's force be sent to New York, to defend against the expected allied attack. Another letter, received this same day, was dated 15 June. This one added Portsmouth and Old Point Comfort, both in Virginia, to possible locations for Cornwallis's base. It also informed him of the possibility that De Grasse was moving his French fleet from the West Indies to attack New York.

The ever-eager Cornwallis, who thought operations in Virginia were so important that Clinton should abandon New York to provide the necessary strength to support them, now made the startling request that he be allowed to return to Charleston. He also decided that he could not hold a position on the peninsula after sending a detachment of troops to New York, and made plans to cross the James River to reach Portsmouth. He skillfully lured Lafayette into the action at Green Spring, 6 July, but failed to follow up on his advantage. If he had, he might well have crippled the American army to such an extent that he could maintain his position on the peninsula. Instead, he crossed the James and immediately (8 July) received instructions from Clinton to send 2,000 or 3,000 troops to Philadelphia, instead of New York. On the 12th he received another letter, this one changing the destination of the reinforcements back to New York. Finally, on 20 July, he was told to keep all his troops and establish a naval station on the tip of the peninsula at Old Point Comfort. This last directive reflected Admiral Graves's desire for an ice-free, winter anchorage at Hampton Roads.

This tangle of orders and counter-orders resulted from Clinton's efforts to direct Cornwallis with instructions that



Washington Before Yorktown (1824), by Rembrandt Peale. *Washington achieved an astounding strategic success at Yorktown. While luck figured prominently, the American commander showed skill of the highest order in planning and executing the campaign.* REMBRANDT PEALE, *WASHINGTON BEFORE YORKTOWN*, (AMERICAN, 1779–1860) OIL ON CANVAS, 137.5 X 120 IN. GIFT OF THE MOUNT VERNON LADIES ASSOCIATION, MOUNT VERNON, VIRGINIA. 44.1. CORCORAN GALLERY OF ART, WASHINGTON, D.C./CORBIS.

took eight days to arrive, while Germain was trying to direct both of them from across the Atlantic. All three agreed that major operations should be undertaken in the Chesapeake, but they disagreed on the timing. Clinton wanted to establish a post at the mouth of the Chesapeake that would immediately serve as a base for naval operations and later, when the necessary reinforcements were available, as a base for land operations in the Middle Colonies. Cornwallis wanted to move on the Middle Colonies operations immediately, even if it meant abandoning New York. Historian Fortescue suggests that Germain “desired to combine both designs after some incomprehensible fashion of his own,” and accuses Germain of “ill-timed interference . . . in every respect fatal” (*History*, p. 391). According to Fortescue, noting that Clinton’s demand for reinforcements from Cornwallis was almost immediately contradicted by a letter from Germain that prohibited the withdrawal of troops from the Chesapeake:

This was nothing less than the rejection of the Commander-in-chief’s scheme in favour of his subordinate’s; yet by the irony of fate Clinton

had hardly received this order before Germain [sic] repented of it, and wrote again, though of course too late, to approve of Clinton’s original plan (*History*, p. 390, citing Germain to Clinton, 7 and 14 July 1781).

Historian John Tilly shares in this judgment, and concludes:

The combination of Cornwallis’s presence in Virginia, Graves’s desire to winter at Hampton Roads, Germain’s dispatch, and the rebel and French threat to New York forced Clinton to compromise. . . . The gist of Clinton’s decision was simple: Cornwallis was to set up, somewhere in the vicinity of Hampton Roads, a ‘post’ suitable for the protection of a squadron of ships of the line (*British Navy*, 247).

Clinton’s final order, which told Cornwallis to establish the base at Old Point Comfort (modern Fort Monroe, Virginia), also authorized Cornwallis to occupy Yorktown, if this would contribute to the security of his main position. However, Cornwallis’s engineers advised him that the former site was unsuitable. They judged that the channel was too wide to be covered by shore batteries, there would be inadequate protection for shipping, and enemy vessels could closely approach the post and bombard it. Cornwallis therefore picked Yorktown for his main base, and established a supporting position across the York River at Gloucester Point. Although Clinton later insisted that this was a violation of his orders, he tacitly acquiesced in this arrangement. Cornwallis might have been better served had he returned across the James River and taken a position at Portsmouth, where fortifications had already been erected and from which he might have more easily escaped to the Carolinas. These considerations notwithstanding, by 22 August Cornwallis had moved his entire command into the two posts that they would eventually leave only as prisoners of war.

THE ALLIED CONCENTRATION BEGINS

On 14 August Washington and Rochambeau received the news that shaped the decisive operation of the war: De Grasse was sailing for the Chesapeake with 28 warships and more than 3,000 troops. He would remain available for combined operations until 15 October, and then he would return to the West Indies. Moreover, German reinforcements reached New York in early August, bringing Clinton’s total strength to over 15,000 rank and file troops. This seemingly negated any chance of a successful assault on the now well-defended New York. Additionally, probes at Clinton’s defenses proved their impregnability, at least by the forces currently at hand.

Washington’s course of action was now obvious, but he remained obsessed with New York even though,



Washington and his Generals at Yorktown (c. 1784). *This painting by Charles Willson Peale depicts General Washington near Yorktown with a group of senior officers that includes the comte de Rochambeau, the Marquis de Lafayette, and Trench Tilghman.* PRIVATE COLLECTION, © CHRISTIE'S IMAGES/BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY

as early as 2 August, he had expressed growing support for the Chesapeake option. Washington believed Cornwallis would escape any trap in the Chesapeake region before the army could arrive. In addition, he had been disappointed too many times by the French navy to depend on it now. He also realized that most of his New England troops would not go so far southward.

Further complicating allied planning was the distinct possibility that the British navy would interfere with any operation in the Chesapeake. For instance, Commodore Barras could be spotted and attacked by the British fleet before reaching the Peninsula with the French siege artillery and the Americans' reserve of salted provisions from Newport. Natural disaster also loomed, in the form of a hurricane that might strike the French fleet either en route to the Chesapeake or after it arrived. Additional concerns revolved around the possibility that Clinton might attack the strung out Franco-American columns along the

Hudson, or that he might strike out against Philadelphia, or toward the fortress of West Point.

Finally, with a decisiveness that does credit to his reputation as a great captain, Washington abandoned his preference for New York and started planning the strategy dictated by De Grasse's Chesapeake decision. Rochambeau directed Barras to take the siege guns and supplies from Newport to the Chesapeake. Barras left Newport on 25 August, forcing British Admiral Graves to contend with two French fleets at sea whose size and destination he did not know. Washington directed General William Heath to remain on the Hudson with half the army, including most of its New Englanders, and charged him with three tasks. Heath was to cover the passage of the Virginia expedition across the river, feign a move towards Staten Island to confuse Clinton, and then withdraw to the Hudson Highlands. Washington called to duty thousands of militiamen from Pennsylvania to Connecticut should Clinton sortie from his

New York defenses. As a consequence Clinton remained behind his New York entrenchments and frittered away an opportunity to redeem some of the losses that the British had already sustained in the Carolinas. The importance of this rear guard of American troops to the whole plan is neglected in most of the historical literature on the campaign.

