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Volume 1 & 2

LYNDA LEE KAID

CHRISTINA HOLTZ-BACHA

Encyclopedia of Political Communication

Encyclopedia of Political Communication

Volume 1

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Books, Films, Journals, Television

All the President's Men
American Voter, The
Bowling Alone
Campaigns & Elections Magazine
Candidate, The
Candidates and Their Images
Citizen Kane
Commander in Chief
Comparing Media Systems
Creating Reality
Crosstalk
Daily Show, The
Deciding What's News
Effects of Mass Communication, The
Film and Politics
Four Theories of the Press
Great Debates, The
Handbook of Political Communication, The
Image, The
Mediated Political Realities
Nature of Prejudice, The
News: The Politics of Illusion
Nightline
People's Choice, The
Personal Influence
Political Campaign Communication
Political Communication
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, The
Processing the News
Psychology of Radio, The
Responsive Chord, The
Saturday Night Live
Selling of the President 1968, The
Symbolic Uses of Politics, The
Television in Politics
Unseeing Eye, The
Virtuous Circle, A

War of the Worlds, The
West Wing, The

Democracy, Democratization

Argentina Democratization Process, Role of the Media
Brazil, Media and the Political System
Bulgaria, Democratization
Democratization, Role of the Media in
Direct Action Protest, Australia
Direct Democracy
German Unification, Role of the Media
Hungary, Communication and Politics
Poland, Democratization
Russia, Democratization and Media

Education and Nonprofit Organizations

Carrie Chapman Catt Center for Women and Politics
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Pew Research Center for the People & the Press
Political Commercial Archive
Political Communication Center
Survey Research Center
Vanderbilt Television News Archive
World Association for Public Opinion Research

Elections

Electoral Systems
European Parliamentary Elections
E-Voting
Grassroots Campaigning
Iowa Caucuses
Primaries
Proportional Representation
Second-Order Election
Ticket Splitting
Voter News Service
Voting Behavior
Youth Voting

Government Operations and Institutions

Brazil, Media and the Political System
China, Media and Politics in
Chinese Cultural Revolution
Communism
Conservative, Conservatism
E-Government
Electoral Systems
Eurobarometer
European Commission
European Parliament
European Parliamentary Elections
European Union
Federal Trade Commission
Government Communication
Hong Kong Handover
Hungary, Communication and Politics
Political Prisoners
Press Secretary, White House
Proportional Representation
Public Affairs, Communication in
State of the Union Address
Supreme Court, Media and the

Law and Regulation

Abortion
Affirmative Action
Ballot Initiatives
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
Brazil, Media and the Political System
Buckley v. Valeo
Campaign Finance
Censorship, Political
Civil Rights Movement
Communications Act of 1934
Council of Europe, Media Policy
Equal Time Provision
European Commission
European Convention on Human Rights
European Court of Justice
European Union Media Policy

Fairness Doctrine
Federal Election Campaign Act
Federal Trade Commission
First Amendment
Free Airtime
Freedom of Information
Libel
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
Obscenity and Pornography
Press Freedom
Press Law of 1766, Sweden
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
Reputation in Politics
Royal Commission on the Press
Shield Laws
Soft Money
UNESCO Media Policy
United States Information Agency

Media

Media Events

Bush–Rather Confrontation
Checkers Speech
Media Consultants
Media Events
Spin, Political
Tampa Incident

Media Outlets and Programs

Al Jazeera Television
Campaigns & Elections Magazine
CNN (Cable News Network)
Commander in Chief
C-SPAN Network
Daily Show, The
Daisy Girl Ad
Fox News
Freedom Forum Media Studies Center
National Association of Broadcasters
National Public Radio (NPR)
New York Times, The
Nightline
PBS (Public Broadcasting Service)
Radio Free Europe
Reporters Without Borders
Rock the Vote
Saturday Night Live
Tabloids
Underground Media
Voice of America
Voter News Service
War of the Worlds, The
Washington Post, The
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Role of Media in Political Systems

Argentina Democratization Process, Role of the Media
Brazil, Media and the Political System
China, Media and Politics in
Congress and the Media
Democratization, Role of the Media in
German Unification, Role of the Media
Hungary, Communication and Politics
Public Service Broadcasting
Rwanda Genocide, Role of Media
Russia, Democratization and Media
Supreme Court, Media and the
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News Media Coverage of Politics, Political Affairs

Ad Watch
Blogs, Blogging
Citizen Journalism
Commentary, Political
Congress and the Media
Fairness Doctrine
Fourth Estate, Media as
Gulf War, Media Coverage of
Hard News
Horserace Coverage
Iraq War, Media Coverage of
Media Bias
News Coverage, Politics
News Management
News Selection Process
Pooled Journalism
Press Conferences

Press Secretary, White House
Public Affairs, Communication in
Radio, Politics and
Soft News
Sound Bite
Stringer
Supreme Court, Media and the
Talk Radio, Political
Talk Shows, Television
Voter News Service
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White House Press Corps
Women Candidates, News Coverage

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Agenda Setting
Hostile Media Effect
Information Technology in Politics
Infotainment
Media Bias
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Muckrakers, Muckraking
Music and Politics
Political Branding
Press and Politics
Press Freedom
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Public Relations, Political
Public Service Broadcasting
Spin, Political
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Alternative Media in Politics
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Big-Character Posters, China
Blogs, Blogging
Candidate Films, Biographical
Cartoons, Political
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DebateWatch
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E-Mail, Political Uses
Film and Politics
Fireside Chats
Free Airtime
Letters to the Editor
Media Buying in Politics
Negative Advertising
New Media Technologies
News Magazines
Newspapers, Role in Politics
Party Election Broadcasts
Party Press
Political Advertising
Political Advertising, Independent
Political Advertising, Radio
Posters, Political
Radio, Politics and
Radio Addresses
Talk Radio, Political
Talk Shows, Television
Testimonials, Political
Video Games, Political
Web Campaigning
Women Candidates, Advertising
World Wide Web, Political Uses

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Cybernationalism
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Mass Political Behavior
New Right
Parasocial Relationships in Politics
Party Identification
Political Branding
Political Correctness
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Political Knowledge
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Race in Politics
Ticket Splitting
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American-Style Campaigning
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Political Events

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Spiegel Affair
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Terrorism and Media
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Watergate
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Political Groups and Organizations

AARP
Advocacy Advertising
Aging and Politics
American Association of Political Consultants
Center for the Study of the American Electorate
Commission on Presidential Debates
Congress and the Media
Conservative Party, Britain
Conventions, Political
Council of Europe, Media Policy
Democratic National Committee
Democratic Party
European Association of Political Consultants
European Parliament
European Parliamentary Elections
European Union
European Union, Media Policy

Feminist Movement
Freedom Forum Media Studies Center
Glasgow Media Group
Green Party
Interest Groups in Politics
Labour Party, Britain
Latinos and Politics, Media
Libertarian Party
Lobbying, Lobbyist
Minorities, Role in Politics
NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People)
National Association of Broadcasters
New Right
Party Identification
Pew Internet & American Life Project
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press
Political Action Committees (PACs)
Political Culture
Political Parties
Reform Party
Religion in Politics
Republican National Committee
Republican Party
Solidarity Movement
UNESCO Media Policy
Unions, Political Activity
Youth Voting

Political Issues

Abortion
Aging and Politics
Ballot Initiatives
Civil Rights Movement
Issue Management
Issue Ownership
Kids Voting USA
Lobbying, Lobbyist
Mass Political Behavior
Minorities, Role in Politics
Political Corruption
Political Knowledge
Segregation
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Political Journalism

Bush–Rather Confrontation
Commentary, Political
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Hostile Media Effect
Journalism, Political
Metacoverage
Muckrakers, Muckraking
Pack Journalism
Pooled Journalism
Public Journalism
Talk Radio, Political
Talk Shows, Television
Women Candidates, News Coverage
Yellow Journalism

Theoretical Concepts

Agenda Melding
Agenda Setting
Americanization
Apologia
Argumentation, Political
Aristotle
Authoritarianism
Communism
Conservative, Conservatism
Constructivism
Critical Theory
Cultivation Theory
Cultural Imperialism
Cultural Studies
Dealignment
Deliberation
Democracy Theories
Demography
Dependency Theory, Media
Diffusion of Innovations
Digital Divide
Dramatistic Approaches to Political Communication
Fantasy Theme Analysis
Fear Appeals, Use in Politics
Feminine Style in Communication
Focus Groups
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Globalization
Group Decision Making, Political
Heuristics in Political Decision Making
Hostile Media Effect
Humor in Politics
Image, Political
Impression Management
Indexing Theory
Information Flow, Global
Information Society
Inoculation, Political
Intercultural Communication, Dimensions
Interpersonal Communication
Kids Voting USA
Knowledge Gap
Language and Politics
Limited Effects Theory
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McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
Mediatization
Medium Theory
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Modernization
Music and Politics
News Management
News Selection Process
Orientation, Need for
Participation, Political
Personalization of Politics
Persuasion, Political
Pharisee Effect
Pluralistic Ignorance
Political Conflict
Political Disaffection
Political Efficacy
Political Engagement
Political Information Efficacy
Political Information Processing
Political Involvement
Political Knowledge
Political Leadership
Political Marketing
Political Scandal
Political Socialization
Politics, Policy, Polity
Presidential Communication
Press and Politics
Press Theories
Priming
Professionalization
Propaganda
Psychographics in Politics
Public Communication in Politics
Public Sphere
Pundits, Punditry
Race in Politics
Reputation in Politics
Resonance Theory
Rhetoric, Political
Selective Processes, Exposure, Perception, Memory
Sleeper Effect
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Social Responsibility Theory
Speeches, Presidential
Spiral of Silence
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Symbolic Convergence Theory
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Third-Person Effect
Two-Step Flow Model of Communication
Uses and Gratifications Approach
Verbal Style
Videostyle
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Women in Politics

Carrie Chapman Catt Center for Women and Politics
Feminine Style in Communication
First Ladies, Political Communication of
Gender and Politics
Hill–Thomas Hearings
Women Candidates, Advertising
Women Candidates, News Coverage

About the Editors

Lynda Lee Kaid is professor of telecommunication in the College of Journalism and Communications at the University of Florida. She received her Ph.D. degree in 1974 from Southern Illinois University. She previously served as the director of the Political Communication Center and supervised the Political Commercial Archive at the University of Oklahoma. Her research specialties include political advertising and news coverage of political events. A Fulbright scholar, she has also done work on political television in several European countries. She is the author or editor of more than 25 books, including *The Handbook of Political Communication Research, Videostyle in Presidential Campaigns, The Electronic Election, Civic Dialogue in the 1996 Campaign, New Perspectives on Political Advertising, Mediated Politics in Two Cultures, Political Advertising in Western Democracies,* and *Political Campaign Communication: A Bibliography and Guide to the Literature.* She has also written more than 150 journal articles and book chapters and more than 100 convention papers on various aspects of political communication. She has received more than $2 million in external grant funds for her research efforts, including support from the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Department of Education, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Election Assistance Commission, and the National Science Foundation. Kaid is a former chair of the Political Communication Divisions of the International Communication Association and the National Communication Association and has served in leadership roles for the American Political Science Association and the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication.

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Introduction

Political communication began with the earliest studies of democratic discourse by Aristotle and Plato. However, modern political communication relies on an interdisciplinary base that draws on concepts from communication, political science, journalism, sociology, psychology, history, rhetoric, and others. This encyclopedia considers political communication from that broad interdisciplinary perspective, encompassing the many different roles that communication plays in political processes in the United States and around the world. Not limited to communication in electoral contexts, political communication also considers the role of communication in governing, incorporating communication activities that influence the operation of executive, legislative, and judicial bodies, political parties, interest groups, political action committees, and other participants in political processes.

This work contains discussion of the major theoretical approaches to the field, including direct and limited effects theories, agenda-setting theories, sociological theories, framing and priming theories, and other past and present conceptualizations. Considerable attention is devoted to major sources of political communication and to important political messages such as political speeches, televised political advertising, political posters and print advertising, televised political debates, and Internet sites. The channels of political communication encompass interpersonal and public communication, radio, television, newspapers, and the World Wide Web. News media coverage and journalistic analysis of politics, political issues, political figures, and political institutions are important topics included. The audiences for political communications are also central, necessitating concentration on citizen reactions to political messages, how the general public and voters in democratic systems respond to political messages, and the effects of all types of media and message types.

Whereas this encyclopedia provides information that may be helpful in an introductory way for political communication scholars, researchers, and graduate students, it is also designed for libraries, undergraduates, and members of the public with an interest in political affairs. Media and political professionals, as well as government officials, lobbyists, and participants in independent political organizations, will find the volume useful in developing a better understanding of how the media and communication function in political settings.

In developing the list of entry terms to be included in this encyclopedia, we consulted several sources. First, we considered indexes and lists of topics in other types of political communication reference materials. These included *The Handbook of Political Communication* (Nimmo & Sanders, 1981), *The Handbook of Political Communication Research* (Kaid, 2004), the *Communication Yearbooks* sponsored by the International Communication Association, and major journals in the field such as *Political Communication*. We also consulted other encyclopedias on related topics, such as the *Encyclopedia of Politics* (Carlisle, 2005), *The Encyclopedia of Television* (Newcomb, 2004), the *Encyclopedia of Radio* (Sterling & Keith, 2004), and the *Encyclopedia of Media and Politics* (Schaefer & Birkland, 2004). We further examined the indexes of many other books and reference materials related to the political communication discipline.

Additional advice on the headword list came from our Advisory Board of distinguished scholars, Max McCombs, Denis McQuail, Doris Graber, Robert Denton, and Kathleen J. M. Haynes. Reliance on Haynes's expertise in library and information science, as well as her work with Lynda Lee Kaid on the development of the Political Commercial Archive database (Kaid, Haynes, & Rand, 1996), allowed us to shape the entry terms in line with Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH).

The nearly 600 entry terms in this encyclopedia are comprised of four different levels. The first level contains up to 500 words and is designed for simple concepts, individual persons, a book or reference item, or important political communication events or happenings that are limited in time or scope. These include political leaders whose political communication styles or actions warrant description and classic books in the field. More advanced concepts and those related to other broader concepts in the field generally justified entries at the second level of 1,000 words. Examples of entries at this level include Political Disaffection; Radio, Politics and; Citizen Journalism; and the Kennedy Assassination. The description of a major subfield within political communication or a concept with many different aspects or ties to other theoretical or research concepts called for an entry at the third level of 2,000 to 2,500 words. These included Diffusion of Innovations, Party Identification, Political Engagement, and Campaign Finance. Finally, the longest entries (5,000 words) were reserved for major concepts or topics that overlap many different areas and many different theoretical concepts. Examples of these larger entries include Agenda Setting, Political Advertising, Political Information Processing, and Media Bias.

We also attempted to provide many synonyms or alternative forms of concepts with blind entries. For instance, a user who might be interested in civic engagement would find that term listed with a "*See* Political Engagement" notation, pointing the user to the entry term under which civic engagement is discussed. Similarly, a user looking for civic journalism would find an entry directing the user to Public Journalism. Entries also include cross-reference information where relevant, thus also pointing the user to other topics or headwords that might yield additional information on the topic. Each entry term also includes, where appropriate, a list of further readings or references that can help a user delve more deeply into a subject or topic.

Three other parameters are particularly important in considering what was and was not included in the headwords for this encyclopedia. First, it is important to stress the importance of communication in our conceptualization. Political topics were not included unless they had some direct and important tie to communication and communication processes. Consequently, every political leader or politician was not included. Only individuals whose communication actions have been particularly important or about whom major communication research or undertakings have revolved were included. Likewise, concepts from political science or sociology that have generated considerable scholarship in those disciplines but have not been advanced greatly by applications of communication theory or research were omitted. Examples of concepts or entities omitted on these grounds included Hegemony, Isolationism, Political Economy, Xenophobia, and Immigration. A second important parameter was the time period covered. In general, this encyclopedia concentrates on headword entries that represent the field of political communication since the middle of the 20th century. A few very classic and central persons and ideas are included from earlier times, including Aristotle and his writings, the persuasion techniques of Machiavelli, the propaganda techniques from World War II, and the fireside chats of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Nonetheless, important work and persons before 1950 were sometimes omitted because of the need to include more recent and timely material.

A third parameter of this encyclopedia is its inherent emphasis on political communication from the point of view of the United States. There is substantial and important research and scholarship on political communication in international contexts. Researchers in Western Europe, particularly in Germany, Britain, and France, have made important contributions to political communication theory and research. Political communication research in Asia and in Australia and New Zealand is expanding rapidly. Latin America and Africa have also yielded important scholarship in recent years, as have expanding new democracies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We have included major developments from these areas where published scholarship and available reference materials yielded sufficient depth for inclusion. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to acknowledge the dominance of U.S. researchers and published scholarship on political communication, and our entry terms and the treatment of them in this volume often represent this U.S. perspective.

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

AARP

AARP, formally known as the American Association of Retired Persons, is a nonprofit membership organization of persons 50 and older that is dedicated to addressing the needs and interests of older adults. Along with providing information and products/services to its more than 30 million members, AARP is a powerful force in advocating for social change in the political arena.

AARP has considerable political influence partly because of the large number of voters the organization represents. Furthermore, older adults tend to vote more actively than other age groups. Along with representing a large voting constituency, AARP also spends millions of dollars on lobbying. In fact, AARP is often considered to be the most powerful congressional lobby in the United States. For example, Politicalmoneyline (http://www.fecinfo.com/) reported that AARP accounted for the highest lobbying expenditures made by any one group or organization in 2003; they spent over $20 million supporting the proposed prescription drug plan that year. When in 1997 *Fortune* magazine compiled a ranking of the 25 lobbying groups with the most political influence in Washington, D.C., AARP was ranked No. 1.

AARP's efforts to influence public policy are not limited to lobbying legislators. AARP makes a concerted effort and spends large amounts to reach its membership and the general public to garner support or opposition regarding pending legislation. For example, in regard to privatizing social security, AARP held dozens of forums on the issue, sent mailings to its members, and spent millions of dollars on advertising opposing private social security accounts. AARP's magazine (the largest circulation magazine in the United States), newspaper-styled Bulletin, and Web site provide channels AARP uses, in part, to motivate their vast membership on particular issues. AARP's Web site has an issues and elections section in which they explain where AARP stands on issues, encourage grassroots networking, provide briefs on political candidates, and present directives to members to either support or oppose pending legislation. For example, in 2006, AARP's Web site urged members to "stop TABOR" (the taxpayer bill of rights) and "get involved, fight back against TABOR."

Determination of AARP's public policy is accomplished by a special advisory group of 25 volunteers, the National Policy Council. This group considers members' views on issues obtained through calls and letters, surveys, and town meetings. The National Policy Council then makes recommendations to AARP's Board of Directors, who in turn establish AARP's stance on issues such as social security, health care, retirement, and Medicare.

Even though AARP is officially nonpartisan, it is generally regarded to be moderate to left-leaning. Traditionally, AARP's support has tended to align more closely with Democratic policies. However, AARP stood beside the Republican administration in helping to pass a prescription drug bill in 2003. Perhaps in order to maintain a nonpartisan association, AARP does not have a political action committee (PAC), endorse political candidates, or contribute money to political parties or candidates' campaigns.

Terri Ann Bailey

See also Aging and Politics

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Abdullah II (1962–)

King Abdullah II ascended to the throne as monarch of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in February 1999 following the death of his father, King Hussein. Educated at British Sandhurst Military Academy, King Abdullah II has served in the Army as commander of the Jordanian Special Forces (1994). His global views, coupled with his perfect mastery of both English and Arabic, have resulted in positive political communication performances and open orientations to the media. Although Jordanian media were already experiencing some liberalization in their public discourse and structures in the aftermath of King Hussein's death, the realities of both geography and politics seemed to have mitigated against sustainable free practices. Surrounded by politically unstable settings in Palestine, Iraq, and Lebanon, Jordan, under King Abdullah II, has had to cope with multiple challenges that were bound to affect its destiny. Lack of regional stability and the rise of terrorism as the defining features of the new era have cast dark shadows on Jordan's media system.

King Abdullah II proclaimed continuity of his father's path. Addressing a group of international media reporters in 2000, the king noted that "the legacy that I inherited from my late father, His Majesty King Hussein, and from my grandfathers, is one that has always upheld the integrity of human life. It has consistently called for respecting the rights, and the freedom, of the individual." When he assumed his position as king of Jordan in 1999, Abdullah II was perceived by many as a liberalizing force set on changing and restructuring some of the archaic structures of the Hashemite kingdom. He has spoken out in favor of strengthening press freedom and modernizing the media. In a February 2003 speech, the king advocated "transparency in our society, because we have nothing to fear." Yet, the state still controls much of the media even though some positive changes have been initiated. The Jordanian press has seen several positive developments under King Abdullah's reign, including the reform of several articles of the restrictive Press and Publications Law (PPL), the passage of new legislation to allow private broadcast media, and an apparent halt to the practice of arbitrarily detaining journalists.

Muhammad Ayish

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Abortion

Few sociopolitical issues polarize contemporary American politics as much as abortion. Although most polls indicate that a majority of Americans support the legality of abortion, a host of corollary issues remain quite controversial: These include parental and/or spousal notification, the role of states and the courts in crafting abortion policy, and the moral and ethical questions invoked by various abortive procedures such as "partial birth." Contemporary abortion discourse remains emotionally charged on both sides with abortion rights advocates arguing that reproductive choice is a fundamental right of all women and opponents of the practice claiming that nearly any form of abortion for nearly any reason is "murder."

The conflict over reproductive choice in the United States dates back to 1821 when Connecticut became the first state to ban abortion. An array of various state and local laws prohibited or otherwise restricted abortions for the next century and a half, yet the controversy remained somewhat muted because many of these laws were seldom enforced by local officials. In the 1950s and 1960s, many states began to liberalize their abortion laws in light of the American Law Institute's proposal that exceptions to the proscription of abortion should be made in cases of rape, incest, health of the mother, or fetal deformity. Events such as the thalidomide (a popular tranquilizer shown to cause severe birth defects) scare, reports of "back alley" abortions, and the work of a loose confederation of physicians and women's rights activists further

influenced many states to repeal or modify their abortion statutes. In the 1960s, the American Medical Association eventually endorsed these efforts after vigorous debates among its membership about the ethical issues involved and the medical utility of abortion. These events permanently forced the issue into the national consciousness.

In 1970, "Jane Roe" (Norma McCorvey) sued the district attorney of Dallas County in Texas claiming that the vagueness and breadth of the state's criminal abortion statute—which permitted abortion only in cases of imminent danger to the mother's life as defined by a physician—violated her privacy rights implicitly guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Roe sought to terminate a pregnancy which she claimed was the result of rape—a claim she later recanted. The District Court for the Northern District of Texas permitted a Texas physician then under prosecution for providing abortions (James Hallford) and a married couple challenging a similar Georgia statute (John and Mary Doe) to join the suit. While the District Court found for Roe, it refused to grant the injunction against the state of Texas sought by the plaintiffs, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court. The case was argued before the High Court in December 1971 and reargued in October 1972. In a 7–2 decision, the Court held the Texas law to be unconstitutional in view of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of personal liberty, which Justice Blackmun argued was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision" to terminate a pregnancy within the first trimester.

The political effects of the *Roe* ruling were tremendous. Aside from affirming "a right to choose," which invalidated the remaining state laws restricting abortion, the ruling federalized the creation of abortion policy. In short, Roe (along with the Supreme Court's decisions in *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services* in 1989 and *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* in 1992) initiated a new era in abortion politics in which states, the federal government, and the courts would all participate in policymaking. The decades since have produced intense judicial and legislative efforts from both sides of the controversy. The effort to ban late-term or "partial birth" abortions is among the most recent and prominent of these efforts. In the mid-1990s, abortion opponents such as the National Right to Life Committee and the Family Research Council waged an all-out lobbying offensive for state and national legislation banning the procedure. Groups such as the National Organization for Women and Planned Parenthood opposed these efforts with equal vigor. President Clinton twice vetoed such bans citing concerns over a lack of maternal health exceptions. In 2003, abortion opponents again took up the fight in the Republican-controlled Congress and successfully lobbied for passage of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which George W. Bush signed in March of that year. However, the legislation was not enforced prior to 2007 because of federal court challenges such as *Gonzales v. Carhart*. In April 2007, in *Gonzales v. Carhart*, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act on its face but ruled that the statute might be subject to further challenge as applied to particular situations. As such, the abortion controversy will continue to be engaged at every level of government for the foreseeable future.

Apart from the federal implications, the abortion issue has profoundly affected sociopolitical discourse in the United States. Both sides of the controversy often engage in discourse designed more to mobilize supporters via emotional images and language rather than engage opponents or outsiders in meaningful rhetorical dialogue. For instance, Rev. Randall Terry—founder of the radical antiabortion group Operation Rescue—has been known to display aborted fetuses in jars and boxes and to encourage members to engage in forms of civil disobedience, such as blocking the entrances to abortion clinics, to convey their message that "abortion is murder." Similarly, some radical abortion rights advocates wave wire hangers to invoke the specter of "back alley" self-abortions when arguing against proposed abortion regulations. Although the vast majority of abortion rights supporters and opponents are certainly more nuanced in their views, there can be little doubt as to the polarizing effects of such discourse. Indeed, the ubiquitous and misleading labels of "pro-choice" and "pro-life" serve to create in-group cohesion via slogan as much as they also define, isolate, and vilify the group's enemies. Contemporary abortion discourse reminds one of Henry Kissinger's well-known mantra that "great tragedies occur not when right confronts wrong, but when two rights face each other." In short, the abortion controversy remains a polarizing issue in American politics.

David C. Bailey

See also Schroeder, Patricia

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Adenauer, Konrad (1876–1967)

Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, used professional media relations to achieve his political goals. With the assistance of professional communication management, he became a legendary leader. Many people still regard him as the most outstanding German statesman. Due to fundamental rebuilding after the Second World War, the Adenauer era (1949–1963) plays a key role as far as political communication in Germany is concerned. Adenauer's party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is considered to be the first people's party in Central Europe. Modern public relations (PR) was a substantial factor in its establishment. In the early fifties the public could not be easily reached through party press or classical environmental organizations such as trade unions or churches. Media-oriented public relations programs were needed to integrate different classes and denominations. The newly created CDU could not depend on a strong party press and therefore had to focus on the developing commercial media in order to mobilize voters.

Media relations were directed toward newspapers and radio. Television played an insignificant role in early media adjustment of political communication: Range and transmission patterns of German television were still too limited. Adenauer's repertoire already contained issues and event management suitable for the media, offering information as well as support for journalists. By 1953 a strategy of media-oriented personalization is recognizable, which let the political program step back behind the person. The most important instrument of Adenauer's media relations was the "tea discussions." Selected journalists participated in these informal background sessions.

Adenauer's party played only a marginal role in the chancellor's communication. The level of organization was clearly underdeveloped until the early seventies. The organizational center was the newly founded Bundespresseamt (Federal Press Office). Substantial impulses proceeded also from the Bundeskanzleramt (Office of the Chancellor). Its first office chief, Otto Lenz, built a network of PR organizations that were seemingly independent but were financed by the Press Office. They conducted lobbying on critical issues such as the rearmament. Adenauer was the first to use commercial agencies: Since 1950 "Allensbach," an institute for public opinion, has provided polls regarding political tendencies. Other polling institutes such as "EMNID" and advertising agencies such as "Dr. Hegemann" followed.

Despite their forward-looking spirit, Adenauer and his staff occasionally used methods of propaganda or national censorship in order to discourage undesirable reporting. For example, the editor of the magazine *Spiegel* was arrested due to a critical report on the German army.

Lars A. Rosumek

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Advocacy Advertising

Advocacy advertising—encompassing issue advertising, legislative issue advertising, editorial advertising, and cause advertising—is a well-established facet

of U.S. public policy environments and American political campaigns. Unlike political candidate advertising, advocacy advertising is characterized as ads sponsored by third-party groups, such as corporate entities, issue or cause-related citizen groups, and organized labor. Advocacy ads either promote or denounce a certain policy agenda. Advocacy advertising is likely to escalate whenever the political environment is uncertain or when political situations suggest opportunities or threats to the vested interests of advocacy groups. The uncertainty surrounding political elections makes advocacy advertising during campaign seasons particularly significant.

Rise of Advocacy Advertising

Advocacy advertising surrounding the 1994 health care reform debates changed the landscape not only for political campaigns, but also for the public policy process by significantly altering the mediated strategy advocacy groups used to gain control of mediated messages. President Bill Clinton's appointment of First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton to head the Task Force on National Health Care Reform, and his subsequent address to Congress presenting a proposed universal health care plan, created an uncertain environment for one of the issues with the greatest economic impact in the United States. Political and economic uncertainty for advocacy groups concerned with favorable and unfavorable consequences of the Clinton health care reform proposal resulted in unprecedented levels of televised advocacy advertisements aimed to sway attitudes of citizens and legislative decision makers. The rise of advocacy advertising created debate over issues such as moneyed interests in politics and First Amendment free speech protections for these groups.

An estimated $50 million was spent on health care advocacy advertising by the numerous groups battling over the Clinton plan. The Health Care Reform Project, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, the League of Women Voters, the California Wellness Foundation, and the Democratic National Committee were among the groups supporting health care reform; the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), the American Medical Association, the National Restaurant Association, and the Project for the Republican Future used advocacy advertising to challenge the proposed plan. The HIAA was the most prominent group to attempt to shape interpretations of the Clinton plan. To oppose the proposed Clinton health care reform proposal, the HIAA organized and created the Coalition for Health Insurance Choices as a nonprofit advocacy group. Creation of the Coalition for Health Insurance Choices allowed the HIAA to funnel unlimited amounts of money to the Coalition for advertising expenditures and other media advocacy.

The HIAA alone spent an estimated $15 million on a television advertising campaign that included the widely publicized "Harry and Louise" ads. Harry and Louise were fictional middle-class characters created to dramatize a typical couple agonizing over a complex and bureaucratic plan. The Healthcare Reform Project, a partnership of consumer, labor, and business entities, was formed to support the Clinton plan and defend against the complexities and fear Harry and Louise created by labeling the proposed plan another huge government bureaucracy. Consequently the impact of Harry and Louise is widely debated; some media credit this couple with bringing down the health care reform proposal and cite this campaign as ushering in a new style of advocacy advertising. Although advocacy ads may sway public opinion, attempts to target messages in media markets of congressional members holding important minority and majority leadership roles on critical congressional committees suggest that the main goal of the ads was to influence policymakers.

The increase in advocacy advertising expenditures from $50 million during the 1994 mid-term elections to more than $500 million during the 2000 elections demonstrates clearly the increasing reliance on advocacy advertising as a means to shape policy agendas and decisions. Reports from 2004—especially considering the increase of advocacy groups under the label of 527 organizations—again revealed significant surges in advertising spending for these types of ads as estimates for advocacy advertising expenditures topped $1 billion. Even though 2005 was considered a light campaign year, with gubernatorial elections in New Jersey and Virginia representing the most high-profile elections, spending by advocacy groups continued. In this case, the advocacy groups advertised to influence Supreme Court nominations, as well as issues such as prescription drug coverage and social security reform.

Advocacy Advertising and Campaign Finance Reform

Controversy about undue individual and corporate financial influence in U.S. political campaigns dates back to some of the earliest presidential campaigns. Although the Tillman Act in 1907 and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 respectively banned direct corporate and union contributions to federal candidates, these laws were not frequently enforced.

In 1976, the *Buckley v. Valeo* decision distinguished candidate and advocacy advertising by the labels "express advocacy" and "issue advocacy," respectively. Express advocacy included communication that explicitly asked voters to "vote for" or "vote against," "defeat" or "reject," "elect" or "cast a ballot" for a candidate or referendum. Campaign finances raised specifically for purposes expressly advocating on behalf of a candidate are subject to federal campaign finance laws and require contribution and expenditure records in keeping with legal statutes. Advertising, or other forms of communication, not expressly or explicitly urging voters through use of the express words were classified as issue advocacy. The Supreme Court's *Buckley v. Valeo* ruling removed issue advocacy advertising from the Federal Election Campaign Act because this form of communication did not expressly advocate on behalf of a candidate. As a result, issue advocacy is interpreted to include communication intended to support or oppose legislative proposals, policy issues, or public policy, but does not specifically mention the goal to elect or defeat candidates or referenda. Based on congressional interpretation of campaign finance laws, advocacy advertising is protected by freedom of speech provisions under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), originally labeled McCain-Feingold after Senators John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Russ Feingold (D-Minn.), was adopted on November 6, 2002, with the intent to prohibit "soft-money" contributions for the purposes of party activities. There were no previous contribution limits on soft money, because it did not directly contribute to a political candidate. The goal of the law, effective immediately following the 2002 election cycle, was to limit severely soft money and to reduce the influence of labor and corporate political action committees by restricting advertising from these groups in the months prior to a general election. However, a significant loophole existed in section 527 of the federal tax code. The 527 loophole allowed for the creation of what are referred to as 527 groups. These groups are able to receive unlimited contributions from any source and spend the contributions on anything other than express advocacy. Groups organized to exploit the 527 loophole are able to raise and spend unlimited amounts of "soft money," which they are able to spend on campaign advertising as long as they do not expressly advocate for the election or defeat of a federal candidate. Many 527 groups exploit the campaign finance loophole and air political advertisements that, although not expressly, present messages that subtly and not-so-subtly attempt to influence the outcome of elections. Reports of fundraising activities by 527 groups demonstrated that some organizations observed more than 100% increases in funds raised and spent in the short time period between 2002 and 2004. Estimates on combined advertising expenditures alone from 527 groups topped $1 billion during 2004, which is up from more than $250 million during 2002.

Advocacy Advertising and 527 Groups

Several 527 groups, such as Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, America Coming Together, The Media Fund, Progress for America, and MoveOn.org, quickly emerged as significant players in the political landscape during the 2004 elections. The top 11 most successful fundraising 527 groups during the 2004 election cycle each raised and spent more than $10 million, largely for advertising purposes. The top 527 groups in order of fundraising during 2004 were: America Coming Together; Joint Victory Campaign 2004; Media Fund; Progress for America; Service Employees International Union (SEIU); American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, Club for Growth, MoveOn.org, New Democratic Network, and Citizens for a Strong Senate. Clearly, the advertising and publicity strategies by some of these groups produced higher name recognition and notoriety during the campaign. The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth advertising strategy that showed former troops and military spouses questioning John Kerry's bravery raised awareness for this group. In addition to spending more than $10 million on ads in key districts during 2004, MoveOn.org gained public awareness through a creative strategy of featuring "real people" ads that documented MoveOn.org members' dissatisfaction with President Bush.

Although these groups do not expressly advocate on behalf of a candidate, their support for or against a candidate is so heavily implied that they may appear indistinguishable from candidate or party ads with the exception of the candidate's endorsement. Basically, any individual or group can start a 527-campaign fund as long as campaign political activities and day-to-day functions are maintained separately.

Progress for America Voter Fund is a 527 group closely aligned with the Bush Administration and the Republican National Committee. Federal Election Commission data shows that the Project for America Voter Fund outspent both the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and The Media Fund by a rate of three to one during the final stretch of the 2004 presidential campaign. Although Project for America aired negative ads against Kerry, it received the most recognition for the ad *Ashley's Story.* The ad shows President Bush embracing and consoling Ashley Faulkner, the 16-year-old girl whose mother was a victim of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Some political observers identify this ad as the most influential ad of the 2004 election.

During the extremely negative final weeks of the 2004 presidential campaign, *Ashley's Story* became the definitive ad in the lead up to the election. Its positive message, depicting a compassionate and caring President Bush, provided voters with a message incomparable to other messages in the media environment during this time. *Ashley's Story* included the following audio message:

Lynn Faulkner—Mason, Ohio:	My wife Wendy was murdered by terrorists on September 11.
Male Announcer:	The Faulkner's daughter Ashley closed up emotionally. But when President George W. Bush came to Lebanon, Ohio, she went to see him, as she had with her mother four years before.
Linda Prince—Family Friend:	He walked toward me and I said, Mr. President, this young lady lost her mother in the World Trade Center.
Ashley:	And he turned around and he came back and he said I know that's hard. Are you all right?
Linda Prince:	Our president took Ashley in his arms and just embraced her, and it was at that moment that we saw Ashley's eyes fill up with tears.
Ashley:	He's the most powerful man in the world and all he wants to do is make sure I'm safe, that I'm okay.
Lynn Faulkner:	What I saw was what I want to see in the heart and in the soul of the man who sits in the highest elected office in our country.
Male Announcer:	Progress for America Voter Fund is responsible for the content of this message.

Progress for American Voter Fund is clearly, although not expressly, advocating on behalf of President Bush's reelection in this spot.

Additionally, advocacy advertising is controversial because the advocacy group names may be difficult to interpret. Take, for example, the Progress for America Voter Fund. To the average voter, the name Progress for America hardly represents anything disagreeable. However, if voters were aware that Progress for America was closely aligned with the Bush administration and the Republican National Committee, they would be in a better position to evaluate the potential bias in the advocacy ads. The Coalition for Health Insurance Choices—although described by the HIAA as a movement including thousands of businesses, groups, and individuals—shared the same office building, advertising and public relations firm with HIAA. As a result of the close affiliation of advocacy groups with candidates, administration, and groups otherwise restricted by campaign finance laws, the loophole for 527 groups creates great controversy between those arguing that changes in campaign finance would infringe upon free speech and those that would like to see moneyed interests in politics diminished.

Advocacy Advertising Impact

Like political candidate advertising, the role of advocacy advertising content and effects is widely debated. Academic research generally fails to demonstrate that advocacy ads directly influence candidate preference among voters, so the worries that advocacy ads come too close to candidate ads may not be so serious. Even during the health care reform debate, many Americans were not familiar with Harry and Louise from the ad campaign, but instead came to recognize these characters based on media coverage of the ads in stories about the debate. Nevertheless, research also appears to show that these types of ads may be more influential among nonpartisans and undecided voters. What appears to be missing from academic research on the

topic of advocacy advertising is research attempting to measure how such ads may influence opinion leaders and decision makers in legislative roles.

Nevertheless, substantial criticism remains targeted toward advocacy advertising based on assertions that it is largely sponsored by big corporate, moneyed interests. As long as ad advocacy advertising continues, there is increased need for media organizations to help citizens digest the group names and their affiliations and the message strategies they use in their ads. Advocacy advertising is rarely the focus of media ad watches. Considering the pervasiveness of advocacy advertising in the American political process, the claims advanced in these ads should be subject to media scrutiny to help voters assess the validity of advertising claims.

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See also Ad Watch; Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act; Campaign Finance; First Amendment; Political Advertising, Independent

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Ad Watch

An ad watch is a media report and evaluation of political advertising content. *Washington Post* columnist David Broder is credited with urging fellow journalists to be more watchful of political advertising messages and making coverage of advertising claims a standard feature of campaign news. Broder called for more ad watches following the intensely negative nature of the 1988 presidential campaign in which political advertising played a significant role in shaping campaign news coverage. In fact, televised political advertising is a prominent feature in most U.S. political campaigns. Televised ads, also known as spots, comprise a significant portion of presidential candidates' campaign budgets and figure substantially in most statewide and congressional elections. Candidates, political party organizations, and issue advocacy groups rely heavily on televised political advertising because it provides direct control of the messages targeted to voters. Ad watches provide citizens some assistance in processing and evaluating claims made in political ads.

Broder's call following the 1988 presidential campaign, and the negative nature of ensuing presidential campaigns, resulted in more ad watches as journalists attempted to police dishonest or ethically suspect campaigning. Ad watches fit nicely into the dominant horse-race style of political reporting as journalists are able to dramatize the attack and defend interplay of candidate ad strategies. When candidates use political advertising as a form of campaign dialogue—attacking opponents or responding to attacks—journalists are able to create news packages that contribute to political discourse and the fourth estate function of media. Beyond the fourth estate function of questioning true and false claims advanced by candidates and serving as an independent source of information about ad claims, political ad watches took hold as a form of political reporting for several news management considerations.

The dominant nature of political advertising in campaigns means that this campaign format serves as a continual source of political news for journalists. Furthermore, whether aired in their entirety or as an ad bite—or a short clip—ads transfer easily to the news format since they supply journalists with visual components for more appealing news reports. Unfortunately, no systematic approach to political ad watches exists. As a result, it appears that more negative ads become the focus of ad watches. Although history informs us that negative ads are frequently home to misleading claims, it also shows us that ads promoting a candidate tend to mislead the audience.

As far back as the 1952 "Eisenhower Answers America" presidential ad campaign, candidates manipulated messages contained in their spots. Eisenhower's

ads manipulated audio and video content to give the impression that Eisenhower was responding to a range of citizen questions. Instead, Eisenhower provided staged answers to a variety of issues on his campaign agenda, and citizen actors later were drafted to ask questions that addressed Eisenhower's previously filmed answers.

By modern standards, Eisenhower's advertising strategy may not appear to be an egregious violation of ethical standards. However, more recent audio and video technological developments provide campaigns with tools capable of more blatant, deceptive, and ethically suspect strategies labeled as technodistortions. A more disturbing example of deceptive audio and video techniques by campaigns in political advertising was uncovered during the 1996 Virginia senate race featuring Senator John Warner and his opponent Mark Warner. One of Senator Warner's televised ads manipulated a 1994 photo that featured former Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder and Virginia Senator Charles Robb shaking hands while President Clinton was posed between the two. When the photo appeared in Senator Warner's advertisement, the face of Robb was seamlessly replaced by the face of Mark Warner, misleading voters to perceive that Senator Warner's opponent Mark Warner was shaking hands with Wilder and associating with Clinton. Senator Warner manipulated the photo in an attempt to link his opponent with two unpopular political figures in Virginia. In this case, the manipulation was uncovered and widely reported in media ad watches. It is extremely unlikely that ordinary citizens would pick up on this re-creation of history and virtually impossible for them to detect the photo manipulation techniques used in the spot.

Candidates have long recognized that there are benefits to having their ads covered as news items. When aired in their entirety within a news segment, it is possible that political ads reach millions of voters. Furthermore, ads aired in the context of a news story may be enhanced by the credible news environment. History informs us that some candidates create advertising messages to earn free media coverage. Lyndon Johnson's famous 1964 "Daisy Girl" spot, which contains visual images of an atomic bomb explosion to elicit nuclear war fears, aired only once as a paid political spot but was shown in its entirety by the major news networks in their campaign news coverage at the time. Examples of modern political advertising shaping the news agenda are frequent. Since journalists appear to give more attention to ads that are controversial, dramatic, and evocative, campaigns create ad messages with the intent to maximize the likelihood that their ads will be featured as news.

Academic researchers studying the content and effects of ad watches on voters find that specific reporting strategies are more likely to result in favorable effects. But, ads do not need to use technological manipulations in order to mislead voters. Prior ad watches show the public that candidates play loose with the truth even in advertisements that promote their accomplishments, issue positions, and prior public service records.

Simply including advertising messages in news reports is not sufficient for helping voters discern true or false messages. Academic researchers studying the content and effects of ad watches on voters find that specific reporting strategies are more likely to result in favorable effects. If visual aspects of ads are included in ad watches, stopping or interrupting ads immediately following misleading audio or visual claims through the use of on-screen graphics and voice-overs helps voters understand specific features of advertisements that are questionable. Additionally, rather than showing ad bites or ads full screen, researchers recommend placing ads in downsized, labeled graphics to lessen the visual impact of the suspect ad and to make it less likely that free air time for candidate spots will be provided.

Reliance on paid advertising as a significant form of campaign communication continues in modern political campaigns. Whether purposefully playing loose with facts and attempting to deceive the public with technical manipulations of audio and video content or presenting voters with nonmalicious but questionable claims, the need for ad watches continues as the typical voter is not equipped to fact check many advertising messages independently.

In the future, journalists may wish to create a systematic procedure for evaluating ad claims. Since the high volume of ads aired across political campaigns each election cycle is beyond the number possible for journalists to evaluate, a systematic trigger or random procedure for evaluating ads may help journalists avoid claims that they focus predominantly on negative ads, ads from candidates of a specific party, or ads that are developed specifically to create news attention.

A new direction in ad watches has been the use of the World Wide Web as a channel. Newspaper and television stations are using their Web sites to post ad

watch material from their news broadcasts and, in some cases, providing extended coverage and expanded explanations on their Web sites. The University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg School of Communication also maintains a Web site to analyze ads. Called FactCheck, it is available at www.factcheck.org. The increased space available on the Web has also encouraged candidates, political parties, and third-party interest groups to engage in their own adwatch analysis on their Web sites. These trends will surely be useful to voters in providing more information and assistance in evaluating claims.

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See also Broder, David; Daisy Girl Ad; Fourth Estate, Media as; Journalism, Political; Negative Advertising; News Coverage of Politics; Political Advertising; TechnoDistortions

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Affirmative Action

Affirmative action requires employers and college/university admissions procedures to give special consideration to minorities and female applicants. The purpose of affirmative action, as it was originally conceived, is to reverse the detrimental effects that discrimination had on minorities prior to 1964. Through subsequent Supreme Court rulings, affirmative action policies cannot impose quotas or inflict reverse discrimination. The goal of affirmative action policies is to increase diversity in employment and educational arenas.

Affirmative action was first mentioned on March 6, 1961, as part of President John F. Kennedy's Executive Order 10925, which mandated the creation of the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. However, it would be four years before affirmative action was brought to the public's attention.

The Civil Rights Act was signed into law on July 2, 1964. The Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination based on race, creed, color, or national origin. The Act also included the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to oversee the implementation of the Act in the workplace.

President Lyndon B. Johnson introduced affirmative action in 1965 through a speech at Howard University and the subsequent crafting of Executive Order 11246. Through this Executive Order, government contractors were required to show proof that minorities were provided equal access to and equal consideration during the employment process. The order also abolished the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and transferred its duties to the Department of Labor. In 1967, the order was amended to include gender as a consideration for equal access to employment.

In 1969, President Richard M. Nixon created the "Philadelphia Order" in which minorities were guaranteed fair hiring practices in construction jobs. The order was so named because Philadelphia was chosen as the test location given the rampant discrimination in the construction industry there. The ultimate goal of the Philadelphia Order was to increase minority employment in construction jobs. President Nixon noted that the order did not enforce racial quotas but, rather, employers were required to show "affirmative action" in meeting the goal of increasing minority employment.

The first test of affirmative action as reverse discrimination to reach the Supreme Court was *DeFunis v. Odegaard* (1974), involving law school admissions, but the court declared the case moot without deciding the issue because DeFunis (having been admitted to law school pending the appeals) effectively would have graduated from law school before the case was decided. Affirmative action programs were first tested on the merits in the Supreme Court in the case of *The Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* (1978). Allan Bakke was a white man who had applied for two consecutive years to medical school at University of California at Davis. Both years lesser qualified minority applicants were admitted while his application was denied. The Supreme Court ruled in Bakke's favor (5–4) stating that UC Davis had inflexible quotas that were unacceptable. Later Supreme Court decisions regarding affirmative action stated that "moderate" quotas were acceptable.

Another landmark Supreme Court case was *Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education* (1986). In this case, nonminority teachers with seniority were laid off in order to retain minority teachers. Ultimately the Supreme Court ruled that the harm inflicted on the nonminority teachers was greater than the benefits to the minority teachers that were retained.

Beginning in 1997, states began passing legislation banning affirmative action. California was the first followed by the state of Washington. In 2000, Florida banned the use of affirmative action in college admissions.

Additional Supreme Court cases brought about rulings regarding local, state, and federal affirmative action guidelines. In 2003, several Supreme Court rulings regarding the affirmative action policies at The University of Michigan set guidelines about the use of affirmative action in the admissions process. In one case, *Gratz v. Bollinger* (2000), the Supreme Court ruled that the university's undergraduate admissions process was unconstitutional because minority students were given additional credits in their application score for being a "minority."

However, in a similar case against the University of Michigan's law school, *Grutter v. Bollinger* (2001), the Supreme Court ruled that race can be a factor in the admissions process because a diverse student body adds to the educational experiences of all students. The difference between this case and the undergraduate admissions case is that the law school took race into consideration, while students seeking admissions to the undergraduate programs were given credits for being minorities.

Despite the many Supreme Court rulings and Executive Orders, affirmative action continues to be debatable in both its inception and its effects.

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AFL-CIO

See Unions, Political Activity

Agenda Building

See Agenda Setting

Agenda Melding

Agenda melding can be defined as the process by which audience members seek out and blend media agendas from various communication sources to fit their individual preferences and cognitions. Where the media can set the public agenda by influencing the salience of key issues, along with details or attributes about those issues, agenda melding argues that the already established values and attitudes of audience members play a role in how those issues and attributes are sought out and mixed—or melded—into a coherent individual picture of events. Agenda setting focuses on the power of media to set agendas; agenda melding concentrates on the ability of audience members to select among media, issues, and elements of

messages. The latter is important because the study of audience interests and needs in acquiring media agendas is a necessary element of true understanding of public opinion formation of all groups.

With agenda melding audiences are not passive but actively select messages from the plethora of those available. More developed countries offer more choices, but there are nearly always informational options, even in controlled states. Individual agenda melding involves individuals expressing, and perhaps reinforcing, their personal values and attitudes through the messages selected. This idea dates back to Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance in which he posited that individuals seek out information that supports their views while disregarding or avoiding information that does not. Even ancient observers, however, noted that birds of a feather flock together, which individuals can do today via the Web without leaving their homes.

Agenda melding argues that we are attracted to agenda groups, even if we have to find and mix them ourselves. According to Donald L. Shaw and his colleagues, membership may not be formal, such as paying dues and attending meetings, but instead can be informal and exist only in the person's mind, such as if one subscribes to a belief in environmentalism or a particular social theory. Shaw and his colleagues tested David Weaver's argument that audiences exercise more interest in seeking information if there is a need for orientation to a public issue. The authors explain that agenda melding is an ongoing social process in which individuals choose a variety of media, both mass and interpersonal, to relate to other people and meld their own group agenda of issues. In a sense, many chat-group monitors choose to belong to an agenda group, even if secretly. Many groups are organized around social issue agendas. Some examples include Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and the progressive political group MoveOn.org. If organized and determined enough, these individuals may organize into groups that may have the power to influence public agendas either with or without the use of traditional mass media.

Donald L. Shaw and Rita F. Colistra

See also Agenda Setting

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AGENDA SETTING

Agenda setting is a theory of mass communication effects which holds that news media, through the editorial selection process, transmit to the public the salience of political objects, which affects the relative importance of these objects to the public. According to agenda-setting theory, the news media may not tell the public *what to think* (for example, what position to take on a political issue or what candidate to support in an election), but they tell the public *what to think about* (for example, what issues are important or what candidates are viable).

One of the primary services the news media provide to their audiences is their surveillance of the environment to determine what events are occurring in the world that the press believes their audiences should know. Journalists use professional norms called news values, such as proximity, timeliness, conflict, celebrity and human interest, to decide what is newsworthy. News media also prioritize the news, such as giving a banner headline on the newspaper's front page or the lead position on a newscast to signal importance. Agenda-setting theory conceptualizes this ordering of political objects by the news media as the "media agenda." The news media's selection and presentation of news provides an indexing function that helps readers decide where to place their attention. Through this exercise of editorial judgment, newspapers and newscasts make political objects stand out in relief from others. The media agenda directs the public's attention to certain political objects. In this way, the news media change the salience of political issues, persons, or topics. News media tell the public what is important. Agenda-setting theory conceptualizes this ordering of

political objects by the public as the "public agenda." Agenda-setting theory holds that as the media agenda changes, the public agenda follows. The news media set the public agenda.

Since the news media's ability to cover events is limited by time and space, only a few issues muscle their way onto the media agenda, shoving aside other issues. Further, because the public's ability to attend to concerns is limited, only a few issues grab the public's attention at any one time. Agenda setting is based on the media's limited ability to cover issues and the public's limited ability to attend to them.

Agenda setting originally focused on the transfer of the salience of political issues from the news media to the public. The earliest agenda-setting studies took place in the context of U.S. presidential election campaigns. They studied how shifts in the occurrence of newspaper and television news stories devoted to campaign issues changed during the course of the race. They compared these changes in the media issue agenda to subsequent changes in voters' concerns. The studies also expanded to investigate the agenda-setting influence of other forms of political communication beyond the dominant mainstream media, including alternative news media and political Web logs. Research also encompassed other political objects, including persons, such as election candidates, and the attributes of objects, such as characteristics of election candidates. Attributes are those characteristics of an object which complete the picture of that object. Attributes can vary widely in scope, from a candidate's age to a candidate's foreign policy experience. The agenda setting of attributes of objects, as opposed to the agenda setting of objects, is also known as "second-level agenda setting." The studies also turned to agenda setting in other types of elections, in non-election times, in other countries, including Argentina, Germany, Japan, and Spain, and in other contexts. Not surprisingly, agenda setting does not occur in the presence of either a closed electoral system, one in which selection of political leaders and policies is patently undemocratic, or a closed media system, one in which the news is strongly government controlled.

Agenda setting also may be regarded as a more general theory of salience transmission. In its most general form, agenda-setting theory may conceptualize an agenda as a list of objects ordered by their salience, and the process of agenda setting may be regarded as the transmission of the salience of one agenda to another agenda. One of the major theoretical contributions of agenda-setting theory is its conceptualization of corresponding agendas of political objects. The world of politics may be regarded as a collection of political agendas, agenda setters, and agenda recipients. Thus, the effects of media agendas have been studied on other types of agendas besides the public agenda, such as the presidential agenda and the congressional agenda. Also, the effects of these and other nonmedia agendas on the media agenda have been studied. This has been labeled "agenda building." Thus, while election campaigns are designed to elect a candidate, part of that process involves trying to influence the media agenda. A working hypothesis might be that the more control a campaign wins over the media agenda, the more likely it will win the election.

As a general theory of salience transmission, agenda setting also has been extended to investigate the effects of nonmedia agendas on other contemporary nonmedia agendas, such as the effects of the public agenda on the congressional agenda. How well Congress's activities (e.g., hearings, legislation) reflect the public's concerns has always been a key question in the study of political representation. Traditional models of representation have mostly examined how well congressional actions match public concerns generally, without considering the specific priority rankings of these concerns. However, if Congress acts upon issues to which the public gives a relatively low priority while neglecting issues with higher priority, then representation may not be as effective as it appears to be. Political leaders' neglect of issues the public considers most important is typically ignored in political science models of representation.

Historical Developments

The empirical study of agenda setting began in 1968 when Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw found that the issues emphasized in the news media during that year's U.S. presidential race corresponded to the set of issues of greatest concern among undecided voters. McCombs and Shaw conceptualized the media coverage as the "media agenda" and the voters' concerns as the "public agenda." They coined the term "agenda setting" to refer to their hypothesis that the media agenda sets the public agenda. The media agenda was determined through a content analysis of newspaper coverage of the election campaign. The public agenda was determined through a survey of randomly selected undecided voters. McCombs and Shaw reasoned that if they did not find an effect among undecided voters (whom they reasoned should

Other agendas* → Media agenda → Public agenda

Agenda building | *Traditional agenda setting*

Object salience → /News norms/ Object salience → Object salience

Opinion strength

Priming

Behavior

Opinion direction

Attribute salience → /News norms/ Attribute salience → Attribute salience

Attribute priming

Attribute agenda setting

**Organizations, interest groups, public relations, political campaigns, etc.*

Figure 1 Comprehensive Model of Agenda Setting

Source: Adapted from McCombs (2004).

be most susceptible to influence), then there would be no reason to look for an effect among the general public. On the other hand, if they did find an effect among undecided voters, then there would be good reason to investigate whether the effect held more generally. Based on the promising results of the 1968 study, McCombs and Shaw then expanded their study to all voters in the 1972 presidential election. Additionally, they tested the rival hypothesis that the public agenda set the press agenda, rather than the other way around. By tracking the press and public agendas three times during the election campaign, they demonstrated that changes in the press agenda at one time led to subsequent changes in the public agenda, whereas the changes in the public agenda were not reflected subsequently in the press agenda. The study also indicated that the agenda setting influence of the news media fluctuated during the course of the campaign

and that the influence of newspapers and television also changed over time. A third study, of the 1976 presidential election, utilized nine waves of interviewing over an entire year and corresponding analyses of news media content. Meanwhile, other evidence in other settings began to accumulate, including laboratory experiments which could offer compelling supporting evidence that changes in the media agenda caused changes in the public agenda.

A criticism of agenda-setting theory might be that the public agenda dictates the media agenda, rather than the reverse. From the earliest studies, however, attention has been given to study the process over time, so that the chronological order of effects could be observed. Studies consistently show that the media agenda at Time 1 affects the public agenda at Time 2 more than the other way around.

Another criticism of agenda-setting theory might be that a third variable, namely, the set of real-world events, determines both media and audience agendas. It would seem reasonable that both the media and public agendas would be driven by real-world happenings. Studies demonstrate, however, that neither news coverage nor public concerns closely mirror real-world events. A real-world agenda can be constructed from statistical records, such as the *Statistical Abstracts of the United States.* One investigator constructed such a historical agenda of the United States covering the 1960s. The salience of Vietnam, for instance, was measured in terms of the number of American troops committed there throughout the decade. It was found that both the media agenda and the public agenda were independent of the historical agenda (real-world events). News coverage of the Vietnam War, for instance, peaked 12 to 24 months before troop commitments peaked. Throughout the 10 years, the press agenda was closely correlated with the public agenda, but both of those agendas were far less correlated with the historical record. Another study found a correspondence between the press and public agendas in late 1973 in Germany regarding an energy crisis. Again, though, the "real world," as captured by the actual availability of energy supplies in the country, did not correspond with either the press or public agendas. Supplies in September and October were actually higher than a year earlier, and supplies in November were the same as a year earlier. Yet, the supply "shortage" was high on the press and public agendas during this time and continued until February of the following year. Another study found that although the actual incidence of illegal drug use in the United States in the second half of the 1980s remained relatively stable, the media agenda gave drugs a top priority. The great attention the news media gave to the drug issue was subsequently reflected in the public's agenda, where it became "the most important problem facing this country." Another study conducted in the 1990s in Texas found that when the state's two major newspapers dramatically increased their coverage of crime between 1993 and 1995, public opinion subsequently increased. Yet, while the press and public both were expressing a high fear of crime, the historical agenda, measured by federal crime statistics, was moving in the opposite direction. While the press and the public were growing increasingly concerned about crime, the crime rate was actually declining. Other studies, including one of coverage of the environmental issue from the 1970s to the 1990s, and another on shark attacks in 2001, also have demonstrated how the press agenda drives the public agenda while neither of these agendas corresponds well to the historical record.

How Agenda Setting Works

Agenda setting involves exposure of individual persons to a news media agenda, and individuals do differ both in how frequently they are exposed to news media and in the quality of their attention. However, agenda-setting theory views the news media agenda as essentially ubiquitous, evident to all adult society members. Through something like a two-step flow from opinion leaders to opinion followers, the news media agenda permeates society. Agenda setting occurs because essentially the same stimulus, in a variety of mass communication channels, is distributed to a massive number of individual persons. As a consequence of the high penetration and saturation rates of newspapers, television news, radio news, and other mainstream news media, many different individuals share a similar experience. Despite individual differences, agenda setting occurs because the news media carry highly similar messages to so many individuals.

At the same time, the various news media are not exactly alike in their ability to transmit the salience of political objects. When newspaper and television news are compared, about half the time no significant differences in the agenda-setting effects of these two major news media are observed. Contrary to conventional wisdom, when agenda-setting differences are observed between these two news media, agenda setting tends to

be stronger for newspapers than for television news. The reasons for this are still unclear, but it may be due partly to the general capacity of newspapers to cover more and longer stories, compared to television news, and also to the relative lack of governmental control over newspapers in most societies, compared to television news. Which of these news media most affects the public agenda also may depend on other important contextual factors, such as the phase of an election campaign. For example, while newspaper coverage has a stronger effect throughout the campaign, the influence of television coverage increased over the course of the race.

The psychological variable "need for orientation" has been offered as an explanation for the transmission of salience from the press agenda to the public agenda. Need for orientation depends upon, one, relevance of the political object and, two, uncertainty about the political object. If relevancy is low, then need for orientation is low. If relevancy is high but uncertainty is low, then need for orientation is moderate. If both relevancy and uncertainty are high, then need for orientation is high. The higher a person's need for orientation, the greater the likelihood of attention to the media agenda. When need for orientation is high among many in the population, agenda setting is more likely to be strong. Thus, in a social crisis—a time of high relevance and uncertainty—people turn to the media for guidance.

Agenda setting appears to produce stronger effects on "unobtrusive" issues, issues with which a person has little direct personal experience. A military conflict in distant lands would be an unobtrusive issue for most people who have little personal or interpersonal experience with it. In contrast, inflation is an "obtrusive" issue because it obtrudes directly into most people's lives. One does not need the news media to know that inflation is an important issue of the day; one's trips to the grocery and gas station suffice. Obtrusiveness, however, is less a property of the issue and more a property of the person. Furthermore, it is not something that one either possesses or not but is more a matter of degree. To a soldier abroad, a military conflict may be highly obtrusive whereas inflation at home may be unobtrusive. If an issue is obtrusive, it means that uncertainty is low. Personal experience and interpersonal experience lessen uncertainty. In contrast, if an issue is unobtrusive, it means that uncertainty is higher because personal and interpersonal experiences can offer little information to reduce uncertainty. Therefore, need for orientation provides a general explanation for the differences in agenda-setting effects observed for obtrusive and unobtrusive issues. For unobtrusive issues, people look to the media to reduce their uncertainty.

In the early 1920s, journalist Walter Lippmann provided an explanation for how agenda setting works. Lippmann wrote that from the elements which make up the real world (i.e., the real environment), the news media select elements from which they construct a rendition of the environment (i.e., the pseudo-environment). The environment and the pseudo-environment therefore are not isomorphic; the pseudo-environment is a simplified version of the environment. The media thereby create the "pictures in our heads" that represent the political world. According to Lippmann, the public responds not to the real environment but to the pseudo-environment created by the media. Agenda-setting theory holds that the media's pictures of the world may be conceptualized in terms of agendas of items. Those elements of the real world that the media make prominent become those elements the public considers prominent. The public comes to accept as important those elements the media emphasize.

Measuring Agendas

One reason agenda-setting theory attracts scholars is that it makes an explicit connection between specific media content and a specific effect on those exposed to that content. Researchers have become adept at measuring both the media agenda and the public agenda, and showing the relationship between the two. The method of survey research is generally used to measure the public agenda. The public agenda commonly consists of a list of objects ranked by frequency of occurrence. In a typical study, a sample of the adult population is asked what political issues are of greatest concern. The question might be, "What is the most important problem facing this country today?" The Gallup polling organization has been asking a version of the "most important problem" (MIP) question since the 1930s. It has become a mainstay in the measurement of the national public agenda, especially useful in studies of change over time. Other polling organizations have utilized similar MIP questions. Versions have been adapted for state and local populations, as well. The "public agenda" is constructed by ranking the issues by how frequently they are mentioned by respondents. Then, at another time, the process is

repeated, usually with a different sample. In this way, changes in the public agenda can be tracked. Besides the MIP survey question, other ways to measure the public agenda include making observations of voting or other political decisions, opinion holding, and conversations. The salience of political issues has been assessed by asking people to recall news stories that appeared in the newspaper and ranking the importance of various sets of news stories. Issue salience also has been estimated by asking people about the extent of their discussion of an issue with friends and the need for more government action on an issue. The salience of attributes has been measured by asking people which aspects of an issue are of most interest and which have been discussed the most. Attribute salience also has been commonly assessed with a question used to measure candidate images in the early agenda setting study of the 1976 U.S. presidential election: "Suppose you had some friends who had been away for a long time and were unfamiliar with the presidential candidates. What would you tell them about [Candidate's Name]?"

Agenda-setting researchers also have begun to use nonresponse as an inverse measure of both object and attribute salience. Thus, the fewer persons who have no opinion about a candidate, the greater the salience of that candidate.

The research method of content analysis is generally used to measure a media agenda. The media agenda commonly consists of a list of objects ranked by frequency of occurrence. In a typical study, a sample of the content of a news medium (or a set of news media) is selected, and the amount of space or time devoted to a political issue is counted. For example, each news story might be coded in terms of the political issue about which it is most concerned. Then the number of stories that are primarily about each issue is counted. The "media agenda" is constructed by ranking the issues by how frequently stories are primarily about them. Then, at another time, the process is repeated, with a different sample of media content. In this way, changes in the media agenda can be tracked. Besides the full-text content analysis of news stories, other ways to measure the media agenda include the use of news indices and abstracts (for example, *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, Vanderbilt Television News Index and Abstracts*), which help simplify the construction of media agendas. These have proven to be particularly useful when dealing with large samples of media content and when examining news coverage over long periods of time. The construction of media agendas also has been simplified by the development of computer software programs (e.g., General Enquirer, VB Pro) that can identify and count the frequency of words and phrases.

Related Concepts

Another reason agenda setting has attracted the interest of scholars is its connections to and, in some cases, overlaps with, other mass communication theories and concepts. Gatekeeping theory deals with how editors open the gates only to selected stories, which relates to which political objects end up on the media agenda. Agenda-setting theorists incorporate gatekeeping theory into agenda-setting theory for its contributions to the question of how the media agenda is formed. Status conferral theory deals with how news coverage confers status on persons, which relates to how candidates and other newsmakers land on the media agenda. Agenda-setting theorists regard status conferral as the setting of an agenda of persons. Cultivation theory deals with how television cultivates an image of a mean and dangerous world, indicating that television may be setting a long-term agenda of crime, violence, and corruption. Spiral of silence theory deals with how the public senses what cannot be said without fear of social ostracism and how silence perpetuates silence, which relates to how—or whether—the news media cover political positions. Framing theory deals with how the news is organized and presented and the effect of this on the public's interpretations of the news, which relates to the frequency with which issues, positions, and other political objects are covered in the news. Some theorists maintain that attribute agenda setting and framing are identical. A frame is often regarded as an organizing principle that gives a person a way to interpret some event, issue, or other political object. As an organizing attribute, a frame is more than the sum of its parts. Successful framers can control political discourse by repeatedly invoking the same frame, which sets the terms of engagement, the words, the vocabulary, and metaphors, by which a political object (e.g., issue, candidate) is discussed. Agenda setting would show that the most important problem in the public's mind is, say, the abortion issue, because the news media have been writing or airing many stories on the topic of abortion, and giving them prominent display. Framing would show that the public thinks of the abortion issue as a matter of,

say, an unborn child's right to live, as opposed to a pregnant woman's right to choose what happens to her body, because the news media in their stories on the topic of abortion have treated abortion from a pro-life perspective rather than from a pro-choice perspective. Attribute agenda setting would show that the attribute of the abortion issue that is most salient to the public is, say, the right of a woman to choose what happens to her body, as opposed to the right of an unborn child to live, because the news media in their stories on the topic of abortion have treated abortion from a pro-choice perspective rather than from a pro-life perspective. If one is willing to conceptualize a media frame of the attributes of a political object as a list of those attributes ranked by how frequently they occur in the media content, then a media frame and a media agenda would be essentially indistinguishable. If a frame is conceptualized as an attribute of an object, then it is clear that not all attributes are frames. Only a special type of attribute is a frame. A frame is an attribute that offers a predominant perspective on a political object. A frame has the power to integrate thoughts into a distinctive pattern, that is, a frame organizes thought. A frame can be represented as a cognitive structure, similar to an association network, exemplar, script, schema or other mental representation. Often attributes of an object are relatively microscopic (e.g., a candidate's age) and lack the gestalt qualities of a frame. In contrast, a frame presents a holistic, defining description of a political object. A frame is a macrolevel characterization that usually includes a number of microlevel characterizations. A frame has the power to structure thought. Unlike attribute agenda setting generally, framing draws attention to the dominant perspectives that promote a particular view of things. These can represent causal interpretations, problem definitions, moral evaluations, treatment recommendations and other ways of suggesting social accountability. This gives frames a power role that many other attributes of political objects lack. Agenda-setting theory tends to view the process as a more or less unintentional byproduct of the news production system. Framing theory, in contrast, tends to view the process as more deliberative, with emphasis upon the process of how powerful parties promote powerful frames. Agenda-setting theory recognizes that in a democratic state the ability to set the public agenda is political power. Agenda-setting theory, however, does not limit itself to the study of framing attributes. When agenda-setting research focuses upon those unique attributes with the power to structure thought—frames—then it is engaged in research that is difficult to distinguish from framing research.

Given (a) the large number of events that occur daily, (b) the time and space the news media have to report on them, and (c) the limited capacity of the public to attend to but a select few, the news media's gatekeepers have no choice but to be highly selective in what they report to their audiences. Most events are given scant or no coverage at all. Of the events that are covered, some are given prominent display, some for a day or less, others for a week or more. Gatekeeping theory deals with the question of how this editorial selection process works. Agenda-setting theory treats the formation of the media agenda as a matter of "agenda building." Agenda building deals with the question of what influences the media agenda. Agenda setting is then regarded as an unintentional byproduct of the creation of the media agenda. The news media's effect on the public's perceptions of important current issues is not regarded as a premeditated effort but instead as an unintentional effect of the news media's need to choose only a few stories to report.

Although agenda setting is regarded as a byproduct of the news media's production of news—the need to winnow the world down to a few choice stories—it results in a public which regards some concerns, candidates or criteria as having more currency than others. Certainly, other factors contribute to public opinion, including personal and interpersonal experiences. Still, this indexing function of the news media produces a powerful cognitive effect. Furthermore, agenda setting may occur early in the formation of public opinion, where it opens the possibility to effects on one's attitudes and actions, as well.

An important question in agenda-setting research is what the "time lag" is between when the media adjust their agendas and when the public agenda is subsequently influenced. Time lags utilized in agenda-setting research have ranged from as short as one week to as long as nine months. A too-short time lag risks failing to capture the causal relationship before it has had a chance to form; a too-long time lag risks missing the causal effect, because it may dissipate over time if the researcher waits too long to measure it. A time lag of less than 2 weeks may not give sufficient time for agenda-setting effects to reach all members of the community, while a lag of more than a month may result in audiences beginning to forget the media agenda. Research suggests that a time lag of

about 4 weeks might be optimal for observing most traditional agenda-setting effects.

Long-Term Agenda Trends

Although the *capacity* of the public's agenda (the number of issues on the agenda at any one time) has not changed much from 1939 to 1994, there have been increases in both the *diversity* of the agenda (how the agenda varies from person to person) and the *volatility* of the agenda (how quickly the agenda changes). Agenda-setting effects also differ over time between opinion leaders and opinion followers. The media agenda at first had a greater effect on opinion leaders, who then influenced others interpersonally, thereby enhancing the agenda-setting effects on opinion followers. This finding recalls the "two-step flow" model of media effects that was used to explain findings about the role of the media in the U.S. election studies of the 1940s. Opinion leaders first pay attention to the news media and then they subsequently convey media information to their opinion followers.

Among the criteria used to evaluate a theory are the extent to which it is general, predictive, explanatory, parsimonious, and integrative. Agenda-setting theory is relatively general in scope, covering news media influence on the general public's consciousness. The theory is also relatively explanatory, directly connecting a specific media stimulus to a specific media effect on the public. The theory also is relatively predictive in power. If one knows the media agenda and the correct time lag then one can predict the public agenda at a given time. The theory is also relatively parsimonious. Its parts and their connections are few, uncomplicated, and relatively easy to identify. Finally, the theory fits well into more general conceptions of news production processes, information processes, and other social and psychological processes.

Both traditional agenda setting and attribute agenda setting predict important political effects. Both objects and the attributes of objects made prominent in the mass media's portrayal of the world will become the objects and attributes of objects in the media audience's picture of the world. Furthermore, because both first- and second-level agenda setting occur early in the communication process, they also have the potential, indirectly, to influence processes that occur later in the communication process, including changing people's attitudes and behaviors.

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See also Agenda Melding; Cultivation Theory; Framing; Knowledge Gap; News Selection Process; Orientation, Need for; Two-Step Flow Model of Communication

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Aging and Politics

As the number of older adults has increased substantially in the U.S. population, their potential to influence politics and policy has also increased. Recognizing older adults as an important voting block is called the senior power model of impact on politics. Statistics show that there are more than 30 million Americans aged 65 or older, and that number is expected to grow to over 50 million by 2020. Much of the projected growth can be attributed to the aging baby boomer generation cohort (those born between 1946 and 1964). There are more than 70 million baby boomers in the United States, and those born in 1946 reached aged 60 in 2006.

Along with large numbers, older adults also vote at higher rates than other age groups. They tend to be politically active. The life experience and life cycle hypotheses suggest that older adults' high democratic participation can be attributed to lifelong learning experiences and community involvement that leads them to view participatory politics as an important endeavor. Another explanation of high voter rates among older adults is that they have additional free time in retirement to pursue democratic involvements. A previous theory, disengagement theory, argued that due to physical limitations and social withdrawal, elderly adults were

less likely to participate in political action. Due to increases in life expectancy and advancements in health care, today's senior citizens are leading active lives that contradict disengagement theory.

The senior power model presents older adults as significant in being able to shape public policy on group-specific interests such as Medicare, social security, and health care. As an established group represented by large organizations with strong lobbying power, politicians increasingly need to win support of older adults by focusing attention on issues important to them. Budget reductions and other threats to age-related programs such as social security may serve to further mobilize older adults and enhance their group unity as a political force.

A challenge to the senior power model is the lack of homogeneity among older adults. Indeed, socioeconomic status varies greatly within the older adult population, as do partisan preferences. These and other points of difference tend to fragment the older adult group, thereby lessening their political solidarity and unified power. For example, efforts to reform or improve social security are more important to older adults in lower economic brackets than those with higher incomes. Despite heterogeneity within the older adult population, however, shared interests in age-related issues combined with significant population numbers, high political participation, and group representation by associations such as AARP guarantees this group attention and a voice in shaping public policy in American democracy.

As a result of their numbers and voter turnout, older citizens are often targeted for special communication messages by candidates running for office, as well as by officeholders once elected. In campaigns from the presidency to elections for state house and senate, candidates often address specialized campaign advertising and news messages directly to issues of concern to the aging population.

Terri Ann Bailey

See also AARP

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Agnew, Spiro (1918–1996)

Spiro Theodore Agnew was born in Maryland on November 9, 1918, to Margaret Akers and Greek immigrant Theodore Spiros Anagnostopoulos. He attended Johns Hopkins University and later graduated from the University of Baltimore Law School in 1947. Agnew served in the Army during World War II as well as the Korean Conflict. It took a mere 6 years for Agnew to go from his first elected position of county executive in Maryland to vice president of the United States.

Agnew was a controversial politician early in his career. He was raised a Democrat but switched parties and became a Republican to fit in with his Republican law partners in Maryland. In his first campaign in 1960, he ran for circuit court judge, where he came in last of five candidates. Agnew gained public recognition the following year when he protested loudly after he was dropped from the Zoning Board. In 1962, he ran for election as county executive. Running as a Republican outsider in a predominantly Democratic region, he took advantage of a split in the Democratic Party and was elected.

Just 4 years later, Agnew ran for the position of governor of Maryland against the Democratic candidate, George P. Mahoney, who opposed integration. In this election, many Democrats who were opposed to segregation crossed party lines to vote in favor of Agnew, giving him the victory by just 82,000 votes. As governor, he worked to pass tax and judicial reforms as well as antipollution laws. Agnew also signed Maryland's first open-housing laws and succeeded in getting the repeal of an antimiscegenation law, which in turn gained him support in the African American community. However during the riots after Martin Luther King, Jr.'s assassination, many African American leaders became angered when Agnew lectured them to denounce publicly all black racists.

Agnew served as Richard M. Nixon's vice president after being elected in 1968 and reelected in 1972.

Agnew was known for his tough criticisms of political opponents, especially journalists and political activists who opposed the Vietnam War. Some of his unusual epithets are "nattering nabobs of negativism," "pusillanimous pussyfoots," "hopeless, hysterical hypochondriacs of history," and "radiclib" (i.e., radical liberal). In October of 1973, Agnew resigned as vice president. At the end of his vice presidency, he was charged with accepting bribes and falsifying federal tax forms, and he pled *nolo contendere* (no contest) to the latter charge. Agnew's resignation was the reason for the first use of the 25th Amendment, which led to the appointment and confirmation of Gerald Ford as vice president. Agnew blamed President Nixon for the accusations of tax evasions and bribes in order to distract from some of the publicity of the Watergate Scandal and the Nixon administration.

After his resignation and leaving politics, Agnew became an international trade executive. At the age of 77, he died on September 17, 1996, near his home in Ocean City, Maryland.

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See also Nixon, Richard M.

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Ailes, Roger (1940–)

Roger Eugene Ailes was born on May 15, 1940, in Warren, Ohio. He graduated with a bachelor's degree from Ohio University and later received an honorary doctorate also from Ohio University. Ailes's career ranged from television property assistant, producer, to executive producer of *The Mike Douglas Show* from 1962 to 1968; media adviser to Richard M. Nixon's 1968 presidential campaign; media consultant to Ronald Reagan's 1984 presidential campaign; media consultant for George H. W. Bush's 1988 presidential campaign; and television executive.

In 1962 Roger Ailes began his television career as a property assistant on *The Mike Douglas Show.* Three short years later, he became a producer of the show. Then, in 1967, he became an executive producer. In 1967 and 1968, he won Emmy Awards for *The Mike Douglas Show.* Ailes caught the attention of Richard M. Nixon and was hired as Nixon's television advisor for his presidential campaign in 1968, thus beginning his career in politics. Ailes also served as a media consultant to Ronald Reagan in the 1984 presidential campaign and is credited with helping Reagan win the second debate after a disastrous first debate against Walter Mondale. During the same year, he co-produced *Television and the Presidency,* a television program for which he won an Emmy as executive producer and director. Ailes was also a media consultant for George H. W. Bush during the 1988 presidential campaign, and he worked as a political consultant for a number of visible political candidates in elections below the presidency.

Ailes retired from his political consulting career in 1992 but continued his television career. From 1993 to 1996, he was the president of CNBC, the cable channel for NBC. Then in 1996 he became the chief executive officer of Fox News and the Fox News Channel. Since 2005, Ailes has been the chairman of Fox Television Stations.

Rebecca M. Verser

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Al-Asad, Hafiz (1930–2000)

Hafiz Al-Asad rose to power in Syria in February 1971 in a bloodless coup known in contemporary Syrian political jargon as The Corrective Movement (*Al Haraka Al Tashiheyya*) in which the ruling Baath Party consolidated its grip on public life in Syria. At that time, Syria already had a media system comprised of two television channels, two state-owned newspapers, two radio services, and a government-operated news

agency (SANA). Under Al-Asad's rule, Syrian media were operating within a tight control system drawing on state-ownership and a pan-Arabist political discourse. It was described as a mobilization media system that harnessed media channels to drum up support for the regime and its brand of Arab nationalism. For many Westerners, Syria under Hafiz Al-Asad was a dictatorship that lacked freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Yet, from a pan-Arabist perspective, "unity," "socialism," and "freedom from colonialism" took precedence over Western-style freedom and liberal democracy at a time when the country was facing serious threats. To promote his pan-Arabist version of politics, the late Al-Asad used media as tools of political mobilization. His speeches were carried live on broadcast media and occupied sizable space in print media in both Syria and in Lebanon, where Syrian troops were stationed since the mid-1970s.

The Socialist system of Syria under Hafiz Al-Asad precluded private media ownership. Print and broadcast media were owned and operated by government agencies, and their staff were virtually state employees. The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Culture and National Guidance censored domestic and foreign media operations. Media political discourse during Asad's era was characterized as ideological and inflammatory. In theory, the Syrian Constitution provided for the right to express opinions freely in speech and in writing; but in practice, these rights were seriously flawed. Some Western critics argue that Al-Asad followed a "cramped" diplomatic style of speech, drawing on passive constructions and indirectness. The media were apparently contributing to making Al-Asad the object of a state-sponsored cult of personality, depicting him as a wise, just and strong leader of Syria and the Arab World in general. The mobilizing role of the media in Al-Asad's Syria was to communicate the desires of the political leadership in pursuit of its national goals.

By the end of the 1990s, satellite television and the World Wide Web were already becoming integral parts of Syria's political communication environment. The traditional state-controlled media system that dominated Syria under Hafiz Al-Asad was experiencing some transformations as Syrians became more exposed to diverse political views and orientations in countries around them. When Hafiz Al-Asad passed away in June 2000, the stage was set for realizing a more open and liberal political communication setting.

Muhammad Ayish

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Alfonsín, Raúl (1927–)

Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín, born in 1927, was the president of Argentina from 1983 to 1989 when democracy was restored after the last military dictatorship (1976–1983). As a member of the UCR-party (Radical Civic Union), he projected a charismatic image. Alfonsín's presidential campaign represented the first introduction of typical American methods for political communication in Argentina and one of the earliest in South America.

In 1958, Alfonsín was elected member of the Buenos Aires Provincial Congress. In 1963 he became national legislator. He lost in his party's primaries for the presidential nomination in 1973. During the military dictatorship he worked for the defense of human rights. When running for the presidency in 1983, he emerged as the most competent "media-liked candidate." For the first time in Argentina, television coverage was key to a campaign. Mass meetings were still an important element, but their television coverage was especially decisive for the candidates. Alfonsin's party hired a professional advisor, which represented the beginning of the "spin doctor age" in the campaigns of Argentina.

Alfonsín's run for the presidency took advantage of the strategies of modern campaigns. Although the opponent Peronist Party was presented by the radicals as a continuity of the past (violence, chaos, fanaticism), the candidate of UCR was presented as the keeper of democratic values and peace. Alfonsín's party incorporated a new image of a young and powerful organization, which seemed to be capable of accomplishing the difficult task of transforming the institutional system. People chose the candidate who—they understood—represented a combination of renovation and order. Issues of the campaign were the respect for law and constitution and the generation of a new ethic in politics. His campaign introduced

some features of the American style: personalization; targeting (particularly young people and women were segments of interest in the UCR's propaganda); performance of the candidate in front of the cameras; use of emotion and sensitization.

Throughout his administration, his media and communication policy showed shortcomings that contributed to the deterioration of his image. His government was well known for sponsoring the trial of military officers who had participated in the "Dirty War" and the promotion of human rights. However, the mismanagement of the economy ended under Alfonsín's government with a hyperinflation that pushed the country into a financial and institutional crisis. As a consequence, he resigned his post before his term was up. He was succeeded by Peronist Carlos Menem. Despite the continuing decline of his party's performance, Alfonsín remained active in politics and was elected vice president of the Socialist International in 1999 and a senator of Argentina in 2001.

Malvina Rodriguez

See also Argentina Democratization Process, Role of the Media; Menem, Carlos

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Qatari staff work at Al Jazeera's new state-of-the-art newsroom, June 15, 2005. As it marked its 10th anniversary on October 31, 2006, the news channel announced that it was extending its reach to audiences by launching its English-speaking service November 15, 2006.

Source: AFP/Getty Images.

Al Jazeera Television

Founded in 1996, the Qatari satellite broadcasting station Al Jazeera has become the most popular news network in the Arab world and has a worldwide reputation. The channel is generally recognized for making a breakthrough in the history of Arab television by having introduced a liberal TV model that is largely free of government control into the Arab media landscape. The network was founded by Qatar's ruler, Emir Al-Thani, who hired a large number of journalists from BBC's closed-down Arabic service. The "Arab CNN," as Al Jazeera is often called, aims at combining U.S. news and politainment formats with BBC's journalism ethics of "neutrality" and "objectivity" while carrying out an Arab news agenda. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, D.C., and in the course of its coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a heated debate over the network broke out and has received enormous attention.

Within the first years of existence Al Jazeera won around 40 international prizes from organizations such as Index on Censorship. What made the network so attractive to Arab viewers, as well as to international observers, was the channel's often rigorous break with social and political taboos. Female circumcision, the Syrian regime, or the West-Sahara conflict: These are just a few of the many issues Al Jazeera covered over the years that no other Arab TV station had ever tackled before. On talk shows such as *The Opposite Direction* with moderator Faisal al-Kasim,

a show based on the *Crossfire* model, opponents from different ideological camps, representatives of governments, and opposition forces directly confront each other. For many, Al Jazeera has reanimated the idea of free public speech in the Arab world.

As a consequence, Al Jazeera has been strongly criticized by almost all Arab regimes, most of them authoritarian in nature, who fear the loss of their TV monopoly. Many offices of the network in Arab countries have been closed time and again. The Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) denied Al Jazeera a regular membership, and many advertisers close to Arab regimes from Saudi Arabia and other countries boycotted the network.

But governments also understood that such pressure made the network even more popular as a mouthpiece of Arab populations. Although there are no solid figures at hand and research concentrating on media usage patterns is still in its infancy, Al Jazeera is widely considered the leading news network in the Arab world. Thirty-five to 45 million regular viewers who receive the channel through Arabsat and other satellites.

In terms of finance and organization Al Jazeera is a hybrid that fits into none of the standard Western categories of state, public, or private broadcasting. Without the protection and financial engagement of Emir al-Thani and the state of Qatar Al Jazeera would not exist. However, the channel views itself as being independent and indebted to Arab public opinion. It is also "private" in the sense that no institutional checks-and-balances or a clear programmatic seem to exist—as in the case of German public TV, for instance ("Programmauftrag"). Moreover, state subsidies are not guaranteed indefinitely, and the network has frequently proclaimed the need to become commercially independent. On the whole, Al Jazeera's financial and organizational situation remains fragile and vulnerable.

Without a binding legal framework the channel could be closed down from one day to the next, although that is quite unlikely since Qatar's image has profited enormously from Al Jazeera's worldwide standing. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine how the network can be transformed into a satisfactory public TV model without prior democratization of the Qatari political system. The state is able to prohibit any coverage on Qatar's domestic policies. And the natural ally of the network, its viewers, demands a close orientation toward Arab political culture—a tendency that has been criticized by many as leading to a certain bias in political coverage.

Despite the large debate on the network no comprehensive content analysis has yet been undertaken. However, several long-term phases of the coverage can be discerned. Between 1996 and 2001 the taboo-breaking opening of democratic debate dominated. Also, for the first time Israeli voices could be heard and seen on Arab TV justifying the Israeli government's measures against the Palestinians. But after the outbreak of the second Intifada uprising in the occupied territories in 2000, following the events of 9/11 and the succeeding American interventions in Afghanistan, an inflammatory style of reporting against Israel and the United States predominated. The day-long coverage of the burial of Sheikh Yassin of the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, regular shows by leading Islamist preachers such as Yusuf Qaradawi with his sometimes controversial support of Palestinian suicide bombers, and the frequent airing of Al-Qaeda videos showing messages of Osama bin Laden and others have gained the network the aura of a mouthpiece of terrorism—although Western channels have often bought such material from Al Jazeera.

In recent years Al Jazeera has extensively covered the still modest signs of democratic awakening in the Arab world with long reports on the oppositional Kifayah movement in Egypt or the Lebanese popular resistance against Syrian occupation. On the whole, Al Jazeera's political coverage is a mix of professional journalistic neutrality and consumer-oriented populism in times of crisis that seems comparable to the style of the large U.S. television networks.

Such comparison seems to be supported by the fact that Al Jazeera has agreed on a number of cooperation agreements with CNN, ABC, NBC, Fox, and many other Western networks on the exchange of programs. In practice, however, such exchange is often confined to the issue of terrorism and control of images and videos rather than allowing news texts that could help Western audiences understand Arab views on world events. The often applauded reversal of the North-South flow of news and information and the globalizing effects of new Arab satellite broadcasters should not be overestimated.

Kai Hafez

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Allende, Salvador (1908–1973)

Salvador Allende Gossens, born June 26, 1908, was president of Chile from November 1970 until his forced removal from power resulting from a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte on September 11, 1973.

Allende, father of three daughters, attended high school in Santiago and medical school at the University of Chile, graduating with a medical degree in 1933. In the late 1930s Allende became minister of health, and between 1945 and 1969 he was senator for nine provinces.

Both Allende's Marxist-Communist ideology and his friendship with Fidel Castro made him unpopular within the U.S. administration. The United States' attempt to prevent Allende's election by financing political parties aligned with candidates of the opposition did not succeed and thus the leader of the coalition Popular Unity won the Chilean presidential election in 1970, beating conservative right-wing candidate Jorge Alessandri with 36.2% of the votes and Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic with 27.8% of the votes.

Upon assuming power, Allende started to implement the socialist ideology, known as the Chilean Way to Socialism, in which large parts of industries, especially American-owned copper mines, were nationalized. The implementation of these policies led to strong opposition by the National Party, the Christian Democrats, the Catholic Church, and landowners. The Christian Democrats, who were aligned to the social movement in the 1970 elections, removed themselves more and more from the socialist position of Allende's administration, seeking to form a coalition with the National Party. Allende and the opposition in congress perpetually accused each other of acting undemocratically and so eroding the Chilean Constitution.

In 1972, the economy was greatly weakened by the increasing inflation. The combination of inflation and price-fixing by the government led to the rise of black markets. As a consequence, in 1973 Allende faced the first confrontational strikes organized by the opposition. Due to the rising tension between the government and the public, military movements on the streets increased in the same year and fed rumors of an imminent military coup against Allende's administration.

Finally, on September 11, 1973, the Chilean military, under the leadership of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, bombarded the presidential palace, La Moneda, in downtown Santiago. Before the military could arrest the first democratically elected Marxist in the Western Hemisphere, Allende committed suicide. This day was the inception of a 16-year dictatorship of the Chilean military junta.

During his life Allende's relation to the media was ambivalent. During his 1970 presidential campaign he could rely on the support of *Clarín*, a newspaper that collaborated in a decisive way in the triumph of the Popular Unity. The journalist, Darío Sainte-Marie, then owner of the *Clarín*, was a personal friend of Salvador Allende, and he used the publication as a campaign tool for the president. Besides, Allende could also rely on *El Siglo*, *Puro Chile*, *La Nación,* and *Ultima Hora* which were four newspapers that supported the government. All together these media had a circulation of 312,000. However, there where strong attempts to discredit Allende and his government by using the media of the opposition, namely the newspapers *La Tercera*, *El Mercurio, Las Ultimas Noticias, La Segunda, Tribuna,* and *La Prensa,* which were financially supported by the CIA and transnational corporations. An estimated foreign capital of more than $4 million was invested in propaganda against Allende and to support structures of the opposed media.

Markus Moke

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All the President's Men

All the President's Men (1974) is a nonfiction book by *Washington Post* journalists Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward recounting their experiences investigating the initial Watergate break-in and the subsequent Watergate scandal which led to President Richard Nixon's resignation. The stories written by Woodward and Bernstein won a Pulitzer Prize for *The Washington Post.* The book was adapted 2 years later for film and starred Robert Redford as Woodward and Dustin Hoffman as Bernstein. The film won four Academy Awards.

The Watergate scandal began when five men broke into the National Democratic Headquarters carrying photographic and electronic equipment on June 17, 1972. Woodward, a new journalist at *The Washington Post,* was assigned to cover what initially appeared to be a simple burglary. Bernstein, a more experienced journalist, was working on the same story. The two writers joined forces to expose a political scandal that ultimately involved several key members of the Republican Party and the Nixon administration.

The efforts to uncover the conspiracy scandal demanded both journalists to persist in fact finding and interviewing skills against great odds. To discredit *The Washington Post*'s stories, Nixon frequently encouraged the public and the news media to focus their attention on matters other than Watergate. The book and articles led to the resignation of President Nixon in August 1974, just 2 months after the book was published.

The Watergate news stories were controversial for a number of reasons. Woodward and Bernstein uncovered many trails of money and secrecy which led to the Oval Office. Along the investigative journey, they met many obstacles and depended upon unnamed sources in the Nixon Administration who remained anonymous because of fear of repercussions. The book named sources such as Hugh Sloan who had refused to be identified when the stories ran in the *Post.* The most famous source, Deep Throat, had his identity kept secret for over thirty years. In 2005, the legendary figure of Deep Throat was revealed to be then-FBI Associate Director W. Mark Felt. Felt met secretly with Woodward, giving insider information that made the articles possible. The reporters eventually exposed illegal campaign practices by high-level Republican leaders H. R. Halderman and John Ehrlichman.

The book and movie also feature the legendary role of the *Post* editor Ben Bradlee who supported the unconventional reporting used to crack the conspiracy. Bradlee was heavily criticized during the coverage of the case early on for allowing Woodward and Bernstein to use unnamed sources.

Following *All the President's Men,* Woodward and Bernstein also wrote a sequel, *The Final Days,* which started at the time the previous book ended and covered the last months of the Nixon presidency. The University of Texas at Austin purchased the Woodward and Bernstein papers for $5 million in April 2003. Now housed at the Harry Ransom Center, the papers serve to document the historic events and also provide public availability to the records. Files that could reveal the identity of sources who wish to remain anonymous remain closed until the death of the individual source.

Released in 1976, the movie version of the book starring Redford and Hoffman received considerable acclaim. A new release of the film on DVD with several new features and interviews was available in 2006.

Nadia Ann Ramoutar

Al-Sadat, Anwar (1918–1981)

Muhammad Anwar Al-Sadat was born in 1918 in the village of Meet Abou El-Kom of Al-Menoufeya governorate. When he graduated from the Royal Military Academy in 1938, he was appointed to the Signal Corps. However, his military career was interrupted by vehement political activism. Sadat was accused of spying for the Germans in the Second World War and joined the ranks of several underground military organizations, which finally led to his discharge from the service and subsequent imprisonment. Having escaped prison, Sadat lived as a fugitive from 1945 until 1950 and took several low-status jobs. After charges against him of assassinating a pro-British minister were dropped, he worked as a journalist and was readmitted to military service. Then Nasser invited him to join the ranks of the leadership committee of the Free Officers Organization. It was Al-Sadat, on July 23, 1952, who read on air the first communiqué of the Revolutionary Command Council, informing the Egyptian people that the armed forces were in control of their country.

During Nasser's reign, Sadat remained on the margins of the political arena, sidestepping various power struggles and occupying quite insignificant political positions. He gradually reached the top of the political ladder; he was appointed as Minister of State, editor of *Al-Jumhuriya* newspaper, secretary to the National Union, and the speaker of the People's Council, and finally was appointed by Nasser to vice president in 1964. Upon Nasser's death, Sadat was elected as president of Egypt in 1970.

The impact of President Sadat on Egyptian and Middle Eastern history was both powerful and unique. What he undertook during his presidency (1970–1981) changed the economic, political, and social maps of his world. These included imprisoning Nasser loyalists in the so-called Corrective Revolution on May 15, 1971; expulsion of the Soviet advisors in 1972; the October 1973 War victory; shifting Egypt's strategic alliance from pro-Soviet to pro-American; the "open-door policy" or liberalization of the economy in 1974; the two disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel in 1974 and 1975, respectively; the re-opening of the Suez Canal in 1975; establishing a multiparty political system; the trip to Jerusalem in 1977; the Camp David Accords in 1978; the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979; winning the Nobel Peace Prize; boycotting Egypt by a number of Arab countries are some of the cornerstone events that altered his presidency.

Remarkably, Sadat's internal and external policy did not attain the desired goals, and his harsh tactics antagonized all political parties and groups, whose leaders were all arrested in September 1981. Consequently, he was assassinated on October 6 of the same year by the hands of young military officers with an Islamic ideological orientation. Sadat authored several books, including *The Full Story of the Revolution, Son, This Is Your Uncle Gamal*, and *In Search of Identity*.

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Alternative Media in Politics

Alternative media in politics (AMP) are defined as media practices falling outside the mainstream of corporate communication or using traditional media forums other than news outlets to communicate with citizens. AMP platforms are often unabashedly politically biased, leading to a form of advocacy journalism that promotes specific political views and dissenting perspectives. Advocates of such communication argue that the mainstream media are heavily biased as a consequence of profit-driven media corporations and political or governmental influence.

The Development of Alternative Media in Politics (AMP)

AMP is often thought of as a new direction for political communication. Candidates for the presidency who once relied almost exclusively on traditional news outlets (radio, television, and print) can now make appeals to specific audience segments by appearing on a wide range of cable and/or satellite channels and Internet platforms. During the 1992 presidential campaign, viewers witnessed hopeful Bill Clinton playing *Heartbreak Hotel* on his saxophone on The *Arsenio Hall Show.* The phenomenal growth in radio and television talk shows featuring candidates and political commentary, candidates appearing on programs such as MTV's *Choose or Lose,* and the advent of Internet Web logs (commonly known as blogs) are examples of how AMP platforms have changed the nature of political communication in recent years. Citizens who once discussed politics with friends or coworkers can now establish or participate in dialogues on blogs. In short, the political communication environment of the 21st century offers new and provocative ways in which AMP can play a role in political discourse.

However, each new media information dissemination system from the advent of the printing press to the introduction of the *Dailykos.com* blog represents an example of how the interplay between *political, economic, technological,* and *audience* factors have an

influence on political communication processes. Therefore, to understand the contemporary significance of AMP, it is essential to consider how these variables have historically influenced media information.

The Impact of Politics, Economics, Technology, and the Audience on AMP

Before the 1830s, newspapers generally had circulations of 2,000 to 3,000 and contained content that was intended to appeal to members of the upper class who often held elective office and/or ran businesses. These newspapers often provided a forum for the members of the upper class to engage in political arguments and debates. But in the 1830s several factors converged that would result in a transformation of the media landscape and political communication. First, cities had grown large enough to support media marketed for ordinary citizens. Second, literacy skills had increased, making media produced for the mass audience an economically appealing enterprise. Finally, technology had developed such that newspapers could be produced quickly and inexpensively on efficient printing presses.

Instead of focusing on producing newspapers with a relatively small upper-class target audience in mind, it made sense for newspaper publishers to produce newspapers with widespread appeal directed toward the working and growing middle class. In a relatively short period, newspapers competed fiercely for audience members, often resorting to sensational political content designed to attract the mass audience. Thus, the Penny Press newspapers represented an alternative voice to the papers that had been consumed primarily by the political elite of the day.

Another precursor to contemporary AMP was the advent of radio in the early 20th century which gave politicians a voice. Beginning in 1933 and continuing throughout World War II, Franklin Roosevelt skillfully used this new medium to engage the audience through his fireside chats. Many observers believe that broadcasts helped the popular World War II General Dwight D. Eisenhower defeat Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson in the 1952 presidential election because the governor tended to bore listeners with long-winded commentaries. In response to the growing importance of broadcasting in the political communication process, the Federal Communications Commission adopted rules in the 1940s that charged broadcasters with the responsibility of acting as custodians of the spectrum.

The rationale for broadcast regulation hinged on the concept of *spectrum scarcity.* In theory, anyone with the necessary resources could produce a newspaper or magazine. By contrast, the broadcast spectrum could accommodate only a limited number of stations. Thus, in exchange for the exclusive use of limited public airwaves, licensees were charged with acting as a trustee of a scarce resource and operating in the public interest. Obligations to society could be met through news segments, public affairs shows, or editorials. Another obligation was to uphold the Fairness Doctrine adopted by the FCC in 1949. The Fairness Doctrine required broadcasters to devote some of their airtime to discussing controversial matters of public interest, and to air contrasting views regarding those matters. As a result, broadcasters tended to be quite conservative in the presentation of political information fearing that excessive editorializing might produce complaints from the public that could potentially lead to challenges to their broadcast licenses.

New technology in the 1980s, however, enabled 50 or more radio stations and more than a dozen television stations in large markets to broadcast without any signal overlap. Cable had become a viable distribution system and the introduction of new information sources, such as CNN in 1980, increased access to political information. In 1987 the Fox network joined the three established broadcast networks. These and other factors led the FCC to conclude during the administration of President Ronald Reagan that spectrum scarcity was no longer an issue, leading to the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987.

By the early 1990s, direct satellite broadcasting to 18-inch dishes appeared on the scene providing rural areas with access to more programming. Furthermore, the Internet began to make significant strides in the 1990s as both an entertainment and information source. Finally, the FCC passed The Telecommunications Act of 1996, the first major overhaul of telecommunications law in almost 62 years. The FCC believed that, by promoting competition, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 could change the way we work, live and learn, affecting telephone service, cable programming and other video services, as well as broadcast services. The new distribution systems combined with deregulation and the availability of more types of programs and programmers looking for narrower niche audiences produced an environment in which AMP could thrive.

AMP Platforms

Broadcasting

Although it is not possible to establish a precise point on a timeline for the beginning of AMP, the introduction of programs such as *Larry King Live* on CNN in June of 1985 laid the groundwork. Only two radio stations in the United States had talk shows in the 1960s. The format, however, became very popular in the 1980s, boosted by many events including the advent of cheap satellite technology and the foundation of the National Association of Talk Show Hosts. AM radio was also making a comeback led by the phenomenal popularity of the edgy conservative talk show host Rush Limbaugh who began broadcasting a nationally syndicated 2-hour radio program in 1988 that eventually expanded to 3 hours. Unshackled by the Fairness Doctrine, the host led the way in pushing the limits of partisan political talk, spawning other similar programs.

By the early 1990s, entertainment-oriented media started to act as a conduit for political communication as Jay Leno, David Letterman, and other late night hosts increasingly relied on political news for monologue jokes. However, 1992 is often considered a watershed year for AMP as presidential candidates George Bush, Bill Clinton, and Ross Perot increased their use of non-news programs significantly in an effort to receive more exposure, more coverage, and direct access to the audience. In 1994 Bill Clinton addressed eligible voters and underage drinkers on MTV. In 1999, *Comedy Central* introduced *The Daily Show,* a parody of news programs containing nearly nonstop political satire.

Call-in radio and television shows also became important AMP platforms. However, unlike talk shows, the hosts take live phone calls from people listening at home, at work, or in their cars, who want to voice their opinion on a specific topic, ask questions, or seek clarification. Research indicates that such media formats can encourage public discussion of political issues and concerns.

Internet Resources

The Internet has assumed a prominent role in the evolution of AMP. Web sites, listservs, and chat rooms that distribute information and enable users to communicate with each other have grown steadily since 1990. Users discuss issues by sending electronic messages to each other, often in real time, with the option of revealing or concealing their identities. Although Internet resources were used in the 1990s and before by presidential candidates, campaign Web sites began to take on major importance in 2000 as the number of users with access increased and as Web sites became more sophisticated and more diversified in content and structure.

Campaign Web sites post news releases prepared by campaign staff members. Although news releases are traditionally directed at journalists with the purpose of announcing an event or something newsworthy, Web site news releases target both news organizations and the public at large. Further, campaign news releases appear as a supplement to other media and represent candidate communication directly with voters. Hence, they may contain general information about the candidates on the campaign trail or they may supply reprints of editorials placed in prominent newspapers. They may present results of public opinion polls measuring the competitive position of candidates in the campaign horse race or they may present transcripts of radio or television advertisements. In sum, online news releases enable candidates to focus on election issues they prefer, attack each other, or concentrate on the personality characteristics of the opponent.

Web Logs

Blogs are one of the most innovative and influential alternative media developments. In a blog entries are made for public display on a Web site, much as one would write in a personal journal. Although early blogs were primarily individual personal chronicles, by 2000 blogging developed into a popular Web content that embraced recurring political themes. Political blogs now typically provide commentary or news and information on a particular subject. Most blogs are textual and consist mainly of narrative discussions, but some blogs include other media and links to other blogs as part of their regular content. For instance, some blogs emphasize photographs (photoblog), videos (vlogs), or audio (podcasts).

As blogging became more common, blogs emerged that enabled Internet users to interact with each other and to discuss political issues. By 2001, political blogs had become regular Web content, spurring research on the differences between blogging and traditional journalism. In 2002, Markos Moulitsas Zuniga started a blog called *DailyKos.* With about

600,000 visits a day in 2006, it quickly became one of the Internet's most trafficked and influential blogs.

Since 2003, blogs have emerged as a major force in the dissemination of news stories, sometimes responsible for breaking new stories on controversial political topics. For instance, bloggers were responsible for opening up many, sometimes passionate, viewpoints during the Iraq War, and bloggers with *Médecins Sans Frontières* used blogs as a way to report from areas in Sri Lanka and Southern India during the December 2004 Tsunami. During the 2004 election, political consultants, news services, and candidates used blogs as a way to sway public opinion and reach out to constituents.

The Impact of AMP on American Politics

Many characteristics of the American contemporary media environment facilitated the evolution of AMP platforms and their transformation into forces that are impacting the American media landscape as well as its political process. Some bloggers argue that they initiated their blogs and joined the political dialogue as a response to conservative talk show hosts such as Rush Limbaugh. These bloggers believe that blogs give people a voice that would otherwise not be heard. Technology and the growing number of Internet users make blogs and other Internet resources a viable means of expression for political communication.

AMP may also represent the failure of mainstream media to reconcile both their commercial and their professional needs. Trust in traditional media continues to decline, especially with respect to election news. To some extent, the surge of new AMP platforms is a response to the public dissatisfaction with campaign news provided by the traditional media. However, distrust in old media coverage of election campaigns is certainly not the only factor that helped spur the increasing success of alternative media. As was the case with the advent of the Penny Press two centuries ago and broadcasting in the 20th century, variables associated with *politics, economics, technology* and the *audience* combined to make AMP possible. Without audience demand or the technological wherewithal to provide an alternative political expression, AMP would not have evolved. Ironically, some of these AMP platforms are now becoming enormously profitable in their own right, suggesting that they may be well on the way to becoming mainstream media platforms in the future.

The Effects of AMP on Citizens

The use of AMP platforms in contemporary society is a major component of candidates' campaign communication strategy. However, one must question if they influence voters' knowledge of the issues, their perception and attitude toward candidates, and even the political process of democracy itself. Research in political communication offers conflicting results in this regard. Some of the nontraditional news media platforms (e.g., call-in shows, talk shows) are very useful and helpful in the strengthening of democracy, in the sense that they help promote issue discussions among citizens, thereby fostering a meaningful level of deliberative dialogue within the political sphere, and the society as a whole.

Analyzing the influence of both the traditional and the nontraditional news media on voters' attitudes and perceptions of candidates in the 1992 presidential election campaign, researchers concluded that neither one really exerts a direct influence. However, because of their highly personal nature, the nontraditional news media generate a greater impact on voters' evaluation of candidates' competence and relational abilities. For other alternative media audience members such as radio talk show listeners, the format can have a negative effect. Research findings suggest that radio talk shows can produce passion among listeners who may be swayed in their political positions by such oratory.

Elsewhere, the impact of nontraditional media outlets on voters' political knowledge seems to vary according to the platform considered. Thus, while watching talk shows has been linked to increased campaign knowledge, exposure to MTV and late night talk shows is negatively related to campaigns. Talk show listeners are also more interested in politics than non-listeners. Hence, they tend to vote in greater numbers and they can be more politically knowledgeable.

Commenting on these mixed findings about the impact of AMP on audience members' political participation and knowledge, researchers such as William Eveland suggest that they might be related to the "growing pains" inherent to the new media. The nontraditional political communication forms are

finally producing consistent positive effects equivalent to newspapers and television news. Hence, they can no longer be ignored and should be recognized for their potential impact on political communication in the future.

Robert H. Wicks

See also Blogs, Blogging; Clinton, William Jefferson; Communications Act of 1934; New Media Technologies; Talk Shows, Television

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American Association of Political Consultants

The American Association of Political Consultants (AAPC) is a professional organization for those who work in various aspects of political campaigns. Political consultants are involved in the organizational and media aspects of all types of political campaigns for candidates and political issues at all levels of elections. Members include campaign managers, pollsters, media producers, fundraising specialists, lobbyists, and other political professionals. Members of all political parties, as well as independents, are included.

The AAPC was formed in 1969, although political consulting as a career existed decades before the official organization was chartered. Joseph Napolitan is credited by the organization with inventing the term "political consultant." Napolitan served as the first president of the AAPC. The organization now has more than 1,100 members and maintains a permanent office in Washington, D.C.

All members of the AAPC agree to abide by a Code of Professional Ethics. The code establishes basic rules of ethics for consultants and lays out expectations for financial and public dealings with clients.

The AAPC regularly holds campaign-training workshops for its members. The organization also publishes a regular newsletter for its members. The AAPC provides on its Web site links to other national and international organizations that specialize in political consulting, including the International Association of Political Consultants, the European Association of Political Consultants, the Latin American Association of Political Consultants, and the Asia Pacific Association of Political Consultants.

Every year the AAPC conducts the Pollie Awards which reward excellence in the production of campaign materials for candidates and other public campaigns. Awards are given for direct mail pieces, advertising on radio, television, newspaper, and Internet, and for promotional materials of all kinds. Entries are judged by panels of campaign professionals, and awards are presented at an annual ceremony.

The AAPC maintains an active oral history project. Interviews have been recorded with political consultants such as Matt Reese, Bill Hamilton, Stu Spencer, Bob Goodman, Charles Guggenheim, Walter DeVries, Joe Napolitan, Peter Hart, Ray Strother, Richard Wirthlin,

and many others. The tapes for these oral histories have been deposited at the Gellman Library at George Washington University and are available for study.

Lynda Lee Kaid

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American Association of Retired Persons

See AARP

Americanization

In general, the term *Americanization* is used to denote a process of adaptation to the way things are or look like in the United States. Mostly, this qualification is used with a negative connotation, criticizing the process and/or the object of adaptation. However, there is quite a variety in what is diagnosed with this adaptation process: Americanization has been used for different things such as culture in general, the film industry, media systems or some of its parts or its contents, political communication in general, and electoral campaigns in particular. Terms like *McDonaldization*, *Hollywoodization*, *Coca Cola Culture* and *Mickey Mouse Culture* are expressions that demonstrate how symbols of U.S. culture are used to qualify actual or feared trends. Contrary to what the discussion sometimes seems to suggest, Americanization is not a process that has been discovered only in recent years. In Germany, for instance, such trends have been diagnosed since the 1920s.

In political communication, Americanization has been primarily used to discuss trends in election campaigning in countries outside the United States, mostly in Europe and Latin America. At the same time, the term has elicited much critique based on the fact that no satisfying definition of Americanization has been presented or can be agreed upon. Attempts at defining what was meant by Americanization often were simple catalogues of characteristics of what was seen as typical for American-style campaigning: engaging political consultants and other experts from the marketing industry, poll-driven campaigning, a media- or television-centered campaign, negative campaigning, personalization, de-politicization, to name just a few. While these are attributes that refer to the organization of campaigns and the strategies that are applied, German strategist Peter Radunski added a new angle by pointing to the fact that voters, in their new unpredictability, also have become more Americanized. Researchers Jay Blumler and Michael Gurevitch further broadened the perspective by emphasizing that, in the Americanized environment, journalists tend to react by "mediating" the campaign more in order to avoid being made the mouthpiece of campaigners.

Although many researchers were unhappy with the term, Americanization has proved to be a useful descriptive paradigm. In fact, several studies have used Americanization as a reference. However, only few employed the comparative perspective that is inherent in the term Americanization but were rather single country studies. Thus, it is mostly unsettled if and how the Americanization hypothesis can be operationalized for empirical research.

It was another point of critique that the idea of other systems adapting more and more to the U.S. model of political communication made the United States an inevitable yardstick for research, thus neglecting the fact that the United States is an exceptional case and therefore comparisons with the United States are problematic because of the obvious differences in the political and media systems. From there, it was a short way to discuss whether what could be observed in other countries was indeed a process of Americanization or rather a general trend that was, sooner or later, going on in all countries. This led to new terms being offered instead of Americanization, such as professionalization or modernization, thus abandoning the use of U.S. campaigns as role models. This view places the United States at the forefront of a development that is going on everywhere and

acknowledges that a multitude of intervening variables, such as national specifics of the political system and the media system, prevents the adoption of recipes for effective campaigning from one country to another. Similarities in social developments cause similar reactions by political actors which leads us to assume convergence, but there is still much room for national variance, particularly in comparison with the United States. Campaigners in other countries take over from the United States what has proved to be effective but adapt it to national conditions.

Christina Holtz-Bacha

See also American-Style Campaigning; Professionalization

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American-Style Campaigning

The practice of political campaigning in the United States is regarded as the cutting edge of the electioneering industry. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that the United States is an international "role model of campaigning." The world is following American-style campaigning, applying the methods, concepts, strategies, and tactics. Many now identify this "new politics" with postmaterial norms, cognitive mobilization (media manipulation), and pragmatism—modeled on or influenced by the American style of politics. The global diffusion of U.S. campaign and marketing techniques is fostered by the internationalization of the campaign consulting business and is promoted by ideologically kindred political parties and by the world mass media.

In the United States, several studies documented the decline of the "old style" campaigns and the emergence of "new style" campaigning. The new style campaign is perceived to consist of four dimensions: new players, new incentives, new tactics, and new resources. First, the new players are the political consultants. Although political parties, candidates, and voters are still a part of the electoral process, contemporary campaigns are now "consultant centered." The centrality of the political consultants (or "spin doctors") is certainly American, but the pattern is exported worldwide: in the Israeli 1999 election campaign top American consultants such as James Carville, Bob Shrum, Stanley Greenberg, and Arthur J. Finkelstein were hired by the leading candidates. U.S. political consultants have designed electoral

campaigns all over the world. The *Global Political Consultancy Survey (1998–2000),* for instance, shows that 57% of the top U.S. political consultants offered their services to foreign institutions in the 1990s. Two thirds of these consultants were engaged in consultancy activities in more than one geographic region. Latin America was the most important foreign market for the U.S. consultant industry. About 64% of the top U.S. consultants involved in foreign electoral campaigns worked there. The second important market was Europe, followed by postcommunist countries. The least important but still profitable markets were in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

The new players are in fact representing the professionalization of the campaigns, a process based on the apolitical assumption that the "modernization" of politics requires management of its processes, including elections, by professionals, who represent advancement over a reliance on citizen participation (amateurs). Professionalization is concerned more about "winning" elections and less about the long-term qualities of democracy and citizenship.

Second, patronage, loyalties, or ideologies are no longer the only incentives for people to be involved in campaigns. American campaigns are more of a "political marketing" system, thus focusing on public opinion polling, market research, and campaign testing to find the appealing message tailored to the voters' opinions and concerns. This gives rise to an emphasis on candidate personalities. This "marketingization" of political campaigns includes personalization of the political debate, "carnivalization" of the campaign (emphasizing entertainment over the message), and the reliance on and influence of polls, surveys, and focus-groups testing.

Third, contemporary campaigns focus on "targeting" voters with specific messages. Computers now allow campaigns to engage in fundraising, survey research, demographic research, and direct mail efficiently. The content of the campaigns is designed and tested to affect voters regardless of the political value. Thus, emotions such as fear, pride, joy, or hate are common elements in American political ads, as well as in other "Americanized" campaigns. An additional feature of Americanized campaigns is the emphasis on image in political ads over issues and substance. However, and perhaps surprisingly, Lynda Lee Kaid and Anne Johnston have shown that ads remain largely issue-oriented. Nevertheless, the fact that ads are issue-oriented does not mean that they provide specific recommendations, substantive arguments, or that they engage in explaining complex policy issues. Moreover, comparative studies of the American campaigns find that although the presence of issues in ads has increased, the tone of the campaigns has become more negative. Researchers have also found that the specific issue content of political advertising may be related to the political party of the presidential candidate. For instance, Republicans are often thought to "own" foreign policy issues, while Democrats fare better on claims about domestic policy. Candidates appear to be more successful when they emphasize in their advertising the specific issues over which they can claim ownership.

Finally, new style campaigns are expensive. Politicians and parties are now spending more on advertising than on anything else, and with each cycle the amount they spend grows dramatically. Running a campaign can be costly. Candidates must pay for all costs related to their campaigns from buttons and bumper stickers to television production, from costly research and polling to expensive consultants, from phone bills to travel expenses. Throughout the rise of television as a popular medium, the demands for political money have skyrocketed. In the 1956 U.S. elections, total campaign spending for all candidates was approximately $155 million. In today's elections, it is not uncommon for one single candidate to raise over $200 million by himself/herself. Campaign finance is a controversial issue, with free speech cited as an argument against legal restrictions and allegations of corruption from those who favor existing or further restrictions. Individuals and groups support candidates with their money but, in return, those individuals and groups expect that the candidate will reward them. In turn, it is widely believed that these individuals and groups wield an inordinate amount of power in government.

The "Americanization" of political campaigning throughout the world raises certain concerns regarding the impact of this process. The professionalization of the campaign, combined with heavy emphasis on personification of the political system, may lead to devaluation of the traditional structure of party organizations. More worrisome is the evidence that American news and broadcast media coverage of the political issues and focus on campaign-issues directly causes increased voter cynicism and nonparticipation. The focus on the game of politics, rather than its substance, may fuel a cycle of cynicism, trapping media, politicians, and voters. Several researchers have also concluded that negative campaigns are demobilizing voters and alienating them from politics. This may make American-style campaigning more harmful to

political participation and thus to the well-being of democratic systems.

Gabriel Weimann

See also Consultants, Political; Media Consultants; Spin, Political

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American Voter, The

First published in 1960 by Angus Campbell, Warren Miller, Philip Converse, and Donald Stokes of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, *The American Voter* (*AV*) is considered an icon in the study of voting behavior theories and forms the foundation of the National Election Studies. The work is primarily concerned with the fundamental processes of political decision making by individual voters in the election of the American president, specifically as found during the 1956 Eisenhower-Stevenson presidential vote.

The work defines a political system as a collection of processes for the making of decisions. As such, the authors seek to comprehend the electoral process itself, as office holders in a democratic government are guided in many of their actions by what the work terms a calculus of electoral effect. Overall, the stated aim of *American Voter* is to understand the voting decisions of the national electorate in a manner that transcends some of the specific elements of historical circumstance.

Data for this endeavor, which has become controversial over time, was collected through interviews with randomly selected individuals in an effort to represent the national electorate on three presidential elections (1948–1956). Though most of the data represents individual recollections of behavior from the two Eisenhower-Stevenson elections, the authors attest that their data have the capacity to extend historical intervals, as they believe people are able to recall accurately past political actions. This methodology was chosen due to the authors' view that voters have a picture of the world of politics in their head, and that this picture is a key to understanding what voters do at the polls.

Of the book's major findings, *AV* depicts an individual's political decision process, in terms of partisan choice and turnout, as highly influenced by psychological factors as broken down into six dimensions. These dimensions include perceptions of a candidate's personal attributes, the comparative record of the two parties in managing the affairs of government, and informal political discussion between individuals or between individuals and the mass communications media. Thus, overall the model of voting behavior posited by *AV* described voting decisions as being determined by long-term forces (party identification and group affiliations) and short-term forces (candidate images and issues). Partisan identification is represented by the model as the dominant factor in determining voting outcomes for presidential elections.

Other forces are found to play a role in the political decision process including sustained party identification between elections. *AV* concludes that the orientation to party identification begins long before

an individual reaches voting age and is found to be a strong reflection of one's social surroundings, especially family. The authors attest that stability in party identification is so strong that cumulative intense and widespread experiences (such as found during a great national crisis) are required to produce profound political consequences. Finally, external factors such as membership in social groupings, social class, and economic antecedents are further determinants of a citizen's voting behavior.

As a seminal work in political behavior studies, *AV* has posited both revolutionary and controversial findings. Debate has centered upon the true level of vote-rationality possessed by individuals, and on the notion that participation in political processes is often determined by partisan intensity. Finally, some have criticized that certain findings have not been sustainable over time, especially in the face of modern dealignment and a decline in partisan identification by voters.

H. E. Schmeisser

See also Mass Political Behavior; Voter Behavior

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Apartheid

See Mandela, Nelson

Apathy, Voter

Apathy reflects a lack of engagement in even the most basic forms of public affairs participation. Apathy also has been described as a lack of interest and involvement in political affairs and a separation from matters political. Studies, however, have shown that interest is an effect rather than a characteristic of apathy. In addition, people can decline to participate for reasons other than apathy.

Reports of apathy have been inflated by flawed reporting of turnout rates. The most common method for reporting turnout, based on the "voting age population" from the U.S. census, includes noncitizens and ineligible felons. The number of ineligible citizens has increased markedly since 1972, but turnout among eligible voters has remained fairly steady.

Apathy often is considered one aspect of "political alienation," which is said to include the four dimensions of normlessness or distrust (cynicism), powerlessness or efficacy, meaninglessness (seeing little difference among candidates, parties or policies), and apathy. It is common for party officials and commentators to combine apathy with other aspects of political alienation, and to blame deficiencies in high school civics education, negative campaigning, and poor media coverage for disengagement.

Education matters a great deal, but research does not bear out perceptions about the role of negative campaigning, media coverage, and cynicism. For example, some estimates indicate that negative advertising has tripled since the 1960s. Yet voting rates have not decreased proportionately. Turnout in 2004 was 77% (86% of registered voters), the highest since 1964.

Apathetic individuals may be somewhat immune to negativism in ads due to their lack of involvement and attention to the political process. Citizens who blame negative campaigning for their apathy also might not be accurately reporting the roots of their own lack of interest.

Cynicism also cannot shoulder the blame for apathy. Research has confirmed that apathy and cynicism form distinct constructs, meaning that someone who is cynical may not be apathetic. Instead, political disaffection can lead to action among those with higher efficacy. Action is most likely among those with the highest efficacy and highest disaffection.

Research suggests that disengagement results more from low efficacy and satisfaction with the status quo. Political efficacy has decreased markedly since the 1960s, when it was as high as 74%. In 2004 it was at 47% although it has increased gradually since the early 1990s. Those with conservative outlooks, higher incomes, more education, and Caucasian ethnicity tend to have higher efficacy. Partisans, the more advantaged, and Caucasians also tend to vote more reliably.

Apathy is most appropriately viewed as a separation from civic involvement that reflects a negative valence (I don't feel like caring; it doesn't matter; it's too much trouble to care). It differs substantially from

complacency, which reflects a positive valence (I don't need to care because things are fine the way they are) based on comfort with the status quo.

This distinction explains problems with the view that a lack of substance in television coverage contributes to apathy. For example, satisfaction with television as an information source associates with more disengagement while increased use and attention to news—including on television—consistently associates with higher levels of political knowledge, efficacy, and public affairs involvement. It seems that television, a low-involvement medium, can cultivate interest and lead to more goal-oriented information seeking from additional sources. This then boosts efficacy, giving media a role to play in a positive cycle of increasing involvement.

On the other hand, citizens—and especially younger ones—can get trapped in a more negative cycle in which cynicism toward the political system diminishes efficacy, which cultivates apathy, which limits information seeking and which then reinforces cynicism. This makes it especially important to consider the causes and cures of apathy and complacency among young people.

Turnout is higher among citizens over 25, but complacency and a lack of efficacy appear to be more to blame than apathy. Surveys show that a strong majority of young citizens care about some issues and candidates. They tend to vote if they think their voter will matter and if the process is made easier such as through Election Day registration, early voting, convenient locations, and motor-voter registration. Unfortunately, younger people are often ignored by public officials and campaigns, which can trigger a cycle that cultivates apathy. Although local party leaders overwhelmingly cite a lack of youth political engagement as a problem, for example, they cite senior citizens almost three times more often than young people as the demographic group most important to the "long-term success" of their party.

This may be changing. In late 2003, the belief among 15- to 25-year-olds that they could make a difference was declining. Young people also expressed less trust of the government, and studies consistently show that cynicism toward the political system diminishes efficacy. In 2004, however, parties and nonpartisan get-out-the-vote campaigns targeted young voters more energetically, and young citizens responded. The use of celebrities to attract attention to messages, which focused on boosting efficacy, diminishing complacency, and making registration easy, contributed to an 11% increase in youth turnout after declining 16% between 1972 and 2000 (other than a 1992 spike attributed to Bill Clinton's novel and active campaigning among young people). This represented an increase almost triple that among older citizens.

In sum, apathy and complacency, while related, appear to have different causes. Complacency seems more likely than apathy to respond to campaigns focused on the relevance of civic issues and the value of civic involvement. Apathy may require more concerted efforts due to its roots in a lack of knowledge and efficacy. Although discussion at home makes a big difference in political socialization, for example, many young people report they have never talked about politics, government, or current events with their parents while living at home. In addition, young people generalize from how seriously student governments in schools are taken. Overall, lessons learned early, in and out of civics classes, seem more responsible for the development or prevention of apathy than do characteristics of campaigns and media coverage.

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See also Negative Campaigning; Political Efficacy; Political Involvement; Political Socialization

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Apologia

Apologia is a formal act associated with self-defense or self-justification. It is generally in the form of a personalized discourse. A convincing defense of one's character or ethics is a central concern of the apologist and has been an important rhetorical ritual of past as well as contemporary society. Many scholars have argued that the successful or unsuccessful use of apologia can even alter the course of history.

Although the circumstances and outcomes of apologia vary greatly, its traditional form has not significantly deviated since its use by the ancients. First, a statement of the case at hand is given. Then, a refutation of the charges is advanced. Next, an explanation unfolds—particularly stressing the speaker's character. Finally, a conclusion is given bolstering the apologist's integrity.

Research on apologia has yielded a number of findings. Apologia results from moral choices that have been subjected to ethical challenges. Unless character repair is made, there can be negative future consequences. Apologia often involves focusing the audience on how the apologist wants them to perceive his/her character. Finally, the apology is seemingly context or accusation bound.

In the history of public address there are many cases of well-known public apologies. For example, in the Greek tradition, Socrates, Isocrates, and Demosthenes all presented noteworthy self-defense discourses. Examples of contemporary apologists include Richard Nixon, Edward Kennedy, and Bill Clinton. Nixon's 1952 "Checkers" or Fund speech is, perhaps, the most famous apologetic discourse in modern times. Using the new medium of television, Nixon went face-to-face with the American people and defended his character to the largest television audience of that time, 60 million people.

In 1973, communication scholars B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel wrote a pioneering article on apologia. Their article established apologia as an important speech genre. Moreover, they posited that four primary strategies consistently appear in self-defense rhetoric: denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence.

The Watergate scandal of 1973 to 1974 served to further heighten interest and scholarship in the apologetic form. Identifying key apologetic strategies and noting their frequency and implications in selected apologia became a popular scholarly focus during the Watergate scandal and in the aftermath of Nixon's forced resignation from the presidency in 1974.

Similarly, Clinton's involvement with various scandals and his subsequent impeachment trial in 1999 provided additional focus on the importance of effective apologia. Clinton's internationally televised August 17, 1998, apologia on the Monica Lewinsky case received a considerable amount of scholarly and popular attention. As such, the subgenres and strategies inherent in the apologetic form continue to captivate a wide variety of critics of public communication.

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See also Checkers Speech

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Arafat, Yasser (1929–2004)

Yasser Arafat, born as Mohammed Abdel Raouf Arafat al-Qudwar Al-Husseini, was a Nobel Prize–winning political leader as well as a guerrilla warfare soldier. Arafat's political career and personal life were riddled with controversy.

Born to Palestinian parents in Cairo, he was one of six children. Arafat was an active student leader who graduated with a degree in Civil Engineering in 1956. Thereafter, he went on to serve in the Egyptian Army. His political career began with the formation of al-Fatah, the largest group in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). His main objective in forming the PLO was the liberation of Palestine from Israel.

Arafat's relationship with the media was complex. He used communications, such as speeches and leaflets, for generating propaganda as a recruiting tactic for the PLO. These communications were carried out on militaristic, psychological, and political levels.

Some of the improvements Palestinians had hoped for after the PLO took over Gaza in 1994 were free speech and expression. However, Arafat turned the Palestinian press into another channel of control for the PLO. Editors and journalists were threatened and beaten into submission to make sure they supported the "regime mentality" of the PLO. They were forced to reflect only the political agenda supported by Arafat. Political communication became narrow and one-sided. Reporters for independent news agencies in the region, too, were forced to send positive reports of the PLO to the outside world.

Arafat's political career was based on adept diplomatic communication and suppression of opposition. After the victory of the Palestinian Liberation Army over Israeli troops at Karameh in 1968, Arafat started systematic efforts to obtain recognition for the Palestine state on the world stage. Despite the killing of 11 Israeli Olympic athletes by PLO-sponsored terrorists at the 1972 Munich Olympics, Arafat secured an observer berth for the PLO at the United Nations in 1974.

After being driven to Tunis in 1982, Arafat launched the First Intifada in 1987. Intifada is essentially an Arab word for uprising. Arafat made sure that the world media picked up on the killing of children during the Intifada, which put the PLO's agenda back on the world map. The 1990s witnessed a series of diplomatic political communications between the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships. The first peace treaty, the Oslo Accords, secured Arafat the Nobel Peace Prize for his "efforts to create peace in the Middle East."

In 1996, Arafat was elected as the head of the Palestinian Authority, an entity created by the Oslo Accords. However, the then prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, refused to recognize Palestinian statehood despite the Oslo agreement. This led to further communication about the peace process between Netanyahu and Arafat, mediated by Bill Clinton, resulting in the Wye River Memorandum of 1998. More negotiations followed in 2000 and 2001. However, it is alleged that Arafat continued to use the Palestinian media to further his political agenda and to continue terrorist activities against Israel despite the façade of the peace talks. He launched the Second Intifada in 2001.

When Ariel Sharon secured power in Israel in 2001, he refused any further peace talks. He used military force to put Arafat under house arrest in 2002 at his headquarters at Ramallah. Arafat died in 2004 in a hospital near Paris. The cause of his death remains unclear.

Rati Kumar

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Arendt, Hannah

See Public Communication in Politics

Argentina Democratization Process, Role of the Media

Democracy returned to Argentina in 1983 after many interruptions of the constitutional system during the 20th century, culminating with the last military dictatorship (1976–1983). The media have had a limited influence on the process of transition to democracy, mainly because they worked under censorship. Another reason for this limited influence was the lack of partnership between the media and political parties. However, the media played an important role as a trustworthy political actor respecting the consolidation of democracy.

The return to democracy happened, in large part, due to the decay of the military regime. Characteristics of this transition were economic crises and political decline, caused primarily by a lost war. Furthermore, numerous internal and external claims existed against the government based on egregious human rights violations. Argentineans demanded democracy but possessed a weak civic and political culture since citizen participation had been restricted, or even forbidden. Political parties lacked experience due to many years of prohibition and persecution. The media were accustomed to extreme censorship. Opponents of the government disappeared or were forced into exile.

Upon return to democracy, a new relationship developed between the government and media. The Radical Civil Union (UCR) candidate, Raúl Alfonsín,

won the presidential election in 1983, and the radical party demonstrated a high professional performance in electoral communication. Polls, merchandising, and visual innovations were the features of this run for the presidency. It was the first campaign which showed a high degree of Americanization in terms of political communication.

This first experience of postdictatorship democracy was characterized by a combination from the government of confrontation and agreement attempts with the opposition. Nevertheless, some mistakes of Argentinean politics were soon reproduced: the ruling party tried to become hegemonic; corporations' power was underestimated; congress lacked autonomy for decision making; and corruption abounded. Additionally, the economy experienced a severe crisis. Some indicators at the earlier end of Alfonsín's administration showed the consequences of extraordinary economic mismanagement: real wages dropped 50%; unemployment and underemployment doubled; and a high and constant inflation turned into accelerating hyperinflation.

The transfer of power in 1989 was the first step toward maintaining the constitutional system. The continuity of this process by consecutive elections changing ruling parties is a sign that democracy has been, at the present, consolidated in Argentina. The 1989 election results followed the Latin American trends at those times, because the voters supported candidates who carried out economic liberalism's policies. At the time of the presidential elections of 1989, the media began a new phase in their relations with government. President Menem's reform to broadcasting law liberalized the market. As a result, media conglomerates emerged and increased the level of concentration. The next trend was a progressive convergence between media and telephone companies. Menem was reelected in 1995.

In 1999, a new political coalition between a center-left party and Radicalism won the presidential elections. The coalition's discourse seemed to fulfill demands of citizens after 10 years. Although the Argentinean society had manifested a willingness to maintain the convertibility plan and the free-market economic policy, the way in which these transformations were implemented was not so widely accepted. Corruption scandals and signs of abuse of power placed serious expectations on the new political faction.

However, the coalition failed to accomplish promises, and radical President Fernando De la Rua found increasing difficulties in governing. The 2001 legislative elections showed a general distrust due to a high level of electoral absenteeism in addition to null and blank votes. This election testified to the disintegrated links between citizens and politicians, as well as political parties. President De la Rua was unable to control this state of affairs. The popular media mocked him because of his incompetence. Mass demonstrations in the capital city and other important metropolises pushed the president to resign. As a consequence, the Argentinean institutions experienced one of the most difficult situations in their history, having five presidents in a month, since the possible successors were forced to step down due to many reasons. The last one was the Peronist Eduardo Duhalde, who ruled the country until the next national elections, finally called for 2003, when Peronist Nestor Kirchner became president.

The media did not encourage the process of transition to democracy in Argentina but accompanied it. Television played an active role in campaigns and by popularization of the political debate. The media system experienced a slow expansion, from press to broadcasting, from public to private property, from control to liberalization, and to concentration in multimedia. Journalists recovered the press freedom when democracy returned, but they still denounced a growing influence of government over media.

Whereas some participants (e.g., the military) lost power, others (e.g., political parties and labor unions) lost credibility. The media progressively took sides with the people in two main ways: as "watchdogs," developing investigative journalism, and as advocates, performing a symbolic substitution of discredited police and justice system officials. People requested that the media report corruption and criminal affairs specifically involving public officers. By televising illegal agreements involving politicians, by live transmissions of judicial processes, or by appearing on the scene before police and other authorities, the media evolved into a role as jury for the public opinion. The dynamics of political television shows contributed during the transition to democracy by familiarizing people to political issues through trivialization and entertainment.

Malvina Rodriguez

See also Alfonsín, Raúl; Democratization, Role of the Media in; Falklands-Malvinas War; Menem, Carlos

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Argumentation, Political

Democracy, governance by the people collectively, entails collective thoughts and actions—realities in rhetoric alone. Therefore, adapting to the fluid political needs and desires of a free society necessitates freedom of individual expression via argumentation. In this regard, political argumentation's foundations were laid in 339 B.C., when Aristotle's *Rhetoric* advocated use of "all available means of persuasion," to maintain a free society.

Academic definitions of argumentation emphasize its "logocentricity," or focus on logic and reasoned argument. Politics, by nature, however, has always been schizophrenic, part reason-governed or substantial and part illusory. Political communication's ever-increasing reliance on mass media in the past half century has exacerbated this duality, making emotional images all but inseparable from logical claims. Scholars agree, however, that argumentation involves controversy between an advocate and an opponent who each wish to influence the thoughts or behaviors of others.

Even while the Mayflower lay in Plymouth Harbor, its compact's adherence to the desires of "the most voices," laid the foundation for argumentation as a central feature of the U.S. political system as a democratic entity. Since that time, the evolution of political argumentation in the United States has followed the trajectory of the forum by which "the most voices" could be heard.

Therefore, public political argumentation has evolved in three nondiscrete stages:

1. The New England town meeting, dominant from 1641 until the mid-19th century, in which a nearly pure form of direct democracy was possible due to the small population and large proportion of available time (and attention spans) for lengthy and compulsory weekly meetings,
2. The "Great Debates" of the general assembly of the Constitutional Convention and early legislature creating the U.S. government as a representative democracy, and
3. The virtual democracy created by media technology in the 20th century, wherein a greater proportion of the citizenry engaged in argumentation less as advocate or opponent, and more as audience or critic.

A political argument is a two-way process employing symbolic interaction to influence others' thoughts or actions. Three components embody this definition and, hence, distinguish it from related terms such as "rhetoric," "discourse," and "political debate":

1. A political argument is a two-way process. Whereas rhetoric may only involve one party's persuasive attempts, argumentation implies that at least two parties are involved either in mutual persuasive attempts, or attempts to influence a mutual audience. The AIDS Quilt, a traveling fabric collage whose stories were vital to the rhetorical humanization of "People With Aids," for example, can be considered political rhetoric due to its persuasive nature, but not necessarily political argumentation, due its lack of a defined opponent.

2. Political argument involves the use of symbolic interaction (communication). Debate, however, as a subset of argumentation, is more limited to verbal/linguistic communication, and (notwithstanding the joint press conferences currently labeled as debates in modern political campaigns) is considered specifically a decision-making process with a defined endpoint and, presumably, a distinct outcome—a "win" by either advocate or opponent in the eyes of a particular audience or critic. Political argument often involves a more ongoing controversy such as party identification or social issue stances and less simply-defined or measured goals. Political argument may include political ads, bumper stickers, and films such as *Fahrenheit 911*. Therefore, a debate is a form of argumentation; but not all argumentation can be considered debate.

3. The purpose of influencing others' thoughts or actions is paramount as a distinguishing characteristic of political argumentation. Political discourse, however, may be simply for the purposes of information-dissemination or entertainment, as in the after-dinner speech.

Much of today's public political argumentation is not only depicted in the mass media, but is often created specifically for broadcast, thus further changing the nature of what is political argumentation. The interim between the "Great Debates" and modern televised political debates traces political argumentation through the more classic forms of argument of Chautauqua groups (traveling troupes of political and social activists seeking to educate the public and rally support for social issues) and Lincoln-Douglas debates to Roosevelt's fireside chats—the first forum of real-time mass consumption of political argument.

In the 1950s, when television literally leapt into the lives of American households, dominating political argumentation and information dissemination, new forms of political argument allowing far greater mass consumption and image-representation were possible. The savvy political arguer adapted to rich formats such as televised political advertisements, network news, and the new "Great Debates" (which J. Jeffery Auer argues are neither great nor debates), while unfortunates soon learned that reliance on purely reasoned argument was unwise in a society where governance and communication so diverged from the direct democracy of earlier generations.

Despite vast alterations in the forums of public political argumentation, private forums of "cracker barrel democracy" (so-named for its occurrence around the cracker barrels in grocery stores of old) have always been accessible through interpersonal channels, in local homes, and businesses. This forum's true influence over public policy has vacillated; however, since the advent of the Internet, the genuine democracy of the town hall meeting may once again be accessible, this time through mass-mediated interpersonal communication. While current Internet argumentation may not measure up to the power of the face-to-face interactions of the "cracker-barrel" days, the sheer interactivity of cyberspace makes hearing "the most voices," once again possible for the people collectively.

Karla Hunter

See also Debates; Rhetoric, Political

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Aristotle (384–322 B.C.)

Aristotle, a Greek philosopher and protégé of Plato, is considered the Father of the Scientific Method, the creator of formal logic, and one of the greatest thinkers in the history of the Western world. He was born in Stagiros in northeastern Greece near the neighboring kingdom of Macedonia. In 367 B.C. he traveled to Athens and joined Plato's philosophical school, the Academy. Aristotle remained in the Academy for approximately 20 years, first as a student and, later, as a teacher. One of the subjects he taught was rhetoric (*rhētorikē*). Notes used for his lectures on rhetoric at the Academy are thought to form, in large part, the contents of what is today the text titled *Rhetoric.* Around the time of Plato's death in 347 B.C., Aristotle left Athens. Over the next 3 or 4 years, he researched the natural history of the eastern Aegean Sea coast and apparently began work on lecture notes that would later be compiled into the text known today as *Politics.*

Sometime in 343 or 342 B.C., Aristotle joined the court of King Philip of Macedonia. Aristotle's father, Nicomachus, had served as personal physician to Philip's father, King Amyntas. Aristotle tutored the king's teenage son, Alexander, who later became the Macedonian hegemon, Alexander the Great. However, Aristotle only remained on as royal tutor until 340 B.C. Two years later, Philip's army defeated the Greek city-states at the Battle of Chaeronea. Following Philip's assassination in 336 B.C., Alexander ascended the throne, and Aristotle maintained positive relations with him for the next decade.

In 335 B.C. Aristotle founded a school of philosophy in the Lyceum, a gymnasium attached to the temple of Apollo Lyceus, just outside of Athens. Aristotle's proclivity for walking the colonnaded portico (*peripatos*) while teaching his students resulted in the school's common name, the Peripatetic School. At the Lyceum, Aristotle maintained an open library that was encyclopedic in scope and included his writings on rhetoric, logic, politics, ethics, psychology, biology, zoology, physics, meteorology, metaphysics, and poetry. Aristotle accepted Macedonian subsidies for his school and made no secret of his friendship with Antipater, an Alexandrian general appointed by the Macedonian king to serve as ambassador to Athens and later as regent over Greece. Thus, when the sudden death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C. resulted in increased anti-Macedonian sentiments, Aristotle fled to the ancient city of Chalcis on the island of Euboea, leaving his school and its library under the direction of one of his students, Theophrastus. Aristotle died the following year.

Unfortunately, much of what Aristotle published during his lifetime has been lost, and most of the extant texts of Aristotle's works, including *Rhetoric* and *Politics,* are thought to be compilations of Aristotle's lecture notes combined, in some cases, with the writings of some of his students. Aristotle's notes on rhetoric seem to have been made available to the public in an organized hand-written format by Andronicus of Rhodes in the mid-first century B.C., but this work was not widely published in print form in the Western world until the latter part of the 15th century A.D.

Aristotle's extant writings indicate that, like Plato, he was interested in the good life, which Aristotle defined as human happiness (*eudaimonia*) or human flourishing. However, Aristotle rejected Plato's approach to gaining the knowledge (*epistēmē*) necessary to understand how to live the good life. According to Plato, understanding the world in which humans lived and obtaining knowledge about how to live well in it depended upon human comprehension of a transcendent world of ultimate and universal ideas (*eide*). Aristotle rejected this otherworldliness and insisted that only the knowledge gained through the human senses could be considered true knowledge. Thus, Aristotle's pragmatic empiricism: collecting, classifying, and systematizing data that were accessible through the human senses. That which motivated Aristotle to study plants and animals, including the human animal, also apparently impelled him to examine the forms of reasoning men used in efforts to persuade others as well as the political systems men had created to govern their fellows.

Both the *Politics* and the *Rhetoric* are concerned with human affairs and the means of achieving the good life. Essentially, in the *Politics,* Aristotle is concerned with which state (i.e., political system) is best for creating conditions conducive to human flourishing. In the *Rhetoric,* he is concerned with the methods of human reasoning in argumentation that can influence decision making toward human happiness. In both works Aristotle relies on empirical data. His political philosophy developed in the *Politics* is grounded in examination of 158 political constitutions. In the *Rhetoric,* Aristotle's rhetorical theory draws from the *Synagoge Tekhnon,* his collection of writings by Greek Sophists on the arts of *logos* and rhetoric, as well as other data.

The *Rhetoric* begins as a philosophical work and shifts to a technical handbook examining practical reasoning in argumentation within contingent circumstances, or where conditions of uncertainty exist because absolute knowledge is unattainable. Aristotle opens by describing rhetoric as a counterpart (*antistrophos*) to dialectic (i.e., formal logical discussions), and justifying the study of rhetoric based on its practical usefulness in human affairs. He defines rhetoric "as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion." For Aristotle, there are two primary modes of persuasion, or proofs (*pisteis*): inartistic and artistic proofs. Because inartistic proofs exist prior to the creation of a speech (*rhēsis*) in various forms of testimonial, physical, and written evidence and need only to be used by the speaker (*rhētōr*), Aristotle focuses on the artistic proofs which must be invented by the speaker and demonstrated through speaking. Aristotle describes the three species of artistic proofs as *ēthos* (the character, knowledge, and good will toward the audience that the speaker demonstrates in a given speech), *logos* (the general case or argument(s) in any given speech), and *pathos* (the combination of *ethos* and *logos* to produce certain emotions in an audience).

Because, for Aristotle, rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic (i.e., formal logic), he describes two forms of informal logic in which humans engage: the example (*paradeigma*), which involves inductive reasoning, and the enthymeme (*enthymēma*) which involves deductive reasoning. The reliance upon examples allows a *rhētōr* to generalize from several experiential instances and also to reason from one specific case or instance to

another. The enthymeme, on the other hand, with its three-part form—major premise, minor premise, and conclusion—allows the *rhētōr* to move from a probability through a factual or material claim to a specific conclusion. What Aristotle's syllogism is to formal logic, the enthymeme is to rhetoric. The enthymeme differs from the syllogism in that: (1) it is *informal* reasoning (i.e., premises may be suppressed or unstated and, thereby, the overall form of the argument truncated); (2) it is designed to be comprehensible by a popular or mass, nonexpert audience; thus, it draws upon generally held principles, common beliefs, or values accepted by audiences as "probably" true or best (which also allows the suppression of a premise); and, (3) it is participatory in that it is designed to encourage the audience to supply or "fill in" what is unstated (i.e., the suppressed premise). For example, consider the following: [Major premise:] We need more honest politicians. [Minor premise:] "Candidate A" has a record of honesty. [Conclusion:] Therefore, we need to re-elect "Candidate A." If a particular audience accepts the view that there are too many dishonest politicians, the *rhētōr* making this case can leave the major premise unstated, and argue: We need to reelect "Candidate A," because s/he is an honest politician.

Aristotle claims that there are three species of rhetoric: deliberative, forensic (or judicial), and ceremonial (*epideictic*). Deliberative speeches are often political, especially legislative, addressing future actions on the basis of the likelihood of advantage/benefit or disadvantage/harm. Forensic speeches are often, though not always, legal speeches involving accusations (*kategoria*) or defenses (*apologia*), addressing past actions on the basis of their apparent justice or injustice. *Epideictic* addresses are ceremonial speeches, addressing present, existing conditions through praise (*eulogistic*) or blame (*dyslogistic*), often of an individual or community's virtue or vice. Aristotle offers both common topics (*topoi*) for use in any type of speech as well as special topics for each type of speech to which a *rhētōr* can turn in order to invent arguments for a public address.

In addition to modes of proof and types of reasoning in the three species of rhetoric addressed in Book I and the latter half of Book II, much of Book II addresses the roles of character and human emotions in persuasion. Aristotle stresses the importance of understanding how to arouse and subdue certain emotions in an audience as well as how a speaker can adapt his/her character to the character of the audience. Much of Book III addresses the delivery of a speech in terms of style and arrangement of the parts of the speech. Although Aristotle does not delineate what have come to be known as the "Five Classical Canons of Oration" (Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory, and Delivery), his *Rhetoric* provided a foundation for later rhetorical theorists, particularly those in Rome, to develop those canons as the guidelines for the production and delivery of public speeches.

In the *Rhetoric,* Aristotle counsels that a *rhētōr's* effectiveness in deliberative speaking depends upon an understanding of the four forms of political constitutions and the differences between them. The *Politics* treats the subject of types of political systems in much more detail, examining the structures and practices of various types of states with the purpose of recommending that system which Aristotle sees as ideal as providing the most likely circumstances for human flourishing. In Book I, Aristotle argues that the state (i.e., the Greek city-state, or *polis*) is the result of several natural associations. First is the family, constituted by marriage and slavery to meet daily needs. When greater needs are to be met several families associate in a village. Finally, when several villages unite they create a new association, a state (*polis*). According to Aristotle, the state originates out of natural needs and continues to exist in order to provide the highest end (*telos*) of human life, the good life. Thus, for Aristotle, the state is a natural association and "man is by nature a political animal," fitted by nature with the ability to reason and speak about justice and injustice and, therefore, to live in association with others in a state. In the remainder of Book I, Aristotle addresses issues related to slavery, private versus common property, and the rule of men over children and wives.

In Book II, Aristotle criticizes Plato's ideas expressed in his writings, the *Republic* and the *Laws,* as well as the ideas of others about utopist states. He singles out for specific examination the structures and practices of political systems in Sparta, Crete, and Carthage, and comments on previous and present lawgivers from Solon to Draco before concluding his commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of existing and theoretical political systems.

Books III and IV are the heart of the *Politics* and deal with definitions of citizenship, the virtues of citizens, the number and types of governments and those that are true and those that are perverted, an examination of monarchy (kingship) versus the rule of law, and the difficulty of simplifying types of regimes into good and bad, and an introduction to Aristotle's ideal state.

For Aristotle, the citizen is one who participates directly in public deliberations and decisions about public affairs and serves in public offices of the state; citizenship carries both rights and responsibilities. Here rhetoric is involved as each citizen develops toward his end (*telos*) as a political animal, reasoning and deliberating about justice. Aristotle argues that the virtue of the good citizen differs from the virtue of the good man in that the function of the virtue in the good citizen is to preserve the state. However, in the best state, the virtue of the good citizen is the virtue of the good human being, because the purpose and function of the best state is to lead to the highest form of virtue, the human being living the good life. Thus, Aristotle deems it significant to characterize the different types of regimes. In essence, there are six, three major types which can take a good and bad form: (1) when good, rule by one is a kingship; when bad, a tyranny; (2) when good, rule by the few is aristocracy; when bad, an oligarchy; and, (3) when good, rule by the many is a polity (*politeia*); when bad, a democracy. Aristotle concludes Book III by advocating what has become a fundamental principle of liberal democracy: the rule of law. Established law is like the rule of reason, whereas rule by a single individual allows for error due to the passions. The most common types of constitutions are democratic and oligarchic and the various forms of these types of regimes provide evidence of their strengths and weaknesses. Thus, Aristotle offers polity as the best form of government, a mixture of aspects from democracies and oligarchies in a state that avoids extreme disparities between rich and poor and has a large middle class that can moderate potential political extremes by either the wealthy or the poor.

Thus Book V deals with the causes of revolutions and means of avoiding them, and Book VI addresses in greater detail aspects of democracies and oligarchies and how people framing new constitutions can learn from the best forms of democracy. Books VII and VIII address Aristotle's conception of the good life, what is needed in the ideal state for citizens to pursue the good life, and the importance and significant aspects of educating the young in the ideal state. For Aristotle, the relationship between a state functioning to assist individuals in fulfilling their *telos* in living the good, virtuous life and the practice of the good and virtuous life of a state's citizens in preserving the ideal state is a symbiotic one.

B. Wayne Howell

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Attack Advertising

See Negative Advertising

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism is a concept central to understanding modern politics, as well as contemporary social life. The term *authoritarian* is not only used to describe political beliefs and the structure of political systems, but also individual psychological dispositions and interpersonal relationships.

The discussion of an "authoritarian character" can be traced back to Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom.* Authoritarianism was then elucidated by critical theorists of the Frankfurt School. In The *Authoritarian Personality,* T. W. Adorno and his colleagues attempted to explain anti-Semitism and the rise of Fascism throughout Europe in the 1940s, by combining Freudian psychoanalytic conceptions with Marxist theory. They developed the notion of the "authoritarian personality" in which one's fear and aggressiveness deriving from a specific familial socialization is a byproduct of the social structure of capitalistic society. This personality is forced to obey social authorities, accept societal norms, and release individual hatred toward members of weaker societal groups. Thus, authoritarians tend to have an anxious veneration of authority while expressing vindictiveness toward subordinates and so-called "deviants."

This Freudian approach was rejected by Bob Altemeyer whose Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale was rooted in Albert Bandura's social learning theory. Altemeyer assumed that like other

attitudes, people would acquire RWA from interactions with others or through various direct or indirect experiences with attitudinal objects. Parents could be the most important source of right-wing authoritarian attitudes. Several empirical studies show that religion apparently enhances authoritarian attitudes.

According to Altemeyer, RWA is a unidimensional measure of three attitudinal clusters in a person—authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. First, authoritarian submission is one's willingness to comply with established authorities placing very narrow limits on people's rights to criticize authorities. Second, authoritarians advocate sanction against those whom they deem detrimental to established authorities. Authoritarian aggression is enhanced by the belief that established authority at least tacitly approves it or that it will help preserve established authority. Thus, the theory of authoritarianism is closely related to the theory of social dominance. Finally, authoritarians tend to commit to the traditional social norms that are endorsed by society and its established authorities. Targets of authoritarian aggressiveness are often directed toward unconventional people or those defined as social deviants, such as homosexuals.

Since Altemeyer's conceptualization and development of the RWA Scale, authoritarianism has been used as a robust predictor of various political phenomena. It is especially noteworthy that the RWA Scale has correlated positively with a variety of conservative attitudes, such as those attacking environmentalism and abortion and in support of the death penalty. Thus, the question has arisen as to whether authoritarianism is any different from conservatism, which could be defined as the disposition to maintain existing orders and to resist change. Researchers who examined this issue have found that there has been a strong correlation between the RWA Scale and political conservatism. Indeed, authoritarianism and conservatism share two core dimensions—resistance to change and acceptance of inequality. However, the two are not isomorphic because among the traditions and established system that the conservatives wish to preserve are freedom of speech, freedom of opportunity, law-abiding principle, and so on. Those who embrace these values are not expected to score high on the RWA Scale.

One irony is that left-wing authoritarianism also resists change, allegedly in the name of egalitarianism. Relatively little literature has focused on left-wing authoritarianism, although the former Soviet Union could be considered as the clearest case of an authoritarian on the left. Milton Rokeach criticized that the original authoritarianism scales were so ideologically motivated and oriented that it could measure only authoritarianism on the right. This is a valid criticism, as some samples of communists in Altemeyer's study scored very low on the RWA Scale.

Thus, Rokeach came up with the Dogmatism Scale to provide a measure of general authoritarianism, irrespective of one's ideological stance. Dogmatism was defined as a closed cognitive organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality. Individuals who are high in dogmatism are inclined to be close-minded, intolerant of others, and deferential to authority. Though this concept was developed to encompass diverse ideological spectrums, people who score high on Dogmatism Scale also tended to register high on the RWA Scale. Although studies of authoritarianism started with the challenge to explain generalized prejudice in terms of personality traits, scholars have pointed out that authoritarianism can be more appropriately conceptualized if social or ideological contexts are taken into account. For instance, Hitler's popularity could be attributed to various national crises that affected Germany after World War I. Among these crises, Altehmeyer contended that the emergence of the radical left in Germany during the Great Depression helped drive many moderates and conservatives to the swastika. In this sense, authoritarianism may not be an unvarying psychological status but rather something that is affected by societal and ideological circumstances. Thus, recent scholars such as Stellmacher and Petzel view authoritarianism as a group phenomenon that is influenced by both authoritarian dispositions and situational factors, explaining that it reflects "the situation-specific activation of authoritarian beliefs."

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Aznar, José María (1953–)

José María Aznar López (born in Madrid on February 25, 1953) worked as a Spanish Tax Authority inspector after his law studies and before his political career. From 1982 to 1987 he was the Secretary General of the People's Alliance (*Alianza Popular,* AP); for the next two years he was president of the Autonomous Region of Castile-León. In 1989 the People's Alliance was re-founded as People's Party (*Partido Popular,* PP) and Aznar became its new leader.

In 1995 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), or Basque Homeland and Freedom, attempted to assassinate him, but he was not injured seriously. One year later, in March 1996, the PP won the general elections with a small majority; Aznar had to reach agreements with small nationalist parties in order to form a minority government. On May 5, 1996, he was sworn in as prime minister and began to support the efforts of the Regions for their autonomy. Concerning home affairs, Aznar tried to consolidate national finances, to achieve a strong economic growth and to struggle against the terrorism of ETA. In March 2000 the PP was reelected with an outright majority, thus Aznar held the office of prime minister for 8 years.

Aznar's presidency was identified with positive economic development of the country and a successful struggle against the terrorism of ETA, but he was reproached for being stubborn and high-handed. The opposition often criticized his policy; for example, the disastrous handling of the wreckage of the *Prestige* tanker, the military support of the war in Iraq even though the majority of the Spanish population was against it, and misrepresenting the investigations into the Madrid train bombings on March 11, 2004. Three days after the train bombings, on March 14, the PP lost the general elections.

Already in 2003, Aznar decided not to stand for reelection as prime minister for a third term, proposing Mariano Rajoy as his successor for the office of leader of the party. Due to his responsibility for the election defeat of the PP, the relationship of Aznar to his party worsened. In autumn 2004, he was appointed visiting lecturer at the Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., leading weeklong seminars on contemporary European politics and trans-Atlantic relationships.

As opposed to his predecessor Felipe González, José María Aznar never seemed to possess the qualities of a charismatic leader. The press always stressed his self-awareness of being "average" and "normal." After the failed assassination attempt in 1995, it is reported that he said: Now I have charisma, too. In spite of the undisputed successes of his government, his personal popularity was small, although the rightist press flattered him. His serious public image problem was enduring; his TV image was not convincing.

Unlike his first legislative period, Aznar developed a very authoritarian style in his second presidential period (from 2000), when he governed with an absolute majority; he also behaved arrogantly in his treatment of the media but only with partial success. His relationship with the media hit rock bottom after the train bombings of March 11, 2004. Aznar personally called the chief editors of the leading daily newspapers and radio stations and pushed them to announce the (wrong) statement by the government that Spain was the victim of a gigantic ETA terror attack. Although the truth was unearthed in the following weeks and months, Aznar refused to apologize for his misconduct to the victims and the Spanish population. Aznar was convinced not only of his abilities but also of the greatness and the importance of Spain. So his aim for Spain was to stay on the same level with the mightiest states of the continent. With

toughness and tenacity he tried to realize his idea (also against the majority of the population).

Walther L. Bernecker

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B

Bachelet Jeria, Michelle (1951–)

Michelle Verónica Bachelet, born on September 29, 1951, is the current president of Chile and the first woman to hold this position in Chile. Bachelet, candidate of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy, was sworn in as president of the Republic of Chile on March 11, 2006. In 2006 Bachelet, a surgeon and pediatrician, won the election in a runoff, beating center-right candidate Sebastián Piñera.

Michelle Bachelet, daughter of Air Force brigadier Alberto Bachelet Martínez, who was tortured and killed by the Pinochet regime, was exiled in 1975. Together with her mother she moved to the German Democratic Republic where she studied medicine at Humboldt University of Berlin. During her exile Bachelet got married and her first son, Sebastián, was born.

In 1979 Bachelet returned to Chile, where she graduated as a medical doctor at the University of Chile. After a specialization in pediatrics and public health in the mid-1980s her second child, Francisca, was born.

Between 1986 and 1990, Bachelet was head of the Medical Department for a foundation to aid injured children. After restoring democracy in Chile in 1990, she began to work for the Ministry of Health and acted as a consultant for the German Corporation for Technical Cooperation, the Pan-American Health Organization, and the World Health Organization. In the early 1990s her third child, Sofia, was born. Between 1994 and 1997, Bachelet worked as senior assistant to the deputy health minister before she completed a defense course in military strategy in Washington, D.C., in 1997.

Her political career began in 1970, when she became a member of the Socialist Party of Chile. Her first public appearance on the political stage was in the mid-1990s, when she campaigned against Joaquin Lavín, a future presidential candidate, for the mayorship of Las Condes, a suburb of Santiago. In 1999 she worked in the campaign of Ricardo Lagos of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy, Chile's governing coalition since 1990.

In early 2000 Bachelet was appointed minister of health. During her tenure she became a central political figure in Chile and started several reforms of the public health care system. Only 2 years later, president Ricardo Lagos appointed her defense minister, and she became the first woman to hold this position in the country.

Due to her rising popularity, in 2004 Bachelet was asked to become the Socialists' candidate for the presidency. The only presidential competitor within the coalition, Christian Democrat Soledad Alvear, resigned due to a lack of support within her own party.

Bachelet's personal history made her into a popular figure preferred by the media. Her popularity derives from repeated initiatives to attract media attention. In response to a flooding of a slum of Santiago some years ago, Bachelet coasted on a tank into the crisis zone. This image created a furor and finally made a star of her. Michelle Bachelet has an intense empathy toward the media and knows how to deal with it. Bachelet was one of the first politicians in Chile to use a Web log as a succesful tool within her presidential campaign.

In the first round of the presidential elections in December 2005, Bachelet faced the center-right candidate Sebastián Piñera, the right-wing candidate Joaquín Lavín, and the far-left candidate Tomás Hirsch.

She failed to obtain the absolute majority, winning 46% of the vote. In the runoff election on January 15, 2006, Bachelet faced Piñera and won the presidency with 53.5% of the vote.

Markus Moke

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BALLOT INITIATIVES

Ballot measures are either initiatives, which are drafted by citizens, or referenda, which are written by government officials. There is a perception that interest groups control the initiative process, and that interest groups can influence ballot measure elections through their campaign spending.

Importance of Campaign Spending on Ballot Measures

Real campaign spending on ballot measures has been steadily rising for decades and reached new heights in the 1990s. In 1992, $117 million was spent in 21 states on supporting and opposing measures on ballots, but in 1998 interest groups spent close to $400 million in 44 states. In comparison, in the 2000 presidential elections, all presidential candidates combined, for both the primary and the general election, spent $326 million. Candidates for the U.S. House and U.S. Senate spent $740 million on their campaigns for the 1998 election.

For the November 2004 election, $400 million was spent on 59 initiatives on the ballots in 18 states, and $269 million of this amount was spent on 10 campaigns. In comparison, senate and house candidates spent $911 million in primary and general election races in 2004. Presidential candidates Bush and Kerry spent $493 million combined on their 2004 presidential campaigns, although this does not include spending by parties and others in support of these candidates.

Californians spend more money on passing or defeating ballot measures than the citizens of any other state. For example, in 2004, gambling interests spent $100 million in California to influence passage of two propositions alone. This was about one fourth of what George W. Bush and John Kerry each spent in their 2004 presidential campaigns.

The Role of Campaign Advertising in a Direct Democracy

One can think of ballot measures in unidimensional space where one point on this space is the policy status quo, and the other is the proposed policy by the ballot measure. The policy which is closest to the median voter will be chosen. Assuming all voters cast a ballot, and all voters are fully informed, it is not clear what role campaign expenditures play. In order for campaign expenditures to have a role, we need to relax one or both of the two assumptions.

One type of advertising may be called *informative.* Informative campaign spending educates voters about the position of the proposed policy (X) on the single-dimensional space, and it can also provide information about the position of the status quo (S). Suppose there are two interest groups, one group S which supports the status quo, and group X which supports the ballot measure. If uninformed voters abstain, each group has an incentive to inform voters with ideal points closest to the groups' preferred policy.

With informative advertising, opponents and supporters of ballot propositions inform the voter of the

position of the status quo and the proposition on the single dimension. The voter then compares his ideal point to that of the points where the status quo and the ballot proposition is located and makes his decision. Informative advertising assures that the option closest to the ideal point of the median voter wins. Informative campaigning by both interest groups increases the likelihood that the policy closest to the median voter will be chosen.

Informative advertising may be more important in ballot measure campaigns than in races for well-known offices (such as the presidency or governorships) because voters often have little information about the consequences of ballot measures, although they are more likely to be familiar with candidates.

With informative advertising, an advertiser tries to increase his support among voters close to his position, but decrease it among voters closer to the alternative. An alternative way of thinking about persuasive advertising is that advertising is directed toward impressionable voters. Advertising to target impressionable voters may be more pronounced on complex issues, such as insurance regulation, as opposed to simple or emotional issues on which many voters have already formed an opinion, such as abortion. It may also be more common when the status quo is not very different from the proposed measure, and therefore many voters are indifferent to the two alternatives.

There is little direct evidence linking campaign spending to the level of knowledge or competency of voters. One potential, albeit poor, measure of whether campaign spending provides information is whether voters are aware of the ballot measure. Some evidence points to the fact that campaign spending makes voters aware of ballot measures. Studies of ballot elections in California between 1956 and 2000 found that campaign spending led to more ballot measure awareness. Importantly, negative spending increased voter awareness while positive spending had no effect on awareness.

Evidence linking competency and campaign spending is even less available than that between awareness (as a measure of being informed) and campaign spending. However, voters may get information cues on how to vote from endorsements of ballot measures. For example, knowing whether someone like Ralph Nader opposed a measure was sufficient to cast a vote mimicking the voting pattern of informed voters.

Turnout in candidate elections is higher when initiatives and referenda are also on the ballot. Most evidence for this claim is, of course, indirect, showing that turnout is higher in many elections that coincide with higher spending on ballot questions in the same elections.

It is also more likely that laws are enacted that reflect the wishes of the majority when there is direct democracy. For example, evidence suggests that states with the direct democracy option have laws and policies that are closer to the desires of the majority of voters than those states that do not have that option. These findings suggest that, at least on average, interest groups do not have a detrimental effect on policy outcomes. The older literature on the effects of campaign spending on initiatives calculates whether the side that has spent more is also more likely to obtain a majority vote for their position.

The role that interest groups play in ballot initiatives is complex. Citizen groups are groups who receive their support from personal and monetary resources, and economic groups are groups who rely on monetary resources only. Businesses and corporations are considered economic interest groups and trade unions and citizen interest groups are included in the citizen group category. Professional interest groups, such as the California Trial Lawyers Association, may be considered hybrid groups. Economic interests groups are effective in blocking the passage of ballot measures; they are especially effective in maintaining the status quo but not in changing it. On the other hand, citizen groups often succeed in using ballot initiatives to change existing situations. For instance, although 40% of all initiatives on California ballots from 1986 to 1996 passed, only 14% of initiatives pushed by special interests passed. Sometimes economic interest groups have been influential in blocking initiatives they oppose, but they cannot purchase their preferred changes in the status quo.

Analysis of initiatives between 2000 and 2004 in California, however, suggest that supporting TV campaign advertising can be at least as productive as opposition spending. For example, 100 extra supporting television advertisements increased the ballot's vote percentage between 1 and 2 percentage points and, for the most part, positive and negative advertising is equally productive.

Overall, then, it is important to consider whether television advertising has a big effect on the outcome of ballot measure elections. Again, there is mixed evidence, but recent research suggests that interest groups do not have a disproportionate influence on the

initiative and referendum process. The results show that the effect of interest groups on outcomes is somewhat offsetting. Although spending taken by itself has an influence on whether a ballot proposition is passed or defeated, the results suggest that the other side can adopt a counter campaign and thereby partially—and sometimes completely—offset the influence of the other group. These results suggest that if only one side spends it has the advantage. However, if both sides spend, their spending is largely offsetting.

In summary, early work showed that money might be most successful in maintaining the status quo. Later work showed that economic groups are more successful than citizen groups in maintaining the status quo, and that citizen groups are more successful in pushing for a change from the status quo. Overall, the academic literature has found little evidence that interest groups can purchase their preferred policies through the initiative process and that money has only a small influence on whether initiatives pass.

Evidence that the side that spends more money is also more likely to win does not necessarily imply an inequality in access to political participation. The reason that the winning side outspends the other side may simply reflect that the winning side represents the views of the majority and thus was able to attract many funds. Recent work showed that campaign spending for both sides is equally effective, but that this effect is small. Campaign spending can have benefits such as informing voters and reducing uncertainty, but if it is deceptive and no opposition group is formed, the outcome may not be the one preferred by the median voter.

Thomas Stratmann

See also Political Advertising

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Banner Ads

A banner ad is an advertisement that appears on the Internet. Banner ads vary considerably in size, shape, appearance, and subject matter, but all banner ads take you to the advertiser's Web site if you click on them.

Banner ads are made of hypertext markup language (HTML) that instructs a Web server to call a particular Web page when a user clicks on the ad image, ad text, or ad animation. Banner ads are different from television, newspaper, or radio ads because banner ads take the potential customer directly to the advertiser's Web site. Another difference between newspaper ads and banner ads is the possibility for animation. Banner ads are similar to newspaper ads in that banner ads stay in one place on a Web page.

The Internet Advertising Bureau specifies eight different banner sizes that vary in pixel dimensions. Most Web sites impose their own restrictions on memory size for banner ads in order to maintain a reasonable file size for the Web page. A larger banner ad increases the time it takes for a browser to load that Web page. The simplest banner ad features one static GIF or JPEG image linked to the advertiser's Web site. A more common type of banner ad is the animated GIF banner ad, which creates the effect of motion by displaying several different images in succession. The most complex banner ads use audio, video, or Java or Shockwave programming, which causes the Web page to have a larger file size.

The goal of banner ads is to lure the user to click on the ad that takes the user to the advertiser's Web site. Once the user is on the advertiser's Web site, the user

would ideally purchase something. However, even if the user does not click on the banner ad, the advertiser hopes that the user will see the banner ad, and the ad will register in their minds. Perhaps the user will visit the advertiser's Web site in the future, or is more aware of the advertiser's product or service, or will tell others about the advertiser's product or service. This is also branding, where users are made familiar with an advertiser's product or service so that in the future the user may choose their product or service over a competitor's.

In regard to their political use, banner ads have been found on traditional and alternative news media Web sites, interest group Web sites, nonpartisan group Web sites, nonprofit organization Web sites, networking Web sites (e.g., MySpace.com), and popular Web logs. Politicians have also placed banner ads on other like-minded politicians' Web sites and party Web sites.

The advertiser will pay money to the Web site that is hosting the ad (publisher site). To measure banner ad success, advertisers look at the number of users who click on the banner ad (click-through), the number of users who view the page (page impression), the ratio of page views to clicks (click-through rate), and the amount of advertising money that is spent making one sale. Most advertisers consider all of these measures when deciding where to publish banner ads and when judging the effectiveness of a banner ad.

Kristen D. Landreville

See also Political Advertising; Web Campaigning; World Wide Web, Political Uses

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Ben Ali, Zine el-Abidine (1936–)

Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali has been the president of Tunisia since being elected on November 7, 1987. Ben Ali, the chairperson of the Democratic Constitutional Rally (formerly Neo-Destour party) was elected by a landslide in 1994 and 1999, and in 2004, he was reelected to a fourth 5-year term with nearly 95% of the vote. During these election campaigns, Tunisia's voters do not have the right to any independent news or information. The information they have been offered in the Tunisian media was filtered, controlled, and partial.

Ben Ali's iron grip on state and privately owned media, his wide-ranging crackdown on journalists, and his instrumental use of the Tunisian media for his propagandist objectives have made him one of the predators of press freedom according to Reporters Without Borders.

On November 7, 1987, Ben Ali announced on the national broadcasting channels that with his election, Tunisia was entering a new era of modernity and democratization. This announcement reflected his full awareness that media matters in politics. In his political communication, he uses a wide range of media to channel his messages and images. However, the November 7 anniversary speeches and national and international press conferences remain critical to his political communication with local and international audiences. In the Arabic political context, where charisma still counts, political leaders cultivate their personality cult by placing their portraits everywhere, including the press. Ben Ali is no exception.

Ben Ali has endlessly repeated that Tunisia under his reign has made a number of efforts to liberalize the print-press sector (245 privately owned newspapers and magazines). However, the private media are owned by the presidential clan, and they are by definition nonindependent. The Reporters Without Borders journalist organization contests the characterization of an independent press in Tunisia, insisting that the president's control prevents free and open reporting. Self-censorship is a common practice among journalists in Tunisia, who work under an ubiquitous apparatus of repression including restrictive laws, bureaucratic harassment, withdrawal of state advertising, corruption, and police violence. A new antiterrorism law adopted in December 2003 imposed additional limitations on freedom of the press. No wonder that in a press conference, Ben Ali encouraged the media to play its role as a watchdog without "hiding behind unthinking fear or self-censorship." The decision of the Association of Tunisian Journalists to award Ben Ali the Golden Pen award in 2003 has brought condemnation from other press and journalism organizations throughout the world.

Ben Ali said in his 19th anniversary political speech that he regarded the media as "particularly

important" and that he would help the media to improve its content and establish freedom of the press. In the same context, he pledged to be personally engaged in restructuring and liberalizing the audiovisual system to face the new challenges posed by the information and communication technologies. In the digital age, the president has launched his own Web site which features online brochures consisting of a collection of his speeches and ads from the presidential campaign and other information.

Since his accession to power in November 1987, Ben Ali has been engaged in polishing Tunisia's image abroad. He launched a number of international public relations campaigns in the international press which targeted tourists and investors. He wanted to frame Tunisia as an oasis of stability, modernity, and the region's most solid bulwark against fundamentalism and terrorism. Due to Ben Ali's adroitness with communication, Tunisia, despite the protest of a number of international organizations such as Amnesty International and Reporters Without Borders, hosted the United Nations World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in November 2005.

Mohammed Ibahrine

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See *News: The Politics of Illusion*

Berlusconi, Silvio (1936–)

Silvio Berlusconi, an Italian self-made media tycoon and the richest man in Italy, entered politics and became prime minister in 1994 and 2001. He epitomizes the modernization of Italy's politics and political communication. Following the collapse of the old political class in 1992 to 1993 that had ruled the country since the end of World War II, Berlusconi decided to enter into the political arena by creating a brand-new party, Forza Italia. This party filled the vacuum in the center-right political spectrum, and in the general elections of 1994, with a new majoritarian electoral law, won an unexpectedly large support. His victorious bid was backed by an unprecedented television campaign to launch the new party and by a well-designed marketing strategy. He relied on his in-house resources, owning practically the entire commercial television sector (through Finivest-Mediaset) and controlling most of the advertising investments (through Publitalia 80).

He did not enjoy the same success in the general elections of 1996 but regained power in 2001 and lost again in 2006. A flamboyant and charismatic personality, Berlusconi in and out of government has dominated the country's political scene since his decision to run for office. His popularity among conservative voters has been consistently high, in spite of the electoral ups and downs. His amiability and showmanship has helped him to escape several embarrassing moments of his political life. His populist appeal has even been acknowledged by his political foes. Berlusconi's speech has often been politically incorrect, undiplomatic, and even offensive, but it did not appear to damage his political leadership nor his personal image among his supporters. On the contrary, he appeared to be a tough combatant, capable of putting his adversaries in disarray. He has been the target of strong criticism at home and abroad for his conflict of interests, especially when serving as prime minister. His direct control of the three main commercial television networks and indirect influence on the three public service channels when in power raised strong concerns about the freedom of information. His control of a significant portion of the publishing industry (through Mondadori) and of the new sector of digital television channels, plus a large slice of the film industry, involved the state of the country's media pluralism. In the longest period of a governing coalition since World War II (2001 to 2006), Berlusconi was able to convince a docile parliament to pass legislation that served many of his personal interests, including several touching upon his judicial troubles. The communications bill of 2004 represented the most significant example of the conflict of interest. It left intact his control over his three television networks and further strengthened Mediaset's position in the country's media marketplace.

Berlusconi is credited with changing political communication in Italy, thanks to his market-oriented savvy. With his unconventional ways to "sell" a new party and to rally supporters, marketing techniques have become increasingly popular among public office seekers, television has become pivotal, and candidate's image building a common feature in Italian election campaigns. Also political news reporting has changed since Berlusconi entered the domestic political arena and especially when in power. Broadcast news (Rai and Mediaset) became increasingly vulnerable to Berlusconi's idiosyncrasies and spinning, whereas the printed media exhibited independence and criticism.

Gianpietro Mazzoleni

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Bernstein, Carl

See *All the President's Men*; Watergate

Biased Assimilation

See Selective Processes, Exposure, Perception, Memory

Big-Character Posters, China

Big-character posters are handwritten posters prominent in Chinese politics, typically comprising complaints about governmental officials or policies. The posters are usually just a large piece of white paper, on which the author has written slogans, poems, or even longer essays with ink and brush. The posters are hung on a wall or a post and have historically been a major aspect of political communication in China, used as a means of protest against governmental incompetence or corruption. Because the posters are typically written anonymously, it is a popular means of expressing dissatisfaction with local officials who might be able to exact revenge if a complaint were made in a more public setting. Moreover, because of the low expense of creating a poster, they effectively provide a mechanism for political communication and, if placed in a prominent place, such as a university bulletin board or a city wall, might be viewed by hundreds of people or even reprinted in an official press venue. The term "big- character poster" refers to large posters written in large Chinese characters, but some use it to include "small character posters," which are written in smaller script (such that it would be difficult to see from a distance of more than a few feet) but are of a typically greater length in terms of content.

Historically, big-character posters have been influential in several important social movements during the communist era, including the Anti-rightist campaign of 1957, the Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1975, and the Democracy Wall movement of 1978 to 1980. During the Cultural Revolution, a poster which claimed that Peking University was controlled by antirevolutionaries came to the attention of Mao Zedong, who had its contents re-published nationally. Big-character posters soon became common throughout the nation and typically attacked local officials. Officials who found themselves accused in a poster might find themselves suspended from their jobs, under arrest, or even under physical attack. The famous "Democracy Wall" movement of Beijing began with a big-character poster titled "The Fifth Modernization," written by a dissident. The right to write big-character posters was guaranteed as one of the "four great rights" in the 1975 state constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC), but in 1980 this right was removed. During the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement, and in spite of their illegality, big-character posters again became a symbol of democratic sentiment, as the posters sprang up around the country to mourn the death of Hu Yaobang and to criticize Chinese political leaders.

Randolph Kluver

See also China, Media and Politics in; Mao Zedong

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Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81, also known as the Shays-Meehan or McCain-Feingold Bill, after some of its congressional sponsors, was the first major amendment of the earlier Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) since the extensive 1974 amendments that followed the Watergate scandal. The legislative scheme of the 1974 Amendments to FECA had been substantially altered by the Supreme Court's decision in *Buckley v. Valeo,* which, in 1976, struck down several provisions of the 1974 Amendments limiting campaign finance expenditures as violations of the First Amendment's protections of freedom of speech and freedom of association. The constitutional framework established in *Buckley v. Valeo* allowed contributions to be limited, but expenditures (including political advertising) were not limited in order to protect political expression under the First Amendment.

BCRA and Soft Money

A primary purpose of the BCRA was to eliminate the use of so-called soft money to fund the explosion of advertising by political parties on behalf of their candidates. Pre-BCRA, money was "hard" if it was raised in accordance with the limits concerning sources and amounts specified by FECA (1974); for example, a maximum of $1,000 per election and no contributions by corporations or unions. However, because state campaign finance rules differed from the federal rules, many states allowed corporations and unions to donate and to do so in larger, sometimes unlimited, amounts. These "soft" money expenditures were allowed by the FEC because federal and state and local candidates all appeared on the ballot in the same election year, and the funds paid for advertising and other activities that benefited state and federal candidates, such as generic "get out the vote" (GOTV) drives. Most notably in the 1996 and 2000 elections, state party-financed presidential campaign ads were purchased with soft money raised by state parties.

By funding advertising for federal candidates with "soft money" raised outside the strictures of FECA, parties and candidates were able to evade the federal limits on the size and type of campaign contributions. This was particularly apparent in the presidential race, where candidates accepted public money to finance their campaigns and agreed to abide by contribution and expenditure limits but then evaded them through large soft money contributions from corporations and labor unions routed through state party organizations. For example, while federal law then limited contributions to $1,000 per election and prohibited corporate and labor union contributions, corporations and unions could and did give, in some cases, many thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars to state party organizations which then spent them to fund advertising for the benefit of federal candidates for office. In the 1996 presidential election, federal law limited the Democratic Party candidates to about $30 million in total spending for the presidential primaries. The Clinton campaign arranged $44 million in primary soft money expenditures for advertising alone, greatly exceeding the hard money limits specified by law. In the 2000 election, the Democratic and Republican National Party Committees collectively raised over $460 million in soft money contributions. In addition, corporations and unions spent directly for televised advertisements which stopped short of expressly advocating the election or defeat of specific candidates but which nonetheless conveyed messages of support or opposition; under the ruling in *Buckley,* such ads, which eschewed express advocacy, were not prohibited to corporations or unions because they were not "in connection with federal elections" within the meaning of the FECA. These developments helped lead to the adoption of BCRA.

BCRA attacked these loopholes in several ways. First, it raised the amounts of permitted, lawful "hard money" contributions for individuals from $1,000 per candidate per election, where it had remained since

1974, to $2,000 per candidate per election (primary and general elections count separately, so $4,000 per election cycle is allowed), and provided for future adjustments in accordance with inflation. This was intended to reduce the incentive for candidates to evade the limits.

Second, BCRA provided, with limited exceptions, that federal candidates, parties, officeholders, and their agents are prohibited from soliciting, receiving, or directing soft money to another person or organization, or from raising or spending any money not subject to the FECA limits. The law is intended to prevent the national parties from raising money and then directing that it be contributed to others in order to avoid federal limits. Accordingly, parties are prohibited from donating funds to so-called tax-exempt "527" groups, named after a provision in the Internal Revenue Code. Moreover, any funds spent on "federal election activity" as defined in BCRA are required to be raised in accordance with FECA limits. Federal election activity includes any activity within 120 days of an election in which a federal candidate is on the ballot, including get-out-the-vote activity, generic campaign activity, and public communications which refer to a clearly identified federal candidate and which support or oppose a candidate for office. This new rule reverses the former practice of allowing parties to allocate generic expenses between hard and soft money depending on the number of state candidates versus federal candidates on the ballot: Now, if a federal candidate is on the ballot, all of the money spent (with only a few exceptions) must be hard money raised in accordance with FECA limits.

In BCRA, Congress also sought to force political parties to choose between making potentially unlimited advertising expenditures independent of its candidates, or making coordinated expenditures that could be treated as contributions and limited in amount. However, the Supreme Court in *McConnell v. FEC* struck down these provisions, thus leaving party committees free to make both limited coordinated expenditures and unlimited independent expenditures, although the ban on solicitation or expenditure of soft money was upheld.

Third, BCRA prohibited "electioneering communications" by corporations and unions in an effort to halt the corporate and union practice of airing ads which were intended to influence federal elections but stopped short of express advocacy—urging the audience to vote for or against a federal candidate. Ads meet the definition of "electioneering communications" in BCRA if they are broadcasts that (1) refer to an identified federal candidate, (2) are made within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary election, and (3) are targeted to the electorate of a federal candidate (except president/vice president for whom the whole country is the electorate). Persons other than corporations or unions are not prohibited from making electioneering communications, but are required to file disclosures with the Federal Election Commission if they spend over $10,000 in a calendar year in making them. By defining electioneering communications in terms of when they are made, to whom they refer, and at whom they are aimed, the BCRA removed the ability of unions and corporations (except media corporations which remain free to express political opinions) to air issue ads during election periods by avoiding express advocacy. This provision was initially upheld on its face by the Supreme Court in *McConnell v. FEC* against the claim that First Amendment rights were violated, but in *Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.* (*WRTL*), the court found the provision unconstitutional as applied to particular ads. In *McConnell,* the court had allowed electioneering communications by corporations and unions to be banned if they were the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The court in *WRTL* said that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible to no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. It appears that the Supreme Court may have gone far toward restoring the express advocacy doctrine first announced in *Buckley* and may be willing to consider reversing its decision in *McConnell,* upholding the BCRA electioneering communication provision.

Millionaire's Amendment

Some provisions of BCRA appear to be aimed more at protecting incumbent politicians than avoiding possible corruption or the appearance of corruption. The so-called Millionaire's Amendment provision of BCRA allows candidates whose opponents spend more than certain amounts of their own money (determined by application of a complex formula) to accept contributions in excess of the FECA limits, normally $2,000 per candidate per election, before adjustments for inflation. The concept seems to be that if a candidate (often an incumbent) has a wealthy opponent

who spends his own money rather than having to raise it in contributions, the candidate should be able to ask supporters for larger contributions to offset this "unfair" advantage.

Accordingly, in the Illinois 2004 Democratic senatorial primary (an open seat with no incumbent), Barack Obama faced a multimillionaire, Peter Hull, who spent $15 million of his own money. Obama (the eventual winner) was able, because of this provision, to raise $3 million in contributions larger than $2,000 (over one third of his total campaign fund), whereas he could only have raised $960,000 from the same donors under the normal limits. The Millionaire's Amendment allows contributions up to six times the normal limit in the Senate and three times for House races, depending on the amount of self-funding by wealthy candidates, or up to $12,000 per election. In addition, another part of the Millionaire's Amendment prohibits candidates who loan their own money to the campaign from repaying themselves more than $250,000 from funds raised after the election. This provision seems intended to discourage candidates from self-funding their campaign at all in any amount over $250,000.

The irony of this Millionaire's provision is that limits on contributions are supposedly justified in all campaign finance regulations by the concept that contributions larger than the statutory limits might result in corruption or the appearance of corruption. The Millionaire's provision suggests that larger contributions have a potential for corruption only if the opponent is not willing or able to fund his or her own campaign—and since self-funding accounted for 24% (in 2002) of challengers' campaign funds compared to .5% (in 2002) of incumbents' campaign funds—the conclusion that the provision is intended to protect incumbents is virtually irresistible. In *McConnell v. FEC,* a constitutional challenge to this provision was ruled premature, but the Supreme Court could revisit the question in the future.

BCRA Specialized Provisions

Another provision of BCRA prohibited minors from making any political contributions at all, apparently assuming that minors who did so were merely serving as a subterfuge for excessive contributions by adults. In *McConnell v. FEC,* the Supreme Court ruled this provision unconstitutionally impaired the First Amendment rights of minors to associate with candidates of their choice where the minors had their own funds. Congress cannot impose a blanket prohibition without regard to the source of the funds.

BCRA also imposed new detailed disclaimer requirements on political advertisements requiring, in the case of television ads, that a candidate must appear visually in the ad, state his identity, and declare that he approved the ad. The candidate's identity must also appear in writing at the end of the ad for at least four seconds, in a clearly readable manner and with a reasonable degree of color contrast. For radio ads, there must be an audible statement in the ad by the candidate that identifies the candidate and states his approval. These disclaimers were aimed at discouraging negative advertising by requiring the candidate to associate himself or herself personally with the ad, apparently on the theory that candidates would not want to be perceived as directly sponsoring negative ads, so this would result in fewer such ads. The proponents of this provision were congressional incumbents who thought it would help reduce political ads critical of incumbent officeholders. Based on the content of ads appearing in the 2004 election, this does not appear to have had the desired effect of reducing negative political advertising.

Clifford A. Jones

See also *Buckley v. Valeo;* Campaign Finance; Federal Election Campaign Act; *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*

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Blair, Tony (1953–)

Tony Blair became British prime minister in 1997 having been elected Labour leader in 1994. He entered parliament at the 1983 general election, a party defeat that influenced his support for new leader Neil Kinnock and his communications director Peter Mandelson. They reciprocated by rapidly promoting the member of Parliament as a representative of their "new model" party. Blair also formed a close working relationship with fellow parliamentarian Gordon Brown and formed a relationship with Labour's chief strategist Philip Gould and leading media supporter Alastair Campbell. These five (and, indirectly, Kinnock) have been credited with rebranding the party "New Labour" during Blair's early leadership, which was a logical consequence of their affinity with Bill Clinton and his "New Democrat policy" repositioning (or triangulation), and strategic communication. The group blamed Labour's defeats on its supposed "tax and spend" image, lack of credibility, and links to "minorities" and organized labor. Yet there was continuity between the Kinnock and Blair leaderships and attempts to represent the period 1994 to 1997 as a watershed in party history have involved a characteristically large degree of "spin." Blair emphasized this when, in his first party conference speech as leader, he argued Labour needed to "mean what we say and say what we mean" yet he relied on spin doctors to brief journalists of his undeclared intention to rewrite Clause 4, Labour's mission statement committing it to public ownership.

Blair greatly expanded the "public relations state" on taking office, and it came as little surprise when a 2004 government report stated communication was now as important as policy formulation and delivery. The prime minister endorsed this not least because, as a former cabinet colleague argues, "he thinks in soundbites." Characteristically presidential in style, Blair has nevertheless been reliant on colleagues in promoting the "new" Labour "project": thus Brown cultivated business, Mandelson policed the party, Campbell forged relations with a once hostile British press (particularly Rupert Murdoch's newspapers), and Gould monitored public opinion through focus groups. In 1997 they worked together in a Clintonesque "war room" from which they oversaw Labour's return to government after 18 years of opposition. Several American Democratic consultants (including Stan Greenberg, Bob Shrum, and Mark Penn) also played an influential role in this and subsequent victories. And whereas 2001 was a rerun of 1997, 2005 was a considerably more fraught election. The tensions regarding Iraq proved especially contentious because of the way Blair and Campbell had "spun" the threat from weapons of mass destruction. A BBC claim that the evidence justifying war had been "sexed up" provoked a major argument and the death of the alleged government source for the story led to an official inquiry which criticized the broadcaster. But public trust in the once hugely popular Blair has never recovered from an Iraq crisis that may dominate his legacy. Blair stepped down as Labour Party leader in 2007.

Dominic Wring

See also Labour Party, Britain

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Blogs, Blogging

Web logs, or blogs, began popping up on the Internet as early as 1997, and there have been several noted attempts at defining the technology and differentiating the medium from standard Web pages. One of the earliest definitions of blogs actually came from a blogger in 1999 as he struggled to classify the content on his frequently updated Web site. Cameron Barrett published a short essay on his blog called "Anatomy of a Weblog" in which he defined a blog as a small, frequently updated Web site maintained by a single individual with many repeat visitors.

The current technical definition of a blog asserts that it is a Web page with a series of dated entries arranged in reverse chronological order. Every blog includes standard elements along with several optional features. Bloggers incorporate the optional features as access to the various technologies, expertise, and interest level allow. Today, there is still disagreement about

Internet bloggers work on their Web log stories during the Democratic National Convention at the Fleet Center, July 26, 2004, in Boston, Massachusetts.

Source: Getty Images.

which elements must be present in order for a Web page to be called a blog. Elements of blogs can include, but are not limited to, the post itself where the blogger publishes content, permalinks which represent the permanent links to the blog post (to be used after the blog post has been archived), the comment features where some bloggers allow readers to respond to the post and the comment is threaded into the original post, and trackbacks where other bloggers link to a particular blog post and the context and/or link is then threaded back into the original post.

The social definition is more representative of describing what blogs really are. Bloggers are often described as opinionated people who use the outlet as a means to communicate their thoughts, ideas, reflections, and politics, resulting in the frequent label of "a soapbox."

Bloggers and Blog Readers

Current estimates by the Pew Internet and American Life Project, a frequently cited source for measuring the blogosphere, suggest that there are 12 million adult American bloggers writing for an audience of about 57 million people online. With each year, these numbers rise dramatically. While these blogs run the gamut from fun personal blogs to political and serious, those who write blogs can be considered the "new influencers" as blog readers believe blogs are credible sources of news and information. In fact, 9% of those online during the 2004 U.S. presidential election used blogs to find political information, and those involved with campaigns online were more likely to read political blogs, thus making the study of political communication on blogs a worthy area of inquiry.

Campaign Blogs

Blogs were first used on the campaign trail during the primary season of the 2004 election, when 10 Democrats were vying for their party's nomination. Some observers believe that the introduction of blogs marked the biggest advancement in campaign interactivity since 1996 because the blogs provided the opportunity for communication between citizen supporters and opponents and campaign staff.

The campaign of Democrat Howard Dean brought the power of the blog to the spotlight, as his supporters became a vocal part of online discourse, catching the attention of the media and allowing a new type of civic and political engagement where citizens could inform themselves and become a part of the discussion without having to leave their desks. This approach to civic engagement differed substantially from the traditional paradigm view that "being active in politics" meant voting or volunteering for a campaign.

Even in this early use, it became evident that there was not a "one-size-fits-all" blog style; official campaign blogs varied in the type of content posted, level of personalization, and interactive features incorporated. Later analyses comparing the Democratic and Republican candidates found that such differences in approach and content on blogs has continued.

Blogs and Media

The most discussed political impact of blogs relates to the possible agenda-setting effect they may have on the mainstream media. Indeed, academics and journalists both cite anecdotes where blogs are said to have either

(a) broken a scandal or introduced a story to the elite media or (b) created a buzz about a story bloggers felt was getting too little attention in the media.

In the first instance, bloggers are more closely aligned with journalists, as they are the ones telling the story and disseminating information. This was the case when a blogger reported off the record remarks made by CNN's Eason Jordan during a public speech when he suggested that the military had murdered journalists in the Middle East—comments which subsequently led to the resignation of the cable news executive.

The second instance, in which bloggers pick up information from the mainstream media, occurs more frequently as bloggers act as "gatewatchers" constantly watching news reported by the mainstream media and placed by gatekeepers. Examples of this so-called gatewatching occurred in the case of Senator Trent Lott who made racist comments at fellow Senator Strom Thurman's 100th birthday party. In this case, Lott's speech aired on CSPAN, and the comment was repeated in an early morning network newscast, but it went largely unnoticed by mainstream media for several days. Here, bloggers are often credited with reintroducing the topic onto the public agenda. More recently, bloggers have evolved gatewatching into an act of being watchdogs of the watchdog media. That is, bloggers have been known to question the accuracy of mainstream media reporting ranging from the authenticity of documents used as source material in a news story during the 2000 presidential election on U.S. President George W. Bush's military service to the doctoring of photos from Israeli bombings of Lebanon in the 2006 attack against Hezbollah when Reuters was found to have manipulated a picture of the attacks.

Kaye D. Sweetser Trammell

See also New Media Technologies

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Blumler, Jay G. (1924–)

Jay Blumler was an influential figure in the development of research and theory in political communication. He was born in New York and graduated from Antioch College before military service in Europe at the end of World War II. He began his career teaching political theory at Ruskin College Oxford, gaining a D.Phil. from Oxford University. He came to specialize in political communication only after appointment to the Granada Fellowship (Centre for Television Research) at the University of Leeds in 1963, later holding a personal chair in Broadcasting Policy. For a number of years he held a joint appointment in the College of Journalism, University of Maryland. His work on the influence of television in British elections pioneered the application of the "uses and gratifications" approach, and he directed a series of empirical inquiries within this framework during the 1960s and 1970s. He played a key role in the United Kingdom in the development of communication studies and subsequently in the growth of collaborative communication research in Europe, initially by way of a large-scale cross-national study of the role of television in the first elections to the European Parliament. The University of Leeds became the unlikely hub of an international network of communication scholars that has left its mark on the larger international community

of scholars. His influence bridged linguistic and national divisions in Europe as well as the Atlantic. He was the driving force behind the launching of the *European Journal of Communication* in 1986 and its first editor. He also served as president of the International Communication Association (ICA).

Although a meticulous scholar, Jay Blumler was driven by normative impulses, seeking to engage research in support of democracy and of what he conceived of as the public interest in communication, with particular reference to the public service obligations of broadcasting in the area of news and current affairs, political coverage, and children's programming. A later preoccupation, evidenced in the *Crisis of Public Communication,* was with the widely perceived threat to the integrity of public communication stemming from forces of liberalization and commercialization. In his time, his work as a communication scientist and as a public intellectual came into conflict both from the Marxist left and the libertarian right.

Blumler's legacy is to be found partly in the institutional development of the field of communication in Europe (although he remained an American citizen), partly in giving intellectual support to the public communicative role of television but mostly by way of his many contributions to communication theory and research. The latter included: studies of election campaigns and of news coverage of politics, both by way of surveys and participant observation, often based on cross-national inquiries; significant contributions to the theory of uses and gratifications research and the general links between media systems and political systems; clearly formulated statements of principle for the role of public communication.

Denis McQuail

See also European Parliamentary Elections; *Television in Politics*

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Bork, Robert

See Supreme Court and the Media

Bormann, Ernest G. (1926–)

Ernest G. Bormann is best known as the originator of symbolic convergence theory (SCT) and its attendant method, fantasy theme analysis, which both explore how the sharing of narratives or "fantasies" can create and sustain group consciousness. For Bormann, these communal narratives encouraged group cohesion and fostered the development of a shared social reality among group members. While his initial conception of symbolic convergence stemmed from his research of small group communication, he argued that group consciousness can occur at any level of communication, from small group to public to mass media. Thus, he identified symbolic convergence as a general theory of communication.

Bormann received his bachelor's degree from the University of South Dakota in 1949, graduating magna cum laude. By 1953, he had received both his master's and doctorate from the University of Iowa. For the next 6 years, he taught briefly at the University of South Dakota, Eastern Illinois University, and Florida State University. He began his long and distinguished career at the University of Minnesota in 1959, where he is currently Professor Emeritus in the Department of Speech Communication.

Bormann served as the president of the Central States Communication Association as well as the director of Graduate Studies at the University of Minnesota. In addition, he has served as an associate editor for the *Central States Speech Journal, Communication Monographs* and the *Quarterly Journal of Speech.* He has received several awards, including those honoring him for outstanding teaching, scholarship, service, and mentoring.

Throughout his extensive career, Bormann has authored numerous scholarly articles, including several that sought to clarify and even defend symbolic convergence theory since its inception in 1972. In a 1994 publication, he refuted the theory's most persistent criticisms, namely that it borrows and needlessly relabels concepts from other theories and that its application is limited to small group communication. In 2001,

along with John F. Cragan and Donald C. Shields, he published a retrospective look at the last three decades of symbolic convergence research and development while speculating on its future applications.

Bormann has successfully applied symbolic convergence theory and fantasy theme analysis to a variety of topics and issues such as inaugurals, campaigns, and even political cartoons. In a case study of the Cold War paradigm, for example, he joined Cragan and Shields to identify three stages in the life cycle of a rhetorical vision. In addition, he has published several books addressing a range of topics, from interpersonal and small group communication to speech communication. *The Force of Fantasy,* for example, is an extended case study of America's attempts to restore the American Dream from the 17th to 19th centuries.

Arin Rose Dickerson

See also Fantasy Theme Analysis; Symbolic Convergence Theory

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Bouteflika, Abdelaziz (1937–)

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, born in 1937 in Morocco, has been president of Algeria since 1999. He lived and studied in Morocco until he joined the National Liberation Army (ALN), which later became the National Liberation Front (FLN), the ruling party in Algeria from independence until today. At the age of 25, in 1962, he was minister for youth and sport in the government led by Ahmed Ben Bella. The next year, he was appointed minister for foreign affairs and remained in this position until the death of President Houari Boumedienne in 1978. In 1989, he returned to Algeria after 6 years abroad, and he became a member of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front (FLN).

The Algerian army placed him in the presidency in 1999 in a fraudulent and much contested election but claimed neutrality in his 2004 landslide reelection victory for another 5-year mandate. During both elections, television and radio, both government-owned, broadcasted special election programs in which all presidential candidates had the chance to present their electoral programs (required under article 10 of the 1990 press law), but the stations relayed enormous coverage in favor of Bouteflika's campaigns. The rival political parties and civil society groups, with no access to state media, have turned to foreign satellite stations to speak to their citizens..

According to Reporters sans frontières, much of the privately owned press criticized the fraudulence of the 2004 elections and attacked the president for his abuse of state institutions, public money, and media to win the elections. Bouteflika responded by saying the journalists were harming the country the same way terrorists were and vowed to fight what he called "press mercenaries." With regard to television and radio, Bouteflika made it clear that the state would keep its monopoly. In early April 2005, Bouteflika said, "I don't want to put these weapons of mass destruction in irresponsible hands."

During the first year of his second mandate, President Bouteflika held a referendum on his "National Reconciliation Plan," a plan that would put an end to the 1990s Algerian Civil War from a political and judicial point of view. The civil war was an armed conflict between the Algerian government and various Islamist rebel groups which began in 1991 and ended in 1998. The surprising first round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the December 1991 elections prompted the Algerian army to intervene and began a crackdown on the FIS that spurred FIS supporters to begin attacking government targets. The struggle escalated into an insurgency, which witnessed intense fighting from 1992 to 1998 and resulted in over 100,000 deaths. According to Reporters Without Borders, many journalists were targets of Islamist militia, and about 70 were killed during the insurgency. The government gained the upper hand by the late 1990s, and FIS's armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000.

Bouteflika's plan for reconciliation and his role in ending the civil war have certainly helped in securing a much more stable environment for journalists.

Bouziane Zaid

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Bowling Alone

Bowling Alone is a book written by Harvard sociologist Robert Putnam. In this book, Putnam talks about the decline in civic life in America. He specifically talks about the erosion in relationships, networks, and interactions, a concept which he refers to as social capital, which is somewhat similar to financial or human capital. Social capital allows greater productivity, promotes volunteerism, and instills concern about the society as a whole. Putnam points to evidence of decline in participation in a variety of civic arenas—politics, churches, labor unions, parent-teacher organizations, and fraternal organizations. The title of the book derives from Putnam's observation that civil society is breaking down as Americans are becoming more disconnected from their families, neighbors, and communities. Thus the organizations that sustain democracy are fast disappearing. Putnam uses the bowling metaphor to highlight the difference between the past and the present—there was a time when thousands of people belonged to bowling leagues, but today, they are more likely to bowl alone.

In *Bowling Alone* Putnam identifies two kinds of social capital—bridging and bonding social capital. The former, he says, refers to the value assigned to social networks between homogeneous groups of people and the latter to social networks between socially heterogeneous groups. Typical examples could be that criminal gangs create bonding social capital, while choirs and bowling clubs create bridging social capital. Putnam argues that bridging social capital in particular is more beneficial for societies, governments, individuals, and communities.

Despite suggesting the two kinds of social capital, Putnam's *Bowling Alone* is not a treatise on social capital. In this book, Putnam first raises his concern about the civic decline and then goes on to provide possible explanations for why this kind of phenomenon is taking place. He identifies television, both parents working, and the growth of suburbs leading to longer commutes as a few probable culprits leading to this decline in civic life.

Putnam's thesis, however, has been heavily criticized in recent years. One criticism that has particularly been noted is that by focusing on formal membership in organizations such as the League of Women Voters, the Boy Scouts, and the Elks, Putnam has overlooked other, newer forms of civic engagement which have compensated for the fall in membership in these particular organizations. Critics suggest that declining church attendance may have actually been offset by increased participation in small support groups and that shrinking membership in the League of Women Voters and the Shriners may have been replaced by increase in membership in other forums such as the Sierra Club or the American Association of Retired Persons. Bowling leagues might be shrinking, but perhaps other sports clubs are gaining in popularity. So the harshest criticism is that Putnam mistook change for decline, failing to recognize that the vessels through which Americans channel their civic engagement may have changed, but the overall level of engagement remains stable. However, despite these criticisms, *Bowling Alone* continues to be a popular book on civic participation

Sumana Chattopadhyay

See also Political Engagement

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Brady, James

See Press Secretary, White House

Brandt, Willy (1913–1992)

Willy Brandt was German chancellor from 1969 to 1974. In the course of his political career he also was the mayor of West Berlin from 1957 to 1966, secretary of state from 1966 to 1969, and chairman of the Social Democratic Party from 1964 to 1987. In 1971 he was honored with the Nobel Peace Prize. Due to his achievements in the field of foreign politics, he was especially known as the "peace chancellor."

When Brandt first ran for chancellor in 1961, he was the first candidate supported by intellectuals such as authors, composers, and artists. Furthermore, Brandt's team organized a tour across the whole republic in a white Mercedes convertible so that the people could meet the candidate in person. "Smiling Willy" also challenged his competitor Konrad Adenauer to a U.S.-style television debate, but the Christian Democrat refused. These campaign strategies, in some respects similar to the American style of campaigning, as well as the fact that Brandt's consultants visited the United States when planning his campaign, made the media, along with large parts of the social science community, quickly characterize this as the first American-style political campaign in Germany. Regardless of whether the 1961 Brandt campaign can truly be called "New politics" and the Social Democrats really advised Brandt to copy the style of John F. Kennedy or whether the comparison merely resulted from the fact that Brandt was youthful and telegenic in contrast to the incumbent chancellor Adenauer, it was doubtless this campaign that initiated the myth of the "German Kennedy."

During this electoral campaign as well as in the following ones the Christian Democrats started unprecedented negative campaigning against Brandt and tried to present him as a traitor to his fatherland, a Casanova, a communist, and an illegitimate child.

During his chancellorship, Brandt was especially successful in creating and denoting catchwords such as the emotional term *peace policy* for the more neutral *foreign policy.* In addition to using these catchwords on the rhetorical level, Brandt was filling them with life too: When he fell to his knees at the Warsaw monument, it was an unforgettable moment of symbolic politics that solidified his reputation as the "peace chancellor" to the world.

Because Brandt himself worked as a journalist before his political career and knew the rules of this profession well, his relationship to the national and especially the foreign media—the latter mostly saw him as "The good German"—can be regarded as a good one most of the time. The only exception was the powerful German media empire Springer which supported Brandt at the beginning of his career but later tried to heavily boycott his policy regarding the Communist countries for years.

Mona Krewel

See also Americanization; Kennedy, John F.

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Brazil, Media and the Political System

Brazil is a federation with 26 states and one federal district. The executive government is headed by the president, who is elected by popular vote every 4 years and can be reelected once. At the state and local level, the governor, the mayor, and the local representatives are elected by popular vote every 4 years along with the chamber of deputies. In addition, the senators are elected by popular vote every 8 years. In the past, Election Day was always considered a holiday. The first round would be held on October 3, and the runoff, when necessary, would be held on November 15. As of 1998, first-round elections are held on the first Sunday of October, and the runoff is held on the last Sunday of October. Voting in Brazil is

considered a right and is also mandatory. Every Brazilian between the ages of 18 and 70 should be registered to vote. Illiterates and 16- and 17-year-olds are also eligible to vote.

Brazil has a multiparty system whose origins date from 1945 when parties and elections were permitted. At that time, groups associated with the Vargas government since 1930 from the urban and rural areas of the country formed the Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro—PTB) and Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático—PSD), respectively. The other groups that opposed the Vargas government founded the National Democratic Union (Uniao Democratica Nacional—UDN). In October 1965, President Castelo Branco (1964–1967) announced the end of the multiparty system and created a two-party system. Having a multiparty system did not contribute to a strong and loyal allegiance to the president, therefore, the National Renewal Alliance (Alianca Renovadora Nacional—Arena) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democratico Brasileiro—MDB) were formed. However, the two-party system was abolished in December of 1979 as a result of voting trends in previous elections. Since then, a multiparty system exists in Brazil with 29 active parties.

The media, and in particular television, have a great influence on public opinion. The media have played a decisive role in politics during the last few years. Particularly, the media played an influential and critical role in the impeachment of the president Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992. Special issues of magazines and newspapers were created to disseminate information to the population. In 2005, a series of scandals and a network of corruption emerged in the government of President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, and the media's investigative character resurfaced.

Political advertising, especially televised political advertising, has undergone a great deal of change over the years. These changes are attributed, in part, to the various electoral codes established over the years and to the different political regimes that Brazil endured. For example, between 1945 and 1964, Brazil experienced almost two decades of democratic governments. As a consequence, the access to political advertising by the candidates became less strict. In addition to the introduction of the "single ballot" where the names of the candidates would be printed in a single ballot instead of candidates printing their own ballots, the 1950 electoral code introduced a chapter about political advertising. It guaranteed that the prices charged for airtime were the same for all candidates. Radio stations were required to broadcast political advertising 2 hours daily during the 90 days before the election.

In 1962, a new law established that candidates should have free airtime. As a consequence, radio and television were required to broadcast 2 hours daily of political advertising during the 60 days before the election. Moreover, the new law established that candidates could continue campaigning until 8 days before Election Day. Although the access to political advertising seemed to be following a more liberal path, the military coup of 1964 stopped the democratic process, and Brazil returned to the control of a military dictatorship. As a result, the two-party system was created, and all forms of political expression were banished to suit the interests of the military government. In 1976, envisioning a severe control over the content of political advertising, the Lei Falcao (Falcao Law) established strict regulations regarding the broadcasting of political advertising. On radio, candidates were allowed to broadcast only their names, party, identifying ballot numbers, and brief curriculum vitae. On television, candidates could broadcast their close-up photograph and the place and time of their political rallies.

In 1985, the democratic regime returned with the movement called Diretas Ja ("Direct vote" movement), and the strict rules regarding political advertising were abolished. Brazil adopted the Horario Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral—HGPE (Free Electoral Political Advertising Time) model. This model is mandatory, and all television and radio stations must broadcast ads 2 hours per day at the same time and during fixed time slots. This model also establishes that candidates and political parties have free access to broadcast their political advertisements 45 days preceding Election Day. Since the adoption of the HGPE, airtime on radio and television cannot be purchased. Candidates and parties, conversely, can buy space in newspapers. The amount of airtime that the candidates and parties receive depends upon the number of seats that these parties have in the Chamber of Deputies. Usually, parties such as PMDB, PT, and PSDB receive more airtime than other parties. Therefore, electing many deputies will help that specific party (and coalition) to receive more airtime on television and on radio. The content of the HGPE can be categorized as follow: (a) programs that discuss the candidate's positions on

issues; (b) programs that present what the candidate has done for the country, state, or city; (c) programs that accentuate the good qualities of the candidate; (d) programs that denigrate the image of the opponents; and (e) programs that respond to an attack made by another candidate. Additionally, since 1996 the use of commercials or spots has become a powerful tool in the Brazilian political scenario.

Juliana de Brum Fernandes

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Broder, David (1929–)

David Salzer Broder is a well-known journalist for *The Washington Post,* a news organization he joined in 1966. He was born and raised in Chicago Heights, Illinois, and attended the University of Chicago, where he received both a bachelor's degree and a master's degree in political science. After serving 2 years in the U.S. Army, he began his journalism career with the *Bloomington Pantograph.* From those modest beginnings, Broder became a staple for the coverage of national politics, writing a syndicated column (carried in more than 300 newspapers) read avidly by Americans from all walks of life. Prior to 1966, he covered national politics for *The New York Times* (1965–1966), *The Washington Star* (1960–1965), and *Congressional Quarterly* (1955–1960). He has written several popular books, including *Democracy Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the Power of Money, Behind the Front Page,* and *The System: The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point.* In addition to print journalism, Broder has also made his mark on television, becoming a common fixture on NBC's weekly Sunday news show *Meet the Press,* as well as CNN's *Inside Politics.* He is also an academician. In 2000, he became a tenured, salaried full professor at the University of Maryland's Philip Merrill College of Journalism, teaching a course on politics and the press; interestingly, the class meets at the offices of *The Washington Post.* Broder has won numerous awards, including the White Burkett Miller Presidential Award in 1989, and in 1990 he won two honors: The National Press Foundation awarded him with the esteemed Fourth Estate Award, and Colby College awarded him with the Elijah Parrish Lovejoy Award. He was also elected to Sigma Delta Chi's Hall of Fame. During the remainder of the 1990s, the honors continued. In 1993, the National Press Foundation awarded him for a second time, honoring him with the Distinguished Contributions to Journalism Award. In 1997 Broder won the prestigious William Allen White Foundation's award for distinguished achievement in journalism and received the National Society of Newspaper Columnists Lifetime Achievement Award. Moreover, in 1997, the *National Journal* counted him as among the 25 most influential Washington journalists; also, the *Washingtonian* magazine ranked him as one of Washington, D.C.'s top journalists (an honor he has won every year since). Broder's highest honor came in 1973, when he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for distinguished commentary.

In addition to his general political accomplishments in journalism, Broder can be credited as a leader in suggesting that the news media have an obligation to "police" the political advertising of candidates. His call for the importance of this watchdog function for journalists in the late 1980s led to the increased frequency of "ad watches," in which journalists scrutinize and evaluate the claims in candidates' political advertising. One primary reason for Broder's popularity centers on his integrity and his sense of fairness regarding politics. In a *Washingtonian* magazine poll, Broder was highly

regarded by his peers and members of Congress from both sides of the aisle. In 1990, the same magazine surveyed the op-ed editors othe nation's 200 largest newspapers, once again finding that Broder was considered a class act by his peers, being labeled as "Best Reporter," "Hardest Working" and "Least Ideological" among 123 columnists.

Cary Stacy Smith and Li-Ching Hung

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Buchanan, Patrick (1938–)

Patrick Joseph Buchanan is an author and columnist, former television commentator and presidential advisor, and three-time unsuccessful presidential candidate.

Born in Washington, D.C., he graduated from Georgetown University and received a master's in journalism from Columbia University in 1962. Upon graduation he began writing for the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat.*

In 1966, Buchanan began working for Richard Nixon as the first full-time staffer in preparation for the 1968 presidential election. Following Nixon's election, Buchanan worked as a White House advisor and speechwriter for Nixon and Vice President Spiro Agnew. After Nixon's resignation in 1974, Buchanan briefly continued his duties under President Gerald Ford until leaving later that year.

After leaving the White House, Buchanan became a syndicated political columnist and a commentator on a radio program and television shows *The McLaughlin Group* and *Crossfire.* In 1985, Buchanan returned to the White House as communications director for Reagan. He remained there until 1987, at which point he returned to *Crossfire.* He would leave *Crossfire* two more times to run for president but returned between elections until his final departure in1999.

Buchanan challenged incumbent President George H. W. Bush for the 1992 Republican nomination for president. Buchanan enjoyed early success by winning the New Hampshire primary before losing the nomination. Buchanan later supported Bush and delivered his famous "culture war" speech at the Republican National Convention.

In 1996, Buchanan again ran for the Republican nomination for president. Buchanan won New Hampshire before ultimately being defeated by Senator Bob Dole. During the campaign he gained the nickname "Pitchfork Pat" because of his slogan, "the peasants are coming with pitchforks." He also ran on his opposition to NAFTA. He threatened to run as the U.S. Taxpayer's Party candidate if Dole chose a pro-choice running mate. After Dole's selection of Jack Kemp, Buchanan offered his endorsement.

In 2000, Buchanan sought the Reform Party nomination for president against Iowa physicist John Hagelin. Although Buchanan easily won the primaries, Hagelin's supporters challenged the results. Some were also concerned about Buchanan's strong comments against abortion and homosexuality, as well as accusations of racism and anti-Semitism. The two sides held competing and simultaneous national conventions in the same convention center. Ultimately, the courts ruled Buchanan's nomination was valid, which placed his name on the ballot and granted him the $12.6 million in matching federal funds.

In his nomination address, Buchanan advocated that the United States leave the United Nations, abolish the IRS, Department of Education, capital gains and inheritance taxes, and affirmative action. He took fourth in the national election, garnering just 0.4% of the votes.

In 2004, Buchanan announced he was once again a Republican and endorsed the reelection of President George W. Bush. Buchanan continues to write and is a frequent guest on television news shows. He has written six books, including the *New York Times* best-seller *A Republic Not an Empire.*

Brian T. Kaylor

See also Commentary, Political; Republican Party

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Buckley v. Valeo

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its 1974 amendments faced a constitutional challenge in *Buckley v. Valeo* (1976). The resulting decision of the U.S. Supreme Court has set the parameters of constitutionally permissible regulation of political campaigns for over 30 years. Political campaigns depend on the mass media and require the spending of money. The relationship between political communication in the modern age and the raising and spending of money thus assumes constitutional dimensions:

> [V]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio and mass media for news and other information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech. (*Buckley,* 1976, p. 19)

The Supreme Court in *Buckley* considered that two aspects of First Amendment freedom were potentially impaired by FECA. First, limits on campaign *expenditures* by candidates and others were held to "heavily burden core First Amendment expressions" because they represented "substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech" (*Buckley,* p. 19). Accordingly, limits on campaign expenditures were struck down as unconstitutional because they were direct limits on political speech.

Second, the *Buckley* court upheld restrictions on the size of campaign *contributions.* The court considered that making a contribution of money to a candidate, like joining a political party, served to affiliate a person with a candidate and to enable like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals. This right of free association is a "basic constitutional freedom" that is "closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society." In view of the fundamental nature of the right to associate, governmental "action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny" (*Buckley,* p. 25).

However, the limits on *contributions* were upheld because the restraints on political speech were "marginal" in that the contributor remained free to spend independently, associate with candidates in other ways, and "the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor," *viz.* the candidate (p. 21). The Supreme Court concluded that a compelling governmental interest in the prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption from large contributions justified these less serious impairments of First Amendment activity.

The *Buckley* decision substantially altered the campaign finance landscape envisaged by Congress. Major features in FECA 1974 were declared unconstitutional: limits on candidate spending, limits on independent spending, and limits on expenditures of candidates' personal funds. While one goal of the legislation had been to limit the cost of election campaigns, the *Buckley* court found this to be impermissible: "The First Amendment denies government the power to determine that spending to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise" (p. 57). The court did uphold expenditure limitations in the context of the public funding of presidential election campaigns because candidates could voluntarily choose to limit their expenditures in return for public funds.

FECA purported to broadly regulate all spending "in connection with," or "for the purpose of influencing" a federal election, or "relative to" a federal candidate. It was argued that these phrases were so vague and overly broad that they provided an unconstitutional lack of notice to persons potentially affected by the FECA. In order to avoid declaring these provisions unconstitutional, *Buckley* held that "explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat" are required. The court listed certain explicit advocacy terms as satisfying the strict "express advocacy" test: "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against," "defeat," "reject" (p. 44, note 52). The court considered that such precision was required to avoid "chilling" speech involving public discussion of political issues:

> [T]he distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on various public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest. (p. 42)

The result of the *Buckley* decision was to free "issue advocacy" advertisements from regulation as either contributions or expenditures except for the reporting requirements: "So long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that, in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his views" (*Buckley,* p. 45). In 1976, Congress amended the statute to conform to the *Buckley* court's interpretation. Further statutory amendments changing this rule were contained in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and were the subject of Supreme Court decisions in *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission* and *Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc*.

Another consequence of *Buckley* in combination with other aspects of federal law was the use of soft money by political parties to run television ads which, although not expressly advocating election or defeat of candidates, served the purpose. Soft money is money contributed (usually to political parties) which is not subject to the hard limits of the FECA, such as the limits on amounts of contributions and prohibitions of contributions by corporations or labor unions. By the 1996 election, parties were spending more soft money than hard money, and parties spent more running issue ads for their presidential candidates funded by soft money than the entire amount permitted by the public funding expenditure limits for presidential campaigns. Such contributions were legal because the contributions were raised under more permissive state laws and then routed by state parties through the national party committees. Such evasion of FECA limits led to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.

Clifford A. Jones

See also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act; Campaign Finance; Federal Election Campaign Act; *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*

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Bulgaria, Democratization

The years after the 1989 collapse of the ruling communist government in Bulgaria, along with the profound political changes throughout Eastern European countries, resulted in a fundamental restructuring of the society. Prior to that, an atmosphere encouraging social obedience in line with Party-State propaganda priorities reigned in the country. Freedom of expression was totally controlled. The idea of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroyka* (restructuring) launched by Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 opened the doors for pluralistic discussion clubs in Bulgaria. The first dissident associations, however small, found support among the public. Communist Party leaders, fearing the threat of social unrest, tried to reform the party along Soviet *perestroika* lines. The general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party (*BCP*) and chairman of the State Council, Todor Zhivkov, was removed from power in a November 10, 1989, party coup.

Political activity among the population surged dramatically, and its legality was no longer questioned. Political rallies and demonstrations became the events of the day. Encouraged by the landslide of totalitarian collapse throughout Central and Eastern Europe, on December 7, 1989, the opposition set up *The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF);* a coalition of 16 pro-democratic parties and organizations. One major political achievement of the *UDF* was the abolishment of Article I of the Constitution, which legitimized the leading role of the Communist Party in societal and state affairs. The consensus achieved by political forces in the round-table discussions (1990) for convocation of a Grand National Assembly marked the start of legalization of the democratic processes in Bulgaria. The Grand National Assembly adopted a new constitution on July 12, 1991. It was the first democratic constitution in the former Eastern Bloc countries. It proclaimed that Bulgaria would be governed by the rule of law and set up the fundamental principles of

a civil society. Zhelyu Zhelev, the leader of the *UDF* and a longtime dissident, was elected president of the National Assembly on August 1, 1991.

Under the terms of the new constitution, Bulgaria is a parliamentary Republic. The National Assembly is composed of 240 deputies elected for a term of 4 years. The president, as the head of state of the Republic of Bulgaria, is elected with majority vote for a term of 5 years.

The long years of one-party dominance were replaced by an ever-growing host of new political parties, unions, and organizations, which constantly split, regrouped, and entered into coalitions, especially on the eve of forthcoming elections. However, the model of democracy that was forming in the country delegated the difficult tasks of transition to the political elite and eliminated the broad participation of the people in the process of transformation.

The period of transformation to democracy and a market economy posed significant social challenges to the population in Bulgaria. The transition was slowed down by delayed legislation, aggressive political behavior, and underdeveloped markets. All of this caused a rapid impoverishment, a high rate of unemployment, and a loss of established social benefits such as free health care and free education. Thus, the country entered the 21st century under the Currency Board. The encouraging sign is that the political processes and changes in the country are carried out peacefully and in spite of significant differences between the political forces, their reasonable behavior has so far not allowed any disastrous display of violence.

Currently, the list of the main political organizations include the left-wing *Bulgarian Socialist Party* (direct successor of the Bulgarian Communist Party)*, The Union of Democratic Forces* (nowadays fragmented into small right-wing formations), *The National Movement Simeon the Second* (political centrist formation of the former Bulgarian Tsar), *The Movement for Rights and Freedoms* (party of the ethnic Turks with a traditional role as a balancing factor in the political area), and *Attack* (party with a markedly nationalistic character, challenging the role of the MRF in power).

The past period of over 15 years witnessed four presidential elections (in 1992, 1996, 2001, and 2006), six parliamentary elections (in 1990, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2001, and 2005), four local elections (in 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2003), and the appointment of ten governments. An encouraging sign is that the two last of these successfully finished their mandate.

The comparative stability in the executive power during the last 8 years had spread relief in terms of the political and economic development of the country. Nevertheless, the election apathy started to displace the initial political euphoria in the society. After the elective boom triggered by the political changes, launched in 1989, the relative share of people who refused to vote gradually but unswervingly began to increase, reaching, within a decade, half the voting public at the time of the local elections of 1999. Since that time all the elections (parliamentary, presidential, and local) have become a protest vote of the Bulgarians against the political class. Apparently, Bulgarian voters were not influenced by any mass media or political and sociological propaganda, especially when dished out along negative lines.

January 10, 1992, will remain important in the history of Bulgarian political life as a date marking the first presidential debate televised "live." The opponents were Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, the candidate of the UDF, and Prof. Velko Vulkanov, an independent candidate backed by the BSP. In the process of transformation to democracy the foundations of televised political advertisement were laid down. Thus, with debates and ads, television has great possibilities for molding the public opinion, especially in view of the fact that Bulgarians maintain greatest confidence in public television as compared to the other mass media.

Bulgaria still experiences the difficulties of the transition to a democratic society and a market economy. The country has achieved considerable progress toward democratization and economic growth, but many political difficulties remain. The mass media often operate as the fourth estate, strongly influencing the political, economic, social, and cultural leanings of the public.

Since the turn of the century Bulgaria has begun to improve its legislative, economic and social policies. It joined NATO in 2004 and became a member of the European Union on January 1, 2007.

Lilia Raycheva

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BURKE, KENNETH

See DRAMATISTIC APPROACHES TO POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

BUSH, GEORGE H. W. (1924–)

George Herbert Walker Bush was elected 41st president of the United States (serving from 1989 to 1993) after a highly decorated career in public service. He enlisted in the Navy on his 18th birthday as a naval aviator serving in World War II. Following his father's footsteps, he later went on to run for the Senate in 1964 and lost. He won a subsequent election to Congress, representing Texas's 7th district but lost a U.S. Senate election to Lloyd Bentsen in 1970. He became a United Nations Ambassador, chairman of the Republican National Committee, and worked as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director under the Ford administration. He also taught as an adjunct professor at Rice University.

Bush ran against Ronald Reagan for the Republican primary in 1980, but after his famous campaign-trail criticisms of Reagan's "voodoo economics" and other noteworthy salvos, he was thought by the Republican Party to be too moderate. Reagan came out on top as the party nominee for president, but Bush was selected as the vice president, a position he held during both Reagan presidential terms (1981 to 1989).

When Bush again sought the White House in the 1988 election he made a number of speeches with memorable and catchy phrases, including "Weakness and ambivalence lead to war," "They talk, we deliver! They promise, we perform," and "Read my lips, NO NEW TAXES." At the Republican National Convention he made his most famous speech (Thousand-Points-of-Light): "For we're a nation of community; of thousands and tens of thousands of ethnic, religious, social, business, labor union, neighborhood, regional, and other organizations, all of them varied, voluntary and unique. This is America: the Knights of Columbus, the Grange, Hadassah, the Disabled American Veterans, the Order of Ahepa, the Business and Professional Women of America, the union hall, the Bible study group, LULAC, Holy Name—a brilliant diversity spread like stars, like a thousand points of light in a broad and peaceful sky."

Bush's opponent in the 1988 election was former Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis. This campaign season was noted for its high density of negative campaign ads. Bush defeated Dukakis by both the popular vote and the electoral college totals. At his inaugural address he proclaimed, "I come before you and assume the presidency at a moment rich with promise. We live in a peaceful, prosperous time, but we can make it better. For a new breeze is blowing, and a world refreshed by freedom seems reborn; for in man's heart, if not in fact, the day of the dictator is over. The totalitarian era is passing, its old ideas blown away like leaves from an ancient, lifeless tree. A new breeze is blowing, and a nation refreshed by freedom stands ready to push on. There is new ground to be broken, and new action to be taken."

Leading up to the Gulf War, President Bush said in 1990, "Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective . . . a new world order can emerge—a new era!" It is interesting to note that his secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, warned against invading Iraq in the early 1990s, only later to become a key architect of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Bush was often ridiculed by the media for some of his awkward moments, gaffes, and mishaps. He had an aversion to broccoli, famously noting "I am the president of the United States, and I am not going to eat any more broccoli." In a separate incident, at a state dinner, he vomited on the lap of the Japanese prime minister. This caused a wave of late night television jokes and ridicule in the international community, even coining new terms such as *Bushu-suru* which literally means to "do the Bush thing."

In addition to the successful Gulf War effort, Bush's presidency will be remembered for presiding over the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of communist control in much of Eastern Europe. Despite Bush's foreign policy successes, however, the declining state of the national economy gave ammunition to his opponent in 1992. Bill Clinton's extremely negative campaign advertising scored many successful hits against Bush, and Clinton also performed well in the presidential debates. Although Bush lost the 1992 election, he left office with a 56% approval rating. He

is the father of the 43rd president of the United States, George W. Bush.

Brandon Jay Hersh

See also Bush, George W.; Bush–Rather Confrontation

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Bush, George W. (1946–)

The 43rd president of the United States (2001–2009) and son of the 41st president, George H. W. Bush, George Walker Bush was an unsuccessful candidate for the House of Representatives in 1978, and instead of running again he worked as an oil entrepreneur. In 1989 he became a shareholder of the Texas Rangers baseball team and worked with the team's media relations, which secured him both exposure and media attention that later garnered public and political support. He was inspired by Rev. Billy Graham and became a self-proclaimed "born-again Christian" after giving up alcohol in 1986. He and his family moved to Washington, D.C., in 1988 to work on his father's presidential campaign. George W. Bush networked to ensure an evangelical base in the primaries, which was considered key to the Republican presidential nomination. In 1994, his nickname, Dubya, became a household name in Texas, where Bush campaigned against and defeated the highly popular Governor Ann Richards. Richards was considered an easy front-runner in the campaign given "W's" lack of polished political experience. With the help of Karen Hughes, John Albaugh, and Karl Rove, Bush successfully campaigned against Governor Richards's record on law enforcement, education, tort reform, and questionable political appointments. The Bush campaign was accused of using brutal and often-controversial attack ads to win the election with a margin of 52% to Richards's 48%. Quickly becoming one of the nation's most popular governors, alongside his brother Jeb Bush in Florida, he was reelected in 1998 with 69% of the vote.

As governor, Bush focused on reforming the criminal justice system, set higher standards for education, and solidified his reputation as both a fiscal and social conservative. He was criticized for his often foggy separation of church and state. In 2000 he declared June 10th Jesus Day in Texas, where he urged Texans to "answer the call and serve those in need."

Bush was considered an early favorite for the Republican presidential nomination in 2000. On a televised interview in Iowa, all primary candidates were asked, "What political philosopher or thinker do you identify most with and why?" Bush responded, "Christ, because he changed my heart." He labeled himself a "compassionate conservative" and out-raised John McCain and others in campaign funds. Upon his acceptance of the Republican nomination, Bush promised to "restore honor and dignity to the White House." He chose former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney as his running mate.

In a bitterly contested campaign against the sitting vice president, Al Gore, Bush rallied the support of much of the religious right. On election night, November 7, 2000, Bush carried key swing states such as Missouri and Ohio, as well as Gore's home state, Tennessee. Initially some networks called Florida for Gore but then retracted that claim and popularized the phrase "too close to call." Florida law required multiple hand recounts, and the case *Bush v. Gore* took 2 months to get to the Supreme Court, where the recounts were stopped and Florida was called in favor of Bush, albeit narrowly. Bush became the first president since Benjamin Harrison (1888) to win the Electoral College but lose the popular vote (by about a half million votes).

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, signified a turning point in Bush's presidency. On September 14, Bush made one of his most famous speeches and rallied support from a wounded nation, saying, "I can hear you. The rest of the world hears you. And the people who knocked these buildings down will hear us all soon!" He famously declared a War on Terror and subsequently made the decision to invade Afghanistan and later Iraq to depose the dictatorial president Saddam Hussein.

Bush's reelection campaign in 2004 was characterized by the repeated use of an F. D. R. quote that noted the danger involved with "changing horses midstream." He also repeatedly noted that "the world changed on

9/11," and that his opponent, Massachusetts Senator John Kerry, did not understand the gravity or nature of the threat that terrorist groups caused. In a shockingly more controversial campaign than most were used to, the American public was subjected to a smattering of attack ads from all sides. John Kerry was defeated at the polls by both the popular vote and the Electoral College.

"I have earned political capital . . . and I intend to use it." Bush furthered his agenda with increased war spending, tax cuts, and a rallying of the Christian conservative base against social liberalism. Bush's approval ratings began to plummet after a myriad of scandals captured media attention: a slow and incomplete response to hurricane Katrina; the Jack Abramoff scandal; increasing violence and uncertainty in Iraq; intelligence leaks; an alleged Republican culture of corruption; and the unfulfilled vow to catch Osama bin Laden.

Despite his plummeting poll numbers, Bush insisted that "America is headed in the right direction." He famously dubbed himself "the Decider," amid media scrutiny of his War in Iraq and War on Terror.

Brandon Jay Hersh

See also Bush, George H. W.; Bush, Laura; Iraq War, Media Coverage of

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Bush, Laura (1946–)

Laura Welch Bush, First Lady of the United States from 2001 to 2009, has been one of the most well-liked first ladies in recent history. She has used her popularity on the campaign trail, as well as to promote causes ranging from education and literacy to women's health.

Laura Welch was working as a school librarian when she met George W. Bush in 1977; the two married a few months later. In speeches, Bush often tells audiences that she agreed to marry her future husband only after he promised that she would never have to give a political speech. He broke that promise just a few months after their wedding when he ran for his first political office, and she has been giving speeches ever since. Laura Bush has become one of the most sought-after campaign speakers. During her husband's presidential campaigns of 2000 and 2004, Bush toured the country, often speaking to women's groups and smaller community gatherings. She has also stumped on behalf of various Republican candidates and spoken at many RNC fundraisers, often drawing "standing room only" crowds.

Despite her popularity, Bush has, for the most part, been successful in staying out of the media spotlight focused on first ladies. Her media coverage has been primarily positive, centering on her advocacy work. However, after September 11th, Bush was cast in the role of the nation's "comforter-in-chief." She did numerous interviews, advising families and teachers on how to talk to children about the terrorist attacks. She also met with survivors, attended memorial services, and visited classrooms around the country. Bush played a similar role in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, touring the devastated areas and meeting with victims.

For most of her tenure, Bush has worked quietly in the background, offering support to a number of causes and garnering limited media attention. Her earliest White House initiatives, on literacy and education, drew upon her background as a librarian and elementary school teacher. During her first year in office, she launched the National Book Festival and hosted a summit on Early Childhood Development. She has also supported various literacy and teacher recruitment programs, as well as organizations aiding underprivileged youth. In later years, Bush expanded her efforts beyond the United States, hosting a conference on Global Literacy and becoming an Honorary Ambassador for the United Nation's Literacy Decade. She has called for equal access to education for girls and women around the world, visiting programs in Africa, the Middle East, and Southern Asia that promote education and literacy.

Bush has also become an advocate for women's health programs both at home and abroad. She supports programs that educate American women about the risks of heart disease and breast cancer. Abroad,

she has toured women's health clinics and promoted her husband's AIDS Relief plan.

Lisa M. Burns

See also Bush, George H. W.; First Ladies, Political Communication of

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Bush–Rather Confrontation

During early 1988, CBS Evening News began to air a series of profiles of the individuals who were running for the Republican and Democratic nominations for president. A major contender for the Republican nomination was George H. W. Bush, the sitting vice president under then-president Ronald Reagan. When CBS attempted to schedule time with Bush for interviews and material to construct his profile, the Bush campaign refused to participate unless the vice president could appear on the evening news live and unedited. His staff indicated that he was not willing to be interviewed on tape and have his remarks edited for broadcast by CBS.

Although unhappy about this restriction, CBS agreed and scheduled Bush's live appearance for the regular evening news on January 25, 1988. However, CBS prepared a 5-minute segment to precede the interview that focused on Bush's involvement in the Iran-Contra affair that had been plaguing the Reagan administration for several months. The tone and focus of this 5-minute prerecorded segment was clearly negative and confrontational toward Bush, placing him in an immediately defensive position as CBS anchor Dan Rather began the live interview portion of the program.

The live sparring match between Bush and Rather consumed approximately 9 minutes of additional airtime, an extraordinary amount of uninterrupted airtime for any evening news segment. As Rather continuously pushed and challenged and accused, Bush fought back strongly and firmly, establishing a powerful presence for the vice president who had sometimes been characterized as a "wimp" prior to this encounter.

The interview itself took on the flavor of an intense argument between two contenders. Neither combatant gave much respect to the other, as they constantly interrupted and overlapped each other, each trying to score the next verbal jab. In the aftermath, Rather received more of the blame for allowing the encounter to go so far out of the norms of a public display and for his obvious refusal to show any respect or deference to the vice president of the United States.

It is always difficult to pinpoint the effects of a single campaign event, but this one certainly came at a critical time for Bush, and many observers believe it had a major role in securing Bush's future position. Coming into this interview, Bush had been trailing Senator Bob Dole in the polls as the Republican choice for the presidential nomination. Research after the encounter has suggested that Bush probably gained more from the encounter and that Rather's behavior violated viewer norms and expectations of journalistic objectivity. The use of the "surprise" anti-Bush documentary preceding the interview gave the impression that Bush had been "set up" and created sympathy for him that helped bolster his position.

Bush, of course, went on to win the Republican nomination in 1988 and eventually the presidency. In the aftermath of the final election results, many observers pointed back to this encounter with Rather as a major turning point for Bush, who was unlikely to ever again be referred to by the media as a "wimp."

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Bush, George H. W.; Rather, Dan; Journalism, Political

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

Campaign Finance

Campaign finance refers to the methods and governing rules under which candidates and political parties obtain the funds necessary to organize political parties and carry out campaigns for public office. In the United States, for example, campaign finance is largely achieved through private fundraising by both candidates and parties. Public finance of candidates or parties is exceptional, although it does exist in limited circumstances. In contrast, many democracies in other parts of the world rely almost exclusively on public funding of political parties and candidates, and many utilize a combination of public and private funding.

Political parties require funding—more in election years than in others—to create and maintain their organizations, pay staff, recruit candidates and volunteers, and to engage in election campaigns. Over the years political campaigns, especially in Western democracies, have become more and more professionalized. The need for funds has increased to hire services such as pollsters, advertising agencies, production companies, political consultants, and media time, including everything from campaign buttons to yard signs to billboards, posters, radio and television ads, Web sites, and Internet-based advertising and distribution of spots, position papers, and other campaign materials. In addition, engaging accountants and lawyers to aid in compliance with campaign finance regulations is a necessary expense. Campaign finance has assumed constitutional dimensions in countries such as the United States, where the Supreme Court declared in *Buckley v. Valeo* in 1976 that

> virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio and mass media for news and other information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech.

In the United States, political parties and candidates either provide their own campaign funds from personal wealth or have them donated by supporters. The principal exception to this is the limited public financing provided by the federal government for candidates for president of the United States. The 1974 Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 established a system of partial public funding of presidential campaigns and party conventions funded by a voluntary tax check-off system in which taxpayers may designate on their federal income tax returns that $3.00 (originally $1.00) of their tax liability should go to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund. This fund provides funding for the national nominating conventions of qualifying political parties, primarily the Democratic and Republican Parties. In 2004, each major party received $14.924 million for their party convention from public funds. Parties do not receive public funding for the campaign itself or for their general operation.

This fund also provides partial funding for candidates for president. Under the presidential funding scheme, candidates are allowed to choose whether to

participate in public funding. Those who do not participate do not receive public funds but are not restricted as to the amounts that may be expended on their campaign. Those who do participate receive partial matching public funds during the primary in proportion to certain eligible private contributions that they receive and full funding during the general election campaign (private contributions may not be accepted) if they win their party's nomination. In 2004, each major party nominee received $74.62 million in public funds for the general election campaign. For the primary, nine candidates (not including Kerry, Bush, and Dean who declined public funding) received a cumulative total of approximately $28 million. The exact 2008 election amounts will not be determined until early 2008, but the major parties' candidates can expect to receive over $82 million for the general election in 2008, assuming they accept public funds.

Candidates who are participants in the public funding system are limited in the amounts they may spend during the primary season and in each state. In the general election, candidate spending is limited to the amount of the public grant. In 2004, the primary spending limit was $37.31 million, and it is expected to exceed $42 million in 2008. Candidates may choose to decline public funding in the primary and still receive it in the general election. Ross Perot declined public funding in 1992, and the first major party candidate to do so was George W. Bush in 2000. In the 2004 election, several major party candidates declined public matching funds in the primary, including Bush, Howard Dean, and John Kerry, but Bush and Kerry accepted full public funding for the general election. The reason for declining the matching funds in the primary was to avoid being bound by the spending limits in the primary, which were considered insufficient to mount a competitive campaign.

The future of the presidential public funding system has been called into question by the fact that increasingly, insufficient numbers of the general public choose to check off and donate $3 to the fund, which reduces the amounts available. In addition, the fact that so many candidates now choose to decline public funding in the primary indicates that the limits of the program are now exceeded by the needs of the most competitive candidates. So far, no major party candidates have declined public funding in the general election, but this may yet happen. On the other hand, bills to provide public funding for congressional and Senate candidates have been introduced, but so far have not seemed likely to pass. A few states, including Maine and Arizona, have partial public funding systems for state candidates, but this is the exception rather than the rule.

Outside the United States, public funding, direct and indirect, is more common. For example, in-kind subsidies prevalent in European democracies include official publicly prepared voter registry lists, as opposed to the U.S.-style voter registration drive, and free provision of media time for party election broadcasts. Where free media time is provided, some countries permit parties or candidates to purchase additional broadcast time, though many do not, or allow such purchases only on privately owned channels but not public channels. (Public channels in foreign countries, unlike in the United States, often have the highest viewership numbers.)

A study of 111 countries showed that 71 have a system of party finance, another seven have assorted rules but no system, and 12 have a candidate-oriented system rather than a party-oriented one. Sixty countries in the study had rules on disclosure of income, either by the political party (54) or by the donor (14). The disclosures are not made public in all of these countries. Thirty countries set a ceiling on how much a donor can contribute to political parties and nine countries limit how much money a party can raise. Fifty-four of the countries have requirements that political parties disclose their expenditures, and 27 countries limit party expenditures. Corporate contributions are banned in only 22 of 111 countries, and labor union contributions are banned in only 17.

The most common form of political party regulation is public funding; 65 countries have provisions for direct public funding of political parties, and 79 have provisions for indirect public funding. Direct public funding is allocated among parties by a mixture of methods. In 57 of the 65 countries, the basis for funding allocation is the number of seats or votes in the current or previous election; in 12 countries an equal allocation among parties is either the sole basis or one of the criteria for direct funding allocation. Eight countries allocate funds based on the number of candidates fielded in the election. Direct funding is allocated to election expenses in 45 countries and/or to general party administration costs in 29 countries, and 20 countries do not designate a purpose.

Indirect party funding is provided more often than direct funding and takes many forms, such as favorable tax rules for parties or donors (32 countries), free or

subsidized franking of letters and use of telephones (7 countries), free transportation (4 countries), free use of government buildings (4 countries), and free printing of party ballot papers (3 countries). Free access to state-owned media is the most common form of indirect public funding (71 countries). The allocation of broadcast time is based on a principle of equal time for all parties in 49 countries, performance in the previous elections in 20 countries, the number of candidates fielded in the current election in 13 countries, or a combination.

Clifford A. Jones

See also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act; *Buckley v. Valeo;* Federal Election Campaign Act; *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*

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Campaigns & Elections Magazine

A nonpartisan monthly magazine based out of Arlington, Virginia, the mission statement of *Campaigns & Elections Magazine* is "Covering the business and trends of politics." It was founded in 1980 by Stanley Foster Reed in an effort to enlighten the politically savvy as well as the general public. It gives up-to-date campaign polls and information alongside the latest news about known political consultants. It is a meld of political polling information, campaign suggestions, political analysis and a general Who's Who behind the scenes in state/national politics. For example, William Berry Campaigns (WBC, Inc.) is frequently mentioned as a successful firm that any California progressive should consult. The magazine goes out of its way to help out political neophytes and provides training seminars around the nation. Advertisements in the magazine promote some of its seminars and services, and it promotes its services as providing access to the top campaign professionals in the country. The magazine's seminars and information materials cover all aspects of political campaigning, including strategy, polling, direct mail, media, and the Internet.

Campaigns & Elections Magazine is edited by Morgan E. Felchner and has an estimated circulation size of nearly 20,000. It consistently features sections like Inside Politics, Consultant Sign Ups, Movers & Shakers, People and Organizations, Across State Lines, Tech Bytes, Voting Matters, Campaignland, Proving Ground, Consultants' Corner, The High Road, and International Politics. The magazine also publishes lists of campaign consultants and media professionals.

The magazine also publishes a weekly newsletter, *Campaign Insider*, which goes to more than 10,000 political and media professionals.

Brandon Jay Hersh

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Campaigns & Elections Magazine Web site: http://www.campaignline.com

Candidate, The

The Candidate, a movie released in 1972, offers a behind-the-scenes look at the political campaign process in the age of television. The film examines the candidacy of an idealistic young lawyer, Bill McKay, who is running for the United States Senate from the state of California. In contrast to the heroic depiction of political leaders contained in such Hollywood classic era films as *Mister Smith Goes to Washington* (1939), *The Candidate* adopts a more cynical view of politics. In the film, McKay, albeit reluctantly, eventually compromises his beliefs in exchange for victory. This depiction of political expediency is reflective of post-1960s American pessimism toward government.

Director Michael Ritchie and leading actor Robert Redford envisioned *The Candidate* to be part of a trilogy they would produce on the American obsession with winning. In the film, McKay initially pursues office with noble intentions and little chance of success. He is unafraid to speak his mind on the issues. As the campaign proceeds and his polling numbers increase, McKay realizes that he might indeed stand a chance at victory. Unwilling to antagonize potential voters, his positions on issues become more vague, and he begins to mistrust his political instincts. McKay becomes increasingly dependent on the advice of his campaign manager and media consultants. He comes to realize that, in the television era, platforms are no longer as important as image.

The Candidate provides critical insight into how a modern, image-based campaign is run. Political staffers coach McKay on how best to answer reporters' questions, the candidate practices canned responses for supposedly spontaneous televised debates, film editors piece together video clips designed to portray McKay in the most positive light, and influential party leaders hobnob with celebrities at campaign dinners. Above all, campaigning is laborious work designed to market the candidate as advertisers would sell a bar of soap. Thanks to his media-driven campaign, McKay wins an upset victory in the senatorial election but is left with a sense that he has lost touch with his motivation to run for office in the first place.

Jeremy Larner, who won an academy award for the film's screenplay, was active in politics. In 1968, he worked as a speechwriter for the presidential campaign of Senator Eugene McCarthy, and his political experience provided the film with a great amount of authentic detail. Larner was deeply committed to the McCarthy campaign but was ultimately disappointed with the experience, finding campaign coworkers to be petty and McCarthy indecisive. Larner's frustration at the political process set the tone for the film and mirrored the public's wish for better government. The early 1970s were a contentious time in America. Domestic and foreign policy conflicts polarized the country and eroded public confidence in the credibility of its leaders. *The Candidate* captured that erosion of confidence.

William Renkus

See also Film and Politics

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Candidate-Centered Communication

Candidate-centered, or personal, campaigning is an increasingly common feature of elections in many democracies. The term usually refers to two key developments in electioneering. First is the degree to which leading political actors, rather than parties, have become the visible focus of election campaigns. This trend can be seen most clearly in presidential elections in the United States, where candidates for the presidency use the electronic media to sell themselves to voters. Second, personal campaigning can be understood as the extent to which personal information and imagery about a candidate or party leader, rather than policy programs, has become a major element of campaigns. Personal information includes: candidates' biographies, their appearances, beliefs, tastes, values, and any past or current misdemeanors—that is, all information concerning the candidates themselves, not their record or what they propose to do if elected.

Although there has been a tendency to see personal campaigning as concentrated in presidential political systems, where individuals are directly elected to high office, there is a widely observed trend toward increased personal campaigning in parliamentary democracies. Party leaders have assumed an increasingly central position in parties' campaigns for office. The leaders have come to embody their respective parties and dominate the national media campaign. Often the heart of the campaign is a leader's tour of the country, with a series of staged photo opportunities. At the same time there has been a trend toward greater self-disclosure by leaders and personal attacks on leaders of rival parties.

The Visibility of Candidates and Party Leaders

A growing number of observers suggest one of the key factors contributing to the personalization of campaigning is greater media visibility, especially with

the emergence and spread of television. Election campaigns in most democracies are fought mainly on television, which provides contestants with an opportunity to communicate directly with millions of households. Office seekers have, over the years, become adept at utilizing this technology, and as a result their routine appearances have rendered them familiar to a mass audience of voters. It could be argued that leading politicians have even gained the status of celebrities.

Television has provided leading politicians with an increasing number of outlets on which to appear. In many democracies televised debates between the leading contestants have become a permanent feature of campaigns. Research by Pippa Norris found that of 24 OECD democracies examined in the mid-1990s, 16 had televised candidate debates. In addition, there are political advertisements, news bulletins, and non-news outlets, such as talk shows. The first appearance of a candidate on a talk show came in the 1960 U.S. presidential campaign, when both John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon were guests on Jack Paar's television show. By the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign, the television talk show had become a routine campaign stop for presidential candidates. Liesbet van Zoonen and Christina Holtz-Bacha observe that the appearance of party leaders on the talk show sofa is now a feature of campaigns in parliamentary democracies too. In addition to television exposure, representatives and parties in many democracies maintain a permanent Web presence. For example, Pippa Norris notes that a 2000 comparison of 1,244 parties in 179 countries found that 39% had developed their own Web site. The home page can be seen as a cost-efficient self-advertisement, where office seekers are free to construct and present an image of themselves to voters.

It is not only major election campaigns that are media events but also the process of candidate or leadership selection. Whereas once such procedures were largely invisible to media audiences, now they have become visible in an unprecedented way. This can be seen most starkly in the United states, with the introduction of primary elections and media coverage of them. This has led to an almost-year-long contest for the nomination of the two main political parties. In some parliamentary democracies, the process of leadership selection, which once took place behind closed doors, now attracts media attention, with contestants for the post of leader conducting a personal campaign for membership support. Increasingly, the key qualities party members look for in a candidate are photogenic looks and an ability to perform in front of the cameras.

Personal Attributes and Voter Choice

Not only are politicians more visible, but with an increasingly nonaligned electorate, the personality, appearance, and overall style of politicians have become an important criteria affecting electoral choice. In this electoral environment, John Corner and Dick Pels have observed that old ideological and partisan allegiances have given way to choices based on style. The decision of who, of the continually visible political office seekers, to vote for is related to an audience's reading of their style. For others, it is not so much a case of the electorate's visual and emotional literacy but the need to decide who of the candidates available is most competent to govern. Although there is much debate about the extent to which choices are shaped by personal attributes and style, there is an emerging consensus that electoral judgments in some mature democracies are increasingly based on personal nonpolicy factors rather than purely programmatic ones. One democracy where the personal characteristics of candidates are argued to sway the electorate is the U.S.; research carried out there has shown that voters are prone to make their choices on the basis of a politician's personality and appearance, rather than his or her policy platform. Outside the candidate-centered political culture of the United States, some research has found that in certain countries' elections, leaders' personal traits have been influential.

Going Personal

It could be argued that as office seekers have become more visible, and personal attributes and style more important to voters, so issues of personality increasingly become central to an election campaign. In turn, campaigns develop into a battle over the competencies and traits of those who seek to govern. Across a range of presidential and parliamentary democracies elections are more and more characterized by two simultaneous and interconnected processes: contestants selling themselves to voters and attacking each other. These processes are almost continuous throughout the campaign, with information repeatedly re-disclosed in a variety of different media arenas. This information can often be highly personal, with

political actors' private lives becoming a feature of the campaign communication.

Selling the Self

Office seekers and their advisors spend a great amount of time building an image that will appeal to the electorate. Such a strategy can be seen as part of a wider approach to garner support. Candidates' and party leaders' appearances are carefully constructed from the clothes they wear to their hairstyles. Indeed, the well-groomed and suited candidate has become a standard feature of nearly all electoral contests.

The strategy goes beyond outward looks though. Contestants are eager to establish a personal bond with voters. Their autobiographies are an important element in establishing this link. Autobiographies present voters with an insight into the person behind the image. Presidential candidates and party leaders reveal much about themselves to the electorate through a variety of media outlets. For those campaigning for high office it is important that their autobiographies match public expectations of what a leader should be. Across a range of democracies, certain themes appear in these personal narratives: self-made achiever, overcoming personal adversity, a family person, a person of principle. Party and candidate advertisements and public relations offensives attempt to draw on and amplify these themes. For example, former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi issued all voters a glossy brochure about himself in the 2006 Italian general election campaign. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative leader, David Cameron, used his own personal video Web log to highlight his family life.

Contestants are also keen to signal what they have in common with the electorate. An area where commonality can be established is through sport or popular culture. Taking part in popular activities or supporting a sports team reinforces the sense that contestants share the same pleasures as voters. In the United Kingdom, Tony Blair reminds the public from time to time that he is a fan of Newcastle United Football Club. In Ireland, it is important for politicians to be seen attending sporting and cultural events and taking part in the activities of those that elected them. At the same time office seekers endeavor to be seen as socially successful and to have a wide coterie of high-achieving friends. Presidential candidates and party leaders seek to exploit relations with celebrities from the worlds of music, sports, film, and television, hoping that some of their appeal will rub off on them.

In addition, contestants and their campaign teams seek to differentiate themselves from their rivals on a range of traits and competencies. A challenger's teams may look to position their candidates as newcomers or outsiders, distancing them from the political establishment. In Mexico, candidate Vicente Fox's team made a virtue of his lack of political experience in the 2000 presidential election campaign, portraying him as untainted by corruption of political establishment. The incumbents' image managers may in turn seek to emphasize their experience, record in office, and their roles as international statesmen, vis-à-vis their rival's inexperience. For example, in Taiwan, President Chen Li-an effectively used such a strategy in the 2000 presidential campaign.

Character Assassination and Media Exposés

Although contestants and their campaign teams choose to "go personal" they are not in control of all the information that circulates about them in the media during a campaign. Character assassination and tabloid exposé are now a quintessential part of many campaigns. Personal attack advertising increasingly dominates races. Personality assassination has reached its apex in U.S. election campaigns, where 30-second advertisements are used to construct a damaging image of a candidate's opponents. U.S. presidential election campaigns tend to be dominated by hard-hitting, often factually inaccurate, attack advertisements. Outside the United States, a host of studies on campaign advertising have reported the presence of negative personal adverts. For example, in the United Kingdom, there have been regular complaints about advertisements personally attacking rival party leaders.

Over the last 30 years, James Stanyer and Dominic Wring observe, there has been a trend toward intrusive political reporting in a large number of democracies. This inclination is perhaps more developed in some democracies than others. If one was to imagine a continuum between two poles, one where privacy intrusion is a common feature of political reporting and the other where it is rare due to legal and other measures, then the United States and the United Kingdom would probably be close to the first extreme with a range of countries such as South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and India not far behind. At the other extreme would sit several continental

European countries, notably Germany and France, which have strict privacy laws.

However, there has been some movement along this axis over time. Indeed, in the United States and the United Kingdom intrusion is more widespread than 40 or so years ago. Candidates' and leaders' personal histories provide material for journalistic investigation, and there is increasing revelation about contestants past financial and sexual indiscretions. In the United States, recent presidential campaigns have seen media exposés of candidates' extramarital sex lives. In 1988, front-runner Senator Gary Hart was forced to withdraw from the Democrat primaries, after revelations that he was having an extramarital affair. A similar exposé nearly derailed Bill Clinton's bid for the White House in 1992. In 2004, Democrat presidential candidate John Kerry denied widely circulating rumors that he had an affair with an intern. Compare this to the absence of reporting on President Harding's affairs with Carrie Phillips and Nan Britton, Franklin D. Roosevelt's relationships with Lucy Mercer and Missey LeHand, Dwight D. Eisenhower's romance with Kay Summersby, Kennedy's various affairs, and Lyndon B. Johnson's affair with Helen Gahagan Douglas.

There has been an emergence of a journalistic culture which is hostile toward political elites and keen to expose activities they see as hypocritical. This is often done in the context of the importance of personal issues in voter decision making. Although this trend is less developed in some democracies such as France, as noted, some have observed the beginning of intrusive journalism there. In 2006, the potential candidates for the French presidency, Segolene Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy, found themselves the subjects of intrusive photography in popular tabloid magazines. These and other intrusions have been attributed to the spread of a tabloid journalistic culture and the growth of the Internet. Indeed, with the spread of the Internet there are many Web sites and blogs devoted to political gossip that lie outside direct legislative control. In such an environment, revelations about contestants seeking or holding elected office, however tangential to their abilities, if not printed in the press, are revealed online.

In summation, personal campaigning can be said to be a feature of many democracies, especially in relation to the extent to which leading political actors, rather than parties, have become the visible focus of televised elections. That said, in terms of negative advertisements and journalistic intrusion, it could be argued that the extent of personal campaigning varies quite considerably between democracies. It is this second dimension of personal campaigning, and its spread, that may pose the greatest challenge for democracies though.

James Stanyer

See also Berlusconi, Silvio; Blair, Tony; Bush, George W.; Clinton, William Jefferson; Kennedy, John F.; Negative Advertising; Negative Campaigning; Personalization of Politics; Political Advertising; Putin, Vladimir; Schröder, Gerhard; Spin, Political

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Candidate Films, Biographical

Candidate films are a form of political advertising that candidates use to present their biographies and issues to voters. These films, which usually run about 10 minutes, give campaigns the ability to flesh out who candidates are and what they stand for. Candidate films resemble short documentaries and are usually the

longest piece of advertising that a campaign uses to present its candidate and policy positions to voters. This is an important component because the other options that candidates have to get their messages across—such as TV ad spots from campaigns and candidate coverage on TV news—have become ever shorter.

Candidate films tend to focus on personal and professional aspects of the candidate, including the values they learned from their parents, their relationship with their children, their duty to country, and their vision for the future. The biographical and issue-oriented information in candidate films usually revolves around one dominant theme, thereby creating an efficient package for audiences to absorb and interpret. Producers of candidate films often use focus groups and survey data to help make the films more persuasive to voters.

Unlike 30-second TV ad spots, a candidate film is generally not broadcast over and over again on television. Instead, it is targeted to voters via direct mail and is shown at political party conventions and on candidates' Web sites. Select footage from candidate films is often later included in a candidate's 30-second TV ad spots, creating visual and verbal consistency in the campaign's overall message to voters. Candidates for president, governor, and senator have made and distributed these films.

Types of Candidate Films

There are distinct differences among candidate films depending on what type of race it is being used for. At the presidential level, there are films made for the general election and films made for the primary campaign. General election candidate films, often called "presidential campaign films," are broadcast to a national TV audience during the Democratic and Republican national conventions, usually right before the presidential nominee's acceptance speech. This type of candidate film focuses mostly on biography and promoting pleasant images of the presidential nominee.

Candidate films that are used during the primaries, called "primary campaign videos" or "meet the candidate videos," are put on videocassette or DVD and mailed to party faithful and potential donors during the early months of the primary campaign season. Also, the videos typically are shown to small groups of supporters who gather in living rooms at the thousands of house parties that are conducted during the primaries. Journalists also receive the videos in an attempt to spur positive coverage.

Candidate videos at the primary level concentrate far more on specific issues of the day to move potential voters to the polls. The reason for the different approach is that primary candidates deal with voters who are, on average, more involved in the political process and are more interested in complex issue discussion. Also, because primary campaigns are intraparty contests, playing up issue differences helps voters differentiate between a host of candidates who at first might not seem that different from each other. Because candidate videos are usually the first advertising run by a campaign during the primaries, the appeals found within lend insight into how candidates choose to shape the image that they first present to the public.

Candidate films that are used for gubernatorial and senate races tend to be similar in structure to presidential candidate films in that the films combine biographical information during the first half of the film and then move into a discussion of issues.

History of Candidate Films

Today, candidate films are disseminated via almost every medium except film. In addition to being broadcast on television, this form of political advertising can be distributed on videocassette, DVD, or the Internet. However, the first presidential campaign films, which began in 1924 with Calvin Coolidge, ran in movie theaters. Presidential campaigns later switched to buying time to broadcast them on television. The modern era of presidential campaign films began in 1984, with Ronald Reagan's reelection film, *A New Beginning*. Reagan's 1984 film was the first to be shown directly before the candidate gave his acceptance address at the nominating convention. Because the TV networks generally cover the acceptance speeches, the film's new placement increased the chances of the film reaching millions of TV viewers. The ploy worked. All Democrat and Republican presidential candidates have since followed this strategy.

Candidate films at the primary campaign level began with George H. W. Bush's 1980 presidential race. The 1980s was the first time that creating and disseminating this type of advertising on videocassette became cost-effective and the first time that a majority of U.S. households contained VCRs on which to play the films. In every election year since 1988, a majority of presidential candidates have used candidate videos in their advertising strategy, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to produce and

distribute them. Several candidates, including Bill Clinton in 1992, have found these videos crucial to their nomination victory.

How Voters Interpret Candidate Films

Voters who watch candidate films tend to construct their own meaning from the prepackaged biographical and issue elements contained within the 10-minute ad. Viewers draw on their pre-existing knowledge of how a candidate should look and sound, as well as news coverage of the general political climate, to make their interpretations. Such a process results in viewers accepting, ignoring, or transforming the films' messages.

John Parmelee

See also Political Advertising; United States Information Agency

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CANDIDATES AND THEIR IMAGES

Candidates and Their Images: Concepts, Methods and Findings, by Dan Nimmo and Robert Savage, is the seminal work in the specific research area of candidate image. Published in 1976, Nimmo and Savage utilized an expansive approach in their examination that not only produced useful findings in regard to candidate image but also helped direct the course of future research in the subject. Nimmo and Savage made significant contributions such as defining candidate image, providing a conceptual framework for study, and offering methodologies conducive to exploring candidate image.

Nimmo and Savage define an image as "a human construct imposed on an array of perceived attributes projected by an object, event, or person." Interested in the relationship between images and messages, the authors offered a transactional view of candidate images as consisting of voter perceptions based on subjective voter knowledge and candidate messages. Nimmo and Savage concluded that political images "reflect relationships in which leaders not only project selected attributes but must also imagine how followers perceive them; followers not only perceive leaders but also imagine how leaders perceive them."

In *Candidates and Their Images,* Nimmo and Savage studied a comprehensive range of issues related to the topic. These included candidate image content, in-depth examination of the transactional nature of candidate images, how candidate images change, the relationship between electoral outcome and candidate image and the relationship between voting behavior and candidate image. Besides thorough investigation of previous research on image, the authors employed a variety of methodological techniques in generating original findings. These included Q-sorts, factor analysis, and regression analysis.

Nimmo and Savage were able to draw several important conclusions from their original findings. Included in these is the idea that candidates usually have more than one varying image. They also found that although images can be complex, voters usually assess candidates on only a few traits. Empathy, strength, and integrity were popular traits on which voters made these assessments. The authors were interested in how these image traits might be combined into broader image types and found in their research only a few types (three to five) emerging. Nimmo and Savage found that candidate images can change both during and between campaigns and that images change in relation to whether candidates win or lose elections. In terms of voting, the authors conducted a study of the 1972 presidential election and found that the candidate image aspect of candidate evaluation was the most important factor in explaining voting behavior. Nimmo and Savage also offer up the idea that candidate image can be divided into political and stylistic components, with the former consisting of "leadership, partisanship and issue traits" and with the latter composed of "personality and performance traits." The authors offer an educated guess that personality is more important to

voters during a campaign with political qualities being more influential post-election.

Mike Chanslor

See also Image, Political

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Canvassing

See Grassroots Campaigning

Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (1931–)

Fernando Henrique Cardoso was the president of Brazil from 1995 to 2003. He was the first president to govern for two consecutive terms. FHC, as he is also known, was trained as a sociologist at the University of São Paulo, where he became a professor in 1953. In the late 1960s, FHC was considered an influential intellectual, interested in analyzing democracy, international development, and social changes. Since the beginning of the 1960s, FHC was a regular collaborator in the main newspapers and magazines in the country. During the 1980s, he maintained a weekly column in the *Folha de S. Paulo* newspaper, and since 2003, he has written a monthly column in *O Globo, O Estado de S. Paulo,* and *Zero Hora* newspapers.

With an intense presence in protests aimed at the development of public schools, the modernization of universities, and the effort to overcome the authoritarian military regime, FHC was persecuted after the military coup of 1964. To escape the persecution, he spent the 1970s and early 1980s teaching, researching, and writing in France and Chile. In 1968, he returned to Brazil and assumed the Political Science chair at the University of São Paulo. In 1969, he is compulsorily retired, having his political rights revoked. In order to stay in Brazil, FHC and other professors founded the *Centro Brasileiro de Analise e Planejamento* (Brazilian Center of Analysis and Planning), which became an important center for the analysis of Brazilian public policy. FHC was an important participant in a peaceful transition from the military regime to the democracy.

As a supporter of the democratic reform, FHC was elected senator in 1982. In addition, he was a founding member of the *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira—PSDB* (Brazilian Social Democratic Party). Before being elected as the president of Brazil, he served as the minister of foreign relations from 1992 to 1993 and as the minister of finance from 1993 to 1994.

In June 1994, as the minister of finance, FHC directed the creation of the *Plano Real* (Real Plan), a set of measures taken to stabilize the economy. The objective of this plan was to create a strong currency that would help to decrease inflation indices in Brazil. As a result, a new currency was created: the *real.*

After the creation of the new currency, the opinion polls indicated a growth in FHC's popularity. Due to the positive impact of the *real* on the population, FHC surpassed his opponent and won the election later that year. FHC's presidential terms were marked by economic stability and growth, economic reforms, privatizations, and educational expansion.

After his terms as the president of Brazil, FHC has dedicated his time to giving presentations and to the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Institute. In 2002, FHC was nominated by the United Nations as the authority with the most remarkable work in human development.

Juliana de Brum Fernandes

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Carrie Chapman Catt Center for Women and Politics

The Carrie Chapman Catt Center for Women and Politics was founded in 1992 at Iowa State University to interest, educate, and engage citizens in the political process. The center honors Carrie Chapman Catt,

a distinguished alumna of Iowa State University and longtime suffragist who led the campaign to ratify the 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution giving women the right to vote. Catt also founded the League of Women Voters.

The center offers leadership development, mentoring, and educational opportunities through a freshman learning community, courses on leadership, the Catt Associates student organization, and the Legacy of Heroines scholarship program. It is developing a certificate program on Community Leadership and Public Service. The center fosters scholarship on issues related to women and politics through the annual Carrie Chapman Catt Prize for Research on Women and Politics and the only existing Archive of Women's Political Communication.

Through the Mary Louise Smith Chair in Women and Politics, the center brings prominent women leaders, scholars, and activists to campus. Chairs have included current and former members of Congress (Elizabeth Dole, Carol Moseley Braun, Pat Schroeder, and Nancy Kassebaum Baker); former Gov. Christine Todd Whitman; and journalists Soledad O'Brien, Lynn Sherr, Carole Simpson, and Eleanor Clift. The center also offers campaign schools for women interested in running for public office.

The center's programs blend the resources and scholarship of the academic community with the experiences of practitioners in fields important to the political process.

Dianne G. Bystrom

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Archive of Women's Political Communication Web site: http://www.womenspeecharchive.org/

Carrie Chapman Catt Center for Women and Politics Web site: http://www.iastate.edu/~cccatt/

CARTOONS, POLITICAL

Political cartoons are an inherent part of a free society. In any society where freedom of speech and the press is constitutionally guaranteed, the political cartoon occupies a special place. A political cartoon is a visual commentary. Therefore, a political cartoon is primarily an opinion-oriented journalistic medium and can usually be found on the editorial pages. Its subject matter is devoted to a contemporary and newsworthy political issue. However, its readers are required to possess some basic background knowledge about its subject matter. The underlying assumptions must be clear and provided by the media coverage of at least the supporting medium. Otherwise, the audience might have problems decoding the depiction due to the gap in knowledge.

Political cartoons are a regular occurrence in media coverage. They mainly appear within the pages of newspapers. Undoubtedly, political cartoons are shown in other media, too, but it is critical that the media in which the cartoon is published be current and up-to-date or the meaning and context may be lost.

From a more technical point of view a political cartoon is an artistic vehicle, which is characterized by both metaphorical and satirical language and the use of wit techniques. In some ways, it is a journalistic and artistic hybrid. Ideally, the political cartoon is able to point out contexts, problems, and discrepancies of a political situation. In their drawings, political cartoonists judge the political course of life and are only concerned with the cartoonists' points of view, but this does not mean that they are allowed to alter

This 1998 cartoon calls attention to the air pollution caused by vehicle emissions.

Source: Clay Bennett / © 1998 *The Christian Science Monitor* (www.csmonitor.com). All rights reserved.

facts. Even here, facts are sacred and only the visual comments are free to exaggerate. To do so, political cartoonists must choose and encode specific information related to an issue. During the visual transformations, many decisions (e.g., statement, symbols, allegories, wit techniques, composition) must be made. While doing so, the cartoonist must keep in mind whether his or her audience will be able to understand the editorial cartoon. When successful, political cartoons can fulfill an important criticizing and controlling function in society. In addition, the political cartoon can encourage the process of opinion formation and decision making. And last but not least, political cartoons are entertaining and recreational.

Thomas Knieper

See also Humor in Politics

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Carville, James (1944–)

James Carville is a political consultant and Democratic strategist who came to fame working as the campaign manager for President Bill Clinton's 1992 and 1996 election campaigns. The "Ragin' Cajun," as Carville came to be known, because of his feisty debating style, was born in Carville, Louisiana (named for his grandfather). He received a bachelor's degree and a law degree at Louisiana State University. His career as a campaign manager did not start well, as his first three candidates lost the elections that he managed.

Carville's work as a campaign manager was unsuccessful until Robert Casey's victory in the 1986 Pennsylvania gubernatorial race. Subsequent campaigns for Frank Lautenberg's Senate campaign in 1987 and Zell Miller's Georgia gubernatorial campaign in 1990 also proved successful. As a result, Carville was beginning to make a name for himself in the Democratic party. But the defining moment in his career was his management of Harris Wofford's come-from-behind victory for U.S. Senate in Pennsylvania in 1991 over well-known former governor and U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh. Carville led Wofford's campaign from a 40-point deficit to an upset landslide win.

After the successful 1992 presidential campaign with Clinton, Carville was awarded "Campaign Manager of the Year" from the American Association of Political Consultants. It was during the 1992 campaign that he met his wife, Mary Matalin, who was serving as President George H. W. Bush's campaign manager. They coauthored a book about the 1992 campaign titled *All's Fair: Love, War, and Running for President.* Matalin and Carville were married in 1993, and they have two daughters.

More recently, Carville served as a host of CNN's "Crossfire" from April 2002 to June 2005. He also shifted his attention from national political campaigns to international political campaigns. His most notable international campaign was the successful 1999 election of Ehud Barak as prime minister of Israel. His consulting firm no longer works on domestic political campaigns.

In 2003, Carville and his wife served as consulting producers and cast members of the HBO series *K Street*, which portrayed current events in a pseudo-reality framework (the dialogue was largely ad-libbed). Carville also appeared in the Academy Award nominated documentary *The War Room.*

His book credits include: *Buck Up, Suck Up ... and Come Back When You Foul Up* with Paul Begala; *We're Right, They're Wrong: A Handbook for Spirited Progressives; The Horse He Rode In On: The People vs. Ken Starr;* and *Stickin—The Case for Loyalty.*

Kristin K. Froemling

See also Matalin, Mary

Castro, Fidel (1926/1927–)

Fidel Castro Ruz may be the most famous Latin American of the past century, though he has ruled only a Caribbean island about the size and shape of the state of Tennessee in the United States. He became Cuba's undisputed commander-in-chief in January 1959 by overthrowing his military predecessor in a 2-year guerrilla war. By mid-2006, when major surgery forced him to temporarily step down in favor of his brother, Raúl Castro Ruz (1931–), he had held power longer than any other current leader in the world.

Even before 1959, Castro's declarations and activities attracted world attention, and for many he soon became what the BBC in 2006 called a "world icon." Many others in the Miami exile community of more than one million, and others elsewhere, saw him as the embodiment of Satan. His international stature was based on his claims to be building socialism in Cuba and his constant verbal and often indirect military attacks on the United States and imperialism in general. (Castro supported "Marxist imperialism," however, such as Che Guevara's 1966–1967 war in Bolivia and the 1968 Soviet-bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia, the latter to the profound dismay of many leftists worldwide.) Among the manifestations of his internationalism were decades of active involvement in the so-called Nonaligned Movement (NAM). In September 2006 Cuba hosted the NAM's 14th summit, and Cuba was made chairman for the next 3 years.

Although some have argued that Washington's hostility in 1959 pushed Castro into the Soviet bloc, earlier actions and comments had signaled his long-term intentions. Most pointedly, a 1958 letter (now displayed on the top floor of the Museum of the Revolution in Havana) to his closest comrade, Celia Sanchez, declared that his "true destiny" would be a prolonged war against the United States. In order to do this he proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist, Cuban communist and forged an alliance with the Soviet bloc, which eagerly sought its first ally in the Western Hemisphere. This alliance provided Cuba with both a military shield against the United States and a multibillion dollar annual subsidy amounting to more than a quarter of the annual GDP's budget. In exchange, and out of conviction, Castro supported many Soviet-initiated international policies. During his first 2 decades in particular, he trained thousands of guerrillas from Latin American and other areas, proclaiming in 1962 that "the duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution." Between the mid-1970s and late 1980s he sent hundreds of thousands of Cuban troops to help allies in Africa, particularly in Angola and Ethiopia.

Although Castro's main international alliance during the cold war was with the Soviet bloc, and for decades with sometimes anti-Soviet "Fidelista" guerrillas, his fundamental beliefs (like Guevara's) were more in line with those of China's Mao Zedong. During the 1950s Castro had promised to restore Cuba's progressive 1940 constitution and hold elections, but he did not relinquish any power until 2006 and then only to his brother and several colleagues. Like Mao, and contrary to Marx, Castro was convinced that history is driven more by personal will than by economic forces. This led him to try to cultivate a "new socialist man" who was motivated by moral (not material) incentives and a selfless devotion to socialist egalitarianism. His most militant campaigns toward this egalitarianism were the Revolutionary Offensive (1966 to 1970), which stressed revolution supported socialism, not private venders and overlapped Mao's much more brutal Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976), and the Rectification Program launched in 1986. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Cuba entered a deep economic crisis caused by Castro's own economic policies and the disappearance of bloc subsidies and trade. As during earlier economic crises, Castro briefly permitted some small private businesses, which he eliminated again when a degree of economic stability and growth were restored in the new millennium.

Castro's supporters note correctly that Cuba became absolutely independent of the once-dominant United States, though the island then became dependent on aid from the Soviet bloc and, currently, Venezuela. His most admired policies have been health and education programs, their successes being built on what were already among the best (if unevenly available) health and education systems in Latin America. He also denied Cubans the freedom to read or act on ideas that differed from his own. From 1959 on, Castro repressed anyone he thought might threaten his absolute power, however insignificant or prominent the person might be, in the name of the people. Castro's denial of political and economic freedoms contributed to economic stagnation that brought rationing and dependence of up to half the population on remittances from exiles (whom Castro calls "worms") and increasing disparities among Cubans on the island. Thousands have died at sea seeking exile.

Castro's pursuit of his destiny in the context of the cold war guaranteed constant tension with the United States and some other governments. His confiscations of U.S. properties and Soviet alignment were the main factors leading to Washington's breaking diplomatic relations in 1961, as well as imposing a trade embargo and half-heartedly supporting the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion by Cuban exiles. In 1962, the Soviet Union tried to place ICBMs in Cuba and a global nuclear confrontation was averted only when a U.S.-Soviet agreement was reached, without consulting an infuriated Castro. U.S.-Cuban tensions surged and fell thereafter, periodically peaking, as when Castro allowed 125,000 Cubans to flee to Florida from the port of Mariel (1980) and when Soviet-Cuban MiGs shot down two unarmed U.S. Cessnas (1996). Castro's relations with his Soviet-bloc patrons began deteriorating even before the bloc collapsed because Castro rejected their emerging domestic and international reforms. The end of the cold war did not bring a lifting of the embargo. In fact, the 1996 Helms-Burton Law, coupled with the pressure of Miami's Cuban American population, have resulted in tightening of the embargo several times.

By 2007 the prospects for Fidel's domestic revolution were in doubt as Raúl seemed to favor more market-oriented economic policies. Meanwhile, Castro's leadership of resurgent Latin American anti-Americanism was passed willingly to Venezuela's dynamic new president, Hugo Chávez.

William Ratliff

See also Mao Zedong

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Celebrities in Politics

Although their fame is achieved outside of the political realm, celebrities (those who derive their fame from entertainment media, such as television, film, music, and sports) are increasingly becoming involved in various aspects of the political process. They commonly associate with elected officials, run for elected office, or attempt to influence policy and elections. This transition into politics has been eased by the emergence of radio and television, a democratization of fame, and structural changes in the news media.

Beginning in 1918 when Woodrow Wilson entertained silent movie stars, politicians have reaped the benefits of associating with celebrities. Celebrities attract media attention and provide visibility to candidates and causes. They also have the potential to increase and improve fundraising efforts as well as draw in other participants and potential supporters. Politicians also benefit simply by uniting with a glamorous name. Presidents often invite winning sports teams to the White House, for example, hoping that people will also deem them winners.

Celebrities also become involved in politics by running for elected office. Aided by their fame, celebrities have run for office since the 1940s. The most prominent example, however, is the actor Ronald Reagan, who twice was elected president. A more recent example occurred in 2003 when former movie star Arnold Schwarzenegger was elected governor of California.

More commonly, celebrities endorse candidates for office or lobby on behalf of specific causes. The first significant instance was during the 1920 election when entertainers rallied to support Warren Harding, and the first formal endorsement occurred in 1940 when actors gathered to form the Hollywood for Roosevelt Committee. This type of involvement became prominent in the late 1960s when many celebrities began to feel it would be irresponsible not to wield their celebrity status for political purposes. A number of celebrities, most notably Jane Fonda, became vocal antiwar activists. Today, this type of celebrity involvement in politics has become commonplace. Charlton Heston, for example, has become almost synonymous with the gun lobby and Barbra Streisand is well known for her support of liberal causes and candidates.

Although historically there has always been a connection between Hollywood and Washington, D.C., celebrity involvement in politics has been increasing for a number of reasons. The emergence of radio and television allows for intimate communication with the general public, leading to a democratization of fame. Due to the proliferation of the mass media, fame is not

restricted to royalty; ordinary people can now achieve prominence. Structural changes in the news media have also eased celebrities' entrance into politics. Celebrity involvement in politics fits the needs of a news media focused on human interest stories, not detailed and substantive policy reports. As long as the public enjoys hearing news and gossip about celebrities, journalists will continue to cover celebrity involvement in politics.

Kelli E. Lammie

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Censorship, Political

Political censorship is as old a social phenomenon as politics itself. It normally refers to the mechanism, process, or system employed to restrict people's expression of ideas deemed subversive, seditious, unorthodox, or politically incorrect. To a different degree and through a variety of measures, all political entities in human history used some type of political censorship to reinforce their ruling ideology, governing legitimacy, and social order. The objectionable materials were either deleted by the censors, banned from publication, or totally destroyed, and the violators were subject to different types of punishment, ranging from fines, prosecutions, tortures, jail terms, or even execution. The censoring process can be carried out by a government-appointed agency, by the editors and managers of a medium, or by the authors themselves. Political censorship targets all publication forms and communication channels, including but not limited to books, newspapers, radio programs, television programs, theatres, films, cartoons, advertisements, speeches, photographs, and various information on the Internet. The practice of political censorship intervenes in and infringes upon the freedom of press and the freedom of expression. Although many countries in the present world still rely on political censorship to regulate public opinion, its effect has been questioned and its rationale has been criticized.

The History of Political Censorship

The practice of political censorship can be traced back to the early ages of human civilization. In ancient Athens, the great Greek philosopher Socrates, who is widely regarded as the father of political philosophy, was found guilty of impiety and of corrupting Athenian youth through his teaching of unorthodox political ideas. To quell his voice, the Athenian authority sentenced him to death by drinking a cup of poison in 399 B.C. Half a world away, China's first emperor, Shi Huang Di, defeated six rival states and established China's first unified empire, the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C. To reinforce the authority of the central government, he ordered that all history and literary works, excluding books about agriculture, divination, and medicine, be burned. The next year, more than 400 dissenting scholars were buried alive for their treasonable words.

The Middle Ages of Western Europe had been suffocated by the widespread political censorship in the disguise of religious oppressions and persecutions. The printing technology developed in the 15th century in Western Europe triggered the mass production of printed books. In the meantime, the censorship of the printed publications also intensified. Most of the well-known writers, thinkers, and philosophers living in the Enlightenment and Industrialization periods, such as John Milton, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Voltaire, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schiller, Karl Marx, etc. were the victims of political censorship. For example, King Charles II of Great Britain issued a Proclamation in 1660, ordering the burning of John Milton's works for treasonable passages against authorities. In France, the books written by Voltaire, the famous Enlightenment writer and philosopher, were burned in public. Rousseau's book *Social Contract* was banned as being subversive and impious. In sum, it is estimated that between 1600 and 1756, about 900 French authors, printers, and booksellers, including Voltaire and Diderot, the chief editor of the famed *Encyclopedie,* were jailed in the Bastille for their treasonable works.

The modern age of human history also witnessed extensive and institutionalized political censorship. Two World Wars and the enduring cold war in the 20th century had been fought not only on the battlefield but also in people's minds and in the political arena. In May 1933, a wave of book-burning movements engulfed Nazi Germany. The propaganda minister

Joseph Goebbels declared that the German nation needed to clean itself internally and externally by destroying those degenerate, unpatriotic, treasonable books written by Communists and Jewish authors. From the late 1940s to mid-1950s, under the perceived threat of Communist subversion, U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy initiated a series of investigations on the loyalty of U.S. government officials, scholars, and artists. During this time, a lot of books were taken off the shelves, hundreds of people were sent to prison, and numerous authors, film actors, directors, and screenwriters were labeled "un-American" because of their supposedly procommunist beliefs or activities. At the same time, the Soviet Union and China implemented explicit and implicit measures to systematically suppress opposing opinions on the media and to purge those political dissidents. For example, in the Soviet Union, multiple layers of political censorship organs were institutionalized to monitor and examine various media and publications. In China, during the anti-Rightist campaign in 1957, more than half a million intellectuals were sent into concentration camps where hundreds of them died, because of their so-called anticommunism and antirevolutionary speeches, articles, or thoughts.

The end of the cold war did not end the practice of political censorship. Moreover, the advent of the Internet and online technology expanded the practice of political censorship onto the nascent cyber sphere.

The Purposes of Political Censorship

Most of the censoring practices were carried out in the name of reinforcing government legitimacy, maintaining social order, or protecting national security.

For those nondemocratic governments, political censorship has been widely used to suppress the publication of opposing political ideologies, or any information that might hurt the legitimacy of the authorities. For example, in Nazi Germany, books written by Jack London, Thomas Mann, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud were labeled as degenerate, treasonable, and un-German. Huge piles of these works, normally covered with Communist flags, were burned in public. During the cold war, news stories or literatures that were considered critical of the socialist system were routinely censored by the Soviet Union government. In some incidents, a publicly used photograph was altered to remove people who had been purged in the political movement. After the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, the Chinese government forbade any public discussions or media coverage about this event. Meanwhile, systematic measures have been implemented in China's traditional and online media to censor materials on issues of democracy, human rights, Tibet independence, and foreign policy.

To maintain a peaceful social order and racial harmony, many governments explicitly prohibited the publication and dissemination of subversive messages and hate speeches, especially through the mass media. For example, many European countries today outlaw Holocaust denial as a form of hate speech. In France, specific laws were passed to restrict the open expression of anti-Semitism and ethnic bias in public. Since 1999, China banned any publicity by the religious group Falun Gong, and denounced it as an evil cult that spread rumors and harmful information. The government of Singapore has imposed tight restrictions on political contents in the mass media. It claimed that the racial and religious conflicts in the past justified these censorship measures.

In time of war, many governments also relied on political censorship to filter out information that might hurt national security, assist an enemy, or simply cause embarrassment. For example, it is a routine procedure for military authorities to monitor, control, or even manipulate media's coverage of warfare. The censorship was so common and extensive that it led to the notion that the first casualty of war is truth. A widely covered case of the wartime political censorship is the so-called Pentagon papers. In 1971, the U.S. government asked the Supreme Court to restrain two newspapers, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post,* from publishing a classified study on the U.S. government's decision-making process during the Vietnam War. The confrontation led to clamorous controversy and major legal battles, which the newspapers eventually won. A recent example of military restriction on information involved the photographing or filming of dead U.S. soldiers and their caskets carried back from the Iraq war.

The Measures of Political Censorship

Political censorship can be enforced through government licensing, prior censorship, and postpublication censorship.

In the past, governments in Western Europe required newspapers, publishers, broadcasting networks, booksellers, and theater directors to apply for

authorization to operate. The licensing requirement was often supplemented by a mandatory deposit of money as security. This procedure not only prohibited political dissidents from reaching the general public via the mass media, but also reduced their ability to use the media as any kind of outlet for their complaints. Today, many governments continue to use licensing as a tool, though with some modifications, to control the operation of mass media. For example, the Chinese government recently granted the online search engine Google.com an operation license in China, only after the company agreed to comply with the government's Internet censorship regulations. Also, it was disclosed that the Chinese government kept a blacklist of foreign correspondents who had been critical of China and banned them from getting a visa to China. In August 2006, the Singapore government required that all foreign media operating on its land have a legal representative in the country and pay a deposit of about 125,000 U.S. dollars. This policy imposed pressure on those foreign publications that had been critical of the Singapore government.

Governments in different times of history also used the method of prior censorship. Prior to the publication of a book, magazine, or newspaper, or prior to the release of a movie or performance of a play, the government-appointed censors inspected the content, and determined if it was appropriate for the general public. For example, in 1820, authorities in Germany imposed prior censorship on all periodicals and books of fewer than 320 pages. In the Soviet Union, and former communist countries in Eastern Europe, all movies, books, newspapers, and magazines had to be previewed by the designated censoring department within the government. However, prior censorship has its weaknesses. For example, the shifting political reality and constantly changing press regulations made the criteria of censorship highly unpredictable and often arbitrary. Normally, there were no specific guidelines for censors to follow; most decisions were made by individual censors on a case-by-case basis, which often led to the abusing of power and overreacting. Moreover, prior censorship required a lot of time and people to enforce it. In the Soviet Union, every large publishing house, major newspaper, and broadcasting studio had government appointed censors to review and control information before it was disseminated. The main organ for official censorship employed over 70,000 censors to handle this state-imposed censorship.

Most authorities relied on the postpublication censorship to control the objectionable information that was already in the public domain. In many cases, a book, an article, or a movie, was found subversive, unorthodox, or harmful by the authorities only after it had been released or published. The authorities might resort to the postpublication censorship to withdraw the documents, destroy the copies, prohibit its publication, block people's access to the materials, and punish the violators. The postpublication censorship is an old and widely used political censorship method. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that most of the classic works on politics and philosophy in human history have been banned, denounced, or burned by authorities during certain periods. The authors or publishers who offended the authorities might lose their jobs, their credibility, their citizenship, or even their lives. For example, between 1958 and 1968, Russian novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn secretly finished the writing of a monumental first-hand narrative, *The Gulag Archipelago,* in which he documented in great and shocking detail the Soviet Union's prison camp system. Because his previous works were banned by the government, Solzhenitsyn could not and dared not find a publisher within his own country. The manuscript of this three-volume book was microfilmed, smuggled out of the Soviet Union, and published in the West in 1973. Solzhenitsyn was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature for his writings. However, he was deported from the Soviet Union and stripped of his Soviet citizenship for treason. The Russian version of his work was not officially published until 16 years later.

Since the 1990s, the spread of Internet technology has given rise to a new form of postpublication political censorship, in which the authorities simply block people's access to the online information deemed s editious or harmful. The decentralized and instantaneous nature of Internet and online technology led some people to believe that the cyber sphere may pose an insurmountable threat to political censorship. However, the authorities can counter the challenges posed by the Internet through a variety of censorship measures, including restricting Internet access, filtering content, monitoring online behaviors, prohibiting Internet use entirely, and punishing those violators. For example, China claimed that it has recruited more than 30,000 so-called Internet police to monitor its fast-growing cyber sphere. It has established a firewall that prevents Internet users from accessing numerous Web

sites that are run overseas by political dissidents, followers of banned religions, and exiled ethnic groups. In online chat rooms, the Web masters normally use keyword search software to filter out messages considered "subversive" or "harmful to state's security."

It should be noted that many political censorship practices were conducted by the authors or media editors themselves. Authors and publishers might have voluntarily removed materials from their publications or refrained from expressing certain views for fear of government punishment or public pressure. In authoritarian countries, authors and editors normally avoid direct criticism of the government in their publications. In democratic countries, authors and editors use self-censorship to avoid socially undesirable or politically incorrect expressions or thoughts. For example, on September 30, 2005, a Danish newspaper published twelve editorial cartoons, most of which depicted the Islamic Prophet Muhammad. This incident sparked violent demonstrations throughout Muslim countries, where people saw these portraits as blasphemy to the Muslim faith. While covering this controversy, major American print media chose not to reprint the cartoons. In this case, the editors self-censored the materials deemed offensive or socially undesirable.

The Results of Political Censorship

Political censorship contradicts the freedom of the press and the freedom of expression. German poet and journalist Heinrich Heine, whose works were banned in his native land in the 1830s and 1930s, once wrote that where men burn books, they will burn people in the end. In general, undemocratic regimes have been more inclined to enforce strict political censorship to repress unorthodox and rebellious ideas. However, as society becomes more open and modern, and as communication technology becomes more advanced and accessible, the restriction of political expressions not only discredits the government that exercises this policy but also magnifies the influence and dissemination of the censored materials. Several nongovernment organizations, such as Reporters Without Borders and Freedom House, have been actively fighting against all kinds of political censorship in the world.

Xu Wu

See also Hate Speech; *Pentagon Papers, The;* Political Correctness

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Center for the Study of the American Electorate

The Center for the Study of the American Electorate, now affiliated with American University and its Center for Democracy and Election Management, has been for the past 31 years (for 30 years as an independent nonprofit) the principal source for data on voter registration and turnout in the United States. Over those 31 years, it has, each biennium, issued reports on registration and voting in primary and general elections for all elections for which there is a valid denominator of voting population for analyses. The center's analyses of election related matters have appeared in every major publication and broadcast media in the nation.

The center has also conducted discrete studies on a variety of issues, among them: the efficacy of changes in registration and voting laws in enhancing voter turnout; the impact of televised political advertising on campaign cost and citizen attitudes; campaign finance, particularly with respect to the impact of limits on accountability, systemic flexibility and creating a level political playing field; on the uses and abuses of exit polls in projecting winners; on media coverage of politics. It has commissioned polls on campaign finance, election-night projections, and the overall question of citizen participation in politics. It has commissioned studies on such issues as how other nations address the issue of televised political advertising, the efficacy of voluntary approaches to dealing with the deleterious effects of such advertising, the content of that advertising, and both national and international literature on

citizen disengagement from political life. The center has held conferences and testified before Congress on numerous occasions. Its works are often used by policymakers, political practitioners and the academic community. It was instrumental in the passage of the National Voter Registration Act (the so-called motor voter registration bill). It is currently working on a database of turnout for president, state governors, U.S. Senate and aggregate U.S. House of Representatives in primaries (where relevant) and general elections based on citizen-eligible turnout as of the election date each year from 1860 to the present, and turnout prior to that based on the best available data.

The initial and present motivation for the center's existence is a concern about what has been a continuing disengagement of citizens from political involvement in general and voting in particular. With the exception of certain elections driven by fear of economic conditions (1982 and 1992), hostility toward a particular president (1994), or the polarization of the nation (2004 to 2006), turnout has been declining since it reached its apex in 1960. With the exception of people over the age of 65 (and particularly people over the age of 75 as modern medicine has made their participation possible), turnout has been declining among every age with every new generation participating less than previous generations. And with the exception of the South (due to the Voting Rights Act, the enfranchisement of African Americans and the resultant two-party competition), voting has been declining in every region. Voter participation has declined by more than 20% nationally since 1960, more than 25% outside the South. The young (aged 18–24) vote at about a 30% rate in presidential elections and a 15% rate in midterm elections. The United States now stands 139th of 172 democracies in the world in its rate of voter participation.

What the center has learned in its 31 years of study is that the decline in participation is not a matter of registration and voting procedure—the nation has been liberalizing those procedures for most of the last 40 decades, and participation has declined. This also means that there are no procedural quick fixes to citizen disengagement, and many of those which have been proposed or tried—early voting, no excuse absentee voting, mail voting or Election Day holidays—do not enhance participation and carry with them serious downside risks. The problem is not a matter of demography because three of the four demographic indicators of higher participation—education (more than twice as many attend and graduate college now than in 1960), age (our population has been aging since 1969), and mobility (our mobility rates are lower than in the 1960s)—all should have produced higher turnout. Nor is it a matter of competition, because the elections which draw the highest turnout are those for president, governor, and U.S. Senate, the latter two of which had been decided, until the Voting Rights Act, by a one-party whites-only Democratic primary in the South.

What is incandescently clear is that the decline in citizen engagement in politics is due to declining motivation, for which many causes could be ascribed, including, but not limited to: the physical and media fragmentation of American society; a decline in public trust of America's leaders; diminished quality in education and diminished quantity and quality in civic education; polarization and gridlock in public policy; the execrable conduct of campaigns; the weakening of society's integrating institutions; and dominant values that enhance self-seeking and consumer choice at the expense of community and civic engagement values. The continuing work of the center, beyond its staple of studies, is to attempt to identify those problems that most affect civic engagement and to explore methods of addressing them.

Curtis Gans

See also Political Disaffection; Political Engagement; Political Involvement; Youth Voting

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Chaffee, Steven H. (1935–2001)

Steven H. Chaffee received his Ph.D. from Stanford University where he studied communication under mass communication icon Wilbur Schramm. His particular expertise was in political communication theory, especially in regard to news.

Chaffee was on the faculty of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Wisconsin-Madison from 1965 until 1981. In 1982 he joined the faculty at Stanford University where he remained until retiring from Stanford in 1999 to become the first holder of the Arthur N. Rupe Chair in Social Effects of Mass Communication at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

A prolific writer and scholar, Chaffee published 13 books and more than 100 journal articles and book chapters. In 1975 he edited *Political Communication: Issues and Strategies for Research,* an early resource for students and scholars of the developing field of political communication. Among his best-known works was the graduate text, *Handbook of Communication Science* which he coedited with Charles Berger. Chaffee also served for several years as the editor of the journal, *Communication Research.*

A recognized leader in the communication discipline, Chaffee served as president of the International Communication Association (ICA). He also spearheaded the development of research for the Kids Voting project, an effort to encourage children to become involved in elections. Part of his interest in these efforts derived from findings that the involvement of children made their parents more likely to vote.

In addition to being named an ICA fellow, Chaffee received the B. Aubrey Fisher Award for service to students in 1992 and the Paul Deutchmann award for research excellence from the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication in 1999. In 2001 the American Political Science Association awarded him the Murray J. Edelman Career Achievement Award.

Lynda Lee Kaid

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Chappaquiddick

See Kennedy, Edward (Ted)

Chávez, César

See Minorities, Role in Politics

Chávez, Hugo (1954–)

Hugo Chávez Frías, born in 1954 in the town of Sabaneta (Andean State of Barinas) to two schoolteachers of *mestizo* descent, has been president of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela since 1999. Before assuming the Venezuelan presidency Chávez was trained as a military officer at the Venezuelan Academy of Military Science. He was also the founding member and leader of the nationalist Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement (1983) that criticized the corruption of the Venezuelan elite, the two-party system (conservative COPEI and social democratic Acción Democrática, AD), the government, and parliament. In 1992, Lieutenant Colonel Chávez participated in a failed coup d'état against the corrupt AD President Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989–1993). After being in jail for almost 2 years, he became the leader of the Fifth Republic Movement that went on to win the presidential election of 1998.

Chávez can be characterized as a politically motivated military man who operates outside the traditional Venezuelan establishment. As president, he claimed to promote the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela. The main points of Chavéz's Bolivarianism are national sovereignty (because of United States aggression), the people's political participation through plebiscites and referendums (*socialismo democrático*), economic independence in opposition to business domination, moral obligations of all politicians (they must be servants of the people), and redistribution of petroleum benefits (according to principles of social justice). Chávez's major success was the new constitution in 1999 that addresses important elements of Bolivarianism and gives the president extensive power. It should be mentioned that private property rights have not been eliminated so far. However, when Chávez was inaugurated for a new term in January 2007, he announced the nationalization of CANTV, Venezuela's largest telephone company. This enterprise is controlled by Verizon. Moreover, the production and distribution of electricity will be state owned. Since the 2000 election, *chavistas* control the national parliament and most governments of the key states. They control the petroleum industry.

Chávez not only has a capacity for strategic thinking and a talent for organizing but also has remarkable rhetorical skills. These abilities turned him into a leader during a time of social unrest, and he instigated an anticorruption movement with much popular support in the 1990s. He won the elections in 1999 with an antioligarchy and anticorruption campaign, claiming to be the real leader and representative of the poor. Chávez talks like the *pueblo,* he dresses like the *pueblo,* and he behaves like the *pueblo.* When he wears a uniform he tries to show efficiency and well-organized management capacity, qualities that real political leadership require to manage crises. He makes excessive use of the national flag and the national colors wherever he appears in public, and the untouchable *Libertador* Simón Bolívar is omnipresent. Chávez tries to emphasize his personal warmth by giving the impression that his government supports excellent welfare programs to assist needy persons.

Chávez and *chavistas* are opposed by the commercial press such as the mainstream newspaper *El Universal* and the television channels Venevisión, Globovisión, Televen, and Radio Caracas Televisión. He and his followers are constantly accused of violating the freedom of speech. That means that the political opposition still has the power to influence public opinion by some mainstream mass media. But Chávez continues to attempt to intimidate the press—for instance, he recently announced that the license of Radio Caracas Televisión, the oldest television channel of Venezuela, would not be renewed. He accused the company of having backed an attempted coup against him in 2002. In response, Chávez founded his own Bolivarian Circles to promote Bolivarian ideology in the *barrios* (districts) and *cuadras* (blocks). Moreover, the president of Venezuela relies on his own trade union, Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (National Union of Workers) and the Army.

Chávez makes innumerable addresses to the nation on television, and he has had his own television talk show *Aló Presidente* on the state-owned Venezolana de Televisión each Sunday since 1999. In *Aló Presidente* Chávez sings patriotic songs (sometimes with his close friend Fidel Castro), addresses topics of the day, and makes important decisions. He gives the show spontaneity by answering phone calls from common people and promising effective and quick help for their personal problems. Chávez's language includes aspects of leftist and nationalist rhetoric. Moreover, he addresses elements of Latin American culture such as collectivism, masculinity, and the Christian faith. The polarization of Venezuelan public opinion encourages the use of radical populist language without precise content. International mass media perception is diverse: Some consider him a new *Libertador* for Latin America, others perceive him as a political clown who likes to provoke U.S. hegemony, and still others think that he is a dangerous dictator close to Bush's "axis of evil." Yet Chávez has survived impeachment (2000), an attempted coup d'état (2002), two general strikes (2002, 2003), one referendum to remove him from office (2004), and free presidential elections (2006).

Thomas Fischer

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Chechen Conflict, Russian

See Russia, Democratization and Media

Checkers Speech

Republican Senator Richard M. Nixon's Checkers Speech, Tuesday, September 23, 1952, was one of the most problematical addresses ever delivered. The televised speech, watched by 55 million people, demonstrated the power of television to mediate political communication. Nixon was accused of maintaining an $18,000 slush fund from contributors who wanted political favors. As Republicans were running up against corruption in the Truman administration, Nixon, the party's vice-presidential candidate, felt he had to give a speech to defend the fund and to clear his name.

Nixon's speech had two sections. The first part addressed questions that he framed to his benefit, such as why the fund was necessary and whether or not he feathered his own nest. The speech takes its name

from Nixon's mention of his dog Checkers as the only gift he received. Relying on the emotional attachment of his young daughters to the dog, he bluntly told the audience that he would keep Checkers. The only evidence that he offered was an audit of his finances. He never substantiated his claim that he had not given political favors to his contributors.

The second part of the speech was an aggressive assault on Democrats. He attacked Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic presidential candidate, for being rich and for having a slush fund. Nixon assailed John Sparkman, the vice-presidential candidate, for having Sparkman's wife on the government payroll. Nixon used *tu quoque,* a technique that means "and you, too," as he demonstrated his opponents were worse than he was.

For President Harry Truman, Nixon used guilt by association to malign Stevenson and Sparkman. Nixon linked them with Truman's unpopular Korean War and with Truman's alleged softness on communism. Nixon averred that he and Eisenhower would clean up the Democratic mess in Washington.

Nixon concluded his address by appealing to the audience. He asked listeners to telegraph or write the Republican National Committee regarding whether he should stay on the ticket or resign. About 2 million telegrams and 3 million letters supported Nixon, and $75,000 in gifts covered the cost of the telecast.

Nixon's delivery was impressive. Without a teleprompter and relying minimally on notes, he established direct eye contact with the camera, hence with his listeners. When he attacked the Democrats, he arose from the desk, went in front of the camera, and used clenched-fist hand gestures to reinforce his language.

Nixon attended to the speech's word choice. He used personal pronouns to gain identification with his audience; he chose homey language, such as "folks," to speak to ordinary Americans; and he sprinkled verbal fillers, such as "now" and "well," to communicate down-to-earth talk.

Republican media supported Nixon's defense of his fund, but Democratic papers were not thoroughly persuaded. The best epilogue is left to critics who observed that Nixon did not deal with the appropriateness or propriety of maintaining the fund in the first place.

Halford Ryan

See also Nixon, Richard M.

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China, Media and Politics in

The development of China's media is inseparable from the transformation of China's political system. After the victory over the Kumingtang (KMT, the Chinese Nationalist Party) during the Chinese Civil war, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established power in China. The communist government demolished the media system set up by the KMT. It also banned commercial media and advertising in the media in the 1950s. The Chinese Communist State developed a communication system modeled on the Soviet Union's communication system. For the Chinese Communist State, news is not the latest report of an event. Rather, it is any information that can be used to build socialism. Mao Zedong, the principle leader of the CCP, claimed four tasks for the media: to propagate the policies of the Communist Party, to educate the masses, to organize the masses, and to mobilize the masses.

From the 1950s to the1970s, the state subsidized all media operations. However, as time went by, the state was unable to catch up with the increasing funds needed by the media. In the 1980s the state could provide only 50% to 70% of the media's operating budget. Some newspapers lost complete state subsidy in the early 1980s. As a result, the government began to allow the media to use advertising, sponsorship, and other forms of financing to make up what governmental subsidies were not able to cover, known as the "multi-channel financing" policy. In 1978 the Ministry of Finance approved the introduction of a business management system to *People's Daily* and some other newspapers in Beijing. The party and government first permitted broadcasting media to rely on multiple forms of financing in 1988. A 1992 ruling required all newspapers to be self-sufficient by 1994.

Advertising was reintroduced to the media in 1979, and it became the most important nongovernmental

form of media financing. By the early 1990s, advertising revenue began to surpass state subsidy for television. National or "party organ" media, which traditionally have enjoyed semi-governmental status, have enormous advantages in securing advertising income. The profits from advertising enable them to buy regional or other smaller media. As a result, although the government does not officially allow cross-ownership, by the 1990s many national media organizations had multiple outlets.

In addition to explicit advertisements, paid news, known as Type II or soft advertising, has been practiced by the Chinese media. Paid news is disguised as news and conceals its advertising nature from the audience by packaging programs as simply informational. Journalists also participate in the soft advertising practice individually. It is not uncommon for journalists to receive "red-packet" money from businesses for product placement and soft advertising. Private companies also get involved with media through sponsorship. Thus corporations can exert their influence on editorial policies through sponsorship, despite the fact that they cannot legally own the media.

In addition to the "multi-channel financing" policy, the Chinese government initiated the Property Rights Reform in the late 1970s. This reform separates economic rights from legal rights over properties. Economic rights in this context refer to the right or the power to utilize and obtain income from the properties that are still under the ownership of another party. In the case of media, the Chinese government prevents a complete privatization by maintaining legal ownership over media and telecommunication infrastructures; nevertheless, it grants rights to managers and private investors to make use of media resources to generate profits. Although the government, in practice, still legally owns media, managers and investors have full editorial and financial rights and responsibilities. Some local government entities also "contract out" their publishing licenses to private investors. Media organizations also rush into other business sectors, such as real estate, tourism, and sports, which in many cases generate more revenue than media-related businesses.

This particular situation poses dual challenges to Chinese journalists. On the one hand, the bottom line, profit, is a necessity for the media to survive, but on the other hand, the party line is the prerequisite for the very existence of the media. Thus the Chinese media in the post-Mao era can be characterized as "economic liberation without political democratization."

The changes in media financing, nevertheless, have made it possible for Chinese journalists to challenge governmental control and to search for democratic media. Journalistic practitioners have started to emphasize professionalism and the many purposes of the media. The need for profits also has resulted in a de-emphasis on political issues. Growing diversity or de-ideologizing can be seen in overall media structure and content. Highly commercialized tabloid daily newspapers catering to urban readers have also emerged in major cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai. China also witnessed a rapid growth of the Internet. The number of Internet hosts in China has increased 48.7% since 2000, and the number of people using the Internet reached 94 million in 2004. The Chinese government has built an Intranet to block the Chinese people from the Internet and, in the future, is planning to use proxy servers like those used in Singapore.

As part of China's economic reform and its effort to gain a membership in the World Trade Organization, China allowed transnational corporations into service areas such as media and telecommunications. Rather than challenging the authoritative control of the Chinese government, transnational media corporations are more than willing to cooperate with the Chinese government for profits. For example, Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation dropped BBC World Television News from its satellite television *StarTV* in April 1994 because BBC had offended China's leadership. AOL Time-Warner, MTV, and CETV were also willing to participate in the Chinese government's efforts to cultivate "new cultural ideologies." More recently, in order to enter the Chinese market, Yahoo and Google also complied with the Chinese government's regulation of blocking access to certain Internet sites in their service in China. The collaboration between the government controlled media and transnational media corporations in China has contributed to increasing inequalities by cultivating an elite consumer class and further excluding the poor. As a result, the democratizing of Chinese media involves more than eliminating governmental control. It has to simultaneously address the issues and problems brought on by neoliberal globalization.

Jing Yin

See also Censorship, Political; Chinese Cultural Revolution

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CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The Chinese Cultural Revolution started in October 1966 and ended in October 1976. It was launched by Mao Zedong, the late chairman and the founder of the Chinese Communist Party, during his last decade in power in an attempt to renew the spirit of the Chinese revolution. It began as a civil war of sorts—a war of slogans, ideology, and ideas, but later it became almost a nationwide military conflict among different "revolutionary units" of workers, peasants and college students. The purpose of the Cultural Revolution, as Mao claimed, was to guarantee China would never change its "Marxist color," and in order to achieve this goal Mao said that China had to engage in class struggle at all levels, in all aspects, for all times, and the Cultural Revolution was the new format of class struggle in China's new historical stage.

Unfortunately, the Cultural Revolution was, in fact, a distorted and atypical phase of political extremism and forced mobilization. It was not only iconoclastic but also barbaric in its efforts to destroy Chinese culture. The Maoist slogan *po si jiu*—meaning break the four olds: old ideas, old customs, old culture, and old habits—was used by hundreds of millions of people to destroy the "old world" in order to establish a "new world." Virtually speaking, the Cultural Revolution was a mixture of a power struggle among party leaders, an ideological campaign for Mao's revolutionary ideas, and a massive "re-education" movement of every person in China. When the Cultural Revolution started, Mao closed all schools and called students to join Red Guard units. Millions of the young Red Guards were used for criticism of party officials, intellectuals, and anything that was perceived to contain "bourgeois values." The Red Guards became a "shock force" and began to "bombard" both the regular party headquarters in Beijing and those at the regional and provincial levels across the whole nation. The "four big rights"—speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates, and writing big-character posters—became the revolutionary weapon of Mao's youthful followers to criticize all kinds of "class enemies."

The effects of the Cultural Revolution directly or indirectly touched essentially all of China's populace. During the Cultural Revolution, much economic activity was halted, with revolution being the primary objective of many. But the Cultural Revolution mostly affected and changed the realms of culture, education, ideology, and communication and media. Mao long believed that although the bourgeoisie had been overthrown, it was still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds, and endeavor to stage a comeback; therefore, the proletariat must do just the opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie especially in the ideological field. Consequently, the media was a key battleground of ideology and became a particularly important site of class struggle. One of the first moves Mao and his allies made was to gain control over the propaganda apparatus. Media was used to safeguard the directions of the Cultural Revolution and to give its partisans powerful psychological and political support. All communication means and media outlets were exclusively used to propagate an ultraleftist ideology and mass culture, and all of the media's functions became a single one, that is, to publicize, explain, and express the theory and practice of "class struggle."

For most of the years during the Cultural Revolution, people were forbidden to read anything except Mao's little Red Book, a book of the excerpts from Mao's

works that propagate both the Marxist doctrine and Mao's revolutionary theory. Feudalistic, fascist, journalistic control reached its climax. Anyone who expressed ideas even minimally different from Mao's was condemned as a "class enemy." Every editorial, critique, commentary, and signed article is written according to the desires of the power holders. Moreover, when writing their articles, some journalists just copied Central Party Committee or Provincial Party Committee documents, or the speeches of their leaders, because it was politically safe to copy the Central Party Committee-inspected important manuscripts at the *People's Daily*—the mouthpiece of Mao and his allies—and to copy the Provincial Party Committee-inspected provincial newspaper articles. The press thus became a thousand newspapers with one face. Many broadcasters were dismissed—some were sent to factories to do physical labor, some moved to the countryside to receive "re-education" by peasants, and others stayed in radio and television stations to criticize themselves for being bourgeois-influenced and to prepare for new "people's broadcasting stations." The broadcasting media's newscasts were nothing but what the *People's Daily* reported. Television entertainment programming was reduced to a minimum and consisted exclusively of ideological content. All feature film production was closed down from 1966 to 1970, and all but a handful of the movies made in China in the previous 17 years between 1949 and 1966 were banned. Many older artists suffered imprisonment, violence, and physical deprivation. During the whole Cultural Revolution, the only films made were of the "model performances" endorsed by the party's new cultural leaders.

