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Patrick Deer

War is back and seemingly forever. In recent years the pacific neoliberal rhetoric of globalization has been replaced by the Hobbesian imaginary of endless war. The pervasive metaphorization of war blurs the boundaries between military and civilian, combatant and noncombatant, state and war machine, wartime and peacetime. But war discourse also operates as a strategy that partitions, separates, and compartmentalizes knowledge, offering a highly seductive, militarized grid through which to interpret the world. Like a virus, it seems, war tropes have spread throughout the body politic and global economy. What are the ends of war? This special issue of *Social Text* engages this critical question by challenging narratives of endless conflict, by confronting the seductions of metaphorization and militarization, and by analyzing the historical and material interests that they serve. "The Ends of War" insists on the contingent and instrumental nature of war discourse and on the need to think beyond its global reach.

The most seductive aspect of war discourse is its seeming power to manage the contradictory times and spaces of the present. Its greatest appeal lies in its claim to the future. If the prospect of an endless war on terror is less than appealing, it at least offers the compensations of proving "our" technological and economic superiority. The seductive mythology of high-tech, postmodern warfare still enshrined in the mythic active-combat phase of the invasion of Iraq has been kept carefully uncontaminated by the brutal, chaotic realities of the occupation. According to its unstable temporal logic, the invasion of Iraq (20 March–1 May 2003), like the 100-hour 1991 Gulf War, is completely incommensurable with the Cold War and old "hot wars."

In his otherwise relentlessly bloodless Pentagon briefing two days after the launch of the initial "decapitation strike" and "shock and awe" aerial assault on Baghdad, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld paused for a moment before taking questions to make a historical point. "Just before coming down," he said after the bombing campaign began in earnest at 1:00 p.m. EST, "I saw some of the images on television and I heard various commentators expansively comparing what's taking place

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in Iraq today to some of the more famous bombing campaigns of World War II. There is no comparison."[1] Echoing the familiar claims made by the ideologues of high-tech "postmodern warfare," Rumsfeld pointed out that today's weapons had "a degree of precision that no one dreamt of in a prior conflict" and that the bombs were targeted with extraordinary care. "The care that goes into it, the humanity that goes into it, to see that military targets are destroyed, to be sure, but that it's done in a way, and in a manner, and in a direction and with a weapon that is appropriate to that very particularized target. . . . And I think that will be the case when ground truth is achieved." General Tommy Franks, who in Afghanistan in March 2002 had declared, "You know we don't do body counts," told reporters, "This will be a campaign unlike any other in history." And in a September 2003 address, President George W. Bush claimed that the war in Iraq was "one of the swiftest and most humane military campaigns in history."[2] Three years later, with the occupation on the brink of civil war, Rumsfeld was dismissed. Even as he likened himself jokingly to Winston Churchill, the outgoing defense secretary reiterated the futuristic claim that the Iraq war was like no other, describing it as "this little understood, unfamiliar war, the first war of the twenty-first century — it is not well-known, it was not well-understood, it is complex for people to comprehend."[3]

With its rhetorical emphasis on precision bombing and "humane" destruction, the rhetoric of postmodern warfare also claims to have superseded the nuclear logic of Cold War overkill, even as depleted uranium-tipped shells and bunker-busting bombs routinely contaminate the battlefield with radioactive dust and cluster bomblets litter the landscape like high-tech land mines. This "clean," scientific, positivistic neutrality is supposedly quite different from the old-style "dirty war" demanded by colonial policing to combat the low-tech horrors of guerrilla warfare and terrorist violence in Baghdad, Fallujah, and Basra, conducted with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and homemade Humvee armor. High-tech warfare is a computer-networked, virtual, information war in which simulation, artificial intelligence, and stealth weapons are the supposed keys to victory. In this respect, it replicates the rhetoric of high-tech globalization, which claims to occupy a clean, smooth space in the command-and-control networks of the first-world global cities, with their frictionless, speedy flows of metropolitan labor and capital, in stark contrast to the "dirty" quotidian world of the sweatshops and *maquiladoras* or the *favelas* and refugee camps of the underdeveloped global South. The "revolution in military affairs" is only the latest rationale for the U.S. permanent war economy, which has survived constant changes in management.

The obsessive turn toward the doctrine of counterinsurgency or low-

intensity conflict in the fourth year of the occupation of Iraq displays a similar presentism. What is needed, according to the doctrine, is a deployment of culturally sensitive, technologically nimble Special Forces soldiers to "clear, hold, and build" the territory as they persuade the civilian populations that the insurgents have no legitimacy.[4] In the rhetoric of the armchair counterinsurgents, this doctrine has all of the futurity and appeal of "shock and awe," promising to operate on the ground with a newfound cultural sensitivity. But the seeming newness of counterinsurgency is, ironically, also a product of the institutional amnesia of the military commanders who had spent the best part of thirty years trying to forget the failed coupling of counterinsurgency with the brute force of "technowar" bombing against guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. War provides an educational impulse as Americans are enjoined to learn from previous colonial conflicts, from articles studded with quotations from Lawrence of Arabia, and from nervous viewings of *The Battle of Algiers*. Once again the bloody, chaotic, and unglamorous realities of urban warfare and colonial policing in Iraq are disavowed in favor of the glamour of empire.

War discourse also lays claim to the past. The imperial nostalgia evident in much recent war discourse betrays the origins of "shock and awe" bombing in colonial air policing. The strategic doctrine of the "moral effect" of the bomber was developed to police and discipline "savage" colonized populations in European empires after World War I. The Royal Air Force, assisted by those keen imperialists Winston Churchill and Lawrence of Arabia, guaranteed its survival after the Great War by offering to police the British Empire on the cheap with what they could muster from the rudimentary technology of air power. The territories involved were Afghanistan, Somaliland (modern Somalia), and Mesopotamia (modern Iraq). The mystique of imperial air power depended on relegating the "savage," colonized target population to an "other" time and space, where morale could be decisively shattered by shock tactics and the "moral effect" of aerial bombing.[5] Backward conditions in the colonial laboratory or testing ground guaranteed the technological progress and ongoing modernization of the imperial war machine. Even if the technology did not yet exist, did not work well, or could not be afforded, the Western war machine was already projected into a future epistemologically and even ontologically inaccessible to the colonized other. When the colonized resistance movements shot back, adapted, or used guerrilla tactics involving space, movement, and surprise, the strategic discourse of air power had to work strenuously to deny the equality or coevality of its "other." So much for the "benign imperialism" that apologists for U.S. neoimperial foreign policy, like historian Niall Ferguson, enjoin America

to emulate, only with greater fiscal responsibility. This is the long history of colonial violence that haunts any attempts by the United States or its British allies to intervene in whatever name.

In addition to laying claim to the past and future, war discourse struggles to monopolize and shape our cultures. As we saw after 9/11, and then more recently after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the popular social imaginary of World War II has frequently been mobilized in the present. We saw this in Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's enthusiastic endorsement of a book about the 1940 London Blitz as he assumed his autocratic Churchillian role in the days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and also in recent disavowals of the relevance of World War II after the press noted that the U.S. military had now been in Iraq for longer than it was engaged in that earlier war.[6] Dissent or antiwar sentiment is routinely declared a sign of weakness, relegated to the same historical limbo as 1930s' appeasement of fascism. President George W. Bush has often likened the so-called global war on terror to World War II. As he asserted in his "Plan for Victory" speech in August 2005,

> the veterans of World War II defended America when ruthless foes threatened our freedom and our very way of life. And after winning a great victory, they helped former enemies rebuild and form free and peaceful societies that would become strong allies of America. The World War II generation endured great suffering and sacrifice because they understood that defeating tyranny in Europe and Asia was essential to the security and freedom of America. . . . Like previous wars we have waged to protect our freedom, the war on terror requires great sacrifice from Americans.[7]

Beyond the obviously ideological attempts to co-opt the historical memory of a total, "people's" war against fascism, the inescapability of the invocations of World War II signals a powerful desire to legitimize our own culture of violence. World War II saw the emergence of the first fully modernized and mobilized democratic war cultures, which assumed the traditional cultural function of mediating between the state and its citizens; if citizens could not represent themselves during wartime, they had to learn to be represented by the official war culture.[8] For British people living through the conflict, the official war culture helped them cope with trauma by offering an outlet for creative energies, a forum for intellectual debate about national identity and the purposes and nature of war, and a distraction from the violence and dehumanization of wartime. But the official culture claimed a monopoly on making sense of wartime. Despite its democratizing and radicalizing force, the official British culture of World War II promoted a reinvigorated form of popular imperialism that silenced and deferred the historic struggles of national independence movements

and critics of colonialism. It sought to expand over the entire cultural field to make itself identical with culture as a whole, normalizing and naturalizing war as a form of social, political, and economic activity. But this contradictory project had its limits since war culture, like the wider culture, was everywhere committed to separation, partitioning, and dividing up. Its attempt to colonize the dominant culture revealed its pervasive anxieties and parvenu status. It policed its boundaries, projected its demonology, expelled its others, and enforced its standards of taste and aesthetic values. Above all, modern war culture is self-perpetuating and self-replicating; it normalizes and naturalizes a state of war. Peace is not the end of war culture. At its core, war culture seeks a postponement of peacetime "for the duration"; it seeks an adjustment to a state of permanent war.

Compared to previous conflicts, recent wars have created a new low-intensity war culture in the United States. Official attempts to monopolize representations of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the more nebulous war on terror, are greatly aided by media consolidation, official secrecy, embedding of reporters, and the witchhunting of "unpatriotic" critics. But the midterm congressional elections of November 2006 revealed the failure of these attempts to capture the popular imagination. The real problem of course is that the bodily and psychic sacrifice is being borne at a great distance, its traumatic effects carefully contained and screened away; meanwhile, in plain sight, American citizens are asked to sacrifice their basic civil rights and constitutional protections. Where British or American citizens were asked to sacrifice in the name of a Second World War against fascism that promised postwar reconstruction or prosperity, the current conjuncture promises the rewards and the terrors preemptively.

Even torture, that most atavistic, corrupting, and degraded form of violence, is given a futuristic gloss by the U.S. culture of violence. Talk-show pundits spin extreme, apocalyptic "ticking time bomb" scenarios in "debates," arguing that terrorists must be tortured in order to head off possible nuclear catastrophe. Reclassified as "enemy combatants" subject to "extraordinary rendition," people are injected with drugs in the street and whisked off in unmarked CIA-chartered executive jets to "black sites" in countries with reliably shady human rights records. Meanwhile, on Fox, through the paramilitary antics of lead character Jack Bauer, the series *24* unabashedly stages these scenarios as showstopping spectacle. Lest the older networks think themselves superior, the forensic gaze of *Law and Order* and *ER* represents everyday life as a body-strewn battlefield in which the violated, stripped corpses are most often female, each resembling America's next (dead) top model. This media arena is presided over by the inexorable logic of a police and judiciary increasingly influenced by the

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logic of counterinsurgency and indefinite detention. The psychic impact of the Iraq war is a fairly constant feature of our own culture of violence, in stereotypes of traumatized veterans borrowed from the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Indeed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is constantly claimed as symptom on daytime talk shows, worn as a badge of what makes us most human. Yet the bodily impact of war remains an open yet hidden secret: coffins are shipped back in secret; wounded veterans are sequestered in military hospitals in Germany and in underfunded VA establishments at home.[9]

The environmental impact on both Iraqi civilians and American men and women in uniform also remains obscured; this "slow violence," as Rob Nixon compellingly describes it, is consigned, like Gulf War syndrome, to the marginal twilight of "junk science" or popular conspiracy theory.[10] And what of the astonishing asymmetry between U.S. military "casualties" and those wounded in combat? Or of a different kind of exchange rate, between "our" dead and the seemingly uncountable numbers of Iraqi civilians killed and maimed on a daily basis? An army that had spent decades projecting an image of social mobility and racial integration now finds itself engaged in the colonial policing of a multicultural Arab nation. Stretched to its limits in Iraq in 2005, the National Guard was unable to come to the aid of the predominantly poor and black victims of Hurricane Katrina. Yet the economic connections are seldom drawn between a war that, according to the National Priorities Project, is costing $255 million per day and nearly $11 million per hour, a permanent war economy sustained by military budgets that exceed Cold War levels, and the depleted state of the U.S. infrastructure.[11]

These silences in contemporary war culture account, I would suggest, for the continuing appeal of representations of the 100-hour Gulf War of 1991, like David O. Russell's film *Three Kings* or Anthony Swofford's celebrated memoir *Jarhead*, which focus obsessively on the traumatizing effects of war as a nonevent on young men trained for combat but deprived of release in battle. Compared to the bloody realities of occupied Iraq, the virtual Gulf War that "Did Not Take Place" seems charmingly old fashioned. Even as this slim canon of Gulf War fiction represents the traumatic effects of a disembodied, distanced war that exploits the armored yet vulnerable minds and bodies of young men in uniform, it also stages the melancholy detachment and routinized fear of the domestic war on terror. These belated representations of mediatized warfare continue to obsess both the exponents of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and their leftist critics. Their structural absences and hallucinatory visual fields seem to vindicate theorizations of our violent culture in terms of foreclosure or primary repression, or of unrepresentable trauma.

Yet the forbidden and the taboo are more often hiding in plain sight in the U.S. culture of violence, disavowed but not foreclosed.[12] Ironically, it is from the unofficial, pornographic, and taboo subcultures of war that images have emerged to interrupt the silencing chatter of official war culture and to force the open secrets out into the light of day. The now infamous Abu Ghraib torture photos were produced by the guards themselves as a kind of war porn designed to document their own everyday lives, as screen savers, as amateur reality TV or a horrifying mutation of *America's Funniest Home Videos*. Disseminated to the press and to army lawyers, they became whistle-blowing documents of a wholesale violation of human rights. The insurgents themselves have used Web sites to post horrifying footage of beheaded hostages, and their chilling propaganda videos of IED and sniper attacks surface routinely on YouTube and Google Video, but so too do video clips of U.S. soldiers surviving roadside bombings. Are these images merely symptomatic, or do they bear witness to the unacknowledged cost of suffering, the moral confusion, the abuses of power, and the corruptions of empire? What do they say about the profound gender disturbances managed so routinely by the eroticized social imaginary of the "straight" war culture? The officially sanctioned war of images may struggle to police its own boundaries, to compartmentalize the experience of combatants and noncombatants, to divide and rule. But the cultural productions of the war machine, as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari remind us, obey their own logic and can often return to haunt and scandalize the state and its military institutions.[13]

As a force for modernization, as "a force that gives us meaning," war culture claims to be forever. But there is now a strong body of work that seeks to explore and contest the war culture's tangled disavowals and open secrets. Alongside the theorizations of Foucault, Agamben, Baudrillard, Žižek, Butler, and the Retort group, and complementing the burgeoning genre of investigative histories,[14] are a growing number of narrative representations of the Iraq war. Charting the disturbances and dislocations of a conflict at once immediate, fully mediatized, and radically distanced, they straddle uneasily the generic divide between fiction, memoir, blogging, embedded reporting, and polemic.[15] Like the satirical pastiches of news media on *The Daily Show* or *The Colbert Report*, they chart a world in which the Orwell-Chomsky-Moore tradition of plainspoken demystification seems no longer sufficient.

The continued and relentless militarization and colonization of everyday life can be resisted, but this takes more than simple demystification. By charting the genealogy, construction, and buried histories of a "postmodern" war culture, we can challenge its seductive mythology. This makes clear the historically contingent and limited nature of a "cultural

tradition" that seeks to make war a permanent and natural way of life. A true return to peacetime would require putting war culture in its own place, as a historic and historical remnant of a period of violent global struggle never to be repeated.

The essays in this special issue engage the newness and urgency of this warlike present but insist that the current proliferation of war discourse often masks older continuities and long-standing material interests. For Randy Martin, the financialization of conflict and the proliferation of risk visible in the current era of "derivative wars" reveal powerful continuities with Cold War regulation and the management of difference. Tracing the intimate exchanges between a postwelfare world, in which citizens must assume the maximum burden of risk, and the speculative violence of the revolution in military affairs and Special Forces warfare, he challenges the mythic futurity of an economy that generates endless preemptive conflict as the price for "security." Jean Franco argues that rape, that most invisible of war crimes, has been deployed by the modernizing states of Peru and Guatemala as a weapon specifically targeting indigenous women in a scorched-earth policy that continues a long history of conquest and colonial domination. Confronting a horrifying sexual violence designed to render them abject, silent, and expelled from the human, and the tendency of truth commissions and international human rights organizations to position them as marginal and victimized, rape survivors have struggled to reclaim their voices and contest this pervasive weapon of war. Taking at its word the neoliberal claim of inflicting the "gift" of freedom on the Iraqi people at face value, Kennan Ferguson traces the violent genealogy and inequalities of gift giving. Focusing also on the violent gendered imaginary of war discourse, he argues, "If structures of masculinity depend upon giving, then both militarism and generosity become intertwined with conquest and the feminization and delegitimation of the invaded."

Tracing the links between globalization and the war on terror, Leerom Medovoi argues that they share common strategies of biopower, culturalism, and internal threat. For Medovoi this represents a mapping onto the neoliberal globe of the Foucauldian dynamic of "race war" that can be seen haunting the bellicose imaginaries of European colonialism and U.S. Cold War strategy. In his ethnography of the militarized U.S.-Mexico border, Gilberto Rosas traces a tangled history of paramilitary policing, disciplining of labor, and popular resistance by those border crossers who claim the borderlands as a Barrio Libre. Though the border, like other militarized zones discussed in the issue, resembles the state of emergency theorized by Agamben, the forms of violence deployed there and the collective struggle of those who oppose them make clear that there are longer, bloody colonial

histories at work in these seemingly exceptional spaces. In an extended discussion of "shameless" warfare that takes images of the Abu Ghraib torture scandal as its point of departure, Rosalind C. Morris argues that the current conflict in Iraq has seen the emergence of a mediatized, desexualized form of conflict that departs from the traditionally patriarchal wartime goal of rescuing or capturing a victimized or vulnerable femininity. She asks, "By what processes did war, and the violence that accompanies it, come to exceed the question of sexual difference, by assuming so acute a form of racism? This is a question about the new nature of war, but it is also a question about the regression of our increasingly technologized forms of war making." Excavating a neglected tradition of "counterplanning" for reconstruction, Jonathan Michael Feldman tracks the continuities between the U.S. permanent war economy that emerged in World War II and boomed during the Cold War and the Vietnam conflict and the current disastrous confluence of militarism, global outsourcing, and economic depletion. He argues for the relevance of "utopian realism" and alternative networks for reconstruction as ways out of a present addicted to war. Ashley Dawson's discussion of the high-tech urban warfare currently being offered as a military paradigm for the era of global underdevelopment also warns of the historic limits of such colonial policing techniques and of their tendency to migrate to the metropolis, where they are deployed against enemies within. He contends that the "technologies deployed by imperial military forces around the globe . . . build on enduring practices of internal and external spatial apartheid and surveillance."

War discourse makes powerful claims on the present. It offers a vision of endless, permanent warfare, of cutting-edge technological innovation, of the power to instill order and govern the epoch of globalization. It also claims to monopolize patriotism, to provide a proving ground for gender roles or citizenship, and to offer the prospect of a renewed, stronger nation. Even if these are shown to ring hollow, to have terrible long-term human and environmental consequences, then the war makers will settle for second best. They will settle for confusion, for fear and anxiety, for exploitation, and for the prospect of endless conflict "over there," anywhere but here. By blurring the boundaries between civilian and soldier, between noncombatant and combatant, war discourse seeks to defer the human cost of permanent warfare for as long as possible. If we are all at war, if we are all traumatized, and yet people like us can get through the battlefield of everyday life, then it cannot be so bad, can it? This "sacrifice," with all its consumer comforts and distant demonic threats, could be borne forever, could it not? How long can this go on? The immediate answer seems to be for as long as we can bear it. Or until we are able to interrupt the logic of endless war and keep other, nonviolent ends in sight.

By blurring the boundaries between civilian and soldier, between noncombatant and combatant, war discourse seeks to defer the human cost of permanent warfare for as long as possible.

1. U.S. Department of Defense, "DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers," Friday, 21 March 2003, www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t03212003_t0321sd1.html.

2. Office of the Press Secretary, "President George W. Bush, Address of the President to the Nation, September 7, 2003," www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html (retrieved 5 November 2003). To take one more bloodthirsty example, Harlan Ullman, the theorist of U.S. "shock and awe," nicknamed a modern-day "Dr. Strangelove" by antiwar protestors, invoked approvingly the shattering blow delivered to the relentless Japanese by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, when "a society prepared to die was turned around." See Seth Stern, "From Paper to the Battlefield," *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 March 2003.

3. Office of the Press Secretary, "President Bush Nominates Dr. Robert M. Gates to Be Secretary of Defense: The Oval Office," 8 November 2006, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061108-4.html.

4. For representative recent discussions, see Bruce Hoffman, "RAND Corporation Occasional Paper: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," OPC-127-IP EMCC, June 2004, www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2005/ RAND_OP127 .pdf; Robert R. Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Parameters* 34 (Spring 2004): 16–28, www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/04spring/tomes.pdf; and the article by the authors of the U.S. Army's new draft Field Manual on Counterinsurgency, Eliot Cohen, Lt. Col. Conrad Crane, Lt. Col. Jan Horvath, and Lt. Col. John Nagl, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* 86 (March–April 2006): 49.

5. See Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). For the colonial genealogy of air power, see Sven Lindqvist, *A History of Bombing*, trans. Linda Haverty Rugg (New York: Norton, 2003).

6. Mayor Giuliani recommended John Lukacs's *Five Days in London: May 1940* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). The controversy over asserted parallels to World War II was fueled by Oren Dorrell, "WWII Vets Fought a Different Kind of Fight Than Those in Iraq," *USA Today*, 23 November 2006, www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-11-23-iraq-wwii_x.htm.

7. Office of the Press Secretary, "President's Radio Address," 20 August 2005, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050820.html.

8. See Patrick Deer, *Culture in Camouflage: War, Empire and British Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

9. One notable exception is the recent HBO documentary about combat medicine in Iraq, *Baghdad ER* (dir. Jon Alpert and Matthew O'Neil, 2006), which was initially only available to cable subscribers already accustomed to the frank violence of such series as *Deadwood*, *The Wire*, and *The Sopranos*.

10. On depleted uranium and slow violence, see Rob Nixon, "Our Tools of War, Turned Blindly against Ourselves," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 18 February 2005.

11. National Priorities Project, "Local Costs of the Iraq War," 29 September 2006, nationalpriorities.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31 &Itemid=61 (accessed 3 December 2006).

12. For an incisive theorization of foreclosure and disavowal, see Henry

Krips's discussion of fetishistic subjectivity in *Fetish: An Erotics of Culture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

13. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "Nomadology: The War Machine," in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 351–423.

14. See, for example, Slavoj Žižek, *Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle* (New York: Verso, 2004); Retort [Iain Boal, T. J. Clark, Joseph Matthews, and Michael Watts], *Afflicted Powers: Capital and Spectacle in a New Age of War* (New York: Verso, 2006); Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence* (New York: Verso, 2006); James Der Derian, *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001); and Chris Hables Gray, *War, Peace, and Computers* (New York: Routledge, 2004). See also Chris Hedges's *War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning* (New York: Anchor, 2002).

15. Notable combatant writing from the Iraq war to date includes John Crawford, *The Last True Story I'll Ever Tell: An Accidental Soldier's Account of the War in Iraq* (New York: Riverhead, 2005); Kayla Williams, *Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the U.S. Army* (New York: Norton, 2005); Colby Buzzell's compilation of his pseudonymous blog, *My War: Killing Time in Iraq* (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Trade, 2006); Nathaniel Fick, *One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005). See also the embedded journalism of *Rolling Stone* reporter Evan Wright, *Generation Kill: Devil Dogs, Iceman, Captain America, and the New Face of American War* (New York: Berkeley Caliber, 2004). See also the documentaries *Gunner Palace* (dir. Petra Epperlein and Michael Tucker, 2004); *Soldiers Pay* (dir. Tricia Regan, David O. Russell, and Juan Carlos Zaldivar, 2004); *Operation: Dreamland* (dir. Ian Olds and Garrett Scott, 2005); and *Why We Fight* (dir. Eugene Jarecki, 2005).

> The war against this enemy is more than a military conflict. It is the
> decisive ideological struggle of the twenty-first century and the calling of
> our generation.
> —George W. Bush, 11 September 2006

Randy Martin

Five years on, and without a victory in sight, the war on terror has been
renewed with the same evangelical vigor by which it had been launched.
While priding itself on the selectivity of its targets, the claim made for
this war is that it is joined by everyone everywhere, its century-long
future borne as a calling in our present. Despite the assertion of Septem-
ber 11 as its genesis, the war of which Bush speaks in my epigraph has
been a long time in the making.[1] Afghanistan and Iraq were the objects
of U.S. agitation long before terror made the journey from a method to an
ideology.[2] Yet the threat is to be met less with ideological clarity (witness
how ill-defined freedom and democracy turn out to be) than with meth-
odological rigor. A war against all is prosecuted through the protocols of
risk management, a technique for converting uncertainty into calculable
gain. Risk has come to be central to the present imperium's governance of
its foreign and domestic affairs.[3] Where invading armies actually landed,
it was to attack old allies in Afghanistan and Iraq as new enemies with
swift, decapitating precision that would leave waves upon waves of volatil-
ity in its wake. Threats were not eliminated but set in motion, amplifying
terror and providing the occasion for epic conflict. Denying sites of occu-
pation their determinate history is part of the repertory of imperial war.
Yet the emphasis on risk belies a history of commingling the management
of populations at home and abroad along a model of war.

Before there was a war on terror, domestic wars were declared on
drugs, crime, youth, and culture. These policy initiatives shared the per-
spective of populations at risk, a notion itself promulgated by a Reagan-era
report on education called "A Nation at Risk."[4] Populations at risk pre-
sented the specter of failure that could become a contagion to the rest of
the nation. The shift to war as a domestic policy framework referenced the
way in which these various social problems would be addressed from local
to federal agencies that could impose punitive standards, prosecute special

interventions, and conduct seizures. These wars promoted the suspension of liberties in the name of liberty, whether by using federal troops for drug interdiction or usurping the authority of local school districts. Even natural disasters that could place populations at risk would be fought along military lines, a reform whose most tragic symptom (especially for victims of Hurricane Katrina) was in making the Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA) a subordinate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This new configuration, with its own cabinet-level office — hailed at its inception as the most significant government initiative since the creation of the Defense Department — captures the entanglement of foreign and domestic war under the shared administration of risk management. Like the commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq, unable to take control of the territories they occupy, DHS secretary Michael Chertoff has insisted that not all of the homeland can be protected.[5] Risks must be assessed to maximize opportunities for the selective application of resources. The resulting militarization of all manner of policy means that battles are won so that the war can go on.

Winning the war does not mean ceasing hostilities but, rather, entails expanding the mastery of risk capability. Risk replaces progress as the measure of how we are all doing. More generally, over the past twenty-five years, the risk-capable have become the new subjects of history, those able to benefit from decisions taken and able to free themselves from the encumbrances of the at-risk. Famously, the risk takers have been doing very well during the same period that those at risk have seen their fortunes fade. Those cresting the wave of each successive speculation seem propelled only by the wind at their back and the initiative under their feet. They go by the name of investors, not workers, consumers, or citizens, and appear as a species of the extremely free-willed, those able to endure the unexpected with such profound conviction that they are set apart from the herd. But the cocktail of policies and self-transformations of state is more pressingly determinate than the speculator's own irrational exuberance. Investors, the acme of economic policy, are indeed the labor that drives the diffusion of finance into the precincts of everyday life. Finance, once the province of staid investment banks and governments with sovereign control over international exchange with fixed rates, lived a virtuous life of equilibrium. This, at least, was the fable of U.S. monetary hegemony in the heyday of the Bretton Woods agreements (1944–73) by which the global financial order would be pegged to the dollar, anchored by gold reserves.[6]

Postwar equilibrium in monetary policy enjoyed a partner in the grand strategy of Cold War international relations. Gold and nukes would anchor security from within their stony vaults, yielding a symmetry of power among rival societal systems. The idea of a system, a closed world whose

elements were functionally interdependent and tended toward balance, imagined that human affairs could be modeled as a machine, generating behavior or output that was mathematically calculable.[7] In the 1950s, systems approaches were applied to clarify the foggy theater of war and also to forecast the volatile movement of the stock market—both efforts to grapple with the unreason of volatility that could unseat equilibrium.[8] Accordingly, banking and politics aligned along firm commitments to security, both resting on containable boundaries between the foreign and the domestic. Security meant preserving the sanctity of the inside against the uncertainties of the outside. The entailments of domestic security provided a sensibility of passive accumulation or savings evident in the foreign policy of the nuclear arms race and the domestic protocols of investments for retirement (typically a percentage of final salary known as defined benefit). Sturdily policed boundaries would contain enemies overseas and maintain the sanctity of private life from the moral corruptions of politics. By this reckoning, nations and persons would follow a predictable and parallel course of development meant as a guarantee of progress. As time went on, life would get better and the future would offer a qualitative improvement over the present. In a utopian dream, the fate of the individual person would be aligned with the expansion of the dominion of capital.

By the mid-1970s such holy binaries were under strain on multiple fronts. The U.S. defeat in Vietnam had given the lie to containment and the geopolitics of symmetry, not least because of the domestic opposition to the disastrous war. The new financial services industries that emerged in the wake of Bretton Woods sought to make a virtue of disequilibrium, treating volatility and risk as productive forces in their own right for a globally circulating economy of credit and debt. The social forces mobilized throughout the 1960s politicized the boundary between the public and the private, making difference central to the expansion of what populations made of social life. Without doubt, the new domestic wars—from education and crime to culture and the arts—that served to constitute populations at risk took this whole field of difference as their battleground. The multiplicity suggested by critical notions of multiculturalism was not simply an array of identities that jostled with normative conceptions of American life.

Difference referenced a generative and expansive productivity that posited the very form of social life as a matter of historical transformation—whether this meant the nature of employment, expression of affect, or the organization of everyday space. If anything, the risky wars were a reaction, a state resistance to the mobilizations associated with the 1960s that politicized the domestic in the context of a critique of imperial war. So

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long as the journey from private to public life took the form of welfare-state entitlements, service sector jobs, and consumer goods, it looked as though the potent productivity unleashed by the various movements was readily assimilable to individual rights and benefits. But always a residue remained, and the movements themselves surpassed what could readily be afforded them through standard reforms. Difference was treated as the emblem of what people could create together, not only to critique existing norms but to enact more enriching cultural practices. It was reduced by the emergent condominium of reaction to an aberrant identity that would be brought under attack, now without the conciliatory carrots of incremental entitlements. The at-risk would be carefully policed, measured, and monitored, but ultimately left to account for themselves.

The reaction undertaken in the 1980s took the form of a heady but unstable alliance of neoliberalism and neoconservatism, which has reached its apotheosis with the war on terror—itself an initiative full of historical antecedent. Throughout the twentieth century, the legal and repressive means were being developed for the policy of generalized warfare. The Palmer Raids (in the aftermath of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918) detained more than ten thousand suspected radicals. The House Un-American Activities Committee, in various incarnations from 1938 to 1975, devoted itself to the pursuit of subversives. The 1970 Anti-Racketeering Act (RICO), first passed to fight organized crime, made it possible to prosecute the shadowy networks and corrupt organizations that supported violence. Strains of liberalism and conservatism as a governing dialectic of the nation stretch back much farther.[9] The political conjuncture that has made for the war on terror suggests an ideological hybrid. Neoliberalism argues for small government and rational self-regulating markets, while neoconservatism advertises a morally interventionist state and an evangelical economy, a proselytizing of credit that delivers its faith in the here and now. The assault on the welfare state and the attack on social movements need to be understood in the context of efforts to make the loss of equilibrium, symmetry, security, and progress into a virtuous crusade, a war, by all means, propelled by a shared methodology of risk-embrace.

The erosion of equilibrium as the governing value in the international economy served to precipitate an expansion of finance. Finance, whose root meaning is to bring debt to an end, is now a medium of ceaseless circulation by which capital is made available to others and mutual indebtedness becomes a generalized means. The amount of money moving through the coffers of finance exceeded that of industrial production around the time of the demise of Bretton Woods, and today the financial transactions of a month are more than the global gross domestic product.[10] This is not simply a matter of magnitude. Finance is ruled by risk management, by

efforts to harvest market volatility for gain. Accordingly, all manner of instruments or products are created by which investments can be made now on anticipated movements of price in the future, the futures, forwards, options, and swaps made when financial traders peddle their wares.

The social impact of a financialized world is to increase mutual indebtedness that is experienced as a matter of personal risk capacity. Mortgages, credit cards, and student loans are bundled together from local lending agents and marketed as equities in their own right, a process known as securitization. Pensions, once the gateway to emancipation from labor, shift from government- or corporate-defined benefits to pay-as-you-go self-managed contributions to financial markets. To make generalized disequilibrium a universal social good, venturing risk must reap suitable rewards. Drawing people into this logic of investment requires a new belief in the future: not that it will be unpredictably different, but that it will be calculably the same. The time of investment is now, the future must be lived in the present. To make volatility stick, inflation must be eliminated, for a return on investment will dissipate when inflation runs high (with 12 percent inflation, a 12 percent rise in stock prices is neutralized). To avoid discouraging popular participation in the stock market, the state must remain fiscally vigilant, which has meant constantly adjusting interest rates in anticipation of inflationary anxieties. When the future is lived in the present, policy is carried out preemptively.

Long before it was a tenet of Bush foreign policy or monetarist economic intervention, the preemptive strike was a doctrine used to transform the U.S. military. In the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle, the application of advanced weapons and communications systems to preempt an enemy response came to be known as the revolution in military affairs (RMA).[11] The Vietnamese victory also anticipated the reversal of Cold War symmetry, the military advantage of the seemingly weaker force that now guides imperial intervention. As it came to be used within military circles, RMA sought to eliminate human error or the fog of war by applying computer-assisted information processing to automated weapons delivery. The highly touted capacity for "shock and awe" assumed that overwhelming force could be delivered to precisely defined targets (an already dubious claim for the NATO bombing of Kosovo in spring 1999).[12] The battlefield would be rendered transparent through capture by surveillance of all relevant information, and risks would be managed through systems models that could predict optimal gains for minimal input. Behind the cybernetic celebration of Cold War arms superiority, the RMA responded to the crisis of military labor that Vietnam presented. A drafted citizen army questioned mission validity and challenged military command structures beyond what was sustainable politically.

The force transformed by the RMA would be leaner and meaner (downsized by more than half a million and by six divisions).[13] Military operations would be spearheaded by small teams of Special Forces who could anticipate threats before they were manifest, practicing what in military parlance is called "forward deterrence." Special Forces are the military equivalence of arbitragers in finance, those who make small investments on volatile fluctuations that are leveraged to considerable gains.

Not only do Special Forces undertake the riskiest operations, but they are now deployed strategically as key interventions in the theater of battle so as to assure that their work will have the maximum effect. Like the arbitrager, they thrive in the volatility they create. Military and financial operatives share the temporality of anticipating future risks in the present and of fomenting by their interventions the volatility that makes their work possible. Financial arbitrage drives the proliferation of new debt and credit products, each designed to profit from a self-generated form of risk. As is painfully clear in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Lebanon, precision aerial bombardment accompanied by surgical applications of special operatives proliferates those risk-embracing antagonists (lumped together as terrorists) who propel the war.

Both military and financial deployments share the logic of the derivative, a fluctuation in the value of an entity that is isolated and placed in circulation, like a currency exchange rate or a targeted safe house. In finance, a derivative is a contract to buy stock or currency, or some other commodity at a particular time for a given price. It is used to hedge against unforeseen fluctuations in price and, at the same time, to take advantage of those fluctuations, especially if the commodity's price exceeds what the buyer is guaranteed to pay for it when the contract comes due. Because trading in derivatives increases volatility and produces risk through the collateral damage to securities and populations that are their medium of circulation, they are essential machineries of risk production. Win or lose, there is money to be made, certainly a tag for the wars in the Middle East but also a rationale for the relative underdeployment of soldiers and the absolute underfunding of reconstruction.

The mutual imbrication of finance and war in the protocols of risk management touts a generalizable rationality that fuels conditions for further misery and violence. The risk that spreads everywhere does not imagine universal enlightenment. Rather, it is a great sorting machine. Some will find benefits through risk-embrace just as others will accede to the mandate of unshakable war. Populations at risk consist of those unable to turn volatility toward their own profit. The terrorist embraces risk against the imperial ends of war. The wars against the at-risk battle their growing disenchantment that the future holds a place for them by directing

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their attention toward the immediately engrossing demands of financial self-management. The war against terror seeks to channel risk's enchantments toward imperial rule by disallowing those populations around the world whose spirit might move them elsewhere. Hence, while the at-risk can always be named by category (children, artists, people of color, deviants of various stripes), the terrorist who thrives on bad risk is unnameable and uncountable (witness the claim made by the occupying armies that the casualties and the combatants in the war on terror are impossible to count). While the at-risk are to be held to account by punitive testing, mandatory sentencing, and zero tolerance, the bad risk presented by terror is extreme beyond all accounts. People everywhere are to be liberated from the prior encumbrances of social life, whether this meant a stable community or secure job, a certainty of state power, or a distant future in which dreams could be deposited.

The logic of the derivative that informs financial investment and military intervention also seems to remove the underlying reference to value in order to render action arbitrary or discretionary. Just as anything can become an opportunity for profit taking, so, too, imperial intervention can occur anyplace, at any time—a necessary response to the unbounded risk of terror. The evangelism of the imperium brings all possibility into the present and insists that discretionary intervention is worth the risk, even if many places and peoples will be left behind. Freedom is the prospect of having everything now, of not having to wait for the dull march of progress to deliver the future. Risk management installs a preemptive temporality. Imagine what might happen and take care of it straightaway. Turn every specter into a realizable opportunity. Those incapable of embracing the ethical means or the moral ends of risk must therefore be attacked before they can make their differences manifest.

The obsession with preemption is at the same time reactive. The intolerance of difference—sexual, racial, religious, gendered, laboring, or otherwise—has long been made known. The wars, foreign and domestic, that aim to cleave populations around the operations of risk are not merely opposed to historical formations of cultural difference, but are prosecuted on behalf of a virulent indifference. After all, difference is not merely a habit of the heart or pattern of belief. When set in motion against the state as a politics that makes a claim on social wealth, it is generative of all manner of practical and institutional benefit, from health and education to urban infrastructure. The politically mobilized demands of populations have been addressed through extensive social investment from which those who would harbor society's wealth as a private matter now seek to flee under the cover of bomb-generated dust and strong winds. Financial freedom is meant to sever the encumbrance of creative populations on

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social life. No small wonder that emancipation from terror and disaster leaves cities leveled and diminished, schools closed, hospitals abandoned, employments scarce but for pervasive speculation. The monies squandered on war and tax abatement (hundreds of billions in the case of the former, but trillions of dollars lost to tax cuts) conform to a preemptive logic of waste meant to make social investment unthinkable.[14]

The insistence that the future be lived out in the present constitutes an abandonment of capital's own utopian promise of progress for all through a dream machinery that would yield secure deferral of something better to come. The imperative that all reserves be spent now, that everyone be freed immediately, that all opportunities for risk be undertaken spawns vertiginous volatility. The purchaser of a derivative can trade it away before the underlying contract comes due. A military intervention's time can be up even if the war it launched lives on. Staying with war is no easier to justify than maintaining a course of investment. Interventions arrive wearing disinvestment on their sleeves. Exits must be found before the debts come due. Domestic support collapses as the war effort implodes, dispersing risk everywhere.

Antiwar mobilizations anticipate the start of wars, as if they too were already in circulation. The circuits of peace are now as durable as the war economy, but the military knows that actual deployment will mobilize the war resisters and that occupations must therefore be kept as brief as possible. Tempting as it is to measure the antiwar march's success in a strict temporality of cause and effect, these demonstrations, assembled from all manner of organizations with better ideas for how to spend our wealth, make tangible what is on offer by a movement at peace. Despite the fearmongering, the death and destruction, the vast concentration of wealth and power on display by the present empire of indifference has moved beyond self-justifying necessity. The end of war that is on the march transnationally proposes more than a cessation of hostility prosecuted by a brutish empire. The counterproposition to war occasioned by its immediate opposition imagines a different condition of mutual indebtedness after such heavy debt makes us aware of all that can be done toward and on behalf of one another. If derivative wars appear arbitrary and even discretionary, they mark a historic moment when intervention funded by vast surplus wealth can be attached to social investments of our own design. Left abandoned, disinvested, dispossessed, enclosed, a population for itself makes the road to peace. They chart a course for what is to be done with the riches we can afford to share.

Notes

1. For the speech, see "President's Address to the Nation," 11 September 2006, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/print/20060911.

2. See Harry Harootunian, *The Empire's New Clothes: Paradigm Lost, and Regained* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm, 2004), 103–4.

3. There is now a very extensive literature on what has come to be called a risk society. The sociological literature out of a critical Weberian tradition has emphasized reflexivity. It emerged in the early 1980s at the same time as the developments following a financial logic that I am exploring here but largely without consideration of them. See Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage, 1992), Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), and Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, *Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

4. The National Commission on Excellence in Education, "Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform," April 1983, www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/index.html.

5. Secretary Chertoff's own speech to commemorate 9/11 states, "Here at home, we have to continue to work to build a unified set of effective capabilities to manage the risk to the people of this country." He instructs that risk assessment allows investment and intervention to be selective, saying, "We have to recognize that it is simply not possible to eliminate every threat to every individual in every place at every moment." See his remarks at Georgetown University on 8 September 2006, "Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff on September 11: Five Years Later," www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=5822.

6. See Richard Duncan, *The Dollar Crisis: Causes, Consequences, Cures* (Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 2005).

7. See Paul Edwards, *The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

8. The permeability of the system to externalities, and the internalization of randomness, was captured by the phrase "far-from-equilibrium systems." See Ilya Prigogine and Isabel Stengers, *Order Out of Chaos* (New York: Bantam, 1984). Two reviews of the state of organizational sociology written nearly thirty years apart by W. Richard Scott are especially instructive in marking these shifts. See "Organizational Structure," *Annual Review of Sociology* (1975), and "Reflections on a Half-Century of Organizational Sociology," *Annual Review of Sociology* (2004), both available online at soc.annualreviews.org.

9. See Neil Smith, *The Endgame of Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

10. See Robert Guttmann, *How Credit Money Shapes the Economy: The United States in a Global System* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).

11. See Colin Gray, *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History* (London: Frank Cass, 2002).

12. Harlan Ullman and James Wade Jr., *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance* (Philadelphia: Pavilion, 1996).

13. Between 1987 and 1999, the army active duty corps went from 780,815

to 479,426; the navy, from 586,842 to 373,046; the air force, from 607,035 to 360,590. Unlike the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, the two wars in Iraq were not accompanied by major troop buildups and demobilizations. Data from "DoD Active Duty Military Strength Levels," fiscal years 1950–2002, web1.whs.osd .mil/mmid/military/ms9.pdf.

14. The war costs and potential alternative uses of public funds are monitored by the National Priorities Project's Cost of War Web site, nationalpriorities.org. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities keeps similar tabs on the tax cuts, which, if not rescinded, will amount to $3 trillion by the end of the decade. Their Web site is at www.cbpp.org.

Rape

A WEAPON OF WAR

Jean Franco

Rape is "the least condemned war crime," according to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.[1] The "historic breakthrough" made in 2001 when the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) charged three men with seven counts of violation of the laws or customs of war (torture, rape) and seven counts of crimes against humanity (torture, rape) was in fact a puny conclusion to the war in Bosnia where thousands of women were raped during the process of ethnic cleansing.[2] Rape is still being committed with impunity in internal conflicts in Darfur, the Congo, and Colombia.

Susan Brownmiller's pioneering study *Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape* documented examples of wartime rape, but her basic premise that rape "is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which *all men* keep *all women* in a state of fear"[3] is far too blunt a generalization given the need to differentiate between criminal rape and rape as a strategy designed to destroy or disperse ethnic groups. Her conclusions addressed rape as if it were only an individual problem. Women could protect themselves by learning self-defense, and rape might eventually be eradicated thanks to the "good will" of both men and women, solutions that can hardly be applied to state-sanctioned terror or situations in which the intention is to restructure communities by force in the cause of "modernization." There is a difference between individual acts and the collective project of ethnic cleansing, between one man's assault on an unprotected woman and rape as a form of torture that often terminates in death and aims to destroy a community.[4]

Nowhere was this strategy adopted more ferociously than in Peru and Guatemala during the civil wars of the 1980s and 1990s by armies engaged in a scorched-earth policy against insurgency. In both countries, indigenous peoples suffered the worst of the atrocities, including the rapes extensively documented by the Guatemalan Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (Commission on Historical Clarification, henceforth CEH) and by the Peruvian Comisión de Verdad y Reconciliación (Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, henceforth CVR).[5] These reports not only reveal the extent of the atrocities, but they also include substantial

sections on violence against women. The CEH, set up as a result of the Oslo Agreement in 1994 with Christian Tomuschat of Humboldt University in Berlin as coordinator, published its findings in 1999 after conducting thousands of interviews. According to Tomuschat, the CEH report stressed that "the rules governing the taking of evidence were tailored to victims who could not yet be sure with the advent of peace, democracy and human rights, that the rule of law would prevail not only as the law on the books, but in daily practice."[6] The commission was financially strapped and met obstruction from the armed forces. On receiving the report, the then president of Guatemala, Álvaro Arzú Irigoyen, concluded that nothing needed to be done.[7] He refused to express public apologies or to purge the army, nor was the charge of genocide acknowledged. In Peru, after the flight of President Alberto Fujimori to Tokyo in 2000, the interim president, Valentín Paniagua, took the opportunity to set up the CVR, coordinated by the president of Catholic University, Salomon Lerner. Both reports amassed documentary evidence and evidence from exhumations and presented a vast number of testimonies given in private in Guatemala and publicly in Peru.

The numbers speak for themselves. Of the estimated 69,000 dead in Peru, 75 percent were indigenous peoples of both the highlands and the Amazon basin. In Guatemala, of the 30,000 dead, most were Mayans.[8] Although there is no way of knowing the exact number of rapes committed during the wars, both Truth Commissions acknowledged that the majority of raped women were indigenous: 88.7 percent in Guatemala and, in Peru, 75 percent were Quechua speakers.[9] The Guatemala Commission documented 1,465 cases but estimated the number to have been around 9,411, an estimate that cannot be complete because of the reluctance of many women to admit that they were raped, while many others, as the Peruvian CVR underscored, "died as a result of torture so that it is difficult to recover their story directly" (CVR, 34).

In both Peru and Guatemala, war was waged against armed uprisings. In Peru, the insurgent Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, henceforth SL),[10] inspired by a version of Maoism and based in the southern highlands, began its campaign in the early 1980s with the aim of destroying the infrastructure of the state, beginning with the rural areas, according to a program similar to that of Pol Pot in Cambodia. In the highland villages that they occupied, the SL prohibited markets and trade, planning to starve the cities in preparation for their conquest. Unlike the Guatemalan Army of the Poor, they had no interest in the indigenous heritage, nor did ethnicity enter into their scheme of things. Villagers were either recruits or class enemies.