The Americans crossed the Hudson River by Kings Ferry to Stony Point on 20–21 August, and the French completed their crossing on the 25th. Clinton was puzzled by this movement, but not worried. He knew De Grasse was expected, but he had been assured that Rodney would send a superior force, and he was confident that the Royal navy would retain command of the Atlantic coastal waters. On the latter assumption, therefore, Clinton ruled out the possibility that Washington would march to Virginia. Far from concerned about the indications that the Americans were preparing to attack Staten Island—his spies duly reported the presence of boats with the American army—Clinton was planning an attack on Rhode Island. Fortescue assesses the situation in the following terms:

It was not until the 2nd of September [when the allied army reached Philadelphia] that Clinton realized that Washington was actually on the march for Virginia, but still he felt little anxiety. He wrote to Cornwallis that Admiral Robert Digby's squadron was expected shortly, and that he himself would send reinforcements and make a diversion from New York, adding, in tragic ignorance of the true state of affairs, that as Graves had sailed Cornwallis need fear nothing (*History*, p. 393).

Admiral Digby's three ships did not arrive in time to accompany Admirals Graves and Hood to their fateful encounter with De Grasse in the battle of the Chesapeake Capes on 5 September. The French navy's tactical victory was a strategic triumph of enormous proportions that not only sealed Cornwallis's fate but also that of most of the British empire in North America.

THE ALLIED MARCH SOUTH

After crossing the Hudson, the allies followed three roughly parallel routes to Princeton, New Jersey. The American light infantry moved on the left, through Paramus, to simulate an attack in the direction of Staten Island, and the entire army halted in the vicinity of Chatham and Springfield (due west of New York City) during 28 August in order to heighten the deception and also to close up the columns. On the 29th the columns still marched as if heading for Sandy Hook to link up with the French fleet, but on the next day they abandoned the deception and openly headed for Princeton.

The leading elements of Washington's army reached Princeton on the 30th, and Washington rode ahead with Rochambeau to enter Philadelphia the same day. The

American troops passed through Philadelphia on 2 September and continued straight on to reach Head of Elk on 6 September. They found time, however, to let Congress know that, despite the lawmakers' problems of higher finance, they wanted a month's pay before they continued their patriotic steps southward, and they wanted it in hard money. Robert Morris had to raise the funds by borrowing from Rochambeau's war chest. French troops entered the American capital in two divisions on 3 and 4 September, dazzling the provincials with their brilliant uniforms, their bands, and their military precision.

After struggling with problems of transportation and hoping for news of the two French fleets, Washington had left Philadelphia on 5 September. At Chester, that afternoon, he received the joyful intelligence that De Grasse had reached the Chesapeake safely. Now all he had to worry about was whether Barras would get through with the siege guns and whether Lafayette and the troops brought by De Grasse would be able to keep Cornwallis from escaping up the Peninsula and into the Carolinas.

While their troops waited at Head of Elk, Baltimore, and Annapolis for transportation, Washington and Rochambeau rode ahead with their staffs. From 9 to 12 September they stopped at Mount Vernon, Washington's home, which he had not seen for six years. They reached the Peninsula on 14 September. Although Cornwallis had not tried to escape the Chesapeake region, the naval situation was still fraught with suspense. Washington had learned on 12 September that de Grasse's fleet had sailed away to meet a British fleet that was approaching the Chesapeake, and there was still no news about Barras. By the morning of the 15th, however, word came that De Grasse was back and that Barras had arrived safely. The noose encircled Cornwallis's neck, although the trap door had not yet been sprung.

CONCLUSION

With the Yorktown campaign, Washington achieved an astounding strategic success. While luck figured prominently, the American commander showed skill of the highest order in planning and executing this concentration of allied forces. The odds against all of this coming together successfully were astronomical, but they had been overcome.

Still, one must not laud the American general too much. As his biographer Joseph J. Ellis notes, Washington's "subsequent distortion of the historical record" (he indicated that he had advocated the Chesapeake idea in the fall of 1780) "was designed to make the Yorktown victory a possibility he saw early on, whereas his correspondence reveals that New York had dominated his mind's eye for so long that he only gave it up grudgingly and gradually" (p. 133). In allocating praise for the success of the Yorktown

campaign, the strategic contributions of Rochambeau, De Grasse, Barras, and Saavedra should never be overlooked, nor should the exertions of thousands of French and American sailors and soldiers, who collectively turned paper plans into physical reality, be ignored. All these participants contributed to an outcome in which, according to Washington biographer James T. Flexner, "the curtain fell on the greatest defeat which the European aristocratic way of life had so far suffered" (p. 464).

SEE ALSO *Cornwallis, Charles; Clinton, Henry; Finances of the Revolution; French Alliance; Wethersfield Conference, Connecticut.*

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David Curtis Skaggs

YOUNG'S HOUSE, NEW YORK.

(Four Corners). 3 February 1780. The "Neutral Ground" was the term used to describe the zone around New York City lying outside the permanent control of either side. Both the Americans and the British patrolled aggressively all year long, seeking opportunities to overpower small parties, inflict casualties, and damage enemy morale. The regions within the Neutral Ground became hunting grounds for elite units, and both sides sought to employ their best officers as commanders there. The heart of the zone lay in Westchester County, in the region between the Hudson River and Bedford and between White Plains and the Croton River. For the Americans, this sector fell under the supervision of the Highlands Department, which had its headquarters at West Point. In the winter of 1779–1780 Major General William Heath, the departmental head, placed Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Thompson (Tenth Massachusetts Regiment) on duty with a detachment of five Massachusetts companies—about 250 men.

Thompson violated a cardinal rule by remaining in one location for several days. Alerted by an active intelligence network, the British launched an expedition from Fort Knyphausen (previously Fort Washington) against him. Thompson learned of the enemy's advance but, perhaps deceived by the extreme winter weather, thought he had only to deal with a mounted patrol. In reality he was the target of Lieutenant Colonel Chaple Norton with 450 infantry and 100 mounted men. The core of the task force consisted of the two grenadier and two light companies of the Guards Brigade, augmented by detachments from two Hesse-Cassel infantry regiments,

some mounted and dismounted jägers, and forty Loyalists from Colonel James De Lancey's Westchester Refugees (The Cowboys).

Norton's mounted vanguard overwhelmed a nine-man outpost and then opened a long-range fire on Thompson, who had three of his companies in position at the crossroad. Around 9 A.M. Norton's main body came up and the opposing forces spent fifteen minutes in a hot firefight. Some of the Americans broke and the rest withdrew, covered by a fourth company that came up. A few took refuge in the house of Joseph Young, which was captured and burned.

The Americans lost fourteen killed, fourteen wounded, and ninety-five captured, including Thompson. Norton admitted losing five killed and eighteen wounded.

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revised by Robert K. Wright Jr.

ZANE, EBENEZER. (1747–1812). Pioneer. Virginia. Born near modern Moorefield, West Virginia, he explored and surveyed lands in the Ohio country with his brothers Silas and Jonathan, claiming thousands of acres in the process. During Dunmore's War he was the disbursing agent of the Virginia militia, in which he held the rank of colonel, and in 1774 he supervised the construction of Fort Fincastle (later Fort Henry). During the Revolution he took part in the defense of Fort Henry in both 1777 and 1782. His brother Jonathan was present at Crawford's defeat in 1782, and his sister Elizabeth became a heroine of the Revolution. As a member of the Virginia ratifying convention of 1788, Zane supported the Constitution. In 1793 he laid out the town of Wheeling and began selling lots. In 1796 Ebenezer got permission from Congress to open a road from Wheeling to Limestone (Maysville), Kentucky, when southern Ohio was opened for settlement by the Treaty of Greenville. This became the famous "Zane's Trace," and Zanesville (originally Westbourne) was established on a section of land granted to Zane where his road crossed the Muskingum. Zane died in Wheeling on 19 November 1812.

