

## Tracing *Tarbiya*: The Political Economy of Pedagogy in Ottoman Lebanon

### Introduction

"It is necessary that parents begin immediately to educate their children in perfect obedience (*al-ta'a al-kamila*) and to train them in submission (*al-huduwwa*) while they are small, so that these will not be impossible when they grow up. For subordinating the child when he is small is much easier than subordinating him when he is grown, just as it is easier to plant a seed than to plant a tree."<sup>1</sup>

Thus reads the parenting advice of an 1850 text published by the newly-established Syrian Evangelical Church in Beirut, entitled "A Treatise on the Upbringing [*Tarbiya*] of Children" (*Risala fi Tarbiyat al-Awlad*). The Treatise declared its intention to "clarify, in a clear and accessible fashion, the duties [of parents], with an eye to some of the laws that parents should observe" and proceeded to cover parenting expectations ranging from how to feed and clothe a child to the matter of arranging for his or her education (in Arabic, *ta'lim*).<sup>2</sup> These expectations carried high stakes: for those who attend to the *tarbiya* of their children, "God will reward them in this life and the next," but those who "ignore their children and are careless with their *tarbiya* and ethical cultivation (*tahdib*) will provoke the wrath of God and be harshly punished."<sup>3</sup>

Forty-six years later, in 1896, Shaykh Mohammed 'Abduh gave a rousing speech entitled "*khitab fi al-tarbiya*" on the same subject as the Evangelical's 1850 treatise. He spoke at the annual celebration of the Cairo-based Islamic Benevolent Society (*al-Jama'iyya al-Islamiyya al-Khairiyya*) that he had helped to found in Cairo in 1892. In the speech, 'Abduh declared that Muslim unity (*al-itihad*) "is the fruit of a tree that has shoots, branches, and leaves. Virtuous ethics (*akhlaq*), in all their levels, are the roots of that tree. And so," he concluded, "if Muslims want unity [as 'Abduh certainly thought they should], it is upon them to raise themselves

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<sup>1</sup> Syrian Evangelical Church, *Risala fi Tarbiyat al-Awlad* [Treatise on the Upbringing of Children] (Beirut: al-Matba'a al-Amrikiyya), p. 16. Consulted with the permission of the Archives of the Near Eastern School of Theology (NEST). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the author.

<sup>2</sup> *Risala*, 2-3.

<sup>3</sup> *Risala*, 4.

(*yurabbu anfusahum*) according to a true Islamic *tarbiya* (*tarbiya islamiyya haqiqiyya*) in order to bring forth the fruit [of unity]."<sup>4</sup> If they do not, ‘Abduh warned, "then all hope is useless, and all dreams are but illusions."<sup>5</sup>

How did *tarbiya*, an old Arabic term for domesticating animals, begin in the nineteenth century to refer to new structures of formal schooling, new pedagogies, and to the female labor of childrearing, moral cultivation, and subject formation in the home? These two examples highlight the challenge of telling the history of *tarbiya*, a concept which traversed a broad social, temporal, and geographical terrain that included not only ‘Abduh and the Evangelical but many other thinkers and writers from 1850 onwards.

The contextual differences between the two examples are immediately apparent. The Evangelical's 1850 treatise was an unsigned tract published in Beirut by a native Protestant Church abruptly brought into existence by American Protestant missionaries in Lebanon, who were themselves facing stinging criticism from Boston-based superiors for their failure to convert any substantial number of Lebanese.<sup>6</sup> ‘Abduh's 1896 speech, by contrast, was delivered in front of a hometown crowd by the most famous Muslim reformist of his age, at a celebration for an educational and charitable institution that he founded and directed. The conceptual differences between the two invocations, however, are even more striking. As the Evangelical's treatise suggests, much of the pedagogical thought that grew up around *tarbiya* took on a distinctly quietist tone. *Tarbiya* was often invoked as a way to instill obedience in children, to train individuals and populations to keep their place, and to safeguard particular visions of social

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<sup>4</sup> Mohammed ‘Abduh. "*Khitab fi-I-Tarbiya*" [A Speech on Upbringing], in *al-‘Amal al-Kamila* [The Complete Works] Part III, ed. Mohammed ‘Imara (Cairo: Dar al Shuruq, 1991), 167.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> For more information on the foundation of the Syrian Evangelical Church, see Habib Badr, "Missions to ‘Nominal Christians’: The Policy and Practice of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and Its Missionaries Concerning Eastern Churches Which Led to the Organization of a Protestant Church in Beirut (1819-1848)" (PhD diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1992).

order (often articulated in Arabic by another nineteenth-century neologism, *al-hay'a al-ijtima'iyya*, lit. "the social form.")<sup>7</sup> For 'Abduh and others, however, *tarbiya* represented a central mechanism in conversations about individual, communal, and national uplift. Whether as a central instrument of 'Abduh's quest for Muslim unity (*itihad*), for example, or as a means to shape Ottoman, Arab, or Islamic subjects and civilization to compete with the rising technological, financial, and military power of Europe, *tarbiya* was no less than the antidote to decline and a path to power. How did *tarbiya*, and pedagogical thought more broadly, become a plausible language for expressing quietist concerns about social order as well as for articulating radical dreams about progress, uplift, and social transformation?

This chapter argues that both the broad circulation of the concept of *tarbiya* and its particular plasticity emerged in response to transformations in the political economy of education in nineteenth-century Lebanon.<sup>8</sup> It proceeds in three parts. First, I briefly discuss the theoretical and historiographical questions that animate my argument. Second, I show how broad transformations underway in nineteenth-century Lebanese society laid the groundwork for education to become the site of considerable investment by Lebanese elites as well as missionaries and Ottoman statesmen.<sup>9</sup> Third, I trace the political economy of pedagogy produced by three of the most important educational networks in nineteenth-century Lebanon: a French Catholic network built around Lebanon's Maronite community, a Protestant network built around

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<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of the phrase "*al-hay'a al-ijtima'iyya*" and its circulation and meanings in late nineteenth century Egypt, see Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 120.

<sup>8</sup> There was no stable administrative category contiguous with the borders of contemporary Lebanon in the late nineteenth century. This chapter will focus on the city of Beirut and the area that became the independent governorate (*mutasara'fiyya*) of Mt. Lebanon in 1861. I use "Ottoman Lebanon" to refer to these territories and "Lebanese" for their inhabitants for convenience rather than to imply that present borders were inevitable.

<sup>9</sup> I use the word "elite" to refer to members of landed, notable families who held tax-farming rights under the Ottomans (*muqata'jis*) and/or served as Ottoman or municipal administrators in Beirut and Mt. Lebanon; I also consider missionary actors to be "elites" in that they often had access to substantial financial capital and property that made them wealthy relative to the vast majority of Lebanon's inhabitants. In the same sense, influential Lebanese clergy members can also be considered "elites." I also include members of Beirut and Tripoli-based families who made their fortunes as merchants and landlords in the nineteenth century or prior.

American missionaries and their Lebanese interlocutors, and a Sunni Muslim network built around the Maqasid Islamic Benevolent Society (*Jama' iyyat al-Maqasid al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya*) and the Ottoman state.<sup>10</sup> I investigate the funding structures, curricula, hierarchies, and exclusions that characterized these three networks to show how all conveyed the possibility that education could be a means to individual and communal transformation, while they also sought to produce and preserve social hierarchies on their own terms. In this context, *tarbiya* and pedagogical thought more generally became a plausible language for articulating both the broad and tantalizing possibilities of individual social mobility and communal progress, as well as elite hopes that particular versions of the social order--*al-hay'a al-ijtima' iyya*--could be stabilized once and for all.

### **I. Theoretical and Historiographical Considerations**

This chapter is part of an ongoing scholarly conversation about how to conceptualize the circulation of ideas and concepts on local, regional, and/or global scales. The concept of *tarbiya* emerged and circulated in a broader nineteenth century moment in which interest in education and pedagogy was exploding across the Ottoman Empire and indeed across the globe.<sup>11</sup> One approach has been to consider concepts like *tarbiya* which clearly had transnational reach as the products of open-ended, productive, and contingent processes of circulation and translation among intellectual networks brought into contact by nineteenth-century technologies, the rise of print culture, and European economic, military, and missionary advances.<sup>12</sup> Scholars have also

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<sup>10</sup> The Maronite Church is a uniate Catholic church with a Patriarch based at Bkirké in Mt. Lebanon; adherents are spread throughout the Levant and the Lebanese diaspora.

<sup>11</sup> As Ben Fortna has shown, educational developments in Ottoman lands were part of a much broader "age of education." Benjamin Fortna, *The Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 27. Fortna takes the phrase "the age of education" from historian Theodore Zelin's *France, 1848-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, Marwa Elshakry, *Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860-1950* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2014); Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914*

shown how resonances between new concepts coming from Europe and debates within the Islamic intellectual tradition helped particular ideas to catch on.<sup>13</sup> The ideas of foreign, particularly American and European, pedagogues and educationalists did circulate in Lebanon, although their influence is far less clear in 1850 than in 1890; as Omnia El Shakry has shown, these ideas resonated with familiar tropes and texts in the Islamic tradition.<sup>14</sup> But authors based in Lebanon could have chosen to write--and keep on writing--about any one of the large variety of subjects taken up in nineteenth-century Europe or America or in the many centuries of intellectual production in the Islamic or Eastern Christian traditions. Why, then, did questions about upbringing, education, and pedagogy in particular seem so urgent to so many?

Another approach to the global history of thought has been to link the concurrent emergence of related concepts around the globe to the new structures of thought made possible by the expansion of capitalist forms.<sup>15</sup> Andrew Sartori has shown how, in the nineteenth century, the concept of "culture" became a plausible language for ethical and political action in different locations, as capitalism came to mediate social life in different places in similar ways.<sup>16</sup> Timothy Mitchell has made a different kind of argument, explaining the emergence of the concept of *tarbiya* in part as a result of specific changes to modes of production in colonial Egypt.<sup>17</sup> He ties the rise of *tarbiya* to the emergence of modern forms of schooling and education, exemplified by the Lancaster method, that came to be seen as key technologies for producing the obedient, industrious laborers demanded by emerging industries and new forms of agricultural production

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(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Special section on "Global Liberalisms," Glenda Sluga and Timothy Rowse, eds. *Modern Intellectual History* (Nov 2015).

<sup>13</sup> Elshakry (2014).

<sup>14</sup> See Omnia El Shakry in *Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 126-170. Many theorists of *tarbiya* were Christians, however, leading to questions about how the concept may have resonated with a broader Mediterranean or Levantine intellectual life of which the Islamic tradition was only part.

<sup>15</sup> Andrew Sartori, *Bengal in Global Concept History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

<sup>16</sup> Sartori (2008).

<sup>17</sup> Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

in Egypt's colonial economy. As the next section of this chapter will show, nineteenth-century Lebanon also underwent important changes driven in part by global market integration and the rise of commodity production, particularly of fruit and silk. Yet, the concept of *tarbiya* that emerges in the pages of journals, textbooks, and publications in Ottoman Lebanon starting from about 1850 doesn't appear to derive its whole coherence or its particular contours from changes to social relations or modes of production inaugurated by the advent of capitalist structures. The rise of conditions of alienated labor, private property, and new forms of production and exchange, which are only partially understood in nineteenth-century Lebanese history in any case, cannot fully explain how *tarbiya* became a plausible language in which to express not only investments in discipline and quietism, but also in uplift and transformation.

In this chapter, then, I develop a different kind of argument. My aim is to explore a model of conceptual history that emphasizes links between the broad plausibility and popularity of concepts, on one hand, and political-economic transformations and institutional developments in specific times and places, on the other. This kind of argument is by definition not able to tackle multi-sited developments except as a provocation. How might the specific transformations I argue led to the importance and plasticity of pedagogical thought in Ottoman Lebanon resemble or diverge from analogous transformations elsewhere? Might these resemblances account for a multi-sited interest in education and pedagogy at this time?

By tracing the political economy of pedagogy in Ottoman Lebanon, I mean to track the complex articulations of financial, cultural, and social capital that served as the foundations of the new educational-institutional landscape that was established in the nineteenth century. I focus on the Protestant, Sunni, and Catholic educational networks because they were three of the most definitive in shaping that landscape and I was able to access rich archival material relating to

their functioning. Each of these networks (as well as additional networks belonging to Jewish, Russian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, and other communities) has been the subject of important scholarly analysis. This analysis, however, has largely dealt with Lebanese educational networks within a sectarian framework, reading vertically within communal archives rather than horizontally across them and thus lending credence (perhaps unwittingly) to the idea that education was primarily a “sectarian” endeavor and mainly served to sharpen communal boundaries.<sup>18</sup>

In contrast, I analyze three different sectarian networks to highlight the similarities and relationships among them. I show that while education was largely funded and carried out within the confines of communal structures throughout this period (i.e., Protestants paid for Protestant schools), in the pedagogical arena, these communities developed ideas and practices in close conversation with one another rather than in isolation. This led to the emergence of a hybrid concept of *tarbiya* and attendant debates about childhood, womanhood, and pedagogy which were shared between Muslims and Christians, locals and foreigners, and men and women. The contours of this concept will be the subject of Chapters 2 and 3. This chapter shows that the roots of this cross-communal debate about *tarbiya* were sown in the political and economic structures that defined the practice of education and the production of pedagogical thought.

The historiography of education in Ottoman Lebanon is richest in its treatment of university education, particularly the flagship institutions of the Protestant and Jesuit missions respectively,

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<sup>18</sup> On Protestants, see: Abu Ghazalah (1990); Badr (1992); Fleischmann (2010; 2013; 2009a; 2009b; 1998); Khalaf (2012); Lindsey (1965); Lindner (2009); Tibawi (1966); Womack (2015); Zachs (2006), et. al.. On Catholics, see: Eddé (2000); Corcket (1983); Gemayel (1984); Hachem (2003); Heyberger (1994; 2001); Jalabert (1931; 1956a; 1956b); Nordiguian (2003); Verdeil (2011); Zaka (2006). On Sunni Muslims and the Ottoman State, see: Ayyoubi (1966); Blake (1991); Denguilhem (1989; 1998); Evered (2012); Fakhoury (2008; 2013); Fortna (2002; 2011); Hanssen (2004; 2005); Johnson (1986); Shebaru (2001); Strohmeir (1988); Somel (2001); Şahin (2011); Schatkowski (1969). A recent collection of essays published in 2016 by the Orient Institut Beirut, *Entangled Education: Foreign and Local Schools in Ottoman Syria and Mandate Lebanon* (Hauser, Linder, and Moller, eds), is the first attempt that I know of to treat the question of education in late Ottoman Beirut outside of a sectarian framework.

the Syrian Protestant College (henceforth SPC, est. 1865) that became the American University of Beirut in 1920 and the Jesuit Université Saint-Joseph (henceforth USJ, est. 1875).<sup>19</sup> I argue that examining only the elite institutions of nineteenth-century Lebanon without attending to the capacious networks of primary and secondary schools that operated alongside them obscures the gender and class hierarchies that shaped these networks, as well as their attempts to facilitate or discourage certain kinds of social mobility and uphold particular visions of social order. The focus on universities and colleges has produced a scholarship which marks the achievements of elite institutions in producing (male) intellectuals, new notions of science, religion, and Arabic poetics, and new forms of political identity in the Arab East while obscuring the place of these institutions within a broader educational system whose lower levels also partly sought to produce obedient subjects among the non-elite. I argue that educating non-elite children as well as the scions of well-known families may have propagated for some what theorist Lauren Berlant terms a "cruel optimism"--a faith that education would produce social mobility in a future for which the common people were always "not yet"<sup>20</sup> ready, and which, for many, never appeared.<sup>21</sup>

Tracing the conceptual history of *tarbiya* is also partly a matter of studying elite discourse. I follow Sherene Seikaly (2015) in suggesting that the history of how elites have reproduced their power in the modern Middle East is as important, if not as romantic, as the history of the revolutionaries, peasants, and subalterns who have challenged their projects. As Seikaly's "elite

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<sup>19</sup> See for example Anderson (2009), Tibawi (1966), Hourani (1983), Abu-Ghazaleh (1990), Farag (1972), Zaka (2006), Eddé (2000), Gemayel (1984). Notable exceptions to this trend include Abdellatif Tibawi's seminal work, *American Interests in Syria, 1800-1901: A Study of Educational, Literary and Religious Work* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn's article on "the Lebanon Schools" in *The Syrian Land*, eds. Philipp and Schaebler (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1998), a recent edited volume on the "petits écoles" of Jesuit Father Joseph Delore (Nordigian 2003), as well as the impressive work of scholars who have focused on women, gender and the American Mission, notably Fleischmann (1999; 2009; 2010; 2013/14), Lindner (2009; 2011; 2013), and Womack (2012; 2015).