To the outside world, China was implementing Mao's anti-imperialism, antirevisionism, and anticapitalism principles. There were very few foreign programs on television and cinema screens. Importing media and cultural products from foreign countries—imperialist countries such as the United States, revisionist countries such as the former Soviet Union, and capitalist countries such as Japan and Britain—were thought only to poison the Chinese people, change China's socialist color, and destroy the communist ideology. Thus, the importation of foreign television programming and film was almost at zero. Although foreign contacts were gradually reestablished after 1969, and this situation improved to a large extent when President Nixon visited China in 1972, large-scale, major changes in television program importation were not seen until China entered the reform era after 1978.

Fortunately, in October, 1976, just less than a month after Mao's death on September 9, Mao's wife Jiang Qing and her three principal associates, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan—denounced as the Gang of Four—were arrested by Hua Guofeng, the Mao-appointed successor, with the assistance of two senior political bureau members, Minister of National Defense Ye Jianying and Wang Dongxing, which symbolized the end of the Cultural Revolution. Today, the Cultural Revolution is seen by most people inside and outside of China, including the Communist Party of China and Chinese democracy movement supporters, as an unmitigated disaster, the bloodiest and darkest period in contemporary Chinese history and an event to be avoided in the future.

Junhao Hong

See also Big-Character Posters, China; Censorship, Political; China, Media and Politics in; Mao Zedong

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Chirac, Jacques (1932–)

Born on November 29, 1932, Jacques Chirac's activity in French politics started in 1965 with a local mandate. His first job as assistant minister (secrétaire d'état) came in May 1967, and thereafter, he never stopped holding prominent political mandates or offices. Prime minister from 1974 to 1976, then from 1986 to 1988, he was elected president of the French

Republic in 1995 and reelected in 2002. He also held the office of mayor of Paris from 1976 to 1995.

His communication skills are variable. Gifted with a strong direct personal charisma, Jacques Chirac is at the height of his communicating talent when personally canvassing or rallying in small French villages. His popularity among farmers has been particularly constant thanks to his legendary appearances in the Paris National Farmshow where he is able to walk for hours and to adapt from wine tasting to patting every cow or horse in sight.

His television skills have been uneven: It was not until October 27, 1985, that he appeared for the first time to clearly defeat a political opponent during a direct televised debate, when he triumphed over then-Prime Minister Laurent Fabius, who was supposed to be a first-rate media performer.

His 1995 winning electoral campaign was a model of strategic planning. Instead of carrying out a quick media-oriented campaign, Jacques Chirac, well advised by his own daughter, Claude Chirac, undertook a strenuous tour deep into France, and is said to have shaken hands with more than 2 million people. It led him to victory and gained him a grassroots popularity that his conservative opponent, Edouard Balladur, prime minister at the time, had considerably underestimated. A bold and well-devised slogan targeted at the left, "reducing the social breach," was also quite helpful.

As president, Jacques Chirac changed his communications strategy by hiring none other than his predecessor's main communications consultant, Jacques Pilhan—a bold move by the latter, who agreed to advise the former opponent of his long-time client (François Mitterrand). Jacques Chirac's public appearances consequently became much less frequent and highly controlled. When Pilhan died, Claude Chirac officially took the job of the president's communications director and kept faithfully within the framework of the consultant's ideas.

In more recent years, Jacques Chirac's failure to reach younger generations became apparent at the 2005 European Referendum for the so-called European Constitution. During a televised rendezvous with some youngsters he failed to convince the selected youth representatives that they should vote in favor of the Constitution—a failure that was verified on the voting day. His televised appearances were then kept to more formal situations—National Day interviews with selected anchormen, New Year's Eve wishes, and so on.

Altogether, his political communication skills could qualify him as one of the last representatives of the old-fashioned politicians for whom a meeting and direct contact with the people is the best way of campaigning.

Philippe J. Maarek

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Chisholm, Shirley (1924–2005)

Shirley Anita St. Hill Chisholm was the first African American woman elected to the U.S. House of Representatives and the first African American woman to run for president of the United States. Chisholm was a liberal political activist who advocated for greater spending on education, health care, and social services, promoted civil rights and women's rights, and criticized the Vietnam War and the draft. Chisholm's public political career began in 1964 with a successful campaign for a seat in the New York State Legislature. In 1968 Chisholm defeated Republican James Farmer for New York's Twelfth District congressional seat. Chisholm held that seat until retiring in 1982. In 1972, Chisholm shocked the political world by campaigning for the Democratic presidential nomination as the "unbought and unbossed" candidate.

Chisholm decided to run for president in 1972 not to win the election but to change the face of American politics. Chisholm openly campaigned for the outsiders of the American political system: women, minorities, and the working class. Although many Americans supported Chisholm's populist ideas, Chisholm's campaign was not without its critics, including those within the Democratic Party. Feminists who felt George McGovern had a better chance of winning the final election worried that they would be throwing away their influence if they voted for Chisholm. African American political leaders were also divided and at times openly hostile to Chisholm's candidacy both because a woman had stepped into the race and because

of the concern that Chisholm could derail a successful Democratic candidate and thus give Nixon the edge in the national election.

Although frequently not taken seriously by the American press, the Chisholm campaign worked diligently for national visibility—winning a court order, for example, to allow Chisholm to participate in a nationally televised debate with George McGovern and Vice President Hubert Humphrey—and had strong showings in several state primaries. In the California primary, for example, Chisholm received 5% of the votes on a 7-month budget of $50,000. At the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Chisholm earned an impressive 151 delegate votes.

After retiring from Congress, Chisholm taught at Mount Holyoke College and Spelman College. Chisholm was a popular figure on the lecture circuit and actively campaigned for Rev. Jesse Jackson's presidential campaigns in 1984 and 1988. Although Chisholm never reached the office of the president, she is credited with opening the doors of the presidency to all Americans.

Tasha N. Dubriwny

See also Feminist Movement; Gender and Politics; Race in Politics

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Christian, George

See Press Secretary, White House

Churchill, Sir Winston (1874–1965)

Sir Winston Churchill is best known for his leadership of Great Britain as prime minister during the Second World War, but that was the high point of a long and varied career in British politics. Churchill was elected to the House of Commons in 1900 as the representative for Oldham. He was to continue as a member of the House for 64 years, holding every major cabinet post except the foreign ministry post and ascending to the office of prime minister twice.

By the time he was elected to Parliament at the age of 25, Churchill was already a well-known soldier, journalist, and author. During his time in the British army, Churchill served in several of Queen Victoria's "Little Wars," seeing action in India, the Sudan, and South Africa as well as traveling on his own to observe Spanish operations in Cuba. He made good use of these experiences, serving as a war correspondent for such prominent British newspapers as the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Morning Post.* Churchill's dispatches, much praised for their clarity, detail, and colorful style, earned him both financial stability and public acclaim. His reports were not so popular with his commanders, however, who disliked his tendency to criticize military decisions with which he disagreed. In addition to his articles, Churchill recorded his experiences and reflections in several books: *The Story of the Malakand Field Force, The River War, London to Ladysmith,* and *Ian Hamilton's March.* Churchill's exploits, especially in the Boer War, brought him a fame which played no small share in his first campaign victory. These accounts of recent wars also had larger political import because they occurred in the context of debates about British imperial goals and involvement around which the election revolved.

Churchill remained involved in publishing and journalism throughout his career. He continued to write articles and essays for the public press on a great variety of topics, publishing more than 800 in his lifetime. Many of these were explicitly political, such as his defense of the British Empire in India, but many were of broader theme, reflecting on human nature, technology, the proper ordering of society, the role of chance in human affairs, and education, among other topics. During the political isolation of the "wilderness years" (1930–1939), when Churchill was a member of the majority Conservative Party but did not hold a post in the government, he waged his long and unpopular fight against the policies of disarmament and appeasement not only in Parliament but in Britain's newspapers. In addition to authorship, Churchill also had experience with newspaper production and editing, producing a governmental newspaper, the *British Gazette,* during a national strike of trade unionists in 1926.

It is particularly for his oratory that Churchill is remembered. The speeches that he delivered to rally the British people during the first dark years of the

Second World War are among the most famous, but Churchill's practice of the art of political speech was foundational to his entire career. As a young man (1897), Churchill wrote an essay on the power of oratory, *The Scaffolding of Rhetoric,* placing it first among the political virtues. He laid down four principles of effective political communication: correctness of diction, rhythm, accumulation of argument, and analogy. Churchill was to employ these principles to great effect. Although his parliamentary career had its share of setbacks, often because he took strong stands on controversial issues, overall it must be considered a tremendous success. The foundation of his success was his ability to speak well. Whether he was in line with majority opinion or not, Churchill's speeches usually received great attention in the House and in the press for their forcefulness, imagery, and beauty of language. In the fullness of his powers, he must be considered an orator of the first rank. The Second World War and the office of prime minister provided the grandest stage for his rhetorical abilities. When Britain's survival hung by a thread, Churchill's speeches, often broadcast to the nation by the BBC, roused the British people to face the dangers which confronted them. Indeed, Churchill himself became a political symbol of perseverance and courage, his well-known face appearing on posters all over Britain.

Churchill also reached out in speech to the British Commonwealth countries and to the United States, seeking their aid. In both cases, he appealed to shared traditions and ways of life. His attempts to overcome American isolationism centered on the ideas of a union of the English-speaking peoples and a special relationship between America and Britain based on common political heritage and devotion to freedom. Churchill had long felt a connection to the United States that ran deep. His mother was American, he had prominent American friends, and he had traveled extensively in the United States in his younger days on speaking tours. He strove to strengthen the ties and sense of friendship between the two peoples. Several of Churchill's speeches in the early days of the war were aimed at encouraging American involvement, and he spoke directly to Congress after American entry into the war. Above all, Churchill relied on his friendship and personal correspondence with the American president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, to gain U.S. support and to foster common purpose and strategy throughout the war.

In 1946, Churchill spoke at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. In what is usually referred to as the "Iron Curtain Speech," he warned that the postwar world had to confront the next rising threat, Soviet Communism, which had already seized large parts of Eastern Europe. Once again, he called for unity of purpose in action among freedom-loving nations in what would quickly come to be known as the cold war. His efforts to forge and maintain political and moral connections between Britain and America were honored in 1963 when he was made an honorary citizen of the United States.

Justin D. Lyons

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CICERO

See RHETORIC, POLITICAL

ÇILLER, TANSU (1946–)

A political leader born in Istanbul, Turkey, in 1946, Tansu Çiller left her position as the chairperson of the True Path Party (Do?ru Yol Partisi–TPP) after a destructive defeat in the November 2002 elections, and thus brought to an end her active political life which began on November 24, 1990, in the TPP.

A representative of a political tradition pursuing conservative, nationalist, populist policies and relying heavily on rural and provincial constituencies, the TPP, with the aim of reaching women's votes and strengthening the image of a democratic Turkey, elected Çiller who, as a professor of economics, of bourgeois background, having a higher education and a career, happened to be the distinctive choice of Süleyman Demirel, a permanent leader in Turkish politics since the 1960s who used to be called "the father." Although Çiller did not come into politics via the father-spouse-brother route, a route familiar to women, she managed

to create for herself the position of Demirel's "daughter." Working together with many national and international media and PR advisors who fabricated a public scenario based on an uneasy father and daughter relationship and preparing for party congresses and elections, she became Turkey's first female prime minister in 1993 and stayed there for 3 years.

Çiller has become famous for her political speeches filled with blunders. Her mistakes in language usage, including calling one of her fellow party members by the name of a funny character in a famous TV series, means she could not render "Turkish" her speeches prepared by consultants, which were full of plagiarized and recruited statements like "I have a dream" or "that soldier will go, that flag will come down." Çiller, with her linear reasoning process, her expressions full of judgments of certainty, and her emphasis on science, adopted masculine rhetorical strategies.

In four general election campaigns (1991, 1995, 1999, and 2002) Çiller adopted aggressive and negative strategies while bringing forth her outlook, personal characteristics and family status. Her aggression toward political rivals was reduced by close-up camera shots showing her smiling face in political ads. The inevitability of privatization, the idea that the Kurdish problem could only be solved by militaristic measures, and programs against inflation have been unchanging themes she brought to the fore in election campaigns. She gave up using the image of integrity and honesty when her possessions gained publicity as a result of a parliamentary investigation. As the woman with "steel eyes," she joined military maneuvers wearing heavy shoes. In the coalition governments after the 1995 elections, especially the one she took part in with the Islamic Welfare party, she held the offices of foreign minister and deputy prime minister and was attacked with moral and political accusations directed against her partner. Thus, her speeches began more frequently with "the name of God."

During the first 2 years of her term as prime minister (and as a result of her connections to owners and higher-ups in the media and her ability to allot these institutions promotion credits), she was publicized as "the beautiful blonde woman" and "the most beautiful prime minister in the world" to reflect Turkey's modern face. Çiller's campaign featured the slogan "I want my radio" and was supported by private TV and radio broadcasting; she was in turn backed by prominent columnists who argued that a female politician would bring elegance, refinement, and renewal to Turkey. The media attributed a value to each and every single personal detail of her life. She was promoted as the most promising candidate on the rise, the most likely to win, the candidate who reached the highest percentage in the most recent public opinion polls. In the 2002 elections, voters did not forgive the pragmatism of Turkey's modern face. She and her party could not make their way into the parliament.

Eser Köker

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Citizen Journalism

The notion of citizen journalism encompasses a wide range of practices and experiments running from opening traditional media to citizen participation in the news process, to locally based reporting for local or global networks, to citizen expression in the blogosphere (and more recently in the vlogosphere, or video blogosphere) that can be characterized as a networked structure of storytelling.

With roots in the civic journalism movement of the 1990s as well as earlier Deweyan inspired forms of community journalism, citizen journalism gained momentum from the explosion of Web-enabled forms of citizen expression. Partly a reaction to critiques of news coverage by traditional media, partly a process of individual expressive motivation, and partly exploration of new business models for news, different forms of citizen journalism are emerging worldwide. Therefore, rather than specific content, a particular business model, or the adoption of certain journalistic routines, what defines citizen journalism is a move toward openness of information; horizontal structures of news gathering and news telling; blurred lines

between content production and use; and diffused accountability based more on reputation and meaning than on structural system hierarchies.

Due to its broad scope, the current prevalence of citizen journalism is hard to quantify. Yet, with most traditional media accepting some form or other of citizen participation in their content, and the explosion of citizen expression in the blogosphere (where millions of active Internet blogs are doubling every 6 months), the contribution of citizen journalism to the news environment is substantial, and the potential for its continued growth is high. Some prominent examples of the contribution of citizen journalism to the new news environment can be found in the leading discursive role of Ohmynews (www.ohmynews.com) in the 2003 presidential election in South Korea, the on-spot reporting of Hurricane Katrina, and alternative news source functions in the "Rathergate" case in 2005.

To characterize this vast scope of citizen journalism practices, multiple dimensions have to be considered. One dimension is the level of citizen participation in the news production process. On one side of this spectrum would be mainstream media institutions that systematically incorporate the views expressed by the readers in response to their articles in the forms of comments or other city issues in the form of citizen blogs. Along these lines, increased citizen participation would include the opening of the editorial process for citizen review as well as citizen contributions in reporting and editorial decision, as exemplified by the Spokane Spokesman Review (www.spokemanreview.com). On the other side of this spectrum are news media that rely fully on the citizen contributors for editorial decisions and contents production, such as Wikinews (www.wikinews.org) as well as most independent blogs.

In terms of content, citizen journalism projects alternate fact-oriented reporting of locally based participants in the context of a global network, as well as self-expression of opinion. For example, Ohmynews uses a collaboration model where a professional writing and editing staff of 60 people work together with over 43,000 citizen journalists that write news reports for their initial Korean version as well as for their two new International and Japanese versions. The other side of this content dimension would be exemplified by the millions of blogs that are devoted to opinion expression, rather than fact-oriented reporting.

In terms of the interaction between media and society, citizen journalism can be categorized by its relationship with the target community. Projects target from small local communities, through metropolitan areas such as the *Twin Cities Daily Planet* (www.tcdailyplanet.net) or the *Voice of San Diego* (www.voiceofsandiego.org) to the global efforts of Wikinews and Ohmynews International. Also, their content can be characterized in terms of an inclination to build local identity or one aimed at solving civic problems. The *Gotham Gazette* (www.gothamgazette.com) in New York is one example of a metropolitan-level civic-inclined citizen journalism project, whereas the blog-based Baristanet (www.baristanet.com) in Montclair, New Jersey, aims to reach a smaller community and focuses instead on local identity.

The potentials and weaknesses of citizen journalism are being widely discussed, though mainly on the normative level. The main critiques come from the advocates of traditional journalism arguing citizen journalism is short of or lacking journalistic ethics, reliability and quality of reporting, along with effective gatekeeping. On the other hand, practitioners of citizen journalism emphasize the democratic importance of alternate news sources, plurality of viewpoints, open discussion and bringing community networks closer to enhance public life. Efforts by citizen journalism advocates to address these criticisms include the mixed models of professional citizen collaboration and the training of citizens to enhance the quality of their writing and their reporting orientation (www.madisoncommons.org).

Of all the challenges that the citizen journalism movement faces, the most important is sustainability, which requires time, attention and skills from both the producers and contributors/readers. Because citizen journalism incorporates distributed participation from nonprofessional contributors, sustainability involves strong motivational issues which can be as complex as the financial ones, as demonstrated by Bayosphere's demise in San Francisco. The second challenge is quality control of the news articles in terms of accuracy as well as journalistic ethics. The third challenge refers to inclusion and to how to interconnect a broader community dialogue rather than an exponential series of monologues. The fourth challenge is that citizen journalism could accelerate the erosion of traditional journalism practices without replacing their function of bringing attention to core social problems and providing a rational reconstruction of social life.

Citizen journalism attempts to incorporate the values of open participation and discussion into the closed hierarchy of traditional journalism. Ultimately, what forms of citizen journalism will succeed is still an open question, one that depends on the lively ongoing efforts of citizen journalism projects all over the world. What is clear at this point is that citizen journalism offers an intriguing alternative to building a vital and vibrant public sphere.

Hernando Rojas and Nak ho Kim

See also Blogs, Blogging; Public Journalism

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Citizen Kane

Citizen Kane (1941), regarded by many to be one of the greatest motion pictures of all time, was the first feature film directed by Orson Welles (1915–1985). Its innovative use of narrative structure, camera angles, and deep focus photography marked the film as a groundbreaking effort in cinematic history. At the time of its release, the film was highly controversial for its alleged portrayal of newspaper publisher William Randolph Hearst (1863–1951). *Citizen Kane* recounts the life and death of a similarly powerful newspaper owner, Charles Foster Kane. In the film, Kane's deep-seated psychological flaws compel him to seek political influence through manipulation of the press, ultimately resulting in his defeat and disappointment.

Prior to his motion picture directorial debut, Orson Welles had received national notoriety for his 1938 *Mercury Theatre on the Air* radio production of Jules Verne's *The War of the Worlds.* This Halloween broadcast created panic among many radio listeners who thought the program's fictional news reports of a Martian invasion to be real. Because of his notoriety, RKO Pictures gave Welles an opportunity to direct his first motion picture and allowed him unprecedented artistic and thematic control. Welles utilized this opportunity to challenge the way classic Hollywood films were made. Welles studied the deep focus photography in John Ford's *Stagecoach* (1939) and employed its cinematographer, Greg Toland, to incorporate the technique in *Citizen Kane.* This technique allowed Welles to tell the story with fewer cuts, by utilizing longer takes of a single shot where all of the action remained in focus.

Screenwriters Welles and Herman J. Mankiewicz received Academy Awards for their work. The film's story centers on an investigation of Kane's deathbed utterance. During the course of this investigation, we learn of Kane's traumatic childhood removal from his parent's home after they strike it rich in silver mining, and of Kane's later establishment of a publishing empire. Seeking to substitute the public's love for that denied him by his parents, the adult Kane pledges to use his newspaper only to further the public good.

The increasingly influential Kane decides to run for governor but is caught in an extramarital affair with a young singer. Kane then uses his newspapers in an attempt to favorably recast the singer's musical ability. Ultimately, Kane loses the race, as well as his journalistic integrity. It is Kane's extramarital relationship that most nearly mirrored the life of Hearst, who also had conducted a long-term affair with a much younger motion picture performer, Marion Davies. Because of

his displeasure at the film's depictions, Hearst mounted an intense publicity campaign against *Citizen Kane,* which resulted in mediocre box office revenues and denied it victory in all but one Academy Awards category. Over the years, however, the film has grown in reputation. In 1998, The American Film Institute named *Citizen Kane* the greatest film of all time.

William Renkus

See also Film and Politics; *War of the Worlds, The*

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Civic Engagement

See Political Engagement

Civic Journalism

See Citizen Journalism; Public Journalism

Civil Rights Movement

Through marches, sit-ins, boycotts, songs, and speeches, the civil rights movement (1954–1972) challenged America's hypocrisy between its founding ideals of freedom and quality and its systemic disenfranchisement of African Americans. Two factors contributed to the movement's success: Gandhian nonviolent direct action, which shifted arguments over equality from legal abstractions to the individual protestors themselves; and its ability to capitalize upon media coverage to publicize the struggle for civil rights. Ruptures in three cities highlight this relationship between political and moral argument, nonviolence, and how the media framed civil rights.

Following the U.S. Supreme Court's *Brown v. Board of Education, Topeka, KS* (1954) decision, which stipulated that public schools should integrate with "all deliberate speed," movement leaders realized they could not wait for politicians to fulfill this legal promise. During the Montgomery Bus Boycott (1955–1956), African American domestic laborers and their supporters refused to ride the city's mass transit system. The economic pressure of the boycott caused the city's leaders to make concessions that, among other things, resulted in more equal treatment of African Americans aboard the city's buses. The symbolic gains of the boycott cannot be overstated: Participants had successfully called attention to the *de jure* segregation that pervaded Montgomery and reminded America of the inherent dignity and rights that should be accorded all of the country's citizens.

The momentum of Montgomery was checked 7 years later in Albany, Georgia. There, protestors encountered a white power structure that parried every thrust from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), an organization dedicated to voter registration and education. SNCC participants, seeking the desegregation of the city's transportation systems, as well its libraries, parks, and medical facilities, were outmaneuvered by Sheriff Laurie Pritchett, who used the threat of jail to demoralize participants and sequester city officials from having to concede to any demands.

If Albany signaled the movement's low point, its apogee came less than 2 years later, in June 1963, in Birmingham, Alabama. There, civil rights leaders punctuated a massive nonviolent campaign by using children to march against segregation. Like never before, the moral force of the movement was captured and framed through media portrayals of the brutality civil rights participants suffered. The images of women and children suffering dog attacks, the sting of fire hoses, and beatings by police mobilized public opinion. It was also in Birmingham where Martin Luther King, Jr., drafted his "Letter from Birmingham Jail," in which he justified the risks and rewards of nonviolent direct action.

In late August 1963, the movement held its largest gathering in Washington, D.C. Over the course of 3 days, people from across the United States gathered to demonstrate for equal rights and equal treatment under the law. The event was punctuated by numerous speeches from the movement's leadership; none was more eloquent than King's "I Have a Dream."

Signing of the Voting Rights Act, August 6, 1965. President Lyndon B. Johnson moves to shake hands with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., while others look on. Lyndon Baines Johnson has been credited with being one of the most important figures in the civil rights movement.

Source: LBJ Library photo by Yoichi R. Yokamoto.

But the energy and wonder from those August days did not last. In September 1963, four African American girls were murdered when the 16th Avenue Baptist Church in Birmingham was bombed. In June 1964, voter registration workers Andrew Goodman, Michael Schrewner, and James Chaney were murdered in Mississippi. Malcolm X was assassinated in February 1965. James Meredith's march across Mississippi in 1966 for civil rights instead highlighted the tensions within the movement between nonviolence and Black Power. With King's assassination in April 1968, the remainder of the 1960s and the early 1970s saw a movement mired in dissonance, no longer able to hold the nation's moral center. It never recovered.

Researchers have examined the movement through three lenses. Following the examples of Claybourne Carson and Aldon Morris, scholars have viewed the civil rights movement through a grassroots perspective, focusing upon the words and actions of so-called ordinary persons who were instrumental in helping the movement meet its goals. A second lens has focused upon the major leaders of the movement, from Martin Luther King, Jr., to Ella Baker to Malcolm X, plumbing their respective intellectual contributions to social protest and American civic ideals. Finally, researchers have examined the symbolic dimensions of the Movement, undertaking analyses of how argument, metaphor, and other linguistic devices were marshaled to fashion public understandings of equality, justice, and democracy. Scholars also have worked diligently to recover the primary voices from the movement in volumes of collected speeches.

The civil rights movement stands as the most successful social protest of the 20th century. This success may be attributed to the ways it communicated its messages of equality, dignity, and hope against cries of racism, violence, states' rights, and public indifference. Words, music, and images together made a picture of moral clarity from which America could not look away.

Jeffrey B. Kurtz

See also King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Minorities, Role in Politics; Race in Politics; Segregation

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Clinton, Hillary Rodham (1947–)

Hillary Rodham Clinton was born in Chicago, Illinois. After growing up in Park Ridge, Illinois, Rodham Clinton graduated from Wellesley College and went on to attend Yale Law School. Rodham Clinton accomplished many firsts. She was the first First Lady to hold a postgraduate degree and to have her own professional career. She was the first First Lady to be elected to the U.S. Senate. She was the first woman to be a major political party's front runner for nomination as the party's presidential candidate.

After Bill Clinton was elected president in 1992, Rodham Clinton was appointed to head the Task Force on National Health Care Reform. As the head of this task force, Rodham Clinton spearheaded the president's complex proposal that never received enough support for a floor vote in either the House or the Senate. Rodham Clinton's active role as an advisor to the president was often cause for both criticism and praise for the administration.

Rodham Clinton was also the first First Lady to be subpoenaed to testify before a Federal Grand Jury in connection to the Whitewater affair, but she never faced criminal charges related to Whitewater. Rodham Clinton played a role in a public sex scandal at the White House. During the scandal related to Bill Clinton's extramarital affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky, Rodham Clinton remained steadfast in her commitment to the president.

As First Lady, Rodham Clinton supported women's rights and children's welfare around the world. She was one of a limited number of international figures who spoke out against the treatment of women in Afghanistan by the Taliban. As her time as First Lady drew to a close, Rodham Clinton turned her attention to competing for the U.S. Senate seat being vacated by retiring Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan.

In her campaign for the Senate, Rodham Clinton had to overcome accusations of carpetbagging, as she had never lived in New York and had never participated in the state's politics. She launched a "listening tour" during which she visited every county in the state. The race garnered much national attention, and Rodham Clinton eventually won the election.

Rodham Clinton sits on five Senate committees with nine subcommittee assignments. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Rodham Clinton worked to generate funds for the recovery efforts in her state as well as improvements to the security efforts in New York. Rodham Clinton strongly supported military action in Afghanistan and also voted in favor of the Iraq War Resolution. After the Iraq War began, she visited both Iraq and Afghanistan. Rodham Clinton has criticized President Bush's pledge to stay indefinitely but has said that immediate withdrawal from Iraq would be a mistake.

In 2004, Rodham Clinton announced she would seek reelection to the Senate in 2006. In a race against John Spencer, former mayor of Yonkers, Rodham Clinton spent more money than any other Senate candidate in the 2006 race and easily won reelection. Soon after that race concluded, the excitement over a possible presidential bid for the Senator and former First Lady escalated.

Rumors and speculation about the possibilities of her candidacy can be seen as early as an October 2002 *New York Times* article. Rodham Clinton used her campaign Web site to announce her presidential candidacy on January 20, 2007, with the formation of a presidential exploratory committee. In early 2007, Rodham Clinton led the field of Democratic candidates for president, with Illinois Senator Barack Obama and former North Carolina Senator John Edwards being her closest competition. Rodham Clinton's campaign for the Democratic nomination will be the largest bid for a presidential nomination conducted by a woman. Her career of firsts may continue into the White House.

Abby Gail LeGrange

See also Clinton, William Jefferson

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Clinton, William Jefferson (1946–)

William Jefferson Clinton was the 42nd president of the United States. He held office from 1993 to 2001. Prior to his election as president, Clinton served one term as Arkansas attorney general (1977–1979). He was governor of Arkansas for 5 terms, elected in 1978, lost in 1980, and reelected in 1982, 1984, 1986, and 1990. Clinton was among the wave of young progressive Southern Democrats who began to change the face of the Old South.

In 1992, Clinton won the presidency, defeating incumbent George H. W. Bush and Reform Party candidate Ross Perot with 43% of the popular vote. He was reelected in 1996, defeating Republican Robert Dole and Ross Perot with 49% of the popular vote.

As the first post-cold war president, Clinton campaigned on domestic issues. The phrase—"It's the economy, stupid"—became the mantra of his 1992 campaign staff. Many of his major failures and accomplishments involved domestic initiatives. The administration failed to pass a national health care proposal, but Clinton succeeded in winning congressional passage of welfare reform legislation and in balancing the budget with the largest surplus in U.S. history. During his presidency, the country experienced robust economic growth fueled by emerging computer technologies. Clinton signed the controversial 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Despite this domestic emphasis, his administration faced vexing foreign policy challenges. The United States intervened militarily in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. In addition, terrorist attacks escalated during the Clinton presidency. These attacks included the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1996 military apartment bombing in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 African embassy bombings, and the 2000 bombing of the *USS Cole* in Yemen. These terrorist actions culminated on September 11, 2001, after Clinton left office.

For students of political communication, Clinton is a compelling figure because of his populist story, his reinvention of a Democratic centrist discourse, his rhetorical vision of racial reconciliation, his weathering of scandal, and the overlap of his presidency with the emerging new media.

Telling the Clinton Story

Clinton's telling of his own story was an important element of his appeal. The 1992 biographical campaign film, *A Man From Hope,* chronicled Clinton's life. In the film Clinton's oft-checkered personal life is replaced with a persona of a loving husband and father. His wife Hillary, his mother Virginia Kelley, his mother-in-law Dorothy Rodham, and his daughter Chelsea, along with Bill himself, are the principal speakers. The film was photographed in Clinton's own home. The warm, domestic imagery, accentuated by the use of soft focus, is an example of the increasingly intimate presentation of political candidates.

The campaign narrative emphasized Clinton's modest upbringing in small-town Arkansas and his difficult childhood growing up with a single mother and, later, an alcoholic stepfather. Clinton overcame these obstacles and attended Georgetown University, became a Rhodes Scholar, and graduated from Yale Law School. His biography is a populist retelling of the Lincoln log cabin and Horatio Alger myths. This story stood in stark contrast with the incumbent president's privileged New England background.

This portrayal participated in and critiqued the Republican rhetoric of "family values." Clinton's less than idyllic boyhood and his own subsequent success stood as a repudiation of this often judgmental discourse. This framing of family provided Clinton with a sympathetic explanation of his own frequently troubled marriage. In this story, Bill and Hillary are virtuous for staying together and overcoming their difficulties.

Centrist Politics and the Rhetoric of the "New Covenant"

In his 1992 Democratic National Convention address, Clinton articulated the centrist ideology of the New Democrats. He spoke of "a new approach to government, a government that offers more empowerment and less entitlement. . . . A government that is leaner, not meaner; a government that expands opportunity, not bureaucracy; a government that understands that jobs must come from growth in a vibrant and vital system of

free enterprise." He called for a "'New Covenant"—"a solemn agreement between the people and their government based not simply on what each of us can take but what all of us must give to our nation."

Clinton distanced himself from the liberal policies of the Great Society. As a founding member of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), he was dedicated to reviving the Democratic Party through the adoption of centrist policies. In his presidential memoir, he described the DLC as a group committed to "forging a winning message . . . based on fiscal responsibility, creative new ideas on social policy, and a commitment to a strong national defense."

Clinton distinguished his vision from conservative Republican policies. His message emphasized government investment in education, infrastructure, and research. He did not favor the trickle-down, supply-side economics of Reaganism. His campaign characterized the Reagan-Bush era as a new Gilded Age in which the rich prospered at the expense of the middle class. "For too long," he told the 1992 convention delegates, "those who play by the rules and keep the faith have gotten the shaft, and those who cut corners and cut deals have been rewarded."

Welfare reform was a prominent public policy expression of the "New Covenant." In the 1996 State of the Union address, Clinton promised to "end welfare as we know it." The legislation, which put a time limit on welfare benefits and established work incentives, embodied the ideology of the New Democrats. This 1996 act was bitterly opposed by the liberal wing of Clinton's own party and embraced by many Republican members of Congress.

This new centrist rhetoric had a significant influence abroad. Tony Blair and his aides attended closely to the positions Clinton promulgated in his effort to move the Democratic Party to the center. Blair followed a similar path in moderating the socialist impulses of the British Labor Party.

The Discourse of Racial Reconciliation

In 1998, Nobel Laureate Toni Morrison named Clinton the "first black president." She wrote that he "displays every trope of blackness: single-parent household, born poor, working-class, saxophone-playing, MacDonald's-and-junk-food-loving boy from Arkansas." She believed the scrutiny of Clinton's sex life resembled the stereotypes and double standards blacks have historically endured. In 2001, members of the Congressional Black Caucus honored Clinton as the "first black president."

Clinton trumpeted the theme of racial reconciliation in some of his most memorable public speeches. On November 13, 1993, he spoke to 5,000 African American ministers at the site of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s final sermon. "I've looked out," he told the Memphis audience, ". . . over this vast crowd and I see people I've known for years." As a Southern Baptist, Clinton was comfortable with the preaching style of the black church. It is difficult to imagine another white politician feeling comfortable asking a black congregation, "If Martin Luther King . . . were to reappear by my side today and give us a report card on the last 25 years, what would he say?" Clinton delivered a pointed answer, "'I fought for freedom,' he would say, 'but not for the freedom of people to kill each other with reckless abandon, not for the freedom of children to have children and the fathers of the children walk away from them and abandon them as if they don't amount to anything. . . . This is not what I lived and died for.'" At the conclusion of Clinton's speech, he called for a partnership between government and the black church. "We will, somehow, by God's grace," he said, ". . . will turn this around. We will give these children a future. . . . We will take away their despair and give them hope."

On May 16, 1997, the president spoke from the White House Rose Garden and apologized to African Americans for their government's complicity in the Tuskegee syphilis experiments. "Men," he said, ". . . without resources and with few alternatives . . . believed they had found hope when they were offered free medical care by the United States Public Health Service. They were betrayed."

Clinton devoted considerable energy appealing to his African American constituents. In every year of his presidency he delivered a speech to the Congressional Black Caucus. In 1998, he commemorated the 35th anniversary of the March on Washington. In 1999, he presented Rosa Parks with the Congressional Medal of Honor. After leaving the White House in 2001, he located the Clinton Foundation headquarters in Harlem.

Scandals, Impeachment, and Image Restoration

Scandal enveloped the Clinton presidency. These incidents ranged from minor missteps, such as the 1993 misuse of the White House travel office, the 1996

improper access to FBI security-clearance documents, and the 2001 last-day pardons of some seemingly unworthy recipients, to major charges of wrongdoing, which included the Whitewater and the Monica Lewinsky investigations.

In 1979, Bill and Hillary Clinton invested in the Whitewater Development Corporation, an Arkansas real estate venture. In 1992, *The New York Times* published material critical of the Clintons' land dealings. In 1994, the Attorney General Janet Reno appointed a special prosecutor to investigate the Whitewater matter. In 2000, the special prosecutor concluded that there were insufficient grounds to file charges.

In November 1995, the president became involved in an improper relationship with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Upon public exposure in 1998, this revelation sparked a scandal that consumed Clinton's second term of office.

On May 6, 1994, Paula Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, filed a sexual harassment lawsuit against Clinton regarding his conduct while governor of Arkansas. On January 7, 1998, Lewinsky filed an affidavit in the Jones case denying a sexual relationship with Clinton.

Lewinsky had confided in friend and coworker Linda Tripp about her affair with Clinton. Tripp had taped her telephone conversations with Lewinsky. In October 1997, Tripp gave these tapes to Michael Isikoff of *Newsweek.* The magazine delayed publishing information on the alleged affair. Later, when Tripp learned of Lewinsky's false affidavit in January 1998, she contacted the office of Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. On January 17, 1998, the same day that Clinton gave his deposition in the Jones lawsuit denying any sexual involvement with Lewinsky, *Drudge Report,* a news Web site, reported that *Newsweek* "killed a story that was destined to shake official Washington to its foundation." The following day Matt Drudge identified Monica Lewinsky. On January 21, *The Washington Post* published the story.

On January 26, 1998, Clinton proclaimed at a White House press conference, "I want to say one thing to the American people. . . . I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky. I never told anyone to lie, not a single time; never. These allegations are false."

On August 17, 1998, Clinton became the first sitting president to testify before a grand jury investigating misconduct. In his testimony, he admitted to a sexual relationship with Lewinsky. Later that evening, the president delivered a national address of slightly over 500 words. Clinton took responsibility for the "inappropriate relationship" and for having misled people, but he maintained that he had he not asked anyone to lie, destroy evidence, or take any unlawful action. In the final section, he criticized the Independent Counsel for carrying out an investigation of 20-year-old business dealings and then had moved into unrelated matters involving his private life. Clinton insisted that this matter was between him, his family, and his God.

That same year, Clinton gave two subsequent addresses on August 28 in Martha's Vineyard and on September 11 at the National Prayer Breakfast. These three rhetorical efforts have received considerable scholarly attention as instances of political image repair.

On December 19, 1998, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives forwarded two articles of impeachment—perjury before the grand jury and obstruction of justice—to the United States Senate. On February 12, 1999, the Senate rejected both articles of impeachment. Although Clinton's conduct was unfortunate, it was generally believed that it did not rise to the level of "high crimes and misdemeanors." Interestingly, Clinton's public approval ratings stayed well above 50% during this period.

The impeachment and its aftermath have engendered an ongoing debate about the boundaries between the public and private lives of politicians. The increasing intimacy of American politics has faded the old lines between the official and the personal.

The Emerging New Media and Politics

The Clinton presidency coincided with a changing media environment. The conservative talk-radio era began in earnest with the national syndication of the *Rush Limbaugh Show* in 1988. By 1993, the Internet had gained critical mass. In 1996, MSNBC and Fox News joined CNN as providers of 24-hour cable news programming.

The *Drudge Report* first reported Clinton's affair with Lewinsky. The scandal became a mainstay of emergent new broadcast media. In this environment, conspiracy stories circulated about the Clintons. These controversies included their alleged involvement in the murder of presidential aide Vince Foster and Bill Clinton's serial promiscuity assisted by Arkansas state troopers.

Critics have examined the Clinton presidency through a postmodern lens. Whether talking of "boxers

or briefs" on MTV, playing saxophone on *Arsenio Hall,* or being represented as a character type in *The West Wing, Primary Colors, Wag the Dog,* and *The American President,* Clinton's image was obviously constructed from both material and simulated discourses.

Clinton and the Post-Presidency

Clinton's post-presidency has focused on four areas: bringing economic opportunity to the poor, promoting education and citizen service for young people, fighting HIV/AIDS, and advancing religious, racial, and ethnic reconciliation. Clinton is most recognized for his HIV/AIDS efforts in Africa and joining former President George H. W. Bush in fundraising for tsunami relief in Asia and for Hurricane Katrina victims in the United States.

Clinton's post-presidential years are strongly connected to his wife's rise to political prominence. Hillary was elected U.S. Senator from New York in 2000 and 2006. She is a frontrunner for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination. Positioned as a moderate, Senator Clinton is the heir to her husband's political legacy.

Ronald Lee and Kane M. Click

See also Clinton, Hillary Rodham; Lewinsky, Monica; Political Advertising

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CNN (Cable News Network)

The Cable News Network (CNN), a division of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., a Time Warner Company, is a major global news network that delivers 24-hour news around the world via satellite and cable television outlets. Founded in June 1980 by Ted Turner, the network currently has 24 networks and services, including CNN Headline News, CNN/U.S., CNN International, and CNN.com.

CNN dominates international news coverage thanks to a series of dramatic events that occurred in the post-cold war era, such as the Rwanda genocide in 1994 that killed almost 1 million people, the Chinese government's crackdown on prodemocracy demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989, the collapse of East Germany's Communist regime with the Berlin Wall, and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union.

However, it was with the first live war in the Persian Gulf that CNN emerged as a major global actor in international relations as well as global news coverage. Though the government warned American correspondents to get out of Baghdad, CNN aired the voices of three correspondents, Peter Arnett, John Holliman, and Bernard Shaw, from a Baghdad hotel as they described the sights and sounds of the missile and bomber attacks. Its successful coverage inspired other news networks and agencies to challenge the dominance of the big three American television networks (at that time, CBS, NBC, ABC). For example, in January 1995, BBC launched BBC World, a 24-hour international news channel. In 1996, Al Jazeera, financed by the state of Qatar, was started as the independent Arab news channel and has quickly become the most widely watched television network in the Arab world.

Interestingly, the term "CNN Effect" was coined in an anecdotal story that appeared in *The New York*

Times regarding the impact of CNN's coverage of the Persian Gulf War on the lodging industry. Some scholars have extended the meaning of the CNN Effect, suggesting that the coverage of CNN and other global news networks has influenced global international relations and policy/decision making. Those who study the "CNN Effect" pay special attention to CNN's compelling images that have evoked emotional outcries. They assume that those images force policymakers to intervene militarily in humanitarian crises. However, it is difficult to verify whether the impact on policymakers' decision-making process can be solely attributed to the coverage from CNN. Some anecdotal stories do lend credence to this theory, however. For instance, George Bush, Sr. said that he learned more from watching CNN than from listening to the C.I.A.

CNN now faces numerous challenges from both domestic and foreign competitors. Indeed, its growth has stalled owing to competition from other cable news channels, especially Fox News, established in 1996 by Rupert Murdoch. The Annual Report on American Journalism in 2006 indicated that Fox News not only has taken viewers from other news channels but also that the network has a more loyal audience that watches for longer periods of time.

Joon Soo Lim

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Coburg-Gotha, Simeon Saxe (1937–)

Simeon II was the Bulgarian monarch from 1943 to 1946. Also known as Simeon Borisov Sakskoburggotski, he served as prime minister of Bulgaria from 2001 to 2005 and is leader of the party National Movement for Simeon the Second.

Simeon II was heir to the crown of Tsar Boris III (1894–1943) and Tsarina Giovanna (1907–2000), daughter of the Italian King Victor Emmanuel III (1869–1947). On his father's side he is a descendent of the Saxe-Coburg and Gotha line. He was the last Tsar of the Third Bulgarian Kingdom, which, because of his young age, was ruled on his behalf by a Regency Council. After the monarchy was abolished by the 1946 Referendum (its validity is still being disputed), the royal family was expelled from the country without any Act of Abdication or Deposition, though Simeon II was allowed to keep his Bulgarian citizenship. He and his family went to Egypt and in 1951 settled in Spain, where he became involved in business and consultancy. After coming of age (1955), Simeon II proclaimed himself a Tsar in line with the 1884 Turnovo Constitution of Bulgaria. However, the proposals for a referendum to restore the monarchy in the country never gained any large-scale support.

In Madrid, Simeon II graduated from Lycée Francais, and studied law and political sciences. He is married to the Spanish aristocrat Dona Margarita Gomez-Acebo y Cejuela (born 1935), and they have four sons and one daughter. After half a century of exile Simeon II came to Bulgaria for the first time in 1996 and was enthusiastically hailed in all towns and villages on his tour. He had great plans to become involved in Bulgarian politics and ran in the 2001 presidential elections but was impeded by the decision of the Constitutional Court that he had not lived permanently in the country in the last 5 years. In April 2001 he created the political organization, National Movement for Simeon the Second (NMSS) and 3 months later won a staggering victory at the parliamentary elections. Simeon II headed the 85th Government of Bulgaria (2001–2005) in coalition with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (the invariable power balancer in the country after 1989). The major achievements of his government were the adoption of the country by NATO (2004) and the

signing of the Accession Act of the European Union (2005). During his term most of the nationalized royal estates were restored. NMSS ranked 2nd in the 2005 parliamentary elections and together with MRF were represented in the coalition cabinet, headed by winner BSP. The first Bulgarian EU Commissioner comes from the ranks of NMSS: Meglena Kouneva (born 1957), minister for European affairs and chief negotiator for Bulgaria with the EU.

Lilia Raycheva

See also Bulgaria, Democratization

Collor de Mello, Fernando (1949–)

Fernando Collor de Mello was the president of Brazil from 1990 to 1992. Collor was a reporter and heir of a communication company, as well as the founder of the *Partido da Reconstrucao Nacional—PRN* (National Reconstruction Party). Collor was the first president of Brazil elected by popular vote since 1960.

Collor's objective was well known to the Brazilian electorate. During his political campaign, he portrayed himself as the *cacador de marajas,* a person who would combat inflation and corruption and defend the poor. His entire political campaign involved the divulgation of these characteristics. In addition, due to his enthusiasm in combating corruption in Brazil, he was portrayed by the media as a young, vigorous candidate. Collor always tried to maintain a good relationship with the media because he knew the media were the channel to communicating with the electorate. As a result, he became known by the electorate through newspapers, magazines, and TV stations.

On his second day in office, Collor announced the *Plano Collor* (Collor Plan), which aimed to reorganize the national economy. Because of the plan, prices and salaries were frozen temporarily, consumers' checking and savings accounts were confiscated by the government, and layoffs in the government and privatizations of public companies were implemented to reduce wasted government funds. In addition, the plan established that people who had money in the bank could only withdraw a certain amount instituted by the government.

The objective of the *Plano Collor* was to stop government spending, prevent inflation, and modernize the economy. Although the confiscation drastically reduced inflation, it also triggered an economic recession, a collapse in industrial production, the closure of industries, and an increase in unemployment.

At the end of 1990, a second plan was employed to stop the economic recession: the *Plano Collor II* (Collor Plan II). This plan failed to accomplish its objectives as well, and led the country deeper into an economic recession and aggravated current social problems.

In 1992, Collor's brother revealed a network of corruption in Collor's government that led to investigations by the National Congress and the press. In September of 1992, the Chamber of Deputies authorized the Senate to press charges against Collor, accusing him of corruption and announcing his impeachment. Throughout the country several rallies took place to support the impeachment of the president. During this period, students formed their own rallies and painted their faces with green and yellow. This movement was known as *Os Caras Pintadas* (The Painted Faces).

In December of 1992, Collor resigned as president of Brazil hours before the Senate declared him guilty of corruption. Because of his impeachment, Collor was not allowed to run for any political position for 8 years.

Juliana de Brum Fernandes

See also Brazil, Media and the Political System

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Comejo, Peter

See Nader, Ralph

Commander in Chief

The short-lived evening drama, *Commander in Chief,* lifted the glass ceiling from the White House for President Mackenzie Allen, played by Oscar-winning actress Geena Davis. As the standing vice president of the United States, Mackenzie Allen is promoted to the oval office following the death of President Bridges, played by Will Lyman. Mackenzie Allen's ascent is marred by controversy as the dying president and Allen's entire party ask for her resignation. The pilot focuses on the difficult decision Allen must make: to comply with the wishes of her own party or take the oath of office. Episode plots are driven by numerous events that explore potential problems often associated with women in leadership positions and potential concerns political constituents may have with respect to women in high-level political positions. Many of the episodes explore the challenging roles President Mackenzie faces serving as the commander in chief, mother, and wife simultaneously. In addition, her family must adjust to their new roles as the children of a standing president and the First Gentleman. The drama explored in this series questions the conflicting roles, stereotypes, and assumptions the characters, and general public, may hold about women in leadership positions.

The pilot aired on September 27, 2005, and the final episode aired on June 6, 2006. *Commander in Chief* opened with rave reviews a large audience. It drew national attention to the possibility of a woman being elected to serve as the commander in chief of the United States, and particularly to the political viability of Hillary Clinton and Condoleezza Rice. The early episodes of the show attracted an audience of 14.7 million viewers, and these high numbers were attractive to advertisers. Geena Davis received a Golden Globe Award for Best Performance by an Actress in a Television Series, Drama. Donald Sutherland also received acclaim in the role of the president's constant antagonist, the Speaker of the House in the series. Although the series practically exploded onto the air, it quickly lost an audience and was plagued by production and directorial changes. The show received high initial ratings from a select audience during its short run and was considered by many to be a potential counterpoint to the popular *West Wing* series on NBC. Rod Lurie, responsible for the writing and directing of the first three episodes (exclusively and in partnership with others) was replaced by numerous executives, which also affected the continuity and viability of the series.

Jerry Miller

Further Readings

Commander in Chief Web site: http://abc.go.com/primetime/commanderinchief/summaries/overview.html

Commentary, Political

Political commentary is a journalistic genre in press, radio, television, and Internet where journalists analyze or discuss current events. Political commentary often appears in news contexts but is also frequently in opinion sections in newspapers and in special programs or shows in broadcast media. Notably, it has become more common to see political commentaries by non-journalists, such as lobbyists and former politicians.

Political commentary has been an important aspect of political journalism in most democratic countries. Besides the informative role of providing political news and mirroring alternative political positions, the argumentative role of journalists to comment or analyze political developments has been widely acknowledged as a basic professional function and a necessary complement to objective reporting. Comparative studies of journalist perceptions of political commentary show that a majority in most countries considers the analytical function of the media to be important or very important.

The political commentary has similarities to both news and views pieces in the media; like editorials and debate articles it expresses opinions, and like news articles it focuses on current events. However, the distinctive feature of the political commentary is its free role of commenting and expressing opinions about what is going on in society, without a declared political party affiliation or an ideologically consistent perspective in the long run. Political commentators do evaluate parties or candidates but not with the intention of changing public opinion in a certain political direction.

Historically, the strengths of such commentary-oriented journalism have varied in different parts of

the world. Media systems in continental Europe, and especially in the Mediterranean area, have been characterized by political parallelism, with strong advocacy journalism, a more active journalistic role, and a party press system reflecting the institutional ties between media and politics. In liberal media systems, such as the United States and Britain, political commentary was initially more controversial with regard to existing professional and neutral journalistic values. However, political commentary soon developed as a natural part of more market-oriented media systems.

Today, political commentary appears frequently in most media systems around the world, and it is a distinct feature of contemporary political communication. The global rise of the commentary function of the media has different explanations. In times of declining political trust in the most advanced democracies, the neutral reporting position has come under pressure and encouraged a more active and critical journalistic role. Furthermore, structural media changes, such as increased competition, commercialization and production demands, have facilitated the transformation of journalists and journalistic formats toward a more interpretative and speculative direction.

Gradually, television has developed as the most important arena for the political commentary in modern democracies. Commentaries appear in both ordinary daily newscasts and in special weekly television shows focusing on current affairs. One form of television journalism with its roots in political commentary is the so-called punditocracy, a term first developed by the American columnist Eric Alterman, who describes a special group of political commentators in television offering inside political opinions and forecasts in the elite national media. The concept of "political pundit" has become central when explaining the rapid development of political commentary as somewhat of an opinion industry in media societies.

The political commentary is nowadays a prominent feature of election campaign news, in the form of news analysis pieces in newspapers, journalists interviewing journalists, sections in broadcast media, and blogs on the Internet. The analyst's role, further strengthened by the more frequent use of opinion polls, has come to overshadow other journalistic functions. Such commenting on polls is a fairly easy type of political journalism, not too expansive and with great possibilities to dramatize the stories and attract the audience. One main explanation for this coverage is that a focus on the "horse race" and comments on polls often avoids the accusations of being biased, as the polls reflect a constructed picture of reality form which interpretations can be drawn. Another explanation is the desire by newspaper columnists and broadcast commentators to demonstrate their skills and to be recognized for their success in predicting election outcomes.

The political commentary is not uncontroversial. Some research indicates that the distinction between news and views has become more obscure in modern media culture. This kind of material often appears in conjunction with news, without being explicitly labeled as news analysis or commentary, thus making it more difficult to be recognized by the public. Today, opinion journalism coexists with objective journalism in most parts of the world, sometimes clearly differentiated, but sometimes mixed more freely. Generally, political commentary is characterized by the lack of a recognizable code of ethics.

Similarly, research has focused on the effects of the rise of the 24-hour news cycle and the increased media competition for public attention. In order to fill the news hole and attract the audience, there is a constant need for provocative, deviating and entertaining political commentary. Content analyses of political commentators confirm that appearance on television encourages extreme opinions, shortcuts and entertainment values. This has raised a debate whether such political commentaries actually represent and serve the public or mislead and distort public opinion.

The defense of the political commentary often focuses on the fact that these kinds of analyses and interpretations in the media actually offer greater opportunities to understand complex societal issues. The argument is based on the need for guidelines and recommendations in a more complex society, which enables the public to be increasingly aware of the majority of the issues. This is perceived as particularly important, as journalistic communication in general is increasingly 'chaotic' in its structure and effects.

Finally, the degrees of effect that political commentary has on public opinion are disputed, but some research indicates a very strong effect. An American study comparing different factors influencing changes in public opinion found that political commentators were the most important category, along with popular presidents.

Lars W. Nord

See also Editorials; Journalism, Political; News Coverage of Politics; Pundits; Punditry

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Commercial Speech

See Federal Trade Commission

Commission on Presidential Debates

The Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD) has sponsored U.S. general election presidential debates since 1988. The CPD's stated mission is found on its Web site (www.debates.org):

> The Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD) was established in 1987 to ensure that debates, as a permanent part of every general election, provide the best possible information to viewers and listeners. Its primary purpose is to sponsor and produce debates for the United States presidential and vice presidential candidates and to undertake research and educational activities relating to the debates. The organization . . . is a nonprofit, nonpartisan corporation.

As noted in the mission statement, the CPD was formed in 1987. The then chairs of the Republican and Democratic National Committees, Frank Fahrenkopf and Paul Kirk, created the Commission based on recommendations from two studies—the 1985 National Election Study and a 1986 Twentieth Century Fund study of presidential debates chaired by former Federal Communications Commission chair Newton Minow. Both concluded that presidential debates needed to be institutionalized and that a new entity, with the sole purpose of sponsoring general election presidential debates, should be formed. The recommendations included having the two parties start the Commission as a way of ensuring participation by candidates. Although the party chairs were involved in the CPD's formation, the political parties have no relationship to the CPD because it was chartered as a nonprofit, nonpartisan 501(c)(3) education organization.

Currently, Fahrenkopf and Kirk continue to chair the CPD and are guided by 10 directors. An executive director oversees the day-to-day functioning of the CPD and the production of the debates. As a 501(c)(3), the CPD cannot accept funds from political organizations, and it does not participate in any partisan activities, nor does it lobby. Funding to run the CPD and to produce the debates comes from private funding sources. Examples of past sponsors include the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), American Airlines, Discovery Channel, the Ford Foundation, the Century Fund, and the Knight Foundation. Communities bid for the opportunity to host a debate and are also required to raise local funds to offset costs of the production. Information on how to be a debate site is also found on the CPD's Web site.

In addition to staging general election presidential and vice presidential debates, the CPD also engages in a variety of voter education projects. Its most prominent is DebateWatch. Through a set of over 100 voter education partners, the CPD has enabled researchers to gather reactions to the debates in both survey and focus group formats. The CPD has relied on academic research in preparing its formats. The CPD has also sponsored a variety of forums after the debates at which panelists, campaign staffers, and academic researchers discussed the impact of the debates and how to improve them in subsequent election cycles. The CPD staff has produced a video and print material to assist sponsors of local and state debates and has advised the media in new democracies on how to develop their own debate traditions.

Although the CPD has successfully produced debates since 1988, thus achieving the goal of institutionalizing

debates, the process has not been without its problems or detractors. Because candidates stage campaigns independent of even party control, it is difficult for an entity such as the CPD to guarantee that candidates will debate or will debate on the dates selected and with the formats proposed. With the exception of 2000, the CPD was not at the negotiating table with the candidates when they either accepted or rejected the CPD's proposal, and the debate over the debates has occurred in each cycle. Although the CPD has no direct ties to political parties, it is referred to as bi-partisan rather than non-partisan by most media because of its origins and its co-chairs' identification with the major parties. Even though the CPD put Ross Perot into the 1992 debates, it has been criticized for not providing minor party and independent candidates with an equal opportunity for participation even though they currently use the same criteria that the League of Women Voters used when they sponsored debates.

Despite criticisms, the record shows that the CPD successfully produced debates over five election cycles that introduced new formats, emphasized voter education and research, and included citizen participants. The CPD has preserved the historical record of all televised general election debates on its Web site and, through a series of interviews with debate participants, provided material for a Public Broadcasting System (PBS) special in 2000.

Diana B. Carlin

See also Debates; DebateWatch

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Communications Act of 1934

The Communications Act of 1934 and its amendments is the foundation upon which contemporary U.S. telecommunication policy is built. The 1934 act borrowed heavily from the Radio Act of 1927, a temporary measure when it was passed, intended to stabilize the burgeoning but chaotic radio industry of the mid-1920s. The 1927 act was written into the 1934 act, adding communications via common carrier and television.

The Radio Act of 1927

By the early 1920s radio was a worldwide craze. Public demand for receivers was high with technology available to nearly everyone to make their own home-made receiver. New radio stations were signing on at a rapidly accelerating rate simply because they could; the Radio Act of 1912 declared the secretary of commerce to be the regulatory authority over radio, but the secretary was compelled by law to issue licenses to all who applied for one. In 1922 there were 5 radio stations on the air; in 1923 there were 556. To avoid interference with other stations, broadcasters changed frequencies, raised operating power, and/or moved their facilities. The result was an industry headed for mutually assured destruction. Attempts at self-regulation failed in a series of radio conferences convened at the behest of then–Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover.

The Radio Act of 1927 was enacted on February 23 to address the crisis. The legislation conceptualized radio broadcasting as an industry in its own right, not as a means of point-to-point communication or as a means of ensuring public safety (as did the Wireless Ship Act of 1910 and the Radio Act of 1912). The 1927 act created a five-member Federal Radio Commission (FRC) with the discretionary authority the secretary of commerce lacked under the 1912 act. Commissioners were nominated by the president of the United States and confirmed by Congress and served overlapping terms to maintain operational continuity. No more than three commissioners were permitted to represent any single political party. The FRC was to share regulatory authority with the secretary of commerce (although authority was never vested in the secretary of commerce) and after 1 year the FRC was to sunset, leaving the secretary of commerce as the sole regulatory authority. Sorting out the chaos was a daunting task, and Congress extended the sunset deadline twice. Congressional attempts to make the FRC a permanent body failed.

The legislation created the FRC's guiding regulatory criterion—the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" (PICN). The act did not define PICN, though, and the FRC gave much attention to clarifying PICN in the first 2 years of its existence. Congress did not define the PICN standard in specific terms, leaving

it to be defined by case law. The legislation declared the airwaves were a utility owned by the public and charged the FRC to regulate broadcasters so as to guard the interests of the owners of the airwaves by issuing licenses to operators who wished to use that utility. The Commission was forbidden to censor radio broadcasters (in Section 29 of the 1927 act, in Section 326 of the 1934 act), but was given the discretion to create regulations and to punish broadcasters' subsequent offensive actions. Further authority was given to the Commission to renew the licenses of broadcasters who served the public interest: to revoke the licenses, fine, and/or imprison broadcasters who did not; to classify stations; to prescribe the nature of service to be provided; to assign frequencies; to determine transmitter power; to create regulations to prevent interference; and to set up zones of coverage areas. Upon enactment, the Radio Act of 1927 revoked all existing commercial radio licenses and required all operators to re-apply for new ones. All but a handful were granted, but the exceptions are notable; among them was Dr. John Brinkley, the infamous "goat gland" doctor who operated KFKB in Milford, Kansas. Brinkley invited ailing radio listeners to send letters describing their symptoms, and after reading them on the air Brinkley prescribed medical cures that required his own widely available patent medicines. The FRC found Brinkley's actions to fail the public interest standard and did not renew his radio license, the first to fail re-application. In 1933, the Supreme Court affirmed the PICN standard along with the FRC's authority to use PICN as an administrative yardstick (*Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers,* 1933).

The Communications Act of 1934

The transition from the Radio Act of 1927 to the Communications Act of 1934 was relatively uneventful compared to the transition from the Radio Act of 1912 to the Radio Act of 1927. There was already order on the airwaves, and an apparatus by which to administer law already existed. The Communications Act of 1934 did, however, bring change.

Enacted on June 19, the 34-page Communications Act of 1934 created a permanent administrative body, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), at the request of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and incorporated virtually all of the Radio Act of 1927, including the cornerstone principles of public ownership of the airwaves and the PICN standard. The FCC was vested with broader regulatory authority that included all radiotelephone activity, including the newly developing broadcast media FM radio and television, and added interstate telegraph and telephone communication (which had previously been under the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission) and wire and wireless common carrier industries (which had been under the control of the Department of Commerce).

The 1934 act was organized in a series of six titles. Title I outlined general provisions, including the responsibilities and organization of the FCC. Title II dealt with telephone and telegraph common carriers. Title III contained the provisions retained from the Radio Act of 1927. Title IV described procedural and administrative provisions. Title V dealt with the range of forfeitures the FCC could assess. Title VI dealt with miscellaneous provisions, including the repeal of the Radio Act of 1927. When the Cable Communications Policy Act (see below) was enacted in 1984, it was added as Title VI to the 1934 act. It details regulations for the cable television industry, including video delivery by telephone companies.

Two sections of the Communications Act of 1934, both found in Title III, are directly relevant to political communications on the broadcast media. Section 312 indicates the commission may revoke a broadcast license "for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office." And Section 315 (Section 18 in the 1927 act) states "if any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he [sic] shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station." These sections are relevant only to radio and television broadcasters, who use the public utility to disseminate their messages.

Significant Amendments to the Communications Act of 1934

The Van Deerlin 1978 Rewrite Attempt

On June 7, 1978, Congressman Lionel Van Deerlin, then chair of the U.S. Subcommittee on Communication, unveiled draft legislation that proposed a "basement-to-attic" rewrite of the Communications Act of 1934. The major proposals in the rewrite included:

1. Total deregulation of radio, including elimination of the Fairness Doctrine and the equal time rules.
2. Extension of TV licenses and replacement of the Fairness Doctrine for television with broader expectations of "equitable" coverage and elimination of the equal time requirements.
3. Imposition of limitations on station ownership (maximum of 10—5 radio and 5 TV).
4. Deregulation of cable TV at the federal level.
5. Establishment of a license fee for spectrum.

Although Congress took no action on the Van Deerlin bill, it remains an important landmark. Many of the recommendations proposed by Van Deerlin eventually became FCC policy, either by an act of Congress (the extension of broadcast licenses, raising broadcast station ownership caps, and to some extent deregulating cable TV at the federal level) or unilateral FCC action (ending enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine).

The Cable Communications Policy Act

This legislation fundamentally deregulated the cable industry in 1984, placing primary regulatory authority upon the municipality. Programming rules and subscription fee limits were lifted.

The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act

A result of the Cable Communications Policy Act was rapidly increasing cable subscription fees. Reacting to public outcry, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act in November 1992, a bill which restored cable TV rate regulation. It also contained program access provisions and required that cable system operators must gain retransmission consent from local broadcast television stations even if the cable system had to compensate the TV station. On the other hand, TV stations licensed to the city served by the cable system could forfeit compensation and evoke the long-standing "must-carry" clause, earning channel on the cable system.

The Communications Act of 1996

Alternatively known as the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the purpose of the legislation was "to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." Although leaving the mandate to serve the public interest in place, the act's effects were manifest primarily in the radio broadcasting industry. Three important provisions of the act provided the following:

1. Radio and television broadcast station ownership limits were increased to 35% of the total potential nationwide audience, with market-by-market numeric limits established for radio; the more stations licensed to a market, the higher the number of licenses a single owner may hold (the cap was later raised to 39%).
2. The duopoly (a.k.a. "one-to-a-market") rule for radio was removed.
3. A broadcaster should expect license renewal (and competing licenses would not be allowed) provided the broadcaster had no serious violation of PICN standards; the licensing period was extended to 8 years for both radio and television broadcasters.

With an assurance of license renewal and the removal of key ownership limits, large radio chains grew in historic proportions as a result, the most salient among them Clear Channel Communications, growing to over 1,200 radio stations by 2001. Other provisions of the act removed regulatory barriers between common carrier systems and cable television operators, established a TV program rating system, required the V-chip to be installed in all new television receivers, and removed cross-ownership barriers between broadcast television networks and cable networks.

Robert Gobetz

See also Equal Time Provision; Fairness Doctrine

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Communism

Communism is a political and economic system that emerged in the 19th century and gained currency as a response to the problems of industrialization in Western Europe and the United States. Communism centered upon common ownership of property and distribution of goods and services based on need and not individual wealth or social class. Based in part upon utopian and socialist writings, communism was presented as a form of socialism in the *Communist Manifesto,* written by Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels in 1848.

With the Russian Revolution in 1917, communism became the ideological framework that would guide the Soviet Union and eastern bloc nations for the next 60 years. Revolutionaries in China turned to a form of communism in their rise to power in 1949 and activists in Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba adopted communism in the 1950s and 1960s to justify their crusade and offer a form of governing. In the United States and Western Europe, small, organized communist organizations sought political power at various times but never achieved any significant degree of electoral success. With economic pressures and demands for democratic reforms, the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s and communism became a minor political party in Russia, in former Soviet satellite nations, and in eastern bloc nations.

Although many Americans in the early 20th century objected to hardships faced by the working class and excessive consumption by the wealthy, they did not turn to communism in large numbers. Most sought reform, not revolution, either by joining socialist organizations and/or labor unions or by supporting the reforms offered by the populists of the late 19th century and later the progressive movement platform in the early 20th century. Even the Great Depression of the 1930s, with massive unemployment and economic dislocation, failed to energize a significant communist movement in the United States.

After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union competed for global power in a "cold war" which pitted the values of Western democracy against communism. In American political culture, communism became a dominant theme in both campaign and policy-making communication. Conservative leaders in the United States, beginning with Richard Nixon in the 1950s, Barry Goldwater in the 1960s, and Ronald Reagan in the 1970s and 1980s, presented the battle against communism as the defining ideological crisis of the age. Powerful metaphors describing the destructive force of communism were pervasive in political debates in post–World War II America, including such terms as the *iron curtain, containment,* the *domino theory,* and the *cancer of communism.*

The dismantling of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and economic reforms in China and Vietnam left few communist governments in power around the world and no organized effort to install communism in Western democracies.

C. Brant Short

See also Castro, Fidel; Marx, Karl; McCarthy Hearings; Russia, Democratization and Media

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Comparing Media Systems

Published in 2004, *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics* is probably the most significant and ambitious theoretical analysis of the relationship between media systems and democracy since the *Four Theories of the Press* by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956). Based on a survey of media institutions, particularly the press, in 18 West European and North American democracies, the book

offers an updated set of models for analyzing and comparing media systems.

Building on their own long-time cooperation and on work by other scholars (particularly Jay Blumler and Michael Gurevitch), authors Daniel C. Hallin, a University of California, San Diego, professor, and Paolo Mancini, an Italian scholar, base their typology on four dimensions by which to carry out comparisons: (1) economic—that is, the development of media markets, particularly low or high levels of a mass circulation press; (2) the degree to which each media system mirrors the main political divisions in the country, which the authors call political parallelism; (3) the level of journalistic professionalization; and (4) the degree of state involvement in the media system.

Historic patterns of difference and similarity among the countries under study have led Hallin and Mancini to arrive at three basic models they call (1) the Mediterranean or polarized pluralist model (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and, to a lesser degree, France), which, with a high level of political parallelism and high government intervention, is characterized by low professionalization and low levels of media development; (2) the North/Central European or Democratic corporatist model (the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, and Austria which is high on all four dimensions; and (3) the North Atlantic or liberal model (Britain, Ireland, the United States, and Canada), which, with low political parallelism and state intervention, is high in levels of professionalism and media development.

The authors show connections between media systems and political systems of the analyzed countries, arguing there is no "mechanistic, one-to-one correspondence." Political system variables influence media systems, interacting with other kinds of factors, such as economic and technological, but the opposite influence can also be detected. At the same time, the political variables discussed reflect patterns of political culture influencing journalists' thinking about their role in society and their professional values. Hallin and Mancini summarize their research by saying these connections "do not arise from one-way causal relationships" and the process described "is really one of co-evolution of media and political institutions within particular historical contexts."

In comparison with the *Four Theories of the Press,* Hallin and Mancini's book clearly moves beyond, if not outside, the cold war context but at the same time leaves former communist countries out altogether, which admittedly diminishes the number of variables under study and facilitates the analysis.

Although the book is theoretically impressive in scope, the authors admit the media systems of individual countries fit the ideal types they propose "only roughly" and "many media systems must be understood as mixed cases." Reflecting its quality and impact, Hallin and Mancini's work is one of the most highly acclaimed political communication publication in recent years, and as such, it has received awards from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government Center for Press, Politics, and Public Policy, the National Communication Association, and the International Communication Association (Outstanding Book of the Year award for 2005).

Tomasz Płudowski

See also *Four Theories of the Press;* Press and Politics; Press Theories

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Congress and the Media

Usually the public learns very little from the media about Congress, or at least very little that is favorable to the institution. Numerous academic studies arrive at the same conclusion: Congress receives little respect from the national media. Nonetheless, there is evidence that individual members of Congress do not fare so poorly in local press coverage of their activities. Thus, national press coverage may certainly contribute to the phenomenon of public disdain for Congress even though it has had no effect on the extraordinary high reelection rates for members.

Members of Congress bear some responsibility for the negative coverage of the institution. Members

protect their own political interests by attacking the institution in which they serve. Also, candidates for Congress use negative advertising appeals to exaggerate claims of incompetence or impropriety on the part of their opponents. Because the media focus so heavily in campaigns on candidate attacks and accusations of wrongdoing, these communications often become the focus of coverage in elections.

How the Media Cover Congress and Its Members

Studies of media coverage of Congress primarily reveal that members of Congress are either incompetent, corrupt, or both, and that the legislative process does not work as it should. For example, an analysis of all articles on Congress in 10 news dailies during 1 month in 1978 found that journalists focused on conflict, malfeasance, and breach of public trust. Overall, this research suggested that the media generally report little that is good about Congress, reinforcing the view that Congress is a defective institution.

A major study of the impact of newspaper coverage on public confidence in institutions in the late 1970s found that coverage of Congress was much more unfavorable than was coverage of either the presidency or the Supreme Court. An analysis of network news coverage of Congress during a 5-week period in 1976 found that all news stories that presented a point of view about the institution were critical of it.

Another study of congressional coverage during a period in the late 1980s showed that the coverage emphasized scandal and contributed to the legislature's weak reputation. A study of network news reporting on Congress in 1989 concluded that two thirds of the coverage focused on a few episodes of scandal that were unrelated to the normal functions of Congress as a legislative body. Further research conducted in the 1990s also confirmed that press reporting of Congress was generally negative.

Press coverage of Congress over the years has moved from healthy skepticism to outright cynicism. When Congress enacted a 25% pay increase for its members in 1946, for example, both *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* commented that the pay increase was needed to attract top-quality people to public service and that political leaders must be paid a salary commensurate with the responsibilities of public service. The few criticisms of the raise emphasized either the principle of public service as its own reward or the need for an even larger pay increase. More recently, however, the story has been far different. Modern congressional coverage says that the nation's legislators are egregiously overpaid, indulged, and indifferent to the problems of constituents who lack six-figure incomes and fantastic job perquisites. The press portrait of congressional members is one of self-interested, self-indulgent politicians who exploit the legislative process for personal gain. Studies identify the emergence of an aggressive, scandal-conscious media after Watergate as the leading reason for the intense interest in governmental misdeeds, rivalry, and conflict. Many political observers consider the tendency of journalists to focus on scandal and personal wrongdoings to be an investigative reporter mentality fostered by Watergate and inspired by *Washington Post* reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein.

Journalists confirm this tendency. A *Times-Mirror* survey found that two thirds of journalists downplay good news and emphasize public officials' failings. Many fear being perceived by their colleagues as "in the tank" with politicians. Furthermore, journalists are all too aware that conflict and scandal interest the public. Intense competition within the print media—which more recently has seen declining revenues—has driven many journalists toward increased scandal coverage to satisfy what they perceive as the public's appetite for such a focus. Scandal, rivalry, and conflict may also be emphasized because the legislative process is tedious and boring. Consequently, reporters avoid writing process and policy stories except when they are related to inter-branch conflicts, rivalries among colorful personalities on Capitol Hill, or scandal.

Journalist David Broder admits that personal scandals are exciting and interesting; stories about institutional reform will put reporters to sleep before they get to the typewriter. He explains that a reporter will have an easier time selling to his or her editor a story of petty scandal than one of substance or consequence. Junket stories fit editors' stereotypes and preconceived notions of congressional behavior.

In addition to being less exciting than scandal, institutional matters are more complicated to understand and to write about in single news stories and columns. Besides, the presidency is the focus of Washington journalism. Journalists often cover lawmaking from the vantage of how the legislature is responding to presidential initiatives. The press perceives Congress as generally incapable of leadership. Media coverage emphasizes that Congress works best

under the guiding hand of a strong president attuned to the national interest. Members of Congress, according to much of the media coverage, are primarily concerned with parochial issues.

A partial explanation is the difficulty of identifying a focal point in Congress. The presidency by contrast is easily personalized. Congress lacks a single voice. It presents a cacophony of perspectives, often in conflict. With many leaders and a complicated committee structure, Congress has difficulty competing with the unified and more consistent viewpoint of the presidential branch of government.

Congress and the New Media: 1990s to the Present

The new media today offer the potential for Congress to communicate more effectively with the public—not merely to service the electoral needs of individual members but also to enhance the broader institutional reputation. To date, Congress has made significant advances in the uses of new media. Congressional Web pages, for example, vary substantially in quality. Some offer detailed and useful information that is updated regularly. A positive development in congressional communications is the growing public use of government and public organization Web sites that provide information for citizens on the workings of government, the voting records of elected officials, and information on how to contact legislative offices and federal agencies. Although many Americans with a need for government assistance do not have Internet access, more and more citizens are finding useful information about their government through new means of communications.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty created by new means of communications is the increasingly competitive nature of a news industry driven by the perceived need to deliver information to the public as rapidly as possible. Various Web sites, perhaps most notably the conservative *Drudge Report,* have frequently "scooped" the leading mainstream media outlets on big stories and thus precipitated a trend whereby more and more of these outlets seek to outpace the competition to break stories. An unfortunate result has been that many respectable news outlets are not as careful as they used to be in sourcing information before reporting to the public. Consequently, increasingly unconfirmed rumors about government officials and activities have been reported, and little of this kind of information has helped in educating the public about Congress and its members. If anything, much of this current trend exacerbates the media tendencies toward sensationalism and distortion of reality.

Another relatively new phenomenon is the rise of the talk radio format, largely a vehicle for communications among conservatives. Talk radio programs tend to be overwhelmingly negative toward Congress, whether Democrats or Republicans control the institution. This information outlet is especially well suited to the presentation of sensational and scandal stories.

Americans thus are relying on a greater variety of sources of information about Congress than ever before, but there is little evidence that the quality of information has overall improved. Without a doubt, for the motivated news consumer, good and reliable information about Congress and its workings is available. The Internet indeed has spawned an unfortunate rush by competing news organizations to produce stories, and thus the reliability of much information about Congress has been compromised. The credibility of news organizations also suffers from this tendency to produce stories too quickly. Yet the Internet is also full of excellent information about the workings of government and is a vast resource for news consumers who understand how to sift though the Web for credible material.

The growth of new media and the election of a Republican majority in Congress in 1994 modernized political communication and institutional response. The emergence of cable television news providing 24/7 coverage meant that news organizations such as MSNBC, CNN, and FOX closely scrutinized every activity on Capitol Hill.

Congressional responsiveness to media attention became more prevalent from the mid-1990s to the present. Newt Gingrich's ascension to Speaker of the House of Representatives also elevated him to celebrity status. Not only were mainstream media (e.g., the networks and major newspapers) covering Congress, but the cultural media were as well (e.g., *People, Entertainment Tonight*). Moreover, declining ratings by the national networks and waning circulation of the major newspapers meant that traditional media had to compete for a smaller audience. As a result, network news programs featured more personality-driven coverage, and newspapers were promoting more feature pieces in the front section on politicians. For example, the dramatic shutdown of the government in 1995 to 1996 was viewed as a titanic battle between Speaker of the House Gingrich and President Bill Clinton. Gingrich had become such an iconic figure representing the Republican Party that he even appeared on the CBS comedy show *Murphy Brown.* Thus, congressional politics had transcended the

traditional venues of reportage and had become part of cultural and entertainment news.

The rise of personality-driven politics also had a second consequence: declining civility. In the past, congressional relationships had been nurtured, as Democrats and Republicans practiced the norm of mutual respect, and many members even socialized together after work hours. Members may have liked to attack their institution, but they were civil toward one another in Washington. Partisan rancor and incivility eventually displaced the civility that had characterized life on Capitol Hill. The growing partisan divide in Congress was a product of 40 years of nearly uninterrupted Democratic control of the House that was upended in the highly partisan and charged election campaign of 1994. Republicans unveiled an exceedingly negative set of national ads within the last week of the campaign that attacked Clinton and the Democratic Congress. The results created a political and public chasm where the parties and candidates staked claims from which they could not back down. Such public position taking made it difficult to overcome the partisan divide through cooperation.

Thus, the governing and elections processes have been driven further apart; the expectations and promises from election campaigns have not been fulfilled through legislation. For example, although House Republicans did deliver on their "Contract with America"—a 10-point policy platform that Republican House candidates ran on in 1994—their Republican Senate counterparts did not (with few exceptions, such as welfare reform). The publicity about that failure was widely reported in national and local media, enabling Clinton to regain political mobility following the many predictions of his political demise.

Since the mid-1990s, the growth of the Internet has meant that news stories about Congress and other institutions appear instantly and frequently without being vetted for their accuracy across an electronic transom. Politicians oftentimes are forced to react without an opportunity to reflect. This hyper-paced news environment may not only have a deleterious effect on public understanding of government but can also force members of Congress to react through the prism of their party and personal emotiveness rather than reflect rationally.

Television news focuses on an affective-negative emotional reaction rather than a cognitive evaluation of Congress's performance. That same emotive reaction could be heightened further through the immediacy of new media. For example, the 1998–1999 Clinton-Lewinsky scandal first surfaced online through *Drudge Report.* Reaction was instantaneous and members of Congress became immediate stakeholders to save Clinton's presidency (congressional Democrats) or remove him from office (congressional Republicans). The impending debate, impeachment, and trial of Clinton were highly partisan and created a gulf not only between rank-and-file members of the parties in Congress but also among the leadership.

The growing impact of new media coupled with traditional media has driven members further from the institutional norms that made Congress functional in the past, particularly reciprocity. Reciprocity was the golden rule of congressional comity that bound members to an institutional loyalty that transcended party support. Institutional norms declined precipitously in the 1970s through the 1980s with growing individuation of members who became policy and political entrepreneurs. However, growing partisanship in the late 1990s and early 2000s completely unhinged institutional norms. Political communication by party leaders and rank-and-file members became more message oriented and less policy driven. Ideological conformity became a more important congressional norm than reciprocity; members who advertised independence from partisan norms were sometimes punished. For example, Jane Harman (D-CA), who was the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, was highly supportive of the Bush administration's position on foreign and domestic intelligence gathering following the events of September 11, 2001. Her position angered many of her liberal congressional allies who believed that such activities violated individual civil rights. Such outspoken public support for Bush's policies made it impossible for the incoming Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), to appoint Harman as chair of the House Intelligence Committee when Democrats recaptured majority control of the House of Representatives in the 2006 election. Pelosi's actions were consistent with the Democrats' communication theme of "a new direction" in the fall campaign. Harman's direction was viewed as obsolete, even if informed by a national tragedy just 5 years earlier.

Implications

The explosion of Web sites, cable and satellite television, and e-mail has made Congress an even more political body. Whereas September 11 provided a temporary diversion from the congressional partisanship

that has accelerated from the 1990s to the present, the fact is that congressional members and leaders have become less focused on building institutional structures and more focused on position-taking and image-making. That is not to say that Congress is barren of institutional structures and processes, but instead it places a stronger emphasis on communications and strategy to maximize political support—thus, there is less reflection on issues and a deferral of institutional responsibilities in favor of partisanship.

Mark J. Rozell and Richard J. Semiatin

See also New Media Technologies

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Connally, John (1917–1993)

John Bowden Connally was governor of Texas, secretary of the navy, secretary of the treasury, and advisor to both Democratic and Republican presidents. A Democrat and advisor to Lyndon Johnson for most of his political career, he was appointed secretary of the treasury by Richard Nixon. He switched to the Republican Party and was a candidate for president in 1980.

Born near Floresville, Texas, Connally earned a law degree from the University of Texas. In 1937, he volunteered in Johnson's campaign for Congress and was appointed to be his administrative assistant. He managed Johnson's unsuccessful campaign for the Senate, in 1941, and their relationship continued for the next 30 years.

A naval officer on Eisenhower's staff, Connally helped plan the invasion of Italy in 1943. Later, while serving aboard the USS *Essex,* he was awarded the Bronze Star. In 1946, he founded radio station KVET, joined an Austin law firm, and managed Johnson's reelection to Congress. In the 1948 U.S. Senate election, he was linked to the suspicious late report of 200 votes that provided Johnson the margin of victory. He was in the center of political skirmishes that enabled Johnson to gain control of the Democratic Party in Texas. He continued to function as a key operative for Johnson, managing Johnson's bid for the presidential nomination in 1960 and later managing his successful presidential campaign in 1964.

Handsome and personable, Connally made effective use of speech, debate, and theater training received in high school and college. He benefited politically from Johnson's patronage and financially from ties to wealthy clients.

In 1961, at Johnson's request, President Kennedy appointed Connally as secretary of the navy. He resigned 11 months later to run for governor, his only elective office. Connally was seriously wounded riding in President Kennedy's limousine when Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963. He believed that both Kennedy and he were targeted and refused to accept the Warren Commission's conclusion of only one assassin. Though Connally and Kennedy differed significantly on issues, Connally benefited because they were linked in the public's mind.

Connally, a "hawk" on Vietnam, was named to Nixon's foreign intelligence advisory board in 1969.

In 1971, Nixon named him secretary of the treasury, but amid conflicts with international trading partners and key cabinet members, he resigned in 1972. His name was associated with Nixon's 1972 reelection campaign when he headed a group called Democrats for Nixon. The group sponsored a series of successful television commercials for Nixon's campaign. However, in 1973, Connolly became a Republican and was one of Nixon's choices for vice president when Spiro Agnew resigned, but at the height of the Watergate scandal, Nixon picked Gerald Ford, who was more likely to get congressional confirmation.

There were allegations of involvement in Watergate, and in 1975, Connally was acquitted of bribery and conspiracy in a "milk price" fixing case. Connally was announced for the GOP presidential nomination in 1980, and though he raised more money than the other candidates, he lost in the early primaries and threw his support behind Ronald Reagan to ensure that George Bush did not get the nomination.

In the late 1980s, Connally filed for bankruptcy, and he died on June 15, 1993, of pulmonary fibrosis, likely caused by the gunshot wounds received in 1963.

Jerry L. Allen

See also Johnson, Lyndon B.; Kennedy Assassination

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Conservative, Conservatism

A conservative is generally defined as a person adhering to or advocating a political philosophy known as conservatism. As a term, *conservatism* has been used to describe a wide array of ideological viewpoints and has incorporated, to varying degrees, a host of political, social, cultural, and economic ideas. Conservatism's roots extend back to the Enlightenment. Many of the philosophy's particulars were defined by Anglo-Irish political observer Edmund Burke, whose critique of the French Revolution elevated the stage upon which conservative thought began to evolve. American conservatism in the 20th century is no less easily defined and includes strands of free-market liberalism, social and religious conservatism, anticommunism, anti-Statist libertarianism, isolationism, and neoconservatism. Throughout the 20th century, both major political parties in the United States have been associated with conservatism to varying degrees, although by the 1970s, Republicans were generally considered to be more uniformly conservative than Democrats.

Twentieth-century American conservatism has, in many ways, responded to changes in American liberalism and, specifically, expansions in the size and scope of the federal government. For instance, conservatives reacted to expansions in federal power during the Progressive Era (1900 to 1920), the Great Depression and New Deal (1930s), World War II (1941 to 1945), cold war (1945 to 1991), and Great Society (1964 to 1969) eras. Modern American conservatism began to take shape after World War II, when isolationist conservatives lost control of the Republican Party. Cold war anticommunism unified many conservatives in the 1950s and served as a springboard for political leaders like Barry Goldwater, who, in 1964, unsuccessfully ran for the presidency on a platform of anticommunism and smaller government. Other prominent contributors to the coalescence of modern conservative thought include Russell Kirk, William F. Buckley, and Ronald Reagan.

Regional distinction also helped shape modern American conservatism. For many years, conservatism was stereotypically identified as a philosophy of wealthy northeastern elites. Conversely, southern conservatism was long identified with the Democratic Party, the Ku Klux Klan, segregation, and massive resistance to the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Beginning in the 1960s, Western conservatism exposed numerous divisions within both major political parties and infused the ideology with a more color-blind, populist, antitax, and antigovernment ethos. Demographic and social changes have also played enormous roles in defining modern conservatism. During the 1960s, a revival in American Protestant evangelicalism coincided with the rise of suburbs. The electoral coalition that arose as a result of widespread dissatisfaction with the nation's moral character and financial health was referred to by many as the "New Right."

More recently, American conservatism has been buoyed by the rise of conservative talk radio hosts such as Rush Limbaugh, who, during the 1990s, gained popularity as the recognized nemesis of the Bill Clinton presidency. During the administration of George W. Bush, conservatism was primarily viewed as a combination of neoconservative foreign policy and social conservatism. Bush's victory in 2004 was credited to adherents from these two conservative strands. After 2004, the conservatism's electoral appeal encouraged a renewed interest in "moral leadership" among political candidates from both parties.

Sean P. Cunningham

See also New Right; Reagan, Ronald; Republican Party

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Conservative Party, Britain

The Conservative Party, or Tory party, was formed in the late 19th century, and it has shared power alternately with the Labour Party for most of the 20th century. Since 1945, it has been in office for two long periods: 1951 to 1964 and 1979 to 1997. The latter period is particularly significant as it includes the 1979 to 1990 period when Margaret Thatcher was prime minister. The Conservative Party's dominance in the 1980s and 1990s also marked a period in which there were some significant developments in political communication. Moreover, it was a period in which television gradually overtook the press as the new means of mass communication and began to challenge the dominance of the political system. From a different perspective, one could also argue that politicians were beginning to learn to use the media to their advantage.

In the immediate post-1945 period, it was generally acknowledged that the Conservative Party was better organized to exploit the media to its advantage. Unlike the Labour Party, it had no reservations about using outside professional help in achieving its goals, and it was not until the mid-1980s that the Labour Party began to challenge the dominance of the Conservatives. A good illustration of the Conservative Party's use of professionals is the employment in 1948 of Colman, Prentis, and Varley (CPV) to design and place advertisements on its behalf. The use of CPV reflects how the party was able to draw on lessons from the world of business and advertising to achieve its objectives.

Despite these advantages, the party lost power in the 1964 election to a Labour Party with a more modern leader, Harold Wilson, and it was to remain in opposition until 1970. After another period out of office, the party returned to power in 1979 under Margaret Thatcher. In many important ways, Thatcher brought about a change in the way media-politics relations developed. A few examples will illustrate this claim:

- Thatcher famously used Gordon Reece to advise her on how to modulate her voice for public speaking.
- The party successfully used publicists Saatchi and Saatchi in the 1979 election to produce campaign advertising material, some of which is still considered to be of high quality (see http://politics.guardian.co.uk/election2001/images/0,,449826,00.html).
- At a different level, Thatcher employed Bernard Ingham as her press secretary from 1979 to 1990. Ingham was the political (lobby) journalist's *bête noir* in the 1980s. He used the lobby skillfully to carry out the prime minister's wishes, to bully journalists, and to knife ministerial colleagues in a fashion that occasioned both admiration and hostility. In some respects, he can be seen as a predecessor of Tony Blair's Alastair Campbell in the ways in which he ably controlled the flow of information to the media.

The fall of Thatcher in 1990—at the hands of the party—gave John Major an opportunity to lead the party to victory in 1992, but an economic crisis in 1992 and much scandal paved the way for a modernized and slick new Labour Party, under Tony Blair, in 1997.

The end of the Thatcher period created a major political problem for the Conservative Party as New Labour gradually eroded its traditional middle-ground and middle-class appeal. Its efforts to redefine and to reposition itself brought nothing but failure: It lost

three elections in a row (1997, 2001, and 2005) under three leaders, William Hague, Ian Duncan Smith, and Michael Howard. The 2005 election was lost in spite of the employment of the Australian professional campaign manager, Lynton Crosby, to help run the campaign.

Each change of leader exposed a different problem but crucially highlighted the changing dynamics of British politics. With the parties converging in philosophy and each attempting to sway the middle ground where elections are now won and lost, the problem of providing a clear and definitive political strategy remains as difficult as ever. The election of yet another new leader, David Cameron, in 2005 has raised hopes: With Blair suffering from the Iraq issue, among other things, Cameron—young, media savvy, and fresh-faced, not unlike Blair in his day—poses a real challenge. Expectations are high, but polls continue to show that a new face has made little impact on the prospects of voters radically shifting their allegiances. Because Blair stepped down as prime minister in June 2007, Conservatives face a new Labour leader in Gordon Brown.

Ralph Negrine

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Constructivism

Constructivism is an interdisciplinary school of thought firmly rooted in science, especially biology, and of particular relevance to the understanding of media-generated realities. The champions of this school of thought emphatically reject representationist theories and realist conceptions of perception and share the conviction that objective knowledge is essentially unobtainable. They do not deny the existence of an external world; they negate, however, its unconditional cognitive accessibility and, therefore, insist on a critical examination of how concepts of reality are manufactured. All the varieties of constructivist theorizing, whether centered in neurobiology, psychology, the sociology of knowledge, or communication science, additionally share the fundamental conviction that knowledge does not consist of a direct correspondence with an external reality (correspondence theory of truth) but exclusively and inevitably in the constructions of an observer, a knowing subject. However, these constructions are neither arbitrary nor capricious; on the contrary, they are massively dependent on all sorts of preconditions. Construction is not an individual act of creation, nor a process under conscious control, but something conditioned by nature and culture, history, language, and particularly also by the media that operate as central illustrations of socialisation in modern societies.

Traditions of Constructivism

The central roots of constructivism, to which a particular German brand of communication science specifically relates itself, lie in neurobiology, the sociology of knowledge, cybernetics, and the history of philosophy. The protagonists of a *neurobiologically oriented constructivism* (e.g., Humberto R. Maturana), when engaged in exploring the processes of color and gestalt perception, came to the conclusion that the brain (of a human) cannot make direct contact with the environment; consequently, they hold the nervous system to be operatively closed. Their claim is that only the brain can construct an infinitely nuanced perceptual world out of the unitary language of neuronal events. In contrast, the approaches of *social-constructionism* and the *sociology of knowledge* are based on the thesis that the decisive producer of realities is not the (individual) brain but that reality arises through the structure of a society and its specific culture. Individuals thus appear to be formed and molded by their all-encompassing culture, perceive the world against the background of their origins, and remain receptive to external impressions that may become increasingly hardened and rigidified in the process of socialization. The mathematician and physicist Heinz von Foerster is the founder of the *cybernetic variety* of constructivism; he completed the exploration of the fundamental principle of cybernetics—the idea of circularity and especially of circular causality—and established its self-application. The result is a dynamic style of thinking, operating with paradoxes and circular theorems, now known as cybernetics of the second order. This style of thinking has certainly left its mark on constructivism as it is perpetually confronted by

the logical and methodical problems which inevitably arise from the observation of the observer. Finally, *constructivists interested in the history of philosophy* (e.g., Ernst von Glasersfeld) have busied themselves with erecting a kind of ancestral gallery: They have been able to show that elements of constructivist thinking can already be found in the work of the early sceptics, in the writings of Giambattista Vico, Immanuel Kant, and Benjamin Lee Whorf. From this angle, constructivism proves to be a variant of scepticism that provides up to date underpinnings to fundamental doubts about human knowledge.

Applications in Communication Science

Constructivist ideas have been discussed intensively in German communication science since the early 1990s; although often attacked vehemently as a kind of baseless subjectivism, they have by now become an indispensable part of the relevant canon of viable theories as they offer new arguments for the critical evaluation of trivial conceptions of communication and communication effects. Constructivism, evidently, focuses our awareness on the normality of misunderstanding, the improbability of successful communication, and the multitude of preconditions affecting every act of communication. A constructivist point of view forces us to revise linear-causal models of communication, which operate with a direct transfer of information and negate the recipient as the central instance of processing: *Channel, transmission, transmitter* and *receiver* are misleading metaphors with regard to conceptual content. A constructivist view of things rules out any expectation that an utterance will trigger exactly those thoughts in another person which the speaker had in mind when formulating it, and that, therefore, any content can be expressed in such a way that the addressee must receive precisely what the sender intended.

Finally, constructivism is of importance to the scientific exploration of the effects of communication: it replaces the all too simple (and obviously, quite independently of constructivist criticism, long obsolete) stimulus-response model and the misguided idea of an almighty medium by the concept of the influential receiver. The basic assumptions of meanwhile obsolete concepts of communicative effects should be revised accordingly: Identical stimuli (causes) need not produce identical effects; a (potential) effect is not necessarily dependent on the intensity and the frequency of the stimulus used; stimuli are simply not smoothly transferable parcels of information. In the constructivist perspective, the recipients are the controlling instances that decide the success or failure of media effects: Whatever reaches them is sorted out according to the eigenlogic of their cognitive system. The user-oriented approach is thus supplied with an epistemological foundation; the often quoted key question as to what humans do with the media, what specifics of a medial offer are in fact taken up and made use of by a particular receiver in a specific situation, is once more revitalized.

The greatest provocation—despite the broad compatibility of constructivist insights—in the professional debate seemed to be the assertion that it is essentially unknowable whether an individually generated reality or an image of the world as created by the mass media could be true in an absolute, ontic, sense. The ranking and assessing of images of the world by degrees of verisimilitude, as is characteristic of realist positions, should instead be replaced by the comparative evaluation of different and inevitably observer-dependent realities. Judging by the research activities of constructivistically inspired authors, their dominant interests do indeed concern patterns of selection, different forms of presentation, and variants of the dramatization of reality. The champions of this school of thought insist (among other things, to forestall being reproached with baseless relativism) that their emphasis on the observer-dependence of all knowledge entails accepting responsibility for one's own reality constructions as well as tolerance toward other realities (while, at the same time, rejecting all dogmatic claims to truth).

This means, however, that the constructivist insights themselves cannot claim to be new truths; they provide new up to date arguments in favor of the old sceptical tradition that we must generally distrust human knowledge. They pull the rug from underneath any naive dogmatic belief in science and facts. They sharpen our awareness of the multidimensionality of experience—and make us wary of the truth claims by certain groups that want to impose their descriptions of reality (using all possible ways and means, if considered necessary).

Bernhard Poerksen

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Consultants, Political

By the time political campaigns were national in scope—the first was the campaign to secure ratification of the Constitution, which began in 1787—political consulting was a part of American politics. Candidates received help with their speech making and printed material from unpaid friends and political associates. Candidates also had help in staging what today would be called pseudo-events, often providing food and drink to voters. The first true political consultant was John Beckley. Beckley was the first clerk of the Virginia House of Delegates and the first clerk of the House of Representatives, but he is best remembered as America's first political campaign manager. A close personal friend of Thomas Jefferson, Beckley wrote campaign materials on behalf of the Virginian. Additionally, he arranged for the distribution of pamphlets and copies of Jefferson's speeches, as well as surrogate speakers on behalf of Jefferson in Jefferson's ill-fated 1796 presidential campaign, and again in his successful presidential race of 1800. Determining that Pennsylvania would be the key state in the election, Beckley launched a media blitz flooding the keystone state with Jeffersonian literature, sample ballots, and carefully selected surrogate speakers, who today would be called opinion leaders. Although Jefferson carried Pennsylvania, he lost in 1796. Thus, in Jefferson's successful 1800 race, Beckley organized yet another massive effort on Jefferson's behalf in Pennsylvania but this time extended his operations to parts of New York, Connecticut, and Maryland.

The presidential election of 1828, won by Andrew Jackson, saw sharp advances in electioneering procedures, often engineered by individuals who today would be thought of as consultants. In 1828, New York Senator Martin Van Buren became Jackson's campaign manager. Van Buren pulled together a host of statewide and regional political leaders on Jackson's behalf. He cobbled together a national political organization and in effect was the forerunner of both the modern general consultant and the field operations consultant. Van Buren's organization of statewide and urban leaders eventually reached down to the county and precinct levels. Here local supporters, known as hurrah boys because they constantly punctuated campaign speeches and rallies with cheers of "Hurrah for Jackson," provided a host of functions often served today by political consultants, among them a strong get-out-the-vote effort, which identified potential Jackson voters and made every effort to get them to the polls. They distributed pamphlets, handbills, broadsides, and other printed literature and did advance work for countless parades, dinners, and rallies.

Perhaps the first true contemporary political consultant was Edward Bernays. Best known as the father of public relations, Bernays had become active in government when he was asked to help promote the sale of World War I Liberty Bonds. Virtually every president from Coolidge through Eisenhower asked Bernays for advice, though his advice was not always followed. His last major book, *The Engineering of Consent,* suggested that government and political leaders could win consent in a rational, scientific, precise manner. He was among the earliest advocates of political polling. However, Bernays offered political advice as an adjunct to his public relations business. It was not until the California husband-and-wife team, Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter, that a firm was formed and served as the model for contemporary political consulting businesses. Whitaker and Baxter ultimately ran 75 campaigns, from 1934 when they helped elect Republican gubernatorial candidate Frank Merriam until their failed 1967 congressional campaign on behalf of former child star Shirley Temple Black. Among their many successful campaigns were those for California governors Frank Merriam, Earl Warren, and Goodwin Knight.

In 1946 New Yorker Jacob Javits, running for Congress, became the first congressional candidate to rely heavily on a polling firm when he utilized the Elmo Roper organization. Javits subsequently explained that he wanted polls to help him determine the issues to speak upon, not what to say about them. By the 1950s and 1960s candidates were drawing on individuals with a host of consulting specialties. To help them develop and perfect a message, perhaps the most prominent consultants were pollsters and speechwriters and, subsequently, debate coaches. To transmit their messages to the electorate, specialists in

radio and television writing and production, often initially drawn out of the advertising industry, were utilized. Moreover, candidates continued to rely heavily on local party precinct organizers and advance people who, much like Jackson's hurrah boys over a century earlier, still did the unglamorous but critical work of identifying the candidate's voters and getting them to the polls and making the arrangements for a variety of public appearances.

With the decline of political parties, the growth of communications technology, and the changes in fundraising and campaign finance laws, campaigns have grown ever more sophisticated. The contemporary era of political consulting is often dated to the 1960s, which saw the presidential campaigns of John F. Kennedy in 1960, Richard Nixon in 1968, and the 1969 creation of the American Association of Political Consultants (AAPC). Since the 1960s, political consulting has become a full-time occupation, as major campaigns now often take 2 or more years and the money involved has grown dramatically. Today, the AAPC recognizes at least 45 different consulting specialties, ranging from advance and event planning, aerial advertising, and Web logs, through video/CD/DVD duplication, voice-over talent, and voter lists. Within the last 20 years the number of firms providing consulting services to political candidates has grown from approximately 250 to over 3,000, and the amount of money spent on political campaigns, at all levels, now well exceeds 4 billion dollars in presidential election years, much of which is utilized to employ the skills of political consultants. Moreover, in recent years American consultants have begun to develop overseas markets, selling their services to candidates in a host of other countries.

Robert V. Friedenberg

See also American Association of Political Consultants; European Association of Political Consultants; Media Consultants

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Content Analysis

See Methodology

Contract with America

See Gingrich, Newt

Conventions, Political

The nominating convention is the institutionalized mechanism through which political parties in the United States formally nominate candidates for president and vice president during each presidential election cycle. Once primarily instrumental in function, contemporary nominating conventions are predominantly media events serving symbolic and communicative functions. They provide the transition between the primary campaign and the general election. Nominating conventions legitimize the democratic electoral process and the party's candidates, demonstrate party unity, rally party workers, and establish the key issues and positions for the general election campaign.

Nominating Convention Evolution

The 12th amendment of the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1804, established the Electoral College to govern

President Gerald Ford's supporters at the Republican National Convention, Kansas City, Missouri (August 1976).

Source: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, LC-DIG-ppmsca-08486.

election of the president and vice president of the United States. The constitution failed to offer specific guidance for nomination of Electoral College delegates or for the process through which the delegates would nominate candidates. Thus, states adopted a range of approaches over time with various degrees of success. Eventually, the nominating convention emerged as the institutionalized approach for nominating presidential and vice-presidential candidates.

Prior to 1832, each party's members of Congress nominated the party's candidate for president. These congressional caucuses thus wielded significant control over who was nominated and ultimately elected. Throughout the early 1800s opposition to the congressional caucus grew, culminating in an open challenge to the process in 1824. The congressional caucus nominee, William Crawford, was nominated by slightly more than one quarter of the Democratic-Republican Party caucus. Three nominees backed by state legislatures challenged Crawford. They were Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and Henry Clay. In the end, the non-caucus candidates received more support than the congressional caucus nominee did. Crawford ranked third in the electoral vote and fourth in the popular vote for president. As a result, pressure to develop a more open, broad-based, and democratic mechanism for nominating presidential candidates increased and resulted in the move to the political nominating convention in the 1832 presidential election. The Anti-Mason party held the first nominating convention in September 1831, followed by the Democrats and the National Republicans in early 1832.

Party leaders adjusted convention rules as new circumstances introduced new problems, but by 1860, the four instrumental or pragmatic functions of conventions were established as described by Paul T. Goldman, Ralph M. Bain, and Richard C. David. The first pragmatic function was to nominate a united ticket for president and vice president. The second function was to produce a party platform to be shared with the general electorate. A third function was to create a continuous structure to govern political parties; the national committee of each party issued the call to the convention every 4 years and addressed party issues between conventions. The final function, the campaign rally function, opened the nomination processes to public and media scrutiny and energized party members for the general election.

Throughout the latter half of the 19th century, despite the appearance of greater involvement and participation through convention delegations, nominating conventions still primarily legitimized and validated the negotiations of party leaders conducted well before the convention. Delegates were selected through a local or state caucus or convention or were appointed by state party leaders. No formal process linked delegate's voting to the broader voting public. Thus, nominations through conventions were more strongly influenced by the political bosses of the day than by the voters throughout the country.

The Progressive movement of the early 20th century led to multiple election reforms, including the rise of primaries. Throughout most of the early to mid-1900s, party leaders still directed convention outcomes, although primaries provided presidential candidates an opportunity to gather support and to demonstrate their

abilities to party leaders, in some cases raising their profile sufficiently to gain nomination (i.e., Dewey in 1948, Eisenhower in 1952). The clash between a nominating convention system and a primary system reached its climax in the 1964 and 1968 presidential elections. In 1964, Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater used party caucuses to secure sufficient delegates to win the presidential nomination, despite having won only one contested primary and with low support from Republicans generally. In 1968, presidential candidates Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. and Eugene McCarthy ran strong primary campaigns in an attempt to unseat Vice President Hubert Humphrey as the presumptive Democratic nominee. Following Kennedy's assassination, dramatic confrontations both within and outside the convention hall created vivid images of division within the Democratic Party. Vietnam War protestors, vehement opponents of the Johnson-Humphrey administration war policies, demonstrated in the streets near the convention hotels. Police officers, National Guard troops, and FBI and Secret Service agents met the protestors with force and tear gas. The anti-war factions within the convention, led by Senator Eugene McCarthy and George McGovern, launched multiple challenges on credentials and rules. Despite open division within the convention and without participating in a single primary, Vice President Hubert Humphrey secured the presidential nomination on the first ballot. Not surprisingly, the minority in the Democratic Party challenged the convention nomination system as anti-democratic, with exclusionary state delegate selection practices and party control usurping power from the rank-and-file voter. In response to dissent within the party and the horrible images created in Chicago, the Democratic National Committee formed two commissions to study the nominating process. One of the two, the McGovern-Fraser Commission, proposed 18 rules that ultimately increased the number of state primaries and thereby reduced the influence of national nominating conventions. The rise of primaries eventually changed nominee selection for both Democrats and Republicans and was a major factor in transforming nominating conventions from instrumental to symbolic functions.

Communication Functions of Nominating Conventions

As primaries increased in importance, nominating conventions transformed from gatherings designed primarily to perform the instrumental functions of selecting the nominee and conducting the party's business into media events focused on the symbolic functions of establishing party unity and legitimacy for the general election. This change was exacerbated by the increasing role of the mass media in election campaigns.

Judith Trent and Robert Freedenberg identify four communication functions of nominating conventions. The first is to reaffirm and legitimize the electoral process. Convention rituals, including the nominating and acceptance speeches, roll call of votes, prayers, music, and even video introductions of candidates, symbolize the values and traditions of the nation, the election process, and its inclusion of the American people. The convention also marks the transition from the primary campaign to the general election, demonstrating the supposedly effective and efficient means of selecting national leadership. An organized and orderly convention symbolizes the smooth working of democratic processes.

The nominating convention also legitimizes nominees. Through the convention, candidates assume the roles of presidential and vice-presidential nominees, carrying the party's mantle of support. This function is especially important after intense primary competition, in cases when the nominee is a relative newcomer or in some way non-traditional, or whenever a political party selects a nominee that could be deemed politically risky or weak.

The convention serves a third symbolic function, to demonstrate party unity. Intense and often highly negative primary campaigns produce internal tensions within the party that are detrimental to general election success. The convention, then, is an instrumental and symbolic moment of demarcation in the campaign. The convention places the intense internal rivalry of the primaries in the past and refocuses the party's faithful on uniting to defeat their opponent in the general election. Unity may be demonstrated in a range of ways, such as including defeated candidates in celebration and support of the nominee, explicitly calling for unity from party leaders, expressing the party's central values and goals, and promoting images of enthusiastic convention delegates.

The nominating conventions also offer images of inclusiveness. The individuals speaking at the podium, the guests in the gallery, and the delegates themselves all provide visual representation of the party and its commitments. For instance, in 2004, both political parties featured tributes to heroes of September 11, 2001;

both invited party leaders of diverse race and gender to address the convention; both featured representatives of immigrant heritage; and both highlighted their strong political traditions through the presence and recognition of former presidents. Conventions thus offer a symbolic moment not only to unify the faithful but to reach out to independent voters as well.

The final communicative function of the nominating convention is to introduce the candidate's campaign issues. The key ideas central to the nominee's success are crystallized into a strategy for the general election and are central to the nominee's acceptance speech. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's announced a "New Deal" in 1932; John F. Kennedy introduced a "New Frontier"; Bill Clinton called for a "New Covenant." In a more elaborate strategy in 2004, both Democratic and Republican parties adopted an issue theme for each day of the convention and used all convention activity to focus media coverage on the key message of the day. Such strategies demonstrate the convention's communicative potential as it carries messages to the voting public.

Nominating Conventions and the Mass Media

These symbolic functions would be impossible without mass media coverage of conventions. The emergence of national media coverage of political election campaigns contributed significantly to the evolution of political nominating conventions in the United States. In the earliest conventions, newspapers and then phonograph recordings and newsreels shared convention events with broader audiences. However, the radio and television era transformed convention practice. The first convention covered in its entirety on radio was the Democratic Party's 1924 convention in New York City's old Madison Square Garden. Just 4 years later, the network of radio stations broadcasting Alfred Smith's acceptance speech influenced the day and time of his acceptance. Then, in 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt demonstrated his understanding of potential for the convention to reach a large audience of voters. Roosevelt broke with tradition by becoming the first presidential nominee to deliver his acceptance address in person before the convention. The Republicans adopted the practice in 1944. Since then, each party's national convention culminates with the nominee's acceptance address before the convention. Not surprisingly, the speech is always scheduled to receive the largest possible television audience.

The live, mediated acceptance address is only one of many changes made to conventions in response to media coverage. Television coverage of nominating conventions began in 1952 and accelerated changes in nominating conventions to adapt to media practices. Political party leaders responded with orderly, structured gatherings timed and organized to maximize the messages conveyed to the American voting public. Most true discussion and decision making was moved to pre-convention meetings. The positioning of the stage and podium, seating of leaders in the gallery, and placement of delegations accommodated camera angles. Party leaders directed delegate behavior, reminding them to be conscious of their representation of the party to the American people. Campaign operatives directed the delegate celebrations on the convention floor. The number and length of speeches decreased, and the style of oratory adapted to a mediated audience. The roof-raising oratory of William Jennings Bryan was replaced with the more intimate, familiar style of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan. Eventually, the national political parties turned to television professionals—producers, directors, stage and lighting designers, and others—to assist in the impact of conventions for a television audience.

Larry David Smith and Dan Nimmo describe the relationships between party leaders, candidates and their campaign workers, and media decision makers and personalities as a "cordial concurrence." The early adjustments between those invested in the convention were primarily cooperative. A more structured convention provided more interesting content and greater predictability for television producers. The conventions also gave media outlets opportunities to showcase their own talent, building the credentials of anchors, reporters, and guest political analysts. Political parties also benefited. Larger audiences provided greater opportunity to build support for candidates, to create political stars through primetime convention performances, and to showcase the party's issues and ideas.

Yet, as conventions became more highly orchestrated and predictable, media representatives balked at providing free coverage for what appeared to be no more than an extended political advertisement. Media decision makers increasingly exerted their gatekeeper function through controlling what aspects of the convention would reach the public. Producers could choose to air their own interviews of notable political

figures or celebrities rather than cover the speaker at the podium, often dedicating more airtime to their own reporters and anchors than to convention floor and podium events. They also controlled the camera shots and presentation to the audience. During the 1968 Democratic convention, CBS News juxtaposed Chicago Mayor Richard Daley's praise for the Chicago police force with images of officers using force to subdue protestors on the streets outside the convention, resulting in a clear editorial commentary. In other cases, speeches or other convention events were ignored in favor of other content. For instance, in 1984, only two networks, NBC and CNN, showed President Reagan's introductory film in its entirety.

Over time, the broadcast networks also reduced the amount of time they devoted to the conventions. From 1956 to 1976, the broadcast networks ABC, CBS, and NBC covered the Democratic and Republican conventions gavel to gavel. Networks began to reduce coverage in 1980. In a rather dramatic representation of the news media's growing antipathy to the conventions, veteran journalist Ted Koppel described the 1996 Republican National Convention as an "infomercial," announced that ABC's *Nightline* was leaving the convention and would not cover the upcoming Democratic convention. By the 2004 election, ABC, CBS, and NBC limited their primetime coverage of each convention to 3 hours over 4 days, all between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. eastern standard time, thus failing to cover at least 1 day of each convention and airing only a small portion of the convention on the other 3 days.

At the same time, radio, cable television channels, and the Internet provide additional new outlets for individuals who want more information. In 2004, National Public Radio (NPR) scheduled 3 hours of convention coverage each day. PBS offered 3 hours of coverage every night of the convention in prime time; CNN covered the conventions from 8 p.m. to 1 a.m. each night; MSNBC focused on the conventions from 6 p.m. to 2 a.m.; Fox News provided convention coverage from 6 p.m. to 1 a.m. every night as well. C-SPAN began coverage in the late afternoon with uninterrupted coverage until the conclusion of the convention each day. ABC supplemented its broadcast coverage by offering gavel-to-gavel coverage on its digital channels. The Democratic National Committee made its entire convention available through a Webcast. Thus, although the networks decreased coverage, the range of available media outlets and total coverage increased.

The increasing numbers and types of media outlets will continue to shape nominating conventions. In 2004, the political parties and convention planners placed the most important convention elements in the narrow 1-hour window of broadcast network coverage, shortened speeches, and carefully orchestrated transitions to attempt to prevent the networks from breaking away from podium coverage. At the same time, convention planners recognized the changing media environment by catering more to local television stations, radio talk show hosts, and Internet outlets, offering media credentials to bloggers for the first time at the 2004 conventions. As the range and type of media outlets continues to change, nominating conventions will change as well.

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See also Political Parties; Primaries

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Council of Europe, Media Policy

The Council of Europe (CoE)—now affiliating 46 countries—was established in 1949 to defend human rights, parliamentary democracy, and the rule of law; promote standardization of member countries' social and legal practices; and promote awareness of a European identity based on shared values. It also considers itself a guardian of democratic security as a complement to military security. Its mandate also covers social cohesion, the security of citizens, democratic values, and cultural diversity; strengthening the security of European citizens, in particular by combating terrorism, organized crime, and trafficking in

human beings; and fostering cooperation with other international and European organizations. It is increasing its monitoring to ensure that all members respect their obligations and commitments.

CoE's main components are the Committee of Ministers (CM), the decision-making body; the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE); and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. They are supported by the 2,200-strong Secretariat, headed by the Secretary General. International non-governmental organizations enjoy participatory status with the Council of Europe and their annual conference is an important partner.

Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)

Article 10 underpins all CoE media policy standards and activities. It enshrines freedom of expression (which must be exercised without interference by public authorities and regardless of borders) and comprises the freedom to hold opinions, to impart information and ideas, and to receive information and ideas. Under Article 10 a state may interfere with this freedom to protect the public interest (national security, territorial integrity, public safety, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or morals); to protect other individual rights (protection of the reputation or rights of others, prevention of the disclosure of information received in confidence); and to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

The European Court of Human Rights (also operating within CoE) holds that the necessity for restricting freedom of expression must be convincingly established; the national margin of appreciation in assessing the need for that must be circumscribed by the interest of a democratic society in ensuring and maintaining a free press. Any limitation of, or interference with, such freedom must be provided for by law, which must be narrowly interpreted, have a legitimate purpose, and be necessary in a democratic society; that is, must respond to a pressing social need and be proportionate to the legitimate purpose it pursues.

Council of Europe Media Policy

CoE's work in the media serves to strengthen freedom of expression and information and the free flow of information and ideas across borders. It also serves to strengthen pan-European policy measures and legal and other instruments for this purpose, as well as to make sure they keep pace with technological, economic, and regulatory change in the media sector.

CoE helps Member States establish or consolidate free, independent and pluralistic media capable of collecting and delivering information in a professional and ethical manner and, where necessary, to persuade public authorities to provide the necessary conditions for the media to work in. In the years 2004–2008, priorities include

- the balance between freedom of expression and right to privacy, right to a fair trial, and so on.
- online services and democracy (harmful and illegal cyber content, Internet literacy)—the convergence of communications technologies and services and its impact on media regulation;
- media pluralism and diversity in light of the development of concentrations and new communications technologies and services; and
- the interrelationship between freedom of expression and information and the fight against terrorism.

Freedom of Expression and Information

Several CoE documents develop the ideal of freedom of expression and access to information and ideas for all. The 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities require states to take positive measures to protect and promote the use of regional or minority languages in public and private life and to prevent discrimination against persons belonging to a national minority in their access to the media.

In turn, the 1989 European Convention on Transfrontier Television promotes the free flow of information and ideas across borders and puts parties under an obligation to guarantee freedom of reception and to not restrict the retransmission on their territories of program services which comply with the terms of this convention.

A 2003 CM Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet states that Internet content should not be subject to restrictions other than media content. There should also be no prior state control, and self-regulation, or co-regulation, is preferable to any state regulation of the Internet.

New circumstances necessitated the adoption of a 2005 CM Declaration on freedom of expression and

information in the media in the context of the fight against terrorism, which called for no new restrictions on freedom of expression and information to be introduced and for the editorial independence of the media to be strictly respected.

The 1974 CM Resolution on the Right of Reply—the position of the individual in relation to the press—and the 2004 CM Recommendation on the right of reply in the new media environment provide a corrective and a remedy in cases when freedom of expression in the media is abused to provide inaccurate information.

Free and Democratic Media System

In the *Lingens* case, the court stated that "freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders," hence its many judgments serving to protect that freedom. The European Commission of Human Rights found in the *Verein Alternatives Lokalradio Bern and Verein Radio Dreyeckland Basel* case that "States do not have an unlimited margin of appreciation concerning licensing systems . . . a licensing system not respecting the requirements of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic society would thereby infringe Article 10." In the 1993 *Informations-verein Lentia and others* case, the court found that the Austrian public monopoly on broadcasting was "not necessary in a democratic society."

In addition to ECHR, basic goals to be pursued by the organization and its Member States in this field were defined in the 1982 CM Declaration on the Freedom of Expression and Information:

1. Protection of the right of everyone to exercise the rights enshrined in Article 10;
2. Absence of censorship or arbitrary constraints on participants in the information process, on media content or on the dissemination of information; access to public information;
3. The existence of a wide variety of independent and autonomous media, permitting the reflection of diversity of ideas and opinions;
4. The availability and access on reasonable terms to adequate facilities for the domestic and international transmission and dissemination of information and ideas;
5. The Declaration also says it is the duty of States to guard against infringements of the freedom of expression and information and to foster a variety of media and a plurality of information sources.

On this last issue, a 1999 CM Recommendation on Measures to Promote Media Pluralism noted that the existence of a multiplicity of autonomous and independent, politically and culturally diverse media outlets at the national, regional, and local levels generally enhances pluralism and democracy. It encouraged Member States to take measures to promote pluralism and/or anti-concentration mechanisms. Also, a 2000 CM Declaration on cultural diversity noted the role of the media in promoting it. A 1994 CM Recommendation on Measures to Promote Media Transparency additionally called for measures to promote media transparency.

CoE consistently promotes public service broadcasting and its independence and special remit. This is defined as offering news, educational, cultural, and entertainment programs aimed at different categories of the public and supporting the values underlying the political, legal, and social structures of democratic societies, in particular respect for human rights, culture, and political pluralism. A 2003 CM Recommendation on Measures to Promote the Democratic and Social Contribution of Digital Broadcasting calls on members to create the conditions required to enable public service broadcasters to fulfill their remit in the best manner as well as adapting to the new digital environment. This may include the provision of new digital and online services. Public service broadcasters should play a central role in the transition process to digital terrestrial broadcasting.

In order to safeguard the independence of broadcasters, a 2000 CM Recommendation on the Independence and Functions of Broadcasting Regulatory Authorities specifies that these authorities should not be under the influence of political power, should be appointed in a democratic and transparent manner, and may not receive any mandate or take any instructions from any person or body.

Freedom of Political Debate

CoE has specifically promoted political communication through the media. Their role as political watchdog was emphasized by the court in *Lingens,* where it also underlined the importance of freedom of the press in imparting "information and ideas on political issues

just as on those in other areas of public interest; . . . the public has a right to receive them." Freedom of the press, said the court, affords the public a means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders. Consequently, the freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society. This is why political debate by the press enjoys strong protection under Article 10: "The limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual." The politician "must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance."

A 2004 CM Declaration on freedom of political debate in the media stated further that pluralist democracy and freedom of political debate include the right of the media to disseminate negative information and critical opinions concerning political figures and public officials; that the state, the government, or any other institution of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch may be subject to criticism in the media, though individuals remain protected as such. Satire is protected by Article 10 of the Convention, and it allows for a wider degree of exaggeration and even provocation.

In defamation cases the court has pointed out, as in *Lingens,* that "the existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the truth of value-judgments is not susceptible to proof . . . As regards value judgments this requirement is impossible to fulfil, and it infringes freedom of opinion itself." Equally, in *Dalban,* the court held: "It would be unacceptable for a journalist to be debarred from expressing critical value judgments unless he or she could prove their truth."

The court has consistently held that there must be a "reasonable relationship of proportionality" between a sanction imposed for defamation and the injury to the reputation which has been sustained. It has emphasized the impact of criminal sanctions themselves due to their enduring and stigmatizing effect (e.g., through criminal records), noting that the threat of criminal sanctions can discourage imparting information or voicing opinions on issues of public concern.

Serving the Democratic Process, Journalism, and Other Standards

A 1999 CM Recommendation on Measures Concerning Media Coverage of Election Campaigns called on Member States to ensure respect for the principles of fairness, balance, and impartiality in the coverage of election campaigns by the media. Later, a 2004 CM Recommendation on legal, operational and technical standards for e-voting stated that it must respect all the principles of democratic elections and referendums and be as reliable and secure as democratic elections and referendums which do not involve the use of electronic means. Only secure, reliable, efficient, and technically robust e-voting systems, open to independent verification and easily accessible to voters, will build public confidence in e-voting. A 2004 CM Recommendation on electronic governance specified requirements for e-democracy, public e-services, and generally e-governance in a democratic society.

Standards relating to the work and protection of journalists include the 2000 CM Recommendation on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information, the 1996 CM Recommendation on the Protection of Journalists in Situations of Conflict and Tension, and the 2003 CM Recommendation on the provision of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings.

Monitoring Activities

Monitoring is done by the CM, PACE, the Secretary General, the European Court of Human Rights, the Commissioner for Human Rights, and specialized monitoring mechanisms.

CM has developed a whole range of procedures, including specific post-accession monitoring of selected new Member States, as well as thematic monitoring (including the field of freedom of expression and information).

CM is required to ensure that states comply with the court's judgments concerning them, in particular by verifying that the necessary steps are taken to stop ongoing violations and prevent new violations in future (changes in legislation, judicial doctrine, and administrative practices, etc.), as well as to remedy the situation of the applicants (payment of damages and, in certain circumstances, reopening of proceedings, the granting of residence permits, etc.).

PACE set up a committee on the honoring of obligations and commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) in 1997. The Assembly may sanction persistent failure to honor obligations and commitments accepted and/or lack of cooperation in its monitoring process, or recommend that the Committee of Ministers take the appropriate action.

The Secretary General has the right to request from any State Party an explanation of the manner in which

its internal law ensures the effective implementation of the provisions of ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights and the Commissioner for Human Rights have to review compliance with a number of obligations and commitments, which also touch upon issues related to the rule of law and respect for democratic principles in Member States.

The Commissioner may alert the organs of the Council of Europe through reports, opinions, and recommendations. Where the Commissioner found that a State has not undertaken adequate efforts to implement a recommendation, he/she may inform PACE or CM, enabling them to take appropriate action.

Various conventions have called into being committees charged with overseeing their implementation.

Assistance Programs

The program for Assistance and Technical Co-operation in the media field covers a wide range of issues such as the rights and responsibilities of journalists; the regulation of the press, radio, and television sectors; access to information, and so forth. It includes training in Article 10 ECHR for judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, as well as various state officials (e.g., information officers).

Implemented in collaboration with the authorities of the States concerned, these programs take the form of legal expertise of new draft laws or amendments to existing national legislation; training, information, and awareness-raising workshops, seminars, and conferences; training of media professionals (journalists, editors, managers of press, and radio-television enterprises, etc.).

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Creating Reality

David L. Altheide's book *Creating Reality* is one of several studies from the 1970s that addressed the question of how the mass media construct a reality. Many of these books used methods comparable to field studies in cultural anthropology, in the sense that researchers observed a culture unfamiliar to them—in this case the culture of news production. Altheide's book, which appeared in 1976, shares this method with other eminent works in communication from the 1970s by James D. Halloran and colleagues, by Gaye Tuchman, and by Mark Fishman, to name but a few.

Altheide conducted his fieldwork mostly in 1971 and 1972. For about a year, he spent several days a week in the newsroom and with reporters of a California network affiliate television station, observing the production of a local news show. The station also sent him to the 1972 party conventions, where he continued his observation. Altheide also relied on another researcher's field notes and visits to other broadcasting institutions.

The major subject of the book is how the conditions under which a news show is produced affect its product (the show) as it is broadcast. External conditions include the necessity to make profits, the competition, and the relationships between journalists and politicians. Internal conditions include time management, format, the availability of sources, the necessity to relate a structured narrative, and the limits of editing techniques. Illustrating these factors with many examples from his observations, Altheide depicts the news show as the consequence of decisions, many of which have a lot to do with the production process and little to do with the content that is communicated.

The book's key term is *news perspective.* It is the ability to encounter events with expectations that enable a person to make a structured narrative of it (and one that is suited for the medium the person works for). In positive terms, this is what young journalists have to learn in their training. Negatively speaking it is a professional deformation because no one except journalists looks at events in terms of their capacity to be narrated. News perspective (the special way journalists look at the world) has not become an established term in political communication. But it entails many aspects that were discussed under the concept of framing 20 years after Altheide had written his book.

The book also includes two case studies on the framing of two political scandals in the 1972 presidential election campaign in the United States: the news about Democratic vice presidential candidate Thomas F. Eagleton's psychiatric treatment and Watergate.

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See also Framing; Journalism, Political; News Coverage of Politics; News Selection Process; Watergate

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CRITICAL THEORY

Critical theory aims to articulate an overall theory of society by using an interdisciplinary approach to the practical conditions of historic ways of life. The designation *critical theory* is intimately tied to the work of the *Frankfurter Institut für Sozialforschung* (Frankfurt Institute for Social Research), later called the *Frankfurter Schule* (Frankfurt School). At the same time, critical theory represents a philosophical and theoretical paradigm that extends beyond that circle and that follows from, along with continental Marxist thinking and theory, both the philosophical analysis and criticism of rationality practiced by Kant and Hegel and the psychoanalysis of Freud.

The circle of researchers around Max Horkheimer at the Institute undertook a fundamental and interdisciplinary approach to establish, on a scientific basis, the necessity and possibility of changing society. To be closely investigated, along with social institutions and practices, were the convictions and attitudes of the members of society. In this setting, social theory (to the extent that it is concerned with the society in which it exists) constitutes a portion of its own subject matter. Even science is a component of society and accordingly must take account of this in self-criticism. This position is in contrast with the image of bourgeois science, which in Horkheimer's view fits itself unquestioningly into the process of investigation and participation in solving problems prescribed for it by dominant social organs. Critical theory was not directed simply toward resolution of this or that injustice but took as its object society itself. In his inaugural lecture of 1931, in which he also addressed the duties of an institute for social research, Horkheimer understood the goal of social philosophy as the philosophical interpretation of man's fate to the extent that men are not simply individuals but members of society. Social philosophy thus was required to concern itself with those phenomena that can be understood only in the context of man's life in society: the state, law, polity, economics, religion—in short, all human material culture.

The Institute for Social Research was founded in 1924 as an independent investigative body associated with University of Frankfurt am Main. When in 1930 Max Horkheimer succeeded Carl Grünberg as the Institute's director, the conditions were established for the supra-disciplinary studies that were published in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* (Studies in Philosophy and Social Science) from 1932 until 1941 (vol. 9). Forced to dissolve in 1933 when National Socialism came to power, the Institute emigrated first to Geneva, where a branch already had been sited, and then to Paris, as the Société Internationale de Recherches Sociales. In 1934 it arrived in New York, where, as the Institute for Social Research, it was associated with Columbia University. In later years of its exile in America, some members, like Theodor W. Adorno and Horkheimer, moved to Los Angeles, though the Institute maintained its headquarters in New York. Marcuse and Lowenthal worked from 1943 or 1944 for the Office of War Information. After the war Horkheimer and Adorno returned to Germany, while Marcuse, Lowenthal, and others stayed in America to begin academic careers at Brandeis University and the University of California, Berkeley.

In this research context, the task of those representing individual scholarly perspectives—along with Max Horkheimer, they included Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal, Erich Fromm, Theodor Adorno, and others—was the specialized scientific analysis of society and culture. In the work of the Institute can be identified, alongside the phase of research activities specifically critical of capitalism (which persisted into the first years after emigration and which were founded on Marxist criticism of political economy), a phase which followed immediately thereafter, extending from 1937 into the early 1940s, and which was based on Horkheimer's essay "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie" (Traditional and Critical Theory). Directly succeeding this was a phase oriented toward a dialectic theory of society and culminating in the *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Dialectic of Enlightenment; *DE*); it lasted into the period of re-migration to Germany and was then supplanted by new problems of

industrial society and of technical civilization during a period when younger co-workers like Ludwig von Friedeburg and Jürgen Habermas joined the Institute.

A central motive for these shifts among distinct phases of attitude toward social theory and cultural theory is already embodied in the theory's concept, which viewed itself as "reflection and expression of historic experience" and required continuous evaluation of both the theory and its concepts as a result of social and cultural changes. Here Horkheimer's essay "Traditional and Critical Theory" represents the first decisive shift for interdisciplinary research aimed at a dialectic theory of society in view of the cataclysmic political experiences in Europe. In this respect critical theory is based on a separation from traditional theory. The term *critical,* although directly referring to Marx's criticism of political economy, replaces the term *materialistic.* This was assuredly an advantage when introducing the theory in America, as direct reference to Marxist tradition could thereby be avoided (even though the theory followed the lines of historic materialism). Horkheimer laid special weight on the significance of cultural phenomena as part of the social process; that is, their effects on the individual and their alterations under the influence of shifting economic and social power structures, as it is most prominently manifested in criticisms of mass culture and the culture industry. Until the end of the 1930s—particularly in early individual studies—culture was viewed within the theory of contemporary times as the ideological glue of society, and cultural phenomena thus came to be simply objects of criticism. Individual studies of literature, art, and music (and, albeit only at the margin, of the products of mass culture as well) analyzed the role of culture in the transition from liberalism to fascism (e.g., Leo Lowenthal's essay on Knut Hamsun). As a consequence of the assumption of power by National Socialists in Germany, the objects of sociologic study became those features that could help to explain this event. Such questions included authoritarian consciousness, the collapse of the family, the structures of bourgeois consciousness, and developments in political economy. Individual studies and investigations along these lines supplied the background for the dialectic project whose product, appearing in 1944, was the *DE.* In this work, critical theory explicitly takes issue with the principles of traditional experience, and critical theory views the processes of synthesis as imbued with violence and with fear of the other.

It is no accident, then, that *DE's* chapter on the culture industry (with the subtitle "Enlightenment as Betrayal of the Masses") is closely coordinated with the chapter titled "Elements of Antisemitism: Boundaries of Enlightenment." The background for comparisons between the structures of anti-Semitism and the structures of mass production of cultural goods within the culture industry was undoubtedly shaped by exerting influences on the masses. These were apparent not only in the press but also generally in the cinema and radio, which were associated with wholly novel possibilities of disseminating specific attitudes and behaviors within mass culture.

The chapter on the culture industry in *DE,* which concentrates substantially on the experience of the development of mass culture in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s and specifically on the development of the capitalist media system in North America, is a compact assembly of the determinants within culture theory and social theory that apply, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, not only to analysis of the effect of mass communications in capitalism. The effect of instrumental reasoning extends uniformly over nearly all fields within society and culture and is disseminated more widely via mass culture.

From the point of view of communications science, criticism of the culture industry depends on the development of media in the Weimar Republic and the hope then articulated for democratic evolution of the communications media. These appear as a sort of benchmark, from which the employment of media both in totalitarian fashion (Germany, Spain, Italy) and by monopoly capital (North America) has fallen away.

The transition from the democratic phase of the technological development of the mass media into the phase of its use for both totalitarian ends and the purposes of monopoly capitalism thus constitutes the point from which further criticism and analysis begins. Although Benjamin and Brecht continued to suggest novel (and rather utopian) possibilities for electronic media, proposing a dialogue in which receivers became broadcasters ("radio theory"), these degenerated through subjection to the totalitarian state—as well as, finally, to monopoly capitalism—solely into instruments of domination.

Taking this experience in Europe as a background, the manner in which the media were employed in the United States represents only a variation on the same apparently unavoidable enthrallment of the subject by the system. In one instance it is the totalitarian state

which controls the individual; in the other it is the monopoly-dominated sphere of consumption. The circle is closed, in this analysis, with articulation of critical-materialist theory. According to this theoretical position, progress in the culture industry arises, for Adorno, from the general laws of capitalism, which tend toward monopoly. The concept of a unitary system within the culture industry, which inheres in such ideas, views both the aspects of production and distribution as well as progress in technical evolution as inseparably related, a relationship from which the criticism of rationalism within the *DE* took inspiration.

Critical-materialist theory takes shape from the premise that the social system is rationalistic and that its logic is expressed in the dominance of an economic selection mechanism as well as in the style and organization of the culture industry that this dominance shapes. In this analysis, the culture industry comprises the technically industrialized production and distribution of mass-culture or popular-culture offerings of whatever origin or form via every available media route. The concept of the economic selection mechanism constitutes the decisive origin that determines trends in development of the culture industry as well as the incorporation of criticism directed against rationalism.

In technology and technological rationality, then, can be found one of the principal themes that forms the setting for works by the other members of the Institute for Social Research and that addresses questions of the technological transformation of communication and its influence on the production of art and of culture in late capitalism. The contrast between artistic technology and technical rationality already constitutes (in the introductory definitions of the chapter on the culture industry) the caesura at which Adorno could meld the *DE* with aspects of his previous work on changes in art production and in the culture of the 1920s and 1930s.

Adorno dealt with the theme of technology in the culture industry, as did Walter Benjamin in his essay "Art in the Era in Which Art Can Be Reproduced by Technology." The two authors clearly differ, however, in their assessment of the consequences of this development. Adorno criticizes changes in means of artistic representation, with a view toward the acceptance of technological rationality, and Benjamin is interested in the question of what opportunities technical progress confers in the process of destroying what is old.

The concept of the culture industry was uncoupled from criticism of rationalism in the 1960s, when it was rediscovered together with the writings of critical theory from Adorno's period of exile. It became a general term used to criticize mass communication and mass culture in contemporary society.

The actions and accomplishments of the culture industry, according to the standards of this criticism, consist principally in the calculus of the effects and the technology of production and dissemination; according to its own content, ideology is exhausted in idolizing both that which exists and the power that controls technology.

Given the theoretical elaboration of the term *culture industry,* which is rooted in the social-theory analyses of the Institute for Social Research during its exile, to nowadays employ it as metaphorical is not improper. Even Adorno, in his analyses of jazz (which can be read as culture-industry criticisms *avant la lettre*) made no bones about the suitability of the term in metaphorical distinctions, such as in the organization of art and culture as goods. The term *mass culture* thus embraces all fields of cultural production and communication that are not art. With such breadth, however, the term *mass culture* nowadays tends to lack impact and is only marginally useful in analysis of popular culture to the extent that it excludes a differentiation that already permeates the production of culture goods in many more forms than in the 1940s and 1950s.

Initiatives toward reformulation have occurred since the 1970s. Enzensberger's famous essay "Baukasten zu einer Theorie der Medien" (Building Blocks for a Theory of Media) broadened the term to encompass the consciousness industry, which he held as a pacemaker for the socioeconomic development of late industrial societies. In fending off the thesis of manipulation, Enzensberger emphasizes—not least in taking up Benjamin's thoughts on positive barbarism—the possibility that the media, in the sense of using them as emancipators, can be made into a means of production for the masses. The intention here is not a shift in the goal of criticism; instead a strategy is addressed for turning means of domination against those means themselves and to seize the possibilities for emancipation that inhere in them. Accordingly, if one wishes to continue to employ the term *culture industry* for purposes of analysis of popular culture—which appears reasonable, given the advanced industrial production of entertainment offerings—one must use a terminological reconstruction to distinguish the polemic rejection of mass culture that is manifest in the concept from uses that pursue an analytic interest in the concept. This has been the particular success of Douglas Kellner in

his various works that manage to connect culture-industry criticism with themes in cultural studies.

Udo Göttlich

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Cronkite, Walter (1916–)

Walter Leland Cronkite, Jr. spent nearly 19 years as anchor of *CBS Evening News* and became known as "the most trusted man in America." Over the years, he won numerous journalism awards.

Born in St. Joseph, Missouri, Cronkite grew up in Houston, Texas. He attended the University of Texas in Austin, though he did not graduate. After working for several small newspapers and radio stations, he joined *United Press* in 1937. For them he reported on World War II in Europe and North Africa, covered the Nuremberg Trials, and spent 2 years reporting in Moscow.

In 1950, Cronkite joined *CBS News* after being recruited by Edward R. Murrow. Two years later, Cronkite reported for CBS at the Democratic and Republican presidential conventions where the term *anchorman* was first used for news presenters. CBS coined the term by drawing on a sports metaphor with Cronkite handling the anchor leg of the relay race. From 1953 to 1957, Cronkite hosted CBS's *You Are There,* a news program that included reenactments of historical events. He also briefly co-hosted the *CBS Morning Show* with a puppet.

On April 16, 1962, Cronkite began his tenure as the *CBS Evening News* anchor. The following year the broadcast expanded from its 15 minutes format to become the first half-hour evening news program. From 1967 until he left the anchor chair in 1981, Cronkite would dominate his competition in the ratings. Cronkite's famous closing line for the show was "and that's the way it is."

After being handed a piece of paper while on the air, Cronkite became the first to report that President John F. Kennedy had died. During the *Apollo 11* moon landing, Cronkite remained on the air for 27 of the 30 hours. As the spacecraft landed on the moon he shouted on the air, "Wow!" Cronkite considers the event the most important one he witnessed.

After a trip to Vietnam during the Tet Offensive, Cronkite stated that the war was a stalemate. This led to President Lyndon Johnson's response, "If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost Middle America." Johnson dropped his bid for reelection shortly thereafter. Cronkite's broadcasts have been used in historical movies, such as *Apollo 13* and *JFK.*

Following his retirement as CBS *Evening News* anchor on March 6, 1981, Cronkite continued to offer reports for *CBS, CNN, NPR,* and *PBS.* Among his other projects, Cronkite has voiced kids' television shows and movie characters, provided the voice for a character in a Broadway play, narrated advertisements for the University of Texas, and provided the voice-over for a Disney World ride.

More recently, Cronkite has spoken out against the 2003 invasion in Iraq, appeared in the documentary *Outfoxed,* and penned a blog at *The Huffington Post.* The Cronkite School of Journalism & Mass Communication is located at Arizona State Unviersity. In Sweden and Holland, news anchors are called Kronkiters and Cronkiters, respectively.

Brian T. Kaylor

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Crosstalk

Crosstalk: Citizens, Candidates, and the Media in a Presidential Campaign by Marion R. Just, Ann N. Crigler, Dean E. Alger, Timothy E. Cook, Montague

Kern, and Darrell M. West was published in 1996. The book reports the results of an extensive research project on the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign. In the book, the authors contend that to understand a presidential campaign, one must understand the interaction among all of the major actors in the process, the candidates, the media, and the public.

The authors describe the various aspects of the campaign, with particular emphasis on the candidate's messages via their campaign commercials and the news media's presentation of the candidates' issues and personal qualities. Content analysis of a wide variety of media messages, newspapers, and television form a major part of the underlying data of the book. The authors took advantage of their own diverse locations to provide a broad geographic distribution of media market coverage (Massachusetts, North Carolina, California, and Minnesota). Although some variation in news availability was apparent, the authors confirmed the dominance of journalistic styles and patterns such as a focus on horserace coverage. With these parts of the process, the authors then address how the public uses these information sources and the differences among them to construct their own view of the candidates and campaign issues.

Analysis of candidate messages also focused on the television ads sponsored by both campaigns. Noting the negative nature of the advertisements, the authors point to the differences in candidate handling of foreign policy and economic concerns.

The citizen or public view was considered by the authors through the conduct of interviews and focus groups. The analysis of the citizen viewpoints and the evolution of citizen views across the campaign suggests that the interaction of information throughout the campaign can affect how citizens come to view the candidates and the issues in the campaign. Citizens are not immune to media representations of issues and candidate character and personality.

Overall, the book offers some strong evidence for the premise that campaigns do matter to citizen perceptions. In 2003, the book won the American Political Science Association's Political Communication Division Doris Graber Award for best book.

Lynda Lee Kaid

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C-SPAN Network

C-SPAN is the Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network. It was launched March 19, 1979, by the cable industry as a nonprofit network devoted to televising sessions of the U.S. House of Representatives. It has since expanded to air nonstop coverage of government proceedings and public affairs programming. CEO and chairman of C-SPAN, Brian Lamb, came up with the idea for C-SPAN while working at a cable industry trade magazine. C-SPAN has won many journalism awards, including the 1993 Peabody award for overall excellence by an institution.

Contrary to public belief, C-SPAN does not receive funding from the government; its operating revenues are paid by license fees collected from the cable systems that offer the network to their customers. Its board of directors is comprised of executives from television operating companies. Adhering to its policy on neutrality, C-SPAN does not sell advertisements or sponsorships. By airing unfettered video coverage of speeches and legislative proceedings, C-SPAN gives those in office, and other figures of public interest, a channel through which they can reach the public without the filters of traditional media outlets.

Eighty-six million households in the United States have access to C-SPAN networks. The network has grown significantly since it started, launching C-SPAN2 and C-SPAN3 to expand its coverage of government. C-SPAN2 covers Senate proceedings, and C-SPAN3 covers live political events and airs archived historical programming. In addition to its coverage of the U.S. government, the network also occasionally airs proceedings from the British Parliament, Canadian Parliament, and other governments whose proceedings might be of some importance to viewers.

C-SPAN has emphatically stated their video is not for use in the public domain but has allowed its use in classrooms and engages in a vigorous educational outreach program. Major television networks routinely use clips from C-SPAN, but it has filed claims against Internet users who post segments of C-SPAN broadcasts on Web pages.

Though viewing levels comparable to entertainment cable networks will never be reached, the network does reach an average of 22 million viewers weekly. C-SPAN

has covered both Democratic and Republican nominating conventions since its conception. The Clinton impeachment trials, Clarence Thomas's Supreme Court nomination hearings, and the 2000 election recount were all covered in entirety by the network.

C-SPAN has tried to gain access to Supreme Court Hearings, but so far their cameras have been denied access. However, the court did allow them to audio record their reading of the decision on *Bush v. Gore* in December 2000. The network has covered, with audio only, other seminal cases and often airs live coverage of speaking events that the justices engage in.

Even though the network was not initially successful, in terms of viewers, it built up a cult following of political junkies, members of the news media, and legislators themselves. Avid watchers of C-SPAN call themselves SPANners or SPANheads.

Shannon Custer McAleenan

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Cuban Missile Crisis

See Kennedy, John F.; Stevenson, Adlai

Cultivation Theory

Cultivation theory, also known as cultivation analysis, is one approach to finding answers to broad questions concerning television and its effects on children. It is the third component of a research paradigm that investigates (1) the institutional processes that underlie the media and the production of its content, (2) the prevalent images in media content, and (3) the relationships between watching television and audience beliefs and behaviors. Simply, cultivation analysis is designed to assess the contributions television viewing makes to people's conceptions of social reality. In its simplest form, cultivation analysis asks if those who watch more television have views that are more reflective of what they see on television compared to people with similar demographic characteristics but who watch less television.

Television is the United States' and the world's storyteller, telling most of the stories to most of the people, most of the time. As such, it has become our most common and constant learning environment, one that very few can or even want to escape. Children today are born into homes in which most stories are told by a centralized commercial institution rather than parents, peers, schools, or the church. Television is only one of many venues that help explain the world. Television's version of reality, however, bombards everyone with basically the same perspectives at the same time. These views are not much different from those found in other media or imparted by other powerful socialization agents. Yet, television is unique not only because it provides a common set of images to virtually all members of society but also because people tend to spend more time with television than other media. Since television's inception there have been concerns about its effects. The popular press and the government continue to ask, What does television do to us? Teachers and parents wonder if television makes children more aggressive or if it helps or hinders learning. Although seemingly simple, these questions are complex and the answers are far from simple or straightforward.

The methods and assumptions of cultivation analysis differ from those typically found in mass communication research. Research on media effects has often focused on a stimulus-response model—how specific messages produce immediate change in people's behaviors or attitudes. Cultivation analysis, on the other hand, is concerned with the long-term, general, and pervasive consequences of cumulative exposure to television's messages. Cultivation does not imply immediate short-term responses to exposure. Rather, cultivation is concerned with the long-term cumulative exposure to television's repetitive and stable messages that persist despite the increased channel offerings available today to most people. Cultivation implies that some viewers may develop new conceptions of social reality though viewing for others may result in the maintenance of existing conceptions of social reality, all of which may be traced to their cumulative and steady exposure to the world of television.

Cultivation studies typically begin with identifying and assessing the most recurrent and stable patterns in television content by looking for those images and values that cut across most program genres. These

findings are then used to generate questions that ask about people's conceptions about social reality. Using surveys, these questions are posed to samples of children, adolescents, or adults. In addition, some cultivation analyses are secondary analyses of large data sets. A key element in these surveys is the assessment of television viewing. Viewing questions typically ask how much time the respondent watches television on an average day, with the analyses determining light, medium, and heavy viewers on a sample-by-sample basis. The analyses look for differences in amount of viewing, not specific amounts of viewing. The questions of cultivation analysis do not mention television but rather provide answers that reflect (a) the dominant views or images seen on television and (b) reality. The resulting relationships between amount of viewing and the tendency to respond in terms of what is seen on television reflects television's contribution to viewers' conceptions of social reality (cultivation).

As is true for many studies in media effects, cultivation analyses typically generate small effects. As even those who watch the least television may watch 7 to 10 hours a week and certainly interact with those who may watch more television, the cards are stacked against finding evidence of cultivation. Consequently, finding even small differences between light and heavy viewers may indicate far-reaching consequences. Moreover, small effects may have profound consequences. For example, a difference of one percentage point in ratings may indicate the success or failure of a program; a difference of a few percentage points in an election may make a difference in who wins or who loses.

Variations in Cultivation

Cultivation is a continual, dynamic ongoing process, not a unidirectional flow of influence from television to viewers, and there are two processes that reflect differences in how cultivation may work. Direct experience may be important for some viewers, and the phenomenon called "resonance" illustrates how a person's everyday reality and patterns of television viewing may provide a double dose of messages that resonate and amplify cultivation. For example, those who live in high-crime urban areas often show stronger relationships between amount of viewing and a stated fear of crime.

Television provides a shared daily ritual that is highly compelling and contains informative content for diversified viewers; in other words, a mainstream. Television programs typically eliminate boundaries of age, class, and region. Consequently the mainstream is a relative commonality of outlooks and values that is cultivated by consistent and heavy exposure to the world of television. The phenomenon of mainstreaming means that heavy viewing may override differences in perspectives and behavior that typically result from numerous factors and influences. In other words, attitudes or behaviors that would ordinarily be attributed to different social or political characteristics may be diminished or absent in groups who watch more television. In short, mainstreaming reflects the sense that television cultivates common perspectives, representing a relative homogenization that makes television viewing the true melting pot of the American people and, increasingly, the world. For example, the beliefs of those who designate themselves as liberals or conservatives are often quite different when there is little television viewing. But, when heavy television viewers who call themselves liberals or conservatives are asked about these same topics, the liberals may give responses that are somewhat more conservative and the conservatives may give responses that are somewhat more liberal, essentially resulting in both groups reflecting beliefs that are more moderate or middle-of-the-road.

Evidence of Cultivation

The world of television tends to present a stable yet somewhat warped demography, with prime-time programs populated with characters who are 60% male and 40% female. Moreover, both younger and older characters are practically invisible compared to the overabundance of characters between 21 and 50. Prime-time television is also largely segregated. Although African Americans are seen in proportions that reflect their numbers in the U.S. population, this is due primarily to their presence in programs whose characters are mostly African American. Other racial groups such as Hispanics/Latinos, Asians, or American Indians are practically invisible. Similarly, whites are also most often found in programs with mostly white characters. There are few programs showing an adequate mixing of characters from different races.

Cultivation studies using data from the National Organization for Research at the University of Chicago's General Social Survey examined self-designated liberal, moderate, and conservative respondents' desires to keep African Americans and whites separate. Overall, light-viewing liberals are always least likely to endorse segregationist statements. The

views of light-viewing moderates and conservatives are often very similar and somewhat more likely to endorse racial segregation. However, heavy television viewers are more homogenous across political groups and show clear evidence of mainstreaming. Heavy viewing conservatives become more liberal and heavy viewing liberals become more conservative in relation to these issues. In short, the television mainstream, in terms of attitudes toward African Americans, clearly runs to the right.

Television viewing also contributes to a blurring of class lines. Respondents who have a low socioeconomic status are most likely to call themselves working class only when they are light television viewers. Heavy viewers in this socioeconomic group, on the other hand, are more likely to call themselves middle class. Similarly those heavy-viewing respondents who are in the high socioeconomic group tend to call themselves working class compared to the light viewers in this group. Television viewing thus tends to blur class distinctions and make more affluent heavy viewers think of themselves as just working people of average income.

The cultural and political television mainstream tends to absorb the divergent tendencies that traditionally have shaped the political process. Heavy television viewers, compared to comparably light viewers, tend to call themselves moderate but take positions that are unmistakably conservative. Although television viewing tends to bring the views of conservatives, moderates, and liberals closer together, the liberal position diminishes most among heavy viewers. Viewing thus blurs traditional differences moving it into a more homogeneous mainstream and, at the same time, moves the mainstream toward a more conservative or hard-line position on issues dealing with personal rights and minorities. Thus, as television may have come to serve as the current melting pot of Americans, assumptions of what constitutes the current mainstream must be continually monitored and revised to fit the images in the media, particularly those found on television.

Nancy Signorielli

See also Gerbner, George

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Cultural Imperialism

The word *imperialism* refers to the politics of states to expand their empire and thus their sphere of power and influence. *Cultural imperialism* refers to the historical

A Coca-Cola billboard is on display near an anti-imperialist mural June 15, 1999, at La Paz Public University, Bolivia. The population of Bolivia is composed of Native Americans mainly following ancestral customs and Spanish-speaking people of European ancestry who generally follow Western traditions.

Source: Getty Images.

fact that in imperial expansion, cultural forces have always played a significant role. Illustrations are Christian missionary activities, the introduction of Western-style school systems, forms of colonial administration, modern conceptions of professionalism, and the use of European languages in overseas colonies. The essence of cultural imperialism is that in achieving the domination of one nation over other nations, cultural sources of power and influence are of key importance. Cultural imperialism has different names in academic literature. It has been called media imperialism, cultural colonialism, communication imperialism, cultural synchronization, and ideological imperialism.

The combination of culture and imperialism achieved common currency in academic and political debates on North-South relations in the late 1960s and continued to be a recurrent topic on academic and political agendas throughout the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in Latin America. The notion of cultural imperialism played a central activist role in the 1970s debates at UNESCO on the creation of a New International Information Order, later to be renamed a New World Communication and Information Order. Toward the late 1980s, cultural imperialism lost its evocative attraction to the notions globalization and alternative globalization.

Defining cultural imperialism is made difficult by the combination of two highly complex concepts. Culture is defined and interpreted in myriad ways, as is imperialism.

A definition that is often used was given by Herbert I. Schiller in his book *Communication and Cultural Domination* (1976). This definition stresses how the different aspects and processes of a society converge to adapt to the values and structures of the dominant elements of the society. Essential in this definition is the notion of dominance. Cultural imperialism is seen as a process of imperial control that operates through forms of culture and that is more effective than earlier forms of colonial domination through military occupation, foreign administration, and economic dependency.

John Tomlinson has distinguished different discourses on cultural imperialism, which include the following:

- *Cultural imperialism as a discourse on media imperialism.* International media—as producers and disseminators of foreign cultural content—are seen as the key culprits in a process in which foreign cultural contents are imposed upon local cultural traditions. This is contested by scholars who question whether media are the central forces in processes of domination. They ask whether the media are indeed the key cultural points of reference in Western modern societies and whether foreign pressures (particularly from the United States) on structure, ownership, and content of national media effectively constitute a form of foreign domination.
- *Cultural imperialism as a discourse on nationality*. This is a process by which indigenous cultures are invaded by foreign cultures and either synchronize with the invaders or disappear altogether. This discourse raises critical questions around the notion of national cultural identity.
- *Cultural imperialism as a critique of global capitalism.* The challenge for this discourse is to demonstrate that capitalism is a homogenizing cultural force and that the global spread of consumerism constitutes a form of domination.
- *Cultural imperialism as a critique of modernity.* This discourse perceives of modernity as a way of life that spreads globally and that creates cultural homogeneity. The critical issue here is that the resistance against modernity may romanticize traditional forms of life.

Critics of the cultural imperialism perspective have contested what they saw as its main flaw: the assumption that receivers would be passive and non-resisting actors. They have argued that this assumption was empirically falsified in studies that demonstrated that audiences have an active ability to interpret cultural products in their own ways. According to these authors, the active audience frame of analysis shows that viewers actively produce meaning while consuming foreign TV products. Critics have also focused on the assumption of the single nature of the invading culture and the single nature of the indigenous culture. They have argued that the cultural imperialism perspective has too little attention for the multiple constructs that cultures are and for the mutuality, in processes of influence.

Critics have also addressed the lack of precision, measurability, testability, and inconsistency of the cultural imperialism perspective. The response to this has been that cultural imperialism is a macro-theoretical insight in societal processes that by its very nature lacks precision, quantification, or consistency. The defenders of cultural imperialism have argued that their macro-analysis could be neither falsified nor verified by the micro-type level analysis of individual cultural consumption.

Many studies on cultural imperialism have criticized the shortcomings of the cultural imperialism perspective and have suggested that authors defending this perspective failed to provide empirical support. However, most of the authors who have used the concept cultural imperialism in their efforts to understand domination in international relations have argued that they never formulated their work in operational and testable formats.

Cees J. Hamelink

See also Globalization; UNESCO Media Policy

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Cultural Studies

Cultural studies is now well known as a title for a scientific project with different formations researching cultural processes. The essential characteristic of cultural studies is the analysis of cultural contexts, with research into and criticism of the conditions under which individuals as well as groups and classes within society can become culturally self-aware, both in everyday life and in their cultural practices.

Its institutional origins were initially most closely associated with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in Birmingham, United Kingdom, founded in the early 1960s with Richard Hoggart as its first director (1964–1968). Cultural studies simultaneously, however, calls to mind many persons and formations mainly with stances in cultural analysis in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia. Critical association with this tradition is linked with three central authors of the British postwar era: Hoggart, whose book *The Uses of Literacy* (1957) definitively set into motion enquiries into the influence of mass culture on working-class culture and on daily life; Raymond Williams, whose book *Culture and Society* (1958) set decisive terminological, conceptual, and theoretical positions in disputing the traditional positions of Arnold, Eliot, Richards, and Leavis, followed shortly by *The Long Revolution* (1961); and E. P. Thompson, whose book *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963) further delved into the historic background against which these matters were set.

Williams's contemporary role in cultural studies is undoubtedly based on his having achieved within the debate on English culture—a debate from which he drew concepts that are nowadays still significant for the analytical work of cultural studies—an independent perspective whose goal was to make it possible to apprehend culture as an integrated process, as "a whole way of life." The meaning and role of this concept (which is, to be sure, problematic but is nonetheless central to Williams's criticism), to which further phrases such as "common culture" or "culture is ordinary" are associated, can be understood, not surprisingly, as having arisen in reaction to the conservative cultural criticism that then dominated the academic realm.

In this conflict cultural debate appeared deadlocked between the cruder economic determinisms of much Communist Marxism and the political conservatism and cultural elitism. It was—together with other stimuli

that led to the founding of the New Left, among them the uprising in Hungary and the Suez crisis—the postwar climate in English society to which this circle was opposed and which prompted its new positions.

Since the 1970s, a culturalist and a structuralist approach to cultural analysis in the context of cultural studies have developed. These two theoretical strains still determined the cultural analyses carried out under Stuart Hall, second director of the CCCS (1968–1979), from which the driving forces that were at the heart of research emanated into both everyday culture and popular culture since the mid-1970s. These analyses dealt with the media and with the theory of media, with the question of ideology, and with youth subcultures. The significance of the culturalist stance consists, above all else, in having used a new, expanded definition of culture (culture as a whole way of life) to prepare the way for the perspective on everyday culture and popular culture that is typical for cultural studies. The contribution of the structuralist paradigm lies in its acceptance of cultural or, later, discursive constructions of reality. The origins of both approaches exhibit a clear relationship to Western Marxism which thereafter, for later generations in particular, receded behind the designations of culturalism and structuralism. Althusser and later Gramsci and Foucault came to the fore, with whom the analysis of ideologies and of social hegemony and power is linked in different phases of the 1980s and 1990s.

Williams, and after him Hall, who both set into motion many of the innovations in cultural theory within cultural studies, maintains that the social creation of meanings through the use of formal signs is a practical material activity. The specific form of that practical consciousness is for Williams inseparable from all social material activity. It is at once a distinctive material process—the making of signs—and, in the central quality of its distinctiveness as practical consciousness, is involved from the beginning in all other human social and material activity. Relative to social analysis, this means that as culture and ideology emerge in various manifestations, they must continually be deconstructed and reconstructed anew. This has its foundation in the encoding and decoding model that Hall already had articulated in the early 1970s, which has primarily influenced audience studies. In the setting of everyday culture as well, however, society constitutes a structure in dominance, whose elements are also to be understood as autonomous and as existing in contradictory and asymmetric relation to one another. Following from this is the requirement that the status of research continually be defined anew, to keep pace with the alterations in the social and historical conditions that permit its existence and, most of all, to take account of its limitations and relationships, a requirement in which a pluralist perspective inheres.

Cultural studies is not only a matter of using ethnographic methods to discover a set of different cultural practices, but also of tracing the ongoing process of adopting and shifting positions. But although cultural studies carries the same name all over the English speaking world, debate today continues on what can be understood as cultural studies or what such studies really are. The multiplicity of themes addressed by cultural studies, particularly in the past 4 years, makes clear that the work of analysis of the relationships among culture, politics, economics, power, and domination is, in principle, not concluded and that this work constitutively must remain open to new questions and problems.

Udo Göttlich

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Cybernationalism

Cybernationalism refers to a new type of ideological movement that has originated, existed, and developed on the World Wide Web since the mid-1990s. It is a natural extension of the traditional nationalistic movement, but it distinguishes itself in its organizational structure, operational pattern, and political implications. Through various Internet-based communications and activities, cybernationalists promote collective identity, cultural cohesion, political autonomy, and

national interests among like-minded people in the cyber sphere. Taking advantages of the global reach and decentralized nature of online communication technologies (Internet media, e-mail, online chat rooms, online forums, bulletin board systems, personal Web logs, etc.), cybernationalists can advocate their cause with fast speed, low cost, and tremendous impact.

Nationalism is an exclusive, unsettling, and deep-rooted ideology, whereas the cyber sphere is an all-embracing, dynamic, and unconventional domain. The marriage of a powerful ideology and a revolutionary communication technology resulted in a new political phenomenon—cyber nationalism. This mergence takes three general forms. First, the cyber sphere serves as an information center for people to gather and disseminate nationalism-related information. Such a feature is more salient in countries where traditional mass media cannot be accessed by the nationalist groups. Second, the cyber sphere serves as an organizational platform for those nationalistic movements to exist, survive, and expand. The Internet not only enables those nationalists to form a virtual community in the cyber sphere but also provides them with an organizational medium to coordinate plans, mobilize people, and rally public support. Third, the cyber sphere serves as an execution channel for the nationalist groups to achieve those actionable objectives. A determined individual or a group of well-organized Internet users can inflict damage to the computer system of a targeted country through hacking or service blocking.

The following incident exemplifies the characteristics of cybernationalism. On April 1, 2001, a Chinese fighter jet collided with a U.S. surveillance plane over the South China Sea. The Chinese pilot was missing and the U.S. EP-3 plane made an emergency landing at one of China's military airports. The Chinese government initially withheld the information about this crisis on its state-controlled media. However, when Internet surfers picked up a report from American media and translated it into Chinese, the news was quickly spread across China's numerous online chat rooms. As the American crew members were still being held in China, the U.S. computer hackers initiated a series of retaliation campaigns, knocking hundreds of Chinese Web sites out of service. In response, several nationalism-oriented Chinese hacker organizations were formed in China's Internet-based communities. After an online emergency meeting that attracted thousands of Chinese Internet users, several Chinese hacker groups declared an all-out cyber war against the U.S. Web sites. Within weeks, thousands of Chinese and American Web sites in the government, military, and education sectors were defaced or taken out of service. An estimated 80,000 Chinese cybernationalists participated in this operation.

Xu Wu

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D

Daily Show, The

The Daily Show is a nightly news satire program on the cable network Comedy Central that is usually seen by a total of more than 4 million viewers Monday through Thursday. The show was spawned in 1996 with comedian Craig Kilborn as the lead anchor, followed by Jon Stewart in 1999 when Kilborn left to host a late night program on CBS.

Unlike other nightly comedy shows such as *The Late Show with David Letterman* and *The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, The Daily Show* stands out as a program that satirizes the traditional TV news format, simultaneously jabbing contemporary journalism and the current events it covers. The show begins with a 6- or 7-minute monologue from host Jon Stewart, sitting at an official-looking desk much like Tom Brokaw or Peter Jennings did during their respective nightly newscasts. The monologue consists of brief jokes beginning with factual current events information, followed by a sarcastic or satirical punch line.

So, whereas some media critics may lament young Americans' loyalty to a farcical news program, viewers must actually be briefed to some extent on pertinent current events in order to understand the humor and find it amusing.

The monologue is usually followed by a "mockumentary" which mixes clever and frequent off-color reporting with unusual or scandalous topics. This portion of the show has in the past covered topics ranging from online divorce proceedings to turtle festivals in the southeastern United States.

A celebrity interview segment is the last portion of the program, and this is where *The Daily Show* demonstrates its importance in contemporary politics. From the time a sunglasses-wearing Bill Clinton played the saxophone on *The Arsenio Hall Show* in the early 1990s, politicians have recognized more and more the utility of appearing on entertainment programs, particularly comedy shows. *The Daily Show* has been frequented by such political dynamos as Senators John Kerry and John McCain, Secretaries of State Madeleine Albright and Colin Powell, U.S. Presidents Clinton and Carter, and Arnold Schwarzenegger, who announced his gubernatorial candidacy in California sitting next to Stewart. Similarly, Senator John Edwards declared on *The Daily Show* his intention to run for president.

So well known is *The Daily Show* that anchor Jon Stewart has been headlined by Larry King; hosted the 2006 Academy Awards; and, along with other writers from Comedy Central, authored a bestselling book in 2004 titled *America (the Book): A Citizen's Guide to Democracy Inaction. Time* magazine listed Stewart as one of the 100 most influential people in the world in 2005. The show has also received considerable attention from scholars because it appears to be a major source of political information for young citizens.

Justin D. Martin

See also Humor in Politics

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Daisy Girl Ad

Since 1952 when televised political advertising became a staple of presidential elections, no single advertisement has achieved the notoriety of the 1964 spot known as the "Daisy Girl" ad, which was aired as part of Democrat Lyndon Johnson's campaign against Republican Barry Goldwater.

The 60-second advertisement opens with a young girl counting as she picks petals off of a daisy. Approximately 20 seconds into the spot the audio switches to an adult male voice going through a more ominous-sounding countdown. The image of the girl is frozen, and the camera zooms all the way into the pupil of her eye. At this point the countdown reaches "zero" and the next image the viewer sees is an atomic bomb exploding. President Johnson provides the voice over, "These are the stakes, to make a world in which all of God's children can live, or to go into the dark. We must either love each other, or we must die." The spot ends with a slide that reads, "Vote for President Johnson on November 3," as an anonymous announcer says, "Vote for President Johnson on November third. The stakes are too high for you to stay home." Though simple in its construction, the "Daisy Girl" ad, through its juxtaposition of the image of a young girl and an exploding atomic bomb, retains a powerful effect, even in an era of jaded voters accustomed to negative advertising.

The lasting historical impact of the "Daisy Girl" ad is impressive given that it was broadcast only one time. Formally titled "Peace, Little Girl," it aired September 7 during Monday Night at the Movies on CBS. The ad was part of the Johnson campaign's strategy to depict Goldwater as a radical too quick to resort to drastic action, such as using an atomic bomb. Not surprisingly, the airing of the spot sparked widespread criticism from Republicans, who considered the ad dirty politics.

The real genius of the advertisement is best explained by its creator Tony Schwartz. In his book, *The Responsive Chord,* Schwartz argues that effective political advertising does not tell the viewer what to think or believe but rather taps into what they *already* think and believe. The idea of political advertising from Schwartz's perspective is to get something "out" of the viewer, not "across" to them.

Commenting particularly on the "Daisy Girl" ad, Schwartz notes that despite protests from Republicans that the spot was an attack on their candidate, it contains no reference whatsoever to Goldwater. It was effective in that it "evoked a deep feeling in many people that Goldwater might actually use nuclear weapons. This mistrust was not in the Daisy spot. It was in the people who viewed the commercial." In other words, Schwartz is saying the spot did not necessarily create suspicion of Goldwater but merely tapped into what already existed in many viewers' psyches. This ad is a classic example of Schwartz's resonance theory of communication.

Mike Chanslor

See also Resonance Theory; *Responsive Chord, The*; Schwartz, Tony

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Dealignment

Dealignment refers to a secular process of generally eroding political predispositions among the citizens of advanced industrial democracies. The notion that voters' behavior is essentially guided by stable political predispositions dates back to Lazarsfeld's classic study of the 1940 U.S. presidential election. In this pathbreaking analysis, voters' electoral choices could be successfully predicted from a simple "Index of Political Predisposition," consisting of measures of socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, and place of residence, leading to the conclusion that "a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially. Social characteristics determine political preference." Lipset and Rokkan's social-historical cleavage model made plausible how long-standing group conflicts structured modern societies, how they became politicized, and how particular

groups of voters came to be affiliated with certain parties. Various ways are conceivable how structural predispositions are translated into individual political attitudes and behavior. Through processes of political socialization, groups may impose specific voting norms on their members. While interacting with structurally similar persons who display certain political preferences, individuals may learn which parties are best suited for people like themselves. Group-specific values and ideologies serve as interpretive tools for politicized social structures, helping make sense of political information and lending meaning to structurally guided political behavior.

The psychological predisposition of party identification is the core component of the Michigan School's model for explaining political behavior. It is conceived as an individual's affective orientation to an important group-object in her environment, with the group being a political party. Comparable to religious identities, partisanship is seen as deeply rooted in individuals' personalities and thus very stable. In voters' minds, it lends order to the complexities of the political sphere by defining certain elements of it as more or less relevant and by providing cues for normative assessments of these elements. Thus, it serves as a "perceptual screen," filtering the information individuals encounter in their environment in a way that is favorable to their party. Partisanship is therefore highly functional, providing structure and meaning to ordinary persons' understanding of politics. Its roots are seen mostly in early-life, primarily familial, socialization processes.

Political predispositions are important mediators of political communication effects. Through selective exposure, reception, acceptance, and retention, they guide how information from the mass media and other sources is processed. Messages from the media, personal communication, or communication campaigns will be readily processed if they are in accordance with citizens' political predispositions but will be blocked out if they contradict these predispositions. Thus, political predispositions may be activated through congenial political communication, leading to manifest behavior that corresponds to these predispositions. At the same time, conversion through persuasive messages that are not in line with existing predispositions is a rather unlikely phenomenon, except for specific circumstances, such as a high degree of consonance in the content of political communications, and low levels of political awareness that prevent citizens from recognizing that messages they are exposed to are actually not in line with their predispositions. The moderating role of partisanship extends also to indirect forms of media-generated persuasion, such as priming. Concerning purely cognitive effects, most notably agenda-setting, its mere existence is important: Partisans are generally less susceptible to this kind of media influence. Thus, political predispositions channel the impact of political communication and lead to a high degree of stability in citizens' political attitudes and behavior, both at the micro level of individuals and at the macro level of entire societies.

Against this background, there are far-reaching implications for political communications in modern societies if political predispositions are eroding. Although not undisputed, findings from many studies indicate that both structural and psychological predispositions are less important now than they were 3 or 4 decades ago. Two different processes are responsible for this secular trend. First of all, the shares of citizens that are characterized by structural or psychological predispositions are shrinking. Due to processes of social modernization, especially secularization, social and geographical mobility, and the tertiarization of the workforce, more and more citizens no longer belong to the groups that have solidly defined the conflict lines of cleavage politics since the late 19th century—groups such as farmers, industrial workers, or faithful Catholics. Similarly, in many societies the share of citizens who are not psychologically tied in any lasting ways to political parties is increasing. Generational turnover, rather than individuals distancing themselves from previously held party or cleavage group bonds, is the main source of this trend. Although the general decline of political predispositions is certainly the more important aspect of dealignment, it can also not be overlooked that even the grip of the remaining predispositions has been loosened. Members of the traditional cleavage groups, and partisans more generally, are less reliable now as supporters of particular parties than they used to be.

For a while it was disputed whether these phenomena indicated a "realignment"; that is, a reorientation of certain groups in the party system. But now it seems clear that the direction of the trend is toward a general decoupling of parties and society, setting more and more citizens free for persuasive, instead of merely activating, communication effects. From a functional perspective it was argued that the expansion of the media, especially television, together with

rising levels of education created "cognitively mobilized," politically competent citizens who became "new partisans" simply because they no longer needed political predispositions as guidelines to find their ways in the complicated world of politics. However, it is not clear yet whether the "individualization" of politics that was caused by dealignment is a blessing or rather a curse for the rationality and accountability of the modern political process. Voting decisions appear more strongly guided by short-term considerations than before. Hence, issues and candidates—and the communication flows that concern these—may become more important. Phenomena like split-ticket voting and electoral volatility are now generally more widespread, and more voters make up their minds during campaign periods rather than months in advance. Whether most electors indeed make wise use of the vast information resources available to them to cast intelligent votes, or whether they instead more easily fall victim to demagogues and campaign manipulation, remains to be seen.

Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck

See also Voting Behavior

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Dean, Howard (1948–)

Howard Dean was a candidate in the 2004 presidential election and currently serves as the chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Dean was born in New York and studied at the Albert Einstein School of Medicine before moving to Vermont and establishing a medical practice. He began his political career as a state representative in the Vermont House and was then elected as lieutenant governor in 1986. Dean became Vermont's governor on August 14, 1991. He served as governor for 11 years, during which time he achieved a balanced budget and implemented a program that provided universal health care for children and pregnant women in the state.

On June 23, 2003, Dean officially announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination in the presidential election of 2004. He was the first officially declared candidate against incumbent president George W. Bush. Dean had already been unofficially campaigning for 2 years, after his decision not to run for another term as governor. The Dean campaign firmly committed to the issues of health care, a balanced budget, and a restructuring of the war in Iraq. In fact, Dean was the only Democratic candidate to oppose the war in Iraq from the outset of his campaign.

Dean also stressed the importance of the Democratic Party maintaining its core beliefs and not moving to the right to secure more votes. One of the speech modules that he used in almost every campaign speech was that he represented the "Democratic wing of the Democratic party," and he often discussed how centralizing the party's beliefs could be dangerous and ineffective. This message resonated with some Democratic voters who were seeking a candidate outside the influence of the Washington beltway.

Though Dean was initially dismissed by political pundits, his ability to fundraise and mobilize loyal constituents helped him gain recognition in the surfacing (preprimary) stage. Much of his initial success came from his unequaled ability to utilize the Internet. Dean exploited the full potential of the Internet, harnessing its power to present the issues, collect donations, and most importantly, to dispense information to constituents. Despite his early success in surfacing, victory in the primary eluded him. His zeal and excitement ultimately resulted in a notorious scream at a campaign speech following his devastating primary loss in Iowa. John Kerry soon clenched the Democratic nomination, although he

eventually lost the 2004 election to the incumbent, George W. Bush.

Subsequent to his attempt at the presidency, Dean continued his grassroots approach to political organizing with the establishment of Democracy for America. This political action committee's mission is to rebuild the Democratic Party from the ground up. In February 2005, Dean was nominated to be the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, where he is currently fostering Democratic competitiveness in all 50 states and refocusing the party on traditional Democratic values.

Christina M. Smith

See also Democratic National Committee

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Debates

Although various types of political campaign debate had taken place in the United States since the 18th century, it was regarded a major innovation in campaign communication when televised face-to-face debates between presidential candidates John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon occurred in 1960. The televised campaign debate has now become an expected institution in U.S. presidential campaigns, and candidate debates are now common for all levels of elective office. Within the pantheon of political message types, the televised presidential debate is viewed as one of the most important forms of campaign communication by the public, political candidates, and the media, as well as political communication scholars.

Perhaps the most often cited justification for the great attention paid to presidential debates is the fact they reach large audiences. For example, approximately 80% of the U.S. adult population viewed or listened to at least one of the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates. Although viewership has declined somewhat for more recent debate series (see Table 1), presidential debates still generate the largest viewing audience of any single televised campaign event.

For the media, a presidential debate series is often treated as the "super bowl" or "prize fight" event of the general-election campaign, providing a convenient news script to perpetuate the media's typical horserace campaign coverage with candidates "dueling" or "sparring" in the debate arena. Such journalistic appeal explains why debates typically attract the largest amount of media coverage of any campaign-related news story during a presidential general election.

For voters, debates serve as a convenient focal point for what now seems to be a never-ending presidential campaign. Indeed, in one setting, voters can receive more direct-candidate information—focused largely on candidate issue positions—than they may receive throughout an entire campaign from other media and information sources. Also, for voters, debates generate the greatest amount of public interest in the ongoing campaign and spur more citizen-to-citizen discussion than any other single campaign event.

The televised presidential debate has evolved significantly since 1960, and compelling evidence suggests that U.S. democracy and voters have benefited from presidential candidates' willingness to meet, face-to-face,



President Ford and Jimmy Carter meet at the Walnut Street Theater in Philadelphia to debate domestic policy during the first of the three Ford-Carter debates, September 23, 1976.

Source: Gerald R. Ford Library.

Table 1 Presidential Debate Series and Average Viewing Audience

Debate Year	*# of Presidential Debates*	*# of VP Debates*	*Average Viewers**
1960	4	0	63.1
1976	3	1	59.8
1980	1	0	80.6
1984	2	1	63.0
1988	2	1	59.7
1992	3	1	62.6
1996	2	1	36.3
2000	3	1	37.6
2004	3	1	50.9

Source: Data from Nielsen Media Research (see www.debates.org).
*Average viewership expressed in millions.

seeking the public's support. The following discussion of campaign debates will provide a brief historical synopsis of presidential debate encounters from 1960 to the present, discuss the evolution of presidential debate formats, and, finally, discuss the various effects of debate viewing.

History of U.S. Presidential Debates

To understand the evolution and practice of U.S. presidential debates, one must appreciate the candidate debate as it functions within the context of campaign politics. U.S. presidential candidates—not obligated to debate by force of law or campaign regulation—engage in a quadrennial "debate over the debates," struggling to fashion debate encounters that support their own electoral strategy or compliment their personal communicative strengths. Conversely, candidates attempt to negotiate debate particulars that somehow disadvantage their opponent. As previously noted, with public expectations for debates now firmly established, the key question in presidential campaign debates has become not *if* debates will happen, but rather *how* they will occur (including when and where they take place, who will participate, how they are structured, etc.).

In 1960, it literally took an act of Congress for John Kennedy and Richard Nixon to meet in debate. With the nascent TV networks arguing for televised debates, and with Senator Kennedy, the Democratic nominee, agreeing that such exchanges might be to his advantage, the Democratic controlled Congress obliged and authorized a temporary suspension of Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act (the so-called Equal Time Rule) thus allowing the networks to broadcast debates that included only the two major-party candidates. The first-ever televised debates were sponsored jointly by the three networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) which negotiated the specific debate structure with the candidates.

In 1964, incumbent president Lyndon Johnson—no fan of the TV camera and eminently aware of his shortcomings as a public communicator in relation to the sophisticated John Kennedy—stopped congressional attempts to again suspend Section 315 regulations that would have allowed a second installment of televised presidential debates. Next, debates were quashed in both 1968 and 1972 by first candidate and then incumbent president Richard Nixon, believing his defeat in 1960 was due largely to his poor debate performance.

Televised debates finally resumed in 1976 due to a confluence of political and regulatory factors. First, interpretation of Federal Communications Commission regulations allowed for an *independent* debate sponsor to apply its own candidate selection criteria, and thus the networks could broadcast this televised affair as a bona fide news event. The political environment in 1976 was also ripe for the resumption of presidential debates. With a weak incumbent president (Gerald Ford) desiring to appear in command, and an anti-establishment challenger (Jimmy Carter) eager to appear side by side as a presidential equal, both candidates saw the televised debate option benefiting their candidacy. The League of

Women Voters (LWV) took on the role of independent debate sponsor when debates resumed in 1976, yet struggle for debate control between the candidates and the sponsor would eventually lead to the league's replacement by the newly formed Commission on Presidential Debates in 1988.

The ongoing battle between candidates and the LWV for control of the debates became most apparent in 1984 when the league struggled with the Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale campaigns over the specific format to be used, and particularly the selection of journalists who would serve as questioners. The league initially submitted a list of nearly 100 names of potential journalist-questioners to the two campaigns, seeking to impanel a group of four journalists. Eventually, the candidates could agree on only *three* journalists. On behalf of herself, her fellow journalists, and the LWV, debate moderator Barbara Walters of ABC News began the first 1984 debate with a pointed rebuke of the two candidates for their failure to agree on at least four journalists whom they deemed acceptable to serve as part of the debate panel.

Following the 1984 clash between the campaigns and the LWV, representatives of the Democratic and Republican parties joined in 1987 to form an alternative organization to sponsor debates, originally dubbed the "bi-partisan"—and now "nonpartisan"—Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD). In 1988, candidates George H. W. Bush and Michael Dukakis had originally agreed to participate in debates sponsored by both the LWV and the newly formed CPD. However, the LWV withdrew as debate sponsor in 1988, and league president Nancy Neuman publicly proclaimed the LWV was unwilling to serve as an "accessory to the hoodwinking of the American public" by acquiescing to candidate demands regarding debate structure and journalist participants. Following the league's withdrawal, the CPD sponsored all of the 1988 debates and continues to serve as the only general-election presidential debate sponsor.

As Table 1 illustrates, once debates resumed in 1976—with the exception of 1980—the quadrennial debate series has included at least two, and most often three, debates. In 1980, Republican challenger Ronald Reagan agreed to debates that included independent candidate John Anderson. Incumbent president Jimmy Carter, however, refused to participate in three-way debates, and Reagan and Anderson held one debate without Carter (not reflected in the Table 1 count of 1980 presidential debates). With little more than 1 week remaining until Election Day, Jimmy Carter met Ronald Reagan in a single 1980 debate. Table 1 also reveals that vice presidential debates began in 1976, and—with the exception of 1980—each debate series has featured a single vice presidential debate.

Presidential Debate Formats

Perhaps the most often-heard refrain regarding presidential debates is the charge that these staged-for-TV encounters between the major aspirants for the U.S. presidency are anything but "true" debates. In fact, scholars, political pundits, and candidates all frequently complain that these quadrennial exchanges do not reach their full potential as exercises in political argumentation. At the heart of such criticism is usually some quarrel with the actual debate structure or format.

Common criticisms include the inability of candidates to develop sustained and in-depth argument due to abbreviated response times, as well as multiple and often unrelated topics discussed in a single debate. Candidate responses in a typical presidential debate can be as short as 30 or 60 seconds and rarely longer than 2 to 3 minutes. Interestingly, it has traditionally been the candidates themselves who have insisted in their debate negotiations to limit response times (and then these very same candidates during a debate lament they have limited time to fully respond to journalists' questions or to an opponent). Also, U.S. presidential debates, normally 90 minutes in length, typically deal with a host of issue topics in a given debate, covering both foreign and domestic policies, and although a single presidential debate has been devoted to a particular subject area (i.e., international or domestic policy), a full debate has never been devoted to a single issue topic.

Other debate format flaws frequently noted include insufficient opportunity for follow-up questioning, thus allowing candidates to avoid responding to particular queries, and tight controls on candidate responses that prohibit direct candidate exchange or clash, thus limiting comparison of campaign issues. Finally, one of the most frequent complaints of the traditional televised debate structure has focused on the role and performance of the panel of journalist questioners. Often, instead of debating one's opponent, presidential candidates have found themselves arguing with a journalist engaged in a game of "gotcha" with questions deemed convoluted or irrelevant by the public.

When examining the practice of presidential debates from 1960 to the present, one finds the actual

structure of these exchanges remained virtually unchanged until the 1990s. Since that time, however, the design and practice of presidential debates has evolved significantly. Once the CPD took control of debates from the LWV in 1988, there was a steady evolution away from the original Kennedy-Nixon debate model—the much criticized "joint press-conference" format—to debates that are now very different in their design and incorporate many elements advocated by debate scholars. Innovations in presidential debate formats include the exclusion of the journalist panel and adoption of a single moderator to facilitate greater candidate interaction, extended and less-rigid candidate response sequences that allow for more in-depth issue discussion, and also greater inclusion of direct public participation in the actual debate process with undecided citizens participating in the Town Hall debate.

When considering different debate formats, a key question—especially for the debate scholar—is whether or not debate structure actually matters. Does it matter, for example, how long candidates are allowed to respond, or if the debate questions are asked by a citizen or a journalist? Do certain formats contribute to greater voter learning? Also, does debate structure affect the actual content of a debate, or more precisely, does a debate format affect the communicative performance of the candidates? Here, a limited amount of empirical analysis has been conducted to better understand possible relationships between debate format and content, and the answer is becoming increasingly clear that debate format does, in fact, matter in several important ways.

Content-analytic studies have found that candidate clash (debate dialogue that features a direct comparison of candidates' competing issue positions) is limited when format design limits rebuttal times or when the same or similar questions are not posed to both candidates. Also, the actual type of question asked of candidates influences candidate clash. Specifically, "comparative" questions results in greater candidate clash. A "comparative" debate question, for example, is illustrated by debate moderator Jim Lehrer's opening question of the first 1992 debate when he asked, "The first question tonight is what separates each of you from the other? Mr. Perot, you first, what do you believe tonight is the single most important separating issue of this campaign?" Finally, when comparing the amount of candidate clash that occurred in the three distinct debate formats utilized in the 2000 debate series (including a Town Hall debate, a more formal "podium" debate, and candidates seated around a table for a more informal and less structured "chat" debate), the more formal "podium" debate contained the greatest overall level of candidate clash, and the more conversational "chat" debate contained the least amount of clash.

In 1996, with two distinct debates held between President Bill Clinton and Senator Bob Dole—the first a more traditional "podium" debate with questions asked by single-moderator Jim Lehrer and the second a Town Hall debate with questions asked by undecided citizens—a comparative content analysis of the two debates found three important content differences. First, the Town Hall debate contained significantly less candidate attack; also, the two candidates developed significantly more issue (versus image) appeals in the Town Hall debate than in their "podium" debate; and finally, the Town Hall debate featured significantly more candidate-positive (versus opponent-negative) discourse than did the "podium" debate. Also, when examining the relationship between debate format and issues discussion, studies have found that questions asked by citizens in Town Hall debates correspond more directly to the issue priorities—or issue agenda—of citizens than do debate questions asked by journalists.

Overall, the limited amount of debate format research suggests that the actual structure of a debate does, indeed, matter. The extant content-analytic research suggests different debate formats produce different communicative outcomes. These studies typically reveal that the more formal "podium" debates conducted by a moderator or panel of journalists seem to encourage greater candidate clash as well as more aggressive and attack-oriented discourse. When the public is included in the debate dialogue, however, candidates seem to reduce their level of clash and attack, adopt a more personable or "humanizing" style, focus more on issue (rather than image) discussion, and engage in the debate of issues that are of greatest concern to the public.

Presidential Debate Effects

To inform our understanding of specific debate viewing effects, much debate scholarship has been generated guided by a central question: "Do debates matter?" The short answer to the question of whether or not, or actually how, debates matter is the typical scholarly response, "It depends." In brief, decades of presidential debate research has concluded that debate effects are dependent largely on the contextual dynamics of a

given campaign, including the particular candidates engaged in debate, and also highly dependent upon the different types of debate viewers.

First, the overall campaign context in which a debate takes place influences the debate's usefulness or impact. Scholars have delineated four conditions under which voters are most likely to find debates useful in making their vote choice: (1) when at least one of the candidates is relatively unknown, (2) when many voters remain undecided, (3) when the race appears close, and (4) when party allegiances are weak. Findings from the 1992 and 1996 presidential debate series illustrate well the application of these conditions. Polling before the 1992 debates, which included incumbent president George H. W. Bush, Democrat challenger Bill Clinton, and independent candidate Ross Perot, revealed that a significant segment of the electorate remained undecided at the time of the debates; and the debates were judged by many citizens in post-election polling as the single most important campaign event in their decision for whom to vote in 1992. Yet just 4 years later a popular incumbent president (Bill Clinton) debated a lifelong and well-known national political leader (Bob Dole) in a race where the incumbent's lead in pre-election polls never dipped below 10%. Polling before and after the 1996 presidential debate series found viewers learned little new information, and the debates changed few minds as most citizens had made their vote choice well before the October debate series.

In addition to campaign context, the disposition of viewers also influences debate effects. Debates will have their greatest influence on highly interested, yet undecided, voters who might be classified as regular debate viewers (those who view an entire debate or series of debates). Debates will have much less influence on those marginally interested voters, or the "occasional" debate watchers, as well as those committed partisans who view debates for reassurance that theirs is indeed the superior candidate. Finally, debates have little to no effect on the uninterested voter who may not attune at all to the actual debate program or who might be exposed only to media coverage of the event.

Even with these caveats, numerous studies have found substantial debate viewing effects. In general, the extant literature reveals that debates work more to reinforce rather than change voters' minds, debates facilitate the acquisition of issue information, and debate viewing influences perceptions of candidates' character or image traits. The following sections provide a brief review of the specific behavioral, cognitive, and image evaluation effects and conclude with a discussion of the various latent influences of debates on citizens and the democratic process.

Behavioral Effects

Little change in voting intentions is typically recorded following exposure to debates. Yet whereas debates may not alter the voting preferences of the vast majority of previously committed viewers, several studies have found that among the undecided, conflicted, or weakly committed, debates do help these viewers form their voting preference or even change candidate selection. Although the undecided and uncommitted citizen may constitute a smaller segment of the debate viewing audience, it is exactly this slice of the electorate to which most general-election campaign messages are targeted and, in very close contests, the voters that ultimately decide the outcome of an election. In fact, from the nine presidential campaigns that have featured general-election debates, post-debate Gallup polling data suggest that televised debates played a decisive role in the outcome of more than half of these contests (including the 1960, 1976, 1980, 1992, and 2000 debate series and elections).

Cognitive Effects

That debates are an "information-rich" source of campaign communication facilitating viewers' acquisition of issue knowledge is a well-established finding. In addition to the many studies identifying general knowledge acquisition from debate viewing, a number of studies also provide clear evidence refuting the "selective exposure" thesis that suggests political partisans may attune only to those messages from candidates they support. Instead, the comparative nature of debate dialogue encourages citizens to overcome any tendency for selective exposure as viewers report roughly equal levels of learning from both the candidate whom they support as well as from the opposition candidate. Also, issue learning from debates may not be even across multiple debates. In a multi-debate series, viewers report learning more from the first debate, with less issue knowledge acquired from subsequent debate viewing. Finally, studies that have compared voters' issue knowledge in those presidential elections with debates versus election years without (i.e., 1964, 1968, and 1972) find that respondents

were much more knowledgeable about campaign issues during those years with debates; also, respondents who report watching more debates are able to recall more specific issue information and identify more policy differences between the candidates.

Candidate Image Evaluation Effects

A number of studies have found that debate exposure influences viewer perceptions of candidate character or image traits. Yet, within the debate effects research, the relative or proportional nature of issue knowledge and image perception effects has remained a somewhat persistent and unresolved question. In short, the matter remains as to which influence is greatest—does debate exposure have a larger impact on viewers' perceptions of candidate image or on the acquisition of issue knowledge? Clearly, one answer to this question might be that issue and image learning are two message components that work in tandem. Scholars have argued, for example, that candidates' debate messages incorporate a dual strategy of highlighting issue differences while also emphasizing a positive self-image and a negative opponent image.

Latent Effects

Several studies have examined campaign debates' possible latent effects whereby exposure to candidates in debate may activate citizens' various civic and democratic tendencies. In general, these studies have found that debate viewing promotes civic engagement and thus strengthens the electoral process. Specifically, debates have been found to heighten viewers' interest in the ongoing campaign, encourage citizens to seek out additional campaign information following their debate viewing, encourage greater participation in the campaign through such activities as talking to others about one's preferred candidate, and lead to increases in reported likelihood of voting. Also, a few studies have found debate viewing enhances citizens' sense of political efficacy, decreases political cynicism, and strengthens support for political institutions.

Televised Debates Around the World

Following the advent of general-election televised presidential debates in the United States in 1960, many nations followed this lead by establishing their own tradition of televised campaign debates. Although the vast majority of these countries represent Western democracies, a smaller number of Eastern nations, now including Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, have adopted the televised debate as a feature of their nation's campaign communication system. Although there exists no definitive source, the following countries are among those nations where televised debates have taken place, and when available, the year is noted when debates were first televised: Australia (1984), Canada (1968), Denmark, Finland (1974), France (1974), Germany (2002), Holland (1977), Israel (1977), Italy, Japan (1969), Mexico (1999), New Zealand (1984), Norway, Poland, Russia, South Africa (1994), South Korea (1997), Spain (1993), Taiwan, Sweden, United States (1960), and West Germany (1969). Interestingly, some sources have suggested that Sweden may have in fact preceded the United States in televising debates as party leader "debates"—or the so-called Swedish joint press appearances—were first broadcast in the late 1950s.

Certainly, most of the extant scholarly analysis examining televised debates emanates from analysis of U.S. presidential debates. Yet, available analysis of non-U.S. debates now suggests that empirical findings based on the study of U.S. debates may certainly differ when compared to the unique debate dialogues and structures of other countries and cultures. As communication is so closely tied to cultural norms, it is imperative to include cultural variables when examining debates from differing nations. The candidates participating in debate forums and the viewers of these communicative events are all embedded in a specific culture, and thus debate dialogue, as well as interpretations of the interaction, will be influenced by the culture's style of thinking and feeling, value systems, and attitudes.

The U.S. electorate has now witnessed debates in eight successive presidential elections, and there is ample evidence to suggest that the public uses these key campaign events in making their voting decisions. Recent innovations in the design and practice of these debates also demonstrate that debates are becoming increasingly responsive to public needs. With so much thought to be so wrong with the U.S. electoral system, televised presidential debates may well represent a true success story in campaign communication. Indeed, the very principle of a participatory democracy is perhaps best demonstrated in campaign debates in which those desiring to be our leaders must stand before the public and argue why we, the people,

should grant them one of the greatest expressions of power we have—our vote.

Mitchell S. McKinney

See also Commission on Presidential Debates; DebateWatch; Great Debates, The

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DebateWatch

DebateWatch is a voter education project of the Commission on Presidential Debates (see www.debates.org) that encourages citizens to view debates in groups and discuss what they learn after each of the debates. DebateWatch grew out of research conducted by communication scholars in 1992. In the course of conducting 60 focus groups in 18 cities to learn how debates function as voter education tools, how they compare to other political communication channels, what formats are most informative, and how citizens talk about politics, researchers discovered that most participants had not carried on extended political discussions with individuals outside of family. Many participants found the discussions to be as educational as the debates themselves and suggested that the focus group project be continued in future elections.

Through a grant from the Ford Foundation in 1996, Diana Carlin, the team leader of the 1992 study, developed DebateWatch '96. The project included publication of a packet that explained the concept, how to organize a group, questions to ask, and how to provide feedback about the usefulness of topics discussed to the Commission. Through a network of 125 partner organizations, media stories, public service announcements, and information on the Commission's Web site, individuals requested DebateWatch packets. Results of answers to three key questions were sent to the DebateWatch headquarters where they were compiled and released to the media. The questions were: which issues were most useful to you as a voter, which were least useful, and what topics do you want discussed in future debates or in the campaign? Thousands of individuals' viewpoints were represented by facilitator reports. More than 100 research groups were conducted by members of the National Communication Association that provided additional information about sources of political information, the impact of the debates on voter choice, and the value of DebateWatch as a political education tool. DebateWatch was continued in 2000 and 2004. With the extended use of the Web and e-mail, all instructions and forms were provided only on the Web, and results were returned via e-mail or directly online. The Commission released results on its Web site after each debate.

Key findings from DebateWatch were published in journals, books, and conference papers. Findings included the following: (a) Viewers prefer multiple formats, with the panelist format preferred by the least number of respondents; (b) participants in the town hall format are viewed as surrogates who ask questions that resonate with voters; (c) follow-up questions are considered key to making the candidates responsive to questions; (d) viewers consider a candidate's record in office as the best indicator of character because it reveals priorities, willingness to compromise, and ability to deliver on promises; (e) viewers prefer

questions and formats that make comparisons and contrasts clear; (f) participants wanted fewer topics per debate and different topics in each debate; (g) debates were considered a far better way to learn about the candidates than other information sources; (h) all participants learned something new from the debates, but those who had not followed the campaign until prior to the debates learned the most; (i) the debates served to reinforce previous voter choices rather than change candidate preference for nearly all who came into the debates with a preference; however, high percentages of undecided voters did indicate movement toward a candidate—the percentages varied by year; and (j) participants indicated that as a result of participating in DebateWatch they were more likely to seek out additional information about the candidates.

Diana B. Carlin

See also Commission on Presidential Debates; Debates

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Deciding What's News

In 1970, sociologist Herbert Gans released his book *Deciding What's News: A Study of* CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, *and* Time, which combines content analysis and ethnographic analysis to explore news and journalists. Twenty-five years later the book was re-released with a new preface by the author. Whereas the first text was depicted as an exploration of current news operations, the new one is recast as a close look at the "golden age" of news.

Gans introduced the new edition by talking about the changes in the news media environment. He noted the fragmentation due to more national news sources, the declining ratings for the four news outlets he examined, large corporate ownership of news outlets, increasing coverage of soft news items, the opinionated approach of cable news, and the impact of technological advancements.

Gans argued that his conclusions are still accurate today because the nature of news organizations has not significantly changed, and journalists are still driven by the same values. Additionally, Gans contends that despite the conglomeration of news, journalists are free from commercial and political influence on what they report.

The original analysis is then presented in three parts. The first is the result of a content analysis of the four news sources he studied. The second, and most extensive, comes from his ethnographic look at these news organizations, and the final part offers suggestions for the future.

In his content analysis, Gans demonstrates that public officials dominate whereas ordinary individuals receive less attention. He argues that poor and lower-class Americans are underrepresented; thus the upper middle class is presented as the norm—an issue he would further develop in his later work *The War Against the Poor.* Gans also explores coverage of various activities, race, sex, age, ideology, and foreign issues. Finally, he outlines several values that he believes guide the development of the news, such as ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, and moderatism.

In the second part of the book, Gans details the results of his ethnographic analysis in which he spent months observing journalists in the newsrooms of the four organizations. He discusses how the news outlets are organized, how journalists find and work with sources, how stories are developed, how journalists deal with their personal values and ideologies, considerations about profits and audiences, and censorship issues.

After offering some conclusions about media and journalists and their role in society, Gans then argues for the development of multiperspectival news, which presents more perspectives than traditional news. For Gans, this includes more coverage of other nations and ordinary citizens, more attention to the output or impact of policies, stories that are more representative of the population, and stories that serve people. In the preface to the new edition, Gans contends that this approach has still not been adopted.

Brian T. Kaylor

See also News Coverage of Politics; *Television in Politics*

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Defamation of Character

See Libel

de Gaulle, Charles (1890–1970)

Born November 22, 1890, Charles de Gaulle reached historical status on June 18, 1940, when he made a famous radio speech calling for the French to resist the German invaders, though the apparently legal government headed by Marshall Pétain had called for a truce. A professional soldier, de Gaulle had previously achieved the status of "temporary"general by leading one of the few successful counter attacks against the invading army. He was then called by politician Paul Reynaud to serve as assistant minister and subsequently left for London, where he delivered the famous radio speech.

From then on, Charles de Gaulle remained in politics: Leader of the Free French, he became the chief of the French Provisional Government. Dissenting from the traditional political parties, he soon withdrew, tried to establish a new party, and finally retired to his country manor. In 1958, however, he was recalled, again as a savior, to extricate France from the Algerian conflict, becoming at the same time the first president of the Fifth French Republic, under a new constitution he had tailored to fit a stronger executive power.

Tireless in all his enterprises, de Gaulle managed to master any communication means as soon as he thought he might put it to use. First, as a writer, he had already achieved an unusual reputation for an army colonel. Between World Wars I and II, he had written several widely publicized books, which warned about the danger of a new war and about the weaknesses of the French army. His genuine literary talents were again demonstrated in the 1950s, when he wrote three volumes of memoirs.

Radio became de Gaulle's main communication tool during World War II, and he regularly addressed occupied France through the BBC. His inimitable voice helped him reach many French people, in spite of the communication ban imposed by the occupying enemy forces.

Elected president in 1958, de Gaulle had to utilize a new medium, television. Initially he used it as he did radio, reading his texts with his (thick) glasses on. He was eventually advised by communication and advertising consultant Marcel Bleustein-Blanchet, founder of *Publicis,* to memorize his texts, remove his glasses, and look into the camera. De Gaulle continued to write elaborate discourses, which he delivered to his viewers with an apparent ease.

He organized his communication as president in a very thorough way, holding regular and extremely formal press conferences, attended by all the members of his cabinet. There, accredited journalists could ask only questions submitted to his cabinet beforehand. De Gaulle led these press conferences with great ease, using humor and showing an uncommon knowledge of the subtleties of French language.

Philippe J. Maarek

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Deliberation

In the context of political communication, *deliberation* refers to a process of reasoning and discussion about political matters. Deliberation takes place in parliamentary debate, expert panels, deliberative decision-making bodies, news media content, political talk shows, online discussion forums, civil society organizations, and everyday political talk among citizens.

Normative theories of deliberative democracy place particular emphasis on the democratic value of deliberation. Although by no means a uniform group, deliberative democratic theorists agree on the centrality of argumentative exchange in political communication in order to foster both the cognitive quality of political judgment (rationality) and mutual respect

and cohesion among deliberators (social integration). Deliberation is usually considered to be an alternative to both bargaining and rhetoric. Although bargaining involves the pursuit of particularistic interests by means of offering incentives and applying threats, deliberation relies on the persuasive power of voluntarily accepted reasons. Whereas rhetoric can include polemics, humor, emotional appeals, and the like, deliberation is predicated on the literal use and understanding of arguments.

One problem of deliberative democratic theory is how to transpose the benefits of deliberation from small-scale deliberative settings into large-scale societal communication. Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin have proposed a "deliberation day" to bridge the gap: establishing a national holiday one week before major national elections on which citizens would be paid for participating in deliberation groups as well as voting 1 week later. A more mundane possibility lies in measuring deliberative qualities of the mass news media and investigating the conditions under which such deliberative media content has normatively desirable effects on political decision makers and citizens. Vis-à-vis decision makers, mediated deliberation can be thought to foster active justification of political claims and decisions, thus enhancing the quality of decisions or at least avoiding egregious mistakes. In relation to the citizenry, deliberative media content may serve as a repository of arguments and justifications (thus reducing citizens' information costs drastically) and as a model for deliberative behavior in everyday political talk.

So far, there are only a few empirical studies directed at measuring the deliberative qualities of mass media content. In the print media, argumentative exchange is achieved for example in commentary, news analysis, or debate-style articles, with journalists apparently playing a particularly important role for enhancing deliberativeness. In political talk shows, the host can foster argumentation by eliciting justifications from discussants and confronting them with opposing claims. In citizen deliberation, argument repertoire has been shown to be a valid measure of deliberativeness; that is, the number of arguments a person can give for his or her own position and the number of arguments a person can imagine opponents will use to support the counter-position. Exposure to disagreement enhances argument repertoire and political tolerance but discourages political participation, suggesting that deliberative and participative behavior cannot be optimized at the same time. Critical accounts of political deliberation sometimes feature claims of decay over time, but longitudinal evidence to support such claims is scarce at best.

Hartmut Wessler

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Deliberative Democracy

See Group Decision Making, Political; Public Communication in Politics

Demirel, Süleyman (1924–)

Süleyman Demirel has been a leading political figure in Turkey since he joined the center-right Justice Party, or JP, in 1962. He served as deputy prime minister (1965), prime minister (1965–1971; 1975; 1977–1978; 1979–1980; 1991–1993), and the ninth president of the republic (1993–2000). Leader of seven governments, deposed twice by the military (first in 1971 and again in 1980), and the nation's patriarch, often referred to simply as "Baba" or "Father," Demirel had a political life that spanned virtually the whole postwar period.

A self-made man, born in a village in the province of Isparta, a hydraulic engineer with a successful career of dam-building before 1960 and in an American firm after 1960, Demirel was elected the JP's chairman in November 1964. Under his leadership, the JP won a clear victory in the 1965 elections, gaining an absolute majority of the votes cast (52.9%) and of seats in the assembly. Demirel proved to be a first-rate vote-catcher with his rising popularity in the countryside. He was an orator who could speak the language of the mass of the people, stressing that he was one of them: a villager, a shepherd, a civil servant,

and now a prime minister. Upon the ultimatum handed to him by the military in 1971, Demirel resigned his government. In office he had complained about large civil liberties and the autonomy of the state radio and television ensured by the 1961 Constitution. In 1972, a number of amendments were made in the Constitution, limiting civil liberties and ending the autonomy of radio and television, legalizing governmental control over the management and broadcasting policies of state radio and television. Demirel's most important contribution to political communication in Turkey was being the first to utilize advertisement techniques in the party's political campaign for the 1977 elections. Although this technique did not lead his JP to victory, it was an initial step for a larger use of advertising strategies in political campaigns after 1983.

Between 1975 and 1980, Demirel formed three "National Front" coalition governments gathering together the ultranationalist, Islamist, and center-right parties against Bülent Ecevit's center-left Republican People's Party. In 1980, the generals took over political power and banned all political leaders, including Demirel, from politics for 10 years. He was deposed by the military for a second time. However, 11 years after the 1980 coup, he returned to the prime minister's office to lead his seventh government. In 1993, after the death of Turgut Özal, Demirel was elected to the presidential office of the Turkish Republic, leaving his True Path Party in the hands of Turkey's first female prime minister, Tansu Çiller. In 1991, when he led the True Path to power, it was the largest party in parliament, with 27% of the national vote. Demirel stayed in the presidential office until May 16, 2000, when he left active politics, but his image as the nation's patriarch remains alive.

Nur Betül Çelik

See also Çiller, Tansu; Ecevit, Bülent; Özal, Turgut

Democracy Theories

Democracy is a concept that has its roots in ancient Greece. Since that time, political philosophers have derived a variety of understandings of democracy theories and their normative assessments. It is possible, however, to identify a democratic nucleus that is inherent to all democratic theories. Identifying a core concept of democracy allows us not only to clarify our understanding of democracy but also to locate political communication—its importance and functions—more precisely inside democratic thinking.

The family of democracy theories can be structured along three categories: (1) normative foundation, (2) institutional design, and (3) quality of functioning. The first category refers to certain ideal conceptions and finds its expression in versions such as liberal democracy or social democracy (often discussed as procedural versus substantial forms of democracy), strong (participative) democracy, feminist and gender democracy, or deliberative democracy. The second category allows us to differentiate democracies according to their institutional setting, such as parliamentarian and presidential democracies or majoritarian and consensus democracies. The third category distinguishes democracies with respect to their gradual democratic quality, which is assessed by certain standards (such as polyarchy, liberal democracy). Political regimes with lower democratic quality are regarded as defective democracies (e.g., illiberal, delegative, or electoral democracy).

Another common approach differentiates between normative and empirical democracy theories. This divide has its value in two main scientific traditions, which for a long time widely ignored each other. On the one hand political philosophers discussed what democracy should be, and on the other hand empirical researchers looked at existing political systems and analyzed what democracies are. This differentiation has lost most of its tension, because political philosophy is more closely linked to empirical research, and the latter has noticed that the building of democratic standards necessary for the assessment of democracy needs normative reflections, too. Nevertheless it is obvious that we are confronted with different ways of using, building, and testing democracy theories. Besides the different ways to conceptualize the term *democracy,* democratic theories are trying to answer the following questions:

1. What is the appropriate institutional form of democracy, or how is it possible to improve the quality of democracy? This question marks the search for an ideal concept of democracy and its inherent elements. It affects all three categories (normative foundation, institutional design, and standard of quality).

2. What are the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the development and consolidation of democracy?

This question is mainly the focus of transformation research as well as of theories of modernization and political culture.

3. What are the consequences of democratic rule? What are its effects for the economic and social development, for the integration of societies, and for the generation and resolution of (international) conflicts? This question is treated in different fields of research which include policy research, analysis of societal development, and international relations (democratic peace).

All three questions underline the importance of democratic theories in contemporary social science research. It is impossible to discuss all the aspects mentioned above in just a few pages; therefore, the following discussion picks up the first question and concentrates on an explication of democracy and its relation to political communication.

Concept of Democracy

Procedural democracy, which assigns institutions of the political process as central in conceptualizing democracy, is the clearly dominating view of democracy theories and includes lean concepts such as polyarchy, as well as demanding models such as deliberative democracy, which underlines the quality of an appropriate democratic process in its reasoning dimension. In this procedural tradition, democracy can be defined in the following way: Democracy is a constitutional kind of rule, which allows the self-determination of all citizens (in the sense of sovereignty of the people) by guaranteeing their decisive participation in free and fair elections (of the main political representatives) and/or in political decisions (referendum). The concept includes the possibility of a continuing influence on the political process and the control of power. Democratic participation in the political power finds its expression in the dimensions of freedom, equality, and political and juridical control.

These three dimensions can be identified at the core of democratic thinking. They are inherent in each definition of democracy in an abstract sense. Although they build a common platform, their understanding and their significance differ notably. A systematic interpretation of these three dimensions along current debates enables us to explicate the basic ideas of the dimensions.

The dimension of *freedom* is rooted in the citizens' free self-determination in a political community. This dimension contains the transfer of individual preferences through the elections of political representatives in free and fair elections and/or the possibility to make one's own decisions by plebiscite or referendum. Additionally, this dimension allows for continuing political participation embedded in a public structure of competitive organizations and free media. The citizens' political participation is guaranteed by the existence of civil and political rights. Furthermore, sovereignty of the people implies that the elected representatives own the political power and use it (effective power to govern) while respecting individual rights, which are the foundation of democracy. Democratic rule is bounded by individual rights and does not mean unbounded rule. To participate freely means that all rights have to be codified, that the factual possibility to enjoy the rights exists (which demands a certain degree of institutional and administrative capacity), and that the use of these rights is not thwarted by formal or informal acts. Keeping these aspects in mind, it is obvious that democratic rule has to be considered within a system of rule of law (Rechtsstaat).

The dimension of *equality* expresses political equality, which on the one hand includes the fair formal treatment of all citizens by the state (legal equality). On the other hand, this dimension enables all citizens to participate in all formal institutions needed for the democratic process (input-egalitarianism). Whereas the dimension of liberty allows for free participation in the democratic process in an active sense, the dimension of equality underlines the equal chance of having access to these rights and asks whether all citizens have the same opportunity to use their rights. This concept of political equality does not strive for the same results of political participation, not even for equal chance of competition. Differences can be grounded in the changing formal status of the actors or can be given by the specific surrounding norm and value system. Political equality means fair and effective legal equality. Fair means the equal and effective use of civil and political rights. Therefore, equality is not only treated in a formal sense. We have to respect that rights can be realized. All citizens must be able to enjoy their rights. This implies a certain degree of social welfare and education. In a more fundamental sense, equality is rooted in the acceptance of others as equals on the basis of the concept of individual autonomy. Therefore, the existence of liberty rights is a necessity but not a sufficient condition for equality. The field of political and social decisions has to

remain open for the decisions of the democratic sovereign (the citizens) with the previously formulated exception that the material fundamentals of all citizens should be considered.

Democracy always means a certain restriction of rule. Its main function is the control of political power (government and parliament) through political and judicial means. The dimension of *control* integrates both vertical and horizontal accountability. Besides the peculiarities of political control in the political process (mainly through political parties and civil society), the central actors of control are the formal institutions of the state. Democratic control is necessarily based on the opportunity of citizens, civil society, and parliament to participate in control mechanisms, to ensure their capacity to defend their rights, and to support the (sometimes limited) initiatives of the judicial system. The only standard of judicial control is established by the constitutional and legal behavior of the respective office-holders. Transparency of the political process functions as an important condition for both kinds of control (political and judicial), which are exercised permanently. Control is only effective if it aims at forcing the office-holders to render an account of their acts and behavior and if it provides for appropriate sanctions. This requires the functioning of an independent judicial system, supported by other authorities and by initiatives of civil society. As can be seen very clearly, rule of law is an inherent part of democracy regarding not only the dimensions of liberty and equality but also the dimension of control. Hereby the principles of rule of law (or the constitutional legality) serve as a benchmark of the procedures and assessment of control.

Five Central Institutions of Democracy

The dimensions have to be institutionalized if they are to work continuously. On the basis of the current discussion, five institutions are identified by their special functions, which are necessary for the realization of the three dimensions. Some functions are covered by characteristic institutions; however, the typical institutions can be substituted by institutional functional equivalents:

1. *Procedures of decision:* In democracies the participation of the citizens in binding decisions is mainly given by elections. With their vote, citizens select their representatives in government and parliament. This institution is characterized by the standards of free and fair elections. The institution's procedures of decision also include the possibility to participate directly in decisions by means of referenda or plebiscites.

2. *Regulation of the intermediate sphere:* Institutions of the intermediate sphere structure the organization of interests so that they are capable of articulating, selecting, and aggregating interests with regard to the democratic process. The institution is democratic if all preferences of the citizens have a fair chance to be organized and therefore translated into political decisions. To ground the policy decisions only on elections is insufficient. If political situations change, the ability to influence the decision-making process must still continue. Parties and organizations of civil society are the main types of intermediate mediation, whereby both types of representations formulate different goals—office-holding versus decision influence.

3. *Public communication:* The institution of public communication regulates the ways of communication that are necessary for other democratic institutions. Their specific democratic form is built on a set of liberty rights concerning public communication (such as freedom of speech, of expression, of information, of press). Even if they are individual rights, they need the public sphere to find their expression. Democratic communication structures are characterized by transparency and openness, which does not mean that all interests have the same impact but that they have a real chance of being articulated and communicated.

4. *Guarantee of rights:* The institution of guarantee of rights marks a specific form of political participation, which allows all citizens to protect their rights (basic to the other democratic institutions) directly. Through legal proceedings individual citizens or organizations of citizens can defend their rights or influence the political process and policy outputs. Similar to procedures of decision, this institution is qualified by its binding character with one important difference. Whereas voting expresses a citizen's decision, the judicial decision (judgment) is made by a judge (the court). In the latter, citizens can cause a decision about a special issue, but they cannot determine the content of the decision. The institution is used to correct former political decisions or to influence them in the future.

5. *Rules settlements and implementations:* The central character of this institution is linked with the idea of an effective government that implements

the decisions of the democratic majority. This implies the control of the exclusive authority of the state in the whole country and excludes the existence of non-constitutional veto powers (or official veto powers, which use their formal resources in an unconstitutional way) or "brown areas," which are partly dominated by alternative norm systems (informal institutions). It also demands a rational and effective bureaucracy (Max Weber) and should be able to obtain all the information of the citizens that is necessary to fulfill their duty and not infringe on individual rights. An impartial and unbiased treatment of the citizens by government, parliament, and bureaucracy highlights the democratic character of an effective government.

The Matrix of Democracy

The combination of the three dimensions and five central democratic institutions enables the creation of a concept of democracy (Table 1) that allows a differentiated assessment and a separate analysis of the different aspects of democracy.

Political Communication and Democracy Theories

Political communication as public communication is inherent to each understanding of democracy and is necessary for the working of the other basic democratic institutions. The importance of public communication is already underlined in system theory by the input functions of interest articulation, selection, and aggregation as well as by the special function of political communication itself, which stresses the importance of government information. In democracies these functions obtain even more importance because they are the foundation of democratic legitimacy. The legitimacy of democratic rule is unthinkable without public communication. This exchange includes not only the complex processes of transferring individual and collective preferences to the political system and the public explanation and justification of governmental decision but also the central function of control expressed by public criticism through mass media or arenas of civil society.

Although this basic positive significance of political communication for democracy is widely accepted, one should not ignore its questionable aspects, which can undermine the democratic process and with it the legitimation of democracy. One main reason for ambivalent development lies in the transformation of political communication, which can be understood as a process of professionalization and change from party democracy to media democracy. This process means an increasing importance of the public arena accompanied by known attributes: growing importance of public agenda setting, (over)simplification of political arguments, persons gaining more significance than the party ideology or program, and electoral campaigns being more strongly influenced by marketing strategies (organized by spin doctors). One negative aspect lies in the unequal power structure of political communication, which can affect all dimensions of democracy, as prominently discussed in Italy under Berlusconi, who combined private and public media power. Furthermore, public communication inside civil society can be influenced by power structures as well. Another aspect for negative development is related to both of the previous arguments and underlines the problem that political communication follows more the logic of the market than the logic of reason. From this perspective it is difficult to establish a deliberative democracy.

Many of these aspects are also discussed under the phrase "colonization of politics by the media." This statement is called into question by an opposite argument, which stresses the instrumentalization of the media by politics (as partly visible in the conduct of government by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. President George W. Bush). A more realistic position would avoid such extreme interpretations and emphasize the mutual dependence of media and politics as proposed in the symbiosis model by Ulrich Sarcinelli. Empirical analysis provides the basis for an appropriate interpretation. This approach is also true in the general assessment of the ambivalences of political communication for democracy. The functions and effects of public communication depend on its changing form and structure. Its impact on democracy has to be frequently analyzed. This analysis includes the growing importance of the Internet and with it, the changing opportunities of influencing public opinion and the establishing of e-democracy.

The relevance of political communication for democracy theories is also recognizable in other areas. One area concerns the mediation of conflicting interests and conflicts, which also affect the integration of society. Furthermore, public communication allows the steering of informal institutions, which can undermine democracy to a certain degree. Finally, public communication not bound to national borders helps disperse and promote democracy abroad. These

Table 1 Matrix of Democracy

Institutions \ *Dimensions*	*Liberty*	*Equality*	*Control*
Procedures of Decision	Free Elections and Referenda (no restrictions) 01 1/1	Equal Chances of Participation Equality of Votes 06 1/2	Control Exercised by Election Review Board 11 1/3
Regulation of the Intermediate Sphere	Freedom of Organization 02 2/1	Equal Rights of Organization 07 2/2	Control by Parties and Civil Society 12 2/3
Public Communication	Freedom of Communication 03 3/1	Equal Chances of Participation 08 3/2	Control by Media (Independent Journalism) 13 3/3
Guarantee of Rights	Free Access to Court 04 4/1	Equal Rights and Equal Treatment in Court 09 4/2	Effective Court Order/Supreme Court 14 4/3
Rules Settlement and Implementation	Effective Government (Rational Administration) 05 5/1	Equal Treatment by Parliament and Administration 10 5/2	Separation of Powers 15 5/3

considerations underline the importance of political communication in the analysis not only of democracy as a concept but also of the beneficial factors and effects of democracy.

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See also Agenda Setting; Democratization, Role of the Media in; E-Voting; Government Communication; Press Freedom; Public Sphere; Systems Theory

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Democratic Engagement

See Political Engagement

Democratic National Committee

The Democratic National Committee (DNC) refers to an organization affiliated with the U.S. Democratic Party. It was established at the 1848 Democratic National Convention. The DNC's main function is to nominate a Democratic presidential candidate, provide Democratic Party candidates with financial and other social supports, and promote Democratic values through elections. The committee also establishes all guidelines for party conventions, including convention sites, entertainment, and advertising. The DNC is responsible for upholding the Democratic Party's stated platform of equality, multiculturalism, health care, economic responsibility, fair taxes, freedom of speech, women's rights, and technological advancements, as well as educational, environmental, and welfare reforms.

The DNC cooperates with national, state, and local party organizations, including elected officials and candidates, to respond to public need. Moreover, the DNC promotes important party agendas and protects the Democratic Party's interests. Using new media technologies such as official Web sites and politically relevant Web logs, the DNC presents Democrats' views and interacts with the public. It is also responsible for organizing fundraising efforts and contributes financially to party operations. During the 2001–2002 election cycle, the DNC raised $162,062,084 and raised $61,131,832 during the 2005–2006 election cycle. It sometimes acts as a media source, releasing news articles on political candidates, elections, and other party-related issues. During campaign periods, the DNC also sponsors political advertising messages in support of Democratic candidates. The committee sponsors expert research on politically sensitive topics such as the environment, stem cell research, abortion, and gay marriage.

DNC leadership includes nine elected officers of the chair, five vice chairpersons, a treasurer, secretary, and national chairperson. The DNC chairperson often represents important Democratic political agendas in national elections and is dedicated to making the Democratic Party more competitive in every national and local election. There have been 47 chairpersons of the DNC since its inception in 1848.

As the representative body of the Democratic Party, the DNC often confronts controversy. After receiving $115,000 in foreign money for campaigns in 1996, the committee faced accusations of illegal fundraising. The DNC has also been criticized for its inconsistent political stances, especially regarding sensitive issues like gay marriage and stem cell research. Whereas the political function of the DNC is to endorse Democratic values through its activities and elections, it is often confronted with opposition from more conservative forces. Furthermore, its actions have spurned conflicts over control between Democratic parties at the national and state levels.

In 1952, the DNC created an official document called a "loyalty oath" that strategically defined the relationship between national and state Democratic parties. However, this process has produced more controversies regarding the varying degrees of control between national and local organizations. As a result, the DNC's programs and strategies have been modified and abandoned by different leaderships throughout its history.

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See also Democratic Party

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Democratic Party

The Democratic Party in the United States emerged after the splintering of Jefferson's Democratic-Republican Party in the 1820s. Andrew Jackson is sometimes cited as the party's founder. Always more

attuned to the needs of those with fewer privileges, the party initially espoused what one might term a conservative ideology. A succession of changes in party rules gradually altered its ideology to what it is today.

Between 1832 and 1860, the Democratic Party was dominant largely because rivals lacked a comparable level of formal organization. The party stood for strict interpretation of the Constitution, states' rights, and limited federal spending. The party was divided on the question of slavery.

The party was so divided that it ran two candidates for the presidency in 1860, a northern one and a southern one, thus assuring victory to the fledgling Republican Party and its candidate, Abraham Lincoln. During the Civil War, the Democrats' northern wing became factionalized, with "Copperheads" advocating conciliation toward the secessionist south. After the war, the party was weak, assuring a Republican ascendancy from 1860 to 1932.

The Depression brought African Americans, organized labor, and academics into a coalition with traditional Democrats in the South and in urban centers. The party's nomination of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 and his subsequent actions as president pushed the party in a more liberal direction. The abolition of the party rule that required a two-thirds vote for its presidential nominee in 1936 stripped its more conservative members, concentrated in the South, of their power to veto more liberal party standard-bearers. The party, now with liberal leadership, came to advocate a loose interpretation of the Constitution, federal power, and government spending to address the nation's social and economic ills. This agenda was diametrically opposed to the party's philosophy during its earlier heyday.

Despite tensions within the Democratic Party (and widespread defections to the Republican Party in the South), it remained the majority party into the 1980s. Further modification of party rules opened up the national convention to more women and minorities, thus pushing the party in a liberal direction on many social issues. However, the emergence of the centrist Democratic Leadership Council pulled the party back toward the center. President Bill Clinton arguably represented a rapprochement between liberal and centrist groups, but the party lost power during his presidency to Republicans who were aggressively advocating a focused conservative agenda.

Political parties, almost by necessity, represent coalitions, and there will be tensions within any coalition large enough to command the allegiance of many American voters. The tension between centrists and liberals will undoubtedly continue to define the Democratic Party in the near future. In addition, the increasing number of Americans who define themselves as independents should pressure both Democrats and Republicans to stress ideologies less and solutions to public policy problems more.

In the United States, the Democratic Party actively pursues its political and legislative agenda through use of all means of political communication. During and outside formal campaign and election periods, the party produces and distributes campaign messages through multiple media, including the sponsorship of political advertising and the maintenance of Web sites.

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See also Democratic National Committee

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DEMOCRATIZATION, ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN

In contrast to earlier waves of democratization, the media are playing a major role in recent transitions to democracy. Two factors can be regarded responsible for this development that reflect both the beneficial and detrimental potential of the media in democratic politics.

First, innovations in communication technologies have created a transnational, and even global, public sphere. As national opposition movements can link easily with a global network of supporters and journalists, it has become increasingly difficult for political

leaders of autocratic regimes to control political opposition and change. However, it has to be kept in mind that dictatorships cannot be brought down by the media alone. They are just one factor that contributes to the erosion of autocratic rule and can only unfold their potential impact in conjunction with favorable political, social, and international constellations.

Second, institution-building and consolidation take place under the conditions of a saturated and commercialized media environment. For example, unlike political parties in established democracies, which developed before the advent of television and even before the introduction of general franchise, parties in new democracies have to incorporate media strategies as a matter of survival right from the start. As a consequence, new democracies seem to immediately develop into media-centered democracies that are vulnerable to populism, manipulation, and volatile public opinion.

At the turn of the millennium, democracy has become the predominant form of government with about two thirds of countries worldwide being classified as democratic. Over the 20th century, breakdowns of autocratic regimes with subsequent introduction of democratic institutions and procedures occurred in "waves," the first of which took place after the collapse of European monarchies in World War I, the second in the context of decolonization and the breakdown of fascism in World War II, and the third during the 1970s when the military dictatorships in southern Europe and Latin America came to an end. This last wave of democratization gained new momentum after the demise of the Soviet Union, allowing the countries of the former Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe to finally abolish communist rule. The end of the Cold War also allowed many countries in Asia and Africa, which had formerly been tied to the global interests of one of the antagonistic blocs, to hold open and competitive elections. As a consequence, the latest wave of democratization has developed an unprecedented global dynamic and involves more countries than any previous one.

However, many of the new democracies that have emerged over the past 2 decades or so remain fragile and prone to relapses into various forms of autocratic practices. Terms such as *partial* or *defective* democracies are used to characterize countries that fall short of the standards of a functioning democracy. One of the key problems in many new democracies is the persisting restriction on press freedom that prevents these countries from developing into fully fledged democracies. In particular broadcast media remain highly vulnerable to political interference and instrumentalization. Because the mass media are an indispensable part of a healthy democracy, the failure to transform both their institutional structures and journalistic performance poses a serious impediment to the viability of a newly established democracy as a whole. Without a free flow of information and the representation of a broad range of views in the public domain, elections remain rather meaningless, even if conducted according to procedural standards. Furthermore, the accountability and responsiveness of the elected government depend on the media's political autonomy and their ability to play a part in the system of checks and balances.

The media are also a driving force in the process of democratization, which derives from their dual nature as actors in their own right on the one hand, and communication technologies for the dissemination of messages on the other hand. As actors, the media may choose to take sides in the conflicts emerging during regime change, thus playing an active role in promoting, or inhibiting, democratization. Striving for a greater degree of autonomy by fighting a nondemocratic government might appear in the media's own interest. However, this frequently turns out to be a high-risk strategy, as it brings the media into open conflict with vested interests who have the power to cut off vital resources. In contrast, remaining close to the government or forming alliances with particular groups bears the risk of undermining the media's credibility on the side of their audience if the transition to democracy turns out to be successful. Hence, which option the media follow depends on the particular constellation in the political and economic environment and the expected risks and benefits arising from each of the choices.

The potential of communication technologies in processes of democratization arises from the media's ability to transmit messages to mass audiences instantly and across large distances. Although this generally applies to traditional media such as print and broadcasting, recent changes in communication technologies have fundamentally changed the interplay between the media and democratization. Satellites allow information to be broadcast worldwide irrespective of national borders. And the Internet has further revolutionized the production and dissemination of messages to an extent that makes it difficult for governments and political elites to control the flow of information. By allowing for one-to-one and many-to-many communications, the Internet has overcome the centralized structure of traditional media and provides an effective opportunity for

citizens to circumvent censorship and to organize networks for democratic change.

Phases of Democratization and the Media

Transitions to democracy are long-term processes that usually take decades and remain open-ended throughout a considerable period of time. Students of democratization distinguish between three stages of transition to democracy: liberalization, democratization, and consolidation. The media's role differs significantly in each of these phases, reflecting both the particular constraints they are subjected to and the specific constellation in the political environment during the process.

Liberalization takes place under the old regime when the political elites realize they have to respond to the demands of the citizens in order to maintain the legitimacy of the regime. In many instances adopting a less suppressive approach has been caused by economic stagnation and the formation of a progressive faction within the ruling elite. One crucial aspect of liberalization involves the cautious softening of censorship. Deviant opinions are tolerated to a certain degree, and the media are gradually allowed more journalistic freedom. These new spaces of free expression are usually confined to areas the regime regards marginal to its power interests, and sensitive issues continue to be kept under strict control. An example of the dynamics of liberalization within autocratic regimes is the policy of *glasnost,* or openness, initiated in the mid-1980s by Mikhail Gorbachev, leader of the Communist Party and president of the Soviet Union at that time. He invited the media, alongside citizens and societal groups, to publicly discuss existing problems and to engage in a collective search for possible solutions to overcome the crisis. However, the policy of *glasnost* did not yield the intended consequences, as the crisis of the system spiraled out of control, and the Soviet Union finally collapsed in 1991. It is an open question whether the liberalization initiated by Gorbachev actually contributed to the eventual breakdown of the communist regime and whether it can be concluded that demands for freedom cannot be stopped once political leaders start to give in. The example of China illustrates that liberalization does not inevitably lead to the erosion of autocratic rule. Since the economic reforms were started in the 1970s, Chinese media underwent rapid commercialization, in the process of which they were given a high degree of managerial autonomy. However, as of now the state is still able to exert strict control over the content of media information, particularly political news.

The second phase, *democratization,* denotes the actual breakdown of the old regime and the implementation of core democratic institutions, usually laid down in a constitutional document. This is often a time of high drama bearing the risk of a fatal confrontation between the masses demonstrating for change and representatives of the old regime. Often the domestic media remain largely in the background and openly take sides only when it becomes clear which of the opponents is winning. In contrast, international media and, more recently, the Internet, with its instant global reach, play a key role in the course of events. Once the conflict has attracted the interest of international news agencies, global media attention serves like a protective shield for the protesters. As long as the whole world is watching, it is difficult for political leaders "to take out the tanks" without seriously damaging their international reputation. Transborder broadcasting and international media attention also affect the opposition movement itself by setting in motion a so-called demonstration effect. Even if domestic media refrain from covering the protest, information from foreign media makes people in the country aware of what is going on. As more people feel encouraged to take to the streets, international media devote even more coverage to the events, which leads to a rapid acceleration up to a point where it becomes impossible for the old elites to regain control and return to the previous state of affairs.

The third stage, *consolidation,* refers to the process of the new democracy taking roots in society, which in some circumstances can take decades to achieve. Consolidation involves both a structural and a cultural dimension which are closely interrelated and interdependent. Structural aspects of consolidation include institution building and the application of the rules of the democratic game. Cultural aspects denote the orientations, norms, values, and behavior of both citizens and elites. Accordingly, the structural consolidation of a democratic system of public communication involves media regulation and the reform of media organizations, especially those previously directly controlled by the state, whereas cultural transformation requires journalists to adopt orientations and practices that are in accord with the democratic role of the media. Following Blumler and Gurevitch's notion of political communication as a system of interaction between politicians and journalists, one should also

include the practices of news management employed by political actors.

In most new democracies media regulation has become one of the most disputed areas in the consolidation process. In particular, redesigning the organizations of broadcasting is fiercely disputed not only between governments and the media but also between government and opposition parties, even in countries that have made fast progress in setting up democratic structures, such as Hungary and Poland. Throughout newly established democracies, interference in the management structure of broadcasting organizations, direct manipulation of news content, and even threats and blackmailing remain severe impediments to the development of an open and diverse public debate. Some observers have blamed persisting undemocratic traditions for the apparent inability of governments to respect the autonomy of the media. Another explanation lies in the particular constraints under which political power is won and maintained in post-autocratic politics. After years of suppressed pluralism most political parties lack both efficient party organizations and loyal constituencies that are the main resources for electoral success in established democracies. Hence, more than their Western counterparts do, political parties and candidates in new democracies depend on the media as a means of communicating to voters. Securing access to the media agenda at the expense of political competitors is therefore the main, if not the only, effective strategy in the political contest.

Journalists have made remarkable progress in providing a critical voice in the political debate. Indeed, some have taken extreme risks when standing up against misuse of power, corruption, and attempts to mislead public opinion. However, lack of resources often remains a severe impediment for in-depth analysis and independent research. Moreover, most political reporting, especially in the printed media, is characterized by a high degree of opinionatedness and partisanship. For many newspapers, aligning with specific groups or parties and supporting their cause in the day-to-day coverage of politics serve to secure income revenues that are independent from market constraints and circulation rates.

Pathways to Democracy and the Media

Even though the media in new democracies share certain problems, there are also significant differences across countries. The theory of path dependency of democratization provides a framework to explain why this is so. According to this school of thought, the specific features of the emerging democracy, its strengths and shortcomings, are shaped by the specific nature of the old regime. Democratization research distinguishes between transitions from communist regimes, military dictatorships, and one-party rule. Similarly, the role of the media after regime changes is, to a large extent, determined by the role they fulfilled before.

Countries in Eastern Europe represent, in an ideal typical way, the experience of post-communist democratization. The media under communist rule played a key role in mobilizing and re-educating the masses and providing legitimacy for the regime. In fact, according to Lenin's doctrine, the media were a pivotal part of the power structure as they served as the major propaganda channel and organizational instrument for the communist party. Entertainment in the media was frowned upon and only gradually admitted during the period of liberalization. In addition, like the rest of the economy the media were nationalized; that is, effectively owned by the state or state organizations. Democratic transformation of the media involves both political independence and privatization. The dual character of transition makes the post-communist pathway particularly complex and prone to failure. The outcome in many eastern European countries is a mixture of a public service broadcaster that still bears the features of state television and a highly monopolized print market.

In contrast, the situation of the media under military dictatorships, which dominated Latin America, was significantly different. These regimes built their power on the quiescence of the population rather than ideological mobilization. Therefore, apart from a few government-owned outlets, the media played only a marginal political role. Because the capitalist structure of both press and broadcasting remained untouched, media content carried the typical features of a highly commercialized industry with a predominance of cheap entertainment and a marginalization of politics. This has not changed after the demise of the old regimes resulting in the inability of the media to adopt a positive democratic role of informing citizens about political issues and promoting public debate. Moreover, the entertainment-oriented coverage of politics has made the media ideal allies for populist presidential leaders that are on the rise throughout the continent. The combination of popularized politics

and presidentialism is believed to further exacerbate the existing weakness of political institutions in Latin America.

Finally, East Asian countries represent ideal typical cases for the third pathway of democratization, which has its roots in developmental one-party systems. Autocratic regimes, as they existed for example in South Korea and Taiwan, were based on a strong centralized state alongside an extensive bureaucracy that was regarded the primary agent for managing economic development. The media were both agents and beneficiaries of this system, as they were obliged to serve the government's developmental goals while being protected from global competition. Again, there is striking continuity between the old system and the emerging new democracy. Calling on so-called Asian values that emphasize deference to authority, primacy of collective interests, and social harmony, governments are still determined to keep the media at a short arm-length. As a consequence, investigative reporting and public controversies are rare, and oppositional voices find it extremely hard to get access to the media agenda. However, due to economic wealth, satellite television and the Internet are flourishing in these countries and play an increasingly important role in providing an alternative forum that takes on democratic functions traditional media are unable to fulfill.

Katrin Voltmer

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Demography

Demography is the study of variables such as age, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, religion, education, social class, and political preference in different population segments. Biological, economical, societal, and political characteristics determine an individual's demographic categories, which can be used as cues for understanding social interactions and furthering various types of research.

Cultural studies argue that whether an individual is younger or older, male or female, white or of color, well educated or uneducated, poor or wealthy determines how that individual thinks and behaves as well as the expectations others have of that individual in various contexts. Governments and survey research organizations, such as the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) and Census Scope, study population trends and lifestyles to predict demographic changes. Cultural differences among various demographic segments of populations can be compared both nationally and internationally. Besides factual and cultural observations, relationships or causations between demographic elements and possible consequences can also be studied.

In both the social and hard sciences, theories on causations have either centrally focused on demographic characteristics or have used demographics as control variables. The University of California at Berkley's Department of Demography, the University of Michigan, and the University of Pennsylvania have

a long history of population studies focusing on demography. In addition, journals such as *Demography* cover population science across disciplines including geography, history, biology, statistics, business, epidemiology, and public health.

Demography is usually treated ontologically. In biology and epidemiology, for example, age, gender, ethnicity, and social class are important factors that determine chemical and medical reactions. In social science, political predispositions and societal characteristics are necessary determinants for behavioral consequences. Particularly in sociology, politics, and communication studies, all demographic characteristics are used as mediating factors.

In political communication, scholarship deals with demographic causational relations. Some examples of studies conducted include how age affects cynicism about politics, the relationship between religion and political affiliation, the relationship between education and political activism, attitudes toward opposing parties, and how men and women react differently to political candidates and political platforms like national defense, foreign relations, affirmative action, and education.

Studies have found, for example, that younger people are more likely to be cynical and less informed about politics and that females generally perceive or react to political issues differently than males and are often less opinionated about political candidates and issues. Furthermore, studies show that men see defense, foreign relations, and strong politics as important, whereas women think issues such as affirmative action and education supersede the current national agenda.

Furthermore, studies have found that religious people tend to be more active in political events than people who have weak or no religious beliefs and are more likely to be Republicans. More educated individuals are more likely to be politically active, get their information from various sources, and have a greater desire to learn. Individuals who are affiliated with a strong political party tend to not listen to information from incongruent opinion groups or other parties.

Hyun Jung Yun

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Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997)

Deng Xiaoping was arguably the most influential Chinese leader of the second half of the 20th century, apart from Mao Zedong. Deng encountered Marxism in France and, after his return to China, joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), serving as an officer in the civil war against the Nationalist government and in the struggle against Japan during World War II. After the CCP formed the People's Republic of China in 1949, Deng quickly became an influential leader, serving as secretary general of the CCP from 1957 to 1966, when he lost his position and was sent to work on a labor farm during the Cultural Revolution. He was returned to high-level politics in 1974 but again was purged until after the death of Mao Zedong and the end of the Cultural Revolution. By 1980, he had emerged to become secretary general of the CCP again and began China's twin policies of economic reform and openness to the outside world.

Deng was largely responsible for the dismantling of the cult of Mao, the return of market forces to the economy, and the opening of Chinese society to foreign investment, tourism, and interaction. During the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, Deng oversaw the rapid transformation of Chinese society and legitimated policies that would previously have been unacceptable to orthodox Marxists. Deng's pragmatism was expressed in such famous sayings as "It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice," in effect saying that the actual form of economic structure is less important than its effectiveness in increasing overall wealth. In the early 1990s, Deng took a famous "southern tour," visiting the coastal areas, encouraging greater innovation and creativity in economic reform, and spurring the growth of cities such as Shanghai.

In spite of his legacy of reform and openness, Deng's reputation in the West was significantly diminished by his role in the 1989 "Tiananmen Incident," as the government refers to the Tiananmen democracy movement. As students and workers around the nation called for greater democracy, Deng ordered a military crackdown, which occurred June 3 to 4, 1989. At least several hundred were killed in the ensuing chaos, and

estimates range into the thousands. Although Deng officially stepped down in 1992 as chair of the Central Military Commission, the era until his death was known as the "era of Deng Xiaoping."

Deng's role in changing Chinese politics, however, is undeniable. He was responsible for pushing a number of critical policies that laid the groundwork for the phenomenal growth of the Chinese economy in ensuing years, including the "four modernizations" (modernization of agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology), "socialism with Chinese characteristics" (which legitimated the CCP's rejection of Soviet-style communism), and the "socialist market economy" (which enabled market- and profit-oriented economic policies to enter the economy).

Randolph Kluver

See also Chinese Cultural Revolution; Mao Zedong

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Denton, Robert E., Jr. (1953–)

Robert E. Denton, Jr. is a professor in the Department of Communication at Virginia Tech University in Blacksburg, Virginia. He also holds the W. Thomas Rice Chair at the Rice Center for Leader Development and serves as director of the Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets Center for Leadership Development. Denton received his doctorate from Purdue University. An expert in presidential communication, Denton also is well known as the editor of a series of political communication books, first for Praeger Publishers and later for Rowman & Littlefield. This series has been a major venue for political communication scholarship.

At Virginia Tech, Denton is a former chair of the Department of Communication. He has written or edited a number of books, including *Ethical Dimensions of Political Communication; The Media and the Persian Gulf War; Images, Scandal, and Communication Strategies of the Clinton Presidency* (with Rachel L. Holloway); *Presidential Communication* (with Dan F. Hahn); and *Political Communication in America* (with Gary C. Woodword). In addition, he edits a compendium on the communication in presidential elections, beginning in 1992 with *The 1992 Presidential Campaign,* with a separate volume on each subsequent presidential campaign, that serve as important sources for political communication students and scholars. He has also written extensively on the role of religion and morality in political communication.

Active in the Southern States Communication Association, Denton received that organization's Outreach Award in 1999 and the Michael M. Osborn Teacher-Scholar Award in 2003. Denton also regularly appears in the media as a commentator and expert on political communication.

Lynda Lee Kaid

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Dependency Theory, Media

Media dependency theory makes an attempt to explain effects of mass media. Sandra Ball-Rokeach and Melvin DeFleur first outlined the framework of the theory in 1976. They conceived audience and media as integral parts of societal systems and the effects of mass media as determined by the tripartite interactions among audience, media, and the societal system. They conceptualized dependency as the central issue leading to understanding of this tripartite audience-media-society relationship. Dependency is a relationship in which the fulfillment of one party's needs and goals is reliant on the resources of another party.

A central piece of the theory is the relationship between audience and media. In an industrialized and information-based society, individuals tend to develop a dependency on the media to satisfy a variety of needs in their life. These needs can range from obtaining information on a candidate's policy positions to help make a vote decision to watching an episode of TV

drama series for relaxation and entertainment. Media play a multifaceted role of information-delivery services in society: collecting, processing, and disseminating information. And, in turn, media also depend on individual members of the society as a whole for their survival and further development.

In general, the extent of media effects is related to the degree of dependence of individuals and societal systems on media. Two of the basic propositions put forward by Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur are (1) the larger a medium's capacity is to serve as a center of the unique information-delivery services to the audience, the greater the audience dependency is on that medium; and (2) the higher the instability of a society is (e.g., in situations of social change and conflict), the stronger the dependency on the media that audience members tend to develop and, therefore, the greater the potential effects of the media on audience.

Specifically, the theory predicts that there are potentially three types of media effects due to the dependency of audience on media: cognitive, affective, and behavioral effects. In addition to the effects on audience's attitudes, beliefs, and values, one of the cognitive effects is linked to the media's role in "agenda setting." The affective effects include, for example, the development of feelings of "fear and anxiety" about living in certain neighborhoods as a result of overexposure to news reports that cover many violent stories. One example of the behavioral effects is "deactivation"—individual members of the audience don't take certain actions that they would take if they had not been exposed to certain messages from media. Not voting in political elections may be an effect of such. Any cognitive, affective, and behavioral effects on the audience can be channeled back to influence both the society and the media.

Since its inception, media dependency theory has generated many studies across disciplines. It can also serve well as a theoretical basis for research in the domain of political campaign communication, where the relationship between mass media and the electors and candidates remains a central focus.

Yang Lin

See also Uses and Gratifications Approach

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Dewey, John

See Public Communication in Politics

Diffusion of Innovations

In January 2001, the impeachment trial against Philippine President Joseph Estrada was halted by senators who supported him. Within minutes, using cell phones, the opposition leaders broadcast a text message "Go 2EDSA. Wear blck" to people on their telephone lists. The recipients, in turn, forwarded the message to others. Within an hour, tens of thousands of people had gathered at EDSA, or the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, to demonstrate against Estrada. The electronic ripples led the military to withdraw support, and the government fell without a shot being fired. The Philippines story illustrates how a technology-enabled rapid (almost instant) diffusion of a text message galvanized a country's citizenry to mobilize against a corrupt political regime, leading to its demise.

Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is filtered through certain channels over time among the members of a social system. An *innovation* is an idea, practice, or object perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption. This novelty necessarily means that an individual experiences a high degree of uncertainty in seeking information about, and deciding to adopt and implement, an innovation. Although most observers agree that the diffusion of innovations is fundamentally a communication process, communication scholars constitute only one of the many research traditions in diffusion along with geography, education, marketing, public health, rural sociology, agricultural economics, general economics, and political science.

History and Conceptual Overview of Diffusion

The study of the diffusion of innovations can be traced to the writings of Gabriel Tarde, a French sociologist and legal scholar. Tarde originated such key diffusion concepts as opinion leadership and the S-curve

of adoption (although he did not use the same labels). Tarde's intellectual leads were followed up by anthropologists such as Wissler, who analyzed the diffusion of the horse among the Plains Indians. Wissler argued that adding horses to their culture led the Plains Indians, who had lived in peaceful coexistence, into a state of almost continual warfare with neighboring tribes.

The basic research paradigm for the diffusion of innovations emerged with Ryan and Gross's classic 1943 study of the diffusion of hybrid seed corn among Iowa farmers. This innovation was profoundly important, leading to increased corn yields of 20% per acre. The innovation had spread widely to Iowa farmers in previous years, but state administrators wondered why such an obviously advantageous agricultural technology required a dozen years to achieve widespread use. Ryan and Gross indicated that the average farmer needed 7 years to progress from initial awareness of the innovation to full-scale adoption (indicated by planting all of the corn acreage in hybrid seed), emphasizing how difficult it was for most individuals to adopt an innovation. Hybrid corn had to be purchased from a seed corn company, at a price per bushel not trivial to Iowa farmers in the Depression years. Further, adopting hybrid seed corn meant Iowa farmers had to discontinue their previous practice in which healthy ears of corn were used as seed for the following year.

During the 1950s many diffusion studies were conducted, particularly by rural sociologists, and they were directly influenced by the Ryan and Gross investigation. Meanwhile, the diffusion approach infected other social sciences, spreading to marketing, political science, and education. Everett M. Rogers in his classic 1962 book *Diffusion of Innovations* argued for a general model of diffusion, irrespective of discipline. Another key event leading to wider acceptance of the diffusion paradigm was Coleman, Katz, and Menzel's study of the diffusion among physicians of tetracycline, a new medical drug developed by Pfizer. Data were collected via personal interviews with virtually all of the medical doctors in four small communities in Illinois. Prescription data were also collected from pharmacies so the researchers knew the date when each doctor first prescribed the new drug. This represented an important methodological improvement—observed actual adoption—over the usual diffusion investigation, which depended upon respondent accuracy in recalling the date at which an innovation was adopted.

The rate of adoption of tetracycline followed an S-shaped curve (see Figure 1), as had the rate of adoption for hybrid corn, although only 17 months elapsed before most doctors had adopted tetracycline (compared to 12 years for the Iowa farmers adopting hybrid seed). The most innovative medical doctors (early adopters) were cosmopolites, making numerous out-of-town trips to medical specialty meetings. As with the Iowa farmers, mass media channels (such as articles in medical journals) were most important in creating awareness-knowledge, whereas interpersonal communication channels with peers were most important in persuading a doctor to try the medical innovation.

The intellectual contribution of the drug study was the evidence for diffusion as a social process. Doctors who were linked in more interpersonal networks adopted the innovation more rapidly than the isolated doctors. Even though tetracycline had been scientifically evaluated in numerous clinical trials, and even though Pfizer salespeople gave them free samples, they evaluated the innovation mainly through the personal experiences of their fellow doctors. An early adopting doctor might tell another doctor "Look, I



Figure 1 The Diffusion S-Curve

prescribed tetracycline to several patients and it worked great. Want to try it?"

Diffusion of innovations has some distinctive aspects that set it off from other specialized fields of communication study. For instance, the diffusion approach emphasizes interpersonal communication networks more than any other type of communication research. The main function of mass mediated communication in the diffusion process is to create awareness knowledge about the innovation. Further, diffusion research considers time as a variable to a much greater degree than do other fields of communication study. Time is involved in diffusion in (a) the *innovation-decision process,* the mental process through which an individual passes from first knowledge of a new idea to adoption and confirmation of the innovation; (b) *innovativeness,* the degree to which an individual is relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than other members of a system; and (c) an innovation's *rate of adoption,* the relative speed with which an innovation is adopted by members of a system.

The number of diffusion studies has increased steeply in past decades. By 2003, Everett Rogers estimated some 5,200 diffusion publications, increasing at the rate of some 120 to 125 articles per year. By this count, in 2007, the number of diffusion publications should be nearing 6,000.

Political Contexts and Diffusion

Numerous studies of innovations generated through the political process have been published. These include innovative legislative practices in the areas of juvenile corrections, consumer advocacy, judicial administration, health and human services, responses to HIV/AIDS; and simple public health practices such as fortification of flour to combat stunting or iodization of salt to prevent goiter.

How do political contexts impact diffusion of innovations? Political contexts can inhibit or postpone the adoption of some innovations. For example, the fall of the Berlin Wall, followed by the collapse of the former Soviet Union, led to the development and spread of democratic movements in countries of the former Soviet Union. State policies, the nature of bureaucracies, and the existence (or lack) of political freedoms and legislations affect adoption of innovations. Patent laws, for instance, regulate what technological innovations can be adopted and by whom. Governmental restrictions on the broadcast of certain advertisements (e.g., condom ads) can affect the adoption of birth control and HIV prevention practices in a society.

Although we still have much to learn about how innovative ideas and practices gain prominence on policy agendas, social scientists have identified some factors as being salient. For instance, scholars have emphasized the role of policy entrepreneurs and "knowledge coaches"; some have emphasized the importance of research evidence to inform the drafting of policies and programs; some have highlighted the role of social networks; and others have emphasized the importance of media agenda-setting processes in the diffusion and adoption of new policies and practices.

Agenda Setting and Diffusion

Why did the tragedy involving cyanide-laced Tylenol in the United States, which claimed seven lives in 1982, get front-page, top-of-the-news coverage, while the issue of AIDS languished in the U.S. media? *The New York Times* ran four front-page articles on the Tylenol tragedy; however, it took 4 years and 20,000 AIDS deaths before *The New York Times* began to pay attention to the issue of AIDS. Communication scholars and political scientists have been studying this agenda-setting process.

The Media Agenda

The agenda-setting process begins with getting an issue on the *media agenda,* which consists of the hierarchy of news issues ranked by their degree of news coverage. What puts an issue on the media agenda? Seldom does an issue get media attention or stimulate public discourse (unleashing interpersonal channels) due to indicators of the severity of a social problem. In the early years of the epidemic, the weekly reports by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on the number of HIV infections and AIDS deaths did not put the issue of AIDS on the U.S. media agenda. The media reported these data, but AIDS did not yet have a human face.

Research suggests that two factors can help put an issue on the national agenda: (1) when a news article about the issue appears on the front page of *The New York Times* and (2) when the U.S. president gives a talk about the issue. *The New York Times* is the most respected U.S. news medium. Other media follow its lead in judging the news value of various issues. In the case of AIDS in the 1980s, a news article about the

epidemic did not appear on the front page of *The New York Times* until May 25, 1983, 2 years into the epidemic. *The New York Times*' lack of attention to the AIDS issue resulted in a relatively silent mainstream media and a barely audible public discourse. Further, the morally conservative U.S. President Ronald Reagan did not give a speech about AIDS until May 1987, 6 years into the epidemic, a time when 35,121 AIDS cases had been reported by the CDC. Starting in mid-1985, two important tragic figures, actor Rock Hudson and schoolboy Ryan White, helped give AIDS a human face. AIDS rapidly climbed on the media, public, and policy agenda.

The Public Agenda

After the media agenda is set, an issue like AIDS climbs the *public agenda,* defined as the priority of issues that the public perceives as important. The public's agenda of issues is usually indexed by questions asked in public opinion polls, such as "What is the most important problem facing the nation?" Not until late 1985, soon after AIDS climbed the media agenda, did sizeable numbers of the American public begin to identify AIDS as an important social problem. Eventually, in early 1986, the AIDS issue was rated in national polls as the most important health problem facing the nation. In essence, the AIDS issue was not just on the TV screen, but increasingly gained momentum on people's interpersonal radar.

The Policy Agenda

Finally, an issue like AIDS climbs the *policy agenda,* the set of issues that public officials consider as they allocate funding, pass laws, and make policies. Despite the resistance of the White House and *The New York Times,* once the media began giving heavy news coverage to the epidemic after mid-1980, the public began expressing concern about AIDS, and policymakers began to increase appropriations sharply for HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and research. This third step in the agenda-setting process is really the bottom line, when policies are implemented, budgets are determined, and programs are put into practice.

Why has diffusion of innovations research persevered for so many years? Few other areas of communication research have such a lengthy history and represent such a tremendous scholarly outpouring. The popularity of diffusion research is in large part due to its practical importance and its applied nature whether in the field of communication studies, marketing, or political science.

Imagine how different the path of the AIDS epidemic in the world might have been had the United States moved more quickly to stem the tide than it did. Perhaps the world could have mitigated the HIV/AIDS catastrophe, which by 2007 had claimed 30 million lives and had some 50 million living with the virus. In retrospect, the 4 years from 1981 to 1985, during which the agenda-setting process was held up by the inaction of the U.S. government and the inattention of *The New York Times,* proved costly.

Arvind Singhal and Margaret M. Quinlan

See also Agenda Setting; Interpersonal Communication; Rogers, Everett M.

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Digital Divide

The term *digital divide* describes the uneven distribution of information and communication technologies (ICT) in society. This encompasses differences both in access (first-level digital divide) and usage (second-level digital divide) of computers and the Internet between (a) industrialized and developing countries (global divide), (b) various socioeconomic groups in single nation-states (social divide), and (c) different kinds of users with regard to their political engagement on the Web (democratic divide). In general, these differences are believed to reinforce social inequalities and to cause a persisting information or knowledge gap amid those people having access to and using the new media ("haves") and those people living without ("have-nots").

The metaphor of the digital divide became popular by the mid-1990s when the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce (1995) first published its research report on Internet diffusion among American citizens. Under the title "Falling Through the Net: A Survey of the 'Have Nots' in Rural and Urban America," the results of this analysis revealed widespread inequalities in national ICT access. Especially migrant or ethnic minority groups and older, less affluent people living in rural areas with low educational attainments were excluded from Internet services. This pattern was confirmed by follow-up surveys of the NTIA which indicated also an initial gender gap in favor of men.

Although diffusion rates of the Internet were subsequently rising in all groups, additional studies apart from those first policy reports proved a perpetuating digital divide both in the United States and abroad. For the main part, these examinations were based on secondary analyses of cross-sectional data with few panel exceptions and some ethnographic projects in specific communities. Although varying methodologically with regard to their units of analysis (e.g., individuals versus households), their operationalizations of ICT access and usage (e.g., at home, at work, both, or in public places), and their measurement of respective group differences (e.g., users/non-users in absolute percentages versus odds ratios of adoption), the findings of these studies suggested some common characteristics of the digital divide.

A visitor looks at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Media Lab initiative "One Laptop per Child" at the United Nations Development Programme stand of the World Summit on the Internet Society, November 18, 2005, at the Kram Palexo in Tunis. The initiative is a partner in ITU's Connect the World Programme, which has been developing a "one-hundred-dollar laptop," assisted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Media Lab, led by Professor Nicholas Negroponte. The computers are designed for use by schoolchildren in developing countries.

Source: AFP/Getty Images.

In single nation-states, access and usage of computer technology is stratified by age, education, ethnicity/race, family structure, gender, income, occupation, and place of residence. In this way, young Western men with high qualification profiles, working in well-paid managerial positions and living in small urban families with children are most of all advantaged to adopt the new media. This applies both to the formal possession of ICTs (material or physical access) and the

motivation to deal with those devices (motivational access) as well as to the experience and skills provided to use the Internet (skills access) and the amount of self-administered time spent online for specific purposes (usage access). Here, usage among advanced groups includes, in particular, the proficient search for instrumental information on the Web to address professional or political interests. On the contrary, less-advantaged groups have been shown to lack those basic navigation skills and to prefer entertainment or diversion features on the Internet instead. Their political involvement has therefore not increased with the rise of new information technologies.

On the global level, additional factors like state economy (measured in per capita gross domestic product), international trade volume, degree of democratization, deregulation of the telecommunications market, density of the communication infrastructure, and investments in research and development have also been found to influence Internet diffusion. In this way, industrial societies are more prone to implement new technologies than less-developed countries. Consequently, the current intensity of national ICT access and usage decreases geographically starting from the United States and Canada, Northern Europe, Australia, and New Zealand to Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe to Asia, Central and South America, and Africa.

In time comparison, this global digital divide remained relatively stable. Yet, in single nation-states certain gaps in ICT access and usage have slowly begun to fade: Especially among men and women and between rural and urban areas of Western residences those early differences subsided, possibly due to extended telecommunications networks, lowering entry barriers, and additional ICT experiences at work. Other initial inequalities caused by factors such as age, education, ethnicity/race, and income, however, continued to prevail.

These divergent developments and the various types of ICT access and usage encountered in single countries led some researchers to criticize the original description of a digital divide. In their opinion, this metaphor wrongly implies a binary construction of "haves" and "have-nots" based on the simple notion of absolute and insurmountable class differences in technology. Alternatively, they postulate "digital inequality" as a gradual concept and therefore advocate multidimensional measures of Internet connectedness which take into account the history and context of Internet use, its scope and intensity, and finally the centrality of ICTs in people's lives.

Similarly, policy initiatives conducted by supranational organizations (e.g., European Union, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the United Nations), national governments, and private enterprises or foundations have been expanded to ameliorate the worldwide differences in ICT usage. Although concentrating in the beginning on the mere improvement of technical access to computers and the Internet in rural areas and public institutions (e.g., in libraries, schools, cultural centers, and government facilities), recent projects also include civic information campaigns and additional ICT courses for specific user groups to enhance media literacy in society.

Eva Johanna Schweitzer

See also Diffusion of Innovations; Information Society; Information Technology in Politics; Knowledge Gap; World Wide Web, Political Uses

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Direct Action Protest, Australia

Direct action has been used in Australia by groups involved in social movements such as the labor, indigenous, peace, and environmental movements. Such actions are usually undertaken by small, often autonomous groups wanting to make strong statements about social practices they regard as morally wrong. Sometimes, these actions are illegal and so constitute civil disobedience. The messages they are

attempting to communicate are directed at ordinary people, urging them to join or, at least adopt, the same moral positions, rather than to governments or other representative institutions to change their policies.

Strikes, sabotage, and go-slows tended to characterize direct action in the Australian labor movement up to World War II. Radical labor organizations like the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW or "Wobblies") used such methods in the early 20th century, and their paper was named *Direct Action.* New social movements arising from the 1960s onwards resorted to creative direct action when they found it difficult to get their message heard any other way.

Both the indigenous rights and the anti–Vietnam War campaigns in Australia in the 1960s took inspiration from the U.S. civil rights and anti-war movements. In 1965, Charles Perkins, a leading Australian indigenous activist, led a group of Sydney University students on a bus tour of rural New South Wales towns to expose the extent of Australian racism. Similarly, Australian protesters undertook such actions as the burning of draft cards and throwing blood at the stock exchange. During the 1970s, a younger generation of environmental activists, frustrated by the conservatism of movement leaders, began to engage in more confrontational methods that included forestry blockades, occupations to prevent the destruction of historic urban buildings, and messages on public buildings. Perhaps the most famous of Australian direct actions was the Franklin River blockade in early 1983 during which the protesters used rubber rafts to blockade barges taking machinery to a proposed dam site. One of the most spectacular examples occurred during the nuclear disarmament campaigns of the 1980s when activist and surfer Ian Cohen maneuvered his surfboard in front of a visiting nuclear warship and rode it along the Brisbane River until it was forced to come to a halt midstream. He repeated the action on Sydney Harbor a week later gaining national and international media attention.

Mass social movements will often have within their complement of activities a direct action component and, as in the case of the Franklin campaign, the direct actionists can often play an important and creative role in achieving the movement's objectives. However, there is often a tension between the more politically moderate movement leaders, who play representative roles and who use political pressure to change government policy, and the direct actionists, who are often more interested in making moral points and doing things their way using consensus decision making.

Libby Connors and Drew Hutton

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Direct Democracy

Direct democracy refers to a system in which all citizens participate in political decision-making processes. This regime type was first conducted in ancient Athenian politics of Greece in 508 B.C. However, the right to direct participation was restricted to male citizens, who selected their representative officers annually. The success of Athenian democracy was due to the city-state's small population of 300,000 people. A similar political system run by citizens was exercised in the Roman Republic in 449 B.C. Citizens participated in the entire lawmaking process, and the political system lasted approximately 400 years.

Modern citizen lawmaking was established by Switzerland's "status referendum" in 1847. In the 20th century, the United Kingdom pursued the Direct Democracy Campaign, which encourages both citizens and elected representatives to launch public votes to establish new laws and public policies or to change or remove existing laws. Although the meaning of direct democracy has changed, contemporary democratic regimes uphold the principle of citizen participation in politics.

Larger populations and inefficiency render direct democracy an almost impossible ideal in contemporary politics. Defined by national boundaries, political

entities are too large to hear and respond to all citizens. Full participation by all citizens in every political decision proves too expensive and slow for an efficient democratic system. More importantly, majority rule inevitably leads to the suppression of minority voices.

Representative democracy presents an alternative to direct democracy. Most democratic systems in the world have adopted this political system. For instance, the U.S. constitution adopts a combined form of direct and representative democracy to ensure that individuals are protected from majority rule. Under this alternative form of democracy, federal politics depend on voter election of representatives from a two-party system to act in the people's best interests. However, state statutes guarantee citizens direct participation in the lawmaking process, as well as the right to recall or veto laws. Despite this, because representative democracy does not directly represent public interests, it often leads to government corruption, disputes between political groups, and costly elections.

Avoiding the pitfalls of alternative political systems requires elected representatives to impartially pursue the collective welfare of the public. A pure direct democracy also calls for citizens who are well informed about political issues and a government that works via transparent networks. News media outlets are effective at ensuring a democratic system, as modern technologies like online voting allow citizens to directly participate in the decision-making process. Thus, the Internet, phones, and other media tools have rendered national politics more accessible to citizens.

Hyun Jung Yun

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Direct Mail

Direct mail is mail that targets specific audiences and constituents on a specific mailing list. Broadly used in direct marketing of products, services, and ideas, in the political arena direct mail is used by political candidates, political parties, political action committees, lobbying groups, and other organizations for four major reasons: to *raise money,* to amplify *pressure* on public officials, to *recruit* new members into groups, or, most commonly, to *sell* a product, program, candidate, or issue. The first successful national use of direct mail for political purposes was by Dwight Eisenhower in the 1952 presidential election. In 1964, Barry Goldwater's direct-mail campaign raised $4.7 million, mailed over 12 million letters, and most notably, created a list more than 200,000 strong. These lists have seen sizeable expansions today. What might have been possible in the early 1960s only at well-funded national organizations like the Republican National Party became possible at much smaller and more diverse organizations, particularly in the late 1970s and beyond, so that by the mid-1980s direct mail became a dominant means of political fund raising.

There are advantages to direct mail that are not available with other kinds of fundraising, research, and publishing. In fact, it is the only activity that simultaneously serves as fundraising, market research, and publishing. This triple advantage has translated into marketing gold for campaign managers. An organization can mail different letters to its recipient lists, letters that focus on different projects or agendas, and other letters that specifically target small demographic groups of people in scattered geographic locations. Direct mail offers advantages to politicians that are unmatched by many other means of political communication: repeat solicitations, market pretesting, personalization, concentration, and immediacy. Immediacy is a crucial factor for good direct mail. Urgent headlines like "THE BIBLE IS BEING THROWN OUT" tend to elicit fast and motivated reactions, donations, and overall mobilization.

It is common for the success of most direct-mail campaigns to make the group sponsoring the appeal seem powerful but not organizationally massive, savvy but not corporate, influential but still just a grassroots movement with intimate connections to its members. There are, therefore, abundant techniques for downplaying the mass-production of the letters themselves and emphasizing the person behind the personal appeal. Seemingly hand-underlined passages adorn most such letters. The short, telegraphic paragraphs make liberal use of bold-face, bright yellow highlighting, and machine-produced personal messages in the

margins of the letters. The handwritten postscript, the faux post-it note with a personal appeal from the executive director, the bulk-rate sticker on the envelope as if it were a first-class postage stamp affixed with human saliva, the cursive type-font—all of these show the personal touches, the human-to-human bond simulated in the mass mailings.

The criticisms of direct mail are much more muted than its benefits. Some suggest that direct mail induces higher levels of voter apathy and cynicism by polarizing ideologies into extreme and adversarial groups. One concern is that mailers mostly consist of fear, guilt, and name-calling that can also push some to be less likely to even vote on an issue. Another concern is that those who cannot donate money will feel disaffected. They may be turned off by the money chase on both sides of a mailer campaign issue. Some argue that direct mail extends participation in government to people who otherwise would never have gotten involved. Direct mail, they say, enlivens government and extends democracy. Others argue that the extremist rhetoric of such letters and the splintering of the population into target groups encourages alienation, cultural fragmentation, paranoia, and violence. Although direct mail does use highly divisive and absurdly emotional claims, there is little evidence to support the contention that it pushes people away from all things political.

All in all, direct mail can be an effective tool for disseminating diverse messages and mobilizing targeted audiences, both of which are primary tactics in winning elections.

Brandon Jay Hersh

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Dole, Elizabeth (1936–)

Elizabeth Hanford Dole epitomizes the strides women have made in politics in the United States but also illustrates limitations faced by female candidates. Dole worked under six different presidents, and her career includes many “firsts” for women. She was the first female secretary of transportation (during the Reagan administration); the first female executive of the American Red Cross since its founder, Clara Barton; the first serious female contender for the Republican presidential nomination; and the first female senator from North Carolina.

Dole was born Elizabeth Hanford in 1936 in Salisbury, North Carolina, the daughter of a wealthy merchant. She excelled academically and was elected class president during her first year in high school. Dole then earned a degree in political science from Duke University and a master’s degree and law degree from Harvard University. She moved to Washington, D.C., after college to work in national politics.

During her time as a political appointee in Washington, Dole was known for her work to raise the drinking age from 18 to 21 by withholding highway funds from states that failed to comply and implementing the requirement that new automobiles include a third brake light. Elizabeth Hanford married Senator Bob Dole of Kansas in 1975, and she has been an integral part of his various campaigns for public office since that time.

Dole is known for her talk-show style of political communication that catapulted her into national consciousness at the 1996 Republican National Convention. At this convention, Elizabeth Dole gave a speech on behalf of her husband who was running as the Republican presidential nominee. Her ability to connect with her audience—both television and live—established her national reputation and opened the door for her own presidential run in 2000.

Dole’s attempt to secure the Republican Party presidential nomination in 2000 uncovered major barriers for women seeking election to the highest political office in the United States. Dole received a different amount and type of media coverage than the male Republican presidential hopefuls in ways that hurt her candidacy. She received far less media coverage than expected for the second most popular Republican candidate and was less likely than other candidates to be mentioned first in news stories or be included in front-page articles. The press also paid more attention to Dole’s personality traits and appearance than to those of her male competitors. Some reporters discussed her physical features in disparaging, gendered ways. Additionally, journalists repeatedly talked about Dole

as the "first woman" to be a serious presidential candidate, suggesting that she was a novelty in the race rather than a strong contender with a good chance of winning. Biased media coverage conveying the message that Dole was not a viable candidate no doubt contributed to a lack of campaign contributions that eventually forced Dole out of the race.

Dole went on to win a seat in the U.S. Senate from North Carolina in 2002. Elizabeth Dole exemplifies the success women have had in moving into politics in recent decades. Her accomplishments as a Washington political appointee, leader of a major nonprofit organization, presidential contender, and U.S. senator make her one of the most important female political figures of her generation. Gallup polls repeatedly name her as one of the top 10 most admired women in the world.

Caroline Heldman

See also Women Candidates, Advertising; Women Candidates, News Coverage

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Dole, Robert (1923–)

Robert J. Dole served a lengthy political career, including years in the House of Representatives as well as the U.S. Senate and, most prominently, as a candidate for president in 1996. In addition to his prominent political service, Dole's military service was also distinguished. While serving during World War II, in the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division, Bob Dole was shot and seriously injured in Italy in 1945. His recovery from his injuries required 3 years, which left his right arm paralyzed. He received two Purple Hearts as well as a Bronze Star medal during his military career. When he was discharged in 1948, he returned home to Kansas and served in the state legislature from 1950 to 1953 and as Russell County Attorney from 1952 to 1960.

Dole represented Kansas in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1960 to 1968, then in the U.S. Senate from 1969 to 1996. He served as Senate majority leader, as well as Senate minority leader, from 1985 to 1996. On May 16, 1996, Dole resigned his seat in the Senate to focus his attention on running for president.

Robert Dole's first entry into presidential politics was as the Republican vice-presidential candidate in Gerald Ford's run for president against Jimmy Carter in 1976. His political career in elected office concluded with an unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 1996 as the Republican nominee. Dole had made earlier runs for president in 1980 and 1988 but received the nomination for president in 1996 to challenge Bill Clinton's bid for a second term in office. Dole was 73 years old at the time and would have become the oldest president to take office if he had been elected.

Dole's communication style was marked throughout his career by a dry wit and humor that sometimes was characterized as sarcastic and cutting. In the first national televised debate to feature vice-presidential candidates, Dole faced Walter Mondale, Carter's vice president, in the 1976 campaign. Dole's most memorable political commercials were from his 1996 campaign against Bill Clinton when commercials highlighting Dole's biography, including his military service and warm personal statements by his wife, Elizabeth, contrasted with strong attacks on Bill Clinton's moral and policy failures.

After his years in the House and Senate and running for president in 1996, Dole has remained active in politics. He has campaigned for Republican House, Senate, and gubernatorial candidates and promoted George W. Bush's presidency and reelection through campaign activities in 2000 and 2004. Bob Dole has also campaigned for his wife, Elizabeth Dole, in her own bid for the White House in 2000, as well as her election to the U.S. Senate in 2002 representing North Carolina. The Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics opened at the University of Kansas in June 2003 on Dole's 80th birthday. The nonpartisan institution holds Dole's personal and political papers, in addition to sponsoring politically oriented lectures and events.

Since retiring from elective politics, Bob Dole has continued to remain in the public eye. In 2003 Bob Dole and Bill Clinton briefly joined the CBS News program *60 Minutes* for a point-counterpoint segment. Dole's humorous side has been featured in a number of television advertisements, including Target, Viagra, Dunkin' Donuts, and advertisements for Pepsi and Visa that ran during the Super Bowl, the most prominent advertising placement on television.

Dole also wrote his memoirs of his years of service in World War II and his lengthy recovery from his injuries in *One Soldier's Story,* published in 2005. He also authored *Great Presidential Wit (. . . I Wish I Was in the Book)* in 2001 and *Great Political Wit* in 1998.

Joan L. Conners

See also Dole, Elizabeth; Political Advertising

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DONSBACH, WOLFGANG (1949–)

Wolfgang Donsbach studied communications, political science, and cultural anthropology at the University of Mainz, Germany, where he also received his PhD in 1981 and completed his postdoctoral dissertation (*Habilitation*) in 1989. He taught at the universities of Dortmund and Mainz and was a visiting professor at the Free University of Berlin and at Syracuse University, New York. In 1989–1990 he was a fellow at the Gannett Center for Media Studies, Columbia University, and in 1999 the Lombard Visiting Professor in Harvard University. Since 1993, he is professor of communication in the Department of Communication at the Technical University of Dresden.

Early in his career Donsbach started to concentrate on three fields that have remained his primary research interests and which he has often linked together: journalism, political communication, and public opinion. Many of his publications and research projects deal with the education and attitudes of journalists, their professional behavior, as well as objectivity and quality of reporting, the role of journalism and the media in democracy, and media effects. Regarding public opinion polls, he discusses the influence of poll data on public opinion and argues for the "freedom of pre-election polls."

Wolfgang Donsbach is also one of only a few German communication scholars who, almost from the beginning of his research activities, took up the international perspective and engaged in comparative research across countries. His extensive activities in international communication associations are proof not only of his global angle but also of his worldwide connections and the recognition in the international scientific community. From 1995 to 1996 he was president of the World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR), from 1992 to 2002 chair of the AMCR section Psychology and Public Opinion, from 1996 to 1998 chair of the Political Communication Division of the International Communication Association (ICA) and from 2004 to 2005 president of the ICA. He is also a member of several editorial boards of communication journals and the managing editor of the *International Journal of Public Opinion Research.*

Christina Holtz-Bacha

See also World Association for Public Opinion Research

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DOWNS, ANTHONY

See MASS POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Dramatistic Approaches to Political Communication

Dramatism is an approach to thinking about political behavior that employs the metaphor of "life as theater." Most dramatists, however, do not consider their mode of understanding to be a metaphor; they believe that the framework accurately describes the behavior of politics. A playwright uses language in dialogue to create a world within which his/her characters act. Like the playwright, politicians and citizens use language to organize the world they encounter and within which they act. With this language political actors characterize real events of the world, shape understanding of them, organize relationships of power around them, and guide response to them. Political conflict arises from the differences in these interpretations and responses.

Dramatism is part of an influential intellectual movement in the 20th century: contextualism. Contextualists believe that the power of language-based interaction to orient people to events and thus shape response is the essential mode of human activity. They study the strategies through which this interaction shapes response to events and establishes stable structures of human relationship. Although the great philosopher of contextualism was the late Wittgenstein, the most influential writer was the humanist Kenneth Burke. Burke developed a general theory of language's role in human activity. His books *Permanence and Change, Attitudes Toward History, Grammar of Motives,* and *Rhetoric of Motives* are his most influential on dramatistic approaches to political communication. His criticism "The Rhetoric of Hitler's Battle" stands as a powerful example of the explanatory and predictive power of dramatistic inquiry into political discourse. Other important theories of human activity, including Ernest Bormann's Fantasy Theme Analysis (later Symbolic Convergence Theory), Walter Fisher's Narrative Analysis, and Erving Goffman's Dramaturgy, are examples of contextualist and dramatistic theories, each owing varying degrees of debt to Burke. Key early adapters of dramatism to political communication were Murray Edelman, Bernard L. Brock, James E. Combs, Michael Calvin McGee, and Dan Nimmo.

Scholars who study political communication with the dramatistic approach frame their study in two activities. *Theorists* refine a common vocabulary and wield that vocabulary to provide an explanation of how political actors perform politics through their strategic choice of language (and other associated symbols) and how a society organizes its activities politically through the commonalities and adaptability of a shared symbolic system. Critics concentrate their scholarship on political performance, teasing out the significance of the constraints and choices of language on day-to-day political activity. Many scholars mix these activities, deepening understanding of the process of politics even as they contribute to the ongoing dialogue about contemporary political events.

Three examples illustrate how dramatists understand political communication. Murray Edelman laid the groundwork for a broad understanding of symbols and politics. He studied the ways in which leaders command key symbols and common ways of speaking to grow the legitimacy of their power. Like all good contextualists, however, he was not content with one viewpoint on politics. He also explored how language generated around policy issues shapes the carrying out of those policies in a policy-driven bureaucracy and transforms political actions into a satisfactory response to felt need. Ultimately he provided a vision of how political action is not merely an expression of belief but a powerful means through which society organizes each day to respond to the circumstances that it perceives as public problems.

Bernard Brock focused on the political speaker as a goal-oriented strategic deployer of symbols in pursuit of his/her goals. Brock viewed the political speech within the framework of the speaker's language choices from among the possibilities present in the speaking situation. Brock captured the drama of political conflict in the different ways in which those with different orientations pursue politics.

Robert Ivie focuses on the continuities of ways of talking about politics across time. His article "Presidential Motives for War" traces continuities across 2 centuries in the language of justification when American leaders make war. Ivie's critical work illustrates an important way that dramatists see political communication: Choices of language are not circumscribed by the moment, but call upon stable, yet evolving, forms. These forms are real in the language of politics, created in that language, reinforced and evolved within it, and called from the rhetorical context when political actors seek to justify action.

No two concepts better illustrate the difference between dramatistic and other approaches for understanding politics than *ideology* and *motivation.* Broken into its Greek roots, "ide-ology" is the study

of ideas, and many who consider ideology do so by conceptualizing the way people think. Thus, when they see ideology in language, they see through the language to the ideas it expresses. Dramatists do not see language's relationship to ideas in this transparent way. They believe that ideas are, in fact, a property of language. Powerful ideas are a social product. They attain their power through their pronouncement in contexts in which they successfully guide the performance of the political system. Their refinement is far more than a mental process; it is a process of interaction, criticism, and modification born of the interrelated texture of words and actions.

To dramatists, the key to understanding motivations is the pattern of vocabulary and language use that drives society through response to its environment. Thus, motivation is not something *in* political actors and brought to behavior by triggers, verbal or otherwise. Rather, motivations are language artifacts that shape social behavior, built through their use in everyday activity, carried in the understandings of a society, and thus available to organize response to the ongoing events of life. Dramatists, such as Ivie, find these patterns of motivation real in their presence in the texts generated by a political culture and called upon at key moments by framers of political action.

Thus, dramatistic approaches elevate political communication to a primary role in the understanding of politics. The realm of human action we label "politics" organizes people to encounter the world day-today within a framework of power and leadership, with political interactions constructed through the deployment of choices by leaders and citizens from their shared cultural symbolic resources.

James F. Klumpp

See also Bormann, Ernest; Fantasy Theme Analysis; Symbolic Convergence Theory; *Symbolic Uses of Politics, The*

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Dukakis, Michael (1933–)

Michael S. Dukakis was governor of the state of Massachusetts and the Democratic nominee for president in the 1988 election. Much of his loss to George H. W. Bush in that election is thought to have derived from political miscalculations such as a photo op in an M1 Abrams tank in Michigan and the failure of his campaign to respond to Republican attacks ads that portrayed Dukakis as soft on crime.

Dukakis was born to Greek-immigrant parents in the Boston suburb of Brookline, Massachusetts. After serving 2 years in the U.S. Army overseas and graduating from Harvard Law School in 1960, Dukakis began his political career later that year when he was elected as a Town Meeting Member in Brookline as well as the chairman of the town's Democratic organization. In 1962, he was elected to a seat in the Massachusetts legislature. Following an unsuccessful run for lieutenant governor in 1970, Dukakis was elected governor in November 1974, defeating Republican incumbent, Frank Sargeant.

As governor, Dukakis was credited in leading the state of Massachusetts through one of its worst economic periods in history, inheriting record levels of unemployment and the largest budget deficit the state had ever seen. Despite these achievements, known as the "Massachusetts Miracle," Dukakis lost the governor's race in 1978 to Edward King, only to defeat him 4 years later. He was then reelected to an unprecedented third term in 1986.

After winning the Democratic Party's nomination for president in 1988 over a field that included Jesse Jackson, Dick Gephardt, Gary Hart, and Al Gore, Dukakis selected Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen (1921–2006) as his running mate. Despite a strong showing in some states, the Dukakis-Bentsen ticket could not overcome the incessant "liberal" tag Republicans attached to him. This, coupled with the previously mentioned tank incident as well as attacks on Dukakis's prison furlough program that allowed convicted murderer Willie Horton to commit new atrocities, eroded much support from the Dukakis-Bentsen ticket in the eyes of the American public. Dukakis also suffered from media portrayals, particularly in the presidential debates, as a cold, unemotional technocrat. Shortly after his presidential loss, Dukakis announced that he would not run again for governor of Massachusetts and served the remainder of his term

quietly as the state began to fall once again into economic crisis. Once out of office, Dukakis traveled with his wife Kitty to Australia and Hawaii and later joined Amtrak's board of directors as vice chairman.

Currently a professor of political science at Northeastern University in Boston, Dukakis has additionally been a visiting professor or guest at Harvard University, University of California at Los Angeles, the University of Hawaii, and Florida Atlantic University. He also coauthored a textbook on American government with fellow Democratic presidential candidate Paul Simon titled *How to Get Into Politics—and Why: A Reader.*

Fredrick H. Sowder

See also Willie Horton Ad

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E

Eagleton, Thomas

See McGovern, George

Ecevit, Bülent (1925–2006)

Bülent Ecevit was a Turkish journalist, a man of ideas, and a political leader and was also known as a poet. Ecevit had a 45-year political career during which he served as minister of labor (1961 to 1964), deputy prime minister (1997 to 1999), and prime minister (four times between 1973 and 2002). He was jailed three times and banned from politics for 10 years. He is best known for his decision as prime minister to send Turkish troops into Cyprus, for his idea of the "democratic left," for his stand against "anti-democratic political designs," and for his financial honesty.

An editor for *Ulus,* the official journal of the Republican People's Party, Ecevit was elected deputy in 1957. As minister of labor (1961 to 1964), he introduced labor rights so that he came to be identified with leftist-populist politics. Promising a new center-left identity for the Republican People's Party in 1972, Ecevit succeeded Ismet Inönü, the second president of the Republic and the leader of the party after Kemal Atatürk, as party chairman. Ecevit, with his wife and campaign strategist, Rahşan Ecevit, toured the party's branches to explain his new center-left program.

Upon his command as prime minister to mobilize Turkish troops into Cyprus to halt violence against the Turkish minority and to reestablish peace on the island in July 1974, Ecevit came to be publicly known as "Conqueror of Cyprus," a national hero. His political discourse comprised nationalistic/patriotic, pro-working class, and populist elements. It identified the just order with an order of the people. Ecevit, thus, built an image as a "man of the people." He always wore a cap, the headwear of peasants, and a blue shirt, the symbol of the working class. The color of his blue shirt was later named after him and became known as "Ecevit's blue." He addressed the public on a platform launched on the roof of a bus, a strategy to make him visible among others present; in a sense, to turn his physical disadvantage as a small-built man into an advantage. White doves were used as symbols of peace. Ecevit was nicknamed *Karaoğlan*, or "Dark Boy," a name derived from a Turkish comic hero that also referred to his black hair and mustache. He gradually became a symbol of hope for people, and his fans wrote his name over the mountains of the country. The outcome was his party's victory with 41% of the votes in the 1977 elections.

Seven years after the 1980 coup, he became the chairman of the Democratic Left Party. In the 1999 elections, the Democratic Left won 22.1% of general votes. The party owed its success to Ecevit's corruption-free image, his modest way of life, and his ability to communicate clear and consistent messages. However, with the loss of public support in 2002, Ecevit left politics. He was the honorary chairman of the party when he died on November 4, 2006. His funeral attracted hundreds of thousands of people from numerous provinces.

Nur Betül Çelik

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ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY, AN

See MASS POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

EDELMAN, MURRAY (1919–2001)

Murray J. Edelman studied the symbolic and subjective nature of politics to reveal the latent meanings of political performance. Born in Pennsylvania, Edelman received a bachelor's degree in social sciences from Bucknell University in 1941. He then earned a master's degree in history from the University of Chicago in 1942 and his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Illinois in 1948. Prior to his 40-year career in academia, Edelman investigated labor-management relations and public policy. He was on the faculty of the University of Illinois from 1948 to 1966. In 1966, Edelman joined the faculty of the University of Wisconsin, where he was the George Herbert Mead Professor Emeritus of Political Science and received numerous other distinctions including Fulbright Awards and fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities. Murray retired from the University of Wisconsin in 1990.

Edelman's innovative and classic book *The Symbolic Uses of Politics,* which was published in 1964, is the seminal work on symbolic politics, and it continues to exert a widespread influence on scholarly research. *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* explores the use of myths, rites, and other symbolic forms of communication in the formation of public opinion and policy. In the book, Edelman notes that, while the conventional study of politics concentrates on how people acquire what they want through government, his book "concentrates on the mechanisms through which politics influences what they want, what they fear, what they regard as possible, and even who they are." The theses of the book, which are centered on the notion that democracy is largely symbolic and expressive in function, have fostered vibrant scholarly debate. According to Edelman, political reality is accessible to the public through the generation of symbols by the politically elite.

Edelman wrote 10 other books exploring various angles of the issues of which *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* laid the foreground. These books include *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence* (1971), which explored the generation of political perception and public opinion in democracies and mass political action, and *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (1988), in which Edelman argued prevailing political ideologies constrain even the politically savvy with a false consciousness wherein they reify the dominant ideology even while they are thinking otherwise. Edelman further explored the subjective nature of political process with a focus on art in *From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creations Shape Political Conceptions,* written in 1995. Edelman also wrote *Securities Regulation in the 48 States* in 1942, *Political Language: Words That Succeed and Policies That Fail* in 1977, and *The Politics of Misinformation,* which was finished shortly before his death by his daughter Lauren Edelman.

Elizabeth Johnson Avery

See also *Symbolic Uses of Politics, The*

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EDITORIALS

Editorials are most frequently defined as officially expressed opinions on a matter by a publication's editorial board. These statements, often found on an editorial "page" of a newspaper or magazine, represent the consensus viewpoint of the editorial staff of the publication.

An editorial is sometimes referred to as an "op-ed." In its original usage, an op-ed was a newspaper page with featured commentary, "opposite" of the editorial page. Though considered improper by some, it is now common for people to refer to an editorial as an "op-ed," by substituting the word *opinion* for *opposite*. In addition to including the official stance of the publication, editorial pages may contain political cartoons, syndicated columns, and/or letters to the editor. These items are also sometimes referred to as editorials. Editorials of all kinds are much more

common in print media, which are not constrained by any regulatory requirements to provide equal time or balanced coverage.

Editorials are typically constructed by a group of members of an editorial board, which may include the publisher and editor of the newspaper as well as other members of the staff. By not including a byline, these articles are meant to show solidarity of message and purpose among the staff. Organizations such as the American Society for Magazine Editors and the American Business Media Guide have designed sets of ethical guidelines for the creation and dissemination of editorials. For instance, both organizations emphasize the importance of clear divisions and distinctions between advertising or promotion materials and the actual editorial content.

Inspiration for editorials generally arises from current events. As opposed to the neutrality and objectivity that characterize articles written by journalists, editorials are subjective and may attempt to be persuasive. Some researchers have found that newspaper coverage of an issue will be reflective of editorial coverage, contrary to the notion of journalistic neutrality.

Numerous classification systems have been used to typify editorials. Editorials are frequently categorized as being either explanatory or persuasive. An explanatory editorial seeks to interpret the meaning of news stories and provide context to the reader. Alternatively, a persuasive editorial may argue a particular point of view, offer solutions, or call readers to action.

During political campaigns, newspapers may elect to endorse a particular candidate through use of an editorial. Research in communication, journalism, and political science has produced mixed results as to whether editorials are likely to influence the vote choice of readers.

Jason A. Moldoff

See also Broder, David; Cartoons, Political; Commentary, Political; Greeley, Horace; Journalism, Political; Letters to the Editor; Murrow, Edward R.; Newspapers, Role in Politics; Testimonials, Political; Will, George

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Effects of Mass Communication, The

In 1960, Joseph Klapper wrote *The Effects of Mass Communication* in which he outlined the "phenomenistic approach" to media studies. Klapper explains the approach by stating "it [the phenomenistic approach] is in essence a shift away from the tendency to regard mass communication as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, toward a view of the media as influences, working amid other influences, in a total situation" (p. 5). Further developments in the phenomenistic approach eventually led to audience-centered media approaches, such as the *uses-and-gratifications approach*, a term which Klapper coined in 1963.

Klapper provides an extensive review of early political and persuasive communication literature, often citing classic works such as Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet's *The People's Choice* (1948), Katz and Lazarsfeld's *Personal Influence* (1956), and Lang and Lang's *The Mass Media and Voting* (1959). Next, the author explains how individual exposure variables, such as selective exposure, selective attention, and selective retention, play a pivotal role in media persuasion. Klapper then outlines how psychological variables may aid the process of opinion conversion by noting experiments that indicated that war propaganda was effective only after soldiers were fully separated from their respective groups, eventually leading to an argument about the concept of "persuadability" as a predictor of personal influence. Klapper transitions from persuasion to media effects in order to further his development for the phenomenalistic approach, examining crime and violence in the media, escapist media content, and childhood viewing of adult media content.

Lastly, Klapper outlines the five interdependent generalizations of the phenomenisitic approach. First, mass communication does not "serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather functions

among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influences." Second, these mediating factors and influences are a "contributory agent, but not the sole cause" in the reinforcement of media effects. Third, when mass communication does function as a change agent, it is because the mediating factors are absent and the media effect is direct, or it is because the mediating factors will be "impelling towards change." Fourth, there are "residual situations" when mass communication will produce direct effects or will fulfill certain "psycho-physical functions." Fifth, "the efficacy of mass communication, either as a contributory agent or as an agent of direct effect, is affected by various aspects of the media and communications themselves or of the communication situation."

Klapper provides an overview of just about all genres of media effects that originated before 1960, including emerging media effects research that received little empirical or theoretical treatment at the time. In sum, *The Effects of Mass Communication* provides insight into how media effects studies turned from media-centered in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s to the more modern motive and audience-driven approaches that have become vital to modern communication research. More importantly, this book served as the primary source of what became known as the "limited effects" or "minimal effects" model of mass communication.

John Spinda

See also Limited Effects Theory; Selective Processes, Exposure, Perception, Memory

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E-Government

In its broadest sense, *electronic government*, more popularly referred to as *e-government*, is the use of information and communications technologies by governments to operate more effectively and transparently; to provide more and better information and services to the public; and to facilitate the participation of individuals, businesses, and groups throughout society in their own governance. Another, more succinct, way of putting this may be that e-government is the use of electronic technology to facilitate better and more open government and governance. There is now a common understanding of e-government as encompassing most or all of the components noted above, even if there is still some level of controversy among academics and practitioners as to the proper scope and definition of e-government and its subcomponents in practice.

There are some who argue that e-government has in fact been in existence since the introduction of the first mainframe computers in government agencies in the 1950s. At some level, this may be factually correct, but the term itself was most surely not in existence at that time. The use of the term and the more dynamic and commonly understood concept of e-government as a transformational process in government, governance, politics, democracy, and public management are directly associated with the rise of the Internet, especially as the Internet entered the mainstream of society in the mid- to late 1990s.

Definition and Study of E-Government

E-government is an inherently multi- and interdisciplinary field. Concepts include government/public administration, political science, communications and media studies, law, public policy, engineering and computer sciences, and others. The study entails understanding of what e-government is and how it affects the structure and management of government institutions, the delivery of any and all public information and services, and the relationship between individuals and organizations in society as well as those who govern them. This field is still in its infancy.

The main axis of controversy in both defining and studying e-government is whether e-government is or should be thought of as a broad and inclusive concept or a narrow and exclusive concept. In terms of technologies, the narrow-broad distinction focuses on the "e" in e-government: Does it include only or primarily the Internet and Internet related technologies, or does it include any and all electronic/digital technologies from personal computers (PCs) and traditional computer based technologies, telecommunications technologies, as well as the Internet and the host of new mobile technologies and others that are only now in the testing stages?

In terms of public management and government institutions, the main point of dispute, especially among academics, is whether the term *e-government* refers narrowly to administration of government and delivery

of public services or whether the term should be more broadly construed and include the impact of the Internet and new communications technologies on the democratic process, including elections, political communications, and the participation of individuals and groups in society.

There are many definitions of e-government, with both commonalities as well as distinctions between them. A key reoccurring theme, however, centers on the transformational aspect of government in using technology. A number of illustrative definitions that have been adopted by a range of large, credible organizations are included in the following.

The United Nations defines e-government fairly broadly as the use of information and communications technology, and its application, by the government for the provision of information and public services to the people. This definition subsumes the efficient administration and services delivery components of e-government but stops short of encompassing the political and social aspects of e-government, which in U.N. parlance are termed *e-participation*, or more broadly, *e-inclusion*.

The World Bank offers a broader, more complete explanation of e-government, worthy of including in full here:

> E-Government refers to the use by government agencies of information technologies (such as wide area networks, the Internet, and mobile computing) that have the ability to transform relations with citizens, businesses, and other arms of government. These technologies can serve a variety of different ends: better delivery of government services to citizens, improved interactions with business and industry, citizen empowerment through access to information, or more efficient government management. The resulting benefits can be less corruption, increased transparency, greater convenience, revenue growth, and/or cost reductions.

In the United States, the federal government loosely defines e-government as the "federal government's use of information technologies (such as wide area networks, the Internet, and mobile computing) to exchange information and services with citizens, businesses and other arms of governments." This brief definition leans heavily toward the administrative and services aspects of e-government.

The Gartner Group, a leading private technology research company, provides a more dynamic, process-oriented definition of e-government as "the continuous optimization of service delivery, constituency participation, and governance by transforming internal and external relationships through technology, the Internet and new media." Here, again, can be seen a broader, more inclusive definition of e-government.

E-Government in Practice

In the United States, e-government, by way of transforming access to government through technology, was a key component of the National Partnership for Reinventing Government during the Clinton administration. By the late 1990s the Reinventing Government initiative had resulted in the creation of dozens of new federal Web sites and online cross-agency service centers. This e-government Web site push included a complete overhaul of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Web site and culminated in 2000 with the launch of the groundbreaking (at the time) FirstGov.gov government Web portal. Under the Bush administration, a number of high profile projects were identified specifically as federal e-government initiatives in 2001 to 2002 (the 24 so-called Quicksilver Initiatives), and the first E-Government Act was passed in 2002. At the time, Rep. Tom Davis (R-VA), a key supporter of the bill, said the e-government act would revolutionize how Americans interact with government, since citizens now expect government to perform at the same level of electronic service as other Web delivery services. The hopes and expectations around e-government were indeed great at the time.

Other nations that were early adopters in the mid- to late 1990s include the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. Canada and the United Kingdom, in particular, were credited with implementing forms of national e-government that facilitated and encouraged e-participation, thus possibly evidencing the broadest understanding of what e-government is and can be. In more recent years, nations as varied as South Korea and Estonia have established comprehensive systems of e-government. In Estonia's case, comprehensive e-services are matched by e-democracy and e-participation tools that allow citizens to have direct input on legislation and participate virtually in online cabinet meetings. The Korean government has developed and published perhaps the most sophisticated national e-government strategy to date, which includes goals of universal citizen access and participation in government and transparent government. To date, Korea has made great strides in implementing this e-government vision.

E-government can be thought of as constituting the intersection between three related "e" spheres: e-administration, e-services, and e-participation. The relationship is illustrated in Figure 1 below. E-administration deals primarily with the backend processes and internal structure of government. It therefore has an internal focus. E-services connects the backend processes that generate information and services with the end users, such as citizens (government to citizen, or G to C), businesses (government to business, or G to B), and other governments (government to government, or G to G). E-services, then, maintain both an internal and an external focus. E-participation focuses primarily on the external relationships of the government with civil society, and encompasses citizen input on decision making and policy development, direct access to government officials, electronic voting, citizen and social networking as it relates to governance, and other tools of citizen empowerment. E-participation has a primarily external focus.

E-Administration

E-administration refers broadly to the internal mechanisms, processes, and structures of government. While the most immediate goal of most e-administration initiatives is to increase efficiency of administrative processes, a longer term and potentially more important goal is that of government transparency, one of the key hallmarks of democratic societies. By digitizing government records and making them available in electronic formats, and by streamlining and automating bureaucratic processes that previously involved large amounts of paper and human discretion, the inputs, process, and results can all be more readily accessed and monitored, thereby putting in place a more transparent process.



Figure 1 Relationship of E-Government Spheres

E-Services

Government-to-Citizen E-Services

Government-to-citizen, or G-to-C, e-services are generally the main focus of e-services initiatives. The delivery of public information and direct services to citizens via electronic channels has revolutionized the way many governments deliver and think about public services. Citizen e-service initiatives often take the citizen as a true consumer of public services, and the best practices among citizen e-services incorporate notions of marketing and customer service from the private sectors. From the online renewal and issuance of important documents such as drivers' licenses, to registration and payment for government amenities such as recreational services, to the qualification of citizens for and even delivery of key social services such as education and public health benefits, the G-to-C area of e-government promises the most immediate and tangible benefits to individuals and governments.

Government-to-Business E-Services

Government-to-business, or G-to-B, e-services can bring significant efficiencies to both governments and businesses. Large-scale e-procurement projects, for example, whereby governments move their purchasing and contracting processes online, have been initiated at all levels of government and even between national governments. These projects can span a range of implementations, from posting and/or distributing government procurement documents and contracts online, and allowing or even requiring that bidders' responses are similarly submitted online either via e-mail or through more sophisticated electronic systems implemented specifically for that purpose, to managing formal online reverse auctions. Other basic forms of G-to-B services include one-stop service centers for business licensing and registrations. While G-to-B services are generally implemented with the goal of increasing the efficiency of government procurement and realizing cost savings, a related goal is

to increase the fairness and transparency of government contracting, thereby reducing corruption and favoritism.

Government-to-Government E-Services

Government-to-government, or G-to-G, e-services can not only increase the obvious backend internal processes between governments, but also seamlessly expedite external services for citizens through the integration of services offered. For example, in the United States, multiple government entities came together to form the GovBenefits.gov portal, which matches citizen beneficiaries with a government agency that provides some form of assistance. This centralized G-to-G portal approach allows backend integration, coordination, and cost savings in targeting individuals between multiple government agencies while improving citizen access to information and services, thus helping them get the assistance needed. On another G-to-G front, the use of information technologies by different governmental entities (e.g., federal and state, among different states, state and local) to share and/or centralize information, or to automate and streamline intergovernmental business processes such as regulatory compliance, has produced numerous instances of time and cost savings and service enhancements.

Government-to-Employees E-Services

The government-to-employees, or G-to-E, programs initialized often result in significant service improvements. Employee e-services can range from online form initiatives for internal purposes to integration of third-party services, such as allowing employees access to manage their benefits online, to partaking in tailored information related to the agency mission. Even simple internal communications and morale building initiatives done online can show great results.

E-Participation

E-participation encompasses the range of engagement between citizens, as individuals and as members of groups, and their governments. This participation includes formal interaction, including e-voting, formal participation tools such as electronic input on policies, regulations and legislation, as well as informal participation mechanisms such as online citizen forums, direct access to government officials and policymakers, and newer and still emerging technologies, including Web logs, vlogs, wikis, and RSS feeds.

The exact definition of e-participation varies across countries and is sometimes also referred to or partnered with e-rulemaking, e-democracy, e-regulations, or e-inclusion. Generally speaking, all of the definitions and scopes seek to promote the social empowerment of citizens generally, and more specifically to allow citizens to engage in the decision-making or participatory processes. As such, the United Nations, for example, defines e-participation as follows: "The goal of e-participation initiatives should be to improve the citizen's access to information and public services; and promote participation in public decision-making which impacts the well being of society, in general, and the individual, in particular."

Conclusion

While there are differences in opinion regarding the historical underpinnings of e-government, and some minor discrepancies in its nomenclature as well as the extent of its impact, it is safe to say that it most certainly is transforming the structures and processes of government, and more important, governance in society. Some see the change as incremental, whereas others view it as revolutionary. Either way, as e-government systems and applications become more efficient, inclusive, and widespread, the rate of transformation is likely to increase, not only in the United States but globally as well. As such, the study of e-government, as well as its current and future impact, will only increase in importance.

Gregory G. Curtin

See also Information Society

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EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D. (1890–1969)

Dwight David Eisenhower—West Point graduate, supreme commander of the allied forces in Europe, president of Columbia University, and supreme commander of NATO forces—was the 33rd president of the United States from 1953 to 1961. The Eisenhower presidential campaign of 1952 was the first in which television played a major strategic role. Eisenhower's campaign and presidency established historic and enduring precedents in televised political communication. Two key moments of his presidency are the election campaign and his farewell address.

Unique to the 1952 campaign was the confluence of television set ownership (19 million compared to fewer than 500,000 in 1948) and the burgeoning broadcast area, which was able to reach 40% of the population. For the first time, television was perceived as an important strategic campaign tool. The Eisenhower Republicans and the Adlai Stevenson Democrats spent an estimated $4 million to $12 million on television. While both candidates bought 20- to 30-minute time slots (sometimes longer) for political campaign speeches, "Eisenhower Answers America"—the first presidential spot ad campaign—is an enduring legacy of the Eisenhower campaign.

Rosser Reeves of the Ted Bates Agency conceived, developed, and produced the twenty-eight 20-second spot ads and the three 1-minute ads. Based on information acquired from George Gallup, Reeves limited the ads to three topics: high prices and taxes, corruption, and the Korean War. "Eisenhower Answers America" was the first time a presidential candidate appeared in a television ad campaign. In 1952, many believed that a candidate's appearance in television ads would denigrate the office being sought. Both candidates resisted the idea of appearing in their own ads, and while Eisenhower was convinced to appear in ads in 1952, Stevenson was not convinced until the 1956 campaign. A Democratic spot in 1952, for example, was a 40-second "Vote Stevenson" song performed by Judy Garland.

"Eisenhower Answers America" was conceived in direct response to President Harry Truman's slogan "You Never Had It So Good!" Uncertain of victory, Republican Party bosses contacted Reeves hoping he could create an effective counter slogan. Instead, he proposed a spot ad campaign that featured Eisenhower answering staged questions from ordinary citizens. Reeves commissioned a study (The Levin Report) which calculated that a saturation spot ad campaign (at least 12 ads per evening) on television in 62 counties in 12 states—designed to influence 844,320 voters—would, given the voting demographics of 1952, secure the 249 electoral votes needed for victory. The election was a landslide for Eisenhower (55% popular vote, 442 electoral votes), and post-election studies of the effectiveness of the ads were eschewed by the Republican National Committee, which preferred other explanations for their success.

The structure of the "Eisenhower Answers America" ads was simple both in copy and visual appearance. A sample of one of the 20-second ads is typical (Figure 1).

Eisenhower filmed his answers several days before the 26 individuals, couples, or families were photographed asking scripted questions. "Citizens" were

Narrator: Eisenhower Answers America

Citizen: You know what things cost today, high prices are just driving me crazy.

Eisenhower: Yes, my Mamie gets after me about the high cost of living. It's another reason why I say, it's time for a change. Time to get back to an honest dollar and an honest dollar's worth.

Figure 1 Sample "Eisenhower Answers America" 20-Second Ad

selected from visitors to Radio City Music Hall, and they never interacted with Eisenhower. The three 60-second ads consisted of an existing 20-second ad with stock footage and graphics added to the beginning and ending. Also, "Eisenhower Answers America" ads aired on radio using the same format, sometimes the same material, in 15-second spots.

While the spot ad campaign was a presidential campaign first, it was not the only political ad innovation utilized in that campaign. Roy Disney is credited with producing a 1-minute musical animated ad for Eisenhower, often referred to as the "I Like Ike" ad. It has the signature Disney look: upbeat and clever. Further, it seems to be the only presidential political ad produced in the history of Disney. Eisenhower did not appear in the ad except in caricature. The ad features Uncle Sam (with his Ike button prominently displayed) leading a parade of citizens marching with Ike placards to the catchy tune "I Like Ike." The parade's pachyderm beats a drum with his tail and carries an Ike banner hanging from his trunk and a caricature of Eisenhower draped over his back.

"I Like Ike" included specific criticisms of the Democrats. One shot in the ad pictures three donkeys that stand passively as the Republican parade passes them by. In another shot-at-the-Democrats, Stevenson is silhouetted behind the "I Like Ike" parade riding a donkey in the opposite direction just as the song reminds voters that "Adlai goes the other way." The ad ends in Washington, D.C., as the sun rises over the Capitol with Ike's name in the middle of the sun.

The effectiveness of "I Like Ike" was never determined, but along with "Eisenhower Answers America," spot ads (including a few spot ads from the Democrats) from 1952 set an enduring precedent in televised politics. Future presidential ad campaigns increasingly moved away from on-air speeches to saturation-level spot ads focused on limited issues that often featured the candidate. Contemporary political ads continue to use theme songs and animation as part of the persuasive production process.

The ad campaign for Ike in 1952 was unique, precedent-setting, and part of a nationwide sweep into office; his exit from office in 1961 left scholars and the public with his most enduring speech, his farewell address. While Truman's farewell address may have been the first such speech televised, Eisenhower's is among the best remembered of any presidential farewell address because of his warnings about the military-industrial complex. Eisenhower's farewell address is a key rhetorical moment in his tenure in office. On January 17, 1961, Eisenhower addressed the nation for the last time as president of the United States. He warned against the problems associated with the vast military-industrial complex and the "unwarranted influence" and "misplaced power" that could follow. In a touch of irony, the most compelling and pivotal political communication moments in Eisenhower's presidency stand as bookends: before he assumes office (the spot ad campaign) and as he prepares to leave office (his farewell address).

Stephen C. Wood

See also Political Advertising



Figure 2 Abbreviated Story Board for 60-Second "I Like Ike" Ad

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Electoral Systems

Electoral systems can be conceptualized in both a broad and a narrow sense. Although there is a tendency to understand the term for descriptive purposes as encompassing everything relating to the electoral process, including suffrage, electoral administration, and, recently, also electoral behavior, for analytical reasons, a narrow concept is preferable. Correspondingly, electoral systems are the mode by which voters express their political preferences through votes and according to which votes are transformed into parliamentary seats or executive offices. This narrow concept is usually applied when electoral systems are regarded as instruments for shaping party systems.

Institutionalists, among them the most reputed experts on electoral systems, ascribe great significance to the latter as the most fundamental element of representative democracy, especially important for the functioning of the political system. Sociologists, however, argue that political systems and party systems are, to a far greater degree, dependent on societal factors, such as the structure and deepness of social cleavages, the level of development, political culture, and historical paths. In contrast to conceptualizing the issue in sharp alternatives, it seems more reasonable to consider both approaches and to look at electoral systems as an independent and a dependent variable in relation to party systems and contextual factors. Furthermore, the choice or design of electoral systems is made by political parties along with their preferences, and the effects of electoral systems are influenced by the structure of the party system itself.

Certainly electoral systems exert, as Maurice Duverger stated, mechanical effects on the political representation as well as psychological effects, as a voter's choice is influenced by earlier decisions. But the formation and changes of party systems are far too complex to be understood by a traditional linear-causal treatment of their dependence on electoral systems. Their effects largely depend on contextual factors, which play an important role in the understanding of why the same electoral system in different countries goes along with different party systems. While the causal relationship between electoral systems and party systems is maintained, contextual factors, which differ from country to country, can be said to be co-determinant. It is worthwhile to add that the proper party system is likely to constitute a very significant factor determining not only the choice but also the effects of an electoral system.

Structure of Electoral Systems

For more than a century the debate on electoral systems has focused on plurality and proportional representation (P.R.). Indeed, there are only two principles of representation. But majority and proportionality serve as well as decision rules, and electoral systems can combine one principle of representation (for example, P.R.) with the opposite decision rule (majority). At the level of types of electoral systems, the number of possible options is far higher than two because of such combinations. To meet increased requirements of electoral engineering, a more comprehensive approach gives first attention to the range of possible options at a technical level. These technical elements can be subdivided into four spheres: districting—the determination of electoral constituencies; forms of candidacy; kinds of voting; and the formulae of translating votes into seats. Each of these technical elements per se has political effects. The political effects of the electoral system in its entirety, however, are only determined by the combined interaction of the individual elements which can diversely be combined with one another, almost arbitrarily.

Districting refers to the process of determining the constituencies' number and magnitude; that is, the quantity of seats available for allocation in a constituency. The basic differentiation that applies here is between single-member constituencies (SMC) and multi-member constituencies (MMC). The latter, for their part, can be small (2 to 5 seats), medium (6 to 9 seats) or large (10 or more seats). Constituency magnitude is most important for the effects of electoral systems, first for the relation of votes to seats and, thereafter, for the political parties' electoral chances. If one regards only constituency magnitude on its own, using a proportional formula, the following rule applies: The smaller the constituency, the less the proportional effect of the electoral system, and the slighter, usually, chances of small parties getting into office. Through the size of constituencies, political representation, party system structure, and power structure can be controlled. Therefore, districting is frequently enormously controversial. One only needs to think of so-called gerrymandering; that is, attempting to steer candidates' election chances by means of drawing up constituencies according to political criteria. Moreover, constituency magnitude also influences the kind of communication between the voter and the representative. In an SMC, it can be assumed that a relationship between the voter and the candidate or representative, based on direct communication, familiarity, confidence, and responsibility, materializes more easily than in an MMC.

As regards forms of candidacy, the basic differentiation is between individual candidacy and party lists. Three different forms of these can be distinguished: (1) The closed and blocked list only permits the voter to cast his or her vote for the party list en bloc. (2) The closed and nonblocked list or preferential voting within one list, often called open list, enables the voter to alter the sequence of candidates on the party list and hence leaves it up to him or her to decide who is to represent the party. Such a decision is merely prestructured by the party organs. (3) The freedom of choice list, often called free list, gives the voter the possibility to overrule party boundaries, to vote for candidates placed on different party lists, and to compile his or her own list. Here, the party lists are only significant as recommendations.

The kind of voting is closely linked with the form of candidacy. Accordingly, the basic distinction is between the vote for an individual candidate and the vote for a party list. As regards the closed and blocked list, the voter usually has only one vote. With other list forms, the voter can have several votes (multiple vote system), through which he or she can express preference for a candidate, for example by two votes, one for a candidate and one for the party list. Voters can have as many votes as there are candidates running for election (single transferable vote, where voters cast second, third, or fourth preferences), or limited multiple vote,

less votes than there are representatives up for election. In the case of a free list, and by cumulative vote, voters can cast several votes for one and the same candidate, and by *panachage,* he or she can choose candidates from different party lists.