SEE ALSO *Crawford's Defeat; Wayne, Anthony; Wheeling, West Virginia.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ZEISBERGER, DAVID. (1721–1808). Moravian missionary. Born in Bohemia, he followed his parents to Georgia a year after they had established the first of the Moravian settlements there in 1736. In 1745 Zeisberger became a missionary among the Indians, earning the trust of the Iroquois and the enmity of many whites. Present as an interpreter for several treaty negotiations, he helped the Delawares build the town of Friedenshuetten in the Wyoming Valley in 1767 and aided in the establishment of the missionary communities of Schoenbrunn Gnadenuhnten, Salem, and Lichtenau in Ohio between 1771 and 1774. Until 1782 Zeisberger secretly supplied information to the Patriots, talking his way out of a number of difficult encounters with pro-British Indians. But after the Gnadenuhnten massacre, he ended his political involvement. He continued to live among Indians and established new settlements in Michigan, Ohio, and Canada, earning a reputation as one of the most successful and honest Christian missionaries in North America. In 1798, encouraged by Congress, Zeisberger returned to Ohio and established a mission at Goshen, where he died on 17 November 1808.

SEE ALSO *Gnadenuhnten Massacre, Ohio; Moravian Settlements.*

revised by Michael Bellesiles

ZÉSPEDES Y VELASCO, VICENTE MANUEL DE. (1720–1794). Spanish officer and official. Born in Spain in 1720, Zéspedes entered the military in 1734, serving in several postings in North Africa, South America, and Cuba. Named captain of grenadiers, he was sent in 1761 to Pensacola, Florida, which he successfully defended against the Creeks, receiving a royal citation for his performance. In 1768 he was sent to New Orleans to put down French resistance to Spanish control. When Spain and England went to war in 1779, Zéspedes was promoted to colonel and placed in command of the Havana Regiment, serving as interim governor in 1782. With the end of the American Revolution, he was promoted to brigadier general and made governor of East Florida, overseeing the transfer of authority from Britain to Spain. Zéspedes's primary duty was to protect Spanish territory from the encroachment of the new United States. Toward this end, he entered into a number of mutually beneficial treaties with the Indian nations of the region and supplied the Creeks with arms and ammunition for their struggle

Zéspedes y Velasco, Vincente Manuel de

against Georgia. He also established an extensive intelligence network through which he could keep the Spanish government aware of American expansionism. In 1790 he returned to Havana, where he died on 21 July 1794.

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Michael Bellesiles

Appendices

Appendix I: Signers of the Declaration of Independence

	State	Birthdate	Birthplace	Age at Signing	Occupation	Death Date	Age at Death
Adams, John	MA	10/30/1735	Quincy, MA	40	Lawyer	7/4/1826	90
Adams, Samuel	MA	9/27/1722	Boston, MA	53	Politician	10/2/1803	81
Bartlett, Josiah	NH	11/21/1729	Amesbury, MA	46	Physician	5/19/1795	65
Braxton, Carter	VA	9/10/1736	Newington, VA	39	Planter Merchant, Planter	10/10/1797	61
Carroll, Charles (of Carrollton)	MD	9/19/1737	Annapolis, MD	38		11/14/1832	95
Chase, Samuel	MD	4/17/1741	Somerset Co., MD	35	Lawyer	6/19/1811	70
Clark, Abraham	NJ	2/15/1726	Elizabethtown, NJ	50	Surveyor	9/15/1794	68
Clymer, George	PA	3/16/1739	Philadelphia, PA	37	Merchant	1/24/1813	73
Ellery, William	RI	12/22/1727	Newport, RI	48	Lawyer, Merchant	2/15/1820	92
Floyd, William	NJ	12/17/1734	Brookhaven, NY	41	Land Speculator	8/4/1821	86
Franklin, Benjamin	PA	1/17/1706	Boston, MA	70	Printer, scientist	4/17/1790	84
Gerry, Elbridge	MA	7/17/1744	Marblehead, MA	32	Merchant	11/23/1814	70
Gwinnett, Button	GA	1735	Gloucester, England	41	Merchant, Planter	5/15/1777	42
Hall, Lyman	GA	4/12/1724	Wallingford, CT	52	Physician, Minister	10/19/1790	66
Hancock, John	MA	1/12/1737	Quincy, MA	40	Merchant	10/8/1793	56
Harrison, Benjamin	VA	4/7/1726	Charles City Co., VA	65	Planter	4/24/1791	65
Hart, John	NJ	1714	Hopewell, NJ	62	Landowner	5/11/1779	65
Hewes, Joseph	NY	1/23/1730	Kingston, NJ	46	Merchant	10/10/1779	49
Heyward, Thomas	SC	7/28/1746	St. Helena Parish, SC	30	Lawyer, Planter	3/6/1809	62
Hooper, William	NC	6/17/1742	Boston, MA	34	Lawyer	10/14/1790	48
Hopkins, Stephen	RI	3/7/1707	Providence, RI	69	Merchant	4/13/1785	78
Hopkinson, Francis	NJ	10/2/1737	Philadelphia, PA	38	Lawyer, Composer	5/9/1791	53
Huntington, Samuel	CT	7/3/1731	Windham, CT	45	Lawyer	1/5/1796	64
Jefferson, Thomas	VA	4/13/1743	Albemarle Co., VA	33	Lawyer, Planter	7/4/1826	83
Lee, Francis Lightfoot	VA	10/14/1734	Mt. Pleasant, VA	41	Planter	1/11/1797	62
Lee, Richard Henry	VA	1/20/1732	Stratford, VA	44	Planter	6/19/1794	62
Lewis, Francis	NY	3/21/1713	Llandaff, Wales	63	Merchant	12/30/1802	89
Livingston, Philip	NY	1/15/1716	Albany, NY	60	Merchant	6/12/1778	62
Lynch, Thomas, Jr.	SC	8/5/1749	Winyah, SC	26	Lawyer	1779	30
McKean, Thomas	DE	3/19/1735	Chester Co., PA	42	Lawyer	6/24/1817	83
Middleton, Arthur	SC	6/26/1742	Charleston, SC	34	Planter	1/1/1787	44
Morris, Lewis	NY	4/8/1726	Westchester Co., NY	50	Landowner	1/22/1798	71
Morris, Robert	PA	1/31/1734	Liverpool, England	42	Merchant	5/8/1806	72
Morton, John	PA	1725	Tinicum, PA	51	Farmer, Lawyer	4/1/1777	52
Nelson, Thomas, Jr.	VA	12/26/1738	Yorktown, VA	37	Merchant, Planter	1/4/1789	50
Paca, William	MD	10/31/1740	Abington, MD	35	Lawyer, Planter	10/13/1799	58
Paine, Robert Treat	MA	3/11/1731	Boston, MA	45	Lawyer	5/12/1814	83
Penn, John	NC	5/6/1740	Carolina Co., VA	36	Lawyer	9/14/1788	48
Read, George	DE	9/18/1733	Cecil Co., MD	42	Lawyer	9/21/1798	65
Rodney, Caesar	DE	10/7/1728	Dover, DE	47	Landowner	6/29/1784	55
Ross, George	PA	5/10/1730	New Castle, DE	46	Lawyer	7/14/1779	49
Rush, Benjamin	PA	1/4/1746	Philadelphia, PA	30	Physician	4/19/1813	67
Rutledge, Edward	SC	11/23/1749	Christ Church Parish, SC	26	Lawyer, Planter	1/23/1800	50
Sherman, Roger	CT	4/19/1721	Newton, MA	55	Surveyor, Merchant	7/23/1793	72
Smith, James	PA	9/17/1719	Ireland	57	Lawyer	7/11/1806	87
Stockton, Richard	NJ	10/1/1730	Princeton, NJ	45	Lawyer	2/28/1781	50
Stone, Thomas	MD	1743	Durham Parish, MD	33	Lawyer	10/5/1787	44
Taylor, George	PA	1716?	Ireland	60	Ironmaster	2/23/1781	65
Thornton, Matthew	NH	1714?	Ireland	62	Physician	6/24/1803	89
Walton, George	GA	1749?	Cumberland Co., VA?	27	Lawyer	2/2/1804	55
Whipple, William	NH	1/14/1730	Kittery, ME	46	Merchant	11/28/1785	55
Williams, William	CT	3/18/1731	Lebanon, CT	45	Merchant	8/2/1811	80
Wilson, James	PA	9/14/1742	Carskerdo, Scotland	33	Lawyer	8/21/1798	55
Witherspoon, John	NJ	2/5/1723	Gifford, Scotland	53	Minister	11/15/1794	71
Wolcott, Oliver	CT	11/20/1726	Windsor, CT	49	Lawyer	12/1/1797	71
Wythe, George	VA	1726?	Elizabeth City Co., VA	50	Lawyer	6/8/1806	80