<sup>20</sup> To borrow a phrase from Dipesh Chakrabarty's *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

<sup>21</sup> Lauren Berlant, *Cruel Optimism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).



Palestinians envisioned and imagined the future not through anguish and disgust but through notions of progress, class distinction, and civilizational superiority," so too did elite Lebanese develop new educational institutions and pedagogical practices and ideas to imagine, envision, and to some extent bring about a future in which they would continue to occupy positions of power and privilege.<sup>22</sup> Elizabeth Thompson and others have drawn attention to the role of the French mandate in maintaining the dominance of Lebanese elite families into the post-Ottoman era.<sup>23</sup> This chapter suggests that the longevity of these families' prestige was not simply the result of colonial malfeasance--it was also one product of a set of institutions and discourses that local elites made for themselves before the onset of Grand Liban and the French Mandate after World War 1.

## II. Social Order and Nineteenth-Century Transformation in Ottoman Lebanon

Over the course of the nineteenth century, dramatic shifts in demography, economic life, political identification, and ideas and practices of governance threatened an existing social order in Ottoman Lebanon. In the crucible of Ottoman centralizing reforms and ever-increasing European presence and power, these changes threatened existing and emerging elites with economic displacement and political disempowerment. In the end, however, the power and prestige of elite families largely survived the change from a "nonsectarian hierarchical social order," based on horizontal ties between Maronite Catholic and Druze elites, to a "sectarian hierarchical social order" in which political and social identities were based not only on class but also on vertical and clientelist ties within communities.<sup>24</sup> Elites invested in education as they

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<sup>22</sup> Sherene Seikaly, *Men of Capital: Scarcity and Economy in Mandate Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).

<sup>23</sup> Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

<sup>24</sup> Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 81. The Maronite Church is a uniate Catholic church with a Patriarch based at Bkirké in Mt. Lebanon; adherents are spread throughout the Levant and the Lebanese diaspora; the Druze religion is an early offshoot of Islam. While these communities are today two of Lebanon's four politically

were facing and fending off these challenges to their power and authority; *tarbiya* and pedagogy emerged as ways to reinforce existing social hierarchies, in part by opening up the possibility of limited social mobility directed--and thus potentially contained and even coopted--by elites and their allies.

From the late seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century, social order in Ottoman Lebanon was bifurcated not according to religious sect but according to status. The central division was between local landholding elites, called *muqata'jis*, and the *ahali*, or the common Druze and Maronite villagers who "constitut[ed] the bulk of indigenous society."<sup>25</sup> The *muqata'jis* collected taxes for the Ottoman government on the land (*iqta'*) under their control with varying degrees of autonomy, "as long as they provided the High Porte with the fixed amount of purses, supplied armed men to the authorities when in need, and generally kept order in the regions under their control."<sup>26</sup> These families' power was thus rooted in their position as Ottoman officials, their ability to control those who lived and worked on their lands, and their authority over the distribution of agricultural resources.<sup>27</sup> Relationships between elite families, Christian, Druze, or Muslim, were structured around "basic assumptions about quietism shared with [Ottoman] Muslim rulers which gave meaning to a deeply conservative, pluralistic, and extremely hierarchal social order."<sup>28</sup> While violence could and did break out among families competing for resources and position, elites also built and maintained alliances across sect to preserve the control over land and labor that underpinned their power and prestige.<sup>29</sup>

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dominant sectarian communities (the other two being Sunni and Shi'a Muslims). Makdisi (2000) has argued, these sectarian identities were a product of the nineteenth century changes this chapter addresses.

<sup>25</sup> Makdisi (2000), 29.

<sup>26</sup> Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*. 2nd Edition. (New York: Pluto Press, 2012; orig. 2007), 3.

<sup>27</sup> Akarlı, Engin. *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1993), 16.

<sup>28</sup> Ussama Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 138.

<sup>29</sup> Makdisi (2000), 35.

In the first decades of the nineteenth century, this social order was challenged by a series of transformations outside of the control of either Lebanese *muqata'jis* or their Ottoman superiors. The first was the rise of Beirut as a center of political and economic power. Rural populations, mostly Maronite Christians, began to migrate from the Mountain to coastal towns like Beirut and Tripoli which were largely inhabited by Sunni Muslims and Orthodox Christians and overseen by their own merchant and landholding elites. The migrants hoped to take advantage of new economic opportunities and flee periodic outbreaks of violence.<sup>30</sup> In 1831, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Mohammed 'Ali, sent his son Ibrahim to wrest control of the Empire's Syrian provinces.<sup>31</sup> During the decade of Egyptian rule which followed Ibrahim's successful invasion, Beirut, which had been a sleepy market town of 6,000 souls at the century's beginning, overtook rival coastal hubs like Sidon and Acre to become the major port city of the Ottoman Mediterranean and the region's primary link for seaborne trade with Europe as well as with Egypt and Istanbul.<sup>32</sup> Rising demand for Lebanese silk intensified Beirut's trade ties with Europe, especially France, and drove the development of sophisticated local mechanisms for banking and credit as well as of a Lebanese laboring class with aspirations towards middle-class life.<sup>33</sup> Ottoman–European free trade agreements negotiated in 1838 and 1840 allowed Beirut merchants to capitalize on the new status of their city, often at the expense of peasants (largely Maronites and Shi'a) whose agricultural livelihoods were rendered vulnerable to international

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<sup>30</sup> Leila Tarazi Fawaz, *Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth-Century Beirut* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).

<sup>31</sup> This was less a bid for independence than a play for more power, access to resources, and autonomy within the Ottoman system. See Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2010).

<sup>32</sup> Fawaz (1983). Jens Hanssen cites a French Consular report noting that Beirut had already taken over from Sidon as the port of Damascus by 1808. See Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 28.

<sup>33</sup> Akram F. Khater, *Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). Hanssen (2005), 31-32.

markets as their land was turned over to fruit for export and mulberry cultivation to feed silkworms.<sup>34</sup>

The second major transformation that threatened to upend the Lebanese social order was the rise of new demands for and practices of representative governance, driven by Ottoman reforms from above and ongoing peasant revolt from below. As early as 1820-21, Shi'a and Maronite peasants in North Lebanon had refused to pay the high taxes demanded by their *muqata'ji* ruler, Bashir Shihab II, "signal[ing] the introduction of commoners into [Lebanese] political life" and representing the first threat to the *muqata'ji* order from below.<sup>35</sup> After his arrival in 1831, Ibrahim Pasha began to set up representative councils among local elites in Lebanese towns and cities, including Beirut.<sup>36</sup> This gesture, however, did not contain peasant opposition to Ibrahim's imposition of high taxes, new conscription to the *corvée*, and intensified resource extraction to support his push towards Istanbul. Ibrahim, too, faced repeated peasant revolts in Syria, Palestine and Mt. Lebanon from 1834 until his departure in 1840.<sup>37</sup>

In 1839, the Ottoman government issued the Hatt-i Sharif of Gülhane, the first of a series of reform decrees collectively known as the *tanzimat* (lit. "orderings," more often translated as "reforms.") They hoped the decree would help secure European support to halt Ibrahim Pasha's drive towards Istanbul and inspire confidence in Ottoman governance among local populations under Ibrahim's rule. The decree promised to abolish the practice of tax farming and to guarantee Ottoman citizens equal rights vis à vis conscription and taxation regardless of religion or ethnic group. It also introduced, for the first time, the notion that the government would be *accountable* to the desires of its population. It introduced, however, a problematic contradiction between "a

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<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>35</sup> Traboulsi (2007), 20. Also see Akarlı (1993), 18.

<sup>36</sup> Traboulsi (2007), 21; Hanssen (2005), 30.

<sup>37</sup> Makdisi (2000), 53.

notion of equality before the law regardless of rank and station" and the "rigid adherence to a hierarchical and inviolable social order" that still governed political life in Mt. Lebanon.<sup>38</sup> After over a decade of peasant opposition to *muqata'ji* and Egyptian rule, the Lebanese were eager to hear these new statements about equality before the state, but the notion of equality between citizens regardless of *sect*, articulated by the Gülhane decree, raised a pressing question about equality between citizens regardless of *class*.

Ongoing peasant grievances helped to produce further violent episodes in 1840-41. The 1840-41 events were fueled by clashes between notables fighting for control over land and tax revenue, and they were the first to be articulated by some as a fight between newly-politicized communities of "Maronites" and "Druze."<sup>39</sup> 1840-41 was also, however, a decisive moment in which Druze and Christian peasants, "united by their common fear and hatred of foreign troops and oppressive duties, and, more specifically, by their fear of conscription and disarmament," mobilized around a set of concrete demands based in part on the language and promises of the Gülhane decree. An 1840 proclamation penned by Christian, Druze, Sunni, and Shi'a villagers at Antilyas north of Beirut demanded tax reductions, "the abolition of the *corvée*, the restitution of firearms, the abolition of Bashir [Shihab's] monopoly over soap production, administrative reform, and," most importantly, "the representation of religious communities in the council (*diwan*) at [Bashir's palace] at Bayt al-Din."<sup>40</sup> Not to be left out of calls for representation, the Maronite Patriarch wrote to the Sultan to demand that he appoint a Maronite prince to rule in Mt.

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<sup>38</sup> Makdisi (2000), 38; 12

<sup>39</sup> Makdisi (2000), 63. This shift was inspired in part by Ibrahim's arming of the Shihabs against a Druze peasant revolt in the Hauran in 1838.

<sup>40</sup> Makdisi (2000), 58; Traboulsi (2007), 23.

Lebanon, who would "be assisted by a Maronite *mudabbir* (administrator) and 12 councillors representing the different sects, all elected for a period of three years."<sup>41</sup>

On the heels of the 1840-41 revolt, the British intervened to end Ibrahim Pasha's incursion into Ottoman territory. In a sign of Europe's growing presence in Lebanon, a joint British-Austrian-Ottoman committee organized the Egyptian withdrawal from Lebanon and greater Syria in 1841 and split Mt. Lebanon between two administrative districts (governorships or *qa'im maqamiyyas*), one for Christians in the North and one for Druze in the South.<sup>42</sup> This division enshrined new ideas about the sectarian nature of Lebanese politics that emerged more from European and Ottoman stereotypes about the Lebanese than from real transformations in Lebanese political subjectivities.<sup>43</sup> The 1841 division also institutionalized some of the new ideas about representative governance broached in the preceding conflagration. Each *qa'im maqamiyya* was endowed with a council presided over by the governor and composed of 12 members representing each of the six religious communities in Mt. Lebanon (Maronite, Druze, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Sunni Muslim and Shi`a Muslim) "to assist in the collection of taxes and the administration of justice."<sup>44</sup> While the ultimate decision to divide Mt. Lebanon in 1841 rested with the European-dominated commission, it was also partly a response to demands by both *ahali* and elites for more representative governance; the new form of sectarian representation it established threatened to weaken horizontal ties between elites in favor of vertical ties between elites and their co-religionists among the peasants, the *ahali*.

The tensions between sect and class and between hierarchy and equality that drove the administrative reorganization of 1841 laid the groundwork for civil war in 1858-61. The war

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<sup>41</sup> Traboulsi (2007), 21; Hanssen (2005), 33-34.

<sup>42</sup> It should be noted, of course, that this split in no way represented the demographic distribution of Christians and Druze in Mt. Lebanon; it was, rather, the product of an emerging discourse about sectarianism adopted for different reasons by European observers, Ottoman statesmen, and Lebanese elites. See Makdisi (2000).

<sup>43</sup> See Makdisi (2000).

<sup>44</sup> Traboulsi (2007), 36.

would crystallize the threat to established elites posed by peasant unrest and calls for representative governance. In 1858, a Lazarist-educated muleteer named Tanius Shahin led an uprising of Maronite peasants against their Christian landlords, the Khazins, in Kisrawan. The peasants were "galvanized by the Tanzimat, the ample amounts of weaponry available since the 1840s, a climate of economic hardship, and scarcity of land."<sup>45</sup> The revolt followed a second Ottoman reform decree, the Hatt-i Hümayun of 1856, which extended the promises made in 1839 and pledged equality in education, government appointments, and administration of justice to all citizens regardless of sect. Drawing on the reform decrees, Tanius Shahin and his followers demanded "equality between shaykhs and commoners; the abolition of the former's political and judicial privileges; the rescinding of additional taxes; the designation of one local governor, to be seconded by two elected commoners; the establishment of a tribunal of shaykhs and commoners to look into conflicts between the two parties."<sup>46</sup> As the revolt gained ground, the rebels eventually advanced the idea of a governor directly elected by the people. For the first time in Lebanese history, a peasant militia uprooted an elite family from their properties and seized their goods, leaving many Khazins homeless and destitute. Even more striking, perhaps, this was the first time an organized peasant resistance made claims to equality and representation that truly threatened existing elites.<sup>47</sup>

Tanius Shahin's success inspired Christian villagers further to the south to take up arms against their own *muqata'jis*, who in this case were mostly Druze. The ensuing events took on a sectarian character, and the massacres which followed ended in the death of roughly 15,000

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<sup>45</sup> Makdisi (2000), 95.

<sup>46</sup> Traboulsi (2007), 41. Also see Makdisi (2000), 100.

<sup>47</sup> Not everyone followed Tanius Shahin; for example, the peasants at Ghazir didn't join in the rebellion against the Hobeiche overlords.

Christians at the hands of their Druze overlords.<sup>48</sup> These events activated new political boundaries based on sect that had been latent since 1841, further threatening old cross-confessional alliances between elites and sharpening a new need to rally co-religionists based on vertical sectarian logics. The events of 1860-61 also drew the horror-struck eyes of both Ottoman statesmen and foreign diplomats to this remote corner of the empire. For the Ottomans, it was clear that major steps had to be taken to reestablish stable governance in the region, or they would face even more intense European intervention. The French landed ships in Beirut in 1861 to stop the fighting; for the Ottomans, their inability to keep order in their Lebanese lands was drawing to their shores the very thing they most feared. For Europeans and Americans, the 1860-61 massacres were proof that they must step up their efforts on behalf of their persecuted Lebanese co-religionists, Christians they saw as oppressed under Ottoman rule.

The war, then, lent new strength to the fourth major nineteenth-century challenge to Lebanese social order: the rise of European influence and power. In 1861, as in 1841, European representatives (in this case, from France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria) met in Beirut under the leadership of Ottoman foreign minister Fuad Pasha to decide the shape of Lebanon's postwar order.<sup>49</sup> They redrew administrative boundaries to establish the autonomous *mutasarafiyya* of Mt. Lebanon, an autonomous province under a Christian governor appointed by Istanbul that would be separate from the province (and city) of Beirut. They also decreed that the rule of the Istanbul-appointed governors would "depend on the cooperation of members of half-elected, half-permanent provincial councils which were made up of ulama [Muslim scholars] and wealthy local dignitaries."<sup>50</sup> Thus, the language of representative governance pushed forward by

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<sup>48</sup> Akarlı (1993), 30.

<sup>49</sup> Akarlı (1993), 31.