Electoral formulae are to be distinguished first with regard to decision rules, whether majority rule or proportional rule is applied. In the case of the majority rule, allocation of seats is further dependent on whether a candidate needs a relative or absolute majority of the votes. It can be counted as an advantage of the majority formula in general that the voter is confronted with a clear decision-making situation and can retrace directly what is going on with his or her vote. The votes cast for the victorious candidate are successful; the votes for the losers, however, get lost. Consequently, the success value of the votes is quite different, and the plurality system is marked by exclusionary tendencies. With regard to the plurality formula, however, this can have the political consequence of discouraging the political minority in a given constituency from running or campaigning seriously where one party dominates completely. If an absolute majority is required, electoral alliances to contest the run-off elections may lead to an intense political bargaining among parties, where smaller parties can obtain some seats in exchange for assisting a larger party's candidates in other constituencies. In the case of the proportional formula, seats are allocated according to the share of votes the various candidates or parties obtain. Unlike the majority formula, the votes have, at least roughly, equal success value, and proportional systems are marked by tendencies of inclusion at the cost of fragmentation of votes and parties. Correspondingly, along with the use of closed and blocked party lists, representatives of minority cultures or groups as well as women will be more frequently elected under a proportional formula. Furthermore, a significantly greater share of the voters regards its participation in the polls as being crowned with success insofar as their votes have contributed to a party winning a seat. It is therefore worthwhile for the candidates and supporters of the political parties to fight for each vote, which can be conducive to stimulating party competition and voter turnout. Finally, some concentration effects may be exerted by strategic voting, enhanced by voters' will to cast an effective vote; that is, a vote given for a victorious candidate, which requires a good deal of information about parties, coalitions, and the mechanism of the electoral system. The so-called thresholds of representation deserve special attention. As opposed to factual "natural" hurdles originating from the size of constituencies, thresholds are legal "artificial" hurdles; for example, 5% of the total vote as a minimum that parties must obtain to be allocated seats. Thresholds can be distinguished according to the area of application (national, regional, or district level), to the stage of voting account, where they are applied, to their magnitude (actually varying from 1% to 12.5%), and, finally, to their different magnitude according to party alliances and the number of parties they include.

Types of Electoral Systems

When classifying electoral systems, it is necessary to distinguish first between classical and combined (or mixed) systems. Classical electoral systems are those in which the principle of representation and the decision rule correspond to each other. The most prominent are the plurality system in SMCs, applied in Great Britain, the United States, Canada, and most Commonwealth countries; the two ballot system in SMCs, used in France; and the pure P.R., applied, for example, in Israel. Combined systems are those in which the principle of representation and the decision rule cross each other. Although many scholars identify combined electoral systems with the German system, different combinations of decision rule and principle of representation lead to three distinct subtypes of combined electoral systems:

1. *Personalized proportional systems (or mixed-member-proportional systems):* All seats are allocated according to the proportional principle at a national level. The decisions that voters make on the individual candidates in the constituencies, who make up half of the deputies, do not affect the national proportional distribution of seats among parties, except in the case of extra ("overhang") seats. Personalized proportional systems are in use in Germany and New Zealand.

2. *Compensatory systems:* Under these electoral systems, a part of the seats is allocated in SMCs according to a plurality or majority formula, then, in a second step, a second part of seats is allocated by proportional representation in order to compensate, at least roughly, for the disproportionality resulting from the election in

SMCs. A compensatory system was used in Italy (1994 to 2005) and is still used in Hungary.

3. *Segmented systems (also called parallel or "truly mixed" systems):* Under these electoral systems, one part of the seats is allocated in SMCs and, separately, another through party lists according to a proportional formula. Segmented systems are in use, for example, in Mexico and Japan and were used in Russia in three elections during the 1990s.

Criteria of Evaluation

When we proceed to ask what functional demands are commonly ascribed to an electoral system in electoral system debates around the world, and if we disregard unrealistic expectations and purely power and party-related considerations, five functional demands essentially result:

1. Representation, in the sense of fair representation; that is, as close as possible a mirror of social interests and political opinions in the government. The parameter of reasonable representation is the degree of proportionality of votes to seats.
2. Concentration or effectiveness, in the sense of aggregation of social interests and political opinions for the purpose of attaining political decisions and rendering the polity capable to act. Elections are understood not as a mirror but as an act of forming the political will of the electorate. Parameters of a reasonable concentration of an electoral system are, on the one hand, the number or reduction of the number, respectively, of parties that receive seats, and on the other hand, the formation of stable party or coalition majorities in the government.
3. Participation, in the narrower sense of more or fewer opportunities the voter has of expressing his or her political preferences. The alternative between personal vote versus closed party list is crucial. The parameter for reasonable participation of this kind is whether, and if so, to what extent the electoral system facilitates personal voting.
4. Simplicity, in the sense that the voter can understand the way electoral systems work and what is happening with his or her vote. This is especially important because electoral systems that attempt to fulfill more than one function tend to be more complicated.
5. Legitimacy, in the sense of an overall criterion insofar as it relates to the acceptance of the election results and of the rules of the game and, thereby, of the political system.

Comparing Types of Electoral Systems and Worldwide Trends

If we compare the existing electoral systems applying the first three criteria, we notice that the classical ones are likely to fulfill only one (P.R.) or two criteria. That is why these systems tend to be substituted with combined systems, which can be designed to correspond to the various requirements placed on electoral systems. They are more suitable for fulfilling, simultaneously and in a well-balanced way, the different functions of electoral systems: providing fair representation, government stability, voter participation through personal choices, and government accountability to voters. Effectively, looking at the changes in the worldwide map of electoral systems, combined electoral systems have gained ground on classical ones in recent decades. At least in Eastern Europe, almost no classical electoral systems were introduced. In a great number of countries, electoral commissions, charged to design new electoral systems to overcome the shortcomings of the current systems, proposed combined electoral systems. Furthermore these systems are more amenable to political compromise and also to a more complete designing approach. Considering that there is no best system, but only that which adapts best, experience, contextual knowledge, and good judgment are, in practice, the most important devices for electoral engineering.

Normally, politicians and political scientists pay their closest attention to the effects which, from a systems' point of view, different elements and their combination in a given electoral system exert on political representation, measured in terms of party representation, concentration or fragmentation, government formation, and political stability. Another perspective, from the voter's point of view, is how electoral systems improve voters' freedom of choice, how they open up the inclusion of social, cultural, and political diversity, and how they enhance a process of political communication and rational voting, in which the constant need for integration and the postmodern tendencies of greater particularization can be balanced.

Dieter Nohlen

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E-Mail, Political Uses

Political use of e-mail is one of the most revolutionary communication tools for politicians and civic-minded citizens alike. In 1994, fewer than 50 members of Congress even had e-mail addresses, but by 2000 e-mail had become the primary mode of communication between elected officials and constituents. E-mail has been found to have both positive and negative attributes for presidential candidates, congressional members, and political activists alike.

For presidential candidates, the 2000 election year was the first one in which e-mail was utilized on a large scale in multiple capacities. E-mail lists were valuable tools for the Bush and Gore campaigns; by the general election, both candidates had e-mail lists with over 400,000 addresses. These lists aided candidates in getting messages about the campaign to supporters quickly. While some messages were designed to reinforce support for their candidates, other e-mail messages were used to spin or reframe events such as Bush's "Set the record straight" e-mails. E-mails were also sent out by campaigns to supporters to recruit and motivate volunteers. Both candidates also sent e-mails about campaign events and policies to news sources to influence reporting. "Get out the vote" e-mails were common near Election Day to mobilize citizens to vote. Near Election Day the Bush campaign was sending upwards of 600,000 e-mails a day to mobilize supporters to vote in the 2000 election.

E-mail has also been shown to have positive benefits and curses of its own for members of Congress. Because of the ease of sending e-mails, many members of Congress are more likely to take messages from e-mails less seriously than from citizens that write letters or come to visit members of Congress in their offices. E-mail has become a primary form of communication for members of Congress to get information to their constituents. However, one issue that congressmen and congresswomen have struggled with is the handling of e-mails from constituents and nonconstituents alike. Issues began to develop in 1996 as e-mail was becoming more widespread. Citizens can respond very quickly to members of Congress on political issues, but most of their staffs are not equipped to handle the onslaught of communications. Other problems for members of Congress responding to e-mails include the issues of an inability to respond to e-mails with regular mail when e-mail writers do not include a return address, receiving e-mails from nonconstituents as a result of citizens that send out mass e-mails to many members of Congress, and even citizens that attempt to spoof officials by falsely claiming to be members of Congress themselves.

E-mail also has several uses for political activists as well. Its quick delivery to many recipients makes it one of the best tools to mobilize supporters for a cause quickly. Moreover, e-mail campaigns can be staged more cheaply than through other traditional mediums. However, since congressional staff members are not equipped to handle mass quantity e-mails quickly and e-mails can be easily ignored, few e-mail campaigns have led to results for political activists.

David M. Rhea

See also New Media Technologies

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Embedded Journalists

Embedded journalists are reporters who work within and under the control of one side's army in a military conflict. They are attached to a specific military unit and permitted to accompany troops into combat zones. Embedded journalism allows reporters, sometimes referred to as "embeds," a firsthand view of military action taking place in or around battlefields previously unattainable by pool reporters. While the term could be applied to other historical interactions between journalists and military personnel (e.g., during the Vietnam War), it first came to be used in the U.S. Iraq invasion in 2003. Embedded journalism was introduced by the Pentagon as a strategic response to news media who have criticized the low level of access granted during the 1991 Gulf War and in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan.

Though professional journalists have covered wars by accompanying military units since the modern press evolved in the 19th century, embedded journalism added a new dimension to war coverage. It resulted in some intense coverage of real-time combat, including astonishing pictures taken by "lipstick" or tank cameras which have never been seen before in the history of warfare. As part of the U.S. Department of Defense's strategy to provide "the factual story—good or bad—before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions," the Pentagon offered journalists the opportunity to join U.S. troops after undergoing boot camp–style training and accepting ground rules put together in the *Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media*. During the invasion of Iraq approximately 600 embedded journalists were permitted to join American forces. They represented primarily news organizations based in the United States and in countries that united in the so-called coalition of the willing.

The scholarly debate on the effects of covering combat operations by embedded journalists started while U.S. troops were still on their way to Baghdad. On the one hand it was argued that a new standard of openness and immediacy had been created for war coverage. Reporters directly involved in military action were believed to provide a more incisive account of events by shedding the inevitable speculation that might surface by keeping the media at a distance. Others though, viewed embedding more negatively, particularly raising concerns about bias in reporting. Even media organizations, who participated in the embed program, have described it as an attempt to present the U.S. side of the war in a sympathetic light by absorbing reporters into the culture of the military and tainting the objectivity that journalists are bound to uphold. Those holding this critical view have created the alternate term *inbedded journalist* to reflect this bias.

Recently, scholars started analyzing the relationships of embedded journalists and military units developed through interpersonal communication. Present key objectives of research include questions such as whether embedded reporters become part of the military culture, whether the outcome of interpersonal relationships help foster a more affirmative representation of the military, and whether embeds produce a more positive news coverage than unilateral correspondents.

Martin Löffelholz

See also War Coverage

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Endorsements, Political

See Testimonials, Political

Entman, Robert (1949–)

Robert Entman is a well-known interdisciplinary political communication scholar. He received his bachelor's degree in political science from Duke, a Ph.D. in political science from Yale, and an M.P.P. in policy analysis from Berkeley. He taught public policy analysis at Duke and joined the faculty at Northwestern University's

interdisciplinary program in communication studies, journalism, and political science. Entman also served as professor of communications at North Carolina State University and as adjunct professor of public policy at the University of North Carolina. He has worked as co-director at the Center for Information Society Studies, and since January 2006 has served as a J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro professor at the George Washington University School of Media and Public Affairs.

Entman's academic approach deals with the media's normative functions, social responsibility, and inclusive democratic processes. His research focuses on political communication and communication policy, with primary studies measuring the media's framing effects on public policies and opinions. Entman's further analyses criticize media coverage styles that negatively influence policy development processes. Theoretically, Entman believes the media shapes elite and public perceptions. His books *Media Power Politics* (1981) and *Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics* (1989) developed the idea of media bias and its effect on politics. He argues that one-sided media framing, in particular, manipulates public opinions of civic issues. Furthermore, his cascading activation model theoretically illustrates the mechanism of framing spreading through the hierarchical levels of administration, elites, media, news frames, and the public. Entman argues that interpretive incongruence between two different levels of information flow interrupts an intended political framing.

Another primary focus of Entman's studies is media coverage of race and race relations. In *The Black Image in the White Mind: Media and Race in America* (2000), he noted that African Americans receive less media coverage and are more likely to be presented negatively in television news. Entman asserts that African American politicians are often portrayed as black community leaders and troublesome individuals, while ordinary African Americans are described as poor, uneducated, and socially hostile. Entman argues that the media's unbalanced racial coverage fuels and deepens prejudice toward African Americans. *The Black Image in the White Mind* was awarded Harvard's Goldsmith Book Prize, the Lane Award from the American Political Science Association, and several other awards.

Entman extended his framing studies to media influence in international contexts, suggesting that news coverage of similar events that are framed differently yield differing public perceptions of identical events. In his book, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy,* he argues that if the U.S. government wants to lead international politics and obtain greater public support, it must utilize skillful one-sided news coverage that favors its political agendas. Entman has also authored several reports on communication policy for the Aspen Institute, the Commission on Radio and Television policy, and the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Telecommunication, as well as articles and book chapters in the political communication, public opinion, race relations, and public policy fields.

Hyun Jung Yun

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Equal Time Provision

Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 (and its amendments) sets forth "equal opportunity" (as opposed to "equal time") rules of access to broadcast radio and television stations for U.S. political candidates. The origins of the equal opportunity provision appear in Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927:

> If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he [sic] shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station . . . : *Provided,* That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this paragraph. No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. (Sec. 18)

That language was virtually unchanged when Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934.

Congress amended Section 315 on September 14, 1959, creating exemptions from equal opportunity

requirements for bona fide newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events. It was in the 1959 amendment that Congress introduced the phrase "equal time" as opposed to "equal opportunity," leading to some confusion regarding what the provision required. No broadcaster has ever been required to provide unconditional "equal time" to any political candidate; they must only provide equal opportunity to all legally qualified major-party candidates for any given political office. For example, if a television station sells a legally qualified candidate $10,000 of air time for political commercials, all other legally qualified candidates may purchase the same. But the broadcaster is not obligated to give free time to any candidate. While the original wording in the law said that equal time must be provided to all legally qualified candidates for federal office, the Federal Communications Commission has generally extended the guarantee to other electoral levels.

The 1959 amendment also stipulates that political candidates must be afforded the lowest unit charge for commercial air time posted during the 45 days preceding a primary or primary runoff election and during the 60 days preceding a general or special election.

Robert Gobetz

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Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip (1954–)

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a leading political figure in Turkey. He is the chairman of the Justice and Development Party that won 34% of the general votes in the 2002 elections and came to power.

Turkish political life witnessed the rise of Islamist parties in the late 1960s at a time when Erdoğan's political career also began. He took active positions in the National Salvation Party and its successors, the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party, all of which were later shut down by the Constitutional Court on the grounds of threatening the secular nature of the state.

Erdoğan was elected as mayor of Istanbul in 1994 by the Welfare Party. Reading a famous poem with religious imagery in a public speech, Erdoğan was imprisoned for 4½ months and was banned from active politics in 1998.

Following his release, Erdoğan adopted a political discourse with a more secularized accent. He formed the Justice and Development Party in 2001. Despite its founders' lifelong political career in Islamist parties, the Justice and Development Party immediately began to set a distinctive tone: It was "new" and untested, having never competed in Turkish national elections. The party is identified with its leader and represented as a potential agent of change. Erdoğan chose to describe his "new" political identity as "conservative democrat" by assigning the party a mission of bridging a gap between traditional and modern Turkey. This mission is visible in Erdoğan's private and political life: On the one hand, he is still a practicing Muslim valuing a traditional way of life. On the other hand, in his political discourses he accentuates his commitment to Turkey's admission to the European Union as well as his attachment to the principles of the secular Republic.

As a leader, Erdoğan's personality is often described as "decisive," "frank," "charismatic," and "trustful." The fact that he was not corrupt was a major theme of the electoral campaign in 2002. A shining lightbulb was chosen as the party emblem instead of the variations of the crescent moon logo that was common to former Islamist parties. The slogan "continual light" was chosen, and an abbreviation for the party's name connoting "purity" in its religious sense and "cleanness" of the party figures in being untainted by the corruption of the past was preferred.

Because he is from Kasımpaşa, a lower middle class district, Erdoğan has the feeling of belonging to the Turkish cultural periphery. He often describes himself as "your brother Tayyip." During his election campaign, he also benefited from the legal ban on his taking part in a new government and had success with his appeal as an underdog. Erdoğan's personality, together with the grassroots organizational capacity of the party (the party organization was modeled after the organizational successes of the Welfare Party with a focus on neighborhoods), allowed the party to receive substantial support at the grassroots level.

Erdoğan and his party's electoral success are mostly interpreted by the mainstream media as related to the electorate's reaction to the former parties and leaders. After the elections, Erdoğan had generally uneasy relations with the liberal press. He moved to sue and filed for damages in compensation from cartoonists and

humor magazines for depicting him as an entangled cat and for publishing drawings showing his head attached to various animals. He also blamed journalists and the media patrons that published news and comments criticizing his government and his personality, of not supporting Turkey's supreme interests and of violating media ethics. He has been the prime minister filing the greatest number of lawsuits against journalists in Turkey. Intolerant with critics he doesn't hesitate to use vulgar, even slangy, insulting language against opposition parties, the president of the Republic, the president of the Higher Education Council, as well as a farmer protesting his government's policies.

Ülkü Doğanay

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Eurobarometer

Eurobarometer is a series of surveys initiated by the European Commission to measure public opinion in countries that are members of the European Union. Eurobarometer was created in 1973, when the European Parliament released a report requesting the establishment of a permanent research institute that would study European public opinion.

Eurobarometer is conducted every 6 months, and the results are released free of charge to the public. About 1,000 citizens from each European Union (EU) country are polled through face-to-face interviews, with the exception of countries with small populations such as Malta or Cyprus, where the sample for Eurobarometer averages 500 persons.

The first study was designed by the first director of Eurobarometer, Jacques-René Rabier, in collaboration with U.S. political scientist Ronald Inglehart, and was conducted in the nine EU Member States at the time (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg). The results of this first survey were released in 1974. Over time, Eurobarometer grew from surveying the nine original EU countries to include new EU members. Greece was added in fall 1980, Portugal and Spain in fall 1985, the former German Democratic Republic in fall 1990, Finland in spring 1993, and Sweden and Austria in fall 1994. The 13 Central and Eastern European candidate countries that became full members of the EU in 2004 and 2007 were first surveyed in fall 2001.

The Eurobarometer questions measure attitudes toward EU institutions, attitudes toward major topics concerning European affairs, and public awareness of the EU. Another set of questions measures people's satisfaction and expectations regarding the quality of life in the EU. A third set of questions measures how citizens of European countries perceive the other EU countries. Most questions are repeated on each survey in order to measure trends and opinion change over time. Eurobarometer allows monitoring the evolution of public opinion in the Member States, which helps the European Commission with the preparation of texts, decision making, and the evaluation of its work. Eurobarometer data are also often cited by mass media and are used by research scholars in communication, public opinion, and political science.

In the 1990s, Eurobarometer initiated an additional series of surveys, conducted by telephone on smaller samples, called Flash Eurobarometer. Flash surveys differ from the main Eurobarometer studies as their purpose is to find out what the public opinion is on a specific topic, such as the introduction of the Euro currency in the new EU Member States.

Monica Postelnicu

Further Readings

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European Commission, Public Opinion Analysis sector Web site: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm

European Association of Political Consultants

The European Association of Political Consultants (EAPC), founded in 1996 in Vienna under the initiative of Michel Bongrand (France) and Sepp Hartinger (Austria), is a nonpartisan association of individuals

who are actively involved in tasks of communication concerning the political as well as the public arena in Europe.

Founded as a branch of the International Association of Political Consultants (IAPC), the EAPC has developed its own strong identity but still keeps working side by side with the IAPC and maintains a close contact with its brother associations: the Latin American Association of Political Consultants (ALACOP), the American Association of Political Consultants (AAPC), and the Asia-Pacific Association of Political Consultants (APAPC).

Besides the exchange of experience and the improvement of contacts with the other associations, the EAPC has set the following targets:

- Development, support, and maintenance of democratic processes
- Mutual exchange of information and experience
- Support of cooperation and understanding beyond all borders

The EAPC organizes annual European conferences each time in a different European city. During the conferences, recent political campaigns, mostly in Europe but also outside Europe, are analyzed. Obviously, the country hosting the conference is one of the main themes of each conference, and its political situation is deeply analyzed. Technique plays a big role in modern political campaigning, and new ones are usually presented also. Lecture presentations by political professionals are highlights of the conference. Every meeting is accompanied by an interesting social program, which offers perfect settings to meet new people, exchange opinions, and improve contacts for continuing the discussions.

Since 2004 in Istanbul, the EAPC has been organizing a seminar on political campaigning prior to the annual conference. The Master Class, as this special event is called, is a seminar day during which the most distinguished professors impart their more than 250 years of combined experience in political campaigning to students and junior consultants.

Another important contribution of the EAPC to its goals mentioned before has been the regular publication of *Election Time,* the European yearbook of political campaigning that analyzes approximately 20 political campaigns in Europe in each year's edition. The yearbook, originally in English, has already been translated into German, Turkish, and Russian.

The board of the association is nominated and elected by the General Assembly every 2 years with a simple majority for a 2-year term of office. Organization presidents are elected for a 2-year term of office and cannot be reelected. The rest of the board (one to three vice presidents, a treasurer, an executive secretary, and a maximum of eight additional board members) may be reelected in consecutive years.

Association membership consists of political consultants, media consultants, pollsters, campaign managers, public affairs officers, professors, fundraisers, lobbyists, and congressional staffers and is open to everyone associated with politics from the local to national level in their respective countries. Because political consultants do not work exclusively for parties and candidates, a growing number of corporations, public interest groups, labor, and other entities interested in public policy are hiring political consultants as members of their public relations, public affairs, or advocacy teams. Such professionals are welcome at the association also.

José Manuel Talero-Garcia

See also American Association of Political Consultants; Consultants, Political; Media Consultants; Professionalization

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European Commission

The European Commission is one of the four principal institutions of the European Union (EU) and its constituent entities, the European Community (EC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the others being the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and the Council of the European Union. The commission is essentially the executive arm of the European Union, although it also has some legislative and judicial functions as well. The primary tasks of the commission include (a) the administration and implementation of EU and community policies and legislation, including formulation and spending of the

budget; (b) the initiation and drafting of community legislation; (c) the enforcement of EU and community law; and (d) representation of the EU and the communities at the international level, including negotiation of international treaties.

The commission as a body is composed of members called commissioners, who are citizens of and are nominated by the respective governments of each Member State. However, the commission is charged with representing the EU or community interest, not the interests of the Member States, and the commissioners are to act independently in that interest. Commissioners are expressly forbidden to take instructions from their Member State. Because of its responsibility to represent the European interest and enforce the treaties and legislation that provide the legal foundation for the EU and communities, the commission is known as the guardian of the treaties.

The commission is at present composed of one member from each of the 27 Member States: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Romania, and Bulgaria. In the future, the number of commissioners will be less than the number of Member States, so the Member States will nominate commissioners on a rotating basis.

A new commission is appointed every 5 years, within 6 months of the elections to the European Parliament, which occur in June. The procedure is that Member State governments jointly select a commission president, who is then approved by parliament. The commission president-designate, in discussion with the Member State governments, chooses the other members of the commission. The new parliament then interviews each member and gives its opinion on the new commission as a body. After approval, the commission officially begins its work. The present commission's term of office runs until October 31, 2009.

The commission is politically accountable to parliament, which has the power to dismiss the whole commission by adopting a motion of censure. Individual members of the commission must resign if asked to do so by the president, provided the other commissioners approve. The commission attends all the sessions of the European Parliament, and it must reply to written and oral questions posed by members of the parliament.

The commission is responsible for formulating regulations governing political parties at the European Parliament level and providing for public funding for the party campaigns for European Parliament.

Clifford A. Jones

See also Eurobarometer; European Court of Justice; European Parliament; European Union

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European Convention on Human Rights

The European Convention on Human Rights (or the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1950 to protect human rights. The Council of Europe, originally established in 1949 to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, consists today of 46 member countries across Europe. The convention establishes a European Court of Human Rights to monitor observance of the rights and freedoms secured in the convention (article 19).

The convention protects 13 specific rights ranging from the right to life (article 2) and a prohibition against torture (article 3) to a prohibition against slavery (article 4) and the right to liberty and security (article 5) and the right to a fair trial (article 6). The convention also specifically protects rights of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (article 9) and assembly and association (article 11).

At article 10 the Convention provides for the right to freedom of expression, which expressly includes the right to "hold opinions and to receive and impart information." In *Leander v. Sweden, Gaskin v. United Kingdom,* and *Guerra v. Italy,* the European Court has held that this article does not impose an obligation on government authorities and officials to release information to the public. The European Court has held the right to freedom of speech is an essential pillar of

democratic society which should be guaranteed not only for ideas that are "favorable," "inoffensive or indifferent" but also for offensive opinions that disturb the state or sectors of the population. This is required to allow tolerance and openness, necessary in plural, democratic society, the court held in the case of *Scharsach and News Verlagsgessellschaft v. Austria.*

The right to freedom of expression is bounded by "restrictions and penalties" that are "prescribed by law" and are "necessary in a democratic society." The European Court has held that "necessary" is not a synonym for "indispensable" but implies the "existence of an important social need." It is not enough to show that the need is "useful," "reasonable," or "opportune," the court declared in the case of *Barthold v. Germany.*

Under the Convention the right to freedom of expression can be proscribed "for the protection of the reputation or rights of others." The European Court has held there is greater room for criticism in the case of the politician than in the case of private individuals. It is inevitable that a public person would be subject to rigorous scrutiny, the court said, not only by the judiciary and legislature but also by the press and public opinion. Thus, although the right to reputation protects all people including politicians in their private roles, this should be balanced with an interest in open debate on political matters.

Roxanne Watson

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European Court of Justice

The European Court of Justice is the highest court of that entity known as the European Union (EU) or the European Community (EC). The EU includes the EC and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and formerly included the now-expired (1952 to 2002) European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Each of these entities was created by an international treaty, and the European Court of Justice is one of the institutions common to the EU, the EC, and EURATOM.

The European Court of Justice is a supranational court distinct from a court of one of the EU Member States. Its purpose is to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the various component treaties and legislation, the law is observed. The European Court of Justice gives judgments on issues of EC or EU law, not on questions of national law of individual countries, except to the extent it may refer to national law in order to decide the question of community law. The Court of Justice often is asked to determine whether provisions of a national law are compatible with EC or EU law.

The court system of the European Union includes in descending order, the European Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, and the Civil Service Tribunal. Unlike in some other international courts, the judgments of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance are binding in each Member State and have primacy or supremacy over the laws of the Member States in those fields of law to which its rulings apply.

From January 1, 2007, the Member States of the EU include, in order of accession, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Romania, and Bulgaria.

The European Court of Justice hears appeals from the Court of First Instance and direct actions by a Member State against another Member State, or another EC or EU institution such as the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, or the European Parliament. Decisions of the European Commission are appealed first to the Court of First Instance and may then be further appealed to the Court of Justice. A very important aspect of its jurisdiction is that it hears proceedings called preliminary references made from the national courts of the Member States on questions of EC or EU law.

Preliminary references take the form of questions put to the court by judges of national courts when they consider that the application of EU or EC law is

necessary for their decision on a matter before them. Such preliminary references are submitted by national court judges to the Court of Justice, which gives an answer to the question of EC or EU law sufficiently so that the national court is then able to decide the case before it.

The European Court of Justice considers cases involving regulation of political parties or elections in connection with elections to the European Parliament.

Clifford A. Jones

See also European Commission; European Parliament; European Union

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European Parliament

The European Parliament (EP) is one of three bodies of the European Union (EU) involved in its legislative process. The members of the EP were determined by the national parliaments until direct elections were introduced in 1979. Since then, EP members are elected by the people in the Member States in the European elections that are held every 5 years. Since the last European elections and after 10 new Member States joined the EU in 2004, the European Parliament was composed of 732 members. With the most recent enlargement and two more countries accessioned on January 1, 2007, the number of members of the EP rose to 785. Following a graded system, the Member States are assigned different numbers of seats in the EP according to the size of their population. While the minimum number of seats is five (Malta) and six (Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg) for the smallest countries, Germany can fill 99 seats and the other big countries (France, Italy, United Kingdom) 78 seats each.

Due to the nature of the European elections, with candidates running on national party lists, often running more nationally oriented than European campaigns and being elected by the national electorates, the EP is not a real European body, although it is the only one with a direct democratic legitimacy. Once elected, the Members of the EP unite in supranational party fractions which determine their stance on issues and thus their voting behavior in the EP instead of their national origin. Currently, seven fractions exist in the EP (e.g., the Group of the European People's Party [Christian Democrats] and European Democrats, the Socialist Group, the Group of the Greens). The EP is headed by a president who is elected by the Members of the European Parliament for a term of 2½ years. The EP has its seat in Strasbourg (France), but some of its sessions are held in Brussels (Belgium).

Always having been the weakest of the three bodies, the EP has gained in power over the years whenever the treaty was amended. Today, the parliament takes part in the legislative process, particularly through the co-decision process that it shares with the European Council. In addition, the EP shares budgetary power with the council, examining and adopting the budget. The European Commission is accountable to the EP. The EP is also involved in the selection of the president of the Commission and the Commission as a whole needs the consent of the EP. The EP also has the right to force the Commission to resign through a vote of no-confidence.

Again and again, the EP and its committees have provided the impetus for new legislative initiatives, calling upon the Commission to deal with certain issues and take the steps of the legislative process. For instance, it was mainly the EP which made the Commission become active in the field of media policy in the early 1980s and has put its stamp on it by taking up a more cultural than economic perspective on broadcasting.

Christina Holtz-Bacha

See also European Parliamentary Elections; European Union; European Union, Media Policy; Second-Order Election

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European Parliamentary Elections

European elections were held for the first time in 1979. They determine the members of the European Parliament (EP), which is one of the most important institutions of the European Union (EU). Until 1979, the members of the EP were delegates of the national parliaments. The decision to introduce direct elections was driven by the idea of further integration and involving citizens in the European integration process.

European elections are held every 5 years. They take place at the same time in all EU Member States within 4 days. Voters in the Member States cast their votes according to national election laws, meaning there is no supranational European law harmonizing the electoral process. Accordingly, voters cast their votes for national parties and candidates. Thus, the members of the EP are not European politicians but represent their individual countries. Therefore, campaigning for the European elections also takes place at the national level. Analyses of the campaigns have shown that primarily national issues dominate the agendas of the parties and the media. Depending on the date of the European elections in relation to the national election cycle, European elections often become a test election for the incumbent national government. Voters have used their vote in the European election for protesting against current national politics and the established parties, or even to strengthen those parties that do not support their countries' involvement in the European Union. As a consequence, smaller parties that only play a minor role on the national level have made their way into the EP or gained importance through their engagement in European politics before they were accepted by the electorate at the national level. Because of the comparatively weak position of the EP in the European political process and the assumed small impact on their individual lives, European elections have been regarded as second-order elections from the beginning. Average (all European) voter turnout in the first direct election in 1979 was 63% (in then nine Member States, driven up by countries with compulsory voting) and fell to 45.6% in 2004 (25 Member States).

Although the unique event lends itself to internationally comparative research on the role of the media in election campaigns, the European elections have not drawn as much attention of researchers as do national elections. Only on the occasion of the first direct election was a cross-comparative and multimethod study on the role of television in the then-nine Member States conducted (see Blumler, 1983), an exemplary case of international cooperation that could not be repeated.

Christina Holtz-Bacha

See also European Parliament; European Union; Second-Order Election

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European Union

The European Union (EU) is a multinational democratic entity that consists of 27 Member States. There have been six periods of enlargement in the growth of the EU, and the largest occurred on May 1, 2004, when 10 states joined the existing 15. The most recent expansion was on January 1, 2007, when Bulgaria and Romania were accessioned. The current Member States of the EU are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

With such growth, there have been numerous issues of concern as well as the promise of an integrated Europe. One major area is that of language barriers and the need for the EU to spend much time and resources on translation in order to facilitate communication among its diverse membership. Presently, the EU has 23 official and working languages. These languages are Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Irish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish, and Swedish. German is the most widely spoken mother

tongue, followed by English, French, and Italian. English is widely acknowledged as the de facto official common language of the EU.

Historically, the European Economic Community, or the Common Market, was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and was implemented January 1, 1958. It then evolved into the European Community. The EU was officially formed when the Maastricht Treaty was signed on February 7, 1992. It was created as a supranational entity with the goal of creating a common market among its Member States. Therefore, the EU was responsible for the administration of the customs union, the Common Agricultural Policy, and the Common Fisheries Policy. Also, the EU has extended its original tasks to include a broader range of common policies, such as road safety, culture, transportation, and the environment.

The continuation of a developing EU has created what is called the Eurozone, and this major democratic entity is continuing to evolve and expand. Currently recognized member candidates are Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey. Potential member candidates are Albania, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia. According to the EU Treaty, each Member State, and the EU Parliament, must agree to any enlargement.

For a nation-state to join the EU, it must fulfill economic and political conditions generally known as the Copenhagen criteria. These standards are set forth to maintain democratic government, standard rule of law, and corresponding freedoms. Despite these criteria, some critics are concerned about Europe losing not only its identity but also its common standards. For example, much concern arose over the accessioning of Cyprus in 2004, which divided Greek and Turkish parts of this nation. The Cyprus issue illustrated a ferment in EU growth that will undoubtably continue to prove problematic with the plans for the accession of Turkey. While the EU is a secular body, it is largely one whose members' religion is Christianity. The accessioning of Turkey is argued to be problematic due to religious differences—and because only a small part of Turkish territory is considered to be European territory.

While the EU Parliament does not have a great deal of direct power, it serves as a democratic watchdog over other EU institutions. The EU Member States are guided by a series of mandates for foreign policy and security. However, individual Member States are allowed to develop and follow their own foreign policies. EU guidelines require its Member States to follow the United Nations Charter and to uphold human rights.

In May 2004, the EU became what is now widely acknowledged as the largest democratic body in the world when it accessioned 10 new countries. This expansion of the 15 existing members to 25 brought into the EU many countries that only 15 years earlier were under the communist domination of the former Soviet Union. For the accessioning countries, as well as the 15 existing members of the EU, the 2004 elections marked the first opportunity for the selection of representatives to the new and enlarged European Parliament. These elections were held from June 10 to June 13, 2004.

With this growth, the EU has faced what some consider an identity crisis of sorts, and it is unclear to many citizens whether the EU is a military, political, symbolic, or economic entity. It appears that the clearest function of the EU is an economic one, and its main purpose is to create a unified European market. One widely recognized product of the EU is the development of the cross-national Euro currency. While it is used in 13 Member States, others have rejected its use for various reasons including the desire to maintain a national identity and not just a European one.

This division is evidenced by actions on October 29, 2004, when EU Member State heads of government signed a treaty to establish a general constitution for all members of the EU. The constitution was later ratified by 17 EU Member States, but largely the ratification was due to parliamentary action, instead of popular vote. The path to a EU Constitution faced major obstacles on May 29, 2005, when French voters rejected the constitution. This defeat was followed shortly thereafter by failure in the Netherlands. The ability to pass, and enforce, the EU constitution across all Member States remains uncertain.

In addition to the problem of EU skepticism and some resistance to an integrated and an ever-expanding Europe is the issue of voter participation. Beginning with the first election for a European-wide parliamentary body in 1979, these elections have been considered "second-order elections" in which citizens have little at stake. The organization in which the winners of the election will participate is remote from the citizens and perceived to be of little daily relevance. Consequently, voter apathy and low turnout have characterized the EU parliamentary elections and set the stage for party campaigns that attract limited media attention and focus more often on domestic concerns in each

country, rather than on European-wide policies. Fighting voter apathy and raising the stakes for citizens in Member States has been a long-term struggle in European-level elections.

Nonetheless, the EU has become a powerful entity that influences trade negotiations, aid agreements, and border control. It also has the ability to impose sanction and arms embargos. As the EU continues to develop its policies and improve its internal and external communication, it will have the opportunity to flex the muscles of the superpower it is capable of becoming.

Andrew Paul Williams

See also Eurobarometer; European Convention on Human Rights; European Court of Justice; European Parliament; European Union, Media Policy

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European Union, Media Policy

The European Union (EU), or the European Community (EC), has long been active in the field of the media. Whether these activities can be called media policy in the sense of a systematic regulation is at least open for discussion. However, the many-fold actions have a major impact on media regulation in the EU Member States and by now even seem to have forced them onto the defensive in this regard. The increasing relevance of the media in European politics is also reflected by the fact that, since 2004, the Commission has had its own Commissioner for Information Society and Media (Viviane Reding from Luxembourg).

Media-related activities started around 1980 and were at first mainly initiated by the European Parliament (EP). The first EP election (1979) had shown that the idea of a unified Europe not only remained abstract for the people in the Member States, but also that the image of the European institutions was vague if not negative. While at the same time new technologies were introduced that allowed for television to cross borders, the EP prepared several reports and passed resolutions that criticized the current EC information policy and called for using television to promote the European idea. This also referred to examining the possibility of establishing a European television channel. In 1982, five members of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) started *Eurikon,* a TV channel that was to test the feasibility of a joint venture in European television. However, the 6 months of its operation clearly demonstrated the problems of such an undertaking among which the financing and the language turned out to be the most difficult. When a similar project (*Europa TV*) was started in 1985, the experiences were not much different, and it was closed down in 1986.

While the EP hoped for the integrating power of television, the European Commission became convinced that cross-border television provoked the need for a common European regulation. At that time, the Member States had heterogeneous laws regulating their broadcasting markets (e.g., advertising regulations), and programs broadcast from one country to another either had to respect different standards or violate them. In order to allow for the free movement of goods, services, capital, and the freedom of establishment on the EC Internal Market, the European Commission started to discuss the homogenization of

regulations for broadcasting. From the beginning, it was much disputed whether the community had the competence to deal with broadcasting, which was often regarded as a cultural product in the Member States and not so much as a commercial commodity. The Member States reserve the legal competence for the field of culture mostly to themselves. The European Commission instead relied on a decision of the European Court of Justice in 1974 (Sacchi case), which had declared broadcasting should be considered as a service and broadcasting corporations as companies.

The most decisive step in European media policy was undertaken with the adoption of the Television Without Frontiers (TWF) Directive in 1989. This was prepared by an Interim Report in 1983 and the TWF Green Book in 1984. Unlike the original plan, the directive only pertained to television and did not include radio. The regulation is based on the general rule that all Member States must ensure the freedom of reception and will not restrict the retransmission on their territories of television broadcasts from other Member States. Individual broadcasters fall under the jurisdiction of that country where the decisions about their programming are taken and where its management is situated. Each Member State makes sure that the broadcasters comply with the TWF regulation.

The directive brought common rules for television advertising, protection of minors, and the right of reply and introduced a quota for European works. The rules of the directive had to be implemented in the Member States within 2 years. Other than the general doubts concerning the right of the community to become active in the field of television, the quota was the most controversial item of the directive. With the aim to support and foster the European audiovisual industry, the directive rules that more than 50% of the programs (except news, sports programs, and game shows) have to be works of European origin and 10% of the program or 10% of the program budget has to be allocated for independent productions. Although this caused international disputes over protectionism (particularly on the part of the United States) to be put on the agenda of the GATT/GATS talks (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/General Agreement on Trade in Services) and later the World Trade Organization, some Member States interpreted the quota as an unacceptable intervention into the program autonomy of the broadcasting stations. The regular reports of the European Commission on compliance with the quota, however, show that the stations adhere to the quota satisfactorily.

As a supplementary instrument for fostering the European audiovisual industry, the European Community in 1991 started its MEDIA program with diverse measures to support the distribution and promotion of European films and training initiatives. In addition to strengthening European film production, the quota and the MEDIA program are thought to further the integration of the EU Member States through the exchange of films from one country to the other. The latest (and fourth) MEDIA program, which will run until 2013, was launched in 2007 (MEDIA 2007).

The TWF Directive was amended in 1997, mostly in order to react to new developments in television advertising, sponsoring, and teleshopping and to clarify their regulation. The most important innovation of the 1997 amendment was a provision to ensure free access of the public to major events. Under the new regulation, Member States attained the right to draw up lists with events "of major importance for society" that are to be broadcast on free TV channels. Several countries have used this option and listed mainly sports events. The result was that these events are not allowed to be shown on pay-TV exclusively.

In December 2005, the European Commission presented a proposal for another amendment of the directive which is supposed to be adopted at the end of 2007. Because of the technical convergence and the fact that by now the same content is delivered through different technical channels, the new Audiovisual Media Services (AMS) Directive will cover all media services. It distinguishes linear and nonlinear services. Linear services are those where the provider decides about the time of the transmission of a specific program as well as the program schedule (traditional television). Nonlinear services are provided on-demand (e.g., video-on-demand). Because of the control an individual user can exercise over nonlinear services and because of their lesser impact on society, the new AMS Directive will apply only basic rules for nonlinear services (as, e.g., provision of certain information of the origin of the service, protection of minors, basic regulation for commercial communications). Linear services, instead, will underlie additional rules similar to those contained in the old TWF Directive. The restrictions for advertising will be relaxed. As before, product placement will be forbidden, but Member States have the possibility to allow this form of advertising under certain conditions. Another innovation will be a provision ensuring linear services the right to short news reporting about events of major interest to society.

While the TWF Directive is based on the Internal Market articles of the EC Treaty, the European Commission refers to the (general) antitrust articles (81, 82) of the EC Treaty for other activities in the field of the media. These prohibit agreements and decisions of undertakings or concerted practices that may restrict or distort competition within the common market as well as abuse of a dominant market position. Concentration is controlled according to the EC Merger Regulation which, however, is a general law on mergers and therefore does not consider the specificities of the media market (pluralism; small and midsize companies). Although the EP has again and again called for measures to deal with media concentration at the European level, the European Commission has never come to grips with a Concentration Directive. The argument for the reluctance to this point is the heterogeneity of national concentration regulation and, although not officially stated, the resistance of the Member States.

Another article of the rules on competition of the Treaty has recently played a prominent role among the media-related activities of the European Commission. Article 87 of the EC Treaty prohibits all aids granted by Member States that may distort competition. Since the early 1990s, several commercial broadcasters had filed complaints and the European Commission had to examine whether the financing of public service broadcasting by fees was to be regarded as state aid and, if so, whether these aids threatened competition between public and commercial broadcasters. The European Commission at first dealt with these complaints reluctantly but was pushed by the European Court of Justice to become active. While the Commission was convinced that the broadcasting fees constitute state aids, their legitimateness became strongly disputed. Thus under pressure, the public service broadcasters hinted at exemptions for "undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest" (as laid down in Article 86(2) of the treaty).

As the debate about the role of public service broadcasting in the Member States continued, the European Council, at its meeting in Amsterdam in 1997, decided to add a protocol on public service broadcasting to the treaty (Amsterdam Protocol). It stressed the significance that Member States assign to their public service broadcasters and affirmed their competence concerning remit and funding. This was again underlined by a Council resolution on public broadcasting released in early 1999.

Accordingly, in 2001, the European Commission released its "Communication on the Application of State Aid Rules to Public Service Broadcasting" which was to provide for a common scheme to be employed for assessing the existence of state aid on a case-by-case basis and to determine whether the aids are compatible with the common market. The communication emphasized the role of services of general economic interest in attaining the fundamental objectives of the EU but put up several conditions for Article 86(2) to be applicable: an official definition of the public service mandate, which has to be entrusted to one or more broadcasters by an official act. While the European Commission acknowledged that the decision about the financing of public broadcasters lies in the powers of the Member States, it also reserved the right to verify that the aid does not adversely affect competition. The communication also emphasized the obligation of public undertakings to clearly separate their public service and non–public service activities and the respective accounting, as also laid down in the EU Transparency Directive. On these grounds, the Commission examined the activities of public broadcasters in several Member States and in some cases concluded that financing exceeded what was necessary for the fulfillment of the public service task and imposed redemptions.

The general problem with media-related activities in the EU is its confinement to the economic perspective. Because the community does not have much competence in the field of culture every step has to be grounded in and legitimated by the provisions of the Treaty which still shows the origin of the EU as an economic community. Until recently, the EU did not have a fundamental rights catalogue and, because the European Court of Justice often had to deal with cases pertaining to the media, they therefore relied on Article 10 of the European Human Rights Convention of the Council of Europe. At its meeting in Nizza in 2000, the European Council proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was to become part of the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe but that currently is on hold. Nevertheless, the European Court of Justice already refers to the fundamental rights laid down in the charter and to Article 11 that contains freedom of the media. In the long run, this may change the perspective that the EU institutions have on the media and make the cultural side of the media an equal part of their thinking.

Christina Holtz-Bacha

See also European Commission; European Court of Justice; European Parliament; European Union

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E-Voting

E-voting stands for electronic voting. It refers to the process of casting an electronic ballot and generally encompasses a wide range of electronic technology, including telephones, cable, and computers. Internet voting, or I-voting, refers more specifically to the process of casting an electronic ballot that is transmitted to election officials via the Internet.

Interest in electronic voting increased following the dramatic events of Election Day 2000 when concerns over the integrity of the U.S. electoral system arose from the uncertainty over whom had won the presidential election. Over a month passed before Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore conceded the election to Republican George W. Bush. During that month, the Florida recount of the presidential vote brought to the fore the untidy reality of punch card voting involving hanging, dimpled, and pregnant chads that made it difficult to determine with certainty for whom a ballot had been cast. In 2002, the Help America Vote Act was passed by Congress to provide funds to replace vintage voting systems (i.e., punch card systems). The law authorized Congress to make more than $3 billion available to state and federal agencies to improve election systems.

Many states rushed to reform their voting systems by adopting various forms of electronic voting machines as a replacement to traditional punch card systems. During the 2006 general election when many of these new voting systems were implemented, criticisms of these systems arose. Possible problems with e-voting systems include software programming errors, machines freezing, new forms of human errors, and attacks made by hackers. To date, it is unclear whether these systems merit suspicion or whether many of the problems associated with e-voting stem from poll workers insufficiently trained with the new equipment and voter unfamiliarity with machines. For example, in Florida's 13th Congressional District in the November 2006 election, 18,000 votes supposedly went missing. It is unclear whether people did not vote or whether the touch-screen systems did not record the votes. The missing votes could have been consequential, as the Republican candidate won the election with only 368 more votes than his Democratic opponent.

Elderly voters cast their ballots on the new touch-screen electronic voting machines in the Century Village retirement community in Palm Beach County, November 2, 2004. Palm Beach County was one of the centers of controversy in Florida during the 2000 election.

Source: Getty Images.

The four major companies providing electronic voting systems are Diebold, Election Systems & Software, Hart InterCivic, and Sequoia Voting Systems. Voting software is considered proprietary and therefore citizens cannot check to see if the machines are working correctly, placing trust in the companies that have designed the systems.

Voting practices are determined by state and local jurisdictions, although some people are calling for uniform federal standards. Some states do not require paper records to verify vote counts made from electronic machines (voter-verified paper audit trails, or VVPAT). A little less than half, or 22, states use systems with VVPAT. Even with paper audit trails

in place, it is possible that difficulties will emerge due to problems such as paper jams from printers, which could lead to undercounts of electronic votes.

Kate Kenski

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EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES

See METHODOLOGY

F

Face-to-Face Communication

See Interpersonal Communication

Fahrenheit 9/11

See Film and Politics

Fairness Doctrine

One of the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) most controversial policies, the Fairness Doctrine obligated U.S. broadcast licensees to seek out and present contrasting viewpoints on controversial issues of interest to the community in which the license was held. The commission reasoned if such programs were aired in sufficient amounts by a licensee, then the public interest, convenience, and necessity (PICN) would be better served, thus improving the likelihood for license renewal. The goal of the Fairness Doctrine was to foster discussion of important community issues, but it was ultimately set aside by the FCC because it was said to contravene that goal.

Set forth as FCC policy in 1949, the commission declared:

> Radio [must] be maintained as a medium of free speech for the general public as a whole rather than as an outlet for the purely personal or private interests of the licensee. This requires that licensees devote a reasonable percentage of their broadcasting time to the discussion of public issues of interest in the community served by their stations and that such programs be designed so that the public has a reasonable opportunity to hear different opposing positions.

The Fairness Doctrine appeared to gain statutory status in 1959 when Congress amended Section 315 of the Act (which exempted legally qualified political candidates appearing in bona fide news programs from equal time requirements):

> Nothing in [this amendment to the Communications Act of 1934] shall be construed as relieving broadcasters . . . from the obligation imposed upon them . . . to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine in its *Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC* decision, June 9, 1969: "The Fairness Doctrine . . . and political editorializing regulations are a legitimate exercise of congressionally delegated authority."

In the years after *Red Lion,* broadcasters claimed the policy had an inverse effect; rather than fostering debate, it "chilled" discussion of controversial issues such that broadcasters avoided controversy, fearful that they would be required to air opposing viewpoints, thus losing available commercial airtime. In 1984, Fairness Doctrine critics and a sympathetic FCC began gathering information to support a change,

and the FCC soon announced that, although it would not repeal the Fairness Doctrine, it no longer served the public interest, and in 1987 the FCC announced it would no longer enforce the policy. Congress attempted unsuccessfully to enact the Fairness Doctrine into law in 1988, and the D.C. Court of Appeals ordered the FCC to repeal the final corollaries to the Fairness Doctrine in October 2000.

Robert Gobetz

See also Communications Act of 1934

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Falklands-Malvinas War

The Falklands-Malvinas War took place from April until June 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom. From Argentina's side, it was a struggle for recovering a long-demanded sovereignty of these South Atlantic islands. For the United Kingdom, it was a response to Argentina's invasion of British territory. The war culminated in British victory. The conflict embodied a significant event for war communication because despite the development and availability of technologically sophisticated global media, the geographical hindrances allowed each country control over the information given to its citizens.

At the time of the war, Argentina was ruled by a military dictatorship that had begun to lose momentum. The dictatorship's decline resulted from national objections to economic mismanagement as well as internal and external disapproval of human rights violations. In Great Britain, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was losing support. After the war, the military government in Argentina resigned, and constitutional elections were called. Meanwhile, opinions of Thatcher improved and facilitated her reelection in 1983.

The Falklands-Malvinas War is considered a communication conflict particularly because the distant location made for difficult live transmissions. Except for the few inhabitants of the islands, the events became real for the world, including the belligerent countries' populations, exclusively through media coverage and government statements. Consequently, the possibilities for manipulation and censorship were high, and both sides provided their constituencies with incomplete or false information.

There were shortcomings in the diplomacy and crisis management not only caused by the involved parties but also by the international community. Mediation attempts presented by the United Nations, the U.S. secretary of state, the Organization of American States, and the president of Peru failed. Although the European Community and the United States announced economic sanctions against Argentina, the majority of Latin American nations approved the country's claim.

The military government in Argentina used the advantages of the location and their control over national media. The first pictures and commentaries on the war seen by the world came from Argentina. The sinking of the ship *Belgrano* outside the war operations zone briefly brought the international public opinion to Argentina's side. Also, the sinking of the British destroyer *Sheffield* was presented successfully as a consequence of the Argentine possession of more powerful weapons. When the situation turned more favorable for Britain, the propaganda machine of the Argentine government manipulated the facts into suitable interpretations that preserved the optimistic national public opinion until the end. From the British side, no centralized propaganda campaign existed. The British media were theoretically free to publish their points of view. However, the U.K. government did not facilitate access to information for foreign journalists, and the national media complained after the conflict about the news distribution from governmental departments.

Malvina Rodriguez

See also War Coverage

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Fantasy Theme Analysis

Developed primarily by Ernest G. Bormann, fantasy theme analysis is a method of rhetorical investigation, designed to detect and describe the presence of group consciousness, or what Bormann called *symbolic convergence.* First introduced in a 1972 publication, symbolic convergence theory attempts to account for the development of a group mind through "dramatizing" or the dramatic sharing of narratives among group members. Bormann called these communal narratives "fantasies" and argued that such cooperative story-telling would enhance group cohesion and encourage the cultivation of a convergent point of view. Thus, a fantasy provides group members with symbolic common ground and, by extension, a shared social identity.

Emanating from both the social scientific and humanistic traditions of communication scholarship, fantasy theme analysis is often characterized as a bridge between these sometimes discordant lines of research. The social scientific component of fantasy theme analysis derives from the research conducted by Robert F. Bales and his Harvard associates on small group dynamics in the 1960s. A coding system was developed to enable them to apply content analysis techniques to group communication. They observed the process of dramatizing a narrative and the chain reaction that followed as group members interacted with excitement. Drawing upon Freudian thought, they described the phenomenon as group fantasizing and noted that it heightened group cohesion. Bales published these findings in a 1970 book titled *Personality and Interpersonal Behavior.*

The humanistic component of fantasy theme analysis emerged from the small group research of Bormann and his associates at the University of Minnesota, also in the 1960s. They too used content analysis, as well as journaling, interviewing, and recordings, to analyze small group interactions. In addition to these social scientific methods, however, the Bormann group also used rhetorical criticism to study the persuasive tactics of task-oriented groups. When the Bales research was published, the Bormann group recognized that the Bales approach to analyzing group fantasies was a form of rhetorical criticism. The Bormann group then set out to reproduce the findings of Bales's research and further investigate the occurrence of group fantasizing. Symbolic convergence theory evolved subsequently from fantasy research as a means to describe the emergence of group consciousness.

In order for a fantasy to emerge, a group member will "dramatize" or share a story that excites a response in the other members of the group. This excitement ignites a chain reaction in which group members begin to expand the original narrative, collaboratively refining and constructing the story in response to one another. Thus, the initial dramatization "chains out" among group members, generating a fantasy. Bormann used *fantasy* as a technical term within the confines of symbolic convergence theory, not as the word is used in everyday conversation—that is, it does not refer simply to the imaginary. Notably, a fantasy is always set in some other place and some other time, never the "here and now." The specific content of this communal narrative, including its characters and plot, is called a *fantasy theme*. A fantasy theme then is the most basic manifestation of symbolic convergence; it provides evidence that group members have created a common understanding of some aspect of their experience.

Bormann noted that a fantasy theme is a group's *interpretation* of ideas or events, a collective attempt to assign meaning to the world around them. As such, fantasy themes enable participants to account for their ideas and experiences in a way that is palatable to the group mind and serves the needs of its members. In constructing their shared reality, group members often fabricate details, interweaving the fanciful with the factual to produce an account that is satisfactory to all.

With the emergence of a group mind via a fantasy theme comes the increased potential for the chaining out of additional fantasies. Each subsequent fantasy theme will often follow a similar plotline as its predecessors, and these recurrent scenarios can then be sorted into fantasy types. These categories serve as a shortcut for the creation of new fantasies, because the previous stories provide group members with a selection of scripts to emulate. Thus, the group is able to continually integrate new experiences into the shared

consciousness they have already established through prior collaborative fantasizing.

As a group generates multiple fantasy themes, its members will usually invent *symbolic cues,* or shorthand references to a previously shared fantasy or fantasy type. Comparable to evoking an inside joke, these cues are unintelligible to outsiders but are designed to induce insiders to respond as they did when the fantasy was first shared. A symbolic cue can be a code word or phrase or even a gesture, any brief allusion that reminds group members of a particular fantasy or type. The emergence of both fantasy types and symbolic cues offers confirmation that symbolic convergence has developed. Bormann noted that the implementation of an experiment is not essential to fantasy theme analysis, because historical documents and resources can often provide evidence for the existence of fantasy types and symbolic cues.

When a large number of people share a multitude of fantasy themes, they often compile the various narratives over time, creating a broader worldview, or *rhetorical vision*. This vision is a collaborative construction of reality, a means for participants to understand and evaluate the circumstances around them in keeping with the group mind. Those who subscribe to the vision comprise a "rhetorical community" and are united, not necessarily by physical proximity but by a common point of view. The vision they share will usually be consolidated under a "master analogue" or guiding purpose, which can fall into one of three categories: pragmatic, emphasizing practicality; social, highlighting the relational; and righteous, evoking a higher cause. Bormann cites the cold war, black power, and the silent majority as examples of rhetorical visions in recent U.S. history.

Bormann noted that an individual can subscribe to multiple rhetorical visions and consequently belong to more than one rhetorical community. Accordingly, membership in a rhetorical community can be official or unofficial, short-lived or long-term. A long-standing community like an organization will usually be united by a *saga*, a specific type of rhetorical vision that illuminates the group's origins and founders, customs and heroes, fundamental values and ultimate purpose for existence. The saga is perpetuated with the creation of icons, rituals and regular celebrations, all designed to help communities' members "keep the faith."

Although it originated in small group research, fantasy theme analysis has been broadened since its formulation in the 1960s and 1970s and, over the last 3 decades, has been applied to communication at any level, from interpersonal to public to mass. Bormann explained that a fantasy can chain out among a larger public in much the same way that it would in a small group. In addition, a form of public address and/or the mass media could easily propagate a rhetorical vision, therefore uniting substantial portions of the population into rhetorical communities. In light of this, Bormann characterized symbolic convergence as a general theory of communication and fantasy theme analysis as a method of research for interpersonal, group, organizational, public, and mass communication.

Bormann offered an example of fantasy theme analysis in his seminal 1972 publication, analyzing the rhetorical vision advanced by 17th-century Puritan ministers of the Massachusetts Bay colony. He likened the vision that sustained them through the deprivation and hardship of existence in the new world to the exodus of the Jews from Egypt to the promised land. By infusing their struggles with religious significance, preachers like John Cotton gave their congregations hope and purpose in an otherwise bleak situation.

In 1973, Bormann presented a fantasy theme analysis of the 1972 presidential campaign's notorious Eagleton Affair, in which presidential hopeful George McGovern selected Senator Thomas Eagleton as running mate. Eagleton subsequently withdrew from the race when rumors of his past psychiatric hospitalizations surfaced in the press, raising questions about McGovern's judgment. Bormann analyzed how multiple fantasies, spurred on by extensive media coverage, chained out among the American electorate as this story unfolded.

In 1985, Bormann published *The Force of Fantasy,* a book-length case study of the American dream as a recurrent and ever-evolving rhetorical vision in pre-civil war America. He identified four periods of development—namely, the pre-revolutionary Puritan revivals, the great awakening, the frontier era, and advent of the Free Soil and Republican parties—corresponding to four rhetorical communities who each propagated a vision of restoring the American dream. Here, public address played a vital role in the chaining out of a rhetorical vision.

Bormann joined John F. Cragan and Donald C. Shields in 1994 to examine the cold war paradigm as a rhetorical vision. Of particular interest were the various stages in the life cycle of this vision (and, by extension, any rhetorical vision). The cold war, they argued, offered a unique opportunity to explore the inception,

expansion, propagation, decline, and demise of an especially prominent rhetorical vision. They identified three stages common to all rhetorical visions: "consciousness-creating" (the creation and ongoing revision of a group mind, which continues throughout the life of the vision), "consciousness-raising" (intended specifically to attract new members), and "consciousness-sustaining" (the renewal of the group mind, intended to maintain the commitment of members).

Also in 1994, Bormann, Cragan, and Shields published a defense of symbolic convergence theory and fantasy theme analysis, refuting the most persistent criticisms of the theory and its methodological premises. The term *fantasy* has particularly frustrated critics who claim that the word causes confusion because it is intended to describe both the rational and the fanciful elements of a shared narrative. In addition, critics have charged that symbolic convergence merely re-labels concepts borrowed from other theories, needlessly complicating research. In response, Bormann et al. argue that all communicative phenomena need not be condensed under one set of universal terminology and that findings drawn from symbolic convergence and fantasy theme research could not be replicated under any other theoretical framework. Critics have also claimed that a theory based on Freudian thought cannot be applied in studies outside the realm of small group communication, an indictment that Bormann et al. dismissed by citing the abundance and variety of research that the sharing of fantasies has inspired.

Over the past 30 years, fantasy theme analysis has stimulated dozens of studies on a wide array of subjects and encompassing a range of mediums within the domain of communication. In recent years, symbolic convergence theory has continued to inspire researchers to undertake fantasy theme analysis. Csapo-Sweet and Shields used fantasy theme analysis to explore the use of sagas on Serbia's Radio B92. Palenchar and Heath demonstrated the versatility of fantasy theme analysis by applying it to their examination of competing rhetorical visions in risk communication. Stone investigated the rhetorical visions adopted by newly admitted graduate students during the selection of a program of study. Duffy explored the persuasive potential of rhetorical visions presented by hate groups on their Web sites. Aleman used fantasy theme analysis to analyze romantic narratives found on the discussion boards of SeniorNet. From Alcoholics Anonymous to Mister Rogers, from political cartoons to romance novels and public relations to politics, fantasy theme analysis has continually demonstrated that it is both highly effective and virtually indispensable to communication research.

Arin Rose Dickerson

See also Bormann, Ernest; Symbolic Convergence Theory

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Fear Appeals, Use in Politics

The logical fallacy of *argumentum ad metam* or *argumentum in terrorem,* more commonly known as the fear appeal, has been studied scientifically since World War II. This type of emotional appeal in the political arena consists of threatening or arousing dread or anxiety in order to gain support for one's cause or candidate. Fear appeals have been described by political communication scholars Lynda Lee Kaid and Ann Johnston as appeals that suggest a negative consequence will result if the opponent is elected or, alternatively, if the sponsoring candidate is not elected. Their research has found that 32% of all negative ads use fear appeals—significantly higher than the percentage found in positive spots. In fact, in the 1988 presidential race, a full 75% of the ads sponsored

by the Bush and Dukakis campaigns contained fear appeals.

Perhaps the most infamous example of a fear appeal in a modern-day campaign is what has come to be known as the "Daisy Girl" ad. Brainchild of Madison Avenue's Tony Schwartz and sponsored by the Democrats in the 1964 presidential campaign, the black-and-white ad opens on a girl, perhaps 6 years old, pulling off and counting a daisy's petals. When she reaches ten, a faceless announcer counts down, "Ten, nine, eight . . ." At zero, an extreme close-up zooms directly into the child's eye as a mushroom cloud erupts within it. Johnson's voice echoes, "We must love each other, or we must die," appealing to cold war viewers' fears of nuclear attack and inferring that his opponent, Barry Goldwater, if elected, would lead the nation to realizing those fears. The shocking yet powerful ad was pulled after just one viewing. However, it has remained an historical icon of political fear appeals.

Scientific scholarship regarding fear's effects began during World War II, when the U.S. military first turned to mass media technology to keep U.S. soldiers from falling prey to enemy propaganda or their own vices and to indoctrinate them into military life. Yale scholar Carl Hovland and several other psychologists were hired by the War Department to assess the effects of the new mass-mediated military efforts, including films like the *Why We Fight* series, directed by Frank Capra of *It's a Wonderful Life* fame.

Two of the Yale scholars, Janis and Feshbach, published findings which showed that fear appeals are nonmonotonic (i.e., their effectiveness does not increase as the level of fear garnered from the audience via the appeal increases). Conversely, their study found that the level of anxiety produced by a fear appeal is actually indirectly proportional to its success in persuading the audience. In other words, a fear appeal which attempts to incite high levels of arousal through overly aggressive claims or imagery is actually less effective than one with mild or moderate fear appeals. Moreover, an overly strong appeal was found to actually bolster the audience member's defenses against the desired new attitude or behavior. A minimal to moderate fear appeal proved to yield the strongest persuasive force. Findings of the Janis and Feshbach study proved to be not only robust but enduring. One year after the initial treatments, differences remained in the attitude change reported in each of the treatment groups.

In addition to concerns that highly aggressive appeals may have negligible or even reverse effects, a second caveat for persuaders planning to utilize fear appeals is thus: Fear appeals are often short-lived. One study, in fact, found that participants' levels of fear decreased significantly within just 10 minutes of exposure to mildly or even moderately frightening message stimuli.

Further research has continued to address the question of strong versus mild fear appeals, and modern scholarship considers the initial findings somewhat naive, citing a need to investigate whether individual message and receiver variables impact the level of fear incited by a given appeal and the effects of that fear. For instance, studies show that fear appeals are less effective if the receiver feels helpless to act on limiting the harm threatened by the appeal, and they are more effective if they are attached to a message regarding specific steps the receiver might take to avoid or stop the harm from occurring.

A very small percentage of ads combine fear appeals with humorous ones (6%). One such ad warns of a Tyler, Texas, state senator who has "belly-landed" his private plane "not once, but twice." The ad claims, "If he can't get his wheels on the ground in Tyler, how's he gonna (sic) get his feet on the ground in Austin?" In light of findings regarding humor's power to aid recall and reduce negative reactions to strong attacks, the limitations of fear appeals might be circumvented via use of such mixed appeals.

Karla Hunter

See also Daisy Girl Ad; Negative Advertising

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Federal Communications Commission

See Communications Act of 1934

Federal Election Campaign Act

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) was the first serious attempt to regulate the raising and spending of money in U.S. federal elections. The ways in which it does so have important effects on political campaigns and their methods of communication with voters. Political speech is rarely directly regulated by FECA but, for the most part, is indirectly regulated by a combination of limits on the amounts of monetary or other contributions that lawfully can be made to federal candidates and parties, requirements that contributions and expenditures in campaigns for federal office be disclosed, and outright bans on certain corporate and union contributions, speech, and expenditures.

The FECA has been amended several times: in 1974 following the Watergate scandal involving the Nixon administration, in 1976 after several provisions were declared unconstitutional, and most recently in March, 2002, by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). The BCRA amendments went into effect immediately following the 2002 elections and have governed all federal elections since 2004. FECA's key elements include the following:

1. *Disclosure of contributions and expenditures.* FECA requires disclosure of amounts and sources of contributions to candidates and political committees and disclosure of independent expenditures by those making them. Reports of these contributions and their sources are filed with the Federal Election Commission, and they are publicly available over the Internet at www.fec.gov. The BCRA (2002) added new disclosure requirements concerning "electioneering communications."

2. *Contribution limits for individuals.* Specific limits on contributions were originally set in the 1974 amendments. Contribution limits were $1,000 per election (primary and general elections counted separately) to federal candidates by individuals, $20,000 per year on contributions to national political parties, and $5,000 per year to state and local parties. Effective with the BCRA amendments in 2002, the limits on contributions to candidates rose to $2,000 per election, and the limits are now indexed to inflation so they automatically will increase (e.g., to $2,300 in 2007–2008). Under the BCRA amendments, the limits on contributions increase to $25,000 per calendar year ($28,500 in 2007–2008) in the case of national parties and to $10,000 per year in the case of state, district, or local parties (this limit is not indexed to inflation). Aggregate contribution limits rose under BCRA from $25,000 per year to $95,000 per 2-year election cycle ($108,200 in 2007–2008), of which only $37,500 may be contributed to candidates (distinct from parties or political action committees) over the 2 years ($42,700 in 2007–2008).

3. *Limits on contributions by political action committees (PACs).* PACs (if multicandidate) are limited to contributions of $5,000 per election to candidates, and there are annual limits on contributions by PACs of $5,000 per year to other outside PACs and state and local parties (combined) and $15,000 annually to national parties. There is no annual aggregate limitation on PAC contributions. These limits are not indexed to inflation.

4. *Expenditure limits for candidates. (Note: These were declared invalid by the U.S. Supreme Court and are not in effect.)* FECA originally set limits on total candidate spending and on spending of candidate's personal funds. These rules were declared unconstitutional in *Buckley* (1976). Except in the case of candidates for president who accept public financing, candidates may spend unlimited amounts of money in their campaigns.

Candidates may spend unlimited amounts of personal funds. However, in BCRA (2002), it is provided (Sections 304 and 318) that Senate and House candidates running against candidates proposing to spend substantial amounts of personal funds will be allowed to receive contributions in excess of the

contribution limits up to six times the normal limits and have limits on party "coordinated" expenditures removed. This permits candidates facing opponents who spend large amounts of personal funds to raise contributions in larger amounts than would normally be permitted. This so-called millionaires provision was challenged as unconstitutional in *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission* (2003), but the court did not decide the issue in that case.

5. *Limits on expenditures for radio and television advertising by candidates. (Note: Not in effect.)* These specific spending limits for media advertising were contained in the original 1971 law but were eliminated in the 1974 amendments before ever going into effect. The general expenditure limits which replaced them in the 1974 law were in effect until declared unconstitutional in *Buckley* (1976). They are no longer in force.

6. *Limits on "independent" expenditures advocating or opposing election of a candidate. (Note: Not in force.)* These were limited by FECA to $1,000. These were then declared unconstitutional in *Buckley* (1976) and are no longer in force. However, independent expenditures over $1,000 must be disclosed by filing reports with the Federal Election Commission.

7. *Allowance of corporate and labor union PAC contributions.* Other federal statues have banned direct contributions to political campaigns by corporations since 1907 and by labor unions since 1943. FECA allowed PACs to make such contributions in limited amounts. PACs are generally organized by employers (often but not always corporations or labor unions), or they may be "nonconnected" PACs. A corporate or union PAC may solicit contributions from its employees or members, which are then pooled and contributed to political candidates. These funds are not considered corporate or union funds (i.e., general treasury funds derived from profits or union dues) and do not violate the statutes prohibiting such contributions. Contributions to PACs by employees or union members are voluntary. FECA 1971 created the framework that allowed PACs to exist. Prior to FECA, there were in place (and still are) statutory bans on direct contributions to candidates for federal office by corporations and labor unions. Corporations and labor unions are also banned from making expenditures from corporate or union treasuries intended to influence federal elections: Both contributions and expenditures are banned. The 2002 BCRA amendments put in place rules governing "electioneering communications" to more precisely define when corporate or labor union communications not made through PACs are considered to influence federal elections and are thus prohibited. The rules on electioneering communications were upheld on their face in *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission* but found unconstitutional as applied to particular ads in *Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.*

8. *Federal Election Commission (FEC).* The FEC was created by the FECA. It is the federal agency with responsibility for administering FECA, and the reports required by the FECA are filed with the FEC, which audits the reports and enforces the FECA.

9. *Public financing of presidential election campaigns.* FECA established a system of partial public funding of presidential campaigns and party conventions funded by a voluntary "tax check-off" system in which taxpayers may designate on their federal income tax returns that $3.00 (originally $1.00) of their tax liability should go to the presidential election campaign fund. Candidates who accept public funding in this system agree not to accept private contributions in the general election campaign and agree to limit their expenditures in the primary and general election campaigns to the amounts provided in FECA, as adjusted for inflation. In recent presidential campaigns, several major candidates have chosen not to accept public financing in the primary campaign because of the spending limits. These spending limits exceptionally were considered lawful by the U.S. Supreme Court because candidates voluntarily could choose whether or not to accept public funds and the limits on spending that go with them.

Clifford A. Jones

See also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act; *Buckley v. Valeo;* Campaign Finance; *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*

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Federal Election Commission

See Campaign Finance; Federal Election Campaign Act

Federal Trade Commission

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is an independent agency of the U.S. government charged by Congress with protecting Americans from unfair or deceptive business practices. The FTC is headed by five commissioners who serve 7-year terms. Although the president nominates commission members, they must be confirmed by the Senate. By law, no more than three commissioners may be from the same political party. The FTC is divided into three main bureaus: Consumer Protection, Competition, and Economics.

Through its Bureau of Consumer Protection, the FTC regulates product claims made in advertisements in newspapers, magazines, television, radio, direct mail, and Internet media. The FTC is particularly vigorous in its regulation of health claims. However, it has no responsibility for political advertising messages—those are regulated by the Federal Election Commission and the Federal Communications Commission.

The FTC also manages the National Do Not Call Registry, which protects U.S. consumers from unwanted telemarketing calls under the provisions of the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR). The TSR specifically omits calls from political organizations from its definition of *telemarketing*, however. Therefore, political organizations and pollsters may call even those homes on the Do Not Call Registry. A few bills in the House have sought to include "politically oriented recorded messages" among those calls prohibited by the TSR. However, those bills have not yet resulted in changes to the regulations.

Increasingly, there are also issues involving the FTC that relate to the mingling of commercial and political speech. When organizations engage in activities that involve the promotion of ideas or viewpoints that have political implications, even though advocated in a commercial context, the organization may find its communications subjected to a different type of scrutiny. This problem may be particularly acute for companies that develop integrated marketing communication strategies.

Colleen Connolly-Ahern

See also Campaign Finance; Communications Act of 1934; Federal Election Campaign Act

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Feminine Style in Communication

Scholars of political discourse argue that women have, because of a centuries-long relegation to the private sphere, developed a rhetorical style that tends to (a) be more personal in tone, (b) rely on personal experience, (c) be structured inductively, (d) invite audience participation, (e) address the audience as peers, and (f) identify with the audience's experience.

Male speech strategy, conversely, tends to (a) use deductive logic, (b) affirm expertise, (c) refer to expert authority, and (d) use impersonal examples that are not connected to audience experience.

A person's goal when using a "feminine" style of communication is to empower the listener to become effective or an agent of change. Further, the strategy is not exclusive to women and can be used by men. In addition, a more "masculine" style of speech may be used by women. In the past, female political speakers have often been observed utilizing the same approach as men. However, as more women move into higher office, a new appreciation of feminine rhetorical style has evolved. Obviously not all women and men communicate in the same way. However, due to cultural history, stylistic differences between women and men may have developed that are based on the differences between private and public communication.

It has been posited that women often face a "double bind" when running for office—if they portray the masculine qualities needed to convey strength and decisiveness, they appear "unfeminine"; yet if they do not display such qualities, they are thought to be too

weak and unsuited for the tough job of politics. However, over the past 3 decades women have become a much larger component of the political landscape. Many researchers have concluded that the stereotypical gaps inherent in the electorate that are given to male and female candidates have decreased, except perhaps at the presidential level. The number of women being elected to local, state, and federal posts has steadily increased over these decades. Further, political communication scholars have noted that both female and male political speakers have controlled electorate gender expectations by using male and female rhetorical strategies during political discourse. Successful candidates of either gender utilize a balance of male and female communication strategies. Campaigning has evolved in a way that merges feminine and masculine styles, and both are apparent in many candidates as they deliver political speech. In recent elections, men and women often take issues and incorporate a more narrative style in order to explain those issues. The ability, for example, of either sex to use the more feminine style of story illustration and draw people in tends to serve candidates well.

Terry Robertson

See also Gender and Politics; Women Candidates, Advertising; Women Candidates, News Coverage

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Feminist Movement

The *feminist movement* refers to historically specific and culturally contextual political movements that seek justice for women. A concerted effort to address women's social and legal inequalities in 19th- and early 20th-century Europe and America is recognized as the "first wave" of the feminist movement. British women joined together to begin publishing the *English Woman's Journal* in 1858; the First International Women's Conference in Paris in 1892 established the word *feminism* as the belief in and advocacy of equal rights for women based on the idea of the equality of the sexes; and in the United States, feminism that emerged out of the abolitionist movement culminated in the suffrage movement that won a decades-long struggle for women's right to vote in 1920. This first wave of the feminist movement is characterized as "liberal" feminism, an activist movement dedicated to social and political equality.

After winning the right to vote, the U.S. feminist movement remained dormant with no significant political activism around women's subordination until the 1960s. A "second wave" of the feminist movement then rose out of the civil rights and anti-war movements, in which women, disillusioned with their second-class status even in an activist environment, began to organize to contend against discrimination. In this second wave, feminists pushed beyond the early quest for political rights to fight for greater equality across the board, for example, in education, the workplace, and at home. The National Organization of Women (NOW), the National Women's Political Caucus, and the Women's Equity Action League all were formed at that time. NOW's first president Betty Friedan wrote the groundbreaking book *The Feminine Mystique* in 1963, defining the "mystique" as the worthlessness women feel in roles that require them to be financially, intellectually, and emotionally dependent upon their husbands. The movement was not a unified one, with multiple "feminisms" emerging to join liberal feminism, including black feminism that recognizes the duality of racial and sexual oppression, radical feminism that rejects all feminine and all masculine gender roles, and Marxist/socialist feminism that is concerned with economic oppression. In Britain, the movement also had multiple focuses but was based more strongly in working-class socialism.

The "third wave" of the feminist movement refers to feminist sensibilities that evolved from the 1990s up to the present day. It has critiqued second-wave feminism for its lack of attention to the differences among women due to their age, gender, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, religion, and level of education. The third-wave feminist movement reflects postmodern sensibilities; it rejects dogma and academia, celebrates diversity, welcomes ambiguities, negotiates contradictions, sees gender as performance rather than a fixed binary, has a broader political focus, and engages in social activism that often takes the form of music, art, or theater performance, new media Web logs, and e-zines.

Janis Teruggi Page

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Feminist Theory

See Feminist Movement

Ferraro, Geraldine (1935–)

Geraldine Anne Ferraro is a Democratic politician who served as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives and was the first woman to be the vice-presidential nominee of a major political party. Ferraro received her undergraduate degree from Marymount Manhattan College and then her law degree from Fordham University School of Law in 1960. After raising three children, she worked at the Queens County district attorney's office where she started the Special Victims Bureau.

She was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1978 where she represented the 9th Congressional District of New York in Queens. She served for 6 years during which her voting record was generally considered liberal. She served as the secretary of the House Democratic Caucus and was chairwoman of the Platform Committee for the 1984 Democratic National Convention.

On July 12, 1984, Democratic presidential nominee Walter Mondale announced that Ferraro would serve as his running mate. Ferraro was selected for the position over Colorado Senator Gary Hart, San Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros, and San Francisco Mayor Dianne Feinstein, to name a few. Mondale's selection of Ferraro was questioned by critics and supporters alike. It was unclear if the addition of Ferraro to the ticket would gain or lose votes for Mondale.

Mondale was well behind Reagan in the polls, and the addition of Ferraro did not improve his position in the campaign. As the only female to be on a major party presidential ticket, Ferraro is the only woman to participate in a presidential-level debate. She is widely considered to have performed well in the vice-presidential debate against George H. W. Bush in 1984. However, her campaign appearances and presentations were often subjected to female stereotyping by the media. Throughout the campaign, Ferraro's handling of campaign finances was under fire, and after the election, the House Ethics Committee officially criticized her mishandling of campaign finances. The Reagan/Bush ticket handily defeated the Mondale/Ferraro ticket.

After her unsuccessful bid for the vice presidency, Ferraro undertook other endeavors in her life. In 1985, she published her autobiography, *Ferraro: My Story.* In 1992, she ran for Democratic nomination for a New York Senate seat but did not win her party's nomination. President Bill Clinton appointed her to be an ambassador for the United States at the United Nations. From 1996 to 1998 she was the co-host of the CNN show *Crossfire.* In 1998, Ferraro ran again for the Senate. She took second place in the Democratic primary to eventual general election winner Charles Schumer.

Ferraro was diagnosed in 1998 with a form of blood cancer and has since become an active supporter of the Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation. She is a senior managing director of the Global Consulting Group, a corporate public relations firm. She is married to John Zaccaro, a real estate agent and Queens County native.

Abby Gail LeGrange

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Film and Politics

Since the invention of the motion picture at the turn of the 20th century, film has remained a popular and powerful medium that does much more than entertain collective, or individual, viewers. From early efforts, to modern-day productions, movies have had the ability to communicate many diverse, global political issues. Through genres such as comedy, science fiction, drama, melodrama, documentary, mock-umentary, and

American actor James Stewart (1908–1997) clutches a wad of letters as British actor Claude Rains looks on, while standing on the floor of the U.S. Senate in a still from director Frank Capra's film Mr. Smith Goes to Washington.

Source: Getty Images.

blatant propaganda, film has communicated and influenced audiences about political issues, events, individuals, and entities. Popular film continues to inform and educate viewers about politics. From fictional retellings of real events, to the pure imagination of fictional scenarios, to documentaries, film proves to be an important channel through which audiences can explore past, present, and future political areas.

Arguably almost any feature-length film can be viewed, or interpreted, politically for multiple factors. However, certain films clearly engage with overt political content. Political cinema therefore can be narrowed somewhat to films that intentionally direct attention to manifest political content.

The 1900s

It is evident that during the advent of cinema for mass audiences in the 1900s, political content emerged as a popular subject matter. One early example is that of Georges Méliès's *The Coronation of Edward VII* (1902), which employed actors to impersonate and recreate the coronation in accurate detail in order to allow the average citizen the opportunity to feel as if they were witnessing the actual proceedings of the event.

The Early Years of Political Film

It was in the 1910s that feature-length films began to make their mark on the cultural landscape, and a focus on political issues became manifest. In what is considered to be the first major political film, D. W. Griffith's *The Birth of a Nation* (1915) offered a historical epic of the American civil war. This groundbreaking film was about 3 hours in length, and it proved to be a spectacle. However, the film has long been criticized for being racist and promoting white supremacy. In his other epic film, *Intolerance* (1916), Griffith continued to tackle sensitive political subject matter by presenting four stories about victims of prejudice. Griffith's work established him as a pioneer of the cinema.

Also notable is Charles Chaplin's *The Immigrant* (1917). Chaplin's work introduced the tramp character, and through the use of humor, Chaplin brought attention to the hardships of poverty and experiences of those who dealt with the obstacles of everyday existence.

The 1920s advanced the popularity of motion pictures in the United States and in Europe. Charles Chaplin's *The Kid* (1921) is considered by many film historians to be one of this director's finest accomplishments. *The Kid* again used the tramp character to portray the effects of poverty when a boy is abandoned by his mother. The mother changes her mind, rescues her child from Chaplin's tramp character, and the portrayal of these events offers a blend of drama and comedy that allow the auteur to poignantly comment on issues of class and power in society.

Dziga Vertov's *Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny* [History of the Civil War] (1922) and *Shagay, Sovet!* [Forward, Soviet!] (1926) provide excellent examples of Russian propaganda from film's early years. In Sergei M. Eisenstein's landmark film, *Battleship* Potemkin (1925), events that provoked the Bolshevik Revolution were portrayed. This powerful film offered shocking images of a crew eating maggot-infested rations and other inhumanities that led the crew of the battleship *Prince Potemkin* to revolt. The subsequent footage was, and remains, shocking as it depicts an

uprising by the citizens of Odessa, resulting in czarist troops' infamous, systematic slaughter of insurgents and bystanders that included the death of infants.

German director Fritz Lang's *Metropolis* (1927) is a fantastic visual journal of the contemporary, imaginary world of that time and of the future. This silent film is in keeping with portrayals of a class divide where some privileged individuals lived surreal, exotic lives above ground, while other unfortunate souls were forced to work in horrid conditions beneath the surface.

1930s

The 1930s provided a shift in political content in feature films. Themes of war, social injustice, corruption, and the emergence of Nazi propaganda became salient to the public of this time, and such issues were received well by consumers of film during this decade. For example, Lewis Milstone's classic war film *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1930) offered a depiction of young German soldiers who move from a state of idealism to despair in this biting adaptation of Erich Maria Remarque's anti-war novel.

Charles Chaplin's *City Lights* (1931) resurrected his tramp character in this film which depicts his trying to help a poor, blind flower girl get an eye operation. Mervyn LeRoy's *I Am a Fugitive From a Chain Gang* (1932) offers a glimpse into the horrid life of an unjustly imprisoned war veteran who escapes and is then betrayed by a corrupt woman.

Norman Taurog's *The Phantom President* (1932) provided audiences with a glimpse into political conspiracy and an ethical dilemma faced by a candidate who finds himself compromised by his political party. Unfortunately for the presidential hopes of banker T. K. Blair, his party feels he has too little flair for savoir faire.

Hans Steinhoff's *Hitlerjunge Quex: Ein Film vom Opfergeist der deutschen Jugend* [The German Youth Quex: A Film About the Victim Spirit of German Youth] (1933) offered a blatant Nazi propaganda film based on the life and death of Hitler Youth member Herbert Norkus who was killed while distributing flyers in a Communist neighborhood.

David Butler's *The Littlest Rebel* (1935) provided a view of the U.S. civil war era in an absurd story featuring a Confederate man's daughter, played by Shirley Temple, and the black loyal servant, played by Bill "Bojangles" Robinson. In this sentimental yet racist film, viewers are presented with a young girl and her black servant, who are able to plead a case of injustice directly to President Lincoln.

Leni Riefensthal's *Triumph of the Will* (1935) is one of the most infamous propaganda films of its time. This film documents the Third Reich's 1934 Nuremberg party rally and uses a mass cast, including Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Joseph Goebbels, Rudolf Hess, Hermann Goering, and other top officials of the Reich. Through the use of actual footage of cheering crowds, marching military bands, banners lining Nuremberg's streets, and Hitler's actual speech, the film serves to demonstrate how it was possible for Germany to be swayed by Hitler's vision.

David O. Selznick's epic *Gone With the Wind* (1939) glorified the last days of the old South against the backdrop of the civil war. Through the use of the heroine, Scarlett O'Hara, her beloved Mammy, and other memorable characters such as Rhett Butler, Selznick presented a portrait of a glamorized plantation life that falls away due to the unstoppable Yankees.

Frank Capra's *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* (1939) exemplifies the battle between idealism and corruption through the tale of dedicated new senator Jefferson Smith, played by James Stewart, who arrives in Washington to find he must fight for the people and the very essence of democracy.

1940s

The motion pictures of the 1940s took a distinct shift in focus, as the filmmakers of the time faced the unthinkable realities of the Holocaust and the significant changes brought about by World War II. Films of this decade also dealt with American domestic socioeconomic challenges and with corruption.

During this time, the U.S. Office of War Information sought the help of esteemed director Frank Capra to create a series of films to motivate the U.S. military and clarify why the United States had to be involved in World War II. This series was titled *Why We Fight* and was an exercise of great U.S. engagement in production of propaganda. These seven films served to engage viewers in a disturbing topic that ultimately proved to be effective with citizens, military members, and critics. These award-winning films by Capra were *Prelude to War* (1942); *Divide and Conquer* (1943); *The Battle of Britain* (1943); *The Nazis Strike* (1943); *The Battle of Russia* (1943); *The Battle of China* (1944); and *War Comes to America* (1945). Additionally, Capra's *Know Your Enemy–Japan* (1945)

was one of the last films made for the U.S. government, and its goal was to educate the military about how to deal with the fighting strategy of the Japanese.

Of course, Hitler's propaganda machine also produced propaganda films in order to generate support for the Reich in Germany. Viet Harlan's *Jud Süß* [Sweet Jew] (1940) portrayed a Jewish businessman as a corrupt schemer who rises to political power, creates civil chaos, and rapes a Christian girl. Also noteworthy is the Nazi propaganda film *The Resistance* (1944), which portrayed the concentration camp as a type of utopian environment.

Numerous films of this decade focused on the atrocities of war in general, and many directly confronted the issue of Nazi Germany and Adolf Hitler. Examples of films that dealt with Hitler and the Third Reich as central topics include Frank Borzage's *The Mortal Storm* (1940); John Cromwell's *So Ends Our Night* (1941); Henry King's *A Yank in the RAF* (1941); Jean Renoir's *This Land is Mine* (1941); Fritz Lang's *Hangmen Also Die* (1941); and Alfred Hitchcock's *Lifeboat* (1944).

Many other U.S. and international productions of the 1940s dealt with World War II but were broader in scope. These classic war films include Alfred Hitchcock's *Foreign Correspondent* (1940); Lowell Mellett's documentary *The World at War* (1942); William Wyler's *Best Years of Our Lives* (1946); and Vittorio De Sica's *Sciuscià* [Shoeshine] (1946).

A number of motion pictures addressed the U.S. military action against Japan following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Examples of these films include David Miller's *Flying Tigers!* (1942); John Ford's documentary about the bombing of Pearl Harbor, *December 7* (1943); Edward Ludwig's *The Fighting Seabees* (1944); Edward Dmytryk's *Back to Bataan* (1945); John Ford's *They Were Expendable* (1945); and Allan Dwan's *Sands of Iwo Jima* (1949).

John Ford's *Grapes of Wrath* (1940) dealt with the saga of American domestic troubles. In his adaptation of Steinbeck's novel, Ford portrayed the struggle of the Joad family as they leave Oklahoma in their futile search for a better life in California. Similarly, John Ford tackled the issue of how an American family attempts to deal with unionization and survival in the coal industry in *How Green Was My Valley* (1941).

Frank Capra's *Meet John Doe* (1941) addressed the issue of corruption and lies in the media with the creation of a fake story about a gullible man, played by Gary Cooper, threatening suicide by a jump from city hall. The effects of the bogus story spin out of control as the newspaper attempts to use public support to propel him to the highest level of political power. Elia Kazan's *Gentleman's Agreement* (1947) used the story of a reporter seeking to expose anti-Semitism as an opportunity to reinforce the message of the price of prejudice. Frank Capra's *State of the Union* (1948) addresses the issue of both corrupt journalism and politics in this film about moral compromise and the quest for power.

One of the earliest films to portray the use of political power was Orson Welles's *Citizen Kane* (1941). The famous film is based on the character of media mogul William Randolph Hearst and conveys strong and powerful emotions in the struggle for political power and personal gratifications. In 1998, the film was named by the American Film Institute as the greatest film of all time.

1950s

The films of the 1950s generally follow similar themes as those of the previous decade. The world was still attempting to process World War II. These included Lewis Milestone's *Halls of Montezuma* (1950); Anthony Mann's *Strategic Air Command* (1955); Robert Aldrich's *Attack* (1956); Dick Powell's *The Enemy Below* (1957); and Stanley Kubrick's *Paths of Glory* (1957).

Two noteworthy films by French Director Alain Resnais stand out among the rest in their treatment of the horrors of the Holocaust and the bombing of Hiroshima. Resnais's *Nuit et Brouillard* [Night and Fog] (1955) was a landmark documentary, a beautiful but horrific film about the Holocaust that uses 1955 footage of a stark, silent, and vacant Auschwitz and footage of this death camp during its containment of prisoners from 1944. The juxtaposition of the peaceful, quiet scenes compared with chaotic, graphic ones is haunting. Also, *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (1959), in which Alain Resnais presents a retelling of the effects of the bombing of Hiroshima primarily through the dialogue between a French woman and her male Japanese lover. Both are traumatized and their stories, along with the use of restrained but startling visuals, are horrific.

Political Unrest: The 1960s and 1970s

The films of the 1960s reflect major turning points in society that are partly depicted in the cinema. Themes of racism come to the forefront of such films, as do

those of people grappling with multiple sociopolitical issues.

Daniel Petrie's *A Raisin in the Sun* (1961) depicts the plight of a black family who implode due to their inability to take part in the American dream because of racial intolerance. Likewise, Robert Mulligan's *To Kill a Mockingbird* (1962) addresses the issue of racism when an innocent black man is accused of raping a white woman. Despite the hopefulness this movie attempts to offer by providing a protagonist who seeks to prove the black man innocent in the form of a white attorney, played by Gregory Peck, the film shows a southern town torn apart because of excessive hate, prejudice, fear, and lies.

John Frankenheimer's *The Manchurian Candidate* (1962) captures the best and worst of communist paranoia in the story of a Korean War hero who has been brainwashed into an assassin.

One of the most notable films of this decade is Stanley Kubrick's *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* (1964). This dark comedy about the shift into the nuclear phase of the strain between the United States and Russia is an exercise in paranoia. The story sets the stage for nuclear extension at the hands of a deranged American military leader.

Gillo Pontecorvo's *La Battaglia di Algeri* [The Battle of Algiers] (1965) is considered by many to be one of the most significant films in the history of political cinema. This film is shot in documentary style, and the graphic depiction of the events of the 1957 battle remains startling.

Stanley Kramer*'s Guess Who's Coming to Dinner* (1967) presents the fictional story of a family who think they are liberal until their daughter brings home a black fiancé. This groundbreaking film about interracial relationships was a landmark for its time and a strong look at prejudice in American society.

Mike Nichols's *Catch 22* (1970) provides a dark comedy in which, in trying to escape from the reality of war, a military captain sets actions into motion that cause his friends to die. Robert Altman's *M*A*S*H* (1970) is a thinly veiled Vietnam War satire about doctors fighting military insanity and healing wounded soldiers during the Korean War.

The Candidate (1972) depicts Robert Redford as a young lawyer whose ideals are compromised as he becomes more and more caught up in a campaign to become a U.S. senator. This film provided a realistic and sometimes cynical look at the professionalization of the modern media campaign.

Alan J. Pakula's *The Parallax View* (1974) offers paranoia at is best with the story of the assassination of a leading U.S. senator and the discovery that all reporters who were present are now dying. This is the height of 1970s conspiracy-theory films.

Pakula's *All the President's Men* (1976) offers a version of how *Washington Post* reporters Woodward and Bernstein facilitated President Nixon's downfall by proving his connection to the Watergate scandal. Despite the clear outcome of this historically based film, it is a tense experience for the viewer.

1980s

The political films of the 1980s range from the absurd to the horrific. They reflect an uncertain time during the cold war when the world was changing, there was much excess, and nothing seemed clear.

Warren Beatty's *Reds* (1981) is an epic that depicts the experiences of a couple that gets caught up in the spirit, euphoria, and aftermath of Russia's 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.

Sidney Lumet's *Power* (1986) is the story of a powerful and successful nationwide U.S. political consultant who winds up in a mysterious situation that is beyond his control.

Many films of this decade focused their message on the effects of the Vietnam War. Oliver Stone's *Platoon* (1986) is based on the director's own experiences in Vietnam and emphasizes the loss of innocence that was the price of the war. John Irvin's *Hamburger Hill* (1987) is considered to be one of the most realistic, gruesome, and graphic anti-Vietnam War movies that shows the soldiers being reduced to just meat. Stanley Kubrick's *Full Metal Jacket* (1987) is arguably one of the most disturbing portrayals of war in film history. Set in Vietnam, the film challenges viewers to face horrific visuals and difficult questions about the cost of war. Oliver Stone's *Born on the 4th of July* (1989) offers the second in the director's Vietnam trilogy and examines what happens when a wounded, quadriplegic Marine returns from war and changes from fighter to protester.

1990s

The 1990s proved to be a sober time, and the films of this decade reflect this mood. Global issues such as the AIDS epidemic were front-and-center in movie messages, and other political concerns emerged

rapidly as the Berlin wall fell and many changes in political leadership occurred worldwide.

Norman Rene's *Longtime Companion* (1990) is an ensemble film revolving around the lives of a group of gay men in 1980s New York City. It was the first film to deal with AIDS as its central issue. Similarly, Jonathan Demme's *Philadelphia* (1993) was a breakthrough film that examined the rights of a homosexual man with AIDS, played by Tom Hanks, when he sues his former law firm for wrongful termination. This was the first major-studio picture to tackle the topic of AIDS.

Oliver Stone's *Heaven & Earth* (1993) is the third film in his Vietnam trilogy that focuses on the ill-fated lives of a Vietnamese woman and the American soldier with whom she moves to the United States.

Tim Robbins's *Dead Man Walking* (1995) is a film that forces viewers to judge a convicted rapist and murderer and decide if he really deserves to die. This heavy-handed film appears blatantly anti-death penalty and features strong performances from Sean Penn and Susan Sarandon.

Alexander Payne's *Citizen Ruth* (1996) is a scathing satire about the abortion issue in the United States. The film does not take a side, and takes swipes at both the pro-lifers and pro-choicers, who attempt to manipulate the film's protagonist, played by Laura Dern, in order to advance their own political agendas.

Barry Levinson's *Wag the Dog* (1997) is an important film that explores the power of the mass media to shape public opinion—and the political players that are willing to wage a pseudo-war to cover a sex scandal. This film, viewed with the realities of President Clinton's sexual misconduct (and impeachment) is eerie in retrospect and may cause viewers to question what those in power are capable of in order to stay in power.

Michael Mann's *The Insider* (1999) delved into the corruption and cover-ups of the tobacco industry. It is the story of one man's fight to tell the truth while fighting the powerful industry that had the power to destroy him and silence the issue.

The Direction of Political Film in the 21st Century

The films of the early 2000s have run the gamut from those that look back to wars and political issues of the past to those that speculate about what the future has in store for the world based on the political mistakes and tragedies of the past and present. In a time of terrorist attacks and war, the cinema is changing as rapidly as society. The movies of the decade reflect a more diverse offering and are less focused on central themes in comparison with decades past. However, several trends are clear. One major shift is an increase in mainstream documentaries, a focus on corporate greed, an emphasis on cynicism and political corruption, and films that depict the fragility of the world—either due to environmental, medical, or manmade catastrophes.

Roger Donaldson's *Thirteen Days* (2000) is a tense fictional account of what occurred during the Kennedy administration at the height of the Cuban missile crisis. Steven Soderberg's *Traffic* (2000) challenges viewers to consider the plausibility of America winning its war on drugs. Rod Lurie's *The Contender* (2000) offers a fictional account of what happens when a female senator is nominated to be America's first female vice president. The film shows her under attack by the right wing and accused of sexual impropriety.

A major trend of the early 2000s was the significant number of documentaries. These documentaries dealt with a range of issues and are exemplified by films such as Bill Siegel and Sam Green's *The Weather Underground* (2002), which provides a look at an extremist group of freedom fighters in the 1960s who used violence to fight what they viewed as oppression. Jehane Noujaim's *Control Room* (2004) is a documentary that examines the operations of the Al Jazeera news network. Megan Mylan and Jon Shenk's *The Lost Boys of Sudan* (2003) follows two Sudanese orphan refugees throughout their intense journey from their native Africa to the United States. Robert Greenwald's *Uncovered: The Whole Truth About the Iraq War* (2003) is a controversial documentary that purportedly exposes the viewer to information from CIA, Pentagon, and Foreign Service experts that explain the real reasons for the U.S. government's launching the war on Iraq in 2003. Danny Schecther's *WMD: Weapons of Mass Deception* (2004) offers an evaluation of how mass media coverage shaped people's views of the Iraq War through their intense coverage from the war's inception through February 2004. Michael Moore's *Fahrenheit 9/11* (2004) is a documentary that examines September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, details the reasons the United States has become a target for hatred and terrorism, and offers up a scathing criticism of President George W. Bush's response to the attacks—as well as making allegations that there are nefarious connections between the Bush family and the bin Ladens. Joseph Mealey and

Michael Shoob's *Bush's Brain* (2004) assesses the power of Karl Rove and argues that this advisor has almost single-handedly shaped President George W. Bush's policies in the United States. Rachel Boynton's *Our Brand Is Crisis* (2005) follows a team of political consultants to Bolivia. The film examines the impact of such political campaign tactics during a short election period. Eugene Jarecki's *Why We Fight* (2005) is an even-handed documentary that was filmed during the Iraq War and attempts to thoroughly examine the American military and answer the question of why the United States goes to war. Davis Guggenheim's *An Inconvenient Truth* (2006) follows former Vice President Al Gore's fight for the environment. This PowerPoint presentation, interspersed with anecdotes about Gore's personal and professional life, is a troubling film that seeks to have viewers evaluate the devastating effects of global warming and what can be done to prevent imminent doom. Likewise, Chris Paine's environmentally focused documentary *Who Killed the Electric Car?* (2006) seeks to answer the question of why General Motors eliminated the GM EVI electric car—even shredding remaining ones and taking them from customers. Barbara Kopple's *Shut Up and Sing* (2006) is a documentary about free speech that examines a time when the band The Dixie Chicks were denigrated for criticizing President Bush at a London concert in 2003. Robert Greenwald's *Iraq for Sale* (2006) is a disturbing examination of how private contractors are gaining financially during the U.S. war with Iraq and evaluates who is paying the price for these corporations' benefit.

Jason Reitman's comedy *Thank You for Smoking* (2005) is an equal-opportunity offender, but its purpose is larger than just shock value. Some consider it a scathing commentary about lobbying, and others find it to be an interesting look inside the beltway and into the issue of the importance of free speech in a democratic society.

George Clooney's political drama *Good Night and Good Luck* (2005) tells the story of how CBS news anchor Edward R. Murrow battled the crusade against the threat of communism and its primary leader Senator Joseph McCarthy.

Film now has the power to reach many through insular markets via cable, satellite TV, DVD, Video on Demand, Pay Per View, televised broadcasts, and Internet technology. Film will continue to spread through new venues and new production techniques. Undoubtedly film will continue to evolve with technological advances and the increase in distribution to multiple global outlets.

Andrew Paul Williams

See also *All the President's Men; Candidate, The; Citizen Kane*

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Fireside Chats

Fireside chats were radio addresses (aired from 1933 to 1945) made famous by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Although the chats were initially meant to garner Americans' support for Roosevelt's New Deal policies, they eventually became a source of hope and security for all Americans. The chats were influential in reformulating the American social imaginary from one of despair to one of hope during a time of multiple crises, including the Great Depression and World War II. Fireside chats reinforced the importance of broadcast media and the use of common, everyday language when addressing the American people.

Unlike U.S. presidents before him, Roosevelt understood the importance of radio as a medium and first used it to pressure the New York state legislature during his governorship from 1928 to 1932. Roosevelt understood the difference between speaking and radio and thus set up the "informal chats" to convey the success of his policies via radio to the American people. Fireside chats were constructed by a committee of Roosevelt's speech writers and advisors, but Roosevelt was an integral part of the process; he often wrote the

conclusions and even changed some of the text while speaking on air. The chats were scheduled sparingly so as to maintain their importance among his other frequent radio and public addresses. They were delivered by Roosevelt from the White House, with him sitting behind a desk with multiple microphones from various radio networks. The actual number of fireside chats is disputed, with scholars counting between 27 and 31 of his radio addresses as this form of communication. The term *fireside chat* was not coined by the Roosevelt administration but, rather, by Harry Butcher of CBS, who used the words in a network press release before the second fireside chat on May 7, 1933.

Roosevelt used the chats initially to advocate for his New Deal policies to Americans. He had to address both the economic and spiritual crises that accompanied the Great Depression, and his chats were meant to bolster Americans' confidence in both the economic and political systems. Roosevelt's first fireside address came to the American people on March 12, 1933, as the president tried to explain the banking crisis and the government's response. One important characteristic of this form of communication was the simple language. Although Roosevelt's New Deal policies were often quite complex, his chats used common language to construct the radio address as an informal conversation between himself and the American public. The content of the chats moved from bolstering Roosevelt's New Deal policies to discussing various aspects of America's involvement in World War II. During a time filled with major crises, Roosevelt directly met Americans' call for leadership through his fireside chats, strengthening the nation's confidence.

Rebecca A. Kuehl

See also Radio Addresses; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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First Amendment

The text of the First Amendment to the U.S. constitution on freedom of expression states: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Given that the First Amendment only outlines the broad contours of legal protection, American free speech jurisprudence derives more from the gloss provided by the U.S. Supreme Court than from the constitutional text. The judicial interpretations of the First Amendment center on whether the government violates freedom of expression as an individual right. Hence, private infringements on free speech do not raise constitutional issues.

The intrinsic and utilitarian values of freedom of speech and the press inform the Supreme Court in formulating various First Amendment doctrines and tests. The most famous theory of freedom of expression is the "marketplace of ideas" concept. It posits the notion that ideas should be allowed to compete against one another in an open process of human interaction in search of truth. Meanwhile, self-governance theory is based on a premise that freedom of speech is essential to a democracy. It has been influential to the judicial interpretation of the First Amendment on Americans' right to talk politics. The individual autonomy theory holds that the right to freedom of expression that people each—in the development of their own personalities—have the right to form their own beliefs and opinions and to express these beliefs and opinions.

American courts have developed several substantive standards for freedom of expression. The two-level approach—free versus unfree speech—is a good example. The categorical approach to free speech law has identified unprotected speech such as libel, obscenity, and "fighting words." The content-based classification of speech balances certain social interests with their competing individual interest in free expression.

The speech versus action dichotomy has been another way the Supreme Court demarcates on First Amendment rights. It protects pure speech but allows restriction of expressive conduct, also known as symbolic speech or "speech-plus," such as burning draft cards.

The hierarchy of freedom of *protected* speech has been established. For example, political speech is more highly valued than any other expression, and it requires a compelling interest to justify a government regulation. Less protected are commercial speech and sexual expression which is not necessarily obscene. Their First Amendment standards are met by a substantial or significant governmental interest.

Notwithstanding the judicial line-drawing on free and unfree speech, the First Amendment is generally averse to content discrimination. There is the strongest of presumptions against viewpoint-based restrictions,

and they almost never survive a constitutional scrutiny. By contrast, content-neutral restrictions are more easily accepted.

The judicial distinction between prior restraint and subsequent punishment is derived from the differing impacts of the two on freedom of expression. Prior restraint creates a "freezing effect" on free speech, while subsequent punishment brings about a "chilling effect." The Supreme Court has erected so high a hurdle against prior restraints that the government rarely succeeds in using them as an effective weapon. However, the protection of press freedom against prior restraint is not absolute. Prior restraints can be imposed against national security–related information, obscene publications, or incitement to violence and the forcible overthrow of the government.

These days, gag orders against the news media in reporting court proceedings exemplify a more common type of prior restraint. Still they are presumed to be invalid unless they are narrowly tailored to prevent the administration of justice from being jeopardized or if less drastic alternatives are available.

In balancing freedom of speech with its conflicting societal interests, the Supreme Court established the "clear and present danger" test in 1919. The clear and present danger test was refined in a liberal way in *Brandenburg v. Ohi*o (1969). The incitement test of *Brandenburg* allows advocacy of the use of force or criminal violation unless it "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."

Historically, free speech jurisprudence in America arose from persecution of political dissidence, but such subversive expression is no longer at the center of First Amendment law. Rarely does the U.S. government seek to punish dissident criticism. The "preferred position" of political speech is illustrated in the Supreme Court's explicit repudiation of seditious libel in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* (1964). The political speech doctrine applies to, among other types of expression, hate speech, group libel, and blasphemy.

The "actual malice" rule of American libel law is the keystone of the First Amendment commitment to protection of political speech. The unique constitutional rule, as formulated by the *Sullivan* court, bars public officials from recovering damages for false defamation relating to their official conduct if they cannot prove the defamatory statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. The actual malice rule now covers nonofficial public figures.

One of the more vociferous, high-profile First Amendment conflicts concerns whether freedom of the press, separate from freedom of speech, allows reporters a right to protect their confidential sources. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the journalist's source privilege. The press clause of the First Amendment makes no special exception for the news media as an institution; it is for everyone, whether they are journalists or not.

Currently, commercial speech—i.e., advertising—is more protected than ever. Since the mid-1970s, it has been viewed in the context of the public's right to access truthful information about legal products and services. Yet the First Amendment status of commercial speech is not the same as that of noncommercial speech about matters of public interest.

Obscenity remains wholly unprotected under the First Amendment, although its restrictive boundaries have been narrowed since the Supreme Court first ruled on obscenity law in 1957. The current obscenity test, which evolved from *Miller v. California* (1973), mandates proof that to prohibit a sexual material as obscenity, the work appeals to the "prurient" interest; that the word is sexually explicit in a patently offensive way; and that the work lacks "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."

Electronic media enjoy less First Amendment freedom than print media. Over-the-air broadcasting in particular is subject to a range of government regulations such as licensing, political candidate speech, and indecency. The physical scarcity of airwaves justifies the government's direct interference with broadcasting. The scarcity rationale for broadcasting law does not apply to cablecasting and Internet communication.

The First Amendment undoubtedly makes Americans' freedom of expression the object of envy in the rest of the world. This is especially the case with political expression, including hate speech. The uninhibited criticism of the government is a constitutional right in the United States. Ergo a free press is reality under the First Amendment. Nonetheless, the First Amendment does not guarantee an open press in the sense of access to the news media for the public as an affirmative right.

Kyu Ho Youm

See also Libel; Press Freedom

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First Ladies, Political Communication of

The term *first lady* is given to the spouse of the president of the United States. The position, although unelected and unpaid, is considered to be a highly influential role with many expectations attached. An important part of any presidency, there are no "official assignments" for this position, though the first lady plays a prominent role in many areas. The position is so important to the presidency that there have been times in history when other women have served as social "stand-ins" when presidents were either divorced or widowed. For many Americans the first lady serves in a royal capacity, not unlike the queen in a monarchy.

The official use of the term *first lady* emerged in the early part of the 20th century. Some presidential spouses, such as Jackie Kennedy, tried to object to this name, with little success. Other terms such as *first mate* or *first spouse* were explored, but none had the same staying power as the term *first lady*. By the end of the 20th century, the role of the presidential spouse had evolved into a fully supported "Office of the First Lady" complete with a full staff and a suite of offices to help manage the daily demands of the position.

From the standpoint of political communication, scholarship about first ladies as a collective group is quite eclectic. Numerous biographies and autobiographies of various women who served in this position exist throughout American history, many based largely on anecdotal evidence, interviews, and press coverage. In recent years, more work has been done on the rhetorical or symbolic actions of first ladies and the influence they have on their husband's presidency. For example, much has been written about specific first ladies such as Eleanor Roosevelt and Hillary Clinton due to their public, activist roles. Hillary Clinton's unprecedented election as a senator from New York and her presidential bid are of significant interest to many political communication scholars.

Compilations written about first ladies have looked specifically at the rhetorical strategies used to enhance the symbolic nature and expectations of this role. Seen as the worst and best job in America, many first ladies have grappled with this role, especially given the tensions between supporting family and serving as the symbolic focus of the nation. First and foremost, presidential spouses claim their primary role is to take care of and support their husbands. Nancy Reagan's devotion to Ronald Reagan during his presidency, and in his declining days with Alzheimer's, is a common example of the strong support a first lady shows her husband. Several first ladies worked hard to guard access to their husbands so that people would not learn about illness or other troubles. Francis Cleveland, Edith Wilson, and Eleanor Roosevelt each made significant attempts to redirect the press from their husbands' ailments. Following the assassination attempt on her husband, Reagan went to great measures (even consulting an astrologist) to shield her husband from potential dangers. Many first ladies are also very protective of their children, keeping them from the public eye so they can grow up with little public scrutiny. Frances Cleveland, Edith Roosevelt, Jackie Kennedy, and Hillary Clinton all made significant efforts to shield their children from the press and the general public, attempting to help them live relatively normal lives.

A significant part of the first lady's role is to manage the social aspects of the presidency. White House restoration projects, special press and public tours, and overseeing presidential receptions are just a few of the social aspects of the position. First ladies are expected to be visible, to entertain dignitaries, and to be the public "face" of the White House. Great attention is paid to the clothes they wear, their hair styles, and their words. They are invited to present public speeches and are often seen at important ceremonies when their husbands cannot be present. Once their spouse is no longer in office, they continue to enact the symbolic role of their position with special appearances, political speeches, and written memoirs.

From the beginning of the U.S. presidency, women have been involved in helping their husbands run the

nation. First ladies such as Martha Washington, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Rosalynn Carter would travel on behalf of their husbands, representing them on policy matters. White House personnel decisions have been attributed to the influence of presidential spouses. Gerald Ford admitted discussing the pardon of Richard Nixon with his wife, Betty. Jimmy Carter relied greatly on Rosalynn Carter's advice. Nancy Reagan was seen to have considerable interest in matters concerning the Soviet Union and who should work with her husband. Hillary Clinton's stand on affordable health care and her public support of her husband in difficult times are more examples of a strong influential spouse. These examples contribute to the perception some writers have of the first lady as "associate" or "co-president."

Presidential wives have focused on personal causes since the early part of the 20th century when Edith Wilson concentrated on improving housing in Washington, D.C.'s poorer neighborhoods. Reagan's anti-drug campaign, Barbara Bush's focus on the problem of illiteracy, and Laura Bush's reading campaign are all examples of adopted causes. In each situation, the clout of the first lady's position played an important role in gaining public attention about the issue.

As the presidential election evolves and a woman is one day elected, the role of the first spouse will also evolve to reflect shifting expectations. Successful, dual-career couples will have to carefully negotiate the demands of this position; those with families will have to reevaluate more traditional roles and create new opportunities. Regardless of who sits in this position, the important influence of this role will undoubtedly remain the same.

Janette Kenner Muir

See also Bush, Laura; Ford, Betty; Onassis, Jacqueline Kennedy; Reagan, Nancy; Roosevelt, Eleanor

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Fitzwater, Marlin

See Press Secretary, White House

Fleischer, Ari (1960–)

Lawrence Ari Fleischer was born in Pound Ridge, New York. Fleischer was the White House press secretary for George W. Bush from 2001 to 2003. A graduate of Middlebury College in Vermont in 1982 with a degree in political science, Fleischer's career as a press secretary began shortly thereafter for an unsuccessful Republican congressional candidate, Jon Fossil, in New York. Fleischer also worked as press secretary for New York Congressman Norman Lent.

After serving as the field director for the National Republican Congressional Committee from 1985 to 1988, he worked a short time for New York Congressman Joseph DioGuardi as press secretary. Fleischer worked as press secretary for New Mexico Senator Pete Domenici from 1989 to 1994. During U.S. President George H. W. Bush's 1992 reelection campaign, Fleischer served as deputy communications director.

After his stints as press secretary for various Republican candidates and representatives, Fleischer then served as spokesman for the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee until 1999. In 1999, Fleischer worked on the presidential campaign of Elizabeth Dole until she dropped out. He then joined George W. Bush's presidential campaign as the primary spokesman and communications advisor. He became the press secretary after Bush won the election. The role of White House press secretary mainly entails delivering daily White House briefings and serving as the primary spokesperson for the president. He served during the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the 2001 anthrax attacks, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 2003 space shuttle *Columbia* disaster. Fleischer announced his resignation in May 2003 and was replaced by Scott McClellan in July 2003.

Fleischer is a member of the board of directors for the Republican Jewish Coalition. He formed

Ari Fleischer Communications, his own consulting firm, after leaving the White House in 2003. He has also worked as a speaker since serving as White House press secretary and has written a book about his experiences, *Taking Heat: The President, the Press, and My Years in the White House* (2005).

Kristen D. Landreville

See also Press Secretary, White House

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Focus Groups

A *focus group* is a small number of individuals who share common interests in specific issues or events and who are asked to take part in an interactive discussion. Focus group study began in the late 1930s and became more popular in the 1950s with marketing studies. Aside from using interactive discussion groups, researchers also use telephone focus groups, Internet focus groups, and media focus groups depending on the particular purpose of the study or for the sake of convenience.

The purpose of a focus group is to understand how people with common interests feel and think about an issue, product, service, or idea and gather their comments within a comfortable and permissive environment facilitated by a skilled moderator. The intent of the focus group is to comprehend and determine the range of individuals' thoughts and preferences rather than to infer or generalize how respondents might answer. Focus groups are used for decision making, product and program development, primary and secondary research tools, client-satisfaction studies, policy making and testing, and understanding individual concerns.

Qualitative data from at least three different focus groups composed of homogenous participants can represent the subjective motivations and preferences of certain types of individuals. Focus groups are often identified as a nondirective method of study because they rely on asking open-ended questions and enforce no limit on respondents' answers. Good questions for a focus group study are controversial or provocative yet clear, short, one-dimensional, easy, and open-ended. An efficient strategy is to begin with easy, general questions, ask positive questions before negative questions, and conclude the testing with more specific questions.

The purpose and nature of the study determine the sample type and size of a focus group. Researchers often use purposeful sampling to better understand specific target audiences. The use of a homogenous group of individuals with sufficient variation is recommended. 10 to 12 people is an appropriate size for a commercial topic group, but 6 to 8 people are ideal for general social research.

Moderators should exhibit efficiency of time usage, encourage respondents to reply, and remain cautious when supplying participants with information about the topic or agenda. They are required to have an adequate background, listen to and be comfortable with others, avoid distraction, and know which questions are key to the proceedings.

Acquiring focus group data can be difficult because of both the spontaneity of respondents and the environment. Therefore, transcripts, recordings, notes, and memory-based tools are recommended to obtain significant information during group discussion. There are several strategies to analyzing such qualitative information, such as the popular long-table approach where researchers compare answers in terms of frequency, specificity, emotion, and extensiveness. Recently, researchers have used computers to catch key words and manage data.

Focus groups are a useful means of reflecting individuals' true emotions and behaviors toward subjective issues through a process of observing, listening, documenting, and reporting how respondents interpret what they think or like. However, due to the difficulty in obtaining subjective information from a small number of homogenous participants, focus groups exhibit lower external validity than other research methods. Thus, it is less certain that the opinions expressed in a focus group can be generalized to a larger population.

Hyun Jung Yun

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Ford, Betty (1918–)

Betty Ford was the first lady of the United States from 1974 to 1976. As wife of the first unelected president, following the Watergate scandal and Richard Nixon's departure from the White House, Ford attempted to develop an open relationship with the press and the American public. Ford was known as a candid first lady who would engage in frank discussions about both political and personal issues. Ford's political activism challenged the American public's expectations for a first lady, and Ford is credited with helping expand the role of first lady to include political activities. During her short tenure as first lady, Ford actively advocated for breast cancer awareness, caused a public furor with an interview on *60 Minutes,* and campaigned for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). After leaving the White House, Ford stayed in the public eye by founding the Betty Ford Clinic for treatment of substance abuse.

Ford's candidness with the American public extended to issues of personal health, including her need for (and later addiction to) painkillers and the radical mastectomy she received in 1974. Ford's diagnosis of breast cancer in 1974 served as a wake-up call for American women. Using the "white glove pulpit" available to first ladies, Ford made numerous speeches encouraging women to receive yearly mammograms and perform breast self-exams. In 1975, Ford was appointed an honorary chair of the American Cancer Society and was one of the 11 women named *Time* magazine's Man of the Year.

Ford's willingness to be candid with the American public reappeared during a controversial appearance on *60 Minutes* in which Ford applauded the *Roe v. Wade* decision and took moderate stances on premarital sex and marijuana use. The appearance prompted thousands of Americans to write angry letters to the White House. Ford's public appearances for the ERA also caused controversy. By 1975, the ERA had been ratified by 34 states and needed only 4 more for passage. Although President Ford did not explicitly support the ERA, Betty Ford was a passionate advocate, arguing that at stake in the passage of the ERA was human freedom.

Ford's political activism as first lady garnered mixed reactions from the public. Although her popularity ratings were strong by 1976 and some of the campaign materials for President Ford's reelection campaign read "Betty Ford's husband for President in '76," some commentators suggest that Betty Ford's outspokenness—particularly on issues like the ERA—alienated President Ford's conservative constituents and cost Gerald Ford the presidential election.

Tasha N. Dubriwny

See also First Ladies, Political Communication of

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Ford, Gerald (1913–2006)

The 38th president of the United States, Gerald R. Ford was the only president to serve without having ever been elected president or vice president. Considered a man of ordinary talents, Ford nevertheless steered the country through two of the nation's most tumultuous crises during his two-and-a-half-year presidency—the end of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Ford's elevation to the presidency occurred as the result of another scandal involving President Richard M. Nixon's first vice president, Spiro T. Agnew, who resigned from office in 1973. Ford was picked by Nixon, whose presidency was already clouded by the ongoing Watergate investigation, to serve as vice president under the terms of the 25th Amendment.

A 1935 graduate of the University of Michigan, where he played center on the football team and was named most valuable player, Ford attended Yale Law School despite offers to play football professionally. He served with distinction during World War II and returned to Michigan after the war, winning election to the House of Representatives in 1948. In 1965, a group of insurgent House Republicans succeeded in deposing minority leader Charles A. Halleck and replacing him with Ford. Ford's reputation as a party stalwart, his congressional experience, and longtime friendship with Nixon led to the selection of Ford,

who was easily confirmed by Congress for the vice presidential slot. Nixon's subsequent resignation in August 1974 found Ford in the oval office, declaring most famously on taking office that "Our long national nightmare is over." Ironically, Ford initially resisted using the phrase, considering it too harsh.

The Ford presidency struggled from the start. The country's initial enthusiasm diminished when, a month after taking office, Ford pardoned Nixon, sparing him, and the country, a protracted criminal investigation and trial. Ford never wavered in his belief that the pardon was justified but felt that it cost him the 1976 election, which he lost to Jimmy Carter. In addition, Ford had to grapple with the end of the Vietnam War, the seizure of the American merchant ship *Mayaguez,* instability in the Middle East, tensions with the Soviet Union, and domestic problems including high inflation, energy shortages, and public disillusionment with government.

Though an able politician, Ford lacked the communication skills generally regarded as necessary to presidential governance. Occasional verbal gaffes and displays of apparent physical clumsiness by the president, such as hitting his head on the doorway to *Air Force One*, stumbling down the plane's steps, and hitting spectators with an errant golf shot, led comedian Chevy Chase to lampoon Ford on the popular comedy program *Saturday Night Live*. In what soon became a national joke, Ford's physical clumsiness came to be seen by Americans as symptomatic of a politically clumsy, even inept, presidency, a verdict enforced when his policy initiatives foundered in the emboldened Democratic-controlled Congress, leaving him to rely on an unpopular defensive veto strategy. Ford used the veto 66 times in just over 2 years.

In his campaign against challenger Jimmy Carter, Ford engaged in a series of televised debates, the first presidential debates since the initial Kennedy-Nixon encounters in 1960. Ford was not particularly comfortable in the formal debate format. In the second debate on foreign policy matters, a Ford statement about Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe (or lack thereof) was ridiculed and strongly criticized by media and political observers.

Robert J. Spitzer

See also Ford, Betty; Nixon, Richard M.; *Saturday Night Live*; Watergate

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FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

Four Theories of the Press provided the primary theoretical framework for understanding variation in national media systems for a half century after its publication in 1956. Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm argued that a communication system reflects the structure of the society in which it operates, and that this relationship is determined by philosophical assumptions about human nature, state and society, knowledge and truth. They elaborated on four "concepts of what the press should be and do": the authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility, and Soviet Communist theories.

The authoritarian theory, they argued, grew out of the absolutist states that prevailed in most of Europe when the printing press was first introduced. It was based on the premise that the maintenance of social order depended on centralized state authority and required state control or guidance of communications media. Historically, they argued, this has been the most common model of communication system. The libertarian theory developed in the United States and Britain based on the liberal philosophy expressed by writers such as John Milton and J. S. Mill. It was based on the premise that truth should be determined in the "marketplace of ideas," and that the state should stand aside to allow individuals freely to exchange ideas. The social responsibility theory was a modification of the libertarian theory, articulated in the United States and Britain in the years just before the publication of *Four Theories.* It was based on critiques of the libertarian theory which stressed inequality of access to media in the age of large-scale media industries and the possibility that propaganda could overwhelm the rationality on which enlightenment philosophy was based. The social responsibility theory advocated correcting the deficiencies of libertarianism through professionalism, self-regulation, and limited state intervention. The Soviet Communist theory was understood as a variation of the authoritarian theory, in which the state used the media

as a tool of social transformation, rather than merely restricting it to prevent disruption of social order.

Since its publication, *Four Theories* has been widely used to classify the world's media systems, and many scholars have developed variants of its category system. It has played an important role in diffusing the liberal framework in media studies worldwide; the book was written at the height of the cold war and was intended to contribute to the victory of Western liberal conceptions of the press against Soviet Communist ones.

Four Theories has come under considerable criticism in recent years. It offered a highly ethnocentric view of world media systems, based almost entirely on the history of the British and U.S. press and the competition between these and the Soviet system. Its emphasis on the philosophical roots of "press theory" meant that it gave little attention to the actual structure and practice of media institutions and equally little to the structure of society in its political and economic dimensions. Although it pointed in the direction of comparative analysis of media systems, it was not actually based on such an analysis.

Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini

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Fourth Estate, Media as

The "fourth estate" refers to the press as an additional power in society. In the enlightenment, French society was seen as three estates: the king and the clergy; the aristocrats; and the middle class and poor. In the American political system, the three primary estates correspond to the branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial. In the U.S. version of the fourth estate, the press is as an additional branch, one that has a role to play in power-wielding. The function of the press is to provide information about the activities of government and other powerful entities.

In a remark about parliament, political philosopher Edmund Burke allegedly made reference to a fourth estate. In Burke's construction, the press was the most important element in society, presumably because it watched over the other three and provided an avenue of expression for ordinary citizens. This explanation refers to the watchdog role of the press. It means that the press guards the central values of democracy and checks abuses of power by the other estates. In this view, the press helps determine and frame the issues that are important to the public and thereby protects the public interest.

Historically, the rise of the fourth estate coincided with the expansion in the number of newspapers and the demise of licensing. It had its philosophical underpinnings in the enlightenment, which emphasized the quest of knowledge as a way to equality and economic security.

Thomas Carlyle, the 19th-century English author and man who made Burke's coinage legendary, said that being able to express one's self publicly was democracy in action. "Invent writing," he said, "and democracy is inevitable . . . Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole nation, becomes a power, a branch of government, with inalienable weight in law-making, in all acts of authority." Thus, in Carlyle's estimation, journalists deliberated on public matters and had an impact on government as it contemplated, enacted, and enforced laws.

In the U.S. system, journalists have a vital interest in public affairs. Their vantage point, though, is generally taken to be over and against government. The press reveals to the public government activity, including those actions that might show lawmakers and enforcers in less than favorable light. This oppositional relationship often puts journalists and government officials at odds, and over time the latter tend to build structural barriers that make it more difficult for the former to perform their professional duties. The "nattering nabobs of negativism," as Vice President Spiro Agnew dubbed journalists, see their oppositional position as necessary in a democracy.

In the modern world, according to Walter Lippmann, most citizens do not have time to attend to every government activity. Therefore, the journalist is looked to as a proxy who attends board and committee meetings and then reports back to the public about what happens. In this sense, the fourth estate refers to journalists shining light on state authority and other powerful entities in society and defending the rights of individuals.

The concept of the fourth estate as watchdog, though, is not explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution,

but rather by practice and subsequent law. The watchdog role of the press evolved over time and tends to be tolerated by government more than it is encouraged. It is a claim that the press has made for itself, coming out of the American revolution and developing with the abolitionist press and later the muckrakers. It is supported by principles like freedom of information and confidentiality—neither of which appears explicitly in the Constitution. The idea of the watchful eye that provides a check on the powerful in society dovetails with Joseph Pulitzer's class-based charge to the press that it ought to comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable. In this view, the press, in functioning as a spotlight on the powerful, serves ordinary citizens, not elites. Indeed, the crusading, progressive press of Pulitzer's era developed the investigative function of the press that led to pro-consumer legislation in the first decade of the 20th century. So strong has been the press claim for being a fourth entity in society that by 1975 Supreme Court Justice Potter Stuart observed that the First Amendment guaranteed the "institutional autonomy of the press." Stuart said the federal press clause provided for a "structural provision" that allowed for a "fourth institution outside the government to check the potential excesses of the other three branches."

In the United States, press freedom and independence have come from its commercial orientation. The watchdog function depends on the press maintaining its operation because of its financial health, not because of its dependency on party or governmental printing contracts. In the first century of the nation's existence, the party press was firmly in place, and the newspapers of the majority party were not critical of government. However, newspapers representing the minority party lambasted the government, and consumers were free to purchase the paper of either side. In the 19th century, newspapers, although essentially partisan in orientation, began to break away from the dependency model, relying for financial solvency more on advertising and less on subscriptions. Many of these papers made claims of independence, though those were hard to maintain during the antebellum and civil war period because the nation was in extreme political turmoil.

The movement toward a more independent press accelerated after the war, as publishers and editors realized that independence would not leave them in the vulnerable position that minority party journalists found themselves in the civil war. Hundreds of Democratic editors faced suppression in the war. Afterward, they realized that the path to independence was paved with commercial success. Thus, in the 20th century, the U.S. model became tied to independence and objectivity and a shrinking degree of partisan ties.

Many in journalism have championed free markets as a way to guarantee noninterference from the government. However, the problem with journalists yoking themselves to the free-market wagon is that news does not sell as well as entertainment, and thus contemporary newsgathering and presentation have less of a role in media operations. This dilutes the quality of information and raises questions about how well the public is informed—which, of course, is the basic function of the press in the watchdog theory. Some scholars have argued that the news media tend to replicate the positions of the government and other social elites because they are so dependent on sourcing within the upper echelons of society. Noam Chomsky, among others, says the news media act as manufacturers of consent to government positions. Chomsky sees journalists as de facto propagandists.

The term *fourth estate* is pervasive in American culture, and a journal titled *Fourth Estate*, put out by Ernest F. Birmingham and Frank L. Lancaster, covered the newspaper industry from 1894 to 1927.

David W. Bulla

See also Lippmann, Walter

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Fox, Vicente (1942–)

Vicente Fox, born July 2, 1942, was the first Mexican president from an opposition party elected in 71 years. The candidate from the right-of-center National Action Party (PAN), he was elected president of Mexico on July 2, 2000, defeating Francisco Labastida of the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI), a party in power since 1929.

Fox studied business administration and management at Mexico City's Jesuit-run Ibero-American University and at Harvard, joining Coca-Cola in 1964 as a route supervisor. Over the next 15 years he climbed the corporate ladder to become Coca-Cola's president for Mexico and Central America.

He entered politics in the 1980s and was elected to Congress in 1988, ran for the post of governor of Guanajuato in 1991, and won by a landslide victory on his second attempt in 1995. He took leave of absence as governor in 1999 to run in the presidential elections.

In the electoral campaign of 2000, voters, for the first time in the modern history of the country, experienced an aggressive dispute between candidates through radio, television, and the press. Candidates criticized their opponents openly and received extensive coverage by newspapers and news programs on a daily basis, and access to all parties seemed for the first time completely balanced and fair. After 71 years of officialism and self-censorship in the vast majority of mass media, opposition candidates not only received coverage on radio and television stations, but they were able to criticize openly and harshly the current president of Mexico and the candidate of the ruling party. Vicente Fox participated in comedy shows and sketches, tolerating the irreverence of the anchors and actors and the frivolity of the content in order to reach important segments of the public not reached by the news media. During the Fox campaign, fierce criticism against the official contender, populist acts, photo opportunities, and sound bytes were the rule.

Out of a total of six presidential candidates, Fox was the one using more aggressive and innovative political ads, including a significant number of negative ones. Taking into account the historical context where private and public television stations had never transmitted ads from the opposition either praising candidates or criticizing the ruling party or current administrations, numerous ads attacking the PRI's candidate as belonging to a corrupt party monopolizing power for 71 years, or ads praising the personal qualities of Fox, surprised and impacted potential voters.

His administration started on December 1, 2000, and lasted until November 30, 2006. Despite his clear victory over his rivals, his party did not get the majority in Congress, and he had to rule the country with the opposition of both the lower and upper houses. During the whole time of his administration Fox continued using marketing tactics like surveys, focus groups, and thousands of spots promoting his image and his administration's achievements.

José Carlos Lozano

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Fox News

The Fox News network is a cable news channel. Located in the United States (New York), Fox News is owned by Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation media conglomerate. Fox News began airing news programming in 1996. The network is headed by Roger Ailes, a former political media consultant.

With up to 15 hours of live programming per day, Fox News has climbed steadily in the ratings and is now the top-rated cable news channel, ahead of its older competitor, CNN. Among the most popular programs on Fox news are *The O'Reilly Factor* (featuring Bill O'Reilly) and *Hannity & Colmes,* which are the two highest rated cable shows. The channel's overall viewship has had some ups and downs over the past few years, but Fox continues to draw more viewers than any other network news program, including CNN, ABC, CBS, NBC, and MSNBC.

Fox prides itself on its motto "fair and balanced" and other proclamations of its objectvity and intent such as "we report, you decide" and "we put the world in context." One innovation attributed to Fox was the creation of the "Fox News Alert," which is designed to interrupt other programming to highlight specific current news events.

Almost from its beginning Fox has faced accusations of conservative bias. Although the network and its owner Rupert Murdoch continually deny any suggestion of bias, other journalists and reporters perceive Fox as favoring a Republican viewpoint. One attempt to document the charges comes in a documentary by Robert Greenwald called *Outfoxed: Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism.* The documentary is critical of

Murdoch's media empire and suggests it has been used to convey his personal views at the expense of neutrality and objectivity. The documentary maintains that employees are required to espouse the conservative viewpoint or lose their jobs.

Fox, like other news outlets, also maintains a Web site. On the site at www.foxnews.com, the network provides videos, Web logs, and special programs by Fox personalities like O'Reilly, Hannity and Colmes, Brit Hume, Greta Van Susteren, and John Gibson.

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Ailes, Roger; CNN (Cable News Network); O'Reilly, Bill

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Framing

Most scholars of political communication probably agree on one thing: There is not a widely accepted definition of *framing* in the field of political communication. Since the 1980s, researchers have offered a variety of perspectives on framing that all differ with respect to their underlying assumptions including the way they conceptually define and empirically observe frames and the framing process. This entry provides the conceptual definitions relevant to the framing model, the theoretical assumptions underlying the idea of framing, and the important implications for framing research in the field of political communication.

Conceptual Definitions and Assumptions of Framing

Scheufele has classified framing research by grouping studies, based on their level of analysis and the specific process of framing they examined, making important differentiation between *media frames* and *audience frames.*

Media Frames

Frames at the media level act as "central organizing ideas or story lines" which give meaning and perspective to events or happenings. Embedded within news coverage, such ideas provide ways of interpreting and structuring meaning. Journalists employ frames as important translation devices that serve to make their jobs easier. In other words, frames allow reporters to reduce relatively complex issues, such as the war in Iraq or global climate change, into a format that conforms to the constraints of their medium but that also allows audiences to easily integrate the news story into their existing cognitive schema.

Media frames both shape and reflect the policy process. Rarely is a political decision reached without consideration of how it will be defined in the press. Recognizing the importance of the news media, political actors engage in the "frame-building" process, investing heavily in supplying packaged news items and story information to journalists. By framing an emerging issue early and strategically in the news, political operatives can impact the "scope of participation," determining the policy venue where an issue is decided, by whom, and with what outcomes. Early definitional victories can have lasting and powerful feedback effects, insulating future news coverage from rival framing interpretations that might challenge the status quo.

Audience Frames

Media frames work as organizing themes or ideas because they play to individual-level interpretive schema among audiences. These schemas are tools for information processing that allow any individual—whether an average citizen, journalist, or policymaker—to categorize new information quickly and efficiently, based on how that information is defined or described by the media. Framing research has often used the metaphorical term *audience frame* to describe these schemas, seeing them as mental classifications for individual information processing.

Two types of frames of reference can be used to interpret and process information: global and long-term "worldviews" on the one hand and short-term issue-related frames of reference on the other hand. Erving Goffman's idea of frames of reference refers to more long-term, socialized schemas that are often shared in societies or at least within certain groups in societies. In the U.S. context, examples might include Evangelical

Christian identity, or alternatively, secular liberal orientations. But in addition to these more long-term and socially shared schemas, there are also short-term, issue-related frames of reference that are learned from mass media and that can have a significant impact on organizing incoming information and on drawing inferences from that information. Examples might include the strongly held view that people fail in life because they are lazy, or alternatively, that unfortunate personal circumstance is not the result of individual flaws but the product of a system that stacks the deck against success for a particular group.

The Interplay of Media and Audience Frames

The applicability model of framing offered by Price and Tewksbury provides a theoretical explanation of how media frames and audience frames interact to influence individual perceptions and attitudes. They argue that frames work only if they are applicable to a specific interpretive schema. These interpretive schemas can be pre-existing ones or worldviews that are acquired through socialization processes or other types of social learning. But they can also be part of the message itself. For example, a news message may suggest a connection between tax policy and unemployment rates. The news message may suggest that the best way to think about whether higher or lower taxes are desirable is through a consideration of whether one wants higher or lower unemployment. Thus, the message has said that considerations about unemployment are applicable to questions about taxes.

The applicability model, therefore, implies that when audience members do not have an interpretive schema available to them in memory, and the schema is not provided in a news story, a frame that applies the construct in a message will not be effective. Framing effects therefore vary in strength as a partial function of the fit between the schemas a frame suggests should be applied to an issue and either the presence of those frames in an audience member's mind or the content of the message itself.

Theoretical Explanations of Framing

The applicability model is consistent with the two larger disciplinary contexts within which researchers commonly examine framing: sociological approaches and psychological approaches.

Psychological Approaches

Work in this area of framing research is often traced back to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky's notions of bounded rationality, more broadly, and prospect theory, in particular. In 2002, Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize for his contributions to this collaborative effort, and in a summary of his acceptance speech he nicely summed up the basic premise of prospect theory as "perception is reference-dependent." The idea of reference dependency assumes that a given piece of information will be interpreted differently, depending on which interpretive schema an individual applies. More importantly, however, different interpretive schemas can be invoked by framing the same message differently. This makes it clear that context can determine meaning and interpretation. Although his experimental work focuses mostly on the impact of framing on economic and risk-related choices, the implications for communication are obvious.

The debate in the United States over embryonic stem cell research presents a useful example. Over the past 5 years, patient advocates, politicians, and scientists have delivered a focused message in news coverage and political advertising, employing "social progress" and "economic competitiveness" frames to argue that the research "offers hope for millions of Americans," whereas limits on federal or state dollars would catalyze a "brain drain" of top scientific talent. This successful frame-building campaign has helped to drive overall public support for funding from the high 40% range in 2001 to the high 50% range as of late 2006. However, opponents of increased government funding continue to frame the debate around the moral implications of research, and, as of 2006, a strong majority of social conservatives remain opposed to research. The lesson from this example is that powerful "perceptual screens," in this case the schema of social conservatism, can help filter out even dominant and positive media frames about stem cell research. On this scientifically complex and morally uncertain issue, public perception is heavily reference dependent.

Sociological Approaches

Work in this area is often traced to Erving Goffman's work on frames of reference, which served as the foundation for William Gamson and his colleagues' "social constructivist" approach to framing research. According to this social constructivist view, in order to make sense of political issues, citizens use as resources the frames available in media coverage but

integrate these packages with the frames forged by way of personal experience or conversations with others. Media frames might help set the terms of the debate among citizens, but rarely, if ever, do they exclusively determine public opinion. Instead, as part of a "frame contest," one interpretative package might gain influence because it resonates with popular culture or a series of events, fits with media routines or practices, and/or is heavily sponsored by elites.

According to this approach, because frames of reference are socially negotiated by citizens, framing cannot be studied within an experimental lab as an individual-level cognitive "effect" compared across contrived conditions. Rather the *process of framing* should be observed in the "real world" by tracking the careers of certain frames in media coverage and by examining via focus groups how these interpretative packages are used and made sense of in conversations.

To test the assumptions of the sociological approach, in a recent study Vincent Price and his colleagues introduced an innovative "constructionist" methodology, recruiting a representative sample of the U.S. population to participate in 50 discussion groups that interacted online. Categorized by self-reported ideology into homogenously conservative, homogenously liberal, and ideologically diverse groups, participants were asked to debate within Internet forums the topic of gay marriage. Across groups the issue was framed for discussion as either "homosexual marriage/granting special rights," or as "gay civil unions/granting equal rights." Although the two framing manipulations shaped the content and tone of discussion across groups, neither framing condition led to significant opinion change. Based on their results, Price and his colleagues conclude that psychological approaches using laboratory experimental designs may overstate media effects on public attitudes.

Current Issues in Framing Research

Across the framing literature, several core questions and issues remain unresolved.

Levels of Analysis Matter

The term *framing* has been used almost interchangeably to describe individual-level media effects, macro-level influences on news content, and other related processes. At least four separate processes involving framing at different levels of analysis have been identified.

The first of these processes is frame building. Similar to agenda building, frame building refers to the intrinsic and extrinsic influences on the frames used in news coverage. These factors include the personal predispositions of journalists, organizational routines and pressures, the efforts by outside groups to promote certain frames, the impact of other parallel issues or events, and the type of policy arena where decision making or conflict might take place.

Frame setting, the second process, refers to the process of frame transfer from media outlets to audiences. Some communication researchers have suggested that this frame setting effect is conceptually similar to the transfer of salience hypothesized in the agenda-setting model. Recent research, however, has shown that the two processes rely on distinctly different theoretical premises and cognitive processes.

Most framing research in political communication has focused on a third process: individual-level outcomes of framing. These individual-level outcomes include attributions of responsibility, support for various policy proposals, and citizen competence. Unfortunately, despite making important contributions in describing effects of media framing on behavioral, attitudinal, or cognitive outcomes, most of these studies have not provided systematic explanations as to why and how these two variables are linked to one another. The notion of applicability effects outlined earlier provides a first step in this direction.

The last process related to framing that political communication scholars have explored is the idea of journalists themselves as audiences for frames. Without directly referring to the idea of framing, it has been suggested that, similar to "regular" audiences, journalists are indeed susceptible to frames set by news media. For example, one study demonstrated how news coverage of isolated crimes in a community was framed as a "crime wave against the elderly" by initially a small number of local media and how that frame was soon picked up by other journalists and spread across other news outlets and communities. Fishman labels this phenomenon a "news wave." In more recent work, Entman has explored this "journalists-as-audience" process in coverage of foreign policy conflicts.

New Issue, Same Frames

A second problem the field of political communication is beginning to struggle with relates to consistency and validity in framing research. With each

new study or each new topic examined, researchers have a tendency to "reinvent the wheel" in identifying and labeling the frames that exist. Yet based on previous studies, within specific policy domains, a deductively derived set of frames might apply. For example, previous studies describe a set of frames that reoccur across science-related policy debates. Originally identified in Gamson and Modigliani's classic study of nuclear energy, a similar typology of frames has been further developed in studies of biotechnology in Europe and the United States. Specifically, in the early years of development, a new discovery or emerging technology is likely to be heavily promoted by way of "social progress" and "economic development" interpretations. Only later does the issue grow controversial as new frames focus on dimensions of "ethics and morality," "public accountability," or a "Pandora's box" of unknown risks and potential catastrophe. As these interpretations ebb and flow in prominence within the policy and media system, they activate differential perceptions across publics, depending on the schema held by those audiences.

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See also Agenda Setting; *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, The*

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Franken, Al (1951–)

Al Franken is a political commentator, writer, performer, and radio host who is well known for his support of liberal ideologies. Born Alan Stuart Franken in New York City, Franken was raised in St. Louis Park, Minnesota, and graduated *cum laude* from Harvard in 1973 with a Bachelor of Arts in government. While engaging political and social issues as one of the original writers of the sketch comedy program *Saturday Night Live* (in which he also performed) and the short-lived NBC comedy series *Lateline,* some of his most discussed political works include his comedy-laced writings and public statements.

Franken has written five bestselling books, with three of them hitting number one on *The New York Times* bestseller list. Fox News sued Franken over the title of his 2004 volume, *Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them: A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right,* claiming that his title infringed upon their trademark. A federal judge threw the case out of court, citing

Political satirist Al Franken speaks during a news conference at Air America Radio studios August 25, 2004, in New York City. Franken urged New Yorkers and Americans across the country who are opposed to the Bush presidency to open their windows and shout the moment the president takes the stage in New York to deliver his address to the National Republican Convention. Dubbed the "Great American Shout-Out," Franken urged New Yorkers to yell "Fuggedaboutit," a play on the phrase "Forget about it." Al Franken announced his candidacy for the U.S. Senate in 2007.

Source: Getty Images.

Fox's charges as "wholly without merit." Franken's books generally attack conservative political figures and issues and have generated responses from a variety of conservative pundits.

Franken also employs radio and Internet outlets to air his political views. In 2004 he agreed to host a radio show on the new Air America Radio, a radio network dedicated to liberal issues. Initially his program was called *The O'Franken Factor* (a parody of Fox News commentator Bill O'Reilly's program) but later changed to *The Al Franken Show.* In 2005 he began maintaining a Web log as part of the progressive *Huffington Post* Web site.

In addition to a prolific writing, performing, and radio career, Franken was selected to serve as a fellow with Harvard's Kennedy School of Government at the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy. Franken brought controversy to this position when in 2003 he used the Shorenstein Center letterhead to write a satirical letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft requesting information of a sexual nature. After Ashcroft publicly criticized the letter, Franken wrote a letter of apology to Ashcroft and extended the apology to other conservative political figures mentioned in the letter and to the Shorenstein Center.

Franken has actively been part of many political rallies, most notably a presidential election rally in 2004 where a man loudly heckled speaker Howard Dean and, in the process, somehow became involved in a physical altercation with Franken. Although many claim Franken acted in self-defense, the move solicited criticism from Republican pundits who shamed Franken for physically attacking someone who was exercising his free speech. The public seemed to quickly forget the issue. In February 2007 Franken announced his candidacy for the U.S. Senate as a Democrat from his home state of Minnesota.

Jimmie Manning

See also Fox News; Humor in Politics; *Saturday Night Live*

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Free Airtime

The concept of free airtime generally refers to a plan or process of making commercial airtime available to political candidates at no charge. Application ideas have varied from public forums and debates to political commercials, with proponents citing the public interest standard for broadcasters as the impetus for the free airtime.

Free airtime is usually linked to campaign finance reform. Advocates argue that commercial broadcast

time is one of the largest expenditures in an election campaign; free airtime would decrease campaign expenditures by requiring local broadcasters—through either Federal Communications Commission rulings or congressional law—to provide free advertising time for federal candidates for office. The free time is usually proposed in conjunction with having candidates meet spending limits or other criteria. Proponents maintain that because television is the biggest campaigning expense, spending limits can only be met if television is provided. The cost to the stations is justified through the "public interest" clause in the Communications Act of 1934. This clause requires stations to operate in the "public interest" in order to maintain their licenses. Public interest as a concept, however, is not defined. Opponents to free TV claim serious First Amendment and Fifth Amendment concerns and express doubt that the bills offered to date would bring any serious reform.

The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) has been an outspoken opponent of the free airtime concept, citing an undue economic burden on broadcast stations. NAB argues that broadcasters provide many on-air opportunities for candidates in the form of debates and public forums—and that candidates are often reluctant to use that free airtime. Instead, candidates want commercial time that they can control; NAB argues that commercials are not in the public's best interest.

On the other hand, grassroots organizations such as Common Cause have been long-time advocates of the free airtime concept. Groups such as Common Cause argue that the spectrum used for free by broadcasters really belongs to the public and should be used to help create a more transparent election process. They advocate the use of free airtime as a way to cut down on campaign expenditures.

The Federal Communications Commission has, to date, declined to address the free airtime concept. Outspoken commissioners have stated that free airtime is an issue for Congress; because free airtime would be the equivalent of a tax on broadcasters, a bill would have to be written and passed before the Federal Communications Commission would enforce the concept.

The History of the Free Airtime Concept

President John Kennedy has often been credited with originating the idea of free airtime in 1962. Elaborate plans were devised over the next few years, mostly based on party size and previous vote acquisition, but none was ever implemented.

In 1996 the Free TV for Straight Talk Coalition (headed by journalists Paul Taylor and Walter Cronkite) advocated free airtime for presidential candidates. Networks reluctantly agreed during the fall campaign to provide varying lengths of free time slots for candidates Clinton and Dole. These spots, which varied from 1 minute to 2½ minutes, were aired on CBS, NBC, FOX, CNN, PBS, and NPR (radio slots). This experimental effort was not deemed particularly successful, and many voters were unaware of the free time spots.

President Bill Clinton brought the concept back to the forefront in 1997 as part of his national debate on campaign reform. Since that time, numerous free airtime bills have been introduced in Congress, including the Presidential Election Issues Access Act (1997), the Free Political Broadcasting Act of 1985, the Campaign Broadcast Discount Act of 1988, and the original version of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997 (also known as McCain-Feingold).

The original Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997 would have eliminated "soft money" (monies given to the party or to a political action committee but not to be used for a specific candidate), established spending limits, and for those who follow the bill's guidelines, provided free television advertising time. Candidates would have had to choose whether or not to comply with the bill, but the free television time was the incentive for compliance. This bill contained the most comprehensive plan for free airtime. Had it passed intact, it would have provided each senatorial candidate in the general election a total of 30 minutes of free airtime which could be used Monday through Friday during prime time. No more than 15 minutes could be used on a single broadcast station. Although 30 minutes is the total allotment, the bill does not specify any other time frame for the free air. Because the candidate must be qualified for the general election, it is assumed that the 30 minutes must be used between the primary and the general election. The candidate may select the time increments they desire as long as the time is not less than 30 seconds and not more than 5 minutes. A related bill in the House would have provided similar benefits for House campaigns. By the time the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act passed Congress in 2002, however, all free airtime provisions had been removed from the bill.

What McCain-Feingold—and other similar plans—failed to take into account is the lack of congruence

between the Nielsen Designated Market Areas for 0television (DMAs) and the congressional districts. Stations in a given market would be providing airtime for more than one congressional race. Stations might also be required to provide free airtime for congressional and senatorial candidates in other states. For example, the New York City market (which is the largest DMA) would have to provide free airtime for 64 candidates in any presidential election year. At 30 minutes per candidate during prime time, these stations would stand to lose more than 7 weeks of prime-time revenue.

Although the U.S. system has not adopted the free time concept, many other countries have institutionalized such systems and routinely provide free time on television and radio for political candidates. Sometimes these systems provide the time for free and candidates cannot buy other time (for example, Britain), or in other countries a dual system of free time on public channels and purchased time on private channels exists (for instance, Germany).

Glenda C. Williams

See also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act

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Freedom Forum Media Studies Center

The Freedom Forum Media Studies Center was once one of the nation's leading independent media think tanks, devoted to improving understanding between the media and the public. Established in New York City in 1985, the center moved in 1996 from Columbia University to Madison Avenue in Manhattan, just blocks from many of the U.S. major print and broadcast companies. The Freedom Forum, a nonpartisan foundation dedicated to free press and free speech founded by Allen H. Neuharth in Arlington, Virginia, closed the Media Studies Center in early 2000 due to investment reversals and heavy spending on other projects, such as Newseum. The forum now funds the operations of Newseum, an interactive museum of news under construction in Washington, D.C., as well as the First Amendment Center and the Diversity Institute, both at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. Freedom Forum started phasing the center out several years before 2000, and it did not mention it at all in its 1999 and 2000 reports. The New York office, which continued to be a satellite of the First Amendment Center in early 2000, was shut altogether in November.

Among other things, the Media Studies Center relied on its location at the intersection of the media world to draw powerful and controversial practitioners alike to the table for discussion and supported 1-year fellowships that resulted in more than 100 books and hundreds of articles and monographs. Fellows spent an academic year or part of a year in residence at the center in Manhattan working on projects aimed at enriching the knowledge of media practitioners and increasing public understanding of how the media work.

The Media Studies Center also published, three times a year, the *Media Studies Journal,* which has been discontinued since fall 2000. Scholars, practitioners, and people interested in media discussed issues of importance to the mass media and the public. Some back issues are available on the forum's Web site or can be ordered at no charge. Other products developed at Columbia were an electronic newspaper, public records software for journalists, and several innovative television programs and prototypes.

The center organized public forums around the world to discuss media issues such as credibility and fairness, coverage of science and technology, coverage of women and minorities, public perceptions of news coverage, Internet censorship in Asia, and other more specific topics such as the Clinton-Lewinsky story or the Y2K problem.

Raluca Cozma

Freedom of Information

President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the Freedom of Information Act on July 4, 1966, after a

10-year concerted effort by Congress. The law was commonly referred to as FOIA, and it required that government-held information be available to the public unless it is considered to be designated among nine categories of exclusions. These exemptions include information that is restricted for national security, law enforcement investigation records, government employee personnel records, medical records, banking records, trade secrets required by government registration, internal government agency memoranda, geological and geophysical data on oil and gas wells, and any material explicitly exempt by an act of Congress.

The two-page bill not only included the nine exemptions to available information, but also said that agencies must provide notice of what was available in the *Federal Register.* It also required agency opinions and orders be published, as well as agency records, proceedings, and the limitations on exemptions. The codification of the amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act, known as the Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, went into effect July 4, 1967.

The Senate report that accompanied the bill said that the Act was intended to "establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure." In a signing statement President Johnson wrote, "This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: a democracy works best when the people have all the information that the security of the nation permits."

About 20 states already had laws directing that government-held information be available to the public before the U.S. Congress was successful in its effort. Soon after the federal law was enacted, all 50 states had similarly intentioned laws.

Historical Context of Freedom of Information

The first session of the first Congress of the United States worried about the public's need to know what government was doing. During that session there was some debate about how to best provide the necessary reports, but there was little delay in congressional action. On September 15, 1789, Congress required the secretary of state to publish in at least three of the public newspapers printed within the United States every bill, order, resolution, vote of the houses of Congress, as well as presidential objection to these actions.

Though this early resolve in American history might suggest a continuing and empowering atmosphere of government disclosure, it was not the case. In times of open conflict there was little discussion about the need for secrecy, and the courts denied any attempts to force an easing of secrecy. Often, however, during times of relative calm the president and his cabinet were forthcoming about their activities, with Congress pressing the case and the courts responding with some support. Because peace was rare, Congress often found it necessary to push hard where the path was not already well-trod for any disclosure about executive branch decision making and follow-through.

Twentieth-Century Activities Before the Enactment of FOIA

Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 to force federal agencies to provide information about their activities on a regular basis. Unfortunately the language of the law allowed the agencies to decide which information would be made available if the agency thought it in the best interest of the public to withhold some of it. Frustration with the shortcomings of the Administrative Procedure Act led to more congressional hearings and further efforts to force the executive branch to open up. President Harry Truman's expansion of the military's information classification system to include documents from all executive branch agencies did not make things easier with the legislature. Nor did his expansion of executive privilege endear him to Congress. The struggle for more public review of executive agencies during the 1950s and the cold war was a continuing priority among some legislative members. Continued evidence that the executive branch was not only refusing requests from the public, but increasingly rejecting requests from Congress forced members to launch an investigation and publish an unflattering report titled "Withholding Information From the Public and the Press, A Survey of Federal Departments and Agencies" published by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights in 1959.

Outside Congress

The American Society of Newspaper Editors established a committee to compile a report on freedom of information problems. That report, "The People's Right to Know: Legal Access to Public Records and Proceedings," was published in 1953, and its author, Dr. Harold L. Cross, served as a resource to congressional subcommittees that later wrote the FOI legislation.

The American Bar Association recommended that the entire Administrative Procedure Act be revised, as did the U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Legal Services and Procedures, also known as the Hoover Commission, in the mid-1950s.

1974 Revision of FOIA

Soon after the 1966 law went into effect hearings were held frequently during the early 1970s. These activities resulted in the House and the Senate each passing amendment bills that went to a conference committee late in 1974. Both House and Senate agreed to the conference report, which was then sent to the president on October 1, 1974. Among the significant changes to the original law that the separate bills addressed were more frequent reporting of FOIA, shortening the agency response time when an administrative appeal was requested, broadening of the definition of agency to include all executive departments like the executive office of the president, military and government controlling of corporations and independent agencies, and relaxing the definition of identifiable records in a request to that of more simply, reasonably described.

President Gerald Ford received the bill, with many political concerns. Though Watergate investigations 2 years earlier and the resignation of the President Richard Nixon formally accepted on August 7, 1974, had eroded public esteem of the White House, Ford was said to have concerns about the long-term effects of too much disclosure by the executive branch. President Ford had supported the original FOIA legislation when he was a member of Congress, but his shift to the executive branch also shifted his view of the problems detailed in the amendments. President Ford issued some specific suggestions to amend the language of the bill, but Congress set about to override his veto. On November 20, the House voted 371 to 31, with 32 abstentions, in favor of the override and the Senate followed on November 21 with 65 in favor and 27 against. The FOIA amendments, then, became effective on February 19, 1975.

1986 Freedom of Information Reform Act and the 1996 Electronic FOIA

Nearly every session there were some amendments to FOIA offered in Congress. Reform provisions were introduced about the fee structure and waiver provisions based on the purpose and kind of request. With much haste and a minimum of explanation, the House and Senate agreed on a single version of the FOIA amendments and passed the reforms attached to a more popular bill, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. President Reagan signed the bill on October 27 and the law went into effect immediately. Then in 1996 President Bill Clinton signed into law the Electronic Freedom of Information Act, which instructed agencies to put as much of their public information on the World Wide Web as possible.

Shannon E. Martin

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Freedom of Information Act

See Freedom of Information

Freedom of the Press

See Press Freedom

Fundraising

See Campaign Finance

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GALLUP POLLS

See POLLS

GANDHI, INDIRA (1917–1984)

Indira Gandhi was the only child of Kamala and Jawaharlal Nehru. She started her involvement in politics early, at age 12, serving as the leader of the children's political group, the Monkey Brigade. Their task was to help the Indian Congress gain control back from Britain. After Indira completed college in 1936, Kamala Nehru passed away, leaving Indira to care for her father. In 1942, Indira married Feroze Gandhi. Soon after marrying, in September 1942, Indira and Feroze were imprisoned by the British for charges of subversion. They were released in May 1943. In 1944, they welcomed their first son, Rajiv, and in 1943 their second son, Sanjay. Soon after Indira's father was elected India's first prime minister, she set out on the road with him as his assistant and caretaker. For Indira, 1959 brought a political career of her own. She was elected president of the Indian National Congress. In 1960, Feroze died of a heart attack. Indira, now a single mother, continued to push forward. In 1964, she was elected to Parliament, and in the same year her father was assassinated. After the death of her father's successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1966, Indira was appointed prime minister. She was considered a compromise candidate and was called a "dumb doll," but she proved ambitious and strong. In 1971, India defeated Pakistan and was considered "an invincible goddess." In 1975, Indira was convicted of violating election laws in her 1971 reelection campaign. The courts demanded her resignation, but instead she declared a state of emergency and arrested her opponents. This act caused an overturn in her conviction, and she remained in office until she lost the election in 1977. In 1980, she was reelected; in that same year her youngest son, Sanjay, was killed in a plane crash. Then in 1984, after a successful attack on Sikh rebels in the Golden Temple, Indira was assassinated by two of her own Sikh guards at her home in New Delhi.

Indira Gandhi was an extraordinary woman and politician. She is remembered for her battle against poverty and her commitment to the honor and unity of India. She is also acknowledged for her foreign policies, the win over Pakistan, and a 20-year treaty of friendship with the USSR. During her tenure, India's economic status rose tremendously. India became the third largest country in scientific and technical manpower, fifth in military power, sixth member of the nuclear club, seventh to space, and 10th industrial power. Unfortunately, what Indira is most remembered and criticized for is her declaration of the state of emergency. This incident is known as "Indira's Cardinal Sin." The act created a devastating blow to India's democracy and allowed an influx of political pollution to occur that still remains today. As history shows, Indira Gandhi did overcome the hurdle in her 1980 reelection, but the stigma of her poor choice haunts her legacy to this day.

Alecea Davis Jones

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Gatekeeping

See News Selection Process

Gender and Politics

Issues of gender and politics have played a fundamental role in American history since the country's founding fathers penned, "All men are created equal." Since those words were written, women have struggled for fair and equal representation in government, media, and society as a whole.

After the 2006 midterm election, women occupied only 16.3% of the seats in the House of Representatives, 16% of the seats in the Senate, 18% of state gubernatorial positions, and 14.4% of the mayoral positions in the largest cities in America. While these numbers are not representational of the percentage of females living within the United States, they can at least be regarded as a modest improvement for a country that did not allow women to vote until 1920, when the 19th Amendment was ratified.

While there have been several prominent female governors, congressional members, vice presidential, and presidential candidates, when running for elective offices female politicians continue to face an uphill battle, a battle that is exacerbated as the candidate moves up the political ladder. In all political campaigns, the ability to raise adequate funds is essential to a candidate's success. Although since the 1990s women have shown the ability to raise money for their campaigns and their parties, the few who have run for the presidency have always fallen short of raising the massive amount of money necessary to compete in even the earliest presidential primaries and caucuses. Beginning in the 1970s, organizations have been established to provide money for the campaigns of local, state, and national women candidates and women's issues. These organizations include the National Women's Political Caucus, EMILY'S (Early Money Is Like Yeast) List, and Women In the Senate and House (WISH).

Studies of the press coverage of candidates in early elections of the 21st century indicate that male and female candidates receive relatively equal press coverage, although differences in the type of coverage remain. For example, more time is devoted to describing a female candidate's physical appearance than would ever be allotted to describing the appearance of a male candidate. Stories of personal issues such as marriage, divorce, and the birth and care of children have the ability to damage a woman's political career more severely than that of a male politician. These contrasts in how male and female candidates are portrayed in the media are rooted in traditional sex role stereotypes. Because leadership is often conceptualized as a masculine quality, female politicians must try to balance their image to appear both feminine and masculine. Until the 1980s, female candidates were cautioned about the use of negative political advertisements because it was feared that aggressiveness would violate the public's perception about how a woman should act. However, in the 21st century, political advertising studies have found that female candidates who are perceived to be strong and aggressive are more likely to be successful in their campaigns than are candidates who demonstrate more feminine qualities.

Essential to the topic of gender and politics is the role that female voters play and are perceived to play by political parties and political pollsters. Since ratification of the 19th Amendment, some feared that women would vote in blocs and thus be in a power position when it came to social and welfare issues. Although a female voting bloc never truly materialized, beginning in the 1970s evidence began to suggest that there were statistically significant differences between how men and women voted. In fact, the results of a 1983 Harris poll indicated that women were 17% more likely to vote for a Democratic Party candidate than for the incumbent, Republican President Ronald Reagan. Since the 1980s, women voters have continued to favor Democratic rather than Republican candidates. In the first few election cycles of the 21st century, the targeting of the female vote has become more fragmented as both parties have sought to appeal to particular demographics that were thought to be especially important in tipping the scales of an election. Such a strategy was evident in the Democratic

and Republican parties' attempt to appeal to the "soccer mom" during the 2000 election and the "security mom" during the 2004 election.

In trying to appeal to female voters, some politicians may choose to take stances on so-called women's issues, including education, health and welfare, environmental policies, and family care. The most debated women's issue to come to the forefront in the political arena is abortion. Following the 1973 *Roe v. Wade* Supreme Court decision, which declared that the prior governmental stance against abortion was unconstitutional, there have been few political issues as divisive. Since the ruling, many candidates have used either a pro-choice stance or a pro-life stance in attempts to appeal to particular segments of the female vote.

Regardless of issues used by political parties and candidates to appeal to women, three truths about women's voting emerge. First, women do not, as a whole, vote along women's rights issues. Second, there is no evidence that women prefer female candidates to male candidates. And third, prior to the midterm election of 2006, the Democratic Party appears to have benefited from the women's vote more than did the Republican Party.

In summary, gender has played a significant role in American politics, from the Suffragists' struggle to see the 19th Amendment ratified, to the debate concerning abortion, to the struggle that women continue to face when seeking equal representation in county, state, and federally elected offices.

Judith S. Trent and David M. Luftig

See also Women Candidates, Advertising; Women Candidates, News Coverage

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Gender Gap

See Gender and Politics

Gerbner, George (1919–2005)

George Gerbner was born in Hungary, emigrated to the United States in 1939, and became a U.S. citizen. He earned a BA degree in journalism from the University of California at Berkeley in 1942 and worked as a journalist at the *San Francisco Chronicle* until enlisting in the Army during World War II.

After the war, he earned an MA in 1951 and his PhD in 1955 from the University of Southern California. In 1955, his dissertation, "Toward a General Theory of Communication," was named "Best Dissertation." He joined the faculty at the Institute for Communication Research at the University of Illinois in 1956.

Dr. Gerbner became professor of communication and dean of the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania in 1964. He was awarded the only study funded as part of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence to analyze the content of television programs. This research was the beginning of the Cultural Indicators Project, which continued to receive funding from the Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior, the National Institute of Mental Health, and other agencies. It became the longest continuously running research project focused on television. Professor Gerbner served as dean of the Annenberg School until 1989, when he was named Bell Atlantic Professor of Telecommunications in the Department of Broadcasting, Telecommunications, and Mass Media at Temple University in Philadelphia. In 1990 he founded the Cultural Environment Movement, a global coalition of organizations and activists devoted to changing media practices and policies. He served as the executive editor of the *Journal of Communication* for many years.

Professor Gerbner formulated a paradigm for understanding mass communication made up of three prongs: institutional process analysis, message system (content) analysis, and cultivation analysis. Cultivation analysis, an important theoretical perspective in communication, is based on the idea that the views and behaviors of those who spend more time with the media, particularly television, reflect what they've

seen on television. Cultivation theory is a process focusing upon the commonality in what people think about or know and assesses television's contributions to viewers' conceptions of social reality.

Dr. Gerbner is best known for his studies of television violence. For more than 30 years, the Violence Profiles, created as part of the Cultural Indicators Project, provided a continuous and consistent monitoring of violence in primetime network broadcast programming. Violence was studied as a demonstration of power, examining the demographic profiles of who gets hurt and who does the hurting and focusing upon its long-term consequences for both thinking and action. Professor Gerbner often testified before Congress using the Violence Profiles to provide evidence that the amount of violence in primetime network programs changed very little from one television season to the next and had a decided effect upon the public's conceptions of violence in their lives and in society.

Professor Gerbner was a prolific writer. Two of his most important and seminal writings include his 1969 article in *AV Communication Review,* "Toward 'Cultural Indicators': The Analysis of Mass Mediated Message Systems," and the 1976 *Journal of Communication* article (written with Larry Gross), "Living With Television: The Violence Profile."

Nancy Signorielli

See also Cultivation Theory

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German Unification, Role of the Media

The process of German reunification—in fact, the entire period between the peaceful demonstrations in autumn 1989, the first free elections in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in March 1990, and the unification day in October 1990—could not be predicted by the social sciences. Both the speed of this process and the peculiarities of social science research in the GDR resulted in a fairly incomplete scientific analysis of this huge historical event, in particular with regard to the role of the media. Contemporary historians dealing with the "peaceful revolution" focused on the economic, political, and ideological failure of "real socialism" in the GDR, on the developments in the other countries of Eastern Europe (e.g., Poland and Hungary), and on the changed political orientation of the Soviet Union (Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost*—translated, "restructuring" and "openness"). The relevance of these considerations is unquestionable. Nonetheless, a critical review of empirical studies and theoretical approaches on the impact of the media can reveal interesting results on their role in the unification process. Such a consideration requires the analysis of two interlinked aspects: analysis of the general media situation in the GDR and of their specific constellation in the unification process.

A major peculiarity of the media situation in the GDR can be seen in the competition between two media systems. Beside East German media (e.g., two television channels, five radio programs, six national and many regional newspapers in the 1980s), the majority of the population also had access to West German media (TV and radio). This usability was both complementary as well as substituting. Almost everywhere across the country, Western radio stations could be received. Approximately 85% of the territory could watch West German TV programs. In the 1970s, West German media represented a normal part of everyday life, which at last was also tolerated by the communist state. Although the import of press products from Western countries was forbidden, newspapers and magazines circulated to a considerable extent. The long-term impact of Western media use—above all, of TV channels as the "window to the Western world"—can be interpreted along the lines of cultivation theory: the mental existence and attractiveness of alternative cultural models (communication, leisure time, consumption, and so on), of alternative interpretations for political processes (at home and abroad), as well as the sensibility for a common language and culture. The media of the GDR could hardly be competitive. Until 1989, the GDR media were subject to ruling party and government administration, with the press governed by parties and radio stations, TV, film, and music productions controlled by the

state. The media were defined as "instruments of political power" and "mouthpieces" of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the state. Consequently they were headed, controlled as, and censored by the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the SED's Central Committee. This predominantly affected journalism, the character of which can be described as announcements, court circulars, or career journalism as well as all those branches of popular (media) art that touched political values and ideology. A critical exploration of reality based on people's experience remained relegated to the sidelines, where, however, it sometimes (re-)vitalized influentials and "subcultures" in the spheres of literature and visual art or in communicative spheres of film, music, and journalism.

In the sphere of media entertainment, however, the dependence of the GDR on imports, an increasing international cooperation, and consideration of manifest needs led to a strong internationalization (understood as orientation along Western lines) in the respective sections of the GDR media. In the sphere of political journalism, TV to a large extent lost touch with reality and with the audience. TV programs tried to illustrate how the reality should be, not how it actually was. In this way, it produced an "obstinate audience" that pushed its claims of coping with reality in opposition to the GDR media. This occurred in many ways: in extensive rumor and joke communication, in turning to forms of communication with political substitute and compensation functions (as, for example, in arts, in the church, and in Western media), and in selective refusal or subversive interpretation of the existing media situation ("reading between the lines").

In this respect, the causes of the peaceful revolution need to be discussed in the context of everyday experience of economic and political problems, the inability of GDR media to stabilize the state's authority, and the diverse impact of Western media.

Initiation and power of the people's civil movement in autumn 1989 cannot be judged without considering the mass exodus of East Germans to the West via Hungary and the Czech Republic. The intensive media coverage of these developments in the West (and the helpless response of the GDR media) served to increase the stream of refugees and boost the protest movement. From the very start of the protests against the existent regime (in order to transform or to overcome it), this issue turned into a topic of media coverage—at first in the Western media, then also in the media of the GDR. Thus, the revolution and the way to unification was a mediated social process. It was also a "media revolution," since, on the one hand, the GDR media turned into open media without party and state control, and on the other side, the GDR's media market became open for the Western media. The main effect of media coverage in this period was multiplication, for example, of agendas of demonstrations, demands, erosion of state authority through discussions about (unsolved) problems, and involving people in the processes of political discussion about the future. For the protest movement and the newly founded political parties, the media served as organizing and legitimating bodies, presenting their efforts and making the (opposition) protagonists clearly visible.

Hans-Joerg Stiehler

See also Cultivation Theory; Revolution, Political

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Gingrich, Newt (1943–)

Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives (1995–1999), is known for his leadership of GOPAC (a Republican Party training organization), the development of the "Contract with America," and the 1994 "Republican Revolution."

In seeking to erode confidence in the Democrats while concurrently developing a set of Republican ideas and programs, Gingrich's congressional leadership began with the Conservative Opportunity Society (COS) House caucus. Notably, the COS took advantage of C-SPAN's congressional floor coverage so as to preach a blisteringly conservative message to more than 17 million American viewers. Though Democratic leaders were furious and forced cameras to pan across the empty floor, COS had made its mark, and leading conservatives encouraged Gingrich to keep pushing.

Gingrich was handed control of GOPAC in 1986, transforming it into a national organization designed to recruit and train a new generation of Republican

legislators using seminars such as "Language: A Key Mechanism of Control." What began as a program for schooling junior politicians in the ways of campaign techniques through a network of videos and speeches soon turned into a powerhouse of political communication. Referring to GOPAC as the "Bell Labs of GOP politics," Gingrich's efforts resulted in the creation of the Contract with America. Adamant about the message and its presentation, the content of the contract was refined with extensive polling and the advice of sympathetic public policy groups. Further, the contract went public with a calculated, made-for-television political rally on the Capitol steps.

Following a wave of support for the contract, Gingrich found success at the ballot box: on November 8, 1994, Republicans gained 52 seats and assumed a majority in the House for the first time since the Eisenhower administration. A milestone in congressional history, the success of the Republican Revolution was founded on Gingrich's ability to mold public opinion in an effort to gain electoral advantage through political communication techniques.

In his role as Speaker of the House, Gingrich worked to enact the contract within the first 100 days of the 104th Congress, at one point issuing his own nationally televised address in February 1995. President Clinton and the Democrats fought back, resulting in two federal government shutdowns that blighted the contract and Gingrich's appeal to the American public. Finally, after allegations of unethical behavior and his failure to produce Republican gains in the wake of the Monica Lewinsky scandal, Gingrich relinquished his speakership and resigned altogether from Congress. Though much of the contract's specific legislation was either blunted or failed to pass altogether, Newt Gingrich and his work with GOPAC is much credited for establishing the contemporary political arena.

H. E. Schmeisser

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Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry (1926–)

Born on February 2, 1926, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing became one of the youngest French (assistant) ministers in 1959 and then full finance minister in 1962. When dismissed from the government in 1965, he founded a Center Right party, the *Fédération Nationale des Républicains Indépendants,* and slowly achieved a national stature by dissociating more and more from ruling President General de Gaulle. This was done very effectively, with short and easy-to-remember formulas, which showed Giscard d'Estaing's wits in political communication. In 1965, his critical support to de Gaulle was, for instance, expressed by a short *"Oui, . . . mais"* ("Yes . . . , but") to the president, thus vividly articulating his reservations while supporting de Gaulle's reelection. His direct opposition to de Gaulle for the 1969 referendum was then not surprising, and his clever positioning on the center of the political field had the next president, Georges Pompidou, place him again at the helm of the finance ministry.

A strong candidate in the 1974 French presidential election, Giscard d'Estaing demonstrated a superb mastery of campaigning skills. Introduced to American political marketing methods, he was the first significant French politician to introduce his personal life into his campaign. He frequently featured his family, appearing on huge posters alongside his daughters, in order to alleviate his image of "grand bourgeois." He also reached the deeper roots of France, by publicly playing the ever-popular accordion during the campaign (18 years before Bill Clinton's saxophone!). A tough debater, he easily won the first French televised presidential debate, against François Mitterrand. He had prepared well-built sound bites that he inserted with ease, the best remembered being, "*Vous n'avez pas le monopole du coeur*" ("You don't have a monopoly on having a heart"), spoken when Mitterrand, as expected, accused him of representing only the richest classes of society.

When elected, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing undertook to professionalize the communication of the president's office. He was the first to set up a permanent surveys cell, an example that was followed by all his successors. He also tried to mellow his still rather

distant image by organizing events that took him to the poorest classes of society: cameras showed him inviting the Elysée Palace service staff for breakfast, and even the local garbage removers. On several occasions, he invited himself to dinner with "representatives" of middle-class families in view of television cameras.

In 1981, then, defeat came for the first time when Valéry Giscard d'Estaing tried to keep his office. Opposed again to François Mitterrand, he had made several unexpected campaigning mistakes:

- He approved an ambiguous slogan for his posters, "*Il faut un Président à la France*" ("France needs a president").
- He kept the same kind of arguments, even the same sound bites, as for the 1974 debate, becoming an easy target for rebuttal.
- He underestimated the strong preparation of François Mitterrand, who had taken in the lessons of his 1974 loss and had gone through intensive media training.

After his 1981 defeat, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was never able again to compete for presidential office, though his 1984 book, *Deux Français sur trois,* tried to establish that he had the support of more of the French people than the election result had shown. He remained quite influential among the liberal right-wing politicians and held several public offices, serving at the helm of the European group that prepared the so-called European Constitution.

Philippe J. Maarek

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Giuliani, Rudy (1944–)

In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Rudolph Giuliani was labeled "America's Mayor." His courage and compassion during the extreme circumstances of the tragedy reconfigured his public image.

Giuliani received a law degree from the New York University School of Law and spent much of his early career as a prosecutor. He is credited with a number of successful prosecutions of organized crime on the East Coast. He also served as associate attorney general under Ronald Reagan.

As mayor of New York, Giuliani served two terms, from 1994 to 2001. His terms as mayor were praised for his successful reduction of crime in New York City. He also spearheaded a visible Times Square renovation/revitalization that improved the city's appearance and safety. During his time as major, Giuliani honed his media skills by initiating a call-in radio program and appearing regularly on late night talk and comedy shows, including *Saturday Night Live.*

Giuliani has been widely credited with helping to hold the city together in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 collapse of the World Trade Center. His leadership has been called courageous and inspirational, and it was the major reason for his designation as *Time* magazine's Person of the Year in 2001.

Before his term as major of New York was scheduled to end in 2001, Giuliani considered entering the race for the U.S. Senate in New York, upon the retirement of Senator Patrick Moynihan. However, due to prostate cancer and other personal considerations, Giuliani withdrew from that race before the Republican primary in 2000.

After his term as mayor ended in 2001, with a 76% public approval rating, Giuliani continued his commitment to restoration of the World Trade Center site and worked on task forces and organizations to combat future terrorism attacks and facilitate greater preparedness. He was a keynote speaker at the 2004 Republican National Convention and an active supporter of President George W. Bush's reelection.

In 2007, Rudy Giuliani declared his intention to run for the Republican presidential nomination in 2008. His exploratory campaign efforts seem promising, and many polls place him at the top of Republican choices.

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Terrorism and Media

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Glasgow Media Group

The Glasgow Media Group (GMG) was formed in 1974, as six media researchers within the sociology department of Glasgow University got together to produce the book *Bad News.* John Eldridge, Jean Hart, Alison McNaughton, Greg Philo, Paul Walton, and Brian Winston measured bias and ideology in television news coverage through content analysis, complemented by some interviewing and covert participant observation. The book argued that both the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and News Independent Television News (ITN), important news providers in the United Kingdom, editorialized and fell short of their legal obligation to present political and industrial news in a balanced and neutral fashion. The group argued that television news did not reflect the full range of views, was undemocratic in its choice of sources, and that broadcasters defied notions of accuracy and impartiality. All these led to a legitimization of the dominant ideology and to false consciousness among the masses. Journalists, even if well intended, often held unconscious political assumptions that affected news selection and distorted reality.

While many acclaimed the GMG research, some academics challenged the way it defined and measured ideology and the way the data was gathered, while others argued that unconscious political assumptions and media effects cannot be measured with content analysis. The book also met hostility from BBC and ITN, which complained to the university officials and tried to limit the freedom of the researchers.

Follow-up books, *More Bad News* in 1980 and *Really Bad News* in 1982, completed a trilogy based on the same content analysis of news programs. The GMG came to mean all those people who wrote with the initial team to produce the series of books on media bias. It included journalists working on the production side of news media who conducted their own content and audience studies. At the same time they also set up the Glasgow University Media (GUM) Unit, which applied for research grants and won many research awards. *War and Peace News,* with funds from UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), highlighted in 1985 the wholesale abandonment of impartiality in both print and broadcast media. With their work on subjects such as the miners' strike, the group gained a reputation for not shying away from difficult social and political issues.

Getting the Message in 1993 investigated media treatments of areas such as food panics, health scares, AIDS in the media, and mental health.

In 1998, *Cultural Compliance* underlined the political failure of media and cultural studies as they were taught in Britain's universities. The "cultural compliance" concept refers to postmodern writers who have lost the ability to engage critically with the society in which they exist and thus have drifted into irrelevance. The postmodern focus on the text and the negotiation of meaning has reduced the ability to study the real and often brutal relations of power that form our culture. *Message Received* (1999) focused on race, migration and media, disaster and crisis reporting, mental illness and suicide.

A more recent GMG work, *Bad News From Israel,* analyzes the coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian war and its impact on public opinion.

Raluca Cozma

See also Media Bias

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Glasnost

See Russia, Democratization and Media

Globalization

Globalization was one of the most important catchwords in communication studies in the past decade. "Global village," "global public sphere," "global civil society"—phrases like these have characterized the debate on the new phenomena of mass-mediated

transnationalization in all fields of politics, society, and culture.

Cross-border communication is defined very unsystematically in the globalization literature, sometimes as inter- and trans*national* and sometimes as inter- and trans*cultural* communication. *Cross-border* thus describes those processes of information exchange in the course of which system borders, of the nation-state or culture, are transversed. Nearly all contemporary attempts to grapple theoretically with globalization that tackle issues of communication emphasize the nation-state or culture. Theoretical thought on globalization and media can be divided into three fields: (1) system connectivity, (2) system change, and (3) system interdependence.

Globalization and Media Connectivity

Connectivity describes the extent, speed, and intensity of the international or intercultural exchange of information. Connectivity may be generated between entities, however defined, through various means of communication. Alongside mediated interpersonal communication (telephone, e-mail, letter, fax, and so on), communication that depends on mass media can also be understood as direct access to the range of communicative services produced by another country or culture (Internet; direct broadcasts by satellite); international broadcasting (special TV and radio services in foreign languages broadcast to other countries); imports or export of media); and access to information and contexts in another country or cultural area conveyed by journalism (international reporting on television, radio, the press; corresponding media services on the Internet).

One of the key factors shaping the globalization debate over the past decade was the fact that the means of transmission and the exchange of information beyond borders has increased dramatically. The "new media" have set the overall tone of the debate since the 1990s. However, it is far from certain that the new media, regardless of their many new forms, characterize the processes of globalization more than national journalism and international reporting.

The concrete form of connectivity via the new media depends on a range of technological, socioeconomic, and cultural parameters:

Technological reach and socioeconomic implications of media technology. Nation-states and cultural areas are characterized by very different technological capacities for transmission and reception in the field of satellite broadcasting, depending on the prevailing political and financial parameters. The same goes for the Internet. Regardless of the strong increase in the number of connections, a "digital divide" exists, above all between industrialized and developing countries, that restricts connectivity substantially.

User reach. The debate on the globalization of the media often fails to distinguish between technological reach and user reach. The number of those who use a technology per se lies below the technologically possible use—and cross-border use is only *one* variant of the use to which the new media may be put.

Linguistic and cultural competence. To communicate with people in other states and cultural areas or to use their media generally requires linguistic competence, which only minorities in any population enjoy. To avoid dismissing cross-border connectivity as marginal from the outset, it is vital to distinguish between various user groups: globalization elites and peripheries. Connectivity is without doubt partly dependent on the nature of the message communicated, including music, images, and text. Music enjoys the largest global spread, and images occupy a middle position (for example, press photographs or the images of CNN [Cable News Network], also accessible to users who understand no English), while most texts create only meagre international resonance because of language barriers.

Connectivity may ultimately occur within global communication not only between producers and consumers in various nation-states and cultural areas—that is, *inter*nationally and *inter*culturally—but also via a *trans*national (or cultural) media system. Here, media and media businesses would no longer have a clear-cut national base but would emerge as "global players." The idea of a world linked through communication is anchored in the assumption that globalization is more than the sum of the links among its components.

Contemporary notions of what such a transnational media system consists of are, however, still very nebulous. Apart from a few global agreements brought into being by the major transnational trade organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) (in the copyright protection field, for instance), there are only a few transnationally active corporations that can be called "global players." Regardless of the existence of such businesses, transnational media—that is, programs and formats—are extremely rare. CNN,

frequently mentioned as the perfect example of a leading global medium that encourages exchange of political opinion worldwide by concentrating on transnational programs, seems to come closest to fitting this vision. Yet even this case is problematic, for CNN is no uniform program but consists of numerous continental "windows." There are many "CNNs," but no complete global program.

Due to the current state of global connectivity, a number of counter-tendencies characteristic of global communication are having such disastrous effects that the necessity for cross-border communication is more apparent than ever, particularly after the events of September 11, 2001. The worldwide coverage of the attacks of 9/11 and the Iraq War of 2003 have revealed the paucity of evidence of a communicative integration that could help alleviate conflicts and liberate the media from the traditionally strong influence of belligerent governments and patriotic cultural influences. Through one-sided coverage in wartime and limitations on public access to information, it may still be possible to seal peoples and regions off from one another and mobilize them for war. We have little reason to assume that a global media network has significantly reduced the susceptibility of societies, even democratic ones, to war propaganda.

Moreover, permanent cross-border media use—for example, through satellite TV by large numbers of people—is largely limited to specific linguistic regions. In multilingual Europe, for example, it hardly occurs. Foreign-language media use remains the privilege of small knowledge elites or special groups such as immigrants who sometimes create their specific "virtual communities." Alongside the still dominant production and use of media within national media areas, contemporary developments in the media are marked by a regionalism of a geolinguistic hue. At present, it is impossible to state with confidence whether this is open to globalization or not. Major language areas such as Spanish, Chinese, Indian, and Arab are currently experiencing a boom in native-language media.

The Internet has introduced a new subtlety to the global array of information, but cross-border linkage is obviously growing more slowly than local and national interactions in many areas. Since the introduction of non-Latin symbols for domain names at the turn of the millennium, the Internet is also increasingly developing a linguistic diversity that is creating new Babel-esque dividing lines. The potential of some political campaigns to mobilize people on a global scale—in principal an interesting feature for political communication—may be impressive, but this occurs only when very specific conditions and alliances are in place. The large "digital divide" between industrialised and developing countries, where technical connectivity might range as high as 80% of all households (as in Scandinavia) or below 3% (as in most of Africa), raises doubts about whether the comparative political advantages of a "global civil society" are making themselves felt to any real extent and are managing to change policies when faced with the power of governments.

Globalization and Political/ Cultural Change

For both the major realms of connectivity—direct communication through new media and mediated communication by means of journalism—it is also important to understand whether receiving cultures are changed by transmitting cultures in the process of cross-border communication through the Internet, satellite broadcasting, international broadcasting, or through media imports and exports and whether the media content of foreign coverage passed on by national journalism systems to their domestic populations is capable of changing the worldviews and attitudes of the receiving cultures.

Three forms of cultural change are mentioned again and again in the globalization debate:

1. The adoption of the "other" culture (above all in the form of "Westernized" globalization)
2. The emergence of "glocalized" hybrid cultures that are influenced both by global and local elements
3. The revitalization of traditional and other local cultures as a reaction to globalization

Mass media have the potential to change systems, and here the individual media differ, sometimes significantly. The areas in which the Internet can work to change systems are diverse, because its form is untypical of the mass media. The Internet can generate alternative publics. It can unite political actors and oppositional landscapes worldwide to form a "global civil society." The CIA report *Global Trends 2015* predicted new challenges for national and international politics. The report assumes that while the nation-state will remain the most important political actor, its efficiency

will be measured on the basis of how it masters globalization and how it comes to terms with an increasingly articulate and well-organized civil society worldwide. The Internet, it could be argued, is becoming all the more significant as a platform capable of articulating and shaping the will of the citizenry, creating civil networks, and even mobilizing people politically.

In view of the structures underlying television and radio worldwide, which tend to be commercial, government run, or public, direct broadcasting by satellite is a downright elite medium in comparison to the Internet. It features formidable barriers to access—making it difficult to use to articulate one's views—and highly developed journalistic selection mechanisms. Nonetheless, the comparative advantage of satellite broadcasting is that large publics can form rapidly, including cross-border ones. The Internet is fragmenting into countless subpublics; in everyday life, these can be fused only by political organizations and networks.

Is the media forming a "global public sphere" as this popular and central concept in the globalization debate suggests? The catchphrase "media diplomacy" captures the capacity of media to act almost as representatives of the public and the peoples of the Earth and to intervene in the traditional diplomacy between states, which is often stuck in a rut and conflictual in nature. Broadcasters that are clearly nationally based may perform such a function. Ideally, however, it should be taken over by formats of a transnational character. Media diplomacy has thus often been referred to as the "CNN effect," joined in recent years by other models such as the "Al Jazeera effect." In all cases, the suggestion is that the media have global resonance and centrality; that is, within their specific spheres—Western or Arab—they enjoy a privileged position and thus have excellent prospects of changing the politics of international conflicts.

However, in light of the sobering appraisal of connectivity, we clearly have to assess the influence of cross-border mass communication on system change with much care. Today, every political and social change, from the fall of the Berlin Wall through the political upheavals in Ukraine, Lebanon, and Kyrgyzstan to Pope John Paul II's funeral, is thought to be molded by the global media. Yet we are clearly getting ahead of ourselves. Mass gatherings following the death of a pope have been common throughout history, long before the modern mass media, and political revolutions and uprisings are nothing new either. During the era of the information revolution, all appearances to the contrary, the number of free social and media systems has by no means increased. It has, in fact, decreased or at least stagnated. The information revolution has been left untouched by the "Third Wave of Democratization," which finished with the upheavals in Eastern Europe before the new media of the Internet and direct broadcasting by satellite had become established.

Ultimately, as far as cultural change is concerned, the globalization debate has produced an internally inconsistent dual myth. This is the notion that culturally imperialist "Americanization" or "Westernization" may be accompanied by the "glocalization" or "hybridization" of cultures. The European film market as well as much of the pop music listened to worldwide are surely examples of Americanization. These individual pieces of evidence, alluded to again and again, do not, however, allow us to generalize. They permit no overall conclusions about cultural globalization. In many countries and in most world regions, American film imports are in the minority, not to mention TV films, which are produced in the vast majority of countries by national or regional industries.

The second variant of the myth of globalization asserts not only that American and Western cultural hegemony is expanding but takes possible counterarguments into account by conceding that non-European cultures are capable of making local adaptations in response to globalization. Indian rap, for example, is claimed to be a typical hybrid culture. Many of these cultural fusions could not, however, be reexported to Western markets. This points to the way the globalization debate confuses globalization and modernization. External stimuli may serve to spark off cultural change. It is music and images that characterize entertainment culture as the core area of globalization—and it is text, news, and interpretations of the world that are proving to be the basis of local resistance and independence.

Globalization and Political/ Economic Interdependence

The notion of a world linked by communication extends and changes the traditional model of national media systems. It becomes increasingly difficult to demarcate the societal system within which the media operate. Publics can act transnationally, as can politics and the media itself. Alongside each national media system there thus arises a second global system. To the extent that it becomes a component of the flow of information, it has great and growing influence.

Do these changes, however, allow us to speak of a "communicative world system"? More important than the mere existence of other entities beyond national media systems is a deeper understanding of their fundamental relations. Are foreign political systems really as influential as domestic ones? Do journalists feel as keen a sense of duty toward their foreign public as they do to their domestic one, and does this lead to changes in the journalistic product? Are global, market, and capital interconnections as strong as national and regional ones? Cultural and societal change in a global system is not produced by *connectivity* alone, but is based on *interdependence.* In an interdependent global system, autonomous national systems change into partly autonomous subsystems of a global macrosystem.

In striving to understand why cross-border processes of communication have palpably failed to generate connectivity and system change, it is essential to look at the fundamental relations between the transmitters and receivers of mass communication. Despite the extensive exchange of information and news, media systems are firmly in the grip of nation-states. National owners, investors, and publics dominate; transnational media (such as the German-French TV network *Arte*) are hardly used; the transnationalization of media capital mostly ends at subregional borders.

Global media policy remains largely restricted to areas in which commercial interests demand regulation (such as copyright protection), leaving little prospect of a new approach. It is no accident that many commentators have evoked civil society as a third force alongside companies and governments. Perceptual distortions and informational uncertainties typify global exchanges via the Internet as much as they do classical journalism. There is a dearth of binding and stable processes of informational feedback. Moreover, Net-based political alliances, typically casual in nature and characterized by arbitrary selection and random events, lag far behind "offline politics."

Kai Hafez

See also Al Jazeera Television; CNN (Cable News Network)

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Goebbels, Joseph (1897–1945)

Paul Joseph Goebbels is credited by contemporary historians with being the single most influential person in propaganda history and the most important leader of the Third Reich next to Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring. For more than 12 years he served as Hitler's minister for Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment and controlled virtually every aspect of Germany's cultural life.

Goebbels was born on October 29, 1897, in Rheydt, a small town in the Rhineland. Due to an infection he caught when he was 7 years old, he was left with a club foot that prevented him from military service in World War I. In 1921, Goebbels graduated from the University of Heidelberg with a PhD in literature and philosophy and worked in various temporary jobs.

In 1924, he joined the NSDAP (National Socialist Party of Germany). In the first years, he belonged to the left wing of the party, which was advocating a merger of socialistic and nationalistic ideology. After his first meeting with Adolf Hitler in 1926, he changed sides and became a member of the anti-Semitic and strictly anticommunist faction of the NSDAP.

In 1926, Goebbels was appointed *Gauleiter* (district leader) of the NSDAP for Berlin; after 1930 he served as *Reichspropagandaleiter* (chief of propaganda) of the Nazi Party as well. On March 13, 1933, he was appointed minister of the newly created Ministry of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment. In 1944 he became *Reichsbevollmächtigter für den totalen Kriegseinsatz* (Commissioner for the Total War) and mobilized in a huge propaganda effort all the energies of German society for a war that was already lost.

Goebbels was an extremely skilled writer and a talented speaker, whose intelligence was clearly above the standards of the ruling National Socialists. Due to his short stature and his handicap, his craving for admiration was almost limitless. As the ruling propagandist of the Nazi Party he invented many propaganda techniques and strategies that raised the Nazi propaganda at its time (beside the inherent terror and threat, which always went along with it) to a new and until then unseen type of political communication. Goebbels invented the Hitler myth that infected many Germans and created a specific aesthetic style of the Nazi movement.

As minister, Goebbels was in charge of German film production as well as of the playlists of the theaters and concert halls. He turned the radio, then still very new, into a powerful propaganda weapon in the hand of the National Socialist state. Popular entertainment was to him one of the most efficient ways of carrying well-hidden propaganda messages to every German family, but he did not hesitate to use cruel atrocity propaganda when he believed it to be necessary. This was especially the case with the war against the Soviet Union in 1941–1945 and with the anti-Jewish propaganda of the Nazi regime. In 1938 he tried to counteract a decline in his prestige within the ruling Nazi group by organizing the *Reichsprogromnacht* against the German Jews, which for the first time clearly indicated that the Nazis would use direct violence in their fight against the Jews. Foreign countries were shocked at the *Progromnacht,* but Goebbels noted in his diaries that the Führer was "impressed" by this pseudo-spontaneous outbreak of violence—and what Hitler thought about him was the only thing that ever worried Goebbels. To him, it was the peak of his career: although he succeeded Adolf Hitler as chancellor of Germany on April 30, 1945, he remained in office only for one day, because the following day he committed suicide in the Führer Bunker in Berlin after he and his wife Magda had killed their six children.

Thymian Bussemer

See also Film and Politics; Mass Political Behavior; Persuasion, Political; Propaganda; Public Relations, Political; Strategic Communication

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GOFFMAN, ERVING

See *PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, THE*

GOLDWATER, BARRY (1909–1998)

Barry Goldwater was a Republican senator from Arizona for five terms between 1953–1965 and 1969–1987. In 1964, Goldwater, a fervent anticommunist, won the Republican nomination for president but was defeated by Lyndon Johnson in a general election landslide, thanks largely to negative advertising in which Goldwater was painted as dangerous and extreme. Deemed a disaster in 1964, Goldwater's White House bid was later seen as a watershed event in the rise of modern American conservatism.

During the 1950s, Goldwater emerged as one of the nation's leading conservatives. In 1960, he published his book, *Conscience of a Conservative,* in which he outlined many of the central tenets that later defined modern conservatism. In 1964, Goldwater won a bitterly contested presidential nomination fight that exposed the growing factionalism between establishment Republican elites, predominantly from the Northeast, and grassroots populist conservatives increasingly identified with the growing American Sunbelt. At the 1964 Republican National Convention, Goldwater famously told a widely divided convention and national

television audience, “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.”

Goldwater’s abrasive personality and gruff comments did not endear him to the American electorate or to the media, and they opened the door for charges of extremism to cripple his campaign. Goldwater, who once quipped that “sometimes I think this country would be better off if we could just saw off the Eastern Seaboard and let it float out to sea,” was himself the target of one of the most famous presidential campaign commercials in history—the famed “Daisy Girl” ad, which highlighted the potential nuclear ramifications of a Goldwater presidency. The ad, which ran only once, was pulled by the Johnson campaign for being too controversial, but it continued to receive attention and airplay on news programs and talk shows throughout the fall.

Goldwater carried only six states in 1964 (Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina), and won only 38.4% of the popular vote. His success in the deep South was credited largely to his opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. By most accounts, the lone highlight of Goldwater’s presidential campaign was a nationally televised speech given on his behalf by Ronald Reagan on October 27, 1964. The speech launched Reagan’s political career in California, where he was elected governor in 1966.

Though future Republican presidential candidates typically avoided associations with Goldwater the man, the Arizona senator’s ideas about smaller government, lower taxes, property rights, anticommunism, and liberalism were largely adopted by the Republican Party in the coming decade, thereby greatly influencing the nature of modern American conservatism.

Reelected to the Senate in 1968, Goldwater remained politically active long after his failed presidential bid. In the late 1970s, he spearheaded opposition to the Panama Canal Treaty. He retired from the Senate in 1987 and died on May 29, 1998.

Sean P. Cunningham

See also Conservative, Conservatism; Daisy Girl Ad; Reagan, Ronald; Republican Party

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González Márquez, Felipe (1942–)

Felipe González Márquez (born in Seville, Andalucía, on March 5, 1942) graduated in 1966 with a law degree. Afterward, he specialized in representing workers and he also taught law at Seville University. At the beginning of his studies, he was a member of two Catholic organizations. He joined the illegal *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) in 1962, and as a party activist he used the nom de guerre Isidoro. From 1965 to 1969, he was a part of the PSOE Seville Provincial Committee; from 1969 he served on the PSOE National Committee; and in 1970 he became a member of the party’s Executive Commission.

He was arrested in 1971 for attending protests against General Francisco Franco. In 1974, he was elected PSOE general secretary, which represented a victory for the young renovating wing of the party over the traditionalist veterans.

After the end of the dictatorship of Franco, González became one of the leaders of the legal democratic opposition. In February 1977, the PSOE was legalized; participating in the first democratic elections, it became the leading parliamentary party of the opposition. González wanted to rid the PSOE of its Marxist character in order to convert it into a social-democratic party. In 1978, he was named vice president of the Socialist International. In the 1979 general elections, the PSOE could increase its percentage of votes, maintaining, however, its position as the leading opposition party. The change of government was successful in 1982, and González became prime minister. During his government, several reforms were carried out, including, for example, not only all levels of school education but also the promotion of university studies. Further, the reorganization of social security was initiated and a partial legalization of abortion was achieved, despite the opposition of the Roman Catholic Church. González pushed for liberal reforms and a restructuring of the economy, and in 1985 numerous state-owned companies were privatized partially or fully. The job layoffs resulting from this restructuring often provoked protests by workers and trade unions. The PSOE, however, won the general elections in 1986 and 1989 and kept its absolute majority until 1993; afterward, in his last legislative period, González was forced to form a pact with small regional political parties. In 1996, because of the poor economic situation,

high unemployment rate, and numerous corruption scandals, as well as infringements during the prosecution of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) terrorism, the PSOE lost the general elections to the People's Party. Thus, the term of office of Felipe González as Spanish prime minister, which had lasted for 14 years, came to an end. One year later, he resigned as leader of the party, but he stayed a member of the Spanish Parliament until 2000.

Felipe González was a very charismatic leader who was skilfully able to handle the mass media. Already, in the late phase of the *franquismo* (the Franco regime) and in the first year of the transition, when his party still was illegal, the young politician was flattered by the press. Then, and for a long time afterward, the press wrote about "Felipe"; it was an expression of his popularity that he was known only by his first name. Everywhere, the rhetorically brilliant politician was attested to "seduce" his interlocutors. In public performances and in TV interviews he self-consciously cultivated his Andalusian accent, which gave his statements a folksy touch. He used the (state-controlled) television for the promotion of his ideas, for example, in 1986 during the vote campaign for continuance in NATO. When in the second term of his government he was fiercely criticized by the conservative press—mainly by *El Mundo*—because of corruption in his party, his relationship to this part of the public, which he attacked vehemently, got worse. Yet, particularly in the foreign press, he was considered, for a long time after his presidency, to be Spain's most popular politician.

Walther L. Bernecker

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Gorbachev, Mikhail (1931–)

Mikhail Gorbachev was the leader of the Soviet Union from 1985 until 1991. His reform efforts contributed to ending the Cold War, ended the political supremacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and ultimately dissolved the Soviet Union. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990.

Gorbachev is known for trying to revive the Soviet economy, which had reached stagnation in 1985. He initiated acceleration reforms, later known as *perestroika* ("reconstruction") and *glasnost* ("liberalization" or "opening"). In 1988, glasnost brought about greater freedom of speech, a radical change for a system in which control of speech and suppression of government criticism had previously been strictly enforced. The press became less controlled, and thousands of political prisoners and many dissidents were

Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev hold a press conference at the Helsinki Summit, Finland (September 1990). Hailed in the West for his "New Thinking" in foreign affairs, Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990.

Source: Ronald Reagan Library.

released. *Time* magazine named Gorbachev Man of the Year in 1985.

Gorbachev's economic reforms, which permitted the private ownership of businesses in the services, manufacturing, and foreign trade sectors, did not produce the expected results, bringing about food shortages and provoking internal dissatisfaction and hostility from Soviet extremists. They contended that Gorbachev weakened the Communist Party and the country's military capabilities.

Gorbachev also launched radical reforms meant to reduce party control of the government institutions. He proposed a new executive in the form of a presidential system, as well as a new legislative element, to be called the Congress of People's Deputies.

In 1988, Gorbachev abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine and allowed the Eastern bloc nations to determine their own internal affairs. Gorbachev's relaxation of Soviet censorship and control led to liberation revolutions in the Eastern Bloc in the late 1980s and to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The loosening of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe effectively ended the Cold War, and for this Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on October 15, 1990. Also, on March 15 of the same year, Gorbachev was elected as the first executive president of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev was largely appreciated in the West for his "New Thinking" in foreign affairs. He sought to improve relations and trade with the West by reducing Cold War tensions. He established close relationships with several Western leaders, including U.S. President Ronald Reagan. In Germany he is acclaimed for allowing German reunification to proceed.

In 1986 and 1987, Gorbachev made proposals for the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe and agreed to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the end of the century. In February 1988, Gorbachev also announced the full withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

Gorbachev resigned as general secretary of the Communist Party and advised the Central Committee to dissolve itself after the August 1991 unsuccessful coup led by hard-line communists. He lost the presidency to his opponent Boris Yeltsin, after the collapse of the Union in December 1991.

Raluca Cozma

See also Reagan, Ronald

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Gore, Albert (1948–)

Albert Arnold Gore is a Democrat who served as the 45th vice president of the United States (1993–2001) under President Bill Clinton. Before becoming vice president, Gore was a U.S. congressman for 16 years, serving in the House of Representatives (1977–1985) and in the Senate (1985–1993) as a representative of Tennessee. In 2000, Gore was the Democratic candidate for the U.S. presidency, running against Republican George W. Bush. Although Gore won the popular vote, he lost the Electoral College vote after a controversial ballot count in Florida and a legal ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court that awarded the presidency to his opponent.

As vice president, Gore is credited for supporting legislation that led to the development of the Internet in the United States. His efforts resulted in the High Performance Computing and Communication Act of 1991, a bill that allocated $600 million to the development of an "information superhighway." Gore's vision was to create an "infrastructure for the Global Village" through cooperation among the government, academia, and the industry. Gore pushed for open access to this technology for all Americans and also for legislation on digital privacy.

As a presidential candidate, Gore was often criticized as being stiff and having a boring communication style that lacked charisma. The political advertising in his presidential campaign, although primarily policy and issue oriented, were noted for their negativity toward his opponent, George W. Bush. His performance in televised debates was generally uninspiring.

However, Gore's achievements as an advocate for environmental protection are more impressive. Gore's interest in the environment dates back to the 1970s and the 1980s, when he was among the first politicians to initiate environmental-friendly actions, such as hearings on greenhouse emissions and global warming, in Congress. The culmination of his environment advocacy is the 2006 Academy Award–winning documentary *An Inconvenient Truth,* which raises awareness about the damaging effects of global warming. Since its release, the film has become, up to present time, the

third most viewed documentary in the United States, which prompted Gore to release a companion book that also became a best-seller. In February 2007, Gore associated with Richard Branson (the owner of the Virgin brand) to initiate the Virgin Earth Competition. The prize is $25 million and will be offered to the first person who designs a commercially viable method to remove one billion metric tons of carbon gases a year from the atmosphere for 10 years.

Gore is the author of several books, including *The Assault on Reason* (2007) and *Earth in Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit* (1992). He is also known as a businessman and the founder of independent media company and television channel Current TV. In October 2007, Gore, along with the United Nation's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Monica Postelnicu

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Government Communication

Government communication refers to public information institutions and strategies whereby governments manage the flow of political messages. Government communication aims at informing the citizens about the executive's positions and policies, but also at legitimatizing political actions, thereby creating popular consent and achieving an advantageous position in the electoral competition. Since mass media are the most important means of political information of the citizens, they are the means and targets of messages, while the strategies are determined by the political objectives of the government. In all Western democracies, we find similar institutions and professional and political roles of government communication that refer to media relations and message dissemination, political marketing and political strategizing with regard to media agenda setting.

During the past 30 years, the public information strategies of governments have changed from traditional press release policies—based on interpersonal exchanges between government spokespeople and journalists—to a professionalized and specialized process of strategic communication controlling the flow of news in the media. Government communication in Western democracies has become ever more sophisticated and complex as new information and communication technologies have advanced and penetrated all forms of political communications. In terms of the action repertoire, governments apply a series of news management activities and rhetoric and symbolic actions to produce political messages, such as the personalization of politics or image management; the creation of pseudo-events and strategies of defining political issues by framing and spin-controlling political messages. Efforts of spin-control refer to the depiction of the issue in the interaction of news managers and journalists. Most likely it includes the simple pattern of stressing the importance of features that are most attractive to target publics or target media and avoiding the features that are deemed to be undesirable from the point of view of the government. Efforts of spinning can be regularly observed after major political developments, when journalists are often desperate to speak to authoritative sources capable of giving them an instant interpretation of what has happened. If it is not possible to control the message, another technique that belongs to the action repertoire of government communication is *dethematization*, which—as diversionary tactic—intends to divert from substantial issues.

Governments compete with other political actors for favorable media attention. There are various reasons why the messages of the executive have better chances to pass the media filter. In most Western democracies, the government is the most powerful decision-making body that is legitimatized by the popular vote. It is active in setting national priorities and proposing policy innovations, taking collectively binding decisions, and implementing them in its programs. As to politics, governments constantly work on legislative and political coalition building. Finally, the leadership function is expressed in the executive's role of crisis management, in maintaining international

commitments and entertaining foreign relations, if not proclaiming war. Another reason for the governments' favorable position in public communication is the availability of human and financial resources and institutions for public information.

As every government is obliged to inform its citizens, modern executives are in command of institutions and roles to prepare and disseminate official information. In most countries, we find a division of labor regarding the regular day-to-day relation of government spokespeople and the media and the more strategic and political aspects. The most prominent role of official government communication is formally occupied by the press secretary. The formal and informal roles of strategic communication are held by a circle of advisors who decide on the strategy of news management and the reactions to the issues and opinions raised in the media. Those positions are usually located at the heart of the executive office. In addition to these decision-making roles, most countries entertain government information agencies that employ civil servants and public information specialists working in intelligence, media communications, issue campaigns, and policy consulting. Although these offices are obliged to act nonpartisan and pursue their information task in a politically neutral way, they are the most precious resource of proactive news management.

While the general objectives of government communication and its technological means might converge across governments and countries, the environment of government communication varies according to the makeup of the political system and the role of the executive within it. Hence, government communication in a presidential system with low party cohesion in the legislature, like in the United States, is focused on the chief executive. Since the president is elected independently from the legislature and stays in office for a fixed term, his government information policy, strictly speaking, does not look back on the parliamentary groups in Congress, but on public opinion. According to Samuel Kernell, the strategy of "going public" tends to replace the negotiations between the executive and Congress. Geared toward mobilizing the general public's support, this approach is related to a proactive strategy of reaching out to the electorate by determining the media agenda. As a consequence of seeking the general public's support, the personalization of politics and the creation of pseudo-events around the issues of legislation and national security are the most likely outcomes.

In contrast to the presidential system in the United States, the institutional arrangements in parliamentary systems tend to support government communication strategies that aim at orchestrating the debate between the parties inside and outside of Parliament. In countries where two or more parties form a coalition government that depends on the support of the parliamentary fractions, the efforts of the chief executive to set the media agenda clearly aim at positioning his administration as political leader within the coalition government and vis-à-vis the opposition parties. This general constellation becomes even more complex if the government is confronted with oppositional voices from within its own party. In this case, the communication strategy of the executive is not only designed to control the media agenda but must respond to the political rivalries within and across the coalition parties. The constellation of strong parties under high competition provokes public information approaches that focus on political issue management, so the major activities refer to the thematization and de-thematization and the framing of politics.

Barbara Pfetsch

See also Agenda Setting

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Graber, Doris A. (1923–)

Award-winning scholar, teacher, and mentor, Doris Appel Graber's professional career and personal life are shaped by her inquisitive and adventurous nature, her loyalty to family and friends, and her rigorous, pioneering, and trend-setting scholarship. Her love of experiential travel is a reflection of her insatiable curiosity and interest in understanding the world in all its complexity.

With more than 100 chapters and journal articles, Graber's publications span a number of fields in political science. Among her 15 books to date, several stand out as defining the field of political communication. *Processing Politics: Learning From Television in the Internet Age* (2001) received the Goldsmith Book Prize for Best Academic Political Communication book of 2003. In it she argues that findings from neurobiology research show how the brain is "wired" to assimilate information more effectively through audiovisuals, thus challenging those who assert that print media are more important than television as a source of political information. She finds that when citizens talk about issues they consider important, they draw upon accurate and substantive information. Television can provide that information, though the full potential of the medium has yet to be realized. Her seminal study, *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide* (1984), set a new standard for research on information processing. And the link between political opinion and news about crime was established by Graber more than 25 years ago in *Crime News and the Public.*

Founding editor of the journal *Political Communication* in 1992, a journal cosponsored by the American Political Science Association (APSA) and the International Communication Association (ICA), Graber also received APSA's Edelman Career Award that year. Her impact on the field also has been recognized by APSA's book award—the Doris A. Graber Outstanding Book Award for the best book published in political communication in the past decade. Among other offices held, she was vice president of APSA and president of the International Society for Political Psychology, Midwest Public Opinion Association, Midwest Political Science Association, and the political communication divisions of the ICA and APSA.

Graber was a feature writer and reporter for newspapers in St. Louis, Missouri, after completing her BA at Washington University. She took a PhD in international relations and political science at Columbia University in New York. She is currently professor of political science at the University of Illinois at Chicago and has held academic appointments at Northwestern University, the University of Chicago, and Harvard University.

Holli A. Semetko

See also *Processing the News*

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Graduate School of Political Management

The Graduate School of Political Management (GSPM) was established in 1986 under the direction of Neil Fabricant, a New York lawyer. Fabricant believed that politics was becoming professionalized and that an institution needed to ensure that the profession matured in a way that fostered ethics and the democratic process. The GSPM was intended to prepare students to enter the field of professional politics, and the first class of 24 students began classes in September 1987 on the Manhattan campus of Baruch College. After opening a degree program in Washington, D.C., in 1991, the GSPM became part of the George Washington University in July 1995. In January 2006, GSPM became the largest program in the university's College of Professional Studies. The

mission statement of the GSPM is to make politics better by educating its students and professionals in the tools, principles, and values of participatory democracy, preparing them for careers as ethical and effective advocates and leaders at the international, national, and local levels.

The GSPM faculty is drawn from the ranks of top-performing practitioners in the Washington, D.C., area. The GSPM offers master's degrees in political management, legislative affairs, and, beginning in September 2007, strategic public relations. The school also offers a graduate certificate in political action committee (PAC) and political management (the only graduate education offered anywhere in PAC management), and it manages Semester in Washington (SIW), an undergraduate program (including an innovative leadership development program for Native Americans) for students desiring to study politics in Washington. As of 2006, the GSPM has 270 graduate students (200 in political management, 50 in legislative affairs, and 20 PACs students) and 50 SIW students. More than 1,300 alumni work in politics, public policy, advocacy, and public relations around the world.

Students study the full range of practical political skills needed for success in the field. All students follow a core curriculum that provides them with the foundations of political practice, communications, ethics, and research methods. Students may follow concentrations in lobbying, campaign management, issues management, fundraising, corporate/trade association public affairs, polling, public policy, and leadership.

The GSPM advances the growing field of professional politics through its research program, the Institute for Politics, Democracy and the Internet (IPDI). Originally organized in 1998, IPDI is the leading research activity dedicated to understanding advanced technology's emerging role in politics. IPDI hosts the annual Politics Online Conference, the major gathering of students, researchers, and practitioners working at the cutting edge of digital politics.

The GSPM is also dedicated to spreading democratic politics worldwide. Working with the Corporación Andina de Fomento (Andean Development Corporation), the GSPM's Governability Program has trained more than 3,000 local officials, party operatives, and community organizers across Latin America in the skills of communications, good government, and accountability. In addition, GSPM conducts frequent campaign and political communications conferences throughout Latin America.

Charles Cushman

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The Graduate School of Political Management Web site: http://www.gwu.edu/~gspm/

Graham, Katherine

See Watergate

Grassroots Campaigning

Grassroots campaigning refers to efforts to mobilize individuals to take some action to influence a political outcome. In practice, grassroots campaigns come in two types: (1) efforts to mobilize individuals either to turn out to vote or to vote a certain way in an upcoming election and (2) efforts to mobilize individuals to contact a policymaker to take a particular action (also called "outside lobbying"). The distinguishing features of grassroots campaigns are that they (1) mobilize *masses* to participate in politics, such as contacting their legislator or turn out to vote; and (2) they are conducted through narrow communications such as mail, e-mail, phone calls, or face-to-face visits rather than broadcast media such as television or radio.

Incidence of Grassroots Campaigning

How often is grassroots campaigning used as a tactic? There are two methods of measuring the number of grassroots get-out-the-vote drives: survey data and group self-reports. Survey data suggests that in 2004, slightly more than half of the adult population reported some form of contact from a campaign, up from 40% in 2000. The raw numbers of group contacts in 2004 were 8 million door-to-door contacts by the Kerry-Edwards campaign, and more than 9 million by the Bush-Cheney campaign. Each of the respective campaigns was aided by groups that shared the candidates' respective ideologies. For example, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of

Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) knocked on 6 million doors and made more than 100 million volunteer phone calls, while the U.S. Chamber of Commerce claims to have made more than 2.1 million phone calls to its members in eight targeted states.

Political scientists have attempted to count the number of groups that use grassroots lobbying by sampling groups and surveying group leaders. Some have estimated that 56% of groups surveyed regularly mobilize members, plus 38% of groups occasionally mobilize members. This is similar to earlier counts that found that 84% of groups surveyed ran letter-writing campaigns, while 80% used grassroots lobbying efforts.

Grassroots "Get Out the Vote" Campaigns

Early research on grassroots campaigning used surveys to determine the effectiveness of Get Out the Vote (GOTV). There are two problems with this approach. The first is that the method uses self-reports to determine voting behavior, which can be unreliable. The second problem is that endogenous variables can bias the results. That is, individuals who claim to have been contacted by a campaign may be more likely to turn out to vote for reasons not related to the campaign contact itself. Field experimental research has resolved these methodological problems by using public records to measure voter turnout behavior and by randomly assigning individuals to be contacted by a campaign.

Recent research has shown that more personal contacts are more successful than less personal attempts to get out the vote. The difference is so great that it is more cost effective to conduct door-to-door campaigns than direct mailings. For instance, Gerber and Green (2000) estimate that a door-to-door campaign costs $8 per additional vote, while a direct mail campaign costs about $40 per vote.

The research has consistently found that impersonal methods of contact are ineffective. Telephone calls made by commercial phone banks are ineffective at turning out voters, as are Robo or automated calls, or calls placed to households with a recorded message. Phone calls can be effective, but only if they are conducted by volunteers rather than a commercial phone bank. This last result seems to be because volunteers read the script for calls in a more conversational way than professional callers.

Recent research has branched into attempting to determine the influence of GOTV campaigns on specific subpopulations. For example, young people are influenced by appeals to turn out at the same rate as older adults. However, young people are harder to reach, dampening the overall effect of youth vote drives. Many field experimental studies have also examined specific ethnic subpopulations. The literature has suggested a number of special considerations for different groups, including language barriers and difficulty of locating specific subpopulations. When targeting specific subpopulations, it appears that campaigns can be improved with strategies specific to the target population. For example, canvassing was more effective in getting Latinos to vote when the canvassers were also Latino.

Grassroots Lobbying

As with grassroots GOTV campaigns, groups have many methods of carrying out grassroots lobbying campaigns. Groups can have volunteers or commercial phone banks call members to ask them to contact a legislator. A more sophisticated method allows groups to call activists and patch them through to an official's phone number. E-mail, because of its low cost in terms of money and time, has grown in popularity for conducting grassroots lobbying campaigns. Groups maintain lists of interested activists and e-mail them when an important action (e.g., legislative vote, governor's veto) is about to occur. Many groups have software that allows members to click on a link to automatically send an e-mail to their legislator while allowing the group to keep track of which members responded.

Is grassroots lobbying an effective strategy? Bergan, Gerber, Green, and Panagopoulos (2006) conducts a randomized field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of a grassroots lobbying campaign attempting to influence the state legislature in New Hampshire. A number of antismoking groups e-mailed their members, asking them to e-mail their legislators to support a bill banning smoking in restaurants and bars. Legislators were randomly assigned to be contacted by a grassroots e-mail lobbying campaign. The results show that grassroots lobbying by e-mail affects legislative voting behavior.

As there have been fewer field experimental studies on grassroots lobbying, we must rely on other evidence to gauge the relative effectiveness of different grassroots lobbying methods. Surveys of legislators suggest that, as with GOTV drives, the more personal the contact, the more effective on legislative

behavior. Likewise, anecdotal evidence suggests that context matters. Lobbyists and state legislators suggest that it takes 10 or fewer calls or contacts to legislators to have an effect, while at the national level, legislators suggest that it takes many more. This suggests that the effectiveness of grassroots lobbying differs substantially across legislatures.

Daniel E. Bergan

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Great Debates, The

The term *Great Debates* was commonly used for the Lincoln-Douglas Debates during the 1858 Senate race in Illinois. Since then, the term has been extended to apply to several presidential debates, especially during the television era. Most famously, the presidential debates of 1960 were the first televised debates and included John Kennedy and Richard Nixon.

It is often contended that these debates were harmful to Nixon's campaign because several problems related to the medium were unkind to Nixon and made Kennedy look more credible. Nixon appeared to be tired and unwell during the debates due to excessive lighting that caused heat and makeup problems. Kennedy appeared well rested, energized, and healthy. Some speculate that Nixon "won" the voters who listened to the debates broadcast on radio while Kennedy "won" the voters who viewed the debates on television. However, the analysis of this data, as well as the data itself, was questionable, and the accuracy of this conclusion is still questionable.

The 1960 debates offered a chance for every voter with television access to watch both presidential candidates. This was the first time in history that voters were afforded this opportunity without having to attend a convention or debate in person. The candidates were pitted against each other in a setting where questions focused on domestic and foreign issues; they were given time to respond to each other as well as to questions posed by media representatives. These debates differed from current presidential debates in format, length, and topics, but they were the first introduction of debates as a campaign forum.

Over the course of the past 40 years, presidential debates have been used strategically during campaigns. Sydney Kraus (1962, 1977), along with others, reviews the debates and provides suggestions for how campaigns might strategize further with this campaign forum. In a series aptly titled *The Great Debates,* Kraus and contributors have dissected and analyzed not only candidates participating in debates, but how debates function.

As a book and the subsequent series*, The Great Debates* offers a solid report, a close analysis, and careful critique of the presidential debates since 1960. First published in 1962, the original book is now out of print, but Kraus's critique of televised presidential debates continues. In addition, online resources provide samples from the debates and commentaries from those who participated in them. The greatest contribution of the reflections in *The Great Debates* series is not only that it serves as a reminder of the importance of media in campaigns, but that it chronicles change over four decades of presidential debates.

Elizabeth Dudash

See also Debates; Kraus, Sidney

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Greeley, Horace (1811–1872)

Horace Greeley was an American newspaper editor, a publisher of diverse opinions and literary content, and a champion of 19th-century social and political movements. He used the *New York Tribune,* the crowning achievement of his career, to call for protective tariffs and improvements in national infrastructure, the abolition of slavery, and to influence the policies of both the Whig and Republican parties. In 1872, Greeley ran unsuccessfully for president as a candidate for both the Democratic and Liberal Republican tickets, the only time in American history when a candidate received the backing of two major political parties.

In 1834, Greeley founded the *New-Yorker,* his first successful editorial project, as a weekly literary and news journal that featured his interest in politics, social issues, and the arts and sciences. In 1837, Greeley first met Thurlow Weed, editor of the Albany *Evening Journal* and one of New York's most powerful Whig operatives. Weed asked Greeley to edit a new journal, the *Jeffersonian,* to promote the gubernatorial campaign of his friend William H. Seward, which was successful in part because of Greeley's editorial talents. Greeley's connection with Weed helped him in turn launch the *Log Cabin,* a campaign weekly he first issued May 2, 1840, to promote William Henry Harrison's successful presidential bid. At its peak, the *Log Cabin* reached an astonishing circulation of 80,000 copies a week.

After Harrison's election, Seward and Weed encouraged Greeley to issue a daily paper that would reach Manhattan's working-class audience with a range of content, from local and national news to the advocacy of political ideas that would help advance Whig social programs. On April 10, 1841, Greeley first issued the New York *Tribune* and edited the newspaper for more than 30 years. He opened the *Tribune*'s pages to contributions from a range of writers who often identified themselves with a Transcendentalist movement promoting social harmony, popularizing the communitarian ideas of French socialist Charles Fourier (1772–1837). The *Tribune* also advocated homestead legislation and the principle of distributing free public lands to settlers, attacked the exploitation of wage labor, denounced monopolies, supported women's rights and temperance, opposed capital punishment, and editorialized vehemently against slavery. By the 1860s, the *Tribune* and its various editions had a total circulation of more than a quarter of a million.

Historians credit Greeley with naming the Republicans, as well as helping form many of the political objectives outlined in their 1856 and 1860 platforms. With Greeley's support, the Republicans nominated Abraham Lincoln, and during the Civil War, Greeley pressured Lincoln constantly to emancipate the rebel slaves. His most famous editorial on the subject, "The Prayer of Twenty Millions," was published August 20, 1862, urging the president to use the Second Confiscation Act to allow Union commanders to free the slaves of rebel masters.

In May 1872, the newly formed Liberal Republican Party nominated Greeley for president. His campaign took an unexpected turn when the Democratic Party, desperate to unseat President Ulysses S. Grant, also nominated him as its candidate. Greeley resigned his *Tribune* editorship and delivered speeches across the country to stress the need for national reconciliation, but both campaigns quickly degenerated into a mudslinging melee. The persistent assaults on Greeley's character took a mental and physical toll on him. Exhausted, disheartened, and ill, Greeley died on November 29, 1872.

Gregory A. Borchard

See also Journalism, Political

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Green Party

A political party that belongs to the family of the so-called New Politics parties is commonly named a *Green party* (sometimes also *alternative party* or *ecological party*). Such parties were founded in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s in most of the Western industrialized countries. Shortly after their emergence, Poguntke (1987) developed a first theoretical description and definition of the New Politics party family that has found widespread acceptance in the literature. According to this definition, New Politics parties differ from traditional political parties with respect to their programmatic orientation, their party organization, their political style, and the profile of their members and voters.

Poguntke deduced all the specific characteristics of this party family from the central characteristics of the New Politics. The term *New Politics* is used to refer to the changes in the political attitudes and dispositions of the citizens that result from the process of postmaterialist value change in advanced industrialized societies. The most important change resulting from this so-called silent revolution is the increasing emphasis on quality of life, citizen participation, and self-actualization, while material affluence and economic growth are losing their dominance. As a consequence, there is a change in the dominant lines of political polarization in modern societies.

In their party platforms, Green parties take a stand in favor of New Politics issues like nuclear disarmament, solidarity with the so-called Third World, grassroots democracy, and gender equality. In the early years of the New Politics parties, their most distinctive programmatic claim was giving first priority to ecological imperatives. This is the reason that they often named themselves Green parties. Since adherents of New Politics show a strong emphasis on direct political participation, the organizational structure of Green parties originally differed fundamentally from the internal structure of traditional political parties. A series of measures were taken in order to avoid processes of internal oligarchization and hierarchization: ordinary party members had the right to participate in party meetings at all organizational levels and were directly involved in important political decisions. Elected officeholders were strongly controlled by the rank and files, and their terms of office were limited. The intention was to realize the goal of direct participation of the party members under the requirements of the respective national party law as far as possible. However, despite all these efforts, there was a contradiction between operating as a political party within the parliamentary system and the fundamental preference for a grassroots democracy. Initially, Green parties tried to dissolve this contradiction by becoming active in and outside the parliamentary arena simultaneously. Members and officeholders of Green parties engaged strongly in unconventional political actions like demonstrations, boycotts, squattings, and walkouts. The Parliament was seen as an arena that was only to be used in order to give the political concerns of the Green Movement a greater public visibility. According to this strategy, Green parties initially did not strive for coming into power. During its early days, the German Green Party described this strategy with a nice metaphor: while the extraparliamentary New Social Movements should form the "supporting leg" of the party, the parliamentary work should not be more than the "free leg." Taking all this together, the political style of New Politics parties can be described as unconventional. The last aspect of Poguntke's definition of New Politics parties refers to the specific profile of their membership and their electorate. He saw the main potential for Green parties among persons with postmaterial value orientations. According to the available empirical evidence, those persons were predominantly young, highly educated, urban, and members of the new middle classes.

Poguntke's description of the New Politics party family was perfectly correct for the 1980s. Starting in the early 1990s, Green parties underwent a fundamental metamorphosis, which was first described using the prototypical example of the German Green Party as the "Greying of the Greens." The first aspect of this metamorphosis was a programmatic change from fundamental opposition to the political system toward a pragmatic politics of reform within the Parliament. This implies the willingness to become part of a ruling coalition. The second aspect was a gradual shift of the internal party structures toward the classical élite-directed model of the traditional parties. The third

aspect was a change in the political style in the direction of conventional politics, for example, the adoption of personalization strategies in Green election campaigns. Finally, the "Greying of the Greens" describes changes in the electoral support of New Politics parties. In the course of time, their voters became older in the average. At the same time, the electoral support in the youngest age groups was gradually declining. This pattern does not fit the model of intergenerational value change proposed by Inglehart (1977). It seems, that at least in Germany the Green Party is in fact a single-generation party, which is predominantly supported by persons who experienced their formative years in the politically turbulent 1970s and 1980s.

Markus Klein

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Group Decision Making, Political

Many of the decisions made in democracies result from group processes, both small and large. The emergence of deliberative democratic theory over the past two decades has spurred research on political group decision making by stressing the role citizens can play in larger political processes. Researchers informed by deliberative democratic theory examine and evaluate existing organizations and institutions designed to promote citizen participation and deliberation, from government-sponsored citizen forums to voluntary groups involved in democratic social movements. Research has also looked at trial juries, which provide citizens with a formal opportunity to render a consequential public decision (verdict or civil judgment). In addition, scholars interested in political group decision making have investigated the process, content, and quality of group deliberation by governmental officials in institutions, such as Congress and the executive branch.

Citizen Deliberation

The modern ideal of citizen deliberation traces back to the Athenian assembly, in which male citizens acted as legislators on important public questions. In this vision of democracy, citizen decision making was essential to establishing the legitimacy of the state's decisions. This foundational idea deeply influenced democratic theorists from Jean-Jacques Rousseau to Jürgen Habermas. In general, deliberative political theory argues that democratic systems fail to the extent that they do not promote robust, widespread deliberation. A deliberative public sphere in which citizens participate is necessary to help individual citizens develop broad and public-spirited perspectives and reasoned judgments on public policy. In addition, to maintain legitimacy, formal institutions of government in representative democracy such as legislatures, courts, and chief executives should engage in deliberation in their decision-making processes to facilitate representative and well-informed outcomes.

A central claim in the contemporary study of citizen deliberation is that citizens' policy views and civic attitudes can transform through public-oriented discussion, and a wide range of political reforms have demonstrated the potency of such deliberation. In the

1970s, citizen juries in the United States and planning cells (*Planungszelle*) in Germany experimented with varied techniques for convening small representative samples of citizens to study complex public policy issues. Government agencies, private foundations, and others have used these and related processes to gain a sense of what the general public thinks about issues after having the opportunity to deliberate. More recently, the deliberative poll has also become a popular means of assessing how public opinion changes as a result of one-to-three days of discussion.

Some reformers have suggested institutionalizing deliberative practices to give citizen discussion a formally recognized role in government. One widely cited example is Brazil's Participatory Budgeting and Management Council processes, which have created mechanisms for local civil society organizations to influence fiscal and regulatory decisions. British Columbia's Citizens Assembly process provides another precedent, by bringing together a random sample of the province's population to deliberate over several months and draft an electoral reform proposal that was subsequently put on the ballot for ratification by the full electorate.

Groups in Democratic Social Movements

A handful of studies have found that deliberation can have transformational effects on citizens who take part in democratic social movements. Opportunities for democratic decision making exist within many movement organizations, such as civil rights groups in the 1960s, women's collectives in the 1970s, and fair trade groups in the past 2 decades. Though these civil society organizations rarely wield formal political authority, they do have significant cultural and political influence.

Taking part in the internal governance of these organizations, whether planning public events, developing strategy, or undertaking any number of decision-tasks, constitute intrinsically valuable decision making in a pluralistic society. In addition, these tasks can provide citizens with habits, attitudes, and skills conducive to effective participation in other public activities, fueling the development of participatory democracy, aside from whatever substantive benefits are provided by their advocacy on specific issues.

Juries

Though much attention has been given to relatively new forums for citizen deliberation, other researchers have attempted to understand the deliberative qualities of the jury system, one of the oldest venues for groups of citizens to formally participate in political decision making. Originally devised in England as a means of administering justice, the use of juries slowly evolved over centuries, with independence of juries from the will of the magistrate established in 1671. Several countries have adopted the jury system, but its use is most widespread in the United States. The right to a trial by a jury of one's peers is an established component of the American justice system, and as the ideals of equality and civil rights have flourished, the peer group constituted by a formal jury has become more diverse in ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status.

Research on juries has generally demonstrated that citizen-jurors take their decision-making task seriously, more often than not reaching the same verdicts at which experienced judges would themselves arrive. Juries are also less predictable than conventional wisdom would suggest, with juror demographics being very weak predictors of trial outcomes. Even in the contentious area of civil lawsuits, where "Robin Hood juries" are reputed to levy oversized judgments, research has found that juries generally render fair and proportionate judgments. Thus, the balance of evidence is that juries do, in fact, deliberate carefully on the cases that come before them.

In his observations about American political culture, Alexis de Tocqueville imagined that the American jury system would serve a civic educational purpose. Recent investigations of jury deliberation have demonstrated that the experience of deliberation can, indeed, spark heightened levels of future political and civic engagement. Results from large-scale studies of multiple juries show that there is some positive transformational effect as a result of serving on a jury, providing support for the broader claim made by deliberative theorists that active citizen engagement in public decision making can transform private individuals into more active, public-minded citizens. In addition, researchers have found that jury participation bolsters jurors' perceptions of the legitimacy of the justice system.

Congressional Committees

Research on political decision making has also considered the deliberative competence of traditional governmental bodies comprised of elected officials. Legislatures, in particular, are charged with engaging in sustained discussion on public issues, often resulting in policy decisions. For example, in the U.S.

Congress, standing committees are presumed to deliberate when their members "mark up" a piece of legislation. During this step of the legislative process, the substantive details of a bill are revised with the goal of passing it on to the general membership of the body (either the House or Senate) for consideration.

After the reform period (1965–1980) and the Republican takeover of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1995, political parties have become stronger vis-à-vis committees, taking away some of the independent power to deliberate on policy that committees enjoyed in the mid-20th-century "Textbook Congress." Under current practices, committee deliberation overall has been weakened in favor of closed-door discussion within party caucuses. On bills that have partisan implications, majority party members of committees frequently reject suggestions regarding content or amendments proposed by minority party members, using their advantage in numbers to push through their party's favored policy outcome.

Not all legislation lends itself to clear-cut partisan differences, however, and on bills in which party members have an interest but do not divide members of a committee in a clear-cut ideological way, a considerable amount of discussion regarding content occurs. This discussion reflects the original deliberative purpose of committees: to specialize in area of public policy so that members could gain expertise during their tenure and to encourage these members to share information with each other and the general membership in a way that promotes the best (i.e., most thoroughly considered and representative) policy outcome.

Groupthink in the Executive Branch

One additional line of research has sought to connect social-psychological research on small group decision making to the difficult political choices often facing executive decision makers. A distinguishing feature of the executive branch of government is the unilateral decision-making authority given to the mayor, county commissioner, governor, or president. Nonetheless, deliberation is widespread within executive bodies because decision makers often seek information from colleagues and confidants in an effort to inform their ultimate decisions. This is precisely what a president has the opportunity to do when calling together a cabinet, a committee, or an advisory council. The judgments of such groups can help the executive understand and consider a range of views and information; at other times, however, those informal bodies can create a kind of "groupthink."

Irving Janis (1982) cemented the popular understanding of that term when he found that groups of well-intentioned and highly capable experts, policy advisors, and executives have made historically catastrophic decisions that can be traced back to poor group decision-making practices. The most serious symptoms of such "groupthink" include an illusion of invulnerability, wherein a group comes to doubt that it can fail. Another warning sign is careful self-censorship of deviations from the emerging group consensus, along with the application of direct pressure on dissenters and the emergence of self-appointed "mindguards" who keep unpleasant information and dissenters out of the executive's reach.

Janis found these symptoms to be present in the historical record for many important meetings of the executive branch. In particular, groupthink appears to have been partly to blame for such fiascoes as the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba and policy-making errors in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Groupthink, however, remains the exception rather than the rule. Janis famously demonstrated this by showing how the Kennedy administration managed to navigate the Cuban Missile Crisis expertly by learning procedural lessons from its previous decision-making lapses. In the end, the research on groupthink and related deliberative breakdowns is more cautionary than pessimistic about the prospects for political group decision making.

John Gastil and Stephanie Burkhalter

See also Deliberation

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Groupthink in Politics

See Group Decision Making, Political

Guggenheim, Charles (1924–2002)

Charles Guggenheim was an American film director and producer. Using the documentary style of filming, Guggenheim was one of the first to create advertisements for American political campaigns. Guggenheim developed television commercials using filmmaking techniques such as the script, visuals, and editing to showcase the candidates' character and campaign themes. In the course of his career, Guggenheim made more than 100 documentaries, for which he was nominated for 12 Academy Awards and won 4. Guggenheim also received three Emmys and the George Foster Peabody Award.

In 1965, Guggenheim began his work as a media adviser to many Democratic political figures. Guggenheim worked on four presidential campaigns and hundreds of Senate and gubernatorial campaigns. Political commercials have become an indispensable component of American political campaigns. Unlike the current negative trends in political advertising, Guggenheim sought to expose the character of his candidates in an affirmative way, letting the issues speak for themselves.

Guggenheim's efforts shaped the campaigns of many prominent politicians in the 1960s and 1970s, including Adlai Stevenson, Jr., the Kennedys, and George McGovern. However, his most famous contribution to political campaigns was his work on Robert Kennedy's presidential nomination campaign. After Kennedy's assassination, Guggenheim was commissioned by the Kennedys to create a documentary remembering the senator. In less than two months, Guggenheim created the film biography, *Robert Kennedy Remembered,* which aired for the first time at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago and went on to win an Oscar the following year. Guggenheim's success in this arena led to the filming of biographies of former presidents Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson. He was the major filmmaker for George McGovern's 1972 presidential campaign, and his work on that campaign illustrates his use of *cinema verité* documentary film style for political commercials. In many of these commercials Guggenheim presented McGovern interacting with and encountering real voters in real situations.

Guggenheim's work centered on his passion for human fortitude. His ability to bring a humanistic component to the forefront of his pictures has left a lasting impression on more than presidential campaigns. All of Guggenheim's work had a political foundation and message to be shared with its viewers. The 1964 film, *Nine From Little Rock,* focused on the violent 1957 school degradation crisis in Arkansas, and *A Time for Justice* (1994) centered on America's civil rights movement. Guggenheim also made documentaries on the Ku Klux Klan, immigrants entering the United States though Ellis Island, and the D-Day landings. Guggenheim's final and most personal project, *Berga: Soldiers of Another War,* was filmed from the lens of soldiers who survived the Berga war camp. This documentary focused on POWs who were separated from other soldiers and sent to slave labor camps in eastern Germany. Guggenheim finished his last film weeks before dying from pancreatic cancer.

Leslie A. Rill

See also Political Advertising

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Gulf War, Media Coverage of

The Vietnam War was a turning point in the media's coverage of military conflict and was the first modern war in which television brought visual images of combat into homes. Despite the impact these still images and footage had on the public, they were not close-up, live reports, as viewers were able to see during the 1991 Gulf War and later the Iraq War. In 1991, coverage of the Gulf War allowed viewers to watch war in their living rooms in real time.

In August 1990, Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait as the result of a dispute over oil drilling. The United Nations immediately initiated economic sanctions against Iraq, but Iraq continued to occupy disputed territory. Consequently, in January 1991 the United States led a coalition of some 30 countries, with United Nations approval, to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. The live and expanded coverage of the Gulf War was largely due to the groundbreaking coverage of the Cable News Network (CNN), which provided continuous coverage of the 45-day war, sometimes called the Persian Gulf War.

Researchers who analyzed CNN's coverage of the Gulf War conflict concluded that CNN provided generally an American view of the war that highlighted the military and technological aspects of the war. In fact, much scholarly research about the media's coverage of the 1991 Gulf War indicates a general consensus that the reporting was biased in favor of an American point of view. However, the international press was not as supportive and influenced by the high tech. Many studies also noted the tendency of the news media to rely on their own sources and to insert their own involvement into the coverage at unprecedented levels, thus becoming participants in the military conflict that they themselves were reporting on.

Andrew Paul Williams and Lynda Lee Kaid

President and Mrs. Bush walking along the desert in Saudi Arabia with General Schwarzkopf and entourage (November 1990). Throughout most of the period in the buildup to the war (from August 1990 to January 1991), news coverage was both lengthy and intense.

Source: George Bush Presidential Library.

See also CNN (Cable News Network); Iraq War, Media Coverage of; War Coverage

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Gurevitch, Michael

See Uses and Gratifications Approach

H

Habermas, Jürgen

See Public Sphere

Hagerty, James C.

See Press Secretary, White House

Haider, Jörg (1950–)

Jörg Haider is the current governor of the Austrian state of Carinthia, the former head of the so-called Austrian Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*/FPÖ), and founding member of the BZÖ (*Bündnis Zukunft Österreich*/Alliance for the Future of Austria). After taking over the Freedom Party chair in September 1986, Haider began a swift ascendancy in the FPÖ that found its climax in the 1999 elections (the party gained 27% of the votes and the second place behind the Social Democrats). After forming a coalition with the Christian-conservative Peoples Party (*Österreichische Volkspartei*/ÖVP) and resigning as head of the FPÖ (facing massive pressure because of former statements made about the Third Reich and foreigners), he continued his position as governor of Carinthia. Continual losses in regional elections and internal party conflicts led to the end of the coalition in 2002; in the following federal elections the FPÖ lost more than the half of their votes. However, the ÖVP resumed the coalition with Haider's Freedom Party. Further election defeats increased criticism about the party line and of Haider. In 2005, the governing part of the Freedom Party and Haider split from the FPÖ and founded a new party, the BZÖ.

Jörg Haider portrayed himself as a new type of politician. He relied on populist attacks against the great coalition between the Social Democratic Party *(Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs*/SPÖ) and the ÖVP. This government, amassing more than two-thirds of the parliamentary vote in 1999 and in office for 13 years, was a target of attacks and was noted for several scandals. By fraternizing with the voters against the politicians, Haider presented himself to be more a fighter for justice (and later for social issues) than a real politician.

Haider was often criticized for showing a biased view of Austria's Nazi history (playing down historical facts concerning Nazism) as well as for his party's hostile and xenophobic attitude against foreigners and asylum seekers.

Haider introduced several new techniques into campaigning in Austria; he was, for instance, the first politician to use a *Taferl* (board with short messages) in political debates on TV, and began an ongoing tradition. All campaign work was totally focused on the person of Haider; his face eventually showed up on regional election posters in place of the regional candidate's. In discussions and speeches he often made insulting jokes about his opponents, and relied on (sometimes anti-Semitic) stereotypes and prejudices in his arguments.

Frequently discussed with the ascendancy of Haider during the 1990s is the role of the media, as it

offered him much space and time. His face is found on countless covers, mainly because of his highly criticized statements. Politically, a debate took place about whether a politics of exclusion as done by Chancellor Franz Vranitzky (SPÖ) was the right tactic. Some argue that if Haider had been given responsibility (for instance, as part of a government), his winning streak would suddenly have come to an end—of course, at the price of making (extreme) right-wing populism part of the government.

Peter Filzmaier, Flooh Perlot, and Maria Beyrl

See also Populism; Schüssel, Wolfgang; Vranitzky, Franz

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Hallin, Daniel C. (1953–)

Daniel C. Hallin is a professor in the Department of Communication, University of California at San Diego. He is one of the major U.S. specialists in the relationship between mass media and politics, a subject he has studied both in national and comparative dimensions. Indeed, he has written extensively on the U.S. media system and on its comparison with other countries' systems.

His most important book is *Comparing Media Systems,* which he coauthored with Paolo Mancini; it represents a sort of "summa" of his theoretical thoughts and empirical analysis. In this book Hallin was able to place media analysis within an elaborated, theoretical framework that combines suggestions coming from a critical approach, essentially from Habermas's critical view of the mass media, with observations proposed by some functionalist scholars such as Jeffrey Alexander and Niklas Luhmann. Pierre Bourdieu's works on journalism have also been useful to Hallin in developing an approach to a comparative analysis of media systems that is highly original and that represents an important step in the direction of a more comprehensive understanding of how mass media and the political world interact in different social contexts.

Hallin rejects the sort of normative view of journalism that has been so diffused and common in media studies and in the vocational attitudes of journalists, and, instead, proposes to view journalistic practices and structures in a way that is more directly connected with the society in which they develop. In this way, all "imperialistic" and commonsense observation are rejected, while his empirical approach starts from real, social contingencies.

In his previous books, *We Keep America on Top of the World: Television Journalism and Public Sphere* (1994) and *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam*, Daniel Hallin had already used a critical approach to the U.S. media environment that enabled him to look beyond the most common interpretations and to discover, as in the case of the coverage of the Vietnam War, interesting journalistic attitudes that could more fully explain what role the mass media played in producing that perception of the war that so deeply affected its outcome and therefore the entire American society.

Two other research fields characterize Hallin's work: Latin America and clientelism. Hallin is an expert in the media of Latin America, especially in Mexico, and this interest goes together with his involvement in several associations that aim at facilitating the exchange of knowledge between North and South America.

His most recent interest focuses on clientelism and the media. This relationship is observed as an ideal means to place the mass media within the most general cultural and political features of the society in which they function.

Paolo Mancini

See also *Comparing Media Systems*

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Handbook of Political Communication, The

The Handbook of Political Communication was edited in 1981 by Dan Nimmo and Keith R. Sanders. As the first compendium in the discipline of political communication, the book was designed to lay out the parameters of the field and to provide overviews of the extant scholarly literature in the various subfields that were developing. In the introduction, Nimmo and Sanders describe the growth and development of the field of political communication, noting that the components that comprise a discipline are present for political communication: a group of scholars who identify with the field, specialized divisions in national associations, journals that specialize in the content of the field, and university programs that offer degree specializations.

The individual chapters in the handbook are divided into sections. The first section, which concentrates on theoretical perspectives, includes notable chapters on agenda setting by Max McCombs, uses and gratifications theory by Jack McLeod and Lee Becker, and constructivism by David Swanson. In the second section, on means and modes of political communication, are chapters on debates (Sidney Kraus and Dennis Davis), political advertising (Lynda Lee Kaid), political language (Doris Graber), and political rhetoric (Lloyd Bitzer). A third section is focused on political communication settings, encompassing political socialization (Charles Atkin), public opinion (Cliff Zukin), press roles (Jay Blumler and Michael Gurevitch), and social movements (Herbert Simons and Elizabeth W. Meckling). In the fourth section, chapters are included on various methodological approaches to studying political communication, including content analysis, experimental studies, survey research, and critical-cultural studies.

Appendices to the book include a short section on political communication scholarship in Europe and a guide to the literature in the new and growing discipline.

The publication of this handbook was a major landmark for the field of political communication, and the volume served as a textbook in the area for many years. Some chapters are still required reading for political communication students.

Although no second edition of the handbook was ever published, some later books updated the literature in the subfields covered in the original handbook and expanded consideration to include new developments in the field. For instance, Swanson and Nimmo edited a sourcebook of political communication in 1990 that expanded the coverage of the field, and Newman's *Handbook of Political Marketing* (1999) focused broadly and internationally on aspects of the field that relate directly to marketing politics.

The most recent volume to build on the original handbook is *The Handbook of Political Communication Research,* edited in 2004 by Lynda Lee Kaid. This volume contains new and updated chapters on political advertising, political debates, political news, rhetoric, spiral of silence, agenda setting, the press, and methodological approaches. This volume also includes chapters on Europe and Asia in recognition of the great expansion and contributions to the political communication field by international scholars.

Lynda Lee Kaid

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Hanson, Pauline (1954–)

Pauline Hanson, founder of the One Nation party and Australia's most well-known neopopulist political leader, provided a clear challenge for Australia's media. In her notorious maiden speech as an independent member of Federal Parliament in 1996, she attacked Asian immigration and indigenous welfare, sparking racial divisions while striking a chord with many rural, regional, and working-class voters who

felt alienated by multiculturalism and disaffected by rural economic downturn.

At first, Hanson was ignored or ridiculed by the media for her apparent naïveté, nasal Australian accent, and frequent verbal blunders. However, as she gained more support, the popular media (talk radio and tabloid newspapers) and later the more serious print and broadcast media began to examine the causes of her success, often highlighting disaffection brought about by economic and social change.

Unusually, Hanson did not seek to cultivate the media, as more experienced mainstream politicians or other successful populist leaders do. Instead her relationship with the media ranged from indifference to active hostility. She frequently frustrated her media advisors by ignoring or subverting their advice, and she lashed out at the media when they criticized or ridiculed her. Late in 1996 she publicized a videotape to be played after her death, asserting that if people were hearing the tape it was because she had "been murdered."

Hanson was not averse to drawing media attention to herself, but she flaunted her personal appearance and dramatic appeal more than her political ideas. She was photographed draped in an Australian flag and courted women's magazines and dress designers to ensure startling reportage out of the usual political contexts. During one election campaign she appeared on a television ballroom dancing program.

Media attention intensified during the 1998 Queensland State election, when One Nation—the party she established with only three voting members—won 11 seats, comprising 22.7% of first preference votes. Hanson's personal support waned, and she failed to be reelected to her federal seat in late 1998 or to be elected to the Senate in 2001 and 2004. Some media commentators believed she had lost touch with the disgruntled voters who rallied to her in the first couple of years. Others claim Liberal Prime Minister John Howard has gradually subsumed her constituency by incorporating their fears into his populist policies, an explanation Hanson herself endorses.

In August 2003 Hanson was jailed for 3 years for electoral fraud, a conviction she successfully appealed against, serving only 11 weeks of the sentence.

No longer a member of the party she founded, Hanson will run as an independent in the 2007 federal elections. But she commands only fleeting media attention to her renewed racist comments about "diseased" African and Muslim immigrants.

Julianne Stewart

See also Populism

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Hard Money

See Federal Election Campaign Act

Hard News

Hard news is often described as "traditional news." A story has hard news value if it contains new information that is timely and relevant. Hard news is something the reader or viewer needs to know about right away. Stories about catastrophic events or neighborhood house fires are hard news. Crime and political stories are considered hard news. Hard news might be personally relevant to a viewer or listener; an example of this would be a story about a proposed sales tax increase. However, hard news stories, such as stories about war, terrorist acts, or natural disasters, can also be relevant to a viewer or reader even if he or she is not directly involved.

Content is one way to distinguish between hard and soft news. Hard news is usually of a more serious or negative nature. Generally, if something bad has happened, a report on the event is considered hard news. Stories involving government also fall into the hard news category, since government operations affect the general population in serious ways. Conversely, stories about arts, culture, entertainment, and lifestyle are usually considered soft news.

Presentation is another way to distinguish between hard and soft news. Hard news is more often presented in a straightforward manner with a fast pace, with quick cuts between shots. Soft news is more often presented in a feature format. Features may be

longer than hard news stories and contain more production elements, such as graphics and soft transitions between shots.

Gender differences have been found in the content and presentation of hard news. The Global Media Monitoring Project (GMMP) has repeatedly found that women are less likely to be featured in hard news stories. Stories about economics and politics are dominated by men, but women are twice as likely as men to be portrayed as victims in hard news stories. As newsmakers, professional women are underrepresented in categories such as law, business, and politics. Women are also underrepresented as reporters, and there is a gender division in which kinds of stories they cover. Women are much less likely to be assigned hard news stories, instead being asked to cover arts and culture events.

Beyond concerns of gender differences, there is a concern about what appears to be a decrease in the overall coverage of hard news. In 2005 former U.S. Vice President Al Gore accused large media conglomerates of ignoring serious political coverage and other hard news stories and instead covering scandal and entertainment. Gore warned that access to healthy political debate has faded in the current media environment.

However, recent studies suggest that media outlets are simply giving readers and viewers what they want. Many newspaper readers say they skip over hard news because they find it sad and depressing. Young readers in particular say they skip hard news to get to stories about entertainment.

Hard news is supposed to give citizens information they need to make informed decisions about their government. But, increasingly, hard news is being ignored or underreported in an era of declining interest in public life and a continuing disengagement of citizens from their government.

Lisa Mills-Brown

See also Soft News

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Harris, Fred (1930–)

Fred Harris, the "New Populist" U.S. senator, served from 1964 to 1972. He was born in the western Oklahoma small town of Walters on November 13, 1930. From a young age Harris worked in the wheat and cotton harvests. Those experiences taught him the value of hard work and the plight of share croppers.

Hard working and ambitious, Harris was a Future Farmers of America state champion in high school. He graduated college Phi Beta Kappa and finished first in his University of Oklahoma law school class of 1954. At age 25, Harris was elected to the Oklahoma State Senate, where he served for 8 years. Even as he was winning his first local campaign, Harris expressed ambition for the U.S. Senate.

Harris established a reputation as the hardest working member of the Oklahoma legislature. He worked to establish the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission. He also encouraged the development of the Oklahoma Wheat Commission. His record was not entirely populist; he also supported tax breaks for western Oklahoma's rapidly developing oil industry.

In 1964, Harris was elected to complete the term of the late U.S. Senator Robert S. Kerr. The wealthy Kerr family's support helped Harris overcome two former governors and the legendary Sooner football coach, Bud Wilkinson.

In the U.S. Senate, the hardworking Harris became known as "Mr. Science." As a freshman senator he persuaded the chairman of the Government Operations Committee to create a subcommittee on government research and became one of the few freshmen ever to chair a subcommittee. In 1966, Oklahomans elected him to a full 6-year term.

President Lyndon Johnson was persuaded by Harris and others in 1967 to form the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, also known as the Kerner Commission, named after its Ohio chairman. Harris described his work on the commission as a "Damascus Road experience." Although he had long been active in the civil rights movement, he suddenly saw the problems of poverty and race in a new light.

Harris entered the Senate calling himself an "independent Democrat." Soon he made friends with a variety of liberal senators like Hubert Humphrey, Walter Mondale, and Robert Kennedy. Much to the frustration of his southern conservative Democratic constituency, Harris became recognized as an "establishment liberal." In 1968, he served as cochair of Humphrey's

presidential campaign. Following that election, Harris became chairman of the Democratic National Committee while retaining his seat in the Senate.

By 1972 Oklahoma had become a conservative state. Harris, true to his populist roots, had moved left. Rather than seek reelection in Oklahoma, in 1972 Harris chose to run for president. Harris found a platform in *New York Times* reporter Jack Newfield's 1971 article titled "New Populist Manifesto." Harris began to decry many of the Great Society programs that he had helped to put in place. He felt these programs placed too much emphasis on inner-city racism and did not do enough to address the broader problem of poverty in America. Harris's campaign was short lived, but it completed his transformation from "independent Democrat" to "establishment liberal" to "new populist." Harris tried again in 1976, whistlestopping across the country in a Winnebago.

Harris's populist philosophy was congruent with his man-of-the-people communication style. He traveled Oklahoma on a 77-county "Thank You Tour" in 1964. He traveled from ghetto to ghetto as part of his Kerner Commission work. In protest of the Vietnam War, he traveled from campus to campus. Seeking the presidency, he traveled the country in an RV. When he wanted to make major policy pronouncements, he spoke on the floor of the Senate.

Local media found little to criticize early in his Senate career. However, as his antipoverty and antiwar activities took shape, local news outlets began to suggest that he was out of step with average Oklahomans. Nationally, Harris never became a household name.

Rick Farmer

See also Populism

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Hart, Gary (1936–)

Gary W. Hart is a former two-term senator from Colorado and was a candidate for the Democratic nomination for president in 1984 and 1988. Although he was the frontrunner going into the 1988 Democratic primaries, he may be best remembered for an act of hubris. Responding to rumors that he was having an extramarital affair, he dared the press to follow him around. Reporters for the *Miami Herald* took up his challenge and caught his mistress, Donna Rice, leaving Hart's residence one evening. Hart initially fought back. But a photo eventually surfaced showing Rice sitting on Hart's lap on a yacht aptly named *Monkey Business.* The photo story broke in early May 1987, causing Hart to drop out of the race. He briefly returned to the race toward the end of the year, but he received little support and lost to the eventual Democratic nominee, Michael Dukakis.

The drama of Hart's personal fall overshadows his many significant accomplishments and his expertise in international affairs. A graduate of Yale Law School in 1964, Hart went on to earn a Doctor of Philosophy degree in politics at Oxford University in 2001. Before becoming a senator, Hart served as a lawyer for the Department of Justice in 1964 and 1965, an assistant for the solicitor of the Interior Department from 1965 to 1967, and he was the national campaign manager for George McGovern's run for the presidency in 1972. Hart served on multiple international policy boards, including the Defense Policy Board and the Council on Foreign Relations. Many of Hart's recommendations as a presidential candidate in the 1980s for reform of national defenses have been taken up by President George W. Bush's administration. Hart served on a bipartisan National Commission on Terrorism, appointed in 1998 by President Bill Clinton to examine domestic security against foreign attacks. The commission's recommendations, based largely on fears of globalization's sweeping changes to world economies that were bringing people with conflicting values into greater contact with each other, went largely ignored until reinforced by the commission investigating American security failures during the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Hart and fellow commission member Warren B. Rudman warned that the end of the Cold War brought the need for a change in approach to American security, shifting from bipolar calculation to multipolar acknowledgment of emerging superpowers as well as rogue states that would eventually be getting their hands on rapidly spreading technologies of mass murder. Hart's predictions about terror attacks on the United States prior to September 11, 2001, have brought him greater prominence than at any time since his 1987 debacle.

Hart now sees himself as a "Paul Revere," decrying the nation's continued lack of preparedness for another attack. Hart's name has come up as a possible cabinet member should the Democratic Party retake the presidency.

Nicholas A. Thomas

See also McGovern, George

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Hart, Roderick P. (1945–)

Roderick P. Hart (born February 17, 1945) is an important scholar in the areas of political language, media and politics, presidential studies and rhetorical analysis. He has authored 12 books, received numerous teaching awards, created a theoretically grounded computer program designed to analyze language patterns (DICTION), founded the Annette Strauss Institute for Civic Participation, and serves as dean of the College of Communication at the University of Texas at Austin.

Hart received a BA in English from the University of Massachusetts and an MA and PhD in speech communication from the Pennsylvania State University. While at Penn State, Hart studied under rhetorician Carroll Arnold and was named a Woodrow Wilson Fellow. After graduating from Penn State, Hart joined the faculty at Purdue University, where he served as an assistant professor (1970–1974) and associate professor (1974–1979) of communication. In 1979, he was appointed a full professor at the University of Texas at Austin, where he has been to the present.

Hart's reputation in rhetorical analyses—often of political texts—began through a series of research honors, including three Golden Monograph Awards (National Communication Association, 1972, 1974, 1981). These accolades were followed by the Charles H. Woolbert Research Award (NCA, 1984), the Winans-Wicheln Book Award (NCA, 1988), Diamond Anniversary Book Award (NCA, 1995), and the Douglas W. Ehninger Distinguished Rhetorical Scholar Award (NCA, 2003). Additionally, Hart has received the highest honors bestowed by the National Communication Association (Distinguished Scholar Award, 1993), the International Communication Association (Research Fellow, 1993), and the American Political Science Association Political, Communication Division (Edelman Distinguished Career Award, 2000).

While he has authored more than 50 articles and chapters, it is perhaps his books that have had the largest influence in political communication. *The Sound of Leadership* (1987) and *Campaign Talk: Why Elections Are Good for Us* (2000) are unique in that they carefully blend two approaches (a sensitivity to individual texts and the rigor of large-scale human and computerized content analyses) to ask and answer fundamental questions about politics, language, and culture. The former book analyzes nearly 10,000 public speaking events over the course of eight presidencies, focusing not only on what politicians say, but also on *why they said what they said,* and *when and where they said it.* This approach allows Hart to conclude that presidents are speaking more and saying less, largely as speechmaking has become a tool of barter and the speech act has become a political favor and a moment for aggrandizement.

The latter text employs Hart's own computerized-content analytic DICTION program to analyze three political voices (presidential candidates, journalists, and citizens) as they appear in six forms of campaign discourse (speeches, debates, television advertisements, television and print coverage, and letters to the editor of local newspapers) over 13 presidential elections (1948–1996). This method allows him to spot macrolevel patterns that have gone heretofore unexamined, most notably how candidate discourse is hopeful, media discourse is focused, and the campaign settings force elites to be far more transparent than they are during noncampaign periods. These offerings are supported by the careful use of quantitative patterns and illustrative textual examples from candidates, news coverage, and citizen voices.

In *Seducing America: How Television Charms the Modern Voter* (1998), Hart asks what television has

done to citizenship in the United States. In attempting to reconstruct how Americans listen to and feel about televised politics, he contends that *television miseducates the citizenry* and *makes that miseducation attractive.* Specifically, television inspires sentiments that are harmful to political life, and in his mind, any solution to political malaise must address how people feel about democracy (more so than what they know about it).

In addition to his scholarship, Hart founded the Annette Strauss Institute for Civic Participation at the University of Texas at Austin. With the goal of creating more voters and better citizens, the Strauss Institute conducts research on voting and engages in practical interventions to engage citizens in the political process.

Sharon Jarvis

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Hassan II, King (1929–1999)

King Hassan II, born in 1929, was the king of Morocco from 1961 to 1999.

King Hassan II's information policy was conservative and reflected the authoritarian nature of the political regime. The Ministry of Information had been held by loyal and staunch royalists such as Ahmed Guidera (1960), Ahmed Alaoui (1962), and Abdelhadi Boutaleb (1963). Throughout the years when King Hassan II was at the top of Moroccan political life, all areas of broadcasting fell under the control of the Ministry of Information, which was in turn subsumed under the powerful and influential Ministry of Interior.

King Hassan II firmly believed that the national broadcasting system was a fundamental piece in the architecture of his political power. He explained on many occasions that he regarded it as a "very important element in the process of nation building." Morocco's national radio was designed to create common ground for the political regime by filtering information to Moroccan society. The king had a conservative understanding of the flow of information. For him, "the public could not know what I know. My government knows more than the public. But it knows less than what I myself know."

Moroccan TV was launched on Throne Day in March 1962. It has become the privileged domain of the political regime because of its convenience as a means to disseminate news and information and to propagate a sense of national identity around the person of the king.

King Hassan II used the national broadcasting system to create a personality cult that promoted the charismatic features of the king. Moroccan TV has been designed thematically and symbolically to meet the demands of stabilizing the political system. The predominance and the centrality of the figure of the king were obviously manifested in the news bulletins. The news bulletins were an occasion to document with a degree of certainty daily activities of the king, which occupied the bulk of primetime radio and TV news bulletins, followed by the activities of the ministers of his majesty. They covered his domestic and international visits. Official pronouncements take up hours of airtime. News was royal realism on video.

King Hassan II effectively used Moroccan mass media to mobilize Moroccans to take part in the Green March in 1975, the biggest mass mobilization in Morocco's modern history. In 1984, he encouraged and allowed Moroccan political parties to use the national broadcasting system to conduct their election campaigns, a rarity and exception in Arab countries at that time. In 1987, King Hassan II started to subsidize the Moroccan printing press.

King Hassan II's information policy did not favor the exposition of Morocco's "dirty laundry to the world" in the Moroccan media. According to King Hassan II's media philosophy, mass media should not publish true facts if such publication might cause harm to the country by tarnishing its image.

King Hassan II cared for international audiences. He was an eloquent public speaker, fluent in three languages, and was famous for his communication skills, especially during his interviews with international media. No wonder that MBC TV, the first Arabic language satellite channel based in London, interviewed him on its first day on air in 1991.

Mohammed Ibahrine

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Hate Speech

Research from authors have defined *hate speech* as the use of words as weapons that terrorize, humiliate, degrade, abuse, threaten, and discriminate based on race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, or gender. After the efforts and rhetoric of the Nazi regime in World War II, nations like Germany and France began the push for hate speech regulations. Other Western democracies, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, followed suit. The United States, on the other hand, has continued to hold to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which both guarantee freedom of expression. Thus, nearly all efforts to restrict hate speech in the United States, including speech codes on public university campuses, have been disallowed by the U.S. Supreme Court (*Doe v. University of Michigan,* 1989; *UWM Post v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin,* 1991).

There are strong arguments on both sides of the issue of regulating hate speech. Supporters of freedom of expression have argued that true freedom of expression is lost if it is regulated, even for issues such as hate speech. Moreover, they argue that free expression is a necessary condition for individuals to feel free to discuss hate speech against minorities. Supporters of free expression claim that restrictions on free speech will be used against the oppressed groups and minorities they are designed to protect. On the other hand, supporters of hate speech regulation argue that hate speech regulation is essential to preserve the dignity of oppressed groups. The debate on hate speech regulation helps exemplify the long-standing tensions that exist between those upholding individual rights and protecting for the collective good of society.

There are many past examples of the expression of hate in the United States, but one of the most well known is the 1977 and 1978 attempts of the National Socialist Party of America to march on public streets in Skokie, Illinois, a community with many survivors of the Holocaust. The ability for the group to have their event was upheld by the state and federal courts on the judgment of the First Amendment.

One of the current controversies surrounding free expression of political activists and demonstrators against the president and elected officials is the use of *free speech zones*. First used by the Clinton administration and used insistently throughout the George W. Bush administration, the use of these free speech zones—sometimes a mile or two from the sites where the speeches are given by the elected officials—is considered by some to be unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.

David M. Rhea

See also First Amendment

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Havel, Václav (1936–)

Václav Havel, born in 1936, was president of former Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic, from 1989 to 2003. He is a playwright; his work is rooted in the aesthetics of absurd drama of 1960s. One of the most visible representatives of the Czech dissident movement, he became a leading figure of political changes in Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989. Both in his works and his political activities, Havel has focused upon the role of communication and language in thinking and negotiating, exploring the emptiness of Orwellian communist *aparatschik* language. He manifested this approach to political communication during negotiations with representatives of communist power as well as in his speeches on international forums during and after 1989. In his works, he frequently criticized the bureaucratization of political decisions and elaborated on “nonpolitical politics,” a concept of debureaucratized,

non-party politics based upon negotiations within a informal framework of civil society. As explained especially in his concept of "power of the powerless," he believes that civil society is a cornerstone of democracy.

His work examines the influence of modern bureaucratic apparatuses of power on human relations and communication. His first play, *The Garden Party* (1963), was a satire on modern bureaucratic routines and their lack of humanism. In the 1970s, Havel wrote a series of plays—*Audience* (1978), *Private View* (1978), and *Protest* (1978), among others—in which he examined the troubles an individual was having with the authorities. In the 1980s, he focused upon problems of identity and moral issues (*Temptation,* 1986; *Largo desolatio,* 1985).

From the 1960s Havel was involved in various political movements, criticizing the nonhumanistic practices of the pro-Soviet regime in the former Czechoslovakia. He tried to communicate with the pro-Soviet government by writing a letter to the president of Czechoslovakia in early 1970s. Havel was a cofounder of the human rights organization Charter 77. His works were banned, but manuscripts circulated and were printed abroad. He was imprisoned in 1979. He was released due to health difficulties in 1983. Havel was a member of the editorial board of the *samizdat* (unauthorized, clandestine) newspaper *Lidové Noviny,* and a regular contributor from 1987 to 1989. In November 1989, he formed a Civic Forum, an attempt to organize people politically on a non-party basis, and was elected the president of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in December 1989. As a president, Havel witnessed the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1992. He resigned but was elected president of the new Czech Republic in February 1993 and stayed in the office until 2003. He promoted reconciliation with Germany and supported the Czech Republic's entry into NATO and the European Union.

In his political career, Havel became a symbol of informal, deliberative approach to political negotiations, favoring a more personal and individualized political communication than a formalized one.

Jan Jirak

See also Helsinki Process

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Hearst, William Randolph (1863–1951)

William Randolph Hearst was a well-known 20th-century publisher whose influence extended to art, architecture, publishing, politics, and Hollywood. Born in San Francisco, California, he inherited more than just money from his father, a self-made multimillionaire miner and rancher. Most important, he

An advertisement for Hearst papers, 1922. Believed by many to have initiated the Spanish-American War of 1898 to encourage sales of his newspaper, William Randolph Hearst also advocated political assassination in an editorial just months before the assassination of President McKinley.

Source: Wikipedia.

became proprietor of the *San Francisco Examiner,* which had been given to his father as payment for a gambling debt. After studying at St. Paul's Preparatory School, Hearst continued his education at Harvard College, where he showed both interest and talent in journalism, which he demonstrated as business manager of the *Harvard Lampoon.* In 1887 he took over the *San Francisco Examiner* and began his lucrative career as journalist.

Hearst is well known for his development of the phrase "yellow journalism." While his inspiration derived from Joseph Pulitzer, his style for reformist investigative reporting and garish sensationalism soon became his trademark and allowed him to employ the best journalists of his day. Hearst pioneered banner headlines and elaborate illustrations to catch the eye and sell more papers. He purchased the *New York Morning Journal* and from there built a journalism empire that included 28 major newspapers and 18 magazines, along with several radio stations and movie companies.

In addition to journalism, Hearst took a brief interest in politics. He was a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1903 to 1907. His ambition led him to run for both governor of New York and mayor of New York City. Though he was defeated in both, he was an active supporter of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal plan. However, in 1935, when the president vetoed the Patman Bonus Bill, Hearst criticized him in all his papers and broke ties with the party. From that point on, Hearst let politics take a back seat to his other aspirations, such as the development of his art collection, which included classical paintings, tapestries, textiles, sculptures, and furniture. Hearst's private life, particularly his open affair with actress Marion Davies, was the subject of great controversy and speculation.

Hearst unsympathetic view of minorities resulted in his use of his chain of newspapers to aggravate racial tensions, particularly by encouraging the Spanish-American war. His opposition was strong and vocal to the famous Orson Welles movie, *Citizen Kane,* which was undoubtedly based on Hearst's life, but he was not able to suppress the film. Though the life of William Randolph Hearst was littered with scandal, rumor, and unethical transactions, his contributions to journalism, communications, and politics were substantial.

Hilary Noriega and Lynda Lee Kaid

See also *Citizen Kane*

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Helsinki Process

In political communication, the Helsinki Process relates to freedom of expression; more exactly to freedom of information, free access to cultural works, and the rights of journalists to freely work and access information. The expression refers to the series of events that followed the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) from the early 1970s on.

The conference was initiated by Soviet leaders in the era of the *détente* (relaxation of tensions between East and West). The initiative was initially met by skepticism in the West and by democratic opposition in socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe ("dissidents"), as it was expected to formalize the division of Europe as part of the Cold War. However, providing earlier powerless and subdued oppositional voices within the communist bloc with a politically and morally—though not legally—binding international instrument, the process proved to stimulate rapid development in the opposite direction.

Finnish President Urho Kekkonen actively advanced the idea of the conference. Finland offered to host the preparatory talks, which started in 1972. This led to a set of recommendations, the so-called Blue Book, proposing that the process should be carried on in three "Baskets": questions relating to (a) the security of Europe; (b) cooperation in the fields of economy, science, technology, and environment; and (c) cooperation in the humanitarian and other fields. Finland's position as a border country between East and West and the activity of Finnish foreign policy eventually led the initial phase of the work to be hosted by Finland.

A conference of foreign ministers in Helsinki, Finland, in July 1973 adopted the Blue Book, thereby launching the Helsinki Process. After a working phase in Geneva, heads of state from 35 countries signed the Helsinki Final Act in a conference in the Finlandia Hall in Helsinki (the "Helsinki Accords") on August 1, 1975. The signatories represented all the European states (except for Albania), the United States, and Canada.

The Helsinki Accords introduced a unique international instrument that linked security and human rights. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and equal rights and self-determination of peoples, were included in the First Basket on European security. The Third Basket included issues of cooperation in the humanitarian field, freedom of information, the working conditions for journalists, and cultural contacts and cooperation. Having been played down in the initial phase of the process, these aspects soon gained prominence by inspiring democratic opposition in the communist bloc. The Moscow Helsinki Group was formed in 1976. Democratic opposition—for example, Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia, or political movements in Poland that preceded the Solidarity Movement, such as KOR (the Workers' Defence Committee, founded in 1976) or ROPCiO (the Movement for the Protection of Human and Civil Rights, functioning between 1977 and 1981)—was inspired by the Helsinki Accords. A growing body of Helsinki Watch groups led to the formation of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) in 1982.

With disintegration of the communist bloc, new states formed. Today 56 states are part of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which carries the process. The work has been guided by several follow-up conferences. In November 1990, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe was signed, formally putting an end to the Cold War.

In 1997, a position of OSCE Representative of the Freedom of the Media was established, with the task to provide early warning on violation of freedom of expression in the OSCE area and promote freedom of expression and free media.

In 2002, a "second Helsinki Process" was launched by the Finnish and Tanzanian governments to instigate a multistakeholder process for global governance.

Tom Moring

See also Havel, Václav; Kekkonen, Urho

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Heuristics in Political Decision Making

In the early 1970s, heuristics were first noted by Amos Tversky and 2002 Nobel Prize laureate Daniel Kahneman. They defined a *heuristic* as a knowledge-based way to a judgment that does not follow rational principles but instead the dictum of efficiency.

As does other research on human information processing, research on heuristics, too, focuses on the individual's need to cope with complexity by simplifying it. Heuristics—often labeled "shortcuts" or "rules of thumb"—normally lead the individual quickly to adequate judgments, although no extensive algorithmic processing is applied. But since the main characteristic of heuristics is to extrapolate from knowledge stored in human memory, such rules of thumb can also be responsible for erroneous inferences.

In their first articles, Tversky and Kahneman described a few judgmental heuristics, two of which have had an enormous impact on social sciences: *representativeness* and *availability.* Although there are some other heuristics discussed in literature, those two were most influential and model the implications associated with rules of thumb. The representativeness heuristic describes how individuals assess the likelihood of a certain object or person belonging to a certain class of objects or persons. The question, for example, whether politician X is a member of the group of neoconservatives is not evaluated by computing probabilities but rather by using the representativeness heuristic. Thus, a specific case (politician X) is classified as belonging to a class of cases (neoconservatives) if the attributes of the case (e.g., promoted war on Iraq) are typical or representative to the attributes of the class.

Samuel Popkin applied representativeness as so-called low-information rationality to the political decision-making process of the voter. Representativeness acts as a goodness-of-fit assessment, which voters use to evaluate a presidential candidate. Therefore people judge the likelihood of a candidate being a good president by how well their knowledge about the candidate (e.g., drawn from television appearances or

from how he or she manages the campaign) fits the essential features of their stereotype of a good president. Voters do not try to analyze the background of a candidate in detail and do not compute thoroughly the probability of him being a good president. They rather extrapolate predominantly from media-based knowledge how likely it is that a candidate will perform well as a president. Therefore, the representativeness heuristic results in appropriate judgments about a possible president, in case the candidate's characteristics are presented equitably by the mass media. But inferences about him can be inadequate if the information provided only spotlights a few attributes.

Works on the availability heuristic focus on the influence of the easiness with which information comes to mind. Thus, different from what the name *availability heuristic* suggests, the crucial criterion of this rule of thumb is not just the availability of relevant information in the individual's long-term memory but also its accessibility. According to this, people analyze the risk of an accident in a nuclear power plant by trying to recall prior disasters. If there have been recent nuclear accidents that are available in memory and come to mind easily, the assumed likelihood of an upcoming disaster will be rated high, although the actual risk is unchanged. Therefore, deductions based on the availability heuristic are vulnerable to information that is somehow more accessible than other relevant information. This phenomenon is called "accessibility bias."

The accessibility of certain information in the individual's long-term memory depends on the frequency of its processing and can therefore have many sources. As one of the critical determinants of what is more or less accessible in human memory, scholars discuss the intensity of media news coverage. It is assumed that a frequent reporting of, for example, terrorist activity makes people think about the issue more often and therefore facilitates the accessibility of information concerning terrorism (the attacks on September 11, 2001, bombing attacks in Madrid, many dead in London's subway, etc.). In the light of the availability heuristic, the increased accessibility of such memory contents influences inferences on terrorism: when judging the risk of future attacks, individuals try to recall relevant information. If there are considerable attack pictures and other terror-related contents that come to mind easily, the individuals' judgments will be biased with the tendency to overestimate the danger. In the reverse case, the absence of relevant information in memory can lead the individual to underestimate the risk of future attacks.

On this account, media-induced accessibility and biased judgments based on the availability heuristic arouse scholars' skepticism of their ability to influence political decision making, because the people's candidate preferences depend on evaluations about the candidate's attitude toward certain issues. If the mass media stresses the terrorism issue, the repeated reporting on that issue will increase the accessibility of information associated with terrorism in memory. The heightened accessibility of such information influences assessments on the risk of future terrorist attacks, and people tend to overestimate the danger of terrorism. If this is the case, biased judgments based on the availability heuristic should serve the political candidate who does not promote tolerance and liberal principles but a strict law-and-order policy. As this example shows, availability heuristics and accessibility bias are intimately connected with the framing concept and priming theory.

Nevertheless, experience-based rules of thumb in general lead people to judgments that are in their quality comparable to judgments that follow rational approaches while also being less costly. Usually assessments on certain likelihoods based on heuristics are proved by reality to be true. And since heuristic judgment is based on extrapolation, even uninformed people are allowed to decide adequately by using mental shortcuts. But low-information rationality is temperamental: the described positive effects of heuristics as an aid to political decision making will disappear if the extrapolated information used for judgments originates from data that does not meet normative requirements. Then, heuristics lead people to construe pictures in their heads that do not fit the world outside. Scholars consider mass media coverage that focuses on certain attributes of objects and persons while disregarding others a possible source for biased judgments and decisions.

Steven Schuh

See also Framing; Political Information Processing; Priming

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HILL, ANITA

See HILL–THOMAS HEARINGS

HILL–THOMAS HEARINGS

The Hill–Thomas hearings, which took place in the U.S. Senate in October 1991, were held in connection with President George H. W. Bush's nomination of Clarence Thomas to the U.S. Supreme Court. The primary witness to testify against his nomination was University of Oklahoma Law Professor Anita F. Hill. The hearings and events preceding them quickly captured the attention of the American media and public.

On June 27, 1991, Thurgood Marshall, the only African American on the U.S. Supreme Court, announced his resignation. The U.S. Constitution provides that the president "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court." Four days later, the president nominated Marshall's successor, Clarence Thomas, an African American judge who had been sitting on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for the previous 15 months. The nomination was immediately controversial. The president asserted that Thomas was the best person for the job, but some viewed him as too conservative and lacking in experience. Thomas's supporters, however, focused on his character and personal story as a self-made man who pulled himself up through hard work, rising from abject poverty in Pin Point, Georgia, to nomination to the nation's highest court. On September 28, the Senate Judiciary Committee deadlocked 7–7 on Thomas's nomination, then voted to send the nomination without recommendation to the Senate floor for hearings. The committee vote signaled trouble for the nomination.

Senate hearings began on October 3 and continued the next day, with little attention from the general public. On the morning of October 6, just 2 days before the Senate was scheduled to vote on the nomination, a story broke on National Public Radio and in *Newsday* that University of Oklahoma Law Professor Anita Hill, herself an African American, claimed she had been sexually harassed by Clarence Thomas when she worked for him at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the U.S. Education Department in the early 1980s. Although she did not allege physical contact, she stated that he had asked her out numerous times, made obscene remarks to her, and described to her details from pornographic movies he had seen. The allegations created a firestorm of media attention. By that night, reporters had rushed to Norman, Oklahoma, to interview Professor Hill and her friends, colleagues, and students.

Reporters filled the law school building as classes began on October 7. Later that day, Hill held a televised press conference in one of the classrooms. On October 8, the Senate Judiciary Committee received a letter calling for an investigation that was signed by 120 women teaching in law schools from New York to California. That same day seven women serving in the House of Representatives marched up the steps of the Senate, demanding that the vote on Thomas be delayed. Thousands of voters contacted their senators, urging further investigation. By now, Thomas's supporters agreed, believing it necessary that he be given an opportunity to defend himself against the charges. That evening the Senate voted unanimously to delay the vote one week and to hold additional hearings on Hill's allegations.

This second round of hearings began October 11. In the hearing room all three major networks were joined by PBS, CNN, C-SPAN, Court TV, and so many print media reporters that there was standing room only. Clarence Thomas gave an impassioned defense, calling the hearings Kafkaesque and, in a clear reference to the media coverage, characterizing the attack against him a

high-tech lynching. Anita Hill testified next, describing in graphic detail the things that Clarence Thomas had said to her while she worked for him. The spectacle of a black woman testifying against a black man in sexually explicit detail contributed to the public's keen interest in the hearings.

For three days thereafter, while other witnesses were called to testify for or against Thomas and Hill, the nation was riveted. Gavel-to-gavel coverage provided them with a glimpse into usually staid Senate hearings that now more resembled a circus. Senators could not agree on the protocol for such proceedings, nor could they agree on the role they were to play. Eventually the political process took over, and those who supported the nomination argued for proceedings favoring their candidate, while those who opposed the candidacy argued the opposite. Witnesses included friends in whom Hill had confided years before about Thomas's behavior. It also included witnesses who worked with Thomas and claimed he had never harassed them. Thomas's allies called several people who attacked Hill's credibility, accusing her of fantasizing about male attention and outright lying. One senator accused her of committing perjury. Throughout the hearings, Thomas angrily denied the charges.

The hearings especially galvanized women who watched them. Many of them identified with Hill, having experienced similar behavior at their workplaces. Indeed, women across the nation, including female law professors, rushed to Hill's defense and organized opposition to Thomas's nomination once Hill's charges were made public. The hearings split the African American community. Many African Americans, male and female, had mixed feelings about Thomas's nomination. On the one hand, they wanted to support the nomination of a black man; on the other hand, they did not favor attacking a black woman. Some believed Hill should not have spoken out against Thomas, particularly while so much of the nation was watching. Others, especially black women, supported Hill because she reflected some of their own experience. For the black community, the hearings were confusing and divisive.

What is clear, however, is that these hearings received more media attention than any other judicial nomination in this nation's history. More than 50 million people watched, far more than had ever watched judicial nomination hearings before or since. The hearings offered race, sex, and politics; a "he said/she said" theatrical drama; and a story of inappropriate sexual behavior that resonated with many viewers.

The number of polls taken after the hearings was unprecedented. Respondents were asked whom they believed and whether Thomas should be confirmed. Public opinion initially favored Thomas, though a year later it was evenly divided.

The hearings concluded on October 13. On October 15, the U.S. Senate voted to confirm Clarence Thomas's nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court by a vote of 52–48, the closest vote for a successful Supreme Court nominee in the 20th century. Thomas was sworn in just three days later. Anita Hill returned to her position as a law professor at the University of Oklahoma.

In the aftermath of the hearings, Congress quickly voted to approve amendments to Title VII, the federal employment discrimination law, increasing the amount of damages and permitting punitive damages against employers who engaged in discriminatory behavior. Formal complaints of sex discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission rose 50% in the first half of 1992. And in 1992, tagged the "Year of the Woman," a record number of women won congressional seats, raising the number to six in the Senate, 48 of 435 in the House.

Shirley A. Wiegand

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Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945)

Adolf Hitler was chancellor of Germany from January 30, 1933, to April 30, 1945, and the *Führer* (leader) of the NSDAP (German National Socialist Party) and the

German people. Hitler was not only one of the most notorious dictators of the 20th century, on whose command millions of people were killed, but he saw himself as a propaganda genius. And in fact, the rise to power of the Nazi Party cannot be understood without taking into account the propaganda successes of the Nazi propaganda conception, which rested largely on Hitler's person and charisma.

Hitler was born to a petit-bourgeois family on April 20, 1889, in Braunau am Inn, Austria, and moved as a young man to Vienna, where he lived from 1909 in a shelter for the homeless. Twice the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna rejected him due to "unfitness for painting."

In World War I, Hitler served as a common soldier and was decorated for bravery. During the war, he discovered his interest in politics and the power of propaganda. In 1919 he joined the DAP, the German Worker's Party, and became one of its prominent propaganda speakers.

After the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, Hitler was imprisoned for one year and used the time to write his book *Mein Kampf* (*My Struggle*), in which he dedicated two chapters (chapters 6 and 11) to his theory of political propaganda. According to Hitler, "The function of propaganda does not lie in the scientific training of the individual, but in calling the masses' attention to certain facts. . . . The whole art consists in doing this so skilfully that everyone will be convinced that the fact is real. . . . All propaganda must be popular and its intellectual level must be adjusted to the most limited intelligence among those it is addressed to" (*Mein Kampf,* 1980, p. 164). This propaganda conception was relying heavily on the works of popular crowd theorists of the time such as Gustave Le Bon and Ortega y Gasset. Hitler saw the people as a dumb mass that had to be manipulated and seduced according to the wants and needs of the propagandist. This was the effect Hitler sought in the numerous speeches he made while the Nazi Party was striving for power and in the early years of the Third Reich. Even though Hitler was not a very good speaker in the sense of his rhetoric ability, he developed in the interaction with his audience a charisma that produced a kind of mass hysteria. Later, after the National Socialist rule had been secured, Hitler left the propaganda business to Goebbels, who executed it in line with Hitler's ideas. After World War II had begun, Hitler disappeared almost entirely from the public sphere, which led, together with the way the war developed, to a decline in his popularity. Goebbels was aware of this and searched desperately for new ways of reestablishing the intense relation between Hitler and the people. But he failed. When Hitler committed suicide on April 30, 1945, he was convinced that the German people deserved to be eradicated by their enemies. His image as the rescuer of the German nation turned out to be one carefully constructed by propaganda.

Thymian Bussemer

See also Authoritarianism; Censorship, Political; Film and Politics; Ideology; Mass Political Behavior; Persuasion, Political; Propaganda

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Holtz-Bacha, Christina (1953–)

Christina Holtz-Bacha holds the chair for communication research at Friedrich-Alexander-University of Erlangen-Nürnberg in Germany. Her academic career started with the study of communication, political science, and sociology at the universities of Münster and Bonn. In Münster she obtained her PhD in 1978. From 1979 until 1981 she worked as a press manager for the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach. Between 1981 and 1991, Holtz-Bacha worked as an assistant professor in communication at the University of Munich. She received her postdoctoral dissertation (*Habilitation*) in 1989 and held her first professorship from 1991 at the University of Bochum. She continued to the University of Mainz in 1995, and in 2004 she took up the post at the university of Erlangen-Nürnberg, succeeding Winfried Schulz.

Holtz-Bacha is primarily known as a scholar and lecturer in the areas of political communication (especially concerning elections, information campaigning, and political advertising), media politics, and gender-related issues. Her broad perspective is indicated by her work as an editor of both a bibliography and an anthology of key publications in the field of communication

research. Her postdoctoral dissertation investigated the videomalaise hypothesis, an insight that can be found in textbooks. Her five anthologies with empirical studies on German national elections have become classic literature in political communication.

Holtz-Bacha is also renowned for her broad international perspective. She was a fellow at the Joan Shorenstein Center/John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 1999 and a visiting professor at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis in 1986. She has participated in many international projects, including the "Changing Media Changing Europe" Program by the European Science Foundation. Since 1989 she has been the coeditor of the German communication journal *Publizistik.* She also sits on the editorial boards of the *Journal of Communication,* the *Journal of Political Marketing,* the *European Journal of Communication*, and the International Advisory Board of *Comunicazione Politica*. She has served as chair of the Political Communication Division of the International Communication Association and as program chair of the Political Communication Section of the American Political Science Association.

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HONG KONG HANDOVER

Hong Kong Handover refers to the return of the former British colony, Hong Kong, to the People's Republic of China on July 1, 1997. China regained its sovereignty, and Hong Kong became a special administrative region under the policy of "one country, two systems." Hong Kong's Basic Law guarantees the continuity of its capitalist system for 50 years. Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng, as well as British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Prince of Wales attended the special ceremony among foreign dignitaries. Tung Chee-hwa replaced the last British Governor Chris Patten and became Hong Kong's first chief executive.

Hong Kong, with an area of 422 square miles and a population of 6.3 million by 1997, consists of three regions. The island of Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain under the 1842 Treaty of Nanking after the first Opium War. Kowloon was acquired by Britain under the 1860 Convention of Peking after the second Opium War. The New Territories, which constituted the last British territorial extension in Hong Kong, include an extensive northern area of the Kowloon Peninsula and surrounding islands and were leased to Britain for 99 years on July 1, 1898. Hong Kong remained under the British control except during Japanese occupation in World War II.

As China implemented new policies of economic reform and opening to the outside world, China and Britain began to discuss the lease expiry in 1997 and the future of Hong Kong. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited Beijing and began to negotiate with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1982. Both countries signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. China agreed to grant Hong Kong a separate

administrative status and a high degree of autonomy. The Basic Law of Hong Kong was passed by the National People's Congress in 1990 and served as the constitution starting in July 1997.

The handover took place among fireworks, speeches, and live media coverage. Literature on news reports of the ceremony demonstrated domestication of global news as different nations used their own national prisms for framing and agenda setting. The Chinese media celebrated the return of Hong Kong, presenting it as the end of Western imperialism and the beginning of a brighter future for both Hong Kong and China. Hong Kong media cast the event in the global context, searching for a new identity among mixed feelings of hope, excitement, ambivalence, and uncertainty. Western media expressed concerns for Hong Kong's political prospects despite their confidence in its economic prosperity.

Mei Zhang

See also China, Media and Politics in; Chinese Cultural Revolution; Deng, Xiaoping

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HORSERACE COVERAGE

Horserace coverage is a term used to describe mass media coverage of political campaigns that focuses on the overall political spectacle, the who's ahead/who's behind mentality of a race, instead of providing essential political information. The international trend of mass media coverage relying on horserace elements during an election is prevalent in print, television, and Internet channels. Such coverage predominately focuses on the political campaign as a contest instead of a legitimate, substantive political process. Horserace coverage is considered to be a troubling media practice and a breakdown of the gatekeeping function of journalists, as such coverage takes up valuable space in the limited news hole by focusing on image and game elements instead of the political candidates and their issues.

As such, horserace coverage is exemplified by media stories that explicitly address the projected race results through the presentation of opinion polls, stories that are about various types of strategies being used by the candidates and parties in their campaigns, and discussions of political parties' and candidates' campaign media tactics and advertising. Other examples of horserace coverage include media content that contain a focus on who's winning or who's losing, that discuss in detail where the candidates are campaigning, what voter groups the candidates are targeting, how candidates are raising money, and which candidates are getting endorsed by powerful individuals or groups.

This type of media coverage typically does little to inform and educate voters about domestic or foreign issues or policy issues that might directly affect the voters. Instead, such horserace coverage tends to focus on the candidates and members of political parties as if they were celebrities, sports figures, or game show participants who are in a race or contest instead of a political campaign to hold public office and serve a constituency. Research has consistently shown that horserace or strategy coverage dominates campaign coverage at all levels of elections in the United States. Many other countries have noted the same trend in their political coverage.

Research also indicates horserace coverage is not just limited to mass media. Findings from recent elections suggest that political candidates and parties rely on content that focuses on the game, or horserace, elements of a campaign in their own controlled media, such as Web sites, e-mails, advertising, and direct mail. In addition to this tabloidization of news, the media also direct more attention to argumentative discussions between candidates, such as debates.

Also, metacommunication is considered to be specific type of horserace coverage in which the media tend to inject themselves into news. This trend is particularly alarming in democracies, where the public rely on the mass media to provide substantive and objective information on political and policy issues. Researchers have noted this practice and even measured the amount of time the media spend talking to and about themselves versus actual coverage during presidential campaigns, finding significant decreases in the amounts of substantive coverage of issues, as

well as the time given to coverage of statements by political leaders and newsmakers.

Overall, horserace coverage is game- and/or poll-driven reporting. This type of content appears to favor the short sound bite and is often followed by an instant analysis from a media personality. The metacommunication trend is illustrated by the media's tendency to focus the emphasis of campaign coverage on itself, as media commentators report and comment on sensationalistic stories instead of ones that focus on policy. Ultimately, it is of concern that extended exposure to political horserace coverage of elections may increase voter apathy and cynicism.

Andrew Paul Williams

See also News Coverage, Politics; News Selection Process; Tabloids

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Horton, Willie

See Willie Horton Ad

Hostile Media Effect

For journalists reporting on controversial political issues, it is all too common to get critical feedback from readers or viewers who accuse them of bias. They find some comfort, however, when audience members from both sides of a political fence charge that news coverage is slanted in favor of the other side. This scenario is a classic illustration of the *hostile media effect*—the tendency for opposing partisans to see presumably neutral news coverage as unfairly biased against their own point of view.

Psychologists regard such biased perceptions as a contrast effect, in which partisans perceive information to be further away from their own position on an issue. In this sense the hostile media effect illustrates the subjective character of information processing. The fact that different people can perceive or interpret the same political information in different ways nicely illustrates the "active audience" paradigm and argues against the view of the media audience as a passive, vulnerable, and homogenous mass.

An important point is that, for any political issue, not everyone exhibits the hostile media perception. This perceptual bias is often dramatically evident for partisans, those individuals who are highly involved in or have strong opinions on an issue, but it is just as dramatically lacking for people who are neutral or uninterested. Thus it begs another important question in the political communication arena: Just who is a partisan? Research has successfully demonstrated the hostile media effect for people who identify strongly with an interest group or who hold intense or extreme

attitudes on an issue. But many questions remain about the nature of issue involvement and how it might generate perceptions of unfavorable media bias.

Although this phenomenon has long been familiar to news reporters and editors, researchers turned serious empirical attention to the idea only in 1985, when Vallone, Ross, and Lepper published the first carefully observed evidence. The authors showed that groups of Arab and Israeli students each considered broadcast news coverage of conflict in the Middle East to be biased against their own position. As this example illustrates, the hostile media effect is most typically studied by recruiting groups of partisans with opposing views toward a political controversy and exposing them to samples of media coverage of the issue, coverage often selected or sometimes even manipulated to be as neutral or "balanced" as possible. The resulting perceptions of bias have been demonstrated across a range of issues, including debates about genetically modified foods, the 1997 United Parcel Service strike, physician-assisted suicide, sports rivalries, the use of primates in laboratory research, legalized gambling, and, of course, political elections. Some field survey studies have also shown a negative relationship between respondents' political attitudes and their perceptions of the slant of mass media coverage.

However, research has also only begun to carefully investigate some intriguing theoretical questions, including whether this bias is unique to information in a mass media context. Several studies have addressed this question by presenting partisans with content randomly presented as either a mass media report or a college student's essay for a composition class. Results show that partisans view media contents as unfairly biased, but see the identical information as neutral or even supportive when it appears in the student essay context. These findings suggest that the same content can produce a contrast effect when it appears in the mass media, but an assimilation effect (in which partisans see information as more similar to, rather than different from, their own position) in nonmedia formats, perhaps because the mass media arouses a defensive processing response.

The nature of information processing underlying the hostile media effect has also been examined in several studies. Three potential mechanisms have been identified. One, termed "selective recall," proposes that for highly involved individuals, disagreeable content is more salient and is seen as more prominent or more dominant than it actually is. A second mechanism, "selective categorization," occurs when partisans agree on the content but disagree in their evaluations of that content, each side interpreting more of the same content as unfavorably slanted. The third mechanism, quite different from the other two, is very similar to latitude-of-rejection ideas in social judgment theory. In this process, termed "different standards," partisans on different sides would each find some of the ideas or arguments in an array of content—particularly those ideas unfavorable to their own point of view—to be invalid or irrelevant. The presence of such "unacceptable" content thus makes the overall presentation appear unfair. Evidence for these mechanisms is mixed. In general, support has been found for selective categorization but not selective recall. Different standards appears to be robust, but equally so in both contrast and assimilation circumstances, suggesting that it may not explain the hostile media effect.

It is important to note that, while the hostile media perception indicates the presence of an audience bias, it does not necessarily strengthen the defensive position of the media. The presence of an audience bias does not lessen the likelihood of source or channel biases as well.

Finally, some research has discussed or investigated consequences, largely dysfunctional consequence, of hostile media perceptions. These include the possibility that partisans may be increasingly polarized or alienated by their sense that the mass media are hostile to their side of the political fence. This perception is also seen as an obstacle to the effective functioning of the marketplace of ideas in democratic theory, since partisans seem prone to reject what may in fact be evenhanded presentation of competing notions. Of particular concern are data showing that embattled partisans who perceive unfavorable media bias, and see that biased content as likely to influence others, report a greater likelihood to resort to violence in defense of their cause.

Albert Gunther

See also Media Bias; Selective Processes, Exposure, Perception, Memory

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Humor in Politics

Political humor is communication intended to evoke amusement about the governance of society. Humor need not be primarily geared to deliver a political message in order to be classified as political.

Political humor may take a variety of forms. The simplest form is the political joke, pun, or riddle, which typically employs a question-answer format but can use any number of devices to deliver the punch line, including surprise endings, double meanings, or even simple letter inversions. An example would be:

Q: A child, an honest politician, and Santa Claus all spot a $20 bill on the ground. Who picks it up?

A: The child. The other two are figments of his imagination.

Perhaps the most common type of political jokes target prominent politicians, although in repressive states (Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union), jokes about the system itself were not uncommon. Politicians will sometimes use self-deprecating humor to deflate criticism. In one of the 1984 presidential debates, Walter Mondale attempted to make Ronald Reagan's advanced age an issue. Reagan intentionally misinterpreted the issue, retorting, "I will not make age an issue of this campaign. I am not going to exploit, for political purposes, my opponent's youth and inexperience."

Classically, political humor took the form of, or was found in, poetry, song, or literature. Much can be considered political satire, a literary technique that exposes and ridicules the absurdities of its subject in order to affect (or prevent) change. It is typically subtle, relying on irony and deadpan delivery. One of the oldest known examples of political satire is from the Greek comic playwright, Aristophanes, whose *Lysistrata* is still amusing audiences today. The Roman Empire boasted several noted satirists, including Lucilius, Horace, and Juvenal. Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* was in part an attack on England, the dominant Whig Party, and England's war with France. In the 20th century satire was employed by authors like Aldus Huxley and George Orwell to comment on the dangers of social changes taking place in Europe.

In the United States, Mark Twain offered biting and humorous political commentary, including his quip that "it could probably be shown by facts and figures that there is no distinctly native criminal class, except Congress." Twain is also famously credited with claiming that "first God created idiots, that was for practice. Then he made school boards." Another American, the entertainer Will Rogers, was also well known for his political quips, including his claim that "it's easy being a humorist when you've got the whole government working for you." In Great Britain, the Anglo-Irish playwright George Bernard Shaw had a long career as a political humorist, once noting that "a government that robs Peter to pay Paul can always depend on the support of Paul."

During the era of yellow journalism in the United States, political humor routinely included the political cartoon, a form mastered by Thomas Nast. His critical cartoons helped bring down Boss Tweed of Tammany Hall. Garry Trudeau continues to take on controversial issues in his *Doonesbury* comic strip. The past half-century has seen the emergence of standup comics such as Dick Gregory, George Carlin, Lenny Bruce, and Mort Sahl, all of whom gained prominence with their edgy sociopolitical humor. During this period, political humor has also been increasingly found in electronic media (radio, television, and of late, the Internet) as well as in film. For example, filmmakers Trey Parker and Matt Stone poked fun at a wide range of political issues in their marionette-based farce, *Team America: World Police.*

Televised political satire includes situation comedies such as *All in the Family* and *The Simpsons.* Sketch comedy on *Saturday Night Live* has poked fun at political targets for roughly 3 decades. It is also found in the monologues of such late night comics as David Letterman, Jay Leno, and Conan O'Brian, as well as on *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart.* The latter, patterned after *Saturday Night Live*'s "Weekend Update," is a "fake news" broadcast. This makes it a parody, a type of satire that imitates in order to

ridicule. In the past few years hundreds of Web sites have sprung up that offer political humor, including the now-classic "This Land" animated video clip from JibJab.com, a parody of George W. Bush and John Kerry during the 2004 presidential campaign.

The content of most modern political humor in the Unites States is heavily centered around the presidency. From Chevy Chase's portrayal of Gerald Ford as a clumsy incompetent on *Saturday Night Live* to jokes on late night talk shows about Bill Clinton's sexual foibles, presidents (and presidential candidates) provide endless fodder for political humor. Political humor on television is typically nonpartisan, since commercial television must appeal to a wide audience. This is not the case with other media (for example, the Internet).

There is a small body of work in the tradition of the humanities that examines political humor, primarily from a descriptive standpoint. Some examine political humor during specific eras (e.g., the Roman Republic, the American Revolution, the Soviet Union); a few focus on political satire from a comparative perspective; and several serve as compilations or collections of American political humor. Political cartoons and presidential humor remain popular subjects.

Starting in the 1990s, a body of research began to emerge that examines political humor from a more scientific perspective. Communications and political science scholars have begun to focus on television-based political humor. This includes research into various late night talk shows like *The Late Show with David Letterman* or *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart,* programming like *The Simpsons* or *South Park,* and more conventional comedy shows like *Saturday Night Live.* Many studies focus on content, for example, ideology, or cataloging types and targets of jokes during a presidential campaign. More recent research has begun to examine the learning and attitudinal effects of televised political humor. The study of political humor, while a smaller academic niche, holds great promise.

Jody Baumgartner

See also *Daily Show, The; Saturday Night Live*

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Humphrey, Hubert H. (1911–1978)

Hubert Horatio Humphrey, Jr., was the 38th vice president of the United States under Lyndon B. Johnson and is best known as one of the first advocates of civil rights. During his career, Humphrey served as mayor of Minneapolis, U.S. senator from Minnesota, and the 1968 Democratic presidential nominee. Humphrey is seen by some scholars as one of the last representatives of American progressivism, following in the footsteps of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Humphrey's Midwestern progressivism can be traced to his childhood. In his autobiography, Humphrey notes that two major influences in his life were the land in South Dakota and his father, who supported the Democratic Party. During his doctoral study at the University of Minnesota, Humphrey decided to enter the Minneapolis mayoral race in 1943, losing that election but winning the mayorship just 2 years later. In 1944, Humphrey played an integral role in the merger of the Democratic and Farmer-Labor parties, creating the DFL party that is still significant in Minnesota today.

The Minneapolis mayor gained national prominence through his Democratic National Convention speech of 1948, in which Humphrey persuaded the party to adopt a pro–civil rights stance. His famous line from that speech noted, "The time has arrived for the Democratic Party to get out of the shadow of states' rights and walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights." Although the pro–civil rights plank inevitably divided southern Democrats from the rest of the party, Harry Truman won the presidential election in which civil rights defined the Democratic Party.

After his national debut, Humphrey was elected U.S. senator from Minnesota in 1949, where he continued his quest for civil rights, including a role in the passing of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960. Humphrey writes in his autobiography that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the major legislative achievement of his Senate career. He served as majority whip of the Senate from 1961 to 1964, thereafter serving as vice president of the United States until 1968. Humphrey was heavily criticized throughout his vice

presidency for being too loyal to President Lyndon Johnson, especially regarding Johnson's stance on the Vietnam War.

Although Humphrey ran for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1952, and again in 1960 against John F. Kennedy, he did not receive the Democratic presidential nomination until 1968. Humphrey did not end his political career following his loss in 1968 to Richard Nixon; he returned to the U.S. Senate in 1971, ran again and lost the presidential nomination in 1972, was reelected to the Senate in 1976, and remained in office until his death. As a representative of Midwestern prairie progressivism, Humphrey was an advocate of social progress, social justice, and social reform.

Rebecca A. Kuehl

See also Civil Rights Movement; Johnson, Lyndon B.

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Hungary, Communication and Politics

Hungarian political traditions are determined by a thousand years of Hungarian statehood. Before the political transition, the Hungarian political evolution had been characterized by a weak democratic but strong parliamentary system. In the Hungarian political system, the most prominent state and representative organ is its 386-member Parliament, the Hungarian National Assembly. Its legal status and functions are regulated by the Constitution. Members of the Parliament are elected every 4 years in the course of a regular election campaign, and the winning party or coalition then has the legal right to nominate the prime minister, who formulates the program of the government. The head of the state is the president of the republic, who is elected by the members of the Parliament for 5 years.

Democracy was institutionalized in the Republic of Hungary between 1987 and 1989, resulting in a multitier system and a new legal frame of operation: the parliamentary democracy. The first democratically elected government began abolishing the centrally planned economy to develop a new market-based economy. The four political parties that determined the formation of the Hungarian political system are

1. The Federation of Young Democrats—Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz-MPP), which was founded on March 30, 1988, and was chaired by a 13-member National Committee until 1993, when the committee was replaced by a single-member chairmanship. Viktor Orban has been the chairman of the party since 1993.
2. Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) was founded on October 7, 1989, on the basis of the former MSZMP (Hungarian Socialist People's Party).
3. Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) was founded on November 13, 1988
4. Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) was founded on September 27, 1988.

Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), a historical party originally established in 1944, became a parliamentary party in coalition with the Federation of Young Democrats in 2006. All are organized and financed similarly. The financial base for their functioning comes from three sources: membership fees, donations, and state subsidy. They each possess a huge decision-making organization that usually comes together annually or at special occasions (e.g., forming a coalition, leaving a coalition, election of officials). Its main task is to elect the party leaders or to decide on the merits of a political case.

The Media System

Before the democratic regime change, in the so-called Kádár era, the Hungarian print and electronic media functioned under the supervision of the centralized, hierarchic, and bureaucratic political system. The beginning of the new era, or, in other words, the end of the dictatorial media policy took shape slowly, beginning in 1986, when the first commercial radio station, Danubius Radio, started broadcasting entertainment programs without ideological content. That was the year that the first local cable television channels came into being. Law No. 2, regulating print media, was put into force.

On January 14, 1988, professional journalists openly criticized the media policy of the totalitarian state. In

the fall of 1988 an "alternative" paper—*Hitel* (*Credit*)—was legally published. The next year, in March 1989, control of Hungarian Television was taken from the government, and a special committee was formed to deal with the question of the reform of publicity. On August 24, the committee issued the document titled the "Basic Concepts of Unbiased Information," which urged the political independence and neutrality of Hungarian mass media. Consequently, the government eliminated the requirement for permission to found a paper; it also meant the end of the state monopoly of the ownership of print media. In 1989, 1,118 new papers were registered, signaling the privatization of print media and the inflow of foreign capital into the media sector. On August 19, Nap-TV (the Hungarian word *nap* means "sun" and also "day"), the first private television studio, was established. When the modified constitution came into force on October 23, it officially declared the freedom of press. In the spring of 1990, the National Assembly and the parties took further steps to protect the public media and the Hungarian Telegraph Agency (MTI) from political battles. They also agreed that the presidents and the vice presidents of Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television would be appointed by the president of the republic upon proposal of the prime minister.

Thus, during the years of the democratic regime change, state control over the press and electronic media came to an end. The majority of the print media were privatized. A pluralistic media system came into being, characterized by many participants and a tense competition among them. Currently more than 5,000 (almost 6,000) different press organs, radio and television channels, and Internet forums are available to satisfy the information needs of the citizens. The most important question, however, concerns the ownership of information media. In other words, who controls and influences the agenda setting and the opinion formation in Hungary?

In the Hungarian media, market consolidation took place first in the press media segment; the first monopolies were formed in the newspaper business. Different foreign media companies took possession of the most profitable papers, and they started dominating the advertising business as well in the competition for advertisers. The most popular quality political newspaper is still the *Népszabadság,* but during the past years the copies sold of this newspaper dropped by more than 30%. While the issues sold of the quality national newspapers decreases, there is a reverse tendency for the tabloids, and their expansion on the press market has been spectacular. The most popular daily is *Blikk,* a typical tabloid.

Television has a distinguished time-setting and agenda-setting role in Hungarian society. An average viewer spends more than four and a half hours per day watching TV programs. The Hungarian audiovisual media have the format of a dual system: public and commercial. The representatives of the public television broadcast are MTV (Hungarian Television) and Danube Television (Duna TV). MTV has two channels: m1, functioning on terrestrial frequency, and m2, operated by satellite transmission. Duna TV has two satellite channels. In the fall of 2006, more than 900,000 adult people (above the age of 18, who are eligible to vote) chose the *Evening News* of MTV. The most popular public political televised programs are *The ESTE* (*The Evening*), which is broadcast every weekday evening and is watched by more than 8% of all the adult TV viewers (approximately 650,000 people); the *Kedd 21* (*Tuesday 21*), watched by more than 10% of all the adult TV viewers (approximately 800,000 people); and *A szólás szabadsága* (*The Freedom of Speech*), which is transmitted on Sunday night and is watched by more than 9% of all the adult TV viewers (approximately 740,000 people).

The two most important commercial representatives of the Hungarian electronic media are the Luxemburg-based SBS Broadcasting S.A., with about 80% ownership of TV2 channel and Bertelsmann AG., the owner of RTL Klub channel. The National Radio and Television Commission (ORTT) decided to provide two of the three terrestrial television frequencies for these commercial television giants in 1997, at the beginning of the deregulation of the Hungarian electronic media market. ORTT gave permission for a 10-year exclusive franchise of the biggest segment of the electronic media market, which has been prolonged for another 5 years until 2012, thus determining the development of the national media market and the financing of the public information service.

The Hungarian television market is highly concentrated. This concentration can be illustrated by the fact that the money spent by the investors (owners) of RTL Klub and TV2 makes up more than 30% of the revenues of the total Hungarian advertising industry and 90% of the total revenues from television advertisements. The conglomeration of the commercial television market also means the concentration over the control of the program structure and content. TV2

and RTL Klub reach the most valuable (from a marketing point of view) age group of the audience: they have a significant influence on 60% of the viewers between 18 and 49 years old. This situation has led to the monopoly of the television market and to the trivialization (tabloidization) of program content, not to the growth of competition and freedom of speech.

Most of the program topics offered by TV2 and RTL Klub are shallow. However, despite their superficial coverage of important concerns, the *News* of RTL Club and the *Tények* (*Facts*) of TV2 are the most widely watched evening news programs nationally, and the *Evening News* of m1 public channel occupies the third position. One of the first drastic consequences of the "dual media system" in Hungary became the radical decrease of the audience ratings and the advertising income of the public television channel, m1.