The armed uprising began in 1982, just before the election of Fer-

nando Belaúnde as president, when the SL invaded the voter registration office in Chuschi and burned the ballot boxes. Their intention was to sweep away the republican state apparatus—the police, the economy, the power and telephone grids, and the education system—and to make a "clean start." Because of President Belaúnde's initial reluctance to engage the army, the uprising spread, and in 1982 a state of emergency was declared in the city of Ayacucho and eight other provinces, inaugurating the "dirty war" that would escalate during the presidencies of Alan García and Alberto Fujimori.[11]

Both the SL and the MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru) committed rape. For the SL, it was a way of punishing supposed informers and avenging themselves on husbands who were not sympathetic to the cause or who occupied official positions. It was also a form of forcible recruitment of women who were made to accompany the guerrillas on marches or to become their sexual slaves (CVR, 287–92). Among the more bizarre atrocities documented by the commission were cases of the rape of the dead and the punishment of male homosexuals by cutting off their penises (CVR, 286).

But it was the Peruvian armed forces (including the navy) and DECOTE (the Police Department against Terrorism) who used rape (often followed by execution) in a systematic way as a form of torture. Captured women, suspected of belonging to the SL or of aiding them, were handed over to the troops, whereupon they were submitted to mass rape accompanied by insult and other forms of humiliation. But there were more sinister incidents of rape during the wholesale massacres of villages where Quechua-speaking inhabitants were suspected of supporting the SL or the SL had recently occupied. In these places, the men were shot first and the widows raped and then executed.

In Guatemala, four guerrilla groups came together in 1982 as the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca.[12] One of the major guerrilla groups, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor, focused its attention on the countryside and on the indigenous peasantry, many of whom were members of the Comité de Unidad Campesina (Committee for Peasant Unity, henceforth CUC).[13] In 1982, a successful coup staged by Rios Montt against his elected predecessor, Romeo Lucas García, initiated the state's scorched-earth policy in the highlands, during which the army massacred whole villages, killing women and children or forcing relocation. *Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio* records that the savagery of the massacres was of such a magnitude that "on a first reading, it could even provoke a certain incredulity." What made the events credible was the commission's reiteration of detail: of the exhumations of bodies, but also "the images, still vivid in the minds of witnesses—of cut throats, muti-

lated corpses, pregnant women with their bellies cut open with bayonets or machetes, bodies *strewn* (sembrados) on stakes, the smell of *burnt flesh* of those burned alive and dogs devouring abandoned bodies that could not be buried, correspond to a real event" (CEH, 3:249–50). Children ("the seed") were killed by beating them against the wall or by throwing them alive into graves where they were crushed by the bodies of dead adults. The military also destroyed ceremonial places and drove "upward of 80 percent of the population from their homes."

Rape was seldom an isolated act committed by one person. Rapes were collective acts. A witness from Guatemala describes a woman who lost consciousness and was raped by twenty soldiers: "she was in a pool of urine, semen and blood; it was really humiliating, a mixture of hatred, frustration and impotence" (CEH, 3:28). Soldiers were instructed to kill, torture, and rape as a recognized strategy (CEH, 3:29). Army witnesses who gave evidence before the Guatemalan Commission on Historical Clarification confirmed that rape was ordered by the commanders, who gave instructions as to how to proceed. Catherine A. MacKinnon, writing of Bosnia, calls this "rape under orders."[14] One witness stated that the soldiers were not thinking of "excesses," *only* of "pillage and rape," as if violence against women could be counted among the guaranteed spoils of war (CEH, 3:29). After the event, bodies of dead rape victims were exhibited, sometimes with sticks in the anus or vagina to publicize the fact that rape had taken place.

Consider these eyewitness accounts, in which the spare language only emphasizes the extreme violence that accompanied rape. The first is from Guatemala:

> One day I managed to escape, and from my hiding place, I saw a woman. They shot her and she fell. All the soldiers left their back packs and dragged her like a dog to the bank of the river; they raped and killed her, and a helicopter that was flying overhead came down and they all did the same with her.

This demonic incident from Peru was witnessed by a prisoner in a barracks:

> They threw [the woman] to the ground as if she were any object and began to abuse her in a degrading manner, all the soldiers abused her sexually. At the beginning the girl said nothing, but after a good while she said, "Don't do it any more." There were about thirty or forty people. In the end, they all stood around and began to shoot, . . . and they told her to speak but she did not reply. Apparently she had fainted. Four persons wearing black hoods [*encapuchados de negro*] appeared holding something like a dagger in their

hands about 15 or 20 centimeters, others pointed their weapons. . . . They knelt between her legs and put the knife into her vagina. The girl woke, cried out and fainted. Then a car came, that closed truck I don't know what color. They put her in a bag and threw her into the truck. (CVR, 313–16)

Such ferocity accompanied by abusive, discriminatory language (and there are many other examples) can only be explained on the grounds that women represented a significant threat. In Guatemala, women were mutilated, their breasts or bellies cut, and if they were pregnant, fetuses were torn from their bodies. In one case, a woman's breasts were cut off after the rape, and her eyes were pulled out. Her body was left hanging on a pole with a stick in her vagina (CEH, 3:35). A pregnant woman was raped in front of her children and then was killed, and the children were knifed to death. There were many cases of adolescent girls and children being raped (CEH, 3:36–40). In a Peruvian incident, a witness was raped anally and vaginally until she was almost dead, while the soldiers insulted her, shouting "bitch betrayer of Peru, this is how you'll die" (CVR, 348). During rape, women were routinely called prostitutes or animals, as if the verbalization confirmed the degraded state of the victim and helped spur on the perpetrator to more acts of violence. Police passed their penises over women's faces and mouths, and they beat women on the stomachs, as if to emphasize that this was a deadly campaign against the body's reproductive potential (CVR, 306).

In *The Body in Pain*, Elaine Scarry describes the self as embodied in the voice and in language. "The goal of the torturer is to make the one, the body, emphatically and crushingly *present* by destroying it, and to make the other, the voice, *absent* by destroying it."[15] That contrast was extreme in Peru and Guatemala, where mass rape was often followed by the absolute destruction of the body of the voiceless female victim, a body already degraded because it was racially inferior. At the same time, the torturers spoke emphatically, using a vocabulary of insult and euphemism. In both countries there were special terms for mass rape. In Peru, it was known as *pichana*, which means "a sweep." Officers "gifted" captured women to the troops: "She was given over to the troop. Before killing her, we gave her to them," stated one witness (CVR, 342). In Guatemala, when women were captured the soldiers announced "*Hay carne*" ("there's meat"; CEH, 3:34). In Rabinal, naked women were beaten and told they were cows; "they treated them as if they were cows exchanging the stallion" (CEH, 3:31).

Gang rapes consolidated the rapists as a group who mingled their seed in a single body. Soldiers who were reluctant or refused to participate

were insulted. In Peru, the army raped according to rank, officers going first and recruits last.[16] There were bizarre scenes. In Guatemala, women were forced to dance, to cook for the army, and raped to the music of the marimba. The troops even had a hymn, "Himno al Macho Patrullero," that grotesquely proclaimed macho solidarity. Ritual was important. In Guatemala, a troop of specially trained soldiers, ironically named *kaibiles* after an unconquerable indigenous leader, was trained to become killing machines by being forced to eat raw meat and drink blood (CEH, 2:55–62). In Peru, soldiers were said to wipe blood onto their faces after the killing as an act of solidarity.[17] Sometimes soldiers identified themselves by nicknames or wore hoods, giving an air of sinister and archaic mystery to the rapes and killings, as if the soldiers were performing acts that were outside any human norm.[18]

As in the former Yugoslavia, both the Peruvian and the Guatemalan governments suspended the order of law and created a state of emergency or exception in which prohibitions were lifted, "permitting" the killing of those suspected of aiding the enemy. Accounts of massacres in Guatemala describe orgiastic scenes as, for example, the events in "Dos Erres" Petén in 1982, after the *kaibiles*[19] were ordered to "vaccinate" the population, first children and women and then men, all of whom were then hit on the head with a hammer and thrown into a pit; pregnant women were beaten on the stomach; and women, including children, were raped. After finishing off the survivors, the *kaibiles* "were laughing as if nothing had happened" (CEH, 6:402).

Rape and execution in the examples I have discussed *perform* expulsion from the human, reducing its objects to a state of abjection. Abjection places the victim outside the bonds of the human, for the abject is "inscribed in a primordial chaos, marked by a primary indistinctness or formlessness. Which is to say that, before differentiation, ordering is a relation to lack of distinction. The abject is, in other words, not a pole in a binary distinction but indistinction itself."[20] The very postures forced on raped women were designed to maximize their abjection. "They put them on all fours and then shot them, placing the gun in the anus or vagina" (CEH, 3:29). The women were systematically mutilated beyond recognition, reduced to animal-like postures, their bodies defiled and dumped, reduced to inhuman objects. "They treated us like animals. They gave us nothing to eat except for three tortillas. They carried big sticks and hit us all as if we were just dogs, and they came in to interrogate while kicking us. At night the soldiers came to rape the girls, the youngest. And those who did not give in were beaten badly" (CEH, 3:37). The Peruvian critic Rocío Silva Santisteban described these acts as a "rubbishing" (*basurización*) of the female body.[21] Rubbish is what is ejected, dispensable because it is lacking in form.

But while the raped woman is expelled from the social and from humanity, the patriarchal structure is strengthened and purified. Writing of such rituals in relation to the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, Bülent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen argue that rape pollution consolidates the perpetrators in a "brotherhood of guilt," giving them a sense of community derived from the victim's abjection.[22] It is also an act of initiation, serving to strengthen ties to the army or the nation, and "on the side of the victim, the same act often resists translation into language and thus cannot serve as the basis for the formation of a social bond."[23] "Hypermasculinity" is exalted insofar as the female as well as the male enemy are degraded. That the rape of women was also an attack on the opponent's manhood was vividly exemplified by an incident in Guatemala, where soldiers cut off a father's penis and thrust it between the daughter's legs (CEH, 3:51).

In Guatemala and Peru, this dual process of ejecting certain bodies from humanity while exalting others was not random but part of a strategy for rebuilding the nation. To rape *and then kill*, although not unusual in criminal cases, is different in wartime because of both the scale and the planning involved. It demonstrates the desire for the final solution. Is it too exaggerated to suggest that rape, in these countries, was a reenactment of the conquest itself, that these atrocities attempted to finish off the work of conquest? The Guatemalan Commission argued that the slaughter justified a charge of genocide. Certainly, the destruction of unborn children suggests a determination to eliminate "the seed." "She was pregnant, they raped her, then cut her throat with a knife and finally opened her stomach. She was eight months pregnant and they took out the baby" (CEH, 3:34). But whether defined as genocide or not, mass rape was a systematic and planned practice. Describing "shows" with prostitutes that preceded a military operation, the CEH concludes that "it was not a question of isolated acts and sporadic excesses but a strategic plan. The devaluation of women was absolute and allowed the army personnel to attack them with total impunity because they were indigenous women of the civilian population" (CEH, 3:27).[24]

The overwhelming evidence from both countries points to the darker project of genocide. A witness who gave evidence to the Guatemalan Commission overheard a soldier saying, "kill boys, kill everyone because it's now time to kill," underscoring that the aim was "not to kill one, two, or three but so terminate us once and for all" (CEH, 3:321). The use of weapons as instruments of rape linked violation to extermination. In Peru, soldiers and police thrust guns into the vagina and anus, in a symbolic reversal of impregnation by means of a death-dealing rather than a life-giving instrument, a symbolic negation of life. Women, as the bearers of a future generation, were seen as dangerous, hence the practice of taking

fetuses out of the wombs of pregnant women.

Only a deep-rooted hatred of a people thought to be "alien to modernity" can account for the assassination of children and the wholesale massacres in which people were burned alive. As the Guatemalan *Memoria del Silencio* puts it, "Racism was an influence in nurturing feelings against the indigenous as 'distinct, inferior, a little less than human and removed from the moral universe of the perpetrators, making their elimination less problematic'" (CEH, 3:325). The commission members also emphasized that, given this racist mentality, any indigenous mobilization became identified with the atavistic image of an uprising: "In this sense, it can be taken into consideration that racism was also present in the most bloody moments of armed confrontation when the indigenous population was punished as if it were an enemy to be conquered" (CEH, 1:93). In Guatemala, rape and massacre were planned in order to lay the groundwork for reconstructing the nation-state on radically new lines that were explicitly outlined during the government of Ríos Montt in a National Security and Development Plan.[25] The aim was not only to destroy indigenous traditions and to disrupt communities but also to integrate survivors as citizens now severed from communal ties, as Spanish speakers, and even as evangelical Christians, into a regenerated nation. As Greg Grandin has argued, extermination was "a carefully calibrated stage in the military's plan to establish national stability through an incorporation of Maya peasants into the government institutions and a return to constitutional rule."[26] This plan was formulated by a group of modernizing army officers who devised a doctrine they termed "strategic democracy," its long-term objective being to convene a constituent assembly and adopt a new constitution. The first and deadly stage in this program involved the militarization of society, the destruction of the insurgency, and the extermination of their base of support in Maya communities. As part of the policy, PACs (Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil, civil self-defense patrols) were formed with the idea of recruiting sectors of the population to support the army. In Peru, peasant patrols (Rondas Campesinas) were formed with a similar aim in view. Their effect was to divide communities between army supporters and opponents.

The enormity of the nation-building project can only be appreciated in light of the postconquest history of indigenous peoples. In both Peru and Guatemala, state policies in the colonial period and after independence had left indigenous communities on the margins of the state, to be used as ethnic labor. They were often monolingual, outside the education system, maintaining their indigenous language, their traditional dress, and certain customs. Although the arrangement underwent modifications and attack over the centuries, the cultures of the indigenous communities of highland Peru and Guatemala were powerful incubators of practices and

beliefs that provided alternatives to the dominant culture. This is not to say that they were ideal or utopian communities but that they had reserves of historical memory and experience that should have been respected. The civil wars struck at the very roots of these traditional arrangements in a bid to abolish indigenous difference, if not through extermination, by conscripting indigenous people into the state apparatus as recruits against the insurgency and forcing them to participate in acts of violence against their own communities. In Guatemala, there were serious attempts to suppress indigenous languages and dress in order to force the population into a new type of social contract.[27] The Guatemalan army was explicit in its aims, envisaging the birth of a new nation and an eventual electoral "democracy," under new terms that included the preparation of a constitution, presidential elections, and "demilitarization of certain state agencies," all of which, however, was predicated on reorganizing the surviving remnants of the indigenous population.

The state of exception that allowed the army to operate outside the guarantees of juridical rights and, certainly, outside any covenant of human rights prepared the ground. Though the Peruvian military was less explicit in stating its long-term aims, it too took advantage of the suspension of guarantees under a state of emergency declared by President Belaúnde in 1982.

Rape had a devastating effect since it attacked the family as the very basis of society, inducing feelings of isolation and desperation.[28] Women who survived rape often suffered physical damage and were left not only feeling shame but also guilt. As Diken and Laustsen wrote of former Yugoslavia, "The victim is excluded by neighbors and by family members. Hence the rape victim suffers twice: first by being raped and second by being condemned by a patriarchal community."[29] This is the negative side of the honor code that has sometimes been used as an argument in defense of a community's actions, so that the killing of dishonored women has been explained if not excused on the grounds of cultural difference. The U.N. Commission on Violence against Women pointed out that this resort to the honor code "obscures the violent nature of the crime and inappropriately shifts the focus toward the imputed shame of the victim and away from the intent of the perpetrator to violate, degrade and injure."[30] Although this justification was not officially employed in Peru and Guatemala, there was an often tacit condemnation of raped women, and many women felt guilty. They were considered "used" or "wasted" and "were blamed by their companions, by their families, and by agents of the State and even by those who committed rape" (CEH, 4:56).

The concept of "honor" is troubling in that it is one of those deeply sedimented norms that are not easily subject to national or international

law, especially in societies where family custom weighs more heavily than the decrees of the state. It still functions as an unwritten code in many sectors of Hispanic societies, as it did in Bosnia. In sixteenth-century Spain, the purity of the wife was the guarantee of the male's honor, of his standing in society, and had to be defended by husbands or fathers. Honor underscores the gap between individual behavior and legality, a place where the law is ineffective. On the one hand, rape secured the military and the police in their belief that the indigenous were without honor. In indigenous communities, on the other hand, honor was not an individual value but a communal one, so that rape endangered the weft and warp of the social bond.

Rape violates the integrity of the body—whether of the individual or of the community—to such an extent that it becomes unspeakable or, rather, speakable only in euphemistic or indirect terms. Bosnian women, for example, spoke of being "touched" by Serbs. A Peruvian witness speaks of "acoso sexual" (sexual harassment); in Guatemala women used such mundane words as *pasar* or *usar* (CEH, 3:21). In detailed testimony given before the Peruvian CVR, a witness speaks of her rape but cannot repeat the "dirty words referring to sex":

> In the very headquarters, they threw me down, began to beat me, they beat my feet, legs, sides and breasts, they pulled my shirt and they raped me. They were several; I remember up to the third who threw himself on top of me, even when I was shouting. I shouted all the time that I was innocent . . . they looked at me naked and said, "Look how thin she is; she won't take it," among themselves with dirty words, their slang referring to the sex. And one of them, not content with having raped me, put the cannon of the machine gun [*metralleta*] in the anus and said, "You still haven't had it here." (CVR, 319)

A Guatemalan witness uses the same euphemism (touching) as the Yugoslav rape victims. On 15 September 1982, "we were coming back with my father from the market in Rabinal. Soldiers stopped us near the base and confined us separately . . . they pulled off my clothes in pieces and all mounted me, the captain first and eight more soldiers. The others touched me, treated me badly, and told the one on top to hurry up. They said to me to move and they beat me to make me move" (CEH, 3:51).

Indigenous people often did not report rape because they had no confidence in state institutions and because of the absolute impunity of the perpetrators, who were often still living in their community. But in addition to these rationalized silences, there is the fact that "unlike sin, shame resists verbalization; it (rape) cannot be elevated into a sign of faith or belonging."[31] Indeed, raped women often seem to have suffered alone.

The ethnographer Kimberley Theidon, in a sensitive study of the aftermath of atrocities in highland Peru, writes that "if anything can strike a person dumb, it is rape. Women have many reasons for concealing that they had been raped and with justice only a distant possibility they have few motives to speak of stigmatized and shameful experiences." She adds that the "stigma associated with rape has multiplied the consequences. Women go on trying to manage the stigma and the great majority have never spoken of the horrible experience."[32] Theidon's study is unusual in exploring women's resistance to rape and their tactics of survival, including abortion and consenting to sex with the military in order to save daughters or relatives.[33] She also takes into account the Quechua language, which conveys different concepts of suffering, weakness, and evil as well as different concepts of the body and selfhood.[34] Yet some women were able to bear witness, and despite shame, guilt, and silence, the Truth Commissions sometimes managed to record explicit and detailed accounts of rape, sometimes by the assaulted person.

The case of Giorgina Gamboa in Peru is particularly interesting in this respect. Gamboa was one of many who gave birth to a daughter after being raped. In many such cases, women were stigmatized by the community and even by their own families. In some cases they left the babies to die or gave them over to convents. Giorgina Gamboa was refused an abortion, a decision that at first made her suicidal. She eventually accepted the child and became a proud mother, appearing before the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation with her then twenty-year-old daughter. In an essay on the case, Rocío Silva Santisteban argues that in thus refusing shame and victimization, Gamboa was able to overcome the limitations of the Truth Committee itself, which adopted a "tutelary" role toward "victims," and was thus able to insert her own voice into the national narrative. "Giorgina speaks to the members of the Commission, to journalists and on behalf of 'human rights.'" Her testimony, given publicly and before cameras, was "organized according to the urgent need to highlight her search for justice and the need that this be situated in a broader public space than her community."[35] This is an important strategy that few others have been able to follow.

"Violence," writes Judith Butler in her book *Precarious Life*, is a way that "a primary human vulnerability to other humans is exposed in its most terrifying way, a way in which we are given over, without control to the will of another, a way in which life itself can be expunged by the willful action of another."[36] In response to recent global violence, Butler asks, "What counts as human? Whose lives count as lives? What makes for a grievable life?"[37] This kind of question was asked in a different form by Solomon Lerner in his presentation of the Peruvian Report of the Commission on

Truth and Reconciliation in 2003. "What does it say about our political community, now that we know that 35,000 of our brothers are missing without anybody missing them?" What does it mean, we might add, that so many "sisters" have disappeared or have been attacked in their very selfhood? Can "truth" and "reconciliation" repair the wreckage of so many lives and the divisions between those who adapted to militarization and those who did not, especially given the fact that it has been so difficult to remove the impunity of perpetrators?

"Truth Commissions," writes Greg Grandin, "are curious, contradictory bodies. They often raise hope of justice symbolized by the Nuremberg Trials yet operate within the impoverished political possibilities that exist throughout much of the post–Cold War world."[38] The Guatemalan Commission was set up by the Oslo Accord of l994, and the Peruvian Commission drew on the body of international law in its definition of justice. International human rights, however inadequate and whatever their limitations, are strategically significant as an arm against national or local injustices. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have argued that such "new supranational subjects that are legitimated not by right but by consensus intervene in the name of any type of emergency and superior ethical principles. What stands behind the intervention is not just a permanent state of emergency and exception, but a permanent state of emergency and exception, justified by *the appeal to essential values of justice*."[39] Without international human rights rulings, it is unlikely that Peru and Guatemala would, on their own initiative, have recognized rape as a crime against humanity, and even now most of the perpetrators have gone unpunished. As I have mentioned elsewhere, I find it more useful to consider "the appeal to essential values of justice" as strategic.[40]

Peru and Guatemala are now different societies, and indigenous peoples have a far greater public presence in those postwar societies despite the fact that attempts to understand and come to terms with the past are hampered by impunity and trauma.[41] But the melancholy truth is that ethnic cleansing, massacre, and rape go on elsewhere. In Colombia, where there is an ongoing civil war, both guerrilla groups and paramilitary groups rape, and "violence against women, particularly sexual violence by armed groups, has become a practice within the context of a slowly degrading conflict and a lack of respect for humanitarian law."[42] And rape and extermination of women in Juárez, Mexico, and in Guatemala City (described as "feminicide") in "peacetime" raise the uncomfortable question as to whether atrocity of this kind has now been "privatized."

Rape as act of war, genocide, or crime against humanity is not only widely publicized, but the possibility of prosecution now rests on a substan-

tial body of legal precedent.[43] A parallel development is the number and strength of women's organizations, including organizations of indigenous women, of families of the disappeared, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) under the aegis of UNIFEM, the women's fund of the United Nations.[44] The problem is that this mobilization does not sufficiently disturb the rest of the population and force them to take action. The impunity of the military and others will only be broken when the population at large accepts rape as a crime against humanity and determines to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Notes

1. *Preliminary Report* submitted by Radhika Coomaraswamy, the special rapporteur on violence against women of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 50th sess., November l994, U.N. document EcN 41995/42, 64. International laws that deal with rape are mostly spelled out in the following documents: article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and in the 1977 supplement to the Geneva conventions (protocol 2). In the body of law from the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, it is listed in article 6 as a crime against humanity.

2. The numbers vary and range between fourteen and sixty thousand. For a discussion of these statistics, see Indira Kajosevic, "Understanding War Rape: Bosnia 1992," www.women.it/cyberarchive/files/kajosevic.htm.

3. Susan Brownmiller, *Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape* (New York: Bantam, 1976), 5.

4. Bülent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, "Becoming Abject: Rape as a Weapon of War," *Body and Society* 11 (2005): 115. Contrary to Diken and Laustsen and to my own argument here, Kajosevic, in "Understanding War Rape: Bosnia 1992," suggests that rape is a gender-specific atrocity and should be considered separately from genocide. Including it under genocide, she argues, contributes to its historical invisibility. Catherine A. MacKinnon, however, differentiates genocidal rape "as an official policy of war" in her book *Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 145; see also chapter 22, "Genocide's Sexuality."

5. CEH, *Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio*, vol. 3 (Guatemala City: F&G Editores, 1999). The CEH published its twelve-volume report in 1999. The nine-volume final report ("Informe Final") of the CVR is available on the Web, www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php. Both reports give special consideration to violence against women. Unless otherwise stated, the translations into English are mine. Subsequent citations to both reports are inserted parenthetically into the text.

6. Christian Tomuschat, "Clarification Commission in Guatemala," *Human Rights Quarterly* 23 (2001): 233–58, 247.

7. Tomuschat, "Clarification Commission in Guatemala," 253.

8. In Peru, some members of indigenous communities joined the ranks of the Sendero Luminoso, and in Guatemala they were recruited by the Ejército de Los Pobres, and in both countries the army also recruited the indigenous. But active

participants were a small percentage of the population.

9. For Guatemala, see "Violencia sexual contra la mujer," in CEH, 3: 22–23; for Peru, see CVR, 276.

10. The full name is El Partido Comunista Peruano por el Sendero Luminoso de José Carlos Mariátegui (PCP-SL). Henceforth referred to as SL.

11. Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique, *Peru: Time of Fear* (London: Latin American Bureau, 1992), is a useful survey of the civil war. Apart from the SL, a guerrilla group called the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) also was active, especially in the province of Huallaga. The Truth Commission reported on rapes by MRTA members, but these acts were not as systematic as those of the SL or the army. See also Gustavo Gorriti, *The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru*, trans. Robin Kirk (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

12. For an in-depth survey of the antecedents of the war, see CEH, 1:123–93; Susanne Jonas, *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power*, Latin American Perspectives Series 3 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991).

13. Thirty-seven members of the organization were killed in the firebombing of the Spanish embassy in 1980. For the history of indigenous militancy, see Greg Grandin, *The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000).

14. MacKinnon, *Are Women Human?* 145.

15. Elaine Scarry, "The Structure of Torture," in *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, l985), 49.

16. Kimberley Theidon, *Entre prójimos: El conflicto armado interno y la política de la reconciliación en el Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2004), 122.

17. Theidon, *Entre prójimos*, 121.

18. In a discussion of rape in the former Yugoslavia, Linda E. Boose links the irrational ferocity of such attacks to the reenactment of Serbian heroic mythology. See her "Crossing the River Drina: Bosnian Rape Camps, Turkish Impalement, and Serb Cultural Memory," *Signs* 28 (2002): 71–96. The same can be said of incidents in Peru and Guatemala, notably, in Guatemala, the use of the term *kaibiles* to refer to a pre-Colombian hero.

19. The *kaibiles* were specially trained as commandos and counterterrorists. See CEH, 2:55–62.

20. Diken and Laustsen, "Becoming Abject," 113. Julia Kristeva's *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection* (New York: Columbia University Press, l992) draws mainly on literary sources, especially Louis-Ferdinand Céline. Other sources are Georges Bataille and Mary Douglas.

21. Rocío Silva Santisteban, "El testimonio de Giorgina Gamboa. Maternidad y basurización simbólica en el testimonio de una mujer afectada por crímenes de violencia política," chapter 2 of "El factor asco: Basurización simbólica y discursos autoritarios" (PhD diss., Boston University, 2005).

22. Diken and Laustsen, "Becoming Abject," 124.

23. Diken and Laustsen, "Becoming Abject," 120. Although I speak only of the rape of women, there are instances of men being raped or emasculated.

24. In "Understanding War Rape: Bosnia 1992," Indira Kajosevic argues that charges of genocide tend to occult the specificity of rape.

25. Greg Grandin, "The Instruction of Great Catastrophe: Truth Commissions, National History, and State Formation in Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala," *American Historical Review* 110 (2005), www.historycooperative.org/journals/

ahr/110.1/grandin.html,16.

26. Grandin, "The Instruction of Great Catastrophe," 14; CEH, 4:75.

27. President Ríos Montt, an ideologue of this destruction, belonged to the California-based Church of the Word (Jonas, *The Battle for Guatemala*, 153). Members of the Catholic Church, however, especially those sympathetic to Liberation Theology, were among the victims.

28. See vol. 1 of CEH, which deals with the social and cultural consequences of the repression.

29. Diken and Laustsen, "Becoming Abject," 113.

30. Coomaraswamy, *Preliminary Report*, 15.

31. Diken and Laustsen, "Becoming Abject," 121.

32. Theidon, *Entre prójimos*, 126–27.

33. Theidon, *Entre prójimos*, 109. See also Judith N. Zur, *Violent Memories: Mayan War Widows in Guatemala* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998).

34. Theidon, *Entre prójimos*, 68–92.

35. Santisteban, "El factor asco," 87.

36. Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2004), 28–29.

37. Butler, *Precarious Life*, 20.

38. Grandin, "The Instruction of Great Catastrophe," 1.

39. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 18.

40. Jean Franco, "La máquina de guerra subalterna: Mujeres, guerra, y derechos," *Metapolitica* 36 (2004): 74–82.

41. Charles R. Hale, "Rethinking Indigenous Politics in the Era of the 'Indio Permitido,'" *NACLA Report on the Americas* (September–October 2004): 16–21.

42. Coomaraswamy, *Preliminary Report*. See also www.womenwarpeace.org/colombia/colombia.htm (accessed 27 February 2007).

43. Catherine A. MacKinnon, "Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on *Akayesu*," in *Are Women Human?* 237–46.

44. For information on UNIFEM's activities in Colombia, see www.women warpeace.org/colombia/colombia.htm.

The only gift is a portion of thyself.
Thou must bleed for me.
—Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Gifts"

Kennan Ferguson

It's the Thought That Counts

On 20 March 2003, the U.S. military, with minor assistance from England, Australia, and a smattering of other countries, invaded the state of Iraq with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the authoritarian and brutal government of Saddam Hussein and replacing it with a constitutional democracy. At great expense, considerable human cost, and the destruction of vast amounts of international goodwill, the United States intended to free the Iraqi people. (Even though considerable talk of the threat of weapons of mass destruction had preceded the offensive, that chatter disappeared soon after it became clear that the dictator had—surprisingly—complied with international demands and rid the country of any such weaponry.) What did the U.S. government demand from the newly liberated Iraqi people in return? Nothing: this freedom was a gift.

Of course, many critics of the war have insinuated that certain demands have been made: that access to Iraq's considerable reserves of oil remains paramount, or that the U.S. government will insist on the permanent entrenchment of military bases in the country. They have doubted George W. Bush's announcement, at the war's beginning, that the U.S. intent was "to bring freedom to others."[1] But as of now, at least, the Bush administration has guaranteed that it will abide by the will of the new governmental structure. Thus, putting aside such objections for the purposes of this essay, the U.S. military has invaded and occupied Iraq solely to give political freedom to the people therein. In the words of Bush's press secretary, Ari Fleischer, the United States helped "lead a war to give freedom to the people of Iraq."[2]

Yet the gratitude that the United States expected has not exactly been forthcoming. Since the startlingly quick collapse of Hussein's military and

the conquest of Bagdad, violence has steadily continued against the great emancipators. Americans are roundly reviled; Western journalists can no longer travel safely in much of the country; virtually no Iraqi political parties will admit to asking the Americans to stay. Each supposed demarcation toward the end of the uprising—the capture of the fugitive Hussein, the transfer of "sovereignty," the holding of elections—has failed to end the violence or stabilize the country. And the Iraqi people overwhelmingly agree that the United States should leave Iraq as soon as possible.[3]

Such a result appears outrageous, at least from Washington's viewpoint. They have given an amazing and costly gift, and, worse than insufficient gratitude, outright resentment has resulted. The majority of Iraqis do not want Saddam Hussein back in power, and yet they also do not want the Americans, the very Americans who saved them from Hussein's rule. Admittedly, the Iraqi people did not ask for the invasion, but at its successful initial conclusion, with Hussein gone, why did they not embrace this new state of events?

I argue that the U.S. government had little idea what it was doing. Not necessarily in its military strategy (though that is possible), nor in its occupational strategy (though that is probably at this point beyond serious argument), but in its very conception of the relationship that gifting entails. If indeed freedom can be a gift, and if the intent of the American governmental structure was to bequeath such a gift, then what did the action of giving mean, to both the grantor and the receiver?

To answer this question, I turn not to policy, political-science analysis of power politics, nor to classic theories of international relations. Instead, I look at the anthropological, philological, sociological, and philosophical meanings of gift-giving. For almost a century, the question of the gift has been investigated as a cultural, economic, and psychological phenomenon; hermeneutic and sociological interpretations suggest why people give and identify the corresponding obligations, or lack thereof, that giving produces. Under these auspices, the meaning of the "gift of freedom" that the U.S. invasion has delivered looks very different.

Of course, such an approach ignores a number of the conclusions that most commentators desire to draw about Iraq. It sidesteps the question of U.S. grand ambition, the meaning of democratic freedom, and the central role of violence and death in imperialism. One could therefore argue that this entire analysis ignores every important aspect of the war in Iraq. The presumption that the United States gave freedom (of whatever sort) to the Iraqi people still bears closer scrutiny. Yet many other essayists, commentators, and academics have explored these issues of justice, international law, and the authenticity of American claims about weapons of mass destruction. Their answers, even if incorrect, at least explore these

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issues.[4] If, however, both sides conceptualize the invasion as a gift, in the complex and problematic way explored by theorists, then the usual analyses of national interest and international law have failed to understand central and continuing motivating factors on all sides.

To Give

Many will deny that the intertwined motivations of the U.S. military and the Iraqi people do constitute the giving and receiving of a gift, especially those repulsed by this war. A gift, they will argue, must be desired. A gift can be refused. A gift is given only with generosity, or only to one who is beloved, or only with goodwill. The war in Iraq, they will assert, shows none of these traits: it is merely a question of dominance, might, and grand imperialist ambitions. As tempting as these claims might be, they are demonstrably false. Such a naive conceptualization of gift-giving fails any normative and descriptive test, whether cultural, anthropological, or economic. Gifts, simply put, operate at far more complex (and far less sanguine) levels.

To give and *to take* share the same Indo-European roots.[5] In middle Dutch, the word *gif* meant both a gift and a poison; the German word *gift* means toxin.[6] Anthropologists, linguists, and philosophers have engaged the counterintuitive overlap between gift and appropriation, between giving and stealing.

The differences between a gift and an anonymous donation are readily apparent. Gifts are never simply contributions: they take place publicly, with expectations of acknowledgment, and between people who have (or hope to have) a relationship. One cannot understand a gift, therefore, without comprehending the cultural interrelationships in which it operates. Gifts are social objects, circulating in spirit between gifter and giftee, creating and consolidating connections and social standings. The young, for example, bear different gift-giving expectations than do adults. Children do not need to give as many gifts to their parents as parents give their children, for example, and the effort a child spends creating the given object holds greater import than its monetary cost. But the assumptions of gift-giving still apply: a child's empty-handed arrival at another's birthday party in the United States would not soon be forgotten.

Anthropologists were the first to study gifts seriously, investigating the demands they create. Upon analysis, practices of giving clearly involve more than mere friendliness or generosity; rules, expectations, and traditions appear clearest to those who have not internalized the gestures. Gifts, in other words, partake in economies—not in the traditional sense of a

measurable equilibrium of labor-power exchange, but in a social, interactive, creative, and sometimes excessive exchange of value.

Here one must mention the early-twentieth-century anthropologist Marcel Mauss. In his fragmentary, schematic, and astonishingly influential analysis of Melanesian, Polynesian, and northwest American Indian tribes, Mauss developed a theory of gift exchange that swept away the usual dismissive attitudes toward giving as a normatively empty, formal gesture. *The Gift* explained various methods by which social bonds and political status emerge from the giving of presents; in doing so, Mauss's book thus outlined a critical analysis of the processes by which ostensible generosity transmutes into economies of goods, power, status, and domination. He did not intend to limit his investigations to far-flung lands, either, but hoped that such appraisals would apply to Germany, to the West, to "social life in its entirety."[7]

Other analyses soon followed: studies by Georges Bataille, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Martin Heidegger, Marilyn Strathern, Marshall Sahlins, Pierre Bourdieu, Gloria Goodwin Raheja, and Jacques Derrida.[8] Each brought more cultural evidence, newer theories of exchange, and a deepening of the sense of the importance of gift-giving to social relations. Starting with Mauss's conclusions, these theorists expanded and enriched the various implications of giving into space, sex, and time.

Many of these readings of economy followed Mauss's attention to the northwest American tradition of potlatch.[9] During the potlatch, the gift-giving cycle reaches beyond the bounds of generosity into the realm of pure destruction. Haïda and Tlingit chiefs invited their rivals to complex ceremonies, where they gave gifts and ceremonially broke or burnt other valuables, such as houses, crates of whale oil, and copper vessels.

To Mauss, this process of destruction showed the purity of the gift, where you as giver have not given "the slightest hint of desiring your gift to be reciprocated."[10] By conquering the property, you conquer the system of exchange. This destroys the possibility of reciprocity, the object of the system of gift-giving, by making repayment impossible. Mauss divided the symbolic meaning of potlatch into the sacrificial (where the object goes from the material world into the realm of the spiritual) and the warlike. Discussing the latter, he explained that the Tlingit call their potlatch the "War Dance," and they conceive of the property as being killed—either destroyed, or given to a tribe that does not have the resources to reciprocate.[11] The enemy can be beaten when that which is given cannot be returned.

For Bataille, the act of destruction itself constitutes the soul of the gift. In the first volume of *The Accursed Share* (1991), Bataille redefined political economy as intrinsically concerned with excess and surplus,

rather than—as in traditional economics—scarcity.[12] All organisms and cultures, he argued, exceed their minimum requirements; growth, change, and reproduction—the intrinsic determinants of life—can only occur when energy is available that exceeds the requirements of mere existence. The most important anthropological question to ask of a society, Bataille suggested, should not be "where does it get the necessary resources to survive?" but "what does it do with its excess?" In his reading, destruction must be central to social organization. Warfare, sacrifice, religious devotion, monuments, art, and gifts all constitute forms of waste and excess; only a healthy society partakes in such exorbitance, just as only a thriving, extravagant organism has the capacity to grow or reproduce.

Derrida, too, rejected Mauss's closed economy of gift-giving. He pointed out that the circulation of gifts logically contradicts their status as gifts. Once a thing has been truly given, that thing can no longer be part of an exchange.[13] For Derrida, what is given in gift-giving is not objects, but the over-and-above, the excess of objects. Time, experience, and life: those are what are being given, all that can be given. The destruction found in gift-giving arises from the systematic culmination of the exteriority of such gifts. Insofar as gift-giving always builds to overcoming, it also always builds to madness.[14]

These various interpretations are less important for their differences, though, than for the centrality of destruction in each. Potlatch serves as the archetypal form of gift-giving precisely because the giving, the sacrifice, has been abstracted from the taking, from need. The ornamentalism of exchange has been transcended, revealing the power inherent in the act of giving. When the economics of the objects are transcended, only the economics of relationship and affect endure. At the heart of the gift, then, stands the *act* of giving, not the need or pleasure of receipt. In the annihilation of the thing, the subjugation of the other is all that remains.

Materialism

Freedom itself is an abstraction. Gifts, however, are physical objects: they hold concrete economic value even if they are not traded thus. But freedom is neither a copper headpiece nor a container of seal oil; it cannot be fungibly transferred in like a physical good. Freedom, as a concept, cannot corporeally be given, or earned, or even measured. To be free remains indefinable, as a half millennium of political philosophy shows.

This complicates our understanding of giving. For example, Bataille argued that the essence of the gift was the transmutation of *a thing* (what is given or destroyed) into *rank* (that which is gained by the act of giving

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or destruction).[15] Though he carefully distinguished rank from power (strictly, the ability to coerce), the two concepts remain mutually reinforcing. In cases where "prestige is *power*, this is insofar as power itself escapes the considerations of force or right."[16] A form of social magic occurs, where the act of wasting material goods transforms into the acquisition of sacred stature. If no transformable object exists, what precisely occurs? What makes up the gift?

One answer for the example at hand is to emphasize the material quality of the invasion of Iraq. The matériel of warfare overwhelms the mind in its vastness. Troops, weapons, organizations, training, support: all these comprise massive amounts of physical outflow from the United States. The bodily materialism of the armed forces themselves proves both symbolic and incontrovertible; the numbers of U.S. soldiers wounded and killed constitute part of the cost of the war.[17] Perhaps the measurable expenditure of equipage serves as the material basis of the gift.

Another answer could highlight the abstraction of value that the material wealth represents. That is, wealth itself is wasted. For Mauss, the social presentation of destruction proved important: one approach to potlatch involved a chief setting afire barrels of whale oil, a valuable commodity. In that overt expenditure, with of course no hope of return, the gift shows itself as both expansive and wasteful.

So perhaps the expending of billions of dollars in unnecessary warfare itself serves this purpose. This expense need not be translated into material goods to be seen as a massive outlay. Certainly, the U.S. government's financial separation of the Iraq war from the rest of its budget emphasizes the specific and immense cost. Though most commentators interpret this maneuver as a way to feign financial conservativism while simultaneously inflating national expenditures, it seems unlikely that many onlookers are confused.[18] Indeed, this move overemphasizes warfare expenditures, keeping them from being dwarfed by the size of the national budget.

A third answer may play up the immaterial nature of the result. Just as freedom cannot be measured in its giving, neither can it be measured in the taking. That is, perhaps warfare redefines freedom as closer to destruction than gift. "Look," says the giver, "at how much effort and wealth went into the process. One cannot deny the result." Freedom, under this definition, is not measured by journalistic autonomy or national self-determination or even formal balloting—it is measured, instead, by the exertion expended for it. Such an understanding would explain the U.S. government's continued ability to assert that the situation in Iraq continually improves, even though all mensurable evidence points to violence and instability: so much exertion *must* be having a positive effect.[19]

These answers do not exclude one another; perhaps all of them together

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indicate the material meaning of freedom. That mere emotion or gesture does not suffice, however, remains clear. Sacrifices must take place for a gift to be a true gift; oblation cannot arise from immaterial (in both senses of the word) things. Feelings such as pity or admiration, no matter how earnestly experienced, do not require or even suggest repayment—they are a-economic. It is the object's value and materiality that necessitate the unavoidable cycle toward mutual obligation and power.

Production

Additional questions arise: where do all of these gifts come from in the first place, and precisely whose blood and treasure went into the giver's control of them? In her analysis of the relationship between giving and cultural prestige, Lisette Josephides points to what she terms "the unacknowledged relationship to production," the social and economic relations underlying the creation of the objects given.[20] Who actually makes the things, who works for those with the power to gain privilege from the act of giving, cannot be separated from the dispensation. A New Guinean chief's generosity depends on those who labor to create the objects given; the power to gift also signifies the power over others to originate the gift. In other words, according to Josephides, the cultural power of dominance underlies the ostensible equivalence of exchange. Most anthropological descriptions, including Mauss's, naturalize the chief's possession of the objects/gifts. He somehow owns them; production processes fade into the background. Josephides asserts the importance of the conditions of production of those gifts: how do they become the chief's to give away?

In the case of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, who produces freedom? In the Marxist terminology of Josephides's focus on production, who are the workers whose labor gets alienated from them? Soldiers, certainly, appear on the front line of the U.S. production of the gift of freedom. It is they who suffer through dust storms, physical exhaustion, canteen meals, and physical labor.

The threat of injury and death, too, constitutes a form of labor. Mortar attacks, improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, accidents and "friendly fire" incidents, even the constant possibility of such events occurring in otherwise benign circumstances, all form sorts of payments made by the bodies and minds of the American soldiers, most of whom would not choose to be in the Middle East if not called up and deployed there. Certainly, military personnel receive significant (at least to them as individuals) wages, but such payments make no sense outside the power relations of obligatory deference to authority and the rhetorics of patrio-

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tism that undergird a volunteer military. Few, if any, of the enlisted service members would have chosen on their own to exchange their security for the results of the Iraq war: a distant state's quasi partition into various principalities, including Shari'ah-inflected legal republicanism.

In other words, gifts are far easier to give if the giver has a highly disciplined, compulsory workforce whose labor—rather than his or her own—produces the object given. If Bataille's economic presuppositions prove correct, the excess must be expended at the expense of those who create it. The Americans literally at war in Iraq, as the rest of U.S. society lives more or less untroubled by the conflict, provide the sacrificial expenditure that serves as the American gift. Iraqi freedom, argued Donald Rumsfeld (then the U.S. secretary of defense) on the third anniversary of the invasion, "is a gift, selflessly purchased by the very best and brightest among us."[21] For the nation, these soldiers literally embody the overflow of economy, its excess, its wasted gift. It is far easier to comprehend the contradictory messages of the political apparatus under such a conception. Common sense suggests the incoherence of simultaneously hiding the casualties of American service personnel while harping on the massive sacrifices made by the everyday soldier. But if the symbolic expense supersedes the literal bodies of the soldiers, if the sacrifice of the soldiers is at all threatened by their all-too-human wounds, opinions, and corpses, then the latter must be hidden lest they eclipse the former.[22]

That the gift takes the form of warfare, of the violence done to the bodies of the state's own citizens and others, serves as the hypertropic form of expenditure. Ferocity and vehemence already constitute a dynamic of the gift-giving process for the individual; for states to give gifts the expense must be much greater. International war serves as the quintessential act, possessing sufficient dramatic importance to justify such cost. Even those wars that the United States did not originate (such as the two world wars) necessitated astonishing degrees of force, carnage, and expense. "The violence appears irreducible," one might say, "within the circle or outside it, whether it repeats the circle or interrupts it."[23] Indeed, the need for expenditure even continued well after these wars into the postwar period, as the Marshall Plan and the Japanese occupation showed. But the success of these wars (or even all wars) is measured more by sacrifice and bloodshed than by formal gauges of national accomplishment. We lionize achievements by generals and soldiers for generations, whereas we quickly forget successes by ambassadors and U.N. negotiators, no matter how impressive or substantive. Novels and films celebrate wars and battles, not the triumphant use of subtle diplomatic engagement or the skillful stabilizing of economic growth.

The realization that war can serve as the ultimate in sacrificial gift-

giving undercuts the optimistic presumption undergirding Mauss's analysis. Mauss hoped that gift-giving could act as a social repository for the strong passions and excitements of warfare, displacing them into a safe alternative. When differing cultures, even those of neighboring tribal groups, meet, they "can only either draw apart, and if they show mistrust toward one another or issue a challenge, fight — or they can negotiate."[24] The gift concretizes this second, nonviolent option: "It is by opposing reason to feeling, by pitting the will to peace against sudden outbursts of insanity . . . that peoples succeed in substituting alliance, gifts, and trade for war, isolation, and stagnation."[25] Marshall Sahlins explained this as Mauss's solution for the problem of the Hobbesian state of war, where the rationality of structured exchange replaces the natural human tendency toward conflict and oppression.[26] But this opposition, which implicitly shows the savages as progressing toward (peaceful) civilization, rests on too facile a dualism. War and exchange are not mutually exclusive, as the complex economies of contemporary countries no less than ancient civilizations demostrate. On the contrary, they comprise interrelated and reinforcing methods by which people and societies negotiate difference.