Appendix II: Delegates to the Continental Congress

Member	Years served
CONNECTICUT	
Andrew Adams	1778–1782
Josiah P. Cooke	1784–1785, 1787–1788
Silas Deane	1774–1776
Eliphalet Dyer	1774–1779, 1782–1783
Pierrepoint Edwards	1788
Oliver Ellsworth	1778–1783
Titus Hosmer	1778
Benjamin Huntington	1780, 1782–1783, 1788
Samuel Huntington	1776, 1778–1781, 1783
William S. Johnson	1785–1787
Richard Law	1781–1782
Stephen M. Mitchell	1785–1788
Jesse Root	1778–1782
Roger Sherman	1774–1782, 1784
Joseph Spencer	1779
Jonathan Sturges	1786
James Wadsworth	1784
Jeremiah Wadsworth	1788
William Williams	1776–1777
Oliver Wolcott	1776–1778, 1781–1783

Elected from Connecticut but did not serve: Joseph Trumbull, Erastus Wolcott, Jedediah Strong, John Treadwell, William Pitkin, William Hillhouse, John Canfield, Charles Church Chandler, John Chester.

DELAWARE	
Gunning Bedford, Jr.	1783–1785
John Dickinson	1779
Philemon Dickinson	1782–1783
Dyre Kearny	1787–1788
Eleazer McComb	1783–1784
Thomas McKean	1774–1776, 1778–1782
Nathaniel Mitchell	1787–1788
John Patten	1786
William Peery	1786
George Read	1774–1777
Caesar Rodney	1774–1776
Thomas Rodney	1781–1782, 1786
James Tilton	1783–1784
Nicholas Van Dyke	1777–1781
John Vining	1784–1785
Samuel Wharton	1782–1783

Elected from Delaware but did not serve: John Evans, James Sykes, Henry Latimer, John McKinly, Samuel Patterson, Isaac Grantham.

GEORGIA	
Abraham Baldwin	1785, 1787–1788
Nathan Brownson	1777
Archibald Bulloch	1775
William Few	1780–1782, 1786–1787
William Gibbons	1784
Button Gwinnett	1776
John Habersham	1785
Lyman Hall	1775–1777
John Houstoun	1775
William Houstoun	1784–1786
Richard Howley	1781
Noble Wymberly Jones	1781–1782
Edward Langworthy	1777–1779
William Pierce	1787
Edward Telfair	1778, 1780–1782
George Walton	1776–1777, 1780–1781
John Walton	1777
Joseph Wood	1777–1778
John J. Zubly	1775

Elected from Georgia but did not serve: Joseph Clay, Benjamin Andrew, Samuel Stirk, Lachlan McIntosh.

Member	Years served
MARYLAND	
Robert Alexander	1776
William Carmichael	1778–1779
Charles Carroll of Carrollton	1776–1778
Daniel Carroll	1781–1783
Jeremiah T. Chase	1783–1784
Samuel Chase	1774–1778
Benjamin Contee	1788
James Forbes	1778–1780
Uriah Forrest	1787
Robert Goldsborough	1774–1776
John Hall	1775
John Hanson	1780–1782
William Harrison	1786
William Hemsley	1782–1783
John Henry	1778–1780, 1785–1786
William Hindman	1785–1786
John E. Howard	1788
Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer	1779–1781
Thomas Johnson	1774–1776
Thomas Sim Lee	1783
Edward Lloyd	1783–1784
James McHenry	1783–1785
Luther Martin	1785
William Paca	1774–1779
George Plater	1778–1780
Richard Potts	1781
Nathaniel Ramsey	1786–1787
John Rogers	1775–1776
David Ross	1787–1789
Benjamin Rumsey	1777
Joshua Seney	1788
William Smith	1777
Thomas Stone	1775–1778, 1784
Matthew Tilghman	1774–1776
Turbutt Wright	1782

Elected but did not serve: Richard Ridgely, Gustavus Scott, Edward Giles

MASSACHUSETTS	
John Adams	1774–1778
Samuel Adams	1774–1782
Thomas Cushing	1774–1776
Francis Dana	1777–1778, 1783–1784
Nathan Dane	1785–1788
Elbridge Gerry	1776–1780, 1783–1785
Nathaniel Gorham	1783, 1786–1788
John Hancock	1775–1778
Stephen Higginson	1783
Samuel Holten	1778–1780, 1783–1785, 1787
Jonathan Jackson	1781–1782
Rufus King	1784–1787
James Lovell	1777–1782
John Lowell	1782
Samuel Osgood	1781–1784
Samuel A. Otis	1787–1789
Robert Treat Paine	1774–1776
George Partridge	1779–1782, 1787
Theodore Sedgwick	1785–1786, 1788
George Thatcher	1788–1789
Artemas Ward	1781

Elected from Massachusetts but did not serve: James Sullivan, James Bowdoin, Timothy Edwards, Caleb Strong, Timothy Danielson, Tristram Dalton.

NEW HAMPSHIRE	
Josiah Bartlett	1775–1778
Jonathan Blanchard	1783–1784
Nathaniel Folsom	1774, 1777–1780