<sup>50</sup> Hanssen (2005), 39. These dictates were formalized by the *Règlement Organique* issued in 1864.



Ottoman reform and peasant revolt was included in the European-brokered peace, but only "ulama and wealthy local dignitaries" were to serve as representatives.

Meanwhile, European and American missionaries were stepping up their presence on Lebanese shores. A group of American Protestant Missionaries settled in Beirut in 1823, moving quickly to distribute biblical literature and found schools.<sup>51</sup> After their proselytizing efforts were violently discouraged by both the Maronite and Greek Orthodox Patriarchs as well as the Ottoman state in the 1820s, educational endeavors soon took on paramount importance. Shortly after, in 1831, a revived Company of Jesus (the Jesuits) returned to Lebanon to reform and Latinize the Eastern clergy (whom they deemed corrupt) and tie Lebanese Catholics more closely to Rome.<sup>52</sup> As France's imperial gaze began to look outwards after Napoleon III established the Second French Empire in 1852, and French merchants took part in an ever-more active silk trade that linked the Mountain to Lyon and Marseille, French influence began to supersede Italian influence among the Jesuit missionaries in Lebanon, particularly at their flagship clerical seminary (est. 1843) north of Beirut in the town of Ghazir.<sup>53</sup> The French also supported the work of another Catholic missionary-educational order, la Société de Saint Vincent de Paul (the Lazarists), who founded an elite collège (high school) at Antoura in Mt. Lebanon in 1834 and a flurry of primary schools in Beirut and its environs in the 1850s and 60s through their female teaching order, Les Filles de la Charité. Many other European missionary groups, including Prussian, English, and Scottish Protestants, French Capucins, and the Alliance Israélite Universelle, also arrived in Lebanon in the middle years of the nineteenth century. These groups

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<sup>51</sup> Tibawi (1966); Christine Lindner, "Negotiating the Field: American Protestant Missionaries in Ottoman Syria, 1823 to 1860" (Ph.D. diss., The University of Edinburgh, 2009); Deanna Womack, "Conversion, Controversy, and Cultural Production: Syrian Protestants, American Missionaries, and the Arabic Press, Ca. 1870-1915" ( Ph.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 2015).

<sup>52</sup> A previous Jesuit mission to the Levant had been shuttered when Pope Clement IX suppressed the Jesuit order in 1775.

<sup>53</sup> Falk in Hauser, et.al. eds. (2016); Verdeil (2011).

brought new sources of power, prestige, and financial capital to Lebanon that had the potential to upset the existing order and reshuffle, if not topple, Lebanese elites.

The arrival of these foreign missionaries, on top of the peasant revolts that rocked nineteenth century Lebanon and the consolidation of a new ideas and practices of representative governance, threatened established elites like the Khazins with economic displacement and political disempowerment. However, substantial evidence shows that many of the elite families who dominated the century's first decades remained powerful and wealthy at the century's end. In the years immediately following the issuing of the *Règlement Organique* of 1864, for example, Ottoman governor Daud Pasha forewent elections (which were themselves to be limited to the village shaykhs by the terms of the *Règlement*) and simply appointed members to the council. Needing to reestablish the strength and legitimacy of Ottoman governance in Lebanon, Daoud appointed many of the the old Maronite *muqata'ji* families to new administrative positions. They returned to their lands and became "a solid element" in the administrative system.<sup>54</sup> In need of a Druze proxy, Daoud also appointed a member of the Arslan family as his administrator in the Chouf mountains.<sup>55</sup> Even when the elections through which village shaykhs were to determine membership to the elected positions on the council began under Franco Pasha (g. 1868-73), "notables and religious leaders almost dominated the elections through their influence over the village shaykhs, who were mostly semiliterate and had little experience of nationwide politics."<sup>56</sup> A report by Vasa Pasha (g. 1883-1892) described the situation as follows:

"while all the privileges once enjoyed by the *muqata'jis* have become null and void in accordance with the [1864 *Règlement*], my predecessors have paid little attention to this subtle point and some of the offices became confined to certain families considered *muqata'ji*."<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Akarlı (1993), 152-153.

<sup>55</sup> Akarlı (1993), 153.

<sup>56</sup> Akarlı (1993), 87.

<sup>57</sup> Quoted in Akarlı (1993), 155.

Vasa himself, however, behaved no differently: when he wanted to assert his own power in Mountain politics, he appointed a member of the notable Abi Lam'a family in the Metn district and a member of the Jumblatts, a family of Druze notables, in the Chouf.<sup>58</sup>

In the final estimation, the years after 1860 opened politics to new elite actors but not to the *ahali*, despite the fact that many calls for more power and representation had come from below. As Akarlı describes, notables "as always" continued to play a large role in Mountain politics, although now they had to act within a larger system that allowed some previously second- or third-tier notables to rise through the ranks, provided they combined "bureaucratic-administrative skills with political acumen."<sup>59</sup> While the *Règlement* of 1864 appeared a serious threat to the social order, in practice "it attempted to juridically replace a nonsectarian elite culture with a sectarian one that emphasized the important role that disciplined, reformed, and coopted elites could and indeed had to play in the process of restoring an Ottoman social order. Notable society survived its own formal abolition; it persisted and even developed a new and modernized form which still dominates Lebanon today."<sup>60</sup>

Down below on the coast in Beirut, as in the Mountain, established families and a few of the newly-wealthy proved largely able to preserve a social order dominated by elites despite substantial transformations in social and economic life. The city's population experienced steady growth after 1860 and Beirut became the hub for new European commercial, diplomatic, and missionary efforts brought on by the 1858-61 war. These changes notwithstanding, the city's reigning elite remained largely intact throughout the period 1860-1900, although they admitted some new members to their ranks. A glance at the roster Beirut's municipal council from 1882-

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<sup>58</sup> Akarlı (1993), 156.

<sup>59</sup> Akarlı (1993), 161.

<sup>60</sup> Makdisi (2000), 162.

1902 is instructive in this regard. The council, also on its face a move towards more representative governance, was the most important decision-making body in late Ottoman Beirut.<sup>61</sup> It was also the "most powerful manifestation of the stranglehold of Beirut notables over its administrative hinterland."<sup>62</sup> In the council of 1882, for example, three members out of eight were "Beirut notables of at least the second generation, while another member, Ahmad Pasha al-Sulh, was a provincial notable originally from Sidon before he took residence in Beirut in the early 1860s."<sup>63</sup> From 1882 onwards, the most common names on the roster belonged to notable families like the Sursuqs, the Tuwaynis, the Ghandours, the Trads, the Dauqs, and the Bayhums, showing that many of those who were or became wealthy and prominent in Ottoman Lebanon in the first decades of the century remained so at the century's end--and some for many years thereafter.<sup>64</sup>

These old families were joined by men like 'Abd al-Qadir al-Qabbani, whose family rose to prominence in Beirut after 1840 by investing in real estate (hammams, shops, and houses in downtown Beirut), and later on by a new generation of Sunni Muslim notables like the Salams.<sup>65</sup> The composite of old and new elites that took shape around the council also took control over other new mechanisms of municipal governance, such as the joint-stock companies that drove development of the city's port, its electric lighting, and its rail and road transportation.<sup>66</sup> The elite

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<sup>61</sup> The council was first established by Ottoman governor Qabbuli Pasha in 1863, just after the civil war of 1860-61. The Ottoman Provincial law of 1864 then stipulated that all provinces were to have elected municipal councils to take charge of local affairs, law and order, and urban planning. See Kassir (2010), 133.

<sup>62</sup> Jens Hanssen, "From Social Status to Intellectual Activity: Some Prospographical Observations on the Municipal Council in Beirut, 1868-1908," in Philipp and Schumann, eds., *From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon* (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag in Kommission, 2004), 70.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> Hanssen (2004).

<sup>65</sup> For more on the rise of the Qabbanis, see Abdellatif Fakhoury, *Nur al-Fajr al-Sadiq: Mu'assissat Jama'iyyat al-Khairiyya al-Islamiyya fi Bayrut, 1295/1878* [The Light of the True Dawn: The Maqasid Islamic Benevolent Society of Beirut, 1295/1878], (Beirut: Dar al-Maqasid, 2013), 36-40.

<sup>66</sup> See Hanssen (2005). Although Hanssen refers to these people as "middle class," it is hard to see how this could be so given that many of them belonged to long-established landed families like the Sursuqs and the Tuwaynis, and, in order to be members on the council, all had to be among Beirut's 1%. He also remarks that "The families of the

nature of the council was no accident, nor was it a matter of the "choice" of all of the city's inhabitants: according to the electoral law of 1877, voting in council elections "was restricted to male Beirut residents above 25 years of age who paid a minimum of one hundred Ottoman piastres of (unspecified) tax annually and held no criminal record."<sup>67</sup> Few were also eligible to stand for election: as American missionary Henry Jessup estimated in 1880, "461 Christians of varied denominations and 263 (Sunni) Muslims were eligible to stand for municipal elections. In a city nearing the 100,000 mark this was less than 1 per cent of the total population."<sup>68</sup>

The resilience of both urban and rural elites through the end of the nineteenth century and indeed long into the twentieth is one of the curious features of Lebanese history. It is often attributed to the elitist policies of the French, who were mandatory powers in Lebanon from 1924-1948.<sup>69</sup> As the preceding discussion shows, however, by the time the French arrived as formal rulers in Lebanon, local elites and Ottoman administrators had already worked out a complex set of strategies to maintain existing distributions of power and prestige. As the following section of this chapter will suggest, Lebanese elite investment in education should be seen as one of these strategies.

### **III. The Political Economy of Pedagogy**

From about 1850 to 1900, Lebanon experienced a veritable educational boom as missionary, Ottoman, and Lebanese actors competed and worked together to found hundreds of new schools at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. The boom was driven by a competitive logic that produced connections and overlaps between communally-directed educational projects and created a shared educational space. Ottoman statesmen, Sunni Muslim

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council members generally held considerable urban *waqf* properties and/or were owners of large *wikalas*, streets, and entire *suqs*." Hanssen (2005), 159.

<sup>67</sup> Hanssen (2005), 150.

<sup>68</sup> Jessup, quoted in Hanssen (2005), 150.

<sup>69</sup> Thompson (2000) makes this point very compellingly.

and Maronite Christian elites, and Protestant and Catholic missionaries developed communal educational networks that competed over students and souls. One has to only open a document or a letter from any Protestant, Catholic, or Ottoman educator to come across the pervasive anxiety all felt about being outpaced by rival networks: all would have agreed with Soeur Gèlas, the head of the Lazarist Catholic order, the Filles de Charité, in Beirut, who described the fight as "a hand-to-hand battle [une prise corps à corps]." <sup>70</sup> As a Protestant educationalist, probably SPC founder Daniel Bliss, put it in 1861, "it is in fact no longer a question whether or not education is to be obtained, *but simply who are to be the teachers.*" <sup>71</sup> According to the first report of the Beirut-based charitable and educational organization, the Maqasid Islamic Benevolent Society (*Jama'iyat al-Maqasid al-Khairiyya al-Islamiyya*, est. 1878), a central reason they worked to found primary schools in Beirut was to draw even with other religious communities. "For quite some time," they wrote, other communities had "started to establish charitable associations [who aimed to open] schools for boys and girls to teach them the various sciences, disciplines, and languages [...] the Muslim community has been oblivious [to these developments]." <sup>72</sup> The Ottoman governor, for his part, wrote in an 1890 report to Istanbul that "the locations of Beirut and Mt. Lebanon are known for their delicate geopolitical position, as they have been the object

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<sup>70</sup> *Bulletin de L'Oeuvre des Écoles de Orient*. January 1877, 82. The French Catholics often described educational competition through military metaphors. In a letter from 1876, Jesuit Father Louis Abogit described the fight around Moallaqah-Zahle, the heartland of the Jesuit teaching orders, thus: "The fight [against the Protestants] will be hot and may last a long time. When they send forces to defend their terrain foot by foot, hand to hand [lit. thumb to thumb, *pouce à pouce*], when we pull their students of both sexes away from them bit by bit, when they see before them nothing but cold faces, when they are plagued day and night and put up against the wall, when a general outcry is raised against them in the churches, the houses, the streets; then they will need much courage and determination to stand their unpopularity [...]" . Vanves, *Lettres de VALS*, October 1876.

<sup>71</sup> "Reasons for the Establishment of the Syrian Protestant College." AUB Archives, 1.6.2 MSS AUB 28 Box 3: SPC Memorabilia.

<sup>72</sup> *Jami'yyat al-Maqasid al-Khairiyya al-Islamiyya*, "al-Fajr al-Sadiq" ["The True Dawn] (Bayrut: Dar al-Makasid, 1984, orig. 1880), 10.

of greedy intentions by the French, English and (in the second degree) the Americans [...] you can see the numerous large buildings, schools, and hospitals built by the foreigners."<sup>73</sup>

This competition between the various communal networks for students and souls led them to build schools side by side in order to better attract one another's students and keep track of each other's doings. An 1893 report about the Filles de la Charité in the Lazarists' home journal, the *Annales*, recalls how the Filles discovered that Protestants in the town of Abeih "had founded an establishment and produced a number of converts."<sup>74</sup> In response, the Filles immediately decided "to establish, there and in various other villages, schools for girls."<sup>75</sup> This logic also drove the establishment of the Jesuit Université Saint Joseph in Beirut in 1875, as the Jesuit fathers decided that the best way to combat Protestant influence in Beirut was to start their own college despite their Paris-based superiors' lack of enthusiasm for the project.<sup>76</sup> The Ottomans adopted a similar strategy: a 1904 telegram sent from Istanbul to the empire's Asian provinces stipulated that "provincial [Ottoman] administrators were instructed to ascertain whether or not there were any Muslim schools to be found near the American schools. If not, they were to report confidentially on the feasibility of founding Muslim counterparts."<sup>77</sup>

The competition and overlap between the various school networks in Ottoman Lebanon meant that the networks would come to share pedagogical approaches and even students.<sup>78</sup> Most

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<sup>73</sup> BOA Y.PRK.MF 2/53 No. 1 [15 rabiülevvel, 1312 (16 September 1894)].

<sup>74</sup> "Rapport sur les oeuvres des filles de la charite en syrie." *Annales de la Congregation de la Mission de Saint Vincent de Paul* (1893), 106. Likewise, in Moallaqah-Zahle, the heartland of the Jesuit teaching orders, Father Louis Abogit not only allowed but in fact "begged" a local preacher to take over the Jesuits' classes--with the one condition "that a school for boys be opened immediately next to that the Protestants had the audacity to erect next to the Cathedral church." See "Les Protestants au Moallaquah et à Zahleh." Archives de la Compagnie de Jésus, Vanves, France (henceforth ACJV), Letters de VALS, October 1876.

<sup>75</sup> "Rapport sur les oeuvres des filles de la charite en syrie." *Annales de la Congregation de la Mission de Saint Vincent de Paul* (1893), 106.

<sup>76</sup> Letter from P. Monnier to P. Beckx, November 1863. Reprinted in Sami Kuri, *Une Histoire du Liban à travers les archives des jésuites*. Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq, 1985. [Document 53](#).

<sup>77</sup> MKP 86/22-2136 [27 Cemaziyelevvel 1322 (9 August 1904)] Quoted in Fortna (2002), 93.

<sup>78</sup> The crossing of communal lines in education or otherwise would have been even less remarkable prior to the nineteenth century, before "sectarianism" emerged as the dominant way of understanding the Lebanese social order.

of the primary and secondary schools stressed their openness to children from all sects.<sup>79</sup> Secondary schools adopted overlapping curricula, offering subjects like chemistry, biology, bookkeeping, and foreign language that were much in demand among students.<sup>80</sup> These curricular similarities facilitated the transfer of students between the networks. ‘Umar Salih al-Barghouti, for example, went from a Francophone primary school operated by the Alliance Francaise and the Catholic Frères Chrétiennes in Jerusalem to the Ottoman high school, the *Sultaniyya*, in Beirut.<sup>81</sup> The *Sultaniyya* also enrolled sons of elite Christian families from Beirut like the Trads and the Ghandours who would likely also have attended Catholic primary schools. Esther Moyal, a Jewish woman who grew up in Beirut, attended the Beirut Female Seminary run by the American Protestant Mission; ‘Umar Dauq, who would go on to serve as President of the Maqasid, was educated at the Catholic collège at Antoura and would later serve on its board.<sup>82</sup> These students and schools inhabited an educational landscape in which schools were founded and funded along sectarian lines (i.e., Protestants paid for Protestant schools), but were also marked by overlap and cross-pollination.