Gender

The differences in gift-giving, and the differences between the desires of donor and recipient, draw out the power dynamics within a society. The inherently gendered nature of gift-giving reinforces these personal politics. But this depends on the recognition of the gendered social dynamics within which the giving occurs. So long as the gift is understood as the object itself, instead of the relationship (what Mauss calls the "spiritual bonds") between the giver and receiver, the gift remains a mere thing. So long as giving is understood as merely a relationship between two people, the social components of the giving are merely the background. But acknowledging the act, the thing, the social relationship, and the overarching plurality of meanings of gift-giving, while difficult, allows for an analysis that examines the mutually reinforcing aspects of their interrelatedness.

Feminism, as Marilyn Strathern argues in *The Gender of the Gift*, encompasses more than an approach to cultural understanding that focuses primarily on women, though it is often misperceived that way. Gender, she says, "is easily relegated to male-female interaction, male-female interaction to the concerns of women, women to domesticity — always something related to, contained by 'society' and 'culture.'"[27] Instead, feminism examines the very gendering of social and academic comprehen-

sions of behavior: what counts as knowledge, what counts as action, what counts as interpretation (in any culture, whether academic anthropology or Melanesian familial structures) draw on and reinforce sexual, cultural, and power dynamics of that group. A feminist approach, she argues, cannot be simply pasted onto anthropology, any more than the reverse, but each can allow for new understandings and analyses.

Strathern contends that each participant necessarily experiences the gift transaction differently: for one the gift means a continuation of his or her self, now in the embrace of the other, while for the other the gift must be forcibly extracted and disengaged from the previous owner. Similarly, between a man and a woman, especially those within a patriarchy, the gift can never operate as simply as Mauss or others who scrutinize only male-male gift-giving can comprehend. For one partner, the gift may seem deserved or already owned; for the other, the gift cannot even serve as a mechanism of reciprocity.[28]

Other feminist analyses assert the ways in which the act of giving genders both people involved. Hélène Cixous has argued that once one accepts Mauss's conceptual schema, in which gifts enter the parties into a system of reciprocity, one must necessarily ask about the differences in reciprocity demanded of men and women. For women, especially wives without economic recourse, the return of value that a gift demands cannot be replicated in financial terms. The implication for a woman, then, is that her own subservience must serve a man's virility, his masculinity.[29]

But this implication reaches beyond women: it holds true for all who receive. Passivity, Cixous argues, gets rendered female.[30] In the traditional form of gift-giving, those who give are claiming their masculinity (an open-ended and always fruitless claim, since their masculinity can never be fully assured). One could even expand this, as does Cixous's contemporary Luce Irigaray, to identify the tendency to turn humans into objects, to commodify women, as an extension of the desire to control others through the use and expense of things.[31] But the gender of giving does not need to commodify only women: anyone and anything can be given, provided one holds suffcient power. Cixous: "Giving: there you have a basic problem, which is that masculinity is always associated — in the unconscious, which is after all what makes the whole economy function — with debt."[32] If structures of masculinity depend on giving, then both militarism and generosity become intertwined with conquest and the feminization and delegitimation of the invaded.

The buildup to the Iraq war and the early days of the conflict severely tested the relationship between the United States and France, especially among supporters of the American president. Innumerable strains emerged on the western side of the Atlantic, including the renaming of "french

fries" as "freedom fries," the public destruction of French wine, and the popularization of the sobriquet "cheese-eating surrender monkeys," that exemplified the level of contempt.[33] What primarily bothered a great number of commentators was France's perceived lack of gratitude for U.S. involvement in World War II, sixty years before. (Never mind that Pearl Harbor, the motivating event for U.S. entry, followed Germany's invasion of France by a year and a half or that France itself historically aided U.S. military independence by joining George Washington's forces to defeat Cornwallis.) The frenzied fury even led one Florida congresswoman, Ginny Browne-Waite, to introduce a bill seeking to repatriate the bodies of World War II American servicemen interred in France.

These attitudes demonstrate a particular continuity of resentment on the part of these Americans. What, precisely, did France owe? Obeisance to American foreign policy? Support of questionable intelligence? More important, what constituted the international economy of exchange: what, precisely, should the French have paid for their own gift of freedom? Clearly, commitment to democracy, to sovereign decision making, and to international law did not suffice.[34] And obviously the gift could never be repaid, since the French government's half century of determined anti-Stalinism failed to discharge the debt.

From this perspective, by accepting the gift of freedom France had acquired an eternal obligation. Opposition, disagreement, or even lack of support had become unacceptable: a gift had been given, after all. No one demanded that freedom need be renounced, or somehow paid back; instead, the continuance of French democracy necessitated a responsiveness to demands. As Wilton Dillon noted in the 1960s, the French reluctance to accept the Marshall Plan arose from the suspicion that such a gift would carry obligatory demands and eternal reparations.[35]

Civilization

Anthropologists—by the very nature of their work—rarely explain the ways in which the practices they study transcend the cultures that engender them. They may do a superb job interpreting one culture for another, or clarifying how apparently economic relationships are better understood as symbolic cultural relationships. More difficult, though, is making sense of the overlap and interrelation between traditions. A gesture, an object, or a phrase may be profoundly meaningful in two different traditions, and yet when exchanged between actors across those traditions, it may have entirely unrelated meanings.

Maussian and post-Maussian theorists of gift-giving, in pointing

to a universality of excess and exchange, are clearly critiquing Western societies. "Look," they are saying, "the complexities of our economies are just like these so-called 'primitive' ones: we too arrange our systems of exchange toward symbolic rather than commodity exchange, and we too do not understand that the excesses of production could be used to help our weakest and most needy."

Strangely, however, there has been far less attention paid to the practices of transcultural gifts. Perhaps this deficiency arises from the common phenomenological or structuralist assumption that, since such behaviors are universal (or at least come from transcultural economic and social systems), they must hold the same symbolic meanings or disguise the same ugly, oppressive realities across cultures. Yet the dynamics of a gift given around the world, at least one outside the formalized networks of diplomacy, remain poorly understood.

Such a gift remains poorly understood by the givers, at least, who remain convinced they are acting with utter benevolence and tremendous generosity. The recipients are not so naive. They may recognize that the history of globalization, writ large across the past half millennium, includes countless examples of gift-giving as cross-civilizational practice. From the gifts given by European explorers and colonists to native peoples, to the gifts of civilization brought across the planet through colonialism and imperialism, to the gift of economic development through industrialization and free trade, the poison has long been indistinguishable from the gift. These presents were freely given, and sometimes freely received, but they often built relationships that were lethal to the recipients.

What those who receive the gift of freedom understand is that no gifts are truly free, that the submission inherent in getting a gift results by its very nature in unfreedom. Why else do invasions face resistance and denial, even by those they ostensibly free, while revolutions far more often garner celebration and commemoration?[36] In the case of Iraq, even some of those who most hated the tyranny of Saddam Hussein argued forcefully against the U.S. invasion.[37] Many still do; in fact, it would be politically suicidal to suggest publicly in much of Iraq today that the U.S. invasion has been overall a benefit. Gifts, as the saying goes, keep on giving.

Notes

1. George W. Bush, "Address to Nation," Oval Office, the White House, 19 March 2003.

2. Ari Fleischer, press briefing, James S. Brady Press Briefing Room, the White House, 28 May 2003.

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3. See, for example, "The Iraqi Public on the US Presence and the Future of Iraq," poll by the Program on International Foreign Policy Attitudes (27 September 2006, www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/sep06/Iraq_Sep06_rpt.pdf), which found that "a large majority of Iraqis—71%—say they would like the Iraqi government to ask for U.S.-led forces to be withdrawn from Iraq within a year or less" (4); 78 percent of Iraqis reported feeling that the U.S. presence is "provoking more conflict than it is preventing" (5). Even more dramatic, the same survey that 61 percent of Iraqis supported military "attacks on U.S.-led forces" (8).

4. Although many more examples exist, the following sources provide a taste of the debates: John Yoo, "International Law and the War in Iraq," *American Journal of International Law* 97 (2003): 563–76; Richard Falk, Irene Gendzier, and Robert Jay Lifton, eds., *Crimes of War: Iraq* (New York: Nation Books, 2006); James P. Pfiffner, "Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq?" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34 (2004): 25–46; Kenneth Roth, "Was the Iraq War a Humanitarian Intervention?" *Journal of Military Ethics* 5 (2006): 82–94; Laura Sjoberg, *Gender, Justice, and the Wars in Iraq: A Feminist Reformulation of Just War Theory* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006); Mark Phythian, "The Perfect Intelligence Failure? U.S. Pre-War Intelligence on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Politics and Policy* 34 (2006): 400–424.

5. See Émile Benveniste's discussion of the Hittite verb *dā* in "Gift and Exchange in the Indo-European Vocabulary," in *The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity*, ed. Alan D. Schrift (London: Routledge, 1997), 33–42.

6. Ibid. See also J. Hillis Miller, "The Critic as Host," *Critical Inquiry* 3 (Spring 1977): 439–47.

7. Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*, trans. W. D. Halls (New York: Norton, 2000), 83.

8. Georges Bataille, *The Accursed Share*, vol. 1., trans Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1991); Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* (Boston: Beacon, 1969); Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper, 1972); Marilyn Strathern, *The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with Society in Melanesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press); Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (Chicago: de Gruyter, 1972); Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); Gloria Goodwin Raheja, *The Poison in the Gift: Ritual, Prestation, and the Dominant Caste in a North Indian Village* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Jacques Derrida, *Given Time. I, Counterfeit Money*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

9. Cf. Mauss, *The Gift*, 6–7, 38–39, 41, 73–74.

10. Ibid., 37.

11. Ibid., 113–14, n. 141.

12. Bataille, *The Accursed Share*.

13. Derrida, *Given Time*, 44.

14. Ibid., 45–48.

15. Bataille, *The Accursed Share*, 70–72.

16. Ibid., 71

17. For an extended analysis of the symbolic power of bodies in international warfare, see Thomas Hawley, *Remains of War: Bodies, Politics and the Search for American Soldiers Unaccounted-for in Southeast Asia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005).

18. See, for example, Lionel Beehner, "The Cost of the Iraq War," Council on Foreign Relations (Backgrounder), 8 November 2006.

19. One can readily ascertain the distance between effect and expenditure from a variety of sources, from election slogans in the 2006 U.S. midterm elections to exposures in books and articles, such as George Packer's *The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005) or Bob Woodward's *State of Denial*, part 3 of *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

20. Lisette Josephides, *The Production of Inequality: Gender and Exchange among the Kewa* (London: Tavistock, 1985), 18; quoted in Marilyn Strathern, *The Gender of the Gift*, 147.

21. Official statement commemorating the third anniversary of the war, 19 March 2006, www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2006/20060319_4543.html.

22. Larry N. George makes a similar point about expenditure and the response to terror in "The Pharmacotic War on Terrorism: Cure or Poison for the US Body Politic?" *Theory, Culture and Society* 19 (2002): 163–88.

23. Derrida, *Given Time*, 147.

24. Mauss, *The Gift*, 82.

25. Ibid.

26. Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics*.

27. Strathern, *The Gender of the Gift*, 36.

28. Ibid., 198–99.

29. Hélène Cixous, "Sorties: Out and Out: Attacks/Ways Out/Forays," in Schrift, *The Logic of the Gift*, 159.

30. Ibid., 149.

31. Luce Irigaray, *This Sex Which Is Not One*, trans. Carolyn Burke and Catherine Porter (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).

32. Hélène Cixous, "Castration or Decapitation?" trans. Annette Kuhn, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 7 (1981): 48.

33. The term *cheese-eating surrender monkeys*, used extensively by a number of radio and print commentators, was lifted from an episode of the television show *The Simpsons* (episode 2F32, "'Round Springfield").

34. See Bataille, *The Accursed Share*, vols. 2 and 3., trans Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1991). Bataille makes this point about the Marshall Plan in vol. 3.

35. Wilton S. Dillon, *Gifts and Nations* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968).

36. For example, the resistance in the Philippines continued long after the Spanish-American War. Even the descendants of the Normans continue to refer to the "Norman Invasion."

37. For example, the blog "Where Is Raed?" written in English by the pseudonymous "Salam Pax," a gay, Western-educated, atheistic Iraqi, makes this point. These entries were published as *Salam Pax: The Clandestine Diary of an Ordinary Iraqi* (New York: Grove, 2003).

Peace and War: Governmentality as a Military Project   Leerom Medovoi

What do globalization and the war on terror share? The connection between these two frames for the present moment is easily obscured by the seemingly different levels of social reality they address: *globalization* names a broad and impersonal macroeconomic process, while *war on terror* evokes the military campaigns that the Bush regime has pursued in the name of responding to the September 11 attacks. This apparent difference echoes the one that Wendy Brown has observed between "neo-conservatism," the hawkish ideology of the Bush administration as it seeks to "intensify U.S. military capacity and increase U.S. global hegemony," and "neo-liberalism," which she understands as a "political rationality" of market intensification that began to build momentum as far back as the Reagan/Thatcher years.[1] In contemporary usage, the war on terror fits neatly with the neoconservative political agenda, while globalization represents, in large measure, the process celebrated and promoted by neoliberalism. In this essay I will bring these two formations together through a specification of their common genealogy and their shared bio-political aims. Together, as I will show, they have precipitated the telling collapse of liberal society's traditional distinction between the internal and external enemy, as well as between the practices by which each is targeted: regulation and warfare, respectively. This collapse of internal and external threat is itself a consequence of precisely what globalization and the war on terror share: the unbounded surface of the earth as their territorial frame of reference.

In a critical reflection on Michel Foucault's biopolitical investigations, I will argue that these regulatory and military practices were never as far apart as they might on first glance appear. Born in the early nineteenth century, as Foucault argued, the regulatory techniques for managing biopower modeled themselves on an older conception of race war from which they borrowed the dictum that "society must be defended" against its internal enemies.[2] I will argue that the older form of war also survived this process, however, though reshaped into liberal society's ongoing bel-

licose relationships with its outside: colonial warfare and the Cold War are two historically central examples. In contrast to the colonial or Cold War worlds, our most recent regimes of world power—globalization and the war on terror—are distinguished by their undecidable suspension between the rubrics of regulation and war. Indeed, I will ultimately suggest that the war on terror represents the moment when globalization at last openly reveals the military side of its Janus-faced geopolitical aspirations. Society must now be *globally* defended.

What happens when we approach neoliberal globalization through a Foucauldian lens? Like Wendy Brown, and also for that matter like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, I am interested in reading it as a biopolitical project for the regulation of a planetary population. But my emphasis differs from both. For Brown, neoliberal globalization must be understood in terms of what *differentiates* it from classical liberalism, namely the former's more sophisticated premise that *homo economicus* and market rationality are not humanly natural pre-givens but, rather, must be carefully and systematically constructed through strategies of governance. Neoliberalism, in Brown's reading, governs by training the population to regulate its own life process according to the economy of cost-benefit analysis.[3] Yet in reading neoliberalism at face value, Brown takes it at its word to be an administrative project, a code of conduct rather than a strategy of combat. Hardt and Negri, by contrast, make biopolitics into a subset of sovereign power, the right of empire to manage the life of the multitude in the name of the perpetual peace that it promises and upon which it situates its claims to political legitimacy. For them, empire does indeed reserve the right to take police actions, to enact sanctioned violence. But civil peace and juridical right are the legitimating conditions that direct these exceptional actions. As they put it, "interventions are always exceptional even though they arise continually; they take the form of police actions because they are aimed at maintaining an internal order."[4]

What if we approach war, not as an exception to or the opposite of regulation, but rather as continuous with it, as the point when regulation's militarism has surged into the open? As we know from Marx, capital's domination through the impersonal forces of the market does not eliminate class struggle. Rather, it represents the effective *waging* of class struggle: a population is threatened, disciplined, and positioned (using economic or ideological force) into laboring for someone else's profit. So too with neoliberal globalization, we must ask what wars it seeks to win and how it constructs its subjects as entrepreneurial, self-regulating beneficiaries of an ensuing global peace.

The war on terror's importance for globalization can be understood if we return to Foucault's founding claim about biopower, namely that

the regulation of the life of the population is itself conceived on the model of war. It is through biopower, after all, that Foucault first sought to explain the emergence of genocide as the "dream of modern powers," itself inseparable from the twentieth-century phenomena of mass and multiple intersocial wars.[5] If globalization is the name that implicitly designates the "pacification" of populations in the name of world market integration, then the "Global War on Terror," as the Bush administration insistently calls it, should be understood as the territorially unbounded, politically malleable military strategy that this pacification actually demands. On this score, neoliberal globalization is perhaps not all so different from classical liberalism. Both ultimately guarantee the peacefulness of their civil order by conducting a perpetual internal war against wayward and resistant forms of life. They paradoxically assert a *simultaneous* state of war and peace.

What is new, however, is that, for neoliberalism, the "population" in need of protection is global in scope. As such, there is no distinction to be made between internal and external threats. Everyone who threatens the globe's civil order is, at this point, conceived as internal to it but simultaneously also as fair game for the open warfare formerly declared only against external enemies. I begin by mapping biopolitics in relation to practices of war and peace, beginning with their origins in the seventeenth-century polemic of race war as described in Foucault's "Society Must Be Defended" lectures. From there, I consider the tandem development of "internal" governmentality and "external" colonial warfare during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Then I trace their international reorganization under the postcolonial condition of the Cold War and finally into the era of globalization and the so-called war on terror. This highly telescoped and partial historical excursus has a limited aim: to shed light on the current conjuncture by understanding the permutations now being played within a genealogy of liberal biopolitics that has long depended on a simultaneous practice of war and peace.

Biopolitics as Nonsovereign Power

Biopower has become a central analytic in the Left's accounts of the current political conjuncture, thanks in large part to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Empire* and Giorgio Agamben's pair of studies *Homo Sacer* and *State of Exception*. To put it crudely, *Empire* brought biopower to bear on globalization, and Agamben's texts made it relevant to the war on terror. Hardt and Negri's reckoning with biopower helped to reconceptualize so-called economic globalization as a juridico-political phenomenon, a quasi regime that regulates the planetary life of an otherwise dispersed

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human multitude in the name of the "pax" it establishes. They therefore locate empire's prototype, not in the marketplace, but in a system of federation exemplified by U.S. constitutionalism.[6] By contrast, Agamben does not read biopower in relation to globality at all. Rather, he articulates biopower within a Schmittian conception of state sovereignty such that the fundamental object of its rule becomes the bare life of its population. In his provocative reading of the "camp" as the paradigmatic space of exception within which population becomes "bare life," Agamben offers a ready model with which to theorize the war on terror at several levels: the apparent reassertion of state sovereignty as seen in unilateral U.S. military action, the activation of emergency "wartime" powers, the practice of rendition, the uses of torture and abuse, and the employment of threshold legal categories, such as the "enemy combatant."[7]

I rehearse these tremendously influential positions in order to observe a debatable theoretical move they share: both Agamben and Hardt and Negri have swiftly brought biopower back into the orbit of sovereignty. Whether in the context of state or empire, biopower becomes, first and foremost, the revised object and the exercise of juridico-political rule. Now, this is curious. Foucault's investigation of biopower grew precisely out of the *critique* of a sovereignty model that, in his view, distracted us from the newer economies of power associated with disciplinary microphysics and macrosocial regulations of the population. As Foucault famously explained, "What we need . . . is a political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the king's head: in political theory that has still to be done."[8]

Neither Hardt and Negri nor Agamben seriously entertains Foucault's underlying proposition about liberal modernity: within the general economy of power, sovereignty (despite its continued visibility) has steadily retreated, giving way to less dramatic but far more effective disciplinary and regulatory regimes of power that can administer life from the individual level of the body all the way up to the statistical amalgem of the population. Even Achille Mbembe's fascinating essay "Necropolitics," while astutely foregrounding the practice of war in the exercise of power over life and death, does not relinquish sovereignty as modern power's primary mechanism. Mbembe builds his case directly on Agamben's notion of the "state of exception," so that war and law enter a relationship of exception and rule in an analysis of sovereign power. The question of whether war may perhaps operate outside the principle of sovereignty arises only anecdotally, as Mbembe explores actual examples (rather than philosophical conceptions) of war in the postcolony that include complex spatial vectors of force, militias, corporate mercenary groups, and other

nonstate agents.[9] In my view, this latter section of Mbembe's essay offers, in its perceptive reading of openly militarized contemporary biopolitics (comprehensible as complexly practiced race wars), an implicit critique of the philosophical groundings in sovereignty theory that the earlier sections had proposed.

Why are these theorists so ready to read biopower back into the sovereign from which Foucault took such pains to distinguish it? Perhaps this temptation exists because the population targeted by biopolitics possesses approximately the same scale as the "body politic" of the state. Perhaps Foucault himself encourages this conflation when he first introduces the object of biopolitics (in *The History of Sexuality*) as a curious inversion of the king's fundamental right over his subjects. While the king decides either to kill or let live, biopolitics determines instead whether to "*foster* life or *disallow* it to the point of death," deciding thereby when and where to weed out certain forms of life so that life worth living can flourish.[10] Finally, it is perhaps because we presume that only the sovereign bears the right to declare war. And yet, as Foucault explicitly warns us,

> wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who needs to be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; . . . this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.[11]

As Foucault determined, biopower is the currency of a new and different political project that he terms *governmentality*, the art (and later the science) of managing bodies and things, life and wealth. Governmentality is a liberal political project insofar as it decenters the state from the processes by which it regulates the population, but it is crucial also to capitalism in that its object is precisely to enact a "political economy," a maximization of the relationship between wealth, territory, and population with a minimization of force exerted. Governmentality, as meant by Foucault, converges with the "mode of regulation" as the regulation school theorists of capitalism conceived it.[12] Both governmentality and regulation serve to designate the ensemble of mechanisms and tactics through which a conducive social environment for capital accumulation emerges, renews, or even improves. Since the time of mercantilism at least, the object of government has shifted from consolidating the power of the state (or raison d'état) to abetting what we call the "economy," the accumulation of bodies and things.[13] Governmentality therefore concerns not "the people" of national sovereignty, but people targeted as a population and an economic

resource: "men . . . in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate irrigation, fertility etc."[14] The population, along with its various statistical quantities (level of education, health, customs, reproductive capacities, and so forth), thus expresses a certain magnitude of biopower that government aims to mobilize and expand through its regulatory and disciplinary techniques.[15]

Liberalism and the Fundament of Race War

It is from precisely this point of view that we can begin to think of liberalism's fundamental preoccupation with war. Within the realm of language, biopolitics poses "regulation" as the means to a peaceful and affluent administration of life. And yet, as noted earlier, biopower is born for Foucault amid the dream of genocide, and as a kind of inversion of the sword of the king. In the title to his recently translated 1975 lectures, Foucault describes the biopolitical imperative with the words "Society Must Be Defended," suggesting that it is the model of war which ultimately invests the exercise of biopower. As Julian Reid notes, Foucault had in fact been moving steadily throughout the seventies toward an investigation of war as the origin point of modern power. In *Discipline and Punish*, he had already cited military discipline as offering portable tactics to be applied to civil order. Gradually, however, Foucault reached the conclusion that social pacification and regulation, the production of "docile bodies" and productive populations, had in fact *begun* as a military project. It is not just that the arts of war had much to teach political power, but rather that, reversing Clausewitz's influential formulation, politics were reconceived as the extension of war.[16] Civil order and social peace become understood as a military outcome, the successful practice of a campaign vis-à-vis the population. Little wonder then that "genocide is the dream of modern power."

The "Society Must Be Defended" lectures were centrally concerned with one question: where and with whom did this conception of power as war originate? Tantalizingly, Foucault concludes that biopolitics find their martial sources in an older practice of a "race war" against sovereign authority. By the early nineteenth century, Foucault presumes, "race war" was absorbed by biopolitical regulation. I shall argue, however, that race war did not go away but was instead redirected toward the constitutive "outside" of liberal society, where it has been continually reframed and redeployed in a series of major historical permutations: colonial war, the Cold War, globalization, the war on terror.

What precisely is this concept of "race war"? Contrary to Agamben, who reads biopower into a near transhistorical model of sovereign right, Foucault traces a mere four-hundred-year genealogy for modern biopolitics, affiliating it instead with an *anti*sovereign project: the conduct of civil war. Biopolitics does not begin in a juridical model of the social order, but in a partisan and historical account that directly challenges what he calls the classic "Jupiterian" history of the state. Derivative of the pax Romana in its expression of a regime's august might and peaceful influence, a Jupiterian history seeks only to legitimate the sovereign model of power. Beginning in the seventeenth century, argues Foucault, one finds the emergence of a radically different mode of history telling, one that posits social tranquility as merely a pseudopeace belying a continuous war between two armies, a war raging within the interstices of "society." He associates the origins of our modern concept of race with this notion of continuous war, articulated from the viewpoint of one people who have been subjugated by another one that controls both the state and its celebratory Jupiterian discourse. In recounting its history of race war, the subordinated thereby struggle to keep alive the partisan truth of their own subjugation, offering up a counterhistory to the official narrative of power.[17]

In this early form, "race" is not yet "pinned to a stable biological meaning. And yet the word is not completely free-floating."[18] What it does of necessity signify is a partisan divide within the populace. It may of course allude to "bloodlines," as it does in the distinction between the invaded "Saxons" of England and their Norman conquerors, or in the indigenous "Frankish" nobility overrun by the Roman-supported Gaullic monarchy. But in this moment prior to scientific racism, the narrative of race war is most fundamentally concerned with two peoples, divided by language, religion, place of origin, or some other formative collective experience who are nonetheless caught up in a history of mutual struggle. The two groups, Foucault explains, "form a unity and a single polity only as a result of wars, invasions, victories, and defeats, or in other words, acts of violence."[19]

The politics of race war are thoroughly ambiguous. It served the populist radicalism of the levelers and Puritans during the seventeenth-century English Civil War, but half a century later it would express the conservative agenda of the French aristocracy in their reactive battles against the absolutist monarch. Overall, Foucault stresses the practice of race war for the space of a counterhistory that it opens up and the fragmentation of sovereign authority that it seeks. Race war has granted modern history a flexible range of partisan politics, not least of which is the conscious practice of class struggle in the Marxist and socialist vein. It also enabled the kind of anticriminalization and antipsychiatry movements with which Foucault was engaging at the time of these lectures.[20]

Race war's dominant appropriation, however, is in the birth of modern biopolitics, a project that coalesces in the liberal triumph of the French Revolution, which successfully asserts the sovereign unity of the people. Race war's binary conception of society is now collapsed into a monist one, but the category of race does not disappear. Rather, it becomes explicitly biologized for the first time, and folded into a medicalizing project that seeks to eliminate unproductive forms of life that threaten the health of the social body. When biopower first appears, it borrows something crucial from the relationship of war, namely, the notion that "in order to live, you must destroy your enemies." However, these enemies are now no longer in a "military relationship of confrontation" but rather in a "biological relationship" to the life of the social body.[21] Instead of war, we have biopolitical governmentality, the managing of social risks, birth and death rates, public health, criminality, sexual perversion, and the like, for the optimal dispensation of bodies and things.

Foucault fails to raise at least two important questions, thereby closing off some interesting lines of thought. First, even though he links the emergence of biopower to the French Revolutionary moment, he does not ask whether biopower bears some kind of generalizable relationship to the project of political liberalism. Earlier in the lectures, he had rejected Hobbes and Machiavelli alike as possible originators of the military model for power.[22] While they certainly do not fit the profile of the "race war" partisans that interest him, they do both seem vital reference points for race war's subsequent transformation into biopolitics. Hobbes is crucial because, even in suggesting that the founding of a "commonwealth" leads to the cessation of the war of all against all, he makes it equally clear that that state now becomes responsible for waging war (in the stead of each individual subject) against anyone who threatens the common weal, whether from within or without.[23] For Hobbes, therefore, the perpetual war in the state of nature does not so much end as get redirected toward the enemies of civil society. Nor is this unique to Hobbes. While John Locke did not take the state of nature as one of war, in chapter 3 of the second *Treatise* he nevertheless spells out a natural man's absolute right to wage war unto death against any who threaten his property or life. As in Hobbes, the formation of a commonwealth displaces this right of war from the natural individual to the state: "He that in the State of Society would take away the *Freedom* belonging to those of that Society or Common-wealth must be supposed to design to take away from them every thing else, and so be looked on as in a *State of War*."[24] The king's sword is thus handed down to the liberal state in the project of defending the commonwealth. The very notion of "commonwealth," meanwhile, already anticipates the rise of governmentality, the shift from a politics of sovereign right to one

that concerns the economic maximization of common wealth. All that is required, in a sense, is for "weal" (the general good) to become "wealth" in a more fully articulated capitalist sense.

Foucault also fails to consider what happens to the practice of race war following the onset of the biopolitical age. Part of the problem, as Ann Laura Stoler has argued, is that Foucault characteristically fails to incorporate into his argument the history of colonialism in particular and, in general, Europe's entire relationship to its outside: the peoples of the Americas, Africa, and Asia.[25] Although early modern Europe's internal struggles and civil wars also drew on the discourse of "race," our contemporary understanding of "race" discourse descends more obviously from the racialized relationship of war that it mapped in those same centuries between European sovereigns and native peoples in the Americas. If Foucault seems blind to this fact, it nonetheless seems probable that the partisan European mobilizations of "race war" that he cites (in reference to the English Civil War or to the French aristocracy) enacted a kind of tacit identification, or at minimum an analogy, with indigenous peoples. Race war, that is, becomes the partisan, politico-historical discourse through which one *indigenizes* a European people: Saxons or Franks become akin to "native" peoples, invaded and colonized by a hostile force that now conceals itself behind the peaceful mask of the state. One can see in this maneuver the racial kernel around which the emergent project of European nationalism will be implicitly organized.

In the era of biopower, the politics of race war drastically reverses. On the domestic front, with the ascendancy of liberalism, race war becomes aligned *with* the state and not against it, as a submerged language for articulating society's defense against its endemic biological weaknesses. In the context of empire, however, race war comes to openly articulate the practices of the colonizer. Marcia Klotz has incisively argued that nineteenth-century European imperialism oscillated between two different logics, one of which she calls "civilizationism" and the other "global biopower."[26] The former, a self-proclaimed peaceful project, practiced colonialism in the name of bringing law, religion, and industry to native peoples. Colonial atrocities, within this logic, are always either disavowed altogether or else acknowledged as highly regrettable bumps on the difficult road to civilization. In its pessimistic Conradian variation, civilizationism may attribute colonial atrocities to a reverse process, in which the colonizers have succumbed to the temptation of precisely the native savagery that they had sought to supplant with civilized ways. For all its skepticism about the colonial project, even the Conradian narrative preserves aggression as a savage characteristic, and leaves civilization, however fragile, as an untainted ideal.

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The secondary logic of global biopower, however, moves quite openly through the language of war. The notion of race is now biologized, as it is in the case of "domestic" biopower. But unlike domestic biopower, the colonial version retains the partisan language of race war, practicing imperialism as a struggle of biologically defined groups that tests the "strength of human populations—understood both in terms of racial bloodlines and monetary power."[27] On first glance, the externalist practice of colonial race war might no longer seem to take the form of civil war. But the matter becomes more complex once we account for the *global-ism* of the nineteenth century's European world empires. If the globe is understood as the unbounded territory of the species, then imperialism as race war is precisely a civil war of "mankind." Through a logic that explains the relationship between "race" and the "human race," colonial imperialism enacts a global biopolitics whose militarism can be openly avowed in the name of a partisan, yet universal, humanism. Liberalism may therefore cast its internal exercises of biopower predominantly as a practice of peace, presumably because the population that it regulates is roughly coterminous with the sovereign unity of the people. Nevertheless, in the colonial era it continued to practice race war, though now in the name of a universalist humanism, through its external campaign against colonized populations.

This turn toward a civil war of mankind, as we shall see, becomes an important precursor for subsequent narratives of "world war" in its various incarnations. It accounts for the racialized language of World War I as a global struggle against the "Hun." It prepares the way for the lofty language of both World War II and the Cold War as humankind's two civil wars between free and totalitarian humanity. It even prepares the ground for Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations."[28] Under the sway of global biopower conceived as race war, the discourse of human rights becomes a mechanism for distinguishing between the tolerant and right-honoring zone of liberal civil society's "inside" and the intolerant, right-violating "outside" against which it perpetually wars.

The Age of Three Worlds: A Race War without Race?

Historically speaking, the endgame of the European empires coincided with the beginnings of the Cold War and a globe no longer imaginatively divided into those fit to colonize and those fit to be colonized, but rather into the so-called three worlds: capitalist, communist, and decolonizing. Like the colonial world, the postwar world also enacted the simultaneity of war and peace, but in a quite different relationship to race. On the one

hand, the preamble to the 1945 Charter of the United Nations declared the founding of a new international order that would spare future generations from "the scourge of war" by maintaining a regime of "international peace and security" in which "armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest."[29] This chartering of "perpetual peace" was closely linked to the global repudiation of biological racism and race war, which the 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights described as a defeated fascist ideology that had "resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind."[30] And yet, just two years after signing the U.N. charter, President Harry Truman would declare, without any perceived contradiction, a permanent proxy war against the Soviet Union.

In his 12 March 1947 speech to congress outlining the need to support anticommunist counterinsurgency operations in Greece and Turkey, Truman argued that U.N. objectives of world peace and human rights would not be reached,

> unless we [the United States] are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.[31]

The biopolitics of the Cold War moment are completely bound up in this contradictory formulation of "totalitarianism." On the one hand, "totalitarianism" is equated with the repudiated notion of "race war," because both fascism and communism are understood to name politics that wage war against both their own populations (genocide) and other ones (race war). On the other hand, the Cold War, understood as the global struggle against totalitarianism, was itself a politico-cultural surrogate for a race war that could no longer openly speak its name. Prior to the 1950s, anticommunism had openly appealed to antiforeigner, nativist sentiments in the United States, campaigning against domestic labor radicalism as WASP America's necessary measures of self-defense in a "race war" against immigrants.[32] With the global condemnation of racial ideology that accompanied the defeat of fascism and high imperialism, the racial dimension of anticommunism gave way to a struggle articulated instead as a world war between systems, ideologies, or ways of life.[33]

Precisely because it displaced race from the global scene of military confrontation, the Cold War always found its exemplification in divided nations where blood was shared but "ways of life" were not: in Germany

most of all, but also in Korea and Vietnam. As the latter two cases may serve to remind us, the Cold War also posited a narrative of development centered on the decolonizing third world, now poised to decide between democracy and totalitarianism. Cold war against communism, as Truman explained, was crucial precisely because "at the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternate ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one."[34]

Many scholarly accounts reduce America's internal Cold War politics to a repressive operation of "containment" whereby the external enemy became a model for identifying and targeting internal ones: labor radicals, gays and lesbians, antiracist activists, all being treated as so many shades of pink.[35] Such analyses effectively capture the biopoliticization of domestic U.S. culture in exactly the military sense that interests me: to be blunt, it was regulated as so many domestic battles in a global war against communism.

Yet there is far more to say about Cold War biopolitics. The militarization of American culture also gave rise to modern identity politics. While the difference between the American and Soviet model was rarely racialized, it was openly attributed to differences in what got called "national character" and, shortly thereafter, "national identity." I have argued elsewhere that our current language of "identity" was born in the early years of the Cold War, conceived as a universally normative category that established the psychopolitics of peoplehood.[36] Erik Erikson's highly influential 1950 study *Childhood and Society* was the first major text to posit "identity" as the positive achievement of a self-determining sense of personhood for individuals and groups alike. From the start, this concept was both psychological (about the emancipation of the ego's inner life) and political (cast as the personality's capacity to decolonize itself from the social roles foisted on it by figures of power and authority). This concept spread rapidly across American culture, reverberating as well with psychoanalytically inspired critiques of fascism and colonialism (those of Eric Fromm, Theodor Adorno, Frantz Fanon, and the like) to popularize an antitotalitarian psychopolitics.[37]

Like race war in the seventeenth century, the politics of identity was highly ambiguous. Early on, it served the ends of American Cold War propaganda as a means of opposing American freedom to Soviet tyranny. Yet the free character of American identity was often cited by appealing to America's anticolonial revolutionary origins, a move that mimed the liberationist drama of third-world peoples. At one ideological extreme, even the hawkish secretary of state John Foster Dulles would proclaim in 1954, "We ourselves are the first colony in modern times to have won independence. . . . We have a natural sympathy with those everywhere who would follow our

example."[38] In less than fifteen years, and from obviously different political positions, gay identity movements would declare solidarity with the third world in such organizations as "Third World Gay Liberation," while people like Eldridge Cleaver would describe black power and other racial identity movements as fifth columns for third-world revolutionaries inside the "belly of the beast."[39] By the 1960s, if not earlier, identity discourse would begin to avail itself as the basis for a new politics of race, gender, and sexuality in the "first world."[40]

This version of identity politics remains the politics of war, declaring as it does a rebellion, struggle, or insurrection against a pseudototalitarian regime: militarized Amerika, white supremacy, patriarchy. As in the premodern discourse of race war traced by Foucault, the imperative of identity politics resembles the formulation that "we must defend ourselves against society." Antiracism, antisexism, anti-imperialism, these were all identity politics, each asserting a history of subjugation that challenged the "Jupiterian" narrative of the pax Americana. But these politics existed simultaneously with those of the Cold War national security state, whose biopolitical imperative was that "society must be defended." The self-appointed task of the security state was to identify and neutralize internal threats to the American "way of life" by the various surrogates of communism: civil rights activists, feminists, gays and lesbians, radical students, and indeed all the partisans of identity politics. Were these "police actions" seeking to secure a domestic peace? Or were they taken to represent a domestic front in an international war? This remained a principal point of contention between the liberal and conservative blocs that alternately held control over the Cold War security state.

Against this backdrop we can now begin to place the neoliberal narrative of globalization. What, after all, was the "globe" that globalization envisioned, if not the imaginative collapsing of the Cold War's three worlds that followed the actual tearing down of the Berlin Wall? The former second world, specifically the former Soviet Union and its East European client states, would be steadily incorporated into such first-world conglomorations as the new European Union, while the third world, seeing no alternative to capitalism, would necessarily follow the lead of the East Asian, newly industrializing countries. In the fantasy of a unified globe, of one world coming to replace the three worlds of the Cold War, we again see the monist conception of society that Foucault attributes to political techniques of biopower. The difference, however, is that the national territory of "society" now expands to fill the globe itself.

In both the colonial and Cold War eras, an inside/outside binary obtained: the policing of "life" applied on the inside of the state's territory; on the outside one waged a war against biologically foreign "races"

(colonialism) or against ideologically foreign "ways of life" such as fascism or communism (the Cold War). In the narrative of globalization, the discourse of war retreats while that of biopower and the "peaceful" regulation of the social body is projected onto the globe itself.

This is not to say that the world of globalization in the 1990s was not violent but, rather, that its violence was always effaced by the need for regulation. For once, global exercises of biopower disavowed almost entirely the military character of their project. Economic violence was merely "structural adjustment," every apparent war only a police action, every conflict with some "way of life" a managing of risk to the global social body.

It is important to recognize, however, that all this "peaceful" regulation, including the "police" actions in Bosnia and the Gulf, was justified as a necessary antidote to the perceived threat of yet another global race war: the Huntingtonian "clash of civilizations." In this most widely cited and influential prediction of the post–Cold War condition, Samuel Huntington claimed to foresee emerging antagonisms between seven or eight world populations, divided no longer by mere political ideology (as in the Cold War), but instead by far less mutable "cultural characteristics and differences":

> In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which side are you on?" And people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?" That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head."[41]

In the Huntingtonian model, the Cold War retroactively took the form of an artificial truce in an underlying, permanent race war that tends to hold between world cultures. Huntington's position was not at all unlike that of Immanuel Kant in his essay "Perpetual Peace," where Kant had argued that the natural relationship of nations, just like individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature, is one of war, not in the sense of continuous "open hostilities," but rather in the "constant and enduring threat of them."[42] Kant, however, at least believed that permanent peace between nations could be established through social and juridical forces imposed by a universal federation of free states. Such a federation would in effect expand the liberal social contract to the international level, extending to nations the collective equivalents of the rights that free and equal individuals presumably enjoyed under the rule of law within any one of those nations. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations represented obvious efforts to implement something very much like Kant's prescription

for "perpetual peace," a geopolitical framework whereby another world war could be avoided.

Huntington departed from the Kantian model primarily by rejecting the liberal political remedy for international or intercivilizational conflict. The post–Cold War world would now demonstrate unequivocally that liberal universalism was nothing more than the West's unique cultural endowment, a civilizationally specific project that other world civilizations could now be expected to resist as we returned to the natural state of world war.

Globalization, as the dominant strategy of governmentality at this moment, tacitly adopted Huntingtonian race war as the outcome risked by its own failure. In lieu of Kant's universal political liberalism, "globalization" named an alternative universal *economic* liberalism, hence a *neo*liberalism, whose narrative emplotted an inexorable (if somewhat uneven) integration of the earth's population into a geosocial order that would overcome the propensity for civilizational clashes. As Thomas Friedman, perhaps the leading popular guru of globalization in the United States, breathlessly put it, "globalization involves the *inexorable* integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before."[43] The very word "globalization" projected an asymptote toward which we steadily approached: the creation of the "globe" as a new domain of regulational universality (though not statehood) for the population of the species. The practice of globalization was thus strongly marked by its temporality of the "not yet but soon to be," fixed ambiguously between present and future, of which the "now" was a healthy but incomplete approximation of the "globe" toward which we ineluctably pressed forward.[44]

This mode of temporality is hardly unique to the post–Cold War world. It reiterates earlier narrations of capitalist modernization, and as Dipesh Chakrabarty has shown in his analysis of the "not yet" positioning of the colonial world by European historicism, it also reflects the temporal logic of high imperialism.[45] It even has an immediate antecedent in the development narrative for third-world nations of the Cold War era. What does perhaps distinguish globalization is its seeming assertion that this temporal "unevenness" that is in the process of resolving itself happens within a fully interior space: the singularity of a borderless globe.

How does this economic coalescence of a globe serve as an antidote to the natural state of war between civilizations per Huntington? Certainly, globalization looked quite different from the "federation of free states" advocated by Kant and mirrored in the Cold War years by the United Nations. The fourth article listed by Kant for achieving perpetual peace, for example, was that "no national debt should be contracted in connection with the foreign affairs of the nation."[46] For Kant, perpetual peace

depends on a juridical equality and a political federation of nations that must not be undermined by the economic peonage of one people to another, hardly a problem for globalization advocates. Superficially, "globalization" resembled the full realization of the "world market" as described by Marx.[47] But what distinguished the narrative of globalization as an antidote to civilizational clash was its *culturalism*, in the sense that it posited not simply the spread of capitalism but a kind of cultural integration of the human world (and thus an implicit overcoming of race antagonism in a very broad sense) that would match its economic integration. Thomas Friedman called globalization a "new international system" that served as the countervailing force to cultural conflict:

> What is new is the system [of economic globalization]. What is old is power politics, chaos, clashing civilizations and liberalism. And what is the drama of the post–Cold War world is the interaction between this new system and all these old passions and aspirations. It is a complex drama, with the final act still not written. That is why under the globalization system you will find both clashes of civilization and the homogenization of civilizations.[48]

If globalization were to succeed, as the very word implied that it must, cultural difference would thus gradually lose its frictional quality, becoming less an occasion for race conflict than for exchange and enrichment. A wealth of images, values, lexicons, and products would become increasingly free to flow, just like capital itself.[49]

Globalization's narrative of culture thus mimicked its narrative of economic value, imagining a new world in which cultures would remain more or less distinctive (no need to fear homogeneity), yet would become increasingly available to all through their fungibility. One might say that "globalization" applied neoliberal market promises to culture, where the benefits of cultural value from around the world would be everywhere exchanged without restriction, just as everyone who became part of the new global village would stand to gain from the new circulation of economic value. According to Friedman's "golden arches theory of conflict prevention," civilizational clashes associated with our atavistic attachments to cultural specificity (symbolized by the "olive tree") would give way to peaceful exchange under a capitalist order signified alternately by McDonald's or the Lexus.

Ironically, Arjun Appadurai's much-celebrated essay "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy" of 1990 tactily follows these Friedmanesque lines. While the essay begins by insisting on a contemporary "disjunction" between economy, politics, and culture, it rapidly institutes in the place of determination a homology between them in which

the key metaphor becomes "flow," so that capital becomes the tacit fungible model for globalization's effects on the other "scapes" of ethnicity, media, technology, and ideology.[50] Appadurai's move tended to iterate in an academic idiom the dominant globalization narrative I am describing, including that narrative's disavowal of conflict or war as central to the dynamics of geocultural, economic, and political interplay.

Much more helpful, in my view, is the break with this approach represented by George Yúdice's discussion of the "expediency of culture" (and especially in the mode of "multiculturalism") in the era of globalization, both in the economic sense that culture offers exchange value to a major growth industry, but also in the political sense that culture is often deployed as a means of defusing civilizational tensions and thus race wars.[51] In this version of the globalization narrative, race is rendered into culture, which in turn is rendered as the pacifying process of consuming goods produced for exchange by an otherwise potential civilizational enemy.

Clearly, the narrative of globalization projected an imaginative outcome: the asymptote of a pacified global unity. But its application had practical consequences. During the Cold War, America had proclaimed itself a champion of democracy first and foremost, even if democracy was supposed to entail the economic option of capitalism (a free people seeking their human development would presumably always choose free markets). But in the neoliberal rhetoric of globalization, the presumption was reversed. The rising tide of free markets took priority, on the assumption that sooner or later this must yield a free people. The globalization of China, Korea, Egypt, or Mexico would eventually democratize them. Economic development should therefore precede human development, which explains in turn the urgency with which free-trade agreements were granted priority over human rights accords during the 1990s.