Member	Years served
NEW HAMPSHIRE (CONTINUED)	
Abiel Foster	1783–1785
George Frost	1777–1779
John Taylor Gilman	1782–1783
Nicholas Gilman	1787–1789
John Langdon	1775–1776, 1786–1787
Woodbury Langdon	1779–1780
Samuel Livermore	1780–1783, 1785–1786
Pierse Long	1784–1786
Nathaniel Peabody	1779–1780
John Sullivan	1774–1775, 1780–1781
Matthew Thornton	1776–1777
John Wentworth, Jr.	1777
William Whipple	1776–1779
Phillips White	1782–1783
Paine Wingate	1788–1789
Elected from New Hampshire but did not serve: Ebenezer Thompson, Timothy Walker, Jr., Joshua Wentworth, George Adkinson, Benjamin Bellows, Moses Dow, Elisha Payne.	
NEW JERSEY	
John Beatty	1783–1785
Elias Boudinot	1778, 1781–1783
William Burnet	1780–1781
Lambert Cadwalader	1784–1787
Abraham Clark	1776–1778, 1780–1783, 1786–1788
Silas Condict	1781–1783
Stephen Crane	1774–1776
Jonathan Dayton	1787–1788
John De Hart	1774–1776
Samuel Dick	1783–1785
Jonathan Elmer	1777–1778, 1781–1783, 1787–1788
John Fell	1777–1780
Frederick Frelinghuysen	1779, 1783
John Hart	1776
Francis Hopkinson	1776
Josiah Hornblower	1785–1786
William C. Houston	1779–1781, 1784–1785
James Kinsey	1774–1775
William Livingston	1774–1776
James Schureman	1786–1787
Nathaniel Scudder	1778–1779, 1781
Jonathan D. Sergeant	1776–1777
Richard Smith	1774–1776
John Stevens	1784
Charles Stewart	1784–1785
Richard Stockton	1776
John C. Symmes	1785–1786
John Witherspoon	1776–1782
Elected from New Jersey but did not serve: John Cooper, John Neilson, William Paterson.	
NEW YORK	
John Alsop	1774–1776
Egbert Benson	1784, 1787–1788
Simon Boerum	1774–1775
George Clinton	1775–1776
Charles De Witt	1784
James Duane	1774–1779, 1781–1783
William Duer	1777–1778
William Floyd	1774–1776, 1779–1783
Leonard Gansevoort	1788
David Gelston	1789
Alexander Hamilton	1782–1783, 1788
John Haring	1774, 1785–1787
John Jay	1774–1779, 1784

Member	Years served
NEW YORK (CONTINUED)	
John Lansing, Jr.	1785
John Lawrance	1785–1787
Francis Lewis	1775–1779, 1781–1783
Ezra L'Hommedieu	1779–1783, 1788
Philip Livingston	1775–1778
Robert R. Livingston	1775–1776, 1779–1781, 1785
Walter Livingston	1784–1785
Isaac Low	1774
Gouverneur Morris	1778–1779
Lewis Morris	1775–1777
Alexander McDougall	1781
Ephraim Paine	1784
Philip Pell	1789
Zephaniah Platt	1785–1786
Philip Schuyler	1775, 1777, 1779–1780
John Morin Scott	1780–1782
Melancton Smith	1785–1787
Henry Wisner	1775–1776
Abraham Yates	1787–1788
Peter W. Yates	1786
Elected from New York but did not serve: none.	
NORTH CAROLINA	
John B. Ashe	1787
Timothy Bloodworth	1786
William Blount	1783, 1786–1787
Thomas Burke	1777–1781
Robert Burton	1787
Richard Caswell	1774–1775
William Cumming	1785
Cornelius Harnett	1777–1779
Benjamin Hawkins	1782–1783, 1787
Joseph Hewes	1774–1777, 1779
Whitmill Hill	1778–1780
William Hooper	1774–1777
Samuel Johnston	1780–1782
Allen Jones	1779–1780
Willie Jones	1780–1781
Abner Nash	1782–1783
John Penn	1775–1780
William Sharpe	1779–1781
John Sitgreaves	1784–1785
Richard D. Spaight	1783–1785
John Swann	1787–1788
James White	1786–1788
John Williams	1777–1779
Hugh Williamson	1782–1785, 1787–1788
Elected from North Carolina but did not serve: Ephraim Brevard, Adlai Osborn, Thomas Person, Charles Johnson, Joseph McDowell, Nathaniel Macon, Alexander Martin, Thomas Polk, Benjamin Smith, John Stokes.	
PENNSYLVANIA	
Andrew Allen	1775–1776
John Armstrong	1779–1780, 1787–1788
Samuel J. Atlee	1778–1782
John B. Bayard	1785–1786
Edward Biddle	1775
William Bingham	1786–1788
William Clingan	1777–1779
George Clymer	1776–1778, 1780
Tench Coxe	1788–1789
John Dickinson	1774–1776
Thomas FitzSimons	1782–1783
Benjamin Franklin	1775–1776
Joseph Galloway	1774
Joseph Gardner	1784–1785

Member	Years served
PENNSYLVANIA (CONTINUED)	
Edward Hand	1784–1785
William Henry	1784–1785
Charles Humphreys	1774–1776
Jared Ingersoll	1780
William Irvine	1787–1788
David Jackson	1785
James McClene	1779–1780
Timothy Matlack	1781
Samuel Meredith	1786–1788
Thomas Mifflin	1774–1775, 1783–1784
John Montgomery	1782–1784
Joseph Montgomery	1781–1782
Cadwalader Morris	1783–1784
Robert Morris	1776–1778
John Morton	1774–1776
Frederick Muhlenberg	1778–1780
Richard Peters	1782–1783
Charles Pettit	1785–1787
Joseph Reed	1778
James R. Reid	1787–1789
Samuel Rhoads	1774
Daniel Roberdeau	1777–1779
George Ross	1774–1777
Benjamin Rush	1776–1777
Arthur St. Clair	1786–1787
James Searle	1778–1780
William Shippen	1779–1780
James Smith	1776–1778
Jonathan B. Smith	1777–1778
Thomas Smith	1781–1782
George Taylor	1776
Thomas Willing	1775–1776
James Wilson	1775–1777, 1783, 1785–1787
Henry Wynkoop	1779–1782
Elected from Pennsylvania but did not serve: Matthew Clarkson, William Montgomery.	
RHODE ISLAND	
Jonathan Arnold	1782–1784
Peleg Arnold	1787–1789
John Collins	1778–1783
Ezekiel Cornell	1780–1782
William Ellery	1776–1785
John Gardiner	1788–1789
Jonathan J. Hazard	1788
Stephen Hopkins	1774–1777
David Howell	1782–1785
James Manning	1785–1786
Henry Marchant	1777–1779
Nathan Miller	1785–1786
Daniel Mowry, Jr.	1781
James M. Varnum	1781, 1787
Samuel Ward	1774–1776
Elected from Rhode Island but did not serve: none.	
SOUTH CAROLINA	
Robert Barnwell	1788–1789
Thomas Bee	1780–1782
Richard Beresford	1783–1784
John Bull	1784–1787
Pierce Butler	1787–1788
William H. Drayton	1778–1779
Nicholas Eveleigh	1781–1782
Christopher Gadsden	1774–1776
John L. Gervais	1782–1783
Thomas Heyward, Jr.	1776–1778

Member	Years served
SOUTH CAROLINA (CONTINUED)	
Daniel Huger	1786–1788
Richard Hutson	1778–1779
Ralph Izard	1782–1783
John Kean	1785–1787
Francis Kinloch	1780
Henry Laurens	1777–1780
Thomas Lynch, Sr.	1774–1776
Thomas Lynch, Jr.	1776
John Mathews	1778–1782
Arthur Middleton	1776–1777, 1781–1782
Henry Middleton	1774–1776
Isaac Motte	1780–1782
John Parker	1786–1788
Charles Pinckney	1784–1787
David Ramsay	1782–1783, 1785–1786
Jacob Read	1783–1785
Edward Rutledge	1774–1776
John Rutledge	1774–1775, 1782–1783
Thomas T. Tucker	1787–1788
Elected from South Carolina but did not serve: Paul Trapier, Rawlins Lowndes, Alexander Gillon, William Moultrie, Thomas Sumter.	
VIRGINIA	
Thomas Adams	1778–1779
John Banister	1778
Richard Bland	1774–1775
Theodorick Bland	1781–1783
Carter Braxton	1776
John Brown	1787–1788
Edward Carrington	1785–1787
John Dawson	1788
William Fitzhugh	1779
William Fleming	1779–1780
William Grayson	1785–1787
Cyrus Griffin	1778–1780, 1787–1788
Samuel Hardy	1783–1785
Benjamin Harrison	1774–1777
John Harvie	1777–1779
James Henry	1780–1781
Patrick Henry	1774–1775
Thomas Jefferson	1775–1776, 1783–1784
Joseph Jones	1780–1783
Arthur Lee	1782–1784
Francis Lightfoot Lee	1775–1779
Henry Lee	1786–1788
Richard Henry Lee	1774–1780, 1784–1787
James Madison	1780–1783, 1787–1788
James Mercer	1779–1780
John F. Mercer	1783–1784
James Monroe	1783–1786
Thomas Nelson, Jr.	1775–1777, 1779
Mann Page	1777
Edmund Pendleton	1774–1775
Edmund Randolph	1779, 1781–1782
Peyton Randolph	1774–1775
Meriwether Smith	1778–1781
John Walker	1780
George Washington	1774–1775
George Wytche	1775–1776
Elected from Virginia but did not serve: Gabriel Jones, John Blair.	