Three educational networks dominated this cross-sectarian educational landscape: a French Catholic network built around Lebanon's Maronite community, a Protestant network built around American missionaries and their Lebanese interlocutors, and a Sunni Muslim network built around the Maqasid Islamic Benevolent Society and the Ottoman state.<sup>83</sup> In what follows, I

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As Makdisi (2000) has shown, it was unremarkable that Maronite scholars like Asa‘d al-Shidyaq, who graduated from a Maronite seminary at ‘Ayn Waraqa, might be employed by a variety of Druze, Shi‘a, and Muslim notables as well as Maronites.

<sup>79</sup> Chantal Verdeil, *La mission jésuite du Mont-Liban et de Syrie: 1830-1864* (Paris: Les Indes Savants, 2011), 32 (on USJ); Hanssen (2005), 184 (on the *Sultaniyya*); Letter from Yusuf Debs, 1880. MAE 67 ADP Folder: Beyrouth (on la Sagesse).

<sup>80</sup> Important differences between curricula remained; these will be more fully discussed in the next section.

<sup>81</sup> Hanssen (2005), 178-180; Selim Tamari, “The Last Feudal Lord in Palestine.” *Jerusalem Quarterly File*, no. 16 (November 2002).

<sup>82</sup> Hauser et. al., eds. (2016).

<sup>83</sup> This chapter will focus on two of the most prominent Catholic orders, the Lazarist Mission de Saint Vincent de Paul and the Compagnie de Jésus (the Jesuits). Their rise in nineteenth-century Lebanon was mirrored by that of



investigate the funding structures, curricula, hierarchies, and exclusions that characterized these three networks to show how all conveyed the possibility that education could be a means to individual and communal transformation, while each also sought to produce and preserve a particular vision of social order on their own terms. It was in this context that *tarbiya* and pedagogical thought more generally arose as a plausible language for articulating both the broad and tantalizing possibilities of individual social mobility and communal progress, as well as elite hopes that their versions of social order could be brought forward into a new age, unaltered.

### **The Catholic Network**

The first educational network was established by Catholic missionaries, the French government, and Lebanon's Maronite community. Many of the different Catholic institutions and organizations that operated schools in Lebanon were funded by yearly grants from missionary organizations (principally *L'Oeuvre des Écoles d'Orient*, which was established in Paris in 1856 to support Catholic missionary schools in the Ottoman Empire, and *L'Oeuvre de la Propagation de la Foi*, founded in Lyon in 1822) as well as from the French government.<sup>84</sup> While missionary orders and French diplomats called upon local elites to distribute educational funds, local elites used their access to new educational spaces to reaffirm a vision of social order in which their family positions and patronage networks were secure. This dovetailing of missionary and elite interests created an arrangement in which elite institutions trained, certified, and socialized the children of the privileged, while basic primary schools educated non-elite children in literacy, obedience, and piety. Together, however, the twin projects of elite and non-elite education

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other Catholic orders not described here, including the Sœurs de Saint-Joseph de l'Apparition, who had 306 students in 1860 and 1628 in 1900, and the Frères des Écoles Chrétiennees, with 408 students in 1892 and 655 in 1894. See Chantal Verdeil, "La Classe « Sous Le Chêne » et Le Pensionnat." *Outre-Mers* 94, no. 354–355 (2007): 197–221.

<sup>84</sup> Although the French government and the Jesuits had "divergent goals and measures for progress" in the nineteenth century, particularly after the coming of the anti-clerical Third Republic in 1870, the Jesuits remained throughout a "useful ally of French interests abroad;" their work in Lebanon served both Jesuit interests and those of the French state. See Edward Falk, "From Lyon to Liban" in Linder et. al., eds. (2016), 166-167.

produced a belief in education as a transformative force across a broad swath of Lebanese society.

Elite Catholic secondary education in Lebanon revolved around the Jesuit clerical seminary at Ghazir (est. 1843), which made a rapid transition to lay education and became Beirut's *Université Saint Joseph* (USJ) in 1875, and the elite boarding school at Antoura run by the Lazarist Congregation de Saint Vincent de Paul. These institutions served mostly to reaffirm the existing social order by credentialing and socializing the sons of the region's elite. The Ghazir seminary was originally meant to reform and latinize a new generation of Lebanese Catholic priests who could reform the wayward Eastern churches; it graduated a broad array of future clerical and lay leaders.<sup>85</sup> It also became a school of choice for the sons of the region's leading Maronite landholders, graduating the sons of notable Lebanese families like the Khazins, Hobeiches, Dahdahs, el-Khourys, Zouains, Nassars, and el-Hajjs.<sup>86</sup> As Jesuit Father P. Badour confirmed, at USJ, as at Ghazir, "the greatest number [of students] belong[ed] to established families."<sup>87</sup> The other school of choice, Antoura, also did its share of educating the sons of Lebanon's elite, although their educational program was focused on lay students from the outset:

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<sup>85</sup> Verdeil (2011), 365. Falk notes that "within a few decades [of 1860] a large portion of the Melkite and Maronite clerical hierarchy were products of the French-Catholic education system, including Maronite patriarch Elias Hwayik [...]" Falk (2016), 176. Samy Zaka has noted that the students at USJ were "drawn from the elite among the local population." Zaka, "Education and Civilization in the Third Republic: The University Saint-Joseph, 1875-1914" (PhD diss., Notre Dame, 2006), 10).

<sup>86</sup> According to student lists from Ghazir prepared for Père Sami Kuri, likely in the early 1980s, Ghazir's students included boys from the notable families of Khazin, Khoury, Masa'ad, Mourad, Nasser, Rizk, Sassine, Sema'an, Sfeir, and Tabet, among others. See Archives de la Compagnie de Jésus au Liban (henceforth ACJL) 14.b.1 Nos. 22-30. As Ussama Makdisi has noted, the secular and clerical elite in Mt. Lebanon were deeply intertwined: "a deeply symbiotic relationship existed," he has argued, "between secular and ecclesiastical authorities of Mt. Lebanon" in the nineteenth century, for example between Druze *qadis* and the Shihab emirs and between the Khazins and the Maronite Church. See Makdisi (2000), 39.

<sup>87</sup> Letter from P. Badour to "Madmoiselle," one of the Filles de la Charité in Paris. ACJV, Letters to SJ Beirut, 15 Oct 1878.

Antoura's student lists from the 1870s and 80s include sons (sometimes multiple sons) of notable families like Gemayel, Dagher, Sfeir, Sursuq, Karam, Khazin, Frangié, and Lahoud.<sup>88</sup>

High fees at USJ, Antoura, and later on at Maronite-run Catholic collèges like Cornet Chaouan and St. Jean Maron ensured that paying students would be drawn from elite families.<sup>89</sup> Other students at the collèges were funded by "scholarships" (*bourses*) from Catholic missionary organizations and the French government. These bourses re-inscribed rather than mitigating the elite character of Catholic secondary education.<sup>90</sup> The French earmarked the bourses for the children of the region's elite: a note attached to the 1862 list of French subventions (grants) to Catholic schools and charitable organizations in the Levant notes that the 80 bourses given to Antoura in that year were intended for "les enfants des emirs et de cheikhs."<sup>91</sup> Bourses at Ghazir, Antoura and later on at other top-tier Catholic colleges were awarded through a process of consultation that involved both local elites and the French Consulate in Beirut. A parent or recommender would write a letter requesting a bourse for a particular child, specifying the

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<sup>88</sup> Student lists, Antoura Archives.

<sup>89</sup> In 1850, a Ghazir education for lay students cost 1500 kuruş (15 Ottoman lira) per year; by 1872, it was 1800 kuruş plus 250 for "incidentals" (20.5 lira). In 1890, USJ cost 600 francs (26 Ottoman lira) and Antoura 400 (17.32 lira); the native-run Maronite Catholic colleges ran to 250-300 francs (10.83-13 lira). CADN 92 PO A 150. Conversions based on Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 209. Pamuk notes that the value of the gold lira rose in comparison to the silver kuruş or piaster in the 1880s; the lira also increased in value relative to the kuruş with increasing distance from Istanbul. Therefore, these are rough calculations. The lira remained stable against the pound, the dollar, and the franc between 1850 and 1914. It appears from the Ghazir *Diares* that there was some negotiation of fees and not all students paid the same amount; for example, when the wife of the Emir Selim sent her representative to demand admission for her son Joseph to the school on October 8, 1873, she announced that she would pay no more than 1200 kuruş; the rector responded that she would have to pay the "full tariff" of 1800 kuruş. On October 11 of the same year, however, "le petit" Daoud Khorrat, was received at a rate of 1400 piastres per year. ACJL, *Ghazir Diares*, Notes Jalabert, 18 Sept 1872.

<sup>90</sup> Government *bourses* came later to Ghazir than to Antoura (1861 vs. 1853 or prior), probably due to strained relations between France's Second Republic government (1848-1870) and the Jesuits. MAE 67 ADP 16 "Secours Religieux."

<sup>91</sup> MAE 67 ADP 16, Secours Religieux. Likewise, an 1861 request for *bourses* for the Jesuit schools written by M. Bentivoglio, the French Consul in Beirut, to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs noted that "it is important that the education of the sons of emirs, cheikhs, and the notables of the land is given by the French, and that the benefits that it reaps make dear the name of France." MAE 67 ADP 16.

preferred college; USJ ("chez les Jésuites") and Antoura were by far the most often preferred.<sup>92</sup>

The Consulate in Beirut would prepare a list of these requests along with recommendations for how the bourses should be allocated. The list and recommendations would then be sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for approval.

Local clerical elites like Archbishop Boustani of Beirut and heads of notable families like the Khazins wrote on behalf of many prospective students. While having a notable or important cleric for a recommender was no guarantee of a bourse, students with a "known" recommender or parent were much more likely to receive one than those whose recommenders were listed as "unknown" (*inconnu*).<sup>93</sup> In an even more direct form of influence, in 1867, the governor of Mt. Lebanon Daoud Pasha (g. 1861-1868), sent the Jesuits at Ghazir a list of students whom he had identified for a bourse: the Ghazir *Diare* from 4 September records the receipt of a letter from Daoud, "carried express from [the Governor's palace] at Beit-ed-Din, which asks that the P. Recteur send the list of students to whom he has assigned one fourth of the bourses, so that the Pasha can apportion the others to children of his choice, subject to the approval of the P. Recteur."<sup>94</sup> Given the role local elites played in determining the distribution of bourses, it is not surprising that in 1880-81, the 16 recipients (out of 55 total requests) were dominated by the sons

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<sup>92</sup> There was a clear hierarchy between the two tiers of Catholic colleges apparent both from surveying students' requests and from the amounts given by the French in "subventions" to each one. While a bourse at Antoura, Sagesse, the Greek Catholic Collège Patriarcat, and USJ was worth 400, 400, 400, and 600 francs respectively, other colleges were worth less (bourses at Aramoun were 240 francs; at St. Jean Maron, 250). Numbers from CADN 92 POA 121; CADN 92 PO A 150; MAE 67 ADP 16.

<sup>93</sup> CADN 92 PO A 122. Folder: Demandes Bourses Accordees 1880-1881.

<sup>94</sup> ACJL. Ghazir *Diares*, Notes Jalabert, 4 September 1867. Lower tiers of Lebanese elites also got to have their say in the apportioning of French funds. In 1883, M. Gergairy, an ambitious cleric from the town of Zahle in the Bekaa, wrote to Jesuit M. Billotet proposing to establish an "ecole normale" and a "collège" in Zahle. He promised that "children from rich and influential families as well as from less favored families will come from all villages with the intention of receiving our instruction [...] we will raise them according to our views and, after having conquered their hearts for France, give them French character and language." See MAE 67 ADP 15. Letter from M. Gergairy to M. Billotet, 8 Juin 1883. In the end, Gergairy got funding for primary schools but not his école normale.

of the Maronite elite.<sup>95</sup> These 16 were joined by the students nominated by the French Vice Consul, Maronite notable Assad Karam, and the prominent Daher family. Each recommended three students, who were sometimes (in the case of the Dahers and Karam) their relations, and otherwise likely to be scions of other elite families--in this case, a son of the Frangiés (another Maronite notable family) and the son of one M. Turbey, the headman of Tannourine.<sup>96</sup>

The French desire use Lebanese elites as proxies sometimes clashed with the desires of Lebanese elites themselves, who wanted a free hand to distribute the bourses in ways that would shore up their own power and prestige. For example, when Maronite Bishop of Beirut Yusuf Debs was allocated six of the 1880 bourses for the Maronite college *La Sagesse (al-Hikma)* that he had founded Beirut in 1875, he expressed a desire to distribute them only in his own diocese.<sup>97</sup> The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by demanding that the bourses be distributed "in all of the parts of Lebanon, so that the good deeds of the Government of the French Republic will be well recognized among the whole and not a fraction of the Maronite community."<sup>98</sup> As their selection process makes clear, however, the "Maronite community" they had in mind was an elite one.

The Catholic colleges became a node of cultural as well as political and financial capital in Lebanon, as they were designed to train, socialize, and credential their elite male clientele to maintain their social status in a changing world. At the same time, the curricula of these same institutions appeared to open up the white-collar professions to children from across the social spectrum. The 1877 Prospectus at USJ, for example, marketed an education that would

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<sup>95</sup> Alongside the son of the dragoman (translator) for the Italian Consulate, the list included a Khazin, a Shihab, a Tabet, a Shalhoub, a Ghanem, a Ghandour/Trad, a Bellama, and two Dahdahs (the note for Sherfan Dahdah reminded the Consul that his family was "*riche*.") CADN 92PO/A/122. Demandes Bourses Accordees 1880-1881.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> The bourses were to be 400 francs each. MAE 67 ADP 1. 5 April 1880. Letter from Yusuf Debs to M. le Baron Courcelle, Directeur MAE.

<sup>98</sup> CADN 92 POA 121.

"encompass all of the knowledges (*connaissances*) that could open for a young, intelligent man all of the liberal careers, help him access the highest positions, and acquit himself with honor" on the French baccalaureate exam.<sup>99</sup> Antoura and USJ offered Turkish, modern Greek, English, German and Italian alongside history, geography, arithmetic, algebra, bookkeeping, and commercial accounting.<sup>100</sup> The acquisition of good character through daily school life and study of the literary arts was linked to future success in white-collar professions like diplomacy, medicine or trade: "the treasures of poetry and eloquence," USJ's prospectus argued, offered "indispensable resources for the study of the sciences, particularly medicine and law."<sup>101</sup> By rhetorically linking "the highest positions" and "all of the liberal careers" to the acquisition of new, teachable skills rather than to inheritance or family name, the programs of the Catholic colleges invited the possibility of a new kind of social mobility, despite the fact that the selection process made that social mobility difficult, if not impossible, to access.