Political Communication in Hungary

In the Republic of Hungary, TV, among all the media institutions, has gained crucial importance as one of the most powerful means for political influence and shaping the political process. In 1993, the situation became quite dramatic, as TV had become the target of the parties' political struggle. There was no media law officially accepted by the Parliament that could regulate the functioning of Hungarian television until 1996. Law No. 1, concerning radio and television broadcasting, defines the meaning of *political advertisement*: It is a program that attempts to influence; calls for support by participation in the elections of a party or political movement, its successful actions, its candidate, its initiative for plebiscite; and popularizes a party or movement's name, activity, aims, slogan, emblem, and the image. In the paragraph about restrictions and bans on advertising, the law decrees:

> In election periods, political advertisements can be broadcast according to the laws about the election of members of Parliament, the local and regional candidates, and the mayors. In any other period, political advertisements can only be communicated in connection with a decreed plebiscite. It is prohibited to announce political advertisements in any programs broadcast to foreign countries. Although another person or institution is sponsoring the political advertisement, this does not decrease either the responsibility or the freedom of the broadcaster, and neither the sponsor nor the broadcaster may change the content or placement of the program because of the ad, just the timing. The broadcaster is not responsible for the content of the political advertisement. A political advertisement must be visually and acoustically separated from other pieces of the program, with special announcement about its character before and after the broadcast.

Parliamentary elections between 1990 and 2006 were based on Act No. 34 of 1989 on the Election of Members of Parliament (1994), enacted by Parliament on October 20, 1989, and also on Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedure. Act No. 34 contains the regulations concerning suffrage, the electoral system (members of Parliament, nomination, determination of election results), and electoral procedures (electoral campaign, polling, electoral bodies, polling wards, registration of voters, publicity of electoral procedures, legal remedies, final provisions). Article 11 in chapter 4 ("Electoral Campaign") of the act briefly defines the media presentation of the campaign:

> 1. Until the day preceding election at the latest, the Hungarian Telegraph Agency, Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television shall carry on an equal footing the electoral presentations of parties putting forward candidates. Each party with a candidate shall be given at least one electoral program free of charge. This same duty shall devolve upon the local studios in their respective area of broadcast with regard to the electoral programs of candidates. Other advertisements that go toward making a party or any of its candidates more popular can only be broadcast with a clear message declaring such publicity as "Paid Electoral Advertising."
> 2. During the 30 days preceding the election, Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television shall cover the parties presenting national lists on an equal footing in their news of electoral events and, in their electoral reports, in proportion to the candidates nominated.
> 3. On the last day of the electoral campaigns, Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television shall broadcast the electoral summary reports prepared by parties presenting national lists, under equal program conditions for parties, for equal lengths of time and without comments. (Act No. 34, 1994, p. 25)

The key concepts in the act are equality and proportionality in media presentation of the parties and the candidates. These principles guide the application of the regulatory system to campaigning.

Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedure declares that according to the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, suffrage is equal, voting is direct and secret, the process of elections is democratic. This act is applied to the election of the members of Parliament, the election of the members of the European Parliament, the election of the representatives and mayors of local governments, the election of minority municipalities.

Act C of 1997 in chapter 6 contains the regulations of the campaign period. The campaign period lasts from the call for the election to midnight of the day before voting. From midnight the campaign silence period is announced. During this period all election campaign activity is prohibited (including, for example, organizing transportation to the polling station for the voters by the candidate or the nominating organization; supplying food and drink; distributing parties' or candidates' symbols, posters). No opinion polls can be published 8 days prior to the elections, until the termination of elections.

Nominating organizations and candidates can produce posters without permission, and they may place them without limitation on certain areas in the public domain, but they should not cover the posters of other candidates or parties. Posters should be removed in 30 days from the polling day. Radio and television program providers may broadcast political advertisements under equal conditions for candidates and parties without attaching explanation or opinion.

In the Republic of Hungary the marketing approach to parliamentary election campaigns has been applied since 1998. The switch to the marketing approach meant that politics became business, where success mainly depends on professional communication skills and unique public relations strategies. The final goal is to project the most positive image of the political candidate and the party and to sell them with the biggest possible profit. The profit is the voters' support and the winning of the elections. What are the most widely used tools and channels for gaining the citizens' attention in political campaigns? Major components of the candidates' campaign are the televised advertisements and the broadcast of the candidates' debate. The parties' use of televised ads, which is regulated by the media law, is not widely discussed by the news media.

Among the new technological advances, the Internet has significant potential to influence political elections. In Hungary, Internet multimedia became part of the political skirmish in 1998, which was made possible by the latest advances in telecommunication technology: prerecorded messages through cable and SMS (Short Message Service) messages, or text messages, transmitted through mobile phones in 2002 and 2006. The Internet plays a growing role in spreading the election information, in collecting donations, and also in activating the voters. However, the homepages of the parliamentary parties do not reveal the strategy they intend to use to activate the potential "Internet" voters. For example, in the 2006 parliamentary election campaign, the parties did not consider it important to let the citizens know about their plans and party programs well before the voting day. (In that respect the Hungarian Democratic Forum was an exception.) The most informative and well-designed homepage was prepared by the Alliance of Free Democrats. It included podcasting, interactive interviews, RSS, blog, and it introduced the party's candidates for member of parliament. Blogging as an election campaign tool was also used by the prime minister, but not on the Socialist Party homepage—it was accessible on the homepage of a left-wing game called *Amoeba*. Interactive communication possibilities were characteristic only of the homepages of the governing parties and only for registered users. Both the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Federation of Young Democrats used their homepages for recruiting volunteers, and they also had separate homepages for negative campaigning. The main political parties were able to create effective interactive communication with the citizens through the Internet. Online communication became a new qualitative feature of political participation (though online and offline communication of the separate parties did not differ much strategically, they represented the general conventions, manners, and rules of the given party), but it has not been proved yet to what extent online communication contributes to the success of a party.

Jolán Róka

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Hussein I, King (1935–1999)

King Hussein bin Talal was one of few contemporary Arab leaders to effectively harness media communication to promote Jordan's moderate political views on local and international fronts. During its 46-year period, King Hussein's reign was marked by numerous abortive coups, assassination attempts, and military conflicts in Jordan as well as in neighboring countries. King Hussein was instrumental in establishing a solid Jordanian media system, adopting a centrist discourse on national, regional, and international issues. When he acceded to the throne in 1953 as a monarch of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which then comprised what historically was known as Trans-Jordan and the West Bank, there was only one newspaper and one radio station, both based in Palestinian territories. By the late 1980s, Jordan had four daily newspapers, three radio stations, and two television channels. King Hussein was a strong believer in the power of mass media to bring about social and political changes. His speeches over Jordan Radio and Jordan Television reflected a rational and moderate discourse drawing on both traditional and modern themes. His exceptional mastery of classical Arabic language delivery was well appreciated by a traditionally oral Arabian culture, especially when his words were carried live on broadcast media.

From 1970 (on the aftermath of an armed conflict involving Palestinian militias and Jordan Army units) to 1989 (when democratic elections were launched), Jordan had experienced some forms of political repression that adversely affected the media's role in politics. Arabic-language papers had been suspended at various times throughout the 1970s and 1980s for publishing articles that the government considered objectionable. Yet, since the early 1990s, the Jordanian media scene, under King Hussein's reign, had remained far more diverse and open compared with neighboring Arab countries. The press remained largely part of the private sector with certain state shares, as in *Al Rai'* daily. Following the traditional media ownership model dominant in many Arab countries in the postcolonial era, Jordan kept broadcast media under state control. When democratic changes were introduced to Jordan in the early 1990s, the media were among the first to benefit from that transformation. In 1992, a more democratic political parties law was passed, followed in 1993 by a new more liberal press law, giving civil courts the power to handle press issues. The proliferation of new political parties in the 1990s in Jordan led to the rise of more politically diverse print media outlets, thus reflecting King Hussein's ambition for bringing about a more participatory political system in which the media were important players.

Muhammad Ayish

See also Abdullah II

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I

Ideology

A political ideology is an action-oriented model of people and society. The phrase "action-oriented" refers to the prescriptions contained in an ideology regarding how political, economic, and social issues should be resolved. A political ideology also contains generalizations called "models." A *model* is a simplification intended to make complex phenomena understandable. Political ideologies share the characteristic of systematic simplification with science and engineering.

The term *ideology* is frequently used negatively. People who believe in an ideology are often characterized as rigid, fanatical, and unthinking, and ideologies are said by some to produce bad public policy because ideologies fit true believers' preconceptions instead of reality. Definitions of ideology are often biased to discredit the concept or its use. Some authors on all parts of the political spectrum come close to defining ideologies as the belief systems of fanatics.

Others believe ideology to be insignificant. In one version of this view, ideology is not an independent cause of political behavior; ideology is merely an intermediate factor of little importance in explaining political behavior.

Not everyone considers ideologies destructive or unimportant elements of politics. Some regard ideologies as allowing their adherents to understand the relationships among events, to facilitate the making of consistent judgments over time, and to process information more efficiently than an ad hoc approach would allow.

Politics in the United States and in most Western democracies is dominated by two closely related ideologies: liberalism and conservatism. Liberals and conservatives advocate specific policies, but when the democratic process yields a contrary result, they accept it until the next election. Liberalism and conservatism can be contrasted with comprehensive ideologies such as communism and militant Islam, which produce undemocratic, totalitarian regimes.

One difference between liberals and conservatives concerns how they structure three ideological building blocks: equality, freedom, and order. Liberals tend to value equality over freedom and freedom over order. Conservatives reverse this ranking by valuing order over freedom and freedom over equality. Liberals and conservatives value all three, but their relative preferences differ. There are also differences between liberals and conservatives regarding the market economy, with conservatives more inclined to allow the market free rein and liberals more likely to constrain it using government.

The question of whether ideology at least sometimes has an independent impact on public policy has been the subject of many quantitative studies using congressional roll call vote analysis. Often the form such studies take is to explain votes in an area of public policy, such as coal mining, using measures of the ideological positions of U.S. senators and indicators of self-interest, such as a state's reliance on coal. Such analyses often show that the inclusion of ideology provides a more complete explanation of voting behavior than does self-interest alone.

Carl Grafton

See also Conservative, Conservatism; Party Identification; Political Parties; Political Socialization

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IMAGE, POLITICAL

Walter Lippmann (1922) made it clear that people do not directly experience most political affairs but rather respond to the representations of politics produced by journalists. Long before Lippmann, Niccolò Machiavelli (1513) argued that, to most people, politics is more about appearances than substance. Appearances are created with symbolic gestures. Decades of behavioral research indicate that people behave more in relation to their representations of realities than directly to the material realities.

In the study of political behavior, many scholars believe that actions are shaped in relation to perception and that messages have effects on behaviors indirectly by affecting perceptions. Political images are conceptually related to processes of political message perception and information processing. The social science construct "political image" is used to refer to cognitive representations of political subjects, such as candidates for office (candidate images), presidents (presidential images), nations (national images), and political parties (party images). As with the construct "political attitude," political images are individual-level phenomena but can be aggregated for various samples and populations, as with the concept of public opinion (the aggregate of individual opinions).

Research concerning political images is done mainly in communication studies and political science, where scholars who study political communication examine the cognitive effects of campaign messages. Of major concern to these scholars are studies that show how images are changed in relation to particular message strategies. It is generally assumed that political images are drawn upon in various political decision-making processes such as choosing among presidential candidates. Some studies examine mass media effects on images such as news and advertising impacts, while others examine changes in images related to nonmediated contexts such as interpersonal discussions about politics.

The origins of this type of research are generally traced back to the work of Kenneth Boulding, who wrote the seminal book *The Image* (1973). Boulding argued quite clearly that the meaning of a message is the change that it produces in the images held by receivers of the message. The most focused early work on political images was reported by Dan Nimmo and Robert Savage in their book *Candidates and Their Images.* Consistent with Boulding's view of images in general, Nimmo and Savage argued that political images are subjective mental constructs that are formed in relation to political messages.

Political persuasion scholar Richard Perloff (1998) notes that voters consider many factors in choosing their preferred candidate in an election. These factors include issues positions, character, party, and other impressions about the candidates. As voters process information about candidates, they relate that information to their values and ideological dispositions. This affects the formation of political images, including images of the campaign. Despite low levels of detailed issue knowledge, voters are able to choose political candidates who are closest to their issue preferences. Additionally, the more voters know about issues and candidate issue positions, the more likely issues affect their voting choices.

Political message environments like campaigns or conflict situations (terrorism, war, etc.) provide individuals with an overload of messages. People thus select certain aspects from the message environment to employ in representing the political objects to themselves and to others. These representations are what we call "political images." The leaders or candidates who are the objects of this representational process attempt to use persuasion strategies to steer message receivers toward the desired public (most commonly shared) political image.

Despite the uncertainties regarding the actual variables (and relationships among them) involved in voting, scholars know that in making their voting decisions, voters are intentionally selecting the candidate they believe will be the best leader. In whatever proportions, voters think about issues, personalities, communication styles, political parties, and other factors in the election contexts and somehow arrive at a decision about who to select as their preferred candidate.

Interesting research indicates that voters process a great deal of information but can recall very little of it by the time they vote. Political images can be seen as cognitive representations of political subjects, like candidates, wherein the images are not inclusive of all stored knowledge but rather are constituted by what the political perceiver believes is most important about the subject at hand. This means that images are always susceptible to change in relation to the messages the image holder encounters and accepts. In other words, political images can be initiated, cultivated, and modified over time.

Candidates (along with their advisors) can cultivate their images for voters by how they act in public communication situations such as presidential debates. Some candidates, for example, portray themselves as activists by listing their accomplishments in previously held offices.

Candidate images can also include perceptions of issue positions along with impressions of candidate character. Election campaigns always involve voter evaluations of both candidate character and candidate issue positions. Candidates use issues to build perceptions of their character. While some researchers contrast political images with issues, others see images as incorporating impressions related to issues. Emotional responses to political topics are thus included in images.

There are three basic conceptual approaches to political images. The first views the image *as projected by* the political source. The second sees the image as a *mental construct in the perceiver* of the political source. The third view is that the image results from an *interaction of projected traits and mental reactions* of the perceiver. These three views can arguably apply to all types of political images. The projection model stresses what is created and disseminated by specific communication campaigns. The utility in this model is a detailed examination of what persuasion strategies are used by political senders to generate particular framing. The receiver model stresses interpretation of political communication above all else. This model is useful for providing explanations of political message receivers' cognitive structuring of messages. The interactional view emphasizes both projection and interpretations and is useful for describing how political message senders' intentions are met with the realities of message receiver interpretations.

While there is no consensus on a precise operationalization of the construct, most scholars who measure political images use methods that elicit voter or citizen impressions about political subjects such as presidential candidates. Methods of measurement include source credibility scales, surveys of citizen or voter impressions, attitude measures, combined issues and character items, experiments testing message effects on images, open-ended questions for content analysis, and cognitive response testing, While researchers have no consensus on the precise content dimensions of political image, there are common assertions that what is most important about images is what receivers represent to themselves about various political stimuli (candidates, leader, nations, parties, etc.).

Images for election candidates (candidate images) can vary in content by candidates and by elections. In 2004, voters were more concerned about national security (36% rated it as most important) than moral issues (27% rated this as most important), despite common claims about moral issues driving the campaign. When asked open-ended questions about the importance of these issues, moral issues dropped to 13%.

The mix of elements in political images is also variable (e.g., the same person running for office in two different elections may be evaluated differing criteria). Many scholars who study voting behavior classify candidate images as short-term factors affecting voting preference. The argument goes that partisanship is the strongest determinant of vote but that short-term factors like images can diminish the effects of parties. Likes and dislikes about a candidate can include both personal traits and feelings about candidate issues. Another type of short-term factor and another type of political image is *party image*. Party images concern impressions of political parties, such as how they perform on various concerns, for example, maintaining a good economy. However, little is known about how candidate images and party images affect each other. A common image of party image influence on vote choice is what is called "retrospective voting," whereby the voter evaluates the past performance of a party in thinking about candidates. Partisanship (a long-term voting determinant) is not the same thing as party image (short-term determinant), and voters can have negative images of their own parties. When candidate images become most salient, the effect of partisanship on voting declines.

There are political images related to leaders who are already elected, such as presidents, and also for nations. These tend to receive less research attention than candidate images but are equally important. As

images of candidates result from campaign communication and affect behavior related to candidates, images of nations result from international communication and affect how nations respond to each other with policies and various actions.

World leaders make decisions about political events among nations on the basis of information they process and the images they hold of the nations involved. Nations, like election candidates, also attempt to project the kinds of political images that give them the ability to increase their influence on political events.

Impressions that add to the content of candidate images are more than issue positions and character traits and are likely to include physical appearance, style of communication, and nonverbal behaviors. It is know that partisanship and attitudes toward competing candidates are good predictors of actual voting behavior. However, political image research tends to look for the origins of those attitudes and the influence of partisanship in relation to party images. This implies that rating of political objects (attitudes) such as candidate or nations are related to how those objects are cognitively represented (images). Statistically, this should be born out by very high and significant correlations between political attitudes and political images.

The utility of the political images constructs lies in their provision of observable cognitive and psychological models that connects individual political perception to various forms of political communication. The study of political images also allows scholars to examine how voters, citizens, candidates, and leaders reason about politics and how they define and frame various political subjects and events.

Political image formation is most likely a process that is closely related to the process described as "framing." Framing involves highlighting certain aspects of a political situation over other aspects. Just as framing is not a concept reserved for contexts implying imagery, the concept of images should not be confused with the visual communication of imagery. Imagery can certainly be part of the image formation process, and visual communication can affect framing and political images, but imagery and political images are conceptually distinct. Framing can be done by a political message source, but it can also be done by a political message receiver who frames or reframes a particular political object or event in their thoughts and messages to others.

There are many psychological, cognitive, emotional, and communicative aspects of political communication that can be partially described and explained by the examinations of political images. More work is needed on how images are related to other elements of cognitive systems, however. For example, we still need to distinguish attitudes, images, schemata, and general cognitive representations. More empirical and theoretical work on political images should elucidate their specific roles in both political cognition and political communication.

Work in political psychology has shed light on some of these intersections. Voters do not store vast amounts of knowledge about candidates or campaigns but rather those items that are most concern or interest to them. What is known as the "online model" of voter candidate evaluation indicates that voters are affected by information that they process but then forget. Despite a low quantity of candidate and campaign knowledge, the voter is able to summon enough of an affective evaluation model of the candidate to make decisions about how to judge the candidate. The evaluation models appear to be what scholars study when they refer to candidate images. Summary assessment of candidates involves the integration of various types of knowledge or impressions regarding the candidates.

Much more focus is needed today regarding the dynamics of political image emergence, formation, and change. Voting research, for example, demonstrates that voter decision-making variables vary by voters, by candidates, and by elections. In other words, the relative importance of issues, candidate images, and party images is not fixed for each candidate and each election. Studies also show that voters differ in how they weigh various voting determinants like ideology and party membership. Image-related messages come from mass communication and interpersonal communication sources, but it is not known how the various sources precisely affect image formation processes or stages.

While there are many loose claims about the differences among frames, images, schemata, and attitudes, there is still no satisfactory (either theoretical or empirical) explanation of the differences among these elements of the cognitive systems. This should not affect research in any of these areas, however, because a focus on any one of the constructs yields differing, if somewhat similar, insights about political communication. Single-construct descriptions of political communication do not offer only partial explanations of complex and interrelated structures and processes.

Communication researchers have long known that mass media message can be altered by interpersonal influence. As discussed earlier, the formation of political images appears to involve a summative process whereby the image serves as a summary model or summary evaluation of a political subject.

Kenneth Hacker

See also *Candidates and Their Images*; Framing; *Image, The*; Lippmann, Walter

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IMAGE, THE

The Image or What Happened to the American Dream was published by Daniel J. Boorstin in 1962. The book diagnosed the formation and development of illusions held by contemporary Americans. What was central to the making of illusions was the notion of "pseudo-events." A pseudo-event possessed four characteristics. First, it was a nonspontaneous happening planned, planted, or incited by someone. Second, it was planted primarily for the immediate purpose of being reported or reproduced by the media. Third, its relation to the underlying reality of the situation was ambiguous. Finally, it was intended to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Pseudo-events often overshadowed spontaneous events because they were more dramatic, were easier to disseminate and to make vivid, were more intelligible and more assuring, were more sociable, more conversable, and more convenient to witness; could be repeated at will and their impression reinforced, could be advertised in advance as events worth watching, worth believing, and worth investing; and could spawn other pseudo-events in geometric progression.

Boorstin argued that pseudo-events were prevalent in communication and marketing initiatives. Celebrities, for example, were human pseudo-events and were fabricated by the media to satisfy the illusions of human greatness. The package tour was another example of prefabricated experience full of pseudo-events. Travel agencies devised efficient ways of insulating the tourist from the natives in foreign cultures to ensure the experience was convenient, comfortable, risk-free, and trouble-free. The rise of the *Reader's Digest* and the motion picture version of novels were typical examples of how pseudo-events overshadowed spontaneous events, the shadow outsold the substance, and second-handedness won over originality. Stars in motion pictures were the celebrities in the entertainment world and best-sellers were the stars in the book world, and both of them were known primarily for being well known more than for any other quality.

Advertising, Boorstin argued, combined both a pseudo-event and a pseudo-ideal. While the pseudo-event was in the world of fact, the image was in the world of value, and it was the pseudo-ideal. Similarly, the image was planned and created to disseminate, to reinforce, to serve a purpose, and to make a certain kind of impression, was believable, concrete, and appealing to the senses, was simpler than the object it represented, and was ambiguous enough to float itself between the imagination and the senses and between expectation and reality. Boorstin traced the passion for pseudo-events and image to contemporary Americans' attempts to shape the environment that shaped them, which converted the American Dream to American illusions.

For decades after its publication, Boorstin's description and anticipation of journalism, advertising,

celebrity, and the American Dream have been used to interpret the American culture. Pseudo-events and the creation of image, illusions, and other key concepts of Boorstin's work are frequently used to describe and interpret political events and the behavior of political figures.

Feng Shen

See also Image, Political; Pseudo-Event

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Impression Management

Impression management is the strategic action of controlling information about a person, entity, or idea. Impression management is not an inherently deceptive practice; rather, impression management is an attempt to portray and claim a desired image in social interactions. When the images claimed are personally relevant, impression management is known as self-presentation.

Impression management is an important theoretical framework for the study of social psychology. It derives from the work of Erving Goffman, whose 1959 work *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* crystallized the dramaturgical view of sociology, which holds that social interaction between individuals is best understood through the metaphor of actors performing for audiences. Individuals, like actors, want audiences to interpret their actions in particular ways. However, audiences often interpret a performance differently than the actor intended. Impression management expands upon the life-as-theater analogy, studying how individuals seek to influence the reactions of both real and imagined audiences regarding all aspects of their lives. Impression management counts the "self" as a most important audience for every actor's performances; people come to learn who they are as they observe their own actions.

Impression management offers an important theoretical framework for the study of political roles and political campaigns. Barry Schlenker, author of one of the seminal works in the field, *Impression Management* (1980), suggests that public impression management is central to the successful claim of political roles. He discusses Richard Nixon's *Man in the Arena* programs to illustrate the way in which television allows politicians to claim desirable images for themselves, whether authentic or not.

Political advertising represents a very direct form of impression management for political candidates. In contrast to news coverage, advertising allows politicians to completely control their "performance" for key audiences. Through advertising, politicians and their organizations seek to claim specific images. Lynda Lee Kaid and Anne Johnston's book, *Videostyle in Presidential Campaigns: Style and Content of Televised Political Advertising* (2001), offers a detailed account of the mechanics of impression management in political advertisements, detailing both the rhetorical strategies and "props" that are have been used by presidential candidates to claim their desired image: president of the United States.

In his book *Self-Presentation* (1996), psychologist Mark Leary discussed the significance of role playing to successful impression management in politics. As "actors," each individual has a very specific role to play. Job titles like police officer, professor, and politician all evoke specific "prototypes" from audiences. The more an individual's behavior corresponds with the prototypes associated with a particular role, the more the audience finds the person credible in that role. Behaviors that do not correspond with prototypes lead to audience skepticism in the actor's ability to adequately perform a desired role.

Because of the nature of their roles, politicians must perform in very public fora. In fact, politicians rely on mass media to deliver their performances to important constituencies. However, mass media can both help and hinder politicians' efforts to claim desired images. Deviations from accepted prototypes, such as Howard Dean's much publicized "Dean Scream" following the 2004 Iowa caucuses, can have devastating effects on the public's belief in an individual's fitness for a particular role. The media replays of Dean's decidedly unpresidential yowl resulted in wide-scale withdrawal of audience support for his desired political role, and his presidential bid came to an end.

Impression management extends beyond the self; organizations also engage in impression management through their communications and actions. In this sense, the platforms of political parties may be viewed as important "props" for political organizations, allowing parties to provide a kind of impression management manifesto: detailed accounts of what their organizations stand for. Similarly, the use of floor votes to make policy statements by members of a political party may be viewed in terms of the impression management dimensions of the images claimed by parties with those votes.

The self is not always the beneficiary of impression management. Beneficial impression management is the strategic controlling of information to aid others. The role of public affairs in government may be understood as a manifestation of beneficial impression management. Statements made by spokespeople for various departments of government are not meant to present images for the individuals making the statements—although they are certainly engaging in impression management in their attempts to credibly deliver information—but rather on the individuals or institutions that the public affairs officers represent.

Impression management has long provided a useful framework for the study of political communication, in particular political advertising. However, there are many other areas of study that might be informed by the impression management framework. For example, research in the area of impression management has now begun to focus on cultural differences in political roles, examining the impression management techniques employed by politicians internationally.

Colleen Connolly-Ahern

See also Political Advertising; *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, The*; Strategic Communication; Videostyle

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Inaugural Addresses, Presidential

As the United States' chief executive, the president's public speeches both influence and reflect cultural norms. Thus, political scholars have assessed that the presidency is largely rhetorical and that a variety of rhetorical genres have come to typify the institution of the presidency. One such genre is the inaugural address. Each new term of a president of the United States begins with a constitutionally mandated oath or affirmation before they may enter the office of the presidency. The swearing in of the president is known as the "inaugural address" and has been given by each of the presidential elects who were elected to a full term.

Many scholars have used various theoretical approaches to examine the institution of the presidency and some have focused on the inaugural address specifically. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1990) argue that there are five defining features of inaugural addresses. First, they argue that the inaugural unifies the audience by reconstituting its members as the people who can witness and ratify the ceremony. In this sense, the audience is transformed from mere spectators to a testimonial body—giving life to the president's ascent to power and affirming the oath of office, itself. Second, the speech invokes communal values drawn from the past. In taking the oath, the president presents his or her qualifications for the office and demonstrates that the traditions of the institution will remain unbroken in their term. The third defining feature of the inaugural address is that it sets forth the political principles that will govern the new administration. The president must go beyond traditional values and state a guiding philosophy of governance. Fourth, the words of the speech demonstrate that the president appreciates the requirements and limitations of executive functions. The speech must simultaneously demonstrate the president can function as a leader and respect the boundaries established for the office by the Constitution. Last, the proceeding four elements must be adapted to fit the character of epideictic rhetoric, thus, becoming timeless in nature. Great

U.S. President George W. Bush presents his inaugural address before a crowd of thousands in Washington, D.C., January 20, 2005. More than 5,000 men and women in uniform participated in the inaugural events. Military support of the presidential inauguration is a tradition that reaches back to 1789 when U.S. President George Washington was escorted by members of the U.S. Army to his swearing-in ceremony at Federal Hall in New York City.

Source: Photo by PH2 Corey Lewis, USN.

inaugurals transcend the situation and can speak to Americans across time. Scholars mark the ability of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy to express the material problems of their day but articulate ideologies that ring true generations later. In short, the inaugural address incorporates the past and future within a contemplative text that describes the present.

Political scholars have discussed at length the connection between religious and political rhetoric in presidential discourse. Most scholars agree that there is an institutionalized set of beliefs that Americans believe to be true and just. An American president, therefore, becomes the priest, prophet, and guardian of the national civic religion. Inaugurals bear a close resemblance to ordination. Roderick P. Hart argues that when presidents are inaugurated, they are also ordained into American civil piety. The inaugural address provides a unique opportunity to introduce religion into policy. Inaugural addresses must contain a moral dimension, as the president should be seen as possessing a personal ethos to justify the ordination. Thus, the inaugural address must emphasize the enactment of the duties of the office as well as the symbolic role of the president as moral barometer. Harry S. Truman's and John F. Kennedy's inaugural addresses receive a lot of attention in political studies as speeches that evidenced sincere and deeply held religious convictions.

In a mediated age, the spoken word is the primary means of communication from a president to the constituencies. These words constitute and reconstitute the presidency. The inaugural address maintains presidential stability insofar as it affirms traditional principles, heightens what is known and believed about the institution, focuses on the nation's present, reconstitutes "the people" who witness the ritual and vouch for the national faith, and refocuses the president as the central figure in American civil religion.

Kristen McCauliff

See also Presidential Communication; Rhetoric, Political

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Incumbent, Incumbency

An incumbent politician, or one achieving the status of incumbency, is an individual who currently holds political office. Often compared to the status of a challenger candidate or candidates involved in incumbent/challenger races (open races), the incumbent candidate has been described as having distinct communicative campaign styles. Despite the findings of any particular sample of scholarship or the outcome of a specific campaign, Judith Trent and Robert Friedenberg (2004) contend that "styles (incumbency, challenger, and incumbent/challenger) are a product of whatever candidates and their staffs believe is needed at a particular time within the context of their particular campaign." Consequently, various campaign strategies may be used by any candidate throughout the campaign regardless of any official classification. These communicative strategies may be found in the various campaign practices used, including public address, political advertisements, the Internet, and so on.

One of the prominent advantages of incumbency becomes evident when facing a challenger who has limited public exposure and inadequate financial support. Officeholders benefit from the symbols of incumbency, which routinely illustrate candidates' qualifications, serving as reminders for constituents that a candidate is in office. Trent and Friedenberg identify four prominent symbolic strategies of incumbents at the presidential level (this categorization is useful at other levels of office as well): symbolic trappings of office, legitimacy of the office, competency and the office, and charisma and the office. Ever present in the physical offices or structures from which they conduct business, the incumbent politician is shown among the symbolic trappings that suggest leadership and importance. With respect to legitimacy of the office, incumbents are seen holding official meetings, signing legislation, or simply helping their constituencies, all from the perspective that they were elected to serve in office and, thus, are legitimate candidates for reelection. Whereas symbolic trappings and legitimacy of office enhance the public image of a candidate, competency and charisma of the office promote the office held. Once in office the elected official is directed by the competency associated with the office. As the president of the United States is often referred to as the "leader of the free world," the person elected can readily assume that characteristic. Furthermore, charisma and the office recognizes the fundamental influence the office has in relation to the public. Political campaigns and incumbent politicians attract public attention. Campaign stops during fairs, parades, or political rallies capture the awe of the public—the ability to see, hear, or participate in these events through the media, if not in person, captures the charisma of the office and, thus, may benefit the incumbent candidate.

Jerry Miller

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Indexing Theory

The indexing hypothesis, as proposed by W. Lance Bennett (1990), states that the range of debate on public affairs appearing in the news is indexed to the range of debate present in mainstream government discourse. With this hypothesis, Bennett pointed out that a variety of theories about the relationship between media and government, particularly political economy theories of media and theories of the sociology of news production, made similar predictions about what the news would look like. Since its initial publication in 1990, more than 100 journal articles have referred to Bennett's essay.

The concept of indexing has appeared most consistently in three areas of political communication research. First, indexing has implications for theories of media autonomy. Well-functioning democracies require an independent press, but much research indicates that press autonomy is limited at best. Indexing captures an aspect of that limited autonomy, for the hypothesis claims that when political officials do not

differ on an issue, journalists will accept that consensus, fail to seek alternative perspectives, and present one-sided news. References to the indexing hypothesis also appear in the literature on media framing. Indexing offers an explanation of the origins of news frames as well as an explanation of why news sometimes contains multiple, competing frames and sometimes contains only one. Finally, the literature on "new institutionalism" makes use of the indexing concept. Indexing in this context is an example of an institutional practice that links organizational rules and interorganizational relationships to specific day-to-day organizational activities and outputs.

Although the indexing concept synthesizes important theoretical predictions and is intuitively appealing for many scholars of media and politics, empirical support for the hypothesis itself has been mixed. While some studies seem to reveal indexed news, others do not. In its initial formulation, the hypothesis is difficult to falsify. It is not entirely clear what constitutes "mainstream government debate." For example, if the news includes the views of foreign government officials who disagree with American officials' consensus view on foreign policy, is it indexed or not? Moreover, the original formulation of the indexing hypothesis may refer to the range of official debate or to the distribution of official perspectives. Is news that confines itself to the perspectives offered by public officials but misrepresents the distribution of official support and opposition to various views indexed or not? Bennett himself initially expected that indexing would apply to some kinds of news events more than others and has more recently suggested that indexing offers only a partial explanation of how news is covered. These limitations suggest the need for further empirical study and revision of the indexing concept.

Jill A. Edy

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Information, Political

See Infotainment; Political Knowledge

Information Flow, Global

Beginning in the 1960s, as the supply of information increased at a high rate—both internationally and domestically—information and equal access to it were seen as vehicles for reducing dependency in economic, political, and cultural relations. In a broad sense, the study of the international flow of information is an approach to the study of international relations. It is also an aspect of globalization.

Initially, the study of the international flow of information examined the international political aspects of flow as well as the news dimension. Later it broadened to include technological, cultural, and economic factors, expanding the concept of the international flow of information beyond the narrow scope of the mass media and the growing number of technological channels.

The global information flow has two complementary and adaptive dimensions. On the human orientation side, it includes educational, artistic, and cultural exchanges, including conferences and sporting events; diplomatic and political channels, including military and related conferences and organizations; and tourism, travel, and migration, including religious and other personal contacts. On the technological orientation side, the flow includes print media; new(online) media; broadcast media and satellites; film, recordings, and video; marketing, advertising, and public opinion polls; and mail, telephone, telegraph, and related telecommunication channels.

A number of information flow studies dealt with theories of imperialism, integration, conflict and cooperation, and hypotheses about image and perception among and between nations. Other studies examined a nation's internal and external communication systems as well as its political, economic, social, and cultural development in a national, regional, and international context. This category also includes studies on the balance or imbalance of information flow and the direction of flow, which at times are related to such factors as ideology, ethnocentricity, commercialism, or geographical proximity. Other flow studies examined international actors and the impact

of political and persuasive messages on the behavior of individuals and nations. This perspective includes propaganda and policy studies, as well as research on stereotyping or image manipulation and control. Other inquiries analyzed the political economy of information and factors influencing the process of global flow, including gatekeepers, as well as the technological, institutional, and human dimensions of both production and distribution aspects of the information flow. Some researchers looked at the technical and legal aspects of information flow, such as technology and techniques of international information gathering and processing, national and international regulations and standards of information industries and flow, and the technical aspects of transferring information across national boundaries. Studies from this perspective increased recently as a result of the rapid development of the Internet and computers, the growing power and importance of transnational organizations, and the priority regional and international organizations gave to the complex problems of technology, information, and services.

Raluca Cozma

See also Globalization

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Information Society

Information society refers to a society driven economically and politically by nonmaterial products like information and knowledge. To be considered an information society, a society must evolve beyond the trade of material goods and generate at least half of its GNP (gross national product) through information and knowledge. Information society is also referred to as *knowledge society, network society, postmodern society, postindustrial society,* and so on. All these terms describe a socioeconomic reality in which information is a commodity, an essential resource used to create new products and services and to generate wealth to those who have it.

Economist Fritz Machlup (1962) is credited for first developing the concepts of information society and knowledge economy. Machlup immigrated from Austria to the United States in 1933; his research on patents led him to calculate the cost of knowledge and information to economic enterprises. He estimated that about a third of the 1959 GNP in the United States was generated by the five knowledge industries, which he identified as education, research and development, mass media, information machines (signaling machines, instruments, office equipment, and computers), and information services (or the activity of generating and distributing knowledge). Machlup also classified the types of knowledge into practical knowledge (cultural, political, etc.), intellectual knowledge, pastime knowledge, spiritual knowledge, and unwanted knowledge outside a person's interest and acquired by accident. Based on content analysis of 130 daily newspapers in 1954, Machlup claimed that more than half of print media content falls under the pastime knowledge category, which represents knowledge for entertainment purposes. Only about a third of print media content contains intellectual knowledge, and less than a tenth conveys practical knowledge. Advertising, which made up for about 70% of newspaper content, was classified mostly as unwanted knowledge.

Machlup's views on information and knowledge as the main commodity of a modern society were developed by other scholars. Economist Peter Drucker (2002) studied the transition between societies driven by material goods to societies driven by information. Economist Marc Porat classified the various economic sectors into primary and secondary and calculated their share to the GNP based on their information generating capacity. Economist Daniel Bell explained that transitioning from material goods to trading information will result in a postindustrial society based on services rather than tangible items. Philosopher Jean-François Lyotard argued that the reliance of information and its diffusion to all levels of society will end centralized perceptions of the world, called "metanarratives," because information about the outside world makes people aware of the differences rather than the similarities between them.

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Information Technology in Politics

Information technology is also called "information communication technology." It refers to any kind of technology that can be utilized to acquire, produce, process, store, and disseminate information. Mass media (such as newspaper, motion picture, radio, and television), computers, the Internet, satellites, cellular phones, fax machines, and CD-ROMs and DVDs are a few examples of information technology.

In contemporary society, politics and information technology are inextricably linked. This entry focuses on a few information technologies that are considered central to changes in the conduct of contemporary politics: print media, electronic media, and emerging media. Specifically, it examines the role of these technologies in American politics with an emphasis on campaigns and elections. These information technologies, arguably, have had and continue to have a profound impact on American politics, in both positive and negative ways. Communicative activity is central to all politics. Without information technology, contemporary political communication is impossible.

Print Media

Newspapers and news magazines are the two most influential print media in politics. Moving away from serving as mouthpieces of political parties, newspapers in the United States began to develop a reputation of objectivity at the turn of the 20th century. The establishment of wire service for newsgathering helped the growth of objectivity in the newspapers. Since the 1960s, however, the practice of strict objectivity in newspaper news reporting has been modified to encourage news reporting with journalists' subjective analysis and interpretations.

Today, both the nationwide newspapers, such as *The New York Times, The Washington Post, USA Today,* and the *Los Angeles Times,* and some regional newspapers, such as the *Chicago Tribune,* the *Boston Globe,* and the *Atlanta Constitution,* provide extensive and substantive information of political campaigns and elections, government administrations, public policies, and public opinions/polls. The wire services such as the Associated Press also supply a large amount of information to these newspapers and other media. The information of local politics, which is largely missed in the national and regional newspapers and other media, is mainly presented in a variety of local newspapers. News stories, editorial pages, and commentary and opinion columns are common places for readers to seek political information. During elections, editorial endorsements by newspapers for candidates can be influential. Magazines, especially such weekly news magazines as *Newsweek, Time,* and *U.S. News & World Report,* provide relatively detailed analysis of events in politics. These news magazines often help set a news agenda. When a story or a topic gets into these magazines or a photo of a person is featured on their front covers, they suggest the importance of the topic or the person to other media. With its great flexibility of content, size, and timing, political advertisement in newspapers is an effective means for candidates in local elections and their respective parties to disseminate their messages directly to their constituents. Political interest groups often put issues ads in the large national or regional newspapers and magazines to influence policymakers or elected officials on their policy or legislative positions.

Electronic Media

The advances of electronic information technology have had a great influence on American society. The introduction of the telegraph, telephone, and motion picture in the late 19th century and radio, television, fax machine, videocassette recorder, satellite transmission, and computer in the 20th century has changed the landscape of American politics.

Traditionally, radio and television are considered the two most prominent electronic media in politics. Political messages have been included in radio broadcasting since its inception in the 1920s, when the results of the U.S. presidential election were reported. With the development of national networks of radio broadcasting in the 1920s and 1930s, presidential candidates were able to use radio to reach a large number of the national audience. President Franklin D. Roosevelt

used a special radio program (an early version of today's talk radio) to talk directly with average Americans about important national issues such as the New Deal and the Great Depression. Surveys conducted during the 1940 presidential campaign showed that a majority of voters regarded radio as a more important source for political news than newspapers. As television started to become a dominant medium in American politics, in the late 1950s, the significance of radio on national politics was decreased in spite of its essential role in the local politics.

However, in the late 1980s, as a result of the development of satellite technology and the deregulation of the telecommunication industry that stopped enforcing the "fairness doctrine" in radio programming, political talk radio again found its popularity across the nation. The rebirth of talk radio programs has had a widespread influence on American politics. The new wave of conservative talk radio programs has been credited with the Republicans' win of the U.S. House and Senate in the 1994 elections.

Television appeared on the stage of American politics in the late 1950s. With the capacity of transmitting both audio and visual information simultaneously, television changed the way that American voters learn about political information and the conduct of American politics. Three political events in the 1950s and the early 1960s helped television establish its role in the political life of American people: the McCarthy hearings on the alleged influence of communists in the U.S. Army in 1954, and the 1956 and 1960 presidential election campaigns. The American public, through the live coverage of these events by television, were able to observe the political processes that used to be distant from their lives. In the 1960 presidential election, American people watched the first televised presidential debate between Richard M. Nixon and John F. Kennedy. The results of public opinion polls taken after the debate showed an interesting difference between radio audience and TV viewers: the former considered Nixon the winner, and the latter thought Kennedy the winner. In the 1960s and 1970s, television allowed American people to witness many political and social events in their living rooms. Civil rights movements, the Vietnam War, the Senate Watergate hearings, and political parties' conventions are just a few examples. Similar to the news reporting of newspaper and radio, those of national television networks and local stations supply American people with a large quantity of political information. Television news magazine shows (such as CBS's *60 Minutes* and ABC's *20/20*) became a new format of news reporting in the 1970s. These popular shows offered a greater in-depth analysis of political issues than the traditional evening or morning news broadcasts. Since the 1960s, television has been considered the most important source for the majority of American people to obtain information about national and international politics.

The coming of Cable News Network (CNN) in the 1980s brought cable television to the main stage of American politics. CNN's coverage of the first Persian Gulf War in 1991, for example, was the only source of information by which U.S. leaders, U.S. government officials, and American people could get a glimpse of what was going on inside Baghdad. The arrival of C-SPAN (Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network) in the early 1980s added a new venue for American people to see Congress (both House and Senate) in action. In the 1990s, cable news networks, such as CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News Channel, provided the American public with 'round-the-clock coverage of political news, commentaries, and discussions. In the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, more people named these cable news networks as their main sources of the campaign news than those who named the big three national TV networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC). In addition, the interview shows (such as *Meet the Press* and *Larry King Live*), the morning talk shows (such as *Today* and *Good Morning America*), the late night talk shows (such as *The Tonight Show with Jay Leno* and *Late Show with David Letterman*), and comedy talk shows (such as *The Daily Show*) have been identified by many individuals as their primary information sources about candidates and campaigns. It is clear that the amount of political information accessible by the American public through various formats of television programs has increased significantly since the 1950s.

The use of TV commercials has transformed political campaigning. TV ads were first used by the Republican presidential candidate, Dwight Eisenhower, in 1952. Television political advertising has become one of the most important parts of campaign communication strategies. Television political spots are the most common vehicle for statewide and national candidates, their respective parties, and a variety of political advocacy and interest groups to convey their messages directly (that is, without any media's interpretation) to average Americans. The first negative attack-style political spot appeared in the 1964 presidential election—the "Daisy Girl" ad produced for President Lyndon B. Johnson's

campaign. Today candidates are willing to use negative attack-style ads for the purpose of either attacking opponents or rebutting an attack by the opponents. In most of the campaigns, the largest amount of money has been spent on producing television ads and purchasing airtime for the ads.

By watching television, American people receive a wide range of political information on almost every aspect of American politics: information on candidates, issue policies, political institutions and organizations, and public opinions. American people learn more about politics from television than they do from any other media. To date, among all the information technologies, it is television that has had the most profound impact on American politics.

Emerging Media

As narrowly defined, emerging media include mainly the Internet and its major components: the World Wide Web, listservs, e-mail, chat rooms, and Web logs (blogs). In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, with the development of computer technology and an increase in the number of personal computer users, a form of computer network that connects together a vast number of computer networks globally, known today as the Internet or the World Wide Web, emerged and entered into regular American homes. By the end of the 1990s, the Internet had become a new mass medium. Today, any kind of text, audio, and visual messages can be transmitted via the Internet in a variety of communication formats and styles, and the rapid growth of the Internet has had profound implications for newspaper, radio, and television. However, the Internet is not simply a replacement for those traditional mass media. Based on computer technology, the Internet is a new medium, with its own characteristics, that brings traditional mass media together and creates new dynamics of society. Those traditional mass media adapt this new medium by creating a wide range of Internet versions of newspapers and radio and television programs.

Political information available on the Internet covers every major aspect and every major activity of American politics. The information comes from a variety of sources: individual citizens, candidates running for political offices, political parties, political advocacy and interest groups, government at all levels, other mass media (television, radio, newspaper, and magazine), business, to name just a few. The information is shared in various ways, for instance, sending e-mails, using Web sites, joining chat rooms, and writing blogs. As a result, the sheer volume of the information and the speed at which the sources generate the information and people can access it have reached a level that it is unprecedented in human history.

The Internet has exerted a widespread impact on elections. Particularly, the Internet provides a new means for candidates to conduct their campaigns. In 1996, President Clinton and the Republican presidential candidate Robert Dole were among the first to use the Web for campaigning at the national level. Jesse Ventura's Web site in his 1998 campaign for the governorship of Minnesota played an important role in helping him organize his supporters, disseminate the information of his campaign agenda and policy positions directly to the voters, and eventually win the election. Senator John McCain used his Web site to raise a large amount of money within a few days after his winning of the 2000 Republican presidential primary election in New Hampshire. In late 2003 and the early 2004, the former governor of Vermont, Howard Dean, depended primarily on the Internet to engage in a large scale of grassroots campaigning to recruit his supporters and to raise funds for his campaign. His effort allowed him to become a formidable frontrunner in the Democratic Party caucuses and primary elections.

In the United States, a candidate's campaign Web site typically includes the candidate's background information, policy positions, sample speeches, news releases, campaign photos and videos, campaign ads, campaign schedule, and campaign donation links. Similar to a campaign advertisement, the information on a candidate's Web site is totally under the control of the candidate and his or her campaign. A candidate is able to use the Internet to bring unfiltered or unmediated messages directly to voters. Campaign Web sites can be presented in Spanish, Chinese, or other major languages. This capacity of campaign Web sites helps candidates reach voters who may not speak English.

In addition to candidates' Web sites, another means by which a candidate may communicate directly with voters via the Internet is the use of e-mail. E-mail is a low-cost and very quick way to reach a large group of targeted individuals. Campaign Web sites and e-mails promote frequent communications between candidates and voters.

As the Internet has become easily accessible for the majority of American people, new approaches for them to engage in politics have been developed. For

example, campaign activities can be organized via personal e-mail, discussion of issues and candidates can be conducted in chat rooms, and opinions about issues and candidates can be shared in individuals' blogs. The Internet, combining the features of interpersonal and mass communication, makes exchange of information among citizens a task that can be performed in an easy and timely manner. Average citizens can act like journalists to report and comment on any political story. They are now both consumers of and producers of political information. This kind of exchange enables individual citizens to rely less on the analysis and interpretation of political information provided by the mainstream media and to increase their ability to develop their own understanding of the information that can be meaningful to their decision making. The information generated by "citizen journalists" can sometimes present a serious challenge to that of the elite media in terms of accuracy and speed.

The Internet continues to grow and expand. Its further development comes with numerous implications for politics. Assessments of the magnitudes and the meanings of these implications are still in progress, and the effects of the Internet on politics can be revolutionary.

The role of information technology in politics as outlined here illustrates that changes in information technologies can, in a profound way, affect the conduct of politics. The world in the 21st century has experienced and continues to experience a fast pace and a large scale of development and application of information technologies. It is true that, before the effects of existing information technologies on politics can be fully understood, new technologies appear on the horizon.

Yang Lin

See also Media Events; Newspapers, Role in Politics; Radio, Politics and; *Television in Politics*

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INFOTAINMENT

This relatively new concept has multiple meanings. It has been used to refer to such diverse content phenomena as soft news, personalization and human interest in traditionally hard news TV formats; program genres like talk shows that mix seriousness with fun, factual opinions with private feelings; the popular, lighthearted, or emphatic style of journalists; and to the introduction of music, dramatization, and fictional elements in informational TV genres. It is mainly used in relation to television, but sometimes the content of the tabloid press is similarly characterized. As such, *infotainment* is an ambiguous label for the concept. It blurs the distinction between information (linked to knowledge and citizenship) and entertainment (linked to fun, distraction, and passive consumption) and points at politicians going popular by appearing (more) in entertainment-style programs. It is mostly discussed in relation to journalism and usually does not (but could well) cover the informational aspect in knowledge-testing quiz shows and in fictional drama like *West Wing* or *Yes, Prime Minister.*

Infotainment is used both as a normative concept—a term of abuse, even—assuming and worrying about a negative effect, and as an empirical concept to measure and make sense of what is supposed to be a trend. The claim of negative effects appears in various guises: from the "dumbing down" of the public, affecting our sense of reality and promoting a cynical understanding of politics, to disengagement and, in the end, to the decline of our civic culture. The trend is blamed on increasing commercialization and intermedia competition, having prompted more market-driven styles of journalism and more audience-pleasing genres of TV programming. Moreover, to reach the same audience in a multichannel reality as before and to show empathy, image, and authenticity in a more performance-oriented politics, politicians have to use as many platforms as they can find and try to bypass traditional

informational genres, where critical journalists are more interested in their failures than what constitutes their personal charm. As such, infotainment is supposed to be the result of changes in both media and politics. Whether it increases and has a bad effect is, however, contested.

As to the trend, infotainment is not a present-day phenomenon. The popular style of the U.K.'s "penny dreadfuls" in the 19th century and the mixing of fact in fiction in some of the U.S. muckraking in the first half of the 20th century (e.g., the works of Truman Capote) and the new journalism (e.g., Tom Wolfe's essays) in the second half, have all met with the same critique. With more channels and increasing competition for audiences, genres that popularly package serious information have become successful, as have more emphatic journalistic styles. Comparative longitudinal research, however, that could substantiate whether there is a cross-cultural trend that substantive information is being "sauced over" by a gravy of personal feelings and dramatic encounters and that politicians are to be found more where the fun is in TV is far and few between. In fact, the little research there is gives at best a mixed picture: politicians appear in talk shows, but they generally prefer and still do appear mostly in serious programming, and though the style and format of TV news has been popularized, the informational level of TV news, current affairs programs, documentaries, and talk shows has not necessarily declined.

That people do not learn from infotainment, or learn the wrong things with a negative effect, has been even more strongly contested. By focusing on and framing politics in terms of the scandalous, the petty intrigue, and the personal might lead audiences to sideline the hard stuff of policy and decision making while perceiving politicians as predominantly self-interested, as yet there is no unequivocal evidence of a direct causal link between infotainment and political cynicism or disengagement. Instead, research seems to indicate that especially the less politically interested and lower educated learn from it, recall that information better and use it in electoral choices.

Kees Brants

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Inoculation, Political

Inoculation theory was devised by William McGuire in the early 1960s as a strategy to protect attitudes from change: to confer resistance to counter-attitudinal influences, whether such influences take the form of direct attack or sustained pressures.

Inoculation consists of two elements: *threat,* which raises the prospect of persuasive challenges to existing attitudes and is designed to get a person to acknowledge the vulnerability of his attitudes so that he will be motivated to strengthen them; and *refutational preemption,* which raises and refutes specific arguments contrary to attitudes and is designed both to provide specific content a person can use to defend her attitudes and to provide her with a model or script for defending attitudes.

Studies by McGuire in the 1960s proved, convincingly, that inoculation works. More recent research by Pfau and colleagues indicates that inoculation works, in part, through the dual mechanisms of threat and refutational preemption, as McGuire posited, but also by eliciting anger, enhancing attitude accessibility, altering associative networks about an attitude object, and enhancing attitude strength or certainty.

Applications to Political Communication

Inoculation is an interesting theory and a very useful one, since research during the past 20 years has revealed numerous real-world applications, including those relevant to political communication. Studies by Pfau and colleagues found that inoculation is a viable strategy to insulate supporters of candidates in election campaigns against the influence of opponents' attacks. Three studies examined inoculation and political attack advertising. Pfau and Burgoon (1988) examined uses of inoculation in a tightly contested U.S. Senate campaign in South Dakota (the 1986 Abdnor versus Dashle contest). They found that inoculation worked on behalf of Democratic and Republican candidates with weak, moderate, and strong party identifiers, and against both character and issue attacks.

Two subsequent studies also compared the strategies of preemptive inoculation and post hoc refutation (responding to an attack immediately after it occurs). Pfau, Kenski, Nitz, and Sorenson (1990) delivered inoculation treatments via direct mail in the 1988 presidential campaign. Once again, inoculation was effective for both Democratic and Republican candidates and with issue and character attacks. Both the inoculation and post hoc refutation messages partially blunted the effects of opposing attack messages. However, inoculation proved superior to post hoc refutation in reducing effectiveness of opposing attacks for strong party identifiers and for nonidentifiers. Inoculation also was superior to post hoc refutation with weak identifiers, but only with character attacks. An and Pfau (2003, 2004) also compared inoculation and post hoc refutation in the 2002 U.S. Senate and gubernatorial campaigns in Oklahoma. Inoculation proved to be more effective than post hoc refutation in all conditions. Inoculation worked best when the source of the treatment was perceived as high in credibility. Research has also found that inoculation protected viewers of televised debates from the influence of opponents' attacks launched during debates.

Apart from its potential as a strategy for political candidates, inoculation also can be used to impact process. For example, inoculation can serve as an antidote to the corrosive influence of soft money-sponsored political attack ads. Research indicates that, when used generically to forewarn of such ads, inoculation messages were able to preempt the negative influence of soft money-sponsored ads on people's political interest and participation. Finally, research indicates that inoculation is a useful strategy to nurture democratic values in fledgling democracies. A study in Taiwan revealed that inoculation can protect citizens against the spiral of silence, which can thwart minority expression on controversial issues.

Michael Pfau

See also Negative Advertising; Political Advertising; Spiral of Silence

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Intercultural Communication, Dimensions

The term *culture* has been primarily employed as a label for the collective life experience shared by people who live or have lived within the same social environment, such as a nation or a world region. Over the years, the concept of culture has been broadened to include smaller, more specified subcultures from domestic, ethnic, or racial groups as well as from other sociological categories, such as gender or sexual orientation. Consequently, intercultural communication has addressed the two main perspectives: cultural (intracultural) communication and cross-cultural communication. Scholars have labeled the former perspective as "emic" and the latter as "etic." The etic perspective of intercultural communication is mainly addressed in this section.

Cross-cultural study in mass communication involves comparing similar phenomena occurring in different sociocultural systems. In this respect, intercultural political communication research is usually based on the assumption that different parameters of political systems will promote or constrain political communication roles and behavior in disparate manners dependent on their respective systems.

Cultural Dimensions

Scholars in various disciplines have developed schemas shown to be relatively effectual in comparing culture (i.e., Hofstede's (1980) dimensions of cultural variability; Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's (1961) value orientations; Parsons and Shils's (1951) pattern variables). These schemas can be referred to as dimensions of sociocultural variability that affect the specific values and norms predominant in different cultures. Although there are many dimensions along which cultures differ, Hofstede's dimensions of cultural variability and Hall's high-low context communication have proven most useful:

Hofstede empirically derived five dimensions of sociocultural variability:

1. Individualism versus collectivism regarding the relationship between the individual and the group
2. Power distance addressing social inequality
3. Uncertainty avoidance related to the expression of emotions
4. Femininity versus masculinity
5. Long-term (future) versus short-term (associated with the past and present) orientation

Individualism/collectivism is the major dimension of cultural variability used to explain similarities and differences in cross-cultural behaviors. Individual goals are emphasized in individualistic cultures, while group goals take precedence over individual goals in collectivistic cultures. Individualistic societies focus on individual initiative and achievement, while emphasis is placed on belonging to groups in collectivistic societies. In collectivistic cultures, social control over individual behavior is stringently reinforced through the maintenance of rigid hierarchical structures. In individualistic cultures, however, people tend to believe that an individual has control of, and is responsible for, his or her own life. In this cultural pattern, competition is encouraged and frontal attack is considered as a matter of course. The United States is identified as the most individualistic country, followed by Australia and Great Britain, while Guatemala is the most collectivistic, followed by Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela.

Nations can also be distinguished by the manner in which they tend to deal with inequalities. As one of the dimensions of national cultures, power distance is the degree to which the less powerful people within a country tolerate inequality of power distribution. In a large-power-distance society, a hierarchical social structure is strong, and power is centralized at the top. Individuals are very conscious of their rank, and superiors and subordinates perceive themselves as being separate from one another. Malaysia and Slovakia are examples of the largest power-distance countries. However, in a small-power-distance society, members of an organization feel relatively close to one another and possess a shared sense of equality as human beings. Austria has been determined to be the world's smallest power-distance country.

Another dimension of sociocultural variability that distinguishes Western from Eastern culture is uncertainty avoidance. *Uncertainty avoidance* explains the cultural pattern of seeking stability, predictability, and low-stress situations rather than change and new experiences. In other words, uncertainty avoidance involves a lack of tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty in a specific sociocultural system, which thereby exhibits less tolerance for people or groups that display deviant ideas or behaviors and demonstrates a greater need for formal rules and absolute truth. Consequently, people in high uncertainty avoidance cultures try to avoid ambiguity. Countries such as Greece, Portugal, and Guatemala are placed high on the uncertainty avoidance scale, while Singapore, Jamaica, and Denmark rank low in uncertainty avoidance.

The masculinity/femininity dimension reflects the extent to which a society is dominated by masculine characteristics (e.g., assertiveness, performance, ostentation, and self-concern) or feminine characteristics (e.g., modesty, interdependence among people, and affection or caring for others). This dimension is thus related to the traditional divisions of emotional gender roles between men and women. The most feminine-scoring countries are Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark, while Slovakia, Japan, and Hungary display the highest levels of masculine characteristics.

Hofstede later added time orientation to the first four dimensions, addressing the long-term versus short-term orientation involved in individuals' choices to focus on the past, present, or future. Long-term orientation signifies future rewards (i.e., perseverance, thrift), while short-term orientation is related to the past and present (i.e., quick results, personal stability). Generally, people from East Asian countries, such as China, Japan, and Korea, tend to demonstrate long-term orientation, while the populations of European countries occupy a middle range in terms of time orientation, and Americans, Canadians, and Africans tend to possess short-term time orientations.

While individualism/collectivism defines broad differences between cultures, Hall's high/low context notion focuses on cultural differences on the basis of communication processes. Although some scholars have argued that all the cultures labeled by Hall as low context are individualistic, and all high-context cultures are collectivistic according to Hofstede's scheme, this notion has been one of the most well-known and employed dimensions to identify and describe cultural differences. Hall focuses on communication patterns within cultures along the four dimensions of context, space, time, and information flow. High-context communication is characterized by a dominant dependence on the implicit, rather than explicit, expression of messages, and meaning in a high-context culture is primarily derived from the physical context or is internalized within individuals in the culture. In contrast, communication in low-context cultures relies primarily on verbal codes. Hall describes the United States and some other Western countries as being low-context cultures, while Korea, Japan, and Taiwan represent typical high-context cultures.

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Interest Groups in Politics

Interest groups are private organizations that attempt to influence decisions made by public officials. These organizations typically represent a group of individuals with a common interest, or corporations with shared concerns. Interest groups use political communications to appeal to their membership, the general public, and political officials. The influence of interest groups in U.S. politics has grown in recent years with the advent of mass communication and the increasing cost of elections.

There are two basic types of interest groups in America: private and public. Private interest groups represent a small segment of the community and are formed in an effort to protect and improve members' material interests. Examples of private interest groups are AARP, which advocates for the interests of senior citizens, and the National Rifle Association (NRA), which represents gun owners. Public interest groups are established to promote a cause that benefits the whole community, such as animal rights organizations or interest groups promoting environmental protection.

Political scientists disagree about which interest groups have the most political power. Some scholars think that citizen interest groups have the most influence in policymaking, while others propose that corporate interests are more dominant. The number of corporate lobbyists in Washington, D.C., far exceeds the number of citizen lobbyists, and corporate interest groups contribute a much great amount of money to campaigns than do citizen interest groups. Whether these gaps translate into disparities in policy influence is debatable; however, most scholars agree that corporate interest groups have greater access to members of Congress and the White House than do citizen interest groups.

Interest groups engage in different tactics to influence public policy outcomes. The "inside game" refers to direct lobbying of public officials. The "outside game" refers to more public tactics seeking to influence public policy, such as endorsing certain candidates or policies, contributing money to campaigns through political action committees (PACs), or running political advertisements. Interest groups have taken advantage of new communication technologies—namely, television and the Internet—to influence public policy.

Interest groups have played a more prominent role in influencing public opinion, public policy, and elections with the advent of mass communication and the high price of contemporary elections. Candidates are able to appeal to voters directly through communication technology instead of going through the political parties, and, as a result, national elections now cost about 20 times more than they did in the 1950s. Candidates now rely more than ever on the resources of interest groups to support them and to criticize their opponents. Some prominent examples include the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth campaign against Senator John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election and the MoveOn.org Voter Fund that works to elect Democratic candidates.

Interest groups have amassed great influence in politics in recent decades, partially as a result of their savvy use of political communications. Most notably, these organizations have been able to capitalize on the new importance of television in persuading the public to support certain policies and candidates. Interest groups will remain a prominent force in American politics through lobbying efforts and effective use of political communications.

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See also Political Action Committees

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Internet in Politics

See World Wide Web, Political Uses

Interpersonal Communication

Interpersonal political communication refers to episodes of political conversation and discussion that take place between the non-elite members of a political community. Often conceived as a basic form of political participation, it includes activities like conveying and receiving information on political matters, exchanging arguments about how they are to be evaluated, or attempting to convince others of certain points of view. In contrast to mass communication, interpersonal communication is not one-sided but bidirectional. At least in principle it provides all participants with similar chances to control its course. Instant feedback and constant readjustments of the flow of communication are always possible. The structure of its messages is complex and multidimensional, as it involves not only exchanges of verbal statements but also nonverbal metacommunication that may influence how explicit messages are processed. It has a large capacity to convey socioemotional content. Thus, on the whole interpersonal communication appears a richer form of conveying and receiving political messages than mass communication.

On the other hand, the range of coverage of any interpersonally conveyed message is far smaller. Interpersonal communication is decentralized and fragmented, and any particular content can be received by only a small number of addressees. In its capacity to expose large numbers of people at the same time to identical messages it is by far surpassed by the mass media. While modern mass media, especially the audiovisual media, address a politically indistinct audience that is large and socially heterogeneous, interpersonal communication tends to follow lines of social and political cleavage, operating mostly within rather than across structural segments of society. If mass communication functions as the great equalizer of modern society, interpersonal communication rather mirrors its pluralism and diversity. However, to the degree that mass communication provides interpersonal communication with its thematic agenda and frames for dealing with it, some standardization takes place there as well.

The Study of Interpersonal Political Communication

While mass communication is a relatively young phenomenon, dating back just a few centuries, interpersonal communication is as old as mankind itself. Using a shared language to send and receive meaningful symbols in order to orient themselves with regard to one another, as well as to co-orient themselves with regard to their physical and social environments, can be seen as an essential component of humans' nature from its beginning. While the advent and expansion of mass communication is one of the key features of the processes of socioeconomic modernization, it has supplemented but not replaced interpersonal communication as a crucial instrument of exchanging information, including information on politics.

Nonetheless, as far as political communication is concerned, by far the largest share of scientific attention so far has concentrated on mass communication. Only a relatively small body of research has been accumulated with regard to interpersonal political communication, and even smaller is the stock of studies that analyze both interpersonal communication and mass communication simultaneously. With few exceptions, a clear division of labor characterizes the relationship between scholarly interest in these two forms of political communication, and it is complemented by a theoretical divide. Mostly, research into interpersonal political communication works with different concepts and theories than inquiries into the mass media's political roles and attributes.

In an age in which new information and communication technologies tend to increase individuals' capacity to convey messages to larger numbers of other people, while narrowcasting and demand-driven provision of content replace broadcasting and its supply-driven logic in the realm of media, drawing the boundary between interpersonal communication and mass communication appears not so easy. Yet, the paradigmatic form of interpersonal communication remains communication occurring in direct interactions among a small number of individuals. Although often restricted to word-of-mouth communication in face-to-face interaction, in present times it seems more appropriate to include also personal exchanges that are technically mediated, for instance by telephone or e-mail, in the notion of interpersonal communication.

Such communication can be public or private. It can take place in the course of encounters between strangers, when no control can be exerted over the range of participants that share in the dialogue. Or it can occur between persons who are well acquainted if not intimately related to one another, in secluded spaces that are protected physically or at least through

norms of civility against anyone entering who is not explicitly invited.

Public Interpersonal Communication

Advocates of more populist rather than strictly elitist conceptions of democracy often emphasize the crucial importance of open political debate in public situations that involves persons who are personally unrelated to one another. Examples are town hall meetings or other kinds of political gatherings as well as, in more recent times, Internet forums and chat rooms where concerned citizens assemble, personally or virtually, to exchange their views on matters of common interest. However, such activities are very demanding in terms of civic skills and tend to be rather unpleasant experiences for many of those taking part. Almost by necessity, communication under such circumstances is emphasizing conflict rather than consensus, and thus may create a fair amount of discomfort if not outright stress among its participants. It needs courage and a certain confidence in one's ability to prevail in verbal disputes to take a position in plain view of the public. Accordingly, fear of isolation as well as uncertainty about one's argumentative competence have been identified as factors that impede people's willingness to take part in such activities.

Expressing political standpoints is sometimes likened to religious practices—something that due to cultural norms is considered an activity that belongs to the private rather than to the public realm. On the other hand, extended experiences with political discussion in the private realm, especially if it implies exchanges with many associates who hold diverse political views, may spill over into the public sphere, nourishing people's readiness to speak out in public. On the whole, public interpersonal communication appears as a fairly demanding form of political participation. Accordingly, it is rather a phenomenon of a small minority of political activists. In most societies, under ordinary circumstances only few citizens find their way to such events, and even smaller proportions actively engage in their proceedings.

It is difficult to analyse such occurrences in natural settings, and accordingly few attempts have been made so far. An important exception is studies related to recent democratic experiments of plebiscitary institutional reform like "consensus conferences," "citizen juries" or "planning cells." The most extensive and far-reaching, but at the same time also most intensely scientifically monitored of these measures are the so-called deliberative polls, invented by James Fishkin (1997). They start like any ordinary survey of a random sample of individuals from some population, for instance, the electorate of a country, on some political issue. But then a huge investment is made to assemble the respondents of this survey at a central location, to expose them to a huge dose of carefully prepared information on the issue in question, and to let them debate the issue extensively in moderated group discussions. Eventually, they are surveyed again to see how their opinions have changed during this intense process of political information and deliberation.

Within this elaborate procedure, the purpose of interpersonal communication between strangers—in this particular case a random sample from a large population—is to contribute to more substantial, better-considered opinions on complex political issues. This is seen as a practical antidote against the notorious shallowness of public opinion as it finds expression and visibility through media polls, which are usually just registering superficial top-of-the-head statements. The resulting opinions of higher quality among the members of a random sample are assumed to qualify as a proxy for the opinions of an ideal, well-informed, and intensely deliberating electorate that in reality does not exist. As such, they may, according to Fishkin, legitimately play a prescriptive role in elites' political decision making.

These and other studies on organized public deliberation suggest that such events—even when proceeding online and not face to face—can create a sense of community identity and social trust, and change their participants' attitudes, increase their internal efficacy, raise their interest in and knowledge about political issues, make them on the whole better capable to discuss political issues, and eventually also more likely to participate in other forms of political activity. They thus seem to attest to the political potential of ordinary citizens and justify a stronger appreciation of their voice in the political process of a less elitist, and more plebiscitarian version of democracy.

Private Interpersonal Communication

Most research on interpersonal political communication has concentrated on private settings, concerning persons that together form more or less stable webs of social interaction. Such communication takes place within citizens' immediate life-world, in various

contexts by which people get into touch with each other. People's homes are the locus where such communication takes place most often, and it tends to be spontaneous, unstructured, and intermingling with exchanges about other topics of a more mundane character.

Measuring everyday political discussion between ordinary citizens is notoriously difficult. Few studies have so far attempted to gain insights into the functioning of interpersonal communication by directly observing political talks. A notable exception is William Gamson's (1992) study of political discussions among working-class Americans, aimed to demonstrate how common people are able to make sense of complicated issues through political conversation, drawing on media frames, personal experiences, and folk wisdom.

Most of what we know about interpersonal political communication comes from survey research and is derived from respondents' reports on their communication habits and either respondents' perceptions or direct measurements of their political talkmates' attributes. Early research, in particular the seminal studies of Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues at Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research, conceived of interpersonal political communication as a matter of functionally diffuse primary groups, tightly integrated by lasting emotional ties of mutual attraction, sympathy, esteem, and trust, and characterized by strong norms, advocating conformity to group standards and prevailing opinions. More recently, the view of political conversations as an exclusive matter of cohesive social groups, densely interwoven by strong ties, has been replaced by a more open perspective, centered around the notion of social networks. It recognizes that such communication may also extend to weak ties, connecting individuals to mere acquaintances and not necessarily involving intimate relationships and positive emotions. Theoretically, such secondary relationships can be seen as an intermediate form of interpersonal communication that bridges the strictly private and the strictly public realms.

Doubtless, processes of socioeconomic modernization and the ensuing trends toward social differentiation and individualization as well as rising social and geographic mobility have increased the odds for citizens' personal environments to include more such functionally specific linkages. Nonetheless, even today primary relationships are more important than secondary relationships. Data from different advanced industrial societies clearly show that most interpersonal political communication still takes place between spouses, relatives, and friends. Hence, political talkmates are mostly tied to one another by intimate relationships. However, some political discussion also occurs between neighbors, at the workplace, or in voluntary associations. Such secondary relationships' share is larger in more extended networks. But discussion networks that consist exclusively of mere acquaintances are extremely rare. It seems that political talks within primary relationships are a necessary precondition for discussion activities that extend beyond the realm of intimate relationships.

Background and Intensity of Private Political Communication

Compared with other forms of political participation, political talk appears as a distinct mode of involvement. Dimensional analyses reveal how it is set apart from "vertical" activities that are aimed at influencing government by its "horizontal" logic that concerns citizens' interactions with one another rather than with elites.

Cross-National Differences

In cross-national perspective, the intensity with which people discuss political matters varies widely (see Table 1). Many European and North American countries' citizens are very active, with 40% or more claiming to engage in political conversations with high regularity, and large majorities doing so at least occasionally. At the same time, there are also countries where large shares of the population—up to one out of five citizens in some cases—never talk about politics at all. A North/South divide exists in Western Europe, with citizens of the Mediterranean countries being least talkative with regard to politics. Latin Americans also tend to display somewhat lower rates of political discussion, at least as far as conversations with friends—the only kind of political discussion for which comparable data are available on a global scale. In several Asian countries, rates appear also rather low. In North Africa and the Mideast, as well as sub-Saharan Africa, talking politics appears as a minority phenomenon, at least among friends.

Longitudinal studies reveal that such patterns of cross-national differences are very stable. A crucial institutional prerequisite of interpersonal political

Table 1 Political Discussions Worldwide

		Discuss Politics		Discuss Politics With Friends	
		Several days a week or daily	*Never*	*Frequently*	*Never*
Western Europe	Belgium	28.6	19.4	14.7	35.6
	Finland	41.1	4.3	6.6	27.5
	France	37.1	11.8	11.4	35.4
	Germany	47.0	3.9	24.0	15.3
	Greece	19.1	15.0	21.3	21.4
	Italy	30.7	20.9	12.9	32.4
	Netherlands	38.4	10.5	15.9	19.8
	Norway	40.4	3.8		
	Portugal	31.9	14.1	14.4	45.3
	Spain	28.3	22.6	12.1	43.4
	Switzerland	47.3	4.4		
	U.K.	28.8	21.2	9.1	53.9
Eastern Europe	Belarus			18.1	20.1
	Bulgaria			17.4	24.6
	Czech Republic	35.8	9.5	21.7	12.5
	Hungary	36.5	12.2	11.3	43.2
	Poland	35.0	12.1	21.5	25.2
	Romania			10.8	37.7
	Russia			20.2	25.4
	Ukraine			19.4	21.9
North America	Canada			11.0	39.3
	United States			16.3	26.0
Latin America	Argentina			18.5	48.8
	Chile			13.1	43.4
	Mexico			15.2	42.1
	Venezuela			15.6	43.9
North Africa/Middle East	Algeria			8.8	26.3
	Egypt			7.5	42.6
	Iran			16.8	30.6
	Israel	44.2	9.4	37.1	14.0
	Saudi Arabia			21.2	28.1
	Turkey			12.1	46.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	Nigeria			17.1	25.7
	South Africa			10.2	46.3
	Uganda			19.1	20.2
	Zimbabwe			9.7	52.2

		Discuss Politics		*Discuss Politics With Friends*	
		Several days a week or daily	*Never*	*Frequently*	*Never*
Asia	China			24.4	30.0
	India			16.5	42.2
	Indonesia			10.5	31.5
	Japan			7.4	35.5
	Pakistan			9.3	43.1
	Philippines			6.6	23.4
	Singapore			4.3	43.5

Sources: European Social Survey 2002; World Values Survey 1999/2000.

communication is the freedom of expression. This basic right is nowadays guaranteed by nearly all constitutions worldwide. According to a recent comprehensive content analysis, it is explicitly included in 87.5% of 160 surveyed constitutions from all over the world—far more than make mention of the freedom of the press. Nonetheless, it is clear that in many states this right exists on paper but not in practice. Feeling free to express one's thoughts, however, is an important facilitator of political conversation. Even when this basic right is guaranteed, heritages of authoritarian rule, deeply ingrained in citizens' collective memories, may curb their readiness to engage in open political exchange. Other differences between democracies also impinge on their citizens' engagement in political talks. For instance, political diversity seems to breed discussion, as it appears more intense among citizens of countries that are ideologically more heterogeneous.

Certain situational factors also stimulate or depress citizens' readiness to take part in interpersonal communication about politics. During dramatic periods of system change, such as processes of democratization, citizens develop a high need for orientation, which may increase their motivation to engage in political talks. But the ordinary ebb and flow of democratic politics also makes itself felt. For instance, election campaigns have been found to stimulate political conversations among voters.

Inter-Individual Differences

While differences between political systems certainly go a long way to explaining their citizens' general habits of political conversation, individual attributes make for important variations within countries. Citizens' likelihood to be active discussants has been found to depend on a number of personal characteristics, most notably their ability, motivation, and opportunity, as well as civic integration and political identification.

While evidence is mixed with regard to the importance of socioeconomic resources such as income, there is no doubt that people's cognitive resources are a crucial prerequisite of interpersonal communication. Their general intelligence and levels of education, but also more specifically their political knowledge, understanding, and awareness, increase their odds for engaging in political conversion. Persons who are generally more involved with public affairs, through intense interest in politics, partisanship, or strong ideological commitments, are also more likely to discuss political matters. Even when controlling for other factors, gender often appears as an important predictor as well, with males discussing politics more intensely than females, perhaps reflecting tradition role conceptions.

In addition, citizens' participation in extended social networks of interaction seems to stimulate the exchange of political content, as does their involvement in voluntary associations and their general trust in others. Politically, intense discussants tend to deviate from the political mainstream. Cross-national research found that supporters of minority parties as well as persons who are ideologically more extreme engage more readily in political discussion than adherents of the governing majority and ideological moderates.

Homogeneity and Heterogeneity in Private Political Communication

Citizens are usually well oriented about their associates' political positions, although cross-national differences cannot be overlooked. Where discussion activities are on the whole less intense, citizens typically are also more uncertain about where their talkmates stand politically. In all countries, spouses are particularly well informed about each other's political leanings. Contexts that nurture secondary relationships, like neighborhoods, workplaces, or voluntary organizations, are less conducive to learning about other people's political views.

Awareness of other persons' political preferences must not necessarily reflect reception of explicit statements about voting intentions or similarly clear-cut messages. Rather, inference processes certainly play an important role, with individuals drawing conclusions on their discussants' political identities from casual statements on specific topics. To some degree, impressions of others' political standpoints are also vulnerable to projection. People tend to attribute their own preferences on their communication partners. Such attributions are sometimes erroneous. Hence, relying on people's perceptions of each other implies a risk of overestimating the actual extent of political homophily within discussant networks. In addition, people's assessments of their associates' political leanings are also responsive to the general political climates of the wider sociospacial contexts within which their interactions take place.

Notwithstanding, political conversations are typically characterized by a considerable degree of homogeneity. Socioeconomic modernization has so far gradually, but not yet fundamentally, altered the basic rule that "like talks to like." Hence, interpersonal political communication more often than not occurs between like-minded souls and consists of exchanges of mutually agreeable political messages. To some degree, concordance between individuals who engage in political communication with each other is the consequence of deliberate choice and selective attention. Interpersonal communication is a means to reassure one's own identity by exposing oneself to affirming information. Hence, individuals tend to construct personal networks of like-minded associates. When successful, they will thus create for themselves a tight cocoon of mutual political confirmation in which the likelihood of being exposed to dissenting voices is negligible.

However, for several reasons it is unlikely that many citizens indeed find themselves in such circumstances. First of all, not all kinds of relationships are similarly controllable by individuals. One cannot choose one's relatives, and few people will find politics important enough to move to another neighbourhood or change their workplace because it exposes them to discordant political communication. According to several studies, among coworkers the odds are particularly high that conversations entail experiences of dissent and challenge. In contrast, chosen relationships like those between spouses and friends are on average very homogeneous.

In addition, most people are not political animals to such an extent that they let political motives entirely dominate their choices of interaction partners. Selecting associates according to other criteria may thwart citizens' control over the kind of messages they receive when discussing political matters with these people. Often they may not even bother to check where others stand politically before engaging in regular interactions.

Last, even when undertaking a determined attempt to construct a network of politically like-minded souls, people may find it difficult if not impossible to attain this goal. Choices of interaction partners are constrained by availability and the supply of potential discussants with specific political preferences is a function of the distribution of such positions within one's sociospatial context. In regions that are dominated by one party, adherents of other parties have a hard time getting in touch with congenial talkmates, and they find it close to impossible to engage exclusively in political exchanges with politically similar associates. Hence, sooner or later they find their own opinions challenged during political talks. In multiparty systems, at least if they are not segregated regionally, this mechanism implies a structural disadvantage for smaller parties.

For many years, research on interpersonal political communication has emphasized its homogeneity, to the point that it has been identified as a major force of the status quo in politics, contributing to the conservation of existing structures of political cleavage. More recently, an increasing theoretical interest in the notion of deliberative democracy has spurred concern for phenomena of network heterogeneity and its sustenance. This research accords a special role to open networks of lower density. Within such rather loose structures, weak ties fulfil an important function as

bridges to other networks, serving as channels through which opinion diversity may find its way into political conversation, creating, and sustaining experiences of political disagreement.

Effects of Interpersonal Communication

That talkmates more often than not are politically congenial to some degree reflects processes of selection. However, political conversations are also powerful sources of political persuasion, even if they take place in secondary relationships. Hence, similarity between discussants is often also the result of one person having converted another to her own point of view or even voting preference. In recent years, the scope of research into the political consequences of private interpersonal communication has been expanded beyond this narrowly election-related perspective to include also more fundamental aspects of citizenship, such as citizens' engagement with politics and their ability to cope with political diversity—a crucially important theme, as the capacity for peaceful accommodation of political differences is essential for any democratic system of government.

Effects on Electoral Behavior

The seminal Columbia studies saw interpersonal influence as a mighty force that was responsible for the tendency of election results to reflect societal lines of cleavage. According to Lazarsfeld and his colleagues, political discussion intensifies during campaign periods. As it mainly takes place within the confines of socially and politically homogeneous groups, it reminds people of who they are politically and what they accordingly ought to do on Election Day. Thus, being exposed to one's associates' political views during political conversations activates citizens' latent predispositions that then guide their electoral behavior.

Numerous studies provide ample evidence that both voters' political attitudes and their political choices vary in accordance to the frequency with which they engage in political conversations and whom they talk to. While political activation through intense talks to associates with concordant views indeed appears as the more frequent outcome of interpersonal political communication in election times, conversion is also possible, although far less easily attained. While voters seem to be eager to follow their latent inclinations if they get exposed to justifications for doing so when discussing politics, messages that challenge their predispositions encounter resistance. However, if such contestations become strong enough, voters' sturdiness can be softened and eventually broken. On the whole, however, as concordant information is encountered more often and digested more readily, while exposure to discordant messages occurs more rarely, and leads less quickly to these messages' acceptance, the aggregate outcome of interpersonal communication at elections indeed tends to reflect and sustain the political status quo.

However, if predispositions are weak, conversion through political talks is facilitated. This implies that the total impact of interpersonal communication as a mover of public opinion tends to grow in the long run, as processes of dealignment erode voters' perceptional screens for exposure to and processing of messages from interpersonal (and other) communication. Conversions during political discussions appear also more likely in cases of voters who are not political experts and are little interested in politics. In addition, being trusted makes discussants more influential. At the same time, it is clear that interpersonal influence is stronger in primary relationships, although by no means restricted to them.

Effects on Democratic Citizenship

Interpersonal political communication provides not only guidance for citizens' voting decisions at elections. Irrespective of its content, it also creates a more knowledgeable citizenry with regard to public affairs. Furthermore, political conversations contribute to the quality of citizens' opinions. People who talk to each other are not only more like to have opinions on political issues, but these opinions also tend to be well considered.

By providing information, and by conveying norms and expectations about proper political behavior, interpersonal communication functions as a powerful mobilizer for political participation. Political discussion stimulates turnout and other forms of party- or campaign-related participation, especially if it takes place in large networks between highly partisan talkmates. Even stronger is its role with regard to so-called unconventional forms of participation. While certain attitudinal predispositions are often sufficient to drive people to the polls even in the absence of political exchanges with any associates, taking part in protest activities of social movements typically

requires interpersonal mobilization. Social movements can be seen as politically mobilized everyday networks, and attending protest events, especially if they are of a more disruptive kind, is almost always the consequence of processes of recruitment that work through political conversations. In a way, political activity is contagious, and it spreads through interpersonal channels of political communication.

Yet, the mobilizing role of interpersonal communication depends on a certain degree of unanimity and is often thwarted if political conversations confront citizens with “cross-pressures.” Individuals who are exposed to ambivalent messages from their talkmates, at the same time promoting contradictory courses of action, tend to postpone political decisions and to abstain from more demanding forms of political activity, although this does not seem to extend to voting itself.

While disagreement among citizens’ political talkmates thus seems to entail some problematic consequences, in other ways it has recently come to be seen as an important prerequisite for several important facets of democratic political culture. Again, the main impulse for this research came from the recent deliberative turn in democratic theory. From this view, democracy is not primarily seen as an arena where preexisting preferences are expressed and aggregated, but rather as a communicative process of opinion formation that is to yield preferences of higher quality through an extended and inclusive debate in which problems are carefully analyzed, possible solutions identified, evaluation criteria developed, and solutions achieved that are fair to most if not everyone. One essential prerequisite for such a process to work is that interpersonal communication is not uniform but pits diverse opinions against each other. Only exchanging and confirming concordant points of views cannot be deliberative. Hence, it is essential that some degree of disagreement is sustained in interpersonal political communication.

To be sure, disagreement in private interpersonal communication can be only a minimum requirement for true deliberation. Nonetheless, it has been shown to entail healthy consequences that partly correspond to those demonstrated for much more demanding public deliberations. For instance, it increases people’s awareness and understanding for each others’ standpoints by conveying rationales for political views other than their own, and it fosters tolerance for opposing opinions as well as respect for those expressing them. Experimental evidence suggests that conversations including conflicting perspectives may even neutralize elites’ power to frame the way people think about issues.

Interpersonal Communication and Mass Communication

The most influential assumption about the relationship between mass communication and interpersonal communication is the notion of the “two-step flow of communication” proposed by the Columbia researchers half a century ago. It implies the assumption that far fewer people attend to messages from mass media than to word-of-mouth communication from personal associates, and that those who attend to the media serve—as so-called opinion leaders—as relays that filter media messages and convey only those into their groups that conform to these groups’ prevailing norms. If this hypothesis was ever valid, the expansion of television since World War II has changed its premises profoundly. While reading newspapers is still not a common activity in many countries, television nowadays brings political news to virtually everyone’s attention everywhere. Yet, as demonstrated by Table 1, in many countries considerable portions of societies never get exposed to political information while interacting with other people. Hence, there are sizable pockets of non-discussants who nonetheless take part in political communications by watching television. It is probably safe to say that nowadays the reach of the mass media surpasses the reach of interpersonal political communication everywhere.

Accepting this, some studies argued that the two forms of political communication nonetheless play different roles for those exposed to them. While political conversations have been found to possess a considerable capacity to influence attitudes and behaviors of those taking part in them, mass communication’s influence has been assumed to be constricted to cognitive effects, in particular agenda setting. However, after a long period of neglect, caused by the predominance of the “limited effects model” and the cognitive paradigm in effects research, recent years have seen a revived interest in the question of whether the media can not only inform but also persuade their audiences. Opinions, attitudes, and even behavior are no longer believed to be totally immune from media influences. Hence, the question can be legitimately raised as to which of the two forms of political communication—mass communication or interpersonal communication—is more important with regard to the formation and

change of citizens' political orientations. On the whole, beginning with Katz and Lazarsfeld's classic study *Personal Influence* (1955), existing research suggests that mass communication is by no means irrelevant with regard to political persuasion, but that on the whole the impact of political discussion is indeed more powerful than that of media usage. Remarkably, this seems to extend even to cognitive effects like agenda setting.

Various attributes of interpersonal communication contribute to its higher effectiveness as a political influence. Typically, it is more one-sided than mass communication, so that there is a lower chance for oppositional messages to neutralize each other. Furthermore, it is more flexible. Participants in political talks can at all times adapt their messages to the flow of conversation and tailor their messages in such a way that their impact is optimized. To do so, they can make use of a large variety of verbal and nonverbal tactics, including emotional cues. Furthermore, depending on the nature of the relationship they may be able to impose sanctions on their associates in cases of noncompliance. Last, the casual character of many interpersonal communication events may soften individuals' tendency of selectivity when attending to and accepting inconvenient political messages. Only under very specific circumstances—for instance, when few people engage in political discussion while the media cover politics in a very one-sided way—may mass communication exert a more powerful impact on citizens' political orientations than interpersonal communication.

While interpersonal communication as a source of political information for individuals is sometimes seen as an alternative to mass communication, empirical research does not provide evidence for such a division of labor. Rather, the intensity of interpersonal communication appears positively linked to the attention paid to the political reporting of mass media, particularly the press. Exposure to sources of political information follows a cumulative "the more, the more" logic rather than a logic of alternatives. Probably, the relationship between media use and political talking is best understood as being transactional. Receiving mediated political information can stimulate secondary communication to make sense of media content by talking it through. At the same time, political discussion can incite increased attention to media's public affairs coverage, to learn more about some topics one heard about from others, or to prepare for anticipated upcoming conversations.

Often, political talks focus on themes and frames that originate from the media, so that at least to some degree it appears inappropriate to conceive of them as an independent form of political communication. As French sociologist Gabriel Tarde observed more than a century ago, "Every morning the papers give their publics the conversations of the day." Informal communication is an important tool for processing the information received from the media, assisting people in making sense of the political world beyond the realm of their personal experience. Discussing media content with one's associates thus serves as metacommunication that helps assess the viability of media messages by means of a "social reality test." According to recent studies, individuals embedded in politically homogeneous discussant networks tend to perceive stronger biases in the media's political reporting than others. More important, depending on their political composition, discussant networks may even serve as facilitators or inhibitors of media effects on political preferences. Furthermore, mass and interpersonal communication also seem to interact with regard to political mobilization. Media consumption stimulates political participation especially among people who intensely discuss politics, less so among those who rarely or never engage in political talk.

Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck

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Iowa Caucuses

For more than 3 decades, the Iowa Precinct Caucuses' Presidential Straw Polls, known as the Iowa caucuses, have dominated the kickoff of the U.S. presidential nomination process. Traditionally placed first among the nomination contests, Iowa's grassroots-heavy precinct-level party meetings grow in importance far beyond the local delegates they select. Since 1976, when former Governor Jimmy Carter (D-GA) won Iowa's straw polls, propelling himself to national prominence, capturing the Democratic nod, and sweeping to the White House over then-President Gerald Ford, candidates, media, and voters alike have seen Iowa winnow the presidential field for the New Hampshire primary that follows.

A *caucus* is a party meeting. At caucuses, partisans gather to make decisions on whom to back and what to do. In the U.S. presidential nomination system, specifically, caucuses are local party gatherings at which delegates are selected to go on to conventions at the county, district, and/or state level that ultimately determine the delegates the state's party sends to the national convention and thus, indirectly, which presidential candidates the state supports. The local nature of the process and its exacting requirements tend to reinforce the importance of political organization relative to broad advertising.

Most state parties today hold primaries rather than caucuses. In primaries, any party regular (and sometimes even those outside the party) can show up at voting stations just as in a general election. Reforms in the Democratic Party from the early 1970s, generally followed by Republicans in later years, placed strict limits on presidential caucuses, steering more and more states toward the primary method of selecting national convention delegates and away from the caucus-to-convention system.

History of the Iowa Caucuses

The Hawkeye State cleaves to its caucus tradition, as well as its first-in-the-nation status. Since its entry into the union in 1846, the state has always used the caucus-to-convention system for its presidential nomination decisions, with the exception of 1916, when Iowa held one ill-fated presidential primary. (The state uses primaries to select all other levels of candidates, with the exception of judgeships.)

In 1972, the state Democratic Party moved its precinct caucuses up to January 24, ahead of the New Hampshire primary, motivated by clean campaign timelines adopted by state Democrats rather than by national prominence. Yet national prominence was thrust upon the state, with neighboring Senator George McGovern (D-MN) leveraging his geographic proximity into political support and frontrunner Senator Edmund Muskie (D-MA) capturing the endorsement of a key Iowa political figure just before the contest was held—and the victory.

Carter saw the value an early win might provide in the next election cycle. He organized his campaign around doing well in Iowa, and the strategy paid off. With a rising post-Watergate tide of support for crystal-clean politicians, the new face buoyed by the media after the win was carried to the nomination and the White House. On the GOP side, former CIA director George H. W. Bush, in turn, duplicated Carter's Iowa-centered approach in the following presidential cycle. Toppling the prohibitive favorite for the nomination, former Governor Ronald Reagan (R-CA), in the state, Bush rode what he termed the "Big Mo," or momentum, for the 5 weeks until the next contest, and ultimately to a showing that prompted Reagan to grant the moderate Bush the vice presidential slot on his 1980 ticket.

Again in 1984, the caucuses played a political role disproportionate to the delegates they allocated. Former Vice President Walter Mondale beat the field decisively in the state. The media judged that Senator John Glenn (D-OH) had been badly wounded by his rout there—and that the second-place showing of young Senator Gary Hart (D-CO) catapulted him into the challenger position and gained him a national following.

In 1988, frontrunner Vice President George H. W. Bush was stunned in the caucuses, finishing third behind both Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) and religious

broadcaster Pat Robertson. But Bush corrected his stumble by defeating Dole in New Hampshire soon thereafter and went on to the nomination and the presidency.

The 1992 presidential race in Iowa was rendered all but irrelevant, with incumbent President Bush seeking reelection on the Republican side and the candidacy of favorite son Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) on the Democratic side. But in 1996 the caucuses were back in the limelight, with Dole once again besting a tough field of Republican opponents and setting his feet to the path to the nomination.

The 2000 caucuses featured Governor George W. Bush's ascendance, though he triumphed over a field that did not include his main rival, Senator John McCain (R-AZ). McCain explicitly bypassed Iowa, choosing to fight first in New Hampshire, where the primary vote was open to the Independents (and Democrats) to whom McCain's views appealed most.

In 2004, Iowa once again crowned a nominee. Former Governor Howard Dean (D-VT) had built an electrifying fundraising lead by tapping in to a high-tension line of Internet-based opposition to the incumbent president. Yet as Dean's tide began to recede, that of Senator John Kerry (D-MA) came in, and with the air of a war hero's electability, the latter washed over Dean in the caucuses and rode the current all the way to the Democratic nomination.

The leading authority on the Iowa caucuses, Hugh Winebrenner of Drake University, describes Iowa as a "mediality," a press-created event whose coverage far outstrips its actual importance. Because of their position at the outset of the presidential nomination contest, the caucuses give the media—and through them, future voters—a tangible measure of candidates' relative strength. That measure tends to winnow the field of weaker candidates, who are declared uncompetitive after succumbing to Iowa's retail-politics rigors.

Accordingly, no candidate in the past 3 decades has become president of the United States without finishing at least third in the Iowa caucuses.

Christopher C. Hull

See also Grassroots Campaigning; Presidential Communication; Primaries

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Iraq War, Media Coverage of

American news media coverage of the Iraq War largely followed the same trends found by scholars who were examining coverage of prior conflicts involving the United States since at least the Vietnam War. Consistent with prior research, before and early in the war, antiwar protesters were more likely to be framed negatively than were pro-war demonstrators. Furthermore, during the war's initial phase, from March 19, 2003, when the United States bombing began, to the fall of the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad's Firdos Square on April 9, press coverage tended to be episodic, casualty free, and pro-American, especially on Fox News Channel (FNC). For example, studies have shown that American broadcast news channels aired more than five times as many shots of firefights and battles as images of casualties (and less than 4% showed dead soldiers or civilians), as did newspaper photographs from the first week of the war. This period of uncritical, sanitized, and rallying press coverage reached its apex with the toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein, an image repeated an average of once every 4.4 minutes on FNC during that afternoon and once every 7.5 minutes on Cable News Network (CNN). This coverage fed a premature "victory" frame that not only correlated with Bush administration goals but had the effect of dramatically reducing the war's prominence on the news agenda.

Yet, as became increasingly apparent in the summer and, especially, fall of 2003, the war was far from over. As the insurgency phase took off, media coverage slowly became more negative, more driven by events than administration frames, and less episodic. Still, some important story lines still adopted uncritical frames, notably coverage of the first insurgency-period invasion of Fallujah by American forces in the fall of 2003, which greatly underplayed civilian casualties, and coverage of the Abu Ghraib scandal, which avoided the use of the word *torture* in favor of less challenging labels such as *abuse*. These studies also point to the ways in which coverage of the war supported theories of news indexing and cascade activation by showing how the Bush administration dominated the framing of the war for some time and at key moments.

As the war dragged on, however, events on the ground made it more difficult for the administration's frame to go uncontested. From the beginning of the war, Bush administration officials and pro-war commentators often criticized the press for overreporting negative stories from Iraq. These charges increased in tenor as the insurgency grew and U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civilians died in increasing numbers. Studies analyzing reporting from Iraq in 2005 and 2006, however, came to a different conclusion. While it is true that press coverage focused quite a bit on "bad news" such as casualties, sectarian violence, and general political and social instability, when compared with real-world data on, for example, casualties and insurgent/terrorist attacks, the press actually *underplayed* these stories.

Another important feature of the reporting from Iraq involved the controversial "embed" program. Since the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, the Pentagon had employed a media management strategy of "precensorship" in which the military kept the press from the front lines and/or utilized a pool system in which a few journalists were allowed to cover selected actions on behalf of the press corps. For a variety of reasons, not the least of which being the desire to wage a more effective information war against an enemy whom they knew would charge coalition forces with atrocities, the military decided to change this policy and offer to "embed" reporters from around the globe (including Al Jazeera) with front-line units. Before the war, skeptics assumed these embedded reporters would develop some variant of the Stockholm Syndrome and churn out flattering and decontextualized coverage. Studies comparing embedded reporting to that of nonembedded, or "unilateral," reporters showed mixed confirmation of these fears. They did, however, find that unilateral reporters were far more likely to show casualties. Embedded reporting was more favorable to military personnel and employed more episodic frames.. After the Saddam statue fell and coalition forces entered Baghdad in force, large numbers of reporters disembedded themselves, with the number of embeds dropping from 700 to 23, and despite fluctuations during major offensives (e.g., Fallujah in the fall of 2003), that number remained in the mid-20s in 2005. Ultimately, then, the story of the embed program is a mixed one that evolved over the course of the war from episodic and uncritical to more thematic and negative. This, of course, mirrors the broader story of Iraq War coverage from invasion to civil war.

Sean Aday

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Isocrates

See Rhetoric, Political

Issue Management

Issues management is the term used to describe strategic moves by organizations to influence public policy around an issue that is disputed by society. Issues management helps organizations take a more proactive rather than reactive stance on important political issues, such as concerns over the environment or rising energy costs. Although scholars Richard Crable and Stephen Vibbert pointed out that the government possesses the actual authority to determine public policy or legislation that could become regulation, organizations use issue management to advocate for particular resolutions. By targeting those who have the authority to make legal, economic, and political changes, organizations need not wait passively for policy to be determined. Issues management anticipates developing issues and helps determine whether organizations should comply with social norms or attempt to modify them. Organizations can employ issues management to resolve an area of concern in their favor by responding to public interest, changing organizational policy, and/or shaping legislation. Should an organization not exercise public sensitivity on issues of concern, however, they can face federal or state regulation that forces them to adopt more socially responsible practices.

W. Howard Chase coined the term *issue management* in 1976 to answer the question of how management should respond to the criticism being heaped on corporate America by activists during the 1960s and ’70s. In 1977, Chase designed issue management as a “new science.” Along with coauthors Barry Jones and Teresa Yancey Crane, he stressed the proactive position on issues that companies should adopt in order to participate meaningfully in the creation of public policy. Early on, issue management took the form of issue advocacy advertising, where organizations would use advertising to head off controversial issues through skillfully designed messages. Mobil Oil Corporation, for example, famously argued for openness in the heated 1970s energy debate in its aggressive op-ed campaign. While early issue management discussions did not recognize that organizations might need to adapt their internal cultures to successfully manage an issue and forestall regulation, today organizations recognize they may need to change to foster mutual interests in the public policy arena. Issues management may present an organization’s case to the public, but its efforts can unite groups instead of pitting them against each other. Organizations and their publics can be helped to share the same perspective about a given topic through issues management.

Although originally designed to help corporations respond to their critics, issues management is practiced as a management function that helps a variety of organizations integrate public relations, government and legal affairs, and strategic planning. Issue management is responsible for guiding managerial decisions affecting corporations, activist groups, issue-identified nonprofits, and government agencies. Its focus on an organization’s long-term goals and developing policy on issues of concern extends issues management’s decision-making function beyond technician-based public relations activities and public affairs. Shannon Bowen points out that a range of experts, including scientists, legal counsel, financial managers, and product managers, in addition to public relations experts, help identify developing issues and their implications for an organization’s business plan.

Robert Heath identified four common functions of issues management. Issue managers (1) anticipate and analyze potentially troublesome issues by scanning the environment, monitoring public opinion and values, and predicting how they might affect an organization. They also (2) develop organizational stances on areas of concern, engaging in public policy planning that is responsive to societal trends. Issue managers then (3) identify key constituencies whose support is important on an issue and (4) choose the behaviors they wish them to adopt. These publics are reached through issue management campaigns frequently employing advocacy advertising, public speeches, media relations, and working with lobbying groups and PACs.

Several issue management models detail this process. In 1979, Jones and Chase devised the first issues management model. After describing the issue identification, monitoring, and analysis phases issue managers follow, they identified the issue change strategy options managers can select. Organizations can adopt one of three potential issue stances: reactive, adaptive, and dynamic. A *reactive* stance implies that an organization “stonewalls” an issue, an *adaptive* stance indicates an openness to change and a willingness to

participate in the public policy process, while a *dynamic* stance has organizations attempt to direct and shape the direction of public policy through strategic activities. Jones and Chase also described how organizations derive goals and objectives that support their chosen issue change strategy option, create an issue action program, and evaluate results. Crable and Vibbert later noted that all issues are not ready for decision, as Jones and Chase had claimed. They identified the distinction between influence and authority, recognizing that organizations possess the former, not the latter, in influencing public policy decisions. As a result, they offered another issue change strategy option, the *catalytic* stance, which tries to enter into the public policy decision process even earlier. Here, organizations determine what public policy outcome they are trying to achieve and nurture their position through the issues management life cycle.

Other scholars have since focused on predicting how issues become worthy of issues management efforts and classifying the common organizing principles, situational requirements, and substantive and stylistic characteristics of typical issues management discourse. In essence, these scholars detail the process whereby an organization has the opportunity to be perceived as socially responsible and therefore allowed to continue to operate in society. Issues management helps join together corporate or organizational goals with public expectations and harmonizes the relationships between them. Because it serves a vital balancing function, scholars argue that issues management has failed to attract the widespread attention it deserves. Greater attention to issues management in the future should help yield a better integration of stakeholder or activist desires, political representation, and organizational/corporate response.

Ashli Quesinberry Stokes

See also Public Affairs, Communication in

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Issue Ownership

Issue ownership happens when a plurality of voters believes one political party is better suited to handle a particular issue than another party. In the United States, the Republican Party generally "owns" national defense and crime, while the Democratic Party is thought to better handle, and thus "own," education and the environment.

Issue ownership is tied to commonly held images of political parties that tend to be relatively stable over time. But if a ruling party handles an issue poorly over a period of time, it may lose the public's confidence on that issue. For some issues, such as the economy, neither party claims enduring ownership. These are called "performance issues" because public opinion is tied mainly to a party's performance rather than its image. A change in a country's political structure also can alter perceptions of issue ownership. In Canada, competition on the right from the newly formed Reform Party helped end the Conservative Party's ownership of the deficit issue in the early 1990s.

Issue ownership affects party strategies. Candidates tend to address most of their campaign communications to issues their party owns. Some evidence

suggests candidates benefit when they focus on owned issues. This may be because people are biased toward information that confirms their prior beliefs, so they prefer messages consistent with existing party images. Another explanation is that candidates are more credible when they discuss an issue their party owns. There is some dispute as to whether the benefit of stressing owned issues applies in primary elections or among partisans. Partisans tend to believe their own party is best suited to handle every issue, but the margins are larger for ones their party owns.

To the extent that candidates confine their communication to issues they own, they fail to engage each other on the issues; as the issues they discuss diverge, they talk past one another. However, there is evidence to suggest considerable "issue convergence," or discussing the same issues, at least in partisan statements reported in the news. While not the norm, some convergence also occurs in political advertising, a format in which campaigns choose the topic rather than reporters. Candidates tend to converge on the same issues more in races that are more competitive, where issue-based voting is more common, so that the opposing candidate cannot determine the way an issue is discussed. For example, George W. Bush in 2000 ran as a "compassionate conservative" on education and Social Security (but stressing individual or local control instead of more centralized approaches).

It has been suggested that the concept be broadened from issue ownership to issue *and trait* ownership. In the United States, Republicans tend to be perceived as stronger leaders and more moral, while Democrats own the trait of compassion and empathy.

Patrick C. Meirick

See also Priming

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Issues, Policy

See Mass Political Behavior

Issues in Campaigns

See Mass Political Behavior

J

Jackson, Jesse (1941–)

Jesse L. Jackson was an early activist in the civil rights movement. A follower of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Jackson was with King in Memphis when King was assassinated in 1968. After King's death, Jackson continued his work in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference but left that organization as a result of conflicts with other organization leaders. Continuing his civil rights work, Jackson founded Operation PUSH (People United to Save Humanity) and later the Rainbow Coalition, which merged with Operation PUSH in 1996.

As an African American leader, Jackson has been an agitator for civil rights internationally as well as in the United States. He has injected himself into situations and advocated, sometimes successfully, for the release of prisoners or captives in Syria, Cuba, and Yugoslavia. However, his controversial meetings with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez earned Jackson criticism from some religious leaders.

Jackson has made two bids for the U.S. presidency, seeking the Democratic Party nomination. In 1984, Jackson had some initial success, winning five state primaries, but ultimately lost the nomination to Walter Mondale. In 1988, Jackson again had some early success but was eventually denied the Democratic nomination, which went to Michael Dukakis. Jackson's political views, as expressed in these presidential bids, were considered decidedly liberal and included payment of restoration to descendants of American Black slaves, rescinding tax cuts put in place by the Reagan administration, establishing more public works projects and reinstituting New Deal–type programs.

Jackson has given important national addresses at the Democratic national conventions. His keynote address at the 1984 Democratic Convention and his speech at the 1988 convention are considered among his best and are often studied and held up as examples of great speeches.

Although Jackson did not succeed in his own campaigns for elective office, his son Jesse Jackson, Jr., is a U.S congressman from Illinois.

There have been some difficult times in Jackson's career. Controversies over extramarital relationships and accusations of financial misdeeds have sometimes plagued his operations. Nonetheless, his communication style, his rousing rhetorical skills, and his commitment to the African American cause have earned him an important place in American political history.

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Race in Politics

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JAMIESON, KATHLEEN HALL (1946–)

Kathleen Hall Jamieson is a communication scholar and one of the nation's leading experts on political advertising and presidential campaigns. Her academic career started with a focus on papal rhetoric but shifted over the years; she has made many research contributions to the areas of presidential discourse, political argumentation, media framing, gender and sexism, and adolescent mental health. She is author and coauthor of 15 books and more than 90 articles. From 1989 to 1993, Jamieson served as dean of the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, where she is currently the Elizabeth Ware Packard Professor of Communication and the Walter and Leonore Annenberg Director of the Annenberg Public Policy Center. She is also the director of the Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands.

Jamieson is perhaps best known for her book *Packaging the Presidency: A History and Criticism of Presidential Advertising,* first published in 1984 (with revised editions published in 1992 and 1996). In that work, she analyzed the various political advertising techniques used by presidential campaigns since 1952. In another book, *Dirty Politics,* published in 1992, Jamieson identified the ways in which political advertisements could twist facts to mislead the public, highlighting distortions from the 1988 presidential campaign.

While much of her work has focused on political campaign discourse, her research has also examined the influences of news media framing on the public. Much research in the field of political communication has observed that the news media tend to focus on style over substance when reporting about political campaigns. Her book *The Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good,* published in 1997 with Joseph N. Cappella, establishes empirically the deleterious effects of "horserace" framing by the news media on voter perceptions of the political system. Their research suggests that by focusing on horserace coverage over issues, the news media contribute to growing voter apathy.

In recent years, Jamieson has improved the empirical study of presidential campaigns by creating and implementing the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), the largest set of academic public opinion studies of the American electorate ever conducted. The NAES was conducted in 2000 and 2004, providing political communication scholars with datasets collected over the courses of these elections, containing more than 100,000 interviews per election. This contribution is important to political communication researchers because the NAES is predicated on the assumption that campaigns matter. The NAES's research design and questionnaires contain a strong political communication focus.

Kate Kenski

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JOHNSON, LYNDON B. (1908–1973)

Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) served as the 36th president of the United States and led the nation during a time of major changes in social, cultural, and political values. Assuming national power in the early 1950s, for nearly 2 decades Lyndon Johnson was a major force in shaping domestic legislation. Foreign policy, dominated by deepening American involvement in the Vietnam War during his presidency, cast a shadow on his domestic agenda and forced Johnson to retire from public life and not seek a second term as president.

Born and raised in rural Texas, Johnson trained to be a teacher but found politics too inviting. He worked on Capitol Hill in the early 1930s as a legislative aide and was elected to the House of Representatives as a New Deal Democrat in 1937. He served briefly in World War II and was elected to the Senate in 1946. He was elected to a full Senate term in 1948, although corruption charges in the campaign followed him for years. He became the Senate Majority Leader in 1954 and sought the Democratic presidential nomination in 1960. Losing to John Kennedy, he surprised many when he accepted Kennedy's invitation to be the vice presidential candidate. Kennedy's assassination in 1963 elevated Johnson to the presidency, and in 1964 he was elected in a landslide.

Although Johnson debated in high school and later coached debate, he was not noted for his public speaking

prowess. Instead, he was a powerful communicator in interpersonal and small group interactions, often using what some aides called "the treatment" to gain support for his political agenda. Considered one of the greatest leaders in Senate history, LBJ pushed 1,300 bills through during his tenure. He was a tireless political campaigner in Texas and utilized the latest technology available, including political polling, targeted radio advertising, and travel by helicopter and airplane when other candidates dismissed such actions as fads.

As president, Johnson sought to continue Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal with his own Great Society. Legislation designed to eliminate poverty, help the elderly, end racism, promote education, and improve the quality of life for all Americans was a central part of the Great Society agenda. Although successful in gaining victory for many major pieces of domestic legislation, Johnson became mired in managing the Vietnam War. Escalation of the American role in the war in 1965 and 1966 came to define his presidency, and by 1968 he was challenged by fellow Democrats Robert F. Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy for the party's presidential nomination. Johnson declined to run for a second full term and retired from political life, where he remained out of the public eye until his death.

C. Brant Short

See also Daisy Girl Ad

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Jordan, Barbara (1936–1996)

Born in Houston, Texas, on February 21, 1936, Barbara Jordan became one of the most notable women in politics of the 20th century. Raised during segregation and Jim Crow laws, Jordan overcame race and gender as societal barriers to become one the most admired public speakers and the first African American and woman to serve in the Texas Senate.

Growing up, Jordan lived with her parents, two older sisters, Bennie and Rose Marie, and grandfathers, John Ed Patten and Charles Jordan, in an African American working-class neighborhood. Jordan's grandfather made a huge contribution to Jordan's outlook on life and education. With the determination instilled in her, she was an exemplary student at Phillis Wheatley High School in Houston. Soon, she became well known for her rhetorical skills and received many awards for her talent as an orator.

Right after high school, Jordan was admitted to Texas Southern University, where she received her bachelors of science in government in 1956. Jordan was admitted to Boston University Law School and received a law degree in 1959. One of the two women in her graduating class, Jordan passed the bar examinations in both Massachusetts and Texas and set up a law practice out of her home.

A strong advocate for education and justice, Jordan officially entered the political area in the 1960s. She was the first woman to run for the Texas House of Representatives in 1962. She ran again in 1964, losing on both occasions. In 1966, Jordan was elected to the Texas State Senate and became the state's first African American senator since 1883. In 1972, Jordan was elected to U.S. House of Representatives. In that same year, Jordan served briefly as acting governor of Texas on June 10, 1972, the first African American woman to head any American state government.

One of her remarkable speeches was the televised address in favor of President Richard Nixon's impeachment during the House Judiciary Committee's investigation in 1974. In 1979, Jordan retired from the political arena, joining the faculty at the University of Texas in Austin. In 1991, Ann Richards, the new governor of Texas, appointed Jordan as her special counsel on ethics.

Jordan received many distinguished recognitions. In 1977, Harvard and Princeton universities conferred upon Jordan honorary doctoral degrees. In 1984, she was voted the "Best Living Orator" by the International Platform Association. In 1990, she was inducted to the National Women's Hall of Fame. In 1992, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) honored Jordan with the Spingarn Medal prestigious award. Jordan died on January 17, 1996, in Austin, Texas.

Juliana Maria da Silva

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JOURNALISM, POLITICAL

Political journalism is a term used to describe the specialized practice of reporting on political campaigns, elections, and government functions. This practice may take place on the local, district, state, regional, national, or international level and on any channel of the mass media. A political journalist may not report on politics and government exclusively; nor is his or her work limited to any particular approach, style, treatment, or format. Stories covered by political journalists may be ongoing, but often the term is associated with news coverage of a political campaign. This would include but is not limited to advertisements, debates, public appearances, and formal speeches. When covering the executive branch of a state or the nation, a political journalist may travel with the candidates or officeholders. The producer, who decides whom to bring on a political talk show and then arranges those appearances, might also be called a political journalist, even though his or her work takes place out of the public eye.

Political journalism at its best more often focuses on a candidate's statements and records rather than his or her image or on government functions. For instance, voting records can indicate where a candidate stands on important issues. Finance records reveal which individuals or interest groups made the largest contributions to a candidate. An elected official's leadership abilities, character, and responsiveness to constituents are also valid subjects for political journalism when reported through the use of multiple credible sources. America's founding fathers wanted reporters to be able to cover these kinds of stories without interference from the government. They put the First Amendment into the Constitution to guarantee the right of free speech in order that it might generate an informed electorate. This Madisonian Ideal held the hope that the electorate would choose the best person for an office and would hold that person accountable if he or she did not perform their duties satisfactorily.

History of Political Journalism in the United States

As American history shows, however, the relationships among the press, the public, and politicians in this democracy has always been tenuous, following cyclical patterns set by public opinion and cultural norms. A free press was key to revolutionary activities that brought the birth of America. Revolutionary political journalists were printing press operators like Benjamin Franklin, who published pamphlets and treatises that sparked citizens to take arms against British occupiers. A party press emerged in the late 18th century, in which newspaper editors were literally "political" journalists who operated their publications at the center of partisan activity. As Americans moved west, frontier political journalists were less interested in divisive party politics and more involved in issues of community unity. During the Civil War, powerful editorials from newspaper publishers like Horace Greeley challenged President Abraham Lincoln and his cabinet for their moderate slavery policies with bitter and sarcastic attacks. As the 20th century unfolded, journalists became more independent and less partisan, taking on a "watchdog" role as part of the progressive social movement. Muckraking and sensational journalism increased circulation, so newspapers were less dependent on political parties. New media arose, and political journalists began to use the "mass media" to modernize coverage of foreign affairs as part of America's social-political culture. With the advent of radio, movie newsreels, and television, entertainment values were considered in the reporting of politics and commercial influence took shape.

Walter Lippmann was among the first "media critics" to examine the role of the press in the political life of the nation, as political journalism sometimes took the form of patriotic propaganda. Political documentaries such as *Why We Fight,* which supported war efforts in the 1940s, were on the opposite end of the spectrum from television broadcasts that followed 25 years later during the Vietnam War. Coverage of the civil rights era and Watergate scandal brought hope that political journalism could serve an informed democracy and

bring positive social change. But media deregulation in the 1980s emphasized journalism as a money-making strategy for corporations. Public affairs programming dropped off the airwaves as cable competition and the 24-hour news cycle put new economic constraints on electronic journalism. Talk shows on television and radio drew audiences that were hungry for scandal and political punditry that did more to reinforce their beliefs than provide new information and context. Media credibility fell and is still falling. More citizens are turning to the Internet for political journalism, but navigating through a maze of Web sites, Web logs, and podcasts, they more often find biased diatribes. In the Information Age, anyone can be a "political journalist" with the help of a computer, some software, and a space on the Web.

Professional journalists generally abide by certain ethical standards gathered over time and tradition and put forward by professional organizations such as the Society of Professional Journalists and the Radio-Television News Directors Association. At the center of these tenets is the obligation of journalists to report the truth fairly and independently, and to do no harm. The definition of a *political* journalist evolves beneath the broader concept of political communication. Indeed, the first political communication studies conducted in the 1940s centered on political journalism and its effect on the electorate. The underlying questions behind such ongoing studies are,

> Do journalists play their role well in an informed democracy?
>
> Do they help citizens learn enough about candidates, issues, and the political process in order to make good decisions at the polls?

The following summary may tell us some of what political communication scholars have discovered about political journalism in trying to answer these questions.

Construction of the Political News Story

All news stories are constructions in an ever-changing environment of economics, technology, public opinion, and politics. The traditional role of a journalist is to provide content that fills a given space or time with carefully selected facts, descriptions, visuals, quotes, or sound bites. Political news stories may contain many actors in the political process, from candidates and activists to institutions and experts. To a certain extent, each of these actors wants to control the message of the story. Some actors are more powerful than others. Some provide more human interest, while others have more entertainment value. A political journalist must determine what motivates each actor to say what he or she does while providing context for the statements. There is increasing economic pressure on all journalists to create stories that will attract readers and audiences. Thus, a political journalist performs a difficult balancing act, mediating the controlling desires of the actors, the gratification needs of the audience, and, ultimately, the truth.

The stakes are often high in the outcome of a political news story. The choice of words and pictures can promote or provide an advantage to one candidate or one side of an issue. The struggle to maintain balance among all actors can be intense. Underlying this struggle are the structural forces that shape how a political journalist writes or tells a story. These forces have traditionally been studied under the heading of "gatekeeping." Lance Bennett (2004) outlined four broad areas of gatekeeping that interact in the selection and construction of news stories:

1. An individual reporter's news judgment
2. Standards and policies of a particular news organization in which a reporter works
3. Economic pressures from management stemming from audience research, consultant interference, or ratings
4. New technologies that allow new ways of gathering and organizing news stories

Some researchers say their findings indicate the collapse of the journalistic gatekeeping function. They suggest that tremendous economic and structural changes in the news business take story construction beyond the control of individual journalists. Others argue this is a pessimistic overgeneralization. They find evidence that the traditional organizational model still exists, while gatekeeping standards vary from news organization to news organization. Bennett developed his "multigated" model of news construction to illuminate variable news patterns created by a host of social, political, technological, and economic factors.

The bottom line of political communication research that examines political journalism is whether

it is biased and whether it imparts the kinds of information citizens need. Such scholarship has revealed several trends and challenges over the years. Some were expected, while others were more surprising and, in some cases, troubling.

Structural Bias

Political information may be proliferating on talk shows, late night comedy, and the Web, but the amount and the size of political stories is shrinking in newspapers and on traditional television newscasts. Over the past 2 decades, network TV newscasts covered more entertainment, disasters, accidents, and crime while reducing coverage of political campaigns, issues, government, and international affairs. There are also indications that the quality of political news is lower. The journalistic tone is more cynical and negative. Journalists introduce their own voices and interview each other without providing quotes or sound bites from truly independent experts or even the political figures they are covering. Researchers found journalists spoke 6 minutes for every 1 minute allocated to candidates in the 2000 U.S. elections.

When political stories are reported they are less likely to be focused on the thoughts or ideas of political candidates or officeholders. The so-called press pack is instead quick to seize on the "scandal" or "gaffe" of the moment. Such a feeding frenzy adds drama and negativity to political coverage. Emotionally charged content may satisfy the audience hunger for entertaining gossip and scandal, but it disconnects readers and viewers from political reality or public policy. The competition to break stories leads to the reporting of unconfirmed information at best or, at its worst, reporting nothing more than rumors.

Ironically, the hungry 24-hour news cycle does little to promote more serious political reporting. When a reporter is live in front of a camera or on the set he or she cannot be examining voting records, reading proposed legislation, or documenting public policy. Instead, the never-ending demand for news content is met by speculation, superficial analysis, and commentary.

While evidence mounts for this passive sort of bias, the good news is there is little evidence of premeditated or active partisan bias by individual journalists. Repeated analysis of news coverage over decades of presidential elections found little partisan reporting among daily general news journalists. However, that does not mean coverage is neutral. Some candidates receive more coverage, while others receive very little. This particular kind of structural bias has its own line of research known as "horserace coverage" or "the game frame."

Horserace Coverage of Elections

It is not surprising that political journalists would cover a political contest like a game or sporting event. Games and sport have a high entertainment value in modern culture. It is simpler, quicker, easier, and cheaper to whittle a political contest down to a race between a winner and loser than it is to provide deep background and contextual information about complex campaign issues and candidate positions. Some outcome of a contest is inevitable, and the strategies leading to victory meet traditional norms of journalism that dictate the choice of stories that are timely, relevant, and interesting. These norms often lead to the choice of some topics over others and emphasis of some candidates over others. There is a structural bias against covering candidates who have no chance of winning a campaign, not necessarily because of the positions they take, but because of what reporters deem as "news." Some researchers have found losing candidates receive more negative coverage. Others have found the frontrunner is more likely to receive negative coverage, while the "dark horse" benefits from more positive stories. Most researchers agree third-party and lesser-known candidates are rarely quoted or heard over the air.

The emphasis on who's winning a campaign is even more pronounced in American primary elections. A larger field of candidates and time pressures allow political journalists to construct stories that are simpler, boiling down to a candidate's prospects for winning. Some political journalists are vying for affirmation as successful predictors of who will win. But often, the voter loses, because as journalists increasingly take center stage, sounds bites with candidates and other political figures are shrinking. The messages delivered to voters are increasingly mediated. Debates provide a forum in which voters can hear candidates discuss topics of interest, but few are presented without speculative analysis afterward that announces who the winner and loser were.

Political Advertising Analysis

Political ads and Web sites remain the only unmediated messages from candidate to voter. Increasingly,

television ads have been placed in commercial breaks appearing during newscasts, adding to their legitimacy. In 1988, political columnist David Broder called on journalists to analyze political spots for accuracy. The first attempts to do so backfired. Researchers discovered that when all or part of a political spot was played during a newscast, the message of the ad was enhanced. This discovery brought calls for specific ways in which political journalists could report on ads, emphasizing analysis rather than the original ad messages. Production techniques such as truth boxes have brought some success at diffusing any kind of ad boomerang effect. However, ad watch reports that appear in newspapers rarely address technical distortions placed in negative advertising. Recently, candidates, parties, and independent advocacy groups have employed their own ad watching of opponents' spots, adding to the confusion.

Most scholars and media critics agree some kind of political ad analysis is needed as ads proliferate and increasingly appear inside newscasts and on the Web. However, research indicates as the amount of substantial political journalism produced goes down, so does the amount of ad watching.

Political Punditry

Ad watch reporting is only part of a growing culture of interpretive analysis among political journalists. Political pundits abound on network television, cable, and talk radio. Their interpretive style of reporting is supported by a daily supply of political ads, polling data, sound bites, blogs, e-mails, and telephone calls. For the audience, watching or listening to pundits is a way to get a broader perspective or context that often reinforces beliefs rather than providing new or substantive information. This calls into question the fairness of punditry. Long-term research by Page and Shapiro (1992) found that pundits, along with former presidents, were the most important forces influencing changes in public opinion. Talk shows are cheap to produce, which makes them economically viable to 24-hour networks trying to fill air time. Advertisers know that placing spots inside news or quasi-news-format programming legitimizes their image or message. Political talk programming is also popular among desirable key demographic groups. One of the most striking developments in this area is the popularity of late night comedy talk shows that attract young viewers. Recent research indicates shows like *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart* are the number one source of political information for viewers in their late teens and twenties.

Pundits like Tim Russert carry a certain amount of credibility due to their relationship with established news organizations. But can Bill O'Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Jon Stewart be considered political journalists? Such full-time commentators impart political information and context, but they also demonstrate ideological bias. The line between journalism and entertainment is increasingly blurred in pundit venues.

The Internet: New Voices, New Concerns

The Internet is another venue in which political journalism is changing shape. Here, the line between journalist and citizen is blurred as political activists take the reigns of Web sites, Web logs, and viral e-mail communication. There is no doubt the Internet offers exciting opportunities for unmediated political communication and activity. As the so-called digital divide narrows, more people can get information about candidates, interact with their campaigns, and support their choices for office. As the World Wide Web emerges as a significant player in the political process, it is still unclear what role political journalists will play or who they will be. Early research in this area has revealed some trends.

First, mainstream media journalists who practice in traditional media are using the Web to enhance and distribute their political reports. Databases containing important campaign and candidate information are now available online, and reporters are using them to add content to their stories. The stories that air on television and radio may now be accessed on media Web sites. Critics argue, convincingly, such media Web sites too often act as promotional or marketing tools for stations. However, there is no doubt that political reports from traditional media are more accessible now than they were before the advent of the Web.

Second, citizen journalists outside the mainstream are contributing to political communication, for better or for worse. Matt Drudge broke the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal. A conservative Web log first called into question the authenticity of a memo contained in a CBS news story about President George W. Bush's National Guard Service. There is no question such communication added information to important national stories.

They also added to the growing negativity and scandal coverage in the traditional political press.

Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, political operatives can easily disguise themselves as political journalists on the Web. Hidden behind the electronic screen, facing little or no government regulation, and carrying no professional standards, political advocacy groups create convincing political messages packaged as journalism or "truth." Such a group emerged during the 2004 presidential campaign as the "Swift Boat Veterans for Truth." It promised to "provide what the mainstream media wasn't reporting" about John Kerry's service in Vietnam. The group's political motivation and financial support was eventually revealed, but their actions had a devastating effect on the Kerry campaign. Some analysts believe they were ultimately responsible for his defeat.

Although the Internet has the potential to be a powerful tool for political journalism, it also contains troublesome pitfalls. It is a medium that requires both caution and sophistication. Credibility and bias are an even larger concern here than in traditional political media.

Effects of Political Journalism

What are the effects of the struggle among journalists, parties, and candidates for control of a political message? How does structural bias change the way voters perceive such messages? The answers to these questions lie in research based on social science theory. Researchers have used agenda setting and framing theories to explore such effects.

Agenda-setting studies found that issue salience in political reporting was remarkably linked to issue salience among political news viewers and readers. The topics that political journalists report on gain importance in the minds of citizens. As Bernard Cohen suggested, "The news may not be able to tell people what to think, but it is startlingly successful at telling them what to think about." But while citizens may list as important the same issues reported upon by political journalists, there is no evidence citizens are learning much about them. Americans consistently demonstrate low levels of political knowledge, perhaps because they find most political journalism distasteful.

The negative frames used by journalists to report on political scandal may be to blame for increasing levels of political cynicism and disengagement. Many scholars believe it's no coincidence that voter turnout and other political activity have declined alongside the rise of electronic media and the fall of media credibility. Drama and sleaze are not bringing viewers back to the polls or to news programming. The news audience in the United States declined dramatically between 1990 and 2000. T. E. Patterson found that of those who said they now pay less attention to news than they did before, 93% characterized the news as negative, compared to 77% of the general population.

If the relationship between political journalists and citizens is strained, so is the press-government relationship. A higher level of mistrust is bringing higher levels of spin. This makes it increasingly difficult for political journalists to cut through political management to the truth.

Future of Political Journalism

Today's political journalism may be at a technological turning point similar to the one brought about with the rise of radio and television. Some scholars believe the mass media will give way to a more individualized medium in which citizens select their own news sources and stories as personal gatekeepers. Responsible interest groups and civic organizations are bypassing both mainstream media and ideologues in hopes of providing new and credible sources of political information on a global level.

If seeing is believing, visual information will increasingly become important. This is already happening in the form of short political and documentary videos appearing on the Web.

Clearly, the key to political journalism is quality governed by high standards and accessibility to both individuals and the collective. The credible political journalist of the future is likely to be a member of a specialized team conducting research and clearly organizing data relevant to voter choices.

Lisa Mills-Brown

See also Ad Watch, Horserace Coverage; Lippmann, Walter; Media Bias; News Selection Process; Pack Journalism; Public Journalism; Pundits, Punditry

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K

Kaid, Lynda Lee (1948–)

Lynda Lee Kaid is professor of telecommunication at the University of Florida. She received her PhD from Southern Illinois University, where she studied communication under one of the founders of the political communication discipline, Keith Sanders. She is perhaps best known for her contributions in political communication for advancing global empirical scholarship of political advertising. In 1981, she published a chapter on political advertising in the original *Handbook of Political Communication* (1981).

From 1974 to 2001 Kaid was on the faculty of the University of Oklahoma, where she founded and served as the director of the Political Communication Center and director of the Political Commercial Archive. Her work with the Political Commercial Archive was recognized in 1999 when it was named as an American "Treasure" by Save America's Treasures, sponsored by the White House Millennium Council and the National Historic Preservation Trust. In 2001, she joined the faculty of the College of Journalism and Communications at the University of Florida, where she has served as senior associate dean of Graduate Studies and Research.

She was recognized as one of the most productive scholars in communication in 2004 in *Communication Quarterly*. Kaid has published 27 books and more than 150 journal articles and book chapters. One of her greatest contributions to political communication social science research is the development of Videostyle (2001), a method for analyzing the verbal, nonverbal, and production content of political advertisements. Kaid's research on Videostyle has been adapted to the Internet in the development of Webstyle. An international scholar, Kaid has conducted cross-cultural research and has been particularly active investigating the role political advertising plays in emerging democracies. In 2004, she edited *The Handbook of Political Communication Research*, and she coedited with Christina Holtz-Bacha *Political Advertising in Western Democracies* and *The SAGE Handbook of Political Advertising* (2006). Kaid has been executive producer of several videos, such as *Sights and Sounds of Oklahoma Politics*, *Ethics in Political Advertising: Uses and Abuses of Technology,* and *TechnoDistortions in Political Advertising*, an interactive DVD.

Kaid is a three-time Fulbright Scholar. She has received more than $1.8 million in competitive grants and other funding to support her research and projects from sources including the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Federal Election Assistance Commission, the Oklahoma Historical Society, the Council for European Studies at Columbia University, and the U.S. Federal Election Assistance Commission. In addition to active involvement in numerous organizations, she served as chair of the Political Communication Divisions of the International Communication Association and the National Communication Association.

Andrew Paul Williams

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KAPITAL, DAS

See MARX, KARL

KATZ, ELIHU (1926–)

Elihu Katz has significantly contributed to research examining the intersection of mass and interpersonal communication, uses and gratifications research, and media effects research. He received his PhD in 1956 from Columbia University, where he worked alongside his mentor, Paul Lazarsfeld, to write *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications* in 1955. This book has been widely cited as an influential work in the two-step flow model of communication, which suggests that information first flows from mass media channels to "opinion leaders," who then wield their interpersonal influence on less active members of the population. Additionally, this work was unanimously selected by the American Association for Public Opinion Research as one of the *Fifty Books That Significantly Shaped Public Opinion Research, 1946–1995.*

Katz next turned his attention to helping the government of Israel introduce broadcast television to the populace in the 1960s, authoring numerous reports about the newly introduced media and its effects on everyday Israeli life. In the 1970s, he worked with Manchester University in England to help introduce broadcast television to third world nations. In 1974, Katz and Blumler played a major role in the development of uses and gratifications research by publishing *The Uses of Mass Communication: Current Perspectives on Gratifications Research.* Within this compilation of works, Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch present an oft-cited definition of uses and gratifications that underscores the importance of social and psychological needs and individual differences, which in turn determine media consumption and exposure. This influential work helped provide a new level of depth to uses and gratifications research, leading the way for numerous studies across a variety of communication media.

Stirred by Anwar al-Sadat's peace initiative in the late 1970s, Katz began to record and subsequently research the historic broadcasts involved in the development of the 1978 Camp David Accord and the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Katz has also extensively studied television and its impact on culture, namely public opinion and morale during the Six-day War as well as the cross-cultural meaning of the primetime drama series *Dallas.* Many of his works have also dealt with the work of theorists such as Gabriel Tarde and Marshall McLuhan.

In his career, Katz has served as Trustee Professor at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, emeritus professor of sociology and communication at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, distinguished visiting scholar at the University of Southern California, associate professor at the University of Chicago, visiting professor at Columbia University, and scientific director of the Guttman Institute of Applied Social Research. Moreover, he has been awarded honorary degrees from the Universities of Ghent, Montreal, Paris, and Haifa. Katz has also received many prestigious international awards, such as the UNESCO-Canada McLuhan Prize and the Burda Prize in Media.

John Spinda

See also *Personal Influence*; Two-Step Flow Model of Communication; Uses and Gratifications Approach

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Kekkonen, Urho (1900–1986)

Urho Kaleva Kekkonen was a Finnish statesman, prime minister, and long-term Finnish president (1956–1982). Together with his predecessor Juho Kusti Paasikivi, architect of the Finnish foreign policy during the Cold War, Kekkonen maintained a strong stance of neutrality for Finland which facilitated its trade and economic relations with other countries. In political communication, Kekkonen's name is combined with the concepts of *détente* (relaxation of tensions between East and West), Finlandization (in German *Finnlandisierung*, in Finnish *suomettuminen*), and self-censorship.

Kekkonen in his early years was a nationalist with an aim to unify the country. Having been left outside the government in the continuation war against Russia (1941–1944), Kekkonen repositioned himself into the Peace Opposition, craving disengagement from the war fought at the side of Germany. He gradually reformulated his political views toward a radical political realism that could be described as a "Small State Realpolitik." This was based on the insight that Finland as a small nation would have to cope with the Soviet Union, a superpower, as its immediate neighbor. The leading principle of the new policy was "Finnish neutrality," to remain outside conflicts of the great powers and develop economical relations with and secure the trust of the Soviet Union toward Finnish politics.

Kekkonen participated in the negotiations of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, formed with the Soviet Union in 1948. The treaty obligated Finland to resist armed attacks by Germany or any state allied with Germany, if necessary with the assistance of the Soviet Union. This led skeptics in the West as well as the Soviet leadership—from time to time—to question Finnish neutrality. The skepticism rose in the West after interference by the Soviet Union in Finnish government politics during the so-called Night Frost Government (1958–1959) and after the Note Crisis in 1961. The latter followed Soviet demands for negotiations on the basis of the Soviet-Finnish treaty at the time of the Berlin Crisis in 1961. These demands coincided with upcoming Finnish presidential elections. Kekkonen solved both crises to the satisfaction of the Soviet Union, the first by urging his own party to withdraw from the government, which fell as a consequence of the withdrawal; the second by convincing the Soviet leadership to abandon its request. As a consequence of these incidents, the power of Kekkonen in Finnish politics rose to almost monolithic proportions.

The dependence of Finnish security on peaceful development in the region brought Kekkonen to stress an active rather than passive form of neutrality. Under his rule, Finland was actively promoting a Nordic nuclear-free zone and hosted the European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Both initiatives were part of a process to relax tensions between East and West (détente).

The Finnish heightened consideration of its eastern neighbor gave birth to the term *Finlandization* (*Finnlandisierung*). The term was coined by political scientists in Germany in the early 1960s as part of the debate on consequences of a reduced American military involvement in Europe. It gained attention in international politics when the influential Conservative politician in Germany, Franz Josef Strauss (leader of CSU—the Bavarian branch of the Christian Democrats—and minister in several federal governments), applied it as a critique of the Ostpolitik of Egon Bahr and Willy Brandt.

The term was also used internally in Finland, where it was linked to a debate by politicians on compliance with the Soviet Union and self-censorship in Finnish journalism. As part of the new realism in postwar Finnish politics, media were urged to play down critique that was considered to interfere with Soviet interests.

While media in general, and also the political system, by and large operated freely and according to Western standards, a certain lack of critical distance was rooted not only in relation to the Soviet Union but also with regard to President Kekkonen himself. Kekkonen had succeeded in making former opponents passive by balancing alleged pressure from the East against his own personal influence, which became to be perceived of as a precondition for the continuation of good relations between the two states. There remains, however, a general respect for the decisiveness and skill with which the Finnish political leadership guided the country out of the war without giving up its independent status as a sovereign and democratic nation.

Tom Moring

See also Helsinki Process

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Kennedy, Edward (Ted) (1932–)

Edward (Ted) Kennedy has served in the U.S. Senate since 1962. He is the younger brother of John and Robert Kennedy and the foremost living member of the Kennedy family. Ted Kennedy, due to his steadfast advocacy of liberal politics, is considered a stalwart within the Democratic Party. Kennedy began public service by running in and winning a Senate seat from Massachusetts, even though he had never held public office prior to 1962.

Kennedy's tenure in the Senate has been tumultuous. On a personal level, he witnessed the assassinations of both brothers, John (1963) and Robert (1968). Further, he was involved in a plane crash in 1964 and was yanked from the debris by fellow Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.). On July 18, 1969, Kennedy attended a party held on Chappaquiddick Island in Massachusetts. After the party Kennedy drove away with Mary Jo Kopechne as a passenger in his car. During the trip away from the island, Kennedy made a wrong turn at Dyke Bridge and drove over its side. The car plunged into a channel called Poucha Pond and landed inverted, submerged in water. Kennedy was able to escape. Kopechne, unfortunately, drowned. The incident led to scandal, with claims that Kennedy had been drinking, left the scene of the accident, and failed to summon help immediately. Kennedy later pled guilty to leaving the scene of an accident and was sentenced to 2 months in prison, which was suspended.

The political firestorm that took place following the accident was intense. On July 25, 1969, Kennedy attempted to defuse the situation by addressing his constituents and describing the events that took place. The national broadcasting networks provided prime-time coverage of the event, and the speech was heard nationwide. The speech was intended to minimize Senator Kennedy's responsibility in the death of Ms. Kopechne as well as place Senator Kennedy's future in the hands of Massachusetts's voters. The speech probably assisted Kennedy in his quest to hold his Senate seat; however, the impact of the speech on the national stage was negligible and may have been detrimental. For example, Kennedy's attempt to gain the Democratic presidential nomination over Jimmy Carter was hindered by questions concerning Chappaquiddick, and the senator dropped out after winning 10 primaries. Carter, conversely, won 24 and was the Democratic nominee.

Since the failed presidential attempt, Kennedy has secured an influential role in congressional politics. He is the senior Democratic Party member on the Senate Judiciary Committee; the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee; the Immigration Subcommittee; and the Armed Services Committee. In April 2006 he was selected by *Time* as one of America's Ten Best Senators. His substantial legislative record impacts nearly every American.

Terry Robertson

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Kennedy, Jacqueline

See Onassis, Jacqueline Kennedy

Kennedy, John F. (1917–1963)

John F. Kennedy was the first U.S. president born in the 20th century. He was also the first Catholic and the youngest man elected to that office. He assumed the presidency in 1961 and served until his assassination in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963.

Kennedy viewed his speeches as an important element of his political style, and he was very involved in crafting the public address that would be part of his

legacy. He would often edit a major address right up until delivery, and it was not uncommon for him to abandon a prepared text entirely and speak extemporaneously. The importance he placed on his speeches was based, in part, on his belief that an active president needed to provide the leadership necessary to overcome the natural inertia of a democracy and arouse the public to action.

John Kennedy was elected to Congress as a Democrat in 1946 and as the senator from Massachusetts in 1952. He assembled a talented staff that would serve throughout his career. Included among these was Theodore Sorensen, who joined in 1953. Sorensen would eventually become a special counsel to the president, but his primary responsibility was to craft Kennedy's speeches. Although he was not the only writer, he is the person most associated with Kennedy's public address. Sorensen wrote speeches for a listening audience, employing short clauses and short words. It was Sorenson who often provided the historical analogies, literary references, and quotations that became part of the Kennedy persona.

That persona first came to national attention when he delivered a speech for Adlai Stevenson at the 1956 Democratic Convention in Chicago. He so impressed the delegates that he was nominated to be Stevenson's running mate. He lost a close vote to Estes Kefauver and conceded graciously, but he resolved to make his own presidential run.

After securing the Democratic nomination in 1960, Kennedy faced Richard M. Nixon in the general election. This election marked the first time that the candidates of both major parties met in a series of televised debates. What was said in these debates was probably less important that the image of Kennedy debating the standing vice president. The debates helped Kennedy become a nationally recognized figure and to overcome the perception that he was too inexperienced to be president.

On September 12, 1960, Kennedy addressed the Greater Houston Ministerial Association about the "Catholic issue"—whether a Catholic could faithfully fulfill the office of the presidency. Kennedy had faced concerns about his religion during the primary campaign, but many on his staff viewed this issue as the major obstacle to his winning in November. This speech defused religious concerns by successfully reframing the issue away from religion and toward matters of tolerance. Kennedy campaigned on the "New Frontier" theme of getting the country moving again and won by only 113,000 votes out of a total of 64 million.

One of Kennedy's best-known speeches is his inaugural address. After many drafts, the final version was delivered on a bitterly cold January 20, 1961. The speech employed one-syllable words where possible and is probably best known for its memorable sentence, "Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country." The speech lasted 14 minutes.

Civil rights commanded a lot of public attention during Kennedy's term. As a candidate, he had pledged moral and political leadership on the issue. But during the first 2 years of his administration his rhetoric seemed to offer neither. He provided federal protection when lives were threatened in Montgomery, Alabama, during the Freedom Rides of 1961, and when a riot erupted during the 1962 attempt to desegregate the University of Mississippi. But his public statements stressed the necessity of following the law and lamented that these events caused international embarrassment.

But in 1963, after viewing the brutality visited against peaceful demonstrators in Birmingham, Alabama, and confronting continuing southern intransigence—such as Governor George Wallace's promise to personally block integration at the University of Alabama—Kennedy was finally moved to address the morality of civil rights. On June 11, 1963, the president delivered a partially extemporaneous speech that spoke of a moral crisis in America and promised to introduce comprehensive civil rights legislation. Months before his death, Kennedy finally delivered the moral and political leadership he had promised as a candidate.

Foreign policy was the primary focus of President Kennedy. His worldview and his rhetoric in this area were set against the backdrop of the Cold War. Kennedy was aware of the dangers in a nuclear age, and he tried to move beyond the Manichean perspectives that dominated the Eisenhower administration. But much of his foreign policy rhetoric during his first 2 years in office—especially concerning Berlin and Cuba—was marked by direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.

On July 25, 1961, Kennedy stated clearly that the United States would defend its access to West Berlin, located 110 miles inside communist East Germany. On October 22, 1962, Kennedy warned Americans about the threat posed by missiles the Soviet Union was secretly installing in Cuba. In both speeches, Kennedy clearly committed the country to the potential use of its

military, and in each he called for Americans to support him in this struggle of freedom against tyranny.

The first crisis ended with the construction of the Berlin Wall, and the second with Soviet agreement to dismantle their missiles in Cuba. But coming so close to war made Kennedy realize that constant confrontation between nuclear powers could not continue. On June 10, 1963, he delivered the commencement address at American University and called for a reexamination of American attitudes toward the Soviet Union and a national commitment toward a practical and attainable peace.

Kennedy's public address during his brief time in office focused on what came to be seen as watersheds in the American experience, and it often demanded much of his audience.

George N. Dionisopoulos

See also Debates; Kennedy, Edward (Ted); Kennedy, Robert F.; Kennedy Assassination; Onassis, Jacqueline Kennedy

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Kennedy, Robert F. (1925–1968)

Robert Francis Kennedy, son of Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy and brother of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Senator Edward Moore Kennedy, graduated from Harvard in 1948 and earned a law degree from the University of Virginia in 1951. He began his legal career by serving as an attorney in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice 1951–1952, leaving to manage John Kennedy's successful campaign for the Senate in 1952. He returned to public service as assistant counsel, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in 1953. He achieved public notice as chief counsel of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor Management Field (1957–1960), investigating the Teamster Union and its president Jimmy Hoffa. He managed John Kennedy's presidential campaign in 1960 and was named by his brother to be attorney general. He coordinated the integration of the University of Alabama and played a major role in the Cuban missile crisis. After the assassination of his brother, he ran successfully for the Senate from New York in 1964.

In the Senate he served on the Labor and Public Welfare committee, where he championed the poor. He worked to establish the Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation to serve as a model for public-private cooperation to help the needy. He traveled to the Mississippi Delta to publicize the problem of hunger. He traveled to Eastern Europe and South Africa to speak for human rights.

The Vietnam War was a troublesome issue for Kennedy. President John Kennedy had supported it, and many of his advisors were still in positions of leadership in the conduct of the war. His opposition to the war developed slowly. In 1966 he urged that all parties in Vietnam, including the National Front for Liberation, participate in a political settlement. On March 2, 1967, he called for an end to the bombing of North Vietnam as a means to bring about a negotiated peace. His reluctance to challenge President Johnson in the New Hampshire presidential primary in 1968 left an opening for Eugene McCarthy to emerge as the champion of the antiwar forces in the Democratic Party. Amid much criticism, Kennedy announced that he would be a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination on March 16, 1968, setting off a furious campaign for delegates. While campaigning in Indiana on April 4, 1968, he learned of Martin Luther King's assassination. He went to a scheduled campaign rally that night in a predominately black neighborhood in downtown Indianapolis, where he spoke publicly for the first time of his brother's death as he asked the crowd to avoid violence and to return to their homes. After winning the Indiana primary and losing the Oregon primary, the race for the nomination came down to the California primary. Kennedy won California on June 5, 1968. In his moment of triumph, he was gunned down by Sirhan Sirhan.

Lloyd Rohler

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Kennedy Assassination

President John F. Kennedy (1917–1963) was shot and killed on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas. Texas Governor John B. Connally, who was riding in the limousine with Kennedy, was also seriously wounded but survived. Kennedy had traveled to Dallas to resolve political infighting among the Democratic leadership in Texas and to raise funds and support for the 1964 election. Within hours of the assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested as a suspect in the murder of a Dallas police officer and the assassination of Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson, Kennedy's vice president, was sworn in as president. Oswald was shot to death by Dallas nightclub owner Jack Ruby 2 days after the assassination. Television reporters who had traveled to Dallas to report on Kennedy's trip covered the assassination as breaking news. The assassination was the subject of two controversial federal investigations.

Events of the Assassination

On the morning of November 22, 1963, Kennedy spoke at a breakfast gathering in Ft. Worth and then boarded Air Force One with the rest of his party to fly to Dallas. Air Force One arrived at Love Field in Dallas at 11:40 a.m. CST, and 10 minutes later Kennedy's motorcade left on the way to the Dallas Business and Trade Mart, where Kennedy was to attend a luncheon.

As Kennedy's motorcade traveled through large crowds gathered on the streets of Dallas, it turned left in front of the Texas School Book Depository building to make its way to Dealey Plaza. At 12:30 p.m. CST, shortly after the motorcade made the turn, shots were fired. Kennedy was hit by two shots, Connally was hit by one shot, and a bystander was nicked on the right cheek by debris from a shot.

As the motorcade raced away from Dealey Plaza to Parkland Hospital, Marrion L. Baker, a Dallas patrolman ran to the School Book Depository because he believed the shots had come from the building. After gaining access to the building, Baker and Roy Truly, the building superintendent, began a floor-by-floor search. They found Oswald in the second-floor lunchroom at 12:35 p.m. CST. Truly identified Oswald as an employee, and the two moved on.

At 1:00 p.m. CST, Kennedy was officially declared dead at Parkland Hospital, and Connally was taken into surgery to treat his wounds. Out of concern for his security, Johnson left the hospital and traveled to Air Force One. Dallas police officer J. D. Tippet was shot shortly after 1:15 p.m. CST by a man witnesses identified as Oswald. Oswald was seen entering the Texas Theater at 1:40 p.m. CST, police were called, and Oswald was confronted and arrested at about 2:00 p.m. CST after drawing a pistol on officers. Oswald was taken to the Dallas jail and charged first with Tippit's murder and later with Kennedy's murder.

About the same time Oswald was being arrested, Kennedy's body was taken to Air Force One. Johnson was sworn in as president by Federal District Court Judge Sarah T. Hughes on board *Air Force One* before it left Dallas for Washington, D.C. *Air Force One*



November 25, 1963: The John F. Kennedy funeral procession to St. Matthew's Cathedral, including caisson and casket, standard-bearers, riderless horse ("Black Jack"), and mourners.

Source: Photograph by Abbie Rowe, National Park Service, in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston.

arrived at Andrews Air Force Base about 6:00 p.m. EST. Kennedy's body was taken to Bethesda Naval Hospital for an autopsy.

On November 24, 1963, at 11:21 a.m. CST, as Oswald was being moved from the Dallas jail, he was shot and killed by Jack Ruby. Ruby was immediately arrested and charged with Oswald's murder.

Media Coverage

Hundreds of print, radio, and television journalists were in Dallas to cover what they thought would be a routine presidential trip. As the tragic events of the day began to unfold, radio and television reporters took the lead in reporting events as they occurred. ABC, NBC, and CBS interrupted their regular television programming with reports that shots had been fired at the president's motorcade within minutes after the event. About 2:38 p.m. EST, Walter Cronkite, CBS news anchor, read live on the air the Associated Press (AP) wire flash announcing that Kennedy had died.

The three television networks canceled their regular schedules and provided continuous coverage of the events for three days. This coverage included the live broadcast of Oswald's murder and Kennedy's funeral. Even with the significant amount of media coverage devoted to the assassination, several studies of how information about the assassination was diffused through the public demonstrated that most people first learned about the assassination from interpersonal communication and not radio or television.

Investigations

On November 29, 1963, President Johnson established a commission to investigate Kennedy's assassination. The commission is commonly referred to as the "Warren Commission," after its chair, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Earl Warren. The commission issued its final report on September 24, 1964, after hearing testimony from hundreds of witnesses, receiving reports of several federal agencies, and reviewing various photographs and films. One film reviewed by the commission, made by Abraham Zapruder and know as the "Zapruder Film," shows Kennedy grasping his throat in reacting to the first shot and the fatal head shot. The commission found that Oswald had acted alone in the assassination, firing three shots from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. According to the report, one shot struck Kennedy in the upper back, exited his throat, and then struck Connally. This became known as the "single-bullet theory." Another shot struck Kennedy in the head, and a third shot missed the motorcade. The commission also found that Ruby had acted alone in killing Oswald. The report was also critical of the security arrangements for Kennedy's trip and provided several recommendations for changes in Secret Service operations. The findings of the commission were met with widespread public skepticism, especially the finding that one bullet had struck both Kennedy and Connally.

In 1976 the U.S. House of Representatives established the Select Committee on Assassinations to investigate the assassinations of Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. After reviewing the evidence used by the Warren Commission and additional information, the committee issued its final report in 1979. In relation to the Kennedy assassination, the committee found that Oswald had fired three shots at Kennedy. The second and third shots struck the president, and the third shot was fatal. The committee also determined that scientific acoustical evidence established a high probability that shots were fired at Kennedy by two gunmen and that a fourth shot was fired by a gunman on the grassy knoll in front of Kennedy. The committee also stated that it believed Kennedy's assassination was probably the result of a conspiracy, but the committee was unable to discover the other gunmen or the scope of the conspiracy. Like the Warren Commission, the House Select Committee was critical of the level of protection provided Kennedy and gave recommendations for changes in the process for protecting the president. The findings of the committee were more widely accepted than the Warren Commission because the committee acknowledged that the Kennedy assassination was probably the result of a conspiracy, a view long held by many researchers, private citizens, and members of the media.

Larry Jene King

See also Connally, John; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.; Media Events

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Kenyatta, Jomo (1890–1978)

Jomo Kenyatta was the first president of the independent Republic of Kenya. He is considered to be among the great African freedom fighters and nationalists. Kenyatta was a Pan Africanist, a founding member—together with Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Dr. Namdi Azikiwe, Ho Davice QC of Nigeria, and Peter Abrahams of South Africa—of the Pan African movement.

He was born to a herdsman family at Ichaweri village in Kiambu District in Central Province near Nairobi in the 1890s. The exact date of his birth is unknown. Kenyatta had a shaky childhood, as his father died when he was still was young. However, he was salvaged by a church minister, one Musa Gitau at the Thogoto Church of Scotland Mission station, who persuaded him to go to school. After his elementary education, to avoid conscription into the Kings African rifles**,** he went to Narok, where he worked as a clerk in a ranch. It was in Narok that he acquired the nickname Kenyatta, after *Kinyatta,* the beaded Masai belt that he was fond of. He left Narok for Nairobi, where he took up a job as a court interpreter, later joining the Nairobi Municipal Council as a water meter reader.

Kenyatta left his employment to help found the Kikuyu Independent School Association, a counter to the Church of Scotland's refusal to admit circumcised girls into its schools. Kenyatta started his political activities first as a sympathizer of the East African Association in 1928 where he was made general secretary. He traveled to Moscow to attend Moscow University between 1932 and 1934. From Moscow he went to England, where he studied anthropology at London University from 1935 to 1938 and wrote his famous book *Facing Mount Kenya.*

On his return from England in 1964, Kenyatta took over the presidency of the Kenya African Union (KAU). He was arrested along with others on the accusation that he was supporting the Land liberation movement Mau Mau in October 1952, when a state of emergency was declared and tried at Kapenguria, finally sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment. He was released in 1961 and became the president of Kenya African National Union (KANU), a party that was to propel him to power first as prime minister on June 1, 1963, and subsequently as the first president of postcolonial Kenya on December 12, 1964.

Kenyatta was a very skilful orator, whose speeches captured the imagination of his listeners. Like most postcolonial African leaders, he created a sense of fear in the media practitioners without overtly confronting them. He eventually ruled the country for 15 years that were marked by political assassination, detention without trial, corruption and tribalism. To his credit, however, Kenyatta maintained a steady economic growth comparable to the growth rates in most Western industrialized countries. Unfortunately benefits were not equitably distributed. This saw the emergence of a wealthy black middle class and unfavorable ethnic imbalance in the wealth distribution. Kenyatta died peacefully in his sleep on August 22, 1978, in the coastal town of Mombasa.

Christopher Odhiambo

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KEPPLINGER, HANS MATHIAS (1943–)

Hans Mathias Kepplinger teaches political communication, journalism, and media effects at the University of Mainz. This author of 30 books and 250 articles is one of the most published communication scholars in Germany. His firm international orientation has taken him as a visiting scholar to University of California-Berkeley, University of Tunis, Southern Illinois University, Università della Svizzera Italiana, and Harvard University. He is coeditor of the *International Encyclopedia of Communication* and sits on the editorial boards of the *Journal of Communication* and the *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*.

Kepplinger gained his PhD in political science in 1970 and his postdoctoral lecturing qualification in communications in 1977. He was a Heisenberg scholarship holder of the German Science Foundation (1978–1982) and, after his appointment to the University of Mainz in 1982, served as director of the Institut fuer Publizistik and dean of the Faculty of Social Science. Besides his strong managerial and leadership capabilities, Kepplinger is a gifted teacher, demanding adviser, and a highly active scholar with a sense for innovative methodological approaches to a broad range of socially relevant research questions. He was the first in Germany to study systematically the influence of television presentational techniques and how the resulting impressions of nonverbal signals thus influenced the politician's public image. His early case studies on conscientious objection and the oil crisis were among the first quantitative analyses to conceptualize political communication as a complex process in which several protagonists act on various institutional levels and—because their actions are not isolated but interrelated—lead to dynamics that need to be studied with longitudinal designs.

Kepplinger's more recent studies in political communication focused on the question of whether long-term trends of negativism and symbolic politics that are characteristic of U.S. news coverage can also be observed in the German press. One follow-up study titled *Farewell to the Rational Voter* (2005) looked at the effects of TV upon the images of politicians and their impact upon voting behavior over a 5-year period and combines survey panel data with news content data. Another follow-up study identified prototypical mechanisms that steer the construction of mediated scandals in the political and environmental domain.

Among Kepplinger's most important contributions to journalism research have been his involvement in the first cross-national, strictly comparative survey of news journalists using equivalent samples from Germany and England and the conclusions he and Koecher (1990) drew for the concept of media professionalism. His arguably most influential contribution to the study of journalism is his theory of instrumental actualization. With this theory, Kepplinger investigated empirically how journalists' predispositions affect their judgment on the newsworthiness of a controversial story. In this quasi-experimental study, news items supporting the journalist's own opinion on the issue at hand were attributed a higher news value than those that ran counter to these opinions.

Frank Esser

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KERRY, JOHN (1943–)

John Forbes Kerry was born in Fitzsimmons Army Hospital in Colorado. The son of a foreign service officer, Kerry was raised Catholic and spent his childhood primarily on international soil. After graduating from Yale University, Kerry joined the U.S. Navy and did two tours of duty in Vietnam from 1966 to 1970. He received the Silver Star, Bronze Star, and three purple hearts. Upon his return from Vietnam, Kerry became actively involved in "Vietnam Veterans Against the War," and in 1971, he was the first Vietnam veteran to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the atrocities of the war. In a 2-hour-long hearing, Kerry expressed resentment and consternation about war crimes he had witnessed that were perpetrated by U.S. servicemen sent to "die for the biggest nothing in history." Kerry posed the compelling question, "How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?" The 27-year-old Kerry contended that the reason for the prolonged fighting in Vietnam and President Richard M. Nixon's recalcitrance in considering its end was strictly political. "Someone has to die so that Nixon won't be, and these are his words, 'the first President to lose a war.'" Not long after the hearing, in a dramatic demonstration, Kerry, along with 800 other veterans, publicly cast their metals and ribbons over a barrier to the front steps of the U.S. Capitol building.

These antiwar protests, in conjunction with the publication of his first book, *The New Solider* (1971), propelled Kerry's political career. Following his graduation from Boston College Law School, Kerry worked for the district attorney's office in Massachusetts, and in 1982 won the office of lieutenant governor of Massachusetts. Three years later, he was elected to the U.S. Senate, succeeding Paul Tsongas. Characterized as a left-of-center legislator, Kerry was reelected to the Senate in 1990, 1996, and 2002. In 2004, Kerry accepted the Democratic nomination for president.

Kerry focused his presidential campaign on a critique of the Bush administration's foreign policy, especially in relation to the war in Iraq, and this largely negative strategy seemed a reasonable basis for running against an apparently vulnerable incumbent. The campaign failed, however, and, as several commentators have observed, it offered a case study of what not to do in contemporary politics. Kerry proved unable to tell an appealing and coherent story about himself and his ideas, and he could not prevent the Republicans from seizing control of the campaign by defining the Democratic candidate as an irresolute "flip-flopper."

The foibles of Kerry's campaign surface most obviously in terms of general strategic issues such as timing, emphasis, and the use of media. But a careful reading of Kerry's speech texts reveals a less obtrusive but fundamental problem. Stanley Fish, writing during the course of the campaign, noted that Kerry's speeches violated basic rhetorical principles of composition and coherence and characterized his prose as confused, difficult to understand, and (in the words of one of Fish's students) "kind of skippy."

As an example of Kerry's rhetorical meandering, consider this excerpt from his most important speech on the war in Iraq (October 20, 2004):

> Global terrorism is increasing, not receding. Since 9/11, the number of significant attacks has jumped to the highest level in 20 years. The President took his eye off the terrorists. I will stop at nothing to kill the terrorists before they kill us and prevent others from taking their place. This requires America to be strong. It also requires America to be smart. My plan for winning the war on terrorism calls on the totality of America's strength—our military, intelligence, economic, and political power.

Parts of the book, like the passage above, proceed with little sense of logical or narrative coherence; the paragraphs are so random in their arrangement that they could be expressed in almost any order without making much difference in the meaning of the passage. Kerry is here addressing the central issue of his campaign and trying to establish the foundation of his attack against Bush. Yet, while he offers assertions and bits of evidence that provide the raw material for a cogent argument, he utterly fails to put them together into a coherent form.

Students of political communication might wonder whether these observations about the rhetorical microstructure of texts have relevance for the larger concerns that inform the study of campaigns. Fish indicates that there is a connection, and his comments deserve attention. "Words," he writes,

> are not just the cosmetic clothing of some underlying integrity; they are the operational vehicles of that integrity, the visible manifestation of the character to which others respond. And if the words you use fall apart, ring hollow, trail off and sound as if they came from nowhere or anywhere . . . the suspicion will grow that what they lack is what you lack, and no one will follow you.

This judgment, derived through close inspection of Kerry's texts, suggest views about the man and his campaign that are strikingly similar to those of Mark Halperin, John Harris, and other students of the more general features of the 2004 presidential campaign. Perhaps, then, rhetorical disorders at the microlevel have some connection to strategic blunders at the macrolevel. And if this conjecture seems plausible, analysis of Kerry's campaign rhetoric might open renewed interest in the interaction between traditional rhetoric, grounded in textual analysis, and more recently developed modes of scholarship designed to encompass the complexity of extended, mass-mediated campaigns.

Michael Leff and Christopher J. Oldenburg

See also Rhetoric, Political

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Khrushchev, Nikita (1894–1971)

Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the primary leader of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964. Khrushchev's accomplishments and failures during his 11 years in power helped shape and define many of the major trends during the Cold War period (1946–1991).

Khrushchev was an important transitional leader. Today his policies are viewed as an important precursor to the large-scale reforms later attempted by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. He was instrumental in leading the Soviet Union away from the brutal repression of the Stalin era toward a more moderate form of communism. He was a leading proponent of peaceful coexistence with the West, and he attempted to grant a higher level of intellectual and artistic freedom to Soviet citizens. Khrushchev also tried to limit the arms race. He made large unilateral cuts in Soviet defense expenditures and took the first tentative step toward nuclear arms control by joining the nuclear test-ban treaty that stopped atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. In contrast, his stationing of nuclear missiles in Cuba during the summer of 1962 led to the most severe crisis during the Cold War.

In early 1956, Khrushchev delivered his famous "secret speech" to the Twentieth Party Congress. In graphic detail, Khrushchev described Stalin's abuses of power and his massive disregard for human rights. This semipublic acknowledgment of Stalin's crimes undermined Soviet Cold War propaganda both in the world communist movement and among the Soviet elites. Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" campaign contributed to the worsening of relations with communist China and revolts against the communist governments of Poland and Hungary.

Khrushchev's "style" as a leader stood in sharp contrast from most Soviet leaders. He was an impulsive extrovert. At dinners with foreign leaders Khrushchev was noted for his heavy drinking and gossiping about inner party politics. He was also known for his fits of rage before foreign audiences. On one occasion he pounded his shoe on a desk at the United Nations to express his displeasure. Conversely, he could also exude an earthy charm. During his visit to the United States in 1959, his populist, outgoing approach created a favorable impression. He spoke to the media with a sense of humor, without the use of notes or prepared texts.

Domestically, Khrushchev undertook a number of bold initiatives. In order to increase agricultural productivity, he inaugurated the "virgin lands" project in Central Asia, which was eventually curtailed due to large-scale soil erosion . He also encouraged the development of "state farms" (very large farms owned by the state, managed by paid officials, and worked by salaried

workers) that proved infeasible. Khrushchev also initiated several administrative and bureaucratic reforms. However, these changes were strongly opposed by the party bureaucrats. Ultimately Khrushchev's style of rule and his mixed record resulted in his colleagues voting him out of office in 1964.

David K. Scott

See also Russia, Democratization and Media

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Kibaki, Mwai (1931–)

The third president of postcolonial Kenya was born on November 15, 1931, in Gatuyani village, Othaya division, Nyeri, in Central Province. He was the last-born son in his family.

After completing his primary schooling, Kibaki proceeded to Mangu High School, where he was a student from 1947 to 1950. After high school, Kibaki proceeded to Makerere University in Uganda, where he majored in economics, history, and political science. While at the university he became the chairman of the Kenya Students Association and also vice chairman of the Makerere Students Guild. He graduated in 1955 with a first-class honors degree (BA) in economics and took up employment with Shell Company East Africa, Uganda Division, as assistant sales manager.

He left his employment to accept a scholarship to undertake studies at the London School of Economics. After graduation in 1958, he returned to Makerere, where he took a teaching position as an assistant lecturer in the Department of Economics.

His political journey began in 1960, when he quit his teaching position to take up a job back home in Kenya as an executive director with the Kenya African National Union (KANU). He was one of the founding members of the KANU Party, which eventually led Kenya into independence.

He made his first attempt in elective politics in 1963, contesting the Donholm constituency (which changed to Bahati and the Makadara) and won on a KANU ticket. He was appointed the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Finance from 1963 to 1965. He was made a minister of commerce and industry from 1965 to 1969. He was reelected member of Parliament (MP) for the same constituency on KANU ticket in 1969. He later became the Minister for Finance and Economic planning, serving from 1970 to 1978. He shifted his political base to his home village in Othaya after he nearly lost his Nairobi seat to Jael Mbogo in the 1974 elections. He has since been continuously reelected the MP for this constituency in subsequent elections.

When Arap Moi became president in 1978, he appointed Kibaki his first vice president, a position he held until 1983, when he was demoted to head the Ministry of Health.

As a politician, Kibaki always took a neutral position, resulting in the media christening him a "fence sitter." However, when Kenya became a multiparty state in 1991, Kibaki resigned from the government and the ruling party KANU and formed his own party—the Democratic Party (DP) of Kenya—which he used to run for presidency in 1992. He lost to Moi, coming in third after Kenneth Matiba. He contested the presidency again on DP ticket in 1997 and lost, coming second to Moi. In January 1998, his party DP became the official opposition party, and consequently Kibaki became the official opposition leader.

Realizing that he might never become a president through his own party, Kibaki formed an alliance with two other party chiefs: Christopher Kijana Wamalwa of Forum for Restoration of Democracy People (FORD People) and Charity Ngilu of the National Party of Kenya (NPK). They came up with a coalition party known as National Alliance of Kenya (NAK), which finally combined with a rebel group from KANU LDP to form the NARC (National Rainbow Coalition). This is the party that finally propelled Kibaki to country presidency in elections that were held on November 27, 2002. Kibaki was sworn in as the third president of Kenya on December 30, 2002, while using a wheel chair and wearing a neck brace, the result of a road accident during the electioneering period. Indeed Kibaki's campaign was quite interesting, as he was disposed most of the time, and one of Kenya's most indefatigable politicians, Raila Odinga, who had earlier endorsed him for presidency, campaigned for him nearly single-handedly.

Kibaki's presidency was heralded with much enthusiasm and optimism, but much of that has since waned off. Kibaki' s presidency is now marked with failed promises, increased corruption, tribalism, and general apathy. The only promise kept by Kibaki's government is the universal free primary education. Though the economy has shown signs of recovery, the benefits have not trickled down to the populace. Kibaki's leadership is accused of being elitist, taking care only of Kibaki's cronies from his alma mater, Makerere University, and his golf-playing friends.

Before the car accident and the rumors of a stroke that followed it, Kibaki was considered one of the most eloquent and articulate politicians in Kenya. However all this is now history. Kiabki has become incoherent in speech and more often than not lacks clarity of thought in his enunciations.

Christopher Odhiambo

Kids Voting USA

Many adolescents in the United States reside in apolitical cocoons in which friends and parents rarely talk about public affairs. Everyday life is structured by exposure to music, online chat, and television, but news media are shunned. Thus, the problem of youth civic disengagement represents in part the quandary of how to circulate political communication within families and peer networks.

Prior studies on adults have described "obstinate audiences" and "chronic know nothings," while less attention has been devoted to overcoming barriers in the diffusion of political stimulation among young citizens. However, the Kids Voting USA (KVUSA) curriculum has provided researchers with opportunities for exploring the interactions of schools, media, and families in the generation of political discussion.

KVUSA began as a pilot program in 1988 after three businessmen traveled to Costa Rica on a fishing trip and learned that voter turnout hovers around 90%. Voting is a family tradition in Costa Rica, as parents bring children to the polls. Curious as to whether family voting might lift turnout rates in the United States, the three men launched a pilot program in Tempe, Arizona. Kids Voting has since expanded to 29 states. In 2004, 1.5 million KVUSA students voted for president with ballots similar to those used by adults.

The nonprofit, nonpartisan organization comprises a national network of schools that enlist the help of election officials. K–12 teachers typically use lesson plans during the final weeks leading up to Election Day, with the goal of providing authentic activities that involve children in participatory citizenship. Along with voting, students develop media literacy from exercises such as decoding campaign advertisements. Students monitor the flow of news as they anticipate classroom debates, and they ensnare parents in a family voting guide.

The architecture of KVUSA is remarkable—from the perspective of political socialization theory—because it integrates so many agents of civic development: schools, peer groups, families, media, and elections. Such synergy generates counterintuitive outcomes, such as "trickle-up influence" in which children initiate political conversations with parents. This dynamic is most consequential in low-income families, where parents were often never socialized themselves to politics as youth. Spurred on by KVUSA, children provide parents with a second chance at citizenship.

Many parents respond defensively to their newly politicized children. Nonetheless, empirical studies have shown that the provocations of opinionated offspring motivate adults to take civic parenting more seriously. A boomerang effect occurs as parents encourage children to pay more attention to news, to acquire political knowledge, and to express opinions during classroom discussions.

The innovations of KVUSA are significant beyond theory. Since the 1960s, evaluations of civic curricula in the United States have generally concluded that schools are inconsequential in political socialization. Kids Voting illustrates that schools and families are potentially bridged through student-initiated discussion, with outcomes that benefit both children and parents.

Michael McDevitt

See also Political Engagement; Political Socialization; Rock the Vote; Youth Voting

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King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968)

Although controversial to this day, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., has become the quintessential icon of the American civil rights movement. King was born in Atlanta, Georgia, to Michael King, Sr. (who later changed his name and his son's to Martin Luther King) and Alberta Williams King. His father and maternal grandfather (Rev. A. D. Williams) both pastored the Ebenezer Baptist Church and held leadership roles in the local National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) chapter. At 15, King enrolled in Atlanta's Morehouse College, where he was described as "an ordinary student" but displayed the extraordinary oratorical talent that would be a hallmark of his career. King went on to graduate work at Pennsylvania's Crozer Theological Seminary, and earned a PhD in systematic theology from Boston University in 1955. His graduate work exposed him to the ideas of luminaries such as Gandhi, Thoreau, Tillich, and Niebuhr, all of whom played important roles in his subsequent career.

Shortly after his marriage to Coretta Scott, King became pastor of the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1954. The following year he became an influential leader of the Montgomery bus boycott initiated by Rosa Parks's famous refusal to give up her seat on a public bus to a white passenger. After hearing King speak at the first meeting of the Montgomery Improvement Association (formed to coordinate the boycott), Parks opined that "we had found our Moses. . . ." The Montgomery boycott was a major turning point in the civil rights movement, leading to the Supreme Court's 1956 desegregation ruling. King continued his tireless work for civil rights throughout the 1950s and 1960s. As the first president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, he helped organize the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom in August 1963, at which he displayed his considerable rhetorical acumen by presenting his "I Have a Dream" speech. Citing the Declaration of Independence, King argued that the nation had "defaulted" on its declaration of universal equality "insofar as her citizens of color are concerned." These powerful words were made more so by the stirring preacher-like musical rhythms of his deep baritone voice, particularly in repeated poetic refrains such as "Let freedom ring . . ." and "I have a dream. . . ."

Aside from themes of civil disobedience and nonviolence (which often put him at odds with more militant civil rights leaders), King's rhetoric was also heavily infused with biblical rhetorical motifs, such as the Exodus narrative. This influence is seen most clearly in his "I've Been to the Mountaintop" oration delivered on the eve of his assassination in Memphis on April 4, 1968. In this address, King promised that the tedious and dangerous work of the movement would not be in vain because "we, as a people, will get to the Promised Land." The prophetic declarations contained throughout King's speeches and writings not only encouraged his followers, but forced the extant political establishment to confront the inevitability of African American equality—a goal toward which our society continues to strive.

David C. Bailey

See also Civil Rights Movement

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King Assassination

See King, Martin Luther, Jr.

Klapper, Joseph (1917–1984)

Joseph T. Klapper is widely known for his influential work in media effects as well as his long career in private broadcasting with CBS. After returning from World War II, Klapper was a doctoral candidate in English at Columbia University when he met and interacted with Paul Lazarsfeld. Lazarsfeld convinced him

to switch his major. He is best known for his prominent work in "minimal" or "limited" media effects or "functional analyses," emphasized by his 1960 book *The Effects of Mass Communication,* in which he outlined his "phenomenistic approach" as "a shift away from the tendency to regard mass communication as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, toward a view of the media as influences, working amid other influences, in a total situation." Overall, this book provides insight how media effects studies turned from media centered in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s to the more modern motive- and audience-driven approaches that have become vital to modern communication research. This work was unanimously selected by the American Association for Public Opinion Research as one of the *Fifty Books That Significantly Shaped Public Opinion Research, 1946–1995.*

After receiving his PhD in sociology at Columbia University, Klapper served as a professor at the University of Washington and at Stanford University. Next, he moved onto the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), where he conducted research on the Voice of America broadcast channel. Afterward, he spent four years as a research director for General Electric (GE). In 1962, Klapper began his tenure as the director of Social Research for the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS); a position he held until his passing.

In addition to his position at CBS, Klapper remained active in government research, serving on President Lyndon B. Johnson's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography. Additionally, he assisted the U.S. Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Society and was on the board of advisors for the Federal Role of Funding Children's Television Programming. Also, he served as president of the American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) from 1962 to 1963.

During his presidential address at the 1963 AAPOR conference, Klapper coined the title "uses and gratifications" in an attempt to separate traditional "functional analysis" from the uses and gratifications approach by stating "the list of uses to which people put mass communication, and the gratifications they derive from it, do not of course constitute themselves as full 'functional analyses.' . . . They are rather first steps in such analyses." This assertion helped to inspire future scholars to discover additional variables (i.e., psychological variables, audience motives) in media effects research, eventually forming the modern uses and gratifications approach, which examines the "total situation" that exists in mass communication.

John Spinda

See also *Effects of Mass Communication, The*; Limited Effects Theory; Selective Processes, Exposure, Perception, Memory; Uses and Gratifications Approach

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Knowledge Gap

The knowledge gap perspective was and still is a fruitful extension of the classic diffusion of information paradigm insofar as it poses the question of (un)equal distribution of communication and knowledge in democratic societies as a prerequisite of decision making by analyzing the complex (dys)functions of classic and modern media, like the Internet, in this process.

Evidence of learning processes and knowledge gain from news media use is found repeatedly in a vast number of survey studies. As a consequence, modern media effects research no longer considers the most important media function the influence on opinions and attitudes but, instead, the *transfer of information* and *knowledge acquisition* by media users. But empirical studies of public affairs media coverage, political debates, or elections demonstrate regularly that citizens remain remarkably uninformed. Nevertheless, many voters feel sufficiently informed to make voting decisions. This low level of knowledge seems to have remained stable despite the general increase in education that took place in the past decades in the United States as well as in most European countries, together with an explosion of mediated political communication and promising new media like the Internet. This pronounced discrepancy between intensive media use and relatively low or even no knowledge gain can be observed especially in the case of television.

Basic Hypothesis and Explanations

This unsatisfying situation concerning the widely assumed positive information functions of media, on the one hand, and generally only modest levels of knowledge acquisition, on the other hand, resulted in the formulation of the "knowledge gap hypothesis" in 1970. Phillip Tichenor, George Donohue, and Clarice Olien proposed in their initial journal article, "Mass Media Flow and Differential Growth in Knowledge," that dysfunctional media effects, insofar as the better-educated and higher-status segments of society tend to acquire public affairs information and science matters through the mass media at a faster rate than the lesser-educated and lower-status segments, are a consequence of the initial gap in knowledge between different social segments. The gap tends to increase rather than decrease if media coverage of a topic is intensifying.

The authors explain this phenomenon by referring to five underlying processes but not by formulating a systematic theory:

1. *Communication skills:* Formal education fosters reading and understanding abilities in a general way as a basis for efficient learning processes.
2. *Prior knowledge* encourages attention for and facilitates acquisition of new information.
3. Persons with higher education have more relevant *social contacts* as sources for interpersonal communication.
4. Education correlates with *active information exposure,* acceptance, and remembering of new information.
5. *Media system:* Information about public affairs or scientific progress are transmitted mostly by print media that are directed to the interests of and used more by the better-educated segments of the population.

Each of these factors, namely disparities in media access, unequal information exposure, or differences in perceived information utility, on the one hand, and amount and complexity or relevance of information or involved conflict, on the other, can contribute to increasing and narrowing knowledge gaps.

In the past 35 years, the knowledge gap perspective became one of the most cited and used approaches of the new cognitive media effects tradition since the 1970, beside other prominent theories like uses and gratifications, agenda setting, cultivation or framing research. This is certainly because knowledge gap perspective treats long-term media effects, links them to the macro level of society, and points to normative political implications like equal opportunities. Several hundred empirical studies have been realized so far, a number of theoretical refinements and differentiations on the micro as well on the macro level have been formulated

Theoretical Criticism and Further Developments

Initially, the knowledge gap hypothesis was formulated as a deficit perspective, deriving from lack of knowledge and motivation. Others have suggested that it is not education or motivation that underlies knowledge gaps, but the problem is to better understand how motivation and education jointly affect knowledge acquisition; this later led to the formulation of a so-called contingency model. A further development in regard to the communication process is the differentiation between gaps in access, use and reception. So, knowledge gaps can be the result of nonexposure to presidential debates and/or unequal learning processes. Besides these differentiations on the micro level, more sociologically oriented researchers formulated specifications on the macro level: amount of conflict, size, or pluralism of social systems are analyzed as mediating factors in the process of developing knowledge gaps.

Empirical Research

Knowledge gap phenomena were empirically studied in various fields, such as public affairs events or science reporting, presidential debates, elections, public information campaigns, developmental communication, or the diffusion of new media like the Internet. The latter issue was controversially debated in the public sphere under the catchword *digital divide* It is still not clear whether unequal access to the Internet because of education, income, or gender will diminish in the future as consequence of a so-called trickle-down effect or if disparities at least in use and effects will persist.

The research evidence based on one-point-in-time surveys consistently demonstrates gaps in knowledge between different educational segments; but the results of the longitudinal research, based on panel studies or several surveys in time, is more mixed. Contrary to the original hypothesis of increasing knowledge gaps, there are diminishing or even closing gaps as well, especially under conditions of heavy social conflict or in situations of well-conceptualized and targeted public communication

campaigns with information relevant to motivated although underprivileged citizens. Here, one especially studied phenomenon is that of the so-called ceiling effects. Information distributed by health campaigns can be tailored to the low-informed, disadvantaged segments, so that the already informed privileged people can't further increase their knowledge lead since the campaign messages are redundant for them. There are also ceiling effects when knowledge cannot be increased, as in the case of agenda knowledge. In such a situation, that is, of knowing that there will be an election or a referendum, knowledge gaps will close as a result of catching up by the not yet aware or sensitive segments of the population, such as in the case of AIDS after the heavy media coverage of the Magic Johnson case.

Heinz Bonfadelli

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Kohl, Helmut (1930–)

Helmut Kohl, born in 1930, was German chancellor from 1982 to 1998. In the course of his political career, he has also held the post of prime minister of the state of Rhineland-Palatinate from 1969 to 1976 and was chairman of the Christian Democratic Party from 1973 to 1998. Kohl is especially known as the chancellor of German reunification.

At the beginning of his career at the Federal State level, Kohl had positive media responses most of the time, especially in the regional media, and he was regarded as the upcoming man of the Christian Democratic Union. His relationship to the media changed for the worse, however, when he became a chairman of his party's program commission in 1970; it deteriorated even further when he took over the role of opposition leader in the national parliament in 1976. Since these days, Kohl has often been the subject of satire and caricature. Journalists named him "The Pear" because they found his figure was somewhat pear shaped. Moreover, the media took to calling his wife "The Barbie of Palatinate," thereby alluding to her blond hair and immaculate outward appearance. Furthermore, content analyses of his TV appearances during national election campaigns showed that he was frequently filmed from unfavorable camera angles, and TV stations presented negative crowd reactions in combination with his person more often than was the case with his competitors. These are only a few examples to illustrate that Kohl had to counter his negative media image much more than any other chancellor. This might be a reason why only a handful of journalists belonged to his inner circle, not a few of them foreign journalists. Kohl systematically ignored some parts of the German media for years, especially the weekly magazine *Spiegel*.

Considering that his relationship to the media had already been difficult for years, it became even worse when Kohl was suspected of having received donations for his party without identifying them in the party's statement of accounts in 1999. Although he admitted to having received money in a TV interview, he was not willing to give away the names of he donators. Some facts gave rise to the suspicion that the donations had been bribe money. Kohl reacted to these reproaches by accusing the media of having started a campaign against him that was meant to destroy his reputation and lifetime achievements. He even went so far as to call the reporting on his case a violation against the national broadcasting treaty that regulates public service broadcasting in Germany. In addition, he publicly speculated about secret connections between the office of the district attorney on one side and the daily newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the news magazine *Spiegel* on the other side.

Mona Krewel

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Kraus, Sidney (1927–)

Sidney Kraus was among the first observers of political communication to perceive and bring attention to the important function served in election campaigns by televised political debates. He was also among the first to begin challenging the limited effects model of media effects, particularly with regard to television, which had long dominated the field. He began his education at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago where he received his BFA (1953) and MFA (1954). In 1959 he earned his PhD from the University of Iowa (Radio and Television). During his academic career, he has taught at Indiana University, the University of Massachusetts, and Cleveland State University, where he served as chair of the department of communication and is now a professor emeritus. In addition to teaching, he has also served as a consultant in communications and campaign advisor to various political candidates and as a political analyst for television news.

In *The Great Debates* (1962), Kraus brings together for the first time a remarkable collection of interdisciplinary studies that includes a variety of historical, descriptive, critical, and experimental research about a single communication event. This volume opened the door for similar investigations of significant critical events. In 1993, two of his books, *The Great Debates: Background, Perspective, Effects* (1962) and *Televised Presidential Debates and Public Policy* (2nd ed., 2000), were selected by the Freedom Forum Media Studies Center at Columbia University as among the 25 most important books on media and politics. Kraus is best known for the work he has done on televised presidential debates, beginning with those in 1960 between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon. In 1964, *The Great Debates* was chosen for inclusion in the White House Library, one of only four books selected in the area of broadcasting. During the presidential campaigns of 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1996, he was invited to attend the presidential and vice presidential debates, giving him the unique opportunity to study the debates as a participant observer.

In *Televised Presidential Debates and Public Policy,* Kraus reviews what has been learned about televised presidential debates, their impact on the course of the election, and utilizes that knowledge to address the question of whether or not presidential debates should be mandated by legislation. He concludes that, based on the evidence, voters want presidential debates in national elections and gain significant information from the debates. Therefore, to receive federal funding, candidates should be compelled to participate in televised presidential debates. He further suggests that Congress establish a commission regarding eligibility of candidate participation and establish fair criteria for participation.

Cynthia Roper

See also Debates; Great Debates, The

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Kreisky, Bruno (1970–1983)

Bruno Kreisky, Austrian chancellor, Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs,* SPÖ) was elected chairman of the SPÖE in 1967. In the 1970 elections the Socialists defeated the Peoples Party (*Österreichische Volkspartei*/ÖVP; the party had ruled with an absolute majority since 1966) but missed the absolute majority of seats. After failing to achieve an agreement with the ÖVP, Kreisky became chancellor of a minority cabinet, which was tolerated by the Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*/FPÖ). In return Kreisky decided (among other things) a change in electoral law to benefit small parties. In October 1971 he

called elections by open ballot with the FPÖ, and the Social Democrats won an absolute majority. In the 1975 and 1979 elections he managed to secure his absolute power in the Austrian Parliament. In 1983 the Socialists lost their absolute majority and were forced into a coalition once again. Kreisky resigned, nominating Fred Sinowatz as his successor.

With the defeat of Bruno Kreisky, an era in the SPÖ came to its end. Many of his supporters see the last socialist of the old school in Kreisky and look back nostalgically at an era of policy of full employment, while the welfare state was in full swing. Political rivals, however, criticize Kreisky's policy of deficit spending and hold him responsible for Austria's subsequent economic difficulties. Nowadays the Kreisky era is often described retrospectively as an era of welfare, prosperity, and progress.

Kreisky played a prominent role in international affairs, promoting the North-South dialogue as well as supporting the European integration. He presented neutral Austria as a bridge between East and West. He tried to use his position as a European Jewish Socialist to act as a mediator between Israel and the Arabs (even meeting with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat). Kreisky had a deep conflict with prominent Austrian Jew Simon Wiesenthal, especially in terms of the handling of the Austrian Nazi past.

Kreisky was a skilled orator and media performer. He earned the nickname "Media Chancellor" for his alleged understanding of and new way to use the mass media, especially television. Legendary are his appearances in pre-election debates on TV, matching and beating his opponent Taus (ÖVP). Highly intellectual as well as quick at repartee, he had a unique comprehension for this new medium to communicate his politics.

He is also known for his well-placed quotes about the media, like "*Lernens a bissl Geschichte, Herr Reporter*" ("Go and learn some history, Mister") or the statement "ein paar Milliarden Schulden mehr bereiten mir weniger schlaflose Naechte als ein paar hundert Arbeitslose" ("I prefer a few billion more debts over a few hundred unemployed people").

After leaving office, Kreisky had serious health problems and died in Vienna in July 1990.

Peter Filzmaier, Flooh Perlot, and Maria Beyrl

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Kwaśniewski, Aleksander (1954–)

Aleksander Kwaśniewski served as the president of Poland from 1995 to 2005. During the communist era, he was active in the communist Socialist Union of Polish Students. He was a former leader of the left-wing Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, successor to the former ruling Polish United Workers Party, and later of the Democratic Left Alliance.

When communism finally declined in Poland, Kwaśniewski participated in the Roundtable negotiations, where he cochaired the task group for trade union pluralism. Running for the Sejm from the Warsaw constituency in 1991, Kwaśniewski won the largest number of votes and headed the parliamentary caucus of the Democratic Left Alliance in his first and second terms. He was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and chairman of the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly.

In 1995, Kwaśniewski won the presidential elections, collecting 51.7% of the votes in the runoff, compared to 48.3% for the incumbent, Lech Wałęsa, the former Solidarity leader. Kwaśniewski's campaign slogans were "Let's choose the future" and "A Poland for all." In 2000 he was reelected in the first round of voting; his election campaign slogan was "A home for all—Poland."

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, Kwaśniewski organized an international conference in Warsaw, with participation of leaders from Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe to strengthen regional activities in fighting international terrorism. Under Kwaśniewski's leadership, Poland became a strong ally of the United States in the war on terror and contributed troops to the Iraq war, a move that was highly controversial in Poland and Europe.

Kwaśniewski took an active part in the efforts to secure Polish membership in NATO and was engaged in promoting further enlargement of NATO and the European Union.

Polish membership of the European Union became a reality on May 1, 2004, during Kwaśniewski's second term. He strongly supported putting Christian roots into the European Constitution and became one of the strongest advocates of Lithuanian and Ukrainian membership in NATO and the European Union. He also played a major role in peaceful solution of political conflict in Ukraine—the Orange Revolution.

Despite the deep polarization brought about by his election, and opposition fears that a Kwaśniewski presidency would signal a return to communism, these fears proved groundless, and he proved a surprisingly popular leader. His political course resembled that of Wałęsa's in several key respects, such as the pursuit of closer ties to the Western European political and military organizations and the transition to a market economy. He was able to avoid the conflicts with the Sejm and wanted to be seen as "the president of all Poles," including his political opponents.

Andrzej Falkowski

See also Poland, Democratization; Wałęsa, Lech

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

Labour Party, Britain

In terms of its use of communication, the Labour Party's evolution can be traced through three stages of propaganda, media, and marketing campaigning. The initial phase involved experimentation with advertising, public relations, and market research techniques. Strategist Sidney Webb's devising of "stratified electioneering" in 1922 was an early attempt to segment and target voters, and this and other methods helped Labour bypass a hostile print media and limited radio service. This experimentation culminated with London party leader Herbert Morrison's successful reelection in a 1937 local campaign devised by marketing experts and focused on persuading less committed supporters. Those involved were influenced by Graham Wallas's contention that mass democracy meant politics would be increasingly about imagery and symbolism. This conflicted with party traditionalists' belief in "making" (rather than "selling") socialism through interpersonal, didactic methods. Their "educationalist" approach dominated Labour's approach to communication until the 1960s, when Harold Wilson became party leader and the first prime minister to really exploit the growing medium of television.

Whereas previously the aim had been to maximize exposure, Labour's embrace of mediated political communication led to greater refinement of its message. During the run-up to the 1964 general election, strategists called for a "permanent campaign" to appeal to an increasingly affluent, "aspirational" electorate. An image-conscious Wilson perfected the sound bite, evoked a "New Britain," was compared to John F. Kennedy, and supervised the integration of opinion research, advertising, and public relations techniques and expertise into a campaign that ended with the Labour Party regaining office after 13 years in opposition. Marketing experts played a role in every subsequent election, although they became increasingly marginal prior to the arrival of Neil Kinnock as leader of the Labour Party in 1983 following Labour's traumatic defeat that year. Kinnock oversaw the most thorough reorganization of the party's communications in its history and underlined his commitment to professional methods by streamlining headquarters, recruiting the Shadow Communications Agency of marketing experts, and countenancing the employment of American campaign consultants. Although the subsequent 1987 campaign ended in further defeat to Margaret Thatcher, the new leader and his communications director Peter Mandelson (who was, incidentally, early campaign pioneer Herbert Morrison's grandson) were credited with having rejuvenated Labour's fortunes. The party subsequently embarked on a comprehensive Policy Review driven by opinion polling and focus group evidence provided by advisors, including the influential chief strategist Philip Gould. The review saw Labour embrace a marketing-driven electoral approach, in that opinion research now began to inform policies as well as their presentation. The consequences of this have been widespread and have included the abandonment of several long-standing commitments, together with the party's federal system of internal democracy, resulting in the centralization of power in the leader and his unelected advisers. This marketing-driven settlement did not prevent Labour losing again in 1992, but its ultimate legacy was to

help create the circumstances that enabled the charismatic Tony Blair to win the party leadership.

Dominic Wring

See also Blair, Tony

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See Nader, Ralph

Lamb, Brian

See C-SPAN Network

Lang, Gladys Engel (1919–)

Gladys Engel Lang is a sociologist trained at the University of Chicago. A researcher for the Offices of War Information (OWI) and Strategic Services (OSS), her contributions to political communication revolve around media effects on public perceptions and collective behavior. Lang's research in this area of scholarship began with her doctoral dissertation on television coverage of the 1952 Democratic and Republican conventions. Her study, parts of which were published in *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1955) and as a chapter in *Politics & Television* (a book cowritten with husband Kurt Lang, 1968), illustrated how televised commentary can define ambiguous events and create and emphasize action where none would exist otherwise.

Lang's focus on media effects, particularly those of television, is reflected in studies of presidential debates, Watergate, candidates' television images, and how polls influence public opinion and political behavior. In *Voting and Nonvoting* (1968), the Langs demonstrated how vote turnout and vote choice can be shaped by networks declaring a winner. Specifically, they showed how election returns can shift votes from the opponent to the frontrunner (the bandwagon effect), generate sympathy and extra votes for the person behind (the underdog effect), and suppress turnout (slack).

Lang's sociological orientation can be seen in her research on collective dynamics. With her husband, she has studied disaster news, riots, and school desegregation. Their book *Etched in Memory* (1990) seeks to understand how the reputations of some artists survive while others do not. The answer of who survives within the collective memory resides in a combination of demographic and social circumstances. The Langs' attempt to better understand the survival of artistic reputation, like their other studies, draws on multiple research strategies. In this case, they analyzed documents (e.g., memoirs, wills, exhibition announcements) and interviewed the friends and families of etchers. Their other studies have combined the use of survey data, content analyses, interviews, and observations.

A more important commonality in the Langs' research, however, deals with the impact of their work. Across decades of research, Gladys and Kurt Lang have identified immediate, long-term, and ancillary effects of media coverage of events and issues. They have concerned themselves with effects not only on individual consumers of media content but also on news practices and policy outcomes.

Professor emerita of communication, sociology, and political science at the University of Washington, Lang and her husband received the 1994 Murray Edelman Distinguished Career Award of the Political Communication Section of the American Political Science Association.

Patricia Moy

See also Edelman, Murray; Lang, Kurt

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Lang, Kurt (1924–)

Kurt Lang is a scholar whose research in political communication focuses on media effects, particularly how the media shape public opinion. Born in Germany, Lang earned his master's degree and doctorate at the University of Chicago in sociology, and spent several years working for the U.S. military. He has written extensively in the areas of the sociology of war, military institutions, and collective behavior.

In the realm of political communication, however, Lang and his wife Gladys Engel Lang are known best for their study "MacArthur Day in Chicago," which provided the basis for the former's doctoral dissertation. The chapter was published in their 1968 book *Politics & Television* and was hailed as a canonic text in media research by Elihu Katz and his colleagues in 2002.

The study of MacArthur Day compared on-scene observers' reports of the homecoming of General Douglas MacArthur with televised coverage of the same events (his arrival in Chicago, a motorcade and parade, and an evening rally). Observers expected great excitement on the part of bystanders and parade spectators, but instead found thin crowds, passive interest, and disappointment. Onsite observations were in stark contrast to televised coverage, which showed numerous crowds and enthusiastic admirers, and included exaggerated reports of attendance—reports that Lang and Lang showed to be unsubstantiated by other data. The MacArthur Day study emphasized how television portrayals of public mood or opinion, despite their inaccuracies, could be perceived as reality. In essence, television coverage could shape opinion and public policy that relied on public opinion.

The Langs' work on media effects also included a notable study of public opinion and media coverage related to Watergate. In their 1983 book, *The Battle for Public Opinion,* the Langs showed that the news media had very subtle effects on public perceptions of actors and events in this scandal. Specifically, how the news media decided to emphasize some events over others, to use particular language, and to rely on specific individuals as sources influenced how citizens' understanding of Watergate and attitudes toward President Richard Nixon. In 1995, *The Battle for Public Opinion* was cited by the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) as one of 50 books that have significantly shaped public opinion research. In 1989, AAPOR awarded the Langs its highest honor, the AAPOR Award for Exceptional Achievement in Public Opinion Research.

Lang is professor emeritus of communication and sociology at the University of Washington.

Patricia Moy

See also Framing; Lang, Gladys Engel

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Language and Politics

There are many different ways to approach the connections between language and politics, all of them to some extent involving different contexts and all of them in some ways connected. One way is to look at political language as a form of *rhetoric,* to see how politicians seek to persuade their audiences. Another way is to apply aspects of *discourse analysis* to political data; this involves looking at typical structures within political language and seeing how politicians show ideological stances through their language choices, whether these choices are conscious or unconscious.

This short account of the language of politics gives examples from each of these methods, to provide some of the flavor of a broad and important topic. It will begin, though, by looking at some issues around key words, including the word *politics* itself.

Politics/Politician/Political/Politicize

Few words in English carry such negative connotations as the word *politician.* "Connotation" refers to the level of meaning based on associations we attach to words, whereas "denotation" is the referential meaning, the barest core of a word's meaning. A denotative definition of the word *politician* might be

something like "a person who is practically engaged in running a country, district, or town," but the connotations surrounding the word *politician* are nearly always negative, often strongly so.

The suggestion that politicians are somehow sinister, devious figures goes back a long way. Hotspur in Shakespeare's *Henry IV*, Part 1, says of his opponent Bolingbroke:

> I am whipt and scourg'd with rods
>
> Nettled, and stung with pismires (ants), when I hear
>
> Of this vile politician.

And King Lear says to the blinded Gloucester:

> Get thee glass eyes
>
> And like a scurvy politician, seem
>
> To see the things thou dost not.

Because the word *politician* carries such negative connotations, another word is required for those few politicians who achieve and sustain almost universal popularity. If the word *politician* carries such a stigma, then what can we call figures such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, or Nelson Mandela, whose reputations are largely untainted with the usual connotations of deviousness? One word often used to describe them is *statesman*, a word that carries connotations of wisdom, vision, dignity.

The noun *politician* belongs to a family of words: *politic, politics, political, politicize* are some others. The root form *politic* comes originally from classical Greek, meaning "city, citizen, civic," but even Greek philosophers like Plato described politics as "nothing but corruption."

The idea that politics refers broadly to people and the lives they lead in organized communities rather than more narrowly to the battleground of conventional party politics became used again in the 1960s. Feminists, for instance, talked of sexual politics; in using this term they were arguing that culture and ways of behavior, including how we use language, have to be examined and changed. In this sense, then, to politicize an issue is a positive move—it is to subject it to rigorous and careful analysis and to act upon the subsequent findings. To describe an issue as "political," in this usage of the word, is to demand a serious analysis and recognize the need for change; those who seek such analysis and change will often urge those close to the issue to become "politicized." To talk of the politics of food production, for example, suggests that there is something wrong with the way food is currently produced, something wrong with the systems that support that production, and that changes must be made.

Eventually the distinctions among the use of the words *politics/political/ politicize* described here and the narrower sense of politics as the process of government can become blurred—if pressure groups seeking to politicize an issue are successful in raising awareness, then their leaders often become elected politicians, while other professional politicians are quick to add the issue to their own lists of concerns.

Labels

What you are called, what you call yourself, what you call your policies, what you call your enemies are a vital part of the political process. In Britain, for example, the Conservative Party happily refers to itself as the "Tory Party," even though when originally used the word *Tory* referred to Irish robbers. Many political labels carry either positive or negative connotations, and usually these labels undergo semantic drift as their meanings subtly change.

For example, all of the following terms for systems of government carry subtle connotations, often dependent on the context in which they are used: *democracy, dictatorship, one-man rule, regime, junta.* Western leaders, for example, frequently extol the virtues of democracy as though its absolute value as a term must be taken for granted.

All of the following terms, which describe opponents to those in power, carry subtly different connotations**:** *a revolutionary, a fundamentalist, a dissident, a zealot, a critic, a partisan, a militant, a separatist, a paramilitary, a protester, a liberator.* Although often used by politicians as though they are neutral in value, such terms are in fact laden with implications.

Another type of political label is that which is attached to a specific political figure. These can begin life as satirical jibes but then shift in connotation and be seen as complimentary. When Margaret Thatcher was first referred to as "The Iron Lady," she was being depicted as narrow and inflexible, but the term became approving when it was seen to represent qualities of toughness and resolve. Sometimes, too, a particular policy or policies is given a label, named after

the politician deemed to be most responsible for its development; examples include *Reaganomics, Thatcherite, Blairite*.

Rhetoric

Although public speaking is often described as an art (and so presumably a good thing), political public speaking is often labeled as "rhetoric," a term with sometimes negative connotations. The idea that rhetoric is dangerous goes as far back as the concept itself. In classical Greece the Sophists were a group of paid teachers who journeyed around Greece teaching young men how to get on, in politics especially, by using rational arguments rather than intrinsic "truths." The sophist Protagoras argued that the relativity of truth meant that students needed to be able to see both sides of a question, so he taught students to praise and blame the same thing—with the idea being that the best course of action would be sorted out through this debate. It is easy to see, however, how this doctrine could be seen as encouraging the specious, of deceiving both self and others rather than seeking the truth. In early classical civilization, therefore, we can already see the dichotomy about political rhetoric that still exists today. Can content be separated from delivery? Do truth, substance, and sincerity matter more than style? What is truth? Is it possible to distinguish between the substance and the surface? Do politicians actually believe anything at all? Is the whole political thing just a cynical exercise?

The Problem of Truth

Politicians and other public figures often complain about bias in the media, about media "witch hunts"; instead of reporting the truth, they claim, the media present a distorted picture that serves their own interests. Sometimes the complaints revolve around the fact that a story has been broken at all, at other times they concern the presentation of the story, including the language used. Meanwhile the media ridicule politicians for never telling the truth. Truth is relative, though; there is no such thing as absolute truth. What we call a truth is in fact an assertion that we ourselves believe in. By this definition, truth is both relative and subjective. The whole idea of "truth" is very problematic at the best of times, but when it relates to how a political story is reported then it is especially so.

When a television news team reports a story, they make a number of decisions that will affect how the story is received by the audience. Where they position the camera, the sequence in which they show events, the language they use all determine the overall picture we get. In making these decisions they are reflecting an ideological view; there is no such thing as an unbiased report, no such thing as "neutral" language.

This does not mean, though, that language is merely the tool of cynical manipulation, that because you can report the same story in different ways there are no such things as ethical or moral behavior, that one political policy is no more fair and just than another. Language is a means of communication, a means of presenting and shaping argument, and political argument is ideological in that it comes from a series of beliefs. Language is not something separate from the ideas it contains, but the way language is used says a great deal about how the ideas have been shaped.

When analyzing examples of rhetoric it is important to put the data into context. One key question involves the extent to which the example being analyzed is preplanned. Another question involves whether or not the data is spoken, or written, or written to be spoken—and many political speeches also appear in an officially released format that does not necessarily coincide exactly with what was said. These generic issues around planning and delivery are compounded by the fact that the written data we tend to use for analysis does not fully incorporate the three elements that Aristotle identified as being central to rhetoric. Although we are in a reasonable position to examine the *logos* (or arguments) of the data, we can only guess at aspects of the *ethos* (or character of the speaker) and the *pathos* (literally, the means of raising passion in an audience).

The Significance of Pronouns

Pronouns are very common in talk, giving agency to actions (saying who is doing something) and helping to provide cohesion to the overall speech. Politicians and their speechwriters, then, have some difficult decisions to make when it comes to using the pronouns that will keep appearing in their speeches: How much responsibility are they prepared to take on themselves; how much responsibility for success are they willing to share with other colleagues; how confident are they that whole groups of people share their views; how much responsibility for failure are they prepared to accept as their own?

When politicians make speeches, they have two sets of first-person pronouns available to them.

They can talk in the first person singular, using *I/me/myself/mine* or they can talk in the first-person plural using *we/us/ourselves/ours*. With the latter, though, there are several potential meanings. The first-person plural forms can have the following range of reference:

- They can refer to I plus one other; that is, we = minister + prime minister.
- They can refer to I plus a group; that is, we = minister + government and/or political party.
- They can refer to I plus the whole country; that is, we = minister + people of the nation.
- They can even refer to I plus the rest of humanity; that is, we = minister + people everywhere.

The advantage of the singular forms (I/me/myself/mine) is that they show a clear sense of personal involvement on the part of the speaker, which is especially useful when good news is delivered. The disadvantage can be that they show all too clearly where blame lies if something goes wrong. They can also be seen as too self-important, with the individual speakers placing themselves above or outside the collective responsibility of their colleagues. The advantage of the plural pronoun forms (we/us/ourselves/ours) is that they help share the responsibility, especially when the decisions are tricky, when the news is uncertain. In their broadest reference they can show the politician in touch with all of the country, even all of the world. The disadvantage is that the individual does not gain so much credit when things go well.

The following transcript of part of a televised speech by George W. Bush in 2004 shows the importance of pronouns in public rhetoric and the various ways in which they are used:

> If America shows uncertainty or weakness in this decade, the world will drift toward tragedy. That's not going to happen, so long as I'm your president.
>
> The next four years we will continue to strengthen our homeland defenses. We will strengthen our intelligence-gathering services. We will reform our military. The military will be an all-volunteer army.
>
> We will continue to stay on the offense. We will fight the terrorists around the world so we do not have to face them here at home.
>
> We'll continue to build our alliances. I'll never turn over America's national security needs to leaders of other countries, as we continue to build those alliances.
>
> And we'll continue to spread freedom. I believe in the transformational power of liberty. I believe that the free Iraq is in this nation's interests. I believe a free Afghanistan is in this nation's interest.
>
> And I believe both a free Afghanistan and a free Iraq will serve as a powerful example for millions who plead in silence for liberty in the broader Middle East.

Metaphor and Metonymy

Both metaphor and metonymy are frequently used in the language of politics. They are only one aspect of political discourse, but they are useful starting points for looking at some of the ways in which political language has ideological implications.

Metaphor refers to a word or a phrase used to establish a comparison between one idea and another. When a politician is said to "take flak" from an opponent, politics is being compared to warfare, with the politician metaphorically being shot at. On the other hand, it may be the politician who is "on the offensive, targeting" his opponents by "launching an attack" on their policies.

Metonymy involves replacing the name of something with something that is connected to it, without being the whole thing. For example, the president of the United States, his government and advisors, are sometimes replaced by the much simpler term "the White House," which is the presidential residence and administrative center. Similarly, when an announcement is made by the British government, it might begin, "Number 10 Downing Street today announced. . . ." This metonymic use allows economy of language and gives the audience a sort of mnemonic. But it can also be used ideologically: "bad" news is much more likely to be incorporated into metonymically distancing references than good, whereas good news is much more likely to emanate from the named individual.

Adrian Beard

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Lasswell, Harold (1902–1978)

Harold Dwight Lasswell was an influential American social scientist who did pioneering work in political science and communication. His main achievements are the study of propaganda and the development of content analysis as a research method in communication.

Lasswell earned a bachelor's degree in economics and a doctoral degree in political science from the University on Chicago. During his career, he served as a faculty member for major U.S. universities, such as the University of Chicago, Yale University, City University of New York, Temple University, and Columbia University. He was part of the intellectual group of scholars known as the "Chicago School." During the 1930s, Lasswell became one of the leaders of the Rockefeller Foundation Seminar on Mass Communication, where he made two important contributions to the field of communication. First, he defined communication as "*Who* says *what* to *whom* through *which channel* with *what effect?*" a model that became the main paradigm in the filed and stirred research on media effects. Second, Lasswell theorized about the functions of communication in society, identifying surveillance of the environment, correlation of individuals' responses to societal stimuli, and transmission of cultural heritage as the three main functions of the process. Together with entertainment, which was added to the list later by Charles Wright, these functions became known as the classic functions of communication and the basis for the uses and gratifications theory. A third significant contribution to the study of communication was the development of qualitative and quantitative research methods. He developed content analysis while studying propaganda disseminated by various countries engaged in World War I and II. Lasswell served as the chief of the Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communications at the U.S. Library of Congress. This division analyzed print and broadcast communications disseminated by the Axis powers to identify propaganda strategies used by to divide and demoralize the enemy. In doing so, Lasswell and his associates developed sampling techniques, measurement systems, reliability and validity guidelines for content analysis. The first courses on propaganda and public opinion formation taught in American universities came directly from Lasswell's research.

His most popular works include *Propaganda and Communication in World History* (in three volumes; 1979), *Propaganda Techniques in the World War* (1927), *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930), and *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (1936). His interests were diverse and ranged beyond the field of political science and communication. He published across the board in social sciences (anthropology, international and economic relations, law, and psychiatry) and was among the first scholars who attempted to bridge psychoanalysis and behaviorism. Lasswell worked with psychoanalysts in Boston, Vienna, and Berlin on psychoanalytic theory and set up his own experimental lab where he conducted experiments with volunteers, an initiative that scandalized the academic world at the time. He founded the field of political psychology by using psychoanalysis and psychology to describe causal relationships between the personality of politicians and their political behavior. Such theories are explained in his books *Psychopathology and Politics* and *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (1965).

Monica Postelnicu

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Late Night Talk Shows

See Talk Shows, Television

Latinos and Politics, Media

A common analogy about Latinos in the realm of politics as well as marketing is that of "a sleeping giant," which implies a great potential that has yet to be mobilized. Regarding politics and media, however, the Latino giant—that is, the 45 million and rapidly growing population that at 15% of the nation's total is already the country's largest ethnic minority group—is not a single homogeneous body. Instead, it incorporates a number of diverse groups concentrated in a number of regions of the country, with language preferences that vary, and not all of whom are U.S. citizens and able to vote. They are served by and use a vast and growing Latino-oriented media, which offer political news and information that is generally relevant but limited in its use as an incentive for political action. For political news, Latinos are also use general market (mainstream) media, which tend to stereotype or ignore Latinos in terms of political matters.

Political communication research pertaining to Latinos has focused on content analysis of the media and on the communication strategies used by the Democratic and the Republican parties to gain Latino votes. Very little has been studied about Latinos' use of the media and on media effects on their voting opinions, attitudes, or behaviors. Nevertheless, Latinos, just like other Americans, are not immune to political messages disseminated via the media or by the growing number of Internet sites dedicated to all types of political information and propaganda. Still pending, however, are systematic analyses of the role and impact of media (including the Internet) on Latino political life, as well as experimental studies of political messages and of communication rhetoric aimed at Latinos.

Latinos in the United States

Approximately 67% of the Latino population residing across the 50 states is of Mexican heritage, 9% is Puerto Rican, and 4% is of Cuban heritage; 20% is from other Spanish heritage regions and countries. Mexican Americans are concentrated in the southwestern states; the major concentrations are in California and Texas, but the metropolitan cities of every state in the region are home to a few thousand and up to 8 million Latinos (Los Angeles). Puerto Ricans are concentrated in New York and other northeastern states, but also in Illinois and increasingly in central Florida. Cubans tend to reside in the southern Florida region but also in select cities in the Northeast. Central and South American Latinos, as well as others from the Caribbean, have their respective concentrations in select cities, but, as is the case for all other Latinos, they are also scattered across the whole country.

Felipe de Jesus Calderón was elected in the contested 2006 presidential elections. The results were controversial and contested by opponent Andrés Manuel López Obrador, but they were validated by the electoral courts in September 2006. At age 43, Calderon is one of the youngest persons to be elected president of Mexico.

Source: Noticias e Información de la Presidencia.

More than 28 million Latinos (62%) speak primarily Spanish in the home; 13.8 million (31%) do not speak English very well. The level of language proficiency varies by educational attainment, years of residency in the United States, and parental heritage (i.e., more Spanish fluency if both parents speak primarily Spanish; more English if at least one parent speaks primarily English). In some cities (e.g., New York, San Antonio), the

majority of Latinos are bilingual; in others (e.g., Houston, Los Angeles, Miami), Spanish is the preferred language. English as the dominant language of most Latinos is rare.

As a legacy of the U.S. Jones Act, which was unilaterally imposed on Puerto Rico by the U.S. Congress in 1917, all Puerto Ricans (the 2.65 million living in the 50 states of the union as well as the 3.9 million living on the island Commonwealth-type nation) are U.S. citizens. However, only Puerto Ricans residing in a state are allowed to vote in federal elections (i.e., candidates for president, vice president, or Congress). For all other Latinos, eligibility to vote is contingent on acquiring U.S. citizenship by birth on the mainland (or a U.S. territory) or by naturalization.

In 2006, 17.2 million Latinos (38%) were eligible to vote (i.e., were U.S. citizens age 18 and above). Approximately 7 million (less than half of those eligible) voted in the 2004 presidential elections; for the 2008 elections, the projection is 10.5 million. While among all eligible Latino voters the actual voter turnout is low, among Latinos who were foreign nationals and subsequently became U.S. citizens the voting participation rate exceeds that of U.S.-born citizens of any background.

The Media Landscape

Latinos who seek to learn about and participate in American (i.e., U.S.) politics read and tune in to the same general market media that are used by all other politically inclined people who wish to do the same. This means that Latinos, as do non-Latinos, watch the local, network, and cable television channels, read mainstream newspapers and magazines, listen to radio news and commentary, and nowadays increasingly search the Internet for political news and information.

In addition, Latinos have available to them a vast, growing, and diverse Latino-oriented media, many of which also offer news and information about American politics. There are two main Spanish-language broadcast networks (Univisión and Telemundo), the corresponding complementary networks of each of these (Telefutura and Mun2), regional emerging networks (e.g., Galavisión, TV Azteca, LA-TV, SíTV), plus numerous cable channels (e.g., CNN en Español, Discovery en Español, Fox Sports en Español, HBO Latino, MTV Tr3s), which are Latino and/or Latin American operations of the parent market cable companies. News about U.S. politics in general and Latino-related politics in particular are regularly aired in the first of these networks, which have been conduits for political spots for the political parties and candidates during electoral campaigns. The local stations affiliated or owned by the two largest networks also offer a regular stream of news and have likewise broadcast political commercials for local and national elections. However, except for CNN en Español, news programs are practically absent in the other outlets because of the focus of those channels or by omission of the programming/news directors.

In the United States, approximately 20 daily newspapers are published in Spanish for this country's Latinos who can read in that language. Without a doubt, these newspapers cover their respective communities and, in varying degrees, the political news—especially when the editors consider the happenings important for their readers. Political advertising is also found in these newspapers, especially during local elections.

Across the country, more than 350 Latino-oriented weekly newspapers are also published; most are printed in Spanish, a few in English or in both languages. Some are news oriented and cover quite well the local and some nonlocal events (political or otherwise); others print mostly advertisements and offer little or no political news of any type. The extent to which political candidates advertise in these papers varies by locality and type of press.

National and regional magazines oriented to U.S. Latinos are scarce, but the monthly *Hispanic, Latina Style, Latina, Hispanic Business,* and *Vista* (a newspaper insert akin to *Parade*), all of which are published in English, offer occasional political content relevant to Latinos. Advertisements for presidential candidates have occasionally been printed in these media. The vast majority of the U.S.-based Spanish-language magazines are for the most part about fashion, lifestyle, entertainment, celebrities, or sports. Thus, these do not regularly carry political news or advertising.

Latino-oriented AM and FM radio stations—most of them in Spanish but also a few bilingual ones—are easily found all across the country. In cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Chicago, Houston, Dallas, Miami, and Orlando, which have large concentrations of Latinos, various radio stations are aimed at this audience. And in border cities all across the South, especially in San Diego, El Paso, and Laredo, in addition to the local Spanish-language stations, other stations from Mexico are also easily heard. Because of these stations' popularity, many political candidates, especially local ones, have purchased and

aired campaign spots on them. However, news is currently a very scarce offering on most radio stations, especially those in Spanish. As an outcome of the deregulation of the broadcast industry, which led to the increased concentration of ownership and the decline of locally owned operations, radio news programs have been phased out across the country. For example, in central Texas (Austin to San Antonio), in late 2006 none of the 17 Spanish-language stations offered any locally produced news; even canned radio network news was extremely scarce. Popular as these media outlets may be for entertainment and airing of occasional political advertisements, their offerings of political news and information are scarce. Their role as political socialization agents for Latinos is thus understandably quite limited except in some cities (e.g., Miami, New York, Los Angeles), where at least one station in each place does offer regular local news programs, talk show programs, and even political commentary.

For Latinos seeking political news and information, the Internet may be an emergent valuable source. This is particularly the case for the designated sections of the Democratic and the Republican parties' Web sites, and the corresponding sections of the political candidates from both parties who have made it their purpose to create Latino-oriented sections in English and/or Spanish.

The Latino-oriented media described, as well as the general market (mainstream) media, constitute important sources that inform and socialize Latinos' political orientations and behaviors. All types of media are particularly crucial for the political parties, candidates, and their respective outreach operatives, who constantly funnel news, information, and propaganda via those outlets. Undoubtedly, the media—interacting with the communication flowing from family, friends, coworkers, and religious and/or social groups—constitute crucial factors in influencing the political lives of Latinos.

Evidence From Research

Empirical research about the political content provided by Latino-oriented media, or about what the general market media offer in terms of Latino-focused political news, is currently at a developing stage. Also embryonic is the research on the communication strategies employed by the political parties and their candidates to woo Latino voters. Less prominent is survey research attesting to the actual political influence that the media might have on Latinos. Experimental studies of the impact of particular messages or analysis about Latino-oriented political rhetoric are even scarcer.

Like their English-language counterparts, Spanish-language (SL) newspapers have historically printed political news and opinion content. The traditional, commercial-based SL papers have offered such content as an integral part of their coverage of world, national, and local events. A few community-centered or political SL papers focus on advocacy and civil rights issues.

Systematic studies of the latter papers have not been conducted, but it is known that such papers played major roles in the organization, mobilization, and struggles of U.S. Latino and of immigrant activists seeking to overcome discrimination, prejudice, or oppression at home and abroad. Studies of the SL daily newspapers reveal that they all offer political campaign news, but primarily focus—just like their English-language counterparts—on the horse race elements of the campaign. The SL daily papers, however, have been observed to be more partisan than their English-language counterparts. In studies of the coverage of campaigns of the 1980s, *La Opinión* (Los Angeles) and *El Diario-La Prensa* (New York) clearly favored Democratic candidates, while *Diario Las Américas* and *El Nuevo Herald* (Miami) and the now defunct *Noticias del Mundo* (New York) favored Republicans. In these daily newspapers, political/electoral editorials, editorial cartoons, and opinion columns have not been frequent, except in the conservative *Diario Las Américas.* There are no recent in-depth studies of these or the newer dailies that have emerged since the mid-1990s.

The English-language (EL) press coverage of Latino politics (and Latinos in general) has been much more dismal. The main focus of Latino-related political news in these publications has been on the (re)discovery of the potential Latino vote (e.g., whether or not it is still a sleeping giant and if it speaks more Spanish than English or vice versa), the liberalism/conservatism of Latinos (i.e., if they are more prone to vote Democrat or Republican), which candidate is preferred by Latinos (i.e., the horserace among potential Latino voters), and the Latino-oriented campaign activities of select political candidates and/or their parties. The issues and concerns (whatever those may be; for example, education, immigration, affirmative action) that are of central

interest to Latinos in general or to particular subgroups of Latinos have not received much coverage. The EL papers also do not give much attention to Latino candidates, and very infrequently publish editorials or op-ed pieces that focus on Latino electorates or issues.

Studies of the English-language network news reveal strikingly similar patterns in their coverage of Latino political stories. What distinguishes these, however, is the tendency to highlight Latino music and dancers (e.g., Mariachis and ladies with wide, colorful dresses) at the campaign stops that presidential contenders occasional make in predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods.

Research about how the Spanish-language network news cover Latinos reveals that these media have followed some of those same patterns. With each passing electoral campaign, however, Spanish-language networks have made major strides to mobilize Latinos to register and vote. The news departments at the national and sometimes local levels also do not pass up any opportunity to cover and even feature Latino candidates as well as Spanish-speaking representatives or spokespersons for non-English-speaking candidates. Still, the specific issues or concerns of Latino communities or particular Latino subgroups are not covered extensively. Most notably missing in these media, as well as in the press, are news and information that is both uniquely relevant and *serve as incentives to mobilize* Latinos not just to register, but also to get involved in the campaigns and subsequently vote.

Turning to radio, no empirical research has been published about the political content (be it news, commentary, or advertising) directed to Latinos. However, it does not take much research to recognize the mobilization potential of this medium. This was made quite evident during spring 2006, when a handful of disc jockeys in radio stations in Los Angeles and other metropolitan cities used their airtime to promote what turned out to be massive marches against the most restrictive immigration reforms that were being proposed by the conservative elements of the Republican Party.

The political communication topic that has received most academic attention pertains to the communication strategies that the Democratic Party and the Republican Party have used to woo Latino voters during presidential elections. The cumulative evidence from that research shows that dating back to the 1950s, Latinos have been particularly targeted via a variety of communication efforts ranging from simple propaganda paraphernalia (e.g., posters, campaign buttons in Spanish) to sophisticated, multifaceted, and multimedia campaigns via general market and Latino-oriented media in both Spanish and English.

The Latino-oriented political communication efforts have been inconsistent over the years. They have been most intense in tight races during which the Latino vote was considered essential for victory, and least forceful when a party considers that its candidate is assured victory. The Republican Party, more than the Democratic Party, has designated the greatest amount of funding, centralized long-term planning, and multimedia (English and Spanish, print and broadcast) strategies (including survey and focus group research) to target Latinos. The GOP has also formulated advertising and propaganda that seeks to persuade via messages that appeal to emotional chords. In contrast, the Democratic Party has designated significantly less money to its Latino outreach efforts, which have been inconsistent and retooled from one campaign to the next, limited in their research foundations, directed predominantly in Spanish, and focused on specific issues via messages that have not been very emotionally appealing. A common trend since the late 1990s is that both parties—and their respective candidates for the presidency—have set up Latino-oriented Internet Web sites (in English and/or Spanish). These sites have started to receive some academic research attention that shows the different characteristics of each party's efforts to inform and woo Latino voters.

Analysis of the effects that the media and the political parties' communication outreach efforts have had on the political attitudes, opinions, and behaviors of Latinos have not received much systematic research attention. Limited as that research may be, what is clear is that exposure to newspapers and television news does contribute to Latinos' political knowledge, but to a lesser extent to their political participation.

Nonetheless, millions of Latinos do participate in U.S. electoral politics. That participation, which varies by Latino subgroups, location, and campaign period, cannot all be attributed to just word-of-mouth persuasion. Directly or indirectly, the media do play many roles in that process. The shortcomings of the current survey studies to date—mostly secondary analyses of data not designed to specifically assess media effects—and the absence of more sophisticated research leave open new grounds for studies in this arena.

Undoubtedly, Latinos who are U.S. citizens and eligible to vote, as well as Latinos who cannot or wish not to vote, are exposed to and use the media in

English and in Spanish. Thus, all Latinos are potentially influenced by the political news and information that stream from those media and can also be affected in distinct ways by the absence of relevant content in those media. Likewise, Latinos of all types may also be influenced by the communication outreach efforts that political parties and candidates direct to them.

The arena for studying the intersections among Latinos, media, and politics—not only related to presidential campaigns, as has been the norm to date, but also local elections—is ripe for new explorations. Opportunities for innovative research are also open for experimental studies, and many other inquiries related to political communication and Latinos. Given the recent surge in the number of Latinos voting and/or flexing their advocacy muscles in massive marches, the sleeping giant analogy maybe less applicable to this population, but more so to this arena of the field of political communication, which still waits to be awakened.

Federico Subervi

See also Minorities, Role in Politics

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LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. (1901–1976)

Paul F. Lazarsfeld was one of the most influential social scientists of the 20th century. He is credited with the founding of market research and communication research into media effects and the creation of the two-step flow model of mass communication. He significantly advanced qualitative and quantitative methodology for social sciences and invented the first instrument to measure audience reactions to media content in real time.

Shortly after earning a PhD degree in applied mathematics from the University of Vienna in 1925, Lazarsfeld founded the Research Center for Economic Psychology under the patronage of the university. This was the first research institute in the world to be affiliated with a university, and it became well known after conducting the first study of unemployment impact on community life (the Marienthal Study, 1931–1932) and one of the very first studies in the world about the effects of radio broadcasts on listeners.

In 1935, Lazarsfeld left his native Vienna to immigrate to the United States after his family was persecuted by the police for its connection to the Socialist Party in Austria. In the United States, Lazarsfeld founded and directed the Research Center at the University of Newark. In 1937, he moved to Princeton University to become associate director for the Office of Radio Research, which moved to Columbia University in 1944 under the name of the Bureau for Applied Social Research. His work at these institutions laid the foundation for communication research into media effects.

First in a series of seminal studies was the Erie Country (Ohio) Study, an investigation into how mass media influenced people's voting behavior during the 1940 U.S. presidential campaign. Lazarsfeld discovered that mass media influenced only a small number of people (opinion leaders), who in turn persuaded others through interpersonal communication, a process known as "the two-step flow of communication." These findings were described in Lazarsfeld's 1944 book titled *The People's Choice,* which launched the paradigm of limited effects of mass media and also created the foundation for research into people's voting behavior. The relationship among mass media, opinion leaders, and interpersonal communication was explored again in 1945, when Lazarsfeld conducted the Decatur Study of personal influence, explained in the book *Personal Influence* (1955), coauthored with Elihu Katz.

Lazarsfeld's background in mathematics helped him pioneer new quantitative methods of data analysis such as cross-tabulation and deviant case analysis. A firm believer in triangulation, he also developed qualitative methods of research and pioneered focus group interviewing. In collaboration with Frank Stanton of CBS, Lazarsfeld developed the first media effects measurement machine, called the "Lazarsfeld-Stanton program

analyzer." The machine, nicknamed "Little Annie," was a two-button device that could record audience's likes and dislikes regarding media content in real time. It was quickly adopted in other fields of research, such as advertising and media content pretesting.

Monica Postelnicu

See also People's Choice, The; *Personal Influence*; Political Socialization; Two-Step Flow Model of Communication

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Lehrer, Jim (1934–)

James Charles Lehrer was born May 19, 1934, in Wichita, Kansas. A news anchor for *The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer* on PBS, he is an author of nonfiction and fiction novels, films, and plays. At Thomas Jefferson High School in San Antonio, Texas, he was one of the three sports editors at the *Jefferson Declaration.* Lehrer graduated from Victoria College and the University of Missouri. After serving 3 years in the U.S. Marine Corps, his journalism career began at the *Dallas Morning News* and then the *Dallas Times-Herald*. Lehrer covered the Kennedy assassination in 1963. He was also a political columnist at the *Dallas Times-Herald* and became the paper's city editor in 1968.

Lehrer's newspaper career led him to Dallas KERA-TV to work as executive director of public affairs, anchor, and editor of a nightly news program. His work with the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) began in 1972 when he moved to Washington, D.C., to serve as the public affairs coordinator. Lehrer was also a fellow at the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and a member of PBS's Journalism Advisory Board. His work as a correspondent for the National Public Affairs Center for Television (NPACT) led to his relationship with Robert MacNeil. In 1973, Lehrer and MacNeil provided continuous live coverage of the Senate Watergate hearings on PBS, which won them an Emmy. He also covered the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment inquiry of Richard Nixon as a solo anchor on PBS.

In 1975, Lehrer became the Washington correspondent for the half-hour *Robert MacNeil Report,* which was renamed *The MacNeil/Lehrer Report.* The news program won more than 30 awards for journalistic excellence. The collaboration became *The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour* in 1983 and continued until 1996, when MacNeil departed from the news program. Lehrer began hosting *The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer* in 1996.

Lehrer's awards include the 1999 National Humanities Medal, presented by President Bill Clinton and First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, two Emmys, the Fred Friendly First Amendment Award, the George Foster Peabody Broadcast Award, the William Allen White Foundation Award for Journalistic Merit, and the University of Missouri School of Journalism's Medal of Honor. He was inducted into the Television Hall of Frame with MacNeil and inducted into the Silver Circle of the Washington, D.C., chapter of the National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences. He was also elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Lehrer has served as a moderator for 10 of the nationally televised debates in the past four presidential elections.

Kristen D. Landreville

See also PBS (Public Broadcasting Service)

Lenin, Vladímir I. (1870–1924)

Vladímir Iljítsch Uljánov was the leader of Russian Revolution (1917) und founder of the Soviet Union (1922). His works include contributions to political theory and philosophy (*Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism; State and Revolution,* both published in 1917). Lenin was the author of several theoretical works in philosophy such as *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* (published in 1909), which became fundamental in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, especially in their epistemology. In the text Lenin argued, among other issues, that human perceptions correctly and accurately can reflect the objective external world and that there is no independent,

nonsubjective way to verify the existence of the external world.

In an earlier pamphlet titled *What Is to Be Done?* (published in 1902), Lenin argued that only a disciplined party of professional revolutionaries could bring socialism to Russia. In the book Lenin developed his Theory of (Party) Press. He saw the press as an instrument both (1) of party building and (2) of communication between party and people. Relating to the development of party, he judged a party press as necessary for internal communication (organization, self-notification, etc.). As to communication to the masses, Lenin followed Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (*Manifesto of the Communist Party,* 1848) and understood the Communist Party as avant-garde. According to Lenin, the communists have "over the great masses of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement." Thus Lenin defined the party's main task "to connect spontaneous evolution with conscious revolutionary action," that is, the transformation of everyday experiences into socialist consciousness in sense of the Marxist theory. To sum up both functions, he postulated, "The role of a newspaper, however is not limited solely to the dissemination of ideas, to political education, and to the enlistment of political allies. A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a collective organizer." Lenin understood the public sphere not as place of exchange of ideas and/or opinions, but in an educational and unidirectional way of communication form the party to the people.

Until 1989, Lenin's Theory of Press was a very influential doctrine in theory and practice of political communication in the former Soviet bloc.

Hans-Joerg Stiehler

See also Communism; Marx, Karl

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Le Pen, Jean-Marie (1928–)

Born on June 20, 1928, Jean-Marie Le Pen has brought the French far right back to the political scene from where it was excluded because of its extensive collaboration with the Nazis during the Second World War.

His early interest in politics led him to become one of the youngest members of the French Parliament when he was elected on the populist politician Pierre Poujade list in 1956, after having led several rightist movements when he was a student. Though he was drawn back to a relative obscurity in the 1970s, he was brought back to light by two events. First, he was made rich thanks to the death of the owner of the Lambert Concrete Manufactories, Hubert Lambert, who had made him his sole heir. This relieved him of any financial concerns and even enabled him to finance his own party, the newly renovated "Front National." Second, in the mid-1980s, he was helped, paradoxically, when Socialist President François Mitterrand introduced proportional voting to the Parliament in order to diminish his opponents' chances of victory, by giving seats to the small parties—Front National included. This took Jean-Marie Le Pen again to the French Parliament.

From then on, systematically betting on the fears of his fellowmen, notably fear of unemployment due to the foreign-born immigrants, Le Pen regularly increased his electoral scores. For the 2002 presidential election, taking advantage of a low voter turnout and of some campaigning mistakes made by Lionel Jospin, the Socialist candidate, he achieved the unexpected result of making it to the second round of voting against incumbent President Jacques Chirac (who was then easily reelected, with most of the French politicians calling to vote for him against Le Pen).

Jean-Marie Le Pen's campaigning skills have helped him considerably all along. A formidable debater, he is feared by many French politicians. The analyses of his speeches reveal very elaborate discourse strategies. For instance, in order to prove himself as a legitimate candidate, he is one of the very few French politicians to employ some relatively outdated forms of the French language (subjunctive, or nearly forgotten words) in order to subconsciously convey that he his part of old-roots France. One of his less understood but main victories is the fact that he was one of the first to put several issues on the French political agenda: the consequences of the globalization of the economy, and personal safety worries, issues that are now, willingly or not, taken on by most parties and politicians.

Jean-Marie Le Pen also knows how to regularly get media attention when needed, by uttering sentences or words that are on the fringe of what may be tolerated, but do not break the law. His most famous

voluntary slip happened during a radio broadcast, on September 13, 1987: he said that the Nazi gas chambers in the extermination camps were a mere "detail" of the Second World War. Though he insisted later that he was meaning that other methods were used by the Nazis to kill Jews, this caused an immediate scandal, exactly what he was looking for.

His campaigns are organized according to the best of political marketing methods. The Front National militants are systematically trained in a country castle in Normandy; its meetings are carefully planned, often with paying admission in order to eliminate curious people and troublemakers. Similarly, he always starts campaigning early, in order to put into the minds of voters that he will be a candidate, relaying these early starts with elaborate campaigns of direct marketing by mail to increase donations.

Philippe J. Maarek

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Letters to the editor (LTE), a long-standing tradition in American journalism, are letters sent to publications by readers to express opinions about a wide range of issues. While LTEs traditionally have been sent to newspapers, they are now also submitted to electronic broadcast media, including local and national television and radio news programs. In these latter cases, the letters are sometimes read on the air. LTEs are deemed important because they (a) provide a public forum for deliberation and debate on critical issues in a democracy, (b) can influence public policy via their use by both citizens and politicians, and (c) underscore the role of journalism in society and its responsibility to offer a space for public debate. Academic research on this topic has examined the nature of that public forum.

One the one hand, it has been noted that caution should be taken in surmising that letters to the editor are a true reflection of public opinion on a topic. For example, LTEs may be biased in that they simply reflect the opinions of the editorial staff who act as gatekeepers in their selection and publication. Or letters may be chosen for inclusion because of their sensational or dramatic appeal to readers rather than because they are a representative sample of the letters received. Writers of LTEs are also often not demographically and politically representative of the public and are considered unusual because they feel so strongly about an issue that they are willing to make public statements. They have been characterized as a fringe element in society who use the opportunity to blow off steam about an issue.

However, some investigations have shown that LTEs do reflect public opinion on particular and often controversial issues, such as the decision by Arizonans to reject a Martin Luther King Day ballot initiative, or levels of support or opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment. While caution should be exercised in generalizing these findings, letters, on issues that generate strong interest and emotion, written to a broad-based number of publication outlets, can reflect the public's positions on that issue. Thus, under certain conditions, LTEs can provide an accurate gauge of public opinion on controversial issues and thus become a forum for deliberation.

The Internet poses new challenges for editors, as electronic mailing of letters can increase the volume of letters significantly, thus making selection even more time consuming for the editorial staff. Additionally, easy access to "model letters" at organizational Web sites set up a situation in which letters can now easily be submitted by scores of active citizens.

Letters to the editor are a salient piece of the American media. The responsibility for their contribution to public deliberation remains with both the editors and the public. The National Conference of Editorial Writers is committed to presenting a diversity of views on the editorial page. In the same manner, citizens have a responsibility to engage in public debate, including the use of LTEs. The media and citizens working together can create a place for vigorous democratic deliberation.

Barbara J. Walkosz

See also Public Opinion

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Lewinsky, Monica (1973–)

Monica Samille Lewinsky was born July 23, 1973, in San Francisco, California. The older of two children born to Marcia and Bernie Lewinsky, Monica grew up in Beverly Hills, California.

She graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in psychology from Lewis and Clark College of Portland, Oregon, in May 1995. In July of that year, with her mother's encouragement and through family ties, Monica became an intern—an unpaid but highly prestigious position—in the White House, advanced to temporary employment, and, then, a salaried position in the correspondence section of the Office of Legal Affairs. On November 15, 1995, Monica Lewinsky and President Bill Clinton began a sexual relationship that would last until March 29, 1996, the date of their last acknowledged intimate contact. This relationship made Monica a public figure and contributed to impeachment proceedings against President Clinton.

The story of the relationship between Monica Lewinsky and President Clinton was reported to the press on January 21, 1998. President Clinton first denied the allegations but publicly acknowledged an improper relationship on August 17, 1998. The Starr Report, which details the findings of independent counsel, Kenneth Starr, includes sexually explicit descriptions of the affair.

Jerry Miller

See also Clinton, William Jefferson

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Libel

Freedom of speech and the press cannot be absolute, regardless of whether they are constitutional rights or not. They must be balanced against reputation and other competing individual and societal interests. The libel law of a society indicates to a large extent how the society views reputational interests in comparison with freedom of expression.

Harm to reputation is a criminal offense or a civil wrong—or both—in nearly every society. Nonetheless, reputation as a sociocultural and legal value varies from society to society. American libel law is a case in point. In the United States, freedom of the press is protected as a constitutional right, but reputation is not. In many ways, the U.S. approach to press freedom versus reputation emanates from Americans' deliberate judgments as to the special role of the news media as an institution in an open democracy.

Defamation, as a legal concept, refers to publication of material that tends to hold a person up to hatred, ridicule, contempt, or spite. In Anglo-American law, it is subdivided into libel (written defamation) and slander (oral defamation). The libel-slander dichotomy remains a factor in assessing the harmful impact of defamatory statements, but it has become all but obsolete with the recent convergence of communication technologies. Hence, the form of communication medium is rarely a decisive element in classifying a defamatory statement as libel (more harmful) or slander (less harmful).

The main purpose of libel law is to protect the reputational interests of individuals in connection with their existing and future relationships with others. Libel law also serves societal interests because it provides a civilized, nonviolent forum in which a legal dispute over reputational injury is settled in such a way as to

compensate for economic and emotional injury. More important but less acknowledged is the social value of libel law in providing a check on media power. Libel lawsuits expose the otherwise jealously guarded news-gathering and decision-making process of the news media to public scrutiny and accountability.

As already noted, reputation is not explicitly recognized as a constitutional value in the United States, which stands in marked contrast with many other countries. Nonetheless, protection of a good name is accepted by American courts as a basic concept underlying any decent system of ordered liberty. The U.S. Supreme Court has held, "Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation." Thus, reputational injury is treated as a tort, although it has yet to be repudiated as a crime.

Before libel law was constitutionalized in the United States in the mid-1960s, common law required a plaintiff to show that the defendant published a statement about the plaintiff that had a tendency to harm the plaintiff's reputation. More specifically, the plaintiff had to prove three requisite elements: identification of the plaintiff in the allegedly defamatory material, publication of the material by the defendant, and the defamatory nature of the material. But the proof requirements in a modern libel action in American law are more complicated. Especially in media libel actions, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defamatory statement of fact concerning the plaintiff was false, (2) its publication resulted from the defendant's fault, and (3) the plaintiff suffered actual injury.

So, under the common law, statements upon which a libel action were based were presumed to be false. As a matter of constitutional law, however, that presumption of falsity is rejected in the United States. The fault requirement in American law is making libel litigation far more complex than in any other legal system. It hinges on the status of the libel plaintiff. To win libel actions, public figures and public officials must prove "actual malice"—knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Private persons, on the other hand, must prove only negligence in most states, unless they claim punitive damages or presumed damages.

U.S. libel law allows the press a number of defenses against libel litigation. Its policy justifications illustrate a balancing process. The personal rights of individuals to protect their reputations are weighed against the constitutional rights of the public to keep informed on issues important to self-government. Freedom of speech and the press are assumed to contribute significantly to public knowledge and information.

The news media can defeat the complainant or plaintiff's case by refuting any of the plaintiff's proof elements. If the elements of the plaintiff's case are not refutable, they then assert constitutional and common law defenses. The constitutional "actual malice" standard, as the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated in *New York Times v. Sullivan* (1964), states that unless a defamatory statement about a public plaintiff was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth, the defendant cannot be liable. Besides the "actual malice" defense, the affirmative common law defenses are available if the defendant proves the defamatory statement is true, or if the statement is privileged as a result of government proceedings, or if it is a fair comment and criticism about matters of public interest.

In recent years, libel law has emerged as an increasingly global issue largely because of borderless cyber-communication. In 2002, the High Court of Australia held that when a defamatory statement is accessible to Internet Service Provider (ISP) subscribers in an Australian state, regardless of where it was originally uploaded, a court of that state can hear an action for defamation relating to the statement. More recently, a Canadian trial court rejected *The Washington Post*'s argument that a former U.N. official's libel lawsuit against the American newspaper in Ontario be dismissed because it had nothing to do with Canada. The court reasoned, "Those who publish via the Internet are aware of the global reach of their publications, and must consider the legal consequences in the jurisdiction of the subjects of their articles." To the relief of the American newspaper, the trial court's ruling was overturned in 2005. Yet, the transnational libel cases in Australia and Canada showcase a new challenge for defamation law in the Internet era. That is, choice of law and jurisdiction in transnational communication cannot be blithely dismissed any longer.

Kyu Ho Youm

See also First Amendment; Press Freedom

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Libertarian Party

The Libertarian Party is a political party in the United States that rigidly supports limited governmental activity. It is estimated that the Libertarian Party is the third-largest political party in America. The party is active in all 50 states and claims to have more than 200,000 registered voters, which would be more than the membership of all other third parties combined.

The political philosophy of the Libertarian Party transcends the conventional categories of "liberal" and "conservative" thought. In general terms, the party's platform combines liberal views on civil liberties with conservative laissez-faire economic beliefs. It also advocates a noninterventionist foreign policy and favors global free trade. In its most basic form, Libertarianism believes in total economic and personal freedom, as long as one does not impinge on the rights of others. Some of the specific stances of the Libertarian Party include a completely unregulated economy, the legalization of drugs and prostitution, repealing the income tax, and ending foreign aid as a matter of government policy and turning it into a program run on voluntary private donations.

The writings of Ayn Rand (1905–1982) provide much of the intellectual foundation of Libertarian philosophy. Rand provided a moral defense for the laissez-faire capitalism by linking it to personal liberty and rationality. The Libertarian Party itself was formally established in Colorado Springs in December 1971. The impetus for the party's creation was President Richard Nixon's 1971 imposition of wage and price controls, which was viewed as a dangerous expansion of governmental power. John Hospers, head of the Philosophy Department at the University of Southern California, was named as the party's first presidential candidate. Hospers appeared on the ballot in two states and received approximately 2,500 votes. Since that time the party has steadily grown. As recently as 2003, more than 600 Libertarians were serving in elected positions nationwide. However, these successes have been limited to lower-level city and county elections. To date, no Libertarian candidate has won a statewide or national election. In the 2004 presidential election, the Libertarian Party candidate appeared on the ballot in 48 states and received 397,265 votes or 0.3% of the total turnout.

Some political scientists have argued that the Libertarian Party is best seen as part of a larger intellectual movement. Arguably, the ideas of the Libertarian Party have influenced the two major political parties. For instance, the major political parties are associated with Libertarian-advocated policies like school vouchers and privatization of governmental services. In addition, there has been a growth of libertarian "think tanks." For example, the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank in Washington, D.C. (not directly affiliated with the Libertarian Party) is an influential voice in economic discourse. Several notable Libertarian-oriented public policy institutions exist, such as the Institute for Humane Studies, the Reason Foundation, Citizens for a Sound Economy, the Political Economy Research Center, the National Center for Policy Analysis, the Heartland Institute, and the Pacific Institute for Public Policy Research.

David K. Scott

See also Political Parties

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Limbaugh, Rush (1951–)

Rush Limbaugh is a conservative radio talk show host often ascribed with regenerating interest in AM radio when his program, *The Rush Limbaugh Show,* became nationally syndicated in 1988. By the mid-1990s, his program was attracting more than 11 million weekly

listeners and still holds steady today, with roughly 14 million listeners each week. For most of the past 2 decades, the show has been ranked by the media research group Arbitron as the most popular radio talk show in the United States. Limbaugh is compensated handsomely for his success; in 2001, he agreed to an 8-year contract in the amount of $285 million, a salary unprecedented in American radio.

For regularly reaching and captivating such a large portion of the electorate, Limbaugh is credited by many pundits with playing an instrumental role in the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, as well as George W. Bush's defeat of Senator John McCain in the 2000 Republican presidential primary and the subsequent defeat of Vice President Al Gore in the general election. For reasons such as these, *Time* magazine described Limbaugh as "one of the most influential entertainers in the history of the country," in its 2004 survey of the most important people in the United States.

During the presidential election year of 1992 and throughout the years of the Clinton administration, Limbaugh's popularity hit record highs among discontented conservatives. In addition to his radio juggernaut, he published a book titled *The Way Things Ought to Be* that instantly became a national bestseller, and he also starred in a televised talk show, *Rush Limbaugh: Talent on Loan From God,* which for a time entered more than 2 million homes five days a week.

For nearly 20 years Limbaugh's conservative irreverence has delighted sympathizers on the right and infuriated opponents on the left. Not one for soft tones, he has in years past referred to feminists as "Feminazis" and to animal rights advocates as "eco-wackos," and branded prominent American liberals with the epithet "Commie-Libs."

Limbaugh began his career in broadcast journalism as a teenager in the 1960s in his home state of Missouri. After dropping out of college in the early '70s, he moved to Pittsburgh, where he worked as a disc jockey for a top-40 radio station. In 1984, Limbaugh received an important break and was hired and given his own platform by KFBK in Sacramento. In 1987 the Federal Communications Commission under President Ronald Reagan repealed the fairness doctrine—a law dictating that AM radio stations give equal time to more than one side of an issue as well as response time to persons individually attacked on the air—a reversal that led to Limbaugh's national syndication the following year.

Justin D. Martin

See also Conservative, Conservatism; Radio, Politics and

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Limited Effects Theory

Limited effects theory is an approach to mass media effects that claims the media have limited effects on their audiences and/or on society. This theoretical approach emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s in large part because of a team of researchers at Columbia University (Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet) who conducted a series of studies in Erie County, Ohio, to learn how and why people decided to vote as they did. The Erie County Study employed a longitudinal research design interviewing the same 600 participants seven times during the 1940 presidential campaign.

The results of the study indicated limited effects with regard to the influence of media exposure leading to a change in vote intention from one candidate to the other. Rather, they concluded that media exposure led to a reinforcement of voting choice as "correct" among participants instead of a change in vote intention. The media messages over the course of the campaign, instead of serving to move voters toward a decision, were mostly valuable to support a voter's decision regarding for whom to vote. Additionally, the study conclusions indicated that people tend to seek out communication messages that are in line with their personal opinions and perspective, while those messages that are in contrast with one's opinion are discarded or avoided. This notion of *selective exposure* was further explained by Joseph T. Klapper, an influential author in support of the limited effects theory.

Klapper's book, *The Effects of Mass Communication* (1960), brought together the various writings and studies conducted on the effects of the mass

media and argued that they supported the limited effects perspective. In his book, Klapper claims that persuasive messages in the mass media tend to function more frequently as an agent of reinforcement rather than an agent of change. Among the effects of the mass media noted, Klapper also discusses the "self-protective" measures taken by people in their exposure to the mass media. He notes that people will have selective exposure to mass communication that supports their opinions and interests, *selective perception* in how they process the messages from mass media, and *selective retention* in choosing to remember those messages that support their opinions. This notion of selective exposure to communication is one of the most important ideas to emerge from the limited effects perspective.

While Lazarsfeld and his colleagues conducted their study in 1940, during the presidential election between the Republican Wendell Willkie and the Democratic incumbent Franklin D. Roosevelt, it would take several years for them to publish their results due to the large amount of data they had to synthesize by hand. During this time, several other studies took place that supported and expounded upon the limited effects theory.

The limited effects approach contrasted with the then-dominant theoretical approaches of the "magic bullet" model or the "hypodermic needle" model of mass communication. These approaches claimed that when a message reached its audience, it would exert powerful and uniform effects on each person who processed the message. The "strong effects" approach had generally been advocated by researchers in their approach to studying the mass media, and many researchers continued with this approach throughout the 1950s, as the limited effects approach was gaining popularity among researchers.

As this theory was in its infancy, a major development in mass communication took place with television's arrival in mainstream society. The advent of the television and its subsequent placement in American households forced mass media research to examine the influence of this new medium.

Other studies in this perspective have found that the effect of media vary according to the perceived prestige of the communication source. The propaganda in Nazi Germany demonstrated that the more control an entity has over the mass media, the more likely it is that public opinion can be changed in the desired direction. Additionally, the salience of the issues or subject matter to the audience can affect the likelihood of the influence of persuasive messages. Using the limited effects approach to mass communication, several researchers have examined political communication to determine the influence of political communication on the electorate. For instance, research tends to indicate that modern political campaigns reach the politically interested and converted, which supports the selective exposure theory.

The pure limited effects theory and approach to mass communication was relatively short-lived. In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, many researchers returned to a theory advancing stronger, more powerful effects of the mass media. However, researchers tend to agree that the media do not have all powerful effects on audiences, but rather the effects are mediated by a number of different things. Current research on media effects tends to operate through a multilevel effects paradigm and an understanding of various types of media effects. For instance, contemporary research is concerned with such things as macro- and microlevel effects; content-specific or diffuse-general effects; and attitudinal, behavioral, or cognitive effects.

Jenifer L. Lewis

See also Selective Processes, Exposure, Perception, Memory

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Lippmann, Walter (1889–1974)

Walter Lippmann was one of the first political observers to identify and analyze the role of the media in shaping the opinions of the public. During his long career, he worked as a journalist, served in the national government, helped found the *New Republic* magazine, and wrote a syndicated national column. He is best known for his book, *Public Opinion,* published in 1922. When Lippmann contended in this famous book that news media provide the "pictures in

our heads" that are more important than the reality of the "world outside," he primarily applied his discussions to the print media. Many scholars and political professionals have found Lippmann's observations to be just as relevant to television and electronic media.

In *Public Opinion,* Lippmann built his case for the power of the media to influence public opinion on several major concepts. An underlying principle of Lippmann's perspective on the role of the media and public opinion was based on his view that the public was an ill-informed mass whose opinions on policy matters could not be trusted. Lippmann's view of the public, which is further elaborated in *The Phantom Public* in 1925, resulted in an ongoing feud with educator John Dewey, who thought Lippmann's elitist views were unduly pessimistic about democracy.

Lippmann is also credited with a useful discussion of how the media facilitate the development of stereotypes that often then serve to guide the public's interpretations and reactions to individuals and events. However, Lippmann's most enduring contribution to the study of public opinion and political communication was his conceptualization of the media's ability to shape how the public thinks and feels. Lippmann was a strong critic of the media's power to select some events over others for communication to the public. His descriptions of this selectivity process and its influence on the public were a clear precursor to later agenda-setting theories.

It is also clear that Lippmann should be credited with laying the groundwork for the modern discussions of media framing in political communication. Lippmann argued in *Public Opinion* that the way the media choose to present events and ideas to the public has a strong influence on how the public comes to feel about these events and ideas. The title of the first chapter in *Public Opinion* is "The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads." Since the book's publication in 1922, this phrase has been used to describe the idea that most members of the public have little direct experience of most of what happens in the world and consequently must rely on the media's representations in order to understand and perceive the world around them—to form the pictures that represent reality.

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Framing; Journalism, Political; Public Communication in Politics; Public Opinion

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Lobbying, Lobbyist

A lobbyist is a professional expert or an ordinary citizen who advocates the social, economic, and political interests of public and private groups to legislators. Lobbyists target senators, House representatives, and judges and often involve themselves in legislative and executive processes. Professional lobbyists have skillful methods of connecting with government officials. About half of politicians who leave formal political positions become lobbyists.

Lobbying is the process of influencing politics. During campaign periods and legislative terms, organizations, political unions, companies, and individuals spend millions and even billions of dollars lobbying their interests to government officials and decision makers. There are thousands of interest groups appealing to each single issue regarding the budget, health care, transportation, energy, and defense.

Types of Lobbying

There are two types of lobbying. *Inside* or *professional* lobbying takes place within government through direct contact with politicians. This form of lobbying includes meeting with legislative and executive politicians, directly negotiating with policymakers, and providing professional information to political decision makers. *Outside* or *citizen* lobbying occurs outside the center of politics via indirect political contacts. This type of lobbying includes media reportage, establishing political coalitions and local political contacts, organizing rallies, and letter writing campaigns. Outside lobbying is often used to coordinate inside lobbying, since citizen lobbying initiates political relationships.

There are two federal lobbying regulations: one is 31 USC, Section 1352 (the Byrd Amendment), which prohibits the use of federal funds to engage in lobbing activities; the other is 2 USC, Section 1605, which specifies the registration and semiannual reporting of lobbyist activities. According to the Lobby Disclosure Act of 1995, publics are allowed to view filings

received by the Office of Public Records. After several lobbying scandals, including the Jack Abramoff controversy, in which Abramoff pled guilty to five criminal felonies of corruption and bribery, the Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006 was initiated. The bill restricts lobbyists from bribing politicians and requires the disclosure of more details on lobbyist activities. However, the bill does not prevent firms or organizations from giving politicians gifts and funded trips.

Through transparent political processes, such as open meetings, disclosure of financial statements, freedom of information legislation, and budgetary audits, the public and government sectors can check illegal political activities. Media transparency can also reduce illegal lobbying practices by providing the public with multiple information sources as well as publicizing funding and other political transitions.

Hyun Jung Yun

See also Interest Groups in Politics; Issue Management

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Loukanov, Andrey (1938–1996)

Andrey Loukanov was a member of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), which after 1990 was renamed the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). Born a Soviet citizen, he was the grandson of Todor Loukanov (1874–1946), who was killed during Stalin's repressions, and son of Karlo Loukanov (1897–1982), a fighter in the International Brigades in Spain (1939), foreign minister (1956–1962), and, briefly, deputy prime minister of Bulgaria (1956–1957).

Andrey Loukanov graduated with a university degree in international affairs in Moscow in 1963. He was a member of Parliament (1976–1996), member of the Central Committee (CC) of the BCP (1977–1989), representative of Bulgaria at the United Nations and Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (CMEA). He also served as deputy prime minister (1976–1986) and first deputy prime minister (1986–1987), as well as minister of foreign economic affairs of Bulgaria (1987–1989).

In 1944 the BCP became the leading power in the political and public life of the country and was orientated toward the building of socialism, following the experience of the USSR. That was a period of success in the socioeconomic and cultural development of the country. Along with that, the BCP established a monopoly over the executive power, ideology, and information. It was a time of many deformations that led the country to a grave economic, political, moral, and psychological crisis. Andrey Loukanov was one of the main engineers of the deposition of Todor Zhivkov, secretary general of the CC of the BCP, on November 10, 1989. He was also a major driving force of the subsequent political changes by organizing a round table with the toddling opposition.

After Zhivkov was removed from his posts, the country commenced its transition to a democratic social system and market economy. Since 1990, BSP has been invariably represented at the National Assembly and has formed four governments—two with Andrey Loukanov as prime minister (1990), one under Zhan Videnov (1995–1997), and one under Sergey Stanishev (since 2005)—and a president, Georgi Purvanov (since 2001), was elected from its ranks for two consecutive terms of office.

The first government under Andrey Loukanov lasted for 7 months. After the elections for a Grand National Assembly in June 1990, Andrey Loukanov formed a second government, but 3 months later had to resign, owing to the public discontent with the grave economic crisis in the country. That period resulted in the expression "Loukanov's winter."

It has been assumed that Loukanov was connected with some influential circles in Russia, as well as with the process of draining out the government funds into some BCP-related companies that started in the mid-1980s. Gradually, Loukanov withdrew from the limelight of political life, though the press ascribed to him a major role in some economic gains on an international scale. Since 1994 he was partner and president of the Russian-Bulgarian Topenergy Joint Venture. In

October 1996, he was assassinated in front of his house in Sofia, which further intensified the rumors about his connections with organized crime. The assassins and the commissioners of his assassination remained undisclosed.

Lilia Raycheva

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Encyclopedia of POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Volume 2

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Machiavelli, Niccolò (1469–1527)

Niccolò Machiavelli, quite possibly the single most influential political writer of all time, was born in Florence, Italy. In 1518, he published his literary masterpiece, *The Prince,* and has been associated with authoritarianism and government's cynical manipulation of its citizens ever since. This was, and is, unfair to Machiavelli, since his later writings (*Discourses on Livy*) pointed to a much more democratic and fair-minded individual. Regardless of his true feelings, his influence created two new words for the international lexicon: *Machiavellian* and *Machiavellianism*.

Machiavelli started his career in the Florentine government as a secretary, though his innate ability soon allowed him the opportunity to become involved with diplomacy. Although he met many important personages, none influenced him more than Cesare Borgia, a prince of the papal states and the model used for *The Prince.* From all accounts, Borgia was a cruel and heartless tyrant though wily and clever. Machiavelli did not agree with Borgia's methods or philosophy; he felt that Borgia could unite Italy—a situation Machiavelli longed for. However, when the republic was overthrown, Lorenzo de' Medici became the ruler. Lorenzo did not trust Machiavelli because of his support for the Republic and in 1513 had him thrown into prison and tortured. Afterward, he was banished to his estate at San Casciano.

The Prince was written as an effort to gain favor with Italy's new rulers, and Machiavelli dedicated the book to the Medicis. Unfortunately, Lorenzo disliked the book, and the Italian public detested it. They could not understand how anyone could think such cruel and unjust thoughts. In essence, *The Prince* was politics estranged from ethics; that is, one does whatever it takes to gain power and then maintains that power in any way possible. Everything else is secondary, whether it is morality, Christianity, or relationship. The only morality a leader needs is having the skills and the wherewithal to remain in power by any means necessary. Today, as in the 16th century, most people assume that Machiavelli was a proponent of totalitarian dictatorships, not realizing that when *The Prince* was written, Italy was in danger from foreign invaders. In Machiavelli's opinion, what was needed to save his country from destruction was a man with an iron will. Contrary to public opinion, Machiavelli was considered by individuals who knew him well to be both religious and moral.

The examples given by Machiavelli in *The Prince* are considered failures. In fact, the book continually points out that if a ruler makes mistakes, or miscalculates the populace in any way, all of the power and authority he has gained up to that point will be lost. Leaders are successful if they have the moral strength to rule the populace coldly and efficiently. Moreover, since the world is inherently volatile and governmental power is often a chimera, the wise leader is one who takes whatever he can and feels no pangs of conscience if someone is hurt.

Cary Stacy Smith and Li-Ching Hung

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MALCOLM X

See MINORITIES, ROLE IN POLITICS

MANCINI, PAOLO (1948–)

Paolo Mancini is a specialist in political communication whose work focuses on comparative analysis of the relation between mass media and political systems. He has written numerous works on media and politics in Italy, studies comparing American and Italian television news and, with Daniel Hallin, a comparative study of media and politics in Western Europe and North America, *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics* (2004). He edited with David Swanson an anthology on the transformation of election campaigns around the world, and he has contributed to a number of international studies of journalists and news media.

Much of Mancini's work has been concerned with questions of how to theorize the distinctive character of the Italian media. From the point of view of the dominant theories of media and politics, he has argued, Italian media appear as a case of retarded development. From the point of view of structural-functional theories of modernization, for example, Italian mass media appear as less modern in the sense that they are less differentiated from other social structures. Italian media have always been closely linked to the political system. Journalists often have political ties and move back and forth between journalism and more explicitly political roles. Media owners, similarly, are deeply involved in politics and frequently see media more as a political instrument than purely as a business. Media outlets have clear points of view, and reporting and commentary are often combined. Public broadcasting has been part of the *lottizzazione* through which power is shared among political parties.

But it is not enough, Mancini argues, to understand the Italian media by contrasting them with normative models derived from the American case, which stress political neutrality and separation between market-based media and political actors. Instead, it is necessary to understand the distinctive functions media play within the Italian system, with its rich plurality of intermediating institutions like political parties, social movements, trade unions, and interest groups. The media are crucial to the process by which these groups bargain and compete, mobilize their constituencies, compromise and share power. Their political function is more one of horizontal communication among these actors than of vertical communication, mediating between individualized citizens and the state.

Mancini is professor in the Dipartamento Istituzionie Società in the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Perugia, director of the Interuniversity Center of Political Communication, and academic director of the School of Broadcast Journalism run by the Italian public broadcaster, RAI. He has also served on a panel that monitors compliance with rules on political pluralism in Italian broadcasting.

Daniel C. Hallin

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MANDELA, NELSON (1918–)

The man who would eventually become the first president of a truly democratic South Africa was born in rural Transkei in 1918. Close to Xhosa royalty, he received a privileged education at a mission school and then at the South African Native College at Fort Hare. Although modest in size and facilities, Fort Hare had become an academic center for the nation's African population. It attracted the academic elite as well as many with radical political ideas.

In 1941, Nelson Mandela left Fort Hare for Johannesburg. He worked as a clerk in a progressive

white law firm while pursing his legal education at the University of Witwatersrand. He gradually was drawn into increasing political activism within the contexts of the South African Communist Party and the African National Congress (ANC). Mandela, at this point and later, pursed principles, not a party line. As a result, he did not adhere to any single group's agenda, and he sought allies in his emerging crusade on behalf of black South Africans wherever he might find them, including in white liberal circles.

A government crackdown on the activities of the ANC led to Mandela's arrest and trial for treason. The trial was lengthy. During its years, Mandela continued his radical activism under the pseudonym "The Black Pimpernel" and tried to broker the disagreement over tactics that would split what was now the anti-apartheid movement into the ANC and the more violent Pan African Congress. The Sharpeville demonstrations in 1960 hardened government attitudes, and Mandela, although acquitted in the lengthy treason trial, was arrested and convicted of inciting a riot in 1962 and was again arrested and convicted of sabotage and attempting to overthrow the state in 1963. In June 1964, Mandela began serving his life sentence on Robben Island.

"Free Mandela" became a rallying cry of anti-apartheid activists globally as his imprisonment became a symbol of South Africa's oppression of its nonwhite population. In 1980, the United Nations Security Council called for his release. With external pressure against South Africa mounting, discussions began between Mandela and Presidents P. W. Botha and F. W. de Klerk. In early 1990, Mandela was released. He then assumed ANC party office and embarked on a speaking tour of 14 foreign nations. Upon his return, tense discussions began between the ruling National Party and the ANC, culminating in the National Peace Accord of 1991. For their work brokering this accord, Mandela and de Klerk were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993.

In April 1994, Mandela was elected president of South Africa. He served for 5 years, during which he traveled widely in South Africa and abroad and spoke to a wide variety of audiences.

Theodore F. Sheckels

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Mandelson, Peter (1953–)

Although a controversial figure, few would deny that Peter Mandelson had a key role in the creation of New Labour, and that he greatly contributed to the transformation of British political communication, driving the changes in the relationship between policy and presentation and in media management. The "Prince of Darkness," as he became known, grew to be one of Prime Minister Tony Blair's most trusted political, media, and campaign advisers.

Mandelson was the grandchild of Labour Minister Herbert Morrison. He was active in politics from his youth and was elected to the London Council of Lambeth in 1979. Disappointed with the power of the extreme left, in 1982 he went to work for London Weekend Television (LWT), which gave him both inside knowledge of the media and important contacts.

In 1985 he became Labour's director of communications. He formed the Shadow Communication Agency, from which professional advertisers and pollsters advised the party; he also led the redesign of Labour's corporate identity, including the replacement of the red flag with a red rose. In 1987 Mandelson was a driving force in what, until then, was considered the most professionalized Labour campaign. Although an electoral failure, it was regarded by many as a remarkable communication success and it gave Mandelson an almost mythical reputation. However, his utter loyalty to the leader, even if it meant briefing against party colleagues, disdain for the party structure, and his litigious relationship with journalists, who were often bullied both directly and through persistent complaints to their bosses, gained him enemies in the party and the media. This would become a trademark of his career.

He resigned in 1990 to fight for a parliamentary seat. He was elected as a member of Parliament (MP) in 1992 but played only a minimal role in the national campaign, which Labour lost. However, he had now become a close ally and media advisor to Blair and MP Gordon Brown. After John Smith's death, Mandelson took a pivotal but covert role in Blair's leadership campaign and then, more openly, in the

party's "modernization," culminating in the 1997 New Labour landside.

In 1997 Blair named Mandelson as minister without portfolio, giving him direct access to the prime minister and considerable influence on Blair's policy decisions; he also continued to be central to policy presentation and media management, with a belligerence that provoked more resentment now that Labour was in office. In 1998 he became trade and industry secretary and in late 1999 secretary for Northern Ireland. In both cases, although later cleared of wrongdoing, he had to resign due to scandal. However, he continued routinely to advise the prime minister from the backbenches. In 2004 Mandelson was appointed EU (European Union) trade commissioner, which confirmed Blair's enduring trust in his skills. However, despite Blair's belief that Labour would only be truly modernized when it had learned to love Mandelson, he still has more enemies than allies.

Ana Inés Langer

See also Blair, Tony; Labour Party, Britain

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Mao Zedong (1893–1976)

Mao Zedong was the first-generation leader of the Chinese Communist Party. He helped found the party and later the People's Republic of China. In China, he is renowned as a party and national leader, military strategist, poet, and political writer. All these roles granted him opportunities for political communication. As a party leader, he successfully engaged the party in seizing political power through military struggles with their enemies and then establishing the People's Republic of China in 1949. As a national leader, he launched a series of political movements that culminated in the Cultural Revolution, for various reasons ranging from removing his political opponents to reforming Chinese culture. His poems vented his political dreams. In his political writings, he elaborated the party's positions, policies, missions, and political theories, which constitute Mao Zedong Thought, the political ideology of the party in Mao's era. His most important writings are included in the five volumes of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (1967), which were compiled by the Chinese government.

In his writings Mao elaborated the principle of democratic centralism, which is essential to political communication in China. Although it was borrowed from the Soviets, because of Mao's elaborations, the term has unique meaning in the Chinese context. Four themes can be discerned in Mao's writings on democratic centralism. First, democracy is practiced and constrained within a hierarchy. As a hierarchy, a political system has many levels of representation. Democracy at a lower level is supervised by a central authority, which exists at a higher level. For most people, democratic participation is restrained to just one level. Second, democracy is practiced in order to enhance the hierarchy. Democracy is practiced within the party, or its organizations such as the army, only to strengthen its power base. Third, democracy is embedded in class struggle. In this regard, democracy is of an in-group nature. Only in-group members can have the right of democracy. Thus, inner-party democracy is a privilege in China's political agenda. Fourth, democracy is rhetorical in that it helps to sell the party and helps it to gain power. Because of its everlasting appeal to the populace, democracy is often used strategically for political campaigns that aim at some political gains, including but not limited to removing political opponents. Democracy as manifested in these four themes guides the party's operations in cases of leadership selection, decision making, policy making, and relationship building. In most cases, when the two ends are not aligned with each other, usually the democracy end concedes to the centralism end.

In addition to his theoretical contribution to the principle of democratic centralism, Mao showed great expertise in political mobilization. This is manifest in the political campaigns recorded in the party's history. His major role was to set up a tone for these campaigns through which his political messages effectively got across to the masses. Besides media, meetings were a favorite means of political mobilization. These techniques of political communication were effectively employed during the Cultural Revolution, a campaign that the Chinese government now deems as being more destructive than constructive.

Canchu Lin

See also China, Media and Politics in; Chinese Cultural Revolution

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Marx, Karl (1818–1883)

Karl Marx was born in Trier, Germany, and originated from a Jewish family. His parents were very much attached to the values of humanism, the European Enlightenment, and French socialism. Following his father's advice, Marx started studying jurisprudence, but soon he discovered that he was more attracted to philosophy. Between 1836 and 1841 he studied philosophy in Berlin in an intellectual atmosphere that was still dominated by Hegelian philosophy. His doctoral thesis was on the difference between Democritus's and Epicurus's natural philosophy. After his studies he worked as the chief editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung,* but because of its left-wing radical views the paper was soon banned. He went to Paris, where he met his friend Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) in 1844. From this point on, nearly everything they produced was more or less a common work.

The aim of Marx was to develop a total critique of capitalism by analyzing its inner logic (*immanent critique*). It is sometimes suggested that there is a shift or even a break between his early and later works, but his entire work may well be seen as a continuation and development of his original aim. He pursued the same question: What is the foundation of a total critique of capitalism? The essence of Marx's whole work is expressed best in his famous 11th thesis on Feuerbach. He asserts that the philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it. This statement of Marx's is often interpreted in a pure actionist sense, as if Marx were discarding philosophy. However, Marx never gave up philosophy. Rather, he wanted to rescue philosophy from its abstract form and get it involved in practical issues. His program to change the world has two interwoven aims: to revolutionize philosophy and all the rest of theoretical fields and to change the world with the revolutionized scientific-philosophical method. The term *critique* therefore assumes a central role in his work. He starts with the critique jurisprudence, continues with the critique of philosophy, and over the critique of politics he arrives at the critique of political economy. The critique of political economy is, then, the basis from which he wants to develop his total critique of capitalist social formation, including the state, moral, legal system. Some scholars therefore aptly suggest studying Marx's work from the *Capital* and viewing his earlier works from this more mature work.

Two concepts are essential to understand Marx's system: dialectical and historical materialism. *Dialectic* is an ancient Greek concept but may also be found in the philosophy of other civilizations. It is a theory of logic that wants to reflect the structure and the development of the world. The most comprehensive system of dialectic was developed by Hegel in its idealist form. It is a theory of the motion of the terms. Marx arrives at his theory of logic by reversing the Hegelian system. It is therefore called *dialectical materialism*. It wants to explain genesis of the motion in the world from within. It implies that there are laws of motion that govern nature, society, and thought. These fundamental laws concern the nature of natural and social phenomena. Dialectical materialism suggests, first, that every natural and social phenomenon may be seen as a unity of opposing qualities. The contradiction or struggle between these opposing qualities is then the cause of motion. It supposes that, second, this motion proceeds from gradual quantitative changes to a revolutionary change of quality. It assumes that, third, in this process of revolutionary change there is a permanent process of negation, which brings about new qualities.

Historical materialism is the application of dialectic to society and social history. It implies that the production of the means of subsistence is prerequisite for human history and assumes a complex set of factors that are responsible for the changes in the history of humankind. The change in the history of society derives, on the one hand, from the appropriation or humanization of nature by means of labor, and, on the other hand, from social class struggles in a given society. It explains the genesis of the state, religion, metaphysics, morality, and system of law (superstructure) by referring to the material relationships (structure) prevailing in a given society. According to Marx (and Engels), every social formation has its specific form of the production of the means of subsistence, which also establishes its adequate ideological superstructure.

The most well-known explanation of Marx's economic theories is embodied in his treatise, *Das Kapital.* The first volume, which provides an attack on capitalism and the exploitation of the laboring classes, was published in 1867.

Doğan Göçmen

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Mass Nonviolent Protest, Australia

Citizens invoke mass nonviolent protest when they are blocked from successfully communicating their messages to government, either because of a government's hostility to the message or because governments feel that such ideas are not supported by a sufficiently large section of the population. Mass protest serves either to pressure the government to change policy or to heighten awareness of the issue among the general population in order to effect policy changes.

This has been a regular characteristic of new social movement activity in Australia during the past 40 years. These movements include those against the Vietnam War in the late 1960s and early '70s (especially the Vietnam Moratorium movement in 1970 when 100,000 people marched in Melbourne alone), the campaign against the Franklin Dam in the early '80s, the anti-uranium and nuclear disarmament campaigns of the '70s and '80s, the Reconciliation movement culminating in the Sorry Day marches by one million Australians in the year 2000, and large protests of a similar scale against the Iraq War in 2003. Despite the spectacular successes of campaigns like the Franklin, the fact that some protest movements are able to mobilize very large numbers does not, however, guarantee their success. Both the Sorry Day and anti–Iraq War campaigns failed to move the conservative Howard government away from existing policies.

Many Australian nonviolent protest actions are influenced by the teachings and practice of Gandhi. The campaign against the damming of the Franklin River, for example, specifically adopted such Gandhian techniques as training activists in nonviolent theory and practice despite its scale of more than 1,000 participants.

Mass protest actions are seldom controlled by one organization, however, and are usually coalitions of many different groups that tend to find common ground around several key demands. When mass protest actions incorporate nonviolent direct action and civil disobedience, these are usually carried out by autonomous or semiautonomous groups within the overall framework of the movement. There is sometimes a degree of tension between the movement leadership seeking legitimacy and the direct action groups, not all of whom embrace nonviolence, such as in the antiglobalization protests at the World Economic Forum in Melbourne in 2000.

Mass protest activity has become an important component of democratic practice in Australia and many other countries. Despite its long historical antecedents in the Western tradition, the right to protest had to be reasserted in Australia following the Cold War; nonviolence was essential to public and governmental acceptance of this expression of dissent. Mass protests are a dynamic part of civil society and mobilize the energies of many thousands of people. If their activities are accompanied by appropriate media coverage, lobbying of decision makers and the dispassionate analysis of the merits of the protesters' demands by government, then they can consolidate and deepen citizens' identification with democratic values and democratic governance.

Libby Connors and Drew Hutton

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Mass Political Behavior

In democracies, the study of mass political behavior focuses attention on voting decisions, voter turnout, and unconventional political behavior. Each is reviewed in turn in this entry. Generally speaking, there are three approaches to understanding voting: the sociological model, the social-psychological model, and the rational voter model.

The Sociological Model

Early voting studies, conducted in the 1940s and 1950s, were carried out at Columbia University and were characterized by their sociological approach, which placed an emphasis on group characteristics in determining the vote. In these early studies, Lazarsfeld and colleagues examined voters in Erie County, Ohio, and Elmira, New York. They developed an index of political predispositions that were related to voting decisions. Such demographic characteristics as education, income, class, religion, and rural or urban residence explained the vote.

Another important notion that the Columbia school put forth is that voters often rely on opinion leaders, or other citizens who are highly motivated to follow politics, for information. Opinion leaders were the second step in what the Columbia school called the "two-step flow of communication," in which voters receive information from the media but also from informed citizens who have digested the media's information and then related it to others.

The Social-Psychological Model

With the publication of *The American Voter* in 1960, scholars took a social-psychological approach to voting. The social-psychological model, also known as the "Michigan model," considers three important factors in an individual's vote choice: party identification, candidate evaluations, and issue preferences. Of these elements, party identification was the most important. Party identification was conceptualized as an affective attachment to a particular political party. The affinity for a party is often developed early through the socialization process. Parents transmit partisanship to their children much the same way they instill values. Michigan researchers argued that one's partisan affiliation was stable and lasted over a lifetime. Later research called these assumptions into question. Rather than being an unchanging attachment, partisanship was seen as responding to the political environment. Morris Fiorina famously called this a "running tally," in which partisanship can be influenced to a certain extent by the issues of the day and the past performance of the parties.

The social-psychological model downplays the importance of issue preference. Decades of research has demonstrated that voters are uninformed or even misinformed about politics, so some scholars came to doubt whether voters could actually vote on the basis of issue positions. This led many to speculate that democracy was in trouble because the voters were "fools."

The Rational Voter Model

The reputation of voters was rescued to some extent by the rational choice approach. Unlike the proponents of Michigan studies, political scientist V. O. Key argued that the voter is a "rational god of vengeance and of reward." That is, voters evaluate the incumbent's performance over the past term and vote accordingly. Anthony Downs argued in his seminal work, *An Economic Theory of Democracy,* that voters take into account past performance, but Downs's model differs from Key's because he contends that voters are making calculations about the future performance of a party based on the past. The foundation of Downs's model is the notion, imported from economics, that voters act in a rational manner. By *rational,* Downs means that voters are able to make a decision when confronted with a range of alternatives. Further, the alternatives can be ranked so that each is either a preferred choice, indifferent choice, or an inferior alternative to the other, and the preference ranking is transitive. Finally, the candidate chosen was ranked highest in the ordering, and the voter would make the same decision again if confronted with the identical circumstances.

Based upon his understanding of a rational actor, Downs also laid out his expectations of "rational voting." Voters compare both parties and determine which would be most likely to pursue policies that would be favorable for the voter. To understand a voter's decision, we must consider the size of the current party differential. This is the difference between what the voter believes he actually received and what he would have received if the other party had been in power. A positive result means a vote for the incumbent; a negative value reflects a vote for the challenger. If the expected

party differential is zero, then the voter would abstain because it would not matter who won the election—either party would be expected to pursue the same agenda. To vote with the expectation that the outcome of the election does not matter would not be rational because, as noted above, the act of voting itself is costly.

But on what information does the voter base his or her decision? Downs argues that the acquisition of knowledge is costly. Citizens will continue to acquire information until the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits, namely the importance of making a right rather than a wrong decision. To reduce the costs of obtaining information, Downs says that voters can (a) reduce their intake of information, but risk making a wrong decision because of it; (b) reduce the cost of obtaining the same information by using free sources such as government publications, party publications, interest group information, and television; or (c) rely on expert opinions. This last point can be traced back to the Columbia studies and their discovery of the importance of opinion leaders. Because each voter has such little influence, the returns on information are quite low, and it is completely rational to rely on free information. By using the advice of experts they respect, voters can reduce the costs of gaining information and make rational decisions that are the same as if they had been fully informed. In this way, voters might not know the issues, as demonstrated by the Michigan studies, but they can still make meaningful contributions to the democratic process by casting rational votes.

It has long been believed that the "state of the economy" is the most important variable in determining how voters vote in presidential elections. Voters who believe that the economy is moving in the right direction are likely to reward the incumbent president or party with their vote. Scholarly attention has focused on the best indicators to use for models of economic voting. Some models rely on indicators of the health of the national economy and look at macroeconomic variables as predictors of how the electorate will behave. Other "pocketbook" considerations look at the voter's assessment of his or her own economic situation.

Campaigns and Voting

In order to make their evaluations of the candidates and their eventual choices, voters gain information during campaigns. Campaigns actually help reduce the amount of time and energy needed to learn about elections by making information readily available. Campaigns expose voters to information about the differences between the candidates and increase the accuracy with which voters perceive the candidates. How then do campaigns influence voters? In addition to providing information, campaigns play an important agenda-setting role, because they focus attention on certain issues. Though campaigns may not always change the way people view issues, they can make some issues more prominent on the public agenda.

What about elections in which there is less information? Information is plentiful—even hard to avoid—during a presidential election, but elections for Congress and other offices are known as low-information elections. The costs, or time and effort required to become informed, are much higher. Voters can still reasonably operate in a low-information environment. They can take into account partisanship and information gleaned from their past experiences, daily life, the media, and political campaigns.

Voter Turnout

Americans vote at a low rate. In 1960, 63% of eligible voters actually voted. In recent years, a turnout rate hovering around 50% is common. Among democratic nations, the United States is near the bottom in voter turnout. The explanation for who votes and who stays home depends on a variety of factors: individual traits, societal factors, and institutional factors.

The Individual

Education is the best predictor of whether an individual votes. Those with a college education are far more likely to vote than those with a high school diploma are. Education leads to more interest in politics, a greater sense of civic responsibility as well as a sense of efficacy—the belief that an individual can make a difference. Education also increases the skills needed to become informed about politics. It is also more likely to make an individual familiar with how to go about registering to vote. Rising education levels in the United States have not led to higher turnout, however.

Instead, education has only slowed the decline. Turnout can be influenced by a person's occupation and income. Professionals and wealthier Americans are more likely to go to the polls than are the poor and unemployed. Older Americans are more likely to vote than younger Americans. Marriage also has an impact

on the likelihood of voting, with married people casting ballots at higher rates than singles. Americans who strongly identify with a political party are more likely to go to the polls. Also, being contacted by one's party or a political campaign can make an individual more likely to vote. The increasing negativity of campaigns has led some scholars to conclude that the tone of campaigns can depress turnout. However, several studies have challenged this finding and offered an alternative view. Rather than causing voters to stay home, negative advertising may actually stimulate turnout.

Societal Factors

Voter turnout varies considerably among different generations in America. Those who became eligible to vote from 1932 to 1964 are known as the "New Deal" cohort. They are named after Roosevelt's campaign slogan. Members of this generation have always turned out in high numbers.

Baby boomers, who came of age in the era of the Vietnam War and Watergate, are less likely to vote than previous generations. Some scholars have concluded that this is due to a distaste for politics brought on by coming of age in such a tumultuous time, whereas others have implicated television and declining community involvement. The downward trend continued with the so-called GenXers, or those born between 1965 and 1980, who became eligible to vote between 1983 and 1998.

Institutional Factors

Strict voter registration laws have an impact on turnout levels. Voter registration laws vary from state to state. Due to their past history of discrimination, southern states have some of the strictest rules. Some states allow voters to register the same day they vote. Research indicates that most voters do not pay serious attention to campaigns until an election draws near. A potential voter could become motivated by events late in a campaign, when intensity peaks. Without the ability to register and vote on the same day, it is possible for citizens to miss the deadline to register when it is scheduled weeks before the election. This leaves out potential voters who have not planned in advance. Some states have experimented with extensive use of mail-in voting. As one might expect, the opportunity to vote by mail appears to have increased turnout by making voting more convenient. Voting by mail is also an antidote to the problem of voting on Tuesday, the day when U.S. elections are held. Many other democracies vote on a weekend or national holiday.

As previously noted, the United States has lower turnout than most other industrialized democracies. By contrast, many European nations have turnout rates around 75%. Since 1993, voters in the United States have been able to register to vote when they get a driver's license. Although motor-voter legislation has added millions of voters to the rolls, it has not resulted in a substantial increase in turnout. Many organizations, citizen groups, and media outlets have sought to increase turnout by launching voter registration drives, but even these efforts have been unable to reverse the general decline in participation.

Although voting is the most prevalent form of participation, unconventional forms of participation have a long history in the United States. From Boston Harbor to the Edmund Pettus Bridge, protests have been an important part of the political landscape. Protests and direct action were central to the successes of the civil rights movement. However, protests can backfire on participants as well, as Todd Gitlin has observed of the protests at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Instead of making the public more sympathetic to their cause, protests—especially violent ones—can turn the public against the protestors. A variety of factors have been identified that make an individual more likely to engage in protests. Among them are youth and being childless. Individuals are also more likely to take part in a protest if they are asked to do so.

Ann Gordon and Doug Spence

See also *American Voter, The*; Framing; Ideology; Negative Advertising; Party Identification; Two-Step Flow Model of Communication; Voter Behavior

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MATALIN, MARY (1953–)

Mary Matalin is a well-known American Republican political consultant. Famous for her feisty personality and her marriage to Democratic consultant James Carville, Matalin has served as an advisor to numerous high-level Republicans, written several books, hosted her own television and radio political shows as well as routinely making the rounds on the Sunday morning news programs, and is currently running Threshold, a new conservative publishing imprint for Simon & Schuster.

After receiving a BA in political science from Western Illinois University in 1978, Matalin worked on local and state level campaigns until the Reagan Revolution took her to Washington, D.C., to work for the Republican National Committee (RNC). After a brief stint at Hofstra Law School, Matalin returned to Washington and held several senior positions on George H. W. Bush's presidential campaign in 1988. After he was elected, she returned to the RNC and was appointed chief of staff. Matalin served as deputy campaign manager during Bush's 1992 reelection campaign, where she had oversight of operations and organization in all 50 states. Her visibility increased dramatically during this time because of both her vocal support for President Bush and his policies and the appearance that she and then-beau Carville made in the documentary *The War Room.*

In George W. Bush's administration, Matalin served as both assistant to the president as well as counselor to Vice President Cheney until resigning her position in late 2003. She was the first to hold both titles simultaneously. Matalin has recently ventured into political campaigns again as the treasurer for Virginia Republican Senator George Allen's 2006 reelection campaign.

Always media savvy, Matalin was the host of CNN's *Crossfire* in 1993 as well as *Equal Time* on CNBC. Prior to that, she hosted her own weekly radio show on CBS. Matalin has authored two books: first, *All's Fair: Love, War and Running for President* (1994), coauthored with Carville, and most recently *Letters to My Daughters* (2004), which has appeared on both *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* bestsellers lists. Matalin and Carville both appeared on the short-lived *K-Street* (2003), an HBO series revolving around the world of political consultants. They have two daughters, Matalin "Matty" Carville and Emerson "Emma" Carville, and they reside in Virginia.

Michelle Honald

See also Carville, James

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MATCHING FUNDS

See CAMPAIGN FINANCE

MAZZOLENI, GIANPIETRO (1946–)

Gianpietro Mazzoleni is a professor at Università Statale di Milano. He was one of the first Italian scholars to discover the importance of the field of political communication. With his international activity and connections, Mazzoleni has put the Italian school at the heart of this newborn scientific area. Together with other colleagues, with the founding of *Comunicazione Politica,* the leading journal in the country for political communication studies, Mazzoleni has facilitated the creation of an autonomous scientific field, separating it from other older fields such as sociology, political science, and semiotics. Mazzoleni's presence at conferences and debates, as well as his involvement in teaching activities, has been of great importance in establishing a field that had previously lacked proper legitimation.

Mazzoleni's interest in political communication studies derives from his education in the United

States. When back in Italy, he started to empirically analyze processes and phenomena that were, up to then, of no scientific interest. In the 1980s, Mazzoleni was able to understand the dramatic consequences that the birth and development of commercial television would have on politics and democracy. He empirically analyzed these changes, focusing first on media content and structure and later on the reception models while linking empirical data with deeper theoretical frameworks. His interests have been concerned with all the new forms of communication: political ads, the use of polls, and so on.

In 1998, Mazzoleni published the first edition of *La comunicazione politica,* the first Italian textbook devoted entirely to political communication. This publication has meant the official recognition of the importance of the field by one of the major Italian publishers, Il Mulino. With this book, university classes finally have appropriate material to develop an approach that is no longer based on improvisation and contaminated by other disciplines.

Recently, Mazzoleni has focused his interests on the consequences of media commercialization. He has written several journal articles on the personalization and dramatization of politics. The career of Italian media mogul and Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi provided Mazzoleni with interesting experiences and data that he put into a more general framework that he then compared with other countries, identifying similarities and differences.

Then, from media personalization, Mazzoleni easily moved to modern populism and the role that the media system has played in creating new figures of populist leaders and populist proposals. Here, too, Mazzoleni was prompted by the Berlusconi experience; he used Berlusconi as an example of a televised populist leader and then compared him with other foreign figures. The book he edited with other colleagues, *The Media and Neo-Populism,* published in 2003, gives the reader an almost complete overview of the consequences the mass media may have on transforming political life and debate.

Paolo Mancini

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McCain, John (1936–)

The public ethos of Senator John S. McCain III (R-AZ) as a straight shooter has been shaped most principally by two events: his time as a prisoner of war and the savings and loan scandal of the 1980s. McCain entered the Navy and flew fighters during the Vietnam War. On October 26, 1967, he was shot down over Hanoi, breaking a knee and both arms but landing in a small lake. McCain spent more than 5 years in prison, 2 of those in solitary confinement, and he was repeatedly interrogated under torture. He refused the preferential treatment or early release offered by his captors, who were trying to propagandize on McCain's lineage as the son and grandson of Navy admirals. Finally released with his comrades on March 14, 1973, McCain returned to the United States as a decorated hero. After retiring from the Navy with the rank of captain, McCain first ran for elected office in 1982, representing Phoenix in the House of Representatives. After winning reelection to the House in 1984, McCain was elected to the Senate in 1986, taking the seat being vacated by Barry Goldwater.

During McCain's political rise, he had been supported by and become good friends with Charles Keating, a rich and successful investment banker who had cashed in on the federal deregulation of savings and loan banks. The two were close enough to take family vacations together, but that all came to an end when Keating tried to convince McCain and four other senators to support his company exemption from a federal examination of investment practices. Keating was eventually charged with fraud, having made too many risky investments from his company's savings and loan funds. When Keating's company went bankrupt, the federal government was forced to pay out more than $3 billion to defrauded customers. The "Keating Five" became the focus of a Senate ethics investigation, and McCain, the only Republican among the five, was largely found innocent of any intentional wrongdoing save "poor judgment." But McCain's pride was damaged in the scandal; he could not bear having besmirched his otherwise outstanding reputation.

McCain bounced back by cosponsoring campaign finance reform, which he said he hoped would dilute the power of money in politics. Admitting that he too was tainted, McCain portrayed himself as the honest politician inevitably soiled by a corrupt system. McCain also had the epithet "maverick" applied to him

for his willingness to break with his own party on many major issues, like campaign finance reform and torture of political prisoners.

When McCain ran for president in 2000, his character looked outstanding, but McCain's "Straight Talk Express" could reveal his ugly side, too. McCain referred to his Vietcong captors as "gooks," backpedaling only to insist that the slur did not refer generally to the Vietnamese people. After some big primary wins against George W. Bush, McCain lost a crucial South Carolina primary that was saturated with allegations of dirty politicking. McCain reacted by giving a major address in Virginia lashing out at leaders of the religious right like Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell. Alienating an already dubious right wing, McCain went down to defeat.

Nonetheless, his maverick status and willingness to engage in straight talk have made him remain popular with Americans generally. Conventional wisdom holds that McCain will be a contender for the presidency in 2008 if he is able to persuade the Republican base to support him through the primaries.

Nicholas A. Thomas

See also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act; *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*

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McCarthy, Joseph

See McCarthy Hearings

McCarthy Hearings

What have become known as the "McCarthy hearings" refer to 36 days of televised investigative hearings led by Senator Joseph McCarthy in 1954. After first calling hearings to investigate possible espionage at the Army Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, the junior senator turned his communist-chasing committee's attention to an altogether different matter, the question of whether the Army had promoted a dentist who had refused to answer questions for the Loyalty and Security Board. The hearings reached their climax when McCarthy suggested that the Army's lawyer, Joseph Welch, had employed a man who at one time had belonged to a communist front group. Welch's rebuke to the senator—"Have you no sense of decency, sir? At long last, have you left no sense of decency?"—has been called one of the most devastating lines in American history. McCarthy was censured for his conduct by the Senate a few months later, and in 1957, he died. Though he has become something of a pariah in the annals of history, the enduring value of studying and understanding the hearings that bore his name is undeniable.

Prior to the hearings on television in 1954, McCarthy's search for communists in the Central Intelligence Agency, the motion picture industry, the State Department, and elsewhere made him a widely despised man. His reach was unmatched among those with institutional power, and his influence was only bolstered after 1952 with the arrival of Republican majorities in the House and Senate, and with the election of an Eisenhower administration reluctant to denounce him for fear of appearing soft on communism. Moreover, he had commanded the attention of television. McCarthy was eventually undermined significantly by the incisive and skillful criticism of a journalist, Edward R. Murrow. Murrow's devastating TV editorial about McCarthy, carried out on a series of episodes of his show, *See It Now,* cemented him as the premier journalist of the time, and it also raised concerns about the ideological powers of journalists and of television generally.

Television, via Murrow, had seemingly stepped in to stop what a partisan Republican majority around Senator McCarthy could not seem to. In the process, Edward R. Murrow became a symbol of television and its influence. As a result of the hearings, journalists and intellectuals alike talked at length about television's power as a communication medium, just as they had at the dawn of radio. Indeed, the McCarthy hearings are underappreciated for their coincidence with the early stages of the development of TV as a technological medium for politics. In this context—after years of blacklisting in Hollywood, and the

demonizing of some of its most famous writers—TV was a cultural obsession. As pessimists dismissed it as culturally disruptive, overly commercialized, and a promoter of laziness and sloth, optimists argued that TV would deliver America from war into a technologically enhanced democratic utopia. The hearings were a test of TV's democratic promise, but they were a commercial failure and the networks dropped all-day coverage after just 2 weeks. While it is fair to say that they suffered by comparison to entertainment programming, this was only a beginning. The hearings were a test of television for the future, and as such, had important consequences for how we think about the power of television, about the ideology and the media, and about press responsibility today.

Paul J. Achter

See also Murrow, Edward R.; *Television in Politics*

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McClellan, Scott

See Press Secretary, White House

McCombs, Maxwell (1938–)

Maxwell E. McCombs, born in 1938 in Birmingham, Alabama, is one of the two founding fathers of empirical research on the agenda-setting function of the press. McCombs and his longtime research partner, Donald L. Shaw, first tested the hypothesis that the news media have a major influence on which issues the public considers important in the 1968 U.S. presidential election while they worked together as young professors of journalism at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill. The article that resulted from that study, "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media," which appeared in the summer 1972 issue of *Public Opinion Quarterly,* has become a classic and perhaps the most cited article in the field of mass communication research in the past 35 years. Since then, there have been hundreds of studies of agenda setting, many of which are described in McCombs' latest book, *Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion* (2004).

After earning his bachelor's degree from Tulane University in 1960, McCombs enrolled in Stanford University's master's program, which he completed in 1961, and then returned to New Orleans, where he worked as a reporter for the *New Orleans Times-Picayune* until 1963. He then enrolled in Stanford's doctoral program in communication, which he finished in 1966. He took a position as an assistant professor at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), where he had been lecturing since 1965, and stayed until 1967. He moved to the University of North Carolina, where he and Donald Shaw began their 40-year research collaboration. He left North Carolina for the John Ben Snow Professorship at Syracuse University in 1973, and in 1985 he accepted his current position as the Jesse H. Jones Centennial Chair in Communication at the University of Texas at Austin.

Highlights of McCombs' career include serving as director of the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) News Research Center from 1975 to 1984, chairing the Department of Journalism at the University of Texas from 1985 to 1991, spending a decade as a visiting professor at the University of Navarra in Spain from 1994 to 2004, and serving as the president of the World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR) from 1997 to 1998. His honors include the Sidney S. Goldish Award for a significant, continuing contribution to newspaper research from the International Newspaper Promotion Association in 1978, a fellowship in the Institute for Advanced Study at Indiana University in 1990, a fellowship in the International Communication Association in 1995, the Murray Edelman Career Award for distinguished scholarship in political communication (with Donald Shaw) from the American Political Science Association in 1996, and the Paul J. Deutschmann Award for excellence in research from the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication in 1998.

Throughout his unusually focused and productive research career, McCombs has expanded and elaborated the original agenda-setting hypothesis into a rich

and complex theory not only of media influence on the public but also of its influences on the media agenda. This theory is one of few that have been developed solely within the communication field.

David H. Weaver

See also Agenda Setting; Public Opinion

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McConnell, Mitchell

See *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*

McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

On December 10, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (FEC)* upheld by a 5–4 decision most of the provisions of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) against constitutional challenges. In so doing, it purported to apply the constitutional framework of analysis that had been handed down in its 1976 decision in *Buckley v. Valeo,* but in fact reached results arguably quite different from those in *Buckley.*

The progression of the court's constitutional analysis from *Buckley* to *McConnell,* and more recently in *Randall v. Sorrell* in 2006 and *Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL)* in 2007, reflects a sort of doctrinal incoherence whose development is not yet complete. Future decisions of the court may clarify the extent to which the Constitution permits the regulation of political speech in the name of controlling the uses of money in politics.

The constitutional framework established in *Buckley* allowed campaign contributions to be limited, but expenditures by candidates, parties, or independent persons (including political advertising) were not limited because to do so would result in direct limits on the quantity of political expression protected by the First Amendment. The sole justification recognized by the *Buckley* court for allowing contribution limitations, which appeared to impair the constitutional right of free association, was the strong governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. Politicians and political parties over the years developed ways around contribution limits by using unlimited "soft money," raised outside the scope of the Federal Election Campaign Act, to fund unlimited political ads that avoided express advocacy of election or defeat of candidates. When Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002), containing provisions that among others sought to limit soft money and control electioneering communications that did not amount to express advocacy, some 20 provisions of the BCRA were challenged by Senator Mitch McConnell and others.

The *McConnell* decision upheld almost all provisions of the BCRA. The soft money ban in BCRA was that, with limited exceptions, federal candidates, parties, officeholders, and their agents were prohibited from soliciting, receiving, or directing soft money to another person or organization, including state or local parties, on the reasoning that state or local parties might serve as conduits for potential corruption; for example, donors could buy access to federal politicians by donating funds to state or local parties that then used the contributions to support party activities, since federal politicians might potentially benefit from such contributions.

The soft money provisions of BCRA were all upheld in *McConnell.* More specifically, it was permissible to prohibit national party committees and their agents from soliciting, receiving, or spending any soft money and to prevent donors from contributing nonfederal funds to state and local party committees to fund federal election activity.

The court upheld the prohibition on national, state, and local party committees and their agents or subsidiaries from soliciting any funds for, or making or directing any donations to, certain tax-exempt organizations that make expenditures in connection with elections for federal office. Congress could also prohibit federal candidates and officeholders from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending soft money in connection with federal elections and

limit the ability of federal candidates and officeholders to solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend soft money in connection with state and local elections. Finally, it was permissible to prohibit state or local officeholders and candidates from spending soft money to fund communications that refer to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and that promoted, supported, attacked, or opposed a candidate for that office.

Despite a lack of evidence of any actual corruption, the court ruled that the potential for circumvention of campaign contribution limits justified the broad rule of prohibition and use of contributions. The difficulty with the *McConnell* court's equating of potential circumvention to *Buckley's* corruption is the lack of a logical stopping point. As the dissent argued, the same rationale could arguably justify restrictions on the press or political commentators or talk shows because the candidates might be grateful for the potential benefit of positive political speech.

The court also upheld the BCRA restrictions on electioneering communications—those ads aired within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary election that mentioned the name of any federal candidate and were targeted to the candidate's electorate—regardless of whether the message expressly advocated support or defeat for the candidate. The BCRA had extended the existing requirement—that corporations and labor unions use separate (nontreasury funds such as political action committees) funds for express advocacy—to these electioneering communications.

The constitutional attack on the electioneering communications provision was that it was overbroad; that even though it properly banned some ads with an electoral purpose, that it caught genuine issue ads deserving of constitutional protection in its sweep. The court, relying on some questionable empirical studies and perfunctory analysis, concluded that vast majority of such ads had an electoral purpose and could therefore be banned as to corporations and unions and required to be disclosed as to others because they were the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Evidence before the lower court had concluded that from 17% to more than 50% of such ads were genuine issue ads, but the court characterized this evidence as indicating the vast majority of such ads were properly regulated. The impact of upholding this limit is that corporations and labor unions are prohibited from expressing their views on important public issues at a critical time—within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election—even when they have a genuine purpose to comment on issues rather than promote candidates. For example, within 60 days of any election in which Senator John McCain of Arizona or Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin is a candidate for any federal office, no company or labor union may run ads urging the repeal of the McCain-Feingold bill—BCRA—because such would be an electioneering communication. A better indication of congressional purpose may be found in the *Congressional Record,* which is replete with comments suggesting the need for this provision in order to reduce the number of ads criticizing members of Congress.

In BCRA, Congress also sought to force political parties to choose between making potentially unlimited advertising expenditures independent of its candidates or making coordinated expenditures that could be treated as contributions and limited in amount. However, the Supreme Court in *McConnell v. FEC* struck down these provisions, thus leaving party committees free to make both limited coordinated expenditures and unlimited independent expenditures, although the ban on solicitation or expenditure of soft money was upheld. This was one of the few provisions of BCRA that were found unconstitutional.

Another provision of BCRA found unconstitutional was one prohibiting minors from making political contributions at all, apparently assuming that minors who did so were merely serving as a subterfuge for excessive contributions by adults. In *McConnell v. FEC,* the Supreme Court ruled that this provision unconstitutionally impaired the First Amendment rights of minors to associate with candidates of their choice where the minors had their own funds. The court said that Congress cannot impose a blanket prohibition on contributions by minors without regard to the source of the funds. In this particular ruling, the court actually adhered to the ruling in *Buckley,* while others of its rulings merely claimed adherence to *Buckley.*

Following *McConnell,* the Supreme Court seemed poised to give a green light to any kind of election reform that could plausibly be claimed to prevent circumvention of contribution limits, even if First Amendment rights seemed to be given little respect. However, there have been changes to the composition of the court, and there are some indications that the new configuration of the court (at least until the composition changes again) may be less willing to defer to

legislative rules on campaign finance that suppress political voices. In 2006, in *Randall v. Sorrell,* Vermont's state campaign finance law was declared unconstitutional in both its contribution limitations and its expenditure limitations. The court did not purport to overrule *McConnell,* but instead seemed to signal more of a true adherence to the *Buckley* framework. This has led to suggestions that the court may now be willing to reconsider the extreme deference shown to Congress in *McConnell.*

Vermont's *Act 64* imposed inflation-adjusted 2-year election cycle expenditure limits for candidates for state office of approximately $300,000 for governor, $100,000 for lieutenant governor, $45,000 for other statewide offices, $4,000 for state senator (plus an additional $2,500 for each additional seat in the district), $3,000 for state representative in a two-member district, and $2,000 for state representative in a single-member district. Expenditures were broadly defined and expenditures by others that were coordinated with the candidates were counted against the limits. Contribution limits, which were not adjusted for inflation, were $400 for governor, lieutenant governor, and other statewide offices, $300 for state senator, and $200 for state representative.

The court in *Randall* ruled by a vote of 6–3 that both Vermont's expenditure limits and the contribution limits were unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment. In striking down the expenditure limits, the court reaffirmed *Buckley*'s ruling to the same effect and specifically declined Vermont's invitation to overrule *Buckley.* In striking down the contribution limits, the court said that normally it would defer to the legislature in setting such limits, but that merely because some contributions might be so large as to implicate the integrity of the electoral process did not mean lower was always better. Contribution limits that are too low could harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability.

The court found that the Vermont limits involved were so low as to give danger signs in that they were lower than any previously approved limits and lower than limits in other states. The court therefore carefully analyzed the Vermont limits, finding that the limits were likely to be so low as to restrict the amount of funding available for challengers to mount effective campaigns. The court found that the fact that limits on contributions by political parties were the same as the limits on individual contributions indicated an impairment of the right to associate through political parties. The court found that the fact that the travel expenses of volunteers were counted as contributions coupled with how low the contribution limits were placed a serious burden on volunteer political activity and rights of association. The court found that the failure to adjust contribution limits for inflation meant that the limits, if not already too low, would inevitably become too low. Finally, the court found an absence of a special justification for the extremely low contribution limit. The court concluded that, taken together, Act 64 "disproportionately burdens numerous First Amendment interests, and consequently, in our view, violates the First Amendment."

For more than 30 years, the *Buckley* court's dichotomous treatment of contribution limits and expenditure limits has sparked controversy. Proponents of campaign reform have argued that *Buckley's* protection of the First Amendment goes too far and should be overruled and Congress allowed to pass limits on campaign expenditures to reduce the need for large amounts of money in politics. Others have argued that *Buckley* did not go far enough, and that its allowance of contribution limits are what should be overruled. The court's opinion in *McConnell v. FEC* upheld BCRA and allowed Congress to punish what Senator McConnell once called "the crime of incitement to political action." After the Supreme Court decision, Senator McConnell lamented that we now live in a world in which greater protections are afforded to virtual child pornography and dissemination of illegally intercepted communications than to criticisms of elected officials. Others, including some of the dissenters in *McConnell,* said that political speech now clearly has less constitutional protection than virtual child pornography, tobacco advertising, sexually explicit cable programs, dissemination of illegally received communications, nude dancing, defamation, cross burning, and flag burning.

The Supreme Court's shifting campaign finance doctrine was further evidenced in its 2007 decision in *Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.* In *WRTL*, the court considered another constitutional challenge to the BCRA's ban on electioneering communications by corporations and labor unions. The court found the provision unconstitutional as applied to two ads WRTL sought to air in 2004 within 60 days of the general election. The ads urged listeners to contact their (Wisconsin) senators to oppose a threatened filibuster of judicial nominees

submitted by President George W. Bush. Although the ads contained no express advocacy, they ran afoul of the ban because they mentioned, ironically, Senator Russ Feingold by name (the challenged law was part of the so-called McCain-Feingold bill), and he was then a candidate for reelection. The Court in *WRTL* sharply narrowed its holding in *McConnell v. FEC* by saying that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. The court's opinion relied heavily on the *Buckley* court's original discussion of the difficulty of separating public issues from candidates for public office and the need for a test that gave the benefit of the doubt to political speech. It appears that the Supreme Court may have gone far toward restoring the express advocacy doctrine first announced in *Buckley* and may be willing to consider reversing its decision in *McConnell* upholding the BCRA electioneering communication provision entirely. Some observers have suggested that *McConnell* has already been overruled in part by *WRTL*, even though the court did not formally do so.

After *Randall* and *WRTL,* it may be that the Supreme court will not give blanket deference to congressional rules governing election campaigns, but will recognize that when incumbent legislators specify the rules under which their future opponents will campaign to take their places, and those rules are likely to impair the ability of challengers to compete, a healthy skepticism by the courts is not only warranted but necessary.

Clifford A. Jones

See also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act; *Buckley v. Valeo*; Campaign Finance; Federal Election Campaign Act

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McCurry, Michael

See Press Secretary, White House

McGovern, George (1922–)

George Stanley McGovern served as a U.S. representative (1957–1961) and senator from South Dakota (1963–1981) and was the Democratic nominee for president in 1972 against Richard M. Nixon. McGovern secured 38% of the popular vote to Nixon's 61%, winning only 17 electoral votes to Nixon's 520. Although the famous Watergate break-in scandal occurred during this campaign, the investigations leading to Nixon's implication in the scheme and his eventual resignation did not occur until after the campaign was over. McGovern never reaped the benefits of Nixon's wrongdoing. He also conducted unsuccessful campaigns for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1968 and 1984.

McGovern's 1972 campaign was characterized by an emphasis on the primary system, controversy over his choice for vice president, and antiwar themes. The campaign was managed by Gary Hart, future U.S. senator and unsuccessful presidential candidate. Hart published a chronicle of the events of the campaign, *Right From the Start* (1973), which outlined the campaign's strategy of concentrating on winning popular support through primaries and caucuses rather than gaining the support of party elites.

Such a strategy was made possible by reforms instituted in 1969 by the Democratic Party based on recommendations of the party's Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, which had been chaired by McGovern.

At the 1972 Democratic Convention, the choice of a vice-presidential candidate led to 39 nominations from the floor, but McGovern was eventually able to secure Missouri Senator Thomas Eagleton as his running mate. McGovern's choice of Eagleton turned disastrous when journalist Clark Hoyt published a story concerning Eagleton's earlier hospitalization for nervous exhaustion and treatment with electroshock therapy. These revelations led to calls in the media for McGovern to replace Eagleton. Initially McGovern expressed support for Eagleton, but on July 31, 1972, Eagleton withdrew his name from the ticket. McGovern replaced Eagleton with R. Sargent Shriver, but intense media coverage questioning McGovern's choice of and initial support for Eagleton continued.

In his 1972 campaign, McGovern expressed strong opposition to the Vietnam War, calling for the end of bombing and the withdrawal of American troops. He also called for cutting waste in military spending. One of McGovern's television ads highlighted his antiwar stance by showing an image of a Vietnamese woman cradling her injured child in her arms with the sound of jets and the voice of a child saying, "Does a president know that planes bomb children?" Although most of McGovern's campaign ads in 1972 were produced by Emmy award-winning documentary filmmaker Charles Guggenheim, this ad was produced by Tony Schwartz, maker of the controversial "Daisy Girl Ad" for Lyndon Johnson in 1964.

Throughout the campaign, McGovern was never able to defend successfully his liberal viewpoints. The Republican campaign against him succeeded in branding him a liberal whose judgment on policy issues as well as his vice-presidential choice could not be trusted.

McGovern also served as special assistant to the president and director of the Food for Peace Program (1961–1962), as a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly (1976 and 1978), president of the Middle East Policy Council (1991–1998), ambassador to the United Nations Agencies for Food and Agriculture (1998–2001), and the first United Nations Global Ambassador on World Hunger (2001). He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross as a bomber pilot during World War II and earned MA and PhD degrees from Northwestern University. He was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2000.

Larry Jene King

See also Guggenheim, Charles; Hart, Gary; McGovern Library and Center for Public Service and Leadership

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McGovern Library and Center for Public Service and Leadership

October 2006 marked the dedication of the George and Eleanor McGovern Library and Center for Public Service and Leadership, housed at Dakota Wesleyan University, in Mitchell, South Dakota. The center bears the name of 1972 Democratic presidential hopeful and United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization Ambassador Senator George McGovern and his wife and fellow humanitarian activist, Eleanor.

The center's unique utility for the study of political communication is twofold: (1) the center's curricular focus on careers in public service and leadership and (2) the creation of the McGovern Legacy museum.

McGovern Center Director, Dakota Wesleyan University Professor Don Simmons, states that "what makes the Center unique is the emphasis on the study of the practical side of public service, not just the theoretical elements. Students are better prepared for the practical reality of politics and public service when they graduate."

Simmons contrasts the center's curriculum with that of what he considers "the more traditional political science program," asserting that the Public Service and Leadership (PSL) major or minor at Dakota Wesleyan University streamlines political education for those interested in a future in the political arena. University President Robert Duffett adds that the PSL minor also serves the demographic of those students who wish to maximize their public service and leadership abilities within any chosen field. "Nurses, teachers, and ministers are just a few of the fields whose careers the PSL minor's leadership education can infuse with a service ethic."

The center honors the McGoverns not only through its academic programs, but also in the "McGovern Legacy" space it houses. The space is a museum-like exhibit area chronicling the lives and accomplishments of George and Eleanor McGovern. Displays feature highlights and memorabilia from every period of their lives, emphasizing their decades-long quest for humanitarian issues such as ending world hunger as a route to world peace. "McGovern for President" campaign commercials and speeches are accessible, as well as footage from the Vietnam War and more recent events, such as the Medal of Freedom Ceremony at the White House.

President William Jefferson Clinton, keynote speaker at the dedication of the McGovern Center, stated that Senator George McGovern and his wife Eleanor are internationally renowned as dedicated public servants and examples of servant leadership. Clinton, along with the university, dedicated the center in their honor in recognition of their dedication to making a difference in the lives of citizens of the world.

Senator McGovern states that he is thrilled at the choice of a library to honor him and his wife. "Books are the keystone of learning, and knowledge is the foundation of political service," he says. "What better way to honor us than with a library dedicated to honoring our work?"

Karla Hunter

See also McGovern, George

Further Readings

The McGovern Center for Leadership and Public Service Web site: http://www.mcgovernlibrary.com/center.htm

McLuhan, Marshall (1911–1980)

Born Herbert Marshall McLuhan on July 21, 1911, McLuhan was raised in Canada. There, he studied at the University of Manitoba and earned a BA and a MA in English. He then went on to study at the University of Cambridge, where he earned a BA, an MA, and a PhD. McLuhan credited the faculty at Cambridge for his "training of perception" and for providing him with his theoretical foundation. Although he once said he would never be an academic, he went on to teach at the University of Wisconsin, St. Louis University, Assumption University, and the University of Toronto, where he served as director of the Center for Culture and Technology. Additionally, he earned nine honorary degrees and numerous awards for his scholarly works.