The transnationalization of capital accumulation, as Amy Chua points out, hardly leads to the inexorable smoothing out of ethnic, racial, or cultural strife. Indeed, it is her argument that the growing gaps between market-dominant minorities and surrounding populations actually fuels social resentments and violent reactions.[52] The response of globalization gurus, of course, is to naturalize the conflicts as ancient and atavistic hatreds that only *more* globalization will cure. But the point to be made here is that globalization (like any other form of governmentality) has only a limited ability to pacify the population it seeks to mobilize on behalf of capital accumulation. Whether the September 11 attack had happened or not, the veneer of an unstoppable globalization process might have been stripped anyway, as had earlier versions of modernity's inexorable temporality. Certainly this seemed a growing possibility after the breakdown of the November 1999 World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference

in Seattle amid unprecedented popular protests, the advent of the first World Social Forum meeting in January 2001, and the demonstrations at the Genoa Group of Eight Summit in July 2001.[53]

The Return to a War We Never Left

If the premise that globalization was ushering in an era of civil peace was already growing dubious by 2001, then it was, ironically enough, President George W. Bush who dealt it the final death blow when he declared a perpetual war in his address to the Joint Session of Congress on 20 September 2001. Rather than responding to the 9/11 attacks as an international crime by a specific group or organization, he instead announced an open-ended and limitless war against unspecified enemies: "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there," he proclaimed. "It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated. . . . Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen."[54]

Bush's declaration here of yet another world war, and one that reactivates the figure of totalitarianism, suggests where the analysis of globalization as a "pax" had gone awry. Although globalization discourse sought the integration of the Cold War's three worlds into one, it had little to say about the "second world," whose specific value as "enemy" it no longer referenced except in regard to the "defeat of communism" that served to preface the globalization narrative. For globalization cheerleaders, the contemporary second world merely became an extension of the third world, which would begin to prosper as it was integrated into a neoliberal global regime of regional trade agreements, direct capital investment, and export-centered industrialization. Antiglobalization critics responded that, in point of fact, globalization merely confounded the international division of labor between third and first worlds. Third-world conditions infiltrated the first world, in new shantytowns of migrant workers in Paris, London, and Los Angeles, impoverished cities that were once industrial hubs like Detroit, and in the general breakdown of the Fordist social compact throughout the former first world. Meanwhile, a first world of foreign business groups, local comprador classes, and new elites appeared within the third world and made rapid gains from the new flows of capital into the global South. Skyscrapers rise in Shanghai and Seoul, and gated communities spring up in Cairo and Rio de Janeiro, even while the cities' growing majorities live in expanding slums as a growing semi- and lumpen-proletariat.[55]

These criticisms are still timely and important. Yet one question they

did not engage was whether globalization still needed an enemy. This question makes even more sense in the face of globalization's growing fragility and loss of its sense of inevitability. We therefore need to ask this of the current post-Fordist condition of global capital: how has it come to define its biopolitical threat in the absence of a communist world with a distinct sphere of geopolitical influence? Who is the opponent, in short, against which "global society" and its way of life must be defended? The war on terror can perhaps best be understood as a new development in which, for the first time, the classic external enemy of a race war has been internalized by, and incorporated into, the biopolitical project of governing "bodies and things" on a global scale. Terror is the name for a biological threat internal to the globe, rather than one located, at least primarily, "out there" in a discrete second world. While it is true that George W. Bush instrumentalized the World Trade Center attack for his own political purposes, it must also be acknowledged that he succeeded so quickly and so effectively because biopolitics had already prepared us for a wartime version of the new globe.

Similarly, even if Bush's political fortunes continue to crash, and even if future presidents are Democrats, it will not be so easy to leave this "Global War on Terror" behind, any more than it was a simple thing to dispense with the Cold War during the second half of the twentieth century, or easy for the imperial powers to walk away from their colonies before that. Within the framework of perpetual war, political movements that dismiss the necessity of ruthless enemies against whom one must never cease to struggle are by definition "soft," unprepared or unwilling to defend society, and hence a security risk for liberal civilization in toto. As neoliberalism continues to erode people's sense of social and economic security, the appeal to the enemy only gains in importance. In the United States, we can therefore expect that Democrats will need to show that they can fight the war on terror "better" and "smarter" than the Republicans, but it is unlikely they will call off the campaign.

How in fact does the global war on terror differ from the Cold War, which was no less permanent and no less worldwide in its biopolitical objectives? There are at least two distinct approaches to this question: one that focuses on the nature of the enemy, and another that attends to the transformed theater for its battles. One might begin by inspecting the difference between the communist and the terrorist. For all its demonization, communism could never be treated in an entirely monological fashion during the Cold War. The word always bore reference to a historical movement with manifestos, leaders, and political parties in possession of a historically appealing critique of capitalist exploitation and imperialism. Even the fiercest Cold Warriors could not avoid contending with communist nations as

members of the United Nations, or with communist leaders visiting the United States as invited guests. In these ways, the United States was led into a kind of ideological contestation that sometimes took on the rationalistic trappings of a debate. One might allege, per Truman, that communists did not mean to let people make a free choice between capitalism and communism, yet it was difficult to avoid acknowledging that a choice existed, one that even allowed for third ways at times, as the nonaligned movement that grew out of the 1955 Bandung conference demonstrates.[56]

Terrorism, while it mimics the -ism formula for political ideology, lacks precisely the external content signified by communism. It is important that the enemy seems not to be particularized, as *jihadism*, or indeed any term that possesses a political positivity in its own right. *Terrorism* does not name a substantive critique of any social order, nor an alternative conception for social order. It projects no "second world" with its alternative ways of life. Rather, the terrorist is to terror precisely as the criminal is to crime in Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, or the pervert to sex in volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality*. Terrorism becomes, like murder or rape, the naming of a deviant type against which society must be defended. This is the sense in which the external racial enemy has been folded back into a biopolitical project of the traditionally domestic sort: the surveillance, policing, and punishing of a race of "abnormals" who exist in advance of their criminal acts, and who thus should be detected, identified, and neutralized preemptively, before they actualize the potential social threat that they pose.

There is another level at which the Cold War and the war on terror should be contrasted, and that is in their starkly different modes of territorialization. The Cold War quite straightforwardly delineated an inside and an outside: on this side of the Iron Curtain, the free peoples following the leadership of Western civilization; on the other side, the totalitarian enemy. The model allowed for infiltrations, zones of contestation, and proxy battles. But there was a line that moved across the map, less a border than a front: Cold Warriors employed the language of "roll-back," "containment," or "falling dominoes." In the war on terror, however, the terrorists are thoroughly dispersed. "There are thousands of these terrorists in more than sixty countries," President Bush explained in his speech of 20 September 2001.[57] After being trained, "they are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction." This is the militarized mirror image of globalization's one world, in which there is no inside/outside distinction. We are everywhere, but so are the terrorists. The second world, we might say, has also been dispersed across the globe from the viewpoint of this new race war, and thus the campaign is an unbounded one.

This situation also explains why governmentality rather than sovereignty is the ultimate frame of reference. I do not mean to call into doubt a certain obvious reassertion of American sovereign power to wage war and, in the Agambenian sense, to "suspend the rules" under the rubric of a state of siege. My point is rather that we are being asked to construe a "Global War on Terror" that does not resemble a war between sovereign states, battling across a frontier. Rather, this is a war that openly concerns populations rather than sovereign claims on territory. It is projected and practiced as a war between a global "way of life" and the subpopulation that poses the biological threat to it. In this respect, the war on terror perhaps more closely resembles the war on drugs than the Cold War. The state has a role in this biomilitary campaign to be sure, but even in Iraq it is shared with other states, with transnational corporations like Bechtel and Halliburton, with Kurdish and Shiite militias, with a wide array of NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), and with mercenary companies. What we are witnessing is a neoliberal transfer of regulatory responsibility for the pacification of populations even in the most explicit war zones.[58]

If we translate this change into the language of biopolitics, it looks something like this: Whereas under globalization, every military confrontation was a police action, now we might say every police action, every response to the "crime" of terror has become an act of war. As Bush put it, "Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world — and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere."[59] Perhaps the most precise reading, however, is to say that the two sets of categories — the military and biopolitical — have been deliberately blurred, though under the sign of permanent war.

As is often observed, the war on terror finds its institutional hallmark in a carceral archipelago: Guantánamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, the unspecified secret CIA "detention centers" and "renditional" prisons in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Khazakstan, and elsewhere. One could argue that these sites merely globalize the U.S. prison system. Julia Sudbury among others has noted that the tactics of humiliation and abuse used at Abu Ghraib were borrowed from domestic American prisons.[60] And yet, in theory at least, the American prison system is a juridical institution where techniques of discipline meet up with the sovereign power of the law. By contrast, these are sites, as Judith Butler has noted, of "indefinite detention," where even the formality of a sovereign decision concerning the legal status of the "enemy combatant" is continuously deferred. In the place of any such sovereign decision, suggests Butler, we get a system of carceral governmentality — the managing of an enemy population — that paradoxically displays anachronistic, localized eruptions of sovereign power (the figure of the soldier at Abu Ghraib or the warden at Guantánamo who treats the

Whereas under globalization, every military confrontation was a police action, now we might say every police action, every response to the "crime" of terror has become an act of war.

inmate precisely as bare life).[61] These ironies are themselves outcomes of precisely what Amy Kaplan observes as the "ambiguous territory" of places like Guantánamo, alternately inside or outside of juridical space as the need serves the war on terror. The law is redrawn, as Kaplan puts it, "to create a world in which Guantánamo is everywhere."[62] But where and *what* in fact is it? Not a domestic prison where constitutional legal redress should apply, since as the Bush administration has successfully argued it does not fall under sovereign American jurisdiction. Neither, however, is it a war camp; because there is no "outside" place against which the war on terror has been declared, the inmates do not receive recognition as soldiers and do not receive the protection of the Geneva conventions. I do not point this out in order to expose the administration's legal hypocrisy but, rather, to show how the very language it deploys seeks to collapse crime and combat, prison and camp, biopower and race war into an undecidable space.

The war on terror is thus the dark face of globalization, the result of imagining one world that is neither a pax Americana nor a peace of any kind. This is not a realm of tranquil capitalist integration but is instead a living world that must wage bloody war against itself, that must avidly kill its internal enemies so that life worth living can continue. It is now *global* society that must be defended. Globalization, I observed earlier, promised both economic and cultural wealth in a world civilization modeled on the market. The war on terror represents the military targeting of what globalization would consider *cultural abnormality*: beliefs, meanings, and practices of any sort that threaten or resist its Jupiterian vision of incorporation into a global liberal society. The biopolitical distinction would be between "normal" Islam and the "abnormal" kind that "hates our freedoms" and thus our way of life, or indeed between "normal" culture of any kind (defined as a way of life prepared to be fungible and expedient — so that it can join the marketplace of the global economy) and any kind that apparently wills not to be so. Whether we call this globalization or a war against terror, we must challenge a global logic of normalized species life that necessitates biopolitics without boundaries, and thus also war without frontiers.

Notes

1. Wendy Brown, "Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy," *Theory and Event* 7 (2003): 1

2. Michel Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the College de France, 1975–76*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003).

3. Brown, "Neo-liberalism," 4–5.

4. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 38.

5. Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage, 1990), 137.

6. Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 160–82.

7. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). Agamben makes explicit the relevance of his argument for the "war on terror" in the early pages of *State of Exception* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 3 and 22.

8. Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 63.

9. See Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture* 15 (2003): 11–40, esp. 30–39.

10. Foucault, *History*, 138.

11. Ibid., 137.

12. I am referring here to the French Regulation School economic theorists, whose central figures include Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz, and Robert Boyer. To be as pithy as possible, the Regulation School distinguishes between what it calls a "regime of accumulation" (the specific economic practices that increase capital) and a "mode of regulation," which names all the social techniques and mechanisms by which a social environment is created that can maintain the accumulation process and defer crisis. They question the equilibrium theory of neoliberal economics, stressing the institutional frameworks that capitalist regimes continuously require to maintain their stability. It is not hard to see why this approach dovetails with Foucault's interest in governmentality. For a rich overview, see Robert Boyer, ed., *Regulation Theory: State of the Art* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

13. As Foucault puts it, "It was through the development of the science of government that the notion of economy came to be recentered on to that different plane of reality that we characterize today as the 'economic', and it was also through this science that it became possible to identify problems specific to the population; but conversely we can say as well that it was thanks to the perception of the specific problems of the population, and thanks to the isolation of that area of reality that we call the economy, that the problem of government finally came to be through, reflected, and calculated outside of the juridical framework of sovereignty." Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 99.

14. Ibid., 93.

15. For the connection of governmentality with the project of liberalism, see Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality," in Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, *The Foucault Effect*, 1–52. Even here, the state does of course play an important role in social governmentality, but only insofar as the end of governmentality (how to govern rather than how to rule) comes to infiltrate and displace the traditional sovereign end of "reason of state." It is a curious fact about contemporary "uses" of Foucault that critics have taken up governmentality and biopower along quite independent trajectories, but they are pursuing necessarily connected analytics bound up in a kind of means-end relationship. To the extent that the state becomes itself biopolitical, in other words, it has taken up the end of governing a population.

16. Julian Reid, "Life Struggles: War, Discipline, and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault," *Social Text*, no. 86 (2006): 127–52.

17. Michel Foucault, "*Society Must Be Defended*," 65–78.

18. Ibid., 77.

19. Ibid.

20. See the first lecture in *"Society Must Be Defended,"* where Foucault indicates his interest in the methods of archeology and genealogy as means of seeking to "desubjugate historical knowledges" that are expressions of very old social conflicts (10–11). We can then begin to recognize in the words of contemporary inmates and criminals the same insights into the machination of modern power that one unearths in the early histories of the prison, the clinic, the asylum, and other institutional sites where society's biopolitical enemies have been incarcerated and/or abnormalized.

21. Ibid., 255.

22. Ibid., 59.

23. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Touchstone, 1962), 137.

24. John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laselett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 279.

25. Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 14–15.

26. Marcia Klotz, "Global Visions: From the Colonial to the National Socialist World," *European Studies Journal* 16 (Fall 1999): 37–68.

27. Ibid., 50.

28. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer 1993): 22–28.

29. "Charter of the United Nations," United Nations Web site, www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html (accessed 27 February 2007).

30. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," United Nations Web site, www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (accessed 27 February 2007).

31. President Harry S. Truman, "Address before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947," online at the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm (accessed 27 February 2007).

32. M. J. Heale, *American Anticommunism: Combating the Enemy Within, 1830–1970* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1990), 88–89.

33. All the same, the Cold War occasionally resurfaced as race war. Consider, as an early example, the explanation provided in George Kennan's "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" for the "particular brand of fanaticism" held by Soviet Russia's Stalinist leadership, which, "unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces." George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* (1947), in "The History Guide Website, Lectures on Twentieth Century Europe," www.historyguide.org/europe/kennan.html (accessed 27 February 2007). Here, for a moment, totalitarianism appears as an aggressive racial trait that becomes the explanation for America's impending race war with the Orient.

34. Truman, "Address."

35. Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), Robert Corber, *In the Name of National Security: Hitchcock, Homophobia, and the Construction of Gender in Postwar America* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), Alan Nadel, *Containment Culture: American Narrative, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

36. I explore this principal argument in far greater detail in my book *Rebels: Youth and the Cold War Origins of Identity*. I do not explicitly frame the rise of identity discourse within the framework of biopower in that study. I do, however, connect it to the Cold War–Fordist mode of regulation, which can be taken as a special case in liberal governmentality: one in which the autonomy of the self passed through the category "identity," understood as a psychopolitical norm for individuals and populations alike. Leerom Medovoi, *Rebels: Youth and the Cold War Origins of Identity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 14–24.

37. Erik Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: Norton, 1950). Related psychoanalytic critiques of fascism and colonialism include Eric Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Avon, 1966), Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, and Daniel J. Levinson, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Norton, 1993), and Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove, 1991). I map out this formation of psychopolitics more fully in *Rebels*, 4–12.

38. Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Policy: A History since 1900*, 3rd ed. (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1983), 504.

39. See Third World Gay Liberation, "What We Want, What We Believe," in *Takin' It to the Streets: A Sixties Reader*, ed. Alexander Bloom and Wini Breines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 600–604; Eldridge Cleaver, "Domestic Law and International Order," in *Soul on Ice* (New York: Delta, 1999), 155–56.

40. In general I have argued that postwar U.S. culture *already* reflected a potentially transformative "three-world" politics by the 1950s. See "Cold War American Culture as the Age of Three Worlds," in a special issue on 1950s' culture in the *Minnesota Review*, nos. 55–57 (2002): 167–86.

41. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" 27.

42. Immanuel Kant, "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, Histories, and Morals* (New York: Hackett, 1986), 111.

43. Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Anchor, 2000), 5; emphasis mine.

44. For other exemplary statements of this globalization narrative, see John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect: The Challenge and Hidden Promise of Globalization* (New York: Random House, 2003), or, even more openly for business readers, Kenichi Ohmei, *A Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy* (New York: Collins, 1999).

45. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 8–10.

46. Kant, "To Perpetual Peace," 109.

47. This is even the case for left-wing globalization narratives, such as that of Hardt and Negri, who suggest at one point that "the form of the world market

[may be viewed] as a model for understanding imperial sovereignty. Perhaps, just as Foucault understood the panopticon as the diagram of modern power, the world market might serve adequately—even though it is not an architecture but an anti-architecture—as the diagram of imperial power" (*Empire*, 190). How the market could possibly present any kind of model for sovereign power is unclear, but it is easy enough to see how it might present a model for governmentality, as a diagram for a non–state-centered economic disposition of people and things.

48. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, xxi.

49. Ibid., 239–64.

50. Arjun Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy," in *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 27–47.

51. George Yúdice, *The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 9–28.

52. Amy Chua, *A World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 9–10.

53. I develop a more thorough discussion of the "globalization narrative" while also aiming to extrapolate a widening critique of capitalism from the praxis in Seattle in my essay "Globalization as Narrative: Three Critiques," *Review of Education/Pedagogy/Cultural Studies* 24 (2002): 63–76, a special issue edited by Imre Szeman on learning from the events in Seattle.

54. George W. Bush, 20 September 2001 speech to the Joint Session of Congress, online at White House Web site, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.

55. See Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums* (New York: Verso, 2006), and Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), for key studies of globalized cities in the former third and first worlds, respectively. Good examples of left-wing antiglobalization primers include Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello's *Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction from the Bottom Up* (Boston: South End, 1998) and William Greider's *One World Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998). I am obviously very sympathetic to these books for the way in which they subverted the "future perfect" tense of the official globalization narrative, unmasking its complicity in a global class war against peasants and workers. In this respect, these books are very much in keeping with the partisan race war histories applauded by Foucault. They challenged the efforts to create a Jupiterian discourse of globalization on behalf of those populations whom that regime tended to subjugate and exploit. How could they predict the return of the *wartime* globe and the project of the world enemy in 2001?

56. I do not mean to suggest by the genuine countervailing presence of communism that the third world was not devastated by Cold War contestations. Odde Arne Westad's *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Makings of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) provides a detailed history of the tremendous human costs associated with the triangulated rivalry. Nonalignment was in many ways an attempt to avoid being subjected to this danger.

57. Bush, 20 September 2001 speech.

58. See Naomi Klein's "Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in Pursuit of a Neocon Utopia," *Harper's*, September 2004, 43-54, for an incisive journalistic account of these privatization strategies in Iraq.

59. Bush, 20 September 2001 speech.

60. Julia Sudbury, "Globalization, Criminalization and Resistance: Women and the International Prison-Industrial Complex," talk presented at the Cultural Studies Association Annual Conference, University of Arizona, 21–24 April 2005.

61. Judith Butler, "Indefinite Detention," in *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (New York: Verso, 2004), 50–100.

62. Amy Kaplan, "Where Is Guantánamo?" *American Quarterly* 573 (2005): 853–54.

The Fragile Ends of War

FORGING THE UNITED STATES – MEXICO BORDER AND BORDERLANDS CONSCIOUSNESS

Gilberto Rosas

At three o'clock in the afternoon on this day in 1999, the odors of sizzling meat and hot tortillas waft through the hot air at a taco stand next to two fast-food establishments in Nogales, Arizona, about a half mile from the border that severs this community from Nogales, Sonora, Mexico. In 1994, Joint Task Force-6 (JTF-6), a branch of the U.S. military involved in domestic drug enforcement efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border region, renovated the fence that separates these two communities with artifacts from another war. Surplus mobile military runways from the 1991 Gulf War were used to transform the chain link fence into a fourteen-foot-high, two-mile-long steel wall, and at the same time, the number of Border Patrol agents in the area tripled.

At one small table, two screaming children ruin their harried parents' meal of barbecue, refried beans, and pungent grilled onions. At another table, four young Mexicans—or are they Chicanos?—drink their cans of Budweiser and proclaim "salud!"—to your health! A boisterous blond couple perspires heavily in the dry, ovenlike heat. They wear sombreros and Nikes, having just returned from Mexico. They speak English slowly and raise their voices to the Spanish-speaking help, as if trying to assist in the ordering of another round of tequila. Their canvas bag, the word "Guadalajara" stitched on it, bulges, probably containing Oaxacan carved animal figurines, bottles of Jalisco's best tequila, and other wares purchased in the tourist district of Nogales, Sonora, on the other side of the border. A gray drainage ditch ends in a dark tunnel just in front of the restaurant.

A Border Patrol vehicle pulls up to the taco stand in a routine exhibition of state power at this southern periphery of the United States. Behind mirrored sunglasses, an officer evaluates the scene. Their voices lowered, the four likely Mexicans continue to sit at their table, sipping beer. The blond couple downs their tequila shots and orders another round. A Border Patrol helicopter buzzes overhead. A police car cruises down the street. The waiter, who appears to be Latino, ignores it all. Border Patrol and local police officers frequent the place. I feel their momentary scrutiny. Soon the authorities leave. A few minutes pass, then about ten people run into the bright light of Nogales, Arizona, from the sewer tunnel. They scan the sur-

roundings. The family continues to dine while the four Latino men enjoy their beers. Except for occasional glances and a few smirks, those at the first two tables seem to ignore these undocumented subjects, who likewise seem to frequent the place. The blond couple moves to their SUV.

Roman, Margarita, and Victor, all of Barrio Libre (Free 'Hood), stand in the shadow of the tunnel, having literally undermined the U.S.-Mexico border.[1] Behind them are other youths whom I do not know. This is their sometime home: a sleeping bag, once-white shirts and once-blue jeans grown brown, boxes, and wrappers from fast-food establishments. On the cement walls of the tunnel I read "Barrio Libre" alongside the familiar names of el Chamuco, Teporron, la Morena, Roman, Chiuwilli, Guero, and many others. I scale the ditch as quickly as I can and walk toward the young people, who wait for me among the shadows of the dark interstices connecting the United States and Mexico. After we exchange greetings, I ask them: "What do you do when you are down here?"

> Roman (speaking in Spanish): We are free. We are the Free 'Hood.
> Victor (interrupting): We are free.

This ethnographic vignette captures the confounding effects of a seeming paradox appearing at the turn of the twenty-first century, specifically, the conjunction of increasingly militarized boundary policing, a vast number of undocumented border crossings, a continuing escalation and normalization of immigrant death, and a historically specific intensification of "migrant" policing in Mexico. Drawing on my long-term ethnographic research in the Arizona and Sonora borderlands on a severely marginalized population of young people and the vexing sociospatial formation that they call Barrio Libre in the Arizona and Sonora borderlands, I explore how they and other immigrants undermined the border by traveling through a sewer system that connects Nogales in the Mexican state of Sonora to Nogales in Arizona. As I have written elsewhere, these young people rendered this dark liminal space into a treacherous geography, sometimes mugging immigrants in the dark passageway. The young people also frequently journeyed to an "actual" Barrio Libre in Tucson, Arizona, where they struggle to adopt a Chicana/o identity, a form of ethno-racialized U.S. citizenship, trying to escape the intensifying regimes of policing and criminalization.[2]

In this article, I also critically engage recent debates concerning the complex relations between sovereignty, violence, and racism that are premised in the capacity, power, and calculations of those who must live, those who must die, and, as I argue, those who must be either officially or extra-officially subjugated. I focus in particular on the struggles of those who must be either officially or extra-officially policed, surveilled,

or disciplined by forms of power that stabilize both states. The daily challenges, negotiations, and resistances of immigrants and other people of the border region—in the fraying margins of state power and the globalizing politics of labor subordination—capture the fragility of contemporary political relations. They produce what I term a *borderlands consciousness*, a historically specific coalescing of potent political imaginaries forged in the sometimes brutal and often racialized interstices of transnational and state power relations that are increasingly evident among marginalized immigrant populations and those who resemble them.[3]

Stabilizing Sovereignty

Michel Foucault's analyses of sovereignty emphasize its fragility. The philosopher suggests that modern forms of sovereignty suppress ongoing struggles below dominant political institutions and that contemporary institutions such as the law continuously reinstate relations of conquest. Public rites of torture and other acts of sovereign violence and the excess beyond such acts of punishment consolidate state power. These spectacles of state violence inculcate into the public the awesome violence of sovereign power relations, giving material and physical force to the state's institutions. Notably, Foucault suggests that under the sophistication of modern political arrangements public enactments of torture disappear.[4] Moreover, he maintains that at the sometimes violent fringes of state power the silent struggles underpinning sovereignty become unveiled:

> Increasingly, wars, the practices of war, and the institutions of war tended to exist, so to speak, only on the frontiers, on the outer limits of the great State units, and only as a violent relationship—that actually existed or threatened to exist—between States.[5]

Furthermore, Foucault elaborates on two overriding logics of biopower or the modern forms of regulatory control of a population, those of "making live" and "letting die." With respect to the former, certain knowledge-power relations such as health care, welfare, and the birthrate are marshaled to optimize collective life, "making" particular populations thrive. Conversely, he couples the negative referent of biopower, or "letting" a particular population or subset of a population die, to racism. "Letting" a particular population die requires an appearance of biological difference between those who must live and those who must die. Racism constitutes this fissure between those subject to optimized life and merciless disposability.[6]

Giorgio Agamben's recent influential reformulation of Foucault's ideas maintains that sovereignty is founded upon a legal provision involving a state of emergency. Agamben terms this the *state of exception*, a moment where the law is suspended, revealing its unmitigated relationship between violence, state power, and crisis. It is particularly embodied in policing practices.[7] He further maintains that modern refugees and their condition of statelessness generate "the forms and limits of a coming political community."[8] Nevertheless, Agamben's formulation erases the contingent nature of sovereignty, the struggles below its artifices found in Foucault's accounting. He likewise neglects Foucault's emphasis on racism as the construction of killable or at least disposable subjects, dynamics of particular import for an analysis of sovereignty production in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands.

Institutions such as slavery and the contemporary penal system, contemporary venues of state violence as in Palestine and southern Mexico, the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the camps of Guantánamo Bay, and other colonial or neocolonial situations require a recalibration of such ideas. As Achille Mbembe observes, such venues develop and perfect oppressive, often deadly, biopolitical, or what he terms "necropolitical," technologies. These are exercised on the marginalized bodies of those of the Global South and epitomized in the plantation system.[9] In this respect, Agamben's paradigmatic example of the state of exception, the Nazi genocidal practices of concentration camps, deserves to be revisited. Writes Hannah Arendt: "there are no parallels to the life in the concentration camps. Its horrors can never be fully embraced by the imagination for that very reason it stands outside of life and death."[10] For such camps to exist, the European Jewish population was effectively dehumanized, rendering them radically other, unworthy of life, or worthy of life only in the banality of evil that defined the concentration camp. That is, they had to be racialized. Many analyses of Nazi death camps have noted that the exercise of brutal state force and the machinery of terror once reserved exclusively for the colonies were effectively turned on a population within Europe. This is to say that *ongoing* racial, colonial, and imperial relations from which such violent biopolitical technologies develop seem to disrupt Foucault's aforementioned suggestion of the "disappearance of torture as spectacle." The exercises of such technologies on non-Western bodies likewise disrupt his conceptualization of racism and challenge Agamben's legal genealogy of killable subjects.

The conquest and colonization of over half of Mexico in the nineteenth century— including all or parts of California, Texas, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas—constitute an often neglected example of U.S. empire. Although this affair

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hardly approaches the scale of other imperial moments, it was organized discursively and ideologically in racial terms. Nineteenth-century Mexicans were largely conceived of as debased because of their intermarriage with indigenous peoples. They were likewise strongly associated with the enslaved black population. Expansionists who desired to conquer all of Mexico were refused because of widespread anxieties about incorporating such an "inferior" population. Such views were largely held toward Mexican men. Mexican women, in contrast, tended to be eroticized as hypersexual beings. Such qualities continue to pervade contemporary anti-immigrant discourse.[11]

The inner workings of the U.S. state tend to veil the use of military technology, equipment, and tactics in the policing of immigration. These tendencies resonate with the recent deployment of counterinsurgency techniques in what a body of critical social science as well as activist knowledges has come to recognize as the militarization of the border.[12] Indeed, the Pentagon's Center for the Study of Low Intensity Conflict aided in the writing of the *Border Patrol Strategic Plan: 1994 and Beyond*, and senior officials have publicly acknowledged this.[13] Several well-respected international human rights organizations have published reports documenting the effects of the militarization of the border, specifically Border Patrol abuse, harassment, and sexual assault of immigrants, including those from Central America as well as U.S. Latinos.

White supremacist imaginings of citizenship inform the history of such militarized policing practices. Beginning with the origin of the immigrant police force early in the twentieth century in the Johnson-Reed Act, the organization has relied on former military personnel to fill its ranks. Several were klansmen.[14] Others were former Texas Rangers, a paramilitary organization with a legacy of racial terror in the southwest that triggered an incipient, semiorganized insurgency and broad cultural forms of resistance among local Mexican populations. A hegemonic racial polarity of privileged whiteness and marginalized blackness within the contemporary United States obscures the imperialist genealogy of this racial formation, where those hegemonically conceived of as "irreducibly foreign" are situated.[15] Popular ontological signifiers of race such as the speaking of subordinated languages, hygienic practices, forms of dress, as well as phenotype render immigrants and sometimes those who resemble them subject to official and extra-official scrutiny. Such a reconsideration of race underscores the significance of the culturally recuperative projects that Américo Paredes, José Limón, and other scholars have undertaken as documentation of imperial instantiations of power and the challenges to it.[16]

The Mexican state is also involved in the operations of power at the

border. The itineraries of migrants through Mexican border communities such as Nogales, Sonora, Mexico, and the introduction of notions of sovereignty production into an analysis of such communities complicate the analysis of those who must live, those who must die, and those who must be either officially or extra-officially subjugated.[17] A significant body of scholarship links racism and gender hierarchy to the politics of labor subordination in the *maquiladoras* in the border communities of Mexico. Social scientists have likewise traced the ethnic struggles of mestizo-indio relations in border communities.[18] Ana Alonso in her ethnography of nineteenth-century Namiquipa Chihuahua, a state on Mexico's northern frontier, effectively demonstrates the violent relations embedded in the founding of the state. Such processes included a whitening of history, a literal "bleaching of a population," that positioned the Namiquipan peasantry as gatekeepers of civilization against the barbarous indigenous nomads. Such processes had racialized underpinnings, including the whitening of history, the literal "bleaching of a population." Other scholars have drawn upon Agamben's work to suggest that the ongoing "femicide" in Ciudad Juárez, where hundreds of women have disappeared or been brutalized and killed, represents the denationalization of women's rights and the violent disenfranchisement of their Mexican citizenship.[19]

Nogales, Sonora

In 1999, on el Dia de los Muertos, or Day of the Dead, a popular holiday that honors those who have died, I begin my day at a cemetery nestled against the fence that separates Nogales, Arizona, from Nogales, Sonora, Mexico. Atop a surveillance tower in Nogales, Arizona, a video camera films the everyday life of Nogales, Sonora. On the other side of the border, a seemingly new, shiny, green and white SUV of the U.S. Border Patrol parks and overlooks this festive veneration of death from the brown desert hills of Nogales, Arizona. Its passengers apparently observe us as Roman and I watch them. Roman, a sixteen-year-old man-child with a goatee and squared shoulders, makes an obscene gesture in the direction of the vehicle. He lived in Chicago and Seattle before his father's deportation landed him in Nogales, Sonora, and made him a member of the severely marginalized population of young people who call themselves Barrio Libre (Free 'Hood).

I tell Roman about a University of Houston study then soon to be published. It estimates that approximately 1,600 immigrants have died trying to cross the border.[20] Early in the 1990s, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) operations "Hold the Line" in El Paso, "Gatekeeper" in San

Diego, "Lower Rio Grande" in south Texas, and "Safeguard" in southern Arizona had positioned Border Patrol agents en masse along migrant corridors. These spectacular displays of state power at precisely the sites where migrants could blend in with the local U.S.-Mexican population channeled migrants into the unforgiving deserts of the Southwest. This freed the authorities from antagonizing American citizens of Mexican descent, thus giving the agents a strategic advantage. Similar tactics had been tried before. Yet they failed to capture policymakers' imaginations or garner public support until the eve of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The 1999 study's conservative estimate of 1,600 immigrant deaths has since more than doubled to at least 4,000. Bodies decompose quickly in the desert. Several scholars have noted the gendered effects of these strategies, which seem, at least in the mid-1990s, to have dissuaded women (and children) from attempting to circumnavigate border controls. Moreover, such policing strategies seem to make migrants increasingly likely to settle in the United States.[21]

Roman replies, "And that does not account for the violence. I bet you Beto's death doesn't count." His friend Beto had left his home in central Mexico in 1996 at the age of fourteen. The country still suffered from the effects of its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression that began in late 1994, the year that NAFTA began. Mexicans in Nogales, Sonora, and throughout the country commonly referred to this economic downturn as *la crisis*, as it marked an intensification of the urgent need to migrate. La crisis wreaked havoc with Beto's family finances. He and his parents decided he would go to the United States and become an agent of remittances. They planned for him to find work in Los Angeles, probably busing tables at the same restaurant where his aunt worked, and send money home when he could. Yet, as with many of the young people of the Free 'Hood, he could not make his own history as he pleased.

Beto knew that *los chiles verdes* (the green chilies), as some of the young people of Barrio Libre call the Border Patrol because of their green uniforms and because "they make the border hot," were making crossing difficult. He headed to Sonora, where he hoped to slip through the border at Nogales. He arrived during one of the high points of "Operation Safeguard." He tried to cross and was quickly caught: "The *migra* told me they had seen me on the cameras . . . they sent me to Santa Cruz." At the county youth authority, Beto began literacy classes and counseling. Unfortunately, he was admitted to the Santa Cruz county youth authority when it was overwhelmed with more than one hundred young immigrants. Eventually the county decided that Beto and the other young people would be sent back to the juvenile authority of Nogales, Sonora. Yet, this understaffed and underfinanced facility also teemed with young people who, like Beto,

had migrated from throughout Mexico looking for work. There Beto met several youth from Barrio Libre. Their promises of freedom and their open defiance of the youth authorities impressed him. Beto was soon freed. He was sent to the streets with no family, a few pesos in his pocket, and fewer options. But he had new friends and a developing subjugated knowledge of crossing the international boundary.[22]

Almost two weeks to the day from his original attempt to cross the border, and while the Nogales region remained "hot," Beto tried to cross again. He chose the preferred route of the young people of the Free 'Hood and literally undermined the border through the moist underground world of a transnational sewer system, guided by proclamations of "Barrio Libre" scrawled in gold spray paint. For much of the 1990s, small groups of migrants, holding flashlights, some carrying with them their children and their life savings, seeped northward through the tunnels and under the border. A door marked the border underground, separating the U.S. sewer from the Mexican. Occasionally, the authorities managed to solder rod iron over the opening, but the young people, rather, the migrants, would force it open. On other occasions, a special Mexican police force, called Grupo Beta, mimicked the young people's practices. They would write "Beta Rules. Careful Delinquents" in gold spray paint on the walls of the tunnel. But they failed to stem the human flow. The violent reproduction of the state, it would appear, runs deep in this moment of vast migrant flows, but apparently not deep enough.

Beto was successful. He exited the dark tunnel from the drainage ditch into the United States. He then hid on a train to stow away to the northern terrain of Barrio Libre, the "real" one, an ethnically Mexican neighborhood in Tucson, Arizona, about sixty miles to the north.[23] As he jumped from one boxcar to another, probably trying to hide from the Union Pacific police, who were on high alert for immigrants, he slipped and fell onto the track. The train severed his body only a few blocks from the international boundary. Beto's death echoes the notion of merciless disposability found in Foucault's notion of racism, as does the growing number of corpses found in the killing deserts.

Yet the routine undermining of the border by the young people of Barrio Libre and other immigrants, and its circumvention by other means, complicates the analysis of sovereignty at the border. Such practices speak to the fragility of U.S. sovereign power, organized originally in warfare, in the contemporary borderlands and the struggles against the right of the state to regulate passage through its borders. Imperial, colonial, and neocolonial contexts, it must be remembered, develop biopolitical technologies over aspects of life aside from death and violence. Too great an emphasis on manifestly destructive technologies risks mischaracterizing

the specificity of such forms of domination. In this respect the border also resembles the plantation or work camp, to return to Mbembe's formulation, inasmuch as it not only enforces the power to torture or "let die" but also disproportionately involves the deployment of biopower to discipline the vitality of laboring bodies. Many do die at the border. But, many, many more struggle to live and work.

For those immigrants who do survive, their treacherous border crossings through the killing deserts, vigilante patrolled terrain, or transnational sewer systems coercively inaugurate them to their imminent but not inevitable disposability and policeability, indicative of their preeminent social relation of illegality.[24] Indeed, late in the 1990s certain units of the Border Patrol were designed to render humanitarian aid to immigrants in the deserts, underscoring the tensions between the biopolitical and necropolitical technologies that are inextricably and ideologically linked to U.S. empire, its contestations and negotiations.

"I'm Here Already"

Analyses of border militarization largely overlook the Mexican government's own amplification of law enforcement at the international boundary in the 1990s. Mexico City formed Grupo Beta, and later other police forces, for reducing violence in human trafficking in the border region. While working with the young people of Barrio Libre, I regularly witnessed other Mexican authorities arresting what could be called potential immigrants, typically those who resembled the impoverished subjects of Mexico's neoliberal turn, the marginals of southern Mexico, who appeared to be about to attempt to cross the border by irregular means. Complex social relations of race, class, and gender exercised on those perceived as—and actively constructed as—subordinate generates such policing practices. Such measures recall Agamben's intervention concerning policing and its relationship to sovereignty. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, migrant policing in Nogales, Sonora, could be characterized as haphazard, apparently lacking the systemization and implementation of ongoing border militarization in the United States. Often, authorities simply yanked migrants off the border fence.

In this context, local police officers appeared emboldened. They began further subjugating the already marginalized and displaced young people of Barrio Libre. As Gabriel recounted, the authorities

> came and chased us out of tourist zones where we used to ask the gringos [U.S. tourists] for money and where we used to wash the windows on the cars going to the other side.

Victor likewise noted that they

came and started to demand that we get *credenciales* to wash windows.

The crisis-driven displacements of these young people, many of whom had come to Nogales, Sonora, from throughout Mexico — the states of Jalisco, Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa — made access to the required documentation difficult.

The encounter of Margarita of Barrio Libre with border law enforcement foregrounds the complexities in the heightened policing of Nogales, Sonora.

One of Beta put his gun to my head and told me not to move because he was going to shoot. Negro ran . . . took me outside . . . the Beta was going to hit me, and I told him, if your going to hit me, don't hit me on my stomach because I'm pregnant . . . he then handcuffed me and took me to the office. There they told me they were going to send me to the *correcional* [youth detention facility] in Hermosillo. He asked me, if I send you to the correcional, will you stop? *I told him. . . . Send me. . . . I'm here already . . . there's nothing I can do about it.* (My emphasis)

Her statement "I'm here already" captures the density of coercive state power in her life and in other young people's lives at this moment in Nogales, Sonora. Others of the Barrio Libre could tell me the names and personalities of agents in Grupo Beta of Nogales, Sonora, and of agents in the Border Patrol. Yet, the young woman's deft and defiant working of gender dynamics points to the reversibility or fragility of contemporary power relations. She, as well as others, of the Barrio Libre continued with their subterranean border crossings a short time later. Sovereignty, compromised as it is in the Mexican borderlands, cannot easily be forged, and in the fragilities of Mexican and U.S. sovereignty at the border, the young people's formation of Barrio Libre took root.

Border Crossings

The sliding glass door silences the faint buzzing of an almost invisible northward-bound plane high in the sky as the rush of cool air inside the port of entry beckons pedestrians who desire to cross from Nogales, Sonora, to Nogales, Arizona. Depending on when the authorities decide to become aggressive, lines will extend to about half a block into Mexico, so long that they force the transparent doors to remain open. Several rows of cars, awaiting inspection, stream back from the port of entry for

miles into Nogales, Sonora. Some officers carry a mirror on a long metal arm to look under vehicles; an officer with a dog walks up and down the rows, spot-checking cars. There is another port of entry a few miles to the west designed for commercial traffic, the thousands of trucks that plod through the border every month.

Most people simply state their citizenship and glide through into the United States. Some must show their driver's license to the INS or to customs agents at the counter in order to cross the border. Sometimes, the INS agents or customs officers ask a few more questions to those who appear foreign. Just outside the building, a tall turnstile beckons U.S. tourists into Mexico. Once people cross into Mexico, they must press a button that determines, at random, whether Mexican customs will question them.

At the counter on the U.S. side, the INS officer studies me. After asking my citizenship, he inquires about my business in Mexico. I respond that I research the street youth of Nogales, Sonora, Mexico.

"Do you mean the tunnel rats?" he asks.

"That kind of research requires money," says another border guard.

He evaluates my anthropological uniform, my white T-shirt, khakis, my worn Nike tennis shoes, my shaved head, and finally, my goatee. Roman had told me that day that I looked like a *cholo*, a term for a rebellious urban Latino youth.

An officer escorts me to a back room. Another INS officer and a customs agent search my backpack. I am repeatedly asked about my finances. I imagine that they are trying to establish whether I am a drug courier. As I had learned growing up in El Paso, Texas, and spending many of my postundergraduate years in southern Arizona, officials at the border seek simple responses, in which the racialization of foreignness equates to a life of poverty.[25] Such routinized state practices—enacted on the young and, in my case, not-so-young people perceived of as foreign (regardless of citizenship) when they cross the border—underscore the stabilizing of the state through racialized policing and similar forms of subjugation at the border.

After going through my backpack, an officer asks me to remove my shoes. He peers inside them. Then he asks me to untuck my shirt. I *no longer* allow these intrusions to anger me. I reach under my belt to pull out the end of my T-shirt. I feel another officer step close to me. The first officer requests that I turn around. I hear yelling. Another male perceived as foreign is pushed into the room. Thus begins another routine iteration of statehood, or the forging of sovereignty on those perceived as foreign.

One of the officers runs his hands up my inner thighs to examine my groin. I try not to squirm. He touches my buttock. Only a few feet below the gray cement floors on which we stand, the young people of Barrio

Libre may be flowing through the international drainage tunnels that run under the U.S.-Mexico border, undermining these official indignities in the bowels of the border.

A few minutes later, after the officers politely thank me, and, I, inexplicably, thank them, I "border-cross" and enter Nogales, Arizona.

Nogales, Arizona

A few blocks north of the border, an elderly woman sells the local paper, the *Nogales International*. The newspaper keeps a daily tab of the number of immigrants caught for the year. "Internaciónal!" she yells. The struggles below and beyond sovereignty continue. The U.S. and Mexican states blur together under the traction of alternative geographies of immigrants and the people of the border region, who daily negotiate the dynamics of political economy. Sovereignty, an ostensible end of war, proves fragile indeed. Yet, in the border scenario, it is the subjugation of those bodies perceived as foreign that stabilizes the states on both sides of this international boundary.

After exiting the port of entry, I witness two men climbing over the border fence. An INS agent and police officer arrive on the scene. One of the immigrants flees. Neither officer gives chase. The police officer pulls his radio from his belt and puts in a call. A police car arrives and pursues the fugitive. Resigned, the second immigrant waits. He seems to get on his knees without orders from either officer. The agent binds him in handcuffs made of thick, durable plastic.

Later that day, like most others, not far from the same border tower that Roman pointed out earlier, a man peers over the border into Nogales, Arizona. Suddenly, he signals to a group waiting below him in Nogales, Sonora. A mad scramble ensues. Approximately seven men climb to the top of the fence and jump onto the steaming pavement of the United States. Three sprint for the neighborhoods of Nogales, Arizona. They will likely be seen on video cameras, which connect to a local Border Patrol station that in turn will dispatch agents accordingly. Still, the others have a chance. They run toward the brown mass of "documented" Mexicans and probably "undocumented" ones as well, who have managed to cross the international boundary through the regular means via the port of entry. Along with Mexican American citizens, they move through the run-down shopping district of the Arizona border town. A few appear to have made it. I later learn that a truck hit one man as he ran through an intersection.

A few minutes later, the process starts over as three people peer over the border fence.

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The next day, I witness more arrests. Three presumably Latin American migrants lie on their stomachs on the cement that scorches in the ovenlike desert heat. "Chiles verdes" handcuff them. Behind me, an authoritative voice commands "Stop! Alto!" In what could be read as a bilingual literalization of Louis Althusser's interpellation scene, a would-be subject resists.[26] He sprints toward the safety of the brown multitude coursing through downtown Nogales, Arizona. In a blur, a Border Patrol officer knocks over a brown body, apparently a Latin American migrant who had managed to cross the border without authorization. Such forms of coercion call into question the suggestion that hailing constitutes a form of subject-making to a uniform and cohesive ideology, or a form of interpellation to the imaginary relations of the means of production.

Down the street, a manhole cover pops up from the pavement. Several figures emerge from the underground and scamper to a nearby house, yet another underground, undocumented border crossing. Close by, INS agents search a shuttle bus that makes regular trips to Tucson, Arizona. Some of the passengers appear to be arrested. Others wait patiently and others bow their heads. Behind them, more immigrants ready to defy the state. They wait, watching, at the top of the fence. The seeming ungovernability evidenced at the border and other broad regimes of typically racialized governance, as well as the vast resistances to sovereignty that immigrants exercise, mark the fragility of contemporary power relations. The cunning to defy such forms of subjugation captures the dialectics of struggle evidenced in historically particular forms of consciouness and in the region's legacy of conquest, colonization, and contestation.

Oversight

I feel the commonsensical, momentary scrutiny of my dress, hair cut, and English proficiency as I introduce myself in the local office of U.S. Border Patrol in Nogales, Arizona, in 1999. Rows of shiny new green and white SUVs and the new helicopter landing pad outside the glass doors speak to the U.S. government's recent investment in border control. Previously, the Border Patrol had to land at the Nogales airport. Racks of high-powered rifles, pistols, stun guns, rounds of ammunition, bulletproof vests, helmets, billy clubs, and, of course, binoculars line the walls in one room. Officer Pankoke, my guide, explains that the high-powered weaponry is to be used out in the deserts when dealing with drug smugglers. The commanding officer, Officer Pankoke explains, "would not allow you to check one out to patrol downtown Nogales."

We walk down a hall. Two large bay windows allow me to see into this

weigh station. I walk by a heavy metal door with a sign saying "Unaccompanied Juveniles." Pankoke explains. Several individuals sit on a bench. Some sleep; others sit or stand. They will be in the cell for a few hours or a few days. Some will be sent to the penitentiary for having committed a felony or for having been caught crossing the border too many times. Most await what the INS refers to as "voluntary departure," a procedure whereby "deportable aliens" apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border are permitted, indeed encouraged, to waive their rights to a deportation hearing and return to Mexico without lengthy detention, expensive bonding, and trial. Upon release in Mexico near the border, they may try again until they finally succeed.[27] If the agents turn a blind eye, they may cross the line as potential workers, ready to labor across the border. Voluntary departure underscores the collusion between policing and the politics of labor subordination contextualized within the spectacular and violent relations of sovereignty.

At the Nogales, Arizona, Border Patrol station in 1999, in a room full of monitors, radio equipment, and cell phones, next to the soda cans and crumpled coffee cups and fast-food wrappers, a screen displays a Border Patrol SUV cruising down a street that parallels the border. Pan to a second monitor: the vehicle appears onscreen, apparently in downtown Nogales, Arizona, near the port of entry, surrounded by a mass of Latino or Latin American pedestrians. None of the people on the monitor seems to realize that they are under surveillance, or, if they do, they do not seem to care. Two officers observe the flickering monitors and sensors, ready to communicate with border agents who, like me, the then erstwhile aspiring anthropologist, are "in the field." They dispatch agents as needed to sites of unauthorized crossings. On the last monitor, I can make out the end of the border fence in the desert outside of Nogales, Arizona. The military unit JTF-6 has built roads providing the Border Patrol access to the area. Next to the fence, thousands of immigrants have etched paths of beaten brush and compressed brown sand through the treacherous geography of the killing desert.