Catholic missionaries, Lebanese elites, and the French government invested in primary education for non-elite boys and girls as well as for the elite sons who would go on to USJ, Antoura, or another Catholic collège. Starting in the 1840s, Jesuit teaching orders (Xavieriens, Mariamettes, and Pauvres Filles du Sacré-Coeur) joined the Lazarist Filles de la Charité in educating a large number of boys and girls in Catholic primary schools.<sup>102</sup> Local elites played a

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<sup>99</sup> ACJV, USJ Prospectus 1877, p. 2.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, for Antoura's curriculum see CADN 92 PO A 145. Folder: Diplomas. Diplomas from the 1880s and 90s shows that the second-tier Maronite colleges run by Lebanese clergy offered some of the "new" subjects on offer at Antoura and USJ alongside the subjects of a clerical education. Although the USJ and Antoura diplomas included graded sections for "conduct," "civility," and "character," Maronite colleges like la Sagesse (est. 1875 by Bishop Yusuf Debs) went further, listing subjects like "catechism," "dogma," and "morale" alongside arithmetic and jurisprudence. They also didn't offer the range of European languages offered by the top tier, substituting instead Church languages like Syriac and Hebrew. See CADN 92 PO A 145.

<sup>101</sup> ACJV, USJ Prospectus 1877, p. 2.

<sup>102</sup> In 1863, the Pauvres Filles du Sacré-Coeur had 2,425 students in the Bekaa, the Mariamettes had 1,180 in Mt. Lebanon, and the Xavieriens had 1,750. *Bulletin des Oeuvres des Ecoles d'Orient* (henceforth *BOEO*), 1863, 213. By 1901-1902, there were a total of 13,195 students in Jesuit primary schools (11,970 of whom were outside of Beirut). ACJV Prat 26. "Ecoles de la Mission de Syrie, 1901-1902." The Mariamettes and Soeurs de Sacre Coeur were officially united in 1874. For a detailed history of these congregations, see Claire Guillaume, *La congrégation*

central role in the development of primary education, and the primary level, like the secondary level, was divided between those who could and could not pay. Both the Lazarists and the Jesuits ran two kinds of primary schools: one fee-paying for elite sons and daughters, and one "gratuite." The cost of studying at the fee-paying schools was steep: to be a boarding student at a Filles school in Beirut in 1856, for example, the bill was 400 francs (17.6 Ottoman lira); even if, as S. Gélas reported, most paid "only half," 200 francs would still have ensured that only the children from wealthy families could attend.<sup>103</sup> The primary teaching orders received funds from Europe as "bourses" to support students; as at the collèges, however, these also mostly went to better-off children.<sup>104</sup> Some "paying" students may have come from families who were newly wealthy, but did not possess the social and symbolic capital of the old *muqata'ji* and administrative elites that helped students to receive a bourse. The Filles de la Charité received more bourses than the Jesuits and thus may have attracted more students from the older elite class.<sup>105</sup> They competed with other missionary orders for fee-paying students and presumably molded their educational program accordingly.

The Jesuit primary teaching orders received fewer bourses from France and were more likely to educate non-elite students, but this didn't decrease their involvement with local elite society. In a few wealthy urban areas like Deir al-Qamar and Beirut, local notables and clergy partnered with the Jesuits to found schools that would satisfy the desire of well-to-do parents for

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*des soeurs des Saints-Coeurs de Jésus et de Marie au Mont-Liban dans la deuxième moitié du XIX siècle* (MA Thesis, Paris-Sorbonne, 2015); Henri Jalabert, *Histoire d'un siècle. La congrégation des soeurs de Jésus et de Marie au Liban et en Syrie. 1853-1953* (Beyrouth: USJ, 1956).

<sup>103</sup> Letter from S. Gélas to M. Étienne, 3 Jan 1856. *Annales* 1856, 519.

<sup>104</sup> S. Gélas wrote to Father Superieur M. Etienne in 1861 that she planned to use her 10,000 francs from the French government that year to "take back the young ladies of the grand families that are now accepting places at the [rival] school of the [Protestant] Prussian deaconesses." *Annales* 1862, 500. Letter from S. Gélas to M. Etienne, 23 May 1861. For French data corroborating the amount, see MAE 67 ADP 16.

<sup>105</sup> The Jesuit teaching orders did not begin receiving French government subventions, it appears, until 1873—at least 20 years after the Filles de la Charité. See MAE 67 ADP 16. Even then, the amounts were substantially smaller (1000 francs went to the Jesuit primary schools in 1873, compared to a subvention of 10,000 to the Filles de la Charité in 1865). See MAE 67 ADP 8.

a bourgeois, French-language education for their children; these schools probably attracted the same kind of students as the Filles' fee-paying options.<sup>106</sup> Local elite families like the Gemayels, Musallims, and Hobeikas, however, also established and maintained the teaching orders that would establish Jesuit schools outside of these wealthy areas. These families dedicated land, property, and revenues from their *awqaf* (pious foundations) to rural, non-elite, non-paying schools. Many of these families' daughters became members of the teaching orders as well.<sup>107</sup> Without this kind of elite support, indeed, the teaching orders would falter: lacking a wealthy urban clientele or local allies like the Gemayels, Hobeikas, and Musallims, for example, the Xavériens found themselves unable to keep their schools open on the paltry sums coming in from France and were disbanded in 1875.<sup>108</sup>

Under this system, dominated by local elites who paid for schools and a system of bourses directed towards their children, elite students were filtered out from non-elite students even at the primary level, allowing two different pedagogical approaches to work side-by-side. As Verdeil describes, "paying" Jesuit schools offered a "bourgeois [primary] education" in which "French and Arabic language, as well as lessons in history, geography, arithmetic, and drawing" were taught alongside "European etiquette."<sup>109</sup> This contrasted with the situation in rural areas, where "the schools were for the most part financed by the villagers, always taught by local clergy who were content to teach Catechism and the rudiments of Arabic,"<sup>110</sup> or by the elite-funded Jesuit teaching orders. The teaching orders' pedagogy centered around obedience, piety, and

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<sup>106</sup> Verdeil (2011), 399-400. Language was an important educational and political battleground. See Falk (2016) and Deanna Womack, "Lubnani, Libanais, Lebanese: Missionary Education, Language Policy and Identity Formation in Modern Lebanon," *Studies in World Christianity* 18:1 (2012) pp 4-20.

<sup>107</sup> Verdeil (2011); Guillaume (2015). A list of the Soeurs de Sacre Coeur and Mariamettes from 1853-1927 includes daughters of prominent families like Hanna Eddé (d. 1874); Mariana Houry (d. 1877); and Trizia Boustani (d. 1878). See "*Asma' al-ikhwat al-mutawafiyat fi jama'iyat qalbi yesua wa mariam al-aqdisayn mundhu nasha'iha sena 1853 ila sena 1927*," ACJL 9.c.5.

<sup>108</sup> Verdeil (2011), 405.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, 220.



basic literacy rather than preparation for professional life or admission to the colleges. A list of pedagogical directives for the Xavériens, who ran Jesuit village primary schools for boys between c. 1862 and 1875, for example, begins with advice about the frequency with which students must take communion and go to confession, alongside suggestions about modesty and decorum (*al-hishma*). The section on "orderliness" (*al-tertib*) began by noting that "all teachers, when they are working with students, should have their hands on a rod."<sup>111</sup>

The two pedagogical models, fee-paying and free, sometimes ran literally side by side: in 1866, for example, the Filles de la Charité were running both a paying and a free school in Damascus, 130 kilometers inland from Beirut. The paying school was for the girls "whose parents enjoyed a relative degree of affluence" and offered a "bourgeois education where the leisurely arts figured prominently;" there, they taught "French and Arabic language, as well as lessons in history, geography, arithmetic, and drawing."<sup>112</sup> Less affluent, non-paying students in Damascus were educated at a second school, where they were taught only "the first principles of French and 'a little bit of history and arithmetic' [and] geography was replaced by 'manual work appropriate to their condition.'"<sup>113</sup> The possibility that students at the free schools who did not not already hail from elite backgrounds would progress from the primary schools to the colleges was slim. As Father Michel, the director of Jesuit schools in Beirut, wrote in 1903: "the students in our schools in Beirut belong, for the most part, to poor parents who practice different trades.

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<sup>111</sup> "Maitres Xavériens: Directives Pédagogiques." APO [Archive Proche Orient, USJ, Beirut], Xavériens, 9 B 37. Published in Kuri (1985), 332-333.

<sup>112</sup> Lettre from Soeur Marie, Fille de la Charité, Supérieure de la maison de Saint-Joseph à Damas, 9 Nov 1886, *BOEO*, Janvier 1887, p. 15-17. Quoted in Verdeil, "La Classe « Sous Le Chêne » et Le Pensionnat," p. 213.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.* It was perhaps the boys' version of such a school that educated the leader of the 1858 Kisrawan revolt, Tanius Shahin, whose enrollment at a Lazarist school in his mountain hometown of Rayfun gave him the ability to travel to and from Beirut as well as key connections with local clergy. See Makdisi (2000), 109.

The students generally take up the profession of their father; although there are some destined for trade or office work."<sup>114</sup> Only a small number, he admitted, were destined for the colleges.<sup>115</sup>

It appears that pedagogy and curricula were similar for boys and girls in the Catholic primary schools, as seemed to be the case also among their Protestant and Muslim colleagues. Gender did, however, prevent women from attending the Catholic collèges until long in to the twentieth century, although schools like the Collège des Dames de Nazareth established in Beirut in 1868 expanded opportunities for elite girls to receive a "bourgeois education" as described above. Primary education was thus the beginning and end of education for most Lebanese women as well as most non-elite boys. Catholic girls' education was not directed at "opening" liberal careers or high positions, as the USJ prospectus promised to boys, but rather at reforming local Christian communities and training pious mothers to raise future sons in the faith. Jesuit missionaries considered the primary education of girls a "not merely an indifferent or even simply a good thing, but a work of the first order [*une oeuvre de premier ordre*]" because Eastern Christians had suffered "contagion by the infidel milieu in which they are as drowned."<sup>116</sup> Educating girls would shore up Christian communities from within against the infidel contagion. Girls also had to be educated to prepare them for virtuous motherhood: as M. Depeyre, Superior General of the Antoura college, put it, "the first education"--"that which the mother gives in the home"--constituted "the fundamental building block of moral life" that was "completely lacking [in the Levant]."<sup>117</sup>

Girls' education was advertised as a mechanism, then, through which Catholic missionaries would transform Eastern Christian communities from within. For boys, the

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<sup>114</sup> Rapport du R. P. Michel. *Annales* 1903, 121.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>116</sup> CADN 92 PO A 140. Rapport, "Les Religieuses de Syrie: des SS CC de Jésus et Marie et l'éducation des jeunes filles," 14 Feb 1887, 2.

<sup>117</sup> *Annales* 1856, 23. Letter from M. Depeyre to M. Salvayre.

combination of the professional credentials and elite socialization offered by the Catholic collèges and the broader availability of primary education in Catholic schools inspired hopes that education could serve as a transformative force in two senses. For elites, the new collèges held the key to future status and white-collar employment for their sons: while land might be threatened by peasant revolt or wealth by fluctuating markets, a degree from USJ would offer entrée to a professional and hopefully remunerative career. For non-elites, the collèges appeared to hold the key to social mobility through the attainment of new knowledge, a relatively democratic basis for status and wealth compared to an older social order in which these were contingent on land and last name. Not surprisingly, both elites and non-elites clamored for admission.

Lebanese elites made their requests for admission based on status, knowing that having a "known" (*connu*) last name gave them a leg up, if not certain success, in the process of securing free admission to Catholic secondary schools. Recognizing that her notable family was the strongest claim she had to a bourse for her son, letter writer Nouzha Hobeiche began her letter of 1880-1881 thus: "it will already have been indicated to your excellence," she stated, "that I am from a well known family in Lebanon [*que je suis d'une famille bien connue au Liban*] [...] I strongly desire that [*je desire bien vivement*] that (my son) be brought up in a Catholic collège."<sup>118</sup> Although non-elite boys were unlikely to be admitted to the collèges, the promises made by the new curricula inspired them nevertheless to request admission, which they sometimes did by showcasing their love for France, Catholicism, and French language and culture. As one student wrote: "as I know that you are the refuge of the poor, and as I have studied this language that is the gift [*le bien*] of the universe, [...] and as I have hope for the beneficence of God and of yourselves, I come to throw myself at your feet that you may accept

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<sup>118</sup> CADN 92 PO A 122.

me at any college you like, and that "*le Grand Seigneur*" may repay you." He signed his letter, Fadlallah Hadcouk "de la nation Catholique."<sup>119</sup>

Hadcouk may have received a bourse, although I didn't find his name on any lists for subsequent years. It's more likely that he didn't. His letter demonstrates, however, that Catholic secondary education appeared desirable even to non-elites as a pathway a better life, though the pathways were not designed with them in mind. As French-Catholic education served to uphold an existing social order by socializing and credentialing elite sons while emphasizing piety and obedience at the primary level, it also inspired in some non-elites a *faith* in education as the key to a better future, which brought with it a logic of gradual reformism rather than revolution and revolt. The emergence of this faith spoke to the concerns of a reigning elite who "displayed a certain distrust of the lower classes of their projected nation, were disinclined to mobilize the masses [...and who] believed the local population needed a long period of preparation and education before being able to assume their assigned role as fellow nationals."<sup>120</sup> That this faith in the transformative power of education in fact validated a system that served to reinforce (male) elite privilege might be seen as an example of what Lauren Berlant has called "cruel optimism," i.e., a moment when something you desire [e.g., a belief in education as transformational] actually becomes an obstacle to your flourishing, in part by precluding your identification of the very conditions that make your desire difficult to obtain.<sup>121</sup>

### **The Sunni Muslim Network**

Beirut's Sunni Muslim elites established another network of new institutions that projected education as a path to personal and communal transformation while upholding a

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<sup>119</sup> CADN 92 PO A 122. Hadcouk's is one of tens of similar letters preserved in the CADN archive in Nantes.

<sup>120</sup> Carole Hakim, "Shifting Identities and Representations of the Nation among the Maronite Secular Elite in the Late Ottoman Period," in *From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon*, eds. Thomas Philipp and Christoph Schumann (Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2004), p. 237.

<sup>121</sup> Berlant (2011).

particular gendered and classed vision of social order. The Ottoman government founded schools in Beirut in the 1850s and 60s and began by the 1880s to implement the 1869 Educational Regulation, which had promised to establish provincial educational councils and a network of new secondary (*idadi*) schools comparable to France's lycées.<sup>122</sup> None of these efforts did much to reform education at the primary level, however. In 1878, a group of Sunni Muslim merchants and notables in Beirut founded the Maqasid Islamic Benevolent Society (*Jama' iyyat al-Maqasid al-Khairiyya al-Islamiyya*) to provide primary education for Beirut's Muslims; echoing the importance of girls' education expressed by their Catholic competitors, their first act was to establish two schools for girls.<sup>123</sup> By 1880, there were 450 girls and over 400 boys in Maqasid schools.<sup>124</sup> In 1882, the Maqasid was subsumed into an Ottoman Provincial Educational Council (*ma'arif*) as stipulated by the 1869 Regulation, but Maqasid members continued to lead educational endeavors in the city, for example working with local notable Ahmed Abbas al-Azhari to establish a *Sultaniyya* school (the highest level of Ottoman education) in 1883, which became Beirut's *idadi* in 1887.<sup>125</sup>

Maqasid primary schools were free of charge and funded by *awqaf* (pious foundation)

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<sup>122</sup> The Ottomans founded a military academy (*madrassa askariyya*) in Beirut in 1852 and a secondary school (*rüşdiyye*) in 1861. See Davie in Hauser et. al., eds. (2016), 79; Fakhoury (2013), 40. On the Educational Regulation, see Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and Discipline* (Boston: Brill, 2001), 87-88; Tibawi (1966), 257. The *idadis* were to replace the old secondary schools, the *rüşdiyyes*, which had been deemed ineffective and were to be partially phased out. The 1869 Regulation also stipulated compulsory school attendance and inspection and better teacher training and pay.