McLuhan loved word play and is likely best known for his phrase, "The medium is the message." This concept was first laid out in *Understanding Media* (1964). Here McLuhan explained that it was the medium and not the content itself that should be the focus of mass communication studies. McLuhan also developed "medium theory" in this book. Medium theory is based on the hypothesis that the degree of participation an individual must exert to experience media content varies by medium. He explained that some media, such as movies, are "hot." Hot media demand a great deal of attention from the participant. They are well filled with data and offer a "high-definition" experience. Other media are "cold." For example, a comic book requires more conscious participation on the part of the participant. Thus, the user must fill in the missing information. McLuhan considered this a "low-definition" experience. *Understanding Media* provided a new way to look at media effects and culture. Not only did this publication provide the foundation for many modern mass communication studies, but it also brought interest in communication studies to the general public. In fact, this publication received a great deal of publicity in news magazines, including *Newsweek,* in a *Playboy* article, and in a 1967 NBC episode, "This Is Marshall McLuhan," from the network's experiments in TV series. To date, *Understanding Media* has been published in more than 20 languages.

McLuhan elaborated on these ideas in *The Medium Is the Massage* (1967). According to the Marshall McLuhan Web site run by his estate, the title was actually a mistake. It was supposed to have read "message"

as often quoted, but it instead read “massage.” When McLuhan noticed the typo, he said, “Leave it alone! It’s great, and right on target!” Now there are four possible readings for the title: “Message,” “Mess Age,” “Massage,” and “Mass Age.” All may be accurate, considering that McLuhan saw media as an extension of our human senses, bodies, and minds. Each medium, independent of its content, has its own effects, which are its unique message.

Although these works are what made him famous or infamous, depending on how you look at it, his earlier works provided the foundation for these concepts and others. In fact, McLuhan’s dissertation resulted in the book *The Mechanical Bride* (1951). Here, he provided a survey of visual arts history. Using contemporary examples of persuasion, McLuhan stressed the importance of rhetoric and language over the formal study of logic. Today, this work is considered a pioneering study for the field now known as “popular culture.”

In *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (1962), McLuhan also presented many of the concepts that shape our communication today. He discussed how communication technology (alphabetic writing, printing press, electronic media) affect our cognition and, in turn, our social organization. He explained that new technologies would move us from an individualistic to a collective society or “global village” with “electronic interdependence.” Although it would be 30 years before the Internet would be invented, he coined the term *surfing* to represent rapid, irregular, multidirectional movements through a heterogeneous body of documents or knowledge.

Today, Marshall McLuhan is both an intellectual and pop icon. In fact, *Wired* magazine named him their “patron saint.” McLuhan and his concepts have been magnified through audio recordings, mention of him in the song *The Broadway Melody of 1947* by Genesis, a Marshall McLuhan festival, in film roles (cameo appearances and spoofs), and with a Canadian postage stamp in 2000. Additionally, there have been countless biographies, academic articles, and symposia in his honor.

Marshall McLuhan said that the artist picks up on messages before others. So he was always thought to be way ahead of his time. Today, most people would argue that McLuhan himself was ahead of his time. Indeed, his works have changed and continue to change the way that both the general public and scholars view mediated communication. Without doubt, McLuhan will continue to play a major role in the future of mass communication studies and in the future of each medium we use to experience our world. As McLuhan is often quoted, “We look at the present through a rear-view mirror. We march backwards into the future.”

Lori Melton McKinnon

See also Medium Theory

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McQuail, Denis (1935–)

Denis McQuail studied history and administration at the University of Oxford in the U.K. He received his PhD at Leeds University. While working for the newly founded Granada Television Research Unit at Leeds University, he participated in the early British election studies (1959, 1964) and was a coauthor of the classical books that emerged from these projects, *Television and the Political Image* (1961, with Joseph Trenaman) and *Television in Politics* (1968, with Jay G. Blumler). In 1965, he started teaching sociology at the University of Southampton. From 1977 until his retirement in 1997, McQuail held the chair of mass communication at the University of Amsterdam/Netherlands. Over the years, he was visiting professor or fellow at universities all over the world, including the Annenberg School of Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; the Gannett Center for Media Studies at Columbia University, New York; and Seijo University, Tokyo.

Together with Jay Blumler, Denis McQuail was one of the early proponents of the uses and gratifications approach, a perspective that they first applied in their 1964 election study. The authors thus initiated the reorientation of European media effects research and contributed to a significant change in paradigms. Likewise, in his early career McQuail brought his sociological background into the study of mass communication,

from which followed his book *Towards a Sociology of Mass Communications* (1969). This and his book *Communication* in 1975 laid the ground for his well-known *Mass Communication Theory,* which was first published in 1983. This book became a true best-seller and was finally so much associated with his name that the title was changed to *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory.* It is presently on the market in its fifth edition and has been translated into several other languages. Linking theory with empirical research on media content and the media audience, McQuail discusses the contribution of the mass media to the public interest in his work on *Media Performance.*

Since its establishment in 1982, McQuail was a pillar and a driving force of the Euromedia Research Group, a network of European scientists who continuously analyzed the development of the media and of media policy, first only in the West European countries and later in the whole of Europe. This engagement resulted in several publications, the latest being *The Media in Europe: The Euromedia Handbook,* of which McQuail was one of the editors. When the *European Journal of Communication* was founded in 1986, Denis McQuail was one of the three founding editors and the only one who is still an active editor of the journal today.

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See also *Television in Politics*; Uses and Gratifications Approach

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Media Bias

By definition, the word *bias* refers to showing an unjustified favoritism toward something or someone. Thus, on a very simplistic level, *media bias* refers to the media exhibiting an unjustifiable favoritism as they cover the news. When the media transmit biased news reports, those reports present viewers with an inaccurate, unbalanced, and/or unfair view of the world around them.

Political communication scholars have identified and examined two main types of bias in media reporting. The first type, commonly referred to as "partisan bias," involves media reports that are slanted in favor of a particular political party. The second type of media bias is known as "structural bias." This type of bias stems from certain "structures" (customs, reporting routines, commercial pressures, etc.) that operate within the news industry. As a result of the highly commercial and purportedly nonpartisan nature of the mainstream U.S. media, the issue of media bias surfaces in a unique way in American democracy.

Partisan Bias

News that exhibits a partisan bias favors one political party at the expense of other political parties. In the U.S. political system, partisan bias generally alludes to reporting that unfairly favors one of the major political parties, either Democrats or Republicans. In general, when individuals accuse the media of "biased" coverage, they are usually referring to a partisan bias in political reporting.

Through much of American history, accusations of a partisan bias in the media would have made little sense, because American democracy originally rested upon an explicitly partisan press. In early American journalistic history, papers such as the *Gazette of the United States* openly promoted the political positions of the Federalist Party. Competitor papers, such as the *National Gazette,* advanced the views of the Republican Party.

However, from the 1830s to the 1870s the media began adopting nonpartisan, objective news standards. Economic reasons brought on this shift from a partisan to a nonpartisan (objective, nonbiased) style of reporting. Prior to the 1830s, most American newspapers catered to a small, elite audience. Individuals falling below the level of high society could simply not afford these expensive publications; these elite daily newspapers commonly cost 6 cents per issue. In the decade of the 1830s, the penny press arrived in the media marketplace. Penny press papers, such as the New York *Herald* or the Philadelphia *Public Ledger,* were inexpensive (a penny per issue) news dailies designed to attract a mass audience. If a newspaper's goal was to attract the largest possible audience, then

that paper could not afford to engage in biased, partisan reporting. Such partisan news coverage would ultimately turn away certain readers. Just as a paper favoring the Democratic Party would repel Republican readers, a paper showing undue favoritism toward Republicans would discourage Democratic readers. A nonpartisan newspaper, on the other hand, could attract a larger audience comprised of citizens belonging to both political parties. The highly profitable penny presses soon discovered that less partisanship in a paper's reporting resulted in more revenues for that paper.

While the press initially pursued objectivity for economic reasons, it eventually came to view objectivity as a core journalistic value. As the news media progressed through the 20th century, objective reporting became equated with good reporting. When journalism schools today train future reporters, they place great emphasis on news reports that are objective and free of any partisan bias.

While today's journalism profession stresses the importance of objectivity, the very concept of "objectivity" is very elusive and difficult to define. In defining this elusive concept, journalists have come to equate "objective" reporting with "balanced" reporting. For example, a reporter preparing a news story on a Republican administration's budget proposal would probably turn to key administration officials (e.g., the director of the Office of Management and Budget) for comments supporting this Republican budget. In all likelihood, that reporter would then turn to key Democratic lawmakers to obtain arguments against this budget plan. This media format, which juxtaposes the views of Republican politicians with those of Democratic politicians, has grown extremely prevalent in political reporting. This format's popularity has much to do with the fact that it allows reporters to fulfill their professional obligation to objectivity. This format is "objective" because it is "balanced." Democratic views are balanced against Republican views.

While the mainstream news media in the United States have come to place great value on objective, nonpartisan reporting, that value is not universally shared throughout advanced democracies. In fact, many advanced democracies disseminate news through an explicitly partisan press. In such media systems, news sources are commonly connected to particular political parties. For example, in the British press some newspapers, such as the *Daily Mirror,* promote the political agenda of the Labour Party. Other papers, such as the *Daily Mail,* attempt to advance the causes of the Conservative Party. When a nation's political communication revolves around a partisan press, much like the early days of American journalistic history, charges of partisan bias in the media make little sense. Such charges amount to little more than stating the obvious.

The Liberal Press Corps

The best evidence supporting the existence of a partisan bias in the U.S. media can be found in data on the individuals who make their living as journalists. Surveys have consistently shown that journalists tend to be more liberal and more favorably disposed to the Democratic Party than is the general public. For example, after the 1992 election, one survey revealed that nearly 90% of the Washington press corps voted for the Democratic candidate, Bill Clinton. A mere 7% voted for the incumbent Republican candidate in the race, George H. W. Bush. These voting percentages from Washington journalists stand in sharp contrast to the overall electorate. In the 1992 presidential race, 43% of the overall electorate cast ballots for Bill Clinton and 37% voted for George Bush (the remaining votes went to the Independent candidate, Ross Perot). Paralleling the results in the 1992 presidential race, surveys have repeatedly shown that the vast majority of journalists cast their votes for Democratic candidates.

Not only do reporters consistently vote for Democratic politicians, but they also tend to possess liberal viewpoints on most political issues, falling on the liberal side of the value divide that separates liberals and conservatives. Demonstrating reporters' liberal values, surveys have shown that a substantial majority of journalists fall into the pro-choice camp on the issue of abortion. Most journalists report that they do not attend any type of religious service on a regular basis. Regular attendance at religious services is one of the best indicators of a culturally conservative viewpoint.

However, the mere fact that most members of the press possess liberal or Democratic political views does not clearly establish a partisan bias in media reporting. A reporter's personal political biases need not necessarily appear in his or her news stories. Most reporters work in a profession that stresses objectivity and nonpartisanship in political reporting. Media sociologists have pointed out that news reporters who desire career advancement must establish their journalistic credibility. Such credibility comes through

objective (nonbiased/nonpartisan) reporting. Hence, reporters face strong incentives to keep their political views in check and out of their reporting.

News Content and Partisan Bias

Discovering whether the personal political biases of reporters shape news reports requires examining the content of news stories. For several decades, political communication scholars have been doing just that; they have been systematically scrutinizing news stories in an effort to uncover partisan bias. In these systematic examinations, researchers have primarily relied upon a research method known as "content analysis." This method involves coding and counting segments of text, such as paragraphs in newspaper articles or news segments on broadcast news programs.

In their attempts to code and classify news content as biased or unbiased, researchers have struggled to find a workable definition for media bias (i.e., a definition that is clear enough to use in coding content). What appears as biased reporting to one individual may very well appear to be a factual, objective news report to someone else. For example, consider a campaign involving two candidates (Candidate A and Candidate B). In this political race, Candidate A is prone to making misstatements. Unlike Candidate A, Candidate B's political speeches are generally free of such verbal mistakes. Given Candidate A's propensity for verbal errors, Candidate A is likely to receive less favorable treatment in campaign news coverage than will Candidate B. In this case, does Candidate A's higher level of negative news coverage reflect a partisan media bias (the fact that reporters dislike Candidate A's political party), or does it merely reflect the objective reality of the campaign (the fact that Candidate A makes far more misstatements)? Political communication scholars have struggled with such questions in their ongoing effort to analyze the content news stories and uncover partisan bias.

In light of the difficulty in coming up with a clear definition of partisan bias, researchers have employed a host of definitions in their content analysis studies. For example, some research has attempted to uncover partisan bias by comparing the number of campaign news stories on Democrat-owned issues against the number of stories on Republican-owned issues. (When a political party has developed a better reputation for handling certain political issues, that party is said to "own" those issues.) Others have made an effort to find partisan media bias by contrasting media references to liberal think tanks against the number of references to conservative think tanks. While content analysis studies have incorporated many different definitions of partisan media bias, most have adopted the "50–50 rule" when coding news content for partisanship. This rule suggests that on any given political issue or in any political campaign the media should give roughly equal (50%) voice to the views of both major political parties. This 50–50 rule accords with journalists' value and view of objectivity. As discussed previously, journalists value objectivity in news reporting, and in the eyes of the press an "objective" story is a "balanced" story.

In addition to counting and coding the sheer amount of press coverage received by each party, many of these content analysis studies have also examined the tone (either positive or negative) of this coverage. In a typical content analysis study, researchers count how many paragraphs in major newspapers are devoted to the Republican candidate or to the Democratic candidate in a particular presidential race (such as the race between Republican candidate George Bush and Democratic candidate John Kerry in the 2004 presidential campaign). A typical content analysis study would also involve coding the tone (as either positive or negative) of each paragraph. This coding process would reveal the total amount of positive and negative news coverage received by each candidate. If the Republican candidate (George Bush) received more positive news coverage than his Democratic opponent, the content analysis would reveal a conservative bias in the media. On the other hand, if a study showed that the Democratic candidate (John Kerry) received more positive news coverage than his Republican opponent, the research could claim to have uncovered a liberal media bias. In fact, content analysis studies conducted by both the Project for Excellence in Journalism and by the Center for Media and Public Affairs found that Kerry received far more favorable press treatment than George Bush over the course of the 2004 presidential race.

Such content analysis studies have been commonplace in the field of political communication since the 1970s. Most of this research has failed to find any partisan bias in political news stories. Certainly, some studies have uncovered partisan bias on particular issues or in particular campaigns. However, these cases of partisan bias do not appear to consistently favor one party over another. While news reports may favor Republicans on a particular political issue at a specific

point in time (e.g., press coverage in the early stages of the Iraq War was favorable to the Republican Bush administration), news reports will favor Democrats on other issues or at other points in time (e.g., over time press coverage on the Iraq War became unfavorable to the Bush administration). Moreover, just as media coverage may favor a Democratic candidate in a particular political race (e.g., in the 1992 presidential campaign, the Democratic candidate Bill Clinton received more positive press coverage than the Republican candidate, George Bush), other studies looking at other campaigns have found media coverage slanted in favor of Republican candidates (e.g., the Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan, received more positive news treatment than his Democratic rival, Walter Mondale, during the 1984 presidential race). Thus, while many conservative commentators charge that press reports are hopelessly biased in favor of Democratic politicians and liberal causes, decades of research examining actual news content have been unable to find any systemic partisan bias in the U.S. media.

Public Perceptions of Partisan Bias

While media content studies have failed to find any consistent partisan bias in the news, some members of the public consistently see such bias. A 2005 public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 60% of respondents believed that news organizations are politically biased. Political communication research would caution against drawing any conclusions about partisan bias in the media by relying upon public perceptions of such bias. This caution is warranted because studies have often found a disconnect between perceptions of partisan bias in the news and the actual content of news stories. Bias appears to have more to do with the perception of the person reading a news story than with anything said in the story itself.

The disconnect between perceptions of media bias and actual media content is perhaps best illustrated in work on the "hostile media effect" (sometimes also referred to as the "hostile media phenomenon"). Research into the hostile media effect has found that when individuals see bias in the news, they see a bias that runs against their political views rather than a bias that favors their political positions. When people perceive a biased media, they see a media that is hostile to their political causes or to their preferred candidates.

Research into the hostile media effect has clearly demonstrated that people's perceptions of a hostile (biased) media have little to do with the actual content of news stories. Many of the hostile media effect studies have exposed audiences with different political perspectives to the exact same news story. For example, some of the research in this area has examined audience reactions to media messages on animal experimentation. When audiences with divergent political views on this issue (such as animal rights activists and scientists who use animals in their research) read a seemingly neutral (objective/nonbiased) news report on this subject, both audiences perceive a biased news story. However, they see that bias running in opposite directions. When animal rights activists read the news story, they see a biased report that unfairly favors animal experimentation. On the other hand, when the scientific researchers read this exact same news story, they perceive a report that unfairly opposes animal experimentation. After reading the same article, both audiences perceive a media bias that is hostile to their perspective on this issue. Since both audiences form very different perceptions of media bias based on the same news content, their perceptions appear to have little to do with the actual content conveyed in the story.

This hostile media effect does not emerge in all news consumers. Most individuals reading through the aforementioned article on animal experimentation would see a story that is fair, unbiased, and nonpartisan. Most news consumers simply do not succumb to the hostile media effect. This effect, however, does influence a number of individuals, and these individuals share certain traits. For instance, individuals who have strong political views on a subject are particularly susceptible to the hostile media effect. With regard to a news story on animal experimentation, anyone with strong views on this topic (such as animal rights activists or scientists who conduct animal research) is likely to perceive a hostile bias in this news story. In addition, individuals with strong partisan attachments are prone to the hostile media effect. When highly partisan Democrats or Republicans read or watch the news, they tend to perceive media hostility toward their political party. While partisans from both major parties are predisposed to the hostile media effect, this effect appears to be stronger with Republicans than with Democrats.

Structural Bias

As scholars have engaged in an ongoing search through media content for bias, they have observed several trends in news reports that have no apparent connection to partisanship; these patterns do not favor

either political party. However, these trends do constitute a form of bias because they provide the media audience with an inaccurate and distorted view of the world around them. This form of media bias is commonly known as "structural bias," because it stems from certain "structural" features of the news industry. Such structures include everything from reporting routines to newsroom practices to industry incentives. Within any given industry, individuals face certain pressures and incentives. As individuals within the news industry act on these pressures and incentives, they develop a particular way of doing things, such as a way of writing political news stories. When reporters put a certain slant on their stories to adhere to industry pressures and incentives, these stories reflect the industry's structural bias.

In terms of industry pressures, the structural bias in the U.S. media has primarily been associated with the strong profit motive that drives commercial media organizations. In the United States, the news primarily comes from profit-driven media corporations. In contrast to other advanced democracies, the United States has a far more competitive and far more commercial media marketplace. Hence, the structural bias that emerges in the U.S. media market is unique in comparison to other modern democratic nations.

Since the late 1970s, the profit motive has become increasingly important in newsrooms throughout the U.S. media marketplace. Over the past several decades, this marketplace has experienced an increasing number of news sources fighting over an ever-decreasing news audience. These market trends have resulted in fierce competition in the news industry, and in this intensely competitive environment news organizations have had to focus more and more on producing profits. As media corporations place greater emphasis on profits, the media's structural bias, which emerges from the industry's profit motive, has played an increasingly important role in shaping news coverage.

Political communication scholars have identified a myriad of elements that make up the media's structural bias. The sections following discuss some of the more significant aspects of this structural bias. The elements have been divided into the two central components (revenues and costs) involved in turning a profit.

Lowering Costs and Structural Bias

As commercial enterprises, media companies can increase profits by lowering the costs involved in news production. Such cost-cutting decisions generate certain similarities across news stories.

For example, reporters can lower costs (the time and effort involved in news gathering) by developing relationships with and by relying upon individuals in positions of authority. This helps to explain why government officials serve as the primary sources in most political news stories. For instance, when reporters cover a story on U.S. defense policy, they are likely to contact Defense Department officials or members of Congress serving on defense-related committees. Over time, political reporters build and maintain relationships with politicians and government administrators. Contacting such individuals then becomes an efficient and inexpensive way to obtain content for a news story. As news reporters rely heavily on official government sources, their news stories create a biased (i.e., skewed) picture of the political environment. By depending so heavily on official government sources, news stories become slanted in the direction of the dominant political parties. Most government officials are either Democrats or Republicans. News stories built on commentary from such sources favor the views of the dominant political parties at the expense of less prominent political organizations, such as the Green Party or the Libertarian Party.

Reporters can also lower the cost of news gathering by relying on "news subsidies" (also referred to as "news handouts"). A news subsidy refers to materials that essentially subsidize or economically assist a reporter's effort in putting together a news story. Such subsidies often come from government authorities or public relations practitioners who send out press releases, hold press conferences, or often simply make phone calls in order to provide reporters with story ideas and content. As the news industry has become increasingly focused on profits, its newsrooms have grown increasingly reliant on news subsidies. Recent research suggests that such subsidies account for more than half of all of the content contained in both print and electronic news stories. With their heavy reliance on news subsidies, the media provide news consumers with a biased depiction of the world around them. Many media critics have argued that the press favors the voices of the powerful over the powerless. News subsidies play an important role in this pattern of favoritism because such subsidies are likely to come from individuals and organizations in positions of power. An affluent corporation with highly paid public relations professionals is better able to provide

news subsidies than organizations without such financial resources.

Increasing Audience Size and Structural Bias

Another way for news organizations to increase profits is by raising the revenues that flow from advertisers. Advertisers are willing to pay more for a larger audience. Thus, news organizations face strong structural pressures to increase the size of their reading/viewing/listening audience. As newsrooms produce stories designed to attract a larger audience, the stories they air and print come to exhibit several tendencies.

In one such tendency, news stories often emphasize negative news. Psychologists have long recognized that human attention favors negative information over positive information. Taking advantage of this pattern in human attention, the press gravitates toward negative news and away from positive news. A news story about a failed government program is likely to receive more media attention than a news piece on a government program that has achieved great success. The media also devote excessive attention to negative events such as disasters and crimes. This trend in negative news reporting has been steadily on the rise. Content analysis studies of news stories (generally from the 1980s through to the present day) have found that press coverage of the president, Congress, and even government agencies has taken on an increasingly negative tone. By favoring negative news over positive news, the media present the news audience with a distorted image of political reality. For instance, as a result of all of the media attention given to negative crime stories, individuals tend to overestimate the level of crime in their communities; they perceive that crime is more prevalent than it actually is.

The media's structural bias not only favors negative news, it also favors conflict. Just as human attention is naturally drawn toward negative information, it also naturally turns toward conflict. Consequently, the media are partial to stories that portray individuals in a state of conflict. Illustrating the media's fondness for featuring conflict, political news stories often follow a "Democrat said/Republican said" pattern. In this pattern, the news story presents an argument from a member of one major political party followed by a counterargument offered by a member of the opposing party. The media's bias toward highlighting conflict is also evident in coverage of political campaigns. On the campaign trail, candidates spend far more time promoting their political views than on attacking the views of their opponents. However, candidate attacks disproportionately find their way into campaign coverage. By favoring areas of conflict over areas of agreement, the press again provides its audience with a biased (distorted) representation of politics. In this representation, politics becomes an arena for battle rather than a domain for moderation and compromise.

The media's structural bias also favors known political personalities. Humans tend to pay more interest to information about known personalities than to information about unknown individuals. Capitalizing on this pattern of human interest, political news coverage is skewed toward known political personalities. In U.S. politics, the public is more familiar with the president than with any other politician. In part, the president has attained such familiarity because the president receives far more news coverage than any other politician. When the news media turn their attention to members of Congress, they tend to focus on a handful of prominent leaders or personalities, such as the Senate majority leader or the speaker of the House. By focusing in on these well-known politicians, the media produce a self-reinforcing cycle of political prominence; as prominent politicians receive an undue amount of press coverage, they become even more prominent. By highlighting the voices of well-known politicians, the press provides its audience with a partial picture of politics. In this partial view of the political environment, the audience is exposed to the views of the few (prominent politicians) but does not see the views of the many (the multitude of less prominent political actors).

In terms of its structural bias, the media are also partial to new and novel topics. Since new information attracts more attention than old information, today's newsrooms tend to operate on the belief that only new news counts as news at all. As a result of their continual search for novel news subjects, media coverage typically ebbs and flows in waves. Like an ocean wave, media coverage on any given subject rapidly forms, builds, reaches a peak, and then quickly dissipates. Usually, media coverage begins and builds on a particular subject (such as the subject of Social Security reform) based on some key event (such as a president proposing a major change to the Social Security program). This media coverage rapidly builds to a peak. At this peak point, story after story on Social Security reform appear in newspapers and on news programs throughout the nation. When coverage on the topic of

Social Security reform reaches this peak saturation point, news directors and assignment editors start to fear that any additional airtime or print space devoted to this subject will bore the news audience. Consequently, news stories on the subject of Social Security reform rapidly disappear. When acting on this bias favoring new and novel topics, the media once again create a skewed image of politics. This skewed image tends to underrepresent long-running political issues and debates. Many media scholars have argued that this aspect of the media's structural bias (a preference for new and novel subjects) makes it difficult for American democracy to grapple with long-lasting political problems.

As a final element in its structural bias, the media gravitate toward stories with dramatic elements. A dramatic narrative features interesting characters engaged in intriguing actions (usually actions that center on struggle or conflict) that rise to a climax point. A news story on the ramifications of a proposed modification to tax policy does not have the components to build a dramatic narrative. On the other hand, a story about a president having a secretive, ongoing affair with a much younger White House intern, such as the scandal involving President Bill Clinton and White House intern Monica Lewinsky, has all of the elements of good drama. This helps to explain why the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal received more news coverage than any other story in 1998. By highlighting such dramatic stories, the media once again construct a skewed image of political reality. Social psychologists have recognized that individuals often assign too much weight to vivid narratives. That is, when individuals view a compelling dramatic story, they often assume that this unrepresentative story accurately represents the world around them.

The Effects of the Media's Structural Bias

The various elements that make up the media's structural bias, ranging from the media's fondness for negative news to their preference for good drama, push media coverage in an increasingly sensationalized direction. This shift in press coverage to more sensational news content has often been described as the shift from "hard news" (stories about key political events and issues) to "soft news" (dramatic human interest stories that generally lack any public policy component). Political communication studies over the past few decades have consistently charted the growth of soft news and the coinciding decline of hard news. For example, a report issued by the Project for Excellence in Journalism found that the number of news stories about foreign affairs dropped by 25% between 1977 and 1997. During that same time period, the number of entertainment or celebrity stories nearly tripled. Such findings show that hard news topics, such as foreign affairs stories, are being driven out by soft news subjects, such as stories about Hollywood movie stars.

This growth in soft news has fueled an active debate among political communication scholars over how this softening of news coverage impacts American democracy. On one side of this debate, most scholars view this growth of soft news as a damaging media trend. Such scholars have connected this growth in soft news to everything from an uninformed electorate to a cynical citizenry to a politically apathetic public. On the other side of this debate, some political communication authorities view the rise of soft news as a helpful media trend. Such authorities argue that citizens today have more hard news options than ever before. Through the virtual explosion of news content on cable television and on the Internet, citizens who want hard news can get hard news. As the reasoning on this side of the debate continues, the growth of soft news helps to satisfy the needs of news consumers who prefer softer news products. In short, soft news helps to diversify the media marketplace by providing a broader range of news products to satisfy the needs of various news consumers.

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See also Hard News; Hostile Media Effect; Party Press; Soft News

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Media Buying in Politics

Media buying in politics refers to the purchasing of advertising in print or electronic media by the candidate or his or her campaign. A media plan is developed early in a campaign and includes exactly which stations and newspapers the candidate wants to advertise in. Typically, especially for a challenger candidate, the media plan starts at Election Day and works backward. This way, the media is heaviest right before undecided voters make their final decision. In contrast, many incumbents will start a media campaign earlier, essentially because they are more confident in their ability to raise funds should they run low. Incumbents will also use heavier media in the week before the election, however.

For radio and television, local and state candidates must first find out which stations have agreed to carry their political advertising. Under the Equal Time Provision all stations are required to offer advertising space to federal candidates for office; however, each campaign season stations are allowed to determine which other state and local offices they will sell time for. Once this declaration is filed with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), stations cannot change their policies.

Within accepted local races, stations are required by the FCC to make the time available to all candidates in the race and cannot play favorites with individuals or parties. The time provided must be of similar value and similar audiences (equal access). However, the station is not required to notify candidates that their opponent has purchased time.

For federal candidates, the media buying plan usually must be stretched over several broadcast markets. For presidential candidates, the media plan will focus on states and areas where the candidate has the best chance of winning and on states where the race will be very close. Presidential candidates will rarely buy big in states they know they cannot win.

All candidates, federal and local, are to be given prices that reflect the lowest unit rate the station has offered to another client in the current quarter. However, in recent years the FCC has allowed stations to adopt a tier-structured pricing. The lowest price is considered preemptible without notice; that is, the station can replace their commercial with a more lucrative client and move the political spot to a less desirable place without notifying the candidate first; up one level is preemptible with notice; the top pricing level is nonpreemptible. The pricing within each tier is still required to be the lowest unit rate available at that level. This structure allows stations to maximize their inventory, but generally favors candidates with the most money.

In recent years, the FCC has determined that the political rulings for broadcast will apply to cable and satellite service providers as well.

Glenda C. Williams

See also Communications Act of 1934; Equal Time Provision

Media Consultants

Media consultants in political campaigns are a specialized group of political consultants who specialize in the production of and advice about the media aspects of a campaign. As an amateur vocation, “political adviser” probably dates to the formation of groups in hominid populations, or at least to their acquisition of language. With the rise of urban civilization and vast empires, the role of counselor to the powerful became formalized in the courts and senates of the ancient world. For example, in the Roman Republic—the wellspring of many of our political traditions and nomenclature—political advisers were commonplace. Cicero’s brother Quintus wrote his *Commentariolum Petitionis* (Little Handbook on Electioneering) during the late Republican period, giving advice such as “One has great need of a flattering manner, which, wrong and discreditable though it may be in other walks of life, is indispensable in seeking office.” Surely some astute pol told Julius Caesar, running for the political/religious office of *aedile,* to erect a billboard on the Appian Way proclaiming to passersby, “Make Caesar an aedile and he’ll make an aedile of you!”

The political consultant as an American institution has a varied origin. Historians debate whether or not the professional consultant is a product of the

20th century, but there is no doubt that early in our history people operated as political consultants in all but name.

Political consulting also increased as a vocation with the vast expansion of franchisement that occurred in the 19th century, most notably associated with the beginnings of the rise of mass democracy in the 1828 election of war hero Andrew Jackson. Although our sources are incomplete and shadowy, we know that there were large-scale information campaigns, distributions of all sorts of materials, and a good deal of proto-strategizing. The symbolism so prevalent in politics today also was well established. Attendees at Jackson rallies, for example, were given hickory brooms and other hickory-made items to remind them of Jackson's Spartan nickname of "Old Hickory."

The expansion of the country and the increase in the population also changed the role of politicians. Presidents began to campaign, taking donations and raising large war chests. In major cities, political power groups like Tammany Hall in New York created a veritable industrial revolution in voter persuasion, organization, and deployment. Political bosses and advisers, like Mark Hanna of Ohio, became infamous to the point of regular public satire—in the cartoons of Thomas Nast, for example.

But the establishment of the formal profession of political consulting properly belongs to the 20th century. By one account, the first political consultants were Clem Whittaker and Leone Baxter, who in 1933 founded "Campaigns Incorporated," running many California Republican campaigns. As political scholar Dan Nimmo noted, these were the first political advisers not working *directly* as operatives of a party or at the court of a candidate but as independent businesspeople seeking to "make a business of political campaigning." Such developments were not in isolation from the rise of the mass media industries: newspapers, magazines, radio, movies, and later television. In the early and middle part of the century, "scientists of public relations" like Ivy Lee and mass propagandists such as the impresarios of Britain's war propaganda during World War I were pioneering systematic approaches to mass persuasion. In addition, the "father of public relations," Freud's nephew Edward Bernays, was developing strategies for the "engineering of consent."

The professionalization of political and media consulting accelerated in the 1950s. Dwight Eisenhower, running for the presidency in 1952, hired the Madison Avenue firm BBD&O and others to design his television commercials, a foretaste of a giant industry and what would eventually become the single greatest expense for larger campaigns and elections. Simultaneously, George Gallup and other pioneers of polling were developing another important aspect of political consulting, in-depth surveys of the electorate, seeking to understand their concerns and their voting predilections and preferences. In 1959, Joe Napolitan, a Democrat, became the first person to put the words *political consultant* on his business card as his sole profession. The industry expanded with the rise of many great names of the early founding fathers, like Stuart Spencer, Joseph Cerrell, Doug Bailey, and Raymond Strother, who pioneered the field and helped crystallize many of the time-honored strategies.

Political consulting in the late 20th and early 21st centuries was also marked by specialization. Whereas a political adviser or political consultant might have previously been responsible for all aspects of a campaign, now an individual political consultant might specialize, for example, in GOTV (get out the vote), direct mail, or even subspecializations like "styling" a candidate for a debate. New media technology, from the Internet itself to blogs and Facebook, also offer even more narrow breeds of working consultants.

Two major developments marked the rise of political consultants in the 1990s and the new century. First, there was the phenomenon of consultant as star. Joe Napolitan famously advised that "a good consultant is invisible to the public." In other words, it did not behoove the politician's image as a leader to give voters the idea that he or she was being "handled," "styled," or "managed." Yet, with Lee Atwater, James Carville, and Dick Morris, political consultants rose to the forefront of talk shows, book tours, and popular culture parody to the point even of eclipsing their blander candidates.

Second, consultants grew in power through the rise of the "seamless" or "permanent" campaign. Once upon a time, consultants worked only during campaign and elections and then took vacations until the next cycle. Now, political consulting, as Strother and Joe Klein have documented, is part of governing, with polls, pulses, and strategizing behind every issue and every speech.

In modern campaigns, media consultants play a crucial role in the production of political advertising messages for candidates. A media consultant generally develops a strategy, sometimes using the tools of other consultants such as polling, to enhance and

communicate the candidate's image via the media. These decisions include writing political spots, filming or videotaping the messages, editing and postproduction of spots, and decisions about airing and buying time for the spots.

David D. Perlmutter

See also American Association of Political Consultants; Consultants, Political; Napolitan, Joseph

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Media Events

Media events are incidents or processes with high news value and strong public resonance that have been turned into spectacles by the media and have a sustained effect on public communications. The first manned moon landing in 1969, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the death of Pope John Paul II in 2006, and the Olympic Games in any year are examples of media events that are offered to the public as outstanding incidents of general interest. On the basis of this conceptual understanding, originally developed largely by Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, media events may be characterized in the object, time, and social dimensions as follows:

In the *object dimension,* the media event is presented as a kind of exceptional media situation. Existing program routines are interrupted. Live or special reports underline the character of the event as standing outside everyday affairs. Whereas the program flow consisting of daily news, daily talks, and daily soap operas represents the media's normal fare, it is complemented by media events that focus on special issues and distinguish themselves sharply from routine reporting.

In the *time dimension,* media events are staged as follow-up stories with spectacular highlights presented in dramatic detail. As far as possible, the media try to present these highlights before, during, and for a long time after the event in a manner that impacts public interest. Thus the dying of Pope John Paul II was already accompanied by the public, and his death was highlighted as a media spectacle that generated great public interest with as much symbolic and aesthetic resonance as the subsequent election of a new pontiff.

In the *social dimension,* media events are characterized by intensive follow-up communications in the media system as in society as a whole. A large part of the representative media at both national and international levels is involved in the reporting. Other spheres of activity such as politics, economics, and science then take up the resonance and turn their attention to the topic, if they were not already involved in initiating the event in the first place. And finally, viewer ratings and circulation figures rise steeply, that is, the public shows an above average degree of receptiveness.

Other approaches, especially in Europe, do not center their definition so much on the aspect of "outside the daily routine." Media events are not simply reduced to "major events," but are defined in a general way as units of "media meaning" whose thematic core refers to specific events, processes, or abstract problem complexes in the form of narrative figures continuously processed by the media. Questions of impact, that is, of the intensity of resonance and reception, are examined only in secondary fashion—they do not yet form the decisive criterion in advance that identifies media events as such. The same approaches also suggest that the expression "media event" be replaced by the more general term of "communications event." This is due to an understanding of the public sphere or public communications that cannot simply be reduced to the "media." Instead, the public sphere is described,

with reference to Jürgen Habermas, as a network that links various communication spheres such as politics, the economy, science, and the media. High-impact communications events are then characterized by the fact that they form an important part of the agenda not only of the media but also in other communication spheres and that the discourses about the communications event are mutually influenced and intensified in the various communications spheres.

Media events, understood on the basis of the mentioned use of the term as communications events broadcast by the media, play a series of fundamental roles in modern societies. The first of these is their *integrating function*. Such events have the power to bind millions of people worldwide to common topics, needs, and experiences. They allow recipients to participate in a phenomenon in which they can share in a way defined purely by the media presentation. In this way, they then gain an awareness of a socially shared presence from out of their respective situation. Thus the public dying, death, and funeral of Pope John Paul II—all packaged in one and the same media event—ensured that in addition to the 300,000 mourners in St. Peter's Square and the approximately 2 million pilgrims present in the streets of Rome, an estimated 2.5 billion viewers could also participate live in front of their TV screens in an unparalleled "death spectacle" that must be regarded as having a globally integrating force. Media events unfold their integrative function especially through the fact that they trigger massive follow-up communications in society, whether in schools or universities, in pubs, on the train, or at the workplace. They form a thematic resource for discussion material and thus make up a significant part of daily communications. Not least thanks to this integrating function, political events such as party conferences are today deliberately staged as media events with the aim of mobilizing additional votes via political scenarios broadcast by the media.

Another major function of media events is to speed up or even trigger *social change*. All historically significant transitions in the development of the modern age were accompanied by momentous media events. Individual events and the reporting about them, such as the stock market crash of 1929, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, or the terrorist attacks of 2001 have marked entire epochs and triggered fundamental processes of change in society. Thus the global triumph of neoliberal political programs in the 1990s cannot be explained without the intensive communications activity around the fall of the Berlin Wall as a symbol of the collapse of global socialism. Likewise, the previously unparalleled communications intensity around the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to the replacement of previous threat and hostile scenarios by new ones and raised the field of national security to the rank of the primary political arena. Such key communications events are characterized by the fact that they fundamentally change our approach to the world.

On the whole, media events (or media-broadcast communications events) may be considered as elementary components of modern media societies. They may be used to examine society in all its facets. This is because political, religious, cultural, or other events do not draw their significance simply from themselves but depend on the significance assigned to them by the media. It can then be observed that the media are becoming increasingly independent event producers, quite apart from the current of nonmedia events, and thus have an increasingly autonomous impact on social change.

Mark Eisenegger

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Media Feeding Frenzy

The notion of a media feeding frenzy is a metaphor describing a type of media hype, or sometimes any form of media hype. It is a value-laden term, almost always used to criticize media interest in a particular matter at a particular time as exaggerated or detrimental or illegitimate. The notion has won currency in the United States in political communication after Larry J. Sabato's book *Feeding Frenzy* appeared in 1991, and subsequent media attention and behavior toward such stories as Governor Bill Clinton's marital infidelity (the Gennifer Flowers affair) and draft evasion in his 1992 presidential campaign seemed to affirm the necessity for such a term.

Sabato defines a media feeding frenzy as "the press coverage attending any political event or circumstance where a critical mass of journalists leap to cover the same embarrassing or scandalous subject and pursue it intensely, often excessively, and sometimes uncontrollably." The term *press coverage* in this definition is misleading in two respects. First, media feeding frenzies are a phenomenon of the television age, and second, they are not restricted to the coverage of matters in the realm of events but also show the journalists at work, with images such as a multitude of microphones, lights, and cameras, reporters shouting impolitely at politicians (who are otherwise treated respectfully), press conferences being turned into tribunals, politicians helplessly trying to dodge questions. The visibility of these elements make media feeding frenzies public spectacles, and the chance to watch the predators hunt their prey makes the metaphor of a media feeding frenzy compelling and appealing.

Another, more simple definition comes from Clem Lloyd and highlights the consequences: A media feeding frenzy is the "concentration by a media pack on a particular person or event. This process has the power to destroy careers and people."

The metaphor has several qualities that make it useful, despite its value-laden nature. First, a feeding frenzy in nature distinguishes the roles of predator and prey, roles taken by journalists and politicians, respectively, when the biological phenomenon is used as a metaphor. This implies that journalists stop to be messengers who relate events happening without their doing, and become, visible to all, the major actors in the process, the actual driving force. Second, the prey (politicians) is without a chance. Of course, there are many instances in which victims have politically survived a media feeding frenzy, but they have certainly not been unharmed. Third, in a feeding frenzy in nature, something on the inside of the prey is revealed when nothing but the skeleton remains. Revealing something usually hidden from view also moves the journalists' feeding frenzy. What is to be revealed can be a certain behavior or character trait or weakness. Fourth, feeding frenzies in nature often befall a collective, a shoal, a pack of hunting animals. The media feeding frenzy also needs a critical mass of journalists acting in a similar manner. To describe similar collective behavior among journalists, another metaphor (also taken from biology) is often used: pack journalism. Fifth, behavior in frenzied predators appears to be highly concentrated on the prey, physical, driven by primordial instinct. Journalists in a media feeding frenzy often show a lack of proportion, or thoughtfulness, or restraint, or rationality, which is especially noticeable in hindsight.

Media feeding frenzies appear to be linked to typical subject matters: information on a politician's intimate life, drug use, trivia from their personal lives (Senator Gary Hart's age and name change discussed in the 1984 presidential campaign), thoughtless remarks (Senator John Kerry's comment about education versus getting "stuck in Iraq" during the 2006 congressional campaign). Sometimes a suspected breach of law is involved (Edward Kennedy and Chappaquiddick), and sometimes larger and complex scandals such as Watergate or Iran-Contra breed various feeding frenzies.

The advent of media feeding frenzies is often associated with a turn from a tame or "lapdog" journalism of the Franklin D. Roosevelt up to the John F. Kennedy presidencies, to a watchful journalism that took seriously its function to control those in power and that troubled the administrations of Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon, and then to the attack journalism as has been known since the Reagan presidency. It is also associated with a shift in the subject matter of prevalent political scandals, from the substantive such as bribery or abuse of power to gaffes, character issues, and matters of lifestyle.

To date, there is no theory of media feeding frenzies. It is therefore hard to predict when they will erupt. Certain situational factors seem to increase their chance to happen: a sudden thrust of a politician into national prominence by a nomination (e.g., for vice president), frustration of journalists with an administration, a large discrepancy between politicians' public stands and their private behavior, a connection of a

politician's behavior to an established issue or a latent theme in discourse. An important aspect to be also considered is the role of other politicians: The opposing party, or rivals within a politician's own party, may expect to profit from a media frenzy and do what they can to feed it further.

Media feeding frenzy in a narrow sense refers to journalists hunting a politician (or other social actor) for alleged misbehavior or unacceptable utterances. In a wider sense, the term is sometimes also used to refer to any wave of media attention that seems to be inflated. Prominent examples that have been criticized as feeding frenzies include alarmist news coverage of risks, such as BSE (mad cow disease), vaccination risks, or global warming. In the use of "feeding frenzy" for such cases, however, much of the metaphorical appeal of the term (when used for the hunt of politicians) gets lost. Therefore it is suggested that the notion be reserved to its narrow sense and consider it a subtype of news waves or media hypes. Conceptualizing other such subtypes and theorizing about media hypes in general has yet to be done.

Uwe Hartung

See also Checkers Speech; Clinton, William Jefferson; Ferraro, Geraldine; Hart, Gary; Political Scandal; Quayle, Dan; Sabato, Larry

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Media Logic

From a very general point of view, *media logic* is a concept that indicates the influence of the media (considered as both a cultural technology and an organization) on the representation of the events that we consider "reality." This representation follows the logics and the formats that are typical of media language and organizational practices, such as the ways the contents are organized and put together, the styles in which they are presented, and the grammar (syntax, semantics, and pragmatics) of mass media communication.

In this broader sense, media logic is the combination of several technological, organizational, and cultural elements. The most important element characterizing media logic is the commercial logic (which involves the commercialization both of media organizations and of society), followed by such elements as the industrial logic (the media are an important industry), the technological logic (referring to the importance of technologies in producing and reproducing contents), the cultural logic, and the political logic (the relationship between media system and political system).

The media logic involves a particular way of presenting events: according to it, media narratives and images need to focus on symbolic objects and personalities rather than abstract conceptualizations. Media narratives—both in news and entertainment products—show reality through the use of objects, persons, and characters who play a role within the story. For example, the narration of a war consists of the personalization (or the "objectification") of the hero, the villain, and the victim. Even a natural disaster is best presented if the event is narrated as a story (with an original order, the breaking of this order, and the final recomposition), with the use of clear symbols for both the causes (including what we could call a "blaming process" of the natural or human responsible) and the victims (by interviewing the survivors or the siblings of the victims themselves). The rhetorical use of symbolization in almost every narrative pattern is quite common in most historical ages and in most cultures and societies, starting from the ancient mythological tales (which accounted for the origins of society and the reality phenomena). Within the wider context of the media narratives, the media logic patterns can be found in nearly every medium and genre, from the global media sport stars to the various "freak shows" that fill the daytime and primetime talk shows. This way of narrating reality through the media is consistent with the constraints of the "news values," which impose a palatable "media material" for the reporting of stories and the presentation of the issues. Thus, media logic is also a journalistic style, based on the focus on characters playing a role within a narrative.

From a political communication perspective, media logic influences political institutions in different respects: people (candidates, politicians, and leaders) have become more important than parties; the attention

has moved from the local and regional to the national (and the global); the news values influence the actions of the political parties; during the electoral campaigns, the horse race has become more important than the issues and the questions at stake.

As observed, in the case of news media, the political action is best represented by a person or a symbol that literally embodies the issue or the institution. From this point of view, media logic has the cognitive function of reducing the political complexity, that is, to concentrate the political action and the political leadership on a single symbolic aspect is to reduce the cognitive complexity of the social environment for the social actor/citizen/elector. This reduction is of a particular kind, as it reduces what is hard to comprehend to what is comprehensible in an *affective* way. In short, symbolization acts as what is called an "information shortcut," that is, a simplification of perception of politics. In these terms, media logic is part of a cognitive strategy based on an instrumental and "economic" use of political information, a "low-information rationality."

The media logic is considered also as opposed to "political" or "party logic," in that it challenges the traditional dominance in several political arenas of the political imperatives that have for long conditioned the growth of the media industry and the professional conduct of news reporting. In the early stages of political communication the media system tended to align to partisan loyalties. Especially the news media were subservient to political ideologies and dynamics. Media logic is also the driving force of the process of mediatization of politics. It involves a series of effects on the ways politics and political communication are performed by both the political players and the media institutions. These effects have been identified with the "spectacularization" or "dramatization" of the political performance, a clear response to the show-biz demands of today's media industry. Another effect is the mentioned "personalization," that is, the emphasis on the individual political players, represented with their personal idiosyncrasies, a trend that is linked also to the "winnowing" effect, or the selection of political candidates on the basis of their media-savvy attributes. The "sound bite" approach of much political news coverage as well as the capacity of the media to set the agenda of political debate are also implications of the expanding scope of the media logic in the relations between media and politics.

The whole process of mediatization of politics by way of the media logic highlights a preeminence of the media over politics in contemporary society, when politics must go public. The obliged passage under the media spotlights in order to reach voters, citizens, audiences entails an adaptation of political language and ultimately of political logics to the imperatives and constraints (and production formats) of the media complex.

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MEDIATED POLITICAL REALITIES

In *Mediated Political Realities* (1983, 1990), Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs discuss the role of fantasy, defined as a credible story containing actors, plots, scenes, acts, styles, motives, and sanctioning agents, in the construction of political realities. The authors argue political realities are rarely the result of direct, firsthand experiences with political events. Instead, what people know about politics is mediated, that is, the result of indirect, secondhand information constructed through the media logic of fantasy.

The book emphasizes the social aspects of fantasy building. Individuals have their own fantasies about how the world works, but humans, as social beings, share these fantasies with others. These fantasies are either rejected and die or are accepted and confirmed by others. Acceptance and confirmation lead to larger numbers of people sharing a similar fantasy, which creates a social reality. The book's structure reflects the individual and group aspects of fantasy building by discussing mass-mediated politics and group-mediated politics.

Mass-mediated politics discusses the political realities constructed through the fantasies of television news, presidential campaigns, docudramas, celebrity, movies, and popular sports. The fantasies of television

news revolve around celebrations, crises, conquests, crimes, and contests. The contest fantasy of presidential campaigns relies upon suspense, uncertainty, and spontaneity to build audience interest. Docudramas dramatize political pasts, presents, and futures, while celebrity provides fantasies about popularity and public scorn. Movies, whether or not blatantly political, mediate political realities through what Nimmo and Combs call "rituals of power," fantasies about the nature and consequences of power. Popular sports mediate fantasies about the relationship between good sportsmanship and good citizenship.

Group-mediated politics focuses on the fantasies of groups like political elites, inside-dopesters, religious movements, and conspiracy theorists. In discussing the nature of decision making by political elites, Nimmo and Combs equate groupthink with fantasy building. Inside-dopesters, with their perceived special knowledge and expertise, mediate the fantasy that politics is a mystery, and they possess the key to the mystery. Religious movements such as the Christian Right mediate political realities through fantasies of America as the redeemer nation that fights evil at home and abroad, and through the fantasy of apocalypse, the end is near unless America repents and returns to God. These fantasies have been used to justify political actions and to endorse public officials. Conspiracy theories, with fantasies of political elites who manipulate events for their own benefit while keeping the public in the dark, are stories about good versus evil that remind people about the potential of power to corrupt.

The importance of this book rests with its emphasis on fantasy as the means for mediating political information and realities. Understanding the mediated nature of political realities raises awareness about the nature of one's own consumption of and management of political information.

Kaylene Barbe

See also Bormann, Ernest; Dramatistic Approaches to Political Communication; Fantasy Theme Analysis; Group Decision Making, Political; Lippmann, Walter; Symbolic Convergence Theory

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MEDIATIZATION

Even if the term *mediatization* refers to a broader set of societal phenomena, in the scholarly literature it is commonly associated with the media-driven process that affects politics and political communication patterns.

The mass media have brought about significant changes in several precincts of contemporary society, such as extension, substitution, amalgamation, and accommodation. Television especially has been credited to have deeply shaped today's public and individual life.

Since their diffusion the press and the broadcasting media have molded the way politics is performed in the different political arenas around the world, to different extents and at a different pace.

Conceptually, *mediatization* means something more extensive than the related concept of mediation. Beside playing the role of "mediator" between political institutions and the citizenry, the media have increasingly become a key player in the political arena, to the point that today's politics is unimaginable without the presence and action of the media. Similar terms are those of "media politics," "mediated politics," all emphasizing the "media dependence" of most political action. It is not clear that this is true in all political environments. Some scholars prefer to speak in terms of "interdependence" of media and politics. One significant example is the one considered by T. E. Cook, who argues that political news can be seen as the result of a "negotiation of newsworthiness" between media and political institutions. In this sense "mediatization" is the effect of the encounter of two very diverse and often opposing logics, those of the "media complex" and those of the political system. While the media are themselves affected by, for example, legislation, pressures and/or symbiosis with political subjects, the media produce important changes in the political systems by way of imposing their languages on the communication patterns of political players. The dramatization of political events has been for centuries a feature of political action. In the era of the mass media, in contexts where media respond primarily to industrial and commercial imperatives, the drama dimension of politics takes the form of spectacularization, following the canons of show business. This is especially typical of "postmodern" election campaigns where image building, sensationalism, seduction, conflict are the communication tools of the

candidates. Other effects of mediatization of politics can be seen in the phenomenon of sound bites, through which political discourse undergoes a simplification process to respond to the peculiar patterns of news reporting, and in the individualization/personalization of much political activity—as opposed to the traditional model of party-centered politics. The media narratives have a preference for stories in which the players are real persons with their own temperaments, idiosyncrasies, ideas, outlooks, better if capable of sparking controversy.

Further effects are the agenda-shaping and agenda-setting functions of the mass media. Besides often determining what are the issues of public relevance that eventually politicians are obliged to respond to, the media affect the positioning of certain issues and themes in the public opinion.

In brief, mediatization is a process that is implied in several media-politics relations.

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MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE, THE

See McLuhan, Marshall; Medium Theory

MEDIUM THEORY

Early writings on medium theory focus on the transition from primitive oral communication to written communication. The theory argues that writing transforms the meaning of words and lessens their vitality. The central proposition of medium theory is that the vehicle of communication itself has a significant influence on the nature and content of human communication.

Probably the most famous practitioner of medium theory is Marshall McLuhan. In the 1960s, McLuhan published a series of well-publicized books that brought worldwide attention to him as someone with a profound understanding of media and their impact on society. These works elaborated on the central principles of medium theory. Using the medium theory framework, McLuhan synthesized many diverse ideas. Drawing on critical cultural theory, such as political economy, the most central idea of his theory is that communication technology individually produces change in both cultural and social order.

In *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (1962), McLuhan discusses shifts in society from the print revolution, to the Industrial Revolution, to electronic media. According to McLuhan, the invention of movable type greatly accelerated and ultimately enabled cultural and cognitive changes that had already been taking place since the invention and implementation of the alphabet. The advent of print technology contributed and made possible the trends in the modern world such as individualism, capitalism democracy, Protestantism, and nationalism. New communication technology (alphabetic writing, printing press, electronic media) affect both cognition and social organization. McLuhan felt that electronic communications would move society from individualism to a collective understanding of the world in what he described as a "global village."

Based on the notion that ever-changing technologies shape the way messages are communicated, another important concept of medium theory is that of figure and ground. The basic premise is that the content of any medium is another medium. When a new medium is created, it will eventually overtake the medium from which it evolved. Thus, the older medium becomes a ground upon which the new medium is the figure. The old medium loses its original content and becomes the content of the new medium. Each medium, independent of its content, has its own effects, which are its unique message.

Medium theory also is intrinsically linked to the McLuhan aphorism, "The medium is the message." This concept was first laid out in *Understanding Media* (1964) and later in *The Medium Is the Massage* (1967). Here McLuhan explained that it was the medium and not the content itself that should be the focus of mass communication studies. Thus, what we say may not be as important as how we choose to deliver it.

McLuhan believed that the message is greatly impacted by the delivery system and by an individual's participation with that medium. He hypothesized that

the degree of participation an individual must exert to experience media content varies by medium. He placed individual media into two categories "hot" and "cold" media. He explained that some media, such as movies, are "hot." Hot media demand a great deal of attention from the participant. They are well filled with data and offer a "high-definition" experience. The "hotter" the medium, the less the participant needs to interpret what is presented. Other media are "cold." For example, a comic book requires more conscious participation on the part of the individual. The user must fill in the missing information. McLuhan considered this a "low-definition" experience. Thus, the "cooler" the medium, the more the participant must engage in the medium both mentally and emotionally.

Possibly the ultimate in media determinism, medium theory indicates that the message is greatly impacted by the delivery system. The medium affects society, in which it plays a role, by the characteristics of the medium itself. Various media invite different degrees of participation. The degree to which one understands and experiences the content is dependent on the medium itself. Thus, as each medium affects the human sensory, the media serve as extensions of our senses, bodies, and minds.

Lori Melton McKinnon

See also McLuhan, Marshall

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Meir, Golda (1898–1978)

Golda Meir was the fourth prime minister of Israel and one of its founders, serving in various public and political positions from the pre-state era through the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Meir was born Golda Mabovitz in Kiev, Ukraine (part of the Soviet Union at the time); she immigrated to the United States with her family at the age of 8. Influenced by her older sister's Zionist activities, Meir joined a Zionist youth movement and later became active in several other Zionist social circles. Meir immigrated to Palestine in 1921, joining Kibbutz Merhavia. After two years in the Kibbutz she left to Tel-Aviv and later to Jerusalem.

In 1924, Meir became an official of the *Histadrut* Trade Union. In 1928, she was elected secretary of the Women's Labor Council of the Histadrut. During the years 1932–1934 she worked as an envoy in the United States, serving as secretary of the *Halutz* (a Zionist women's organization); she also became secretary of the Histadrut's Action Committee, and later of its policy section. In 1946, Meir replaced Moshe Sharett as head of the Jewish Agency's Political Department. Later in this office she was active in fundraising in the United States to help cover the costs of the Israeli War of Independence, and became one of the state's most effective spokesmen.

In 1948, Meir was appointed member of the provisional government, and later Israel's ambassador to the Soviet Union. Elected to the Knesset in 1949, Meir became minister of Labor and National Insurance until 1956. In June 1956, she was appointed foreign minister, a post she held for nearly a decade. As foreign minister, Meir was in charge of Israel's attempt to create diplomatic ties with the emerging independent countries of Africa. She also managed to strengthen relations with the United States and was successful in creating extensive bilateral relations with Latin American countries.

In 1965, Golda Meir retired from the government, but was asked to serve as party secretary, which she did for 8 months. On August 1, 1968, she retired once again, not for the last time. In February 1969, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol passed away, and Golda Meir was elected as his successor. She held this position for 5 years.

Under her leadership, Israel declared its willingness to accept the Rogers Peace Initiative, which included returning territory occupied by Israel. In reaction to the Munich Massacre during the 1972 Olympic Games, Meir authorized the Mossad to hunt and kill all the operatives involved. As prime minister during the controversial 1973 Yom Kippur War, Meir was facing a growing wave of public and political disapproval.

During most of her years as a public figure, Golda Meir enjoyed a mostly institutionalized, cooperative Israeli news media (of which hiding her long battle with cancer was only one indication). It wasn't until the post–Yom Kippur War era that Meir had to face an unprecedented opposition of hard-line journalists and commentators questioning her performance during the war. A popular and effective speaker; an appreciated interviewee (according to some of her most famous interviewers like Oriana Fallaci); and a symbol of women's success in a manly world, Golda Meir had managed to maintain a supportive coverage among most non-Israeli media as well, albeit her occasionally questioned performance.

Following the general elections at the end of 1973, Golda Meir was reelected as prime minister. However, due to the postwar public atmosphere and her failing health, she decided to resign as prime minister and retire from political life. Golda Meir died of cancer on December 8, 1978.

Vered Malka

See also Rabin, Yitzhak

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Memory Congeniality Effect

See Selective Processes, Exposure, Perception, Memory

Menem, Carlos (1930–)

Carlos Saúl Menem, born in 1930, was the president of Argentina in two consecutive periods from 1989 to 1999. He is renowned for successful image management within the mass media. His showmanship in front of the cameras contributed to political debate becoming a form of entertainment television and began a trivialization of politics. Under Menem's administration, a reform of broadcasting law allowed the institution of multimedia conglomerates. The liberalization of the media market and subsequent concentration in few conglomerates considerably modified the Argentinean media system.

Menem was a Peronist governor of his home province, La Rioja, from 1973 to 1976, when the military coup d'état imprisoned him until 1981. In 1983 he was elected governor of La Rioja for a new term. By running for the presidency in 1989, Menem carried out a populist and demagogic campaign, featuring successful marketing and spectacular public appearances. He promised enormous transformations that seduced the Argentinean electorate. Upon his renomination in 1995, Menem guaranteed to maintain the economy that at those times had approval of many citizens, who took advantage of the exchange rate and the easy credit.

Menem introduced reforms that moved away from historical principles of his party. He carried out a constitutional reform in 1994 and conducted a neoliberal state reform. His economic policies are controversial issues in Argentinean recent history. On the one hand, he succeeded in eliminating hyperinflation—a heritage of preceding president Raúl Alfonsín—and achieved stability by setting the Argentine peso 1 to 1 with the American dollar. On the other hand, Menem introduced liberalization and privatization programs, which increased unemployment and progressively enhanced the distribution gap within the population. His administration coincided with a new wave of market openings in Latin America. Menem's foreign policy was designed for a close alliance with the United States. Therefore, through the media he made society believe that Argentina had been incorporated to the First World.

Menem's relationships with the media were diverse. His flamboyant image and his social life with celebrities attracted the attention of popular mass media. The multimedia conglomerate benefited from his liberalization policies. Investigative journalism made subjects of Menem's autocratic and populist style as well as his involvement in scandals. His government was charged with various kinds of corruption that have had serious consequences for the economics and the institutional system in Argentina. Menem is suspected of having illegal funds outside Argentina, and the investigation of a weapons export scandal resulted in a 5-month house arrest in 2001. Despite judicial procedures and a resignation to second round by 2003's

presidential election, he remains active in the Argentinean political arena.

Malvina Rodriguez

See also Alfonsín, Raúl; Argentina Democratization Process, Role of the Media

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Merkel, Angela (1954–)

Angela Dorothea Merkel is a German politician. She is chairwoman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) since April 10, 2000, and chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany since November 22, 2005. Merkel is the first woman and the first former citizen of the German Democratic Republic ever been elected as chancellor in Germany.

Shortly after her birth (born Angela Dorothea Kastner in Hamburg, Germany), her family moved to Templin in the German Democratic Republic, where she grew up. She studied physics in Leipzig and became a member of the academic staff at the Central Institute of Physical Chemistry at the Academy of Sciences in Berlin, where she was awarded a doctoral degree in 1986. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, she joined the party *Demokratischer Aufbruch* (Democratic Awakening), which merged with the West German CDU in 1990. In the first election after the unification, Merkel was elected Member of Parliament (German *Bundestag*). Then Chancellor Helmut Kohl appointed her to the position of federal minister for Women and Youth. In the 1994 election, the Kohl government was reelected, and Merkel remained in the cabinet to become federal minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety. After the governing coalition of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats (FDP) had lost the majority in 1998, Merkel became general secretary and chairwoman of the CDU in 2000. She also became chairwoman of the CDU parliamentary group in the German Bundestag, and, and, thereby, she was opposition leader during the Schröder (Social Democrats, SPD) chancellorship from 2002 until 2005. In 2005, Schröder called early elections, and Merkel was nominated chancellor candidate for the CDU. Following a tight election result, the negotiations between the possible coalition partners proved to be difficult. Finally, the two big parties, CDU and SPD, formed a grand coalition. Merkel was elected chancellor in the newly assembled German Bundestag on November 22, 2005.

Merkel is not perceived as a "media chancellor" like her predecessor Gerhard Schröder. Especially before her nomination as chancellor candidate, it was often claimed by journalists that Merkel had an image problem. She always tried (and still does) to shut the media out from her private life. Even today, her

Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany with U.S. President George W. Bush. Merkel holds a doctorate in physical chemistry and is the first female chancellor of Germany, the first citizen of the former German Democratic Republic to assume the chancellery of reunited Germany, and the first woman to lead Germany since it became a modern nation-state in 1871.

Source: NATO Photos.

husband Joachim Sauer rarely appears on public occasions. During the campaign, Merkel consciously refused to let the fact that she comes from the Eastern part of Germany, that she is a woman, and that she is a Protestant (all of which are exceptions from the past typical Christian Democratic candidate) to play an important role.

Content analysis during the Bundestag election campaign 2005 showed that Merkel received as much media coverage as did the incumbent Schröder. According to these results, there was no chancellor bonus affecting the vote. At the same time, it appears that, contrary to expectations from results of several U.S. studies, Merkel did not receive less attention because of her being a woman. Journalists indeed reported that a woman was running for office for the first time, but research did not find evidence for gender-stereotyped coverage of Merkel, nor did journalists present Merkel more negatively than Schröder. Again, contrary to results of numerous studies on women candidates in U.S. campaigns, journalists did not focus on Merkel's appearance, haircut, or dress. In general, Merkel's performance and private life have not been covered as often as Schröder's. Even the results of previous research that coverage about female candidates is more often linked with "soft" or traditional women's issues could not be confirmed.

Thomas Koch

See also Gender and Politics; Schröder, Gerhard

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METACOVERAGE

Metacoverage is a term used to describe a type of news story that contains one, or both, of the following main topics: (a) the behaviors, roles, standards, products, and practices of individual journalists or news organizations; (b) the roles, activities, and practices of publicity experts whose main occupation is to garner media visibility and coverage for political clients, such as candidates, governmental officials, political parties, or for business clients, such as corporations or celebrities. In short, metacoverage is news about the news media itself or about publicity processes, some of which, but not all, are covered in terms of how well they succeed at garnering favorable news coverage.

Metacoverage is present in both print and broadcast news formats specifically devoted to how, how much, when, and to what effect the news media cover a particular issue or topic. In radio and television news it is found in programs such as CNN's *Reliable Sources, Media Watch* segments of the PBS *Newshour with Jim Lehrer,* and National Public Radio's *On the Media.* In print news, beat writers (e.g., Howard Kurtz of *The Washington Post*) cover the news media in articles specifically labeled "media." Also, columnists and editorialists regularly discuss topics and issues in light of how, how much, when, or to what effect the news media cover events and issues (e.g., the ongoing Iraq War). In all of these instances, metacoverage can be considered an extension of press criticism found, for example, in trade magazines such as the *American Journalism Review.*

In both print and broadcast news, metacoverage is also found in hard news stories that are not designated by specific newspapers or TV news networks as being about the media. For example, metacoverage is prevalent in news stories with the following topics: politics (e.g., presidential campaigns, the Iraq War), crime (e.g., the 2002 Washington, D.C.–area sniper case, the 2005 conviction and sentencing of the so-called BTK killer), natural disasters and human tragedies (e.g., the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005), celebrity tragedies and trials (e.g., the death and funeral of Princess Diana in 1997, the 1995 O. J. Simpson criminal trial and acquittal), and business malfeasance (e.g., the aftermath of the 2001 Enron scandal).

There are thee principles that underlie theorizing and empirical research on metacoverage. Together, these principles clarify the conceptual definition of this type of news. The first principle is that, while metacoverage can be a feature of any narrative format that purports to be news, it is generally conceived as being a feature of mainstream news. Therefore, the bulk of research on metacoverage centers on mainstream news coverage. To be sure, metacoverage is a salient feature of discourses outside of the mainstream press. In fact,

recent work attests to the regularity in which discussion about the standards, behaviors, and products of the mainstream news media, and discussion about publicity attendant to press coverage, permeates blogs, talk radio programs, and political comedy programs. Still, the bulk of content analyses, both qualitative and quantitative, are conducted on mainstream news stories, a fact that suggests two corollaries to the first principle: (1) that the mainstream press regularly incorporates press and publicity topics from ancillary formats into its coverage (e.g., cable news segments about what bloggers, talk radio hosts, or political comedy hosts say about media coverage of a political candidate) and (2) that, owing to the power of the mainstream press in terms of its agenda-setting, priming, and framing functions, metacoverage in the mainstream press has more influence on political learning and political attitudes than metacoverage on talk radio, blogs, or political comedy shows.

Continuing with the first principle, the most frequently studied topic in content studies is the political campaign. The literature on campaigns is based on the rudimentary point that some campaign stories contain enough spoken, written, or visual references to "journalists," the "press," "reporters," "spin doctors," and "media consultants" to warrant the claim that either the press or publicity, or both, is a salient topic in the story. Studies of U.S. election news, along with a few comparative studies of U.S. and European political campaign news, have counted and categorized verbal and visual references to the news media and to publicity processes related to media coverage. However, different units of analysis, ranging from sentence-level propositions to story themes, as well as different categorizations (e.g., "candidate-press interactions," "media performance/impact"), make it difficult to cross-reference results from different content analyses. Also making comparison difficult is the fact that political campaign researchers use various terms to refer to this type of news, including self-referential process news, media process news, stories about the media, media narcissism, and media stories. Differences in unitization and categorization underlie disparate views about the normative nature of campaign metacoverage. One view holds that metacoverage is mainly about political strategy. From this normative viewpoint, stories with metacoverage degrade the information environment of the campaign and tend to make news consumers cynical of the press, candidates, and the campaign process as a whole. Another normative view holds that metacoverage expresses the press's crucial role to conduct messages from candidates to the electorate (e.g., "The president appeared on *Meet the Press* today to discuss Social Security . . ."), rendering it relatively harmless from a normative standpoint. Yet another view holds that metacoverage expresses the press's self-regulating function (e.g., a story about why the press covers a candidate's character issues), which, in turn, provides a useful platform for news consumers to understand the press's integral role in politics. Whereas some studies adhere to the notion that all metacoverage is about political strategy, other studies, particularly recent framing studies, hold that campaign stories with metacoverage contain all of these attributes.

The second principle is that metacoverage stories contain a compound topical structure. That is, metacoverage stories are not only about the press or publicity per se; rather, these stories are about an event or issue upon which journalists impose a newsworthy press or publicity angle. At times sources propound an angle about the news media. For example, metacoverage is evident in a campaign story in which a political candidate asserts that the news media are not fully covering their policy statements. It is also evident in a story in which a candidate complains that the news media are covering an aspect of their campaign (e.g., the candidate's character) too negatively. Other times, journalists themselves seem to initiate a media angle with which to cover a particular topic, such as when journalists report on media-generated polls about a candidate. Still other times, the source of the metacoverage is difficult to discern. For example, after Vice President Cheney shot a colleague in February 2006 hunting accident, the story became metacoverage when the mainstream press reported that Mr. Cheney did not contact the mainstream news media in a timely manner, sparking additional metacoverage about his media strategy and about whether or not the press was overplaying the incident.

The apparent exception to the second principle concerns newsroom scandals. Stories such as the 2003–2004 Jayson Blair scandal at *The New York Times,* which dealt with Mr. Blair's record of plagiarism and the subsequent resignation of several of the paper's high-ranking editors, or the story about Janet Cooke, a *Washington Post* reporter whose Pulitzer Prize–winning investigative work in the early 1980s was found to be largely fabricated, were heavily covered both locally and nationally. Such stories are not simply about unprofessional behavior on the part

of journalists or news organizations. In particular because the mainstream press often cover these sorts of incidents in terms of findings from media-generated polls about news credibility, these stories also deal with whether or not readers and viewers can trust news organizations to cover topics and events *other than* the news media according to professional standards of accuracy and autonomy from vested interests. Some scholars argue that the topic of press professionalism in news provides a potentially useful site to integrate work on metacoverage with work on news credibility.

The third principle is that metacoverage is tied to the reflexive nature of newsgathering and news reporting. This principle derives from the seminal work of Gaye Tuchman. Using an ethnographic methodology and drawing from theorizing in interpretive sociology, Tuchman argued that (mainstream) news is a reflexive enterprise, by which she meant that news stories are embedded in the very reality that they characterize and record. According to the reflexivity thesis, news stories are so deeply tied to the nature of reality that it is logical to conceive of reality as being doubly composed of discrete, observable events and the stories journalists tell about these events. For example, the tactical responses of a city or town that is going through a crime wave are prompted not only by the fact that individual crimes occur, but also by the fact that the crimes are reported every day in the local news media. Rather than systematically examine its reflexive nature via metacoverage, Tuchman argued, mainstream journalists tend to be defensive about it. When metacoverage does occur, she argued, journalists tend to "repair the paradigm" of objectivity by blaming and marginalizing individuals or organizations who do not adhere to high professional standards.

Research on metacoverage in the so-called critical perspective follows Tuchman's lead. Critical research examines three mechanisms of paradigm repair: self-policing, self-criticism, and self-analysis. This research typically examines one or more of these mechanisms via case studies of nonroutine events, such as the O. J. Simpson trial or the death of Princess Diana. A great deal of this research concludes that self-policing is accomplished by isolating the people or organizations that stray from the rest of the news media institution, such as tabloid journalists, paparazzi, and for the print media, television journalists. These studies argue that metacoverage is mainly employed to repair the paradigm of objectivity rather than to constructively examine news's reflexive relationship to events.

Most research on metacoverage in political campaign news takes a different normative approach than critical research on paradigm repair. All content studies of metacoverage in political campaign news are based on the notion that elections in the United States (and to differing degrees in democracies abroad) have transitioned from party-based elections to media-based elections—the latter being candidate centered, professionalized, and publicity oriented. As a result, journalists are attuned to the campaign's "media politics" environment. Just as candidates have become adept at devising strategies geared toward effectively communicating their policy and image messages to the electorate via news and non-news formats, so, too, have journalists adapted to these changing circumstances by weaving into stories information about the behaviors and roles of the press, as well as information about the behaviors and roles of campaign professionals who garner publicity for candidates via the news media or other communications channels. Thus, most political communication studies consider metacoverage to be a logical outcome of the heightened awareness on the part of the press corps that the campaign does not merely unfold before them. Since they hold that journalists are on the campaign stage directly, these studies work from the premise that campaign reporters are compelled to cover journalists, journalism, and publicity in order to accurately describe, interpret, and analyze the media politics environment.

Paul D'Angelo

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Methodology

Methodology refers to the procedures used to research an issue, a research question, or hypothesis. It is the way that a topic is investigated or researched. There have been many different methodologies used to investigate political communication, and there are many ways to classify these methodologies. One way to classify methodology is to group the procedures as either quantitative or qualitative. *Quantitative* procedures are used when researchers are interested in counting or providing some numerical measure or statistical test to the material. Procedures or methods that are *qualitative* are focused less on numerical findings and are more interested in in-depth exploration and analysis of certain dimensions or characteristics of the issue being studied. Methodology can be further divided into what parts of the communication system are being investigated. For example, certain research procedures are used to investigate the source or content of a message, and others are used to investigate the audience or effects of the message. Still other procedures might look at the historical relevance of messages or media, at the legal implications of political communication, or at the cultural context of political communication. Methodology in political communication is driven, like in other disciplines, by the theory being explored or tested, by the views and preferences of the researcher and by the research problem or question guiding the research.

General Features of Methodology

Although specific methodologies require specific research procedures, most methodologies share several common features. The first issue in deciding any methodology that will be used is the determination of the research questions and hypotheses. Research questions are those questions that the study will answer. The research questions guide how the research will be done and which methodology will be appropriate in answering the questions. In political communication, research questions have ranged from questions about how media use affects political disaffection to how certain techniques or strategies in political advertising will influence a person's liking of the candidate. Hypotheses are more specific than research questions and usually predict the ways in which variables will be related. For example, in a study about how gender might influence attitudes toward candidates during a debate, one hypothesis might be that women will more highly rate a candidate who uses certain language and arguments during a debate.

A second important aspect of methodology is sampling or deciding what will be selected for studying. Samples can include content that will be analyzed or persons who will be selected to participate in a study. Quantitative studies always include an explanation of how samples are selected, and some qualitative studies also discuss how participants are selected or how material is selected for researching.

Another important component of any methodology is what variables will be measured or manipulated and how the variables will be operationalized and measured. Variables are those things that the researcher is interested in observing, manipulating, or measuring. Examples of some variables in political communication include attitude toward a candidate, intention to vote, demographic aspects of the subjects, how negative or positive an ad is about the candidate, the candidate's political ideology or party, and the argument style that the candidate uses during a debate. There are various types of variables. *Independent variables* are variables that may be manipulated or may vary. Researchers are interested in seeing what influence they might have one what's being studied. Independent variables are sometimes called "predictor variables." *Dependent variables* (sometimes called "criterion variables") are the variables that researchers are interested in seeing how they are affected by the independent variables. Although there are various ways of describing variables, two other ways of labeling variables are *continuous variables* (can include infinite number value, such as minutes spent looking at a candidate's Web site) and *discrete variables* (finite number of values, such as gender or political affiliation).

An important part of any research study is how the variable will be operationalized. It is very critical that any methodology clearly describe how the variables will be measured and defined. In political communication,

there are some very standard ways that variables have been defined and measured over a long period of time. Variables such as political cynicism have been systematically measured in a particular way, and most research using this measure use fairly standard and tested ways of defining and measuring this variable. On the other hand, there are many studies that offer different ways of measuring a variable, but good research procedures will provide a clear definition for how that particular study is defining and measuring a particular variable. For example, negative advertising has been defined in numerous ways in various studies, including ads that compare and contrast, ads that are wholly oppositional in focus, ads that contain a negative attack, and ads that denigrate issue stands and personality characteristics of the opponent. What is important in each of these studies has been that the researchers have very clearly operationalized negative advertising and how it will be measured.

Part of defining a variable is explaining how it will be measured or how the variable will be given some quantitative number. There are various levels of measurements, including nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio. *Nominal* measures are those where numbers are assigned to characteristics or names of things, for example, gender and political affiliation are nominal measurements. *Ordinal* measures provide a ranking of the variable, for example, in political communication; a study might determine how respondents rank particular issues in terms of their importance in an election. *Interval* measures include an order to them but there is also an assumption that the distances between the points on the scale are equal. For example, in an experiment, participants might be asked to indicate on a 5-point scale how negative a particular ad was, from not very negative to very negative. *Ratio* scales are like interval scales but there is the presence of a true zero on the scale. For example, in a study of how often a presidential inaugural speech uses certain metaphors, the researcher could determine the absolute number of times a term is used and compare that to the number of times other metaphors are used over time in inaugural speeches.

A final important aspect of any methodology is the reliability and validity of the measurements. There are several types of reliability and validity, but generally, reliability refers to the consistency of the measure to measure the same aspects of the variable over and over again. A *reliable* measure is one that provides the same result over and over again no matter how many times the variable is measured that way. The measure is consistent. *Validity* refers to the ability of the measurement to measure what it is supposed to be measuring. For example, in a study on the influence of negative news on political attitudes, a researcher would want to be sure that asking questions about respondents' political disaffection is truly measuring their political disaffection.

Methodologies for Studying Content

There are several methodologies for investigating political communication content. Quantitative content analysis involves the systematic coding and categorizing of the content of a message. Qualitative methods in investigating political communication can include rhetorical analysis (including fantasy theme analysis) and critical analysis (including methods like narrative analysis).

Quantitative Content Analysis

A critical part of this methodology is the sample that will be used to investigate the content. There are several types of samples for content analysis, and in political communication, the material sampled may be content such as presidential speeches, newspaper articles, political ads, or broadcast shows. Depending upon what is being studied in political communication, there are various ways of selecting samples. Probability samples (those where every content unit has the same chance of being selected as any other content unit) typically used in political communication have included simple random sampling, where all units have an equal chance of being selected; systematic sampling, where every *n*th unit is selected; and stratified sampling, where the content is divided into groups and then samples are taken from the groups.

Another type of sample used in political communication is called a "purposive sample," or a sample selected because of the nature of the study. For example, a study of debates during a presidential election would use the debates during that election and would not use a random sample of all debates. A final type of sampling that has been used with some regularity in political communication has been a convenience sample, or a sample that is readily available to the researcher. For example, researchers have used a convenience sample of political ads to look at the types of appeals used in ads.

An important step in quantitative content analysis is determining the unit of analysis in the sample and how that unit of analysis will be coded or categorized.

The units of analysis in content analysis are those things that will be systematically looked at in terms of the variables of the study. In political communication, units of analysis have included things such as a newspaper headline, a political ad, a 30-second broadcast story, a speech paragraph, and the statements made during a debate. Coding is a critical process in content analysis, and researchers must decide how the research questions or hypotheses will be answered by including certain variables for coding. After the researcher decides how the sample material will be coded or categorized, a coding instrument or sheet is developed that includes all of the variables that the researcher is interested in investigating. The codebook or coding protocol is the instruction manual for how coders who will be doing the content analysis should categorize the material in the sample.

Coders are the persons who are trained to analyze and categorize the sample material in to the categories identified in the coding instrument. After coders are trained in coding procedures, a subsample of the material is coded for a preliminary measure of whether the coders are agreeing on how to categorize material in the content. In most political communication studies, the entire sample is not coded by all coders, but rather a sample of the material (usually 10% in most studies) is coded by all coders and a measure of intercoder reliability is taken on that coding. *Intercoder reliability* refers to how well the coders are agreeing on the categories and how to apply them to the content. There are several measures of intercoder reliability or statistical tests to determine the level of agreement among the coders. A good intercoder reliability score indicates that the coders are agreeing on the categories.

Content analysis has many advantages and can reveal important things about the types of political communication. In addition, content analyses that are done over several decades using similar coding categories can reveal changes in political communication content. A study might, for example, show how newspapers have covered women's rights issues across several decades to see the changes in the coverage.

Rhetorical and Critical Analysis

Rhetorical analysis is also another type of methodology that looks at the content of political communication. The method is typically less interested in quantitative measures or counting variables in a study, but rather interested in the language or rhetoric in political messages. There are many different types of rhetorical approaches to looking at political communication, and the researcher generally approaches his or her analysis of the message or content from a particular approach or theory of rhetoric. In quantitative content analysis, the researcher attempts to, as much as he or she can, objectively analyze the categories in the message or content by strictly defining how these dimensions will be coded and by training coders to adhere to a systematic coding protocol. There is no such interest in rhetorical analysis, where the researcher is may be the only person analyzing the messages for the content. Typically, rhetoricians are looking at the strategies and techniques used in political language, speeches, writing, or broadcasts that make that communication persuasive, effective, and skillful. Different strains of rhetorical studies have looked at these things in different ways. Rhetorical approaches that have been used in political communication have included using the writings on speaking by the ancient Greeks and Romans to analyze political messages to more modern theorists who look at the argumentation and symbols present in political language. Fantasy theme analysis is one way of looking at the language and rhetoric of political communication by investigating how group or mediated fantasies or visions of some event or issue are present in political speech, news broadcasts, newspaper stories, and other forms of political communication. Fantasy theme analysis is a method for investigating the elements of storytelling in political content, including the scenes, the characters or actors, the plotlines, how the story is told, who are the heroes and the villains, what language is used to describe the story, and the style and motives of the characters or actors. Fantasy theme analysis has been used in political communication to analyze about 2,000 political cartoons on the Bill Clinton–Monica Lewinsky scandal and in another study to examine the worldviews and persuasion techniques used by hate groups on their Web sites.

Other methods for analyzing political communication have come from the critical or cultural area. Critical, qualitative analyses of content require that the researcher approach the content (or the text) from a particular perspective or approach. In some critical analyses, there is an assumption that a particular ideology is present in the text (whether that text is a political ad, a news broadcast, a speech, a magazine article, or a film) and therefore the researcher does a close reading or analysis of the text to explore that ideology.

Like in rhetorical analysis, there are various ways that researchers might approach a critical analysis of some text in political communication, and these methods will be determined by the theoretical guidelines of the approach. Overall, most critical theory assumes that some ideology or perspective is present in political communication and that the use of the language and visuals is not neutral or haphazard but would reveal something about the status, biases, and reality of those persons in charge of producing the political message. One example of a critical analysis is a study using the theory of metaphors to analyze political news stories on television, looking at the ways in which certain metaphors are used to construct a certain meaning in the political stories. Another example of this type of analysis would be a study of the semiotics or signs and symbols in speech practices of female politicians.

Methodologies for Studying Audiences and Effects

Other methodologies in political communication are interested in what audiences think or feel about political messages. These can also include social science quantitative studies as well as qualitative studies. They range from methods like survey research and experiments to focus groups and cultural studies procedures.

Survey Research

Survey research generally involves asking people their opinions, attitudes, feelings about some event or message or circumstance in culture. In political communication, surveys can be used to assess a variety of opinions and attitudes, including how audiences are reacting to a political campaign, to ascertain their feelings about government, the president, their use of media for political information, their attitudes about candidates and political advertising, and their use of political debates. Samples are also important in survey research, but here the samples are the people that the researcher will be questioning. Popular types of surveys in political communication have included in person surveys, telephone surveys, mail surveys, and, of increasing popularity, Internet-based surveys. Surveys allow political communication scholars to understand what a sample of persons is thinking, feeling, believing about some political phenomenon or event and then make inferences about that group to the more general population. Universities, media organizations, and private groups do numerous surveys to explore, describe and explain political behavior and communication among populations. Some surveys are interested in a one-shot understanding or snapshot of how people are feeling at a particular time. Other surveys have provided longitudinal (over time) measures of political attitudes, beliefs, feelings, knowledge, and behavior.

The main part of a survey, besides what population will be sampled (national, voters, regional, statewide) and how the survey will be conducted (telephone, mail, Internet), is the questionnaire design. The questionnaire is constructed by operationalizing the variables that the researcher is interested in studying. The questions are then constructed so that each variable is measured using one or more questions. The questionnaire is also constructed so that respondents have a fairly easy time in answering the questions and the interviewer is clear about how the questions should be answered. There are a variety of types of questions to be included on a survey, including closed-ended (forced choice), open-ended (person responds in own words), and contingency questions (the answer to a question determines what the next question for that respondent is). An important aspect of survey research is that the instructions to the respondent on how to answer the question are very clear, whether they are reading the instructions themselves (Internet or mail) or whether an interviewer is reading the instructions to them. In most survey research studies, the researcher may have to do a follow-up mailing, phone call, or e-mail to encourage persons to respond. In some cases, researchers provide incentives for respondents by including money or coupons in the mailing. One critical aspect of survey research is to be able to tell respondents how long the survey will take (a pretest of the survey and timing of it is useful here) and to make the survey as easy as possible to respond to. Response rate is important in survey research and refers to how many completed questionnaires the researcher has. A good response rate means that the researcher can generalize findings to the population. There is some disagreement about good response rates, but researchers can generally find advice in the literature about good response rates for mail surveys, for telephone surveys, and for Internet surveys.

Experimental Research

Another way of understanding political communication from the audience's perspective is by conducting

experiments. Experiments in political communication are interested in investigating the effects of political messages on people. There are several different types of experimental designs, and most in political communication have been short-term effects experiments, although there have been some field experiments.

Like other social scientific, quantitative methods, experiments involve selecting a sample of participants to study some political communication influence. The researcher is interested in how some political communication phenomenon influences or affects participants. Usually in experiments the researcher is interested in actually testing hypotheses or statements to look at explaining some process or influence. The experimenter recruits subjects or participants to take part in the experiment. Subjects are sometimes randomly selected for experiments, but the more typical procedure in political communication experiments is for participants to be recruited and then randomly assigned to treatment conditions or for treatments to be randomly assigned to certain groups (this is particularly true when college students and classes are used). Another way to assign subjects to groups is to use a matching process where the experimenter tries to match subjects across treatment groups. In the area of political communication, a researcher might want his or her groups to match on certain demographics, like gender, or on certain political dimensions, like political ideology.

The treatment conditions in experiments are those cells or parts of the stimuli that the researcher wants to compare. For example, if a researcher is interested in how certain types of political statements or arguments influence a person's evaluation of a candidate's performance in a debate, the experimenter might randomly assign participants to various treatment groups featuring different types of statements and arguments. A basic experiment includes independent and dependent variables and experimental and control groups. In experiments, independent variables are those things that the experimenter manipulates or varies to see what influence they might have. Dependent variables are those variables being measured or observed to see what effect the manipulation has. In political communication, for example, an experiment might be interested in how exposure to varying levels of news broadcasts about the economy (from good news to bad news) (the independent variable) might influence confidence in the president, political disaffection, and political efficacy (the dependent variables). The experimental groups are those groups that get some variation of the stimuli or treatment. The control group would be the group that gets no treatment. In some experiments in political communication, there are no real control groups, only various experimental groups that are compared to each other.

There are numerous ways to design an experiment, but two of the most common in political communication include pretest/posttest designs or posttest-only designs. In a pretest/posttest design, the participants are asked a series of questions and given a variety of measurements to check their attitudes, feelings, knowledge, beliefs, before the experimental treatment is given. Once they are exposed to the stimuli, the same instrument is given to them to see if the treatment has changed their attitudes. In some political communication studies, researchers have preferred not to give a pretest to participants for fear that asking questions will alert the participants to the nature of the experiment. In these cases, the research has simply asked questions after the treatment, arguing that if the groups have been randomly assigned to treatments or treatments randomly assigned to groups then the differences on the questionnaires and measurements following the experiment would be due to the treatments.

Experiments are not generalizable to large populations or to much beyond the short-term effects of the experiment. They are very powerful because of the control they offer in helping political communication researchers understand the possible effects of political communication messages. They offer insight into how certain variables might influence other variables. But they measure short-term effects, and researchers cannot be sure that the effects are permanent. This is why some experiments attempt to test long-term effects by doing a second measure of the effects weeks after the experiments.

Focus Group Research

Focus groups have also been used as a way to understand audience reactions to political communication. Typically, a focus group consists of a group of persons who the researcher uses to explore details about the study. The researcher develops a series of questions and has a guided discussion with the groups to get at their reactions to aspect of the topic under investigation. Focus groups allow the researcher to go into more depth with the participants about their reaction to some political content or some aspects having to do with political communication. For example, a

focus group might be conducted of participants to investigate in detail their emotional reaction to a political ad or to a political speech. The analysis is guided but the participants provide responses to open ended questions. The findings of focus group research tends to feature detailed attention to and reporting of the participants' comments.

Other Qualitative and Cultural Methods

Cultural Studies

Cultural studies approaches are also interested in understanding audiences as well as other aspects of media and include many different approaches and ways of looking at media. There are several tenets that seem to unite works under this umbrella, but the procedures used depend on the questions that the researcher wishes to answer and the interests and theoretical leanings of the researchers. Cultural studies methods are more interpretive and evaluative, like many qualitative research methods and like critical analysis. One other component is that there are no aspects of culture that would not be worthy of investigation, so in political communication, cultural studies wouldn't just have to analyze news for political content, but might also investigate soap operas, films, songs, and any other aspects of popular culture for political content. Cultural studies research is interested in production and political economy components of media communication, the text or message itself, and the audience. Generally, researchers in this area argue that all research in the media is political, and they take an interest in understanding how those groups in control in a society shape and use media messages. They are interested in how hegemony (or ruling forces in a society) serves to dominate other aspects of the society. And media as an institution is one way that those messages get out. Interest in cultural studies, like in critical theory, is on ideology, and in cultural studies that interest has typically been on ideology of race, class and gender.

Other researchers looking at audience interpretations of messages have looked at how the audiences might provide different meanings and interpretations of the media messages. In cultural studies, audiences aren't always persuaded by what the dominant message might be, but can actually resist those messages through their own interpretations.

Historical Methods

Another way of understanding political communication is through the use of historical studies or methods. These methods typically try to understand or investigate political communication content within the historical context of some political or social event or political figure. Historical research, for example, in political communication has been used to investigate how political slogans, songs, and mottos functioned throughout U.S. presidential campaigns. Historical research has provided an important foundation for discussing how context and era influence political communication and provide more than just a one-shot look at political communication at a particular time.

Case Studies

Another methodology for understanding political communication is the case study. Case studies usually look at a specific setting or system over time and investigate in depth various type of data from a variety of sources. A case study of a particular issue or advocacy campaign in a particular country might look at the culture, context, and circumstances of the campaign. The researcher would be interested in looking at whatever political communication sources might be available to provide information about that particular campaign. A variety of tools would be used in a case study, and a variety of sources would be investigated. For example, in the case study example mentioned, the researcher might look at media coverage and ad campaigns, would conduct interviews with candidates, campaign workers, and reporters, read archival documents available from the campaigns, and do observations of the organizations involved. Other examples of political communication case studies include a study of the decision-making process of a particular presidential administration during a political crisis and a study of how gender issues were characterized and featured in the speeches of a female senator.

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See also Focus Groups; Survey Research Center

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Milton, John

See Press Freedom

Minimum Effects Theory

See Limited Effects Theory

Minorities, Role in Politics

To understand the role of minorities in U.S. politics necessitates defining *minorities* and the forms of political endeavors that are included for consideration. Since *minority* in politics refers to access to power, not numbers, women are a "minority" in the United States, as are gays and lesbians, Muslims, and so on. In order to avoid being overly broad in scope (and therefore compromise the depth of discussion of this topic), attention can be focused on two primary groups: African Americans and Latino Americans. Three rationales underlie this focus.

First, among racial/ethnic minority groups, Latinos and African Americans both have arguably faced the most vociferous and long-standing forms of prejudice and discrimination that have led to formal and informal barriers to their participation in American political life. For African Americans, such barriers have existed for more than four hundred years: the legacy of involuntary servitude, legalized segregation, and systematic discrimination in virtually every area of American social and political life. We include Latino Americans also because of their history of prejudice and discrimination in the United States, albeit a shorter one when compared to African Americans. Latino Americans comprise the largest population of recent immigrants to the United States (53% of foreign-born immigrants, according to the U.S. Census Bureau). Further, as the social norm to conceal prejudice toward African Americans has taken hold, there is still an acceptability of overt disdain for Latinos, largely because of the tendency to conflate the status of those Latinos who are citizens or reside in the United States legally with those who are undocumented.

Second, we focus on these two groups because the majority of the literature in political communication (an amalgam of research from diverse fields as political science, communication and media studies, social psychology, legal studies, and others) have and continue to focus primarily on these two groups. This is partly a result of the disproportionate discrimination faced by members of these groups in America, partly a result of the numbers of Americans who identify themselves with either of these groups, and partly a result of the fact that beyond the grassroots struggles for equality, members of these two groups have been most active among racial minorities in seeking elected office. Such visibility has caught the attention of researchers and pundits alike, and has led to more discussion of their participation than that of American Indians, Asians, or Pacific Islanders.

While both African and Latino Americans have faced significant barriers to political participation in the United States, the nature of these barriers, the reasons for their existence, and the way they are communicated

differ in many ways, but they have a number of common themes as well.

Black and Latino Social Movements

Several long-standing social movements have been stimulated by African Americans and Latinos. Two in particular exemplify the history of black and Latino political participation from their inception to the present: the civil rights movement (CRM) of the mid-20th century, and the Latino labor movement.

Though its roots were planted long before, the fruition of the CRM came in the 1960s. It was during this time that we see greatest mobilization and participation of African Americans in this movement to gain full equality in American political, social, and economic life. While there are many ways to tell the story of this plateau in the history of black political involvement, it may be helpful to think of it in terms of particular individuals or leaders of the movement that spearheaded activism among the black populous and the various political and social groups that helped to organize and give voice to their concerns.

The CRM brings to mind two outspoken leaders who exemplify the diversity of opinion not so much about what blacks sought to gain, but the strategies used to pursue it: Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X. Both of these leaders commanded vast audiences among the black populous because they spoke to the heart of their plight: nothing less than full equality and the freedom to choose and control their own destinies as a people. King espoused the philosophy of nonviolent resistance as a way to chastise, challenge, and change the consciousness of white Americans into granting these freedoms to blacks. Malcolm's strategy, however—one mired in a controversy of characterization over the years—was less optimistic. His "by any means necessary" approach, while not an explicit call for armed black resistance, was a message that black America may have to use every weapon in its arsenal to gain the freedoms that white America had originally used to subjugate and restrict those freedoms.

Though perhaps King's approach has been given more backing in the history books, there is no doubt that both men, and both approaches, had the effect of galvanizing the black masses, channeling their collective energy to accomplish a common set of ideals. Their voice and influence spawned a number of self-organizing social and political interest groups dedicated to this cause. The number of civil right organizations that sprang up is too large even to list here, let alone describe their efforts. Whether it was the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Black Panther Party, or Black Muslim organizations, like their diverse leaders, they all shared a common goal. It was their ability to unite around this commonality and the people's ability to channel their efforts in the way they best saw fit that made the CRM one of the most powerful, effective, and memorable social movements in American history.

The 1960s also saw the beginnings of what would become the Latino CRM that, along with achieving the American Dream articulated in the rhetoric of the black CRM, was focused on economic equality and the rights of a burgeoning working class of Latinos in the United States. This movement also had many prominent leaders, the most famous of whom is César Chávez. Chávez, who was a farm worker, later went on to organize others in the struggle for fair wages and working conditions for farm workers throughout the southwest United States. He, too, was able to activate the passions of thousands of Latinos to fight for equality, fairness, and freedom from exploitation. What began with Chávez and other Latino leaders who were his contemporaries led to the organization of a plethora of labor unions and workers' rights organizations that would become a conduit for the movement—including several early groups organized in the 1960s and early 1970s, such as Chávez's own United Farm Workers, the National Farm Workers Association, the Farm Labor Organizing Committee, and others. These groups channeled the energies of the Latino populous into mass boycotts, marches, and legal challenges to workplace injustices.

Each of these movements exemplifies not only the beginnings, but the foundation of black and Latino participation in American political life. They had common struggles, diverse strategies, and a number of important gains in the struggle for equality, all of which were accomplished because those who were oppressed became intimately involved in their own struggle. For both groups, the struggle continues. Whether in recent efforts to reauthorize the original Voting Rights Act of 1965, or recent struggles surrounding immigration and citizenship, efforts to uphold civil rights legislation in the workplace or social institutions, or efforts to repair and build relationships between the United States and Latino immigrant home nations across Latin America,

Latino and African American political participation continues to find meaningful outlets.

Blacks, Latinos, and Electoral Politics

Both blacks and Latinos have made concentrated efforts to expand their political influence beyond the broad, populous forms of citizen participation in social movements into the realm of electoral politics. Similar to the mass citizen movements, the move to secure election to government bodies has been embarked upon by blacks from the 1960s on, while Latino gains in this area have been more recent. In part as a result of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and other early civil rights gains, the late 1960s and early 1970s produced record numbers of blacks elected to federal office and the formation of a coalition of black elected officials in the name of the Congressional Black Caucus. While this included only 13 black elected officials in 1969, the number of blacks elected to the U.S. Congress and Senate has climbed to 43 in the 110th Congress (2007–2009). And, while this group has influenced monumental legislative efforts over its nearly 4-decade history, the scope of its influence and power is realized in the 110th Congress, as many of those early officials moved into some of the most powerful congressional positions, including the chairmanships of the powerful Ways and Means Committee (Charles Rangel, D-NY) and the Judiciary Committee (John Conyers, D-MI).

Speaking more broadly, the number of black elected officials in all federal, state, and local offices in 2006 increased to 9,101 from 1,469 in 1970, according to the latest published report by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. Recent historical gains in this arena include the election of Massachusetts's first black governor, Deval Patrick, in 2006 and U.S. Senator Barack Obama (D-IL), the first black man, and only second African American elected to the Senate (in 2004) in U.S. history.

Latino gains in the area of electoral politics are also significant. In 1996, there were no Latinos in the U.S. Senate, only 17 members of Congress, no governors, 6 state officials, and 156 state legislators; in 2005, those numbers were 3, 23, 1, 9, and 232, respectively. In all elected offices, the number of Latino officials has grown from 3,743 in 1996 to 5,041 in 2005. Latino gains in positions of power in the 110th Congress are also significant, and include the first Latina to every chair a committee: Nydia Velazquez (D-NY) of the House Small Business Committee, and Sylvestre Reyes (D-TX) who heads the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Positions in such powerful roles have also extended to party leadership appointments, including Senator Mel Martinez (R-FL) as the general chairman of the Republican National Committee.

These gains for Latino and black elected officials have come in the face of a number of significant barriers to their election. There is a burgeoning literature in political science and communication studies about the way electoral communication differs when one or more of the candidates in a race are either black or Latino. Because of the social norm of racial equality, white candidates will not be successful with voters (of any race) if they explicitly suggest that an opponent of color is less qualified for the office because of his or her race. While we have seen such attacks historically, such direct racial language has all but disappeared of late. In its place, however, is a more tacit form of political communication that is designed to trigger (or at least has the effect of triggering) racial resentment.

These implicit appeals mostly come in the form of images, rather than text, in televised political campaign advertising. While text can be encoded, as well, to disguise racial intent ("inner city" or "urban" rather than "black"), it has been found that the most effective way to prime racial predispositions is to have race-neutral text with images that suggest (or, rather, remind) viewers that there is a racial component to the issue. For example, in a 2006 advertisement against black senatorial candidate Harold Ford, Jr., a white candidate humorously suggests that his or her black male opponent enjoys interracial romantic encounters with white women. Particularly in a southern state, such a "joke," aimed at questioning Ford's character apart from race, taps into deep-seated negative stereotypes about black sexuality and the threats to white women that led to hundreds of years of discrimination, including violent lynchings. Similar appeals during the 2006 midterm election cycle were prevalent in candidates' ads addressing the topic of immigration, where images of Mexican criminals, drug traffickers, and workers "stealing" American jobs, drawing on prejudices about Latino Americans.

So while explicit appeals to race rarely work (and often backfire), it is still possible (and effective) to use racial fears to woo voters. This serves as a reminder of how far we still have to come with respect to racial equality in America. But it also serves to perpetuate

racist stereotypes, which makes the practice all the more dangerous.

Blacks and Latino Voting and Political Coalitions

The most basic form of political participation—voting—has risen and fallen over the years, especially for African Americans. Voter participation waned significantly through the 1970s–1990s with the percentage of blacks voting rarely rising above 50%. However, the most recent presidential election in 2004 saw a marked rise in black voter participation, to more than 60%. Latino voter participation, while higher in this same election cycle (67%) than for blacks, was about the same as the previous presidential election cycle. Both groups, however, saw a marked increase in the numbers of young voters who participated in the electoral process by casting a ballot.

Voting and other forms of political participation has become a vehicle for the formation of building political coalitions around shared interests between black and Latino communities. The so-called shared interest model of minority political dynamics posits that blacks and Latinos perceive themselves as having common goals related to their status as political "outsiders" in the United States. That is, as members of marginalized groups, they have a vested interested in supporting each others' quests for meaningful inclusion in the political system. An alternative model—the "empowerment" model—suggests that members of each group view members of the other group as threats to their own group's advancement. In this model, blacks and Latinos (as well as white women and members of other minority groups) are disinclined to cooperate in social struggles, support one another for elected office, or advocate for one another once they achieve some level of power.

What we know about minorities' role in politics is that no meaningful change could have or would have come about without constant agitation from within those communities. It has been common to propagate a myth about white folks (specifically white men) "coming to their senses" when they finally realized that the oppression of minority communities was wrong. The direct political action advocated by King, Malcolm X, and Chávez (in cooperation with their white allies) has led to laws and policies that make formal discrimination of racial minorities more difficult. This has led to more racial minority candidates running and ultimately winning elected office. And that access to power will invariably lead to more successes for the historically oppressed aspects of America's pluralistic society. But that historical oppression has left deep scars that are often unrecognized by current citizens. Bringing these issues to the forefront is one way that minorities continue to work to rectify the injustices of the past.

Charlton D. McIlwain and
Stephen Maynard Caliendo

See also Civil Rights Movement; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Latinos and Politics, Media; NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People); Participation, Political; Race in Politics; Unions, Political Activity

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Mitsotakis, Konstantinos (1918–)

Konstantinos Mitsotakis comes from a family with a long tradition in politics. He studied law, political and economic science at the University of Athens, and he is the father of Dora Bakogiannis (presently minister of foreign affairs) and Kyriakos Mitsotakis (MP [member of Parliament] of the ruling party). During the German occupation, he assumed a leading role in the anti-Nazi Resistance on the island of Crete, and he

was imprisoned and sentenced to death twice by the Germans. In 1986, he was honored by the British Parliament for his activity.

Mitsotakis was elected as MP for the first time at the age of 28, first took governmental responsibilities at the age of 32, and ever since he had been incessantly elected with different parties until the coup d'état of April 1967.

He was arrested by the dictatorship along with other political leaders. In August 1967, he escaped to Paris, where he would remain in exile for the next 6 years. In the fall of 1973, he arrived in Greece and was again imprisoned by the dictatorial regime. He was released after the political changeover and was elected MP in 1977. In the spring of 1978, he entered Nea Democratia (New Democracy [N.D.]) and took ministerial positions.

In September 1984, he was elected president of the party of Nea Democratia, and in June's 1989 general elections, N.D., under his leadership, was elected first party with 44.3% of the vote, however without achieving absolute majority (145 seats out of 300). Under these circumstances a coalition government with the Left was the only solution. To make this move easier he accepted not becoming prime minister himself and proposed Tzannis Tzannetakis for the position. That government went down in history for referring his great political opponent, Andreas Papandreou, to a Special Court. Papandreou was indicted on charges of embezzlement of state funds but was cleared by the Special Court. Konstantinos Mitsotakis took the oath of the prime minister of Greece on April 1990 after the electoral victory of N.D. with 46.9% of the vote. During those elections, foreign communication experts were invited by N.D. (as well as by other political parties) to offer media training courses for television campaigning.

Mitsotakis's government, despite its marginal majority in Parliament (151 seats) and the massive reactions of the opposition as well as some disputes from within the party, was the first Greek government after World War II that took measures to downsize the state. But his government was overthrown on September 1993 on the initiative of the young hardliner minister of foreign affairs, Antonis Samaras, on the occasion of the "Macedonian Issue" and the privatization of the Greek Telecoms. Mitsotakis attributed his overthrow to vested economic interests, which he called "interweaving interests"—a term that still overruns Greek political discourse. After the untimely elections of October 1993 and N.D.'s electoral defeat, he resigned from the party leadership. Having achieved nearly half a century of parliamentary life, he decided not to be a candidate in the elections of March 2004. Today he continues to intervene in political life whenever he sees fit.

Mitsotakis was at pains to keep a secure relationship with the private media. His law against the publication of terrorist groups' manifestos was harshly opposed by the left-centrist press moguls who ultimately managed to cancel it. Also, his policies were ruthlessly criticized by a few but influential private radio stations that contributed much to his discreditation and stepping out of power.

Nicolas Demertzis

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Mitterrand, François (1916–1996)

François Mitterrand is the only French president who successfully completed two full 7-year terms. His long political career put him into light as soon as in 1947, when he became the youngest minister of Paul Ramadier's socialist government, in charge of the war veterans, and lasted for nearly half a century, with a long penance as one of the opposition leaders during the 1960s and the '70s.

A superb tactician, as well in political parties politicking as in campaigning, his stature increased when he made it to the second round of voting against incumbent president General Charles de Gaulle, for the 1965 presidential election. Though he did not win then, he appeared as a strong opponent. For the official campaign television broadcasts, in order to avoid boring monologues, he had cleverly staged token interviews by a well-known friendly journalist, Françoise Giroud.

Not at ease in less formal events, like debates, Mitterrand allegedly thought that one of the main reasons of his defeat in the 1974 presidential run against Válery Giscard d'Estaing was his weakness during the televised debate before the final round of voting. In

1977, he also clearly lost ground in another televised debate against then Prime Minister Raymond Barre. He was therefore very cautious in organizing very precisely his comeback for the 1981 presidential election. His preparation for the "decisive" televised debate was most thorough, with impeccable results. He even had dental surgery in order to sculpt his upper canines, wore new tailored suits, and so on. He also went through a careful media training, learning how to boomerang some of the 7-year-old sound bites of his opponent Válery Giscard d'Estaing. The preparation had been trusted to friendly television director Serge Moatti, who had drawn as a rule that the candidates could not interrupt each other—since he knew Mitterrand was not very good in unprepared responses.

For the 1981 campaign, Mitterrand had also hired one of the best political consultants, Jacques Seguela, who cleverly targeted his campaign to the right, with an easygoing slogan *La Force Tranquille* ("The quiet strength"), able to have some centrist voters join and forget that he was a candidate for the left (posters posturing him in front of a traditional country church helped to that effect).

During most of his two terms, from 1984 on, Mitterrand's communication as president was meticulously organized by another consultant, Jacques Pilhan, who staged rare and original television appearances. One of his most notorious achievements was a talk show with a popular anchorman, Yves Mourousi, where aging Mitterrand was exposed as still being able to understand the French youngsters' specific expressions and vocabulary. Broadcasted on April 28, 1985, it again drew favorable media attention to him and was the first step of his second presidential winning streak.

At the time, Mitterrand had transformed himself into a master of television and never failed, even when his age and sickness might have betrayed him. He set an example of what can be achieved by tenacious work in learning about media use for a political result.

Philippe J. Maarek

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Modernization

Modernization is a vague concept. It is meant to indicate a process of complex social change that is taken to be linked with an increasing rationalization of the society and the individual. Modernization denotes a cluster of social processes, such as the taking over of scientifically based technologies, the proliferation of a state-sponsored system of education, urbanization, secularization, increasing interdependence within the society, an increase in political rights, and the introduction of mass media. Research on the relationship between modernization and mass media (communication and development research) emerged in the United States after World War II and had an important role in the propaganda battle between the Soviet and the non-Soviet forces for the allegiance of the peoples in the nonindustrial world.

The mass media were credited with speeding up the modernization process, whether as educational instruments or as "mobility multiplier." It was believed that the mass media could develop modern personalities. The American development aid policy involved the convergence-theoretical idea that ultimately modernization always and everywhere will have identical effects. This policy, also aiming at keeping communism in check, ironically corresponded exactly to the thought developed by Karl Marx in the introduction to *Capital*: "The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future."

Daniel Lerner's (1958) *The Passing of Traditional Society* has for a long time been viewed as the standard work on the theme of mass media and modernization. Moreover, it has influenced international media policy. Modernization is regarded primarily as a communications process. Local or national cultures are seen as hindrances that have to be surmounted on the way to modern society. Modernization is considered to be linked with character change on the level of the individual. Mobile personalities in modern societies are characterized by empathy. Empathy is the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation and in imaging oneself as being in strange situations, places, and times. Empathy is the prerequisite for taking on new roles as well as for adjustment to new situations. The shaping of empathic personalities is fostered in traditional societies by the introduction of mass communication.

In *The Achieving Society,* David McClelland (1961) emphasized the importance of the need for achievement. Ideas are in fact more important in shaping history than purely materialistic arrangements. What really counts is human resources. McClelland recommended a free press to foster modernity and to achieve an informed public. The media are to communicate knowledge of the new norms and to foster more respect for the "impersonal other." They are capable of punishment by publicity. An important step on the way to modernity is, further, the emancipation of women. Women must be so influenced by the mass media that they take on new norms and values.

On assignment from UNESCO, Wilbur Schramm, in *Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries* (1964), sought to indicate the significance of mass media within the context of a program of concrete action. Free information was regarded as generally desirable. Mass media were seen as "a kind of temperature-controlling agent." Through the stimulation of aspirations the "social temperature" could be raised, and by providing explanation the "temperature" could be lowered. An improved flow of information provides a climate for national development. Schramm argued a developing country should invest in a program of mass media development. The trouble with such recommendations is clear: a decision as to whether a program of mass media development and use has been well considered or not can be taken only after the fact.

Modernization processes often began with "Western domination," which went hand in hand with "national humiliation" and the erosion of traditional cultures. The results were feelings of cultural inferiority linked with self-doubt, and self-hate as well. The proliferation of television has resulted in many people being confronted for the first time with information on the possibilities of a better way of living in industrialized societies. Mass media were found in developing countries before other facets of the productive potential (the infrastructure) came near to corresponding to the level in industrialized countries. The modernized individuals became more interested in consuming than in saving and often emigrated in order to have a better quality of life. A result of the introduction of the mass media was the creation of a situation of relative deprivation, that is, affluence was portrayed as attainable, even though it was not attainable. Thus the media became a source of frustration. They could have led to a revolution of rising expectations, because there was an increasing knowledge of the possibilities of a better life, of new ideologies, and of other political systems.

The previous optimistic perspective regarding the positive effects of the dissemination of empathy via mass media has been revised by Lerner, who recognized that the contact of a less developed society with an industrialized society will visit on the developing country externally induced tensions and/or demands. The revolution of rising expectations resulted in rising frustrations and inspired populist movements in countries in the Third World.

Nowadays, modernization theory, which had influenced media policy until the 1970s, has been replaced by dependency theories, which emphasize the power of the media to hinder development.

Michael Kunczik

See also Democratization, Role of the Media in; Dependency Theory, Media; Globalization; Schramm, Wilbur

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Mohammed VI (1963–)

Mohammed VI, born in Rabat, Morocco, on August 21, 1963, obtained a doctorate in law from a French

university. King Mohammed VI ascended to the throne on July 23, 1999, following the death of his father, King Hassan II. As *Amir Al-Mumineen* (Commander of the Faithful) in Morocco, King Mohammed VI is both a political and spiritual leader.

With the motto "It is now time for authority to serve the people, and not for the people to serve authority," King Mohammed VI started what he called the "New Era" of political modernization, where a new concept of authority based on accountability, human rights, and individual freedom was introduced.

After King Mohammed VI had dismissed the unpopular Driss Basri, his father's interior minister since 1979, he allowed political exiles back into the country and established an independent commission to compensate victims of human rights violations and guarantee freedom of press. He imposed a zero tolerance policy toward corruption and often reminded his government that he is watching. These spectacular political changes have fueled political media gossips.

Fully aware of the role of the mass media, King Mohammed VI appointed new senior officials for leading the national television and the news agency. This has given the official media a new impulse.

The king owes his popularity not only to the liberal style of government but also to genuine modesty. His name has become associated with social programs designed to help the deprived sectors of society, including the poor, the elderly, and the handicapped. King Mohammed VI has unbanned Ahmed Sanoussi, better known as "Bziz," Morocco's leading satirist, to present the latest television promotion for the royal charity for poor people. He is lauded in the national and international media as the "king of the poor" because of his marked and immediate concern and compassion toward the deprived.

In his first national televised address, the king pledged to continue Morocco's development. He defended women's rights and spoke against poverty. For him, Morocco's problems are "poverty, misery, and illiteracy."

Mohammed VI, a media-friendly figure, is behind the transformation of the Moroccan media landscape. In September 2002, he created the High Authority of the Audiovisual Communication (HAAC). In November 2004, the parliament unanimously adopted a new law on the audio-visual communication that will regulate the liberalization, modernize the broadcasting system, and consolidate the democratic process.

To boost its declining audience rating, Moroccan national *TVM* has started to use the popular figure of King Mohammed VI and his image as a caring sovereign, especially during his official tours of Moroccan cities, where he managed to touch the hearts and minds of the youths. This has given a new dimension to the news bulletin.

During the first year of his reign, Mohammed VI did not give any media interviews. On June 26, 2000, he started his media contact with an exclusive interview with *Time* magazine, which placed his image on a cover page under the title "The Cool King." Mohammed VI is no conformist and no conservative. He personified a modern style of leadership. His wife appeared in public, and the press was allowed to photograph her, an open rupture with traditions and a sign of modernity. His wife does not bear the title of queen, but was granted the title of "Her Royal Highness Princess." She is regarded as Morocco's first lady. In another break with formal protocol, Mohammed VI drives his own car and pays restaurant bills, aiming to set the example for his ministers and state senior officials to follow.

Mohammed Ibahrine

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Moi, Daniel Arap (1924–)

Daniel Toirtich Arap Moi was independent Kenya's third vice president after Jaramogi Ajuma Oginga Odinga and Joseph Murumbi. He later became the second president of the Republic after the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978. He adopted the slogan *Nyayo*, which is a Kiswahili word for "in his footsteps," obviously indicating that he would follow the development path and maintain the political system introduced by Kenyatta.

Arap Moi was born on September 2, 1924, in the small village of Kurieng'or in Tugen Hills. He was a

song of a shepherd who died when Moi was only 2 years old. He spent 20 years in education as student, student teacher, and teacher before entering politics as an African member of Legislative Council in 1955. He has always been described as a humble and dedicated Christian.

Kenya's seasoned politicians did not consider Moi to be presidential material. He was a Kalenjin, one of the smaller ethnic groups in Kenya. Moi was formally in KADU (Kenya African Democratic Party) before it merged with KANU (Kenya African National Union). During his time as vice president under Kenyatta, Moi functioned in the shadow of Kenyatta, performing ceremonial roles of very little political significance.

Though Moi was vice president, the Kikuyu politicians who were close to Kenyatta did not want him to ascend to power and attempted to change the Constitution in 1976, but they failed. Moi's presidency was slow and cautious in its early stages of tenure until he consolidated his own political base in the country and in the ruling party KANU. After consolidating his power, Moi became very vicious and ruthless to any dissenting voices.

Though a poor public speaker, Moi is remembered for his populist rhetoric and acts. He introduced the provision of free milk to schoolchildren and advocated national land reform. In his initial stages of his leadership, Moi appeared a true democrat. But by 1980 he started to become unpopular. From 1982, several amendments were made to the Constitution to strengthen Moi's rule and undermine democracy and good governance. Finally, under Moi, Kenya was legally converted to a workable one-party state**.** Under Moi, the Parliament became progressively weaker and the presidency more powerful.

In 1982, the airmen attempted a coup on the Moi government. In 1986 the opposition to Moi's rule was mounting by the day, both from clandestine movements and from the church. By 1991 the forces against Moi were becoming stronger, and Moi responded by detaining those who were agitating for the expansion of the democratic principles and space in Kenya. Moi hated the media and accused the media of fronting for the interests of foreigners. However Moi's dictatorial tendencies began to be checked after the amendment of section 2A of the Kenyan Constitution that allowed for multiparty democracy. However Moi (who Jaramogi Oginga Odinga described in his book *Not Yet Uhuru* as a giraffe with a long neck that sees far) once again outmaneuvered his opponents and was elected president in the first multiparty elections. He repeated the feat in 1997. His term ended in 2002.

Moi's 24 years of leadership are remembered especially for the perpetuation of a personality cult, signified by the numerous institutions named after him. Since his term ended, Moi lives in retirement but still meddles in politics, to the chagrin of many Kenyans. Moi has also has started a foundation—Moi African Foundation—to tackle issues of conflict, poverty, and philanthropy. Like Kenyatta before him, Moi perfected the culture of dictatorship, corruption, nepotism, and tribalism. More significant is the fact that he left the economy of the country in shambles.

Christopher Odhiambo

See also Kenyatta, Jomo

Morales, Evo (1959–)

Juan Evo Morales Ayma is the 80th president of the Republic of Bolivia. He began his political career as a union leader of the *cocalero*, the coca crop peasants. As soon as the ethnic-indigenous political movements in Bolivia started to gain political weight, he extended his political rhetoric including indigenous demands and issues. As leader of the still-young MAS (*Movimiento al Socialismo*—Movement Toward Socialism), he was elected member of the Bolivian Parliament in 2002 and president of Bolivia in the elections of December 2005.

Evo Morales has a very intuitive understanding of media. Of modest origin and never having studied anything related to communications, he nevertheless was able to use the media for his political purposes in a tactically very smart way throughout his political career. Since elected president, Morales is, of course, much more limited in using these tactic. Interestingly enough, Morales showed himself to be open to professional counsel during the presidential election campaign of 2005: His campaign was obviously conducted in a very professional manner, stressing his strengths—his down-to-earth ways, his accessibility and charisma. At the same time, he avoided appearing in candidate debates, probably knowing that he wouldn't be able to compete with the much more elaborate rhetoric of his middle- and upper-class opponents. His campaign was able to identify his person with a climate of

much-wanted political change among many Bolivians. The results of the elections were distinct: 53.4% of electors voted Evo Morales for president. In the first 6 months of his administration and in a strongly emotional atmosphere of political optimism, Morales and the media lived in a kind of "honeymoon." Few skeptical voices were heard or lines were read, even reaching embarrassing moments of a cult of personality when describing Morales's humble origins. It is no secret that he was strongly supported in his communication work, particularly by Venezuela. The Venezuelan state-owned oil company PdVSA broadcast several TV commercials in Bolivia highlighting the Cuban and Venezuelan literacy and medical care programs being carried out on Bolivian soil.

Morales's authoritarian ways first were exposed to the media, when voices critical of his administration and his offensive style appeared. He immediately suspected the media of wanting to overthrow his administration. Morales's very rudimental understanding of freedom of the press became more obvious when he was appointing executive positions to state media. But possibly the most overt attempt to dominate the media landscape in Bolivia is the project of creating 30 "indigenous" radio stations, financed by the Venezuelan government. This project seeks to cut down the strong influence of radio broadcast channels of the Catholic Church in the country. The real challenge to freedom of the press in Bolivia is currently being faced in Sucre, in which a constitutional assembly is meeting to work out a new Constitution. This assembly is largely dominated by the MAS, and few of these are known to respect basic civil liberties. Taking into account that Morales has difficulties in understanding the role of media in a democracy, the current situation is not a very good one for the Bolivian media or freedom of press in the country.

Peter-Alberto Behrens

Moseley Braun, Carol (1947–)

Carol Moseley Braun was the first African American woman elected to the U.S. Senate. During her groundbreaking political career, Moseley Braun worked as an Illinois state legislator, a congresswoman, and an ambassador. She also campaigned for the presidency in 2003.

Carol Moseley Braun graduated from the Chicago public school system and attended the University of Illinois–Chicago, earning her Bachelor of Arts degree in 1969. She earned her Juris Doctor from the University of Chicago School of Law in 1972. Moseley Braun was elected to represent the Hyde Park section of Chicago in the Illinois state General Assembly in 1978. After 10 years in the state legislature, she was elected the Cook County recorder of deeds. Moseley Braun was the first woman and first African American politician elected to a countywide executive office in Illinois.

The 1992 election year was a year of change and expansion and has been remembered in American political history as the "year of the woman." This influx of women candidates was linked to an unusual number of retirements by long-term politicians, congressional redistricting, a national anti-incumbent climate, and public fallout in the wake of the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings. Buoyed by these factors, Moseley Braun ousted incumbent U.S. Senator Alan Dixon to become the first African American elected to the Senate since Reconstruction. Braun's door-to-door campaign tactics and grassroots support overcame the obstacles of limited television exposure and limited finances.

Newly elected Senator Moseley Braun served on the Senate Judiciary Committee, the same body that was spotlighted during the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings. She challenged the Senate's support of the Confederate flag and its use by the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC). Her opposition to the reauthorization of a design patent on the UDC's logo was threatened by longtime North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms. On July 22, 1993, Moseley Braun launched a successful filibuster to counter Helm's UDC amendment. She refused to yield the floor and argued that this was an important vote about race and the painful history of race relations in the United States. Moseley Braun's emotional discussion of race on the Senate floor was a historical moment in Congress. She spent most of her historic term advocating legislation to ensure equal opportunities to all Americans and to improve the nation's schools. Unfortunately, her term was also marked by questions of unethical financial and personal practices.

Following her unsuccessful reelection bid, President William J. Clinton named Moseley Braun a special consultant to the Department of Education. She also served as the ambassador to New Zealand in 1999. In 2003, Moseley Braun announced her candidacy for the

presidency to an audience at Howard University. Moseley Braun argued that she was the best alternative to the current administration and encouraged more women to enter politics. Dubbed the "Lady in Red," she was the only woman in a group of nine candidates vying for the Democratic nomination. In the end, Moseley Braun's campaign failed due to limited funding.

Monika R. Alston

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Motivated Reasoning

See Selective Processes, Exposure, Perception, Memory

Moyers, William (Bill) (1934–)

William (Bill) Moyers was born Billy Don Moyers in Hugo, Oklahoma. He was a public servant during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and he is currently a journalist and news commentator. Moyers was raised in Texas and began his journalism career as a 16-year-old reporter at the *Marshall News Messenger* in Marshall, Texas. He studied journalism at North Texas University. As a summer intern for Texas Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson in 1954, he managed Johnson's personal mail.

Moyers then transferred to the University of Texas at Austin. He wrote for the *Daily Texan* newspaper and studied at the University of Edinburgh as a Rotary International Fellow. Also while in Austin, Moyers worked for KTBC Radio and Television, a station owned by Lady Bird Johnson, as an assistant to the news editor. Moyers graduated from the University of Texas at Austin in 1956.

In 1957, he graduated from Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary in Fort Worth, Texas, with a bachelor's of divinity. After working as minister, he was ordained in 1959. He worked as a Christian ethics lecturer at Baylor University for a short time.

When Lyndon B. Johnson campaigned for the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination, Moyers worked as a top aide. After John F. Kennedy won the presidential nomination, Moyers served as a liaison between Kennedy and Johnson, who was Kennedy's vice-presidential candidate. In 1961, Moyers then served as the associate director of public affairs for the newly created Peace Corps for the Kennedy administration. From 1962 to 1963, he was the deputy director of the Peace Corps.

When Johnson became president after Kennedy's assassination, Moyers assisted in organizing and supervising the 1964 Great Society legislative task forces. He also played a key role in Johnson's 1964 presidential campaign, served as White House press secretary from 1965 to 1967, and served as Johnson's informal chief of staff until 1966.

After Moyers' years in public service, he served as publisher for *Newsday,* a Long Island, New York, daily newspaper, from 1967 to 1970. His long relationship with the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) began in 1971 when he hosted news program *Bill Moyers' Journal. Bill Moyers' Journal* was broadcast until 1981, with the exception of a brief absence from 1976 to 1977. Moyers also worked at CBS as editor and chief correspondent for *CBS Reports* from 1976 to 1980 and as a senior news analyst and commentator for the *CBS Evening News with Dan Rather* from 1981 to 1986.

Moyers and his wife, Judith Davidson Moyers, created Public Affairs Television in 1986. Some of his best-known programs include *A Walk Through the 20th Century, Bill Moyers' World of Ideas, Facing the Truth with Bill Moyers, The Power of Myth with Joseph Campbell,* and *Moyers on America.* He worked as a senior analyst and commentator for NBC News in 1995 and as a host of MSNBC's *Insight* program in 1996.

He hosted *NOW with Bill Moyers,* a news journal on PBS, from 2002 to late 2004. In 2005, Moyers hosted *Wide Angle,* an internationally focused news program on PBS. Moyers received a Lifetime Achievement Award Emmy in 2006, an Individual Peabody Award in 2004, a George Polk Career Award in 2004, and has received more than 30 Emmy Awards.

Kristen D. Landreville

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MTV Rock the Vote

See Rock the Vote

Mubarak, Hosni (1928–)

Mohamed Hosni Said Mubarak was born on May 4, 1928, in Kafr-El Meselha, Al-Menoufeya governorate. He graduated from the Egyptian Military Academy and the Air Force Academy in 1952. Later on, in 1964, he studied at the Frunze Military Academy in the USSR.

Mubarak went up the chain of command, holding the positions of pilot, instructor, squadron leader, and base commander. In 1964, he headed the Egyptian military delegation to the USSR, and during 1967 to 1972, he was appointed director of the Air Force Academy and chief of staff of the Egyptian Air Force. In 1972 he became the commander of the Air Force and deputy minister for military affairs. Due to his outstanding performance during the 1973 War, he was promoted to the rank of air marshal. In April 1975, he was named vice president of Egypt, and in 1978 he was selected to serve as vice chairman of the National Democratic Party.

After the assassination of President Sadat on October 6, 1981, Mubarak was elected the president of Egypt on October 14 and consequently became the chairman of the National Democratic Party; he is still so today. As a matter of fact, Mubarak came to power at one of Egypt's lowest points internally and externally. He inherited a country that was buckling under severe economic and political strain; the growing influence of extremists, high rates of unemployment, government debts, excessive population growth, and slow economic growth are some examples that give a grim view of the status. Additionally, most of the Arab world had forsaken Egypt after Sadat's controversial overtures to Israel. Notably, Mubarak pledged to continue Sadat's policies outside and inside.

Internationally, despite criticizing many Israeli policies, Mubarak has maintained peace with Israel, mended relations with other Arab states to the extent to be considered the most powerful leader of the Middle East, and initiated a policy he called "positive neutrality" toward the great powers that maintained Egypt's ties with both the United States and Russia.

Internally, Mubarak instituted a vigorous economic recovery programs such as privatization and economic and financial reform initiatives, battled population growth through programs for family planning, and inched toward political reform, in particular freedom of speech. Moreover, although Mubarak himself was a target of several assassination plots and one close call that took place in June 1995 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the hands of the fundamentalists, he has fairly succeeded to lessen the influence of religious extremism.

Mubarak was reelected in national referenda for three successive terms of 6 years each, in 1987, 1993, and 1999. However, in 2005, he won the presidency for a fifth term in a contested election marred by low turnout (23%). Lifting the state of emergency, presidential succession, and comprehensive political reform are, among other issues, at the top of the opposition agenda.

Saleh A. Ahmed

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Muckrakers, Muckraking

The term *muckraker* is applied to describe journalists and publicists who explore and expose misconduct of public figures and institutions or deplorable social conditions. The word gained prominence in the first decade of the 20th century. President Theodore Roosevelt introduced the term *muckraker* into public debate, using it in his dedication speech of the House

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

DEATH'S LABORATORY

Patent medicines are poisoning people throughout America to-day. Babies who cry are fed laudanum under the name of syrup. Women are led to injure themselves for life by reading in the papers about the meaning of backache. Young men and boys are robbed and contaminated by vicious criminals who lure them to their dens through seductive advertisements

DRAWN BY E. W. KEMBLE

In a series of 11 articles he wrote for Collier's Weekly *in 1905, investigative journalist Samuel Hopkins Adams exposed many of the false claims made about patent medicines. The series, "The Great American Fraud," had a huge impact and led to the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act. The shocking stories of the patent medicine menace were accompanied by startling images, such as "Death's Laboratory," pictured here.*

Source: Food and Drug Administration.

Office Building on April 14, 1906, in Washington, D.C., to attack the scandalmongering reporting of certain journalists and publications. Referring to John Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* (1678), the president likened the journalists to the "Man with the Muck Rake" who was so occupied with raking the filth off the floor that he did not know when to stop. Although Roosevelt shared some objectives of the progressive reformers, his criticism was focused on reporters who, always looking for scoops, tended to manufacture and scandalize stories. In fact, for Roosevelt the real villains were media proprietors such as William Randolph Hearst, who were seen as a driving force behind the yellow journalism and irresponsible sensationalism of the day. Roosevelt's wrath was incurred by a series of articles on the U.S. Senate in *Cosmopolitan* magazine, which was owned by Hearst. In the first issue of "The Treason of the Senate," published in March 1906, author David Graham Phillips sketched a polemic portrayal of U.S. Senator Chauncey Depew, depicting him as a wicked and corrupt politician, a puppet of the large railway companies. Phillips's account was based more on speculations and assumptions than on factual evidence, but the accusations were still very effective in irreparably damaging Depew's reputation. Albeit Roosevelt did not mention any journalist or publisher by name, from his private correspondence it is clear that it was particularly Hearst he was aiming at.

In the 1930s, when first studies on the *Muckrakers* (C. Regier) or *Crusaders for American Liberalism* (L. Filler) were published, a positive notion was attributed to the term. Seen in the broader context of the progressive era, muckrakers were hailed as advocates of civil reform. The term became almost a title of distinction, a badge of honor. There is still some discussion of whether muckraking was a movement, when it actually started, and who belonged to it. Though Henry Demarest Lloyd's articles on Standard Oil and other trusts of the 1880s, and Jacob A. Riis's documentary work on the social conditions in the tenements of New York City of the 1890s are often cited as early examples of muckraking, this new style of political reporting really began to flourish at the onset of the 20th century. Lincoln Steffens' exposure of municipal corruption in St. Louis and other American cities, Ida Tarbell's reporting on the business practices of Standard Oil, Ray Stannard Baker's articles on railroad companies, Charles E. Russell's writings on political machines and social housing, or Upton Sinclair's description of working conditions in Chicago's meat packing industries are all famous examples of muckraking. Many other muckrakers could be mentioned.

This literature of exposure and protest was spread through a new type of inexpensive mass magazine. Founded by Samuel S. McClure in 1893, *McClure's Magazine* evolved as the leading muckraking journal. Within a decade it could boost its circulation to 500,000 copies per week. Other magazines, such as the *American Magazine, Collier's, Cosmopolitan, Everybody's, Hampton's,* the *Independent, Pearson's,* or *Success* jumped into the fray, sending their reporters to peer into the hidden recesses of corporations and

factories, political machines and city halls, hospitals and public utilities. In contrast to newspaper reporting, the magazine journalists had more time for research and more space for expounding the case. The muckrakers pursued their task with relentless energy and great zeal, combining traditional techniques of interviews and observation with new methods of political reporting, making ample use of printed materials and official documents, or presenting authoritative opinion of experts.

It is estimated that the combined circulation of those periodicals reached 12 million readers per month. Taking into account that muckraking exposés produced headlines in the newspaper press, the total effect was even greater. The crusading journalists certainly left their mark on the discourses about civil reform. The Pure Food and Drug Act and the Hepburn Act (both 1906) or the constitutional amendment reforming the U.S. Senate (1913) would hardly have been accomplished without the public pressure continuously sustained by the muckrakers. Thus muckraking is closely linked to progressivism and its political issues. When the United States entered World War I, however, its crusading spirit was subsumed into the nation's efforts to win the war. Once the war had ended, the American public yearned for normalcy, not reform.

Muckraking, as well as the more current term "investigative reporting," generally associated with Watergate, is part of an important tradition of American journalism that has its roots in colonial times but (occasionally) can still prove its force. A prominent example of a modern muckraker is Seymour M. Hersh, who first reported extensively on the My Lai massacre in Vietnam and was just recently involved in the exposure of the Abu Ghraib scandal in Iraq.

Daniel Gossel

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Muhammed Cartoon Events

The so-called Muhammed cartoon events took place in the fall of 2005 and spring of 2006. On September 30, 2005, 12 drawings of the prophet Muhammed—including one with a turban shaped as a bomb with a burning fuse—were published by *Jyllands-Posten,* a provincial newspaper situated in Denmark. Reactions to mediated news about the cartoons triggered a global debate about the proper uses of press freedom and self-censorship versus blasphemy and multicultural considerations. Pros and cons were diffused worldwide, combining traditional mass media, word of mouth, and religious preaching with text messaging and e-mail grapevines.

By January 2006 anticartoon riots had broken out in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan. Danish and Norwegian flags were burned in the streets and embassies picketed, documented live by Al Jazeera. A number of Middle Eastern countries withdrew their ambassadors from Denmark in protest. The State Department of the United States declared the publishing of the cartoons unnecessary, insensitive, disrespectful, and wrong. On February 3, 2006, the cartoons became the focal topic of Friday prayers in mosques in the majority of Islamic congregations around the globe. A boycott of Danish goods was declared in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Supermarkets in Egypt, Syria, and Oman followed suit. A reward of $1 million was offered to anyone killing one or more of

the cartoonists. At this point, 143 newspapers and Web sites in 56 countries, including *France Soir, Die Welt, De Volkskrant,* and *Corriere della Sera,* had reprinted the cartoons. On February 27th the cartoons made the agenda of the summit of European Union foreign ministers, and not until the end of March 2006 did influential Islamic authorities officially proclaim an end to the cartoon protests.

The Muhammed cartoon events clearly illustrate the prevailing power of political imagery. It also demonstrates the power of old print media combined with new electronic media in an age of perpetual satellite news coverage. Fundamentally, the events must be interpreted as political priming and framing in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, radicalizing political sentiments fueled by local conflicts concerning freedom of expression and competing political values in multicultural contexts.

The very notion that a newspaper may print cartoons countering the official policy of a nation state is foreign to many religious leaders and citizens originating from authoritarian regimes. Freedom of expression, however, is a defining premise for societies heralding the notion of public opinion-driven democracy. Within this tradition, antireligious satire has a long history of provoking political events. In line with this, the local publication of the Muhammed cartoons raised global concerns in terms of fundamentalist censorship and political conflicts related to the integration of immigrants. Religious and political leaders in the Middle East effectively framed the events in order to draw attention away from domestic conflicts, while competing elites around the globe used the events for national promotion of a broad variety of political purposes. In this fashion, the local acts of a provocative editor in a small and politically insignificant country fueled a worldwide crisis reflecting political differences in communication of press freedom, blasphemy, and multiculturalism.

Anker Brink Lund

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Murrow, Edward R. (1908–1965)

Edward R. Murrow was born Egbert Roscoe Murrow near Greensboro, North Carolina. A radio and television broadcaster for CBS, he is credited with creating honest, respectable, and courageous news reporting standards in broadcast journalism. Murrow is also credited with helping to end the "Red Scare" through his *See It Now* reports on Senator Joseph McCarthy.

Murrow's parents moved the family to Washington State from North Carolina when Murrow was 5 years old. While attending Washington State University, Murrow served as student body president, president of the National Student Federation, and was a top cadet in the ROTC program. Murrow remained president of the National Student Federation after his graduation from WSU in 1930 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in speech.

From 1932 to 1935, he worked as the assistant director of the Institute of International Education and served as the assistant secretary of the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars, which helped German scholars who had been dismissed from academic positions.

In 1935, Murrow began his lifelong broadcasting career for CBS as the director of Talks and Education. About 2 years later he became the European director and was transferred to London, where he reported the beginnings of World War II and the Nazi march into Vienna, Austria. His trademark phrase, "This is London," was heard at the beginning of each radio broadcast during World War II. Murrow provided firsthand accounts of the air raids and bomb explosions Britain experienced. Murrow's other hallmark phrase, "Good night, and good luck," closed his broadcasts, which often included German bombing raids. The CBS offices and BBC studios from which Murrow broadcasted were bombed at least once. After the war, Murrow returned to CBS in the United States and became the vice president of News, Education, and Discussion Programs. He resigned from this position in 1947, resumed broadcasting, and became a director of CBS in 1949.

Murrow traveled to Korea to report on the war in 1950. The weekly news digest, *Hear It Now,* which was based on an earlier project by him and Fred Friendly called *I Can Hear It Now,* reported on the news of the day and how the war affected people on an individual level.

See It Now became a very successful news documentary program that he narrated and coproduced with Friendly. The program's popularity was attributed to exposing the audience to previously unfilmed areas. Murrow is credited with helping to stop the Red Scare by his focus on Senator McCarthy in an episode that earned him a Peabody Award. Murrow also began *Person to Person, Small World,* and *CBS Reports.*

Murrow retired from CBS in 1961 and presided over the U.S. Information Agency under President John F. Kennedy. He was forced to retire from that position in 1964 due to lung cancer. Murrow died on April 27, 1965, on his farm in New York. He is remembered as a dedicated and sincere broadcaster who inspired, communicated, and educated the world for millions of listeners and viewers. His effective style of broadcast journalism has had a profound impact on the profession. Numerous books have been written about him, and a 2005 Oscar-nominated film, *Good Night, and Good Luck,* focused on his struggles against Senator McCarthy.

Kristen D. Landreville

See also McCarthy Hearings

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Music and Politics

Music has long been considered political. The philosopher Plato regarded music as such a powerful political weapon that he suggested it be banned from the Republic. Music is often a source of protest. From the labor songs of the early 1900s sung by members of the Industrial Workers of the World, to the protest songs of Woody Guthrie and their reinterpretation by 1960s songwriters such as Bob Dylan and Joni Mitchell, to more contemporary protest music such as punk and hip-hop, music and protest are inextricably linked in popular culture. Many argue music played an integral role in bringing down both the Soviet Union and the Apartheid government of South Africa. The relationship between music and protest songs seems to be the most obvious link between music and politics, but it is not the only one.

That music is political is undeniable, but what is music, what is politics, and how do the two relate? Music is very difficult to define, as there is no single definition that encompasses all of the complexities of music. Music is simultaneously a form of communication and an art form. For purposes of clarity, we can understand music as a set of sounds organized by human activity and the process of understanding those sounds by a human listener. From this starting point, we can find in the definition of music the role of both a composer and an audience; music cannot be music without both of these things. We find the political aspects of music in both its communicative and artistic forms.

Just as it is very difficult to define music, there is no single satisfactory definition of politics, and each definition will affect our understanding of music and politics. With some definitions of politics, there is little room to understand music as political, but with other definitions, the political aspects of music are more evident. For instance, if politics is understood as elections, legislation, and lobbying, music seems to play little or no role in politics, save for the debates that occur regarding the regulation of music. If, however, politics is understood as the process through which groups define themselves, their goals, and their demands, music can be seen as an important aspect of these definitions through its communicative role. Furthermore, if politics is understood as the challenging of accepted norms, truths, and ideas, music becomes even more political. The latter two of these definitions of politics are central to an understanding of the relation of music to politics. We can suggest, then, that music and politics are related when politics is defined as both the process of creating a group and advancing that group's claims, and as the challenging of accepted and dominant meanings, ideas, and norms.

For groups to make a political challenge, they must first create a common understanding of themselves. This is often called "collective identity." Many sociologists of music suggest that music is a central aspect in the process creating a collective identity. Music helps us understand who we are on both the individual and group level through communicating aspects of ourselves and communities back to us. This can be observed at the societal level through such things as national anthems or folk musical traditions that are fundamental aspects of culture, such as blues music in American culture. It can also be

observed at the level of smaller groups, such as subcultures and social movements. The early American labor movement, for example, had its own set of musical traditions and songs that helped carry the central ideas of labor across time and space. Many subcultures—punk, rave, and hip-hop, for instance—are largely defined by a common involvement in a musical style. Music assists in creating collective identities through providing a ground on which members of a group can communicate with each other, and on which groups can construct and support collective identity. Music provides the soundtrack to these collective identities. Furthermore, music as a form of communication often helps group spread their messages to other members and to the society as a whole. This is often done through what are often called "political ballads." Music not only helps groups create a collective identity but also helps them communicate their political challenges.

Many contemporary theorists argue that politics consists of challenging the dominant meanings, ideas, and norms of our time. This argument rests on the idea that the world is ordered through the meanings and ideas that abound about this world, and that challenging these meanings is a political act. This can be seen as symbolic, or discursive, politics. Music's communicative and aesthetic elements both contain the possibility of symbolic challenge. That is, music is often a part of symbolic politics. Not only does political music often communicate the demands and concerns of political groups, but it often challenges mainstream ideas. Political songs often suggest alternative understandings of the world and humanity's role in the world. Furthermore, music's artistic or aesthetic aspects can challenge the very structures of meaning that this understanding of politics suggests order the world. There is a long tradition in continental philosophy that suggests music and art exist outside of the everyday world. Twentieth-century philosophers, particularly the members of the Frankfurt School, suggest that music allows us to dream of a life other than our own. This dreaming, or fantasizing, these theories suggest, makes us free. Critical theorists regard music, in this formulation, as not merely political, but potentially a tool for liberation.

Zachary A. Bowden

See also Critical Theory; Language and Politics; Political Culture

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Muskie, Edmund (1914–1996)

Edmund Muskie served as the 58th secretary of state (1980–1981) under President Jimmy Carter. He also served as house member, governor, and senator of Maine. Muskie was a prominent leader during the development of the Democratic Party in Maine. The state had been a Republican stronghold, notable due to its being only one of two states carried by Alf Landon over Franklin Roosevelt in the 1936 presidential election. Muskie was a leader in the environmental movement and became one of the first environmentalist to be elected to the U.S. Senate. Edmund Muskie's lasting legacy is the large amount of environmental legislation for which he was either directly responsible or supported. His crowning achievement was the Clean Air Act of 1970, which was the first federal legislation to implement national environmental goals.

Muskie was nominated as a vice-presidential candidate with sitting Vice President Hubert Humphrey running for president during the 1968 election cycle. Humphrey and Muskie lost the election to Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew by less than 1% of the vote (42.7% to 43.4%). The Electoral College, however, was not as close. Humphrey-Muskie took 13 states and 191 electoral votes, while Nixon-Agnew won 32 states and 301 Electoral College votes. George Wallace ran as an Independent and carried 5 southern states and their 46 electoral votes.

The 1972 Democratic presidential primary season proved traumatic for Muskie. Early during the election season, Muskie was viewed as the frontrunner, more moderate than McGovern yet firmly opposed to Richard Nixon's conduct in the Vietnam War. However, Muskie's campaign collapsed after winning

the New Hampshire primary by a smaller than expected margin and his subsequent response to attacks made by letters to the editor in the *Manchester Union-Leader,* a newspaper in New Hampshire. The first letter claimed Muskie made disparaging remarks toward French Canadians. This was apt to soften support of much of the northern New England population. The second attack was upon Muskie's wife, Jane. The paper reported that she drank and used vulgar language during the campaign. Muskie's response was to deliver an emotionally charged speech in defense of his wife outside the newspaper's office. The press later reported that during the speech Muskie seemed unstable and was in tears. The speech shattered Muskie's image of composure and resolve and led to his ultimate defeat as the Democratic presidential nominee.

Muskie's final act of public service was to serve as Jimmy Carter's secretary of state after the resignation of Cyrus Vance. Vance, who had opposed Carter's ill-fated attempt to rescue the Iranian hostages, resigned shortly after the operation failed. Muskie then attempted to use diplomacy to end the crisis. Muskie retired from office with the inauguration of Ronald Reagan to the presidency. He was presented with the Presidential Medal of Freedom by Carter in January 1981.

Terry Robertson

See also McGovern, George

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Myers, Dee Dee

See Press Secretary, White House

N

NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People)

The NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) is one of the oldest civil rights organizations in the United States. It was organized in 1909 by a coalition of blacks, Jews, and whites to defend the rights of minorities against systematic and pervasive social and state-sanctioned discrimination. It was formed as a grassroots membership organization, whose activities focus on challenging discriminatory practices through legal channels and the mobilization of member participation at times when mass political action is strategically necessary to accomplish its goals.

Major Interests and Accomplishments

The general interest of the NAACP is the fight for civil rights protections for American minorities, focusing specifically on promoting political, educational, economic, and social equality. The organization has been influential in advancing the agenda of, creating the rhetorical basis for, and organizing civic participation in the pursuit of these interests. In its early years, the organization protested the explicit prejudice, bigotry, and hatred of blacks portrayed in the film *Birth of a Nation* by D. W. Griffiths, fought segregation in the military, applied political pressure to force President Woodrow Wilson to take a public stand against lynching, and won the landmark Supreme Court case striking down segregation practices in public schools (*Brown v. Board of Education*).

In the 1950s and 1960s, the NAACP mobilized its membership in countless protests and mass lobbying efforts to challenge racial segregation in social venues, from eating establishments to public transportation, and to effect progress through landmark legislation, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, that opened the floodgates of political participation to African Americans and other minorities. The 1960s presented a plateau of sorts for the organization. The NAACP's membership steadily declined during subsequent decades but continued its efforts to enforce legislation and other forms of progress they had helped to effect in previous years. However, the high-profile battles that galvanized the masses of blacks and other minorities were few and far between and somewhat local in their scope and reach.

The NAACP Today

The NAACP has embarked in recent years on specific efforts to increase its membership, in part by promoting youth membership and engagement in activities that continue Civil Rights-era interests, such as recent successful efforts to reauthorize and extend the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and legal challenges to the elimination of workplace and education diversity efforts through affirmative action. Much of its current visibility has come through its stepped-up ties to the entertainment industry, pressing for increased racial diversity in media—from news outlets to televisions shows, film, and ownership of minority media outlets. Along with their advocacy efforts, the organization currently focuses on issues related to religion, criminal justice,

youth leadership development, health initiatives, and international affairs.

Charlton D. McIlwain

See also Civil Rights Movement; Minorities, Role in Politics; Participation, Political; Race in Politics

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Nader, Ralph (1934–)

Ralph Nader has been a candidate for president of the United States in 1996, 2000, and 2004, a political activist, an attorney, and an author. He became first known to the public in 1966 when he appeared before a U.S. Senate Subcommittee on auto safety that came in the wake of his 1965 book, *Unsafe at Any Speed,* which examined engineering practices of American automobiles. Nader's arguments helped the public to identify with the harassment from corporate power that he was experiencing from General Motors, establish for himself a specific political agenda that he would continue to pursue, and framed him as a heroic leader, which helped to give him credibility on areas of public interest including corporate power, consumer rights, environmental issues, and feminism.

To this day he has continued to serve as attorney and activist. He led the group known as "Nader's Raiders," who investigated corruption in several governmental organizations, leading to books such as *Nader's Raiders* (examining the Federal Trade Commission), *The Chemical Feast* (Food and Drug Administration), and *The Interstate Commerce Commission* (Interstate Commerce Commission). His work also led to the formation of the Public Citizen, a nonprofit consumer advocacy organization, founded in 1971 and dedicated to fighting in Congress for consumer rights. Some of the major accomplishments of Nader and his organization include the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1979, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) in 1981, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 1988. He also started several nonprofit organizations; a sampling includes Citizen Works and Democracy Rising in 2001 and Center for Justice and Democracy in 1988.

Nader is also known for his three attempts as a candidate for presidency. In 1996 he was drafted as a candidate for the Green Party but received less than 1% of the vote, spending less than $5,000 on his campaign. He had his best showing in 2000 as the nominated Green Party candidate, earning 2.7% of the vote. His campaign messages focused on promoting the environment and attacking corporate power. Winona LaDuke was his running mate for the 1996 and 2000 campaigns. In 2004 he ran as an Independent candidate with running mate Peter Camejo. Democrats were concerned Nader's entry in the 2004 presidential campaign would take away votes from John Kerry in the election and started a Stop Nader campaign, but Nader received only 0.3% of the vote and was not a factor at all.

Nader is an accomplished author and has published several books supporting his causes and positions, including *The Consumer and Corporate Accountability* (1973), *The Good Fight: Declare Your Independence and Close the Democracy Gap* (2004), and *In Pursuit of Justice: Collected Writing 2000–2003* (2004).

David M. Rhea

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Napolitan, Joseph

Joseph Napolitan, a pioneer in the field of political consulting, is largely credited with coining the term *political consultant* in the modern campaign era.

He has been advising candidates, parties, and national governments since 1956. He is the founder of the American Association of Political Consultants (AAPC) and cofounder of the International Association of Political Consultants (IAPC), the two primary organizations for political consultants worldwide. He has served as president of each and was the first member ever inducted into the AAPC Hall of Fame. He is also treasurer and board member for the International Foundation for Election Systems. He is the author of the book *The Election Game and How to Win It* and numerous articles about politics including "100 Things I Have Learned in Thirty Years as a Political Consultant."

Napolitan majored in English literature and started out as a sports and then political reporter for a newspaper in Springfield, Massachusetts. His political career began when he agreed to manage a campaign for a dark horse candidate in the local mayoral election. Napolitan went on to work on the campaigns of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson but is perhaps most well known for orchestrating Hubert Humphrey's dramatic rise in the polls near the end of the 1968 presidential election. Napolitan also managed the 1966 campaign of Pennsylvania Governor Milton Schapp, one of the first television-intensive campaigns of our time. Since then he has worked on more than 100 domestic political campaigns, from mayoral and gubernatorial races to the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate.

In addition to his work on domestic campaigns, Napolitan estimates he has worked on at least 20 campaigns on five continents. He has been a consultant to at least nine heads of state, including French President Válery Giscard d'Estaing, several Venezuelan presidents, and Costa Rica's Oscar Arias, who went on to win the Nobel Peace Prize.

Napolitan, in his seventies and still active in politics, is the president and CEO of Joseph Napolitan Associates, Inc., a political consulting firm headquartered in Springfield, Massachusetts, and chairman of Napolitan Associates/PAA, Inc., in New York, which focuses on campaigns outside the United States. He was selected by *PR Week* magazine as one of the "100 most influential PR people of the 20th century" as well as by American University's Campaign Management Institute as one of eight outstanding political consultants who contributed most to establishing and maintaining high standards in the business.

Michelle Honald

See also American Association of Political Consultants; Consultants, Political; Media Consultants

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Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970)

Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein was born in Alexandria, Egypt, in January 1918. He descended from a middle-class family that lived in the village of Bani Murr, in Asyut governorate. He completed his education while his family was moving between Cairo and Alexandria. His passion for historical leaders and events was evident.

Upon his graduation from the Military Academy, Nasser served in Asyut and Sudan, then was appointed as an instructor in the Military Academy. Taking part in the 1948 war, he witnessed the detrimental consequences of corruption, incompetence, and treason, which resulted in losing the war against the Jewish legions and guerilla fighters. Consequently, he formed with others the secret military organization to be known as the "Free Officers Movement." The relationship between this military organization and political parties of the day, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, is grist for the mill of historical debate.

On July 23, 1952, the Free Officers carried out a peaceful coup that resulted in sending the monarch to exile, and new era of republican rule began in Egypt. From 1952 to 1954, Nasser was the minister of interior. In April 1954, Nasser replaced President Mohamed Naguib as prime minister, then became president of Egypt 7 months later. Nasser was the first president to be elected. Nasserism ideology led to the emergence of a one-party system controlled by strong central government under a charismatic type of leadership. It was also during his reign that the first Egyptian People's Council was inaugurated in 1957.

Internally, Nasser's era was characteristic of a number of major achievements that had significant impact on the Egyptian society at large; namely,

signing the evacuation agreement of British forces from the Canal base in 1954, the enactment of the Land Reform Law to eliminate feudalism, construction of the High Dam in Aswan, and issuing a wide range of socialist resolutions in July 1961.

In 1955, he played a key role in the Bandung Conference, which resulted in the launch of the Nonalignment Movement. Problems with the West due to the Arab/Israeli conflict were dramatized by the crisis over financing of the High Dam project. On July 26, 1956, Nasser made the historical decision of nationalizing the Suez Canal, which led to the tripartite aggression against Egypt. Due to the failure of the invasion, Nasser was acknowledged as leader of the Arab world, and achieving Arab unity became one of his dreams. In 1958, Egypt joined with Syria to form the United Arab Republic (which lasted for only three years). Nasser also encouraged Arab nationalism and revolution to take place in Arab states, and he supported national liberation movements throughout African countries. His status was undermined by the heavy losses suffered during the 1967 War, and he died on September 28, 1970.

Regionally and internationally, Nasser became, and still is to some Arabs, the role model they should follow. Nowadays several Arab political parties establish their programs based on Nasserism.

Saleh A. Ahmed

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National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)

See NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People)

National Association of Broadcasters

The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) is the primary trade association for the commercial broadcast industry in the United States. The organization, headquartered in Washington, D.C., represents the interests of more than 8,300 local radio and television station owners, as well as national broadcast networks. Operating through its political action committee NABPAC, the organization's lobbying efforts extend to Congress, the Federal Communications Commission, and the courts. The NAB also supplies its members with industry news, market research, and technological updates.

The NAB was formed in 1923 in Chicago when a small group of radio station owners entered into a dispute with the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) over royalty payments. The station owners lost this initial dispute, but their organization continued to grow in influence. In 1939, the NAB established an alternative musical licensing agency, Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI), designed to compete with ASCAP. In 1940, a rate increase dispute led to the filing of federal antitrust suits against both parties. Ultimately, the broadcasters and ASCAP reached a compromise on fees as well as an agreement acknowledging the permanent existence of BMI that brought stability to the industry into the next decade.

In response to the quiz show scandals of the 1950s, the NAB organized the Television Information Office (TIO) to supply the public with more positive information about the industry. As its first act, the TIO commissioned the Roper Survey to gauge public reaction to the scandals. In addition to publishing the survey report, the TIO also developed television study guides for elementary and secondary schools, disseminated newspaper editorial reprints, and purchased ads in prestigious national magazines intended to promote the industry.

From its beginning, the NAB has been involved in establishing industry guidelines. The NAB first formulated a code of ethics in 1929. Over the years, the NAB has tried to reign in the number of commercials telecast per hour and control ad content, and has issued guidelines for children's programming. In 1975, the FCC pressured the NAB to include a code provision establishing an hour of nonviolent "Family Viewing Time" that would be telecast between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. This measure met with resistance from program producers and was overturned in federal courts. Voluntary industry self-regulation has always proved difficult to enforce. Eventually the code was abandoned in the early 1980s due to legal fears it could be used against stations that programmed offensive material.

The splintering of broadcast media between different platforms proved to be a challenge for the NAB. Groups representing minority and small-market interests have split away from the association. In response, the NAB established an outreach program adapted to those members' interests. At the present time, the NAB addresses issues pertaining to ownership patterns, media convergence, and introduction of digital technology. Its annual spring convention is a showcase for innovations in media.

William Renkus

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National Public Radio (NPR)

National Public Radio emerged in the last quarter of the 20th century as an important outlet for political news in the United States, eventually reaching a substantial audience of voters with desirable demographics. Corporate sponsorship expanded, and the network acquired a reputation for covering varied political topics in depth.

Established as an alternative medium, NPR began airing a daily news program in 1971. *All Things Considered,* in its first decade, emphasized long features and documentaries analyzing social issues, following the network philosophy of giving voice to common people and preparing listeners for democratic participation. The program stressed legal and political affairs, satisfying listeners' needs to stay current and fulfill their civic duties. NPR remained marginal to public debate of the 1970s, but its news program attracted commuters during the evening rush. In 1979 the network founded a second program, *Morning Edition,* also for drive time.

NPR came under scholarly scrutiny after conservatives charged it with liberal bias. Presidential reporting on *All Things Considered* was especially negative, and Republican presidents supposedly fared the worst. Conservative antipathy also sprang from the use of public funding to air controversial viewpoints. An effort in the 1980s to limit the role of public broadcasting accompanied a budget crisis at NPR.

The network changed during the next decade. To increase audience and budget, NPR sacrificed its experimental stance in favor of professionalism. It reached bureaucratic stability during the period partly by shifting to a national focus, under pressure from affiliates. It also resolved its contradictory mission, favoring a unified identity over the diverse voices excluded from the marketplace. Institutional advancement, however, came at the cost of its difference from commercial competitors.

News on NPR also joined the establishment. Programs drifted into the mainstream and adopted values from conventional journalism. Political coverage followed the general redefinition of news in other U.S. outlets, growing more interpretative, less neutral, and more focused on journalists who spoke more often, in longer stories that they peppered with briefer sound bites from politicians.

By century's end, NPR had shed its marginal status along with its populist aims. As public radio advanced, U.S. commercial radio news retreated. Regulatory agencies no longer required public service of broadcasters, the main spur for local reporting, leaving NPR news more dominant. Some conservatives defected from NPR, however, in favor of political talk radio and other right-leaning outlets.

NPR news programs are lightning rods in U.S. political discussion. Introducing conservative ideology into regular programming has not ended the debate over NPR political bias, and neither has scholarly research so far.

Kevin G. Barnhurst

See also News Coverage, Politics; Public Service Broadcasting; Sound Bite; Talk Radio, Political

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Nature of Prejudice, The

The shocking experience of the Holocaust stimulated a multitude of research programs with the objective of identifying and overcoming the causes of intolerance and hostility. Gordon W. Allport (1897–1967), who taught psychology at the Harvard University since 1924, wrote his book *The Nature of Prejudice* in this historical context. Like many of his colleagues, he felt that his research should be devoted to reducing intolerance against others. The most immediate sociopolitical goal of his research was to repeal the racial segregation exercised in the Confederate States.

In his book, Allport defines ethnic prejudice as "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group." Prejudice is expressed (1) as false generalization and (2) as hostility. First focusing on false generalizations, he conceives of them as attitudes toward people consisting of negative attributes. (False generalizations can be construed as a type of a stereotype, a notion already delineated by Walter Lippmann.) These negative attributes are ascribed to the entire social group to which the people are perceived to belong. Allport assumes that the roots of false generalizations develop in the process of socialization. Due to their familiarity, the social norms practiced will be preferred by children and adolescents, as opposed to unknown beliefs and behavior that will be rejected. In this manner, ethnic prejudice becomes the pattern of an intolerant personality.

Allport emphasizes that the state of the art of science does not permit an explanation of how prejudice emerges on the basis of one theory only. He discusses a broad range of theories encompassing historical, sociocultural, situational (unsuccessful coping with everyday requirements), psychodynamic, phenomenological, and stimulus-oriented (the targets of expressions of prejudice) approaches. Although he does not commit himself to a psychodynamic approach, he extensively treats psychodynamic theories, prevalent at the time. According to psychodynamic theories, ethnic prejudice results from negative feelings that have been repressed. These feelings in responses to frustration—for instance, feelings of failure—cannot be accepted by the individual because they threaten his perception of self. The meaning of such hostile attitudes is outside of the individual's conscious awareness. Allport further distinguishes between attitudes that will be internalized if they correspond to the perception of self and attitudes that will be adopted because they are instrumental for conforming to the reference group to which the individual feels related.

A broad range of possible steps to change ethnic attitudes is discussed, comprising, for instance, political measures, education by mass media, and individual therapy. Allport argues that introducing bills, practicing academic education, and getting in contact with members of dissimilar groups having like agendas would be most effective because they would create societal structures that would promote tolerant individuals.

Axel Mattenklott

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Negative Advertising

Negative political advertising is the process by which candidates, parties, and groups promote themselves and their viewpoints by attacking the opposition in a paid space or time medium. Unlike positive political advertising messages, which give potential voters reasons to vote *for* a candidate or an issue, a negative ad provides information on why potential voters should *not* vote for the opposing candidate or issue

position. Although political advertising, including the attack, has existed for hundreds of years, at every level—from presidential campaigns to local state house races, from gubernatorial campaign to race for a city council seat—negativity is increasing in both its frequency of use and in its power as a persuasive force in the early years of the 21st century.

Evolution of Negative Advertising Practices

At the presidential level, 1988 is sometimes heralded as the beginning of a new era in negative advertising. The Willie Horton ad, aired by an independent group, attacked Michael Dukakis as soft on crime when, as governor of Massachusetts, he allowed Horton out of prison for a weekend furlough during which Horton committed murder. Dukakis apparently saw so little merit in the attack that he decided to ignore it; he wanted to "take the high road" and not lower his campaign by responding. One of the lessons learned from this is sometimes called "the Dukakis effect." Simply put, it means that if a candidate is attacked, she or he must respond. A failure to respond, even if the candidate sees little validity in the content of the attack itself, is often disaster. This mantra, that an attack must receive a response, is perhaps the closest guideline to a "rule" that exists governing use of negative advertising response strategies.

Since 1988, other "rules and guidelines" that politicians and their consultants learn and often practice have evolved as well. Several decades ago negativity at the national level was acceptable but "not in my backyard." The NIMBY phenomenon has practically disappeared. Mudslinging and attack advertising, sometimes at their most vicious, are as likely to be found in local community campaigns as they are in races for national offices. Similarly, certain types of races at one time were fairly immune from mudslinging. Today, in states where judges are elected rather than appointed, even campaigns for state supreme court justices are not immune. There is no level of campaign nor any elected position for which mudslinging is not a utilized strategy.

Another guideline that has practically disappeared is based on candidate status: generally speaking, there was a period of 2 to 3 decades when incumbents were less likely to attack their opponents than were challengers, and incumbents were less likely to go on the offensive first. That, too, is a guideline no more. An incumbent candidate, particularly one anticipating a serious challenge, is just as likely in this first decade of the 21st century to "initiate combat" as is any challenger.

A third informal rule that has gone away deals with gender. Today, male candidates initiate attacks against women candidates, women initiate attacks against male candidates, and women candidates attack other women candidates with the same vehemence and zeal as male candidates at one time reserved for battling one another.

Political Advertising as a Source of Information for Voters

One reason negativity in campaign advertising has become an important public policy topic is based on the increasing reliance on all political advertising as a source of information for voters. This is particularly true for those voters with relatively lower levels of interest and involvement in campaigns. In the decade leading to the turn of the century, paid political advertising messages surpassed newspapers, broadcast news, and other traditional sources of political information as the most important source of voting information for a majority of potential voters in the United States. Whereas following election campaigns was once accomplished through reading newspapers, listening and watching broadcast news, and participating as one could, a substantial number of persons who vote receive much to most of their information from the often seen 30-second televised spot advertisement.

Internet information sources, especially blogs, have become of great importance, especially to the youngest members of the voting population. There is as yet no sufficient research to conclude that paid broadcast and print political advertisements will decline in importance with young voters as a result of this trend; it is simply to note that the Internet has challenged all traditional media and that research documenting medium-specific influence is less reliable at this time than it has been in the past. Further, in this increasingly fractionalized media environment, negativity is as dominant in blogs as it is in many paid ads.

Effects of Negative Political Advertising

If negative political advertising is becoming a more important source of information for voters, and if it is increasing in frequency at all levels of elections, and if guidelines regarding its usage are becoming more flexible (all of which are accurate statements);

should voters, scholars, and analysts be concerned? Overwhelmingly, public opinion polls reveal that a majority of American voters dislike mudslinging and constant attack advertising during the campaign season. What is the net effect of this persuasive strategy? There are two sides to this compelling debate, each of which merits consideration and examination.

The Demobilization Argument

On one side of the debate are political observers and scientists who argue that voters are so turned off by the increasing negativity, or mudslinging, during elections that they are tuning out virtually all political communication and separating themselves from political processes, including voting. There is some research that supports this idea that negative campaign tactics can and sometimes do result in cynicism and ultimately apathy among the very groups of people they strive to motivate. This school of thought finds negativity in election campaigns has a demobilizing effect on the electorate. It is challenging to isolate the impact of negative political ads on voter apathy apart from other trends, like shallow, "horserace" news coverage of campaigns, and a growing disenchantment with and faith in government generally at all levels. But there is some evidence that, for certain types of potential voters, negative advertising may depress their willingness to engage in the campaign and ultimately vote.

The Enhanced Involvement Argument

There is another side to the debate over negative attack advertising. There is also research that demonstrates that negative advertising is inherently more involving than is its positive counterpart, that it causes potential voters to process information (therefore think about it) more carefully, and that it can, among certain types of voters, generate excitement and enhance involvement with a campaign. This school of thought maintains that attack ads in a political race keep the campaign exciting, keep discussion of the advertisements themselves in the news as well as in their paid time and space slots, and provide a venue for generating grassroots conversations and discussions as no other political message is able to replicate.

Both sides of the debate agree that voters overwhelmingly indicate that they do not like mudslinging in elections. The two sides diverge, however, on how this dislike impacts the persuasion process. There is little doubt that many people are fed up with political campaigns generally and negative advertising specifically. These ads are viewed by many as fostering negative perceptions of politics overall, of discouraging viable candidates from throwing their hats into the ring as contenders, and creating a generation of nonvoting, noninvolved public citizens. But do they achieve the desired persuasive objective?

Persuasive Effects of Negative Political Advertising

The persuasive outcome of negativity in campaigns remains generally quite positive. That is, consultants, candidates, and special interest groups are not going to abandon a tool that possesses the strong, perhaps unique persuasive power of the negative attack ad. This school of thought argues that it does not matter if potential voters like them or not; the ads are successsful. The success seems to come from several inherently unique dimensions of a negative message.

First, an ad does not have to be liked to be power and effective. Voters have difficulty with this. The most annoying advertising slogan can "stick" in an individual's brain, even though the person doesn't want it there, for a very long time. Negative information is like that: it can be annoying, discomforting to think about, and at times cause outrage. But because it is these things and more, the negative ad is a more complex message than any positive message. The human brain has to spend more time processing it.

A positive ad ("John Smith is a Vietnam War veteran, a family man, and has true American values") provides no conflict, elicits no rebuttal (unless an individual knows the claim to be untrue), and is easily absorbed—it is the kind of positive information one expects to hear during an election. The message is not, however, particularly educational or informative, nor does it have any reason to linger in the brain (there is nothing particularly complex in the message that requires processing).

A negative ad ("John Smith used personal family influence to avoid serving in the Vietnam War; his first wife disclosed that she has had to sue him for child support payments on several occasions") causes voters to think, to make comparisons, to assess the believability of the claims. And in so doing, the negative ad requires more processing, more thinking, more lingering in the brain, whether a person wants it to or not. The comparative complexity of the message with the resultant time spent processing it virtually ensures that a negative message will be more powerful than its positive counterpart.

Second, there is a phenomenon called "the negativity bias." Basically it advances that negative information in general is more memorable and will stand out because of its inherent negative bias more than will positive information. Much as compliments may glide smoothly, though appreciatively, through the mind, an insult may stay forever. Such it is with negative advertising content—even if a person actively dislikes mudslinging in an election, one reason negative ads work is that most people are predisposed to both remember and fixate on that which is insulting, demeaning, or simply an ugly accusation.

Third, negative political advertising content has actually been demonstrated to gain in strength over a period of time. At the moment a potential voter first encounters a broadcast attack ad, she or he may dislike the ad itself, dislike the sponsor of the ad (the attacking candidate), and perhaps even feel some empathy for the victim of the attack. As time goes by, however, the psychological construct known as "the Sleeper Effect" operates: that is, as weeks pass, subjects disassociate where they heard the negative information about the candidates, they disassociate the source of the message from the message itself, and what they remember is the content of the attack. They likely do not even remember that the information came from a political advertisement.

Good Negative Political Ads and Bad Negative Political Ads

Much has been written about types of negative ads, and it is certainly accurate that they cannot all be discussed generically, or that all of them will have the same effects, for good or ill. A poorly designed and executed negative ad can in fact blow up in the face of the candidate who sponsored it. These are often personal attacks, such as likening someone to terrorist Osama bin Laden or Adolf Hitler. This strategy often creates a backlash, or boomerang effect, against the sponsor. When a boomerang occurs, viewers have strong, immediate empathy for the victim of the attack—often because the viewers believe the ad has "gone too far," or has levied a "below the belt" attack or is so far beyond the plausible as to be perceived as a ridiculous claim.

A high-quality negative ad is often seen to possess shared characteristics with other successful messages. Negative messages work best for the attacking candidate when the information is perceived as new. An attack (Jim Jones had an affair with a Capitol Hill intern) will carry little to no weight if it is "old news." If most potential voters already know about the affair, they have (a) forgiven the individual and now discount the transgression, or (b) they know about the affair and have already decided they will not vote for the individual, or (c) they have simply dismissed the affair for one of multiple potential reasons as irrelevant. Reminding voters of an opponent's previous transgression may seem like an appropriate strategy, but it is often the type of message that produces a boomerang.

A good negative attack ad is also more likely to achieve the desired persuasive impact if it is evaluated as "within the plausible." This is new information that could in fact be true. If an incumbent congressional representative with a strong record of voting for a variety of legislation supporting full and equal rights for same sex couples is accused by a challenger of being homophobic and antigay, anyone with any familiarity with the person's record would likely find the attack implausible. Exaggerations or far-fetched claims may seem like a good strategy, especially for a challenger who is running behind in preelection polls against an entrenched incumbent, but such an implausible attack rarely has the intended effect.

With few exceptions, some of the best negative ads deal with issues of professional conduct, for both incumbent officeholders and challengers. Voters regard information about an individual's conduct on the job as relevant and potentially insightful for the office she or he is running for. An accusation that a representative can "never be found" for votes on the floor or is rarely in his or her office when constituents come by to visit is considered by many to be an important insight as to what can be expected if the individual is reelected. If a prosecuting attorney has lost a majority of cases and has a record of not being able to retain assistant prosecutors in the office, that is a professional issue that voters may well regard as important information when judging this prosecutor for another office.

In the United States, since 2002 legislation designed to lessen negativity in campaigns (the "stand by your ad" provision that requires a candidate to appear personally in or endorse every ad his or her campaign sponsors), there has been no lessening in attack advertising messages. The legislation seems to have forced more independent interest groups to initiate attacks on behalf of a candidate, especially at campaigns for national offices, rather than the individual candidate's campaign sponsoring every attack ad. Negative ads are a protected form of political speech. And whether or not voters like or dislike them, they

are an important, potentially educational element of the political campaign process.

Ruthann Weaver Lariscy

See also Ad Watch; Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act; Daisy Girl Ad; Dukakis, Michael; Political Advertising; Sleeper Effect; Willie Horton Ad; Women Candidates, Advertising

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Negative Campaigning

Candidates' use of negative campaign tactics, and especially negative political advertising, has generated a great deal of concern among public affairs experts. As elections near, political commentators typically decry the impact of negative campaigning on public affairs participation, claiming that negative political advertising is ruining the political process by contributing to widespread citizen disgust and disaffection.

What Is Negative Campaigning?

Oftentimes, scholars consider a political message negative—and potentially damaging to the political process by extension—if it contains any form of challenge or candidate attack. In reality, candidates employ a mix of message strategies during political elections, and perceptions of campaign negativity commonly are a matter of individual perspectives. An advertisement may seem negative to some people, for example, when a candidate simply is challenging an assertion or questioning an opponent regarding an issue position. Such give and take, however, is a normal part of political campaigning and communicates potentially useful information to voters. Research evidence also indicates that citizens are more likely to regard an advertisement as truthful and fair if it supports a political candidate they favor, and more likely to regard an advertisement as attacking and unfair if it denigrates a candidate they favor.

Why Do Candidates Use Negative Campaigning?

Despite some experts' concerns regarding the harmful effects of negative campaigning on citizens' political participation, empirical research and candidates' experiences indicate that negative campaign tactics can be tremendously effective. Social scientists have documented a consistent tendency for people to weight negative information more heavily than comparable positive information in a variety of decision-making contexts. The preponderance of this research indicates that negative information is more memorable than positive information and has a disproportionate influence on individuals' behaviors. In addition, people express greater confidence in their evaluations of others, and these evaluations are more resistant to change when they are based on negative information rather than on positive information.

In political decision making, candidates' negative campaign tactics and voters' negative evaluations have potentially serious consequences for politicians. Citizens have rated candidates as being less qualified, less honest, less serious, less sincere, and less successful after exposure to negative advertising. In addition, the behavioral link between negative information and voting behavior is potentially stronger than the link between positive information and voting behavior. Research results indicate, for example, that citizens who disapprove of the president's job performance vote in larger numbers that citizens who approve of the president's job performance.

Are Campaigns More Negative Today and Does This Discourage Participation?

Despite the common claims of journalists and political commentators to the contrary, presidential campaigns

have not grown more negative in recent years. Research evidence indicates that, when considered as a whole, presidential campaigns are no more likely to contain candidate attacks in current campaigns than they were in past campaigns. Ultimately, political experts are mistaken when they claim that modern campaigns are more negative than previous campaigns.

In terms of political participation, it is true that citizens dislike negative campaign tactics and especially negative political advertising. Empirical research consistently indicates that citizens consider negative political advertising untrustworthy, unethical, deceptive, and of little informational benefit. It is interesting, however, that voters seem to have relatively clear perceptions of what is fair or unfair to include in political advertising. Research results indicate that citizens consider topics such as a candidate's family life and medical history unfair to attack in political advertising, for example, while a candidate's issue stands and criminal activities are fair for a candidate to attack.

Research evidence linking negative campaigning to political disaffection is equivocal. While scholars and political observers continue to debate issues concerning negative campaigning and public affairs participation, a comprehensive body of empirical evidence is emerging indicating that much of the concern surrounding candidates' use of negative campaign tactics and their deleterious influence on voter participation is unwarranted.

It is worth noting, of course, that negative campaigning can occur in any communication channel or format, not just political advertising. Thus, negative or attack messages can occur in news coverage of a campaign; in direct mail distributed by candidates, parties, or groups; during candidate speeches, on radio and television talk shows, through the Internet, or through virtually any campaign venue or medium.

Bruce Pinkleton

See also Negative Advertising; Political Advertising; Political Disaffection; Voter Behavior

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NEGATIVITY IN NEWS

See NEWS COVERAGE, POLITICS

NEW MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES

The emergence of new media technologies has impacted political communication in a variety of ways at the individual, community, and societal level.

Defining New Technologies

Encyclopaedia Britannica defines technology as "the application of knowledge to the practical aims of human life or to changing and manipulating the human environment." The term *technology* comes from the

Greek words *techne,* "art, craft," and *logos,* "word, speech." While there is no universally accepted definition of new media technologies, they can be best understood as new *forms* of media technology or new *applications* of existing media technology.

It is useful to distinguish newly invented technological tools from already existing technologies. New technologies (e.g., CDs and DVDs) are based on advances in digital computing in recent years, which have led to smaller, faster information storage devices. Existing technologies such as the Internet have enabled new forms of communication, such as blogging and social networking, beyond the original purpose at the time they were invented,.

While it is difficult to distinguish "new" from "old" media technologies, as these labels become outdated over time, let's consider the main technologies that play a crucial role in the political communication process today.

The Internet

The Internet, even though less ubiquitous in other parts of the world, has become an indispensable part of the lives of Americans. According to 2006 statistics, 73% of American adults are Internet users. Recent election campaigns have demonstrated the tremendous potential of the Internet to influence the political process. In the 2004 U.S. presidential election, for example, the Internet played a key role for getting political news, discussing candidates, and participating in the political process online. Several aspects of the Internet as a media technology offering two-way, interactive forms of communication are particularly relevant: (1) e-mail; (2) blogging; (3) podcasting; (4) mechanisms for online feedback and participation; (5) social networking; and (6) online video sharing.

E-mail

E-mail (short for electronic mail) allows two-way communication over the Internet by exchanging electronic messages between a sender and a receiver. E-mail penetration in the United States is almost ubiquitous, and e-mail popularity around the world is growing as well. One of the advantages of using e-mail is that it is a quick and inexpensive method to reach a large group of people in matter of seconds. Political parties and candidates can now obtain detailed databases with voter characteristics and e-mail addresses from marketing companies. Using such databases gives candidates running for office a real advantage by allowing them to "fine tune" their e-mail messages with more precision. Politicians can microtarget potential voters with personalized messages using e-mail data coupled with basic demographic and psychographic user characteristics. E-mail technology can also be used, of course, for interpersonal discussion of political issues: in the 2004 U.S. presidential election, for example, 35% of Internet users reported that they used e-mail to discuss political candidates and issues.

Blogging

Blogging is another new use of the Internet that impacts political communication. Blogs (short for Web logs) are online diaries—online forums with chronologically threaded messages—that have mushroomed on the World Wide Web in recent years. Blogs can be created using free software (e.g., eBlogger) and thus allow citizens with Internet access to share their ideas online. Blogs can focus on various topics, including controversial public policy issues. As of 2006, only 11% of blogs focused on politics, however. Still, any citizen interested in a political issue can create a blog and post their views to a global audience. While blogs may lack credibility, the main advantage blogs bring is a less formal, intimate tone; therefore, they can serve as a tool for politicians running for office to create the best public image and communicate directly with voters in the blogosphere. U.S. Representative Ray Cox of Minnesota was one of the first major politicians to start a blog.

The following examples illustrate the power of popular blogs. In December 2002, several blogs, including Talkingpointsmemo.com, drove former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott out of office for making racist remarks. Since then, blogs have been acknowledged as watchdogs not only of the government but also of mainstream media. Bloggers of Powerlineblog.org questioned the authenticity of memos about President Bush's military service shown on *CBS News* and led to an official apology from CBS as well as Dan Rather's resignation.

Podcasting

Another new online trend is podcasting. *Podcasting* refers to the phenomenon of accessing audio files over the Internet via streaming or downloading. These files can be digital audio recordings of a radio broadcast or another program and come with an RSS (Really

Simple Syndication) feed. Internet users can subscribe to the RSS feed and receive newly available podcasts automatically. According to the Pew Internet & American Life Project, 12% of American Internet users have downloaded a podcast as of November 2006. The latest trend in podcasting is "vodcasting," in which the user receives a video rather than an audio file. The official Web site of the Democratic Party in the United States, for instance, allows visitors to listen to recent political speeches via the following URL feed: http://www.democrats.org/podcasts.html. Interested citizens can listen to mp3 files on their own time at their own computer and automatically receive updates for new podcasts from the party's Web site. Some high-profile politicians are such as Jack Kingston, a GOP congressman from Georgia, are already using blogs and podcasts on a regular basis. Many political candidates have reportedly hired people on their staff as Internet consultants.

Mechanisms for Online Feedback and Participation

As the Internet becomes more popular, having an online presence as a political candidate will be a must. Web sites for candidates, parties, and advocacy groups are becoming a convenient way of presenting one's political viewpoints and policy stances. Web sites are often cheaper than traditional media channels. But they also offer additional tools for engaging the target audience. More than 13 million Americans used the Internet to engage in campaign activities such as fundraising, volunteering, or learning about political activities in the 2004 presidential election. Political parties and advocacy groups have realized the tremendous potential of the Internet.

If you examine the official Web site of the Republication National Committee (http://www.gop.com), many interactive features offer immediate online feedback. The so-called Action Center at the top of the GOP homepage allows users to take any of the following actions:

- Join the GOP team (asks the user to provide some personal information, such as name and address in order to log in, and an e-mail address that can be used to send news, event invitations, and volunteer information).
- Call your elected officials (you can search for your political representatives by zip code and get the phone numbers for your governor, senators, and local representatives).
- Write your elected officials (allows the user to send an e-mail to politicians directly from the Web site).
- Write letters to the editor.
- Create your own MyGOP Web site (allows individuals supporting the Republican Party to get involved in political organizing).
- Host a party or event.
- Make a monthly contribution.
- Get GOP stuff (enables sympathizers to download GOP images as desktop backgrounds, screen savers, or buddy icons; buy GOP products such as mugs and hats; and get GOP news as RSS feeds for personal Web sites or blogs).
- Sign petitions.
- Call talk radio.

Political candidates and parties today may not have a choice whether to create an online presence: they must do so in order to reach supporters and compete more efficiently with their political rivals. Web sites bring several advantages: inexpensive and timely updates; a global online audience; ability to present where you stand on major political issues quickly; video streaming/Webcasts of speeches, appearances, and town hall meetings; blogs and message boards to communicate with constituents or potential voters. These are powerful tools that allow synchronous, two–way communication between politicians and citizens. Most elected officials already have their own Web sites and take advantage of the benefits the Internet offers. Political Web sites contain highly interactive content and try to engage and mobilize the citizens.

Social Networking

Social networking Web sites have become more popular in recent years, especially among the hard-to-reach group of younger voters. Online communities such as MySpace and Facebook are most popular among high school and college students. MySpace, for example, had more than 61 million registered users with a primary age demographic of 16–34 at the end of 2006. Both MySpace and Facebook have a faithful group of daily visitors. While much of the online communication on these social networks can be described as nonpolitical in nature with a heavy focus on entertainment uses, Facebook, for instance, includes groups formed around a specific political issue. For example, several pro–Iraq War groups exist in Facebook and already have a large number of members. Thus, college-age voters have the ability to voice

their opinions and form an online community around a political issue of common interest. Also, individual profiles contain political affiliation, which is already being used to send e-mails with political information and calls for action.

Online Video Sharing

Another recent phenomenon is sweeping the Internet generation: online video sharing Web sites such as YouTube. Founded in 2004, YouTube quickly became a popular online destination because of the funny videos it offers. The Web site allows anyone to upload their own movie. This increases the probability of gaffes made by political representatives being played repeatedly by any Internet user, which was not possible previously. YouTube, which was acquired by Google, has an average of 100 million video streams per day, 1,586,000 average daily U.S. visitors, and 6,205,000 average daily worldwide visitors as of July 2006. It draws a very large audience even though the Web site contains amateur videos. This new video-sharing Web site puts more pressure on politicians to avoid making any mistakes in public and perhaps requires them to check what kind of video content they may be featured in online.

Cell Phones

Cell phones are not new communication devices any more, but they may offer innovative uses for political communication purposes. One example of innovative use is sending SMS (Short Message Service) text messages. These text messages can be used for voter mobilization. Such uses may be untapped in the U.S. market, but in South Korea, for example, mobile phones have already been used for sending text messages to voters on Election Day. Cell phones are often more common than landline phones in developing countries, so they may be even more important for local politicians. Cell phones facilitate direct communication with individual voters, especially voters from the younger generation and those with mobile lifestyles.

Effects of New Technologies

Taken as a whole, the role of new media technologies in the political process can be summarized as facilitating the following.

Communication

The primary role of new media technologies is not only to raise awareness about public issues and political candidates, but also to facilitate communication among and between various players: citizens and voters, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), political parties, traditional news media, advocacy groups, and government officials.

Interaction

The main benefits new technologies bring in this area are increasing interaction between politicians and voters. Additionally, the Internet enables more precise, and more efficient, political marketing and advertising to specific target groups. Web technology allows the production of more engaging political ads such as pop-up and interactive ads.

Organization

The Internet can serve as platform for organizing political action, especially from the grassroots. To a certain extend, political activism is facilitated by the virtual environment and allows an average person to get involved.

Mobilization

The Internet and other new media technologies can be used for voter mobilization, as evidenced by the 2004 Bush–Cheney campaign. The Internet can also be used as a fundraising device (John McCain in 2000) and for mobilizing young voters and grassroots efforts (Howard Dean in 2003).

Furthermore, the effects of the new media technologies mentioned can be divided into possible positive and negative effects, depending on whether one subscribes to the optimistic or pessimistic view on the role of technology in the democratic process.

Potential Benefits

Empowerment

From the optimistic perspective, new media technologies can serve to level the playing field for individual citizens who want to be involved in the democratic process. Political communication between politicians and voters was mostly a one-way street in

the past, with the politician (normally backed up by a strong party or advocacy group) having more opportunities to broadcast their messages than the average person. The democratizing influence brought by the Internet is empowering any individual to broadcast their political messages online, theoretically to the whole world. Thus, some of the new uses of the Internet such as blogging, podcasting, and social networking are, arguably, equalizers of power in the political communication process. In this new media environment, there can no longer be a monopoly of traditional media or large political organizations.

Another positive effect of the Internet is the huge amount of information made available by the media and other organizations. Thus, the Internet can be seen as a checks-and-balances tool for individuals who can track down information on elected officials, for example, their financial contributors, previous voting records, issue stances, and preelection promises. Thus, the Internet can potentially increase political responsibility.

Internet technologies allow two-way communication between candidates and voters. Today citizens can contact political representatives via e-mail and message boards in a matter of seconds. These online tools enable citizens to provide direct feedback to their elected officials and perhaps gives more power to the average person to provide their input in policymaking.

Furthermore, citizens today can form interest-based communities on the Internet. The growing popularity of online social networks such as Facebook illustrates that new technologies ask us to redefine the very notion of community. These social networks connect groups of individuals who may have no face-to-face contact and are not bound by geography. Yet these online communities can influence group knowledge, public opinion, and ultimately lead to political action.

Activism

The two leading political parties in the United States have already recognized the power of the Internet as the platform for political activism. Party Web sites encourage their supporters to create their own Web sites and form their own online communities. Using the Internet as a tool, such groups can engage in "Net activism" and organize events and fundraising activities.

Advocacy groups, which became critical players in the 2004 U.S. presidential election, are taking advantage of new technologies as well. Organizations such as MoveOn.org try to develop online information platforms and to influence public opinion. Grassroots activists can use the Internet to organize and mobilize their supporters.

New media technologies have led to a 24–7 political campaign cycle. Web sites offer limitless amounts of information and opinion to a global audience. Citizens in any society can stay better informed about politics. Politicians are subject to closer scrutiny by the public in the online environment.

Possible Drawbacks

Fragmentation

Heavy use of new media technologies for political communication purposes also raises several concerns. Relying on the Internet only to find political information based on personal interest leads to the danger of audience fragmentation: if citizens only visit the Web site of the candidate they like, then they may become even more unaware of opposing views and competing candidates. Perhaps future e-citizens would be "netting alone" if they only follow their own political interests.

Information Overload

Another possible backlash of increased Internet use for political campaigning may be information overload: As a result, voters may get tired of the huge number of online messages and start to tune out.

Polarization

Some authors have expressed concern that the Internet can lead to further polarization of the public, increasing the divisions between conservatives and liberals, for instance. Yet such fears remain unfounded. In fact, research suggests that online users tend to be more aware of the views of opposing candidates.

While there is much speculation about the positive and negative effects that new media technologies may bring, the jury is still out. It remains to be seen what the long-term effects of these technologies would be on the democratic process. One thing is clear: as new media technologies evolve, so does political communication.

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See also Alternative Media in Politics; Blogs, Blogging; E-Mail, Political Uses; World Wide Web, Political Uses

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New Right

In the United States, the term *New Right* describes the grassroots coalition of conservatives that collectively led what scholars often refer to as the "Conservative Ascendancy" or "Republican Ascendancy" of the late 20th century. Dubbed the "New Right" partly in contrast to the "New Left" counterculture of the 1960s, the New Right theoretically consisted of conservative grassroots activists opposed to a variety of issues, including abortion, busing, homosexuality, the Equal Rights Amendment, the Panama Canal Treaty, affirmative action, and most forms of taxation.

The "newness" of the New Right refers to several things. It refers to reinvigorated and redefined forms of conservative political activity. It also refers to the geographic hubs of New Right activity, as well as the youthfulness and mobilization of a previously disorganized suburban middle class. The New Right grew rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s, thanks in part to organizations such as the Young Americans for Freedom and College Republicans at colleges and universities. These organizations shared frustrations with Americans generally, sharing common demographic characteristics (white, middle-class, Protestant, suburban). Broadly speaking, these frustrations reflected perceived declines in morality during the 1960s and 1970s. These perceptions were based in part on things such as rampant drug use, more open and public displays of sexuality, as well as rising crime rates, race riots, civil rights unrest, and protest movements against the Vietnam War. Additionally, New Right conservatives of the 1960s and 1970s often blamed the nation's ills on "liberalism." In attacking liberal philosophy, the New Right contributed to new connotations of liberalism, which rhetorically connected that philosophy in conservative political communication with the mismanagement and corruption of the federal government.

Though some debate as to the regional birthplace of the New Right still exists among scholars, the most popular view sees the Sun Belt—or, the area of land stretching from southern California across the Southwest, through Texas, and into Florida—as the geographic home of the New Right. Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign is often viewed as a watershed in the rise of the New Right, while Ronald Reagan is often seen as its iconic hero. Other key players in the rise of the New Right include Phyllis Schlafly and Richard Viguerie, whose pioneering work in the field of direct mail revolutionized political strategies for mobilizing grassroots support.

The "Religious Right" is often confused with the New Right. Although most factions included in the Religious Right were simultaneously active in the rise of the New Right, many conservatives identified as

part of the New Right did not support and, in some cases, openly rejected strictly social and religious agendas. The New Right is not a synonym for the Republican Party, though much of the New Right's political activity functioned in tandem with and to the benefit of the GOP. The New Right is a term often used interchangeably with "Silent Majority," though even that comparison is not wholly accurate.

Sean P. Cunningham

See also Conservative, Conservatism; Direct Mail; Goldwater, Barry; Religion in Politics; Republican Party

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News: The Politics of Illusion

Lance Bennett's *News: The Politics of Illusion* is a now-classic study, used as textbook in many political science departments, on how the interplay among American politics, journalists, and the public influences objectivity in news reporting and ultimately the democratic governance in the United States.

When first published in 1983, this political communication study was a milestone work, as Doris A. Graber from the University of Illinois at Chicago writes in the book's foreword. Bennett, professor of political science at the University of Washington, analyzes what determines which stories get published and which are ignored. He demonstrates that political images in news stories are artfully constructed visions of a reality that don't resemble what an unbiased observer might see. Bennett analyzes the politicians' continued efforts to control images in the news, starting from the findings of a study of two of America's leading newspapers, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post.* According to the study, government officials were the sources of nearly three-quarters of all hard news, and only one-sixth of the news could be traced to sources outside the government. Less than 1% of all news stories were based on the reporter's own analysis, whereas over 90% were based on the calculated messages of the actors involved in the situation.

Bennett argues that the news is the core of our political information system. Superficial, filled with mysteries, melodramas, and stereotypes, growing volumes of political spin and insider media buzz, and short on analysis and explanations, the daily news offers ever less solid basis for critical thinking or effective action. Media tend to cover more soft news—emotional and immediate—rather than hard news—what an informed person should know—blaming its tabloid trend on public demand. Even political news, with its negative focus on personality or money rather than on issues, with dramatic staging and scripting and fragmented or disconnected presentation, contributes to a public that is increasingly cynical and disillusioned with politics and government. The result is a voter turnout beneath 50%.

In the various editions of his book, keeping up with the developments and changes in media and society, Bennett not only pioneered a critical approach to the enmeshed relationship between media and politics, but he also developed and tested a series of theories, such as *indexing.* Indexing theory suggests that media, as news gatekeepers, will never give voice to citizen activists or grassroots views unless powerful officials promote similar viewpoints. Moreover, when conflict breaks out among key decision makers, the news gates will open to a broader range of social voices, reflecting the dissonant views of the establishment.

Bennett completes his arguments with his or other researchers' study findings and incorporates case studies in most of the book's chapters. *News: The Politics of Illusion* is a seminal work about how news about politics influences politics and how it serves the needs of America's democracy. Bennett ends with a list of critical proposals for citizens, journalists, and politicians, arguing that small changes within each sphere can lead to less news bias and press-government interdependency.

Raluca Cozma

See also Indexing Theory

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News Coverage, Politics

Politics is one of the most important topics in the news. During elections, television news shows and newspapers are filled with politics, but even outside of the election period politics is an important feature of news. News—in newspapers, on television, radio, and the Internet—constitutes the most important source of information for most citizens in the world about politics. A minority of individuals have direct or frequent experiences with politics, such as attending political meetings or interacting with politicians and other (elected) officials. The coverage of politics is, therefore, important to understand in order to judge the information environment in which the media, citizens, and also politicians operate.

Considering how key political issues and elections are covered in different news media around the world involves looking at different categories of news about politics. First, given that elections are one of the most important aspects of democracy, news coverage of elections is important. Second, a number of political issues are prominent in the news and share priority around the world. Third, news around the world has a number of distinct features, depending on the continent and each country's political and media system. Finally, different types of effects of news are driven by the coverage of politics.

News and Elections

Politics encompasses a variety of actors, institutions, issues, and processes. A fundamental feature of representative democracy is the use of elections for the selection of leaders in legislative bodies or national parliaments. News coverage of politics and election campaigns is the most important and readily available source of information about elections for most citizens across the world. News about elections and campaigns is the outcome of interactions between journalists, editors, and media organizations, on the one hand, and candidates, political parties, and campaign staffers on the other. Several features of the news coverage during elections are particularly important: (1) the visibility of the elections, (2) the topics on the news agenda, (3) the actors in the news, (4) the tone of the news, (5) the framing of the news, and (6) the balance of the news.

The Visibility of Elections

Generally speaking, news media around the world devote much attention to elections, in particular those for the national parliaments. The visibility of elections is an important prerequisite for citizens to acquire information about upcoming elections. Some election campaigns, such as those in the United States, last for several months, whereas others are short and intense (such as in, for example, Britain and the Netherlands, where they last for only 3–6 weeks). Typically, the visibility of elections in the news is greater toward the end of the campaign and around key moments such as party conventions, debates, and so on. It is commonplace to have entire pages of newspapers devoted to elections, and television news shows sometimes devote up to half of their broadcast time to elections. The automatic visibility of elections in the news, however, has changed somewhat over time, and in competitive media systems in many countries, political news, including election news, is nowadays judged against the remaining news supply and is not per se given preferential treatment. Elections for other than national parliaments, such as local, regional, state-level elections, or elections for the European Parliament are generally given much less visibility in the news, though this varies greatly depending on the context and the medium. News in some countries in Europe, for example, devote more than half of the main evening television news shows in the final weeks leading up to the elections for the European Parliament, whereas news in other places only briefly mentions such elections.

The Topics on the News Agenda

Important questions are how prominent political and election news is on the news agenda and what topics are covered. Within political news and election news, issues such as the economy, welfare, environment, international relations, immigration, and integration tend to be prominent on the agenda. There are no clear-cut, all encompassing, and inclusive accounts of the media's agenda during elections, but in most places a distinction is made between political news that focuses on issues vis-à-vis news that focuses on political processes, the strategies of the candidates, and the candidates' and parties' standing in the polls. A shift can be noted in news coverage of elections in

the direction of an increasing emphasis on candidates and personalities on the one hand and polls and horserace coverage on the other. This shift is taking place at the same time as a decline in linkages between political parties and the press and also simultaneously with a shift in the political strategies of candidates and political parties. All have moved toward more professional campaigns, with messages targeted for specific media and audiences, increased levels of expenditure, and making use of more campaign staff, such as spin doctors. The use of spin doctors and media management staff, especially, has led to the political process and the interactions between media and politics becoming news stories in their own right. News that focuses less on substantive issues and more on the "processes" of politics and, in particular, the role of the media therein has been called "metacoverage." In this vein, news about other forms of political communications, such as advertising and blogging on the Internet, has too become part of news about politics that centers on the role of the media and communication in the political process.

The Actors in the News

Political actors tend to dominate election news. Some patterns are distinguishable: incumbent political actors, typically presidents, prime ministers, and leading members of the government tend to be more visible in the news leading up to elections than nongovernmental actors, typically from the opposition. This is primarily due to the fact that the incumbent actors are not only campaigning but also still governing. The phenomenon has been referred to by many terms, including the "incumbency advantage" and (in German) the *Kanzlerbonus*. In totalitarian regimes the prominence of elite actors in the news is stronger than in democratic contexts. Though politicians and other political actors dominate election news, there is a clear tendency toward these actors playing a less dominant role. The average sound bite or length of quote provided by politicians has been reduced significantly over the past decades, and the prominence of other actors is increasing. The "vox pop," street interviews with citizens, have become increasingly popular. Campaign experts and commentators also increasingly comment on the campaign, and journalists themselves are increasingly used as experts and sources in election news stories. These developments largely come at the expense of political actors, both in terms of frequency and the duration of their quotes. There are mixed responses to these developments, with some suggesting that the changes are not beneficial to the quality of election news (and to the quality of the democratic process) while other have emphasized the positive aspects of journalists no longer merely "holding microphones" for politicians.

The Tone of the News

News about politics and elections is generally fairly neutral and descriptive or slightly negative in tone. This characteristic is almost inherent to the conventions of the news genre that suggest that "good news" is generally less newsworthy. There are significant differences in news cultures so that, for example, news in Britain can be very explicit and evaluative whereas news in other places contains much less evaluation. News media in the United States are often accused of a liberal bias, but most studies have concluded that presidential campaigns and elections are covered in a fairly balanced manner. News in more totalitarian regimes tends to be more favorable toward incumbent governmental actors than toward the political opposition. Tone is important for how citizens perceive candidates, their competence, and prospective qualities.

Framing of the News

The *framing* of news refers to the emphasis of some aspects of a topic at the expense of others. In relation to elections, a number of news frames are dominant in the coverage. These include the *horserace frame,* which refers to the framing of the election in terms of a contest of winning and losing; the *strategy frame,* which refers to the framing of news with an emphasis on candidates' strategies and actions; and the *meta frame,* which refers to the framing of the news with an emphasis on the role played by the media themselves in the campaign and in the development of public opinion. Other news frames are rooted in conventions in journalism. These include the *conflict frame,* the *human interest frame,* the *economic consequences frame,* and the *responsibility frame.* These refer, respectively, to news focusing on disagreement and conflict between candidates and parties; news focusing on the human face behind a story;

news focusing on the economic implications of different events, issues, and plans; and news focusing assigning responsibility for actions, successes, and failures. In addition a number of news frames are inherently tied to specific issues. These, therefore, tend to vary from context to context and election to election. By and large, election news is increasingly dominated by the horserace, the strategy, and the meta-frames as well as the conflict frame, in particular in close contests.

The Balance of the News

An important aspect of political news, in particular during election time, pertains to formal regulations and (informal) conventions about access, balance, and fairness in the reporting. The regulatory and statutory frameworks vary across the world. In some countries little is defined in the way of "monitoring" election news; in other countries political parties and societal organizations have strong links with specific newspapers and television stations, while this political parallelism in other places is minimal. Broadcasting and in particular television news tends to be the most explicitly regulated news outlet (largely due to its perceived political significance). In countries with a strong public service broadcasting ethos, in parts of Europe and North America, for example, explicit rules apply to election news. In two-party political systems there tends to be one or another version of a "50–50 rule" in terms of time devoted to the two major combatants, while multiple party systems often apply a version of proportional representation in the news. In some countries this is monitored and enforced relatively strictly by "news watch" organizations, and in some cases even applied to individual news stories, while in other countries balance expectation is applied in a more laissez-faire manner and primarily judged across the campaign coverage as a whole.

News Coverage of Key Political Issues

Turning from news coverage of elections to news coverage of (contested) political issues, there are a number of issues that are prominent in the news and that share certain similarities around the world. These topics are (1) international/foreign news, (2) welfare, (3) economy, (4) immigration and integration, (5) environment, (6) European Union politics.

News Coverage of International/Foreign News

News about international and foreign affairs is heavily dominated by war reporting and news about armed conflicts. This type of news is often strongly politicized and can reflect real-world international relations and power balances. News cultures differ strongly in the amount of attention devoted to international and foreign news. Whereas news in the United States is heavily domestic in focus, news in a number of European countries is very international in nature. This pattern is in large part a function of the fact that much of international news outside the United States concerns the United States. Indeed, the world is very unevenly represented in news around the globe, with regions in Africa and Asia often taking up much less space in Europe and the United States compared to the amount of news that Europe and the United States take up in news in African and Asian regions.

Priority in political news is often given to domestic issues, but in times of war, terrorist attacks, or conflicts, foreign news can dominate. Foreign affairs typically make it in to the news when it involves elites, has proximity to the country of the news, passes a certain threshold of significance, and involves casualties. News about war and international conflict is often colored by the view of the country's position in the war. A close relationship between official sources and war reporting has been found in the United States and in countries with authoritarian regimes and strong structural links between politics and the press. Foreign news is a costly part of a news organization and often involves both a network of correspondents and the availability of equipment. Competition and cutbacks in news organizations have led to a decline in international news.

News Coverage of Economy

The economy is often the second most prominent topic in news. Economic news frequently has an explicit political component or implicit political antecedents or consequences. Political issues are often discussed and determined by economic parameters, and also in elections the state of the economy and the media's coverage can influence outcomes (hence the expression "It's the economy, stupid"). A general rule is that when the economy gets worse, the amount of attention to economic news increases. It is the case that economic news is somewhat, but by far not always,

related to objective real-world economic indicators such as inflation, interest rates, and unemployment figures. Economic news has become increasingly visible in recent decades, and a number of news outlets devoted fully to economic and financial news have come into existence (ranging from, for example, *CNBC* to the *Financial Times*). Moreover, economic and financial news (such as, for example, stock exchange information) has become an integral part of mainstream news outlets.

News Coverage of Welfare

News about welfare and related issues tend to center around the role of the state and its policies vis-à-vis employment, education, and health care. Issues of education, health care, and the conditions for potentially vulnerable groups such as the elderly and children often dominate such stories. News about welfare is also related to news about liberalization, market competition, and consumer rights. The news itself is often framed in terms of the responsibility of the individual or the responsibility of the state and society at large to provide adequate welfare provisions.

News Coverage of Immigration and Integration

Issues of immigration and integration have become prominent political issues on the news agenda in many countries. As immigration has increased and globalization intensified, more people change country than before. This increase in immigration has been accompanied by a discussion of integration of newcomers in to the host society. It is well known that news is often not reflective of the ethnic composition of a region or country in which the news is produced. Moreover, there tends to be an overrepresentation of ethnic minorities in news relating to crime. Immigration and integration news is often framed in terms of either victims or in terms of intruders.

News Coverage of the Environment

News about environmental issues is very cyclic in nature. It generally peaks around (international) crises and then vanishes off the news agenda again. News coverage of the environment has been related to issues such as nuclear energy, oil consumption, CO_2 emission, and global warming, but also in relation to issues in the fisheries, forestry, and transportation. News about the environment has a distinct feature from most other political news; namely that it often addresses future developments and is less focused on the present perspective. Moreover, news about the environment is often focused on some degree of risks implied in (not) undertaking actions and implementing policies.

News Coverage of EU Politics

The process of European integration is one of the most important political and economic developments in recent history. News about European integration is at the crossroad between political and economic news and between domestic and foreign news. As in the case of foreign affairs, news coverage of European issues is the key source of information for citizens, most of whom have little or no experience with the European political institutions. News about the EU and European integration is often barely visible on national news agenda, though broadsheet quality papers in Europe do cover these topics frequently. European news is also cyclic in nature and has small peaks around key events such as parliamentary elections, national referendums, and meetings of government leaders. News about Europe is generally reported through the prism of the individual country, and it is therefore hard to speak about a common, shared European public space.

Effects of News Coverage of Politics

The different features of coverage of news can lead a variety of consequences and effects for individuals, groups, and societies. One of the primary functions of news is to increase citizens' knowledge and awareness about a variety of issues and events. Indeed, frequently turning to the news does tend to have a positive relationship with learning, awareness of, and knowledge about candidates (during elections) and issues. The visibility of issues in the news and the different topics of the news agenda are important to understand the public agenda and the extent to which the news agenda affects the composition of topics considered important by others, known as "agenda setting."

The relative attention to specific topics in the news is also important to understand political evaluations. *Priming* theory suggests that when most citizen make judgments about politics, they tend to "satisfice" and only consider a number of recent or readily available things. They thus rely on information that is easily

brought to mind. Indeed news media and the coverage of politics may bring a variety of topics and evaluations readily to mind. These may then be considered particularly important for making political evaluations, including evaluations of political leaders and candidates. The *framing* of news about politics, as discussed previously, also has important implications for how citizens understand and think about issues. The strategic news frame, for example, can contribute to a rather cynical perception of politics, while the conflict frame, for example, can make people engage more in a topic. Indeed, news coverage of politics can also mobilize citizens to turn out to vote in elections (and in some cases to abstain), and under some conditions news can also affect, for example, vote choice.

The effects of the news coverage of politics are viewed by some as negative and damaging to democratic processes, but in most instances there is a positive relationship between news exposure and attention to politics, on the one hand, and awareness and engagement in politics on the other. However, this relationship does not always exist in similar ways for different types of citizens, and some individuals may not benefit from these processes if they choose to selectively avoid political news in their media consumption.

News Coverage of Politics: Patterns, Differences, and the Future

While a number of similarities cut across the news coverage of politics in different countries, media, and contexts, there are also many particularities and idiosyncrasies to political news. The features of the political system and the media system often define the parameters for political news. For example, in countries with strong party-press parallelism, the autonomy for individual news organization to define the political agenda or to choose sources freely is less strong compared to situations with a professionalized and institutionalized journalist corps. Another example is the fact that voices outside of the political mainstream have a hard time getting in to the news, in particular in countries that are (de facto) two-party system and where most news is focused on a small number of actors and institutions.

A number of developments will (continue to) influence the content of news about politics. One is the degree of commercialization in a media market. Increased competition and reliance on commercial principles can lead to a shrinking window for political news. If the competition is fought on issues other than provision of news about politics, this can force political content more to the periphery of time schedules and reduce the level of political content in the news. Partially cross-cutting this potential development are phenomena such as (digital) television on demand and the proliferation of news via new and digitized media. Such forms of news provision make issues of prime-time programming less important, but issues of audience self-selection of programs more eminent.

Another realm of developments that exerts influence on the contents of news about politics is political journalism. Journalism itself operates under the constraints and challenges of market characteristics, broadcasting legislation, and political climate. These define the external parameters of political news production, while organizational routines, editorial decision making, and journalists' and news executives' role perceptions are internal definers of political news. A distinction can be made between a *sacerdotal* and a *pragmatic* journalistic approach to politics. In a sacerdotal approach, politics (including elections) is perceived as the fundament of democracy and newsworthy per se. The attitude toward politicians is respectful, cautious, and reactive. In a pragmatic approach, campaign news is evaluated against conventional news selection criteria and is not automatically given special attention. A pragmatic orientation implies that time and space allocated to politics is determined by professional considerations of news values, not by assigning particular importance to politics. In the past, journalists at, for example, the British Broadcasting Cooperation were found to be prudential and cautious, concerned about keeping political television news beyond reproach. In comparison, U.S. journalists, such as at the network NBC, were more analytic and committed to a conventional journalistic approach. Indeed, public broadcasters in several European countries in the past have tended to rely on the official party agendas and *follow* politics. Since the 1990s this has changed, and even though election news is still given high priority at public broadcasters, many news shows have abandoned the often lengthy "election segments."

There are concurrent developments toward both homogenization and diversification of political news. One the one hand, economic constraints have led many news organizations to rely (increasingly) on international press agencies, which has given these agencies a de facto powerful role in providing especially international political news. Moreover, with a number of

global key players (such as CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera) and concentration taking side on the ownership side of media organizations, news and current affairs program end up sharing facilities, journalists, and expertise, which can increase the homogeneity of news. Journalists themselves contribute to the process of standardization by often reporting in large scale on the same events or incidents. These patterns have been labeled both “media hype” and “pack journalism.” On the other hand, a simultaneous trend takes place toward more diversification and heterogeneity in the availability of news. The Internet has facilitated specialized coverage of politics that focuses on single issues and persons. Politicians and journalists also make use of strategies that enable them to communicate directly with their audiences and electorates outside of the mediating and selective function of the media or the constraints of a news organization. Important developments in this field include Web presence and blogging. The latter is not only a way of communicating news directly but has also become the object of news reporting in regular media accounts about politics.

Claes H. de Vreese

See also Agenda Setting; Framing; Horserace Coverage; Incumbent/Incumbency; Media Bias; Metacoverage; Negative Campaigning; News Management; News Selection Process; Priming; Sound Bite; Spin, Political; *Television in Politics*

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News Magazines

Historically, people in the United States have relied upon three major weekly news magazines: *Time, Newsweek,* and *U.S. News & World Report. Time* was founded in 1923 by Briton Haden and Henry Luce and was the first weekly news magazine in the United States. *Time*’s tone is lighter than that of the other two and heavily covers celebrities, entertainment, and pop culture. It often attempts to tell its stories through people and for many years has featured single individuals on its cover. *Time*’s “Person of the Year” is its most famous feature. Each year the magazine recognizes in a cover story an individual or group of individuals who have had the largest impact upon that year. *Newsweek,* founded in 1933 by Thomas J. C. Martin, has attempted to distinguish itself from *Time* by introducing signed columns and avoiding the light language and celebration of celebrity practiced by *Time. Newsweek* is noted for taking a lead role in the 1950s concerning racial tensions in the nation. *U.S. News & World Report* was founded in 1933 (as *U.S. News*) by David Lawrence and later merged with *World Report* in 1948. It was marketed as a more serious-minded magazine that focused on more sober matters than *Time* or *Newsweek.* The magazine began publishing a list of college and university rankings in 1983, and that list has proved controversial.

Many research studies have investigated the political leanings and impact of news magazines. Some have suggested that *Time* and *Newsweek* have a somewhat liberal or left-leaning political orientation, while *U.S. News & World Report* tends to be more conservative. Nonetheless, some research has also shown that readers of news magazines have higher levels of political knowledge.

All three major news magazines have witnessed a decrease in circulation over the past several years and have fallen to pre-1988 levels. Further, readers of news magazines have tended to become older, as many younger people use new media outlets for news sources. Young citizens are turning to news magazines less frequently, but the distribution of news magazine content on the Internet has increased its availability and attraction to a wider, younger audience. Economic stratification of readers appears to be occurring as well. Wealthier individuals are now reading news magazines. Finally, the number of staff members at traditional news magazines has been declining for several years.

However, several nontraditional news magazines are seeing growth. *The Week,* for example, founded in 2001, brings a new approach to the genre by having its editors cull the weekly news and then provide a condensed summary. *The Week*'s format seems more likely to appeal to a younger, more Internet-savvy reader who is accustomed to a shorter, shallower version of events. Further, niche news magazines like *The New Yorker* and *The Economist* are growing in circulation. Indeed, the longer, news and cultural format of the *New Yorker* and shorter, condensed version offered in *The Week* seem to fill niches that traditional formats are unable to meet.

In Europe, however, many news magazines remain important in the political opinion process. Magazines like *The Economist* in Britain, *Stern* and *Der Spiegel* in Germany, *L'Express* and *Le Nouvel Observateur* in France, and their counterparts in other countries include politics frequently as headline stories.

Ultimately, the future of news magazines will evolve in order to mesh with new media and new audiences. Trends in the new millennium tend to illustrate *Time*'s and *Newsweek*'s propensity to offer lighter, more celebrity-oriented fare. In addition, news magazines with new formats will continue to originate as well as boom or bust depending upon readers' tastes and proclivities.

Terry Robertson

See also Political Knowledge

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News Management

News management can be defined as strategic communication by professional news sources used to influence the news in order to reach and further political goals. Traditionally it was solely about the creation and dissemination of press releases from political organizations to the media. This activity was based on interpersonal exchanges between politicians and journalists. Since visibility has become more and more important in politics, news management has changed to a professionalized and specialized process of strategic communication controlling the news flow.

The effects on the public gain a lot of attention in the literature. It is argued by many scholars that news management techniques are a democratic problem. The critics argue that media consultants bringing to politics techniques and tools that do not necessarily fit with the way pluralist democracy is conducted. Political communication becomes designed specifically for market-oriented media, and voters are transformed into passive spectators of politics. But others claim news management practices are necessary. They allow politicians and citizens to communicate more effectively, and the market orientation creates opportunities for a large number of different political actors to communicate in conditions of competitive mass democracy.

An important distinction is made between media-centered news management and political (or party-centered) news management. In the latter, political objectives are in the center of the strategy. The media are the means, but not the goal. In contrast, media-centered news management focuses only on creating positive news coverage and support for the politician or party. Another important distinction is between person and issue. From research in election campaigns we know that communication depends whether the object is a candidate or an issue. These distinctions produce four types of news management:

1. *Media-centered news management focused on a person.* Strategies using personalization of politics or image management. Politicians are seen as stars, politics is framed as a game between persons instead of a political competition.

2. *Media-centered news management focused on an issue.* This strategy includes the staging of pseudo-events, which are events staged to stimulate media reporting. The distinction between personalization and pseudo-events blurs. News managers often try to combine image management and some action, such as bill signings and greetings of foreign guests.

3. *Political news management focused on a person.* Here we often find news designed to attract media's preference for negative news. Attacks on political opponents, scandals, and other strategies are used to put the opponent into a negative light.

4. *Political news management focused on an issue.* Strategies here can be about how an issue is framed and spin control (how to influence media coverage). But they also include attempts to dethematize the message.

Bengt Johansson

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Newspapers, Role in Politics

Thomas Jefferson inexorably linked newspapers and politics when he wrote in the Declaration of Independence:

> We hold these truths to be self evident. That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness—That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of governed.

What Jefferson had in mind was, to use a current cliché, informed consent. The public must be informed because they were to decide. That meant we had to have freedom of the press, because otherwise the public never could be fully informed. The First Amendment therefore was based on the need to have information about politics and government. In 1791, when the First Amendment was ratified, that information could come only from newspapers, the only mass medium of that era.

Some will argue that the First Amendment therefore really applies only to political content, not to entertainment such as MTV or erotica such as *Playboy.* However, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently ruled for a broader perspective that includes not only some marginally political content but some content that is not political at all.

Jefferson could not have imagined the press of the 21st century. Newspapers were a long time coming to the colonies. It was 1690 before there was an attempt to publish a newspaper. That newspaper was *Public Occurrences Both Foreign, and Domestic,* created by Benjamin Harris. However, it lasted only one issue, partly because Harris did not have permission to publish.

Next on the scene was John Campbell's *Boston News Letter,* established in 1704. It was published by authority, and Campbell cleared all its copy with the colonial governor or his secretary. Seventeen years later, James Franklin, Ben's older brother, started the *New England Courant,* which was published not by authority but in spite of it. It sought to offer what readers wanted, not what the government wanted, and was the first paper in this country to crusade. His first crusade, aimed at Increase and Cotton Mather, was to oppose smallpox inoculation, which the Mathers were promoting. Unfortunately he was on the wrong side of the issue, but so many people disliked the Mathers that the crusade was popular. Franklin thus demonstrated that the press could be something other than a bulletin broad for the government.

Newspapers spread to other colonies, partly because the unrest that would lead to the American Revolution was already surfacing. This was evident in the trial of John Peter Zenger in 1735. Zenger had established the *New York Weekly Journal* in 1733 with the backing of a group of men who opposed the colonial government. Zenger was arrested and ultimately charged with "raising sedition." Under English law, all that was necessary was to show that Zenger had indeed published the material. But Andrew Hamilton argued that the truth of the allegations must be determined. Told that he could not argue that to the court, Hamilton turned and made an eloquent plea to the jury. The jury found Zenger not guilty. The jury's verdict was contrary to law, but authorities may have recognized that it was not contrary to public sentiment. They made no further effort to prosecute Zenger, and the first blow for press freedom in the colonies had been struck.

The press was driven to opposition to the British by the Stamp Act of 1765. It was Britain's attempt to get the colonies to pay for the French and Indian War, and a tax imposed by the British on the colonists led to the refrain "Taxation without representation." However, the concern of the press went beyond that. One of the things taxed was paper, and newspapers had to be printed on paper that bore a stamp indicating that the tax had been paid. There were some newspapers that continued to support the British, but at some peril to themselves, most supported the colonists throughout the Revolutionary War.

The Era of the Partisan Press

George Washington was the unanimous choice for president by the Electoral College in both 1788 and 1792, but the unanimity didn't extend to the rest of the political scene. Two political parties developed quickly, each led by a member of Washington's cabinet. The Federalists, who believed in a strong central government, were led by Washington's secretary of the treasury, Alexander Hamilton. The Republicans, who believed in government by the people, were led by the secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson.

Both parties quickly saw the value of newspapers. Hamilton help establish the *Gazette of the United States* in 1789. Jefferson, James Madison, and other Republicans viewed this development with concern and helped set up a rival paper, the *National Gazette* in 1791. Both papers were extremely partisan with no pretext of providing a balanced or complete view on political issues. In content they more nearly resembled the televised political ads of today than any other current media. They were on occasion as vicious as they were one-sided. Other partisan papers came on the scene, and partisan newspapers remained the norm for 40 years.

The First Amendment was added to the Constitution in 1791, but before the decade was up we had a serious First Amendment crisis. Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Act in 1798. It forbade criticism of government officials, including members of Congress. It was used by the Adams administration to silence dissent. There were 11 prosecutions and 10 convictions, all of critics of the administration.

The Alien and Sedition Act became a central issue of the 1800 presidential campaign. When Jefferson prevailed over Adams, the act was doomed. Had Adams and the Federalists prevailed in 1800, the history of the press and the First Amendment in America would have been far different. Yet while Jefferson was president he was maligned by the press perhaps as much as any American president.

Jefferson had written in 1787 that "were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without government, I would not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter." While Jefferson was in the White House he was so disgusted by what Federalists papers were saying about him that he suggested a few prosecutions might be a good thing. And in 1811 he wrote of the "putrid state" of the press. However, in 1823, his years in politics long behind him, he spoke of the importance of freedom of the press because it offered "reform peaceably, which must otherwise be done by revolution."

The election of 1800 turned out to be the last stand of the Federalist Party. Jefferson's Democratic Republican Party and its successor, the Democratic Party, would win the next nine presidential elections. The partisan press became less relevant, and the time was ripe for something else.

Three Waves of Sensationalism

The Penny Press

That something else was to be the penny press. In 1833, Ben Day started the first penny newspaper, *The Sun.* Its price indicated that it intended to reach the masses, and in terms of those times it did, reaching a circulation of 8,000 in 6 months. That was far more than any American newspaper had ever achieved. *The Sun* was sensational, featuring scandals based on police and court reports. Political coverage was minimal. There would be two more great waves of sensationalism, and each of them had the effect of reducing the proportion of news content devoted to politics and government.

The Sun was followed in 1835 by James Gordon Bennett's *Herald,* which imitated the *Sun* in many respects but did do more in coverage of politics and government. It was Bennett who successfully fought to get the press admitted to sessions of the U.S. Senate. It was Bennett who was the first to cover Wall Street. He pioneered coverage of religion and of sports. In a year, Bennett's *Herald* had 20,000 circulation, and by 1860 it had the largest circulation of any American newspaper: 77,000.

While Day's *Sun* faded, Bennett was to have more serious competition. Horace Greeley founded the *New York Tribune* in 1841. Greeley not only covered

politics but also actively took part. He was a socialist and promoted for 5 years the cause of Fourierism, an ideology named for a French communist. It advocated cooperative ownership of property.

Greeley was one of the people whose efforts led to the establishment of the Republican Party in 1854 and one of those who led the effort to get Abraham Lincoln nominated for president in 1860. Greeley was one of the strongest opponents of slavery. Partisan though he was, it was Greeley who created the editorial page, thus separating opinion from news, a distinction that remains with us today. Greeley was genuinely nationally known, in part because of the national weekly edition of the *Tribune,* which had a circulation of 200,000 before the Civil War.

There was yet another player—Henry Raymond and George Jones began *The New York Times* in 1851 with a pledge to nonpartisan news coverage**.** Within 4 years the *Times* had twice the circulation of the *Tribune.* Furthermore, Raymond soon became a more important figure in Republican politics than Greeley.

The three editors thus offered readers a choice between partisanship and objectivity, between serous coverage and sensationalism. All three left their mark on journalism, but in the long run, it was Raymond's approach that prevailed. Raymond's *Times* remains today. Bennett's *Herald* and Greeley's *Tribune* merged in the 1920s to form the *Herald Tribune,* which in turn was merged in the 1960s to form the *World Tribune Sun,* which lasted a year.

The three would go different ways during the Civil War. Bennett was opposed to the war and to abolition. Yet the *Herald* provided extensive coverage of the war, at a cost of half a million dollars. Greeley opposed slavery and editorialized in favor of abolishing it in Abraham Lincoln's first year in office. On August 20, 1862, Greeley published an editorial titled "The Prayer of Twenty Millions" urging immediate action. Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863. Raymond stayed focused on getting the news of the war covered, but he did manage Lincoln's campaign for reelection in 1864.

Yellow Journalism

The next serious wave of sensationalism occurred at the end of the 19th century. This was the so-called yellow journalism of Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst. It got its name from a comic called "The Yellow Kid." Pulitzer introduced it in his paper, the *New York World,* but Hearst lured the artist, Dick Outcult, away for his *New York Journal.* Pulitzer then found someone else to draw it. Pulitzer, an immigrant from Hungary, had revived two faltering newspapers in St. Louis in the 1870s to form the *Post Dispatch,* which remains one of this country's great newspapers. In 1883 Pulitzer bought the *New York World* and set about combining coverage of crime and sex with crusades in the public interest against corruption and greed. Pulitzer combined this sensationalism with a high-minded, serious editorial page. The paper was immediately successful, and 4 years later Pulitzer established the *Evening World.*

Hearst was born into wealth, his father having struck the biggest silver lode anyone ever had and winning a U.S. Senate seat. Hearst went to Harvard and there saw the efforts of Joseph Pulitzer in New York. He convinced his father to let him run the *San Francisco Examiner,* which the father had purchased for political purposes. Young Hearst made the *Examiner* a first-rate newspaper. He longed to go to New York and compete directly with Pulitzer. With the help of money from his father's mining fortune, Hearst was able to purchase the *New York Journal* in 1895, and the contest between Pulitzer and Hearst began. It came to a climax when the Spanish-American War began in 1898. Sentiment against Spain and its occupation of Cuba had been building up, thanks in part of coverage by the *Journal* and others. Hearst hired the famous artist Frederic Remington and sent him to Cuba. Legend has it that Hearst instructed Remington to draw pictures of the war and that Remington wired Hearst that there was no war. Hearst wired back, "You provide the pictures; I'll provide the war." When the battleship *Maine* blew up in Havana harbor, Hearst and Pulitzer certainly did their best to promote the war. Both papers carried a huge front page artist's drawing of the event. The *Journal*'s picture even showed a bomb in position under the ship. Both pictures, were, of course, figments of the artists' imaginations, but the war came quickly as American rallied to the call of "Remember the *Maine*." The war was a tremendous success for the newspapers. They reached an unheard-of combined daily circulation of 3 million.

The Tabloids

In 1896, Adolph Ochs bought *The New York Times,* which had faltered, and turned it into a major force in New York journalism. He chose not to try to outsensationalize Hearst and Pulitzer but set the paper on the

course exemplified by the slogan "All the News That's Fit to Print" that appeared in the upper left on the front page for years. Yet even with the *Times* on the scene, the impact of yellow journalism was to distract the public from news of politics and general and the president in particular. The same thing would happen again two decades later when the tabloids the *Daily News, Daily Mirror,* and *Daily Graphic* brought a new wave of sensationalism to New York. The circulation success of those papers would bring an end to the *World* in 1929. Those papers, however, would not have the impact on the rest of American journalism that the yellow journalism of Pulitzer and Hearst had.

These three waves of sensationalism had somewhat different impacts on the newspapers in the rest of the country. The penny press was imitated in a number of other cities. Yellow journalism had impact because syndication and wire service reports carried their coverage to the entire country. The New York tabloids of the 1920s were imitated in both format and type of content in other cities.

The New York press was the major press of America for most of the 19th century, with about a fourth of the daily circulation in the entire country at the end of the century. Today the combined circulation of New York City newspapers is 5% of the national total. As urban centers grew, other major newspapers emerged, and some would become recognized in the 20th century as among the nation's best and most influential. These included the *Atlanta Constitution,* the *Chicago Tribune,* the *Des Moines Register,* the *Kansas City Star,* the *Louisville Courier-Journal,* the *Milwaukee Journal,* the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, and the *Washington Post.*

Press Conferences

In the first half of the 20th century, press conferences became a major part of newspaper coverage of politics. William Hoard Taft was the first president to hold a press conference, but he abandoned them after an unfortunate incident. Woodrow Wilson resumed the press conferences, and Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover continued them, but it was Franklin D. Roosevelt who made them a major factor in news coverage. He had 998 press conferences, an average of 83 a year. Harry Truman had about half as many, and the number continued to dwindle to the point that Ronald Reagan had only six a year, a number that has not been surpassed by his successors.

The news conference gave the president the opportunity to set the agenda by opening with a statement of some action by government. The strategy was to divert attention from some less favorable topic. Until the administration of President Dwight Eisenhower, news conferences were primarily for newspaper reporters. However, Eisenhower allowed press conferences to be recorded for television with the stipulation that they be reviewed by the White House before they were broadcast. That still left newspapers with a considerable edge, but that changed when President John F. Kennedy did press conferences that were televised live. He was comfortable with that, but none of his successors were. Unfortunately, televised press conferences became a social event, often done in prime time, with as many as 500 journalists attending. It was the place to be seen, and many of those who attended had no intention of writing about it but were merely spectators. This led to the decline of the press conference.

Press conferences were used by politicians at the sate and local level, too. Some were televised, some were not. They did give governors and legislators and mayors more coverage than they would otherwise have received.

Impact of Electronic Media

Radio began in 1920, and newspapers soon saw it as a competitor even though its commitment to news was minimal. By the late 1930s, however, it was a significant factor. One Roper study showed that radio was the main source of news for more people than newspapers were. Television came on the scene immediately after World War II and was a major player in news within a decade. Roper studies in the 1960s showed that television news was the main source of a majority of people. Other studies have shown that television news is the main source of news about presidential campaigns. However, studies that look at local and state news and local and state political campaigns find newspapers used more than television news. It is too early to tell what the impact of the Internet will be. Online newspapers are more popular than online TV news, but the Internet offers other sources. Particularly significant are the Web sites of political parties and government agencies. At this point, though, newspapers have the resources to do more with local and state coverage and should remain the leading source of such news.

Two Court Cases That Redefined the First Amendment

Two U.S. Supreme Court cases in the latter part of the 20th century redefined the First Amendment. The first was *New York Times v. Sullivan* (364 U.S. 254, 1964). The *Times* ran an advertisement by civil rights activists that criticized southern law enforcement. L. B. Sullivan, a police commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama, sued the *Times* for libel on the grounds that the advertisement identified him and contained false statements. He won $500,000 in the trial court, and the verdict was upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled, however, that a public official would have to show actual malice or reckless disregard of the truth in order to win a libel suit. Sullivan's trial court victory was thrown out. The court thus established a national standard consistent with what already had been established in a number of states. This provided a rigorous standard for public officials who wanted to sue because they had been criticized—a standard that few could meet.

The other case was the so-called *Pentagon Papers* case—*New York Times v. U.S.* (403 U.S. 713, 1971). Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had ordered a study of the origins of the Vietnam War. It was classified by the government, but the *Times* got a copy and began to publish it serially. The government sought an injunction to stop the publication because it was a classified document and publication would endanger national security. The *Times* appealed, and the case went quickly to the U.S. Supreme Court. By a 6–3 vote, the court lifted the injunction. The court pointed out that the classification system was not legislated by Congress, but was simply the result of an executive order by President Harry S. Truman in 1946. In 25 years, 20 million documents had been classified. Justice Potter Stewart summed it up in one memorable sentence in his opinion: "When everything is classified, nothing is classified." The classification system still exists, and estimates are that there are 40 million classified documents now. However, the government cannot claim that national security is involved when a classified document is leaked and published but must prove it in court.

Coverage of Presidential Campaigns

Serious study of press coverage of political campaigns really didn't begin until the 1950s. What triggered it was President Harry Truman's complaint about the press in the 1948 election. Truman, seen as almost certain to lose to Tom Dewey, embarked on a national whistlestop campaign by train. He emphasized two issues—the "Do-Nothing 80th Congress" and the "One-Party Press." What he meant by the latter was that 65% of the newspapers had endorsed Dewey editorially, while only 15% endorsed Truman. Truman maintained the news coverage was equally one-sided. There was little evidence to support that claim, but it was an effective political statement that helped Truman score a surprising upset victory over Dewey, who led by substantial margins in most polls.

In the 1952 campaign, Adlai Stevenson, the Democrat nominee, repeated that claim. It was true that 67% of the newspapers endorsed Dwight Eisenhower editorially, while only 14% endorsed Stevenson. The Society of Professional Journalists considered making a study of campaign coverage to deal with the issue, but decided that trying to study the coverage after the campaign was over was impractical. However, there were three studies, all limited, as there also were in 1956.

In 1960 there was more interest in studying coverage, and there were 11 studies made. John Kennedy and the Democrats once again claimed bias, pointing to the fact that on newspaper endorsements, Richard Nixon led Kennedy 57% to 16%. Nixon added fuel to the fire by claiming that though the newspapers supported him in their editorials, the reporters were biased in favor of Kennedy.

In that year Stempel made the first of seven studies of presidential campaign coverage by the "prestige press," a label attached to 15 newspapers singled out in a poll of editors as "most superior for news coverage, integrity and public service." He found that the two parties got virtually equal space, with the Democrats having a slight edge. However, the Republicans had slightly more space on front pages. The study found that display was fairly even. Stempel's other six studies found similar results.

In that same campaign, Danielson and Adams studied the coverage of 42 campaign events by a random sample of 90 daily newspapers. They found that 19 of the events were covered by less than 10% of the papers. Coverage by a majority of papers of a majority of the stories was less than 100 words. They also found that newspapers that endorsed Kennedy gave more coverage to the Nixon events than the newspapers that endorsed Nixon. Neither of these studies provided support for the one-party-press charge.

There have been studies of presidential campaign coverage ever since. Most studies have found little evidence of bias. More recent studies making use of computerized

indexes have provided more extensive analyses of campaign coverage but little evidence of bias.

Impact of Coverage

Studies of newspaper impact on politics began with the Erie County Study of 1940.

Erie County in northern Ohio was a bellwether county—one that usually voted for the presidential candidate who won. As it turned out, it didn't in 1940, but still the study provided new insights on the political process. There was not, however, much emphasis on the role of media. Subsequent studies have found that newspapers do play a part in informing the public about campaign issues, though often it is slight.

Some studies have looked at whether editorials of endorsement affect outcomes of elections. Newspapers make such endorsements, but television rarely does because of FCC restrictions. At a glance it is obvious that endorsed candidates for president do not always win. The trade magazine *Editor & Publisher* surveyed newspapers about endorsements from 1940 to 1996, and in 6 of those 16 elections, the candidates who got the most endorsements lost. Yet studies that have compared survey respondents' preferences for candidates and the editorial endorsements of newspaper they read have found a small effect.

Some research has focused on agenda setting—the notion that newspapers don't tell you what to think, but they tell you what to think about. A number of studies have found that volume of newspaper coverage of issues correlated with respondents' perception of the importance of those issues. Whether this means that the newspaper is setting the agenda for the public or vice versa is an open question. Or it may be that politicians are setting the agenda for both.

Other Coverage

The coverage of the president dwarfs that of the rest of the executive branch and greatly exceeds that of the legislative and judicial branches. You can confirm this for yourself by going to a newspaper Web site and searching. A check of the *New York Times* index for a month in the summer of 2006 found that there were 81 articles about President George W. Bush, 28 about Tony Snow, the White House press secretary, and 50 about Vice President Richard Cheney. With the Iraq War continuing and the crisis in the Middle East, there was comparable coverage of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, with 70 stories. There were 31 about Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. On the other hand, there were none at all about Secretary of Agriculture Mike Johanna, Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Alphonso Jackson, and Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta. Secretary of Health and Human Services Michael Leavitt, whose department spends about a fourth of the federal budget, was mentioned in six stories. There were 117 stories about the U.S. Senate, but only 21 about the House of Representatives. There were 18 stories about Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and 23 about Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid. There were 9 about House Majority Leader John Boehmer and 12 about House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi. Bear in mind this is the coverage of the newspaper with the largest Washington staff except for the Washington papers and also that the *New York Times* service goes to newspapers that have 60% of the newspaper circulation in the country. Many papers will have less coverage of the federal government than what is described here.

Congressional Campaigns

Congressional campaigns get considerably less attention than presidential campaigns—so much so that they are rarely studied. The most extensive data come from a study by Clarke and Evans of 86 contested House of Representatives races in the 1978 election. They analyzed coverage of those campaigns in the newspaper with the largest circulation paper in each of these congressional districts for 6 weeks prior to the election. They found an average of seven stories about each of the 86 races. That is slightly more than one a week. They found that incumbents had a clear advantage over challengers, and the closer the race, the greater the advantage. They also found that only 70% of the newspapers endorsed a candidate in a congressional race, and 90% of those endorsements were for incumbents. It should be added that 90% or more of incumbents usually win reelection to the House of Representatives. This is in sharp contrast to the coverage of presidential campaigns. Studies indicate that major papers average four or five stories a day about presidential campaigns.

Press and Politics in Other Countries

We have thus far talked exclusively about the relation between media and politics in the United States. In any country, politics and the media connect and interact in some way. This was the subject of the book *Four Theories of the Press,* by Fred S. Siebert, Theodore

Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm written a half century ago. Others have suggested that there are five or six theories, but the additional theories that some propose seem minor variants of what *Four Theories* offered.

The connection between media and politics dates from the invention of the printing press by Johannes Gutenberg in the 15th century. That meant material would be more widely disseminated and naturally governments took note of that. The first theory was the *authoritarian theory*. It provided for government licensing and censorship of the press. The press was an instrument for promoting government policy. The press could be either privately or publicly owned. This theory developed in England in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Next came the *libertarian theory,* which was the basis for press-government relation in the United States at the time of the country's founding. It was based on the writings of John Milton, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill, who argued that people were rational and that they had natural rights that ought not to be thwarted by government. The function of the press was to inform and entertain and serve as a check on government. It was privately owned.

In the United States in the 20th century, we turned to the *social responsibility theory*. This was not a development of the media alone. As the nation grew bigger and business became big, the need to have businesses in general, including the press, assume social responsibility became evident. In some cases this was achieved by legislation, but that was something of an anomaly when it occurred. Ownership of media was private, and the press remained independent of government.

The fourth theory was labeled the *Soviet communist theory*, a label that reflects the Cold War perspective of the time at which the book was written. In this system the government owns the media, although the government proclaims that the media are owned by the public. However, the public does not have access to the media. It is loyal party members who have access, and the function of the media is to promote the aims of the party. It is loyalty to the party rather than censorship that controls the media.

In some countries today we see a variant of this latter theory in which broadcast stations are owned by the government and staffed by those loyal to the government, but print media are not. In part, this has to do with literacy. Where literacy is low, the broadcast media, especially radio, are the means of reaching the public.

Most countries in the world do not have a free press. Freedom House, an independent, nongovernment organization that supports expansion of freedom, analyzes the extent of press freedom throughout the world. Their conclusion is that only 74 of the 208 countries in the world have a free press. Freedom of the press exists in most countries in Western Europe and North America, but freedom is the exception rather than the rule in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Where the press is not free, the public is not informed, and the kind of interaction between newspapers and government that we are familiar with does not occur.

Guido H. Stempel III

See also Agenda Setting; *All the President's Men*; *American Voter, The*; Debates; First Amendment; *Four Theories of the Press*; Greeley, Horace; Libel; Media Bias; Presidential Communication; Press Theories; Republican Party; Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Social Responsibility Theory; Testimonials, Political; Yellow Journalism

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News Selection Process

The paradigm for news research often states that news in one way or the other does not reflect reality. Only a small fraction of events that take place are noticed by the news media. Of this fraction, only a small

proportion actually gets published. Newsmaking, therefore, can be seen as a highly selective process. The selection of events or topics can be explained by gatekeeping or through newsworthiness theory.

Gatekeeping

The term *gatekeeping* was introduced during World War II by the psychologist Kurt Lewin, who identified the housewife as the gatekeeper for the food that ends up on the family table. David Manning White applied the term to the selection of news in the late 1940s. He assumed was that the selection of news is highly dependent on the individual likes and dislikes of the journalist. In his original case study he observed the selective decisions of a so-called wire editor (whom he named Mr. Gates) in a small newspaper in a small American town. Mr. Gates had certain prejudices that he claimed to influence his selective decision. He selected articles for his newspapers from incoming wire copy from several news agencies. This study raised a lot of criticisms, for instance that White looked at only one gatekeeper who was at the end of the news chain. Selections made at earlier stages were not explained or even considered. Reassessments of the empirical results came to the conclusion that Mr. Gates mainly reproduced the news structure presented by the news agencies more than he actively selected according to his individual preferences. Despite the shortcomings, this study established a fertile branch of news research. Subsequently, the perspective of the approach was broadened. Routines and work conditions as well as organizational factors were integrated in the gatekeeping approach.

Newer gatekeeping studies identify an ample set of influences on the gatekeeping process. Analytically, at least three levels can be specified: the micro level or the level of the individual gatekeeper, the organizational level, and the macro level, which consists of influences from the surrounding environment and the society itself. To a certain extent the news selection decision lays in the responsibility of an individual communication worker (e.g., an editor). Thus, as outlined by White, individual characteristics influence this decision, namely his or her personality, experience and interest, values and role conceptions as well as his or her capabilities and heuristics of processing—and, therefore, selecting information. It might make a difference whether the gatekeeper sees himself or herself as liberal or conservative or whether her role conceptions as a journalist adhere to objective reporting or to a more opinion-based conception. Experience might affect the selection of information regarding the interest the gatekeepers' audience might share in the topic of concern.

The gatekeeper is not a lonely decision maker; he is embedded in a work unit and his work is highly structured by routines and deadlines. A lot of decisions are made according to these routines, which she adopted when she entered the information-processing organization. These routines are not only developed to reduce the (organizational) risks that come with the decision to pass a news item or not, they also reduce the complexity of the daily work and the personal investment the journalist has to make to produce news. Work in a news organization is, therefore, highly standardized; especially the coverage of politics is characterized by a great deal of standardization. Press conferences by the government or other important institutions are usually announced well in advance, and they are scheduled for coverage no matter what topic will be discussed. Gatekeepers in local papers, for example, are more willing to accept a story as news when it concerns the area of distribution. Stories about scandals are selected only if they are backed by more than one source to reduce the risk of a subsequent court case that may result from publishing false information. The eagerness to select news items or stories also increases when the deadline for publication approaches. The role of deadlines and time pressure was observed by White in the original gatekeeper study and confirmed in later studies.

Each organization has a set of written and unwritten rules that influence the decision whether a news item passes the gate or not. Among these unwritten rules is the editorial bias or the reporting paradigm to which the media outlet in concern adheres. Conservative media will try to suppress information contradictory to its own standpoint and vice versa. Tabloids will concentrate on gossip whereas quality media such as broadsheet newspapers will be less reluctant to pass on information about politics. Early studies showed, for instance, a high correlation between the attitude of the publisher and the content of the newspaper, although the publisher is not involved in the daily gatekeeping. Size is an additional influential factor. Small organizations with flat hierarchies give the individual gatekeeper more room, whereas the position in the hierarchy determines the chances of a gatekeeper in large companies. Furthermore, the type of media and

its position in the news chain will modulate the outcome of the gatekeeping. TV stations will choose stories that are visualizable, local papers will prefer local stories. News agencies will try to anticipate the needs of their customers as much as the frontline media will do so for their audience.

Organizational socialization also helps to understand the outcome of gatekeeping. Each organization selects its employees according to their qualifications and according to how well their attitudes fit in the aims of the editorial guidelines. Put simply, the *Wall Street Journal* will try not to hire communists. Co-orientation and social control in the day-to-day work further shape the individual socialization and might even tone down the individual preferences. Even if a communication worker does not agree with the aims of his employer, he will be hesitant to oppose (the aims) to not endanger his job.

Outside the news organization several factors modulate the gatekeeping process. Since most media organizations are profit-seeking companies, economic factors play an important role. Advertisers might seek to influence content. General Motors stopped its ads in the *Los Angeles Times* after critical coverage about the company in 2005. The influence of the advertiser might even be more subtle than that. In the 1980s American women's magazines were quite averse to selecting articles about the hazards of smoking so as not to scare off ads from the tobacco industry. Even if a magazine would not accept tobacco ads, it did not cover the undisputed risks of smoking so as not to upset the tobacco conglomerates, which could then withdraw their ads for other products (Kessler, 1989).

All sorts of interest groups seek to influence media content in their favor and therefore influence the gatekeeping process. The political and economical powerful, especially, are more successful in making their message pass the gates. Public relations is one mean for achieving these goals. Organizations such as companies or political parties will provide information for the media. They will try to package the information in a way to make it pass the filters (e.g., by anticipating the needs of the gatekeeping media). By creating so called pseudo-events—events that are staged only for the media—interest groups frequently enter the news. The media cover these events because they meet their needs, because they are in constant search for information to print or broadcast.

Cultural norms and fashions also affect gatekeeping on the societal level. According to cultural values certain topics will not be reported. German press usually is quite reluctant to report on the private life of politicians, whereas the American media—even quality media—make this a big issue (e.g., Clinton–Lewinsky). The recent dispute about the Muhammed cartoons in the Scandinavian press underline the importance of cultural norms and values in gatekeeping. The Scandinavian countries might value satire higher than religious issues, whereas Islamic countries do not do so. Thus articles that might portray religious issues negatively would not be selected for publication in Islamic countries.

The Theory of Newsworthiness

While gatekeeping explains how news becomes news (i.e., by looking at the characteristics of the decision makers), the theory of newsworthiness looks at the characteristics of events and topics. This approach integrates concepts of perception and the before-mentioned professional and organizational routines.

The term *news value* was introduced by Walter Lippmann (1922) as a characteristic of an event. News value determines the chances of an event to become news. The higher the news value of an item of reality, the higher its probability of being selected for publication. In other words, the newsworthiness of an event or topic explains why some topics are covered and others are neglected by journalists. The news value of an event is comprised by its features, also known as *news factors*. The first empirical study of this concept was conducted by Charles Merz, who identified four elements of news: conflict, personality, prominence, and suspense.

Östgaard was one of the first to look for explanations why the international news flow seems to be distorted. According to his observation, some countries received more media attention than others, even when regarding their size. He theorized that there are certain features of news that make these countries particularly interesting for journalists: (a) simplicity, (b) identification, and (c) sensationalism. Events that are simple, that bear a high degree of identification (for the readers) and sensationalism are newsworthy and are most likely to be published. Galtung and Ruge published a study in the same year that listed 12 news factors that constitute the newsworthiness of an event:

1. *Frequency*. The better the time span of an event fits the timelines of a medium, the higher will be the probability of its publication.

2. *Threshold* (intensity/increase). Before an event is noticed by the medium, its intensity has to pass a certain threshold. The bigger the increase in intensity, the likelier the coverage will be.
3. *Unambiguity.* Simplicity and clarity of an event increases the chances for publication.
4. *Meaningfulness* (proximity and relevance). Events with far-reaching consequences (for a lot of people) with direct effects for the lives of the recipients or events that take place "next door" will receive more media attention.
5. *Consonance* (predictability). The more an event fits expectations, the better its chances in becoming news.
6. *Unexpectedness* (unpredictability). The more surprising an event is, the better its chances are in becoming news.
7. *Continuity*. Once an event has been defined as news, it will stay news, even if its intensity drops.
8. *Composition*. If the news is dominated by a certain type of event or topic, a complementary topic has good odds in becoming news to balance the overall picture.
9. *Reference to elite nations*. Events that take place in powerful (politically, economically, and militarily) nations receive more media attention.
10. *Reference to elite persons*. Analogous to the previous factor, the media are more attentive to events in which powerful persons are involved.
11. *Reference to persons*. Generally speaking, the media prefer events that can be seen as actions of identifiable persons over abstract events.
12. *Reference to something negative*. If it bleeds, it leads. Damage, conflict, and negative consequences raise the chance of an event to become news.

Galtung and Ruge deducted the first eight factors from general rules of human perception and thought them to be stable across different cultures. The last four were seen as bound to the Western culture and were expected to vary along the north-south or center-periphery axis. Clearly some of the news factors contradict themselves. An event usually cannot be predicable and surprising at the same time. Therefore the authors formulated five hypotheses about how these factors constitute the newsworthiness of an event:

1. The more events satisfy the criteria mentioned, the more likely that they will be registered as news (*selection*).
2. Once a news item has been selected, what makes it newsworthy according to the factors will be accentuated (*distortion*).
3. Both the process of selection and the process of distortion will take place at all steps in the chain from event to reader (*replication*).
4. The higher the total score of an event, the higher the probability that it will become news and even make headlines (*additivity*).
5. If an event is low on one dimension or factor, it may compensate for that by being high on another (*complementarity*).

The extensive theoretical work was not matched by the empirical study the authors conducted. It proved to be a fertile framework for further research. Especially in Europe, scholars replicated and refined this approach theoretically and empirically. Most studies are confined to the content analysis of media output. Newsworthiness is usually operationalized by the editorial emphasis given to an event. Critics argue that the decision whether a story is published or not cannot be explained by news factors when only the published events are analyzed. Supporters of the approach reply that the decision not to publish a story is just the lowest degree of editorial emphasis. Newsworthiness is also indicated through the allocated space, the position of the story, and its visual emphasis.

Schulz argued that news factors cannot be seen as objective features of reality when deciding on the newsworthiness of its items. Furthermore, they have to be seen as hypotheses about reality used by journalists to decide about the news value of an event. They are guidelines or rules of thumb acquired during the professional formation and socialization of the journalists. New research suggests that not only the journalistic perception is led by these hypotheses but that the audience as well uses similar rules for selection and retention of media content. This might explain why different media often make similar selective decisions.

The newsworthiness approach developed in the United States is mostly independent from the European branch of research. In the American literature, the terms *news factors* and *news values* are often use as equivalents. According to Schulz, news value

can be seen as the result of the news factors shown in the editorial emphasis of the story. The catalogs of factors are mostly comparable to their European counterparts, since they are deductible from the psychology of perception.

Gatekeeping and newsworthiness are two sides of the same coin. When gatekeepers select news items according to professional routines, they select news items depending on their news factors.

Reimar Zeh

See also News Management; Schulz, Winfried

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New York Times, The

The New York Times (NYT) is a morning daily newspaper with Sunday editions that is regarded as the most important newspaper in the United States. Together with the *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times,* the NYT is part of the elite press that sets the trends for the other media outlets in the United States. Its coverage of political events is frequently studied by political and communication scholars and is considered both representative and influential of the entire U.S. media. It has won 94 Pulitzer prizes, more than any other U.S. newspaper.

The NYT was founded on September 18, 1851, by Henry Jarvis Raymond and George Jones as a penny paper alternative to the yellow journalism style practiced by most media outlets at the time. Its initial name, the *New-York Daily Times,* was changed to *The New York Times* on September 18, 1857. Since 1897, the newspaper has been published under the slogan, "All the News That's Fit to Print," a phrase coined by its second owner, Adolph Ochs. The newspaper is currently owned by the New York Times Company, which owns numerous other newspapers as well as broadcast and online media outlets.

The NYT has a consistent history of publishing content that leads to political controversy. The most famous such situation is the publishing of excerpts from the *Pentagon Papers*, a 7,000-page confidential

government report on the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, leaked to NYT reporters by State Department officials. The government's attempt to stop the NYT from continuing to publish these documents resulted in a legal case judged by the U.S. Supreme Court, which reaffirmed the media's right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment.

Although considered the top U.S. newspaper, the NYT coverage of presidential campaigns has received much criticism. Extensive studies by several communication scholars revealed that the NYT coverage of political campaigns relies on horserace framing and discussion of candidates' character more frequently than on discussion of candidates' issue positions. Over the past five decades, its reporting of U.S. presidential elections slanted toward reporting negative news and scandal and using reporters as sources of information for articles more often than citing candidates and voters.

The NYT has also been accused of overreliance on official sources and failure to fulfill its watchdog role regarding the government. Critics claim that the newspaper downplayed important events such as Hitler's genocide of Jews, Stalin's genocide of Ukrainians, and Turkey's genocide of Armenians during War World I. Its coverage of the White House discourse prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq is regarded as unquestioning and considered evidence of corporate ownership bias. In 2004, the newspaper's editors published a letter admitting that they failed to be rigorous in their reporting of the events that led to the Iraq War.

Monica Postelnicu

See also News Coverage, Politics

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NIGHTLINE

Nightline, a live ABC late night news program, debuted on March 24, 1980. Originally a 20-minute Monday-through-Thursday-night program (11:30 p.m. Eastern Time), *Nightline* expanded to a 30-minute Monday-through-Friday program in April 1981. Ted Koppel anchored *Nightline* from its inception until November 22, 2005. Since Koppel's departure, the format of *Nightline* has changed from one anchor discussing one topic to three co-anchors, broadcasting from Washington and New York, addressing multiple topics. *Nightline* was groundbreaking in two ways: (1) the program delivered news in a new time slot, and (2) the program's format relied upon new satellite technology.

By the late 1970s, Roone Arledge, president of ABC News, saw the potential of a late night news program that could reach an audience not tuned in to the very popular NBC program, the *Tonight Show* with Johnny Carson. In late 1979, a national crisis provided the argument Arledge used to convince ABC executives of the need for a late night news program. This crisis, the Iranian takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran on November 4, set in motion the beginnings of *Nightline.* By November 8, *World News Tonight* anchor Frank Reynolds was anchoring a late night news program on ABC called *America Held Hostage.* The Iranian hostage situation, expected by most to last only a few days, continued for over a year. By mid-December 1979, Reynolds returned full time to *World News Tonight,* and Ted Koppel, an ABC reporter who had been covering the State Department, became the new anchor of *America Held Hostage.* Within 4 months, a successful late night news slot had been established, and ABC, realizing a program like *America Held Hostage* had a future beyond the hostage crisis, changed the title to *Nightline.*

The second significant contribution of *Nightline* was the program's reliance upon satellite technology as an integral part of its format. Satellite technology in 1979 was a relatively new technology, but by that time, the technology had become more accessible and more affordable. Satellite links enabled newscasters to connect people in ways not possible through other technologies like film and videotape, which had to be physically shipped from place to place. Satellite technology reduced the lag time between covering a story and broadcasting a story. Information was becoming more instantaneous. Satellite technology enabled *Nightline* to develop the multiperson interview format, a break from the traditional single-person interview format. Because *Nightline* could conduct live, simultaneous interviews with people from around the world as a result

of satellite technology, various arguments and viewpoints have been brought directly into the living rooms of late night America.

Kaylene Barbe

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Nimmo, Dan (1933–2004)

Dan Nimmo was one of the most productive and influential scholars to write and teach about political communication. To his work, he brought a broadly educated mind, a profound knowledge of political science, and a great respect for the role that communication plays in politics. In this latter conviction, he was, in the 1960s and 1970s, one of the few voices from his native discipline of political science who thought that the subject matter of this volume was worthy of scholarly attention. He produced, with several coauthors and coeditors, more than 35 volumes, as well as countless book chapters and convention papers. These works provided some of the most substantive, intellectually honest, theoretically sophisticated, and well-written scholarship in the field.

Nimmo's first major book, *Political Persuaders,* was published in 1970, and again in 2001 with a new introduction by the author. These books covered such topics as a paradigm for political campaigns, profiling the electorate, and the effects and consequences of professionally mediated campaigns. To all of this, Nimmo brought a concern about the potential unintended consequences of the "new politics."

In 1976, Nimmo, with Robert Savage, published *Candidates and Their Images.* This was one of the first books on this topic that was heavily based upon empirical research. It relied on the results of the Q-Sort procedure and methodology as a means of measuring candidate image, and it proposed an early model explaining how images are formed in the minds of voters.

Still convinced that political communication as a field of inquiry needed further definition and elaboration, Nimmo in 1981 coedited with Keith R. Sanders *The Handbook of Political Communication.* The first single-volume reference work in the field, it was pluralistic, interdisciplinary, and comprehensive. In 2007, some chapters are still being used in reprint form.

One book, more than any other, represents one of the enduring themes of Nimmo's thinking. In *Mediated Political Realities,* published in 1983 with James E. Combs, the authors contend that

> few people learn about politics through direct experience; for most persons political realities are mediated through mass and group communication, a process resulting as much in the creation, transmission, and adoption of political fantasies as realistic views of what takes place. (p. xv).

Dan Nimmo was also a consummate teacher. He received his doctorate in political science from Vanderbilt University, and during his academic career included service on the faculties of the University of Missouri, the University of Tennessee, and the University of Oklahoma. His many coauthors and coeditors learned more than they taught during their collaborations with him. Several of his students became major contributors to the field that he (and they) helped create.

Nimmo gave unselfishly of his time editing the works of others. He was provocative, witty, and persistent. His work habits and his qualities of mind and character inspired everyone who had the privilege of knowing him. He was, mediated or unmediated, a great force for good throughout his career.

Keith R. Sanders

See also *Candidates and Their Images*; *Handbook of Political Communication*; *Mediated Political Realities*

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NIXON, RICHARD M. (1913–1994)

Richard M. Nixon served as president of the United States from 1969 to 1974, when he became the only U.S. president to resign from the office. Prior to his election to the presidency in 1968, Nixon served as a Republican in the U.S. House of Representatives (Calif.–12th district) from 1947 to 1950, a U.S. senator from California from 1950 to 1953, and as vice president under Dwight Eisenhower from 1953 to 1961.

Perhaps more than any other American president, Nixon's political career was shaped by television. During the 1952 presidential campaign, Nixon was accused of illegally using campaign contributions for personal gain. On September 23, 1952, Nixon became one of the first politicians to use television for a direct appeal to a mass audience. The speech became known as the "Checkers Speech" because of Nixon's reference to a cocker spaniel he had received and decided to keep during the campaign. After his 1959 televised encounter with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, known as the "kitchen debate," Nixon received the 1960 Republican nomination for president and, for the first time, became the victim of television rather than a beneficiary. That year, Nixon participated with the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy, in the first televised presidential debates. Many observers declared that Nixon did not come across well in those debates, largely on the basis of appearance and style. In what became the closest popular vote in American history, Kennedy defeated Nixon by 0.1%.

In 1968, after having lost a bid for the governorship of California in 1962 and famously telling the media that it wouldn't "have Dick Nixon to kick around any more," Nixon defeated Hubert Humphrey and George Wallace in a three-way race to become the 37th president of the United States. Nixon's victory was predicated largely on "law and order" rhetoric, made salient by images of violence and chaos broadcast throughout the year. In 1976, Michael J. Robinson published a groundbreaking study based in part on the 1968 elections and found a correlation between television dependency and political malaise. In effect, television magnified feelings of social distrust, political cynicism and inefficacy, partisan disloyalty, and third-party viability while, at the same time, reducing voter turnout. Each of these factors was seen as contributing to Nixon's victory.

Nixon had an acrimonious relationship with the media throughout his career and presidency. His vice president, Spiro T. Agnew, gained attention in 1970 for referring to media pundits as "nattering nabobs of negativism." Nixon is perhaps most famously remembered for his 1974 resignation in the wake of "Watergate," a scandal involving the cover-up of illegal activities sponsored and administered by the White House. The Watergate investigation was spearheaded by *Washington Post* reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, and news reports of the scandal permeated Americans' television sets for much of 1973 and 1974. Although Nixon continues to be one of the most maligned icons in American political history, historians give him credit for major accomplishments in foreign policy, particularly his openness to engaging with China.

Richard Nixon died on April 22, 1994, after suffering a major stroke.

Sean P. Cunningham

See also Agnew, Spiro; *All the President's Men*; Checkers Speech; Debates; *Selling of the President 1968, The*; Wallace, George; Watergate

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NOELLE-NEUMANN, ELISABETH (1916–)

Born in Berlin, Germany, on December 19, 1916, Elisabeth Noelle is a journalist, an entrepreneur, and one of the most eminent and influential German communication researchers of the 20th century. She is the founder and director of the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, the first German opinion research institute

to employ the representative survey method. She is best known internationally for her "spiral of silence" theory.

Elisabeth Noelle studied journalism, history, and American studies at the universities of Berlin, Königsberg (now Kaliningrad), and Munich, before spending one year as an exchange student at the School of Journalism at the University of Missouri–Columbia in 1937. There she heard about George Gallup, Elmo Roper, and Archibald Crossley's mass surveys on the basis of representative samples, which had come to the attention of a wider public during the U.S. presidential elections the previous year. In 1939–1940 she wrote her dissertation at the University of Berlin on representative public opinion surveys in America.

During the Second World War, Elisabeth Noelle was an editor for the Berlin daily newspaper *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and, from 1941, for the weekly newspaper *Das Reich,* a position from which she was dismissed without notice in 1942 on the orders of Goebbels as a result of an article she had written about Franklin D. Roosevelt. Thereafter, she wrote for the liberal *Franfurter Zeitung* until it was banned in August 1943. Until the end of the war, she wrote anonymous reports for the Frankfurt newspaper *Illustriertes Blatt* and for *Tele* magazine published in Sweden.

Elisabeth Noelle married journalist Erich Peter Neumann (1912–1973) in 1946. Together they founded the Institut für Demoskopie in the small town of Allensbach in southwest Germany in 1947, initially at the behest of the French occupational authorities. The institute rapidly became one of the most influential survey research institutes in Germany. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann served as an advisor to the German chancellors Konrad Adenauer (term of office: 1949–1963), Ludwig Erhard (1963–1966), and Helmut Kohl (1982–1998).

In 1961, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann began teaching as a lecturer at the Free University of Berlin before being appointed to the chair of communication research at the University of Mainz in 1964, where, in 1967, she established the Institut für Publizistik, which is today one of Europe's most reputable communication research institutes. In addition, she also taught as visiting professor at the universities of Munich and Chicago. The University of St. Gallen (Switzerland) awarded her an honorary doctorate in 1978. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann took on emeritus status in 1983 but has continued her research and teaching until very recently. Alongside the spiral of silence theory, her reputation is based mainly on her work in the fields of media effects research, election research, and survey research methodology. She holds numerous German and international awards. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, who was married for a second time to Heinz Maier-Leibnitz (1911–2000), now lives in Allensbach and Mainz.

Thomas Petersen

See also Spiral of Silence

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NORRIS, PIPPA

See *VIRTUOUS CIRCLE, A*

NYERERE, JULIUS (1922–1999)

Julius Kambarage Nyerere was born in 1922 in Tanganyika. After being a teacher for a couple of years, Nyerere was granted a government scholarship to study history and political economy at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland until 1952. On his return to Tanganyika, he dedicated himself to the liberation movement. Full independence came in December 1961, and Nyerere was elected president of Tanganyika in 1962. When the islands of Zanzibar were integrated into a Union government in 1964, he became the first president of the new United Republic of Tanzania. He stayed in power until 1985. He was 77 years old when he died of leukemia in London on October 14, 1999.

Nyerere was highly aware of the two-faceted nature of the media in a newly independent African

country devoted to its construction as a true nation: media's potential for the mobilization of citizens as well as its threat to ideological unity. Starting from 1967, when the *Arusha Declaration* proclaimed Tanzania an "African socialist" state, the role and influence of the media in the country were clearly delimited by the government. The radio and the press—no television sets were allowed—were used by the party in power and the government to support the socialist ideology and promote a common national culture. Though Nyerere published many books to mobilize citizens, explain his political choices, assert his views, or express his regrets and hopes for Tanzania, he is mainly remembered as an extremely gifted orator. He used the radio to broadcast his numerous speeches dealing with all aspects of citizens' life and the future of the new state. Delivered in an eloquent Swahili, the newly adopted national language, his speeches contributed significantly to the mobilization of the population for African socialism.

Various measures were also taken to assert political control on the media. Heads of the national media institutions had to be appointed by the president of the Republic; main newspapers, like the *Standard* and the *Sunday News,* were nationalized in 1970. As stated by Nyerere himself, "The new *Standard* will be a socialist paper. It will support the socialist ideology of Tanzania as defined in the *Arusha Declaration*." Movements of liberation in Africa and in Third World countries were intensively covered and offered as symbols of fights against colonialism that deserve active support. Such an ideological standpoint necessarily implied, for the media, a ban on antisocialist literature and, following the government's directives, repeated calls against imperialism and neocolonialism.

The Nyerere era coincided with a time in which African politics was faced with the need to build viable nations in the context of the Cold War, characterized by the immeasurable divide between capitalism and socialism. Nyerere's conception of the media, as a means in the hands of the state, noticeably illustrates such a hard task.

Marie-Aude Fouéré

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

Obama, Barack (1961–)

Barack Obama has been the junior Democratic senator from Illinois since January 4, 2005. He ran an active campaign as a Democratic presidential candidate in 2008, and many speculate that he could become the nation's first African American president.

Obama was born in Honolulu, Hawaii. His father was from Kenya and his mother from Kansas. They divorced when Obama was 2 years old, and Barack spent his childhood in Indonesia with his mother and later in Hawaii with his maternal grandmother. After graduating from high school, Obama attended Occidental College in Los Angeles for 2 years and transferred to Columbia University, where he graduated in 1983. For several years he worked for a nonprofit organization, helping poor communities in Chicago, before studying law. After graduating from Harvard Law School magna cum laude, Obama worked for a civil rights firm in Chicago and taught at the University of Chicago School of Law. He published his autobiography, *Dreams From My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance,* in 1995. The following year, he was elected to the Illinois State Senate, where he served until 2005. He ran unsuccessfully for Congress in 2000, but in 2004, he was elected to the U.S. Senate by a landslide over Republican opponent Alan Keyes.

Barack Obama is considered one of the best orators in recent political history and is well known for his electrifying keynote address—titled "The Audacity of Hope"—at the Democratic National Convention in 2004. In this address, Obama recounted his own unique experience of the American Dream, emphasized the need for all Americans to work together to help those who are less fortunate to attain the dream, and underscored the oneness of all Americans, regardless of race, creed, religion, or political affiliation. He also attempted to create identification with all Americans through an emphasis on a common mythic narrative, common obligations, and common values. The speech overshadowed convention speeches by Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, Ted Kennedy, and even the party's nominee, John Kerry. It immediately caught the attention of political observers, who noted that the speech had "catapulted Obama to national political prominence."

Rhetorical scholars already have begun to study the rhetoric of the Illinois senator. Some have discussed Obama's ability to reframe the American Dream from a conservative narrative to a liberal one in the convention address. Others have focused on myth, racial issues, Obama's use of the immigration dream narrative, and the inclusive, conciliatory nature of his discourse. A number of scholarly articles and at least one book currently are being written about his rhetoric.

Presently, Obama is campaigning for the White House in 2008. He released his second book, *The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream,* in October 2006 and has been the subject of many interviews and news articles. His life and public rhetoric will likely generate even more scholarly attention as his political career unfolds.

John Jones

See also Race in Politics

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Obscenity and Pornography

Today, the terms *obscenity* and *pornography* refer to material of a sexual nature, particularly that designed to inspire sexual excitement. But, until the middle of the 19th century, obscenity and pornography were as likely to refer to blasphemous, seditious, or otherwise prohibited religious or political speech as to sexual expression per se. Nor did the terms begin to acquire exclusively sexual connotations in the United States until the 19th century ushered in a number of pivotal changes, including technological advances in print and film, increased literacy, urbanization, and immigration, all of which produced efforts to control a rapidly changing population that had access to an expanding array of media. Assuming that sexual material encouraged masturbation, Victorian reformers treated it as yet another call to censor scientific reports that "the solitary vice" caused blindness, promoted acne, produced insanity, compromised fertility, and, generally, depleted masculine vitality. And it was in censoring that Victorians developed a definition of obscenity that centered on sex. But even during the heyday of notorious anti-obscenity crusader Anthony Comstock (1873–1915), dissenters created suggestive and explicit sexual material, distributed it, and fought against the state censorship apparatus. Other opponents of censorship pointed out that even if obscenity laws focused on sexual expression, enforcement officials used them to entrap individuals with radical political views. Thus, obscenity has occupied a dubious and contested legal status in the United States, subject to the many federal, state, and local laws that proliferated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Before the 1950s, legislatures and lower courts struggled on their own to define and regulate obscenity, creating a veritable crazy quilt of laws that ignored, for the most part, constitutional concerns. Filmmakers and exhibitors, publishers and booksellers grew increasingly frustrated by the ways that local obscenity laws fragmented an otherwise national market even as they chafed under a postal obscenity code that blanketed the nation. During World War II, inconsistencies in these regulatory regimes crystallized when military officials distributed material to soldiers (*Esquire*'s Varga girl pinups, for example) that postal authorities declared obscene and banned from the domestic mails. Not until 1957 did the U.S. Supreme Court agree to consider the possibility that obscenity laws raised constitutional issues. In *Roth v. United States,* the Court upheld the constitutionality of obscenity laws but defined obscenity for the first time, deeming it "material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest." Since *Roth,* Supreme Court decisions have played at the margins, tinkering with standards for determining illegal obscenity without challenging its existence or the right and duty of legislatures to regulate it.

Testing the limits and implications of *Roth,* publishers and filmmakers produced ever more racy material that led, eventually, to the creation of a succession of presidential commissions on obscenity and pornography (1970 and 1986) and the development of a feminist antipornography movement. In 1973—amid this swelling tide of activity among commercial interests, political leaders, and feminist activists—the Supreme Court attempted to distinguish between obscenity and pornography in *Miller v. California.* It did so by emphasizing the general "offensive" nature of obscenity and the more specifically sexually titillating aspects of pornography. Pornography—taken from the Greek word meaning, literally, literature about prostitutes—has been defined in a number of contradictory ways. In *Miller,* the Court declared obscene pornography a subset of obscenity, implicitly recognizing a category of nonobscene pornography. In contrast, activists on all sides of the issue have tended to treat pornography as the most extreme, explicit, and objectionable form of obscenity, emphasizing this with modifiers such as "hard core."

Few issues have proven more intractable and polarizing in United States civic and political life than obscenity and pornography. The two presidential commissions reached dramatically different conclusions, with the 1970 report advocating the repeal of obscenity laws and the 1986 one urging stricter enforcement of those laws. Feminists, too, divided bitterly over the issue. One group, led by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, arguing that particular uses of

pornography violated women's civil rights, pressed for municipal ordinances that would permit victims to sue producers of pornography. Other feminists declared antipornography ordinances violations of the First Amendment and accused ordinance proponents of focusing on trivial matters. More recently, many vocal women, identifying as feminists, have embraced pornography as a source of sexual liberation, information, and pleasure even as they have brought it under academic scrutiny.

The topic of obscenity and the law has received sustained scholarly attention for more than a century. Lawyers and free speech enthusiasts, such as Theodore Schroeder (1864–1953) and Morris Ernst (1888–1976), published some of the earliest work. But in the wake of Alfred Kinsey's studies on human sexual behavior (1948 and 1953), studies produced by psychologists and media scholars began to take the lead. In the 1960s, for example, Phyllis and Eberhard Kronhausen argued that pornography served a positive, cathartic social function. The next two decades saw a proliferation of more systematic research on the effects of pornography, but consensus remained elusive. In the 1980s, Edward Donnerstein found that viewing pornography, especially violent pornography, increased male subjects' antisocial attitudes, leaving them more callous toward rape victims and more willing to use force in sexual relations. Many scholars have challenged his work, less by reproducing Donnerstein's laboratory methods than by examining the relationship between pornography and sex crime and exploring pornography's contributions to culture (as an "engine of progress" or medium for artistic experimentation, for example). They have also paid more attention to female consumers of pornography, a phenomenon that has inspired the development of "porn studies" at some universities, with feminist media scholars like Linda Williams and Laura Kipnis leading the movement. Even as the academy takes up the issue, debates over pornography remain polarized. While current scholars lend pornography the legitimacy of literature by theorizing and "reading" it in different ways, journalists like Pamela Paul and Ariel Levy use interviews with consumers as the basis of exposes on pornography's devastating impact on interpersonal relationships.

The political process, judicial system, and scholarly analysis have yet to resolve the debate over obscenity and pornography. Indeed, if any consensus has been reached, it is on the illegitimacy of child pornography, a category of material denied constitutional protection by the U.S. Supreme Court in *New York v. Ferber* (1982). The definition of child pornography remains contested, however, as the American Civil Liberties Union and others challenge state laws against it.

Leigh Ann Wheeler

See also Censorship, Political; Feminist Movement; Film and Politics; First Amendment; Press Freedom

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Onassis, Jacqueline Kennedy (1929–1994)

Jacqueline Lee Bouvier Kennedy Onassis was considered by many people to be one of the most popular first ladies of the 20th century. Wife of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the 35th president of the United States, and Greek shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis was very devoted to her family. She raised two children, Caroline Bouvier, born in 1957, and John, Jr., born just after his father was elected in 1960. Kennedy Onassis had two additional children, a daughter who was stillborn, and a second son, Patrick Bouvier, who was born prematurely on August 7, 1963, and died 2 days later. She was known as a protective mother, shielding her children from media scrutiny whenever possible.

March 27, 1963: Arrival ceremonies for the king of Morocco. President and Mrs. Kennedy in motorcade.

Source: Photograph by Abbie Rowe, National Park Service, in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston.

Kennedy Onassis occupied the White House as first lady for only 1,000 days, from January 20, 1961, to November 22, 1963. During that time she made an enduring impression on the American public. She brought a strong sense of beauty and style to the White House, and is best remembered for her status in art and fashion circles. While in the White House, she saw her main role as taking care of her husband and children by creating a comfortable place to live. Kennedy Onassis did devote significant time to a major White House restoration project, with the goal of creating an important historic site. She also exhibited excellent diplomatic qualities both nationally and internationally, as evidenced by her ease in handling both world leaders and national journalists alike.

Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis had a strong sense of how to communicate politically; she helped create long-lasting impressions of her husband's presidency. Most notable about Kennedy Onassis was her response to the assassination of her husband, John F. Kennedy. She understood what needed to be done, even in the midst of great tragedy. For example, immediately following her husband's assassination she participated in the swearing-in ceremony of her husband's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson; she helped to craft a public statement to share with a grieving nation; and she had the suit she was wearing at the time of the assassination preserved for history—realizing then that this would be an important historical artifact for the future. She is also credited with helping to create the Kennedy "Camelot" myth. In a 1963 *Life* interview with Theodore White, she noted that Kennedy loved the musical and strongly identified with the story line. The image resonated for many Americans and served as a symbolic representation of the Kennedy era.

After her second husband died, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis worked in New York City as an editor for Doubleday until her death in 1994. To date, she is the only former first lady to have complete television coverage of her funeral. She is buried with Kennedy and two of her children at Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia.

Janette Kenner Muir

See also First Ladies, Political Communication of; Kennedy, John F.; Kennedy Assassination

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OP-ED PIECE

See EDITORIALS

Opinion Leaders

See Two-Step Flow Model of Communication

O'Reilly, Bill (1942–)

William James "Bill" O'Reilly, Jr., is a journalist, commentator, television personality, syndicated columnist, radio host, and author. He is best known as the host of the cable news program *The O'Reilly Factor* on the Fox News Channel, which ranked as the top program among U.S. cable news channels from 2003 to 2006.

After his 1967 graduation from Chaminade High School in Mineola, New York, O'Reilly attended Marist College in Poughkeepsie, New York. While at Marist College, he wrote a column for the college newspaper, *The Circle,* and played football. O'Reilly also studied overseas at the University of London during his junior year of college. In 1971, O'Reilly received a bachelor's degree in history from Marist College. He returned to college and received a Master of Arts in broadcast journalism from Boston University after teaching high school for two years at Monsignor Pace in the Miami, Florida, area. While at Boston University, O'Reilly worked as a reporter and columnist for local newspapers and news weeklies.

O'Reilly's broadcasting career began at WNEP-TV in Scranton, Pennsylvania, where he was a reporter and anchor. He then moved to WFAA-TV in Dallas, Texas, where he won a Dallas Press Club Award for excellence in investigative reporting. He also worked at KMGH-TV in Denver, Colorado, and won an Emmy for his coverage of a skyjacking. Two years later, O'Reilly returned to the East Coast to report for WFSB-TV in Hartford, Connecticut.

While at WCBS-TV in New York City, O'Reilly won his second Emmy in 1980 for coverage of corrupt city marshals. He was then promoted to CBS News as a correspondent and covered the conflicts in El Salvador and the Falkland Islands from his base in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Additionally, O'Reilly served as an anchor on ABC and CBS television news affiliates in Boston and an anchor at KATU-TV in Portland, Oregon. He became an ABC News correspondent on *ABC World News Tonight* in 1986, where he won a National Headliner Award for excellence in reporting for a series of reports on the Bradley fighting vehicle.

From 1989 to 1995, O'Reilly reported and anchored the syndicated news program *Inside Edition* on CBS. During his broadcast news career, O'Reilly reported from all over the world, including Vietnam, Kuwait, Germany, Brazil, Australia, Japan, France, Romania, and England. In addition, he wrote an opinion column in the *Boston Herald* for 7 years, and his articles have appeared in publications such as *Newsweek* magazine, *The New York Times,* and *Parade* magazine.

He returned to college after his tenure on *Inside Edition* to receive a master's degree in public administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. After his graduation from Harvard in 1996, O'Reilly began working for the startup cable news channel Fox News. His show, *The O'Reilly Factor,* is a news analysis, commentary, and investigative reporting program that is broadcast in more than 30 countries. *The O'Reilly Factor* has largely been the number-one cable news program since its creation.

O'Reilly is also a best-selling author. His first novel was *Those Who Trespass: A Novel of Murder and Television.* O'Reilly has also written three adult nonfiction books that have each topped the *New York Times* best-seller list, *The O'Reilly Factor, The No Spin Zone,* and *Who's Looking Out for You.* His book for children, *The O'Reilly Factor for Kids,* was the best-selling nonfiction children's book of 2005. His most recent book is *Culture Warrior,* which was published in 2006.

His radio program, *The Radio Factor,* is a 2-hour call-in program and is heard on more than 400 stations in the United States.

Kristen D. Landreville

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Orientation, Need for

The concept of a "need for orientation" (a combination of relevance and uncertainty) was first created and described by Maxwell McCombs and David Weaver in an April 1973 paper titled "Voters' Need for Orientation and Use of Mass Communication," presented at the annual conference of the International Communication Association in Montreal, Canada. In this paper, they reasoned that every individual feels some need to be familiar with his or her surroundings, to fill in enough detail to orient himself or herself. They asserted that need for orientation (NFO) leads to media use, which in turn leads to agenda-setting effects of media. They speculated that increased relevance and uncertainty were important psychological preconditions for arousal of an NFO based on information-seeking theory, and they devised a model in which relevance preceded uncertainty in time such that a low level of relevance led directly to a low NFO, a high level of relevance coupled with low uncertainty led to a moderate level of NFO, and a high level of relevance coupled with high uncertainty led to a high level of NFO.

They predicted that use of newspapers and television for political information, and political agenda-setting effects of these media, would increase monotonically as NFO increased. Using a variety of operational definitions of relevance and uncertainty, they tested these predictions with data from two surveys conducted in Durham and Charlotte, North Carolina, in the spring and summer of 1972 and found considerable support for both predictions, leading them to conclude that the sociological concept of agenda setting and the psychological concept of NFO appeared fruitful for documenting and explaining the political impact of the news media.

This concept of NFO has been tested in a variety of settings since 1973 and has been found to be a useful predictor not only of frequency of media use for political information, but also of varying levels of agenda-setting effects. A careful explication and testing of the NFO concept published in the *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* by Jorg Matthes of the Institute of Mass Communication and Media Research at the University of Zurich finds that the original assumption that relevance precedes uncertainty appears to be valid—that is, when there is low relevance, NFO will be low, independent of uncertainty, but when there is high relevance, uncertainty does matter. This article also finds that another related concept, need for cognition, is a predictor of NFO along with relevance, and that there are at least three separate dimensions of NFO—toward issues, facts, and journalistic evaluations. Matthes recommends that a study be conducted that examines the relationship among these three dimensions of NFO and several levels of agenda-setting effects.

David H. Weaver

See also Agenda Setting; Public Opinion

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Oswald, Lee Harvey

See Kennedy Assassination

Ownership of Media Outlets

See Communications Act of 1934

Özal, Turgut (1927–1993)

Turgut Özal was a politician and a statesman, prime minister of the 45th and 46th governments, and later the 8th president of the Republic of Turkey. He died while in office. Özal founded the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi,* ANAP) on May 20, 1983, and won the elections on November 6, 1983, after a political campaign completely regulated by the National Security Council. In the early elections in 1987, aided by an amendment in the election law, ANAP won more seats with fewer votes, and Özal was reelected. In November 1989 he became president of the republic.

As the creator and practitioner of the economic liberalization program of January 24, 1980, which made its mark on the decade, Özal pioneered the establishment of liberal politics in Turkey. Özal's economic policies got the support of various academic circles, professional groups, foundations, chambers, and associations that mushroomed in the decade, and particularly of big media as a consequence of the new media capital coming in from other business sectors. The support of the wider public was gained by populist politics and discourse. Özal saw liberal economic policy as a prerequisite of democracy. Conceptualizing democracy on the basis of market conditions, he reduced it to a method of government formation. Likewise, throughout the 1980s he did not put much effort in improving the rights and liberties or the participation of social groups in the political process.

In terms of broadcasting policy, Özal years can be identified with the breaking up of the public monopoly, the development of commercial broadcasting, and emerging monopolistic tendencies. ANAP and Özal had mutual interests with the companies from outside the sector that took interest in media; a monopolistic trend has begun and major newspapers have launched radio and television channels. Following the footsteps of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, Özal has used the newspapers and televisions extensively to his political benefit. The public broadcaster TRT was used for progovernment and partisan broadcasts, as it was by all the governments in Turkey since the 1950s. Özal also had close relationships with certain members of the media. These relationships provided for a mutual flow of information, formed an image of Özal as a reformer and action taker, and helped in spreading his political rhetoric. However, a conflict between Özal and the big media arose after 1987 when the phrase "Ottoman Dynasty" was used in the press as a metaphor for his family.

The Americanization of the election campaigns, increased use of experts in the news, the new type of columnists in newspapers, the growth in advertising, new market research techniques, the entry of international companies into Turkish markets and their demand for local information all have led to the appearance of new actors in politics. Transferring their marketing, sales, and research experience from the business world, they have started serving the political leaders as consultants and have become close associates. This has resulted in a belief that politics is an activity to be practiced only with the help of expert knowledge.

Fatih Keskin

P

PAC

See Political Action Committees (PACs)

Pack Journalism

Pack journalism describes the practice of journalists covering the same stories from the same perspective. With the advent of 24-hour news programming, reporters from different geographical areas can travel across the globe to cover the same news event. Pack journalism was originally used to label the "packs" of journalists who traveled with political candidates to cover the news on the campaign trail.

The phrase "pack journalism" (also known as "herd journalism" and "fuselage journalism") is attributed to Thomas Crouse, who introduced the concept in his book *Boys on the Bus.* Published in 1972, Crouse described how journalists were transported en masse (called "packs") from one campaign location to another to cover speeches, fundraisers, and other campaign events. During the McGovern presidential campaign coverage, only a few reporters, known as a "pool," were allowed to attend certain functions (such as small dinners). Those reporters wrote a story about the function, and it was copied and distributed to the rest of the "pack" of journalists. The "pack" passed along the same information in the form of their own news reports. As a result, everyone reported the same event from the same perspective because only a few reporters were granted access to the actual event. After a while, according to Crouse, the journalists "began to believe the same rumors, subscribe to the same theories, and write the same stories" (p. 8).

Still today, there are lead reporters and news outlets (such as *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*) that the rest of the pack follows. The pack reporters restate what the lead reporters and outlets report. The result is that these "pack journalists" contribute little to alternative viewpoints in news. Instead, there is a drive to be in sync with other major outlets.

The pack mentality can result in a "feeding frenzy" among reporters. An often-cited incidence of pack journalism occurred in the O. J. Simpson trial. News outlets were scrambling to find the latest piece of information relevant to the trial and its outcome. Reporters often exhibit this behavior when any news story breaks.

Another problem with pack journalism is that reporters, having covered the same incident, pass along the same erroneous information. This is evidenced in the news reports immediately following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, in which multiple news sources reported that the suspects in the bombing were of Middle Eastern descent. More recently, a tragic misstatement led reporters scrambling to be the first to break the news that the 12 miners trapped in a West Virginia mine in January 2006 were found alive. Sadly, shortly thereafter it was reported that only one of the 12 miners was found alive.

Crouse's words appear to reflect journalism to this day. In *Boys on the Bus,* he states, "Campaign journalism is, by definition, pack journalism; to follow a candidate, you must join a pack of other reporters; even

the most independent journalist cannot completely escape the pressures of the pack."

Kristin K. Froemling

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Paid Media

See Political Advertising

Palestine Liberation Organization

See Arafat, Yasser

Paletz, David

See *Political Communication*

Palme, Olof (1927–1986)

Olof Palme was Sweden's internationally best-known politician during the 20th century. Notwithstanding his upper-class background, he joined the Social Democratic Party as a student. He was the party leader 1969–1986 and prime minister 1969–1976 and 1982–1986. During his more than 30 years at the center of politics, he strongly contributed to changing the relations between the political sphere and media.

Palme came into politics in the beginning of 1950s; a few years later Sweden's first television broadcasting began. As a cabinet member, he became responsible for the Swedish Radio and Television Company, which helped make him aware of media's potential. Palme strongly promoted the principle of public service, and he objected to commercial radio and TV.

Unlike most politicians at that time, he did not hesitate to appear on TV. Instead he did it often and willingly. This made him the target of criticism, in particular from political opponents who accused him of using the state television for his own political agenda. Nevertheless, the television became his most important rostrum.

One thing that distinguished Palme from his political predecessors was that he made a habit of treating journalists very informally. He was often favored by the media because of his political devotion, his provocative rhetoric, and his availability to journalists and photographers. Moreover, he had a deep knowledge of and readiness to accept and adjust to media logics.

In the '60s, many journalists liked Olof Palme, as they felt he represented something new and more radical in Swedish politics. A contributory cause was his criticism of the U.S. war in Vietnam. The relations between Palme and journalists during those years can be characterized as somewhat symbiotic. In the '70s, political journalism went through a process of professionalization. The party press became less loyal to the parties. Simultaneously, there was a drift toward conservatism. The political as well as the media agendas were dominated by issues that the Social Democratic Party had problems dealing with. When the party lost the general elections in 1976, Palme blamed the media. It would take 6 years before he was back in office.

Olof Palme believed in a strong society, where employment and the public sector were the two most important means to increase equality between classes and sexes. His commitment to international issues was about the elimination of colonialism, racism, and nuclear war.

When it comes to the relations between media and politics, he set a new standard in Swedish political life. Earlier, and to a greater extent than anyone else, his political work was directed to the mediated public sphere. This was called into question—he was accused of attaching too great importance to media publicity. The view today is that he contributed to making media an increasingly important arena for political communication. He also made media coverage a measure of political success.

Olof Palme's personality, his politics, and his media visibility made him a controversial person, arousing strong emotions—positive and negative. In

February 1986, he was assassinated in central Stockholm. The murder is still unsolved.

Gunnela Björk

Papandreou, Andreas (1919–1996)

Andreas Papandreou studied at the Law School of the University of Athens and as early as 1936 he was impeached by the dictatorial regime of the time. In 1941 he set out from Greece for the United States, where he pursued an academic career in economics and philosophy at Harvard University. In 1947 he became assistant professor at Harvard University and then professor at the University of Minnesota, the University of California, Los Angeles, and elsewhere. In 1951, he married Margarita Tsant. This was his second marriage, which gave him four children, among them George (present leader of the opposition). At the invitation of Konstantinos Karamanlis, his subsequent political opponent, he came back to Greece in 1961. In the 1964 elections, he was elected with the party of Enosis Kentrou (Union of the Center), led by his father George, who had been a prominent politician during the 1950s and '60s.

In April 1967, Papandreou was arrested by the Dictatorship of the Colonels. He was released the following year, when he departed for Paris and settled first in Sweden and then Canada. While in exile he initiated extensive antidictatorial activity. After the restoration of democracy in Greece, he returned home and founded the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (*Panhellinio Socialistiko Kinima*; PASOK). In the first postauthoritarian elections, in November 1974, PASOK was initially represented by only a few members of Parliament (MPs). In the next parliamentary elections, in November 1977, its strength was doubled and Papandreou became the leader of the opposition.

During the period between 1977 and 1981, PASOK managed to establish itself as an hegemonic political force, which capitalized on the ability and populist charisma of its leader. In the 1981 elections, when PASOK campaigned with the catchword of "change" (*allagi*), it ranked first party with an absolute majority in Parliament. In 1985's elections PASOK was again elected first party (45.8% of the vote). PASOK and Andreas Papandreou dominated the political scene during the '80s, which has been described as a "populist decade." With regards to political communication, PASOK's and Papandreou's political discourse and style of campaign were, among other characteristics, polarizing, anti-American, underdog, nationalist, and mobilizing.

In 1988, Andreas Papandreou underwent a serious heart operation. In the national elections of June 1989, PASOK proved wrong all those who had predicted a dramatic downfall and placed second, with 39.1% of the vote. In September 1989, Papandreou was referred to a special court after a decision of the Greek Parliament relating to political and economic scandals. The long trial attracted the news media's attention and was reported live. In January 1991, Andreas Papandreou was found not guilty by the special court—in which he never appeared.

In 1993, PASOK's electoral victory was a vindication for Papandreou, who despite his poor health staged a triumphant return to power. In those elections "telepolitics" was widely implemented by PASOK and other parties as they applied political marketing tools and focused on television news programs, positive and negative political advertising, and political talk shows. Afterward he abandoned his former populist strategy and adopted a more realistic attitude. In November 1995 he developed serious health problems, and he resigned as prime minister in January 1996. He passed away on June 23, 1996.

Nicolas Demertzis

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Parasocial Relationships in Politics

Parasocial relationship is a term used to describe the pseudo-personal relationship media users develop toward mass media performers. Donald Horton and R. Richard Wohl were the first to bring up the parasocial relationship idea in 1956. They claimed that the unique characteristics of the electronic media,

especially those of television, have encouraged an illusional face-to-face relationship between spectators, defined as the media users, and performers, defined as the personas that appear repeatedly in the media, such as actors, presenters, newscasters, and politicians. The qualities of television, such as close-up shots and camera zooms, create a sense of intimacy, reality, and affinity toward the personas on the screen. Observers have indicated that these qualities are felt more strongly in the context of politics, due to the realistic nature of the political material and the high frequency with which it appears on screens. Researchers added that politicians, media people, and the audience welcome the parasocial phenomenon. It may contribute to the popularity of politicians, to the rating of shows, and to the gratification of audience needs to communicate with politicians and political content, especially in times of political disaffection.

It was not until the late 1970s that the parasocial concept started to receive attention in the communication discipline. The trigger came from the extensive development of the uses and gratifications theory, which examines how the audience uses the media and for what purposes. Major progress in the field was marked within the boundaries of political communication research by Mark R. Levy in 1979. Levy studied television news while measuring the parasocial relationships between newscasters and television news viewers. It appears that the viewers like to compare their own ideas with what the commentators say, see the newscasters as friends, and find the news easier to take when the newscasters joke around with each other. Moreover, support was found for the correlation between parasocial relationship and television news exposure, meaning that high gratification of the parasocial relationship comes along with increased levels of exposure to television news. Finally, in attempts to profile the parasocial audience, Levy found that education relates negatively to parasocial relationship, in other words, the more people are educated the less they would be prone to develop parasocial relationships with newscasters. Since Levy's benchmark, parasocial research in politics has taken various directions: television news, political talk radio, and parasocial strategies.

The largest group of studies has been focused on television news audiences while leaning on the uses and gratifications tradition. In 1985 Alan M. Rubin, Elizabeth M. Perse, and Robert A. Powell made a significant development when they devised a 20-item scale, known as the PSI scale, to measure parasocial interaction of television news viewers toward newscasters. Prominent PSI findings indicate that news viewers mostly see their favorite newscasters as natural, down-to-earth persons, as people who seem to understand the kinds of things the viewers want to know and feel sorry when the newscasters make mistakes. While taking a step forward, some researchers attempted to reveal the origins of the behavior depicted in the PSI scale. They did not find much support for the hypothesis that states that parasocial relationships with newscasters are used as substitutes for social events and feelings of loneliness. However, studies did find that when viewers feel affinity with news programs, perceive the news as reality, react with positive emotions to the news, and view news in order to receive information, they are more likely to develop parasocial interactions with favorite television newscasters. Some researchers suggested that viewers originally use the news to gratify instrumental needs such as information seeking and subsequently develop parasocial relationships. At the same time, other findings suggest that television news viewers seek parasocial interactions independently from other gratifications; however, it seems that in the process of obtaining these gratifications, viewers do link gratifications such as parasocial interactions and entertainment.

In the early 1980s, Lawrence A. Wenner decided to shift the focus from newscasters to politicians and conducted a study on parasocial interaction between viewers and presidential candidates who appear on television news. He found that people who are poor, uneducated, low on political cynicism, high on campaign interest, and nonreaders tend to develop parasocial interactions with candidates appearing in the news and, in the process, receive vote guidance.

Studies that have concentrated on political talk radio audiences examined the level of involvement among listeners, which ranges from passive listeners who do not listen at all to active listeners who call the host. Results illustrate a triple connection among listener involvement, political participation, and inclination toward parasocial interaction. Apparently, people who participate in political and civic activities such as voting and demonstrations tend to be more active listeners and to search for parasocial interaction with the host. Other studies explored the effects of parasocial interaction on listeners' behavior and attitudes. Listeners who experience parasocial interaction with a host tend to expose themselves to the show more

often, see the host as a credible source of information, and as a persona who can influence their attitudes and behavior.

Despite the sparse literature on parasocial strategies used by politicians and newscasters, some strategies have been documented. Some of them are attractive appearance, warm tone, informality, emotionality, storytelling technique, blending with the audience, and production techniques. Studies demonstrate how media and other social forces have turned politics into a personal experience for voters and media users. Candidates' personal qualities become more significant for voters. Accordingly, research reports that politicians try to emphasize their personalities and images on the screen while using strategies to create intimacy. To illustrate the significance of this phenomenon, one study showed how in the historical 1978 Camp David Accords that outlined a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel politicians used parasocial techniques to approach their target audiences. Recently, the parasocial phenomenon was implemented in the televised political advertising setting. The one study conducted in the field found that the use of parasocial strategies in ads have increased over the years. Moreover, results suggest that religious and left-wing political parties tend to use parasocial strategies significantly more than nonreligious and right-wing parties.

Galit Marmor-Lavie

See also Political Involvement; Talk Radio in Politics; Talk Shows, Television; Uses and Gratifications Approach

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Participation, Political

Political participation can be loosely defined as citizens' activities aimed at influencing political decisions. It includes activities such as voting, signing a petition, or blocking streets. Political participation refers to people in their role as citizens and not, say, as politicians or civil servants. It is understood as an *activity*—simply watching television or being interested in politics does not constitute participation. Political participation is *voluntary* and is not ordered by a ruling class or obliged under some law. Finally, political participation concerns *government and politics* and is neither restricted to specific phases (such as parliamentary decision making), nor to specific levels or areas (such as national elections or contacts with officials). Political participation is directly related to the quality of democracy. Democracy is not worth its name if it does not refer to government by the people; hence democracy cannot function without some minimum level of political participation. A lack of political participation is considered destructive for democracy, and debates focus on the amount of participation—not on the necessity of it.

In the past 60 years the forms of political participation expanded continuously. This increase reflects the growing relevance of government and politics, the blurring of the distinction between private and public spheres, and the rise in skills and resources (especially education) among citizens. In the 1940s and 1950s political participation was restricted mainly to voting and campaign activities. By the early 1960s it was broadly understood as campaigning by politicians and parties and contacts between citizens and public

officials. These forms of activities became known as "conventional" modes of participation. The late 1960s and early 1970s show a growing relevance of community groups and direct contacts of citizens with public officials and politicians. More important was the social turbulence in the late 1960s. Evidently, protest and rejection are also clear expressions of citizens' interests and opinions and should be accepted as forms of political participation. These newer forms of participation have been labeled as "unconventional" modes of participation because they were not in line with the norms and values of the early 1970s. "New Social Movements" such as the women's movement or those of pacifist organizations belong to this category too. Another expansion took place in the 1990s. The disappearing border between political and nonpolitical spheres of society led to an expansion of political participation with "civil" activities such as volunteering. In short, political participation grew from voting in the 1940s to nearly every conceivable form of nonprivate activity now.

The continuous extension of the forms of political participation does not imply that participation is a one-dimensional concept that simply absorbs new activities. The question about the modes of political participation has been debated in many studies. First, voting always is a distinct mode of political participation; that is, no other activities are systematically related to casting a vote. Second, campaign activities constitute a mode of political participation on its own, and the same applies, third, to contacting officials or politicians. Protest activities (and New Social Movements) constitute a fourth major mode. It is not yet clear to what extent activities in voluntary associations establish a fifth type of political participation or that we are dealing with a further specification of one of the existing modes.

The increase in political participation is driven by political and societal changes that have broadened the repertoire of activities as well as the public domain for those activities. Clearly, the space defined by repertoire and domain is enormous. For instance, an individual demand for some home equipment by a disabled citizen has to be labeled as political participation if the request is directed to a public office. And for a private firm selling tropical wood, a blockade of a transport rapidly becomes "political" if ecological groups try to attain public attention by mobilizing citizens against this transport.

The growth of the forms of participation has not led to a substantial increase in the proportion of citizens being politically active. Voting still is the most popular activity used by almost every citizen at least once in his or her life. Although actions such as signing petitions appeal to growing parts of the citizenry, most forms of political participation are used by (tiny) minorities of the population only. Whether a decline in some form of participation (especially voting) is "compensated" by the rise of new forms of participation is still debated. Whereas some citizens use a number of different forms of participation to express their cause, many people seem to refrain from those activities almost completely.

The willingness to participate depends on situational factors, especially mobilizing events and conflicts, institutional opportunities, and group integration. In addition, extensive empirical research confirms the fact that individual resources—education, social status, social networks—are highly relevant for the mobilization of citizens. Surprisingly, political participation is not widely spread among victims of societal developments or marginalized social groups. On the contrary: participation is tilted in the direction of the higher educated, higher income, higher status, and more integrated groups in society. The growing political skills and resources of citizenries in general in the past decades have not reduced this evident bias in political recruitment and opportunities for interest representation. Despite the rapid increase in the forms of participation available, empirical research unambiguously shows a continuous and consistent violation of the basic democratic principle of equal access and responsiveness.

The opportunities presented by Internet technologies have widened the scope and forms of political participation once again. Experiences with "digital democracy" show that voter turnout can be increased considerably. Political theorists focusing on deliberation instead of the expression of opinions and interests especially expect an improvement of the quality of democratic decision making when the Internet is used for participation. To find a fruitful conceptualization for political participation—avoiding the correct but useless conclusion that participation can be everything, but is not used by everybody—seems to be one of the most crucial challenges for the further development of democracy.

Jan W. van Deth

See also Political Disaffection; Political Efficacy

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Party Election Broadcasts

Party election broadcasts (PEBs) are blocks of television and radio airtime allocated free of charge to parties during election campaigns. They are effectively free political advertising rationed to parties that meet certain criteria. While the practice of allocating free airtime is common in countries with traditions of public service broadcasting, the name "Party Election Broadcast" is associated with the United Kingdom. Britain offers an extreme example of the practice in that paid political advertising is prohibited completely on television and radio, while PEBs must be carried by designated commercial television and radio channels as well as the public broadcaster, the BBC. Few other countries provide this particular combination of controls. Thus Britain stands at the opposite end of the spectrum from the United States, which offers no free airtime and where campaigns are dominated by paid political commercials.

Principles and Regulations

The underlying principles of the United Kingdom's PEB model are (1) provision of a relatively level electoral playing field for the major parties, (2) control of campaign costs, and (3) balancing freedom of speech against the other two aims.

There has been cross-party consensus on these principles, and they explain the historic opposition to paid political advertising on television. The PEB system operated voluntarily until 1990 when the Broadcasting Act enshrined it in law. The regulatory framework is now overseen by the BBC and Ofcom, the regulator of the commercial sector. Ofcom sets the minimum requirements for designated broadcast channels in regard to carrying PEBs of specified lengths, currently between just under 3 and 5 minutes. The BBC and the main private terrestrial channels (ITV, Channel 4, and Channel 5) must air PEBs in peak time for general elections and national referenda. PEBs are offered to the "major parties": the three main parties Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, plus the Scottish and Welsh nationalists and main parties in Northern Ireland. "Minor" parties may qualify for PEBs, provided they are registered with the Electoral Commission and contest at least one-sixth of all seats up for election.

The PEB rules keep political advertising tightly within the main parties' ambit. However, at every general election in recent times, there have been special interest parties that meet the qualification threshold. The Ofcom code sets the guidelines but leaves the detail of allocation and scheduling to the BBC and the "designated" commercial broadcasters. By convention since 1964, the Conservative and Labour parties have received five PEBs each per general election and the Liberals usually four. Allotments to minor parties are based on preexisting strength in Parliament and opinion polls but rarely amount to more than one each.

Control of costs has been a powerful argument against the introduction of paid political advertising. The ban has contained the costs of national campaigns, such that central election spending in Britain is no higher in real terms than in the 1960s. Moreover, the PEBs offer a subsidy in kind, offsetting the historic fund-raising advantage of the Conservatives. Freedom of speech is the third regulatory aim, and this is protected in the Ofcom Broadcasting Code. PEBs are free from the commercial advertising consumer protections of "honesty" and "truthfulness" and are not subject to the complaints procedures that Ofcom adjudicates for regular commercials.

History and Development

Initially the PEBs were the campaign on television. The BBC offered little campaign coverage and persuaded the parties to take PEBs, one each for the major parties in the 1951 and 1955 elections. The golden age of PEBs came later, from 1959 to 1966, with the arrival of commercial television (ITV) and

the growth of the audience. By 1959, most homes had a set, and PEBs had become established as the main campaign tool on television. Moreover, their allocation set the terms for judging "stopwatch balance" in political news; the amount of news devoted to each major party was to be roughly in line with the ratio of PEBs. The allocation gradually increased to the current ration of five each for the Conservatives and Labour by the 1964 election. The broadcasts were shown simultaneously on both channels, thus ensuring a huge captive national audience. Concurrent transmission on BBC and ITV stopped after 1987, and in 1992 the ITV unilaterally abandoned stopwatch balance. However, even before then PEBs had come to be regarded as in decline, their functions as promotional and educational resources usurped by television news and the parties' battles to influence the news agenda. At every election since 1987, the audience for PEBs has reduced as the television market expanded, from four channels to more than 270 in 2005, with only five of them now obliged to show PEBs.

Trends Over Time

The look of PEBs transformed in the period 1979–2005, due largely to the influence of the advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi on behalf of Margaret Thatcher's Conservatives. In form and style PEBs borrowed much from U.S. political advertising and from normal commercials. The main changes are as follows:

- Reduced length of PEBs
- Cultivation of nonpolitical language and promotional styles
- Dominance of issue advertising
- Conservative negativity within predominantly positive campaigns

The maximum length declined from 30 minutes in 1955 to 4 minutes, 40 seconds for the 2005 elections. The parties encouraged the trend, led by Saatchi, which decided in the 1983 election not to fill the then 10-minute maximum. Since then parties have increasingly opted for the minimum length, and in 2005 the average length of the main parties' PEBs was just 3 minutes. Declining length was predictable as soon as production was put in the hands of agencies, and after the success of the Saatchis, Labour has followed suit with a succession of celebrity movie and commercial directors.

The trend to nonpolitical style is exemplified in leader-biography PEBs that emphasize personal character. Leaders have progressively eclipsed all other party spokespersons. This is in contrast to the 1950s–1974 era, when it was usual for the members of leadership teams to present issues related to their individual portfolios. Equally striking is a new tendency for PEBs not to use politicians at all, preferring actors and popular genre story formats.

Research over successive elections finds that PEBs are informative, providing a reasonable guide to the main parties' key proposals. In the 1997–2005 campaigns, 79% of the three main parties' PEBs emphasized issues. The dominance of negative advertising and its potential damage to voter engagement has been a major thrust of research in the United States. However, despite British willingness to draw lessons from America, PEBs have not been heavily negative. For the four elections from 1992, the PEBs have been predominantly positive, considerably so in the case of Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The Conservatives are the exception in the period 1992–2001, with increasingly aggressive advertising, although in the 2005 campaign their positive/negative balance was more in line with their rivals.

Effects of PEBs

Overall, research finds modest but significant effects of PEBs on voters' attitudes. There is little evidence of effect on vote choice, except in the case of the third party, the Liberal Democrats, who gain a small increase in support. However, viewing PEBs is associated with improved assessments of leaders' qualities and, to a lesser extent, overall opinions of parties. Additionally, election surveys also indicate that viewing PEBs is associated with knowledge gain and with increased attention to the campaign. Polls over many elections report that the majority of respondents find PEBs uninteresting. However, there is also fairly strong support for the principle of PEBs, and surveys indicate considerable reach, with approximately two-thirds of the electorate seeing a broadcast during the course of an election campaign. PEBs remain the parties' most important non-news communication tool nationally.

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See also Political Advertising

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Party Identification

Party identification is a term that is used to describe a psychological attachment to a political party. The concept was initially developed by Angus Campbell and his colleagues at the University of Michigan in their landmark studies of voting behavior in U.S. presidential elections in the 1950s. It is at the heart of the social psychological model of electoral choice and became a central concept in the study of public opinion and voting behavior. The Michigan scholars conceptualized party identification as a durable affective loyalty that tends to reinforce itself as it serves as a perceptual filter that screens out information that might weaken it. It is seen as shaping citizens' perceptions of politics, their evaluations of political objects like candidates and issues, and their behavioral responses to political stimuli, most important their voting behavior. By providing coherence and stability to political perception and political behavior, party identification conditions the effectiveness of communication strategies adopted by political elites. At the aggregate level, party attachments provide stability to public opinion and electoral outcomes.

The concept of party identification encompasses two dimensions. The directional component indicates which party a voter identifies with, while the intensity component denotes how strongly she identifies with this party. The Michigan scholars devised a simple instrument to measure party identification in the United States. First, respondents are asked, "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?" Persons who identify with a party then are asked how strongly they do, while the remaining respondents are then asked whether they lean toward a party. Subsequently, the answers to these questions are combined to form a seven-point scale ranging from strong and weak Democratic identifiers to weak and strong Republican identifiers. At the midpoint of the scale, pure Independents are located between Democratic and Republican leaners. Thus, to capture the concept that encompasses two components a one-dimensional measure is used.

This procedure has several conceptual implications that have not gone without criticism. First, some authors proposed to regard the directional component and the intensity component as being independent of one another, so that it would become easier to explain why some strong identifiers with one party turn to strong identifiers of another party. Second, the traditional measure assumes the identification with one party to be incompatible with an attachment toward another party, thereby ruling out the possibility of multiple party identifications. Third, partisan independence and party identification are also assumed to be mutually exclusive. Building on evidence on the attitudinal and behavioral correlates of independent leaning, critics objected that this assumption is not valid and conceives of independent leaners as "closet partisans." However, more recent research revealed crucial differences between leaners and identifiers in attitudes toward political independence, thereby backing the traditional measure. Finally, critics pointed to the possibility that citizens may dislike a party while not identifying with any party. Building on this argument, they pleaded for considering positive and negative attachments to political parties independently. Despite these and related objections, the traditional measure of party identification is still in use.

Only a few years after it had been developed to analyze attitude formation and voting behavior in the United States, scholars attempted to export the concept of party identification to other political systems. In a lively debate, scholars raised severe doubts about whether the concept could travel abroad. Some critics argued that in European countries political conflict is entirely structured by deeply rooted social cleavages, so that party identification is derived from social group membership and cannot add to our understanding of opinion formation and voting behavior. Another strand in this debate questioned whether party identification could be used in parliamentary systems, as in this setting, party identification tended to travel with voting behavior, thereby undermining the notion of party identification as standing decision that is distinguishable from and provides stability to voting behavior. Measurement issues also loomed large in this

debate, with functional equivalence being a primary concern. Though these and related issues are not entirely settled yet, it is widely agreed upon that the concept is applicable to political systems other than the United States. At the same time, evidence from diverse countries suggests that the characteristics of party attachments are correlated with attributes of the political setting. For instance, party identification is likely to be more stable in political systems with stable political parties.

By serving as a perceptual screen, party identification is a factor that conditions how a voter processes political information. Identifying with a political party makes a person more inclined to be attentive to and to learn about politics. At the same time, party identification promotes selective exposure, selective perception, selective retrieval, and selective interpretation, so that party identifiers are prone to primarily receive information that reinforces their existing loyalty. Party identifiers are thus likely to consider politics as being highly controversial and to prefer candidates and policy proposals from the party they identify with to politicians and issue positions of other parties. Accordingly, by shaping political perception, party identification enables voters to orient themselves to political objects that are remote to their daily lives and that they are not well acquainted with, though their attitudes toward political objects are likely to be biased.

Party identification thus serves as a heuristic or cost-saving device, providing voters with a shortcut to political evaluations and decisions. Building on the traditional view, this effect leads to a somewhat paradoxical result, as identifying with a political party is likely to be accompanied with being highly knowledgeable about politics, so that it serves as a heuristic for those voters who are least in need of orientation in the political sphere. The functional interpretation of party identification turns this upside down. It assumes the need for a cost-saving device to be function of political sophistication. Accordingly, it is the political inattentive voters who should acquire party attachments, while political attentive voters should not. Although this argument sounds reasonable, it is not supported by the evidence: party identifiers are more strongly interested in and attentive to politics and know more about political matters than political independents. Thus, voters appear to not intentionally choose to acquire party attachments in order to make sense of politics.

A fundamental issue in the controversies about party identification concerns its stability over time. Initially, the Michigan scholars conceptualized party identification as a long-term force largely unresponsive to current political stimuli. Stability is crucial to the traditional conception of party identification, as it is a prerequisite for party attachments structuring and providing stability to citizens' political perceptions and behavior. The traditional view has been challenged by empirical findings showing that party identification responds to short-term influences. Building on these findings, revisionists decided to adapt the traditional concept of an affective party loyalty that structures political perceptions, political evaluations, and political behavior. Instead, they suggested conceptualizing party identification as a "running tally" of retrospective evaluations of political parties. In this view, party identification does not stabilize and reinforce itself, so that party attachments will be stable only if the political environment is stable. Empirical evidence shows, however, that despite its responsiveness to short-term stimuli, party identification is one of the most stable of political attitudes, and it actually "colors" political perceptions and evaluations considerably, though it does not screen out any information that might weaken it. Thus, it is fair to conclude that though party identification is not an "unmoved mover," that is, immutable and insensitive to real-world events, it shapes political perception and usually does not respond to short-term forces quickly and sizably.

A related issue deals with how party identification evolves within an individual's life cycle. Initially, party identification was seen as acquired in childhood and then becoming more stable in direction and stronger throughout the life cycle as it reinforced itself by promoting selective processing. Accordingly, party identification was seen as being mainly rooted in the family and the network of social relations defining the young adult experience. This view of party identification as being inherited has been challenged and qualified considerably. First, intergenerational transmission of party identification is far from perfect and responds to social and political conditions. In the politically turbulent 1960s and 1970s, for instance, the rates of intergenerational transmission of party identification in American families were considerably lower than in the fairly calm 1950s. Second, identifications that have been learned in childhood may change in later years, when adolescents and adults encounter information that does not reinforce their existing party attachments. Finally, persons who have not acquired a party identification in childhood may identify with a party in adulthood in

response to political experiences. Thus, it is now widely agreed that though the family is an important source of party identification, its effect is limited, and it competes with other factors for influence on party attachments.