Appendix III: Members of the British Cabinet

	Period of service		Period of service
First Lord of the Treasury (Prime Minister)		Lord Chancellor	
Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle	June 1757–May 1762	Robert Henley, Earl of Northington	1757–July 1766
John Stuart, Earl of Bute	May 1762–April 1763	Charles Pratt, Lord Camden	July 1766–January 1770
George Grenville	April 1763–July 1765	Charles Yorke	January 1770
Charles Wentworth, Marquis of Rockingham	July 1765–July 1766; March–July 1782	Henry, Earl Bathurst	January 1771–April 1778
William Pitt, Earl of Chatham	August 1766–October 1768	Edward, Lord Thurlow	June 1778–1792
Augustus FitzRoy, Duke of Grafton	October 1768–January 1770	Chancellor of the Exchequer	
Frederick, Lord North	February 1770–March 1782	Henry B. Leffe	1757–March 1761
William Petty, Earl of Shelburne	July 1782–March 1783	William, Viscount Barrington	March 1761–May 1762
William Bentinck, Duke of Portland	April–December 1783	Francis Dashwood, Baron Le Despencer	May 1762–April 1763
Lord President of the Council		George Grenville	April 1763–July 1765
John Carteret, Earl Granville	1751–January 1763	William Dowdeswell	July 1765–July 1766
John Russell, Duke of Bedford	September 1763–July 1765	Charles Townshend	July 1766–September 1767
Daniel Finch, Earl of Winchelsea and Nottingham	July 1765–July 1766	William Murray, Earl of Mansfield	September–October 1767
Robert Henley, Earl of Northington	July 1766–December 1767	Frederick, Lord North	October 1767–March 1782
Granville, Lord Gower	December 1767–November 1779	Lord John Cavendish	April–July 1782; April–December 1783
Henry, Earl Bathurst	November 1779–March 1782	William Pitt	July 1782–April 1783
Charles Pratt, Lord Camden	March 1782–March 1783	First Lord of the Admiralty	
David Murray, Viscount Stormont	April–December 1783	George, Baron Anson	March 1761–June 1762
Secretary of State for the Northern Department		George Dunk, Earl of Halifax	June 1762–January 1763
Robert D'Arcy, Earl of Holderness	1754–March 1761	George Grenville	January–April 1763
John Stuart, Earl of Bute	March 1761–May 1762	John Montagu, Earl of Sandwich	April–September 1763; January 1771–March 1782
George Grenville	May–October 1762	John Perceval, Earl of Egmont	September 1763–September 1766
George Dunk, Earl of Halifax	October 1762–September 1763; January–June 1771	Sir Charles Saunders	September–December 1766
John Montagu, Earl of Sandwich	September 1763–July 1765	Sir Edward Hawke	December 1766–January 1771
Augustus FitzRoy, Duke of Grafton	July–May 1765	Augustus, Viscount Keppel	March–December 1782; April–December 1783
General Henry S. Conway	May 1766–January 1768	Richard, Earl Howe	January–April 1783
Thomas Thynne, Viscount Weymouth	January–October 1768	Commander in Chief	
William van Zuylenstein, Earl of Rochford	October 1768–December 1770	John, Earl of Ligonier	1759–August 1766
Henry Howard, Earl of Suffolk	June 1771–March 1779	John Manners, Marquess of Granby	August 1766–January 1770
David Murray, Viscount Stormont	October 1779–March 1782	Jeffrey, Baron Amherst	January 1778–March 1782
Secretary of State for the Southern Department		General Henry S. Conway	March 1782–December 1783
William Pitt, Earl of Chatham	1757–October 1761	Master General of the Ordnance	
Charles Wyndham, Earl of Egremont	October 1761–August	John, Earl of Ligonier	1759–1763
George Dunk, Earl of Halifax	September 1763–July 1765	John Manners, Marquess of Granby	July 1763–January 1770
General Henry S. Conway	July 1765–May 1766	George, Marquess Townshend	1772–March 1782
Charles Lennox, Duke of Richmond	May–July 1766	Charles Lennox, Duke of Richmond	March 1782–1795
William Petty, Earl of Shelburne	August 1766–October 1768	Secretary at War	
Thomas Thynne, Viscount Weymouth	October 1768–December 1770; November 1775–November 1779	William, Viscount Barrington	1755–March 1761; July 1765–December 1778
William van Zuylenstein, Earl of Rochford	December 1770–October 1775	Charles Townshend	March 1761–December 1762
Wills Hill, Earl of Hillsborough	November 1779–March 1782	Welbore Ellis	January 1763–July 1765
Secretary of State for the American Colonies		Charles Jenkinson	December 1778–March 1782
Wills Hill, Earl of Hillsborough	January 1768–August 1772	Thomas Townshend, Viscount Sydney	March–July 1782
William Legge, Earl of Dartmouth	August 1772–November 1775	Sir George Yonge	July 1782–April 1783
George Germain, Viscount Sackville	November 1775–February 1782	Richard Fitzpatrick	April–December 1783
Welbore Ellis	February–March 1782	President of the Board of Trade	
Secretary of State for Home and Colonial Affairs		George Dunk, Earl of Halifax	October 1757–March 1761
William Petty, Earl of Shelburne	March–July 1782	Samuel, Baron Sandys	March 1761–March 1763
Thomas Townshend, Baron Sydney	July 1782–April 1783	Charles Townshend	March–April 1763
Frederick, Lord North	April–December 1783	William Petty, Earl of Shelburne	April–September 1763
"Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs"		Wills Hill, Earl of Hillsborough	September 1763–July 1765; August–December 1766; January 1768–August 1772
Charles James Fox	March–July 1782; April–December 1783	William Legge, Earl of Dartmouth	July 1765–August 1766; August 1772–November 1775
Thomas Robinson, Baron Grantham	July 1782–April 1783	Robert C. Nugent, Viscount Clare	December 1766–January 1768
		George Germain, Viscount Sackville	November 1775–November 1779
		Frederick Howard, Earl of Carlisle	November 1779–September 1780
		Thomas Robinson, Baron Grantham	December 1780–June 1782