Officer Pankoke tells of the small-scale forms of violence exercised by Mexicans on the other side of the border:

> When I'm driving at the border, they throw large rocks from Mexico over the fence at us. Sometimes our agents have to call in for help.

Only two weeks before this interview, an agent had been shot in the Arizona borderlands. Such violence at the periphery of two nation-states underscores the fragility of sovereignty.

I ask Pankoke how he and other officers determine whom they will

and will not question. "It's hard to explain. . . . They're just not American looking. Things like dirty clothes, beat-up dress shoes, shaggy hair, mean they're a *ewey*" (entry without inspection). His comment captures the diffused, popular ontological signifiers of race in the borderland. It also underscores the politically organized investment in the fixing of difference. Such forms of racial governance in the borderlands situate this population—and sometimes those who resemble them—as subject to militarized policing, or vigilante actions, or to daily forms of surveillance. In the process, they are marked as worthy of policing, or even worthy of dying in the treacherous geographies of the borderlands. These diffused forms of governance and the violence they may portend inaugurate the vast majority of immigrants who do survive the processes of undocumented border crossings into the protracted subjection of the social relation of illegality.

Yet race as a diffused form of governance proves ultimately unstable, contingent, reversible. These dynamics are embodied in the daily struggles of the young people of Barrio Libre, who would often exploit the tunnel in Nogales, Arizona, and then stow away on trains or walk some sixty miles in order to reach the Mexican neighborhood of Tucson, Arizona, that also is called Barrio Libre. Historically this latter Barrio Libre is an immigrant community of working-class Mexicans.[28] The area's name comes from the one-time absence of policing; as the community was formed, the Tucson police department would not patrol it.[29] In this and other parts of the shifting borderlands of the United States, the young people of Barrio Libre exploit their resemblance to U.S. citizens of Mexican descent, sometimes blending in with the local Mexican population. As Roman explained: "If I dress right, and wear baggy clothes, the Border Patrol thinks I'm Chicano." The cultural and racial resemblances between U.S. citizens of Mexican descent and the undocumented immigrants render dress a key marker of belonging to the Free 'Hood. Those clothes most prized were those signifying either participation or transnational identification with Chicanos in the United States, such as baggy pants and T-shirts proclaiming "Chicano style," "Chicano Power," "Brown Pride," and the like. These and similar practices disrupt theorizations of race as solely phenotypical and reveal the relational and ultimately political nature of racism as a form of governmentality.[30] The knowledge that certain cultural practices, such as forms of dress or speaking the dominant language, are resources that subvert relations of illegality reveals the dynamism and reversibility of racial governance, even among such a marginalized population.

The young people's vulnerability to policing on both sides of the border by those figures that in Agamben's formulation embody sovereignty, yet in this scenario with the significant difference that they are often

militarized, gestures to the fragility of the ends of war, its violent refounding, and the forging of borderlands consciousness.[31] Two young women, Margarita and Juana, who had just emerged from the transnational sewer system close to a small restaurant in Nogales, Arizona, described the Free 'Hood in this way after the authorities had left:

> Margarita: [Barrio Libre is] in Nogales, Sonora, it's in the tunnel, Phoenix, Tucson. Where else?
> Juana: Chicago, El Paso, all the way to Los Angeles. It's a barrio that goes through all the cities, floating like that, and over that way [gesturing northward].
> Margarita: Through Tucson, Phoenix, here in Nogales, Arizona, over there in Nogales, Sonora. It's Barrio Libre *wherever* you are (my emphasis).

Such pronouncements were common among those in Barrio Libre.

Many of the U.S. cities they referred to have major immigrant populations. Moreover, often when I asked the youths where they were going, they would reply, "I am going to the Free 'Hood." Be it Nogales, Sonora, the transnational tunnels, Tucson, or the streets of the informal economy and its labor, Barrio Libre was always in formation. Such discourses hardly signal a coming political community, per Agamben's formulation. They do, however, gesture to the coalescing of imaginations fired by the conditions of ultimately contested and fragile states.

Yet the formation of their particular borderlands consciousness took a tremendous toll on these youth. After a lunch of spaghetti, corn tortillas, bottled salsa, and Coca-Cola on this day in 1999 in Nogales, Sonora, Bolillo shapes his fingers into the form of a pistol. He shouts at Victor in English:

> "You there on your knees, motherfucker! On your knees!"
> Victor falls to his knees.
> In broken English, Bolillo continues: "Hands behind your back"
> He then proceeds to "handcuff" Victor.
> Victor protests: "Soy libre, cabron!" (I'm free!)

Bolillo starts an expletive-filled diatribe. He pretends to strike Victor with the pistol. Later, I ask Victor and Bolillo about this performance. They tell me that they were performing their memories of being in the Barrio Libre of Tucson, Arizona. They had been spending time with a group of impoverished Chicanos. Nevertheless, despite their cultural and racial resemblance to this population and their adoption of Chicano dress, they had still become subject to policing. Such official misrecognitions speak

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to the specific racial character of anti-immigrant discourses and their material effects. They reveal the blurring of boundaries between immigrants and racialized citizenry.

The war on terror, the occupation of Iraq, and other ongoing wars have reinforced the long-standing, dominant representation of the border as a site of ungovernability. Indeed, on September 11, 2001, the number of Border Patrol agents in Brownsville, Texas, equaled the number across the entire U.S.-Canadian border.[32] Now, the new draconian police powers of the "Homeland Security" state and the "instantaneous hegemony of the metaphysics of antiterrorism" have had profound consequences. They are evidenced in the mass immigrant mobilizations that occurred across the United Sates, the approximately eight thousand Muslim immigrants or visitors sought for questioning by the FBI, and the five thousand who have been detained.[33] Vigilante groups, exploiting the white-supremacist force relations embedded in sovereignty, seize on such public anxieties over the failed border in the states of Arizona, Texas, New Mexico, and California, and, increasingly, in other states in the interior of the United States. The mobilization of the National Guard to the borderlands in 2006, the construction of new walls, and the increasingly commonsensical collapsing of immigrant with terrorist will undoubtedly contribute to the violent subjugation of immigrants to the special relation of illegality and speak to the fragility of sovereignty in the borderlands.[34]

The Fragile Ends of War

The undermining of the sovereign right to regulate boundaries and the daily challenges and negotiations by immigrants and the people of the border region of the United States and Mexico expose the rickety scaffoldings of the state and gesture to its often violent refounding. I have mapped some of the broad contours of the decidedly capitalist biopolitical and necropolitical technologies exercised in the borderlands, as well as the disciplining and subjugation of those appearing as foreign in Nogales, Sonora, and Nogales, Arizona. The ongoing militarized policing in the borderlands, as moments in my ethnography show, resonates with Foucault's suggestion that public spectacles of state violence coalesce sovereignty and underscore the force relations behind institutions such as the law. They also resonate with the commingling of law, sovereignty, and violence in Agamben's formulation. Moreover, the channeling of immigrants into the killing deserts or the transnational sewer system exemplifies a merciless logic of disposability. These are the forces that configured Beto's singular

death and those of some 4,000 other immigrants in the killing deserts of territory that once belonged to Mexico, deaths that resonate with the forging of sovereignty through death and violence in both Foucault's and Agamben's respective explications of sovereignty.

Nevertheless, Agamben's positing of a relationship among policing, sovereignty, and the formation of new consciousness remains too removed from the legacy of empire in suggesting that the abject figure of violence is rooted in the genealogy of the Western legal system. Moreover, it elides Foucault's analysis of the ongoing struggles below and at the fringes of sovereignty. In contrast, Achille Mbembe's suggestion that colonial and neocolonial venues anticipate, develop, and perfect violent biopolitical technologies proves useful in analyzing the legacy of U.S. empire in the borderlands. Yet a necropolitical analysis of militarized policing in the borderlands perhaps loses sight of the biopolitically organized vitality of living and ultimately laboring immigrants. As the young people's repeated though painful forms of border crossing show, the vast majority of undocumented border crossers succeed in making the crossing. Biopolitical technologies over life and death, as diffused forms of capitalist state power, are integral to the politics of labor subordination. Many die, but many, many, more struggle to live and work.

Over the *longue durée*, the ends of war on the border appear to marshal the technologies over life and death to inaugurate bodies flowing across borders to the social relation of illegality. In this respect, Nicholas De Genova has presciently suggested that the conjunction of dramatic apprehensions and militarized policing along the borderlands produces an "exemplary theater for staging the spectacle of the 'illegal alien' that the law produces."[35] Nevertheless, it is power relations beyond the state and the historically organized relation of force that give the law its potency, forged on the bodies of those from Latin America, particularly Mexico, and in practices of official and extra-official misrecognition of those who culturally or phenotypically resemble them.

An insular vision of the Western state plagues dominant notions of sovereignty. Policing practices in the Mexican border community of Nogales, Sonora, exercised on the marginalized populations from Mexico's interior suggest the decentering of state power to a broader global politics of labor subordination. The consolidation of neoliberalism in Mexico in the 1990s further compromised the already fragile sovereignty of the country, rendering its fringes jagged for particular populations, echoing the aforementioned particular conceptualizations of sovereignty. As on the other side of the border, this sovereignty was once again forged on the bodies of those who appear foreign, typically those impoverished from Mexico's neoliberal turn, the rural marginal en route to becoming

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an immigrant. The bolstering of the fragile sovereignty of Mexico at its northern border demands that broad forms of subjugation are exercised against the marginal rural migrants, essentially degrading their citizenship in the process of immigration. As we have seen, the effects of such policing include the sometimes official violent practices exercised against the young people of Barrio Libre.

Mexico's recent embrace of an economy of labor exportation, evidenced in President Vicente Fox's hailing of immigrants as heroes, leads one to speculate that such policing of migrants by the authorities is likely to dissipate. Unlike the other side of the border, in Mexico the extra-official nature of policing, particularly evidenced in my narrative of Margarita's encounter with an officer from Grupo Beta, underscores the subjective impulses of the police officer. Ethical sensibilities of particular officers seem to organize official violence in these cases, and such a configuration echoes one of Agamben's qualities of life in another of his concepts, the camp, where "petty sovereign[s]" such as this officer enact a spatialization of the state of exception.[36]

The sometimes violent disciplining and subjugation of bodies perceived as foreign stabilizes the respective states and serves to reproduce the border against the traction of alternative geographies of immigrants across the fraying boundaries of the United States and Mexico. The young people's practices of literally undermining the international boundary as well as occasionally passing as marginalized U.S. citizens underscore the fragility of sovereign forms of power. At the same time, the young people's own participation in regimes of border violence underscores the mundane reconstitution of the international boundary. Their mugging practices further subjugate the already degraded, impoverished bodies of neoliberal organized immigrants in formation, as do the policing practices of elements of the Mexican state, and the spectacular, militarized policing practices and forms of racial governance concretized in vigilantism occurring on the U.S. side of the border. Nevertheless, the overwhelming transgression of the international boundary, the reversibility of this racial governmentality sparking the imagination of those in Barrio Libre, the transnational social movements that challenge Border Patrol abuses, as well as the everyday forms of subaltern struggle and negotiation, such as the elderly newspaper seller's invocation of the "Internaciónal," signal the multiple and, in this case, vexing forms of subjectivity emerging betwixt, between, and below the United States and Mexico. Although the young people of Barrio Libre are situated in radically different social positions, they approximate a borderlands consciousness currently writ large in the immigrant movement across the United States.[37]

1. I choose the term *'hood* over *neighborhood*, another meaning for the term *barrio*, because of the term's significance in terms of social struggle. Barrios in the United States have a long history for Mexicano and other Latin American immigrants as a site of racial formation and social struggle. See Carlos Velez-Ibañez, *Border Visions: Mexican Cultures of the Southwest United States* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1996); and Arlene Davila, *Barrio Dreams: Puerto Ricans, Latinos, and the Neoliberal City* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

2. Gilberto Rosas, "The Managed Violences of the Borderlands: Treacherous Geographies, Policeability, and the Politics of Race," *Latino Studies* 4 (2006): 401–18.

3. Gloria Anzaldúa's rendition of a socially just subjectivity cognizant of power asymmetries captures borderland conditions in the late 1980s in south Texas. See Gloria Anzaldúa, *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Book Company, 1987).

4. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

5. Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collége de France, 1975–76*, trans. David Macey, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana (New York: Picador, 2003), 239–63.

6. Ibid.

7. One scholar has drawn on political philosopher Giorgio Agamben's notion of the state of exception in his analysis of U.S. Supreme Court decisions to suggest that Border Patrol policing practices exemplify a "permanent state of racial emergency, or the permanent legal racial exception." See Scott Michaelsen, "Between Japanese Internment and the USA Patriot Act: The Borderlands and the Permanent State of Racial Exception," *Aztlán* 30 (2005): 87–111.

8. Giorgio Agamben, *Means without End: Notes on Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

9. Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," *Public Culture* 15 (2003): 11–40.

10. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1948; repr., Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973); Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism* (1955; repr., New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); Mbembe, "Necropolitics."

11. Arnoldo De Leon, *They Called Them Greasers: Anglo Attitudes toward Mexicans in Texas, 1821–1900* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983); Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Martha Menchaca, *Recovering History, Constructing Race: The Indian, Black, and White Roots of Mexican Americans* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001); Aimee Carrillo Rowe, "Whose 'America'? The Politics of Rhetoric and Space in the Formation of U.S. Nationalism," *Radical History Review* 89 (Spring 2004): 115–34.

12. Timothy J. Dunn, *The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978–1992: Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home* (Austin, TX: Center for Mexican American Studies, 1996).

13. See the testimony of Gus de la Vina, Border Patrol chief, on the collaboration of the U.S. Department of Defense and the Border Patrol (U.S. House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight) in Sylvanna M. Falcón, "Rape as a Weapon of War: Advancing Human Rights for Women at the U.S.-Mexico Border," *Social Justice* 28 (2001): 31–50.

14. Mae M. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 68.

15. Nicholas De Genova, "Latino and Asian Formations at the Frontiers of U.S. Nationalism," in *Racial Transformations: Latinos and Asians Remaking the United States*, ed. Nicholas De Genova (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 1–22. See Mary Weismantel and Stephen F. Eisenman, "Race in the Andes: Global Movements and Popular Ontologies," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 17 (1998): 121–42.

16. José E. Limón, *Dancing with the Devil: Society and Cultural Poetics in Mexican-American South Texas* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994); Américo Paredes, *With His Pistol in His Hand: A Border Ballad and Its Hero* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971).

17. Tomás Almaguer, "At the Crossroads of Race: Latino/a Studies and Race Making in the United States," in *Critical Latin American and Latino Studies*, ed. Juan Poblete (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 206–22.

18. Devon G. Peña, *The Terror of the Machine: Technology, Work, Gender, and Ecology on the U.S.-Mexico Border* (Austin, TX: CMAS Books, 1997); Melissa Wright, "The Dialectics of Still Life: Murder, Women, and Maquiladoras," *Public Culture* 11 (1999): 453–74; Carol Nagengast and Michael Kearney, "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism," *Latin American Research Review* 25 (1990): 61–90.

19. Ana Maria Alonso, *Thread of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution, and Gender on Mexico's Northern Frontier* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995); Alicia Schmidt Camacho, "Ciudadana X: Gender Violence and the Denationalization of Women's Rights in Ciudad Juárez," *New Centennial Review* 5 (2005): 255–92.

20. Karl Eschbach, Jacqueline Hagan, Nestor Rodriguez, Ruben Hernandez, and Stanley Bailey, "Death at the Border," *International Migration Review* 33 (1999): 430–54.

21. Peter B. Brownell, "Border Militarization and the Reproduction of Mexican Migrant Labor," *Social Justice* 28 (2001): 269–92; Leo R. Chavez, "Immigration Reform and Nativism: The Nationalist Response to the Transnationalist Challenge," in *Immigrants Out! The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States*, ed. Juan F. Perea (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 61–77; Eschbach et al., "Death at the Border"; Tamara Diana Wilson, "Anti-Immigrant Sentiment and the Problem of Reproduction/Maintenance in Mexican Immigration to the United States," *Critique of Anthropology* 20 (2000): 191–213.

22. One form of what Foucault calls "subjugated knowledges," or those knowledges disqualified by totalizing theories, is that of the delinquent. Foucault, "Two Lectures," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1977), 78–108.

23. This transnational dimension of Barrio Libre thus links the young people to a history of Mexican transnational practices. The Tucson Barrio Libre refers to a neighborhood with porous boundaries that expanded and contracted in accordance with the needs of the larger Tucson community for a Mexican working force. Velez-Ibañez, *Border Visions*.

24. Rosas, "The Managed Violences of the Borderlands."

25. Pablo Vila, *Crossing Borders, Reinforcing Borders: Social Categories, Metaphors, and Narrative Identities on the U.S.-Mexico Frontier* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000). This ethnographically informed intervention resonates with

scholarship that critically revisits the notion of "border crossing" as it is used in cultural anthropology and in Latino studies. See Alejandro Lugo, "Theorizing Border Inspections," *Cultural Dynamics* 12 (2000): 353–73; and Renato Rosaldo, *Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis* (Boston: Beacon, 1989).

26. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes toward an Investigation)," in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 127–86.

27. Josiah Heyman, "Putting Power in the Anthropology of Bureaucracy: The Immigration and Naturalization Service at the Mexico-United States Border," *Current Anthropology* 36 (1995): 261–87.

28. Velez-Ibañez, *Border Visions*.

29. Guadalupe Castillo, MA, and founding member of Derechos Humanos/ The Arizona Borders Rights Project, interview by author, Tucson, Arizona, July 1999.

30. Rosas, "The Managed Violences of the Borderlands."

31. Gilberto Rosas, "The Thickening Borderlands: Diffused Exceptionality and 'Immigrant' Social Struggles during the 'War on Terror,'" *Cultural Dynamics* 18 (2006): 335–49.

32. Peter Andreas, *A Tale of Two Borders: The U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada Lines after 9-11*, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper 77 (La Jolla: CCI, University of California, San Diego, 2003).

33. Nicholas De Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality' and the Metaphysics of Anti-terrorism: 'Immigrants' Rights' in the Aftermath of the Homeland Security State," 2006, on the Social Science Resource Center Web site, borderbattles.ssrc .org/De_Genova.

34. Rosas, "The Managed Violences of the Borderlands."

35. De Genova, "Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31 (2002): 419–47.

36. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Ben Chappell, "Rehearsals of the Sovereign: States of Exception and Threat Governmentality," *Cultural Dynamics* 18 (2006): 313–34.

37. Rosas, "The Thickening Borderlands."

The War Drive

IMAGE FILES CORRUPTED

Not only does the discourse of war belong to the discourse on society but it assigns it its meaning: the idea of war measures the idea of society.
—Pierre Clastres, *The Archaeology of Violence*

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A man stands disarmed and naked with a weapon pointing at him; this person becomes a corpse before anybody or anything touches him.
—Simone Weil, "The *Iliad*, or the Poem of Force"

Fight, rape, war, pillage, burn. Filmic images of death and carnage are pornography for the military man.
—Anthony Swofford, *Jarhead*

The scandal of torture in the war on terror has diminished noticeably since it first erupted in 2004, when photographs of a grinning young woman, poised and posed next to a nude Iraqi detainee, entered the contemporary mediascape. Already, the discourse of alternative techniques has begun to paper over the wound of torture with a veneer of academic propriety or, at least, of logical necessity. Without more new images to fill out and, as it were, enflesh the debate about torture, widespread opposition to its continuation has lost some of its vociferousness. In the end, however haunted we may be by the image of a hooded man standing as though crucified on a box, or of a naked man on a leash, or of a scrum of stripped bodies splayed for the camera, the news photograph has a short half-life and fades quickly. The recent passage of legislation permitting some forms of coercive interrogation previously thought to be torture is evidence that the restraining force of that scandal has indeed dissipated.[1] For this reason we would do well to recall, if we can, our shock at that first sighting. However, the utility of this gesture will be realized only if we acknowledge that what offended us was less the torture than the apparent enjoyment expressed in the faces of those who were its perpetrators.

Michelle Brown had made this point already in 2005, when she wrote that the shock of the photographs from Abu Ghraib consisted in the "patriotic delight of the torturers, in America 'out of place.'" For Brown, Abu Ghraib represents the exportation of a penal culture that has nor-

malized the exceptional and exceptionally violent treatment of prisoners.[2] She is undoubtedly correct in her diagnosis of the relationship between the development of penal cultures in the United States and abroad, but this institutional and political development does not account for what she rightly recognizes as the affective investment of the torturers, nor for the particular forms of violence that occurred in Abu Ghraib and other spaces under U.S. military control in Iraq. And it is to that particular question that I want to turn in the pages that follow. There is, as Pierre Clastres says, something to be discerned about a society in the manner that it pursues war, and in the way that it conceives of its enemies.[3]

Construing torture as technique (method), and even as a necessary evil (means), as policy makers tend to do, effaces both the actuality of the event as it is experienced by those tortured and the conditions within which it has been practiced thus far. Indeed, it distracts us entirely from what such activities might represent more generally. The conclusions of all investigative reports on Abu Ghraib state that most of the torture was unrelated to intelligence gathering. Hence no consideration of torture as method or means can address its fundamental characteristics or its "function" within the current political scene.[4] Function is, in fact, an inadequate term to describe the place of torture in the current war—where it exceeds the means-ends relation and symptomatizes a transformation in the "sexual economy" of war, or rather an apotheosis of the sexuality of that economy. It is this transformation that I wish to discuss here.

I begin with the assumption that, in general, war entails the libidinization of the entire social field. War is a regressive institution in many regards but most specifically in the way that it strips away the usual prohibitions on both an intimacy with death and the pursuit of sexual satisfaction outside of generally legitimated (though not necessarily normative) contractual social relations—whether these take the form of companionate relationships, interfamilial bonds, dynastic partnerships, or some other form. This stripping away is not accidental of course; it is structured by forms of discipline and pedagogy, as well as by the discursive elaboration of war in and beyond the actual space of militarization. Such institutional structuring is what distinguishes the criminal sexual violence of war from that in nonwartime contexts, but, of course, it is also what constitutes the basis of their continuity.[5] Determined and overdetermined by social institutions and histories, these liberated drives may express themselves in any number of ways, but often enough they entail sexual violence directed at one's enemies.[6] One may understand such violence as compensation, as cathartic discharge, as an unconscious effort to cancel death with eros, as the form of a violent effort to institute reciprocity in a negative mode, and so forth. And all of these factors may be at play. The point is that this

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violence has heretofore constituted a mode of relationality with the other, however ironic, unethical, or brutal.[7] This is why, indeed, it is generally thought that war occurs between others who might have been friends. For the same reason, its resolution is generally construed as the conversion of hostility into fraternity through the production of a common language, usually in the form of negotiated settlements and binding treaties. Let the gendered language of fraternity reveal what is at stake in the form of peacemaking that can emerge from war: this is a patriarchal relation.

One may make a distinction for analytic purposes: the absolute annihilation of the other, and hence a surpassing of the possibility of relation with the other, however violent, is a goal and a property not of war, at least in the sense I am using the term here, but of complete genocide and perhaps of that exceptional case of war we call Total War. Here, however, I am interested in the transformed nature of the libidinization and the sexual economy of war in the era of real-time and reality TV, a transformation that Lacan addressed under the shorthand of shamelessness. We discern something new emerging in and against these other logics in the current conflict, exemplified in the case of Abu Ghraib. This newness consists neither in the libidinization of war, which is old, nor in the fact of sexual violence, which is similarly ancient and persisting. Rather, it consists in a partial displacement of the former structures of violent relation and fantasy by an extreme literalism, and a narcissistic economy in which, instead of obtaining satisfaction through the violation of the other, the other is made to perform his own (self-) abuse and to perform that abuse as enjoyment in a grotesque parody of consent. I hope to show that this demand for the performance of a consent to be violated, and moreover of that violation as satisfying, as in Abu Ghraib, works to obviate the perpetrator's need for fantasy even as it institutes a mirroring (though not identification) in the place of relation. It is a development that expresses on the plane of corporeal experience and psychic life the logic of a political relation already described by Jean Baudrillard (in relation to the 1991 Gulf War) as one in which alterity has been banished by the demand for mimesis. According to this logic, one only speaks to those who resemble oneself. Difference here is construed not as that which demands the labors of language—converse and listening, translation and interpretation—but rather that which prohibits it. In this essay, I want to try to explain how this transformation came to be.

Like many others (including, most notably, Allen Feldman, Nicholas Mirzoeff, Paul Virilio, and Samuel Weber), I see this development as being crucially related to trends in media culture.[8] Nonetheless, I do not think that what is occurring in the war on terror, and what happened at Abu Ghraib, is explicable in terms of the ethically distancing effects that

are correlate with the hallucinatory proximity of television or with the transformation of thought that emerges at the point where social relations are overtaken by the network and the internet (Weber). Nor do I think it is exhausted by concepts of scopophilia and spectacle, even when those concepts are specified in terms of surveillance, the politics of risk (Feldman), and the shoring up of imperial masculinity through the projection of a sodomitical alterity (Mirzoeff). All of these readings remain devoted to an analysis of contemporary visual culture in terms of a gaze structured by sexual difference, in which mastery is the goal and spectatorial authority, even when assigned to professional elites, is the locus and the primary form of political power and sexual subjectification. But, as Lacan had already intuited in his analysis of television following the student protests of May 1968, the category of the gaze is transformed in the regime of television, as the question of looking is dissociated from the process of shaming.

In the interest of clarity, let me briefly sketch the contours of an argument still to come. In the current conflict, for which Abu Ghraib has become so crucial a sign, older logics of war based in sexual difference and newer ones oriented by technologized scopophilia are still operative, but they are now augmented by an emergent economy beyond sexual difference, beyond the still-human opposition of friend and enemy, and beyond shame. It is notable in this context that even the discourse of common soldiers reveals a sense that the current war has a different sexual logic; as discussed below, they often describe this new logic in terms of desexualization. Members of the military elite refer to it under the rubric of dehumanization. In any case, there is a palpable sense of change. I trace this change to the end of the U.S.-Vietnam war, and the period of reflection that followed it, which seems to have culminated in a sense that war, if it is to be redeemed, must be desexualized.[9] This gesture became possible only after the failure of that war was reduced to the question of sexual violence, itself rendered as an excess of the war. In other words, the politics of empire had to be effaced, in order that empire might return—first as a rescue of women and then as the enactment of an absolutely racialized and religious otherness.

Ironically, perhaps, some of the effort to reclaim war from within the United States received support from dissident antiwar documents (novels, films, and other artifacts) emanating from Vietnam. Many of these documents repudiated the idea of military heroism even in wars of national liberation, and converged with much American antiwar discourse in figuring war's depravity as sexual violence. In the sphere of cultural production, the rehabilitation was accomplished, if not consciously intended, through the revival of World War II as the primary object of cinematic war storytelling.[10] In recent actual conflicts, it has been accomplished through the

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displacement of sexual difference by racialized religiosity as the organizing principle of collective violence.

Clearly, this displacement has been enabled by several geopolitical factors, including, most important, the collapse of Soviet socialism, the globalization of capital, and the emergence of new Islamic internationalisms. It has also been facilitated by developments in media culture. If the U.S.-Vietnam war inaugurated the phenomenon of the living-room war, the televisual presentation of a distant battle was nonetheless limited to nightly news segments, edited according to the principles of narrative documentary cinema. The Gulf wars have given us twenty-four-hour, real-time coverage, the phenomenon of warhead-mounted cameras, embedded journalists, and a sense that we are not always looking so much as we are constantly being exposed to the world of and at war. Even when power assumes the form of telling us that "there is nothing to see," as Jacques Rancière claims, the drive and the ideal of popular culture takes the form of exposure—often enough without judgment.[11] It relentlessly attempts to circumvent the processes of concealment and dissimulation by which (anachronistic) state powers try to maintain their hold on knowledge. So, for example, what the nightly news fails to broadcast, we can often see on YouTube. The repudiation of editing (on the grounds that it is always political subterfuge) never achieves its goal, of course. But it has a psychic corollary nevertheless. By means of what can be called the pornography of actuality, it displaces and supplements the existing structures for generating reality effects and a symbolically mediated realism. If this appears to liberate us from the censoriousness of the state, it has also been accompanied by the atrophy of fantasy and the violent demand that the other perform his submission to violation as a source of satisfaction. For it is this satisfaction in self-violation that appears to constitute the core of a new military eros, one that can no longer be adequately conceived as a form of relation with the other. Its medium is reality TV, of which digital cameras and cell-phone imaging devices are the supplement. This is visual culture that attempts to exempt itself from the gaze, and that has an infantile narcissus as its ideal subject. Or so I will attempt to demonstrate.

Language of the Prison-House

To read Abu Ghraib as a sign or symptom of an emergent mode of war requires, before all else, that we ask in what sense, or to what extent, it can be conceived of as representative. Official opinion focuses on the exceptionality of the events, the small numbers of participants, and the formal irregularity of the activities vis-à-vis military law. However, these

statistical arguments do not yet address the deeper questions of representativeness. Let us then begin with the military's self-assessment.

Under Army Regulation 15-6, two investigative reports on Abu Ghraib were written, one by Lt. Gen. Anthony R. Jones, the other by Maj. Gen. George R. Fay. These reports have come to be known jointly as the Fay-Jones report and formed the basis, along with the Taguba report and assorted internal review documents, of the "Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense (DoD) Detention Operations" conducted under the chairmanship of James R. Schlesinger and submitted to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on 23 August 2004. By far the most systematic of the reports is that by Fay.

In his report, Fay concludes as follows:

> Physical and sexual abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib . . . spanned from direct physical assault, such as delivering head blows rendering detainees unconscious, to sexual posing and forced participation in group masturbation. At the extremes were the death of a detainee in OGA [other government agency, usually CIA] custody, an alleged rape committed by a U.S. translator and observed by a female Soldier, and the alleged sexual assault of a female detainee. These abuses are, without question, criminal. They were perpetrated or witnessed by individuals or small groups. Such abuse can not be directly tied to a systemic U.S. approach to torture or approved treatment of detainees. The MPs [military police] being prosecuted claim their actions came at the directions of MI [military intelligence]. Although self-serving, these claims do have some basis in fact. The environment created at Abu Ghraib contributed to the occurrence of such abuse and the fact that it remained undiscovered by higher authority for a long period of time. What started as nakedness and humiliation, stress and physical training (exercise) carried over into sexual and physical assaults by a small group of morally corrupt and unsupervised Soldiers and civilians.[12]

In many ways, Fay's report expresses the aporia of the idea of war crime—a crime written into the interior of the legitimated state of war which would otherwise be a travesty of law. The idea of war crime is an idea of exception, by which the normalization of war is effected. War crimes are a necessary exception, an illogical but reasonable categorical interruption of what would otherwise be the generalization and even the totalization of war's violence.[13] But if the notion of a war crime may constitute something of a limit to the atrocities perpetrated in war, it cannot address the question of war itself and may indeed be the instrument by which we finally relinquish the idea of an opposition to war per se.

That the violence at Abu Ghraib was socialized, but at the same time exceptional, creates particular problems for Fay in this context. Hence,

he invokes not war, but environmental factors to explain what occurred. These factors include the understaffing of the facility; lack of integration of policies on interrogation, stemming from the "migration" of individuals and practices from GTMO (Guantánamo) and Afghanistan to Iraq (28–29); the fact that the facility was in a combat zone and was regularly hit by mortar fire, leading to the injuries, deaths, and terror of both soldiers and detainees; the reliance on contract interrogators and interpreters (supplied by the Titan corporation[14]) whose qualifications were unclear, and whose training was limited (46, 50–51); the lack of any doctrine as the basis for integrating contract civilians into military operations (19); the lack of a doctrinal basis of the organization and oversight of the entity responsible for the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib, a newly created body comprised of members from numerous different units who had previously not worked together and who had no clear understanding of each other's roles (41–42); poor communications and information systems ("some interrogation related information was recorded on a whiteboard which was periodically erased" [47]); and lack of leadership.

The dilemma that confronts Fay, however, is in adjudicating whether the events were themselves exceptional or whether they were merely illicit in the sense outlined above — namely, as violations of the normative codes of warfare. On the latter, all of the investigators concur: the activities of the "demented night shift," as Christian Parenti would describe the perpetrators at Abu Ghraib, were breaches of law, and specifically of the laws of war. The Fay report cites the relevant regulations, and one has only to consider two to recognize how unquestionably criminal the guards' activities were. Thus, for example, "Photographs of detainees are strictly prohibited except for internal administrative purposes of the confinement facility."[15] And, "At all times, the Civilian Internee will be humanely treated and protected against all acts of violence or threats and insults and public curiosity. The Civilian Internee will be especially protected against all acts of violence, insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, reprisals of any kind, sexual attacks such as rape, forced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault."[16]

On the question of exceptionality, however, the various authors of the many investigative reports appear to be ambivalent or in disagreement. Fay's claim that the abuse was not systemic but encouraged by environmental factors that were within the control of the military seems to evade the question. The final combined report (of Jones and Fay) commences with an executive summary that emphasizes individual culpability: "The primary causes are misconduct (ranging from inhumane to sadistic) by a small group of morally corrupt soldiers and civilians, a lack of discipline

on the part of the leaders and Soldiers of the 205th MI BDE [Military Intelligence Brigade] and a failure or lack of leadership by multiple echelons within the CJTF-7."[17] The Schlesinger report concludes, to the contrary, that "the abuses were not just the failure of some individuals to follow known standards, and they are more than the failure of a few leaders to enforce proper discipline. There is both institutional and personal responsibility at higher levels."[18]

Beyond such official disagreement, however, there is a wide and often acrimonious debate about what Abu Ghraib represents in relation to the U.S. military and the society on whose behalf it wages wars — though majority opinion within the United States certainly appears to read the events there as anomalous, which is to say that these were nonrepresentative eruptions of disorder. Such a claim rests on a statistical conception of representativeness, which is itself subject to some doubt and which ultimately fails to address the possibility that Abu Ghraib represents something more than itself, that it might symptomatize a more general development. Nonetheless, the defense on the grounds of statistical rarity also requires some debunking.

Fay's report was based on an analysis of forty-four incidents involving twenty-seven individuals alleged to have committed the abuses. By the time of the Schlesinger report, there were 66 substantiated cases, with 300 reports of abuse in Guantánamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, of which only 155 had been investigated.[19] In other words, evidence could be found for more than 40 percent of the abuse claims. The others were not necessarily unsubstantiable, but they lacked evidence and had not been deemed credible or otherwise at the time of writing. More revealing, perhaps, is the number of personnel involved: 27 military intelligence individuals, by Fay's count. This number seems relatively small when compared to the 150,000 troops deployed. But Abu Ghraib itself was staffed by a total of only 160, including 45 interrogators and 18 linguists/translators from six different battalions.[20] Many of the MI people had limited or no contact with the detainees; therefore, one can say, a sizable proportion of the military personnel with opportunity used it at Abu Ghraib to abuse their charges.

Equally significant, I believe, are the statistics about the number of detainees at Abu Ghraib, where the ratio of military intelligence to detainee reached 1:75, although interrogation policies imported from Guantánamo were premised on a ratio of 1:1. By December 2003, between four and five thousand people of "potential security interest" were being held in Abu Ghraib, and when the Schlesinger report was being written, approximately fifty thousand people had been apprehended.[21] Forty-five thousand people had thus been detained "by mistake," as the International Committee of

the Red Cross (ICRC) states. Among them the "juveniles" locked in a cell and terrorized by dogs; the Egyptian medics incarcerated and "ghosted" (held without their identities being recorded by the CIA); the sixty-one-year-old man, arrested and severely burned when his face was placed on the hot engine of the transport vehicle (a tactic repeatedly used at intake, often with long-term scarring, infection, and even, in some cases, requiring skin grafting and amputation); the young women accused of prostitution; the thirteen-year-old boys gathered up with their grandfathers; the ailing people abducted in the middle of night, without bedclothes and deprived of medications;[22] and so forth. While the physical violence directed against the detainees has been repudiated, there has been no serious effort to address the systematic incarceration and deprivation of tens of thousands of innocent people, with no recompense for their losses and no care for their traumatized selves. At best, a more expeditious and efficacious processing has been advocated.

The context for the violence was, quite simply, mass detention. This is the prison nation abroad identified by Michelle Brown.[23] But here one must pause. For the ideological manifest on which detention is based is not so much the idea of a generalized criminality as much as it is the notion of consent. The significance of this conceptualization of criminality cannot be overestimated, and it has profound implications for the management and form of violence in Iraq. The "Ethical Foundations of Detention and Interrogation," as outlined by the Schlesinger panel, states that "Criminals, by not respecting the rights of others, may be said to have consented—in principle—to arrest and possible imprisonment. In this construct, and due to the threat they represent, insurgents and terrorists 'consent' to the possibility of being captured, detained, interrogated, and possibly killed."[24] In other words, in Iraq criminality is defined as the act by which freedom expresses itself in surrender to detention.

The authors of the report use this spuriously named ethical principle to delimit the category of who may be detained and for how long; it implicitly legitimates the subjection of some individuals to extraordinary treatment (namely, that applied to criminals rather than prisoners of war or civilians).[25] As with all arguments in defense of torture and detention, it presumes the omniscience of the apprehending forces and bypasses demands for habeus corpus.[26] There is no presumption of innocence. After all, the policy has identified the one who consents to be apprehended as, precisely, the criminal. In posing the issue in these terms, then, the authors elide the deployment of force by the apprehending and/or detaining body, which, by this analysis, is merely actualizing the consent that the criminal implicitly grants. In the language of the report, consent is the "manifestation of the freedom and dignity" of the person. In other words, what the consenting

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person consents to, as a free and dignified being, is the surrender of his freedom and dignity. Here we can discern a relationship exceeding contextuality between official policy and the violence of Abu Ghraib.

It is not incidental that one of the most common recurrent forms of violence described in the reports is that which commands others to perform their sexual satisfaction for the torturers. This scenario, in which the detainee's submission to the torturer's very command is made to appear as the source of the detainee's own enjoyment, and where the generalized deprivation of all individuals is represented as an expression of their consent, suggests that the war in Iraq has moved beyond older forms of warfare that were organized by sexual difference, and oriented toward abduction — of women, labor, resources, land, and all those things that, in peacetime, would have been the subject of contractual negotiations and less violent exchange.

In the end, one may say, it amounts to the same thing: death, physical suffering, psychic trauma, unlivable lives. But it matters that war is no longer conceived of as war, that it has been inscribed into a discourse of freedom (Juliet Flower MacCannell will call it love; see below), and that it is tending toward a hatred that transforms and at times prohibits even violent sexual contact. This last utterance must sound odd, if not offensive, or even outrageous. Surely sexual violence is not a mode of relation, let alone a form of recognition through which peace can be made to supplant war? In the Lacanian sense, of course, there is never any sexual relation, and not only because sexual violence inhibits it. The subject is endlessly split by desire, and desire is separated from fulfillment.[27] There is thus only sexual nonrelation. Moreover, as Freud argued with increasing acuity over his career, sexuality is always ambivalent and combines within itself the tendencies of both love and hate, the drive or drift toward both fusion and fragmentation (the latter resulting from aggression).

So, I need to be clear. My invocation of something called "sexual relation" is intended to reflect the consequences, both ideological and material, that arise when one speaks, however imprecisely, of a sexually violent relation. For within normative Western discourses of war, sexual violence has been precisely the awful form of an acknowledgment that, if not war, then peace — between men or the patriarchies they represent. And vice versa. For now, let us limit ourselves to acknowledging that, in the scenario we now occupy (and I use this word with all self-consciousness), there is violence, there is even sexually demeaning violence. But this violence increasingly holds apart and rests on the absolute (because absolutized), unending, and untraversible difference of race and religion, beyond which there is no possibility of any termination, nor, therefore, of relation — including that nonrelation of which Lacan speaks. This

scenario has not been finally accomplished; it remains an emergent pos-
sibility, the anticipatory seeds of which were discerned by Lacan in 1973,
when he remarked that "our *jouissance* [is] going off track, [and] only the
Other is able to mark its position, but only insofar as we are separated from
this Other."[28] He linked this fact, as well as the emergence of new fantasies,
to a new discourse, which he called "humanhysterianism" [*humanitair-
erie*]. Under the guise of this "humanhysterianism," the West continues
to extort from the rest of the world defined as "underdeveloped."[29] The
once-new fantasies are, I believe, now familiar. They have a form. When
one sees soldiers demanding that others violate themselves while pretend-
ing to self-satisfaction, in order that the bearers of the commandment may
receive their own fulfillment, one recognizes it. How did this come to be
the case? By what processes did war, and the violence that accompanies
it, come to exceed the question of sexual difference by assuming so acute
a form of racism? This is a question about the new nature of war, but it
is also a question about the regression of our increasingly technologized
forms of war making. Let me try to trace the contours of an answer—or
rather, a history and an analysis—by which we might understand it and
what is at stake in its transformation.

War; or, Love's Fate: Displacing Vietnam

In the beginning, as it were, the war against terror began with an assault
on Afghanistan, an assault that was not only intended to open the way to
bin Laden but, more positively, to save that nation's women. The pursuit
of bin Laden would, in fact, take place within the discursive space of this
other war, and the eviction of the Taliban found its initial ethicopolitical
justification—as have so many colonial wars—in the claim that it would
also liberate women. That this liberation would make them available for
exploitation by foreign capital rather than by their fathers, brothers, and
husbands would be concealed in the rhetoric of equality and in the imita-
tion honor of the chivalrous forces descending from clouds of dust. But
women's liberation would be the call and cause to which the noncomba-
tants of America would be summoned.

It is an old dream, this rescue of women from the hands of their lascivi-
ous abductors. But it is also a new dream. It is there in the mad, ruinous
war to liberate Helen, told and retold by Homer and his heirs. And it is
there, Slavoj Žižek tells us, in the impotent fantasies of the husbands whose
wives were incarcerated in the rape camps of Bosnia.[30] Now, in *Disgrace*,
J. M. Coetzee has imagined this story for us in its African, postcolonial
form.[31] The story of women's liberation is not entirely absent in Iraq, but,

I want to argue, its relative attenuation in the war on terror as waged in Iraq represents a significant development in the nature of U.S. war making, and thus in the nature of American society. Its gradual diminution must be understood as a stage in the long transformation set in motion at the end of the U.S. wars in Southeast Asia, and particularly in reaction to the conflict in Vietnam.

One sees tokens of such transformations in the popular-cultural landscape, notably in the displacement of dystopian post-Vietnam-era war films by those depicting American heroism in World War II. *Saving Private Ryan* (1998) was a watershed development in this regard. The ratings triumph of *Band of Brothers* (2001) on HBO television secured the amnesiac transformation and made possible the kinds of 9/11 films now entering the scene: *United 93* (2006) and *World Trade Center* (2006). But the enormous popularity of these films was already foreseeable in the success of Bao Ninh's great antiwar novel, *The Sorrow of War*, which was translated into English in 1995 and immediately embraced by the American literati as well as broader war-story audiences. Hailed for its aesthetic mastery and antiromantic honesty, the novel conveys a "sorrow of war" even among the victors of anticolonial conflict.

In fact, the English title constituted something of a restoration for the novel, which had not appeared in Vietnamese under its intended title because publishers feared opposition from government censors. Bao Ninh had wanted the book to appear as *Nỗi Buồn Chiến Tranh* (*The Sorrow of War*), but the press felt the reading public was not ready (in 1991) to hear of their "glorious victory" in such critically melancholic terms. They opted, instead, for *Thân Phận Của Tình Yêu* (*The Fate of Love*).[32] The English publishers found in the original title the story they desired. This was not a story of the meaning-producing, self-sacralizing gesture of sacrifice in war (which orients the sexual relations of the novel). The "sorrow of war" was read instead as the meaninglessness that afflicts the survivors of such sacrifice (which negates the political demands and moral claims of the anticolonial movement in Vietnam).

The protagonist of Bao Ninh's novel, Kien, is a member of a corpse-gathering team, the Vietnamese counterpart of the MIA search-and-rescue mission. In this role, he must visit the scene of war, and while doing so, he encounters not only bodies but the spirits of the war-dead. In a profound sense, *The Sorrow of War* is a ghost story. Its apparitions invariably make themselves heard before, and often in the absence of, achieving visibility; they laugh, weep, cry out, soliciting the ex-soldiers but never responding to the calls made by the living. The sorrow of war, evoked so powerfully in these recurrent specters, has another dimension, however. For it is

experienced by Kien as inseparable from the grief that he suffers when his beloved, Phuong, vanishes from him in the midst of war, first when she is gang-raped by local laborers after the train they are riding is derailed by an explosion, and then when, following this trauma, she becomes a prostitute. The latter event marks the irrevocable departure of Phuong from any familial (patriarchal) structure of desire, and Kien cannot bear this. But if he cannot forgive Phuong for what he believes to be a perpetual reenactment of her trauma in gang rape, he does grieve for the guide of his own platoon, Hoa. She sacrifices herself by diverting an American patrol and then submitting to gang rape and, presumably, death at their hands, so that her Vietnamese comrades can use the American distraction to escape and, she hopes, wage war against the imperialists. Thinking of her, Kien is moved to wonder if war is not the condition within which "such sacrifices" become an "everyday occurrence."

To a certain extent, then, it made sense to transmute the one title into the other, to render the sorrow of war as the fate of love. Both Kien and the women he loved have submitted themselves to the war in an orgy of anti-colonial nation-love (nationalism), but in the end only Kien, the protagonist, is left to bear the burden of survival among the ghosts of the war-dead. And even his status—as living witness or as the morbid shade of a suicide, ventriloquized by a cynical author—is ultimately in question. Living or dead, the specter that Kien cannot accommodate, however, is that which supplants the intimacy of familial love with the circuitries of completely commodified relations. The sorrow of war, for him, then, is that he could not rescue the women he loved. The fate of love in war is, by contrast, its disarticulation from normative forms of intimate relation—even though these are inevitably "built from repression."[33] Ultimately, the grief of surviving war—the war in Vietnam, the war between socialist, anticolonial nationalism, and national-monopoly capitalism—lies for Bao Ninh in the intimation that there is no longer any intimacy beyond either commercial exchange or sexual violence.

Kien remains impotent before the image of his violated beloved. But this does not prevent us from resignifying the novel's narrative. For it is also possible to tell Phuong's story as the consequence not only of her rape but of the patriarchal sorrow that leaves her lover incapable of acknowledging her survival (even if that survival entails a certain repetition compulsion). Phuong lives the consequences that emanate from this fact: the rescue of women is inevitably an ideological obfuscation of the abduction of women. More than any war before it (though perhaps not as strongly as would be the case in Bosnia, or even Darfur), the conflict in Vietnam revealed the continuing force of a conception of war dominated by the drive to "get"

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women. No master narrative of geopolitical conflict could conceal the crucial fact that rape was a constantly erupting event, and an even more pervasive fantasy, among combatants.