Party identification is a standing decision for a political party. Thus, party identifiers are predisposed to vote for a particular party, so that they are less likely than independents to abstain, to split tickets, and to switch votes from one election to another. However, party identification does not determine voting behavior perfectly. Rather, by responding to candidate or issue appeals, voters might deviate from their party identification in the polling booth, so that they might not turn out or vote for a party other than the one they identify with. The effect of party identification on vote choice depends upon the strength of party identification, with strong party attachments being more powerful than weak ones. Moreover, political conditions play a role in conditioning the effect of party identification on vote choice. For example, voters are particularly likely to vote in line with their party attachments when they are asked to choose between parties rather than individual candidates or when individual candidates campaign as party mouthpieces. By contrast, if the prevailing issues are more controversial within parties than between parties, party identification is likely to affect vote only mildly. Though the effect of party attachments on vote choice is conditioned by several factors, party identifiers as a rule cast a vote in line with their partisan loyalty.

Party attachments condition the voter's responsiveness to campaign efforts. Party identifiers are less likely to make up their minds immediately before an election and to change their party preference as a response to electoral campaigns than independents. By implication, political independents are something of a natural target of campaign efforts aiming at this effect. However, party identifiers are not entirely immune to campaign effects but may be mobilized by electoral campaigns. Thus, it is reasonable for campaigners to adopt different strategies when campaigning for votes of partisan identifiers and independents, respectively.

The individual level effects of party identification on political perceptions and on political behaviour have several aggregate-level ramifications. As party identification shapes political perception, public opinion on political issues is likely to be fairly calm when the electorate is made of wholesale party identifiers. Party attachments also condition the effectiveness of campaign strategies. Moreover, leaving political independents aside, the aggregate distribution of party attachments is likely to approximate the outcome of an election. As party identification is stable over time, in an electorate made up of dyed-in-the-wool party identifiers outcomes of subsequent elections are likely to resemble each other, while in an electorate not exhibiting any party attachments aggregate volatility is likely to be high. Finally, party attachments to existing parties make it more difficult for new parties to enter the political stage. Partisan loyalties thus tend to preserve the existing party system.

An aggregate-level extension of the notion of party identification as a standing decision for a political party is the normal vote analysis. It aims at determining the outcome of an election that would result if individual voting behavior were not influenced by short-term forces, or short-term effects canceled out each other, so that the vote shares of competing parties are not affected differentially. Comparing the actual outcome with the normal vote thus shows how strongly the aggregate outcome of an election is affected by short-term influences. This comparison may also be used to classify elections and to identify critical elections. The most prominent type of election is the *realigning election* that is defined as an election in which a former minority party obtains a majority both of the popular vote and of party attachments.

Empirically, both the United States and a number of other Western democracies have experienced a decline in party attachments over several decades. In the 1950s, about 3 out of 4 Americans identified with a political party. This rate declined precipitously in the 1960s to only 6 in 10 voters, and despite some recovery it has not reached the 1950s level again. In many European countries, the number of party identifiers has decreased considerably, as well. In Great Britain, for instance, though the number of party identifiers did not change considerably, the number of voters who identified (fairly) strongly with a party dropped from roughly 80% in the 1960s to about 60% at the turn of the century. Likewise, in the 1970s more than 8 out of 10 West Germans identified with a political party, while today only about 6 in 10 do. As party attachments affect individual-level attitude formation and voting behavior, the decline of party attachments, which is termed *dealignment,* exhibits considerable effects on the political landscape. Public opinion is likely to become more volatile, electoral outcomes

may be more strongly affected by campaigns and change considerably from one election to the next.

Harald Schoen

See also Dealignment; Ticket-Splitting; Voter Behavior

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Party Press

The "Party Press era" refers to a period of time (1783–1833) when news editors in the United States received patronage from political parties, usually in the form of government printing contracts. An editor who had limited financial resources would readily endorse a party's candidates and champion its principles. In turn he received support for his six-cent paper. This gave the editor, who served as printer, writer, and business manager, a sense of prestige and power in society, and patronage was critical to the paper's long-term economic stability. For example, during Thomas Jefferson's administration, Samuel Harrison Smith, editor of the *National Intelligencer* in Washington, D.C., received from the State Department each year thousands of dollars, a considerable sum at the time.

Generally, the era in the United States is considered to have begun in 1783 with the end of the Revolution and ended in 1833 with the rise of the penny press. Still, 80% of the press remained partisan at the outbreak of the Civil War, according to the 1860 census. The Party Press era coincided with extensive growth in the American press. In 1783, the newly independent nation had only 35 newspapers, but by 1833 it had 1,200. The non-advertising content of the Party Press era was primarily political news and interpretation, including abuse hurled at opponents. Most editors prominently displayed the names of a party's ticket for weeks. Editors also printed speeches of major national and state political leaders as well as significant government documents.

The concept of having a press that represented a variety of political points of view came directly out of the civil liberties philosophy of James Madison, among others, as stated in the First Amendment, which guarantees no interference from Congress regarding freedom of the press. Implicitly, not having an official government newspaper was parallel to the idea of not having a single state religion. In the first decade of the Party Press, newspapers had to survive the Sedition Act of President John Adams, who made criticism of the federal government illegal. Several Republican editors were prosecuted under that law, but his successor and political opponent, Jefferson, let the renewable law expire. Jefferson believed written criticism of the government did not necessarily lead to revolution and that the press could serve as a check on the abuse of power. Based on the impact of Thomas Paine's pamphlets during the Revolution, politicians in this era believed editors' words had a significant effect on public opinion.

The Party Press coincided with the first two party systems in the United States. First came the contest between the Republicans and Federalists, followed by the battle between Democrats and Whigs. Editors, many of them politicians themselves, lined up on each

side of these political divides and interpreted events of the day within the ideology of a particular party.

Politicians frequently owned newspapers, and editors sometimes became politicians. Alexander Hamilton printed the pro-Federalist *Gazette of the United States.* Decades later, Henry J. Raymond served in the New York legislature before founding the *Times,* and *Tribune* editor Horace Greeley would run for president after the Civil War. Abraham Lincoln owned a newspaper, a German-language organ that supported the Republicans. No politician in the first 75 years of the nation's history took advantage of partisan editors better than Andrew Jackson, who bestowed federal jobs on at least 40 journalists when he became president.

David W. Bulla

See also Press Freedom

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Patterson, Thomas

See *Unseeing Eye, The*

PBS (Public Broadcasting Service)

The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) is a nonprofit public broadcasting network that was founded in the United States in 1969. PBS has no central production or news division, and public television stations are horizontally networked so that each autonomous station determines its own programming. The Public Broadcasting Service is a community-centered and anticommercial media enterprise operated by 86 nonprofit community organizations, 57 universities, 20 state authorities, and 6 local educational authorities in the United States.

PBS has a number of partnerships with nonprofit organizations such as America's Public Television Station (APTS), Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), National Educational Telecommunications Association (NETA), National Public Broadcasting Archives (NPBA), National Public Radio (NPR), and Public Radio International (PRI). These partner affiliations provide financial and nonfinancial resources as well as supports for quality programming. PBS has 349 public TV member stations throughout the United States. Although each member station that supplies PBS programs does not have the right to broadcast them, it does have the right to sell its programs in the form of nonbroadcast media such as books, DVDs, and other merchandise.

PBS goals are to provide objective information to all U.S. citizens equally by cooperating with member stations and upholding media ethics for American public and media producers. It provides communication standards and policies for media producers, determines whether programs are appropriate for public TV, and distributes and schedules programs that meet the standards to its member stations and other media corporations.

PBS is well known for its objective educational programs. PBS TeacherSource helps pre-K–12 educators learn more about efficient teaching methods. PBS TeacherLine provides professional courses and classroom lessons in reading, mathematics, science, and technology, among other subjects. Such programs prove useful for teachers and home-schooled students. PBS programs also focus on politics, science, the arts, and film. Station WGBH is one of the largest producers of educational programs, with WETA-TV and WPBT producing news programs, and WNET producing interview shows. These programs are sent to PBS, which reorganizes and schedules them for broadcasting.

PBS also contributes to media liberalism. Unlike cable or satellite TV, PBS opens its programs to public access despite the fact that it only has three to four different signals. Its programs are carefully evaluated under stricter standards and regulations than those for cable and satellite TV programs. To uphold the standards of the Public Broadcasting Act, which states that public TV programs should be politically fair, accurate, and ethically neutral, PBS tries to remain independent of political pressures and funding sources. Studies

show that compared to other media corporations, PBS programs are more professionally produced, cover many different viewpoints, and offer more educational and enlightening shows to provide audiences with useful and varying information sources. Individual member stations are often innovative and diverse in their programming to meet local needs and interests.

PBS also provides a regular evening national newscast, the 1-hour-long *NewsHour with Jim Lehrer.* Although the show traditionally has the lowest audience of any regular network newscast, the program has a regular following, and Jim Lehrer is considered a professional and respected journalist.

Hyun Jung Yun

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Pentagon Papers, The

The Pentagon Papers, a 7,000-page classified study commissioned by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in 1967, detailed U.S. involvement in Vietnam by tracing policies and decision making in Indochina from the 1940s to 1968. *The Pentagon Papers* became public knowledge on June 13, 1971, with the debut of a series of articles in *The New York Times* by journalists Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith. By day three of the series, Attorney General John N. Mitchell requested *The New York Times* cease publication of *The Pentagon Papers.* The *Times* refused. Over the next few days, a series of court decisions addressing the right of the press to publish information and the right of the government to control information in the name of national security ensued. The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled on June 30, in *New York Times Co. v. United States* (1971), that the government could not exercise prior restraint without threatening the rights of the press under the First Amendment. *New York Times Co. v. United States* (1971), also known as the *Pentagon Papers* case, was the first of its kind, as it tested the nature of the relationship between a free press and the government.

Soon after the court ordered suspension of the *New York Times* series, *The Washington Post,* and then the *Boston Globe*, began publishing articles on *The Pentagon Papers.* Both newspapers received court orders to stop publication. Clearly *The New York Times* was not the only newspaper with access to *The Pentagon Papers* and finding the source of the leak became a major focus for the government. Within days, Daniel Ellsberg was identified as the leak. On June 28, he surrendered himself to the authorities and was charged with possession of unauthorized materials. In the early 1960s, Ellsberg had worked for the Defense Department in Vietnam, and by the late 1960s, he was with an independent think tank, the RAND Corporation. Through this association, he had access to *The Pentagon Papers.* By 1971, disillusioned with U.S. policies in Vietnam, Ellsberg sent photocopies of *The Pentagon Papers* to *The New York Times, The Washington Post,* and more than a dozen other newspapers. The charges against Ellsberg were dropped on May 11, 1973, on grounds of governmental misconduct.

The fallout from *The Pentagon Papers* lasted for months after initial publication and set the stage for continued investigative journalism during Watergate. *The Pentagon Papers,* as a landmark case about the relationship between the government and the press, reflected a time when the government was being questioned and the right of the public to know was being preserved.

Kaylene Barbe

See also First Amendment; Press Freedom; Watergate

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People's Choice, The

To this day, the study known as the People's Choice has influenced academic discussion far beyond the field of political communication. In sociology, the study is

regarded as methodological spadework, in political science as the first systematic explanation for voting behavior, and in communicational science as the beginning of the empirical research on media effects. Thus, the study is a milestone for any of these disciplines.

Methodically, Paul Felix Lazarsfeld (1901–1976) continued to develop for People's Choice the instrument of the descriptive survey in order to explain differences between and changes of attitudes. From the constituency of the Erie County community in Ohio, he took a representative sampling that was divided into four evenly composed groups of 600 persons each. One of these groups was interviewed once a month over a period of 7 months during the presidential election campaign of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Wendell Wilkie in 1940 in order to trace individual developments. The other three groups were used for monitoring purposes by interviewing them once, but not at the same time—a groundbreaking design ("panel technique").

The substantial output of this study can be summarized in three theses:

1. *Political predispositions.* Social structures explain voting decisions. The assumption is that the decision for a vote can be explained by considering three lines of conflict: city/country, socioeconomic status, and religion. "Social characteristics determine political preference" (p. 27). Through an "index of political predisposition," the interviewees were grouped into different classes that permitted for prognostication about their voting decisions. The election campaign had the following effects:

- The primary political orientation of more than half of the interviewees is reinforced during and by the election campaign ("reinforcement effect").
- The political orientation of 14% is not activated until the election campaign, but this orientation can be predicted from their positions in the social structure ("activation effect").
- Only a small number (8%) undergoes conversion of its previously stated party preference during the election campaign; these are usually unconcerned people with little interest in politics ("conversion effect").

2. *Opinion leadership.* Political preferences are mediated by communication in homogeneous groups. The social structure forms separate social networks. The communication in these social homogeneous groups is of determining significance, especially the interaction between the "opinion leaders" who are intensively involved in the election campaign and the "opinion followers" in the according network. Both types are distinguished by psychological and communicative variables, that is, willingness of articulation. So in all social groups there are "opinion leaders." They provide orientation for the followers, that is, they mediate "interpretations" and exert social pressure, for example, in their families or at work. For this reason the group specific opinions are intensified—including those of who will win the election ("bandwagon effect").

3. *Two-step flow.* Media messages have limited effects—mediated by the opinion leaders. Because of the group communication, latent political predispositions become apparent in the citizens. They are the selection pattern with which the media messages are filtered ("protective screen"). The opinion leaders follow the media in a comparatively intensive manner; they arrange the election propaganda according to the pattern of analysis and pass them on afterward. The authors are able to show that those who follow politics in the media very intensively change their opinions very rarely; their positions were also confirmed by messages that were intended to achieve the absolute opposite. Conversely, the more someone is susceptible to change, the less she or he is likely to be reached. The authors find interpersonal communication by far more effective than media communication; they see the reason for this in advantages such as flexibility, trust, and commitment: "more than anything else people can move other people" (p. 158).

All three results have to a great extent formed the understanding of public opinion. *The explanations for voting decisions out of the social structure* became the groundwork for election prediction models. Compared to competing approaches, the sociostructural explanation has lost ground as traditional social relationships are dissolving and thus the regular constituencies decrease and the volatile voting potential increases. The hypothesis of *the relevance of group communication* has been reviewed many times und developed to the network approach. The hypothesis of *the twofold relativized media influence* (through social structures and interpersonal communication) has dominated the discussion, until in the 1970s long-term and specific—for example, cognitive—media effects became the center of empirical research. In this process, a central

role is played by television, which is imputed with a comparatively high credibility and suggestive power and therefore with a higher influence on voting decisions than the press and the radio.

Gerhard Vowe

See also Mass Political Behavior; Voter Behavior

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Perón, Juan (1895–1974)

Juan Domingo Perón (1895–1974) was three times an Argentine president, from 1946 to 1955 (reelected) and from 1973 until his death. He founded one of the most relevant political movements in Latin America, Peronism, as institutionalized in the Justicialista Party. Perón and his second wife, Eva Duarte, are credited with achieving a better quality of life for the poorest sectors of Argentines. Opponents define him as populist and a dictator.

Perón began his political career in Argentina as a member of the military government that came into power in 1943. In charge of the Department of Labor, Perón agreed with the positions held by labor unions, socialists, and other political groups that represented his voting base. As a result of his growing influence, the government arrested him. He had to be released because of his followers' claims upon their occupation of Mayo Square in Buenos Aires. After that event, Mayo Square would become a key place for demonstrations and the mobilization of campaigns.

During his presidency, he strengthened ideas of political sovereignty, economical independence, and social justice and introduced most of them in the new Constitution of 1949. Benefits for the working class, nationalization of public services, and industrialization projects gave Perón the support of workers and industrial sectors, as well as internal and external rejection from dominant classes. Perón articulated that the country's international politics and his party's ideological orientation was a "third position," a different and alternative way beyond capitalism and communism.

His government took control over many newspapers and radio stations and carried out an intensive use of them. The conservative press objected to this media policy. In 1951, the first television transmission in Argentina took place. This media emerged as a government development project under private administration. During election times the role of propaganda was influential at improving the success of his direct, and highly charismatic communication with population. Perón began the trend of government advertising in Argentine politics. National campaigns establishing social reforms and presentation of public works received widespread official promotion.

The military coup d'état of 1955 resolved his proscription. He lived in exile in Madrid until he was allowed to return to Argentina in 1973. During his absence, the country experienced political censorship from the military dictatorship, which forbade the publication as well as any kind of public statement related to Perón and his political ideas. Upon his return, the right and left wings of the Peronist Party disputed the leader's favor. The confrontations divided public opinion and put the country into a situation of violence and insecurity. After his death, the power came into the hands of his third wife and vice president, Maria Estela Martínez, until she was withdrawn in 1976 by the last military coup d'état in Argentina.

Malvina Rodriguez

See also Perón, María Eva Duarte de

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Perón, María Eva Duarte de (1919–1952)

María Eva Duarte de Perón, well known as "Evita," was the second wife of President Juan Perón and the first female politician in Argentina whose fame extended beyond the country's borders. Bestowed with a mythic image by the worker class, Evita is credited

with improving social conditions for marginal sectors and furthering women's civic and political rights.

Evita was born in a humble family and moved at a very young age to Buenos Aires, where she aimed to become an actress. A few years later she became a popular radio presenter. She was early a labor activist as the head of the union for radio employees. Her speeches demonstrated her natural talent before big audiences, a charismatic approach to the masses, and an effective rhetorical style. Eva met Juan Perón at a fundraising rally for victims of an earthquake in 1944.

As a first lady, she created a foundation that financed and executed social projects for housing, health, education, and sport, in order to improve the quality of life of the country's poorest. She was well known for paying attention to people's individual demands in her government's office. Eva Perón is also credited with achieving suffrage rights for women in 1947. She encouraged female political participation by organizing and leading the feminine branch of the Peronist Party. As a result, the nation chose its first female deputies and senators in the 1951 elections.

Eva Perón influenced not only the government's propaganda machinery but also the official press. Her role as an intermediary with labor union delegations, as mediator in governmental conflicts, and her social and philanthropy activities found widespread media coverage. Nevertheless, the conservative and anti-Peronist media as well as some intellectual circles carried out a strong opposition to her behavior. Her image as a beautiful, intelligent, and powerful woman seduced not only her Argentinean supporters but also world public opinion. By visiting some European nations in 1947 she largely demonstrated her political capacity of negotiating strategic agreements for the Argentinean geopolitical position in the postwar scenario.

In 1951, Eva turned down a vice-presidential nomination, and as a victim of cancer, died the next year at the age of 33. Evita was mourned at a public mass with long vigils held all over the country. Argentinean Worker Unions and a Latin American Labor Federation petitioned the pope for her canonization. Her corpse was embalmed, and during the military dictatorships and Perón's proscription, was the object of political disputes between her relatives, supporters, and enemies and was moved to different destinations. Evita's life provoked several controversial responses. A martyr and religious image corresponds to the "Lady of Hope," supported by worker classes and orthodox Peronists. The Black Myth, sustained by the upper middle classes and anti-Peronists, characterizes her as a prostitute and ambitious person; and the Peronist left perceives her as a revolutionary woman.

Malvina Rodriguez

See also Perón, Juan

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Perot, Ross (1930–)

H. Ross Perot is a prominent business and civic leader, best known for running as a third party U.S. presidential candidate in 1992 and 1996 and for founding the Reform Party of the United States of America (RPUSA) in 1995.

Following his education at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, and a brief stint in the U.S. Navy, Perot went to work at International Business Machines (IBM) as a salesman. After a successful career in sales, Perot left IBM in 1962 to form his own data processing company, Electronic Data Systems (EDS). In 1984, Perot sold EDS to General Motors (GM) for billions in cash and stock options.

In 1979, while Perot was still in control of EDS, two of the company's employees were arrested and imprisoned in Iran. Perot financed a rescue mission, led by retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simons, that proved successful.

In the same year, Perot headed the Texas War on Drugs Commission, at Texas Governor Bill Clements' request. In 1982, Perot served on a commission charged with improving public education in Texas. In February 1992, Perot announced on the *Larry King Live* television program that he would be challenging then-President Bush in the presidential election that fall. His platform held stances in favor of balancing the federal budget, strengthening gun control legislation, and expanding the War on Drugs.

Perot's campaign surged in the postconvention period, with polls showing him leading Bush and Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton in June. However, in July, Perot announced he was dropping out of the race after negative media attention and the selection by the

Democratic Party of the Bill Clinton/Al Gore ticket. Perot reversed his decision to run in October, but his level of support never returned to the high numbers of the summer. However, he was allowed by the Presidential Debate Commission to participate in the 1992 presidential debates with Bush and Clinton, which undoubtedly increased his national visibility.

Following his defeat in 1992—in which he earned 19.8% of the popular vote, the best showing for an independent presidential candidate since Theodore Roosevelt in 1912—Perot maintained an active presence in national politics, crusading against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and supporting the 1994 Republican Revolution and the Republican Party's "Contract with America." In 1995, Perot formed the Reform Party of the United States of America (RPUSA). The Reform Party's original platform included strong positions on fiscal issues such as the national debt and the federal deficit, and promised significant political reform, including term limits, campaign finance reform, and lobbying restrictions.

The next year, Perot again ran for president, this time as the Reform Party's nominee. In 1996, however, he only received 8% of the national vote, due in part to difficulties getting on the ballot in several states and his exclusion from the nationally televised candidate debates.

Since 1996, Perot's visibility on the national stage has diminished. His leading role in the Reform Party was eclipsed by Jesse Ventura, the former professional wrestler and governor of Minnesota. Perot has since severed his ties to the Reform Party and turned his interests back to business.

Justin S. Vaughn

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Personal Campaigning

Personal campaigning is a traditional form of office seeking, and despite the importance of media and the Internet in modern campaigns, personal campaigning still plays an important role. Personal campaigning refers to two different aspects of the campaign process: personal interactions between candidates and voters and personal interactions between representatives of the candidate and voters.

Personal campaigning directly by candidates is, of course, the most visible and well-known part of the political process. Candidates seek to involve themselves directly with voters by going door to door, making individual phone calls, or seeking out voters directly in other individual one-on-one settings. Candidates also find personal appearances before small groups of voters can offer some of the same advantages as direct one-on-one campaigning.

Canvassing and *grassroots campaigning* are other words sometimes used to describe personal campaigning. When a candidate and/or a candidate's supporters "canvass" voters in this sense, it means that they go from door to door seeking to solicit the vote of the eligible voters in each household., often distributing flyers and campaign literature as well as meeting and talking directly with voters.

In lower level races, particularly at the local and districtwide level or in rural communities, personal campaigning is one of the only ways for a candidate to communicate with voters. In such situations, there are no localized media that can serve to get out the candidate's message, or the cost of media-oriented messages is too costly and inefficient to be a viable campaign strategy. Voters in such locales have come to expect that candidates will be available to meet with them personally.

Even at the U.S. presidential level, there is some evidence that personal campaigning is important. Such individual contact and personal or small-group meetings are particularly recognized as important in the early stages of a presidential campaign. The two earliest presidential selection markers, the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary, are situations where experts have agreed that candidate appearances and personal campaigning are crucial. A candidate's bank account and the advantages of media buys play a much larger role later in the primary selection process. But Iowa and New Hampshire are very much personal tests for candidates and their workers.

Research has been mixed on the effectiveness of particular aspects of personal campaigning. There is some evidence that personal campaigning is particularly effective at enhancing turnout. Voters who have been contacted personally by candidates or their

supporters are more likely to go to the polls and vote on Election Day. Evidence is less clear that personal campaigning translate directly into votes for the candidate who makes the contact.

Many studies also suggest that personal campaigning is particularly important outside the United States. In many countries, personal contact between candidates and voters is still very important and overrides media in many situations.

The increased use of computers in campaigning has raised questions about the ability of cyber-campaigning to replace or enhance personal campaigning. While some argue that Internet communications, particularly e-mail contact and chat room involvement, can provide voters with the feelings of personal and intimate involvement with candidates, other political observers argue that computers depersonalize the campaign contact and reduce voters' feelings of political engagement.

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Grassroots Campaigning

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PERSONAL INFLUENCE

Conceptualized by Elihu Katz and directed by mentor Paul F. Lazarsfeld at Columbia University, the 1955 book *Personal Influence* revolutionized understandings of how people interact with media institutions by reviewing and critiquing the substantial media theories that primarily dominated social thought at the time. Highlighting their principal argument, the duo subtitled the volume *The Part People Play in the Flow of Mass Communication,* thus demonstrating their key implication: mass media influence is not always one that is direct but is instead frequently mediated interpersonally through key figures who position social issues they have extricated from mass media sources.

Prior to the book's publication, social scientists studying mass communication largely believed that people assigned weight and relevance to information learned through media sources by their own means and of their own accord. That is, media theorists largely believed that the connection between mass media messages and the public was a direct one. Katz and Lazarsfeld challenge this notion in Part One of the volume by exploring how select groups of people are key to the circulation of messages within social groups, particularly messages they have extracted from mass media sources. Their theory argues, then, that instead of the largely held "one-step" system of influence that positions people as direct receivers of media messages, a "two-step" system of message dissemination is instead in play, through which key public figures identify media concepts, introduce them to people in their social networks, and explain how they are relevant to their social community. To support their assertions, the authors employ the rest of the volume exploring Katz's groundbreaking Decatur, Illinois, study examining mass communication's impact on social interaction. Not only does this study offer remarkable empirical evidence for the authors' theories, it also expands upon the assertions presented in Part One of the text—including data that suggest the media issues circulated through social systems in everyday talk were not limited to politics and public affairs, but also included recreation, fashion, discussion of popular culture, and consumer action.

The book is still frequently cited as one of the leading influences toward bringing mass communication into the exploration of how information flows interpersonally through the public sphere. After being out of print for a short period, the text was reissued in honor of its 50th anniversary in 2005 with a new essay from Katz, who revisits the research design and methodology of the Decatur study; examines the influence the study had on his career; and offers an overview of related work completed by mentor and coauthor

Lazarsfeld, who passed away in 1976. Also included is an introduction from the late Elmo Roper, who founded the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

Jimmie Manning

See also Interpersonal Communication; Parasocial Relationships in Politics; Personal Campaigning; Two-Step Flow Model of Communication

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Personalization of Politics

The personalization of politics may be defined as an individual politician gaining stature over the relative decline of his or her political power. In the United States, this may be evidenced by the terms "Reaganite" or "Reaganomics" named after President Ronald Reagan, or "Thatcherite" named after England's former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. In essence, the personalization of politics means more emphasis is placed on individuals instead of political parties.

No one single explanation exists regarding the origins of this phenomenon, though one theory states that the ubiquity of the electronic media is the culprit, specifically in national elections. Moreover, the electronic media has been viewed as decisive in shaping the way that governments communicate with voters and their seeking to convert them; at the same time, party leaders have exploited their exposure in the electronic media in order to attract votes.

During the past few decades, interest in how individuals accumulate information about candidates—personal as well as political—is an essential tool enabling the electorate the opportunity to make value judgments regarding the suitability or lack thereof of candidates seeking public office. Interest in a candidate for his or her personal mores has grown while strict loyalty to a political party has decreased. This supports the contention that political leaders have become electorally important in their own right, by personifying the policy platforms of their respective parties. In other words, if a political party wishes to win a national election, it needs to make sure that the chosen candidate is attractive to a wide range of voters since they are candidate centered rather than party focused.

The role of television in personalizing politics would be hard to overrate. During the 1952 presidential election, Dwight Eisenhower was viewed as being warm and friendly, while his opponent, Adlai Stevenson, was seen as cool, cerebral, and detached. A more powerful example was the first televised debate between presidential hopefuls John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon. Kennedy, the more handsome of the two, appeared cool and calm when answering questions, whereas Nixon appeared nervous and flighty. In terms of appearance, Kennedy won; in terms of substance, many felt Nixon was the victor (according to radio listeners, Nixon won hands-down).

Television executives make the decision about what to show the public regarding politicians. These decisions can determine whether voters are likely to have a view on the issue in the first place. For instance, television can imply that a leader is responsible for creating a problem in the first place, such as the failure of an economic policy. In addition, while the leader may not be responsible, he is seen as incompetent if the problem is not solved. Partisan loyalties to a political party, while not completely disappeared, have dimmed, and in the absence of strong social links to specific parties, such as class or religion, voters are more likely to switch their vote between elections or to abstain.

Cary Stacy Smith and Li-Ching Hung

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Persuasion, Political

Abraham Lincoln's observation that "he who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions" remains as true today as it was when Lincoln stated it during his first debate with Stephen Douglas in 1858. It is the quintessential statement of political persuasion, and political persuasion is a critical element of contemporary media democracy. Research on political persuasion cuts across disciplines, engaging scholars in communication, political science, social psychology, and marketing.

Foundations

Political persuasion fits into the general rubric of persuasion because it involves a deliberate attempt to convince people to change their attitudes in an atmosphere of free choice. To be sure, freedom is never absolute and does not operate in all political circumstances, such as coercive attempts at vote suppression. Nonetheless, political persuasion presupposes that citizens are psychologically capable of discriminating among messages and translating private attitudes into public behavior.

At the same time, there are several aspects of political persuasion that distinguish it from other forms of persuasion.

First, attitude change occurs indirectly through exposure to messages, such as news and late night comedy programs, which are not intended to persuade so much as inform or entertain. This necessitates invocation of a host of communication concepts, such as agenda setting, priming, and framing. Second, political persuasion operates not only at the individual level of analysis, but at the group (e.g., political party), organizational (lobbying), and systemic levels (grassroots protests aimed at changing laws). Third, unlike most persuasion situations, which engage the individual's self-interest or egotistical concerns, political contexts touch on broader issues, such as values, affect-laden symbols, or, as normative theory would have it, civic duty. Finally, and partly as a result of factors just described, political persuasion is a striking study of contrasts. It involves the presentation by politicians of colorful, emotional arguments, market tested by professional elites, to audiences of individuals who are frequently indifferent to the rich panoply of messages. This in turn produces an ethically disturbing mismatch between the level of activity shown by political communicators and the passivity displayed by electoral receivers.

In addition, political persuasion overlaps with marketing but differs from commercial marketing in an important respect. While marketing may have long-term goals, the short-term ones are crucial in political persuasion—that is, to win the election! As political consultant Tony Schwartz notes, in politics you have a *one-day sale,* and you have to sell a majority (or plurality) of your product on that day—"or you are out of business." Because of this short-term need, persuasive messages are often more emotive, more fear arousing, and, generally, more vituperative than in other persuasive situations. Further, most of the public seems to expect, accept, and forgive such visceral messages. Negative messages are seen as influential by experts and the public. Further, the promulgators of these messages do not seem to foster long-term harm to their causes but are even in some cases lauded for their cleverness.

Purposes and Functions

Persuasion of all varieties has three goals: to form, change, and reinforce attitudes. In the political domain, attitude formation occurs through political socialization, increasingly performed by mass media. Campaigns can also change attitudes through central and peripheral processes, as articulated by the Elaboration Likelihood Model. Political marketers are adept at matching messages to voters' motivation and ability levels, for example, directing simple messages that require minimal processing to low-involvement, last-minute deciders, and gearing more complex issue-based messages to high-involvement segmented markets. Given the stability and persistence of political attitudes, political appeals directed at high-involvement/high-ability audiences are not processed independently of preexisting biases, despite idealistic hopes. For these and other reasons (e.g., consultants increasingly believe swing voters constitute a small minority of the voting public), much electoral persuasion focuses on securing the base or reinforcing preexisting attitudes.

Communications reinforce attitudes through various psychological mechanisms. Emotional ads, such as those used to reawaken questions about John Kerry's service in Vietnam during the 2004 presidential campaign, access dormant feelings toward a candidate or issue. Once brought to the surface and made

salient, attitudes that draw on these feelings can strongly influence voting behavior. By accessing attitudes in this way, such reinforcement is more politically consequential than suggested by Joseph Klapper's Limited Effects Model. Political messages also reinforce attitudes through social judgment processes, such as assimilation, contrast, and associated cognitive biases that induce individuals to perceive candidates in line with existing biases rather than to probe or even reject preexisting prejudices. As Tony Schwartz observed, a political candidate does not try to persuade voters to alter their attitudes on the issues so much as to convince them that he or she shares their preexisting views on the topics at hand.

Increasingly, political message managers—President George W. Bush adviser Karl Rove being the most famous current practitioner—adopt this approach. Rove provides a useful current model for long-term political persuasion and strategy. He disregarded the common notion that elections are fights over the center and instead concentrated on his base. Persuasion in this model is about reinforcement and motivation. While this approach also seeks to tailor messages to various publics, the messages remain more consistent than they would be if the goal were to move undecided voters from one side to the other. This necessarily results in political persuasive communications designed to strengthen preexisting attitudes and access strong feelings rather than to shake up beliefs or achieve the loftier aim of educating voters on the problems that ail the country. The result, in the view of some critics, has been growth of persuasive campaigns that polarize and divide rather than unite or inform.

Continuities and Changes

Yet political persuasion goes beyond psychological mechanisms, market testing of messages, and even polarizing electoral campaigns. It is ultimately about control—whether it be control of political language, campaign and policy messages, political imagery, or political reality itself. The classic example of this is a campaign that dates back nearly a hundred years: the campaign created by George Creel and the Committee on Public Information (CPI) in 1917. The Creel committee was created to shape American and, to some extent, world attitudes toward the Axis and Germany, and to propel the U.S. public, economy, and industry into war. From this effort came the notion of propaganda writ large.

Creel and CPI also coincided with the beginnings of psychological and mass communication research into persuasion. While this may be viewed as the quintessential example of political persuasion, it is ironically the exception rather than the rule. Political messages are rarely so well coordinated or consistent. Unlike persuasive messages and campaigns in other areas, political persuasive messages are often conceived, prepared, and circulated at several levels without being specifically attributable to a single group or individual. While national Republican or Democratic parties might offer monies or provide guidance about campaign strategies, they cannot control actual messages or emphasis. The closest attempt may have been the 1994 Republican Contract with America, which intended to give central focus and frame to the election of the House of Representatives.

Presidential Persuasion

As noted earlier, these attempts at influence and control are developed by diverse political agents and occur across various domains. Much of the power to influence political attitudes has been historically centered within the actions of the president. As presidential scholar Richard Neustadt famously noted, "Presidential power is the power to persuade." Prior to the age of electronic media, it was President Theodore Roosevelt who understood how he needed to control the political agenda with his reference to the White House as his "bully pulpit," a powerful platform in which to advocate persuasively his agenda. Several decades later Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the first president to realize the potentially persuasive power of the new medium of radio to influence American public opinion. In his "fireside chats," Roosevelt spoke in an intimate, plain, and folksy manner to the American people, using colloquial phrases such as "my friend" that proved effective in reassuring the public of his leadership and policies during the Depression.

In the 1980s President Ronald Reagan and his advisors found new ways to use the power of televised images to sustain Reagan's popularity and keep the "Teflon president" immune from various administration scandals. By carefully controlling the pictures of the president available for television news, President Reagan and his advisors demonstrated how the visual image can be much more important—and politically effective—than the actual political

message. But by 2006 President George W. Bush was using the powers of the presidency to control aspects of political reality in ways that would have been unimaginable to his predecessors. Speaking to journalist Ron Suskind, a top aide to President Bush explained that control of political reality was now the ultimate mode of political persuasion: “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re [journalists] studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out.”

Political persuasion is a fundamental form of political communication. Political persuasion is essential to politicians, both in the short term (campaigning) and the long term (legislating). In their control of political language and images, presidents and politicians use all means of interpersonal and mass communication to persuade the public to agree with their constructions of political reality. While researchers may struggle with the processes by which the public responds to these persuasive messages at the macro and micro levels, the constantly shifting terrain and evolution of media technologies virtually guarantees that political persuasion will remain in the nexus of our political world. “Political language,” George Orwell wrote in 1946, “is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.” Written in the ashes of the Nazi and fascist propaganda machines of World War II, Orwell’s understanding of the powers of political persuasion remains true today. Political persuasion remains an uneasy persuasion, founded on idealistic hopes, but frequently resorting to self-interested, vague, or polarizing appeals—the worst form of social influence, save all the others.

Richard M. Perloff, Edward M. Horowitz, and Gary R. Pettey

See also Limited Effects Theory; Presidential Communication; Schwartz, Tony

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Pew Internet & American Life Project

The Pew Internet & American Life Project conducts research on the impact of the Internet on families, communities, home and work, daily life, education, health care, and civic and political life. The Internet & American Life Project is one of the seven projects of the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan "fact tank" based in Washington, D.C. It is funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts.

The Pew Internet & American Life Project investigates Internet evolution and effects through nationwide random digit dial telephone surveys as well as online surveys, supplemented with research from government agencies, academia, and other expert venues. It includes observations of what people do and how they behave when they are online, in-depth interviews with Internet users and Internet experts alike, and examinations of individual and group behavior. The project releases 15–20 pieces of research a year, varying in size, scope, and ambition.

Internet trends studies look at who is online (in terms of demographics), Internet adoption, Internet usage over time, and online activities. For instance, in April 2006, 91% of Internet users went online to check or write e-mail, whereas 58% looked for political news or information.

In 2005, a Pew Internet study showed that the Internet became an essential part of American politics in the 2004 elections. Fully 75 million Americans used the Internet to get political news and information, discuss candidates and debate issues in e-mails, or participate directly in the political process by volunteering or giving contributions to candidates. There was also a striking increase in the number who cited the Internet as one of their primary sources of news about the presidential campaign: 18% of registered voters said the Internet was a primary source of political news in 2004, compared to 11% in 2000. The Pew Internet survey also found that, during the 2004 campaign, Internet users were more likely to be aware of differing political views—including those that counter their own beliefs—than nonusers.

In November 2006 Pew Internet researchers contended that YouTube, the free video-sharing Web site where users can upload videos, was the latest Internet-driven innovation to affect politics, after candidate Web sites in 1996, e-mail in 1998, online fundraising in 2000 (John McCain), blogs in 2003 (Howard Dean), and Net-organized house parties in 2004 (Bush-Cheney). Any candidate who nodded off at hearings (Senator Conrad Burns of Montana), ran away from questioners (Representative Sue Kelly of New York), or came up with unusual words with which to address opposition videographers (Senator George Allen of Virginia) must continuously monitor YouTube—along with Googling themselves—to see the feedback of citizen media creators.

Raluca Cozma

See also Blogs, Blogging; New Media Technologies

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Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press is an independent research institute located in Washington, D.C. Data from the surveys conducted at the center offer insight into public sentiment about issues of politics and media.

Formerly the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press, the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press is one of six projects that make up the Pew Research Center, an internationally recognized and respected "fact tank." The center has been funded since 1995 by the Pew Charitable Trusts.

Research at the center measures the public's attitudes and attention paid to news stories, political figures, and media channels. The mission of the center is to provide factual information on public opinion without editorializing or recommending changes in public policy. As a well-respected source of data on the opinions of the public, its findings are frequently cited in news stories, academic journals, and political discourse.

The center conducts public opinion surveys via telephone, through a process known as "random digit dialing." By using this method, the center is able to draw reliable conclusions about the opinions of the population in question from a representative sample. In addition to determining the perception of the overall public

toward an issue, surveys at the center often focus on the opinions and attitudes of a specific demographic group, such as Hispanic voters or college-educated women. The center provides a summary of their survey findings, a copy of their questionnaire, and access to datasets free of charge.

Jason A. Moldoff

See also Methodology; Pew Internet & American Life Project; Polls; Public Opinion

Further Readings

The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Web site: http://people-press.org/

Pharisee Effect

The Pharisee Effect refers to a boomerang, or voter backlash, toward candidates who overuse religion as the basis of a political argument. The phenomenon derives its name from a New Testament passage (Luke 18:9–14) in which Jesus criticized a Pharisee for being too public with his prayers. The Pharisee's mistake is that his loud public prayers were intended to enhance his own image rather than being an honest expression of internal religious devotion. The Pharisees, it was argued, were so openly religious that they were subject to charges of insincerity and hypocrisy. Powell and Neiva argued that the same thing can occur with the use of political appeals in politics.

Theoretical discussion of the Pharisee Effect is grounded in game theory as developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern. A political campaign represents a specific application of a zero-sum game, since every vote gained for one competitor (+1) would be a vote lost for the opponent (–1). In the heat of a campaign, the candidates must constantly balance two conflicting tensions regarding that message escalation. The Pharisee Effect argues that such tensions are particularly important when the content of political messages is related to religion. In an electorate in which a majority of voters hold religious values, statements about religious issues can generate positive responses among voters. But, if they overdo it—if the religious messages is escalated to the point that it is viewed as excessive by the voters—the use of religious content has potential to boomerang on the message source.

Five attribution effects of the phenomenon have been identified that could cause voters to have a negative evaluation of the speaker's intention or motivation: (1) *self-serving motivation,* or intentionality, that is, the speaker uses a religious appeal for his or her own purposes rather than to promote a religious purpose; (2) deception, or *hypocrisy,* that is, the speaker is viewed as basing his appeal on a set of religious values that he himself does not personally hold; (3) *inappropriateness,* that is, the particularly religious arguments used by the rhetor are deemed inappropriate for public debates; (4) a perception of *fanaticism* on the part of the candidate; and (5) a perception that the candidate has an undesirable *"holier-than-thou" attitude.*

Examples of the Pharisee Effect in political campaigns include Jimmy Carter's "lust in the heart" statement in the 1976 campaign, George W. Bush's speech at Bob Jones University in the 2000 campaign, and—more recently—the defeat of Roy ("The Ten Commandments Judge") Moore in the 2006 Alabama Republican primary for governor.

Larry Powell

See also Religion in Politics

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Plato

See Rhetoric, Political

Pluralistic Ignorance

The term *pluralistic ignorance* was first used as a psychological term by the social psychologist Floyd Allport in the 1920s to describe mistaken impressions

or misjudgments about others' beliefs, emotions, or thoughts. The term gained wide currency in the 1970s to describe patterns of false beliefs as applicable to the political arena or other social issues.

Pluralistic ignorance functions on the psychological level insofar as it explains the aspect of ignorance and on the social level to help understand the pluralistic element of the phenomena. Pluralistic ignorance occurs when people mischaracterize the number of people who hold similar or same opinions. For example, a person may believe that a majority of people subscribes to a position actually held by a minority. Conversely, one may believe that a majority position represents the views of a minority. In 1972, Charles Korte identified a distinction between "absolute pluralistic ignorance," the belief that a majority represents a minority or vice versa, and "relative pluralistic ignorance," overestimating or underestimating the degree to which others share one's beliefs or sentiments.

A central tenant of pluralistic ignorance is that people often develop or adjust their beliefs in concert with their perception of public opinion or social norms. The degree of inaccurate social projections regarding the distribution of public opinion is manifested on various matters on a continuum. Studies have shown mistakenly perceived social norms or other impressions of public opinion with respect to political candidates, voting preferences, civil rights, racial segregation, or prohibitions against smoking or drinking. For example, pluralistic ignorance can be used to explain how many southern whites overestimated national support for Jim Crow Laws in the 1960s.

Psychological factors such as fear of embarrassment and inhibitions affect the gulf between what one believes in private and expresses in public. However, recent scholars have tended to stress the social norms, cultural values, and shared aspects as opposed to the individual, psychological, and cognitive motivations of pluralistic ignorance. A majority opinion on a particular issue is expected to represent basic values that culturally resonate and match societal norms. External factors such as social environment, political climate, prominence of public agenda, diversity of communication channels, and media framing also mediate the development and degree of pluralistic ignorance.

The media are particularly considered to play a central role in development and maintenance of pluralistic ignorance. Noelle-Newman has emphasized how journalists' political leanings often create a social environment that does not necessarily reflect the distribution of opinion among the general audience. Media tend to overemphasize the views of minority groups that are particularly vocal or visible, even within the context of reinforcing existing social norms. Thus, pluralistic ignorance emerges often when public perceptions do not synchronize with public opinion. Elihu Katz indicated, on the other hand, that the media may dispel pluralistic ignorance by presenting an accurate portrayal of public opinion. For instance, the media may enlighten the audience by reporting on a scientifically valid survey of public attitudes or presenting a balanced presentation of a controversial issue.

Jae-Hwa Shin

See also Public Opinion; Spiral of Silence

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POLAND, DEMOCRATIZATION

Only 4 years after the Constitution of the United States of America had been ratified in 1787, Poland established its own supreme law—the Constitution—on May 3, 1791. The Polish Constitution, the second in the world, was actually the first act of this type established in Europe. Poland, a pioneer in establishing democratic rules, did not have much time to practice democracy. For more than one hundred years the country was removed from the world map. The democracy renaissance took place on November 11, 1918, when Poland regained its independence. Again the period of democracy was short. As a result of the Second World War, Poland ceased to be an independent state and became one of the satellites of Soviet Russia. The nation, however, did not stop the struggle for democracy—during the whole period of the communist régime there existed the Polish government-in-exile set up in France and later in the United Kingdom. Activity continued until 1990 when President-in-exile Ryszard Kaczorowski handed over Polish state insignia to Lech Wałęsa,

the first Polish president democratically elected since World War II.

During the Yalta Conference in 1945 the Allies agreed to accept the Curzon line as the border between Poland and the USSR. As a result, nearly half of the former Polish territory became a part of Soviet Russia. Later, the Potsdam Conference again shifted Poland's western border. The conference also legitimized the mass deportation of Germans from the new Polish territory on the one hand and the simultaneous expulsion of Poles from the territory belonging to the USSR on the other. The change of borders, the mass-scale migration in the war-damaged country, the imposition of the Soviet political system, the continued stay of the Soviet troops, and the loss of independence were the factors defining the postwar situation of Poland.

With the help of the Polish communists, as well as the Soviet troops occupying Poland until 1993, the Soviet authorities quickly managed to crush any trace of the opposition against the communist system. Many combatants who during the war formed a number of underground resistance organizations (e.g., Home Army—*Armia Krajowa,* the biggest underground army during World War II) were executed, deported to the USSR, or sent to prisons and labor camps. The political leaders from the prewar period were imprisoned in Moscow and sentenced to long periods of imprisonment after a mock trial. In July 1944 Joseph Stalin elected the Polish Committee of Nation Liberation (known as PKWN) from its Polish abbreviation. In 1945 the committee became the Provisional Government of National Unity. Although formed by the Soviets, this government was formally recognized by the United States and the United Kingdom in July 1945. It was composed of the representatives of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), and the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL), led by Deputy Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk (PSL). However, real power rested with the PPR, which had full control over the army and secret police and enjoyed the Soviet support. After the liquidating the remnants of the underground organizations by terror, the political attack was directed at the independent PSL. Members and associates of this party were arrested, intimidated, executed after fake trials, or secretly murdered. After a rigged referendum about the future of Poland held in June 1946 and the parliamentary elections in January 1947, Mikolajczyk was forced to leave the country. Fully dependent on the Soviets, the Parliament elected Boleslaw Bierut, a Polish communist and a citizen of the USSR, as president of Poland.

As the next step the communists liquidated the PPS. That aim was achieved by uniting it and the Polish Workers' Party into the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) in December 1948. After that date PZPR had full control of the political activities in Poland. The Sovietization of Poland accelerated: between 1948 and 1956, Poland was under the absolute rule of the PZPR Communist Party assisted by the secret police and the "Soviet advisers."

The PZPR pursued a reconstruction program stressing agrarian reform and industrial development. A war on illiteracy was declared. Free education and social insurance was made available to everyone. The Communist Party shunned the Marshall Plan, and during the first two decades of its existence the party renounced all dealings with the Western powers.

Having destroyed the private sector and thus the market economy, the communists introduced the centrally controlled economic system. In addition, the party began forced collectivization of farming. As a result the economic structure in Poland was adjusted to the needs of the USSR. The constitution of 1952 made Poland a People's Republic, a country that mirrored the Soviet model.

In politics the 1950s were the worst years of the Stalinist terror. Repressive measures were directed not just against political opponents but at normal citizens as well. The peak moment of that struggle against society came with the attack on the Roman Catholic Church. Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, Primate of Poland, was imprisoned in 1953. The political terror in Pland diminished after the death of Stalin and Bierut. Along with the stagnating economic conditions, this led to bloodily dispersed workers' riots in Poznan in July 1956.

In October 1956, Gomulka, who had been purged in 1949 from the Polish Communist Party as a "rightist deviationist" and imprisoned from 1951 to the beginning of 1956, was elected leader of the PZPR and became the symbol of the revolt against Moscow. His promise to embark upon the "Polish road to socialism" won social support. Cardinal Wyszynski was freed from house arrest, and gradually other political prisoners were released from jails. Enforced agricultural collectivization was dropped, and the communists decided to tolerate some margin of private business in the economy. Recovering from the wartime devastation, Poland entered the so-called small stabilization period. Relations with the church

improved, and economic and cultural ties with the West were broadened.

However, Gomulka soon backed out of from the liberal course and dissipated the support that he had enjoyed. He entered into conflict with the Catholic Church in 1965 when he condemned the letter wrote by Poland's Episcopate to German bishops (including the famous clause, "We do forgive and ask forgiveness"), which is considered the opening of the difficult Polish-German dialogue.

In the middle 1960s intellectual freedom was curbed even more, and political rhetoric was infused with an anti-Semitic nationalistic fervor. One of the reasons lay within the conflict among the members of the Communist Party and the anti-Semitic slogans employed by part of the party apparatus. Thus, 1968 was marked with the student demonstrations against the government in the university centers. The Gomulka regime countered with a political offensive in which many government officials and party members accused of anti-Socialist or pro-Zionist sentiments were removed from office. As a result about 12,000 Polish Jews left the country.

Two years later, demonstrations by shipyard workers in Gdansk broke out on December 16, 1970, protesting the country's economic conditions, including the planned implementation of a new incentive system and an announced rise in food prices. The party answered with force, with troops shooting at the defenseless crowds of workers. After widespread violence, in which at least 44 people were killed, Edward Gierek succeeded Gomulka as the party's first secretary. The new team undertook another attempt at reforming the system. Thanks to foreign credits the standard of living rose significantly. All those actions were accompanied with propaganda trying to convince the people of the big success of establishing socialism in the country. The middle 1970s were therefore described as the "propaganda of success" period.

The first sign of crisis within the socialistic system came in 1976, with riots in Radom and at the Ursus industrial plant. Again, the riots were crushed by force, although the authorities did not resort to shooting at the crowds. Repressions directed against rioters led to the creation of the illegal Workers' Defense Committee (KOR), which stood up for oppressed workers. Other illegal opposition groups (e.g., Movement for Defense of Human and Civic Rights—ROPCiO; Confederation of Independent Poland—KPN) and clandestine publications began to appear. The church also played a significant role, organizing widespread educational activities and addressing the most urgent social needs.

The growing resistance against the communist system was backed by a number of intellectuals who, despite censorship and administrative interference, worked on the development of Polish film, theater, arts, music, and literature. The clandestine publications were circulated among Polish citizens. They not only consisted of secretly distributed newspapers but also included books that were published even by thousands of copies. The defense against communism was also supported by literary and scientific activities pursued outside the country by Polish immigrants. Radio Free Europe, led by Jan Nowak Jeziorański, broadcast its programs from Munich (Germany) and the American radio Voice of America also played a significant role in molding public opinion. Apart from the political information, the programs included also news from the world of culture and descriptions of different aspects of everyday life not known to the public in Poland. Both radio stations transmitted their programs in the Polish language, and both were considered as extremely dangerous by party leaders, who decided to use special radio transmitters dispersed all over the country in order to deafen their signals. A similar role was played by the Paris-based periodical *Kultura* and a number of other publications. The importance of the émigré cultural community was highlighted by the awarding in 1980 of the Nobel Prize in literature to Czeslaw Milosz—a Polish poet who lived in the United States.

The picture of democratization in Poland in the late 1970s and early '80s would be incomplete without stressing the role of the Catholic Church, which was highlighted in October 1978 when the Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyła was elevated as Pope John Paul II. When the pope visited his homeland in June 1979, the Polish society, previously divided and deprived of a possibility to form independent social organizations, recovered its unity and its sense of dignity.

The continued shortage of food and rising prices of everyday goods led to strikes in 1980, first at the Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk and then in other cities. The striking workers formed an illegal labor union, Solidarity, led by shipyard worker Lech Wałęsa. The workers forced the party leaders to go into the negotiations on the list of 21 demands that included not only pay raises but also called for the end of censorship and the right to form free trade unions. On August 31 the

government officials agreed to make concessions to the striking workers and ratified the agreement that allowed for the creation of the Solidarity trade union led by Wałęsa. Within 2 months, huge number of Poles, more than 10 million in the country of 40 million citizens, became members of Solidarity. Also in 1980 Edward Gierek, the party first secretary, was forced to resign and was replaced by Stanisław Kania and later by General Wojciech Jaruzelski.

In the face of an economic crisis, threatened by the growing influence of Solidarity and under the pressure from the USSR, General Jaruzelski decided to embark upon a violent action. On December 13, 1981, he introduced martial law all over the country. Several thousand opposition members were interned, and strikes were crushed with the help of the army and special riot police units. On December 16, nine mine workers were killed in the Wujek Coal Mine in Katowice. Almost the whole leadership of Solidarity, including Wałęsa, was arrested, and the union was suspended. Some others were forced to emigrate. All civic rights and freedoms gained in the preceding year were abolished.

The Poles, being a nation of strong Catholics, turned to the Catholic Church, which provided the venues for meetings and patriotic demonstrations. In 1984 the police secret service decided to murder the popular priest Jerzy Popieluszko. The public reaction reached its boiling point, and the government was forced to put the direct perpetrators on trial, revealing the disintegration of the state apparatus.

The martial law was officially lifted in July 1983, but the problems of the Polish economy remained the same. The opposition against the government was growing with the help of Pope John Paul II's subsequent pilgrimages (1983 and 1987) and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Lech Wałęsa in 1983.

Continued decline in the living standards led to waves of strikes throughout Poland from the spring of 1988. In the autumn, the entire government resigned, making clear that talks with labor activists were unavoidable. The negotiations led to the so-called Round-Table Talks, which finally opened in February 1989. The talks between the authorities and the opposition were arranged and held with the mediation of the church. They were also helped by a favorable international situation—*perestroika* in the USSR and the support of the Western states for reforms in Poland. In April 1989 the party and opposition leaders reached an agreement on a number of unprecedented concessions: Solidarity was recognized as legal, and a partly free election was scheduled for June 1984. The Poles could freely choose their representatives to the newly established upper chamber of the Parliament (*Senat*). What was even more important, 35% of the seats in the lower chamber, *Sejm,* were also left for the free election. The election held on June 4, 1989, brought a landslide victory to Solidarity. The candidates chosen by the Solidarity leaders got the entire 35% of the free seats in the lower chamber and 99 of the 100 seats in the higher one.

In June 1989, the newly elected "contract parliament" named General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who had won only by one vote, Poland's president. Although the prime minister was to be voted in the lower chamber of the parliament, which was controlled by the communists, Adam Michnik, the chief editor of independent newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza,* published an article with a very significant title: "Your President, Our Prime Minister." Although it was widely expected that Lech Wałęsa might lead the first Solidarity government, he demurred, instead putting forward chief adviser to the Gdansk strike committee in 1980, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who took office on August 24, 1989, as the first noncommunist prime minister in the eastern bloc.

The People's Republic of Poland became a thing of the past. The events in Poland precipitated the fall of the entire Communist bloc. Although Jaruzelski had been elected to a 6-year term as president, Wałęsa made it known in early 1990 that he was now prepared to stand for president in open elections. Jaruzelski resigned, opening the way for new elections. Lech Wałęsa became the first president of Poland chosen by the people in a free election.

The transition from the socialist country to a democratic state was finalized in March 1999 when Poland became a full member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Subsequently, the country became a member of the European Union in May 2004.

The day (June 4, 1989) when the first, not yet fully democratic parliamentary elections took place in Poland can be said to mark the birth of political communication and marketing in postcommunist states. For the first time in 40 years, political groups faced the need to develop voting strategies and conduct professional electoral campaigns in order to win the support of the electorate. Together with the political changes, a number of changes in the ways the media operate took place. These changes concerned both the legal regulations of the media market and its opening up to commercial broadcasters.

Despite the fact that democratic processes are still developing in Poland, American and Western European models are used to prepare media campaigns. Political campaigning is prohibited 24 hours before polling day and throughout polling day until the conclusion of the vote. Election committees (in parliamentary and presidential elections) have the right to free broadcast of their election programs on national television and radio channels. Regardless of the time assigned for these programs, each committee can run their paid election advertisements in public and commercial electronic and print media.

Political communication in Poland can be seen as concentrating more on candidates than on political parties and their programs. Election advertisements influence voters' image of candidates, especially, and lead to changes in voting preferences. Furthermore, research results suggest that Polish ads also increase feelings of uncertainty among citizens.

Wojciech Cwalina

See also European Union; Radio Free Europe; Solidarity Movement; Voice of America; Wałęsa, Lech

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Political Action Committees (PACs)

First authorized under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, PACs are interest groups that financially support political candidates and parties through funds collected from committee members and donors. PACs began to take root in the 1940s, consisting largely of traditionally organized contributors such as labor unions seeking a means to sidestep stipulations in the Taft-Hartley Act. Since that time, PACs have proliferated, growing from 608 registered groups donating $12 million to congressional races in 1974 to nearly 4,000 entities pushing $178 million into Washington, D.C., just 20 years later. In presidential races, the top-10 PACs donated approximately $123.4 million in 2004 alone. With this financial firepower, PACs have significantly transformed fund-raising practices in the electoral process in terms of contribution patterns, influence on legislative actions, and impact on political communication strategies.

There are two types of PACs. The first is the segregated fund, which is fully accountable to the organization that created it and cannot solicit funds from the public. The second type is termed a "nonconnected" political committee, as these PACs can seek money from the voting public for purposes of donation to political candidates.

While PACs have grown significantly in their ability to fund candidates and their campaigns, federal election contributions have been regulated since passage of the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and its subsequent amendments. In short, FECA established spending and contribution limits on congressional campaigns, forced reporting requirements for candidates, and outlawed direct contributions from labor unions or corporations to political campaigns. Challenged in 1976 under *Buckley v. Valeo,*

the U.S. Supreme Court found FECA constitutional, generally upholding outlined contribution and reporting regulations. Currently, PAC contributions subject to FECA are limited as follows: $5,000 per candidate per election, $15,000 per political party per year, and $5,000 per PAC per year. Regardless of federal election contribution regulations, there exist no limits on advertising expenditures supported by PACs for their own agendas.

Controversy continues in the campaign finance debate over the role of PACs in contemporary campaigns. Some are opposed to the influence of these organizations, viewing PACs as a threat to representative democracy and criticizing that PACs are able to buy policies favorable to their special interest agenda. Others see these organizations as essential sources of funding in the increasingly expensive campaign process because of the perceived need to incorporate cutting-edge technology into the candidate-centered, media-intensive campaigns. Either way, PAC contributions continue to be significantly outpaced by individual contributions. Overall, candidates have increasingly seen PACs as important sources of direct funds; as such, PAC contributions have escalated over time.

Though the exact role of PAC donations in the modern political campaign process is contested, the majority of scholarship on the subject has found that PACs operate defensively, attempting to influence present members and not election outcomes. Thus, money goes predominantly to incumbents over challengers despite ideological or partisan affiliations. Presently, Democratic and Republican candidates have been equally likely to receive monetary support from PACs. Unlike political parties and individual donors who focus on elections and are more willing to fund challengers, PACs tend to take a stance of risk aversion and pursue legislative rather than electoral strategies. As such, academic studies have depicted PACs as more concerned with their access to and influence over politicians than about who is in office and that representative's individual partisan or ideological considerations. In fact, studies show that PACs support incumbents over challengers by a 7:1 ratio. In general, when it comes to contributing to one congressional campaign over another, incumbents are at a distinct advantage.

In terms of the legislative development process, research has demonstrated that PAC contributions may have a profound influence on the creation of new laws. Members of Congress will often consult with interest groups that are recognized as experts within their fields as they construct legislation that falls within a particular PAC's sphere of interest. As such, some have argued that PAC funds have a direct impact on the content of legislation, influencing what is in the legislation from its inception. Conversely, though, their impact on legislative decision making is not discounted altogether; contending academic studies have argued PAC money is less important to members of Congress than such influences as partisanship, personal ideology, and constituency demands.

In looking at their role within political communication, PACs tend to employ direct public strategies of influence in an effort to inspire constituency pressure from a member's district. As exampled by Samuel Kernell, in seeking to promote its legislative agenda, the National Chamber of Commerce founded its own public affairs television network named BizNet. By producing weekly programs that attempt to persuade viewers to support certain interests in Congress, the National Chamber of Commerce seeks to motivate members by way of their reelection desires. Finally, a survey of PAC members found that the greatest increases in lobbying activity have been centered upon speaking with people from the press and media.

The PACs of many organizations also sometimes sponsor their own independent political communications in attempts to influence the election of particular political candidates or ballot measures. In some cases these efforts take the form of direct sponsorship of political advertising. Some observers argue that the newest campaign finance regulations passed by the United States in 2002 (the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act) encouraged PACs to make more direct and independent contributions to the political process. The result of the new legislation was to redirect PAC contributions away from candidates and parties and to channel them more directly into independent PAC-sponsored advertising.

H. E. Schmeisser

See also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act; Incumbent, Incumbency

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Political Advertising

Political advertising refers to the process by which candidates, parties, individuals, and groups promote themselves and their viewpoints through mass communication channels. Political advertising is generally considered a form of paid media in which the promoter (or sponsor) buys the space or time for distributing the advertising message. The paid nature of political advertising is characteristic of the system in the United States; but in many democracies in other parts of the world, candidates and parties are often given free time to promote their messages, at least on the public media channels.

Types of Political Advertising

There are at least three different ways of looking at types of political advertising. First, different types of political situations and elections call for different types of political advertising. Second, the source of the advertising message (a candidate, a political party, a group, etc.) is important. Third, political advertising is often differentiated by the communication medium or channel through which the advertising is distributed.



A George W. Bush congressional campaign poster circa 1978.

Source: George Bush Presidential Library.

Elections and Public Policy Decision Making

The most common type of political advertising in the United States is advertising occasioned by an election for a specific office. In the United States, thousands of such elections are held regularly at levels from the presidency down to city council officers and district school board members. In these elections, advertising is directed at voters who must choose one candidate over one or more other candidates. Advertising is used in these direct electoral contests in (a) primary campaigns (where voters choose between possible candidates for their political party's nomination), (b) runoff elections (which are held in some states and local districts between the two highest vote-getters in the primary, and a runoff is needed because state or local regulations require that a candidate must receive a majority of votes in order to win the nomination), and (c) general elections.

Candidate electoral contests are not the only elections in the United States in which political advertising is used. A second election type where political advertising is often used is for votes on a referendum or proposition. Many individual states and local governments have

provisions that require voters to vote to approve or disapprove questions of policy. For instance, voters in California might decide on the level of benefits afforded to illegal immigrants, Florida voters have been asked to decide on class sizes in the public schools, and Oklahoma voters have voted for and against taxes and bonds for public improvements. Not every election on a proposition or referendum question is the subject of political advertising, but controversial measures may attract heated campaign advertising on both sides.

Finally, another type of political advertising became popular in the United States during the past century. Groups began to advertise their positions for or against certain policies under consideration by state or federal government legislative bodies. For example, when the U.S. Congress was considering the adoption of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) agreement, many business groups and industry associations ran national advertising campaigns on the pro or con side. A similar rush of advertising messages on both sides surfaced in the mid-1990s when the Clinton administration was considering major health care reforms. Although the groups who engage in this policy advertising, sometimes called "advocacy" advertising, are not seeking a specific electoral outcome, the targets of the message are clear. On the one had, the messages encourage state and federal legislators to reconsider their positions, and, on the other hand, the advertising seeks to stir voters to take political actions (such as contacting and lobbying their elected representatives) that may help the group achieve its policy goals.

Sources of Political Advertising

The source of a political advertisement is usually the person or group who pays for or sponsors the advertisement. In the United States, the candidate is the most frequently identified source of political advertising messages. After all, it is usually the candidate who is seeking to convince the voter to choose him or her at the polling booth. Nonetheless, many other individuals and groups have a stake in the outcome of particular elections.

Political parties also sponsor advertising messages on behalf of candidates who are members of their parties or messages against those they hope will not be successful. While party advertising is not the dominant form of electoral advertising in the United States (candidate advertising is), many democracies around the world are organized as parliamentary democracies wherein voters choose a party whose leader is designated by the party (usually called a prime minister or chancellor). In these countries, the party advertising usually supplants candidate advertising.

Candidates and political parties are not the only ones who want to influence how voters will choose their leaders. Independent groups who favor a particular viewpoint or a particular candidate or party may sponsor advertising that supports a particular candidate or party. In the United States the amount of political advertising sponsored by independent groups has been growing dramatically. In the aftermath of new campaign finance legislation in 2002 that placed tighter restrictions on contributions to candidates and parties, in 2004 the expenditures by independent groups for political advertising skyrocketed. Many of the independent groups that run ads for and against presidential candidates are existing labor groups (like the AFL-CIO labor union group) and business or issue groups (like the National Rifle Association), but new campaign finance legislation has fostered the formation of many new groups that collect and spend millions of dollars for campaign advertising. Groups like Moveon.Org, the Media Fund, America Coming Together (ACT), and the Progress for America Voter Fund are just a few of the groups who have underwritten such advertising.

Finally, another source of political advertising can be an individual who wishes to sponsor advertising for or against a candidate or issue. Such sponsorship is possible and legal at all levels of campaigning in the United States. There have been many instances of such sponsorship even at the presidential level, where the cost of paying for political advertising that can be distributed nationally can be very expensive. Before the Internet, the ability of an individual who was not wealthy to produce and distribute a quality television advertisement was limited. However, the Internet has now made it possible for individuals to be sources of political advertising messages, even if they do not have substantial personal wealth at their disposal.

Channels for Political Advertising

While there are many different approaches used for every channel of communication, political advertising has usually been quite traditional in its approach to each medium of communication. Candidates, parties,

and groups can choose to distribute their advertising messages through (a) print and display advertising, (b) newspaper and magazine advertising, (c) radio broadcasting, (d) television—broadcast or cable, and (e) the Internet.

Both print/display advertising and newspaper/ magazine advertising are distributed via the print channel, but they are so different in form and targeting potential that they are treated separately here. Print and display advertising of various kinds was the first channel of communication to be used by political candidates and parties. Printed campaign advertising can take the form of brochures, flyers, cards, bumper stickers, and other campaign paraphernalia. At most state and federal levels, these print channel messages are often supplemented by outside display advertising such as signs and large billboards. Variations on this political advertising channel are used primarily as a form of name identification and can do a good job of getting the candidate or party name known.

Advertisements in newspapers and magazines offer the possibility of more complex messages that may provide the candidate or party with space for explaining issue positions and promoting background and experience. Ads in newspapers and magazines can be targeted to readers in particular local areas, or in the case of magazines, to voters with particular issue or professional interests.

Radio commercials are very useful in campaigns at all levels. In part, this is because radio commercials have three clear advantages over the print media. First, radio commercials (like their television counterparts) can overcome voter selective exposure. Selective exposure is a difficult communication problem for political candidates and parties because research has shown that people tend to expose themselves to information that is in line with their current beliefs. For instance, a voter who is a Democrat may not choose to pick up the brochures or read the magazine ads of candidates who represent the Republican viewpoint. However, a radio ad may overcome this selectivity process because the voter may hear the ad as part of a radio program without making a conscious or deliberate exposure decision. Second, a message delivered with sound may provide additional message cues (such as music or sound effects) that may attract the listener's attention or assist the candidate in making his or her message stand out. Finally, an advertising message delivered on the radio channel can take advantage of the ability of radio to target the message to specific types of voters. Far more than television or newspapers, radio has become a very specialized communication channel. Professional time buyers can assist a candidate or party in choosing radio stations and time segments that can target audience groups with specific demographic characteristics and issue concerns.

While its use for candidates at lower election levels may be limited, there is no question that television has become the most important channel for political advertising in the United States. No only does television have the same advantage as radio for overcoming selective exposure, but television has a far wider reach and almost universal penetration in the United States. Television has also been praised for its ability to add dramatic and emotional imagery with the inclusion of visual messages.

A new channel is now challenging print, radio, and television media for the distribution of political advertising. The Internet has not yet reached universal penetration, but in the United States more than 75% of the population had broadband Internet access by 2005. As mentioned earlier, the Internet is providing a channel for access of ordinary citizens and increased ability for interest groups to express their viewpoints. Like radio and television, the Internet has the ability to overcome some aspects of selective exposure. Pop-up ads, banner ads, animation ads, and other innovative Web productions capture the attention of online information seekers. Web advertising distributors have the ability to target ads to specific consumers with very specific characteristics on an individual basis not possible with radio or television time buying. In the United States in 2004, more than $4 million was spent on Internet political advertising buys.

History and Regulation of Political Advertising

In the United States the earliest forms of political advertising fell into the category of print and display advertising. Brochures and political pamphlets and flyers helped candidates and parties to get their message out to voters in the early elections of the newly formed United States of America. Political ads in printed newspapers and magazines were available to voters in the first 150 years of the new republic. In 1924, parties and candidates seized upon radio as a new vehicle for election promotion, and in that year the first radio political ads were broadcast. Radio

remained an important political medium until the 1952 presidential campaign.

Presidential Television Advertising

Dwight Eisenhower was the first presidential candidate to use advertising spots on television in a presidential campaign. Recently returned from heading the successful Allied military campaign in Europe in World War II, Eisenhower used short television spots to give his cold, military image a softer, warmer, more personable quality. Along with a musical, animated commercial (produced and donated to the campaign by the Walt Disney Studios), Eisenhower's campaign also aired a series of 31 short spots that were part of a series called "Eisenhower Answers America." In the spots, ordinary citizens appeared to ask Eisenhower simple questions that he answered with short, sometimes humorous, but always amiable and appealing answers. Eisenhower's opponent in 1952, Adlai Stevenson, refused to turn his campaign over to the Madison Avenue advertisers.

When Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy faced off in the presidential race of 1960, both candidates used television ads, but Kennedy was the candidate with the warmer, made-for-television image, and his television ads were substantively and visually convincing. After Kennedy's tragic assassination in 1963 cut short his television successes, Lyndon B. Johnson faced Republican Barry Goldwater in 1964. Neither candidate was particularly charismatic on television, but the campaign is famous for the introduction by Johnson of a series of extremely negative emotional ads that hinted (some say, accused) that Goldwater was too unstable and trigger-happy for America to trust his finger on the nuclear button. This campaign is renowned in campaign advertising history because the campaign saw the airing of the most famous (and infamous) political television advertisement in history, the "Daisy Girl" spot. This 30-second ad shows a small girl picking the petals off a daisy as she counts (1–2–3 . . .); her voice is overshadowed by the background countdown (10–9–8 . . .) to a weapon's launch. The nuclear bomb explodes and a mushroom cloud appears in a close-up in the child's eye as Lyndon Johnson's voice in the background proclaims, "These are the stakes: to make a world in which all of God's children can live or to go into the darkness. We must either love each other or we must die." Only broadcast one time, on September 7, 1964, during NBC's *Monday Night at the Movies,* this spot was created by New York advertising professional Tony Schwartz, who also made political spots for George McGovern in 1972 and for other candidates at various electoral levels.

Subsequent presidential campaigns developed their own presidential advertising approaches. Richard Nixon in 1968 developed an approach that kept him out of the limelight in his commercials, reacting to the work of media scholar Marshall McLuhan, who maintained that Nixon had lost the 1960 debates with Kennedy and the subsequent advertising battle because he was "too hot" for television. In 1972 George McGovern used Emmy-winning producer Charles Guggenheim to produce his mini-documentary and *cinema verité*–style spots. Jimmy Carter used a folksy "down-home Georgia" style to appear genuine and unpackaged in his 1976 spots, but his television style was no match for the camera-comfortable Ronald Reagan in 1980. Reagan's 1980 and 1984 spots were beautifully produced, and even now serve as examples of what to do right in campaign advertising. In particular, praise was heaped on the 1984 Reagan spots that developed a positive style and used a theme called "It's morning again in America" to embody Reagan's optimistic spirit and positive vision for America.

The last presidential campaign of the 1980s will be remembered for a political ad that was sponsored not by either candidate but by an independent group, an ad that highlighted an African American criminal named Willie Horton who escaped to create murder and mayhem while on a weekend "furlough" from a Massachusetts prison when Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis was governor. Thus, the 1988 campaign has been accused of beginning a new era of negativity in campaign advertising, but the Clinton campaigns of 1992 and 1996 were the two campaigns with the highest percentage of negative ads in the history of presidential political advertising. The following sections of this entry provide additional details about the historical development of the content of televised political advertising, including the campaigns from 1992 through 2004.

Legal and Regulatory Environment of Political Advertising

The regulations and laws that apply to political advertising in the United States are not particularly complex. These regulations fall into three basic

categories: (1) spending limits on general campaign expenditures determined by the Federal Election Commission, (2) broadcast regulation rules for the sale and purchase of equal time according to the Access and Equal Time Provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, and (3) statutory or case law that relates to advertising content.

Until 1971 there were generally no laws about campaign spending in the United States or about expenditures related to advertising in campaigns, although a 1920s anticorruption act prohibited corporations from contributing to political campaigns. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (amended 1974) set limits on the amount of contributions that individuals ($1,000 per candidate per election) and multiparty committees or political action committees ($5,000 per candidate per election) could give to political candidates. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 raised these limits to $2,000 per candidate per election and retained the $5,000 limit on contributions from committees. Direct contributions by corporations and labor unions remain illegal. The new BCRA rules also attempt to decrease the use of party "soft money" for campaign advertising. The U.S. law sets no limit on the amount of funds a presidential candidate may spend for television advertising. However, a candidate who agrees to take matching funds from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) must adhere to an overall spending limit for the campaign. This amount was set by the FEC at almost $75 million per candidate for the 2004 presidential election. BCRA also sets some new limitations on "electioneering communications" by independent groups that affect the ability of candidates to coordinate advertising with other groups.

The Federal Communications Commission administers the Communications Act (FCA) of 1934 (and revisions), which requires that a licensed broadcast station must provide reasonable access to or permit purchase of a reasonable amount of time for the use of the station by all legally qualified candidates for federal elective office, and stations must also sell this time at what is called "the lowest unit rate."

However, BCRA extended the FCC's rules on the disclaimer or sponsorship identification that must be contained in all television ads. In an attempt to reduce negative advertising by requiring candidates to take clear responsibility for their ads, the new law requires that a candidate appear visually in the ad, state his or her identity, and state that she or he approved the ad. The U.S. legal system permits virtually no limitations on political advertising content, primarily because of the fear of conflict with the First Amendment guarantee of free speech. Since so many laws explicitly or implicitly prohibit any regulation on political content, the only recourse most candidates have against false or misleading claims is to pursue action under libel laws. However, the courts set rigorous standards for proving libel for public figures, as candidates are generally interpreted to be. Laws in some individual states also prohibit candidates from making false or deceptive claims.

Content of Political Advertising

Since political advertising can occur in many different types of electoral situations, in different channels with many different sponsors, description of the content of political advertising has many different aspects. The focus here remains on presidential campaigns since they are the most visible and important electoral level in the United States, but the content of political advertising is also important in the elections of U.S. Senators, U.S. Congresspersons, state governors and other statewide officials, and, of course, at numerous state and local levels throughout all 50 United States.

The content of political advertising is often analyzed through a three-component system called "Videostyle." Videostyle is a system of analyzing how candidates present themselves to voters through their television advertising. There are three components to Videostyle: (1) the verbal content of a candidate's spots, (2) the nonverbal content of the spots, and (3) the audiovisual or television production techniques used in the spot.

Verbal Content of Political Advertising

Many of the concerns about verbal content relate to how much candidates talk about issues in their spots and how negative or positive the tone of the spots are. Television spots are frequently criticized for being too focused on the candidate's image and providing insufficient information about the candidates' positions on issues. Research does not support this concern. Historically, presidential candidates have been much more likely to stress issues in their television ads than to talk about themselves or their images. An analysis of television ads in presidential campaigns from 1952 through the 2004 election showed that 69% of all the

general election ads sponsored by presidential candidates focused on issues. Table 1 shows how the percentage of image and issue ads can be broken down by presidential candidates. The trend has varied little over time. During the 2004 campaign, both George W. Bush and John Kerry concentrated four out of every five of their television ads on issues. The most frequently mentioned issues have, not surprisingly, been economic concerns, taxes, medical care and Social Security benefits, and occasionally foreign policy.

Political advertising has also been accused of being too negative, of focusing on attacks and criticisms of the opponent instead of positive things about the sponsoring candidate. On this concern, research has also documented that television ads have more often focused on the good points of the sponsoring candidate. Overall, 59% of presidential candidate ads have been positive, while 41% have been negative.

However, it is worth noting that the percentage of negative ads has been increasing over the past 2 decades. Bill Clinton used negative ads throughout both his presidential campaigns. In fact, 69% of Clinton's ads in 1992 were negative, as were 68% of his 1996 commercials. The 2000 campaign brought only a small decline in negativity when 62% of Al Gore's ads were negative, compared to 37% of Bush ads. In 2004, however, it was Bush who ran the most negative ads (58% compared to 34% for John Kerry). Some researchers have argued that it is also important to consider how often each negative or positive ad was aired and which voters in what states or television markets were exposed to these messages. While some political observers have a negative reaction to negative ads, research has shown that most negative ads focus on policy issues and often provide voters with useful information that helps them to distinguish between candidates.

Table 1 Presidential Candidate Use of Ads in the United States, 1952–2004 (*N* = 1,535)

Year	*Name*	*Positive*	*Negative*	*Issue*	*Image*
1952	Eisenhower	34%	66%	40%	60%
	Stevenson	--	--	--	--
1956	Eisenhower	100%	0	100%	--
	Stevenson	67%	33%	80%	20%
1960	Kennedy	88%	12%	82%	18%
	Nixon	92%	8%	82%	18%
1964	Goldwater	54%	46%	81%	19%
	Johnson	52%	48%	72%	28%
1968	Nixon	85%	15%	31%	69%
	Humphrey	67%	33%	46%	54%
1972	McGovern	60%	40%	70%	30%
	Nixon	80%	20%	54%	46%
1976	Carter	81%	19%	64%	36%
	Ford	73%	27%	49%	51%
1980	Carter	64%	36%	45%	55%
	Reagan	65%	35%	57%	43%
1984	Mondale	46%	54%	92%	8%
	Reagan	73%	27%	53%	47%
1988	Bush	64%	36%	44%	56%
	Dukakis	46%	54%	70%	30%
1992	Bush	34%	66%	50%	50%
	Clinton	31%	69%	67%	33%
1996	Dole	39%	61%	62%	38%
	Clinton	32%	68%	86%	14%
2000	Gore	38%	62%	84%	16%
	Bush	63%	37%	63%	37%
2004	Bush	42%	58%	85%	15%
	Kerry	66%	34%	79%	21%
TOTAL		**59%**	**41%**	**69%**	**31%**

Source: Adapted from Kaid and Holtz-Bacha, 2006, Table 3.1, p. 42.

Nonverbal Content in Political Advertising

The nonverbal content of political spots concerns the candidate's appearance and presentation through style of dress, body movements, speech rate and style, eye contact, and so on. While there is great variation across candidates in this aspect of Videostyle, successful candidates have usually dressed formally, maintained eye contact with the camera when speaking, smiled frequently, and maintained a fluent speech rate.

The final aspect of candidate Videostyle is the use of television production techniques to present the candidate to voters. Trends in production techniques have developed over the past 5 decades as television production became more elaborate and complex, and candidates were able to adopt and take advantage of new technologies. However, the development of new technologies brought with it an ethical concern in the Videostyle of candidates. Candidates and their media

producers began to take advantage of the new sound, video, and digital production techniques to alter the audio and video used in their advertisements. Labeled "technodistortions," these new techniques were able to mislead voters through editing, morphing, digital alterations in video materials, and changes in audio soundtracks. Most common in negative ads, these technodistortions have been increasing since the 1980s and now constitute a substantial ethical concern in political advertising.

Effects of Political Advertising

In addition to understanding what makes up the content of political advertising, research has considered the question of how effective political advertising is. The effectiveness of political advertising can be considered in many ways, including whether political advertising results in increased knowledge for voters, whether it affects the evaluation of candidates, and, of course, to what extent political advertising can influence votes or even cause voters to become alienated from the political system.

Information Effects

One of the ways in which political advertising appears to be the most effective is in its communication of knowledge to voters. Voters who are exposed to political advertising are usually more likely to recall the candidates who are running in an election, to recognize and understand campaign issues, and to learn other useful information about the candidates and campaign. Political advertising has been shown to be such an effective transmitter of campaign information that researchers have found that exposure to political ads can lead to higher levels of information gain than can exposure to television news about the campaign or to debates between opposing candidates.

Effects on Candidate Evaluation

Exposure to political ads can also affect how voters evaluate a political candidate. Studies have shown that the candidate evaluation effects of television advertising can be both negative and positive. Sometimes a particular candidate is helped and sometimes hurt by particular advertising. It is impossible to say that political spots will always affect candidate evaluations in the same way for every candidate. Much depends on the individual voter and on the type and presentation of the advertising, but it is unquestionably possible for political advertising to affect a voter's positive or negative evaluation of a candidate.

Effects on Voting Behavior

In the United States there are many examples of situations where political advertising has made a difference in the outcome of an election. It is worth repeating that, of course, all political advertising does not result in votes for every candidate who sponsors it. But research has substantiated the potential of political ads to affect voter's choices, sometimes for a candidate in the case of positive ads and sometimes against a candidate in the case of negative advertising.

Researchers have also considered the conditions under which political advertising is more or less likely to be effective. Most of these conditions have been studied in terms of television advertising. For instance, televised political advertising seems to have stronger effects on voters who have low involvement in a political campaign. Political television ads are also more likely to affect the votes of citizens who are undecided at the time of exposure or who are late deciders. These characteristics often apply to voters who do not have strong affiliations with a political party and are thus more likely to be influenced by candidate advertising.

The content of a political advertisement may also be related to the likelihood that the political advertisement will be successful. Ads that focus on issues tend to be more effective than those that concentrate only on candidate image. Ads that arouse voter emotions are also effective.

Effects of Negative Political Advertising

Negative advertising has become such an important part of campaign advertising that a separate area of research has developed about the effects of negative advertising. Several decades ago, political consultants and candidates anticipated that negative advertising was likely to have a backlash effect that could hurt the sponsoring candidate more than it would damage the opponent being attacked. This is still a concern, and instances where backlash occurs continue to occur, but negative advertising has become so common in the modern U.S. political system that backlash happens much less often. Aside from the potential but unlikely backlash effects, how do negative advertisements function in a campaign? First, negative political advertising can be very effective because it is more

likely than positive ads to be remembered by voters. Second, negative advertising is most effective when it focuses on issue messages, attacking the opponent on the basis of issue positions or inconsistencies, rather than on the opponent's personal qualities.

Negative advertising appears to be particularly effective when it is sponsored by an independent group that is not connected with the candidate. Apparently, voters view such independent sources as less biased and more likely to provide objective information.

Because negative political ads appear to be so effective, candidates have developed guidelines for how to deal with negative advertising in campaigns. Most important, a candidate cannot afford to ignore a negative television attack. Research has shown that it is important for the candidate who has been attacked to act quickly to rebut the attack, preferably by providing a direct rebuttal to the charge or charges made in the opponent's attack ad. Another strategy for a candidate who fears that attack ads may be a problem is to consider a strategy of inoculation. Research has shown that if a candidate can provide voters with initial positive and constructive information about a topic and the candidate's position on it in advance of attacks by the opponent, then voters are less likely to be convinced by the negative attack when and if it does hit the airwaves.

Some political observers and researchers have considered the possibility that negative advertising creates an unpleasant campaign atmosphere that alienates voters and may even cause voters to decide not to participate in the political system. A small amount of research has shown that voter disgruntlement about negative advertising can lead voters to refuse to vote at all and thus lower voter turnout results. Recent research has shown this concern is likely unwarranted, and, in fact, negative advertising may stimulate interest in a campaign that leads to increased voter participation and turnout.

The increased participation of women and minorities in the American political system has also led to more interest in understanding the role of political advertising when it supports or opposes female candidates and candidates who are African American, Hispanic, Asian, or representatives of other voter groups.

International Political Advertising

The United States is not the only country to use political advertising to promote candidates and parties. However, there are several differences in how political advertising functions in other democratic systems. First, many other countries prohibit political advertising on television, and candidates and parties generally rely on printed materials, particularly posters and flyers, for public distribution of their messages. Second, many countries that permit political promotional materials on television do not permit candidates and parties to purchase time for advertising. Instead, time is given to candidates or parties at no cost on public channels. Such systems prescribe very precisely the length, conditions, contents, and/or formats of the messages. Examples of such systems are Britain and France. Third, some countries operate under a dual system in which candidates or parties are given free time on public television channels and are allowed to purchase limited amounts of time on private television channels. Germany is an example of a dual system.

Research on political television advertising outside the United States has shown that such advertising is generally longer and, like ads in the United States, tends to focus primarily on issues in the campaign rather than on candidate images. This is partly a result of the fact that parties are often more important than individual candidates in elections outside the United States. Television ads outside the United States are also much more likely to be positive ads that promote the positive characteristics of the candidates or parties rather than negative or attack ads. Political television ads also tend to reflect the cultural differences between countries.

There is less research on the effects of political advertising outside the United States. However, Kaid and Holtz-Bacha have found that such advertising may affect the images of candidates and result in issue learning.

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Advocacy Advertising; Ad Watch; Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act; Communications Act of 1934; Daisy Girl Ad; Federal Election Campaign Act; Negative Advertising; Political Advertising, Independent; Political Advertising, Radio; *Responsive Chord, The*; Schwartz, Tony; TechnoDistortions; Videostyle; Willie Horton Ad; Women Candidates, Advertising

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Political Advertising, Independent

Political advertising is usually sponsored by the candidates and parties who seek election or reelection to political office. However, in the United States, where free speech is a valued right, political advertising is often sponsored by independent groups or individuals who wish to advocate for the election or defeat of individuals, parties, or ideas or issues. Such advertising has always been possible in print form, but growth of electronic media, radio and television, and later the Internet provided additional means and channels for these messages. Independent advertising also provided an outlet for corporations and labor unions that are prohibited from contributing to political campaigns in the United States.

Television advertising by groups independent of the candidate's campaign became nationally visible in Richard Nixon's 1972 campaign when a group called "Democrats for Nixon," headed by former Texas Governor John Connolly, sponsored a series of effective ads for Nixon. The ads were particularly effective in their attacks on George McGovern. One ad highlighted McGovern's inconsistencies and contradictory statements on policy issues, and another used toy ships, soldiers, and aircraft to illustrate alleged damage to American military security if McGovern's defense cutbacks were implemented. Following the Nixon campaign, however, the newly passed Federal Election Campaign Act went into effect, and the law and the subsequent 1976 *Buckley v. Valeo* Supreme Court case interpreting it made it clear that independent expenditures were legal. As long as they were not "coordinated with the campaign," such expenditures could be used for ads supporting or opposing candidates without being regulated or restricted.

In the decades following the *Buckley* decision, independent expenditures became an increasingly important part of campaigns. The independent groups most active in sponsoring political advertising were political action committees formed by corporations and labor unions who could not contribute directly to political campaigns. Groups like the AFL-CIO, the National Rifle Association, the AARP, the NAACP, the Conservation League, and the American Medical Association have used their political action committees as sponsors for political advertising. In some cases, committees were formed more generally to support particular viewpoints or philosophies. For instance, in the 1980s the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) boasted many successes in its efforts to defeat candidates with liberal viewpoints and/or support candidates with conservative viewpoints.

In several instances independent groups also were formed and organized to support or oppose legislative proposals rather than specific candidates. For instance, during the 1990s many groups advertised in support or opposition to the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and in support or opposition to the passage of comprehensive health care reforms advocated by President Bill Clinton and his wife Hillary. Groups have also formed and expended money to air ads in support or opposition to Supreme Court nominees in hopes of influencing the votes of the U.S. Senate in confirmation hearings. Advertising focused on issues or policy concerns is sometimes called "issue advocacy advertising." In 1995–1996 more than $150 million was spent on advertising by such groups.

It is also legal for an individual to purchase time for ads to support or oppose candidates. Some observers believe that Senator Chuck Percy (R-IL) may have lost his Senate seat in Illinois in 1984 at least partly as

a result of the expenditure of more than $1 million on negative advertising by private businessman Michael Goland of California. Even more famous was the notorious Willie Horton Ad. Sponsored by an independent group in 1988, this ad criticized Democratic presidential candidate Michael Dukakis for his prison furlough program in Massachusetts that allowed convicted criminal Willie Horton to escape custody and go on a murder and rape spree.

Independent expenditures for advertising took on even more importance after the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) in 2002. In the rush to control soft money and political party fundraising and spending, the new legislation spawned new highs in independent spending for political advertising. Since the spending of some types of political committees, particularly 527 groups named after the section of the Internal Revenue Code under which they are organized, was virtually unregulated by BCRA, the 2004 campaigns witnessed a glut of independent expenditures. Many groups were formed just for the purpose of sponsoring ads for and against presidential candidates and other high-visibility office contenders. Groups like MoveOn.org (funded heavily by wealthy businessman George Soros), the Media Fund, Progress for America Voter Fund, and many others were active sponsors of advertisements in 2004. The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth group, for instance, formed and sponsored ads designed to criticize the actions of John Kerry after his Vietnam service. Large percentages of the ads from these groups were negative. One notable exception was the very effective ad sponsored in support of George W. Bush by the Progress for America Voter Funds. Focused on the story of a young girl who lost her mother in the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, "Ashley's Story" was an emotional ad that touted Bush's caring and compassion.

Overall, independent groups spent hundreds of millions of dollars on ads in the 2004 campaign. Groups like America Coming Together ($61.8 million) and the Media Fund ($51.7 million) sponsored ads supporting Kerry, while Progress for America Voter Fund ($37.9 million) and Swift Boat Veterans for Truth ($26 million) supported Bush. Unless new regulations are passed to control these expenditures, it is likely that they will continue to increase in future election cycles.

One reason independent advertisements have gained popularity is that research has shown that negative ads sponsored by independent sponsors are more effective than those sponsored by a candidate. Negative ads sponsored by independent groups thus allow the candidate who benefits from the attack to do so without being blamed for the attack or risking backlash from voters.

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Advocacy Advertising; Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act; *Buckely v. Valeo;* Campaign Finance; Willie Horton Ad

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Political Advertising, Radio

The radio airwaves became a central mode of campaign advertising soon after the entrance of commercial radio in the United States in 1922 and maintained that role for more than 3 decades. Despite the rise of television advertising, with candidates for higher profile offices spending large amounts of their campaign budgets on the production and airing of television spots, radio advertising has persisted in the American political arena. In addition to maintaining a crucial place in the communications strategies of candidates for smaller budget state and local offices because of the cost effectiveness of radio advertising, since the early 1990s radio has reasserted its role in higher-profile campaigns

as a mode of advertising that allows campaigns to target their messages to subgroups of voters.

Soon after radio's entrance into American life in the early 1920s, the new technology became a vehicle for advertising by candidates and parties. During its first decades, radio was dominated by national networks like NBC and CBS (formed in 1926 and 1927 respectively). The 1934 Federal Communications Act forced noncommercial and independent stations to share frequencies with networks or to move to less desirable space on the dial; this cemented networks' dominance. As a result, in the early years campaign advertising carried out on radio was primarily by the national parties on behalf of presidential candidates. With each election cycle after 1924, radio campaigning techniques grew more elaborate, innovative, and expensive. By 1940, more than a third of the spending by the two national parties was on radio advertising. Social scientists who studied the impact of radio advertising on politics during these early years, most notably Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues, contended that radio advertising served primarily as a reinforcer of voters' attitudes rather than a source of political conversion.

During the 1950s, national radio networks disappeared as the broadcast industry shifted their attention (and their dollars) to television development. Local radio stations began defecting from the networks and began focusing their attention on local advertisers, including candidates for political office. As this localization occurred, stations began to target small segments of the radio audience through focusing their programming on a particular format so that they could develop audience loyalty with the limited demographic group most drawn to that format; groups whose cultural tastes were not being served by television became an especial target for this programming . In contrast to radio's early decades, this *narrow*casting resulted in stations gaining smaller but sufficient and specialized shares of the listening audience. The number of formats grew as the years passed. More than 100 different specialized formats existed by the early 21st century. Such narrowcasting had a major impact on campaign advertising on those radio stations, creating a unique communication opportunity for candidates and partisan organizations.

While scholarly and public attention tends to focus on television campaign advertisements, radio ads continue to play a significant role in all levels of American campaigns. For instance, two-thirds of House candidates and virtually every Senate candidate uses radio ads, and there is some evidence that their use is expanding, with political consultants from the successful Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidential campaigns noting the importance of radio ads in their communication strategies.

Radio ads have numerous features that make them attractive to political campaigns. First, lower production and airtime costs means that radio ads are generally longer and, therefore, more substantive than similar television ads. Second, radio's distinctive utilization patterns permit candidates to communicate with targeted constituencies about the issues the groups care most about and employ a style of communication that resonates with those communities, with little risk of also mobilizing the political opposition. As early as 1928, some targeted advertising began on radio with both parties using morning radio programs, with a disproportionately female audience, to air messages expected to resonate with women. But, changes in the structure of radio that began after the demise of networks and the continue with the ongoing increase in the number of formats have allowed such targeting to become more precise (most listeners tune into only one or two stations, with stations chosen largely on the basis of demographically distinct musical preferences). Recent scholarly work has found that African Americans, religious voters, and young citizens are most reliant upon radio advertising as a source of campaign information. Importantly, those who disproportionately rely upon radio messages developed for their demographic group are more likely to perceive democracy as healthy in the United States and are also more likely to approve of the quality of the campaigns in intense elections.

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See also Political Advertising; Radio, Politics and

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Political Advertising, Women Candidates

See Women Candidates, Advertising

Political Alienation

See Political Disaffection

Political Ballads, Songs

See Music and Politics

Political Branding

Nowadays there are highly visible resemblances between the consumer goods market and the world of politics. There is an evident relationship between business research and electoral affairs. Hence *brand positioning* and *brand management* have become more and more important in politics. Both parties and politicians hold a brand equity.

In the economic sense, a *brand* is a deep-seated and distinctive image of a commodity or a service in the mind of a consumer. Transferred to the world of politics, a brand is a deep-seated and distinctive image of a party or a politician (and a candidate, respectively) in the mind of a voter. Therefore it is important that parties and politicians exhibit a strong, consistent, unique, distinguishable, and trustworthy image. Besides traditional methods like grassroots campaigning differentiation from other parties or politicians, position papers, public relations, self-portrayal, public performances, appearance in media, and so on, an integral part of contemporary political campaigning is intelligent and courageous brand equity management.

From the voters' point of view, the political brand must be both attractive and emotive. Therefore the primary purpose must be building up a positive brand image and a solid brand essence. The *brand essence* consists of brand identity and brand value. To be successful, the brand identity should be as precise as possible. The voter must know what the party or the politician is standing for. The politicians have to meet the challenge to communicate their political attitudes, to grant insights into decision-making processes, to work with appropriate symbols and slogans, to raise the voter's awareness of party organization and identity, to define the scope of other positions, to expose the unique selling proposition, to disclose core values, and to prove expertise in problem solving. The *brand value* should correspond with the value hierarchy of the voter. Information about the voter's lifestyle, desires, and needs are essential. A brand not only knows the demographical distribution of the voters but understands their lives. This empathy is the requirement for a long-term strategy using emotional bonding. It guarantees the connection to a voting base. Furthermore, a politician should present her- or himself as predictive. Primarily the politician should be a reliable and familiar partner of the voters.

Political branding means to have these maxims in mind and to act upon these principles. Then the voter's esteem will be reflected in the choice of the candidate' own brand from among other brand choices.

Thomas Knieper

See also Political Marketing

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Political Campaign Communication

Judith Trent and Robert Friedenberg (2004) have done a superb job of providing readers with a broad picture and a truly honest view of politics, candidates, and campaigns in their book, *Political Campaign Communication.* Trent and Friedenberg include perspectives from other disciplines, but ultimately they believe the backbone of political campaigns is found within the art and power of communication. Their study of political campaign communication has been broken down into two areas: the analysis of principles and the analysis of important and contemporary political practices.

Political Campaign Communication was first published in 1983 with the purpose of addressing six questions and concerns regarding political campaigns. Trent and Friedenberg agree that those same concerns still exist today, but they exist in a new day and time, and some are still tragically unchanged. The questions seek to address trends, campaign effectiveness, ethics, cost, public expectations, and the candidates themselves.

Political Campaign Communication also describes three vital areas of importance in political campaigns, providing the basis for why readers and voters should still have faith in the political system. Elections are important because they "allow us freedom to actively participate in selecting our leaders," "provide us with the opportunity to determine how our own interest can best be served," and also allow those elected the "legitimacy with which to govern." In the book, Trent and Friedenberg describe changes in politics and campaigns throughout the decades. Their use of real examples, ranging from John F. Kennedy's presidency to George W. Bush's reelection campaign, bring to life the principles and practices they describe.

In the book, Trent and Friedenberg address several topics within the communication principles. As part of the principles of political campaign communication, the book discusses communicative functions, styles, and strategies of campaigns, communicative channels of campaigning, and types and functions of political advertising. As part of the practices of political campaign communication, the book describes the art of public speaking, the forms of addresses and speeches, the skill of debate, the importance of interpersonal communication and advertising. The book is written well from a communication core. Trent and Friedenberg's goal for this book is the hope that the readers will become "better informed" voters and find a "renewed understanding and interest in the political system."

Both authors are extremely knowledgeable in political campaign communication. Trent, currently a professor of communication at the University of Cincinnati, has written and edited several books and is a popular analyst on candidates and campaigns for the network affiliates in Cincinnati, Ohio. Friedenberg, currently a professor of communication at Miami University of Ohio, has also written and edited several books and has served as a consultant for the Republican National Committee. He is also an experienced campaign consultant, having been involved in more than 70 political campaigns. Both bring a wealth of knowledge and insight to the field through their book, *Political Campaign Communication,* now in its fifth edition in 2004.

Alecea Davis Jones

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Political Commercial Archive

The Political Commercial Archive (PCA) is the world's largest collection of political commercials and is nationally and internationally recognized as a major

research resource. The archive is a part of the Political Communication Center (PCC) in the Department of Communication at the University of Oklahoma. The original collections in the archive were purchased from a private collector, Mr. Julian Kanter, and established at the University of Oklahoma in 1985. Kanter had operated the archive out of his home in Highland Park, Illinois, and at the time it was purchased by the University of Oklahoma, the collection contained about 20,000 items.

Under the supervision of the PCC's founding director, Lynda Lee Kaid, the collection grew to more than 50,000 in 2000. Kaid and Library and Information Sciences Professor Kathleen J. M. Haynes developed a cataloging and archival management system for the archive, and the items in the archive were organized according to the Archives and Manuscripts format for entry into standard Library of Congress bibliographic systems. They produced printed catalogs of the archive's holdings, some of which are available in online format at http://www.ou.edu/pccenter/catalogue.htm.

Many of the items in the collection are the only known existing video or audio recordings of these particular political commercials. The archive contains commercials from every election year from 1952 to the present. All levels of races are included: presidential, U.S. senatorial, gubernatorial and other statewide offices, congressional, state legislative, county and municipal, judicial, school board, and so on. The archive has materials from all 50 states and some foreign countries. It also contains ads for and against ballot issues (or propositions) and an increasing number of advocacy commercials that deal with public and social policy questions.

The archive operates with the endorsement of the Republican and Democratic National Committees, the National Archives, and the Library of Congress. In 1999, the archive was named an American "Treasure" by Save America's Treasures (White House Millennium Council and the National Historic Preservation Trust).

Scholars and researchers may access the holdings of the archive onsite at the University of Oklahoma campus in Norman, Oklahoma. Limited numbers of items are available for off-site use.

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Political Communication Center

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POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Political Communication is the premier academic journal in the political communication discipline. The purpose of the journal is to provide an outlet for scholarship in the political communication field. The journal is jointly sponsored by the Political Communication Divisions of the International Communication Association (ICA) and the American Political Science Association (APSA). Published quarterly and peer reviewed, *Political Communication* is one of the highest ranked journals in both the political science and communication disciplines.

Political Communication published its first volume under the joint auspices of these two academic organizations in 1994. The journal was a successor to two other publications, *Political Communication Review* and *Political Communication and Persuasion.*

In 1975, the Political Communication Division of ICA commenced publication of a small annual journal, *Political Communication Review* (PCR). PCR initially concentrated on providing bibliographic or review essays, book reviews, descriptions of nonprint materials available to scholars. PCR continued publication under the joint editorship of Keith R. Sanders and Lynda Lee Kaid until 1991, when it was succeeded by *Political Communication.*

Based on the recommendation of a joint publication committee, the Political Communication Divisions of ICA and APSA agreed in 1991 to cosponsor a new journal, *Political Communication.* The new journal was to be published by Taylor & Francis Publishers and would replace the printing house's journal *Political Communication and Persuasion.* The first editor of the journal

was Doris Graber. Subsequent editors are appointed in alternation between the two sponsoring associations and have included David S. Warson and David Paletz. The ICA and APSA divisions also cooperate in sponsoring a regular newsletter, *Political Communication Reports.*

Lynda Lee Kaid

Further Readings

Political Communication Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/10584609.asp

Political Communication Center

The Political Communication Center (PCC) at the University of Oklahoma was the first academic center in the United States to focus on the role of communication in the political system. The PCC's founding director was Lynda Lee Kaid, who established the PCC in 1985 as an interdisciplinary center in the Department of Communication at the University of Oklahoma.

The Department of Communication offers an undergraduate, a master's, and a PhD specialization in political communication. Areas of study include mass media impact on voting behavior and public events; communication between political figures and the public; government-press relations; political advertising; and social, psychological, and political antecedents of public opinion. The programs of the center prepare students for careers in academic teaching and research; for positions in government with political candidates and office holders; and for jobs in public and private research consortia and with media organizations.

An important component of the PCC is the Political Commercial Archive, the world's largest collection of radio and television commercials. The archive contains political television and radio ads for campaigns from 1936 through the present. All levels of elections from president to school board elections are represented. The collection also contains ads for ballot initiatives and referenda. A portion of the archive contains advertising from elections in other countries, including Asia, Australia, Europe, and Latin America.

The Political Communication Center also sponsors conferences, workshops, symposia, and lectures on political topics. Such programs provide a forum for the interaction of students, scholars, and practitioners on political communication issues. The Political Commercial Archive also engages in active outreach efforts, providing programs and presentations for other colleges and universities, civic clubs, business and professional organizations, political gatherings, and other interested groups.

The center sometimes issues special publications such as *Political Advertising Research Reports* that have been mailed periodically to scholars and researchers. More information on the PCC's holdings, activities, and publications can be found on its Web site at http://www.ou.edu/pccenter.

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Political Commercial Archive

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Political Communication Review

See *Political Communication*

Political Conflict

Political conflict can be defined as a public dispute over political influence or control between two or more antagonists. The role of the news media in political conflict is a central area of research in the field of political communication. There are at least two reasons for this level of interest. First, there is reason to believe that that role of the media in such disputes can have a major impact on both the course of these disputes and on their final outcome. Second, the news media serve as the central arena for such disputes, and most citizens rely on the press as their primary source of information about political conflicts.

The research in this area can be divided into two broad areas. Studies concerning the role of the news media in international conflicts are concerned with such issues as the role of the press in wars, international interventions, international terrorism, and peace processes. Researchers who focus on domestic conflicts are mostly concerned with the ability of movements, minorities, labor unions, and domestic terrorist organizations to gain access to and legitimacy from the media. Although the two realms of research have a number of overlapping concerns, it is helpful to distinguish between them.

The role of the news media in international conflicts receives the most amount of research interest in political communication. One central theme in this literature has to do with the relative independence of the news media during wars. Studies carried out in a variety of countries have found that the news media generally tend to "rally 'round the flag" in support of their governments, especially during the early stages of such conflicts. A number of researchers, however, have pointed to the fact that as the level of political consensus surrounding a war begins to break down, the news media reflect that change in mood or even accelerate the rate of change. The one conclusion that all researchers in this field can agree on it is that the specific role the news media play in wars varies along with the surrounding political environment.

A related body of literature concerns the ways in which technological changes influence the flow of information and images from the battlefield to people's homes. The fact that the public receives almost instantaneous news about ongoing losses in the field, for example, probably makes it more difficult for political and military leaders to convince citizens to support drawn out conflicts. Scholars have also looked at what has been termed the "CNN effect." The term refers to concerns that the constant flow of instant and graphic news stories puts undue pressure on political leaders to intervene in international conflicts and humanitarian disasters. Most researchers have come to the conclusion, however, that such fears are exaggerated because modern political leaders are well aware of the dangers involved in such interventions.

The topic of media and terrorism has also received considerable attention in the literature on international conflict. As might be expected, the research in this area tends to be more policy oriented. A major question has to do with how governments can limit the ability of terrorists' organizations to exploit the news media without unduly restricting freedom of the press. Here too technological issues—especially the creation of the Internet—have become more important in the field. The Internet provides terrorist organizations with an extremely efficient tool for mobilization and coordination that would have been unavailable a few years earlier.

Concerning the field of international conflict, the role of the news media in peace processes has received the least scholarly attention. Those who have studied the issue have concluded that there is an inherent contradiction between the needs of the news and the needs of peace. News is about conflict, and apart from an occasional breakthrough, the long and complicated negotiations involved in a long peace process do not supply sufficient drama to be considered newsworthy. In addition, news tends to be inherently ethnocentric, and any serious attempt at reconciliation requires at least a minimal understanding of the needs of the other side.

Concerning domestic political conflict, a good deal of the literature focuses on the ways in which the news media serve as central agents for increasing the gaps between the strongest and weakest elements in society. One of the more important themes in this work concerns coverage of minorities. Studies from a variety of Western countries conclude that due to definitions of newsworthiness the press either ignores such groups or relates to them as social deviants. The major reason for this phenomenon is that while the more powerful elements in society are considered inherently newsworthy, those living in the social, geographical, or economic periphery are considered worthy of coverage only if they are linked to dramatically negative events. This dynamic also has also been found important in studies that examined the attempts by political movements and other challengers to gain access to the news media. Protest groups and labor unions often find themselves paying the "dues of disorder" in order to be considered worthy of coverage. Such behavior, however, means that such groups are framed by the media as extremists.

Despite this, research also shows that some challengers manage to overcome these obstacles by successfully gaining both access and a certain amount of legitimacy from the news media. Examples include the American civil rights movement, women's movements, environmental movements, and gay rights movements. Here too, then, the overall goal of research in this area is to better understand how the

role of the news media in political processes varies over time and circumstance.

Gadi Wolfsfeld

See also Minorities, Role in Politics

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Political Consultants

See Consultants, Political

Political Correctness

Political correctness, politically correct, and PC are terms used to refer to language that seems intended to give the least amount of offense, especially when describing groups identified by external markers such as race, gender, culture, or sexual orientation. The concept has been discussed, disputed, criticized, and satirized by commentators from the conservative, liberal, and moderate camps. It has been used to ridicule the view that altering language usage can change perceptions, outcomes, and beliefs in the public arena.

The term first appeared in Marxist-Leninist vocabulary following the Russian Revolution of 1917. At that time it was used to describe the party line. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the term began to be used wittily by liberal politicians to refer to the extremism of some left-wing issues, particularly regarding what was perceived as an emphasis on rhetoric over content. In the early 1990s, the term was used by conservatives to question and oppose what they perceived as the rise of liberal left-wing curriculum and teaching methods on university and college campuses in the United States. By the late 1990s, the usage of the term had again declined and was most frequently employed by comedians and others to lampoon political language. It was also used at times by the left to scoff at conservative political themes. In recent years, a few multiculturalist writers and speakers have chosen to ignore earlier definitions of the term and have begun using it.

Linguistically, political correctness seems to be rooted in a desire to eliminate exclusion of various identity groups based on language usage. According to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, our perception of reality is determined by our thought processes, which are influenced by the language we use. In this way language shapes our reality and tells us how to think about and respond to that reality. Language also reveals and promotes our biases. Therefore, using sexist language promotes sexism and using racial language promotes racism.

Those who are most strongly opposed to the concept of political correctness view it as censorship and a curtailment of freedom of speech that places limits on debates in the public arena. They contend that such language boundaries inevitably lead to self-censorship and restrictions on behavior. They further believe that

political correctness perceives offensive language where none exists. Others believe that political correctness has been used as an epithet to stop legitimate attempts to curb hate speech and minimize exclusionary speech practices. Ultimately, the ongoing discussion surrounding political correctness seems to center on language, naming, and whose definitions are accepted.

Cynthia Roper

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Political Corruption

Political corruption is a term generally used to describe the abuse of political or public office for private gain. Some of the more common forms of corruption concern issues of access to legislators and members of the executive branch, as well as patronage. It has been argued that while corruption is widespread and often considered systemic in many political systems, it is generally only in liberal democracies that its exposure leads to what has become a mainstay of modern political media coverage: the political scandal.

Political communication scholars have been interested in corruption especially as it pertains to three different areas: the increased importance of money in politics in general and campaigns in particular as a reason for an apparent increase of corruption, the exposure of corruption by the media, and the reaction following this exposure by the media and the persons involved.

It has been well established that political activity today poses higher financial burdens on the actors than ever before. While corruption for personal gain is certainly not uncommon, this motive does not account for the apparent increase in such practices. However, one of the issues that has often been related to this increase is the issue of financing political activity in modern society. The rising costs of political campaigns at all levels of government are generally a result of the increased need for advertising and as such have been well documented. It is generally thought that as political actors increasingly feel the pressure to secure higher levels of funding for their campaigns and for party activities, an increase in financial corruption is a likely result. In exchange for financial contributions, access may be granted or decisions may be made in favor of the funding sources. In the United States, campaign finance reform, including setting limits on contributions or spending, or even public financing, has often been touted as having the potential to limit corruption. However, political systems that do impose such limitations are not immune to corruption, as the wave of scandals throughout the world—for example, in Brazil, the Czech Republic, and Germany—has shown.

Another focus of media researchers is the investigation of the media's role in exposing corruption. This function of the media is often described as the fulfillment of its role as the Fourth Estate, providing checks on the functioning of government and contributing to remedying the consequences of corruption. The exposure of corruption and corrupt practices within the government are often the result of in-depth investigative reporting. It has been argued that in the United States, the media's execution of this function has diminished in recent years after its heyday during and immediately following the Watergate era. Similar developments have been discovered in the United Kingdom and throughout Europe. The so-called tabloidization of the media may be partially to blame, as the focus of news coverage has increasingly become the personal rather than the political or systemic. Under this model, the goal of investigative reporting has become to expose private peccadilloes rather than abuses of power and position. Additionally, patterns of media ownership have been cited as a reason for the decline of investigative reporting. On the one hand, the resources provided for newsgathering have generally declined under corporate ownership. On the other hand, conflicts of interest that may inhibit the exposure of financial connections between powerful interest groups or businesses and political actors may also have an influence on the nature of reporting.

Researchers are also interested in the developments that occur when corruption is exposed and made public. Theodore Lowi has defined scandals as "corruption revealed," and it is the press that is in large part

responsible for the reaction to these scandals. Whether or not a scandal has "legs" is in large part determined by the interest the media shows in it rather than by the substance of the underlying corruption. While the media may become responsible for changes in policy and may even cause people to leave office (as was the case following Watergate, e.g.), it may also create a situation in which a scandal is quickly forgotten due to a shift in focus on another issue or, in fact, the next scandal. At times, media coverage of politics can take on the guise of a never-ending succession of scandals. The actors involved in such scandals are of course interested in influencing the media's coverage, as well. Crisis communication models and image restoration techniques in response to the exposure of corruption have been described by a number of researchers.

Thomas Bartl

See also Political Scandal; Watergate

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Political Culture

Political culture is one of the most popular concepts in political science. To scrutinize political culture is to study how people view their country's politics. The notion of political culture does not refer to attitudes toward specific actors such as the current president or prime minister; rather it denotes how people view the political system as a whole, the institutions and the input and output structures, including their belief in its legitimacy. Pye defines *political culture* as the composite of basic values, feelings, and knowledge that underlie the political process. The building blocks of political culture are, therefore, the beliefs, opinions, and emotions of the citizens toward their form of government. Political culture consists of assumptions about the political world with concentration on certain features of events, institutions, and behavior. They set the range of alternatives among which members of a given population make decisions. Thus, political culture represents a disposition in favor of a range of alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions that are possible within a population.

Political culture has been studied most intensively in the context of established Western democracies. The classic study is Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture,* published in 1963. Based on surveys conducted in the United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy, and Mexico, this landmark investigation sought to identify the political culture within which a liberal democracy is most likely to develop and consolidate. Almond and Verba's argument is based on a distinction between three pure types of political culture: the parochial, subject, and participant. In the *parochial* political culture, citizens are only indistinctly aware of the existence of central government. In the *subject* political culture, citizens see themselves not as participants in the political process but as subjects of the government. In the *participant* political culture, citizens believe both that they can contribute to the system and that they are affected by it. Almond and Verba's work attracted the attention of generations of scholars who replicated the findings, criticized the conceptualizations, and refined the theory.

Almond and Verba's core idea was that democracy will prove most stable in societies where subject and parochial attitudes provide ballast to an essentially participant culture. This mix is termed the "civic culture." In this ideal combination, citizens are sufficiently active in politics to express their preferences to rulers but not so involved as to refuse to accept decisions with which they disagree. Thus the civic culture resolves the tension within democracy between popular control and effective governance. In Almond and Verba's study, Britain, and to a lesser extent the United States, came closest to this ideal. In both countries citizens felt they could influence the government.

In the decades following events such as the Vietnam War and student activism in the 1960, the oil crisis of the 1970s, the antinuclear movement and the rise of ecology groups in the 1980s, privatization and cutbacks to the welfare state in the 1990s, and terrorism

at the beginning of the 21st century left their mark on Western political cultures. In most Western democracies the civic political culture is moving toward a more skeptical and instrumental attitude to politics. Moreover, declining trust in government, lower turnout, and unconventional political participation implies a shift away from the participant culture that Almond and Verba regarded as the basis of democracy. Since the 1980s, confidence in the legislature, civil service, parties, and political leaders declined in most democracies, but popular support for democratic principles remained high. So far as political discontent focuses more on the performance of governing institutions and leaders than on the democratic process itself, the stability of the political system itself is not threatened.

Political culture is the property of a collectivity—for example, a nation, region, class, or party. Most studies of political culture concentrate on national cultures. Almond and Verba compared the political cultures of five nations; Richardson examined the political culture of Japan; and Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt analyzed the changing political culture in Germany. Some studies focus on territorially defined units at the subnational level, such as the political cultures of American states, Canadian provinces, or Italian regions. Following the pioneering footsteps of *The Civic Culture,* Putnam argues that civic community, based on high levels of political interest, social equality, interpersonal trust, and voluntary association leads to higher probabilities of effective governance and democracy. In addition, we find studies of the cultural attributes of other social groups such as the political elite, the working class, and the like.

Political culture can be a fruitful explanation, if we identify what it is about these collectivities that leads to the distinctive patterns of assumptions. So far as nations are concerned, it is crucial whether their collective experience is essential or whether the differences between them are the result of the varying proportions of particular groups with their own unique experiences. National culture has an effect only when people in the same social categories, but in different nations, hold different assumptions. Political culture defines the range of tolerable alternatives from which groups or individuals choose an option. The choice an individual or group makes within these range is to be explained by other factors.

Jürgen R. Winkler

See also Political Disaffection

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Political Cynicism

See Political Disaffection

Political Disaffection

Political disaffection is a term used to describe negative attitudes and feelings toward one's political system. Political observers have hypothesized that such negative attitudes toward the political system may be influenced by the media, and particularly by television. Although such expectations have been voiced since the introduction of television, the discussion was intensified when Michael J. Robinson brought up the "videomalaise hypothesis" during the 1970s. Building on the coincidence of increasing political cynicism in the United States and a decline of trust in political

institutions, on the one hand, and an increasing reliance on television for the acquisition of political information by citizens on the other, the videomalaise hypothesis regarded television as a major factor in the growth of political alienation. This revived suspicions of a "narcotizing dysfunction" of the media suggested by Lazarsfeld and Merton as early as 1948.

Several studies, in the United States and abroad, have been designed to test the simple correlation as put forward in the videomalaise hypothesis. Findings have been mixed, partly as a result of diverse conceptualizations, research designs, and measurement indicators. Often the studies applied different measures to represent political disaffection, including political powerlessness or efficacy, trust, alienation, apathy, and cynicism. A more systematic approach was based on David Easton's model of the political system and his concept of political support that can refer to the political community as a whole, the governing regime, or the political authorities. Support, as Easton saw it, can either be diffuse or specific. *Diffuse support* represents the general support of the different elements of the political system. *Specific support* is transferred to those who are responsible for decisions, first the authorities, than the governing regime. Diffuse support should be independent of day-to-day politics and therefore also provides acceptance of political decisions that may not meet an individual's expectations.

Easton's concept of diffuse support has repeatedly been related to the concept of political alienation and the diverse indicators mentioned. Alienation would occur when diffuse support weakens and thus can also be directed toward the three objects of the political system. Together with diffuse support, alienation is defined as a more general attitude toward the political system that is also more permanent than the rejection of specific political decisions, discontent with the government, or the opinion about an individual politician. However, Easton himself only accepted alienation as the opposite of support when it accompanies the refusal of and a negative evaluation of a political object. Nevertheless, he saw diffuse support and alienation in an important interrelation and therefore suggested that alienation should be regarded as a crucial determinant of support.

This research also discussed the consequences of disaffection from politics for political behavior. It was initially assumed that disaffection leads the individual to turn away from politics and become apathetic. While this might be the necessary consequence of a decline in efficacy, a decline in trust or increasing cynicism might also lead to a growth in political participation and more specifically in certain activities beyond the usual forms of participation, such as protest behavior.

Similarly, researchers discussed appropriate measures for determining television use and other independent variables that were supposed to influence disaffection. The videomalaise hypothesis spoke of "television reliance," meaning the preference for television for political information. Some of the earlier studies used television exposure instead of reliance. Research soon turned away from global measures of television exposure or reliance and started to apply interactive media behavior measures, combining general and specific exposure as well as attentiveness and motives for media use, which expands the predictive power of exposure.

Finally, researchers also contrasted the effects of the use of political content with the use of entertainment media and discovered the "virtuous circle," which has been described as a positive relation between the use of political media content and knowledge or trust and efficacy. At the same time, some support was found for a the correlation between the use of media entertainment and political alienation variables, meaning that high use of entertainment media comes along with low levels of efficacy and political trust. However, this correlation was interpreted as an interrelationship in which media use and political attitudes mutually influence each other.

By making television the scapegoat, the early videomalaise hypothesis assumed special features of the medium to be responsible for increasing political disaffection, namely its negativism, the high credibility of television, and the "inadvertent audience." This assumption, however, failed to consider that negativism and other content-related features are not specific to television. Therefore, researchers started to look into the development of political journalism in general or, even broader, the reporting about politics as it has merged with entertainment, opening up a new line of research. This approach, instead of making the television medium responsible for political disaffection, addressed journalistic behavior as well as the packaging and framing of politics in the media and their connection to political attitudes. Thus, the way the media cover politics has come under attack. Its game and strategy structure and its conflict-oriented style are accused of starting a "spiral of cynicism" that is responsible for turning citizens away from news and

public affairs coverage and undermining their interest in politics.

Christina Holtz-Bacha

See also Framing; Political Efficacy; Political Engagement

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Political Efficacy

Political efficacy is a term that refers to the feeling that one's own political actions can have an impact upon the political process. Like with many important concepts in the field of political communication and sociology, its origins can be traced back to a string of biannual surveys directed by Angus Campbell and his associates at the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center (SRC) that eventually became to be known as the (American) National Election Studies (ANES).

The SRC's approach to the study of politics focused on three basic tenets: (1) the idea that attitudes guide political behavior, (2) the notion that research has to be cumulative, and (3) the willingness to draw on the rich tradition of political polling that was already established as well as on commonsensical ideas about politics. Therefore, the four items—a fifth item was dropped later on—that were introduced in 1952 were not derived from some overarching theory, but were simply considered interesting and relevant by the SRC group, given the political situation of the time.

They read:

1. "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think."
2. "Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things."
3. "People like me don't have any say about what the government does."
4. "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."

Items 1, 3, and 4 were replicated in the ANES after 1956 on a more or less biannual basis, and therefore at least in the United States it is possible to track the waxing and waning of the general public's sense of efficacy over several decades. Translations of the SRC items were developed for surveys of social and political attitudes in a host of other countries, and nowadays the concept has gained universal recognition in Western democracies.

Campbell and his associates initially assumed that (a) people with a high socioeconomical status (SES) would (rightly) consider themselves more influential than people with a low SES and that (b) people who consider themselves influential are more likely to participate in politics (this is even a part of their definition). Therefore, efficacy should be an important intervening variable that could help explain the manifest link between SES and electoral participation. This conclusion was borne out in countless election studies. Moreover, political efficacy turned out to be a good predictor for other, more unconventional forms of political participation like protest marches, sit-ins, or boycotts.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the lack of a theoretical foundation of the concept finally led to a third strand of research that reinterpreted the meaning of the items in the context of other approaches. In turn, a low sense of political efficacy was seen as an indicator for political alienation, a low level of support for

the political system in the sense of David Easton's work, and as sign of political disaffection and malaise. Arguably the single most important contribution to the latter debate was Robinson's article on "Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise," which essentially blamed (political) television for the sharp decline in efficacy starting in the late 1960s. This alleged causal relationship between TV consumption and a low sense of political efficacy became known as the "videomalaise hypothesis" and sparked a scientific debate that is still far from closed. In its course, the political efficacy items were increasingly seen as core indicators for political disaffection. This interpretation of the concept rests on the (implicit) argument that for democracies high levels of participation by all members of the public are desirable per se, and that low levels of efficacy are therefore a sign of crisis. On the other hand, functional or elitist theories of democracy claim that high levels of participation may well lead to overload and instability of the political system as well as to suboptimal political results.

A fourth and final strand of research focuses on the dimensionality of the concept. As early as 1959, Robert Lane pointed out that the SRC items refer to two distinct subdimensions of the concept: Items 1 and 3 reflect perceived attributes of the political system ("external political efficacy"), while items 2 and 4 tap evaluations of the respondent's own political abilities ("internal political efficacy"). Fifteen years later, George Balch could empirically prove that internal and external efficacy do indeed form two separate (but closely related) subdimensions of the original concept. Adherents of elitist theories hold that the combination of low levels of internal efficacy with high levels of external efficacy is most beneficial for the stability of democracy (see Almond and Verbas's development of the "civic culture" for a closely related argument).

The existence of two subdimensions is nowadays uncontroversial. However, the long tradition of the concept not withstanding, its measurement underwent considerable change over the years. From the late 1960s on, additional items were introduced in the ANES surveys, the wording of the original items was varied somewhat to avoid response sets, the format of admissible answers was changed from agree/disagree to a Likert-type rating scale, and new or modified items were conceived. Therefore, a whole host of measurement models has been proposed during the past 3 decades, and the debate about the best (i.e., most valid and reliable) way to measure political efficacy is far from over.

Kai Arzheimer

See also Political Disaffection

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Political Engagement

Democracy depends on an engaged populace. An important component of citizenship is political activity. People can be politically engaged by voting; reading the newspaper; volunteering on local projects; sending letters or e-mails to public officials, organizations, or media sources; participating in demonstrations and rallies; attending local school council meetings; visiting a local representative's office; going to church, synagogue, or mosque; talking to their neighbors about community concerns; or making a donation (e.g., money, time, advice) to a worthwhile cause. Any activity, individual or collective, devoted to influencing the community is defined as *political engagement*. Key skills necessary for political engagement include the following: active involvement, knowledge and understanding, a sense of political connectedness, and skills necessary for political

participation (e.g., listening, critical thinking, research skills).

The State of Political Engagement

There is a growing concern about the health of democracy in the United States. Political participation is declining. Citizens express a lack of interest in politics at all levels and an extreme hesitancy to participate in democratic decision making. A prominent series of studies are found in the 2000 book, *Bowling Alone,* by Professor Robert Putnam, which describes the current state of political [dis]engagement. Putnam chronicles a pattern of declining civic participation in America and concludes that this trend has accelerated since 1985. Using data from Roper surveys, he examines 12 civic activities, and across that criterion, participation declined by an average or 24% between 1983–1984 and 1993–1994. In addition, the research also shows that each succeeding generation shows less interest and involvement in political activities.

The most cited measurement of democratic health is voting participation. Generally, half of American citizens do not participate in presidential elections. A participation level of around 50% ranks the United States at 140th among the world's 163 democratically elected governments, between Chad and Botswana, where democracies have a shorter history. Furthermore, if one includes midterm and presidential elections, the United States has *the* lowest voting participation level of any democracy in the world.

Political disaffection is especially pronounced among young adults. Younger Americans vote less often than their elders do, show lower levels of social trust, and have less knowledge of politics. For example, only 38% of the eligible youth participated in the electoral process in 2000, and, although there was a small increase in 2004, the overall trends remain disappointing. With few exceptions, the percentage of 18- to 24-year-olds who vote has declined in each succeeding election since 1972, when 18-year-olds were first eligible to participate. Moreover, experts say that younger individuals are not likely to acquire the habit of voting as they get older.

Furthermore, communication scholars Bruce Pinkleton and Erica Austin argue that this negative trend among the youth and adults can lead to an inconsolable situation called "spiral of disaffection." In this situation, people isolate themselves from political information, which heightens cynical perceptions of government, resulting in hardened personal views in opposition to civic participation. When individuals shun political knowledge long enough, they become uninformed on public policy and outright hostile to political candidates. As a result, a politically alienated individual will often try to encourage others to question government and civic engagement, leading to a downward spiral in political participation.

Causes for Political Abstention

Voting participation continues to decline each election year, and for many reasons. There are generally four modern areas of voting behavior: sociological, social-psychological, economic, and legal-institutional. One of the first works to give attention—albeit scant—to nonvoters was a 1924 work by Charles Merriam and Harold Gosnell. Much of the early work comes from sources whose primary purpose is to explore other phenomena. However, some early research did provide brief descriptions of characteristics common to nonvoters. The seminal work on voting behavior and nonvoters is the 1960 book by Angus Campbell and his colleagues titled *The American Voter.* This book was the first to present a comprehensive and organized theoretical schema, called the "funnel of causality," to describe voting behavior. Other important works on voting behavior include V. O. Key's (1949) *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, Lane's (1959) *Political Life*, Key's (1966) *The Responsible Electorate*, Verba and Nie's (1972) *Participation in America*, Milbrath and Goel's (1977) *Political Participation*, and Piven and Cloward's (1988) *Why American's Don't Vote.*

The first book to turn the focus of voting research from sociological characteristics to psychological influences was Campbell, Guerin, and Miller's 1954 book, *The Voter Decides.* In addition, one of the more refreshing earlier studies was written by Arthur Hadley in his 1978 book *The Empty Polling Booth.* This book was the first source to divide nonvoters into differing attitudinal subgroups.

One of the most frequently mentioned reasons that people do not vote is that Americans feel unempowered. Common reasons for nonvoting are apathy and the feeling that politics is not important. Other reasons offered for political abstention are the following: media reliance, negative political advertisements, past political experiences, the decline of political parties, the absence of a working-class party, the complicated voting system, the increased mobility of citizens,

fraying social bonds, and the current state of economic affairs. On the whole, studies reveal that nonvoters tend to be younger, more mobile, have less of an education and income, are less partisan, and less politically involved.

Aside from demographic characteristics of nonvoters, several alternative factors contribute to a lack of political participation. These other voting influences—including economic, psychological, institutional, and cultural—vary from citizen apathy to voter confusion to governmental anger. Specifically, parental, school, and party affiliation, as well as political knowledge, political efficacy, and civic duty are all common psychological influences cited as related to voting behavior. Institutional attributes affecting voter behavior include governmental influences (e.g., registration requirements, electoral process, campaign finance system, bureaucratic nature of government), mass media influences, and campaign influences (e.g., campaign style, competitiveness of election). Cultural influences are often credited with affecting voting intentions as well.

Methods for Increasing Political Engagement

More Communication Between Populace and Politicians

There are steps that can be taken to increase political participation. Countless studies recommend communicating the importance of voting to the citizenry and educating the populace on how politics affects their everyday lives. The more education people have about politics, the more likely it is that they will participate in civic affairs. The widespread belief of a symbiotic relationship between education and civic engagement has been held among political scientists since at least the end of World War II. In 1995, three distinguished scholars—Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Scholozman, and Henry E. Brady—provided convincing empirical evidence for this belief in their book *Voice and Equality: Civic Volunteerism in American Politics.* They surveyed some 15,000 individuals and conducted 2,500 personal interviews as the basis for their analyses of why Americans become political engaged.

These studies confirm that there is—specifically—a need for students to receive more education on issues of civic education and political science. High school and college teachers must spend more time and do a better job of discussing how the political process works, the difference between the political parties, the nature of political campaigns, and the importance of political participation in a representative democracy. Furthermore, the addition of civic instructional tools—mock classroom simulations of the political system, government internships, community volunteerism, in-class debates—serve to educate students on the value of political knowledge and participation.

Education increases one's knowledge of civic affairs, but it also provides individuals with bureaucratic experiences—two ingredients that mobilize voter participation. Moreover, studies conducted by the Ohio Department of Education in the late 1980s concluded that high school teachers—not mass media, campaign literature, or peers—are the most effective in encouraging voter registration and participation among youth.

For people not in school, successful efforts for engagement include voter education, registration, and participation drives. An effective method for reaching these citizens is though coordinated efforts with employment and training centers. Action on the part of American businesses—both large and small—as well as community-based activist groups can help rectify lack of voter participation. Organizations that have implemented voter registration, voter education, and get-out-the-vote efforts among their employees and/or customers have seen an increase in political participation as a result.

More Contact Between Populace and Politicians

In addition to greater education about how politics affects the average citizens, more contact between the citizenry and politicians has proven to increase political efficacy and therefore participation. Research shows that citizens value getting to know their government officials and want to interact with them. As such, community meetings, political discussions, debates, and town hall meetings are all examples of methods for increasing connections between the citizens and government. Studies also confirm the strong influence of personal contact on voting. One-on-one contact stimulates interest and provides communication about political affairs that, in turn, increases the probability of voting. The more communication modalities are used to inform and motivate the populace, the greater the likelihood of political participation.

Reform Electoral Process

Changes can also be made in the electoral process to increase political participation. Moving polls to more convenient locations and extending the polling hours are two approaches. Other options for stimulating participation include an easier registration process, same-day registration, and weekend voting. The advent of innovative technology has also heralded the call for touch-screen voting, voting via phone, and Internet voting, for example.

Scott Wells

See also Political Disaffection; Political Efficacy; Political Involvement; Political Knowledge; Voter Behavior

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POLITICAL INFORMATION

See POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

POLITICAL INFORMATION EFFICACY

Political information efficacy is a concept that describes the extent to which individuals have sufficient confidence in their level of political information or knowledge to participate in the political process. The concept is closely linked to political efficacy, particularly internal political efficacy or feelings of political power or worth for engaging in politics.

Political scientists and sociologists have long hypothesized that those with low feelings of political efficacy, who feel they can do little to influence the political process, are less likely to participate in politics and often do not exercise their right to vote.

Political information efficacy was first proposed by Kaid, McKinney, and Tedesco, who found that young voters are more likely than their older cohorts to feel they are not sufficiently well informed to vote or participate in politics. In fact, many studies have validated a real concern about the low levels of political knowledge among young voters. Young voters often attribute their lack of political involvement to feeling inadequately informed. Strong gender differences are also apparent in political information efficacy. Young females appear to have significantly lower levels of political information efficacy than their male counterparts.

Research has also concluded that certain types of information exposure can increase a young citizen's level of information efficacy. For instance, young voters who are exposed to political advertising and debates during presidential campaigns exhibit higher levels of political information efficacy, which in turn leads to increased likelihood of voting.

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Political Efficacy; Voter Behavior

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Political Information Processing

Political information processing focuses on human thoughts, emotions, and behaviors as they relate to political communication. It evaluates messages and cognitive processes on the part of recipients and considers how governments, politicians, or administrators frame and construct media messages to influence the attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of voters. It focuses on the outcomes of such message frames as they relate to the construction of social reality. Thus, political information processing theory draws on social cognition research in an attempt to explain how and why political messages influence people in various ways.

Research on political attitude, belief, or opinion formation initially employed the stimulus-response (SR) approach to predict political behavior. The causal ingredients influencing voter decisions in the SR model include factors such as *partisanship* (e.g., party affiliation), *personal relevance* of an issue, or the *character* attributes of the candidate. However, the model does not explain *how* citizens use these ingredients in political information processing. To understand how and why people behave as they do requires the use of the stimulus-organism-response (SOR) model to explain both political thinking and behavioral patterns like voting. To do so, the SOR model uses basic information processing theory to assess how political messages attract attention, are selected and interpreted by audience members, and then matched with schemas drawn from memory. Thus, political information processing theory goes beyond predicting political behavior to explaining *how* and *why* political communication influences cognitions, emotions, and behaviors of voters.

In this entry, a general model of information processing is first introduced. Then, the model is interpreted to explain the processes associated with political information processing.

Media Effects in Political Communication Research

Communication theorists have identified four paradigms during the past 100 years that have led to the evolution of contemporary information processing theory. The first part of the 20th century was a time during which SR theory dominated thinking about media effects. The media were believed to have strong or *powerful effects* on attitudes, opinions, and beliefs of audience members. This is because effective propaganda campaigns during World War I demonstrated that media could shift public opinion. A paradigm shift came about in the 1960s with the publication of a volume titled *The Effects of Mass Communication.* Sociologist Joseph Klapper considered all of the research on media effects, including a large body of research on political campaigns conducted at Columbia University. He concluded that when media do have powerful effects, it is a departure from the norm, because media primarily serve to *reinforce* rather than shape ideas or beliefs. Although the *limited effects model* took into account the content of the message, how the message is structured, and the knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, and predispositions of an individual, it did not sufficiently acknowledge individual differences among audience members, nor did it adequately consider the importance of selective processes, including exposure, perception, and recall.

Researchers in the 1970s leveled sharp criticisms against the limited effects model, arguing that it presented an overly simplistic view of the complex interaction among the media, information presented, and the audience members. Using new and wide-ranging social scientific methodologies, theorists and researchers began to demonstrate that while the media may not be all-powerful in altering public opinion and beliefs, the media can have significant effects under certain circumstances. To understand the true relationship, they argued, one must consider how people psychologically interact with media, signaling a shift to the SOR model. Pioneering research of the 1960s and 1970s also marked a shift to the third paradigm, in which mass

communication theory would now focus on both messages and audience members to understand how they interact. Among the streams of research to emerge were cultivation analysis, the knowledge gap hypothesis, agenda setting, the spiral of silence, media uses and gratifications, priming, and framing.

1. *Cultivation analysis*. In a series of reports developed from the Cultural Indicators Project, George Gerbner and his associates argued in 1969 that exposure to televised violence and crime *over time* might lead to false perceptions of the world, disregard for pain and suffering of televised victims (i.e., desensitization), and the likelihood that perceptions of a *mean world* might be amplified for individuals living in high crime areas.

2. *Knowledge gap*. Phillip J. Tichenor, George A. Donohue, and Clarice N. Olien introduced the knowledge gap hypothesis in 1970, suggesting that individuals with higher levels of education are better able to process and understand news than are those individuals with less education. This phenomenon, they argued, had the potential of widening the divide between the information rich and poor based on educational level and social class.

3. *Agenda setting*. Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw introduced the agenda-setting research tradition in 1972. Agenda-setting research is based on the notion that the media control the agenda by selecting certain broad issue topics for prominent coverage, and this leads audience members to judge these issues to be more important than other issues. The researchers demonstrated that while newspaper reports may not be particularly influential in telling what to think, they can spotlight certain issues, thereby causing people to think about them.

4. *Spiral of silence*. In 1974, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann introduced the spiral of silence, which suggested that people may be silenced when media messages about public issues are at odds with their own beliefs, even if they actually hold the majority opinion.

5. *Media uses and gratifications*. A wide range of scholars of communication researchers began looking into the psychological rewards of media usage (i.e., entertainment, surveillance, and social utility), leading to a compilation of reports in a volume edited by Jay G. Blumler and Elihu Katz in 1974 titled *The Uses of Mass Communication.*

6. *Media priming*. Priming studies appeared in the late 1970s to study person perception, stereotyping, and attitude activation. Priming procedures involve exposing participants to some stimulus to assess what associated memories might be drawn from memory. Although the first priming studies were conducted by psychologists, communication scholars quickly discovered the utility in assessing whether repeated exposure to information or recently encountered information dictates which memories are accessed by audience members.

7. *Media framing*. Framing research evaluates how journalists organize the world, thereby enabling audience members to understand news and events.

Each of these approaches argued from differing perspectives that media must have effects and that consideration of the underlying cognitive processes are essential to understand the impact of media on individuals and ultimately society. These complimentary research traditions led to accelerated collaboration among scholars of communication, political science, sociology, and psychology, leading in the 1980s to the fourth paradigm, known as “cognitive revolution.” The cognitive revolution expanded the boundaries of political communication research to ask *what* people do with media information along with focusing on *how* people might be influenced by media messages.

Before proceeding, it is important to mention that the notion of messages and individuals interacting was being considered long before the 1970s. As early as 1922, journalist Walter Lippmann wrote that people are all captives of the “pictures in their heads,” explaining that in the “buzzing confusion of the outer world, we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture.” In other words, human beings tend to process information in the context of previously stored knowledge for the purpose of reinforcing beliefs and stereotypes.

Lippmann also explained that the *selective portrayal* of the world by the newspapers of the 1920s contributed to the construction of social reality by spotlighting certain news items while ignoring others. He wrote that issues that “obtrude,” tend to attract the attention of the news media, and these obtruding issues present themselves in the forms of hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, and other natural disasters, economic downturns, and political elections, upheaval, or

scandals. Thus, although the research of the 1970s and 1980s has generally been accepted as the time period during which the true conversion from the SR to the SOR model occurred, some of the theoretical bedrock upon which these ideas were built can be traced to the early part of the 20th century.

Building a Theory of Political Information Processing

Audience Interpretation Processes

Information processing theory is essentially an amalgam of theories that explain how people perceive symbols, images, and sounds and then convert them into mental representations. It concerns the relationship among attention, encoding, information selection, schema activation, information retrieval, and information storage in memory.

Journalists and editors decide what news content to present through media channels. Once exposed to such messages, audience members initiate procedures that will lead to information processing. Information processing models begin with two assumptions. First, people are active information processors because they can use stimuli to build upon existing knowledge that may lead to changes in attitudes, opinions, and beliefs. The active audience denotes emotional, intellectual, and/or cognitive engagement with the message. Second, people have a limited and fixed pool of mental resources available to them, and may hit a threshold at which they are not capable of dealing with more sensory input. Audience members are assumed to be adept at filtering out information that is perceived as dull, irrelevant, or unimportant and focusing most on important information. Media messages that successfully engage an individual will produce a search in which she or he attempts to match the new information with knowledge stored in memory. Connections are made between the symbols, words, sounds, or images that enter the senses and the information stored in knowledge structures known as "schemas."

The Memory System and Automatic and Controlled Information Processing

The *memory system* is a critical element of information processing as it guides the interpretation of newly encountered information. This system contains three parts—the long-term system that stores accumulated knowledge, the short-term system that represents consciousness (i.e., all of the stimuli processed by the senses), and the working memory, which integrates new information with stored knowledge. Stimuli enter the memory system through receptors such as the eyes, ears, nose, mouth, or skin. Stimuli perceived as unimportant or irrelevant will be filtered; meaning only a fraction of the media messages encountered will make it into the short-term or active working memory. However, information that is deemed important or interesting will be extracted and linked with existing knowledge to be stored in the long-term memory.

Shiffrin and Schenider explain that automatic (unintentional) and controlled (intentional) processes guide the information selection processes. *Controlled information processing* occurs when people consciously decide to pay attention to a message. Motivation to learn will cause people to focus intently on new information. *Automatic processes* are unintentional, involuntary, effortless, autonomous, and outside awareness. Arousing content increases the resources needed to process information, shifting attention more in the direction of controlled processing. Therefore, political news that presents novel, surprising, and emotional content may enhance information processing.

Schemas

People use schemas for ease of information processing. A *schema* is defined as a cognitive structure that includes knowledge about a concept, person, or event. Schemas enable people to encode stimuli, they provide context from memory for new information, and they enable people to infer when information is incomplete or missing. They also enable people to use information quickly in ordinary human interactions, and they assist in making judgments. Information can summon one or more schemas from the long-term memory. When new information joins with an existing schema in the working memory, the modified knowledge structure will become more complex. For example, ongoing reporting on the inability of Israel and neighboring states to find ways of living in harmony may strengthen the "peace in the Middle East is unobtainable" schema. Schemas are strengthened by the addition of new related information, and associations between related schemata will be strengthened as individuals evaluate information over time, making the linkages more explicit.

Integration of new information and information stored in schemas takes place in working memory. Complex or recently activated schemas tend to be more accessible because the pathways between the working and the long-term are better defined and developed. Therefore, media attention to political issues, or the decision on the part of audience members to seek political information, will lead to the acquisition of new knowledge and the strengthening of schemas.

Influences on Political Information Processing

The primary media variables influencing information processing are message content and structure. Other considerations include the agenda-setting function of media, message priming and framing, labeling cues, party affiliation, candidates, issues, political sophistication of the audience member, motivation to learn, and the influence of opinion leaders.

Media Content and Structure

The interaction between structure and content can produce effects that may engage viewers. Content is selected by gatekeepers who set the media agenda and who choose content that will be offered to the public. Repeated coverage of scandals in the Clinton White House had the effect of cognitively linking the former popular president with less than flattering concepts such as adulterer and liar. Political advertisements produced on behalf of a candidate might include a hopeful message illustrated with colorful patriotic images and inspiring music, whereas an ad produced to attack the record of an opponent might feature gray tones, along with images of illicit drugs and police activity, placed over a somber narrative. Hence, the interaction between message content and structure may influence the degree to which people attend to, process, and store media content.

Agenda Setting, Priming, and Framing

As noted previously, *agenda setting* is a process wherein the media focus attention on an issue. *Primes* are messages or symbols that activate a concept, which for a period of time increases the likelihood that the concept, and related thoughts and memories connected with it, will come to mind again. Message *framing* is a mechanism by which journalists or editors employ a central organizing principle that holds together and gives coherence and meaning to a diverse array of symbols in news reports.

Gitlin, Goffman, and others argued in the 1970s and 1980s that frames fit nicely with the concepts of agenda setting and priming. However, the concepts are quite distinct. Agenda-setting attempts to show how mass media cues contribute to perceptions of issue salience on the part of the public. Priming research attempts to show how media coverage may influence judgments that people may have about political issues. Thus, studies testing priming effects evaluate agenda setting as the *independent variable* and priming effects as the *dependent variable.*

Message framing can have a significant impact on how information is used. News messages may be framed as either episodic or thematic frames. *Episodic framing* is normally event-oriented coverage of breaking news stories, while *thematic frames* provide background and perspective on public issues. Political leaders also have an important role in the message-framing process. Various presidential administrations took advantage of the "Cold War frame" that developed after World War II, in which *good* (i.e., democracy) must triumph over *evil* (i.e., communism). Such framing produces rally effects that strengthen support for presidents and other elected officials. The administration of President George W. Bush initially framed the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a defensive measure to protect the United States against weapons of mass destruction. But as it became clear that Iraq no longer possessed such weapons, the rhetoric changed to freeing an oppressed people, bringing democracy to the Middle East, punishing a dictator for past deeds, and maintaining the war on terrorism.

Parties, Candidates, and Issues

Party affiliation is perhaps the most important ideological signal sent to voters, because certain issues have been claimed by parties, providing voters with cues on how to vote. Republicans, for example, have traditionally presented themselves as fiscal conservatives but willing to spend to maintain a strong defense. Democrats, by contrast, have historically stressed social welfare issues. Therefore, party affiliation acts as a cue to voters that can in turn guide voting behavior.

Candidates and issues are often inextricably bound. Candidates often try to avoid hot-button issues like

abortion or gay marriage, fearing that taking a stance will undermine their aspirations for public office. But emotionally charged issues such as these can cause voters to cast votes for candidate of an opposing party if the candidate from their party is not perceived as properly aligned with the position of the voter. The outcome of hotly contested presidential, congressional, or gubernatorial races may also be influenced by other variables associated with both cognitive and emotional information supplied by the media, or by the candidates themselves. Therefore, in most elections, citizens vote for candidates who will best represent their positions when policy issues are up for debate. This also explains why candidates like to align themselves with safe issues support for education or holding the line on taxes.

Issues also have an impact on voting behavior. Mueller explained in 1994 that in garnering support for the 1991 Gulf War, former President George H. W. Bush stressed in January of that year the need to defeat aggression, uphold international law, restore sovereignty to Kuwait, and protect access to Middle Eastern oil. Immediately prior to the war, polls showed public support for those goals stood at 70%. Despite the fact that all of these objectives were met, 52% of the public thought the war had not been worth the cost just weeks after the fighting had come to an end. By June, only 8% of those polled thought the war had been worth the cost.

Scholars explain while the 1991 Gulf War may have achieved the stated objectives, public expectations were not, and this became an issue in the November election. Voters expected that the war would end with the toppling of the government of Saddam Hussein. When this did not occur, the approval ratings of President Bush fell, and he was subsequently defeated by Bill Clinton in the election in November 1992. Hurst believes that the approval rating of President George W. Bush also fell in the years following the 2003 Gulf War because public expectations had not been met. Although the regime of Saddam Hussein had been toppled, U.S. troops remained in high numbers as sectarian fighting continued to escalate in Iraq and the country appeared destined to enter a civil war.

Level of Political Sophistication and Motivation to Learn

Individuals with higher levels of interest in politics are more motivated to evaluate implications of political communication than their less politically sophisticated counterparts. Furthermore, political sophisticates draw more upon well-developed schemas to evaluate incoming information. Therefore, their evaluations should occur throughout the course of thinking about political information and will involve both matching consistent information while noticing inconsistent information. For example, a political sophisticate might carefully consider that a conservative Republican is against abortion (consistent) but in favor of gay marriage (inconsistent) and arrive at conclusions about the candidate that might explain anomalies. The political novice, by contrast, would focus primarily on the consistent information and ignore the inconsistent information.

Fiske, Kinder, and Larter have shown that level of expertise in politics (i.e., political sophisticates or experts versus novices) influences political information processing. Individuals who are politically sophisticated are more likely to use both consistent and inconsistent information when evaluating new information. Their less politically astute counterparts would be expected to employ labeling cues such as party affiliation, information consistent with expectations, and the most recently encountered information. People become more motivated to learn more about political issues and candidates as their level of sophistication increases. Political novices tend to rely on cues such as party affiliation or liberal or conservative leanings as a baseline for making judgments about candidates for elective office.

Media or Opinion Leader Attention

Heavy coverage of candidates or reporting on issues influences the degree to which, and how, audiences will process political information. When public policy concerns dominate center stage in national political debates, then, in the agenda-setting tradition, people may think more about these issues. Following the 2001 terrorist attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon, public approval favored President George W. Bush in efforts to dislodge the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. Media coverage generally focused on the need to stop the forces that threatened the United States. However, public opinion gradually shifted away from Bush when the war with Iraq failed to conclude in a timely fashion, and when it became clear that some of the arguments given for going to war were flawed.

Political elites may also serve as opinion leaders who can influence potency of media messages about political candidates and issues. They understand both the obvious aspects of political issues along with more subtle nuances. For example, the popular CBS News anchorman Walter Cronkite concluded a special report on February 27, 1968, on the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War, stating he believed that the war was unwinnable and that the United States must find a way to withdraw. A month later President Lyndon Johnson addressed the nation and announced that he had decided not to run for reelection and said that he was looking for a way to end the war. Although many factors may have contributed to public disillusionment with Johnson, author David Halberstam wrote that it was the first time in American history a war had been declared over by an anchorman.

Conclusion

Political information processing is an important domain for scholars of communication and political science. But to understand how political messages are processed requires an understanding of the characteristics of the message (stimulus), the receiver (organism), and the outcome or result (response). Thus, audience members are assumed to be active participants in the communication process. However, level of participation is dependent upon quite a few factors.

First, audience members use filtering processes to determine whether they should invest cognitive effort in evaluating political messages. Therefore, message content and structure will dictate whether messages are noticed and deemed important in the first place. Messages perceived as personally relevant are processed more readily and easily than are messages perceived as less relevant. Thus, a news report containing information about a property tax proposed by the mayor will attract the attention of the homeowner, while the announcement of plans to reinstate the military draft may catch the eye of the college student.

Structure will also influence processing as messages constructed to gain the attention of the overall audience (or specific identifiable audience segments) may employ devices that get and hold the attention of audience members. Political advertising in particular employs structural techniques to manipulate emotions and portray candidates in a favorable light while presenting opponents as ill informed, hypocritical, or even sinister. Therefore, production variables are capable of influencing how messages are encoded and ultimately stored in memory.

Second, the agenda-setting function of media, priming, and framing are crucial elements in political information processing. Heightened coverage of issues by media cause audience members to think about them more often than issues that received less coverage. Because individuals invest more time thinking about these issues, they are more easily primed when new information is encountered. And, like message structure, media framing techniques are capable of influencing how messages are encoded and integrated with previously held knowledge.

Third, cognitive devices will determine how much attention and effort is invested in processing messages. These processes may be either automatic or controlled depending upon the perceived importance or personal relevance of the information. Automatic processing is relatively effortless, while controlled processing involves focusing closely on message content and assimilating the information into existing knowledge structures known as schemas.

Fourth, schemas guide political information processing. Schematic structures place new political information in an existing field of meaning, thereby strengthening and enhancing the original schema. However, schemas are also used heuristically in the process of interpreting political information. Labels such as Democrat or conservative can prime related concepts and enable individuals to infer attributes or qualities to candidates. Schemas also enable audience members to infer issue relevance. Upon hearing that the local city council is discussing building a new waste treatment plant, a homeowner may immediately infer that taxes are bound to go up.

Fifth, individual characteristics that influence political information processing include level of political sophistication or expertise and motivation to learn. Motivation to learn can be rooted in self-interest (e.g., the draft or taxes) or it may be a function of intellectual curiosity. As knowledge gap research has suggested, more educated audience members stand a better chance of learning from political information. Political sophistication denotes higher levels of political knowledge, which predicts more rapid encoding of messages, more focused ease in categorizing, and better recall of political information. Political sophisticates are also more adept at spotting schema inconsistent information as would be the case if a newcomer running for Senate on the Republican ticket favored

gay marriage, a woman's right to choose, or increasing the federal income tax to provide more support for social welfare programs. Thus, the politically sophisticated are better equipped and more motivated to analyze and evaluate political information.

Finally, media attention and political elites may influence political information processing. While scholars are in agreement that media messages rarely are successful in telling people what to think, spotlighting certain issues offers cues on what to think about. As media focus more on certain issues or candidates, people may be induced to invest more cognitive effort thinking about them.

Political information processing is based on the theoretical assumptions that guide all information processing models. However, such political communication models take into account specific variables such as personal relevance, level of expertise, motivation to learn, and the impact of political elites on members of the audience. Thus, it exports communication, political science, and psychological theory and applies these theories to real-world settings. Such ways of considering political information can be especially fruitful in understanding what guides shifts in public opinions or why oratory from one candidate may resonate with voters while seemingly important perspectives from an opponent may fall short. Therefore, understanding the relationship between information selection, attention, encoding, schema activation, information retrieval, and storage in memory may help understand how and why people arrive at the political positions, beliefs, and understandings that they do.

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See also Agenda Setting; Cultivation Theory; Framing; Knowledge Gap; Limited Effects Theory; Lippmann, Walter; Priming; Selective Processes, Exposure, Perception, Memory; Spiral of Silence; Uses and Gratifications Approach

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Political Involvement

Political involvement, sometimes referred to as "engagement" or "interest in public affairs," is of potentially great importance in political decision making because of its relationship to media use, learning about elections and issues, and public affairs participation. Research indicates that citizens who are high in political involvement are active information seekers who purposefully use media to learn about candidates, campaigns, and public affairs issues. Unfortunately, scholars in different disciplines, including political science, psychology, advertising/consumer behavior, and communication, have used the term *involvement* to refer to somewhat different but related constructs. In fact, even scholars within the same discipline sometimes have conceptualized involvement differently, occasionally relying on quite different questions and/or procedures to measure involvement. As a result, involvement commonly lacks definitional and operational clarity, and research results concerning this construct can be confusing or may even appear contradictory.

In early political communication research, scholars identified political involvement with general political interest, as well as with interest in the outcomes of specific elections. As researchers further developed the construct, they suggested that involvement represented a psychological trait reflected in citizens' concern for public affairs outcomes and associated with political efficacy and a sense of public duty. Currently in political communication, social scientists commonly treat involvement as a characteristic of an individual or as a characteristic of an event or other external stimulus. Scholars also recognize that these two manifestations of involvement work together. As a personal characteristic, scholars typically associate involvement with an individual's continuing, long-term interest in public affairs. In this instance, social scientists typically call such involvement "enduring." This form of involvement refers to the strength of a preexisting relationship that individuals perceive between themselves and an issue, event, or other stimulus. This form of involvement produces a long-term, internal motivational state that contributes to greater message attention and systematic and purposeful media use among individuals as they seek information related to the object of their involvement.

When social scientists conceive of involvement as a characteristic of an event or stimulus, they typically focus on the heightened relevance of an event or other stimulus to an individual. In this instance, major events such as presidential elections or controversial public referenda typically stimulate citizens' involvement in public affairs on a transitory basis as they respond to the circumstances at hand. Political communication scholars commonly refer to this as "situational" political involvement and associate it with a temporary increase in perceived relevance or a heightened interest in a short-term outcome. This form of involvement is short-lived. As circumstances or events change, an individual's situational involvement ceases to exist at a high level, although it may manifest itself again during similar circumstances or events.

Involvement and Political Decision Making

Whether situational or enduring, involvement is especially important in political decision making because of its potential to act as a moderating variable, activating enhanced media use and learning among citizens. Citizens' experiences with mediated political campaigns and related news stories have the potential to significantly affect their political decision making. Some scholars and political observers have raised concerns that superficial, image-oriented political campaigns, negative campaign tactics, and news coverage focusing on candidates' standing in the polls rather than issues of substance have resulted in a high degree of political disaffection. These scholars suggest that media and political campaigns serve to distance citizens from the political process, many of whom ignore even the most basic forms of political participation. When citizens are highly involved with public affairs, however, research indicates that they are more likely to use the media to learn about public affairs and to engage in informed public affairs participation.

Involvement and Media Use

Research is clear in demonstrating a strong association between involvement and an individual's active use of information sources. Models of information processing that account for the role of involvement in information source use provide a constructive basis from which to understand its relationship to media use. These models generally indicate that in instances of low involvement, individuals are unlikely to seek out and thoughtfully consider information. Instead,

information source use is likely to be limited and individuals are more likely to engage in a heuristic decision-making process.

When citizens are more highly involved, however, they are motivated to actively seek information relevant to their decision-making task and to systematically consider the merits of the information they obtain. Research results indicate that citizens who are involved in public affairs engage in active, purposeful information seeking using a variety of information sources ranging from newspapers to new technologies. Under these circumstances, individuals dedicate greater attention and cognitive effort to the consideration of relevant messages. This process reflects a classic learning hierarchy in which an individual engages in a purposeful information search that leads to knowledge gain and then behavior. As a result of this process, the attitudes of highly involved citizens are likely to emerge as logical outgrowths of knowledge and are more likely to be reliable predictors of behavior.

Involvement and Efficacy

Social cognitive theory suggests that citizens have the potential to develop long-term involvement through positive experiences that contribute to their development of self-efficacy, the perception that their political participation makes a difference. As people develop interests and experience rewards, they are likely to continue to practice activities that contribute to their sense of fulfillment within a specific context such as public affairs. In a public affairs context, successful citizen participation is likely to contribute to enhanced levels of individual involvement. As citizens grow in involvement, they gain knowledge and expertise and develop still greater efficacy.

Efficacy and involvement appear to enjoy a bidirectional, co-supportive relationship in political decision making in that some level of efficacy is necessary to build involvement even as involvement contributes to greater levels of efficacy. When citizens lack efficacy they are more likely to become disaffected and refuse to invest themselves in a political system they view as corrupt and unresponsive. When people believe they can make a difference, however, even if they are angry or frustrated, they are more likely to involve themselves in the political process and work for what they perceive as positive change. Citizens are likely to develop greater involvement in public affairs to the extent that they acquire expertise and experience rewards. In this instance, efficacy contributes to higher levels of involvement even as involvement helps to strengthen efficacy. As an additional note, research indicates that self-efficacy is an important precursor to political participation, both on its own and by contributing to citizens' involvement.

Involvement and Cynicism

Scholars typically define *cynicism* as a lack of confidence in, or a feeling of distrust toward, public officials and institutions. Cynicism is one of the most frequently studied aspects of political disaffection because of its relationship to poor voter turnout and low public affairs media use. Cynical citizens distance themselves from the political process and generally are closed to sources of public affairs information. Scholars suggest that cynicism depletes citizens' involvement and efficacy by contributing to their belief that public affairs participation is ineffective and meaningless. Critics often blame the media for contributing to the public's cynicism, but the empirical evidence to support this claim is lacking.

Based on the process of media use and learning, cynicism and involvement manifest themselves in nearly opposite ways in political decision making and participation. While involved citizens engage in purposeful information source use and dedicate attention and cognitive effort to media messages they find useful, cynical citizens are less likely to use public affairs media in a meaningful way because they are uninvolved and distrustful of the political process.

Involvement and Apathy

When citizens are apathetic they are unwilling to invest themselves in even the most basic forms of political participation. Scholars have expressed concern that as citizens follow campaigns through the mass media, they may become discouraged when confronted with negative campaign tactics and news coverage largely focused on candidates' campaign techniques. As citizens grow in their frustration and disenchantment with the political process, they may fall into apathy and simply opt out of the public affairs participation altogether. In terms of the political decision-making process, it is useful to distinguish between skepticism and outright cynicism. Healthy skepticism is more likely to result in a critical but open approach to the media and public affairs process

among citizens; cynicism reflects an unreceptive distrust of the political process and governmental institutions. While scholars commonly link cynicism to apathy, research indicates that cynicism and apathy are distinct constructs. Cynical citizens are distrustful of governmental and media institutions, while apathetic citizens are unwilling to invest themselves in even the most basic forms of political participation.

In terms of citizens' involvement in public affairs, research evidence indicates that involvement enjoys a negative association to both apathy and cynicism. When citizens are motivated to seek and consume public affairs information, enhanced civic engagement is a natural outcome of their involvement, and they are more likely to demonstrate informed public affairs participation.

Ultimately, citizens' involvement in public affairs is a critical aspect of their political decision making because of its motivational role in information seeking. While scholars have expressed concern regarding the detrimental role of negative campaign tactics and inadequate media coverage in citizens' development of political disaffection, research indicates that involved citizens purposefully use media to learn about candidates and public affairs issues. Involvement negatively associates with citizens' cynicism and apathy, which are linked to a failure to participate in the political process, and positively associates with citizens' information source use and learning, contributing to informed participation in the public affairs process.

Bruce Pinkleton

See also Horserace Coverage; Negative Advertising; Political Advertising; Political Disaffection; Political Efficacy; Political Engagement

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Political Knowledge

Political knowledge is considered to be among the most important determinants of citizens' competence to govern in a representative democracy. The concept is used to indicate anything in the broad spectrum from information awareness to confident understanding of politics that may enable citizens to vote, cast a vote that accurately reflects their views on important public issues, and engage in other activities that affect government. Classically, *knowledge* has been defined as a belief that can be justified as true. There are deep philosophical debates about whether only what is evident is true, as René Descartes (1596–1650) proposed, or true is any idea that is successfully used in action to solve problems, as John Dewey (1859–1952) suggested. Generally, the meaning of the concept emerges only from the practical purposes of its users. Therefore, in the American National Election Studies (ANES), the largest, most influential and widely used sample survey research project investigating voting behavior, political

knowledge has been defined since the 1950s as the amount of information that citizens remember about various public figures and institutions. Specifically, during the 2004 U.S. presidential election, ANES asked citizens to identify the speaker of the House of Representatives, vice president of the United States, prime minister of England, chief justice of the Supreme Court, and majority parties in Congress.

The ANES definition implies three main assumptions about political knowledge. First, it is information useful for voting; second, it is dependent on media use; and third, it consists of discrete facts. Although empirical research over the past 50 years has consistently supported those assumptions and has shown that ANES questions measure what they measure quite well, the question still remains of the true nature or meaning of what is being measured. The starting point for explicating the concept of political knowledge is to ask questions that may broaden the ANES assumptions: What are the purposes for which democratic citizens use knowledge? What constitutes useful knowledge? What are the sources of useful knowledge?

Knowledge for Democracy

Democracy cannot exist without citizens' expressing their opinions on how their public life should be conducted. The struggle to have those opinions enacted, either by influencing public policies or by selecting the people who make those policies, is the core of all politics. What should people know to be able to participate meaningfully in democratic processes?

Scholars disagree about the standards of adequate knowledge that can be expected of competent and effective citizens. Traditionalists contend that tests asking citizens to know names of public officials, various rules of how government works, and substantive features of major public affairs issues capture the most *general* skills necessary for participating in democracy in the most simplified form—voting. The answers to such questions also indicate basic cognitive awareness and connectedness to the political process. Reformists argue that those tests are geared toward those who had learned civics through formal education, who have opportunities to put that knowledge in practice, and are largely irrelevant to the political activities of average citizens that are not reducible to voting. Different kinds of political activities require distinct resources that are differentially available to various groups of citizens. Although the ANES-type factual political knowledge is very important for voting, it is only modestly related to political discussion and time-based political acts such as community work, protesting, or contacting government officials. It is even less important for donating money. The tests also do not reflect what is currently known about how individuals process information and learn: citizens construct meanings dependent on the communication contexts rather than just store cold, hard, facts in their memories. Those processes help citizens understand what politics means to their lives rather than just show where their allegiances lie.

Scholars' interpretations of ANES results diverge depending on their approach to standards for adequate knowledge, both in terms of its type and extent. The fact that Americans can on average correctly answer half of the questions, and that about 10% of Americans cannot answer any, is taken as an indication of either ill-informed citizens undermining democracy or as an elitist understatement of the ability of moderately well-informed citizens to cope with the political tasks they face in their everyday lives. Average people who may score poorly on the ANES questions still display complex understanding of the roles that government performs in society and familiarity with major policy areas. Such findings suggest that individuals' political knowledge may be more *domain specific* than general. In further support, typical gender differences in political knowledge favoring men disappear or are reversed when the knowledge items deal with local issues related to schools and for issues of special relevance to women such as abortion and political rights.

Conceptually, the distinction between general and domain-specific knowledge also maps onto the epistemological differentiation between *declarative* knowledge (also called "propositional" or "descriptive") that is based on information that answers "what" questions contained in facts and concepts, and *procedural* knowledge that involves information about when and how to do something, or how to solve a problem. Procedural knowledge involves more senses, such as hands-on experiences, practices, and understanding of the limitations of a specific solution.

Media as a Source of Political Knowledge

The interest in and prominence of the concept of political knowledge in political communication research coincides with the so-called cognitive revolution in social psychology. *Cognitions,* defined as things that a person knows about himself and the environment, or as

items of information, are considered to be central for explaining behavior. Gradually, within communication research the view emerged that the main role of media was in providing political information rather than directly changing individuals' attitudes and behaviors.

Education

The cognitive revolution also affected the research in political socialization that recognized the importance of formal education in promoting political knowledge toward the formation of an individual's sense of citizenship and political enlightenment. Acquisition of knowledge is particularly facilitated in classrooms that offer opportunities for open discussion of issues over emphasis on rote learning and patriotic rituals. In general, number of years of formal education completed is related to knowledge typically studied in the civic classes. Education may also affect knowledge about public affairs indirectly through its influence on political interest and efficacy that, in turn, stimulate current information seeking and perhaps provide a framework to understand new information. However, once the formal education is over, and civic knowledge that spells out the mechanics of government and politics has been acquired or perhaps forgotten, adults learn mostly from media about current issues and what happened to whom and why in politics. Without continuous learning from media, the effects of education on knowledge may be invisible.

Effects

Knowledge gain from media has been documented since the 1960s, and research has shown positive effects of exposure to news media independent of formal education, demographics, attitudinal factors, and cultural differences. Communication research in particular has emphasized the importance of distinguishing between use of different media and various types of content when knowledge gain is measured. Newspaper reading has a stronger positive effect on knowledge than does viewing of television news, whereas exposure to entertainment-based or "soft" news shows no effect or even a negative relationship with political knowledge. Political debates and media analyses following these debates are sources of issue information, whereas campaign advertisements show positive effects in campaigns when they do not confuse and misinform.

For identifying effects for media such as television where audience members are most often doing things other than focused learning, it is important to include the level of attention that the person pays to the content in addition to the extent of exposure. Research on effects of the Internet on political knowledge further emphasize the importance of what content is selected and how it is used. In general, when the Internet is used for search of political information and accessing campaign news it has positive effect on political knowledge. Users of the Internet are more likely to be consumers of newspapers and television news, suggesting that as a newest medium the Internet is not replacing traditional media but supplementing their information.

Equivalence

Although research has convincingly shown that media use contributes to informed citizenry, no less important to normative democratic theory is evidence that knowledge gain is relatively equivalent across major forms of stratification and differentiation in the society. Equality in receiving the benefits of democracy depends on equivalence of informed participation. To the extent that media convey knowledge essential to participation, it is important to achieve equivalence in both their use and effects. Equivalence in the levels of use means that the cost and effort of accessing the media is alike for all citizens, whereas identical quality or difficulty of available information is reflected in their equivalent effectiveness. Research has shown differences in both media use and knowledge gain between high and low social economic status groups and levels of education and age, suggesting the nonequivalence or gaps. In other words, media use increases the knowledge level for everyone, but certain types of media use such as newspaper reading and seeing information on the Internet disproportionately benefit those who already have advantages in their higher level of education and younger age and so perpetuates those inequalities. The use of the Internet and newspapers, two media that have shown effectiveness among less-educated citizens, will realize their potential for overcoming knowledge gaps only if their use could be widened in those groups.

Trends

Despite clear indications that individuals are gaining knowledge from media, those effects are not reflected in aggregate levels of political knowledge.

Americans are not more informed about politics than they were about half a century ago, despite the substantial increase in the population's education and communication opportunities. The stagnation of levels of political knowledge is accompanied by a decline in voter turnout and membership in political clubs, but also increases in the numbers of those contributing to political campaigns and contacting public officials. The public has maintained previous levels of interest in campaigns and public affairs. The over-time stability in political knowledge is attributed to "offsetting forces" among which changes in the quality and relevance of available political information in the mass media are of considerable importance.

Many voters feel that information they have is sufficient to make vote decisions, but many also are left uninspired. Many Americans who are not politically active think that they should take care of themselves and their families before they worry about their community and nation, and believe that important things in their lives have nothing to do with politics. Most simply, many Americans say that they do not have enough time for politics. Little knowledge of political information and low interest in politics are among the most serious detriments to citizen's participation. Therefore, availability and easy access to the information that stimulates interest are the keys to the puzzle of functional democracy.

Providing information about specific opportunities to act is the most direct and basic way in which media may have a mobilizing role. The public wants news that is connected to them and helpful to their lives. Among strictly political stories, only the outcome of presidential elections in 1996 has been followed closely by a majority of Americans, according to the list of most closely followed news stories of the past 2 decades. In 2005, only the impact of Hurricane Katrina and high gasoline prices peaked the interest of more than half of the American public. Even though less obvious and stately, politics contained in those stories may be more meaningful to ordinary citizens. It is politics in which power is found in identities, relationships, and cultural practices that make government workings more transparent and relevant to daily lives. Audiences' perceived aversion to serious stories is a myth. More people complain that news is too superficial and sensational than fault it for being boring or opinionated.

Over recent decades, knowledge gain from both television and newspaper campaign coverage declined despite the stability of both how much they have been used and how much attention audiences paid. Media may have become less effective because of the changes in presentational format and emphases on certain values in the content and structures of news stories. Some scholars suggest that learning campaign information is primarily constrained by an overemphasis on isolated facts and inappropriate message framing in news stories. Others blame the "horserace" coverage of political campaigns, focusing on who is winning rather than on issues. The emphasis on the entertainment value of events rather than their political relevance may have the same effect as entertainment in general—to limit learning. Trends of changing definitions of news toward features and people-oriented content and away from direct public affairs accounts may have also contributed to less learning from the media over time. Overall, the inadequacies of media coverage rather than lifestyle-related changes in audiences' interest may be the main factors diminishing learning and counteracting and depressing expected effects of the increase in education on aggregate levels of knowledge.

A peek into the future of public knowledge may be gained by projecting from media use of young people today. Use of campaign information from the Internet is extremely effective for knowledge gain among the youngest adults (18–23 years old). Effectiveness of Internet use then decreases to a moderate level for ages 24–30, when it is about the same as for the newspapers, and remains significant until age 60. Given that Internet use will diffuse much further in the next decade and that today's youth and subsequent cohorts are likely to continue using the Internet over the life course, there is hope for an increase in political knowledge. The strongest effects of Internet use in the youngest cohorts that are most deficient in knowledge particularly warrant grounds for optimism. The special problem is, however, that today's youth have much lower levels of traditional (newspaper and television) news use than earlier generations. The result may be that the gains from high levels of Internet information use will be offset by the losses from traditional news media use. Unless traditional media do something to reinvigorate the news interests of the young, their pattern of low use is apt to be perpetuated as they age, and the news audience will continue to shrink.

Interpersonal Communication

Research has shown that interpersonal communication is not a major source of political knowledge.

However, media and interpersonal communication embedded within structures of discussion networks have complementary and reciprocal relationship that exerts a strong influence on political learning. Size of networks, heterogeneity of their composition, and openness to diverse points of view promote frequent interpersonal discussion, in which individuals often argue about and elaborate on what they learned from the media. Heterogeneity and openness of discussion networks also stimulate use of public affairs media and indirectly enhance learning of information.

Functional Political Knowledge

Decisions that people make in democracy are truly democratic only if they are based on full and accurate information. What exactly constitutes the information that meets those standards is contestable. Just simple facts, easy to verify empirically and accurately representing the real world, may not be what citizens want or what they need to make adequate decisions. Most citizens, about 70% in the United States, say that they want news media stories to provide both facts and context in the form of background information and connections to other relevant issues. The context triggers interpretations through which facts may become useful to individuals and ensures that the meanings formed by different people will be similar. Without being discourse analysts, media practitioners understand that only facts placed into context convey a theme or main point of the story. Some news editors, in attempt to provide content that is more useful to readers, say that they are shifting their focus to stories that deal with broader issues, outcomes, and ramifications of events at the expense of routine coverage of meetings and governmental processes. Research has suggested that particularly conducive to collective action are media stories focusing on themes of injustice, agency, and identity. Media content may be empowering and mobilizing to the extent that it helps citizens make connections between their daily experiences and a broader social context.

Themes in news stories are essential in communication because they are more likely to be remembered than any factual information used to support them. They represent "the summary, gist, upshot" of the text, and they are not reducible to the meaning of individual words, sentences, or facts. Studies have shown a substantial correspondence between certain recurrent themes in media and what was understood, believed, and remembered by the audience. The overlap is induced by audiences' motivation to make sense of what was intended by the author and their reliance on the similar sociocultural conventions.

Cognitive psychologists generally refer to all information encoded into individuals' memory as mental representations. Representations take different forms, such as features, concepts, evaluations, and summary judgments. They influence the way individuals interpret the world around them, put their experiences in context, and plan their actions. However, mental representations are not merely copies of what is intended by the authors. Themes also trigger inferential processes through which individuals actively construct various types of summary observations, categories, evaluations, and orientations that may even lead to oppositional interpretations. Research has found that people tend to remember inferences and judgments drawn from news stories rather than facts and evidence presented in those stories. In sum, across disciplines there is agreement that reliance on just facts is inadequate to account for the effectiveness of individuals' decision-making processes.

Knowledge as Structure

Marvin Minsky was among the first to point out that attempts to represent knowledge as collections of separate, simple, fragments do not explain power and speed of individuals' mental activities. Instead, he wrote, when one encounters a new situation "one selects from memory a substantial structure called a frame." *Frames* are data structures for representing stereotyped situations that enable a person to understand the situation from a particular viewpoint. Mental frames approximate themes in the media stories. Studies show that highlighting some properties of information by placing it in a certain context (i.e., framing it) activates interpretative frames that influence individuals' consequent decisions.

Framing has become a popular idea, generating a considerable amount of research showing that leaders and political elites can successfully use framing to generate support for their positions. Communication research has established that media encourage or discourage use of specific frames among their audiences by making them readily available. Research on framing represents a movement away from the traditional view of knowledge as isolated facts to knowledge as interconnected structures of information. Those structures

consist of information from both media and directly experienced reality as well as of relatively abstract representations encoded along perceptual information from the environment. Framing may make information more relevant to citizens and may result in judgments that better reflect their true preferences. It may also reduce disadvantages in amount of factual knowledge caused by inequalities in social statuses given that studies show that no one is immune from framing effects. However, their contribution to democratic competence and informed participation will not be clear as long as research has not established a taxonomy of frames that cuts across different issues, ascertain their frequencies in the media content, or identified those with most appeal and power.

In comparison with frames, *schemas* are even larger-scale mental representations with significant internal structures. They represent abstract, generic, knowledge that allows individuals to connect an event to a general framework of knowledge, filling in gaps, inferring what is missing, and to understand the event according to their needs. In communication research, the concept of schema is used mostly to explain what individuals notice in the media and how they use their prior set of beliefs and general knowledge to interpret information, rather than showing how schemas are acquired or constructed. For example, highly developed political schemas are related to greater use of news, learning differentiated constructs, and higher-quality issue arguments. Media- and politics-related schemas lead to information seeking and higher salience and attention to campaign information.

Research has shown that people use their schemas to select and reduce media information to useful essentials, but when media stories include clear generalizations, they facilitate processing information in abstract terms. This suggests that media with the organizational structures of their presentation may influence schemas and consequent understanding. Studies have found that contextualizing the news by providing analytical hooks, such as historical background and economic impact, could stimulate audience members who otherwise lack cognitive skills or motivations to become informed about complex issues.

The knowledge structures with the shortest research history and largely unexplored potential in politics are *exemplars.* They are mental representations that consist of what a person perceived or inferred about the general or typical characteristics of an event or a person rather than of objective stimulus information. Exemplars serve the same function as frames and schemas—to summarize and organize all past experiences into representations that are useful for interpretations and judgments. Media regularly present social information in the form of exemplars, a person, or an event that is supposedly typical for the whole category, to achieve vividness. Individuals base their perceptions of distribution of particular problems or people based on those exemplars even when they are contradicted by the survey data or base rates.

Knowledge as Process

Since Ulric Neisser defined *cognition* as processes by which any sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used, there have been attempts to conceive knowledge not as a thing, but as a dynamic state that leads to understanding. In general, these attempts emphasize the importance of generating relations among various representations and discrete pieces of information. Thought processes and strategies that are used to connect representations into a meaningful structure and properties of those structures are seen as indicators of comprehension.

Individuals engage in *processing strategies* that best address their goals. Motivated persons use strategies that involve consideration of a range of information and careful attention to its implications. In contrast, unmotivated individuals seize on a single piece of information and default to relatively simple representations. Individuals motivated to be accurate may put more cognitive effort and systematically process all relevant information, in contrast to individuals who just need to solve a problem most efficiently and process information heuristically. Similarly, individuals have different goals when approaching media content, and their strategies may be to reflect, integrate, doubt, or scan media content. The strategies can be more effortful, elaborate, and analytic or less demanding, simple, and heuristic. More elaborated, active processing is related to greater recall of news and greater exclusion of irrelevant information. Elaborative and reflective processing of news is found to be weakly related to public affairs knowledge but more strongly related to knowledge of candidates' issue stances. Most important, reflection mediates the influence of media use on political participation more effectively than does factual knowledge.

Processing of the media content is not necessarily restricted to purposeful direction. The mere presence

of the relevant stimulus can set into operation cognitive processes without individuals' conscious guidance or awareness. For example, perceptions of patterns in media content may help develop a tendency to think about news, recall stories later, and habitually seek more information as motivated by reflective integration. Cues of a given story, such as the primary themes, causal antecedents, and emotional response, as well as its structural characteristics, such as choppiness and coherence, can activate particular processing strategies. Studies have found that both reading newspaper public affairs and watching television crime dramas and adventure shows may stimulate reflective processing, although individuals may approach these two types of media content with very different motivations.

Three major structural properties of representations have been identified: differentiation, relatedness, and integration. These properties capture the interconnectedness of different forms of representations and determine the level of individuals' comprehension. Research shows that comprehension of media messages can be improved by modifying their organizational and logical structures. Television news produced in a tabloid style that uses music, sound effects, slow motion, flash frames as transition between shots, and obtrusiveness of the reporter's voice does not improve recognition or recall of information, and viewers find them less believable, less informative, and less enjoyable than stories produced in standard formats. News stories that use emotion sparingly, keep the pace slow to moderate, match audio and video, use concrete words and pictures, and use strong chronological narratives are better remembered, and they are rated by audiences as more comprehensible, interesting, and informative.

More *complex thinking,* which involves differentiation and integration of various dimensions of the issue, produces less retaliatory, punitive attitudes and more moderate and balanced positions on political controversies. Cognitive structures that support democratic principles of consultation and integration of various points of view in decision making may have important consequences for political participation. Complex thinking influences stronger nontraditional forms of political participation (community involvement) than traditional (voting and other campaign activities), but most important, it provides citizens with meaningful information beyond factual knowledge.

Knowledge is, in the discipline of political science, traditionally conceptualized as the quantity of discrete facts individuals remember about the political world. Although reasonably extensive, factual knowledge may be necessary for individuals to participate competently in democratic processes such as voting, it may not be sufficient to explain how individuals come to be politically active. Factual knowledge also does not adequately represent all types of information that individuals learn from media. Information that triggers understanding of how politics is relevant and connected to individual daily lives may have the most important implications for political action. Advances in cognitive psychology emphasize the importance of larger knowledge structures, consisting of both factual and inferential information, and linking relationships between discrete pieces of information as the main elements of comprehension. Only what is comprehended can be empowering and optimally applied toward realizing one's political interests.

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See also Framing; Interpersonal Communication; Newspapers, Role in Politics; Political Engagement; Political Information Processing; Political Involvement; Political Socialization

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Political Leadership

Leadership is a standing topic in political philosophy and the social sciences. Despite the recognized and continuous relevance of political leadership in any political system, an exhaustive and conclusive concept, theory, or even definition is still missing. Probably most advanced is research on leadership in organizations. But, as Yukl has pointed out, even in this research field no consensus has been reached on how to explain and study leadership. Despite those conceptual and definitional problems, political philosophy and theory have been concerned with political leadership from the very beginning. Plato's idea of "philosopher kings," Machiavelli's *principe,* and Max Weber's concept of traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic leadership show ample evidence of the relevance of the leadership concept through centuries. These thoughts still inspire research on political leadership. Notwithstanding these fruitful reflections, the term *leadership* remains lucid in political science and political philosophy. It is often used with diverse meanings in politics and in the social sciences. Connotations of leadership include positive and negative normative views, depending on the chosen definitions. Positive usage of the term often relates to functional definitions and to leadership as a communication process, whereas negative evaluations prevail regarding elitist views, power relations, and coercive processes.

Mughan and Patterson have shown that two characteristics of leadership are common to all definitions and approaches: the understanding that leadership is a relationship in which influence is exercised, and that this relationship can be best studied as a form of dynamic interaction within groups. Otherwise, definitions vary strongly and there are debates between advocates of different perspectives. At a very general level, one can differentiate two basic approaches: the power-based approach and the interactionist perspective on leadership.

Janda proposed a power-based definition. For him, leadership is a special type of power relationship in which a group member accepts the right of another group member to prescribe behavior patterns to the members of the group as legitimate. Similarly, Blondel defines *political leadership* as a phenomenon of power, because it characterizes the ability of the one or few who are at the top to decide on the actions of the others. He regards this as a top-down process. This perspective has been criticized for being too static and too strongly tied to the view that a rigid command hierarchy governs the leader-follower relationship. Burns has argued that all leaders are actual or potential power holders, but not all power holders are leaders. For Burns, leaders are a particular kind of power holders. The reach and domain of leadership are more limited than those of power, because leadership is exercised in a condition of conflict or competition in which leaders contend for followers by appealing to their convictions. Absolute wielders of brutal power may not be regarded as leaders from his point of view. Addressing leadership in democracy, this perspective meets the normative understanding that leadership involves a voluntary response of followers to leaders. However, it should not be neglected that the dark side of European history in the 20th century has shown that dictatorship may also find willing followers. Leadership covers a wide spectrum, varying from dictatorial forms to highly participatory or democratic forms.

Emergence of Leadership and Leadership Characteristics

Until the late 1940s, the *situational approach* was dominant among the psychological explanations of leadership. The opinion prevailed that the specific situation of a group largely determined who became a leader of that group. In a situation of attack, someone with the respective fierce capabilities would be chosen; in a situation of peaceful adaptation, someone with management qualifications would take the lead. In its modest form, the situational approach still finds support. Empirically, there seems to be some truth in the observation that leadership flourishes in problem situations. However, at the end of the 1950s, the situational approach was replaced—or better: complemented—by a variety of *interactional approaches*. The insight that leadership traits are not universal but vary with the situation enhanced the development of more complex models to understand the relationship

between personality and leadership. To some degree, and at a very general level, the interactional character of leadership and the varying composition of leadership characteristics are already inherent in such basic concepts as the charismatic leadership of Max Weber. In Weber's approach, "charismatic grounds" for leadership rest on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him. Charisma applies to an individual personality with extraordinary qualities that is seen and treated as gifted with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers and thus recognized as a leader. Although this conceptualization lacks specificity, it already highlights the relational aspect of leadership, because it refers several times to the evaluation by the group members. A person must be considered as exceptional to be treated as leader. This is not the only condition. Weber has made clear that, in addition, a leader must achieve something because leadership has to benefit his followers, otherwise he will lose his charismatic authority.

Borgatta, Bales, and Couch argue that very special circumstances are required for the exceptional forms of leadership for which Weber's or other forms of "great man theories" of leadership can be regarded as applicable or adequate. In modern societies, functional differentiation and division of labor is extremely complex. Leadership can be observed in all kinds of hierarchies, at all levels, be it in the countless number of organizations, institutions, or the social structure.

This, however, does not imply that personal characteristics are of no consequence and that only function matters. To the contrary, in mass democracies with their full-fledged means of communication, the personality or image of formal power holders in politics, organizations, and institutions in any sector from economics to culture is probably more visible and closely observed, for example, by the mass media, than in any prior society. For candidates for political office, for example, empirical research has found that integrity, trustworthiness, and assertiveness are of equal importance for people's choice as the perception of political competence. Scholars like Wattenberg and King have provided evidence that, at least in some systems, persons matter more today than in earlier periods of postwar history (personalization of politics; candidate-centered politics) and that personality can make a difference.

In line with this reasoning are the findings on *leadership effectiveness*. Organizational sociology has found that leadership effectiveness depends very much on the character and the way in which influence or power is exercised. Leadership can use coercive power, incentive by reward, legitimate influence (when followers belief that it is exercised rightfully), expert power, or referent power in the sense that the appeal, the personal qualities, or the value system of the leader is positively referred to by the followers. Outcomes are very different depending on which resources are employed by leaders. Whereas the typical outcome of the use of coercive powers is resistance, the use of rewards or legitimate power results in compliance. Only leaders who can rely on expert or referent power produce commitment. Commitment must be regarded as the most effective of the three possible outcomes, because it implies an active and affective engagement of the followers for the leader's course. Political leadership research has demonstrated that personal effectiveness, strategic capabilities, and the ability to mobilize and persuade are crucial in order to achieve intended outcomes. In a comparative study, Brettschneider has shown that in political competition leaders or potential leaders are successful if they appear to be politically competent, trustworthy, decisive, energetic, and strong.

In competitive settings like democracy, performance and effectiveness are of crucial importance for "constituted political leaders"—that is, for those holding an official leadership position in a political order—if they want to stay in office. This confirms Max Weber's argument that even charismatic leaders have to perform well. In addition, it confirms the interactional approach, since in democracy interaction between leaders and followers in terms of selection, election, and support is raised to a principle (alternation in power). Political competition for leadership governs the turnover in leadership. Turnover of chief executives is roughly 7 years in dictatorships, more than 4 years in autocracies, but only a little more than 3 years in democracies.

Leadership and Political Communication

The development of modern mass media communication contributes strongly to the emergence of political leadership. It has changed the way in which the relationship between politics and society as well as that

between leaders and followers work. Today, favorable media coverage is important in order to win popularity, support, and trust of citizens and voters. Many political leadership studies and theories relate leadership closely to political communication. Leaders who have major objectives (ideological, programmatic, policy, career, etc.) and who seek to activate, mobilize, and motivate cannot act as leaders without recognizing and using the means of mass communication. It is not by chance that political observers and political scientists speak of a symbiosis between the media and politics.

However, mass communication processes are more complex than just one step between leaders and followers. Already in the late 1940s, the analysis of the U.S. presidential elections of 1940 revealed that the flow of mass communication is not necessarily direct, but is mediated by personal communication. This model has become known as the "two-step flow of political communication." Actually, reality shows that the steps are multifold. Even in societies with high levels of political sophistication the real-world process of opinion formation does not really fit the bottom-up idea, termed the "cascade" model. Leaders communicate with representatives of the mass media, opinion leaders listen to mass media, the mass public talks with opinion leaders. Communication is more intense and more open within each level of the cascade compared to communication between levels. Although opinion leadership is leadership at its simplest, certainly not achieving the high level of leadership of a Churchill, and furthermore almost invisible, it should not be neglected as basis for political leadership. As Burns has put it, the essence of "transactional opinion leadership" is that most leaders are followers and most followers are leaders. In modern democracies, the prevailing mode of government, in general, can be best described in terms of the responsible party model. Political leadership is inherent to this mode of government. It implies that political leaders competing for office have to convince to create support for their goals. Neither coercive nor reward powers would help in this regard, neither within the party nor outside.

The means by which potential leadership can emerge and may succeed in elections is successful mass communication. Modern election campaigning shows how relevant it is to manage communication in order to install leadership. With the evolution of the modern campaign the location of political communication gradually shifted, from the print media toward the electronic, from the constituency toward the central party leadership, and from amateurs toward professionals. The crucial point is, however, that leadership does not automatically evolve from the achievement of sufficient and favorable media coverage. It may help to install a formal leader, but this does not necessarily imply leadership. Only if the leading person is able to create positive resonance among the potential followers, she might qualify for leadership. In democratic and noncoercive settings, leadership rests on acceptance and vital support. This is the basic message of the interactional approach to leadership. Empirical research on the selection and election of leaders has provided evidence that there is not the "one and only" route. Even if a person may carry all the qualifications conducive to leadership, leadership may not emerge because the potential followers do not follow. This proves true for constituted as well as for nonconstituted leadership. However, the processes of interaction and resonance between potential leaders and potential followers fostering political leadership are still not very well understood. There is urgent need for an integrated perspective of leadership and mass communication. The demand for advances in this direction will keep the topic on the agenda of political science and communication research.

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See also Machiavelli, Niccolò; Personalization of Politics; Two-Step Flow Model of Communication

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POLITICAL MARKETING

Political marketing has developed in parallel with commercial marketing through the course of the 20th century, particularly in America and Europe, with the rise of the universal franchise, the development of broadcast media communications, and scientific methods of assessing market and public opinion, which have transformed how political campaigns are run today. The use of marketing in British political campaigns has been said to have developed over four different eras: the unsophisticated selling era (candidates promoting themselves to different social classes in the 19th century); the selling era (early 20th century, when politicians used the mass media to disseminate messages but did not research voting intentions); the sophisticated selling/nascent marketing era (the private poll was developed, allowing voter feedback into the political process); and the strategic marketing era (which has yet to emerge).

The commercial world of marketing has informed the worlds of political and referendum campaigning, and to a lesser extent vice versa. Charities and other campaigning organizations are increasingly using marketing techniques to influence legislation and public opinion and so use the techniques of political marketing. With the development of globalized industries, the interplay between marketing and politics has increased further, and marketing methods associated with political campaigning are increasingly used by companies to influence legislators and regulators (e.g., in Brussels, Washington, D.C., Doha) who in turn influence the structure of, and legislation associated with, commercial markets. The underlying process in political marketing is the exchange of political support (in terms of votes, petitions, funding, resources) for political influence (in terms of legislative, regulatory or programmatic—commercial or political—changes).

Although the use of promotional and managerial techniques in political, electoral, and commercial campaigning has long existed, the uptake of marketing techniques has rapidly increased in recent decades. Political marketing has been likened to a marketing-propaganda hybrid, particularly in America, where negative attack-style campaigning is rife. The political marketing "product" could be said to include party policy on important issues and party ideology and ideals, which effectively comprise political representation. Considering political representation as a political service provided to companies or voters provides a better understanding of the political party's raison d'être vis-à-vis its target markets. In parallel to the development of marketing techniques, such as advertising and market research, there is increasing use of strategic marketing techniques such as market positioning, where the campaigning organization determines its campaign's ideal positions in the minds of those in their target markets and uses research to continually refine the difference between their actual position and their ideal position. Market segmentation is also an important marketing activity for political parties as they divide the electorate into groups of targetable voters.

Parties function in representative democracies to provide the nation with guidance and information on current and potential political and economic infrastructure. This process benefits the public by improving social cohesion, democratic participation, and citizen belongingness, and ensures that politicians take account of important economic considerations associated with commercial markets. Political marketing could be argued to be increasingly important as political participation declines in Western political markets, although, ironically, its cynical overuse may

well be the very cause of just such a drop in political participation.

Famous examples of campaigns include Lyndon Baines Johnson's "Daisy Girl" television campaign against Barry Goldwater in the 1964 American presidential election, when a young girl was portrayed picking leaves off a flower to Johnson's nuclear countdown voiceover. The spot was extremely evocative, and Goldwater's campaign was damaged by it. Margaret Thatcher's use of the advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi in the 1979 British general election was particularly effective, using a devastating billboard campaign around the strike-ridden "Winter of Discontent," displaying a dole (unemployment office) queue and the words, "Labour is not working," which kept the British Labour Party out of power for a generation (1979–1997).

Most marketing activity for political, referendum, and public affairs campaigns has been provided by specialized marketing and PR agencies on an ad hoc basis, although increasingly political parties and multinational corporations are conducting their political marketing activity in-house. Agencies typically take the form of pollsters, lobbyists, and public relations or advertising agencies in Britain. In America, however, political consultants have a much wider remit, taking in roles such as polling, petition management, fundraising, strategy, media buying, advertising, public affairs, grassroots lobbying, law, donor list maintenance, and campaign software consulting. Europe is increasingly developing its own political marketing industry, geared around Brussels and Strasbourg and public affairs activity.

Marketing's entry into politics has not been widely applauded, bringing disquiet to the many who believe that politics has a "higher purpose" than commercial profitability or who acquaint marketing with "style" (viz. form) rather than "substance" (viz. content). Public affairs activity, particularly lobbying, through which a government's commercial policy is influenced by companies, comes under particular scrutiny in an age where the multinational corporations and trade bodies become more powerful and governments around the world shift from being primarily providers of goods and services to regulators of commercial and social markets.

The importance of the succinctness of political marketing is apparent when one considers that the voting public and industrial directors are subjected to limited availability of time for paying attention to public affairs, with corresponding limited understanding of political and economic issues and the technical solutions required to solve them. Thus, political parties and governments will probably never truly be market or voter oriented. There are, in any case, major ethical considerations in determining how market or voter oriented any political party or government should be since they are required, once in power, to regulate them both. Of particular concern in America is the importance of funding in elections as political campaigns become increasingly advertising focused. Around $2.2 billion was spent in total in the 2004 American election cycle by all candidates. In Britain, concerns over spending in elections were offset when an electoral commission was set up with powers under the 2000 Elections, Parties and Referendums Act to regulate spending for national party campaigns at around £20 million at that time. Around the world, political campaigns and companies operating political strategies are increasingly in vogue as companies take over the delivery of what were once considered to be government services.

Paul R. Baines

See also Daisy Girl Ad; Lobbying, Lobbyist; Political Advertising; Propaganda; Public Affairs, Communication in; Public Opinion

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Political Parties

Throughout the 20th century, political parties have been counted among the most important political institutions; liberal-democratic political systems are inconceivable without parties. Parties aggregate social interests and represent those interests in the political arena. On the one hand, they contribute to the articulation of contested interests and social problems

arising from underlying social and cultural structures. On the other hand, they force the advocates of various interests and aims to cooperate and package their demands. With the politicalization of the masses, the formation of coalitions between social groupings and elites, and the emergence of centrally controlled political apparatuses, parties have increasingly become an object of social science research.

Following Sorauf, the party literature approaches parties in varying ways, for example, "parties as organizations," "parties in government," and "parties in the electorate." This literature concerns itself with the origin and history of parties, describes their activities in "opposition" or "government," strives for defensible classifications of parties, and establishes their functions. Furthermore, it examines internal party structures, for example, party finances, programs, and goals, as well as processes of candidate selection and decision making. In addition, the literature analyzes a party's leadership, activists, and voters as well as the relationships among these groups. It has put forward diverse proposals for the organization and classification scores of parties and party structures, describes changes to parties and party structures, and attempts to explain these processes.

In contrast, the party system literature directs its attention to the totality of parties in one or more countries, to the system's features, the relationships between parties, and the relevant connections between parties and the background social environment. At the center of party system analysis stand the structure and development of the relationships between parties. The aims consists of developing concepts for the comparative description and classification of party systems, of examining the conditions for party system development, consolidation, and transformation, as well as exploring their effects on politics and society, especially on the support for political systems.

Concept and Classification

The term *political party* designates a group of like-minded individuals, who in various organizational forms, participate in political decision making and strive to occupy political positions in order to implement their aims. The aims of these groups are frequently determined through a common belief system and are focused on the implementation of policies. They can, however, be primarily focused on the occupation of positions in governmental institutions. Because parties are the primary organizations linking citizens to the state, they control access to positions of political leadership. In addition to seeking political positions, parties strive for the assumption of political power by entering government. In liberal-democratic political systems, groups are only called parties if they formally contest elections. Sociologist Max Weber (1964) understood parties to be voluntary organizations that pursue the goal of assuming power in order to give their activists the opportunity to implement their aims or to pursue their personal agendas. German political scientist Maurice Duverger saw parties above all as agents, aggregating and implementing their voters' interests. Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori defined a party as a political group whose goal is to take part in elections in order to place their candidates in public offices.

The parties literature has long classified political parties based on their diverse characteristics. Parties are today classified, among other things, according to the structure of their membership and voters as "interest," "class," or "catch-all"; as "worker," "farmer," or "middle class" based on the social background of their voters; as "notable," "cadre," "mass," or "cartel" according to their organizational structure; as "vote seeking," "office seeking," or "policy seeking" based on their electoral strategies; as "extreme right," "conservative," "Christian," "liberal," "green," "social-democratic," "socialist," or "communist" based on their ideological orientations; as "system" or "antisystem" based on their acceptance of the political system; as "established" or "unestablished" based on their degree of institutionalization; and as "democratic," "authoritarian," or "totalitarian" based on their toleration of opposition.

Party Formation

Parties unite individuals with more or less similar socioeconomic backgrounds, religious affiliations, preferences, and values. All societies are aggregated from individuals with heterogeneous interests, and in general increasingly heterogeneous interests result in increasingly fragmented party systems. Parties represent and are influenced by contradictions that have developed in society.

According to Neumann in 1956, the modern nature of parties developed in parallel to the development of parliaments and the expansion of the franchise. They were the consequence of a growing call on the part of citizens to have a share in political decision-making

processes. Early representative parties relied on loose networks of social elites, who based their relationship to their voters on personal contacts and communication. Sustained processes of democratization and industrialization, however, limited the effectiveness of these methods. With the expansion of the franchise and the participation of larger portions of the population in the political process, these parties were replaced by new organizations whose purpose, among other things, was to secure their leaders the necessary mass support to enter office. The expansion of the franchise led to the development of the first mass parties supported by powerful intermediary organizations. Their voters and activists were in many ways tightly bound to the parties and caught in an all-encompassing subculture. This organizational superiority and networking with social organizations made it possible to contest elections on a cross-regional scale, strengthened them in processes of political decision making, and offered economies of scale in voter recruitment. Out of the rise of mass parties came professional politicians, making it possible to for individuals to concentrate entirely on politics but at the same time making them increasingly dependent on the party for their livelihood.

However, the social differentiation and cultural pluralization of advanced modernization has also threatened the basis of mass parties by weakening their strong, exclusive connections to interest organizations and social groups. Parties run the danger of falling into a structurally subordinate position as progressive secularization in Western societies leads to weakening religious bonds and the development of the economy's service sector shrinks the traditional working class. This second process has forced traditional worker parties to adjust their programs to appeal to the interests of the new, growing middle class.

The organizational and ideological roots of many parties in Western democracies reach back to the implementation of universal suffrage and conflicts arising during processes of centralization, democratization, and industrialization, in the course of which coalitions between parties and social groups were developed and consolidated. The numerous intermediary organizations underpinning party affiliation strongly limited the establishment of new parties. Parties founded after World War II in many countries lacked loyal votes and supporting intermediary institutions. Only changing value orientations, the decoupling of parties from interest organizations, and new media structures and issues in the last third of the 20th century favored the rise of new parties. Supported by new social movements, Green parties established themselves above all, though extreme right or right-populist parties have entered the electoral market in many countries.

In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, parties often developed in conjunction with the establishment of national representative bodies and the implementation of elections. Some parties had their roots in nationalist independence movements struggling against the colonial powers in the first half of the 20th century. In some cases, the promotion of political groups by the colonial powers led to the development of national parties that pushed for the equal treatment of Africans in political processes. The so-called administrative parties favored by the colonial powers generally recruited personnel from the civil service but found little support in the general population. In Asia, the first and largest parties came out of independence movements. During independence struggles, movements like Congress in India or the Nationalists of the Philippines bundled various interests in order to guarantee themselves a broad support base. After reaching their common goal, divergent interests led in many countries to schisms within these movements. In Africa as well as Asia, ethnic heterogeneity led in many states to the construction of ethnic or religious parties.

Finally, postcommunist political systems have seen the formation of many parties since 1989, though with the exception of postcommunist parties, they could be characterized as lacking strong organizational resources. As in Western democracies, the nature of parties in postcommunist systems has run parallel to the democratization of Central and Eastern European societies. Many parties contained preexisting parliamentary factions, which then dominated the decision-making process within the parties. As poorly organized parties of notables, they exhibit only minor support among the large interests in society and depend far more on loose networks of social elites, with their relationship to the voters arranged through the media and elections. In contrast, postcommunist parties have acquired the financial, organizational, and personal resources of the former state parties, which provide them with an advantage in party competition.

Party Functions

The spread of system-theoretical perspectives in political science increased the interest in questions regarding

the function of the party in political systems. The literature on parties attributed various functions to parties, though the precise conceptual meaning of these functions and their reasons for being named remained mostly unclear. In view of the ambiguity and lack of consistency of the concepts, no consensus has developed on the functions of parties in a democracy. Additionally, most lists fail to specify whether they are discussing empirical or normatively preferred party functions. Regardless, the functions of parties likely vary depending on the type of political system; parties in liberal-democracies provide different benefits than those in authoritarian or totalitarian systems. Among the party functions frequently counted in liberal political systems include elite recruitment and evaluation, the formulation of political goals and programs, the articulation and aggregation of interests, the communication between elites and citizens, coordination of personnel and policy functions in government, as well as control over system integration.

If one selects the stability of the political system as the point of reference for the determination of party functions, we ask what specific contribution parties make. From the system-theoretical perspective, parties secure support for the basic principles and institutions of the political order by providing the masses with the necessary emotional mooring to the system. Party competition contributes to stability by regulating and moderating political conflict and limiting political power through alternating governments. This is accomplished on one hand by politics that are responsive and communicative with citizens, and on the other hand through the recruitment of suitable personnel to hold political positions. Along with other interest groups, parties articulate social wants and needs, create feasible solutions (interest aggregation), and advocate those solutions in the decision-making process. At the electoral level, they take social demands and bundle them into political concepts; at the parliamentary level, they convert these demands into binding decisions; at the government level, they attempt to implement these political programs. In parliamentary systems they sustain and guarantee the government's capacity to act. In contrast, if one regards parties primarily as instruments of power acquisition and see the most important functions of parties in that light, the primary function of parties is to support rival groups of politicians in order to accumulate votes and enter political office.

The function of parties is connected in particular to the institutional form of political systems, particularly the form of government. In the German Empire, parties had an important influence on budgetary questions but no control over the government. Under the framework of the Weimar Republic, parties could not adapt their structures to the requirements of liberal-democratic systems, nor generate the performance necessary to maintain that system. Massive party failures contributed to the failure of democracy and the assumption of power by Hitler. In totalitarian systems, parties primarily act as instruments of the government engaged in social control.

Parties as Organizations

To achieve their aims, modern parties build more or less permanent, formal organizations. The growth of parties and the development of their organizational apparatus bring about a transformation. The preservation of the apparatus becomes a party goal, while the purpose for the creation of the apparatus increasingly moves into the background. As soon as parties reach a certain size, Robert Michele suggested that there is a separation between the party leadership and the party's members. The delegation and concentration of power effects on the one hand a decreased involvement on the part of members in inner-party decisions and on the other hand an autonomy of action for the leadership. The leaders seize the organization in order to carry out their own goals, and collective decisions are replaced by oligarchic leadership. The party leadership is no longer under the control of the party's members, but rather they use the party apparatus to direct their members.

Influenced by Michels's thesis, the party literature after World War II increased its focus on the construction of party organizations and interest groups within parties, the composition of the membership, activists, and voters, the selection of leaders, processes of inner-party decision making, and the attitudes of party members. These studies showed that the construction of oligarchies come from the division of labor in complex parties, the position of party leaders in the social stratification, and the participation interest of members. Internal party democracy is promoted by a decentralized structure, a weak bureaucracy, chances for individual members to build and acquire political competencies, and through institutionalization of protections for internal opposition. The construction of leadership circles is above all fostered by a generally weak participation by members in decision-making processes within the party.

Like Weber, the modern party literature has pointed out that parties form voluntary social organizations in order to mediate between citizens and the state. Parties work toward getting political elites in order to move state institutions toward the wishes of the electorate. Neumann emphasized that in earlier times Western European mass parties formed complex organizations to increase the role of their supporters in internal decision making. This had the reciprocal effect of bonding citizens to a coherent worldview through their inclusion in a diverse network of suborganizations. Others assumed that such parties would thrive as a result of their strong organization, their roots in large segments of the society, and their close relationship to influential interest groups.

On the other hand, Epstein argued that Western European models were approaching the organizational model of parties in the United States. By building strong organizations and anchoring themselves in social groups, parties were hindered from reacting flexibly to social changes or new challenges. Thus, parties were increasingly dependent on reaching citizens outside of the influence of large interest groups and recommended that party elites save the costs they put into member organizations and mobilize citizens directly through the mass media. Empirically, modern election campaign techniques have grown in importance, while the influence of large interest groups in mobilizing and informing voters has diminished. Epstein overlooked, however, that the recruitment of political personnel for the various offices and mandates presuppose a sufficient number of members from which suitable candidates can be drawn.

Finally, toward the end of the 20th century, parties suffered from a consistently shrinking membership. In addition, the structure and motivation of party members has changed. While the number of blue-collar workers has steadily sunk, the number of members with high levels of education as well as the portion from the new middle class has substantially grown. These newer members are less driven by the direct benefits or incentives of party membership. While not just the result of declining numbers, the question arises whether and to what extent parties still mediate between citizens and the state. As parties detach themselves from society and increasingly lose their meaning as membership organizations, the connection between parties and voters weakens. At the same time, the traditional social milieus are disintegrating and party elites are able to directly reach voters through the mass media and to gauge their opinions through surveys.

In addition, parties have gained increasing access to state resources. In many countries they have secured access to the publicly controlled electronic media and strongly expanded the state's role in party financing. As state resources increasingly serve the maintenance of the party organization, elite recruiting, and voter mobilization, the less it becomes necessary for the party to mediate between state and society and the more parties develop into quasi-state institutions. This process destroys the basis of a party's integration ability, the linkage between the party and its voters.

Party System Classification and Concepts

Following the conventional definition, *party system* refers to the number of parties, their characteristics and interrelationships in a political system. A party system is therefore more than the sum of its parties. Duverger labeled party systems as the form and character of coexistence between parties. A denser concept includes the relationship between parties and elements of the social system, particularly the electorate.

Most party system descriptions begin with the number of relevant parties. The earlier literature differentiated above all between "one-party," "two-party," and "multiparty" systems. Vague and often arbitrary decision rules led to a heavy critique of this classification, though it persists today. Alongside this basic classification, party systems are frequently differentiated based on the strength of the parties into "multipolar," "bipolar," and "dominant" as well as "symmetric" and "asymmetric," and by electoral volatility and government stability as "stable" and "unstable." Finally, party systems are classified by the ideological distance between parties into "polarized" and "nonpolarized," according to the prevailing tendencies of party competition as "centripetal" or "centrifugal," and by the exercise of power into "dominant" or "alternating." In addition, the fragmentation and volatility of the system, number of dimensions of conflict, and the existence and strength of party families, as well as the coalition possibilities, are used as descriptors for the determination of dimension.

The influential party system typology offered by Sartori combined the number of parties and their ideological distance. Based on the number of parties, Sartori differentiated between one-, two-, and multiparty systems, with the later divided into pluralistic

(three to five parties) and extreme-pluralistic (more than five parties). Multiparty systems with little ideological distance are referred to as "moderate pluralism," while those with large differences are referred to as "polarized pluralism."

The two-party system is considered the classic model of Anglo-Saxon democracy. The distance between parties is minimal, and competition tends to move party policies toward the center. In systems of moderate pluralism, any party can in principal join a governing coalition. Moderate systems can be found in Sweden and Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium, Germany and Switzerland, as well as Hungary. Characteristic of polarized systems are the existence of substantial antisystem parties, large ideological distances between the parties, limited coalition opportunities, and competitive tendencies that result in centrifugal outcomes. Examples include the Weimar Republic, the French Fourth Republic, and occasionally Italy. An exceptional case of multiparty systems is the predominant-party system. These systems have multiple parties, with one, however, dominating the center. Dominant parties are able to perpetually win elections and form the government, as was often the case in India or Japan.

Party System Development

Party systems are the expression of sociocultural and institutional structures, and changes in those institutions or underlying social preferences should affect the fortunes and strategies of political actors. The early party literature assumed above all that electoral systems determined the number and strength of parties, as well as the stability of the political system. Proportional representation (PR) systems were seen as leading to fragmented party systems and unstable governments, whereas "winner take all" majoritarian systems led to integrated and stable party systems and effective governments. Experience has shown, however, that the change from majoritarian to proportional systems in most Western European countries at the beginning of the 20th century led to the development of stable multiparty systems rather than fragmentation. Furthermore, majoritarian systems did not always breed strongly concentrated party systems, as indicated by the German experience from 1871 to 1912.

More recent research has placed a stronger emphasis on the role of socioeconomic relationships in shaping party systems. Party systems are expressions of the fundamental conflicts present in society, and these conflicts shape the value orientations of voters and the actions of political elites. The structure of Western European party systems developed according to the outcome of territorial, religious, social, and political conflicts during processes of centralization, industrialization, and democratization. First, the demands of the middle class for a share in decision making and on questions of the constitutional order of the nation-state led to the development of Liberal and Conservative parties. In addition, the formation of nation-states produced tensions between dominant and subordinate cultures. Contradictory interests from members of ethnic or religious minorities (the periphery) and members of the majority culture (the center) facilitated the development of regional and ethnic parties, for example, by Poles in the eastern German Empire, South Tyrolians in northern Italy, Scottish nationalists in Great Britain, Swedes in Finland, or the Basques of Spain. Conflicts between church and state led to the development and stabilization of the Centre Party in Germany or the formation of Catholic, Calvinist, and Reformed parties in the Netherlands. In secular countries, for example, France or Italy, religious mass movements developed into parties in order to represent the interests of the religious community against a secular state.

In the course of industrialization, the conflicting interests between urban and rural citizens were reified into a conflict between the up-and-coming urban middle class and the traditional rural nobility. Additionally, a rift developed between salaried urban employees and manual laborers on one side and farmers on the other. This conflict led above all to the development of Agrarian parties in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. The strongest effect on party systems came, however, from the class conflict, with strong Socialist and/or Social-Democratic parties developing in almost all Western democracies. In the course of industrialization, an increasing number of workers fought for political equality and organized worker parties, which led to a fragmentation and polarization of the party system. Last, the Russian Revolution led to the formation of Communist parties as offshoots of Socialist parties in many countries.

In most postcommunist political systems, party systems have developed around conflicts between classical liberals and structural conservatives on questions of the economic system and the political rules of the game. While structural conservatives defend past political and economic clientelistic structures, liberalizers

plead for free market principles and a democratic parliamentary system. Socioeconomic, religious, and ethnic conflicts play an altogether subordinate role. Last, Kitschelt et al. found that the structure of party systems in postcommunist systems were strongly influenced by the circumstances in which the communists first came to power.

Party System Change

The party systems literature has long agreed that Western European party systems “froze” at the end of their formation phase in the 1920s. The anchoring of parties to large, powerful social interests and groups, as well as their competency in articulating and aggregating interests, guaranteed extraordinary stability. Large shifts would occur only when deep, far-reaching political crises led to a failure in the continuity of party organizations (as in Italy, Germany, Austria, or Spain). For example, radical critiques on established liberal-democracies and growing nationalism in countries with severe economic, cultural, and social crises created the conditions for renewed fragmentation and polarization of party systems, unstable governments, and the rise of fascist parties.

In contrast to Lipset and Rokkan Otto, Kirchheimer postulated that European party systems had undergone a fundamental transformation. The major parties in many countries had converged in their policies, the old group-based “mass parties” had been reshaped into “catch-all” parties competing for all voters, the parliamentary opposition had become a formality, and the acrimony of the old interest conflicts had been alleviated by continuing social changes. Kirchheimer attributed these changes especially to the spread of mass media, the development of a new middle class of salaried employees and civil servants with a reasonably secure social existence, and the construction of a welfare state that guaranteed an increasing measure of social security.

Since the 1970s, social scientists have increasingly emphasized fundamental changes in Western democracies, which have also expressed themselves in changing party systems. In advanced industrial democracies the bonds between social milieus, political parties, and individuals have weakened; class and confession have lost their impact on voting. As a result, at the micro level the willingness to engage in “issue” voting has increased, with party systems fragmenting and increased electoral volatility at the macro level. These processes have altered the relationship between voters and parties. Postindustrial societies have developed a new style of citizen politics with consequences for the party system. Voting behavior had previously reflected political socialization and group loyalties. Political attitudes were therefore an expression of one’s group affiliations and position in the social structure. However, citizens in the last third of the 20th century showed an increasing readiness to participate directly in politics, with their political behavior oriented more and more on specific issues. Combined with shifts in normative values, these processes resulted in a continual loosening of sociocultural and psychological connections to established parties (dealignment), leading to a readiness of the citizenry to engage in direct political participation, with mass or catch-all parties losing much of their meaning.

Perspectives

Over the past 100 years, parties and party systems have become central objects of study in political science. Scholars approach the questions in this field with different questions in mind, using different methodologies as appropriate for those questions. Like other scientific fields, the study of parties and party systems exhibits cyclical variations in interest. For example, waves of democratization tend to be followed by an increasing interest in parties.

The continued interest in parties and party systems, however, shows that there are still large necessary endeavors to fill the many gaps and address the open questions. Thus far, there is no comprehensive, testable theory on the development of new and old parties. Authors have put identified a multitude of factors that on the whole may influence the strength and development of parties on the one hand and the continuity and change of party systems on the other. It has not been sufficiently clarified under which conditions new parties develop, which effects opportunity structures have in the founding and consolidation of new parties, or which influence social changes have. We also lack systematic comparisons of internal party structures, the relationship between party members and party structures, inner-party activities, member motives for joining, or their impact on political processes. Although the literature is united that parties select interests, transport them into the political arena and select political elites, there nevertheless remains a lack of well-elaborate theoretical models that illustrate these

processes, as well as comparative empirical studies about the ability of parties to fulfill these roles.

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See also Dealignment; Electoral Systems; Proportional Representation

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Political Prisoners

Political prisoners is a term used to refer to individuals who are imprisoned or otherwise held against their will because their ideas or public personae are considered by a government to present a threat to the nation or opposition to the current regime. Frequently, incarceration of political prisoners takes place with no recourse to legal or judicial processes. At other times, a legal system may be used to arrest and try political prisoners by implementing false criminal charges and evidence to cover up the politically motivated nature of the imprisonment. This can be achieved through the use of a kangaroo court, where a mock trial is conducted for the sake of appearances, but the outcome has already been determined. This approach may be used to avoid national or international accusations of violations of human rights. At times an individual who has been denied bail or parole could be defined as a political prisoner. Ultimately, however, classifying someone

as a political prisoner can be a matter of perspective and interpretation.

Throughout history, governments of almost every persuasion and type have jailed or confined individuals they have found politically inconvenient. One early case involving imprisonment for political reasons occurred in England during the late 1400s, when the young princes, Edward and Richard, were sent to Tower of London. The last incontrovertible sighting of the princes was in 1483, and the mystery of their disappearance has never been solved.

The past 100 years of world history gives testimony to a multitude of politically motivated detainments in almost every corner of the globe. In the 1930s, Stalin began the Great Purge of the party, in which many were imprisoned in gulags, deported to Siberia and the Central Asian republics, or executed. Evidence collected after the collapse of the Soviet Union indicates a total of approximately 3 million victims.

During the same time period, political activists and others were beginning to disappear in Germany as a result of the *Nacht und Nebel* ("Night and Fog"), a decree issued by Adolf Hitler on December 7, 1941. Even before the deportation and mass murder of the mentally impaired, Jews, and Gypsies, political prisoners and Soviet prisoners of war began to disappear without a trace.

During World War II, members of the Allied forces also implemented procedures of detention. In Great Britain, under Regulation 18B of the wartime Defense Regulations, approximately 2,000 British citizens were held without charge, trial, or term set. This action was fueled by the widespread belief in the existence of the Fifth Column. Although Churchill was initially an enthusiastic supporter of this measure, he later lamented this use of power. At the same time in the United States, approximately 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans were forcibly moved to War Relocation Camps, even though 62% were U.S. citizens. This internment was authorized by President Franklin Roosevelt with Executive Order 9066. In 1988, President Ronald Reagan made an official apology for this action, and the government paid reparations to surviving internees.

The years from 1950 into the 1980s bore witness to many politically motivated imprisonments in several countries in South America. During this period, many of the existing governments throughout the region were displaced by military coups. Some of the military dictators who took power during this period were Brigade General Jorge Rafael Videla (Argentina), General August Pinochet (Chile), and General Alfredo Stroessner (Paraguay). Then, during the 1970s, these and other government leaders participated in what was known as "Operation Condor." Intelligence and military groups in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay initiated a campaign of assassination and oppression to deter Marxist influence and suppress active or potential dissenters against the military dictatorships that had been established throughout the region. Archives discovered in Asuncion, Paraguay, on December 22, 1992, revealed the fates of thousands of South Americans who were secretly kidnapped, tortured, and killed. According to these records, 50,000 people were murdered, 30,000 disappeared, and 400,000 were incarcerated.

In the years following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the actions of the U.S. government, intelligence services, and military have come under international scrutiny. In the pursue of the War on Terrorism, a series of memoranda at the executive level sought to eliminate or circumvent legal constraints specified in the Geneva Convention on the use of torture to attain intelligence. On September 18, 2001, the U.S. Congress passed the "Authorization for Use of Military Force" resolution. This paved the way for President Bush to issue a Presidential Military Order, "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against Terrorism." Individuals held under this order are classified as "enemy combatants," a term not found in the Geneva Convention. In 2004 stories began emerging about prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, in Afghanistan, and at the military prison in Guantánamo, Cuba.

In response to the plight of political prisoners around the world, a number of organizations have arisen to redress these human rights violations. One of the most prominent and successful is Amnesty International. The organization began in the 1960s when Peter Benenson, a British lawyer, heard about two Portuguese students who had been given a 7-year prison sentence for raising a toast to freedom. He called for an international campaign of letter writing to bombard authorities with protests. The main focus of Amnesty International has been to free all "prisoners of conscience" and ensure a prompt and fair trial for all political prisoners.

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Political Satire

See Humor in Politics

Political Scandal

Political scandals refer to actions by those holding public office that violate social norms and are accompanied by a public reaction of indignation. Political power's basis in social trust is key to understanding political scandal. In a representative democracy, power is ceded on the basis of trust and accountability, and it is precisely these areas that scandal affects. In addition, for scandal to be possible, there must be mechanisms allowing its expression, means for public opinion to be formed and expressed. In 20th-century democracies these have been the mass media. In the 21st century, Internet technology has permitted the development of alternative means for publicizing political scandal, including publications such as the *Drudge Report,* which first reported on Bill Clinton's liaison with Monica Lewinsky, and the use of Weblogs (blogs).

The following discussion looks at scandal's relationship to the domain of public vice, provides an outline of a typology of political scandals, an account of how they develop, and the impact they have, as well as a consideration of reasons for their media prominence.

Scandal, Corruption, and Sleaze

Scandal is a term belonging to the vocabulary of public vice, which also includes the terms "corruption" and "sleaze." *Corruption* refers to abuse of trust through the inappropriate use of power for some kind of gain. *Sleaze* is a term that came into vogue in the last decades of the 20th century and refers to insalubrious behavior in relation to financial or sexual morality.

Scandals have an ancient pedigree, as indicated by the antiquity of the word *scandal,* which can be traced back to Greek, Latin, and early Judeo-Christian thought. The original Greek terms, the noun *skandalon* and the verb *skandalizein,* referred to a spring-trap for prey, recalling its Indo-Germanic root—*skand*—to spring or leap. It was used in a figurative way in the Old Testament, to describe a trap, an obstacle, or a cause of moral stumbling.

Types of Political Scandal

Political scandals can come in all shapes and sizes. They can be summarized in three ways:

1. *Political sex scandals*. These involve the disclosure of allegations about the private lives of public figures concerning actions that appear to transgress accepted, although not always legally binding or even generally observed codes, about the conduct of sexual relations.
2. *Political financial scandals*. These concern the disclosure of allegations concerning the misuse of economic resources by public figures in ways that often but not always transgress legal norms.
3. *Political power scandals*. These involve the disclosure of allegations concerning the improper use of power by public figures in ways that either transgress the norms and conventions of the power game or break the law.

The Development of Political Scandal

Scandals generally consist of a number of elements, including an initial transgression; the phases of revelation, publication, defense, dramatization, prosecution, and labeling; and finally, the outcomes. The British sociologist John B. Thompson outlines five phases of political scandal:

1. First, there is an initial transgression of social norms and values that typically leads to "second-order transgressions," actions taken to conceal the first

involving obstruction and deception. These second-order transgressions can come to assume more importance than the original transgression. The paradigmatic case is Watergate. Here the initial transgression—the break-in by Republican activists into the Watergate office complex in Washington, D.C., in order to plant taping devices in Democrat offices—was overshadowed by the subsequent attempted cover-up by the Nixon administration, which eventually led to the president's resignation in 1974.

2. Scandals involve nonparticipant knowledge of the transgression, hence the important role of the media.

3. The action must be one that provokes disapproval. Shock is a rare phenomenon.

4. The disapproval must be expressed. The response contributes to the constitution of the scandal and takes the form of language expressed in public implying that the action is shameful or disgraceful. For a political scandal to occur, it must reach a certain threshold in terms of numbers and consensus.

5. A final key feature of scandals is the potential harm to the reputation of a person that the allegation of scandalous behavior can cause. The issue of reputation allows one to understand why scandal or the threat of scandal is of such importance in politics. Reputation is a kind of resource, a symbolic capital, allowing politicians to build up legitimacy, to develop trust among audiences. Politicians must constantly use symbolic power to persuade.

Scandal can destroy this resource, which is why scandals are often characterized by struggles for one's name, denials, appeal to higher values, open confession, or downplaying the importance of the scandal.

Consequences of Political Scandal

Media coverage of political scandal begins a battle to stigmatize an individual in order to confer an inferior moral status on them. Scholars have thought about the consequences of political scandals in a number of ways.

First, the "no-consequence theory" views political scandal as the ephemeral product of media culture. Scandals entertain, divert the populace, and cause inconvenience to public figures but have no enduring consequences.

Second, the "functionalist theory" regards scandal as a mechanism for reinforcing existing social norms and conventions. Scandal is essentially conservative in its impact, acting as a marker for the boundaries of acceptable public behavior that, once crossed, are reaffirmed by the real and significant consequences of scandal.

Third, the "trivialization theory" considers the proliferation of scandal coverage as testimony to the decline of the public sphere. The Habermassian notion of the public sphere as the critical-rational domain of orientative public discourse is, in this view, undermined and impoverished by political scandals. Critics see three processes at work that combine to convert politics into a spectator sport for a cynical public, namely:

1. *Privatization of the public sphere*. Distinctions are no longer drawn between what constitutes private affairs from public ones.
2. *Tabloidization of the media.* Issue-based, analytical reporting is replaced by sensational journalism.
3. *Personalization of politics.* The decline of political parties and of the importance of ideology leads to an increasing emphasis on the personalities of public figures rather than the policies they advocate.

Fourth, the "carnival theory" regards scandal as subverting the power and privilege of elites to the general merriment of the populace. The topsy-turvy world of carnival breaks into the political realm, increasing the general quota of skepticism with which the public views its political class.

Fifth, there is the journalists' account of the impact of political scandal, derived from a view of journalism's function as the "Fourth Estate," the watchdog of the public interest. Here political scandals mobilize public indignation, which in turn forces action by policymakers. In this account, scandals form part of the journalism of outrage that is underpinned by the social responsibility model of the press.

Finally, Thompson's social theory of scandal locates the power of political scandals in their ability to damage reputation and undermine trust, both of which comprise the necessary symbolic capital of contemporary public figures. Political scandal strikes at the root of symbolic power because of the conditions of mediated visibility in which public figures must operate. This approach has considerable force: it posits the impact of scandal on an individual level (the loss of reputation of this or that politician) and, more

significantly, on a systemic level. Survey data in liberal democracies indicate deepening public distrust of government and low esteem for politicians, and this is taken as grounds for considering that political scandals corrode trust.

Each of these approaches has weaknesses. The trials, resignations, and procedural reform seen in Spain, Italy, and the U.K. in the 1990s provide sufficient evidence to show that political scandals do have consequences. The functionalist approach fails to take into account the way in which political scandal can underline moments of uncertainty and crisis regarding prevalent norms and conventions. Many scandals arise in areas of uncertainty about norms.

The trivialization model provides a variant on the theme that liberal democratic societies are suffering from "media malaise," the argument that the news media's practices are bringing about civic disengagement, one that remains unproven.

The carnival theory provides an attractive and partly convincing account of the consequences of a particular genre of scandal (for example, the Clinton/Lewinsky affair, various British sex scandals). However, it fails to account for serious political scandal such as corruption in Nigeria or death squads in Spain.

The Fourth Estate approach establishes political scandal and its consequences as a function of the media. This approach implies, first, that there is only as much reporting of scandal as is provided by the politicians, and, second, that the media's exposure of wrongdoing is the trigger for policy action through the pressure of public outrage. Both these assumptions are suspect. The first begs the question as to what counts as political scandal. Sexual and financial scandals are not givens (the absence of sexual scandal in many countries demonstrates this), nor are all clear-cut cases of them exposed by the media (as the nonreporting of John F. Kennedy's adultery shows). The second element of the argument has scant evidence to support it. Scholars have shown that even if the revelation of scandal does prompt public outrage—not always the case—public policy changes are more reliant on prepublication transactions between journalists and policymakers than on public response, leading them to speak of a "democracy without citizens."

Attempts to frame the argument solely in terms of media effects, a cause-and-effect relationship between media content and effects on policy and/or public opinion indicators, seem doomed to failure. It may be that that a more fruitful approach is to examine what journalists do in scandal coverage.

First, they disclose information perceived as negative about an individual or institution. Second, they give publicity to this information. Third, they place this information in a narrative frame.

It is in the power to disclose, publicize, and frame perceived misdemeanors that the power of the press can be located. Political scandals are perhaps best understood as open processes with unpredictable consequences that can only be understood by taking fully into account the cultural, institutional, and temporal contexts in which they occur.

The Narrative Power of the Media

Political scandals imply wide and public knowledge of certain actions or events made possible by processes of communication, and here the media play a key role. Scholars have considered that the media have become excessively fixated on political scandal coverage to the exclusion of more serious political reporting. There may be a number of reasons for this.

First, political scandals sell newspapers and increase audiences. Scandals provide the sort of stories that have all the ingredients needed to attract audiences. They are vivid, racy, dramatic, and compelling. Second, the transformations wrought by the developments in communication media have produced a new form of visibility and publicness in the contemporary world, creating new opportunities as well as new problems and risks for political leaders. The "public president," who is engaged in a "permanent campaign," has become a continuous presence, literally constantly in the public eye. This allows a potential for damage to the reputation of the leader, which makes the media powerful in scandals and attracted to their coverage. Third, the media's own news values, skewed to the unusual and negative, ensure that political scandal will be attractive. Fourth, the media's capacity to fix symbolic content—we see before us Clinton saying, "I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky"—gives them an extraordinary central role in creating the compelling narratives of scandal.

Once a scandal begins to emerge, a whole process of mediated communication unfolds. This process, which consists of a set of subsequent revelations, reactions, accusations, and defenses, has a very specific characteristic: facts and events are told by journalists.

To narrate the story, journalists try to create a coherent whole, ordering facts and events within a

cogent logic of space and time. But that logic has to be adjusted to the rhythms of media production.

The process of reporting scandal can be long and complex. Reporters might find that their information can not be confirmed, and the story might lose salience; a story might need to be reconceptualized as new information is received. In scandal stories, characters are created and qualities attributed. Stories have plots with turning points: they receive a specific temporal order to construct a coherent whole.

First, to create compelling stories and give them a coherent meaning, characters are identified in terms of villains and victims. Second, a plot or storyline is created. Third, the plot is related to drama. In preparing an investigative story, the journalist needs to allow the audience to make clear inferences about who is to be blamed for what. Moral language is used to characterize the wrongdoing for viewers or readers. Scandal narratives are full of terms like *corrupt, wasteful, greedy, lazy,* and *shameful*.

The drama is, fourth, moral drama. Scandal stories establish patterns of what is acceptable and what is not. As a result, political scandals become the center of public attention, and news coverage creates morality tales. A key characteristic of scandal tales is that whatever else they do, they always point to a moral. Scandal journalism mediates values through the exposition of wrongdoing and its consequences. Like morality tales, scandal stories implicitly recommend certain kinds of choice and action to members of the audience.

The extraordinary ordinariness that scandals capture, their airing of moral dilemmas in personalized, compelling narratives, make them into particularly engaging events but, for these reasons too, especially localized affairs. Mediated political scandals provide some knowledge of facts. Crucially they enact the drama of moral agency, and their stories become the stuff of social memory.

Political scandals are more than economic or ideological epiphenomena (which is, of course, not the same as saying that they are not put to economic and/or ideological use) in that they arise in and out of specific cultural contexts that are extremely influential in shaping the precise features of political scandal in different times and places. Political scandals are, then, examples of global phenomena that are at the same time highly local.

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See also Framing; Political Corruption; Watergate

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Political Socialization

The concept of political socialization embodies an unresolved tension in how theorists think about the processes by which a democratic culture renews itself. Political socialization is conventionally understood as a kind of generational inheritance in which societal "agents" such as families, schools, and media transmit civic knowledge and attitudes to youth. The promotion of values such as a commitment to voting and trust in government is thought to ensure the stability of a democratic regime. However, this top-down, "enculturation" perspective tends to view children and young adults as passive recipients of political influence. Recent research in political communication offers evidence that challenges the enculturation paradigm and points instead to civic learning as a developmental dynamic in which youth potentially exhibit a good deal of autonomy and initiative in political learning once motivated to monitor news media and to exchange opinions. In this "empowerment" framework, youth test out options for civic identity in deliberative activities that allow them to evaluate and to integrate perspectives from teachers, friends, parents, and siblings.

The Primacy of Parents

The principle that moral education should encompass training for active citizenship is evident in the prescriptions of Aristotle and Plato. However, the Greek philosophers were doubtful (if not scornful) of the inherent proclivities of youth for participatory competence. The notion that society must work actively to transform children into civically competent adults became the original motivation for establishing a public school system in the United States.

However, empirical research on political socialization did not commence until the middle of the 20th century. This early scholarship assumed that the family was the primary agent through which a political system prepares children for civic participation. In the 1960s and ’70s, parents were imagined as powerful role models: children were thought to observe parental cues and to internalize the same attitudes and orientations to politics. The structure of family relations was described as a mini-polity in itself, whereby proper behavior would be learned and transferred from the home to the larger culture. By respecting the authority of parents, children would develop respect for and trust in institutions such as law enforcement and the electoral system. In operational terms, scholars measured socialization outcomes as the extent to which parents and children held similar attitudes about politics and adopted the same partisan loyalties.

Researchers tended to focus on children rather than adolescents or young adults. According to the “primary principle,” lessons learned in early childhood endure in the shaping of behavior and attitudes into the adult years. For example, political party identification was viewed as essentially as a fixed orientation, acquired from parents and held consistently throughout a lifetime in most cases.

Theorists of this era generally believed that schools also played an important role in political socialization, albeit supplemental to parents. Other agents of influence, such as mass media and peer groups, were considered secondary. As communication scholar Jack McLeod observed, the top-down, transmission view of school and family influence reflected the anxiety of the Cold War years, marked by a preoccupation with the need to preserve democracies. Activism and provocations of the 1960s eroded much of the social homogeneity that held sway during the Eisenhower presidency (1952–1960), but the youth counterculture seemed to reinforce the desire of political scientists to demonstrate empirically how schools and families might preserve diffuse support for democracy. Political socialization was viewed as the adoption of norms, values, and behaviors accepted within a political system. In this view, children were essentially inert in civic learning; they simply absorbed a unified and culturally agreed upon a set of facts, behaviors, and beliefs.

In retrospect, it is not surprising that the heyday of political socialization research was short-lived given such an instrumental view of children as successfully socialized when they supported the political system or agreed with parents. Data collection peaked in the 1960s, and by the 1970s many scholars were abandoning the field for more promising fields of political behavior research. Scholars had failed to find consistent patterns of attitudinal matching between parents and adolescent children.

Other researchers concentrated on evaluating the effects of schools in formal civic education, and once again the results were disappointing. Schools appeared to be mostly irrelevant in political development outside of the direct transmission of information from lesson plans and textbooks. Still, the non-results were puzzling in that sociological factors such as ethnicity, years of formal education, and socioeconomic status (SES) are predictive of political interest among adults. The microsocial mechanisms of interpersonal influence and learning in families, classrooms, and peer groups were yet to be discovered.

Communication in Civic Development

Against this backdrop of disappointing findings, communication scholars began to investigate effects from media while applying a more interactive approach to family life. Outside the realm of political socialization, media theorists were debating the merits of a once-dominant perspective known as “limited effects.” The view of minimal media influence emerged out of the research of Paul Lazarsfeld. His voter studies of the 1940s seemed to show that adults are influenced more by peer groups than by media when making voting decisions. More generally, citizens could resist or avoid media influence through selective exposure to media content. Media merely reinforced preexisting beliefs about politics, according to the limited effects paradigm.

By the 1970s, political communication scholars such as Steven Chaffee were arguing that the media reinforcement presumption did not make sense when

applied to youth civic development. Children did not possess fully formed attitudes in the first place. In media-saturated environments of the late 20th century, youth were potentially exposed to a milieu of political information, opinions, and perspectives. In survey research, children themselves identified media as more important than parents or teachers as influences on their views about politics.

Youth impressions of relative influence were confirmed in parallel research. In experimental and survey studies, investigators sought to disentangle the multiple effects of teachers, parents, gender, age, and ethnicity to gauge media contributions. Researchers found that, despite controlling for the impacts of parents and family demographics, attention to news accounted for gains in adolescents' knowledge of current affairs as well as more fundamental knowledge of the political system. Other research showed that media provide raw material for youth discussion about politics with parents and friends. Beyond effects on knowledge, partisan opinions, and interpersonal communication, media contribute to children's support for the electoral system and support for other prosocial, democratic values. Attention to news, and subsequent observations of political actors and institutions, prompts many children to imagine their future as voters and activists.

With media contribution to political socialization generally established, theorists turned to identifying the distinct learning functions of different media and the specific conditions of influence. Theorists proposed that television, despite its superficial coverage of issues, is in some respects more important than print media with regard to civic development. Broadcast news stories are easier to comprehend and more engaging visually for younger audiences. Children can pick up on discrete bits of knowledge, such as the names of candidates during elections. For both children and adult immigrants to a new country, television operates as a bridge into the political world.

Children would ideally "graduate" on to newspaper reading during adolescence to gain from the more substantive depictions of political issues and controversies. The acquisition of a newspaper-reading habit during the teenage years is highly predictive of adult participation in politics, as youthful readers integrate various perspectives, connect the cognitive dots, and develop sophisticated opinions.

As scholars have designed improved measures of media use, they have been more successful in documenting media influence. For example, mere exposure, or time spent with news media, is marginally associated with youth gains in knowledge and opinion formation. Active, purposeful attention to news content leads to more efficient learning and motivation for talking about politics with parents and friends.

Another important distinction for political socialization is entertainment programming versus news shows. These content categories have blurred in recent decades, but the bulk of evidence suggests that excessive television viewing is accompanied by political apathy, ignorance, and cynicism among youth. There are many psychological constructs that could help to explain why general TV viewing inhibits civic development, but part of the answer is time displacement. Studies of generational differences show that young people today spend more time plopped in front of television. This leaves less time for social activities that cultivate interpersonal trust and communication skills—orientations that could be applied later in life to civic engagement. Generational differences represent what some call a "reverse gap" for media use. Older citizens pay more attention to news media, but young Americans consume more entertainment media. Unfortunately, this dynamic is not simply the result of life cycle changes whereby we can be confident that the current generation of youth will give up a heavy entertainment diet for news content once they get older.

The widespread avoidance of news media among youth is unprecedented, and reflects more generally a historic erosion of youth interest in public affairs and electoral participation.

Survey research on college freshmen, for instance, cast a bleak portrait for the future of participatory democracy in the United States. The following indicators of civic engagement have all diminished by about one-half since the 1960s: acquiring political knowledge, discussing politics with friends, and believing that keeping up with politics is important. The problem is more complex than simply a lack of youth interest in political media. Political scientists refer to the "start-up" costs of civic engagement: Young adults are busy with completing formal education, finding jobs, moving frequently, and searching for a spouse. Young adults are also less likely than their parents and grandparents to identify strongly with a political party. Without a psychological investment in a party, or without some other ideological loyalty, there is little motivation to keep up with public affairs.

These trends are troubling, to the say the least, because regular attention to news is the fuel of

spontaneous conversation about politics in everyday life. When young people are not motivated to talk about public affairs and lack the information and perspectives to engage in meaningful conversations, other civic dispositions associated with deliberative democracy remain dormant. Interpersonal orientations such as respectful listening, the gumption to voice unpopular opinions, and a willingness to compromise derive from habitual political discussion. Some theorists contend that a culture of intolerance, incivility, and hyperpartisanship is the inevitable result of a society in which youth are not encouraged to express themselves politically and to pay attention to news media that might challenge preexisting beliefs.

Crisis or Opportunity?

While scholars have described youth disengagement as a crisis for participatory democracy, we should keep in mind that every generation of adults tends to project its fears about the future on to the younger members of society. Just as Plato's philosophy of moral education reflected anxiety about the civic competence of youth, many activists and educators worry about the meager levels of political interest among neophyte citizens.

A vigorous debate in contemporary scholarship circles around the question as to whether youth are really apathetic, or whether they are instead eschewing traditional modes of electoral participation while adopting new forms of active citizenship. Empirical studies show that while many young adults do not relate to politics via party identification and voting, volunteering is more common than in previous generations of youth. Reflecting and reinforcing this trend is the incorporation of service learning as a regular part of high school and college curricula.

Adolescents and young adults are also more likely to participate in new media compared with older cohorts. Interactive media such as the blogosphere constitute densely interconnected discussion venues that represent, at least theoretically, the opportunity to revive a culture of deliberative engagement. Scholars are currently investigating whether the kind of interpersonal trust and social capital associated with face-to-face interaction is also generated in online communities. If so, new media might constitute an arena for civic development with possibilities yet to be imagined. Online media are also increasingly used in political mobilization of young adults, as evident in the Howard Dean campaign for president in 2004.

Certainly the notion of youth as permanently disengaged is overwrought. Concepts such as apathy and cynicism are exaggerated characterizations of how youth relate to politics. To be sure, curricula reforms and media innovations are needed so that educators and activist can better comprehend the possibilities for how political communication might animate the civic imagination of youth. Recent research identifies some hopeful strategies:

- In some media literacy programs, students learn how to critique political news. By assessing journalistic bias or by checking out claims in campaign advertisements and candidate debates, adolescents become more sophisticated about media, politics, and how these two domains interact in a democratic system.

- Political satire is immensely popular with college students, who respond to an irreverent and comical take on the serious business of politics. Scholars are beginning to explore the ways in which satire might contribute to civic awareness and inclinations to participate in politics.

- Civic education at the high school level is potentially effective, despite the early research that showed minimal influence. Adolescents are easily bored by the traditional approach of rote memorization of textbook material. However, when they are invited to participate in classroom debates and discussions about controversial issues, they develop peer norms for skillful political communication. Just as deliberative theory would predict, adolescents become motivated to acquire knowledge from media as they prepare for classroom discussions.

- Prior research has tended to examine effects of one socializing agent at a time, as when studies investigate learning within the contexts of schools, families, or peer groups. But recent studies point to elevated influences possible when these spheres interact. For example, classroom discussions about politics motivate students to engage parents in conversations and the resulting discussions lead to increased news media use as a regular feature of family life. In this scenario, students essentially turn political socialization theory upside down, as they put the onus on parents to become more civically aware. Educational initiatives that involve the entire family—rather than

individual students—are examples of synergistic innovations that offer an optimistic view of the prospects for democratic renewal.

These strategies have all proven to be successful, and they are all based on the premise that political socialization is not a matter of top-down influence. Youth are themselves the most important agent of civic development. When they actively interact with family members, friends, and media, the result is civic empowerment rather than the passive internalization of attitudes and behavior handed down by elders.

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See also Deliberation; Kids Voting USA; New Media Technologies; Party Identification; Political Engagement; Political Knowledge; Rock the Vote; Youth Voting

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Political Spin

See Spin, Political

Political Trust

See Political Disaffection

Politics, Policy, Polity

How much do the terms *politics, policy,* and *polity* differ from one another and how helpful is their distinction for the research on political communication? In Anglo-American technical terminology, each of these terms describes a different nuance of the political.

- *Polity* is used in the sense of "community." The term comes from the Greek word *polis* and includes not only the city state, but also other forms of politically organized societies such as the nation-state and the empire.
- *Politics* describes the theory and practice of the power struggle between the players inside the polity. It constitutes the core of the political system.
- *Policy* aims at the planned formation of social domains such as economy, environment, or education through collectively binding decisions ("policy making"). With this functional perspective the output and outcome respectively come to the fore and provide the opportunity to differentiate between individual political domains (e.g., social policy, foreign policy) and individual phases of the policy cycle (from the articulation of interests to the evaluation of policy).

The English terms have entered the German technical terminology as foreign words and constitute general common distinctions of the generic term *Politik*. However, as three coequal dimensions of the political, the terms are referred to one another more systematically and are disassociated more explicitly than it is the case in the Anglo-Saxon technical terminology:

- *Polity* describes the formal dimension of Politik. It includes the framework of institutions, that is, the political order in which political action has to take place. One example is the competences of individual governmental authorities specified in the constitution.
- *Politics* describes the process-related dimension of Politik, the conflict about decisions between the political players, for example, between the parties.

- *Policy* describes the substantial dimension of Politik; that is, the organization of individual social problem areas through obliging decisions, for example, about the distribution of resources.

This differentiation has proven quite helpful in the research on political communication. The three dimensions are used in order to distinguish between political attitudes. *Attitudes* can refer to individual policies such as the introduction of the Euro or the environmental policy of the government. Or they refer to single players and their debates, for example, the competition between parties or the predominance of interest groups ("politics"). Or attitudes are analyzed that refer to the political system in general, such as contentment with democracy as a form of government or with the possibilities to influence political decisions ("efficacy"). This, then, is tangent to the dimension of polity.

In *content analyses* of political media offerings, it is also helpful to distinguish which range the media dedicate to substantial political problems (e.g., effects of tax laws), to political conflicts (e.g., conflict in the government), and to general questions of the political order (e.g., constitutional conformity of a regulation).

Different *explanatory approaches* for phenomena of political communication, such as the political agenda or the framing of certain issues, are the result of this distinction. When, for example, it is to be explained why a conflict is pictured differently in two nations, the respective functional requirements and possibilities can be the cause or the different institutional general conditions or the respective miscellaneous disputes of the political actors.

Gerhard Vowe

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Politics, The

See ARISTOTLE

Polls

Polls are a useful method for collecting information about the public's opinions, attitudes, and behavior in a variety of political contexts. Good-quality polling results in information that describes these attributes of a relevant population to which inferences can be drawn from the sample of the respondents who were interviewed. Polls and surveys are employed by political campaigns, news organizations, and interest groups who want to understand the public's reactions to actual or potential events in order to develop strategy, report on current events, or contribute to the development of public policy.

A *poll* is a form of data collection that typically involves a sample of respondents, drawn to represent an underlying relevant population, who are asked a standardized series of questions in a fixed form. The results are analyzed for the entire sample, with inferences drawn back to the population from which it was drawn, as well as for specific subsamples that represent subgroups in the population. In some cases, the relevant population is well known and easily operationalized, as in the case of "adults age 18 and over residing in telephone households." But in other cases, the relevant population has to be constructed during the course of the interview, as in the case of "likely voters."

Polls and the news media have been closely linked ever since the start of commercial polling in the 1930s. In this initial period, many pollsters built the commercial, private side of their businesses by having a relationship with news organizations that would distribute the results of their polls of public opinion and build the visibility of their firms. This was true of George Gallup, who produced a syndicated newspaper column, and Elmo Roper, who started out doing quarterly polls for *Fortune* magazine. They anchored their public work around their performances during presidential election campaigns; their general success in estimating those outcomes, leaving aside the 1948 election, validated the method and increased its public acceptance. In the 1960s, major news organizations

formed partnerships to conduct their own polls, linking large circulation metropolitan dailies and national television networks.

In the 1970s, broadcast networks were engaged in a contest with newspapers about the nature and content of election night coverage. The networks began to develop the exit poll methodology as a way to capture the views of voters leaving the polls to support immediate coverage of who won and why. Up until this time, newspapers had been the primary source of information about elections, although the full tabulation of the votes would often not be available until Wednesday's or Thursday's editions. This exit polling technique transformed the coverage of elections by providing more immediate information and fuller analyses of what happened and why. Exit polls did not come without controversy, however.

Polls in Political Campaigns

Campaigns rely upon polls for intelligence as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of their strategy. They collect their own data to provide different kinds of information at different stages of the campaign. The release of information from public polls also can have an effect on the campaign.

Polls form an integral element of the research function of the campaign that also includes analyses of potential opponents and their records, historical voting patterns in the constituency, and assessments of advertising content and its effectiveness. Polling consultants may conduct benchmark polls before the campaign starts to set a baseline for a candidate's standing and how it has to be improved or sustained. There are also polls conducted after key events in the campaign, such as major speeches or debates, and tracking polls that measure the relative standing of the candidates, especially at the end of the campaign.

The relative standing of a candidate in the polls can have important consequences for the campaign. It is an indicator of viability early in the campaign and electability later. Early on, this standing can be a function primarily of name recognition, but it also has an effect on the flow of contributions, volunteers, and the quality of consultants who sign up for the campaign. Electability and viability in turn affect the quality and quantity of news coverage that candidates receive, so poll standing contributes in an important way to coverage as well. While many of the impacts of polls on a campaign are seen as negative, there can also be positive equivalents. For example, when the polls show one candidate way ahead, there are concerns about depressing turnout in a "no contest" race. But at the same time, polls that show a race is "too close to call" can have a stimulating effect on turnout.

One of the different ways that campaigns use polls involves their sampling procedures. In many cases, campaign strategists are not interested in the entire electorate, especially strong partisans who support their opponent. They may interview samples of undecided or uncommitted voters or of their own weak supporters in order to determine what kinds of issues or approaches can move them to become strong supporters. So these polls produce results that are not generalizable to the normal adult population or even the likely electorate. Nevertheless, the campaign may leak such results to the press in order to make the candidate's standing look better than it actually is or than it appears in other published polls.

Polls Used by News Media

Polls are attractive to news organizations because they support their tendency to cover campaigns and elections through sporting metaphors and "horserace" coverage and as a way to stem losses in audience size and share. Both of these functions are important to the way that news is currently covered.

Elections have a special attraction for news organizations because they encompass so many attributes of newsworthiness. In the case of a presidential election, for example, there is a high-impact event involving conflict that occurs on a regular schedule. This allows news organizations to allocate resources and adjust those allocations as events take place. The campaigns also include willing sources who are happy to be interviewed and quoted. Polls contribute to these interests by providing scientific and precise measures of where the candidates stand and how that has changed. And at the same time, they provide a distinctive and independent voice for the electorate about how they are reacting to the candidates and their campaigns.

Thinking about the "old" form of campaign coverage, the articles leading up to Election Day would often involve quotations from party leaders and campaign officials about what was going to take place. These strategists always had a particular "spin" to impart to their comments about how. Patterns of turnout and the preferences of specific subgroups of the population were difficult to discern. The use of

key precincts could help where homogeneous subgroups had distinct residential patterns so that the behavior of groups of voters by race or size of place of residence could be analyzed. But the advent of exit polls provided the key for news organizations to analyze the preferences of more meaningful subgroups, such as men or women or even voters who held different attitudes about abortion.

Use of Polls by the Government

Government agencies have given increasing weight to citizen input since the advent of environmental impact statements. This means that the views of potentially affected citizens had to be taken into account when government projects were being considered. These impacts were often measured by ethnographic techniques and focus groups. But as the costs of data collection dropped with the advent of telephone interviewing, then surveys of individuals gained an increasing role in evaluating citizens' reactions.

Public polls often provide other kinds of important information on referenda and initiatives, also a growing phenomenon in contemporary politics as risk-averse legislators demonstrate increasing reluctance to take on tough policy questions in legislative debate and pass laws. When this is combined with a different set of strategies from interest groups who want to push their own agendas through petition drives to get issues on the ballot, voters are often faced with an increasing number of issues to vote on without very much guidance about what is at stake or how their fellow citizens are reacting to the issues. The availability of public polls on such issues can inform both government agencies and officials about how citizens will feel about and react to such plebiscites.

One way that polls are *not* used by elected officials is to help them adopt positions on specific issues. Most candidates for office have a history of speeches and even votes on a wide range of issues, and they cannot turn their back on those, or "flip flop," based upon the results of current polls. Recent incumbent presidents have maintained extensive polling operations, usually through their national party committees, so they are always well informed about where the public stands on important issues of the day. And the availability of public polls from media organizations also provides important information in this regard. While poll results may sometimes indicate the best way that discussion of an issue can be framed in terms of the officials' personal beliefs or past history, there is little evidence that they adopt different positions based upon them.

Use of Polls by Interest Groups

Interest groups use polls to collect information in their attempts to influence public policy and legislation. Polling data can be used to represent the views of citizens, to describe their policy preferences, and to assess their reactions to proposed policies. Interest groups collect this kind of information to inform the discussion and debate surrounding these kinds of issues, as interest group leaders use it to produce press releases and support testimony before legislative hearings. Since interest groups are organized to the represent collective views of their membership, polls provide a convenient and relevant way to describe such views.

In most cases, interest groups contract for polls conducted by private polling firms. In this way, they get to build their argument based partly on the legitimacy and record of the polling firm they hire. But sometimes interest groups use "pseudo-polls" to boost their membership or as a fundraising technique. When interest groups engage in Fund Raising Under the Guise of polls ("frugging") or Solicitation/Selling Under the Guise of polls ("sugging"), they engage in a form of deception that has been outlawed by the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), the Council of American Survey Research Organizations (CASRO), and the Marketing Research Association (MRA).

Public Reactions to Polls

Research shows that the public has a variety of interests in poll results, although they have a very limited ability to evaluate the methodology of any specific poll as it might relate to its accuracy. There are two separate dimensions of this interest: one is related to political communication in the sense of providing information about mass preferences of citizens to their government. The second dimension reflects the entertainment value of polls and the information they can provide about how other citizens are thinking about issues and policies.

As part of this second function, polls can provide information about popular or majority views as well as unpopular or minority views. When this phenomenon is at work, it can produce a "spiral of silence" by which those who hold minority views become less

willing to express them in public. In election campaigns, *momentum* refers to how citizens react to campaign events, including recent primary and caucus results or the outcome of debates. Potential voters who do not have any preference for a candidate can look to polls for guidance. In one circumstance, such voters may choose to support the frontrunner in the polls, responding with a "bandwagon effect." However, others may make a sympathetic gesture in support of the trailing candidate, resulting in an "underdog effect." These effects are very difficult to measure, as they represent countervailing forces in the electorate and would tend to cancel each other out in any cross-sectional survey. Furthermore, they are both difficult concepts to operationalize because they represent a shift over time from an initial position of "no preference" or a weak preference to eventual support at the polls. This implies the assembly of panel data in order to measure such change, a research design not commonly employed in the public polls.

The TV networks' use of exit polls to project vote results since the 1970s has consistently created public concerns about invasion of privacy, because citizens want to be left on their own to make up their minds at the end of the campaign, as well as about the suppression of turnout among West Coast voters who have not voted yet when the networks call the winner before their polls close. This is also a difficult research issue to address, because it is the combination of the Electoral College assignment of all of a state's votes to the winning candidate *and* the timing of poll closings across the United States that underlie such concerns, not even considering the guarantees of freedom of the press under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. What is more troubling to some is that the effects of calling the presidential race based on the turnout for offices lower down the ballot is that people are dissuaded from voting for president. The research on these effects is mixed at best, suggesting there is little or no such effect.

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See also Horserace Coverage; News Coverage, Politics; Polls; Public Opinion; Voter Behavior

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Pooled Journalism

The term *pooled journalism* refers to the journalistic coverage of events, particularly international conflicts and wars, by a comparatively small and therefore controllable group of reporters. In the United States, the Department of Defense (DOD) established in 1987 the so-called DOD National Media Pool as a system designed to control media accessibility to American troops. Consequently, pooled journalism may be defined as a technique of political or military censorship. In a broader meaning, the term *pooled journalism* is also applied to describe news-gathering organizations pooling their resources in the collection of news. A video pool or pool feed, for instance, is then distributed to members of the pool who are free to edit it.

The setting up of media pools as a method of censorship first came to be used in 1989, when the Pentagon selected about a dozen reporters to cover the U.S. invasion of Panama. These journalists were not permitted to accompany troops into the combat zone but were restricted to an airport in Panama until nearly all fighting ended. The emergence of pooled journalism is connected to tensions between U.S. media and military created in and after the Vietnam War. When the war ended, many in the military blamed the press for "losing Vietnam." Since then American political leaders and high-ranking military personnel favored tight media policies in subsequent conflicts.

In the second Gulf War, in 1991, the Pentagon authorized several "press pools," allowing a selected number of reporters to travel to the "front" under the supervision of media escorts, usually U.S. military public affairs officers. News organizations and journalists willing to join the pool system were required to observe numerous ground rules outlining categories of information that could not be reported on (e.g., troop deployments, weapon systems) and spelling out the methods of information gathering that reporters were restricted to. Interviews, for instance, could only be conducted in the presence of a military escort, and

pool dispatches had to first pass through the "military security review system" that was organized and controlled by the American military's Joint Information Bureau in Saudi Arabia.

The pool-and-review system later was criticized by scholars and media organizations as an illegal "prior restraint" (censoring of material before its publication) violating the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, even though a majority of Americans, for the most part, had supported the military's control of the press during the second Gulf War. It took, however, until the 2003 war against Iraq before the U.S. military replaced the system of pooled journalism with current "news management" techniques, including the embedding of journalists into combat troops. Scholars interested in pooled journalism especially described the media pool system as a component of military public relations or looked at the effects of this form of censorship on news coverage.

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See also Embedded Journalists; Gulf War, Media Coverage of; War Coverage

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Populism

Populism is a notoriously vague concept, and scholars of populism frequently mention its polysemic and elusive, chameleon-like nature. It was defined as an ideology, a doctrine, a mentality, a system of ideas and a political style, also a rhetoric, demagogy, and discourse, or as a number of concrete historical movements. Thus many advocate speaking of populism in the plural and prefer examining each concrete case individually.

Indeed, there are very specific and idiosyncratic characteristics to the *Narodnichestvo* of agrarian Russia, the *populiusmo* of Argentinean *descamisados* ("the shirtless people"), the American farmers movement, and even the supporters of Joerg Heider in Austria or Jean-Marie Le Pen in France at the beginning of the 21st century. There are, however, some common denominators to all of these historical phenomena and analytical concepts. They are all an appeal to the people against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of society.

Populism basically distinguishes between the people, *el pueblo,* and the social groups in power, the elites. It regards the *pueblo* as the incarnation of the authentic nation—the good, the just, the virtuous, and the moral—while despising the oligarchy for representing evil, the foreign, the unjust. It therefore aspires to reestablish the mythical unified community of the past.

The other crucial element of populism is the centrality of the leader. He is the one who expresses the nation and embodies its spirit; he represents all that is good and beautiful in the nation. Therefore, he is qualified to maintain a more autocratic system of government than liberal representative democracy.

Thus populism has a radical nature. It opposes the liberal concept of democracy, which emphasizes separation of powers, political parties, representative institutions, civil rights, and pluralism. It also challenges the established powers and calls for their overthrow by, or the inclusion of, the counter-hegemonic bloc.

That is why populism is seen by its supporters as a positive concept, promoting the participation of the periphery within the political system and equal distribution of power in society. Its opponents, on the other hand, point to the ethnocentric, nationalist, xenophobic impulses; its antiparty and antiparliamentarian nature, and for being a system of political mobilization used by charismatic yet demagogic leaders.

Close to the turn of the 20th century, a new wave of populism spread in the world, similar to the previous wave of the 1960s. The new trend was descried as "neopopulism," "new populism," or "postpopulism." Besides the fact that in this phase populism moved from the left to the right, the new populism had a different economic orientation, and it strongly supported neoliberal economics.

Yet what is so peculiar to the new populism is the interrelationship with the media. Though populist leaders always had to use the mass media to connect with "the people," this time television and television culture became central to this political style, to such a degree that it justified the use of the term *Telepopulism*.

Indeed, the nature of contemporary media fosters populist values and populist leaders. They appeal to, and in the name of, the common (wo)man, engage emotions, promote popular culture and popular discourse, and encourage anti-intellectualism. They personify and personalize issues and have preference for style and packaging rather than substance. Consequently, the more people rely on television for political knowledge, the more they incline to a populist approach.

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Posters, Political

Political posters are visual means of communicating political messages to large audiences. A poster is a printed mass media product. Graffiti and murals do not qualify as posters, since one of the defining criteria for a poster is its mass reproducibility. While graffiti and murals only exist as single objects, attached to a specific place, posters are moveable objects produced in large quantities to cover a wide geographical area. The production of political posters is typically event related. Political events that regularly lead to poster production are election campaigns and also public relations campaigns as well as public protests and demonstrations. While political posters in the context of an electoral campaign have to be considered as *paid media,* protest posters produced for demonstrations or to express clandestine opposition are free media that have an end in itself and are not part of a larger, commercialized campaign.

Historically, the introduction of posters as political means of mass communication is linked to two developments: first, the invention of lithography at the end of the 18th century, which enabled the reproduction of visual motifs in large quantities; and, second, the political development of mass democracy in the 19th and 20th centuries, which created an audience for political posters.

Political posters are produced for the purpose of being displayed in public. In the United States, during the 1960s and 1970s, printed posters and billboards were largely replaced by televised commercials. Contemporary campaigns in the United States print posters, if at all, only in small numbers, and mainly as collector's items. Outside the United States, and particularly in Europe, the political campaign poster maintains its role as major campaign communication tool.

The poster's content or motif depends on the political context for which it is produced and in which it is displayed. The most pervasive motif is a candidate's headshot in the context of a political election campaign. The majority of political posters feature portraits. Thus, the election campaign poster is a specific, and in quantitative terms dominant, subcategory of the political poster.

History of Election Campaign Posters

Lithography, a printing technique from stone that uses the repulsion of water and grease for the reproduction of graphic images, was invented by the Bavarian printer Aloys Senefelder around 1796. This cheap and relatively fast technique to reproduce visuals spread quickly in Western Europe and was mainly used in art and in early forms of advertising. The *political* poster needed a second "fertilizer"—mass democracy—to flourish in the second half of the 19th century, which happened to be the United States of America as the world's first mass democracy. The first publication of a lithograph in the United States dates back to the year 1819. But, it took another 20 years until this printing technique became popular and the political campaign poster emerged to become a characteristic feature first of presidential campaigning, then of campaigning in general. While, for example, in France and Germany posters were already produced in the 19th century, those two countries were then still lacking the mass audiences at which political posters were targeted. Thus, the origin of the modern printed election poster is the U.S. presidential campaign. Four phases of the presidential campaign poster can be distinguished:

The Experimental Phase of U.S. Electoral Posters (1828–1840)

Elections and electioneering already existed in colonial America. Candidates for political offices used

to solicit votes by providing the few eligible voters with a barbecue and, even more important, booze for free. The decades after independence showed marginal differences in colonial electioneering techniques. It was only during the 1820s that a larger enfranchisement of white male voters took place, and thus anonymous audiences had to be convinced of voting for the respective candidates. In many ways, running for office then could not be compared with today's campaigns. In the absence of visual and other means of entertainment, political campaigns were a spectacle that drew large crowds. Until the advent of the so-called Jacksonian democracy, termed after Democratic candidate and later President Andrew Jackson, most of the electioneering was direct oral communication involving long speeches. Andrew Jackson was the first political candidate who, in 1828, was also campaigning with visual reproductions of his portrait. In the early 19th century, when parties were still in formation and most political communication happened either orally or in writing, few people knew what the presidential candidate looked like. But opposition against Andrew Jackson was strong and the first poster-like print products—the Coffin Handbills scandalizing Andrew Jackson's military past and his alleged responsibility for the shooting of soldiers, who were symbolized by the coffins depicted on the broadside—could count as the first attack visuals in U.S. campaigning. This was in 1828. At that time the majority of the available woodcuts and etchings were limited in edition, and campaigns were local events that were lacking any centralized planning. This changed with the "Log Cabin and Hard Cider Campaign" of Whig presidential candidate William Henry Harrison in 1840. Trinkets and memorabilia were produced in large numbers, and many images helped to promote the myth of the wealthy plantation owner as a simple and hardworking farmer who grew up in a log cabin, drinking hard cider, and defending the interests of the common man. While campaign structures started to get organized and campaigning turned into a mass phenomenon with torchlight parades, marching bands, and an abundance of campaign memorabilia, the true heyday for campaign posters was yet to come, in the following 2 decades.

The Commercialization of the U.S. Campaign Poster Production (1844–1880)

While nowadays political posters and other campaign items are usually commissioned by the respective campaign, and in Europe by the political parties running campaigns, the invention of candidate portraits in poster format was owed to the commercial genius of America's early lithographers. Lithography as a trade blossomed in the 1840s and 1850s and kept its momentum until the end of the century, when color lithography, so-called chromolithographs were fashionable. Around 1860, a total of 60 operating firms employing 800 people were registered in the United States. Twenty years later the census of 1880 showed an increase to 167 lithography firms, employing a total of 4,332 people and a production volume of $6,912,338. The business kept growing, and toward the end of the 19th century, 700 lithograph companies were registered, with a total labor force of about 8,000 and a turnover of about $20 million annually. Given those figures, it comes as no surprise that in the 1840s small lithographic firms like the New York–based Currier & Ives were also offering political posters. From the perspective of 20th-century campaigning, where the differentiation of candidates is crucial, the similarities of opposing candidates' posters is surprising. For example, the only differences between the posters for the Whig presidential candidate Henry Clay and the competing Democratic candidate James K. Polk are the portraits and the accompanying names and slogans. The rest of the poster, including an American eagle, flags, floral ornaments and framing curtains, are identical. This was typical for the commercial period of the electoral poster, since these posters were meant to be sold by peddlers at very low price. The most expensive part of the poster production was the original design of the poster prepared by an artist. In presidential campaigns, those designs could be used twice by just exchanging the medallion-shaped portraits of the candidates, thus reduce production costs. These early campaign posters were meant to be posted indoors—in saloons, at the sheriff's office, and by the large partisan audience at home above the fireplace.

Mass Printing, Partisanship, and the U.S. Campaign Poster (1884–1948)

At the turn of the 19th century, the printing trade had reached its peak, and the professionalization of presidential campaigning had led to a reversal of the former commercial production structures of posters into commissioned products with distinct iconographic programs promoting both the candidate and the Republican or Democratic party symbols. These colorful posters had a larger format and were no

longer meant for private display, but for adorning party rallies, work spaces, and public billboards, as well as street parades. The New Deal campaigns of Franklin D. Roosevelt employed artists such as Ben Shahn, who had formerly been working in the Work Progress Administration (WPA), to design posters and billboards for his campaign.

TV Commercials Take Over the Functions of Posters (1952–Present)

With the introduction of television commercials for Dwight D. Eisenhower's first presidential bid in 1952, posters became first old-fashioned, then too costly, and finally obsolete in modern U.S. campaigning. Television advertisements had many advantages. They provided a national reach at comparatively low costs, and they could convey more information in a short period of time. Still, the poster tradition lives on. Stereotypes of presidential candidates were long established in political posters before electronic communication was available. Thus, the U.S. presidential campaign poster can be termed the legitimate predecessors of contemporary TV and Internet commercials. The medium has changed, but the political messages vary only marginally, as can be demonstrated by the nine following types of visual campaign strategies, most of which are still applied in 21st-century campaigning.

Typology of U.S. Presidential Campaign Posters

A total of nine types of visual strategies in U.S. presidential campaigning can be distinguished. The first five strategies pertain to the candidate's personality, the other four to the issues advocated:

1. Strategy of silence
2. Hero strategy
3. Ancestor strategy
4. Common san strategy
5. Family strategy
6. Educational strategy
7. Negative strategy
8. Emotional strategy
9. Economic strategy

The *strategy of silence* is mostly used by presidents in office during their reelection campaigns. Presidents are usually portrayed in profile and from an angle below so that the distance between the president and ordinary people is implicit. A pictorial silence strategy was employed by Presidents Abraham Lincoln, William McKinley, and Ronald Reagan during their reelection campaigns. The *hero strategy* also tries to emphasize the distance and thus the authority of the candidate by focussing on his heroic war record, which is usually accompanied by an *ancestor strategy*, pointing out the predecessors in office that the candidate likes to be associated with. Contrary to those honorable and distant strategies, both the *common man strategy* and the *family strategy* aim at pointing to the humble origins of presidential candidates, trying to elicit identification and personal liking in the beholder of those images. The main purpose of these five personality strategies is to establish name recognition of the person, his or her face and looks, and the party and ideas the candidate stands for.

Of the four issue strategies, *educational campaigning* was prominent at the end of the 19th century, when whole platforms were printed in enormous numbers and the electorate preferred to read on the issues rather than being entertained with spectacles focussing on personality. The other three issue strategies are a staple of all presidential campaigns, the *negative* or *attack strategy* being the most notorious of the later 20th century. *Emotional campaigning* is not per se negative; it tries to establish a direct emotional link between the electorate and the candidate through strong visual symbols, while the *economic strategy* focuses on topics that have a direct impact on the financial and economic situation of the electorate. Posters like the colorful chromolithographs for William McKinley's 1900 gold standard campaign, rebutted by his Democratic opponent William Jennings Bryan, who favored the silver standard, used powerful visuals to communicate their differing political standpoints. This tradition is continued in the United States in the form of televised political commercials.

Campaign Posters in Germany and France

In Germany, to this day, publicly advertised billboards and posters illustrate the election campaign. Campaign posters still rank high in the mix of paid media used by German parties to communicate with

the electorate. Although a slight decline in the importance of posters can be observed when comparing the campaigns 1998 and 2002, posters still featured second on the list of most important campaign communication tools, beaten only by party conventions in 1998 and by the then-newly introduced *TV-Duelle* ("television debates") in 2002. Since in the German public broadcasting system, television commercials of parties running in the general election are limited according to party size, but have to be aired for free (only on the private television channels does airtime have to be paid), TV ads are not dominating the German campaign communication and have not yet replaced the posters. Due to the electoral system in a parliamentary democracy, parties, not candidates, commission the posters and control the campaigns. The parties' logos as well as the party chairmen and chairwomen dominate the posters. But "Americanization" in terms of emotional and personality-oriented campaigning has left an imprint on German campaigns. Despite the fact that the German chancellor is elected by the German Parliament and not directly by the voting public, the two competing parties' candidates for the chancellor's office—the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the center-left Social Democrats (SPD)—dominate the election posters. Another reason for the domination of personality images over policy issues on the poster is the limited time that the audience has for grasping the poster's meaning.

The colorful French tradition of political campaign was abruptly curbed by the so-called *Loi Rocard* in 1990, a law titled after then-French Prime Minister Michel Rocard that banned all forms of political advertising within the 3 months preceding an election, expressively including newspaper advertisements and commercial posters. The only possibility for displaying a poster in public during election time is in designated poster areas in the immediate vicinity of polling stations. Elaborate billboard campaigns like the one that brought President Mitterrand to power in 1980—*La Force Tranquille* (The "quiet strength"), drafted after the image of U.S. actor John Wayne—belong to the past. Thus, in contemporary French campaigning, posters no longer play a significant role.

Propaganda and Protest Posters

The 20th century, and particularly the two World Wars and the following Cold War, were the heyday of political posters. Posters were a crucial strategic tool of war propaganda on all sides. Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and in China perfected large billboard campaigns that were spread over vast territories, propagating the communist model of society.

Contemporary usage of political posters is, with few exceptions, concentrated outside of the Western and the developed world. For example, the use of posters of religious leaders, of victims of violence, and of terrorist "martyrs" in public rallies and demonstrations in the Near and Middle East is a scarcely researched topic. Additionally, in many non-Western countries election posters still play an important role that requires further investigation.

Posters are typically displayed in public, and the passers-by, or rather the drivers-by, have a very small amount of time in which to grasp the poster's visual message. Little is known about the effects and the perception of political posters by the audience. An experimental study using dummy posters of political candidates in a simulated German campaign found that the displayed candidates were perceived as *either* being competent *or* as being likeable. This incompatibility of inferred meanings on candidates' images is supported by a more recent experimental study on U.S. congressional candidates that did not, however, use poster displays.

Marion G. Müller

See also Americanization; American-Style Campaigning; *Candidates and Their Images*; Electoral Systems; Image, Political; Political Advertising; Presidential Communication; Willie Horton Ad

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PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, THE

In *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1956), one of sociologist Erving Goffman's earliest works, he uses the imagery of the theater as an analogy to everyday life in order to portray the importance of human interaction in the production of self-identity and self-design. Ideas found in the book follow the symbolic interactionist tradition in general—that all reality is socially constructed. Goffman sees the individual self as a product of the various means by which it is produced, maintained, and constrained through interaction with others who both create and threaten it. Thus, people do not merely act for the sake of action; rather, all actions are social performances with the aim of not only achieving the inherent purposes of the action itself but also of giving and maintaining certain impressions to others.

Goffman outlines several techniques people employ in order to manage these social performances: the selection of a stage or backstage (the physical setting), the actor's personal appearance and mannerisms, dramatic actions directed by certain props, idealistic representations, misrepresentations, and mystifications. The actor is also an audience for his viewers' play, even while he is being watched by the audience. The involved parties are audience members and performers simultaneously, with an agreed-upon definition of the situation. Goffman acknowledges that when the accepted definition of a situation has been discredited, some or all of the actors may pretend that nothing has changed if they find this advantageous. Goffman claims that this type of artificial, willed credulity happens on every level of social organization, from top to bottom. To Goffman, there exists no pure reality or pure contrivance, but rather all actions take place within a liminal state between reality and contrivance.

Goffman's concept of the presentation of self in everyday life is recognized as a contribution both to systematic sociological theory and to an understanding of human consciousness. It is representative of the dramaturgical model in the humanities and social sciences developed by Kenneth Burke, Victor Turner, and Goffman during the mid-20th century. This model, which uses the notion of performance as an approach to understanding the self and society, can be seen in Burke's "dramatistic approach," Turner's concept of "social drama," and Goffman's "dramaturgical" approach to everyday life through interaction models. Goffman's concept contributed greatly to the theory of social constructionism outlined by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann in their seminal 1966 book, *The Social Construction of Reality.*

The dramaturgical model has spread to many intellectual fields or disciplines through the late 20th and early 21st centuries. From this perspective, politics, for example, can be seen as a form of symbolic action, as spectacle or as "the performance of power."

Janis Teruggi Page

See also Dramatistic Approaches to Political Communication; Videostyle

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PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION

Presidential communication refers to the means for shaping and mobilizing varied publics and is a primary tool used by presidents in their attempts to implement policy objectives. Communicative acts are called into play by exigencies, problems for which persuasion can affect potential outcomes.

More narrowly, a rhetorical perspective on presidential communication attends to the social construction of meanings; the intersection of message, audience, and context, where meaning is layered and multivocal, contingent and negotiated. The president offers recommendations and directives, and, perhaps more important, tenders worldviews, values, and moral and ethical direction. The president's communication, in conjunction with other actors including the media, shapes the context in which discussion, potential solutions, and evaluation are understood. Exercise of rhetorical choice is often addressed as agenda setting, framing, priming, and cuing.

Researchers employing a communicative lens see the presidency as principally a rhetorical or symbolic institution. The presidency is constituted not only by institutional authority but also by public communication undertaken in a variety of modes, traditions, and contexts. Investigation from this perspective employs principles of communication theory and criticism, examining situation, audience, speaker's character, arrangement, style, ideas, motives, argument, and delivery.

Presidents believe that public support aids their ability to govern, to influence Congress, and to have weight in the international arena. "Political capital" can be cashed in but must first be earned, largely through communicative efforts. To that end they communicate more often, to innumerable audiences, using increasingly diverse modes of transmission via scores of official and unofficial messages and for a variety of reasons.

Presidents must close fissures of political life; legitimize their policies, principles, passions, and patronage. They must define a country, its nationhood and values, articulate the common good, and be credible on the basis of their own character. Finally, the president must get things done, enact policy, and praise collective enterprise.

The White House is increasingly the political epicenter for domestic and international audiences. The president is expected to "be all things to all people" and becomes symbolically "interpreter-in-chief," "celebrity-in-chief," and according to some, "schemer-in-chief." Every word, every movement, every occasion—even the lack of communication—are potentially persuasive. The president's communication is parsed, amplified, scrutinize, used, and misused by a host of audiences, many of whom are hostile.

The discussion of presidential communication here examines speechmaking and "going public," mainly from a rhetorical viewpoint, and then considers effects, strategies, genre, venues, formal structures, and non-speaking modes more generally. The discussion is limited to communication regarding governance; topics associated with campaigning are considered under other topics in this volume.

Rhetorical Presidency/ Presidential Rhetoric

Scholars have observed the emergence of the "rhetorical presidency"—a development argued to be antithetical to the Constitution—at the turn of the century. Rather than carrying out the traditional managerial duties enumerated in the Constitution, the office has been transformed by "going public." *Going public* refers to the president appealing directly to the people for support, bypassing the media or the Congress. Theodore Roosevelt's concept of using the "bully pulpit" to increase the power of the presidency through popular support has come to symbolize the phenomena.

Political scholar Jeffrey K. Tulis argues the transition to the modern rhetorical presidency occurred in the period of Theodore Roosevelt through that of Woodrow Wilson, who legitimated it with a theory of governance that stressed the motive force of the president in American politics. Nineteenth-century presidents, Tulis observes, governed more by written communication to the other branches of government rather than the oral tradition that characterizes modern presidents.

Some argue the turn to public persuasion necessarily evolved as presidents sought to achieving workable leadership, while others lament declining eloquence and presidential discourse likened to "empty rhetoric." Others, primarily communication scholars, contend that there has never been a

nonrhetorical period, but rather simply differences in the mode of presentation.

These scholars see the power of presidency, from the beginning of the Republic, as emanating from their own authorship in creating the presidency. The case is presented that presidential communication exhibits more concordant structures, conventions, and values than differences and that the strategy of "going public" is as old as the Republic. George Washington used newspapers to direct public opinion, not unlike current practice.

Research Traditions

What constitutes presidential rhetoric has accelerated in the past 3 decades, as scholars approach expanded venues. Traditionally, communication research focused on criticism of single presidential speeches, movements and genres of presidential speeches. Continuing in the public address tradition, rhetorician/historian scholars have ushered in a renaissance of interest in past presidents, examining historical cases of presidential discourse.

A series of books have examined a single speech, bringing into new perspective the invention process of conceiving and executing influential speeches. These include works on Lincoln's Gettysburg Address and second Inaugural; Jefferson's, Kennedy's, and Franklin D. Roosevelt's (FDR) Inaugurals; Lyndon Johnson's Voting Rights Address; and Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace. Distinct historical eras studied include President Johnson's' War on Poverty, Dwight D. Eisenhower's Cold War efforts, and movements like the Nuclear Freeze campaign. More recently, rhetorical eras and persuasion campaigns have found extended study including Woodrow Wilson's campaign for the League of Nations, Kennedy's Bay of Pigs, and some heretofore forgotten presidents, in particular Herbert Hoover and William McKinley. Additionally, numerous book-length works with rhetorical compass have addressed civil rights, economics, environment, leadership, moral rhetoric, national identity, and war and peace.

Communicative Influence

Efforts to trace the effects of presidential communication and in particular efforts on behalf of specific legislative initiative have found small effects, seemingly mitigated in the blur of ongoing events. Yet few would go as far as to argue that presidential messages make *no* difference. Certainly specific efforts impact political realities, as when Truman initiated and moved public opinion on aid to Greece and Turkey, redefining the limits of the Cold War containment. Assessing presidents' ability to change hearts and minds can be seen as case-by-case success, such as Johnson and the Civil Rights Act, or failure, as when Bill Clinton's proposals emboldened opposition to his gays in the military initiative. Even when the effects are judged modest when measured by public opinion or congressional votes, impacts can become more generalized within the larger political milieu.

Presidential attempts to configure the discussion of policy or national character operate within firm parameters. Events and prevailing public mood, political enemies and competing storylines seek to influence the same eventualities. Presidential messages necessarily function in a mediated environment; an ever-expending milieu of traditional media (newspapers, radio, television), complete with 24/7 news cycles and electronic communication unavailable a decade ago. The conventional media are increasingly operating within a context restricted by prevailing media narratives, driven by conflict and convenience.

Presidential communication is most often presented as directing and stimulating political response. Communication, however, also has the function of reinforcing political institutions and values, or as Murray Edelman counseled, symbolic constructions often induce quiescence.

Speeches and Going Public

Presidential speeches and pronouncements remain primary modes of modifying public opinion and congressional action. Speeches are isolated following for the reasons that they dominate scholarship and are perceptually the connection between presidents and the public. Additional modes of presidential communication are addressed later in this entry.

Presidents must *speak* to perform their constitutional duties, stipulated or not. Roderick P. Hart's research found that presidents, with each passing administration, speak more. Policy speeches on single topics can materially influence public opinion, yet speech effects are often short-lived, with little discernable influence. The tenure of a president is strewn with long forgotten speeches on long forgotten topics. For example, several presidents have verbally fought the "War on Drugs" but arguably have achieved more anxiety than results. Presidential popularity seems to

interact with most arenas addressed, with popular presidents having more influence on public action and congressional compliance.

Presidents give speeches on nearly every subject imaginable, ranging from welcoming sports teams to the White House to world-changing events, such as John F. Kennedy's and Ronald Reagan's speeches at the Berlin Wall. Presidents tend to speak to very few specific legislative initiatives, generally speak positively about bills under consideration, and show more interest on legislation enacting their own initiatives. Hostile congressional makeup also increases the incentive to go over the heads of Congress and appeal directly to the American people. The choice to not speak on legislation can also serve not to stir opposition or risk prestige on issues that have a life of their own or are unlikely to prevail even with presidential intervention.

Presidents have, since Richard Nixon, increasingly spoken about the economy, and in more optimistic terms. They have assumed the mantle for economic viability, and by the creation of economic expectations create material impact on economic performance. Electoral success is associated with the economy's performance, which may in part account for the more attention it receives in election years. Positive economic talk often fails as well, as with President Gerald Ford's ill-fated Whip Inflation Now (WIN) campaign or Jimmy Carter's moral calling to repair the spirit of "malaise."

Foreign policy speeches are important facets of every presidency. Teddy Roosevelt's diplomatic maxim was to "speak softly and carry a big stick," and he maintained that a chief executive must be willing to use force when necessary while practicing the art of persuasion. In 1907, Theodore Roosevelt chose to send the "Great White Fleet" on a 14-month world tour over the objections of Congress and media. The expedition created a *cause célèbre* in support of "world peace," enlisting public opinion and in so doing silencing lawmakers and editors.

Focusing public attention is also to divert public attention. Most presidents use force in public affairs and are from time to time accused of diverting public attention from domestic problems or other foreign policies (for example, Reagan's Granada "rescue mission"). Using foreign policy to distract achieved wide public awareness with the 1997 movie *Wag the Dog,* in which a Washington spin doctor distracts the electorate from a presidential sex scandal by hiring a Hollywood producer to fake a war. The realities are less dramatic than the movies, but presidents do attempt to "change the topic." Nixon's emphasis on foreign policy during the Watergate scandals or Clinton's speeches from Africa during the Lewinsky scandal seems suspect. Regardless of the merits of these examples, critics are always prepared to offer the accusation of presidential failure to address the "relevant" topics. Such criticism invites questioning of presidential motives. In the arena of foreign policy, presidents may choose to "go private" by conducting portions of foreign policy out of the public spotlight. Engaging the public raises the stakes, creating public demand that may be unpredictable over time, and may have small payoffs in terms of national security or electoral favor.

Communicative Strategies

Rhetorical choices by the president can be seen as instrumental responses to immediate exigencies, the balancing of competing demands, multiple audiences, and future considerations. The president's rhetoric responds to events, as with George W. Bush and the attacks of September 11, 2001, but speeches also reframe the very meaning of events, as with FDR's 1933 response to the Depression, "We have nothing to fear but fear itself."

Strategies vary from calculated ambiguity, as with apologia of self-defense (Nixon's Watergate defense), to focused form (Clinton's collective atonement for the Tuskegee, Alabama, syphilis experiment). Several rhetorical forms are apparent in presidential communication, each with attendant qualities and relative effects on the political process. Exemplars include the used of *Jeremiad,* whereby presidents chastise the public for breaking moral covenants that can be repaired only through conforming to proper and ethical behavior by convergence with commends of providence (e.g., Lincoln's Gettysburg Address). Presidents are storytellers, who recount the past in ways that celebrate and marginalize particular people and events.

History/Memory/Narrative

Rhetorical choice can be understood as situated in larger historical traditions, recruiting the conditions, styles, and cultural resonance to persuade. Collective memory presumes selective appropriation and is malleable, pieced together like a mosaic. For example, presidents since the time of Martin Luther King, Jr., have appropriated his memory in service of dissimilar Civil Rights agendas.

Presidents often evoke former presidents and public figures to establish identification with personages and purposes. William Clinton's memorable 1993 Memphis speech to black ministers echoed the representational black church, emulating Martin Luther King's last speech. "If Martin Luther King were to reappear by my side today and give us a report card on the last 25 years, what would he say? 'You did a good job,' he would say. . . . 'But,' he would say, 'I did not live and die to see the American family destroyed.'" Lyndon Johnson petitioned not only persons but the Emancipation Proclamation, the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and even emblematic song—"We Shall Overcome"—to recruit shared moral rightness for the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

Definition/Transcendence

Presidents often emerge as the chief definer of situations. The act of naming invites transformation and transcendence, moving from one interpretation to another way of thinking. For example, President Reagan recast Marine deaths in Lebanon as a tragedy rather than a crisis, to precipitate withdrawal not escalation. George W. Bush's attempts to (re)define the War on Terror asked for acquiescence based on the nature of the enemy. In a larger sense, the White House recognizes who is included and excluded, who is up and down, visible and imperceptible. The ability to define chiefly favors the institutional and the known.

Trends

Several scholars have traced changed presidential talk, producing useful insights. For example, Roderick Hart employs his DICTION program to compare a 20,000-item sample to examine language uses across a series of variables. Presidential language, he suggests, varies by (a) *optimism:* language endorsing positive entailments; (b) *activity:* language of movement, changes, implementation; (c) *realism:* tangible language, immediate; (d) *commonality:* language utilizing agreed-upon values; and (e) *certainty:* resolute and totalistic language. The latter, for example, is found to have declined as political demands moderate presidential speech, but is reversed for foreign engagements (George W. Bush being the exception).

Also, political scientist Elvin T. Lim found presidents, in their inaugural and State of the Union speeches, to be more (a) *anti-intellectual:* less contemplative, more formal; (b) *abstract:* religious, poetic, and idealistic references; (c) *assertive:* confident, realistic, powerful; (d) *democratic:* inclusive, egalitarian, people oriented; and (e) *conversational:* intimate, trust based, anecdotal.

Customary Communicative Form

Presidents are expected to honor certain rhetorical traditions when they address the public. Karlyn K. Campbell and Kathleen H. Jamieson in their seminal work, *Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance* (1990), examine the situation, style, and substance that cohere to reoccurring speech occasions. The study of genre has grown beyond the categories classified by Campbell and Jamieson, drawing out understanding of sermon, eulogy, war and prophetic speech, conspiracy and moral suasion.

Inaugural

The inaugural address is a hybrid with deliberative and ceremonial aspects: a speech that reunites a politically divided country, previews the policy agenda for the new president's term in a general way, affirms cultural beliefs, situates the launching of a presidency within a historical context, recruits nostalgic strains, and establishes legitimacy. Presidents routinely describe American ideals in terms of civil religious themes; constituting the American people as "God's chosen people." The language is comparatively elevated. In the 21st century they have dropped in length, and the language has been make simpler, inviting identification with the "people." Symbols of unity increasingly ground the speech.

Some presidents have also used the inaugural address to structure an ambiguous situation to their advantage. One thinks of Thomas Jefferson in 1801 ("We are all republicans, we are all federalists") and Abraham Lincoln in 1865 ("With malice toward none, with charity for all"). Sometimes a phrase enters the cultural lexicon instructing what it means to be a citizen, as with John Kennedy's 1961 address ("Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country").

State of the Union

The "Annual Message," the only communication constitutionally required of the president, moved from

a speech to a written report delivered to and read to Congress when Jefferson thought it too regal. The tradition of the president delivering the message in person was revived by Woodrow Wilson, a move designed to assert executive power in the face of strong congressional prerogative. The innovative use of the State of the Union address as legislative agenda is of more recent origin. The State of the Union traditionally reassures that problems are solvable.

Farewell Address

Farewell addresses have commanded less attention but continue as a president's parting statements. As a rhetorical form, the speech places the administration's accomplishment in a historical context, presenting a prospective legacy consistent with presidential character and events. These speeches have a presumed honesty, imbued with the wisdom that can only come by grappling with the nation's fortune. Farewell addresses seems to have less staying power than the hopeful beginnings of administration unless they are appropriated by subsequent generations as guidance. Eisenhower's admonishment that "we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence . . . by the military-industrial complex" or Washington's reproach not to "entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition . . ." resonated in later political fare.

War Rhetoric

Presidents routinely celebrate peace and the peaceful nature of the American character, yet nearly all generations have been summoned by presidents to pursue wars; from the Revolution to the War on Terror there have been more than a dozen extended encounters as well as numerous military actions. Presidents attempt to rally the nation, exhort sacrifice, justify, unifying the national effort. Framing, (mis)information, metaphorical enrichment, savage imagery, and other critical responses characterize studies of war rhetoric. Generally, war rhetoric is both deliberative (justification, accounts) and epideictic (values, virtues).

Situations of *crisis rhetoric* share characteristics with war rhetoric. Presidents periodically are called upon to address imminent circumstances, acknowledging or amplifying frames for understanding, calling for action in some cases, as with war, or calm, as with natural disasters. Largely it falls to the president to define a crisis, resulting in diversion or focus of national responsibility, values, and resolve.

Related is the president's role of "national mourner" who must regularly comment on the passing of notable figures and more visibly and dramatically respond in the aftermath of tragic circumstance. The occasions are used to celebrate shared values, lessen uncertainty, and restore confidence. The *moment* calls for a collective response, and only the president speaks for "the people." Strategies typically include continuance and on occasion reformulation of national character and mission. Reagan postponed his State of the Union address to poetically eulogize the *Challenger* crew who "slipped the surly bonds of earth" to "touch the face of God." He also addressed the policy implications of continuing American's space program. Bill Clinton's speech following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 reassured, "You have lost too much, but you have not lost everything. And you have certainly not lost America. . . ."

Structures of Presidential Communication

Press Apparatus

The president has at his disposal an impressive array of communication outlets, ranging from press operations at each administrative unit (e.g., State Department's Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs) to several units operating out of the White House, including foreign (the Office of Global Communication, which amplifies U.S. policy), and several offices focused on domestic policy. The most visible communication link is the press secretary, who briefs and coordinates access for the White House Press Corps, including schedules and timely responses to unfolding news and updates on what is happening with government operations. The press secretary's work is often contentious exchanges with senior and seasoned quasi-permanent press representatives.

Press Conferences

There is a long tradition of presidents standing "exposed" before the press. FDR's regularity and John Kennedy's ease during press conferences remain prototypes of the practice. Research has focused on the conditions under which press conferences are called, their growth and institutionalization, their increasingly public character, and the declining frequency with which they are held.

Speechwriting

Presidents are often portrayed as marionettes of their speechwriters, or as with President Reagan, "merely" skilled actors. Reagan's considerable influence in constructing his addresses has emerged in later scholarship, just as other presidents have been found to retain authorship of their messages, contributing in design, purpose, and prose. Even when lacking specific authorship, they rightly assume possession and responsibility for "their words." The process is often collaborative, with speechwriters being more policy contributors than procurers of adornment. The practice of seeking contributions in preparing speeches goes back to the beginning of the Republic. Even Lincoln, rightly touted as the author of his most famous speeches, nonetheless passed around drafts of speeches and often implemented the counsel of others. Input is not always reserved to the administration.

Venues

Newspapers

From 1800 to 1860, presidents often spoke through newspapers that served as the semi-official voices of the administration. Before that period, Federalists financed the *Federal Gazette of the United States,* beginning in 1789. Jefferson's "campaign" was bolstered by the *Aurora,* published in Philadelphia and distributed nationally, and the administration's exponent was the Washington-based *National Intelligencer.* Overtly partisan press prospered in the years that followed. Newspapers continue to be influential in interpreting, leading, and critiquing presidential communication, but in the past century have become less directly the voices of the administration.

Radio

In 1924, the Democratic Party broadcast their national party convention, gavel to gavel, from New York City on radio before nominating Al Smith. The use of radio became a formidable political tool when Franklin D. Roosevelt launched his "Fireside Chats," noted for their sense of "intimacy," in March 1933. FDR's address to the joint session of Congress, declaring war against Japan following Pearl Harbor, moved a stunned nation gathered around their radios. Other presidents made use of radio to establish resolve, as with the articulation of the Truman Doctrine before a joint session of Congress in 1947. In recent times, presidents beginning with Ronald Reagan each week air a short radio addresses. The audiences for these speeches seem to not be citizens as much as they are aimed at subsets of supporters, opinion leaders, and the media, their role more akin to agenda setting than persuasion.

Televised Addresses

The direct television address is often seen as the president's most powerful means of going public, bypassing other political actors and unfettered by the media's interpretive ability. Studies indicate modest effects from televised addresses, often in the range of 2%, and these opinion shifts are typically short term. Of course, the president may not be seeking to move general public opinion but may be speaking to a particular audience, fulfilling political roles, or setting the stage for other persuasive efforts. Televised appearances are less likely to be carried by the largest networks, but do reach audiences through cable news outlets and C-SPAN. Formal presidential addresses of import command full television coverage, as do speeches occasioned by crisis.

Internet

Presidents increasingly use the full range of "new media" and are, in turn, constrained by them. Clinton's White House first made heavy use of Internet communication to broadcast their message and to distribute the president's speeches. The role of the Internet is unfolding at a mind-boggling rapidity. Official presidential communications of all classifications are available online, as are podcasts and Webcasts of most speeches and informal remarks. The Internet and Web pages have also provided critics venues to mount counter-persuasion to presidential initiative and fan the flames of scandal. Going over the heads of media and Congress to the people is increasingly subject to ad hoc corrective information and organized grassroots opposition.

Local Speeches

Presidents often communicate in local markets aimed at influencing national stories, but also to avert the national spotlight. Local coverage in state media markets, town halls, and newspapers engender more

favorable press. They are designed to recognize problems while not overpromising and recognize group solidarity while building a national identity. Local audiences are praised in a way that ingratiates the president with his audience.

Often the president travels around the nation to punctuate policy initiatives, as has become the custom following State of the Union addresses. Presidents in recent administrations average around 60 trips a year in support of legislation, performing party leader functions, and in support of electoral contenders. Research indicates only slight effects from these trips, but such efforts are often embedded in larger persuasive campaigns.

Written Communication

The president has at his disposal a series of "official" written communications, many of which are formally posted in the Federal Registrar and are informally offered electronically by the White House press office. Most of these instruments establish policy and many have the force of law, but they also contain persuasive aspects.

Proclamations

Proclamations are issued for commemorative occasions and congressionally mandated observances; highlighting of days, weeks, and months set aside for recognition. In 1789 George Washington issued the first proclamation establishing the Thanksgiving holiday. Many proclamations are epidictic in nature. George W. Bush issues about 110 proclamations each year. They are often used to characterize the national character, as with "Loyalty Day," on which Bush observed, "As Americans, we work to preserve the freedom declared by our Founding Fathers, defended by generations, and granted to every man and woman on Earth by the Almighty," thus invoking the founders, religion, and ideological posture all in the opening sentence.

Executive Orders

Presidents in the 19th century signed orders, but the instrument known as the executive order originated with Abraham Lincoln in 1862, establishing the provisional court of Louisiana. Many are implementation instruments, but others carried rhetorical impact that still resonates, as with John Kennedy's establishment of the Peace Corps and Franklin Roosevelt's internment camps in World War II. Executive orders are gradually used more to bypass congressional action.

Signing Statements

Signing statements, starting with James Monroe, are issued when the president signs a bill. Most often they simply comment on legislation. They have become controversial since Ronald Reagan when they are used to "ignore" parts of legislation, arguing the law can only be implemented in ways believed to be constitutional. Critics argue that the proper presidential action is either to veto or execute the laws.

Other Written Methods

Presidents also use a series of official and quasi-official means of notification and means to persuade. These include National Security instruments, regulations, presidential letters, and veto messages. Also Findings are offered, as required by law, to certify compliance with congressional mandates, for example, conditions of foreign assistance or certifications for nations "engaged in terrorist activity."

Nonspeaking Contexts

Increasingly scholars examine presidential communication in contexts beyond traditional spoken and written form. Potentially influential channels are many. The illustrations provided here are not exhaustive, but rather suggestive.

Self-Presentation

Presidents' nonverbal presentation becomes part of their message, and some argue, in an era of constant exposure, an integral aspect of accomplishing practical leadership. The presidents' idiosyncratic manners of speaking are more than fodder for impressionists and political humor; they are integral to interpreting messages, character, and layers of meaning. In many ways the president is always engaged in impression management. Nonverbal traits intersect evaluation of performance, competence, knowledgeability, and more personal dimensions of likeability, trustworthiness, positive regard, and others.

A persistent question accompanying presidential assessment, consciously or unconsciously, asks what

the president is "really like." Auditors unavoidably judge the president's public and backstage dimensions, noting coherence and divergence. Often expressed as degrees of authenticity, judgments are rendered for characterological coherence in which presidents' behavior and words are measured as "ringing true" with lived experience.

Indirect Communication

Presidential often seek to influence through a myriad of indirect channels. Trial balloons, unidentified sources, off-the-record interviews, surrogates, leaks, and other informal channels become expressions of the president, albeit buffered "quasi-official" expressions. They also mask for effect. Indirect modes function to highlight, clarify, correct, mislead, distance, initiate, delay, and divert.

Silence

Noncommunication, often used by the White House, can communicate as much as overt messages. Theorists argue that strategic silence invites assignment of meaning of mystery, uncertainty, passivity, and relinquishment, independent of context. Refusals to engage can be seen as intentional or unintentional, leading to diverse political meanings. The relative importance of issues is signaled by the president choosing to embellish or avoiding giving an issue a political stage.

On occasion presidents can adopt a modified version of silence by refraining from standard political activity and remaining in Washington. The practice, sometimes identified as "the Rose Garden strategy," can signal heightened importance or immediacy of political events. Jimmy Carter adopted a Rose Garden strategy during the Iranian Hostage Crisis in 1980, forgoing reelection travel in deference to solving the calamity. He was eventually forced to abandon the strategy and assume the role of an active candidate.

Space and Place

Presidents inherently use space and place to communicate. The White House is presented as the center of the free world and, more narrowly, the center of U.S. government. The Oval Office becomes ground zero of decisions, the symbol of power and responsibility. Spatial proximity to the president is perceived as power and communicates actual power.

Presidents routinely stage events to provide interpretive contexts for their message. Reagan on Normandy Beach, Nixon walking the Great Wall of China, or Kennedy playing a game of touch football powerfully visualize and frame. The synoptic moment supplements and sometimes replaces the eloquence of a well-crafted speech. Ronald Reagan's 1987 speech in Berlin ("Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!") and Theodore Roosevelt's performative body English indicate the power. Critics argue such "displays" reinforce prevailing power structure, constrain the public sphere, and short-circuit deliberation.

Post-Presidency

For some presidents, their most important rhetorical influence unfolds after office. John Quincy Adams served nearly 2 decades in the House of Representatives (1830–1848), becoming an important antislavery voice in Congress. Adams notably represented the *Amistad* Africans in the Supreme Court of the United States and won repeal of the "gag rule" on citizen antislavery petitions to Congress. William Howard Taft solidified the independent status of the Judiciary, serving 9 years as Chief Justice. Nixon engaged in a redemptive exile, weighing in on foreign policy. Carter's legacy of the "good man" seems less about vindication and more about teaching moral lessons through personal example.

Allan D. Louden

See also Apologia; Argumentation, Political; Fantasy Theme Analysis; Fireside Chats; Inaugural Addresses, Presidential; Language and Politics; Press Conferences; Press Secretary, White House; Radio Addresses; Speeches, Presidential; State of the Union Address

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Press and Politics

The expression "press and politics" is most often used to denote a large and complex set of issues related to the interaction between the political sphere of activity and the media. The term *press* is therefore not only restricted to newspapers. Instead, it encompasses media in general and journalistic media in particular. The fact that the term is still used although not restricted to a particular form of media should be seen as a reflection of the historical fact that newspapers used to be synonymous with journalistic media in general. Until the 1960s, newspapers continued to be the most important source of information for most people, before successively being replaced by television in most advanced countries around the world.

On the most general level, the political sphere includes the political system and all its parts. More specifically, it includes political institutions on a national, regional, or local level, political parties and candidates and their activities, as well as other groups in society that aim to influence policy. The questions related to the interaction between press and politics—between the media and the political sphere—are descriptive and empirical as well as normative and theoretical in their nature.

That being said, even descriptive and empirical research is often accompanied by normative assumptions and underpinnings. This reflects the historical fact that mass circulation newspapers and authoritative politics are both children of the same process of nation building that began in the 17th century. The invention of the printing press in the 15th century was a prerequisite for mass circulation newspapers, but also for mass communication by other means such as pamphlets and books. Such mass communication was necessary for the dispersion of information across larger geographic distances, which, in turn, was necessary for the formation of political movements and the creation of more or less centralized political institutions and hence authoritative politics. When democracy started to replace predemocratic regimes, and political parties started to evolve, this process gained momentum, and the need for communication between rulers and the ruled became acute when competitive elections were introduced.

Originally, in Western countries, newspapers were generally tied either to the government or to political parties and other political movements. In such countries, this was the era of the "partisan press," when newspapers were subordinated to political causes. This was reflected in different ways, such as in ownership, readership, and journalistic content. The underlying reason for aligning with a party could be that owners sympathized with a particular political party. It could also be because the printers required licenses to print and to obtain governmental printing contracts, and these could be provided by the political party in power. Through licensing, subsidies, and sponsorship, political actors could thus exercise power over the press. Through partisan coverage, newspapers could provide support for the political actors who sponsored and supported them. As advertising had not yet developed as a source of income for newspapers, they were dependent on subsidies and sponsorship from the political sphere. This was also before the concepts of journalistic objectivity and impartiality were developed and became widely acknowledged as normative journalistic ideals. This process started in the United States in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. Since then, this journalistic ideal has gained acceptance in democracies around the world, although not always to the same extent or using the same interpretations. There are also differences between countries that belong to different models of media and politics. In some countries, the press in general or at least some mass media is still

partisan, in democracies as well as in semi-democratic and authoritarian countries.

Politics and the press thus have a common history, and both these spheres of activity have always been closely intertwined. Since the political sphere and the media sphere have always been partly independent and partly interdependent, although to varying degrees across space and time, there is a tension between "what is" and "what ought to be" with regards to the proper balance between a politically speaking independent press, on the one hand, and a press subordinated to politics and political needs on the other. The fact that the press can exert considerable power, for example, with regard to agenda setting and the framing of issues, events, and personalities, is another source of tension between press and politics.

A Symbiotic Relationship

The relationship between politics and the press varies across countries depending on historical, cultural, technological, economic, and political circumstances and the structures of each country. However, it is widely acknowledged that the relationship between politics and the press in democratic countries is symbiotic. As long as politics requires a system for communication between those elected for office and the citizenry, and that widely available information is seen as being crucial for the workings of the political system, there is a need for the mass media. Additionally, as long as the media requires to be free and reasonably independent in order to operate, there is a need for democratic governance. Thus, the relationship has been described as a social contract, in which the democratic regime is legally and morally obliged to respect the freedom of speech and of the press, and in which the mass media is morally obliged to provide the information that people need to be free and self-governing, to act as watchdogs against abuse of power and to facilitate public debate and deliberation.

The concept of a social contract between democracy and the press notwithstanding, there is general consensus that freedom of both speech and the press are essential for any political system that describes itself as democratic. The First Amendment to the U.S Constitution is famous for its formulation that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," but laws with a similar meaning form part of the constitutions in other democracies around the world. The degree to which freedom of both speech and the press is respected in different countries is also an important part of the annual and worldwide investigations of the state of democracy conducted by the Freedom House. In fact, freedom of both speech and the press are an essential part of the definition of a democratic regime.

There is less consensus regarding which, if any, obligations the media have in a democracy and which, if any, functions the media must fulfill in order to assist a democracy to work. There are five major explanations for this lack of consensus. First, this is an area in which different countries and regions have different traditions. Second, even though most observers might be in agreement as to what distinguishes a democratic from a nondemocratic regime, they often disagree over issues such as the best electoral system, the role of political parties, and the importance of people being actively involved in politics and civil society, to name just a few examples. Thus, there are different conceptions of what constitutes "the good democracy," and each of these have normative implications for the media in general and for journalism in particular. The third explanation is that there exists several press-political ideologies or theories of the press. Fourth, most major media in most democratic countries are, with the exception of public service media, run as commercial enterprises. As such they are required to make profits, and it might be thought of as being wrong in principal to place any specific legal or moral obligations on the media other than the requirement to follow the same laws that apply to other private enterprises. Fifth, ideas and concepts are not static but dynamic and, hence, change gradually over time through interaction with cultural, sociological, political, technological, and ideological changes.

Four Theories of the Press

Discussions concerning the press and politics have taken place for as long as newspapers and other mass media have been in existence, but it was not until the 1940s that they gained prominence. One reason was that an independent Commission on Freedom of the Press was set up—often referred to as the Hutchins Commission after its chairman Robert M. Hutchins—in the United States in 1942. Their final report was published in 1947 and sparked a major debate, not least because of its conclusion that the freedom of the press was in danger. According to the commission, the freedom of the press is essential to political liberty,

and the press has a fundamental right to its freedom. At the same time, the commission argued that any power capable of protecting freedom is also capable of endangering it. Furthermore, it argued that the press had become a powerful force in society, and that this power rested in the hands of a very few. As such a powerful institution, the press thus had a responsibility not to abuse its power, but was, instead, expected to provide a service that was adequate to the needs of society and to promote the common, rather than the private, good.

A few years later this view was identified as the "Social Responsibility theory" of the press by Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm in the very influential book *Four Theories of the Press*. In their book, they attempted to analyze the philosophical and political rationales that lie behind the different kinds of press that exist around the world, including its origins and development, chief purposes, and essential characteristics. The four theories of the press identified by the authors were Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist-Totalitarian, the two latter treated as developments of the two former.

The essential characteristic of the Authoritarian theory of the press, developed in 16th- and 17th-century England, is that the press should function as an instrument for effecting governmental policies, but it need not be owned by the government. The Soviet Communist-Totalitarian theory differs from the authoritarian theory in the belief that the press must be state owned and closely controlled by the state. The press is perceived and treated as part of the state. The Libertarian theory of the press was adopted in England after the revolution of 1688, and the essential characteristic of this theory is that the press should be as free as possible. Only through total independence can the press fulfill its role as watchdog, checking on the government and acting as an arena for a free debate that will ultimately assist society to discover the truth. In this theory, the press functions as a marketplace of ideas. According to some, however, a totally independent and uncontrolled press might lead to a marketplace of money instead of a marketplace of ideas, as the right to own and use the media resides among those who own the media. Thus, there is a need for socially responsible media, according to the social responsibility theory of the press. If the press does not adopt a socially responsible attitude, the government should thus have some, although limited, means of creating positive incentives or negative sanctions in order to enforce some social responsibility on the part of the press.

What is common to these four theories of the press is that they all recognize the close links between the press and politics. Any theory of the press is partly a theory of the state, and any theory of the state is partly a theory of the press and its proper role and functions in society. The political and the media sphere define and are defined by each other, although not exclusively.

Three Models of Media and Politics

If the four theories of the press are identified mainly on theoretical and philosophical ground, an empirically based account of the relationship between the media and politics was provided by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini at the beginning of the 21st century. Through an analysis of the political systems and media systems in Western democracies, they identified three models of media and politics, each with its own distinctive features: the Liberal, Democratic Corporatist, and the Polarized Pluralist models. These models are also called the North Atlantic, the North/Central European, and the Mediterranean, respectively, in recognition of where they are most prevalent. The most important political system characteristics include patterns of political conflict or consensus, partly related to consensus or majoritarian government, whether individual or organized pluralism predominates, the role of the state and how active it is, how polarized a society is, and the development of rational-legal authority. What is meant by *rational-legal authority* is a form of rule based on adherence to formal and universalistic rules of procedure. The media system characteristics deemed to be most important are the development of the media industry and the strength of the newspaper sector, the degree of political parallelism, which refers to the extent to which the media reflect political and social divisions in society, the degree of journalistic professionalization, and the extent to which the state intervenes in the media system. Together these dimensions interact and shape the relationship between the press and politics. In the Liberal model, the media system is dominated by market mechanisms and commercial media rather than by the state or organized political or social groups. In Polarized Pluralist countries, the media is integrated into party politics, while commercial media

is relatively weak and the state is relatively strong. In Democratic Corporatist countries, commercial media coexist with media more or less strongly tied to organized political and social groups, while the state plays a legally limited but active role.

These three models of media and politics are empirically grounded ideal types. As such, they do not offer exact empirical descriptions. Nevertheless, the United States is said to be a prototypical example of the Liberal model. Similarly, Greece is said to be a prototypical example of the Polarized Pluralist model, whereas Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden are said to be typical examples of the Democratic Corporatist model.

Differences across space and time notwithstanding, the press and politics exist in a complex, interactive and symbiotic relationship, and this is what the expression "press and politics" usually refers to.

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See also Agenda Setting; *Comparing Media Systems; Four Theories of the Press*; Framing; Party Press; Press Freedom; Press Theories

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Press Conferences

A press conference is a formal question-and-answer session between reporters and public officials. The press conference is a media event, designed to give reporters access to a newsworthy public official and official access to the public through media. Although lawyers, celebrities, sports figures, and company CEOs also hold them, political press conferences—especially those given by the president—comprise the bulk of these interactions. Much of what we know about presidential press conference varies by the history of the office and each president's individual preference for holding them.