Appendix IV: Continental Army, General Offices

		Appointed	End of Service	
General in Chief				
Washington, George	Virginia	15-Jun-75	23-Dec-83	resign
Major Generals				
1. Ward, Artemas	Massachusetts	17-Jun 75	23-Apr 76	resign
2. Lee, Charles	Virginia	17-Jun 75	10-Jan 80	resign
3. Schuyler, Philip John	New York	19-Jun 75	19-Apr 79	resign
4. Putnam, Israel	Connecticut	19-Jun 75	3 Jun 83	resign
5. Montgomery, Richard	New York	9 Dec 75 from 3 bg	31-Dec 75	killed
6. Thomas, John	Massachusetts	6 Mar 76 from 2 bg	2 Jun 76	died
7. Gates, Horatio	Virginia	16-May 76 from 1 bg	3 Nov 83	resign
8. Heath, William	Massachusetts	9 Aug 76 from 5 bg	3 Nov 83	resign
9. Spencer, Joseph	Connecticut	9 Aug 76 from 6 bg	13-Jan 78	resign
10. Sullivan, John	New Hampshire	9 Aug 76 from 7 bg	30-Nov 79	resign
11. Greene, Nathanael	Rhode Island	9 Aug 76 from 8 bg	3 Nov 83	resign
12. Arnold, Benedict	Connecticut	17-Feb 77 from 10 bg	25-Sep 80	traitor
13. Alexander, William (Lord Stirling)	New York	19-Feb 77 from 15 bg	15-Jan 83	resign
14. Mifflin, Thomas	Pennsylvania	19-Feb 77 from 18 bg	25-Feb 79	resign
15. St. Clair, Arthur	Pennsylvania	19-Feb 77 from 22 bg	3 Nov 83	resign
16. Stephen, Adam	Virginia	19-Feb 77 from 26 bg	20-Nov 77	resign
17. Lincoln, Benjamin	Massachusetts	19-Feb 77	29-Oct 83	resign
18. Lafayette, Marquis De	France	31-Jul 77	3 Nov 83	resign
19. Tronson de Coudray, Philippe	France	11-Aug 77	15-Sep 77	drowned
20. De Kalb, Johann	France	15-Sep 77	19-Aug 80	killed
21. Howe, Robert	North Carolina	20-Oct 77 from 16 bg	3 Nov 83	resign
22. McDougall, Alexander	New York	20-Oct 77 from 23 bg	3 Nov 83	resign
23. Conway, Thomas	France	13-Dec 77 from 50 bg	28-Apr 78	resign
24. Steuben, Friedrich	Germany	5 May 78	15-Apr 84	resign
25. Smallwood, William	Maryland	15-Sep 80 from 31 bg	3 Nov 83	resign
26. Parsons, Samuel Holden	Connecticut	23-Oct 80 from 24 bg	22-Jul 82	resign
27. Knox, Henry	Massachusetts	15-Nov 81 from 34 bg	20-Jun 84	resign
28. LeBegue DePresle Duportail, Louis	France	16-Nov 81 from 53 bg	10-Oct 83	resign
29. Moultrie, William	South Carolina	15-Oct 82 from 28 bg	3 Nov 83	resign
Brigadier Generals				
1. Gates, Horatio	Virginia	17-Jun 75	16-May 76	to 7 mg
2. Thomas, John	Massachusetts	22-Jun 75	6 Mar 76	to 6 mg
3. Montgomery, Richard	New York	22-Jun 75	9 Dec 75	to 3 mg
4. Wooster, David	Connecticut	22-Jun 75	2 May 77	died
5. Heath, William	Massachusetts	22-Jun 75	9 Aug 76	to 8 mg
6. Spencer, Joseph	Connecticut	22-Jun 75	9 Aug 76	to 9 mg
7. Sullivan, John	New Hampshire	22-Jun 75	9 Aug 76	to 10 mg
8. Greene, Nathanael	Rhode Island	22-Jun 75	9 Aug 76	to 11 mg
9. Frye, Joseph	Massachusetts	10-Jan 76	23-Apr 76	resign
10. Arnold, Benedict	Connecticut	10-Jan 76	17-Feb 77	to 12 mg
11. Armstrong, John Sr.	Pennsylvania	1 Mar 76	4 Apr 77	resign
12. Thompson, William	Pennsylvania	1 Mar 76	3 Sep 1781	died
13. Lewis, Andrew	Virginia	1 Mar 76	15-Apr 77	resign
14. Moore, James	North Carolina	1 Mar 76	9 Apr 77	died
15. Alexander, William (Lord Stirling)	New York	1 Mar 76	19-Feb 77	to 13 mg
16. Howe, Robert	North Carolina	1 Mar 76		to 21 mg
17. Woedtke, Frederick, Baron De	France			
18. Mifflin, Thomas	Pennsylvania			to 14 mg
19. Mercer, Hugh	Virginia			
20. Reed, James	New Hampshire			
21. Nixon, John	Massachusetts			
22. St. Clair, Arthur	Pennsylvania			to 15 mg
23. McDougall, Alexander	New York			to 22 mg
24. Parsons, Samuel Holden	Connecticut			to 26 mg
25. Clinton, James	New York			
26. Stephen, Adam	Virginia			to 16 mg
27. Gadsden, Christopher	South Carolina			
28. Moultrie, William	South Carolina			to 29 mg
29. McIntosh, Lachlan	Georgia			
30. Maxwell, William	New Jersey			
31. Smallwood, William	Maryland			to 25 mg

Appendix IV: Continental Army, General Offices [CONT]

	Appointed	End of Service
32. Fermoy, Matthias	France	
33. Preudhomme DeBorre, Phillipe	France	
34. Knox, Henry	Massachusetts	to 27 mg
35. Nash, Francis	North Carolina	
36. Poor, Enoch	New Hampshire	
37. Glover, John	Massachusetts	
38. Paterson, John	Massachusetts	
39. Wayne, Anthony	Pennsylvania	
40. Varnum, James Mitchell	Rhode Island	
41. deHaas, John P.	Pennsylvania	
42. Woodford, William	Virginia	
43. Muhlenberg, John Peter Gabriel	Virginia	
44. Weedon, George	Virginia	
45. Clinton, George	New York	
46. Hand, Edward	Pennsylvania	
47. Scott, Charles	Virginia	
48. Learned, Ebenezer	Massachusetts	
49. Huntington, Jedidiah	Connecticut	
50. Conway, Thomas	France	to 23 mg
51. Pulaski, Casimir	Poland	
52. Stark, John	New Hampshire	
53. LeBegue DePresle Duportail, Louis	France	to 28 mg
54. Sumner, Jethro	North Carolina	
55. Hogun, James	North Carolina	
56. Huger, Isaac	South Carolina	
57. Gist, Mordecai	Maryland	
58. Irvine, William	Pennsylvania	
59. Morgan, Daniel	Virginia	
60. Williams, Otho Holland	Maryland	
61. Greaton, John	Massachusetts	
62. Putnam, Rufus	Massachusetts	
63. Dayton, Elias	New Jersey	
64. Armand, Charles	France	