Today, the rapprochement between former enemies can be read in the return of the novel's "original" title to Vietnam. It is now published as *Nỗi Buồn Chiến Tranh* (*The Sorrow of War*). Much, however, was lost in translation, even as that translation appears to reinstate the author's intentions. For if the Vietnamese author wishes to signify the impossibility of retrieving life from war, even an anticolonial war of independence, the novel's movement into English cannot be separated from the effort to recuperate war for empire. This latter gesture can only be accomplished, however, by finally leaving behind the U.S.-Vietnam war itself (though it has never been officially declared as such), the war so indelibly marked by the images of rape (which its cinema endlessly replays), and the ultimate failure of the United States to extract itself from death.

To this end, the negation of the heroism of war in Bao Ninh's novel facilitates the revisionist narratives of World War II, and the fantasy of rescue — but with a difference. For one of the crucial lessons of Vietnam, from the perspective of war's proponents, is that today in the United States, the overt sexualization of war contaminates its moral claims. To go forward by going back, war must go beyond sexual desire, must be returned or catapulted toward a pure violence, at once mechanistic and infantile.[34] If one wants to know what this new kind of war looks like, sexless but technologically sophisticated, one has only to turn to Abu Ghraib and the theater of violent self-satisfaction that it incarnates. To the extent that Abu Ghraib has come to be associated in most people's minds with the "tactics" of nudity and sexual humiliation, however, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the idea that war today exceeds the sexual economy whence it came and from which it was previously inextricable.

Thanks to the intermediary role of World War II, which returns now as the scene onto which new aspirations can be projected, this aspect of the military operation in Vietnam has been displaced. Or rather, the return to World War II allows the particular forms of sexual violence in the U.S.-Vietnam war to appear as that which has been surpassed in and through a new civilizational mission. One initially imagined such claims to be self-deluding ideology. But their secret truth had not yet been revealed, or understood. We need to understand, precisely, what was supposed to have been surpassed; then we may understand in what ways it was really transformed and hence extended.

I am reminded here of an episode that occurred shortly after the beginning of the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. At that time, an incident at a teach-in at Columbia University drew national attention, and

as a result, certain members of the department of anthropology received hate mail because of their perceived lack of support for individual members of the U.S. military. Occasionally, letters arrived that attempted to explain the good intentions of the men who were thought to have been maligned by our faculty members. One such letter came to me from a woman whose husband had just enlisted, and it explained, in tones at once poignant and pathetic, that the man was a person of honor and decency and concern for others, especially those whose land was about to be occupied. "My husband," the woman wrote, "will not rape anyone." I thought it extraordinary that a woman would imagine her husband as a rapist — if only in order to repudiate the possibility that he was one. And I was moved, if also repelled, by the awful predicament of a woman who recognized, despite all else, that, for most people, indeed for her, war means rape. Her efforts to imagine her husband as an exception to this rule only proved its validity.

We are all familiar with this semiotic formula and its presumption of a structural identity between collective violence and sexual coercion. It is coded in the myriad myths that come to us from history's multiple traditions, and from the anthropological theories that travesty the sentence "war *means* rape" by representing sexual conquest as the end and apotheosis of war, and, at the same time, as the condition of possibility of war's transformation into peace through marriage. It is this linkage that lies buried in the repeated translations of the title for Bao Ninh's great novel.

Structuralist — and, by extension, much contemporary — anthropology explains all war in nonstate societies as the violent pursuit of women and/or as the repudiation of exchange by peaceful means.[35] In marital relations, the structuralist argument goes, women move between communities of allies.[36] Marriage permits the reproduction of the communities, and even their growth, but no one (no male-dominated society) gains anything relative to anyone else through such peaceful, contractually regulated exchanges.[37] To gain absolutely requires violence; it requires the abduction of women — or whatever it is that constitutes the desired, the feminized object. There is much to be said by way of criticism of this argument, either in its Lévi-Straussian form or in its subtler, more radical articulation by Pierre Clastres. And whether it is true or not that women can be construed as tokens of exchange, analogized either as objects or signs, as structuralists want to suggest (and feminists generally dispute), the form of the argument is exactly commensurate with the ideology of war as it has been articulated in patriarchal contexts — until now.[38] We might say that a structuralist theory of war as the abduction of women is the dream of a warring patriarchy, just as Lacan said that Oedipus was Freud's dream. The difference between the simple form of its articulation, say, among the Guayaki Indians as described by Pierre Clastres and that

found among the British imperial forces in India is that the imperial model narrates the exchange of women as their liberation.[39]

For those of us raised in the West, the urtext of this ideology of war is perhaps Homer's *Iliad*, the text Simone Weil described as the poem of force. In the *Iliad*, she wrote, "we see force in its grossest and most summary form—the force that kills."[40] It transforms all of the living into corpses in the moment that it appears. Weil's humanism, though aesthetically persuasive, may have led her to overlook the sexual dynamics of the conflict being portrayed. For the *Iliad* commences with a nearly absurd conversation about who will have whom as spoils of war. Achilleus, Agamemnon, and Patroklos fight over whether their booty is adequate to their contributions to the fighting, and Achilleus is so incensed that he will not have Briseis, whom Agamemnon has taken for himself, that he threatens to withdraw his own swift brilliance from the war. Pouting, he ensures that the *Iliad* opens in doubt about war and not with the story of Helen, whose affair with, or abduction by, Paris and flight from Menalaos ostensibly constitutes its ultimate cause. And in this mode of petulant negation, Homer himself makes visible, if only for a moment, a countertheory of peace as that which would be possible if war were not construed as the instrument of a phallicized eros, as the means to abduct women.

But of course, that is only the first book of the epic; there are another twenty-three to go, and as we all know, the moment of possible suspension is overcome by a drive that will consume Troy, and give us the unbearable story of the Trojan women. What Weil failed to comprehend is how this force works to unmoor desire from the structures in which it is otherwise restrained—most notably by kinship. It is, after all, war and the exile that follows upon it which lead Oedipus to make his fateful mistake. In the *Iliad*, desire is at the origin of the story of war. It is, in some sense, at the origin of force, and it is the socially organized force that, ironically, appears to desocialize desire. This understanding of the relationship between force and desire, it should be stated, is the opposite or the inverse of that total libidinization that Deleuze and Guattari speak about in *Anti-Oedipus*. There they approve the accomplishments of feminists who they believed had more or less understood that liberation consists in the investment of the total social field by desire.[41] Such an investment was, for them, correlate with a disinvestment of the repressive structures in society, namely those of Oedipality, through which desire would be contained in the family and instrumentalized in the interest of reproductivity. But their analysis can only operate within society, and not in the relations between societies. If the laws of war have historically attempted to contain this force by producing an identity between the categories of woman and noncombatant, for example, they have nonetheless been cultivated by the structures

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of militarism and the pedagogies that undergird it. The laws of war are always belated to this inevitable eruption of an event whose arrival we can anticipate from the start.

War imagined as the rescue of women merely defers the violence against women and posits it as the outside of war—either as its objective, which is dissimulated as peace (wartime brides, and so forth); or, as its criminal interruption (wartime rape, punishable under the codes of military justice). In either case, Thanatos and Eros are held apart. Freud famously offered a countertheory for this oppositional model when he posited the death drive—noting that the effort to repetitively achieve satisfaction constitutes a movement toward stasis and death. But when he wrote that every organism chooses its own form of dying, he was only partially correct; it also chooses the form of the death it perpetrates on others.[42] The form of death being disseminated in the war on Iraq has, as its structuring principle, not sexual difference (on which the entire theory of the abduction of women was based), but a racial difference so severe that it can only be framed as a relation between the human and the not-human, a fact recognized by the Fay-Jones report, which rightly understands nudity not as sexualizing, but as dehumanizing. The brutal irony of this new economy is that it masquerades as an abstract kind of love and a new kind of rescue.

As Juliet Flower MacCannell has so incisively argued, the current regime in the United States has chosen the love of others as the discursive form of their annihilation. Her argument takes Lacan's marvelous neologism, of "humanhysterianism," to its theoretical outer limits. In the cause of liberating societies from despotism, saving them from dictatorial patriarchy, or simply enabling them to restructure their economies along neoliberal lines, the U.S. government has justified the bombing of cities, and with it the deaths of tens of thousands of people.[43] Identification with the wounded, whether through rituals of political solidarity like "die-ins" or in the dropping of humanitarian supplies from thousands of feet in the air, is, according to MacCannell, the basis of a situation in which "war is now a means of radiating love." She writes, "Late capitalism . . . still requires real destruction and loss to generate surplus *jouissance*, but now hostility—even open hostilities, war itself—must be absorbed in the aura of universal love."[44] For this reason, one might say, the sorrow of war is indeed love's fate.

MacCannell attributes this development to the new demands of capitalism and to the displacement of a structure of mastery by that of leadership. Here, she follows Lacan and contemporarizes him. In Reagan she discovers the real leader, someone who is not thought to incarnate the power of the master, to bear the law or to exercise the threat of castration,

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but someone with whom everyone can identify, someone whose primary attribute is a wealth that is said to be available to everyone else (by way of trickle-down economics) and whose achievement of stature has been, precisely, painless. One can therefore hardly imagine a more appropriate heir to the Reagan phenomenon than the one who gave us the idea of a "kinder, gentler America" or his son, the man of post-Schmittian simplicities, a huckster of the "friends or enemies" theory of international relations. The kind of leadership exemplified by these men is like populism, but seemingly it lacks the structure of mastery; it is based, instead, on the possibility of identification between "ordinary people" and their "leader," and for this reason, it is obsessed with the concept of consent.[45] The war that is waged in the form of universal love has as its corollary the demand that the losers and the victims consent to their subjugation, that they show themselves consenting, and even more, that they show themselves enjoying this consent. Herein lies the origin of the current war's perversion. It is not unrelated to the fact that, as MacCannell says, in the world of the leader, sexual division "is displaced as the primary mechanism of social organization."[46] If this is correct, then the war in Iraq and elsewhere would be characterized by violence that is defined by an extreme literalism and a lack of differentiation among male and female victims. It would entail violence that exposes itself while asking others to perform their own self-abnegation, which is then read not as submission, but consent. All of these characteristics can be seen in the abuse of Abu Ghraib. Perhaps, one realizes now, they could be seen already in the Gulf War of 1991.

(No) Satisfaction, Literally

The 1991 Gulf War has generated a rather slender body of literature, but one of its most incisive and astute narrations comes in Anthony Swofford's *Jarhead: A Marine's Chronicle of the Gulf War and Other Battles*—a book that stands to the Gulf War as Michael Herr's *Dispatches* and Tim O'Brien's *The Things They Carried* stood to the U.S.-Vietnam war. The book's autobiographical narrator is reading the *Iliad* while waiting for training on the latest sniper weaponry: a Barrett .50-caliber gun with a pistol grip and a range of two thousand yards (a gun that would later be used by white-supremacist militias and homegrown terrorists like Timothy McVeigh and the Branch Davidians, the author informs us). But he is less concerned than Patroklos or Achilleus had been about the possibility of female booty, despite having spent his early training days watching Vietnam War films for the excitement of the rape scenes. He experiences Saudi as "sexless." It is all the more significant, then, that at the end of

the war, when he and his battalion mates are charged with the awful task of disposing of the Iraqi war dead, he describes their predicament as one lacking satisfaction. Compared to the Vietnam vets in his own family, he and his fellow soldiers have experienced a superfluity of discourse about the war, a superfluity of technology that the military had exposed in massive displays of weaponry staged for the watchful eyes of CNN cameras—and almost no combat.

Swofford's platoon mate compensates for the lack of satisfaction by mutilating the bodies of dead Iraqis and then photographing them. This combination of desecration and photography produces something less than total satisfaction—the soldier cannot get enough of it, and so repeats the act, but the photographing of the damage seems to be part of the effort to achieve such satisfaction.[47] It constitutes the moment whereby the violence is transmuted into scopophilia. The soldier photographs the violence for his own visual consumption, and it is this viewing that stands in the structural place of Briseis in Homer's text. The implication, of course, is that the soldier's satisfaction will come when he can see himself satisfying himself. This satisfaction seems to entail the literalization and externalization of all his rage. He wants to destroy the body of the Iraqi, to render it mere pulp, to evacuate even the trace of its humanity. In this way, he will complete the cycle begun in boot camp. Earlier in the book, Swofford remarks of the same soldier and another platoon mate: "because they are ignorant and young and have been well trained by the Corps, [they] are afraid of the humanity of the Bedouin."[48] Though they have left the Bedouins behind, the soldiers of Swofford's platoon have brought with them their incapacity to regard the other in his or her humanity. This is why the soldier can and does mutilate the corpse.

In the awful scene of violent literalization (and literal violence) that culminates Swofford's Gulf War memoir, one finds an uncanny resonance with scenes described by Klaus Theweleit in his analysis of the German *Freikorps* and Nazism. Theweleit similarly emphasizes the rage that transforms the enemy into pulp, but he also attends to the forms of torture that were most commonly practiced in more controlled circumstances. His analysis of the erotics associated with such torture is instructive for our own case, both because of the continuity of literalism that links them and because of the different sexual economy within which it operates.

In one witness's account reported by Theweleit, the presiding commandant in a war camp is seen to masturbate while watching a flogging. The witness also claims that such masturbation was a frequent part of such public rituals, which demanded that the coerced audiences (including other prisoners and lowlier military personnel) observe not only the humiliating flogging of victims' naked buttocks but also the public sexual

self-satisfaction of the man in charge. Theweleit refuses to ascribe to this scene of physical violence and scopophilic pleasure a properly homosexual dimension, although he grants to ritual flogging the status of the most phallic and most sexual of all tortures. Its function, in his analysis, is to combat "Ego-disintegration," but, he adds, it also *absolves [the torturer] of the requirement that he fantasize in order to gain pleasure.* Masturbation released him absolutely from his own threatening interior since this now takes the externalized form of the victim at the whipping post."[49]

The scene is thus pornographic: enacting the absolute literality of the actual. It does not transform, dissimulate, or express a desire for something else. Indeed, this is how Theweleit reads the phenomenon of the *Freikorps* (and Nazism in general): not as the metaphoric translation of another process, or the expression of a prior or deeper reality—whether this be the logic of capitalist production, the crisis of the ego in the aftermath of World War I, or some other system—but as the literal articulation of a sexualized code that "places sexuality in the service of destruction."[50] He takes seriously the language in which its practitioners wrote of their ambitions and their memories, and it is the language of a specifically misogynist sexual violence—directed almost exclusively against maternity, against women, against the feminine.

Theweleit's formulation of the relationship between observer, torturer, and victim owes something to psychoanalysis, but it is perhaps useful to clarify that what he means by fantasy is not precisely what many others, particularly those with Lacanian inspiration, mean when they deploy the same concept to explain seemingly similar phenomena. Slavoj Žižek, for example, insists that we include torture and murder as possible sources of the sublime, which he understands as a passive observational status vis-à-vis that which exceeds comprehension. Expanding on Kant's category, and occluding the moment of the sublime that Kant emphasizes, namely the retreat into Reason that follows upon the experience of blissful impotence in the face of an unfathomable enormity, Žižek defines fantasy as the process by which "the subject is reduced to a pure impassive gaze witnessing the phantasmic scene whose reality has been suspended."[51]

Žižek made this statement in the space between our collective witnessing of the war in the former Yugoslavia, and specifically the rape camps in Bosnia, and what we now term the first Gulf War. His concern is with the complicity of the gaze and, hence, with those who "watch"—whether by compulsion or choice. While this is an urgent issue even today, its privileged position in Žižek's discourse appears to displace analysis of the power of the one who may be committing the violence in actuality, whether as the possessor of torture's instruments or as the possessor of the commandment. In any case, and if it is true that one is always witness to one's own

deeds (if not one's doing), the perpetrator is not merely an "immobilized witness who cannot but observe what goes on." That person—who seems to be the primary object of Žižek's analysis—may be the father forced to observe his daughter's or his wife's assault (this is the scenario invoked by the Iraqi police in their own interrogation scenarios), or the woman forced to observe her child's mutilation. But these witnesses, who are less passive than pacified, cannot form the basis for a theory of what occurs in the scenario of military torture—at least not insofar as the torturer is the one who, though always watching, exceeds the role of witness. The need for a different analysis becomes evident when one considers Žižek's concluding reading of the guilt or shame of the perpetrator. Žižek asks, "Why . . . is the observer passive and impotent?" And he answers, "Because his desire is split, divided between fascination with enjoyment and repulsion at it."[52] This is true of all desire, but if all desire is tortuous, it is not always torturing. The problem with Žižek's analysis is that he cannot think the question of torture except as that of the spectator, which is to say his own position. In this moment, the torturer is elided and fantasy becomes precisely that which holds him in thrall.

What we see in the photographs from Abu Ghraib, however, is the apparent vanishing of repulsion on the part of the observers and the torturers, who, via the circuitry of the digital camera, can anticipate possessing the very gaze that will observe them(selves) in the (slightly deferred) future. In *Jarhead*, the soldiers hacking at the Iraqi dead were interrupted in their apparently commonplace act of desecration by a sergeant who threatened punishment if the men were caught violating the corpses or taking pictures of them. The threat of punishment appeared to curtail some of the activity, even if the men resented the circumscription of their pleasures. At Abu Ghraib, there is, instead, what Brown calls delight and what I call satisfaction. This is an extreme moment in what Jacques Lacan referred to as the historical development of shamelessness—now writ large and inscribed into the geopolitical narrative of American aspirations to hegemony.

Showing to Be Seen: Shameless Satisfaction

If, in the end, Žižek's conception of fantasy seems inadequate to comprehend the scene at Abu Ghraib, his thought nonetheless does converge with Theweleit around the conception of symbolic failure. In the era of "post-modern warfare" (which he believes has been correctly understood but for the wrong reasons), remarks Žižek, the world has become saturated by extremely realistic images of war. As a result, it suffers from an atro-

phying of symbolic activity. Symbolic fiction depends on a space between representation and reality. In its absence, Žižek argues, there is opened the possibility, perhaps even the likelihood, of violence — especially what he terms "'irrational' war violence."

Unlike Theweleit's *Freikorps*, the rage and the libidinous aims manifest in the photographs of torture at Abu Ghraib do not articulate a uniform rage against the feminine, although they often depict the explicit demasculinization or humiliation of male subjects. The violence appears capable of generating satisfaction precisely to the extent that it can be (re)viewed in photographic form. This viewing is not, however, strictly contained by the historically expected codes of the masculine gaze within military cultures, not even those of an expressly imperial sort.[53]

At Abu Ghraib, of course, not all the perpetrators were male. In fact, three of the seven soldiers first charged with criminal abuse in the initial proceedings were women.[54] Their commanding officer, Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade, was also a woman. Moreover, there were sexual relations between at least two of the soldiers. (Lynndie England was pregnant by Charles Graner.) To be sure, a number of photographs from Abu Ghraib depict the bared breasts of women, who had been forced to pose for the camera in various states of undress and seductive posturing.[55] The generic codes of pornographic photography can be discerned in the photographs of the women. But it is in the images of the torturers with their naked male victims, oftentimes shackled to each other, that one can discern the pornographic in Theweleit's sense.[56] In the triumphant jubilation evident on the torturers' faces and in the gestures of "thumbs up," there appears to be an immediate relationship to the victims. There is no suggestion in these images that the torture is performed toward other, deferred ends, or that the torturers are awaiting their victims' responses. The torture is a kind of self-sufficiency, it is satisfying in itself, or at least it will come to appear to have been satisfying in the moment when the photographs are viewed. No fantasy, then, just carnal enjoyment derived from the material fact of the wounded Iraqis.

A clear pattern in U.S. practices of humiliation can be discerned not only in the U.S. military's own internal inquiries but also from the ICRC report. The humiliation ranged from forced nakedness (either in solitary confinement or as part of a parade in front of other prisoners), to being forced to wear women's undergarments, to the extreme cases of forced (simulated) oral intercourse with other inmates and sodomization with an object.[57] Nudity was commonplace. But nudity was not simply one among other abuses; it conditioned the others. Thus, Fay writes, "The use of nudity as an interrogation technique or incentive to maintain the cooperation of detainees was not a technique developed in Abu Ghraib,

but rather a technique which was imported and can be traced through Afghanistan and GTMO. . . . The use of clothing as an incentive (nudity) is significant in that it likely contributed to an escalating 'de-humanization' of the detainees and set the stage of additional and more severe abuses to occur."[58] This dehumanization needs to be understood, above all, as a refusal to acknowledge the symbolizing capacities of the other. The Iraqis denuded and compelled to masturbate were forced, among other things, to perform the presumptive loss of their own capacities for fantasy. Only then could they serve the purposes of torturers, who can be seen as themselves incapable of fantasy and thus devoted to the violent literality of physical torture.

It is interesting to note, in this context, a slight difference in tactics deployed by the Iraqi police. The Iraqi police, who were then performing under the jurisdiction and supervision of the Command Force, deployed techniques that were often physically brutal—including beatings by hand or with guns, and burnings with cigarettes. They also made recourse to sexually significant threats. However, reviewing the incident reports of abuse against members of the Iraqi police, these appear to be directed less against the sexual body of the male detainees than against the hallucinatory image of the violated bodies of their wives, sisters, or daughters. In the threats of rape or sexual humiliation that the police conjure for those in their custody, one could possibly adduce a culturalist stereotype of honor and shame. But this stereotype offers us no insight. (The same threats, delivered in other contexts, would undoubtedly produce comparable fears.) The more important issue, in this context, is that the Iraqi tactic deploys the victims' fantasy as an instrument of terror.[59] By contrast, the American practice appears to have been formulated in behaviorist terms such that the victim will seek relief from his own suffering and humiliation. In the effort to escape his own humiliation and dehumanization, it is thought (and, undoubtedly, hoped) that he will enter into submissive relations with the commanders or, more properly, the bearers of commandments, namely the Combined Forces personnel. And no wonder, for the personnel themselves have been trained according to the same principles. As Anthony Swofford writes, "The Marine Corps environment is one of cause and effect, the first pragmatic principle we learn as children. When red, the stove is hot."[60]

It is therefore significant that, as part of its remedial plan after Abu Ghraib, the independent panel chaired by James R. Schlesinger advocated using "more specialists for detention/interrogation operations." The only scientific personnel identified in this group are "behavioral scientists."[61] Here, perhaps, is the discursive link between U.S. policy, science, the torture at Abu Ghraib, and what can only be described as a mode of war.

Behaviorism is, of course, the science of an immediate relationship to one's environment, based on an analysis of human activity that bypasses the mental activity of symbolization and fantasy, or that conceives of it as merely "covert speech." It conceives of obedience before the law as conditioned response (read compliance), or as the mere avoidance of future pain. It is within this same report that we find the statement on ethics, cited above, which claims that "Criminals . . . 'consent' to the possibility of being captured, detained, interrogated, and possibly killed."[62]

The idea of consent allows one to render one's own satisfaction as the satisfaction of another. It is what lets the torturer enjoy the forced masturbation of the detainee: the perverse extension of war in the mode of love, and the surpassing of it as the deferral of sex. In this context, we can expect to hear a great deal about the enjoyment experienced by the torturer. We can expect something like what Swofford describes as the "torturer's smile . . . [which] says, 'I am enjoying this, I am enjoying every second of fucking you.' "[63] And of course, we find that in the photographs themselves. But we find it elsewhere as well.

Documents released by the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy, and re-released to the public by the ACLU, repeatedly mention American military personnel laughing while interrogating detainees. In April 2004, at the Forward Operating Base in Mahmudiya, marines used electric shock and hooding simply because the detainee repeatedly grabbed the bars of his cage. (Hooding is "standard operating procedure," but electric shock is strictly in violation of Geneva conventions.) The official inquiry report described the marines as laughing at their victims.[64] Laughter is also mentioned in the trial record of Corporal Scott A. Burton, of the 81mm Mortar Platoon, who was court-martialed for spraying the face of a man with a fire extinguisher in July 2004. The man was unarmed and unthreatening, and the witness testimony makes it appear that the corporal committed this act for fun.[65] Conscious of the aggressivity that could be communicated in and through laughter, and aware that it might be the sign of an attitude beyond the putative utilitarianism of the war on terror, the Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan actually issued a general order setting out standards for the treatment of detainees and prohibiting laughter, taunting, and the use of humiliation. It also prohibited the personal possession of photographic equipment on the grounds of any detainee facility.[66] In Iraq, however, the laughter continued. This laughter, far from mere nervous defensiveness, is precisely correlate with the extreme excessiveness of the detention operation itself. It is made possible by that very excessiveness, which precludes any arguments about the relationship between torture and interrogation methods, about means and ends.

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According to the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, only a third of the abuses committed by U.S. military personnel were committed in the course of interrogation.[67] Both Jones and Fay confirm that the majority of abuse was unrelated to intelligence gathering.[68] In fact, they reproduce the claim of the Abu Ghraib Detainee Assessment Board, which indicated that "85%–90% of the detainees were of no intelligence value."[69] This correlates with the report of the ICRC, which estimated that "between 70% and 90% of the persons deprived of their liberty in Iraq had been arrested by mistake."[70]

Torture in Iraq is therefore not about getting anything (and here we should bear in mind that old economic formula about war and the getting of women, labor, and resources, including intelligence). It is about enjoyment, seemingly divorced from desire. Not surprisingly, one soldier questioned about military intelligence procedures at Abu Ghraib remarked, quite simply, that the incidents made famous by the photographs from that institution showed "abuse for sport."[71] Sport is, of course, an amusement, an act of pleasure, but it is also a theatrical event, a play or a show. The oddity of sport is its simultaneous public nature and its lack of intrinsic meaning.[72] It is that which requires signification. This does not imply anarchy. Sport is always subject to rules. More important for our analysis, however, is the fact that sport is a kind of activity through which one may exercise force while championing the freedom of the other to be vanquished.

Something of this logic can be seen in the torture so aptly described by the sergeant whose interview remarks upon the sport of abuse at Abu Ghraib. In the torture meted out there, the bodies of the Iraqis are made to signify, but this signification is without metaphoricity. This is why, at Abu Ghraib, the literality of pornography and the immediacy of sport can be said to converge. The detainees are marked—and by various instruments. They are sometimes even written on with felt-tip marker. For example, some of the naked men were said to have been shackled together as punishment for having raped a younger inmate. The word "rapist" can be seen on the flesh of at least one man in the photographs posted on Salon.com, and this is also mentioned in the military reports.[73] Not all of the inscriptions are so immediately linked to events, however. Until the ICRC petitioned the U.S. Central Command in Doha (in May 2003), foreign detainees (presumably those from outside of Iraq) were given wristbands that read "terrorist." Thus "named," the detainees, or as the ICRC prefers to refer to them, "persons deprived of liberty," were treated accordingly, which meant they could be subject to extreme techniques of deprivation and interrogation (which the Bush government currently refers to as "alternative methods").[74]

Most commonly, such techniques include sleep and light deprivation,

isolation, and physical beatings. At Abu Ghraib, at least one mentally unstable detainee was sometimes smeared with fecal matter. Although apparently self-applied, this filth was nonetheless not removed by the guards, who, in fact, did urinate on many detainees. Treated like shit or waste and called shit or waste, they were made to wear it. The shit or waste is not a symbol of something else. It is shit. Thus were the victims of Abu Ghraib expelled from the world of meaning. Those terrorized by animals were similarly reduced to that status—not transformed through some mimetic magic, but forced through a grotesque theater to become what they were for their torturers: shit, animals, sexual deviants.

The expression "become what you are" is the formula Theodor Adorno adduced to describe the (deceiving) demands of mass culture. If Theweleit is correct, then we might discover a relationship between the form of torture at Abu Ghraib and the fact that it is photographed or, rather, from the manner in which it is photographed. In the photographs, the victim is the one who shows the torturer to be capable of producing an immediate effect. The victim becomes the one who can be made to obtain self-satisfaction (erection) without fantasizing—simply because he was commanded to do so. And this lack of fantasy is the externalization of the torturer's lack of fantasy. Everything is materialized as the visible in this scenario. The erections of the Iraqis show their putative satisfaction; the smiles of the soldiers show theirs. Desire has vanished here, or at least no one can acknowledge that another is standing in as the cause of his desire. We might update Swofford's remark and describe the torturers as those whose smile says, "Look at me! I am enjoying (not) fucking you." This "not fucking you" does not mean there is no sexual violence; it means that the sexual violence is, effectively, a form of killing, a repudiation of fantasy and indeed of the subjectivity that fantasy produces. Like all death, it is best apprehended photographically. That is why the forced masturbation of the Iraqis is related to the imaginary theater of necrophilia joked about by the troops who never even made it to Abu Ghraib. They are described by Christian Parenti, who "embedded" himself with U.S. troops in order to "see their counterinsurgency methods up close." Parenti evokes the living quarters of the men as a cliché of military masculinity: pornographic images adorn the walls, flags are displayed, and water bottles have been converted into spittoons for chewing-tobacco juice. He also cites a jovial wager among the men, an example of what he calls the "necrophiliac humor of imperial war-making": "How much money would it take for you to have sex with a male corpse at the fifty-yard line during the Super Bowl halftime show?"[75] Far from Abu Ghraib, it seems, the sexual fantasies of the military men seem incomplete without some sense of public display.

The wager imagines a fusion of sport and sexless sex, a relation with death that takes place for the camera.

The Abu Ghraib photographs are not the first such testimonies of torture. There is a lengthy genealogy that links photography to the practice of trophy hunting and that inserts the torture photograph into a genre that is perhaps best described as part forensic testimony, part travelogue. Historically, images of torture have often been used for didactic purposes (as was the case in Nazi Germany). Just as often they have been used as evidence of the torturer's accomplishment—whether as a form of bravado or as a means of incrimination. Sometimes, too, they are incorporated into pornographic publications, where they perform something like the function described above.[76] But even in this latter case, they tend, by and large, to be hidden. The only exception to this is when the torture photograph is incorporated into the apparatus of terror itself, to extend its reach by way of the circulation of images, so that images acquire something of the performative force on which all terror relies.

Seymour Hersh's story in the *New Yorker*, which first published the images, came about in the face of enormous efforts of suppression. It is also true that members of the military at Abu Ghraib who objected to the practices there were threatened if they revealed them. Yet the fact remains that the images were widely reproduced, that they served as screen savers on military computers, and that, in their very composition, they display themselves as such: that is to say, they give themselves to be seen. The question is, by whom? And what is the nature of this giving to be seen? At the very least, the expressions of the torturers in the photographs appear to be without fear of judgment. One might presume that this is because those imaged believed that the photographs would remain within the cloistered community of the coparticipants, or that the military authorities had approved of the activities and had thereby immunized them against censure. But I would like to suggest that they be read as evidence of a more profound, indeed, generalizing condition in which such judgment is presumed to be, if not absent, then entirely irrelevant to enjoyment. And I would like to suggest that this fact is correlate with the manner in which war is being waged, at least in Iraq, today.

Jacques Lacan's analysis of television offers a useful point of entry here, punctuated as it is by a kind of astonishment that those around him are not ashamed of their enjoyment.[77] While delivering his famous Seminar XVII, "The Other Side of Psychoanalysis" (after the 1968 student uprisings in Paris), he declares of his students, "Look at them enjoying!" Lacan was commenting on the student uprisings themselves and the obvious excitement that ran through them. What he means to say, as Jacques-Alain

Miller observes, is that there is no longer the presumption of an Other who can judge, and who judges within the structure of the gaze. The point of the gaze has become, in the era of television (or spectacle, in Debord's language), mere enjoyment.[78] Hence the television is harmonized with the "death of the gaze of God." Lacan tried to tell his students that there was actually shame after all, that there is a primal shame at being alive, and that the spectacle cannot ultimately eliminate this. For Miller, such an analysis no longer persuades. The era of reality television has annihilated it, transforming irrevocably the nature of subject formation.

Without the gaze that judges, the subject cannot come under the law of prohibition, cannot become a subject of desire, and cannot relate himself to a master signifier. The master signifier is the instrument by which an individual claims uniqueness, but if any signifier will do, the subject too will become just one of many, an interchangeable individual in mass society. Hence, Lacan's supposition of a link between this televisuality and the logics of capitalism: the violently enabling condition of liberal democratic politics.[79] This total substitutability is ideological fiction, of course, as much as it is a political ideal. It allows for the identification between people of disparate class positions — Wal-Mart workers and presidents, for example — and it obscures entirely the differential compensation of labor within a global economy. But it nonetheless has effects, and these effects are to be observed in the shameless self-exposure of both torturers at Abu Ghraib and participants in reality TV shows such as *Jackass*. The television is that from which a voice emerges, but where no individual is located.[80] Seen this way, it cannot be the site of a speaking subject, and we cannot imagine it (or we could not in Lacan's moment) speaking to us, by which I mean answering to an address. It cannot, therefore, stand in for the Other. And it cannot, correspondingly, function as the place of law — even though it can depict a world in which law and order obtain. This does not mean that we live in an era, television's era, where anything goes. On the contrary. What Miller proposes is that in the absence of an older, indeed "aristocratic" form of the master signifier, with its potential for elitism and repressive social organizational forms, we have reintroduced not shame but what he calls insecurity. And we have supplanted the imperfections of the master signifier and its discourse with a new authoritarianism and artificial mastery.[81] The fortuitous resonance between the language of insecurity and the politics of securitization is not accidental. Miller means, precisely, to invoke the contemporary milieu and the problematics of both neoliberal capitalism and the international regime of (in)security in which the war on terror is currently being waged.

Beyond Shame and Sexual Difference: War of the Worlds

At the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the ticker-tape parades in major U.S. cities announced the end of the Vietnam syndrome. The transformations wrought by the Gulf War, so remarked in the critical literature of the time, were conceived in terms of mediatization, the birth of real-time news coverage, and the awful loss of difference between the simulacrum of the video game and the actual battles fought from on high. It would be some years before the other transformations represented by that war would be felt, transformations registered in the fiction and the memoirs of the decade between the first Gulf War and September 11. Among them: the displacement of interstate war by the asymmetrical war between state and nonstate actors, the racialization of religious difference, and the displacement of sexual difference as the organizational principle operating at the juncture between war and not-war. We cannot say that these transformations are for the better or the worse, and one is loathe to feel nostalgic for an era of mastery. But these changes, many of them ambivalent, none of them total, are significant. Today, in addition to the monstrous cliché of raping and killing, we have on the one hand the lunatic instrumentality of reproductive violence, the mass rapes and forced impregnation of women in Bosnia and Darfur—in the interest of ethnic cleansing—and on the other, the spectacle of impotent enjoyment in others' humiliation and the parody of consent at Abu Ghraib. This is living death in an era that no longer believes in ghosts. Perhaps this is pure war—not total war, but pure war, in the age of television, when there is no longer a difference between the reality of television and reality TV, when everything is for show and it does not matter who is looking.

What is the political corollary to these psycho(anti)social developments? To answer that question requires that we recognize the degree to which war rendered as the abduction of women was itself a figure and a self-sustaining myth of patriarchy. The structuralist obsession with both kinship and Oedipality allowed the signifier to be conflated with the signified, the Other with the subject who stood in its place. If women have more often than not suffered the consequences of warfare (if not the suffering of war itself), and if they have often endured the fate of being treated as trophies, this does not make their acquisition the goal of war so much as it reveals that war, as the repudiation of exchange, is nothing but the organized pursuit of that for which one will not have to pay—through labor, resources, one's own expenditure. Today, we know that war is being waged not (only) for women, despite the promises to unveil Afghanistan, but for oil. Or rather, it is being waged to ensure U.S. control over the indebtedness that will afflict those other nations (mainly Europe and Japan) dependent

on oil for their economic well-being, nations that no longer owe fidelity to the United States for protection from a Soviet threat.[82]

Historically, wars conceived as (non)relations between patriarchal nations have been structured by sexual difference and infused with desire. This is because a nation always represents more than its actuality (the sum of its many citizens and noncitizen subjects) for the members of another nation, and hence for itself. Seen from without, a nation represents both a pastness and a futurity that fills out a space in relation to which the individuals of another nation will always be at least potentially lacking. In its most extreme forms, this relation can be figured as the possibility of being subjugated by another nation's law. So national or interstate conflicts will always be saturated with both fear and desire.

Now, we know that the current war on terror is no longer conceived as a war among comparable nations, or nation-states, though it must be played out on a geopolitical field wherein those categories still operate. It is, famously, an asymmetrical war waged between state and nonstate actors. Although the figure of the network has emerged to offer something like an analogy to the state-form, as that against which the state can oppose itself, the conception of terrorism currently operating in the American imaginary is that which conceives of the network as a multiplicity of discrete individuals. This is why so much emphasis can be put on the targeting of individual persons—bin Laden, Zarqawi, and so forth. Even if it is a mere ideological ruse (the war on terror cannot ultimately terminate itself, nor can it address the possibility of the self-reproduction of the network), the reduction of the opponent to a series of individuals alters profoundly the economy within which military engagement is undertaken. The terrorist, unlike the member of the national army, is not a representative of something else; he (and sometimes she) is simply defined as a person who attempts to terrorize Americans or their allies. The terrorist is represented as a person without a politics, which is to say, without that futurity that would be the product of social labor. As a figure, the terrorist is circumscribed by tautological literality, is simply one who brings about terror, an object-cause to be annihilated.

The terrorist incites fear but does not call forth fantasy (in Theweleit's sense); on the contrary, the desymbolization (what others might term the dehumanization) of the terrorist reduces the nonrelation with him to the question of destruction. It is a destruction that must be endured as the demand to become, quite simply, the externalization of the torturer's enjoyment. One wonders what might have happened if the United States and its Coalition of the Willing (the consenting allies) had dared to ask the question of what the other wanted, if, as Lacan says, we did not impose our mode of jouissance upon him. Would we be at war if it had been possible

to acknowledge that the other wanted something very different from what the United States wanted—politically, socially, or economically?

That question has been under erasure since September 11, 2001. It is possible that this foreclosure is a self-protective one, born of trauma. But if any of the foregoing is correct, then we would have to consider the possibility that the shamelessness of current policy and practice is not merely a mediatic phenomenon but, also, an active refusal to be shamed and hence a repudiation of any other discourse still structured by mastery. Official U.S. policy toward the International Criminal Court bespeaks such a repudiation. So too do the anxious discourses about the excesses of Islamic law. Indeed, the Western concern with the excessiveness of Islamic law expresses the flip side of the formula by which the United States believes itself to be sole bearer of international right; any other law is invalid by virtue of its extremity.

It may be that the resentful acknowledgment of another law, a law with consequences even for those who are not its subjects, acts as something of a barrier to what would otherwise have surely been an even greater and more conventionally sexualized violence in Iraq and Afghanistan—such as occurred in Vietnam. As made clear by the awful case of Abeer Qassim al-Janabi, a fourteen-year-old Iraqi girl from Mahmoudiya who was raped and murdered along with her family, the present war is not without its properly sexual violence. There are eruptions of an old patriarchal aspiration to defeat the enemy by possessing and violating his women (and thereby to dispossess him), despite the emerging and apparently common spectacles of humiliation and self-gratification that come with picturing oneself as the possessor of an absolute commandment, beyond judgment, beyond shame.

Surveying the file of corrupt imagery that goes by the name of Abu Ghraib, one is reminded of de Sade's tale of the hoarder masturbating in front of his piles of gold. Accumulation and the literalist's incapacity to conceive of money's symbolic function are on display in this scene. One gets a sense that what excited the perpetrators at Abu Ghraib was their own power: the power of a commandment by which another man can be made to gratify himself. The perpetrator is able to make this violation of another appear to be the source of that person's pleasure. He or she becomes the cause of another's enjoyment, and this status is the cause of his own. One can legitimately pose the question here of whether the abuse at Abu Ghraib can be thought not only as the logical extension of the brutality of "Shock and Awe," as Mark Danner argues, but also as the counterpart of a strategy that entails the distribution of candies to children in the hopes that they will embrace the soldiers as the source of their consumer pleasures (however paltry).[83] The point is to elicit consent for that

which has been done in any case. The solicitation of pleasure in children works to annul their fear or, rather, to mask their fear with a performance of enjoyment. Thus is the child's gratitude transmuted into consent for a continued violence, now represented as benevolence. The requirement that detainees masturbate, which calls on them to show themselves enjoying their subjugation, is certainly a much more extreme situation (although more than one suicide bomb has taken the scene of candy distribution as its point of intervention, thereby subjecting the children to a violence as awful as anything experienced in Abu Ghraib). The Schlesinger report's discourse of ethics, which renders the detainee a consenting participant in his or her own interrogation and violation, cannot be forgotten here; it is the ideological frame that weaves together these otherwise disparate moments. The suturing is possible, however, only because a racialized conception of religious alterity makes all Iraqis (by virtue of being in Iraq) at least suspected of harboring terrorists.

When considered in the context of mass detention (fifty thousand detainees in the first two years), the Schlesinger panel's statement about ethics can only be explained through reference to the logic of guilt by association, what the Bush administration has termed "harboring." Even when the well-intentioned members of the Senate acknowledge the need to release the mistakenly detained as quickly as possible, they tacitly embrace the notion that those in the place of terror must at least be scrutinized as its possible source. I have argued elsewhere that this logic is also that of hostage taking, indeed that it is the basis of an awful mirroring between terrorism and counterterrorism.[84] Here, I want to suggest—no doubt at great risk—that the abduction of ethics performed in the Schlesinger report is of a piece with the perversion of Abu Ghraib. For it gives itself to be seen in the confidence that the only gaze to which it submits itself is its own. Such is the terrifying predicament of an aspiring global authority in the era of reality TV. There is terror, but there is no fear of appearing to have been wrong.

It may be objected, after all that has been said here, that the changes I have observed in the form of war waged by the United States are not limited to U.S. war making. Perhaps, it will be objected, they can also be seen in the videotaping of executions, the mutilation of corpses, and in the sexually indifferent recruitment of suicide bombers by the opponents of the United States. Perhaps there is indeed shamelessness all the way around. In response to such an objection, I can say little by way of either agreement or dispute. But if it is true that these new techniques suggest such a tendency, then perhaps we will have to acknowledge that shamelessness has been turned back on us like the hijacked technology of another, earlier moment.

1. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Public Law 366, 109th Cong., 2nd sess. (17 October 2006). The new legislation is described as "an Act to authorize trial by military commission for violations of the law of war, and for other purposes." In section 948r (b), the act holds that a "statement obtained by use of torture shall not be admissible in a military commission under this chapter." The relevant parts for my purposes are those in section 950v: Crimes triable by military commissions, (b) Offenses (11)(A) Torture. This section of the act defines torture as "an act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (or the pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions . . . for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or any reason based on discrimination of any kind, shall be punished if death results to one or more of the victims" (70, lines 1–11). Paragraph 12, Cruel or Inhuman Treatment, (B) defines "serious physical pain or suffering" as "(I) a substantial risk of death; (II) extreme physical pain; (III) a burn of physical disfigurement of a serious nature (other than cuts, abrasions, or bruises); or (IV) significant loss of impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty" (71, lines 15–22). The act further prohibits murder, destruction of property in violation of the law of war, treachery and perfidy, improper use of a flag of truce, improper use of a distinctive emblem, the abuse of dead bodies, rape, and sexual assault or abuse. The latter includes not only contact between the abuser and the victim, but also the compulsion of sexual activity by the detained person (paragraph 22, 76, lines 3–7). Finally, the act includes "additional Prohibitions on Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment," and refers to the 1984 "United States Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment" (a document that expressed the U.S. intention to maintain its practice of capital punishment, among other things). The Military Commissions Act produces a category of torture dependent not only on the difficult assessment of what constitutes "severe pain" (and making permanent bodily damage the criterion for severity) but also demands that the intentionality of the torturer be determined as the basis for adjudicating the torture. It is notable that while the 1984 statement of U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings also emphasizes the intentionality of the torturer, it is more capacious in its understanding of torture as including the incitement of fear that one may experience pain, and not simply the requirement that pain be inflicted in order for torture to be conceived as having occurred. For the 1984 statement, as well as the text of the U.N. Convention itself, see www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm.

2. Michelle Brown, "'Setting the Conditions' for Abu Ghraib: The Prison Nation Abroad," *American Quarterly* 57 (September 2005): 973–97.

3. Pierre Clastres, *Archaeology of Violence*, trans. Jeanine Herman (1980; repr., New York: Semiotext(e), 1994), 143.

4. This is always the repressed issue in discussions about the legitimacy of torture, as Elaine Scarry makes clear. In an argument with Alan Dershowitz, who advocates torture on the basis of the hypothetical "ticking bomb" scenario, Scarry makes the urgent point that such scenarios presume an ironic omniscience on the part of the interrogators, who must know that the person being tortured knows something of intelligence value to legitimate the scenario. But this can

never be known for certain, and in the present war, as the case of 9/11 showed and the statistics of Abu Ghraib make clear, most people tortured do not possess the knowledge that the torture is supposed to elicit. See Scarry's article "Five Errors in the Reasoning of Alan Dershowitz," in *Torture*, ed. Sanford Levinson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 281–90.

5. I use the terms "nonwartime" and "not-war" to distinguish them from a more substantively positive conception of peace or peacetime. I take the latter category to imply something more than the absence of overtly militarized conflict (whether declared or not), but I also want to avoid an argument that suggests that war is the appropriate or only means to ensure peace. In this respect, not-war is to be understood in a series, ranging from war, not-not-war (which would include militarized or generalized conflict in the absence of formal declarations of hostilities), not-war, and peace. For a more thorough discussion of these ideas, please see my essay "Theses on the Questions of War: Media, History, Terror," *Social Text*, no. 72 (Fall 2002): 149–75 (special issue titled "911—A Public Emergency?").

6. They may also involve previously unimagined sexual intimacy with one's comrades. This intimacy may be mutual, and of a heterosexual or a homoerotic sort, but as the large number of reported incidents of sexual violence against women in the military in Iraq suggest, the liberated libido of the militarized zone may also (and often does) produce sexual violence against one's own. I nonetheless leave this issue to the side in this essay.

7. Let it be clear that I am not positing the aggressivity of relations with the other as exclusive to war. Nor am I positing some ideal form of peaceful mutuality as the normal condition of intimate relations outside of war. All relations with others entail some form of aggressivity.

8. Allen Feldman, "The Actuarial Gaze: From 9/11 to Abu Ghraib," *Cultural Studies* 19 (March 2005): 203–26; Nicholas Mirzoeff, "Invisible Empire: Visual Culture, Embodied Spectacle, and Abu Ghraib," *Radical History Review* 95 (2006): 21–44; Paul Virilio, *Desert Screen: War at the Speed of Light*, trans. Michael Degener (New York: Continuum, 2002); Samuel Weber, *Targets of Opportunity: On the Militarization of Thinking* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005).

9. I use "U.S.-Vietnam war" to distinguish this period of military conflict in Vietnam from the earlier but protracted struggle between anticolonial nationalism and French imperialism. A good history of the transformation of and continuities between these conflicts can be found in Marilyn Young's *The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991).

10. Some of the filmmakers clearly intended their work to contribute to this rehabilitation, but the question of intentionality is difficult to locate in cinematic productions, and in any case, the films circulated in ways that far exceeded the aims and objectives of any of the agents responsible for their making.