The presidential press conference is a unique event that combines a prewritten introductory presidential statement with direct questions asked by reporters. Individual presidents set the tone and direction of press conferences with a formal policy or position statement. This allows presidents to communicate directly with the American people. Because the president can use other means to do this, the press conference is more for reporters than the president. Press conferences give the media direct access to the president and give reporters an opportunity to ask specific questions and receive immediate responses from the president. Although reporters ask questions, presidents have enormous influence over the direction and tenor of the press conference. The president calls on members of the media during the question-and-answer portion of the conference and might strategically avoid certain reporters whom he or she knows will ask a difficult or controversial question. George W. Bush famously revealed the predetermined nature of reporter selection in an April 13, 2004, press conference: "Hold on for a minute. . . . I've got some 'must calls,' I'm sorry." Reporters often hint what questions they will ask in daily "gaggle," so the press secretary and other staffers in the Office of the Press Secretary can alert presidents as to which topics are likely to be covered and by whom. Presidents can also announce press conferences just hours before they take place—or schedule them on Saturdays, as Lyndon Johnson did—leaving reporters ill prepared to ask tough and detailed questions.

The press conference is an important conduit for presidential–press relations. Presidents need media to communicate their policy positions to the public. Media need presidents as a reliable source for political news, and presidents' press conferences are often considered newsworthy. The press conference also satisfies a basic requirement that politicians are available to the news media. At the same time, presidents have used the press conference to dictate their policy agendas to the media. It was Franklin Roosevelt who first used the press conference in this way, to encourage reporters to frame their stories in a manner mostly favorable to the president and his policies. The advent of television allowed presidents to use the press conference not only to communicate with and appease media's desire for access to the president but also to speak directly to the American people, whose support is vital to the president in the democracy of the United States. President John F. Kennedy was the first to use the press conference as this vehicle for communicating directly to the American people on live television. Because he set a high standard of presidential performance during press conferences, other presidents, such as Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Ronald Reagan, avoided press conferences and chose other means to publicize their policy positions.

California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (R) and U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) hold a news conference on the docks of Terminal Island in the Port of Los Angeles to talk about the governor's efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and dependence on fossil fuels on February 21, 2007, in Los Angeles, California.

Source: Getty Images.

Even so, presidents do not have discretion simply to ignore the media and not hold press conferences. Doing so may exacerbate an already contentious and adversarial relationship between media and presidents. Initially held irregularly as informal exchanges with President Roosevelt, today, presidents hold formal primetime press conferences in the East Wing of the White House. Presidents may hold other daytime press conferences outside the White House, in the Rose Garden, in the press briefing room, or other locations throughout the White House, or as joint press conferences with foreign dignitaries.

Although less studied than presidential press conferences, other politicians and government officials at the federal, state, and local levels also use press conferences to make statements concerning policy and public safety. Members of Congress use the press conference to raise awareness of an issue, emphasize partisan loyalty, or challenge the positions of the president or legislators from the opposing political party. Upon becoming speaker of the House in 1995, for example, Newt Gingrich held daily, televised press conferences in an effort to wrest control of the policy and political agendas away from President Bill Clinton and lead the media and public according to the agenda of Republican Party leaders in the House of Representatives. Cabinet secretaries use press conferences to announce changes in public policy and take questions from reporters. Governors may use a press conference to explain a state of emergency declaration, while mayors or police chiefs hold them to reassure local citizens in times of crisis, such as natural disasters or local crime waves. Indeed, it is through the press conference that local officials have the greatest access to the public, as they have fewer media resources to make public announcements as frequently as federal officials do.

Ultimately, press conferences are similar in format for all political officials. The presidency dominates discussion of the political press conference, as presidents have the greatest access to the media and are

deemed most newsworthy. Other governmental officials, especially at the state and local levels, are more likely to hold press conferences during times of crisis. Despite these differences, the goal of the press conference is the same for all: convey a message to the media and public while giving reporters access to a source of news.

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See also Congress and the Media; Presidential Communication; *Television in Politics;* Press Secretary, White House

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Press Freedom

In the United States, press freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This right of free speech encompasses both print and electronic media and is designed to ensure that media organizations have the ability to gather and distribute knowledge and ideas without government censorship or restrictions.

The idea of an independent press that is free from government control is embraced as a means to keep the public informed of government activities. The press has long been considered a fourth branch of the government alongside the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In order to maintain the public's interest, media organizations must be able to keep watch over the actions of the government in an unencumbered manner.

Press freedom came to the forefront not long after the printing press was invented and the mass distribution of ideas suddenly became a reality. In England, a royal proclamation required that all publications obtain a license from the monarchy prior to publication. This attempt at licensure of the press was essentially an attempt by the government to censor the content of what was printed. In 1644, John Milton published *Areopagiticia: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of England,* in which he argued for and defended a free press. Milton argued that censorship was unnecessary in a free society and that all points of view should be heard because truth would ultimately prevail. In 1695, licensing laws were abolished in England.

In the United States, during colonial times, the press was censored by the British government. Prior to being printed, newspapers were required to obtain approval from the government. Once government approval was obtained, the newspapers were stamped with an official approval notice. In 1735, a landmark trial occurred in which press freedom was defended. John Peter Zenger was the publisher of the *New York Weekly Journal* and was an outspoken critic of Governor William Cosby of the Province of New York. Cosby accused Zenger of libelous statements and using seditious language. Libelous statements damage an individual's reputation, while seditious statements are considered to encourage revolt against the government. In the trial, the jury did not convict Zenger and therefore established the precedent that if printed material is factual it cannot be considered libelous or seditious.

An essential aspect of free speech rights for the press is that prior restraint by the government is prohibited. In 1931, the Supreme Court ruled in *Near v. Minnesota* that there was a constitutional guaranty of press freedom. In the *Near* case, the Supreme Court asserted that it was in the public's best interest to have a free and unrestrained press than to have government suppression. The Supreme Court argued that instances of press freedom abuses should be dealt with after the fact through established legal procedures rather than through prior restraint.

There are rare exceptions when prior restraint may be allowed, including whenever the following information is involved: (a) information that would interfere with war efforts, (b) information that would incite acts of violence, and (c) information that is defined as obscene. The Supreme Court noted that there was a difference between restrictions that are aimed at the content of the expression versus restrictions aimed at the avenue of the expression. For example, the Supreme Court ruled that time, place, and manner restrictions are permitted. In order for a government action that restricts expression to

be considered content neutral by the courts, the restriction must not be based on personal partiality or personal interpretation. The restriction must be applied equally in all situations.

In 1965, in *Freedman v. Maryland,* the Supreme Court outlined the procedures required for censorship, of obscene material, to be considered constitutional. First, the censor, and not the exhibitor, must prove the material in question is obscene. Second, there must be a process in place for a quick judicial review for the matter. Third, a permanent restraint is permissible only if the courts find the material to be obscene. Obscene material is sexually explicit as defined in the later 1973 *Miller v. California* case.

In 1971, the Supreme Court underscored its earlier ruling prohibiting prior restraint in the case of *New York Times Company v. United States.* This case revolved around an incident in which the Department of Justice attempted to prevent *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* from publishing details of a report about government decision making relating to the Vietnam War. The Department of Justice argued that publication of the report posed a threat to national security. This case became known as the *Pentagon Papers* case. The Supreme Court noted that the government carried a heavy burden of showing justification for prior restraint and sufficient justification had not been met in this case.

Press freedom does not extend to the actual gathering of information for news purposes. The American government perceived news coverage of the Vietnam War as negative. Thus, the government imposed access restrictions on journalists in all wars that have followed the Vietnam War. Unlike in Vietnam, where reporters had the ability to travel without restraint through battlefields, now journalists must be escorted in press pools throughout areas of conflict. This was most noticeable during both Persian Gulf wars.

Press freedom primarily exists in democratic societies. Reporters Without Borders, an international organization, ranks countries based on their freedom of the press. Internationally, countries that rank high in terms of press freedom include Finland, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, and Switzerland, while North Korea, Burma, China, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and Iran rank low. Reporters Without Borders asserts that more than a third of the world's population lives in countries where freedom of the press does not exist.

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See also First Amendment; *Pentagon Papers, The*; Reporters Without Borders; Shield Laws

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Press Law of 1766, Sweden

The Swedish Press Law of 1766 is regarded as the oldest legislation of press freedom. It was passed by the Swedish *Riksdag* (the Parliament) as "His Royal Majesty's Law on freedom of writing and print" on December 2, 1766. It was considered as a basic law, which meant that changes must be decided by identical decisions by two Riksdags. The law abolished the censorship of all printed publications, including those imported from abroad, but excluding those on theological subjects. Further, it guaranteed public access to documents drawn up by government agencies. However, the strong punishments for writing against the state or the king were kept, meaning that control was transferred from the public censor to the publishers.

The background of the Swedish Press Law of 1766 was the weakened power of the king. King Charles XII had died in 1718 leaving no children, and the throne had gone to his sister, who was followed by very weak kings. This meant an increasing importance of Parliament on political development. Even though it still had four chambers—for nobility, clergy, townsmen, and farmers—Parliament had developed two strong parties—"The Hats" and "The Caps"; the latter aimed for liberalization of Swedish society. The intense political debates included a number of printed political pamphlets. This created problems for the public censor, who himself participated in the debates, and meant an increased acceptance of critical publications. Thus,

when censorship was abolished it had already lost most of its power.

In 1770 a new king—Gustaf III—entered the throne. He wanted to restore the power of the king. In 1772 he took dictatorial power, and the status of the 1766 as a basic law was abolished, making it possible for the king himself to make changes in the law. Formally censorship was not reintroduced, but the control of publishers was strengthened, specific rules for the right to publish newspapers were introduced, and punishments for harmful printing became harder.

Gustaf III was assassinated in 1792, and slightly more than a decade later the old dynasty died out. Thus in 1809 a new constitution was passed by Parliament, containing the main principles of the 1766 Press Law, and in 1810 the rules of press freedom and free access to public documents were transferred to their own basic law, where censorship on academic and theological publications was abolished. This law was extended in 1812 with, among other things, principles of editorial responsibility and specific rules for the legal process. Even if the new king, Charles XIV Johan—a former French general—tried to implement an increased press control, the newspapers managed to resist the activities, and in 1842 most of the state control was excluded from the law. In 1949 the law was somewhat revised, but its main principles are still the same as in 1766. In 1992 a similar basic law for radio, television, and film were passed.

Lennart Weibull

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Press Secretary, White House

Leaders are measured by their success in communicating with the public; however, the evaluation of communication has changed dramatically throughout the American presidency. With no paid staff to assist early presidents in their dialogue with reporters, newspapers were awarded government printing contracts to promote programs. In contrast, the modern White House Press Office employs 25 to 50 staffers, depending on the administration. The press secretary leads this office, to speak on behalf of the president across print, broadcast, and Internet channels, issue credentials to journalists, distribute as many as 15 news releases each day, hold televised daily briefings as well as press gaggles (untelevised but on-the-record meetings), and maintain nearly real-time information between the president and the news media. With comments broadcast instantly and globally, the press secretary is the most recognized representative of the executive branch other than the president.

William McKinley was the first president to provide workspace for reporters in the White House. His secretary, George Cortelyou, met daily with reporters on behalf of McKinley and later for Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt sought to make his own news from the "bully pulpit" as well as in meetings with selected reporters, but not every president worked to gain favorable headlines. Press relations were inconsistent in the early 20th century. William Howard Taft abandoned the reporters who came to expect time with Roosevelt and spoke less to the press throughout his presidency. Woodrow Wilson's secretary, Joe Tumulty, returned regularity to meeting with reporters and set the model for what would become the daily briefing.

A career newsman, Warren Harding handled his own press. He offered candid access but kept with tradition not to be quoted. The no-quote rule continued for Calvin Coolidge, who instead became the first unnamed "White House spokesman." As Harding's and Coolidge's secretary of commerce, Hoover was known as a terrific news source. His appreciation for the press carried into his presidency. He was the first president to assign his secretaries—first George Akerson and then Theodore Joslin—with the original, specific duty of press secretary.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt's press secretary Stephen T. Early planned to hold conferences only on the occasion of news events rather than on a schedule. Still, through a series of conferences to trumpet the New Deal, he gained popular celebrity. With Roosevelt, Early served the longest of all press secretaries, whose average tenure is nearly 3 years—long in comparison with other White House staff. The unique demands of the job have encouraged some presidents to appoint friends. Harry Truman selected lifelong friend Charlie Ross. President Jimmy Carter brought his gubernatorial press secretary (Jody Powell) to Washington.

Others opted to appoint news professionals. Dwight D. Eisenhower asked former reporter James C. Hagerty to be his press secretary. During his tenure, Hagerty allowed the first televised press conference.

Technology did the most to change his job, but Hagerty did the most to change presidential communications. He set goals and procedures that would become the work of the White House Communications Office. Hagerty also served as Eisenhower's advance man—traveling internationally to prepare for presidential visits.

Another newsman, Pierre Salinger, served John F. Kennedy and remained on staff for Lyndon Johnson. With Salinger, Kennedy held the first live televised press conferences. Salinger enjoyed a close relationship with both Kennedy and reporters, but that relationship changed with Johnson, who referred to reporters as "spies." Reporters responded with their own cynicism as the Vietnam conflict escalated. Salinger was succeeded by George Reedy, Bill Moyers, and George Christian—all in less than two full terms.

News often emerges just from the triangulation of the press, president, and press secretary. Richard Nixon's press secretary Ronald Ziegler is remembered for calling the Watergate breakin a "third-rate burglary attempt." Gerald Ford's first press secretary, Jerald terHorst, resigned in protest of the pardon of Nixon. Deputy press secretary Larry Speakes (James Brady retained the title of press secretary after being wounded in the 1981 assassination attempt on Ronald Reagan) admitted fabricating statements for Reagan. Mike McCurry faced repeated questions on Bill Clinton's personal life during the Monica Lewinsky scandal. When reporters demanded personal information as never before, McCurry steered clear of internal meetings on the matter so he could fulfill his job without deceiving the press or damaging the president.

The president who met most often with the press in recent years has been George H. W. Bush. Marlin Fitzwater served both Reagan and Bush: Reagan was the "Great Communicator," but Bush was not as effective on television or in formal speeches. However, Bush possessed thorough knowledge of the issues and was comfortable in the briefing room. He met with reporters 280 times in just four years. In a presidency bookended by the first Gulf War and economic recession, Fitzwater and Bush excelled in offering open communication to the press but failed to articulate larger leadership themes.

Those larger themes helped elect Clinton, and his administration made history with the appointment of the first female and youngest press secretary, Dee Dee Myers. Restructuring to place Myers under Communications Director George Stephanopoulos reflected efforts to exercise greater control of information. It is notable as the first time the press secretary did not report directly to the president. The Internet arrived during these years—again changing the timing and delivery of news as Myers was succeeded by McCurry and then Joe Lockhart.

Like those of many who served George W. Bush, Ari Fleischer's tenure as press secretary is remembered for his performance following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Though already televised, the daily briefing gained new audiences and the press secretary gained still new stature. When Bush's approval ratings dropped in his second term, the White House underwent high-ranking staff changes, and Fleischer's successor, Scott McClellan, was among the most visible departures. Tony Snow replaced McClellan. Snow—experienced as a former White House staffer under George H. W. Bush, a well-known broadcast journalist and radio talk show host—is arguably the first press secretary to come to the job with established celebrity status and gravitas.

Nearly 30 individuals have held the title of press secretary since Hoover asked Akerson to meet with reporters. Each has been different in experience, approach, and of course in their response to the events of each presidency. Still, the job's fundamental purpose is unchanged: Press secretaries talk to reporters on behalf of the president.

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See also Press Conferences

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Press Theories

The idea of "press theories" dates from Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm's 1956 book *Four Theories of the Press,* which advanced the thesis

that media systems could be classified in terms of four philosophical orientations: the Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist press theories. Two of these, the Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist theories, are considered to be variations on the other, more basic ones; this framework thus divided media systems into two fundamental categories, understood in terms of the role of the media in relation to the state and the individual: in the Authoritarian model, the media served the state; in the Libertarian model, it served the individual.

Four Theories of the Press has widely been used to classify media systems worldwide, and subsequent authors have often started from its framework and added additional "press theories." Some authors, for example, add "development journalism" as a fifth theory. The notion of development journalism was advocated by many journalists and intellectuals in developing countries during the 1970s as an alternative to dominant Western theories. Development journalism was built around the idea that the primary function of the press was to promote modernization and nation building through education and mobilization of communities; it deemphasized the notions of the press both as a "watchdog" of state power and as a servant of advertisers and consumers. Some have also noted that Northern European social democratic theory deviates from Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm's four categories, since it emphasizes press freedom but includes a strong positive role for the state.

Both of these "fifth" press theories stand apart from Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm's formulation because they rest on conceptions of the media's role that are not built around the opposition between state and individual: the social democratic theory puts greater stress on the tension between the market and the public sphere, and the development communication perspective on the divisions between the global North and South and between dependence and modernization. In the 1960s, American modernization theories also classified media systems into traditional, transitional, and modern based not on the distinction between libertarianism and authoritarianism, but on the degree to which specialized communication institutions had emerged, intensifying social exchange and displacing traditional means of communication tied to structures of kinship and status. Individualism was important in this framework but was not necessarily opposed to the state, which was often seen as a force for modernization.

Four Theories of the Press was attractive to media scholars because it raised the question of the relation between media institutions and the wider societies of which they were a part. The press theories proposed by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm, and others following in their footsteps, however, were normative theories of the press; that is, they were theories about how the press *should* be organized. They were not really empirical models; that is, scholarly theories about how different media systems actually worked They could perhaps most accurately be described as press ideologies, since they were advanced to fight political battles over the role of the press—Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm reinterpreted liberal press theory to help fight the Cold War battles of ideas between the Soviet bloc and the West, for instance, while the advocates of development journalism or more recently of "Asian journalism" developed their ideas to fight the influence of those same liberal theories.

Comparing Media Systems

In recent years, researchers in communication and in comparative politics have begun to think more systematically about how to compare media systems and explain their development and relationships with other social institutions. "Press theories" may enter into this kind of analysis but will not be the center of it as they were in *Four Theories of the Press*. Their centrality in that book was based in part on the premise that philosophical assumptions about human nature, the state and the individual, and the nature of truth underlay the structure of media systems. This conception leaves out factors like the market structure of media industries and the structure of party and interest group competition in the political system.

One of the appeals of the notion of press theories was the idea that it was possible to categorize media systems using a relatively parsimonious set of ideal types that would summarize the main similarities and differences among them. Is it possible to develop a set of models of this sort on the basis of empirical comparative research? Three models that can be used to summarize the distinct patterns of development in the media systems of Western Europe and North America, the "Polarized Pluralist" or "Mediterranean" model, "North/Central European" or "Democratic Corporatist" model, and the "Liberal" or "North Atlantic Model." Several cautions about the use of this type of model should be considered. First, there these are not intended to be universal models. One of the most important problems with the tradition of scholarship that followed from *Four Theories of the Press* was that the effort to fit

all the world's media systems into a small number of models meant that the specificity of most systems was obscured. The three models presented here will no doubt be useful as points of comparison for thinking about media systems in other parts of the world, in part because the countries studied are dominant countries in the world system and their media have had influence worldwide. But they are not intended to be applied mechanically, without modification. Second, Concrete media systems do not fit neatly into these conceptual models Many will be mixed cases or will deviate from the ideal types in important ways. The scholarly function of media system models is not to create a set of pigeonholes with which to categorize particular cases but to understand what patterns of characteristics tend to go together in the development of media systems. When we analyze individual cases, then, we can use those models to think about how and why they conform to or deviate from these patterns. Third, media systems are not homogeneous: not all elements of a media system will reflect the same logic or ideology. In Europe, for example, broadcasting and the press have been organized on very different models, the press characterized by private ownership and "external pluralism"—that is, by a variety of different media outlets reflecting different political tendencies—while broadcasting was organized on the basis of public ownership, internal pluralism, and a principle of "due impartiality" in the coverage of political controversy. Third, media systems are not static. They change over time, and the models we develop need to be understood not as timeless but as historically bound.

The Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model

In the Mediterranean countries of Europe, the press developed as an institution of the worlds of politics and literature rather than of the market. With the exception of France, literacy rates remained low in these countries until the mid-20th century. The newspaper, therefore, developed not as a form of mass culture but as a medium for debate among elites active in politics and high culture, and remains so to a significant degree today, though sports dailies and weekly magazines devoted to celebrities and human interest reporting circulate among wider publics. Because of the political roots of the press, the level of "party press parallelism" or, more generally, "political parallelism" has always been high in this media system: the structure of the media system, that is, tends to reflect the main lines of partisan and ideological division in society. Newspapers and often electronic media as well typically have clear partisan or ideological identities and readerships. This pattern of partisanship and external pluralism is closely related with a history of what political scientist Giovanni Sartori called "polarized pluralism." Because the political systems of these countries have been characterized by a wide spectrum of political parties with sharply differing ideologies, the idea of neutral media standing apart from partisan divisions has never seemed plausible or appealing. Even as media in the Mediterranean countries have become more market oriented in recent years, political partisanship has continued to structure media markets.

The political roots of the press also meant that journalistic professionalism developed later and less strongly in the Mediterranean countries than in Northern Europe or North America. The role of the reporter as a specialized type of communicator—differentiated from the political commentator—developed relatively late, as did codes of ethics distinct to journalism. While many Northern European countries have press councils, which serve as a form of professional self-regulation, the only press council in Southern Europe is in Catalonia. This is related to the fact that rational-legal authority is less deeply rooted in Southern than in Northern Europe, and conceptions of common norms transcending particular ideologies and interests are thus less accepted. A history of instrumentalization of the media, that is, control by outside actors in politics or business, means that the autonomy of journalists has with a few notable exceptions—the French newspaper *Le Monde,* for example—not been strongly developed.

Finally, the Mediterranean model is characterized by a relatively active state intervention in the media system. The state or state-owned companies have often been media owners, for example, and France and Italy have the highest level of press subsidies in Western Europe. At the same time, legal regulation of the media has often been weaker than in Southern than in Northern Europe. Sylvio Berlusconi's television empire in Italy was built during a long period when partisan divisions prevented Italy from passing a new broadcasting law.

The North/Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model

The media system that prevails in Northern and North/Central Europe is interesting from the point of

view of communication theory because it combines elements that have often been assumed to be incompatible. In the first place, this system has combined a strong commercial press with a strong history of what might be called "representational media," media whose primary purpose is to represent a social group or community in the public sphere. These groups have included political parties, trade unions, and churches and religious communities. The combination of these two press traditions produced the highest rate of newspaper readership in the world, as the connection of newspapers with social groups created a culture in which newspaper readership was closely connected with peoples' sense of social identity.

The Democratic Corporatist system also has combined a high degree of political parallelism—a legacy of the representative press—with a high degree of journalistic professionalism. Party newspapers have declined since the 1970s, and the degree of political parallelism has diminished in Northern Europe. But national newspapers do still tend to vary in their political orientations, and the media of Northern Europe still focus fairly strongly on the views of parties and other organized social groups. The Democratic Corporatist system is characterized by relatively high levels of consensus on the distinct norms of journalism as a profession. Press councils, for instance, are more important in this system than in the Liberal or Polarized Pluralist one. Journalists also enjoy relatively strong autonomy. Democratic Corporatism is a form of political organization based on bargaining among organized social groups. One of its characteristics is to combine political pluralism with a high degree of consensus on the rules of the political game, and traditions of rational-legal authority are strong. The media system reflects this same combination of pluralism and consensus.

Finally, the Democratic Corporatist system combines strong protection for press freedom with a relatively strong role of the state. Liberal protections for press freedom developed early in most of these countries. But the state is also seen as having a positive role to play in preserving a plural and open media system, a role that is reflected in press subsidies in many countries and also by particularly strong public broadcasting systems.

The North Atlantic or Liberal System

The Liberal system, which prevails in Britain and former colonies like the United States, Canada, and Ireland, has been theorized more extensively than others. The central characteristic of this system is the strong dominance of commercial media, which relatively early displaced the "representative media" that were more central to media development in Continental Europe. A strong commercial press produced relatively high newspaper circulation, though not as high today as in Northern Continental Europe. It also combined with a consensual political culture to produce a relatively high level of journalistic professionalism.

It is common to speak of an "Anglo-American media model," and in many ways this makes sense. Britain and the United States share a strong commercial press and a form of journalism based on information and storytelling rather than the kind of political analysis and commentary that played a larger role in Continental Europe. There are, however, important differences between the U.S. and British media systems. The United States, first of all, is characterized by a low level of political parallelism: journalistic culture is dominated by the principle of balance or internal pluralism. The same journalistic norm of "due impartiality" applies in British broadcasting. The British press, however, is strongly partisan. The difference is due in part to market structure. American newspapers are local monopoly newspapers, and the United States therefore lacks the external pluralism that characterizes competitive national newspaper markets in Britain or Continental Europe.

The United States and Britain also share a tradition of limited state power, manifested, for example, in the absence of press subsidies. The legal tradition associated with the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution limits many kinds of media regulation common in other parts of the world. Press freedom does not take legal precedence in the same way in Britain, however, and Britain, with more of a social democratic tradition, has a strong public broadcasting system, which the United States does not.

Globalization and Convergence of Media Systems

When Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm wrote about press systems reflecting the nature of the societies in which they developed, they were assuming that these "societies" coincided with national boundaries. In fact, media systems—and particularly where the news media are concerned—have historically developed in a close relation to national political institutions. There

have always been important cross-national influences, to be sure. This is an important reason why common patterns of media systems organization exist. The media in Italy, Spain, and Portugal are similar to one another and to the media in France, for example, in part because French press practices were exported to Italy and the Iberian Peninsula during the Napoleonic wars. But from the time nation states became consolidated, newspapers were closely tied to national political systems, and broadcasting in most cases was directly run by them. With commercialization and globalization of media, it is possible that the nation state may cease to be the correct unit for comparing media systems, though there is considerable debate still about haw far cross-national convergence has gone.

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See also *Comparing Media Systems; Four Theories of the Press*

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PRIMARIES

The presidential primaries are a phenomenon of the American presidential election system. Every 4 years, in a series of 35–40 primary elections in the states, the presidential nominees are selected. In these primaries, the voters are choosing delegates who are committed to the candidates and who will vote in the national party conventions during the summer. As one of the party's candidates moves into the lead and gains more and more delegates, the other candidates typically are "winnowed" from the race, withdrawing because of lack of support. In 2004, for example, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts had won enough of the primaries by early March to have enough delegates to secure the Democratic nomination. He was officially chosen as the party's nominee at the Democratic convention in July 2004.

While some states select their delegates by a caucus process instead of by primaries, the *primary process* is the main route to presidential nomination. (Caucuses, such as the famous Iowa precinct caucuses, are held in several stages, and require that voters attend meetings at night to discuss the candidates. The time-consuming and public nature of the caucuses has the effect of keeping voter participation much lower than in the primaries.)

Presidential primaries were part of the reforms advocated by the Progressive Movement in America in the early 20th century. Reformers such as Senator Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin and former President Theodore Roosevelt urged the states to change the old system, whereby a small group of party leaders at the national convention selected the nominees. Instead, urged the Progressives, the party members at the grassroots level should have a direct voice in choosing the presidential nominees through primary elections. Many states adopted this reform, and by 1912, there were at least 12 primaries, and newspapers mentioned others, with widely different rules and structures. So embedded was the party convention system, however, that the party leaders in 1912 replaced the delegates at will during the convention. The reform effort underwent a long hiatus. Although 12–16 states routinely had presidential primaries, and the early primaries (particularly the first primary, New Hampshire) occasionally had an agenda-setting effect on the campaign, the majority of states did not use this method of selecting candidates.

The McGovern-Fraser Commission of the Democratic Party, working during the 1968–1972 period, revived the idea that party members at the grassroots level should have a direct hand in selecting the party nominee. The commission mandated new rules for wider participation (adopted by the Democratic Party), which led to sweeping changes in the nomination process and the adoption of primaries and caucuses by the states. Starting with the presidential election of 1972, one candidate (Senator George McGovern of South Dakota) had won enough delegates *in the primaries* that as the party convention approached, it was

evident that he was the party's nominee *before* the convention. Presidential primaries are now the main way candidates become the party nominees, in both parties.

The presidential primaries have six unique situational factors that influence the campaign communication process. First, the primaries are held much earlier in the year than the convention, and with every quadrennial cycle, states have moved their primaries earlier, in a process of "front loading." The earliest primaries tend to capture the heaviest media attention and to set the news agenda for the presidential campaign. Second, instead of there being a one-time event such as a fall election date, there are multiple primaries, which forces the candidates and media to divide their communication energies and resources among many states. The media focus their attention on the "horse race," giving the most attention to the candidates who are ahead in the polls. They also give heavy coverage to the "fighter," the candidate(s) who fight against the odds and do better than expected.

Third, there are multiple candidates openly competing against each other rather than just the two candidates typical in a fall campaign. The frontrunner in the race tends to draw the most attacks from the other candidates. All the candidates work to introduce themselves to the public in effective biographical messages, in candidate videos, political advertisements, speeches, and Web sites.

Fourth, in the primaries the individual candidates must fund and promote their own candidacies, whereas in the fall campaign the national party plays a leading role in promoting the party's nominee. The year before the primaries officially begin has been called "the money primary," as candidates struggle to raise enough money to enable them to hire staff, develop their campaign plans, travel among the early primary states, conduct polling, and gain favorable media attention. Fifth, because the primary candidates are all in the same party, there are fewer differences in policy positions among them. This leads them to emphasize differences in character and image rather than policy. Sixth, the primaries are serial: they occur over a period of several months rather than all at once. In planning for the 2008 nominating race, for example, candidates needed to focus on the earliest state events, in Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Florida, scheduled for January, while also looking ahead to primaries in many other states scheduled in February and later.

Because the primaries are held long before the general election, before many people have formed strong opinions, the candidates and media have an unparalleled opportunity to influence their perceptions and to set the agenda. The stakes are high: selection of the presidential nominees. While the principle that voters at the grassroots should choose the nominee has wide support (instead of giving this power to a little group of men behind closed doors), there are also proposals for reform. Some propose a national primary, or four regional primaries, to reduce the heavy influence of the earliest primary states, and to bring order to a hectic system. In the meantime, the American system of presidential primaries poses diverse communication challenges.

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See also Conventions, Political; Iowa Caucuses

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PRIMING

Also known as a consequence of agenda setting, *priming* refers to the process by which the importance of political issues in media content and public opinion influences evaluations of political leaders. Whereas agenda-setting theory posits that mass media increase the salience of political issues in public opinion, priming suggests that the issues made prominent via agenda setting are used as the major criteria by which individuals judge political leaders, particularly the president. Thus, if news media tend to cover the economy more than any other issue, public evaluations of politicians will be predominantly based on their perceived performance of how those leaders are handling that issue. Thus, the emphasis of news media on certain issues at the expense of others can substantially alter assessments of political figures.

Led by Shanto Iyengar and associates, several studies have offered robust support for priming effects. In a seminal series of experiments, residents of New Haven, Connecticut, were presented manipulated television newscasts to assess news media impact on audience perceptions. The issues manipulated were national defense, pollution, and inflation. Among the key findings of these studies were that news media content not only raised the salience of theses political issues (agenda setting), but also affected subsequent evaluations of President Jimmy Carter's job performance (priming). Effects were more pronounced for performance evaluations than for personal assessments. In a more recent set of experiments in Columbus, Ohio, priming influence was examined for a diverse set of issues, ranging from drug use to unemployment. Both studies reported priming effects prompted by exposure to news. A common feature of the aforementioned inquiries was their use of television newscasts as experimental stimuli. The exploration of priming via print and online news has remained somewhat unexplored.

Building on this laboratory work, researchers have supplemented experimental research with field studies. For example, one investigation observed that presidential approval of George H. W. Bush was predicted by public perceptions of his performance on foreign policy issues during the First Gulf War. Using content analysis and survey data, this investigation demonstrated that increased news media coverage of the war led to greater emphasis on foreign policy by citizens when asked about presidential job performance.

In a related analysis comparing the Gulf crisis and the economy from 1990–1992, researchers found that evaluations of the president were principally determined by the salience of these two issues in media coverage and public opinion. In particular, public assessments of job approval varied depending upon which issue dominated news media content. As a consequence, this study confirmed priming influence for both a domestic and foreign policy issue.

Consistent with previous research, similar patterns were noted for the impact of media attention of the Iran–Contra scandal on public evaluations of President Ronald Reagan. Specifically, an examination of National Election Studies' data compared public opinion before and after the scandal was made known to the American public to ascertain causal relationships. Study results illustrated that priming effects were more pronounced for appraisals of job approval than judgments of presidential character. In an international context, media attention to the introduction of the euro in Denmark was also associated with priming effects on Danish political leaders. In sum, a variety of experimental and field studies have offered support for priming using both cross-sectional and time series data.

Given the widespread evidence, some scholarly debate concerning the mechanisms underlying priming has been engendered. One major perspective indicates that the process occurs psychologically by making certain issues more accessible in individuals' minds as they make political judgments. From this standpoint, people are viewed as cognitive misers who use simple cues from the media as the basis for their political evaluations. Another perspective indicates that inference is the primary psychological mechanism by which priming occurs. Inconclusive evidence

regarding underlying psychological explanations for priming suggests that this debate will remain pervasive in the scholarly literature for years to come.

While news media are considered the driving force in priming, political campaigns can also play an integral role in the process, particularly when candidates and political parties aim to impact the agenda of issues in news content. By emphasizing certain issues over others, campaigns attempt to impact public evaluations of candidates by stressing concerns upon which their candidates are believed to have a strategic advantage. These efforts are often carried out through news releases, interviews, and other types of "information subsidies."

In addition to the evidence obtained from news content, research has indicated that other forms of political communication can lead to priming effects with voters. For example, one study found that political advertisements can prime racial opinions to shape evaluations of political leaders. In an innovative setting, another inquiry proposed that priming via campaign advertisements can modify assessments of judges running for political office. In brief, multiple investigations have identified political advertising as a key determinant of priming influence.

Though understudied, some research has uncovered priming effects from entertainment content. Specifically, one investigation revealed that exposure to the *West Wing* television show could impact reactions to current and past presidents. A connected study of film content reported that exposure to *Fahrenheit 9/11* affected ambivalent attitudes toward President George W. Bush. Finally, priming effects were shown for attention to late night comedy shows during the 2000 presidential campaign using data from the National Annenberg Election Survey. The extension of priming to entertainment content represents a key frontier for further scholarly exploration. Other forms of political communication that are largely unexamined include attention to political debates and conventions.

A major reason for the consistent interest in priming research lies in its potential implications for voting behavior. In an analysis of the 2002 German federal election, one inquiry found that priming contributed to vote choice and significantly swayed the election outcome. Similar results were obtained empirically in studies of voter behavior in Canadian and Israeli elections. Priming does not always enhance voting. Some scholars have argued that news media can prime cynicism, leading to declining voter turnout. Thus, priming appears to have ramifications for political participation, which may extend beyond voting to other actions, such as volunteering, donating, and demonstrating.

Issue ownership theory supplies a germane conceptual framework for explaining why priming influence can lead to strategic advantages for political candidates, parties, and campaigns. According to this perspective, political parties tend to "own" certain issues in public opinion, in that voters often believe that certain parties are able to handle some problems better than others. For example, Republicans are frequently regarded to be more effective for issues of defense, while Democrats are regarded as more effective for social issues. As a result, when media focus on issues owned by a particular party, the resulting priming effects should translate into increased support for candidates from the advantaged party. Research has suggested that priming effects can also occur for political parties themselves. Issue ownership theory has received support in several studies, including an extensive analysis of debate content, political ads, media content, and public opinion from 1952 to 2000.

In the abstract, priming posits that mass media wield substantial influence on the considerations used in public evaluations of political leaders. As such, beyond issues, scholars have examined priming effects for aspects of candidate images, such as leadership. One analysis, for instance, revealed that a president's own remarks during the State of the Union Address could translate into priming impact via both issues and aspects of his image. International evidence obtained in investigations of Canadian elections has documented similar results. Another inquiry reported that the publicity associated with public opinion poll results can lead to priming effects for aspects of candidate images.

Connected to the related concept of second-level agenda setting, scholars have also observed "attribute priming" influence, whereby shifts in the salience of dimensions of topics in the news can affect public evaluations concerning those same topics. For example, one study found attribute priming effects for news coverage of a local issue in Ithaca, New York, among a sample of adult residents. The exploration of priming beyond national elections to the state and local levels in studies such as this is vital to the expansion and application of the theory.

Despite the observed relationships, several moderating variables have been identified that can amplify or reduce priming effects. Political knowledge has

been perhaps the most extensively examined. Research has been mixed as to whether it enhances or diminishes priming effects. Other moderating variables receiving scholarly attention include partisanship, political expertise, trust, and involvement.

With the growing impact of the Internet and other forms of political communication, researchers will need to examine priming dynamics in several contexts with a variety of political objects. Hence, it should continue to remain a fruitful arena for political communication scholarship for several years to come.

Spiro Kiousis

See also Agenda Setting; Political Knowledge

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Prince, The

See Machiavelli, Niccolò

Processing the News

Doris A. Graber's seminal study *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide,* represents a landmark in political communication research. First published in 1984, the study shed new light on major questions concerning the political consequences of media use and audience behavior.

This carefully conducted, pioneering research eschews the generalizations that characterize media effects as either nonexistent or all powerful. Instead, Graber illustrates the complexities of media uses and effects on individuals' mental stores of information by bringing schema theory into the field of political communication. Media influence on schemas is evident in the way Graber's interviewees talk about politics, but media influence cannot be categorized simplistically in all-or-nothing terms.

Schema theory draws heavily on cognitive psychology, and Graber argues that when people encounter

new information they integrate parts of it into existing schemas. Schematic thinking, Graber argues, is rather well informed; affectively consistent and interdependent; based in more abstract conceptualization; and stable over time.

The book is based on a yearlong panel study with a sample of 21 randomly selected registered voters from Evanston, Illinois. Through careful analysis of media diaries and 10 depth interviews with each of her 21 respondents over the course of a year, Graber offers a valuable research design and methodological approach to studying media uses and effects on political knowledge, attitudes, and behavior. The study offers new insights on how citizens obtain information via print and broadcast media in comparison with learning about politics from friends or personal networks. Graber shows how citizens synthesize information from various sources to make sense of the news. She finds that citizens are active users of the media and not passive recipients of media content. Personal situations and criteria predispose people to be selectively attentive to some information in the media and to ways of organizing and processing that information.

Graber's study goes deep into the individual experience to challenge some of the traditional expectations of media effects research, such as the "two-step flow hypothesis" and the power of agenda setting. She draws upon her depth interviews to discuss the applicability of major concepts in the field of media effects research, such as uses and gratifications, agenda setting, and more, with concrete examples from her fieldwork.

Processing the News is one of Graber's 15 books published to date. Her most recent study, *Processing Politics: Learning from Television in the Internet Age* (2001) received the Goldsmith Book Prize for Best Academic Political Communication book of 2003. *Processing Politics* continues where *Processing the News* left off on the topic of information processing and provides exciting insights from neurobiology research to show how the brain processes visual and verbal information. Graber is also known for her classic texts in the field: *Media Power in Politics* (5th ed., 2006) and *Mass Media and American Politics* (7th ed., 2006) are popular volumes rich with detail and attention to the latest in political communication scholarship.

Holli A. Semetko

See also Graber, Doris A.; Political Information Processing

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Professionalization

During the past 10 to 15 years, *professionalization* has become a catchword for characterizing recent developments in electoral campaigning. The term, however, refers to a concept that was originally developed in the sociology of labor and professions. *Professionalization* stands for the process through which occupations become professionalized. This process passes through certain stages from specialization, academization, the founding of professional organizations, the introduction of licensing or some other kind of certification, and the development of professional standards. Wilensky emphasizes the relevance of autonomous expertise and the service ideal. Among the classical professions are doctors and lawyers.

When the term was introduced to characterize modern election campaigning, not much was retained from the sociological concept. Instead, professionalization was often used to describe U.S. campaigns and to declare them the model for modern electioneering. However, when Maggie Scammell studied U.S. campaigning at the end of the 1990s, she applied the sociological professionalization criteria (control over entry, self-regulating code of conduct, definable bodies of knowledge, training and certification by recognizable standards, full-time employment, formal organization). She found that while professionalization was often treated as the hallmark of American-style modern campaigning, professionalization is problematic even in the United States. She discovered only some emerging signs of professionalization (as the growth of a common identity, specialist knowledge, the development of a specialist education, and the establishment of a code of conduct) but nevertheless ascertained that the campaign business was predominantly influenced by folk wisdom. She finally

concluded that political consultancy in the United States was characterized more by commercialism than professionalism.

More often, the term has been used in a simple, one-dimensional sense, where professionalization became equated with the trend of giving the organization of election campaigns into the hands of consultants. In this sense, professionalization mostly stands for the alleged worldwide adaptation of campaigns to the U.S. model of electioneering, and thus was also used as a synonym for Americanization.

However, this shift of campaign organization from parties and candidates to experts in the marketing business implies the application of certain strategies and techniques and thus a new perspective on politics and how it is "sold" to citizens and the media. In this broader sense, professionalization can be understood as an adaptation to recent changes in society, in the political system, and in the media system. These changes have been influenced by the modernization of society. In short, this describes an individualization process that has brought about a decreasing influence of once-powerful social structure variables. These no longer prescribe individual behavior in a binding way. Without these guidelines, individuals have gained new liberties that often come along with new uncertainties.

The changes in society also had consequences for the political system and for political communication. The traditional models of voter behavior were more or less built on social structure variables and were conceived of as being rather stable. Parties and politicians knew who their voters were and how they should be addressed. During the past decades, these ties between parties and their voters have been weakening in most Western democracies, a process that has also been called "dealignment." At the same time, the mass media, and television in particular, have gained importance for the communication process between political actors and the electorate. The increasing relevance of economic factors in television markets led to commercialization, which has had consequences for the way politics is presented to the audience.

These developments—modernization of society, unpredictable voters, and the commercialization of the media market—posed a major challenge to the political system, which was thus forced to adapt to the new conditions. Those who have to communicate politics to citizens and the media had to cope with social differentiation and to make greater efforts to gain the attention of the media. Therefore, the professionalization of political communication was an inevitable consequence of and reaction to these trends. How this process developed and what its consequences are can best be observed in election campaigns where the share of power is at stake and communication efforts increase.

Professionalization in this sense implies the application of those tools and techniques that have proven their worth in marketing. On the one hand, that means the extensive use of polling and other social science methods to analyze voters' attitudes and for testing campaign material in advance. On the other hand, these techniques include strategies that raise the chances for reaching the attention of the media and the voters and for directing the attention to certain topics. Ideally, these strategies are the result of proactive planning. They encompass attention strategies like agenda setting and framing to steer the attention to those topics that are uncontroversial or on which a candidate or party can demonstrate competence or point to earlier successes. This also includes the organization of media events or negative campaigning. Accordingly, distraction strategies divert the attention from topics that are uncomfortable for the candidate or party (e.g., personalization, privatization). Finally, adaptation strategies customize the campaign to the individualized electorate and to the (new) media environment. How these strategies turn out in a certain campaign is very much dependent on the situation, which is influenced by long-term and stable factors (e.g., the electoral system) and by short-term, varying factors (e.g., the candidate, the economic situation).

While these processes have been widely studied in election campaigns, professionalization is not restricted to campaigning but rather is a process that takes place in political communication in general. However, due to the fact that elections directly decide about the distribution of power, the process of professionalization is probably more advanced in election campaigning than in day-to-day politics.

Christina Holtz-Bacha

See also Americanization; Consultants, Political; Dealignment; Government Communication; Political Marketing

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Pro-Life Movement

See Abortion

Propaganda

Propaganda is a communicative technique that seeks to manipulate the opinions and attitudes of a targeted audience. It intends to change existing belief systems, value structures, and political positions in order to create specific attitudes toward a subject of public discourse in a manner favorable to the propagandist. Specific messages usually are linked to an overwhelming ideology. Propaganda is directed at a large number of people and thus is communicated by mass media. It can use different media genres, such as speeches, advertisements, editorials, articles, songs, or posters. Propaganda is a function of the political system and strives to gain or defend political power. It is ideological in the sense that it tries to "naturalize" specific, self-interested viewpoints and opinions to let them appear self-evident, logical, and in the public interest. Propaganda may, for tactical reasons, take the form of open public discourse or dialogue, but it is always directed toward a previously defined end that the propagandists carefully attempt to achieve. In this sense, it is always unidirectional communication.

Types of Propaganda

Defining propaganda is a difficult task. For nearly a century, definitions of both criteria and limits characterizing this phenomenon have been highly contested. For instance, there has been no consensus about whether propaganda should be seen as a subform of advertising or the other way around. While, at the beginning of the 20th century, propaganda was predominantly used as a synonym for advertising in the commercial sphere, social scientists after World War I tended to see it as an exclusively political technique. In National Socialist Germany it was prohibited by law to apply the word *propaganda* to commercial promotion because the regime reserved the term for its own politics of persuasion. Today, propaganda is widely considered either a historical phenomenon of the 20th century—closely linked to the propaganda regimes in Germany, Italy, Russia, and China, yet without much significance for the present—or one perceives *propaganda* as a not very precise collective term for all promotional activities in the political realm.

There are at least three major types of propaganda in modern society.

1. *War propaganda* (also termed *psychological warfare, public diplomacy, psychological operations*) consists of communicative campaigns designed to serve as auxiliaries in warfare. The typical techniques here are deception, defection, and other devices that help to weaken the adversary's power and to strengthen one's own forces. Propaganda is directed against enemy civilians and troops and to the home front in an attempt to fortify the morale. War propaganda is usually performed by the military; its deployment is limited to the time of crisis. War propaganda is applied in democracies as well as in authoritarian systems.

2. *"Sociological" propaganda in totalitarian regimes.* Totalitarian regimes of the 20th century have intensively sought to create "a new mankind" by using propaganda and permanent persuasion. The population of National Socialist Germany or the Soviet Union, for instance, was exposed to constant propaganda. Every aspect of society was penetrated by persuasive communication to ensure the dominance of the ruling ideology and to make people act according to the wants and needs of the regime. The French sociologist Jacques Ellul termed this type of all-pervasive persuasion "sociological propaganda."

3. *Political propaganda in democracies.* Some scholars define ongoing political contests in democracies, especially during election campaigns, as propaganda. When the term *propaganda* is used in this context, it reflects a close relationship to political communication, public relations, and campaigning and implies a rather weak impact on the audience.

Competing parties openly admit that they try to persuade the electorate, and the media can comment freely on the various positions. Propaganda competes as one position among many on the market of opinions.

Origins of Propaganda

The Latin word *propagare* means "to spread out, to enlarge." It has been used since the Middle Ages to characterize the missionary work of the Roman Catholic Church. The Spanish Carmelite Thomas A. Jesu published in 1613 a book titled *De erigenda Congregatione pro fide propaganda*, in which he made detailed suggestions for the improvement of missionary work. In 1622, Pope Gregory XV founded the *Sacra Congregatio de propaganda fide* ("holy congregation"), a secret board responsible for the missionary work of the Catholic Church. During the Enlightenment, many intellectuals identified this agency, which still exists today, as the center of the anti-Enlightenment. They considered propaganda to be a secret and dangerous technique for deluding the people and making them act against their will and their interests. Over time the word became a collective expression for all kinds of persuasive communication techniques directed at public opinion and was conceptualized as a specific means of political action that could be employed wherever political ideas were at stake.

In this new understanding, propaganda became one of the most important concepts of the French Revolution. In analogy to the church's missionary work, the revolutionaries in Paris saw it as their duty to spread the ideals of the French Revolution to other European countries, thus raising widespread fear in conservative Europe about the agitating effects of secret and influential clubs. For the first time in history, propaganda was regarded as a technique, which could universally be employed for all political aims. Fear of propaganda increased even further during the European uprisings in the year 1830, when conservative governments were convinced that the French were exporting their revolution by means of propaganda. This assumption was indeed more fitting in 1830 than in 1789, because by then propaganda had lost its negative connotation among European democrats. While it gained a reputation as an effective instrument to propagate revolutionary ideas, the term lost its association with traditional propaganda agencies like the *propaganda fide*.

It was only logical that the strongest political power of the 19th century, the labor movement, soon discovered and developed the potential of propaganda. Early in their Paris exile, Karl Marx, Wilhelm Weitling, and Heinrich Heine fervently debated the impact of propaganda and its function for the promotion of communism. In this discourse, Marx neglected the use of the term *propaganda*, because in his view it did not conform to his claim that communist ideology should be based on rational thinking and scientific accuracy. As a result, the labor movement was deeply split about how to use the concept of propaganda: while communists in the Soviet Union as well as in France and in Germany employed it excessively, social democrats avoided it and spoke rather about agitation. As a result propaganda gained very little momentum in the Western European labor movement, whereas in communist regimes it came under the influence of Vladimir Lenin, who outlined a sophisticated propaganda theory, one of the cornerstones of socialist ideology.

The Emergence of Modern Propaganda

Toward the end of the 19th century, two trends led the European and American bourgeoisie to discover the power of propaganda. For one, the expansion of consumer capitalism and modern mass media sped up the professionalization of an advertising industry (a development discussed in many countries under the heading of "propaganda"). Furthermore, "crowds" or "mass society" appeared as subject of intense discussion. The writings of Gustave Le Bon, Scipio Sighele, Wilfred Trotter, and—later—Sigmund Freud expressed what many members of the bourgeoisie had observed in the decades since 1848: Political dominance in modern society was no longer exclusively based on formal power and law; public opinion (and thus mass media) had become a driving force in society. In the age of class struggle, conservatives and liberals alike tended to view public opinion as an inherently irrational force—and a dangerous one to boot—that had to be controlled. New forms of propaganda promised to be one cure for this new challenge of social control. Accordingly, by the first decade of the 20th century, scientific research on propaganda had been initiated, with universities and think tanks approaching propaganda in similar ways as other societal problems, for example, syphilis or infant mortality.

Scientific propaganda analysis initially conceptualized the impact of propaganda in terms of the crude mass psychology outlined by Le Bon and others.

According to this approach, the human being in modern industrial society was not much more than a biological organism reacting to outer stimuli with preconditioned responses. Products of this strand of thought were those well-known formulas about the simple repetition of messages until even the most slow-witted in the audience grasped them. In the first half of the 20th century, the academic mainstream attributed to propaganda almost unprecedented power.

At the outbreak of World War I, the concept of propaganda had found its way into the policy papers of ministries and state chancelleries. Image had become crucial to European regimes governing vulnerable territorial empires stretched all over the world. By 1914, then, propaganda had become integral part of international politics and a means of cultural diplomacy. Then propaganda turned into a weapon of warfare. All parties involved in the war set up propaganda units, some of them even in the rank of ministries. Led by an enemy propaganda apparatus under Lord Northcliffe, Great Britain was credited to be the most successful nation in creating effective atrocity propaganda that affected the morale of German and Austrian soldiers and isolated the two powers in the diplomatic sphere. In the United States, President Woodrow Wilson set up the Committee on Public Information in April 1917. Led by the journalist George Creel, the committee created a new type of modern propaganda that used all available public media and that was widely regarded as a very successful adaptation of advertising techniques to the realm of political propaganda. Germany, in turn, at least in the first half of the war, was not very active on the propaganda front, which caused an intense discussion about the shortcomings of German propaganda and, after Germany's defeat, to the creation of the doctrine of the "propaganda deficit." This was the starting point for heavily subsidized German research programs on the subject in the 1920s, and the National Socialists later used many of its findings for their own purposes.

The Russian Revolution 1917, Mussolini's purge in 1923, and the National Socialist *Machtergreifung* ("rise to power") in 1933 were peak times in the history of propaganda; all three regimes can be considered movements that came into power at least in part due to their effective communication techniques. The creation of the German Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, headed by Joseph Goebbels, one of the key figures in propaganda history, is one example. Just like the Soviet communists and the Italian fascists, National Socialism used propaganda in order to stabilize their regime both domestically and on international diplomatic ground, while trying to remodel their respective societies according to their ideology. The anti-Jewish propaganda of the National Socialists became notorious for creating the ideological notion of a "Jewish question" in German public opinion and thus playing a crucial role in paving to the holocaust.

World War II (1939–1945) started with a propaganda coup—the alleged attack of Polish troops on the Gleiwitz broadcasting station—and saw propaganda as an auxiliary to fighting throughout the war. The use of propaganda during the course of the war—different than in World War I—was more tactical than ideological. Much research by the most able social scientists of the time was carried out to assess how troop morale could be stabilized or how the enemy could be encouraged to desert. Social scientific research on propaganda rapidly gained sophistication. Empirical methods replaced the old stimulus-response model, and people were no longer merely seen as "mass" but as human beings with specific needs and interests. Scholars like Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Harold D. Lasswell replaced the notion of strong propaganda impacts with theories according to which the success even of the most carefully designed propaganda message could never be taken for granted because both people and modern society had inbuilt barriers against the power of unprecedented persuasion.

The Impact of Propaganda in Today's Democracies

After World War II, the term *propaganda* was discredited because of its association with Hitler and Goebbels. The word disappeared from both scientific discourse and political debate and was replaced by more neutral terms like *international communication, public diplomacy*, or *public relations*. Research on this subject continued, especially in the United States, even though much of it was carried out in secret. All major wars since 1945 were accompanied by intensive propaganda campaigns. In addition to this, the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States set the stage for a constant ideological propaganda battle over the basic values of modern society. In this struggle, the Soviet Union as a totalitarian regime had some advantages, as many social scientists observed: modern media, characterized by freedom of information rights,

media competition, and the journalistic principle of consulting multiple sources, and an increasing public awareness of the potential threats of propaganda have made the successful use of propaganda more difficult. Today, propaganda is often limited to campaigns directed against the enemy with specific goals. Nevertheless, large-scale attempts to influence the home front continue to exist. Attempts by the Bush administration to convince the American public of the danger allegedly posed by Saddam's regime in 2003 is one recent outstanding illustration of both its possibilities and its limits. Bush's claims about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq turned out to be false. As a result, Bush's reputation was damaged, and his entire administration faced an increasing credibility gap. It became once again obvious that propaganda needs to be at least partially true to have a lasting impact, and that in democracies the media and the critical public can constitute effective obstacles against the power of propaganda. This is one of the lessons of propaganda's history: Propaganda may be a powerful weapon, but it cannot create information that has no correspondence in the outer world.

Thymian Bussemer

See also Communism; Ideology; Persuasion, Political; Political Advertising; Revolution, Political; Spin, Political; United States Information Agency; War Coverage

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Proportional Representation

Proportional representation (PR) provides for the allocation of parliamentary seats to political parties in proportion to the votes they received in an election. As a principle of representation, the desired objective of PR is to reflect in parliament the existing political preferences and parties as accurately as possible. As a decision rule, in PR systems the share of votes candidates or parties receive determines whether they get a seat. In both aspects, PR is diametrically opposed to majority or plurality representation. Ever since the invention of PR as a decision rule during French Enlightenment and the mirror function of national assemblies during the French Revolution, majority/plurality and proportionality have built up the basic alternatives in debates on political representation. Regarding constitutional arrangements, their supposed impact goes so far as to determine the types and functions of political systems. PR is seen as intimately connected with the consensus model of democracy, where governments are not only responsive to the majority of the electorate but to as many people as possible.

Normative Expectations

In normative terms, defenders of proportional representation refer to the following advantages: (a) maximal representation of all opinions and interests in parliament in relation to the percentage of votes in their favor; (b) rejection of excessively artificial political majorities that do not correspond to any real majority in the electorate; (c) promotion of majorities by negotiation, compromise, and consent; (d) prevention of extreme political convulsions in the composition of parliament caused by the distortion effect of the electoral system rather than by fundamental changes in the voters' political preferences; (e) equality of the vote not only in numerical but in outcome terms (effective vote). All these advantages may be aggregated in the PR ideal of "fair representation." Nevertheless, the PR ideal continues to be seriously challenged by the opposite principle of representation. But empirically, real PR systems deviate more or less from it.

Diversity of Proportional Systems

There are many ways of designing a PR system, especially with regard to increasing or decreasing

proportional effects. The achievement of proportionality is mainly dependent on districting, thresholds, and electoral formulae. In a nationwide district, proportionality is nearly accurate (pure PR). Distortions between the share of votes and the share of seats increase when magnitudes of districts decrease. Theoretically, the amount of disproportionality in the national outcome is highest in single-member districts. Thresholds, used in order to prevent an excessive fragmentation of parliaments, force political parties to show a certain level of electoral support (for example, 5% of the votes) for getting parliamentary seats. Their effects on proportionality differ. While pure PR encourages dispersion of votes by strategic mistakes, leading to high numbers of wasted votes (up to 30%), thresholds may exert a concentration effect on voting behavior that fosters the number of effective votes and by this a higher degree of proportionality. The most common PR system provides for multimember districts of different magnitudes with blocked lists, using the d'Hondt formula.

Empirical Evidence

Proportional representation has been long discredited for creating multiparty systems and political instability. However, most stable democracies of the world apply PR systems. Nearly all of them use technical elements to prevent extreme fragmentation. Furthermore, PR systems may create a considerable distortion in the vote–seat relation. To be true, real effects of PR on party systems crucially depend on contextual factors, which are also responsible for the kind of electoral system in force. In general, there is no linear causal relationship between PR and party system.

Dieter Nohlen

See also Electoral Systems; Political Parties

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Propositions

See Ballot Initiatives

Protests, Political

Political protest refers to various means of influencing the political process that typically fall outside of the more traditional means such as voting for elected officials and running for office. These actions do not always involve fringe groups or individuals and can emerge instead from within the establishment. Further, protest activities are instrumental to social movements as a way to affect change, recruit members, share messages, and reach broader publics through mass media coverage. Protest acts can take many forms, including speeches, marches, rallies, letter-writing campaigns, sit-ins, and demonstrations, among other actions. As a result of this variation, research on political protest has explored a wide range of groups, activities, issues, and causes. Scholars have particularly focused on the key role communication processes can play in the success and functioning of protest activities at many levels, including through interpersonal connections among members, the communication artifacts and rhetorical strategies used by social movements, and coverage of protest acts by news media.

Much of the scholarship on what factors predict whether individuals will engage in protest-related activity has been categorized under the "social movements" label. This literature suggests the importance of an individual's connections to other people and

how those connections influence the individual's decision to participate in protest activities and join protest groups. The influence of others takes two main forms. First, social network research indicates that having network ties to protestors and protest groups are important, such that those with *more* social network ties to protestors are more likely to engage in protest activity than those who have few ties to protesters. Second, work by Pamela Oliver and others on critical mass indicates that individuals take into account the number of other individuals participating in a protest action or social movement when making their own decision to participate. Specifically, each individual has a threshold for the number of people that need to be involved in order to feel comfortable participating themselves. If there are not enough other people involved, the individual will not participate.

*Protesters, including Cindy Sheehan (*center*), march down 15th Street during the "10,000 Mother of a March" rally May 14, 2007, in Washington, D.C. Hundreds of antiwar protesters marched from Lafayette Park across from the White House to the U.S. Capitol, staging a sit-in and blocking traffic on Independence Avenue for more than 30 minutes.*

Source: Getty Images.

Apart from individual protesters, interpretations of the meaning and success of a protest event are based on the rhetorical strategies and tactics employed by a movement. The symbolic actions—speeches, marches, slogans, signs, chants, clothing, and so on—that different protest groups employ have provided a rich source for scholars studying the rhetoric of social movements, and each contributes to how a group or event is interpreted. As such, the rhetorical scholar studying social movements would only consider the protest event as one small piece of the symbolic meaning of a social movement. Considerable debate within the field has also centered on how to best characterize and study the rhetoric of social movements. Morris and Brown's collection of readings tracks the theoretical development and debates within this area of research as well as highlighting scholarly work on key political movements. Such work highlights a shift in focus toward application and testing of rhetorical theory by conducting case studies on key political movements such as the American Indian movement, the Black Power movement, and the feminist movement, among others.

News coverage of protest events, tactics, and rhetoric can also play an important role in the success and perceptions of protest groups. Protest events are important to journalists and news media because they are often event and conflict driven—therefore they make for interesting news. Media coverage of protest events is also important to protest groups in that news coverage allows groups to broadcast their message, gain publicity, and generate awareness and membership for causes. Although protesters have been able to generate and control their own media and rhetorical strategies through such means as newsletters and pamphlets, they have typically struggled to control how protest groups and events are represented to the wider audiences offered by mainstream news media such as television and newspapers.

Much of the research on news coverage of protest is rooted in theories of social control with scholars proposing that inherent biases in those who control the media play a central role in the perceived function and success of protest groups. Specifically, scholars have found that mainstream news media tend to marginalize protesters—particularly those who pose a greater threat to the status quo. This notion of social control via the news media is highlighted by Chan and Lee's study of the Golden Jubilee protests in China. Their work introduced the concept of the *journalistic paradigm*, commonly referred to as the "protest paradigm,"

which has become an oft-explored area in the study of news coverage of protest. The notion of the protest paradigm is that mainstream news media maintain the status quo (i.e., the current power structure) by marginalizing and delegitimizing groups that pose a threat to the system. Resulting news coverage that fits this paradigm is typically characterized by stories that present protesters as odd, threatening, ineffective, small in numbers, and disorganized.

Michael P. Boyle

See also Political Involvement

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Pseudo-Event

A pseudo-event is an event produced by a communicator with the sole purpose of generating media attention and publicity. These events lack real news value, but still they become the subject of media coverage. Pseudo-events can include press conferences, advertisements, speeches, campaign events, and other similar events with little value in terms of content and importance. Pseudo-events are carefully choreographed productions that follow a prepared script and leave nothing to chance. They are scheduled in advance, and journalists are informed of the specific time when the event occurs, which makes covering pseudo-events very convenient. Pseudo-events are also dramatic, which makes them interesting for the public, and produce iconic images, such as big enthusiastic crowds and hand shaking and baby kissing. In short, pseudo-events are a public relations tactic.

The term was coined by American scholar Daniel J. Boorstin in his book about the effects of media publicity and advertising on political and social practices in the United States in the 1950s. Boorstin defined a pseudo-event as an ambiguous truth that appeals to people's desire to be informed. He argued that being in the media spotlight is a strong incentive for public figures to stage artificial events, which become real and important once validated by media coverage. Boorstin described pseudo-events as the opposite of propaganda, although both forms of communication have similar consequences and result in public misinformation. Propaganda slants facts to keep the public from learning the truth, while pseudo-events provide the public with artificial facts that people perceive as real.

Pseudo-events are often used by political candidates to gain media attention during elections. Sometimes candidates stage pseudo-events in order to distract journalists' attention from real, more important events unfavorable to them. Opponents of candidates also stage pseudo-events in an effort to divert media attention from the competitor's event. Political pseudo-events are criticized for lowering the quality of political dialogue because they focus on image and horserace information rather than on issues and substances. Real dialogue is replaced by sensationalistic, dramatic, and emotional images that provide the viewer with a distorted sense of reality.

Monica Postelnicu

See also *Image, The*

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Psychographics in Politics

Psychological variables or data have been used to measure personality of political actors and analyze the beliefs, attitudes, or values of voters that may affect their political behaviors. Psychographics in politics is a method of political market segmentation that divides the entire political market into several relatively homogeneous groups with similar views.

The term *psychographics* derives from a combination of psychology and demographics. Psychographics adds the analysis of psychological motivations to the dimension of demographics. Psychographics was first broadly defined as beliefs, attitudes, socioeconomic status, and general patterns of living that influence buying decisions in marketing. Psychographics later drew distinctions among geographic, demographic, or behavioristic segmentations. Scholars focused on the personality profiles in psychographics. More recent researchers have emphasized the concept of lifestyle and values with a much broader class of variables, including attitudes, opinions, interests, needs, or activities.

The use of psychographics in marketing denotes the lifestyle and preferences of consumers, analyzes motivations behind their behaviors, and creates messages that consumers are likely to recognize and match to their own opinions, interests, and activities. Similarly, psychographics *in politics* refers to analysis of the psychic imagery underlying voters' decision-making processes. It is useful to explain the cognitive processes guiding voters' preferences as well as the changing patterns of voters' behaviors over time. This is due, in part, to the cause and effect of political campaigns to engender, reinforce, transform, or eradicate voters' mental imagery of political candidates or parties.

Psychological mapping of voters' perceptions leads researchers to discover key features of political candidates inside voters' minds and identify patterns of similarity and complex relationships about voters' political preferences and voting patterns. The goal of psychographic analysis in the political arena is to identify the ways in which voters classify and characterize political candidates or parties, as well as how voters weigh the benefits of alternative positions. This allows political candidates to strategically tailor their messages to match voters' expectations. Multidimensional scaling is often used to develop hypotheses about which candidates are most likely to compete against one another, what characteristics will be associated with positioning of candidates, and how best to take advantage of the political climate.

Harold D. Lasswell constructed psychological typologies of political actors in the 1930s. In an effort to discover the psychological traits of certain political actors, Lasswell developed a behavioral inventory of political types and offered an insight into the psychology of political convictions. His behavior inventory has influenced subsequent psychographic analysis in political campaigns. Dwight Eisenhower was among the first to employ political market segmentation and positioning as a political campaign strategy during his 1952 campaign for the presidency. He sent fundraising letters with varying messages targeted to different population groups and developed his campaign strategy based on the messages that encouraged the largest donations. Political candidates or parties have subsequently assessed and developed policy or character positions by identifying their voters' interests and beliefs. Sadrudin A. Ahmed and Douglas N. Jackson studied the Canadian provincial elections in the 1970s using respondents' attitudes toward welfare to produce different political market segments.

Jae-Hwa Shin

See also Political Marketing

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Psychology of Radio, The

The Psychology of Radio (1935) paints a comprehensive portrait of the early days of radio. At the core of the book there is a series of experiments exploring the possibilities of this then-new medium. In Cantril and Allport's opinion, it is the task of social psychology to deliver empirical knowledge to the prospective users—including program sellers, publicity managers, and educationalists—on how to shape their messages appropriately. The authors combine this explicit orientation toward the interests of practitioners with an academic interest in the role of the radio in society. Their speculative reasoning gives an early example of social utopia associated with a new medium: Cantril

and Allport ascribe to the radio the potential to vitalize political life, to promote social integration, to enlarge the cultural competence of the masses, and to improve the understanding between nations. They see it as an agent of democracy. But they also warn against the standardization of opinions and forms of everyday life caused by the structural conservatism of commercially oriented mass media.

The Psychology of Radio develops an understanding of the new medium, comparing it with print media, film, and the speaker–audience relationship. Concepts to describe the radio—communication in only one direction, reception free of the conventions of a present audience, mass communication with a parapersonal manner that addresses the users and creates the suggestion of a shared social experience—are built by analogies and distinctions to the "old" media.

The experiments are designed to explore the potentials of the new medium, as an instrument for education but also for commercial and political "propaganda." A series of experiments analyze the differences between the perception of a speaker compared with the perception of the voice of the same speaker transmitted by the radio with regard to the assessment of the communicative situation and the modes of information processing. The findings show that mediated communication is recognized as more structured, less personal, and less social; and that it dulls "higher mental processes" because the hearers are not required to be analytical or vigilant, and they are less personally and socially involved. Another series of experiments compares the efficiency of radio with reading, with regard to memorizing, understanding, and assessing information. It becomes evident: the more complex and difficult the information, the less efficient radio is as a medium. But the reception of radio does facilitate reproductive mental performances, especially those that concern "concrete" or acquainted material. Cantril and Allport were surprised to also find that the higher the degree of formal education of the listener, the better the capability to benefit from the reception of radio.

Cantril and Allport scrutinized several dimensions of programming—the best length of sentences, speed of speech, and attributes of content—with regard to information processing. They found, among many other results, that a general statement combined with an illustrating example is optimum for clear understanding and perceived relevance of the information.

They also determined that hearers build a consented image of the invisible media personae based only on the sensual impression of the voices. They supposed underlying social stereotypes of persons. With their experiments, Cantril and Allport revealed a basis for parasocial interactions with media personae.

Radio provides the users with access to events in culture, society, and politics in a very comfortable way. Summarizing, Cantril and Allport identify the "sense of participation" as the central characteristic of the radio. Meanwhile, television and online communication would take over much of this societal function. In *The Psychology of Radio,* Cantril and Allport demonstrated in an impressive manner how the meaning of a medium could be creatively analyzed.

Ralph Weiss

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Public Address, Political

See Rhetoric, Political

Public Affairs, Communication in

For more than 5,000 years, since the time of the ancient Egyptians, governments have sought to inform citizens of the inner workings of the political process. As a specialization of public relations, public affairs (also referred to as "government relations"), fills the need to inform citizens of the many services that a particular government has to offer. Organizations outside of government also employ public affairs specialists to lobby and help shape public policy. Viewed within a democracy framework, public affairs is essential if citizens are to make logical and intelligent choices about their candidates and their political policies.

Communication in public affairs can come from all sides of the political spectrum. William Ragan, former director of public affairs for the U.S. Civil Service Commission, is credited by Wilcox and his colleagues with developing a set of objectives for governmental information efforts:

1. Provide information to the public.
2. Use appropriate information activities to improve the effectiveness of agency operations.
3. Provide feedback to governmental administrators to allow continuation or change.
4. Recommend to management the most desirable communication strategies for distributing decisions or initiatives.
5. Undertake the role of an ombudsman on behalf of the public.
6. Educate administrators and bureaucrats about the functioning of the media and how to influence coverage.

By law, the U.S. government is forbidden from using appropriated money to hire "publicity experts." Therefore, public affairs usually falls under a variety of diverse departments, such as the External Affairs Division (FBI), the Office of Communications and Consumer Affairs (Interstate Commerce Commission), the Office of Public Awareness (EPA), and the Offices of Public Affairs, in which the military uses needed public relations functions that inform the citizens about their operations. Within these departments, public relations practitioners may be given such titles as director of public affairs, public information officer, press secretary, administrative aide, or government program analyst, to carry the government's mission of communicating to its publics.

With the increased complexity of government, the need for more communication and/or publicity has increased as well. Public affairs officers must help define and achieve governmental program goals, enhance the government's responsiveness and service, as well as provide the public with sufficient information to permit self-government. To do this, they must construct messages for internal and external audiences, gauge public opinion, plan and organize for public relations effectiveness, as well as measure the effectiveness of the entire process.

Looking to create many avenues of communication for a diverse audience, governmental public affairs officials rely on a variety of different media platforms to disseminate information. Press conferences and releases, VNRs (video news releases), and direct mailings have been popular ways for governmental agencies to communicate. Most recently, the technological focus has been on the Internet. Being relatively inexpensive, the Internet allows governmental agencies operating on low budgets to put out vast amounts of material at a fraction of the cost of printing and mailing. This practice allows audiences to get instantaneous information and communicate directly with the departments, while governmental agencies can maintain better control over their content and effectively bypass traditional media.

Public affairs also helps nongovernmental organizations respond to issues that concern their environment. Businesses, schools, libraries, foundations, and nonprofits must effectively build relationships with governmental agencies in order to affect public policy. Most business or corporate public relations programs have a component to deal with the government. Relying on fact finding and dissemination, public affairs specialists must then evaluate the differing policies and their effects on the corporation and communicate them effectively to their publics (i.e., corporate decision makers, employees, stockholders, etc.). Dow Chemical is one company that has a thorough public affairs program in place for its employees. Its four communication objectives include:

1. Keeping employees informed about relevant national and local issues
2. Acquainting employees with government procedures
3. Encouraging involvement of employees in the political process
4. Helping employees to understand the value of political contributions and assisting them with access to political action committees or PACs

This communication can be conducted via corporate planning sessions, newsletters, e-mail and Web pages, or through company Web log (blog) updates.

In addition to communicating within the organization, public affairs experts must also lobby the government to create policies beneficial to the organization. After the dissemination process, a variety of communication tactics can be used to attract the government's attention. Spoken tactics, such as speeches, informal office visits to officials, or testimonies at public hearings, may be employed. Written tactics can include such things as preparing position papers, writing letters and op-ed articles, newsletters, mass e-mails, blogging, and advocacy (issue) advertising.

Lobbying has become a main staple in public affairs. With the 1995 lobby reform bill, grassroots lobbying has now become an $800 million industry due to the absence of rules and regulations governing this practice. Grassroots lobbying establishes organizations at local levels that can be activated when the need arises. To increase public support for their causes, grassroots lobbyists employ a variety of communication methods such as toll-free phone lines, bulk faxing, computerized direct mail, and bulk e-mail so that local citizens can call and/or contact the appropriate governmental agency or department.

Those professionals involved with public affairs can become involved with the Public Affairs Council. Begun in 1954 under the name of the Effective Citizens Organization (ECO), the Public Affairs Council seeks to get businesses to become more active in the political process. The organization offers a wide variety of comprehensive programs as well as produces a number of conferences and publications (*Impact,* etc.) that communicate with those in the field.

Danny Shipka

See also Lobbying, Lobbyist; Public Relations, Political

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Public Broadcasting Service

See PBS (Public Broadcasting Service)

Public Communication in Politics

Discussion of public communication in politics presupposes discourse in democratic or republican systems of government. Though publics play a role in all modern nations, they perform a necessary function in democratic forms of government. According to democratic theory, public approval legitimizes government actions. Jean Cohen explains the role of the public in what she terms “deliberative democracy,” that democratic associations value choice derived through public reasoning. As such, community decisions are deemed legitimate inasmuch as they are the product of open deliberation. Understanding just what the public is, however, is essential to any further explanation.

There are three ways to understand the concept of “the public.” Often, *public* is used to denote a space to which people are given free access. As such, “the public” constitutes a context. Children are told to use their “public voice” when “in public.” Displays of affection “in public” are generally frowned upon, despite the general thawing of conventions. In the social scientific sense, publics have been generally understood by Chicago School sociologists—Hannah Arendt, and Walter Lippmann, for instance—as communities of people who realize a common interest, coalescing around a single issue. John Dewey defined *the public* as transitory groups that emerge to respond to a shared good or evil. Antiwar or pro-life advocates may emerge as publics in response to events that generate a shared awareness or concern. Michael McGee’s explanation of the process by which “the people” are constituted has been used by students of public communication to describe the formation of publics as individuals united by myths seeking to effect political change. “The public” is also used in common parlance to denote those people who comprise a nation’s population. For instance, the government releases documents to “the public,” or makes them “publicly available” in an archive ostensibly to keep “the public” informed and capable of reasoned deliberation and knowledgeable decision making.

The formation of publics necessitates communication between citizens for their formation—public communication. Interaction is necessary; without it, a group cannot form. A public cannot exist until individuals somehow become aware that their interests, concerns, or anxieties are shared with others. John

Dewey, seeking to dispel the common assumption that publics emerge spontaneously, explained that face-to-face interaction was necessary to the organization of publics. Consciousness-raising seminars used by feminists are paradigmatic illustrations of the role of interpersonal and group communication in the organization of publics of women who are prepared to react to or advocate for government policy.

Spheres of Communication

The performance of public communication is governed by cultural norms that distinguish it from other communication modalities. There are, according to Thomas Goodnight the public, private, and technical spheres. The standards for argument in these three spheres differ. Most anyone can note from experience that what makes a good political argument, for instance, vastly differs from what makes a good private argument. The norms of public deliberation differ from those of private argument in that they are relatively more formal and demand different forms of proof and reasoning. Public speakers might, as a result, be less likely to rely on informal modes of address as well as on highly technical data and jargon.

Public Communication and Rationality

Communication in public does not perforce constitute the communication Dewey claims is necessary for the formation of a public. Much communication conducted "in public" either is not intended to be deliberative (e.g., a group chatting in a park) or fails to satisfy is necessary for deliberative communication. Much public sphere communication can foster crowd or mob behavior. One need only listen to political radio personalities for evidence of the latter; they are often highly emotional and appeal, with seeming strategic intent, to passion instead of reason. In contrast, Jürgen Habermas has argued that active participation and *rational* communication in the public sphere are prerequisites for strong and legitimate government in modern society. Western Europe's 18th-century bourgeois public sphere, Habermas explained, is an Enlightenment development that legitimized the role of citizens to critique their governments. Public debate, he wrote, shifted decision making from an elite private decision-making calculus to a public competition of ideas. Thus, private citizens were, with the new organs of information (e.g., the press) and venues for discussion (e.g., coffeehouses), able to influence government. Habermas maintains, however, that the quality of contemporary public communication has deteriorated for two reasons. First, he maintains that in Western society the ethos of individualism has overwhelmed the sense of collective responsibility. Second, current institutions fail to foster debate and participation. Blaming late capitalism and mass communication, Habermas argues that public communication has been largely reduced to a one-way activity; individuals now consume ideas and arguments while participating less in the testing and production of these ideas.

Counterpublics

Habermas's formulation of "publics" came under intense theoretical criticism and reconsideration following the publication of the English translation of *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.* Among several notable problems with Habermas's notion of the public sphere—including what some consider the unnecessary distinction between public and private and the inaccurate distinction between public sphere and government—scholars noted the lack of access suffered by many to the bourgeoisie public sphere. Consequently, it is argued that an important component of modern democracy had been ignored: counterpublics. Counterpublics develop because of their exclusion from the more generally accepted public sphere. Instead of competing in the marketplace for the superiority of ideas, counterpublics attempt to affirm their difference from the mainstream. Counterpublics, the identities of which are precluded from equal public sphere access, attempt to disrupt the culturally homogenizing forces of mass communication that promote and perpetuate uncritical consumerism. A good illustration of counterpublics can be found among "zine" publishers. Zine publishers are underground comic writers who write, illustrate, print, and distribute their own zines. Often political in nature, it is evident from the miniscule distribution of these publications that these writers seek less to change the public sphere and more to find a community willing to listen to their countercultural perspectives. Common themes in zines include homosexuality, identity issues, rape, and leftist women's matters.

Deterioration of Public Communication

Understanding the public's deterioration into an aggregate of highly individuated persons has been the focus of numerous scholars since Habermas. People have become more separate from one another: more lonely, as Meyrowitz puts it. More recently, Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone* has revisited this issue, extensively evidencing the deterioration of public interaction. Putnam maintains that without face-to-face interaction, the quality of public discourse spirals downward. Anonymity harms deliberation. Thus, it is concluded by some that in today's social, political, economic milieu people function in public to perform economic transactions, while social and political participation have waned.

Mass media effects on public communication have also become widely studied. Habermas's arguments are consistent with many of the conclusions drawn by technological determinists (e.g., Meyrowitz; Neil Postman): that the confluence of mass communication delivery, modes of interface, commodification, consolidation of ownership, and content incapacitate citizens, lulling them with the perception that they are informed, knowledgeable, and active. In 1986, Postman, describing television as the most potent expression of flawed information mass-delivery mechanisms, asserts that television makes information abstract, decontextualized, and entertaining. He further warns that reliance upon this medium for information can put a nation at risk.

Other scholars have focused more on the impact of media conventions and ownership on public communication. Dewey maintained that access to thorough information and records is necessary for knowledgeable citizens to affect public policy. Long before television's ubiquity and anticipating Postman by more than 60 years, Dewey lamented that news is rarely presented in context, while its contents are governed by its shock value. McChesney maintains that the United States' media system is designed to maximize corporate profit. This, he explains, can be disastrous to a self-governing society. The disaster McChesney writes about is a result of policies increasingly enabling corporate media consolidation. Though ownership heterogeneity was once considered necessary enough to society that ownership rules, and content requirements were codified as prerequisites for broadcast licenses by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the government has back-peddled on many of these rules over the past 20 years. Lawmaker attitudes about media consolidation and public communication responsibility seemed to change following the demise of the Fairness Doctrine, an FCC rule that required broadcasters to examine different sides of issues relevant to the public. The FCC repealed its rule in 1987, and President Ronald Reagan subsequently vetoed legislation codifying the Fairness Doctrine as federal law. Since that time, limits on radio, television, and newspaper ownership have also been scaled back significantly.

Postmodernism and Public Communication

Much of the debate regarding public communication from postmodernists centers around responses to Habermas's modernist notions of public communication, his project of emancipating rationality, the "ideal speech situation," and his theory of communicative action. Generally, postmodern arguments challenging Habermas's ideas proceed from suspicion or outright rejection of the existence of socially determinable metaphysical truths and communicative practices predicated on the assumption of their existence. The norms of public communication situations, the arguments go, ultimately privilege a perspective or a regime of knowledge. Kellner and Steven Best summarize the postmodern position as rejecting the modern notions of reason and freedom while characterizing rationality as reductive and oppressive. They further explain that, according to postmodernism, arguments for rationality suppress plurality while favoring conformity. Society is plural inasmuch as there exists various points of view, perspectives, realities, and logics. The role of the individual in society is to maintain an attitude of reasoned skepticism because of the relationship between rationalization and excesses of political power. Cooperation with public communication norms legitimizes existing power arrangements.

New Media and Public Communication

Clearly, the role of public communication in politics differs based on one's theoretical standpoint and the period during which one is observing politics. The technology and techniques available to those wanting

to deliberate change with the times. Kevin DeLuca and Jennifer Peeples describe ways with which publics today exploit newsgathering conventions in order to be heard. They argue that the mediated environment we presently inhabit warrants the reconsideration of communication in the public sphere: that the epistemology of visual media has made Habermas's public sphere, to the extent that it ever existed, obsolete. DeLuca and Peeples maintain that public communication exists in a new form, as competing spectacles viewers consume through what they term the "public screen." We see this manner of public communication often today, as protest groups exploit corporate newsgathering conventions in order to break through the ordinary broadcast chatter, directing the public's attention to underaddressed issues and/or solutions. Protests, sit-ins, and marches are often used. DeLuca and Peeples identify protests at the 1999 World Trade Organization ministerial conference as exemplifying this modality of contemporary public communication.

Besides exploiting mainstream media outlets, voices have helped develop alternative channels for participation. Some observers hold out hope for the promise of public communication in light of the development of newer technologies and the new contexts created by our technologies. Most notably, the Internet has become a forum for political discussion and has recently been acknowledged for its growing political influence. In the 2004 Democratic primaries, Vermont Governor Howard Dean and his campaign manager Joe Trippi ran a surprisingly successful grassroots campaign by tapping the communication power of the Internet. Using a Web log, the Dean campaign arranged revolutionary "meet-ups" that convened committed and prospective supporters at volunteers' houses for speakerphone conferences with the candidate. Today, interactive blogs have changed the political communication landscape, making influential political players out of quasi-Web journalists ("bloggers") like Markos Moulitsas-Zuniga (DailyKos.com), Jerome Armstrong (MyDD.com), and Eli Pariser (MoveOn.org), giving power to the large communities of devoted readers and contributing writers. DailyKos.com, for instance, receives approximately 500,000 daily visits.

Philip Dalton

See also *Bowling Alone*; Deliberation; Fairness Doctrine; New Media Technologies; Public Sphere

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Public Funding

See Campaign Finance

Public Journalism

Public journalism is a movement within journalism that aims to reconnect news institutions to public and civic life and local community. Also known as "civic journalism," it began with a series of experiments in local newspapers in the late 1980s and eventually spread to more than a fifth of all U.S. newspapers (as well as some public and commercial television and radio stations) before beginning to fade as a self-conscious movement around 2002. The public journalism movement generated an impressive array of innovative practices in newsrooms and communities and an extensive network of practitioners, educators, and organizations committed to reshaping professional and institutional norms. Further, public journalism laid some of the foundations for the current practice of citizen journalism.

Philosophy of Public Journalism

The philosophy of public journalism, as manifest in the writings of its leading theorists and practitioners, can be summarized as follows: Journalists must assume responsibility for helping to constitute vital "publics" with the usable knowledge that enables them to deliberate about complex issues and to engage in common problem solving. Since journalists invariably frame and narrate the story of our common life in their reporting of "the facts," they should do so with an eye to how their stories permit people to see themselves as citizens rather than as mere spectators, victims, or consumers of information. While they should not compromise their objectivity through advocacy journalism, or by taking the lead in developing solutions to problems, they can play convening and catalytic roles that bring citizens together to deliberate among themselves, and with those who hold positions of power and authority, so that citizens may help fashion problem-solving strategies and policy responses.

Journalists can frame their coverage in ways that enable citizens to better map their own associational resources and build the knowledge base needed for active and productive engagement. They can shine a comparative spotlight on "solutions" that seem to have worked reasonably well in other communities, in order to expand citizens' knowledge of potentially useful models and to generate a sense of efficacy, without advocating for specific models or succumbing to "feel good" news and superficial optimism. Indeed, civic journalists can be tough on those in power by challenging them to respond to citizens' own agendas and real-life concerns and to engage with integrity in how they present their views and follow through on their commitments. And even as civic journalists help to expand the forums and usable knowledge through which citizens can engage with public life, they hold citizens themselves accountable for grappling with the full complexity of issues and acting responsibly to solve common problems. If there is a bias in civic journalism, it is a bias toward the democratic work of citizens in a self-governing republic.

History of Public Journalism

The public journalism movement began in the mid-1980s at the Knight-Ridder newspaper chain, led by James K. Batten, its then-CEO. Concerned about declining readership and the drift of newspapers from the communities they served, Batten began a company-wide search for new forms of what he called "community connectedness." In a series of experiments, beginning in Columbus, Georgia, in 1987, and moving soon to Wichita, Kansas, and Charlotte, North Carolina, editors at Knight-Ridder papers began to wrestle with the relationship between their coverage and democracy.

In Wichita, Davis "Buzz" Merritt, editor of the Knight-owned *Wichita Eagle,* responded to what he saw as a breakdown in the fundamental relationship of the press to the public. Merritt and the *Eagle* experimented with a new model of "citizen-driven" election coverage of the 1990 Kansas gubernatorial race. Citizens were polled on the issues that were most important to them, and their questions were asked of the candidates. When candidates refused to answer citizen questions, Merritt ran white space, and candidates quickly responded. By 1992 the *Eagle* sought to expand the experiment from politics to civic life and launched "The People Project: Solving It Ourselves," which explored a series of problems facing Wichita and sought citizen-solutions through a new kind of public deliberation in the pages of the newspaper. The People Project had a strong indirect effect on local public life, stimulating local community–government partnerships for more than a decade.

The Knight-owned *Charlotte Observer* (which Batten had once edited) tackled similar election projects in 1992 and then in 1994 launched "Taking Back Our Neighborhoods" under the leadership of editor Jennie Buckner. This pathbreaking effort to link coverage

of crime to its underlying causes included extensive neighborhood forums on problems and potential solutions. These were followed by intensive, coordinated coverage with television and radio partners for more than a year, and included spotlights on strategies used successfully in other communities in Charlotte and around the country. The media partners also covered citizen and governmental efforts to implement solutions. "Taking Back Our Neighborhoods" catalyzed lasting changes in the neighborhoods and the wider metropolitan community as well as in the newspaper itself. The project helped to forge civic linkages across lines of class, race, and neighborhood, and was widely credited by citizens, government, and police officials with reducing crime in the most dangerous neighborhoods as well as with the mobilization of communitywide social capital. Some magnet schools were opened to their neighborhoods for afterschool programs. Community centers were established where children could be tutored, and schools supplies, uniforms, and recreational equipment were collected and distributed. Neighborhood leaders began to meet with each other, in some cases for the first time, thereby catalyzing new forms of grassroots engagement and leadership training. The *Charlotte Observer* continued its efforts after the project with shorter daily and weekly civic series on race, education, the environment, and many other topics. The paper was reorganized into teams around new beats that reflected its broader civic approach to framing the news. By 2000 it had become one of the most consistent civic newsrooms in the United States, even though it had largely abandoned the rhetoric of civic journalism.

In Madison, Wisconsin, the "We the People Project," launched in 1991, enriched the democratic culture of Madison and Wisconsin communities statewide with a series of innovative collaborations among Wisconsin Public Television, Wisconsin Public Radio, the Wisconsin State Journal, CBS affiliate WISC-TV (Madison), and a local public relations firm. The project reported on both critical state elections and public issues (taxes, health care, budgets, land use, and the environment), usually combining careful community-based deliberation well in advance of news coverage, in-depth issues reporting by each of the media partners, and regional or statewide on-air coverage that featured innovative techniques of citizen reporting, questioning, or small group deliberation. By the late 1990s, to "we-the-people" an issue had become a verb in Wisconsin political culture.

In Norfolk, Virginia, and the surrounding "Hampton Roads" cities, the *Virginian-Pilot* led by editor Cole Campbell (1954–2007) undertook the most ambitious effort to build civic capacity in a daily newspaper. A series of innovations, including "community conversations" and "public life pages," were designed, in the words of managing editor Dennis Hartig, to do "public work" that "builds capacity" in the Norfolk region. For several years the *Pilot,* led by public life editor Tom Warhover, mapped a civic agenda in its five-city area on the topics of government, education, and public safety, each of which had a carefully formatted weekly public life page designed to build public memory on local issues, leading to better public deliberation and decision making. Citizens reported that, although they had not read the paper before, or only read the sports pages, they had begun photocopying articles and distributing them in their neighborhoods and through their civic organizations. The public life pages motivated citizens to become involved and attend trainings, and the civic institutions in turn taught citizens how to use the paper in a public way.

National Networks of Public Journalism

Many of these efforts were stimulated or supported in some way by two national networks: the Project on Public Life and the Press (PPLP) and the Pew Center for Civic Journalism (PCCJ). The PPLP, founded by New York University professor Jay Rosen in 1993 and funded by the Kettering and Knight Foundations, was a center for practical research and reflection until it closed in 1997. Particularly in its early years, PPLP served as a think tank for the movement, as executive and midlevel editors, senior reporters, and new hires mingled with leading journalism scholars like James Carey in quarterly seminars at the American Press Institute in Reston, Virginia. The seminars helped revive the long-forgotten work of John Dewey on the public and the press, thereby forging a language connecting the practical sense of the newsroom and the larger reaches of democratic theory.

The Pew Center, founded by journalist Ed Fouhy in 1994 and later directed by reporter Jan Schaffer, took a slightly different approach. Both were experienced, award-winning journalists, and their primary goal was to set up a series of experiments in newsrooms whose results could be studied, publicized, and replicated. The PCCJ awarded annual grants to news organizations

(generally ranging from $10,000 to $15,000) and also served as a center for reflection on practice and technique through scores of workshops and a clearinghouse of ideas until it closed in 2002. The Pew Center eventually reached out to hundreds of newsrooms, both directly and through important journalism organizations like the American Society of Newspaper Editors and Investigative Reporters and Editors. One study, which systematically analyzed the Pew archives, found that 320 American newspapers, approximately one-fifth of the total, had conducted nearly 650 civic journalism projects from 1994 to 2001.

Criticisms of Public Journalism

After the early experiments became widely discussed in the critical and journalism trade press in the early 1990s, mainstream critics, led by editors of *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* and the press reviews, reacted harshly to public journalism. The criticisms were wide ranging and often contradictory. Initially, many concerned the tone of public journalism's advocates, arguing that they were evangelical or proselytizing gurus seeking to convert journalists. Careful scholarly examination of the actual framing and tone of most public and civic journalism advocates has demonstrated that these characterizations were generally distortions. The larger question concerned what public journalism was and what it should do. Two public journalism criticisms of the mainstream press seem to have struck the deepest chord with those who sought to discredit public journalism. The first was making explicit that news media frame public debates and are not simply neutral filters for objective news (a proposition now widely accepted). If this was true, then many of the practices of the mainstream press would be opened to much wider public scrutiny and criticism, and the role of the elite press in serving as a primary filter and arbiter of public debate would be called into question. The second was the corollary proposition that, if framing is inevitable, journalists ought to employ frames that encouraged, enabled, or advanced civic and public life, although they should do this in a nonpartisan way. This remains the primary dividing line between public and mainstream journalism.

Critics also claimed that public journalism was a gimmick, designed to reinforce the failing commercial position of newspapers and build audiences. Further, critics claimed it was doing this cheaply. While there was an explicit and open link between Batten and the early Knight experiments to the rebuilding of newspaper audiences, studies demonstrated that public journalism was rarely cheaper than the standard practice. One of its main tenants of basic practice was that journalists should leave their desks, not rely on the usual sources in their Rolodexes, talk to a much wider range of citizens as well as experts, and build these sources into more complex, multisided stories on difficult public and civic problems. Whatever their shortcomings (and critics and supporters alike sometimes derided public journalism stories as broccoli, meaning that it was good for the public but not to its taste), these stories were almost invariably more difficult to report, took longer, involved more resources in writing, editing, layout, and space than almost all traditional daily journalism.

A third criticism was that public and civic journalism was being forced on the press by foundations, particularly the Pew Charitable Trusts, which financed the Pew Center for Civic Journalism. The Pew Center did have tremendous influence, through its workshops and seminars, research, and grants. The Pew grants, however, rarely covered the cost of projects funded, much less underwrote any news organization's practice over time. Rather, they were catalytic, creating space for experiments in news organizations.

Public and Civic Journalism in the Present

By the time the Pew Center closed it doors in 2002, however, momentum in the public and civic journalism movement *as* a movement had declined considerably, for several reasons. First, it was difficult to sustain the movement against continued opposition from mainstream critics. Within newsrooms, advocates became tired of defending civic journalism and frequently continued many of the practices without attempting to articulate them in terms of democratic renewal. After several years, the legitimacy and distinctiveness of the movement began to fade, and what was left was a collection of new practices without a larger frame. Intellectual and academic leaders moved on to other things, as did many newsroom leaders, editors, and reporters. Second, the generation of corporate leadership represented by James Batten passed (Batten died in 1995), and leading corporate sponsors like Knight-Ridder continued verbal support but became more focused on profit and short-term solutions to declining readership in the face of the considerable costs of doing public journalism well and the competing

investments in new technologies. Newspapers, always the engine of public journalism, were in crisis as an industry, and it had become clear (to supporters and critics alike) that public journalism per se was not a short-term fix. Third, and perhaps most important, as the larger framework of rethinking of citizen participation in media shifted to the World Wide Web, so did much of the specific focus of public journalism, as many of its veterans moved forward to new experiments in citizen journalism.

Still, many of the major innovations in news practice initiated by public journalism have been absorbed into the journalistic mainstream. Issue grids, ad watches, and citizen-posed questions for candidates can now be found in most mainstream papers during elections. The civic problem focus of civic journalism has entered the mainstream as "solutions-oriented" reporting. And major pockets of practice remain in newspapers that are still edited by movement veterans. As noted, the *Charlotte Observer* continues much of its civic practice, although without naming it as such. The *St. Paul Pioneer Press,* the editorial pages of the *Philadelphia Inquirer,* the *Spokesman-Review* in Spokane, *Memphis Commercial-Appeal,* and *Portland* [Maine] *Press Herald* are among the papers that actively continue the tradition in some form. Other newspapers still actively incorporate elements of civic and public practice into their work, including the *Wichita Eagle, Seattle Times-Intelligencer,* and Portland *Oregonian,* along with dozens of smaller papers. In Tampa Bay, the *Tribune* has been a leader in digital convergence in the newsroom and maintained a civic journalism tradition at least through 2005.

Further, public journalism experiments have spread internationally, to Europe (particularly Scandinavia), Africa, Asia, and South America. In many countries, where the public role of the media is more formally recognized, understood, institutionalized, and debated than in the United States, the public journalism movement's impact is still being felt.

Lewis A. Friedland

See also Citizen Journalism

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Public Opinion

Despite its centrality and invocation in today's political and social world, the notion of public opinion has been plagued by inconsistent conceptualizations over the years. Disagreements over the public can be traced back to the ancient Greek philosophers: Plato expressed disdain for the public and believed in the rule of philosopher kings, whereas Aristotle was more optimistic, believing in the power of the community and the wisdom of collective deliberation. These differences in perspectives transcended time, manifesting themselves in European thinking in the 16th and 17th centuries. For instance, Machiavelli cautioned rulers to be wary of the ruled, but Rousseau noted the indestructibility of the general will, arguing that the state should rest on—and advocate for—the good of the community. Contemporary views of public opinion are grounded in the assumption that a government should enact policies that reflect the will of its citizens. Despite this general consensus, the extent to which leaders respond to the demands and interests of their constituents has varied across space, time, and context.

Scholars continued to grapple with defining public opinion in the 20th century. In the inaugural issue of *Public Opinion Quarterly* in 1937, Allport posited a definition that involved "individuals . . . expressing themselves [regarding a] condition, person, or proposal of widespread importance . . . as to give rise to the probability of affecting action . . . toward the object concerned." Linking citizens' preferences to policy, this definition assumes that public opinion is an aggregate of individual opinions.

Allport's definition, however, is only one of several perspectives on public opinion. Another view does not see it as something quantifiable, but as a reflection of societal norms. This majoritarian perspective can be seen in Locke's "law of opinion" and Noelle-Neumann's theory of the spiral of silence, in which society has the power to impose sanctions on those who deviate from the norm. Other common definitions of public opinion include its being the opinion expressed by media and elites, something that arises from the clash of group interests, and a fiction.

This latter definition, equating public opinion with something that does not exist, is particularly crucial given a decades-long debate about citizen competence. Scholars immersed in this debate have questioned whether members of the mass public, who participate in an increasing number of polls, really understand enough about public affairs so as to express a meaningful opinion on these issues. After all, studies have shown that citizens are willing to express opinions on fictitious issues, and that their responses to questions asked repeatedly can be quite inconsistent. The extent to which opinions really exist, therefore, is critical in addressing the normative question regarding how much policymakers should rely on these expressed opinions.

Opinions, however, can be expressed in venues other than public opinion polls. Given these definitions, citizens can express their opinions in political conversation with friends, family, and neighbors; they can contact the media or their representatives directly; they can vote, campaign, donate money, sign petitions, and protest alongside others. Of course, technological advances have provided numerous opportunities to deliberate with and express views to individuals outside one's immediate lifespace. The public sphere, once delimited by geographical boundaries, has become more physically diffuse. Not surprisingly, this development has changed how *public* and *expression of opinion* are defined.

The study of public opinion is quite interdisciplinary in nature. Researchers across a number of fields collectively ask what public opinion is on a given issue, which segments of the populations hold these opinions, how these opinions are shaped, and in the spirit of Allport, how these opinions can effect change. For instance, sociologists tend to be more interested in how social movements and mobilization efforts take hold and how group identity can influence perceptions, while psychologists devote more time to studying how information gets processed and which persuasive appeals are more effective. In a related vein, political scientists' study of public opinion can include voting and other forms of political behavior as well as influences on policy formation.

Borrowing from a number of disciplines, political communication scholars examine public opinion from a number of different vantage points. Some examine public opinion as a product (how many people feel a certain way about a given issue), while others emphasize process-related phenomena (i.e., how opinions are formed). Some researchers look at macrolevel issues (e.g., how trust in government varies by country), leaving others to address microlevel concerns, such as how citizens acquire and use political information.

A large corpus of political communication research emphasizes the study of messages, ranging from their construction to content to consequences. That is, what institutional and ideological factors affect whether an issue gets covered or how the story is conveyed? What are the effects of media coverage or interpersonal discussion on an individual or group? And are attitudes, thoughts, and/or behaviors shaped by these messages, whether they appear in a conversation, news, entertainment content, advertisements, or political debates? According to communication theorists, the media not only have agenda-setting effects (the ability to convey to their audiences which issues are important), but also framing effects, or the capacity to shape attitudes and cognitions based on how an issue is portrayed.

Patricia Moy

See also Agenda Setting; Framing; Political Engagement; Spiral of Silence

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Public Relations, Political

Political public relations refers to the strategic communication activities of actors participating in the political process that aim at informative and persuasive goals in order to realize single interests. Beyond this rather general outline, however, the concept of public relations is quite inconsistent. The term's definition varies according to discipline and perspective. In general, three different approaches can be specified:

1. From a *micro-perspective,* public relations is defined by its instruments and activities ("Public relations is what public relations does"). These depictions of public relations are often adopted by practitioners and professional associations emphasizing normative views in order to justify their doing. Accordingly, these definitions often stress the idea of harmony and postulate the creation of mutual understanding.

2. Today, *organization theory* provides the most prevalent concept of public relations. It deals with the contribution of public relations to the goal attainment of an organization.

3. The *macro-perspective* deals with the function of public relations for society. Some authors consider public relations as part of the public communication system that also includes journalism and that provides information on publicly relevant subjects, whereas others argue that public relations is functionally dependent on other social systems and therefore has to be regarded as their subsystem. Some scholars, such as Franz Ronneberger, maintain that public relations is constitutive for the functioning of a democratic system because it helps to publicly articulate the diverging interests within a democratic society and thus allows for a reconcilement of these interests and for integration.

Differentiation From Related Terms

Political Advertising

Political advertising is a nonpersonal, one-way form of communication. It differs from public relations (which mainly tries to influence media coverage) in the use of *paid media*—the purchase of advertising space—in order to transmit a message to the public. Typically, in contrast to public relations, which aims at long-term effects such as the building of trust and credibility or image cultivation, advertising strives at short-term goals, such as the initiation of an electoral decision. However, the two concepts may overlap insofar as political advertising can affect the image of a political actor, just as long-term political public relations can influence voting behavior.

Political Marketing

The term *marketing* originated in the business sector and refers to influencing the behavior of the public or a target group in a competitive situation. Transferred to politics, it means the application of commercial marketing tools within the political field. This leads to designing "market-oriented" "products" (e.g., a political party) that suit the preferences of the electorate (detected by market intelligence) in order to gain a competitive edge. From a marketing perspective, public relations is a part of marketing (among advertising, etc.). This assumption, however, rests upon a very limited and narrow concept of public relations.

Propaganda

After having been used in a quite neutral way for a long time—originally in the religious and political, and since the 19th century also in the economic realm—the use of propaganda in the World War I and especially in Nazi Germany resulted in a negative connotation of the concept. Since then, propaganda designates partial, manipulative, and mendacious forms of persuasive communication that are often contrasted with the self-proclaimed pretense of public relations to provide only objective, honest, and informative messages. From a strictly functional perspective, however, public relations and propaganda are synonyms.

History of Public Relations

It was probably at the end of the 19th century that the term *public relations* was first used with today's meaning. The history of the term and the professional history of public relations, however, are much shorter than the thinking and acting that fulfilled the functions that correspond to those of public relations today. Determining at which time in history public relations started is therefore a much-contested question among public relations scholars. Three approaches may be identified:

1. Public relations has existed since people first tried to persuade and seek the trust of other people and applied respective techniques. Concrete examples can be named for the ancient world; however, appropriate activities can be probably traced back to the beginnings of humankind (*activity-oriented approach*).

2. Public relations appeared when industrialization, division of labor, and urbanization led to a more differentiated, heterogeneous society—a development that bore the need for systematic communication in order to foster one's own interests. This was the case in the second half of the 19th century. This *need-oriented approach* mainly applies to commercial public relations—examples for political public relations can be found much earlier.

3. Public relations has existed since the profession of public relations counselors emerged (*profession-oriented approach*). The development of public relations as a profession had already started in the middle of the 19th century. The first one to claim the invention of the phrase "counsel on public relations," however, was Edward L. Bernays (1891–1995), who together with his wife allegedly coined it in 1920. Ivy Ledbetter Lee (1877–1934), another founder of American professional public relations, in 1916 spoke of himself as "Adviser in Public Relations." Both Bernays and Lee worked not only for companies but also for politicians and states.

Actors in Political Public Relations

Political public relations is applied by diverse actors. These may be

- international organizations (e.g., UNO, EU, and their institutions);
- nation states;
- constitutional bodies such as governments and governmental institutions, parliaments, courts, authorities;
- intermediary actors such as parties, public organizations (federations and associations), NGOs, and pressure groups such as social initiatives and movements (e.g., citizens' groups).

As Barbara Pfetsch stresses, these actors strive for different goals, dispose of different resources and correspondingly use different strategies and instruments, and have different prospects of success. For example, governments in the first place aim at legitimization and acceptance for their generally binding decisions. In their public relations activities, they may take advantage of their members' prominence and of many occasions that take place and attract attention routinely (e.g., state visits), and they dispose of a large and professional public relations apparatus.

Intermediary organizations' functions are the articulation and aggregation of specific interests. They aim at the commitment of their partisans and at attention for their particular concern. Parties, in particular, have to distinguish themselves from their competitors in order to win elections. Associations are dependent on the support of their members and have to convince the public of the importance and the legitimacy of their interests. They also try to influence political decisions in the desired way. Social movements try to occupy topics that are neglected by established organizations. Their financial scope is usually limited, and they cannot access public attention routinely. This leads to strategies that aim at public attention in the first place, for example, by staging spectacular events.

As not only these actors as a whole but also their individual representatives avail themselves of public relations activities, a differentiation can be made between *corporate* and *personal* actors. Additionally, for example, Guenter Bentele distinguishes between *professional* corporate and personal actors whose main task lies in public relations activities and in *functional* actors who fulfill public relations tasks only in addition to their main function (e.g., politicians who appear in talk shows). Professional actors may work *within* a political organization (public relations divisions, press officers) or as *external* consultants (e.g., public relations agencies or single counselors). They may fulfill their task as *long-term* consultants or as *short-term* ones for special occasions (e.g., electoral campaigns). According to the increasing importance of public relations, a process of professionalization is taking place. This means that purely functional public relations is reduced in favor of the use of experts (or at least training functional public relations actors) and that professionals become more and more specialized.

Target Groups, Strategies, and Measures of Political Public Relations

Concerning the target groups of political public relations, a differentiation has to be made between internal and external public relations. *Internal public*

relations is directed at the members of an organization (for example, in order to communicate decisions, coordinate a campaign, or mobilize partisans during elections). *External public relations,* in contrast, is directed at an organization's environment, at the public or special segments of it that are important for an organization's successful functioning (stakeholders).

The target groups may be reached by *direct* measures, such as personal communication (e.g., speeches) or the distribution of an actor's own printed material (e.g., brochures). Most public relations messages, however, are *indirect,* which means they are mediated by the media (the effects of direct measures may also be fortified by media coverage, however). Therefore, the creation and maintenance of a reliable network of interpersonal relations between political actors and public relations professionals, on the one hand and media representatives, on the other hand, play a crucial role in public relations. These activities may be referred to as "relation management." They comprise the preparation of information, press conferences, background circles, invitations to accompany politicians on major journeys, and so on. These measures aim at creating favorable conditions and occasions for successful "news management." News management comprises strategies that aim at having one's position carried over to the public via the mass media in the most favorable way. Successful news management requires an adaptation to the media logic, which includes the specific conditions of content production (e.g., news values, deadlines), in order to make public relations messages more attractive to journalists and to overcome selection barriers.

An important component of news management is the strategy of *agenda building,* which attempts to influence the media agenda and thus to control the topics that become dominant in the public sphere. By this means, political actors may try to raise favorable issues. Correspondingly, another variant of this strategy is *dethematization,* which aims at avoiding media coverage of disadvantageous subjects or at gaining time for internal decision processes by shielding a topic from public interest.

An important measure in the agenda-building process is *personalization.* According to the media logic, it is more probable that the media will pick up an issue if it is linked with a—if possible, prominent—person, which makes abstract and complex facts easier to visualize and may serve as a kind of *symbolic message.* The same holds true for actions and events. Another measure to gain the interest of the media, therefore, is *event management,* which means the staging of events that take place purely for the media to cover them (pseudo-events, e.g., press conferences or protest actions by social movements) or influencing events that take place anyway but that may be arranged in a way (e.g., by timing, presence of celebrities) that guarantees the highest media attention possible (mediated events, e.g., party conventions).

However, these measures of news management not only aim at having a topic or an event simply covered by the media, but also, and at least as important, to have it covered in the desired way. The technique that tries to put an issue in a predefined context and aims at the convenient interpretation and accentuation of single aspects in order to influence the emerging perception is called "framing."

All these strategies build on *issues management,* which means the permanent identification and observation of issues actually or potentially relevant to an organization's stakeholders that are already or may in future be discussed in public and that bear a risk or an opportunity for an organization's scope of action.

Public relations not only tries to influence the coverage on particular issues, but also extends to another important field of activity, *image building.* Image building—which is applied to organizations as well as persons—aims at establishing credibility and trust that may guarantee long-term support without having to ask for understanding for each single decision and that enhances the chances that public relations messages are adopted by journalists. With respect to persons, the aim is not only to create a favorable image in respect to factual qualifications or for abilities that are needed in the political process (e.g., assertiveness), but also to add facets that create sympathy, for example, by delivering insights into the private sphere (e.g., pictures of family life). News management and image building are closely related to each other insofar as a favorable image is an important condition for the personalization of a topic, as issues focused by the media establish criteria for the judgment of political actors (priming) and contribute to the shaping of their image.

Another measure that can be assigned to political public relations is *public affairs.* Public affairs is directed at political and administrative decision makers and aims at influencing the legal and administrative conditions of an organization's work in the most favorable way (e.g., by lobbying).

Finally, it has to be stressed that political public relations takes place not only within a state or nation, but it is also used in *international communication* in order to achieve foreign policy goals. The most commonly used strategy in this context is *media diplomacy.* Direct media diplomacy uses the media as a channel to communicate with policymakers of foreign states (e.g., if diplomatic relations are troubled or nonexistent). Sometimes also journalists act as media brokers, which means that they deliver messages between political actors. Indirect media diplomacy, in contrast, designates a strategy of influencing decision making in other states by influencing public opinion. Media diplomacy is part of *public diplomacy* that also comprises *cultural diplomacy* activities that aim at building a climate of mutual trust in the long run and that are part of national image cultivation.

Public Relations Democracy

Because of eroding party loyalties, increasing competition among a rising number of political actors, a growing complexity of political decisions, and an expanding media sector, political public relations activities are becoming more and more important. The mediatization of politics (meaning the adaptation of politics to the media logic) and the emerging "public relations democracy" (a political system that is focused on the distribution of positive messages and the enhancing of one's public perception) are intensively discussed topics. On the one hand, it is argued that public relations helps articulate different standpoints in the political field and to put political issues across also to the politically less interested segment of the population. On the other hand, it is stated that public relations distorts the image of political reality, endangers factual decisions in favor of politainment (politics as entertainment) considerations, and finally contributes to a disenchantment with politics and a public disengagement from the democratic process.

The main criterion for the scope of positive versus negative effects lies in the question of whether public relations is policy focused—meaning whether public relations serves only to better communicate political decisions to the public—or whether public relations is applied in a media-focused version— whether the requests of public relations activities influence or substitute for political decisions.

Astrid Zipfel

See also Framing; Government Communication; Image, Political; Issue Management; Mediatization; News Management; Personalization of Politics; Political Advertising; Political Marketing; Press and Politics; Priming; Propaganda; Pseudo-Event; Public Affairs, Communication in; Spin, Political

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Public Service Broadcasting

Public service broadcasting (PSB) has emerged in three distinct waves: *paternalistic* (as in the UK, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere in the 1920s and 1930s); democratic and *emancipatory* (as in some Western European countries in the 1970s, when state [government] control of monopoly broadcasters could no longer be justified and they were transformed into autonomous PSB organizations); and *systemic* (as in West Germany after World War II, Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the 1970s, and in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989, when transition to democracy after an authoritarian or totalitarian system prompted corresponding change in the media).

Most European PSB organizations were originally created as public monopolies. Elsewhere, they emerged in the context of a mixed, public/commercial

system. In special cases (as in the United States), they were created as alternatives to an already existing commercial broadcasting system, or recreated (as in New Zealand) in the conviction that commercial broadcasting alone fails to meet all the needs of society.

PSB mostly arose out of collectivistic, social-democratic social arrangements that assigned to the state a duty to create a public sector institution providing a fundamental service with all the content needed by the audience as members of a society, culture, and democratic polity. The objective was to sustain an informed electorate, cultural and educational enrichment, and enlightenment of society. An important element of this was the culture of "noncommercialism."

Public service broadcasting emerged during what has been called the "public service" phase of media policy development, when it was dedicated to the achievement of cultural and social goals (mainly in broadcasting) and to the provision of "communication welfare." The ultimate goal was protection of the public interest and enhancement of democracy, with PSB serving as a mainstay of the public sphere, a forum for public debate, and one of the primary channels of political communication. It had the democratizing effect of making virtually the whole spectrum of public life available to all and extending the universe of discourse.

PSB displays, as do all media systems, "systemic parallelism": its organization, structure, governance, and financing reflect national specificities. Still, some shared features include public ownership; public funding, at least in part; universal access, free at the point of reception; a charter or legislative remit enshrining purpose; the Reithian doctrine that the purpose of broadcasting is "to inform, educate and entertain"; the promoting of national identity and culture, or nation building; a comprehensive range of programming to serve the whole audience (diversity of programming); programming to address the needs of minority audiences; programming that includes elements of "high culture" or other content unlikely to be provided by the free market; the encouraging of risk taking and innovation in programming; regard for the audience as citizens rather than consumers. Editorial independence and institutional autonomy are indispensable, as PSB is to serve the public, rather than the state, government, or political establishment. Often, however, political influence on PSB is strong.

As formulated by the Council of Europe in 1994, some additional program obligations of public service broadcasters provide a reference point and a factor for social cohesion and integration of all individuals, groups, and communities; provide a forum for a broad public discussion; develop pluralistic, innovative, and varied programming, meeting high ethical and quality standards; reflect the different philosophical ideas and religious beliefs in society, promote mutual understanding and tolerance and community relations in pluri-ethnic and multicultural societies; ensure that the programs offered contain a significant proportion of original productions and as appropriate use independent producers and cooperate with the cinema sector.

In Europe, as commercial broadcasting and new communication technologies developed, PSB first lost its monopoly on the audience and then, with the arrival of thematic channels, on most of the PSB "content." That, and a "program convergence" with commercial stations (due to competition for audiences and/or advertising revenue) resulted in a crisis of legitimacy and financing for PSB stations.

Meanwhile, ideological, cultural, and axiological change (the arrival of postmodernism, neoliberalism, individualism, anti-authoritarianism, marketization, and commercialism) undercut the legitimacy of the public sector and its involvement in satisfaction of individual needs. Moreover, the leveling of living and educational standards and democratization led to rejection of asymmetrical relations once involved in the model of paternalistic, public enlightenment-oriented PSB organizations. This is also promoted by the "architecture of participation," created by the information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the Internet.

The future of PSB seems to hang in the balance. It is clear that it needs to be fundamentally adjusted to the digital age. At the same time, governments and some trade-oriented international organizations, under pressure from the commercial sector, are insisting it remain in its traditional mold. This may prevent its vital realignment to new technological realities and new ways of popular participation in mediated social communication.

Digitalization and ICTs seem to create limitless choice and are seen as further undermining the rationale for PSB. Yet, they also force commercial broadcasters and content providers into cut-throat competition, reducing their ability to provide high-quality content to the mass audience and to offer public service-like content. Even thematic commercial

channels are abandoning ambitious, quality content in favor of more entertainment. Where quality content is available from commercial sources, additional payment is often required. PSB—with its dedication to universal access, free at the point of reception—continues to be the only realistic alternative of access to such content. Thus the old scarcity rationale for PSB's existence may paradoxically return, bolstering the claim that PSB will be more needed in the Information Society than ever before. Moreover, ICTs offer PSB an opportunity to perform its service better and extend its range of activities, from universal service to personalized public service via a range of new platforms other than traditional broadcasting. Hence the calls for a change of name, for example, to "public service media."

Karol Jakubowicz

See also Public Journalism

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Public Sphere

The field of political communication has always drawn upon and incorporated elements from different intellectual currents. In recent decades the concept of the *public sphere* has emerged as a focal point of theorizing, research, and reflection within a number of disciplines in the social sciences and humanities and in political communication. In fact, it could be argued that for political communication, the relevance of the public sphere as a particular concept and as a general perspective is particularly compelling, even if the notion of the public sphere brings with it a number of contested issues. The discussion here first looks at the basic elements of the concept of the public sphere as derived from the groundbreaking work of Jürgen Habermas. From there it suggests that the public sphere, as a concept to be used with political communication, can be seen as comprising three basic dimensions. The discussion then looks briefly at some of the issues and debates that have followed the evolution of this concept.

The Public Sphere According to Habermas

Increasingly, discussions about democracy and the media are framed within the concept of the public sphere. In schematic terms, a functioning public sphere is understood as a constellation of communicative spaces in society that permit the circulation of information, ideas, debates—ideally in an unfettered manner—and also the formation of political will, that is, public opinion. In the vision of the public sphere, these spaces, in which the mass media and now, more recently, the newer interactive media figure prominently, serve to permit the development and expression of political views among citizens. These spaces also facilitate communicative links between citizens and the power holders of society. While in the modern world the institutions of the media are the institutional core of the public sphere, we must recall that it is the face-to-face interaction, the ongoing talk among citizens, where the public sphere comes alive, so to speak, and where we find the actual bedrock of democracy.

While versions of the concept of the public sphere appear in the writings of a number of authors during the 20th century, such as Walter Lippmann, Hannah Arendt, and John Dewey, most people today associate the concept with Jürgen Habermas's version that was first published in 1962. Though the full text was not translated into English until 1989, his concept had by the 1970s come to play an important role in the critical analysis of the media and democracy in the English-speaking world. Since the translation, both the use of the concept and critical interventions in relation to it have grown considerably. While Habermas has not attempted a full-scale reformulation of the public sphere, it is clear that his view of the concept is evolving as his work in other areas develops.

After an extensive historical overview, Habermas surmises that a public sphere began to emerge within the bourgeois classes of Western Europe in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The institutional basis for this public sphere consisted of an array of milieu and media, such as clubs, salons, coffeehouses, newspapers, books, and pamphlets, all of which in various (though incomplete) ways manifested Enlightenment ideals of the human pursuit of knowledge and freedom.

For Habermas, the key here was not only the institutional basis, but also the manner in which communication took place in this burgeoning public sphere. He saw that interaction in this social arena, however imperfectly, embodied the ideals of reason, that is, the Enlightenment goals of rational thinking, argument, and discussion. In his notion of the public as a rational, dialogic process, Habermas's account of communication and democracy bears similarities with that of John Dewey. We can note that Habermas's work from the 1980s on communicative rationality further develops normative perspectives on how political communication should take place in order to enhance intersubjectivity and the democratic character of society.

Habermas sees the public sphere growing and deepening in the first few decades of the 19th century with the spread of mass literacy and the press, but then, gradually, the decay sets in. Journalism increasingly loses its claim to reason; public discourse degenerates into public relations. As the logic of commercialism increasingly shapes the operations of the media, the domain of rationality diminishes. Moving into the 20th century, Habermas observes with pessimism the trivialization of politics, not least in the electronic media, the industrialization of public opinion, and the transformation of publics from discursive to consuming collectivities. These and other ills serve to constrict society's potential for democratic political communication.

Three Dimensions of the Public Sphere

The public sphere perspective on political communication, with its strong normative commitments and broad horizons, may seem removed from the empirical realities of political communication. While the strength of the perspective lies in its conceptual and theoretical dimensions, it also offers many entry points for empirical and critical analysis. To make the notion of the public sphere more accessible as an analytic tool for political communication research, it can be useful to conceptualize it as comprising three constitutive dimensions: the structural, the representational, and the interactional.

The *structural dimension* has to do with the formal institutional features of the public sphere. At bottom, the public sphere rests upon the idea of universality, the norm that it must be accessible to all citizens of society. If the media are a dominant feature of the public sphere, they must thus be technically, economically, culturally, and linguistically within reach of society's members; any a priori exclusions of any segment of the population collides with democracy's claim to universalism. Seen from this angle, the vision of a public sphere raises questions about media policy and economics, ownership and control, the role of market forces and regulation, issues of the privatization of information, procedures for licensing, rules for access, and so forth.

The *representational dimension* refers to the forms and contents of mass media output, as well as the attributes of "one-to-many" communication via the newer interactive media. Thus, the representational dimension includes all the traditional questions and criteria within political communication about media output—for example, fairness, accuracy, pluralism of views, sensationalism, infotainment, diversity of cultural expression. Yet, while the media are central to the public sphere, they also generate a semiotic milieu that far exceeds its boundaries. Most media output is not about political communication; it deals instead with entertainment, popular culture, sports, advertising, and so on. Thus, the mediated public sphere of political communication is competing for attention in a semiotic environment overwhelmingly oriented toward (ostensibly) nonpolitical matters.

The dimension of *interaction* reminds us that democracy resides, ultimately, with citizens who engage in talk with each other, whether face to face or via interactive technologies like the Internet and telephones. The public sphere as a process does not "end" with the publication of a newspaper or the transmission of a radio or TV program; these media phenomena are but one step in larger communication chains that include how the media output is received, made sense of, and used by citizens in their interaction with each other. Moreover, civic interaction in the public sphere need not just be directly mobilized by the media; it can also rise through discussions that relate personal experience to societal horizons. Here it is useful to recall that Habermas, as well as other writers such as Dewey, argue that a "public" should be conceptualized as something other than just a media audience. A public, according to Habermas and Dewey, exists as discursive interactional processes; atomized individuals, consuming media in their homes, do not comprise a public. To point to the interaction among citizens is to take a step into the sociocultural contexts of everyday life. Interaction has its sites and spaces, its discursive practices, its contextual

aspects; politics, in a sense, it emerges through talk. Thus, from a public sphere perspective, it can be argued that political communication extends deep into people's microworlds.

Conceptual Issues and Debates

Habermas's work on the public sphere had a major impact on thinking about media, publics, democracy, and the nature of political communication. Observers have noted that Habermas's historical account bears many of the markings of the original Frankfurt School of critical theory. There is also a decidedly nostalgic quality to the analysis, the sense that there once was an historical opening that then became closed off. Habermas certainly sees the limitations of this original bourgeois public sphere, not least in class terms; a counterpoint to Habermas's model even argued for a proletarian public sphere. Feminists have been quick to point out the gender limitations of the bourgeois public sphere—as well as in Habermas's own thinking. He has responded generously to his critics and made constructive use of their interventions.

There is ambiguity with the concept: it is not fully clear whether what Habermas describes is the empirical reality of an historical situation or whether he is fundamentally presenting a normative vision. Most readers conclude that it is both. He describes the structural mechanisms that erode the public sphere, yet at the same time he—and many of his readers—continue to be inspired by the vision of a robust public sphere serving a well-functioning democracy. Indeed, as the use of the concept spreads, the idea of the public sphere has tended to gravitate away from its Frankfurt School origins and to join mainstream discussions about media performance, journalistic quality, political communication, and the conditions of democracy. In practical terms, the normative horizons from the liberal or progressive traditions that promote "good journalism" or "information in the public interest" are not so different from ideals about the media inspired by the framework of the public sphere.

Another key theme of debate has centered on the tension between a unified, national public sphere versus a pluralistic or fragmented one. The argument that each nation state should strive for a large, encompassing public sphere is based in part on the criteria for governability—with too many forums and too many voices, democracy ends in an ineffective cacophony. This position also derives from concern that isolated islands of public discourse will become politically ineffectual. This view of the public sphere—as providing a unified political culture—was used (albeit indirectly) in, for example, defining the mission of European public service broadcasting. Today, the importance of the public sphere concept is being reiterated in the context of the European Union; there is a need to achieve some such semblance of a transnational public sphere, as well as the profound difficulty in attaining anything other than a collection of national mediated spheres in which European Union matters are aired and discussed.

The arguments that see the public sphere in essentially plural terms base their claims in part on the complex and heterogeneous sociocultural realities of late modern society, including its increasingly globalized character. To even think of a unified communicative space for all citizens seems simply sociologically out of touch with the real world. Habermas has moved in this direction in a more recent reformulation of the concept. Further, it has also been argued that in a democracy, various groups, movements, interests, and other collectivities need a semi-sheltered space to work out their own positions, promote collective identity, and foster empowerment. Some argue for oppositional or counter-public spheres. Obviously the heterogeneous quality of late modern life and its public cultures raises problematic issues for democracy, and these become particularly compelling when refracted through the prism of the public sphere.

One way to conceptualize the public sphere in the context of societal heterogeneity is to see it as consisting of many communicative spaces structured in a tiered fashion. The major mass media of a society can be seen as creating the dominant public sphere, while smaller media outlets, not least those that exist on the Internet, can generate cluster of smaller spheres defined by interests, gender, ethnicity, and so on. Smaller spheres "feed into" larger ones, ideally resulting in interfaces that allow collective views to "travel" from the outer reaches toward the dominant center.

A further point of contestation has been the normative view of the kind of communication that should take place in the public sphere. There is in the Habermasian tradition a strong leaning toward the rational; communication is theorized in a rigorous manner that emphasizes formalized deliberation. Among the common criticisms leveled against

his approach is that he seemingly strives to reduce political communication in a manner that excludes affective, rhetorical, symbolic, mythic, bodily, humorous, and other dimensions. Furthermore, it could be argued that the criteria of traditional notions of rational speech may exclude other, specific communicative registers prevalent among particular groups, thereby undercutting their communicative legitimacy in the public sphere—a line of argument that readily links up with the theme of a unified versus pluralistic public spheres.

Politics, the Public and the Private

Certainly one of the central quandaries of public sphere theory is that social and cultural evolution continues to scramble the distinction between public and private. This is a development that is abundantly visible in the late modern media milieu. The traditionalist stance is to define politics in a narrow way, focusing on the formal political arena in the mainstream media. In the process it thereby shuts its eyes, so to speak, to a lot of reality.

The concepts of public and private encompass an ensemble of notions that readily align themselves into sets of polarities. The idea of "public" in traditions like the Habermasian is implacably associated with reason, rationality, objectivity, argument, work, text, information, and knowledge. The private resonates with the personal, with emotion, intimacy, subjectivity, aesthetics, style, image, and pleasure. (There is a large literature on these themes as they pertain to the media.) In the media context, the private is also closely related to consumption, entertainment, and popular culture.

At a fundamental level, what is at stake in the modern use of the public sphere perspective is the question of where the political resides and how it is positioned against that which is deemed nonpolitical. There has been a flood of discussion and debate around this issue. Depending on circumstances, the seemingly private can often harbor the political, a point that has been forcefully made not least by feminist political theorists like Lister and Meehan. Similarly, the potentially political character of popular culture is often asserted, a view that has also entered into some corners of political science. The possibilities for topics to become politicized are key elements of the open, democratic society. In the final instance, it can be said that politics has to do with decision making, but within the public sphere, the realm of the "politically relevant" is larger, always shifting—and can never be fully specified.

Peter Dahlgren

See also Deliberation; Democracy Theories; Public Communication in Politics

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Pundits, Punditry

Pundits are individuals who are considered highly knowledgeable or possessing of expertise in a particular topic. Most commonly, the term *pundit* is attributed to people knowledgeable and interested in politics, current affairs, sociology, and other social sciences, but the term is also applied to individuals knowledgeable in technology or computer science. The term has become an increasingly common word in popular culture as the cable news channels have risen in power.

Pundit has a somewhat negative connation in recent usage, as it denotes a person who is politically biased but is *portraying* a knowledgeable, balanced, and neutral image. People who are recognized as pundits often express opinions without necessarily being acknowledged experts in the subject areas in which they opine. Pundits may be more similar to ideological partisans who have an agenda than similar to legitimate experts in a particular subject area who have measured and educated commentary.

Additionally, in part because of the popularity of punditry on cable news channels, there is a perception that punditry may be damaging the credibility and objectivity of journalism. There is concern that news consumers may associate punditry with news reporting and therefore develop a distrust of journalism. Additionally, critics of pundits believe the large amount of news space and news time devoted to punditry (commentary, opinion, and analysis) takes away news space and news time for legitimate news reporting, and it encourages an "infotainment" view of news.

Cable news channels such as CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC often have punditry news and political programs on their lineup. For example, Lou Dobbs on CNN, Bill O'Reilly on Fox News, and Joe Scarborough on MSNBC are all considered pundits. Other media personalities considered pundits are Al Franken, Rush Limbaugh, and Ann Coulter. Sometimes television pundits are referred to as "talking heads."

Pundits also exist in print news media. For example, newspaper columnists are sometimes considered pundits because they comment on current affairs even though they are not recognized experts in all of the subject areas they discuss in their columns.

The term originates from the Indian term *pandit*, which refers to someone who is knowledgeable in various subject areas, conducts religious ceremonies, and offers counsel to authorities.

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See also Commentary, Political

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Putin, Vladimir (1952–)

Born in Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg), Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin served as the second president of Russia. During his one-year appointment as the last of Boris Yeltsin's prime ministers, he unexpectedly became acting president of Russia on December 31, 1999, following Yeltsin's resignation after 8 years in power. Putin's first decision was to grant immunity from prosecution to his predecessor, who had been under investigation for money laundering by Russian and Swiss authorities. Elected president in the first round by a clear majority of 57%, Putin projected the image of a literally and metaphorically strong leader (a judo black belt), a welcome change for Russians nostalgic about the country's glorious past. Putin's firm approach to the Chechen crisis combined with his law-and-order image have kept his popularity high throughout his presidency, as reflected in his 2004 reelection with 71% of the vote.

With a degree in international law from the Leningrad State University, Putin speaks near-native German and acceptable English. Before becoming a prominent Russian politician, he spent most of his career in the KGB. Having completed training at the KGB School in Moscow, between 1985 and 1990 he was stationed in Dresden, Germany. In the 1990s he changed positions frequently and received a degree in economics from the Saint Petersburg Mining Institute. Immediately prior to his nomination as prime minister, Putin was head of the FSB (successor to the KGB) and a permanent member, and then head, of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

Domestically, Putin focused much of his efforts in office on overturning the negative population growth that threatens the very existence of the Russian people. His policies are characterized by concentration of political power and renationalization of critical economic sectors such as oil and gas industries.

Intent on taking Russia back to its strong international position without directly repeating the Cold War rhetoric, Putin is popular at home but increasingly controversial internationally. What started out as an almost unconditionally approving response of the United States and European Union (EU) to Putin's Russia has slowly turned into a more critical view of his rule. The world has let Putin know it does not like Russia's suppression of media, court, and legislative freedoms, and the treatment of Kremlin critics. Several events have been particularly controversial: the prosecution and imprisonment of Russia's richest man, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, president of Yukos oil company and Putin's frequent critic, for tax evasion; the Beslan school hostage crisis; former KGB agent Aleksander Litvinienko's deathbed accusation of Putin poisoning him; the murder of political journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who extensively criticized Putin's policy in Chechnya; the poisoning of a Ukrainian opposition presidential candidate; and numerous limitations on media freedoms.

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Putin's Russia is the third most dangerous place in which to work, after Iraq and Algeria, and Politkovskaya was the 13th journalist to be killed in Russia in 2006. Informal and formal government control of the media has increased through punitive tax audits and hostile takeovers, leading to the situation where "all three major television stations are in the hands of Kremlin loyalists."

The beginning of 2007 saw the EU adopt a more unified critical stand against Russia concerning energy security, following Russia using energy to gain or keep political domination in the region through dramatic increases in gas and oil prices and through sudden interruptions of energy supply. Putin has also been criticized for supporting former communist Victor Yanukovych for president of the Ukraine against the more progressive opposition leader, which is emblematic of Putin's efforts to increase Russian influence in the whole region, leading to strained relations with a number of countries, including the Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, the Baltic Republics, and Poland.

At the same time, overall, Putin has had relatively good relations with most of the Western world, including U.S. President George W. Bush and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and has actively sought to increase Russian influence in Asia, particularly in China and India. Internationally, Russia is treated like a democracy and plays an important (if unwarranted by its economic potential) role, exemplified by its membership in the G8 group.

Since 1983, Putin has been married to Lyudmila Putina (born Shkrebneva) with whom he has two daughters, Maria and Yekaterina.

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See also Russia, Democratization and Media

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QUAYLE, DAN (1947–)

James Danforth Quayle, born to James and Corrine Quayle in Indianapolis, Indiana, served as vice president of the United States under President George H. W. Bush from 1989 to 1993. At the time of his birth, his father, Jim Quayle, a far-right conservative and member of the John Birch Society, was a middle manager with the *Huntington Herald-Press* newspaper, owned by his father-in-law, Eugene Pullman, in the small town of Huntington, Indiana. After moving to Arizona for 8 years, Jim Quayle returned to Huntington with his family in 1963 and bought the *Herald-Press* from his father-in-law. After returning to Indiana, Dan Quayle finished his last 2 years of high school in Huntington, which he calls home. From 1965 to 1969, Quayle worked as a reporter and pressman for the *Herald-Press* (and general manager from 1974 to 1976). In 1969, he also graduated from DePauw University in Greencastle, Indiana, with a degree in political science.

In 1974, Quayle graduated from Indiana Law School and passed the Indiana bar, but before doing so, he held various positions in Indiana state government. Between 1970 and 1971, he worked with the Indiana State Attorney General's Office, served as an administrative assistant to the governor of Indiana from 1971 to 1973, and was Director of the Indiana Inheritance Tax Division between 1973 and 1974. After teaching Business Law at Huntington College, Indiana, in 1975, Quayle was elected to the U.S. Congress in 1976, where he represented the fourth District of Indiana for two terms. Quayle was then elected to the U.S. Senate and served from 1981 to 1989. During this time, Quayle was relatively unknown outside of his home state. All of that changed when Bush nominated him to serve as his vice-presidential running mate in the 1988 presidential election.

At the age of 41, with 12 years of experience in Congress, Dan Quayle not only became George Bush's surprise running mate but also a constant target of jokes and ridicule by the media. As such, Quayle would earn his dubious distinction, according to David Broder and Bob Woodward, in *The Man Who Would Be President: Dan Quayle,* as not only a political lightweight but as a boyish buffoon. Stunned during the campaign by what he referred to in his memoir, *Standing Firm,* as a feeding frenzy by the press, he failed to be forthright about accusations concerning his privileged upbringing, mediocre performance and academic dishonesty in college, and use of family connections to enter the Indiana National Guard to avoid the draft and enroll in law school.

In light of the 1988 election campaign, Quayle became known as one of the most undesirable and debunked vice-presidential candidates to hold the office. During his vice-presidential campaign debate with Democratic vice-presidential opponent Lloyd Bentsen, Quayle was famously ridiculed when, in response to Quayle's mention of John Kennedy's youthful accomplishments as a defense of his own young age, Bentsen quipped: "You're no Jack Kennedy." Quayle's lackluster and gaffe-ridden campaign notwithstanding, he remained largely unknown to the public and believed himself that he was misunderstood by the press. Broder and Woodward also admitted that some media allegations, particularly those surrounding descriptions of vast wealth and

academic dishonesty, were false. Nevertheless, there were legitimate doubts about Quayle's strength as a potential president, and given the options for a conservative running mate that Bush had, the campaign ironically brought attention to the importance of the vice presidency and the diligence needed when selecting a candidate for the office.

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R

Rabin, Yitzhak (1922–1995)

Yitzhak Rabin was the fifth prime minister of Israel (and the first local born), serving in this office for two terms, during the years 1974 to 1977 and 1992 to 1995. A former chief-of-staff and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, Rabin has made a significant contribution to the developing history of the state of Israel, in times of war as well as in the pursuit of peace.

Through most of his childhood years Rabin's family lived in Tel-Aviv, where he was raised in a Zionist-socialist educational environment. As a teenager Rabin left the family house and joined the agriculture boarding high school, Kadoori. During his years there, Rabin joined the "Haganah" (a paramilitary Zionist organization). After graduating high school with distinction in 1940, Yitzhak Rabin became one of the leading officers in the "Palmach," the strike force of the "Haganah."

When the state of Israel was established in 1948, Rabin became one of the senior commanders in the IDF (Israeli army). During his 27 years in the IDF, Rabin played key roles in some of the most dramatic and influential military operations. Following more than a decade of service in senior military positions, Rabin was appointed chief-of-staff, serving in this role from 1964 through 1968 (and leading the army to its historic victory in the 1967 Six Day War).

When he retired from the IDF, Rabin became a diplomat, serving as the Israeli ambassador to the United States from 1968 to 1973. In this office Rabin promoted and consolidated the ties between the two countries.

Returning to Israel in 1973, Rabin joined the Labor Party and became a Knesset member. In 1974, following Golda Meir's resignation as prime minister, Rabin was chosen as her successor, first in his party and later in the general elections that took place in that year. His first term as prime minister ended in 1977, as a result of a few political and personal turbulent events. In 1984, after 7 years as an oppositional Knesset member, Rabin was appointed as the defense minister in the newly established national unity government. He served in this position for 6 years, during which the first Intifada (Palestinian uprising) had begun. As a defense minister Rabin has been associated with a "strong hand" policy toward the Palestinians, although some of his moves were meant to increase their political autonomy.

In 1992, following his reelection as chair of the Labor Party, Rabin was once again elected as prime minister. He served in this position through his last day.

Rabin's second term was marked by his intense efforts to pursue peace between Israel and its neighbors. Rabin played a leading role in the signing of the Oslo Accords, which enabled the creation of the Palestinian authority. For this role Rabin was awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize, along with Yaser Arafat and Shimon Peres. This was also the year in which the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty was signed.

Yitzhak Rabin's relationships with journalists and the news media were relatively strong and solid throughout the years (partly due to his reputation as an honest politician and a man of his words). This is ironic because it was an Israeli journalist who contributed to Rabin's resignation as prime minister in 1974 (by publishing a report on Lea Rabin's illegal

bank account in the United States). Rabin had the habit of utilizing long hours in flight (during his frequent visits around the world) to share sensitive and rare pieces of information with the group of political reporters who would join him, making such flights cherished opportunities for any journalist involved. Another irony in Rabin's relationship with the news media was found in the last months prior to his assassination. Although there was an overall support for his debated peace agenda, the Israeli media had covered the numerous terror attacks of the time in ways that frustrated Rabin, as he would see them as disproportional and dangerously harmful. The growing popular resistance to Rabin and his policy, and especially the violent and sometimes illegal demonstrations from the far right, was also intensively covered. It was not until after the assassination that many journalists began questioning their own performance, wondering whether giving the right extremists such extensive coverage might have stimulated the chain of events that ended with Rabin's death.

On November 4, 1995, at the end of a massive peace rally in Tel-Aviv, Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Jewish extremist. This was the tragic peak of a long period of escalating oppositional activities against Rabin and his peace plans. The day of the assassination has become a national memorial day for Rabin and his legacy.

Vered Malka

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Race in Politics

"Race in politics" can mean many things depending upon which definition of politics is used. Defining politics as "the use of power" encompasses the broadest range of topics. Many of these, such as persuasion techniques in intercultural communication and dominant and subservient stereotypes in entertainment, are of interest to scholars of communication, yet they tend not to be the focus of a political communications curriculum. Political communication tends to define the parameters of studying race using a more restricted definition of politics that relates more directly to the power of the government. Attention is paid to communication on explicitly racial issues (such as slavery, Japanese internment, desegregation, affirmative action in education) or to issues that impact racial minorities disproportionately (such as welfare spending, English-only referendums, or immigration). Other times it refers to public speeches, advertising, and news coverage of events and people who mobilized racial minority communities or defined (and redefined) race relations. Another way to think of "race in politics" is to focus on the members of racial minority groups who are literally "in politics" as politicians, candidates, and voters. Political communications studies their persuasive strategies, messages, coverage, and effects of campaign communication.

This discussion of race in politics begins with the question of what race is—explaining how race as a concept is inherently political and how it has changed over time. It then examines the centrality of race in American history. Political communications are central to how that history is understood and the place that this history holds in today's racial debates. Finally, the role of race in political campaigns will be considered focusing on strategies of candidates and politicians of color, voting behavior of people of color, as well as the ways that the idea of racial difference is used to persuade white voters.

Race as Inherently Political

Since race is a social construction rather than a biological fact, its meaning has changed over time. Its understanding both reflects and influences politics. The notion that people can self-identify as a member of a racial group and practice "identity politics" with a community of similar people is a fairly recent way of considering race as a social construction of political relevance. It assumes an individual autonomy that ignores the authority exercised by the government to ultimately determine racial categories (and who fits in each) and the implications of these categories.

Until the mid-1960s, the category of "white" was recognized by law as the "top" of a racial hierarchy imbued with power and privilege. The naturalization law of 1790 limited citizenship to "free white people" because they were assumed (by free white people) to be the only ones "fit for self-government." The perceived

threat to "good citizenship," by including large numbers of Irish immigrants in the 1840s and Eastern Europeans in the 1880s, resulted in a redefinition of "whiteness." What was once considered a monolithic group was differentiated using eugenics into a hierarchy of "white races." Courts defined the boundaries of whiteness in naturalization and miscegenation cases (determining, for example, in one case that a Sicilian was not white and in another that Armenians were). In 1924, Congress passed the Johnson-Reed Act establishing a quota system that allowed in just 2% of each group's population as of the 1890 census. This was designed to reduce the influx of "undesirable" Europeans. This highly restrictive policy was generous in comparison to approaches taken to blacks (Black Codes and Jim Crow laws), Indians (extermination, displacement, and re-education), and Asians (Chinese exclusion immigration policy and being barred from California in 1854). Native Americans were given official citizenship in 1924, but it was not until 1968 that the Indian Bill of Rights gave Native Americans living on reservations full constitutional rights.

By the 1940s large black migration and agitation over segregation in the military, the poll tax, and lynching refocused conceptions of race into a black/white binary. The idea that race is "about blacks" continues to dominate public discourse. It is challenged by other people of color who argue that they are rendered invisible by this dualistic thinking.

American Political Heritage and the Centrality of Race

Although assumptions about racial difference have moderated, the fundamental dilemmas remain the same—how to balance freedom and equality, property rights and human rights, unity and individualism. America's enduring challenge is how to create community, unity, and stability while valuing freedom, individualism, and competition. One approach to creating a national identity among diverse people is to impose a hierarchy under which everyone "knows their place" and to justify these "places" in a way that sidesteps contradictions with central American values. Another is to allow diverse groups access to democratic values under conditions that mitigate differences. Still another is to prioritize group identities over a unified national one.

The first was explicitly racist (and as indicated in the previous discussion—nativistic). The nation's founding was predicated on conceding to Southern states' desire for maintaining slavery and South Carolina and Georgia's insistence that unrestricted slave importation continue (at least until 1808). The debate that resulted in the 3/5 Compromise (counting slaves as 3/5 of a person for representation and direct taxation) was the result of practical bargaining among men whose economic self-interests differed; it was not a moral debate. The idea of a new "free nation" outlawing slavery was dismissed fairly quickly in a negotiation over commerce and navigation rights.

Similarly, western expansion helped forge a national identity of rugged individualism at the expense of Native American and Mexican American property and lives. According to this model, racial oppression was seen as compatible with core American values by those who accepted the biological essentialist argument that non-whites were inferior (childlike, dangerous, or even subhuman). Abolitionists eloquently challenged this approach in speeches and writings. These include Frederick Douglas ("We Have Decided to Stay," "The Hypocrisy of American Slavery," and "What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July"), Lucretia Mott ("The Law of Progress"), and William Lloyd Garrison (Peace Declaration).

An acknowledgment of the contradiction between the ideals of the "American Creed" (freedom, equality, and fairness) and the realities of racial discrimination heralded the second approach, called liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalism argues that through assimilation diverse people become one nation (the "melting pot" model). Although originally thought to address ethnic diversity, it was also applied to blacks as they sought opportunities open to "new" Americans. Liberal nationalism assumes an open political system and people's eagerness to follow an individualistic "bootstrap climbing" acculturation and shoulder the blame if they do not succeed. For example, successful Asian Americans (the "Model Minority") and fictional characters (such as the family on *The Cosby Show*) are seen as "evidence" that failure is the fault of individuals rather than "the system." According to this model, racial inequality can be compatible with core American values because it is assumed to be derived from minorities' faulty work ethic, lack of personal discipline, and defiance of authority. These attitudes are called "symbolic racism" or "modern racism."

The Civil Rights Movement fought for liberal nationalism. The goals of inclusion and opportunity use values central to American national identity. This is evident in the most acclaimed speeches of the

time: Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I've Been to the Mountaintop" and "I Have a Dream" speeches and the televised "Civil Rights Address" of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Baines Johnson's "We Shall Overcome," and Robert Kennedy's "Remarks on the Assassination of Martin Luther King."

Yet, it is important to remember that the dominant ideology had begun to shift away from endorsing segregation and black exclusion prior to the mass demonstrations. This was evident in Supreme Court decisions (including *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*), passage of minor civil rights laws, and gradual change in public opinion beginning in the 1940s. This shift in hegemony was reflected by national television news coverage. It was evident in major legislation that embraced liberal nationalism (the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965).

The limitation of the liberal nationalism approach to end discrimination helped a third approach gain support. It prioritizes group rights and recognition over a uniform national identity offering "race conscious" solutions. These can be extra-governmental (separatism, self-determination) or compel government action (affirmative action policies; restitution for slavery). This approach is generally unpopular among whites, who see it as "un-American" (e.g., not based on an individualistic approach to fairness and equality). Speeches which articulate this approach include Stokely Carmichael's "Black Power" speech; Malcolm X's "Message to the Grassroots" and "The Ballot or the Bullet." The American Indian Movement, the Chicano Youth Movement, and the Black Panthers also advocated race consciousness.

Race in Political Campaigns

Race is perhaps most explicitly "in politics" when people of color hold positions of power in government or have political leverage with whites in these offices. Obtaining suffrage was only the first step; organizing to effectively use suffrage to change public policy was the ultimate goal. When the movement went from "protest to politics," activists moved from demonstrating to campaigning (many, such as John Lewis and Andrew Young, became politicians).

Blacks were mobilized by group consciousness and new feelings of efficacy and hoped to register and vote beyond what would be expected by their socioeconomic status. Having black candidates on the ballot and black politicians in local offices also contributes to black voter turnout. This has not worked as well for Hispanic voters.

Vote turnout is higher among blacks and Hispanics when they reside in communities with large minority populations. This helps explain why politicians of color are most successful in local races. Black candidates won mayoral elections as early as 1967 (Carl Stokes in Cleveland and Richard Hatcher in Gary, Indiana). Maynard Jackson became mayor of Atlanta, Georgia, in 1973. Hispanic geographic concentration and their growing numbers make them a political force in places such as California, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and south Florida.

Candidates of color campaigning in areas where whites make up the majority of voters, though there are substantial minority populations, find themselves in a double bind. If they talk about race, they are accused of representing "special interests." Yet, "deracialized campaigns" run the risk of deflating minority turnout. One advantage of deracialized campaigns is that they encourage the media to police "race baiting" campaign tactics, such as the use of racial code words or more explicit messages used to frighten white voters away from voting for minority candidates. A good example of "race baiting" is the North Carolina senatorial race of 1984. Jesse Helms ran a misleading ad (titled "Hands") which showed white hands crumpling a job rejection letter while the voice-over said, "You needed that job, and you were the best qualified. But they had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota. Is that fair? Harvey Gantt says it is." Gantt did not support quotas.

Deracialized campaigns can also provoke accusations that the candidate is "inauthentic." For example, when Henry Bonilla ran for the House of Representatives seat in San Antonio in 1992, newspaper coverage focused on another politician's accusation that he was a "coconut" (brown on the outside but white on the inside) and criticized Bonilla for not speaking for the Hispanic community.

The media can still talk about race even if the candidate does not. Tom Bradley tried to downplay race issues in the 1982 California gubernatorial race, but the media made frequent references to his race, his popularity with black voters, and suggested that whites might not be willing to vote for him. Running a deracialized campaign worked for Doug Wilder (he won the gubernatorial race in Virginia in 1989) but not for Andrew Young (he lost the gubernatorial race in Georgia in 1990).

Although not the first black to run for president, Jesse Jackson's campaigns in 1984 and 1988 held the greatest symbolic victories. For a time, he was the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination, receiving extensive media attention (a situation that provoked accusations of "special treatment"). He was characterized in much of the coverage as a novelty, an outsider, a spoiler, and a negative role model (based on his calling New York City "Hymietown" and a photograph of him embracing Louis Farrakhan). Jackson's efforts dramatically increased black voter registration and voting and provided campaign experience for many black activists. Although his attempt to build a "Rainbow Coalition" saw limited success, his speeches at the Democratic National Conventions inspired Democrats of all races (as Barbara Jordan's Keynote Address had at the 1976 Democratic National Convention).

The influence of race in campaigns is not limited to those involving minority candidates. Racial resentment is provoked by white candidates competing with each other. The most memorable example of using racial resentment in a modern presidential campaign occurred in 1988. The general election campaign between Republican George Bush and Democrat Michael Dukakis followed Jesse Jackson's early success in Democratic primaries and his (and black delegates') visibility at the Democratic Convention. First, Republicans exaggerated Jackson's power in a Dukakis presidency, and then they campaigned against Dukakis's support for a prisoner furlough program. Finally, the infamous "Willie Horton" ad was shown on cable networks. It was sponsored by a political action committee, but it used the same story (one linking Dukakis to a black convict's violent crimes) told by Bush on the campaign trail and by the Republican Party in fliers. Dukakis failed to directly accuse his opponent of using racist tactics or to talk about race issues or to address primarily black audiences. As a result, racial resentments were activated helping Bush win white voters and discouraging black turnout (hurting Dukakis).

Racial issues have also transformed the political party system. The Civil War resulted in black Republicans and a one-party (Democratic) South. Then economic considerations led to blacks voting for Democrats in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1948, both parties included civil rights resolutions in their platforms. Blacks split their votes between Republicans and Democrats from 1952 to 1960. Race became a critical issue in the 1964 election when Lyndon Johnson (representing the Democratic liberal wing) and Barry Goldwater (representing the Republican conservative wing) took clear and contrasting positions on civil rights. This began a secular realignment of the parties accelerated by George Wallace's campaign for presidency in 1968. The realignment resulted in Republicans having a stronghold on the white South and strongly aligning blacks with the Democratic Party.

As the Civil War demonstrated, the 1960s was not the first time race was central in party alignments, nor is it likely to be the last. As the parties now compete for the burgeoning Hispanic vote, the issue of immigration has the potential to change party platforms and coalitions.

Stephanie Greco Larson

See also Affirmative Action; Conventions, Political; Democratic Party; Fear Appeals, Use in Politics; Jordan, Barbara; King, Martin Luther, Jr.; Latinos and Politics, Media; Minorities, Role in Politics; Protests, Political; Segregation; Wallace, George; Watts Riots; Willie Horton Ad

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RADIO, POLITICS AND

Politics was well suited to radio when the new broadcast medium first began to develop national audiences. The first radio station in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, KDKA, broadcast the results of the 1920 presidential elections. Warren Harding soon began using the radio for political addresses, giving his 1923 State of the Union Address on radio. Political events, such as the national party conventions of both Republicans and Democrats in 1924, were among the first major productions to attract a broad national audience.

Calvin Coolidge also made use of radio in his communications with the American people, but it was Franklin D. Roosevelt who became the pre-eminent radio communicator. FDR's fireside chats began in 1933 and continued through 1945. FDR's resonant and commanding voice offered hope and encouragement to American audiences from the dark days of economic depression through the trials and eventual triumphs of World War II.

Presidents were not the only political figures who saw the usefulness of radio in promoting political viewpoints. The "Radio Priest," Father Charles Coughlin, used radio to broadcast his own controversial message during the 1920s and 1930s. Groups such as the League of Women Voters also used the radio to disseminate programs designed to inform voters with background information, differing points of view on issues, and information on the political and voting process.

Radio also began to play an important role in the political campaign process. Herbert Hoover was particularly keen on the use of radio, and he used radio and film as major parts of his 1928 campaign. His Democratic opponent, Alfred Smith, was not as comfortable or successful in his radio performances. However, radio spending was significant in the 1928 campaign, reaching nearly 2 million dollars. Both Republicans and Democrats made substantial use of radio campaigns from that time on, developing the strategy in 1932 of using short "spot" announcements.

Radio was an important political medium outside of political campaigns, of course. In World War I, radio had been available but in use only for military purposes. In World War II, however, the radio medium became a universal information source providing news and progress reports around the world. Particularly significant were Edward R. Murrow's effective reports from London. Radio also evolved during this time into a powerful propaganda tool for governments on both sides of the conflict. There is considerable historical evidence of the successful use of radio by Germany's Adolf Hitler and Italy's Benito Mussolini.

In the immediate postwar years, radio continued to be an important information source in politics. For instance, in 1948, Harry Truman began to record press conferences. In the latter half of the 20th century, television supplanted radio as a major form of political information, but radio maintained a large audience by developing all-news formats and innovative programming that provided additional avenues of being heard in the political process. Particularly strong political voices have developed in the talk radio format where call-in formats have thrived by giving ordinary citizens a chance to voice their political views and to interact with radio commentators such as Rush Limbaugh, Oliver North, Gordon Liddy, and others.

Presidents today continue radio addresses to the nation, sometimes on the occasion of national holidays or to commemorate special events. Reagan used them extensively, giving more than 300 addresses during his White House occupancy. Clinton also used radio addresses frequently, and George W. Bush uses the radio for regular policy addresses.

Radio continues to play a vital role in local and regional politics in the United States. While television unquestionably dominates national and statewide elections, radio remains a crucial medium for local and regional elections. Thousands of candidates use radio advertising to reach their potential voters. Even at the presidential level, radio advertising continues to prove effective in political races because it provides

much greater opportunities for targeting more specialized audiences with specialized messages. Radio news operations in these venues also cover local campaigns more closely than television.

Radio also serves an important link between the free world and many oppressed and less free societies. Throughout the Cold War, Radio Free Europe and Voice of America provided messages of hope and freedom throughout the world and continue that mission today. In many less-developed countries, radio is still the most pervasive and available form of mass communication and is used extensively for dissemination of political information.

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Fireside Chats; Political Advertising, Radio; Radio Addresses; Radio Free Europe; Voice of America

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Radio Addresses

Radio addresses were a primary way for politicians to communicate with citizens and voters prior to the advent of television, yet presidential radio addresses continue into the 21st century. With other technologies available today for presidents and political leaders to communicate, there are a number of reasons why radio addresses continue. First, as they are typically unedited, radio addresses offer the opportunity for elected officials to communicate directly to the public. Second, radio addresses are preferred by politicians who do not feel they are treated fairly by the news media and are often used by presidents who feel they or their policies are not supported by other mass media. Third, contemporary presidential radio addresses have typically been given on Saturdays and therefore shape the news agenda for weekend coverage of the White House.

Presidential radio addresses are most often associated with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "fireside chats." FDR is considered to be the first president to use broadcast communication for political purposes to speak directly to citizens. Roosevelt faced considerable opposition by many newspaper publishers, so he sought out the public audience by radio and was able to control the message listeners received. Roosevelt's addresses were introduced as "fireside chats," as he pictured his listening audience as a small group sitting around a fireside. The fireside chats drew large listening audiences and were more popular than radio comedy shows or other highly rated programs. Roosevelt's informal and conversational style was successful with listeners, and radio was a medium by which Roosevelt could convey active leadership.

Roosevelt's addresses, often lasting 30 minutes and airing in the evening from the Oval Office or East Room of the White House, provided hope and comfort for listeners. They often motivated listeners as well, encouraging people to return to using banks, after nearly one third of the banks closed in the 1930s, and recycling rubber during World War II. Roosevelt's fireside chats began in March 1933 with an address about the Great Depression, followed next by one on his New Deal. He gave approximately 30 fireside chats during his presidency, with his addresses continuing through January 1945 with commentaries regarding World War II and related coal crises and loan drives.

In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, presidential radio addresses have become institutionalized as communication directly to the public. Radio addresses often focus on domestic policy, social issues, and foreign affairs and are often ceremonial to celebrate holidays (such as Labor Day or Independence Day) or achievements. Today presidential radio addresses

generally run 5 minutes in length and are sometimes followed by a response from the political party opposite the president's own party. While many presidential speeches are written primarily by staff members, radio addresses are often authored, or heavily edited, by presidents themselves.

Ronald Reagan, often called the "Great Communicator," used radio addresses nearly every week while president from 1981 to 1988, giving 330 addresses while in the White House. He used them to better connect with citizens and to bypass other news media that he felt were not giving his administration fair treatment in their coverage. Reagan was also a president who grew up in the era of radio and had worked early in his career in radio. His acting background made him an engaging speaker for the public listening audience. Reagan had initially planned to offer just 10 addresses about his administration's economic policy, but he quickly followed with additional addresses that then became institutionalized within his presidency. He was known for closing each address with the words, "Until next week, thanks for listening. God bless you."

George H. W. Bush rarely gave radio addresses in his first two years in office but did so amid the events of the Persian Gulf War and through the rest of his term in office. In comparison to Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush focused a greater proportion of his addresses on domestic issues but considerably fewer on international affairs.

Bill Clinton, sometimes referred to as "the Great Talker," gave nearly 350 radio addresses during his two terms in office. Domestic issues were overwhelmingly the focus of Clinton's addresses, with the majority of his talks on domestic policy rather than international affairs. His radio addresses were also consistently upbeat and positive, even amid the investigation of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky and subsequent impeachment by the House of Representatives.

George W. Bush continued the routine of regular Saturday morning radio addresses into his presidency with the regularity of Reagan and Clinton and will equal or exceed both for the number of Saturday addresses given during his presidency. The Democratic Party regularly offers a short response to each Bush radio address, with a variety of politicians speaking for the party.

In the midst of new communication technologies and evolving sources of information, radio addresses continue to be used by presidents and other politicians in the 21st century, as a way to communicate directly to the public to bring issues to the national agenda so as to shape the news agenda and subsequently news coverage.

Joan L. Conners

See also Fireside Chats; Presidential Communication; Radio, Politics and; Reagan, Ronald; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Radio Free Europe

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a U.S. government–sponsored agency broadcasting pro-American information into Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. The two closely linked broadcast services, which signed on in 1950 and 1951, have had complicated funding and reporting structures since their creation as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–affiliated organizations intended to effect political change through propaganda.

Following in the footsteps of the original U.S. government broadcast news service—the Voice of America (VOA)—RFE/RL is one of seven American special interest radio and television services broadcasting to millions of people around the world in their native languages. However, unlike the better-known VOA, RFE/RL has, since its inception, been less committed to impartial reporting of the news and more focused on inspiring political change among listeners.

During its more than 50 years, RFE/RL and the other government-supported "freedom radios" have come under criticism from congressional critics who argued that the need for these services passed as more of the targeted countries fell away from communism and adopted Western-style journalism. Still, the various

services have retained enough supporters to maintain congressional funding and continue their mission.

The role of the CIA in initially funding RFE/RL was, for a number of years, a widely known and loosely kept secret. Many journalists working during the Cold War period later said they knew of the ties between the stations and the intelligence agency, but those links were not publicly disclosed until a 1967 *New York Times* story. During that time, the press appealed to Americans to financially support the Crusade for Freedom, ostensibly to fund RFE/RL, which was largely staffed by refugees of the stations' targeted nations. Once the funding structure of the radio station became public knowledge, it was reassigned to oversight by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), a government-funded agency tied to the State Department. That board maintains jurisdiction over the Voice of America and six other international stations, including Radio and Television Marti, targeted at Cuba, and Radio Sawa, broadcasting into the Middle East.

One of the most significant and controversial events in RFE/RL's history was its role in the Hungarian uprising of 1956. During the uprising, the stations broadcast appeals to citizens of Soviet-dominated Hungary, urging them to join an ill-fated rebellion, in spite of near-overwhelming evidence that the protests would be crushed. In the wake of the crackdown, many criticized RFE/RL for callously encouraging Hungarians to put themselves at risk while knowing that the efforts were doomed to fail.

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See also Voice of America

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Radio Political Advertising

See Political Advertising, Radio

Rather, Dan (1931–)

Dan Rather spent 24 years as anchor of *CBS Evening News* and was called "the hardest working man in broadcast journalism," receiving nearly every major broadcast journalism award. Born in Wharton, Texas, Rather graduated in 1953 from Sam Houston State Teachers College with a journalism degree. He taught as a journalism instructor at Sam Houston the following year. Rather also studied at the University of Houston and the South Texas School of Law.

Rather began reporting for the *Associated Press* in 1950 and worked for several other news organizations in Texas during the 1950s, including *United Press International,* KSAM and KTRH radio stations, *Houston Chronicle,* and KTRK and KHOU television stations in Houston.

In 1962, Rather joined CBS News as the Southwest bureau chief in Dallas. The following year, he became the chief of the Southern bureau in New Orleans. While there he covered Southern racial conflicts, the civil rights movement, and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Rather also served as chief of CBS's bureaus in London and Saigon and as the White House correspondent during the administrations of Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon.

On March 9, 1981, Rather began as the anchor and managing editor of *CBS Evening News.* When *48 Hours* premiered on January 19, 1988, Rather anchored and premiered for that program and continued to anchor until September of 2002. He also reported for *CBS Radio* and *60 Minutes.* During the 1988 presidential campaign, Rather was in the limelight as a result of a controversial interview he conducted with then Vice President George H. W. Bush. In the interview, billed as a campaign profile for the 1988 primary campaign in which Bush was a candidate, Rather engaged in a contentious and, many thought, unseemly confrontation with Bush during the regular CBS evening news over Bush's possible involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair.

During the presidential election of 2000, Rather stayed on the air for 16 hours. Following the events of September 11, 2001, he reported around the clock and later reported from Ground Zero in New York. Rather also reported at times from around the world, including from several war zones. He was the first anchor to report from Belgrade in Yugoslavia during the NATO bombings.

Rather interviewed every U.S. president since Dwight D. Eisenhower and most international leaders, including Yasir Arafat, Hosni Mubarak, and Raoul Cedras. He was the first to interview President Bill Clinton following Clinton's impeachment. In February 2003, Rather had an exclusive interview with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, which was Saddam's first with an American journalist in 12 years. Rather had also been the first to interview Saddam after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Rather has authored several books, including *The American Dream, I Remember,* and *The Camera Never Blinks.* He has also written numerous newspaper and magazine articles. He has received numerous awards, including the prestigious Peabody and several Emmy Awards. In 1994, Sam Houston State University named its journalism and communication department after Rather.

Rather left the *CBS Evening News* anchor desk on March 9, 2005, following the "Rathergate" controversy surrounding a *60 Minutes* report Rather made the previous September that questioned President George W. Bush's National Guard service. CBS eventually fired others involved in the report. Rather continued to file reports for CBS until he left the network in 2006. He later began reporting for HDNet, a high-definition cable television station.

Brian T. Kaylor

See also Bush–Rather Confrontation

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Rawlings, Jerry (1947–)

Jerry John Rawlings, who ruled Ghana between June and September 1979 and from December 1981 to January 2001, was born on June 22, 1947. He is charismatic, with a penchant for populist rhetoric and a cunning ability to identify with the masses. His analysis of deprivation and poverty pits the privileged elite against the oppressed masses. At a symbolic level, these acts demystified the office of the head of state and presented Rawlings as a leader in touch with his people by being willing to sacrifice the conveniences of office. His political rhetoric emphasizes accountability, probity, equity, social justice, and grassroots participation, portraying him as a paragon of virtue and a defender of the subaltern, even though some actions by his governments cast doubt on the extent to which these principles were upheld under his watch.

Rawlings was commissioned as a pilot officer in the Ghana Air Force in January, 1969. On May 15, 1979, he was arrested for attempting a coup which, he averred, was motivated by extensive corruption within the military government, elite privilege, and socioeconomic deprivation among the masses. On June 4, 1979, he was freed from custody by some military personnel. The operation culminated in a coup d'état, and Rawlings was appointed chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC ruled for 4 months, pursuing a "housecleaning exercise" to rid the country of socioeconomic ills and promote the virtues of probity and accountability among citizens. It received tremendous popular support, even though the period witnessed extreme human rights abuses against those who were seen as enemies of the "revolution." The AFRC handed over power to the democratically elected government of the People's National Party (PNP).

On December 31, 1981, Rawlings overthrew the PNP government, accusing it of violating the tenets of the revolution, and formed the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). Much of the PNDC era witnessed a brutal assault on political dissent and free expression, in the media and elsewhere, culminating in the incarceration, death, and disappearance of some regime opponents. The result was a "culture of silence," as citizens felt intimidated from voicing alternative views freely. The government maintained a stranglehold on the state-owned media using legal instruments, such as the Newspaper Licensing Law, to control the limited private press that existed.

In the early 1990s, the PNDC was compelled, through internal and external pressure, to initiate a transition to constitutional rule. Notwithstanding his avowed disdain for multi-partyism, Rawlings founded the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to contest democratic elections in 1992 under a new democratic constitution. He and his party won this, and the 1996, election. Political expression was more open, but the NDC used legal and extra-judicial tactics to curb expression, even in a democratic setting. The regime

exploited the convenience of the archaic colonial laws of criminal libel and sedition to cow and victimize journalists. The law of sedition prohibited the publication of any material that could be discerned by the authorities as threatening to national security and public order, exciting disaffection against the government, or evoking hatred or contempt for it. Even though Section 183A of the penal code (which made it an offense to publish any material "with intent to bringing the President into hatred, ridicule or contempt") preceded the Rawlings regimes, it was conveniently and rigorously applied by the regime to mollify criticism. The government employed the power of arrest for emotional, psychological, and sometimes physical torture of journalists. To this end, it used those security agencies that were notorious for brutality (such as the Bureau of National Investigation and the military), instead of the police to effect the arrest of its staunchest critics in the media.

Government officials also employed civil libel suits to exact financial hardship on critical journalists and media outlets, through heavy fines imposed by the judiciary, with the goal of ensuring acquiescence. In addition to the use of the legal system and the coercive apparatus of the state to intimidate, harass, and abuse journalists, there were covert acts of vandalism, most certainly by agents of the government, against media personnel and organizations that were critical of the regime.

The media climate under the various Rawlings regimes cannot, however, be encapsulated by a single, static perspective. There was an unprecedented expansion in the number and variety of media outlets and viewpoints during the NDC era, due to the liberal provisions of the 1992 Constitution and the democratic opportunities that it created. Some of the private print media displayed brazen disdain, strident criticism, and uncivil discourse toward Rawlings and the government. On the airwaves, particularly private radio, there was no shortage of partisan expression, by journalists and the public at large, for and against the government and its leader. It is this shift in the nature of state–media relations that led the Commonwealth Press Union to describe the Ghanaian media, in 2001, as "remarkably one of the most unfettered and freest on the continent of Africa."

In January 2001, Rawlings handed over power to the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which had won the 2000 elections—elections he did not contest because of a constitutional limit of two terms for the presidency. Rawlings continues to be a polarizing figure in Ghanaian politics, and his influence remains very strong, even after leaving the presidency. His constant and vituperative condemnation of the NPP administration draws the wrath of the latter and its supporters while generating admiration from his followers. Rawlings' intolerance for dissent looms over his own political party, as opponents of his preferences are marginalized or compelled to quit.

Wisdom J. Tettey

See also Authoritarianism; Journalism, Political; Political Corruption; Press Freedom

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Reagan, Nancy (1921–)

Nancy Davis Reagan, First Lady of the United States from 1981 to 1989, was her husband's protector and confidant throughout his White House years. Often criticized during her time as First Lady, she rehabilitated her public image through an antidrug campaign urging children to "Just Say No." Since leaving the White House, Reagan has been committed to preserving her beloved "Ronnie's" memory and finding a cure for Alzheimer's disease, which her husband suffered from during his final years.

Nancy and Ronald Reagan, both former actors, brought Hollywood glamour to the White House. Reagan became known for her designer gowns, lavish parties, and famous friends, such as Frank Sinatra. However, her opulent tastes were criticized by journalists, who characterized her as being out of touch with the average citizen and ignorant of the country's

ongoing economic recession. For example, her purchase of $200,000 china caused controversy, even though private donations covered the costs, and her practice of keeping designer clothing "lent" to her resulted in an IRS investigation of whether she violated the Ethics in Government Act.

In an effort to improve her image, White House advisors decided Reagan needed a project that would garner positive press coverage. The result was the "Just Say No" antidrug campaign, launched in 1985. Using the media to promote her cause, Reagan appeared on numerous talk shows, hosted a documentary on drug abuse, and starred as herself on the popular television sitcom *Diff'rent Strokes.* Within months, "Just Say No" was a pop-culture catchphrase, and Reagan's approval ratings had improved considerably.

Reagan's closeness with her husband shaped their time in the White House. She became known for the adoring looks she would give him in public, which the media termed "the gaze." However, Reagan faced criticism for her perceived influence over her husband. She often advised him on personnel issues and was instrumental in firing White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan. In her memoirs, she acknowledged telling the president that Regan was not serving his best interests but claimed she was only offering supportive, wifely advice. Reagan also had considerable control over her husband's schedule, using input from an astrologer to determine which were good and bad days for the president. She maintained that she was protecting her husband, whose life she feared for after a 1981 assassination attempt. An incident in which she prompted her husband's response during an impromptu press conference also raised questions regarding Reagan's role in her husband's administration.

After retiring to California in 1989, Reagan focused on preserving her husband's legacy. She was active in designing the Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California. She also orchestrated her husband's funeral in 2004, which was a major media event. That same year, Reagan began advocating for stem cell research, a potential cure for Alzheimer's disease, which her husband suffered from during his final years. Reagan plans to be buried next to her husband in Simi Valley.

Lisa M. Burns

See also First Ladies, Political Communication of; Reagan, Ronald

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Reagan, Ronald (1911–2004)

Ronald Wilson Reagan was the 40th president of the United States and one of the most effective orators of the 20th century. His public speaking career lasted nearly 50 years and includes several speeches that are listed in the top 100 addresses of the 20th century by AmericanRhetoric.com.

Reagan was born in Tampico, Illinois, on February 6, 1911, and grew up in nearby Dixon. During his formative years, his did his first public speaking as a Sunday School teacher and through acting in church and school plays. At Eureka College, Reagan continued to develop his performance skills by being involved in drama. He also was one of the featured speakers during a student strike. After graduating from college, Reagan worked as a sportscaster for WOC and WHO radio in Iowa, at times broadcasting Chicago Cubs games by using descriptions and accounts from a teletype and adding his own imaginative descriptions to enable the home audience to picture the scenes.

In 1937 while covering the Cubs' spring training games, Reagan auditioned at Warner Brothers Studio and received his first contract as an actor. He went on to appear in 53 films, the two most memorable of which were *Kings Row* and *Knute Rockne All American.* After World War II, Reagan, then a liberal Democrat, became deeply disturbed by what he considered an attempt by communist organizations to take over Hollywood and began to speak out against communism and served as an informant for the FBI. In 1947, he testified as a friendly witness before the House Un-American Activities Committee, denouncing communism but also maintaining that democracy was strong enough to stand on its own without outlawing the Communist Party. It was also during this time that Reagan was elected president of the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) where he would serve seven terms. His experiences with SAG helped develop his negotiating skills which would prove to be of great benefit in future dealings with the California Assembly, the United States Congress, and the Soviet Union.

In the 1950s, Reagan's film career started to decline and he turned to television, hosting *General Electric Theater* from 1954 to 1962. Part of his responsibilities with GE included traveling to the corporation's numerous plants and speaking to its employees. During the 1950s, Reagan also found himself slowly moving from left to right politically, and his speeches took on a conservative political tone. He warned of the fundamental flaws and dangers of communism and the "encroaching control" of the federal government. He was convinced that each new or expanding government program resulted in a gradual erosion of personal freedom. If this trend were allowed to continue, he cautioned, our freedoms gradually would be eroded until none was left, and the nation would find itself having drifted into socialism. By 1962, Reagan had become a Republican.

It was in 1964 that Reagan gained national attention with a speech he gave on behalf of Barry Goldwater, the Republican presidential nominee. Delivered on October 27, "The Speech" was simply a repetition of what Reagan had been saying for years with adaptations to make it relevant to the Goldwater campaign. The address raised $8 million for the candidate, and *Time* magazine called it "the one bright spot in an otherwise dismal campaign." Reagan also taped television commercials to aid Goldwater's presidential campaign. Almost immediately supporters urged Reagan to run for office.

By 1966, he was approached by business leaders such as Holmes Tuttle, Henry Salvatori, and others, who encouraged him to run for governor of California. At first Reagan resisted, but he later agreed to travel across the state and deliver speeches for 6 months before making a decision. He received so much positive feedback from the addresses that he announced his candidacy for governor on January 4, 1966. His opponent, Edmund G. (Pat) Brown dismissed Reagan as a mere actor who had no substance. Reagan countered this charge by shortening his speeches to 10 to 15 minutes and devoting the remainder of the time to questions and answers. In so doing he showed himself to be a person of substance, gifted at argumentation and persuasion. Although he also focused on the fiscal situation in California and Brown's record as governor, the most salient issue for Reagan was the unrest at California's university campuses. His frequent assertion that students should "obey the rules or get out" resonated with many voters, and on Election Day, Reagan defeated Brown by 1 million votes.

Reagan served two terms in Sacramento and even made a brief run for the White House in 1968. As governor, the primary themes of his rhetoric continued to be tax relief, welfare reform, limited government, and what he called "the mess at Berkeley." During this time, he also debated Senator Robert F. Kennedy on the Vietnam War. Kennedy later stated that Reagan was the toughest debate opponent he had ever faced. Reagan was reelected in 1970 and returned to private life in 1975.

In 1974, Richard Nixon, in the wake of the Watergate scandal, resigned from office. A year later, his successor, Gerald R. Ford, appeared vulnerable and in November 1975, Reagan announced that he would challenge Ford for the Republican nomination. During the early days of the primary race, Reagan adhered to the "Eleventh Commandment," refusing to directly attack the incumbent. After losing several primaries and facing a campaign debt of $250,000, his associates persuaded him to go negative. Reagan sharply denounced the Ford administration in the speeches that followed. In these addresses, Reagan criticized the president for the policy of détente with Russia and for what the challenger considered a proposal to "give away" the Panama Canal. A televised speech to the nation that Reagan delivered in March 1976 had particular impact. As the campaign moved to the South and West, Reagan began winning primaries and, in the final analysis, he came within 117 delegates of upsetting Ford for the nomination.

Four years later, Reagan again ran for president, advocating limited government, tax relief, and peace through strength. The primary themes of his rhetoric were neighborhood, family, work, peace, and freedom. As Election Day approached, the race between Reagan and Jimmy Carter was too close to call. While the nation was dissatisfied with Carter's performance, it also was fearful of what a Reagan presidency might bring. Of course, the political campaign advertising format provided a natural forum for display of Reagan's television persona, and many of the campaign ads featured Reagan himself speaking head-on into the camera. Political observers, however, questioned if his communication skills would be as sharp in spontaneous, non-rehearsed formats. Reagan essentially put these fears to rest in his televised debate with Carter. A scholarly analysis of the encounter revealed that Reagan won the debate not only on style but on substance, by outscoring his opponent in the areas of fully answering questions, substantiating his claims, and skillfully refuting the incumbent's arguments. On November 4, he won by an electoral landslide. His

inaugural address ranks 30th on the list of greatest speeches of the 20th century.

As president, Ronald Reagan proved himself to be a skilled rhetor in both domestic and foreign policy. His rhetoric persuaded Congress to enact his economic package and even gained the support of several Democratic legislators. Over time, he proved less successful in garnering support for domestic spending cuts, however, and massive budget deficits resulted. Nevertheless, Reagan largely has been credited with making conservatism a dominant political ideology in the United States.

In his 1984 reelection campaign, Reagan took full advantage of the communication tools and strategies of an incumbent. The high-quality production of his television commercials is still a model for professional and skilled presentation, presenting an America with a bright and shining future. A series of these ads, dubbed the "Morning in America" spots, credit Reagan with bringing back an America full of prosperity, hope, and optimism. He also performed well in a series of debates with his Democratic challenger Walter Mondale, laying to rest fears that he was too old to carry out the responsibilities of being president. In one famous retort during a question about whether his age was limiting his capabilities, Reagan good-naturedly denied the charge and then drew widespread crowd approval by turning the tables with the magnanimous comment that he would not hold the youth and inexperience of his opponent against him.

In the area of foreign policy, Reagan began his presidency by sharply criticizing the Soviet Union and pushing for a military buildup. In an early press conference he suggested that the Soviets would "lie, cheat," or "commit any crime" to further their agenda. On March 8, 1983, he denounced the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" and "the focus of evil in the modern world." Less than 3 weeks later, in another televised address, Reagan revealed his plan to build a missile defense initiative known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). By 1984, however, Reagan became more conciliatory in his remarks about the Soviet Union.

When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, Reagan recognized that the new premier was a different kind of Russian leader and pushed for summitry. The two leaders met first in Geneva and then in Reykjavik to discuss nuclear arms reduction. Although the latter summit ended without an agreement due to differences over the future of SDI, the two men would meet in Washington a year later to sign a treaty that eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. On June 12, 1987, Reagan stood at the Brandenburg Gate and called upon Gorbachev to "tear down this wall." Both the State Department and the National Security Council objected to this line and attempted to excise it from the address. Reagan, however, insisted that the line remain in the speech. A year later, Reagan delivered an address at Moscow State University, which was an attempt at identification with the Soviet Union. It is regarded by some as Reagan's finest rhetorical hour. During the Moscow visit, he stated that he no longer considered the Soviet Union an "evil empire." Careful analysis of Reagan's Soviet rhetoric reveals both a principled anticommunist conservative and a pragmatist who adjusted to changing times, leaders, and contexts.

Reagan also was a gifted ceremonial speaker, as evidenced by his speeches commemorating the 40th anniversary of D-Day, his farewell speech, and his address to the nation after the *Challenger* exploded on January 28, 1986. The *Challenger* speech accomplished a twofold purpose of calming the nation as it mourned the loss of the seven astronauts and protecting the space program. It is ranked eighth on the list of greatest speeches of the 20th century.

After leaving the White House in 1989, Reagan continued to speak on what he called the "mashed potato circuit," promoting conservative policies such as the line-item veto and a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced federal budget, but also issuing an implied warning against the excesses of conservatism. This clearly can be seen in his 1992 address to the Republican National Convention, in which he implied that some government intervention was necessary and embraced an inclusive vision of who was part of the American family in stark contrast to Patrick J. Buchanan's call for a "cultural war."

An assessment of Ronald Reagan's rhetorical legacy reveals several qualities. Conventional wisdom attributes his success largely to performance and acting ability. Scholars have long noted Reagan's skillful use of narrative, whether in the form of humorous anecdotes, stories of excessive government and welfare abuse, or his larger narrative of America as a "Shining City on a Hill." Others emphasize his use of apocalyptic discourse, commonplaces, definition and redefinition, myth and ideological/value appeals. In the years since his death in 2004, a group of scholars and writers have uncovered evidence that Reagan played a significant role in the creation of his own rhetoric. Prior to becoming president, there is evidence to suggest that Reagan

wrote his own speeches. Archival materials also suggest that as president, Reagan was an involved editor of speech drafts, especially during his first term in office. This lends support to the argument that Reagan's rhetorical success was at least as due to ideology as to performance or rhetorical strategy.

John Jones

See also Reagan, Nancy

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Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC

In *Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC* the Supreme Court upheld in 1969 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) fairness doctrine, which provided that stations should allow a person criticized on the station an opportunity to respond to the criticism.

The *Red Lion* case had its origins when author Fred J. Cook criticized presidential candidate Barry Goldwater in his book. A Pennsylvania radio station operated by Red Lion Broadcasting Co. ran a 15-minute broadcast by Rev. Billy James Hargis criticizing Cook and claiming he had been fired from a newspaper for false charges against city officials and that he worked with a communist publication where he had attacked J. Edgar Hoover and the CIA. The Reverend said that Cook had now written a book smearing Goldwater.

When Cook heard of the broadcast, he demanded free reply time to address the attack. The broadcast station refused to allow Cook to reply to the allegations. On appeal the FCC declared that the station should give Cook an opportunity to reply to allegations against him. The Court of Appeals for D.C. upheld the FCC decision. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, holding that FCC had the authority to regulate the electronic media and that the fairness doctrine was both "authorized by statute and constitutional."

The court held that because of the scarcity of radio frequencies there was no First Amendment right for all citizens to own a radio license. However, the court said, there was also no First Amendment right for licensees to monopolize the airwaves. Thus, the government had the authority to require a licensee to share his station with the public since the right of viewers and listeners was paramount and not the right of broadcasters. Under certain circumstances, the court held, a licensee had to provide reasonable broadcasting time for persons with a view different from that expressed on his or her station. The court found that it was consistent with the First Amendment goal of "producing an informed public capable of conducting its own affairs" to allow persons attacked on stations to respond publicly on the station.

Changes to the Communications Act of 1934 and subsequent interpretations of the FCC have essentially repealed the Fairness Doctrine and its corollary personal attack provisions.

Roxanne Watson

See also Communications Act of 1934; Fairness Doctrine

Further Readings

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See Press Secretary, White House

Reeves, Rosser

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Referendum

See Ballot Initiatives

Reform Party

The Reform Party of the United States of America is a relatively recent political party founded by Ross Perot in 1995 based on his belief that Americans were disappointed with the state of politics and the corruptness of the two-party system. He wanted to offer an alternative to the Democratic and Republican Parties because he felt they were not sufficiently confronting vital U.S. issues such as the federal deficit and term limits. Perot's creation of the Reform Party began after he ran for the presidency in the 1992 elections as an Independent and became the first non-major party candidate since 1912 to have been considered viable enough to win the presidency, earning 18.9% of the popular vote. Though he was less successful in the 1996 elections and his dispute with Dick Lamm over the party's presidential nominee caused a split within the party, his financial and emotional support from the party spurred one of the most successful third parties in U.S. history.

Initially, Perot's Reform Party gained ballot access in all 50 states. The party's controversy, however, over who should be the presidential nominee for the 2000 elections and the Federal Election Committee (FEC) investigation resulting from accusations of ballot fraud affected its original positive image. Pat Buchanan was ultimately recognized by the FEC as the official presidential candidate in 2000, but the investigations and underground dealings that surfaced during his reign alienated over 90% of the Reform Party's supporters. The misspending of large amounts of money caused most states to remove the party from their ballots. By the October 2003 National Convention, the Reform Party had only started rebuilding after interference from Buchanan's brigade, but several former state organizations had already elected to rejoin. They increased their membership from 24 to 30 states and managed to regain ballot access in seven states.

Despite ongoing disputes on the national level between founders and extremists, several Reform Party state parties have been actively running candidates across the country. In the past, the Reform Party has run candidates for various offices and seats, including president, Senate, House of Representatives, state house, county commissions, and city councils. The most notable of these candidates include Ross Perot, Pat Buchanan, and Ralph Nader, all of whom ran for the presidency in consecutive elections. In 1998, the Reform Party gained ground when Jesse Ventura was elected governor of Minnesota, the highest office win to date for the Reform Party. Since then, the party has consistently appeared on ballots in many other states with active Reform Party organizations petitioning to regain ballot access in their states.

In 2006, the Reform Party ran candidates in several states, including Arizona, California, and Mississippi. The Reform Party of Kansas nominated a slate of candidates led by Iraq War veteran Richard Ranzau. In Colorado, a former assistant Environmental Protection Agency administrator and Navy veteran, Eric Eidsness, ran on the Reform Party ticket in Colorado's fourth congressional district and received 11.28% of the vote. The Florida Reform Party sponsored Max Linn of Florida Citizens for Term Limits (a traditionally Republican organization) in the 2006 Florida gubernatorial election. Linn was supported by a campaign staff with connections to the Perot and Ventura campaigns but received only 1.9% of the vote. Most recently, Daniel Imperato has pursued the Reform Party nomination in the 2008 presidential elections.

Hilary Noriega and Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Buchanan, Patrick; Perot, Ross

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Religion in Politics

Religion and politics in the United States are tied inextricably to one another, a tandem that is manifest in several key ways. From the efforts of religious special interest groups to influence public policy to candidates' goals of appealing to a large portion of the populace, religious faith is both a desired end as well as a tool used by eager politicians. Religion has recently been recognized as a necessary component of American political platforms. In comparison to the world's other industrialized nations, the United States is a rather religious country, and this characteristic is evident in several modern political and journalistic trends.

Regardless of the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment to the Constitution—ensuring the populace that the federal government shall make no law establishing a state religion—politics and faith have long exerted shared force in American government. Many Americans might be surprised by the fact that the words "separation of church and state" are not found in the Constitution but were instead penned by Thomas Jefferson in an 1802 missive demanding that the federal government not in any way establish a specific religion for the citizenry. Perhaps contrary to Jefferson's insistence, to this day religion helps direct the course of political outcomes in the United States, on matters of public health to tenets of foreign policy.

President Reagan addresses the annual convention of the National Association of Evangelicals ("Evil Empire" speech) in Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983. The National Association of Evangelicals represents millions of evangelical Christians in the United States.

Source: Courtesy Ronald Reagan Library.

Religion in the Modern Political Age

Historically, religion has been noticeably visible in national politics. Not long after the United States was founded, President John Adams remarked that "our constitution was made only for a religious and moral people. It is wholly inadequate for the government of any other." Every American president has openly identified himself as either Protestant or Roman Catholic.

Perhaps for this reason, past American leaders have tended to view large-scale challenges to the United States as quasi-religious struggles of good versus evil. For Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, the German and Japanese dictatorships were the evil opposition to a righteous way of life in the West. In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson considered the existence and proliferation of communism in Southeast Asia inherently evil. Later in the Cold War, Ronald Reagan went so far as to call the Soviet Union an "evil empire" and regularly made mordant remarks about the secular nature of his communist foes. Similarly, George W. Bush markets his Bush doctrine and war against terrorism as a fundamental bout of good versus evil.

Religious influences on politics have become even more salient in recent decades. In the late 1970s, American journalists began recognizing religion's potential to influence politics on the grand scale, including Supreme Court rulings, congressional initiatives, and presidential executive orders. During this time Jimmy Carter, a self-proclaimed evangelical Christian, occupied the Oval Office. Carter did not conceal the fact that his religious upbringing in Plains, Georgia, influenced his stances toward issues such as nuclear nonproliferation and abortion.

Reagan was a leader who frequently made religious references in his speeches, famously remarking that felled astronauts in the Challenger disaster of 1986 had "slipped the surly bonds of earth to touch the face of God." During Reagan's two terms, the "religious right" became a popular descriptor among political scientists studying the forces behind the actor's electoral victories.

Few if any political leaders in the United States, however, particularly in the modern age, have been more openly religious than George W. Bush has. During his first run for the White House in 2000, Bush was asked by a journalist to name a hero in his life, to which he responded "Jesus Christ." The remark made many headlines across the country and the then-governor of Texas was ridiculed on more than a few op-ed pages in daily newspapers. The public did not ultimately seem to be bothered, however, and other politicians vying for high

office seemingly took notice of the relationship between faith and victory at the polls.

In the summer of 2006, President Bush made headlines the world over when he delivered a presidential veto rejecting a federal bill subsidizing embryonic stem-cell research. At first glance the decision may not appear too controversial; American presidents frequently veto bills when they feel the Congress is misguided. By year two of their second terms, for example, presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton had vetoed dozens of bills. Bush's decision, however, was the first veto of his presidency.

The doomed fate of the stem-cell bill demonstrates the mighty role that religion plays in American politics. Despite having broad bipartisan support in both houses of Congress, the bill never made it past Bush's desk, due largely to conservative religious groups that were able to assure the president of the bill's reprehensible nature. In an article titled "When the Majority Doesn't Rule," the *St. Petersburg Times* reported on the president's proscription, as well as the disproportionate influence occasionally exerted by religious groups in the American political system.

Herein lays a remarkable facet of religion in American politics. While many observers believe that the United States is a relatively religious nation, which it is, they may also assume that a religious majority is necessary to force political change, which it is not.

The American Jewish community serves as a good example of the power of religious minorities to mobilize voters and special interest groups and to affect the national political climate. While American Jews comprise less than 3% of the voting-age population in the United States, they represent nearly 5% of the total vote in presidential elections. For this reason, Jews in the United States usually receive a generous hearing from American presidents—presidents who closely listen and usually respond with auspicious directives toward Israel.

Another good example of religion's role in voter mobilization involves the issue of gay marriage. Even in the perhaps less religious strongholds of Washington and California, religious conservatives have succeeded in energizing the public in voting down decisions that would have legalized same-sex marriage. In Washington, where State Supreme Court justices are elected to the bench, the high court voted 5–4 in 2006 to recognize state marriage contracts only between one man and one woman. Many Washington-based religious groups as well as other organizations from around the country hailed the decision as a political victory.

These are just a few examples of ways religion affects American political initiatives, something that has become slightly more conspicuous in the modern political scene, especially with the emergence of "values voters"—a large demographic of Americans attracted to the moral fiber and religiosity of political candidates. Prior to the midterm elections of 2006, politicians often used religious rhetoric in their public talks, and candidates on both the left and right ends of the political continuum were increasingly and deliberately invoking the Judeo-Christian God in their public dialogue.

The reason for this is that American politicians have recognized the necessity of pious faith in winning high political office. It is now common for politicians on both the local and national level to pay homage to religion and family values in speeches, pamphlets, or on candidate Web sites. During the 2004 presidential contest, challenger John Kerry hired advisors to focus on projecting his image as a devout Catholic and man of traditional American values. Political speeches to religious congregations have become arguably as important and strategic as other traditional venues.

Politicians try to avoid, however, appearing sanctimonious in their rhetoric, lest the public view them as insincere or self-righteous. Furthermore, public figures must be careful not to use religious diction in the wrong situations, or they render themselves vulnerable to widespread criticism. Following Hurricane Katrina in the summer of 2005, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin alluded to a divine rage that possibly precipitated the disaster that destroyed much of his city. National media outlets all but eviscerated the mayor, who subsequently apologized for his insinuation. So, while modern political candidates may recognize the utility of religious fervor in their speeches, they also must strike a balance of faith in their appeals to voters.

Communicating Religion in Politics

There exists an old adage admonishing socialites never to discuss politics or religion in polite settings because of the often inflammatory nature of these topics. Perhaps partly for this reason, for a time journalists avoided covering religion consistently. Also, for many journalists, religion reporting was not the most desirable of beats, and many writers and broadcasters struck into the journalistic field intending to write in other arenas.

Prior to the 1980s, American media practitioners did not seemingly emphasize religious news content. In recent years, however, religion has maintained

a constant presence in American journalism, so much so that the majority of daily newspapers in the United States have at least one reporter devoted solely to covering contemporary religious issues. Based on the more visible nature of religion in American politics in recent years, such reportage frequently comes from the political realm. For instance, in covering the potential inclusion in public school curricula of intelligent design, which challenges Darwinian evolution, news coverage often focuses on political controversy surrounding the dockets of education boards across the country in places such as Kansas, Ohio, or Pennsylvania.

For some time American media consumers desired more news coverage of religious issues, something that editors and producers seemingly picked up on. America is one of the most religious nations in the world, especially when considering the religiosity of other first-world nations. Roughly 85% of Americans identify themselves as followers of the Christian faith—one possible reason Americans desired greater news coverage of religious topics.

In the past 5 years mass media have increasingly covered national religious issues. It is now not at all uncommon for national newspapers to cover religion in stories above the fold or for weekly newsmagazines to devote their covers to articles on contemporary religious debates. To list only a few, the debates surrounding intelligent design versus evolution in American public schools, abortion, and purported secular propriety of the Pledge of Allegiance are common issues in media outlets across the country.

Reporting on such issues—especially religious issues with political implications—is rarely easy, and American media are incessantly criticized for their coverage of such sensitive material. Media consumers who are acutely interested in a particular topic will usually express discontentment with that topic's coverage in news at one point or another. This tendency is often multiplied with hypersensitive issues such as religious faith. Some media critics chastise mainstream news practitioners in their coverage of religion, citing endemic inaccuracies and sloppy contextualization. This criticism, however, is not unilateral. Secular organizations such as the ACLU and Americans United for the Separation of Church and State occasionally criticize mass media practitioners for offering what they feel is undue credence to religious movements and ideals in news content.

In most cases where it exists, poor coverage of contemporary religion is not necessarily deliberate. American journalists at elite media outlets, by their open admission, do not engage in religious practices as much as the average layperson. Media researchers in the 1980s found that more than half of a large sample of elite media practitioners in the United States expressed few or no religious beliefs. Such research was later called into question by other media scholars and some media advocacy groups, but such findings still serve as evidence that American journalists perhaps do not share a religious worldview similar to many members of their audience.

This has led pundits and media critics, such as Ann Coulter and Bernard Goldberg, to vehemently criticize media for what they consider inaccurate and unfair characterizations of religion and religious conservatives. For its part, the public takes great interest in such critiques; Coulter's books *Slander* and *Godless* and Goldberg's *Bias* were runaway best-sellers in the United States. Such muckraking helps foster an us-versus-them mentality in the mindset of many media consumers, whereby public mistrust of many journalists is bolstered.

Conclusion

Whatever the true ideological nature of religious/political content in American media outlets, such increased coverage in the news generates passionate responses from the general reader/viewer and political pundits alike. Because of this, journalists and editors have recognized in recent years that covering religious trends has the capacity to stir and rivet news consumers in strong ways. Many political candidates, too, now realize that communicating religion to the masses can aid in success, in this case not in selling newspapers or advertisements, but in culling support at the polls.

Justin D. Martin

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Religious Right

See Religion in Politics

Reporters Without Borders

Reporters Without Borders (RWB), also called *Reporters sans frontières* in French and *Reporteros sin fronteras* in Spanish, is a world organization officially recognized as serving public interest. The official Web site www.rsf.org lists the slogan "Defending press freedom . . . every day," capturing the basic essence of RWB.

The RWB Web site reports that more than a third of the world's population lives in countries with no press freedom, and hence RWB works constantly to restore the right to be informed among these countries' citizens. Its Web site quotes statistics about crimes perpetrated around the world against media professionals, who often spend years in jail just for using the "wrong" word or photo. RWB conceives of such imprisonment or murder of a journalist as akin to eliminating a key witness and as a threat to everyone's right to information.

RWB, with its team of over 100 professionals, keeps constant watch and condemns any attack on press freedom worldwide by keeping the media and public opinion informed through press releases and public-awareness campaigns. It also defends journalists and other media contributors who have been imprisoned or persecuted for doing their job and protests against the abuse and torture being meted out to media professionals in nations around the world. It not only provides support to journalists threatened in their own countries but also provides financial and non-financial support to their families. RWB also wages a battle worldwide — to reduce the use of censorship, oppose laws restricting press freedom, and improve the safety of journalists around the world, especially those stationed in war zones. Among RWB's other objectives is its commitment to rebuild media groups and provide financial and material support to news staff facing different hardships in their jobs.

Damocles Network, RWB's judicial arm, created in January 2002, works to ensure that criminals murdering/ torturing journalists are brought to trial. It also provides legal services to victims representing them in competent national and international courts to ensure enforcement of proper judicial procedures.

RWB's Web site maintains a regularly updated tally of attacks being inflicted on press freedom worldwide, serving like a press-freedom news agency providing Internet users with opportunities to demand the release of jailed journalists by signing petitions online. To battle censorship, articles banned in their country of origin are also published online. Among RWB's other contributions are its two annual publications, the *Worldwide Report on Press Freedom* and the *Country Index of Press Freedom,* measuring the extent of freedom that journalists and media possess—being published on World Press Freedom Day every year.

RWB, however, has not escaped critics' scrutiny. One major criticism raised against it is that it receives 19% of its funding from the Western world, raising questions about the extent of possible bias in its

reporting. The methodology used by RWB to rank press freedom has also been criticized in the past.

RWB's operations are spread out over five continents through its national branches. The organization also has close cooperation with local and regional press freedom organizations around the world.

Sumana Chattopadhyay

See also Censorship, Political; Press Freedom

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Republican National Committee

The Republican National Committee (RNC) is the organization that oversees political activities for the Republican Party, including (a) organizing the party's national convention, (b) developing its political platform, (c) coordinating campaign strategies, and (d) fundraising.

Each political area (states, U.S. possessions, District of Columbia) has a minimum of two representatives (one man, one woman). Some states qualify for additional members, based on previous election, by having (a) a Republican governor, (b) a majority in the state's congressional delegation, or (c) a Republican majority in the presidential election.

The RNC was founded in 1856 (2 years after the organization of the modern Republican Party) to aid in the, albeit unsuccessful, campaign of John C. Fremont, its first presidential nominee. Chairs for the RNC, elected by the members for 2-year terms, are usually recognized by media as party spokespersons. Chairs have included George W. Bush's 2004 campaign chairman Ken Mehlman (elected in 2005), former Senator Robert "Bob" Dole (1971 to 1973), future President George H. W. Bush (1973 to 1974), noted campaign consultant Lee Atwater (1989 to 1991), and future Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour (1993 to 1997).

The committee was originally composed of one person from each state. After the 1924 passage of the 19th Amendment, which provided voting rights to women, the rules were changed to one man and one woman from each area. The rules were changed again in 1952 to add membership rewards for electoral success.

The RNC also oversees activities of the Republican state committees and coordinates activities with its two national legislative committees—the National Republican Senatorial Committee and the National Republican Congressional Committee. The state committees are organized around counties, similar to the structure of the national party.

The two legislative committees support Republican candidates for the House and the Senate. The National Republican Congressional Committee, organized in 1866, works for candidates to the House of Representatives. The senate committee was organized in 1916 following the ratification of the 17th Amendment, which provided the first direct election of senators. Its original name was the "Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee"; that was changed to its present title in 1948.

The RNC's activities focus heavily on fundraising, turnout, and message development. Funds are used for both direct financial contributions to candidates and indirect assistance. Funds for indirect assistance—including organization, voter registration, turnout, research, and consultant fees—can be provided by the committee without being subject to the same contribution limits as those imposed on federal candidates (aka "soft money").

The committee also organizes 527 groups, named after a section of the Internal Revenue Code that allows political groups to circumvent federal donation limits that apply to the party committees. The 527 groups cannot advocate the election or defeat of any candidate but can engage in issue advertising that favors the party. Federal law prohibits such groups from coordinating their campaigns with candidates or party committees, but many of the people involved have ties to the party committee.

The RNC headquarters is at 310 First Street, SE, Washington, DC 20003.

Larry Powell

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Republican Party

Founded in 1854 in opposition to slavery expansion, the Republican Party is one of two major political parties in the United States. In the modern era, the Republican Party (aka G.O.P. or "Grand Old Party") has been viewed publicly as being in support of a philosophy of limited government, libertarian economics, and social conservatism. In conjunction with the demise of the Democratic Party's New Deal Coalition, the Republican Party benefited from a national partisan realignment during the last quarter of the 20th century and, from 1968 to 2004, won 7 of 10 presidential elections. Though traditionally critical of the media's alleged "liberal bias," Republicans have successfully used mass communications outlets to foment the party's appeal, largely on the basis of patriotism and family values.

The Republican Party's first successful presidential candidate was Abraham Lincoln, who was elected in 1860, despite not having been on the ballot in most Southern states. In the aftermath of the Civil War and Reconstruction, the American South became known as the "Solid South" for its unified opposition to the Republican Party. Nonetheless, Republicans enjoyed great success at the national level throughout the 20th century, though for much of that time it was perceived as a friend of big business and the wealthy at the expense of the working class and poor.

While Democrats such as President Franklin D. Roosevelt pioneered the use of radio as a political tool, Republicans, beginning in the 1950s, took the lead with television. In 1952, Republican presidential candidate Dwight Eisenhower was the first to use television commercials in his campaign. During that same campaign, vice-presidential candidate Richard Nixon, in his famed "Checkers Speech," became one of the first politicians to appeal directly to the public through television.

The careers and aspirations of Republicans such as Joseph McCarthy in 1954, Barry Goldwater in 1964, and Nixon during the Watergate scandal were adversely affected by negative media coverage and fostered, in some Republican circles, an adversarial relationship with the media. Nonetheless, Republicans such as Ronald Reagan effectively used the media to emote patriotism, hope, and optimism during much of the 1980s while, at the same time, broadening the party's appeal to include libertarians, evangelicals, social conservatives, anticommunists, urban Catholics, disaffected labor, and white Southerners.

In 1994, the Republican Party swept midterm elections and took control of both houses of Congress for the first time since 1952. Many political pundits credited the influence of conservative radio talk show host Rush Limbaugh for that surge in Republican electoral success. During coverage of the 2000 presidential campaign, network news entities began to distinguish the Republican Party from the Democratic Party through a color-coded system in which red represented Republican and blue represented Democrat. The terms *red state* and *blue state* have come to connote dichotomies between broadly defined conservative and liberal philosophies and have entered the American lexicon as identifying statements of political values.

Sean P. Cunningham

See also Conservative, Conservatism; Democratic Party; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Goldwater, Barry; Limbaugh, Rush; Nixon, Richard M.; Reagan, Ronald

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Reputation in Politics

Reputation designates the respect enjoyed by a person, organization, institution, or, more generally, an individual or collective subject among relevant reference groups in the mid or long term. An agent's reputation gains in social importance to the degree that prestigious information diffuses beyond the sphere of his or her immediate group of acquaintances. This diffusion process takes place either via oral propaganda or—and much more effectively—via the medium of public communications. Because this implies that reputation is strongly linked to public celebrity, it is simultaneously evident

that the mass media play a central role in the process of creating reputation. Indeed, in the political sphere, the importance of the mass media as creators of reputation has increased massively in recent decades. Thus stakeholders perceive political and government agents to an increasingly exclusive degree via the leading opinion-forming media. At the same time, the reputation bearers concentrate their public relations ever more strongly on the media arena, whereas other communications media, such as political advertising, tend to lose significance.

In modern societies, the creation of a good (or bad) reputation follows a logic from which two elementary types of reputation are derived. First, the actions of a reputation bearer are measured on the basis of objectives specified by the function systems of politics, business, journalism, science, and so on. Politicians gain a reputation when they prove to be effective in making political decisions or can mobilize voters in large numbers. Journalists appear to be worthy of recognition when they push circulation and viewer figures up dramatically. By the same token, companies and their managers increase their respect when they run their businesses at a profit. When people or organizations are measured on the basis of such performance objectives set by the various function systems, this corresponds to what is known as *functional reputation.* This is an indicator of success and technical competence and is linked to how well an agent fulfills the role assigned to him or her or how well an organization serves the purpose for which it was created. However, a second general type of reputation has also emerged in modern societies, namely, *social reputation.* It is not based on the specifications and logics of the various function systems but is subject to overall standards of social evaluation. In social reputation, interest centers on the extent to which agents possess moral integrity; that is, act in a manner that complies with social norms. Accordingly, agents have an intact reputation if they are successful and appear to be competent (functional reputation) as well as act with social responsibility in their efforts to achieve success (social reputation). Particularly in politics, social reputation has gained markedly in significance under media conditions: Politicians take care to manage their social reputation as credible and charismatic personalities who possess integrity. At the same time, an authentic expert culture of scandal-mongering has developed in the media system that specializes in revealing failings of a social-moral character.

A good reputation brings fundamental benefits to its bearers in politics and society. High respect allows people to select reputation bearers despite minimum knowledge, simply on the basis of a gut feeling. Agents with intact respect more easily mobilize support and followers because pressure groups have learned to trust the performance, competence, and integrity of the status bearers. Reputation thus extends the scope of action and minimizes social control. The function of reputation as a way of legitimizing social power is particularly important. High respect gives access to power. At the same time, power positions become fragile if the reputation of a status bearer is seriously damaged. Almost every day we witness how political, business, or other leaders must leave the scene because their tarnished reputation no longer allows them to hold high office. This shows that power and reputation must be in balance to be stable in the long term. Not surprisingly, modern election campaigns concentrate not so much on complex political arguments about specific issues but increasingly on directly challenging the reputation of their political opponents. Reputation strategies aiming to damage social reputation are particularly effective in this regard because, in contrast to functional reputation, it is almost impossible to recover a social reputation that has been tarnished.

Mark Eisenegger

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Resonance Theory

The term *resonance theory* has been used in different ways by two well-known communication scholars.

Both George Gerbner and Tony Schwartz have used the word *resonance* to refer to a process by which a mass media message is received, interpreted, or affected by a person's real-world experiences. However, Gerbner believed resonance happens by accident, whereas Schwartz believes it can be used by a communicator on purpose, in order to persuade.

Gerbner used the term *resonance* to describe one of two processes involved in his theory of media cultivation. That theory contends attitude change is a gradual and cumulative process as a person is exposed over time to many media messages. His research found that heavy television viewers began to believe their real world was like the fictional world presented on the TV screen. Gerbner said he found evidence that heavy TV viewers believed their world was just as violent as the world of the television crime program. His studies and those of his colleagues describe two processes leading to media cultivation. The first, called *mainstreaming,* contends different people exposed to the same media messages will be similarly cultivated by those messages. The second, called *resonance,* refers to what happens when a person's real-life environment really does resemble what they see on television. Gerbner said he found evidence that in a high-crime area of a city there was a strong fear of victimization because television viewers received a double dose of crime messages. The crime seen on television "resonated" with the crime all around the viewers in their neighborhood.

Schwartz seems to agree with Gerbner when he writes that patterned electronic information provides the basis for how people perceive their world. He takes this notion one step further, arguing that shared TV exposure over time creates a common reservoir of media experiences in the brain. When a persuasive message taps into the shared experiences of a receiver, it brings forward a meaning in the listener or viewer. Schwartz believes resonance has always been a part of communication, but by virtue of a shared electronic media environment, stimuli in radio and television messages evoke material stored in the brain. In this way, the audience is put to work by the message sender, investing itself in the message and becoming part of the communication process. This process is almost instantaneous. A successful message, writes Schwartz, "strikes a responsive chord" using the resonance principle, whereby the brain of a listener or viewer actually creates the intended perception or behavior. This can have a powerful persuasion effect, as illustrated by Schwartz's most famous political spot, "Daisy Girl." Created by Schwartz for the Lyndon B. Johnson presidential campaign, it evoked feelings of fear in viewers who saw a little girl picking petals off of a flower, but then heard a countdown from mission control preceding images of a nuclear bomb explosion. Although Johnson's opponent, Barry Goldwater, never appeared in the spot and was never mentioned, he was placed there by viewers who feared nuclear proliferation under his administration.

Lisa Mills-Brown

See also Cultivation Theory; Daisy Girl Ad; *Responsive Chord, The;* Schwartz, Tony

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RESPONSIVE CHORD, THE

This classic book in the mass communication literature has been widely cited by both scholars and practitioners because it uses a communication principle called resonance to outline both a theoretical and a practical approach to creating electronic media messages. The author contends "presearch" is critical to creating a persuasive radio or television message that will "use the audience as a workforce" by evoking a response from each listener's or viewer's personal experiences and background. Published in 1973, this was the first book written by Tony Schwartz, the man who created the famous "Daisy Girl" spot for Lyndon B. Johnson's presidential election.

Schwartz believes many people using the electronic media to persuade or inform do not really understand how it works. He explains why transportation theories of communication that track the linear information flow of a message from sender to receiver are outdated and do not fully account for or explain the effects of complex messages delivered through the electronic media. Schwartz contends that for such sound and picture

messages to be successful, they must "strike a responsive chord." Such a "chord" is "struck" when a sound or visual image in a message is designed and controlled with the goal of evoking a desired response from the receiver's stored past experiences.

Schwartz was among the first to view the communication process in electronic media as interactive. He calls this interactive process the "resonance principle," whereby a radio listener or television viewer actually brings more information to the communication process than the sender or the stimulus itself. The listener's or viewer's brain is an important component of the communication process because his or her life experiences interact with the stimulus in determining the meaning of the message. Schwartz challenges communicators to deeply understand how controlled stimuli in their visual and aural messages can evoke stored information and result in a desired learning or behavioral effect.

If the first 25 pages of the book outline the resonance principle, the next 85 guide practitioners on how to use resonance to make effective messages for radio and television. In his section on designing a commercial, Schwartz argues that the audience should be viewed as "a work force in the communication process," filling in spaces of familiar phrases such as "things go better with _____." He contends the radio audience is not just listening, it is "bathing" in the sounds it hears.

Schwartz's chapter on political messages applies his strategy to campaign and candidate communication. Instead of creating political spots and then testing them with an audience, Schwartz believes in "presearch." He urges campaign managers to first find out how an audience feels about a candidate because, Schwartz writes, "it is much more important for a voter to feel a candidate than to see him." Thus, the goal of a political spot producer is to find a way to "bring the voter to the candidate," by evoking positive feelings about him or her with appropriate sound and picture stimuli that strike a responsive chord in the audience.

Lisa Mills-Brown

See also Daisy Girl Ad; Resonance Theory; Schwartz, Tony

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Revolution, Political

In political revolutions, it becomes evident that social change in modern societies is catalyzed by public communication. This can be observed in revolutionary Paris in 1789: In the period from February to May 1789 alone, even before the estates-general were convened, 450 clubs and more than 200 journals appeared, while the three traditional newspapers just simply disappeared. After the storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, another surge of new publications in the form of hundreds of brochures, pamphlets, and illustrated leaflets followed. Apart from these print products, the communication events of the revolution manifested themselves in theatre, in literature, in songs, in revolutionary festivities, and in numerous other manifestations. Like a magnet, the fundamental conflict of the "(political) rule of progress" attracts all of public communication.

Political revolutions are marked by a multitude of communicators which is in tandem with an intensification of communication where only few topics remain the focus of attention. Mass mobilizations rely on this process, and at the same time, they produce those dramatic events on which public communication then focuses. In no other periods do *many* communicate about *the same* so intensely as in periods when the existing social order is called into question in an "either-or" conflict. The mass media public sphere fuses with the physical public sphere of the manifestations and demonstrations in such a way it becomes one single world that consists only of these actors involved. A revolution creates this very special historical period when all persons affected look at the new, emerging arena of the public sphere and see themselves and each other in it. For revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries, a direct public sphere is constituted where communication, action, and interpretation by the media *merge.* The successful and the failed revolutions at the beginning of modernity—the revolution in Mexico, the revolutions at the end of World War I and in the 1930s, the revolution in China in 1949, the upheavals in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, those in the context of de-colonization and, finally, the upheavals in Eastern Europe in 1989—had their "Bastilles," their key communication events, and their identity-shaping symbols. They constitute for both contemporaries and future generations those epoch-making breaks which tear up the continuity between the past and the present.

In this process, *semantics of difference* which are used in public communication prove to be crucial. The rigid differentiations that can be observed for the interpretation patterns of the revolutionaries regarding the temporal, segmentary, stratificatory, and functional dimension dominate the attention structures, direct the expectation structures, and indicate future societal structures. It is through these semantics of difference that "more-or-less" conflicts, which societies constantly have to deal with, are transformed into "either-or conflicts."

If one examines where these semantics of difference come from, it becomes clear that they originate in non-established political actors (social movements and protest parties). Without social movements (starting with the Enlightenment movement), neither the revolutions from the late 18th to the late 20th century nor the totalitarianisms of the 20th century can be explained. The importance of social movements (in all various forms, compositions—homogenous or heterogeneous regarding ethnicity or socioeconomic strata—and organizational types) for social change is not to be underestimated.

Following this, a diachronic analysis of public political communication reveals that the importance of social movements and protest parties, including their charismatic leaders, shows a discontinuous pattern. Non-established actors have different chances for resonance to define social problems for society, and they need to compensate their lack of influence on the political system by resonance in the political public sphere. While in periods of stable social development established political actors (and increasingly the media) dominate the agenda of political communication, periods of upheaval are marked by resonance of new social problem definitions by social movements and protest parties. One cannot understand rapid value and norm change and processes of delegitimization without taking into account the role of this type of political actor that emerges again and again. Once more, the French Revolution serves as a case in point: Beginning in the 1770s, the frivolity, immorality, and corruption of the nobility and the royal family were revealed and denounced in a large number of "cahiers scandaleuses" (scandal sheets) and leaflets. This way, the delegitimization of the ruling elite constantly gained resonance, culminating in the calling of the estates-general in the spring of 1789 when the political public sphere emerging through scandal got out of control. Since then, political elites have been challenged by new, powerful actors in periods of upheaval; furthermore, the conditions and contents of political communication have been changing.

Revolutions are extraordinary communication intensifications in the struggle for the right interpretation of the past, present, future, and belonging. It is in revolutions that political conflict breaks out, which—induced by the secular promise for progress based on enlightenment—regularly and unavoidably occurs in modern societies.

Kurt Imhof

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Rhetoric, Political

Political rhetoric is an art of articulating and promoting one's political interests through influence in the

public sphere by symbolic manipulation of signs and symbols, including language, images, and the staging of events. The rhetorical theorist Lloyd Bitzer noted that political rhetoric was in action wherever there were groups of individuals with collective interests at stake in some public, decision-making situation. As such, its scope includes the individual campaign speech of a local politician as well as the broadcast advertisements for a senatorial candidate and the Web log discourse of an advocacy group for or against a president's public initiatives or governing policies at federal, state, or local levels. This discussion of political rhetoric includes a brief review of the main streams of thought about political rhetoric and the current forms and functions of political rhetoric scholarship.

Classical Western Traditions

Political rhetoric is a concern that stretches back to Plato, the Sophists, and Aristotle. The battle between Plato and the Sophists gave the term *political rhetoric* a negative connotation. Plato's concern with the health of the body politic (soul) was directly in contrast to the Sophists' concern with audience analysis and adaptation. Plato's "Gorgias" skewered rhetoric as "cookery" and a false ability to substitute the worse for the better, appearance for reality, and the probable for the true. This conception of political rhetoric echoes to this day, where public officials of all stripes denounce the "mere rhetoric" of their opponents.

An alternative to Plato's dour view of political rhetoric was that of the Sophist Isocrates. In such works as "Against the Sophists," he argued that political rhetoric was essentially bound to civic life and that political *rhetors* should take great care in how they used language, asserting that it reflected upon their character. This work was a sharp critique of his contemporaries, placing character as the central driving force behind Isocrates' ideal of a community-grounded political rhetoric. For Isocrates, political rhetoric would arise through a specific "liberal" form of education (something akin to the contemporary liberal arts) and would engender a practical wisdom within those who would be the leaders of society.

The most respected and systematic treatment of political rhetoric was developed and articulated in the works of Aristotle. In his work, Aristotle acknowledged that ethics, politics, and rhetoric are inextricably linked in public life, as can be seen in his essential works on "Politics," "Rhetoric," and "Nicomachean Ethics." These three areas are the pillars of public life and each contributes to the form and substance of political rhetoric. The ends of political rhetoric, from the Aristotelian perspective, are practical wisdom, which enables a person to be able to attain "the good life." Two essential parts of this wisdom are an ability to make good, responsible choices in public affairs and an ability to balance between the extreme vices of excess and deficiency in a given situation, also called "the golden mean."

From an Aristotelian perspective, rhetoric serves politics as the central tool for defining and evaluating matters that are essential to the good life: what is considered to be just, good, and noble. In this regard, these three essences parallel the three modes of proof inherent in rhetoric (ethos, pathos, and logos). The modes of proof arose from the realization that political affairs fell within the area of the probable and thus require a practical wisdom that is arrived at through proper modes of argumentation. Additionally, a virtuous character was necessary for any political figure to establish any kind of bond of authority and trustworthiness with his or her audience. Lastly, a correct emotional experience on behalf of the political speaker was essential in setting the proper emotional tone through which the argument should be received and judged. These three elements form an interrelated series of factors that bind a political communicator, his or her message, and an audience into a functioning civic entity.

Equally important are the three genres of political rhetoric (deliberative, forensic, and epideictic). These three types of rhetorical situations, endemic to politics, center on the legislative deliberation as to future policy and actions; judicial examination of past actions and the establishment of fact within those past situations; and praise and vilification of those persons, actions, and events that comprise the polity. The epideictic differed from the other two genres in that it did not suggest any overt action (establishing past "fact" or deciding future action) but rather considered whether the subject in question was virtuous or not.

Related to the Aristotelian perspective on political rhetoric is that of ancient Cicero. Where Aristotle's work served as a prime exemplar of Greek ideas on political rhetoric, Cicero's work was the best representation of the Roman perspective. Cicero's classic work *De Oratore* established the rules for both rhetorical practice and statesmanship. In *De Oratore,* the Ciceronian ideal of the good person who speaks well and actively participates in the civic life of his or her

community was set forth as a model for readers to imitate. Indeed, according to a Ciceronian formulation, rhetoric was most alive when used for public affairs. Here political rhetoric functioned as a site of controversy in which persons entered to proffer claims and counterclaims, accepting only those assertions that had been thoroughly tested through debate.

The Ciceronian ideal of political rhetoric took a distinct turn in later formulations of political rhetoric. A different concept of political rhetoric was articulated through the Renaissance period writings of Machiavelli and his classic work *The Prince.* In *The Prince,* Machiavelli presented a complete theory of power politics that was based on real, practical problems and situations in which a politician had to adapt rhetorical appeals. Machiavelli's theory of political rhetoric found the most essential, pragmatic elements of political circumstance to be of higher importance than civic and moral virtue.

The transition from the Renaissance notion of pragmatic power politics to that of Enlightenment and modern notions of political rhetoric was effected by a number of political philosophers and writers from the Renaissance onward. Throughout all of these conceptions of political rhetoric, three essential elements were at their core: rhetoric (as discourse focused on addressing public issues), ethics (as a sensibility of determining what was right and wrong), and politics (as the form in which a society was governed), each one an intrinsic part of the other. Moreover, these ideas show political rhetoric had been the mediating factor between human persuasion and the inherent tensions between liberty and equality, the individual and community, and the ways people conducted themselves under different systems of government (monarchy, oligarchy, republic, democracy).

Contemporary Political Rhetoric

Contemporary thinking on the subject considers that political rhetoric manifests itself within all forms of political speeches, candidate and issue advertisements, debates, campaign films, ritualistic public ceremonies, journalistic reporting and opinion, and many of the other communicative facets of a modern political campaign. "Image politics" is the modern and postmodern reliance on polling, public relations "spin," and media handlers to shape highly stylized, narrative meaning on events of national significance. The televisual positioning of candidates and politicians, and the staging of events for media consumption, has greatly altered public and academic assessment of political rhetoric. This evaluation of the form and content of contemporary political rhetoric has primarily centered upon ideology, style, the use of generic forms, and the postmodern condition of political rhetoric. It has considered the contexts of political advertising, debates, polls, the "constructed" public person or issue, and political media.

Ideology has a significant role in contemporary thinking on political rhetoric. The two main perspectives of thinking about ideology, ideology as false consciousness and ideology as a belief system, are reflected in the scholarship on political rhetoric of the last two decades. An important contribution to the literature on ideology and political rhetoric has been in the development of the "ideograph" and its link between rhetoric and a collective worldview in understanding how political sentiments are expressed symbolically. The context of rhetorical action is more than just the immediate circumstances that brought life to the discourse; historical and cultural forces were equally important to the understanding of a statement. Terms such as *freedom, justice, right to know,* when used in public debate, suggest a broad point of view that is embedded in our culture and expresses deeply held values. Contemporary political rhetoric is, at its essence, a blend of language, culture (popular or traditional), and history. These serve as the bases for meaning within the public sphere.

Some contemporary work in political rhetoric focuses on the identification of specific political styles. Identification and analysis of the realist, courtly, republican, and bureaucratic, paranoid, puritan, hortatory, laudatory, admonitory, and feminine political styles are some of the studies being performed within this sphere of political rhetoric scholarship. The broader analysis of a "political style" is a recent contribution to this area. *Political style* is defined as the symbolic cause that engenders a particular aesthetic reaction as political effect, a focus on style has had wide-ranging findings. From one corner of this scholarship, we find that Machiavelli is responsible for creating "modern" politics (realism in politics) through his use of a realist style that has, at its essence, a negation of those texts and social norms that would be above it. From another corner there is the feminine style, which relied more on personal examples rather than strict deductive reasoning, put a premium on identification with the

audience, and used alternative public personae to make those connections.

Studies of political rhetorical genres have identified and analyzed the various genres in presidential rhetoric and those genres that correspond with running for or holding political office. Such genres include political convention speaking, nomination and acceptance speeches, and victory/defeat speeches. Additionally, resignation speeches, political apologia, and congressional antiwar speaking can constitute genres of political rhetoric. The presidential genres include inaugural addresses, state of the union addresses, and presidential war requests. Much of the scholarship in this area of political rhetoric focuses upon the continued existence of certain forms of political rhetoric and a discussion of the ways these recurring forms tap into the wider culture and society.

Scholarship within political rhetoric has worked within the larger sphere of rhetorical studies and the concern with the connection between rhetoric, identity, and image. Numerous studies have been conducted with a focus upon class, gender, race, sexual orientation, and culture. Studies in this sphere seek to understand, in a broad sense, how a speaker, listener, or other objective subject is constructed through a rhetorical act. Whereas this concern places political rhetoric squarely within the larger sphere of the rhetorical studies and the humanities, the concern with rhetoric and image making (or image politics) has been conducted from a number of ideological positions. While some have focused on image from an Aristotelian or neo-Sophistic (postmodern) perspective, there are others that have taken a narrow Platonic view of political rhetoric as issue and image manipulation for politically unhealthy ends. Thus, we can have rigorous analyses of a president's image construction within a contemporary, postmodern milieu side by side with other, more popular treatments of presidents' ability to "spin" public issues through their discourse.

Grant C. Cos

See also Aristotle

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Rhetoric, The

See Aristotle

Rhetorical Criticism

See Methodology

Rice, Condoleezza (1954–)

Condoleezza Rice was born in Birmingham, Alabama. From her childhood in the most segregated cities in the South in the 1950s and 1960s, Rice became one of the most influential women in the history of the U.S. government. She received her bachelor's degree in political science from the University of Denver in 1974; her master's degree from the University of Notre Dame in 1975; and her Ph.D. from the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver in 1981. In that same year, Rice joined the Stanford faculty as a professor of political science and won two of the highest teaching honors: the Walter K. Gores Award for Excellence in Teaching in 1984 and the School of Humanities and Sciences Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching in 1993.

From 1989 to 1991, Rice served as an advisor on Soviet and European affairs to President George H. W. Bush's National Security Council and a Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. She was the only Soviet adviser at the National Security Council and helped write the U.S. policy

through the unification of Germany and the end of the Cold War. Returning to Stanford in 1991 as a member of the faculty, Rice became the provost in 1993: the youngest, the first non-white, and the first female provost at Stanford. In 2000, Rice became George W. Bush's foreign policy advisor and in 2001 she was named the National Security Advisor: the first woman and the second African American, after Colin Powell, to hold the post. In 2005, Rice succeeded Colin Powell as the U.S. secretary of state.

Rice is the most distinctive member of the Bush foreign affairs team because of her gender, age, and academic achievement. Her publications include *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed* (1995) with Philip Zelikow, *The Era* (1986) with Alexander Dallin, and *Uncertain Allegiance: The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army* (1984) in addition to numerous articles. Rice's popularity surfaced in September of 2001 when she was appointed as one of the primary White House spokespersons on the war on terrorism. Since then, her visibility has been enhanced by profiles in magazines such as *Vogue* and *O: The Oprah Magazine.* Rice was also ranked as the second most powerful woman by *Forbes* magazine in 2006.

Juliana Maria da Silva

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Richards, Ann (1933–2006)

Former Texas Governor Dorothy Ann Willis Richards championed her beloved Texas and appointed more women and minorities to state positions during her term than any other governor. Serving as the 45th governor of Texas, and only the second woman governor of the state, Ann Richards got her start in elective politics in 1976 as a Travis county commissioner and went on to serve as Texas state treasurer until her gubernatorial election in 1990.

"Welcome to the first day of the new Texas!" With these words Governor Richards opened her inaugural address on January 15, 1991, and defined the hallmark of her political communication. Not only did Richards revitalize the Texas economy, she also cut state bureaucracy and advocated insurance, education, and prison reform.

Governor Richards's style of political leadership represented the new Texas. Richards prided herself on building partnerships, actively putting people in places to effect change, and opening the doors of government to those who hadn't been welcome before. Richards believed that "everyone who has a piece of the puzzle" must be "at the table when we sit down to put the jigsaw together." Leadership required the input of all in Richards's administration. As she often remarked, "using the visibility of my office to open doors" is an important way to build the new Texas.

Richards's political communication was known for its humor, stories, and flair, best represented by her self-described "Dairy Queen lady" hair. The country was first introduced to Richards's sense of humor in her keynote address at the 1988 Democratic Convention when she quipped about Republican nominee George H. W. Bush: "Poor George. He can't help it. He was born with a silver foot in his mouth." Following that rousing 1988 address, speculation mounted about a Richards run for Texas governor. She ran and, after a hard-fought race, declared the most negative in the state's history, Richards narrowly defeated Texas millionaire Clayton "Wheat" Williams.

Governor Richards was defeated in 1994 by George W. Bush, but her commitment to public service did not end when she left the governor's mansion. She served on several boards of directors, worked in law and public relations, and campaigned tirelessly for Democratic political candidates, particularly women, and for issues such as women's rights, civil rights, abortion, and gay rights.

In September 2006 Ann Richards died of esophageal cancer. Former President Clinton eulogized Richards as larger than life: "First, she was big. Big hair. Big bright eyes. Big blinding smile. She also had a big heart, big dreams; did big deeds." Clinton praised Richards for opening the doors of government to women and minorities and said that Richards "really believed we could make a world where everyone could be a winner . . . where young girls grew up to be scientists, engineers, police officers and politicians, where people, without regard for color, condition or orientation were treated as God's children." Governor

Ann Richards will be remembered for her pioneering work paving the way for other political women.

Kristina Horn Sheeler

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Right-to-Life Movement

See Abortion

Rivera, Geraldo (1943–)

Gerald Miguel "Geraldo" Rivera, a television journalist, an entertainer, and a talk show host, is best known for sensationalistic reporting and his tendency to include himself in stories. He has aired investigative pieces about abuse of the mentally ill, war coverage of fighting in Afghanistan, and talk show topics such as "Men in Lace Panties and the Women Who Love Them." He has also taken occasional acting roles (movies: *Natural Born Killers, The Bonfire of the Vanities;* occasional TV appearances as himself). He has earned numerous honors, including 10 Emmy Awards and a Peabody Award, but his approach has become a target for comedians and critics on the problems of sensationalistic journalism.

Rivera was born on July 4, 1943, in New York City. He graduated from Arizona State University and received a law degree from Brooklyn Law School. In 1970, his work as the attorney for some New York Puerto Ricans led to television interviews that became his break into TV journalism. He joined WABC-TV in New York as a reporter, eventually working on both *Good Morning America* and *20/20.* In 1972, Rivera won his first Emmy for a story on the abuse of patients at Willowbrook State School, a New York institution for the mentally ill.

He stayed with ABC until 1985 but was fired after complaining that the network refused to air his story on the relationship between John Kennedy and Marilyn Monroe. The next year, he produced a 2-hour, live, syndicated special called *The Mystery of Al Capone's Vault* in which he opened an empty vault found in Capone's former headquarters.

Rivera hosted a daytime talk show, *Geraldo* (1987 to 1998), known for theatrics and controversial guests. One episode included the "Men in Lace Panties . . ." story. Another led to an on-air brawl with neo-Nazis. Twice he had plastic surgery on the show. Meanwhile, he also produced a series of prime-time specials on Satanism.

His 1991 autobiography, *Exposing Himself,* discussed his sexual encounters (most notably with Bette Midler). The book became a source of news itself.

In 1994, he signed with CNBC to do *Rivera Live.* Three years later, he became a reporter for NBC, covering the impeachment of President Bill Clinton.

Rivera joined Fox News Channel in 2001 and became a war correspondent in Afghanistan. His tenure was marked by two controversies—an inaccurate report that he was at the scene of a friendly fire incident and his reporting on a military operation while embedded with a U.S. military unit. In the latter incident, he drew a map in the sand on camera, describing the planned movements of the unit.

He later hosted *At Large with Geraldo Rivera* for Fox and the syndicated *Geraldo at Large.* He obtained an exclusive interview with Michael Jackson before the pop star went on trial on child molestation charges. Rivera said he believed Jackson was innocent and promised to shave his mustache if he were wrong—again inserting himself into a news story.

Larry Powell

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Rock the Vote

Rock the Vote is a nonprofit organization for political advocacy, established in Los Angeles in 1990 by Jeff Ayeroff, co-chief of Virgin Records. Though its political affiliation has been disputed in recent years, the group does claim to be nonpartisan. The group argues that it was created as "a response to a wave of attacks on freedom of speech and artistic expression."

Rock the Vote's main objectives are to increase youth voter turnout and encourage positive change in

society. This is evident from the organization's slogan listed on its official Web site—"Political power for young people." The central motto of the organization is also reflected through its numerous voter registration drives, get-out-the-vote events, and voter education efforts, which intend to ensure that young people exercise their right to vote.

Rock the Vote is also known for the debates it organizes every 4 years during the U.S. presidential campaign. Though the credibility of this once in 4 years event has been marred by questions like "Boxers or briefs?" or "Mac or PC?" researchers of campaign politics have looked upon the debate organized by Rock the Vote as a big electoral event trying to capture the attention of the increasingly apathetic young voter. A large number of studies in recent years have analyzed the debate and its effects on young citizens' perceptions toward politics. They have concluded that the content for this debate is structured and framed to attract the youth voter, unlike other traditional campaign messages, which is why it has a greater chance of engaging their attention and perhaps leading them to exercise their right to vote and participate in the political process.

Despite its claim of being nonpartisan, the Rock the Vote organization drew criticism from Republicans during the 2004 presidential election because it sent a mock draft notice to over 600,000 e-mail addresses. This e-mail had the Rock the Vote logo and a facsimile of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's signature at the bottom of the message. In addition, Rock the Vote also created two public service announcements focusing on the draft issue and a third public service announcement endorsed by celebrities that mentioned the draft issue as one of the issues young voters might be concerned about. At least one of these public service announcements focusing on the draft ran on MTV for 10 consecutive days in September 2004. Rock the Vote also devoted a significant amount of content to this issue on its Web site. Such actions have led many people to believe that the group was trying to suggest that the draft might be reinstated if President George W. Bush were to be reelected.

Sumana Chattopadhyay

See also Framing; Political Efficacy; Youth Voting

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Rogers, Everett M. (1931–2004)

Everett M. Rogers was born on March 6, 1931, in Carroll, Iowa. In an academic career spanning 47 years, he wrote 36 books and some 425 journal articles, book chapters, and technical reports. His clear prose has left an indelible mark on our understanding of how innovations (new ideas and practices) diffuse in societies.

Rogers almost skipped college. He wanted to farm. One day in 1948, a high school teacher drove Rogers to Ames, the home of Iowa State University (ISU) where he enrolled in agriculture. Numerous agricultural innovations were being generated at ISU, and its rural sociologists were conducting studies on the diffusion of such innovations as hybrid seed corn and chemical fertilizers. Questions were asked about why some farmers adopted these innovations and some did not. Rogers found these questions to be especially intriguing given, back home, he knew his father loved electro-mechanical farm innovations but resisted adopting biological-chemical innovations (such as the new hybrid seed corn even though it yielded 20% more crop and was drought resistant).

Questions about innovation diffusion, including accompanying resistances and how communication could help overcome them, formed the core of Rogers's graduate work at ISU. His 1957 doctoral dissertation analyzed the adoption of a cluster of agricultural innovations among farmers in Collins, Iowa. In reviewing existing diffusion studies in various fields (agriculture, education, marketing, and so on), he found marked similarities: Innovations, for instance, tended to diffuse following an S-shaped curve of adoption. This finding was of great interest to scholars because of its deductive and parsimonious potential. For instance, marketing scientists, epidemiologists, demographers, and political scientists appreciated the predictive potential of S-shaped curve given it elegantly describes an exponential growth curve.

In 1962, Rogers published this literature review, greatly expanded as the *Diffusion of Innovations.* The book provided a comprehensive theory of how innovations diffused in a social system. The book's appeal was global; his timing was uncanny. In the 1960s, dozens of countries in Asia, Africa, and South America gained their political independence and were searching for ways to effectively communicate agricultural, health, and family planning innovations.

Rogers's book proved to be of tremendous practical value in furthering such efforts.

Many believe that Rogers's scholarly contributions are defined by his uncanny ability to explain how macro processes of system change were linked to micro (individual and group) level processes. The explanations he offered showed both how micro-level units of innovation adoption were influenced by system norms, as well as how system change was dependent on individual action. In this sense, diffusion of innovations theory is one of the few social theories that connect macro- with micro-level phenomena.

Not surprisingly, as per the Social Science Citation Index, the *Diffusion of Innovations* is the second most cited book.

Arvind Singhal

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Roosevelt, Eleanor (1884–1962)

Anna Eleanor Roosevelt, First Lady of the United States and internationally known advocate in her own right, was committed to civic, social, and political reform. During her lifetime, she spoke and wrote about an impressive array of topics including poverty, employment, voting, housing, education, child labor, workers' rights, public health, civil rights, and women's rights. Her extensive involvement in political life, which included press conferences, lectures, and campaigning, secured the respect and affection of audiences worldwide.

Born into a wealthy and influential New York family, Eleanor Roosevelt quickly developed an interest in progressive reform and political activism. As a young adult, Eleanor participated in the Social Settlement and National Consumers' League movements, becoming attuned to poverty and working class concerns.

After her marriage to Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) in 1905, Eleanor's political activism flourished. Prevailing notions of femininity constrained women's public roles, but Eleanor found socially acceptable ways to justify her advocacy by lobbying on behalf of women's interests and by supporting her husband's career. She gradually assumed prominent roles in the Democratic Party, gaining a substantial political following. She campaigned actively for Al Smith during his bid for the presidency, backed Robert Wagner's New York senatorial campaign, and accepted leadership positions in the Democratic National Committee.

Later, Eleanor Roosevelt redefined the presidential First Lady role especially with regard to public communication. Recognizing the power of mass media, she made full use of several forms of media. She engaged in an unprecedented volume of correspondence with the American public, earning a reputation for genuinely caring about ordinary citizens. She

Eleanor Roosevelt at Gila River, Arizona, at the Japanese American Internment Center, April 23, 1943. For more than 30 years, Eleanor Roosevelt was the most powerful woman in America. Historian Geoffrey Ward once described her as "one of the best politicians of the twentieth century."

Source: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Presidential Library and Museum.

addressed the administration's policies, controversial topics such as civil rights, and family life in radio addresses, her syndicated column "My Day," and articles in political publications such as the *Democratic Digest.* She was the first wife of a president to testify before Congress where she advocated for migrant worker living and working conditions. Addressing the Democratic National Convention in 1933 when FDR was nominated for a third term, Eleanor Roosevelt spoke on behalf of Henry Wallace and is credited with securing his vice-presidential nomination. Reflecting her abiding support of women, Eleanor set a precedent for holding regular press conferences, restricting attendance to female journalists. She traveled the world, composing and delivering scores of speeches, sometimes as a paid lecturer.

After leaving the White House, Eleanor Roosevelt continued her political activities. She served on the board of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, made television appearances in support of presidential candidate John F. Kennedy, and was appointed by President Harry S. Truman as a delegate to the United Nations where she was instrumental in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Her thriving speaking and writing career grew as she authored addresses, newspaper articles, and books, taking an arguably liberal stance on issues.

Eleanor Roosevelt's death on November 7, 1962, prompted a flood of tributes. Newspapers, radio broadcasts, U.S. presidents, and world leaders extolled Eleanor for her lifetime commitment to social justice.

Lisa M. Gring-Pemble

See also Democratic National Committee; Democratic Party; First Ladies, Political Communication of; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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Roosevelt, Franklin D. (1882–1945)

Among American presidents, Franklin Delano Roosevelt stands out as a master of political communication. FDR and his administration strove to inform, explain, and justify the many New Deal programs to address the economic catastrophe of a great depression, so much so that the White House became the major center of national news. More than any president before or since, Franklin Roosevelt gave access to journalists with timely, newsworthy information in his press conferences. These primarily background sessions highlighted his policy knowledge, personality, and quick retort, impressing the correspondents with his leadership skills for counteracting the nation's economic disaster. With a record of almost 1,000 press conferences, Roosevelt's more than once weekly sessions set an expectation of news from the White House.

Roosevelt had the first designated press secretary, Stephen T. Early, who met twice daily with White House correspondents and helped organize an entire administration communication system of openness and information efficiency. Just before the 1933 inauguration, Early told one Washington correspondent that FDR did not want the press to serve in a "watchdog capacity" but rather to transmit spot news (announcements), thereby serving as stenographers to the public. In fact, this president mangled the watchdog role concept by his artful control and the tremendous information output during vast government changes. However, journalists more and more had to give interpretive news accounts to make sense of the many new agencies and programs.

Roosevelt's communication efforts relied upon the technologies of the day. During that golden era of radio, FDR originated a new informal speaking style with his fireside chats, held infrequently for impact. There, rather than exhort as with a radio address, he would explain policies and discuss administration options, as if he were sitting in a listener's living room. FDR sustained an image of an involved, active president, reinforced with newsreels, photojournalism, and even the first television pictures. Roosevelt's multiple communication efforts were to garner public opinion for the vast government changes. To monitor the public reaction during the New Deal, the president received reports from around the country; during the war he relied on the embryonic public opinion polls.

If control of information is a source of political power, FDR's presidency is a prime example of that control and that power, especially in the military sphere. With a world war, Roosevelt's presidency shows how a democracy becomes more authoritative, more closed, and more censored. Unlike the New Deal years when the administrative deliberated solutions in

public, the president had the administrative speak in one voice. Remembering the World War I communication mistakes, Roosevelt had few sedition trials and different censorship and information agencies with security labels and regulations. Previous frankness gave way to wartime covertness to protect military and diplomatic plans. The political candor of the New Deal era was never to return.

The political communication legacy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt presidency rests in the classic conflict of a democracy between openness and access to information for the people to make reasoned decisions, and confidentiality, which must be preserved to some extent if government is to operate, especially during an all-out war. Roosevelt was, as a result, one of the great presidential communicators with one of most open presidencies until the onset of World War II.

Betty Houchin Winfield

See also Fireside Chats; Presidential Communication; Press Conferences; Radio, Politics and

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Royal Commission on the Press

There have been three Royal Commissions on the Press (RCP) in the United Kingdom: 1947 to 1949, 1961 to 1962, and 1974 to 1977. The Commissions were established because of concerns about press standards and concentration of ownership. Their recommendations concentrated on self-regulated reform and antimonopoly measures and are regarded as merely having reinforced the status quo. This conservatism resulted largely from the strong influence of the liberal tradition, with its emphasis on the protection of the press from state interference. Moreover, governments, fearing antagonizing the press, failed to enact the more reformist recommendations.

Little has changed since then; despite later inquiries examining the press and private bills calling for legislation, the press is still, unlike broadcasting, largely self-regulated. Furthermore, the RCPs have had little impact on fostering professionalization and a public-service culture.

Regarding economic structure, the first RCP stated that "free enterprise . . . is a prerequisite of a free press." Moreover, it concluded that, despite some problems with local monopolies and chain-ownership, "concentration is not so great as to prejudice the free expression of opinion or the accurate presentation of news." However, it recommended that acquisitions and mergers should be monitored.

By 1962 it became clear that this optimism was unwarranted. The second Commission concluded that, given the economics of production and sales, further contraction of titles and concentration were all but inevitable. However, it rejected government financial assistance and instead recommended government approval for press acquisitions by large groups. It also stated that press shareholdings in broadcasting companies were "contrary to the public interest."

The third Commission reported further decline in diversity, especially due to high entry costs and economies of consolidation. Departing from previous Commissions, it also referred to the need to protect editors and journalists from owners, and emphasized the importance of preserving the public's freedom of choice. Nevertheless, it ruled out any form of government assistance. Instead, it recommended the referral of more cases to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the toughening of tests of approval (which was ignored), and the limitation of press shareholdings in broadcasting. This recommendation was enacted in the 1981 Broadcasting Act but relaxed in the 1990s.

Regarding press performance, the Commissions consistently upheld the principle of self-regulation. The first Commission recommended the establishment of a Press Council, to deal with questions of standards and training, and to promote press research. The Council was formed only in 1953, with a narrower remit, and due to threats of statutory regulation. The second Commission heavily criticized the Council and this judgment was repeated by the third, which recommended "far-reaching changes" in its composition, funding, and operation. Nevertheless, the Council failed to reform and never achieved its aims. Amid renewed threats of statutory regulation, especially because of the tabloids' invasion of privacy, the Council was replaced in 1991 by the Press Complaints Commission (PCC). The PCC, within its more

restricted remit, is generally considered a somewhat more effective self-regulator than its predecessor.

Ana Inés Langer

See also Press Freedom

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Ruby, Jack

See Kennedy Assassination

Russia, Democratization and Media

The opening of media through the policy of *glasnost* helped facilitate a democratic transformation in the Soviet Union. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the structure of Russian television changed from one of central government control of media outlets to a hybrid system of government and corporate ownership which some thought would promote democratization. Today the Russian public clearly has more access to information than under Soviet rule. Government control, however, has tightened under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, and many now question the ability of media to promote or safeguard democratization in Russia.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union controlled television from above, and the structure of the Soviet television system reflected the understanding of television as a socialization force. The State Committee for Television and Radio (Gostelradio) coordinated the communication of the ideological message sent down from above, and the chairman of Gostelradio was directly responsible to the general secretary of the Communist Party and the Politburo. Directives passed down to various departments that produced the television programs aired on Soviet television. The State owned all equipment, paid all salaries, and monitored all broadcasts. As a consequence, television presented the leadership view and agenda and did not cover events the party leadership preferred to suppress. Under Soviet control, citizens were unlikely to see certain types of stories, including those about crime, accidents, policy failures, or other bad news. The language of Soviet discourse was highly formalized, but the degree to which ordinary people understood or made meaningful the discourse is questionable.

The late 1980s saw the introduction of *glasnost* or openness, as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and others sought to facilitate more active citizen involvement in the political system in the pursuit of socialist goals. Although still controlled, Soviet media presented a wider range of issues, but this had unintended consequences that undermined one-party rule in the Soviet Union, contributing significantly to the breakup of the USSR. Many associated the opening of media with the transformation of the Soviet Union along a democratic path as various views were given an outlet for expression.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian media were restructured in the midst of economic and political transformation. At first new publications and radio and television channels proliferated. By early 1993, however, no longer supported by state subsidies, media outlets, particularly newspapers, found it increasingly difficult to compete for readers. Some television channels remained state-owned or state-controlled, as was the first channel, Gostelradio, renamed ORT in 1994. Others were privately owned, including NTV (founded in 1993). The range of programming on these channels increased greatly as Western television programming was introduced alongside the Russian. In the early 1990s many journalists and scholars looked forward to the development of media as a fourth estate, able to serve as a watchguard for democratic development.

The power of television, however, was not lost on political and economic elites (oligarchs), and the coverage of important events was followed closely by leaders. This included the 1993 constitutional crisis and the surprisingly strong showing of nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky in parliamentary elections. In 1994, NTV, the largest private television station in Russia, covered the battlefield atrocities and destruction of the First Chechen War (1994 to1996) extensively. Government credibility was questioned as television exposed divisions in elite and public opinion about the war. While some argued that this type of coverage

served to further the goals of a democratic transformation in Russia, others said that it threatened the stability of the Russian state.

The 1996 presidential election helped to forge a renewed connection between political power and the media in Russia. Instead of promoting an independent media system in which candidates for political office were critically scrutinized, commercial and state-run television channels chose to support President Boris Yeltsin against his communist challenger, even as Yeltsin struggled with ill health and unpopular policies. Many journalists justified this clear support by asserting that a communist victory would have meant the death of democracy altogether.

Many scholars have noted with concern the reassertion of government control associated with the rise of Vladimir Putin as leader of Russia. The Second Chechen War (1999) shows how things changed. Russian leaders, including Putin, whom Yeltsin appointed as president in December 1999 and who was elected in March 2000, were critical of NTV's coverage of the First Chechen War. This led, in part, to a reassertion of governmental control over the media. Not only was coverage of the Chechen War more restricted, but owners and journalists were challenged in general. Oligarchs Vladimir Gusinsky of the Media Most group (that controlled NTV) and Boris Berezovsky were both forced out of Russian media and the country.

Today in Russia, journalists and the public view media as tied to significant political and economic interests. The concept of the public interest is often overridden by personal and professional interests. It is extremely difficult and dangerous to be a journalist in Russia. The public, for its part, has experienced the trauma of rapid transformation in the political, economic, and social realms. Many long for stability and do not desire a critical press, presenting a multitude of voices.

Laura Roselle

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Rwanda Genocide, Role of Media

The roots of the genocide of members of the Tutsi, which resulted in the loss of up to 1 million lives in Rwanda between April and July 1994, lie in the colonial history of the East African country. After the colony's independence from Belgium in 1962, the Hutu majority of the population came into power and began to discriminate against the Tutsi minority group. This so-called social revolution had its ideological foundation in the racist "Manifest of the Bahutu." Because of several waves of violence and emigration in the second half of the 20th century, the population of Tutsi was diminished to 9% of the Rwanda population. To avoid a further exclusion and to depose the regime of President Juvénal Habyarimana, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which consisted of emigrated Rwandan Tutsi soldiers in Uganda, attacked the north of Rwanda in 1990.

Since the beginning of the civil war, the ruling single party National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) adopted a double strategy: On the one hand, it accepted peace talks, introduced a multiparty system, and allowed a media pluralism. On the other hand, these official measures were undermined by the systematic preparation of the genocide which became manifest in the "10 Commandments of the Hutu." This text called openly for the exclusion of the Tutsi and was published by the extremist journal *Kangura.* At the same time, the number of military tripled and the Rwandan population was armed via militias. These groups participated in several programs against Tutsi between 1990 and 1992.

The final genocide commenced after the murder of President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994. Until today, it is not clear if extremist Hutu circles or the RPF were responsible for the assassination. However, only hours after this event, the systematic murder of oppositional politicians, Tutsi, and moderate Hutu began and successively captured the whole country. The mass media played a crucial role in the conduct of the genocide. In addition to several print media and the official *Radio Rwanda,* it was particularly the newly founded *Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille*

Collines (*RTLM*) which abetted the entire population in diatribes, songs, and death lists for the elimination of the Tutsi. Beyond its function as the voice of genocide, *RTML* even contributed to the organization of the genocide which was finally stopped by the RPF's conquest of Rwanda. Two and a half million Rwandans fled from this offensive. Among them, a large number of political, military, and media actors who were responsible for the genocide succeeded in escaping to the security zone or overseas. In 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in Arusha, Tanzania, and mandated to judge the main perpetrators. However, the ICTR cannot answer the question of the share of responsibility of the international community and of global media which failed at the prevention of the crime.

Frank Wittmann

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S

Sabato, Larry (1948–)

Larry Sabato, the Robert Kent Gooch Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, is known for his research on U.S. elections. His political expertise has earned him different nicknames over the years. The *Wall Street Journal* once referred to him as "probably the most quoted college professor in the Land," *The Washington Post* dubbed him "the Mark McGwire of political analysts," and Fox News Channel called him "America's favorite political scientist" while the *Washingtonian* magazine called him the "Dr. Phil of American politics." Dr. Sabato is the founder and director of the University of Virginia's Center for Politics, and his favorite slogan "Politics is a good thing!" aptly describes his lifetime contribution to political analysis.

Sabato's research focuses broadly on national and state governments, particularly the different elements of the U.S. electoral scene. He has written numerous books and essays on topics such as the rising power of political consultants in U.S. elections, the changing nature of the gubernatorial office, the role of Political Action Committees (PACs) in the U.S. political process, and history of U.S. primary elections. He was among the first to identify the changing nature of the political scenario with increasing power being handed over to consultants and to point out how campaign financing determines U.S. electoral dynamics.

Sabato's book *Divided States of America: The Slash and Burn Politics of the 2004 Presidential Election* analyzes the individual 2004 races in great detail and provides background analysis leading to the 2006 and 2008 elections. He is also the author of over 20 other books and countless essays discussing the American political process. His other recent works include *Get in the Booth! A Citizen's Guide to the 2004 Election*, *Midterm Madness: The Elections of 2002*, *Overtime: The Election 2000 Thriller*, *Dangerous Democracy: The Battle Over Ballot Initiatives in America*, *Peepshow: Media and Politics in an Age of Scandal*, *Toward the Millennium: The Elections of 1996*, and *Dirty Little Secrets: The Persistence of Corruption in American Politics*. Sabato also issues a political newsletter through Sabato's Crystal Ball, a critically acclaimed election analysis Web site which predicted results for the 2002 midterm elections and the 2004 presidential elections.

A graduate in government from the University of Virginia, Sabato also studied at Princeton University for a year before completing his doctorate at Queen's College at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar. He has appeared on numerous U.S. news programs as a political expert and has served on many national and state commissions and panels.

Sumana Chattopadhyay

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Salinger, Pierre

See Press Secretary, White House

Sanders, Keith R. (1939–)

Keith R. Sanders deserves more credit than any other individual for the formation and development of the field of political communication as an academic discipline. A teacher and a scholar, he taught and mentored generations of young political communication researchers.

Sanders was born in Benton, Illinois. After receiving bachelor's and master's degrees in speech and psychology from Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, he was awarded a Ph.D. in communication from the University of Pittsburgh. As an assistant professor, he taught at George Washington University, but he spent most of his academic career at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale where he established one of the first academic programs in political communication in the country.

The interdisciplinary approach to political communication study and research characterized Sanders's perspective on the young discipline. He reached out to scholars in political science, journalism, television and film, psychology, and sociology, respecting what each could bring to a deeper understanding of the role of communication in political processes. It was an inclusionary vision that served well the expanding new field of political communication.

Seeing the need for a formal recognized structure for the growth of the discipline, Sanders worked tirelessly to establish the first political communication division in a national/international academic organization. In 1973 to 1974, the International Communication Association agreed to establish the Political Communication Division as one of its permanent divisions; Sanders served as the inaugural chair of the division. Sanders also founded and edited *Political Communication Review* for the ICA division. The journal, the first dedicated solely to the political communication discipline, evolved into the current journal *Political Communication,* now co-sponsored by the Political Communication Divisions of the International Communication Association and the American Political Science Association.

An important marker for an academic discipline is the collection and recognition of its scholarship, and Sanders has contributed strongly to that aspect of the field's evolution as well. In addition to his own research and publications on communication and candidate image development, he coauthored early bibliographic work in political communication and coedited with Dan Nimmo the first *Handbook of Political Communication,* a classic in the political communication discipline.

Sanders was also a leader in recognition of the importance of broadening the political communication field to international and comparative perspectives. He organized and led one of the first international political communication research teams, a group formed to study the 1988 U.S. and French presidential elections. This effort, which he spearheaded with French colleague Jacques Gerstlé, led to the publication of *Mediated Politics in Two Cultures: Presidential Campaigning in the United States and France.* Throughout his career, Sanders authored/edited five books and numerous journal articles, book chapters, and professional papers.

He continued his commitment to academic excellence as an academic administrator, serving as the university's governmental relations officer and dean of the College of Communication and Fine Arts for Southern Illinois University, chancellor of the University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point, senior vice president for administration and chief operating officer of the University of Wisconsin system, and executive director of the Illinois Board of Higher Education. Currently serving on the Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Sanders has received many awards and recognitions for his service to higher education.

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also *Handbook of Political Communication, The*

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SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE

Saturday Night Live is a U.S. late night comedy and variety show that first aired on NBC in October, 1975. The show satirizes current events and news personalities through a format of skits and sketches. One example is "Weekend Update," a sketch that parodies news broadcasts and has helped launch the careers of many famous comedians, such as Dennis Miller and Chevy Chase. *Saturday Night Live* has been a cornerstone of NBC's late night programming and a model for subsequent late night television comedy shows such as *Politically Incorrect* and *The Daily Show* that are becoming more and more popular as alternative sources of political information.

A key impact of the mass media is their ability to inform. The quality of public debate on issues and political candidates depends on a citizen's political socialization process in which information is acquired that helps one make competent political judgments. Traditional political communication research has focused on television news because it has been the major source of political information for most citizens. More recently, however, political communication is undergoing change as new and alternative sources of political information emerge.

Late night television comedy shows such as *Saturday Night Live* have become a significant source of political information. Entertainment programs such as *Saturday Night Live* have become more and more useful to voters in helping them make sense of political reality. Politicians will often bypass traditional news outlets and make appearances on these late night television comedy shows. These late night programs use an emotionally intense comedic style that emphasizes images over fact-based issue coverage. Yet, this humor helps in the process of forming and shaping voter evaluations by highlighting certain traits that enable voters to access political information. In particular, the humor in late night television comedy shows is useful in helping voters access readily available political stereotypes, especially in the areas of candidate impressions and personalities. This type of information is often not available from mainstream news outlets.

From its inception, *Saturday Night Live* has been a prime example of such a show, especially among the 18- to 34-year-old demographic that the program was designed to target. During the 2000 national election, 9% of voters reported they learned about the election from late night comedy television shows such as *Saturday Night Live.* In 2004, this number increased to 21%. Young viewers rate the comedy formats as more "real" than the actual campaigns. Humor on *Saturday Night Live* often focuses on certain characteristics of a politician that are already central in voters' mental images. Young voters report that this personalization of candidates not only stimulates their interest in politics but also helps them in their overall learning about the political process. The "Weekend Update" segments, which comment on the week's newsmakers and events, have been very popular with this younger audience. Political analysts noted that *Saturday Night Live*'s debate satires of Al Gore during the 2000 presidential campaign actually impacted how he performed in the subsequent debates. This effect was amplified as other news shows would air replays of the sketches from *Saturday Night Live.*

The best examples of *Saturday Night Live*'s use of humor to convey political information have been in debate satires and opening skits. Comedians on *Saturday Night Live* have parodied Michael Dukakis's height, Ross Perot's physical appearance, Ronald Reagan's competence, Bill Clinton's reading erotic novels, and George W. Bush's intelligence and mannerisms. *Saturday Night Live*'s opening sketches in Election 2000 offered a glimpse of "our presidential future" with all three candidates. Ralph Nader was impersonated in the Oval Office with pigs flying and devils shivering. Al Gore was impersonated as he read from an economics textbook in front of a supercomputer. George W. Bush was impersonated hiding behind the Oval Office desk as the Capitol burned in the background and as beer cans littered his desk.

Few programs match *Saturday Night Live* for this type of satire. *Saturday Night Live* is one of the most distinctive and significant programs in television history. *Saturday Night Live* is the prototype of a new type of political communication that is now a key source of information for young voters.

Michael Nitz

See also *Daily Show, The;* Political Knowledge

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Schemas, Political

See Political Knowledge

Schramm, Wilbur (1907–1987)

Wilbur Schramm founded communication study at the University of Iowa (1943), the University of Illinois (1947), and Stanford University (1955). He established communication research institutes at these universities and launched doctoral programs in communication studies. Unlike other forerunners in the field, Schramm did not return to his previous discipline once he had established and contributed to communication studies.

Schramm received a B.A. from Marietta College in 1928, an M.A. in American civilization from Harvard University in 1930, and a Ph.D. in American literature from the University of Iowa in 1932. He worked as a reporter, desk editor, correspondent, and associated press member in his early 20s. Throughout his professional and academic life, Schramm wrote fiction and poetry and worked as an administrator in many academic capacities. He was a professor of English at the University of Iowa from 1934 to 1941 and served as Education Director in the Office of Facts and Figures and the Office of War Information until 1947. His talents in various fields and professional experience made his ideas for a new communications program practical and viable.

Schramm became Director of the School of Journalism at the University of Iowa in 1943 and a research professor at the Institute of Communication Research at the University of Illinois in 1947, where he also served as Dean of the Division of Communication. In his later life, Schramm was an educator and scholar at several communication research institutions, such as the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and International Communication (1959 to 1973), Stanford University (1967 to 1973), and the East-West Communication Center in Hawaii (1973 to the early 1980s).

Schramm's research interests included audience behaviors, persuasion, WWII propaganda, media uses, and world violence. He primarily focused on media messages as an integral part of people's daily lives. His model of communication suggests connections between a sender, message, channel, coder, decoder, and receiver. Schramm theorized the relationship between communication and economics and the impact of communication development on democracy. He strongly believed in the social responsibility model of mass communication.

Schramm's most important research contributions discussed the effects of the media on the public. Among his 25 books, his best-known works, such as *Mass Communication* (1949 & 1960), *Process and the Effects of Mass Communication* (1954), *Television in the Lives of Our Children* (1961), *Mass Media and*

National Development (1964), and *The Story of Human Communications: Cave Painting to the Microchip* (1987), deal with how the media affect audiences. Several of these books remain seminal readings for communication scholars, influencing generations of students and professionals. Likewise, Schramm's Stanford communication program greatly influenced the field of communication study in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s.

Hyun Jung Yun

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Schröder, Gerhard (1944–)

Gerhard Schröder was German chancellor from 1998 to 2005. He also was prime minister of Lower Saxony from 1990 to 1998 and chairman of the Social Democrats from 1999 to 2004. Schröder is especially known as Germany's first media chancellor or the first chancellor of the arising media democracy.

When Schröder first ran for prime minister of the state of Lower Saxony in 1986, he had already made his biography the subject of public discussion. It would become one of his main strategies throughout his career to make use of his simple origin and the fact that he grew up without a father yet achieved great success. In addition to constructing the image of a promising social leader, Schröder also capitalized on his private life for political benefit at other occasions: Now married for the fourth time, Schröder always tended to use his spouses for public relation purposes. The fact that the Social Democrat and his third wife appeared on several non-political TV shows and allowed stories about their home life led to their image as the "Clintons of Lower Saxony." As a consequence, a "War of the Roses" situation arose when the couple split up that even the quality press could not ignore. It seemed that whenever it came to presenting politics in a popular way, Schröder would be at the forefront: Posing in expensive suits in a flashy magazine and allowing the public to be present when meeting with newly discovered relatives are only a couple of examples. In particular, the social democratic election campaigns in 1998, 2002, and 2005, during which the focus was put on the chancellor candidate Schröder rather than on his party, led to his image as a showman.

Even this brief review of Schröder's behavior in relation to the media shows that he can be regarded as a politician who knew the rules of journalism, accepted them, and used them in his favor. However, although Schröder worked with and not against the media–contrary to his predecessor in chancellorship Helmut Kohl—it should not be forgotten that the changes in the relation between media and politics often connected with the Schröder era cannot be attributed to the former chancellor's personality alone. It should be recognized that Schröder's chancellorship coincided with a time in which politics had to deal with the challenges of a more volatile electorate as well as a more commercialized and differentiated media market. On account of this, "fun chancellor" Schröder's so-called lifestyle politics can be regarded as a good example of the response of politics to these challenges.

Mona Krewel

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Schroeder, Patricia (1940–)

Patricia Nell Scott Schroeder was a pioneer for women, a Democratic politician who represented the state of Colorado in the U.S. House of Representatives. After completing a law degree at Harvard, Schroeder moved to Denver, Colorado, where she began her career by working as a lawyer for the National Labor Relations Board. She also became involved with the community by working closely with the local Planned Parenthood chapter and teaching in the Denver public school system.

In 1972, she was elected to Congress as a Democrat in Colorado's first district, based in Denver. This first

electoral victory was a narrow one, but she was reelected without contest the following 11 times with a platform consisting of anti–Vietnam War sentiments and the reordering of national priorities with emphasis on health services, environmental protection, education, and health care. In Congress, she immediately began pushing boundaries by becoming the first woman to serve on the House Armed Services Committee. Though she and the head of the committee, F. Edward Hébert, were at odds most of the time, she continued to fight to channel "saved" defense funds into social welfare programs. She openly denounced the Military Procurement Authorization Bill and accused the committee of being afraid of debate on defense issues.

Schroeder was also active on behalf of women's and children's issues, attempting to eliminate gender inequities, introducing legislation providing finances for child-abuse centers, sponsoring legislation to develop Head Start programs, and supporting year-round use of recreational facilities for underprivileged children. As chair of the National Task Force on Equal Rights for Women, she spoke out for federal payments for abortions and spoke against the anti-abortionist's violent tactics. As chair of the Defense Burden Sharing Panel, a component of the House Armed Services Committee, she advocated the cause of women participating in the military. The legislation she was most instrumental in putting through include the Family and Medical Leave Act and the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act, passed during her tenure as chair of the House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families. Others important legislation she championed included the Breast and Cervical Cancer Mortality Prevention Act, National Child Protection Act, and the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.

In 1987, Schroeder started campaigning for the 1988 presidential elections seeking the Democratic nomination. After touring the country for 5 months, she realized she did not have enough support and dropped out of the race. In 1995, she announced she would not seek reelection partly due to the 1994 Republican "House cleaning" that eliminated much of the Democratic power in the House of Representatives. Instead, in 1996, she turned to supporting Bill Clinton's presidential campaign before moving out of politics. In 1997, after a brief stint as a professor at Princeton, she was appointed President and CEO of the Association of American Publishers where she has been a vocal proponent of stronger copyright laws and has been head of New Century/New Solutions, a think tank for the Institute for Civil Society.

Hilary Noriega and Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Gender and Politics

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SCHULZ, WINFRIED (1938–)

Winfried Schulz (born in Berlin, Germany) is especially well known for his many publications in the field of political communication. He has been influential over decades not only on the direction of research in political communication but on the methodological developments of the field in Germany. His work has been unconventional but tenacious. He has focused on empirical methods since his dissertation when he explored the role of experiments in social sciences. He received his Ph.D. at the University of Mainz, Germany. His advisor was Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. From 1972 until 1975 he was assistant professor at the University of Mainz. From 1975 until 1976 he worked as a research fellow at the University of California at Berkeley. From 1977 to 1983 he was a professor of communication at the University of Münster, Germany. From 1983 until 2004 he was chair of the Department of Communication at the University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany, until he became Professor Emeritus in 2004. Schulz has worked with content analysis when the method was not quite established in Germany and thus introduced, popularized, and developed the method. He was one of the first to apply the method of content analysis not only to the print media but to film and radio as well. With his many contributions he has triggered further debate of the research content, and he enriched the methodological developments.

There are three primary areas Schulz has focused on: news selection and media reality, changes of media systems, and media reception and media effects.

The construction of reality has been his focus of attention at various times. Schulz was in charge of many content analyses exploring this topic. His publication *The Construction of Reality in the News Media: An Analysis of Contemporary News Coverage* (1976) is a milestone in political communication research. Schulz suggests that media do not simply reflect reality but they (re-)construct it. With this publication, he not only expanded previous research on news factors, but he laid the foundation and thus triggered the European research on news factors.

With the liberalization of the broadcasting system in the 1980s and social changes in Eastern Europe, Schulz also focused more on media systems and their changes. One of his major research themes has been the effects of the media expansion on the viewer. With the growing competition between public and commercial channels in the mid-1990s, he focused on the quality of media content and on methods to measure quality. Another research theme was the changing media environment in Eastern Germany with the reunification. Already during the first changes and well before the official reunification, Schulz had been interested in democratization processes in the former GDR. He was involved in a study about regional elections in 1990 in Leipzig, Eastern Germany, concentrating on the actual development of a democratic culture in political communication. He investigated how far the political communication process already worked under the new circumstances. His interest and involvement in Eastern countries and media systems has been rewarded by the Charles University, Prague, with an honorary doctorate.

Winfried Schulz is also credited with many theoretical contributions and descriptive research summaries. His work illustrated research deficiencies and solutions to shortcomings primarily in media effects research. He was, thus, one of the founders, as well as the chair, of the media effects area in the German Research Community (DFG) to support media effects research. His theoretical and explanatory publication *Political Communication* is yet another milestone equally known by students and scholars and often cited. It lays the foundation of many students' papers, and it serves as recommended literature in many political communication classes.

Nina König-Reiling

See also News Selection Process

Further Readings

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Schüssel, Wolfgang (1945–)

Wolfgang Schüssel, Austrian chancellor since 2000, started his political career in Peoples Party (Österreichische Volkspartei/ÖVP) in 1968. In 1989 he moved up as minister for economic affairs in an effective coalition between Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs/SPÖ) and ÖVP under SPÖ Chancellor Franz Vranitzky. In 1995 he was elected chairman of the ÖVP. From 1995 to 2000 he filled the position of vice chancellor and minister for foreign affairs.

After the federal elections in 1999 Schüssel found himself in third place (behind the SPÖ and an all-time-high Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs [FPÖ] vote of 27%), scoring the worst result since 1945 with only 27% of the votes. Despite this he led his party in opposition and without the mandate to build a coalition, managing with strategic flair to become chancellor by forming a coalition with the FPÖ of Jörg Haider. This made him the first chancellor from the Peoples Party since 1970. The new coalition faced massive protests both in Austria and abroad. The other 14 EU Member States decided to limit relations with the Austrian government until a delegation of three experts was sent to Austria to examine the political situation and to determine if the EU14's so-called sanctions should be withdrawn.

After the early end of the collaboration in 2002, the ÖVP won the elections (focusing on Schüssel in the election campaign with the slogan "Wer wenn nicht er" ["Who if not him"]) and became the strongest party

in Austria. Schüssel continued the coalition with the FPÖ, which had been reduced to 10% of the vote. Finally, in the 2006 federal elections the ÖVP lost the first place to the SPÖ. Schüssel remained in power only until a new coalition was formed.

Schüssel is often called a strategist and tactician, and his verbal skills are unquestioned as is his strong leadership. His government shaped a rigorous economic drive and cost-cutting reforms following the axiom “Mehr privat—weniger Staat” (“More private responsibility in spite of public services”).

The relationship between journalists and Schüssel has sometimes raised questions. Because of an alleged verbal slip-up in informal talks at an EU conference in Amsterdam 1997, he came under journalistic fire. Thereafter, the relationship between journalists and Wolfgang Schüssel seemed to be tense and reserved. Schüssel was given the nickname “Schweigekanzler” (“the silent chancellor”) by the opposition and the media due to his habit of remaining silent, especially in reaction to statements of the FPÖ and Jörg Haider. The initial criticism against the first coalition of Schüssel especially forced him and his team to focus even more on political communication and to try to control every public move as much as possible, using, for instance, pseudo-events and staging political appearances.

Peter Filzmaier, Flooh Perlot, and Maria Beyrl

See also Haider, Jörg; Vranitzky, Franz

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Schwartz, Tony (1923–)

According to Tony Schwartz, political campaigns are won or lost in the living room with the help of the media. Long gone are the days of baby kissing and mingling with the constituents. Now it seems as though the major television networks are the new political parties. Schwartz has played an important role in creating this new system. “Tony Schwartz, as much as any person, laid the foundation for modern political advertising,” says Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH). Schwartz’s “presearch” theory has become a necessary tool in campaigning and creating political ads. “We are in the business of using public relations in a new manner, not in the old terms of press relations,” says Schwartz. “We are using PR as ‘peoples’ reaction,’ personal retrieval of feelings and associations.” Schwartz believes there is no reason to try and impart information about a candidate. He feels voters have already formed an opinion and a more effective campaign includes sensory impressions used to create an emotional response.

The single most famous and talked about political spot in history was produced by Tony Schwartz for Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 presidential campaign. The “Daisy Girl” ad features a little girl counting while pulling petals off of a daisy. Her image is frozen as a monotone missile launch countdown begins. When the count reaches zero, a mushroom cloud appears and the voice of Lyndon Johnson says, “These are the stakes, to make a world in which all God’s children can live, or to go into the darkness. Either we must love each other or we must die.”

The Responsive Chord, a book by Tony Schwartz, explains how audio and visual material is used to strike what he calls “a responsive chord.” A chord is struck through what he refers to as “resonance theory” where the audience of a particular media object brings with them more information than they are being given. This method uses what an audience already knows to create the desired emotional response. In producing political campaign material, Schwartz suggests learning what an audience thinks of a candidate and using that information to create a positive emotional response. Then, an audience is not asked to digest a message but to help create it, to use information already stored in their head to key off reactions to the current message.

Tony Schwartz, born in New York City in 1923, graduated from Peekskill High School in 1941 and Pratt Institute in 1944. From 1945 to 1976 Schwartz produced radio programs about the sounds and people of New York on WNYC. He has lectured extensively around the world and still lectures occasionally at New York University, Columbia, and Emerson colleges.

Lisa Mills-Brown

See also Daisy Girl Ad; Resonance Theory; *Responsive Chord, The*

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SCHWARZENEGGER, ARNOLD (1947–)

Arnold Schwarzenegger successfully transformed himself from an internationally acclaimed bodybuilder into an internationally recognized action-movie hero and then in 2003 into the governor of California. His ability to use the muscle man image in crafting political images garnered him respect, particularly when the transference proved successful, but also criticism, when the movie star persona acted as a shield to challenges about his life and public policies.

Born in 1947 near Graz, Austria, he immigrated to the United States shortly after becoming the youngest man to win the Mr. Universe title at age 20. After struggling, he says, to both learn English and gain entrance into Hollywood, Schwarzenegger earned a Golden Globe Award for best newcomer in the film *Stay Hungry* (1976). He continued in bodybuilding competition, earning 12 world titles. His film career excelled as muscle action movies became popular, starring in *Conan the Barbarian* (1982) and *The Terminator* (1984). In 1983, he became an American citizen and earned his bachelor's degree from the University of Wisconsin. Three years later he married television journalist Maria Shriver, daughter of diplomat Sargent Shriver and Eunice Kennedy Shriver, sister to John F. and Robert Kennedy.

Schwarzenegger, though a Republican, became active in Kennedy family civic concerns, particularly in the Special Olympics, which was founded by Eunice Kennedy Shriver, and serves as the program's Global Ambassador. In 1990, President George H. W. Bush appointed him chair of the President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports.

Numerous politicians have made appearances on entertainment television, including presidential hopefuls Bill Clinton, playing sax on the *Arsenio Hall Show,* and Al Gore and George W. Bush, appearing on *Saturday Night Live.* Other celebrities, including former President Ronald Reagan and Congressman Sonny Bono, turned to political careers after entertainment careers. On August 6, 2003, Schwarzenegger took the celebrity politician model, also called politainment, to new heights when he announced on *The Tonight Show with Jay Leno* plans to enter the recall race to replace California Governor Gray Davis. Fans turned voters came out in droves to Schwarzenegger's political rallies. Some opposing candidates argued that the media largely ignored anyone but the man now nicknamed "the gubenator," so they pooled resources and rented a bus to follow Schwarzenegger's entourage around the state. Notably, Maria Shriver was the only wife of a California gubernatorial candidate invited to appear on the *Oprah Winfrey Show* during the campaign.

Allegations surfaced that could have collapsed the political ambitions of other candidates: As many as 15 women approached the *Los Angeles Times* stating Schwarzenegger had groped them. Schwarzenegger dismissed some accounts but admitted that he had "behaved badly" on "rowdy movie sets." He apologized and promised to be a "champion of women." Other news organizations questioned the timing of the story, less than a week before the recall, and many in the voting public vilified the *Los Angeles Times* for reporting on what came to be called Schwarzenegger's masculine antics. Other accusations were deflected as well, including that Schwarzenegger had years earlier praised Adolf Hitler's rhetorical abilities and had used illicit drugs.

Schwarzenegger won the recall and ousted the sitting governor, a feat accomplished only one other time in U.S. history. In a field of 135 candidates, Schwarzenegger garnered 49% of the vote and over 1.3 million ballots more than the next ranked candidate. Jay Leno introduced Schwarzenegger at his victory party. Later, Schwarzenegger and Davis appeared together on Leno's show, promoting key legislation that they both supported. They also reported that they had become friends, with Davis giving Schwarzenegger political advice on managing a fractured state government and Schwarzenegger giving Davis acting tips for the out-of-work governor's cameo appearances on television sitcoms.

Critics charge that Schwarzenegger continued to be indulged more like movie star than a governor by both the public and the media even after election to a second term in 2006. At that victory party, Schwarzenegger announced, "I love sequels." The governor and his political policies, critics argued, were treated with the

deference normally reserved for entertainment reporting while his opponents received scrutiny common for politicians. Yet in that climate Schwarzenegger used his celebrity and personal charisma to create support among California's political insiders across party lines, a crucial and largely successful strategy when compared with Republicans elsewhere who lost the GOP's stronghold in Congress. In his second inaugural address, Schwarzenegger referred to himself as post-partisan.

Virginia Whitehouse

See also Celebrities in Politics

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Second-Order Election

The conceptual framework concerning second-order elections was developed by Karlheinz Reif and Herman Schmitt in the article "Nine Second-Order National Elections" (1980). In one of the first systematic studies of direct elections to the European Parliament, Reif and Schmitt draw an important distinction between two categories of elections: (1) First-order elections offer voters the critical choice of who should govern the country. This includes elections in parliamentary systems such as Great Britain, Sweden, and Germany and presidential elections in countries such as the United States, Venezuela, and the Philippines. (2) Second-order elections, in contrast, are less important since they determine the outcome for lesser offices, such as regional, municipal, and local officials in parliamentary systems and legislative representatives in presidential systems.

Based on this distinction Reif and Schmitt showed that European parliamentary elections clearly fall into the second-order election category. Elections to the European Parliament are seen by both political parties, mass media, and voters as less important compared to the first-ranked national elections. The main explanation for these attitudes can be found in the institutional framework. There is no government chosen based on the results of the voter turnout, and there are few all-European campaigns conducted. The party system on the EU level is rather underdeveloped, and the European Union still has limited authority compared to the national parliaments.

A number of characteristics of second-order elections are pointed out in the literature: (1) lower level of voting turnout; (2) the outcome is strongly related to the popularity of national parties within a particular country, rather than around particular issues, individual candidates, or specific events; (3) in a cyclical pattern, governing parties often experience a fall in support in second-order elections and can therefore be characterized as "barometer-elections," as a poll on how the national government is doing their job and how the economy develops; (4) minor parties, often with charismatic leaders, are usually the main beneficiaries of any temporary protest vote against the government.

Bengt Johansson

See also European Parliamentary Elections

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Segregation

Segregation means the separation of the races by informal means such as custom and tradition, frequently upheld by threats of violence, or formal means through laws that forbid the mixing of the races in public facilities such as trains, buses, hotels, restrooms, restaurants, schools, and hospitals. When slavery was

practiced in the United States, free blacks in both the North and the South found restaurants and hotels closed to them, and they were often excluded from first-class accommodations on trains and steamboats. Although these forms of segregation continued after the Civil War, during Reconstruction the complete segregation of the races was not mandated by law. The withdrawal of federal troops from the South following the election of 1876 allowed Southern states to restrict and eliminate voting rights of blacks by utilizing such devices as the poll tax and literacy tests. Once this was accomplished, the Southern states were able to pass laws segregating public accommodations. The Supreme Court of the United States upheld legal segregation on railroads in *Plessy v. Ferguson* in 1896.

Governor George Wallace attempting to block integration at the University of Alabama, June 11, 1963. Deputy U.S. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach confronts him.

Source: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, LC-U9-9930-20.

By the turn of the century Jim Crow laws mandating segregation and relegating black Americans to an inferior status proliferated across the South. The National Association for Colored People (NAACP), founded in 1909 to fight against racism, used the courts to fight against segregation. The struggle against segregation was also aided by social forces such as the migration of many blacks to northern states where they could vote and influence the political process. During World War II, black Americans fought in segregated units but following the war, President Truman ordered the Armed Forces to integrate.

The U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* reversed the earlier *Plessey* decision and declared that separate but equal was no longer the law. Massive resistance to school integration in the South led to the creation of White Citizens' Councils and increased violence against blacks. This resistance led to increased determination by blacks to defy segregation through sit-ins at lunch counters and freedom rides on buses. The demonstrations turned increasingly violent. In August 1963, over 200,000 Americans gathered at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C., to rally for the passage of federal legislation that would outlaw segregation in public accommodations. On July 2, 1964, President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law. It outlawed segregation in public accommodations such as restaurants, hotels, motels, public restrooms, railroads, bus lines, airplanes, and waiting rooms for public transportation. The end of legally mandated segregation did not mean the end of *de facto* segregation as residential segregation reinforced by white flight to the suburbs of the major cities continued. Even good faith compliance with the *Brown* decision did not end *de facto* segregated schools with those in the suburbs tending toward all white students and schools in the inner cities tending toward all black.

Lloyd Rohler

See also Civil Rights Movement; Wallace, George

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Selective Attention

See Selective Processes, Exposure, Perception, Memory

SELECTIVE ELABORATION

See SELECTIVE PROCESSES, EXPOSURE, PERCEPTION, MEMORY

SELECTIVE PROCESSES, EXPOSURE, PERCEPTION, MEMORY

Selective processes are the means by which individuals' preexisting beliefs shape their use of information in a complex environment. Current interests and opinions influence the acquisition (selective exposure), evaluation (selective perception), and retention (selective memory) of political information. As a consequence, individuals tend to be more knowledgeable about personally salient topics than about topics that do not interest them, and they tend to know more of the evidence supporting their political opinions than they know about other perspectives. These characteristics limit individuals' ability to revise their political beliefs in response to new evidence and promote political polarization because existing opinions receive systematic reinforcement. Though these processes have rich roots in political communication, there is also significant research on the processes in nonpolitical contexts.

Selective processing is related to motivated reasoning, the idea that individuals' cognitive processes are goal-oriented and are often biased in favor of their political predispositions. Motivated reasoning concerns the mechanisms by which individuals construct justifications for their positions, specifically how they recall and interpret information, whereas selective processes concern the mechanisms that shape individuals' awareness of the political information that they use to form such justifications. Selective processing and motivated reasoning overlap with regard to the evaluation of opinion-relevant information. Individuals' tendency to be more critical of information that challenges their political opinions is cited as an example of both concepts.

Two key factors motivate selective processing. The first is the complexity of the information environment. People do not have the time or the cognitive ability to consider every argument, so they must be selective, choosing a subset of information that adequately, though incompletely, addresses the information need at hand. The second is that individuals experience a negative emotional response, referred to as *cognitive dissonance,* to information that conflicts with their existing opinions. Individuals seek to minimize dissonance by seeking out opinion reinforcement and finding fault with opinion-challenging information.

Selective Exposure

Selective exposure refers to the idea that individuals' political interests and opinions influence the information to which they attend. Within political communication the term *selective attention* is sometimes used synonymously. Selective attention has a somewhat different meaning within the field of cognitive psychology. Human cognition is limited, which means that people are unable to process the volume of information conveyed by the senses, so some stimuli go undetected. In this context, selective attention refers to the nonrandom process through which certain stimuli are attended to while other stimuli are ignored.

The evidence that political interests influence individuals' exposure decisions is unambiguous. Individuals pay more attention to political information the more it interests them or is personally salient. There is substantial debate, however, regarding the influence that political opinions have on information exposure. Opinion-motivated selective exposure is said to occur when individuals choose an information source that supports their opinion over one that challenges their opinion. Some scholars argue that decades of research have yielded little compelling evidence of the phenomenon, while others maintain that it remains an important concept for the field. The most recent research suggests that opinion-motivated selective exposure does occur under certain conditions. First, individuals must be committed to their opinion for this form of selective exposure to occur. Confidence has the opposite effect: The more confident an individual is about his or her opinion, the less likely he or she is to practice selective exposure. Second, to the extent that an individual engages in selective exposure, its effect is moderated by a variety of environmental factors. For example, environments in which individuals feel threatened or which place limits on their ability to acquire information produce stronger selective exposure effects. Third, there are some circumstances under which individuals will seek out opinion-challenging information. For example, individuals who expect that they will have to defend their opinion often seek other viewpoints prior to debate.

Selective Perception

Individuals tend to interpret novel political information in a manner that is consistent with their preexisting beliefs. *Selective perception* occurs in at least two ways. First, individuals fail to notice, or they misperceive, information that does not match their beliefs. For example, individuals tend to think that the positions held by a favored candidate or party mirror their own and will misinterpret evidence to the contrary rather than updating their views or preferences. Second, individuals frequently accept evidence supporting their opinions without hesitation but will scrutinize information that challenges their position carefully, critiquing the methods by which data were collected and analyzed and questioning the interpretation of results. This form of selective perception is often referred to as *selective judgment* or *biased assimilation.* It should be noted, however, that this bias may have a rational basis: Questioning new information that contradicts prior knowledge and experience can be an effective assessment strategy in a complex information environment. If one invests considerable energy in evaluating available evidence when forming an opinion, he or she may be justified in thinking that new, contradictory information is less trustworthy.

Selective Memory

Individuals are more likely to retain political information the more personal importance they attach to the topic. This effect is partially due to interest-motivated selective exposure. As noted previously, individuals exert more effort seeking out information about topics they deem important. The other mechanism underlying selective memory is that individuals devote significant cognitive resources to elaborating on interest-relevant information. Taken together, these processes yield greater political awareness and higher knowledge accuracy for personally important political issues than for issues that an individual considers unimportant. Recent research, however, suggests that there is not a memory congeniality effect: People do not exhibit a bias for opinion-consistent or against opinion-inconsistent information. Thus, selective memory is influenced by political interests but not political opinions.

R. Kelly Garrett

See also Hostile Media Effect; Limited Effects Theory; Public Opinion

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Selling of the President 1968, The

The Selling of the President 1968, written by Joe McGinniss, is widely considered to be the first book of its kind. Joe McGinniss essentially infiltrated the Nixon campaign and, in his book, told America what was really happening behind closed doors in political campaigning. McGinniss reveals how Nixon's team developed an image of Nixon as a good and decent man and found ways to ensure the perfect image was presented to the public according to a concise plan. This "planned image" ran counter to the beliefs of the general public that candidates were presented as themselves and not as creations of a campaign team.

The Selling of the President 1968 describes how the Nixon campaign believed the perfect image was necessary to get Nixon elected in 1968. Nixon had previously run for president and lost to John Fitzgerald

Kennedy in 1960. During that election the American people formed a rather unfavorable opinion of Richard Nixon, viewing him as an ugly and cold man. It was apparent from the previous election that his old image was not successful and could not win him this election either. For that reason, it was necessary for Nixon to have the new image.

The Selling of the President 1968 provides the details of how that new image was created. The Nixon campaign team developed a systematic approach to reveal the new and appealing image of Nixon. Nixon's team discovered that television was the best medium for advertising Nixon's new perfect image. The book begins with quotes from Nixon and his crew while they were filming Nixon's commercials for television. Nixon had different commercials with different scripts for various parts of the country. The first chapter of the book contains scripts from some of the commercials aired in various locations. Chapter 7 of the book explains how Nixon's advisors created a series of commercials for Nixon without Nixon having to actually appear or speak much in them. The commercials consisted of crowd-pleasing still pictures with Nixon's voice in the background. Nixon's words were going to be the same he always used—the words from his acceptance speech. The goals of these commercials were to divert the audience's attention away from the words of Nixon and toward the emotional appeal presented by the still pictures. The book suggests that one of the reasons for this strategy was the media consultants' belief that Marshall McLuhan was right about the importance of hot and cold media and images. McLuhan had earlier attributed Nixon's loss of the first 1960 Kennedy–Nixon debate to Nixon's failure to come across successfully on the cool medium of television. The last 100 pages of the book is an appendix which details specifics such as actual television ads. The index may be useful for further research or identifying details about the Nixon campaign.

The book has had such significant value to the study of politics, government, and communication that it is often required reading for some undergraduate courses to this day. *The Selling of the President 1968* still has relevance as a prime example of how politicians must carefully devise a plan and an image to present to the voters to gain their vote.

Kalisa Lynn Hauschen

See also *Candidates and Their Images;* McLuhan, Marshall; Nixon, Richard M.; Political Advertising; Presidential Communication

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Senghor, Léopold Sédar (1906–2001)

Léopold Sédar Senghor was the first president of the Republic of Senegal, co-founder of the Negritude movement, and the first African member of the Académie Française. He attended schools in the capital of Dakar, and went to university in Paris, France. Here he met other African and Caribbean intellectuals such as Aimé Césaire and Léon-Gontran Damas with whom he founded, at the end of the 1920s, the culturally influential Negritude movement. This movement revolved around the theory of Africanity which postulated the universal equality of all peoples, contributed to the fortification of African identity, and claimed the political independence of the colonized countries. He then returned to Senegal where his actual political career started.

In 1948, he founded the Senegalese Democratic Block and the journal *La Condition Humaine,* which obtained the symbolic title *L'Unité* in 1957. According to this motto, and after his election as president of independent Republic of Senegal in 1960, Senghor governed the country in a socialist one-party system. Senghor's main objective was national unity in order to preserve the diverse belongings of Senegalese society members to ethnic groups, families, brotherhoods, and castes. This is the reason why he did not permit the existence of a political opposition or of independent mass media. The media market was monopolized by state-run media such as the daily journal *Le Soleil* and *Radio Sénégal,* which served the single political party.

During the first half of his term of office, Senghor succeeded, through clientelistic and neo-patrimonial politics, in integrating the key actors of Senegalese society in general and the religious leaders of the Muslim brotherhoods in particular. However, at the beginning of the 1970s, he was forced to revise his semi-authoritarian way of ruling. This revision was an

indirect effect of the world economic crises which were responsible for the slump of agricultural production and prices. Confronted with this precarious situation, Senghor changed the constitution in order to introduce stepwise a controlled multi-party system. Besides his own Socialist Party, he now allowed the foundation of the liberal Senegalese Democratic Party, the communist African Independence Party, and the conservative Senegalese Republic Movement. The political opening was accompanied by a cautious liberalization of the mass media: Clandestine journals were officially released and other journals newly founded. On an economic level, the president decided to introduce the structural adjustment programs conceived by international institutions before he set an example by handing over power (even though it was unsolicited) to his Prime Minister Abdou Diouf in 1980.

With the exception of television, Diouf liberalized the entire mass media market from the end of the 1980s onwards. Although the pluralization of the media market has continued since then, the semi-authoritarian style of politics—originally introduced by Senghor—has remained a central feature of Senegal statehood until today.

Frank Wittmann

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September 11 Attacks

See Terrorism and Media

Sharon, Ariel (1928–)

Ariel ("Arik") Sharon is a former prime minister of Israel and a high-ranked general in the IDF (Israeli army). Although he is one of the most controversial public figures in Israel, his long-term, wide-range influence on the formation and history of the state is beyond doubt.

Sharon was born in Israel as Ariel Scheinermann. In 1942, at the age of 14, he joined the Hagana (a paramilitary Zionist organization). During the 1948 War of Independence, Sharon was already an active commander, and in 1953, he founded and led the "101" special antiterror unit. During the Six Day War Sharon commanded an armored division, and as major general he commanded another armored division during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Holding this position, Sharon led the crossing of the Suez Canal, considered to be a critical turning point in the course of the war.

In December 1973, Sharon began his political career by becoming a Knesset member of the right-wing Likud party. He resigned a year later to serve as security adviser to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Sharon was reelected to the Knesset in 1977 and was appointed minister of agriculture in Menachem Begin's first government. In this office Sharon initiated and carried out an extensive settlement program in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza strip, creating one of his most famous public images as "Father of the Settlements Movement." Despite his critical role in evacuating settlements (as part of the peace agreement with Egypt) in 1982, Sharon remained extremely close to that movement.

In 1981 Sharon was appointed defense minister, serving in this post during the Lebanon War. Following the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre in 1982, and the establishment of an Israeli inquiry commission, Sharon was

found indirectly responsible for the massacre, was dismissed from his office, and banned from any future similar position. Sharon remained in the government as a minister without portfolio and then served as minister of industry and trade from 1984 to 1990. During the years 1990 to 1992, he served as minister of construction and housing and chairman of the Ministerial Committee on Immigration and Absorption. In 1996, Sharon was appointed minister of national infrastructure and, in 1998, became foreign minister and headed the permanent status negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.

In 1999 Sharon was elected chair of the Likud Party, following the resignation of its former chair, Benjamin Netanyahu, as a result of the party's defeat in the general elections of that year. In 2000 Sharon paid a historic visit to Temple Mount in East Jerusalem, a visit that was, and still is, considered by many to be the trigger for the second Intifada (Palestinian uprising).

Sharon was elected prime minister in 2001 and then reelected in the elections of 2003. His disengagement plan and its initial implementation during the summer of 2004 caused a split in the Likud Party, and altered Sharon's long-lasting public image as a hawkish statesman. This state of affairs led Sharon to form a new, left-center party called Kadima ("Forward" in Hebrew) after leaving the Likud.

Ariel Sharon's highly complex relationship with journalists and the news media (Israelis as well as non-Israelis) can be thought of as a reflection of his political ideology. From his lawsuit against *Time* magazine in the aftermath of the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre, through his bitter relationship with several leading Israeli commentators who criticized how he functioned and questioned his integrity during the war in Lebanon, and through his confrontation with the BBC in 2003 (banning any Israeli cooperation with the organization due to its alleged anti-Israel continuing bias), Sharon, unlike many other political leaders, rarely enjoyed a supportive and cooperative media. A well-known exception was Uri Dan, a journalist and a commentator and a long-time close friend and supporter, who has been serving for decades as Sharon's mouthpiece, in and out of Israel.

With Sharon's change of status, as he became prime minister of Israel, with his political-ideological shift toward the Israeli left, and especially following the implementation of his disengagement plan, national and foreign media alike became less critical of him. Sharon's relationship with many of the leading journalists in Israel turned warmer, followed by a "softer," more positive public image (i.e., the hawkish "bulldozer" who became a peacemaker). A similar trend has taken place among foreign media, although on a much more limited scale.

Sharon suffered a massive stroke on January 4, 2006. The stroke placed him into a coma, and so Ehud Olmert replaced him as acting prime minister. Olmert was elected prime minister in the election of 2006, stressing the continuance of Sharon's political legacy.

Vered Malka

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Shaw, Donald

See Agenda Setting

Shield Laws

Shield laws are statutes designed to help journalists keep their sources confidential and to protect journalists from unnecessary subpoenas. Journalists cite several reasons why shield laws are needed. First, journalists assert that if they are unable to guarantee anonymity to sources, then individuals will be less likely to share confidential and sensitive information. This hinders the process of investigative journalism that can be beneficial to the public. Second, journalists assert that if the government requests both confidential and nonconfidential information, then journalists actually become investigators for the government. This scenario also forces journalists to waste resources in court proceedings. Third, journalists assert that shield

laws protect them from frequent subpoenas from litigation surrounding the content of their work.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in *Branzburg v. Hayes* (1972), ruled that news gathering was protected by the First Amendment. The court did not define the extent of the protection that the Branzburg case yielded for journalists. However, the Supreme Court did rule that journalists did not possess constitutional immunity from the law. After the Branzburg ruling, both case law and state statutes have defined when it is legally appropriate to seek confidential information from journalists, and includes (a) when the information is highly relevant to the case, (b) when a compelling need exists, (c) when the information cannot be obtained through other means, and (d) whether the information was gained through a confidential source or through observation. Some state shield laws apply to both civil cases and criminal cases, whereas others apply only to civil cases. This varies from state to state.

In the United States, 30 states and the District of Columbia have shield laws that protect journalists' right to keep sources private. Those states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee. The first shield law was adopted in Maryland in 1896.

In addition to the shield laws, all states have a constitution that guarantees free speech not only for journalists but also for every citizen. Although shield laws exist in many states, there is no federal statute protecting journalists. There have been unsuccessful attempts by the U.S. Congress to pass legislation that would provide journalists federal shield law protection. Occasionally, issues highlight the need for a federal shield law. The case involving Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent Valerie Plame initiated a debate among journalists and politicians regarding the need for a federal shield law. Plame's identity as a CIA agent was revealed to journalists through confidential sources and the Department of Justice subpoenaed journalists to determine who leaked her identity. Judith Miller, a *New York Times* reporter, served jail time for refusing to reveal the identity of her source.

John Allen Hendricks

See also Press Freedom

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Shriver, R. Sargent

See McGovern, George

Simitis, Konstantinos (1936–)

Konstantinos Georgiou Simitis (generally known as Costas Simitis) was born in Piraeus, Greece, and studied law and economics in Germany and England. He began his academic career in law at the University of Marburg in 1959. He taught as an assistant professor at the University of Konstanz in 1971 and went on to become a regular professor of commercial and civil law at the University of Giessen. In 1977, he was appointed regular professor at the Panteion University of Athens.

Living in Athens as a lawyer, Simitis played a leading part in the founding of the Association of Political Research, also known as Alexandros Papanastasiou. In 1967, the association evolved into the antidictatorial organization Democratic Defense (Democratiki Amina), which was to participate in the founding of PASOK (the Panhellenic Socialist Movement) 7 years later. Simitis was an active participant in the antidictatorial struggle against the colonels' junta (1967 to 1974) and was sentenced to imprisonment by default. In 1969, he fled abroad and by way of retaliation his wife was arrested and kept in isolation for 2 months. In 1974, he became a founding member of PASOK (Panhellinio Socialistiko Kinima). Immediately after PASOK's electoral victory on October 1981, he was appointed by Andreas Papandreou to minister of agriculture. During this time, he achieved the successful inclusion of Greek agriculture into the European Common Agricultural Policy. He was elected member of Parliament for the first time in 1985, when he took over the ministry of national

economy (until 1987). From 1993 to 1995, he was minister of industry, energy, research and technology and was minister of commerce at the same time. On January 1996 he was elected prime minister by the parliamentary group of PASOK, after the resignation of Andreas Papandreou from the office due to health problems. The same year, he emerged from PASOK's fourth convention as the president of the movement and was reelected prime minister after PASOK's victory in September's parliamentary elections with a self-reliant parliamentary majority. In the elections of April 2000, he was reelected prime minister. The 1996 and 2000 electoral campaigns were outmaneuvered by all sorts of broadcast political communications and political marketing strategies (opinion polls, TV spots, debates, talk shows, live coverage of rallies, and so on).

On January 2004, Simitis announced his resignation from the presidency of PASOK, remaining the prime minister until the end of his second term in office and the elections of March 2004, having completed 8 consecutive years as prime minister. Simitis's premiership was characterized by an effort for the overall modernization of Greek society, especially for the stabilization and development of the economy. This policy made Greece achieve inclusion in the Economic Monetary Union in the year 2000, but the effects of Simitis's rule continue to be a central point of confrontation between political parties and among the electorate. Today, after the elections of March 2004, Costas Simitis is a member of Parliament for PASOK. His writings and public discourse include many books and texts of political and scientific interest.

Nicolas Demertzis

Sleeper Effect

The Sleeper Effect, first identified by the psychologist Carl I. Hovland in the middle of the 20th century, refers to the short-term and long-term effects of communications depending on the communicator's image.

In the 1940s, Hovland studied attitude changes on the basis of learning theory or reinforcement theory approach. Researchers Hoveland, Lumsdaine, and Sheffield examined the impact of the film *The Battle of Britain* (the fourth film of the series "Why We Fight" that was showed to recruits of the U.S. army) on U.S. soldiers' attitudes. They found that some changes in attitude in the direction of the communicator's position were more pronounced after several weeks than immediately after the confrontation with the film. This phenomenon they described as the Sleeper Effect.

One hypothesis that Hovland and his colleagues advanced for this result was that individuals may be suspicious of the communicator's motives, initially discount his position, and thus may show little or no change in opinion. However, with the passage of time one may remember what was communicated and not who communicated it and then may be more inclined to accept the position of the communicator.

In other experiments in the early 1950s, Hovland and Weiss wanted to verify the Sleeper Effect under controlled conditions. They examined the differences in the retention and the acquisition of identical messages when being attributed to a "trustworthy" and "untrustworthy" communicator. They then presented several identical messages—written texts about four different topics—to two different groups of students. One group was told that the messages came from a trustworthy communicator, whereas the other one believed that the messages came from an untrustworthy source. Immediately after being confronted with the messages, as well as 4 weeks later, the students answered a questionnaire concerning the factual information of the communicated message and their personal attitudes toward the topic. The main result of this experiment was that neither the acquisition nor the retention of factual information seemed to be affected by the trustworthiness of the source but that changes in attitude were related to this factor: Students who were confronted with the trustworthy communicator changed their opinion significantly more often in the direction advocated by the communicator when they believed that the message came from a trustworthy source than when they attributed the information to an untrustworthy one. The results also confirm the hypothesis of the Sleeper Effect. After 4 weeks the two groups of students showed similar attitudes. The agreement with the position of the trustworthy communicator in the first group decreased (Forgetting Effect), and the agreement in the group of the untrustworthy communicator increased (Sleeper Effect). In further experiments, Kelman and Hovland supported these findings.

However, the Sleeper Effect as a theoretical concept is not reliable as once was thought and was criticized in the following decades. One of the main critiques is that the Sleeper Effect was demonstrated

by Hovland under experimental conditions, which are not comparable to real life where the process of communication is much more complex.

Sandra Lieske

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Social Marketing

Social marketing is the application of traditional marketing tools and practices to promote social products rather than consumer goods and services. The term *social marketing* was coined in 1971 by Philip Kotler and Eduardo Roberto to describe socially based campaigns, though government agencies and nonprofit organizations had been using marketing practices many years beforehand. Social marketing and public communication campaigns, as well as public service campaigns, are often referred to interchangeably.

A primary goal of social marketing is to increase the acceptance of a social idea or practice in one or more groups of target audiences. Areas in which social marketing is often employed include disease prevention, gun control, the arts, conservation, seat belt usage, and charitable giving, to name only a few. Political involvement is one topic that agencies have attempted to influence. For example, Rock the Vote was designed to increase voter participation in the United States. Another current campaign, Pay Attention and Vote*,* sponsored by the Federal Voting Assistance Program, was specifically designed to increase involvement among young adults ages 18 to 24. Through various means the campaign sponsors attempt to get members of this group to vote in midterm elections.

Social marketing is similar to traditional marketing in several ways. For one, campaigns for social causes use carefully defined target audiences. Audience segmentation is based on in-depth analyses of the target members' motivations, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors gleaned through research such as focus groups, interviews, and surveys. Generally, campaigns are designed to target individuals who are most at risk. Examples of these campaigns include efforts to get people to stop smoking or to get a colorectal exam, or to persuade large groups of individuals to work for water conservation, litter reduction, and energy reduction.

Second, creative message construction, usually employing paid professionals, uses planned persuasion goals that often use theoretical concepts. Although many campaigns are education based, a change in behavior is the ultimate goal of most social marketing campaigns. Action can range from making a phone call to report domestic abuse, to stopping smoking, or to recycling paper at the office to aid conservation efforts. Appeals to fear are a common message strategy for many public health issues. Increasingly, however, social marketers use a range of approaches designed to appeal to the audience's positive emotions and motivations.

Third, message delivery is a vital consideration as advertising, public relations, events, and word-of-mouth are strategically used to reach members of the target audience. A commonly employed technique is the public service announcement (PSA). PSAs are very similar to paid commercial advertisements. In some instances the media air the PSAs at no cost to the sponsoring agency or as a public service. More often, however, to guarantee exposure to the target audience, social change organizations budget media costs so that PSAs are paid to air just like paid advertising. In addition to mass media messages, many social marketing campaigns use peer influences and word-of-mouth. For example, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) places a significant emphasis on the involvement of community representatives, stakeholders, and opinion leaders.

Social marketing differs from traditional marketing in several ways. For one, in commercial marketing the beneficiary is the sponsoring organization (i.e., company or individual) and profits are a desired goal. In social marketing, the goal is to improve individual members of the population or the population as a whole. In addition, government and nonprofits sponsor the social marketing messages as opposed to manufacturers and suppliers.

The Ad Council is an organization that has produced some of the most successful and memorable

public service campaigns in the United States. Those campaigns include Smokey Bear's "Only You Can Prevent Forest Fires," the Crash Test Dummies "You Could Learn a Lot From a Dummy," as well as "Take a Bite Out of Crime" and "Friends Don't Let Friends Drive Drunk." Volunteers from the advertising and media professions select, plan, create, and distribute campaigns sponsored by a wide variety of government agencies and nonprofits.

In 1942 the first campaign developed by the Ad Council, then known as the War Advertising Council, sought to stimulate the sale of war bonds. Another campaign developed that same year, "Loose Lips Sink Ships," sought to aid the war effort by raising citizens' awareness of the dangers associated with sharing vital information concerning troops/armaments.

The efficacy of social marketing campaigns is evident. For example, an Ad Council campaign initiated in 1972 for the United Negro College Fund has used a variety of avenues for its message, "The Mind Is a Terrible Thing to Waste." As of 2006, the campaign had helped to raise $22 billion and graduate 350,000 minority students from college. Similarly, a campaign initiated in 1985 to increase auto safety-belt usage helped to increase the practice from 14% to 79%, saving 85,000 lives from auto fatalities and over $3.2 billion in social costs.

Effective health-related social marketing campaigns include the Stanford Five-City Heart Disease Prevention Project, among others. A current government-sponsored campaign, VERB, is designed to increase physical activity among 9- to 13-year-olds. Secondary target audiences include parents and teachers. A range of mediated messages, including posters and PSAs, are being placed to remind adolescents to be active instead of watching television or playing videogames.

Tom Reichert

See also Advocacy Advertising; Diffusion of Innovations; Rock the Vote; Youth Voting

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Social Responsibility Theory

The Social Responsibility Theory (SRT) argues that the press has a responsibility to the public. This theoretical approach is a result of broadcasting and media ethics. Early communication administrators such as Robert Hutchins (head of the Commission on Freedom of the Press) expressed concern over communication ethics in libertarian media cultures. Early followers of the theory believed that mass media should contribute to societal improvement. SRT has been widely recognized by media practitioners and scholars since the Commission on Freedom of the Press in 1947.

The Committee on a Free and Responsible Press (1947) expressed the view that the press should provide a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning; serve as a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism; project a representative picture of the constituent groups in society; help in the presentation and clarification of the goals and values of society; and offer full access to the day's intelligence. The statement of principles by the American Society of Newspaper Editors (2002) restated that the primary purpose of gathering and distributing news and opinion is to serve the general welfare by informing the people and enabling them to make judgments on the issues of the time.

Early communication scholars, such as Frederick Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, argued that according to the relationship between the social structure and the media, each society has a particular communication system. These early scholars emphasized SRT as a desirable direction for new media societies to correspond to liberal political and social climates.

However, current scholars such as Scott Lloyd think a fresh perspective of SRT should be considered,

because all information sources are interrelated and message channels grow more complicated. Thus, social responsibility for certain social actors is an obscure concept in terms of media ethics and social values. Lloyd argues that although SRT is practically and academically useful and acceptable, American society does not consistently correspond to the assumptions of SRT. He asserts that societal obligation, individual rights, and interpersonal relationships are concepts necessary to modifying the theory to fit a contemporary usage.

Levels of media accuracy and reportage depend on how social circumstances support media information. Reporting with either very few details or vague information could make media sources look unethical and socially irresponsible. Thus, the appropriateness of media roles proves troublesome in rapidly changing societies with multiple information sources. Therefore, some argue that SRT is an outdated theoretical approach, while others still assert that the media and the public should determine and uphold social values and degrees of responsibility. Besides the original SRT assumption that the media remain independent and self-regulate their level of social responsibility, all journalists need to understand the appropriate social values for a given time and place and adjust SRT to fit current social systems.

Hyun Jung Yun

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Soft Money

Soft money describes financial contributions that are virtually unregulated by federal election laws, yet are used to influence elections. Originally designed to help local and state parties with party-building activities (such as voter registration or get-out-the-vote drives), soft money later was often used to fund “issue” ads for candidates. While “hard money” (monies regulated by the Federal Election Commission) has strict limits on the amount of contributions, soft money typically had no such limits. Soft money accounts regulated by state law could accept money from individuals, corporations, and labor unions even where federal law did not allow such contributions.

To avoid being regulated by federal law, ads funded by soft money could not expressly ask voters to vote for a specific candidate. However, the parties could address issues from the campaign so long as express advocacy was avoided. In other words, the parties’ soft money ads could ask the people to vote, but could not say “vote for” a specific candidate, even though the implication in the ad often was clear.

The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA) banned soft money for national parties, requiring that all party-building activities be paid for with hard money that was regulated by federal law. Legal loopholes in BCRA quickly led to the formation of the so-called 527s, nonprofit political groups that could still legally accept soft money. The Democratic Party is generally credited with the creation of the 527s, but Republicans and Independents quickly participated, and groups such as Swiftboat Veterans and MoveOn.org became key 527s in the 2004 presidential race, spending millions of dollars to influence the vote. Named after section 527 of the IRS tax code, these groups are required to file their contribution list with either the Internal Revenue Service or their home state, but there is little restriction on contributions.

Numerous organizations have campaigned both for and against a total ban on soft money. Proponents of a ban argue that soft money allows contributors to contribute more funds than allowed by legal contribution limits. Opponents of a soft money ban argue that such a ban would violate free speech rights in the political process and unnecessarily chill political activity.

In 2006, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill called the 527 Reform Act, seeking again to tighten the loopholes on soft money, but the bill has not passed in the U.S. Senate.

Glenda C. Williams

See also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act; Campaign Finance

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Soft News

The term *soft news* was originally synonymous with feature stories placed in newspapers or television newscasts for human interest. Such stories were often placed much lower in priority than more urgent items. However, more recently soft news evolved into a concept associated with a style of journalism that blurs the line between information and entertainment. In addition to soft news stories, there are now entire soft news programs and reporters who present with a soft news style. Professional journalists often make a distinction between hard news and soft news this way: Hard news stories require immediate attention to an event or incident, soft news stories usually center on the lives of people. In 1973 Gaye Tuchman noted that the publication of hard news of the moment cannot be delayed, whereas soft news stories have no urgency. Tuchman suggested that hard news concerns issues, politics, economics, international relations, welfare, and scientific developments, soft news focuses on human interest stories and gossip. Gamson's 1989 guidelines for soft news suggest it is "telling stories about the world rather than presenting information, even though the stories of course include factual elements." Repeated studies begun in 1995 by the Global Media Monitoring Project have found women are more likely to be assigned soft news stories about entertainment, arts, and culture. Such stories are also more likely to feature women in traditional, rather than professional, roles.

Beginning in the late 1990s media critics and some scholars expressed concern over the so-called feminization of the media, exemplified by an announcement by the *Wall Street Journal* that it was setting aside more space for "family news." Scott and Gobetz documented an upward trend in the amount of soft news carried in the three major network newscasts between 1972 and 1987, from 59 to 73 seconds in 1973 to 90 seconds in 1987. Critics such as former Vice President Al Gore believe the recent de-emphasis on hard news stories characterizes the bottom line mentality of media conglomerates that want to maximize profits by giving readers and viewers what they want instead of what they need. If that is indeed the case, this corporate strategy is not working, because there is evidence that the shift from hard news to soft news has not stopped the decline in news audiences.

Beyond the cultural dynamics of what makes news "hard" or "soft," Thomas Patterson argued soft news "weakens the foundation of democracy by diminishing the public's information about public affairs and its interest in politics." His 2-year study of Americans' news habits concluded soft news distorts the public's perceptions of politics and public affairs. He argued his evidence indicates that as interest in public affairs declines, so does interest in news, therefore what is good for democracy is also good for the press.

Others have challenged this general notion, suggesting the effects of soft news differ, depending on whether members of the audience are actually interested in politics (specifically, foreign affairs). The least politically engaged citizens are more likely to view soft news programs and outlets. Such viewers do gain political information from programs such as *Oprah* and *The Daily Show.* Some studies have shown that knowledge of candidates is positively correlated to viewing of late night soft news, while such knowledge is not associated with viewing morning news programs.

While the effects of soft news on political knowledge and interest are debated, features, entertainment, and lifestyle stories continue to be a substantial part of print and broadcast news content. The 2006 Report on the State of News Media indicates "Celebrity/Entertainment" and "Lifestyle" stories make up nearly 17% of broadcast stories by duration and nearly 10% of print stories by length. In contrast, "Election" and "Government" stories make up 15% of broadcast stories and 21% of print stories. Similar research on Web news content is now under way. However, indications are that Web news stories may be even more driven by advertising in the digital medium than in traditional broadcast and print.