Note: mg = Major General, bg = Brigadier General

Appendix V: British Regiments

Unit	Alternate unit name	Arrived in America			Left America	
		Date	Year	Location	Date	Fate/Destination
Guards						
(single battalion drawn from the three Guards regiments)						
1st Gds		July	1776	New York	1781	interned, Yorktown
2nd Gds	Coldstream	July	1776	New York	1781	interned, Yorktown
3rd Gds		July	1776	New York	1781	interned, Yorktown
Regiments of Foot						
3rd	Bufs	June	1781	Charleston	1782	West Indies
4th	King's Own	June	1774	Boston	1778	West Indies
5th		July	1774	Boston	1778	West Indies
6th		October	1776	New York	1776	drafted
7th	Royal Fusiliers	July	1773	Canada	1783	British Isles
8th	King's		1768	Canada	1785	British Isles
9th		May	1776	Canada	1777	interned, Saratoga
10th			1767	Canada	1778	drafted
14th			1766	Halifax	1777	drafted
15th		May	1776	Cape Fear	1778	West Indies
16th			1767	New York	1782	drafted
17th		December	1775	Boston	1781	interned, Yorktown
18th	Royal Irish		1767	Philadelphia	1775	drafted
19th		June	1781	Charleston	1782	West Indies
20th		May	1776	Quebec	1777	interned, Saratoga
21st	Royal North British Fusiliers	May	1776	Quebec	1777	interned, Saratoga
22nd		July	1775	Boston	1783	British Isles
23rd	Royal Welsh Fusiliers		1773	New York	1781	interned, Yorktown ¹
24th		May	1776	Quebec	1777	interned, Saratoga
26th	Cameronians		1767	New Jersey	1779	drafted
27th	Enniskillens	October	1775	Boston	1778	West Indies
28th		May	1776	Cape Fear	1778	West Indies
29th		May	1776	Quebec	1787	British Isles
30th		June	1781	Charleston	1782	West Indies
31st		May	1776	Quebec	1787	British Isles
33rd		May	1776	Cape Fear	1781	interned, Yorktown ¹
34th		May	1776	Quebec	1786	British Isles
35th		June	1775	Boston	1778	West Indies
37th		May	1776	Cape Fear	1783	left New York
38th		July	1774	Boston	1783	left New York
40th		1. June	1775	Boston	1778	West Indies
		2. September	1781	New York	1783	left New York
42nd	Royal Highland Regiment	July	1776	New York	1783	left New York
43rd		June	1774	Boston	1781	interned, Yorktown
44th		June	1775	Boston	1780	Canada
45th		July	1775	Boston	1778	drafted
46th		May	1776	Cape Fear	1778	West Indies
47th			1773	New Jersey	1777	interned, Saratoga
49th		June	1775	Boston	1778	West Indies
52nd		October	1774	Boston	1778	drafted
53rd		May	1776	Cape Fear	1777	interned, Saratoga
54th		May	1776	Cape Fear	1783	left New York
55th		December	1775	Boston	1778	West Indies
57th		May	1776	Cape Fear	1783	left New York
59th			1765	Halifax	1775	drafted
60th	Royal American Regiment: 1st Battalion 2nd Battalion 3rd Battalion, raised 1775 4th Battalion, raised 1775					
62nd		May	1776	Quebec	1777	interned, Saratoga
63rd		June	1775	Boston	1782	West Indies
64th			1768	Boston	1782	West Indies
65th			1768	Boston	1776	drafted
69th		September	1781	New York (6wks)	1781	West Indies
70th		August	1778	Halifax		

¹ Part not interned at Yorktown left Charleston in 1782: 23rd, 33rd, and 71st.

SOURCE: Anthony D. Darling, *Red Coat and Brown Bess*, Museum Restoration Service (Ottawa, Ontario), 1970, pp. 55-57

Appendix V: British Regiments [CONT]

Unit	Alternate unit name	Arrival in America			Left America	
		Date	Year	Location	Date	Fate/Destination
Newly Raised						
71st	Fraser's Highlanders	1776	July	New York	1781	interned, Yorktown ¹
74th	Argyll Highlanders	1778	August	Halifax		
76th	MacDonald's Highlanders	1779		New York	1781	interned, Yorktown
80th	Royal Edinburgh Volunteers	1779		New York	1781	interned, Yorktown
82nd	Duke of Hamilton's Regiment	1778	August	Halifax	1781	interned, Yorktown 1co
					1782	left Charleston 3 cos
Newly Raised in America						
84th=1779	Royal Highland Emigrants 1st Battalion	1775		CANADA		
	2nd Battalion					
105th=1782	King's Irish Regiment	1778		AMERICA	1782	left Charleston
Light Dragoons						
16th LD	Queen's Light Dragoons	1776	July	New York	1778	drafted
17th LD		1775	June	Boston	1783	British Isles

¹ Part not interned at Yorktown left Charleston in 1782: 23rd, 33rd, and 71st.

SOURCE: Anthony D. Darling, *Red Coat and Brown Bess*, Museum Restoration Service (Ottawa, Ontario), 1970, pp. 55-57

Appendix VI

1775

JANUARY							FEBRUARY							MARCH							APRIL							MAY							JUNE																				
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S														
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	4	5	6	7	8	9	10							
8	9	10	11	12	13	14	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
15	16	17	18	19	20	21	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	18	19	20	21	22	23	24							
22	23	24	25	26	27	28	26	27	28	26	27	28	29	30	31	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	28	29	30	31	28	29	30	31	25	26	27	28	29	30	25	26	27	28	29	30						
29	30	31												30																																									

1776

JANUARY							FEBRUARY							MARCH							APRIL							MAY							JUNE													
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
14	15	16	17	18	19	20	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
28	29	30	31	25	26	27	28	29	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	28	29	30	26	27	28	29	30	31	26	27	28	29	30	31	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	23	24	25	26	27	28	29				

1777

JANUARY							FEBRUARY							MARCH							APRIL							MAY							JUNE													
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
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12	13	14	15	16	17	18	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
19	20	21	22	23	24	25	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
26	27	28	29	30	31	23	24	25	26	27	28	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	27	28	29	30	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	29	30										

1778

JANUARY							FEBRUARY							MARCH							APRIL							MAY							JUNE													
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
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11	12	13	14	15	16	17	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
18	19	20	21	22	23	24	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
25	26	27	28	29	30	31	29	30	31	29	30	31	26	27	28	29	30	26	27	28	29	30	31	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	28	29	30								

1779

JANUARY							FEBRUARY							MARCH							APRIL							MAY							JUNE													
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
10	11	12	13	14	15	16	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
17	18	19	20	21	22	23	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
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Appendix VI [CONT]

1780

JANUARY							FEBRUARY							MARCH							APRIL							MAY							JUNE						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
2	3	4	5	6	7	8	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
16	17	18	19	20	21	22	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	27	28	29	26	27	28	29	30	31	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	28	29	30	31	25	26	27	28	29	30	30	31

1781

JANUARY							FEBRUARY							MARCH							APRIL							MAY							JUNE						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
14	15	16	17	18	19	20	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	25	26	27	28	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	27	28	29	30	31	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	28	29	30	31	

1782

JANUARY							FEBRUARY							MARCH							APRIL							MAY							JUNE						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
6	7	8	9	10	11	12	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
13	14	15	16	17	18	19	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
20	21	22	23	24	25	26	24	25	26	27	28	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	28	29	30	26	27	28	29	30	31	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31					

1783

JANUARY							FEBRUARY							MARCH							APRIL							MAY							JUNE						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
5	6	7	8	9	10	11	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
19	20	21	22	23	24	25	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
26	27	28	29	30	31	23	24	25	26	27	28	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	27	28	29	30	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30			

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This compilation expands upon the on-line bibliographies of the U.S. Army's Center of Military History, which were in turn based on Robert K. Wright Jr's bibliography for his contribution to the Center's Army Lineage Series, The Continental Army (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1983). In addition to updating the scholarship of these earlier works, this bibliography has added material on the U.S. Navy and maritime studies, as well as incorporating books and articles on social history, gender studies, racial relations, and other topics of interest to contemporary historians. A number of web sites offering accurate information and documents of value have been included. It is hoped that this bibliography will serve as a useful starting point from which the next generation may craft an independent interpretation of this seminal event in the creation of the United States.

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