<sup>123</sup> As the Maqasid's 1880 pamphlet, *al-Fajr al-Sadiq* [The True Dawn] remarked, "[the Ottoman schools] do not admit children at the elementary level of education. Thus, if the different communities do not prepare their children for admission, they would be deprived of their benefits." *al-Fajr al-Sadiq* (1984, orig. 1880), 12. On the founding of the Maqasid, see *Thamarat al-Funun*, 28 Aug/9 Sept 1878, Issue 181, p. 1; *al-Fajr al-Sadiq* (1984); Schatkowski (1969), Cioeta (1979; 1982), Shebaru (2001), Fakhoury (2013).

<sup>124</sup> *al-Fajr al-Sadiq* (1984), 16-17; another contemporary estimate put the total number of students at 748 (untitled announcement, *Thamarat al-Funun*, 24 Nov/6 Dec 1880, Issue 308, p. 1).

<sup>125</sup> "Alan min Majlis al-Baladiyya Bayrut." *Thamarat al-Funun*, 22 August/4 September 1877, p 3.

revenue and contributions from members and the community.<sup>126</sup> Contributions came not only from the wealthiest but also from middle strata of Beirut society.<sup>127</sup> The students were also likely diverse in terms of class. Some, like ‘Aisha Tabbara and Khazindar Bayhum, were children of Maqasid members and belonged to Beirut's wealthy merchant and notable families.<sup>128</sup> The rapid growth of Maqasid schools--to 800 students in the first four years--suggests that other students came from outside the upper class. What was taught, how, and to whom, however, was dominated by the Maqasid membership, which was drawn from Beirut's Sunni Muslim elite.<sup>129</sup>

The curricula at Maqasid primary schools didn't differ much between boys and girls, although it would have prepared some male students to attend the *Sultaniyya* or other top-tier institutions while girls' education ended at the *rüşdiyye* level. Maqasid schools taught basic reading, the study of Qu'ran, Islamic principles and the unity of God (*‘aqa'id wa tawhid*), writing, and arithmetic, as well as the tools of Arabic rhetoric (*al-sarf wa-l-nahu*) and ethical

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<sup>126</sup> Jamila Ayyoubi, "Jama'iyat al-Maqasid al-Khairiyya al-Islamiyya fi Bayrut" (MA Thesis, American University of Beirut, 1966), 63. These costs were not insignificant: the first year's running costs for the two girls' schools came to 14,281.10 kuruş (142.8 Ottoman lira) and 6,586.20 kuruş (65.86 lira); the boys' school cost 720.25 kuruş (7.2 lira). See *al-Fajr al-Sadiq*, Year Four, reprinted in ‘Assam Shebaru, *Jama'iyat al-Maqasid al-Khairiyya al-Islamiyya fi Beirut, 1290-1321 [1878-2000]*. Bayrut: Dar Musbah al-Fikr, 2001), 425. In its first year, the Society's total revenue from contributions and *awqaf* came to 135,152.20 kuruş (1,351.5 Ottoman lira), a significant sum in a region where 2.5 kilograms of tomatoes cost 3.5 kuruş. See *al-Fajr al-Sadiq*, Year Four in Shebaru (2001). Price of tomatoes from Bkirké Archives, General Budget, *Rumiyya* School, 1902.

<sup>127</sup> Contributions in the first four years ranged from the relatively modest 20 kuruş given by Ahmed Efendi al-Qabbani, to the 450 kuruş donated by the Bayhum family. See *al-Fajr al-Sadiq*, Year 4 in Shebaru (2001). For list of contributions, see Shebaru (2001), pp. 408-425.

<sup>128</sup> Shebaru (2001), 35.

<sup>129</sup> A list of the 25 members in 1878 included well-known wealthy Sunnis like Bashir al-Barbir, Hussein Bayhum, Hadar al-Hoss, Raghīb ‘Azz al-Din, Sa‘id al-Jundi, Sa‘id Tabbara, Taha Nsouli, ‘Abd al-Qadir Sinno, ‘Abd al-Latif Hamada, and many others. The Bayhums, for example, were a branch of the Agharr family, who had been substantial landholders starting in the eighteenth century and held positions in the consultative council (*majlis al-shura*) established by Ibrahim Pasha in the 1830s. The Barbirs rose through the sugar trade with Europe and were able to invest substantial resources in Beirut real estate after about 1850. On the Barbirs, see Fakhoury (2013), 64. Eight out the first 25 members would go on to serve as members of Beirut's municipal council (est. 1882), which represented the top 1% of Beirut society in financial terms (see Hanssen (2004), 70, 150). Service on the municipal council was not well-paid and the ability to stand for election was based on the payment of a property tax, which meant that "only notables whose residence was worth at least 50,000 piastres were eligible candidates." Hanssen (2004), 63-64. Also see Fakhoury (2013); Shebaru (2001); Somel (2001). This elite character persisted into the twentieth century: after the Maqasid was re-established in 1908, it was dominated by two well-known wealthy merchant families, the Salams and the Daouqs. See Michael Johnson, *Class & Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State, 1840-1985* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Ithaca Press, 1986).

cultivation and comportment (*tahdib al-ahlaq wa adab*); for girls, they also offered sewing (*fann al-khiyata*) and embroidery (*tetriz*).<sup>130</sup> The clear segregation between elites and non-elites at the primary level that characterized the Catholic educational network does not seem to have been in evidence among the Sunnis. The question of how class, like gender, influenced social mobility arose at the point of transition between primary and secondary schools. Girls who graduated from the Maqasid schools could pursue further education at home, attend the old-style girls' *rüşdiyye* in Beirut (est. c. 1894), where half the students were on scholarship, or apply to the prestigious secondary schools for girls run by the Catholic Dames de Nazareth, the Protestant Prussian Deaconesses, or the American Protestant Mission.<sup>131</sup> But what about the boys?

Some boys would go on from the Maqasid primary schools to the top-tier Ottoman educational institution in Beirut, al-Azhari's *Sultaniyya* (later the Beirut *idadi*.) Like the Catholic colleges of Antoura and USJ, the *Sultaniyya* trained male students for careers in bureaucracy, trade, or diplomacy and produced practitioners of the new sciences who could go on to medical school in Cairo or Istanbul; it also drew upon educational elements familiar within the Islamic tradition to shore up new claims about Muslim unity under Ottoman rule.<sup>132</sup> The curriculum included French (*francızca*), arithmetic (*hesap*), and writing in Turkish and Arabic alongside the study of the Quran, the art of recitation (*tajweed*), and ethics (*ahlaq*) for Muslim students in Year 1. Geography, english, algebra (*cebiri*), chemistry (*kimya*), natural philosophy (*hükümet-i tabiya*), natural history (*tarih-i tabii*), and engineering (*handese*) were for the upper years.<sup>133</sup> By

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<sup>130</sup> See ‘Abdellatif Fakhoury, *Mohammed ‘Abd ‘allah Bayhum: al-Sarikh al-Maktum* (Dar al-Hadatha li-l-Tib‘a wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi‘a: Beirut, 2008), 57; Yusuf Yazbek, *Awraq Lubnaniyya* (Vol 1: 1955), 142. Some elite Muslim girls might have gone on to attend Protestant schools run by the Prussian Deaconesses or the American Protestants, this practice remained rare until non-sectarian girls schools like the Ahliyya school run by Mary Kassab opened after World War I. See Nadya Sbaiti “Lessons in History: Education and the Formation of National Society in Beirut, Lebanon, 1920-1960s” (Ph.D., Georgetown University, 2008).

<sup>131</sup> A girls' boarding school (*inas rüşdiyye*) is mentioned in the Ottoman yearbook (*Salname*) for 1311-1312 (1894).

<sup>132</sup> The *Sultaniyya* would be joined by another elite college, the *Kulliyya ‘Uthmaniyya*, in 1895.

<sup>133</sup> BoA.YA.RES 21/27 No. 1 [18 Shawwal 1300 (9 August 1899)]. Translated with the help of Secil Yilmaz.

marrying the new arts and sciences with the study of Islamic ethics and Qu'ranic recitation, the Ottoman curriculum emphasized its links with its Muslim population and drew on established practices of Islamic education to create a cadre of male Ottoman business and statesmen prepared for a new age but still deeply loyal to the state.<sup>134</sup> This loyalty to the state, on religious grounds or otherwise, was one important aspect of the social order the *Sultaniyya* strove to uphold.

Top-tier Ottoman schools in Beirut, as elsewhere, were set up to allow for limited social mobility, allowing a few exceptional students to join those who already had money and power on the path to lucrative administrative, medical, or business careers.<sup>135</sup> This limited social mobility may have helped to stabilize an Ottoman social order in which loyal elites, new and old, would govern provincial administration. At first, Istanbul made broad promises to open top-tier education to all deserving boys: according to *Thamarat al-Funun*, the newspaper run by Maqasid founder ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Qabbani, the *Sultaniyya* promised to "welcome students for free from all the classes (*sunuf*) of the people (*ahali*)," agreeing to "accept for free those who completed their primary education in the elementary (*ibtida'i*) schools and secondary (*ruṣḍiyye*) schools and who excelled at their studies and in their morals."<sup>136</sup> However, a report from Istanbul recording the school's construction in 1882 painted a very different picture. The report averred that "this school [the *Sultaniyya*] is funded by the charity of the civil servants working in the school and the people [...] to be able to meet the expenditures of the school, they are trying to raise a tax (*akar*). However, for it to be a boarding school, each male student is charged 2000 kuruş (20

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<sup>134</sup> Somel (2001), Fortna (2002).

<sup>135</sup> On limited social mobility in Ottoman schools elsewhere in the empire, see Somel (2001), Denguilhem in Philipp and Schaebler (1998), Rogan in Philipp and Schumann (2004), Fortna (2002).

<sup>136</sup> Qabbani [?], "al-Ma'arif." *Thamarat al-Funun* 24 Feb/10 March 1890, Issue 774, 2. This accords with the spirit of the Educational Regulation of 1869, which, as Fortna describes, "envisioned a complete, integrated network of schools that would stretch across the length and breadth of the empire and would work as a pyramid to funnel the top students to the capital for specialized training at the advanced level or directly into the scribal service of the central government." See Fortna (2002), 113.



Ottoman lira) according to the current system. The poor community doesn't have the power to meet this (*te'dim*); on the basis of this fact, some of the rich will pay the fees for one or two children."<sup>137</sup> The Sultan himself promised in the same document to fund scholarships to the tune of 20,000 kuruş for 10 "refugees" (*muhacirin*), who may have been children being resettled to Beirut from other provinces as part of an ongoing effort to increase Muslim populations in heterodox areas.<sup>138</sup>

Due to chronic shortages of funds caused by diversions of the 1884 Education Tax revenue meant for Beirut schools to Istanbul, however, we cannot be certain if the Sultan's promise was ever made good. Although half of the revenue raised by the Educational Tax of 1884 was supposedly guaranteed by Istanbul for provincial education, an 1887 report from Ottoman governor in Beirut Raşid Naşid Paşa complained that an outsized proportion of the Educational Tax revenue was going to Istanbul, robbing the province its educational funds.<sup>139</sup> Certainly, the Beirutis' assumptions that the school would be free of charge for everyone who successfully completed the lower levels of Ottoman education appears to have been undermined by the end of the decade. By 1890, *Thamarat al-Funun* was questioning "if the high costs that are collected on behalf of the Education Ministry (*al-Ma'arif*) in the center of the province (*vilayet*) are producing equal benefits to the government (*al-dawla*) and to the people (*al-ahali*)."<sup>140</sup> What's more, *Thamarat* reported, "we know that there is a group of students who pay the known fee [to attend the school] and there is another group that entered for free, which means that they learned and ate on the account of the school." This was a matter of "grave injustice and cheating," since the government had promised to support the education of all students whose

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<sup>137</sup> BoA.YA.RES 21/27 No. 1 [18 Shawwal 1300 (9 August 1899)]. Translated with the help of Secil Yilmaz.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>139</sup> BoA.Y.Mtv 29/48 No. 1 [29 Rebiülevvel 1305 (15 Dec 1887)], quoted in Fortna (2002), 58.

<sup>140</sup> "al-Ma'arif." *Thamarat al-Funun* 24 Feb/10 March 1890, Issue 774, p 2.

scholarship and morality qualified them for the school.<sup>141</sup> As for the local scholarships, *Thamarat al-Funun* suggested in a subsequent article that the Maqasid had succeeded in sending 16 students to the *Sultaniyya* "with the help of the Mutasarrif [governor] Ahmed Neguib Pasha."<sup>142</sup> It's not clear if these students were self-funded or supported by the Maqasid and/or the Ottoman state, or some combination of the three.

Despite the difficulty of assessing routes for non-elite students to access the highest level of Ottoman education in Beirut, there is some evidence that upper-level Ottoman education served as a mechanism for limited social mobility elsewhere in the empire. Ben Fortna recounts, the story of Ali Suavi, who rose "from humble origins through one of the new avenues of social mobility afforded by the state's expansion in the nineteenth century: the public education system."<sup>143</sup> Likewise, Randi Denguilhem has argued that Ottoman schools did widen chances for professional success for families who could afford to send their kids to school in the first place. On the other hand, as Selçuk Akşin Somel has argued, one important function of provincial *idadi* schools was "rais[ing] a local elite familiarized with Ottoman cultural values and with the modernistic notions of order and material progress."<sup>144</sup> Along the same lines, Eugene Rogan has shown that the Maktab 'Anbar, the *idadi* school in Damascus, played a key role in "shaping an elite bound by a common school experience [...] From the frock-coat trousers and fez of their uniforms to the new habits of eating and sleeping communally, the 'Anbar school imparted a distinct socialisation to its students of diverse backgrounds" and imparted to them a distinct language that made them "incomprehensible to all but others educated in the Ottoman

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<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>142</sup> Untitled. *Thamarat al-Funun* 8/19 August 1881, Issue 348, p. 1.

<sup>143</sup> Fortna (2002), p. 105.

<sup>144</sup> Somel (2001), p. 122.

system."<sup>145</sup> While the Beirut *Sultaniyya* likely offered limited social mobility, it also likely participated in the formation and socialization of a new, loyal administrative elite that would serve Istanbul's needs, responding to an Ottoman imperial vision of social order in Beirut.

The curriculum at the Beirut *Sultaniyya* seems to have been devised with this very project of elite socialization in mind. According to a request sent to Istanbul in 1882, the draft curriculum of the *Sultaniyya* included subjects like French (*francızca*), arithmetic (*hesap*), and writing in Turkish and Arabic alongside the study of the Quran, the art of recitation (*tajweed*), and ethics (*ahlaq*) for Muslim students in Year 1. In subsequent years, geography, english, algebra (*cebiri*), chemistry (*kimya*), natural philosophy (*hükümet-i tabiya*), natural history (*tarih-i tabii*), and engineering (*handese*) were added to the curriculum.<sup>146</sup> Like the top-tier Catholic colleges of Antoura, USJ, and Sagesse, then, the *Sultaniyya* appears to have been seeking to train and credential students for careers in bureaucracy, trade, or diplomacy by educating them in Ottoman, Arabic, English and French, or fitting them to become practitioners of some of the new sciences in demand among the upper classes (like engineering and chemistry) that might have allowed students to go on to medical school in Cairo or Istanbul.

Curriculum aside, evidence suggests that the Beirut *Sultaniyya* did enroll many of "the sons of elites."<sup>147</sup> In 1883, the school registered 55 students, many of whom came from important families from around the region: seven came from the Jerusalem-based Husayni family alone, for example, while others hailed from Beirut's other notable families, whether Muslim, Druze, or Christian, or were sons and grandsons of Beirut's Ottoman officials.<sup>148</sup> Despite the government's commitment to free education for those who deserved it, the cost of attending the

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<sup>145</sup> Rogan, "The Political Significance of an Ottoman Education," in Philipp and Schaebler (2004), p. 86. Quoted in Fortna (2002), p. 149.

<sup>146</sup> [BoA.YA.RES 21/27 No. 1 \[18 Shawwal 1300 \(9 August 1899\)\]](#). Translated with the help of Secil Yilmaz.