Lisa Mills-Brown

See also News Coverage of Politics

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Solidarity Movement

Solidarity began in September 1980 at the Lenin Shipyards, and although it was a Polish trade union federation originally led by Lech Wałęsa, it in fact constituted a broad anticommunist social movement. It rapidly changed into an umbrella organization under which a broad range of political and social groups united in opposition to the communist regime.

At Solidarity's first national congress in 1981, a program calling for an active Solidarity role in reforming Poland's political and economic systems was adopted. The government attempted to destroy the organization with the martial law of 1981 and several years of repression. The organization was forced underground until the late 1980s. During its underground phase, Solidarity lost much of its original cohesion as tactical and philosophical disagreements split the movement into factions. The radical elements, convinced that an evolutionary approach to democratization was impossible, created the organization called Fighting Solidarity in 1982. Ultimately, however, Wałęsa's moderate faction prevailed. Favoring negotiation and compromise with the Polish United Workers' Party, the moderates created the Citizens' Committee, which represented Solidarity at the Round Table Talks and brought about the election triumph of June 1989. A coalition government led by Solidarity was formed and in December Wałęsa was elected president. The organization not only had regained its legal status as a trade union but also had become an effective political movement that installed Eastern Europe's first post-communist government.

The defeat of the ruling Polish United Workers' Party in the June 1989 parliamentary elections removed Solidarity's most important unifying force, that is, the common enemy. By the time of the local elections of 1990, Solidarity had divided, and a number of small parties had appeared. Since 1989 Solidarity has become a more traditional trade union and has assumed less and less importance on the political scene of Poland. A political arm was founded in 1996 as Solidarity Electoral Action won the Polish parliamentary election in 1997 but lost the following 2001 election. Currently Solidarity has little political influence on modern Polish politics.

The survival of Solidarity was an unprecedented event not only in Poland, a satellite state of the USSR ruled by a one-party communist regime, but in the whole of the Eastern Bloc. It meant a break in the strong position of the communist Polish United Workers' Party and the broader Soviet communist regime in the Eastern Bloc.

Solidarity's influence led to the intensification and spread of anticommunist ideals and movements throughout the countries of the Eastern Bloc, weakening their communist governments and causing the peaceful anticommunist counterrevolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Solidarity's example was in various ways repeated by opposition groups throughout the Eastern countries, leading to the communist Eastern Bloc's dismantling and contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.

Andrzej Falkowski

See also Wałęsa, Lech

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Sorensen, Theodore C.

See Kennedy, John F.

Sound Bite

Sound bite is a term most often used by television journalists, although radio journalists use the term *clip* in the same way. A *bite* is one of the staple elements of electronic journalists who face increasing pressure to present their stories in a very limited amount of time. Electronic journalists are rarely allotted the time inside a newscast to include an entire recorded interview, thus they select parts or pieces of the interview and edit them into their reports as sound bites. One college-level electronic journalism textbook describes the process this way: "Once the sounds bites have been selected, the story should begin to fall into place around them." The idea behind this selection is to choose a sound bite that clearly and succinctly conveys meaning or emotion. Objective sound bites are chosen for description or fact. Subjective sound bites are chosen to give the viewer a sense of feeling in the story. Voiceover narration connects the bites together and, when well written, provides context for the bites in the sentences immediately before and after the selections. In television, the name and title of the person in the sound bite is often superimposed on the screen. In radio, the name and title are used in the sentence prior to, or immediately following, the clip.

Sound bites have been criticized most often by politicians, who would naturally prefer that their entire interview be aired on the news. However, there also has been increasing concern among media critics about the effects of the so-called shrinking sound bite. One academic study compared sound bites used in presidential elections since 1968 and found the average length of a candidate statement dropped from 43 seconds in 1968 to 8 seconds in 2000. Critics argue such short sound bites do little to add meaning or information to a report. Critics also suggest journalists are increasingly prone to choosing sound bites that express extreme opinion or overcharged emotion. Such sound bites might attract viewers' attention and provide entertainment value, but critics argue they do little to help viewers understand complex circumstances or issues.

Journalists have often been defined as selectors, wading through documents, interviews, and in the case of television, video to choose the elements that, in the best cases, lead viewers somewhere near to the truth. Newspaper quotes came long before sound bites and neither is likely to go away. The people most likely to be quoted or used in sounds bites know this and prepare themselves with the help of books and articles such as one published in the July 2003 *Harvard Management Communication Newsletter,* which offers "four secrets to delivering the right *sound bites.*"

Lisa Mills-Brown

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Speeches, Presidential

Presidential speeches are in their most basic form, verbal events that occur when the chief executive decides to communicate with the public. For most of American history, these speeches take the form of prepared addresses by a president and communicated to the people. Presidential speeches touch upon a wide variety of interrelated topics ranging from campaigning to governing to bolstering public support. When presidents campaign for either themselves or others, they are seeking the public to support themselves and members of their party for elected office.

Perhaps the most famous of all presidential speeches are the inaugural addresses. After taking the oath of office, each president gives a speech in which the president sets out a vision for America. These speeches are also instrumental in setting the tone for the incoming, or in the case of reelection, continuing administration. For many administrations prior to President Hoover, the inaugural addresses are the only public speeches the national government has archived. Other speeches are recorded, but there is not a standardized system. The National Records and Archives Administration was created in 1957 in response to the lack of uniformity in the collection of presidential speeches. Since then, the national government has publicly collected all the speeches and public communication for every president since Harry Truman. These speeches compiled by the government are published as part of the *Public Papers of the President.* They also have all this material for the Herbert Hoover administration, but the Franklin D. Roosevelt papers were donated and published privately before the establishment of the national archives.

The State of the Union speeches are also considered some of the most important presidential speeches. The Constitution in Article II, Section 3 says the president shall from time to time give Congress information regarding the State of the Union. George Washington, on January 8, 1790, personally delivered the first State of the Union speech to both chambers of Congress during a joint meeting in New York. However, Thomas Jefferson chose to send his written communication to Congress regarding the State of the Union believing Washington's approach too similar to that of a monarch. The tradition of a written State of the Union address delivered to Congress continued for the next 112 years. Woodrow Wilson was the first president to revive the spoken State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress. Calvin Coolidge was the first president to have his State of the Union broadcast on radio, and Harry Truman the first on television. With the movement toward broadcasting the speeches to the public, they have also become events in which the president can present a yearly vision for the country to the people. These speeches have become some of the most critiqued, analyzed, and dissected of a president's administration.

President Lyndon B. Johnson addresses the nation, announcing a bombing halt in Vietnam and his intention not to run for reelection (March 1968).

Source: LBJ Library photo by Yoichi R. Yokamoto.

In the early years of both radio and television, presidential speeches drew large media audiences, and presidents used these tools as a way to avoid exhaustive travel. Franklin Roosevelt's paralysis and Dwight Eisenhower's declining health inhibited them from vigorously engaging in speaking tours throughout the country. A nationally televised presidential address often preempts other television programs. At that moment, the president has the attention of the majority of the American public. Presidents save these occasions for highly scripted and carefully orchestrated speeches to convey thoughts, actions, or ideas. Presidents have used these occasions to deliver State of the Union addresses, resign from office (Richard Nixon), announce policies or military actions, and a multitude of other things. In the latter part of the 20th century, however, television viewers for these broadcasted speeches began to wane. Some blame the rise of cable television while an equally viable explanation may lie in the vast array of distractions available to the public in the form of the Internet, mobile phones, and other forms of modern technology. As technology has increased, the ability to self-select news sources has grown so many people do not need to commit time toward watching television to learn the contents of a speech delivered by the president.

Presidential campaign speeches often unavoidably involve the coordination of practical problems such as transportation. Before the 1896 presidential campaign, candidates often relied on surrogates to give campaign speeches on their behalf throughout the country. Surrogates were often well-known local or regional orators who would stump on behalf of a political party's candidate. As a candidate, William Jennings Bryan in 1896 was the first to give a large whistle stop tour filled with speeches. The 1908 campaign was also important because it was the first to involve speechmaking from candidates of both major parties. The 1912 campaign is notable for a wide variety of well-known speakers (Louis Brandeis, William Jennings Bryan, James Gillett) standing in for President Taft and the other candidates (Woodrow Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Robert LaFollette). Before modern transportation, travel constraints often kept sitting presidents from giving campaign speeches at the same pace as their rivals. The duty to govern the country often took precedence over long and grueling

travel around the United States. Many presidents from Taft onwards used the White House to their advantage by allowing the press corps greater access to craft stories publicizing the activities and commitment of the chief executive.

President Coolidge was the first president to address the nation by radio from the White House in 1924. In fact, during his run for the presidency that same year, Coolidge gave his final campaign speech on the radio, garnering the largest listening audience of any broadcast to date. President Franklin Roosevelt most notably employed radio broadcasts with his fireside chats. Thirty speeches spanning more than a decade, from 1933 to 1944, the fireside chats humanized an American president in ways no previous administration had achieved. The term was coined because Roosevelt sought to cultivate an image of him actually sitting in the living room of individual citizens informally conversing about his policies and actions. These talks were enormously successful in forging a new relationship between the public and presidency. People viewed Roosevelt as a friend and partner who took the time to carefully explain his strategies in clear, straightforward terms. The use of television by later presidents further served to amplify the president's relationship with the American public. Though Franklin Roosevelt was the first president to appear regionally on television in 1939 at the opening of the New York World's Fair, Harry Truman was the first president to have an address nationally broadcast in 1951. Neither president, however, used television as a mechanism to directly connect with the public. In 1953, Dwight Eisenhower was the first president to give regular televised news conferences, interacting with reporters and answering their questions. Like Franklin D. Roosevelt with radio, he saw this new medium as a way to manage his image and foster a bond between him and the public. Between his heart attack in 1955 and intestinal surgery in June 1956, Eisenhower was quite ill toward the end of his first term. He used televised speeches to interject himself into American homes during his reelection campaign. Television campaign commercials cultivating an image of health put Eisenhower into practically every American household. This television approach succeeded with Eisenhower winning in a landslide.

The creation and content of presidential speeches are also quite interesting. Throughout history, American presidents have both written their own speeches as well as delegated that task to others. One of the most famous presidential speeches, George Washington's farewell address, was actually written by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison. Lincoln frequently used William Seward for help with speeches. Theodore Roosevelt wrote many of his own speeches, even writing one in the smoking room of Penn Station in New York waiting for a train. The first president with a full-time White House speechwriter was Warren G. Harding, and his speechwriter continued through the Calvin Coolidge administration after Harding's death. The Franklin D. Roosevelt administration marked a noticeable change in the nature of presidential speechwriting. Before FDR, speechwriters were often someone personally or professionally close to the president. During the Roosevelt presidency, speeches were no longer given to friends, colleagues, or a single assistant to craft. Instead, FDR created a large assembly of people often referred to as the Brain Trust. These people were not credited as speechwriters but were often referred to as administrative assistants. It was not until 1969 when Nixon created the Writing and Research Department that the White House had a formal office for speechwriting. Since then, speechwriters have become an acknowledged and often well-known part of the president's staff. However, the1969 change was more than just a new office title for presidential speeches. Before this period, policy creation and speechwriting were often one and the same. Afterwards, speechwriters found their access to the president curtailed, and speechwriting was often reduced to "wordsmithing" rather than policy formulation. Speeches have often become more of a negotiation between the president, various departments, policy officials, and the speechwriters. The balance between the president's intent, departmental policy goals, and speech integrity often creates fights and power struggles within administrations. The study of speeches from inception to delivery has received more attention in recent years. Often, what is included and excluded in draft speeches reveals much about the attitude and focus of an administration. While each speech is different, almost all speeches in the modern era have followed a similar process. This process usually involves receiving the assignment, creation, editing, and circulation of a draft, and revisions from various interested parties including the president. Most presidential speeches are highly scripted, though the final version is always left up to the chief executive. Some speeches are written long in advance, while others are quickly written, often in response to national tragedies such as the

events of September 11 or the explosion of the space shuttle. Many presidents, though they do not often create the speech, involve themselves in crafting the final product into a form that flows more with their general speaking styles. These changes may involve insertions and deletions of specific words, but they are not solely limited to minor shifts.

Presidential speeches are the president's way of communicating with the public. Different types of speeches allow presidents to pursue different goals. Congresspersons have distinct incumbency advantages through franking privileges, pork barrel legislation, and name recognition. The president similarly has strong advantages through occupying the office. Most important, any appearance, engagement, or event inevitably attracts attention. Consequently, every word or phrase spoken by the president invites scrutiny. How and what a president says can have major implications both domestically as well as internationally. Presidential speeches can often impact popularity, polling, and support. A successful speech can help the president gain support needed to persuade Congress, other governments, or constituents into backing the president's own policies. The first president to actively reach out to the public through speeches was Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt believed presidential power was rooted in public approval, not the constitution. Theodore Roosevelt's use of the "bully pulpit" allowed him to make appeals to the public to win support for his policies. When he lacked support in Congress for the Hepburn Act in 1906, Roosevelt gave public speeches with the intent of shaping public opinion to influence the legislative branch.

In more modern times, this common technique is referred to as "going public." Constitutionally, the president should convey his ideas to Congress, and, in turn, they relay these thoughts to their constituents since the population directly elected them while the president was indirectly elected via the Electoral College. Going public means the president bypasses Congress and appeals directly to the people. If the president can successfully sway the public through speeches, then he can use their support to pressure Congress into backing his administration's policies and goals. With the advent of radio and later television, speeches from the president have increasingly employed the "going public" technique. They have been able to communicate national-level appeals directly into the homes of the American public. In recent years as national television audiences have waned for presidents' speeches, there has been an increase in the number of local speeches presidents give throughout the United States. George W. Bush, in particular, has been notable for the large number of similar speeches he has given in smaller locales throughout America. During his first term in office, George W. Bush gave a smaller percentage of speeches in the largest media markets than any other president in the past 35 years.

Presidential speechmaking is not static. Every administration has its own style and preferred methods of delivery. Bill Clinton enjoyed giving more informal speeches whereas George W. Bush leans more toward scripted events. When a president gives a speech, there is always an audience. Some speeches, such as honoring a championship sports team, are innocuous, while others, such as Franklin Roosevelt's speech on December 8, 1941, asking Congress to declare war on Japan, are extremely significant. Speeches given by a president can help inform, persuade, and even help heal the American public. How, when, and why a president says something within a speech can have serious repercussions to his administration, the country, as well as the world.

Shannon L. Bow

See also Presidential Communication

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Spiegel Affair

During the so-called Spiegel affair of 1962 the German weekly news magazine *Der Spiegel* was accused of high treason after having published an article about the weak points of the Western defensive alliance. The critical reactions by the majority of the media concerning the proceeding of the government against the magazine were taken as a symbol of the redemocratization of the German media after World War II. Never before or afterwards has the German press been called a fourth power more often.

In the context of the criminal charges against *Spiegel* the editors' offices were searched in the night. This house search remained questionable because according to German law, this type of search is only allowed if there is either an imminent danger or if it can contribute to catching somebody in the act. The district attorney claimed that the first reason was given, because they had erroneously arrested a person who they had thought to be the magazine's publisher, Rudolf Augstein, and now feared that evidence could be destroyed. However, the opponents of the police raid stated that because it was such a long time after the story came out, no one could speak of an imminent danger and the person arrested in no way resembled Augstein. Another point that led to negative reactions was the fact that a lot of material that had nothing to do with the case itself but was of general interest to the government was also confiscated. Augstein as well as Conrad Ahlers, the journalist responsible for the story, were searched in connection with warrants of arrest. Whereas Augstein gave himself up to the police, Ahlers was arrested in Spain. Ahlers's arrest on foreign territory, which was arranged by Secretary of Defense Franz Josef Strauss, caused considerable indignation because it was somewhat out of their legal jurisdiction, as the government had to admit later. Strauss denied his involvement in the arrest because he did not want to appear vengeful. After all, his relationship to *Spiegel* had been bad for years because the magazine had repeatedly tried to create a scandal regarding Strauss's behavior because Augstein wanted to keep the upcoming politician away from the chancellorship because he disapproved of his defense policy. Strauss suffered heavily when his participation was proved. The Spiegel affair caused a coalition crisis because the attorney general, who was supposed to be in charge, had not been fully informed about the steps carried out against *Spiegel*; instead it was the Department of the Defense that took matters into their own hands. Strauss had to resign but was able to make a political comeback and ran as chancellor candidate of the Christian Democrats in 1980, but the fact that he never became chancellor is attributed by many to the Spiegel affair.

Mona Krewel

See also Adenauer, Konrad

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Spin, Political

Spin is a pejorative term often used in the context of public relations practitioners and political communicators. It is used to refer to the sophisticated selling of a specific message that is heavily biased in favor of one's own position and that employs maximum management of the media with the intention of maintaining or exerting control over the situation, often implying deception or manipulation.

In the political context, it is often associated with government press conferences in which it is understood that the press secretary or the government official has a vested interested in communicating a political message to have a desired outcome, often to the neglect of delivering the full truth of a situation. In such situations, the press conference room is sometimes cynically referred to as the "spin room" and the schedule of briefings as the "spin cycle."

Spin techniques may include careful timing in delivering information, selective presentation of facts, careful selection of words and phrases meant to invoke certain responses in hearers, choice of sound bites, or redefining of terms and phrases. Skillful practitioners of spin are sometimes pejoratively referred to as "spin doctors," "spin merchants," or "spinmeisters," among other unflattering terms.

Famous and successful "spinsters" in the political arena have included Mike McCurry, press secretary

to former President Bill Clinton, who has been called a "spinmeister extraordinaire" with his ability to maintain charm and wit while occasionally misleading reporters, intimidating and also courting correspondents, and managing a litany of damaging stories coming out of an administration mired in controversy.

Another well-known example to whom the label has been applied is Britain's Peter Mandelson, who was head of Prime Minister Tony Blair's publicity machine and successful political campaigns. He was considered ruthless in his management of the media in favor of Blair's message and using the media to cast opposers in a negative light.

The rise of spin and media pressures has been said to be harmful to the political system in that it has contributed to ongoing cynicism among journalists and the voting public as politics is increasingly viewed more as theater than governing.

Concern over the effects of spin have manifested in the popular culture with the rise of talk shows, talk show personalities, and self-proclaimed "fact-checkers" such as Bill O'Reilly's *No Spin Zone,* and numerous Web sites proclaiming to help a cynical and unsuspecting public unravel the barrage of political spin.

Sandra Braun

See also Public Relations, Political

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Spin Alley

See Spin, Political

Spin Doctor

See Spin, Political

Spiral of Silence

The spiral of silence theory, which was developed by German survey and communication researcher Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann in the 1960s and 1970s, is one of the most frequently cited and debated theories in the field of communication studies. Formulated against a backdrop of surprising election outcomes and group-dynamic processes during the era of student protests in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, the theory attempts to describe collective opinion formation and societal decision making in situations where the issue being debated or decided upon is controversial and morally loaded.

In the literature in the field, the theory of the spiral of silence is often reduced to a single premise; that is, that people who feel their opinion is held by the minority tend to fall silent in public. Although this is a perfectly accurate description of one key aspect of the theory, it is in fact just one element of a far more comprehensive theory of how public opinion functions. In the context of the theory, the term *public opinion* refers to opinions or behavior that can be displayed or expressed in public without running the risk of social isolation or, in some cases, that even must be displayed to avoid the danger of isolation. Public is not meant in the legal sense (freely accessible to all) nor in the sense of a political category, in other words, as something that concerns the general public or society as a whole. Instead, the concept is interpreted from a social psychological perspective as a state of consciousness in which individuals, who are subjected to the gaze of those around them, consciously realize that their actions are "seen by all" and "heard by all" and must therefore constantly monitor the reactions of others in their environment. Accordingly, Noelle-Neumann views public opinion as a form of social control that ultimately applies to everyone, regardless of social class, and that is apparent in many areas of life, ranging from controversial political issues to fashion, morals, and values. This understanding of public opinion stands in contrast to another conception which views public opinion as the result of rational debate among an educated elite that is of crucial importance for the state.

The theory of the spiral of silence must be viewed in the light of this social psychological understanding of public and public opinion. At the same time, the theory also rests on the notion that there is such a thing as a "social nature of man," which causes people

to fear social isolation and thus substantially influences their actions in public.

Origins of the Theory

The theory of the spiral of silence did not originate from abstract theoretical thinking, but from a surprising research finding for which a plausible explanation had to be found. This puzzling finding was encountered in connection with election research conducted during the 1965 German federal election campaign. Months before Election Day in September 1965, Noelle-Neumann and her staff at the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research launched a series of surveys designed to track the entire campaign. Over the course of 10 months, from December 1964 to shortly before Election Day, the survey findings on voting intentions remained practically unchanged. Month after month, the two major parties, the governing Christian Democratic Party and the opposing Social Democratic Party, were in a dead heat, with about 45% of the population intending to vote for each party. Under these circumstances, it seemed impossible to predict which party was most likely to win the election. Throughout the entire campaign, the two parties remained locked in a neck-and-neck race.

In the final few weeks and days prior to the election, however, the situation suddenly changed, with survey findings showing a so-called last-minute swing in favor of the Christian Democrats. After a standstill that had persisted for months on end, the percentage of respondents who said they intended to vote for the Christian Democrats in the upcoming election suddenly climbed to almost 50%, while the share who intended to vote for the Social Democrats dropped to less than 40%. In the end, the election outcome confirmed these final survey findings: The Christian Democratic Party clearly won the election with 49% of the vote and the Social Democrats obtained 40%.

On attempting to determine what had caused this last-minute change in voting intentions, the puzzle was encountered that ultimately led to the development of the spiral of silence theory. Namely, while voting intentions—as measured via the question, "If the next federal election were held this Sunday, which party would you vote for?"—remained unchanged over the course of many months, responses to the following trend question shifted dramatically over the same period of time: "Of course, nobody can know for sure, but what do you think: who is going to win the election?" In December 1964, the percentage of respondents who expected the Social Democrats would win the election was about the same as the share who anticipated a Christian Democratic victory—in fact, the Social Democrats even had a slight edge. But then the results began to change direction. The percentage of respondents who expected a Christian Democratic victory rose relentlessly, while the Social Democrats continually lost ground. By as early as July 1965, the Christian Democrats were clearly in the lead; by August, almost 50% anticipated a Christian Democratic victory. It was not until late in the campaign that the bandwagon effect came into play, with 3% to 4% of voters being caught up by the general current and swept along in the direction of the expected winner.

How could party strength possibly have remained constant for so long while at the same time expectations as to who would win the election change so dramatically? Noelle-Neumann suspected that a visit by the Queen of England to Germany in the summer of 1965 may have contributed to the situation. Under sunny skies, the Queen traveled up and down the country, being greeted at all times by cheering crowds and with Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, a Christian Democrat who was extremely popular anyway, almost always at her side. Had the images of this state visit, the cheerful atmosphere, perhaps given rise to an optimistic mood among the supporters of the governing Christian Democratic Party, prompting them to gladly proclaim their convictions? And might the supporters of the Social Democrats thus suddenly have felt that they were surrounded by political opponents on all sides? Had they allowed themselves to be intimidated by their opponents' ebullient mood and ultimately fallen silent, to the point where their own political camp was hardly visible in public, even though it was actually no smaller than that of their opponents? Had the social nature of man, man's fear of isolation, caused the Social Democrats' supporters to fall silent?

Subsequently, especially during the emotionally charged federal election campaign of 1972, the Allensbach Institute gradually gathered survey data pointing to man's fear of isolation, to the tendency to speak out or fall silent in controversial, morally loaded debates. The pattern that had been observed during the 1965 campaign was detected again on other occasions—and thus the spiral of silence theory

slowly began to take shape. The following is a brief summary of the theory's most salient points.

Key Elements of the Theory

People experience fear of isolation. They have a fear—probably developed over the course of evolution—of being rejected by those around them. For this reason, people constantly monitor the behavior of others in their surroundings, attentively noting which opinions and modes of behavior meet with public approval or disapproval. But people do not only observe their environment. They also—in part unconsciously—issue their own threats of isolation via what they say and do, via behavior such as turning away from someone, knitting their brow, laughing at someone, and so on. These are the signals that individuals perceive, showing them which opinions meet with approval and which do not. Since most people fear isolation, they tend to refrain from publicly stating their position when they perceive that this would attract enraged objections, laughter, scorn, or similar threats of isolation. Conversely, those who sense that their opinion meets with approval tend to voice their convictions fearlessly, freely, gladly, and at times vociferously. Speaking out loudly and gladly enhances the threat of isolation directed at the supporters of the opposing position, reinforcing their sense of standing alone with their opinion and thus their growing tendency to conceal their opinion in public. A spiraling process begins, whereby the dominant camp becomes ever louder and more self-confident, while the other camp falls increasingly silent.

This process does not occur at all times and in all situations, but only in connection with issues that have a strong moral component, in other words, in situations where ideology, agitation, and emotions come into play. The process of public opinion is not set in motion if there is no underlying moral fundament implying that those who think differently are not merely stupid, but bad. This moral element is what gives public opinion its power and allows it to levy the threat of isolation that sets the spiral of silence in motion. Only controversial issues can trigger a spiral of silence. Topics on which there is social consensus—true consensus and not merely outward agreement—give rise to no disagreement and thus leave no room for a spiral of silence.

The actual strength of the different camps of opinion does not necessarily determine which view will predominate in public. An opinion can dominate in public and exert the pressure of isolation even if the majority of the population holds the opposing view that has come under pressure—yet does not publicly admit to holding this position.

The mass media can significantly influence the spiral of silence process. If the majority of the media take the same side in a morally charged controversy, they exert a substantial, presumably even decisive influence on the direction which the spiral of silence takes. Thus far, no instances in which a spiral of silence ran contrary to the media tenor have been observed.

As a rule, people are not consciously aware of either the fear or threat of isolation. They observe behavior in their environment that is indicative of self-confidence and strength and react to threats of isolation levied by their surroundings with fear and silence.

Public opinion is limited by time and place. As a rule, a spiral of silence only holds sway over a society for a limited period of time. In this regard, there are both short-lived elements, such as the controversy over the sinking of the Brent Spar oil platform in the 1990s, and extremely long-term elements, such as the growing tendency in Western societies over the course of the past centuries to attach ever greater importance to the value of equality. In geographical terms, the area in which a certain climate of opinion predominates can be of varying size. Thus, there have even been a few cases of globally valid public opinion in recent history, such as the public opinion that isolated South Africa around the world for decades and ultimately forced the apartheid regime to step down from power. Generally, however, the process of public opinion, and thus the spiral of silence, tends to be limited by national borders or the borders of a particular cultural group. When viewed in hindsight or from an outsider's perspective, it is hard to comprehend the agitation and emotional fervor that accompany a spiral of silence.

Public opinion serves as an instrument of social control, indirectly ensuring social cohesion. Whenever there is especially strong integrative pressure in a society, as found in connection with the spiral of silence, this generally indicates that the issue or controversy that triggered the spiral of silence poses a particularly great threat to social cohesion. In extreme cases, the spiral of silence culminates in a situation where certain topics can either only be broached using a specific vocabulary (political correctness) or cannot be mentioned at all (taboo), lest people wish to be the target of extremely harsh signals of social isolation.

Difficulties Encountered When Testing the Theory of the Spiral of Silence

Over the past 3 decades, the spiral of silence theory has been subjected to numerous empirical tests, many of which have been based on misinterpretations of the theory. The spiral of silence model is contingent upon a number of conditions and is not designed to be a universal theory that can explain every social situation, since it is, as stated above, only one part of a more comprehensive theory of public opinion. Given the complexity of the spiral of silence model and the numerous conditions that must be fulfilled for the theory to apply, it is fair to ask how the theory can be empirically tested at all, an issue which numerous researchers have addressed over the past few decades.

The most common misunderstanding found in many tests of the theory pertains to the concept of the "quasi-statistical sense." In Noelle-Neumann's book *The Spiral of Silence,* this term is used to describe people's tendency to constantly monitor their environment, thereby assessing which opinions are gaining ground and may be expressed in public and which ones are losing ground and hence connected with the threat of isolation. The concept of the quasi-statistical sense is often misinterpreted, as if Noelle-Neumann were saying that most people have some sort of cash register in the back of their heads with which they continually estimate and record the distribution of opinions among the population. Yet this is not what this somewhat unfortunately formulated term means. On the contrary, the spiral of silence theory assumes that the perception of which opinions meet with public approval or disapproval is not, as a rule, a conscious process. People who are not directly subjected to the pressure of isolation in a particular situation are apparently unable to rationally comprehend the behavior of those who do find themselves under pressure from the climate of opinion.

Thus, there is generally no point in attempting to test the spiral of silence theory via hypothetical questions such as, "Do you tend to remain silent if you think that your opinion is held by the minority?" Questions asking respondents to estimate the percentage of people who hold a particular view are also of little value. When asked directly, "Do you think your opinion is shared by the majority?" most respondents tend to say "yes." Yet speaking out and falling silent do not depend on whether people, on considering the matter rationally, claim to be in the majority. People who hold a view that is subject to pressure from the climate of opinion still become increasingly less willing to speak out even if they deny this when asked directly during the interview. In 1997, Caroll Glynn, Andrew Hayes, and James Shanahan completed a meta-analysis of a total of 17 studies designed to test the spiral of silence, ultimately determining that most of the studies included in their analysis revealed only a slight connection between respondents' willingness to speak out and whether they assumed they held the majority opinion. Hence, the authors concluded that there was only weak empirical corroboration for the assumptions on which the spiral of silence theory is based. In fact, however, practically all of the investigations included in the meta-analysis focused on abstract, hypothetical situations. None of the studies analyzed created an interview situation in which there was in fact perceptible pressure from the climate of opinion.

Contributions of the Theory to the Field of Communication Studies

Even though most attempts to test the spiral of silence theory empirically have been less than satisfactory thus far, the spiral of silence theory is still indisputably one of the most inspiring theories to emerge in the field of communication studies in the 20th century. Few other theories have had a similar impact on empirical communication research. Although there is still no definitive proof that the assumptions formulated in the theory are in fact correct, there are at least numerous indications and research findings from other scientific fields, such as behavioral research and psychology, that are in line with the theory and would seem to indicate that the core elements of the theory are fundamentally correct. The theory has also proved influential in the political sphere. In Germany, at least, conclusions drawn from the theory about how to act successfully in election campaigns are now regularly considered by campaign strategists.

Thomas Petersen

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Starr, Kenneth

See Lewinsky, Monica

Starr Report

See Lewinsky, Monica

State of the Union Address

Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution requires that the president give information to Congress on the state of the union. The founders, however, did not specify when, how often, or in what manner the information should be delivered. Furthermore, presidents can also recommend policies they believe "necessary and expedient." The State of the Union Address (SUA) highlights much of what the president believes Congress should do in the upcoming legislative session. Over the years, the SUA has been known by various names, including the "annual message" until 1934 when it was called the Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union. Finally, in the 1940s, it became known as the State of the Union Address. George Washington established the precedent of delivering an oral address at the beginning of a congressional session, and John Adams continued this practice. Thomas Jefferson, however, did not follow suit and presented written messages to Congress during his tenure. The SUA was submitted in writing and read by clerks until Woodrow Wilson reinstituted the oral delivery in 1913, forever changing the nature of presidential communication with Congress. This made the occasion of the SUA a visible and monumental event for the president. It was not until Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, that the practice of delivering an oral SUA would be firmly established and would evolve into a significant aspect of presidential rhetorical and legislative leadership.

The SUA is meant to be a persuasive speech in which presidents simultaneously communicate their policy agenda to both the Congress and the public. When presidents give the SUA they have an opportunity to further their policy agenda while at the same time fulfilling their constitutional duty. Because of the vagueness of the reporting and recommending provisions in the Constitution, as the institution of the presidency changed so did the SUA. Presidents began to

U.S. President Bill Clinton addresses a joint session of Congress during his final State of the Union Address on January 2, 2000, in the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C.

Source: AFP/Getty Images.

assert their leadership of Congress, specifically with the presidencies of Teddy Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. In addition, increased powers were granted to the president with the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the creation of the Executive Office of the President in 1939, providing the president with more staff, policy advice, and information. These changes allowed presidents to expand their role in the legislative process, and they could take the lead in making policy recommendations.

Presidents who gain the public's support may have an easier time getting Congress to enact their agenda. Despite the fact that the founders were afraid of this type of demagoguery, public appeals are an integral part of the modern presidency. With the SUA, presidents address both the public and Congress in an attempt to set the policy agenda and exercise legislative leadership. The inclusion of the public began early through technological advancements including the expansion of newspaper circulation, the development of radio, and ultimately the creation of television. Recognizing the importance of public support, Lyndon B. Johnson was the first to specifically address the public in his salutation; he also moved the address to the evening in 1965, in order to capture the largest possible audience.

The public has come to expect the president to assume the role of legislative leader. Both Congress and the public want to hear from presidents where they stand on particular issues, where they want the country to go in the future, and what they believe should be done to alleviate troubles. As the nation's problems became more complex, the need for the president to provide a vision for the country by identifying policy priorities and offering solutions became inevitable and the SUA became a significant policy-making tool for presidents. At the same time, however, public expectations about what the president should accomplish have increased tremendously over the years, creating an "expectations gap." Presidents are expected to fulfill promises made during a campaign and while in office. This is seldom easy to do because of the system of shared powers in the United States, and, as a result, much of the time the public is disappointed and disillusioned. The SUA calls attention to a host of policy issues the president would like to see accomplished; however, many will not be accomplished during a president's tenure contributing to the "expectations gap."

Scholars vary in their assessment of the SUA. Some downplay its importance, while others argue that the speech is a significant part of a president's political communication with Congress. There are two primary fields of study: One focuses on the rhetorical presidency and the other on presidential rhetoric. Both of these approaches assess the importance of communication and popular rhetoric for presidents. Whether the focus is on changes in the institution of the presidency and the use of popular rhetoric as a tool to accomplish policy-making goals, or on the type of language used in the addresses, the study of presidential communication is essential for understanding the institution and power of the presidency. Early studies detailed historically how the speech evolved into an important agenda-setting document for presidents. Other scholars classify the addresses into types of speeches and discuss the policy issues and the legislative program outlined. Content analyses, media reactions to the speech, and public opinion studies have also been done. Similarly, the president's role as chief legislator has been explored through a close examination of the policy-making rhetoric in SUAs. Policy-making rhetoric is defined as rhetoric that frames a problem and offers a solution. Using common themes, symbols, and universal values, presidents explain their policy agenda and attempt to focus congressional attention in an effort to initiate deliberation. Presidents are elected to lead, and the SUA is used to put forth their agenda, engage Congress in the policy-making process, communicate their agenda to the public, and exercise legislative leadership.

Alison Dana Howard

See also Presidential Communication

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Stephanopoulos, George (1961–)

George Stephanopoulos is best known as a broadcaster in the United States and as a political advisor to former President Bill Clinton from 1992 to 1996. He is currently chief Washington correspondent for ABC News and anchor of ABC's *This Week.*

As a former senior political advisor to Bill Clinton, Stephanopoulos directed communications and advised on policy and strategy in an administration rocked with scandal. In his 1999 book, he documents the pressures he endured in attempting to get out the White House message. He worked on both of Clinton's successful presidential bids (1992 and 1996), served in the first administration, but resigned after the second campaign.

George Robert Stephanopoulos was born in Fall River, Massachusetts, to a family of Greek heritage. Both his father and grandfather were Greek Orthodox priests. His mother was a former public relations student at the University of Minnesota. He was raised largely in Cleveland, Ohio. As a child and young adult, he considered careers in both law and the priesthood. He credits his experiences as an altar boy in his father's church for preparing him to be an operative behind the scenes.

He received his Bachelor of Arts degree in 1982 from Columbia University, and graduated summa cum laude in political science. At Columbia, he was a Truman Scholar, valedictorian of his class, and later the commencement speaker in 2003. He obtained his master's degree in theology at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar. He later served as executive floor manager to House Majority Leader Richard A. Gephardt.

He rose to prominence on the United States political scene as a result of his connection with former President Bill Clinton. In the Clinton White House, he served first as de facto press secretary for Dee Dee Myers and then as senior advisor for policy and strategy. He worked closely with other Clinton strategists David Wilhelm and James Carville. He left the Clintons after the 1996 campaign to teach briefly at Columbia University.

He joined ABC in 1997 as a political news analyst and correspondent. In September 2002, he became host and anchor of *This Week* and, in December, was officially named chief Washington correspondent of ABC. His memoir, *All Too Human,* was published in 1999, for which he received a $2.75 million advance. It became a *New York Times* best-seller and relates his experiences with the Clintons. The book highlights his physical and mental ailments as a result of job pressures. It is also a critique of both the President and First Lady. The publication raised criticism because it was released while President Clinton was still in office.

Stephanopoulos was the inspiration behind television characters in *The American President* and *The West Wing.* His role in the Clinton campaign is also featured in the documentary film *The War Room.* Stephanopoulos is married to actress Alexandra Wentworth and they have two daughters.

Sandra Braun

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Stevenson, Adlai (1900–1965)

Adlai Stevenson was a Democratic politician from Illinois, best known for his unsuccessful presidential campaigns against Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956 and for his role in the Cuban Missile Crisis as ambassador to the United Nations.

Stevenson attended law school at Northwestern University and worked as an attorney in Chicago. For 15 years, Stevenson's career alternated between private-sector attorney and midlevel bureaucrat in the Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Navy, and the Department of State.

In 1948, Stevenson unseated the incumbent governor of Illinois, Republican Dwight Green. As governor, Stevenson reformed the criminal justice system, improved highways, and toughened antigambling statutes. He served a single term, before being drafted by then-President Harry Truman to run for president in 1952.

Running against the Republican Party ticket of Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon, Stevenson and

his running mate, John Sparkman (U.S. senator from Alabama) were defeated handily and lost the popular vote 55% to 44%. Widely perceived as an "egghead," as Nixon had tagged him, Stevenson performed poorly in every region of the nation except the South.

In 1956, Stevenson again won the Democratic Party's nomination for the presidential election. With Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver as his running mate, Stevenson once again faced a dominating Eisenhower/Nixon ticket. The strong economy and emerging foreign policy crises in the Suez Canal and Hungary persuaded voters to return Eisenhower to office. Eisenhower beat Stevenson by an even larger margin than he had in 1952, winning 57% of the popular vote to Stevenson's 43%.

Following the election, Stevenson returned to his law practice in Illinois. After John F. Kennedy's election in 1960, Stevenson served as ambassador to the United Nations, a position that made use of Stevenson's role as elder statesman and extensive foreign policy experience. When the United States and the Soviet Union appeared on the brink of nuclear confrontation in 1962, Stevenson realized his final moment of greatness. In an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council, Stevenson vigorously interrogated his Soviet counterpart, Valerian Zorin, about whether the Soviet Union was building missile sites in Cuba. This exchange led to Stevenson's famous demand, "Don't wait for the translation, answer yes or no!" As Zorin refused to answer Stevenson's charge, Stevenson followed up with the equally memorable statement, "I am prepared to wait for my answer until Hell freezes over." When Zorin denied the existence of missiles on Cuban soil, Stevenson dramatically produced reconnaissance photos that proved the existence of those very weapons.

After the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Stevenson's tenure as ambassador was relatively quiet, with the exception of an assault in Dallas, Texas, from an anti–United Nations protestor in October 1963. Less than 2 years later, Stevenson died from heart failure.

Justin S. Vaughn

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Stewart, Jon

See *Daily Show, The*

Strategic Communication

Strategic communication is the purposeful communication by a person or an organization designed to persuade audiences with the goal of increasing knowledge, changing attitudes, or inducing desired behavior. Strategic communication campaigns are generally designed to respond to the perceived communications needs of significant publics. The term was originally associated with U.S. governmental communications directed toward audiences outside the United States. However, the use of the term has expanded and is now commonly used to describe the overall communications efforts of both individuals and organizations, including political candidates.

Historically, strategic communication has been used to describe the barrage of informational and cultural communication strategies employed by U.S. agencies such as the Voice of America and the U.S. Information Agency during the Cold War in order to position the United States in opposition to the Soviet Union in both Western and Eastern Europe. In 2004, the U.S. Department of Defense outlined strategic communication principles for an "influence campaign" designed to reverse negative opinions about the United States among mainstream Muslims in the Arab world.

A strategic political communication campaign relies on the integrated use of multiple communications strategies from both the public relations and advertising arenas, taking into account both the specific audiences targeted for communication and the media through which those audiences can most successfully be reached. The goal of a strategic political communications campaign is to create an image of reality in which a party's or candidate's positions about important issues appear consistent with those of the audience being targeted. Strategic communications may rely on traditional media, such as print and broadcast media. However, in the information age, strategic communications campaigns increasingly use non-traditional media, especially the Internet. Message consistency and clarity are regarded as crucial to the success of a strategic communication campaign.

A key element of successful strategic communication management in the political arena is audience research. Assessing current audience beliefs and attitudes is critical in designing a campaign that will result in real change. Focus groups and public opinion polls serve to inform strategic communication campaigns, determining issues important to impressionable publics.

Strategic political communication campaigns may employ a wide variety of tactics to reach audiences. Traditional public relations tactics are often the centerpiece of strategic communication campaigns, including the distribution of press releases and video news releases, the staging of press conferences and town hall meetings, and the granting of personal interviews to key members of the news media. Political advertising must also be considered a strategic communication element, because advertisements work in synergy with traditional public relations tactics to create an overall image of a candidate, a party, or an issue.

Colleen Connolly-Ahern

See also Political Advertising; Propaganda; Public Relations, Political; Voice of America

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Strauss, Franz Josef

See Spiegel Affair

Stringer

A stringer is a part-time or freelance journalist. Stringers typically are assigned to cover areas that are considered less newsworthy or peripheral to the news organization's coverage area, where it has no bureau or full-time reporters. A local newspaper may have stringers in surrounding small towns, whereas major news organizations may have stringers in dozens of countries around the world. Stringers also may be used in areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan that are seen as "trouble spots."

"Stringing" can be a way for aspiring journalists to get their work into print or on the air and build a portfolio that will help them land a full-time job. New technology such as satellite telephones, digital cameras, and the Internet have made reporting from abroad more feasible for freelancers. A Brookings Institution survey showed stringers in foreign countries can be placed into six categories: spouses (of journalists abroad), experts (about a certain region), adventurers (who aren't tied to an area), "flingers" (who have gone abroad for a short period of time), ideologues (who sympathize with one side in a conflict), and residents. The latter category makes up an increasing number of the journalists reporting for Western news organizations in Iraq. Residents may do more work than their bylines would indicate because they often gather information for full-time correspondents. Some wish not to be named because of fear of reprisals.

Stringers sometimes face great danger. They often lack protections news organizations expend on full-time reporters, such as flak jackets, bodyguards, or armored cars. They may seek out danger because news organizations will pay much more for dramatic photos or footage. Many resident stringers in Iraq keep their work a secret from friends and family and have faced death threats. They say journalists are sometimes assumed to be spies. In fact, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency revealed in the 1970s that it had had relationships with journalists from most major U.S. news outlets, most often with stringers, although this practice is believed to have declined. But stringers captured in Iraq, by Iraqis or Americans, have sometimes received less support from their employers than full-time correspondents have.

One reason news organizations use stringers is because they are paid much less. News organizations in recent years have been cutting bureaus and full-time staff to minimize costs. Stringers usually are paid a certain amount per word or inch or copy, or per photo. Because they are independent contractors and may provide the same material to multiple outlets, they often do not receive benefits such as insurance coverage. While stringer pay is low compared to what a correspondent might make, it may be much more than a typical resident correspondent can earn.

Patrick C. Meirick

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Supreme Court, Media and the

The relationship between the media and the U.S. Supreme Court differs from that between the media and other institutions in terms of the deference that mass media outlets have shown the court throughout history. By covering the court less frequently and in a less political manner than the other branches of government, the media enhance the court's legitimacy, which allows it to function more effectively.

The court's high degree of legitimacy and level of public support facilitate compliance with its rulings. Americans do not hear very much about the Supreme Court's activities, which may partially be a result of the way the mass media cover the court's activities. The justices do not give frequent press conferences and are rarely interviewed by journalists. They generally seek to maintain the independence that is associated with judicial posts. As a result, the Supreme Court is covered far less frequently than the presidency or the Congress. In recent years, the court has handed down fewer than 80 to 100 decisions per term, and only a fraction of those receive any substantial media coverage. In contrast, rarely a day passes without a story about the president or Congress. Because one function of the media is to set the agenda for public discussion, this lack of attention leads to the so-called political branches of government maintaining their prominence on the American political landscape, while the court remains relatively less visible most of the time.

The Supreme Court receives substantial media attention in two instances: when it issues a ruling on a case that has a higher level of interest to the public and when there is a vacancy, nomination, and subsequent confirmation of a new justice. On these relatively infrequent occurrences, the court temporarily moves into the public consciousness, only to slip back to the shadows after the "news" is exhausted.

Cases that generate media attention often involve a salient public issue (e.g., abortion, capital punishment, freedom of expression, rights of the criminally accused) or a public figure. While such decisions will likely make the news, there is potential newsworthiness at two other stages in the process, as well. For the highest-profile cases, there will also be brief media attention when the court issues or denies a *writ of certiorari* (agreeing to hear or refusing to hear a case) and during oral arguments on the case. Such cases are often covered in an apolitical manner, which contributes to the court's comparatively high level of public support. Broadcast media reports rarely mention the names of individual justices during reports of decisions, and if they do, they rarely connect the justices to their political ideologies or the presidents who appointed them. A notable exception to this was in media coverage of the Supreme Court's decisions in 2000 in *Bush v. Gore,* the litigation over the Florida recounts in the presidential race between Republican President George W. Bush and former Democratic Vice President Al Gore. In those cases, the media made frequent mention of which justices were appointees of which presidents or were thought to lean toward a particular ideology.

Newspapers have more space to devote to reporting court decisions; but, even there, journalists often spend more time explaining the relevance and implications of the decision than they do elaborating on the political underpinnings of the decision-making process. The result is a picture of the court as an institution that is above politics.

When a vacancy on the court occurs, media coverage focuses on three stages of the story. First, there is discussion about the retiring or deceased justice, including biographical information, recollection of his or her nomination, and discussion of his or her legacy (including salient decisions he or she authored). Second, there is speculation as to whom the president will nominate to fill the vacancy. Unlike the reporting on salient decisions, there is explicit political discussion. How would each prospective nominee rule on various salient legal issues if and when those issues come before the court? How likely is the prospective nominee to make it through the Senate confirmation hearings? How will the replacement change the balance of the court's ideological makeup? While these questions are ripe for a political frame, the political nature of the answers is often offset here, as well as in the third stage—the nomination hearings, by the language used by the president and senators, who go out of their way to note that their decisions will not be based on politics (i.e., ideology or policy preferences), but rather apolitical elements of the nominee such as judicial temperament, experience, and legal expertise. The nominee plays

into this characterization during the confirmation hearing, as well, by refusing to answer questions that would suggest any political predisposition whatsoever. In 1987, the nomination of former Professor and Federal Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court by President Reagan was contested on explicit ideological grounds, using many of Professor Bork's own writings, and the dispute was so sharp that the word *Borked* subsequently entered the national lexicon to signify that a nominee was the subject of strident personal or ideological attacks sufficient to defeat the nomination. The Bork experience is one of the reasons subsequent nominees are careful to eschew signaling any particular political or ideological leanings; another is the idea that no judge should appear to have decided any case on grounds other than the facts of the particular case.

Once the nominee joins the court, he or she becomes part of the mystique that both affects and is affected by the quantity and type of coverage the court receives.

Stephen Maynard Caliendo

See also *Buckley v. Valeo;* Hill–Thomas Hearings; *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*

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Survey Research

See Methodology

Survey Research Center

The Survey Research Center (SRC) was established in 1946 and is affiliated with the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Rensis Likert, the inventor of the Likert scale, was the first director of SRC, which has been a pioneer in political behavior research since its foundation. Most of the SRC's political behavior research between the late 1940s and the 1960s was initiated by its Political Behavior Program.

In a 1948 foreign affairs survey that also measured the national electorate's intention to vote, researchers in SRC accurately predicted Harry Truman's victory in the 1948 election, whereas the commercial pollsters missed the forecast. After the 1948 election, Angus Campbell and Robert Kahn in SRC introduced a social-psychological approach to the first national election study on voting behavior. From 1952 to 1960, Angus Campbell and Warren Miller conducted the first national panel study of voting behavior. The researchers were among the first to integrate survey data with census data, election statistics, content analysis of newspapers, and roll call records of legislative behavior to examine the influences of psychological, social, and economic factors on voting behavior.

In 1960, Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes published *The American Voter.* This book was regarded as a milestone in the political science discipline. It well represented SRC's social-psychological perspective to voting behavior analysis and highlighted sampling and personal interviews as the data collection methodology for this line of research. The book was the result of a 10-year-long study that attempted to identify key factors influencing voting behavior in both presidential and congressional elections. For the first time, concepts such as party identification and general feelings about "the times" and "candidates" relative to specific issues were advocated for voting behavior analysis, which created a much broader and deeper context than any previous approach. In addition to *The American Voter,* Philip Converse also directed a national panel study on the stability and change in political values, attitudes, and behaviors of the American electorate in the early 1960s. The analysis indicated that attitude stability could be better explained by basic group affiliations, such as identification with a specific religion or political party, than other social attributes of individuals, such as occupation.

In 1970, the Political Behavior Program in SRC became the Center for Political Studies (CPS) of ISR. Studies in CPS continue to investigate a wide variety of issues associated with the electoral process and

voting behavior. In 1977, the National Election Studies (NES) was established within CPS by a National Science Foundation grant. More than 50 countries have joined NES for worldwide election studies, and the center remains the world's preeminent source of voting and social behavior theory and data.

Feng Shen

See also *American Voter, The;* Party Identification

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Symbolic Convergence Theory

Symbolic convergence theory (SCT), brainchild of Ernest G. Bormann, attempts to explain how communication can create and sustain group consciousness through the sharing of narratives or "fantasies." Drawing on the observations of Harvard social psychologist Robert Bales, Bormann explored how the practice of cooperative fantasizing leads to enhanced group cohesion and, ultimately, the emergence of a group mind. He asserted that these communal narratives serve as the means by which group members can understand and articulate their shared social reality. Thus, sharing fantasies encourages the development of a convergent point of view, a shared understanding of the group's common experiences, as well as their identity as a community. Fantasy theme analysis was developed to detect the presence of group consciousness resulting from collaborative fantasizing and is the line of research from which this theory evolved.

Symbolic convergence begins when an individual "dramatizes" or shares a narrative in such a way as to arouse excitement in the rest of the group. A chain reaction results as the other members begin to build on the initial narrative, embellishing and extending the story in response to each other. This "chaining out" of the original dramatization generates the basic unit of symbolic convergence, a "fantasy theme." According to Bormann, a fantasy theme is a cooperative interpretation of ideas or events that serves the needs of the group, therefore helping its members to understand and evaluate experiences in accordance with the group mind.

The presence of group consciousness allows and even encourages the group members to share multiple fantasy themes, enabling the group to continually evaluate new experiences in terms of established social knowledge. Moreover, group members will often unconsciously recycle the same basic plotline for each additional fantasy theme so as to ensure that subsequent narratives will be palatable to the group mind. Group consciousness also prompts group members to develop "symbolic cues," or succinct references to previously shared fantasy themes. Bormann likened these cues to referencing an inside joke, where a word or phrase or even a gesture, although incomprehensible to an outsider, will arouse group members to respond in much the same way they did when the fantasy theme originated. Both the recurrence of fantasy themes and the creation of symbolic cues serve as evidence that symbolic convergence has occurred.

Since a given group can share multiple fantasy themes, these communal narratives can coalesce over time to form a broader worldview to which the group members subscribe, what Bormann called a "rhetorical vision." A rhetorical vision has five main components: the "dramatis personae," or the characters; the "plotline" or the action of the vision; the "scene," or location of the action; the "sanctioning agent," or that which legitimizes the action; and a "master analogue," or purpose that guides the vision. Bormann identified three categories of master analogues: "pragmatic," with a focus on practical purposes; "social," emphasizing relationships; and "righteous," guided by a higher cause.

Those who participate in a rhetorical vision comprise a "rhetorical community." An individual can participate in multiple rhetorical visions and thus belong to multiple rhetorical communities. Membership in a rhetorical community can be formal or informal, brief or long term. Long-standing communities are often united not only by a rhetorical vision but also by a "saga," a unifying understanding of the group's origins and founders, customs and values, purpose(s) and ultimate significance.

Originating in small group communication research at the University of Minnesota in the late 1960s, symbolic convergence theory has been expanded since its inception to include communication at any level, from small group to public to mass media. Bormann argued

that fantasies can chain out among larger publics just as they do within small groups. Furthermore, he contended that a rhetorical vision can develop through public address and/or the mass media to unite large segments of the population in rhetorical communities. Group consciousness, then, is not limited to small groups, but is possible whenever fantasy themes catch on and chain out within a community. Accordingly, Bormann conceived of symbolic convergence as a general theory of communication.

Since its introduction in 1972, symbolic convergence theory has been challenged for lacking clarity in its basic assumptions and for recycling and relabeling concepts from other theories. Bormann's use of the word *fantasy* in particular has drawn much criticism. In addition, critics have claimed that the theory's foundation in Freudian thought limits its application to small group communication and that any conclusions drawn from symbolic convergence theory studies are based on researcher insight rather than theory application. Bormann publicly acknowledged and refuted these challenges to the theory in a 1994 publication. As recently as 2003, Bormann joined John F. Cragan and Donald C. Shields to defend symbolic convergence against the accusation that its fundamental premises are contradictory.

Since its formulation, symbolic convergence theory has been applied to various media, such as the Internet and political cartoons, and within various communication genres, from interpersonal to mass communication, from political to organizational communication. In 2001, along with Cragan and Shields, Bormann traced the development of symbolic convergence theory over the previous 3 decades, reviewing its research applications and answering its critics while speculating on its future research avenues.

Arin Rose Dickerson

See also Bormann, Ernest; Fantasy Theme Analysis

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Symbolic Uses of Politics, The

Murray Edelman's classic book, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics,* has exerted a strong and enduring influence on political communication scholarship since its publication in 1964 and remains an all-time best-seller for the University of Illinois Press. *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* is the germinal work on symbolic politics as it explores the influence of cultural signs, myths, rites, and other symbolic forms of communication on political involvement and institutions. In his review of *The Symbolic Uses of Politics,* noted political scientist Harold D. Lasswell wrote that Edelman's book "is evidence of the degree to which the political scientist's map has changed." Lasswell also notes that at "every point comments or hypotheses are put forward that will undoubtedly focus future research."

Indeed, Lasswell's early observation has been realized, as Edelman's first book has created and shaped the study of political symbolism. The theses of *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* largely center on the idea that democratic action is symbolic and expressive in function. Edelman argues that political reality becomes overlooked as people focus their energies on the interpretation of political symbols, ultimately compromising the democratic process. Thus, as people participate in politics, which Edelman says for most people is a "passing parade of abstract symbols," they may be far removed from political reality and relegated to participate as an ignorant and quiescent public. Perhaps overshadowed by political speeches, media coverage, advertising and ceremony, political reality, and the actual impact of government on its people may be ignored by the public; signs, rites, and symbols are often the smoke and mirrors distorting political reality.

In the introduction to *The Symbolic Uses of Politics,* Edelman writes, “political forms thus come to symbolize what large masses of men need to believe about the state to reassure themselves. It is the needs, the hopes, and the anxieties of men that determine the meanings.” Edelman argues that these meanings also operate in concordance with the will, and on behalf, of the political elite.

This theme is interwoven throughout all of the chapters of *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, which topically focus on symbols and political quiescence, the administrative system as a symbol, political leadership, political settings as symbols, language and political perception, the forms and meanings of political language, persistence and change in political goals, and mass response to political symbols. Many of these topics are further explored in Edelman’s 10 other books and numerous scholarly articles. In his 1971 book *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence,* Edelman called for political scientists to shift their focus from formal government action to illuminate the force of the political elite on the public’s political involvement and attitudes.

Elizabeth Johnson Avery

See also Edelman, Murray

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Systems Theory

Systems theories are scientific descriptions not of single phenomena but of systematic relationships between individual parts. A system is generally understood as composed of elements that stand in a lasting connection with one another, thus forming a complex whole that can be separated by boundaries from an environment of elements not belonging to the system. Systems theory is based on the idea that the whole is irreducible to the sum of its parts (*emergence*) and that through the interaction among the parts, a specific capacity (*function*) is made possible. Systems research investigates the emergent order and functional logic of these connections based on the assumption that each larger unified whole possesses properties and regularities that are not observed in the parts. Whereas microanalytic research efforts, which predominate in communication science, accumulate ever more detailed knowledge of the relationships among a few variables, the systemic approach attempts to decipher the laws and principles of complex, interconnected wholes.

Because various material and non-material components can be understood as comprising a systemic whole, the system concept is used in a multitude of scientific disciplines. This has led to differentiation among a multitude of systems theories in different fields of research, among which cross-connections can be drawn via the system concept. *General systems theory* aims at finding general principles of the behavior of all systems based on the findings of systems research in different scientific disciplines (physics, biology, chemistry, psychology, the social sciences, philosophy, theology). Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901–1972), who was a biologist, is known as the father of general systems theory.

Social systems are regarded as extremely complex phenomena because they are composed of many elements that interact and relate to one another in a multitude of ways. It is also characteristic of social relationships that they frequently contain feedback loops. Due to these circular causal relationships, the momentum of social systems is not easily foreseeable, and they cannot be controlled through external influences in a targeted way. A distinction can be made among social science systems theories according to what they view as the basic element of a social system: individuals, social actions, or communication.

A number of prominent systems theories emerged in theory building in the 20th century. The American sociologist Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) is known as the founder of the structural functionalist systems theory *(structural functionalism*). Entirely within the tradition of holistic social theories (Herbert Spencer, Émile Durkheim, and others), Parsons starts out from the assumption that social phenomena can be understood sufficiently only when they are investigated in their systemic connection with other social phenomena, no matter whether these are human interactions or complex social structures. Structural functionalism formulates a universal answer to the question of what conditions (*functional prerequisites*) must be fulfilled in order for these systems to maintain themselves. Two analytic categories are central here. The relatively

stable order of a given whole system is called its structure. Function is understood as a specific contribution made by the individual system element to the maintenance of the system as a whole. According to Parsons, a social system must perform four basic functions if it is to survive and continue. A system must be able to adapt to changing environmental conditions (adaptation). A system must formulate goals and be able to master instrumental problems in achieving those goals (goal attainment). Systems must be able to ensure the cohesion of the system (integration). A system must be able to manage and reduce tensions that arise among the elements (latent pattern maintenance). Referred to by the acronym AGIL, these four *functional imperatives,* which any society must accomplish to maintain itself, form the central instrument of structural functional analysis. With the aid of the *AGIL scheme,* each element in the system can be examined in terms of what it specifically contributes to which of the four basic functions. The stable order of a social system is then said to be explained, if it can be demonstrated that it contains sufficient functional elements and, at the same time, has the ability to eliminate dysfunctional components. In modern societies, four subsystems are responsible for maintaining the system: the economic system (adaptation), the political system (goal attainment), the legal system (integration), and education, religion, family, or the sociocultural system (latent pattern maintenance). In each of these subsystems, in turn, the same functional prerequisites must be served, just as they must be served in each organization system and action system of the subsystems.

Cybernetic systems theory is the study of control and communication processes in self-regulating systems. Cybernetics was first developed by the American mathematician Norbert Wiener. The term *cybernetic system* denotes a feedback system that uses its own output as input and in this way is able to maintain equilibrium. As an interdisciplinary paradigm, cybernetics has left its mark not only on engineering and natural science disciplines but also on psychology and the social sciences. Applied to political science, cybernetics inspired Karl W. Deutsch, an important social and political scientist, to view the governing process as a cybernetic steering process and, therefore, as a problem of information and communication flows. Here, the norm of democratic self-determination is reformulated as the ability of autonomous self-steering, which, for its part, is dependent on connection of communication channels, allowing the system to learn from itself. Deutsch's work can be regarded as one of the few basic research efforts conducted expressly for the purpose of aiding the development and testing of the theory of political communication (in a broad sense). Modern, or second-order, cybernetics, developed by Heinz von Foerster, is based on the insight that cybernetic systems must be thought of as closed, because they can perceive the environment only through observing their own operations (feedback). With this, the reality surrounding a system gains the status of the system's own "invention." Moreover, cybernetic systems are blind to their own blindness, because they cannot see that they do not see what they cannot see. If this basic idea is applied beyond the realm of technical and living systems to social systems, highly interesting perspectives emerge for theory building in the social sciences.

In the European social sciences, the theory of *autopoietic* (self-producing) *systems,* developed by the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, has had great impact. In contrast to Talcott Parsons, whom Luhmann met in the early 1960s during his studies at Harvard University, Luhmann's interest was not in the stability of existing systems but in the relation of system to environment. Luhmann describes this relation as a gradient of complexity between a world in which everything is possible and social systems that allow only certain possibilities of experience and action. Only the "reduction of complexity" makes social order possible, and it is the actual function of system formation. The search for the selection mechanisms, through which social systems protect themselves against the superabundance and variety of possibilities and, through this, maintain their boundaries to the environment, is thus declared to be the core task of sociological systems research.

Starting in the 1980s Luhmann further developed his systems theory into a communication theory. The basic element of a system is now no longer societal action but instead communication. According to this, all social systems are systems of communication. Social systems emerge by developing a specific code and distinguishing themselves from other societal communications. Here, communication is understood in an abstract sense as the interaction of three selection processes: selection of information, selection of the utterance of this information, and a selective understanding or misunderstanding of this utterance and its information. Only when these three processes can be synthesized can communication take place. Human consciousness cannot guarantee this, so Luhmann places the human being outside any social

system, as a part of the environment. To make successful communication probable, social systems have developed different types of media: languages to facilitate understanding; dissemination media, such as writing, print, radio, and so on, to increase the reach of communication; and finally, symbolically generated communication media, such as love, power, money, truth, and the like, to foster the continuation of communication. As every communication must itself create the preconditions for its continuance, and because communication in addition can take reference only from other communications of the same type, social systems are to be seen as self-reproductive (*autopoietic*) and self-referentially closed communication circuits. To Luhmann, society is a network of functionally specialized communication systems that cannot operatively have an effect on each other but instead work exclusively and strictly according to their own structures (*codes, programs, media*). A society formed in this way has to do without hierarchical top and without center and without representation of the whole.

As Parsons did, Luhmann took up a multitude of theoretical concepts and currents, integrating them in his theory. Luhmann's language and thinking reached a degree of complexity that to many social scientists remains unfamiliar and inaccessible.

Systems theory can be used in order to enlarge theory building in communication science, the majority of which is microanalytic, with macroscopic analyses. It is particularly useful for developing a sophisticated theoretical understanding of the *media system* and for describing its relationships to other functional areas, such as to the economy, politics, science, and others. In fact, all of the systems theoretical approaches described previously have left visible traces in media research and political communication.

An extensive structural functional analysis of the media has not been presented up to the present. Parsons himself dealt explicitly with the mass media only in one short work, which was not a theoretical study but a critical depiction of the situation of the American media in the 1960s. Nevertheless, the influence of functionalist theories in communication science is obvious, as evidenced to this day by the ever appearing, varied taxonomies of the political, economic, social, and cultural functions of the media. When, for instance, political information, control of political power, and needs articulation through the media are deemed functionally essential requisites of democratic political systems, the basic pattern of structural functional thinking is easily recognizable.

Second-order cybernetics, the "cybernetic of cybernetics," strengthened and radicalized constructivist thinking in communication science. This has, among other things, consequences for our view of the relationship between media and reality. In the cybernetic way of looking at things, media organizations must be seen as circular causal, closed systems, which, like all *observing systems,* have no direct access to the reality surrounding them. They can only observe and reconstruct. The accusation that the media reality is a distortion of reality cannot be upheld from the constructivist perspective, because the "real" world provides no complete and objective representation of itself that could serve as a yardstick of authentic reality. Consequently, media research can always only draw comparisons among different constructions of reality and trace the principles upon which they are built. If human consciousness is also understood as a cybernetic system, with contact to environment restricted to observation of its own operations, there are considerable consequences for media effects theory.

Above all, the functional structural systems theory rendered outstanding services to an alternative understanding of public opinion. In a systems theory view, public opinion has nothing to do with what real people actually think. The concept does not focus on the opinions of individuals or opinions shared by the collective. Instead, public opinion stands for the structure of themes in public and, most of all, political communication. Public opinion reduces the superabundance of problems and issues that stand at the disposal of politics to a manageable stock of topics that can be used in the political process. It indicates which issues can be seriously considered for decision making, without having to expect that they will be found to be misplaced or that they will be rejected as topics of political communication. Public opinion helps politics to reduce the multitude of possible decision problems; for compacting of the range of opinions to a decision, the decision rules of the system are then responsible.

The autopoiesis theory also opens up new perspectives of a multitude of communication science basic concepts and problems. It sees the media system as a functionally differentiated communication system that focuses on filtering and making distinctions among information that can be assumed to be known to society at large. The binary code (*public–non public*) processes the distinction between issues, events, and states that can be communicated with a right to receive attention (as "information") and information that is not dealt with within the system with great attention and, therefore,

remains unpublicized. The system has developed numerous criteria for making this series of logical distinctions (its “program”) that result from observation of successful public communication. In this respect, each new publication represents a communicative connection to the system’s own operations; it is self-referential.

A self-referentially functioning system cannot be expected to contribute effectively to the functioning of other areas of society. For this reason, the functions expected of the media from a systems theoretical perspective are limited. The media produce a description of reality that imposes itself on others as a common fiction of societal reality and allows society to observe itself.

Frank Marcinkowski

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T

Tabloids

Tabloid has two meanings. First, it is used for a small newspaper format, roughly half the size of the ordinary broadsheet. Second, it stands for various concepts of popular and largely sensationalistic journalism. Not every newspaper, however, that is printed in tabloid format is a tabloid in content and style. The *Christian Science Monitor,* for instance, not known for being sensational, is a tabloid-size publication. Also, many of the free local dailies, like *Metro,* are printed in tabloid format, and only a few years ago, even several traditional British broadsheet newspapers such as the *Independent,* the *Times,* and the *Scotsman* have changed to the smaller size, preferring, however, to call it "compact" format. On the other hand, the biggest tabloid in Europe, the German *Bild-Zeitung,* is still printed as a broadsheet.

The origins of the term are disputed. According to the most plausible explanation, the name seems to derive from *tablet*—the product of compressed pharmaceuticals. *Tabloid*—a combination of tablet and alkaloid—was a trademark for tablets introduced by Burroughs, Wellcome & Co. in 1884. Within a couple of years, the connotation of being compressed was transferred to other items and also to a new kind of reporting that condensed stories into a simplified, concentrated style.

In 1900, Joseph Pulitzer, publisher of the *New York World,* invited the English publisher Alfred Harmsworth, founder of the *Daily Mail,* to edit the *World* for one day. Harmsworth (later Lord Northcliffe) was the new creative power of London's Fleet Street, having boosted the *Mail* within a few years to become Britain's biggest newspaper. On January 1, 1901, Harmsworth's imaginative version of the *World* came out. Half the size of its customary format, the new *World* was

Thursday November 9 2000

The Mirror

32p

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Paula's final hours

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U.S. HUMILIATED IN PRESIDENTIAL SHAMBLES

FORREST CHUMPS

'This election's like a box of chocolates. You never know what you're gonna get'

From DAVID LEIGH, Foreign Editor in Texas

AMERICA is without a new president today after its election ended in confusion and farce.

In a night of drama, TV stations declared George W Bush the winner and Al Gore accepted defeat — then backtracked as a recount was called in Florida.

Bush was favourite to win as counting went on but the result may not be known until tonight. President Bill Clinton said: "The American people have spoken. It's just going to take a little while to figure out what they have said."

The drama left the men fighting to be America's 43rd president looking like a pair of Forrest Gumps, the bumbling character from the Tom Hanks hit film.

SEE PAGES 2, 3, 4 AND 5

BROWN GOES GREEN ON FUEL

TAX CUTS: Brown yesterday

By JAMES HARDY, Political Editor

GORDON Brown launched a green revolution yesterday in a bid to scupper a new round of fuel protests.

The Chancellor unveiled a £1.75billion package which he said would cut costs by the equivalent of 8p a litre for lorries and 4p for cars.

Despite the pledges, fuel activists threatened a new wave of direct action starting with a motorway convoy tomorrow.

In a sparkling Commons performance giving his pre-Budget report, Mr Brown left the Tories in tatters. Labour MPs cheered as he announced his £5billion giveaway which included a one-off winter fuel payment of £200, a big rise in pensions, £200million for school improvements and a string of measures to boost firms.

Mr Brown also scrapped plans to raise tax on petrol by 1.5p in next March's Budget. The freeze – revealed exclusively by The Mirror on Monday – comes on top of a penny cut last year.

He trimmed the levy on "green" ultra low sulphur petrol by 2p a

TURN TO PAGE 7

The November 9, 2000, front page of The Daily Mirror, *one of Britain's largest tabloid newspapers, carries headlines mocking U.S. presidential elections.*

Source: AFP/Getty Images.

heralded as the "newspaper of the twentieth century." For the English publisher, who called this newspaper edition a tabloid newspaper, the term did not refer to the reduced size, but to the economical use of printing space. Short stories, short paragraphs, and simple sentences were key elements of this new technique.

Two years later, Harmsworth started the first modern tabloid newspaper, the *Daily Mirror,* in London. After a difficult start, it became a huge success. Appealing to the mass market, the tabloid offered all the attractions of traditional popular journalism: sensational makeup, visual images, and entertainment in various forms ranging from crime stories, human tragedies, to celebrity gossip, sport events, comics, and puzzles. The *Mirror* offered more photographs than other newspapers and presented its stories in a reduced and easy-to-read manner. By 1909, the *Mirror* was selling a million copies a day. Not surprisingly, new tabloids the *Daily Sketch* and the *Daily Graphic* jumped into the fray, imitating Northcliffe's concept.

The modern British press, measured by circulation, is dominated by tabloids: five national dailies (*Daily Express, Daily Mirror, Daily Star,* the *Daily Mail,* the *Sun*) and their respective Sunday papers have a combined circulation of roughly 16 million (July 2006). Despite the fact that the emphasis is clearly on entertainment and not on news coverage or political issues, due to their daily appearance and nationwide distribution, British tabloids are reckoned as an important force in public opinion building.

Tabloids in the United States developed differently. Though American concepts of popular journalism can be traced back to the penny press of the 1830s and the yellow press of the 1880s and 1890s, it was not before the end of World War I that a tabloid newspaper was produced in the United States. On June 26, 1919, the first issue of the *Illustrated Daily News,* published by Joseph Medill Patterson and his cousin Robert R. McCormick, publishers of the *Chicago Tribune,* appeared in the streets of New York City. Within 2 years the *Daily News*' circulation was up to 400,000, and by 1930 the daily circulation had risen to 1,520,000. In 1924, William Randolph Hearst followed with his own tabloid—the New York *Daily Mirror*—and Bernarr Macfadden started the *New York Evening Graphic.* By 1937, 49 tabloids were being published in the United States.

In the 1970s, many American tabloids were transformed into weekly publications shifting from newsstand to supermarket distribution. The main producer of tabloid weeklies is American Media Inc., based in Boca Raton on Florida's east coast, which publishes some of the most popular tabloids in the United States. The *National Enquirer,* the *Globe,* the *National Examiner,* and *Star*—the latter turning itself into a more glossy magazine—devote themselves almost completely to Hollywood and other American celebrities, and the *Sun* and *Weekly World News* have a strong focus on the weird and bizarre, featuring largely faked news stories of aliens and supernatural powers, religious prophecies and curious mysteries, juicy scandals and political conspiracies. Reliable circulation figures are available only for three of these six publications, but the estimated combined circulation is over 5 million (July 2007).

Since the 1980s and 1990s, the tabloid as a journalistic model for popular entertainment appealing to mass readership (or mass audience) has been successfully applied to television, producing low-brow talk shows (*Jerry Springer*), soap operas (*A Current Affair*), and pseudo-documentaries (*Unsolved Mysteries*). As the circulation figures for print tabloids are going down, TV "tabloidism" is as successful as ever with many productions being copied all over the world. And the "tabloidization" of online media has just started. Whatever media technology may be applied, tabloids seem to have become a persistent cultural phenomenon of modern society.

Daniel Gossel

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Talk Radio, Political

The history of radio is synonymous with the spreading of political messages to a mass audience. World War I brought with it the use of radio as a tool for the propagandist and an agent for shaping public opinion, whereas World War II saw radio used at the hands of the Nazi Party in Germany for the spreading of its aggressive, nationalistic diatribes. In addition, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's fireside chats broadcast via radio were created to inspire the American people to persevere through the Great Depression and to battle against the Axis powers. In short, it is difficult to disassociate radio as a medium from political radio as a social force. Radio played a central role in the rise of the mass and the creation of the modern conceptualization of public opinion. As a result, radio has been consistently used by the elite as a means by which to shape what issues people think about, what proposals and policies gain public support, as well as the shaping of public judgment toward a given set of political outcomes.

The academic study of political talk radio has been approached as both a social scientific and a humanistic endeavor. Humanists approach the study of political talk radio as text in order to deconstruct the nature of the arguments prevalent within this type of programming, the communicative dynamics involved in the give and take between host and caller or guest, as well as power relationships that exist between those who are participating in talk radio message construction. The empirical study of political talk radio has been a mainstay of political communication research for more than 50 years, with the seminal *The People's Choice* study serving as a foundation from which several different empirical lines of political talk radio research have been formed. Researchers found in this study of the 1940 U.S. presidential election that Roosevelt, the Democrat, retained a "good radio manner," whereas Willkie, the Republican, had a comparatively "bad radio manner." In addition, radio was labeled "the Democrats' medium" for the 1940 election. These findings mirror later discussions concerning the Kennedy–Nixon debates aired on television versus radio, as well as the partisan nature of talk radio as a place that shapes modern political discourse.

Most recent work on political talk radio has been focused on the medium's reemergence as an American political force. More specifically, studies of late have analyzed political talk radio within the context of presidential elections. In addition, political talk radio has been studied as an agent for the promotion of a particular political ideology, America's brand of conservatism. As a result, what political communication research has come to understand about this particular medium and this particular format within the medium falls within a fairly small set of theoretical and empirical boundary conditions.

There has been surprisingly little systematic content analysis work completed on political talk radio messages. A number of assumptions are made concerning the nature of the messages offered on American conservative political talk radio, but no one has analyzed large amounts of this type of political content across time. Cappella, Jamieson, and Turow analyzed the political messages offered on a wide range of political talk radio programs during the 1996 American presidential primary season and found clear differences in the issues receiving the most air time across conservative, moderate, and liberal talk radio shows. In addition, one specific conservative talk radio program (Rush Limbaugh) was an anomaly relative to all other talk radio programs in terms of the types of issues being raised.

Other research has found that political talk radio content can stand out from more top-down political information outlets (e.g., newspapers, broadcast television news) due to the nature of its call-in format. Political talk radio generates significant portions of its content through audience participation. Several major political talk radio programs ask audience members to call in and speak with the host about the major issues of the day, and this communicative dynamic is unique relative to the pre-packaged pieces of public affairs information supplied by news organizations through all forms of mass communication. Conservative political talk radio provides fundamentally distinct presentations of all three branches of the federal government, the news media, and public schools relative to more traditional political information outlets. Overall, it was revealed that public institutions were generally presented in a negative light on political talk radio, which is directly reflective of American political conservatism's skepticism toward government.

Political communication scholarship has been able to determine a great deal about who tunes in to listen to American conservative political talk radio. Males are more likely to use this particular political information source. In addition, Republicans are more likely to listen, as well as those who rate themselves higher in general political interest. Political talk radio listeners also have higher levels of education and income, and older Caucasians are more likely to tune in to this type of programming. Information seeking dominates the motivations for why people turn to political talk radio, more so than for entertainment or developing parasocial relationships with the radio personalities who drive the programs. This combination of studies provides a solid typology of the typical audience member who makes political talk radio one of the political information sources used to gain an understanding of the major issues and political personalities of the day.

Research has also provided a better understanding of how the use of this particular form of communication relates to the consumption of other political information outlets. The typical political talk radio listener does not obtain most of his or her public affairs information from political talk radio, but relatively little when compared to more traditional news outlets (e.g., newspapers). The political talk radio audience is fairly concentrated, with those who define themselves as listeners not treating this political information source as their primary political information outlet. This combination of findings points to the need to study political talk radio in combination with the use of other media forms.

Although the study of the political messages offered on political talk radio and who is tuning in to listen to these messages have been of interest to political communication scholarship, of greater concern have been the effects of this potentially powerful source for unapologetically ideologically biased political information. Political talk radio effects span the range of the hierarchy of effects, including analyses of audience awareness, knowledge (information and misinformation), attitudes, and behaviors.

A few examples of the effects found related to political talk radio listening include the ability of ideologically extreme political talk radio to influence attitudes toward specific public policy proposals, to reinforce preexisting attitudes toward politicians, as well as to aid in the establishment of audience understanding of political outcomes. In terms of a basic knowledge function, political talk radio listening positively predicts political knowledge, but listening to extreme levels of ideologically conservative political talk radio negatively predicts political knowledge and positively predicts political *mis*information. As for political participation, some research has found that listening to conservative political talk radio by moderate and conservative listeners over time produced higher levels of efficacy and a subsequent increase in political participation. The sum of empirical findings for the political talk radio influence point to the ability of this particular political communication information source to have substantive effects on basic democratic processes.

However, it is important that a distinction be made between general political talk radio and ideologically extreme political talk radio, in particular American conservative political talk radio. The effects of conservative political talk radio do not translate to general political talk radio and vice versa. Moderate political talk radio is reflective of a two-sided message flow of public affairs information, whereas conservative political talk radio is reflective of a one-sided message flow outlet. One-sided message flows have the ability to influence audience members in that the opposing side of any issue is not presented within the message, whereas a two-sided message flow tends to lead to a negating of any overall media influence due to the presenting of multiple, opposing viewpoints within a single message.

Finally, there are growing lines of political talk radio effects research relative to the study of emerging democracies. Researchers have considered the role of talk radio within Hong Kong and its democratization movement, and similar types of work can be found in the study of other nations as well, such as Hungary and Spain. It is important that these studies of political talk radio, conducted outside the context of America as a stable democracy, continue in order to gain a full appreciation of the influence of talk radio as a source for political information, political discourse, and social change.

R. Lance Holbert

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Talk Shows, Television

Politicians have a long history of appearing on television entertainment and talk programs. Baum notes Richard Nixon's piano playing appearance on *The Tonight Show* in 1960, and Schultz reminds us of the same candidate's turn on *Laugh-In* in 1968. Many voters undoubtedly recall an image of Bill Clinton playing the saxophone on the *Arsenio Hall Show.* Besides filling guest spots, politicians have long served as comedy fodder for talk show hosts. At one level, these types of programs may seem peripheral and unimportant to the political process. However, in recent presidential elections, candidate appearances on such shows seem to have become an almost institutionalized part of campaigns. Given research findings that late night shows can serve as important political information sources, especially for young people, the relationship between talk shows and politics has become a topic worthy of academic attention. Researchers are beginning to study the political content of television talk shows and the potential effects they have on the political process.

David Niven, S. Robert Lichter, and Daniel Amundson found late night comedy talk show political content to be fairly narrow in scope. Their examination of 13,301 jokes on late night shows between 1996 and 2000 revealed that the most frequent target of humor was the president or a candidate for the office. There was little attention given to the legislative or judicial branches of the federal government, as well as other levels of government (state or city). The number of politicians targeted was relatively small, and there was consistency in individual features that served as the basis for jokes. For example, in 1996 Bob Dole's age was a springboard for humor. In 1997 Clinton was targeted based on financial dealings, eating habits, and sexual issues. It is perhaps not surprising that the researchers found only 9.3% of the jokes to deal with issues involving public policy. The appearances of George W. Bush and Al Gore on late night shows had no subsequent effect on the content of the shows as it remained substantially the same after the candidate visits.

Given the unserious nature of such programs and their particular focus on personal characteristics, why do candidates appear on them? One answer may lie in the finding that in 2000 candidates got more time on late night shows speaking for themselves than they would have during an average month of evening news. Shrinking sound bites and time constraints, as well as

extensive editing in news formats help explain why this is true. Also, as a rule, candidates prefer communication contexts in which they exercise some control.

Another reason candidates may agree to talk show appearances is that they receive positive treatment. Matthew Baum found support for this idea in an examination of candidate appearances on daytime and late night television talk shows in 2000. His content analysis revealed that candidate interviews on what he called entertainment talk shows made fewer political references than were elicited by candidate appearances on traditional outlets such as the evening news and political talks show (i.e., *Meet the Press*). Entertainment talk shows avoided controversial issues and were more sympathetic to candidates than were traditional news outlets. Baum also discovered that entertainment shows did not focus on issues or candidate issue position comparisons as much as traditional outlets did. The different approach taken on entertainment based talk shows might also serve to make them an attractive communication option for candidates.

Along with examining content of talk shows, researchers have tried to explore the relationships between exposure to talk shows and viewers' political feelings, attitudes, and behaviors. Baum found that for "politically unaware individuals," traditional news exposure had less effect on perceptions of candidate likeability and vote choice than did exposure to daytime entertainment talk shows. Further, exposure to daytime talk shows for these politically unaware types resulted in their rating the opposition party candidate as more likeable. The opposition party candidate was also more likely to get votes from this same group. Baum did find that these positive assessments of the opposition diminished as political awareness increased.

It may be that the particular type of talk show viewed is a factor in the relationship between viewer and political characteristics. Late night comedy talk shows attract liberal, politically interested viewers, and there is a positive relationship between viewing such programs and campaign participation. Politically sophisticated viewers of late night comedy talk shows were more likely than less sophisticated viewers to get out and vote and also to engage in interpersonal discussions about politics. In contrast, although politically interested viewers were more likely to watch candidate appearances on the daytime show *Oprah,* viewing such appearances had no relationship to subsequent levels of interpersonal discussions of politics. As is the case in many areas of effects research, what may be happening is reinforcement rather than conversion.

Michael Pfau, Jaeho Cho, and Kirsten Chong found evidence that there may be variance in the way different communication forms affect candidate perceptions as opposed to perceptions of the democratic process. The researchers studied the relationship between 13 communications forms and citizen perceptions in the 2000 presidential campaign. In general they found that subjects' candidate perceptions were influenced more by less traditional media, including entertainment talk shows, whereas traditional media had the most impact on their feelings about the democratic process. Interesting specific findings showed that use of political talk radio was related to pro-Bush perceptions and higher likelihood of voting Republican. Use of entertainment-based television talk shows was related to pro-Gore perceptions and a higher likelihood of voting Democrat. It may be that with their emphasis on personality, television talk shows are more likely to influence candidate perceptions, whereas traditional media forms such as the evening news, with their more serious focus on the political process, would influence feelings concerning the democratic process.

Mike Chanslor

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TAMPA INCIDENT

In August 2001, the Norwegian cargo vessel *Tampa* made Australian political history when it picked up

438 mostly Afghan refugees from a sinking Indonesian people-smuggling vessel, the KM *Palapa 1,* in the Indian Ocean, but was refused permission to land them on the nearby Australian territory of Christmas Island. Australian Prime Minister John Howard exploited the incident politically to make radical changes to the country's territorial boundaries to increase his popularity in the months prior to an important election campaign. The *Tampa* incident was a major landmark in legitimizing Howard's increasingly populist approach to policy making, and of his use of the popular media to broadcast nationally a "tough" stance on asylum seekers to the segmented audiences of talk radio and commercial television.

The *Tampa*'s captain, Arne Rinnan, had assumed he would be allowed to off-load his human cargo on Christmas Island. However, when he was not given permission to land at any Australian port for 6 days, he refused to move his ship and a political stalemate ensued, culminating in the boarding of the vessel by the Australian military. Australia paid Pacific Island neighbors Papua New Guinea and Nauru to take the asylum seekers for detention and processing (the so-called Pacific solution), and New Zealand voluntarily accepted 150. Howard later introduced legislation permitting the exclusion of Christmas Island (and other external territories) from Australia's migration zone. As a bonus for Howard, people-smuggling between Indonesia and Christmas Island is no longer viable.

The *Tampa* episode provided Howard with a means of practicing what veteran Australian journalist Laurie Oakes has called "dog whistle politics." This involves communicating, usually via the populist media, support for a populist cause—in this case that of strengthening border protection from asylum seekers arriving by boat from the Middle East and Central Asia—to a receptive part of the electorate without need for justification. Populist tendencies in the media (expressed as the need to provide saleable news in order to make profits) often form a neat fit with populist policies. This was supported by the fact that most of the pro-government support was from influential talk radio and tabloid newspapers.

Howard's actions were designed especially to appeal to supporters of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party, who were believed to be taking votes from Howard's ruling conservative coalition. His actions, including labeling the opposition as "weak" for opposing his legislation, won over an unruly section of the electorate, increased his support in the opinion polls, and helped gain him a third term of office in November 2001.

Julianne Stewart

See also Hanson, Pauline

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TechnoDistortions

TechnoDistortions is a word that has been used to describe the distortions in audio and video messages caused by the use of various technologies to alter the messages. TechnoDistortions have been defined by Lynda Lee Kaid and other researchers as any use of technology that may give the viewer a false, distorted, deceptive, or misleading impression. The concept has primarily been applied to political advertising but could potentially be present in other types of political messages. TechnoDistortions were first used in television commercials during the 1952 presidential election. Television advertising has since become the dominant form of communication between the candidates and voters in the United States and many other countries.

Studies have shown that exposure to political spots affects voter knowledge levels, attitudes toward candidates, and voting behavior. However, with these potential effects come concerns about the ability of television spots to manipulate the images to which voters are exposed. Concerns have increased with advances in video and computer technology.

TechnoDistortions fall into five different categories. First, there are editing techniques which include rearranging video or audio, using audio or video out of its proper or original context, or the juxtaposition of two or more images or sounds to create a falsehood that

misleads the viewer. A second type of TechnoDistortion is the use of special effects such as animations, slow and fast motion video, inappropriate sound effects, or other specialized audio, video, or computerized techniques. Dramatizations are a third type of potential TechnoDistortion. Dramatizatons include staged action, often using performers. The famous "Daisy Girl" spot from 1964 is an example of a dramatization. A fourth possible type of TechnoDistortion is a computerized alteration that uses computer technologies to alter or create images or sound. For instance, morphing, color alterations, changing a person's features, or altering a real-life setting might fall into this category. The fifth and final category of TechnoDistortions is subliminal techniques, which are the integration of a message below the normal threshold of human recognition or awareness. Such distortions are rare in political ads; but some have been identified by researchers.

Political ads from political campaigns have been analyzed over long periods of time to determine how often TechnoDistortions occur in ads. Research initially concluded that about 15% of all political ads since 1952 have used one or more of these five types of TechnoDistortions to mislead voters. However, the growth in the use of computers and technology has greatly increased the presence of such techniques, and political campaigns in 1996, 2000, and 2004 had much higher rates of TechnoDistortions. TechnoDistortions are much more common in negative, or attack, advertising than in positive advertising.

An important question is whether or not the presence of such distortions influences how voters react to political spots and to the candidates who sponsor them. Unfortunately, research has shown that candidates who use such distortions are often successful in fooling voters and enhancing their support and the likelihood of voting for the sponsoring candidate. However, researchers have also found that making voters aware of the TechnoDistortions, increasing education about the distortions and how they are done, can reduce the negative impact on voters. Thus, voters with a higher level of visual literacy, who recognize and understand visual distortions, are less likely to be affected negatively by them.

University of Florida researchers have produced a DVD that explains and provides examples of the TechnoDistortions. The DVD contains examples of all five types of TechnoDistortions and includes a glossary of terms and expanded explanations of how to recognize TechnoDistortions. Called "TechnoDistortions in Political Advertising," the DVD provides an in-depth overview of the use of technological distortions in political commercials. The goal of this production is to educate voters about this ethically suspect practice and thus help reduce the effects of technological distortions on viewers. Through additional examples, this DVD tracks changes in the use of technological distortions in political ads from the 1950s. In addition, users can test their own knowledge of manipulation through technology in the TechnoDistortions Game.

Lynda Lee Kaid

See also Negative Advertising; Political Advertising

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Telecommunications Act of 1996

See Communications Act of 1934

Television and Politics

See Debates; Medium Theory; Political Advertising; Talk Shows, Television

Television in Politics

Television in Politics: Its Uses and Influence (1968) by Jay G. Blumler and Denis McQuail examines the role of television during the British parliamentary election campaign in 1962 when Sir Alec Douglas-Home ran as top candidate of the Conservatives and Harold Wilson for the Labour Party. At that time, the American communication researcher Jay Blumler and his British colleague Denis McQuail worked for the Granada Television Research Unit of the University of Leeds. Their 1964 study was explicitly understood as a follow-up to *Television and the Political Image* (1961), which was the result of a study conducted by McQuail and Joseph Trenaman during the previous election campaign in 1959. Both studies can be credited with having brought the mass media, and television in particular, back to the attention of (European) election research after their influence had been regarded as negligible in the wake of the book *The People's Choice,* published in 1949 by Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet.

By applying the uses and gratification approach, the 1964 study, however, went beyond its predecessor. The authors assumed that the amount of TV use would be less influential for persuasion effects than the motives underlying TV consumption and their varying intensity. Thus, Blumler and McQuail initiated the reorientation of European effects research, which was later called a change in paradigms. By taking the individual search for gratifications into account, the study complemented the traditional transfer model with a new perspective that attributed, to a certain extent, an active role to the recipient.

The study used a three-wave panel design with 768 respondents who were interviewed twice before and once after the election date. This survey was prepared by two exploratory surveys done in early 1964 to develop the questions finally used in the main panel. The interviews were made in two constituencies in the county of Yorkshire, which had also been the location of the Trenaman and McQuail study. Additionally, the 1959 panel participants were re-interviewed, thus allowing for the assessment of campaign effects as well as some long-term effects.

With the 1964 campaign, television became the most important medium for the campaign. In addition to Party Election Broadcasts (PEBs), electoral programs were broadcast. During the 1959 campaign, the regular political programs were taken off air, and the newscasts rarely dealt with the campaign to prevent any influence on the voters. Thus, in 1964, TV was no longer just a platform for politicians and parties and therefore changed its function for the campaign.

The authors describe the analytical steps and the results in detail. An extensive annex documents the data of the sample and the fieldwork, the questionnaires, index construction, as well as the findings of a theme analysis of the PEBs. All in all, the results indicated an influence of television, and of PEBs in particular, on attitudes and beliefs deemed relevant for the voting decision. Two motives, the search for vote guidance and reinforcement, proved to be relevant. These and other motives, such as campaign interest, often interacted with other variables (e.g., sociodemographic variables).

The fixation of agenda-setting research on its beginnings in North Carolina left forgotten that the 1964 election study in Great Britain, as well as its predecessor, had already looked at agenda-setting effects although the process was not yet named that way.

Christina Holtz-Bacha

See also Blumler, Jay G.; McQuail, Denis; *People's Choice, The;* Uses and Gratifications Approach

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Television Political Advertising

See Political Advertising

Terrorism and Media

The reporting of terrorism provides one of the biggest challenges for the mass media in democracies. *Terrorism* is defined as the use of violence in order to promote a political cause. The media have an obligation

Video grab taken from CNN showing Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Mutawakel, speaking late September 11, 2001, in Kabul following the series of terrorist strikes in New York and Washington. Afghanistan's ruling Taliban militia denied that Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden had played any role in a series of apparent terrorist attacks in the United States.

Source: AFP/Getty Images.

to report on politics as well as violent events, but reporting on terrorist acts does more than just broadcast news about explosions, airline hijacking, and other violence. This reporting also gives publicity to the terrorist organizations and their aims. As a result, reporting on terrorism presents the mass media with a difficult dilemma. News organizations must balance their role as information providers with their function as gatekeepers of civil society and social order. At the same time, failing to examine the complex social and political causes of terrorism makes it difficult to find ways to stop terrorists.

Media coverage of terrorism can have several different effects on media outlets, terrorist groups, and the general population. First, coverage of terrorist events can provide a huge source of sensational, visually compelling news. This helps media outlets in competition for ratings, revenue, and prestige. At the same time, it leaves journalists open to charges of providing extensive publicity for a terrorist campaign.

The media have a great deal of power in defining whether terrorists are simply criminals or have some sort of legitimate political grievance to justify their acts of violence. The tone as well as the level of sympathy for "terrorists" varies a great deal in different countries. For example, African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela was labelled a terrorist by the South African government at the same time he was called a freedom fighter by the international media for his campaign against the racist regime. Eventually this "terrorist" became the elected leader of the country.

As the media coverage of Mandela suggests, it is easier for those removed from the violence of political unrest to make dispassionate judgments about whether violence is justified for a political cause. For example, Christopher Hewitt found that Italian journalists were relatively uncritical of domestic terrorism until the violence of the attacks escalated. There was little interest in covering terrorism as an international phenomenon in the United States until the September 11, 2001, attacks. Since then, coverage of terrorism has increased markedly and remained on a high level although there have been no subsequent major terrorist attacks on the United States.

Although there is a relatively large amount of time devoted to possible terrorist plots in the U.S. media, there is little discussion about the broader political reasons for Islamic groups to target the United States. Studies of news broadcasts and magazines in the wake of September 11 found that U.S. journalists were uncritical of plans to attack foreign countries in the attempt to reduce terrorist threat. This suggests that although journalists are careful to avoid manipulation by terrorist groups, they are perhaps less questioning about government messages on counter-terrorism.

Northern Ireland: The British Media and Domestic Terrorism

Although the United States is relatively new to dealing with the aftermath of terrorist attacks on its population, the region of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom has a long history of a complex media-and-terrorist relationship. Terrorist acts have been used on both sides of a conflict between Irish-Catholic groups who want to break the region away from British rule and British

Protestants who passionately support the continued inclusion of Northern Ireland as a full part of the United Kingdom. This Irish–British conflict goes back for hundreds of years and, although most of Ireland gained independence in the 20th century, Northern Ireland remains under British control. Terrorist organizations, often with strong community support, were formed on both sides of the conflict. The result was decades of violence and fear. Most of the violence and murder was perpetuated against people in Northern Ireland, but there were assassinations and bombings carried out against English targets as well.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once accused the British media of giving terrorists in Northern Ireland the "oxygen of publicity" and allowing them to thrive. In the minds of many political leaders, if the media simply stopped reporting on terrorist events, terrorists would stop killing innocent people. After all, terrorists do claim that they perpetuate violence against innocent civilians only in order to make their political views heard. If there is no publicity surrounding the event, then there is theoretically no point to the terrorism. Yet, this creates the dilemma of a population that is not informed about important events in their community.

It is clear that the fear of terrorism was the single most powerful political force in Northern Ireland for decades. The British government tried several measures to limit media coverage of terrorism, including at one time a complete ban on allowing any person with a terrorist affiliation to speak on television. The tactics did not reduce the power of the terrorist groups. Eventually, the British officials tried an entirely new tactic with the media, a type of journalistic diplomacy. Certain journalists were encouraged to suggest ideas in print about possible reconciliation between the two entrenched enemies of Catholic loyalists and Protestant unionists.

Although the British government had sworn not to negotiate with terrorists, ideas for reconciliation were discussed by political leaders in newspaper columns. The deadlock was ended and eventually led to the peace process in the mid-1990s. Although the Northern Irish peace process is still problematic, the level of violence has decreased and dialogue has increased between the two sides of the conflict. It should be noted, however, that it was the choice of the politicians to use the newspapers rather than a pro-active move by journalists to lead the dialogue for reconciliation themselves. It is also hard to tell how much difference the change in newspaper coverage had in the overall peace process.

September 11, 2001: The U.S. News Media and International Terrorism

It would be difficult to think of a more stark contrast in terrorism from Northern Ireland to September 11. Whereas terrorism in Northern Ireland was an issue for decades, a single day in 2001 changed the relevance of terrorism for Americans. On September 11, 2001, terrorists allied with the Al-Qaeda fundamentalist Islamic group used passenger aircraft as bombs to destroy the World Trade Center in New York City and part of the Pentagon. The September 11 attacks, which left almost 3,000 people dead and many more injured, caused widespread panic and disruption. Although terrorist acts were not unprecedented in the United States, the scale and method of the September 11 attacks were particularly shocking for the American public. Just as the domestic security forces had no precedent for this type of attack, the news media also were faced with a completely new and alien situation.

Given the enormous interest generated by the story, all television stations with news coverage immediately switched to live, blanket coverage of the events. There was no existing template or "frame" for the story, as there are for other major events such as elections, natural disasters, or even riots. The media were faced with a number of enormous challenges on the day of September 11: how to simply get the facts in a timely manner in a chaotic situation in two major U.S. cities; how to get useful safety information to the populace; and how to reassure traumatized citizens. The U.S. media is generally competent at performing all three of these roles. To perform all of these roles simultaneously in an unprecedented situation was an enormous challenge. However, in one way it was clear that the media had learned from earlier terrorism coverage. The breaking television news did not rush to identify the terrorists as a particular group. In the 1995 bombing of an Oklahoma City federal building, early news reports attributed the attack to Islamic extremists. This led to hate crimes against Arab Americans, even though it quickly emerged that the bombers were American white supremacists.

Analysts have found that the additional time and attention to September 11 on the news did not lead to more meaningful political and historical context for the attack. Rather, the attacks followed a style similar

to that of crime reporting, a script that elevates the drama of the situation while suggesting a satisfying retribution by society. It was clear that Americans were receiving important emotional support and gratification from television in this time of crisis. However, the fact that the emotional content outweighed the informational content about September 11 did not necessarily serve the public's long-term interest or the ability of the news organizations to mediate the threat of terrorism.

The September 11 coverage did not analyze in depth why certain groups would resort to terrorist tactics against the United States or whether terrorists had a meaningful base of political support. Nor did the news coverage discuss what policy choices may have led to terrorist attacks or what policy choices could address the problem. Rather, the news discourse focused on finding who to blame and how much proof of this blame would be required before the United States could retaliate. Violent retaliation was never seriously debated. The September 11 coverage gave little information to help Americans to perceive "terrorists" to be as diverse as the causes, people, or nations they purport to represent. At the same time, the journalists echoed the twin themes of U.S. strength and the demonization of the "enemy," relying heavily for sources on government officials and politicians united in nationalistic outlook in the wake of the attacks.

Thus, research suggests that the U.S. media responded to the September 11 attacks using a model not unlike the "patriotic" approach to war coverage. There was a great deal of news from the scenes of the attack, with myriad stories of human tragedy. There was some discussion of the gaps in domestic security and surveillance that allowed the attacks to proceed. There was little attempt, however, to examine whether the September 11 attacks were a part of a broader political movement and a result of U.S. foreign policy. Rather, they were framed as the act of a group of extremists, who were aided and abetted by rogue regimes in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. On the one level, this reassured the American people that the "criminals" would be "punished." On the other hand, it left unanswered many questions about future insecurity in an uncertain world.

The coverage of September 11 also relates to the broader issue in coverage of foreign affairs by American media outlets. In general, there is a cycle of disinterest in foreign news, which can be confusing and alienating to U.S. news consumers. As a result, U.S. media outlets cover little foreign news and the audience remains uninformed. However, in a complex world with shifting alliances, this makes it difficult for readers and viewers to understand the causes (or possible solutions) to international conflict, including terrorism. As a result, the challenges for U.S. media outlets in covering terrorism cannot be considered separately from the general challenges of presenting complex international political issues to a U.S. audience that is often uninterested in foreign news.

The London Underground Bombings and the British Media

Britain faced another terrorist challenge when the London transport system was bombed by Islamic terrorists on July 7, 2005. Four young men who described themselves as devout Muslims detonated three bombs on underground trains and one on a bus during the morning rush hour. The explosions killed 26 people, including the four bombers, and hundreds were injured. The bombings led to widespread disruption in one of the world's largest cities. This was the deadliest act of terrorism in the United Kingdom since the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland that killed 270 people in 1988.

Commercial, public, and international stations immediately began covering the events. Roger Mosey, head of the public British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) television news, reported that 30 million people tuned into BBC news on the day of the bombings (more than half of the British population). Like their U.S. counterparts on September 11, television broadcasters suspended normal coverage to bring breaking news from London. In particular, the BBC struggled to make sure that the live video from the scene would not be unduly distressing or disturbing.

The major difference between the coverage of the July 2005 London bombings and that of September 11 was in the domestic focus. Whereas the U.S. September 11 coverage often focused on the surprise and shock of the event, the coverage of the London bombings put the event in a familiar context in a number of ways. First, London has considered itself a terrorist target for decades because of Northern Irish terrorism. In addition, there had been numerous threats to London—and particularly to the Underground—discussed particularly in the wake of September 11 and Britain's involvement in the second Gulf War. Issues surrounding the perceived cultural isolation of British Muslims had been discussed in the media. As part of the coverage,

the BBC and other media outlets examined the reasons behind the attack. Although a government report into the attacks eventually concluded there were no formal links with Al-Qaeda, it was clear that all four of the bombers had an interest in fundamentalist Islam.

For the British public and the British media, the July 2005 bombings brought up a set of issues separate from those of September 11. Although tragic (on a smaller scale), the bombings could be discussed and understood in a context familiar to the media audience. In discussions in British focus groups immediately after the bombings, most respondents claimed they were not surprised by the bombings, feeling that London was an inevitable target. Hence, although the public seemed resigned, the bombings did not significantly change their feeling of security or their perception of the world as September 11 may have done for much of the U.S. media audience.

Sarah Oates

See also Framing; Mandela, Nelson; Thatcher, Margaret; War Coverage

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Testimonials, Political

A testimonial, also referred to as an endorsement, is a statement for or against a product, service, candidate for office, or political idea. Such a statement is intended to influence others to follow the guidance of the individual(s) providing the testimonial. The use of testimonials is based on identification, association, and projection. Testimonials are often used as a persuasive technique in propaganda and political advertising.

Propagandists and advertisers often use testimonials because they believe that members of the audience will identify with, or want to be like, the individual(s) providing the statement(s) of support. Often, celebrities or well-known figures are used to provide testimonials. This is done to enhance the desire of audience members to accept the ideas being presented because they wish to be like, or identify with, celebrities. Association works in much the same way as identification, where audience members may be more likely to accept claims in a testimonial because they wish to be associated with the source, the ideas presented, or a group the source represents. Testimonials may also employ projection by using statements from ordinary people which allow members of the audience to recognize that people who are similar to them recommend a product or support a candidate.

Testimonials were one of the "seven common propaganda devices" identified by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) in its 1939 "A, B, C's of Propaganda Analysis." According to the IPA, testimonials involve an esteemed or despised person stating that an idea, program, product, or person is beneficial or harmful. The IPA noted that testimonials, like each of the other propaganda devices, could be used by dangerous propagandists to get people to accept ideas

without critically examining the claims being made. Fair propagandists would use testimonials to get people interested in a statement of support so they could examine it before accepting the idea. To judge the validity of a testimonial, the IPA said that we should determine who or what is quoted in the testimonial, why this person(s) should be regarded as an expert on the subject, and the value of the idea without the support of the testimonial. The IPA also noted that testimonials can be used unfairly by employing untrustworthy sources, distorting facts or opinions of trustworthy sources, and falsely attributing statements to a trustworthy source.

Since the early days of televised political advertising, testimonials have been used in campaigns. In the 1952 presidential campaign, Adlai E. Stevenson used an ad showing an average American woman expressing her support for the candidate. Eisenhower used several testimonials from average Americans in his 1956 campaign, including ads that featured average women, a man identified as a union member, and Lena Washington, an African American woman. Harry Belafonte was featured in a television ad endorsing John F. Kennedy during the 1960 campaign. In the 1964 campaign, actor Raymond Massey was featured in a television ad urging Americans to "Vote for a real American. Vote for Barry Goldwater. In your heart you know he's right." Ronald Reagan also appeared in a television ad endorsing Goldwater. Mamie Eisenhower made a testimonial television ad for Richard Nixon's reelection bid in 1972. Singer, actress, and activist Pearl Bailey appeared in a television ad endorsing Gerald Ford in his unsuccessful reelection campaign 1976. Former President Gerald Ford himself appeared in a testimonial ad for Ronald Reagan in 1980. John Kerry's 2004 campaign used a television ad with Kristen Breitweiser, whose husband had been killed in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, giving her endorsement to Kerry.

Larry Jene King

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Thatcher, Margaret (1925–)

Margaret Thatcher is considered by many to be one of the most influential women in politics. She gained a strong reputation in England and worldwide as the highest regarded politician in recent British history. She is the only female British prime minister and the longest-serving British prime minister in the 20th century.

Margaret Thatcher was born in Grantham, England, as Margaret Hilda Roberts. Her parents, Alfred and Beatrice Roberts, were small business owners. Thatcher studied chemistry and law at Somerville College, Oxford University, and graduated in 1947. While at Oxford University she was elected president of the student Conservative Association.

In 1950, while in her mid-20s, she ran as a Conservative candidate for a Labour Party parliamentary seat. She was not elected, but she did gain national attention for being the youngest female Conservative candidate ever. As she was starting to gain national attention pursuing her career, she also started her family. In 1951 she married Denis Thatcher and, in 1953, gave birth to a set of twins.

Unlike many women of that time, having a family did not stop her from continuing her career in politics. Margaret Thatcher entered Parliament in 1959 at age 34. In 1970 at age 44, she was appointed to the cabinet as education secretary. Shortly after her appointment she was forced to cut the education budget. One of the cuts she made abolished free milk for school children. That incident gave her a rather unflattering nickname: "Margaret Thatcher, Milk Snatcher." Thatcher gained another nickname on the night of January 19, 1976, when she gave a speech that attacked the Soviet Union; shortly afterward, she became known as the "Iron Lady." Thatcher appeared to like the name and, shortly after, it became part of her political image.

In 1979, after serving for 20 years in Parliament, Thatcher was elected British prime minister—the first and only female ever elected to this post. She continued to serve as prime minister for 11 years. Thatcher resigned as prime minister on November 28, 1990, after many in her cabinet expressed doubt that she could be elected for a fourth term, leaving her no choice but to resign.

During Thatcher's 11 years as prime minister, her leadership style was questioned often and by many. Thatcher's actions were considered controversial by most. Although Thatcher's leadership style is

controversial, her importance is not questioned. Critics along with supporters agree that the Thatcher years are historically important and have great value. During her time in the office, she helped grow the economy in the United Kingdom. She was a co-founder with U.S. President Ronald Reagan of a school of "conservative conviction politics."

Leaving the office of prime minister did not eliminate her influence. After her resignation, Thatcher continued to travel the world as a lecturer. She also wrote two best-selling books, *The Downing Street Years* (1993) and *The Path to Power* (1995).

Kalisa Lynn Hauschen

See also Conservative Party, Britain

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Third-Person Effect

Coined by W. Phillips Davison in 1983, the term *third-person effect* refers to people's tendency to perceive others (the "third" person) as more susceptible to media effects than themselves. This tendency is assumed to lead individuals to take action, for example, to support the regulation of media content that may have undesirable effects. The third-person effect thus consists of a perceptual component (usually called third-person perception) and a behavioral component. The third-person perception is typically seen as a self–other perceptual bias: People are prone to assume that something undesirable—for example, being influenced by media—applies to others rather than to themselves. This assumption may be right at the individual level. At the aggregate level, however, the assumption is logically inconsistent: The majority of people claim that the majority of people are more strongly affected by media than they themselves are.

Although empirical research on the third-person effect effectively started only in 1988, more than 80 published correlational and experimental studies and a meta-analysis have confirmed the robustness of the third-person perception since then. Researchers have documented the third-person perception regarding issues as diverse as political advertising, Internet pornography, and the Lewinsky affair. Moreover, evidence from different cultural contexts tentatively suggests that the third-person perception is a universal perceptual tendency although recent research has pointed out that a collectivist orientation typical of some Asian cultures may reduce third-person perceptions. Finally, studies have shown that the third-person perception is insensitive to methodological influences such as question order.

To study the factors that affect the emergence and strength of third-person perception, researchers have focused essentially on three domains: the features of the media message and its effects, the characteristics of the self, and the (perceived) characteristics of the others. In terms of the features of the media message, persuasive, incredible, and biased media content with a negative valence has been found to generally increase third-person perceptions. Incredible sources and persuasive or biased media genres—for example, political advertisements—also boost third-person perceptions. An important role for the emergence of third-person perceptions is played by the social desirability of the media effects in question: If media effects are socially undesirable, third-person perceptions occur. However, the reverse third-person perception—people perceive themselves as more strongly influenced than others—only erratically emerged when media effects were socially desirable.

Regarding the characteristics of the self that influence third-person perception, research has shown that self-perceived knowledge about an issue, the belief that one is better educated than others, and greater self-esteem augment third-person perceptions. Further, people's involvement in (emotionalized political) issues has generally increased the size of third-person perceptions. People's gender, age, and media exposure are usually unrelated to third-person perceptions.

In terms of the (perceived) characteristics of others, early research consistently showed that third-person perceptions increase as the others become socially more distant. For example, the third-person perception is bigger for "the public at large" than for "friends." Recent studies, however, have challenged the so-called social distance corollary. Various studies have shown that people draw on relevant social knowledge, including stereotypes and schemas about out-groups, when they assess media effects on others. For example, the perceived exposure of others to particular media

content has been shown to be a better predictor of the size of third-person perception than has social distance. Moreover, stronger effects for groups of remote others have been found to result from larger group sizes in addition to social distance. Finally, others' perceived predispositions toward accepting or imitating media messages, the relevance of media messages for others, and negative stereotypes about out-groups have appeared as promising explanations of third-person perceptions.

The behavioral component of the third-person effects has received somewhat less research attention than has the perceptual component. Studies have established evidence that third-person perceptions increase the support for external regulation of entertainment or advertisement content. However, third-person perceptions do not affect whether people support control over news. There is growing evidence that third-person perceptions also influence domains other than people's support for regulation of media content. For example, third-person perceptions may reduce people's intention to prepare for potentially dangerous events, may decrease adolescents' use of condoms, and may boost individuals' willingness to resort to violent protest.

Researchers have used various theoretical frameworks to study the third-person effect, for example, attribution theory, social comparison theory, social identity theory, and the optimistic bias concept. These frameworks typically emphasize either motivational or cognitive explanations of the third-person effect. Motivational approaches consider the third-person effect essentially a form of self-enhancement, that is, the tendency of individuals to see themselves in a light as positive as possible, even if this entails an adjustment of reality. Cognitive approaches see the third-person effect as a result of information processing. Limitations in how we perceive, process, store, and retrieve information may lead to perceptual biases such as the third-person effect. Both motivational and cognitive approaches are useful for explaining particular aspects of the third-person effect. However, it is unclear whether and how the two approaches can be combined to come to a more encompassing explanation of the third-person effect.

The significance of the third-person effect for mass communication research in general and political communication in particular lies in its focus on the implications of perceived, instead of actual, media effects. In less than 20 years of empirical research, our knowledge of the phenomenon and its underlying processes has advanced greatly. However, our understanding of the range and intensity of the behavioral consequences of the third-person perception is still limited. Moreover, research is silent about which theoretical approaches to the third-person effect are most appropriate to explain the phenomenon. It is these two lines of inquiry that need the particular attention of future research.

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Thomas, Clarence

See Hill–Thomas Hearings

Ticket Splitting

Ticket splitting is a term that is used to describe voting for different parties when voters are provided with the opportunity to cast more than one vote at a time. By contrast, voters who vote for only one party are said to cast a straight-ticket. This definition applies to voting behavior in various institutional settings. Voters can cast split tickets when they are asked to elect different offices. Voting for a Republican candidate in an American presidential election while voting for a Democrat in the House contest is a case in point. Citizens can also cast split tickets when voting for only one institution. For example, in German federal parliamentary elections voters are asked to cast two votes that they are allowed to cast for different parties. For a long time, intra-institutional ticket splitting was unique to Germany. Yet, in recent years, a considerable number of countries, including Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the Ukraine, adopted two-vote systems for elections to legislative assemblies.

Depending on the institutional setting, ticket splitting has considerable political consequences. As regards intra-institutional ticket splitting, split tickets can influence the partisan composition of parliament and thereby turn the partisan balance. Inter-institutional ticket splitting can cause divided partisan control over institutions. If many Americans, for instance, vote for the Republican candidate in the presidential election while casting their House votes for Democratic candidates, a Republican president and a predominantly Democratic House could result. As far as these institutions jointly decide about policy-making, this pattern of divided government requires different parties to compromise about policies. Thus, divided government can render a system of checks and balances to be more effective, but it can also cause gridlock.

Regardless of the institutional setting, only a minority of voters engage in ticket splitting. In the United States, the extent of ticket splitting between presidential and congressional votes increased from roughly 10% in 1952 to about 30% in 1972, but it then declined again to about 15% in 2004. Intra-institutional ticket splitting is also not common. In New Zealand, for instance, the share of split tickets dropped from about 39% in 1996 and 2002 to about 29% in 2005, although in Germany, ticket splitting in federal elections rose from roughly 5% in the late 1950s to almost 25% in 2005.

A large and rapidly growing amount of literature has proposed various explanations for ticket splitting. A traditional account considers voters to cast split tickets because they prefer (candidates of) different parties when it comes to casting more than one vote. This model of sincere or affective ticket splitting appears in various guises. Scholars argue that a lack of strong partisan attachments increases the likelihood of casting split tickets as political independents are more likely to prefer (candidates of) different parties. Divided partisan preferences may be fueled by lopsided campaigns. For instance, to explain ticket splitting between presidential and congressional candidates in the United States, scholars rely on congressional incumbents' advantage in resources and visibility that allows them to secure reelection, irrespective of partisan ebbs and flows at the presidential level. Alternatively, divided partisan preferences may result from voters relying on different criteria when deciding whom to vote for. For instance, Jacobson argues that Americans suppose presidents to provide national goods like peace and prosperity, whereas they expect members of Congress to concentrate on providing benefits for their districts. Likewise, under the German two-vote system, a voter may refer to national policies when deciding for which party to cast his or her party vote while judging local candidates in terms of personal appeal.

A more recent line of reasoning claims that ticket splitting is a result of voters engaging in strategic decision making rather than in expressing their preferences sincerely. In the United States, so the argument goes, ticket splitters deliberately cast split tickets to obtain divided government so that policies will result from parties compromising about moderate policies. Thus, in this account, divided government is not an unintended by-product of ticket splitting but is deliberately chosen by strategically balancing voters.

As regards intra-institutional ticket splitting, the strategic voter account is somewhat different. It builds on the notion of strategic voting implying that voters do not vote for their most preferred party or candidate because they consider it not viable. Instead, they vote for the party they prefer among those parties they consider viable. Thus, strategic ticket splitting occurs when a party is viable with regard to one vote as it is not viable with regard to the other vote. In Germany and New Zealand, for instance, one vote is cast under plurality rule and the other one under proportional representation so that small party supporters may vote for their party in the latter contest but for the major party they prefer most in the former one. Scholars propose even more sophisticated calculations to exploit institutional incentives resulting in ticket splitting.

Scholars have put forth convincing evidence supportive of the notion that voters express multiple preferences and the lack of strong partisan attachments when they split their votes. As regards the strategic splitting approach, in spite of indications that some voters engage in strategic ticket splitting, the evidence is not encouraging. Some scholars even contend that ticket splitting may sometimes result from voter confusion rather than from sophisticated strategic reasoning. As mixed-electoral systems which allow voters to engage in intra-institutional ticket splitting are quite complicated, some voters are ill-informed about the working of the electoral rules. Thus, they may split their tickets in a rather unreasonable way. A case in point is a German voter who casts a party vote for the party of his or her most preferred local candidate while voting for his or her most preferred federal

party with the local candidate vote. As a result, though mixed electoral systems clearly provide incentives to cast split tickets, strategically this appears not to be the prevailing way voters split their tickets.

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See also Party Identification; Voter Behavior

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Tripp, Linda

See Lewinsky, Monica

Trippi, Joe (1956–)

Joe Trippi is an American political consultant who worked on political campaigns for prominent members of the Democratic Party, such as Edward Kennedy, Walter Mondale, Gary Hart, and Dick Gephardt. In 2003–2004, Trippi served as campaign manager for Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean and ran a campaign which is now a textbook example of successful online grassroots activism.

Trippi described his pioneering work for Howard Dean in his book *The Revolution Will Not Be Televised: Democracy, the Internet, and the Overthrow of Everything* (2004). One of the most important innovations to political campaigning was the creation of the first ever campaign Web log, initially named *Call to Action* and later changed to *Blog for America.* Trippi used the blog as a way to appeal to supporters directly for fundraising. Trippi also pioneered the use of social networking Web sites such as MeetUp.com to organize and connect supporters. When the MeetUp site became insufficient for the huge number of people who signed up to support Dean, Trippi ordered the development of special software which supporters could download for free, personalize, connect to other Dean supporters in their area, and campaign on behalf of the candidate. Through blogging and social networking, he built a huge online community of political activists and managed to break all previous fundraising records in the history of U.S. primaries by collecting 50 million dollars for Dean. Trippi explained that his vision was to decentralize the way political campaigns are run and to involve voters into the political dialogue, rather than relying on a small number of big donors.

Trippi also pioneered online television for a political candidate, setting up a Web site called DeanTv.com, which played videos of candidate speeches and clips from the campaign trail.

These strategies and tools for online campaigning developed by Trippi for Dean in 2004 transformed political campaigning in the United States and have been widely adopted by political candidates ever since. Trippi's campaign for Dean is also credited for revitalizing engagement in the political process and stimulating grassroots support for political candidates.

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See also Blogs, Blogging; Dean, Howard; World Wide Web, Political Uses

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Triumph of the Will

See Film and Politics

Turnout, Voter

See Center for the Study of the American Electorate

Two-Step Flow Model of Communication

The two-step flow model of communication is a theory of limited media effects formulated in 1948 by Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet in the book *The People's Choice,* after research into voters' decision-making processes during the 1940 U.S. presidential election. The two-step flow model of communication stipulates that mass media content first reaches "opinion leaders," people who are active media users and who collect, interpret, and diffuse the meaning of media messages to less active media consumers. According to the authors, opinion leaders pick up information from the media, and this information then gets passed on to less active members of the public. This implies that most people receive information from opinion leaders through interpersonal communication rather than directly from mass media, as previously assumed by other theories of mass communication. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet discovered that most voters in the 1940 election got their information about the candidates from other people who read about the campaign in the newspapers, and not directly from the media. These more informed people became "opinion leaders" who filtered mass media content and passed it on to other people, together with their own interpretation. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet concluded that word-of-mouth transmission of information plays an important role in the communication process in our society, and mass media have only a limited influence on most individuals.

The theory of the two-step flow of communication reversed the dominant paradigm in mass communication at the time. Before Lazarsfeld's study, it was assumed that mass media have a direct influence on a mass audience who consumed and absorbed media messages. Media were thought to significantly influence people's decisions and behaviors. However, the research done by Lazarsfeld et al. showed that only about 5% of people changed their voting preference as a result of media consumption and that interpersonal discussions of political issues were more prevalent than consumption of political news within one typical day. Factors such as interpersonal communication with family members, friends, and members of one's social and professional circles turned out to be better predictors of a person's voting behavior than that person's media exposure. These findings came to be known as the "limited effects paradigm" of media influence, explicated more fully by Joseph Klapper in *The Effects of Mass Communication* (1960), which guided mass communication researchers over the next 5 decades.

The theory of the two-step flow of mass communication was further developed by Lazarsfeld together with Elihu Katz in the book *Personal Influence* (1955). This book explains that people's reactions to media messages are mediated by interpersonal communication with members of their social environment. A person's membership in different social groups (family, friends, professional and religious associations, etc.) has more influence on that person's decision-making processes and behavior than does information from mass media. Researchers of mass communication cannot therefore conceive the public as a homogenous mass audience that actively processes and responds to media messages uniformly, as postulated by initial theories of mass communication such as the hypodermic needle model, which assumed that audiences responded to media messages directly as if the message had been injected into them.

Since its formulation, the theory of the two-step flow of communication has been tested, and validated, on numerous occasions through replicative studies that looked at how innovations were diffused into society through opinion leaders and trendsetters. However, the theory came under some criticism in the 1970s and the 1980s. Some researchers argued that the process of a two-step flow is an oversimplification and that the actual flow of information from mass media to media consumers has more than two steps. For instance, additional research revealed that conversations based on media content are more frequent among opinion leaders themselves rather than among opinion leaders and less informed individuals. This creates the extra step of opinion sharing among equally informed individuals, compared to only a vertical flow of information from opinion leaders to followers. Another criticism is the fact that the two-step flow model was formulated during a time when television did not exist. Both original studies relied on people's responses to newspapers and radio broadcasts and concluded that interpersonal communication is more frequent than media consumption during an average day. Later studies of everyday behavior in the era of television dominance seem to indicate the opposite. It was also found that only a small percentage of people discuss information they have learned

from mass media with their peers. National surveys regarding people's main sources of information also indicate that people rely much more on mass media rather than on personal communication.

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Underground Media

Underground media is synonymous with underground press and underground journalism. All these terms refer to the ideologically liberal journalism during the 1960s and 1970s that revolted against the journalistic norms of objectivity and appeared in the form of independently owned, published, and distributed print media. The first underground newspaper is considered to be the *Los Angeles Free Press,* founded in 1964. Some examples of underground media are the *Berkeley Barb,* San Francisco's *Oracle,* Chicago's *Seed,* the *East Village Other,* and New York's *Rat Subterranean News.* The Underground Press Syndicate was created in 1967 so underground newspapers could freely share information and news. Most college towns and large cities had an underground newspaper by 1969.

Underground journalists did not believe that a reporter could escape personal biases to report a factual news story. Underground stories did not feature divergent views and investigate opposing beliefs; rather, underground stories included the reporter's own passionate opinions. Although underground media were not mainstream news outlets and offended many different segments of America, the underground press can be credited with covering important stories that the traditional news media did not pick up for months or years. For example, the Kerner Commission faulted the 1967 Newark and Detroit riots to institutionalized white racism and the traditional media's negligence in failing to report on racism. Additionally, stories about Agent Orange made underground media headlines long before mass media picked up the stories.

Underground media was not a long-lived experiment in journalism. Most underground newspapers had disappeared by the mid-1970s. However, the investigative drive that the underground media possessed drifted into the mainstream as the underground newspapers faded away. Popular underground media beats that the traditional media eventually incorporated into its regular coverage included environmental pollution, music, civil and women's rights, and drugs.

There are still magazines and online news outlets that can be described as being in the spirit of underground media. *Utne Reader* is just one of many alternative magazines that focus on stories that the mainstream press does not cover. CommonDreams.org, AlterNet.org, and IndyMedia.org are some of the online news resources for people interested in alternative news. Even on the political right, ideological conservatives have their own news magazines and online news outlets that cater to the news stories conservatives think are not getting covered by the mainstream media. The underground media had an impact on both mainstream news organizations and also today's alternative press.

Kristen D. Landreville

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UNESCO Media Policy

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) media policy is the whole of its collective binding decisions, which the multilateral United Nations agency takes in order to change the frame for public communication. Media policy, which is part of UNESCO's communication policy, sets standards, laws, and rules and, thus, narrows or extends the playground of stakeholders and participants in mass communication. Traditionally analyzed in the national context, the discovery of the global dimension of media policy is quite a recent phenomenon, although communication and exchange over long distances is an old historical fact. International policy, therefore, referred to the policy between nation-states rather than to a global media policy. A new comprehension developed only after the two great catastrophes of the 20th century, World War I and World War II. Together, nation-states erected world institutions such as the Völkerbund (1919). But only after the end of World War II did the erection of the United Nations (1945), with its comprehensive structure of special organizations, lead to institutional conditions for global media policy. UNESCO is the global forum for international communication and media policy.

"Since the wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed." This poetic first sentence of the UNESCO Constitution explains why, from its very beginning, the UN Special Organization for Culture has been concerned with communication policy. The principle of the free flow of ideas in word and images, one of the very basic values of Western democracies, in order to enable freedom of expression, has therefore been enshrined in Article 1 of the Constitution of this specialized UN agency. Today, UNESCO functions as a laboratory of ideas and a standard-setter to forge universal agreements on emerging ethical issues among its 191 member states and six associate members. It does so by adopting recommendations, declarations (so-called soft law), and conventions. As international treaties, conventions have to be signed and ratified by member states. Also, 30 ratification documents must be handed over before a convention becomes part of international law.

History

Communication has been central to the thinking of UNESCO from the start, but this question has taken on markedly different meanings depending on the period concerned. There seem to be few points in common between the postwar period of trying to improve the distribution of books and the readership of newspapers and UNESCO's program today, which aims at shaping new norms for the construction of knowledge societies in the age of Internet, global computerization, and digital contents. Yet the basic idea, the defense of peace, has remained the same, although the tools have changed. But what has changed even more is the composition of the membership of the organization in the very first decades of its existence. Founded by 20 states, which signed the constitution on November 4, 1946, the agency consisted of 140 member states in the mid-1970s, mostly developing countries, due to the worldwide process of decolonization. These states, the so-called third world, together with the socialist bloc, questioned the state of play concerning the "cultural contract" in the world, pointed out the "one-way flow" of information from North to South, analyzed the structures and means of communication in the hands of a few Western countries, and—recognizing the importance of cultural perception for the developing of their own countries—asked for a New World Information and Communication Order. In the mid-1980s the United States, Great Britain, and Singapore left the organization.

Media Policy

In 1989, UNESCO changed its strategy in international media policy. The iron curtain tore, and the Berlin Wall and Communism fell. As the world left behind the era of the cold war, UNESCO parted with the concept of a new order. It was increasingly realized that the impediments to what is called the free flow of ideas and the interchange of cultures are not only political ones but also economic ones. Yet the imbalances in the international media landscape could not be overcome by directing or restricting information flows. New media landscapes should come into existence by freedom, recognition of cultural differences, and through international solidarity. This was not only the conviction of Federico Mayor, since 1987 the general director, it was widely shared by the member states. The 25th General Conference ultimately led to the new

program Communication in the Service of Man. As modern communication technologies such as satellites and new media enabled a world without frontiers, the newly designed UNESCO program sector comprised communication, information, and informatics. The former vice president of Russia's broadcasting system, Henrikas Yushkiavitshus, holder of the renowned American Emmy Award, became its director (1990). Again, UNESCO supports the development of a free, independent, and pluralistic media landscape throughout the world. For this aim, the organization works closely together with the United Nations and its development program, United Nations Development Programme, as well as international nongovernmental organizations and their networks in the field of journalism, print and electronic media, news agencies, libraries, archives, press freedom, and human rights. The Declaration of Windhoek, Namibia (1991) endorsing the importance of a free and independent press, followed by such declarations in all regions of the world, demonstrated the successful involvement of civil society in the organization's media policy. Core programs of UNESCO's reform became the International Program for the Development of Communication, adopted in 1980, and the 2001 program Information for All. Yet, as media aid was not a political priority in the Western world, UNESCO was confronted with growing unrest. Even Western diplomats commented on the inability of UNESCO's instruments to tackle the undeniable structural problems. On a global scale first analyzed by the so-called McBride Report (1980), the structural problems grew with rapidity at the beginning of the digital age.

The New Concept

Information and knowledge are core aspects of business in the postindustrial world. Worldwide, states are increasingly unable to handle on their own the internal and cross-border flow of ideas, images, and resources that affect societal development. Notwithstanding its basic democratic function, international competition increasingly frames media and media policy in the context of economics. In its extension of market principles, and by highlighting the culture of economically powerful nations, globalization has created new forms of inequality, thereby fostering cultural conflict rather than cultural pluralism. As all developments create their reverse, new impulses for the global debate came from the cultural sector. The 1995 report *Our Creative Diversity*, published by the World Commission on Culture and Development chaired by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, marked a shift from development to diversity. The title of the report is a clear reflection of this shift. It is no accident that the report was published in the very same year the member states of the World Trade Organization signed the General Agreement on Trade in Services Treaty, which recognizes media as products with the consequence that instruments of cultural policy are to be deemed superfluous in the context of continuing market deregulation. But media goods and services are always both economic as well as cultural assets. They are "vehicles of values." As such they should not be treated like other commodities. This was the strong statement of the World Culture Conference in Stockholm 1998. States were asked to design national cultural policies in order to create pluralism and do so in full respect of individual freedom. In 2001, UNESCO's General Conference adopted the Declaration on Cultural Diversity, followed in 2005 by the adoption with an overwhelming majority of the International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural Expressions. By becoming part of international law in 2007, nation-states were allowed to develop their media policies by using their cultural tool kits in order to create and develop media pluralism without running the risk of being accused of having violated international trade law.

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Unions, Political Activity

Unions are associations of wage earners who work together to maintain and improve the economic, social, and political conditions that affect them. Unions offer a collective voice on jobs, on government, on candidates, on political issues, and on community and global economy. The National Relations Act of 1935 gave most U.S. workers the right to join or to form unions. Union membership is voluntary, and most people join unions for the collective bargaining power they provide. In fact, it is estimated that union members earn on average 28% more than their non-union counterparts.

In the United States, over 16.1 million individuals are members of labor unions. Although there are numerous large union groups (United Steelworkers of America, the United Auto Workers, the Teamsters Union, and so on), over 9 million individuals are affiliated nationally with the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), which represents 53 affiliate unions. Although often associated with representation for industrial workers, modern unions are comprised of all types of individuals. In fact, the greatest growth has recently occurred in the service and public sectors. There are unions for manufacturing, construction, teaching, technical, and medical employees. Although the majority of union members traditionally have been white males, unions are seeing their highest membership growth among female members, workers of color, and immigrant workers.

Objectives vary by union but may include providing benefits to workers (health care, etc.), collective bargaining (wage negotiations, etc.), industrial actions (strikes, lockouts, etc.), and political activity (favorable legislation, campaign communication, lobbying, financial support, etc.). Through political involvement, unions work to secure social and economic justices. Unions provide a stronger political voice to members by engaging in political activity in several major ways.

First, unions endorse political candidates. Although dwarfed by business interests, union endorsements and contributions still mean large donations. Endorsements have been known to shape election races. Indeed, candidates who are seeking endorsement may be influenced to support the issues that are of importance to the unions. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, unions are among the most generous contributors to political campaigns. In recent election cycles, labor unions have spent over $120 million on federal political activity. By pooling resources, unions engage in lobbying and in political activity aimed at securing the interests of their membership. In the past, unions have been criticized for promoting favorable legislature by supporting political "friends" and punishing political "foes" through both campaign financing and votes. Although "friends" may be of any political party affiliation, findings from the Center for Responsive Politics indicate that unions have traditionally contributed far more to Democrats than to Republican or Independent candidates. A sponsored candidate does not have to vote for all bills endorsed by the union as contributions are made in good faith. However, to be considered "friendly" a candidate usually votes in support of most legislation that is favorable to the union. In recent years, unions also have been criticized for using membership dues to help fund political campaigns. Following recent legislation, this practice is no longer acceptable. Currently, most unions accept voluntary donations from members to support political activities.

Second, unions communicate with members about the status of legislation and the political stances of candidates that affect their working conditions, industry issues, or funding for services or products they provide. Their mission is often to give voice to legislative professional, economic, and social aspirations; to strengthen the work environment; to improve the quality of products or services provided; and to bring members together. In many cases, unions are involved in politics because members' working lives are impacted by decisions made in the political realm. Indeed, working conditions are a matter of public policy. Thus, it is not only the members' right but also their responsibility to engage in politics. Although unions do not tell members whom to vote for, they do communicate with members about the issues and the stances of political candidates that they feel will be in the best interest of union members. In addition to providing campaign literature, many unions also mobilize campaign workers and organize voting drives. This helps encourage member participation in the political process. Indeed, the strength of unions often can be seen at the ballot box.

Finally, unions communicate with the public about the status of legislature and the candidates' political

stances that affect the union. Unions communicate with the public through community forums. They distribute campaign literature by hand and through direct mail in support of candidates or particular issues. They purchase commercial airtime on television and radio or buy space in newspapers and magazines to run political advertisements. Some argue that the political activity of unions resembles that of modern political parties.

Lori Melton McKinnon

See also Political Action Committees (PACs)

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United States Information Agency

The United States Information Agency (USIA), best known for the Voice of America (VOA) and the Fulbright Fellowships, was a U.S. foreign affairs agency from 1953 to 1999. It was established by President Eisenhower to explain U.S. foreign policy and promote national interests abroad through a program of public diplomacy. USIA supporters assert that its public diplomacy programs made a crucial contribution to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc by promoting the values of freedom and democracy. Detractors counter that the agency did no such thing and, in fact, mirrored its Soviet counterpart in the use of propaganda and selective truths.

The USIA's mission was continuously redefined by the changing international political environment, with priorities determined by an array of policy makers and leaps in new technology. When the Cold War era ended, advocates for merging the USIA into the State Department argued that its mission ended with the Cold War. The emergence and commercial success of the global news networks such as Cable News Network also made USIA's traditional broadcasting operation appear to be obsolete.

Advocates for an independent USIA refuted having any propagandistic function, asserting its sole mission to be the distribution of information. Thus, after the Cold War era, the USIA sought to continue its mission through cultural and educational exchange programs for journalists, scholars, and public officials. It also actively engaged in civic educational programs aimed at helping nations learn how to conduct elections, run markets, attract investment, and protect ethnic and political minorities. This was to be accomplished through radio broadcasts and libraries, as well as educational and cultural exchanges. When Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) was pushing the Clinton administration to fold the USIA into the State Department, there was considerable opposition to the idea of merging public diplomacy with traditional diplomacy. Critics argued that traditional diplomats tend to put their values into negotiation, compromise, and even secrecy, an art known as quiet diplomacy. Public diplomacy, they argued, requires openness, both to reach foreign audiences and to keep in touch with journalists, intellectuals, students, and cultural organizations. Whereas traditional diplomacy seeks to communicate with the public as little as possible, public diplomacy was said to dig into a country's grassroots. Despite their stern defense, the USIA experienced first budget cuts and then finally complete merging of the slimmed organization into the State Department in October 1999 by the Foreign Affairs and Restructuring Act. Its public diplomatic functions were taken over by the State Department and its broadcasting technologies were combined with the International Broadcasting Bureau, providing the administrative and engineering support for U.S. government-funded non-military international broadcast services. Their functions include the Voice of America, Radio Sawa, and Radio and TV Martí (Office of Cuba Broadcasting). They also provide engineering and program support to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Radio Free Asia. Though nearly entirely forgotten by the American public, the USIA has received renewed attention in the post-9/11 world. John Hughes, associate director of the USIA during the Reagan administration, contends that the USIA needed to be reconstituted as a means of countering the distorted messages from Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda leaders over Al Jazeera and other media outlets in the Arab world.

Others, however, argue that the entire effort of public diplomacy is inherently flawed, resting as it does on the notion that it is misunderstanding that causes disagreement with the United States.

Joon Soo Lim

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Unseeing Eye, The

In 1976, Syracuse political scientists Thomas Patterson and Robert D. McClure published *The Unseeing Eye: The Myth of Television Power in National Elections,* detailing the controversial and groundbreaking results of one of the first rigorous and systematic studies of television's impacts on the outcomes of an election. This National Science Foundation funded analysis employed a four-wave panel study with interviews of over 600 subjects, as well as content analysis of news and political ads aired by both major parties in the 1972 presidential campaign.

The authors contend that their findings negate the conventional wisdom that political commercials are devoid of political issue information, whereas broadcast news coverage provides a panacea of campaign issue coverage. Conversely, Patterson and McClure reported that political ads actually taught viewers more information about candidates and political parties and their stances than did televised news coverage. Ads, they hypothesized, impart issue knowledge well due to their simple messages and heavy use of repetition. Campaigns' assumed power to manipulate voters' minds is also refuted by the study's findings.

The authors also discovered that television news was no more informative or persuasive than newspaper coverage of the campaign. With these conclusions, the authors criticized television network news for its failure to inform the public rather than simply cover the "horse race" elements of the campaign, hence laying much of the blame for political malaise on television news coverage of campaigns. One of the most telling statistics reported is that the script of a full 30-minute news broadcast could fit on a single newspaper page.

This text is a part of the third generation of mass communication study, the first being that scholarship which attempted to find powerful effects in the media; and the second, after failing to find powerful effects, assuming the media's effects to be minimal. The book marks a return to the belief that the media can impact viewers, tempered with the knowledge that the media's effects are variable-dependent and generally gradual and incremental rather than party-changing, election-winning entities.

The Unseeing Eye was named by the American Association for Public Opinion Research as one of the 50 most influential books on public opinion. Media scholars and practitioners alike acclaim the significance of Patterson and McClure's contribution to the landscape of political scholarship. Warren Weaver, Jr., then a *New York Times* reporter, in the book's foreword, predicted that the book would be an eye-opener for broadcasters, political party strategists, and political scientists. Even the book's critics, despite warning readers of possible overstated conclusions, acclaimed the book as a watershed event for the study of political communication.

Karla Hunter

See also Limited Effects Theory; Political Advertising; *Television in Politics*

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Uses and Gratifications Approach

This topic presents some difficulties, in that there is no clear or agreed definition to be offered. In general terms, the uses and gratifications approach refers to a media research orientation, in which priority is given to the perspective of the receiving audience, with

particular reference to self-perceived motives or reasons for using (attending to) mass media and the satisfactions (or gratifications) they believe that media (both the process of use and the particular content) provide. Information of this kind is believed to shed light on the dynamics of audience formation, explaining variations in attention and appreciation. It is also a potential predictor of certain kinds and degree of effect, on the assumption that the consequences of media use or content received will depend, to some degree, on the motivations of the audience. Audience motivations are, in turn, expected to vary according to social circumstances and individual differences.

The approach has a significant place in the history of political communication research as well as in the field of communication generally. The origins lie in an early stage in the form of studies that were carried out during the 1950s and 1960s in the United States. These studies were characterized by a strong focus on the subjective experience of the audience, on recounting and making sense of "media use" from this perspective. The underlying issue was expressed by Elihu Katz as a need to focus less on what the *media do to people* and more on what people *do with their media.* Early studies were mainly concerned with children's general media use and with certain entertainment genres (especially with radio soap operas aimed at women audiences), although the significance of newspaper reading was also assessed.

Compared to the predominant focus on persuasion, propaganda, and mass information at the time, this was little more than a byway of the communication research field. It became more central during the 1960s, for a number of reasons, but primarily because of dissatisfaction with the apparent sterility of mainstream research into persuasive effects. The basic model for effect research derived from a view of mass communication as one-directional and noninteractive, governed by the motives of the source and sender and with a high potential to directly impart information and opinions, following a stimulus-response logic, even against the apparent interests of the receiver. The adoption of this "propaganda" model had typically failed to produce much evidence of significant effects from the media (still presumed to be powerful) or to explain patterns of media use behavior. The indisputable public appeal of all forms of mass media, with such little evidence of effect, was increasingly seen as a conundrum requiring systematic inquiry and especially attention to the driving forces underlying media use.

Another support for the adoption of this approach was the then contemporary appeal of "functionalism," a theoretical school that sought to explain recurrent social phenomena (such as media use) in terms of their consequences for the society, mediated by individual perceptions and motivations. Charles Wright, following Harold Lasswell and Robert Merton, named the main societal functions of media as "surveillance," "correlation," "cultural transmission," and "entertainment." The emerging "uses and gratifications" approach seemed to offer a way both of explaining the appeal of mass media (answering the question "why use media?") and also of providing a key to potential effects.

The central tenets of the approach that underlie this expectation can be summarized in the following points: (1) media use (attention by an audience) requires personal motivation; (2) motives are fundamentally rational, in terms of perceived needs and interests, as shaped by social background; (3) audiences (as individuals) are able to give some account of their motivations (reasons for behavior); (4) these expressed motivations provide an explanation of media choice and use; and (5) different levels and types of motivations lead to different probabilities of effect from mass media (differentiated by medium and content type) and different levels of satisfaction with the experience.

In general, this paradigm elevates the subjective view of the audience member and the interaction it presupposes between receiver and sender (or the message) over and above the planned manipulation on the part of a propagandist. It has affinities not only with functionalism but also with the newer schools of phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, and ethnomethodology, which were emerging as alternative paradigms to structural-functionalism and behaviorism at this time (1960s).

The relevance of this to the study of election campaigns (seemingly characterized by high exposure and few effects) was evident. The basic logic of political campaigning by way of mass media conformed largely to the linear model of direct effects as sketched previously. The results of research into political campaigning certainly showed the typical pattern of "few significant differences," suggesting that campaigns were largely ineffective or self-canceling, despite the enormous effort invested in them. The new approach offered a possibility of investigating political effects from the perspective of the voter audience member rather than the campaigner. It was also a moment of potentially significant change in the character of election campaigns, with the

recent arrival of television as a replacement for radio and newspapers as the medium of choice for the majority of citizens. The new medium was believed to have more impact. It was also a more truly universal and popular medium, less prone to the patterns of selective exposure which had typically screened the majority of supposedly disinterested citizens from political propaganda and news, leading to the predominant "reinforcement" effect of political communication.

The first full and specific application of the approach to the study of an election campaign was made by Jay Blumler and Denis McQuail to the case of the 1964 British general election in two local constituencies, using a panel survey design. The general expectations were as outlined previously, with the specific aim of seeking explanations of differential campaign exposure and effects according to respondents' motives (and degree of motivation) for following the campaign on television. The primary challenge was to find an adequate way to measure and record the various motives that might be recognized by viewers and play a part in the process of exposure and effect. Preliminary open-ended research identified eight specific motives for attending to politics on television. A cluster analysis of these data showed a more economical structure. The main axis of motivation lay between one pole labeled "surveillance" (generally keeping up with issues, judging leaders, and policies, etc.) and another of "contest-excitement" (the horse race aspects). Two other more specifically political clusters showed up: looking for reinforcement of existing beliefs and looking for guidance in deciding how to vote. The analysis enabled a distinction to be made between more and less politically motivated viewers. In addition, a set of items reflecting negative feelings about following the campaign was devised in a similar way, identifying motives that reflected, variously, an alienation from perceived propaganda, a firmly settled partisan position, or a preference for more entertaining fare. This provided the material, when combined with positive motivation scores, for a scale of favorability to the television campaign ranging from very positive to hostile rejection. The panel survey collected detailed evidence of pre-campaign intentions, actual vote, actual exposure to different components of the media campaign, and evaluations of these components in relation to motivations.

The results of the study undoubtedly helped to answer the question "Why do people watch political television?" confirming the expectation of underlying rationality, despite the redundancy of much content and lack of strong interest on the part of a majority of viewers (much exposure being politically unmotivated). The most important explanation was found to lie in the acceptance of the role as a citizen of a democracy to keep at least minimally informed. The criterion of degree of motivation was, in many respects, predictive of attention patterns. The self-chosen motivations were also found to be consistent with the evaluations made about different program formats and with certain types of effect.

The study identified a number of changes during the campaign, some that could be classified as campaign effects, including an increase in political information, a shift toward adopting the issue agenda emphasized by the campaign, and a gain in attitudinal support for the minority Liberal Party as well as a shift toward Labour. The measures of degree and type of motivation showed a complex pattern of interaction with these changes (effects) depending on which group was involved. The strongest piece of evidence of the role of motivation was the finding that the Liberal Party benefited particularly strongly from its campaign exposure among the less motivated section of the electorate, consistent with the view that a passive reception of persuasive content about a relatively unknown object is likely to bear fruit. All in all, the findings vindicated the expectation that the new approach would have some added value when compared to earlier before and after effect studies.

This research was followed by other applications, notably in the case of the U.S. presidential election of 1972, where Jack McLeod and Lee Becker followed a similar procedure, using essentially the same design and indicators of motive. They confirmed the general usefulness of the indicators as additional sources of valid information about the campaign process, with some deviation from the British findings. They also concluded that even after the effects of television time and content exposure on 14 political effect variables were held constant in regression analysis, the gratification and avoidance dimensions were able to explain significant amounts of additional variance in over half the comparisons. The general conclusion of McLeod and Becker was that the results encourage the adoption of a *transactional* model of *additive media effects,* with both exposure and gratification variables making independent contributions to political effect variance. Other research during the 1970s confirmed the general utility of the research approach, without

altering the general conclusion that most political campaigning most of the time has no measurable effects as intended by senders. The suspicion voiced at the time that the uses and gratifications approach would deliver more effective weapons into the hands of the persuaders has not been supported, although the intention to use such knowledge is certainly an element in contemporary political marketing.

Leaving this potential aside, several different purposes can be served by this audience-centered approach, especially the following:

- To classify and describe the motives for receiving political communication
- To find the origin of (explain) these motives
- To assist in evaluating and comparing the capacity of different media and formats to meet the communication of citizens
- To investigate the interaction between prior motive and actual use of political content (gratifications expected versus gratifications received)
- To investigate the relation between motivation (both degree and type) and a range of possible effects

Although the approach as outlined has received support for its cross-national validity and general robustness and utility, it has also remained an object of some criticism because it has raised several unresolved problems. These problems are theoretical, conceptual, and methodological. Leaving aside the general charges that the approach is irredeemably saddled with the sins of functionalism, behaviorism, psychologism, and conservatism, the main theoretical objection is that there is really no theory, just a framework or model for organizing a variety of variables that could or should play a part in any empirical investigation of the political communication process. Many separate elements of this framework have been validated to a reasonable degree, but not the framework as a whole. It can also be argued that the assumption of audience rationality in media use is too weakly grounded, given the fact that much media use is not really motivated, but a matter of habit or ritual.

The conceptual problems have been alluded to, as there is no definite agreement about the meaning of several key terms that are used, sometimes interchangeably, such as *need, motive, gratification, satisfaction, use.* This does not stand in the way of using the approach, with appropriate definitions, but it is to acknowledge a high degree of uncertainty about what is more or less fundamental or causal in the assumed logical sequence from need to observed behavior.

Several methodological problems are linked to the previous, despite the empirical confirmation of validity in the case of political communication (more than elsewhere). In the end, research into motivations has to depend primarily on self-reporting, with some uncertainty on both sides about the meaning of terms used, quite apart from variations in the capacity to express or distinguish between alternatives, plus factors of social desirability, and so on. The linkages between general orientations before a campaign, reasons for choosing specific materials during it, and reflections after the event can never be made with much precision, although this is a more general problem for much social research.

Despite criticism, limitations, and difficulties, the approach has proved to have some staying power and retains contemporary relevance. It is now axiomatic to try to understand the audience perspective in any communication process, especially if the purpose is persuasion. This imperative, quite apart from its practical good sense, helps to differentiate more from less democratic means of campaigning (and of research). The approach has provided an essential component in other advances in the study of political communication. It offers a pathway to investigating agenda setting (via the link to surveillance) and to understanding the appeal of "horse race" news (entertainment) and the limited possibility of conveying substantive political information on any scale. In some version or another, this perspective is used in order to investigate the alleged tendency of mass media to increase cynicism among voters. It is currently an essential aid in studying the implications for political communication of channel multiplication and fragmentation, with their different niche audiences. It may seem to have disappeared from view, but in fact it has now largely merged into the general investigative armory of political communication research and theory. As a footnote, it is worth observing that the tenets of the uses and gratifications approach have probably been better upheld in the case of political communication than in most other content areas, partly because needs for political information are fairly specific and identifiable as well as widely dispersed.

Denis McQuail

See also Blumler, Jay G.; Katz, Elihu; McQuail, Denis

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Uzan, Cem (1960–)

Cem Cengiz Uzan is a Turkish businessman-turned-politician. He is best known for his launch of the first private Turkish television channel in 1990 and for his political campaign in the 2002 general elections. Uzan is also known worldwide for fraud and racketeering because his family's cell-phone provider business, Telsim, defaulted on a huge loan to Nokia and Motorola.

Uzan launched Turkey's first private television channel, Star, with ex–Prime Minister Turgut Özal's son, which violated the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation's constitutional monopoly. Even though this led to a severe controversy about a private channel's legality for a couple of years, in the long run it symbolized the initial step of *de facto* deregulation of broadcasting in Turkey.

In 2002 Uzan announced that he would put his own work as a businessman aside to pursue a historical task, that is, governing Turkey. He then founded the Youth Party. The party got 7.2% of general votes in the 2002 elections, or 2½ million votes, most of which came from young people and the Western regions of Turkey. This rapid rise in votes for a newly founded party directed attention to the political campaign, designed by "advertising genius" Ali Taran. Other political parties and the media simply ignored the Youth Party, which was exactly what was wanted by the campaign strategist: Instead of being forced to enter into public discussion, Uzan could appear in the rallies and could extensively use his own media outlets for his purposes.

In his campaign, Uzan did not talk about hot issues such as the European Union, economic policies, education, and health, but promised students free books and raged against the International Monetary Fund and other institutions and people within a nationalistic discourse. He used the "us and them" distinction extensively and repeated simple phrases. His use of such tactics even led him to be called "Young Führer."

Uzan was also labeled as the "Turkish Berlusconi" because he owned a football team and several media outlets along with other assets in construction, energy, and finance, and for his fortune-fueled political ambitions. However, his career would be different. The Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government, from 2003 on, seized more than 200 Uzan-owned companies to collect the Uzan family's debt to financial authorities. Cem Uzan, in return, targeted his propaganda directly at Erdoğan, accusing him of being an "infidel," "godless," and "treacherous," which caused another libel suit to be added to the Uzan family's scores of lawsuits, ranging from extortion to fraud.

Beybin Kejanlioglu

See also Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip; Özal, Turgut

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Vanderbilt Television News Archive

The Vanderbilt Television News Archive, a department of the Vanderbilt University Library in Nashville, Tennessee, is a collection of U.S. national network news programs (1968–present) available on a loan basis to all researchers. The collection includes evening news and selected other news programs (specials) from ABC, CBS, CNN, NBC, and Fox, with occasional items from CNBC, MSNBC, PBS, and others.

The Archive makes its materials available through tape loans and in-house viewing. A premium subscription package is available to educational institutions. The tape loans take two forms. The best for most researchers is the compilation of items from the evening news. The borrower creates a list of individual news items to be viewed, and these are put together on videotape or in the near future on DVD. The second is the duplication of complete shows or of materials in the specials collection. In order to sustain itself the Archive charges for its services.

The Collection

The archive collection is divided into two parts: the evening news shows and specials. Specials are news programs other than the evening news. These include Democratic and Republican presidential conventions, other election events, presidential debates, speeches, press conferences, Watergate hearings, Iran–Contra hearings, Clinton impeachment hearings/trial, Iran hostage crisis, Gulf War, September 11, 2001, attacks, and the first weeks of the Iraq War.

The collection is described in a searchable 800,000 plus record database. Specials are catalogued by program or hour, and the evening news is abstracted by the individual news story. This database is available on the Internet at http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu. Video loans can be arranged online. By 2007 all programs in the collection will be stored digitally as mpeg2 files with copies stored at both Vanderbilt and the Library of Congress.

History

The archive was founded through the efforts of Nashville businessman and Vanderbilt University graduate Paul Simpson. The archive began recording the news on August 5, 1968. On that first day the archive recorded the evening news shows along with Republican Convention coverage from ABC, NBC, and CBS. This established a routine that carried on for the next 2 decades of recording the evening news from the three major broadcast networks and recording news specials, primarily current event programming centered on the president.

In November 1988, the Archive began to record from a cable network, CNN, for the first time. At first these were election coverage and post-election specials, but on January 1, 1989, the archive began recording its first regular cable news program, CNN *PrimeNews.* In October 1995, with the beginning of the show *WorldView,* the archive started creating abstracts of the CNN broadcast to go with the 27 years

of abstracts of evening news shows from ABC, CBS, and NBC.

In January 2004, the archive added one more network to its regularly recorded group, Fox, which was added to broaden coverage of the presidential election campaign. The show selected to join the evening news collection was *The Fox Report.*

John Lynch

Vargas, Getulio (1882–1954)

Getulio Vargas was the president of Brazil from 1930 to 1945 and 1951 to 1954. His terms in the presidency can be divided into four distinct periods. After losing the election in 1930, Vargas and his allies organized a military action to take over the government and to depose the president elected, Julio Prestes. In October 1930, Vargas took over the Provisory Government (1930 to 1934), which marked the end of the Old Republic and the beginning of a political, social, and economic transformation in Brazil. In the second period, the Constitutional Government (1934 to 1937), Vargas was elected by a Constituent Assembly, and a new Constitution was approved in 1934. However, with the Constitution of 1934, Vargas would have a 4-year term and he would not be allowed to run for reelection. These rules deeply upset Vargas, who wanted a more controlled government. As a result of a military coup, Vargas became a dictator and established his third presidential period: the New State (*Estado Novo,* 1937 to 1945). He closed the Congress and dissolved all political parties including the *Integralistas,* a political movement with fascist ideas that had failed to depose Vargas in 1938. During the dictatorial period, Vargas instituted the minimum wage, enacted labor legislation, and created important national companies that stimulated economic growth.

Since the beginning of his government, Vargas attributed great importance to the radio and foresaw it as a powerful political tool. It was through the radio that, in 1937, Vargas announced the establishment of the New State and the promulgation of the new Constitution. In 1935, the *Hora do Brasil* radio program was created to publicize the accomplishments made by the government. All radio stations were required to broadcast this program, which airs up to the present day. It is clear that Vargas used the radio as a main means of communication with the population, using censorship as its main tool. With the creation of the *Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda* (DIP—Department of Press and Propaganda), newspapers had censors on their staff who literally controlled all the material that would be published. Although every publication had to be checked first by the DIP, Vargas always tried to maintain a friendly relationship with the press. One of his platforms was valuing journalism as a profession because he knew that he could use the press to disseminate his populist ideals.

Vargas's populist ideals were well received by the people. Nevertheless, Liberals and Democrats who were against Vargas decided to take military action to depose the president. In October 1945, Vargas was removed from the government by the same military that helped him establish the New State.

Vargas's last term in the government was when he was elected president (1951 to 1954) by popular vote. The democratic government, however, was considered turbulent. The previous president had left numerous debts, the military was not satisfied with the performance of some cabinet ministers, and the pressure to resign from the presidency eventually led to the tragic end of the Vargas Era. On August 24, 1954, Vargas committed suicide.

Juliana de Brum Fernandes

See also Brazil, Media and the Political System

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Verbal Style

Verbal style was proposed by Roderick P. Hart as a method to analyze the rhetoric of presidents of the United States. Such analysis was an effort to determine the rhetorical effectiveness of the president. Because

American presidents do not take up arms, perform manual labor, or perform medical surgery on their constituents, their primary way of leading is through the spoken word. The method of verbal style provides a computer-based content analysis of the words spoken by presidents during speeches. The word counts are then subjected to statistical analysis to determine the strength of the four variables or dictionaries that comprise the computer program (DICTION) that performs the initial word count. These four dictionaries include activity, certainty, optimism, and realism.

Activity refers to motion, or change, or the implementation of ideas; Certainty includes statements demonstrating resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness; Optimism statements endorse someone or something, offer positive descriptions, or predict favorable occurrences; Realism expresses tangible, immediate, and practical issues. Taken individually the variables might not mean much but taken collectively and analyzed as such in a presidential speech, a rhetorical picture of the president can be constructed. The analysis determines how much change to the status quo is offered in the speech (activity) or how much resolve or resistance to change is expressed (certainty). It also determines if there is praise or satisfaction offered in the speech (optimism) and whether or not the president discusses issues in a forthright, honest, and uncompromising manner (realism).

Although verbal style was designed to perform a post hoc analysis on speeches already delivered in order to determine how effective a president's speaking ability was to his governing ability, the heuristic value inherent in verbal style has been explored in other venues of presidential communication as well.

Verbal style was used in an attempt to project winners of presidential elections based on their campaign speeches. In other words, the candidate that spoke most like a president during the campaign would be elected. Although verbal style was detected in campaign speeches when candidate George H. W. Bush defeated candidate Michael Dukakis, who actually did speak more like a president based on the verbal style variables, none was statistically significant enough to claim that more use of activity, certainty, optimism, and realism was the deciding factor in the election. Further use of DICTION in the analysis of presidential campaign advertisements demonstrated that verbal style was evident in presidential commercials as well. Here again, statistical analysis of data resulted in no significance.

Future investigation of political communication in an effort to determine verbal style should analyze presidential debates in an effort to detect the verbal style present in the candidate's responses in a more spontaneous and impromptu manner. Although debates are rehearsed by the candidates, data retrieved via verbal style analysis would provide insight into the word choice selection of the particular presidential candidate during a live exchange and not from a prepared speech or commercial.

R. John Ballotti, Jr.

See also Hart, Roderick P.; Presidential Communication

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Video Games, Political

Video games officially became a significant cultural force when sales outpaced Hollywood movie ticket receipts in 1999. Apart from games such as *The Political Machine* (2004), a strategy game that simulates a presidential race, relatively few mainstream games have taken conventional politics as a central theme. Games have become a political force, however, in other ways: (a) through moral panic, (b) by way of the military-entertainment complex, and (c) as activism.

First, as a new technology, games have spurred moral panic and much public debate. The most prominent cultural debate surrounding video games continues to be those centered on the issue of violence and its imitation. The first game to attract widespread attention on this count was Exidy's *Deathrace* (1972). This was followed much later by *Mortal Combat* (1992) and *Grand Theft Auto* (1997). In 1999, after the school shootings at Columbine High School in Colorado, first-person shooter games such as *Doom* (1993) and *Wolfenstein 3D* (1992) entered public debates about adolescent gun fantasies. More recent continuations of the *Grand Theft Auto* franchise have created a stir due to their graphic violence, anarchic ethic, and misogynistic and racist

themes. With a push by U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman, the video game industry institutionalized the Electronic Software Review Board, which in 1994 adopted a voluntary ratings system in the manner of the Motion Picture Association of America. Not all video game political provocations have been negative. The highly developed female adventurer character of the series that began with *Tomb Raider* (1996) has been lauded for smashing female stereotypes in the predominantly male world of video games.

In the military sphere, the real-time television spectacle of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 initiated the popularity of war games based on real conflicts. Cooperation between defense contractors and video game companies intensified throughout the 1990s in what some have dubbed the military-entertainment complex. The flight simulator *F-15 Strike Eagle II* (1993) explicitly referenced Gulf War fighting, as did *Desert Tank* (1994) and *Apache* (1995), which featured the Apache helicopter, a frequent subject of television war coverage. In 1997, the military developed a strategy simulator called *Real War,* which was released commercially in 2001. This was followed by the release of a foot soldier trainer named *Full Spectrum Warrior* in 2003 during the early U.S. occupation of Iraq. In 2005, the Marines released another foot soldier trainer commercially under the name *Close Combat: First to Fight.* The U.S. Army was perhaps the first to use sophisticated games for actual recruitment. In 2001, the Army developed a free, first-person shooter called *America's Army,* which came to include updated versions and online hosting. Commercial game makers capitalized on the 2003 televised invasion of Iraq as well. Although Sony may have failed in its attempt to trademark the phrase "Shock & Awe" for use in a game, another production house, Electronic Arts, marketed *Conflict: Desert Storm* (2002) and *Conflict: Desert Storm II: Back to Baghdad* (2003) during the initial bombing and occupation. The online subscription game company *Kuma/War,* launched in 2004, provides playable first-person shooter games featuring recent military missions overseas, billing itself as less of a game company than a news organization. Although most of the episodic missions are based on recent events, such as the capture of Saddam Hussein, *Kuma/War* also featured an episode based on Democratic presidential contender John Kerry's service in Vietnam, which attracted controversy in 2004.

The final category of political video games has been called "activist games" or "edugames." These games are designed as a means to an end. In 2003, game scholars Ian Bogost and Gonzola Fresca began the Web site www.watercoolergames.com as a forum for discussing the role of "persuasive games" (from advergaming to politically oriented material), signaling increased interest in this area. Most activist games are small-scale productions utilizing an online Flash format. Some of the more visible of this genre include *Food Force* (2005), designed by the United Nations World Food Program to raise awareness about world hunger. The Reebok Human Rights Foundation, the International Crisis Group, and the television channel MTV sponsored a contest to design an educational game to raise awareness of the ongoing genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. The result was the online Flash game *Darfur Is Dying* (2006). In the realm of more sophisticated off-the-shelf games, the game *Under Ash* (2001) was an early activist game produced by a Syrian game maker. Players of *Under Ash* take on the character of Ahmed, a young Palestinian boy resisting Israeli occupation. The game's distinguishing aspect is the fact that it was intentionally designed to be "unwinnable." Finally, a phenomenon has emerged that creates certain online multiplayer games as sites of political activism. The most visible example of this is the organization Velvet Strike, which produced a series of strategies and modifications for protesting the culture of military violence within the virtual world of the massively popular online game *Counterstrike* (1999). These tactics included "martyrdoms for peace" and spray painting the virtual walls of the playspace with messages of peace within the context of the Bush administration's war against terror.

Roger Stahl

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VIDEOSTYLE

Videostyle is a concept used to describe the pattern of styles and strategies that candidates use in their

televised political advertising. A candidate's videostyle includes three important components of their ads: the verbal elements, the nonverbal elements, and the production elements. The concept of videostyle was influenced by several studies looking at personal style, presentation of self, and communication style. These earlier studies of style suggested that a person's communication style would be revealed through a pattern of behavior that recurred over and over again in different settings.

Videostyle builds on this concept, proposing that a political candidate's personal communication style is translated and constructed for voters through the candidate's television ads. A candidate's videostyle is also influenced by his or her political status, ideology, and the context of the campaign.

The videostyle approach to political advertising, first outlined by Lynda Lee Kaid and Dorothy Davidson in 1986, has been updated, revised, and enhanced through the numerous studies using the approach. The current videostyle coding instrument has approximately 62 categories into which ads are systematically coded. Those categories are organized into the three dimensions of the ads: the verbal elements, the nonverbal elements, and the production elements of the ads. Kaid and Johnston have used the system to analyze U.S. presidential campaign commercials beginning with their first use in 1952, and the system has been applied by many other researchers to candidate advertising at different electoral levels and in numerous countries.

The first dimension or aspect of a candidate's videostyle is the language or verbal elements of the ads. This dimension includes things like whether the ad is a positive ad and says good things about the candidate or is a negative ad and criticizes the opponent. Other verbal categories that make up a candidate's videostyle include the use of certain appeals (appeals to issue stands, personality characteristics, or group/partisan affiliations), the types of issues discussed, the types of proof or evidence provided (use of facts, use of emotional appeals, use of the candidate's credibility), the use of fear appeals, the appeal to certain values in the ads, and the communication strategies and styles present in the ad associated with incumbent or challenger political positions. One interesting finding about candidate videostyle is that presidential political ads contain lots of issue information and that important candidate characteristics mentioned in ads over the years have included honesty, competency, and aggressiveness.

A second critical element of a candidate's videostyle is the nonverbal dimensions of his or her ad. Nonverbal aspects of communication include things such as gestures, eye contact, facial expressions, and appearance. The nonverbal aspects of videostyle include the setting of the ad, the candidate's eye contact, dress, facial expression, body movement, fluency, rate of speech, and pitch. In addition, other aspects that add to a candidate's nonverbal videostyle include the speaker used in the ad, the use of American symbols (flags, landmarks, or monuments), and the presence of family members or partisans in the ad. Researching the nonverbal dimensions of a candidate's videostyle has revealed that candidates use a variety of speakers in their ads. In addition to the candidates themselves, speakers used in political ads have included family members, anonymous announcers, politicians, celebrities and average citizens.

A third important aspect of videostyle is the unique production components of television. Television has a language of its own and offers candidates an intimacy and conversational style with viewers. Candidates have used the unique aspects of television to develop their style and to reinforce that style with voters. Production aspects of videostyle have included format of the ad (documentary, staged press conference, testimonial), production techniques (use of slides, video, or cinema), sound characteristics (sound over, live sound), use of music in the ads, the dominant camera angles and shots used, and the presence of certain special effects and editing techniques. Research on this area of videostyle has shown that broadcast political ads have made full use of the range of special effects available in television production and have increasingly included more movement and combinations of production styles.

In addition to being influenced by a candidate's personal style, videostyle can be influenced by a variety of things, including the candidate's political position as incumbent or challenger, the candidate's gender, external factors influencing the campaign, the focus (issue or image) of the ad, the tone (negative or positive) of the ad, and the country or culture where the ads are produced and aired. Incumbent and challenger videostyles, for example, are similar in that they have historically both focused on issues, but have differed in several ways, including that incumbents tend to focus on personality characteristics, use source credibility appeals, use more fear appeals, use anonymous announcers more, include more testimonials, and emphasize foreign policy issues. Challengers tend

to speak for themselves more in ads, call for changes, attack the record of the opponent, and use tight, close-up camera shots.

Gender has also been shown to influence videostyle, with women candidates sometimes appearing similar to challengers in their videostyles. Female candidates tend to speak for themselves more and use more testimonial or introspective type ads. In addition, some studies have found that successful female candidates use fear appeals, stress their accomplishments, and discuss the important issues of an election. Finally, several studies have applied videostyle in international settings to understanding how candidates and political broadcasts communicate with voters. Candidate videostyle has been investigated in Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Greece, as well as other countries. In these situations, videostyle has evolved in accordance with the countries being studied, and researchers have made modifications to the videostyle coding design based on how the political, economic, and regulatory climate influence the political ads or broadcasts in a particular country.

Videostyle has recently been expanded to encompass political advertising messages on the World Wide Web. Adding the elements of Web construction and interaction, this approach has been labeled Webstyle.

Anne Johnston

See also Political Advertising

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Viguerie, Richard

See Direct Mail

Virtuous Circle, A

The title and subtitle of this book, *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies,* attest to an ambitious program. The book promises an overall picture of political communication, not an extract, a case study, or a snapshot. In using the term *virtuous circle*—a control loop of mutual strengthening processes—Pippa Norris, McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government and presently director of the Democratic Governance Group at the United Nations Development Program in New York City, has chosen a metaphor which is perhaps destined to become a token with a similar sustained yield as it was granted to two-step flow, agenda setting, or videomalaise.

The many facets of videomalaise theory—from Langs via Robinson to Patterson and Putnam—have been applied in research on political communication in the past 10 years. Some claim the media are responsible for the increase in public apathy, mistrust, and cynicism, and television's portrayal of politics is said to undermine the foundations of society. Norris vehemently objects to conventional wisdom, although not always with the necessary differentiation.

The main focus of Norris's argument is developing an effect theory regarding the recipients. She hypothesizes that the more citizens turn their attention to political media information, the more political knowledge, trust in the political system, and civic commitment increase; at the same time, knowledge, trust, and commitment increase the attention directed toward the media. Norris fashions an interplay between the use of political media contents and the formation of political virtues.

Norris tests her hypothesis through secondary analyses of surveys and cannot find any confirmation in the data for the correlations conjectured by theories

that suggest that exposure to media result in political disillusionment. Instead, she finds evidence for her assumed mutual positive correlation which she fashions as helical dynamics. Her spiral model rests on empirical groundwork in which the weight is spread out evenly. Norris finds only weak correlations in the single analyses at different points throughout a long period of time, and with different data sets from different political contexts with different variables and methods of inquiry. She relies on the fact that none of the many multivariate analyses is persuasive when looked at individually, but the position is convincing through cumulative evidence.

Logically, the opposite of the upward spiral is the downward spiral: The less people turn to the media, the less knowledge, trust, and commitment they have regarding it. And here, too, mutual amplification would be a plausible interpretation, but Norris only touches on it. Instead, she concentrates on the good side of the coin, or the virtuous circle. However, only the downward spiral can explain the result that political commitment and general use of television correlate negatively. This simultaneity of downward and upward spiral not only is important for the evaluation of the digital divide but suggests other complex relationships between access to information and political attitudes.

Thus, her theoretical figure consists of four elements:

1. The identification of statistically positive correlations between the turn to political media contents and political knowledge, interest, and commitment
2. The assumption of a mutual causal relationship between variables
3. The assumption of a dynamic sampling of this relationship as a result of mutual amplification
4. Assessing this process as politically positive

This Norris subsumes under the metaphor of the virtuous circle, a twofold positive term: A control loop with positive feedback (a process building itself up) is evaluated as positive. Coined by Edith Simon in 1953, virtuous circle is the opposite of "vicious circle" (*circulus vitiosus*). Both have the same logical structure, but in the vicious circle the vices are amplified, and in the virtuous circle the virtues are amplified. Anyone thinking about cybernetic control loops must ask where the positive amplification, praised by Norris, leads. Where is the negative feedback, or the stabilization through backlash? One possibility could be ceiling effects in committed people or bottom effects in indifferent people. It is also conceivable that the correlation levels off in the time lapse caused, for example, by a decrease in participation. Although Norris does not pose this question explicitly in her book, she hints at it in the most inconspicuous location: the book's dust jacket, which prominently features Pieter Bruegel's painting "The Tower of Babel" from 1563. A spiral escalates into the sky, but the painting does not show where the spiral ends.

Gerhard Vowe

See also Political Disaffection; Political Efficacy

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VOICE OF AMERICA

The Voice of America (VOA) represents the U.S. government's original venture in influencing world opinion through broadcast news and entertainment content. As of 2006, VOA broadcasts were delivered via shortwave in 44 languages to an estimated 100 million people.

From its beginning, the VOA has walked a fine line between providing balanced news coverage and offering content supportive of U.S. political policies. On February 24, 1942, the VOA—then known as the U.S. Foreign Information Service—aired its first broadcast, transmitting news of World War II to Europe. In signing on the network, announcer William Harlan Hale told listeners that the service would broadcast the truth regardless of whether it was good or bad. Hale's words were reflected in the VOA charter, drafted in 1960 and adopted in 1976. That document included a promise that information broadcast via the network would be a reliable source of news for listeners around the world to hear balanced information about the United States and its policies.

Broadcasting to the world, the U.S. State Department dispenses information to foreign countries throughout the world by way of VOA (Voice of America), January 1950.

Source: Hulton Archive.

Still, although the commitment to an objective presentation of the news is a stated core value of the VOA, reviews have been mixed as to whether the line has ever been blurred between balanced news coverage and the political agenda of the United States. Part of that perception may be due to the fact that the State Department, through the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the United States Information Agency (USIA), ultimately oversees the VOA. The dual objectives are demonstrated on air on a daily basis, with news content making up much of a typical VOA broadcast hour at the same time that pro-U.S. government editorials are also featured as a regular part of programming.

Although the Voice of America is respected in many quarters for maintaining an overall balanced approach to its news content, even VOA staff members have, at times, been critical of the level of outside influence exercised over editorial content. For example, former VOA Director Sanford Ungar claimed that overt congressional and administrative political influence, once held at bay, has recently been allowed to creep into the network's content.

Since the VOA signed on more than 60 years ago, it has experienced threatened budget cuts starting with cold war era conservatives who charged that the network was a haven for pro-communist sympathizers up to more recent challenges from congressional critics arguing that VOA broadcasts needed to be more overtly pro-American. To date, attempts to strip away all funding have failed. Many would argue that the reason the service has staved off these budget assaults is the VOA's basic commitment to providing balanced news and information to its audience. As one-time USIA director and long-time CBS newsman Edward R. Murrow argued, to be persuasive the VOA should first be credible.

Johanna Cleary

See also Radio Free Europe

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VOTER BEHAVIOR

Between the early 1940s and the late 1960s, four basic models of voter behavior were proposed on which almost all studies of electoral behavior draw. These models describe how humans react to environmental factors and choose between different courses of action. *Homo sociologicus* (more or less implicitly) forms the basis of the approaches to voting behavior

laid out in the first three parts of this entry. In contrast, rational voter theory explicitly invokes *homo economicus* through deductive reasoning. A closer examination reveals, however, that these seemingly different approaches are in fact complementary and can be regarded as aspects of an overarching model. In the past few years this line of reasoning has become increasingly present both in sociopsychological as well as rational choice writings.

The Microsociological Model

The microsociological model was developed in the early 1940s by Paul F. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues, and its formulation in *The People's Choice* first appeared at the end of World War II. A milestone of modern electoral research, it was also criticized for its methodological and empirical deficiencies, and these critiques informed the design of the follow-up study *Voting.*

The motivating question for Lazarsfeld and his colleagues can be found in the subtitle of *The People's Choice*: How do voters develop concrete vote intentions over the course of an election? Lazarsfeld et al. investigated this question by conducting an intensive study of Erie County, Ohio, during the 1940 presidential election. They interviewed a representative sample up to seven times over the course of the campaign with regard to vote intention, evaluation of the candidates, and assessment of the major political issues. By doing so the researchers sought to determine how individual voters developed their political attitudes over time and the impact of the campaign on this process.

Lazarsfeld et al. rapidly determined that sociostructural variables, above all socioeconomic status and religious affiliation, strongly influenced vote intention for both major American parties. Taken together with a voter's living situation (urban or rural), the researchers constructed an "index of political predisposition" with an extremely accurate predictive capability. Blue-collar workers and Catholics disproportionately trended toward the Democrats, but Protestants and middle-class voters predominantly supported the Republicans, with the interaction of both variables strengthening these effects.

With muted reservations, the authors concluded that the political preferences of their respondents were largely socially determined. For many voters, party choice was fixed months before the election, and new information was used selectively to reinforce rather than challenge or update prior opinions. These findings were far removed from the ideal of responsible democratic citizens painstakingly informing themselves about the various parties and candidates before coming to a decision based on sober reflection.

As they went on, however, Lazarsfeld et al. could only tentatively explain *why* sociostructural variables influenced vote choice so strongly, despite the relative anonymity of individual members to these large, impersonal structures. The authors argued implicitly that sociostructural variables could be viewed as indicators of membership in a mostly homogenous social environment of friends, family, neighbors, and colleagues with similar political views. This web of interactions is then capable of reinforcing wavering individual opinions through social pressure. In these circumstances, so-called opinion leaders play an important role by intensively informing themselves about political events through the media and then passing their observations on to less interested or less educated citizens. To describe this relationship Lazarsfeld et al. formed their famous "two-step flow" hypothesis of political communication.

Emphasis on the immediate social environment disposed some researchers to observe an interesting phenomenon: If a voter's social environment is not homogenous and he/she belongs to multiple social groups with incompatible political norms, conflicting behavioral expectations (cross pressures) should develop. To explain non-voting or party-switching, two phenomena that electoral researchers have always been preoccupied with, Lazarsfeld et al. were forced to rely above all on cross pressures in the immediate social environment.

The Macrosociological Model

In contrast to the Columbia study, the macrosociological approach focuses its explanations on processes at the level of the entire society. In Germany, this approach was initially forwarded by M. Rainer Lepsius, who was primarily occupied with social-moral milieus, a key characteristic of German society in the Imperial and Weimar periods. Internationally Lepsius had little impact, and even within German literature his approach was soon displaced by a competing macrosociological model that argued with abstract categories, was tailored to explain a larger area (Western Europe), and was easily portable to other

contexts. This model was the cleavage theory of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, originally formulated in the comprehensive introductory chapter of their work *Party Systems and Voter Alignments.*

By *cleavage,* Lipset and Rokkan mean a social fault line, a sustained social conflict pitting (at least) two large groups with conflicting social interests (defined by their social characteristics) against one another. According to Lipset and Rokkan, European social conflicts can be systematically ordered and divided into four groups:

- Conflicts between the national center and the subordinate periphery
- Conflicts between the state and the Catholic Church
- Conflicts between urban and rural territories
- Conflicts between labor and capital

These four conflicts ultimately go back to processes of modernization. The first two refer predominantly to the cultural sphere and hearken back to the development of modern nation-states, and the latter two conflicts are, above all, economically motivated and consequences of the Industrial Revolution.

For Lipset and Rokkan, social conflicts become politically relevant if a specific set of conditions is fulfilled:

1. The conflict must remain virulent over a long period and play a central role in the lives of the affected individuals.
2. Social mobility must be low, so that one typically remains a lifelong member of the relevant social group.
3. Those affected by the conflict must have the motivation and opportunity to ensure that their interests are incorporated into formal associations.
4. The leaders of these pressure groups must found their own party or agree to some form of coalition with a pre-existing party.
5. This party must have an opportunity within the electoral system to cross the threshold of parliamentary representation.

Under these conditions social conflicts achieve a sort of political reification. The parties that develop are understood as the agents of social groups and are treated as such by group members. The format of the party system that develops, such as the number of parties or polarization between them, is determined by the number of relevant social cleavages and whether these fault lines run parallel or overlap with one another. So long as the system of social conflicts remains stable, for example, when parties negotiate a lasting compromise that is also acceptable to their represented social groups, the party system will remain fundamentally stable.

Lipset and Rokkan's unpacking of the relationship between social structures and the party system is highly internally consistent and constitutes a powerful analytical frame, in that prior findings on voting behavior are easily integrated into a cleavage theory. An obvious deficiency in their model, however, is the failure to consider the individual level and the role of communication. Lipset and Rokkan do not address why individual voters usually behave empirically as elites expect them to.

It is possible to close the microlevel gap and integrate Lipset and Rokkan's macrosociological model with the complementary microsociological findings of the Lazarsfeld group and Lepsius's work at the mesolevel. But even this combined approach has a major deficiency, because it poorly explains moments of political change. For relatively short-term fluctuations in the strength of political parties, which lead to relatively frequent changes in the size and composition of governing parties or coalitions, the picture of an idealtypical *homo sociologicus* blindly adhering to the norms of his reference groups is unsatisfying. The sociopsychological model represents a solution to this problem and its findings are highly complementary with the previous sociological models.

The Sociopsychological Model

Ten years after *The People's Choice* Angus Campbell and his associates at the Survey Research Center published their first major election study. *The Voter Decides* was distinct from the Lazarsfeld group's work in two respects. First, Campbell and his co-authors conducted a random sample covering the entire United States, as opposed to prior regionally limited inquiries. Second, Campbell et al. initially explained voting behavior exclusively through psychological variables, specifically the evaluation of candidates, their positions on the major political issues, and their party identification, or the degree of attachment to a political party. Initially all three psychological variables were considered equally important. Sociological variables, of primary importance to Lazarsfeld et al., were held in *The Voter Decides* as exogenous and remained unconsidered.

Campbell et al. were initially and correctly criticized for almost fully ignoring the social context of vote choice and for relying on variables so temporally and empirically connected with the act of voting that the model risked tautology. Campbell et al. reacted to these critiques by extending their inquiries to include the broader social context, a sociopsychological model of behavior that would become identified with the University of Michigan as the Ann Arbor model. Put forward in *The American Voter,* this new model demonstrated its effectiveness by using surveys from the 1952 and 1956 elections. The response from the scientific community was overwhelming: *The American Voter* became one of the most influential monographs in the history of electoral research, and the Ann Arbor model dominated the study of voting behavior in Western democracies for many years after its publication.

The American Voter deviated from the Michigan group's past work in two respects. First, party identification was now taken as a long-term stable variable, causally prior to individual evaluations of candidates and political issues. Second, psychological variables were no longer taken as given, but rather were seen as influenced by a voter's sociological background. This included the experiences of an individual's reference groups with various parties and the integral role of the strengthening or weakening of opinions through a voter's immediate social circumstances. The Ann Arbor model can therefore be considered an extension of sociological theories of voting behavior.

An aspect that is frequently overlooked, however, is that *The American Voter* describes a wide range of potential influencing factors, which were seen as alternatives to the sociopsychological model in later years. These factors include, for example, the institutional context, economic situations and personality structure of voters.

Using the famous image of the "causality funnel" Campbell et al. summarized the relationship between these varied factors. Individual vote decision is understood as the result of a complex process principally traced far back into a voter's past. At the moment of the vote decision itself, only the previously identified psychological variables are of interest. The further one moves back into a voter's history, the more potential influences have to be taken into account to explain the final behavior. The causality funnel, therefore, expands into the past until it reaches a level of complexity that the researcher can no longer untangle.

Despite its evident advantages, a dispute arose over the next several years concerning the Ann Arbor model's portability outside of the American context. Especially problematic for the Michigan group was the central concept of party identification: The idea of a psychological membership seemed too dependent on the peculiarities of the American system, particularly the (relatively) stable two-party system, the organizational weakness of the major parties, and the absence of historically based ideological conflicts.

In an influential contribution Russell Dalton, Paul Allen Beck and Scott C. Flanagan showed that long-term stable party identification did not imply a psychological party membership. The characteristic coalitions between social groups and ideological parties in Europe, as set out by Lipset und Rokkan, could instead be considered the functional equivalent of party identification described in *The American Voter.*

The Rational Voter Model

The theory of rational voting goes back to Anthony Downs's pioneering study, *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* Building on prior work by Kenneth Arrow, Joseph Schumpeter, Herbert Simon, and others, Downs applied the tenets of neo-classical economics to voting behavior and provided the impetus for a new and fruitful research agenda in political science.

Downs's concept differed from previous approaches in two respects. First, Downs's approach to electoral research was primarily theoretical: Downs engaged in no empirical studies but rather limited himself to deductively deriving axiomatic propositions that could be empirically tested. Second, the approach founded by Downs was based much more strongly on formal modeling than were earlier approaches. Although the sociological and sociopsychological approaches tied into experiences from everyday political life and seemed intuitively plausible despite their abstractions, the rational choice approach initially struck many researchers as all too artificial and unrealistic. That the contributions of rational choice theorists were often presented through systems of equations only strengthened this impression.

The starting point for Downs is the assumption that politicians and voters behave as rational actors in a market, in which political power (in the form of votes) is exchanged for the realization of political objectives. The rationality of actors is therefore understood in a formal sense that has nothing to do with reasonableness in the commonly accepted sense, but rather is solely related to the decision between alternative actions.

According to the model, rational actors possess stable and transitive preferences, which give them the ability to select from a set of alternatives to maximize their benefits. Benefits are not limited to economic gains for an actor, but rather any result that is in line with their preferences. Stable means nothing more than that the preferences of actors remain constant during the period in question; transitive means that there are no contradictory or cycling preferences. A rational actor that prefers a government formed by Party A to one formed by Party B, and prefers Party B to Party C, must therefore prefer Party A to Party C given a choice between the two.

If one assumes that political programs can be placed as positions on an ideological left-right continuum, a rational voter will choose the party that stands nearest to his or her ideal point on that continuum (the point where their benefits are maximized). At the same time, parties will formulate their political programs with an eye toward maximizing their vote total. As the preferences of actors are seen as stable, changes in behavior are only explained through structural changes, such as through the entry of a Party D.

How the benefits of actors persist and how their preferences come about are not discussed in rational choice models. As the preferences of actors are, as a rule, constructed from observations of their behavior, the rational voter approach is fundamentally tautological: The rationality postulate is an axiom rather than an empirically tested hypothesis.

But this tautological structure is precisely the greatest strength of the rational choice approach. It makes it possible to connect psychological or sociological models to the rational choice approach by treating them as mechanisms for the construction of preference sets. Thus, it is possible to hold exogenous the complex and often-idiosyncratic backgrounds of individual voters in order to focus on the influence the structural features of a situation have on decision making.

Downs himself recognized some of the complications that arose from exporting market behavior to electoral research. The most famous of these problems is the so-called paradox of voting: Independent of the electoral system, in a mass democracy with millions of voters the probability of any one voter casting the winning vote is infinitely small. Therefore, there is effectively no relationship between a voter's behavior and the victory of his or her preferred party. Although it is unlikely that an actor can draw some personal (instrumental) benefit from casting his or her ballot, participation certainly entails costs. A voter has to spend time and/or money to build a picture about the intentions of the various parties (information costs). Furthermore, the acts of voting or voter registration often take time, which means foregoing other material or immaterial benefits (opportunity costs).

The net benefit of voting is therefore always negative, and rational individuals should not choose to vote. This conclusion contradicts actual voter turnout, which consistently reached 70% to 80% in many democratic states in the 20th century. Many solutions have been suggested to solve the paradox of voting, though all have their complications.

The uncertainty inherent in the act of voting is not limited to whether one's own behavior can affect the outcome. For example, a voter cannot be certain whether he or she will receive the desired outcome for the actual costs spent; his or her party could lose the election. Uncertainty also exists regarding a party's future actions. Even when parties intend to honor promises made during the election, changes in the general political situation could cause them to depart from their programs.

Voters in mass democracies thus find themselves in a low-cost situation. Rational choice explanations typically do not delve further into the intricacies of behavior in low-cost situations, as it is already highly irrational under these circumstances for rational actors to put effort into collecting information or engaging in a cost-benefit analysis. Instead moral and expressive patterns dominate behavior in these situations; decisions are made on the basis of everyday information, group norms, or fundamental ideological beliefs, which function as information shortcuts. Rational voters therefore often behave as the sociological or sociopsychological models would predict. Such considerations were already evident in Downs's approach and stand at the center of the research agenda for some newer theories of rational voting.

Kai Arzheimer and Jürgen W. Falter

See also Lazarsfeld, Paul F.; Party Identification; *People's Choice, The;* Survey Research Center; Two-Step Flow Model of Communication

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Voter News Service

The Voter News Service (VNS) was a data collection and analysis service intended to aid in the reporting of exit poll numbers during national elections. The consortium was created by ABC News, CBS News, CNN, Fox News, NBC News, and the Associated Press under the direction of Murray Edelman. The main mission of the VNS was to provide rapid delivery of exit polling numbers to media outlets. In 2000, the VNS had difficulty in providing accurate information for the presidential election, particularly in the state of Florida. This led to inaccurate exit polling reports and confusion about which candidate had secured a win in Florida. As reports continued to flip-flop, the American public was unsure of who won the presidency until after several days had passed and recounts of votes were demanded.

The inaccurate data was only one problem for the VNS. There were complaints that the executives of the consortium had contact with—and personal ties to—the candidates, and early reports did not take into account time zones, particularly in the Florida panhandle. After the 2000 election disaster, the VNS attempted to again serve the media during the 2002 midterm elections. Due to a computer glitch, the VNS did not deliver results from their data until 10 months after the election. In January of 2003, the VNS was disbanded after the media partners determined that the consortium provided too little accurate information.

In the 2004 presidential election, a new reporting agency was created by the same media organizations and renamed the National Election Poll (NEP). In an effort to achieve greater accuracy and speed in results, an outside consulting firm was to oversee the NEP. Much like its predecessor, the NEP used the consulting firm to analyze the results tabulated by the Associated Press. However, several problems emerged again during this election which led to leaked information that projected John Kerry as the elected president. Several news agencies assumed that Kerry would win the election, but after re-calculating the statistics, it was reported that Bush had actually been in the lead.

In 2006, the NEP was used for exit polling results for the midterm election. Although results took longer, the accuracy was relatively accepted and most reporting agencies were reluctant to report too quickly. It appears that the NEP was successful in fulfilling its mission during this election. However, the past problems with the VNS, the NEP, and the media reports still haunt the acceptance of exit poll results and may lead to questions about the accuracy of any exit polling data.

Elizabeth Dudash

See also Polls

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Vranitzky, Franz (1937–)

Franz Vranitzky was Austrian chancellor (1986–1997) and head of the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ; 1988–1997). He studied business administration, was adviser to Finance Minister Hannes Androsch (in the Kreisky era), and finally became finance minister himself in 1984. At this time Fred Sinowatz (SPÖ) was chancellor of a red-blue coalition between Social Democrats and the Freedom Party (FPÖ).

Following an aggressive election campaign against Kurt Waldheim in the 1986 presidential elections (which was clouded by the Waldheim affair), Sinowatz retired as chancellor after Waldheim won the election. Vranitzky followed him and continued the coalition with the FPÖ until Jörg Haider took over the Freedom Party in September 1986. Vranitzky suffered consequences due to the obvious shift of the FPÖ to the far right and ended the coalition which was installed in 1983 and which was the first time that the FPÖ was part of an Austrian government. The following elections were won by the SPÖ, and Vranitzky emerged as chancellor of a strong revived coalition in 1987 (which was the first strong coalition since 1966). He remained chancellor for 10 years and then passed on the chair of the SPÖ and the office of the federal chancellor to his successor Victor Klima.

During Vranitzky's term in office Austria joined the European Union, which was seen by many as the one crucial and decisive project in the 1990s that also tied the two big parties, SPÖ and ÖVP (Austrian Peoples Party), together. Vranitzky managed to win the referendum for entry into the EU by a two-thirds vote. This result was preceded by a large consensus of political, economic, and media elites that believed the EU would hold big opportunities for Austria.

In domestic politics Vranitzky changed the course of the Social Democrats toward the FPÖ by preventing any further coalition between them. He also kept some distance between himself and Haider. This move was directed against the right-wing populist agenda of Haider and the hostile statements of the FPÖ about foreigners. The strategy of exclusion was heavily criticized and attacked by Haider, who could not stop the rise of the Freedom Party. However, although Vranitzky was criticized for the exclusion strategy's contribution to Haider's success, it made it possible for him to present himself as a victim of old-fashioned politics.

One of the most memorable events in Vranitzky's career was a letter to all Austrian retirees in the electoral campaign of 1995. In this letter he personally promised that the pensions would not be cut. Vranitzky could not keep his promise, and in the following years the letter became a symbol of broken election pledges.

The great coalition under his leadership had to face growing criticism concerning personal privilege and favoritism. His appearances were rather cool and defensive most of the time. Vranitzky expressed himself more like an elder statesman than a people's chancellor. Vranitzky was the first Austrian chancellor to admit publicly that Austrians played an active part in World War II and the Holocaust.

Peter Filzmaier, Maria Beyrl, and Flooh Perlot

See also Haider, Jörg; Schüssel, Wolfgang

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W

Waldheim, Kurt

See Waldheim Affair

Waldheim Affair

The Waldheim affair refers to discussions about the involvement of the former Austrian President Kurt Waldheim (1918–2007) in World War II. Waldheim, a member of the People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, or ÖVP), was foreign minister and UN Secretary General from 1972 to 1981. In 1986 he ran for the office of Austrian president. As Waldheim missed an absolute majority of votes in the first round, it came down to a runoff between him and Social-Democrats candidate Kurt Steyrer. During the campaign questions about his past as an officer in the German army and his membership in the SA (Sturmabteilung, Stormtroopers) in World War II arose, as there were some omissions in his, at the time, recently released autobiography. This created suspicions about his possible involvement in war crimes.

As a consequence the election campaign got much more aggressive. Waldheim faced massive critiques both at home and abroad (for instance, by the World Jewish Congress). He was severely attacked by Chancellor Fred Sinowatz from the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ). The People's Party reacted harshly and defended its candidate, using arguments considered at least partly anti-Semitic (this was stressed by the mass media). It also took advantage of the international critique by appealing to Austrian voters that no one but Austrians themselves would decide who should become the next president. Waldheim himself denied any involvement in war crimes and claimed that he had done nothing but his duty as a soldier. He won the election and became the Austrian president and remained in office until 1992. As a consequence Chancellor Sinowatz retired.

Due to his uncertain role between 1938 and 1945 Waldheim was internationally isolated and even put on the U.S. Watch List (prohibiting his entry to the United States). The Austrian government installed an international commission to investigate Waldheim's past. The commission found that Waldheim must have known about war crimes but could not prove any personal involvement.

The 1986 election campaign and the Waldheim affair became symbols of both Austria's handling of its own past and the latent anti-Semitism still present in society. This is closely related to the picture of Austria being the first victim of Hitler's Germany (which views Austrians as victims but not perpetrators in World War II). This view was almost a consensus for decades after the war, backed by all political parties. Bringing up the involvement of Austrians in the Third Reich was no majority-winning political issue. It took scandals such as the Waldheim affair to draw attention to Austria's coming to terms with the past. Due to the rise of the Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, or FPÖ) under Jörg Haider in the 1990s—which stood up for the argument that the Austrians just did

their duty and used anti-Semitic stereotypes in their rallies—this topic got more attention.

Peter Filzmaier, Flooh Perlot, and Maria Beyrl

See also Haider, Jörg

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Wałęsa, Lech (1943–)

Lech Wałęsa is a Polish politician who co-founded the first independent trade union, *Solidarity,* in the Soviet Bloc, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983, and served as president of Poland from 1990 to 1995. Wałęsa's importance is clearly shown by the international recognition he received; he was featured widely in the international media.

In 1980 Wałęsa became the leader of an occupational strike in the Lenin Shipyard of Gdańsk, which was spontaneously followed by similar strikes across Poland. Together with workers he organized the Strike Coordination Committee to lead and support the general strike in Poland. In that year, the communist government signed an agreement with the Strike Coordination Committee to allow legal organization although not actual free trade unions. The Strike Coordination Committee legalized itself as the National Coordination Committee of Solidarity Free Trade Union, and Wałęsa was chosen as a chairman of this committee. He kept this position until 1981, when he was arrested as a result of his activities on behalf of workers, and, just after the state of martial law was declared, he was interned for 11 months until November 1982. The next year Wałęsa applied to come back to the Gdańsk Shipyard to his former position as an electrician. While formally treated as a "simple worker," he was practically under house arrest for over 4 years. In 1988 Wałęsa organized an occupational strike in Gdańsk Shipyard, demanding only the re-legalization of the Solidarity Trade Union. After 80 days of "power-testing," the government agreed to enter into roundtable talks in September, and Wałęsa was an informal leader of the "nongovernmental" side during the talks. During the talks the government signed an agreement to reestablish the Solidarity Trade Union and to organize "half-free" elections to Polish parliament. Although officially just a chairman of Solidarity Trade Union at the time, Wałęsa played a key role in Polish politics. At the end of 1989, he persuaded leaders from the Communist Party to form a non-communist coalition government, which was the first non-communist government in Eastern Europe under the influence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. After that, Poland started to change its economy to a Western capitalist system.

During his presidency, Wałęsa started a "war at the top," which meant changing the government almost annually. His style of ruling was strongly criticized by most of the political parties, and he lost most of his initial public support. However, Poland was completely changed from an oppressive communist country under strict Soviet control and with a weak economy to an independent and democratic country with a fast-growing market-based economy. Apart from his Nobel Prize, Wałęsa received several other international prizes and has been awarded honorary degrees from several U.S. and European universities.

Andrzej Falkowski

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Wallace, George (1919–1998)

George Corley Wallace served as governor of Alabama for 16 years and ran unsuccessfully four times for U.S. president. Wallace was a segregationist and outspoken proponent for states' rights. He is most remembered for his attempt to prevent racial integration at the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa. In

1963, Wallace stood at the entrance of a campus building to prevent physically the enrollment of two African American students. Wallace allowed the two students, Vivian Malone and James Hood, to enter the building and enroll in classes only after the Alabama National Guard, federal marshals, and the U.S. deputy attorney general intervened.

Wallace served four terms as governor of Alabama in 1963, 1971, 1975, and 1983 and is the only individual ever to be elected to four terms as governor of Alabama. Before being repealed, the Alabama constitution prevented Wallace from seeking a second term as governor. Instead, Wallace's wife, Lurleen, campaigned for governor and won the 1966 election. Although Lurleen Wallace was the governor, it was understood by Alabama voters that during this time George Wallace was actually running the state government. Lurleen Wallace died of cancer before her term as governor expired.

Wallace campaigned for the Democratic nomination for U.S. president in 1964, 1972, and 1976. In 1968, he campaigned for U.S. president as a third-party candidate, seeking the nomination from the American Independent Party. In 1972, during a campaign stop in Laurel, Maryland, Wallace was shot by a would-be assassin named Arthur Bremer. Wallace was left paralyzed from the waist down after the shooting because a bullet was lodged in his spinal column.

The foundation of Wallace's campaign rhetoric for the presidency was a populist stance promoting strong states' rights through less government involvement, anti-Washington sentiments, and empowerment for the poor and middle-class citizens. Wallace believed his political views were adopted by other successful presidential aspirants such as Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton. In the early 1970s, a Gallup poll indicated that Wallace was the seventh most admired man in America. Despite his popularity, Wallace was unable to win the nomination for either the Democratic Party or the American Independent Party.

In the 1980s, Wallace publicly denounced segregationist stances and reversed his views on civil rights matters. He apologized to African American civil rights leaders for the segregationist views he held in his early political career. In his final term as governor, he was supported by many African Americans in Alabama and appointed many African Americans to high-level state positions.

Wallace was known for his strong and emotional rhetorical style. His populist rhetoric was sometimes characterized as demagogic. The political television advertisements he used in his 1968 presidential campaign are also often cited as examples of ads with strong emotion and fear appeals.

John Allen Hendricks

See also Civil Rights Movement; Populism; Segregation

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War Coverage

The term *war coverage* refers to two dimensions of journalism. On the one hand it describes media content dealing with war and war-related events. On the other hand war coverage refers to the journalistic work process from which media content on wars emerge. This definition of war coverage is based on a specific understanding of war. Essential characteristics of a war are the involvement of at least two military or armed social systems, an extraordinarily high degree of physical force against people or objects, and a certain continuity of combat. This description goes beyond the traditional understanding of war as an international conflict. In civil wars or (partially) non-state conflicts, which have been dominating the statistics of clashes since the end of World War II, at least one of the war parties is to be assigned to the non-state sphere.

War coverage evolved with the development of a periodical press in the 17th century. For the aspiring newspapers of the absolutist European societies, the violent conflicts of 1618 to 1648 delivered the material for news which, in content and form, certainly resembled adventure stories. The relevance of this literary war coverage decreased in the 19th century when the basic principles of today's objective reporting, a differentiated journalistic profession and the role of the "war reporter," developed. William Howard Russell,

who, in 1854, reported to the *London Times* on the Crimean War, is regarded as the first protagonist of modern war coverage. During the following violent conflicts, war coverage changed considerably. Innovations in media technology, economic interests, the abuse of journalism for political purposes as well as information and entertainment desires of the audience represent characterizing factors of war coverage.

The current scholarly understanding of war coverage is mainly based on case studies. Every new war, extensively covered by Western media, induced a batch of respective analyses. Although a comprehensive theory on war coverage does not exist, there are numerous empirical findings on war coverage enabling insights into its effects on political communication. When exploring the production of media content, above all the relation between war coverage and the information management of security policy is, besides the characteristics of war reporters, the focus of scientific attention. International discussions center on, among other aspects, the legitimacy of the secrecy of military information, the chances of the so-called peace journalism as well as the significance of public relations instruments such as censorship or "embedded" journalism.

For the scholarly examination of war coverage, content analyses of media contents constitute the main part of research activities. The results show that, in the initial phase of a war, the subject dominates nearly the entire coverage. Already after a short time, however, the extent of coverage returns to a normal level: The war is again subject to the usual competition of topics. Long-lasting conflicts as well as wars not corresponding to the criteria of news selection are, on the other side, marginalized in coverage. Whether a war is considered worth being covered or is left unnoticed depends, among other criteria, on the involvement of so-called elite nations, the possibility of follow-up communication referring to domestic events, the degree of surprise, the visualization of an event, and the cultural, political, and economic proximity.

The findings of media effect studies show that communication on war attracts considerable attention on the part of the audience, at least at the beginning of a conflict. This leads to ambivalent reactions: uncertainty, depression, anxiety, but also—depending on the respective conflict—satisfaction that finally something was done. The audience's interest, however, fades with the increasing length of the war, as recipients tend to be unresponsive toward events not concerning them personally. Furthermore, research shows that in the United States the public approval of the president, the Congress, and the military considerably increases at the beginning of a conflict. After a certain time, however, the results of this "rally effect" (deriving from "rally-around-the-flag") decline, and the valuation of the political class reaches the pre-war level.

It is disputed whether media coverage generally may contribute to the ending or the enforcement of wars. On the one hand, the media are used to stimulate a patriotic public opinion; on the other hand, the media are attributed the potential to promote peace efforts. In any case the increasing global character of the public communication system has changed the quality of political action. However, the coverage in war situations obviously seems to shape the symbolic agenda more than the actual political decision-making process. The significance of war coverage for the political process increases if politicians are not able to compare the media content to other sources of information. War coverage is especially relevant in phases of decision making and if there is a dissent in the decision-making center.

Even if wars between territorial states become less likely in the 21st century, the numerous existing conflicts indicate that an age of worldwide peace is not imminent. Therefore, war coverage will remain considerably relevant not only as a basis for decision making in democratic societies but also as an object of professional attempts by political public relations to abuse its role in society. It is doubtful whether journalism is sufficiently prepared to appropriately meet these challenges. Especially with regard to war coverage, the erosion of the established news journalism is obvious. This can be seen clearly when looking at the propagandistic coverage of the attacks of the United States and its allies on Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) by many U.S. media which once had been considered as the ideal of objective journalism. On the other hand the increasing public criticism of war coverage may contribute considerably to the improvement of quality in war coverage.

Martin Löffelholz

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War of the Worlds, The

On October 30, 1938, between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m., CBS broadcast the radio play *The War of the Worlds*. The script by Howard Koch was based on the novel of the same name by H. G. Wells, written in 1897; the director of the radio play was the then unknown Orson Welles. The broadcast became a milestone in media history, causing the emergence of many myths. At the same time, it is also a milestone of media research because the discourse in communication science constantly refers to it.

The radio play is about an invasion of the planet Earth by Martians. The first part of about 40 minutes depicts the futile fight of resistance against the invaders. In the second part of about 20 minutes, a survivor describes how he managed to escape and how he discovers that the invaders have died due to terrestrial bacteria.

The radio play stands out because of its numerous and, for 1938, novel plot devices which create an impression of authenticity. It is structured in such a way that elements of different genres (reportage, news, press conference, interview, etc.) are combined in a dramatic manner, clouding the fictive character of the production. Only three times—in the beginning, middle, and end—is the program clearly identified as a radio play. In a resourceful manner it shows the possibilities of the new medium of radio, which is to create a feeling of direct presence.

It is a stroke of luck for communication science that the *Princeton Radio Research Project* analyzed listeners' reactions to the broadcast. That is why we reliably know about some of the events that took place after the broadcast and do not have to refer to the lurid recounts by the press, which exaggerated the individual reactions to a mass panic—a distortion which to this day has obstinately stayed in the collective memory. As a psychologist, Cantril was interested in the variance of the reactions to the radio play and how they can be explained. On the basis of different data sources, the study shows that about 6 million people listened to the whole program or parts of it. The lynchpin of the reception was the estimate of authenticity of the program by listeners. Twenty-eight percent of the listeners thought the program authentic. Of these, 70% were scared; the rest described themselves after the event as calm. Thus, about 1.2 million were excited. In interviews, the various reactions to the experiences became obvious. One group was naive. Its members did not doubt the authenticity of the broadcast but responded in different ways: Some were paralyzed by fear, some tried to flee, and so on. In contrast, the uncertain tried to get a picture of the character of the program through different checks. This in turn led to different reactions. The research produced a complex network of different types of perception and action. The differences cannot alone be explained by the broadcast's high quality and the cultural unfamiliarity with the medium of radio. This would have affected all the recipients just as would the overall historical context (the imminent perils of war, economic situation, etc.). According to the results of the study, the following factors are of greater relevance:

- Differences in the amount of time the program was listened to and in the additional programs tuned in to
- Differences in personality, especially in "critical ability" and "susceptibility" or "suggestibility," which are again connected to educational background, religious belief, and mental stability
- Differences in the situation of reception (the behavior of present persons and the anticipation of non-present ones)

The study reveals the complex network of personal, social, cultural, and media factors which can cause an incident such as a panic. Thus, it is irreproducible to use this media event in order to illustrate a model of intense direct media effects.

The radio play was not only Orson Welles's breakthrough, it also gave rise to many post-productions, among others a TV movie by Joseph Sargent reenacting the production and the effects of the radio play.

Gerhard Vowe

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WARREN COMMISSION

See KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

WASHINGTON POST, THE

The Washington Post is the largest daily newspaper published in the Washington, D.C., area and one of the largest in the United States. Its coverage focuses on political affairs, especially on the workings of the White House and the government. Together with *The New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times,* the *Post* is part of the elite media in the United States, reporting trends and topics that tend to influence other media's publishing agendas. It is also well known for its role in the Watergate affair, which led to President Richard Nixon's resignation in 1974.

The newspaper was founded in 1877 by Democratic politician Stilson Hutchins and was the first newspaper to have a Sunday edition. It is currently owned by the Washington Post Company, which also owns the news magazine *Newsweek* and several other media outlets. By 2006, *The Washington Post* had won 22 Pulitzer prizes and numerous other awards.

In June 1971, the newspaper joined *The New York Times* in publishing excerpts from a leaked government report known as *The Pentagon Papers.* It was ordered by the U.S. Justice Department to stop publishing the secret documents, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the government's injunction a week later.

In June 1972, reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward started an investigation into the arrest by police of five men accused of burglary and break-in into the Watergate office building in Washington, D.C. The reporters soon discovered that the presumed burglars were former CIA agents attempting to plant listening devices in the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee. Bernstein and Woodward's investigation became known as the Watergate scandal and continued for about 2 years, during which the two reporters were able to trace a connection between the break-in and Richard Nixon's campaign fundraising committee. The continuous reporting of *The Washington Post* into the Watergate affair culminated in Nixon's resignation in 1974 and was rewarded with a Pulitzer Prize for Public Service in the following year.

The main criticism against *The Washington Post* is its liberal bias. Although the newspaper's current policy is not to endorse political candidates, it has a history of endorsing Democratic candidates rather than Republicans.

Monica Postelnicu

See also *Pentagon Papers, The*; Watergate

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WATERGATE

Watergate, an apartment complex in Washington, D.C., was the site of a botched burglary of Democratic National Committee (DNC) offices on June 17, 1972, perpetrated by nonaligned covert operatives—known as the Plumbers—working for President Richard M. Nixon, who had originally won the presidency in 1968 with law and order as a major plank in his platform. The name of the apartment complex became synonymous with the journalism that doggedly pursued the president's cover-up of the break-in and with Nixon, the only president in U.S. history to resign.

Two *Washington Post* reporters, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, investigated the burglary, in which the Plumbers were planting listening devices in the office of DNC chairman Lawrence F. O'Brien, and their gumshoe work kept the story alive. *The New York Times,* led by the reporting of Seymour Hersh, also probed the illegal activity. Eventually, in the spring of 1973, when the Senate began to investigate the incident, the news operations of the three major television networks and PBS made coverage of the congressional hearings must-see TV. The coverage made stars of Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina and Congressman Peter Rodino of New Jersey, chairs of the two committees investigating Watergate.

A year later, Rodino's House Judiciary Committee recommended three articles of impeachment against Nixon for abuse of power, obstruction of justice, and contempt of Congress. Then the full House voted 410–4 to begin impeachment hearings. Nixon, with flagging support from his core in the Republican Party, decided to resign on August 8, 1974, rather than face impeachment. The investigations into the matter led to more than 70 convictions, including members of Nixon's cabinet and White House staff.

Bernstein and Woodward, supported by their boss, Ben Bradlee, pursued the story of the burglary, originally reported by police reporter Alfred E. Lewis, and discovered a connection to the White House and the president's reelection committee. Early in the *Post* investigation, the reporters found that one of the burglars, James McCord, who said he had been in the CIA, was connected to E. Howard Hunt, a former CIA officer who was listed as being in the White House. The *Post* duo scrutinized public records and benefited from an anonymous source named "Deep Throat," who turned out to be the assistant director of the FBI, W. Mark Felt, whom Woodward had met briefly while he was in the Navy. Felt told Woodward to follow the money and the story would unfold. Woodward found that a check for $25,000, a donation to the Committee to Re-elect the President, was in the bank account of one of the burglars.

The White House consistently told the country that Deep Throat's information was false or misleading, although there was speculation that the source was inside the inner circle. It must be noted that Felt had been in line to replace J. Edgar Hoover, but when the long-time FBI director died in May 1972, Nixon chose L. Patrick Gray as his successor.

Reporters for the *Post*'s Metro section, Bernstein and Woodward were unfamiliar with how the upper echelons of the federal government functioned and had to learn as the story unfolded. They faced extreme resistance from the White House. However, damaging evidence came from Felt, other FBI agents, and eventually some of Nixon's aides.

So convincing was the work of the *Post* reporters, as well as that of the *Times'* Hersh, the *Los Angeles Times'* Jack Nelson, and CBS's Dan Rather, that Watergate is seen as the crowning moment of 20th-century U.S. journalism. Most historians agree that the reporters had a hand in Nixon's downfall, although a debate continues over the degree of the journalistic role in the unseating of the president. Many in the FBI did not look kindly on the president and his men, and the fact that the Republicans did not have control of Congress also left Nixon vulnerable. Woodward himself has said the press did not cause the president to resign, though Rather has claimed that the cover-up would have been successful if journalists had been silent. Furthermore, technology had a role in Nixon's demise as he had recorded his Oval Office conversations on a reel-to-reel machine. The tapes, which Nixon tried to block from public hearing but were finally turned over to Watergate trial Judge John J. Sirica by the U.S. Supreme Court on July 24, 1974, showed that the president's denials that he had any knowledge of wrongdoing were false.

Perhaps an equally important historical point for journalism was the relative unresponsiveness of the press in the early days of the story. Overall, newspapers, wire services, magazines, and broadcast companies assigned only 15 of 433 Washington-based reporters to cover Watergate in the first six months of the story. The news media before Watergate tended to be less skeptical of public servants. Accordingly, journalists gave Nixon a free pass for months.

Even if some academics are skeptical about the role the *Post* reporters had in bringing down a president, adversarial investigative journalism became a mainstay in the U.S. media for decades. This included the rise of television investigative news shows, starting with CBS's *60 Minutes.* Relentlessly pursuing the facts of a case became the chief function of such reporting, and journalists began to focus on the how and why of stories, not merely the superficial details. This approach was in sharp contrast to another popular form of the day, the "new journalism," which also attempted to go in-depth, but in a subjective manner.

For its work on Watergate, the *Post* received the Pulitzer Prize for Public Service in 1973. According

to mass communication historian Michael Schudson, most Americans saw the reporting of Woodward and Bernstein as a David slaying Goliath; that is, Nixon, who had an enemies' list that included approximately 50 journalists. The *Post* was just emerging as Washington's top newspaper, supplanting the *Star*, which generally was supportive of the Republican president on its editorial pages. As a consequence of the *Post*'s Watergate coverage, owner Katharine Graham found herself the target of a Nixon-led attempt to challenge the licenses of her television stations in Jacksonville and Miami, Florida.

Vice President Gerald Ford replaced Nixon and said, "Our long national nightmare is over." He then pardoned Nixon from prosecution. Public opinion was divided over Ford's decision, but it was not over the watchdog function of the press. Suddenly, being a reporter was popular and investigative journalism was the industry standard. College journalism schools across the country saw substantial increases in enrollment after the 1974 publication of Bernstein and Woodward's book on Watergate titled *All the President's Men* and a Hollywood movie based on the book starring Robert Redford and Dustin Hoffman.

David W. Bulla

See also *All the President's Men;* Nixon, Richard M.; Rather, Dan

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Watts, J. C. (1957–)

Former Republican Congressman Julius Caesar "J. C." Watts, Jr. has the natural gift of charisma and leadership, skills that were honed as a football quarterback and as a youth minister. Although he received many individual honors in sports and politics, he was always revered as a team player.

His accomplishments in sports shaped his personality and his public image, preparing him for a future career in politics. He quarterbacked the Eufaula Iron Heads, the University of Oklahoma Sooners, and the Ottawa Rough Riders of the Canadian Football League (CFL). In 1980 and 1981 Watts was named Most Valuable Player (MVP) of the Orange Bowl, leading his Sooners to two consecutive conference championships and Orange Bowl titles. In his CFL rookie season he was MVP of the Gray Cup game, even though his team ultimately lost the championship. When asked the source of his charisma, Watts once explained that he had spent much of his life standing next to the coach in a receiving line.

During his political career Watts was a trailblazer for African Americans. In 1990 he was the first African American elected to statewide office in Oklahoma. He became the only Republican African American in Congress in 1994, when he was elected in Oklahoma's largely rural and white Fourth Congressional District. In 1997 he was the first African American to deliver his political party's response to the president's State of the Union Address. In 1998 he became the first African American to gain a Republican leadership position in Congress when he was elected chairman of the House Republican Conference.

Politics and controversy were no stranger to the Watts family. Watts's Uncle Wade served as the president of the Oklahoma NAACP. As a child, Watts participated in the integration of Jefferson Davis Elementary School in Eufaula, Oklahoma.

Raised in a staunchly Democratic family, Watts is a proud conservative, claiming that his upbringing and faith taught him the value of hard work, family, and doing the right thing. He opposed many of the social programs that other African American leaders supported, believing they reduce incentives for personal responsibility and degrade family. In Washington he refused to join the Congressional Black Caucus.

Nationally, many African American leaders criticized his conservative stands. However, in Oklahoma he enjoyed the support of several African American state legislators. These local leaders stepped forward to publicly condemn Watts's 1994 Democratic opponent for playing a race card in his first congressional campaign.

Although Watts preferred to be known for his character and policy positions rather than for the color of

his skin, news coverage continually alluded to it. One reporter noted that he gets testy when asked about being an African American Republican. Watts generally dismissed race as unimportant.

After leaving Congress, Watts started a consulting company and is regularly seen as a political commentator on national television. Watts is often mentioned as a potential candidate for office in Oklahoma and nationally.

Rick Farmer

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Watts Riots

The Watts riots (August 11–17, 1965) began with the arrest of an African American man, Marquette Frye, by California Highway Patrol officers for drunk driving. Most accounts now concur that Frye resisted arrest, but it remains unclear whether police used undue force to subdue him. Although named for the small, Los Angeles inner city community of Watts, the riots actually affected many sections of what is now called South Central Los Angeles. In six nights of rioting, 34 people were killed, 1,032 injured, and $40 million worth of property was destroyed. Many of the most vivid images of the Watts riots depict the massive fires set by the rioters. Hundreds of buildings, whole city blocks, were burned to the ground. Firefighters were unable to work because police could not protect them from the rioters.

Public officials and the news media offered conflicting depictions of the Watts riots in their immediate aftermath. Conservatives and many city officials blamed the riots on African American tendencies toward lawless behavior, pointing to the large number of minority men living in the inner city who had criminal records and to the influx of "outsiders" from the South. They observed that looters took far more goods from stores than they could possibly find useful and that it was irrational to burn down one's "own" neighborhood. Some suggested that the riots were an insurrection fostered by urban gangs or by the Black Muslims, at that time considered by the mainstream press as a radical cult. Others suggested that police-community relations in South Central Los Angeles had long been uneasy and that those tensions had exploded into rioting. At the time of the Watts riots, Americans had been exposed to police brutality toward African American civil rights demonstrators, particularly during the then-recent Selma to Montgomery march which was violently dispersed by local police in Alabama. However, the civil rights movement was still primarily associated with struggles for voting rights and an end to legal segregation in the South, so the riots were not clearly associated with the larger movement for civil rights. Finally, many federal officials and some reporters explained the Watts riots as a violent protest against the poverty and hopelessness of life in the inner city. They described the challenges of joblessness and the lack of basic services such as health care in South Central Los Angeles. This interpretation of the riots dovetailed effectively with the federal government's War on Poverty programs just then being rolled out in cities across the country. The War on Poverty seemed to be a response to the Watts riots, and the riots seemed to demonstrate the need for the War on Poverty programs.

Despite this apparent synergy, South Central Los Angeles was slow to come back from the damage done during the riots. In later years, some media reports would suggest that the Watts riots had blighted the area rather than that the community's poverty, and lack of infrastructure had long predated the riots. Nevertheless, today, the Watts riots are most typically represented as the community's angry response to deprivation and neglect, and they remain a vivid collective memory, particularly in Los Angeles, but also nationally.

Jill A. Edy

See also Civil Rights Movement

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Weaver, David H. (1947–)

David H. Weaver is primarily known for his theoretical work on media agenda setting and his landmark studies of American journalists. Weaver's most significant

contribution to the original agenda-setting hypothesis is the psychological concept of need for orientation, which he developed with Maxwell E. McCombs in the 1970s. The need for orientation explains how political interest and uncertainty influence people's tendency to seek information about political issues in the news media. Weaver's representative survey studies of American journalists conducted in 1982, 1992, and 2002 provide exclusive insights into the changing demographic and educational backgrounds, working conditions, and professional and ethical norms that have characterized journalists in the United States during the past 3 decades. His coauthored book *The American Journalist in the 21st Century* is based on the latest survey conducted in 2002 and features interviews with almost 1,500 print, television, radio, and online journalists. Weaver is also the editor of the book *The Global Journalist,* which brings together surveys of journalists from more than 20 countries around the world.

Weaver earned his Ph.D. in mass communication research from the University of North Carolina in 1974, after working as an editor and reporter at four daily newspapers in Indiana and North Carolina and serving as an information officer in the U.S. Army. His bachelor's and master's degrees in journalism are from Indiana University. In 1974, he joined the School of Journalism at Indiana University in Bloomington, where he has been lecturing mainly in the areas of research methods, political communication, and public opinion. In 1988, he accepted his current position as the Roy W. Howard Professor in Journalism and Mass Communication Research.

Weaver's professional achievements, among many others, include serving as president of the Midwest Association for Public Opinion Research (MAPOR) from 1986 to 1987 and as the president of the Association for Education in Journalism & Mass Communication (AEJMC) from 1987 to 1988. His honors include the 1983 Krieghbaum Under 40 Award for excellence in teaching, research and service in journalism and mass communication from the AEJMC, the 1986 Sigma Delta Chi Distinguished Service Award for research about journalism (with G. Cleveland Wilhoit) for the book *The American Journalist,* the 1993 Fellow Award for significant contributions to public opinion research from the MAPOR, the 1996 Sigma Delta Chi Distinguished Service Award for research about journalism (with Wilhoit) for the book *The American Journalist in the 1990s,* the 2000 Fellow Award from the International Communication Association, the 2005 Trayes Award for outstanding contributions to mass communication scholarship from the AEJMC, and the 2006 Presidential Award (with Wilhoit) for 3 decades of research on journalists also from the AEJMC.

Weaver's studies on professional journalism are unique in the field of mass communication because they have provided empirical findings about the work of journalists that can be easily compared across time. Moreover, his studies have brought together communication scholars from different countries who have enriched his research with an international perspective lacking in so many other communication studies.

Lars Willnat

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Web Campaigning

Web campaigning can be defined as activities with political objectives that are manifested in, inscribed on, and enabled through the World Wide Web. The terms *e-campaign* or *hypermedia campaign* are sometimes used synonymously with *Web campaigning* but may also be used to describe campaigns' use of a broader array of information and communication technologies in addition to the Web. To understand Web campaigning, it is important to understand its characteristics, history, and anticipated trends.

Characteristics of Web Campaigning

Various actors engage in Web campaigning in a range of sociopolitical contexts. Candidates for public office and their campaign organizations, along with political parties, seek to accomplish electoral objectives by creating and managing a Web presence that promotes themselves through one or more Web sites. The

pursuit of electoral, legislative, and other political aims through the Web by advocacy groups, lobbying organizations, and individual citizens constitutes Web campaigning as well. Some Web campaigning, including most in the electoral arena, is accompanied by simultaneous and closely linked offline campaigning as well. In these cases, Web campaigning is part of a larger set of activities that include face-to-face interactions and communication through other forms of media. Other Web campaigning is initiated, organized, and enacted largely if not solely online. Sometimes, Web campaigning activities expand to the offline arena over time, such as the international campaigns against sportswear manufacturers accused of supporting sweatshops or in favor of fair trade coffee.

Political actors enact and extend campaign activities on the Web by employing one or more Web production practices. These practices can include informing site visitors about a candidate or cause, involving site visitors in supporting the campaign, enabling site visitors to connect with other political actors online or offline, and mobilizing supporters to become advocates of the candidate or cause. Electoral campaigns, as well as largely integrating Internet applications into traditional campaign activities, have also developed important and highly effective tools for mobilizing activists. In developing a Web presence that goes beyond informing and involving supporters, campaign organizations cede to others some of the control they have traditionally sought to maintain. Web production decisions by political actors reflect the inherent tensions between the desire to maintain control over messages and resources and the generally decentralizing dynamic of Web-based communication.

History of Electoral Web Campaigning

Web campaigning emerged from the experiences of political actors' use of the pre-Web Internet. The history of the Internet begins with the advent of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) in the United States in the mid-1960s. The first overtly political uses of the Internet are usually traced back to Usenet, which was first introduced in 1979. By 1986, some political actors, most often advocacy organizations with international constituencies, had adopted e-mail and bulletin board systems and were using these Internet applications intensively. Many users and contemporaneous scholars believed that computer networking technology had the potential to dramatically alter the nature and shape of political discourse, and of democracy itself, by engaging and energizing new participants in the political process. Following the January 1994 introduction of Mosaic 2.0, the first Web browser that presented integrated graphics, a few electoral campaign organizations in the United States launched Web sites, including Senators Diane Feinstein (California) and Edward M. Kennedy (Massachusetts).

By 1996, the campaign Web site was considerably more common in the United States, the United Kingdom, and several other countries. In the United States, most contenders for the major party U.S. presidential nomination had Web sites, as did nearly half of the candidates for U.S. Senate and about one sixth of the candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives. Analysts examining sites from this era describe them as mostly "brochureware" or "virtual billboards," simply replicating in electronic form materials already distributed in print. In general, Web campaigning was largely seen as a gimmick, or at best an ancillary to "real" campaigning. In 1996, for most candidates, merely being on the Web, or demonstrating knowledge of the Web, was Web campaigning. And only marginal change was noted in the types of Web campaigning in 1998. Although the percentage of candidates with Web sites increased significantly, scholarly analyses concluded that most campaigns limited their Web campaigning to the practice of informing, with little overall development in sophistication or features noticeable.

As the 2000 election season dawned, the dot-com boom was in full swing in the United States. Some analysts proclaimed 2000 to be the "first Internet election" in the United States, and comparisons were often made to the role of television in the 1960 U.S. elections. Though much of this commentary proved to be hyperbole, the 2000 U.S. election marked a significant shift in the attention paid to the Web by political candidates. All major party candidates for the presidential nomination established a Web presence early in the campaign cycle. Several invested significant resources and placed considerable strategic value on Web campaigns.

By 2002, uses of Web technologies that had been pioneered in the 2000 U.S. presidential campaign had become more commonplace among gubernatorial, Senate, and House campaigns in the United States and in many European and Asian national elections. In 2004, some campaigns took yet another leap forward in the complexity and strategic value of their uses of the Web. Candidates for the Democratic U.S. presidential

nomination developed extensive and complex Web presences leading up to the primary elections. Howard Dean, the former governor of Vermont, became established as a serious contender for the nomination and indeed as the frontrunner for a time in late 2003, demonstrating legitimacy as a candidate largely on the basis of his campaign's Web strategy. The Dean campaign dramatically altered the landscape of the political Internet. During its peak, the extent and strength of the campaign was demonstrated not only by the Web sites produced by the campaign but by the material produced by supporters across the Web, on sites including those produced by the campaign as well as those produced by supportive but independent organizations. The Dean campaign demonstrated, on a national level, how a political organization could use the Web as the platform for a large-scale national movement. In just 10 years, some campaign organizations had moved beyond thinking of the Web as an electronic brochure to viewing it as an electronic headquarters.

The Internet was clearly a significant source of political information and a location of political action in the 2004 elections in the United States and many other countries. Over 40 countries held national elections in 2004; European Parliamentary elections were held that year as well. In most of these elections, most candidates and political parties engaged in one or more Web campaigning practices, as did many issue advocacy groups. Informing was the most common practice, followed by involving, connecting, and mobilizing. Web campaigning practices were more consistent within each type of political actor across democratic countries in Asia, Europe, and North America than among different types of actors from countries with similar political cultures. In the first half of 2006, French presidential candidate Segolene Royal drew international attention with her campaign's use of informing, involving, and connecting practices on the Web and the innovative strategy of writing a policy book during the campaign—posted chapter by chapter on her campaign Web site—on which site visitors could comment via a campaign-hosted blog.

Trends in Web Campaigning

Significant changes in Web campaigning can be anticipated during the next few years. The act of producing a basic campaign Web site will be nearly ubiquitous among candidates for elected office in most democracies, raising the baseline of political information available to online citizens. Most practices are fairly enduring and will evolve gradually over time. However, Web production techniques, which emerge with and evolve alongside new technologies, will change rapidly and dramatically and, thus, will reshape each of the practices of Web campaigning. In addition, new techniques will emerge in relation to technologies that enable information provision through a wide variety of interfaces other than the familiar Web browsers embedded in personal computers, for instance, via highly mobile and wireless devices.

As a response to the challenge of producing greater quantities of information that is fresh and interesting (created partially by increased demand for new and relevant content from site visitors), campaigns will increasingly co-produce information with other actors that share their agenda through syndication and other means. More campaigns will provide comprehensive access to candidate biographies, issue position statements, and voting records for longer periods of time, perhaps even providing permanent and sustained archives of key documents, as they seek to control and manage their own online representation.

More significant and perhaps more dramatic development can be expected in the ways and extent to which campaigns engage in the practices of involving and connecting. With respect to involving, there will be greater convergence between the online and offline worlds. Campaigns will increasingly manage citizen involvement and view the relationship through a transactional lens. Campaigns will develop rewards and incentives for individuals to provide credentials, through a user ID and password, to access more and more of their Web sites and information environments. For example, features that track visitor interactions will emerge, similar to online structures on e-commerce sites, suggesting additional activities based on profiles of similar involved citizens. In sum, the campaign's Web site will increasingly be seen as the primary mechanism through which individuals interested in being involved with the campaign will negotiate and manage their involvement with the campaign organization.

With respect to connecting, increased linking to other political actors is anticipated. Fewer campaign Web sites will be constructed on a model that assumes providing links to other actors risks losing the attention of site visitors. Instead, the campaigns will cede more control over the messages to which visitors may be exposed when they follow links to sites produced by other actors. More broadly, campaigns will increasingly

position themselves as connection managers, carefully steering visitors to the sites of selected actors and increasingly seeking to control messages through techniques like framing and syndication.

Of all four Web campaigning practices, mobilizing will develop furthest in the near future. The emphasis on mobilizing activities, especially relative to informing and involving, will increase dramatically, as campaign organizations develop their Web presence using techniques which give site visitors the ability to engage other citizens in the activities of the campaign. In these ways, campaigns will deepen the commitment of involved citizens and more effectively turn them into advocates.

The Web is now a place where many citizens in a wide range of countries look for politically oriented information and where political activity occurs to a significant extent. Electoral and issue advocacy campaigns are becoming increasingly aware that they need to not only post a Web site but also manage their Web presence as it is mediated across the Web on sites that they do not and cannot control. In addition to electoral and issue advocacy campaigns, all types of political actors are increasingly likely to have a Web presence: political parties, civic groups, individual citizens, government bodies, and news producers, including those that were originally established in print and broadcast media and those that were "born digital." Understanding how campaigns use the Web in relation to other political actors, and why they use it in particular ways, is thus a foundational step toward understanding the relationship between the Web and politics.

Kirsten A. Foot and Steven M. Schneider

See also E-Mail, Political Uses; Grassroots Campaigning; Information Technology in Politics; New Media Technologies; Protests, Political; World Wide Web, Political Uses

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Web Site

See Web Campaigning

Webstyle

Webstyle is a term used to describe a system for analyzing how candidates strategically present themselves to voters through their campaign Web sites. Since the 1996 campaign Web sites have been institutionalized in presidential campaigns. By 1998 close to 90% of U.S. Senate and gubernatorial candidates hosted campaign Web sites. Since that time voters and the media have developed expectations that serious campaigns for national or statewide office will host a campaign site; and expectations are growing for races at lower levels as campaign Web sites become financially reasonable for candidates at all levels.

Similar to political television advertising, campaign Web sites offer candidates a communication forum they can control. This control allows candidates to fine tune both their message and appearance, neither of which are subject to reinterpretation by a third party before reaching the voter directly. Campaign Web sites differ, however, in that they are relatively inexpensive to design and host; do not have time and length restrictions; provide textual, visual, *and* video capabilities; can link to materials outside of the site; require an active—as opposed to passive—viewer; and offer

voters and the candidate/campaign an opportunity to interact with one another.

Because of the similarities between political television advertising and a campaign Web site, Webstyle was grounded in the construct of Videostyle—the systematic analysis of political television advertisements developed by Lynda Lee Kaid and Dorothy Davidson. Indeed, the uniqueness of the Internet medium required certain adaptations to the three traditional Videostyle content areas (verbal, nonverbal, production techniques) and the necessity to develop a fourth content area to address the interactive capabilities. As such, Webstyle consists of the following four components: the verbal content of a candidate's Web site, the nonverbal content, the production techniques used on the site, and the interactive content.

Specifically, the verbal content analyzed in Webstyle includes the text, video, and audio available on the Web site. The verbal categories include the issues addressed, use of a negative attack, strategies used in attacking the opponent, candidate characteristics, use of appeals, identification of the office, and identification of party affiliation. The nonverbal content examines the photos of the candidate and others as placed on the Web site. The nonverbal categories include settings of the photos, who is pictured, eye contact, facial expressions, body movement/posture, and candidate attire. The production categories examine the presence of graphics and the type of graphics featured on the site.

The interactive content categories coded in Webstyle include the number of main menu links, types of links, information about feedback links, links to detailed information created by the campaign, links to press coverage, and links to legislation the candidate has sponsored or co-sponsored. Additional categories include links to campaign coordinators in a constituent's specific area, a form for contributing and volunteering, a sign-up form for getting involved, ability to print/download campaign distribution materials, and the opportunity to sign up for e-mail updates.

Webstyle has been frequently applied to mixed-gender races, those races that include a female and a male candidate. Drawing from research on gender-related stereotypes in politics, variables were included to identify if and how candidates were adapting to such stereotypes. Although political television advertising research has detailed how female and male candidates present themselves differently in their Videostyles, Webstyle analyses have uncovered minimal gender-related differences. Thus, at least initially, candidate self-presentation on Web sites did not seem to be subject to gendered expectations, offering female candidates the potential for an even playing field.

In 2000, for instance, as many differences were present when analyzing candidate gender as candidate party and status (incumbent, challenger, open seat). Republican candidates were more likely to discuss taxes, defense issues, and other "masculine" issues, whereas Democrat candidates were more likely to discuss gun control. Incumbents were more likely to use incumbent strategies such as "incumbency stands for legitimacy" and being a "voice for the state"; challengers were more likely to "call for change," attack their opponent, and "invite viewer participation." Open race candidates and incumbents similarly emphasized their accomplishments and "masculine" appeals, yet both did so more than challengers. Female candidates were more likely to discuss women's issues, use expert authorities, and include a contribution form on their Web site. Male candidates were more likely to discuss defense issues, use statistics, and identify their party on their home page. Both female and male candidates were more likely to be shown in formal attire in their photos (as opposed to casual), although women were 23% more likely to do so. Both male and female candidates smiled in their photos, but female candidates were 21% more likely to smile.

In an analysis of U.S. Senate and gubernatorial mixed-gender races from 2000 and 2002, the candidates' Webstyles were again similar. Although gender-related differences were scarce, the candidates actively used their Web sites to discuss issues and to present images as viable political candidates. Yet, the candidates underused interactive opportunities. Less than a majority provided a campaign calendar of events, making it difficult for interested voters to find out how to meet the candidate. Just over half provided detailed information about their issue positions and not one provided links to issue-related legislation. Links for feedback were sporadically placed throughout the sites, and almost half of the candidates did *not* provide a form for getting involved. Not surprisingly, by 2002 approximately 80% of candidates in these mixed-gender races provided forms for contributing.

An analysis of Webstyle from 2004 mixed-gender U.S. Senate races found similar results, determining that the strategies employed by female and male candidates remain in response to the expectations of the medium of campaign Web sites and the candidates' status, as opposed to gendered stereotypes. The

Webstyle research cautions that it is too early to discontinue examination of gender differences in this form of political communication; as structural expectations stabilize, voter cues used in evaluation of other forms of female and male candidate communication may become salient. Further, as candidates' use of the interactive content identified by Webstyle continues to evolve, additional analysis that can offer important implications for candidates, campaigns, and voters is warranted.

Mary Christine Banwart

See also Videostyle; Web Campaigning

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Welfare Policy

Welfare policy has a controversial history in American political life. Values such as personal responsibility, hard work, and family have influenced welfare legislation from colonial times to the present. Interested parties have debated the causes of poverty, sources and goals of assistance, and eligibility criteria. Broadly speaking, welfare policies fault individuals or structures for poverty; rely on private charities, volunteer organizations, or local, state, and federal governments for aid provision; and aim to assist the needy, modify recipient behavior, deter aid requests, and/or reform the welfare system. Policymakers have struggled to define aid eligibility, resulting in an implied hierarchy of deserving and undeserving recipients. The categories of deserving and undeserving have remained relatively constant since welfare's inception; what has changed are the criteria used to define them.

Class, gender, and race distinctions have pervaded discussions of recipient eligibility. Arguably forms of welfare, government programs associated with employment (e.g., social security, tax advantaged retirement plans, flexible spending accounts, and most group health insurance plans) are considered earned entitlements, not welfare. Implicitly, recipients of these types of aid are deserving of assistance. Welfare has acquired increasingly negative connotations, referring to public assistance programs associated with poor, minority, unwed, divorced, and separated mothers. Recipients of public assistance have been stigmatized as less deserving of aid, frequently leading to intense criticism of welfare programs.

Prior to 1935, individualist explanations of poverty prevailed, and relief efforts were largely at the local and state levels, relying on families and institutions for aid provision. Following the stock market crash on October 24, 1929, Americans experienced severe economic hardship and sought federal relief. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt responded with the New Deal and Social Security Act of 1935. Ending a nearly three-century tradition of local and state provision of aid, the Act relied on federal funds and signaled preference of structural over individually based explanations for poverty. The Act provided several forms of aid, including social insurance, work relief, and categorical assistance programs. A relatively low priority at the time, the categorical assistance program Aid to Dependent Children was the precursor to the largest and most controversial welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).

For most of the 20th century, AFDC experienced increased criticism, due to caseload increases, rising program costs, and changing recipient demographics. Many families experienced difficulty leaving welfare rolls and escaping poverty. In response, President Clinton signed the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).

PRWORA replaced the entitlement-based AFDC with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant, giving states increased administrative control over welfare programs. PRWORA's passage sparked controversy; supporters praised the legislation for affirming traditional work and family values, whereas critics accused the law of harming millions of poor and lower-income working families.

For many reasons, including the Iraq War, PRWORA, which was set to expire in 2002, has operated under a series of continuing resolutions as Congress debates reauthorization proposals, many of which emphasize marriage promotion, work requirements, and social services.

Lisa Gring-Pemble

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Wellstone, Paul (1944–2002)

Paul Wellstone was a professor, progressive activist, and two-term U.S. senator from Minnesota. Prior to being elected to the Senate in 1990, Wellstone was a professor of political science at Carleton College and a liberal activist. As a senator, Wellstone was often referred to as the "conscience of the Senate" or a leading spokesperson for the "Democratic wing of the Democratic Party." He served in the Senate from 1991 until his death in a plane crash on October 25, 2002. His wife Sheila, daughter Marcia, three campaign aides—Tom Lapic, Will McLaughlin, and Mary McEvoy—and two pilots were also killed. There were no survivors of the crash. Paul and Sheila Wellstone are survived by their sons, Mark and David.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Wellstone became involved in community organizing, working mainly with the poor. In the process, he gained a reputation as an effective organizer and a powerful speaker. In 1990, Wellstone ran for the U.S. Senate against wealthy incumbent Rudy Boschwitz. He was an underdog, outspent by a 7-to-1 margin. Despite the odds, Wellstone ran a grassroots campaign that energized voters, crisscrossing the state in a green, old, rickety bus. He was significantly helped by a risky advertising strategy that injected into the campaign what would be one of his greatest assets: humor. Finally, Wellstone's surprising victory is also often credited to the "Boschwitz letter," which accused Wellstone of being a "bad Jew" for marrying a gentile and not raising his children in the Jewish faith. In 1996 Boschwitz ran against Wellstone again; Wellstone beat him by a nine-point margin. Wellstone contemplated a run for president of the United States between 1997 and 1999. After relatively extensive travel and planning, Wellstone called a press conference to declare that he would not be a candidate due to an old wrestling injury (which was later diagnosed as multiple sclerosis). Wellstone ran for a third term in the Senate against Republican Norm Coleman in 2002, but the campaign ended abruptly with his untimely death in a plane crash. The replacement candidate was former Vice President Walter Mondale, who lost the election.

Wellstone was a successful legislator, authoring legislation to ban gifts from lobbyists and limit the influence of special interests. He won victories in the areas of economic security, health care, environmental protection, and children's issues. He gained a national reputation for efforts on veteran, mental health, and domestic violence issues. According to former presidential candidate Bill Bradley, however, Wellstone will be best remembered for taking principled but sometimes unpopular positions. He opposed the first Gulf War in 1991. He voted against President Clinton's welfare reform legislation in 1996, and in 2002, he voted against congressional authorization for the war in Iraq. In the end, Wellstone claimed his success as a legislator was due, in part, to abide by a set of four principles: personalize the issue, be relentless, look for unlikely allies, and advocate for those who do not have advocates.

Scott Wells

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West Wing, The

Arguably the most complete and extensive portrayal of the American presidency in popular culture history, *The West Wing* (*TWW*) was a 1-hour dramatic serial program broadcast on the NBC television network from September 22, 1999, until May 14, 2006. A total of 156 episodes of the program aired on NBC, with rerun episodes featured on the Bravo television network. *TWW* has also been released on DVD in yearly installments and in a final series package in late 2006. The program depicted the inner workings of the administration of President Josiah "Jed" Bartlet, a New Hampshire Democrat.

TWW was created by Aaron Sorkin, a film and television writer who was also the screenwriter for the feature films *A Few Good Men* (adapted from his Broadway play), *Malice,* and *The American President* and who created and wrote the television series *Sports Night.* Sorkin wrote and was an executive producer for *TWW* until its fourth season (2003). *TWW* received many awards, including numerous Emmys, several Screen Actor's Guild honors, and two Peabody Awards for excellence in broadcasting. The recurring cast of *TWW* included Martin Sheen as President Bartlet, Stockard Channing as First Lady Abigail Bartlet, Gary Cole as Vice President Bob Russell, Dulé Hill as Personal Assistant Charlie Young, Allison Janney as Press Secretary C. J. Cregg, Rob Lowe as Speechwriter Sam Seaborn, Tim Matheson as Vice President John Hoynes, Janel Moloney as Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff Donna Moss, Richard Schiff as Communications Director Toby Ziegler, John Spencer as Chief of Staff Leo McGarry, and Bradley Whitford as Deputy Chief of Staff Josh Lyman. In the show's sixth and seventh seasons, *TWW* depicted the presidential election campaign for Bartlet's successor that featured candidates Matthew Santos, a Democratic Texas congressman played by Jimmy Smits, and Arnold Vinick, a Republican California senator played by Alan Alda. The show also featured literally hundreds of supporting characters, including members of the president's administration, members of Congress, foreign dignitaries and diplomats, members of the news media, and military leaders.

Originally, *TWW* was designed as a program about the White House staff, where viewers would come to learn the backstage happenings of a presidential administration. That focus shifted, however, when noted actor Sheen was cast as President Bartlet, and the program evolved into a complex ensemble that blended depictions of the president, his family, his staff, and other domains of political and governmental life in the United States. This administration confronted a series of crises, tackled numerous public policy issues, and dealt with ongoing scandal and intrigue. Among the issues discussed in *TWW* were drug policy, terrorism, the census, gay rights, women's rights, civil rights and racial tension, child labor, international trade policy, nuclear proliferation, Mideast peace, conflict between India and Pakistan, and abortion. In addition, the program featured three presidential campaigns (Bartlet's initial election campaign, depicted in flashbacks; Bartlet's reelection; and the election of his successor), an assassination attempt on the president's personal assistant that left the president and an aide seriously wounded, a scandal concerning the president's health, and the kidnapping of Bartlet's daughter.

Although some plotlines on *TWW* stretched credibility, others were certainly "ripped from the headlines." Most significantly, *TWW* produced a "play" titled "Isaac & Ishmael" in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that aired just 3 weeks after the attacks, on October 3. Preceded by an appeal for donations to charities assisting the victims of the 9/11 attacks, the play occurred outside of the show's regular plot and featured a lengthy discussion of the causes of terrorism and exposed assumptions and prejudices at the heart of American responses to terrorism. The special episode was both praised and derided by critics, even as it garnered significant ratings and was one of only a handful of television fictional programs to incorporate and discuss the 9/11 attacks in their immediate aftermath.

Among the criticisms leveled against *TWW* was its failure to accurately and completely depict presidential politics and its depiction of a liberal, left-leaning administration complete with villainous Republicans. Such criticisms are not universal, however, with some critics applauding the program for its capacity to educate citizens about political issues and public policy concerns and others attacking the show for its conservative moralizing and jingoistic nationalism. *TWW* was also simultaneously praised and attacked for its depictions of women and people of color. Although women were often portrayed in powerful positions in the show, with considerable political and policy authority, they were also often sexualized and delegitimized. The same

critique can be offered about *TWW*'s depictions of people of color.

Ultimately, *TWW* tried to be many things at once. The program was clearly progressive in its politics, offering a liberal, Democratic president to its viewers and electing another Democrat to succeed him. But *TWW* also went to considerable lengths to depict Republicans and conservatives in a favorable light, hiring Reagan speechwriter Peggy Noonan and George H. W. Bush press secretary Marlin Fitzwater as creative consultants. *TWW* was a gripping, often sensational television narrative, complete with action, romance, and melodrama, but it also worked to seriously grapple with complex policy questions.

TWW provided a powerful, complete, and extended depiction of a presidential administration to television viewers in the United States and around the world for seven seasons. Some studies have demonstrated the power of *TWW*'s depiction of the presidency. A 2001 Council for Excellence in Government survey discovered a considerable increase in the esteem accorded to government employees, a rise the Council attributed to *TWW.* Other studies have explored *TWW* viewers' reactions to presidents of both parties and to the depictions of President Bartlet's multiple sclerosis. But whatever the reactions, *TWW* demonstrated the viability and power of political topics in popular culture and the singular importance of the presidency in the American cultural imaginary.

Trevor Parry-Giles

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White House Press Corps

The White House press corps consists of those journalists from various news media who primarily cover the presidency. In covering the president as well as other administration officials, they rely on daily briefings and news releases for information, ideally hold officials accountable, and give the White House communication entrée into the presidential news cycle by deadline.

Journalists have covered the president from the nation's beginning, along with other news from the nation's capital. As the power of the presidency grew in the 19th century, two factors led to a White House press corps. First, the number of Washington correspondents increased from four, during James Madison's administration, to several hundred by the 20th century and to almost 10,000 by the 21st century. Because of this, journalists had to specialize their coverage. Second, by the latter part of the 19th century a number of major city newspaper editors and publishers concentrated on reportage of the president so much so that a designated White House space was allotted to waiting journalists. A secretary would give daily briefings on everyday information and advance copies of speeches and arrange for conferences and interviews with the president.

With more and more direct contact with Washington correspondents and a desire to sway public opinion, the White House developed additional techniques to influence its political communication. Theodore Roosevelt held informal press meetings with his "newspaper cabinet," as he called them, when he went over his mail or had his morning shave. For the most part, he gave the journalists background

information, without attribution, and threatened to stop all briefings and press releases for erring journalists. Woodrow Wilson initiated semi-weekly talks and was surprised when a hundred reporters attended. Although the meetings were useful for both the president and the correspondents, even with rules of confidentiality, Wilson found it difficult to be open with the journalists during peacetime and impossible during war; by the end of 1916, he stopped.

To separate from the huge Washington Correspondents' Association, a White House Correspondents Association began in 1914 as a social organization with a dozen or so members; it also acted as a screening mechanism for admission to the president's press conferences. The impetus was President Wilson's threat to cease his press meetings after several journalists published his "off-the-record" comments about a 1913 diplomatic crisis with Mexico. The association accredited members, weeded out rule violators, and negotiated with the White House over their working conditions. Membership was initially limited to those whose duty was to cover the White House (then, print journalists) and who had membership in the accredited press galleries of Congress. During the Franklin Roosevelt years, the association began annual dinners for the president. Today, all kinds of media are represented in the White House press corps.

President Gerald Ford talks with reporters, including Helen Thomas, during a press conference at the White House, Washington, D.C.

Source: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, LC-DIG-ppmsca-08532.

New technologies impacted the White House press corps membership and communication. Radio correspondents were included in the 1940s, television in the 1950s, and more recently reporters for online publications. Now, the press corps relies on the White House Web site for press releases, the daily briefings, the president's schedule, and pooled reports from those journalists who travel with the president. The president's press conferences have gone from taped television during the Eisenhower years to live television beginning with John F. Kennedy to live press secretary's briefings during the Clinton era. Website updates meant that Washington correspondents can follow White House news.

A major issue concerning the White House press corps is whether these journalists serve as part of the president's press agency, as an uncritical transmission belt for official opinion. The difficulty rests in a White House source dependency that is tied to news management and spin. Key White House press corps members are based in the White House, and the press office exerts tremendous leverage over the press corps by controlling the amount of news, leaving journalists little time for enterprising reporting.

Betty Houchin Winfield

See also Journalism, Political; Presidential Communication; Press Conferences; Press Secretary, White House

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Whitewater Scandal

See Clinton, William Jefferson

Why We Fight Series

See Film and Politics

Will, George (1941–)

In 2006 George Will's syndicated newspaper column appeared twice weekly in more than 475 newspapers. However, trying to assign an occupation to George Will is difficult. Although Will is one of the most recognizable conservative political commentators on television, he could also add college professor and author to his résumé. George Frederick Will was born May 4, 1941, in Champaign, Illinois. He received a B.A. degree from Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, a Master of Arts degree from the University of Oxford, and a Ph.D. in political science from Princeton University in 1968. After 2 years of service to Senator Gordon Allott (R-CO) from 1970 to 1972, Will began his career in public life.

Will was the Washington editor of the *National Review* from 1973 to 1976. He began his career as a syndicated writer in 1974 when he wrote a column for the Writers Group, founded by *The Washington Post*'s Ben Bradlee and Katherine Graham. In 1976 Will became a contributing editor for *Newsweek* magazine and one year later, in 1977, won the Pulitzer Prize for Commentary. Other writing awards include the 1978 National Headlines Award for "consistently outstanding special features columns" appearing in *Newsweek*; a finalist citation in the Essays and Criticism category on the 1979 National Awards competition; a column on New York City's finances earned a 1980 Silurian Award for Editorial Writing; in January 1985, the *Washington Journalism Review* named Will "Best Writer, Any Subject"; and he was named one of the 25 most influential Washington journalists by the *National Review* in 1997.

Will began working as an *ABC News* panelist and commentator in 1981 with the premier of *This Week with David Brinkley. This Week* subsequently became *This Week with George Stephanopoulos,* and Will remained a regular weekly contributor to the program.

Will has published seven collections of his *Newsweek* and newspaper columns, including *The Pursuit of Happiness and Other Sobering Thoughts* (1978); *The Pursuit of Virtue and Other Tory Notions* (1982); *The Morning After: American Successes and Excesses 1981–1986* (1986); *Suddenly: The American Idea Abroad and at Home 1986–1990* (1990); *The Leveling Wind: Politics, the Culture & Other News 1990–1994* (1994); *The Woven Figure: Conservatism and America's Fabric, 1994–1997* (1997); and *With a Happy Eye But . . . America and the World 1997–2002* (2002).

Five other books include three on political theory: *Statecraft as Soulcraft* (1983); *The New Season: A Spectator's Guide to the 1988 Election* (1987); and *Restoration: Congress, Term Limits and the Recovery of Deliberative Democracy* (1992). The other two are on baseball: *Men at Work: The Craft of Baseball* (1989); and *Bunts: Curt Flood, Camden Yards, Pete Rose and Other Reflections on Baseball* (1998).

Will taught political philosophy at Michigan State University and the University of Toronto and he taught at Harvard University in 1995 and again in 1998, but he is most recognized as columnist, author, and commentator.

R. John Ballotti, Jr.

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Willie Horton Ad

The Willie Horton ad was a political television advertisement used by those sympathetic to Republican George H. W. Bush's campaign during the 1988 presidential election against Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis. The attack ad emphasized Dukakis's support

of a weekend furlough program in his home state of Massachusetts, where he served as governor. This program, as the ad claimed, allowed Willie Horton, convicted of murder in 1974, to commit rape and armed robbery after he was released from prison in 1987 on a weekend furlough and never returned. A picture of Willie Horton is included in the ad, thus showing that he is of African American descent. This attack first materialized after Lee Atwater, a strategist for Bush's campaign, consulted with aides Jim Pinkerton and Andrew Card and discovered the Massachusetts weekend furlough program. Atwater witnessed the strength of this issue by screening an early version of the ad to a focus group of Dukakis supporters in Alabama, nearly all of whom switched their allegiance to Bush after viewing the ad. Although Dukakis supported this program as a rehabilitative measure, it was actually started by Republican governor Frank Sergeant in 1972. Dukakis, however, was governor in 1987 when Horton was released on the furlough, committed further crimes in Maryland, and remains incarcerated there to this day serving two life terms. The Bush campaign took advantage of this issue by producing its own ad, the "Revolving Door," which focuses on the Dukakis furlough program but does not identify Willie Horton or any other specific offender by name. This ad is often confused with the Willie Horton ad.

The Willie Horton ad was not released as an advertisement by the Republican Party or the Bush campaign, but rather by an arm of the National Security Political Action Committee known as Americans for Bush. The producer of this ad was Larry McCarthy, a former employee of current Fox News Channel chairman Roger Ailes. Others, such as Jesse Jackson and Dukakis's running mate Lloyd Bentsen, called the ad overtly racist. Lee Atwater eventually apologized to Dukakis for the creation of the ad before he succumbed to cancer in 1991. In addition, the "Black Elected Democrats of Ohio" along with the Ohio Democratic Party filed complaints with the Federal Election Commission alleging that the political action committee that released the ad did so as an in-kind campaign contribution to the Bush campaign, but no evidence of campaign finance violations was found.

Although the Willie Horton ad was not aired a great deal, it benefited from repeated play and commentary by the news media. Of course, the Revolving Door ad did run frequently and may have called the Willie Horton ad issues to mind for some voters. The failure of the Dukakis campaign to respond effectively to the charges in these ads is considered a major reason for his electoral defeat.

Although Dukakis abolished the weekend furlough program in April 1988, the criticism of his past support of it continued. Dukakis, however, continued to insist that it was overwhelmingly effective long after its demise. Following his presidential loss, Dukakis announced his departure from politics effective with the conclusion of his third gubernatorial term in 1991. Horton remains incarcerated at the Maryland House of Correction Annex in Jessup, Maryland.

Fredrick H. Sowder

See also Dukakis, Michael

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Wilson, Harold (1916–1995)

Harold Wilson was British prime minister from 1964 to 1970 and again from 1974 to 1976, serving as leader of the Labour Party from 1963 to 1976. His career demonstrates both the importance and limitations of political communications. Born to lower-middle-class parents in Huddersfield, Wilson studied Politics, Philosophy and Economics at Jesus College, Oxford. After a period in academia he became a temporary civil servant during World War II. He returned as a Labour Member of Parliament (MP) for Ormskirk in the 1945 General Election, remaining in the Commons until 1983. He quickly rose to become a member of Clement Attlee's cabinet in 1947.

Wilson came to political activism and the Labour Party relatively late in life (though he made rapid progress once he arrived). During the 1950s he developed an association with the left-wing faction, which coalesced around Aneurin Bevan, but Wilson's ideological baggage was light. Political positioning—to which communication skills and image were vital—was more important. In 1963 the Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell died suddenly, and Wilson succeeded him.

As leader of the opposition, Wilson made a spectacular media impact. He presented himself as a man of

the people and a dynamic leader; he presented Labour as a party of modernization. By contrast the Conservatives, led by the aristocratic Alec Douglas-Home, appeared outmoded. Wilson was an effective performer on the rising medium of television and used striking phrases (including his often-misquoted reference to the white heat of a scientific revolution). He visibly surrounded himself with advisers molded after John F. Kennedy's Camelot—some of whom followed him to No. 10 Downing Street when he became prime minister—whose duties included media management and contributing to speeches. Though the press was favorable at this stage, the substantial opinion poll lead Wilson inherited from Gaitskell declined. He won the General Election of 1964, ending 13 years of Conservative government, but the victory was narrow.

In office Wilson continued in his publicity-seeking, image-conscious manner, recruiting journalists to his staff. The Beatles were given honors—a groundbreaking decision at the time. To appear statesmanlike he was seen smoking a pipe. But Wilson's government—reelected with a substantial majority in 1966—soon encountered disaster. The National Plan for economic growth was abandoned in July 1966, and in November 1967 there was a forced devaluation of the sterling currency. Wilson's turn of phrase, once so effective, became a weakness. His claim that "the pound . . . in your pocket" had not been devalued along with sterling attracted derision. Relations with the media soured. In 1968 the newspaper magnate Cecil King attempted to inspire a coup against Wilson. Though defeated in 1970, Wilson returned to power in 1974. In his second premiership he was charged once again with valuing style over substance. An example of this was his allegedly largely cosmetic renegotiation of Britain's terms of membership within the European Economic Community. While he pioneered some of the promotional and administrative methods used by Labour under Tony Blair, and his governments saw great progress toward social tolerance and equality, his reputation for shallowness and short-sightedness has tainted his achievements, though there are signs of a rehabilitation beginning.

Andrew Blick

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Wolfsfeld, Gadi (1951–)

Gadi Wolfsfeld is best known for his research on the role of the media in political conflicts and peace processes. As an Israeli political science and communication scholar at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, his main political laboratory is the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Wolfsfeld's research represents a life-long commitment to trying to understand how we can use political communication tools to make a contribution to resolving conflict and war. This started with his first article, which was published in 1977 in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and looked at how Palestinians and Israelis perceived each other in ways that contributed to their mutual hatred and suspicion, and has continued into his latest book, *Media and the Path to Peace,* which was published in 2004 and is dedicated to "the victims of violent conflict and their families."

In his first major book in the field of political communication, *Media and Political Conflict: News From the Middle East,* published in 1997, Wolfsfeld demonstrates that the news media play a central role in political conflicts. The major thrust of the political contest model developed in this book is that the best way to understand the role of the news media in politics is to view the competition over the news media as part of a larger and more significant contest among political antagonists for political control. He argues that the political process is more likely to have an influence on the news media than the news media have on the political process.

Wolfsfeld's second major book, *Media and the Path to Peace* published in 2004, turns the analytical lens to the opposite direction: the role of the media in peace processes and especially in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process (but including a comparative analysis with the North Ireland case). This is one of the first major studies to analyze the interaction between the media and the peace process, and its major finding is that the role the news media play in resolving conflict is very different than the role they play in the midst of conflict. Due to a fundamental contradiction between the nature of a peace process and news routines, the media often play a destructive role in attempts at making peace, as they have played in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process.

The most important contribution of this book to his earlier political contest model is the development of the politics media politics (PMP) model, which in essence states that the influence of the news media on a peace process is best seen in terms of a cycle in which changes in the political environment lead to changes in media performance that often lead to further changes in the political environment. Wolfsfeld stresses that it is not a "chicken and an egg problem" because politics almost always comes first. Although the PMP model was applied specifically to peace processes, he argues that this proposition can and should be applied more generally in efforts to understand the role of the media in large-scale and long-term political processes.

Tamir Sheafer

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Women Candidates, Advertising

With significantly more women entering the political arena, exploring the differences and similarities in the campaign communication styles and strategies of female and male candidates has become more important. Studies investigating the role of gender in campaign communication have become more feasible, from a methodological perspective, since the 1992 election when record numbers of women began seeking and winning political office.

Televised political ads provide an important resource for documenting the communication styles and strategies of political candidates as they remain one of the few candidate-controlled (rather than media-mediated) communication tools of the modern political campaign. The importance of television advertising to today's political campaign is underscored by the significant financial resources devoted to such communication.

Television advertising and the control it offers over campaign messages, especially in transmitting information on image and issues, may be more important for women candidates, who are often framed in stereotypical terms by the media. Media coverage of women candidates oftentimes emphasizes their traditional roles as wives and mothers and focuses on their appearance, personality, and personal lives. Women candidates can use televised political advertising to counter such images and present themselves in their own ways and words.

Studies of the communication strategies used by female and male candidates in their television commercials date back to at least 1985. Over the past 20 years, researchers have found both differences and similarities in the ways in which female and male candidates use this campaign communication medium.

In the 1980s, female candidates' political ads were more likely to emphasize social issues considered feminine because they are more commonly associated with women, such as education and health care, whereas men were more likely to focus on economic issues, such as taxes, in their political spots. As far as image traits, women were more likely to emphasize the stereotypical feminine characteristic of compassion and men to stress the stereotypical masculine attribute of strength, although sometimes both sexes emphasized stereotypical masculine traits such as competence and leadership. Although the early studies found that both women and men used negative political advertising, the results were mixed as to the types of attack strategies employed in their television spots.

In their nonverbal communication, these early studies found that men were more likely to dress in formal attire and women preferred feminized business suits and office or professional settings in their television spots. In their production content, female candidates in the 1980s were more likely to appear live in their television commercials and male candidates used more voiceovers.

From the 1990s to the present, as more women ran for political office, female and male candidates have become strikingly similar in their uses of verbal, nonverbal, and film/video production techniques—or "Videostyle" as conceived by Lynda Lee Kaid and Dorothy Davidson—though some differences have been found. In terms of their verbal communication strategies, female and male candidates were similar in the use of negative spots, employing attacks in about one third of their total ads. Female and male candidates were increasingly similar over time in the issues discussed in their ads and, especially, in the image traits emphasized and appeal strategies used.

The similarities and differences that did emerge over the past 15 years in verbal communication strategies are interesting from a gender perspective. For example, although female and male candidates have been similar recently in their use of negative ads, they differ in the purpose of the attacks and strategies employed. Both female and male candidates now use negative ads primarily to attack their opponents on the issues. However, the ads of women candidates are significantly more likely to criticize the opponent's personal character as compared to the spots of male candidates. And, although negative association was the preferred attack strategy in the ads of both women and men, the spots of women are significantly more likely to use name calling.

Attacking the opponent's character, rather than his or her stance on the issues, and calling the opponent names are seen as much more personal. Here, female candidates may be taking advantage of voter stereotypes, which portray women as more caring and compassionate. That is, female candidates may be given more latitude than male candidates to make personal attacks as they enter the race with the stereotypical advantage of being considered kinder. Of course, defying stereotypical norms also may backfire for women candidates as they may be labeled as too aggressive, rather than assertive, by the media.

Male candidates, on the other hand, may feel more constrained by expectations that they treat women with some degree of chivalry by refraining from attacks on the personal characteristics of their female opponents. So, instead, they lash out significantly more often at their opponent's group affiliations, which is a more acceptable and indirect way to question their opponent's character as a member of certain organizations.

Although female and male candidates are increasingly similar in the issues they discuss, image traits they emphasize, and appeal strategies they use in their ads, the differences that did emerge are interesting from a gendered perspective. For example, the top issue in the ads by women candidates running for office between 1990 and 2002—and one that was discussed significantly more often in females' spots than in the ads for male candidates—was the stereotypically feminine concern of education and schools.

The ads of female candidates between 1990 and 2002 also discussed other stereotypical feminine issues—such as health care, senior citizen issues, and women's issues—significantly more often than the ads of their male opponents. As with the issue of education, women candidates may be conforming to stereotypical expectations that consider them to be experts on such concerns. However, female candidates also were more likely than male candidates to discuss the economy, which is usually associated more with men than with women and therefore can be considered a masculine issue.

The only issues discussed significantly more often in the ads of male candidates, compared to female candidates, were crime and prisons, a more masculine issue, and welfare, a more feminine issue. However, some of the male candidates discussing welfare took a hard-line approach, focusing on limiting the number of families receiving such benefits.

Even fewer differences are evident between female and male candidates in the images they emphasize and appeal strategies they use in their television commercials. However, the traits they choose to emphasize both defy and underscore stereotypical expectations about the roles and behaviors of women and men in today's society. The top traits emphasized in the ads by women candidates between 1990 and 2002 were aggressive/fighter, toughness/strength, past performance, leadership, and action-oriented—commonly considered masculine attributes—and honesty/integrity, more commonly considered a feminine quality. The top traits emphasized in the ads by men candidates were past performance, leadership, aggressive/fighter, action-oriented, toughness/strength, and experience in politics—all masculine attributes. Of these traits, women candidates were significantly more likely to emphasize toughness/strength than men candidates, and men candidates were significantly more likely to discuss their experience in politics than were women.

The appeal strategies used in female and male candidate ads were closely related to the traits they emphasized and, thus, also are interesting from a gendered perspective. Both female and male candidates were equally as likely to use all of the elements of feminine style, which is characterized by an inductive structure, personal tone, addressing the audience as peers, relying on personal experiences, identifying with the experiences of others, and inviting audience participation. Male candidates did rely on statistics, a masculine strategy, significantly more often than did female candidates, and female candidates were significantly more likely to make gender an issue in their ads—an indication that at least some women are campaigning as female candidates and not political candidates who happen to be women. The fact that both

women and men candidates used elements of feminine style in similar proportions may suggest that this style works best for 30-second spots on television.

In the nonverbal content of their television ads, it is interesting to note that female candidates were more likely to dress in businesslike, as opposed to casual, attire and to smile significantly more often than men did. Both of these nonverbal characteristics reflect gender-based norms and stereotypical expectations. For example, the choice of businesslike attire reflects the gender-based norms that society imposes on women as they face the challenge of portraying themselves as serious and legitimate candidates. In their everyday life, smiling is regarded as a nonverbal strategy that women use to gain acceptance. Perhaps women candidates are more likely than men candidates to smile in their ads for the same reasons—to gain acceptance from viewers in the traditionally male political environment.

Because society's gender stereotypes more often associate women with families and children, it is interesting to note who is pictured in female and male candidate ads. Interestingly, women candidates distanced themselves from their roles as wives and/or mothers by picturing their families in only 9% of their ads, whereas male candidates showed their families in 20% of their ads between 1990 and 2002. In picturing their families or not, both male and female candidates are confronting societal stereotypes. Women candidates may want to show voters that they are more than wives and/or mothers and to dismiss any concerns voters may have over their abilities to serve in political office due to family obligations. Men candidates, on the other hand, may want to round out their images beyond business and politics with voters by portraying themselves as loving husbands and/or fathers.

In terms of production content, no significant differences between female and male candidates have been found in the past 15 years of study. Both female and male candidates overwhelmingly preferred 30-second spots, both about 90% of the time, sponsored by the committee for election or reelection of the candidate as sponsors. The ads of both female and male candidates were most likely to feature straight-on dominant camera angles and medium or tight shots.

Recent studies also have been conducted for political party affiliation and election outcome to see if Democrat and Republican female and male candidates as well as winners and losers differ in their television advertising strategies. Some differences have been found.

For example, television ads tended to be more negative in races between female Democrats and male Republicans than in races between female Republicans and male Democrats. Female Democrats were more likely than other candidates to use negative advertising; to attack their opponent's personal qualities and background; and to discuss education and school issues, taxes, and health care. Male Democrats were more likely than other candidates to attack their opponent's issues, stands, and group affiliations; voice their dissatisfaction with government; and emphasize their experience in politics, leadership, and past performance. Female Republicans were more likely than other candidates to discuss the economy and emphasize their toughness/strength and qualifications. Male Republicans were more likely than other candidates to talk about crime/prisons and emphasize their trustworthiness.

Winning female and male candidates also use different strategies from losing female and male candidates in their televised political advertising. Winning candidates, both female and male, used substantial issue discussion in their advertising, but this was particularly true of the ads of winning female candidates. Specifically, female candidates who ultimately won had discussed issues more frequently—taxes, health care, senior citizen issues, and women's issues, in particular—and emphasized being aggressive or being a fighter more often than other candidates. Male candidates who won had discussed crime and prison issues more frequently and emphasized their leadership and experience.

Women candidates, both winning and losing, used attacks in almost half of their ads. Losing males were the most negative and winning males the least negative of all candidates in their campaigns.

Overall, it is notable that female candidates who won tended to be those who emphasized masculine traits and both feminine and masculine issues (although more feminine than masculine issues) in their television advertising. Winning male candidates incorporated a mix of feminine and masculine strategies to ensure their success.

In addition to the content of their television ads, it is interesting to look at the effects these appeals have on potential voters. At first, researchers and campaign consultants thought that masculine strategies (aggressive and focused on career)—rather than traditional feminine strategies (nonaggressive and focused on family)—worked best for women candidates in their political ads. However, it now seems that women are most effective when balancing stereotypical feminine

and masculine traits, such as compassion, honesty, toughness, and competence. Also, neutral—as opposed to emotional—appeals for women candidates seem to trigger the greatest audience recall, especially for issue stances. Research also has found that women candidates are more effective when communicating about stereotypical feminine issues as women's rights, education, and unemployment than stereotypical masculine issues such as crime and illegal immigration.

Based on the research, then, women candidates should be advised to emphasize both stereotypical feminine and masculine images and issues in their televisions commercials. Voters will perceive a woman candidate as more honest and trustworthy than a man, and just as intelligent and able to forge compromise and obtain consensus. However, especially in a climate of international terrorism, homeland security, and the war in Iraq, a woman candidate will need to emphasize her ability to lead the nation during a crisis and to make difficult decisions.

Issue emphasis will vary with the context of the campaign. In the 1992 through 2000 elections, the economy, education, and health care were the top issues. According to survey research, voters rate female candidates about the same as, or more favorably than, male candidates on these issues. However, according to survey research, women candidates are considered less able to handle such issues as law and order, foreign policy, and governmental problems. In elections like those of 2002, 2004, and 2006, when the war in Iraq and terrorism emerged among the top voter concerns, women candidates needed to demonstrate their competency on such issues through their television advertising.

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See also Feminine Style, in Communication; Gender and Politics; Political Advertising; Women Candidates, News Coverage

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Women Candidates, News Coverage

Women are underrepresented in the news. Women are rarely used as sources in news stories, and when women are quoted, they are more likely to represent private citizens than experts or authorities. On network news, for example, men are used as on-camera sources five times more often than women are. And, newsmakers receiving attention in newspapers, in news magazines, and on television news programs are much more likely to be men than women. When women are newsmakers, they are much more likely to be entertainers and artists than government officials or activists.

The dominance of men as newsmakers is illustrated by *Time* magazine's choice of "man of the year." Since 1928, when *Time* magazine began selecting "men of the year," only three women have been recognized as sole recipients. The first woman chosen was Mrs. Wallis Warfield Simpson in 1936, the Duchess of Windsor. The next woman, Elizabeth II, was selected in 1956. And, 30 years later, in 1986, Corazon Aquino, the president of the Republic of the Philippines, was chosen.

The scarcity of women in the news may be driven by the dominance of men in the newsroom. According to recent surveys, more than 60% of reporters are men and almost 75% of newsroom supervisors are men. While the proportion of women in newsrooms has increased steadily over the past 30 years, men still outnumber women in news departments across the nation.

Women Politicians in the News

Women in the U.S. Congress, when they receive coverage, are often described as "agents of change." The bulk of the coverage these women receive in the press

emphasizes their work on health, abortion policy, and, to a lesser extent, sexual harassment issues. News coverage of women members of Congress downplays their involvement in other issues, such as foreign affairs, international traits, and the appropriations process. On the international scene, women politicians are also often described by the press as outsiders or agents of change. And women political leaders from countries as disparate as Turkey, the Philippines, Norway, and Nicaragua receive less press attention than their male counterparts.

*Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) (*center*) raises hands with National Organization for Women (NOW) President Kim Gandy (*right*) and others at a news conference March 28, 2007, in Washington, D.C. NOW has endorsed Senator Clinton in her bid for the White House in 2008.*

Source: Getty Images.

Women Political Candidates in the News

The news media also differ in how they cover men and women political candidates. Women candidates receive less press attention than their male counterparts. Moreover, the coverage that women candidates do receive is more negative than the coverage given to male candidates. For instance, news reports covering women candidates often focus on women candidates' poor standings in public opinion polls, or their inability to raise funds for their campaigns, or their failure to secure important endorsements. This negative slant on women candidates' viability persists even among women officeholders running for reelection and among women challengers mounting competitive bids, according to objective measures such as campaign fundraising and support in public opinion polls.

Furthermore, the content of coverage is different for men and women candidates. The news media are more likely to focus on women candidates' personal life, appearance, and personality. For example, after Hillary Rodham Clinton claimed victory in the 2000 New York Senate race, *The New York Times* ran the following headline: "First Lady's Race for the Ages: 62 Counties and 6 Pantsuits." In a similar vein, the *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel* wrote how Clinton "whittled her figure down to a fighting size 8" and mentioned that she had eaten "little more than a lettuce leaf" during her fundraisers.

In addition, the news media, in their coverage of campaigns, is more likely to pay attention to the marital status of women candidates, compared to male candidates. And, when covering political campaigns, more press attention is given to discussing the women candidates' relationships with their husbands and children, as well as discussing their gender as an issue.

When male candidates are covered in the press, there is significantly less attention devoted to their appearance, their choice of clothes, their hairstyle, and their marital status. Instead, news reports on the campaigns of male candidates focus more heavily on their policy proposals and policy priorities, compared to news coverage given to women candidates.

Stereotypical Coverage of Women Political Candidates

News reports of political campaigns tend to mirror common gender stereotypes that people hold about men and women politicians. Gender stereotypes are beliefs about the characteristics and behaviors considered appropriate for men and women. People use these stereotypes as cognitive shortcuts to process information more efficiently in their everyday lives.

These gender stereotypes lead people to associate certain types of traits with men and male politicians, such as competence, leadership, aggression,

and intelligence, while traits like compassion, integrity, passivity, and honesty are more likely to be associated with women and women politicians.

Similarly, common gender stereotypes lead people to view male candidates as better able to deal with certain issues, like economic issues, foreign policy, crime, and defense policy. On the other hand, women are viewed as competent at dealing with compassion issues, like education, health care, and the environment.

The news media coverage of campaigns echoes these common stereotypes. In particular, the news media associate male candidates with certain issues, like foreign policy and defense issues, and specific traits, such as competence, strength, and experience. And, when covering women candidates, news reports highlight alternative issues, such as education and health care, and different personality traits, like honesty and warmth. Finally, the news media is more likely to link issues that resonate with voters (e.g., the economy) with male candidates than female candidates.

The Disconnect Between Candidates' Messages and News Coverage

The electoral consequences of these gender differences in coverage lead people to develop less favorable impressions of candidates covered like women candidates. For example, candidates who are covered like women candidates are viewed by citizens as less viable and less competent than candidates who are covered like male candidates.

Additionally, female candidates often express frustration with media coverage of their own campaigns. For example, Christine Gregoire, who ran for governor of Washington in 2004, lamented the disconnect between her own campaign message and media coverage of her campaign. While her own campaign advertisements stressed her humble beginnings and experience as attorney general, news coverage emphasized her toughness, ambition, and self-confidence—in a negative fashion.

Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, while not a candidate at the time, encountered problems with the press after Hurricane Katrina destroyed much of her state in the summer of 2005. According to a *New York Times* article published in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Governor Blanco was mocked as weepy and indecisive and the press derided her as "momma governor." Governor Blanco's staff was concerned with improving Blanco's image in the aftermath of Katrina. For example, Governor Blanco's spokeswoman, Denise Bottcher, worried that the governor was doing too many first lady things and not acting enough like John Wayne.

In candidates' campaign messages, such as their televised political advertisements, speeches, Web pages, and direct mail, they focus on themes that will lead to an electoral advantage. And, men and women articulate different campaign themes. First, men and women candidates focus on different issues, with women focusing on their stereotypical strengths, like education and health care, while men are more likely to focus on their stereotypical strengths, such as the economy and foreign policy.

However, candidates do not highlight their stereotypical strengths when discussing their personality characteristics during campaigns. Instead, women candidates try to eradicate trait stereotypes by emphasizing their possession of stereotypically male traits, such as experience and leadership. Male candidates adopt a similar strategy by highlighting their possession of typically female traits, focusing on their empathy and integrity in their political communications.

While men and women candidates emphasize alternative issue and trait messages in their campaigns, the news media are not equally likely to cover the messages of men and women candidates. In fact, the news media much more faithfully represent the messages of male candidates, virtually mirroring the content of their political communications. In contrast, the news media are less accurate in their representation of the messages of women candidates, often distorting the messages of these candidates.

Coverage of Elizabeth Dole's Campaign for President

To understand how women candidates are covered, it is instructive to see how Elizabeth Dole was covered by reporters when she ran for the Republican nomination for president in 2000.

The office of president presents women with unique challenges because of the highly masculine nature of the office. In particular, the president's role as commander in chief of the military and as manager of the country's economy highlights men's stereotypical strengths, while corresponding to women's stereotypical weaknesses.

Given that the office of president may draw attention to women's perceived liabilities, it is not surprising that Elizabeth Dole's coverage during the 2000 campaign for president was less favorable than coverage given to her rivals.

To begin, Elizabeth Dole received less coverage and less serious and less sustained coverage than George W. Bush and John McCain, even though Dole was leading McCain in public opinion polls at the time. In addition, the press reported horserace coverage more often for Dole, and the coverage of Dole's viability was negative, focusing on her lack of fundraising abilities. And, Dole received significantly less attention to her policy concerns when compared to her male colleagues.

In addition, reporters covered Elizabeth Dole's personality and appearance more than the traits and appearance of her opponents. For example, reporters described Dole as "robotic," a "control freak," and "over-rehearsed." In an article appearing in *The New York Times,* a reporter explained that Dole prepares so thoroughly for appearances that she requires aides to count the steps she must take to the podium. In the same article, the reporter compared Dole to the former prime minister of Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher, and explained that Dole is so thin-skinned that she sometimes burst into tears when she receives unflattering news coverage.

Coverage of Dole during her 2000 presidential campaign emphasized her gender more than any other aspect of her candidacy and framed her coverage as the "first woman" to be a serious contender for the presidency. By using the "first woman" frame, the news media may have been encouraging citizens to view Dole as a novelty and to view her as a candidate not to be taken seriously.

Moreover, male and female reporters differed in their coverage of Elizabeth Dole. For example, female reporters were more likely than their male counterparts to describe Dole's position on issues (i.e., 25% of the articles by women reporters discussed Dole's issue views, compared to 14% for male reporters). And, male reporters were more likely than female reporters to focus on Dole's personality traits (i.e., 39% of the articles written by men mentioned Dole's personality, while only 27% of the female reporters' news stories discussed Dole's personal traits).

However, women reporters did not always offer Dole praise in their coverage of the candidate. In fact, some of Dole's harshest criticism came from women journalists. The Pulitzer Prize–winning *New York Times* columnist, Maureen Dowd, noted in a March 31, 1999, column that "it's hard to imagine the woman who likes to coordinate the color of her shoes with the color of the rug on the stage where she gives a speech, dealing with any crisis that involved a lot of variables . . ."

Similarly, Mary McGrory, in a column in *The Washington Post* in October 1999, said, "Some men call her . . . an over-programmed perfectionist. And women from outside the South found her deep-fried effusiveness off-putting. . . . Despite her considerable credentials she brought only a skirt to the proceedings and in the end offered only the novelty of the first serious presidential run by a woman." Dole's communications director, Ari Fleisher, often expressed his frustration in the way Dole was covered. Why were male politicians "on message" and women "scripted?" George W. Bush's inaccessibility rivaled Dole's, but he was praised for being "disciplined" and having "a controlled message," while Dole was portrayed as a Stepford-like personality who offers sound bites on command. Although Elizabeth Dole's campaign was plagued by a number of political shortcomings in the 2000 nomination campaign for president, one was clearly the negative and stereotypical news coverage.

Conclusion

Women are seldom used as sources in the news and rarely appear as newsmakers. Women candidates and politicians receive inequitable news coverage, compared to their male counterparts. Gender stereotype may be at the core of this inequity. However, as women's presence in the newsroom increases and as women move into leadership positions in news organizations, the impact of gender stereotypes may diminish, thus shrinking imbalances in news coverage.

In addition, the escalation of women in powerful political positions may lead to more even-handed press coverage. Today, 14 women serve as president or prime minister in countries as diverse as Bangladesh, Finland, Chile, Germany, Latvia, Jamaica, and New Zealand. Some women were freely elected in countries where women historically have held subservient roles. For example, Michelle Bachelet was elected in January 2006 as president of Chile, a conservative, male-dominated, deeply Roman Catholic country. Western European countries are also placing women at the helm of political leadership. For instance, Angela Merkel is currently serving as Germany's first

female chancellor. In addition, in the United States, there has been an increase in the number of women in high-level elective office as well as an increase in women in leadership positions, such as Nancy Pelosi, the minority leader of the U.S. House of Representatives and Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. secretary of state. The increase of women in positions of power may help reduce people's stereotypes about men and women's unique strengths and weaknesses, producing more equitable treatment of women in the news.

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See also Feminine Style, in Communication; Women Candidates, Advertising

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Woodward, Bob

See Watergate

World Association for Public Opinion Research

The World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR) is a professional association of survey researchers from universities and private institutions. It is open to individual people who have an interest in the conduct, use, or teaching of scientific opinion and attitude surveys, social science research, media or communications research, market research, or related activities. The organization has approximately 500 members from almost 60 different countries. It was founded in 1947.

WAPOR aims at organizing and sponsoring meetings and publications, encouraging high professional standards, promoting improved research techniques, informing journalists about the appropriate forms of publishing poll results, observing the democratic process and use of polls in elections, promoting personnel training, coordinating international polls, and maintaining close relations with other research agencies.

WAPOR considers public opinion a critical force in shaping and transforming society. As the constitution formulates,

> Properly conducted and disseminated survey research provides the public with a tool to measure opinions and attitudes in order to allow its voices to be heard. In light of this mission the Association shall . . . promote . . . the right to conduct and publish scientific research on what the people and its groups think and how this thinking is influenced by various factors, . . . promote the knowledge and application of scientific methods in this objective, . . . assist and promote the development and publication of public opinion research worldwide, and promote international cooperation and exchange among academic and commercial researchers, journalists and political actors, as well as between the representatives of the different scientific disciplines.

In furtherance of these aims, WAPOR representatives have taken part in election supervision projects, and WAPOR has repeatedly co-sponsored reports on the freedom to conduct and publish polls.

WAPOR organizes annual conferences, usually conducted alongside the meetings of the American Association for Public Opinion Research in even-numbered years and the meetings of the Worldwide

Association of Research Professionals in odd-numbered years. WAPOR also offers regional and thematic seminars in all parts of the world.

The organization publishes a quarterly journal, the *International Journal of Public Opinion Research,* founded in 1989 by three past presidents of the organization, Seymour Martin Lipset (United States), Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (Germany), and Robert M. Worcester (United Kingdom). From the beginning, the managing editor was Wolfgang Donsbach (Germany). The journal is devoted to the study of public opinion theory and methodology and also publishes studies on the role of public opinion in politics and mass communication, the dynamics of individual and group behavior, and long-term shifts in attitudes and values. Aside from the journal, WAPOR also publishes a quarterly newsletter.

The chief representative of WAPOR is the president, elected for a 2-year term and to be succeeded by the vice president, who has to come from a different country. Along with the immediate past-president, the general secretary, and a number of committee chairpersons, they form the WAPOR Council, the body to lead the organization between annual meetings.

Since 1981, WAPOR has annually presented the Helen Dinerman Award in memory of Helen Dinerman's achievements over 3 decades of public opinion research. The award particularly honors significant contributions to survey research methodology.

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See also Donsbach, Wolfgang; Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth; Polls; Public Opinion

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World Wide Web, Political Uses

Political uses of the World Wide Web refers to the ways in which political actors can use Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) for political action. That political action can include information dissemination, discussion, mobilization, and activism. Information dissemination is the core of the Web's functions and is one of its most heavily used elements. Discussion includes conversation among citizens in online discussion spaces, including Web logs. Mobilization refers to the ways that political organizations can use the Web to engage potential supporters in online or offline political action. Activism refers specifically to the uses to which activist-citizens use the Web for political expression and protest.

The World Wide Web is a set of agreed upon standards designed to relay digital information across the Internet. One can think of the Web as being similar to the conventions that govern how analog signals are broadcast to television sets. Those conventions ensure that the programming content is received by the television set and then channeled through it for viewers to see.

The World Wide Web has three essential components. The first component is the standards that govern the encoding of information. This is called HTML, and it was developed by software engineer Tim Berners-Lee. HTML is a set of expressions called tags that convey how information should be presented, including what should be the background colors, font sizes, and location of text and images on the page. The second component is the standard for sending information through the Internet, which is known as Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). The third component is the naming convention that identifies a site. This is known as the Uniform Resource Locator (URL). The URL can be thought of as a unique address, similar to a street address for postal mail, and is often referred to as the domain name.

To illustrate how the Web works, take for example the Web page for the White House. Its URL is www.whitehouse.gov. To view the content of that Web page, a person must use a Web browser, which is the software program that reads the encoded text, graphics, and design of the page. To see the page, a person would type the URL http://www.whitehouse.gov, which tells the browser to retrieve the HTML of the resource whitehouse.gov using HTTP to send the information through the Internet.

Additional software can be embedded in a Web site to add functions, such as forms that a user can fill out, polls or surveys that users can answer, audio and video they can download, and threaded discussion or

a chat room for visitors to talk with each other or with the host of the Web site. These additional functions increase the World Wide Web's utility for political action. Without them, the Web primarily serves as an information dissemination tool. With them, the Web also becomes a conduit for interaction between people (through discussion spaces) and for interaction between people and the Web site (through multimedia downloads or click polls).

Researchers of political communication have found that the technical characteristics of the World Wide Web open up the possibility for political action. Web pages are relatively cheap to produce, especially compared with newspapers or television. This inexpensive cost entails that more people can share information or express themselves online than they could through traditional media channels. The phenomenon of Web logging is a good example of this. Web logging or "blogging" is a way for people to easily create a personal space on the Web and then to express their opinions or share information with readers of the blog.

Software tools have been developed to make Web page creation possible for the technically inexperienced. Tools, such as blogger, were developed to make it easy for people to build and maintain a blog. Facebooks, services designed to promote social networks such as My Space, Orkut, and Friendster, make it easy for people to create personal Web pages to express themselves and to find and network with others of similar interests.

Information Dissemination

The World Wide Web is at its essence an information dissemination tool. Its original purpose was to help individuals, organizations, and governments to display information for others to view. Although it now offers much more than this, at its core it is a highly efficient, inexpensive, and user-friendly way to display and to find information.

Political organizations and political campaigns increasingly rely on the Web to display information about themselves and their activities. Nearly all candidates for political office at the state and federal levels create a campaign Web site during the campaign season in the United States and Europe. U.S. presidential candidates since the 1996 presidential election have created a Web site. Most candidates running for state and federal offices also develop Web sites.

Political campaigns use the Web as a means through which to connect to potential supporters alongside older forms of campaigning, including broadcast advertising, door-knocking, and free media. The advantage of the Web site for the political candidate is the opportunity to express a lengthy and detailed message, with elaborated issue positions, unfiltered by journalists and unconstrained by the 30-second sound bite. Candidates' Web sites generally include issue positions, biographical statements, texts of speeches, press releases, archives of advertisements airing on television, and campaign events. Information dissemination is an essential element of any political campaign Web site.

Traditional political and social organizations have established Web sites to disseminate information about their organizations, to detail the problems the organizations work to solve, and to highlight solutions toward which the organizations work. Organizations—ranging from the mainstream environmental group, Sierra Club, to the more radical animal rights group, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, to the Countryside Alliance, an organization in the United Kingdom working to stop a proposed ban on hunting with dogs—have elaborate Web sites devoted to informing visitors about the organizations and their work.

New tools have been developed to make it easier for users to manage the wealth of information on the Web. Really Simple Syndication (better known as RSS) is a software application that allows users to create what is known as a Web feed. These feeds allow users to see summaries with links to news stories, updated information on Web sites, or blogs that the user is tracking. Users can view these feeds through an aggregator service, such as Feedster, and these services are also embedded in updated versions of most Web browsers.

Discussion

Discussion and deliberation Web sites—made possible because of additional software that is embedded in HTML—promote political conversation among citizens and between citizens and elites. Some Web sites, such as Google groups, Usenet (accessed now through Google), and Yahoo! chat, offer spaces for political conversation. Other Web sites, such as E-thepeople.org, are designed specifically for political discussion, allowing users to rate the posts, creating a user-controlled discussion space. Some Web sites, such as Slashdot .org, an otherwise nonpolitical discussion space about information technologies, has a special section for political topics. Political blogs also often include an opportunity for readers to comment on the blog posts and to engage in conversation with others.

In general, political organizations and campaigns do not include applications on the site to enable citizens to talk with each other or with organizers. Generally, political campaigns, for example, view forums for political discussion as a risky addition to the Web sites. There are a few notable exceptions, such as the campaign of Howard Dean, a candidate in the Democratic primaries of 2004. Although he did not win any primaries and dropped out of the race, the campaign was heralded for using blogs to promote a sustained dialogue between the campaign and supporters.

Mobilization

Web sites are also used for mobilizing supporters to the social cause or political campaign. Involvement and mobilization tactics include inviting supporters to use secure online transactions to donate money, to send information to the campaign via feedback forms to indicate if the visitors would like to become more involved with the organization or campaign, to invite the visitors to sign up for e-mail alerts or newsletters, or to offer electronic petitions for visitors to sign and which are then delivered to politicians or other power elites. These tactics situate the visitors to the Web sites as not only information seekers but also as political actors who can participate in the political process in a variety of ways.

An example of organizational uses of the Web for involvement and mobilization is that of the environmental organization Environmental Defense Fund (EDF). The EDF, established in the 1960s in the United States to ban the chemical DDT, had no real membership until 1999 when its leaders shifted their organizational structure to harness the Web. The organization created a database-backed Web site to invite visitors to share their environmental concerns with the organization and to receive information about environmental issues from EDF by filling out a form on the Web site. Through this strategy the organization developed a list of over 120,000 people who expressed interest in the organization and who can be mobilized by the organization to write letters to members of Congress or to switch to compact fluorescent light bulbs to reduce the amount of electricity households use.

Political Activism

Political activism is another use to which the Web is put. It refers to the activities citizens can engage in to advocate for, or protest against, a political candidate, public policy, or social issue. The Web facilitates many of the traditional offline forms of political activism, including information dissemination (discussed earlier), and also opens up some new forms of political protest made possibly because of the communication technology, including new forms of political parody, "hactivism," and vote swapping, to name a few.

Because the Web is a digital medium, the name of each Web site must be unique. A user who misspells the URL of the desired Web site or who uses a .com rather than a .org designation will find themselves at an entirely different Web site from the one they seek. Some political activists have used this feature of the Web to engage in a kind of domain name activism for political parody. For example, in the 1996 U.S. presidential campaign Republican candidate Bob Dole created a Web site at the domain name www.dole96.com. His staff did not purchase other domain names and early in the campaign season a parody Web site was developed that capitalized on the confusion users have between .com and .org Web sites. They created a parody site at www.dole96.org that operated on associations noninformed citizens might have about Dole, such as that he was the head of the Dole pineapple company. The parody site included much of the same images and content from the official Dole Web site but altered them to make jokes at Dole's expense.

Citizen-activists can also engage in "hactivism," political motivated sabotage of Web spaces. Techniques include breaking into the server holding Web site content and altering it, and denial of service attacks that overload the servers by bombarding the servers with requests for content. A group calling itself the Yes Men engaged in a denial of service attack on the Dow Chemical Corporation to protest the company's refusal to pay additional reparations to victims of a 1984 chemical spell in Bhopal, India.

Another novel political use of the Web occurred in the 2000 election in the United States. In that election three candidates vied for office, Republican George Bush, Democrat Al Gore, and Green Party Ralph Nader. In October of that year, several Web sites were developed to allow Nader supporters to find Gore supporters, with the intention of swapping votes in the election. Voters in states likely to go to Bush and who had an inclination to vote for Gore could help out the Green party by agreeing to vote for Nader, while those Nader supporters in contested states could vote for Gore.

The range of political uses of the Web will become even larger as it evolves. Current trends suggest that more applications will be accessible through the World

Wide Web, making the Web similar to a personal workspace with spreadsheet and word processing applications available through Web sites, such as Google. In addition, there is a push to make different applications on the Web work with each other, such as to have one's online photo diary, such as Yahoo!'s Flickr, work with a blogger site to easily combine user photos and blog posts. Such applications may make it easier for novice users to harness the Web for political ends and may be used creatively by organizations or activists for new forms of political expression and action.

One must recognize that the political uses of the Web are limited to those with access. There are still many without access, some of whom choose not to have access while others lack the skills, resources, or live in geographic locales without connectivity. For those with Internet access and an inclination to become politically active, however, the political uses to which the Web can be put are diverse and plentiful.

Jennifer Stromer-Galley

See also Blogs, Blogging; E-Mail, Political Uses; E-Voting; New Media Technologies; Web Campaigning

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

YASSINE, ABDESSALAM (1928–)

Abdessalam (sometimes translated as Abdul Salam) Yassine, born in 1928, is the leader of Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan (Justice and Charity), one of the leading Islam-oriented political movements in Morocco. Founded in the early 1980s, Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan is popular among students, professionals, and Moroccan diasporas in Europe and North America.

Yassine has tried different political communication strategies to appeal and target a variety of groups inside and outside Morocco. Yassine's books have functioned as a channel for voicing Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan's perspectives and thus gain access to Moroccan elite publics. He initially chose the book medium as a platform for communicating with Moroccan intellectuals. Yassine's first book was published in 1972. He has published more than 20 books, and thus can be regarded as one of the most prolific ideologues in the Arab world.

In 1973, Yassine published a 114-page letter *Al-Islām Au At-Túfān: Risāla Maftúha Ilā Malik Al-Maghrib* (lslam or the Deluge), which earned him a 3-year imprisonment. After his release in 1978, he began preaching and was then banned from mosques. Yassine established his first periodical, *Al-Jama'a* (The Group) in February 1979. *Al-Jama'a* initially appeared quarterly and then turned into a monthly magazine and was banned in July 1984, after its 16th issue. The magazine's year of publication was suggestive because it coincided with the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution of 1978 to 1979.

The communication technologies of the second generation, especially cassettes and videos, have captured the imagination of Yassine since the early 1980s. With the growing popularity of Sheikh Abdel Hamid Kishk's cassettes among Arab masses, Yassine quickly realized the potential of what has come to be known as "Islamic small media" to target Moroccan masses.

Having been banned from preaching, in 1982 Yassine recorded more than 40 videos on the basis of his books. His cassettes were, and still are, very popular and widely circulated among his followers and supporters in Morocco, Europe, and North America. Yassine also used video films for internal communication.

The Internet gained momentum in Moroccan politics on January 28, 2000, when Yassine launched a Web site to release a memorandum (a critical letter), titled "to whom it concerns" in many European languages on the Internet, after the political regime prevented the independent magazines from publishing the full text of the memorandum. The conscious use of the Internet to modernize his political communication arsenal was announced in a press conference, which suggests the paramount importance Islamists place on new media. The personal Web site "Yassine Online" published many of his writings, including some of his books, which are technically banned in Morocco.

In the area of social software, Yassine is again in the vanguard. He employs podcasting to target the Moroccan youth, who have become familiar with these new tools.

Mohammed Ibahrine

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YELLOW JOURNALISM

Yellow journalism refers to the style of journalism that features scandals, sensationalism, and unethical or unprofessional practices by news media organizations or journalists. The term originated during the newspaper battles between Joseph Pulitzer's *New York World* and William Randolph Hearst's *New York Journal.* It was another newspaper, *New York Press,* that coined the term *yellow journalism* in 1897, apparently arising from *The Yellow Kid* comic strip that both papers featured in their Sunday editions. From 1895 to about 1989, these two papers were accused of sensationalizing news, exaggerating news, and, even, creating news to increase circulation, although both papers reported serious news as well.

In regard to the *New York World,* Pulitzer's strategy of low cost, high volume, and a mixture of crime stories, games, and investigative reporting made the paper the highest circulated in New York. Pulitzer's strong link to the Democratic Party also helped increase circulation. Other New York newspapers attacked the *World* because of its success and accused it of yellow journalism. Hearst founded the *Journal* to compete with the *World* and was very successful at luring reporters and consumers to the *Journal.* The *Journal* was also Democratic and sympathetic to immigrants, laborers, women, and the poor. Even though these two papers did feature war-hawk stories and inaccurate accounts on their front pages, the journalists who traveled to Cuba to report the war, including Hearst himself, have been credited with exposing the injustice and misrule of the Spanish over Cuba.

In modern times, the term *yellow journalism* is reserved for news media that use sensationalism, profiteering, propaganda, journalistic bias, or government pandering. Some critics accuse the media conglomerates of cowardly journalism with its focus on infotainment. However, most news media organizations today are respected for, and take pride in, factual, objective, balanced, and fair news reporting.

Kristen D. Landreville

See also Muckrakers, Muckracking; Tabloids

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YELTSIN, BORIS (1941–2007)

Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was born in the village of Butka and went down in history as the first freely elected president of Russia. Sworn in as president of the Russian Federation on July 10, 1991, Yeltsin remained in office for over 8 turbulent and decisive years of Russia's democratization and adoption of a free-market economy until he unexpectedly resigned on the eve of 2000 in favor of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, making the former KBG spy acting president.

Yeltsin's early career saw numerous ups and downs. In 1955 he graduated from the Ural Polytechnic Institute in Sverdlovsk with a degree in construction. After joining the Communist Party in 1961, he occupied a number of local and central-level positions in construction and party administration, both in Sverdlovsk and Moscow, including first secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional committee, the experience he later likened to being "a god, a czar, a master of his province," and member of the USSR Supreme Council. Several years after his fall from grace within the Communist Party, the end of the 1980s saw his career accelerate. Following his nationally televised critical speech at a party conference in 1989, which well echoed the public mood of discontent with the government, he was elected delegate to the Congress of People's Deputies and began his steady rise to power.

Yeltsin earned the acclaim of the democratic world and secured his place in history during the August 1991 coup by communist hard-liners when he famously rallied his supporters to oppose the coup and demand the release of Gorbachev. The footage of Yeltsin mounting a tank outside the White House is one of the unforgettable political communication images of the 1990s and has earned a place in the world's textbooks.

Gorbachev's one-time protégé, Yeltsin saved the *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) champion's rule, only to end it several months later.

The years 1990 to 1991 mark the transition from the Soviet Union to independent Russia. In the 18 months following Yeltsin's resignation from the Communist Party in July 1990, he not only became president of Russia but also rendered the Soviet Union obsolete by negotiating (with the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus) the establishment on December 8, 1991, of the Commonwealth of Independent States behind Gorbachev's back. On December 25 of that year Gorbachev resigned as president of the Soviet Union that no longer existed.

Yeltsin's 8 years in power were mixed at best. He supported the free media more than his predecessors and his follower, he eagerly collaborated with the Western world, and he maintained friendly relations with the newly independent former Soviet satellites of Central and Eastern Europe. However, economic reform was slow and ineffective, and many of the monetary funds given to Russia by international institutions to help the process of democratization were squandered by his circle. Yeltsin also ordered the military invasion of Chechnya. His leadership was compromised by his erratic behavior, frequent disappearances, personal weaknesses, poor health, and firing his cabinet four times.

As a result, his chances for reelection in 1996 looked dim, reflected in his 35% of the vote during the first round of that election. However, with the financial help of influential business oligarchs and the expertise of American political communication consultants, he did manage to beat his communist challenger, Gennady Zyuganov, in the runoff election. Rumors of Yeltsin's poor health were managed with campaign TV images of Yeltsin vigorously dancing at rallies. Later that year he spent months in the hospital undergoing and recuperating from quadruple bypass surgery. At the time of his resignation, Yeltsin's popularity oscillated around 5%. In his televised resignation speech, Yeltsin asked forgiveness and apologized for his mistakes.

Married to Naina Yeltsin (born Naina Iosofovna Girina in 1932), he had two daughters, Yelena and Tatyana, and five grandchildren. After his resignation on December 31, 1999, he kept a low profile, enjoying his comfortable life and occasionally endorsing Putin as "the right choice" for Russia.

His health, however, was in decline from the time he resigned, and in April 2007, he died of heart failure at the age of 76.

Tomasz Płudowski

See also Gorbachev, Mikhail; Russia, Democratization and Media

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YOUTH VOTING

Youth voting typically refers to the voting trends of 18- to 24-year-olds in the United States. Citizens as young as 18 years old were first able to vote in U.S. federal elections in 1972 following the ratification of the 26th amendment to the U.S. Constitution on July 1, 1971, which lowered the voting age in state and federal elections to 18 years old (the voting age was set at 21 years old in the original U.S. Constitution). Since that time, youth voting has been closely tracked.

Voting numbers indicate that the electoral participation of young people in the United States was highest in 1972, when they were first given the right to vote, and has declined in years since then. There are several ways to measure the number of young people who voted in elections. The most widely reported measure of youth voter turnout is calculated by the U.S. Census Bureau. This measure is an estimate of the number of young voters calculated from a Census Bureau survey conducted immediately following a general election. That number is then divided by an estimate of the number of young citizens of the United States. While the Census Bureau process for generating estimates of youth voting has been debated, the data are the most consistent with regard to methodology and its reported numbers are similar to other reports of youth voting. Since the U.S. Census Bureau has used consistent methodology for generating its reports, the trends for youth voting can be reported from 1972 to present. The U.S. Census Bureau reported voting estimates for presidential election years only. Additionally, there are few consistent reports of young voter turnout prior to 1972 (when the minimum voting age in federal elections was 21), which limits comparisons prior to this time.

Overall, voter turnout for 18- to 24-year-olds in the United States has generally declined since 1972, with two exceptions, 1992 and 2004. In 1972, 52.1% of citizens aged 18 to 24 voted. The overall downward trend begins in 1976 with 44.4% turnout, followed by 43.4% turnout in 1980, 44.3% in 1984, and 39.9% in

1988. Youth voting took a dramatic turn in 1992 increasing to 48.6% turnout, the highest turnout since 1972. However, the trend was short-lived when, in 1996, the lowest turnout was recorded at 35.6%, and low turnout continued in 2000 with 36.1%. Another increase was seen in 2004 with 46.7% turnout among 18- to 24-year-olds. Given that the increase in young voter turnout in 1996 was for only one election cycle, many believe that the increase in 2004 will be just as short-lived.

However, more than 11.6 million American youth voted in the 2004 presidential election. Young voter turnout was at a 12-year high in the 2004 presidential election with a 46.7% turnout. The young voter demographic showed an 11% increase in voter turnout from 2000 to 2004—the largest increase of any age demographic during that time. Young voters also represented a larger share of the total votes cast in 2004 (9.3%) than in any of the previous 11 years. However, several reports leading up to the election indicated that approximately 80% of registered voters in this demographic intended to vote; therefore, the 46.7% young voter turnout on Election Day was extremely low when compared to the reported intent to vote.

Several reports of youth voting further divide turnout in this age group by gender and education. Generally, young women vote in higher numbers than do young men, with a 6% gender gap in the 2004 election (50% female, 44% male). A comparison of young people with at least some college education to those with only a high school education indicate that those with only a high school education vote in much lower numbers than their college-educated counterparts. For instance, in 2004, 18- to 24-year-old college citizen turnout was 59% compared to only 34% of 18- to 24-year-old non-college citizens. Additional comparisons of youth voter turnout to other age groups indicate that youth voting rates also fall below those of any other age group in the United States.

A number of nonprofit, governmental, and media organizations have been established with the purpose of civically engaging young people and increasing the youth vote in U.S. elections. Nonprofit organizations such as the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning, the Harvard University Institute of Politics, the American Democracy Project, and Campus Compact are all dedicated to examining the lack of civic and political participation by young voters and have developed programs to increase their participation. Many of these organizations provide reports of youth voter turnout rates and conduct surveys of the attitudes of young people toward the political process. At the state level, the National Association of Secretaries of State has also initiated several programs to address the low levels of engagement among the young voter demographic. MTV also embraced the cause in the past few presidential general elections with its Rock the Vote campaign, focusing programming and advertising using celebrity endorsements to encourage youth voting with the slogan "Vote or Die."

The trend of low turnout among young voters is visible not only in the United States. In countries that do not have compulsory voting laws, turnout of young voters also lags behind that of older age demographics. In the United Kingdom, for instance, young voter turnout is much lower than all other age groups in parliamentary general elections despite higher overall voter turnout in the United Kingdom than in the United States. In recent Canadian elections, only about 22% of young voters (18- to 20-year-olds) participated compared to about 83% of those over 65 years old. Compulsory voting laws seem to have a positive influence on youth voting. In countries with compulsory voting laws, such as Australia, youth voter turnout is much higher than in noncompulsory countries. However, youth voting still lags behind voting rates of older demographics in Australia, with approximately 80% of young people (18 to 25 years old) turning out on Election Day compared to an overall 95% voter turnout.

Jenifer L. Lewis

See also *American Voter, The*; Rock the Vote; Voter Behavior

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Z

Zhelev, Zhelyu (1935–)

Zhelyu Zhelev, Bulgarian philosopher and politician, is a former dissident and president of Bulgaria (1990 to 1997). He graduated with a degree in philosophy from Sofia University (1958) and earned a Ph.D. (1974) and a Doctor of Science (D.Sc.) degree (1988). As a philosopher, he worked in the field of ontology. He had membership in the Bulgarian Communist Party but was expelled in 1965 for questioning Leninist theory. He subsequently was expelled from Sofia (1966), spending 6 years without employment. In 1974 he started work at the Institute of Culture as head of the Culture and Personality Department (1977–1982).

Zhelev is the author of a number of books and publications. In 1967 he finished his book *Fascism*, which was published 15 years later. Three weeks after its publication the book was banned and withdrawn from the bookshops because of the obvious likeness between the fascist dictatorship and the Socialist state system. Zhelev took part in the organization of the Public Committee for Ecological Protection of the Town of Rouse in 1988. In 1989 he became founding member and chair of the Club for Support of Glasnost and Perestroyka (Restructuring), which boosted him to the position of chair of the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF).

The UDF was founded in 1989, after the overthrow of the communist leader Todor Zhivkov. It was a coalition of a group of nongovernmental organizations and restored former parties aimed at discarding the communist totalitarian system and establishing democracy in Bulgaria. UDF formed two governments—one headed by Filip Dimitrov (1991–1992) and one by Ivan Kostov (1997–2001)—and had two presidents from its ranks: Zhelyu Zhelev (1990–1997) and Petar Stoyanov (1997–2001). In 1997 UDF organized protests against the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) government. The members of Parliament (MPs) were besieged in the Parliament by the social unrest and the parliament building itself was violated. This brought about preliminary parliamentary elections won with a convincing majority by UDF. In a short period of time UDF was transformed into a party, but the centrifugal forces prevailed and it was fragmented once more into small formations that weakened the right wing in the country. UDF is an associated member of the European People's Party.

Zhelyu Zhelev was elected MP to the 7th Grand National Assembly in 1990. On August 1, 1990, the assembly elected him president. During his term of office, the BCP Party House was set on fire (1990) and the New Constitution of Bulgaria was adopted (1991). In January 1992 Zhelyu Zhelev stepped into office as the first democratically elected Bulgarian president and served the full 5-year term. However, in 1996 he was defeated in the primary elections by the new UDF candidate Petar Stoyanov. In order to keep UDF intact, Zhelev withdrew from the contest.

Currently, he is one of the patrons of the Liberal International. He also presides over his own foundation, which was established in 1997. Zhelev was the initiator and president of the Balkan Political Club, a union of former political leaders from Southeastern Europe.

Lilia Raycheva

See also Bulgaria, Democratization

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ZHIVKOV, TODOR (1911–1998)

Long-time Communist leader of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov was the longest serving among all Eastern Bloc leaders. A printer by trade, Zhivkov was a member of Parliament for 35 years (1954–1989) and first secretary of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party for 9 years (1962–1971). He served as prime minister and for 18 years (1971–1989) was the head of state.

Todor Zhivkov's career is related to the general development of Bulgaria when the country fell into the zone of influence of the Soviet Union under the Yalta treaties (1945). After the coup on September 9, 1944, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), supported by the Red Army advancing into the country, quickly managed to take absolute political and economic power. A totalitarian regime was imposed under communist supremacy, legitimized by the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria of 1947, known as Dimitrov's Constitution. The multiparty sector was reduced to only one other party besides the BCP, the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union, which in fact was a satellite of the ruling BCP. The political opposition was routed. Many paid with their lives, others were interned; a third group chose to emigrate. After the death of Prime Minister (serving from 1946 to 1949) Georgi Dimitrov and the chairman of the National Assembly Vasil Kolarov (serving from 1945 to 1949), both prominent figures in the Communist International, Todor Zhivkov began his smooth ascent up the party hierarchy. In 1954 he became first secretary of the CC of the BCP. Since 1981 that post was renamed secretary general of the CC of the BCP. After initiating the April plenary session of the CC of the BCP (1956), which marked the beginning of eradication of the personality cult of the party leader Vulko Chervenkov, Todor Zhivkov, in turn, began to concentrate ever more power in his hands by permanently occupying the posts of prime minister (1962–1971) and president of the State Council—that is, head of the state (1971–1989).

Thus, with Zhivkov's active and leading participation, and guided by its major political goal, "the building of communism," BCP established dictatorship of the proletariat in the country (the rule of "political expedience," not of the law) and carried out a series of government programs: (1) nationalization of large-scale urban and rural estates; (2) industrialization (resulting in the growth of industry over the next 40 years); (3) collectivization (coercive cooperation of private farm producers and setting up of consolidated agriculture); (4) social policy (free education, free health care, early retirement, 3-year paid maternity leave, full employment of all active population); (5) 40-hour work week; (6) hefty subsidizing of prices of staples, children's foods, and clothes, culture, education, and transportation; and (7) the so-called cultural revolution (development of large-scale but ideologically slanted art activities).

The rule of BCP was tightly bound up with the policy of the Soviet Union and accompanied by ideological and religious intolerance. Thus, for instance, during the so-called Regeneration Process (1984–1989) the Bulgarian Turks and Mohammedans were forced to change their characteristic Muslim names and rites into Christian ones.

On November 10, 1989, Todor Zhivkov was removed from the post of the BCP secretary general. The following week saw his removal from the position of the head of the state, and at the plenary session of the CC of the BCP (December 11–13, 1989), he was expelled from the BCP and brought to justice. After his death all allegations were dropped.

Lilia Raycheva

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ZIEGLER, RONALD

See PRESS SECRETARY, WHITE HOUSE

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