11. Jacques Rancière, *On the Shore of Politics*, trans. Liz Heron (New York: Verso, 1996); also Mirzoeff, "Invisible Empire," 23.

12. Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, "AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade" (declassified), issued 23 August 2004, 9–10, available at fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf. Cited hereafter as Fay report.

13. The category of war crimes receives its formal articulation in article 6 of the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal. For a discussion of the

difference between war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity, see Yoram Dinstein, "The Distinction between War Crimes and Crimes against Peace," in *War Crimes in International Law*, ed. Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), 1–18. War crimes are defined as "violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity."

14. The Titan Corporation is a primary contractor of interpreter and other intelligence support services to the U.S. military. According to the Center for Public Integrity, Titan Corporation has annual revenues of approximately $2 billion, with translation work for the U.S. military being its largest single source of income (6 percent of total). Under a $412 million contract, it has more than 4,400 linguists in Iraq. At least two of its employees were identified in the Taguba, Fay, and Jones reports as having participated in the violation of detainees at Abu Ghraib. One of the cases involved rape. The Fay report, in particular, remarked the lack of standards for screening and training Titan personnel for the work of interrogation. Information on Titan obtained from www.publicintegrity.org/bio .aspx?act+pro&ddlC=159 (accessed 21 September 2006), and from www.titan .com.

15. Fay report, 15.

16. Fay report, referencing AR 190-8, paragraph 1-5(a)(2) and (3), 15.

17. "Executive Summary: Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib," issued 23 August 2004, available at fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/ hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf.

18. James R. Schlesinger (chairman), "Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations," issued August 2004, 5, available at www .informationclearinghouse.info/article6785.htm (hereafter referred to as the "Independent Report.").

19. Ibid.

20. Fay report, 9.

21. "Independent Report," 11.

22. See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq during Arrest, Internment, and Interrogation," issued 24 February, available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/icrc_ report_iraq_feb2004.htm. One of the most disturbing instances in the report is the description of a detainee who was deemed of intelligence value and who was shot during a confrontation in the prison. After being taken to hospital for treatment of his wounds, he was returned, wearing a catheter but no bag. Though reported on by junior officers, with some concern, more senior members of the staff at Abu Ghraib refused to address this profound lack of medical care, with its attendant humiliations and the extreme risks for postoperative infection that it created.

23. Brown, "Setting the Conditions."

24. "Independent Report," appendix H, 1.

25. Significantly, George Bush's memo of 7 February 2003, outlining the

legal principles of the war on terror as it applies to the detainees, "accepts" the judgment of the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense that neither article 3 nor article 4 applies to Al Qaeda or the Taliban. Neither prisoners of war nor civilians, they came to be classified as "Enemy Combatants" or "Unprivileged Belligerents" (the ICRC's term), legal outlaws for whom humane treatment is extended merely as an act of American presidential beneficence. The memorandum is presented in appendix C of the "Independent Report."

26. Scarry, "Five Errors."

27. Accordingly, Lacan goes so far as to argue that "orgasm is in itself anxiety." Jacques Lacan, "Introduction to the Names of the Father Seminar," in *Television*, trans. Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss, and Annette Michelson, ed. Joan Copjec (1963; repr., New York: Norton, 1990), 86.

28. Lacan, *Television*, 32.

29. Ibid., 32–33.

30. Slavoj Žižek, *Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality* (New York: Verso, 1994).

31. J. M. Coetzee, *Disgrace* (New York: Vintage, 2000).

32. It is interesting to note that the French translators made the same decision. In French the book is titled *Le chagrin de la guerre*. I am grateful to Jason Picard for undertaking the research on this history of titling and translation, and also for the translation between Vietnamese and English.

33. Lacan asks, "Why couldn't the family, society itself, be creations built from repression? They're nothing less" (*Television*, 28).

34. I mean to use the term *infantile* in relation to what I believe is a kind of postsexual but also presexual violence, in its Freudian sense. Freud's early acknowledgment that there is a sadistic or violent element in the sexual instinct appeared first in the 1905 *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (reprinted in vol. 7 of *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey, Anna Freud, Carrie Lee Rothgeb, and Angela Richards [London: Hogarth, 1953–74]) and was followed by a recognition that the ego could itself become an object of such violence. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), this idea is extended and explicated such that sadism comes to be thought of as that which has to be ejected from the ego and attenuated in order for maturity and for sexual relations with an other to become possible. When this does not occur, Freud says, there is an "admixture of love and hate in erotic life." The point I am trying to make here is that this sadism, if it has been subject to any mitigation in the course of socialization, is nonetheless being resuscitated in a context that precludes the other from the category of the human/sexual other. The dehumanization that has characterized Abu Ghraib and the war in Iraq more generally has ensured the return to an infantile state where "erotic mastery coincides with [the] object's destruction." See *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, trans. James Strachey, vol. 18 of the *Standard Edition*, 53–54.

35. This is not the place to argue the degree to which all anthropology remains indebted to structuralism, however historicist or poststructural it has become. I nonetheless believe that the ghost of structuralist analysis continues to possess the discipline of anthropology with considerable force.

36. Claude Lévi-Strauss, "Guerre et commerce chez les Indiens de L'Amérique du Sud," *Renaissance* 1 (1943): 122–39; also Lévi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, trans. James Harle Bell and John Richard von Sturmer, ed. Rodney Needham (1967; repr., New York: Beacon, 1969).

37. Clastres, *Archaeology of Violence*. Clastres's position is something of a departure from both Lévi-Straussian and Sahlinsian models of the relationship between war, women, and exchange. Essentially, he inverts the relationship such that war is not resolved through the acquisition of women in marriage but is the effort to do so without surrendering anything.

38. The finest critique of the structuralist argument about the exchange of women is that proffered by Gayle Rubin in "The Traffic in Women: Notes toward a 'Political Economy' of Sex," in *Woman, Culture, and Society*, ed. Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974), 57–210.

39. The locus classicus for the analysis of such imperial economies is Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's essay "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Cultures*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana-Champagne: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313.

40. Simone Weil, "The Iliad, or the Poem of Force," in *War and the Iliad*, trans. Mary McCarthy, introduction by Christopher Benfey (1945; repr., New York: New York Review Books, 2005), 4.

41. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking, 1977), 61.

42. Freud's statement that "the organism shall follow its own path to death" appears in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, 39.

43. According to a major study published in the *Lancet*, the conflict in Iraq had, by the end of 2006, caused an estimated total of 654,695 deaths, 601,027 of which have been due to violence. The authors are "95% certain that the correct number [of people suffering violent deaths] is between" 426,369 and 793,663; "601,027, is the statistically most probable number" (11). The remaining deaths attributed to the conflict are thought to be a result of deteriorating health services. The report also states that 31 percent of the violent deaths are directly attributable to Coalition activity, 24 percent to other sources (locally originating crime), but 45 percent remains unattributable in terms of immediate causation (8). See Gilbert Burnham, Shannon Doocy, Elizabeth Dzeng, Riyadh Lafta, and Les Roberts (principal authors), "The Human Cost of War in Iraq: A Mortality Study, 2002–2006" (Baltimore, MD: Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University; Baghdad: School of Medicine, Al Mustansiriya University; and Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, MIT, 2006), also referred to as the *Lancet* study.

44. Juliet Flower MacCannell, "More Thoughts for the Times on War and Death: The Discourse of Capitalism in Seminar XVII," in *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis: Reflections on Seminar XVII*, ed. Justin Clemens and Russell Grigg (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 212.

45. This structure of politics is not unique to the United States; it characterizes all politics in the televisual era. For a study of its operations in another context, see my "Intimacy and Corruption in Thailand's Age of Transparency," in *Off Stage, on Display: Intimacy and Ethnography in the Age of Public Culture*, ed. Andrew Shryock (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 225–43.

46. MacCannell, "More Thoughts," 211.

47. Anthony Swofford, *Jarhead: A Marine's Chronicle of the Gulf War and Other Battles* (New York: Scribner, 2003), 239.

48. Swofford, *Jarhead*, 139.

49. Klaus Theweleit, *Male Fantasies*, vol. 2, *Psychoanalyzing the White Terror*, trans. Erica Carter and Chris Turner, with Stephen Conway (1978; repr., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 303; emphasis added.

50. Anson Rabinbach and Jessica Benjamin, "Foreword" to Theweleit, *Male Fantasies*, 2:xii–xiii.

51. Žižek, *Metastases*, 73.

52. Žižek, *Metastases*, 75. Žižek provides "other words" or, rather, an example of what he means by this splitting between fascination and repulsion at enjoyment: "because his yearning to rescue the woman from her torturer is hindered by the implicit knowledge that the victim is *enjoying* her suffering." Typically, Žižek tends to structure his arguments by invoking historical reality and then using an example from Hollywood cinema from which to draw the paradigmatic instance for his analysis. Hence, in *Metastases of Enjoyment* he moves from Bosnia to Hitchcock's *Notorious* and *Rear Window*, extending the detour through Poe's "The Purloined Letter" and Howard Hawks's *The Big Sleep*, not to mention Fritz Lang's *Scarlet Street*, before coming back to Freud. At this point, he substitutes Freud's famous formula, "A child is being beaten," with "A woman is being tortured-coited." Here one wants to say of Žižek's analysis what Lacan ultimately said of Freud's reading of the Oedipal myth, namely that it is Žižek's dream, or rather, that Žižek is merely speaking the dream of American patriarchy in his analysis of the fantasy of another's torture.

53. In this respect, I take some distance from Mirzoeff, who reads the sodomitic emphasis at Abu Ghraib as evidence that the torturers desired (consciously and unconsciously) to establish and maintain their imperial heterosexual masculinity, projecting that which they imagined as their other. My point here is that the crucial innovation of Abu Ghraib is the demand for a performance of self-violation in the mode of coerced consent.

54. The soldiers charged were Jeremy Sivits, Ivan Frederick, Charles A. Graner, Javal Davis, Lynndie England, Sabrina Harman, and Meghan Ambuhl.

55. The photographs of the women appeared in the dossier published by Salon.com under the heading "The Abu Ghraib Files." Photographs of women are also mentioned in the interview notes listed as "Questions for MI BN CDR/BN S-3/COCDR/1SG," army documents released by the U.S. government on 15 July 2005, file no. DoD 01864-5. See action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/091505/18597.pdf (accessed 27 February 2007).

56. I use the terms *torturer* and *torture* despite the ongoing dispute about the applicability of those terms in legal circles. The ICRC report refers to the activities of Abu Ghraib as "tantamount to torture." The internal military investigative reports of Fay and Jones refer to the activities as in violation of the laws of war and as criminality. Without claiming that the semantics of the term *torture* are irrelevant, I nonetheless refuse to accede to the linguistic evasions by which the acts committed against some detainees of Abu Ghraib are made immune to international law and evacuated of their full, intentional violence.

57. The nudity and forced wearing of female undergarments are repeatedly referenced in the ICRC report. But see, especially, sections 3.1:25; 3.2:27. They also are referenced in the Taguba report. Significantly, the majority of violations cited by Taguba (eleven of thirteen) include reference to nudity. The Taguba report does not indicate any substantiated reports of a threat of rape to male prisoners, and only one of the eight instances of abuse deemed credible but not substanti-

ated entailed such threat. The latter cases did, however, include actual sodomizing (with a chemical light and a broomstick). In other words, actual sexual violence was far more common than threatened sexual abuse. See Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, "Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade: U.S. Army Report on Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners," issued 5 May 2004, 16–17, www.dod .mil/pubs/foi/detainees/taguba.

58. Fay report, 10. In September 2006, in response to the exposures at Abu Ghraib, the U.S. military issued a revised *Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations* (FM 2-22.3). The new manual precludes nudity, beatings, sexual humiliation, threatenings by dogs, and other brutalities familiar from Abu Ghraib.

59. This does not mean that there is no sexual abuse or rape of women in Iraq. On the contrary. Sexual crimes against women are both common and have increased in the vacuum of law and order that was produced by the destruction of the Iraqi civil apparatus and the police machinery of Saddam Hussein's regime. In his account of the failed effort to install "freedom" in Iraq, Christian Parenti, who has traveled repeatedly to Iraq and met with representatives from all sides of the conflict, including members of the Organization for Women's Freedom, describes the common and commonly known "misery gangs," which roam the unelectrified streets of Baghdad and other cities, kidnapping and perpetrating extreme violence against girls and women. He also notes the practice of honor killings, which sometimes follow, as the brutal and ironic effort to eliminate the shame of such incidents through the execution of the wounded woman. See Christian Parenti, *The Freedom: Shadows and Hallucinations in Occupied Iraq* (New York: New Press, 2004), 23. In this essay, however, I focus on the particular structures of institutionalized military interrogation rather than the general problem of violence against women.

60. Swofford, *Jarhead*, 60.

61. "Independent Report," 90. The report also calls for more linguists, interrogators, human intelligence, counterintelligence, and corrections police.

62. "Independent Report," appendix H, 1.

63. Swofford, *Jarhead*, 86.

64. "Second Endorsement of [redacted] Preliminary Inquiry 5812 S-1/XO," memo from commanding general, 1st Marine Division (Rein), to commanding officer, 2nd Marines; subject: Preliminary Inquiry into the Alleged Incident of Abuse of a Detainee by Members of the Detention Facility Guard Force on 13 April 2004 at FOB Mahmudiya, Department of Defense and Department of Navy documents released on 15 June 2006, file no. 1293-1349. See www.aclu .org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/july_docs/USMC%201ST%20MARDIV%2021% 20-%208.pdf (accessed 27 February 2007).

65. *US v. Burton — Court Martial Records of Scott A. Burton*, Department of Defense and Department of Navy documents released on 15 June 2006, file no. 2578-2727. See www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/july_docs/ (I)%20US%20v.%20BURTON.pdf (accessed 27 February 2007).

66. General Order No. 2, "Detainee Procedures in Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A)," signed by David W. Barno, lt. gen., USA commanding, Department of Defense and Department of Navy documents released on 15 June 2006, file no. 2209-2212. See www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/ july_docs/(C)%20GENERAL%20ORDER%20NUMBER%202%20(GO-2)%

20DETIANEE%20PROCEDURES%20IN%20COM.pdf (accessed 27 February 2007).

67. "Independent Report," 13.

68. Lt. Gen. Anthony R. Jones, "AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade," report issued 23 August 2004, 5, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nationi/documents/fay_report_8-25-04.pdf.

69. Fay report, 37, 39.

70. ICRC, "Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross," sec. 1:7.

71. "Questions for MI BN CDR/BN S-3/ COCDR/1SG," army documents released on 15 July 2005, file no. DOD 01864-5. See action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/091505/18597.pdf (accessed 27 February 2007). The possibility that the torture was "just for the fun of it" is also mentioned in the "Independent Report," 13.

72. By "meaningless," I do not mean to imply that it cannot be signified. Precisely because it is intrinsically meaningless, sport can be made to signify anything—from interregional competition to anti-imperial sentiment.

73. This event is also referenced in Antonio Taguba's report on the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca. See Taguba, "Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Bridage," 16.

74. ICRC, "Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross," sec. 3.4, 33.

75. Parenti, *Freedom*, 122.

76. The most recent merging of these genres can be seen in Quentin Tarantino's 2005 film *Hostel*, which attempted (largely without success, it appears) to redeem torture for pure scopophilia. Unlike the comic book antics of *Kill Bill*, *Hostel* gives us "the real" of torture for a literal-minded excitation in the face of pain.

77. Jacques-Alain Miller, "On Shame," in *Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis: Reflections on Seminar XVII*, ed. Justin Clemens and Russell Grig (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 11–28.

78. Miller, "On Shame," 15–16.

79. In *Television*, Lacan makes the following extraordinary remark: "Back to zero, then, for the issue of sex, since anyway capitalism, that was its starting point: getting rid of sex" (30).

80. Lacan, *Television*, 27.

81. Miller, "On Shame," 26.

82. Peter Gowan, *The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for Global Dominance* (New York: Verso, 1999), 9; also, Parenti, *Freedom*, 54.

83. Mark Danner, *Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror* (New York: New York Review Books, 2004).

84. On the logic of hostage taking in the mediatic treatment of the 1991 Gulf War and the Iraq war, see my "Images of Untranslatability in the U.S. War on Terror," *Interventions* 6 (2004): 401–23, esp. 414.

From Warfare State to "Shadow State"

MILITARISM, ECONOMIC DEPLETION, AND RECONSTRUCTION

From the Permanent War Economy to Perpetual Interventionism

Jonathan Michael Feldman

Lying behind the seemingly endless cycle of military interventions, massively distorted budget priorities, and the erosion of peaceful diplomacy in the postwar era is the permanent war economy and a group of war-making institutions. In the permanent war economy the state's military welfare and subsidy has helped make millions of people economically dependent on war. Most high-tech managers at military behemoths like Lockheed-Martin, like a great many American foot soldiers from the "working poor" trapped in Baghdad, see few options beyond military capital. The war-making institutions, led by the Pentagon and private military contractors, have come to promote military approaches to foreign policy between wars.

Postwar militarism in the United States has long been associated with a concentration of power in the executive branch and infringements on civil liberties. Simultaneously, the growth of military state capitalism has helped erode the welfare state and sustainable industrial development. Concentrated corporate and military power used to promote laissez-faire policies and militarism, together with managerial incompetence, have led in recent years to a Bush White House and an American state that often resembles a fifth column. The state becomes a planning mechanism for outsourcing and military spending rather than sustainable energy and transportation systems. Both transnational corporations and the warfare state benefit from relatively weak, submissive trade unions (at home and abroad), marginalization of oppositional forces, underinvestment in nonmilitary public goods, and the opening of foreign outposts. This neo-colonial system benefits from and promotes easy access to oil and other strategic resources, inexpensive or repressed labor, and free trade. When global elites purchase political services from our leaders in exchange for adopting militarist and free-trade policies, the political capital for disarmament and workers' power is further depleted.

The U.S. war economy represents a vast engine of accumulation, with military spectacles building media power (war as advertising), political power (war mongering banked as votes), and economic power (war as both product and service). Where "new social movements" petition the state, the military machine sells weapons worth billions of dollars. These products have little use value for the larger society. The citizen's claim on the state is a single ballot. The military's claim is gigantic war contracts that help make (or unmake) entire cities.[1]

While peace movements and political reformers aim to stop the latest intervention or weapons system, the underlying structures propelling these endure. The U.S. midterm elections of November 2006 sent a strong antiwar message, resulting in the dismissal of defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, but in some ways this only shifted the composition of the coalition of warfare-state managers led by the president, Congress, and the Pentagon.[2] Defense secretaries come and go, but this political directorate manages a military accumulation system that still involves hundreds of billions of dollars despite the end of the Cold War and the much vaunted "revolution in military affairs." This revolution has simply automated the military, replacing labor with capital and substituting payments to engineers and military contractors for soldiers' pay.

Impressed by the power of the Pentagon, some "progressives" have advocated a coalition linking militarism, "cosmopolitanism," and humanitarian intervention in places like Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.[3] In contrast, a number of antiwar scholars and political leaders who lived through the 1930s and 1940s recognized the costs and dangers of using Pentagon Power and postwar imperialism even as they questioned the Soviet model. These thinkers realized that a permanent war economy and militarized foreign policy were sustained by planning during World War II and its aftermath. As former vice president Henry Wallace warned in 1948, America's addiction to a war economy created conditions that would be immensely difficult to overcome:

> Fear—hysterical fear—stalks our land. It haunts the towers of New York and sweeps through the fields of Kansas. In London, Paris, Rome, and Moscow men are afraid. Millions of men are afraid with a fear that has been communicated to them by their own leaders.
>
> Nor is it a blind or groundless fear. It is not vague. Men are afraid of losing their jobs, their freedoms, their homes and farms, and, in the course of projected events, their lives.
>
> They face a clear and present danger. They have a clear and present reason to fear. For as long as their leaders go on communicating fear among each other and abroad in the world, these millions are drawn closer and closer to the whirlpool of depression and war.[4]

Jonathan Michael Feldman

Wallace's words speak eloquently to the present era haunted by the politics of fear and a permanent war on terror. Such critics of militarism developed a political discourse whose scope matched the full extent of Pentagon power.

Attempts to create a winning politics out of this discourse have been fraught with difficulty. At the national level, candidates pushing for demilitarization have rarely gained office. Critics of militarism like Wallace nevertheless believed that change was possible by highlighting the economic limits of the system. He recognized not only the dangers of the warfare state but also those he associated with the growth of an anarchic global trading system. These allied forces, Wallace argued, led to the erosion of domestic employment and the dollar's value as well as the ability of citizens, workers, and consumers outside of the dominant class to maintain their civil rights and extend their political capital. Wallace was part of a group of reconstructionist thinkers who recognized that the problems of war and peace extend well beyond the particulars of any single conflict. This group also included academics Robert S. Lynd, C. Wright Mills, and Seymour Melman. As "utopian realists," they sought alternatives to both the permanent war economy and the unregulated, free-market capitalism led by unaccountable economic elites. Some of these thinkers believed that militarism could even lead to fascism and economic depression. I will argue that while there are limits to such arguments, they also show how the persistent contradictions generated by militarism (and an interconnected system of globalization) nevertheless support the presumption that the war machine is "contingent." To overcome both the political barriers to disarmament and the economic costs of militarism requires social and political innovations foreshadowed by these earlier critics. The movement cannot begin and end in electoral politics. Drawing on the utopian thinking of the reconstructionists, I call for the development of an alternative network, a "shadow state" that would operate inside and outside established party structures.

Ironically, the ways in which military power has been accumulated in the warfare state can teach us something about the ways in which alternatives can be built and reconstruction can be planned for. Military power in all its forms is subject to cyclical upswings and downswings and is therefore limited. The original critics of militarism believed that each form of power supporting militarism is nevertheless contingent; militarist accumulation can be reversed as this corrosive system undermines its own ability to sustain itself. True *reconstruction* is a process that changes economic and state structures, puts them under more direct popular control, and involves disarmament and economic democracy.[5]

World War II and the period shortly thereafter became a turning point for the U.S. permanent war economy.[6] At this crucial juncture, militarism and corporate capitalism were fully joined by the advent of military-state capitalism and the creation of specialized defense contractors highly dependent on government contracts. These contractors included large corporations and universities and involved labor unions organized at these corporations. The five-year mobilization during World War II "transformed the relationship of government and the defense industry and created the symbiotic partnership that exists today."[7] A strategic alliance then emerged among large corporations, military interests in the state, Congress, and other key actors; it was called "military corporatism" by some and "the military industrial complex" by others.[8] The system integrated and extended diverse forms of power: "the military-industrial complex was and is a complex of financial, political, military, human, and media capital."[9]

During the 1960s the U.S. permanent war economy was further consolidated. Seymour Melman argued that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, "under the direction of President John Kennedy, organized a formal central-management office to administer the military-industrial empire." In place of the "loose collaboration formed mainly through market relations, of senior military officers, industrial managers, and legislators," there now arose "a defined managerial-hierarchical control center" regulating "tens of thousands of subordinate managers." In this form of state capitalism, the "government *is* business," and the Pentagon becomes the top management that regulates the "submanagement" of individual military corporations.[10] Despite the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military economy lives on.

Prior to World War II, important capitalists were critical of militarism: "Some of the most prominent businessmen, such as Andrew Carnegie and Henry Ford, were commercial pacifists who believed that the salvation of mankind lay in trade expansion." In fact, "the choice for America, as they saw it, was between industrial progress and militarism, and the latter they equated with waste." For their part, military professionals viewed businessmen as constituting "a money-grubbing leisure class."[11] Up to 1941, splits within the state helped undermine an earlier corporate alliance with military interests: "memories of Congressional attacks on World War I munitions makers still were crisp enough" in 1941 "to give war profiteering a bad name." After the Pearl Harbor bombing on 7 December 1941 and America's entry into World War II, criticism of military-industry

coordination necessarily became muted and corporate commitments to the domestic warfare state strengthened.[12]

President Franklin D. Roosevelt turned to the business world because he needed its industrial might and political capital for the war. Many companies were hesitant about entering the military market during the war because they feared postwar downswings. But the continuing cycle of military contracts after the war maintained and guaranteed the military market. Cost-plus contracts gave defense firms a guaranteed profit rate, and follow-on programs tied military agencies to successive models of related military equipment. As World War II drew to a close, some argued that the war economy did not simply stabilize markets for future defense contractors. Rather, a militarized economy could be used to rationalize the macroeconomic system as a whole. In February 1944, Walter J. Oakes wrote a seminal essay, "Toward a Permanent War Economy?" in which he argued that the capitalist system would be unable to survive "another siege of unemployment comparable to 1930–1940." As a result, he described how the American public was being prepared before the war's end "to recognize as a legitimate economic activity *peacetime* expenditures for war of a sizable nature."[13]

As various constituency groups became co-opted and conscripted by the warfare state, a small group of critical voices outlined the dangers and potential alternatives. This group analyzed how the warfare state accumulated power and planned for alternatives to militarism. Three core arguments addressed by this group—the economic opportunity costs of militarism, militarism's threats to democracy, and the necessity and utility of democratic planning and institution building as alternatives—help explain the contingent nature of militarism. Yet, with very few exceptions, this reconstructionist discourse has largely been buried, forgotten if not ignored.

The military economic system that emerged from the war helped cement labor interests to militarism. As Harry Magdoff, the noted critic of imperialism, observed firsthand, despite wartime wage and price controls, defense contractors were able to overcome these limits. Cost-plus contracting on weapons systems with no fixed price tag allowed defense firms to increase their profits by producing more and boosting their costs. Many firms also freely used overtime and weekend work to raise production levels, practices that increased their profits and in the meantime lifted the income of their employees. The U.S. government turned a blind eye, since the exigencies of the war created strong incentives to maximize production.[14] For the first time, there was a U.S. working class with savings. Conversion to nonmilitary production was thus seen by many unions as leading to a return to lower wages. Nor did the aggressive pursuit of the

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Cold War with the Soviet Union represent any serious conflict with the long-term alliance of most labor unions with the Democratic Party.[15] During the 1950s, the labor union became "the defender of the *status quo*," and management secured advantages over labor by introducing "new plants, new processes, new organizational structures for which there was no body of traditional management or union practice."[16]

The growing links between militarism and imperialism rapidly became apparent. During the period from 1939 to 1945, members of the State Department and the Council for Foreign Relations met to plan for a post-war world that they knew would place the United States in a position of global dominance. Their successors developed "a concept known as Grand Area Planning," a plan to keep the world "open to investment, open to the repatriation of profits" and "domination by the United States."[17] In 1943 and 1944, the social critic Daniel Bell noted that business planners wanted to establish a "permanent war economy" to support "far-flung expansionism." Big business planned to take over government war plants for free after the war and "to suspend anti-trust laws and allocate materials so new competitors could not enter the market." The new "monopolized order was part of a program to create what Henry Luce called the 'American Century,' a new imperialism" backed by "a worldwide network of military bases and supply lines." Bell believed that the war was not simply an "inter-imperialist conflict," but "rather, in some way capital had usurped labor's war."[18] United States economic power contributed to its military might, which was then used to promote international expansion through trade, neocolonialism, and policing the international system against regimes that failed to "fall into line."[19]

At home in the United States, the extension of economic power in the hands of large corporations through arms contracts, and the marginalization of other groups like labor, also led to fears that the alliance among the state, corporations, and militarists would compromise democracy. Robert S. Lynd, at one point the leading American sociologist and a professor at Columbia University, pointed to the political choices faced by the country. During World War II, Lynd warned that the absence of democratic processes in fighting could lead to authoritarianism:

> The thing we do not realize, or are prevented from realizing, is that we are building the structure and accompanying animus of the post-war world by the manner in which we fight the war. The already half-accepted formula that "You can't fight *this* war democratically" is both factually incorrect and a one-way ticket to American fascism. If democracy is suspended now, it will not reappear at the peace conference. If during the war we avoid the development of genuine democratic organization and participation, if we curtail the partial organization of labor we now have instead of moving

forward to its thoroughgoing democratic extension, we can know for certain fact that democratic people's organizations will be similarly frustrated after the war. Both during the war and after, the issue is identical: Who controls, and to what ends?[20]

Lynd summarized the Faustian bargain represented by Roosevelt's alliance with corporate interests to further the military effort.

The critics of the emerging U.S. military industrial complex also warned about its economic dangers. Although World War II helped end the Great Depression, some politicians were convinced that militarism itself could create its own economic costs. Henry Wallace was part of a larger circle around President Roosevelt, including Secretary of State Hull, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, Secretary of War Stimson, and their top assistants, who "shared the belief that the economic policies followed by the major trading nations after World War I had led directly to the global depression of the 1930's, and then to the Second World War."[21] The economic instability of the business cycle, the opposite of planning, represented a "danger to peace" and "essential freedoms." Wallace believed that increasingly "the American people will question a program of imperialism and heavy armament as the true road to peace, prosperity and freedom."[22]

Wallace explained the opportunity costs of militarism during his third-party presidential campaign in 1948, the same year his book *Toward World Peace* was published. Wallace wrote: "too much of the American housewife's dollar is buying guns — guns of war, guns of diplomacy and power politics, guns of social and economic strife."[23] Wallace argued that America could avoid depression and depressed living standards by pursuing a less militarized foreign policy. "Our peace and prosperity program must be worked out in . . . more far-reaching policy terms than the big-armament, inevitable-war program which is now being followed so enthusiastically by those whom the press has deluded."[24] While militarism placed limits on the public welfare, it helped enrich large corporations. During World War II, "some $175 billion worth of prime contracts — the keys to control of the nation's means of production — were given to private corporations. Naturally enough, two-thirds went to the top one hundred corporations — in fact, almost one-third were to ten private corporations."[25]

This concentration of economic and political power was enhanced by a political and media campaign of fear. As Henry Wallace and later W. E. B. DuBois observed, fear campaigns were used to suppress the welfare state in support of the warfare state.[26] In order to justify sizable peacetime military expenditures before the public at large, the political directorate of the warfare state turned to the power of the media to promote

a politics of fear. In *The Power Elite*, C. Wright Mills had warned about the power of the military propaganda machine. Warlords had developed "a large-scale and intensive public-relations program," spending "millions of dollars," employing "thousands of skilled publicists, in and out of uniform." These fear campaigns were tied to lobbying efforts aimed at Congress that increased "the prestige of the military establishment" and helped ready "the public for the advent of war."[27] Militarist interests made use of the Pearl Harbor crisis and the wave of popular patriotism that followed. The Cold War saw a further militarist accumulation of media capital. The 9/11 crisis, which the neoconservatives claimed was "another Pearl Harbor," followed this all-too-familiar pattern.

The Long-Term Costs of Militarism, Managerial Capitalism, and Parasitic Globalization

The Keynesian boost from the war and the subsequent postwar boom meant that the reconstructionists' nightmare scenario did not come to pass. Nevertheless, the instability that these critics of militarism had feared showed up in other ways, through an economic crisis associated with the global economy. Militarism (and other institutional factors related to corporate governance, short-term-oriented rentier capitalism, and incompetence in the industrial system) weakened the American economy's ability to respond to new international competition. The industrial systems of Japan and later China emerged as a serious challenge, as did the larger problem of overproduction.

During the Cold War, there was no proactive civilian planning of the kind favored by the reconstructionists. The absence of such planning and a depression partly reflected the economic realities of U.S. economic hegemony. After 1945, the United States was the dominant economy and the center of the world's production system. The United States accounted for about half of world GNP and so took a "free-trade approach." It helped to create the free-trade system as a substitute for "nationalist protectionism."[28] During "the first several decades after 1945, most foreign nations took it for granted that major inventions and discoveries would come from the United States."[29]

Cold War military procurement rescued U.S. aircraft firms, and federal programs spurred Fordist production and consumption.[30] This military Keynesianism did not encourage economic conversion to non-military production but developed into a Cold War industrial policy in which the Pentagon subsidized aerospace production and other high-technology industries. During the Cold War, the aerospace, electronics,

communications, and computer industries retained strong links to military procurement and subsidy.[31] Government programs also encouraged Fordist consumption, helping build a mass consumer market for the automobile and suburban home ownership. This automotive industrial complex was built on the interstate highway system, oil interests, and various prime contractors and their suppliers, supporting blue-collar trade unions and ancillary economic sectors like steel and rubber. State policies to promote the consumption of these commodities proved critical to sustaining the postwar boom and the successful conversion of key sectors. Yet the emergent dependency on automobiles and oil would later encourage wars designed to secure critical natural resources.

The economic hegemony of the United States after World War II was sustained in part by its superior trading and manufacturing system. These allowed for steadily increasing (albeit competing) welfare and warfare states. But the ability and commitment to sustain the welfare state and employment began to erode. U.S.-based corporations used their management rights to pursue foreign markets. The existence of protected home markets not yet challenged by superior production systems and competitive models from abroad initially allowed U.S. firms to neglect production efficiencies and product choices that would have made them more competitive. So in the United States, auto firms used their rights to develop gas-guzzling and fuel-inefficient cars that later were displaced by far more fuel-efficient foreign models.[32] While "the United States supplied half the world's gross product" in 1950, by 2003 the country supplied only 21 percent. In 1950, the United States supplied 60 percent of global manufacturing production, but only 25 percent in 1999.[33] Some of the roots of the problem could be seen as early as the 1930s, when rentier capitalism was already leading to the abandonment of domestic markets.[34] In the postwar era, the competitive hegemony and market dominance of U.S. firms may have given the American economy a reprieve. But the combined, depleting effects of militarism and managerial capitalism left many U.S. firms unable to meet the new competition from Asia and Western Europe.

Despite the benefits of transnational linkages to international labor, research networks, and consumer markets, many U.S.-rooted producers and workers are losing in the global game. As more and more productive economic activity is abandoned at home, the most important sources of growth are tied to unsustainable and parasitic parts of the economy like massive public and private debt and military spending.[35] The result is parasitic globalization in which global links are used to decrease employment, to limit workers' power, and to eliminate domestic suppliers. In the past year or so, China has overtaken the United States as a supplier of high technology.[36] In 2005, the United States spent "57 percent more than

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it earned on world markets . . . imports were 57 percent larger than . . . exports." The debt was based on imports from Japan, China, and Middle East oil producers. Borrowed money was used "to build houses, buy consumer goods and . . . finance the federal budget deficit."[37]

As the U.S. trade system and domestic fiscal support system for militarism has broken down, nations like Japan and China have stepped into the void and helped finance the U.S. debt and hence military spending. Japan and China have indirectly financed America's wars through securities purchases.[38] As economic competitiveness and domestic employment problems worsen, U.S. politicians loyal to the transnationals have been sustained by a Free Trade Axis with these foreign saviors of American militarism. Paul Craig Roberts, a former Reagan official who is now a vehement Bush basher, argues that outsourcing and misguided military adventures have weakened the country's economic base, eroding U.S. power and living standards. Outsourcing and the deteriorating competitive position in the way work is organized in the United States have had devastating impacts on employment, particularly in manufacturing. Alan Blinder, the Princeton University economist, estimates that "as many as 56 million American jobs" are vulnerable to offshore outsourcing which amounts to "about half of the US work force." Such offshore outsourcing "has contributed to the explosion of the US trade/current account deficit over the past decade to $800 billion annually and rising."[39]

Some claim that military procurement, which represents a subsidy to high-technology businesses, has nurtured the computer and other strategic industries.[40] The military depletionist school, led by economists Seymour Melman, Lloyd J. Dumas, and John E. Ullmann, long argued that military expenditures diverted important research and development resources away from civilian applications and weakened manufacturing capacity and the ability to organize work domestically. Melman argued that the military economy was associated with deterioration of the machine tool industry, diversion of engineering talent into military pursuits, and failure to invest in the educational and physical infrastructure that sustains competitiveness. He believed that military spending represents a "logjam" that limits civilian development, and that economic reconstruction necessarily requires demilitarization.[41] Fiscal overstretch has already led to some cuts in military spending and to defense firms preparing for cutbacks.[42] During the Eisenhower, Carter, and Clinton administrations, previous cuts in defense spending and associated government initiatives led military contractors to plan for diversification of products and services. While many projects failed, the problem was largely based on managerial mismanagement and weak industrial policies. This suggests that conversion is not "technically" impossible.[43]

Military Keynesianism has been used to keep the U.S. economy stimulated, but any "macroeconomic gains" have been accompanied by harsh economic costs. While the military economy may promote innovation in key sectors, there is no guarantee that manufacturing (and eventually engineering and design) jobs created by such innovations will remain in the United States.[44] For example, while military procurement contributed to the development and growth of the U.S. aerospace sector, it is far from clear that military subsidy of the sector guarantees domestic growth and U.S. jobs. The increasing limit to military contributions to the aerospace market is graphically demonstrated by the following startling statistic: "in the future 70 percent of Boeing's new 787 will be manufactured offshore primarily in China and Japan."[45]

The division of labor among the U.S., Chinese, and Japanese states is based on the ascendancy of rentier capitalists in America and the power of domestic and/or industrial interests in the Asian giants. In Japan, for example, "individual corporations are not permitted unilaterally to transfer advanced technologies to foreign operations."[46] While the Chinese state "often requires foreign companies to use Chinese workers and products as a condition of signing a contract," the U.S. state is more loyal to profit making by stateless corporations.[47] The Chinese state's fear of reprisals leads to policies that help its working class at the expense of the U.S. working class. China needs to create about ten million new jobs a year to quiet disruption, but many of these jobs are based on "the steady transfer of production capacity from other countries," particularly the United States.[48] This becomes possible as the Chinese "import" American politicians and rent their services. In the 1990s, "big American companies—mainly the ones that import goods into the United States from factories they own or work with in China—spent millions of dollars each year buying votes in Congress to keep tariffs on Chinese-made products low."[49]

Globalization may itself place potential constraints on the corporatist coalition that has contributed political capital for military budget expansion. Ironically, the very cost savings achieved by purchasing military components and goods abroad also translates, in turn, into reduced economic dependency on military production for U.S. labor and communities. A November 2005 report noted that the Pentagon was dependent on a growing globalized private sector for key military technologies: "This is taking place as China's position at the center for the global technology supply chain grows, raising the prospect of future U.S. dependency on China for certain items critical to the U.S. defense industry as well as vital to continued economic leadership."[50] Take, for example, Magnequench, an Indianapolis-based defense contractor that contributed components used in the bombing of Baghdad. This company "is not only moving its defense

plants to China, it's actually owned by Chinese companies with close ties to the Chinese government."[51] Such outsourcing weakens U.S. militarist-corporatist coalitions by displacing American working-class jobs.

Militarism also depletes the economy by diverting resources away from civilian applications. Twenty years ago, Daniel Greenberg warned that "the country may some day find itself in the absurd position of having a formidable and hugely expensive strategic defense system standing guard over an industrial rust bowl."[52] Military spending diverts procurement and capital investment funds from alternative uses in modernizing the domestic civilian economy and infrastructure: "From 1951 to the present day, the yearly budget of the Department of Defense has exceeded the net profits of all U.S. corporations. No other single management commands a finance capital fund of this size." As Seymour Melman has observed, "for every $100 of new civilian capital formation in 1979, the military were given $33 in their budget."[53] In the era of a permanent war on terror, the vast military spending continues. In the first three months of 2004, "defense work accounted for nearly 16 percent of the nation's economic growth, according to the Commerce Department."[54] A recent study by Linda Bilmes and Joseph Stiglitz estimates the projected total costs of the Iraq war to be from about $1 trillion to an excess of $2 trillion.[55]

The neoconservative Right has protected its base by lowering taxes on the rich and increasing military spending. The problem with this feat is that it combines massive debts with bloated military budgets. Combining militarism and deficit spending required a reliance on foreign nations and American rentier capitalists, both groups that are indifferent, if not hostile to, domestic manufacturing. Foreign bond purchases and debt financing have contributed to the survival of imperial overstretch and associated militarism. Powerful financial interests at home and abroad have greased the wheels for this exchange system. Like transnational interests in general, defense contractors buy politicians' "services." For example, "the leading defense contractors spent nearly $1.9 billion on Washington lobbyists between 1998 and 2003."[56] War has provided the political capital for expanded military budgets and tax cuts. Where the former represents an increased allocation of state-financed capital for defense firms, the latter represents decreased tax contributions by defense and civilian firms to the state.[57] Both hollow out the basic infrastructure of society by promoting parasitic war goods or by obliterating public goods. Military spending and associated foreign-policy crises have helped create the political capital to sustain and expand budget deficits and extend the warfare state at the expense of the welfare state. This political capital has been called "the war dividend"[58] and corresponds to a myriad of ways that corporations have been aided at the expense of working people.[59]

From the Peace Movement to the
"Struggle over the Very Means of Power"

The limits to military power, accelerated by various crises, provide a potential foundation for disarmament. These objective conditions do not guarantee an alternative politics, however. The legacies of the Cold War and managerial capitalism, together with competing formulations, have marginalized the reconstructionist legacy. The New Left helped rekindle various forms of antiwar sentiment, but even Columbia University's student protestors failed to seriously embrace the planning ideas of professors Lynd, Mills, and Melman.[60] In contrast to the default response—of responding to ad hoc crises without a long-term strategy—Mills presented an alternative over forty years ago: "Our struggle for peace . . . is and must be a political struggle over the very means of power required for that struggle."[61] This "very means of power" was needed to support reconstruction of the sort advocated by the proponents of disarmament, conversion, and economic democracy. Policies without vehicles for accumulating power to sustain them would not go very far. Writing ahead of their time, the reconstructionists made plans for an American state that was relatively demilitarized, marshaling its economic energies for more productive economic pursuits. As the limits to military power and associated economic decline become more apparent, we can have greater faith in the relevancy of their wide-ranging solutions.

While the Internet and liberal radio have helped level the playing field somewhat against the right-wing and militarist media, the availability of such new media forms has not automatically produced a comprehensive antimilitarist politics. Even though American society is increasingly shaped by the economic, media, and political effects of war, there has been a scarcity of comprehensive plans to escape from a permanent war society. Robert S. Lynd argued in 1939 that the social sciences were not quite up to the job of providing meaningful alternatives:

> The causes of war are known and accepted by a wide group of thoughtful students. But the statement of what is to be done languishes because social science shrinks from resolving the austere findings of scholarly monographs into a bold program for action. And each war creeps up on us and is ruefully, or cynically, accepted as "more or less inevitable," because, at the last moment of action, there seems to be no alternative.[62]

Lynd therefore suggested that in one sense social science represented an apologetics for war, especially when it gave the impression that wars were not preventable. At the same time, he argued for a special kind of social

science, one tied not only to action,[63] but also to planning for alternatives.

Lynd, Mills, and Melman represented a counterpoint to the intellectual apologetics for war. Their philosophy of reconstruction paralleled the work of social critic Paul Goodman, who advocated "utopian planning" as a form of realism. Goodman realized that the absence of alternatives to militarism, modernist planning, and dependency on fossil fuel–based transit created dystopias that were unsustainable and unrealistic.[64] Only by positing alternatives or utopias could possibilities emerge for a more humane future. In contrast, the militarists who often dominate political debate offer what Mills memorably called "crackpot realism."[65] This so-called realism was defined by the seeming inevitability of militarism because the "economic and military causes of war" were sustained by "the political apathy of publics and the moral insensibility of the masses . . . and by the political inactivity and abdication of leading intellectual circles."[66]

In *The Causes of World War Three*, Mills echoed Lynd's observation about how militarism was sustained by the absence of intellectual alternatives: "the absence of an American program for peace is a major cause of the thrust and drift toward World War III."[67] Mills proposed many alternative strategies. In terms of media power and capital, he argued that a program of demilitarization required "that there be media of genuine communication which are open to" a critical intelligentsia supporting fundamental structural changes, "with the aid of which they can translate the private troubles of individuals into public issues, and public issues and events into their meanings for private life."[68] In terms of political power and capital, he argued that democracy "certainly requires, as a fact of power, that there be free associations linking families and smaller communities and publics on the one hand with the state, the military establishment, the corporation on the other." These social innovations could create the necessary accountability structures, because without such associations, "there are no vehicles for reasoned opinion, no instruments for the rational exertion of public will."[69]

Mills also argued that the major powers should rein in their imperial interests by proposing "an embargo on all arms shipments" to the developing world. They "should jointly guarantee all frontiers in these areas; at the same time, with any European nations that want to cooperate, they should undertake regional development programs." He supported a U.N.-sponsored authority in the Middle East that would use oil profits to develop the region and provide "an adequate standard of living for the peoples who live there." The dystopian alternative was "U.S. Marines in Lebanon . . . and U.S. threats to invade Iraq should the oil corporations

there be threatened by the Iraqi government." Mills questioned whether a system in which corporate imperialism could not "be maintained today without violence" was sustainable.[70] New barriers have emerged to complicate the proposals advanced by Mills. Nevertheless, the current war in Iraq is partly the result of the absence of such reconstructive planning over the last forty years.

Seymour Melman also advocated antimilitarist reconstruction. From the early 1960s until his death in 2004, in many ways Melman was the conscience of the American peace movement. He was a strong proponent of the view that the term *peace* was not operational and that a systematic program of disarmament was essential. Therefore, he believed that organizing opposition to the latest war was an insufficient strategy for making progress against the war-making institutions. Something bigger was required, a sustained program for the gradual elimination of the permanent war economy and the warfare state. This program would include the following: a comprehensive treaty in support of disarmament; economic conversion of military firms; new budget priorities promoting needed civilian investments; and the implementation of democracy in the workplace, giving working people more control over their lives. He argued that economic democracy based on worker ownership and control was an alternative to the growing power and influence of militarism and footloose capital. Through worker democracy and cooperative networks of industrial enterprises, working people could systematically accumulate the scale of power necessary to challenge both the Pentagon and transnational corporations.[71]

The reconstructionists argued that the very organization of the Left and peace movements was insufficient for accumulating the scale of power necessary to challenge militarism and parasitic globalism. What happened to the political efforts to address the failed postwar conversion that left in place a permanent war economy? When Henry Wallace argued for reconciliation with the Soviet Union, he was decried as being soft on Communism. Indeed, he was sometimes naive about aspects of Soviet society, but he nevertheless presented an alternative to the militarism and waste of the Cold War. So passionate was Wallace about the evils of Cold War militarism that he broke completely with the Democrats in 1948, running for president on a third-party platform.

In electoral terms, Wallace's campaign was a failure, although it did suggest the need for organizing outside established party structures. George McGovern, a Wallace admirer, was the last major presidential nominee of either party to present a comprehensive program for the comprehensive demilitarization of the United States. Since his 1972 campaign, almost every presidential cycle has presented the voters with a Faustian

bargain: choosing between a Democratic or Republican manager to lead the military industrial complex. Like Wallace, McGovern faced a stunning electoral defeat.

The McGovern campaign attempted to promote reconstruction within the Democratic Party, a mission some on the Left believe is a lost cause. Wallace's campaign also pointed to the limits to third-party efforts outside the Democratic Party.[72] Neither strategy, organizing inside or outside the Democratic Party, succeeded in dismantling the systemic structures supporting militarism. To tackle the big questions of U.S. militarism seems to require a politics relatively autonomous from the Democratic Party, itself a client and patron of the permanent war economy. Yet antiwar activities that have failed to focus on the link between military organization and industrial production have at best placed time limits on the length of any given military intervention.