<sup>147</sup> Betty Anderson, *The American University of Beirut: Arab Nationalism and Liberal Education* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), 10.

<sup>148</sup> Hanssen (2005), 174.

*Sultaniyya* was set at 8 Ottoman lira per year, with 15 lira required for board and lodging (bringing the total to even more than the 20 Ottoman lira projected in 1882).<sup>149</sup> Some students, however, seem to have been funded by local elites.<sup>150</sup> Other students might have had more in common with ‘Umar Salih al-Barghouti, the son of a wealthy Jerusalemite family whose father sent him to the *Sultaniyya* in 1907 with not only his yearly boarding fee of 12 gold Ottoman lira, but also 10 lira to cover his travel and expenses and an open invitation to go to his father's friend (a member of the notable Tabbara family) if he needed more cash. In turn, Barghouti seems to have lived quite well as a student in Beirut: he spent nights in the city with his classmates "revelling, watching films or popular dances, or [partaking in] sexual pleasures with a young girl or other matters"—all of the wholesome pleasures available to young Beirutis with money in their pockets.<sup>151</sup>

The *Sultaniyya* was not, however, the only option for continuing education in Ottoman Beirut. In 1887, just as al-Azhari's *Sultaniyya* was being converted into an official Ottoman *idadi*, two men from two of Beirut's other elite Muslim families, Ardati and Da‘uq, were embarking on a very different kind of project.<sup>152</sup> Their aim was to establish a vocational school (*sanayye*) for which they were willing to put up the capital themselves. In 1887, they wrote requesting permission from Istanbul to open a private school by "issu[ing] 1,000 shares in their company; each share will cost 10 lira. They will have 10,000 lira as capital," the request predicted, "and they will establish a private *sanayye* school in Beirut."<sup>153</sup> The two had gone

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<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 175.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, 176.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, 178.

<sup>152</sup> According to French records, both the Ardati and Daouq families were among Beirut's wealthy notables and their business partnership was well-established. A letter from 10 December 1898 recounts that "Ardati and Daouk are important, they have a business of *literie* and one of *horologerie* at Beirut. They also have a factory for *glaces*, a bus line, and many buildings in Beirut." Therefore, the letter concluded, "Dauk [sic] son merits a good line of credit." See CADN 92 PO A 170, Folder: 1898.

<sup>153</sup> [BoA.DH.MKT 1592/ 3 No. 1 \[19 Shaaban 1304 \(21 May 1887\)\]](#).

ahead requesting tools and machinery from Europe.<sup>154</sup> By 1892, the school was open, and women were learning "sewing and tailoring" while men were "trained in the skills of shoe-making, book-binding, goldsmithery, painting, engraving, printing, and other arts and crafts."<sup>155</sup> The school would be revived or reconfigured ten years later in 1902 as a full-fledged Ottoman industrial school.<sup>156</sup>

The *sanayye* school would be one option for the boys who didn't hail from the city's elite classes and weren't lucky enough to receive a possible scholarship to the *Sultaniyya*; it would also enroll girls who wanted or needed to pursue vocational education. This vision of girls' education was a bit different from that proffered by the Maqasid, who had opened their girls' schools immediately after their foundation in 1878 because they had "come to the conclusion that the best way to spread education in our community was by teaching girls how to bring up their children, and helping them to acquire the sciences and skills that they need most."<sup>157</sup> Ardati and Da'ud's vocational school probably spoke to the needs of poor women who wanted to learn new crafts to make a living, among whom we might imagine the many widows and orphans made by the events of 1858-61. The Maqasid's vision, on the other hand, was more similar to that of Catholic elites like the Gemayels and the Hobeikas who underwrote the founding of Jesuit teaching orders in the 1850s, as well as of American Protestants and French missionary orders. All of these educationalists emphasized the link between educating girls and producing educated mothers, a matter of extreme importance given that the process of the new

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<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup> Kassab and Tadmori (2002), 61. Quoted in Hanssen (2005), 247.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, 247.

<sup>157</sup> *al-Fajr al-Sadiq* (1984), 16. As Kalthoum Barbir, one of the Maqasid's earliest students, recounted in an interview in 1955, "the goal of the Maqasid to educate women to be mothers and do good *tarbiya* is not a new phenomenon: that goes back to the middle of the second half of the 19th century when the Maqasid started their first school for girls in Basta Tahta (a neighborhood in central Beirut). I was a student at that time [...]." See Yazbek (1955), 140.

education they theorized began with women, in the home. This was a shared conviction among all of Lebanon's sectarian actors and will be discussed more fully in Chapter 2.

Not unlike the French-Catholic network, then, Beirut's Sunni Muslim elite worked with Ottoman officials to shape curricula and pedagogy for both elites and non-elites to partially uphold a social order erected around hierarchies of gender and class and desirable for the Ottoman state. At the same time, the Sunni notables also purveyed a notion of education as a transformative, almost alchemical tool. The curriculum of the *Sultaniyya* and the promises made about its openness to students from all social backgrounds would have made many feel that the acquisition of new skills and entrance into the white-collar world was within their grasp, likely inspiring a faith in education like that shared by Catholic parents and students. Of course, while the sons of elite families (and perhaps a few scholarship students) did attend the *Sultaniyya*, for most, formal education stopped after primary school. Meanwhile, Sunni notable educators also broadcast the notion of education as a transformative force in public and in the press. As Sunni notable Husayn Bayhum put it on behalf of the Maqasid in a speech he gave in front of Ottoman Governor Midhat Pasha in 1879, "it is not a secret to you that knowledge is the basis of every initiative: it is the reason for the uplift of nations in terms of both their character (*adab*) and their material [wealth]; this is among the axiomatic truths."<sup>158</sup> Unfortunately, in Bayhum's view, "our knowledge is in a lamentable state, and at the lowest degree of backwardsness." He asked,

"Where are the secondary schools (*madaris*) and primary schools (*makatib*)? What are the sciences (*'ulum*) that are studied, and what are the lessons (*durus*) that are taught? How many ways do we have to improve our [ability] to extract the treasures of the land through agriculture (*al-zira'a*), or to transform and perfect the conditions of industry? Based on what will we become experts in trade? What is the condition of the logical (*'aqliyya*), mathematical, natural, and political sciences? They are bad, as it is bad for anyone who loves his homeland to decide that this knowledge is little, rare, and extinct!"<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> "*Khitab Bayhum*" ["Bayhum's Speech"], *Thamarat al-Funun*, 25 June/7 July 1879, Issue 236, pp. 3-4.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*

Bayhum's stirring words show how catastrophic the state of Muslim education in Beirut appeared to this prominent Maqasid member, although he was also perhaps exaggerating as part of an (ultimately successful) bid by the Maqasid to secure Midhat Pasha's support. His speech is also characteristic, however, of the soaring rhetoric that depicted education and pedagogy as the key to transformation—both practical and ethical—in late nineteenth-century Beirut. In the end, then, the educational network driven by the Sunni elite endorsed education as a means to personal and communal transformation, even as its structures mostly served to ensure that elite sons could maintain their families' wealth and social position and that loyal Ottoman administrators schooled in the new sciences would be easy to find. The limited social mobility of the Sunni-Ottoman model may, in fact, have intensified the "cruel optimism" of Lebanese education: as a few exceptional non-elite students progressed into the higher tiers, they proved that education *could* serve as a tool for individual and communal transformation, even if for most, it would not to do so.

### **The Protestant Network**

American Protestants joined the Sunni/Ottoman and French/Maronite networks as educational pioneers in nineteenth-century Lebanon. Unlike their French and Ottoman colleagues, however, American Protestants lacked a group of local elite interlocutors to help shape and administer their educational network. They were therefore less committed to an Ottoman-Lebanese social order based on maintaining a previously-existing social status quo, or to guiding and shaping a limited social mobility that would produce loyalty to the Ottoman state. Protestant educators seem to have welcomed both elites and non-elites into their circle and into their educational institutions: early converts like As'ad al-Shidyah in the 1820s and Butrus al-Bustani in the 1840s came from the ranks of the Mountain's Maronite elite, while other families

who became involved with Protestant education like the ‘Attiyehs from Tripoli or the Baroudis of Beirut seem to have emerged from middle and lower strata. Moreover, the Protestant educational network run by the American Board of Foreign Missions (ABCFM) offered a relatively large degree of social mobility. Their flagship institution, the Syrian Protestant College (SPC) established in Beirut in 1865, educated and credentialled both elites and boys from poor backgrounds to become doctors, lawyers, and journalists.<sup>160</sup> At the same time, however, the Protestant educational network upheld a particular vision of social order based on firm hierarchies between urban and rural, missionary and native, and men and women.

Like the Catholic colleges and the Beirut *Sultaniyya*, the SPC was a training ground for the skills demanded by new professions like medicine, administration, and trade as well as foreign languages and the literary arts. Despite the opposition of the ABCFM Board under Corresponding Secretary Rufus Anderson, who considered education far less important than conversion, Beirut-based American Protestant missionaries became determined in the early 1860s to open an institution for higher education. They hoped to compete with rival missionary orders who were intensifying their efforts after 1860-61 and also to respond to local demands for higher education in secular subjects.<sup>161</sup> According to an early prospectus, the college sought to "enable native youth to obtain *in this country* the literary, scientific and professional education which the exigencies of the community demand."<sup>162</sup> The Prospectus went on to emphasize that the first aim of their education was to "qualify the pupils...to enter at once upon the line of life

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<sup>160</sup> The SPC was renamed the American University of Beirut in 1920.

<sup>161</sup> Tibawi (1967); Marwa ElShakry, "The Gospel Of Science And American Evangelism In Late Ottoman Beirut." *Past and Present*, no. 196 (2007): 173–214; Ellen Fleischmann, "Evangelization or Education: American Protestant Missionaries, the American Board, and the Girls and Women of Syria (1830-1910)." In *New Faith in Ancient Lands: Western Missions in the Middle East in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*. Heleen Van Der Murre, ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2006). Sharp has also argued that this turn towards education came out of developments in Protestant theological thought and practice at home. See Matthew Sharp, "Transformation at the Syrian Protestant College" (MA Thesis, American University of Beirut, 2013).

<sup>162</sup> AUB Archives, 1.6.2 MSS AUB 28 Box 1: SPC Memorabilia, 1861-1901. "Programme and Prospectus of the Native Protestant College Institute of Beirut, Syria" [n.d., probably 1861-62], 1. Emphasis in original.



which they desire."<sup>163</sup> The curriculum developed accordingly, speaking to the demands of local students as well as what was being offered at Antoura and, after 1875, at USJ. Based both on competition with French-speaking USJ and Antoura and on local demand, the SPC changed its language of instruction from Arabic to English in 1879-1880 (at the Medical school, in 1882-83).<sup>164</sup> By 1889, students in the preparatory department at the SPC were taking English, French, Arithmetic, Mathematics, Bible, History, and Geography; at the collegiate level, Anatomy, Chemistry, Zoology, Astrology, Botany, Geology, Moral Philosophy, and Psychology and Logic were also offered. The medical department oversaw a four-year undergraduate curriculum that included Anatomy, Practice of Medicine, Surgery, Hygiene, Geology, Zoology, and Minerology as well as a two-year course in Pharmacy.<sup>165</sup>

Although tuition was comparable to other elite colleges, the SPC made concrete efforts to open its doors to non-elite boys.<sup>166</sup> The 1861 prospectus included stipulations regarding "scholarships for indigent students," noting that "in a land where most of the population are poor—and Protestants especially, sometimes for the very fact of having left their old faith, are generally unable to do much for the support of their sons at the college—unusual efforts are necessary to encourage promising young men to undertake a thorough course of study."<sup>167</sup> The college pledged to arrange teaching jobs, lab work, or "other forms of labor" for "poor and deserving students."<sup>168</sup> These work-study scholarships were definitely available through 1882

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<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>164</sup> Womack (2012), 9; Tibawi (1966), 207.

<sup>165</sup> AUB Catalogue 1889-1890, AUB Archives, accessed online 8.10.2016.

<sup>166</sup> In 1880, tuition was 17 Ottoman lira (1700 kuruş) per annum for preparatory and collegiate students and 22 Ottoman lira (2200 kuruş) for medical and pharmacy. Medical and Pharmacy students coming from the SPC's collegiate department paid 17 Ottoman lira. Numbers are assuming the lowest level of "boarding" privileges, which cost 12 lira, rather than the higher level which cost 25 lira. *SPC Catalogue 1880-81*, AUB Archives.

<sup>167</sup> AUB Archives, 1.6.2 MSS AUB 28 Box 1: SPC Memorabilia, 1861-1901. "Programme and Prospectus of the Native Protestant College Institute of Beirut, Syria" [n.d., probably 1861-62], p. 14.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*

and probably much longer.<sup>169</sup> Attempts to make the SPC accessible to non-elites worked, at least for some: the yearly lists of SPC graduates included children from non-elite as well as elite backgrounds.<sup>170</sup> In 1880-81, for example, the undergraduate students included sons of elite families like the Tabits and the Shihabs alongside students like Jurji Zaydan, the son of a restaurant-owner who lived in a one-room house in downtown Beirut, and his friend Jabr Dumit, who was raised by a single mother in Safita, north of Tripoli. Maria Bashhur Abunassr has emphasized the role of the SPC as a vector for social mobility, particularly for those who also belonged to the Protestant faith, who could take advantage of a dense set of business and educational ties that grew up around the SPC in Ras Beirut in the late nineteenth century and after World War I.<sup>171</sup> Supporting Abunassr's findings are the responses to a circular sent out by then-College President Daniel Bliss in 1888, asking graduates to write back recording their current employment. While many had left Beirut for other cities and towns in Lebanon, Egypt, and greater Syria, the vast majority of the responses came from doctors, teachers, and businessmen. Of course, those who had returned to the land or had suffered a collapse of fortunes might have been less likely to receive the circular or indeed, to write back—but clearly, the SPC education was translating into white-collar employment for many graduates.<sup>172</sup>

Non-elite boys often reached the SPC by attending Protestant primary schools, which were open to children from across the social spectrum and sometimes enabled their students to

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<sup>169</sup> These scholarships are mentioned in an 1874 pamphlet entitled "The Syrian Protestant College" as well as in an 1882 fundraising letter from Henry Jessup asking for contributions to match a 10,000\$ gift to the scholarship fund, suggesting the system lasted some years. See "The Syrian Protestant College," AUB Archives 1.6.2 MSS AUB 28 Box 1: SPC SPC 1861-1901; Henry Jessup, "Scholarship Endowment Fund for the Syrian Protestant College," AUB Archives 1.6.2 MSS AUB 28 Box 3: SPC Memorabilia.

<sup>170</sup> SPC Catalogue, 1880-81. On Zaydan, see Jirji Zaydan and Thomas Philipp, *The Autobiography of Jurji Zaidan: Including Four Letters to His Son* (Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1990). On Dumit, see Abunassr (2013), 139-141. It is also important to note that branches of large Lebanese families may have differed in terms of wealth, and some may even have converted to Protestantism by the 1880s. Thus the names can only be a rough estimate.

<sup>171</sup> Maria Bashhur Abunassr, "The Making of Ras Beirut: A Landscape of Memory for Narratives of Exceptionalism, 1870-1975" (Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2013).