The counterplanners' utopian project of demilitarization and reconstruction was limited by their ability to create or extend power-accumulation systems. The modern peace movement, which some trace to the antinuclear mobilization of the 1950s, together with labor, environmental, and other movements "from below," represents a key foundation for change. But without reconstructive planning, we are left with "resistance" and other strategies that leave the initiative to the powers that be. Social movements become reactive, unable to take the offensive. As Mills himself noted, to change things we must think big.

Beyond Dystopia: Contemporary Strategies for Reconstruction

Just as a deindustrialized America faces limits, so too does imperial overstretch. These limits can be seen in all the areas in which the Pentagon has systematically been accumulating power. The power of the military has faced growing constraints in the strategic, political, economic, and media realms.[73] Turning to the strategic problem, in *The Permanent War Economy*, Seymour Melman wrote: "As a result of the diversity of technological options that have been developed for weaponry, as in biological warfare, military dominance is not assured even by overwhelming military expenditures." He also noted, "Conventional military forces wielding superior firepower cannot necessarily subdue a military opponent organized along guerrilla lines."[74] Others have argued that the Iraq war has perpetuated a cycle of violence that has aggravated the terrorist threat. Americans "do not understand that the ranks of suicide bombers rise or fall in relation to our violent acts."[75]

In the political and media realms, military power is also constrained. The public's support for the war on terror has steadily decreased. Even if some voters have substituted cultural politics for economic interests, the scandals surrounding the Iraq war began to raise questions even among "Bush's Faithful."[76] Pentagon failure in Iraq and associated battle deaths have diminished the popularity of the Iraq war. This failure in turn is based on the *strategic* limits of military power, the inability to achieve victory over a guerrilla insurgency supported by the local population.[77] These developments culminated in the Democrats' victory in the November 2006 elections.

The continuing sacrifice of domestic manufacturing to outsourcing by politicians supporting unmanaged global trade will also face limits. The multibillion-dollar trade and budget deficits are one potential barrier. Splits between members of the capitalist class also place constraints on militarism and lead to protectionist measures. The capitalist backlash against the economic costs of Vietnam helped bring an end to U.S. military involvement there.[78] Yet these potential economic barriers will mean very little unless there are incentives for politicians to support change, and economic possibilities for domestic firms to survive the new competition. In addition to the wrath of citizens mobilizing against outsourcing (as in the recent election and grassroots, anti–Wal-Mart campaigns), different "objective conditions" suggest how the United States could avoid becoming a militarized and depleted third-world nation.

Fiscal crises at the national and local government levels, though contributing to increased outsourcing of government work, also place pressure on the state to organize work to provide jobs and raise tax revenues. The local state is the last line of resort for many people, and it is more susceptible than its national counterpart to local mobilization. More important, managers of local states—like professions tied to various areas of infrastructure investment—will be unable to meet their professional obligations if investments are not made. Therefore, they must generate a basis for growth to maintain services and infrastructure. Some local elected officials may support military budget cutbacks, particularly in regions giving more in tax dollars than they receive in federal military spending.[79]

Despite economic depletion and the rise of new competitors, some U.S. firms have withstood or beat the competition. One example is the California-based Haas Automation, Inc., which designs and successfully manufactures computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools.[80] This is far from an isolated case as other U.S.-based firms have been successful in competing with their counterparts, and comparative advantage has not simply been based on "cheap labor."[81] As a condition for survival, firms may be forced to adopt sustainable economic systems linked to

productivity and design improvements that are also rooted in worker and user participation.[82] When more participatory and productive work relations take the form of networks, as in the highly successful Spanish worker cooperatives in the Mondragon complex, the advantages are not limited to a single firm. Such diversification, together with new waves of innovation and public investment, as in sustainable energy and transit systems, can help reverse depressive effects in the economy. The integration of users, producers, and designers is often critical for maintaining oversight and quality, which (together with the advantage of knowledge of local conditions) places constraints on outsourcing.

Compared with the Right and the warfare state, the Left and the peace movements are relatively disadvantaged in accumulating diverse forms of power. This resource deficit has weakened their ability to change foreign policies, support conversion and disarmament, and exploit (or otherwise respond to) various crises. Where the limits to military power reveal how the "objective conditions" for change are possible, the ability to consciously exploit these conditions politically depends on organizing and accumulating the kinds of economic, media, and political capital so well developed at the Pentagon.[83]

One way that this challenge can be met is by making better strategic use of the political space created by legitimation and other topical crises. While the post–Cold War "peace dividend" proved short-lived, the kinds of topical crises that can feed such organizing are not. These crises create periodic opportunities—manifested in scandals, economic disruption, and reactions to war—for organizing and mobilizing alternative media capital. Just as militarists and terrorists both try to use "the spectacle" to gain audience power or influence, so too must peace groups and trade unions make more systematic use of media power.[84] In the recent election, strategic military failure created a legitimation crisis that translated into Democratic votes. Yet, other topical crises have been more directly channeled into reconstructive politics. In this way, citizens can gain media capital lost via the alienation process of the spectacle.[85] A new economic, media, and political platform must be created to exploit the contradictions associated with militarism, outsourcing, scandals, and voter discontent. The creation of new networks bundling diverse forms of power can promote such platforms.

In a dystopian present overshadowed by seemingly endless war and a permanent war economy, utopian alternatives are more necessary than ever. The fiscal shortages facing cities and some state governments, a continuing environmental crisis, and the depletion created by war and outsourcing create potential allies for labor and peace groups within the state and corporate world. One possible alternative would be the development

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of a new, "networked" alternative state that could bring these fragments together. The idea of a "shadow state" can best be understood as a return to the original meaning of "government." As Thomas Paine remarked in *Rights of Man*, "*government is nothing more than a national association acting on the principles of society.*"[86] Such a "state within the state" could provide services, help finance democratic firms and social innovations, and provide a means to extend accountability vis-à-vis the existing national state.[87] This "shadow state" would fill the vacuum created by the abdication of basic governmental functions and services wrought by neoliberal privatization, fiscal shortages, and retrenchment. This alternative network could organize its own public forums that would follow candidates from both parties and challenge their continuing arbitrage game, in which they sell out the government to parasitic corporate interests. Congressional hearings could document the economic costs of militarism.

Elements of such an alternative to the warfare state can be seen in various government initiatives supporting local economic control, in the Mondragon cooperatives, and in proposals for "franchise cooperatives."[88] As in the multistate Apollo Alliance network, corporatist coalitions can link labor, capital, social movements, and the local state in projects to build sustainable energy industries.[89] In Ontario, the Canadian Auto Workers Union has gained leverage over local state procurements by getting union members and their supporters elected to city councils. These examples illustrate how consumers, citizens, and workers can gain economic capital. Such an alternative network could also cooperate with friendly European governments, progressive forces in Latin America, and allies elsewhere. The demonization of progressive foreign governments has helped thwart progressive transnational coalitions. Yet the shadow state could, for example, enter into research-and-development alliances with the European Union, create bilateral procurement initiatives to support alternative energy systems and mass transportation, and use such economic and technical exchanges to open up a new political front against the elites that have taken over the national state. Ultimately, strategic alliances can be built through exchanges among local governments, socially responsible corporations, trade unions, universities, and other actors alienated by the increasingly dangerous status quo.

To accumulate sufficient power, the shadow state would have to build on the ability to organize, recombine, and transform economic, media, and political capital. Just as the Pentagon organizes procurement power and war spectacles to accumulate economic and media power so too must an alternative to the warfare state organize capital and constituencies created by political scandals and civilian infrastructure spending proposals.[90] The accumulation of capital in the shadow state can be supported through

community banks, government procurements, the monies raised by individual subscribers over the Internet, door-to-door canvassing, equity stakes in cooperative spin-off firms from municipal- and labor-controlled incubators, and initiatives to politicize the millions of viewers watching radical documentaries who have no proactive outlet for remedial action. The integration of diverse spaces of reconstruction and opposition can be sustained by community radio and TV, alternative media, trade among socially responsible firms, political mobilization in town meetings, and networks of cooperating communities. Building on the "utopian realism" of the reconstructionists, such approaches can create the kind of alternative public and economic sphere necessary to challenge both American militarism and parasitic forms of globalization.

Notes

1. On democracy and militarism, see Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 205–50; Marcus G. Raskin, "Democracy versus the National Security State," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 40 (1976): 189–220.

2. Seymour Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970) and *After Capitalism: From Managerialism to Workplace Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 2001).

3. For a critique of military humanism, see Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003).

4. Henry A. Wallace, *Toward World Peace* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948), 1–2.

5. Jonathan Michael Feldman, "Industrial Conversion: A Linchpin for Disarmament and Development," in *Dimensions of Peace and Security: A Reader*, ed. Gustaaf Geeraerts, Natalie Pauwels, and Éric Remacle (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2006): 193–217. See Thorstein Veblen, "A Policy of Reconstruction," in *Essays in Our Changing Order* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998): 391–98; Marcus G. Raskin, *The Common Good: Its Politics, Policies, and Philosophy* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986).

6. American militarism obviously predates World War II. For example, intellectuals, "publicists," and labor leaders supported World War I. On World War I, see Randolph S. Bourne, *War and the Intellectuals: Collected Essays, 1915–1919*, ed. Carl Resek (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1999).

7. Richard J. Barnet, *Roots of War: The Men and Institutions behind U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Penguin, 1973), 35.

8. See Gregory A. Bischak, "The Obstacles to Real Security: Military Corporatism and the Cold War State," in *Real Security: Converting the Defense Economy and Building Peace*, ed. Kevin J. Cassidy and Gregory A. Bischak (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 133–65.

9. Jonathan Feldman, "Broadening the Peace Dividend," *Society* 30, no. 4 (1993): 33. Michael Mann similarly argues that societal structure is fundamentally determined by four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and political. See Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire* (London: Verso, 2003).

10. See Seymour Melman, "From Private to State Capitalism: How the Permanent War Economy Transformed the Institutions of American Capitalism," *Journal of Economic Issues* 31 (1997): 311–12. Another key reference is Gregory Hooks, *Forging the Military Industrial Complex: World War II's Battle of the Potomac* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991).

11. Barnet, *Roots of War*, 35.

12. Richard Polenberg, *War and Society: The United States, 1941–1945* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1972), 2.

13. Walter J. Oakes, "Toward a Permanent War Economy," in *The War Economy of the United States: Readings on Military Industry and Economy*, ed. Seymour Melman (New York: St. Martin's, 1971), 54–55.

14. Harry Magdoff, interview with Jonathan Michael Feldman, Burlington, VT, 26 December 2003.

15. Ibid. In contrast, the historian Nelson Lichtenstein emphasizes conversion benefits: "unionists resented the army's tendency to cancel orders without advance warning and to lay off workers in areas where there was a surplus rather than a shortage of labor." Moreover, "wartime conversion of some plants to civilian production (under conditions of high employment) would help ensure that the relatively high wartime wage scales would continue into the postwar era." See his *Labor's War at Home: The CIO in World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 204–5. Later, with deindustrialization, nonmilitary production jobs diminished, strengthening the barriers to conversion.

16. Margaret Chandler, *Management Rights and Union Interests* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 69–70, quoted in David Noble, *Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 39.

17. Noam Chomsky, quoted in "U.S. Imperial Ambitions and Iraq," *Monthly Review* 54 (2002): 2; see also Peter Gowan, "A Radical Realist," *New Left Review*, no. 41 (2006): 127–37.

18. Howard Brick, *Daniel Bell and the Decline of Intellectual Radicalism: Social Theory and Political Reconciliation in the 1940s* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), 85–86.

19. For a recent example, see Michael Parenti, *To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia* (London: Verso, 2000).

20. Robert S. Lynd, foreword to Robert A. Brady, *Business as a System of Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), xvii.

21. Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948* (New York: Knopf, 1972), 16.

22. Henry A. Wallace, *The Reminiscences of Henry Agard Wallace* (New York: Columbia University Oral History Research Office, 1950–51), 28:5061–62. Wallace quotes here from a speech he wrote for a meeting on 29 December 1946 of the National Citizens PAC at the Hotel Commodore. The debate at this time suggested that "anti-globalized" autarchy itself could trigger war, whereas later developments also suggest that globalization may *sometimes* weaken militarist coalitions (see p. 154).

23. Wallace, *Toward World Peace*, 1.

24. Ibid., 35.

25. C. Wright Mills, *The Causes of World War Three* (New York: Ballantine, 1960), 68. He refers here to the period 1941–44.

26. W. E. B. DuBois, *The Autobiography of W. E. B. DuBois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Last Decade of Its First Century* (New York: International Publishers, 1968).

27. C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 220.

28. Peter A. Gourevitch, "Reinventing the American State: Political Dynamics in the Post–Cold War Era," in *Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 311.

29. John A. Alic, Lewis M. Branscomb, Harvey Brooks, Ashton B. Carter, and Gerald L. Epstein, *Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 21.

30. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Richard B. Du Boff, *Accumulation and Power: An Economic History of the United States* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1989).

31. Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, *Dismantling the Cold War Economy* (New York: Basic Books, 1992).

32. See for example Alic et al., *Beyond Spinoff*; Seymour Melman, *Profits without Production* (New York: Knopf, 1983). I thank Brian Turner for his related observations.

33. Richard B. Du Boff, "U.S. Empire: Continuing Decline, Enduring Danger," *Monthly Review* 55 (2003): 1.

34. For example, one critic of what he termed "parasitic rentier capitalism" described these patterns as follows: "*The income from foreign investments, which increasingly represent the export of interest on existing investments, not the export of new capital or goods, is derived from no economic activity within the home economy, produces no employment, wages, or mass consumption*" (original emphasis). Lewis Corey, *The Decline of American Capitalism* (New York: Covici Friede, 1934), 448; cf. Gowan, "A Radical Realist," 134.

35. "The Stagnation of Employment," *Monthly Review* 55, no. 11 (2004): 3–17.

36. David Lague, "China Overtakes U.S. as High-Tech Supplier," *International Herald Tribune*, 12 December 2005.

37. Paul Krugman, "Debt and Denial," *New York Times*, 13 February 2006.

38. Paul Craig Roberts, "Wars, Debt, and Outsourcing: The World Is United against the Bush Imperium," *Counterpunch*, 25 April 2006, www.counterpunch.org/roberts04252006.html.

39. Paul Craig Roberts, "Another Grim Jobs Report: How Safe Is Your Job?" *Counterpunch*, 18 April 2006, www.counterpunch.org/roberts04182006.html; Alan S. Blinder, "Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (2006): 113–28.

40. Kenneth Flamm, *Creating the Computer: Government, Industry, and High Technology* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988).

41. Seymour Melman, "The 'Key Log' in America's Economic Logjam," Op-Ed, *New York Times*, 12 December 1987; Melman, *After Capitalism*.

42. Leslie Wayne, "Contractors Are Warned: Cuts Coming for Weapons," *New York Times*, 27 December 2005; "Boeing Axes 900 Jobs in Kansas Due to Defense Budget Cuts," *Defense News*, 18 April 2006, www.defensenews.com/story .php?F=1708143&C=america.

43. Jonathan M. Feldman, "The Conversion of Defense Engineers' Skills: Explaining Success and Failure through Customer-Based Learning, Teaming, and Managerial Integration," in *The Defense Industry in the Post–Cold War Era: Corporate Strategy and Public Policy Perspectives*, ed. Gerald I. Susman and Sean O'Keefe (Oxford: Elsevier, 1998), 281–318; Feldman, "Industrial Conversion."

44. See Alic et al., *Beyond Spinoff*; Melman, *After Capitalism*; Paul Craig Roberts, "Outsourcing Innovation . . . and Everything Else: America's Has-Been Economy," *Counterpunch*, 16 March 2005, www.counterpunch.org/roberts 03162005.html; and Roberts, "Wars, Debt, and Outsourcing." See also Feldman, "The Conversion of Defense Engineers' Skills."

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53. Seymour Melman, "Limits of Military Power, Economic and Other," *International Security* 11 (1986): 76–77.

54. Jonathan Weisman, "Across America, War Means Jobs; Defense Spending Pumps New Life into Small or Dying Towns," *Washington Post*, 11 May 2004, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15952-2004May10.html. See also Fred Magdoff, "The Explosion of Debt and Speculation," *Monthly Review* 58 (2006): 1–23.

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57. Michael Perelman, "Some Economics of Class," *Monthly Review* 58 (2006): 24–25.

58. James Cypher, "The War Dividend: Gulf War Pumps up US Military-Industrial Complex," *Dollars and Sense*, no. 166 (1991): 9–11, 21. See also Jonathan M. Feldman, "Public Choice, Foreign Policy Crises, and Military Spending," in *The Socio-Economics of Conversion from War to Peace*, ed. Lloyd J. Dumas (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 233–64.

59. Frances Fox Piven, *The War at Home: The Domestic Causes and Consequences of Bush's Militarism* (New York: New Press, 2004).

60. For related arguments, see Jonathan Michael Feldman, "Extending Disarmament through Economic Democracy," *Peace Review* 12 (2000): 205–10; Russell Jacoby, *The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); and Seymour Melman, "Politics for Peace: A Road Map, Not a STOP Sign," in *The Demilitarized Society: Disarmament and Economic Conversion* (Nottingham, U.K.: Spokesman, 1988), 36–89.

61. Mills, *The Causes of World War Three*, 136. See also Melman, "Politics for Peace."

62. Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?: The Place of Social Science in American Culture* (1939; repr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 241.

63. Ibid., 241–42.

64. Paul Goodman, *Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals* (New York: Random House, 1962); Paul Goodman and Percival Goodman, *Communitas: Means of Livelihood and Ways of Life* (New York: Vintage, 1960).

65. Mills, *The Causes of World War Three*, 89–97.

66. Ibid., 93.

67. Ibid., 96.

68. Ibid., 138.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., 128.

71. Marcus G. Raskin, "Draft Treaty for a Comprehensive Program for Common Security and General Disarmament," in *Essays of a Citizen: From National Security State to Democracy* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991), 227–91; Melman, *After Capitalism*; Feldman, "Extending Disarmament through Economic Democracy."

72. The limitations of Wallace's and McGovern's campaigns do not argue against their merits. Rather, for both campaigns to have been more successful they would have required the creation of some relatively autonomous base of power that organized economic, media, and political capital outside the Progressive or Democratic Party structures. This is essentially the strategic approach taken by the neoconservative movement and, to a certain extent, Move On and George Soros.

73. Melman, "Limits of Military Power"; Mann, *Incoherent Empire*; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World* (New York: New Press, 2003); and Gabriel Kolko, *Another Century of War?* (New York: New Press, 2002).

74. Seymour Melman, *The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 169–70.

75. David C. Hendrickson, "The Curious Case of American Hegemony: Imperial Aspirations and National Decline," *World Policy Journal* 22 (2005): 12.

76. James Dao, "In Ohio, Iraq Questions Shake Even Some of Bush's Faithful," *New York Times*, 17 July 2003.

77. John Mueller, "The Iraq Syndrome," *Foreign Affairs* 84 (2005): 44–54. See also Melman, "Limits of Military Power"; Mann, *Incoherent Empire.*

78. Gary Stone, *Elites for Peace: The Senate and the Vietnam War, 1964–1968* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2007); see also Ann R. Markusen, *Regions: The Economics and Politics of Territory* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987).

79. See Melman, *After Capitalism.*

80. Haas's VF-2SS machine tool compares favorably with the Nexus 410A produced by the Japanese firm Mazak in horsepower, tool change time, and price—beating the Japanese by $17,000. See Seymour Melman, *War, Inc.* (Troina, Italy: Città Aperta Edizioni, 2005).

81. Suzanne Berger, *How We Compete: What Companies around the World Are Doing to Make It in Today's Global Economy* (New York: Doubleday, 2005).

82. Feldman, "The Conversion of Defense Engineers' Skills"; Melman, *After Capitalism.*

83. This distinction between "objective" and "subjective" conditions is connected to the work of Jean-Paul Sartre and has been developed by political scientist John Gerassi.

84. One striking example could be seen when public expectations grew about the peaceful use of military budgets at a low point in the armaments cycle. On 2 May 1990, after the Cold War had ended, a national town meeting linked by radio was organized to beef up public support for economic conversion and substantial military budget reductions. Involved in the meeting were, among others, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Claiborne Pell, the president of the Machinists Union, George Korpius, and various political leaders, including George McGovern, Jesse Jackson, and Bernie Sanders, as well as public intellectuals, such as Seymour Melman and Barry Commoner. This political media space built on the establishment mass media's growing discussion of a "peace dividend." The meeting involved more than fifty-eight local community meetings and about thirty-eight radio stations. See Feldman, "Broadening the Peace Dividend."

85. Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle* (New York: Zone Books, 1994).

86. Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man* (New York: Penguin, 1988), 167 (original emphasis). In reviewing "the history of the English Government," Paine also noted "that taxes were not raised to carry on wars, but that wars were raised to carry on taxes" (77).

87. On such "social innovations," see for example Goodman, *Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals.*

88. See Gar Alperovitz, *America beyond Capitalism: Reclaiming Our Wealth, Our Liberty, and Our Democracy* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2005); Melman, *After Capitalism*; Jonathan Michael Feldman, "From Microenterprise to Fran-

chise Cooperative: A New Model for Ethnic Entrepreneurship," in *From Community Economic Development and Ethnic Entrepreneurship to Economic Democracy: The Cooperative Alternative*, ed. Jonathan Michael Feldman and Jessica Gordon Nembhard (Norrköping, Sweden: Partnership for Multiethnic Inclusion, 2002), 143–74.

89. See www.apolloalliance.org.

90. See Melman, *After Capitalism*; Markusen and Yudken, *Dismantling the Cold War Economy.*

Combat in Hell

CITIES AS THE ACHILLES' HEEL OF
U.S. IMPERIAL HEGEMONY

Ashley Dawson

A group of insurgents screeches out of a dusty alleyway in an old pickup truck on a typical sweltering day in Iraq and begins lobbing mortars toward one of Baghdad's primary power stations. Coalition forces are quickly deployed to quell the attack, but in the firefight that ensues, a number of civilians who do not get out of the neighborhood's crowded streets in time are wounded. How will the residents of the area react to these civilian casualties? Will an angry crowd gather to condemn the U.S. occupation and attack any troops remaining in the area, or will the soldiers' effort to protect the city's power supply elicit sympathy from a population that struggles to cope with frequent power outages? What impact will this conflict have on other neighborhoods in Baghdad, on the country as a whole, and on the entire Middle East region? Operation Urban Resolve 2015, the largest computer modeling and simulation exercise ever undertaken by the Department of Defense (DoD), played out this and hundreds of other scenarios similar to the power station attack in a series of virtual war games conducted by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) during the summer and autumn of 2006.[1] Urban Resolve is perhaps the U.S. military's most frank admission that the megacities of the global South are likely to be the predominant loci of future warfare. Indeed, JFCOM's description of the exercise acknowledges the increasing primacy of urban combat:

> The explosive growth of the world's major urban centers, changes in enemy strategies, and the global war on terror have made the urban battlespace potentially decisive and virtually unavoidable. Some of our most advanced military systems do not work as well in urban areas as they do in open terrain. Therefore, joint and coalition forces should expect that future opponents will choose to operate in urban environments to try to level the huge disparity between our military and technological capabilities and theirs.[2]

Yet if Urban Resolve somewhat belatedly acknowledges the growing strategic importance of cities, it does not focus on urban combat alone, since, as Dave Ozolek, executive director of the Department of Defense's Joint Urban Operations office, puts it, "the security problems we are facing

are so complex that they can't be solved with military power alone."[3] In an attempt to understand the complex political, economic, and social factors behind urban warfare, DoD war gamers used the Simulex Corporation's Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation (SEAS), an advanced computer program that uses data from military incidents to extrapolate how community leaders, local media, and the general population in urban areas such as Baghdad would react to endemic conflict. Alok Chaturvedi, director of Purdue University's Homeland Security Institute and founder of Simulex, describes SEAS as "behavior anticipation and shaping," a digital version of the classic counterinsurgency strategy of winning hearts and minds.[4] JFCOM's Joint Futures Laboratory employed SEAS in the Urban Resolve war game to model the behavior of Baghdad's inhabitants, from mundane daily routines such as prayer rituals to bloody counterinsurgent battles, in a cybercity that included accurate three-dimensional digital reproductions of every building in the city as well as more than two million individual entities such as people and cars. Participating in this virtual urban battle zone were team members in nineteen distinct networked sites throughout the United States, from Fort Benning, Georgia, to the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command in San Diego, all involved in the quest to create what retired admiral James Winnefeld, director of JFCOM's Joint Experimentation Directorate, called "a toxic environment for extremist ideologies."[5]

For all the millions of dollars and billions of megabytes expended in modeling the behavior of the residents of Baghdad, however, Urban Resolve had a curiously hermetic feel to it. While Admiral Winnefeld underlined that Americans of Iraqi descent were involved in the exercise to augment its verisimilitude, most of the people that I observed sitting underneath the impressively detailed 3-D digital projection of Baghdad that hovered on the wall of the JFCOM situation room were balding white men with handlebar moustaches, the same blend of superannuated spooks and worn-out Special Forces hotshots who have been running the real occupation of Iraq to such disastrous effect since 2003. Moreover, SEAS's canny focus on the cultural components of urban counterinsurgency operations is vitiated by the fact that the Illinois-based team mined their data on Baghdad from Web sites, public opinion surveys, policy research organizations, and economic data sites, sources whose information on what drives the insurgency is likely to be even less accurate than that guiding the imperial proconsuls in Baghdad's "Green Zone" over the last three years.

More important, perhaps, Urban Resolve was predicated on a blinkered disavowal of the fact that it is the U.S. occupation itself that is creating a toxic environment in Baghdad and the rest of Iraq. Military operations to win over Iraqi hearts and minds are futile in the face of a rapacious

occupation guided by the rigid nostrums of neoliberal economic dogma.[6] Urban Resolve thus seems symptomatic of the combination of blindness and insight currently afflicting the U.S. military, which has registered the increasing prominence of urban combat zones but seems constitutively unable to acknowledge the underlying economic and political forces that are driving urbanization in the megacities of the global South. If cities are the Achilles' heel of military power, U.S. war makers are increasingly forced to disavow awareness of the role played by empire in unleashing the very forces of unsustainable urbanization that they are called on to quell.

It was not supposed to be this way. In the late 1980s, Pentagon theorists began discussing a so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) that would endow the United States with unparalleled "full spectrum dominance."[7] Using cutting-edge networked information technology, the United States, it was argued, would vault beyond all potential military antagonists in the same manner that the Germans' use of coordinated air and armored assault had handed them primacy in the blitzkrieg against continental Europe at the onset of World War II. As James Der Derian has remarked, the ferocious destructive potential of U.S. military technology as it developed in the 1990s had the paradoxical effect of strengthening the belief in *virtuous warfare* by allowing civilian and military leaders to threaten and, if necessary, unleash violence from a distance and by remote control—with few if any American casualties.[8] Indeed, to the extent that the big technostick sanitized the gory side of warfare through its pixellated displays of precision destruction, it threatened to absolve those who wielded it from moral responsibility for their acts.[9] The promise held out by a technowar of sanitized "surgical strikes" allowed its proponents to actively solicit foreign conflicts, in the same way that Samuel Huntington's thesis concerning a "clash of civilizations" anticipated and even catalyzed conflict through its Manichaean representation of relations between the West and Islamic nations.[10] The RMA was thus an immense boon and alibi for hawks like Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. Their bellicose doctrines, such as the asserted right to a "preemptive defense," relied on visions of war as bloodless and hygienic in order to garner the support of a public averse to seeing their children sent home from the front in body bags.

There were always skeptical "mud soldiers," battle-scarred veterans of bloody conflicts such as Vietnam, who questioned the starry-eyed, technophilic discourse associated with the RMA.[11] Indeed, for those who knew something about the "fog of war," Clausewitz's famous dictum concerning the confusion created by warfare should have been more timely than ever, especially given the RMA's propensity to proliferate and intensify rather

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than streamline information flows. Such contrarian perspectives gained little traction after the swift and decisive rout of Saddam's army in the 1991 Operation Desert Storm; and, after 9/11, RMA doctrines seemed once again to be vindicated in the successful battle to roust the Taliban from Afghanistan and in the lightning-quick initial victory of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Of course, the protracted occupation of an increasingly unhinged and violent Iraq made the hubris of RMA doctrines dramatically apparent. While U.S. and "coalition" forces quickly destroyed Saddam's ragtag army, the Sunni and Shiite insurgents soon began to sabotage the occupation from their bases in the slums of cities such as Baghdad, Fallujah, and Basra.[12] For all their technological savvy, U.S. forces were quickly reminded of the primal, premodern character of urban warfare. Military theorists tempered their zealous embrace of RMA doctrine, with its fetishization of technology and airborne firepower, and opened a new line of inquiry into what is known as Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain (a.k.a. MOUT).

Of course, there had been warnings that urban settings would diminish if not destroy the decisive advantage conferred on U.S. military forces by networked technology. In 1993, an elite force of Army Rangers and Delta Force special operators sustained 60 percent casualty rates while battling ragtag Somali clan militias during the U.N.'s humanitarian intervention in Mogadishu.[13] Later that decade, Russian troops were severely mauled by Chechen separatist forces, who lured federal armored columns into the center of the capital city Groszny only to pop up out of the sewers to destroy the Russian vehicles using rocket-propelled grenades. These premonitory episodes went largely unheeded, so that when former Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Charles Krulak coined the term "three-block war" in 2004 to describe the combined humanitarian, peacekeeping, and combat missions in urban settings that characterize the overwhelming majority of U.S. military engagements today, his analysis was hailed as a visionary warning rather than a severely belated acknowledgement.[14] Military historians suddenly recalled that, despite the media primacy enjoyed by the assaults on Iraq over the last decade, twenty-one of the last twenty-six conflicts in which U.S. forces have been engaged involved urban settings, and of these, ten were fought exclusively in cities.[15]

The conclusion drawn by most theorists was not, however, that war is inherently or even tendentiously urban but, rather, that insurgent forces around the world, having witnessed the annihilation of Saddam's troops in the open desert by U.S. "smart bombs," had realized that their only chance of survival lay in fighting future wars in the urban jungles of the underdeveloped world.[16] One hears the echo of this logic in JFCOM's argument that insurgents will try to "level" the technological playing field

by operating in urban environments. "Urban combat," as one RAND Corporation–sponsored white paper had it, "is complex": the dense, three-dimensional structure of cities slows down occupying forces, inhibits advanced communication systems, and allows guerrillas to hide within buildings and behind civilian populations.[17] Fighting in cities, U.S. forces are forced back into what theorists described as a "premodern" mode of warfare in which experience and cunning count for far more than Global Positioning System technology and aerial firepower. For military theorists, then, the turn of insurgent forces to urban-based "asymmetrical" guerrilla warfare was a direct consequence of the unparalleled domination by the United States over land, sea, and air, a kind of dastardly plot to foil the hegemony conferred by the RMA.

In their analysis of the rise of urban warfare, MOUT theorists tend to ignore the structural economic and cultural forces that propel urbanization in the global South. While many studies begin with a seemingly obligatory nod to U.N. statistics that suggest that 70 percent of humanity will live in cities by 2020, few pursue the causes of urban-based conflicts to their roots. As Stephen Graham emphasizes, there are multiple factors driving the urbanization of war, including

> the unleashing of previously constrained ethnic hatreds since the end of the Cold War bipolar system; the proliferation of fundamentalist religious and political groups; the militarization of gangs, drug cartels, militia, corrupt political regimes, and law enforcement agencies; the failure of many national and local states; the urbanization of populations and terrain; the growing accessibility of heavy weapons; the crisis of increasing social polarization at all geographical scales; and the growing scarcity of many essential resources.[18]

Underlying these disparate epiphenomena, however, is the massive transfer of wealth to a handful of corporations and individuals in the developed world as a result of the debt crisis of the 1980s and the subsequent structural adjustment programs administered by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank over the last three decades. During the era of the Washington Consensus, peasants pushed off their land by agricultural deregulation and chronic civil wars flocked by the millions to cities largely devoid of economic development. As Mike Davis argues, the unprecedented growth of megacities throughout the global South in a context of structural adjustment, currency devaluation, and state retrenchment has been "an inevitable recipe for the mass production of slums."[19]

Urban-based conflicts such as those catalogued by Stephen Graham are, then, a product of the geopolitical creation of a teeming surplus humanity, for whom the slums of megacities such as Lagos, Cairo, and Rio are a final desperate refuge and a point of entry into the violent subcultures

of globe-spanning criminality and warfare. To argue, as do most MOUT theorists, that the urbanization of warfare is a calculated strategic ploy on the part of antagonists to U.S. power is to ignore the fundamental causes for a trend that will inevitably become more prominent, given the failure of global elites to broach, let alone answer, the question of how to integrate the surplus humanity of the global South into the global economy. It is also to substitute military repression, that is likely to spark a bloody cycle of blowback, for economic and political policies that might deal with this root cause. The resort to military force is thus, as David Harvey has suggested, an index of the waning hegemony of U.S. imperial power rather than a sign of the empire's invincible might.[20]

Notwithstanding their acknowledgement that urban warfare is "combat in hell," MOUT theorists have worked diligently to elaborate doctrines for such fighting through a series of conferences sponsored by the likes of the RAND Corporation think tank, armed forces publications such as *Parameters*, and Joint Forces war games such as the San Francisco–based "Urban Warrior" exercise.[21] MOUT theorists seek to overcome the advantage conferred to insurgents by the urban terrain through a series of interlocking tactics. Most important, theorists argue, steps must be taken to prevent buildings, sewers, and other parts of the urban environment from offering refuge for enemy combatants. New technologies of surveillance and reconnaissance called for by advocates of MOUT promise to turn cities inside out and, by revealing their entrails, to deny insurgents the advantages offered by the architectural edifices of the city.[22] In addition, tactics are to be developed that limit access of both combatants and noncombatants to particular urban areas by using nonlethal obstacles, such as vehicle barriers and quick-hardening foams. Extending such measures to a wider ambit, what the RAND book *Coralling the Trojan Horse* calls "nodal operations" are designed to cut off and control particular zones or nodes of the city.[23] In tandem with such steps to limit physical mobility within cities, the RAND report calls for psychological operations (PSYOP) such as media campaigns in order to win the "hearts and minds" of the civilian population as part of counterinsurgency operations. Should these localized strategies fail, Major General Robert Scales has suggested that an "indirect" approach be used whereby U.S. forces cordon off a city or establish a siege line around it, allowing them to strike at enemy forces within the urban perimeter at will—a strategy that for all intents and purposes would turn cities into giant internment camps.[24] All of these tactics have been in evidence in the Iraq occupation, although in cases such as Fallujah, U.S. forces seem to have employed a strategy of destroying the city in order to save it, all too reminiscent of the humanitarian and propaganda debacles of the Vietnam War.

Ashley Dawson

In addition, rather than completely abandoning RMA doctrine, some enterprising MOUT theorists have found a way to reintroduce computer-based technology to urban combat, notwithstanding its supposedly low-tech character. In a recent article that seems oblivious to the dystopian messages of films such as *Robocop* and *Terminator*, two MOUT analysts call for the creation of an "urban warfighter system" that is equal parts man and machine in order to allow the military to win the coming urban wars of the next quarter century. The core of this system would be a bodysuit with "integral C4ISR,[25] engagement, and active survivability systems" that would allow soldiers to communicate and "see through" walls, leap over tall buildings in a single bound, survive enemy gunfire unscathed, and unleash lethal hails of lead at will.[26] Just as in the air war–based RMA doctrine, the animating force for this hyperbolic "urban warfighter system" is the desire to avoid any erosion of domestic consent caused by the high death toll of city-based combat. Once again, then, the military is turning to a series of technological fixes for the intractable social problems generated by the spiraling inequalities of the neoliberal world order. Urban Resolve offers the most advanced edge of this deployment of technology to deal with urban combat, melding computerized battle systems such as the army's future warfare hardware with the cultural computations of SEAS, while successfully eliding broader strategic questions concerning the causes of urbanization.

MOUT doctrine was developed with the dense slum-dominated mega-cities of the underdeveloped world in mind. U.S. forces have, for instance, engaged in recent years in joint operations with the Israeli Defense Force in order to draw on the latter's long experience in hunting down fighters in Palestinian cities such as Nablus and Jenin. Indeed, Mike Davis calls MOUT "the highest stage of Orientalism," since it has been used to create a Manichaean distinction between the besieged cities of the homeland and the volatile megaslums abroad that harbor the so-called axis of evil.[27] This firm distinction between the inside and outside of the body politic breaks down quickly, however, in the face of a constant need for prophylaxis against internal threats. MOUT theorists in fact tend to construct stereotypical urban typologies whose geographical application is highly flexible. In "The Human Terrain of Urban Operations," for example, Ralph Peters argues that cities may be classified, "for military purposes," as hierarchical, multicultural, or tribal.[28] Peters, who apparently has spent little time in chaotic, racially polarized cities such as New York and Rome, argues that the hierarchical cities of the developed Western world are characterized by orderly "chains-of-command" that operate within a broadly accepted rule of law.[29] "Multicultural" cities, by contrast, are riven by conflict between overlapping and discordant ethnic groups whose

failure to achieve a homogeneous cultural orientation threatens their polity with continual turmoil. Peters argues that Jerusalem is the prototypical dysfunctional multicultural city. Finally, tribal cities resemble multicultural cities, except that they're worse because conflict follows along clan or tribal lines rather cultural ones. Peters inevitably points to Mogadishu as an example of his final category. Just as predictably, Peters's typology conforms perfectly to the old Victorian racial hierarchies that helped legitimate imperial rule.[30] As was true during the Victorian era, efforts to control the supposedly degenerate masses in the periphery have a strong impact on measures developed to discipline the "dangerous classes" close to home in the imperial metropolis.

It should not surprise us, then, to find that MOUT tactics are not being deployed in the imperial periphery alone. Even prior to 9/11, urban police forces in Europe and the United States drew consciously on the military's tactics for combating urban insurgency in order to shut down the large protests organized in cities by the Global Justice Movement (GJM) during summit meetings of the World Trade Organization and the G8. Bereft of any other way to make their voices heard inside the well-insulated conference rooms of such largely unaccountable global organizations, protesters took to the streets of cities such as Seattle and Genoa in order to register their discontent with the Washington Consensus. Using new consumer technology such as cell phones as well as tried and true direct-action techniques, members of the GJM scored a victory when they shut down the WTO summit meeting in Seattle by blockading streets through an extremely flexible structure of cellular affinity groups.[31] Within a few years of the "Battle of Seattle," however, peripatetic global elites had developed an answer to the protesters' antihierarchical organizing tactics and rambunctious street demonstrations in the form of what Robert Warren calls "state-sponsored pop-up armies."[32] As Warren argues, by the time of the G8 summit in Genoa during the summer of 2001, these pop-up armies, viewing citizens who attempted to exercise their democratic rights as de facto enemies, drew on MOUT doctrines to clamp down on popular mobilizations through the militarization of urban space. Authorities deployed paramilitary forces clad in riot gear to prevent protesters from gaining access to summit meeting sites, zoned and barricaded parts of the city, required authorization for citizen movement, engaged in preemptive arrests, harassed independent media, and allowed police and military forces to use massive nonlethal and even lethal force. Perhaps most significantly, this paramilitary policing consistently conflated nonviolent protesters with violent "terrorists" in order to garner broad public support for the imposition of martial law and the massive expenses involved in protecting

a relatively small contingent of global elites.[33] Since 9/11 the conflation of large gatherings of people in urban spaces with terrorism has proceeded apace. Pop-up armies now protect not just global summits, but almost all large public events, including second-tier summits, sporting events, and other entertainment events. Demonstrators are routinely limited to razor wire–ringed "free speech zones" miles away from political events. As a result of this militarization of urban space, cities such as New York have at times come to resemble armed encampments full of citizens who have been rendered suspects in the boundless war on terror.

This is hardly the first time that tactics of military control deployed in the periphery have been brought back to the imperial homeland. According to Stephen Graham, the French general Bugeaud, who resorted to wholesale destruction of portions of the Algiers Casbah in his struggle against the insurgent nationalist forces of Abd El-Kader during the mid-nineteenth century, was responsible for the first manual on urban warfare.[34] Thirty years later, the exploits of Bugeaud had a strong influence on Baron Haussman when he set out to redesign Paris in order to tame the capital city's notoriously explosive populace. Drawing on Bugeaud's book *La guerre des rues et des maisons*, Haussman demolished wide swaths of the medieval city in order to make the city more permeable to military forces. Although Haussman's elegant, café-encrusted boulevards may seem a boon to French civilization today, it is unlikely that the contemporary citadelization of U.S. cities is likely to result in such an architecturally felicitous and culturally conducive outcome.[35]

The elaboration of MOUT doctrine in both domestic and foreign urban zones during the war on terror, in other words, should not be seen as entirely exceptional. Once again, we are living out a cycle in which colonial discourse is used to map, contain, and control urban space and society. Notwithstanding the sweeping gentrification of U.S. cities over the last several decades, urban zones remain riddled with anonymous nonplaces such as airports and freight terminals that are seen as prime spots for terrorist attacks and as incubators for the putative "fifth columnist" potential of diasporic groups.[36] Long-standing traditions of spatial control exist that serve to legitimate contemporary MOUT doctrine as it is increasingly applied to domestic urban zones. In the case of the United States, such traditions blur the boundaries of imperial periphery and "homeland." Indeed, as Loïc Wacquant, among others, has argued, racialized groups, such as African Americans in the United States, have long been subjected to a succession of systems of confinement stretching from chattel slavery, through Jim Crow, to the mass carceral apparatus of the present.[37] The status of certain quarters of the nation's cities as

dangerous zones of difference, foreign countries within domestic space, was made explicit by activists such as Stokely Carmichael and the Black Panthers, who compared black ghettos to internal colonies during the civil rights era. Similarly, in Britain, with its most spied upon citizenry of any contemporary nation, urban surveillance systems are a direct product of the counterinsurgency campaign against the Irish Republican Army. MOUT technologies deployed by imperial military forces around the globe thus build on enduring practices of internal and external spatial apartheid and surveillance. While the militarization of urban space in the developed world pales in comparison to the fate meted out to residents of contemporary Fallujah or Beirut, we would do well to remember that these seemingly disparate locations are intimately connected by logics of military domination whose costs are increasingly steep for civilian populations at home and abroad.

Notes

1. Official information on Urban Resolve 2015 can be found at the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Web site, www.jfcom.mil/about/experiments/uresolve.htm (accessed 15 November 2006).

2. Ibid.

3. Quoted in Josh Rogin, "Baghdad Reduced to Bytes," *FCW.com*, 6 November 2006, www.fcw.com/article96689-11-06-06-Print.

4. Ibid.

5. Admiral James Winnefeld, personal interview, Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia, 20 September 2006.

6. For a discussion of the Coalition Provisional Authority's implementation of dogmatic neoliberal policies under L. Paul Bremer III, see Naomi Klein, "Baghdad Year Zero," *Harper's Magazine*, September 2004, 43–53.

7. The doyen of U.S. military theorists, Andrew Marshall of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, notes that the Soviets were the first to begin speculating about the impact of information technology on warfare, although it was his legendary memorandum of 1993, "Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions," that triggered the full-blown discourse on a revolution in military affairs within the United States. See James Der Derian, *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), 28.

8. Der Derian, *Virtuous War*, xv.

9. Ibid., xvi.

10. For a detailed critique of Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis, see Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells, "Introduction: Constructing the Muslim Enemy," in *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy*, ed. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 1–29.

11. For a discussion of criticism of the RMA by military theorists, see Christian Parenti, "Planet America: The Revolution in Military Affairs as Fantasy and Fetish," in *Exceptional State: Contemporary U.S. Culture and the New Imperialism*,

ed. Ashley Dawson and Malini Johar Schueller (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).

12. There is, by now, an extensive literature on the Iraqi occupation and insurgency. Among the best works are Pratap Chatterjee, *Iraq Inc.: A Profitable Occupation* (New York: Seven Stories, 2004); Robert Fisk, *The Great War for Civilization: The Conquest of the Middle East* (New York: Knopf, 2005); George Packer, *The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005); and Christian Parenti, *The Freedom* (New York: New Press, 2004).

13. This episode was described in Mark Bowden's best-selling book *Black Hawk Down* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), which was subsequently transformed into the patriotic gore of Ridley Scott's movie of the same title.

14. Kelly P. Houlgate, "Urban Warfare Transforms the Corps," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 130 (November 2004): 43–48.

15. Ibid. Notable examples include Saigon, Mogadishu, Panama City, Beirut, and Port au Prince as well as, of course, urban sites in the current conflict in Iraq, such as Baghdad and Fallujah.

16. For typical examples of this line of analysis, see Vincent Goulding Jr., "Back to the Future with Asymmetrical Warfare," *Parameters* 30 (2001): 21–30, and Thomas Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith, 2004).

17. Russell Glenn, *Urban Combat Is Complex* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2002).

18. Stephen Graham, "Introduction: Cities, War, and States of Emergency," in *Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics*, ed. Stephen Graham (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 6.

19. Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums* (New York: Verso, 2006), 17.

20. David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77.

21. For a discussion of "Urban Warrior," see Der Derian, *Virtuous War*, 124–51.

22. A summary of MOUT doctrine can be found in Robert Warren, "City Streets—The War Zones of Globalization," in Graham, *Cities, War, and Terrorism*, 218.

23. Russell Glenn, R. Steeb, and J. Matsumura, *Corralling the Trojan Horse: A Proposal for Improving U.S. Urban Operations Preparedness in the Period 2000–2005* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2001).

24. For a discussion of Scales's proposal, see Robert F. Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, "Urban Warfare and the Urban Fighter of 2025," *Parameters* 29 (1999): 77.

25. C4ISR is military jargon for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

26. Hahn and Jezior, "Urban Warfare," 79.

27. Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 205.

28. Ralph Peters, "The Human Terrain of Urban Operations," *Parameters* 30 (2000): 4–13.

29. Ibid., 5.

30. For a discussion of the racialized Victorian Great Chain of Being, see Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

31. For accounts of the "Battle of Seattle" and subsequent aspects of the Global Justice Movement, see Eddie Yuen, Daniel Burton Rose, and George Katsiaficas, eds., *The Battle of Seattle: The New Challenge to Capitalist Globalization* (New York: Soft Skull, 2001), Tom Mertes, ed., *A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?* (New York: Verso, 2004), and Notes from Nowhere, *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism* (New York: Verso, 2003).

32. Warren, "City Streets," 221.

33. Ibid., 222.

34. Stephen Graham, "Cities as Strategic Sites; Place Annihilation and Urban Geopolitics," in Graham, *Cities, War, and Terrorism*, 36.

35. For a discussion of the citadelization of New York following 9/11, see Peter Marcuse, "The 'War on Terror' and Life in Cities after September 11, 2001," in Graham, *Cities, War, and Terrorism*, 263–75.

36. On nonplaces and terror, see Timothy W. Luke, "Everyday Technics as Extraordinary Threats: Urban Technostructures and Non-Places in Terrorist Actions," in Graham, *Cities, War, and Terrorism*, 120–36.

37. Loïc Wacquant, "From Slavery to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking the 'Race Question' in the U.S.," *New Left Review* 13 (January–February 2002): 41–60.