<sup>172</sup> AUB Archives, AA 2.3.1 Daniel Bliss Collection, Responses to 1888 Circular.

go on to preparatory schools like Butrus al-Bustani's *Madrassa Wataniyya* (National School) or the Abeih Seminary, and from there to the SPC.<sup>173</sup> Primary schools were often run by native teachers and were free of charge.<sup>174</sup> The Protestant network expanded their primary educational offerings throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, although not in a linear fashion. According to published statistics retained in the archives at AUB, there were 80 Protestant schools in 1876, 141 in 1888, and 132 in 1899.<sup>175</sup> The number of students also doubled over this period, as the mission counted 3,599 pupils in 1876 and 6,246 in 1899; roughly a third of the students by the end of the decade were girls.<sup>176</sup> Protestant schools sometimes served as conduits for non-elite boys to access the SPC.<sup>177</sup> Boys like Jabr Dumit, Daud Kurban, and Jirjis Khuri al-Makdisi, none of whom came from Lebanon's established elite families, attended Protestant schools in Safita, Marja'yun, and Tripoli. Once identified as "promising" or "bright" by missionaries like Samuel Jessup (in the case of Makdisi) or Lebanese Protestants like Butrus al-Bustani (in the case of Dumit), they entered the SPC's Collegiate department by way of the Abeih Seminary or the SPC's own preparatory school.<sup>178</sup> For each of these boys as well as others, "academic success at village or town mission school, then secondary school, opened doors to the

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<sup>173</sup> This accords with what Norbert Schulz has found, i.e. that "American Protestant primary schools were very similar to other confessions' except that they " provided a venue for social mobility by preparing students to attend SPC [...] For most students, attendance at Protestant schools was merely an instrument to advance their position in society." See Norbert Scholz, "Foreign Education and Indigenous Reaction in Late Ottoman Lebanon: Students and Teachers at the SPC in Beirut" (PhD Diss., Georgetown University, 1997), 55.

<sup>174</sup> Tibawi notes that there was an attempt to make these schools fee-charging in 1859, but it was unsuccessful. See Tibawi (1966), 147.

<sup>175</sup> AUB Archives, 1.6.2 MSS AUB 28 Box 2: SPC Memorabilia, 1861-1901. "Statistics of Evangelical Mission Work in Beirut, 1891: VII. Educational Work." The dip between 1888 and 1899 is probably a result of the constriction of funding from the PCUSA in the 1890s, which Tibawi describes as the worst in the history of the Syria Mission.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.* Again, growth was relatively slow between 1889 and 1899, as the Mission saw an increase of only 74 students over these ten years.

<sup>177</sup> They also allowed non-elite girls to access the top-tier secondary institutions, the Beirut Female Seminary and the Tripoli School for Girls, which were among the most prestigious girls' schools in Lebanon and offered curricula similar to the SPC's preparatory department, including foreign languages as well as scientific subjects like hygiene and astronomy.

<sup>178</sup> Abunnasr (2013), 138-149.

college at Ras Beirut."<sup>179</sup>

However, a distinct hierarchy emerged at the primary level between urban and rural schools, as students from schools in Beirut, Tripoli, Zahle, and Sidon were far more likely to make it to the SPC. The boys' schools in these towns were overseen and funded directly by the Mission and were more likely to host American missionary as well as native teachers.<sup>180</sup> In the words of Henry Jessup, these were the real "rills that fed the college river."<sup>181</sup> Outside of the urban areas, boys had a much smaller chance of advancing through the Protestant educational food chain; as Tibawi has argued, the difference between rural and urban schools was that "most of the pupils in the rural schools were bound to revert to illiteracy after leaving the school and becoming part of their environment. Few of them went to urban schools where achievement of permanent literacy was more assured."<sup>182</sup> Given that the content of education at the rural schools was often entirely based on the Bible, students there were less likely still to encounter the new subjects like bookkeeping or medicine which would facilitate their entry into the white-collar world.<sup>183</sup>

The split between urban and rural (i.e., between the flagship schools and the village primary schools) was not the only form of hierarchy created and propagated by the American Mission. Not unlike their Maronite and Sunni colleagues, Protestants (whose schools were often in financial difficulty) didn't give up on the hope that their institutions would become favored by Lebanon's wealthy elites. Daniel Bliss, the founder of the SPC, declared himself to be interested

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<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, 138.

<sup>180</sup> The Tripoli Girls' School and Beirut Female Seminary, for example, were run by American headmistresses (Harriet LaGrange and Eliza Everett respectively) and employed various American teachers. They also received regular influxes of Mission cash: in the case of the BFS, they received about \$5,000 about every two months through 1882, in contrast to the roughly \$200 allocated every few months to the primary school in Ras Beirut. See NEST archives, Account Book of Beirut Station 1888-1906; Day Book of Tripoli Station, 1882.

<sup>181</sup> Tibawi (1966), 285.

<sup>182</sup> Tibawi (1966), 240.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*

"in helping the local elite to establish an "advanced" Syrian society."<sup>184</sup> Likewise, one of the Mission's two flagship female secondary schools, the Beirut Female Seminary, offered an education "adapted to the wants of the class most advanced in civilization and refinement."<sup>185</sup> Their Jesuit competitors, indeed, appear to have felt that Protestants were at least partly succeeding in their desire to appeal to elites: according to Jesuit historian Père Coron, the Jesuits became very concerned in the 1870s and 80s that Protestant "influence [was] being felt more and more profoundly on the educated classes of Syria and Lebanon."<sup>186</sup>

Although Protestant institutions were officially open to all, hierarchies based on class would have remained quite apparent to students at the SPC and were formally marked in the daily life of the institution. As the 1884-85 catalogue shows, "general boarders" could pay 12 lira for shared sleeping accommodation and local food in the regular dining room, while wealthy students could get 1/3 of a sleeping room and eat European food at a special table in the dining room for 25 lira. Students willing to pay 50 pounds Sterling (55 Ottoman lira) could occupy a private room, access fuel, lights and washing facilities, and eat European food at a private table.<sup>187</sup> In 1904, the College went farther, deciding to employ poor students as waiters in the dining room.<sup>188</sup> For Anis Makdisi, a 1906 SPC graduate whose fees and tuition were covered by the Mission, it was the more subtle markers of class that were difficult to acquire: in his memoirs, he wrote of "how his personal needs such as more expensive clothing taxed his father's modest income."<sup>189</sup> While Anis went on to teach at the Preparatory School after his graduation, signaling his ascension into the realm of white-collar work, these memories stuck with him long after he left the SPC.

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<sup>184</sup> *The Missionary Herald*, Vol. 59, September 1862, 220. Quoted in Zachs (2005), 12.

<sup>185</sup> Fleischmann (2006), 273.

<sup>186</sup> Coron, *Missionaires de vingt ans*, Aj. Rpo 122. Cited in Zaka (2006), 38.

<sup>187</sup> *SPC Catalogue, 1884-85*, pp. 7-8. Quoted in Scholz (1997), 139.

<sup>188</sup> Scholz (1997), 141.

<sup>189</sup> Makdisi, Anis. Quoted in Abunnasr (2013), 148.

While Protestant education didn't reproduce an existing elite, like the Catholic network, or stabilize and regularize limited forms of social mobility, like the Sunni-Ottoman network, it institutionalized a different pattern of social organizing based around hierarchies of race and gender. The interest in keeping the native native had been a hallmark of Protestant education since the early 1830s; Anderson himself had expressed concerns that Protestant educational projects would denaturalize local Lebanese, imbuing them with customs, habits and desires that would direct them away from the work of converting their brethren.<sup>190</sup> The division between native and Missionary, however, was not merely of instrumental value: it also represented what Makdisi has called "a mid-century American racialist reading of the world."<sup>191</sup> As Christine Lindner has shown, even the receipt of the full slate of American Protestant education didn't upend this hierarchy: while "individual acquisition of Protestant education affected the relationships within the [Protestant] Circle," she argues, it was "in a manner that often reinforced the centrality of the ABCFM male missionaries" themselves.<sup>192</sup>

This hierarchy structured every aspect of Protestant educational policy in Lebanon. Teachers at the SPC were paid far less if they were "native" than if they were American, regardless of their level of education.<sup>193</sup> Yacoub Sarruf and Fares Nimr, two of the College's most distinguished graduates who worked for a short time as "native tutors" there and went on to found the famous scientific-literary digest, *al-Muqtataf*, didn't receive equal pay or equal titles. It was in part this ongoing, systematic racism that caused them to leave the college in 1882, on top of the debate about Darwin that roiled the campus in that year.<sup>194</sup> The divide between native and non-native teachers also reached down to the primary and secondary levels: in Tripoli in 1882,

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<sup>190</sup> Fleischmann (2006), 275.

<sup>191</sup> Makdisi (2009), 209.

<sup>192</sup> Lindner (2009), 152.

<sup>193</sup> Scholz (1997), 326-328.

<sup>194</sup> Scholz (1997), 315-318; Elshakry (2007), 211.

for example, the Mission spent 1,282.25\$ in one month on just the room and board of the headmistress of the Tripoli Girls' School, Harriet LaGrange, compared to 481\$ per month to pay Jabr Dumit (mentioned above) for his services as a teacher. His was a relatively high salary, too: the 1882 books also list several entries for "assistant teacher" at 100\$, perhaps per month or longer.<sup>195</sup> As Tibawi has suggested, the relative poverty of primary and secondary school teachers was even worse outside of the five flagship schools (of which Tripoli was one): when the Mission was forced to close 27 village schools and fire 28 village teachers in 1897 (due to the ongoing financial crisis the PCUSA suffered in the 1890s), the \$1,250 raised by the native Church in Tripoli was enough to reopen all 27 schools—which translates to a total running cost (including teacher salary) of 46.29\$ per school. This pales in comparison to the 5000\$ bimonthly allowance given by the Mission to the Beirut Female Seminary in the 1880s and 90s.<sup>196</sup> What's more, the missionary-native hierarchy wasn't limited only to men: Rahil (Ata) al-Bustani, the wife of leading intellectual and educator Butrus al-Bustani and one of the most respected and highest status women within the Syrian Protestant community, was repeatedly situated in a mother-daughter relationship by the ABCFM missionary women.<sup>197</sup>

Like their Muslim and Catholic contemporaries, the Protestant educational network was structured around a hierarchical separation of genders. On one hand, the Protestants shared their Catholic and Muslim colleagues' sense that girls' education was of the utmost importance.<sup>198</sup> At the same time, however, the Protestant educational network worked hard to uphold a gendered social order. Both native Lebanese and American women were systematically subordinated to

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<sup>195</sup> NEST Archives, Day Book of Tripoli Station, 1882 (see March and October).

<sup>196</sup> NEST Archives, Account Book Beirut Station, 1888-1906.

<sup>197</sup> Lindner (2009), p. 199.

<sup>198</sup> Fleischmann (2006), p. 268. Lindner (2011), Womack (2015).

their male peers and paid less than their male contemporaries.<sup>199</sup> As Lindner has shown, women's standing at the Syrian Station was determined by their relation to male missionaries: they were allowed to join the mission as either wives or single 'assistant' missionaries, but never as fully-fledged missionaries on their own terms.<sup>200</sup> Women were also systematically paid less than men for doing the same work: for example, in 1899, Eliza Everett, who had served as headmistress of the Beirut Female Seminary since 1868, was paid 884\$ monthly, whereas the monthly salaries of SPC Professors Dennis and Van Dyck were 2,428\$ and \$2,834 (respectively). The Beirut Female Seminary (along with the Tripoli Girls' School) represented the highest level of female education in Lebanon; as no women were enrolled or employed at the SPC, they couldn't take advantage of the higher salaries offered at the collegiate level.

The gender hierarchy also extended to Lebanese. While some village schools might educate girls and boys together, gender segregation was a common feature of Protestant education at and above the urban primary level. Girls would attend girls' schools in Zahle, Tripoli, or Beirut, and then if they were particularly lucky or talented, enter the prestigious secondary schools, the Beirut Female Seminary (BFS) or Tripoli Girls' School (TGS).<sup>201</sup> We know very little about curricula at the village schools, which were probably largely based around the reading of religious texts for both boys and girls. At the higher levels, it appears that curricula didn't differ substantially between the Beirut Female Seminary, for example, and the Preparatory Department of the Syrian Protestant College. At the SPC, students took English, French, arithmetic, mathematics, bible, history, and geography. In the early years of the BFS, when it was run by Catherine DeForest, students were taught scripture, moral philosophy,

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<sup>199</sup> Fleischmann (2006), 268. Lindner (2011), 185.

<sup>200</sup> Lindner (2009), 124.

<sup>201</sup> NEST archives, "List of Schools, Teachers, and Diplomas, 1889-1893." Some village schools, like Duma, Barbara, Baaklin, and Suq al-Gharb, are listed once with no specification as to gender of students, suggesting that the school may have taught both boys and girls. Larger villages like Beino and Safita, as well as the urban centers of Beirut, Tripoli, Deir al-Qamar, and Sidon, list both boys' and girls' schools.



english, arabic, arithmetic, geography, and history.<sup>202</sup> After the school was re-established in 1861 independent from the American Board, other subjects appear to have been added, including French and potentially Astronomy (Everett penned a textbook on this subject published in 1875).<sup>203</sup> The focus was on producing good Christian wives and mothers, although as the rest of this dissertation will show and Fleishmann's research on later periods suggests, many students went on to become teachers and writers as well as fulfilling the schools' maternalist intentions.<sup>204</sup> The trajectories of girls and women after preparatory school, however, diverged sharply from their male peers. Until the first decades of the twentieth century and the establishment of the Nursing department at AUB in 1905, women did not continue on beyond the preparatory level. It was also difficult for them to find employment in the lucrative realms of business or commerce that would enrich some of their SPC-educated colleagues. They did, however, go on to become teachers and writers—and to develop important theories about education and pedagogy that will be the focus of subsequent chapters of this dissertation.

This chapter has argued that transformations in the political economy of pedagogy in nineteenth-century Lebanon produced a new concept of *tarbiya* that was an equally plausible language for expressing both ideas about individual and communal self-transformation and desires to justify and stabilize unequal and hierarchical social orders. As elites faced the substantial challenges to the established social, political, and economic order in Beirut and Mt. Lebanon that emerged in the nineteenth century, they joined with missionary actors and Ottoman statesmen to invest, both financially and intellectually, in new networks of educational institutions and in pedagogical thought. In different ways, the three most prominent educational

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<sup>202</sup> Tibawi (1966), 125.

<sup>203</sup> Everett's text is preserved in the NEST archives; an inscription shows it to have been in use in a school in Suq al-Gharb in 1902.

<sup>204</sup> Fleischmann (2006).

networks of nineteenth-century Lebanon advertised a vision of education and cultivation--of *tarbiya* and *ta'lim*--that held the promise of social mobility and communal and individual transformation. At the same time, however, the political economy of pedagogy that these institutions and networks defined meant that educational pathways were never equal to the hopes they inspired. The combination of rapid expansion in primary education and the emergence of new professional and scientific curricula that seemed to offer entry into the white-collar world imbued a broad swath of Lebanese society with a *desire* for education, while the way education worked in practice served mostly to uphold visions of social order dear to local elites and missionary actors. I have suggested, then, that we see educational thought in nineteenth-century Lebanon as a version of what Lauren Berlant has called "cruel optimism," as people's desires for education and their faith in its transformative power may have conscripted them affectively to a technology that actually served to reinforce the relations of power which kept them marginalized and excluded. I therefore suggest that the breadth and particular plasticity of concepts like *tarbiya* and *ta'lim*, and pedagogical thought more broadly, resulted from the political economy of pedagogy in which these ideas were produced. This moment of conceptual emergence lay the groundwork for *tarbiya* to become a key concept for Arab intellectuals and writers at the turn of the century and beyond.

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### **Archives**

AUB	Archives of the American University of Beirut (Nami Jafet Library, Beirut)
BA	Archives of the Maronite Patriarchate (Bkirké, Lebanon)
NEST	Near East School of Theology (Beirut, Lebanon)
ACJL	Archives de la Compagnie de Jésus, Liban (Université de Saint Joseph, Beirut)
ACJV	Archives de la Compagnie de Jésus, Vanves (Paris, France)
MAE	Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, La Corneuve (Paris, France)
CADN	Centre des Archives Diplomatiques Nationales (Nantes, France)
FO	British Foreign Office, accessed at the National Archives (Kew, London)
BoA	Başbakanlık Arşivi (Ottoman Prime Ministry Archives, Istanbul, Turkey)

### **Journals and Newspapers**

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